

Passionate Philosophy:
Amatory Fiction in the Eighteenth-Century Periodical, 1744-1762

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Abstract

This dissertation focuses on the many tales of distressed women found in mid-eighteenth-century British magazines and essay serials. On the one hand, I argue, scenes of “virtue in distress” and amatory fiction more generally demonstrate the increasing commercialization of literature and the rise of the sentimental reader. On the other hand, they reveal the periodical writers’ drive to educate readers both in and through the passions. I propose that two factors complicate the *pathos* of these narratives. In the first place, the periodical form was thought to work against the arousal of vehement passions. In the second place, even if such passions could be raised in the miscellaneous format, there were moral reasons why indolent, distracted periodical readers craving sympathetic identification should not be indulged. Driven by market forces and yet constrained by the unique nature of periodical publication, writers of miscellanies responded with ingenuity to these challenges, crafting and deploying literary depictions of “virtue in distress” that suited this compressed and constrained medium. In part because of the challenges and risks associated with raising powerful feelings on the limited canvas of the periodical, some periodicalists worked to suppress or otherwise complicate the most affecting aspects of their amatory fictions. Others strove to correct the reader’s passions in their operation; and others still called into question, elsewhere in their periodicals, the suitability of a passionate response. All attempted to justify their efforts on aesthetic and/or ethical grounds. Drawing on their knowledge of eighteenth-century aesthetic theory, classical models of rhetoric and composition, and early modern theories of the passions, periodical writers strove to raise useful, calm passions through their fictions—passions in some sense suited to the periodical form—and to suppress vehement, dangerous ones. By examining mid-century periodicals in relation to

broad strands of enlightenment and also classical thought, my thesis uncovers an important proto-disciplinary moment in eighteenth-century Britain, when the fields of psychology, rhetoric, and moral theory were not yet separated. The organization of my study is, with some exceptions, chronological, with sections on Eliza Haywood's *Female Spectator* (1744-46), Samuel Johnson's *Rambler* (1750-52) and *Idler* (1758-60), Christopher Smart's *Student* (1750-51) and *Midwife* (1750-53), John Hawkesworth's *Adventurer* (1752-54), and Oliver Goldsmith's *Citizen of the World* (1760-61). My purpose is not to chart a change over time, but to reveal the innovative ways mid-century periodical writers responded to a set of interrelated questions and concerns: is it possible to import the famously sentimental motif of "virtue in distress" into the miscellany, given the structural limitations of the form; which passions should, ethically speaking, be raised by depictions of distressed women and which suppressed; and what aesthetic and rhetorical resources can be mobilized to convey such depictions effectively to readers and thereby influence their passions?

Acknowledgments

In *The Improvement of the Mind* (1741), Isaac Watts urges readers to consider God’s “secret and supreme method of government,” by which he “can draw you to read such a treatise, or converse with such a person, who may give you more light into some deep subject in an hour, than you could obtain by a month of your own solitary labour” (“General Rules to Obtain Knowledge”). I have been fortunate enough to converse with many such persons while writing this thesis. Special thanks are due to my supervisors, Frans De Bruyn and Sara Landreth, who were indefatigable readers of chapter drafts, and who frequently seemed to know what I was trying to say even when I did not. This thesis would not exist without their constant support, erudite criticism, and great patience. Thanks are also due to April London and Ina Ferris, whose incisive comments at an early stage of the project proved immensely valuable.

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INTRODUCTION

In his *Brief Retrospect of the Eighteenth Century* (1803), the American theologian and historian Samuel Miller reflected on the various forms of cheap ephemera that flooded the English-speaking world over the course of the eighteenth century, ultimately pronouncing that “the eighteenth century may be emphatically called *the age of periodical publications*. In the number of these it so far transcends all preceding times, as to forbid comparison; and their amusing, popular form constitutes a peculiarity in the literary history of the period under consideration, equally signal” (2.246). While a defining feature of the period in a historical sense, this deluge of journals, newspapers, periodical essays, and magazines was not always met with approval. Conflict defined the rise of the English periodical. Eighteenth-century critics frequently labelled serialized miscellanies as low and contemptible works,¹ a sentiment that lingered on into the nineteenth century.²

To periodical contributors and their proponents, however, the form was one of the most useful and even venerable types of literature. In the preface to the tenth volume of the *Gentleman's Magazine* (1740), Samuel Johnson cautioned that readers should “not look upon the humble Compilers of a monthly Chronicle with too much Contempt” due to the historical precedent of such works. With an eye to a subsequent essay penned by Philip Yorke, “On the *Acta Diurna* of the Old Romans,” Johnson reasoned that periodical writers demanded public esteem, in large part because of the illustrious precedent set by their classical counterparts, who

¹ Iona Italia observes that by the mid eighteenth century, in particular, English journalism was associated with “the derivative, hackneyed and commonplace” (*Anxious Employment* 21).

² As the authors of the *British Lady's Magazine* complained in their opening number (1815), “great contempt ... is recently affected for the passing sheet and recurring miscellany” (“Introductory Address” Jan. 1815).

registered “the daily Transactions of the Roman Heroes” (*GM* vol. 10 iii).³ Johnson was not alone in his admiration of the periodical format. Later periodicalists trumpeted the almost utopian potential of serialized miscellanies. James Anderson argued in *The Bee, Or Literary Weekly Intelligencer* (1790-94) that “periodical performances ... though apparently a humble kind of writing, are in effect the most proper means that ever yet have been contrived, for raising human nature to its highest degree of exaltation” (Dec. 23, 1790). Anderson’s claim is both simplistic and grandiose, his point being that periodical writings foster a kind of epistemological feedback loop⁴ and thus encourage the advance of knowledge on a national scale.⁵ When it came to artistic achievement, the prestige of the periodical miscellany was held by some as equally significant. In fact, in *England and the English* (1833), Edward Bulwer-Lytton held up serial publications as the single greatest repository of national literary genius: “It is a great age—we have great literary men—but where are their works? A moment’s reflection gives us a reply to the question: we must seek them not in detached and avowed and standard publications, but in periodical miscellanies” (282). Bulwer’s observation, in the present context, testifies to the determination on the part of eighteenth-century periodical writers and their allies to restructure

³ While Johnson himself is occasionally seen as the author of “On the *Acta Diurna* of the Old Romans,” Markman Ellis (2014) attributes it to Yorke. Johnson is commonly assumed to be the author of the preface to the tenth volume of the *Gentleman’s Magazine*, in part because of his assumption of major editorial duties around this time.

⁴ Jürgen Habermas makes a similar, if somewhat less grandiose, claim when he states in *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1962) that “The periodical articles [of Addison and Steele] were not only made the object of discussion by the public of the coffee houses but were viewed as integral parts of this discussion” (42).

⁵ More moderate and precise praise concerning the utility of the miscellaneous form, in terms of both knowledge formation and the construction of literary history, was advanced by Anderson’s contemporary, Isaac D’Israeli. See Ina Ferris, “Antiquarian Authorship: D’Israeli’s Miscellany of Literary Curiosity and the Question of Secondary Genres” (2006), and April London, “Isaac D’Israeli and Literary History: Opinion, Anecdote, and Secret History in the Early Nineteenth Century” (2005).

and reorient established hierarchies in the literary field and, at least in some respects, their success in doing so.

While authors from Anderson to Bulwer-Lytton tend to treat periodicals *en masse*, conflating newspapers with essay serials and magazines with literary reviews and scholarly journals, the present study focuses on two prominent, perhaps even metonymic, types of eighteenth-century periodical: the magazine and the essay serial (whether free-standing or appearing in magazines or newspapers). Both have received increasing attention of late.⁶ Despite this recent interest in eighteenth-century essay serials and magazines, however, few studies engage with these works in all their diversity. In their pioneering piece, “The Rise of Periodical Studies” (2006), Sean Latham and Robert Scholes complain of a metaphorical “hole in the archive” that has resulted in periodical advertisements, in particular, being all but ignored by contemporary scholarship (520). An even more significant lacuna, and one that has provided the impetus for my own study, is the critical neglect of periodical fiction—what Vicesimus Knox refers to in *Winter Evenings* (1788) as “Little Novels” (1.67)—which tends to be passed over in silence.⁷

This omission, especially when it comes to sentimental or amatory periodical fiction, is striking, considering both the large number of such narratives published in eighteenth-century

⁶ See for example Anthony Pollock’s *Gender and the Fictions of the Public Sphere* (2009), Manushag Powell’s *Performing Authorship in Eighteenth-Century English Periodicals* (2012), Paul Keen’s *Literature, Commerce, and the Spectacle of Modernity* (2012), Richard Squibbs’s *Urban Enlightenment and the Eighteenth-Century Periodical Essay* (2014) and Powell’s and Jennie Batchelor’s collection, *Women’s Periodicals and Print Culture in Britain* (2018).

⁷ Some exceptions include Robert Mayo’s by now classic study, *The English Novel in the Magazine, 1740-1815* (1962), Gillian Hughes, “Fiction in the Magazines” in *English and British Fiction 1750-1820* (2015), and Jenny DiPlacidi’s “‘Full of pretty stories’: Fiction in *The Lady’s Magazine*, 1770-1832” in *Women’s Periodicals and Print Culture in Britain* (2018).

English periodicals and the important roles they played in the larger periodical enterprise. As the editor of *The Trifler* (1795-96) reflected in *Trifler* no. 8, “the chief object of [periodical] writings was to keep the heart free from the approach of avarice and cruelty by the tale of distress, to humanize the mind, or, by some pleasing picture, to render it susceptible of improvement” (Feb. 6, 1796). The *Trifler*’s pronouncement helps contextualize the many “pictures” of distressed women, in particular, that appear in eighteenth-century serials and that constitute the object of this study. It also serves to augment and complicate those studies, including Kathryn Shevelow’s groundbreaking work, *Women and Print Culture: The Construction of Femininity in the Early Periodical* (1990) and Shawn Lisa Maurer’s *Proposing Men: Dialectics of Gender and Class in the Eighteenth-Century English Periodical* (1998), which discuss periodicals (including periodical amatory fiction) primarily from a gender studies perspective.⁸ Sentimental and amatory tales of virtue in distress may indeed reflect, reinforce, or even challenge existing gender constructs, but, as I suggest below, the distressed woman motif was most groundbreaking not in its engagement with gendered norms, but rather in its reshaping of the sentimental literary marketplace and its grappling with philosophical debates about the passions.⁹

⁸ Thus Shevelow writes, “The crusade to educate women to an appropriate level for their domestic role and to guide their conduct within it painted a cautionary portrait: the recurrent image of the unfit mother, the uncompanionable wife, the uneducated, ignorant, and thus fallible female. Her voice was that of the unhappy adulterer or the deceived wife in the *Athenian Mercury* and her variously constructed image appeared with great frequency in the pages of the *Tatler* and *Spectator*. ... In the later publications [of Addison and Steele] ... she became most frequently the reprehensible model against which a ‘correct’ female reader of the periodical was encouraged to regulate her own conduct” (53).

⁹ Anthony Pollock is one critic who hints at the broader significance of periodical tales of distressed women. See particularly his discussion of literary portrayals of prostitutes in *Gender and the Fictions of the Public Sphere*. To Pollock, such tales teach readers to embrace “spectatorial neutrality” and to view real prostitutes from an aesthetic rather than a moral standpoint (61-62, 69-71).

Generally speaking, the prevalence of amatory fiction in eighteenth-century English periodicals reflects the influence of market forces on miscellaneous writers and the increasing commercialization of literature. More specifically, the appearance of such tales in mid-century periodicals, the temporal focus of the present study, reflects the emergence of the sentimental reader, a particular type of consumer seeking emotional arousal. As James Ralph cannily observed in *The Case of Authors by Profession or Trade* (1762),

the sagacious Bookseller feels the Pulse of the Times, and according to the Stroke prescribes; not to cure, but flatter the Disease: As long as the patient continues to swallow, he continues to administer; and on the first Symptom of Nausea, he changes the Dose. Hence the Cessation of all Political Carminatives, and the Introduction of Cantharides, in the Shape of Tales, Novels, Romances, &c. (21)

Ralph's observation was not new. Mid-century periodical writers such as Arthur Murphy were equally aware of the public demand for sentimental or amatory fiction that would raise the passions. In *The Gray's-Inn Journal* (1752-54), for example, Murphy advised writers eager to conform their "compositions to the prevailing taste of the Town" to take up the genre of secret history, a type of literature, he argued, almost guaranteed to appeal to the "favourite Passions of ... Readers" (2.176). Some years later, in *Mirror* no. 101 (1780), a correspondent to Henry Mackenzie's popular periodical reflected that "in books, whether moral or amusing, there are no passages more captivating both to the writer and the reader, than those delicate strokes of sentimental morality, which refer our actions to the determination of feeling. In these, the poet, the novel-writer, and the essayist, have always delighted" (3.247).

While periodical writers were undoubtedly influenced by market forces, they frequently justified their publication of pathetic fictions for non-commercial reasons, stressing the didactic or civilizing tendency of such narratives. The editor of *The Hussar*, a periodical paper appearing in *The Weekly Magazine, or Edinburgh Amusement* (1768-79), hints as much, apologetically observing in the opening number, “Did reason constantly maintain her authority, cool sense, and a clear discernment of what is right, would be sufficient to preserve us from errors ... But this is not the case; our passions too often take the lead; fancy stands centinel at the heart, and will scarcely permit a sentiment to pass, that is not clothed in the garb of amusement” (June 22, 1769). The editor makes two assertions, in this case, the first explicit and the second implicit. He clearly states that while periodical writers may like to appeal directly to reason to reform readers, the particular nature of the consumer necessitates a more nuanced, indirect approach geared toward the passions. Sentimental periodical fiction thus functions not merely as a carminative for unthinking readers, but as a metaphorical Trojan Horse, smuggling in wisdom in the guise of entertainment. And yet, implicit in this assertion is the idea that the passions are both ontologically definitive and themselves in need of reformation, being apt to exceed their proper sphere and “too often take the lead.” The Hussar’s pronouncement sheds light on the overall significance of sentimental narratives in mid-century periodicals. Pathetic depictions of female distress were deployed to educate unsuspecting readers on multiple levels, not only in terms of general morality (e.g., the pathos of individual tales driving home a specific moral or life-lesson) but also, more importantly, in terms of the correct function of the passions. In other words, the pathos of sentimental fiction frequently served a heuristic function in mid-century periodicals, readers being encouraged to raise but also monitor, direct, or control their own passions.

A study of mid-century periodical fiction may appear handicapped by the fact that such tales are not always or not necessarily very different from other kinds of eighteenth-century literature. Is Charlotte Lennox's serialized novel, *Harriet and Sophia*, for example, which appeared in *The Lady's Museum* (1760-61), obviously distinguishable from standalone novels by the same author? What about Tobias Smollett's *The Life and Adventures of Sir Launcelot Greaves*, first published in *The British Magazine* (1760-67)? And yet, I argue, the peculiar nature of periodical publication did exert a significant influence on miscellaneous amatory fiction, defining the contours of the depictions of distressed women that played such an important part in it and the specific uses to which such depictions were put (in addition to the more general functions of sentimental periodical fiction listed above). Authorial innovation was driven by the fact that the miscellaneous format was deemed to pose a unique challenge to writers. As the Irish author Hugh Kelly stressed in *Babler* no. 123 (1767), periodical writers laboured under more "inconveniencies" than the public imagined, constantly having to adapt to the constraints of their medium (2.273). Speaking of his own work as an essayist, Kelly writes, "there is scarcely a walk of literature, which is reckoned so easy, or which in fact is so difficult as this species of periodical publication" (2.273). In the introduction to a collection of his own essays, Oliver Goldsmith, Kelly's acquaintance, was more specific: "I would ask whether in a short essay it is not necessary to be superficial? Before we have prepared to enter into the depths of a subject, in the usual forms, we have got to the bottom of our scanty page" (*Collected Works* 3.2). While limited space was undoubtedly problematic, the heterogeneous format of the periodical seemed, for various reasons, even more troubling. To borrow William Cowper's description of

newspapers in *The Task* (1785), periodicals tended to be “a wilderness of strange / But gay confusion,” thus mirroring that “great Babel,” civilization itself (189).¹⁰ Unlike Cowper, who appears to celebrate such heterogeneity in *The Task*, periodicalists like Christopher Smart saw it, at the very least, as a glaring aesthetic flaw, a problem I will return to in chapter two. Periodical editors and compilers repeatedly reminded their readers of both constraints (viz., limited space and extreme heterogeneity) in an attempt to solicit their indulgence.¹¹ When it came to sentimental fiction, whose *raison d’être* was emotive arousal, a pressing question for periodical writers was whether the passions (particularly the strong or vehement passions) *could* be raised in a such a heterogeneous, restricted medium. As I will argue in chapter two, eighteenth-century theorists suspected that both length and uniformity were required from a literary and psychological standpoint to raise the passions to any significant degree.¹² While longer genres

¹⁰ Both sentiments regarding the constraints of periodical publication proved to have surprisingly long life-spans. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, for example, would go on to echo Goldsmith in the twentieth century: “Hastiness and superficiality—these are the psychic diseases of the twentieth century and more than anywhere else these are manifested in the press. In-depth analysis of a problem is anathema to the press; it is contrary to its nature” (*East & West* 53). In the same way, George Steiner could be said to echo Cowper in his discussion of the heterogeneous contents of newspapers: “The journalistic vision sharpens to the point of maximum impact every event, every individual and social configuration; but the honing is uniform. Political enormity and the circus, the leaps of science and those of the athlete, apocalypse and indigestion, are given the same edge. Paradoxically, this monotone of graphic urgency anaesthetizes” (*Real Presences* 27).

¹¹ So repetitive were such reminders that by the turn of the century, the apologetic assertion made by the editors of the *Lady’s Monthly Magazine* (1798-1832) that “the writer of a periodical paper labours under peculiar disadvantages” would have appeared distinctly hackneyed (*The Passions* no. 1, Feb. 1802).

¹² As Sara Landreth points out in “John Dennis and Early Eighteenth-Century Motion Imagery” (2016), contemporary psychological theory held that “Once the passions are set moving, they tend to keep moving in the same direction until meeting with an obstruction” (73). This view posed a serious problem to periodical writers, the fragmentary nature of the miscellaneous form necessitating a start-and-stop method of reading, which in turn was thought to obstruct the course of particular passions.

such as the novel were deemed to be suited to the arousal of strong emotions, therefore, the periodical was not, forcing periodicalists to adapt their amatory tales accordingly.¹³

Though the periodical medium was undoubtedly problematic, poor reading praxis was thought to pose a different kind of challenge to periodical writers, whose works appealed to the commonest of common readers. An anonymous correspondent to the editors of *The Student* (1750-51) put the point bluntly: “consider, Mr. Student, you write for the publick, of which three fourths are *Ignoramuses*” (1.187). What exactly was wrong with such readers? To James Boswell, whose *Hypochondriack* appeared in the *London Magazine* between 1777 and 1783, most readers of periodicals consumed them out of necessity rather than choice, being unable to “fix their attention on any thing more than short essays” (22). Such distracted consumers, to Boswell, were “idle, dissipated or listless,” and, unless reformed by the periodical papers they consumed, were “hardly able to read at all” (22). As the eighteenth century wore on, such unthinking and “dissipated” readers became increasingly associated with circulating libraries. By the nineteenth century, Samuel Taylor Coleridge famously observed in *Biographia Literaria* (1817) that

as to the devotees of the circulating libraries, I dare not compliment their *pass-time*, or rather *kill-time*, with the name of *reading*. Call it rather a sort of beggarly daydreaming, during which the mind of the dreamer furnishes for itself nothing but laziness and a little mawkish sensibility; while the whole materiel and imagery of the doze is supplied *ab extra*

¹³ For the view that novels are an excellent form with which to raise the passions see *The Eclectic Review* vol. 12 art. II (September 1819): “For the purposes of eloquence, as the vehicle of passion, prose is infinitely more affecting than the most nervous versification; and as to its adaptation to narrative, it would be sufficient to contrast any one of Walter Scott’s metrical tales with either his *Waverley* or his *Old Mortality*, to show how very inferior in point of vividness of effect is poetry, as a style, and, if emotion be all that is wanted to be produced, how great are the disadvantages of verse” (211).

by a sort of mental *camera obscura* manufactured at the printing office, which *pro tempore* fixes and transmits the moving phantasms of one man's delirium, so as to people the barrenness of an hundred other brains afflicted with the same trance or suspension of all common sense and definite purpose. (48)

Coleridge's critique of the passive reception of literary images echoes a similar critique by Oliver Goldsmith in *The Citizen of the World*, one directed specifically toward periodical readers, which I will discuss in detail in chapter four. Eighteenth-century consumers of periodicals, in this case, were not so different from the worst sort of nineteenth-century library "devotee." Whatever the case, mid-century periodical editors, like Coleridge, were deeply suspicious that poor reading praxis was tied to poor ethical practice. When it came to such readers, the pressing question was whether strong passions should be raised—regardless of whether or not they *could* be raised—through periodical amatory fiction. Sentimental readers may seek empathetic identification, in other words, but should they be indulged? Or would the arousal of powerful emotions, particularly in unthinking, uncritical readers have dangerous consequences? A strong current of western philosophy rooted in Stoicism, after all, saw such passions as highly dangerous, as Phillip Fisher demonstrates in *The Vehement Passions* (2002).¹⁴

At the whim of market forces and yet constrained by the unique nature of periodical publication, writers of magazines and essay serials nevertheless responded with ingenuity to these challenges and concerns, fashioning and deploying literary depictions of "virtue in

¹⁴ Fisher stresses both that "Stoicism was at war with the passions [...viewing] them as suffering rooted in false belief" (5) and that "what we might call low-level, everyday Stoicism" infused "all later European culture" (6).

distress” strategically and, effectively speaking, making virtue of necessity. On the one hand, therefore, my project rests on the simple premise that periodical depictions of the female passions indicate market demand. On the other hand, I posit that serialized amatory narratives demonstrate a multifocal, layered attempt on the part of mid-century periodical writers to educate unthinking readers in the passions and to navigate the constraints of the miscellaneous form, with a view to elevating its cultural prestige in the literary field. Because of the various challenges and risks associated with raising powerful feelings through this form, some periodicalists worked to suppress or otherwise complicate the most affecting aspects of their amatory fictions; others to correct the reader’s passions in their operation; and others still to call into question the suitability of a passionate response. All attempted to justify their efforts on aesthetic and/or ethical grounds. More specifically, many periodical writers, drawing on their knowledge of eighteenth-century aesthetic theory, classical models of rhetoric and composition, and early modern theories of the passions, strove to raise useful, calm passions through their miscellaneous fictions—passions in some sense uniquely suited to periodical form—and to suppress vehement, dangerous ones. Occasional humorous and even mocking references in the periodicals to classical authorities, and to those who rely on them,¹⁵ should not disguise the fact that periodical writers tended to be classically educated themselves or closely connected with those who were. Christopher Smart could jokingly refer to the great Roman orator Quintilian as “that admirable Bum-brusher” in *The Student*, for example, but that only served to attest to his knowledge of classical rhetoric (1.285). Something similar can be said for each of the periodicalists included in this study. By

¹⁵ See for example the bumbling Mr. Profound in *Gray’s-Inn Journal* no. 78, who exhibits a profound, albeit ludicrous, reverence for Quintilian in his address to the Robin Hood Society: “Mr. President,—a—I think,—I think,—a—Mr. President,—that you have all been wrong-headed in this Debate;—I believe they [the other members] have not read Quintilian, and of Course have not correct Minds” (2.164-65).

examining mid-century periodicals in relation to broad strands of enlightenment and classical thought, my thesis uncovers an important proto-disciplinary moment in eighteenth-century Britain, when the fields of psychology, rhetoric, and moral theory were not yet separated.

Of course, everything that has been said to this point presupposes that the passions were subject to control and that readers could be taught to command their emotive states. But what was the eighteenth-century view on the question of whether the passions could be controlled, either by reason, the will, or any other faculty? Scholars currently debate the extent to which early modern thinkers saw the passions as volitional, in part because the eighteenth century was a watershed moment in the history of the passions. In her article, “On Being Moved: Sympathy, Mobility, and Narrative Form” (2011), Miranda Burgess argues that early-century thinkers such as Lord Shaftesbury and David Hume stressed the “inescapably contagious form of affective migrancy,” and thus the difficulty of controlling the passions, while late-century theorists such as Adam Smith and William Wordsworth argued the opposite, suggesting that the imagination could provide much needed distance between individuals and thus make sympathy—the transference of emotion—something “individuated and volitional” (297). In his essay, “Uneasy Passions: *The Spectator*’s Divergent Interpretations of Locke’s Theory of Emotion” (2017), Joel Sodano charts a similar tension in *The Spectator*, situating Addison and Steele somewhere between the classical view of the passions as “un-governable, external, extra-rational determinants of the human will” and the decidedly modern perspective, in which “emotional feelings are predicated upon active,

cognitive functions and are, thus, within the subject's realm of responsibility" (451).¹⁶ Both Burgess and Sodano recognize that eighteenth-century perspectives on these questions reflected the classical legacy even as they anticipated the modern trend, making it difficult to locate any coherent, universally accepted theory of the passions in eighteenth-century thought.¹⁷

Significantly, however, even those thinkers who saw the passions as contagions tended to believe they could be reined in, directed, and perhaps even controlled. The question was simply how much effort it took to do so (and how to go about it). To demonstrate this point, a distinction is in order. Like their classical and medieval forebears, eighteenth-century thinkers frequently divided the passions into those operating antecedent to reason and those consequent to it.¹⁸ Those passions activated temporally prior to reason were, in a limited sense, ungovernable. Edmund Burke, for example, argues in the *Philosophical Enquiry* (1757) that pity and terror (*miseratio*/

¹⁶ To Sodano, "The newly modern view [of the passions] retains an element of passivity in the sense that objects of perception engage our capacity to be moved, but subjects can never be merely passive because the patient has some cognitive role to play in how those feelings are registered and the degrees to which they are acted on. Through this lens, early modern thought envisioned a new model of emotion where it is the case that 'passion is not just something experienced passively, but that passionate experiences ... contain in themselves a form of cognition.'" (451).

¹⁷ Daniel Gross argues for a different kind of watershed in the *Secret History of Emotion*, locating it at the turn of the century: "Seventeenth-century political rhetoric ... became a generalized psychology thereafter, and passions that were once overtly rhetorical, such as anger, pride, and humility, now quietly gird the Western system of belief that emotion is hardwired to the human nature we all share equally. Or even more prosaically, one might imagine emotions that were once treated by everybody as externalized forms of currency and worldly investments sucked, as it were, into the brain [in the eighteenth century]" (8).

¹⁸ See for example Thomas Aquinas: "The passions of the soul may stand in a twofold relation to the judgment of reason. First, antecedently: and thus, since they obscure the judgment of reason, on which the goodness of the moral act depends, they diminish the goodness of the act; for it is more praiseworthy to do a work of charity from the judgment of reason than from the mere passion of pity.—In the second place, consequently: and this in two ways. First, by way of redundancy: because, to wit, when the higher part of the soul is intensely moved to anything, the lower part also follows that movement; and thus the passion that results in consequence, in the sensitive appetite, is a sign of the intensity of the will, and so indicates greater moral goodness.—Secondly, by way of choice; when, to wit, a man, by the judgment of his reason, chooses to be affected by a passion in order to work more promptly with the co-operation of the sensitive appetite" (*On Human Nature* 258).

misericordia and *ekplēxis*, respectively, in the classical tradition) are raised “antecedent to any reasoning, by an instinct that works us to its own purposes, without our concurrence” (46). Lord Kames agrees in *The Elements of Criticism* (1762), suggesting that the qualities of courage and benevolence make us “instantaneously feel pleasant emotions, *without the slightest act of reflection*” (1.34; my emphasis). James Beattie advances a similar position, proposing a thought experiment in which a sudden agitation in the street causes him to rush to his window to see it: “the scene before me is the first thing that engages my attention; and is in itself so interesting, that for a moment or two I look at it in silence and wonder. By and by, when I get time for reflection, I begin to inquire into the cause of all this tumult” (104). To such thinkers, passions—or in Kames’s case, emotions, internal agitations of the soul preceding desire—frequently strike first, while reflection and attention emerge much later. The passions were thought to operate in this way because of their dependence on the imagination, specifically those imaginative projections that were brought before the eyes of individuals, whether in real life or through various art forms.¹⁹ According to Murphy,

Our Passions are involuntary, and are nothing else than the Impressions which external

Objects usually make upon the human Imagination, from the Operations of which we feel

¹⁹ For more on the connection between emotion and bringing-before-the-eyes (*pro ommatōn poiein* or *enargeia*) see Sara Landreth’s “‘Set His Image in Motion’: John Dennis and Early Eighteenth-Century Motion Imagery” (2016) and Ruth Webb’s “Imagination and the Arousal of the Emotions in Greco-Roman Rhetoric” in *The Passions in Roman Thought and Rhetoric* (1997). For a useful discussion of what Kames describes as “ideal presence” in painting see Aaron Hill and William Popple’s *Prompter* no. 49: “To have some celebrated Action, express’d with so much Force, that we see Dignity, or Grief, Terror, or Love, according to the Circumstances of the Story, and are moved as strongly, as if the Persons represented were actually in Being, and before our Eyes:—To see a stabbed Lucretia, or a dying Cleopatra, an exposed Andromeda, or a forsaken Ariadne:—To see an irritated Sea, and a Vessel struggling with the over-pouring Wave, or splitting on a Rock, while Horror and Despair strike from the ghastly Looks of the drowning Mariners:—It is no longer a dumb Entertainment to the *Eye*, but a *speaking* Image to the Mind, that awakens every Sentiment and Power in it, and hurries the Beholder, by an imperceptible Violence, thro’ every Passion represented on the *now living* Canvas” (108).

those sundry Emotions which are Incitements to spur us on from Theory to Practice, and which disclose themselves in our Actions, and are thence known to belong to the amiable Train of Benevolence, or to be of the hateful Family of Selfishness and Ill-nature. (*Gray's-Inn Journal* 1.267)

Of course, not all passions were thought to precede reason. For example, while the philosopher Francis Hutcheson describes a variety of appetites or “uneasy Sensations” that are “previous to any opinion” (69), he situates them alongside more pure or “spiritual” affections that “arise necessarily from a rational Apprehension of Good or Evil” (51). He also distinguishes the grosser appetites from more publicly-minded, and at least potentially reasonable passions such as love and pity. Aaron Hill and William Popple make a similar distinction between pre-reflective and post-reflective passions in *The Prompter* (1734-36). In *Prompter* no. 63, an essay on romantic love, the eidolon observes that

It is a mistaken Notion of the Fair Sex, that arises from their not understanding the Nature of the Passion, as well as the Sensation of it, which prefers the tumultuous, violent, and strong Impressions of Love, to the more calm, tender, and serene ones: They think any Sentiment that seems involuntary, and out of our Power not to feel, more true and genuine, than a Sentiment formed upon Principle, and born from Reflection. (137)

Notably, in this case, it is a single passion or sentiment whose various forms exist in opposition: a violent or vehement kind of love preceding reflection (described in *Prompter* no. 5 as a

“passive impression”) and a calm kind raised by contemplation (described in the same essay as an “active sentiment”) (21).²⁰

Crucially for the present project, even those passions that precede reason were thought to be subject to its influence, something I discuss in detail in chapter three. The reflective faculty, in other words, was understood to have an indirect power over the passions by monitoring and controlling the raw materials (ideas, perceptions, images) that contribute to their arousal. As Isaac Watts states in *The Doctrine of the Passions* (1732), “we cannot stir up and suppress these Ferments of animal Nature by a sovereign Act of Volition when we please. But it may be done by the Consideration of Truth: For ... the Passions are raised by Perceptions of the Mind” (98).²¹ Thus, while some passions exist antecedent to reason, they were not thereby deemed incapable of control. Periodical readers whose passions were raised through amatory fiction, in particular, could therefore be expected to control their affective responses, however involuntary such responses may at first glance appear. As Hill and Popple suggest in *Prompter* no. 11, it is not true that a “perpetual Succession of Objects, fill the Mind with a perpetual Succession of involuntary Passions” for the mind has a “Sense ... of its own Desires” and can thereby form a “Scheme for its own Happiness” (32-33).

²⁰ Hill and Popple thus echo Aquinas, who distinguished between anger coming “before a judgment” and anger coming “after a rational judgment,” going on to argue that while the former was “bad” the latter could be distinctly “useful” (*Breviary* 61).

²¹ Hutcheson implies much the same, suggesting that while human appetites and passions frequently operate “previous to any Opinion, yet our very Appetites may be strengthened or weakened, and variously alter’d by Opinion, or Associations of Ideas” (94).

Chronology determines the organization of chapters in this study. The purpose of this study, however, is not to chart a single path of change over time, but rather to explore the various ways periodical writers responded to the same, often interrelated, set of questions and concerns, whether formal/generic (is it possible to translate the famously sentimental motif of “virtue in distress” into the mid-century miscellany given its structural limitations?); moral/ethical (what kinds of passions should be raised by depictions of distressed women?); or aesthetic/rhetorical (how can depictions of such women be brought before the eyes of readers and thereby influence their passions?).

Chapter one explores Eliza Haywood’s use of the distressed woman motif in her groundbreaking periodical, *The Female Spectator* (1744-46). Amatory fiction makes up nearly half of Haywood’s miscellany and provides a kind of heuristic education in terms of the passions. Tales of distressed women are deployed particularly to foster anger, love, and compassion in the reader. As I go on to argue, however, Haywood follows in the footsteps of the influential eighteenth-century philosopher Francis Hutcheson by ultimately encouraging the limiting of particular, vehement passions—whether tender social passions like love or violent selfish passions such as anger—in favour of what Hutcheson calls universal calm benevolence. *The Female Spectator* facilitates this process, I suggest, through a gradual drop-off in amatory fiction over the course of the periodical, as well as through the repeated advocacy of reason and reflection over imagination. Even more significant in this regard is the eidolon’s persistent defence of a quasi-Stoical ethos, whereby a detachment from externals enables the suppression of strong passions. Significantly, by encouraging universal calm benevolence, Haywood both justifies and promotes her own project: on the one hand, universal calm benevolence legitimizes

the eidolon's foray into the literary marketplace; on the other hand, it turns mere consumers into literary collaborators, periodical readers demonstrating their benevolence by corresponding with the eidolon.

My second chapter surveys two periodical writers who, like Haywood, incorporate narratives of distressed women in their periodicals, but who suppress or otherwise complicate the most affecting elements of these tales. In *The Rambler* (1750-52) and *The Idler* (1758-60), Samuel Johnson includes such narratives but attempts to diminish their emotive power by focusing on unparticularized character types, privileging bare description, and disguising the emotions of his distressed heroines. Christopher Smart appears to do the same in *The Student* (1750-51) and *The Midwife* (1750-53), surrounding obviously pathetic depictions of distressed women with comic parodies. While Johnson's muted portrayals of distressed women reflect his belief that the passions cannot be raised in short, miscellaneous pieces, Smart's juxtaposition of sentimental and comic-parodic pieces turns out to stem from a different kind of anxiety over the periodical form. To Smart, magazines and other miscellanies require careful organization and systemization to counter their inherently fractured nature. While maintaining the pleasing variety of such productions, therefore, Smart works to foster a sense of unity in diversity—or *concordia discors*—by returning to the same *topoi* again and again, albeit in various ways and forms. Although complicating or limiting the pathos of sentimental tales of virtue in distress, therefore, Smart's parodies do not imply a critique of obviously pathetic tales, but instead reflect his desire to overcome a key weakness of the periodical format.

The third chapter of my thesis focuses on the periodical writings of John Hawkesworth, a neglected figure today but a well-known and highly-respected writer in the eighteenth century.

Hawkesworth demonstrates a pronounced interest in raising readers' passions in his popular *Adventurer* periodical (1752-54), deploying numerous tragic tales of amatory distress to do so. His inclusion of these narratives, I argue, was part of a calculated strategy to fix the wandering attention of the distracted periodical reader and to ensure that precepts advanced in individual tales would be recalled by readers. Even as Hawkesworth works to raise his readers' passions, however, he challenges those who uncritically indulge their appetite for such fictions, insisting that the pity elicited by pathetic narratives is not as benevolent as it may seem. Hawkesworth's distrust of Lord Shaftesbury's philosophy in particular and deism in general helps explain his all-out assault on pity. That said, Hawkesworth's critique does not imply a condemnation of all passion *per se*, or even a repudiation of passionate fictions. Rather, it serves to encourage a habit of meta-reflection in readers, prompting them to question the morality of their initial, passionate responses to sentimental phenomena, and to obey the dictates of conscience.

In my fourth and final chapter, I examine the periodical writings of Oliver Goldsmith, paying particular attention to his popular *Citizen of the World* series (1760-61). This chapter focuses on two interrelated aspects of *The Citizen*: its broad critique of the romance tradition and its inclusion of a frame narrative revolving around the Man in Black's unfortunate niece, Zelis. Goldsmith is deeply critical of the way works of romance function as images or pictures. As literary *tableau*, romances threaten to hijack the reasoning faculty by appealing to what Goldsmith defines as the passive imagination, a mental process and/or faculty resembling a dream state. To counteract such "dreamy" reading, I argue, Goldsmith re-writes the romance tradition by including a narrative within *The Citizen* that appeals to the active rather than the passive imagination. An absence of fully-formed literary images forces readers to imagine Zelis

for themselves, which in turn encourages critical distance as well as affective responses that are both controlled and reasonable. Specifically, I argue that the idea of Zelis in *The Citizen* is designed to facilitate the arousal of pity and curiosity, two passions that tend toward the calm and superficial (or fleeting). I ultimately show that Goldsmith's attempt to raise these passions through pseudo-romance in *The Citizen* reflects his underlying suspicion of the periodical reader. Such readers, to Goldsmith, were incapable of responding to reason and could only be reached through the passions. And yet, Goldsmith offsets this rather gloomy prospect by stressing the important role of the passions in the advancement of human knowledge. It is in this light that Goldsmith's attempt to raise and regulate particular passions through the agency of the mediating, active imagination should be seen. Rather than merely derivative, the Zelis narrative functions as a training ground in which readers may learn to deploy their passions for valuable purposes.

CHAPTER ONE

Eliza Haywood, Francis Hutcheson, and the Stoic Heritage: Calming the Vehement Passions in *The Female Spectator*

Eliza Haywood's first major foray as a writer of periodical essays was anything but conventional. *The Female Spectator* (1744-46) stands out as one of the first periodicals written "both by and for women" (Sitter 122) and is markedly distinct from its forebear, *The Spectator* (1711-1712) of Joseph Addison and Richard Steele, in terms of both content and form. Of particular note, Haywood's essay serial has a pronounced fictional bent: by some counts, short, amatory narratives make up over half of the periodical (Shevelov, "Re-Writing" 25).

Reminiscent of Haywood's early novels, these tales tend to revolve around "the encounter of vulnerable female and opportunistic male" and frequently end in the betrayal and abandonment of the female protagonist (King, "Introduction" 4). While not nearly as erotic or "warm" as Haywood's early works, I suggest that these narratives are nevertheless calculated to arouse readers' passions. I also argue that the passionate nature of Haywood's periodical fictions should not necessarily be seen as secondary to their professed moral/didactic aim: the pathos pervading a narrative on the practicality of bearing with domestic abuse, for example, serves multiple purposes, only one of which is to convey the moral of the story. This chapter examines how these tales provide a form of heuristic education, inviting readers to exercise, interrogate, and correct their own emotional responses.

Indeed, while the passions at times come under fire in *The Female Spectator*, Haywood, in line with contemporary theoretical trends, sees them as an essential part of human nature, which explains her willingness to raise even the most violent, selfish states of feeling. As the

influential philosopher Francis Hutcheson argued, all passions, including selfish ones, “are necessary to such Natures as we are” (44), and, “when our *Opinions* are true,” are “calculated for good, either publick or private” (72).²² It is not surprising, therefore, that Haywood works to elicit her readers’ anger and desire for revenge through her amatory fiction, at the same time as she reveals her characters’ motives for action, thus giving the impression that such passions are founded on correct opinions and therefore justified. As social passions like love and compassion were generally thought to be more beneficial to the individual and to society than selfish ones, Haywood also works to raise these passions in her readers, particularly by charting the sad demise of innocent women courageously and calmly enduring suffering, often at the hands of near relations. And yet, though the sufferings of such individuals were assumed to raise strong feelings of pity and love, they were also thought to elicit “Dissatisfaction with the Administration of the World” (Hutcheson 57). This explains Haywood’s tendency to stress the hidden workings of divine providence in these tales, and, with some important exceptions, to work toward poetic justice. More importantly, it sheds light on her inclusion of alternate narratives that follow the basic plotting of Aristotelian tragedy, wherein the tragic flaw of a generally good character has sad consequences. Such narratives were believed to raise strong emotions of pity and fear, but also, crucially, to function as an effective alternative to more formal theodicies, effectively justifying the ways of God to man (Hutcheson 60).

While Haywood does work to raise readers’ passions, both selfish and social, I suggest that she follows in Hutcheson’s footsteps by ultimately encouraging the limiting of *all* particular

²² Critics such as Rebecca Tierney-Hynes have argued that Haywood was familiar with seventeenth- and eighteenth-century theories of the passions, including those advanced by philosophers such as Hutcheson, Hobbes, and Locke.

vehement passions (“strong, coarse, or violent states” of feeling, to borrow Philip Fisher’s phrase (18), including anger and certain species of love) in favour of universal calm benevolence—a state of mind wherein one rationally desires the good of “the more abstracted or general Community, such as a *Species* or System” (Hutcheson 31). *The Female Spectator* facilitates this process, I argue, through a gradual drop-off in its amatory fiction over the course of the periodical—a kind of enforced *catharsis*, wherein an absence of passion-inducing material clears the way to mental equilibrium—as well as through the repeated privileging of reason, reflection, and contemplation over imagination. Perhaps the clearest indicator of this tendency is the eidolon’s persistent defence of a quasi-Stoic ethos, through which a detachment from externals enables the suppression of all strong passions. Haywood’s essay serial thus facilitates a kind of “progress through the passions”: readers are encouraged to raise, but ultimately restrain, particular vehement passions in order to achieve the goal of general calm benevolence.

Interestingly, Haywood’s proposed turn from particular vehement passions to universal calm benevolence corresponds with a similar progression from reading to writing. Like the eidolon herself, subscribers were invited to rise above the world of fashionable diversions and to work toward “the Good of Society in general,” primarily through the medium of print (*FS* 3.303). One practical way of doing so involved corresponding with the eidolon and sharing acquired knowledge, something proponents of the periodical miscellany pointed to when championing the form’s almost utopian potential. By encouraging general calm benevolence, therefore, Haywood strategically furthers her own periodical project—mere consumers becoming literary collaborators and thus, indirectly, “agents of enlightenment”—at the same time as she reinforces *The Female Spectator*’s claim to legitimacy. It is universal benevolence, after all, that

turns consumers into correspondents. More importantly, it is universal benevolence, rather than crude materialism, that fuels the eidolon's foray into the literary marketplace.

Haywood's knowledge of the passions was notorious by eighteenth-century standards. She was thought to equal any of the great artists of the age in her ability to depict them. As David E. Baker (1764) famously stated of Haywood's early fictions, "where the stories have been of her own creation ... she has given proofs of great inventive powers, and a perfect knowledge of the affections of the human heart" (635).²³ Notably, while the passion Haywood interrogates in her early fiction tends to be concupiscent love, her later works expand in scope. Rebecca Tierney-Hynes maintains that Haywood's "early concern to explore love in particular ... gives way, in her later fictions, to a concern with examining the passions more generally" ("Fictional Mechanics" 154). Indicative of this shift is Haywood's late novel *The Adventures of Natura; or, Life's Progress Through the Passions* (1748), which aims to reveal "the secret springs that give [people] motion" (3), and which ultimately concludes that a whole host of passions, including joy, sorrow, hope, fear, avarice, anger, revenge, ambition, jealousy, and pride—not to mention love—function as "powerful abettors" if not the "sole authors of all human actions" (5). On the surface, such a shift may imply a disjunction between Haywood's early and late works. It is important to stress, however, that while Haywood's focus changed over time, her fascination with passion in general, and with the effects of the passions on human behaviour, did not.

²³ Compare Baker's assessment of Haywood with the depiction of William Hogarth found in *The Encyclopedia Perthensis* (1816): "The passions he thoroughly understood, and all the effects which they produce in every part of the human frame" (s.v. "Hogarth").

Haywood's knowledge of the passions was believed to be rivalled only by her ability to raise them. This is particularly true of her earliest works. After all, it was in reference to novels such as *Love in Excess* that James Sterling (1725) bestowed the title of "Great Arbitress of Passion" on Haywood, comparing her powerful influence on readers to that of God on creation: "You sit like Heav'n's bright Minister on High, / Command the throbbing Breast, and watry Eye, / And as our captive Spirits ebb and flow, / Smile at the Tempests you have rais'd below" ("To Mrs. Eliza Haywood on her Writings"). Sterling analyzes Haywood's passionate fictions perceptively, focusing on two key aspects of her novels—image and language—and suggesting that Haywood deploys both strategically: "Proportion'd to the Image, Language swells, / Both leave the Mind suspended, which excels." While Sterling's poem functions more on the level of panegyrical puff than critical analysis, modern critics tend to agree that Haywood's early novels are carefully designed to raise readers' strongest passions.²⁴ As Jonathan Kramnick observes of *Love in Excess* (1719) and *Fantomina* (1725), "few writers of the period are more extravagant than Haywood in their language of passionate feeling" (*Actions and Objects* 19). Such assessments are undoubtedly true, though this is yet another instance in which there is no need to see Haywood's early and late works as inherently different. In other words, there is no need to suppose that Haywood stopped eliciting readers' emotions at some point in the early 1730s,

²⁴ One of Haywood's most prominent modern commentators, Kathryn King, has focused on this "swelling" quality of Haywood's prose to prove her knowledge of contemporary theories of the sublime: "The notoriously exclamatory nature of Haywood's prose style, its melting and swelling tendency ... may be seen ... as an attempt to translate into amatory fiction the effects of 'the sublime,' to represent the transporting effects of love in the medium of prose fiction" ("New Contexts" 265).

though, as already noted, she may be said to have changed course over time, and, more specifically, to have come to facilitate the arousal of different passions for different purposes.²⁵

As Haywood's interest in writing the passions is visible throughout her oeuvre, it is not surprising that her first major foray as a writer of periodical essays is as deeply and explicitly concerned with the passions as any of her other works. Much like *The Spectator* before it, *The Female Spectator*'s *raison d'être* is generally "the Improvement of ... Morals and a due regulating [of] the Conduct," but, as one correspondent reminds the eidolon, in order to succeed in such an undertaking "there is an absolute Necessity to begin with the Passions" (2.323). The eidolon concurs, elsewhere claiming that the fundamental purpose of *The Female Spectator* is to "see into the secret Springs which gave rise to the Actions I had either heard, or been Witness of—to judge of the various Passions of the human Mind, and distinguish the imperceptible Degrees by which they become masters of the Heart, and attain the Dominion over Reason" (2.18). Such a bold undertaking obviously demands a sophisticated knowledge of the passions, and of contemporary debates regarding their function, something that Haywood demonstrates in part by emphasizing their centrality in human nature. As Ephraim Chambers observes in his *Cyclopædia* (1728), "considering the good and wise Purposes the *Passions* serve, and that absolute Necessity they are of; 'tis surprizing that it shou'd ever be doubted, that they are essential to human Nature" (s.v. "Passion" 2.759).²⁶ In what follows, I will emphasize three broad tendencies that

²⁵ Earla Wilputte is one critic who sees continuity between Haywood's early and late fictions in this regard: "Haywood progresses in her career from depictions of love in excess to the more 'quotidian passions' in her late novels. What remains constant is her interest in a language that ensures not only sympathetic comprehension of the passions but an epistemological understanding of passionate subjectivity" (194).

²⁶ As Alan McKenzie stresses, "for the writers of the eighteenth century, the passions constituted an inherent and essential component of human nature" (19).

drive home Haywood's familiarity with, and debt to, contemporary philosophical debates concerning the passions. Doing so will provide a solid foundation for the entire chapter, which rests on the premise that Haywood's knowledge of such debates in *The Female Spectator* is both sophisticated and wide-ranging.

Haywood and the Passions: Theory and Praxis

In the first place, Haywood, like many of her contemporaries, maintains the existence of basic or fundamental passions and thus operates on the assumption that there is a "genealogy" or hierarchy of the passions. In his discussion of early modern theories of the passions, Adrian Johns explains that "Admiration was [thought to be] the primary of all passions" and curiosity the "second passion" (402). According to Johns, "typical genealogies then went on to recognize five more simple varieties of passion: love and hatred, desire, and joy and grief. All others were best regarded as compounds or species of these" (402).²⁷ In *The Female Spectator*, Haywood appears to be aware of this and similar formulas, even as she subtly qualifies them: thus, in the second half of the periodical, the eidolon suggests that curiosity, rather than admiration, "is the first and most natural Passion of the Human Soul: we begin no sooner to think than we discover an Eagerness of Knowledge" (3.81). At times, Haywood appears to depart from this hierarchy, as

²⁷ Thomas Dixon stresses that "there has never been any consensus about the number of passions or emotions, nor about the number of 'basic' or 'principal' passions or emotions. Descartes lists forty-one passions, Hobbes forty-six, Spinoza forty-eight and Hume about twenty. ... some, such as Augustine, have sought to reduce all the passions and affections to forms of a single movement—love; others have suggested a longer list of four, five or more basic passions or emotions (Aquinas suggested both four and eleven as possibilities)" (19). Dixon's list could be expanded to include Malebranche, who argues for six primary passions, and Zeno, who argues for four (Hutcheson 69-70). Significantly, Haywood's acquaintance Aaron Hill maintains the existence of "ten strong-mark'd passions" in his *Essay on the Art of Acting* (1753): "Joy, Grief, Fear, Anger, Pity, Scorn, and Hate, / Wonder, Shame, Jealousy, and Love's soft weight" (qtd. in McKenzie 11).

when the eidolon states that “Hope and Fear,” rather than curiosity, “are the first Passions that agitate the human Mind” (2.323). Still, this is not as significant a departure as it may seem. Hope and fear frequently function as basic or generic passions in eighteenth-century fiction²⁸; and even in more explicitly philosophical texts they have a special significance, suggesting the early modern tendency not only to systematize the passions but also to divide them into “a list of opposites” (Fisher 32). Chambers states that “all the *Passions* may be reduced to *Love* and *Hatred*; of which *Joy* and *Sorrow*, *Hope* and *Fear*, are only so many Modifications, or Complexions, according to the various Appearances, Positions, &c. of the Object” (*Cyclopædia* s.v. “Passion” 2.759). Hutcheson agrees, seeing hope and fear as key combinations of fundamental passions, if not fundamental passions themselves (66).²⁹

In the second place, Haywood works on the assumption that there are two relatively stable groups of passions: on the one hand, violent selfish passions; on the other, tender social ones. Passions in the former category are both dangerous and morally dubious: to Haywood’s eidolon, “Ambition, Lust, and Avarice” are “ill Passions” that “pervert the beauteous Order of Nature” (3.87); “Avarice, Ambition, Luxury and Pride” are “destructive Passions” and “the very Tyrants of the Mind” (2.115-16); “Pride, Luxury, Ambition, and Revenge” are “wicked Passions” that “make a terrible Havoc of the nobler Propensities” (3.395); and “*Ambition*, *Avarice*, and

²⁸ See, for example, the Stoic philosopher in Samuel Johnson’s *Rasselas* (1759), who preaches “the happiness of those who had obtained the important victory, after which man is no longer the slave of fear, nor the fool of hope ... but walks on calmly through the tumults or the privacies of life” (*Works of Samuel Johnson* 16.72). See also Samuel Richardson’s description of epistolary writing in *Sir Charles Grandison* (1753) as “written to the moment, while the heart is agitated by hopes and fears” (4). In both cases, hope and fear stand in for all the passions.

²⁹ Hutcheson states that “Fear, as far as it is an *Affection*, and not an undesigning Propensity, is ‘a Mixture of *Sorrow* and *Aversion*, when we apprehend the Probability of Evil, or the Loss of Good befalling our selves, or those we love.’” On the other hand, “Hope, if it be any way an *Affection*, and not an *Opinion*, is ‘a Mixture of *Desire* and *Joy*, upon the probability of obtaining Good, and avoiding Evil’” (66).

Revenge” have set “the mighty Men of the Earth a madding” (2.295). Two passions come in for special treatment: jealousy is a particularly “poisonous Passion” (2.349) while pride, unsurprisingly, is “the very worst ... Passion of the Soul” (2.335). Such pronouncements could be said to associate Haywood with a religious tradition exemplified by thinkers such as William Law, who in his *Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life* (1728) describes selfish passions as illnesses, contagions, and poisons. To Law, “pride, envy, ambition and covetousness” (171) are “dropsies and fevers of our minds” (164). When revenge comes in for analysis, he states that “religion forbids all instances of *revenge*” because “all revenge is of the nature of *poison*” (178). Haywood’s critical comments on this group of passions also positions the Female Spectator as a kind of neo-Stoic—one who, in Marcus Aurelius’s words, fights in the “noblest contention, that against the passions” (*Meditations* 79).

I will explore the link between Haywood and Stoic philosophy later in the chapter. For now, it is enough to state that Haywood’s distinction between dangerous selfish passions and beneficial social ones links her to an eighteenth-century tradition of philosophy associated with thinkers such as Hutcheson. In his *Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections* (1728), which exerted a defining and lasting influence on eighteenth-century English theories of the passions, Hutcheson identified the selfish passions as “Ambition, Covetousness, Hunger, Lust, Revenge, Anger” (30).³⁰ Unlike earlier theorists such as Thomas Hobbes, however, Hutcheson opposed the selfish passions with an extensive grouping of distinctly social passions (or affections). Later thinkers would complicate this dichotomy. Lord Kames (1762), for

³⁰ As late as 1802, correspondents to *The Lady’s Monthly Museum*, aiming to ensure their own credibility, and that of their proposed essay series on the passions, promised to “constantly avail [themselves] of the labours of Watts, Hutcheson, Graves, Cogan” (February 1802, 109).

example, would go on to posit the existence of *dis-social* passions alongside the selfish and social, suggesting that when a particular passion such as revenge “flames so high as to have no other aim but the destruction of its object, it is no longer selfish; but, in opposition to a social passion, may be termed dis-social” (1.41). Still, the simple dichotomy of selfish/social passions appealed to many eighteenth-century thinkers, including, in this case, Haywood.

So what are the social passions? In his *Essay on the Passions*, Hutcheson defines “Love, Congratulation, Compassion, natural Affection” as “particular [kind] Affections” (32). Affections and passions are distinct in *The Essay*, but, as Hutcheson observes, the difference between the two is primarily a matter of intensity.³¹ To Hutcheson, social passions could be said to grow out of social affections, and, at times, he conflates terms: “if we have selfish Passions for our own Preservation, we have also *public Passions*, which may engage us into vigorous and laborious Services to Offspring, Friends, Communities, Countries. Compassion will engage us to succour the distressed, even with our private loss or danger” (46). In this case, compassion functions as a passion rather than an affection. Haywood tends to avoid using the term “affection” at all, relying almost exclusively on the word “passion” or even “sentiment” when referring to such publicly-inclined attitudes. Near the close of the periodical, for example, Haywood praises “the softer Passions” and “every generous, or humane Sentiment” (3.272-73). While she only hints at a taxonomy of such passions, there are close similarities between Haywood’s soft passions and Hutcheson’s public affections. Witness Haywood’s tendency to compare these passions with

³¹ To Hutcheson, “When the word *Passion* is imagined to denote any thing different from the *Affections*, it includes, beside the *Desire* or *Aversion*, beside the *calm Joy* upon apprehended Possession of Good, or *Sorrow* from the Loss of it, or from impending Evil, ‘a *confused Sensation* either of Pleasure or Pain, occasioned or attended by some violent bodily Motions, which keeps the Mind much employed upon the present Affair, to the exclusion of every thing else, and prolongs or strengthens the Affection sometimes to such a degree, as to prevent all *deliberate Reasoning* about our Conduct’” (29).

more dangerous, selfish ones. In Book 22, the eidolon contrasts pride and luxury (or love of oneself and “the Pleasures of the World”) with the noble feelings of compassion and affection (3.322); in the same way, the eidolon sets gratitude (“this truly noble Principle”) against “other Passions of a quite different Nature” (2.256). The benefits of the social passions are unquestionable in Haywood’s periodical, as they are in Hutcheson’s treatise: to the Female Spectator, friendship, “the noblest, purest, and most exalted Passion of the Soul” (3.260), is generally positive, and love, “when under the Direction of Reason, harmonizes the Soul, and gives it a gentle, generous Turn” (2.20).³²

The third and final tendency that suggests Haywood’s reliance on contemporary philosophical theory in *The Female Spectator* has to do with her technical vocabulary. For instance, Haywood frequently uses the term “emotion” as distinct from passion in her periodical, a designator that was acquiring new significance in the eighteenth century. Tierney-Hynes notes that “Haywood’s fondness for what was a somewhat unusual term at the time, both in its older sense (inward turbulence) and its newer sense (specific feeling associated with differing circumstances)” illustrates her overarching “commitment to theoretical discussion of the passions” (“Fictional Mechanics” 158). Generally speaking, Haywood tends to use “emotion” in *The Female Spectator* in what Tierney-Hynes describes as its older sense, though it is important to remember that it retained this meaning long into the eighteenth century.³³ In 1735, Aaron Hill

³² This may explain why love is one of the few passions that Haywood ever refers to as an affection. See, for example, Haywood’s tale of Aliena and the Captain (particularly 3.51). According to Dixon, “theorists of the passions often ... employed the concepts of ‘affections’ and ‘sentiments’ to refer to more cognitive and refined feelings” (3). There are obviously exceptions—in the seventeenth century, for example, the clergyman and poet Thomas Traherne would lament the prevalence of “ambitions, trades, luxuries, [and] inordinate affections” (156)—but the general rule stands.

³³ Dixon stresses that “the category of emotions, conceived as a set of morally disengaged, bodily, non-cognitive and involuntary feelings, is a recent invention” (3).

observed “That the Passions, are no more, than Emotions of the Will, in Desire of some conceived Advantage, or Evasion of some apprehended Evil” (*Prompter* no. 118 : 246)³⁴; and much later, in his *Elements of Criticism* (1762), Lord Kames suggested that “an internal motion or agitation of the mind, when it passeth away without desire, is denominated an emotion: when desire follows, the motion or agitation is denominated a passion” (1.37). As indicated, Haywood tends to use the term “emotion” in this rather conventional way in her periodical, at one point describing a character overcome by “the present Emotions of her various Passions” (2.107).³⁵ She elsewhere states that “till Suspense is wholly swallowed up in Certainty, there will be Emotions in the Heart that will not suffer us to be quite compos’d” (2.322). At times, however, the eidolon uses “emotion” in its newer sense—as in, “he looked earnestly upon her Face . . . easily perceiving, by the various Changes in her Countenance, every Emotion as it rose and fell in her Soul” (3.330)—and on occasion even conflates it with passion, commenting at one point on “those tender Emotions which attract the Heart with a resistless Force, and bear the Name of Love” (2.204). In the same way, in her discussion of prejudice, she delivers a scathing response to those readers who wonder why “any Pains [are] taken to decry and rail against an Emotion, which is inherent to our Nature” (3.287). In a particularly bewildering passage Haywood even goes so far as to conflate emotion, passion, and desire in the same sentence, observing that “as no Business, no Avocation whatever will bar the Intrusion of some Sorts of Passion, we are not to

³⁴ See also *Prompter* no. 113, wherein the eidolon states that theatrical pauses must be “filled out, by such agitated Perturbation, in the Look, and the Gesture, as may (instead of interrupting the Course of the Passion) seem but the Struggling, of its inward Emotion” (237).

³⁵ See also the heroine of Haywood’s novel, *The Injur’d Husband* (1722), who is “led by the emotions of her tumultuous passions” (43). Of further interest is Chambers’s exposition on Melebranche, who “defines the Passions to be all those Emotions naturally arising in the Soul, on occasion of extraordinary Motions of the animal Spirits, and the Blood” (*Cyclopædia*, s.v. “Passion” 2.759).

let any one Desire get the better of us, but to check in their Infancy all Emotions” (3.260). This occasional confusion of terms should not, however, imply ignorance on Haywood’s part. As Adela Pinch stresses, there is a “fluidity” of terms in this period: “for most writers, the many names of emotion travel as freely as emotions themselves” (16). If anything, Haywood’s tendency to distinguish emotion from passion sets her apart from the vast majority of eighteenth-century writers.

The aim of the preceding section was to establish that Haywood is both aware of and responsive to contemporary theoretical discussions of the passions in *The Female Spectator*. It now remains to be seen how Haywood’s interest in the passions extends from theory to praxis. In what follows I suggest that Haywood actively works to raise readers’ passions in her periodical. The eidolon observes, “these Speculations are not published with a View of depressing, but of exhilarating the Spirits” (3.34). Correspondents frequently reflect on the pathetic nature of Haywood’s periodical—“nothing certainly can be more just than your Definition of the Passions, or more pathetic than your Representation of the Mischiefs they bring upon Mankind,” one gushes (2.154)—and they often petition the eidolon to espouse particular causes in a way only she can.³⁶ Thus Sarah Oldfashion urges the Female Spectator to “set forth, in the most moving and pathetic Terms you can, the Folly of gadding eternally to ... publick Places” (2.155); and the aptly named Veritatus asks that the eidolon deliver an indictment of coquets, as “the Discretion

³⁶ Haywood tends to use “pathetic” interchangeably with “affecting” or “moving,” and, for the most part, so do I. The *OED* reflects this usage when it defines pathos as a general “quality which evokes pity, sadness, or tenderness; the power of exciting pity; affecting character or influence” (s.v. “Pathos” def. 2).

of some, and the Good Nature of others, may possibly be roused by your judicious and pathetic Remonstrations” (3.408).

The eidolon is not the only one known for her “nervous and pathetic Strains” (2.267) and “short, though pathetic Remonstrance[s]” (3.220). Correspondents, whether real or imaginary, also submit pathetic epistles to *The Female Spectator*. Thus, in response to a letter on women’s education, the eidolon praises the writer for having “been blest with that Sort of Education which she so pathetically laments the Want of in the greatest Part of our Sex” (2.356); and on a more personal note, the narrator praises another correspondent for representing “the Unhappiness of her Condition in very moving Terms, and such, as it is easy to be seen, flow from the Soul” (3.135-36). The list could go on. In the second half of the periodical, the eidolon observes of a third correspondent’s submission, “there cannot be a more melancholy Circumstance than what she so pathetically describes (3.111); and she subsequently praises a fourth correspondent for the “pathetic Energy” of her narrative, “which shines ... especially in those Parts of it which ought most to affect the Heart, where, indeed, the Distresses she describes touch the very Strings of Life, and compel the Reader to *feel* the Woes he is told another has endured” (3.320).

As this last quotation indicates, periodical fiction is chiefly responsible for the affecting quality of *The Female Spectator*. Such fiction is generally amatory in nature and, somewhat surprisingly, makes up more than half of the periodical by some counts (Shevelov, “Re-Writing” 25).³⁷ As a particularly critical correspondent complains, with only a touch of hyperbole, readers “find themselves for several months together entertained only with home-amours, reflections on human nature, the passions, morals, inferences, and warnings to your own sex” (2.293).

³⁷ I use “amatory fiction” in its broadest possible sense, denoting any piece of literature revolving around sexual love or desire.

According to Robert Mayo, there are “fifty-some tales and novelettes” in *The Female Spectator*, all of which serve as “edifying sermons on prudence and propriety at the same time that they also manage to be, in some way, secret histories, *romans à clef*, novels of sentimental adventure and intrigue, satirical tales of gallantry, and amatory romances” (91). More specifically, many of these fictions deal with “stereotypically Haywood” *topoi*, including, among other things, “masquerade, seduction, rape, abusive marriages, and criminal passions” (Powell, “Haywood” 174).³⁸ Such short periodical tales are admittedly not as sexualized as Haywood’s early novels, but, as will become clear, they are nevertheless well suited to her stated aim of raising particular passions in readers.³⁹

Before proceeding, it is worth stressing that the large number of “passionate fictions” found in *The Female Spectator* is unusual in terms of eighteenth-century essay serials (or periodicals in general, for that matter). Kathryn Shevelow writes that while “fictional illustration has always played an important role in the periodical of manners and morals, in the *Female Spectator* it dominates,” a clear indicator of the great divide between Haywood’s particular “didactic style [and] that of the moral essay tradition” (“Re-Writing” 25). Of course, this is only one of several aspects—whether in terms of content, form, or target audience—that make

³⁸ Unsurprisingly, there is a distinctly novelistic aspect to many of Haywood’s periodical tales. To Deborah Nestor, “Haywood’s use of these narratives makes her periodical more closely resemble the novelistic discourse of the age—both because of the dialogic quality they give to her essays and because of their richness in psychological detail” (8). Patricia Meyer Spacks agrees, stressing that “the narratives display considerable intricacy and inventiveness. Often they seem to miniaturize entire novels, adumbrating elaborate plots and sketching multiple possibilities of character” (*Selections* xviii).

³⁹ According to Kathryn King, “readers will find in *The Female Spectator* many elements that recall the ‘warm’ romances and scandalous tales ‘a-clef’ of the 1720s—but with a difference. In the early amatory fictions the encounter of vulnerable female and opportunistic male is staged so as to deliver libidinal thrills, pulse-quickenings seductions, and prurient displays of violated innocence in which the intent is arousal of sensation in the reader. *The Female Spectator*, however, seeks not to warm but to warn. The amatory materials take shape accordingly within an admonitory frame” (“Introduction” 4-5). For more on framing see Barbara Benedict, *Framing Feeling* (1994).

Haywood's periodical sit so uneasily alongside more canonical eighteenth-century serials such as *The Spectator*, *The Rambler*, *The Mirror*, and *The Lounger*. As Manushag Powell stresses, "there is nothing standardizable" about any of Haywood's "multiple periodical forays" ("Haywood" 170). To Powell, "all of Haywood's periodicals and semi-demi-periodicals are in one way or another queer, adhering to past precedent only so long as it is useful to her current interests" (182). Mayo agrees, arguing that Haywood "is the most eclectic of the major essayists" (90).⁴⁰ Still, because of the clear links between Haywood's *Spectator* and that of Addison and Steele, it would seem unwise to discount it as part of the periodical essay tradition, as some scholars have done.⁴¹

The passionate character of the fictions in Haywood's periodical has often been seen as subservient or secondary to their pedagogic function. Of course, there is good reason for this, at least on one level. As the eidolon herself observes, it is only by stressing the "sad Effects" of "giving way to any Passion, though of the most tender Kind" that she can effect any kind of reform (2.134). Haywood makes a similar claim in her novel, *Lasselia: Or, The Self-Abandoned* (1723):

My design in writing this little novel (as well as those I have formerly publish'd) being only to remind the unthinking part of the world, how dangerous it is to give way to passion, will, I hope, excuse the too great warmth, which may perhaps, appear in some particular

⁴⁰ James Hodges attempts to account for *The Female Spectator*'s peculiarity of form by suggesting that its "essay-miscellany character ... demonstrates the transition in periodicals from the single compact essay to the pure miscellany, which by the close of the century usurped the popularity enjoyed by the essay periodical in the reigns of Anne and the first George" (155).

⁴¹ See for example Richard Squibbs's *Urban Enlightenment and the Eighteenth-Century Periodical Essay* (2014), which avoids any discussion of *The Female Spectator* "on purely formal grounds, [Haywood's periodical] having been a miscellaneous monthly rather than a thematically focused weekly or bi-weekly" (14).

pages; for without the expression being invigorated in some measure proportionate to the subject, 'twou'd be impossible for a reader to be sensible how far it touches him, or how probable it is that he is falling into those inadvertencies which the examples I relate wou'd caution him to avoid. (105)

As in *Lasselia*, therefore, the pathos of Haywood's periodical tales may be said to underscore the danger of acting on the passions, or perhaps of women revealing their passions unthinkingly or spontaneously.⁴² Of course, the message being communicated is not necessarily, or not always, this straightforward. Still, even scholars such as Deborah Nestor, who suggests that Haywood's periodical fictions "undermine the morally conservative, ideologically correct voice of the principal narrator" (8), seem to see the pathos of these tales as secondary to their ideological thrust. Most critical studies thus read the amatory tales in *The Female Spectator* through the lens of basic models of character writing. That is to say, the tales function very much like the *exempla* of Theophrastus, and are not so different from the character sketches that play such an important part in texts like Law's *A Serious Call*.⁴³

Such interpretations are plausible, but they do not take into consideration the fact that raising or not raising the passions, or, more specifically, determining which passions should be

⁴² According to Shawn Lisa Maurer, *The Female Spectator* teaches that "women's prosperity rests upon their ability to internalize so completely an ideology of domesticity in which men reign supreme that their own passions become not just stifled but nonexistent" (224). This lesson is by no means unique to *The Female Spectator*: Emily Hodgson Anderson traces a related message across Haywood's oeuvre: "Haywood uses her fiction to explore a strategy of what I term self-conscious performance—women acting roles that they have independently conceived for them-selves—to achieve an effective expression of female passions which would, in another setting, be disastrous and unavailing" (1).

⁴³ To Law, "characters of this kind, the more folly and ridicule they have in them, provided that they be but natural, are most useful to correct our minds; and therefore are no where more proper than in books of devotion, and practical piety. And as in several cases, we best learn the nature of things, by looking at that which is contrary to them; so perhaps we best apprehend the *excellency* of wisdom, by contemplating the *wild extravagancies* of folly" (193-94).

raised and which suppressed, is generally significant regardless of the ostensible lesson being promulgated. Put differently, the pathos of Haywood's passionate fictions may be pedagogic in-and-of-itself. I do not mean to suggest that Haywood is content to raise just any passion, or that raising the passions takes precedence over moral instruction. Indeed, Haywood fiercely critiques romances in *The Female Spectator* for employing "their whole Art in touching the Passions, without any Regard to the *Morals* of an Audience" (3.53). Rather, I wish to caution against underestimating the pathetic nature of Haywood's periodical fictions, particularly as women, the target audience of the periodical, "were deemed particularly susceptible to the pathologies of reading" (Johns 413).⁴⁴

As indicated, few scholars have discussed the passionate quality of Haywood's early fictions independent of the more conventional wisdom such tales convey. Kathleen Lubey is a noteworthy exception. Lubey suggests that the passionate nature of Haywood's early texts is itself enlightening, arguing that "Haywood utilizes eroticism for pedagogic ends, demanding that readers detoxify their visceral response to 'warm' description by remaining mentally attentive to the instructive warnings contained therein" ("Amatory Aesthetic" 310). Following in Lubey's footsteps, I will focus on the passionate nature of Haywood's periodical fiction, independent of the status of these tales as moral exempla. While Lubey focuses on the titillating or prurient aspect of Haywood's early novels—that is, on the more concupiscent passions—I suggest that

⁴⁴ It is worth noting that the loudly-proclaimed susceptibility of women to the pathologies of reading was in many ways a strategy to account for how texts influenced readers *in general*. According to Lubey, "If perilous effects of erotic reading are fictitiously projected as the plight of the softer sex it is because doing so allows a more detailed model of mind—one whose processes and movements would apply across the divide of sexual difference—to be drawn. ... [S]pecific concerns over women readers isolate the reading mind as an abstraction that could be objectified, familiarized, and brought under the control of individual readers. The erotic training of the implicitly masculine individual, it might be said, is figured most vividly in novelistic discourse on the pathologically soft female mind" (*Excitable Imaginations* 10).

Haywood uses amatory fiction in *The Female Spectator* to elicit a whole *range* of passions in the reader, from the selfish to the social.

Experiencing the Passions: Selfish and Social Impulses in *The Female Spectator*

At this point, two questions demand answers. First, what prompts Haywood to raise selfish passions in her readers? Put differently, what good purposes were selfish passions—including “Ambition ... Revenge and Anger” (Hutcheson 31)—thought to serve in *The Female Spectator*? Second, how specifically does Haywood use periodical fiction to raise, and perhaps even correct, such passions? In what follows, I will focus on two particularly violent (and interconnected) selfish passions, anger and revenge. I do so primarily because of the immense significance of anger (*orge*) in terms of both classical and early modern taxonomies of the passions. As Philip Fisher points out in *The Vehement Passions* (2002), “the history of philosophical descriptions of the passions has been strongly dominated by templates of fear [a passive passion] and anger [an active one]” (16). To eighteenth-century theorists, both anger and revenge could easily exceed due bounds and become dangerous, but, when properly directed, they were deemed to be instrumental to human happiness. Thus, Hutcheson argues that anger “is really as necessary” as any other passion, “since Men’s Interests often seem to interfere with each other; and they are thereby led from Self-Love to do the worst *Injuries* to their Fellows. There could not therefore be a wiser Contrivance to restrain *Injuries*, than to make every mortal some way *formidable* to an unjust Invader, by such a violent Passion” (46). In this case, by stressing the social significance of anger, Hutcheson provides a thorough revaluation of Thomas

Aquinas's more self-centred claim in the *Summa Theologica* that anger "is useful from the fact that when angry a man does more readily what reason commands" (*Breviary* 61).

So much for the final cause of anger. But what about the efficient cause? To Hutcheson, anger or the "Propensity to occasion Evil to another" is "attended with the most violent *uneasy Sensations*, and produces as great Changes in our Bodies as any whatsoever" (58). Aristotle hints at such violence when he states in *The Art of Rhetoric* that "becoming angry is the opposite of becoming mild, and anger of mildness" (185). While there are a variety of contributing factors when it comes to anger, individuals tend to become angry when either they themselves or any innocent person are threatened. This last point drives home the potential social benefits of the so-called selfish passions. To Hutcheson, "When we apprehend any Person as *injurious* to our selves, or to any innocent Person, especially to a Person beloved, the Passion of *Anger* arises toward the Agent" (58). Anger, in this case, can be distinctly altruistic. It can also, of course, be misdirected, particularly when founded on false information. Hutcheson states that "when our Ideas and Opinions of the moral Qualities of others are just, our Affections are generally regular and good: but when we give loose Reins to our *Imagination* and *Opinion*, our Affections must follow them into all Extravagance and Folly" (73).⁴⁵ Something similar can be said of revenge, a kind of offshoot or corollary of anger.⁴⁶ Hutcheson writes that human nature tends to "disapprove an *Agent* apprehended as evil, or malicious, thro' *direct Intention*" (72). As such, "we must desire

⁴⁵ It may be objected that anger is not an affection but a primal appetite or passion and therefore that opinion has no power over it. This is true, but, as previously indicated, Hutcheson argues that even the most violent passions and appetites may be directed by opinions (69).

⁴⁶ As Haywood helpfully explains in *The Adventures of Natura*, "nothing is so violent as anger in its first emotions," but "should its force continue, it would lose its name, and be no longer anger, but revenge" (168). Haywood is perhaps drawing on Aristotle, who states in *The Art of Rhetorick* that anger is "a longing, accompanied by pain, for a real or apparent revenge for a real or apparent slight, affecting a man himself or one of his friends, when such a slight is undeserved" (173).

the Destruction of such a being, not only from Self-Love, but from our Benevolence to others” (72). Like anger, however, revenge can easily be derailed from fulfilling such noble purposes. Specifically, “when we rashly form Opinions of *Sects*, or *Nations*, as absolutely evil ... we may be led to act in such a manner, that Spectators ... may think we have *pure disinterested Malice* in our Nature ... when it is really only the *overgrowth* of a just natural Affection, upon false Opinions, or confused Ideas” (72-73). It is wrong opinions rather than wrong passions, therefore, that are to blame for the damage caused by anger and revenge.

While Haywood is generally suspicious of selfish passions in *The Female Spectator* it is worth remembering that she condemns neither anger nor revenge outright. In fact, the heroine of one narrative is tacitly justified for her hatred of an unworthy fortune hunter—“let him seek a Wife more befitting him than Celemena,” she states, “who now hates and scorns him” (2.265)—and the protagonist of another, the famous “Lady’s Revenge,” is loudly praised for her calculated vengeance: “I heartily wish ... that all Women who have been abandoned and betrayed by men, either through a determin’d Baseness, or Caprice of Nature, would assume the Spirit she did, and rather contrive some Means to render the ungrateful Lover the Object of Contempt, than themselves” (3.70). In this last instance, the Female Spectator echoes the narrator of *The Adventures of Natura*, who unreservedly states that “there are some kinds of revenge, which may deserve to be excused” (187). When such examples are properly considered, it is not surprising that Haywood works to raise anger and revenge in the reader.

But how, specifically, does Haywood work to raise such violent passions? On a very basic level, and in line with Hutcheson’s *Essay on the Passions*, Haywood accomplishes this end by stressing the total innocence of those heroines who suffer some form of assault. From

“innocent Erminia” who is brutally raped by a mysterious masquerader (2.40) to the “perfectly innocent” Sabina who is betrayed and assaulted by a “sly Seducer” resembling “the Serpent in Eden” (2.352), Haywood’s periodical is replete with tales of naive but virtuous women victimized by depraved men.⁴⁷ As Hutcheson suggests, readers “must desire the Destruction of such a Being, not only from Self-Love, but from our Benevolence to others” (72). Of course, there may be no actual person to destroy, but, as Mark Akenside stresses in *The Pleasures of Imagination* (1744), this does not make the passion felt any less real or intense. To Akenside, even events long past—particularly those from Greek and Roman history—are capable of rousing the reader and inspiring violent, vehement emotions: “the prospect thrills / Thy beating bosom, [...and] the patriot’s tear / Starts from thine eye, and thy extended arm / In fancy hurls the thunderbolt of Jove / To fire the impious wreath on Philip’s brow, / Or dash Octavius from the trophied car” (book 2, lines 751-56). John Dryden makes a similar claim in his “Heads of an Answer to Rymer” (1677), regarding the murderous Viking Rollo in *The Bloody Brother*; when he states that “we stab him in our Minds for every Offence which he commits” (17.189).

Although Haywood works to raise readers’ anger, she also attempts to ensure that their anger springs from correct opinions and is therefore justified. It is worth recalling that violent passions such as anger and revenge, according to Hutcheson, are easily misled by false information. Haywood ensures correct opinions, primarily, by looking into the hearts of characters—both victims and perpetrators—and exposing their true motives for action. There is thus no question that her victims are perfectly innocent and her perpetrators wholly base. Such

⁴⁷ See also Flavia, the “virtuous Maid” who struggles to escape “the Toils laid for her Innocence” (2.49-50); Ismenia, a “young Lady ... whose Innocence was equal to her Beauty,” and who is preyed upon by a decorated general (2.385); and Jemima, a naturally good and “innocent young Creature” who is nevertheless abandoned by her upper-class lover (3.325).

“exposure” has a great deal to do with Haywood’s third-person mode of narration, which, as Kramnick observes, she was then “in the process of developing” (*Actions and Objects* 177).

Referring to her early novels, Kramnick writes that

Haywood takes great liberty in telling us what her characters are thinking and feeling, threading the experience of one over the experience of another in ways that on occasion seem to trouble ordinary English grammar. But her representation of thought from the third person is less a burrowing into her character’s mind than a kind of turning of thought outward into the external world where it can be observed by the narrator. (177)

Kramnick’s analysis may be helpfully applied to the amatory fiction in *The Female Spectator*.

Significantly, there are only three first-person narratives of distressed women in Haywood’s periodical.⁴⁸ Another is suppressed: “we must omit the Lamentation of *Ophelia* [though] we allow her Condition to be as unhappy as hopeless Love can make a Woman” (3.177). Those narratives that claim to inspire the most anger thus tend to be communicated by an almost omnipotent narrator, whose position, as I explain below, ensures veracity and, therefore, correct opinion.

Somewhat inconsistently, however, Haywood stresses throughout her periodical that it is impossible to truly see into the human heart. There is, the narrator argues, no “Window in the Breast, through which might be discover’d the secret Recesses of every Heart” (2.384). To the *Female Spectator*, only God sees “into the inmost Recesses of the Heart” (2.256), just as God alone “sees into the secret Springs which put in Motion the Machine of this vast

⁴⁸ The three first person narratives may be found in the second half of *The Female Spectator*: Amonia’s tale in Book 16 (3.133-35), that of Monyma in Book 20 (3.268-72), and that of Lavinia in Book 23 (3.369-79).

Universe” (3.367). As such, despite her “watchful Eye,” the eidolon admits that she can never be completely sure “of any thing that passes in another’s Breast” (3.129). This is made abundantly clear in Haywood’s short fictions.⁴⁹ Still, there are ways around such epistemological uncertainty, and the very fact that the Female Spectator dwells so much on the limits of intersubjective knowledge (that is, knowledge of the other) reveals just how much she values such knowledge and how far she will go to achieve it. The narrator works to overcome these limitations, in part, by observing, and making “scientific” inferences about characters.⁵⁰ This explains her general reliance on firsthand experience coolly recollected from a temporal distance —“a thousand odd Adventures, which at the Time they happened made slight Impression on me ... now rise fresh to my Remembrance” (2.18)—and her “hermeneutic of suspicion” when it comes to alternate testimonies. Recounting a maritime disaster at second hand, for example, the eidolon frequently inserts qualifiers into the narrative (e.g., “The Storm increasing, the Vessel being weak, and, *as some say*, the Mariners unskilful, it bulg’d against a Rock”; “Now *if this Fact be real* it must be owned...” (2.248; my emphases).

From this solid foundation, the narrator ensures access to the innermost recesses of the human heart through a form of abductive reasoning. In the opening pages of the periodical, the Female Spectator states that “I find it easy to account for the Cause” of most actions “by the Consequence” (2.18), and she later encourages the reader to do the same: “I shall leave you to

⁴⁹ Representative in this regard are the following statements made by the Female Spectator: “Whether she were [a real penitent or not] Heaven only can determine” (2.346); “whether any better reconcil’d to her fate, none but her own Heart can determine” (2.84); and “Laconia appeared very assiduous about her, but whether out of real or counterfeited Tenderness I will not pretend to say” (3.21).

⁵⁰ Nestor explains that “like Boyle in his scientific discourse, [Haywood] promises to base her narratives on events she has actually observed and to provide a great deal of particular and—often irrelevant—detail to create a sense of the real” (5).

judge of the Cause by the Consequence” (3.42). It may be impossible to see into another’s breast, in other words, but reasonable conclusions may still be drawn by a detailed examination of human behaviour. Complete or total knowledge is thus both unavailable and unnecessary. In fact, the narrator often uses a form of *concessio* or *paromologia* to strengthen her arguments.⁵¹ Thus, musing on what made the “naturally innocent” Jemima approve the addresses of a worthless rake, the narrator states,

Whether it were that he had the Advantage by being the first that had discovered a Sensibility of her Charms, or whether it were that there was really somewhat more engaging in him than she had seen in any other Man, is altogether uncertain; but it is not so that her young Heart was insensibly caught with the fine Things he said to her. (3.324)⁵²

Ultimately, because the eidolon claims to reveal the truth of the human heart through a combination of empirical observation and logical inference rather than direct testimony, it is helpful to think of Haywood’s amatory narratives as “strong representations” in Alexander Welsh’s sense of the term. Like the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century texts Welsh discusses, Haywood’s narratives “openly distrust direct testimony, insist on submitting witnesses to the test of corroborating circumstances” and, perhaps most importantly, “claim to know many things without any one’s having seen them at all” (in this case, the minds of the characters in question)

⁵¹ Paromologia is defined as “admitting a weaker point in order to make a stronger one.” [http://rhetoric.byu.edu s.v. “paromologia.”](http://rhetoric.byu.edu/s.v./paromologia)

⁵² Haywood deploys this technique extensively in her periodical. For further examples see the following: “Whether the same Medicines as were before prescrib’d, or others of a different Kind were now administer’d, I will not pretend to say; but whatever they were, they brought him into such a Condition that his Life was despair’d of” (3.67); “Whether his Estimation favoured not a little of the hyperbolical, I will not venture to affirm, but sure it is, that they were of very great Value” (3.194); and “whether it were the Girts of the Saddle had not been taken due Care of, or whether the Strength of the Horse exceeded the Art of the ostentatious Rider, is uncertain; but [what is certain is that...] he was thrown off” (3.341).

(8). By exposing characters' hearts and minds to her readers in this way, Haywood thus ensures that readers' anger and desire for revenge are based on justified or warranted opinions. What is more, there is a corresponding call for readers to monitor their own desire for vengeance in real life, and to use these tales as a training ground for the proper exercise of violent, vehement passions.

If Haywood shows an interest in raising violent selfish passions in her readers, she is equally concerned to raise social and benevolent ones. Such passions, as previously indicated, include "Love, Congratulation, Compassion, natural Affection" (Hutcheson 32), and are obviously beneficial, particularly from a social perspective. In the eighteenth century, social passions were often paired with adjectives like "tender," "gentle," or "soft" and were thought to be uniquely capable of working in conjunction with reason. Paradoxically, however, these passions could also easily progress to an all-consuming, vehement state. For example, the spectator of a tragedy may experience such strong emotions of love and compassion (in addition to terror) as to cause him to weep.⁵³ To philosophers and critics ranging from Aristotle to Dryden and Hutcheson, the raising of strong social passions was an important province of literature. As Dryden advises in his discussion of tragedy in "Heads of an Answer to Rymer," "all the Passions in their turns are to be set in a Ferment; as Joy, Anger, Love, Fear" (17.186).

⁵³ In his *Treatise of Human Nature* (1739-40), David Hume helpfully illustrates how love, one of the so-called social passions, can shift from a vehement to a calm state (and *vice versa*): "The reflective impressions may be divided into two kinds, viz. the *calm* and the *violent*. Of the first kind is the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition, and external objects. Of the second are the passions of love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility. This division is far from being exact. The raptures of poetry and music frequently rise to the greatest height; while those other impressions, properly call'd *passions*, may decay into so soft an emotion as to become, in a manner, imperceptible" (276).

Of course, such theorists tend to focus their attention on more canonical genres and works, but, in what follows, I suggest that their analyses may be helpfully applied to Haywood's periodical amatory fiction as well. As Ros Ballaster observes, Haywood's amatory fiction tends to revolve around one of two figures: "the unfortunate mistress and the mistress of artifice" (181). Ballaster is speaking specifically of Haywood's early works, but her comment equally relates to the periodical fiction found in *The Female Spectator*. Both figures are visible, to a certain extent, in Haywood's periodical, and both are well suited to raising the social passions. Pity (or compassion) is the most obvious social passion prompted by these characters. When it comes to the former, I have already demonstrated how the innocence of the unfortunate mistress fosters anger—a violent, selfish passion—toward the predatory male. However, as Hutcheson stresses, the misfortune of such a person also gives rise to powerful feelings of pity: "The misfortune of [a person of moral dignity] raises ... *Sorrow, Pity, or Regret*, and *Dissatisfaction* with the Administration of the World" (57).

When such individuals are victimized by near relations, the level of pity was thought to increase. Aristotle observes in *The Poetics* that the most affecting tragedies revolve around "cases where the sufferings occur within relationships, such as brother and brother, son and father, mother and son, son and mother—when the one kills (or is about to kill) the other, or commits some other such deed" (75). It is significant, therefore, that Haywood's periodical is filled with narratives of innocent women abused by near relations: thus Panthea's father, Lacroon, betrays his daughter "to Infamy and Perdition" in the capacity of a kept mistress (2.84); Flavia's mother sacrifices her daughter in exchange for a "Coach and Six" (2.47); and Ismenia's Aunt effects the ruin of her niece by essentially selling her to an amorous general (2.386).

Curiously, the very fact that the victim was female was thought to make the social passions raised more complex and nuanced, a point I shall return to in later chapters. In such instances, pity and sorrow fuse with love. As Kames would go on to state, the sight of a “mistress in distress” is particularly powerful because her “beauty gives pleasure, and her distress pain: these two emotions, proceeding from different views of the object, have very little resemblance to each other; and yet so intimately connected are their causes, as to force them into a sort of complex emotion” (1.91).

If this were not enough, the depiction of perfectly good individuals who suffer but nevertheless forgive was thought to increase love and pity. This is Hutcheson’s view in his *Essay on the Passions*: “*Forgiving of Injuries*, and much more *returning Good for Evil*, appears wonderfully great and beautiful to our moral Sense: it raises the strongest *Love* toward the forgiver, [and] *Compassion* for the Injury received” (62-63). Such forgiveness is on full display in *The Female Spectator*, a key instance involving the saintly Alithea. When confronted with her husband’s infidelity, Alithea’s behaviour is “astonishing to the Person who was Witness of it” and, presumably, to the reader as well: “*Oh Heaven!* cried the Lady, *can you forgive such an Injury?*—*Yes*, resumed Alithea, stifling her sighs as much as she was able, *Love is an involuntary Passion*” (2.209). It is worth noting that the spectacle of a perfectly good individual who experiences uncommon hardships but nevertheless perseveres through them was thought to generate, in addition to the other social passions mentioned above, a general elevation of soul in the reader. Thus, Jemima’s persistent reluctance to believe that she has been duped by a conniving rake, while it may preclude the possibility of forgiveness (there being nothing to forgive, from Jemima’s perspective), nevertheless elicits powerful emotions. In fact, Jemima’s

dismal odyssey from London to the country, her two children in tow, is perhaps the most affecting tale of them all, in large part because of the heroine's resilience in the face of suffering: "she was running through Dangers, Hardships, and Sorrows, which nothing but the Supreme Giver of Courage, and her perfect Confidence in him, could have enabled her to sustain" (3.345). In *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres* (1783), Hugh Blair links such narrative trajectories to a species of the sublime:

There [is] one class of sublime objects, which may be called the moral, or sentimental sublime. ... These will be found to be all, or chiefly, of that class, which comes under the name of magnanimity or heroism; and they produce an effect extremely similar to what is produced by the view of grand objects in nature; filling the mind with admiration, and elevating it above itself. ... Wherever, in some critical and high situation, we behold a man uncommonly intrepid, and resting upon himself; superior to passion and to fear; animated by some great principle to the contempt of popular opinion, of selfish interest, of dangers, or of death; there we are struck with a sense of the sublime. (29)

To be fair, Haywood's heroines rarely move "in some critical and high situation." Nonetheless, Blair's general point stands. Perseverance in suffering is a clear marker of the sublime.

It is worth stressing that plotting alone, even in tales of heroic perseverance, was not thought to be enough to make a narrative pathetic. Eighteenth-century critics recognized that various rhetorical or stylistic strategies were also necessary to uphold the pathos of narratives. For example, distressed individuals must speak naturally, or the whole illusion collapses. Narrative interruption, crucially, was thought to be a clear marker of distress. Kames reasons that "as no passion hath any long uninterrupted existence, or beats always with an equal pulse, the

language suggested by passion is not only unequal but frequently interrupted” (1.349). It is thus significant that the few distressed women Haywood admits directly as correspondents apologize profusely for their disjointed style of writing: “in my present Situation, [I] cannot be supposed to range my Thoughts in that Order which the Press requires,” laments one such correspondent (3.369). As I previously indicated, however, few distressed individuals speak for themselves in *The Female Spectator*. As such, they are reported to speak naturally or appropriately. Another essential when it came to communicating certain tragic passions was deemed to be simplicity of speech. To quote from Kames once more, “figures are not equally the language of every passion,” as “humbling and dispiriting passions affect to speak plain” (1.350). Thus, a correspondent in Haywood’s periodical states, upon witnessing a young wife’s tearful petition for her husband’s discharge from the military, that “the Terms in which this poor Creature expressed herself were truly pathetic, and touched the Soul the more as they were purely natural, and void of all the Ornaments of Speech” (3.127).⁵⁴

Haywood relies on other stylistic or rhetorical devices more extensively in her periodical. The rhetorical device of *adynaton*, for example, or the impossibility of expression, encourages readers to exercise their passions for themselves by filling in the blanks. Like other mid-century periodical writers, Haywood uses this device extensively in *The Female Spectator*, particularly when it comes to distressed women, such as the heartbroken and bewildered Ariena, of whom she declares, “no Description can any way equal the Distraction she was in; I shall therefore not attempt it” (3.42). In describing the aftermath of a brutal masquerader’s assault on Erminia, the

⁵⁴ In a particularly relevant passage, considering the context, Blair states that “conciseness and simplicity are essential to sublime writing. Simplicity, I place in opposition to studied and *profuse ornament*; and conciseness, to superfluous expression” (36; my emphasis).

eidolon reports that she “made herself be carried home, tho’ with what Agonies of Shame and Grief is easier to imagine than describe” (2.42). It may be true, as Wilputte argues, that *adynaton* had become an “exasperated convention” by the time Haywood deployed it in her works (11). And yet, writers continued to use it throughout the eighteenth century, and *adynaton* would become an almost essential feature of late-century sentimental literature. As Patricia Meyer Spacks writes, *adynaton* was “the most familiar of sentimental tropes,” and “appears everywhere in sentimental fiction. . . . Over and over the narrator tells us that she cannot convey in words the feelings elicited by a given story or provoked by a given event” (*Novel Beginnings* 133).

While the passions raised by the sufferings of innocent individuals were believed to be extremely powerful—as well as bafflingly diverse—theorists were sceptical of their value. As Hutcheson states, “we see how unfit such Representations are in *Tragedy*, as to make the perfectly Virtuous miserable in the highest degree. They can only lead the Spectators into *Distrust* of Providence, *Diffidence* of Virtue” (57). Hutcheson thus follows in the well-worn footsteps of Aristotle, who states in *The Poetics* that the change of fortune in tragedy should not involve “decent men . . . changing from prosperity to adversity, as this is not fearful nor yet pitiable but repugnant” (69). Paradoxically, the Female Spectator seems to agree, despite the fact that her periodical is filled with such narratives. Haywood gets around this problem, I suggest, by vocally maintaining both the activity and efficacy of divine providence in her narratives, and by frequently meting out poetic justice.⁵⁵ Near the close of a narrative revolving around a husband’s infidelity, for example, the narrator states that “the Virtues of *Alithea* had already sustained a

⁵⁵ The case of “innocent Erminia” at the masquerade stands out as one key exception.

sufficient Trial, and heaven thought fit to reward them, when she, so long inured to Suffering, least expected Relief” (2.214). In the same way, the reader of Jemima’s sad, Job-like tale is comforted by the narrator’s placation that “*JEMIMA*’s Sufferings were however not yet arrived at their Period; Heaven thought fit to try her yet a little farther, thereby to make her Virtue more conspicuous” (3.345). The above examples are merely a sample.⁵⁶ Their sheer volume suggests the lengths to which Haywood was willing to go to ensure that no ignoble passions or impulses, particularly in relation to divine providence, accompany particular kind affections.

If narratives of unfortunate women were always in danger of provoking distrust of divine providence, even as they fostered love and pity, the “mistress of artifice” tales—to borrow Ballaster’s phrase—provide a welcome corrective. Many eighteenth-century theorists believed that the misfortune of individuals who were in some way responsible for their fate would elicit multiple or mixed passions—all bound up with the same spectacle—fusing pity with indignation, social passions with selfish. To quote Hutcheson once more, “when an imperfect good Character, by an evil Action, procures the highest Misery to himself; this raises these complicated Passions, *Pity* toward the Sufferer, *Sorrow* for the state, *Abhorrence* of Vice, *Awe* and *Admiration* of providence, as keeping strict Measures of Sanctity and Justice” (60). Since Aristotle, such plots were seen as most proper for tragedy. In the *Poetics*, Aristotle writes that a perfect tragedy should involve an individual who is “not preeminent in virtue and justice,” but “who falls into adversity not through evil and depravity, but through some kind of error” (71). Such plots were “perfect”

⁵⁶ See for example the following statements: “when she thought herself most abandoned by good Fortune, she was nearest the Attainment of it. Heaven was pleased that she should prove with Child” (3.24); “Heaven, long a Witness of the Wrongs *Lothario* had been guilty of to our credulous Sex, now thought fit to take the Part of Innocence betrayed and distressed” (3.342); and “that Almighty Being ... snatched her now almost sinking Soul from the Miseries in which it had so long been plunged, and graciously rewarded the Virtue it had tried” (3.345).

not only because they performed the function of theodicies, but also because they were familiar, featuring what Samuel Johnson describes in *Rambler* no. 4 as characters “levelled with the rest of the world” (3.21). Johnson hints at the dynamic influence of such “familiar histories” when he states that “the power of example is so great, as to take possession of the memory by a kind of violence” (3.22). As previously indicated, a number of Haywood’s periodical fictions follow this basic pattern. The tale of Sabina and the Welshman is a particularly good example, Sabina having “a very good Capacity” and wisdom beyond her years (3.290), but, unfortunately, one “obstinate ... Folly” in the form of a prejudice against all things Welsh, which ultimately leads to her downfall (3.295). The story of Aliena and the Captain further illustrates this point: “one of the most charming Creatures in the World” and “the Darling of all that knew her” (3.40), Aliena has an Achilles heel—namely, the “Impetuosity of her Passion” (3.55)—which makes her disguise herself as a cabin boy and attempt to abscond with her beloved on board his ship.

The above tales may be well suited to eliciting the most beneficial passions, but it is important to remember that the reader was an important and unpredictable variable in this equation. As Haywood recognized, not all readers would respond to her narratives in the correct or approved manner. Following Aliena’s tale, therefore, the eidolon pauses to ensure that subscribers interpret the tale correctly:

Of all the Letters with which the *Female Spectator* has been favour’d, none gave us a greater mixture of Pain and Pleasure than this:—’Tis difficult to say whether the unhappy Story it contains, or the agreeable Manner in which it is related, most engages our Attention; but while we do Justice to the Historian, and pity the unfortunate Lady ... we must be wary how we excuse her Faults. (3.52-53)

Haywood's implication seems to be that some readers may not in this instance experience the complicated passions Hutcheson gestures toward in his *Essay on the Passions*, though the narrator herself does. In other words, readers may experience only pity for Aliena, rather than pity mixed with aversion.⁵⁷ Still, the frequent insertion of such narrative recapitulations suggests Haywood's belief that readers do not respond this way deliberately, but simply out of ignorance.

***The Female Spectator* and the Reader's Progress through the Passions:**

General Calm Benevolence versus Vehement Passion

Thus far, I have drawn attention to Haywood's sophisticated treatment of the passions in *The Female Spectator*—paying particular attention to her engagement with contemporary philosophical theories on the subject—and shown that Haywood uses periodical amatory fiction to raise, correct, and interrogate both selfish and social passions. And yet, this is only part of the story. I will now suggest that a drive to raise particular, powerful passions in readers—thus encouraging what Dryden refers to in “The Grounds of Criticism in Tragedy” (1679) as “pathetic vehemence” (13.246), *vehe-mente* suggesting a state in which one is “out of the mind” (Fisher 61)—ultimately gives way to the advocating of general calm benevolence. To do so, I will once again turn to Hutcheson's *Essay on the Passions*, which encourages a similar restraining or limiting of particular passions in order to facilitate universal calm benevolence. To Hutcheson, the latter has little in common with the former: “There is a Distinction to be observed ... between

⁵⁷ For other instances of readers “reading against the grain” (to borrow Charles Lamb's phrase) see Haywood's discussion of history. Generally speaking, the Female Spectator argues, “on the reading or being told the History of any great and memorable Person, the Auditors are sensibly affected, and ready enough to give such-a-one the Praises they deserve” (2.432-33). And yet, much to the chagrin of Haywood and the historians, “There are *Generals*, who seem wholly unaffected by the Triumphs of old *Rome* ... and Ladies, whose Hearts are incapable of feeling either Compassion for a dying *Lucretia*, or Admiration of that fam'd *English* Princess who suck'd the Poyson from her Husband's Wound” (2.149).

‘the *calm Desire* of Good, and Aversion to Evil, either selfish or publick, as it appears to our *Reason* or *Reflection*; and the *particular Passions* towards Objects immediately presented to some Sense’” (31). As indicated, reason and reflection are crucial when it comes to implementing general calm desire: “*particular Affections* are found in many Tempers, where, thro’ want of Reflection, the *general calm* Desires are not found. ... We obtain Command over the *particular Passions*, principally by strengthening [sic] the *general Desires* thro’ frequent Reflection” (32). Hutcheson establishes a hierarchy of calm public desires, the greatest being universal calm benevolence, in which the individual wishes for the good of an “abstracted or general Community, such as a *Species* or System”—a distinctly Stoic sentiment—rather than that of “*particular Persons* or *Societies* presented to our Senses” (32). More importantly, this highest form of benevolence is a moral duty. To Hutcheson, “our moral Sense ... approves the Restraint or Limitation of all particular Affections or Passions, by the calm universal Benevolence” (33). In fact, the very “Perfection of Virtue consists in ‘having the *universal calm Benevolence*, the prevalent Affection of the Mind, so as to limit and counteract not only the selfish Passions, but even the *particular kind Affections*’” (8).

I want to stress that Hutcheson’s portrayal of general philanthropy distinguishes his moral theory from that of Christian thinkers such as William Law. In *A Serious Call*, Law, like Hutcheson, also argues that general benevolence is a moral duty, stating that “There is no principle of the heart that is more acceptable to God, than an *universal* fervent love to all mankind, wishing and praying for their happiness” (392). And yet, Law’s emphasis on the intensity of such love alerts readers to a fundamental distinction. Put simply, Law’s “universal fervent love” is a vehement passion; Hutcheson’s “universal calm Benevolence” is not.

I have dwelled extensively on Hutcheson's theory, in part because I wish to contend that Haywood is an equal proponent of universal calm benevolence, a species of love so calm and reasonable as to make theorists such as Hutcheson equivocate over its classification as an affection or passion (even a social one). Even if Haywood was not personally acquainted with Hutcheson's philosophical writings, she was likely familiar with popularized versions of his theories, including one that appeared in *The Prompter*, an essay serial produced by Haywood's acquaintances William Popple and Aaron Hill. In *Prompter* no. 63 (June 17, 1735), the Prompter goes to great lengths to distinguish philanthropy or "humanity"—which he characterizes as a "calm, tender, and serene" passion, "born from reflection"—from romantic love, a "tumultuous, violent, and strong" passion antecedent to reason (137). At first, the Prompter defines philanthropy as simply a "Love of our Fellow Creatures," and something that closely resembles "Good-nature" (136). In *Prompter* no. 65 (June 24, 1735), however, the eidolon goes on to describe it in distinctly Hutchesonian and perhaps even Stoical terms as "a Sensibility, that exerts itself in Behalf of every moving Object" and a "general Good-will to Mankind" (141). In the process, crucially, he distinguishes it from romantic love or "*Tendresse*," a "particular Passion" with "a particular Object" (141). Philanthropy, although technically a species of love, is therefore like Hutcheson's universal calm benevolence incapable of reaching a vehement state, both because of its close connection to reflection (rather than sense) and because it has no particular object as its focus.

If, like Hill and Hutcheson, Haywood can be said to embrace universal calm benevolence over particular vehement passions, whether selfish or social, how precisely does she encourage readers to do the same? Or rather, how does Haywood facilitate a shift from a vehement to a

calm passionate response? The first way, I suggest, is through a gradual but steady drop-off in amatory fiction over the course of *The Female Spectator*.⁵⁸ In other words, particular vehement passions are suppressed simply by limiting affecting objects. Thus, while a correspondent in the first half of the periodical complains that “Home-Amours” pour in on subscribers for “several Months together” (2.293), later correspondents point angrily to the fact “that since the Second or Third Book I [the eidolon] have become more serious.—That I moralize too much, and that I give them too few Tales” (3.411). As such, a kind of overarching or meta-textual trend toward *catharsis* is visible in the periodical. This is not surprising since Haywood suggests in her discussion of history writing that powerful emotions should, in the natural course of things, give way to a pleasing, calm mental equilibrium and a general sense of goodwill toward all. It is worth stressing that such goodwill is far removed from the “tumultuous, violent, and strong” love described by Hill and seemingly elicited by Haywood’s periodical fiction in *The Female Spectator*. To Haywood, the best sort of history, that which revolves around “Events as there is a Possibility may happen” to the reader, “will insensibly engage” the reader’s attention. What is more, “by this her noblest Passions will be awaked;—she will forget every thing beside;—she will rejoice, or weep, according as the different Accidents excite;—her whole Soul will take a new Turn, and become all Generosity and Gentleness” (3.91). Limiting the number of passionate fictions in the second half of *The Female Spectator* is one way Haywood ensures that readers, if they do not progress to universal calm benevolence, can at least move past the indulging of particular vehement passions.

⁵⁸ Admittedly, such tales never entirely disappear: in fact, one of the largest, making up a whole book, appears in the second half of the *The Female Spectator*.

The second way Haywood facilitates general calm benevolence involves encouraging readers to make reason and reflection a habit and privileging philosophical contemplation over fanciful imagining. This is in line with Hutcheson's prescription for controlling particular passions and achieving universal calm benevolence. Curiously, the Female Spectator encourages reflection for a variety of reasons: somewhat vaguely, the eidolon states that "Reason and Reflection [will] enable us to erase whatever is a Blemish in the Mind" (3.77); and she later observes that "Reason and Reflection" will serve to wear off the "ill Habits contracted in our Youth" (3.19). More significant in terms of the present argument, the eidolon encourages reason, reflection, and contemplation, because these ensure the correct functioning of the imagination. Relevant in this regard is the Female Spectator's critique in Book 20 of Akenside's poem *The Pleasures of Imagination*. To the eidolon, the imagination may provide pleasing images, but it can also cause a great deal of pain when not "restrained ... under the Guidance of right Reason" (3.267). She elsewhere states that "if we do not early harmonize our Minds, and accustom ourselves to the Contemplation of moral Virtues, to subdue our Passions, and give Reason an Opportunity to exert itself, we shall naturally be led astray by the Senses to Aims, in which Imagination will at most afford us but a short-lived Satisfaction" (3.259). As this last passage makes clear, readers should also view Haywood's endeavour to rein in the imagination as an attempt to privilege or prioritize inherently reasonable passions (or affections) over vehement, sensual ones. Speaking of those passions associated with sensory impressions, Tierney-Hynes writes that early modern writers effectively made "the passions and the imagination synonymous" (*Novel Minds* 15). Lubey agrees, stating that "across this period, the imagination is closely connected to the passions and to bodily arousals" (*Excitable Imaginations*

14).⁵⁹ By distinguishing contemplation from imagination—"I would ... not have Contemplation confounded with the powers of Imagination, the latter of which borders too much on Fancy and Fiction, whereas the other is under the government of Reason, and is guided by Truth" (3.266)⁶⁰—and positioning the former as instrumental to the correct functioning of the latter, Haywood provides a framework in which general calm benevolence can operate. Of course, this framework was not unique to Haywood, but the very fact that she embraces it suggests her awareness of broad trends in Enlightenment moral philosophy, and, consequently, encourages a re-evaluation of Haywood's "passionate" reputation.

The third way Haywood encourages universal calm benevolence involves her general and persistent advocating of a kind of pseudo- or neo-Stoicism in *The Female Spectator*. I use the phrase "pseudo- or neo-Stoicism" to characterize what Srinivas Aravamudan refers to as "loosely Stoical rather than precisely Stoic discourse" (103). To the Stoics, detachment from or indifference to externals (*apatheia*) facilitates the suppression of strong passions, which in turn allows for the possibility of universal benevolence. In Hutcheson and James Moor's translation of *The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus* (1742), for example, the Emperor advises the novice Stoic to remember that "external things, about which your actions are employed, are indifferent" (91), as only then will he become "a victorious champion in the noblest contention, that against the passions" (42), and only then will he seek the good of the "universal city" over

⁵⁹ It is not surprising, therefore, that Mark Akenside devotes a significant portion of *The Pleasures of Imagination* to those "species of pleasure" that arise "from the passions," and to the "circumstances proper to awaken and engage" them (4).

⁶⁰ At times, Haywood suggests an alternate relationship between contemplation and imagination, as when she approvingly quotes an unknown source: "Imagination ... is the fountain head, from which all movements of life are derived:—Imagination is the source of contemplation,—contemplation produces design, and design breaks forth in action; so that if the first is vitiated and corrupt, all the others will naturally be impure" (3.267).

more ignoble pursuits. Samuel Johnson sums up this Stoic view nicely when he states in *Rambler* no. 99 that “to love all equally is impossible [...without] the suppression of all our hopes and fears in apathy and indifference” (4.166). Although not a Stoic *per se*, Haywood follows in Marcus Aurelius’s footsteps by encouraging readers to detach themselves from externals and rise above the vehement passions. Early on in the periodical—whose very ephemerality, significantly, could be said to encourage a detachment from externals—the narrator argues that “not to be too anxious after any thing, is ... the only sure Means of enjoying that Tranquility we but vainly depend upon in the Acquisition of what our Passions make us look on for a Time as our greatest Good” (2.100). And she later endorses a correspondent’s observation that while hope and fear are “*Passions* ... inspired by the Creator himself” (2.323),

the Scale of human Probability frequently deceives us, and Events greatly depend on what we call Chance or Fortune, [so that] the safest way is not to build on anything. To bear *Prosperity* with *Temper*, and *Adversity* with *Fortitude*, is the truest and noblest kind of Heroism. ... The Man then that would attain or preserve this happy Situation, let him make all Things as indifferent to him as possible. (2.326-27)

Haywood is aware that dictums such as “never be too much attached to any one Thing in Life” (3.260) are explicitly Stoical and, as such, may perhaps be dismissed by her readers as savouring “too much of the Stoic” (3.421). Still, she does not feel the need to temper their force, suggesting that if individuals would seriously reflect on the consequences of overly “vivacious” behaviour—the polar opposite to Stoic indifference—“none would wish to exchange the solid,

serious, and unmoved Temper for it” (3.421).⁶¹ Such passages reveal that Haywood saw Stoic indifference as both valuable and distinctly attainable, something Hill and Popple had previously stressed in *The Prompter*. In *Prompter* no. 97 (October 14, 1735), for instance, the Prompter emphasizes the practical nature of Stoic philosophy to an overly vivacious correspondent:

To conclude in the Words of Epictetus, and shew Perdita that the Height of Philosophy is no more than what she is capable of, I shall present her with his short Sketch of the compleat Philosopher. It is to have,—Desire free from Disappointment,—Refusal, not subject to Change,—Affection fitting,—Resolution adhered to,—Assent weigh’d. (205)

Significantly, in this case, “affection fitting,” implies not a repudiation of all desire *per se*, but the privileging of general calm benevolence over all vehement passions—a point very much in line with the ethos of *The Female Spectator*.

A number of characters in *The Female Spectator* exhibit such Stoic traits and thus demonstrate to the reader, if only indirectly, the importance of privileging general calm benevolence over vehement passion. One is Ariana, the spoiled daughter of a clergyman, who learns the value of *apatheia* upon the death of her parents, growing “as abject in her Notions, as she had before been elated,” and submitting “to everything with a Patience which, some imagined, came pretty near Stupidity” (3.415-16). Rather than being encouraged to imitate any one character, however, readers are instead urged to follow in the footsteps of the narrator

⁶¹ See also the discourse appended to Haywood’s *Letters from a Lady of Quality to a Chevalier* (1721): “I have heard some Ladies (in the Infancy of Love) dispute very warmly in its behalf, declare that they look’d on a state of Indifference, to be no better than a state of Stupidity, and that they would not part with their Passion, with all the little Fears, Hopes, Wishes, Languishments which attend it, for the World: but, I believe, there are but few in whom this Opinion had any long duration” (“A Discourse Concerning Writings of This Nature” 9).

herself. As Powell reminds us, eidolons “are usually idealized figures” (*Performing Authorship* 32), and the Female Spectator is no exception. A clear indicator of this is the fact that the Female Spectator has learned to limit or restrain vehement passions by detaching herself from fashionable society and therefore from externals. In this regard, she mirrors the ancient Stoics, whose detachment from society implied a kind of solitary, mountaintop existence. Marcus Aurelius urged readers of his *Meditations*, himself quoting Plato, “when we consider human life, we should view, as from an high tower, all things terrestrial” (89).⁶² Significantly, the eidolon has also learned to practice general benevolence, in part by tempering “the too great Vivacity of my Nature ... with Reflection” (2.18). The Female Spectator makes it abundantly clear throughout the periodical that she bears “Good-Will ... to Mankind in general” (2.200). In fact, this is why she writes, stating early on that her “Ambition was to be as universally read as possible” so that “the Publick may reap some Benefit” from her experience (2.18). On one level, of course, such comments are simply meant to deflect charges that she was a “prostitute of the pen,” participation in the print market suggesting interest and therefore immorality. Still, Haywood’s emphasis on *universal* good will suggests another level of signification. The eidolon later stresses that “these Lucubrations are intended for the good of the Publick, and the Advice contained in them flows from a sincere Heart, and the warmest Wishes for the true Happiness and innate Peace of *all my Fellow-Creatures*” (3.303; my emphasis).

⁶² For Stoic detachment compared to life on a mountaintop, see the following passages from the *Meditations*: “Contemplate, as from some height, the innumerable herds; and innumerable religious rites, and navigation of all kinds” (114); and “This remainder you have of life is small. Live, as if on a mountain” (125). Samuel Johnson would draw on this motif in his depiction of the Stoic philosopher in *Rasselas*: “‘I have found,’ said the prince ... ‘a man who can teach all that is necessary to be known, who from the unshaken throne of rational fortitude, looks down on the scenes of life changing beneath him’” (*Works of Samuel Johnson* 16.74). Hume would draw on the same motif in his 1773 essay “The Stoic” (*Essays* 151). Curiously, hermit-like detachment does not preclude lachrymosity in Hume’s essay.

Not surprisingly, the Female Spectator explicitly urges readers to mimic her behaviour and practise general calm benevolence or, as it is more commonly known in the periodical, “Good-Nature.”⁶³ To the eidolon, if “we desire a long Life, or to enjoy any of its Blessings, let us ... accustom ourselves to Acts of Benevolence, Affability, and Good-Humour to all we converse or have any Dealings with” (2.199). Admittedly, the scope of such benevolence is restricted to known associates, but the Female Spectator later expands it to include British society in its entirety, including an epistle in her periodical that urges readers to emulate the bees, as the tranquility of “this great Hive, the World” would be assured if individuals would only “do all those Things necessary for the common Good of their whole Community, as well as that of each particular Individual” (3.87). In fact, much like Hutcheson, Haywood suggests that such benevolence bears a divine mandate, if only because God has provided individuals with the mental tools needed to determine that which contributes to the good of society: “the Almighty has given every one a sufficient Share of that Divine Emanation [i.e., reason] to direct them to form a true Judgment of the Things of this World, or at least so far as relates to his own Affairs, or the Good of Society in general” (3.303).

The eidolon urges readers to practise universal benevolence in part through writing. To the Female Spectator, “There is no one Thing which affords a greater Proof of *Good-Nature* than being communicative, and imparting, as much as in us lies, what Degree of Knowledge we are possessed of to those who may have less extended Capacities, or fewer Advantages of Improvement. ... *Good-Nature* is industrious in seeking out as many as it can” (2.218-19). Print

⁶³ Haywood succinctly defines good nature in her periodical as “real Benevolence of Mind” (2.189). Good nature in *The Female Spectator* thus resembles that in *The Prompter*, where it is defined as philanthropy or “humanity” (*Prompter* no. 63).

is an obvious medium with which to communicate knowledge, and readers are invited to join a whole community of writers whose pens are dedicated to promoting “the common Good of Mankind” (2.255). More specifically, they are invited to imitate the many correspondents to *The Female Spectator* who have already learned this lesson, and who have chosen to correspond with the eidolon rather than pursue their own works. As one correspondent observes, “The main View I have to desire the Publication of my Case, is to warn all young Girls, of what Rank or Degree soever, from being guilty of the Fault I have been” (3.369). In this case, significantly, the wisdom being communicated is meant for all women, if not humanity in general.

I would like to make explicit some conclusions regarding Haywood’s emphasis on general or universal benevolence in *The Female Spectator*, to which I have obliquely gestured throughout this chapter. Specifically, I would like to link Haywood’s emphasis on general benevolence—over and against vehement passion—to her particular status as a periodical writer. In the first place, it is worth stressing that Haywood, as periodical essayist, demonstrates her own value to early modern society and the public sphere(s) by promoting and practicing general calm benevolence. Paradoxically, she promotes such benevolence even while depicting characters overwhelmed by powerful, uncontrollable passions. Haywood thus drives home the point that periodical writers and readers play an important part when it comes to the general betterment of eighteenth-century English society. In the second place, Haywood subtly justifies her own periodical project by promoting universal calm benevolence. The philanthropic periodical writer is naturally led to increase the circulation of his or her periodical. Audience building thus becomes a kind of virtue, an expression of good will. As Jon Klancher stresses, the eighteenth-

and nineteenth-century British periodical was “a paradigm of audience making” (4), periodical writers aggressively expanding “the middle-class public whose very scope and diversity would, finally, work against the more traditional intimacy of writer and reader” (20). In Haywood’s case, an emphasis on benevolence legitimizes such relentless expansion. In the third place, Haywood’s championing of general calm benevolence strategically increases the number of her correspondents. A key corollary of the broad shift from vehement passion to calm benevolence is that readers become writers. One obvious way subscribers demonstrate general calm benevolence, after all, is by engaging in dialogue with the *Female Spectator*. They thus assist others by sharing their knowledge and, more generally, further Haywood’s larger project, if only by supplying free printed material for discussion.⁶⁴ In the fourth place, and related to the previous point, Haywood’s tendency to privilege general calm benevolence—an inherently *reasonable* disposition—over the particular vehement passions may be seen as an attempt to promote critical engagement over cursory reading. While a correspondent to *The Female Spectator* complains that “a great many” readers “have not Patience to go through whole Books on any thing” (3.29), those capable of commanding their passions will not only read the periodical *through* but read it *carefully* as well. Of course, it would be unwise to see any one of these points as the controlling impulse behind Haywood’s treatment of the passions in *The Female Spectator*. Taken together, however, they suggest that Haywood, like her fellow periodical writers, was keenly aware of her medium, creatively adapting the contents of her essay

⁶⁴ While Haywood undoubtedly received correspondence from readers, it is impossible to say for sure whether any of the epistles in *The Female Spectator* are genuine or not. Whatever the case, it is important to note that by encouraging general calm benevolence and, indirectly, correspondence, Haywood promotes an already inbuilt aspect of the essay form. As Scott Black reminds us, the essay is inherently responsive: “registering readers’ engagements with texts, the genre enables a practice of response through which, on the one hand, readers participate in their cultures, and, on the other, those cultures evolve” (16).

serial to improve the prestige and reach of the periodical genre, justify her foray into the literary marketplace, and encourage reader response.

CHAPTER TWO

Samuel Johnson, Christopher Smart, and the Constraints of Periodical Publication: Rewriting Virtue in Distress in *The Rambler*, *The Idler*, *The Student*, and *The Midwife*⁶⁵

Whereas Eliza Haywood deploys the figure of the distressed woman in *The Female Spectator* to elicit vehement passions, meaning that she neglects, relatively speaking, to experiment with amatory fictions designed to facilitate calm benevolence, other mid-century periodical writers altered or complicated their portrayals of virtue in distress from the start. In this chapter, I argue that when Samuel Johnson and Christopher Smart included such narratives in their periodicals, they modified them to take into consideration the constraints imposed by the miscellaneous and necessarily abbreviated format of the periodical. Johnson and Smart had differing views on these limitations and their effects; as a result, they elaborated their respective narratives of virtue in distress in contrasting ways. What both have in common, however, is their tendency to limit or contain the pathos of amatory fictions because of a deep-rooted anxiety over the periodical form.

Samuel Johnson, Periodical Publication, and the Sentimental Reader:

Virtue in Distress in *The Rambler* and *The Idler*

Like many of the essay serials and magazines published in mid eighteenth-century England, including *The Female Spectator*, Samuel Johnson's *Rambler* (1750-52) and *Idler* (1758-60) contain numerous melancholy tales of "virtue in distress." Young women who have lost health, wealth, or innocence reach out to Johnson's eidolons for the reader's benefit or their

⁶⁵ All references to *The Adventurer* in this chapter are to vol. II of *The Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1963).

own relief. Despite being linked to the growing market for sentimental literature, Johnson's periodical portrayals of victimized women are notable for their lack of pathos. In this chapter I will suggest that this lack is deliberate. Though these epistles do bear some resemblance to the popular literature of sensibility, their focusing on generic personae rather than specific individuals, their privileging of bare description over tragic declamation, and their disguising of the heroines' emotions distance them from such literature. Equally important, Johnson's tales of virtue in distress tend toward poetic justice and the deflation of what my first chapter identified as "vehement passions." Johnson's rationale for limiting the pathos of these stories is multifaceted, but an overlooked reason has to do with his awareness of the difficulty of raising powerful feelings in short, miscellaneous works. In this, Johnson concurs with contemporary theorists such as Adam Smith, who would go on to state in his *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres* (1762-63) that "smaller compositions ... have not time nor connexion Sufficient to awaken great emotions" (126). Instead of avoiding tragic spectacles altogether, however, Johnson makes a virtue of necessity by arguing that the most *affecting* tales are seldom the most *useful* (*Rambler* 5.320). Unlike obviously sentimental works of literature, Johnson's tales do not agitate the passions, but neither do they inhibit the reader's reformation because of their improbability. Johnson's curiously muted tales of virtue in distress thus reflect his desire to turn the perceived weaknesses of periodical publication into strengths, and, more generally, to solidify the important place of miscellaneous literature in the eighteenth-century literary field.

When they do not avoid them altogether, critics tend to approach Samuel Johnson's female correspondents in *The Rambler* and *The Idler* from a gender studies perspective. Scholars such as Lorraine Eadie, Sarah Morrison, and James Basker have shown how Johnson's fictional

letters from women in the periodicals shed light on his relatively “progressive” attitude toward real women, thus challenging the longstanding perception of Johnson as a misogynist.⁶⁶ While valuable, these studies tend to focus on Johnson the man rather than Johnson the writer, and thus tell only part of the story. Johnson’s female fictions do expose the myth of his misogyny, but, when read with an eye to literary-historical context, they also show him to be a shrewd literary projector. As I will go on to suggest, Johnson’s periodical portrayals of *distressed* women, in particular, should be read in the context of the eighteenth-century demand for sentimental literature, a demand that miscellaneous writers such as Johnson—perennial underdogs in the early modern literary field—met in innovative ways.

The eighteenth-century demand for sentimental literature is obvious enough, though the connection between such literature and the figure of the distressed woman needs some clarification. Admittedly, sentimental literature is a broad and at times amorphous category: for the purposes of this argument, it is enough to say that its defining characteristic was “the arousal of pathos through conventional situations, stock familial characters and rhetorical devices” (Todd 2), and that it was in many ways a response to the emergence of a reading audience eager for “empathetic role playing” (Wittmann 300). As Trevor Ross states, eighteenth-century authors were increasingly aware of, and responsive to, “readers, their judgment, expectations and requirements” (406). Because the arousal of pathos was a key goal of sentimental literature, images of suffering or distress were bound up with this tradition, though it is important to

⁶⁶ See Lorraine Eadie, “Johnson, the Moral Essay, and the Moral Life of Women” (2011); Sarah Morrison, “Samuel Johnson, Mr. Rambler, and Women” (2003); and James Basker, “Dancing Dogs, Women Preachers and the Myth of Johnson’s Misogyny” (1990).

remember that the distressed individuals in sentimental literature had little in common with the larger-than-life heroes of Greek tragedy. As Mikhail Bakhtin observes, the literature of sensibility was predicated on “a pathos occasioned by helplessness and weakness rather than by heroic strength” (397). Specifically, sentimental texts often relied on depictions of female virtue in distress in order to elicit an emotional response on the part of the reader. While male virtue in distress was a possibility, as in Henry Mackenzie’s *Man of Feeling* (1771), the popular perception of women as intrinsically or extremely vulnerable, particularly to the sexual advances of men, meant that the distressed individuals in sentimental tales tended to be “archetypically female” (Barker-Benfield 219). Both eighteenth-century aesthetic theorists and philosophers of the passions were aware of, and repeatedly stressed, the emotive power of the distressed woman figure. As early as 1712, in *Spectator* no. 418, Joseph Addison had argued that an accurate rendering of a “beautiful face ... softened with an Air of Melancholy or Sorrow” had the ability to “raise a secret Ferment in the Mind of the Reader, and to work, with Violence, upon his Passions” (*The Spectator* 3.567). Later critics agreed. Significant in this regard was Lord Kames, who singled out this image when formulating his concept of “ideal presence,” suggesting that portrayals of distressed women were capable of sweeping away the observer in a kind of “reverie.” Kames admits that he himself slipped into just such a waking dream when meditating on the sight of “a beautiful woman in tears for the loss of an only child” (1.67). Of course, one need not have actually *seen* a beautiful woman in tears to imagine such a figure, and Kames is quick to point out that an imaginative, albeit convincing, literary depiction of the rape of Lucretia would serve the same purpose (1.71). Kames’s quasi-phenomenological analysis goes a long way toward explaining why distressed women were such an integral part of the literature of

sensibility: by raising the passions to a fever pitch, such images enabled the “sympathetic identification and even dreamy self-forgetting” craved by sentimental readers (Phillips, *Society and Sentiment* 106).

Before proceeding, it is worth stressing that Johnson was not aloof from either the general culture of sensibility or its corollary, sentimental literature. As Robert Uphaus points out, Johnson was profoundly interested in the “affective appeal” of literature (7). Though reticent to discuss the subject at length—in an instructive reminiscence, Hester Piozzi admits that Johnson never liked to speak “of the pathetic in poetry” (199)—Johnson was conscious that some of the most affecting literature involved female virtue in distress. When commenting on Rowe’s sentimental tragedy *Jane Shore*, Johnson bluntly states that it “lays hold upon the heart” (*Lives of the Poets* 22.584).

It should not be surprising to find, therefore, that Johnson’s periodicals contain numerous portrayals of virtue in distress, nor that these portrayals bear similarities to other, obviously sentimental works of fiction. In the first place, like more popular sentimental works, Johnson’s tales of distress are domestic or private in scope. To eighteenth-century thinkers such as Adam Smith, such a focus was particularly calculated to encourage an emotive response on the part of the reader. As Smith explains in his *Lectures*, “the incidents of private life ... affect us more deeply and interest us more than those of a Publick nature,” for “In Private calamities our passions are fixt on one, as it were concentrated” (113). Johnson would seem to agree, equating the domestic with the pathetic in both his *Life of Rowe* and his *Life of Otway*.⁶⁷ Furthering their

⁶⁷ Regarding *Jane Shore*, Johnson says that “This play, consisting chiefly of domestick scenes and private distress, lays hold upon the heart” (*Lives* 22.584). Speaking of Otway’s *Orphan*, Johnson writes that “It is a domestick tragedy drawn from middle life. Its whole power is upon the affections” (*Lives* 21.257).

connection to the sentimental tradition in literature, Johnson's distressed women narratives feature exceptional protagonists. While the literature of sensibility was marked by an interest in characters "more ordinary than ideal" (Phillips, *Society and Sentiment* 127), the heroes and heroines of such literature were nevertheless often distinguished by some remarkable quality, bearing up Edmund Burke's broad claim in the *Philosophical Enquiry* (1757) that the most affecting narratives involve "some excellent person who sinks under an unworthy fortune" (46-47).

It is therefore significant that the sorrowful heroines in Johnson's periodicals, while not socially high ranking, nevertheless begin their narratives by emphasizing those qualities that elevate them above, or otherwise set them apart from, other women. Recalling her pampered existence before contracting smallpox, Victoria casually states in *Rambler* no. 130 that "I was born a beauty" and that all other women "fell below my perfection" in this regard (4.326-27). Prior to her descent into prostitution, the young Misella in *Rambler* no. 170 is equally remarkable for her innocence (5.136), and even the plebeian Betty Broom in *Idler* no. 26 is distinguished by her charity-school teachers for her academic precocity, until the school's closure drives her to London in search of menial employment (2.80). Other elements that link these tales to the sentimental tradition are, briefly, their epistolary format—making them appear, in Samuel Richardson's memorable phrase, written "to the Moment, while the heart is agitated by Hopes and Fears" (*Sir Charles Grandison* 4), and thus ostensibly eliciting "sympathetic involvement" on the part of the reader (Keymer 584)—and a general air of realism, or rather, an absence of those fantastic and unbelievable elements associated with romance narratives.

That being said—and this is the crux of my argument—Johnson’s tales ultimately work against the prospect of a powerful emotive response on the part of the reader, upholding Iona Italia’s claim that Johnson’s essays “have little in common with the sentimental novels” of the period (“Johnson as Moralizer” 63). To be sure, late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century commentators such as James Boswell, William Hazlitt, and Lord Macaulay never thought of these fictions as particularly affecting, in part because of the correspondents’ Latinate diction, a characteristic that, they implied, distracted from the pathos of the stories. According to Macaulay, “no man surely ever had so little talent for personation as Johnson”: his heroines, like all his characters, speak “in a learned language—in a language which nobody hears from his mother or his nurse—in a language in which nobody ever quarrels, or drives bargains, or makes love—in a language in which nobody ever thinks” (195).⁶⁸

There is an element of truth to such assessments, but the tendency of critics to focus almost exclusively on the Latinate speech patterns of Johnson’s female correspondents, particularly as the nineteenth century wore on, has obscured the more fundamental ways in which Johnson worked to interrupt empathetic identification on the part of his audience. Significant in this regard is his tendency to privilege generalizations over particulars, a tendency, like others I will consider, that confirms his awareness, and perhaps even anticipation of, emerging trends in eighteenth-century aesthetics and philosophies of the passions. As Joseph Priestley observes in his *Lectures on Oratory and Criticism* (1777), “when general and abstract terms are used, the imagination must ... reduce them to particulars, before any real scene can be

⁶⁸ In the same vein, Boswell writes that Johnson’s language makes his female correspondents “seem strangely formal, even to ridicule” (*Life* 1.223). Hazlitt agrees, stating that Johnson’s “Letters from Correspondents ... are more pompous and unwieldy than what he writes in his own person” (144).

imagined, or any passion raised” (84).⁶⁹ It is true that Johnson tends to privilege the general over the particular in all his writings, but this alone does not account for the predominance of the one over the other in his tales of virtue in distress. Moreover, as Howard Weinbrot reminds us, Johnson was known to criticize excessive generality in literature and to stress the value of particularity, above all in his defence of biography (89, 92).⁷⁰ Clearly, then, Johnson’s decision to privilege the general over the particular in these essays is significant, suggesting as it does a deliberate limiting of pathos.

The characters in Johnson’s narratives of virtue in distress bear out this claim. This is not to suggest that they are entirely abstract—simply that they are frequently unnamed, possess general titles, generic names, or are lumped into broad categories. The name of Misella, the prostitute in *Rambler* nos. 170 and 171, is noteworthy in this regard, being simply the feminine form of the Latin adjective meaning “poor” or “wretched.” It is worth recalling that Johnson had used the same adjective in its masculine form in *Rambler* no. 16, this time to describe an unfortunate author, Misellus. Johnson’s use of such names suggests that Misella and Misellus are more a *type* of character in the manner of Theophrastus or, to some extent, La Bruyère, than they are specific individuals.⁷¹ His use of the appellation Perdita or “lost one” in both *Idler* no. 42, a

⁶⁹ Of course, as Ann Jessie Van Sant points out, none of this is particularly new: “In his treatise on the soul, Aristotle explains that the particular moves the passions more effectively than the universal. In the *Rhetoric*, he explains the necessity of ‘actualizing’ an object, of setting it ‘before the eyes’ of an audience. Particularity is the writer’s means of creating images, and thus of turning readers into spectators” (28).

⁷⁰ Johnson writes in *Rambler* no. 60 that those “images, to which we readily conform our minds are ... to be found in narratives of the lives of *particular persons*” (3.319; my emphasis).

⁷¹ As Marie Hamilton Law stresses in her classic study of the English familiar essay, La Bruyère’s “English predecessors had created types which by means of much witty ingenuity, they endowed with attributes which enabled an individual to recognize himself in the type, but La Bruyère made his readers believe in the individuality of the characters he typified” (79).

dismal tale in which the heroine is “tricked out for sale” by her father (2.133), and *Adventurer* no. 74, wherein the protagonist’s pursuit of “a husband of rank and fortune superior to my own” is stymied by a superfluity of advice (2.398), drives home this point.

Yet, while the names of Johnson’s distressed women often suggest only a generic persona, their persecutors are rarely named at all. In *Rambler* no. 12, Zosima, the unfortunate daughter of a bankrupt country gentleman, refers to her cold-hearted London relative simply as “my relation” (3.62), and Misella describes her seducer in the same way. The significance of Johnson’s reliance on such general titles becomes clear in light of Priestley’s observation that the writer who would affect his reader should “prefer a more particular to a more general term; as father, mother, brother, sister, &c. *instead of relation*” (86; my emphasis).⁷² Other persecutors lack a definite identity to the extent that they can be lumped into categories of genus or sex: thus Misella describes her clients simply as “despicable wretches” and “reptiles” (5.139); and Victoria distinguishes those who mistreat her only in terms of their sex (4.343). This lack of characterization reflects an absence of psychological development, but more importantly, it works against the likelihood of the reader’s being moved by Johnson’s melancholy female correspondents.

If a lack of characterization is designed to prevent the reader from conceiving a clear image of the women in question and therefore from viewing them with any degree of emotion, the women’s own tendency to hurry through those parts of their narratives that would seem most

⁷² Priestley goes on to state that such a writer should also prefer specific terms such as “justice, temperance, veracity, &c. and cruelty, covetousness, deceit, &c. as the case requires, instead of the more indefinite terms virtue, and vice; and universally, the proper names of persons, places, and things, rather than more comprehensive terms which are applicable to other ideas besides those ... intended to be conveyed” (86).

affecting is calculated to be equally disruptive of pathos. In this, Johnson once again demonstrates his awareness of emerging trends in aesthetic theory, if only by reversing prescriptions for raising the passions put forward by eighteenth-century theorists. As Kames would later observe in his *Elements of Criticism* (1762), “it is necessary that the cause of every emotion be present to the mind a due time; for an emotion is not carried to its height but by reiterated impressions” (1.70). Such reiterated impressions are conspicuously lacking in Johnson’s tales of virtue in distress. One has only to read Betty Broom’s unhappy history in *The Idler* to realize that Johnson’s narratives are often remarkably fast-paced: in these essays, one tragic situation gives way to another, with the repetitive insertion of the transitioning adverb “then” precluding any possibility of reflection (e.g., “I then lived with a gentlewoman of a small fortune,” “I then fled for refuge to the other end of the town,” “I was then hired by a consumptive lady”) (2.90-91). Zosima’s sad tale in *Rambler* no. 12, in which the protagonist rushes from one interview to the next, is similarly fast-paced. As such, when potentially pathetic events are described, they generally take the form of short, bare descriptions.

Perhaps more importantly, Johnson’s victimized women rarely show their own emotions, either to their persecutors or to the periodical eidolon. This omission is significant, according to Adam Smith, because “no action however affecting in itself, can be represented in such a manner as to be very interesting ... by a bare narration where it is described directly without taking notice of ... the effects it had on those who were either actors or spectators of the whole affair” (*Lectures* 86). Admittedly, none of Johnson’s periodical correspondents, be they actors or spectators, come across as particularly emotional. Yet such reticence is striking when one considers the degree of distress under which many of his female correspondents labour.

Remarkably, some of Johnson's distressed women appear not even to feel grief over their losses. Following the "failure of a fund, in which my money was placed," the suddenly penniless Melissa observes in *Rambler* no. 75, "I bore the diminution of my riches without any outrages of sorrow, or pusillanimity of dejection" (4.30). Most, though, simply hide their feelings: after contracting smallpox, Victoria states that she did not gratify her acquaintance with "any appearance of resentment or depression" (4.344); and when she is literally "depressed" by her relations, Misella locks herself away "to vent my grief" (5.137). Moreover, while a few female correspondents do see Johnson's periodicals as a legitimate outlet for their emotions—Molly Quick, the waiting maid in *Idler* no. 46 who is terrorized by her employer's "odd humour," states that she must vent her "vexation" to the *Idler* because if she does not she will "burst" her silence to her mistress (2.143)—most hide them from the reader as well. Upon the death of a kind employer in *Idler* no. 29, Betty Broom writes, "I shall say no more than that her servant wept upon her grave" (91); and after being expelled from her home, Misella says that the "rage, anguish, and resentment, which I felt ... are not to be expressed" (5.142). In this last case, Misella's professed inability to communicate her feelings to the reader should not be taken as a form of *adynaton*. The truth is that Misella may well have the words to communicate her feelings, but she is unwilling to do so, as the rest of her narrative makes clear. Kathleen Kemmerer sums up this aspect of the tales nicely when she states that Johnson's female personae never "report their emotional reactions to events" (82), and almost always speak in an "emotionally understated style" (85).⁷³

⁷³ Carey McIntosh's observation regarding *Rambler* nos. 170 and 171 is generally applicable here: to McIntosh, Misella's story is "curiously muffled, not weepy at all," in large part because of the focus on circumstances rather than feelings (160).

To this point, I have focused primarily on those rhetorical and stylistic elements of Johnson's stories of virtue in distress that limit their pathetic appeal. Yet there are other more general features of plot and narrative progression that do the same. Significantly, Johnson's periodical essays rarely feature sexual victimization, a trump card of sentimental literature. To be sure, the events recorded are generally calamitous and the threat of sexual victimization often present.⁷⁴ But such fears seldom come to fruition. Characteristic in this regard is Betty Broom's observation in *The Idler*, following her journey to the metropolis, that "I had no snares laid for me at my arrival but came safe to the sister of my mistress," a narrative turn that interrupts the reader's horizon of expectations (2.81). There is a general trend toward *deus ex machina* poetic justice in these essays.⁷⁵ "Redeemer" figures repeatedly emerge to rescue women who have suffered one catastrophe and are in danger of suffering a worse. The numinous Euphemia appears at the conclusions of *Rambler* nos. 12 and 133 to rescue Zosima and Victoria, respectively, providing financial assistance and good advice; and in *Idler* no. 29, Betty Broom is suddenly extricated from her problems when a consumptive lady "died and left me five hundred pounds" (2.92). The list could go on.⁷⁶ Even Misella the prostitute ends her tale with the

⁷⁴ Zosima's relation, for example, talks of "sending me down in the wagon to preserve me from bad courses" (3.67); and in the *Idler*, Perdita is afraid that the "track" which she is on may lead her "at last to ruin" (2.132). This is not to discount the fact that there is, at times, a bathetic aspect to these fictions: Molly Quick's fear in *Idler* no. 46 is not that she will be forced into a life of prostitution if she displeases her employer, but that her mistress will "perhaps give the next gown to the housekeeper" (2.146).

⁷⁵ For more on Johnson and poetic justice see Joan Klingel, "Reconciling Johnson's Views on Poetic Justice" (1983).

⁷⁶ "Miss Maypole," oppressed by her mother, is defended by a "maiden sister of my father" (3.298); Melissa discovers that she has two unexpected friends in "an old curate" and a "lieutenant of dragoons" (4.32); and Perdita in *Idler* no. 42 is encouraged by a "pious relation" who bids her "fly" to heaven for protection (2.134).

optimistic hope that she will be deported to the colonies, a circumstance that would restore her to “honesty and peace” (5.145).

There are a number of equally plausible reasons that could be put forward to explain why Johnson shies away from presenting pathetic “pictures of life” in his periodicals, including his general distrust of imagination—expressed most vividly, perhaps, in the mad astronomer chapters of Johnson’s novella *Rasselas*—or a more pointed dislike of emotionalism. In 1769, after all, Johnson roundly criticized those very “sensible” individuals who weep over the misfortunes of others but show no interest in alleviating their sufferings: “You will find these very feeling people are not very ready to do you good. They *pay* you by *feeling*” (Boswell, *Life* 2.95).⁷⁷ Such reasons are certainly not wrong. Yet, an analysis of Johnson’s tales of virtue in distress that stops here would be incomplete, failing as it would to take into consideration the constraints of periodical publication.

As such, I suggest that an equally important, and even fundamental, reason for Johnson’s reticence at attempting moving narratives of distressed women in his periodicals is simply that truly affecting narratives were thought to require a great deal of uninterrupted space. To put it another way, short, miscellaneous pieces were seen as incapable of raising readers’ passions to what Kames referred to as a “due pitch,” unlike longer, more uniform works (1.212). As Adam Smith observes in his *Lectures*, “Great Passions as they are long of being raised in the Persons themselves so are they not to be raised in us but by a work of considerable Length” (126). Smith

⁷⁷ For more on Johnson’s distrust of imagination see John Radner, “Samuel Johnson, the Deceptive Imagination, and Sympathy” (1974). A discussion of Johnson’s dislike of emotionalism can be found in Leopold Damrosch, *Samuel Johnson and the Tragic Sense* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1972).

further observes, “A temper of mind that differs very little from the common tranquility of mind is what we can best enter into, by the perusal of a piece of a small length” (126). More importantly, as Johnson himself argued, pathetic emotions are easily interrupted by the unexpected insertion of an incongruous idea. In his *Life of Cowley*, Johnson remarks that the metaphysical poets were incapable of raising their readers’ passions because they tended to privilege the “unexpected and surprising” and had “no regard to that uniformity of sentiment which enables us to conceive and to excite the pains and the pleasures of other minds” (21.27). While the comparison should not be pushed too far, miscellaneous periodical literature, like the conceits of metaphysical poetry, combines “heterogeneous ideas” in a larger whole (21.26)—though periodicals frequently do so on a number of different levels, in terms of both content and form. In *Rambler* no. 158, Johnson defines the essay, a literary mode or genre with close ties to periodical publication, as a “licentious” combination of material drawn from the author’s mind and heaped together “without order, coherence, or propriety” (5.77); and in *Idler* no. 40 he puts his finger on a more general lack of coherence in many periodicals, lamenting the proximity of his didactic leaders to the frivolous advertisements of a commercial society: “The noblest objects may be so associated as to be made ridiculous” (2.126). Unable to maintain that “uniformity of sentiment” which is a prerequisite of empathetic identification, the periodical writer is thus at a clear disadvantage when it comes to tragic spectacles.

And yet, rather remarkably, Johnson does not shy away from such spectacles altogether, but instead works to convince his readers of the utility of melancholy fictions that do not agitate the passions unduly or, rather, that inspire calm rather than vehement passions. As Paul Keen reminds us, “it is worth remembering the energy with which some writers made a virtue of

necessity” (163). The didactic purposes of literature are at the root of Johnson’s defence, a didacticism that depends on mimesis or the verisimilitude of the object being represented. The problem, as Johnson sees it, is that the characters and events in pathetic literature are often too fantastic to credit, and “what we cannot credit we shall never imitate” (3.24). In his final *Rambler* essay, Johnson argues that as comic characters and scenes become more humorous and tragic characters and scenes more pathetic, “The mind of the reader is carried away from the contemplation of his own manners; he finds in himself no likeness to the phantom before him; and though he laughs or rages, is not reformed” (5.320). Put bluntly, Johnson’s own tales may not powerfully affect readers, but obviously pathetic literature does not always teach them anything because it is unnatural, and, therefore, unbelievable. In this way, the rather muted or muffled quality of Johnson’s tales of virtue in distress could actually be said to work in their favour, emphasizing as it does their verisimilitude and thus ensuring their applicability. This is not to suggest that Johnson’s defence is entirely convincing. Theorists such as Kames would presumably counter that pathetic literature must maintain an air of reality—that is, such texts must conform to “the order and course of nature”—for an “improbable incident” disrupts ideal presence (1.76)⁷⁸ Moreover, by making this defence Johnson opens himself up to the charge that his own heroines are not always as believable as they could be, and that poetic justice is generally found in poems rather than in real life. The point I would like to stress, however, is simply that Johnson could be said to anticipate the charge that would be levelled against his

⁷⁸ To Kames, “a chain of imagined incidents linked together according to the order of nature, finds easy admittance into the mind; and a lively narrative of such incidents, occasions complete images, or in other words ideal presence: but our judgement revolts against an improbable incident; and if we once begin to doubt of its reality, farewell relish and concern” (1.76).

periodical tales of virtue in distress by calling into question the merits of obviously or excessively pathetic literature.

In the end, Johnson's periodical fictions of virtue in distress should be thought of both as a product of the eighteenth-century demand for sentimental literature—including in *The Rambler* and *The Idler* to appeal to a growing body of sentimental readers hungry for such spectacles—and as an anomaly in the company of such literature. With their privileging of generic personae or “types,” their tendency to gloss over affecting scenes, and their general drive toward poetic justice, Johnson's tales are curiously unlike other, more obviously pathetic portrayals of virtue in distress. As I have argued, this lack of pathos should be understood in light of the constraints of periodical publication, though this did not stop Johnson, and other periodical essayists like him, from printing melancholy tales of victimized women. In fact, such tales abound in mid eighteenth-century English periodicals, a reflection of the fact that periodical writers were comfortable and capable of making a virtue of necessity. I am not suggesting that all eighteenth-century periodical writers conceived of the constraints of periodical publication in exactly the same way as Johnson did or reacted to them uniformly. Tales of virtue in distress in Haywood's *Female Spectator* (chapter one) and even Hawkesworth's *The Adventurer* (chapter three), to which Johnson was a contributor, bear closer affinities to obviously sentimental works than those found in *The Rambler* and *The Idler*. Nor am I attempting to gauge how real readers of Johnson's periodicals actually appropriated these texts, recognizing, as Michel De Certeau puts it, that there is a “silent, transgressive, ironic or poetic” aspect of reading that resists coercion (172). But these two qualifications do not, I believe, discount the saliency of my argument, namely, that

Johnson's tales of virtue in distress reflect the ingenuity and innovation with which periodical writers responded to the constraints of their form and the demands of a market-driven society.

Christopher Smart, *Concordia Discors*, and the Figure of the Distressed Woman: Sentiment and Sentimental Parody in *The Student* and *The Midwife*

As with Johnson's periodicals, the two magazines with which Christopher Smart was most closely associated, *The Student, or Oxford and Cambridge Monthly Miscellany* (1750-51)⁷⁹ and *The Midwife, or The Old Woman's Magazine* (1750-53), are interspersed with sentimental vignettes depicting female virtue in distress. Although Smart did not write all of these tales—he produced *The Midwife* almost single-handedly, but was one of several contributors to *The Student*—the ones he did compose show him to be a shrewd literary projector, responsive to an emerging demographic of sentimental readers. Curiously, however, Smart tends to surround sentimental depictions of distressed women—his own and those of others—with humorous parodies of virtue in distress. In these parodies, the predatory and diabolical men of sentimental narratives are replaced by comic, bumbling admirers; at the same time, innocent and naive female victims give way to experienced and aggressive old maids. Although Smart was inclined to satire, I contend that these tales do not, despite initial appearances, offer an underhanded attack on the sentimental tradition by comically parodying the pathetic tale. Smart may not have been a sentimentalist at heart, but neither was he opposed to sentimental narratives *per se*. So what then? This conundrum can be solved, at least in part, by considering both Smart's overarching commitment to miscellaneity and his concomitant desire for unity in diversity. Smart

⁷⁹ Smart's controlling influence begins to be felt in the sixth number of *The Student*, when "Cambridge" was added to the title.

is intensely critical of other mid-century magazines, primarily because of their disconnected character, a quality that makes them “only calculated to puzzle, not instruct the Reader” (“Index to Mankind,” *Midwife* 3:161).⁸⁰ While actively promoting miscellaneity, Smart also works to create a sense of connection amongst disparate pieces in *The Student* and *The Midwife*, thereby to achieve a kind of unity in an inherently fractured form. It is in this light that we should understand Smart’s tendency to juxtapose sentimental vignettes with comic parodies. While obviously different, such tales are nevertheless fundamentally connected. As such, Smart’s curious combination turns out to be part of a larger project to counter key weaknesses of the magazine form and, in the process, to achieve credibility for an otherwise disreputable genre.

As eighteenth-century scholars have long recognized, Smart was plagued by “habitual untimeliness” in his literary productions (Powell, *Smart’s English Lyrics* 89). Characteristic in this regard is Smart’s translation of Phaedrus’s fables, which appeared long after the public had tired of similar works by Gay and Moore (Powell 89). At first glance, Smart’s work as a periodical writer would seem to exhibit the same sense of misjudgement. Instead of embracing in his periodical productions the polite and genteel style popularized by Addison and Steele, for example, Smart gravitates toward the “acerbic” wit (Wild 46) and “learned humour” (Sherbo 71) of satirists such as Aristophanes, Lucian, Rabelais, and Swift. Equally striking is the curious makeup or structure of Smart’s *Midwife*, so different from that of more popular miscellanies such as *The Gentleman’s Magazine* (1731-1833, first series). Ross King finds *The Midwife* unique for

⁸⁰ In terms of its immediate context, this phrase concerns “Common-Place Book[s]” and other “Things of this Nature.” To my mind, “Things of this Nature” may very reasonably be said to include magazines and miscellanies in general.

its “irreverent blending” of genres and forms (“Insolent Women”); Lance Bertelsen for its “ontological promiscu[ity]” or “fractured ontology” (367); and Fraser Easton for its “energetic mixture” of the comic and the serious (197). John and Deborah Sitter are particularly struck by “the ways period pieties and tender tales jostle boisterously with parody and irreverence” (226).⁸¹ Without disputing these assessments of the frequently anomalous nature of Smart’s periodical productions, I would like to suggest that Smart was more in tune with market demand than critics have realized. His pathetic tales of distressed women in *The Midwife*, in particular, show him to be, at least on occasion, a shrewd literary projector.

As previously indicated, the number of readers eager for emotional arousal and empathetic identification grew rapidly during the second half of the eighteenth century. Increasingly aware of their audiences, opportunistic authors responded to this development with texts featuring a “trembling alertness to the minutiae of suffering and sympathy” (Keymer 572). It bears repeating that such texts frequently revolved around “formulaic plots of beleaguered [female] virtue and predatory [male] vice” (Keymer 587). Unsurprisingly, Smart’s enterprising publisher and father-in-law, John Newbery, was aware of the demand for sentimental spectacles, and printed a string of pathetic tales of virtue in distress early on in *The Student*, even before Smart’s involvement with the magazine. These vignettes were part of a larger scheme to set up “a society for the benefit of the widows and children of minor clergy” (Mounsey 97), but a more general function was to expand the readership of the *The Student* by attracting sentimental

⁸¹ Of course, all magazines are inherently diverse, eliciting what Barbara Benedict refers to as “conflicting sympathetic reactions, including especially laughter, reflection, wonder, and tears,” and thus demanding that the reader “be able to shift quickly among different reactions as the mode of expression shifts” (*Making the Modern Reader* 21). What critics such as Easton, Bertelsen, and King realize is that Smart takes such heterogeneity to new levels in *The Midwife*, and thus keeps readers on an emotional rollercoaster.

readers. The tales themselves are explicitly sentimental, and are identified as such either in terms of paratextual matter (the title of one reads “Pathetick History of a Clergyman’s Widow”) or passing references in neighbouring pieces.⁸² They also feature many of the *topoi* of popular sentimental works, focusing on penniless clergymen’s widows and orphans who are victimized by predatory men from the upper classes. What is more, many follow the familiar and increasingly predictable plot points of sentimental novels. In these narratives, false promises and sham marriages (*Student* 1.302) lead to pregnancy (1.257-58, 1.302), callous abandonment (1.258, 1.302), arrest for debt (1.258), a turn to prostitution (1.212), and an ultimate descent into hysteria or madness (1.303).

I have already noted that Smart did not write any of the sentimental tales in *The Student*. They were most likely the productions of George Russel. However, Smart did publish his own pathetic narratives of distressed women in *The Midwife*, and these bear obvious similarities to those found in *The Student*, not to mention more popular sentimental works. Two narratives stand out in this regard: in “The Villain: A True History,” an innocent orphan girl, “weak and unthinking,” travels to London to seek employment (*Midwife* 1.25), but is met on the road by a “cruel ... inhuman Villain” (1.27) who dupes her into agreeing to a private wedding in Fleet Prison before abandoning her; and in “A Survey of Bedlam,” Hannah, a “poor innocent Girl” recently come into an inheritance (1.220), is tricked out of her fortune and abandoned by “the basest of Villains,” “one of those infamous Creatures [... with] a Wife in *Ireland*, one in

⁸² In an epistle “To the Student,” for example, a correspondent praises the editors of the magazine for having “painted so pathetically” the distresses of poor clergymen’s widows (2.181); and in the Student’s “Farewell to the Public,” the eidolon reflects on “the many private histories occasionally publish’d by us,” which “so pathetically enforced” the importance of instituting a “scheme” or society for their relief (2.391).

Scotland, and another in the *West Indias*” (1.22). In both cases, the women respond to their ruin and abandonment with floods of tears and general hysteria, although in Hannah’s case, her distress is so severe that she is confined to Bedlam, where she recounts her sad tale to visitors.

As in other sentimental tales, the hysteria in these narratives is calculated to encourage a related reaction on the part of the reader. According to Janet Todd, “sentimental literature is exemplary of emotion, teaching its consumers to produce a response equivalent to the one presented in its episodes. It is a kind of pedagogy of seeing and of the physical reaction that this seeing should produce” (4). When, therefore, in “The Villain,” the abandoned heroine’s heart fills “with Anguish, and her Eyes with Tears,” the reader is supposed to respond in kind (*Midwife* 1.26). Moreover, in this particular tale, the sheer volume of tears shed leaves little doubt as to the correct sympathetic response. Thus Hannah weeps while recounting her story, but so do Mary Midnight (the eidolon) and Charles Trusty (her suitor) who have paused to hear it during their tour of Bedlam (1.260). In fact, Trusty is “so affected with her Story, that he frequently shed Tears during the Narration” (1.224).

The publication of such obviously sentimental tales of virtue in distress in *The Midwife* suggests that Smart was more in tune with eighteenth-century literary trends and more responsive to the demands of an emerging body of sentimental readers than critics have credited him for. And yet, Smart’s response to the sentimental tradition in literature is anything but straightforward, as becomes clear when his pathetic pieces are viewed *in situ*. As Gillian Hughes reminds us, “magazine fiction is only separated out with difficulty from its surroundings, and the most apparently conventional story reads differently in context” (464). While Smart’s publication of pathetic tales of virtue in distress in *The Midwife* is noteworthy, therefore, equally striking is

his tendency to juxtapose such tales, whether found in *The Midwife* or in *The Student*, with comic parodies.

Before proceeding, a word on terminology is in order. After all, as Gérard Genette observes in *Palimpsests* (1997), “the word parody is ... the site of a rather onerous confusion” (24). It is thus worth stressing that the parodic narratives to which I refer are not parodies in Genette’s sense of the term. That is, they are not direct transformations of specific precursor texts, in the form of quotations, *inter alia*. In Genette’s schema they are closer to pastiche—playful, humorous, or ironic imitations of a broad literary tradition. While I choose not to adopt Genette’s system in this chapter, primarily for the sake of simplicity and clarity, the reader should be aware that I use the term “parody” to mean a form of pastiche or burlesque.

Generally speaking, Smart’s parodic impulse manifests itself in the figures of the Female Student and Mary Midnight, both of whom are controlling eidolons of their respective magazines, though the former acts in an admittedly secondary capacity to her “dear Brother.” Despite some overlap between these two characters—at one point, the Female Student claims to be “that very same Midwife, who publishes the *Old Woman’s Magazine*, which makes so much noise in the world” (*Student* 2.52)—I will treat them as distinct entities. The two may resemble each other superficially, but they are nevertheless quite distinct. This is not to suggest that Smart is entirely consistent when it comes to either figure. Much like the first-person narrators utilized by the Roman verse satirists Horace and Juvenal, each one of Smart’s eidolons appears to be made up of “several versions of a self,” and each is thus “better regarded performatively than confessionally, [as] a persona rather than a strictly autobiographical subject” (Sitter, *Eighteenth-*

Century Poetry 94). Still, this is no reason to confuse or conflate two characters who are so obviously different.

Leaving aside their putative connection or identity, what links the Female Student and Mary Midnight to the sentimental heroines of pathetic tales of distress? What makes the one a parody of the other? A brief comparison will shed light on some underlying similarities that Smart exploits to comic effect. Like so many of the distressed women found in sentimental tales, the Female Student and Mary Midnight are vulnerable, the former an orphan, the latter a widow. As a result, both find themselves in precarious financial circumstances. While the Female Student and her mother must survive on a small legacy amounting to a “sum scarce sufficient to maintain us” (*Student* 2.50), Mary Midnight’s position is even more perilous. A seventy-year-old widow (*Midwife* 3.59) with no savings (2.223), she also claims to be the mother of twenty-six children (2.101). Consequently, both eidolons must take on menial employment in order to survive, although, somewhat uncharacteristically, it is Grub Street hack-work that attracts them. The Female Student laments, “I am now forc’d to apply my pen, as others of my sex do their needle,—to get bread” (*Student* 2.52).⁸³

Perhaps the most important element linking Smart’s eidolons to the distressed women in sentimental tales is their pursuit by men with dishonourable intentions. Thus the Female Student receives an offer of marriage from “the elegant Mr. Supple,” with the dubious caveat that the ceremony be performed in secret, and their union only be revealed when “he met with preferment” (*Student* 2.189). Mary Midnight appears to be the object of even more blatant and brutal male advances when she somewhat surprisingly claims that both John Henley—the

⁸³ Curiously, aside from their work for the magazines, both the Female Student and the Midwife also compose “Manuscript Sermons” for their acquaintance (*Student* 2.52 and *Midwife* 2.215).

freethinking clergyman characterized by Alexander Pope as “Preacher at once, and zany of thy age!” (*Dunciad* 3.206)—and the Greek god Apollo “have amorous Intentions upon my Person” (*Midwife* 3.50, 3.56).

As quickly becomes clear, however, these narratives bear only a superficial resemblance to the often formulaic sentimental tales of virtue in distress. In the first place, while sentimental tales of virtue in distress tend to follow the trajectory of a vulnerable, naive woman tragically betrayed by an experienced, predatory man, the gallants who pursue Smart’s female eidolons are not the potent devils found in sentimental tales but harmless caricatures. Many seem genuinely to desire marriage, and an aura of impotence lingers around those whose intentions are dishonourable. Smart illustrates the toothlessness of these men, at least in part, by their age. Many are “senior admirers” (*Student* 2.187), among them Dr. Atrophy in *The Student* and Charles Trusty in *The Midwife*, who, while they may work to disguise their senescence, never quite succeed in doing so.⁸⁴ Others are mere “shadows” (*Student* 2.104) or harmless beasts. In fact, most of the men who pursue the Female Student are defined not by their human traits but by their animal ones. To give only a few examples, Solomon Salop is described as a “ridiculous ape” (*Student* 2.226), Mr. Tunbelly as a turtle (2.225), Dr. Atrophy as “a dried herring without his roe” (2.188),⁸⁵ and Mr. Brevier alternately as a dog, an amphibian, and a horse (2.226). Others are compared to creatures even lower down the chain of being and are equally harmless. Thus the

⁸⁴ Prior to their third and final tour of Bedlam, Charles Trusty attempts to convince Mrs. Midnight that “there are many young Fellows in Town, born since I was a Man, who are in most Respects older than myself,” and that his “Strength of Constitution and Flow of Spirits are owing to a firm Adherence to Virtue, and a regular Course of Life” (*Midwife* 1.261).

⁸⁵ The phrase “a dried herring without his roe” is a reference to Shakespeare’s *Romeo and Juliet*, Mercurio observing of the downcast Romeo that he is “Without his roe, like a dried herring. O flesh, flesh, how art thou fishified!” (2.3.35-36).

Female Student refers to one group of admirers as a swarm of “inferior insects, who buzz’d about, and wanton’d for a while in the sunshine of my favours” (2:110). Most surprisingly, some are not even male at all: Mr. Brevier, the printer-turned-bookseller who attempts to “ingratiate himself” with the Female Student, dwindles “into a mere old woman” by the conclusion of the narrative (*Student* 2.228); and Orator Henley, whose attentions the Midwife finds so disgusting, is accused of being the same (*Midwife* 3.50).

Because the men who pursue the Female Student and Mary Midnight are generally harmless, defanged entities, they tend to inspire neither anger nor a desire for revenge in the reader. Yet Smart goes to great lengths to make these men appear not only harmless, but also comic. Rather than merely inhibiting a particular passionate response, therefore (e.g., the violent passion of anger), Smart essentially substitutes one such response for another. In this context we should recall Hobbes, who argues in *The Elements of Law* that laughter is the visible manifestation of a “passion which hath no name” (54). The comic aspect of these men has in large part to do with their appearance. Smart’s gallants are neither the “genteel” nor the “best dressed”—terms used to describe Mrs. Jenny’s truly diabolical lover in “The VILLAIN: *A True History*” (*Midwife* 1.24)—which distinguishes them from the villains of sentimental tales.

Rather, their appearance is often risible in Kames’s sense of the term. To Kames, disproportionate features are chiefly responsible for making an individual risible, specifically, “a nose remarkably long or short” or any other physical feature having “some remarkable defect or excess” (1.194). Such disproportionate features give rise to a laugh of pleasure and, notably, characterize a number of Smart’s beaux. Characteristic in this regard is Mr. Tunbelly, whose “diminutiveness” of stature is curiously contrasted with his “huge globosity of paunch” (*Student*

2.224). Equally characteristic is Dr. Atrophy, who is “so lank and meagre” as to appear almost “skin and bones” (*Student* 2.188). If the disproportionate features of some of these men give rise to a laugh of pleasure, the clothes of others encourage a laugh of scorn, and are thus, in Kames’s sense of the term, ridiculous (1.253).⁸⁶ Charles Trusty’s wig, for example, is ridiculous in that it is “made up in the ancient Fashion,” and is so outdated as to draw the “Attention of the whole Company” as Trusty waits to conduct Mary Midnight to Bedlam (*Midwife* 1.215). Francis Hutcheson stresses that this is an entirely appropriate response in his *Reflections Upon Laughter* (1725), stating that “if in any polite assembly, a contrary dress, behaviour, or ceremony appear, to which we have joined in our country ideas of meanness, rusticity, sullenness, a laugh does ordinarily arise” (24).

Just as the risible features and ridiculous clothes of these men are calculated to induce laughter in the reader, so too are their actions, which are equally improper and therefore equally absurd. According to Joseph Priestley, “the most abundant scenes of mirth and laughter, are incongruities relating to human sentiments, which some distinguish by the name of improprieties. Such are the blunders and mistakes, the false taste, and absurd speeches and actions of some of our own species” (206). Such “incongruities of sentiment” are easily apparent in Charles Trusty, Mary Midnight’s elderly suitor, who commits the *faux pax* of reading an hour-long “Lecture on Punctuality” in a coffee shop (*Midwife* 1.215). They are also apparent in Mr. Tunbelly, who, “tho’ he had neither voice nor ear, yet pretended to a most exquisite taste for

⁸⁶ Kames characterizes the ridiculous as whatever is “contemptible” or “improper,” and suggests that “blunders and absurdities” are notable instances (1.194). Joseph Priestley provides a somewhat more specific definition when he suggests that “objects truly ridiculous are such as pride in rags, conceit in ignorance, and hypocrisy in gravity, a violent passion raised by a trifling cause, and great disproportion between the means and ends of human actions” (207).

music,” serenading the Female Student with his “harmonious croaking” while strumming an enormous bass-viol “on tip-toes” (*Student* 2.224-25). What compounds the absurdity of these actions is their performance by elderly men who insist on acting the part of young lovers. As the Female Student muses, “what can be more ridiculous? For at the maturer time of life, the flame burns with less heat but more constancy, and love is consolidated into friendship” (*Student* 2.188).

A final factor that contributes to making the gallants of these tales appear more comic than dangerous—or even respectable—is the eidolons’ tendency to compare them with classical figures. The Female Student is particularly keen to make such comparisons. In one of her first papers on academical gallantry, she portrays the unfortunate Beau Blossom as a kind of Narcissus, whose affection for her is rivalled only by his love of “himself and his fiddle-stick.” In fact, his self-love is so pronounced that when his arm is “obliged to be cut off” following a riding accident, “he soon after died of the mortification” (*Student* 2.106).⁸⁷ The Female Student is more explicit elsewhere, referring to Beau Blossom as “my Orpheus” (*Student* 2.105) and to Mr. Starch shortly thereafter as Ladon, “the dragon guarding the Hesperian fruit” (2.110). Such indiscriminating comparisons between high and low subjects are common fare in comic texts—Swift’s “A Description of a City Shower” (1710) provides a number of good examples—and undoubtedly contribute to the humour of Smart’s parodies. Contemporary aesthetic theorists stressed as much, though the idea was by no means unique to the eighteenth century. As the Roman orator Quintilian observes in his monumental *Institutes of Oratory*—a book Mary

⁸⁷ Mortification may refer to localized necrosis of tissue or gangrene (*OED* def. I.2), though the Female Student does not use the term in this way: “I ... was inform’d, that his arm being oblig’d to be cut off, he soon after died of the mortification,—I mean the extreme mortification to think that the finest hand in *England* was spoil’d by it” (2.106).

Midnight says “no Man or Woman of Learning ought to be without” (3.8)—“material for jests is [often] supplied by ... comparisons of things greater, equal, or less” (6.3.66).⁸⁸

To this point, I have shown that the men who pursue Smart’s female idolons function as comic parodies of the diabolical villains found in sentimental tales of virtue in distress. But how are the two idolons themselves distinct from stereotypical sentimental heroines? Some differences are obvious enough. On a basic level, both are “stale superannuated virgins,” neither being remarkable either for virtue or beauty (*Student* 2.253). In fact, while the Female Student loses her charms on her twenty-eighth birthday, Mary Midnight appears to have always been “Ancient, Female, and plain” (*Midwife* 1.93).⁸⁹ More importantly, neither idolon is either innocent or naive. Mary Midnight is notably experienced, at one point suggestively stating that “there’s not a Street, Lane, or Alley, in all the City, but I have trod” (*Midwife* 1.6). This statement signifies in various ways: on one level, treading London’s back-alleys and by-ways suggests geographical knowledge; on another, it implies sexual experience. Robert Erickson emphasizes this notorious aspect of Mary Midnight’s character, arguing that by deploying a midwife idolon, Smart conjures up a character who is alternately “physician, wise woman, gossip, fortuneteller, bawd, whore, Gypsy, authority on sex” (277). And yet, this is not the only kind of knowledge that Smart’s idolons possess. The Female Student and Mary Midnight are also keen interpreters

⁸⁸ To illustrate how laughter can rise from absurd comparisons, Quintilian points to a story by Marcus Caelius concerning “the dispute between Decimus Lælius and his colleague when they were both in a hurry to reach their province first” (6.3.39). To Quintilian, “The whole of the story told by Caelius is full of wit and invention, but the gem of the passage is its conclusion. ‘He followed him, but how he crossed the straits, whether it was a ship or a fisherman’s boat, no one knew; but the Sicilians, being of a lively turn of wit, said that he rode on a dolphin and effected his crossing like a second Arion’ (6.3.41).

⁸⁹ In “A Dissertation on the Dignity, Benefit and Beauty of UGLINESS,” Mary Midnight writes that “when I view those unhappiest of all human Creatures, the Ladies of Pleasure, and find so many fine Women among them, I bless myself that I never was very eminent for my corporeal Charms, and that I am an Example of the following Precept, BE UGLY, AND BE HAPPY” (1.243).

—the latter observing that “I am not so credulous ... as to believe every Story at first Hearing” (*Midwife* 1.43)—and philosophically inclined. In her first epistle, the Female Student proudly states that “I am mistress of the Latin language, I have sounded the depths of philosophy” (*Student* 2.49). Mary Midnight is equally knowledgeable, making the grand tour of Europe “two Years before my Marriage with my dear Mr. Midnight” (*Midwife* 2.214), where she becomes “perfectly well acquainted with all the sciences and ... every language” (*The Nonpareil* iv). In this way, significantly, both can be said to resemble the “powerful Amazons” and “learned ladies” so prevalent in neoclassical antifeminist satire, as described by Felicity Nussbaum in *The Brink of All We Hate* (1984).

What separates Smart’s idolons most from the woman in distress, however, is their predatory pursuit of men, a circumstance that also links Smart’s periodicals with antifeminist, misogynist literature. The Female Student is particularly aggressive in her search for a husband, and resolves “within [herself] to be run away with by a nobleman, or a baronet at least” (*Student* 2.50). In fact, as one essay gives way to the next, her language becomes increasingly characterized by sporting metaphors, as when she laments that she had “out-run my game in the pursuit” (2.51). She is also keen to entrap or “spread ... snares” for potential suitors (2.51). At one point she recalls how “a young freshman, not sixteen, just come out of the country ... fell readily into my snares” (2.110)—a particularly obvious reversal of sentimental conventions—and at another how a country parson “seem’d so greedily to devour the bait” (2.226). It is significant that Mary Midnight deploys the same language of entrapment when she discovers Charles Trusty’s “amorous intentions,” stating that she is “at that time of life, in which there is no time to spare; and therefore, as Shakespeare says, ‘He shall go no farther than a Wanton’s Bird, /

That lets it hop a little from her Hand, / Like a poor Pris'ner in his twisted Gyves" (*Midwife* 1.217).⁹⁰ Of course, the underlying violence of this imagery is tempered by the context of the original quotation, but Smart makes Mary Midnight's aggressive and even violent tendencies toward men abundantly clear elsewhere.⁹¹

Like the men who pursue them, Smart's eidolons not only reverse or parody sentimental conventions, but do so in obviously comic ways. As is now abundantly clear, it is difficult to take either Mary Midnight or the Female Student seriously. There are a number of features that contribute to making Smart's female personae laughable, perhaps chief among them their exaggerated sense of self-importance, such hubris in "stale superannuated virgins" appearing highly improper and consequently ridiculous. Particularly absurd is their tendency to associate themselves with classical or even Biblical figures. In the second volume of *The Midwife*, Mary Midnight concludes her reflections on matrimony with the imprimatur, "such is the Opinion of *Solomon*, such of *Socrates*, such of *Sir Thomas More*, and such of *Mary Midnight*, four Persons ... to which all the Ages in the World shall never be able to add a fifth" (*Midwife* 2.101-2); and she later positions herself as one of the *regulati poetae* when she condemns critics as "Creatures whom neither *Homer*, *Virgil*, nor even the *Midwife* herself can please" (1.168). Along the same lines is the Female Student's portrayal of herself as "the Hesperian fruit" (*Student* 2.110), and as Eurydice waiting for her Orpheus (2.105). The absurdity of these claims can be easily inferred,

⁹⁰ This is yet another reference to *Romeo and Juliet*: "'Tis almost morning. I would have thee gone—/ And yet no farther than a wanton's bird, / That lets it hop a little from his hand, / Like a poor pris'ner in his twisted gyves, / And with a silk thread plucks it back again, / So loving-jealous of his liberty" (2.1.221-26).

⁹¹ See, for example, *Entertainer* no. 12 (November 19, 1754), where Mary Midnight states, "I am what the world call an accomplished LADY. ... I beat my husband one hundred times every day and spend twice the rent of his estate every year" (qtd. in Sherbo 99).

though if the reader *were* inclined to take either Mary Midnight or the Female Student at their word, Smart leaves clues as to their real position in society. While Mary Midnight portrays herself as a respectable member of society, “continually pester’d with Cases and Questions from the Literati of all Nations” (*Midwife* 2.128), the bouts of derisive laughter directed at her by coffee shop patrons (*Midwife* 1.215) and fashionable visitors to Bedlam (*Midwife* 1.218), suggest otherwise.

Before proceeding, I would like to stress that both idolons see themselves as genuinely distressed, another important factor that contributes to the humorous quality of Smart’s parodic narratives. Although the Female Student describes herself as “deceived, and basely betrayed” by Mr. Supple (*Student* 2.189), and “disregarded, deserted, and despised” by men in general (2.349), such sentimental catchphrases are used hyperbolically in each case. The truth is that neither the Female Student nor Mary Midnight is in serious danger, something that Smart exploits to comic effect. As Quintilian explains in his *Institutes of Oratory*, to attempt “tragic methods in trivial cases would be like putting the mask and buskins of Hercules on a small child” (6.1.36).

Hutcheson picks up on this point in his *Reflections Upon Laughter*:

The more violent passions, as fear, anger, sorrow, compassion, are generally looked upon as something great and solemn; the beholding of these passions in another strikes a man with gravity: now if these passions are artfully, or accidentally, raised upon a small, or a fictitious occasion, they move the laughter of those who imagine the occasions to be small or contemptible, and who are conscious of the fraud. (22)⁹²

⁹² See also Lord Kames: “no object is risible but what appears slight, little, or trivial; for we laugh at nothing that is of importance to our own interest, or to that of others. A real distress raises pity, and therefore cannot be risible; but a slight or imaginary distress, which moves not pity, is risible” (1.194).

I wish now to turn to some of the thornier questions that my analysis of Smart's periodicals has raised. It is one thing to draw attention to a curious juxtaposition of pathetic and comic-parodic pieces in *The Student* and *The Midwife*. Determining how such pairings function in the larger scheme of the periodicals is quite another. In the first place, these pairings should not be dismissed as accidental, if only because of the at times close proximity between sentimental narrative and comic parody. In the *Midwife*, for example, Hannah's sentimental tale is interpolated in Mary Midnight's humorous courtship narrative, suggesting at least some form of deliberation on Smart's part. Nor, I suggest, should Smart be seen as "framing" pathetic texts with comic parodies to control or contain the potentially subversive power of sentimental fiction. Such an impulse may be visible in works by his contemporaries, as Barbara Benedict argues in *Framing Feeling* (1994), but does not fit Smart's *modus operandi*.

It would be equally unwise to see such pairings as a kind of underhanded or disingenuous attempt by Smart to appeal to sentimental readers all the while mocking the sentimental tradition. The truth is that Smart emphasizes the benefits of sentimental literature in his periodical writings, though he does so in an admittedly convoluted and roundabout way. In the fourth essay (third chapter) of his "castle building" series in *The Student*, Smart (writing as "Chimæricus Cantabrigiensis") lays the foundation for his defence of sentimental literature by stressing the social benefits of empathetic identification and/or imaginative projection, a particular type of castle building in his schema:

If then, by this art, one may lift one's self above one's degree in life, and enjoy superior dignities by the forgeries of the imagination, we may *a fortiori* sink ourselves to an

humbler condition; for to go down stairs is much easier than to ascend. I would have therefore, those people, who are in affluence ... conceive for a few moments, that they are distressed themselves, and level their Castle to the humility of the Cottage. (*Student* 1:332-33)⁹³

Smart's point is that those who sympathize with distressed individuals will naturally work to alleviate their sufferings. He is never explicit about how this process works—after all, castle building is “of much too vague a nature to be comprehended in a concise regular definition” (1.223)—but, significantly, he does suggest that certain kinds of literature encourage empathetic identification. In a passage that would not be out of place in Kames's *Elements of Criticism*, Smart writes that “I do not know how it is with the readers of romances in general, but for my own part I declare that I have killed many a giant; on the perusal of an action I have been in the midst of it, and always complimented myself with being the hero of the day” (1.332).⁹⁴ It logically follows that some works of literature, specifically those portraying distressed individuals, may be socially beneficial. What is more, when Chimæricus Cantabrigiensis later urges readers to “reflect on the miseries and hardships of the inferior Clergy ... and on their daughters who must submit to prostitution,” encouraging readers to go so far as to “make ... the case their own” (1:333), it would seem impossible for Smart to have missed the fact that the

⁹³ Smart's castle building essays are perhaps a response to a tongue-in-cheek request in *Spectator* no. 167: “A Dissertation on Castle-Building may not only be serviceable to my self, but all Architects, who display their Skill in the thin Element” (2.160).

⁹⁴ What Smart refers to as castle building in this case is similar to what Kames calls “ideal presence”: that is, “a kind of reverie; in which state, forgetting that he is reading, he [the reader] conceives every incident as passing in his presence, precisely as if he were an eye-witness” (1:69). It is also similar to the daydreaming Quintilian refers to in *The Institutes of Oratory*: “When the mind is unoccupied or is absorbed by fantastic hopes or daydreams, we are haunted by these visions of which I am speaking to such an extent that we imagine that we are travelling abroad, crossing the sea, fighting ... and seem to ourselves not to be dreaming but acting” (6.2.30).

sorrowful, sentimental tales of distressed clergymen's widows and orphans strung throughout *The Student* are one way of doing so and therefore serve a valuable purpose. Those who read these tales, it appears, will actively promote "the generous, noble, and Christian scheme, communicated to the public in the fourth number of this work" (1.333). Something similar could presumably be said for other sentimental tales of virtue in distress.

I do not mean to paint Smart as a closet sentimentalist, encouraging "the dreams of sensibility" as Henry Mackenzie puts it in *Lounger* no. 20. It is worth remembering, after all, that Smart advocates sympathetic identification only in small doses, inviting individuals to put themselves to "a short imaginary pain" and to "conceive for [only] a few moments, that they are distressed themselves" (*Student* 1.333). Interestingly, such limited sympathetic identification would seem uniquely suited to the fractured periodical form, which Johnson saw as inimical to the raising of strong emotions. Still, the question remains: if sentimental tales of virtue in distress have real value, why humorously parody them? The answer to this question becomes clear, I suggest, when we approach Smart's miscellanies with an eye to the more mundane realities of magazine publication, and recognize, as Hutcheson puts it, that "parody, and burlesque allusion [may] move laughter in those who may have the highest veneration for the writing alluded to" (7-8). Smart's fellow periodicalist, Arthur Murphy, would go on to argue something similar in *Gray's-Inn Journal* no. 97, stating that "Parody does not always carry with it any Sneer at the Author parodied" (2.286). In other words, parody is not only or not necessarily satiric in nature. Seen in this light, Smart's tendency to burlesque the sentimental vignettes in *The Student* and *The Midwife*, rather than implying an underhanded assault on the sentimental tradition *per se*, simply

reflects his desire to make both magazines as miscellaneous as possible and to ensure that neither has the “Pedantic Regularity of a Dictionary” (“Index to Mankind” *Midwife* 3.161).

At the same time, however, this tendency is part of a very practical strategy to avoid or surmount what Smart saw to be the main problem with the miscellaneous form. He is, somewhat surprisingly, fiercely critical in both *The Student* and *The Midwife* of almost all rival magazines, journals, newspapers, and other “monthly pamphlets.” On a very basic level, he stresses the impracticality of such works. In *The Midwife*, for example, a correspondent requests a “Parcel of *Kapelions*,⁹⁵ and *Magazine of Magazines* to put her Pies upon, for ... they are better for that Use than any other” (1.207).⁹⁶ In part, this is because such publications contain untruths (*Midwife* 2.5 and 1.96), revel in absurdities (*Midwife* 1.235 and 1.177), and promote the “puny, paltry Product of ... fumbling despicable Dullness” (*Midwife* 2.59). Smart goes so far as to declare that magazines are “the dullest Things in the Universe” (*Midwife* 2.25) and that when rival editors “insert any Pieces, it is putting them into a Dunciad” (*Midwife* 1.270). Even more specific is Smart’s critique of the incoherent, jumbled, or confused nature of most magazines, both on the level of individual pieces and in terms of general organization. Smart’s critique thus closely resembles Johnson’s in *The Rambler* and *The Idler*.⁹⁷ Smart hints at his distaste for the former kind of incoherence in a dream vision in *The Student*, where he situates “the whole tribe of magazine authors” near “the chaotic abyss of the Bathos ... into which thousands daily plunge,

⁹⁵ *The Kapelion, or Poetical Ordinary, Consisting of Great Variety of Dishes in Prose and Verse* (1750-51) was published by Smart’s rival, William Kenrick.

⁹⁶ Along the same lines, an unnamed correspondent in *The Student* attacks a particular coffee shop known as the *παμφλετικον* (*pamphletikon*) for containing “books of no use at all” (2.374). Attribution of this piece is uncertain.

⁹⁷ See pages 79-80 of this chapter.

like croaking frogs into a muddy pond,” leaving “behind them a frothy kind of matter” (*Student* 2.384). In fact, the young narrator of this “rhapsodic vision” is so stunned by the “confused murmur of discordant sounds” coming up out of the abyss that she nearly plunges in herself (2.383).⁹⁸

What Smart finds most damning about contemporary magazines and miscellanies, however, is their overall organization. To Smart, such productions rarely represent a unity in diversity, and *a fortiori* do not deserve the epithet *e pluribus unum*. Rather, they generally comprise a cacophony of voices. In the introduction to the second volume of *The Student*, an unnamed editor, whom Ainsworth and Noyes take to be Smart (42), states that “we are very little inclined to pilfer from the productions of our contemporaries, especially from the patchwork, pye-ball’d, party-colour’d contents of the monthly pamphlets: we want not to win *any vests from these naked Picts*” (2.2); and in an “Index to Mankind,” a collection of aphorisms and *bon mots* originally published in 1751, but appended to the third volume of *The Midwife*, Smart criticizes those collections that are “so ill-connected that they seem only calculated to puzzle, not instruct the Reader” (*Midwife* 3.161). Such miscellanies bear a striking resemblance to the higgledy-piggledy course of lectures delivered by John Henley at his Clare-Market Oratory, which Smart satirizes as consisting indiscriminately of “Argument—Oration—Declamation—Dissertation—Declaration—Essay—Tragedy—Comedy—Farce—Treatise—Controversy—Account” (*Midwife* 3.40), and are just as absurd. Destitute of “Order, Regularity, or Connection,” magazines require

⁹⁸ Oddly enough, Smart at times revels in incoherence, admitting “that I am [not] absolutely incapable of being absurd when I wish it” (*Midwife* 3.40). As one correspondent to *The Student* complains, the Female Student’s work “treats of subjects of a *vague* nature, and is ... of a mere *Jack-lanthorn* nature, *neither here nor there*; in short, it is a topsy-turvy, rhapsodic, miscellaneous method of writing” (2.352). Another reader faults Chimæricus Cantabrigiensis for producing “incoherent stuff—a medley of words, without beginning, ending, top or bottom; a chaos of absurdity and confusion” (*Student* 2.6-7).

careful indexing, regulating, or systematizing before they can be at all serviceable, much like the modern commercial society of which they are a part (*Midwife* 1.226).⁹⁹

Smart's attack on the disconnected or incoherent nature of most magazines is admittedly curious, considering that, as Paul Keen points out, miscellaneous writers and editors tended to celebrate the "discontinuities, partial truths, and localized knowledge" of the form, even arguing that miscellaneous publications were a perfect vehicle for training readers to participate in modern commercial society (what Johnson refers to in *Rambler* no. 2 as the "general miscellany of life") (111). Isaac D'Israeli is a good example of this tendency. As Ina Ferris explains, D'Israeli believed that "in offering the reader gaps and spaces to be filled, the disconnected form of miscellany itself served as a stimulus to mental energy, promoting the acts of construction and reflection" (530). From Smart's perspective, however, such gaps and spaces were just too big to be filled, at least by common readers. He would thus seem to agree with Samuel Miller, who argued in his *Brief Retrospect of the Eighteenth Century* that periodical publication could actually be said to have "discouraged those habits of *connected* reading and of patient *systematic* thinking, which were the glory of the learned in former ages" (2.242-43).

While embracing miscellaneity, therefore, Smart also works to create a strong sense of relation among pieces in both *The Student* and *The Midwife*, and thus a degree of unity or wholeness in a fractured form. Smart's use of a controlling eidolon in *The Midwife*, and, to some extent, *The Student*, is one way he achieves a sense of relation between disparate pieces. Also

⁹⁹ Smart's unflattering comparison of modern society to a "vast, voluminous *Miscellany*, destitute of Order, Regularity, or Connection" (*Midwife* 1.226) should be compared with Johnson's more positive description in *Rambler* no. 2: "But, though it should happen that an author is capable of excelling, yet his merit may pass without notice, huddled in the variety of things, and thrown into the general miscellany of life" (3.14).

relevant in this context are Smart's attempts to create links between the two magazines, as when the Female Student claims to be "that very same Midwife, who publishes the *Old Woman's Magazine*" (*Student* 2.52). More than anything, however, Smart maintains a sense of connection between pieces simply by returning to the same *topoi* again and again, albeit in very different ways and forms.¹⁰⁰ Chris Mounsey's perceptive observation regarding *The Midwife* is generally applicable here. To Mounsey, Smart uses "techniques of juxtaposition and voicing at one and the same time. There are articles commenting upon one another written by voices of different characters who have access to particular pieces of information and viewpoints" (108). Even pieces that appear entirely antithetical are frequently linked in this way. For example, in the final volume of *The Midwife*, an essay praising silence is followed by a panegyric on loquacity, Smart self-consciously (and somewhat scholastically, I might add) playing "the Part of a true Game-disputant" in the second essay by taking "the opposite Side of the Question" (3.115). On the surface, such a combination may contribute to a sense of confusion or chaos, even "ontological promiscuity," as Bertelsen would have it, but beneath this apparent discord lies a unity in opposition, reminiscent of Nicholas of Cusa's *coincidentia oppositorum* or Horace's *concordia discors*. As Smart himself states in *Jubilate Agno*, "the relations of words are sometimes in oppositions" (B599).

Smart's attempt to mitigate the perceived chaos that characterizes most miscellanies, all the while working to maintain diversity of content in *The Student* and *The Midwife*, goes a long way toward explaining his tendency to publish humorous parodies alongside sentimental depictions of virtue in distress. However different such pieces may be on a surface level—Smart

¹⁰⁰ See appendix 2 in Min Wild's *Christopher Smart and Satire* (2008) for a list of *topoi* that Smart frequently returns to in *The Midwife*, in one form or another.

is, after all, seeking unity in diversity rather than uniformity—there is a strong connection between them: the one (the comic-parodic *hypertext*, as Genette would have it) is predicated on, and modifies, the other (the sentimental *hypotext*). Or as George Steiner puts it in *Real Presences* (1989), there is a “mutual interplay” between the two (15). Curiously enough, from a classical standpoint, these two kinds of pieces were seen not only as related but as together making up a whole. Mikhail Bakhtin explains that Greek and Roman artists saw comic-parodic texts as completing other, serious works, which explains the classical tendency to “accompany every tragic (or serious) treatment of material with a parallel comic (parodic-travestying) treatment” (56). To Bakhtin, “the serious, straightforward form was perceived as only a fragment, only half of a whole; the fullness of the whole was achieved only upon adding the comic *contre-partie* of this form” (58). Bakhtin provides an example of this impulse in a description of two attached frescoes unearthed at Pompeii, one that is particularly relevant to the subject at hand:

On the one we see Andromeda being rescued by Perseus, on the opposite wall is a picture of a naked woman bathing in a pond with a serpent wrapped around her; peasants are trying to come to her aid with sticks and stones. This is an obvious parodic travesty of the first mythological scene. The plot of the myth is relocated in a specifically prosaic reality.
(57)

Of course, there is no way to determine with certainty whether Smart was aware of this impulse in Greek and Roman art. I would simply like to suggest that if he *was* aware of it, his inclusion of comic parodies alongside pathetic narratives of virtue in distress would reveal an attempt to bring

not only a sense of connection or relation to an otherwise fractured form, but one of wholeness as well.

I conclude with a letter from the first volume of *The Midwife* in which the correspondent distinguishes Mary Midnight from her rival magazine editors, reflecting that when “those incorrigible Thieves your Contemporaries ... insert any Pieces, it is putting them into a Dunciad, and consigning them to Infamy; but when a Work of Merit is printed in your Magazine, it is a Brilliant set in Gold and increased, not diminish’d in its Lustre” (*Midwife* 1.270). The correspondent turns out to be Smart himself, and the letter encapsulates Smart’s tendency to portray those magazines with which he was associated as essentially different from those of his contemporaries. In this chapter I have argued that one way Smart distinguishes *The Student* and *The Midwife* from rival miscellanies is by maintaining a sense of unity or coherence, albeit a unity in diversity or *concordia discors*. I have further argued that Smart’s decision to include in his periodicals comic parodies alongside more popular sentimental narratives of distressed women (themselves part of a calculated attempt to attract sentimental readers to the periodicals) is metonymic of this larger project. However different such pieces may appear at first glance, they are related on a fundamental level. Consequently, Smart’s tendency to reverse sentimental conventions in terms of his idolons and their suitors should not be seen as an attack on the sentimental tradition in literature. Neither should it be seen as an attempt to limit the pathos of genuinely pathetic narratives, something Johnson aims at in *The Rambler* and *The Idler*. Indeed, Smart lays the groundwork for a defence of sentimental literature in his castle-building essays in *The Student*. Such comic-parodic pieces are rather a key component of Smart’s innovative strategy to overcome the potentially debilitating *discors* of the miscellaneous form and thus to

raise the status of his own periodical productions in the early modern literary field. Significantly, by doing so, Smart in a limited sense mimics the Christian divinity, who famously spoke order into chaos. In fact, in his *Translation of the Psalms of David* (1765), Smart would go on to describe the Judeo-Christian God as containing the volatile oceans within a divine storehouse or “great magazine,” thus rendering them valuable (29).¹⁰¹ By way of analogy, I suggest that Smart himself not only contains the heterogeneous elements of his periodicals, but renders such heterogeneity valuable through the institution of a deep-seated order.

¹⁰¹ See Smart’s translation of Psalm 33: “In one great magazine compell’d / The waters of the main he heaps, / And, as a store by warders held, / The briny depth he keeps” (29).

CHAPTER THREE:

John Hawkesworth, Lord Shaftesbury, and the Distracted Periodical Reader: Encouraging Meta-Attention in *The Adventurer*¹⁰²

Despite John Hawkesworth's status as a successful and well-known man of letters in eighteenth-century English society, his fame today rests on the ignominious distinction of being one of the few professional writers to die from a bad review.¹⁰³ Of humble origins,¹⁰⁴ Hawkesworth rose to prominence through the publication of *The Adventurer* (1752-54), a periodical paper produced in conjunction with, among others, Samuel Johnson and Joseph Warton. While his critics often questioned his literacy, Isaac D'Israeli famously observing that Hawkesworth "could not always have construed the Latin mottos of his own paper" (215), they generally admitted his ability to raise the passions through short periodical narratives. In what follows, I argue that Hawkesworth's drive to raise readers' passions in *The Adventurer*—particularly through brief, tragic tales of amatory distress, whether in the form of eastern tales or domestic fictions—was not influenced exclusively by market demand, but was also part of a calculated strategy to counteract the wandering attention of the distracted periodical reader and to ensure that the precepts advanced in individual tales were available for recall. Distraction, as

¹⁰² All references to *The Adventurer* in this chapter are to the four volume London edition listed in the bibliography (London: W. Strahan, 1778).

¹⁰³ See for example a recent article by Lynne Truss, "A bad book review can kill you – look at the case of John Hawkesworth," *The Guardian*, January 13, 2017. The review(s) in question concerned Hawkesworth's *Account of the Voyages undertaken ... by Commodore Byrone, Captain Wallis, Captain Carteret and Captain Cook* (1773). As the Rev. Lionel Thomas Berguer noted in 1823, charges of inaccuracy, infidelity and even heresy had a debilitating effect on Hawkesworth: "He never held up his head again in society; his health became rapidly deteriorated, and his too sensitive and irritable spirit sunk under the malignity of his revilers. ... Like the stricken deer, shunning and shunned, he carried the barbed arrow a short while in his side; and died ... on the 7th of November, 1773" (x).

¹⁰⁴ "He was originally a watchmaker, or some other mechanick trade," according to Edmond Malone (Prior 441).

critics such as Natalie M. Phillips have recently argued, was as prevalent in the eighteenth century as it was multifaceted. And yet, pathetic fictions, because of their very sentimentality, were uniquely suited to “fix that volatility which would break away from ratiocination” (1.133), and to impress “facts ... upon the mind” (1.134). Hawkesworth is, I suggest, very particular about the passions he intends to raise in readers: curiosity aroused by novelty and, more particularly, the striking and wondrous (*speciosa miracula*); surprise and astonishment through moments of *anagnorisis* and *peripeteia*; and, most importantly, pity and terror through various other scenes and situations derived from conventional tragedy. Revealing an awareness of contemporary and classical aesthetic theory, Hawkesworth tends to focus on the sufferings of beautiful and/or estimable individuals, particularly women, whose mental distress, family connections, and conflicting emotions prior to their final dissolution ensure that the passions of the reader are powerfully engaged. Hawkesworth’s privileging of particularity, or an abundance of “little circumstances,” over verbosity, is also significant in this regard, as it is “minute and discriminating circumstances,” he argues, that tend to “rouse our sensibility” (4.33).

Even as Hawkesworth works to raise readers’ passions, however, he challenges those who uncritically indulge their appetite for such fictions. In particular, he suggests that the pity elicited by pathetic narratives, which provides so much pleasure to readers, is not so benevolent as it may seem: on close inspection, there is an element of sadism to it. As Hawkesworth angrily observes in *Adventurer* no. 110, “Let us distinguish that malignity, which others confound with Benevolence, and applaud as Virtue” (4.39). Hawkesworth’s somewhat Hobbesian view of human nature helps explain his assault on pity, but it is chiefly his distrust of Lord Shaftesbury’s philosophy—which he somewhat unfairly reduces to a series of catchphrases such as “moral

sense,” “publick affections,” and “the beauty of virtue”—that accounts for it. As Hawkesworth’s essays make clear, thinkers like Shaftesbury who pronounce natural impulses such as pity to be virtues are only epicureans at heart, working to disguise their worst appetites and justify an unbridled pursuit of pleasure.

Naturally, all this leaves the periodical reader in something of a conundrum. Does Hawkesworth expect readers not to show compassion for the tragic and thus *pitiable* heroes and heroines in his periodical narratives? And does he suggest that the pleasure associated with these narratives is actually dangerous? Ultimately, I argue, Hawkesworth’s critique of deism in general and Lord Shaftesbury in particular implies neither a condemnation of all passion *per se*, nor a repudiation of passionate fictions. Rather, it serves to encourage a habit of reflection in readers, prompting them to question the morality of their initial, passionate responses to sentimental events, narratives, and episodes. Human beings are passionate creatures to Hawkesworth, but this does not mean that passions or appetites always function appropriately, that they should be indulged uncritically, or that there is no human faculty capable of reining them in. When not suppressed by the “cavils of sophistry and sense” (4.218), the human conscience—closely connected and at times even synonymous with reason and reflection in *The Adventurer*—is capable of monitoring, judging, and, in conjunction with the above mentioned faculties, directing particular passions to their appropriate ends. A close examination of Hawkesworth’s critique of Shaftesburian philosophy and, by extension, the “epicurean” periodical reader who unthinkingly indulges his or her appetite for pathetic fictions thus reveals an urgent call to self-examination through reflection. This call facilitates Hawkesworth’s broader goal of encouraging not only attention but meta-attention in distracted periodical readers—a kind of “attention to their own

attention” to borrow Phillips’s phrase (*Distraction* 42)—and, more generally, an awareness of the complex workings of the human mind.

Because of Hawkesworth’s relative obscurity today, a brief examination of his legacy, particularly as it appeared to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century *literati*, is in order.¹⁰⁵ Karina Williamson remarks that the “neglect of Hawkesworth’s writings in the twentieth century is difficult to explain. He was indisputably a talented and versatile author, highly regarded by discerning critics in his own day” (*DLB*). Stephen Brown goes so far as to maintain that Hawkesworth’s *Adventurer*—his crowning achievement as a writer—was one of the “three most influential English-language periodicals of the eighteenth century,” an assertion that makes this critical silence all the more striking (7).¹⁰⁶ Both Williamson and Brown are correct to see Hawkesworth as an important figure in the eighteenth-century literary field, though it would be a mistake to suggest that contemporaries, even his warmest admirers, were uncritical. Hawkesworth was frequently labelled as an illiterate, derivative, presumptuous, and unsystematic thinker, who delighted in puzzling out abstruse questions of religion and morality, and who, as a result, at times advanced radical or even heretical positions unknowingly.

¹⁰⁵ Hawkesworth’s final work, the infamous *Voyages*, has alone received any sustained scholarly attention in recent years. See for example Matthew Binney, “The Authority of Entertainment: John Hawkesworth’s *An Account of the Voyages*” (2016); Jonathan Lamb, *Preserving the Self in the South Seas* (2001) and “Circumstances Surrounding the Death of John Hawkesworth” (1994); Anne Maxwell, “Fallen Queens and Phantom Diadems: Cook’s Voyages and England’s Social Order” (1997); Philip Edwards, *The Story of the Voyage: Sea-Narratives in Eighteenth-Century England* (1994); and G.J. Finch, “Hawkesworth as Anthropologist” (1975).

¹⁰⁶ Apparently with an eye to *The Adventurer*, the anonymous author of *The Trifler* (1795-96), a Scottish periodical, would go on to state that Hawkesworth was one “of the best and most religious writers”—alongside Johnson, Marmontel, and Fenelon—who “reflect honour on whatever subject they have embellished with their pens” (*Trifler* no. 19).

Hawkesworth's glaring lack of classical learning was the most obvious target for hostile critics. As Edmond Malone stated condescendingly in his journals, he "had no literature whatever," though by "reading Dr. Johnson's writings he acquired his stile, and a certain moral and sentimental air" (Prior 441-42). Sir John Hawkins agreed in his *Life of Samuel Johnson* (1787): "Hawkesworth was a man of fine parts, but no learning: his reading had been irregular and desultory" and "on no subject had he ever formed any system" (252).¹⁰⁷ This lack of "system" would become a kind of catchphrase when it came to Hawkesworth. Shortly after his death, Elizabeth Montague wrote to the philosopher James Beattie that, while she believed Hawkesworth was a "good Christian," his not having had "a literary education" meant that "he was not systematical" and was thus vulnerable to "strange starts" (Forbes 378). Beattie agreed, attributing Hawkesworth's delight "in ruminating upon riddles, and puzzling questions, and calculations" to his "vague way of thinking" (Forbes 390-91). This reputation for vagueness and lack of systematization plagued Hawkesworth throughout his career, becoming particularly problematic upon the publication of his *Account of the Voyages undertaken ... by Commodore Byrone, Captain Wallis, Captain Carteret and Captain Cook* (1773), in which he wrestled with the hidden workings of divine providence.¹⁰⁸ As Nathan Drake put it in 1810, Hawkesworth's "practice was correct, but his theory, both in philosophy and theology, was often inconsistent and unsettled; and he was apt to indulge himself in speculations, the ultimate tendency and bearings

¹⁰⁷ To Hawkins, "all of ethics that he knew, he had got from Pope's 'Essay on Man,' and *Epistles*; he had read the modern French writers, and more particularly the poets, and with the aid of Keill's *Introduction [to Natural Philosophy]*, Chambers's *Dictionary* [or *Cyclopædia*], and other such common books, had attained such an insight into physics, as enabled him to talk on the subject. In the more valuable branches of learning, he was deficient" (252).

¹⁰⁸ Isaac D'Israeli (1812) states that in the *Voyages*, Hawkesworth "indulged his imagination till it burst into pruriency, and discussed moral theorems, till he ceased to be moral" (215).

of which, could he have accurately appreciated them, he would have shrunk from with abhorrence” (30).¹⁰⁹ A certain amount of presumption was thought to be behind this tendency to puzzle over religious and philosophical mysteries, something a particularly hostile reviewer of Hawkesworth’s *Voyages* in *The Westminster Magazine* pointed out savagely:

It is no wonder a man should make a blunder in talking about what he ought not perhaps at all to mention. The truth is, a writer may make a figure in the composition of little elegant Essays on the externals of social decency and sacred decorum, calculated for unthinking readers, who by custom have already adopted them; but it requires not only [a greater] share of science, but of fortitude than generally falls to the lot of our Essay writers, to investigate the first principles of religious duty and moral obligation. (“A Review of Dr. Hawkesworth’s *Account*” 334)

However presumptuous Hawkesworth may have appeared to be in the *Voyages*, it is worth stressing that his tendency to ruminate upon moral and theological truths was already apparent in his “little elegant essays,” something thinkers such as James Beattie and William Duncombe were painfully aware of.

While his critics often questioned the validity of his moral and theoretical deliberations, no one seems to have cast doubt on Hawkesworth’s skill in prose fiction. In fact, his ability in this province of literature encouraged critics to excuse his faults as a practical moralist. It was here that his real genius lay and here that he could deploy to good effect “his Warmth and Sublimity of Imagination,” to quote from Hawkesworth’s fellow essayist Arthur Murphy

¹⁰⁹ Alexander Chalmers thought much the same, stating in his monumental *British Essayists* series (1817) that “everywhere, indeed, his practical morality is to be preferred to his philosophy of ethics, for the latter is frequently perplexed, and leads to erroneous conclusions” (30).

(*Gray's-Inn Journal* 2.320). As William Duncombe wrote to Thomas Herring in 1755, after minutely and relentlessly dissecting Hawkesworth's curious critique of natural law found in *Adventurer* no. 91,

Notwithstanding these free remarks, I have a just value for the author of the *Adventurer*, both as a good man and an excellent writer. He is undoubtedly possessed of a fine genius, and a fertile imagination, which he happily employs to advance the cause of virtue and religion. His style is rhetorical, clear and flowing; and his oriental stories deserve the applause they have received. ("Remarks on the *Adventurer* ... No. 91" 354)

Hawkesworth's narratives were particularly praised for the knowledge they displayed of the human heart and for their ability to exert what Drake called "a powerful mastery over the passions" (14). The Reverend Lionel Thomas Berguer observed in his *British Essayists* series (1823) that "few people are better acquainted than he, with the labyrinths of the human heart" (i). Chalmers is more particular in his praise, arguing that Hawkesworth's narratives "are told with impressive elegance, and discover an accurate knowledge of the human heart, and an uncommon felicity in displaying the workings of the passions" (30). As if to drive home the connection between theory (viz., a knowledge of the passions) and praxis (viz., an ability to raise the passions), Chalmers maintains that such tales "cannot be read without exciting a powerful interest" (30).¹¹⁰ While some writers qualified this statement, perhaps in order to distance Hawkesworth from more salacious writers of romance, the general sense was that Hawkesworth

¹¹⁰ Chalmers is referring specifically to *Adventurer* nos. 86, and nos. 134-36 in this passage, together comprising the tale of Agamus and his daughter, but his comments can be applied generally without corrupting his meaning.

was both willing and able when it came to raising the passions.¹¹¹ As an anonymous contributor to *A New and General Biographical Dictionary* (1798) stated, works “of taste and elegance, where the imagination and the passions were to be affected, were his province; not works of dry, cold, accurate narrative” (358).

Hawkesworth, *The Adventurer*, and the Distracted Periodical Reader

Hawkesworth’s tendency to advance unorthodox positions, perhaps unknowingly, and his partiality for sentimental or pathetic narratives are both on display in *The Adventurer*, and, as will become clear, overlap at times. It is to this work that I now turn my attention. Although it was common to include such tales in moral/didactic periodicals, their appearance and even prevalence in *The Adventurer*, to which Hawkesworth was the primary contributor, is more significant than it may appear at first glance.¹¹² In what follows, I suggest that Hawkesworth includes pathetic narratives to meet market demand, but also, more importantly, to imprint moral lessons on the memory and to fix the attention of the distracted periodical reader.

But what exactly constitutes a distracted periodical reader to Hawkesworth? After all, as Phillips writes, “there are as many kinds of distraction as there are kinds of attention” (*Distraction* 26).¹¹³ Hawkesworth’s occasional references to potential readers provide

¹¹¹ In his *Classic Tales: Serious and Lively* (1807), Leigh Hunt muses that Hawkesworth “writes always to the heart or to the judgment, but more frequently to the latter. . . . His narrative is dramatic, and his evident end is to amend the heart, rather than cater to the passions” (222).

¹¹² Williamson counts 54 prose narratives within *The Adventurer* (DLB), “in addition to which,” as Robert Mayo points out, “there are numerous illustrative anecdotes and stories included in the essays” (106).

¹¹³ In *Distraction: Problems of Attention in Eighteenth-Century Literature* (2016), Phillips focuses on five kinds of distraction or inattention: “wandering attention,” “lapses of concentration,” “scattered attention,” “fixated attention,” and “divided attention.”

a clue. In his final essay, *Adventurer* no. 140, he describes his prospective audience as “the Young and the Gay” (4.293), a phrase more flattering than indicative. A more accurate description may be found in *Adventurer* no. 16, in which the eidolon distinguishes between scholars “who voluntarily read for instruction” and his own readers “who seek only entertainment” or diversion (1.135).¹¹⁴ In his *Winter Evenings* (1788), Vicesimus Knox describes such readers as “miscellaneous” in the sense that they “consist of all conditions, of the young and the old, the gentleman and the merchant [... and] of the ladies” (1.75). To Knox, what these readers have in common is not only their shared tendency to read “for amusement chiefly,” but also, more importantly, the fact that they require “something which [they] can read and comprehend in a short time” (1.76). Knox’s implication is that those who read for the purposes of diversion are frequently characterized by what Phillips describes as a “wandering attention” or short attention span.¹¹⁵ Consequently, should a work of literature require more than a “short time” to read, the result would be boredom or “weariness” and, ultimately, a turning away from the text in question. Hawkesworth would seem to agree. As he complains in *Adventurer* no. 17, he “who writes to assist the student, of whatever class, has a much easier task, and greater probability of success [than the periodical writer]; for the attention of industry is surely more easily fixed than that of idleness” (1.140).

¹¹⁴ As Samuel Johnson writes in *Adventurer* no. 137, clearly with an eye to his own readership, while “every passion which incites to any other action, serves at one time or other to stimulate a reader,” “the most general and prevalent reason of study is the impossibility of finding another amusement equally cheap or constant” (4.274-75).

¹¹⁵ I do not mean to imply that Knox (or Hawkesworth for that matter) conflates diversion with distraction, as Blaise Pascal frequently does in the *Pensées* (1670). The two are merely related, to Knox, in that readers who take up books seeking diversion from their normal way of life tend to possess a short attention span (i.e., a particular type of distraction).

Curiously, such distracted readers frequently find their likenesses reflected back at them from the pages of *The Adventurer*, a point that gains added significance when one considers Andrew Piper's assertion in *Dreaming in Books* (2009) that "learning how to read books and how to want books did not simply occur through ... technological, commercial, or legal conditions," but "was also importantly a product of the very narratives and symbolic operations contained within books" (4). While frequently humorous, vignettes of readers plagued by a short attention span suggest the very real dangers of such reading practices when it comes to both producers and consumers. Thus *Adventurer* no. 17 contains the story of Mr. Friendly, an "old gentleman" who stands in for the periodical writer, and whose attempt to educate his fashionable nephew by reading a lengthy treatise on Shakespeare fails miserably: "The old gentleman, who imagined that [his nephew] was held motionless with attention, wonder, and delight, proceeded long in his lecture ... but at the end of a favourite passage ... he ventured to steal his eyes from the paper, and glancing them upon John, perceived that he was fast asleep with his mouth open" (1.148). In this case, as John is unable to direct his wandering attention to new stimuli, the result is a state of boredom so extreme that he falls asleep. Along the same lines, when Dramaticus, the correspondent in *Adventurer* no. 52, attempts to read his play—a tragedy with a clear moral/didactic thrust—to a "select company" (2.133) assembled in a fashionable salon, he finds his audience alternating their attention between his play and the cries of an injured dog (2.137). A young gentleman in *Adventurer* no. 110, who gives an account of the Battle of Fontenoy to a fashionable group assembled for that very purpose, meets with a similar rebuff: "the company, however amused by the relation ... were still attentive to every trifling punctilio of ceremony, usual among well-bred persons; they bowed with a graceful simper to a lady who

sneezed, mutually presented each other with snuff, shook their heads and changed their posture at proper intervals, asked some questions” (4.34). In these last two instances, notably, attention is not so much wandering as it is scattered—that is, divided among myriad objects and “multiple stimuli” (Phillips 27)—something Dramaticus and the young gentleman find intolerable.¹¹⁶

Not surprisingly, when it came to this audience, the Horatian imperative to please and instruct, *dulce et utile*, presented serious difficulties. How could the periodical writer fix the reader’s attention long enough to inculcate a moral?¹¹⁷ One way was through the inclusion of interesting and pleasing objects, the challenge being to locate objects that would appeal to an ever-expanding demographic of readers. Darryl Domingo reminds us that just as “showmen and impresarios actively catered to the eclectic and often eccentric desires of England’s pleasure seekers, professional authors ‘to be lett’ looked for innovative ways to gratify a reading audience increasingly avid for diversion” (3). Periodical writers were particularly conscious of this

¹¹⁶ Erroneous readers or interpreters are a common feature in *The Adventurer*, though not all can blame their mistakes on a wandering attention. See, for example, Cosrou the Iman in *Adventurer* no. 38, who is reprimanded for mistakenly interpreting a dream and thus perverting “the instruction which was vouchsafed thee” (2.225); Almet the Prophet in *Adventurer* no. 114, who is condemned for having read the “Book of Nature . . . without understanding” (4.71); and Bozaldab the Caliph in *Adventurer* no. 76, whose initial response to a tragic spectacle is misdirected: “‘Will Heaven permit such injustice to be practiced,’ exclaimed Bozaldab?—‘Look again,’ said the Angel” (3.48). Curiously, even the eidolon is portrayed as having occasional hermeneutic lapses, at one point being reprimanded by a lady who “has been a great reader, and is not behind those who discovered a political satire under the Rape of a Lock, in resolving a riddle or penetrating an allegory”: “Good Sir, your province and your importance are mistaken by none but yourself. Could not your sagacity discover this letter [a tale of two distressed sisters] to be an allegory?” (1.229).

¹¹⁷ This is not to suggest that all writers attempted to “cure” distracted readers. Darryl Domingo’s *The Rhetoric of Diversion* (2016) suggests some of the ways eighteenth-century writers accepted and even embraced the wandering attention of pleasure-seeking readers. Domingo focuses particularly on the literary strategy of digression. To Domingo, “Commercialization brought about a higher valuation of work as an important activity in itself, and of leisure as a ‘differentiated psychic space’ which served as a foil to the tedium of progress and an alternative to work’s forward momentum. Commercial literature did something of the same by providing for ‘differentiated discursive spaces,’ time away from plot, character, or thematic argument in which readers could also have their minds unbent. Devices like digression played to both the material and mental needs of a pleasure seeking public, furnishing a market that was actively assimilating contemporary theories of mind as a justification for commercial diversion” (8).

challenge. Hawkesworth writes in *Adventurer* no. 17 that the “author who hopes to please the public ... must have skill to select such objects as the town is willing to regard, such truths as excite its curiosity, and such knowledge as it is solicitous to acquire” (1.140-41). Murphy agreed, stating in the *Gray’s-Inn Journal* (1752-54) that a “Periodical Writer, in order to procure himself a sufficient Number of Readers, should endeavour to render his Works agreeable to the various Palates which predominate ... in the Metropolis” (1.312). Even if such objects could be found, however, how could periodical writers include them while simultaneously preserving their credibility as teachers of morality, models of good taste, and, more generally, agents of enlightenment?¹¹⁸

Hawkesworth’s emphasis on the passions and his frequent inclusion of pathetic narratives in *The Adventurer* suggest his answer to this question and a way around the problem. Writers had long recognized that the passions were a favourite topic with the public and often used them as a not-so-subtle hook to draw readers in. Edward Young, for example, openly admits in his *Vindication of Providence* (1728), “I know not well why, but the Passions are a Favourite Subject with Mankind. ... Being sensible how difficult it is to gain Attention for Works of Divinity, I have insisted more on the Passions, than any other Head of the following Discourse” (“Preface”). Of course, works that raised the passions, rather than discussing them, were thought to be even more pleasing to readers. As Murphy states in *The Gray’s-Inn Journal*, “Certain it is [that] the Mind of Man never feels such intense Pleasure from any of the imitative Arts, as when its

¹¹⁸ While “enlightenment” is an admittedly vague term, it was nevertheless deployed by periodical writers to justify their foray into the literary marketplace. In *The Prompter*, for example, Hill and Popple contrast their own essay serial with contemporary newspapers, which, they claim, “rather confound, than enlighten, the Multitude” (19).

passions are awakened” (2.252).¹¹⁹ Hawkesworth agreed, arguing in *Adventurer* no. 4 that “no species of writing affords so general entertainment as the relation of events; but all relations of events do not entertain in the same degree. ... Those narratives are most pleasing, which not only excite and gratify curiosity, but engage the passions” (1.23).

Relations of events that appealed to the readers’ passions were not only pleasing but, crucially, instructive as well, in the sense that they allowed authors to impress moral lessons on their readers and to exemplify and encourage virtuous behaviour. Speaking for periodical writers in general, Mr. Friendly observes in *Adventurer* no. 17 that the passions, “as they are naturally productive of all pleasure, should by reasonable beings be rendered subservient to a higher purpose” (1.143). But how specifically could they do so? In *Adventurer* no. 18, Hawkesworth states that narratives which appeal “both to the understanding and the passions” are “more forcible and perfect” than any other because their sentimental quality renders “the precepts ... more striking” (1.156-158). He earlier suggests that passionate fictions play a primary or active role in educating readers in morality and etiquette, arguing that “by example the passions are roused; we approve, we emulate, and we honour or love; we detest, we despise, and we condemn, as fit objects are successively held up to the mind: the affections are, as it were, drawn out into the field: they learn their exercise in a mock fight, and are trained for the service of virtue” (1.133). In this passage, Hawkesworth appears to anticipate Lord Kames, who remarks in his *Elements of Criticism* (1762) that “examples both of virtue and vice raise virtuous emotions;

¹¹⁹ Murphy had previously stated that a “Friend of mine” who “has a knack in conforming all his Compositions to the prevailing taste of the Town ... is determined to avail himself of the favourite Passions of his Readers” (*GIJ* 2.176).

which becoming stronger by exercise, tend to make us virtuous by habit as well as by principle” (1.77).¹²⁰

With the possible exception of some allegories and dream visions, Hawkesworth’s own fictions tend to fall into two categories: eastern tales and “domestic fictions.” Both tend to deploy instances of human tragedy, or what Hawkesworth refers to as “scenes of prosperity and distress” (4.293) and “tales of fictitious suffering” (4.33), to raise the passions. These tales—“fanciful, romantic tales deep-laden with warnings and preachment” according to Philip Edwards (87)—will be discussed in more detail below. For now it is enough to observe that Hawkesworth, like many periodical writers, is particularly drawn to scenes of distressed women and “the tears and importunity of female distress” (*Adventurer* 2.219).

To Hawkesworth, such narratives, when properly handled, drive home moral lessons and serve as *exempla* of virtuous behaviour, but just as importantly, they prevent distraction.¹²¹ Again and again, he underscores the point that only passionate narratives are capable of holding the attention of the distracted periodical reader, which, to borrow Samuel Johnson’s phrase, “is every moment starting to more delightful amusements,” and forever seeking after novelty (*Adventurer* no. 138, 4.281). Thus in *Adventurer* no. 140 Hawkesworth states, “I could not hope to fix the

¹²⁰ It is worth stressing that Kames’s position was not universally accepted, being called into question by thinkers such as Anna Laetitia Barbauld, who bluntly states in her “Enquiry Into Those Kinds of Distress Which Excite Agreeable Sensations” (1773) that “sensibility does not increase with exercise” (205).

¹²¹ For alternate strategies when it comes to fixing the attention see Natalie Phillips, *Distraction* (2016). Relevant to the present argument, Phillips pays particular attention to Samuel Johnson’s periodical essays, arguing that the “*Rambler* and *Idler* prove crucial to the history of sustained attention and mind wandering; their serial form provided a constant lesson in training attention’s precision and strength over longer durations. In this spirit of attention’s perfectibility, [Johnson’s] essays emphasize effort and training. His *Rambler* no. 7 urges readers to see their focal willpower as capable of immense strength, imagining themselves directing (and sustaining) attention with unprecedented power” (42).

attention, but by engaging the passions” (4.293) and in *Adventurer* no. 16 he reasons that since it is only “by example the passions are roused,” it is therefore by example that the periodical writer can “fix that volatility which would break away from ratiocination” (1.133). Similarly, in *Adventurer* no. 54, Hawkesworth affixes the following clause to a sentimental narrative illustrating the dangers of dissimulation: “that I may fix the attention of my readers a little longer on the subject, I shall relate a story” (2.153). Notably, periodical writers claimed that it was not only their arresting narratives, but also the very form of the periodical itself that could rouse and painfully sustain the passionate response of readers. As an anonymous essayist in *The Lady’s Magazine* reflected in 1783,

A friend of mine, who is employed in the compilation of a periodical paper, in which he inserts many tales, has thought of an entirely new method of having his publication eagerly sought after: in the most interesting part of a tale, he generally breaks off abruptly at the end of a number, and by that means keeping his readers in suspense, hopes to secure himself their attention. (“*The Traveller* no. 2” 239)

In addition to fixing the wandering attention, the pathos of sentimental periodical literature was meant to serve as a mnemonic device when it came to the moral precepts conveyed by the tales. In other words, at least in principle, the attentive reader of Hawesworth’s essays would find it difficult to forget the instruction they contain. In *Adventurer* no. 16, Hawkesworth states that facts which are “impressed upon the mind by the passions, are tenaciously remembered” (1.134). He implies much the same in *Adventurer* no. 125 (“May every lady, on whose memory compassion shall record the events, tremble to assume the levity of Flavilla”) (4.179) and in *Adventurer* no. 54 (“I shall relate a story, which, by those who have much

sensibility, will not soon be forgotten”) (2.153). In what is perhaps the clearest indicator of the multiple functions these fictions were thought to perform, Hawkesworth states in *Adventurer* no. 123 that “as the persons whom I wish to warn, are most impatient of declamation, and most susceptible of pity, I will address them in a story; and I hope the events will not only illustrate but impress the precept which they contain” (4.152). Here, Hawkesworth clearly emphasizes the potential of sentimental narratives to *illustrate* or drive home a moral precept, even as they *impress* this precept on the memory to facilitate recall. In this respect, pathetic narratives differ from more formal treatises, as texts read with difficulty and without pleasure are not easily remembered: “a laboured commentary, which is never read but as a task [...] immediately forgotten” (*Adventurer* 1.158).

The rationale behind Hawkesworth’s innovative attempts to facilitate recall becomes even more significant when one considers that many theorists considered the format of the miscellany to pose a problem when it came to recollection. As Samuel Taylor Coleridge scornfully observed in *Biographia Literaria* (1815), “the habit of perusing periodical works may be properly added to Averrhoe’s catalogue of Anti-Mnemonics, or weakeners of the memory (49). Hawkesworth muses over this challenge in *Adventurer* no. 18, where he distinguishes between long and short tales:

A story or tale, in which many different characters are conducted through a great variety of events, may include such a number and diversity of precepts, as, taken together, form almost a complete rule of life: as these events mutually depend upon each other, they will be retained in a series; and, therefore, the remembrance of one precept will almost

necessarily produce the remembrance of another, and the whole moral, as it is called, however complicated, will be recollected without labour and without confusion. (1.149)

On the other hand, short tales with no obvious connection to one another pose serious challenges when it comes the memory: “though a number of distinct fables may include all the topics of moral instruction, caution, and advice, which are contained in a story, yet each must be remembered by a distinct effort of the mind; and they will not recur in a series, because they have no connection with each other” (*Adventurer* 1.150). In this, Hawkesworth agrees with an anonymous correspondent to *The Gentleman’s Magazine*, who in 1766 complained that the “abrupt transition from one thing to another, is apt to overload and confuse the memory so much, that after reading two or three newspapers, people generally throw them down” (“A New Method of Reading Newspapers” 587). He also anticipates the great Dominican scholar, A.G. Sertillanges, who states in *The Intellectual Life* (1934) that a “string of unconnected words, numbers, ideas, or elements is hard to get into our heads; these isolated notions do not settle in; each is, as it were, lost and promptly vanishes. On the contrary, a series holds together and has power of resistance” (182). Hawkesworth not only attempts to overcome this difficulty by including frequent pathetic narratives in *The Adventurer*, but also attempts to turn it to his advantage, boldly suggesting that while a number of distinct tales may not be so easily recalled as one large narrative, “the memory of them may, however, be more frequently revived by those

incidents in life to which they correspond” (1.150).¹²² Hawkesworth thus attempts to forge strong links between modern commercial society—what Christopher Smart describes as a “vast, voluminous Miscellany” (*Midwife* 1.226) and Johnson as “the general miscellany of life” (*Rambler* 3.14)—and the periodical form, any given occurrence in the former naturally and almost automatically bringing to mind a related excerpt from the latter.

While the periodical form was considered to present unique challenges to the memory, it is important to remember that the form posed equal or even greater challenges when it came to raising the passions. In other words, the miscellaneous format was a threat to the very means—the passions—that would serve to fix the attention and imprint instruction on the memory. Drawing on Aristotle, Chambers states in the *Cyclopædia* (1728) that a crucial requirement in the “Management of the Passions” is that “they be found pure, and disengaged from any Thing that might prevent their Effect. *Polymythy*, therefore, *i.e.*, a Multiplicity of Fables, Actions, or Histories, must be avoided: All Adventures much broken, and hard to be retain’d ... embarrass the Mind, and require so much Attention, that there is none to spare for the *Passions*” (s.v. “Passion” 2.761). This is why Chambers maintains that “the passions are ... the Life and Spirit of the longer Poems” (2.761), a point subsequently taken up by Johnson, Adam Smith, and Lord Kames.¹²³ Length and uniformity were thus assumed to be crucial factors when it came to raising

¹²² Describing the sad tale of an old hound whose desire to please his master is impeded by his infirmities, Hawkesworth states that “pity is here forcibly excited; and injurious resentment may be repressed, when an instance not equally strong recalls this to the mind” (1.151-52). Such recall, surprisingly, could take place even when a given text was not read with attention, as a writer for the *Daily Gazeteer* (1735-45) observes in the leader for no. 951: “I am satisfy’d that our Youth, and all who have to do with our Youth, stand in need of such Admonitions, which tho’ at present they may be read without Attention, may possibly be remembered hereafter, and prove the Means of awakening that Spirit, of which I have endeavour’d at least to discover the Beauty and the Excellence” (July 21, 1738).

¹²³ See chapter two of this thesis.

the passions. As such, Hawkesworth's chosen medium, the essay serial, was potentially at odds with the pathetic elements of his fictional narratives. Leigh Hunt hints as much in his discussion of Hawkesworth's periodical tales, apologetically observing that "too much is not to be expected in these abridged moral portraitures" because they are "too compressed to allow room for any ... detailed exhibition" of character and setting ("Hawkesworth" 231). Although Hawkesworth is aware of this difficulty—presenting a humorous anecdote in *Adventurer* no. 52 about a tragedian's inability to raise his audience's passions because of frequent interruptions¹²⁴—he chooses not to admit it explicitly. As he observes in *Adventurer* no. 4,

From a dramatic poem to those short pieces, which may be contained in such a periodical paper as the *Adventurer*, is a bold transition. And yet such pieces, although formed upon a single incident, if that incident be sufficiently uncommon to gratify curiosity, and sufficiently interesting to engage the passions, may afford an entertainment, which, if it is not lasting, is yet of the highest kind. (1.28)¹²⁵

On occasion, he is even content to space individual instalments of pathetic narratives when there would appear to be no need to do so—as in the story of Eugenio and Amelia (much of which takes place in *Adventurer* nos. 64-66, though it does not conclude until no. 70) and of Agamus and his daughter (which Hawkesworth begins in nos. 86 but does not resolve until nos. 134-36)

¹²⁴ See for example the following instance: "I increased the pathos of my voice in proportion as I ascended the climax of distress ... but at this crisis, the gentleman ... desired me to stop half a moment" (2.140).

¹²⁵ Hawkesworth's comments on periodical fiction in some ways anticipate Edgar Allan Poe's aesthetic of the short story. In his review of Nathaniel Hawthorne's *Twice-Told Tales* (1842), Poe remarks that "Were we called upon ... to designate that class of composition which, next to such a poem as we have suggested, should best fulfill the demands of high genius ... we should unhesitatingly speak of the prose tale, as Mr. Hawthorne has here exemplified it. We allude to the short prose narrative, requiring from a half-hour to one or two hours in its perusal. The ordinary novel is objectionable, from its length. ... As it cannot be read at one sitting, it deprives itself ... of the immense force derivable from *totality*" (298).

—leading Mayo to observe that “Hawkesworth was indifferent to the special problems presented by the long story in an essay periodical” (107). This is not to suggest that Hawkesworth was unaware of such “problems,” but simply that he chose not to admit them as serious obstacles.

If Hawkesworth chose to ignore the challenges facing him as a periodical writer, particularly when it came to raising the passions, he was vocal in his promotion of particular literary techniques or stylistic elements that would, in fact, contribute to emotive arousal in the reader. He thus shows a marked preference for answering positive or *cataphatic* questions (viz., what objects or scenes raise the passions?) while ignoring negative or *apophatic* ones (viz., what objects or scenes prevent the passions from being raised or interrupt their activity?). To quote Mayo once more, “It is in the realm of psycho-aesthetic principles, and the realization of these principals in terms of his own stories in *The Adventurer*, that [Hawkesworth] made his real contributions to magazine fiction” (107).

To this point, I have been speaking of the passions in a general sense, which was undoubtedly a common way of referring to them in the eighteenth century. After all, as David Hume pointed out in *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739-40), “All resembling impressions are connected together, and no sooner one arises than the rest immediately follow” (283). Thus, a “spectator of a tragedy passes thro’ a long train of grief, terror, indignation, and other affections, which the poet represents in the persons he introduces” (369). To speak of one passion is thus, in a limited sense, to speak of them all, for, in the view of eighteenth-century theorists, passions tend to exist in chains or relays (there being “paths among the passions,” according to Philip

Fisher) (*Vehement Passions* 35). In what follows, however, I argue that Hawkesworth was deeply concerned with raising particular passions, rather than passion in general.

Curiosity is the first and foremost passion Hawkesworth attempts to elicit through his periodical fictions, which is not surprising given both the important position assigned to curiosity in eighteenth-century taxonomies of the passions¹²⁶ and the close connection between periodicals and curiosity. As Nicola Parsons stresses, “The capacity to elicit readerly curiosity is a hallmark of ... the early eighteenth-century periodical” (251). Hawkesworth tends to distinguish curiosity from the rest of the passions, as in his remark, “Those narratives are most pleasing, which not only excite and gratify curiosity, but engage the passions” (1.23). In part, this has to do with curiosity’s crucial role in holding the attention. If literary works “do not excite curiosity, the whole is rejected together” (*Adventurer* no. 16, 1.134). Ultimately, to Hawkesworth, this is the key problem with biography:

Biography would always engage the passions, if it could sufficiently gratify curiosity: but there have been few among the whole human species, whose lives would furnish a single adventure; I mean such a complication of circumstances, as hold the mind in an anxious yet pleasing suspense, and gradually unfold in the production of some unforeseen and important event. (1.24)

Of course, like his contemporaries, Hawkesworth does not endorse all forms of curiosity, at times mocking “the curiosity of mankind” for “perpetually thirsting after novelties” in the form of monstrosities (1.13).¹²⁷ In *The Passions of the Soul* (1649), Descartes had labelled such

¹²⁶ See “Eliza Haywood and the Passions: Theory and Praxis” in chapter one of this thesis.

¹²⁷ In *The Enquiry*, Burke defines curiosity, the first and “simplest emotion which we discover in the human mind,” as “whatever desire we have for, or whatever pleasure we take in novelty” (31).

individuals “the blindly curious” or “those who investigate rarities only to wonder at them and not to understand them” (61). Hawkesworth is equally critical. “It is a peculiar happiness to me,” he sarcastically states, “that I sally forth in an age, which emulates those heroic times of old, when nothing was pleasing but what was unnatural ... Every street [now] teems with incredibilities” (1.159-60). Still, curiosity could be beneficial—i.e., there are objects that “might justly raise curiosity,” unlike those aberrations “which ... convey no instruction, inspire no noble sentiment, nor move one tender passion” (1.147)—which explains Hawkesworth’s attempt to elicit it through his periodical fiction. Echoing Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, and anticipating periodical writers like Oliver Goldsmith, Hawkesworth states in *Adventurer* no. 17 that the “love of variety which is found in every breast, as it produces much pleasure, may also produce much knowledge” (1.143).¹²⁸ In this way, Barbara Benedict’s assertion in *Curiosity: A Cultural History* (2001) that early modern writers represent curiosity “as a passion that turns the inquirer into either a saviour or a monster” (3) could be said to apply to Hawkesworth as well.¹²⁹

But what kinds of phenomena appeal to curiosity? According to Benedict, “opportunities and commodities that encourage and manifest” curiosity include “nature, the supernatural, the occult, sexuality” (8). A more encompassing taxonomy, as has already been suggested, involves

¹²⁸ In the *Metaphysica*, Aristotle writes that “it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize” (Book A, Part 982b). I will elaborate on the connection between passion (including wonder) and the advancement of knowledge in the fourth chapter of my thesis.

¹²⁹ When it came to the positive effects of curiosity, Murphy stresses in *Gray’s-Inn Journal* no. 30 that “our Love of Novelty ... is a leading Principle in the Heart of Man, implanted in us for the most benevolent Purposes by the Author of our Frame” (1.192). Relevant to the present argument, early modern philosophers praised, in particular, the power of novelty to imprint information on the memory, one obvious reason why individuals should foster curiosity. As Stephen Gaukroger notes, Cartesian philosophers believed “that novelty induced a rare fixity in brain traces, an independence between stored items that guaranteed immunity from the melding and confusion of ordinary remembering” (*The Soft Underbelly of Reason* 12).

whatever is uncommon, wonderful, or novel, such objects making up, according to Joseph Warton, himself drawing on Joseph Addison, one of the “three principal sources of pleasure that strike the imagination” (*Adventurer* 3.89). The novel *qua* object or quality takes many forms in Hawkesworth’s periodical fiction, most frequently that of supernatural events and machinery or *near*-miraculous happenings. In this, Hawkesworth would seem to agree with Joseph Warton, who reflects in *Adventurer* no. 80 that “the *Speciosa Miracula* [or “striking and wondrous tales”] of the *Odyssey* are ... calculated to excite our curiosity and wonder, and to allure us forward with unextinguished impatience to the catastrophe” (3.90).¹³⁰ Such miraculous beings and happenings—“those visible and palpable artifices,” as Knox scornfully puts it in *Winter Evenings* (1.69)—play a particularly prominent role in Hawkesworth’s oriental tales. In fact, Hawkesworth seems to see supernatural beings as an integral part of such tales.¹³¹ To Hawkesworth, eastern tales, “perhaps the most pleasing of all literary performances,” are fictions “in which supernatural events are *every moment produced* by Genii and Fairies” (1.26; my emphasis). The nearly omnipotent and omniscient “Genius Syndarac” in *Adventurer* nos. 20-22, an eastern tale revolving around a beleaguered beauty, and inculcating the danger of privileging desire over conscience, is a good example; Syndarac emerges from a cloud so repeatedly—either to transport the heroine, Selima, through space or to change the form of the hero, Amurath—that his presence becomes almost routine.

¹³⁰To understand what Warton means by the phrase “striking and wondrous tales,” it is important to locate its original in Horace’s *Ars Poetica*, in which the “striking and wondrous” relates directly to Homer’s gods and monsters: “Not smoke after flame does he plan to give, but after smoke the light, that then he may set forth striking and wondrous tales—Antiphates, Scylla, Charybdis, and the Cyclops” (463).

¹³¹ As Martha Pike Conant observes in her by now classic study, *The Oriental Tale in England in the Eighteenth Century* (1908), not “only in language, but also in incident, Hawkesworth is far more fantastic than either Addison or Johnson” (93).

Metamorphosis or the transmigration of souls is another technique that Hawkesworth uses to gratify his readers' curiosity. In *Adventurer* no. 20, Hawkesworth muses that frequent transformations would not "appear altogether incredible, to people among whom the Metempsychosis is an article of faith, and the visible agency of Superior Beings admitted without scruple" (1.166), thus hinting that such happenings *would* appear altogether wonderful to his own English audience. As already noted, metempsychosis plays an important part in *Adventurer* nos. 20-22. The Sultan Amurath, very much like Nebuchadnezzar in *Daniel* 4:33, is transformed into a monster with "the fore-parts of my body like a wolf, and the hinder parts like a goat" to atone for his sins (1.178), after which he is progressively changed into a dog, a dove, and finally back into a man. Hawkesworth demonstrates his partiality for this trope as early as *Adventurer* no. 5, in which the "eldest son of a country gentleman" finds himself, upon his death, "with inexpressible grief and astonishment, under the shape of a mongrel Puppy" (1.31), before he is progressively reanimated as a bullfinch, a cockchafer (or doodlebug), an earthworm, a cock, a lobster, a pig, a flea, and, finally and most surprisingly, a distressed "young Lady of exquisite beauty" (1.39).¹³² Other tales, while not introducing obviously supernatural beings and events are nevertheless well-stocked with near-miraculous events to gratify the reader's curiosity. In *Adventurer* no. 134, Agamus reflects upon an "event so extraordinary that it was almost miraculous" (4.242), and his daughter marvels at a similar occurrence in *Adventurer* no. 136 (4.268). Melissa's repeated, surprising, and almost frantic changes of fortune in *Adventurer* nos. 7-8 can also be said to fall into this category, as she incredibly manages to avoid death,

¹³² For miraculous physical restoration rather than complete transformation see the færie story in *Adventurer* nos. 103-104, which tells of an ugly child transformed into a beauty: "The moment this wish was uttered, the spell of Farimina produced the contrary effect: her [Shelimah's] skin, which was scaly and yellow, became smooth and white" (3.288).

seduction, and disenfranchisement before ultimately coming into an unexpected inheritance and marrying the son of a country squire.¹³³

In his *Enquiry*, Burke reflects that “some degree of novelty must be one of the materials in every instrument which works upon the mind; and curiosity blends itself more or less with all our passions” (31). Thus, while it is technically correct to speak of novelty as raising or eliciting curiosity, the uncommon, wonderful, or novel could be said to elicit not only curiosity but other passions as well, including surprise and astonishment.¹³⁴ Hawkesworth enlists these passions in *The Adventurer*, though he is not content to raise them only through supernatural or near-supernatural happenings. In his running commentary on *The Odyssey*, Joseph Warton suggests that the most affecting works of literature feature scenes of *anagnorisis* (discovery) and *peripeteia* (unexpected change of fortune), as such narratives “more deeply interest and more irresistibly move the reader, by adding surprise and astonishment to every other passion which they excite” (3.113). Such changes in fortune are a staple of Hawkesworth’s periodical fiction, particularly his domestic tales: thus in *Adventurer* no. 8, the penniless Melissa discovers that “by the death of her father’s elder brother, whose family she had never known, she was become entitled to a very considerable estate” (1.67); and in *Adventurer* no. 70, the disinherited Eugenio is interrupted in his desperate attempt “to discover the north-west passage to India” (2.256) in

¹³³ Warton’s comments on *The Odyssey* may be helpfully applied to Melissa’s tale in *Adventurer* nos. 7-8: “The vast variety of scenes perpetually shifting before us, the train of unexpected events, and the many sudden turns of fortune in this diversified poem, must more deeply engage the reader, and keep his attention ... alive and active” (3.90).

¹³⁴ It is worth noting that astonishment was not always seen as a positive emotion. Descartes, for example, argues that astonishment can “never be anything but bad” (58).

order to regain his honour, when Amelia's wealthy father unexpectedly approves their marriage. Scenes of *anagnorisis* are equally prominent: these moments may be tragic, as when the wife of a British soldier "discovered hanging on the wrist [of a corpse] the remains of a ruffle, round which there was a slight border of her own work" in *Adventurer* no. 110 (4.37); or fortuitous, as when in *Adventurer* no. 86 the worn-out rake Agamus is "preparing to go to bed" with a prostitute, "when, to my unspeakable confusion and astonishment, I discovered a mark by which I knew her to be my child" (3.141).

This last example provides yet more evidence that particular passions were thought to blend into others, and that one object could inspire two or more very different passions. Agamus's hair-breadth escape from incest may inspire surprise and astonishment, but these passions are in a sense supplemental or secondary, for, as Warton stresses, they appear in addition to "every other passion which they [scenes of *anagnorisis* and *peripetiea*] excite" (3.113). The passions Warton is gesturing toward in this case are clearly pity and terror, also known as the tragic passions. As Aristotle observes in *The Poetics*, when an individual is "on the point of unwittingly committing something irremediable, but recognizes it before doing so," as when "in *Cresphontes* Merope is about to kill her son, but recognizes him in time," these circumstances, more than any other, inspire pity and terror (77-79). The narrative of Agamus and his daughter thus demonstrates both Hawkesworth's knowledge of classical criticism and the

centrality of pity and terror when it comes to his mandate to raise the passions in *The Adventurer*.¹³⁵

In *The Poetics*, Aristotle provided perhaps the most lasting, but also the most general, formula for raising pity and terror in an audience: pity “is felt for the undeserving victim of adversity,” fear “for one like ourselves” (71). Why exactly individuals should delight in the misfortune of others was, of course, hotly debated, and I shall return to this point later: for now, it is enough to say that for critics such as Burke, “terror is a passion which always produces delight when it does not press too close, and pity is a passion accompanied by pleasure, because it arises from love and social affection” (46).

But aside from unmerited and relatable (or identifiable) misfortune, what kinds of phenomena were thought to elicit the tragic passions, particularly when it came to eighteenth-century aesthetic theory? And how did Hawkesworth integrate such phenomena into his short narrative fictions in *The Adventurer*? In the first place, as I have already discussed, Hawkesworth’s tragic fictions tend to focus on individual or “domestic” distress and, more particularly, to revolve around sorrowful women. Arthur Murphy points out in *Gray’s-Inn Journal* no. 63 that generalized descriptions of catastrophes have a negligible effect compared to a single, well-chosen instance: the “mind is totally impassive in all ... general Accounts of the Calamities of war; but, when the Poet thinks proper to distinguish a single person from the Throng, we melt in Pity of his Fate, heedless of the general Devastation, which is spread around

¹³⁵ As I have argued in chapter one, pity was often seen as a calm tender passion, associated as it was with love; terror, on the other hand, was an inherently violent or vehement passion. Hawkesworth never lays out a regular taxonomy of the passions, or, as one correspondent puts it in regards to his own epistle, “never enter[s] into a philosophical inquiry concerning the nature of the passions, or the power of reason” (1.215). Still, he does distinguish between appetites, affections, and desires (3.205), and between “appetites and passions” (2.96). Relevant to my present point, he also distinguishes between “violent passions (3.279, 4.160) and “gentle emotion[s] in the mind” (4.18).

him” (2.64). Hawkesworth agrees in *Adventurer* no. 4, stating that while history may gratify curiosity, “it does not often excite either terror or pity,” as “the mind feels not that tenderness for a falling state, which it feels for an injured beauty; nor is it so much alarmed at the migration of barbarians ... as at the fury of a husband, who, deceived into jealousy by false appearances, stabs a faithful and affectionate wife kneeling at his feet, and pleading to be heard” (1.24).

Hawkesworth stakes a great deal on this claim, for short pathetic fictions involving a jealous husband are found frequently in *The Adventurer* (see, for example, the tale of Maria and Charlotte in nos. 54-56; that of Desdemona in nos. 117-118; and that of Flavilla in nos. 123-25).

But why focus on amatory distress in general and distressed women in particular? In a historical sense, simply because, as Julie Ellison observes, literary victims in the second half of the eighteenth century tend to be “marked by racial, social, or national disadvantages: the deep-feeling Moor, the dying Indian, the impoverished veteran, the slave, the vagrant” (18) and, I might add, the vulnerable young woman. From an aesthetic perspective, Hawkesworth’s focus on amatory distress in *The Adventurer* becomes clear when we consider the opening pages of Smith’s *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759). Smith notes that readers tend to associate lovers with “a happiness superior to any other,” making their infelicity—particularly the *violent* or *vocal* infelicity of women (40)—“the most atrocious of all injuries” and therefore the most pitiable (63).¹³⁶ Significantly, pity was thought to increase with, or even be predicated on, the *beauty* of distressed women, something Hawkesworth hints at in *Adventurer* no. 4. As Anna

¹³⁶ Curiously, Hawkesworth’s fellow contributor to *The Adventurer* objects to this reasoning, in part because of his attempt to establish Shakespeare’s tragedy of *King Lear* as preeminent among tragedies. To Joseph Warton, *King Lear* proves that “Boileau was mistaken, when he affirmed, ‘Those tender scenes that pictured love impart, / Insure success and best engage the heart.’ The distresses in this tragedy are of a very uncommon nature, and are not touched upon by any other dramatic author” (4.59).

Laetitia Barbauld notes, “there must be some other sentiment combined with ... instinctive sympathy, before it becomes in any degree pleasing, or produces the sweet emotion of pity. This sentiment is love, esteem, *the complacency we take in the contemplation of beauty* ... called forth and rendered more interesting by circumstances of pain and danger” (197; my emphasis). Not surprisingly, therefore, the orphan Melissa in *Adventurer* no. 7 is “taken notice of by all the gentry as the prettiest girl in the place” (1.57); and Agamus’s prostitute daughter in *Adventurer* no. 86 is thought to be “extremely beautiful” (3.141).

Other literary techniques are designed to heighten the distress of Hawkesworth’s beautiful, yet sorrowful heroines and thus to facilitate pity and terror. Crucially, their distress tends to be mental rather than physical, as when Fidelia states in *Adventurer* no. 78 that “my peace of mind was utterly destroyed” (3.72) or when the narrator of *Adventurer* no. 7 relates that “a train of mournful ideas now rushed upon” Melissa’s mind, “which, if they could not be suppressed by reason, were soon destroyed by their own violence” (1.58). Murphy points out that an “account of bodily Pain has but a very slight Influence upon our Passions; it is mental Distress that principally operates upon our Hearts, and our Pity rises in Proportion to the Agitations of Mind, which we perceive in the Person afflicted” (*GIJ* 2.64).¹³⁷ This is not to suggest that there is no physical violence in these tales—indeed, some can be quite brutal, as when Agamus’s daughter is “struck ... so violent a blow, that [she] fell from [her] chair” (4.249)—but that Hawkesworth emphasizes mental over physical distress.

¹³⁷ Smith agrees, observing with some humour that “The loss of a leg may generally be regarded as a more real calamity than the loss of a mistress. It would be a ridiculous tragedy, however, of which the catastrophe was to turn upon a loss of that kind” (*Moral Sentiments* 35-36).

At times, mental distress is caused by conflicting passions, as is illustrated in the figure of Desdemona in *Adventurer* no. 117: “During this journey my mind was in great agitation; and it is difficult to determine whether pleasure or pain was predominant” (4.102). Conflicting emotions also cause anxiety in *Adventurer* no. 8, when the narrator observes that “the conflict of different passions that were at once excited with uncommon violence in the breast of Melissa, deprived her for a time of the power of reflection” (1.66). Such internal conflict was thought to exert a particularly powerful influence on the spectator. Murphy argues that “there are frequent Occasions, in which the Breast is distracted by two different Passions at once, both working the Heart-strings in one mixed Emotion” (*GIJ* 2.41). He goes on to suggest that literary portrayals of individuals activated by such “thwarting passions” strongly “interest the Heart; which is the Perfection of Poetry” (*GIJ* 2.42).¹³⁸

Other plot elements that were believed to contribute to the production of pity and fear in the reader, and that are visible in Hawkesworth’s periodical fictions, include family connections, as when a soldier falls in battle “and his blooming Mistress mourns with frantic Sorrow, and all his Relations bewail his loss” (*GIJ* 2.64),¹³⁹ and Stoic detachment on the part of the victim. Complete insensibility, it should be noted, like that exemplified by many of Johnson’s heroines in *The Rambler* and *The Idler*, could actually be said to work against the production of pity and

¹³⁸ The same could be said of drama. To Murphy, “Some of the finest Passages in Epic and Dramatic Poesy, are those, where a Conflict is marked between several warring Passions” (*GIJ* 1.132). *King Lear*, in particular, features “such an artful Mixture of thwarting Passions, that the Heart-strings of an Audience are torn on every Side” (*GIJ* 2.75). Joseph Warton agrees, stating in *The Adventurer* that the scene in which Lear asks Goneril “Ar’t not asham’d to look upon this beard” achieves a great deal of its power because it “abounds with many noble turns of passion; or rather conflicts of very different passions” (4.65).

¹³⁹ See particularly *Adventurer* no. 7 and no. 110 in this regard.

terror.¹⁴⁰ Of course, many distressed women *do* vent their sorrows, as when Opsinous's pregnant mistress opposes an abortion with "terror and regret, with tears, trembling and entreaty" (1.121), and such displays *were* thought to elicit pity and fear. As Hume states,

All human creatures are related to us by resemblance. Their persons, therefore, their interests, their passions, their pains and pleasures must strike upon us in a lively manner, and produce an emotion similar to the original one; since a lively idea is easily converted to an impression. If this be true in general, it must be more so of affliction and sorrow.

These have always a stronger and more lasting influence than any pleasure or enjoyment.

(*Treatise* 369)

Still, "emotional reserve" was perhaps even more affecting (Ellison 10). For Hume, a man who feels, but "is not dejected by misfortunes, is the more lamented on account of his patience" (370).¹⁴¹ Curiously, such reserve is visible in *The Adventurer* not in the form of Stoic men but a cancer-riddled clergyman's wife who "showed more dauntless intrepidity than the sternest philosopher" (3.87) and in Agamus's daughter, who, by the time she was "four years old, had learnt ... to surmount the sense of pain and suppress [her] passions" (4.242).

The final narrative feature I would like to focus on is death—what Burke describes as "this king of terrors" (40). Depictions of death, it was agreed, contribute greatly to the production

¹⁴⁰ In *Adventurer* no. 82, Hawkesworth states that "the finest features ... when they are animated, will generally excite the same passions which they express. If they are fixed in the dead calm of insensibility, they will be examined without emotion" (3.106-7). On the other hand, beauty "is extremely forcible in [both] the silent complaint of patient sufferance ... and in tears, whether of joy, of pity, or of grief, it is almost irresistible" (3.107-8).

¹⁴¹ Compare with Barnett's summary of eighteenth-century dramatic theory: "A girl collapsing in tears merely embarrasses the audience; a god or a hero, noble and elevated in bearing, who weeps despite himself, arouses the fear and pity essential to classical tragedy" (*The Art of Gesture* 221). For a periodical manifestation of such a "god or a hero," see Mr. Wentworth in *Mirror* no. 27 (April 27, 1779).

of pity and fear. Accordingly, Hawkesworth is fond of eliminating key players in his pathetic narratives to achieve a kind of grand catastrophe. The means vary but the end is generally the same. Some protagonists die by poison (*Adventurer* no. 22 and no. 73), others fall in battle (no. 7, no. 110), drown in the English Channel (no. 56), or are executed (no. 91). Still more expire from excessive grief (*Adventurer* no. 110 and no. 125). The rationale for such bloody catastrophes is obvious. Dramas that end in death, according to Aristotle, “are found the most tragic, if successfully managed” (*Poetics* 73). Or as Philip Fisher bluntly states, “killing is very central to any literature of the passions” (92). At times, Hawkesworth increases this terror by emphasizing the dying individual’s sudden prospect of hell. To critics such as John Dennis, “no subject is so capable of supplying us with Thoughts that necessarily produce ... great and strong Enthusiasms, as a Religious Subject: For all which is great in Religion, is most exalted and amazing ... and all that is terrible, is astonishing” (218). Death may be frightening, in other words, but the prospect of eternal damnation—a distinctly *religious* prospect—“alarms, confounds, and terrifies” (*Adventurer* 4.213). Hawkesworth hints at such terror in his anecdote of a sick kite, “who [had] requested of his mother to petition the Gods for his recovery, but was answered, ‘Alas! to which of the Gods can I sacrifice? for which of their altars hast thou not robbed?’” (1.156). Hawkesworth remarks, the “passion that is [here] excited, is terror; the object of which is the despair of him who perceived himself to be dying, and has reason to fear that his very prayer is an abomination” (1.156). Significantly, it is this terror that Opsinous experiences in *Adventurer* nos. 12-14, after poisoning his pregnant mistress, and ultimately himself: “My mind is all doubt, and terror, and confusion; I know nothing but that I have rendered ineffectual the clemency of my Judge, that the approach of death is swift and inevitable, and that either the

shades of everlasting night, or the gleams of unquenchable fire are at hand. My soul in vain shrinks backward” (1.124). It is also the terror that the reader is expected to experience upon the perusal of Opsinous’s narrative.

I have been focusing primarily on the particular *topoi* Hawkesworth uses to raise the passions, including curiosity, surprise, pity, and terror. As Hawkesworth recognizes, however, there are other narrative features to consider when it comes to inspiring passion in the reader. As indicated in the first two chapters of this thesis, theorists frequently stressed the utility of a first person narrator when it came to raising the reader’s passions. Hawkesworth agrees and includes a number of first-person fictions in his periodical, stating that “the first person” voice gives to narratives “an air of greater dignity, and render[s] [their] influence more powerful” (1.166).¹⁴² Another factor widely assumed to contribute to the pathos of individual narratives was simplicity of plot. Scholars have traditionally seen the simple structure of Hawkesworth’s narratives as an unavoidable byproduct of the periodical form, rather than a deliberate strategy on Hawkesworth’s part. Thus, Mayo states that Hawkesworth’s tales “contain no mysteries to be unfolded, or interpolated histories” and require no back-tracking “or oscillation between different scenes or sets of characters” (113-14). Hawkesworth’s biographer, John Lawrence Abbott, agrees: “His tales have little technical sophistication: there are no interpolated histories, no shifts between scenes and characters. ... Hawkesworth’s suffering heroes and heroines as well as his villains move from youth to old age to chronology’s strict cadences” (37). I suggest, however,

¹⁴² For relevant first person narratives see particularly *Adventurer* nos. 12-14, nos. 20-22, nos. 77-79, nos. 86, 134-36, and nos. 117-18.

that this simplicity is not simply an oversight. In fact, as Joseph Warton observes in *Adventurer* no. 127, it is by

simplicity of fable alone, when every single act, and scene, and speech, and sentiment and word, concur to accelerate the intended event, that the Greek tragedies keep the attention of the audience immovably fixed upon one principal object, which must be lessened, and the ends of the drama defeated, by the mazes and intricacies of modern plots. (4.189)

What is condemned as a weakness by modern critics, therefore, may have been seen as a strength to Hawkesworth and his contemporaries.

I contend that Hawkesworth deliberately structured his plots so as to avoid intricacy and sophistication, and that by doing so he sought not only a passionate response from the reader but also his or her full attention. Indeed, Hawkesworth openly deploys other stylistic or structural elements for the same purposes. Significant in this regard is his valuation of short, broken speeches over verbosity. There is no need, as Joseph Warton reminds readers in *Adventurer* no. 113, for “long and laboured speech” to enflame passion: “Nature, Sophocles, and Shakespeare, represent the feelings of the heart in a different manner; by a broken hint, a short exclamation, a word, or a look” (4.62).¹⁴³ Hawkesworth implies much the same, attacking extended prose fiction in *Adventurer* no. 4 for wearying the reader with “languid descriptions and impertinent declamations” (1.26), and faulting it again in *Adventurer* no. 16 for a “redundancy of language” (1.152). But how does this preference for brevity play out in *The Adventurer*? On the one hand, distressed individuals, often women, may decline to discuss their sorrows in detail, as when the beleaguered Fidelia in *Adventurer* no. 79 declares, “I can give no account of my

¹⁴³ Murphy agrees, arguing that “our great Masters of the Passions make their Hearers feel by Sympathy the Agitations of their Hero’s Breast, without running into cold languid Declamation” (*GIJ* 2.94).

thoughts at this period of time: they were all confused and distracted” (3.79).¹⁴⁴ Others resort to *adynaton*, as when Agamus’s daughter observes that “the terror that seized me, when I could no longer doubt into what hands I had fallen, is not to be expressed” (4.257). Even the eidolon resorts to *adynaton* on occasion, at one point declining to reveal Flavilla’s agony in *Adventurer* no. 125, as “all attempts to describe it would be not only ineffectual but absurd” (4.176).

Even as Hawkesworth condemns verbosity, he stresses the importance of many particulars or “little circumstances” when it comes to raising the passions. In this, he would seem to agree with Johnson, among other eighteenth-century theorists. In *Adventurer* no. 4, Hawkesworth insists that facts should always be “delivered with discriminating circumstances” for “who that reads in a table of chronology or an index, that a city was swallowed up by an earthquake, or a kingdom depopulated by a pestilence, finds either his attention engaged, or his curiosity gratified” (1.123).¹⁴⁵ He later states that it is “minute and discriminating circumstances” that “rouse our sensibility” (2.96). Such particularly is visible, above all, in *Adventurer* nos. 134-36, when Agamus’s daughter describes in detail her miserable condition as a street walker: “my face was covered with a cold sweat, and my legs trembled under me” (4.260); “my hair

¹⁴⁴ *Adventurer* nos. 77-79 were almost certainly written by Hester Mulso, later Mrs. Chapone. Nonetheless, there are important similarities between these and Hawkesworth’s narratives. Leigh Hunt, in his attempt to account for these similarities and justify his inclusion of Mulso’s tales in his collection, suggests the following solution: “the Story of Fidelia was sent to the *Adventurer* in a different form to that in which it now appears, but ... Dr. Hawkesworth, as the author of the work, gave it its present character and polish” (235).

¹⁴⁵ Hawkesworth was fond of recycling ideas almost verbatim. A passage that echoes these words in *Adventurer* no. 4 appears again in the preface to the *Voyages* (1773)—though this time with a subtle cut directed at Richardson: “the relation of little circumstances requires no apology, for it is from little circumstances that the relation of great events derives its power over the mind. ... An account that ten thousand men perished in a battle, that twice the number were swallowed up by an earthquake, or that a whole nation was swept away by a pestilence, is read in the naked brevity of an index, without the least emotion, by those who feel themselves strongly interested even for Pamela, the imaginary heroine of a novel that is remarkable for the enumeration of particulars in themselves so trifling that we almost wonder how they could occur to the author’s mind” (vii).

hung loosely about my shoulders, my stays were but half-laced, and the rest of my clothes were hastily thrown on” (4.262); “I was almost covered in kennel dirt, my face was discoloured, [and] my speech was inarticulate” (4.262).¹⁴⁶ While Jonathan Lamb associates Hawkesworth’s emphasis on “little circumstances” with Robert Boyle and the rise of experimental philosophy (*Preserving the Self* 101), one can equally argue that there is a literary tradition behind it, a tradition associated with, and espoused by Joseph Warton. Warton observes of Shakespeare’s *Tempest* that “it is by selecting such little and almost imperceptible circumstances [as Miranda’s offer to assist Ferdinand with the wood] that Shakespeare has more truly painted the passions than any other writer: affection is more powerfully expressed by this simple wish and offer of assistance, than by the unnatural eloquence and witticisms of Dryden, or the amorous declamations of Rowe” (3.231). Interestingly, Warton adjusts his critical method to emphasize such particulars, claiming that “general criticism is on all subjects useless and unentertaining” and that writers such as Shakespeare must be “accompanied step by step, and scene by scene ... if we would do complete justice to [their] genuine beauties” (4.93), a point stressed by Jonathan Kramnick in *The Making of the English Canon*.¹⁴⁷ To reiterate, a focus on particularity was not new. In fact, by stressing the importance of “little circumstances” when it comes to raising the

¹⁴⁶ Hawkesworth’s reliance on particulars to elicit emotion is particularly apparent in *Adventurer* no. 47, in which he contrasts a very general and uninteresting account of Alexander the Great with a particular and sensational one of “Bagshot” the highwayman.

¹⁴⁷ To Kramnick, “the manner in which Warton invests Shakespeare finds an allegorical double in his method. Warton is in fact among the most detailed and adamant of midcentury critics about the protocols of reading. He finishes the gloss on ‘wilt break my heart’ by noting that ‘the turns of passion in these few lines are so quick and so various that I thought they needed to be minutely pointed out by a kind of perpetual commentary.’ This reading approximates what he takes to be the defining formal features of poetry, namely ‘short expressive’ figures, detailedness, or what he summarily terms ‘particularity.’ Here Warton stakes his poetics in opposition to Johnson’s notion of ‘generality’” (134-35).

passions, Warton and Hawkesworth ally themselves to a literary tradition going back at least as far as Aristotle and Quintilian.¹⁴⁸

Challenging the Epicurean Reader in *The Adventurer*

To recap, pathetic narratives in *The Adventurer* serve to fix the public's wandering attention through the arousal of particular passions such as curiosity, surprise, pity, and terror. They also ensure that the moral of a tale—when such morals are visible—remains fused in the reader's memory. But do such tales ever present a risk? Did readers ever abuse them? And if so, how would we know? Hawkesworth's portrayals of poor readers scattered throughout *The Adventurer* provide a clue. It turns out that mere inattention is not the only thing that makes for a poor reader. There is a lurking threat posed by those who are simply unmoved by such narratives, and who, precisely because of their immobility and/or insensibility, paradoxically exert pressure on an emerging sentimental model of ethics, a point expanded upon by Wendy Anne Lee.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁸ On this point, see for example the following passage from Quintilian: "At times ... the picture which we endeavour to present is fuller in detail [...as when we] move our hearers to tears by the picture of a captured town. For the mere statement that the town was stormed, while no doubt it embraces all that such a calamity involves, has all the curtness of a dispatch, and fails to penetrate to the emotions of the hearer. But if we expand all that the one word 'stormed' includes, we shall see the flames pouring from house and temple, and hear the crash of falling roofs and one confused clamour blent of many cries: we shall behold some in doubt whither to fly, others clinging to their nearest and dearest in one last embrace, while the wailing of women and children and the laments of old men that the cruelty of fate should have spared them to see that day will strike upon our ears. Then will come the pillage of treasure sacred and profane, the hurrying to and fro of the plunderers as they carry off their booty or return to seek for more, the prisoners driven each before his own inhuman captor, the mother struggling to keep her child, and the victors fighting over the richest of the spoil. For though, as I have already said, the sack of a city includes all these things, it is less effective to tell the whole news at once than to recount it detail by detail" (*Institutes* 8.3.66-69).

¹⁴⁹ In "The Scandal of Insensibility" (2015), Lee summarizes her thesis thus: "my claim is not that insensibility is a single, coherently understood state that poses problems for the ontology of emotions as the interior origins of human agency. Rather, I am arguing that the event of nonresponsiveness exhausts this model, eliciting the illogical charge of an absence of motion that exerts force, an immobility that also applies what Hobbes calls 'counter-pressure'" (1409).

Hawkesworth attempts pre-emptively to override such unimpassioned reading with timely warnings, such as that found at the conclusion of *Adventurer* no. 66: “not to pity Eugenio is surely to be a monster rather than a man” (2.257). Joseph Warton is equally concerned that readers or spectators of *King Lear* will be unmoved by Shakespeare’s tragedy, writing optatively, “I hope I have no readers that can peruse [Lear’s] answer [to Cordelia] without tears” (4.146).

Hawkesworth emphasizes the danger of such reading throughout *The Adventurer*. Take, for example, the following scenarios. In *Adventurer* no. 135, an old woman appears to show pity to the tragic heroine of the tale, even pausing long enough to hear her recount her sad biography: “I told her my story; to which she listened with great attention, and often gazed steadfastly at my face” (4.251). Similarly, in *Adventurer* no. 78, Fidelia finds her “story ... sentiments, and unhappy situation” related at a dinner party, during which one gentleman “listened greedily to all that was said of me, and seemed to eye me with earnest curiosity as well as admiration” (3.67). Both the old woman and the young gentleman could be said to respond appropriately on one level. After all, Hawkesworth’s goal in *The Adventurer* is to “not only excite and gratify curiosity, but engage the passions” (1.23), and both characters are attentive and seemingly moved by the tragic relations. What troubles this reading, however, is the fact that the old woman turns out to be a bawd, and the young man, Sir George Freelove, a predatory rake. Sentimental behaviour, both tales suggest, can disguise an unmoved heart; and a heart unmoved by sentimental circumstances is morally suspect.

These are extreme cases: I do not mean to suggest that Hawkesworth sees his readers—even his insensible ones—as either predatory or opportunistic. Yet there is a lingering fear in *The Adventurer* of readers who are unmoved by pathetic spectacles, toward which the previous and

perhaps extreme examples gesture. The fact that a reader *is* moved, however, does not necessarily mean that her response is appropriate. There are some spectators within narratives who are portrayed as being affected by tragic situations and characters but who are shown to be moved in the wrong way. These characters hint at alternate dangers of passionate reading.

Adventurer no. 110 is significant in this regard. In this essay, Hawkesworth paints the picture of a young gentleman recently returned from the disastrous Battle of Fontenoy. Describing horrific scenes to a polite company assembled for that very purpose—“carcasses that almost floated in blood, and obscured the path of those who followed to the slaughter” (4.34)—the young man is shocked that “the company, however amused by the relation, appeared not to be affected by the event” (4.34). The reason is that, as Hawkesworth had outlined earlier in *Adventurer* no. 4, “history ... gratifies curiosity, but it does not often excite either terror or pity” (1.24).)

Recognizing his mistake, the young soldier changes tactics, describing a scene of “domestic distress” in which a young bride follows her husband to France, only to watch him die on the battlefield. The result is predictable: “All regard to each other was for a while suspended” and “every eye [was] fixed upon the speaker, and all attention monopolized by the story ... tears by degrees overflowed every eye, and every bosom became susceptible of Pity; but the whole circle paused with evident regret, when the narrative was at an end; and would have been glad, that such another could have been told to continue their entertainment. Such was the Benevolence of Pity” (4.38).

Hawkesworth’s critique of this particular group of “readers” deserves some explanation. What exactly is wrong with such an audience, who are not only attentive but also responsive to emotive cues and stimuli? In what follows, I argue that Hawkesworth is reacting to a particular

ethos gaining traction in eighteenth-century culture, in which pleasing passions such as pity were heralded as indicators of natural benevolence and therefore as virtues. To understand his reaction to this ethos, we must begin with his rather dark and Hobbesian view of human nature (a view, it is worth stressing, not shared by all contributors to *The Adventurer*).¹⁵⁰ James Beattie was one contemporary who recognized Hawkesworth's tendency to such a worldview, stating in a letter to Elizabeth Montague that "from the theory of pity, which he has given us somewhere in the 'Adventurer,' one would suspect that he was no enemy to the philosophy of Hobbes" (Forbes 391). To Hawkesworth, a malignant kind of self-love is the governing principle of mankind, as distinct from the kind of self-love espoused by thinkers such as Shaftesbury and Joseph Butler, which does not exclude goodwill to others.¹⁵¹ As a fictitious correspondent in *Adventurer* no. 29 observes, advancing a position only mildly more extreme than Hawkesworth's own, "every man, whatever he may pretend, is concerned only for himself; and might, consistent with right reason, cut any other man's throat if he could escape punishment, and secure to himself any advantage by the fact. If any of your readers have still scruples ... I refer them to the great Dr. Mandeville's *Fable of the Bees*" (1.254). This correspondent should not be seen as speaking for Hawkesworth,

¹⁵⁰ For a sunnier view of human nature see Joseph Warton's critique of Rochefoucauld in *Adventurer* no. 49: "he who labours to lessen the dignity of human nature, destroys many efficacious motives for practising worthy actions, and deserves ill of his fellow-creatures, whom he paints in dark and disagreeable colours. ... According to his gloomy and uncomfortable system, virtue is merely the result of temper and constitution, of chance or of vanity, of fashion or the fear of losing reputation. Thus humanity is brutalized" (2.110).

¹⁵¹ To Butler, "positive exclusion, or bringing [a] peculiar disregard to the good of others into the idea of self-love, is in reality adding to the idea, or changing it from what it was before stated to consist in, namely, in an affection to ourselves. This being the whole idea of self-love, it can no otherwise exclude goodwill or love of others than merely by not including it" (50).

though his position is very similar.¹⁵² As Hawkesworth observes in *Adventurer* no. 36, there is such a thing as “good nature,” which “does indeed participate the pains and pleasures of others,” but such benevolence is “at best but the imperfect excellence of imperfect beings, whose immediate gratifications are often selfish, and such as folly or vice render incompatible with the true happiness of the individual, and of each other” (2.3).¹⁵³ Good nature is also, importantly, generally an *acquired* rather than an *innate* quality (1.261).

In this view of human nature, there are no social passions *per se*, particularly of the kind proposed by thinkers such as Shaftesbury, Butler, and Hutcheson. To Hawkesworth, as to François de La Rochefoucauld and Jonathan Swift, even pity is not disinterested, which suggests that the pleasure accompanying it implies a kind of sadism in the spectator. In *Adventurer* no. 110, Hawkesworth advances this idea without clearly associating himself with it, perhaps in an attempt to straddle two broad philosophical traditions:

Pity has been generally considered as the passion of gentle, benevolent, and virtuous minds; although it is acknowledged to produce only such a participation of the calamity of others, as upon the whole is pleasing to ourselves. As a tender participation of foreign distress, it has been urged to prove, that man is endowed with social affections, which, however forcible, are wholly disinterested; and as a pleasing sensation, it has been deemed an example of unmixed selfishness and malignity. (4.31)

¹⁵² In *Adventurer* no. 28 the narrator appears to advance the position that “mankind have [a] natural propensity to ill, [and] that their minds are subject to the influence of an invisible and malevolent being” (1.243).

¹⁵³ See also *Adventurer* no. 45: “we are formed for society, not for combination; we are equally unqualified to live in a close connection with our fellow-beings, and in total separation from them; we are attracted towards each other by general sympathy, but kept back from contact by private interests” (2.80).

He goes on to claim, “I shall not perplex my readers with the subtleties of a debate, in which human nature has, with equal zeal and plausibility, been exalted and degraded” (4.32). Still, his succeeding comments reveal an undeniable leaning toward the “degraded” camp, as when he suggests that if pity “is absorbed in another passion, when our love of those that suffer is strong,” it is “rather an evidence of the weakness than the strength of that general philanthropy, for which some have so eagerly contended” (4.32). He later argues that “if human benevolence was absolutely pure and social ... we should certainly deplore irremediable calamity, and participate temporary distress, without any mixture of delight” (4.33), cautioning readers not to “applaud” their “benevolence for sensations [of pleasure] which shew [pity’s] defects” (4.38), before ultimately urging them “to distinguish that malignity, which others confound with Benevolence, and applaud as Virtue” (4.39).

All this is in line with Hobbes, who suggests in *The Elements of Law* (1640) that pity is simply an “imagination of future calamity to ourselves, proceeding from the sense of another man’s present calamity” (53).¹⁵⁴ In this way, crucially, Hobbes degrades the pleasure associated with pity. Because of the delight men take in witnessing the sufferings of others, they “usually are content in such a case to be spectators of the misery of their friends,” even where there is no prospect of alleviating them (Hobbes 58). This is the type of pity St. Augustine refers to as itself “pitiable folly” (78). Curiously, when such pity did lead the spectator to assist another, its value was still suspect. Sir Thomas Browne puts the point bluntly in *Religio Medici* (1643):

¹⁵⁴ Hawkesworth could almost be quoting this passage when he says that pity “has been resolved into that power of imagination, by which we apply the misfortunes of others to ourselves: we have been said to pity no longer than we fancy ourselves to suffer, and to be pleased only by reflecting that our sufferings are not real” (4.31).

Hee that relieves another upon the bare suggestion and bowels of pity, doth not this so much for his sake as for his own: for by compassion we make anothers misery our own, & so by relieving them, we relieve our selves also. It is an erroneous course to redresse other mens misfortunes upon the common considerations of mercifull natures, that it may bee one day our own case; for this is a sinister and politick kind of charity, whereby we seem to bespeak the pities of men in the like occasions. (72)

Of course, all of this was debated by so-called “sentimental” moral thinkers such as Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Butler. In what follows, I suggest that Hawkesworth’s espousal of a Hobbesian theory of pity suggests not so much his own Hobbesian ethos and Calvinist background as his attempt to call into question the ethos of the sentimental school of philosophy.

Significantly, philosophers of the so-called “sentimental school” tended to establish their arguments for a moral sense and natural benevolence precisely on compassion and pity.

Shaftesbury states in the *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times* (1711), “In the Passions and Affections of particular Creatures, there is a constant relation to the Interest of a Species, or common Nature. This has been demonstrated in the case of Natural Affections, parental Kindness ... Love of Fellowship and Company, [and] Compassion” (78). Butler makes much the same point in his *Sermons* (1726): “it is not a true representation of mankind to affirm that they are wholly governed by self-love, the love of power and sensual appetites” because men and women “are frequently influenced by friendship, compassion, gratitude” (16). So too does Hutcheson in his *Essay on Passions* (1728): “If we have selfish Passions for our own Preservation, we have also publick Passions, which may engage us into vigorous and laborious Services to Offspring, Friends, Communities, Countries. Compassion will engage us to succour

the distressed, even with our private Loss or Danger” (55). This emphasis on pity or compassion as an indicator of selfless, natural benevolence was propounded long into the eighteenth century, appearing, for example, in Smith’s 1759 *Moral Sentiments*. In the opening pages, Smith voices what was becoming an increasingly hackneyed idea: “how selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion” (11).¹⁵⁵

The popularity of this system of philosophy in the eighteenth century was undeniable, which makes Hawkesworth’s reaction to it all the more striking.¹⁵⁶ Although Hawkesworth rarely mentions Shaftesbury, Butler, or Hutcheson by name, deists and freethinkers who advanced four interconnected ideas associated with Shaftesbury, in particular, come under heavy fire.¹⁵⁷ These ideas or catchphrases, which Hawkesworth seems to see as together comprising the moral

¹⁵⁵ It is worth noting that this emphasis on sympathy in general (and on pity in particular) as a foundation for moral behaviour was not always convincing, even to the thinkers themselves. As Sean Gaston writes, “From Hutcheson in the 1720s to Wordsworth in the 1790s, there is an incessant call for sympathy to be at the heart of morality and an unending confession of the insufficiency of sympathy” (145).

¹⁵⁶ Curiously, Abbott attempts to link Hawkesworth to the “deism of such figures as Chubb, Morgan, and Shaftesbury, and later, its most persuasive exponent, Benjamin Franklin” (40). While it is possible that Hawkesworth was influenced by this brand of thought, I hope that I have proven, at the very least, his strong aversion to some aspects of it.

¹⁵⁷ The only essayist in *The Adventurer* to aim a direct and sustained attack at Shaftesbury was Joseph Warton. In *Adventurer* no. 129, the weakly Spumosius “always carried a Shaftesbury in his pockets and used to read and explain the striking passages to large circles at the coffee-house; he was of opinion that for purity and perspicuity, elegance of style, and force of reasoning, the *Characteristics* were incomparable, and were models equally proper for regulating our taste and our morals. He discovered a delicate artificial connection in these discourses, which to vulgar eyes appear to be loose and incoherent rhapsodies; nay, he clearly perceived, that each treatise depended on the foregoing, and all together composed one uniform whole, and the noblest system of truth and virtue that had been imparted to mankind. He quarrelled irreconcilably with his dearest friend, who happened to hint, that the style was affected and unharmonious, the metaphors far-fetched and violent, and frequently coarse and illiberal, the arguments inconclusive and unfair, the raillery frigid and insipid” (4.209-10).

underpinning of a broad strand of deism, were put forward and subsequently refuted, both in straight-forward moral/didactic essays and within narratives.¹⁵⁸

The first idea (in order of relative significance) to appear for critique, and which has already been discussed in some detail above, is the notion of a moral sense and, by way of corollary, the idea of “disinterested publick affections.” In *Adventurer* no. 13, Hawkesworth hints at the hollowness of both notions when the freethinker Opsinous reveals, “I was first seduced by a prostitute, in my return from a declamation on the Beauty of Virtue, and the strength of the Moral Sense” (1.110). As this passage suggests, the beauty of virtue—and, by extension, the deformity of vice—is another Shaftesburean catchphrase refuted in *The Adventurer*. This idea plays an important part in *The Characteristics*, Shaftesbury stressing that “the elegant Passion or Love of Beauty” is “advantageous to Virtue,” because virtue is itself beautiful (75). Conversely, every individual is naturally averse to vice because of an inbuilt “Sense of Deformity in what is ... ill-deserving and unnatural” (121). The notion of the beauty of virtue is particularly visible in *Adventurer* nos. 77-79, Hester Mulso’s sorrowful tale of Fidelia, whose freethinking father “laboured with great application to inculcate in me the love of order, [and] the beauty of moral rectitude” (3.53). Fidelia later states, “I had always been taught ... that those things which are generally esteemed evils, could have no power to disturb the felicity of a mind governed by the eternal rule of right, and truly enamoured of the charms of moral beauty” (3.59).

¹⁵⁸ I do not mean to suggest that Shaftesbury was the only philosopher to advance these ideas. However, he was one of the first and most prominent English thinkers to do so. Stephen Darwall stresses the formative nature of Shaftesbury’s moral philosophy in his discussion of natural law: “Two critics who rejected [key...] tenets of voluntarist natural law and who were most influential in developing an alternative ethics of virtue at the beginning of the eighteenth century were Shaftesbury and Leibniz” (993).

The two final Shaftesburean ideas that crop up in *The Adventurer* include the equation of virtue with happiness (i.e., the sense that virtue is its own reward) and the irrelevance and even danger of a future system of rewards and punishments. In terms of the first, Shaftesbury declares that “Every thing which is an Improvement of Virtue, or an Establishment of right Affection and Integrity, is an Advancement of Interest, and leads to the greatest and most solid Happiness and Enjoyment” (175). Related to the second, he writes that “there can be nothing more fatal to Virtue, than the weak and uncertain Belief of a future Reward and Punishment. For the stress being laid wholly here, if this Foundation come to fail, there is no further Prop or Security to Mens Morals. And thus Virtue is supplanted and betray’d” (69). Hawkesworth draws attention to the first idea in *Adventurer* no. 10, musing that among the favourite topics of freethinkers and deists is “the Excellency of Virtue. Virtue is said necessarily to produce its own happiness, and to be constantly and adequately its own reward; vice, on the contrary, never fails to produce misery” (1.82). It also appears in *Adventurer* no. 52, when Dramaticus admits, “that every man is happy in proportion as he is virtuous, was once my favourite principle” (1.132), and in *Adventurer* no. 78, when Fidelia states, “I had always been taught, that virtue was of itself sufficient to happiness” (3.65). Significantly, Fidelia recognizes the easy progression from this idea to the next: “As I was urged to choose virtue, and reject vice, from motives which had no necessary connection with immortality, I was not led to consider a future state either with hope or fear” (3.53). In this, she embraces the logic of *Adventurer* no. 10, in which deists are represented as inferring, at least, according to Hawkesworth, that because virtue is its own reward, “future rewards and punishments are not necessary, either to furnish adequate motives to the practice of virtue, or to justify the ways of God” to man (1.82).

Hawkesworth is critical of these ideas for various reasons, though the notion that virtue is its own reward perhaps comes under the most sustained attack. On the one hand, to Hawkesworth, virtuous individuals can still suffer, a point driven home by Dramaticus's intense social angst in *Adventurer* no. 52 upon committing *faux pas* after *faux pas*.¹⁵⁹ As such, virtue can only "confer happiness in this world" if it is "animated with the hopes of eternal bliss in the world to come" (3.88). On the other hand, vicious actions can contribute to happiness, as it is possible for happiness to derive from "external advantages," which "are frequently obtained by vice, and forfeited by virtue" (1.83). Hawkesworth's primary objection to all four principles, however, is simply that they tend to disguise even worse ones. Put simply, deists and freethinkers who embrace Shaftesburian principles are self-regarding, godless epicureans at heart. That is, they are sophists who have put a moral stamp of approval on their worst impulses. At the very least, it is an easy transition from deist to epicurean in Hawkesworth's imagination.¹⁶⁰

In the first place, the related ideas of moral sense and natural benevolence were thought

¹⁵⁹ As Dramaticus laments, "I felt all the torment that could be inflicted by guilt ... in the prosecution of an undertaking which I believed to be virtuous" (2.142).

¹⁶⁰ I use the term epicurean to signify one who values his or her own pleasure (often sensual in nature) above all. According to Chambers, this was the popular or common meaning of the term in eighteenth-century England: "in the common Use of the Word, *Epicurean* constantly signifies a Debauchee, an indolent, soft, effeminate Person, who only consults his Pleasure, without concerning himself with any Thing serious" (*Cyclopædia*, s.v. "Epicureanism" 1.322). In her introduction to *All the Works of Epictetus* (1758), Elizabeth Carter explains why the term Epicurean took on this meaning: "That the End of Man is to live conformably to Nature, was universally agreed on among all the Philosophers: but, in what that Conformity to Nature consists, was the Point in Dispute. The Epicureans maintained, that it consisted in Pleasure; of which they constituted Sense the Judge. ... By Pleasure the Epicureans sometimes explained themselves to mean, only Freedom from Uneasiness; but the Philosophers of other Sects in general, as well as Cicero, insist, producing their own Expressions for it, that they meant sensual Delights. This, indeed, was more explicitly the Doctrine of Aristippus, the Father of the Cyrenaics: a sect, however, which sunk into the Epicureans; whose Notions plainly led to the Dissoluteness so remarkable in the lives of most of them" (i).

either to disguise or lead to the more dubious principle that the passions in general are virtuous and, ultimately, that whatever is *easy* is virtuous. Hawkesworth warns against such an undemanding system of morality in *Adventurer* no. 130, urging readers not to “confide in such virtue as can be practised without a struggle, and which interdicts the gratification of no passion but malice” (4.218). If the promotion of natural benevolence was thought to sanction moral laxity, the conviction that virtue is both beautiful and contributive to happiness was thought to degenerate into a belief that whatever is *pleasing* is virtuous, particularly when it came to corporeal or sensual pleasure.¹⁶¹ As the freethinking Fidelity comes to reason, “What is good but pleasure? What is evil but pain?” (3.74). She later reflects, “thus had I almost reasoned myself out of every principle of morality, by pursuing through all their consequences the doctrines which had been taught me as rules of life and prescriptions for felicity ... and collecting arguments on the side of passion” (3.75). To Hawkesworth, Fidelity is an anomaly in the sense that she espouses deistic principles honestly, with a belief in their validity, rather than as a cover for her worst impulses.¹⁶² In *Adventurer* no. 130, Hawkesworth insists that most “disciple[s] of infidelity” have already determined to follow their natural appetites and espouse deistic principles simply in order “to render sensuality and virtue compatible” and to “justify natural

¹⁶¹ In *Adventurer* no. 34, Samuel Johnson’s rakish criminal, Misargyrus, states, “I was determined to the pursuit of pleasure, which according to my notions consisted in the unrestrained and unlimited gratifications of every passion and every appetite” (1.293).

¹⁶² Agamus in *Adventurer* no. 86 is another possible anomaly. As he recounts, “having learned from some celebrated philosophers, ancient and modern, to prove that nothing is good but pleasure, I became a rake upon principle” (3.136).

desires” (4.215).¹⁶³ Thus the deist or freethinker “thinks himself convinced, that virtue must be happiness, and then dreams that happiness is virtue” (4.216). Hawkesworth had drawn attention to this inverted or rather *pervverted* reasoning as early as *Adventurer* no. 10: as “virtue is said to be that which produces ultimate good below, whatever is supposed to produce ultimate good below is said to be virtue” (1.82). It also appears later, in Hawkesworth’s popular oriental tale *Almorán and Hamet* (1761), where the haughty Almorán states, “that alone is virtue, by which happiness is produced: and whatever produces happiness, is therefore virtue” (73). This last example drives home Hawkesworth’s tendency to recycle ideas almost verbatim.

The final deistic principle under consideration in *The Adventurer*—the notion that an afterlife has an uncertain or even corrupting effect on morality—is equally dangerous. Like other Shaftesburian ideas, this one was thought to metastasize into something much darker and entirely different. Thus the idea that an afterlife is unnecessary ultimately leads to the discounting of an afterlife altogether, which in turn licenses unlimited hedonism in this life and precludes the need to look past the present. Characteristic in this regard is Fidelia’s deistic cousin in *Adventurer* no. 77, who advises her to “let the poor souls, who are taught by the priests and their nurses to be afraid of hell-fire, and to think they shall go to the devil for following nature and making life agreeable, be as outrageously virtuous as they please ... you know that the term of your existence is but short; and it is highly reasonable to make it as pleasant as possible” (3.63). Sadly, the consequences to characters who espouse this principle—and other Shaftesburean doctrines—

¹⁶³ Hawkesworth underscores this point in *Adventurer* no. 98, satirically stating that “According to the moral philosophy which is now in fashion ... the gratification of appetite is virtue; and appetite therefore, I shall allow to be noble, notwithstanding the objections of those who pretend that whatever be its object, it can be good or ill in no other sense than stature or complexion; and that the voluntary effort only is moral by which appetite is directed or restrained, by which it is brought under the government of reason, and rendered subservient to moral purposes” (3.238).

are devastating: Agamus nearly commits incest, Fidelia attempts suicide, and Opsinous does commit suicide, but only after killing his pregnant mistress. Deism, built on the foundation of Shaftesbury's philosophy, leads only to epicureanism and thence to misery. As the Sultan Amurath realizes in *Adventurer* no. 21, upon finding himself at the gates of an impressive walled city, in which "nature is not oppressed by the tyranny of religion, nor pleasure awed by the frown of virtue" (1.184), outward brilliance can disguise inward corruption. Upon entering the city, "my ears were now stunned with the dissonance of riot, and my eye sickened at the contortions of misery: disease was visible in every countenance, however otherwise impressed with the character of rage, of drunkenness, or of lust. Rape and murder, revelling and strife, filled every street and dwelling" (1.185).

Hawkesworth's assault on Shaftesburian deism is problematic for the reader who enjoys pathetic or sentimental narratives. Such readers are called on to question their underlying motives for doing so and the legitimacy of their passions. They certainly cannot rationalize the pleasure they experience in reading tragic narratives by pronouncing pity, or any other passion, a moral impulse—i.e., a benevolent passion—for, if they do, they are no better than epicureans. So what are readers to do? Should they scorn pathetic characters and eschew pleasure in pitiful scenes and situations? Probably not, considering Hawkesworth's consistent drive to raise readers' passions and his occasional remarks regarding their utility.¹⁶⁴ Despite his at times pessimistic outlook on human nature, Hawkesworth does not seem to be suggesting that all passions be

¹⁶⁴ See for example *Adventurer* no. 106: "Fear, when it is justly proportioned to its object, and not too strong to be governed by reason, is not only blameless but honourable; it is essential to the perfection of human nature" (3.3-4). See also Hawkesworth's insistence in *Adventurer* no. 16 that passions may be "trained [not extirpated] for the service of virtue" (1.133).

suppressed or, by extension, that all passionate fictions be avoided. As already noted, passions are an essential part of human nature in *The Adventurer*. As such, Hawkesworth's positing of the malignity of publicly-directed passions such as pity should be seen as a kind of posturing, or, rather, a ploy to call into question a philosophical system tending to elevate passions above their proper sphere.

I would suggest that Hawkesworth's purpose in questioning Shaftesburian deism and thus the morality of readers' initial, passionate responses to sentimental phenomena—viz., instead of uncritically celebrating such responses—is to instil a habit of reflection and an awareness of the dictates of conscience, particularly when it comes to the passions themselves and their operation in everyday settings. Individuals should not assume that their emotive responses to phenomena are by definition good but should monitor or reflect on their passions to determine their fitness, and then, perhaps, direct them appropriately. Individuals are furnished with just such a monitor, in Hawkesworth's view, which goes by the name of conscience. As such, conscience, not pleasure, determines the fitness of the passions, at least, when not opposed by the “cavils of sophistry and sense” (4.218). In this, Hawkesworth somewhat surprisingly falls in line with Butler, who states in his *Sermons* that

there is a principle of reflection in men by which they distinguish between, approve and disapprove, their own actions. We are plainly constituted such sort of creatures as to reflect upon our own nature. The mind can take a view of what passes within itself, its propensions, aversions, passions, affections, as respecting such objects and in such

degrees, and of the several actions consequent thereupon. ... This principle in man by which he approves or disapproves his heart, temper, and actions, is conscience. (29-30)¹⁶⁵

Butler thus encourages what Phillips refers to as “meta-attention” or attention to attention (*Distraction* 42), the human conscious, in this model, paying multifocal attention to the activities of various internal faculties. To Hawkesworth, conscience would seem to have a similarly wide-ranging purview, something indicated by its many names and qualities. While generally referred to as “conscience” in *The Adventurer*, Hawkesworth’s internal monitor is also known as “the light of nature” (3.177), “the law that has been written upon the heart” (3.182), “a monitor who reproaches thee in secret” (1.194), and “a sense, which always distinguishes right and wrong” (2.95, 3.136). It also has important links to reason and reflection, though it tends to make decisions “by spontaneous approbation and censure” (3.241).¹⁶⁶

Practically speaking, to Hawkesworth, conscience ensures the correct function of the understanding and determines right from wrong, virtue from vice, and truth from falsehood.¹⁶⁷ In *Adventurer* no. 91, he states that “with respect to particular actions, opinion determines whether they are good or ill; and conscience approves or disapproves, in consequence of this determination, whether it be in favour of truth or falsehood” (3.176). More importantly, in terms

¹⁶⁵ See also Shaftesbury: “In a Creature capable of forming general Notions of Things, not only the outward Beings which offer themselves to the Sense, are the Objects of the Affection; but the very *Actions* themselves, and the *Affections* of Pity, Kindness, Gratitude, and their Contrarys, being brought into the Mind by Reflection, become Objects. So that, by means of this reflected Sense, there arises another kind of Affection towards those very Affections themselves, which have been already felt, and are now become the Subject of a new Liking or Dislike” (28).

¹⁶⁶ Reason and conscience are linked in *Adventurer* no. 131 (4.226); reflection appears to be used as a synonym for conscience in *Adventurer* no. 34 (1.296).

¹⁶⁷ In *Adventurer* no. 130, the eidolon states that he who “restores the power of conscience ... at once rectifies the understanding” (4.216).

of the present argument, a key province of conscience is the appetites, desires, and passions. Thus in *Adventurer* no. 10, the eidolon suggests that “the remonstrances of conscience” are the “principal barrier, by which appetite and passion are restrained” (1.82), a point reiterated in *Adventurer* no. 22 and *Adventurer* no. 91. It is also hinted at in *Adventurer* no. 28, in which those who “live in a perpetual violation of the dictates of conscience” are described as being “slaves of sensuality” (1.246). Of course, conscience may not always operate correctly, at times being duped by the passions, as in *Adventurer* no. 47 (2.95), and at others mistaking the end for the means, as in *Adventurer* no. 91 (3.182). Still, while the fallibility of conscience may encourage readers to fix their “dependence upon Him, who has promised to ‘create in us a new heart and a right spirit’” (4.39), it does not discount the general importance of this faculty.

Even if Hawkesworth’s ideal reader were to admit all this, how are the passions to be directed? After all, it is one thing to *monitor* the passions, and another to *steer* or *rein them in*. And what use is conscience if it performs the former function but not the latter? Hawkesworth’s response reveals his awareness of contemporary theories of the passions. As Isaac Watts states in his *Doctrine of the Passions* (1732), “since the Passions are made up of the Ferments of the Blood, and the Commotions of animal Nature, as well as the Operations of the Mind, they do not lie entirely under the Command of the Will; we cannot stir up and suppress these Ferments of animal Nature by a sovereign Act of Volition when we please” (98).¹⁶⁸ Still, there are ways around this problem, and the passions may be directed for all that. As Watts goes on to argue, the

¹⁶⁸ Hobbes would quibble with this wording, arguing in *The Elements of Law* that passions are synonymous with will rather than under its command: “Appetite, fear, hope, and the rest of the passions are not called voluntary; for they proceed not from, but are the will; and the will is not voluntary. For a man can no more say he will will, than he will will will, and so make an infinite repetition of the word will; which is absurd, and insignificant” (72).

governance of the passions “may be done by the Consideration of Truth: For ... the Passions are raised by Perceptions of the Mind” (98). In this, he agrees with thinkers such as Hutcheson, who states in his *Essay on the Passions* that while the passions themselves are outside the governance of reason, “our Passions ... depend much upon our Opinions,” which *are* under its tutelage (91). Hawkesworth advances a similar argument in *Adventurer* no. 48, in which he attempts to justify the divine imperative to “love thine enemy,” responding to possible objections in the process: “I know it will be said, that our passions are not in our power; and that, therefore, a precept, to love or to hate, is impossible” (2.101). In Hawkesworth’s view, however, the passions are “in some degree ... in our power,” for, “though love and hatred are necessarily produced in the human breast, when the proper objects of these passions occur ... yet it is in our power to change the passion, and to cause either love or hatred to be excited, by placing the same object in different circumstances” (2.102). To prove this point he introduces a thought experiment involving a young woman who marries without her parents’ consent:

[This circumstance] is frequently considered as a breach of the strongest and tenderest obligations; as folly and ingratitude, treachery and rebellion. By the imputation of these vices, a child becomes the object of indignation and resentment ... and there can be no doubt, but that these are species of hatred. But if the child is considered as still retaining the endearing softness of filial affection, as still longing for reconciliation, and profaning the rites of marriage with tears; as having been driven from the path of duty, only by the violence of passions which none have always resisted ... the same object which before excited indignation and resentment, will now be regarded with pity, and pity is a species of love. (2.103)

Although Hawkesworth's argument is not unique, it does suggest that conscience, as a monitor of the passions, is more potent than it may at first appear. In conjunction with reason and reflection—which act under its dictates—conscience may facilitate a change of opinion, and, by extension, a change of heart. Its efficacy thus functions as a spur to heed its directions. Ultimately, therefore, if the passionate fictions in *The Adventurer* are to be consumed appropriately and even beneficially, the passions must be guided in their operation by conscience. To this end, the periodical reader must learn to resist the pleasing appeal of Shaftesbury's philosophy, and to value critical self-examination over epicurean indulgence.

CHAPTER FOUR:

Periodical Romance: Passion, Imagination, and the Advance of Knowledge in Oliver Goldsmith's *The Citizen of the World*

*Sive risus essent movendi,
Sive lacrymæ,
Affectuum potens at lenis dominator*

“A powerful but kindly master of the emotions,
whether he would move to tears
or to laughter”

—Samuel Johnson's Epitaph on Oliver Goldsmith¹⁶⁹

Oliver Goldsmith's essay series *The Citizen of the World* (1762) first appeared in John Newbery's *Public Ledger* in serial instalments published in 1760-61. A fictional, epistolary correspondence between Lien Chi Altangi, a Chinese philosopher in England, and Fum Hoam, his counterpart in China, the letters in *The Citizen* demonstrate a heavily ironic bent, a remarkably wide scope, and an unabashed willingness on Goldsmith's part to plagiarize from French sources, particularly the Enlightenment *philosophes*. In what follows, I focus on two prominent, but frequently under-appreciated, aspects of *The Citizen*: the frame narrative (involving Lien Chi's son, Hingpo, and the Man in Black's niece, Zelis) and Lien Chi's overarching critique of the romance genre. In the first section of the chapter, I argue that Lien Chi's critique of the romance tradition contains a surprisingly pointed attack on the status of romance as image. Romance writers are painters, Lien Chi suggests, while romances themselves are paintings. As vivid and affecting images, romances threaten to hijack the reasoning or reflective faculty and thus disrupt what Goldsmith sees as an important and even natural cycle: imagination and passion should insensibly and almost automatically give way to reason and

¹⁶⁹ Johnson's complete epitaph may be found, among other places, in Boswell's *Life of Johnson* (3.83).

judgment. This critique of romance is driven home by Goldsmith's tendency to taxonomize the imagination and to distinguish the active from the passive. Whereas the passive imagination associated with the reading of romances resembles a dream state, the active imagination has links with reflection and judgment.

In the second section, I turn to the Hingpo-Zelis narrative to show how Goldsmith rewrites the romance tradition within the periodical format to promote the kind of active imagination associated with proper reading praxis. While this narrative has important links to the romance genre, Goldsmith modifies it by not presenting fully formed pictures to the reader. An abridged back-story, an absence of particulars, and her own deliberate silence, for example, function to make the unfortunate Zelis appear more as an abstract idea than a clearly defined image. By structuring the narrative in this way, Goldsmith forces readers to actively imagine distressed innocence for themselves, thus encouraging critical distance and ensuring affective responses that are both controlled and responsible.

In the third section, I argue that the idea of Zelis is designed to lead to a particular set of impressions through the mediating power of the active imagination. Goldsmith encourages the arousal of two passions in particular, both of which have links to the romance tradition: pity and curiosity. Significantly, both passions were thought to be, at least optimally, calm and fleeting rather than vehement and/or lasting. The variety of Zelis's person, character, and history is designed to elicit a moderate degree of curiosity, and a broadly-sketched and almost never-ending series of tragic events similarly contributes to the arousal of calm pity rather than what Dryden in "The Grounds of Criticism in Tragedy" refers to as "pathetic vehemence" (13.246). The final section of the chapter will argue that the particular character of the periodical reader

forces Goldsmith's hand when it comes to the inclusion of a pseudo-romance in *The Citizen*. I show that Goldsmith's opinion of such readers is particularly dim. The consumer of periodicals, he maintains, much like the entire "vulgar" populace, was incapable of responding to appeals to reason and could only be reached through the passions. And yet, there was a silver lining to this rather dim reality. Goldsmith argues elsewhere that affect is not simply a tool for individual reformation but a crucial component in the advancement of human knowledge. This fact explains the importance of arousing and regulating particular passions such as curiosity through the agency of the mediating, active imagination (and restricting the activity of other passions by denying the passive imagination). By facilitating the arousal of calm and short-lived passions, in particular, the Zelis narrative functions as a kind of training ground in which readers may learn to deploy their passions, through the active imagination, for valuable purposes.

The Citizen of the World is difficult to classify, both in terms of content and form. In the first place, is it an essay serial, an epistolary novel, or something else entirely?¹⁷⁰ Secondly, while much of the periodical is obviously ironic, which parts are designed by Goldsmith to be

¹⁷⁰ Samuel Woods attacks the tendency to see *The Citizen* as either a novel or an essay serial: "the pseudoletter genre was ... a common and lively form, and the fact that we have no exact modern equivalent is no reason we should try to fit this, one of Goldsmith's finest works, on the procrustean bed of the novel, which it clearly is not, or on the equally unsuitable bed of the miscellaneous essay series exemplified by *The Spectator* or *The Rambler*, where it clearly will not fit, either, without losing essential characteristics of its form" (*DLB*). Robert Mayo disagrees, suggesting that *The Citizen* is clearly "an effort in the Spectatorial manner" and "conspicuously in the tradition of the *Tatler* and *Spectator*" (123-24).

ironic and which serious?¹⁷¹ Finally, what are the governing themes or motifs of the text?¹⁷² Or is the search for some kind of metanarrative inherently problematic? Megan Kitching attempts to summarize the thematic variety of *The Citizen* as “London life and entertainments, politics and party, fashions and fads, and the paradoxes and frailties of human nature” (176). Similarly, Robert Mayo classifies the Chinese Papers as “a developing series of lightly satirical sketches of men, manners, and morality, diversified with episodes drawn from the day-to-day experience of the author, illustrative cases, anecdotes, fables, diverting histories, domestic apologues, and eastern tales” (123). Even considered as an essay serial, it appears, *The Citizen* is remarkably wide ranging, demonstrating what Virginia Woolf defines as Goldsmith’s uniquely “detached attitude and width of view” (12).

Regardless of classification, *The Citizen* has tended to elicit contradictory reactions from critics. On the one hand, drawing on Samuel Johnson laudatory observation, “Is there a man, Sir, now who can pen an essay with such ease and elegance as Goldsmith?” (qtd. in Prior, *Life of Goldsmith* 109), some critics have seen Goldsmith’s journalism as his best body of work and the Chinese Papers as his best journalism. To Leigh Hunt, for example, *The Citizen* “affords the best specimen of Goldsmith’s genius, both as an observer and a man of wit” (“Goldsmith” 74). In the same way, Wayne Booth states that the Chinese Papers constitute “Goldsmith’s most important work, clearly outranking *The Vicar*, say, or *She Stoops to Conquer*” (S96). On the other hand,

¹⁷¹ As Wayne Booth observes, the entire periodical may not be ironic, but “every commentator has been aware that much of it is” (S92).

¹⁷² Important if not exactly governing themes of Goldsmith’s periodical include the professionalization of criticism and the inadequacy of modern empirical science as advanced by Bacon, Locke, and Newton. Frank Donoghue explores the first theme in *The Fame Machine* (1996); and John Dussinger the second in “Oliver Goldsmith, Citizen of the World” (1967).

many critics have tended to describe Goldsmith's journalism, including *The Citizen*, as overly simplistic and almost juvenile, much like the man himself (at least, so the argument goes). As George Saintsbury observes, "except when he endeavours ... to be learned, or philosophical, or critical, which were the three very last things that the gods had made him ... [Goldsmith] is like that bee which he took for his emblem on one occasion, only that he is all honey and no sting" (210-11). Saintsbury implies that Goldsmith repeatedly returned to the ostensibly simplistic medium of the periodical because it suited his own "careless[ness]" and "ignorance" (212): "No troublesome and question-begging construction is required [in the essay format]; the genius can be indulged and relaxed at pleasure" (214). Even Booth, *The Citizen*'s most enthusiastic critic, seems to incline to this end of the spectrum, qualifying his earlier praise by stating that "readers who desire depth can go read Hume" (S91).¹⁷³ Some commentators have gone so far as to suggest that Goldsmith's ignorance shines most brightly in *The Citizen*, as others have argued his genius does. William Hazlitt quips that "for light summer reading, it is like walking in a garden full of traps and pitfalls. It necessarily gives rise to paradoxes, and there are some very bold ones in the Essays, which would subject an author less established to no very agreeable sort of *censura literaria*" (148).

Given the popular critical perception of Goldsmith as a well-meaning dunce, it may seem ill advised to focus on his critical response to the genre of romance. After all, if Saintsbury is correct, Goldsmith was anything but a critic. Even in the eighteenth century, Joshua Reynolds propagated the image of Goldsmith as a kind of inspired idiot in order to account for his success

¹⁷³ Hunt also qualifies his praise along the same lines, writing that "Goldsmith does not appear to have possessed an attention sufficiently persevering to pursue one individual subject through a long maze of reasoning. Hence he was fond of detached essays" (72).

as a writer: “No man ever wrote so much from his feelings as Dr. Goldsmith. I do not mean here the vulgar opinion of being possessed himself with the passion which he wished to excite. I mean only that he governed himself by an internal feeling of the right rather than by any written rules of art” (qtd. in Rousseau 178). To Reynolds, Goldsmith was “very inexpert in explaining even the principles of his own art,” just as he was ignorant of “the scholastic or technical terms by which similar things are distinguished” (177). Notwithstanding, Goldsmith’s periodical writings reveal, in my view, a very different character than that advanced by Saintsbury and Reynolds.

Goldsmith, *The Citizen of the World*, and the Romance Tradition

In the following pages, I will question the general tendency to deny Goldsmith’s knowledge of aesthetic theory, arguing that his response to the romance tradition, which manifests itself perhaps most fully in *The Citizen*, shows him to be abreast of trends in art criticism as well as contemporaneous currents of eighteenth-century epistemology. This is not to suggest that Goldsmith was innovative in his critical views. For example, his most general criticism of the romance tradition is simply that works of romance centre around romantic love, a rather banal objection that nevertheless sheds light on his taxonomy of the genre.¹⁷⁴ Mocking French romance and secret history, in particular, Lien Chi states in *Citizen* no. 75 that “tender hearts, languishing eyes, Leonora in love at thirteen, ecstatic transports, stolen blisses, are the frivolous subjects of their frivolous memoirs” (2.313). He later insists that “every book can serve

¹⁷⁴ In *The Secular Scripture* (1976), Northrop Frye argues much the same, maintaining that “The central element of romance is a love story” (24). He later qualifies this statement by maintaining that “the two chief elements of romance” are “love and adventure,” though these elements frequently degenerate into “lust and bloodlust” in popular iterations of the genre (26).

to make us more expert except romances, and these are no better than instruments of debauchery. They are dangerous fictions, where love is the ruling passion” (2.340).

This broad criticism is visible throughout Goldsmith’s oeuvre.¹⁷⁵ He rarely classifies romance on a formal or even historical basis. As a result, he tends to use the term “romance” indiscriminately, applying it to various amatory French works as well as English novels such as Henry Fielding’s *Tom Jones* and *Joseph Andrews* (*Collected Works* 1.461).¹⁷⁶ As indicated, however, Goldsmith seems primarily to have had a debased French version of romance in mind in making his critique. Like his fellow periodicalist William Whitehead, therefore, Goldsmith would seem less concerned with classical or “heroic romance,” or even more respectable English iterations of the form, than he is with “that inundation of obscenity which is daily pouring in from France” (*The World* 1.120).

In *World* no. 19 Whitehead had criticized certain English romance writers for writing “below nature”—i.e., “writing on low subjects ... in a low manner” (1.118)—but Goldsmith’s objection is rather that unrealistic or unnatural portrayals of happiness, beauty, and love are built into the genre. His objection is thus in some sense that writers of romance write “above nature,” something Whitehead had faulted old romance for (1.117). Goldsmith is most explicit about this in his reviews and miscellaneous essays. In his review of *True Merit True Happiness* (1757) in

¹⁷⁵ In his review of “The History of Two Persons of Quality,” Goldsmith states “The hero, like most other heroes of romance, is wholly employed in making love; the heroine, in returning his addresses with equal ardour” (1.16).

¹⁷⁶ Goldsmith’s contemporaries used the term “romance” to cover an equally diverse body of texts, though, unlike Goldsmith, they tended to distinguish particular species of romance from one another. In *Dissertations Moral and Critical* (1783), for example, James Beattie distinguishes Spenser’s *Færie Queene* (“the old romance”) from Defoe’s *Robinson Crusoe* and Richardson’s *Clarissa* (“the new romance”). For more on the eighteenth-century understanding of romance see Clara Reeve’s *The Progress of Romance* (1785).

The Monthly Review, an English translation of *Memoires & Avantures d'un Bourgeois*, Goldsmith singles out the unnatural happiness bestowed on the characters of romance, stating, “Reader, if thou hast ever known such perfect happiness, as these romance-writers can so liberally dispense, thou hast enjoyed greater pleasure than has ever fallen to our lot” (1.17). Subsequently, in “A True History for the Ladies” (1760), which appeared in *The British Magazine*, Goldsmith adds unrealistic depictions of love to his critique of romance, arguing that “in the flowery paths of novel and romance, we are taught to consider love as a blessing that will last for life” and that by this means “it is exalted above its merits” (3.120). Finally, in his review of *Jemima and Louisa* (1759) for *The Critical Review*, Goldsmith mocks the romantic tendency to hyperbolize not only love and happiness but beauty as well: “to console us for this calamity [the death of Louisa’s lover], there are two or three other very good matches struck up; a great deal of money, a great deal of beauty, a world of love, and days and nights as happy as heart could desire; the old butt-end of a modern romance” (1.206).

As Lien Chi remarks in *The Citizen*, such idyllic settings would not be a problem if works of romance did not simultaneously celebrate vice. The philosopher remarks critically in *Citizen* no. 83 that romances contain too many passages “that offend good morals, overthrow laudable customs, violate the laws, and destroy the duties most essential to society,” thereby exposing virtue “to the most dangerous attacks” (2.340). Lien Chi concludes from this that “to be able to inculcate virtue by so leaky a vehicle, the author must be a philosopher of the first rank” (2.341). This critique is by no means unique to Goldsmith. For example, the philosopher James Beattie argued in his *Essays on Poetry and Music as they Affect the Mind* (1776), that “the frequent contemplation of [love’s] various ardors and agonies, as exhibited in plays and novels can scarce

fail to enervate the mind, and to raise emotions and sympathies unfriendly to innocence” (205).¹⁷⁷ As Goldsmith’s most fundamental objection to the genre, however, the complaint that romance celebrates vice in some sense encompasses all others and thus deserves to be stressed.

Goldsmith’s stated objection to the romance genre expresses a view that commanded wide assent. In what follows, I would like to single out another, more subtle aspect of his critique of the romance tradition, involving a kind of hermeneutic praxis unique to the form. Specifically, I argue, Goldsmith objects to romances as images or pictures presented to the imagination. This is why Goldsmith cautioned his brother Henry in 1759, concerning the education of Henry’s son, “above all things let him never touch a romance, or novel [as] those paint beauty in colours more charming than nature, and describe happiness that man never tastes. How delusive, how destructive ... are those pictures of consummate bliss” (*Collected Letters* 60). Goldsmith argues in the same vein in his review of *True Merit True Happiness*, exclaiming against those “imaginary pictures of felicity” and “delusive daubing[s]” to be met with in novels and romances (1.17).¹⁷⁸

To understand the significance of such passages, some context is in order. In the first place, it was not uncommon in the eighteenth century to regard all objects of the imagination as images or pictures, including verbal texts. In fact, this was a frequently voiced literary ideal (see

¹⁷⁷ See also Whitehead’s critique in *World* no. 19 that “the present race of romance-writers” celebrate and thus in some sense promote “extreme indecency” (1.102).

¹⁷⁸ Significantly, Haywood characterizes writers of romance in the same way in *The Female Spectator*. Speaking specifically of “those extravagant fictions with which some books abound” and which appeal to those of “a romantic turn [of] mind,” the eidolon writes that “if Poets would consider how great an Effect their Writings have upon the Minds of young people, they would surely never paint whatever is an Error in Conduct in too beautiful Colours...” (3.53).

Horace's *ut pictura poesis*).¹⁷⁹ Secondly, critics were in broad agreement that literary pictures did not necessarily affect the passions. They could be simply pleasing, as John Brown suggests in his *Essays on the Characteristics* (1751):

Perhaps there is no Species of Writing ... but what will fall under the Denomination of Poetry, Eloquence, or Argument. The first lays hold of the Imagination; the second, through the Imagination, seizes the Passions;¹⁸⁰ the last addresseth itself to the Reason of Mankind. The immediate, *essential* End therefore of Poetry is to *please*, of Eloquence to *persuade*, of Argument to *instruct*. To this end, the Poet dwells on such Images as are beautiful; the Orator selects every Circumstance that is affecting; the Philosopher only admits what is true. (16)

Goldsmith implies much the same in *The Citizen*, when Lien Chi attacks modern English poetry for appealing to the imagination while putting both passion and reason to sleep: "A parcel of gaudy images pass on before his [the reader's] imagination like figures in a dream; but curiosity, induction, reason, and the whole train of affections are fast asleep" (2.388). Significantly, Lien Chi goes on to compare such poems to "paintings, just, indeed, because laboured with minute

¹⁷⁹ For more on the connection between text and image in the eighteenth century see Andrew Varney's "'The Motion of the Things it Represents': The Verbal and Visual in Early Eighteenth-Century English Culture" (2000).

¹⁸⁰ In this case, Brown echoes Thomas Hobbes: "the imagination of men proceedeth from the action of external objects upon the brain, or some internal substance of the head; and ... the passions proceed from the alteration there made, and continued to the heart" (*Elements of Law* 60). See also Arthur Murphy's comment in the *Gray's-Inn Journal* that "as soon as the Beams of Imagination are diminished, the Passions, like Flowers at the Setting Sun, immediately are contracted" (2.325).

exactness” (2.388).¹⁸¹ Literary pictures, in this case, could actually work *against* the arousal of the passions.

As Brown and, to some extent, Goldsmith imply, however, literary pictures were the first step when it came to raising the passions. Joseph Addison famously observes in *Spectator* no. 420, referring to the Roman historian Livy, that “he describes every thing in so lively a Manner, that his whole History is an admirable Picture, and touches on such proper Circumstances in every Story, that his Reader becomes a kind of Spectator, and feels in himself all the variety of Passions which are correspondent to the several Parts of the Relation” (3.574). John Dennis argues much the same in *The Advancement and Reformation of Modern Poetry* (1701): “these passions that attend upon our Thoughts, are seldom so strong, as they are in those kind of Thought, which we call Images. For they being the very lively Pictures of the Things which they represent, set them, as it were, before our very Eyes” (1.218). The necessity of what Aristotle referred to as *pro ommatōn poiein* and Quintilian as *enargeia* (“bringing before the eyes”) when it came to raising the passions was equally apparent to later critics such as James Beattie and Lord Kames.¹⁸² For Kames, “the power of language to raise emotions, depends entirely on the raising such lively and distinct images as here described: the reader’s passions are never sensibly

¹⁸¹ Lien Chi’s critique echoes Mr. Burchell’s in *The Vicar of Wakefield*: “English poetry ... is nothing at present but a combination of luxuriant images, without plot or connexion” (4.46).

¹⁸² Sara Landreth defines both terms in “John Dennis and Early Eighteenth-Century Motion Imagery” (2016): “In book 3 of the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle argues that a successful orator causes listeners to experience vivid mental images, so that ‘things should be seen’ with both clarity and immediacy. In describing events, this skilled storyteller will create a kind of temporary virtual reality in which unseen actions appear so vividly to the mind’s eye that they seem to be occurring in front of the listener. Aristotle calls this capability *pro ommatōn poiein* (bringing-before-the-eyes). ... In Quintilian’s *Institutio Oratoria* which adopts many of Aristotle’s theories about mental imagery, bringing-before-the-eyes is renamed *enargeia*” (62-63).

moved, till he be thrown into a kind of reverie” (1.69).¹⁸³ Crucially, this movement from image to passion was thought to be an important one, particularly in the later decades of the eighteenth century, as is attested by the divergence between Brown’s insistence that pleasing images are the *raison d’être* of poetry and Beattie’s argument that “mere poetical ornament, when it fails to interest the affections, is not only useless but improper” (51).

Goldsmith’s views, as expressed in *The Citizen*, align with those I have associated with Beattie. One of Lien Chi’s first critiques of English poetry is that modern poets are “more employed in describing to the imagination than striking at the heart” (2.173), a complaint he had previously levelled at English travel writers: “I esteem ... the traveller who instructs the heart, but despise him who only indulges the imagination” (2.41). Like many of his contemporaries, however, Goldsmith would also seem to believe that vividly affecting images presented to the imagination, while generally desirable, were at least potentially dangerous because they tended to hijack or overrule the reason or judgment. Dennis had diagnosed this problem early in the century:

Images are never so admirably drawn, as when they are drawn in Motion; especially if the Motion is violent. For the Mind can never imagine violent Motion, without being in a violent Agitation itself; and the Imagination being fir’d with that Agitation, sets the very Things before our Eyes; and consequently, makes us have the same passions that we should have from the Things themselves. ... when once the Imagination is so inflamed, as to get

¹⁸³ Quoting almost verbatim from Dennis, Beattie writes that “every thing in poetry, being intended to operate on the passions, must be displayed in lively colours, and set as it were before the eyes: therefore the poet must attend to many minute, though picturesque circumstances” (97).

the better of the Understanding, there is no Difference between the Images, and the Things themselves. (218)¹⁸⁴

Particularly when the morality of a text was in any way suspect, that text's status as affecting picture or image became a serious problem. In fact, this situation was so concerning that steps were taken to redefine reading itself. Rebecca Tierney-Hynes points this out in *Novel Minds* (2012): "over the course of the early eighteenth century, reading will be rewritten, partly in response to [the] perceived capacity of romance to fill our minds with agitating images. The intermediate step of what Dryden calls 'imaging' will be written out of our experience of text" (5).¹⁸⁵ It is in this context, therefore, that Goldsmith's observation that romance writers are like painters should be understood. Far from being an anomaly, in other words, Goldsmith's tendency to characterize works of romance as pictures is metonymic of a deep-seated and shared anxiety over the very nature of reading.

Before proceeding, it is worth stressing that Goldsmith saw other genres and works as presenting powerfully affecting images as well. Mid-century tragedy, for example—what Lien Chi describes as "tragic pantomime" because of its reliance on gesture to stir up emotion—depends upon visual spectacle to raise the passions to such an extent that they "lift up the heart,

¹⁸⁴ See Landreth's article "John Dennis and Early Eighteenth-Century Motion Imagery" (2016) for more on the significance of motion in terms of both mental imagery and the arousal of the passions.

¹⁸⁵ Tierney-Hynes goes on to explain that, to Dryden, "reading is like seeing. And more specifically ... reading is like seeing the performance of a play" (19).

like opium, into a rapture of insensibility” (2.326).¹⁸⁶ To Goldsmith, the literary sublime, productive of both terror and awe (and an eclipse of the reasoning faculty), is also built on the formation of such images. In his generally favourable review of Edmund Burke’s *Philosophical Enquiry* in the *Monthly Review*, Goldsmith objects to Burke’s connection between obscurity and the sublime, arguing that “distinctness of imagery has ever been held productive of the sublime. The more strongly the poet or orator impresses the picture he would describe upon his own mind, the more apt will he be to paint it on the imagination of his reader” (1.31). Still, Goldsmith is particularly concerned with the effects of romance when it comes to visual spectacle. Lien Chi warns in *The Citizen* that romances put villainy “in such strong lights, as may inspire, even grown men, with the strongest passion; how much more therefore ought the youth of either sex to dread them, whose reason is so weak, and whose hearts are so susceptible of passion” (2.340).¹⁸⁷ His characterization of romance in this case echoes that of Thomas Hobbes in *The Elements of Law* (1640), where such works are not only associated with a suppression of reason but with madness proper:

Another, and a principal defect of the mind, is that which men call MADNESS, which appeareth to be nothing else but some imagination of such predominance above all the rest, that we have no passion but from it. And this conception is nothing else but excessive vain

¹⁸⁶ In *Prompter* no. 113, Hill and Popple describe skillful actors as metaphorical blacksmiths, hammering images into audiences. Their discussion of a poor actor is particularly worthy of note: “A Smith might as well pretend to fashion his Iron, by Smoothing it over with his Hammer, as an Actor imprint his Images, with an Un-pausing Delivery of his Speeches—What the Elevation of the Hand, for Renewal of each Stroke, is, to the Smith, That the Pause is, to the Actor.—One Sentiment, like one Blow, has its Effect, distinct, and visible; and, the Heart, and the Understanding, are, again, prepared, for a New One” (237).

¹⁸⁷ Goldsmith appears to echo Johnson in this regard. In *Rambler* no. 4, Johnson states that modern romances are “the entertainment of minds unfurnished with ideas, and therefore easily susceptible of impressions” (3.21)

glory, or vain dejection ... And the gallant madness of Don Quixote is nothing else but an expression of such height of vain glory as reading of romants may produce in pusillanimous men. (63)

The connection Hobbes charts between “romant,” imagination, passion and madness—or, in Goldsmith’s case, a temporary suspension of reason—becomes clear when we consider that the imagination was often connected with a dream state. Hobbes had previously stated, for example, that because imagination is nothing else but sensory “conception remaining, and by little and little decaying from and after the act of sense,” it was particularly active “in SLEEP,” where “the images remaining after sense ... as in dreams, are not obscure, but strong and clear, as in sense itself” (27). Arthur Murphy picked up on this connection in *Gray’s-Inn Journal* no. 4, observing that “when the Faculties of bodily Sensation are lulled in Sleep; then the Imagination calls forth her abstracted Train, and, being free from the Incumbrance of Flesh, disports herself in the most whimsical Manner” (1.21).¹⁸⁸ This link between imagination and a dream state, driven home by Kames’s description of ideal presence as “a waking dream” (1.68), sheds additional light on Goldsmith’s anxiety over the romance genre.

To sum up, romance readers, according to Goldsmith, are at serious risk of imbibing poor principles primarily because romances take the form of affective pictures that put the judgment to sleep. Goldsmith has no fundamental objection to the experience that Kames characterizes as ideal presence, but he seems to imply that an almost automatic process (what I will describe as

¹⁸⁸ Murphy returns to this topic again in *Gray’s-Inn Journal* no. 26: “A Lively Imagination is ... great Nature’s second Course; for not content to have enjoyed the intellectual Pleasures immediately arising from the Beauty of external Objects, or the transient Scenes of Life, it frequently, when they have vanished and disappeared, makes fond Excursions after them again; and even in our Sleep, it will occasionally recall the Objects of our waking Reflection, and from thence receive livelier Sensations, than were perhaps occasioned by the first Impression” (1.169).

an aesthetic cycle) corrects the negative effects of such imaginative daydreaming in most cases. In *Bee* no. 8, Goldsmith outlines the first half of this process or cycle when he argues that “our own imaginations ... are amused and entertained with the novelty and variety that fiction affords ... He, therefore, that would gain our hearts, must make his court to our fancy, which being sovereign comptroller of the passions, lets them loose, and enflames them more or less, in proportion to the force and efficacy of the first cause, which is ever the more powerful the more new it is” (1.493). He lays out the second half of this cycle by repeatedly suggesting that passion normally gives way to reason. In *Citizen* no. 82, Lien Chi writes that “a desire of enjoyment first interests our passions in the pursuit, points out the object of investigation and reason then comments where sense has led the way” (2.335-36); and in “A Comparative View of Races and Nations,” first published in *The Royal Magazine*, Goldsmith observes that “sensuality first finds out the pleasure, and wisdom comments on the discovery” (3.73). Lien Chi acts out this cycle on his arrival in London:

I consider myself here as a newly created Being introduced into a new world; every object strikes with wonder and surprise. The imagination still unsated, seems the only active principle of the mind. The most trifling occurrences give pleasure, till the gloss of novelty is worn away. When I have ceased to wonder, I may possibly grow wise; I may then call the reasoning principle to my aid, and compare those objects with each other, which were before examined without reflection. (2.21-22)

Goldsmith is never explicit about how this process works, but I suggest it looks something like that found in Figure 1. I will return to Goldsmith’s belief that the passions are essential to knowledge formation later in the chapter. In the present context, it is important to note that

Goldsmith sees romance as an exceptional case, since by overloading the imagination with affecting images, romances somehow disrupt the cycle or cause it to skip a circuit.¹⁸⁹ Of course,

Goldsmith's emphasis on the

importance of subjecting

imagination to reason was not


original. To quote from Kathleen

Lubey, "across this period, the

imagination is closely connected to

the passions and to bodily arousals,

but it is also part of a larger mental



field that should, to the minds of most writers, be ruled by morality and reason" (*Excitable Imaginations* 14). Thus, Goldsmith's aesthetic cycle shows him to be aware of the broad consensus on this point in early modern philosophy.

Rewriting the Romance Tradition in *The Citizen of the World*

The preceding pages have shown that Goldsmith's response to the genre of romance in *The Citizen* is neither straightforward nor trite. I will now turn to the frame narrative in *The Citizen* concerning Hingpo, Lien Chi Altangi's fugitive son, and Zelis, the Man in Black's distressed niece, to show how Goldsmith manipulates or re-writes the romance genre within the periodical format. This narrative plays an important part in *The Citizen* periodical, despite taking

¹⁸⁹ Curiously, the Man in Black sees his dissent into penury as resulting from a disruption of this cycle: "my imagination and memory yet unsatisfied, were more eager after new objects, than desirous of reasoning upon those I knew" (2.115).

up a comparatively small amount of space.¹⁹⁰ Like much of *The Citizen*, it has highly derivative features, the name Zelis, for example, being culled from Montesquieu's *Persian Letters* (1721).¹⁹¹ At the same time, it is also one of the most original elements of Goldsmith's periodical. Because I see the narrative as a rewriting of the romance tradition, my assessment of it is different from that of most literary scholars, who tend to see it as a simple parody of romance (in much the same way as Christopher Smart's periodical idolons function as parodies of sentimental heroines). As Woods insightfully observes, "most critics and literary historians have underrated or ignored the two fictional threads that run throughout *The Citizen of the World*, usually dismissing the Hingpo-Zelis thread as romantic claptrap" (*DLB*). Seamus Deane is of the latter view, describing the Hingpo-Zelis narrative as consisting of "absurdly far-fetched and sentimental stories" (37) in which "irony subverts sentimentality [and] sentimentality softens irony" (48); and Booth sees it as a hodgepodge of clichéd themes from "exotic romance" (S92), dismissing the conclusion, in particular, as an obvious "parody of romantic endings" (S87).

As Booth's comment illustrates, critics who see the narrative as essentially parodic tend to focus on the sudden and surprising resolution, in which Hingpo and Zelis are unexpectedly reunited in England. By doing so, however, they tend to pass over the rest of the narrative which,

¹⁹⁰ Samuel Woods writes that "forty-six letters, more than a third of the total number ... involve either the Hingpo-Zelis romance or Lien Chi's London circle" (*DLB*). Significantly, Woods does not bother to distinguish the two narrative strands. In his *Classic Tales*, Leigh Hunt includes only fourteen letters under the heading "The Chinese Philosopher's Son."

¹⁹¹ As Hamilton Jewett Smith summarizes, "It is highly probable that from this story in the *Persian Letters* Goldsmith received suggestion for the frame-tale in the *Chinese Letters*. Similarity is found in the following episodes which are common to both: the use of the name Zelis for the heroines, the attack by a pirate ship, the ransom of the captive, the separation of father and son, the attempt to make one of the characters renounce his religion in favour of another, the capture of the heroine, the sudden appearance of the beautiful slave to the hero, her attempted flight with the hero, and the separation and final reunion of hero and heroine" (54).

taken together, presents a more complete response to the romance tradition than the conclusion taken on its own. Indeed, the narrative could even be said to function as an *anti-romance*. In *Bee* no. 6, Goldsmith muses that “instead ... of romances, which praise young men of spirit, who go through a variety of adventures, and at last conclude a life of dissipation, folly, and extravagance in riches and matrimony, there should be some men of wit employed to compose books that might equally interest the passions of our youth, where such an one might be praised for having resisted allurements when young” (1.461). Goldsmith appears to have seen himself as just such a man of wit, for the Hingpo-Zelis romance fulfills these aims, in somewhat the same way as Penelope Aubin’s “pious romances” do.¹⁹² In *Citizen* no. 36, for example, Hingpo exclaims against dissipation, folly, and extravagance:

What, shall I in a transport of passion give up the golden mean, the universal harmony, the unchanging essence for the possession of an hundred camels ... What, part with philosophy, which teaches me to suppress my passions instead of gratifying them, which teaches me even to divest my soul of passion... Never, never! (2.156)

Yet it is unwise to see the narrative as entirely reactionary, existing only in opposition, humorous or otherwise. On one level, at least, the Hingpo-Zelis narrative is a serious love story or amatory fiction,¹⁹³ involving almost unnaturally beautiful individuals, much like the formulaic French romances Goldsmith had previously critiqued (see especially pages 169-70 of this

¹⁹² Frans De Bruyn’s comparison between Aubin’s romances and the novels of Daniel Defoe is informative in this case: “Defoe’s characters manifest a tenacious instinct for survival and a drive for material prosperity that often seems ironically at odds with their professed religious beliefs. By contrast, the seductive attraction of the secular holds no allure for Aubin’s heroes and heroines, and they display none of the ambiguous self-awareness that Defoe grants his most memorable characters” (13-14).

¹⁹³ Hingpo at first protests to his father that he would never “stoop to so degrading a passion” as love (2.154), but eventually admits his error: “I will confess I loved her” (2.380).

chapter). Hingpo, it transpires, is one of the “twelve ... most beautiful slaves” in the tyrant Mostadad’s service (2.154). Zelis is even more beautiful: “The eunuch who bought her and is accustomed to survey beauty with indifference, speaks of her with emotion” (2.153). After a brief stop in Circassia, Hingpo even goes so far as to state that, while “nature has not granted her all the boasted Circassian regularity of feature,” she “greatly exceeds the fairest of the country, in the art of seizing the affections” (2.314). Zelis’s beauty is further heightened by distress, as she falls victim to one tragic event after another. Crito, the primary speaker in Joseph Spence’s *Crito; Or, a Dialogue on Beauty* (1752) illustrates this last point when he reflects on a particularly beautiful female acquaintance abused by her “Brute of a Husband”: “the Distress in her Countenance, and the little Confusion that appeared about her Eyes ... added so much to the other Beauties of her Face, that I think I never saw her look so charming in my Life” (3-4).¹⁹⁴ However much Lien Chi complicates the idea of beauty in *The Citizen*, therefore, stressing its dependence on “fashion and caprice” (2.449), Zelis is at the very least a paragon of English beauty.

A further link to the romance tradition is the fact that, while idealized, happily-ever-after bliss is not represented in the narrative, Hingpo, in particular, is keen in the pursuit of it, debating whether “wisdom be alone sufficient to make us happy” (2.156) or whether Mostadad, his piggish captor, is the truly happy one (2.155).¹⁹⁵ As previously shown, the supreme happiness of

¹⁹⁴ The eidolon of William Dodd’s *Visitor* (1760-61) says much the same on encountering a distressed female acquaintance: “my heart was touched with a sensation which I never felt in that degree before; as indeed I never had seen such an object as Mrs. Goodvile, whose negligence of dress heightened her usual beauty, and whose tears, glistening in her eyes, added fresh charms to them—charms I mean of attractive grace and innocence” (160).

¹⁹⁵ Charles Knight observes of *The Citizen* that “for a work whose tone is so often that of comic geniality, there are virtually no happy people in it” (364).

the protagonists was a defining feature of the debased French romances reviewed by Goldsmith. Moreover, Hingpo and Zelis eventually achieve at least a modicum of happiness when they marry and are provided with “a small estate in the country, which,” to Lien Chi, “will be capable of supplying all the real but not the fictitious demands of happiness” (2.476). Lien Chi is speaking from experience, having devoted much of his life to the pursuit of happiness. Early in the periodical, he observes that the “chief business of [his] life has been to procure wisdom, and the chief object of that wisdom was to be happy” (2.40). At the same time, however, Lien Chi’s view that happiness is both constitutional and individual/subjective complicates Hingpo’s search, while also posing a serious challenge to the fictitious happiness portrayed in works of romance. In *Bee* no. 2, Goldsmith had argued that happiness is “in a great measure dependent upon constitution” (1.384). Lien Chi repeats the sentiment in *Citizen* no. 44, stating that “every mind seems capable of entertaining a certain quantity of happiness, which no institutions can encrease, no circumstances alter, and [which is] entirely independent on fortune” (2.186). He further suggests that “it is impossible to form a philosophic system of happiness which is adapted to every condition in life, since every person who travels in this great pursuit takes a separate road” (2.185).¹⁹⁶ At first glance, Lien Chi’s position appears at odds with the classical view, summed up in Aristotle’s dictum that happiness is “the active exercise of his [man’s] faculties in conformity with excellence or virtue” (*Nicomachean Ethics* 33). However, in elaborating his opinion, Lien Chi aligns his outlook more closely with the traditional ethical view by observing that while “positive happiness is constitutional, and incapable of encrease,” “misery is artificial,

¹⁹⁶ According to Frederick Copleston, William Paley would advance a similar idea in 1785: “It is impossible, he says, to lay down a universal ideal of happiness valid for all, because men differ so much from one another” (207).

and generally proceeds from our folly” (2.189). As such, philosophy *can* contribute to our happiness, as Aristotle suggests, if only by making us “œconomists of what we are possessed of” (2.189).

Despite various links to the romance tradition, such as those outlined above, Goldsmith takes a number of steps to ensure that the narrative of Hingpo and Zelis does not read like a romance. In particular, he is careful not to present fully formed “pictures” to the reader, especially when it comes to the unfortunate Zelis. Booth, one of the most perceptive critics of *The Citizen*, draws attention to this sparse quality of the narrative with his observation that characters in the periodical “are not only ‘humorous’ but ‘humours,’ highly caricatured ‘two-dimensional’ folk who go through the same paces each time they come on stage” and are “never offered as developed persons” (S94). Booth blames the thinness of the characters on the periodical form: “it is in the nature of this genre that it will not permit a developed drama any more than it will permit a really serious development of philosophy” (S94). While form does influence the narrative, I argue that Goldsmith’s decision to include generalized character sketches rather than vivid, layered portraits is deliberate rather than necessitated.¹⁹⁷ Much like Johnson’s distressed women in *The Rambler* and *The Idler*, therefore, Zelis is purposefully constructed to lack perspective or depth.

¹⁹⁷ According to Mayo, “The numerous sources of the ‘Chinese Letters’ seem to have been fully recovered. ... But the extent of [Goldsmith’s] cribbing from these sources has tended to obscure one important difference between him and them, namely that the ‘Chinese Letters’ are a genuine periodical series, appearing not as a full-blown collection of epistolary essays, but at fairly regular intervals in a daily newspaper over the course of eighteen months” (123).

If Zelis is in some sense hidden from the periodical reader, she is similarly hidden from Hingpo himself. While a crucial figure in the narrative, she is both numinous and spiritual and therefore, in some sense, incorporeal, invisible. Hingpo observes in awe that “her beauty seemed the transparent covering of virtue. Celestial beings could not wear a look of more perfection while sorrow humanized her form, and mixed my admiration with pity” (2.153). He later states that “her appearance was like that of an aerial genius, when it descends to minister comfort to undeserved distress” (2.243), and that her “bright perfection” filled him with “rapture and astonishment” (2.244). On a more mundane level, she is often isolated from Hingpo and the rest of the characters, taking off one head-covering only to put on another. When her journey to Rome to “take the veil” ends in her capture and sale by a “Barbary corsair,” she is provided with a *yashmak*, a Turkish veil revealing only her eyes, and locked away in a Persian harem (2.250). Hingpo, however, is adept at imaginatively recreating her when physically separated. As he laments after the vessel carrying Zelis is wrecked on the Volga, it is not “in the power of time, or of reason to erase her image from my heart” (2.380).¹⁹⁸ An instance of this tendency is his detailed description of Zelis’s appearance when presented to the Muslim prince, Mostadad, on her forthcoming wedding night, something he has not and could never see (in part because it will never happen):

six ladies, in all the magnificence of Persia, are directed to undress the bride. Their business is to assist to encourage her, to divest her of every encumbering part of her dress, all but the last covering, which, by an artful complication of ribbons, is purposely made

¹⁹⁸ Curiously, even when united in Circassia, Hingpo says that “the form of Zelis grows upon my imagination” (2.314).

difficult to unloose, and with which she is to part reluctantly even to the joyful possessor of her beauty. (2.155)

Hingpo's use of the present tense ("six ladies ... are directed to undress the bride") suggests not only that the event is happening now, but that he himself is present as a spectator, thus emphasizing his tendency to imaginatively recreate or visualize his future bride in his own mind.

While Hingpo is able to visualize Zelis in spite of her absence, effectively bringing her likeness before his eyes (*pro ommatōn poiein*), those readers who depend on fully formed poetic images are not. Summary and abridgement are one reason such readers do not "see" Zelis. As Hingpo says after recounting Zelis's unfortunate narrative in *Citizen* no. 60, "thus ended her relation, which I have abridged, but as soon as we are arrived at Moscow ... you shall be informed of all more particularly" (2.250). Notably, Hingpo breaks this promise after he is separated from Zelis on the Volga, meaning that readers must be content with an absence of particulars, even though they, like Lien Chi, presumably take delight "in minute description" (2.412). Since Hingpo has himself heard the original story, his abridgement becomes a purposeful device designed, in Leah Price's phrase, to "spare, or prevent ... readers from reading all the editor did" (2). Lien Chi further assists in the abridging process by refusing to describe the union of Hingpo and Zelis at the conclusion of *The Citizen*: "Were I to hold the pen of a novelist, I might be prolix in describing their feelings at so unexpected an interview, but you may conceive their joy without my assistance" (2.474).

Another reason readers cannot easily visualize Zelis, reinforcing her existence within the narrative as a shadowy idea, is her separation from other principal characters in the text.

Although the reader is aware of Zelis for roughly two thirds of the periodical, for much of this

time she is either hidden away in the harem or shipwrecked on the banks of the Volga, whence she is “carried by the Russian peasants to the port of Archangel” (2.474). Her motion further underscores her absence. In some sense, she never stops long enough for the reader to get a glimpse of her, racing from England to Italy to the Middle East to Circassia to Russia and back to England again. She thus resembles the heroines of Penelope Aubin’s novels, who, according to Frans De Bruyn, find themselves traversing “the remotest corners of the globe” as a result of “a tangle of disasters taking the form of storms, shipwrecks, slavery, Barbary pirates, and lustful Turks and Moors,” their hectic travels mirroring the narrative structure (12-13).¹⁹⁹ Eventually even Hingpo begins to refer to Zelis as a “dear idea” (2.380), for, as Kames explains, “a quick succession, even of the most beautiful objects” scarce makes “any impression” (1.70). Upon her arrival in England, Zelis remains a shadowy presence, at times refusing to speak to her uncle’s acquaintances. Lien Chi reflects upon his initial encounter with Zelis, “curiosity prompted me to ask several questions, but she declined them all” (2.396). The reader, in this case, is at as much of a loss as Lien Chi.

By presenting Zelis as a mere idea, Goldsmith encourages readers to use their imaginations to render these portions of the narrative for themselves (just as Hingpo imaginatively re-creates Zelis in his own mind). He is not content to describe fully formed scenes to their imaginations. The difference between the imagination’s response to an indistinct sketch as opposed to a vivid portrayal is a subtle but crucial one. Indistinct sketches spur the imagination to action; vivid portrayals sink it into passive lethargy. Throughout his writings, Goldsmith shows the imagination to be, at least *in potentia*, both an active and a passive faculty.

¹⁹⁹ De Bruyn describes Aubin’s novels as “an extended series of briefly told episodes which follow upon one another with dizzying rapidity” (12).

Thus, in *Citizen* no. 3, Lien Chi refers to the imagination as “an active principle of the mind” (2.21), which explains his belief that the reader can, on command, “transport the imagination for a moment to the midst of a forest in Siberia” (2.335). This passage also sheds light on Goldsmith’s earlier claim in “A Reverie at the Boar’s-Head-Tavern,” which first appeared in *The British Magazine*, to be able to “transport my imagination” at will to the days of Falstaff and Prince Hal (3.98).²⁰⁰ The “Reverie” is particularly significant as in it Goldsmith distinguishes the active imagination from the more passive faculty at work in a dream state. After employing his active imagination, the narrator drifts off to sleep and “fancied [the landlord] changing sexes; and, as my eyes began to close in slumber, I imagined my fat landlord actually converted into as fat a landlady” (3.98). While the passive imagination or “fancy” is associated with sleep, Goldsmith links the active imagination with reason or reflection. In *Bee* no. 5 the narrator states, “as I was indulging these reflections, in order to eke out the present page, I could not avoid pursuing the metaphor, of going a journey, in my imagination, and formed the following Resverie [sic] too wild for allegory, and too regular for a dream” (1.444).²⁰¹ Such a reverie is very different from that charted by Kames in *The Elements of Criticism*, in which the reader indulges the imagination passively in a waking dream (1.69). After all, the narrator’s

²⁰⁰ See also Lien Chi’s own observation that “my heart still hovers round those scenes of former happiness with pleasure; and I find satisfaction in enjoying them [i.e., his gardens in Quamsi or Quang-si] at this distance, tho’ but in imagination” (2.135). Thomas Traherne’s description of the “roving” imagination in *Centuries of Meditations* provides an interesting parallel to Lien Chi’s comment: “Creatures that are able to dart their thoughts into all spaces can brook no limit or restraint; they are infinitely indebted to this illimited extent [“the Infinity of God”], because were there no such infinity, there would be no room for their imaginations; their desires and affections would be cooped up, and their souls imprisoned” (306-7).

²⁰¹ This is not to suggest that reason is synonymous with imagination in *The Citizen*: for example, in *Citizen* no. 76, Lien Chi states that “when reason was thus fatigued to find an answer, my imagination pursued the subject. ... I fancied myself placed between two landscapes [sic] ...” (2.315).

reverie in *The Bee* is “too regular for a dream” and, crucially, is predicated upon “these reflections.” Leaving aside the active imagination’s precise scope and operation, however, its existence in Goldsmith’s oeuvre provides a clear rationale for his willingness to present Zelis as an indistinct idea in *The Citizen*. In fact, like Arthur Murphy, he seems to see it as “a Rule among good Writers, never to enlarge too much upon any subject, and to leave something for the Imagination of the Reader to supply” (*Gray’s-Inn Journal* 1.236).

It is important to remember that Goldsmith is not necessarily seeking to limit readers’ passions by presenting the narrative in this form (in fact, I will go on to suggest that he is not), for the active imagination would seem just as capable of raising the passions as the passive. While Goldsmith had previously qualified Burke’s argument in the *Enquiry* that the passions “may be considerably operated upon, as in music, without presenting any image at all,” his own emphasis on “distinctness of imagery” in the review (1.31) should not be taken to suggest that the passions cannot be raised by obscure or partial images, but that they are most easily raised by complete, clear ones.²⁰² In other words, he seems to believe that the active imagination is capable of turning a bare idea into an affecting image. If I am correct in this assumption, Goldsmith could be said to echo John Brown, who had previously argued that no passion is “*strongly excited* in the Soul by mere Knowledge only, till the *Imagination* hath formed to itself some Kind of Picture or *Representation* of the Good or Evil Apprehended” (13). Pieces of information, in this case, rather than fully formed images, may contribute to the arousal of powerful emotions with the help of a particular species of imagination.

²⁰² See page 176 of this chapter for more on Goldsmith’s qualification of Burke’s theory.

Goldsmith's apparent belief that the imagination has the potential to raise the passions with the help of only the faintest pre-existent image situates him within a larger historical context. By advancing this position, Goldsmith may be said to be part of a larger shift in reading charted by Tierney-Hynes, in which words increasingly "impress us like passions, unmoored and immaterial language is newly our only access to the world, and the theatrical context [of reading] that Dryden uses [in which "authors 'image' and readers 'see'"] ... falls away" (22). Alternately, it may suggest a more expansive knowledge of French thought on Goldsmith's part, including the philosophy of René Descartes, than critics have previously recognized. As Descartes suggests in *The Passions of the Soul* (1649), reason and reflection have the potential to raise the passions, though such passions are admittedly lesser (in terms of duration and intensity) than those raised by the senses. To Descartes, the "passions of Delight and Abhorrence are usually more vigorous than the other species of Love and Hatred, because what comes to the soul represented by the senses affects it more forcibly than what is represented to it by its reason" (65). In this case, Descartes' emphasis on the vehemence of love and hatred, stimulated by, among other things, those images received through the senses, should not disguise the fact that reason is capable of producing the passions of delight and abhorrence independent of such images.

Before proceeding, I would like to suggest some additional reasons for Goldsmith's emphasis on the active imagination and his corresponding critique of the passive or somnambulant fancy. In her article "On Being Moved: Sympathy, Mobility, and the Narrative Form" (2011), Miranda Burgess suggests that in response to the theory of sympathy advanced by thinkers such as Shaftesbury and David Hume, in which "sympathy appeared as an inescapably

contagious form of affective migrancy,”²⁰³ writers like Adam Smith and William Wordsworth advanced a rival model in which sympathy became “individuated and volitional” (297). Significantly, both Smith and Wordsworth place great stress on the “mediating work of the imagination” and judgment to disrupt the “circulation of contagious affects” and to “displace the anxieties ... surrounding an understanding of sympathy as immediate, involuntary, and transpersonal” (300). Goldsmith, I suggest, was equally troubled by the anxieties charted by Burgess. At the very least, he was aware of the reality of affective migrancy. *The Citizen* contains numerous situations in which feelings travel freely among individuals, particularly in crowds. In *Citizen* no. 54, for example, Lien Chi explains his desire for being “at the centre of a crowd”: “I join in whatever goes forward, work my passions into a similitude of frivolous earnestness, shout as they shout, and condemn as they happen to disapprove” (2.225). The philosopher’s volitional language (“I ... work my passions into a similitude”) should not disguise the fact that the affective transference he describes is remarkably easy and in some sense outside of his control, providing a kind of cathartic effect because of its intensity (“a mind thus sunk for a while below its natural standard, is qualified for stronger flights”) (2.225). Lien Chi later repeats his predilection “to make one in the mob, to shout as they shouted, to fix with earnestness upon the same frivolous objects, and participate for a while the pleasures and the wishes of the vulgar” (2.268). In both cases, Lien Chi, like Hume and Shaftesbury, founds “sympathetic contagion on proximity and immediacy” (Burgess 303). The crowd, it appears, facilitates the almost automatic transference of “the passion or sentiments with which [one man is] moved himself, into the breast of another” (*Bee* 1.477). This almost automatic transference of passion,

²⁰³ See also Isaac Watts in this regard. As Watts observes in *The Doctrine of the Passions*, “There is ... a Contagion in some of the Passions, whereby one Person infects his Neighbour with them” (80).

interestingly, helps explain Lien Chi's rather frightening definition of love as "an involuntary passion, placed upon our companions without our consent, and frequently conferred without our previous esteem. We love some men, we know not why" (2.71).

While Smith tends to deploy imagination and judgment to disrupt affective migrancy in real situations, as tools to create distance between *actual* individuals and to disperse *actual* crowds, Burgess argues that Wordsworth uses them to disrupt affective migrancy between *metaphorical* individuals and *metaphorical* crowds (311). After all, readers can also constitute a kind of mob and the passions may easily flow from books (commodities) to readers (consumers). It is in this context that we should position Goldsmith's emphasis on the active imagination. Encouraging the active and reflective imagination is one way Goldsmith creates critical distance—something that the genre of romance appears to preclude by facilitating the easy transference of emotion—thus ensuring affective responses to texts that are both controlled and reasonable.

Facilitating Calm Passions in *The Citizen of the World*

Certainly, Goldsmith does not envision readers of the Hingpo-Zelis narrative using their active imagination to conjure up just any passion. I would argue that the idea of Zelis, in particular (to borrow Humean terminology) is designed to lead to a particular impression, or set of impressions, through the mediating power of the active imagination.²⁰⁴ Based on the ideas Goldsmith presents of Zelis, I suggest, readers are encouraged to conjure up images that inspire calm and fleeting passions rather than vehement and lasting ones. There is thus a close affinity

²⁰⁴ As Hume observes in *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1738-40), sympathy is "nothing but a lively idea converted into an impression," and this conversion is at times only possible through the "force of imagination" (385-86).

between Goldsmith's *Citizen* and Eliza Haywood's *Female Spectator* (see chapter one).

Goldsmith's anxiety over vehement passion is readily apparent in his writings. As he observes in *The British Magazine*, "love and friendship, by being too violent, often destroy themselves" (3.121). This fact is underscored in numerous tales and apologues. In "The Proceedings of Providence Vindicated. An Eastern Tale," for example, Asem attempts suicide after naively loving mankind with "the most ardent affection" (3.58); in "The Story of Alcander and Septimus," Septimus is infected/affected by "an involuntary passion" that causes "the emotions of his mind [...to become] so strong, that they brought on a fever" (1.364); and in "Sabinus and Olinda," Ariana is "warped by [the] wrong passions" of jealousy and lust to such an extent that she has her own relation imprisoned for debt (1.489). It is thus not surprising that Goldsmith attempts to promote in *The Citizen* what he describes in *Bee* no. 7 as "transient and superficial emotions" (1.478), or what Quintilian describes as *ethos* (affection) rather than *pathos* (e.g., love) (*Institutes* 6.2.12). Goldsmith could also be said to second Horatio's observation in Bernard Mandeville's *The Fable of the Bees* vol. 2 (1729) that "it is the Gentleness of them [the Passions], and the calm Serenity of the Mind, that make us amiable, and bring us the nearest to the Perfection of Angels; whereas the Violence of the Passions, in which the Corruption of the Heart chiefly consists, dethrones our Reason, and renders us most like unto savages" (39).

In Goldsmith's "The History of Miss Stanton," a kind of early prototype of both the Zelis narrative in *The Citizen* and the story of Olivia in *The Vicar of Wakefield* (1766), Miss Stanton's father demonstrates his humanity and benevolence by being "touched at once with pity and curiosity" at the sight of "a stranger dressed in black, with a grey wig, posing wearily by his

door” (3.131).²⁰⁵ The good man later pays for his benevolence, failing to see through the stranger’s disguise, but the passions he demonstrates, I argue, are precisely those Goldsmith wishes to generate in the Zelis narrative in *The Citizen*. Significantly, both curiosity and pity are connected to the romance tradition, and both were thought to be, at least when functioning properly, superficial and short lived.

Hugh Blair draws the connection between romance and curiosity in his *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres* (1783), stating that curiosity or a love of novelty is a “vivid and an agreeable emotion” focused on whatever is “uncommon or new,” which explains “the entertainment afforded us by fiction and romance” (50). He illustrates its superficiality when he suggests that “the emotion raised by Novelty is of a more lively and pungent nature, than that produced by Beauty; *but much shorter in its continuance*” (51; my emphasis). Burke had previously advanced a similar claim in his *Philosophical Enquiry*, stating that “as those things which engage us merely by their novelty, cannot attach us for any length of time, curiosity is the most superficial of all the affections” (31). In some sense, it is Lien Chi who is most associated with this passion in *The Citizen*. His very cosmopolitanism is a product of it, leading him to travel to England and tour its attractions, the Man in Black taking “every opportunity of introducing me to such company as may serve to ... gratify my curiosity” (2.239). Curiosity also prompts his departure. In *Citizen* no. 122, Lien Chi states that “my long residence here begins to fatigue me, as every object ceases to be new, it no longer continues to be pleasing” (2.470).

²⁰⁵ “The History of Miss Stanton” first appeared in *The British Magazine*. Speaking of this tale, James Prior writes, “Among the supposed contributions of Goldsmith, but less certain from being less finished, is a tale where we find something like the first rude germ of the *Vicar of Wakefield*. The catastrophe is indeed unnatural and abrupt, obviously hurried to a conclusion and written probably when the press required an immediate supply of matter. ... it [is] probable that this formed the first draught of a tale which we have hitherto known only in its perfect state” (*Life of Goldsmith* 182-83).

Notably, Lien Chi also tends to inspire curiosity in others, lamenting that “I am sent for not to be treated as a friend, but to satisfy curiosity” (2.190).²⁰⁶

While Lien Chi both inspires and demonstrates curiosity, it is Zelis who plays a crucial role in communicating this passion to the reader, primarily through what I will refer to as “simple variety” rather than the fantastic novelty associated with the unknown and marvellous (products of “the wild strain of imagination” Johnson associates with “heroic romance” in *Rambler* no. 4) (*Rambler* 3.19-20). In the first place, as already observed, Zelis is always in motion, traveling between England, Italy, the Middle East, Circassia, and Russia. While her motion introduces the reader to a variety of settings, Zelis also brings to the narrative a variety or diversity of misfortune. *Peripeteia* characterizes her narrative, with flight and capture giving way to rescue and flight again in a kind of never-ending cycle. In this, she resembles Catherine the Great, whose up-and-down story Lien Chi recounts in *Citizen* no. 62.²⁰⁷ She also resembles many of the distressed heroines found in John Hawkesworth’s *Adventurer*.

Zelis’s variety of person and variety (even *contrariety*) of character could also be said to appeal to curiosity, or at least to single her out as an object of potential curiosity. Hingpo defines variety of person as grace, a particularly kind of beauty: “ever changing under the eye of inspection, her variety, rather than her figure, is pleasing” (2.317). He thus echoes Spence’s observation in *Crito* that “the last finishing and noblest part of Beauty is Grace,” a type of beauty

²⁰⁶ Goldsmith portrays himself as an author in the same way: “I resemble one of those solitary animals, that has been forced from its forest to gratify human curiosity” (2.15).

²⁰⁷ Lien Chi draws an explicit comparison between Zelis (“your fair companion”) and the Russian Queen (“our beautiful stranger,” “the solitary wanderer”) for his son’s benefit (2.261).

that is “perpetually varying its Appearances” (28).²⁰⁸ While Zelis’s beauty consists in her variety of person, her variety of character makes her a particularly difficult figure to “bring before the eyes,” however much it may inspire a general degree of interest. Zelis is, like Smart’s female eidolons, the reverse of an autobiographical subject, her various *personae* existing not only in conflict with each other but frequently in opposition: she is both humble (“easy without pride, and free without impudence”) (2.396) and proud (“her pride astonishes her attendant slaves no less than her beauty”) (2.153); a Catholic nun (“I embarked in order to go by sea to Rome, where I intended to take the veil”) (2.250) and a married woman (“My son and his fair partner are fixed here for life”) (2.476); an Englishwoman in the mould of Johnson’s Irene (“she refuses the warmest solicitations of her haughty lord; he has even offered to make her one of his four wives, upon changing her religion, and conforming to his”) (2.153) and a native Persian-speaker (“Unhappy stranger, said she, in the Persian language...”) (2.243).

She is also, strangely, a type of Socrates even as she exists as an holy angel or “aerial genius” (2.243). Lien Chi is eager to meet just such a Socratic figure throughout the narrative. At a visitation dinner organized by the English clergy, for example, he anticipates one of “those sentimental banquets so finely described by Xenophon and Plato; I was hoping some Socrates would be brought in from the door, in order to harangue upon divine love” (2.240). And yet, he only meets such an individual at the conclusion of the narrative, with the arrival of Zelis. Lien Chi is surprised that when “our conversation turned upon love,” she “seemed equally capable of defending and inspiring” the passion (2.448). Moreover, the subsequent debate over the precise

²⁰⁸ According to Michael Griffin, “Goldsmith and Burke were in broad aesthetic agreement on the analogous subjects of female beauty and landscape gardening ... non-proportionality and imperfection (here meant as an opposite of symmetrical accomplishment) are sources of beauty ... perfection and regularity are not” (110).

nature of love, during which Zelis defends it as “a natural and universal passion” that “produces the happiness of those who [cultivate] it with proper precaution,” is a clear echo of Plato’s *Symposium* (2.448-49).²⁰⁹

Goldsmith models a correct response to Zelis by exemplifying it in Hingpo and Lien Chi. Both are deeply curious about her. After rescuing Zelis from Mostabad’s harem, for instance, Hingpo writes that “when sufficiently refreshed after the fatigues of our precipitate flight, my curiosity, which had been restrained by the appearance of immediate danger now began to revive: I longed to know by what distressful accidents my fair fugitive became a captive” (2.246). Lien Chi’s response is similar: he observes that “curiosity prompted me to ask several questions, but she declined them all” (2.396).

The other passion with which Goldsmith links Zelis is pity. Like curiosity, pity has links to the romance tradition, if only because of its connection with love. According to Burke, “pity is a passion accompanied with pleasure, because it arises from love and social affection” (46). Hume agrees, stating that “there is always a mixture of love or tenderness with pity” (*Treatise* 381).²¹⁰ Goldsmith’s own opinion on the subject is debatable, as he presents multiple definitions of pity throughout his oeuvre from multiple points of view. Confusingly, in *Bee* no. 3 he writes that “pity and friendship are passions incompatible with each other” because “friendship is made

²⁰⁹ Curiously, Zelis’s position is actually closer to that of Eryximachus in the *Symposium*, who argues that while love may exert a powerful influence in the world, “it is [only] the love whose object is good and whose fulfillment is attended by sobriety and virtue ... that possesses the greatest power, and is the author of all our happiness” (57). That said, Lien Chi’s observation that she is “equally capable of defending and inspiring” love would seem a clear echo of Alcibiades’ panegyric on Socrates in the *Symposium*.

²¹⁰ See also Anna Lætitia Barbauld: “there must be some ... sentiment combined with ... instinctive sympathy, before it becomes in any degree pleasing, or produces the sweet emotion of pity. This sentiment is love, esteem, the complacency we take in the contemplation of beauty [and grace and gentleness], of mental or moral excellence, called forth and rendered more interesting by circumstances of pain and danger” (197).

up of esteem and pleasure” while “pity is composed of sorrow and contempt” (1.396).²¹¹ Later, in *The Citizen*, however, he seems to suggest that they are linked, arguing that “pity and tenderness ... enable every virtue” (2.52). In his series of literary essays published in *The Public Ledger* upon completion of *The Citizen*, he also refers to a kind of compounded passion “mixed with love and pity” (3.169). In the context of his pronouncements elsewhere in his writings, then, Goldsmith’s depiction of pity in *The Bee* would seem to be an anomaly.

Pity was, in its purest form, assumed to be a particularly calm passion, predicated on, rather than antecedent to, reason and reflection, and therefore akin to universal calm benevolence. Hutcheson, for example, associates pity with reason as it arises from our “Opinion of another’s *undeserved Misery*” (66). To eighteenth-century philosophers, it was an even more “easy and agreeable ... affection of the mind” than love, to borrow Goldsmith’s definition of the latter passion (2.272), because of its particular focus. As Hume states, pity may be connected with love, but it is lesser because “Pity is a concern for ... the misery of others, *without any friendship to occasion this concern* ... We pity even strangers, and such as are perfectly indifferent to us” (*Treatise* 369; my emphasis). Goldsmith assumes as much in his periodical papers, observing in his definition of elegiac poetry that “elegy [never] venture[s] to strike the lyre. It is indeed passionate, but has nothing terrible; *nor is there, in the wildest rage of a lover, ought that can excite a stronger emotion than pity*” (1.164; my emphasis). In the same way, in his famous discussion of sentimental comedy (or “bastard tragedy”), a dramatic tradition with

²¹¹ Notably, John Brown also links pity with contempt in his *Essays* (13).

which pity was almost emblematic, Goldsmith argues that such works aim “at touching our Passions without the power of being truly pathetic” (3.212).²¹²

In the eighteenth century, pity was also seen as a short-lived passion, something Goldsmith stresses throughout his periodical writings. In *Bee* no. 3, he argues that compassion “is but, at best, a short-lived passion, and seldom affords distress more than transitory assistance: With some it scarce lasts from the first impulse till the hand can be put into the pocket; with others it may continue for twice that space, and in some of extraordinary sensibility, I have seen it operate for half an hour together” (1.396). He repeats this pronouncement almost verbatim three more times in his journalism: in *Citizen* no. 21 Lien Chi complains that it is impossible to sympathize with actors “through five long acts” as “pity is but a short-lived passion” (2.93); in *The Critical Review* Goldsmith insists that “all enthusiasms are of short continuance; nor is it in the power of genius to keep our sorrows alive through five acts, unless it diversifies the object, or, in every act excites some new and unforeseen distress” (1.172); and in “The Proceedings of Providence Vindicated” in *The Royal Magazine*, Asem sadly discovers that “pity is but a short-lived passion” (3.59). Goldsmith’s repetition of this idea drives home Leigh Hunt’s observation that he was “fond, even to an unpardonable vanity, of repeating his sentiments almost word for word” (48). More importantly, it reveals his awareness of an enduring aesthetic principle, advanced both by classical thinkers such as Quintilian and eighteenth-century theorists like Anna Lætitia Barbauld. As Quintilian observes in the *Institutes of Oratory*, “Appeals to pity should ... always be brief, and there is good reason for the saying that nothing dries so quickly as tears” (6.1.27). Barbauld agrees, stating that “all our finer feelings are in a manner momentary,

²¹² In this case, Quintilian’s distinction between *ethos* (calm affection) and *pathos* (vehement love) helps explain Goldsmith’s use of the term “pathetic” (*Institutes* 6.2.10).

and no art can carry them beyond a certain point, either in intenseness or duration” (204). Of course, pity could become a predominant passion, as in the case of the Man in Black, whose father “wound us up to be mere machines of pity” (2.114), but even the Man in Black’s pity is in a sense momentary (see particularly *Citizen* no. 26, in which his attention is repeatedly drawn to the sight of distressed individuals).

In the Hingpo-Zelis narrative, Goldsmith deliberately portrays Zelis as a potential object of pity. The Zelis thread is affecting rather than properly pathetic in part because of the heroine’s drawn-out distress. In his hostile review of *The Orphan of China* (1759), Goldsmith attacked Murphy for just such drawn-out suffering, arguing that “when the poet thus attempts to move us before his time, the most he can do is to raise an equally moderate degree of pity through the whole, which all his art cannot raise into that fine agony of distress, so common among the great masters of his art” (1.172). Lien Chi says something similar in *Citizen* no. 21, complaining that “if the actor ... exclaims upon every occasion in the tones of despair, he attempts to move us too soon; he anticipates the blow, he ceases to affect though he gains our applause” (2.94). Significantly, however, while Goldsmith sees the arousal of a “moderate degree of pity” in tragedy as an aesthetic fault, he strives for it in *The Citizen*, in which Zelis almost constantly experiences “some new and unforeseen distress” (2.172).

Also contributing to the pitiful quality of the narrative is the fact that Zelis’s repeated misfortunes are frequently minor and always sketched in very broad strokes. Unlike both the eponymous heroine in “The History of Miss Stanton” and Olivia Primrose in *The Vicar of Wakefield*, it is Zelis’s reputation that suffers in her origin story, not her person. She is never exactly harmed by her captors and/or lovers, who seem in awe of her almost ethereal quality: “I

have been bought by several masters, each of whom perceiving my reluctance, rather than use violence sold me to another” (2.250).²¹³ As such, Zelis seems to suffer almost exclusively from little more than an ill-defined state of enmity between herself and the world: “I now perceived myself entirely unfit for all society; discarded from the good, and detesting the infamous, I seemed in a state of war with every rank of people” (2.250). Barbauld’s commentary on *Venice Preserv’d* provides some much needed context in this case. To Barbauld,

we are struck and affected with the general face of ruin, but we are not brought near enough to discern the ugliness of its features. Belvedira ruined, Belvidera deprived of friends, without a home, abandoned to the wide world—we can contemplate with all the pleasing sympathy of pity; but had she been represented as really sunk into low life ... our compassion would have given way to contempt and disgust. (203)

It is precisely because she is abandoned to, and in some sense at war with, “every rank of people,” therefore, that Zelis exists in clear and deliberate opposition to the street walkers Lien Chi describes in *Citizen* no. 117, whose sufferings are more tangible. Unlike Zelis, these women are “strangers, wanderers, and orphans, whose circumstances are too humble to expect redress, and whose distresses are too great even for pity. Their wretchedness excites rather horror than pity” (2.453).

²¹³ In this, she resembles the historical figure of Hypsasia in *The Bee*, who, according to Goldsmith, “joined to a beauty the most striking, a virtue that might repress the most assuming” (1.402). Even so, Hypsasia eventually falls victim to a mob who “exerted the most inhuman cruelties upon her” (1.404).

The Passions and the Advancement of Knowledge

To this point, I have focused primarily on the building blocks or ideas that readers of the Hingpo-Zelis narrative are invited to turn into a particular set of impressions (pity, curiosity) *via* the active imagination. I would now like to consider the two following questions. First, why include a romance plot at all in *The Citizen*? Second, why facilitate the arousal of any passions? After all, as Burgess suggests, authors such as Wordsworth and Immanuel Kant encouraged aesthetic appreciation (or aesthetic pleasure) in readers over emotive arousal in large part because of the perceived dangers of sympathy (311).²¹⁴ Is it not possible to see Goldsmith as a forerunner to this shift and, therefore, as someone opposed to the arousal of passion in readers? Not exactly, for in what follows, I will argue that the passions, for Goldsmith, play a crucial role in the reading process, particularly when it comes to the consumer of periodicals.

Passionate reading is crucial to Goldsmith primarily because the majority of the populace (“the vulgar”) are incapable of any other mode of reformation. Of course, writings intended to arouse the passions are a double-edged tool of reformation, for the general public are also vulnerable to works encouraging vehement or uncontrolled passions. Still, this does not discount their efficacy in certain situations. As Goldsmith observes in “Some Remarks on the Modern Manner of Preaching,” “Whatever may become of the higher orders of mankind, who are generally possessed of collateral motives to virtue, the vulgar should be particularly regarded, whose behaviour in civil life is totally hinged upon their hopes and fears” (3.151). When it

²¹⁴ In *The Author, Art, and the Market* (1994), Martha Woodmansee charts a similar kind of shift, with its roots in the aesthetic theory of Theodor Bergk: “By the end of the eighteenth century ... light reading matter had so proliferated that some ... principles seemed urgently called for. They were provided by the intense philosophizing about the arts which Bergk drew in order to elaborate a reading propaedeutic that would drive his middle-class readers to classical authors by turning them into classical readers” (101).

comes to such individuals, appeals to reason or *logos* are fruitless. Hence the danger of modern methods or styles of preaching that constitute “an address to reason and not the passions” (1.151). To Goldsmith, preachers who communicate in this way are “indifferently acquainted with human nature” and “are not sensible, that ... reason is but a weak antagonist when headlong passion dictates. ... Those who attempt to reason us out of our follies begin at the wrong end, since the attempt naturally presupposes us capable of reason” (3.152). Of course, this way of approaching the issue tends to disguise an important truth. Though Goldsmith insists that the vulgar can only be reformed *through* the passions, he also appears to claim that the passions themselves require reformation. In other words, the passions are both the problem and the solution in Goldsmith’s mind, both poison and cure.²¹⁵

But is it fair to equate periodical readers with “the vulgar?” Goldsmith is perfectly clear on this front. Periodicals are addressed to the multitude, the lowest literate, and perhaps even illiterate, orders of society. In “New Fashions in Learning,” which appeared in *The Public Ledger* upon completion of *The Citizen*, Goldsmith echoes Addison and Steele in stating that “essay writing ... may be considered as the art of bringing learning from the cell into society” and is “chiefly encouraged by the multitude” (3.161). His classification of “the multitude” becomes even clearer when he states in “A Preface to a Series of Literary Essays” that “in the execution of a task of this nature neither great abilities nor profound learning will be exerted by

²¹⁵ This sense of the passions as *pharmakon*, both poison and cure, is visible in John Dennis’s criticism. Sara Landreth explains, “Dennis stresses that bringing-before-the-eyes, like Quintilian’s *enargeia*, functions as a kind of absent presence. Even though we read about actions that are both temporally and geographically removed from us, we experience ‘the same passions’ as an eyewitness. But while this virtual ‘madness’ might sound dangerous, it functions as a *pharmakon*. Like hemlock that poisons in order to cure, poetic imagery agitates the faculties in order to put them into order” (70). For more on the passions as *pharmakon* see “Miscellaneous Thoughts on the Passions” in *The Lady’s Magazine* (Dec. 1771): “Our affections and senses are like many drugs, one way poison, another way preventatives” (261).

the writer, and no great discernment or sagacity will be required on the part of the reader. ... To go deeply in to the subject is not our design, [for] to please the greatest number we must be superficial” (3.159).²¹⁶ More generally, consumers of periodicals consist of “indolent” (1.45) and “unlettered” readers (1.110), including those who subscribe to “circulating libraries” (1.110) and devour “compilations” (1.356). In *The Bee*, Goldsmith had striven to reach a more refined audience, stating that if “like labourers in the Magazine trade, I humbly presume to promise an epitome of all the good things that were ever said or written, those readers I most desire to please may forsake me” (1.353-54). He appears to give up the attempt in *The Citizen*. By doing so, Goldsmith insinuates that periodicals had become the exclusive province of the vulgar. To presume otherwise was mere posturing on the part of the periodicalist.

While the vulgar reader of periodicals could only be reformed through the passions, Goldsmith lends the passions a degree of credibility by suggesting that they are not simply instrumental when it came to individual reformation, but crucial in the advancement of all human knowledge. Significantly, this rather Mandevellian claim provides an aura of authority to all literary enterprises that aim at moving the passions. Goldsmith’s basic idea is this: the search for pleasure leads to knowledge. In “A Comparative View of Races and Nations,” he maintains that “luxury ever preceded wisdom, or, in other words, every country must be luxurious before it can make any progress in human knowledge. Sensuality first finds out the pleasure,²¹⁷ and wisdom

²¹⁶ Elsewhere, Goldsmith blames the apparent superficiality of his essays on the particular constraints of the periodical form: “I would ask whether in a short essay it is not necessary to be superficial? Before we have prepared to enter into the depths of a subject ... we have got to the bottom of our scanty page” (3.2)

²¹⁷ In an early essay, Fum Hoam writes that “all our pleasures proceed from the senses” (2.37).

comments on the discovery” (3.73). He thus echoes Aaron Hill and William Popple, who state in *Prompter* no. 30 that while “our noblest Sentiments begin with our Pleasure, they enlarge, and maintain themselves, with our Reason” (70). Later, in *Citizen* no. 11, Lien Chi states that “to luxury we owe not only the greatest part of our knowledge but even of our virtues” (2.51). In *The Citizen*, he makes explicit the role of the passions as mediator in this process, arguing that “sensual enjoyment adds wings to curiosity. ... A desire of enjoyment first interests our passions in the pursuit, points out the object of investigation and reason then comments where sense has led the way” (2.335-36).²¹⁸ Elsewhere in *The Citizen*, Goldsmith goes so far as to argue that the passions “are the source of our pleasures,” giving to them an ever more primary role in this epistemological process (2.201).

It is important to keep in mind that some passions are more valuable than others in this operation: Goldsmith had previously singled out curiosity, for example, as instrumental in the advancement of human knowledge, though, significantly, he does not restrict epistemic advancement to this particular passion.²¹⁹ Hence the significance of arousing and regulating a variety of passions through the agency of the mediating imagination, a process with which Goldsmith is not only tacitly but explicitly concerned. Lien Chi describes this procedure in different ways in *The Citizen*, but all centre on the idea of regulation: in *Citizen* no. 7, Lien Chi emphasizes the importance of “control[ing] the passions” to achieve happiness (“our attempts

²¹⁸ See also *Citizen* no. 11: “we then only are curious after knowledge when we find it connected with sensual happiness” (2.51).

²¹⁹ The important function of curiosity becomes clear in Goldsmith’s discussion of Francis Bacon: “Of all the English philosophers I most reverence Bacon, that great and hardy genius; he it is who allows of secrets yet unknown; who undaunted by the seeming difficulties that oppose, prompts human curiosity to examine every part of nature” (*Collected Works* 2.419).

should be not to extinguish nature, but to repress it”) (2.40-41); and in *Citizen* no. 11, he maintains the benefit of “indulging [the] appetites” in a controlled environment, “with innocence and safety” (2.51).

Goldsmith is never specific about this regulatory process, though he does see it as an essential, albeit thankless, part of his job as a periodical writer: “How cold a reception must every effort receive that comes thus endeavouring to regulate the passions, in a place [i.e., the periodical] where almost every paragraph tends to excite them” (3.182). Thankfully, his use of the language of conflict when theorizing the passions provides a clue. In “Some Remarks on the Modern Manner of Preaching,” he argues that “we should arm one passion against another; it is with the human mind as in nature, from the mixture of two opposites the result is most frequently neutral tranquility” (3.151-52). In *Citizen* no. 47, Lien Chi elaborates on this theory, arguing that

The soul may be compared to a field of battle, where two armies are ready every moment to encounter; not a single vice but has a more powerful opponent; and not one virtue but may be overborne by a combination of vices. Reason guides the bands of either host, nor can it subdue one passion but by the assistance of another. Thus, as a bark on every side, beset with storms, enjoys a state of rest, so does the mind, when influenced by a just equipoise of the passions, enjoy tranquillity. (2.201)

He is even more explicit in *Citizen* no. 95, writing that “to love, we ought to oppose dissipation, and endeavour to change the object of the affections; to ambition, the happiness of indolence and obscurity; and to avarice, the fear of soon dying” (2.380). At times, it is unclear whether Goldsmith believes the object of opposing one passion to another is the suppression of all passion (viz., mental tranquility) or merely what Phillip Fisher describes as the “blocking” of

vicious passions with virtuous ones (*The Vehement Passions* 33). After all, in *Citizen* no. 47, already cited above, Lien Chi somewhat confusingly insists that “every endeavour of our lives, and all the institutions of philosophy, should tend to this, not to dissemble an absence of passion, but to repel [or block] those which lead to vice, by those which direct to virtue” (2.201). It is also uncertain how Goldsmith envisages this process to occur when it comes to those passions that operate antecedent to reason, and which therefore cannot be preemptively “blocked” or otherwise regulated by the reflective faculty. The point I would like to stress, however, is that Goldsmith saw one of his fundamental responsibilities as a periodicalist to involve teaching readers to pit one passion against another.

Significantly, while Goldsmith seems to have borrowed the idea of deploying one passion against another from popular writings by Haywood, Mandeville, and Hill²²⁰, this notion flew in the face of more formal, systematic theories of the passions. In *The Passions of the Soul*, for example, Descartes had roundly criticized those who “never make their will do battle with its proper weapons, but only with the ones which some passions supply it in order to resist other [passions]” (46). Regardless of how contested this idea may have been, however, it sheds light on Goldsmith’s attempt to facilitate the arousal of calm, short-lived passions through his

²²⁰ Haywood writes in *The Adventures of Natura* that “It is the peculiar providence of Heaven ... that the more ignoble passions of human nature, are, generally speaking, opposites, and by that means serve as a curb to bridle the inordinacy of each other” (169). Mandeville observes in *Fable of the Bees* vol. 2 that “there are many Persons ... who by the Helps mention’d might attain to ... good Qualities and Accomplishments; If they had but Resolution and Perseverance enough, to render every Appetite and every Faculty subservient to that one predominant Passion [pride], which, if continually gratify’d, will always enable them to govern, and if requir’d, to subdue all the rest without Exception” (75). In *Prompter* no. 38, Hill and Popple write that a key “Advantage, in Favour of the Stage, is, that tho’ it applies itself to the Reason, It does it not, primarily, and with a dry Demonstration of what is, and what is not, our Duty; but, thro’ the powerful Mediation of the Passions, governs the Mind, by moving the Heart; and so, playing Pride against Desire, Fear against Ambition; or Shame against Folly; perseveres the Balance of Nature; and makes Reason the Consequence, not the Cause, of our Conviction” (86).

periodical adaptation of the romance genre. Generally speaking, the Hingpo-Zelis narrative functions as a kind of training ground in which readers may learn to deploy particular passions through the active imagination for valuable purposes. More specifically, the figure of Zelis is designed to facilitate the arousal of socially beneficial passions including curiosity (crucial to the advancement of human knowledge) and a moderate degree of pity (equally important in terms of the proper functioning of a Christian society). However dangerous romantic images or pictures may be on their own, therefore, the careful deployment and curating of romantic motifs in *The Citizen* ensured that Goldsmith's periodical played an indispensable part in Enlightenment Britain.

CONCLUSION

The preceding pages have gestured toward the innovative and diverse uses to which the figure of the distressed woman was put by eighteenth-century periodical writers. “Virtue in distress,” a crucial motif in the literature of sensibility, was at the same time both a marketable commodity and a powerful pedagogic tool, capable of educating readers in and through the passions. And yet, the presence of distressed women in mid-century periodicals was complicated by formal constraints and pressing ethical considerations, something frequently overlooked by modern commentators. In her recent article, “‘Full of Pretty Stories’: Fiction in the *Lady’s Magazine*” (2018), for instance, Jenny DiPlacidi works to raise serial fiction in *The Lady’s Magazine* to the level of stand-alone novels by Jane Austen and Ann Radcliffe, effectively eliding the two forms and thus discounting the constraints and peculiarities of the miscellaneous format.²²¹ Readers may have desired sympathetic identification, but the arousal of vehement passions was not always advisable given the character of the periodical consumer, nor was it always possible given the nature of the periodical form. Both factors, I have argued, contributed to the production of a unique type of amatory fiction geared toward eliciting calm passion or no passion at all. They also explain the strategic placement of amatory narratives within the periodicals and the construction of an often extensive framing apparatus for the purposes of questioning, monitoring, or reining in the passions.

In conclusion, I would like to briefly explore the larger significance and applicability of my argument, which has focused on a period of about twenty years in scope. Did periodical

²²¹ To DiPlacidi, “The thematic, stylistic, and tonal complexities of magazine serials are analogous to those of novels printed in volume form; these continuities reveal the instability and permeability of generic and formulaic boundaries” (266).

writers across the long eighteenth century deploy amatory fiction in a similar manner to that of Haywood, Johnson, Smart, Hawkesworth, and Goldsmith? Although the answer to this question would require a study of its own, some partial conclusions may be drawn. Certainly, late-century prescriptions regarding the use of periodical amatory fiction, in particular, were at times directly at odds with mid-century practices, a point illustrated by Vicesimus Knox's *Winter Evenings; or Lucubrations on Life and Letters* (1788). I do not mean to suggest that Knox was representative of late Georgian or early Romantic attitudes toward periodical publication, nor that his pronouncements should be applied to all types of the form. Still, his pseudo-periodical provides a telling contrast to mid-century miscellanies. Knox modelled his one-off collection on earlier essay serials, and in the sixth chapter he reflected on the long history of the periodical essay with an eye to discerning its place in modern British society. Like Oliver Goldsmith and Hugh Kelly, among others, Knox readily admitted the peculiarities of the form, contrasting the "systematical" or regular works of Newton, Locke, and Malebranche with the "short miscellaneous treatises" of the essayists (1.73). Like Samuel Johnson in *The Gentleman's Magazine*, he also pointed to the "ancient example" of miscellaneous publications, and like James Anderson, his contemporary, he stressed their great value in terms of knowledge formation (1.77).²²²

While Knox believed periodical essays to be inherently useful, he suspected that the derivative methods of contemporary practitioners threatened the utility of the form. To Knox, too many late-century periodical writers were imitators rather than innovators. Although his own essays may not have appealed to the public demand for "air balloons," his "few plain remarks on

²²² For more on Knox's belief in the epistemological and/or pedagogic benefits of the miscellaneous form, see Leah Price's *The Anthology and the Rise of the Novel*, particularly pp. 70-77 ("Knox's Scissor-Doings").

men and books” were at least original, if only in terms of presentation, which lent them a degree of relevance (vii-viii). Knox’s emphasis on originality is telling, for it suggests a distinction between types of miscellany: on the one hand, essay serials, which demand originality; on the other hand, anthologies (including his own *Elegant Extracts*) and perhaps even magazines, which do not. Regardless, Knox specified a variety of literary modes that should be jettisoned from modern essay miscellanies, among them “Allegories, Diaries, Eastern Tales, Little Novels, Letters from Correspondents” (1.68). These modes or methods, to Knox, had been used so often that the moral instruction or “salutary cordial” contained in the periodicals, “operates at last like a dose of ipecacuanha” (1.68).²²³ He is very specific about what should replace such hackneyed forms, advocating straight-forward language and an appeal to reason (*logos*) (35):

But though the modes of conveying instruction may lose their estimation by continual recurrence, yet instruction itself can never be depreciated, if it is founded on the solid basis of experience and sound reason; and perhaps the best method of conveying it, is that which is plainly addressed to the understanding, without any contrivance, or laborious attempt at novelty of form, which too often terminates in affectation. (1.69)

Although Knox never refers explicitly to amatory fiction in his discussion of affected literary forms, his emphasis on reason is telling. Implicit is the notion that the passions neither require reformation nor promote it, something that many mid-century periodical writers took for granted. This veiled privileging of *logos* over *pathos* explains both Knox’s critique of “Little Novels” and

²²³ Knox’s medical terminology, in this case, echoes that of James Ralph, who states in a passage already quoted in the introduction that “the sagacious Bookseller feels the Pulse of the Times, and according to the Stroke prescribes; not to cure, but flatter the Disease: As long as the patient continues to swallow, he continues to administer; and on the first Symptom of Nausea, he changes the Dose. Hence the Cessation of all Political Carminatives, and the Introduction of Cantharides, in the Shape of Tales, Novels, Romances, &c” (21).

his earlier claim to promote only “so much diversion *as excludes passion and vice*” (1.6; my emphasis). It also appears to position him in fundamental opposition to earlier mid-century miscellaneous writers.

And yet, however much Knox resists the methods of earlier periodical writers, his interest in subordinating passion to reason in many ways resembles their own efforts to rein in and direct the passions. After all, just as many mid-century periodicalists somewhat paradoxically deploy sentimental narratives to elicit calm passion or no passion at all, Knox similarly urges the restraint of strong feelings (“passion and vice”) in *Winter Evenings*. The means vary, but the end is similar. Despite obvious differences in practice, therefore, mid- and late-century periodical writers—including writers of pseudo-periodicals, such as Knox’s *Winter Evenings*—share a common tendency to work against the arousal of vehement passion or “pathetic vehemence,” to borrow Dryden’s phrase.

The significance of this fact deserves to be stressed. Many valuable studies of the literature of sensibility have already been written, including some charting a change in such literature over time. In *The Poetics of Sensibility* (1996), for example, Jerome McGann posits that “sentimental writing overtakes and subsumes the discourse of sensibility between 1740 and 1840,” the former emphasizing “the mind in the body,” the latter “the body in the mind” (7). However, studies of insensibility, immobility, and unfeeling in the eighteenth century, and of works of literature designed to elicit either a dispassionate or a calm emotional response, are more rare. Critics have only recently begun to recognize the significance of insensibility when it comes to eighteenth-century literature, thanks in part to valuable studies by Wendy Anne Lee. In “The Scandal of Insensibility” (2015), Lee perceptively argues that “theories of motion (emotion

and narrative) are always and only made possible by the appearance of an unfeeling, unmoving being,” and, more generally, that “insensibility come[s...] to incite narrative” (1407). Lee places great emphasis on the eighteenth-century novel in her work on insensibility, especially in *Failures of Feeling: Insensibility and the Novel* (2018), but I have shown that narratives of distressed women in mid-century periodicals are deserving of attention for similar reasons. As I have demonstrated, such narratives frequently feature insensible characters, including the curiously Stoical heroines in Samuel Johnson’s periodicals; in addition, many promote dispassionate reflection (or the arousal of calm, reasonable, balanced feelings) in readers. Like the novels analyzed by Lee, therefore, the periodicals included in this study prompt a re-evaluation of the eighteenth century as the “age of feeling.” More importantly, as my discussion of Knox’s *Winter Evenings* indicates, periodical writers across the long eighteenth century were similarly concerned with promoting insensibility or an absence of strong feelings, suggesting that there is valuable work to be done.

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