

Resisting Liberal Peace: Unpacking the FARC-EP's Documents for La  
Habana Peace Negotiations

**Kiara Mongrut Rosado**

Thesis submitted to the University of Ottawa, in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the Degree of Master of Arts.

Department of Criminology  
Faculty of Social Sciences  
University of Ottawa

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## **Acknowledgements**

This thesis could have not been completed without the love and encouragement of several important people.

I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to my thesis supervisor, Dr. Maritza Felices-Luna for your guidance, expertise and encouragement. Thank you for helping me figure things out, while I was stressed and for challenging my thinking and helping me become a better writer. Without your constant support and patience, I would have never been able to complete this journey.

Next, I want to thank my family for always listening and providing me with love and support to pursue my aspirations.

A special thanks to my friends, especially Camila, Anthony and Elias who listened and encouraged me to keep going. A special shout out to Haileigh and Thana in the MA program, AKA the support system.

Finally, I would like to thank my cat Zelda who was always there when I needed a break.

## Abstract

Peace negotiation is a complex political process used to end a conflict and establish peace. This thesis provides a qualitative analysis of the FARC-EP documents in preparation for the peace negotiations. Using Neocleous concept of pacification and Hannah Arendt's concept of the political, I explored the ways in which the FARC-EP resist liberal peace by re-politicizing the conflict, addressing the sources of the inequalities and injustices generated by and for capitalism, and implying alternative ways of thinking about politics, power, justice and security to transform society.

The analysis revealed that the FARC-EP thinks about peace and conflict resolution as a political process requiring social transformation of deep structural conditions through negotiation and deliberation in order to create a more just society. The FARC-EP conceptualizes peace as a complex political process that must be under local ownership and domestically rooted. In doing so, the FARC-EP addresses the root causes of the conflict by calling for transformative justice, replacing national security with integral security, extending politics beyond representative democracy and demanding equality to end the power imbalances that are so prominent in Colombia.

By negotiating with the Colombian state, the FARC-EP accepts that not all their proposals will be implemented, given that it is in fact a negotiation. As a result, I conclude that peace negotiations can have the opposite effect and pacify political-military organizations in order to protect capitalist order after armed conflict has failed to succeed.

**Keywords:** liberal peace; critical theory; peace and conflict studies; pacification

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## Introduction

Negotiations to transform a state of war or conflict into a state of peace and non-violence is a complex process that includes many diverse actors deliberating on a wide range of political, constitutional and economic issues and values (Pfetsch, 2007). The political negotiations to reach peace agreements represent a unique opportunity to create lasting social and political change by addressing the underlying issues generating conflict and by developing relationships among parties to the conflict. This view is not widely recognized and studied within the peace and conflict literatures.

The scientific literature tends to adopt a peacemaking approach, which aims to solve manifested problems by using international intervention, negotiation outcomes and liberal peacebuilding strategies to produce durable peace agreements. This approach is criticised for its inability to address root causes of conflicts and the narrow ways in which peace, justice and power are thought of (Schmid, 1968; Carroll, 1972). As a result, the peacemaking literature produces liberal peace<sup>1</sup> and protects the status quo. The critical literature on peace negotiation has evolved from a discussion of the failures of intervention and strategies to increase effectiveness to “unpacking the historical and theoretical bases for intervention and power” in peace negotiations (Richmond & Mac Ginty, 2015, p. 278). It proposes an alternative focus on real world issues that have a direct impact on people’s lives by bringing attention to the ‘local turn’<sup>2</sup> and highlighting alternative conceptualizations of justice and power, while emphasizing emancipation and

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<sup>1</sup> Liberal peace promotes peace made possible by liberalism and seeks to protect the social order governed

<sup>2</sup> The ‘local turn’ challenges liberal peace by calling for locally based agencies and actors present within a conflict and post-conflict environment, to create the necessary processes for peace without international intervention. In doing so, the local turn seeks to create more democratic understanding of peace and politics (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013)

empathy (Boulding, 1978; Lederach, 1997; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013; Richmond, 2005). By examining a variety of different armed conflicts that have transitioned from military means to negotiations, the critical literature has shown peace agreements that impose liberal peace often maintain the capitalist economic order, manifest existing inequalities and power structures and often increase the risk of conflict (Sriram, 2008). This has led researchers to study issues of power relations, legitimacy of actors' involved, systemic structures and epistemologies found within liberal peace (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013).

Situated within the critical literature, this research examines how the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP) attempt to challenge and resist the liberal peace put forward by the Colombian State by conducting a qualitative analysis of the documents produced in preparation for the peace negotiations. In particular, I explore how the FARC-EP brought to the negotiation table a different view of peace, which requires re-politicizing the conflict, addressing the sources of the problem and implies a different conceptualization of politics, power, justice and security.

The process undergone to producing this project was not an easy one. When I first started to familiarize myself with the literature, it became apparent that the peacemaking approach provided a very narrow perspective on peace negotiations, leaving me with more questions than answers. The peacemaking approach led me to think of peace negotiations as a bargaining process used to solve conflict and achieve peace; liberal peace. Given that was not satisfied with the simplified and pragmatic understanding of peace negotiations, I turned to the critical approach for further insight. The critical approach rendered explanations to the issues I had with the peacemaking literature. For

instance, I learned that peace negotiations are in fact political and require the careful analysis of the socio-economic and political issues that led to the conflict. Further, it became evident that peace is a complex concept that goes beyond liberal peace; rather peace is in fact political and locally rooted. In the same manner, resistance and conflict were highlighted as political and necessary to end structural violence and achieve an alternative peace. Finally, the critical approach demonstrates through the careful analysis of the implementation of peace agreements that peace negotiations often do not achieve 'peace'; rather liberal peace is achieved to protect the current social order and status quo. By combining these answers, I realized I had an interest in looking at how peace negotiations, are a political tool used to eliminate resistance and protect the liberal order.

Drafting the research question and research goals required a theoretical framework that allowed analyzing the material in a way to contribute to the critical approach. Initially, Neocleous' theory of pacification was selected to analyze the material. However, as I familiarized myself with the material, I realized pacification could not help me address the FARC-EP's proposed transformation in the realm of politics. As a result, I decided to create a conceptual framework by including Arendt's concept of the political in order to explain the FARC-EP's vision of politics and their type of democracy proposed.

Following this introduction, Chapter 1 provides a review of the peacemaking literature and the critical literature. In the first section, I present the peacemaking literature on negotiating actors, conditions needed for successful peace agreements and possible outcomes of negotiations. Second, I explore the critical literature and its critique of the peacemaking literature, whilst emphasizing conflict resolution as political and

providing alternative solutions. Third, I compare and contrast the critical and peacemaking position on the conceptualization of peace, justice and power. This will allow the reader to understand the liberal peace put forward by the peacemaking literature as opposed to the ‘critical peace’ proposed by the critical literature. In other words, the goal of this chapter is to highlight what liberal peace consists of, the critiques and alternatives proposed by the critical literature. Finally, a short presentation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP) will be provided to better understand the thesis.

In chapter 2, I outline the conceptual framework, which is divided into three sections. In the first section, I describe Mark Neocleous’ concept of pacification and how it operates to protect capital accumulation and liberal peace through war power, law and security. The second section describes Hannah Arendt’s concept of the political and its alternative conceptualizations of politics, violence, power and resistance that seek to challenge liberal peace. Finally, the third section discusses how both concepts are coherent and complement each other by providing a more holistic picture of the limitations of liberal peace.

In Chapter 3, I describe the methodological approach used to conduct this research. I begin by situating this research within the critical paradigm. Then, I provide a brief outline of the research question and research goals that guide this research. This is followed by a discussion on documentary analysis and how I specifically went about collecting the material. Next, I provide a description of the analytical strategy used to study the material and the specific steps taken to conduct the thematic analysis. The last section of this chapter explains the shortcomings of the research.

Chapter 4 presents the results and analysis divided into four sections. In the first section, I describe how the FARC-EP conceptualizes an alternative peace to challenge and resist liberal peace. The second section explains the FARC-EP's call to re-politicize the conflict as means to overcome its de-politicization. The third section addresses the problems experienced by Colombian society and the changes proposed for implementation. Finally, the fourth section provides a discussion of how through these elements, the FARC-EP produces an alternative view of politics, power, justice and security to achieve 'real' peace.

In the conclusion, I provide some closing remarks regarding the findings. This is followed by a brief discussion on potential ideas for future research.

## Chapter 1: Literature review

Conflict studies commenced after the Second World War during the height of the McCarthy era in the 1950s, where the political atmosphere and fear of communism influenced the emerging field (Kelman, 2016). The majority of scholarly works devoted their attention to the causes of war and limited their focus to developing knowledge on how to create the proper conditions for peace agreements. This narrow focus led to some internal tensions within the movement. Peacemaking literature emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union and strove to resolve the increase in armed conflicts using a problem-solving approach. This approach was heavily criticised for ignoring the root cause of the conflict by an emerging critical literature.

Currently, there are two trends within the peace and conflict studies literature: problem-solving approach (PSA) and the critical approach. The PSA protects the liberal order and seeks to solve conflicts undermining the status quo by identifying factors and developing strategies that lead to the successful resolution of conflict (Cox, 1981; Jackson, 2008; Mac Ginty, 2006). This approach is driven by an apolitical and positivist orientation to apply particular forms of scientific knowledge to the promotion of peace by establishing causal mechanisms through the use of empirical studies (Gleditsch et al. 2014; Julia et al., 2008). In contrast, the critical approach aims to go beyond problem-solving and uncover the interests behind the dominant understanding of the social order by analyzing the histories and interrelationships of social and political institutions, and the operation of power across formal “institutional” boundaries (Cox, 1981; Short, 2007). Furthermore, the critical orientation is guided by qualitative techniques, which serve to investigate social structures and conceptualize diverse concepts such as peace, conflict

and violence that the PSA often appears to take for granted (Jackson, 2008). Fundamentally, the critical stance views conflict as political and is devoted to examining how the status quo is the source of the conflict the PSA seeks to solve (Schmid, 1968; Carroll, 1972).

This literature review will first present an in-depth overview of the key elements of the problem-solving approach regarding strategies, identified causes and factors that lead to successful peace agreements and protect liberal peace. The second section provides a detailed description of the critical approach by highlighting its critiques of the problem-solving orientation and by showcasing how it approaches conflict resolution. In the third section, I describe how each approach conceptualises peace, justice and power. The last section provides a brief description of the FARC-EP's ideology and history to facilitate understanding of the thesis. Through this literature review, the aim is to understand liberal peace with critiques and limitations, while demonstrating the alternatives proposed by the critical perspective.

### **1.1. Peacemaking Literature**

Using the problem-solving approach (PSA), the peacemaking literature seeks to eliminate existing armed conflict through alternative solutions such as peace accords and repair damage to political, social and economic institutions through liberal peace building methods (Gormley-Heenan, 2006). Positivist methods are the preferred technique for this approach. It is important to highlight this type of research claims to take an apolitical stance and an objective perspective to come to the right solution. In other words, the emphasis of this type of research is to discover the causes of conflict and to identify the conditions necessary to generate peace agreements and win-win outcomes. In this section,

the problem-solving strategies used to solve armed conflict will be briefly explored before focusing on what the literature says about peace processes.

There are three problem-solving strategies used to solve armed conflict: formal sanctions, humanitarian aid and military intervention. In most instances, the three strategies are used in combination, as opposed to independently from each other. Formal sanctions are typically imposed in cases when a country or regime are violating human rights, waging war or endangering international peace and security. The imposed sanction usually varies by country and situation. For instance, sanctions can include an arms embargo of weapons, restrictions on loans and credits or embargoes in the import/export of certain goods. The purpose is to use stigmatization or coercive pressure to limit opportunities for undesirable behaviour and also to deter other countries from choosing an adverse course of action (La Rosa & Wuerzner, 2007). For the sanction to be lifted, the country must meet the conditions stated in the mechanism of the sanction.

International organizations or foreign governments also use humanitarian aid and/or military intervention as an instrument to end conflict. Humanitarian aid seeks to save lives, alleviate suffering and provide short-term relief to victims by providing basic needs until government and other institutions can provide long-term relief (Griffiths & Barnes, 2008; Chaulia, 2011; Beswick & Jackson, 2014). Similarly, the use of military force often occurs under the banner of peace to protect, defend, or rescue other people from gross human rights (HR) abuse attributable to their own government. Foreign-armed interventions can occur without the consent of the offending government and are often utilized as a tool of coercion or as an implied threat to impose a settlement between conflict parties (Seybolt, 2007; Lang Jr., 2012). In most cases, however, foreign military

intervention intensifies the violence, leading to more widespread-armed struggle often for a longer period of time (Layne, 2000). Consequently, foreign military intervention can have devastating humanitarian consequences as it increases the risk of destruction and casualties to civilians and/or troops. In short, humanitarian/military intervention requires direct involvement in the armed conflict, either through providing humanitarian aid for victims or military force to end the conflict.

Peace process is recognized by the PSA as the alternative solution to achieve peace through dialogue. Scholars agree that peace process includes several steps and phases needed to “exchange war for peace” (Sisk, 2001; Saunders, 2001; Ball, 2001). This large political process involves a series of mediated agreements through a combination of politics, diplomacy and negotiations in both official and unofficial arenas (Saunders, 2001, p. 483). Despite many variations, the peace process usually includes the following stages: pre-negotiations, negotiations/dialogue, post-agreement negotiations or implementation (Darby & Mac Ginty, 2003; Ohlson, 1998; Höglund, 2008). Beginning with pre-negotiations, this phase involves the parties making contact to “break the ice” and ultimately determine the rules and sequence of the negotiations. Negotiations pertain to dialogue and discussion of the central issues in the dispute in order to arrive to an agreement. For instance, academics suggest that peace negotiations involve the discussion of substantive agenda items such as decommissioning of arms, security of armed groups, territory and political participation (Azar & Webb, 1991; Kelman, 2015). Lastly, the post-agreement negotiation requires the parties to implement what was agreed upon in the accord. This is often known in the literature as ‘peacebuilding’ (Hoglund, 2008, Srinivasan, 2008). Peacebuilding involves a range of measures used to achieve the

objectives set out in the agreement as a means to prevent a relapse in the conflict and to promote liberal peace (Darby & Mac Ginty, 2003). In sum, actors stabilize the existing disorder through external intervention to construct liberal peace and neo-liberal development as quickly and as efficiently as possible (Richmond, 2000).

Negotiations are thought of as a forum for antagonists to reach a mutual settlement without further use of violence (Loughlin, 2008). The negotiation process involves the deliberation of divergent political interests and values and the agreements reached can have consequences at the human, political and socio-economic levels, if not negotiated to benefit the collective (Hoglund, 2008; Pfestch, 2007). Negotiations are a dynamic bargaining process taking place between warring parties, involving and characterized by constant change, activity or progress (Aggestam & Jonsoon, 1997; Pillar, 1983). Peacemaking literature studies the negotiating actors that should be included and excluded in peace negotiations, the factors required for successful peace agreements and the possible negotiating outcomes.

### **1.1.1. Negotiating actors**

The question of who should be part of the negotiation process has always been an important one. It is understood that representatives should negotiate on behalf of the warring parties. This usually involves a representative of the state and a spokesperson of the armed groups. However, the dilemma lies on whether civil society such as civilians who have been directly affected by the conflict should be involved, as well as, whether external third parties should form part of the process. The next section will describe the differences between bilateral and multilateral negotiations, followed by the inclusion and

exclusion of third parties and of civil society. More specifically, I will present the advantages and disadvantages of their involvement brought forth by the literature.

#### ***1.1.1.1. Warring parties***

Internal conflicts usually involve two or more warring parties. Negotiations can be bilateral (state plus one warring party) or multilateral (state and warring party (ies) +civil society) (Pfetsch, 2007). The negotiations may be done in secrecy with only the representatives of the parties knowing about the meeting or the public may be informed that negotiations are taking place. Those who support bilateral negotiations do so because peace agreements can be negotiated more efficiently. However, there is a risk that civil society may not recognize the agreement as completely effective (Zanker, 2014). Due to this risk, negotiations can lead to partial agreements only supported by the warring parties. The risk can further create spoilers who attempt to end the negotiations and/or implementation phase by mobilizing and/or using violence (Hosli & Hoekstra, 2013). As a result, partial agreements sometimes fail to give the population the stability and security it seeks.

Multilateral negotiations include multiple parties concerning several issues from different perspectives. To be part of these negotiations, the parties must be willing to enter negotiations with an open mind to reach a settlement (Mac Ginty, 2006). Typically, multilateral members include various states, more than one-armed group and civil society. The literature suggests that “conflicting parties fear they may be excluded from negotiations on a potential settlement and with this, are more ready to engage in the bargaining process” (Hosli & Hoekstra, 2013, p.123). This form of negotiations are said to be more difficult to carry out due to their complexity and scale, as it is difficult for

parties to achieve a consensus (Nilsson, 2010). Nonetheless, when a multilateral agreement is achieved, it receives more support from the community and provides more stability and security.

#### ***1.1.1.2. Third-party involvement***

According to the peacemaking literature, there is a high correlation between third party participation and peace negotiation success rates, while the inability to properly move forward in the peace process has often been suggested to be the effect of the absence of third party involvement (Armengol, 2013; Höglund 2008; Mac Ginty, 2006). This is further validated by the high number of third party participation in peace negotiations in the last few decades such as in the case of Northern Ireland with the IRA, Israel-Palestine and El Salvador with the FMLN. In this section, I will briefly identify the different roles undertaken by third parties and the potential problems of having external third parties in peace negotiations.

It is argued that third parties are an essential component to achieve a successful peace agreement (Fisher, 2001; Armengol, 2013). Third parties acting as guarantors and offering security assurances to intervene as part of the negotiated settlement is considered to be one of the factors that will lead to a more stable peace (Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothchild, 2001). The effect of the promise is to reassure weaker parties that negotiating parties have good faith and are committed to the agreement. Typically, third parties can also act as facilitators to guide the discussion, providing advice and ensure that all parties maintain control of the negotiation process. Other scholars claim that facilitators should possess bargaining power and military/economic resources to not only to bring an initial settlement, but also to keep the parties in line with the agreement (Pfetsch, 2007; Fisher,

2001; Touval & Zartman 1989). However, some scholars argue that third parties need to be sensitive to their pervasive effects, as lack of cultural sensitivity can cause negotiation barriers or failed implementation, consequently furthering violence (Johnston & Dagne, 1997; Regan 2002b). Facilitators should strive to understand their intervention as actions with the potential to contribute either to the maintenance or transformation of the existing social system (Fisher, 2001).

Even though numerous authors have extensively supported third party participation and rendered it a vital element to achieving successful peace agreements, some academics highlight their shortcomings. Scholars have demonstrated that previous successful peace negotiations have had high level to little or no third party involvement, and thus they are not crucial to success (Höglund, 2008; Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothchild, 2001). For instance, Höglund's research compares the central role the 'Group of Friends' played in the Guatemalan conflict to the South African conflict. Despite South Africa developing its own democratic transition, the results were almost identical to that of Guatemala. The findings suggest that international actors should make a case-by-case analysis to assess the most appropriate strategy to be used in negotiations (Höglund, 2008). In turn, some scholars question the legitimacy of external third parties. The contribution of international actors to secure peace is not denied, however, there is a tendency for accords to reflect external rather than internal concerns (Mac Ginty, 2006). In other words, local priorities may be subordinated to international concern to promote liberal peace. Thus, it is proposed for peace negotiations to be under local ownership (Reilly, 2009; Stokke, 2012). In short, a consensus is shared whereby peace negotiations

are more likely to achieve success if third parties act as ‘servants rather than masters of the peace’ (Mac Ginty, 2006, p.188).

### ***1.1.1.3. Inclusion versus exclusion of civil society***

The relationship between the state and civil society is argued to be an organic one. Political elites need civil society groups to gain public support for their policies, while civil society groups are dependent on the state to provide some order among the competing interests of the various civil society groups. The peacemaking literature thinks of civil society as a vast number of public-oriented associations that are not part of government institutions (Wanis-St & Kew, 2008) such as: community associations, religious institutions, human rights groups, and business associations, among others. In this context, civil society is “the middle sphere” between the state and the individual, whereby persons who share the same perspective become a collective to promote their concern toward the state (Wanis-St & Kew, 2008 p. 15; Cohen & Arato, 1992). Civil society is typically seen as a vital actor in the negotiation process. However, when it comes to reaching an agreement during peace negotiations, the debate focuses on the question of including or excluding civil society. Currently, there is an emerging consensus on the inclusion of civil society, as it makes the peace process more durable and democratic (Paffenholz, 2014). Some scholars argue that peace negotiations should include civil society, as it enhances the legitimacy of peace negotiations by obtaining greater public support and consequently contributing to sustainable peace (Barnes 2002; Belloni, 2008; Donais, 2009).

Zanker (2014) adds that including civil society at the negotiation table is not enough. Rather, it depends on the type of impact civil society has in addressing major

issues and concerns within the negotiation table that are not those of the warring parties. Wanis –St & Kew (2008) makes reference to the Rwanda case and the Israel-Palestine case, whereby negotiations were strongly characterized by the exclusion of civil society, based on the assumption that spoilers would impede the agreement if included. Fundamentally, the concern is to find a way to contain or engage spoilers sufficiently enough to prevent breakthroughs, while still inviting the participation of civil society. The literature has not yet found a specific consensus on the degree of inclusion and exclusion to maximize efficiency and produce a successful agreement.

### **1.1.2. Factors for successful peace agreements**

One of the main themes in the literature is to determine the conditions that facilitate progress and develop durable settlements. Scholars have identified a variety of incentives and technical factors that influence the dynamics of the negotiation process. I will identify potential problems including: spoilers, limitation of violence and minimum trust. Following these problems, I will refer to some mechanisms highlighted as necessary to produce peace agreements such as: identifying the ripe moment, the use of secrecy when conducting negotiations, technical factors and direction of negotiations.

Spoilers can be found within and outside the negotiation table and their objective is to utilize violence to prevent achieving a successful agreement (Stedman, 1997; Guelke, 2003; Darby & Mac Ginty, 2003). This often occurs because spoilers believe that peace emerging from negotiations threaten their power, world-view and interests, and consequently use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it (Darby & Mac Ginty, 2003). The warring parties can also use violence as a lever and a bargaining tactic to accompany negotiations. Violence becomes a source of contention between parties, and

feeds resistance towards accommodation and reconciliation with the enemy (Hoglund, 2008). As a result, negotiations often involve fear and suspicion that engagement in negotiations is tactical and used to extract benefits while evading disadvantages (Guelke, 2003; Zartman, 1978). This shared mistrust makes the parties hesitant to take the negotiations seriously and accept each other's conditions. Some authors argue that trust in the ability of the negotiations to reach a satisfactory settlement is most important, while others argue 'minimum trust' is a necessary precondition for any progress toward any solution (Mitchell, 2000, p. 65; Lewicki 2006; Loughlin, 2008).

For the negotiation process to begin, some academics argue that commitment to peace is necessary to create the right climate for negotiations and to seek a negotiated settlement (Hoglund, 2008; Wagner, 1995). Other scholars suggest that parties seek settlement not out of a desire for peace, but because military and political conditions compel them to end the armed conflict (Stedman, 1996; Loughlin, 2008). In either case, the literature agrees on one necessary condition: identifying the ripe moment to start negotiations (Zartman, 1995; Guelke, 2003, Albin & Druckman, 2012). This concept centres on the parties' perception of a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS). That is, when an alternative or unilateral means of achieving results are blocked and consequently neither side can defeat each other. Some scholars and senior practitioners argue that deadlines can help generate positive momentum, reduce inaction, induce concessions and maximize efficacy in the negotiation process (Zartman & Berman, 1982; Bebachick, 2002). Opponents suggest a deadline can act as a "double-edged sword", as it runs the risk of backfiring by reducing the quality of the output and consequently leading to the failure of the negotiation (O'Connor & McCusker, 1993; Ikle, 1964, p. 72). Other players

propose reducing the number of negotiators and using secret negotiations. For instance, including the main parties involved and the use of secrecy will lower the number of potential spoilers and maximize efficiency by arriving at a mutual agreement as quickly as possible (Fjelde & Hoglund, 2011). On the other hand, opponents argue that secrecy and exclusion becomes progressively less helpful when popular support is critical for the acceptance of the agreement (Wanis-St & Kew, 2008).

Technical factors are also identified as affecting the durability of peace. Measures such as detailed negotiation agendas, demobilization, creation of demilitarized zones, formal cease-fire agreements and peacekeeping help foster trust between the warring parties and more durable peace (Fortna, 2002; Hartzell, Hoodie & Rothchild, 2001). Zartman (2005) proposes that negotiations can be focused in two directions, which can facilitate or hinder the negotiation process. The backward-looking approach seeks to end previous violence while seeking accountability for past actions. In contrast, forward-looking negotiations aim to “prevent the resurgence of the old conflict by resolving its underlying causes through means of cooperation and problem solving” (Zartman, 2005, p.3). These two directions are interconnected. Measures for past accountability may increase the chances of future cooperation by accepting responsibility of human rights abuses, but it can also threaten future peace if the measure is imposed and the parties responsible refuse to be held accountable (Pfetsch, 2007).

### **1.1.3. Outcomes to look for**

Having discussed the actors and factors that produce a durable settlement, it is important to understand the potential outcomes of peace negotiation, as it facilitates effective negotiation (Pfetsch, 2008). The peacemaking literature describes different

negotiation models with respective strategies used to reach the best possible negotiation outcome. Some scholars suggest that most durable settlements are likely to be those that concern states in which the previous stable regime was a democracy (Hartzell & Hoodie, 2001). More importantly, for the PSA, a successful outcome is produced when it maintains or reproduces liberal peace.

The peacemaking literature indicates positive-sum (integrative) and zero-sum (distributive) are negotiation outcomes (Pfetsch, 2007). A positive-sum outcome refers to a non-coercive solution derived through a process of analytic problem-solving, cooperation and a high degree of trust between the warring parties (Watson & Hoffman, 1992). In contrast, the zero-sum model indicates that coercion is an integral part of the negotiation process, as one party advances its position and achieves their desired outcome, while the other party is at loss (Guelke, 2003; Darby & Mac Ginty, 2003). Some scholars have proposed that the backward-looking and forward-looking approach are related to zero-sum and positive-sum outcomes (Ikle, 1964; Schelling, 1980; Zartman, 1978; Wagner, 1995). Zero-sum and the backward-looking approach typically focus on compromising outcomes, defense of positions and disbelief in long-term cooperation, often leading to new conflict or increasing the risk of re-starting the conflict (Wagner, 1995). The forward-looking approach and positive-sum outcome emphasize intraparty satisfactions and the construction of long-term cooperation (Zartman & Kremenyuk, 2005).

The peacemaking literature favours power-sharing as a positive outcome, since it leads to more durable peace (Walter, 2002). Power-sharing strategies contain four dimensions: economic (post-conflict distribution of wealth and resources), political

representation (guaranteeing political participation), security (disarmament and demobilization) and territorial autonomy (provide territory to exercise autonomy). The aim is to balance power among groups by effectively sharing power in such a way that it makes it exceedingly difficult to threaten that balance (Mac Ginty, 2006). The literature concludes that the more dimensions of power-sharing specified in peace accords, the higher the likelihood that peace will endure, as the dimensions reinforce each other and offer a strong commitment to peace (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Lijphart, 1977).

Political systems with proportional representation from all parties are more peaceful as it reduces the likelihood of rebellion (Reynal-Querol, 2002). Other scholars determined that long-term inclusion and participation of former rebel groups in the political process has an important impact on the likelihood of post-settlement peace and reduces the possibility of recurring conflict like in the case of Spain and Northern Ireland (Stedman, 1997; Marshall, 2016; Manning, 2004). In turn, the literature demonstrates that formalizing power balance in a negotiated settlement is more likely to bring about more democratic politics, as it offers all relevant groups a stake in the system. However, there are limitations to power-sharing. Recent research suggests that power sharing is at best ineffective and likely to clash with attempts to meaningfully deal with truth, accountability and past abuses by awarding parties with resources, political participation or sovereignty (Vandeginste & Sriram, 2011, Roeder & Rothchild, 2005). The authors argue that tension between these two paradigms give rise to important challenges to policy makers, while furthering the tension between peace and justice.

Having explored peacemaking literature, the critical literature will now be examined in order to understand the differing positions within the debates of peace, justice and power.

## **1.2. Critical Approach**

Members of academia saw problems with the peacemaking literature based on the failure to consider the structural roots of the conflict. Consequently, a different approach to conflict resolution emerged that looked at power relationships and socio-political institutions in a critical manner. This section presents a brief overview of the critical approach and explore their critique of the peacemaking literature. Following this, I examine why the critical literature deems conflict resolution as political, while presenting alternatives to liberal peace: local society as leading actors, showing the repercussion of politics of naming within conflict and peace negotiations, and highlighting previous peace accords whereby liberal peace and the PSA failed. Finally, I explore the negotiation outcomes necessary to address the root causes of the conflict.

The critical perspective examines the social and political conditions of the conflict in order to uncover the hidden structures of the social order, which are neglected and consequently maintained by the PSA (Cox, 1981; Short, 2007). Short (2007) explains that whereas problem-solving theories take social and political institutions as a 'given', critical theories seek to analyze the histories and interrelationships of social and political institutions. This entails understanding the historical construction of power and how power relationships become naturalized or obscured (Short, 2007, p. 4). For the critical approach, it is necessary to reflect on concepts like peace, justice and conflict, which are often left under-conceptualized by the PSA, but said to be the goal of conflict resolution

(Carroll, 1972, Jackson 2008). Fundamentally, the critical approach is committed to probing how the status quo is involved in the very problems the problem-solving perspective seeks to solve (Schmid, 1968; Carroll 1972).

Herman Schmid, a well renowned critical peace scholar, is one of the first to challenge the general orientation of the PSA. Schmid (1968) argues the PSA supports the existing social order, given that its supporters neglect questioning the roots of conflict, while insisting to cooperate with decision-makers to resolve conflict. This is illustrated in the heavy emphasis on conflict resolution and in the tendency to reduce conflict regardless of the actual impact of peacemaking. In other words, the PSA aims to protect and maintain the liberal order, while ignoring the instability and social divisions that can be intensified by peacemaking methods (1968). Other academics have supported Schmid's claim and argued the problem-solving approach's sole purpose is to simply 'solve' the problems of conflict or the 'trouble' which appear to challenge the status quo (Cox, 1981; Jackson, 2008; Mac Ginty, 2006).

Critical scholars have identified the dominance of the positivist orientation within the peacemaking literature as narrow and lacking sustained reflection. Problem-solving theories legitimize the positivist social scientific paradigm as the 'dominant and normal science' within the field (Gleditsch et al. 2014; Jutila et al., 2008). This is of concern since these conditions result in a failure to reflect meta-theoretical issues or questions of epistemology and ontology that are central to the field, such as the conceptualization of peace and violence (Jackson, 2008). More generally, the literature has cut itself off from wider debates of social and political theory and developed a general lack of reflexivity with the field. Schmid (1968) further adds that the PSA and its condition of stability is a

biased view not scientifically justified. This is because, conflict is a necessary pre-condition for the kind of revolutionary change required to end structural violence and move towards an alternative peace (Schmid, 1968). Thus, the problem-solving perspective is value-bound as it favours the status quo and its institutions with its inherent structures of power and domination (Short, 2007; Jackson, 2008). Schmid's call for a critical turn proposes that social researchers ask probing questions and utilize scepticism towards accepted knowledge claims and dominant ideas.

### **1.2.1. Conflict resolution is political**

For the critical perspective, the source of the conflict is political and therefore the solution and the way in which the solution is obtained is political and should take into account politics. This perspective involves three criteria: civil society as leading actors, the naming of the parties and of the conflict, and the content of the negotiation.

#### ***1.2.1.1. Local society as leading actors***

The critical perspective emphasizes the leading role of civil society, local communities and local actors in peace negotiations. This perspective proposes building “peace from below” as opposed to using a ‘top-down’, Western, external intervention. In this context, international actors should provide a space for sustainable peace to be locally produced and rooted (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015; p.831; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013) The critical approach emphasizes the inclusion of local understandings of peace and a critique of what has been done so far in peace negotiations. This local turn has put an emphasis on ‘the local’ in terms of the local context, local capacity, local ownership and local agency.

Local capacity refers to the ability of local society to be fully engaged in all phases of planning and implementation of the peace process. For this to occur, local capacity must be promoted and placed at the center, given a leadership role, and respect its expertise and commitment to peace (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015; Rupesinghe, 1995; Fetherston, 1998). The critical perspective argues local ownership should be understood as a concept based on the capacity of local societies to create their own social institutions and make their own decisions in the future. From this perspective, the local refers to the everyday acts of a diversity of individuals and communities that go beyond elites and civil society and into networks and relationships (Donais, 2012). In other words, peacebuilding is a project that is continuously changing through encounters with local agencies (Mac Ginty, 2011; Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015).

This emancipatory approach further suggests the notion of local agency as crucial to the peace process. Scholars adhering to this approach highlight the need to criticize international peacebuilding agendas for imposing their liberal-democratic-product, which local actors are expected to buy and consequently own (Donais, 2012; Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015). For peace consolidation to be sustainable, it has to be the result of a home-grown, bottom-up and context-specific process. Peace must be formed according to local understandings of legitimacy, identity and institutions, while external organizations provide external guarantees and resources.

Critical scholars denounce the peacemaking approach as problematic, given its focus on the manifestation of conflict, with its commodification of liberal peace into pre-packaged templates ready to be implemented to solve conflict situations. Mac Ginty (2006) explains that the liberal order is a social construct, which has the political and

economic power to name and shape the conceptualization of peace. Consequently, liberal peace is accepted as the norm, while alternative versions of peace are regarded as less appropriate.

#### ***1.2.1.2. Naming of the Parties and of the Conflict***

Poynting & Whyte (2008) have called to bring politics back into the study of peace and conflict. Peace negotiations involve wider and more political contestations, which will set in motion new political dynamics ultimately impacting peacebuilding (Srinivasan, 2014). The institution of the negotiating table itself frames the bargaining of what peace and the conflict might mean and what it will be known as, once the agreement has been signed. Further, negotiations are bound by certain directives that are closely connected with national and economic interests and thus are part of a certain political culture (Pfetsch, 2007). Poynting & Whyte (2008) argue “political violence perpetrated by both state and non-state actors is always deeply political, yet their construction in popular discourse is not” (p.3). Politics and violent struggle tend to be kept apart in the discussion, while the struggle is portrayed as irrational and those involved as criminal or greedy. Consequently, this portrayal blinds individuals to the politics of those struggles and that the violence may be a response to the political conditions and the social order.

It is further suggested that greater attention should be paid to the discursive battlefield of peace negotiations in determining the political significance of the framing of the conflict, peace and the concerns raised (Srinivasan, 2014). From this perspective, peace and conflict are often de-politicized to preserve the social order and produce liberal peace. For the critical approach, it is vital to acknowledge that conflict and peace are political in nature and thus, must be resolved through the use of politics and be under

local ownership. As a result, peace negotiations should be analyzed within its wider politics.

There are several critical scholars who show how naming and discourse are immediately relevant to conflict resolution and peace negotiations. Naming often occurs when there is a need to delegitimize internal opponents prior to military intervention, in order to stigmatize and exclude local methods to deal with the conflict (Bhatia, 2005). Typically, names and discourses are viewed as objective representations of fact. According to Parsons (2000), the assigned name may reflect essential characters, however, some complex aspects of character such as purpose and histories fail to be included. For instance, once an attack has been classified as criminal or terrorist in nature, the term becomes a habit to describe the group itself and all the acts the group engages in even when they attack military targets or when only a few engage in acts of terrorism.

Scholars like Parsons are sometimes identified as ‘terrorist-sympathising’ academics, as they propose left-leaning nature, and make no distinction between right and wrong actions (Bhatia, 2005). Bhatia argues this largely occurred during the post-9/11 landscape whereby the “desire to inform any attempts to move beyond condemnation are proposed as being a result of confusion or betraying an absence of morality” (2005, p.13). In other words, once a “terror” attack occurs, it becomes a matter of pure “evil”, with no history or reason and any other discourse is denounced as transgressive (2005). Furthermore, many scholars discourage critique of military intervention in the name of democracy and freedom. The objective of critical scholars, however, is to utilize a holistic approach by showing the bigger picture of the conflict. Discourse is a tool of government and reflects dominant ideologies that serve to recruit supporters and justify

actions by labelling the group as the ‘criminals’, ‘terrorists’ or ‘insurgents’ (Askew, 2010). The labelling of the revolutionary movement then removes the political core of its actions and places it in a stage of lawlessness and as illegitimate actors (Toomey & Singleton, 2014; Hulsse & Spencer, 2008).

The politics of naming can have negative repercussions on peace negotiations. Askew (2010) argues the label ‘terrorist’ has denied the LTTE international legitimacy and undermined the organization’s political project of Tamil self-determination and autonomy. Further, the label undermines the negotiation process by limiting the neutrality of third parties and restricting the LTTE’s access to knowledge regarding constitutional rights and amendments even though a reformulation of a new constitution is needed to resolve the conflict (Nadararajh & Sriskandarajah, 2005). Others argue that including the LTTE in the US list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations compelled them to enter the peace negotiations. After a brief period of negotiations and the repeated failure of inclusion incentives; however, the LTTE pulled out of the negotiations indefinitely (Guelke, 2003).

#### ***1.2.1.3. Content of Negotiations***

The critical literature argues many contemporary accords focus on conflict manifestations rather than causes. This focus often leads to the failure to include essential conditions in the accord, consequently reinforcing rather than challenging intergroup division. The problems that were neglected during the negotiation process are then transferred to the post-negotiation phase, where parties often find loopholes in the language of the agreement or use the legal or political system to avoid or delay implementation. During this process, the needs of the armed groups are considered, while the needs of the less vocal, but more vulnerable groups in society are often neglected

(Mac Ginty, 2006, p.5; Belloni, 2012). As a result, more peace accords have been signed; however, the structural problems are not addressed, often leading to poor quality of peace and failed implementation. For instance, Sriram (2008) does not support the so-called liberal peacebuilding consensus and its presumption of the ideal outcome of peacebuilding after armed conflict to be a liberal, capitalist state. The author argues that many cases have shown democratization and marketization to be destabilizing. It is further suggested that liberal peace and its power-sharing incentives can often reify existing cleavages in societies and increase rather than decrease risk in conflict (2008). The author analyses the Sudan case and concludes that although the power-sharing incentives sufficed to bring armed groups into an agreement, implementation was stalled either due to corruption or lack of will. As a result, the conflict over control has simply been “imported into existing and new institutional structures, and has the potential to generate further conflict” (Sriram, 2008, p.142).

Another example is the Guatemalan Peace Accord with its 17 agreements in 8 years. The socio-economic agreement is of most interest as it demonstrates the divergent positions on socio-economic reform. The URNG guerrilla leaders and the assembly pursued major reform on the redistribution of wealth to decrease poverty of disadvantaged groups (Murga, 1996). In contrast, the government and the assembly of business rejected land ownership reform and sought access to international finance for more investment on security and privatization. In the final agreement, there is a broad affirmation to help overcome social inequality and promote the quality of all groups, especially women. However, major issues related to land redistribution and limiting privatization were not incorporated. Further, the Peace Accord did not mitigate the

extreme levels of violence and has since disappeared from political discourse. Short (2007) argues that although the peace process included the broad participation of civil society and international support, it did not overcome the pre-existing social power inequities in Guatemala. Rather, the peace process preserved elite power and cultivated the appearance of broad popular consent through ‘participation’ in ‘openly contested’ negotiations (Short, 2007).

The final example is the Comprehensive Peace Accord that came into force in Nepal 2006. The leaders of the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (UCN) and the Government of Nepal signed this agreement to put an end to the ten-year Nepalese Civil war. The Accord comprises several political, economic and social changes in the country; however, many of them have not been implemented. In the negotiation agenda, the UCN demand land under control of the feudal system and owned by elite classes to be confiscated and nationalized. The peace agreement obligated the left-wing group to return the land to its owners and articulated a commitment to land reform. Despite this agreement, efforts to formulate land policies and make arrangements for landless people have been stalled and largely unimplemented. According to Adhikari (2011), many of the landowners continue to remain well represented in the bureaucracy and political parties.

Land reform is a sensitive issue that is directly linked with the power structure of important families and power interests. Thus, even though several land commissions have developed land reform plans, there is no political commitment to change. Similarly to the demand of land reform, the pledge to end discrimination of marginalized groups and give more power to their communities continues to be deeply contested and power continues to rest among traditional elites (Adhikari, 2011). As a result, even though a peace process

was successful and an agreement had been signed, the process of implementation was slow. It failed to meet the needs of the marginalized groups and victims of the conflict while the powerful groups continue to benefit.

Based on the cases presented in the literature review, the critical perspective suggests looking beyond individual cases and viewing peace-support interventions as part of wider historical processes linked to power. Furthermore, the critical literature calls to examine the commonalities between cases, particularly the issues of power and systemic structure that connect them (Richmond & Mac Ginty, 2015; Chandler, 2009; Mac Ginty, 2011). For instance, scholars have found commonalities evident in policy documents from the UN, International Financial Institutions, INGO's and regional organizations (Richmond & Mitchell, 2011). These official documents assume international intervention should focus on liberal constitutions, democracy, separations of power, rule of law and neoliberal development, among others. Alternative forms of peace are automatically disallowed, as well as the serious or active participation of local actors to shape peace or redress historical justice. Consequently, liberal peace is a subtle form of control in which, any act to bring peace must be constructed as maintaining a social order in favour of Western assumptions, norms and political and socio- economic systems.

### **1.2.2. Outcomes to look for**

The discussion of peacebuilding outcomes is not widely studied by critical scholars; however, the possibility of achieving peaceful outcomes lies on the capacity and agency of local society and critical local agencies to shape the outcome. Peaceful outcomes are only possible when they are rooted in local legitimacy, representative of local culture, needs, and perspectives and emerges as a result of political (non-violent)

struggle (Richmond 2011, Visoka, 2016). Critical scholars emphasize the importance of justice, equality, welfare and politics over institutional governmentality (Visoka, 2016).

For the critical perspective, the ideal outcome is not a liberal capitalist state. Rather, key outcomes must focus on contextual processes and must be determined by everyday peace indicators. For instance, conditions to look for include the balance of political power among the various groups within a society, regions, territories; legitimacy for decision makers and implementers of decisions in the eyes of their respective groups; establishing equality, respect, and human rights, in sentiment and practice; eliminating injustice and socio-economic inequality (Bobichand, 2012). Another outcome involves land reform or land redistribution and the limiting of privatization. Numerous groups have cited these specific outcomes as desired results, but they are almost never realized often leading to more violence and injustice. As a result, outcomes to look for are not techniques that simply avoid conflict or remove manifested conflict, but rather overcome the structural roots of the conflict and respond to the needs of local communities (Schmit, 1968; Carroll, 1972).

The critical perspective opposes outcomes that are determined by resources, hegemonic standing and discursive capacities administered by polarized elites and international community (Richmond, 2012). Due to this, liberal peace fails to support the progress of ordinary citizens in rebuilding their lives by neglecting local context, needs, ownership and agency (Urlacher, 2008)

### **1.3. Exploring the different perspectives on Peace, Justice and Power**

Given what has been explored in the first two sections of the literature review, the astounding differences between the peacemaking literature and the critical literature are

evident. For instance, the critical position is political and challenges the status quo while the PSA ignores politics and protects the status quo and the interests of capital. The discussion on conflict resolution by the peacemaking and critical approaches seems to be anchored on three key terms: peace, justice and power. Whereas the critical approach seems to actively engage in discussions of what those concepts mean and the implication of that meaning, the peacemaking literature seems to provide short-sighted conceptualizations. In the next section, I will contrast the understanding of each concept taking into account the political connotation and implications of each conceptualization.

### **1.3.1. Conceptualizing peace**

There is an ongoing debate between literatures regarding the conceptualization of peace. One of the main challenges lies in understanding what peace means and what can be done to achieve it. Is peace a moment in time? Is it an ongoing process? Or is peace simply a lack of conflict?

For the problem-solving perspective, achieving peace signifies the absence of violence. John Galtung (1964) makes a distinction between negative peace (absence of violence) and positive peace (ending structural and cultural violence) (Fortna, 2002; Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothchild 2001). The PSA supports and seeks to achieve negative peace, as it eliminates the manifested conflict. Mac Ginty (2006) proposes the term peace to be ‘grossly-under-conceptualized’. The author argues the PSA focuses on managing the de-escalation of the conflict rather than addressing the actual conceptualization of the ultimate objective. Further, the PSA accepts and supports the dominant version of ‘liberal peace’ and disregards alternative versions of peace.

Liberal peace promotes peace made possible by liberalism, which is based on the notions of economic interdependence and democracy (Mac Ginty, 2006). Economic interdependence creates favourable conditions between governments and people, as cooperation is necessary for the management of mutual and economic problems (Tziarras, 2012; Levy, 2002). According to liberalism, democratic states have to act transparently and respond to those who vote for them. Further, through the development of international law and international organizations, good relationships between states and its people are secured (Levy, 2002). Therefore, it is argued that governments are less likely to produce secret policies to pursue geopolitical deception of other states or engage in war (Howard, 1981; Tziarras, 2012). For supporters of liberal peace, when the above democratic conditions exist, there is peace. In other words, democracy is seen as inherently peaceful and understood as being the 'best route' to achieve it (Hoglund, 2008). Democratization, economic liberalization and pacification, are seen as the preconditions for building peace (Kurtenbach, 2010). The best method to build liberal peace is through peace negotiations.

The critical literature conceptualizes peace as a social construction that is difficult to ascribe, as it is dependent on time and context. Nonetheless, efforts to conceptualize peace using a critical perspective have been made by several academics, each one building on the other and engaging in discussion and contestation about the various discourses and concepts of peace.

From the critical perspective, peace is conceptualized as an elusive concept that means more than the absence of war or hostilities. The absence of war is a necessity but not a sufficient condition for the prevalence peace (Martin, 2005). Critical thinkers are

also unwilling to adopt Galtung's broad definition of positive peace (lack of structural violence). It is argued that the absence of all conflict is impossible, given that some conditions of violence and structures of change can contribute to peace (Miall, 2007; Schmid, 1968). Although concerns have been raised that it is much simpler to achieve negative peace, critical scholars encourage the raising of the threshold of what can be achieved under the banner of peace (Mac Ginty, 2007). As a result, expectations must not be lowered to achieving negative peace, rather the absence of hostilities should only be viewed as the first step towards a fuller ideal of peace. Thinking about peace in this manner represents it as a discursive framework, which can prevent the discursive replication of violence that is often overlooked by the 'universal' liberal peace constructed by international relations (Martin, 2005). From this perspective, peace is not about stressing the absence of armed conflict and the superficial manifestations. Rather, peace is thought of as fundamentally political and subjective, seeking to ensure social justice and social stability through formal and informal institutions, practices and norms (Bobichand, 2012). To achieve this, unofficial and official actors must engage in political participation, mutual trust and cooperation.

Some critical scholars draw from Habermas' concept of communicative action for an approach that leads to political participation without the threat of dominance (Richmond, 2007; Mac Ginty, 2006). For these thinkers, politics of solidarity and dialogue are the basis of peace. Thus, the critical perspective proposes 'critical peace', as intersubjective and indicating a mutual construction of a global order by a broad range of official and unofficial actors (Richmond, 2007, p. 259). Although this sounds similar to the Western conceptualization of peace, the critical perspective offers a reflexive

engagement with peace through the use of context to facilitate reflexivity, emancipation and the inclusion of local actors. While critical peace exists, liberal peace is the dominant conception of peace propagated by the liberal peace framework.

The critical perspective criticises how elements of liberal peace have undergone a commodification into pre-packaged templates delivered by international actors to all conflicts without inadequate concern for local needs (Mac Ginty, 2006, p.18). In this context, peace becomes standardized and is reduced to time-limited events. For instance, programs under the liberal model such as, refugee repatriation, livelihood generation and democracy training become two or three year projects that are often applied to internal conflicts, while disregarding context. As liberal peace becomes standardized around the world, it becomes 'true peace', as long as it conforms to Western values. The problem with standardized versions of peace is that they are often far from being positive or sustainable. Other inherent flaws include a tendency to overlook conflict maintenance and causation issues (Hoffman, 2007, 638).

For the critical literature, peace cannot be achieved by liberalism even if the 'right steps' are followed. This perspective shines a light into the interrelationships between actors involved and the politics that form part of the process, which are otherwise forgotten within the PSA. Further, the critical orientation helps to see beyond the outcome of the agreement by considering the realities and implications of the entire process. Mac Ginty (2011) argues a balance between bottom-up approach and top-down approach must be established. He introduces the term 'hybrid peace', which is the interaction between bottom and top down approaches. That is, to include both local groups and government institutions to build a sustainable peace. Richmond (2010) adds

to this perspective by using the notion of local-liberal-hybridity to describe the collaboration between local and international groups. Richmond maintains, however, that this approach can lead to positive or negative peace. In other words, the author does not guarantee the positive peace whereby structural violence is removed and social justice promoted.

### **1.3.2. Justice v. Peace**

The peacemaking and critical literature understand justice as a complex concept with various overlapping components. Justice as: procedural (process) vs. distributive (outcome); restorative vs. redistributive; rule of law (accountability); transitional justice vs. community transitional justice. These components will be explored in the next two sections. The first section will focus on the notion of justice, followed by the justice v. peace debate.

From the peacemaking perspective, the concept of justice is typically thought of as forming part of the negotiation process and as a tool to formulate agreements. The literature typically conceptualizes justice as a multifaceted process and outcome concept whereby there is a mutual advantage for all parties (Kelma, 2006). This conceptualization can be attributed to the two principles of justice: procedural<sup>3</sup> and distributive<sup>4</sup>. When incorporating these two principles, it is argued that justice is a complex concept, both in relation to establishing just processes and in attaining just outcomes (Druckman & Wagner, 2016). In other words, justice is found within the negotiation process, as it

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<sup>3</sup> Procedural justice refers to principles guiding the negotiation process. These principles include fair treatment, fair play, transparency, voluntary decisions and fair representation.

<sup>4</sup> Distributive justice consists of general standards for allocating collective benefits or burdens among the members of a group or community. They are principles of outcome justice as distinct from justice of the process and procedures from which outcomes result (Druckman & Albin, 2011).

guides the bargaining dynamics or it can become subject to the negotiations themselves and part of the conditions in the final agreement.

From the critical perspective, the notion of justice is conceptualized as restorative or redistributive justice. A restorative or redistributive approach aims to address material discrepancies and psychological legacies of conflict (Sriram, 2010). Similarly, Zartman (2005) conceptualizes justice as a fair and mutually accepted solution, punishment for perpetrations of conflict in the past, redress of injustices of the past and the establishment of equality and dignity of the future. It must be noted that addressing past human abuses are often cited as one of the most difficult challenges in any peace negotiation. As a result, it can trigger the onset of dialogue and facilitate its progress or it can cause deadlocks in the process (Hayner, 2008; Albin, 2001). The form that justice is conceptualized then becomes a matter of political negotiation and compromise. Different sides have different conceptions of what would constitute justice, even if they share an understanding of justice principles (Bernstein, 2012). The challenge is to find a conception of justice that is acceptable to all parties. Thus, past injustice can therefore be corrected or repaired only if it is consistent with the key players' gains from an agreement (Gauthier, 1986). The lack of strong justice components is sometimes due to the power of certain groups at the negotiating table and their insistence on impunity or amnesty (Haynes, 2008).

The critical position recommends that justice needs to be seriously considered by all parties involved in the negotiation. In particular, justice issues need to be acknowledged by international communities, as the main emphasis has been on procedural and retributive justice, highlighted as the minimalist conception of justice

(Park, 2010). Distributive justice concerns need to be fulfilled in peace agreements, as it directly affects local communities and the possibility for social justice and local reconciliation. Fundamentally, the participation and input of the local communities, specifically the voice of the victims of the conflict are essential within the peace process as restoring justice enables local peace (Mani, 2002).

The PSA argues that reaching a mutual agreement is often challenging due to the tensions between peace and justice. When peace negotiations are taking place, there is a desire for peace and a demand for justice. The PSA agrees that both are necessary; however, one is often possible at the expense of the other due to their competing interests (Zartman, 2005; Endoh & Mba, 2016). Those who argue for peace first, take a pragmatic approach by prioritizing security and a negotiated settlement over accountability of the warring parties (Bell, 2003). In contrast, those who argue for justice view accountability as vital for conflict resolution efforts (Bell, 2003).

The critical approach argues the peace versus justice debate is overstated and “grossly oversimplified” (Sriram, 2009, p. 5). Academics propose that in reality the choice is seldom simply ‘justice’ or ‘peace’, but rather a complex mixture of both conceptions (Sriram & Pillay, 2010). Thus, the pursuit of justice is not always an obstacle to peacemaking since peace agreements often include mechanisms of accountability (Vinjamuri & Boesenecker, 2007). To put it more simply, there is a nexus between rebuilding peace and restoring justice (Mani, 2002). Kelman (1979) suggests that justice has a strong bearing on the feasibility and stability of peace and on the quality of peace by removing injustices that lie at the root of the conflict. Scholars also note that peace and

justice are not mutually exclusive, rather they are mutually reinforcing as they represent the two sides of the same coin (Endoh & Mbaio, 2016; Zartman, 2005).

Supporters of the PSA argue that peace and justice are interconnected through liberal peace, good governance and transitional justice (TJ). According to the critical literature, however, liberal peace has had a negative impact of state-centric security in justice, truth, repair and reconciliation. This is because liberalism has undermined options for human security, favouring the state's security and integrity (Canteh-Morgan, 2005; Santander, 2016). Further, Andrew (2010) mentions that the liberal project has used TJ as an extensive part of the top-down approach that aims at creating official narratives for truth, justice and reconciliation. Fundamentally, the peace versus justice dilemma that is extensively debated by the PSA, is not of concern since the question of justice in which the goal is to address past wrongs, while emphasizing the need to rebuild a divided society is therefore a question of liberal peace (Sriram & Pillay, 2010, p.348). Thus, understanding liberal peace in this form ensures TJ.

The PSA has attempted to balance the peace and justice dichotomy through the development of transitional justice (TJ) methods. These provisions involve international TJ methods such as truth commissions as well as trials & amnesties, as a means to address the legacy of human rights violations that were committed during the conflict in dispute (Renner, 2013). The international community plays a vital role to increase the use of TJ methods within negotiations and peacebuilding efforts through the building of courts, writing laws, and developing transitional operations (Park, 2010). TJ rests on the assumption that addressing engagement of past violence and using truth telling through Truth and Reconciliation commissions (TRC) will foster reconciliation between the

parties and victims involved. Within TRC, the official narrative of a country's violent past is reconstructed from victims and perpetrators' individual testimonies. It is argued that through this measure, TRC helps heal traumas, develop trust, mutual respect and acceptance of the other as a legitimate actor (Lederach, 1997). At the same time, the TRC can use conciliatory measures to grant amnesty to perpetrators and give recommendations for reparations to acknowledge victims (Graybill 1998; Wilson, 2001). Further, it is argued that these mechanisms can re-establish and strengthen democracy and the rule of law in countries emerging from protracted conflict (Bosire, 2005). This is achieved through the restoring of relationships and reconciliation between parties and civil society. As a result, the PSA proposes that addressing systemic human rights violations and establishing accountability will help overcome social divisions and establish a new legitimate political order (Arthur, 2009; Bell, 2003; Leebaw, 2008).

Critical scholars argue that although establishing reconciliation through TRC seems promising at first, there are numerous problems. Nagy (2008) points out that concerns have been addressed through internationalized institutions imposed as 'one-size-fits-all, decontextualized solutions' to complement the project of liberal peacebuilding (p. 275; Sriram, 2007). It is contended that producing a shared narrative that is accepted by society, the TRC marginalises and de-legitimizes claims that call for a more fundamental political and economic reform and do not consent to the terms of reconciliation (Schaap, 2006; Moon, 2008; Meister, 2002). In other words, the voices of citizens that threaten the political community become silenced and excluded, while perpetrators are publicly dealt with and the people who benefited from the armed conflict are concealed from the public view. For instance, this often involves residents who gained land or profited from

weaponry sales or simply government officials who committed human rights abuses, but are not publicly acknowledged by the TRC. Several critics claim this is problematic since it strengthens and legitimizes the dominant position of the liberal state as the only viable form of political organization (Renner, 2013; Schaap, 2006).

According to Schaap (2006), reconciliation risks being undemocratic and promote assimilation by denying the possibility to reject the negotiation outcome for the sake of stability and negative peace (p.256). It is further proposed that rule of law initiatives are not neutral and serve to support liberal peacebuilding. This is because law is increasingly seen by the international community as one of the safest ways in which to influence, or intervene in other countries. The tendency to exclude local communities is also a major flaw, thus raising fundamental questions of legitimacy, local ownership and participation (O'Hearn, 2000; Lundy & McGovern, 2008).

The critical approach proposes an alternative solution to this problem: a bottom-up approach or community-based justice. This type of justice refers to practices that take place in the community and involve their participation as a whole with minimal external assistance and association with the state (Sriram & Pillay, 2010). In other words, sustainable peacebuilding efforts are domestically rooted and owned by the population as opposed to imported and imposed by external actors. Further, communities shape the mechanism that is necessary to produce locally meaningful justice (Park, 2010). Community-based justice does not include the TRC, but rather local practices intrinsic to the specific community. Local practices can serve to overcome the limits of the TRC by including more people and witnesses of communities, appointing qualified personnel and increasing time for reconciliation (Nagy, 2008). At the same time, bottom-up initiatives

becomes a broader approach encompassing discussion of topics that call for a more fundamental and political socio-economic reform, eliminate structural violence and gender inequality. As a result, community justice sparks more democratic debate than traditional TJ and increases the potential for political change and reconciliation. However, in order to achieve community justice, it is necessary to address power structures and power relations.

### **1.3.3. Conceptualizing of Power**

When thinking about power, the PSA and the critical approach conceptualize it in the same way. Power is viewed as a tangible resource that some actors have and others do not. The difference lies in the context in which power is considered. For the PSA, power is mainly considered in the negotiation process, but there is no larger concern over power structures. For the critical perspective, conflict will resurface unless there is a redistribution of power. The critical approach criticizes the PSA for protecting or establishing a distribution of power beneficial for maintaining or instituting liberal peace.

The PSA identifies power to take different forms and exist at all stages of the negotiation process (Pfetsch 2007; Höglund, 2008; Mitchell, 1981). According to Zartman (1978), power is intrinsic to negotiations as “both sides have power over each other” (p. 70). Power determines the relationship between the negotiating parties as being symmetric (balanced relationship) and asymmetric (unequal parties) (Zartman, 1978). The PSA argues starting positions for negotiations, the tactics and leverage used may well reflect power inequalities, which results from the parties’ own legitimate resources, personality factors and efforts to better their position (Gauthier, 1986; Zartman, 1978). Strong parties tend to bargain hard by exploiting the power advantage to maximize self-

interest (Albin, 2001, Zartman 1978). Meanwhile, the less powerful choose the soft strategy and have no choice but to make the most concessions. Some academics argue that ethnic and internal conflict stresses power inequality as a chief reason for the difficulty to negotiate successful outcomes (Rothchild, 1997). In contrast, some researchers argue that relative power is not a reliable indicator of how a negotiation will evolve and that the weaker side may well gain as much or more than the stronger party (Ravenhill, 1993; Rubin & Zartman, 1995). In turn, the final agreement of negotiations usually reflects the relative distribution of power within positive-sum and zero-sum outcomes. As previously mentioned, justice principles and power-sharing incentives can be utilized to balance power at the negotiation table and position parties as equal partners. Nonetheless, despite the attempt to balance power within the negotiation table, it is difficult to achieve and researchers and politicians alike often disregard power relations. Although the PSA recognizes power within its power-sharing strategies there is no real conceptualization of power or discussed in the context of the conflict. Rather, it is simply used as a strategy to end the conflict without real discussion of power structures.

The critical approach challenges this minimalistic conceptualization of power. Supporters argue that the PSA only acknowledges the role of power within the context of peace negotiations, but fails to have an in-depth discussion regarding its function in the conflict. More specifically, the PSA tends to explore the conditions for maintaining the power of the status quo by creating stability and producing liberal peace. In this context, the conceptualization of power is simply about competition, coercion and domination at the negotiation phase.

The critical approach conceptualizes power as something that is not given by nature, but is constituted out of ideas, culture and social patterns (Miall, 2007). Similarly to the PSA, the critical perspective views power as ‘domination’ or as ‘power over’ occurring beyond the closed doors of the negotiation phase. The critical perspective proposes that power structures underlying the conflict and within society need to be recognized and analyzed. In other words, it involves acknowledging how unequal distribution of economic, social and political power in society are the reason for the marginalization and discrimination of certain groups and the motive for the conflict. While, the conflict itself is meant to redistribute power more evenly in order to end the dominance of one group and the status quo (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000).

There is recognition that power is not necessarily linked with conflict or oppression, as viewing power relations merely as ‘coercive’ or as ‘dominance’ is narrow and problematic (Follet, 1927, p.101; Giddens, 1984). Scholars have developed alternative conceptions of power to alter these discourses that help shape our reality. From this perspective, power is conceptualized as “capability” or as “collective capacity” (Arendt, 1970, p.44; Karlberg, 2005; Carroll, 1972). In other words, there is power in cooperation among equals. This can be achieved through the creation of a new political arena in which official and unofficial actors can engage in politics and create peaceful change (Arendt, 1970). These discourses do not focus on ‘who rules whom’ but rather how individuals can rule as a collective. To date, these efforts are still in the nascent stage, are important but have yet to change the Western liberal-culture of conflict (Karlberg, 2005).

#### **1.4. Introduction to the FARC-EP**

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia- People's Army (FARC-EP) is a revolutionary movement of political and military nature, who rose up in arms in 1964 in the jungle of Southern Tolima, Colombia (FARC-EP, 2016). Having been founded by Colombian Communist party members and the peasantry, the FARC-EP is the largest and oldest guerrilla organization in Latin America (Otis, 2014). The FARC-EP has engaged in armed conflict against the Colombian state for 50 years, until the signing of the final peace agreement in la Habana, Cuba in 2016<sup>5</sup>.

The objective of the FARC-EP is to replace capitalism with socialism to end the class exploitation and the social injustice that takes place in Colombia (FARC-EP, 1993.). In order to do so, it follows a form of Marxist-Leninist ideology inspired by Bolivarian and Che ideals, which have been adapted to the Colombian context of domestic class relations (Brittain, 2008). To achieve their goal, the monopoly of political and economic power by latinfundistas<sup>6</sup> and the Colombian oligarchy must be eliminated through force. Once in power, the FARC-EP propose an “equitable redistribution of wealth and resources” and supporting the rights and power of the common people against the privileged elite by providing wealth, resources and political participation (Petras & Brescia, 2000; p. 135). The FARC-EP upholds Bolivar's ideal of liberty and complete national sovereignty of Colombia, without the intervention of foreign countries, particularly the U.S (FARC-EP, n.d.). To achieve this, the working class must engage in armed conflict in order to overthrow the ruling capitalist class. This is based on the assumption that only using legal methods does not work within a political climate of

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<sup>5</sup> The final peace agreement was part of the peace process that began in 2012.

<sup>6</sup> Latinfundistas are private owners of thousands of hectares of land.

repression (Salgari, 2014). Bolivar's ideals further propose to fight for a socially inclusive republic, whereby "public administration is dignified, all corruption is eliminated and an extensive populist education is extended to all demographics" (Salgari, 2014, p. 28). To achieve this, politics must not be used to gain profit, but rather seen as a "social service and commitment to helping others" (Salgari, 2014, p. 29).

The FARC-EP has evolved significantly since its inception. Prior to being founded in 1964, the FARC-EP originated as an armed-wing of the Colombian Communist Party (CPP). At this time, the CPP established communist-inspired resistance cells as a defensive collective to prevent *latifundistas* and the state from further taking the agricultural land from the peasants (Janes, 2018). This expropriation of land followed a ten-year civil war known as *La Violencia*<sup>7</sup> that began in 1948. The Conservative-Liberal coalition that ended the civil war was viewed as political elites controlling and suppressing political involvement (Martz, 1992; Turel, 2013). In other words, the coalition was simply protecting the mainstream parties, while disregarding social issues affecting the countryside. Many persons within the countryside were left isolated without formal governance. The disillusionment with the coalition and its military campaign to expropriate peasant land, particularly of communist supporters, led to the formation of the FARC-EP and other revolutionary movements (Turel, 2013; Brittain, 2010). The founding of the FARC-EP took place once 16,000 Colombian troops backed by the U.S. attacked the village of Marquetalia, as a counterinsurgency strategy against these

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<sup>7</sup> *La Violencia* was a civil war in Colombia taking place from 1948 to 1958, between the Colombian Conservative Party and the Colombian Liberal Party, fought mainly in the countryside (Stokes, 2005). The introduction of a bipartisan system of government ended the civil conflict, following a referendum whereby the people of Colombia accepted the "National Front Regime". This new regime required alternative governments between Liberal and Conservative parties every four years, for 16 years, until 1974 (Turel, 2013).

resistance cells whom had established an “Independent Republic”, as the Colombian state called it (Janes, 2018). Having fought the government forces, the 48-armed men escaped to the jungle and formed the core of the FARC. As expressed in their first political declaration, “we rose up in arms because in our country, the political, legal, peaceful and democratic ways of struggle are closed” (FARC-EP, 1993).

During the Seventh Conference of the Guerrilla Movement (May 1982), the FARC announced they had become the “People’s Army” (Ejercito del Pueblo- EP) and adding the initials “EP” to the group’s name to symbolize the change (Brittain, 2008, p.46). This new strategy meant moving from a defensive collective to becoming a revolutionary guerrilla movement with more offensive military tactics to seize power and establish a government (Simons, 2004, p. 52). The FARC-EP proclaimed their fight for a change in regime, as the current regime was viewed as “rotten and dominated by financial monopolies funded in imperialism” (FARC-EP, 1993). The FARC-EP opposes the state’s support of neo-liberalism, inequality, capitalist exploitation, the patriarchy, discrimination, the national security doctrine<sup>8</sup> and the preventative war<sup>9</sup> (Octava Conferencia, 1993).

The FARC-EP’s change in strategy exposed the differences between their movement and the Communist political party, eventually leading to their separation in the 1990’s. One of the main reasons for the dissolution was the FARC-EP’s quest for power through force, while the CPP pursued socialism and communism without Marxism and through the acceptance of capitalist tendencies (FARC-EP, 1999, p.47). Prior to their

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<sup>8</sup> National security doctrine- use a range of measures such as military, political and economic power to eliminate possible threats to national security that involve physical, political or economic security.

<sup>9</sup> Preventative war- a war or military action initiated against a party that poses no imminent threat, but could pose a threat in the future.

dissolution, however, the FARC-EP and the CPP founded Union Patriótica (UP) in 1985. The UP was a leftist Colombian political party established by the peace negotiations between the FARC-EP and the Betancur administration. After generating mixed electoral success unprecedented for a non-mainstream third party, the UP was subject to political violence by drug traffickers, right-wing paramilitaries and their allies in the security forces (Janes, 2018). The decline and extermination of the UP had an estimated 3,000 members murdered (Brittain, 2008). The FARC-EP viewed the UP's extermination as a clear sign of government intolerance, state terrorism and as proof of the inability to exercise political action in Colombia (Salgari, 2014). This extermination led to the intensification of violence.

The FARC-EP engaged in several military operations to weaken the state and gain greater control of territories. During its operations, the FARC-EP mainly targeted security forces through tactics like ambush, area attacks and periodic assassinations (Brittain, 2010). The FARC-EP also conducted attacks on infrastructure, with a special focus on electricity generation and supply, oil installations and pipelines, the mining and energy sector, and transportation structures (Janes, 2018). These attacks were carried out through the use of sabotage such as regular arson, as well as land mines and assault, directed at military or police guarding the facilities. Finally, kidnapping was also used to attack important government officials (Standford, 2015). The FARC-EP's primary weapons include improvised explosive devices, booby traps, snipers, use rifles and bombs; although these are usually relatively low-level and the group avoids mass-casualty attack (Janes, 2018). The FARC-EP's operations mainly remained in the rural regions of Colombia. However, from 2002 the number of operations in urban cities drastically

increased due to the counter-insurgency campaign. Throughout the years, the FARC-EP has been accused of human rights violations, extortion, child soldiers, kidnappings, engaging in the drug trade, sexual abuse and forced abortions.

In order to conduct these military operations, the FARC-EP learned to expand their funding through a variety of different sources. Drug trafficking is a significant source of funding, although senior members of the FARC-EP have denied this assertion (Janes, 2018). Revenue is also produced from charging 'revolutionary' taxes in their zones of influences, including taxes on gold mines, drug fields, laboratories and transport charges for movement of passengers and goods (Phippen, 2016). Apart from the drug-related income, extortion and kidnapping for ransom produce substantial revenue. Other areas of income production include cigarette smuggling, vehicle theft, and investments in legitimate businesses with bank accounts in tax havens like Panama (Janes, 2018)

Having gained large revenue to fund their military operations, the FARC-EP has obtained control of several territories in rural areas, with only sporadic operations in Bogota. At their peak at the end of the 1990's, the FARC-EP controlled up to one-third of Colombian territory (Colombian Reports, 2018). The FARC-EP function as the local authority in the regions it has been most active for decades, including the regions of Arauca, Cauca and Caquetá. Many of these areas have been forgotten by the Colombian state and have low population densities (COHA, 2010). Due to this, working alliances have been developed between local communities and the FARC-EP. The revolutionary organization seeks to foster and cultivate an alternative form of social and economic organization in the areas it controls (Brittain, 2010). With an emphasis on local participation, the FARC-EP provide public services the normal state fails to deliver in the

regions, as well as create democratic political institutions, which the FARC-EP hopes will overcome state absence. The revolutionary organization has provided offices for social services, mechanisms and assemblies such as: medical services, building infrastructure, mediating disputes, support for communities displaced by violence, establishing 'fair' market relations of coca crops between traffickers and cultivators, and providing protection of local populations against land invaders and common thieves (FARC-EP, 2014f). Since the FARC-EP has had control of certain territories for decades, generations have come to accept the authority of the political-military organization (COHA, 2010). In other rural areas, where the FARC-EP has only established its control in the last twenty years, their rule remains primarily military in nature with great suspicion and distrust from local communities such as in the case of controlling areas in Guaviare and Vaupes (Leech, 2011)

The FARC-EP also has several encampments throughout Colombia, particularly in the jungle. Within the FARC-EP's camps, similar social services are offered as well as a guerrilla tribunal and statutes concerning the rights, duties and disciplinary measures against combatants (Brittain, 2008). Furthermore, the FARC-EP allocates a fixed budget to maintain each member, as well as a budget for equipment, health care and transportation (COHA, 2010, Janes, 2018). The combatants are also educated on military training, politics, culture, ideology, FARC-EP and Colombia's history and individual studies (Octava Conferencia, 1993). Education is said to be a permanent right and duty of every combatant. In general, combatants are provided with the basic necessities to live a decent life.

Throughout the last fifty years, the state and the FARC-EP have fought countless battles and engaged in several peace negotiations to put an end to the conflict. Having the support of the U.S., the Colombian state received more than \$10 billion in funding as part of an aid package to support Plan Colombia (anti-narcotics program) and in turn the counter-insurgency campaign (Janes, 2018). During this time, the state has improved its military operations and intelligence, having successfully secured strategic locations, which the FARC-EP deemed vital to its operations. As a result, the state has produced crucial setbacks for the FARC-EP, forcing them to progressively retreat to its rural strongholds. In recent years, the FARC-EP's strength has considerably degraded from approximately 26,000 fighters at its peak in the early 2000's to an approximate 7,800 in 2013 (Janes, 2018). Some of the reduction in the number of combatants is due to the loss of support from FARC-EP members, with about 3,000 combatants defecting in 2008 (RRT, 2009). The loss of support was also demonstrated by numerous international rallies and protests held in 2008, with about 1.5 million people coming out in Bogota alone (The Economist, 2008). The armed conflict has ultimately left behind a high number of civilian casualties, with 220,000 dead, 25,000 disappeared, and 5.7 million displaced (Moloney, 2016).

In 2012, the FARC-EP and the Santos government engaged in official peace talks in Oslo, Norway to seek an end to the conflict. Following this, the two peace delegations travelled to La Habana, Cuba to negotiate each of the five points of the framework agenda: rural agrarian reform; political participation; resolution of the conflict; drug production and trafficking; truth and reparation for victims. After nearly four years of intense negotiations and hundreds of proposals, the warring parties produced a peace

agreement in August of 2016. The peace deal was subject to a referendum, with Colombian voters rejecting the agreement with 50.2% against it, due to reasons of impunity and absence of justice (ICG, 2006). In December 2016, the Colombian congress voted to approve the revised peace agreement, without the approval of the public.

## **1.5. Conclusion**

Negotiation processes involve deliberation of divergent political interests and values. The non-state actors in an internal armed conflict are challenging the status quo defended or protected by the state. Based on the literature review, we can assume that during peace negotiations, capitalist states will attempt to impose a liberal peace, a peace that ceases the armed violence without changing the status quo and the capitalist economic order. In other words, peace negotiations (particularly when the opposing side seemed hard to defeat) are part of the pacification project attempting to impose a liberal order. This thesis explores how non-state actors attempt to resist the imposition of liberal peace while participating in peace negotiations. In order to achieve this, I will focus on the negotiation process to solve the longstanding conflict between the Colombian state and the FARC-EP.

## **Chapter 2: Conceptual framework**

In this chapter, I will be looking at two authors that criticise liberal peace as preserving the status quo and the root problems of the conflict. Hannah Arendt challenges the main core of liberal peace: representative democracy, and offers an alternative way of thinking about politics and democracy. Neocleous and his colleagues help us understand how the current liberal peace functions and is protected by pacification through the elimination of resistance. Pacification is used to eliminate resistance by utilizing security and legal mechanisms for the establishment of a particular social order that favours liberal peace. In particular, pacification is used by the state to reduce violence and subsequently, minimize political participation and contestation between groups sharing varying discourses of the conflict at hand.

### **2.1. Hannah Arendt and the Political**

Hannah Arendt offers a different way of thinking about politics than theorists like Weber and Foucault who view politics as domination and struggle. For Arendt, politics is based on the idea of active citizenship and civic engagement regarding all matters affecting the political realm (Passerin, 2016). In other words, politics is action, which is realized in the public sphere or in the company of others (Arendt, 1958). More specifically, action is political speech that involves deliberation and discussion as part of the process to decide issues concerning the public good (Kateb, 2000). Further, the content of politics must be purely political in which the economy and the social are excluded (Owens, 2012). This is because the 'social', meaning the necessities of life and expansion of the market economy have taken over the nation-state, and the public realm transforming it into a sphere of satisfaction of material needs (Owens, 2012). As a result,

the public and private sphere has blurred, to maximize the interest of order and capital accumulation (Arendt 1958, p. 47). Arendt argues the public realm and the political cannot be reducible to capitalism (Owens, 2012, p.298). For instance, political content includes anything beyond the private self-interest such as changing the constitution, reforming legislation and policy to promote the good of society (Kateb, 2000). As a result, Arendt changes the level of political activity that is ascribed to the people by arguing humans have a much bigger role in politics. That is, “man is a political being due to his ability to act and that enables him to reach out goals in plurality with others” (Arendt, 1970, p. 82). In this respect, action is one of the fundamental categories of the human condition and constitutes the highest realization of the ‘vita activa’ (Arendt, 1958). Arendt explains that the ‘vita activa’ is composed of three categories: labour, work and action. Political action is ranked above labour and work as it gives human beings life beyond the existence of the social and private sphere (Wellmer, 1999). Finally, Arendt describes political action being rooted in natality. For Arendt, “the new beginning inherent in birth can make itself felt in the world only because the newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning something anew, that is, of acting ”(Arendt, 1956). Furthermore, each person is unique and capable of action, thus the unexpected can be expected (Arendt, 1970, p.9). As a result, the birth of every person signifies a new beginning, representing the possibility of unique actions that can make significant changes for the better of society.

Arendt also proposes the concept of ‘isonomy’, that is the capacity of positive laws to make people in the political realm equal (Arendt, 1963; Waldron, p. 209). In other words, by political convention all individuals are equal for political purposes. Thus,

within the public realm, there is bound to be disagreements and diversity of opinion throughout the process. However, politics lies in the ability to relate to each other's interests and cooperate by coming together to make a decision through what Arendt calls "the drawn-out wearisome process of persuasion, negotiation and compromise" (Arendt, 1963, p. 267). Through this "in between space" that is negotiations is where the sense of plurality and the moment where politics take place. According to Arendt, the constitution and its structure are vital for this process to take place and for the public realm to be secured and work effectively. This involves valuing structure, formality and procedure. The constitution is not understood as fabrication but as the on-going 'housing' of politics, which allows citizens to speak and act together (Waldron, 2000, p. 206). Moreover, the constitutional building serves to lay down the boundaries and the scope of the political realm. Thus, it serves to protect and separate the public sphere from the private sphere and create the power of the political community (Waldron, 2002). Consequently, the constitution should be treated with respect, but also as an object of change that is capable of growth (Waldron, 2000, p.213). Arendt's notion of constitutional politics is relevant to the context of peace negotiations. Although, new constitutions are not often developed, constitutional politics can be useful when deliberating and restructuring political distributions and governmental structures.

Arendt asserts democracy is the ideal system to exert the political. In this context, the heart of democracy includes active political freedom within the public realm and it is not simply about a political system or drafting legislation (Bokiniec, 2009). In other words, for Arendt, democracy involves the voicing and discussion of political concerns within the public sphere (participatory democracy), while representative democracy is not

ideal since it does not include the participation of all citizens. Rather, it only includes a small amount of representatives whose procedures are often used to advance aims of economic interest, which are not compatible with the true aims of political action (Bokiniec, 2009). Arendt further explains that democracy should not be known as ‘rule of the people’ as it is commonly discussed within political theory. This is because the latter reduces freedom of liberation and interferes with the self-determination of the people (Markell, 2006). Instead, freedom should be understood as no-rule, whereby the political life is without division between rulers and ruled. For Arendt, democratic politics is an open system that is permanently exposed to the possibilities of critique, contestations and capable of transformation (Markell, 2006).

Hannah Arendt challenges liberal peace with a critique of its characteristic of representative democracy. For Arendt, representative democracy is a closed system, whereby citizens are not admitted to the public realm and most are not interested in participating in politics (Wolin, 1983; Bokiniec, 2009). Further, elitist forms of democracy that are part of politics do not view politics as life, but as business (Bokiniec, 2009). In the same manner, bureaucracy shrinks the power to act by enacting the ‘rule by nobody’ where all are equally powerless and there is limited accountability (Arendt, 1970). Arendt argues these are characteristics of the modern epoch and are consequence of the political realm being invaded by the social realm, especially by the “private economic interest and private values of consumption and pleasure” (Wolin, 1983, p. 9). As a result, the author considers her vision of the political as authentic politics within a larger field of politics and superior to non-political activities (Kateb, 2000). Participatory democracy standing in contrast of representative democracy is Arendt’s way of restoring

the dignity of the political. To illustrate, Arendt proposes a federal system of council through which citizens could effectively determine their own political affairs. This space of appearance whereby citizens deliberate as a collective is known as the 'polis' (Passerin, 2016). The polis is meant to be interactive and non-hierarchical whereby citizens share the power that comes from civic engagement and exercise effective public agency. At the same time, supporting political action is Arendt's way of counterbalancing the 'mass society' in order to prevent another totalitarian movement and genocide (Bokiniec, 2009). This refers to a large number of people who consume high levels of propaganda and indoctrination that they become apathetic and indifferent. As a result, the mass society cannot be integrated into one organization of common interest, consequently becoming vulnerable to extremist movements as it occurred in Nazi Germany during WWII (Arendt, 1958). With the political, Arendt aims to eliminate the loss of responsiveness to events by promoting action and resistance in all contexts for the advancement of politics and the public good.

Due to Arendt's aim to foster political action and resistance, her praise for the revolutionary tradition comes with no surprise. Contrary to other thinkers, Arendt argues violence is a phenomenon in its own right and distinct to power and force. Within the context of the political realm, power is never the property of an individual, but rather it belongs to a group and remains in existence as long as the group stays as a collective (Arendt, 1970, p. 44). In other words, power is not to be understood in a vertical hierarchical manner, rather power is a horizontal concept that grows when individuals act together, persuade each other and treat each other as political equals (Bernstein, 2011). Consequently, Arendt's conceptualization of power opposes the traditional

conceptualization of an individual or group having ‘power over’ others. For Arendt, power is seen as the heart of the political. Politics involves acting together to deliberate and persuade each other about how to conduct public affairs.

Force is a means of coercion that occurs when energy is released by **physical movement**. For Arendt, violence is generally outside the realm of day-to-day politics. However, violence is instrumental in nature and forms part of revolutionary struggles that pave the transition from one political model to another. In this context, violence is rational only if it pursues short-term goals and to the extent that it is effective in reaching the goal that must justify it (Arendt, 1970). Further, the author argues that under certain circumstances, acting without speech and without counting the consequences can be rational as it is the only way to set the scales of justice. In this manner, violent reaction can be a weapon of “reform and liberation by provoking action via bringing dramatic grievances into public attention” (Arendt, 1970, p. 79). However, Arendt argues violence becomes irrational the minute it becomes a tool to reach long-term goals. In other words, the moment violence is used to reach a goal that will not be achieved rapidly such as capturing Osama Bin Laden, violence will enter the realm of politics and lead to a more violent world such as with the ‘war on terror’ and the establishing of new anti-terrorism legislation and security institutions. When this occurs, there is a loss of power, which can lead to using violence to take that power back. In this way, violence substitutes the role of power in the public sphere.

As Arendt explains, it is difficult to find power and violence independently from each other, “nothing is more common than the combination of violence and power, nothing less frequent than to find them in their pure and therefore extreme form” (Arendt,

1970, p. 46). In other words, power and violence are not only distinct, but actually opposites. This is because violence does not enhance power, but can diminish it and even destroy it. Power stands at the center of politics, while violence is anti-political. Nonetheless, violence can in certain cases be justified for political purposes. Violence and power are not a natural phenomenon; rather they belong to the realm of political action and to the condition of natality. Consequently, Arendt proposes that violence is the means that defines politics and for action and change to take place. Given that, Arendt examines the challenges against liberal peace within the political realm and has a vision for an alternative politics, another important element is to examine how pacification is used to maintain and/or fabricate liberal peace worldwide.

## **2.2. Neocleous and the concept of Pacification**

Pacification seeks to maintain or impose a new social order organized around capitalism, while maintaining peace and security within it (Neocleous, 2014). The capitalist social order is maintained and protected through the reordering of the social world and the production of disciplined non-disruptive workers (Neocleous, 2006; Jackson, 2014). To achieve this, resistance to the bourgeois order must be eliminated by first shaping the behaviour of subjects in accordance with the hegemonic discourse. Neocleous argues there is a nexus of instruments that are utilized for pacification to take place: accumulation, war power and police power. These are interconnected and employed by the state under the banner of peace and security and protected under regular law (Neocleous, 2008). This section will discuss the various elements and how they come to produce pacification.

Neocleous (2007) explains capital accumulation is the separation of workers from the means of production, while the commodities produced become the property of the bourgeoisie. Violence, force and other powers such as discipline and regulation are utilized to maximize productivity and capital (Neocleous, 2011). The brute force used to create capital is used as a means to destroy the current social order. As a result, capital is produced through the exploitation of the workers, consequently creating a class tension between the workers and the bourgeois. It is further suggested the process of capital accumulation occurred within the transformation of the feudal mode of production into the capitalist mode and continues to occur today. The creation of capitalism and its future organizations is the violence; Neocleous refers to as the process of pacification (2011).

From this perspective, the best means for achieving pacification involves a combination of brute force and politics (Neocleous, 2011, p.195; Gallieni, 1994). Force is conceptualized as destruction and used only as a last resort and only as the first step towards reconstruction. Politics signifies reconstruction and it is where real pacification lies. It is through politics that the capitalist liberal order is maintained, fabricated, structured and administered (Neocleous, 2011, 2000, 2008). In particular, politics involves the construction of a liberal welfare state, in which society becomes more modernized and markets and trades are re-established (Neocleous, 2011, p.197). From this perspective, power is a complex concept conceptualized as domination and persuasion. Power is conceptualized as domination through the use of violence and force to destroy or maintain the current social order. More importantly, power lies at the center of politics through the use of persuasion and deliberation to fabricate and administrate the

social order. To maintain the imposed capitalist social order, pacification relies on a conjunction of military and police functions to crush the resistance and opposing forces.

Neocleous urges to think about war power and its use of warfare as inseparable from the concealed war between the capitalist class and the working class (2014, Marx, 1977). This social war has been occurring since the colonisation of the social world where violence is used to continue to discipline the proletariat for the benefit of capital (Neocleous, 2014). Similarly, police power must also be viewed in a different manner. Police power is in 'constant war against the enemies of order' (Neocleous, 2008, p. 14). This includes fighting against the criminal, indecent, and the disorderly to maintain the political economy throughout the state. Neocleous suggests taking a critical perspective towards war power and police power and away from the manner they are often studied. The distinction between the two powers is irrelevant and suggests assuming that these two powers are 'always, already working together' (Neocleous, 2014, p. 13). In particular, the technologies required for law enforcement and for military operations are dynamically linked and their roles have blurred. The unclear distinction between these forces has facilitated police to become a central mode through which war power is now simultaneously applied and hidden (Neocleous, 2014, p. 11). Police have the ability to use lethal weapons or lethal force typically used in military operations into situations such as protests or uprisings that threaten the current social order. This enables war to function under a different label while producing similar violence. Together, both powers function as state power and participate in the protection or construction of social order. For instance, Dafnos (2003) suggests that contemporary policing practices and liberal legalism are used to produce the 'good' subject and legitimize means of political

contention for the purpose of shaping conduct. While, negotiation-based approach policing is used to monitor conduct and make distinctions between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ protesters, and subsequently enabling the use of coercive practices for ‘those who do not exercise their rights ‘properly’ (Dafnos, 2013, p. 60). In this context, both the liberal law and police power are used in conjunction for the purpose of achieving pacification and producing docile subjects.

The core logic of police and war power is peace and security and thus, the state and capital are also governed around this logic. When discussing the security discourse, Neocleous argues that security is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and liberalism (Neocleous, 2013). Further, security should not be understood as some kind of universal value, but rather as an apparatus in which the key task is pacification. In other words, security has become a ‘master narrative’ used by the state to justify a particular social order and reshape society through violence (Neocleous, 2011, p. 4). The author further argues the state and capital are connected through security. The security mechanism is used as a strategy for both sustained capital accumulation and a constant political policing of society (Neocleous, 2014). In this context, the interests of the state and capital are aligned with each other and protected by security. The security industry introduces security by first selling the culture of insecurity and fear. Then, security must never be achieved in order for the capital and the state to continue to profit.

The process of ‘securing insecurity’ takes place in everyday life and internationally, given that resistance sustains a permanent insecurity to capitalism. For instance, Neocleous argues that the ‘war on terror’ is used as a violent way to fabricate world order (2011). This is achieved by first criminalizing the war as a

‘counterinsurgency’ in order to use forms of police and military engagement to produce security and maintain the liberal order. Further, the return of the term ‘civilization’ in the way the conflict is framed, creates distance between the Western World and the enemy while labelling them uncivilized or savages that need to be replaced by the “‘pacific world of civilization” (Neocleous, 2011, p. 154). In this context, the internal and external dynamics have intertwined in order to maintain the neoliberal order. Jackson (2013) further adds that liberal states frame the politics of national security in a particular way in order to ‘depoliticize’ subjects. De-politicisation is pacification, as it forces subjects to be unwilling and unable to resist the current social order. In the context of the ‘war on terror’, Jackson explains that securitization excludes all but the state in defining the problem and framing political activism. As a result, in order for citizens to participate, persons’ must first conform to the state’s position and discourse or be labeled ‘extremists’ (Jackson, 2013). Pacification takes place not only in the policing of protests in the name of security, but also in producing docile subjects whose approach to political activism is non-disruptive.

Dafnos (2013) further supports the concept of pacification and anti-security and argues it is present in the context of Indigenous peoples’ continuous settler colonialism. Pacification attempts to eradicate existing Indigenous societies while establishing a new society on expropriated land that also erases its colonial past (Wolfe, 2006; Dafnos, 2013). In particular, the author argues that settler-colonial pacification is operating through the organizing logics of security and liberal legalism. Pacification is achieved through the framing of indigenous resistance as a security threat based on the perceived ‘potential’ for violence. This ‘risk’ posed by Indigenous protests provides the rationale for

surveillance and the production of intelligence on Indigenous communities as a normalized colonial practice. Pacification is also evident in the specific legal strategies used in fabricating Indigenous colonial order in such as the expropriation of land, displacement and confinement of Aboriginal people, and assimilation mechanisms such as residential schools.

Pacification tends to operate under the banner of peace. Peace and war tend to be recognized as dichotomous concepts; however, Neocleous as well as other academics challenge this notion and argue that peace is the continuation of war through the process of pacification (2014). In the past few decades, liberalism has been seen as inherently peaceful (Nussbaum, 2009). Neocleous argues liberalism likes to “threaten violence while denying or masking the violence it inflicts in the name of liberal order” (Neocleous, 2014, p.46). In other words, liberalism commits as much violence as other systems, but hides its actions behind the banner of peace and democracy. In this context, the objective of pacification is the destruction (force) of an existing social system, followed by the reconstruction (politics) of a new social order with its characteristics of liberal democracy and accumulation. Politics is the method used under the logic of peace and subsequently ‘politics is the continuation of war by other means’ (Foucault, 1975). At the same time, the foundation of liberalism in commerce and free markets allows it to expand and increase accumulation under the banner of peace. According to Saborio (2013), the mega-events in Rio de Janeiro triggered the pacification of the favelas. The author argues that mega-events are a tool to reconstruct the urban landscape around the logic of security and the needs of global investment under the banner of safety and peace. The state uses a

combination of force and politics to impose pacification. For instance, the UPP<sup>10</sup> police attempted to neutralize the marginal population in the favelas by forcing residents to accept market rules in their communities.

Saborio (2013) further improves the concept of pacification by proposing that there is always a possibility of resistance. In the context of the pacification of the favelas, residents took advantage of the opportunity produced by the mega-events to improve social conditions inside the favelas. Community organizations and residents in Rio de Janeiro joined forces to implement preventative actions against police brutality. Further, civil society shared strategies on how to avoid and fight police brutality and forced removal. The motto of their demonstration was the call for “peace not pacification” (Saborio, 2013, p. 140). The major challenge for the UPP was to contain daily forms of micro-resistance and spontaneous riots that led to the UPP killing residents of the occupied territories (Cano, 2012). In short, Saborio’s objective is to emphasize that resistance and struggle against pacification always occur and should not be disregarded by researchers.

In sum, Neocleous and the academics share similar conclusions with respect to the elements that together produce the process of pacification. Pacification is used to eliminate resistance by utilizing security and legal mechanisms for the establishment of a particular social order that favours neoliberal peace. In particular, pacification is used by the state to reduce violence and subsequently, minimize political participation and contestation between groups sharing varying discourses of the conflict at hand.

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<sup>10</sup> UPP- Rio de Janeiro Pacifying Police Units. This was the new model of “community policing” launched in 2008 by the Security department of the State of Rio de Janeiro, the federal government and private sector funds. The objective was to affirm the presence of the state in the favelas by using constant pervading presence of the military police in the communities. The program was implemented in 107 favelas.

### **2.3. Coherence of Conceptual Framework**

Neocleous' concept of pacification and Arendt's concept of the political take a critical stance and challenge liberal peace. However, the difference lies in the focus of analysis. Neocleous and other authors describe the role and function of contemporary liberal peace through the process of pacification as filled with force, resistance, war power and depoliticization. In contrast, Arendt challenges representative democracy and offers constitutional politics as the alternative solution. The author views constitutional politics as citizens having active political freedom and the capacity to engage in equal deliberation and contestation for the benefit of the public sphere.

Together, Arendt and Neocleous' analysis complement each other, and offer a more detailed and holistic picture of the challenges and limitations of liberal peace. Both authors examine the socio-economic and political structures as well as the power relations that exist within the state and society. For instance, Neocleous analyses the connection between war, liberalism and power while Arendt focuses on political action, violence, power and democracy. Both authors also acknowledge the importance of accumulation and capital but in different contexts. Neocleous uses a broader context and argues that war power and police power supported by legal mechanisms are used to protect and ensure the advance of capitalism. Neocleous further mentions that politics just like warfare is used to maintain capital, but does not go in-depth of the complexities of politics. Rather, politics is discussed as a soft approach that citizens do not utilize to its full potential, while used by the state to depoliticize and ensure conformity. In contrast, Arendt's concept of the political and critique of representative democracy will help fill this gap in order to develop a deeper understanding of the peace negotiation process. Like

Neocleous, Arendt argues that representative democracy serves economic and personal interests as opposed to the authentic political aims of democracy. In both contexts, citizens are viewed as consumers than as active citizens with political freedom, while the state and corporations frame conflicts and control the discussion around it by using labels and discourse to create good and bad protesting. This reduces democracy to voting, while limiting active participation and rights to involvement in matters of 'security'. Arendt describes the limits of political participation in her critique of representative democracy.

Further, the author presents an alternative, that of participatory democracy and freedom of political action within the public sphere. Arendt's idea of the constitution is also important in the context of peace negotiations. The constitution is vital for negotiations and politics to take place, especially when contending the conditions of peace agreements and changing governmental structures. Combining both theories will render the critical analysis of peace negotiations as a moment of politics and pacification.

Neocleous and Arendt also share a similar perspective on the role of resistance and violence. Arendt takes a more theoretical approach by defining violence and force. Further, the author encourages voicing political concerns and in some cases using violence to induce change for the public good, while Neocleous explains that violence is controlled by the state and used to shape the social order and the docile subjects. In this context, Arendt promotes a better democracy or an increase in citizen involvement in political matters, while Neocleous demonstrates that this often does not occur because of de-politicisation as pacification. Consequently, through pacification, a passive liberal democracy is constructed. However, Arendt seeks to challenge passive liberal democracy by bringing back the public sphere and encouraging political action. Together both

authors help to understand how liberal peace functions in the real world, while providing alternative to change the current social order governed by capitalism.

## **2.4. Limitations of Conceptual Framework**

The chosen conceptual framework has certain points of incompatibility in regards to how the authors conceptualise power and politics. For Neocleous, power is conceptualized as hierarchical and embedded in class relations. In contrast, Arendt proposes an alternative power, horizontal power, which is exercised as collective through cooperation and communication. Although at first glance there is a clear inconsistency in the conceptualization of power, for the purposes of this project, this difference may actually provide a more holistic picture of the topic in question. In this project, Neocleous' notion of class power could be used to explain the form of power existing under liberal peace in Colombian society, while Arendt's conception of power may be used to describe the FARC-EP's alternative notion of power that would occur once their proposed changes and solutions are properly implemented. In this manner, the thesis is not combining both powers and suggesting both occur at the same time. Rather, class power will be used to describe power under the current liberal order, while the collective power is used to describe a transformation in power.

Similarly, Arendt and Neocleous have different conceptions of politics. Neocleous views politics as pacification within the current system. In other words, Neocleous shares a narrow definition of politics, which favours representative democracy and seeks to eliminate resistance. In contrast, Arendt allows for violence

as revolution in order to establish a new social order and a new constitution through collective action and negotiation. Although this difference can appear problematic, it actually provided me with a more complex understanding of peace negotiations.

## **Chapter 3: Methodology**

In this chapter, I outline the epistemological stance and methodology approach used to conduct this research. Next, I provide a brief outline of the research question and research goals. In the following section, I describe documentary analysis and data production techniques. In particular, I explain the decisions I made with respect to sampling, data collection. Then, I discuss thematic analysis and the decisions made with respect to analyzing the material. The chapter concludes with the limitations of this thesis.

### **3.1. Critical Paradigm**

Using a critical epistemological framework, the goal of this project is to analyse the FARC-EP's production of alternative conceptualization of peace as means of resisting liberal peace and reshape the political and socio-economic structures of Colombian society. In doing so, my research contributes to the critical literature that challenges liberal peace. By unpacking the alternatives produced by the FARC-EP documents, my research also attempts to draw attention away from the capitalist dominant discourses commonly accepted as truth and provide with an alternative view that can produce institutional change (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2001).

As a critical researcher, it is important to highlight that knowledge is not a neutral tool, but rather a political instrument that seeks to maintain or reform the social order (Cropley, 1998; Schultze & Stabell, 2004). While knowledge can be a tool for oppression, it can also be a powerful "tool for emancipation and liberation" (Schultze & Stabell, 2004, p. 559). By analysing the discourse of a political-military organization, my objective is to provide an analytical description of the discourse, which inevitable aims to

produce a particular reality and instigate change in a society organized and structured by capitalism. In this context, the political documents exist as “objects of knowledge” or carriers of meaning and are part of the reality being studied (Reckwitz, 2002, p. 196). Analysing the documents demonstrates how the FARC-EP attempt to alter the historical, political, cultural and socio-economic structures that shape reality.

### **3.2. Research Question and Research Goals**

Having introduced the FARC-EP, it is evident their decision to take power is due to the Colombian state’s tradition to work systematically toward producing better conditions for the development of capital and the advancement of capital interest. Capitalism has produced particular modes of governance, distributions of power as well as specific conceptualizations of politics, justice and peace. In opposition to this, the FARC-EP has fought against the Colombian state in order to replace capitalism (as the force organizing and structuring society) with an alternative economic model that challenges current modes of governance, distribution or power as well as the conceptualization of the politics, justice and peace. The continued stalemate between the warring parties and the reduction in the FARC-EP’s military strength has resulted in both parties changing their strategy from use of military force to negotiations as a means to put an end to the armed conflict. The negotiations become then a new terrain through which the Colombian state attempts to impose liberal peace while the FARC-EP attempts to impose a different view of peace.

The main goal is therefore to analyse how the FARC-EP attempts to impose a peace that is not liberal. My specific research goals include: identify the elements the FARC-EP deem necessary preconditions to the development of critical peace; examine

the concrete and immediate changes that the FARC-EP consider crucial to create proper conditions for a real transformation of society; analyse the deep structural transformations the FARC-EP view as essential for lasting peace. The first specific goal aims to highlight the preconditions necessary for the re-politicization of the conflict. The second goal seeks to identify the problems and solutions. The third goal describes how the FARC-EP re-conceptualize power, politics, justice and security.

### **3.3. Documentary Analysis**

#### **3.3.1. Data Production Techniques**

Originally, the objective of this project was to analyze how the discourses of the FARC-EP and Colombian state evolve throughout the negotiation process to examine which perspective became the dominant discourse in the final agreement. To do so, I was going to analyze the reflections and proposals of the warring parties to show politics in action and its production of a political system. This proved to be unfeasible, given that the Colombian government does not publish their negotiation proposals. Given that the original objective of this project could not be pursued, the scope of the project was narrowed down to only analyzing the FARC's discourse.

Documentary analysis was used to examine the material. This method of analysis is a form of qualitative research in which documents or records are interpreted to give voice and meaning to the topic of study (Bowen, 2009). Documents and records include written material such as public documents produced for 'official purposes' by social institutions and organizations published on the Internet (Esterberg, 2002). Some of the problems of this technique lie in having no control over the quantity, quality and form of data (Platt, 1981). Other problems include authenticity, availability of documents, lack of

choice in sampling and making poor inferences due to over-interpretation and misinterpretation (Platt, 1981). However, the challenges of documentary analysis are not “significantly different than research using other data sources” and can be dealt through scepticism of the material and systematic procedures (Platt, 1981, p.49).

The material was collected through the examination of publicly accessible documents published online by the FARC-EP Peace Delegation ([www.pazfarc-ep.org](http://www.pazfarc-ep.org)). This website is in Spanish and claims to include all documents relating to the peace process such as FARC-EP press releases, proposals, blogs, tweeter posts, joint communiqués and agreements with the Colombian government Peace Delegation. When navigating the FARC-EP Peace Delegation website to search for material, I found a timeline of the peace process dating from January 2011 to August 2016 to the final ceasefire. I used this timeline to find important dates and documents that were relevant to the research question. I created a Word document to produce a revised timeline with descriptions of the respective political documents that surged on those dates. This revised timeline included 20 documents that were of potential use to this research. Following this step, I met with my thesis supervisor to review the online timeline and identify the most relevant documents that could be of use to answer the research question.

Through purposive sampling,<sup>11</sup> I selected documents that possessed relevant information to my project. My goal was to produce an in-depth description of the complexities of the FARC-EP’s discourse and not generalize the findings to all the documents published for the negotiation table. Therefore, I selected documents that were

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<sup>11</sup> Purposive sampling is a technique used to carefully select material based on the objective of the research with the expectation that the material will provide unique and rich information of value to the study (Suen & Lee, 2014). As a result, sample size is determined by data saturation, meaning sampling ends once the material collected adds nothing new to the study (Suen & Lee, 2014).

most relevant to answering the research question and manageable in light of the time restraints for the completion of the Master's thesis. The material collected is limited to 4 reflections and 5 proposals. In total, 350 pages of material were collected throughout a 7-month period. This material was downloaded and saved to my hard-drive, following this, it was printed for analysis.

The documents selected included five negotiation proposals and four reflections on justice. Once the documents were identified, I returned to the online timeline to find the documents; however, the web links to the official documents were not working properly and thus, I had to navigate the website to find them. After a tedious search in the FARC-EP's delegation press releases, I found the four reflections on justice as four separate documents released on four different dates. Three proposals were published under the "Proposals by the FARC-EP" tab on the top menu bar: 100 minimum proposals on rural and agrarian development, 100 proposals on political participation and 50 proposals on illicit drugs. All three proposals were available for download as PDF files and included a professional layout with local artwork and photos.

Apart from these documents, the 10 minimum proposals about victims' integral rights and the 10 minimum proposals to guarantee the end of the conflict, national reconciliation and the construction for a stable and long lasting peace were also collected for analysis. However, these proposals were published as press releases and uploaded as separate documents. I searched for them through numerous press releases, as they were not released consecutively and could not be found on the search bar. These proposals were not available as PDF files and did not include any local artwork or distinct layout like the first three proposals aforementioned. Nonetheless, all five proposals were used

for this project. The documents were collected from the original source and in their original language, as translated documents could tamper or misinterpret the meaning of the documents (Polkinghorne et al., 2005)

The documents I did not select included: partial agreements on the five points of the negotiation agenda, guidelines, FARC-EP press release, joint press releases by the warring parties and the final and revised agreement. Given that the focus was to solely examine the FARC-EP's discourse with respect to the four central themes and their conceptualization of peace, these documents were excluded, as it extends beyond the scope of this project.

### **3.4. Thematic Analysis**

Thematic analysis is the selected analytical strategy for this project. It is commonly utilized to identify, organize and analyze material produced in and by people, situations, and events (Floersch et al, 2010; Boyatzis, 1998; Braun and Clark, 2006; Patton, 2002; Riessman, 2008). The flexibility of thematic analysis provided me with a straightforward analytical technique that contained few prescriptions and procedures (Braun & Clarke 2006; Nowell et al., 2017). This allowed flexibility with the working material by allowing the modification of the analytic strategy to include more themes, change categories and create a thematic map to explain the phenomenon. Furthermore, through its theoretical freedom, thematic analysis is compatible with the critical lens guiding this project (Braun & Clarke, 2006; King, 2004).

The analytical process began with a coding phase. The process of creating codes was both pre-set and open. The technique of open coding<sup>12</sup> was first used, as it is an important step because “no insights or theories can bring forth from the data without the researcher becoming completely familiar with them” (Elo & Kyangas, 2007, p. 109). The four reflections on justice were the only documents analyzed using open coding. Although I completed a preliminary reading of the material, this step required in depth reading of the documents to identify patterns and themes<sup>13</sup>. During the first reading of the four reflections on justice, I coded all matters raised by the FARC-EP. This was achieved by highlighting phrases and sentences within the PDF documents using different colours and then employing the copy-paste feature to transfer blocks of text to a Word document (Maguire & Delahunt, 2017). The important sentences and patterns were then placed in a chart where the connections were better identified and themes were created. For instance, I identified themes such as the FARC-EP as a sovereign entity and political crime as legitimate and necessary within democratic states. The themes were then used to write a summary of each reflection and better understand the FARC-EP’s discourse with respect to the problem.

After open coding a coding scheme was developed for the FARC-EP’s five proposals (please refer to appendix A). During the first reading, I coded all the problems raised by the FARC-EP’s proposals. Some of the problems raised in the documents were: the cultivation of the coca leaf by peasants as a national problem; excessive concentration of power in the executive branch of government; justice system as corrupt and influenced by powerful groups; sub-demographics lack of/poor access to land. Each problem was

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<sup>12</sup> Open Coding- “process of closely inspecting text to look for recurrent themes, topics or relationships, and marking similar passages or label to categorize them for a later retrieval” (SAGE Reference, 2010, p.2).

<sup>13</sup> Theme- a patterned response or meaning found within the material analyzed (Braun & Clark, 2006)

highlighted using a designated colour and number. As I continued to read the printed versions, I looked for the following conditions of the problems: cause, consequence, solution, result, condition and principle. All categories were also noted on a separate sheet of paper called Coding Scheme. The purpose of this document was to maintain consistency with my note taking to facilitate the finding of a particular category at a later time.

After I completed the first reading, I conducted a second reading of the material to ensure the codes I had assigned reflected the FARC-EP's discourse as accurately as possible. After reviewing the preliminary coding group, I determined that some categories were too broad, and further divided them into smaller codes. For instance, the code of: State politics as corrupted and privatized was further divided by adding a separate code called narco-paramilitary structures in the state. By doing so, categories became more complex as more codes were added for better understanding. Finally, I typed up the codes and categories into a Word document to facilitate the access and searching of codes. Once I had the categories, I organized them into four larger themes: justice, peace, politics and justice. During the third reading, I reviewed the material and codes one last time to ensure nothing important had been excluded. These multiple readings largely targeted the symbolic features of a text, rather than the physical data (Berg & Lune, 2012). The overlaps between categories and themes showed capitalism to be the key source of the problems leading to the emergence and continuation of the conflict. For instance, capitalism was exhibited as the key source of the drug problem within Colombia, including the continuation of the war on drugs, criminalization of cultivators, consumer and the coca leaf.

Furthermore, despite each theme being distinct, each one is influenced by the other themes. In other words, justice, politics power and peace are interconnected. As a result, I organized the recurrent themes into a conceptual map. Doing this allowed for the linking of codes in order to better understand the process of conceptualization of each theme (Floersch et al, 2010; Aronson, 2004). For instance, having explained the current modes of governance with its respective codes, it is then linked by making a connection to the political system. In this instance, the current mode of governance leads to a particular political system, which then results in using politics to benefit particular groups through the use of national security strategy and Anti-drug policies. After doing this for every theme, I then put it altogether to explain the FARC-EP's discourse in preparation for peace negotiations with the Colombian state. This process was divided into four sections: describe how the FARC-EP conceptualize peace, re-politicize the conflict, address the problems generated by and needed for capitalism, and how the FARC-EP produces an alternative view of politics, justice, power and security. Thus, through the creation of the thematic map, I was able to create a better picture of the FARC-EP's discourse in resisting liberal peace and generating an alternative ways of thinking about peace.

### **3.5. Limitations of the research**

One of the key limitations of thematic analysis concerns the potential of inaccurate interpretation of the material through over interpretation (Li & Seale, 2007). The risk of over interpretation occurs when researchers are actively looking for something in particular and not being sceptical of their findings (Platt, 1981). With respect to this thesis, I was the only researcher coding the material, the interpretation of

the material and the themes that were drawn out were solely left to my own judgement. However, my thesis supervisor reviewed the documents and the codes in its original language to minimize the possibility of over interpretation. As a Spanish native speaker, I was able to read and understand the material without concern. Additionally, political terms that I did not understand were searched using Google translate and online dictionaries. However, the number of terms searched was minimal and rather specific such as “Cámaras Territoriales” meaning territorial chambers or “curules” signifying political seats. To further prevent over-interpretation from influencing this project, I kept a reflective journal where I consistently questioned my techniques and motives, in order to avoid confirming claims far more easily than questioning them (Miles & Huberman, 1994). I also provided a detailed account of how the research findings were obtained and included a rigorous coding scheme for reference.

There are also a few shortcomings concerning the selected political documents. For instance, the discussions that surged due to the proposals are not known, including the final and revised agreement. Since the drafts and partial/final agreements were not included, there is an inability to describe the entire evolution of the FARC’s discourse; how it changed and when they gave ground during the peace negotiations. Due to this limitation, there is only a snapshot of the beginning of the negotiations. In other words, a description of what the FARC-EP came wanting from the negotiations is analyzed but not the results of the negotiations. However, given that the project focuses solely on the FARC-EP’s discourse, the selected political documents are enough to produce rich complex description of the discourse and conceptualization of the central themes in question.

## **Chapter Four-Analysis**

This chapter provides an analytical description of the FARC-EP Peace Delegation proposals prepared in anticipation for the peace negotiations with the Colombian state. The FARC-EP resist liberal peace by bringing to the negotiation table an alternative conceptualization of peace that is not liberal in nature. To accomplish this, it requires re-politicizing the conflict; identifying the problems and solutions; reconceptualising politics, power, justice and security to achieve a durable peace. In particular, the second section involves identifying the elements the FARC-EP consider essential to the development of critical peace. The third section examines the specific changes the FARC-EP deem vital to produce the appropriate conditions for a real transformation of society. The fourth section explores the deep structural transformation the FARC-EP view as necessary for long lasting peace.

### **4.1. The FARC-EP's conceptualization of peace**

For over 50 years the FARC-EP has aimed to replace liberal peace (focused on limiting visible violence that threatens capitalist social order) with an alternative form of peace (focused on eradicating structural violence produced by the current capitalist order). Through the documents produced in the peace negotiations, liberal peace is replaced by another way of thinking about peace, focusing on the deep structural problems, calling for social justice, replacing national security by integral security and developing political participation beyond electoral voting and representative democracy. The FARC-EP views peace in the same light as in the critical literature, as a combination of justice, politics and security that seeks to ensure social justice and social stability

through formal and informal institutions (Bobichand, 2012; Mac Ginty, 2008). Through these elements, the FARC-EP sees peace as what “generates real and material conditions” for the people of Colombia (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2015, p.5). The FARC-EP’s alternative view of peace differs from the state’s implicit support for liberal peace. For instance, the FARC-EP states:

Peace does not mean the silence of the rifles, instead it involves the transformation of the structure of the state and signifies changing the political, economic and military conditions. If peace is not simply demobilization, it is necessary to remove the causes that generated the conflict and first heal the rotten institutions (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2013b, p.20).

My analysis shows that just like Schmit (1968) and Carroll (1972), the FARC-EP oppose liberal peace and its imposition to end the manifested conflict (Schmit, 1968; Carroll, 1972). Furthermore, the FARC-EP explains “a peace that does not address solutions to the economic, political and social problems that generated the conflict is at a whim and tantamount to sowing chimeras in the soil of Colombia” (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2013b, p.15). Through this colourful illustration, the FARC-EP implies liberal peace will not be durable or long lasting; rather it will sow further violence and more problems within Colombia. In combination, the FARC-EP opposes the top down approach to peace, which is a tendency within liberal peace, by advocating for domestically rooted, and context-specific building of peace. The FARC-EP highlights the role of local communities as vital to peacebuilding:

In the discussion of development plans, public policies and, in general, in issues that concern the community, to effectively impact the decisions of the corresponding authorities and public corporations. In this way, citizen participation becomes a real complement and, at the same time, a mechanism for controlling the system of political representation and public administration for the protection of national sovereignty (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2013b, p.70)

By challenging liberal peace, the FARC-EP seeks to transform the current social order governed by the capitalist economic system, injustices and power imbalance into a new system composed of social justice, integral security and greater political participation.

The FARC-EP has fought to eliminate systemic violence and repression for decades in order to achieve peace. For instance, the FARC-EP states “the peace that we have wanted, for which we have fought for a long time, has always been to seek to end the inequalities that are so powerful in this country” (2013b, p.15). For this conception of peace to be implemented, it is necessary to eliminate injustices, which requires changes in politics, mode of governance, policies and security. In order to implement peace, the FARC-EP argues, “Peace cannot be obtained through military means, but through dialogue and political participation” (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2014b, p.9). This change in strategy is not surprising, given that achieving peace through military means has been ineffective and the FARC-EP’s military strength has reduced significantly in recent years, risking the possibility of losing the armed conflict at the hands of the state. As a result, this change in strategy is more rational, since the FARC-EP can negotiate with the state and produce a peace agreement that can meet some of its conditions. However, the FARC-EP emphasizes that their willingness to engage in peace negotiations must not be seen as a sign of weakness. For instance, the FARC-EP states:

Those who talk about the end of the guerrilla are mistaken and confuse the willingness for peace talks as an inexistent manifestation of weakness. We have been hurt and we have hurt them, yes...no one in the FARC-EP are discouraged (2013b, p. 21).

Consequently, the FARC-EP denies or hides the fact that reduction in military strength could be a possible factor that has driven them to change their tactics.

The FARC-EP view peace as the ultimate goal, which must be acknowledged as a complex political process that needs to be situated locally and developed domestically by Colombian society. The FARC-EP explains:

The promotion of both political pluralism, social organizations and movements and, in general, democratic debate, requires new spaces for dissemination so that the parties, organizations and communities that participate in the construction of peace have access to spaces in channels and stations at the national, regional and local levels. Additionally, the construction of peace requires the participation of the territories most affected by the Congress of the Republic to ensure the political inclusion of those territories and their populations, as well as the representation of their interests (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2013b, p.70)

Through this quote, the FARC-EP highlights how local actors produce peace through deliberation and negotiation, without external intervention. In this manner, local communities who have experienced the consequences of the conflict and the structural injustices in their region must be the main actors who build peace through politics. Building peace through politics involves strengthening the political guarantees and capacities of local persons and creating greater inclusion through the establishing of organization, and different social and political movements. In doing so, local people contribute to the pluralistic society by sharing their interests, needs and solutions. At the same time, the change in strategy is justified as a realization of the importance of using negotiation and the inclusion of the population to achieve peace. Peace negotiations are a vital step to increase political participation of local persons, as it represents acceptance of new ways of doing politics. In the same manner, negotiation recognizes the internal conflict as political in nature and must be negotiated within its wider political socio-economic conditions (Albin, 2001).

This alternative view of peace cannot be achieved without re-politicizing the conflict, addressing the actual sources of the problem and consequently, producing alternative views of politics, power, justice and security. In doing so, the FARC-EP align with the critical literature by resisting liberal peace with its inadequate concern for local needs and its protection of the capitalist social order. (Mac Ginty, 2006; Hoffman, 2007).

## **4.2. Re-politicizing the Conflict**

Given that the FARC-EP conceptualizes peace as the ultimate goal, it is important to understand how the Colombian state uses what Neocleous (2011) describes as de-politicization as pacification to maintain liberal peace. There are three instances of de-politicization by the Colombian state. De-politicization took place by: labelling the inequalities and injustices as something other than political such as economic or development issues; depicting the FARC-EP and any other actor involved in the conflict as criminal/terrorist, and framing the conflict as a counter-insurgency war or as a fight against terrorism. Having identified these three instances, I will now explore how the FARC-EP thinks about each one and the consequences of each of these framings.

By recognizing the structural inequalities and injustices as political issues that need to be transformed, the FARC-EP analyzes the conflict as political (FARC-EP Delegación de Paz, 2014b). In the documents, the FARC-EP states:

If that persecution and extermination had not existed, if the intolerant excluding and violent regime had allowed us to conduct politics through peaceful methods, we would have never emerged as an expression of popular resistance (FARC-EP Delegación de Paz, 2014b, p.2).

From this perspective, the conflict began due to the state's repression and inability to conduct negotiations and dialogue to address the structural conditions. As a result, the

armed conflict is viewed as political; engaging in political violence to change the political socio-economic conditions impacting Colombian society. In other words, violent means are thought of as a component of political means, while peace negotiations are the political means to change systemic structures and transform society. Together, both emphasize the inequalities and injustices as political issues that were in fact de-politicized by the Colombian state in order to protect the social order and the interest of capital. By redefining the conflict as political, the FARC-EP aim to address the underlying causes of the conflict through politics in order to obtain peace; aligning with the critical literature on conflict being a necessary pre-condition for systemic change (Schmid, 1968). Once the inequalities and injustices are acknowledged as political issues, the military means used to address them also become political. As the FARC-EP explains, “Precisely, the violation of these fundamental rights of the population by the State, its policies and its agents, fully justifies the exercise of our right to rebellion” (2014c, p.4).

However, the Colombian state did not present the FARC-EP in such a way. Drawing from Parsons (2000) and Askew (2010), the FARC-EP concludes the state used the terrorist label to de-politicize their actions and goals, and ultimately portraying them as illegitimate actors not worthy of negotiations and with no right to rebellion. In using this label, the FARC-EP has been portrayed as an internal enemy, which must be eliminated through the counter-insurgency war (FARC-EP Delegación de Paz, 2013b). As Neocleous (2011) argues, a ‘master narrative’ is produced through the use of security and legal mechanisms to pacify resistance and maintain the social order through violence.

The re-politicization of the conflict, inequalities and injustices and of their political-military organization has concrete consequences. These include the

decriminalization of the FARC-EP, their recognition as political actors, the identification of the conflict as a political struggle, the re-politicization of the problems as repercussions of the social order and its political socio-economic conditions and finally criminalizing the actions of the state and capital. The FARC-EP proposes the historical truth of the conflict will be better framed once the problems and their consequences have been recognized and accepted:

The clarification of the historical truth and the events that occurred during the conflict constitutes an ethical and political imperative of the FARC-EP with the victims of the conflict and Colombian society in general...The clarification of what happened must explain the origins and causes, the persistence and the impacts of the conflict on the population, while explaining circumstances and events that particularly affected individuals, women and men, communities and processes, violating their rights and life projects. The clarification of the truth implies identifying responsibilities, both individual and collective... (2014b, p. 1).

This quote demonstrates the FARC-EP's call to produce a historical truth that is complex in nature and inclusive of all voices to explain the reasons and consequences of the conflict, and the actors and victims involved. Although this quote does not include the recognition of the consequences aforementioned, the FARC-EP implies their inclusion throughout the documents.

The FARC-EP has used the peace negotiations to demand their recognition as a political-military organization that seeks to end the inequalities and injustices:

The FARC-EP was founded as an organization of the Colombian people to demonstrate resistance against the state's injustices, repression, failed promises to end the era of La Violencia and the exclusion of peasants in their political and economic affairs" (2014c, p. 2).

By making this statement, the FARC-EP connects the conflict and their organization as consequences of the capitalist order and its injustices; ultimately emphasizing their

political nature. At the same time, however, the FARC-EP shines a light on the criminality of the state and the crimes the state committed:

We are not the cause but the response to state violence, the state is the one who must be held accountable under the law and respond for its atrocities and crimes against humanity, for the 300 thousand dead of the so-called era of 'La violencia', for the 5 thousand militants and leaders of Union Patriótica that were killed by paramilitarism as a counter-insurgency strategy of the State, for the displacement of about 6 million peasants, for more than 50 thousand cases of forced disappearance by the massacres and false positives, for the social and humanitarian crisis; in summary it must respond for state terrorism (FARC-EP Delegación de Paz, 2013b, p.21)

It is important to highlight that while the FARC-EP accuses the state of being criminal, the FARC-EP contends that their political-military organization did not commit any crimes, given that it was actually political crime against state repression. By redefining their actions as political crimes, the FARC-EP justifies the harm caused to society, while condemning the state as the primary actor responsible for the casualties. Furthermore, these connections allow the FARC-EP to re-conceptualize the victims of the conflict as victims of politics and the economic system.

In the analysis, the FARC-EP recognizes victims of the conflict as individual and collective victims. When describing individual victims, the FARC-EP recognizes political prisoners, persons victimized by capitalism and the political economy, women and combatant victims of war (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2014b, p. 3). The FARC-EP's description of individual victims is brief and simple compared to their focus on collective victims. When describing victims as a collective, the FARC-EP includes: opposing political organizations; work unions at local and national levels; peasant, indigenous and Afro-descendant organizations; human rights organizations; women organizations and LGBTQ groups (2014b, p. 5-6). The FARC-EP explains these groups have experienced

state repression, segregation, discrimination and state absence in one way or another. The analysis further distinguishes the FARC-EP's definition between victims of direct state crime and indirect state crime. For instance, victims of direct state crime include those who have experienced forced eradication of land by the state or have been persecuted for cultivating coca or cannabis. In contrast, victims of indirect state crime involve persons who have had family members persecuted by the state and experienced the repercussions of the war. The FARC-EP also briefly address the victims of their actions in another section of the document:

The population has not been a main target or secondary target of the defensive or offensive actions of our armed structures, that is, there has never been a policy of subjective determination in the FARC EP for the systematic and deliberate victimization of the population. We explicitly recognize that our actions have affected civilians at different times and circumstances throughout the conflict, which, as it continues, has generated more and multiple impacts, but never as part of our reason for existence (2014b, p.7).

The FARC-EP's conceptualization of their victims is simplified to the 'population' and fails to offer the same complexity and differentiation provided for the collective victims. A potential reason for this may be that the FARC-EP includes their victims within the victims of the conflict or perhaps the FARC-EP fails to truly recognize their own victims, as they hold the state and other institutions accountable for the casualties.

Therefore, victims are viewed as political actors who must be directly involved in the reparation and implementation of the final agreement. Nonetheless, defining victims of the conflict as political actors promotes engagement and active participation to end the conflict and obtain reparation. By guaranteeing the direct political participation of victims, the FARC-EP seeks to "emancipate victims and transform their political socio-economic conditions" (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2014b, p.10). Having broadly

described the FARC-EP's position in regards to the conflict, I will now demonstrate in detail the structural problems that the FARC-EP identifies as leading to the conflict and their proposals to resolve them.

### **4.3. Addressing the problems of and generated by capitalism**

#### **4.3.1. Describing the situation**

Examining the documents has allowed us to identify the rationale behind the FARC-EP's analysis of the problem. The FARC-EP's analysis of the situation depicts Colombian society as intrinsically and extremely unjust. Injustice is produced and heightened by power imbalances within Colombian society. Both are caused and reinforced by specific policies, mode of governance, politics and economy. Although these elements will be presented separately, they actually work together and reinforce each other to maintain and reproduce the capitalist order. Finally, two examples will be provided at the end of the section to explain how these elements work together to produce injustice and inequality.

Having examined the FARC-EP's negotiation documents, it is clear the discourse focuses on inequalities and injustices taking place within territorial regions. The FARC-EP's emphasis on injustices and inequalities occurring in rural regions is not surprising given its roots and controlled areas solely exist within territories. Drawing from Neocleous (2014), the FARC-EP describes a clear divide between landowners and workers that produces a class tension to maximize capital accumulation and productivity. On the one hand, there is a concentration of property owned by latifundistas and transnational companies. On the other hand, peasants and local communities lack an equitable access to fertile land, prompting them to work for latifundistas and businesses

for meagre wages (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2013a&b). As a result, the FARC-EP suggests rural communities experience poor living and working conditions such as “hunger, poverty, poor access to social services, lack of dignified work and underpaid salaries” (FARC-EP Delegación de paz 2013a, p. 47).

The FARC-EP analyzes these socio-economic inequalities and injustice as strengthened by power imbalances:

The persistence of the structural links between the narco-paramilitaries and military, police and intelligence services constitutes an insurmountable barrier of narco-paramilitary power insofar as it fosters political, economic and social control over the territory based on the exercise of violence, which is the basis... for the enlistment of territories to promote new and lucrative business with land and natural resources, and access to public resources (2014a, p.42).

The FARC-EP sees this form of power as a negative force producing domination and control. Further, the FARC-EP draw from Marx and Engels’ (1970) and conclude that power signifies having economic and military resources to impose a will. Those who have power use it as “domination” or “control over” through the use of violence to shape class-consciousness and pacify other groups (Follet, 1942, p.101; Giddens, 1984; Neocleous, 2014). Just as Neocleous (2011), the FARC-EP concludes that power imbalances are due to the class structure created by capitalism, with the ruling class holding the power and using it to exploit the working class. From this position, capitalism eliminates the ability for all groups to prosper equally. Power then carries a negative connotation as it is used to ensure that one group thrives at the expense of another.

Based on the documents, there is a power imbalance within rural regions between latinfundistas and peasants, there is power imbalance within urban spaces between capitalism and workers and there is another power imbalance between urban and rural spaces where rural regions receive less services, funding and state presence. The FARC-

EP contends that as rural regions lack the most state presence and civilian authority compared to urban spaces, the state perpetuates internal pacification and domination within these territories, through what Neocleous (2014) describes as using police power and war power to crush resistance and protect the capitalist order. In doing so, war and police power are employed by the state under the banner of liberal peace and security to legitimize the use of lethal weapons and force (Neocleous, 2014). These forms of power have forced the militarization of land, structural violence and systemic victimization of local coca growers and consumers (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2014b, p. 6-7). The FARC-EP's analysis reinforces Neocleous (2011) and Marx (1977) view on war power and the use of warfare as inseparable from the concealed war between the social classes. In this manner, the state and powerful groups use violence and power as domination to eliminate the possibility for sub-demographics to be self-sustainable, in order to maximize capital and preserve the status quo.

These injustices further support Neocleous (2014) and Dafnos (2013) position on how the state's functioning logic continues to use colonial modes of domination and war machine dynamics against sub-demographics to eliminate resistance. In doing so, capitalism appears to benefit from the inequalities, as it exploits local communities to increase the capital of powerful groups. The power imbalances result from and further entrenches a liberal order with a particular conceptualization of politics that serves to produce a mode of governance with specific elements.

Politics entails the philosophical positioning of how governing should be conceptualized and exercised. For the FARC-EP, the current form of politics is thought of as corrupt and having been influenced and co-opted by the economic sphere. The FAC-

EP implies politics in Colombia further maintains and reproduces the class division within society in order to protect capitalism. From this perspective, politics is reduced to the capitalist logic, serving as a functional apparatus to fabricate and administrate the social order governed by capitalism and class exploitation.

When referring to the mode of governance, it involves the relationship between those who govern and the governed. In particular, it signifies the decision-making process between those who govern to meet the needs of the population. The FARC-EP criticize the market as the mode of governance used within Colombian politics<sup>14</sup>:

Within Colombia's dynamics, the regime does not only kill with its plans of war, with its paramilitaries and assassins, but also with its economic policies that kill with hunger. Today we have come to unmask that metaphysical assassin that is the market, to denounce the criminality of financial capital, to put neoliberalism in the dock of the defendant, as the executioner of persons and the manufacturer of death (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2013b, p.17)

The FARC-EP highlights how the market in fact governs the country through its neoliberal ideology and economic policies. By using this mode of governance, there is limited government and economic liberalization because of “deregulation, massive privatizations and the reduction of public investments to provide more opportunities for the participation of private companies” (Zurbriggen, 2014, p.48). In turn, the state's actions serve to benefit capitalist interests and maintain the status quo. For instance, the FARC-EP claims current governments and economic groups have “monopolized media sources to produce propaganda to benefit capitalist interests, while limiting the voice of the opposition” (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2013b, p. 42). As Neocleous (2014) and Arendt (1979) argue, the state views citizens simply as consumers and workers and not as

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<sup>14</sup> This form of governance incorporates efficiency principles, procedures and measures from the private section, and market mechanism all of which lead to a better performance in public administration. Implemented in the 1980's and 1990's in Latin America by international institutions to improve economic reform within the neoliberal development paradigm (Zurbriggen, 2014).

political subjects who should engage in politics. For example, the FARC-EP argues there is a lack of interest in politics in urban spaces, as they are only “designed as places of consumption, while territories lack governmental services and state civilian authority” (2013b, p.49). Furthermore, the current modes of governance do not seek to engage citizens in politics or stimulate political participation:

In view of the fact that the designs of the economic legal order establish forms of participation limited to consultation without binding character, as in the case of development plans, or simply do not recognize it, or are limited to participation through the mechanisms of representative democracy in the procedure and approval of norms in the Congress, or to the citizen intervention in the procedures of control of constitutionality (2013b, p.33)

As exhibited in the quote, the mode of governance imposed by the Colombian state upholds representative democracy as the system of government founded within the nation. Through representative democracy, civilians outsource their right to political participation to individuals who are elected into office. Drawing from Neocleous, democracy has been reduced to voting, while limiting active participation and rights to involvement in matters of ‘security’ (2014)

Within this particular form of politics, it appears as if persons who govern or make political decisions are those that have the economic resources to invest in a campaign and run for office and are therefore interested in protecting the status quo. In other words, persons who have economic power tend to form part of the public sphere and govern the sub-demographics and low-income groups. The FARC-EP claims politicians are often more interested in maintaining power than public welfare, while the state is too weak to discipline the powerful groups (2013b). For instance, the FARC-EP argues politicians are often involved in different forms of corruption such as taking bribes, having irregular salaries and often diverting public funds to companies and

individuals (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2013b, p.37). These actions limit and threaten the participation of political opposition, minorities, guerrillas and territories/regions. The FARC-EP criticises the credibility and transparency of politicians and demands the reform of this system of government:

Such institutionalization includes the enactment of special legislation, including criminal policy, for the prohibition of corrupt, criminal and mafia practices, which permeate the political and representation system, the electoral regime, and the different public powers, reducing their credibility and transparency and generating powers that are based on the purchase of votes and the exercise of violence. (2013b, 38)

According to the FARC-EP, Colombia is a nation governed by people with great wealth who produce political polarization within the nation, using their power to serve their own interests and thereby increasing class conflict and inequalities. Based on the FARC-EP's analysis, I suggest this conceptualization of politics is similar to what Neocleous says about politics producing a particular mode of governance used to generate and maintain the capitalist social order (Neocleous, 2008, 2011). Through pacification, a passive form of democracy is constructed by limiting political participation and de-politicizing problems to ensure conformity (Neocleous, 2014).

The negotiation documents explain there is also a centralization of political power within the presidency that has undermined and “influenced other branches of government in order to benefit these powerful groups” (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2013b, p.31). I suggest a closed system has been established; a system founded on domination, exploitation and privatization. The closed system has prompted the exclusion of territories and sub-demographics within public affairs, resulting in “unheard voices and a threat to their interests for the benefit of capitalist groups” (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2013b, p. 46). For instance, sub-demographics are not often consulted about mining-

energy projects that will take place within their territories, even though it could pose a great impact to their communities, land and ecosystem (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2013a, p.32). In other words, discussions and agreements mainly involve the state and transnational companies without the direct participation of local communities. In combination, there is a power imbalance that impacts the state's political ordering of the territory:

An authoritarian ordering of the territory, which is conceived as a mere instrument for obtaining juicy profits through the merciless extraction of natural resources, or is inscribed within military consolidation strategies to protect large capital, or to impose power relations based on the structural exercise of state and paramilitary violence (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2013a, p.31)

Indeed, the FARC-EP criticises the state's interest to increase capital through partnership with transnational companies, while neglecting local needs and interests. This mode of governance based on exclusion and privatization has consequently led to a disconnection between state and citizens; an aspect of Hannah Arendt's critique of the economic realm invading the political realm (Bokinić 2009; Wolin, 1983). I suggest the current mode of governance produces particular policies that represent certain interests, specifically those of powerful groups. That is because political leaders' knowledge, experiences, beliefs and power influence policy-making. Most importantly, power becomes a tool necessary for the implementation and enforcement of policies. As Neocleous (2011) argues, policies de-politicize social problems that challenges the status quo, as a means to protect it.

I contend policies produce structural violence by relying on physical violence exerted by police, military and the criminal justice system. Although the state frames the criminal justice system (CJS) as a legitimate and legal force, the FARC-EP opposes this narrative. The FARC-EP criticises the CJS as corrupt, flawed and being under political

influence (2014b). In turn, the CJS receives a negative reputation due to its lack of credibility, transparency and impartiality. As a result, the FARC-EP explains the CJS is unable to ensure human rights and the rule of law. In particular, the FARC-EP reveals the CJS has served to persecute revolutionary combatants, while not persecuting state and corporate crimes (2014c, p. 4). This is because the CJS has failed to acknowledge the FARC-EP's actions as political crime. The FARC-EP claims that although the Constitution of 1991 contains laws about political crime, there has been an:

Orchestration between the Government, Congress, the Crown Attorney Office and a large part of the Judiciary, to deny us such a status of armed uprisings and therefore to refuse to be creditors of those measures that in many experiences of other countries and in Colombia to some degree, have been warned as effective means to guide processes of national reconciliation (2014c, p.1)

This depiction reflects Neocleous' (2014) use of legal mechanisms to pacify resistance, while at the same time disregarding the state's injustices and systemic violence. Fundamentally, the FARC-EP emphasizes that policies, mode of governance, politics and the economy produce injustices such as systemic violence, discrimination and lack of opportunities. I argue that power imbalances and legal mechanisms generate and heighten each of these conditions to establish pacification and produce liberal peace. As a result a centralization of power and a closed system has been produced, whereby certain opposition and non-capitalistic interests are excluded and silenced from participating in politics.

In order to demonstrate how these different elements are put together, I will exemplify how the FARC-EP argues Plan Colombia and the National security strategy serve to de-politicize social problems and the conflict in order to protect the social order governed by capitalism. As previously mentioned, peasants do not have much access to

land and as a result some turn to the cultivation of coca for illicit means in order to improve their living conditions. Consequently, there has been an expansion of coca cultivators, subsequently increasing cocaine trafficking and distribution. Instead of recognizing the lack of access to land as a social problem, the state labels coca production by peasants as “a criminal problem that must be eliminated through the use of policies, the criminal justice system and the military” (FARC-EP Delegación de paz 2014a, p. 21). Due to this, Plan Colombia was established by the Colombian state and the United States in order to combat the nexus between the drug trafficking problem and left-wing insurgents. In other words, eradicating illicit coca cultivations will limit left-wing insurgents’ funding for military operations against the Colombian state, while targeting left-wing insurgents will reduce their zones of control and ‘revolutionary tax’ to continue the cultivation of coca by peasants. The FARC-EP highlights how this policy promotes the stigmatization, persecution and discrimination of consumers and cultivators of coca and cannabis (2014a). I contend this problem is an instance where we can see what Neocleous (2011) describes as the modes of survival become securitized and therefore people become securitized. Policies serve to depoliticize criminalized persons, both cultivators and consumers, turning them into “objects of political domination and social control” (FARC-EP Delegación de paz 2014a, p.17). As Neocleous points out, persons become objects of political decision-making, allowing the state to wield arbitrary power over them in the name of securitization (2014). Consequently, the political voices of these groups are silenced to benefit the interest of the state.

Additionally, Plan Colombia promotes US intervention and militarization of social life particularly in the territories and in poor urban spaces. In accordance with

Jackson (2013), the use of legal mechanisms and de-politicization as pacification reflects the forcing of subjects to be unable to resist the current social order and subsequently produce docile subjects whose approach to activism is non-disruptive.

Plan Colombia also serves to control the narrative about the coca leaf, while silencing opposing perspectives. The FARC-EP argues the Colombian state frames the coca leaf as deadly and harmful; however, the FARC-EP views the coca leaf as “having cultural value and composed of nutritional, medical and therapeutic qualities, especially for Indigenous populations” (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2014a, p. 29). The opposing discourses represent a power imbalance between local communities who view the coca leaf as part of their cultural heritage, while dominant groups who seek to profit by continuing the war on drugs. By controlling the narrative and having the dominant discourse, it facilitates the fight against coca production and the stigmatization of cultivators and consumers, allowing the use of extreme measures.

In order to eradicate the coca fields, the Colombian state with the aid of the United States has taken controversial techniques such as the aerial spraying of glyphosate onto coca plantations, which produce health issues. These chemicals seep into the soil, consequently “destroying the land for future farming and threatening the health of coca workers, particularly that of pregnant women” (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2014a, p. 20). By destroying fertile land, the glyphosate aerial spraying further eliminates the possibility for peasants to be self-sustainable, pushing them back into poverty and to work for transnational companies or latifundistas (2014a). More importantly, however, the destruction of coca plantations appears to be more vital for the state than the health of cultivators and local communities. Through this illustration, it is evident how those who

continue to cultivate risk losing their lands to glyphosate aerial spraying can be criminalized and sent to prison to maintain peace and security. In turn, the FARC-EP's analysis is in line with Jackson (2013), as aerial spraying becomes a tool to eliminate resistance to the current social order and create docile subjects by punishing them with future health concerns, risk of incarceration and unfertile land. Drawing on Neocleous (2014), this phenomenon is also an example of how war power and police power operate under its banners of liberal peace and security to use lethal weapons to eliminate resistance and produce docile subjects.

It is important to highlight that Plan Colombia has also been used to fight left-wing organizations in combination with the National Security strategy. The security doctrine frames the internal conflict as a problem of national security and a threat to democracy to legitimize state crime and victimization. As previously mentioned, the conflict is framed as a counter-insurgency war and the FARC-EP are labelled 'terrorists' to eliminate their legitimacy of rebellion against the social order. In doing so, both are de-politicized to create fear against practices and ideology alternative to democracy (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2014b, p.37, 63). The FARC-EP implies that de-politicizing their organization and framing them as a problem of national security allows the Colombian state to justify the overspending and heightened use of military forces and deadly military equipment to end the 'counter-insurgency war' and pacify the 'terrorists'. This analysis is in accordance with Neocleous (2014), as de-politicisation serves to pacify through the use of war and police power and the constant policing of society. The FARC-EP argues that the militarization of society affects all aspects of life:

Implementing a policy of militarization of political, economic, social, cultural, and communication life subjects social relations as a whole to the logic of confrontation and social control according to military parameters (2014b, p. 8)

In this statement, the FARC-EP illustrates how the militarization of territories serves to inculcate a logic of violence and social control within all aspects of life of the communities. The FARC-EP further adds that militarization of society particularly occurs within communities living inside conflict spaces and in areas with coca plantations for illicit means (2014b). I suggest national security has allowed military forces to occupy territories as a means to pacify potential threats and opposition to state administration and democracy. At the same time, the National Security doctrine allows Plan Colombia to justify systemic victimization and expand the internal conflict through the use of harsher methods and weapons against the FARC-EP and coca cultivators (2014a).

Drawing from Neocleous, the Colombian state appears to be ‘securing insecurity’ by selling a culture of fear and insecurity through policies and war power to generate and maintain capitalism (2014). At the same time, however, Plan Colombia has served to intensify the ‘counter-insurgency’ war, as guerrillas are often connected to drug trafficking to fund their political-military organization. Through these actions, the FARC-EP and coca cultivators are de-politicized and pacified to eliminate resistance and opposition to capitalism. Having illustrated these two examples, I contend that these types of policies are the source of the problem in the reproduction of discrimination, injustice, inequality and lack of opportunities. Together, both strategies serve to pacify resistance, while reproducing systemic victimization and structural inequality. As a result, a cycle of corruption, war and injustice is generated that maintains the liberal order based on capitalism and exploitation.

### **4.3.2. Changes to be implemented**

Having examined the FARC-EP's analysis of the current social problems experienced by Colombian society, I will now explore the concrete and immediate changes the FARC-EP deem necessary to create the conditions for a real transformation of society. First, I will examine the solutions required to redress the power imbalances within Colombian society, followed by the transformation of the mode of governance and the economic changes to eliminate injustice and inequality. Then, I will explain the need to remove the national security doctrine, reform police and military forces and the criminal justice system. Finally, I will discuss the FARC-EP's call for the warring parties to apologize to victims, accept responsibilities and produce a common history of the conflict with the direct participation of victims and civil groups. It is important to highlight that every change proposed must be properly implemented, given that every solution is interconnected with the other. As such, these changes work together to eliminate the problems and change the social order and in turn establish true lasting peace. In turn, failure of implementation of one solution will impact the other and diminish structural change.

#### ***4.3.2.1. Necessary changes for a real transformation of society***

In order to redress power imbalances, the FARC-EP focuses on the structural reform needed for equality. When describing equality, the FARC-EP expresses the need to have equal distribution of resources and opportunities. For instance, this includes food security and social security, such as incorporating the need of social services, proper work conditions, adequate living and dignified work (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2013a, p. 47). These examples, among others, ultimately represent equality as an intrinsic

element of basic human rights. Equality will now be examined in more detail within politics, policies and economic changes.

As previously noted, the FARC-EP describes a current social order based on capitalism and exploitation. Having said that, it is revealed the social order must be changed in order for peace to be established. In the analysis, the FARC-EP implies changing the social order through a transformation in the mode of governance. The FARC-EP describes the need to establish a new political culture founded on local, direct and participative democracy, concepts Arendt considers vital for her vision of politics as active citizenship (Passerin, 2016; Arendt, 1958). By establishing alternative modes of governance, it serves to “overcome the individualistic and competitive nature of capitalism” (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2013b, p. 62). To achieve this, there must be a change in politics. The state should recognize citizens and victims as political actors and motivate persons to have greater political participation in public affairs (2013b, p.23). The FARC-EP’s acknowledgment of individuals as equal political actors beyond labour, reflects Arendt’s (1963) discussion on the *vita activa* and the political. This alternative conceptualization signifies rethinking politics and the way of doing politics and governance. The FARC-EP calls for the development of new programs, initiatives and reforms to materialize politics and stimulate political participation. For instance, the FARC-EP proposes creating a fourth government branch called popular power to serve as citizen oversight over public matters awarded to the executive branch (2014b). Other examples include creating the National Council of Social & Political Participation, the National Electoral Council to “increase citizen participation and effectively control political parties, movements and the electoral process” (FARC-EP Delegación de paz,

2014b, p.36). By increasing political participation, the FARC-EP highlights the need to be inclusive of opposition and diverse views within politics and mode of governance. In doing this, politics is not influenced by capitalism, but by high levels of participation and negotiation for the good of the public (2014b). The FARC-EP aims to transform into a political party and be provided a special peace circumscription to participate in congress. This special circumscription will “allow and guarantee the participation of the FARC-EP...it will have the duration and the number of seats that will be established in the final agreement” (2014b, p.40). In the same manner, the FARC-EP support and advocate for the inclusion of other political/social movements and organizations within public affairs. Nonetheless, any of these initiatives require institutional and constitutional arrangements in order to redesign the system of government institutions and limit centralization (2014b).

It is important to emphasize the FARC-EP focus on implementing political changes within the territories to address concerns over inequality. This is achieved by reorienting the territorial political ordering. The reorientation of territorial political ordering is described as:

Based on the broadest democracy and social participation, aimed at building a society that overcomes injustice and inequality, able to meet their food requirements, to stabilize their communities, to carry out a sustainable management of their environment, and in search of the decent living conditions for its population (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2013a, p.31).

This quote makes a connection between developing political, economic and social reform within the territories as a means to produce integral security<sup>15</sup>.

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<sup>15</sup> Integral security will be analyzed in detail in section 4.4.4.

When discussing politics, the FARC-EP seeks to provide territories with the opportunity to govern their own affairs through the election of representatives and creation of council and assemblies at all levels of government; proposals Arendt (1963) considers vital for participatory democracy. For instance, the FARC-EP proposes the substitution of the Chamber of representatives with the Territorial Chamber, as it would be a “fundamental part of the institutional organization of the legislative power and increase political participation in public matters” (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2013b, p.47). The Territorial Chamber would be selected based on territorial and special circumscriptions (sub-demographics). It is apparent that the FARC-EP seeks to maximize the autonomy and sovereignty of the territories involving social, economic, cultural, environmental, political aspects and community justice. For the FARC-EP, granting territories and rural regions self-autonomy and sovereignty will “prevent urban logic from making changes within the territories, and maintain the territorial way of life” (2013a, p.34). Despite this, it is also clear the FARC-EP aims to provide locals with the opportunity to improve living and working conditions through their own methods to meet their needs.

For the FARC-EP, the political reordering signifies the de-centralization of political power held by powerful landowners and economic groups through the sharing of power by local groups as a means to produce equality (2013b). In doing so, the FARC-EP aims to de-pacify the territories after centuries of latifundista control and domination.

Similarly, the FARC-EP proposes establishing special peace territories known as TERREPAZ:

The special territories for the construction of peace constitute a social and geographic space for the integral transformation of the FARC-EP in its territorial,

political, economic, social and cultural dimension, inhabited by its ex-combatants, family members, relatives, and neighbours of the area, within the constitutional order produced by the peace negotiations and the organizational political and social conditions that derive from the exercise of direct democracy, self-management and community relations, through political lobbying or assemblies (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2015, p. 7).

In this statement, the FARC-EP demonstrates their interest in obtaining power and maintaining territorial sovereignty within the geographical spaces. It also explicit that the FARC-EP seeks to govern and have similar institutions parallel to that of the state to put in play their ideas about how to build a better society. Given that the FARC-EP has been fighting for power for 50 years, this proposal is not surprising.

As previously noted, the current mode of governance develops policies that produce injustice and inequality. The discourse shows that changing these structures will prompt the reformation of current policies. In particular, the FARC-EP reveals the need to transform Plan Colombia (2014b). With this in mind, the objective is to think of the drug problem as caused by the lack of access to land and lack of opportunity. In doing so, the FARC-EP seeks to democratize land redistribution as a means to end the preservation of inequalities and injustices; this will be discussed in the later section. At the same time however, the FARC-EP seek to transform the drug problem into a “public health and human rights issue that is democratic and gender-focused” (2014a p. 75). By becoming a public health and human rights issue, the drug problem is not resolved through legal mechanisms and criminalization, but through increasing free access to therapeutic treatment, rehabilitation, prevention strategies and supervised injection sites (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2014a, p. 39). To do so, the FARC-EP demands the increase of women’s participation in the design and implementation stages of new drug-related

policies. By making this proposal, the FARC-EP acknowledges women's greater lack of access to land and the limited voice women have in the creation and implementation of policies (2014a, p.28). Furthermore, the FARC-EP recognizes the high number of female peasants who work the fields and the fact that women have a hard time obtaining work and pay equity (p.92). Additionally, the FARC-EP note that women are:

The main sector of the population that has suffered the repercussions of war and the impacts of the structural of victimization formed by the dominant classes, such as the historical situations of discrimination and violence that are characteristic of the patriarchal regime, which violates their rights, exerts sexual violence and affects their sexual and reproductive rights (2014b, p. 4).

Given that, the FARC-EP claims to oppose the patriarchy and discrimination against women, their advocacy for women's involvement in the design of new drug-related policies is not surprising. The FARC-EP argues that transforming the drug problem into a public health issue and implementing these changes will end the neoliberal strategy for institutional violence that is Plan Colombia (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2014a). The public health perspective would eliminate the persecution and criminalization of the poor and sub-demographics that consume drugs or cultivate coca leaf for illicit means to improve their living conditions (2014a, p.26). The FARC-EP claims reformulating policies will also result in the de-militarization of occupied rural and urban zones. Furthermore, corrupt politicians, transnational companies and US intervention would no longer profit through money laundering, but instead be identified and persecuted (2014a). I contend that this means a shift in strategy would take place, from using war and police mechanisms to persecute consumers and coca cultivators, to focusing on identifying those that profit from these inequalities and prosecuting them instead.

When combining these proposals, it is evident the FARC-EP emphasizes the importance of integral politics by upholding political pluralism. More specifically, the discourse recommends an open system, based on integral-inclusive politics and founded on the ability to critique and oppose the capitalist order (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2013b, p.35). To achieve this, the FARC-EP seeks to establish the National Constituent Assembly in order to include citizens in the creation and implementation of policies and public affairs. The Assembly would be composed of 141 representatives from a variety of demographics, some will be directly assigned and others selected based on popular vote (2013b). Through the inclusion of different collective groups and communities, the FARC-EP aims to create a constitution that safeguards the Peace Accord, while also producing a new constitution that incorporates issues that have not been agreed upon at the negotiations table. The FARC-EP explains:

The constitution that arises from the constituent process would be the true peace treaty that will promote reconciliation and govern the destiny of the nation of Colombia, and channel it towards greater political, economic, social and cultural democratization (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2013b, p. 28).

In this statement, the FARC-EP views the Assembly as a powerful inclusive organization necessary for stable and long-lasting peace and true democracy. This change distinctly aims to recuperate the value of politics and establish a new political order that contributes to peace and transformative justice<sup>16</sup>. In this manner the FARC-EP share what Waldron (2000) identifies as Arendt's vision of a constitution as the on-going housing of politics that is capable of growth and acts as a mechanism for the public realm to be secured and work effectively.

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<sup>16</sup> Transformative justice will be explained in section 4.4.3.

By engaging in constitutional politics and including local groups, the FARC-EP is in accordance with Arendt's (1963) call to reform political distributions and re-structure modes of governance. The FARC-EP inclusion of all groups within the Constituent Assembly also reflects Arendt's (1963) vision of no rule without division between rulers and ruled. In this context, the openness of democratic politics is emphasized as an open system that is permanently exposed to possibilities of critique, contestation and transformation (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2014b). In particular, these changes reflect peaceful relations, which represent the use of politics as a tool to build peace through the collaboration and direct participation of local communities, civil society and the warring parties. Community groups and civil society must have "direct participation in the design, execution and control of the National Plan for Victim Reparation" (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2014d, p.3).

Another example is the National Plan Commission, whose purpose is to design and implement the Peace Plan to end the conflict, develop reconciliation and the construction of peace. This Commission is composed of "representatives of the state, FARC-EP, social organizations, economic unions, territorial organizations, academia and communities in which initiatives will be applied" (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2014b, p. 10). We contend that the FARC-EP position is in accordance with the critical literature<sup>17</sup> regarding the need for local ownership and bottom-up approach to peace, with minimal external assistance. Through national collaboration, the aim is to address inequalities and injustices for national reconciliation and healing to take place. In other words, the aim is to address "the root problems of the conflict and the reformation of the

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<sup>17</sup> See Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013; Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015.

political socio-economic conditions that maintained and prolonged the duration of the conflict” (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2014b, p. 6).

Economic changes must also be implemented within the territories through a political rural agrarian land reform. The FARC-EP connects the political reorientation to the democratization of land and integral reparation to provide restitution and reparation to victims of the conflict and of the economic system. The agrarian rural reform encourages the de-concentration of unproductive rural property, as a means to realize the democratization of access to land. To achieve this, the discourses propose the creation of a land fund from unused and unexploited land to contribute to Peasant Reserve Zones (PRZ), Food Production Zones (FPZ) and Forest Reserve Zones (FRZ). In the case of the PRZ, its extension of land would amount to over 9.5 million hectares in order to meet the expectation and needs of the peasant communities. By implementing these changes, the FARC-EP “carry out the structural transformations demanded by the rural and agrarian society of our country...with a territorial approach (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2013a, p. 57). For instance, it includes providing fertile land, more affordable credit, technical assistance, workers unions, commercialization, better wages and dignified work. At the same time, integral reparation seeks to secure better living conditions by providing better health services, housing, education, infrastructure and becoming self-sustainable (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2013a, p. 79). These services and infrastructure would be designed, executed and implemented by the local communities, in order to meet their needs (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2013a)

It is important to highlight the rural agrarian reform also has a program to regulate and substitute the cultivation of coca, which would form part of the transformed Plan

Colombia policy aforementioned. The National Integral Program of Substitution of crops for illicit use (PNIS) defines territorial zones subject to voluntary substitution of crops by alternative development plans, towards sustainable agricultural crops (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2013a). Other zones would be used to cultivate coca, cannabis and poppy for therapeutic, medicinal, industrial or cultural purposes, by the will of the producers (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2014a, p.52). However, the production of these crops must be regulated by the state “either through lawful industrial or industrial processing or a system of state purchases, oriented to the supply of the internal market or to the attention of international demand, on the other” (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2014a, p. 51). Rather than combatting production, the goal is to regulate it according to demand and provide alternative means towards sustainable agricultural crops. To effectively implement the PNIS, the FARC-EP argues it is necessary to reform the criminal justice system and its agents.

#### ***4.3.2.2. Eliminating National security and Reforming the Criminal Justice System***

The FARC-EP calls to eliminate the national security strategy to contribute to the transformation of society:

The structural transformation of the political culture includes the prohibition of the doctrine of "national security", imposed by the Pentagon and the School of the Americas in times of the "Cold War" and adopted as Doctrine of the Military Forces of the State. The exile of this doctrine entails the commitment of the State to take action to guarantee a substantial revision of the military and police training and therefore part of the necessary conversion of the Military and Police Forces (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2013b, p.63).

Additionally, reforming military and police forces means significantly reducing overspending resources on military and police personnel (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2013b). The FARC-EP also demands the removal of state agents involved in the systemic

victimization process (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2014b). By eliminating the national security doctrine, it appears the FARC-EP seeks to prohibit one of the elements that facilitate pacification within Colombia. In other words, pacification might be more difficult to occur, given that national security can no longer depoliticize the resistance or to justify the use of violence and mechanisms of war. As a result, a new form of security must be established to replace national security as the doctrine guiding state forces and Colombian society. The FARC-EP proposes implementing integral security; this form of security will be explained in the later section.

Eliminating national security also signifies reforming the criminal justice system (CJS). Just as Neocleous (2014), the FARC-EP concludes that the CJS is the legal mechanism used to enforce national security and ultimately pacification. The FARC-EP demands the CJS to no longer target those who seek equality and instead become a tool used against those who generate and profit from inequality (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2014b). From this perspective, the FARC-EP uses the term crime not to refer to street crime like the Colombian state, but instead uses it to refer to state crime, corporate crime, and white-collar crime. In particular, it reveals a shift in focus from street crime, which are most often committed by persons of low-socioeconomic status, to criminalizing white-collar crime often committed by persons of high status and less likely to be processed through the justice system. To achieve this, the FARC-EP changes the emphasis from National Security and Plan Colombia (targeting drug-related crime, political crime and low income crime) to the crimes committed by the powerful (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2014a, p.79). Furthermore, the FARC-EP points to the need to highlight the reformation of the judicial system. In particular, the FARC-EP suggests

electing judges “through merit and public campaigns”, removing corrupt agents, and developing new laws with harsher penalties for organized crime and white-collar crime (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2013b, p.33). As a result, the FARC-EP seeks to reform the CJS as a means to achieve transformative justice<sup>18</sup> and its elements of equality and human rights. Given this emphasis, improving the CJS can provide reparations to victims and prevent future injustices.

#### ***4.3.2.3. Accepting responsibility and Apologising to Victims***

Although the FARC-EP acknowledges causing harm, the discourse is framed as non-intentional in response to, not having the same legal responsibility nor moral responsibility as the state and other institutions. The FARC-EP argues their political-military organization is not an independent state and thus does not share the same obligations and responsibilities as the Colombian government (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2014c, p.2). This argument contradicts the FARC-EP’s claim of having state-like functions and autonomy in their zones of control. It must also be noted the FARC-EP argues they “never intentionally committed crimes against humanity, rather casualties were due to unfortunate errors, bad apples tremendous military disadvantage and unforeseen circumstances” (2014b, p. 4). The FARC-EP argues their actions were to address the political issues impacting society, and as such presenting their organization and the armed conflict as legitimate. In doing so, international and national documents are mentioned such as the laws of war, the UDHR of 1948 and the Rights of the Man and Citizen in Colombia to govern the armed conflict and justify their actions (2014c). Despite this, the FARC-EP assumes responsibility for casualties and their acts of war,

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<sup>18</sup> Transformative justice will be addressed in detail in section 4.4.3.

while at the same time demands amnesty and pardons for actions connected to political crime and rebellion. Given this has occurred with other political- military organizations in other nations, the FARC-EP claims this should also take place, as it would symbolize an effective guide to national reconciliation (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2014b, p.4).

In the analysis, the FARC-EP argues the state and other institutions bear the brunt of responsibility of the harm cause to society. Throughout the documents, the FARC-EP articulates the need to hold the state accountable for their crimes and human rights violations. The FARC-EP accuses the state of:

The implementation of economic models, measures and actions of the political economy that reproduce and heighten the socio-economic inequalities, stimulate the concentration and centralization of riches and land ownership by latinfundistas, economic groups...a closed political system and electoral system, ...the design and implementation of security politics and defence inspired by National Security, imperialist intervention, designing and mobilizing the administration of justice to meet the goals of the war...eliminating political crime and right to rebellion...producing policies of militarization of political, social and cultural life, using legislation to intensify and prolong the war..." (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2014b, p. 6-7).

The FARC-EP also identifies other institutions and agents responsible such as: economic groups, politicians, the US, powerful landowners, transnational companies and the Church. These groups are accused of supporting the state's systemic violence, forced dispossession of land, supporting paramilitary groups, engaging in corruption, money laundering and organized crime (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2014b, p.2). The FARC-EP calls for the de-classification of state files in order to identify the extent of their crimes and produce a more in-depth history of the conflict.

The FARC-EP's discourse requires the establishing of historical truth of the conflict, with its elements of memory and remembrance. The documents describe

historical truth as “a complex building process based on sharing the narratives of victims and actors involved” (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2014b, p.20). Combining different narratives from victims and the actors involved are portrayed as constructing a better picture of the historical truth of the conflict, while preserving the memory and remembrance of the conflict. It is evident these narratives seek to demonstrate the evolution of the conflict and the nexus between paramilitaries, the Church, foreign government, politicians and the state (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2013a & 2014b). The FARC-EP further emphasizes the construction of truth does not only provide answers to victims, but also demands actors to take responsibility for their actions and provide reparation to victims (2014b). In the same manner, the construction of truth implies recognizing the FARC-EP’s political nature as part of the historical truth of the armed conflict.

The FARC-EP reveals the need for the warring parties to apologize to victims of the conflict and of the economic system (2014b). Additionally, the FARC-EP demands the state to apologize for the misrepresentation and de-politicization of their political-military organization. When describing the ‘real’ apology, the discourse does not involve forgiveness or justification. Rather, a real apology is conceptualized as “a process, a decision and an action with wide social, political and ethical dimensions that must be built collectively...there is no real apology without the true abolishment of prior and current injustices” (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2014b, p.20). Given this conceptualization, the FARC-EP establishes a connection between apology and justice. For the FARC-EP, producing a political apology signifies the transformation and inclusion of politics by redressing the structural conditions that promote violence,

discrimination and injustice. Fundamentally, a real apology is an intrinsic part of transformative justice. For justice to take place, it involves changes in conditions that produce suffering and recognition of the suffering (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2014b). Furthermore, acknowledging the rights of victims' functions as a way to express a 'real' apology towards them. The FARC-EP suggests collective victims should obtain seats in parliament in order to design and implement programs to eliminate structural inequalities. The FARC-EP claims this is significant as the inclusion of victims increases social cooperation and helps develop national reconciliation and healing (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2014b p. 6).

The FARC-EP contends a history of the conflict cannot be produced without the history of their political-military organization (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2015). For the last 50 years, the FARC-EP has used violence and resistance to oppose state repression and the preservation of inequality and injustices. The FARC-EP argues their rise to take up arms was due to the failure of democracy within Colombia, as methods of negotiation and deliberation were unavailable (2013a). This systemic flaw is an example of Arendt's (1963) division of the rulers and the ruled, whereby citizens cannot determine their own political affairs due to a closed political system and representative democracy. The FARC-EP's political nature resides in the fact that they criticise and expose the injustices and inequalities preserved by the state, while also addressing the inequalities and injustices to create a just society. Through these political claims, the FARC-EP demonstrates their political nature and fight against pacification; aligning with Arendt's (1970) view of using violence to induce political change within the public sphere. Finally, entering the negotiations with a significant amount of power compared to that of the state

renders the FARC-EP as a powerful negotiator that can make its own proposals and play an active role in the development of the peace agreement.

#### **4.4 Deep structural transformations for long lasting peace**

Through the changes proposed, it is apparent the FARC-EP aligns with the critical literature on peace: to establish a real transformation of society combined with and made possible by alternative ways of thinking about politics, power, justice and security.

##### **4.4.1. Conceptualizing the political**

It is evident the FARC-EP's alternative conceptualization of politics represents an alternative vision to that of current politics. The negotiation documents describe this new form of politics as "legitimate and valuable...extending beyond the political and electoral system" (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2013b, p.62). In turn, the FARC-EP's statement reformulates politics as more than representative democracy and introduces greater political freedom. This signifies that political freedom must extend beyond parliament and legislatures, and make way for participatory democracy to be inclusive of persons and increase the number of spaces whereby politics can take place. This depiction better reflects Arendt's (1963) vision of politics as having political freedom. In the same manner, the FARC-EP describes politics as action and as a right:

Mobilization and protest, as forms of political action, are legitimate exercises of the right to assembly, to free circulation, to free expression, to freedom of conscience and to opposition in a democracy. Its practice enriches political inclusion and forges a critical citizenship, willing to promote dialogue and the collective construction of the nation (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2013b, p.77).

It is evident resistance and opposition are examples of politics as action, which serves to address inequalities and injustices and transform society. The FARC-EP describes action as political in nature, involving discussion and critique to overcome obstacles affecting

society (Arendt 1963). This further involves the voicing of political concerns through the process of persuasion, negotiation and compromise. For the FARC-EP, politics and plurality take place within spaces of negotiations such as in councils, congress and assemblies.

Similarly to Arendt, it is explicit how the FARC-EP thinks about politics as a right that must be exercised by all persons and founded in “values of social cooperation, human rights, and solidarity” (2013b, p.62). The right to engage in politics signifies working together to overcome obstacles in order to produce a better society. In combination, political equality guarantees the right to engage in political/social movements, protests and subversion (FARC-EP Delegación de paz 2013b, p.35). My analysis demonstrates that political equality underpins the FARC-EP’s positioning. Indeed, political equality is necessary for all persons to effectively exercise their right to engage in political dissent. When the right to engage in politics is removed, politics in the form of resistance and violence take place as a means to address injustices and transform society. In this context, resistance and violence are considered important elements of politics, utilized to oppose corrupt politics and transform politics or revert it back to its original form. In other words, the findings suggest resistance and violence can be used as a safeguard to oppose further corruption and eliminate the cycle of war. By transitioning from military means to negotiations, it demonstrates the state’s acceptance of political equality and political freedom and a change in doing politics with political-military organizations.

As previously mentioned, for the FARC-EP peace involves three main conditions: (1) peace as a complex political process; (2) local peace; (3) peace as the ultimate goal.

For the FARC-EP, peace negotiation is the space in which peace can be deliberated and contested. The peace negotiations with the Colombia state are an example of this space, whereby the FARC-EP has the political freedom to produce proposals to address the deep structural transformations required for the realization of peace. In the proposals, the FARC-EP reveals that many political changes must be made in order to achieve peace (2014b). As previously mentioned, these include establishing an open system, greater political participation and inclusion in the design and implementation of policies. The FARC-EP's conceptualization of peace aligns with Arendt's formulation of peace. For Arendt, 'politics' and 'peace' are interconnected. This association means that 'good peace' can only be the result of negotiations, mutual compromise and eventual agreement (Arendt, 1950; Poynting & Whyte, 2008; Schmid, 1968). In accordance with Arendt, the FARC-EP concludes peace is the necessary condition for the stabilisation of politics, but politics is necessary for the new system that will generate and maintain peace. In other words, peace is required for persons to come together and deliberate on the political socioeconomic structures of the new system. Fundamentally, the FARC-EP echoes Arendt's understanding of peaceful relations as the ideal method for politics.

#### **4.4.2. Reformulating Power**

A reformulation of power is necessary to create a new political order that produces an equal and just society. Given this vision, the FARC-EP transforms negative power as 'domination' to positive power as 'local power'. In doing so, the FARC-EP's reformulation of power aligns with the critical perspective on power as "collective capacity" (Arendt, 1970, p.44; Karlberg, 2005; Carroll, 1972). For the FARC-EP, "local power" is balanced and dispersed among the people of Colombia (FARC-EP Delegación

de paz, 2013b, p.25). Local power is most influential when individuals function as a collective within the public sphere:

Political participation entails guaranteeing and stimulating the participation of regions, structural and environmental entities of the State, compensating for excessive centralism, and strengthening democracy and local power (2014b, p.25)

In this statement, the FARC-EP draws a connection between politics and power, demonstrating that both concepts are interdependent, as strengthening local power by empowering local groups to take greater part in politics and social issues, subsequently reduces power imbalance and de-centralizes politics (2013b, p.75). As a result, the FARC-EP draws from Arendt (1963) and conceptualizes the role of power as a complex notion realized through the new political arena for the building of peace. Given that, power signifies coming together to produce something for the good of the community, there is power with mobilization and resistance. Furthermore, it is evident there is a connection between democracy and power balance. For real democracy to exist, the FARC-EP implies there must be an equal amount of power dispersed across groups and branches of government (2014b). In this manner, political equality and participatory democracy prevent the abuse of power. Finally, political power should not be influenced by economic power. Rather, the FARC-EP share Arendt's (1970) view of maintaining both forms of power in their own spheres, to prevent the influence economic power from influencing politics, mode of governance and ultimately policies.

#### **4.4.3. Conceptualizing Justice**

The FARC-EP suggests justice is a vital element needed to realize peace. Justice is described as a “never-ending process that must look at the past and the present to fix injustices” (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2014b, p. 14). This argument is in line with the

literature on backward and forward-looking approaches to redress past and current injustices, and establishing equality and dignity (Zartman, 2005). The FARC-EP's discourse further highlights rebellion and protesting as important components to repair injustices. This is because resistance and protesting are used to address injustices and promote change. At the same time, the FARC-EP depicts justice as a "political and ethical virtue that society needs to strive for", as it is needed for long lasting peace (2014b, p.14).

The FARC-EP aligns with the critical literature by viewing peace and justice as interconnected and mutually reinforcing (Endoh & Mbaio, 2016; Zartman, 2005). For the FARC-EP, justice must be re-conceptualized in order to implement peace. The FARC-EP redefines justice as social justice, characterized for being transformative in nature:

In any case, a comprehensive reparation policy committed in a certain way to the victims is only possible if it understands the political, economic, social and cultural reforms for the real democratization of the country and is based, therefore, on a concept of transforming social justice for the welfare and good living of the population, avoiding re-victimization and recognizing the centrality of the victims of the conflict as subjects of the structural changes that the country needs (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2014b, p.12).

The discourse reveals that capitalism, power imbalances, privatization of land and subsequently, discrimination based on race, ethnicity, gender and class, obstruct social justice. As a result, the FARC-EP argues the Colombian state does not view individuals as equal for political purposes, affecting the diversity of opinion and ability to persuade and negotiate to produce change. By preventing integral politics, the cycle of corruption, war and injustice is reproduced. The FARC-EP explains that transformative justice must be used to overcome the political socio-economic conditions and transform the problem. The FARC-EP's argument is in accordance with the critical discussion on redistributive

and restorative justice and the need to address the material discrepancies (Sriram, 2010). My analysis shows that reformulating justice does not remove the element of criminal justice. Rather, criminal justice is rethought of as a tool to protect the common people from the exploitation of the ruling class and the state through stricter laws for state crime, corporate crime, white-collar crime and organized crime. As previously mentioned, the criminal justice system becomes a tool to protect those who seek equality, while criminalizing powerful groups who profit from inequality.

The FARC-EP emphasizes transformative justice over transitional justice, as the former transforms the political and social conditions of Colombian society, while the latter simply addresses victimization and reparation through the criminal justice system (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2014b). Transitional justice is revealed as forming part of traditional liberal justice, typically used by the state to maintain or strengthen the social order. Although the FARC-EP does not provide an in-depth critique of transitional justice, the critical literature suggests transitional justice promotes top-down state reform and the production of a ‘dominant truth’ (Schaap, 2006; Moon, 2008; Meister, 2002). In doing so, a shared narrative is imposed on society, subsequently silencing claims that call for more fundamental social and political reforms. Given the emphasis on transformative justice, it is evident the FARC-EP resist liberal peace and its tendency to use transitional justice to protect the capitalist order. However, transforming the social order is not possible without rethinking security as integral security.

#### **4.4.4 Thinking differently about Security**

In order to reconceptualise peace as the final goal, it requires an alternative thinking of security. As previously mentioned, the FARC-EP proposes eliminating

national security as the doctrine guiding security forces and the nation. In turn, the FARC-EP replaces national security with integral security as a means to make way for the values of equality and human rights. The FARC-EP describe the structure of integral security as:

In keeping with a conception of security centered on the person, it is based on the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention and self-determination of people, and allows security measures with individual and collective development and welfare measures contemplated in the present agreement (2013b, p. 72).

In this statement, the FARC-EP focuses on people's basic needs as opposed to protecting national security with its political socio-economic conditions. By focusing on security on an individual level first, the FARC-EP aims to secure the nation as a whole through the transformation of political socio-economic channels and, ultimately achieve peace. The FARC-EP argues that transitioning to integral security would reduce overspending on military and police forces, and instead finance social and political priorities such as better health care services, education and housing (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2013b, p.33). Furthermore, security would "recognize and respect the opposition and their rights, oriented to peaceful regulation of political and social conflicts" (FARC-EP Delegación de paz, 2013b, p.37). Proposing a transition towards integral security, suggests that the state will no longer be 'securing insecurity' to sustain capital accumulation from war and continue the constant policing of society (Neocleous, 2014). Fundamentally, integral security is the final element necessary for the establishing of transformative justice and the elimination of the systemic conditions that preserved the injustices and inequalities occurring in Colombia, which is what started the conflict in the first place.

## Chapter 5: Conclusion

This project calls to approach criminology in a wider sense and move beyond near-sighted views of harm and crime. Like Vicente Ruggiero, a well-known criminologist, who calls for the inclusion of war as crime in criminological thinking, my contribution is precisely that, to expand the critical criminological literature. I explore a range of global social, political and economic issues that are often overlooked such as: harmful actions of the state and powerful groups, political conflict and peace negotiations. In doing so, I present these issues as legitimate objects of inquiry in criminological thinking. Further, these issues are explored from a theoretical standpoint, which is unique, as theory is not commonly used to examine these issues. Working from the critical perspective, I demonstrate how peace negotiations can undermine efforts or represent a challenge for social transformation. The findings contribute to critical criminological thought and therefore we can use this to think about the challenges and obstacles to producing a social system. Further, the findings suggest many attempts and initiatives are co-opted and repackaged to pacify resistance and protect the capital order through politics.

Through Neocleous' concept of pacification and Hannah Arendt's concept of constitutional politics, I illustrated how the FARC-EP analyzes the conflict as political. Negotiation and deliberation are necessary to end political conflicts by addressing its root causes. In doing so, the FARC-EP aimed to produce deep structural transformation of Colombian society by providing alternative ways of thinking with respect to politics,

justice, power and security, but ultimately generate a different notion of peace, which resists liberal peace.

I have demonstrated how the FARC-EP replaces liberal peace for an alternative conceptualization of peace, highlighting the transformation of the deep structural conditions, calling for social justice, replacing national security by integral security, and increasing political participation beyond electoral voting. The FARC-EP conceptualizes peace as the ultimate goal, which must be acknowledged as a complex political process, be situated locally and be context specific to Colombian society. In order to achieve this, the FARC-EP calls for re-politicizing the conflict, the inequalities and injustices, its political-military organization, the victims of the conflict and the economy to replace the de-politicization as pacification that took place to maintain the liberal order. Also, in order to achieve peace Colombian society must become aware that injustices and inequalities are caused and reinforced by representative democracy, closed politics, Plan Colombia, the National Security doctrine and capital accumulation, with power imbalances producing and heightening each of these conditions. To address these problems, the FARC-EP suggests establishing land reform, decentralizing power, increasing political participation, sovereignty, replacing national security doctrine for integral security and reforming the CJS and its agents.

When considering these conditions, it is important to highlight that the FARC-EP did not present a perfect linear solution, with one change leading to the next alteration. Rather, politics are not only changed by the current modes of governance, but also inspired by the new social order founded on participatory democracy, transformative justice and collective power. In implementing these changes, the discourse states both

parties will apologize to victims, accept responsibility and produce a common history of the conflict with all actors involved. Through these changes the FARC-EP produce alternative conceptualization of politics (action), power (collective), justice (transformative/social) and security (integral) to produce a real transformation of society and achieve peace.

Having prepared these proposals in anticipation of the peace negotiations, the FARC-EP sought to shine a light and transform the issues aforementioned to challenge and resist liberal peace. Although the FARC-EP does not accept liberal peace, by negotiating with the Colombian state, the FARC-EP will not be able to implement all their proposals for change. The Colombian state demonstrates the importance of negotiation, as it attempts to use negotiation as a way to pacify the FARC-EP, after military means have failed to succeed. Furthermore, the FARC-EP abandons their goal to challenge and replace capitalism by accepting to negotiate with the Colombian state. Rather, the FARC-EP are attempting to reign in the capitalist order to minimise its consequences; supporting the idea that there is a risk that negotiations are a way to pacify. Therefore, while peace negotiations are a moment of pacification, the negotiation process to some extent, is also about transforming society by expressing resistance to liberal peace and shining a light on alternative conceptions of peace and the changes necessary to transform the social order.

Although peace agreements are binding, there is a possibility that the Colombian government can use its legislative power to renege on its commitments in Congress, possibly leading to failure of implementation. If this takes place, the structural violence and the inequalities and inequalities will not be fully addressed, enabling the possibility

to return to violence. Consequently, at first glance peace negotiations and peace agreements appear to achieve 'peace', when in reality, the liberal peace produced does not address any real structural change. Rather, liberal peace serves to protect the status quo and capitalism. However, these consequences have not been proven yet, given that the implementation of the peace agreement is still ongoing. Although the implementation of the peace agreement is outside the scope of this project, it is necessary to remain informed about its progress in order to see if liberal peace is produced.

Now that we know the FARC-EP challenged liberal peace through its proposals, future researchers may want to consider studying the implementation phase to see whether the proposed changes in terms of politics, security, power and justice have in fact been achieved. Other potential research areas include: looking at the dynamics of the actual negotiations, studying the perspective of local groups with regards to the negotiation, and implementation phase in order to understand their role and position. These studies might include qualitative interviews in order to obtain in-depth narratives and clarify certain issues that cannot be addressed through document analysis.

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## Appendix

### Coding Scheme used for the five proposals

#### 100 minimum proposals for rural and agrarian development

**Problem 1-** Colombia has an authoritarian ordering of the territories, which serves the interests of the elite.

**Problem 2-** sub-demographics' lack of/poor access to land

**Problem 3-** transnational business companies involved in mining, energy, forestry affect the sustainability of the environment

**Problem 4-** state political, economic, social and cultural debt owed to peasants

**Problem #5-** lack of dignified work & underpaid salary workers

**Problem #6-** hunger and malnutrition of rural population

**Problem #7-** lack of an information system (cadastral) that involves land ownership

**Problem #8-** poor/lack of education, scientific and technological research and development in rural areas

**Problem #9-** Problems involving mobility, connections and distribution of products from the fields

**Problem #10-** lack of sovereignty of peasant and national economy

**Problem#11-** politics favour economic groups, transnational companies and elite groups.

#### 100 minimum proposals- Political participation for real democratization, peace with social justice and national reconciliation

**Problem 1-** excessive concentration of power in the government executive branch

**Problem 2-** the systemic design of government institutions in connection to decentralization have weakened the de-centralization process

**Problem 3-** The legal economic order limits political participation

**Problem 4-** overspending on military forces and national police

**Problem 5-** justice system is corrupted, flawed, influenced by powerful groups.

**Problem 6-** political regime is corrupted and criminal

**Problem 7-** limited rights and guarantees for political opposition, political minorities and guerrillas.

**Problem 8-** national security strategy guides military and police forces and used to militarize society.

**Problem 9-** paramilitaries hinders and persecutes political opposition

**Problem 10-** economic groups monopolize media sources and urban spaces.

Governments in power use media to serve their own interests

**Problem 11-** lack of territorial/regional political participation

#### 50 Minimum Proposals- Anti-Drugs politics for the self-autonomy and well-being of the poor people of the countryside.

**Problem 1-** War on Drugs & Plan Colombia/Politica Anti-Drogas

**Problem 2-** labelling of coca as deadly/harmful. “La mata que mata”

**Problem 3-** peasants cultivating coca for illicit means is a national problem

**Problem 4-** consumption of psychoactive drugs.

**Problem 5-** aerial spraying of glyphosate and the forced eradication program

**Problem 6-** narco-paramilitary structures in the state.

### **10 minimum proposals- Integral rights of victims for peace and national reconciliation**

**Problem 1-** Truth about the conflict remains unknown by the general public.

**Problem 2-** Lack of recognition of victims by the state

**Problem 3-** Lack of accountability by parties, particularly the state

**Problem 4-** Lack of reparation for victims of the conflict and economic system.

**Problem 5-** Possibility of repetition of violence and victimization

**Problem 6-** politics that generate violence and victimization

**Problem 7-** justice reduced to vengeance and punishment.

### **10 minimum proposals- guarantee the end of the conflict, national reconciliation, and the building of stable and long lasting peace.**

**Code 1-** constitutional, judicial and institutional reform necessary to allow the implementing of the peace agreement.

**Code 2-** PLANPAZ will incorporate all the projects and programs necessary to end the conflict and promote national reconciliation

**Code 3-** Transformation of society means generating the material conditions necessary for the regulation of class conflict

**Code 4-** The TERREPAZ program necessary for reintegration of combatants and transformation of the FARC-EP into a political party.

**Code 5-** Redefinition of national security to integral security.

**Code 6-** Recognize and eliminate corruption and criminal entities from the state.

**Code 7 -** Ceasefire and demobilization is indispensable for the de-militarization of society and national reconciliation and peacebuilding.