

**CHINA AND  
THE TRANSLATION OF THE OTHER**

**by**

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## ABSTRACT

A one unified China exists in theory alone. In reality, as the country projects itself on the international stage as a modern global power, on the domestic front it continues to grapple with the perceived secessionist and “splittist” threats from Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang to its carefully constructed image of “Chinese” national unity.

This study looks at the role of translation in such a politically-charged context, and specifically its significance in the case of China-Xinjiang/Han-Uyghur relations. By examining the documented trends in violent unrest in Xinjiang against the trends in translated state propaganda from 1949-2009, the formulated research question is that translation in this context does not function to facilitate intercultural communication, but serves as an expression of ethno-dominance and a means to strengthen one’s own cultural subjectivity and superiority against the Other.

Furthermore, by examining China’s historical relations with non-Han identities *before* 1949, this study would like to suggest that what is deemed, in modern Chinese terms, the “Xinjiang Problem,” should be turned around and re-assessed as the “Chinese Problem”—of too much power concentrated in the hands of the majority who identify as “Han” and that power being normalized and constructed as “Chinese” throughout history, so much so that it becomes an undetected privilege akin to what is known in Western cultural studies as “white privilege.” By exercising this privilege without critical examination, the Han majority creates, incites, and exacerbates the very “splittist” tendencies it wishes to diffuse—because if what is “Chinese” derives from a Han prerogative, then a non-Han perspective would, almost by default, become “anti-Chinese/China.”

Translation, reframed under this specific sociopolitical and power-relations framework, becomes what enables “China”—an ideological entity focused on securing and normalizing the legitimacy of “Chinese” rule—to translate seemingly oppositional ideological regimes, from Confucianism to Communism, Marxism to a market-based economy, into coherent tenets that support that goal.

## RÉSUMÉ

Une Chine unifiée n'existe qu'en théorie. En réalité, le pays se présente sur la scène internationale comme une puissance mondiale et moderne, mais il reste confronté à ce qu'il perçoit comme une menace sécessionniste, "séparatiste", de la part de Taiwan, du Tibet et du Xinjiang, en contradiction avec l'image soigneusement construite d'une unité nationale "chinoise".

Le rôle de la traduction est étudié dans ce contexte politiquement chargé, plus précisément celui des relations Chine-Xinjiang/Han-Ouïgour. En comparant la courbe des violences attestées dans la province du Xinjiang et celle de la propagande d'État traduite entre 1949 et 2009, on en vient à l'hypothèse que la traduction a pour effet non pas de faciliter la communication interculturelle, mais d'affirmer la domination de l'ethnie au pouvoir qui renforce son identité propre et sa supériorité culturelle au détriment de l'Autre.

De plus, en examinant à travers l'histoire et jusqu'en 1949 les rapports de la Chine avec ses composantes ethniques (non Han), on cherche à montrer que le « Problème du Xinjiang », selon la terminologie en vigueur, doit être envisagé à l'inverse comme le « Problème chinois ». Celui-ci résulte de la concentration du pouvoir entre les mains de la majorité « Han », un pouvoir normalisé et construit au fil de l'histoire comme étant « chinois », au point de s'imposer subrepticement comme un privilège similaire à celui que dans les études culturelles occidentales on appelle le « privilège de l'homme blanc ». En exerçant ce privilège comme s'il allait de soi, la majorité Han suscite et exacerbe les tendances séparatistes qu'elle veut désamorcer. Car si ce qui est « chinois » découle d'une prérogative Han, il s'ensuit que toute perspective non Han devient par défaut « antichinoise » ou hostile à la Chine.

Repensée dans ce cadre sociopolitique et sous l'angle des rapports de pouvoir, la traduction est ce qui permet à la « Chine » – entité idéologique soucieuse d'établir et de normaliser la légitimité du pouvoir « chinois » – de traduire en principes cohérents servant cet objectif des systèmes idéologiques censément antinomiques, le confucianisme en communisme, le marxisme en économie de marché.

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## INTRODUCTION

A passing acquaintance in China once remarked, over lunch, during what was a typical workday for me in the country, before I enrolled in a PhD program, and well before the materialization of this study and its arguments: “It was Mao who changed the name of the country, not Taiwan.” Specifically, the comment was directed at Mao renaming the “Republic of China” to the “*People’s* Republic of China.” Implied was the contentious legitimacy of the regime change. The hint of a usurped throne lies in the actual Chinese term that was used in this comment. It was not that Mao changed the “name of the country.” It was that he changed the *guohao*<sup>1</sup>—the title of the reigning dynasty. In other words, China had always been “China”; but the title of the dynasties that ruled over China changed with each ruler. In the cases where there were competing dynastic titles in the land—the Song (960-1138) and Jin (1115-1234) dynasties, for example—there was war. And if it just so happened that they constituted different ethnicities—the Song (Han) and Jin (Jurchen)—one of them would be called Barbarian, and the war would be fought in the name of “Chinese” culture and civilization.

When it comes to relations with the ethnic other, this historical ethnocentric strain lives on in the governing ethos of the People’s Republic of China, a country that boasts 56 different ethnicities and 155 ethnic autonomous jurisdictions within its national borders (SCIO 2009). The insistence on the “unification” of China under a superior “Chinese” civilization, an inculcated belief that it is this “heavenly” order that the ruler must pursue, continues to inform—under seemingly disparate ideological regimes such as Confucianism and Communism—what Blank (2003) depicts as China’s “shrill defense” (126) on issues of sovereignty and “profound insecurity about internal cohesion” (128). The word “shrill” is key; it is incomprehensible to the

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<sup>1</sup> 國號

“enlightened” kind of rationality, but perfectly logical according to what Max Weber sees as “value-rational activity,” in which actions find their logic by corresponding to “values” as opposed to “interest” (Kalberg 1980, 1148-49). So: *Taiwan is a part of China*—despite a president, a military, a constitution, a passport, a completely different official calendar called the Calendar of the Republic (*minguo*<sup>2</sup>), after which its citizens record their deaths and births, and the Republic of China records its anniversary—despite these living and breathing facts, *how dare you suggest otherwise*. How dare anyone let Taiwan attend the World Health Assembly even if it means improved coordinated public health measures against communicable diseases on a global scale? (Smith 2017).<sup>3</sup>

Moreover, what this “profound insecurity” translates into are ever heavier-handed, yet counter-productive, approaches towards an accumulating list of taboo topics, from the 3Ts—Taiwan, Tibet, and Tiananmen (Volodzko 2015)—to the one X, Xinjiang, the autonomous northwest region in China which provides the context to this study. The Taiwan analogy is necessary to train the mind to see the issue from a particular angle: If the Chinese state has not ruled out training its missiles on the people of Taiwan, who share the same culture and language, the same modes of worship, the same founding father, even the same unawareness of Han Chinese privilege and superiority they are brought up to exercise, what are the chances that it will empathize with the plight of its Uyghur population in Xinjiang, who do not speak Chinese, look Chinese, follow Chinese customs; who are, culturally and spiritually, Muslim?

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<sup>2</sup> 民國 [minguo]; both administrative and popular recording of dates in Taiwan give priority to the “Year of the Republic” and not the Western calendar. For example, the year 2018 is referred to as 民國 107 年 (the “107th Year of the Republic”) in both official documents (such as one’s driver’s license, health card, and ID card) and popular vernacular. The Republic of China was founded in 1912, which is known as 民國元年, the first year (of the reign). 元 [yuan] does not simply mean “first” year; it implies the beginning of a “new” era, new beginnings.

<sup>3</sup> The World Health Assembly is the World Health Organization’s decision-making body. The Assembly is held annually in Geneva, Switzerland.

Being “Muslim” after 9/11, no matter the nationality, is not simply assuming a religious designation (though, arguably, no religious label is apolitical). It has become an exceptional political task, arduous and stigmatized. It means you are consumed by the terrorist narrative; you are by default a potential terrorist, a threat to national security. It means, in China’s case, that this narrative can now be employed to frame its relations with the Uyghur population. The expression of dissent can now be labeled “terrorism,” and the suppression of that dissent called “counter-terrorism.” The enactment of laws to allow the state to pursue its activities under a legal framework was swift. In late 2015, China passed its first national Counterterrorism Law (Xinhua 2015)<sup>4</sup>; in 2016, it officially announced the regional implementation measures of that law in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Xinhua 2016)<sup>5</sup>; in 2017, it introduced the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region De-radicalization Regulations (SARA 2017).<sup>6</sup> Yes, the state is abiding by the modern notion of “rule of law,” but take a closer look, and it becomes evident that “most of these laws involve granting even more powers to governmental agencies that already have broad, intrusive competences” (Zhou 2017, 17).

The Chinese state has a designation for the recurrence and resurgence of ethnic “separatism” that engulf the region in periodic eruptions of violence, which in turn force the state’s hand in violent suppression and forceful reiterations of sovereignty over the region. The Chinese state frames it as the “Xinjiang Problem” (*Xinjiang wenti*).<sup>7</sup> Fuller and Starr (2003) devote an entire publication called *The Xinjiang Problem* to the examination of this designated problem in the region. They summarize it as thus:

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<sup>4</sup> 《中华人民共和国反恐怖主义法》 zhonghua renmin gongheguo fankongbuzhuyifa

<sup>5</sup> 《新疆维吾尔自治区实施中华人民共和国反恐怖主义法办法》 xinjiang weiwuerzizhiqu shishi zhonghua renmin gongheguo fankongbuzhuyifa banfa

<sup>6</sup> 《新疆维吾尔自治区去极端化条例》 xinjiang weiwuerzizhiqu qujiduanhua tiaoli

<sup>7</sup> Key dates that illustrate the struggle between separatism and sovereignty that underwrite and give context to what is known as the “Xinjiang Problem” are provided in Chapter 1.7 on methodology.

This, then, is the “Xinjiang problem.” It pits a small but increasingly self-conscious people anxious for its existential future against one of the world’s most powerful states whose leaders are equally concerned to preserve the territory and administrative integrity of the whole. It arises primarily from economic, social, and cultural developments within the borders of the People’s Republic of China. But as we shall see, it is linked in complex ways with currents beyond China’s borders. Because of this, if the “Xinjiang problem” is not resolved, it is bound to affect not only broader developments within the People’s Republic of China but also the stability of Xinjiang’s neighbors in Central and South Asia and, indeed, of the broader world order. (8, 9)

But this study would like to point out that this “problem” stems, in fact, from the Chinese state and the Han identity having *too much* power, not the other way around; that dissent is fueled by the disempowerment of its Uyghur citizenry; that the population who needs to be “de-radicalized” are the Han extremists who believe in hardline nationalism,<sup>8</sup> because, as the dominant ethnicity in numbers and in power, they disproportionately contribute to the problem being labeled a “problem.”<sup>9</sup> The study attempts to do so proceeding from the discipline of Translation Studies, but with an interdisciplinary approach, branching into theories and findings from other disciplines such as Political Science, Sociology, Anthropology, Philosophy, and Asian Studies. Even popular culture, that radically honest vehicle for our most reflexive urges, plays an informing role.

In summary, this study investigates and attempts to highlight that in the context of China-Xinjiang relations, where the Han ethnicity accounts for 91.6% of the total population in China (2010 Census) and the Han hold the highest positions of political power in Xinjiang, translation

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<sup>8</sup> The subversion of radical vs. “normal” is influenced by Judith Butler’s ([1990] 2000) argument that the stigmatization of homosexuality is inscribed in the stability of heterosexuality. For one to hold ground, the other must be deemed a “radical” departure from the norm (hence the “de-radicalizing” practice of “conversion therapy”). Also of influence is Adrienne Rich’s (1980) notion of “compulsory heterosexuality.” In the Xinjiang Muslim context, this means “compulsory secularization”—discouraging, or banning, signs of Muslim identity, such as the beard and the veil, in order to “combat extremism” (Reuters 2017).

<sup>9</sup> To a larger extent, the Chinese state’s paradox in dealing with issues of “dissent” is the same: dissent is fueled by the disempowerment of its citizens, which include Han and Uyghur alike. Making the state more powerful only exacerbates the problem.

is not a means of intercultural communication, but an expression of ethno-dominance, or struggle for it, irrespective of target audience reception and against the public discourse of “harmony” advanced by the Chinese state. The complicity or duplicity of translation in Western postcolonial contexts regarding power relations in the former colonies of the British, French and Spanish empires have been much studied in Translation Studies, but relatively understudied in the Chinese *internal* context—to be differentiated from the role translation played in China’s communication and competition with *outside* foreign powers, which has also been dealt with as a subject, albeit less prominently featured as a case study outside Chinese Translation Studies. I therefore understand the mission, and hopefully contribution, of my study to complement both Western and Chinese Translation Studies with this specific foray into the role and function of translation relating to China’s *interethnic* relations, and specifically the Han-Uyghur context, using theoretical frameworks traditionally applied to Western postcolonial contexts and a case study that has not traditionally been the focus of Chinese Translation Studies, which for political reasons can hardly be investigated within China using a (post)colonial narrative. Also, precisely because of its highly contentious and political nature, Han-Uyghur relations are often discussed under the rubric of political science or “culture”, not *translation*, which features front and center in my study to attempt to explain its fractured state. Hence the relative novel aspect of this study is that it does not attempt to explain China with “nationalism,” “communism,” “capitalism,” or “Confucianism,” or necessarily a dichotomy between “authoritarian vs. democratic” values. It attempts to explain the state’s behavior by applying “translation,” using both material translation data and the immaterial concept of “translation” as “transformation”—that is, the transformation of varying ideologies, from both East and West, into doctrine that support Han ethnocentrism. Subsequently, my study also hopes to break through the trend and focus in Translation Studies

being mainly on how China interacts with *Xifang* (the West) by shedding light on how it interacts with *Xiyu* (the Western Regions)<sup>10</sup>—Han China’s own framing of the wild, western borderlands inhabited by “barbarians.”

Chapter 1, Methodology, lays out the methodology for this study: first, I collect the number of titles translated from both Uyghur into Chinese and Chinese into Uyghur from UNESCO’s online database, Index Translationum, between the years 1950-2007; second, I identify titles that, among those translated titles, function as “propaganda” according to a restricted defined criteria; third, I identify violence in the region of Xinjiang recorded and compiled by Bovingdon (2010, 114) for the timeframe between 1949-2005 and by Hastings (2011, 899) for the timeframe between 1990-2009; fourth, I trace the upward and downward trends in “translated propaganda,” as defined, against the upward and downward trends in violence, for both timeframes, in an attempt to discern a relationship between the translation of propaganda and violence; fifth, a number of key milestones and events that have had a major impact on governance within China or international perception of China were provided to anchor the interpretation of the trends in translated propaganda and the trends in violence within specific sociopolitical contexts, alongside key dates that illustrate the shifting relations between the Chinese state and the Xinjiang region.

Chapter 2, Presentation of Trends, is a descriptive presentation of the comparison between translated propaganda and violence. It further details how the graphical representations were devised and how, potentially, the relationship between propaganda and violence, in both translated directions, from Uyghur into Chinese and Chinese into Uyghur, could be interpreted. The graphs included a comparison of trends in violence with the total number of translated

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<sup>10</sup> 西方、西域

propaganda, and also a comparison of trends in violence with the number of translated propaganda according to the nine individual genres categorized by Index Translationum—Law, Social Sciences, Education; Literature; Natural and Exact Sciences; Applied Sciences; History, Geography, Biography; Philosophy, Psychology; Arts, Games, Sport; Generalities, Bibliography; Religion, Theology.

The relationship suggests that, at the most literal and value-free level, translating fewer propaganda (tweaking one data point) could have the potential of decreasing violent confrontations in the Xinjiang region (influencing another data point), if such is the desired outcome, which, objectively, should be the state's goal. After all, achieving a “harmonious society” is one of the foremost strategic development goals that the Chinese government put forth (CPC 2004), after realizing that breakneck economic development also introduced the fracturing forces of economic divide between urban and rural, rich and poor, the coastal east and interior west, where a large proportion of its ethnic minorities are (coincidentally) distributed. Proposed under then President Hu Jintao (2003-2013), it was not only hailed as a natural progression in China's Marxist tradition, but also theorized to be the direct descendant of the eastern teachings of Confucius and Mencius and Western philosophies of Socrates and Plato (Yu 2005).

But there is a reason propaganda is called “propaganda.” It is a one-way message that is intent on advancing a very particular agenda and not really concerned with two-way communication; it is designed specifically to quash different opinions. If packaged properly, the propaganda model can yield successful results, as demonstrated by Herman and Chomsky ([1988] 2002), in the case of an American mass media complicit in advancing an anti-communist ideology in the US. The interesting fact in China is that there is no “independent” mass media

that argue they are “speaking truth to power.” The party arguably controls and censors all media outlets; the media speak very much in mind of the party’s power. So the state cannot “manufacture consent” by enlisting “objective” news outlets in quite the manner explained by Herman and Chomsky in the American context. The hand of the party is much easier to spot. However, when pockets are lined with money and there is food on the table and a roof over one’s head, it is easier to turn a blind eye to propaganda, dismiss propaganda as simply “propaganda,” or even gradually succumb to its repeated brainwashing effects and “agree” with the gleaming images of economic progress and the benefits of “law and order.”

In the China-Xinjiang context, however, when the disparity that development brings upholds existing inter-ethnic prejudices instead of overcoming them, propaganda proves harder to ignore. The persistent trends in violence against the equally persistent trends in translated propaganda indicate that not only is it harder to ignore, it is potentially contributing to the environment that fosters mutual misgivings. If so, then why continue to translate? Why has this pattern of translated propaganda and violence persisted against a backdrop of seemingly different political and cultural shifts since the communist party came into power in 1949? From Mao worship to a revival of Confucianism; from a closed-door policy to World Trade Organization membership; from communism to “socialism with Chinese characteristics” to becoming the largest economy in the world in terms of purchasing power parity (Willige 2016). Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 attempt to explain that the answer lies not so much in what happened after 1949, but before.

Chapter 3, (Post-)Colonialism, deals with the temptation, controversies, and drawbacks of applying the framework of colonialism and subsequent (post)colonial scholarship to explain the Chinese state’s behavior towards the ethnic other, while acknowledging at the same time the

colonial framework's explanatory power in discerning a structure of dominance in place between the Han and the Uyghur.

Chapter 4, *Ethno-Nationalism and the Nation-State*, explores the historical construct of Chinese ethnocentrism, dating as far back as the Eastern Zhou period (770–255 BC); how the narrative, packaged in the rhetoric of Confucianism, predates the current Han-Uyghur struggle framed under nationalism; how it continues to inform—throughout the downfall of the Qing, the creation of the Republic, the triumph of the Communist Revolution, to the Rise of China as an indisputable power—its modern-day manifestations in ethnic policy, demarcation of space and identity, kinship and outsider; and contribute to the divide and resentment evident in the surveys and studies conducted on the two groups.

Chapter 5, *High Modernism and Marxism*, further explores how the modern-day execution of this ethnocentrism borrows from the idioms and ideologies of high modernism and Marxism—how China *translates* these supposed “Western” concepts, deemed to be “modern” and “progressive” and “scientific” to underwrite and justify its action towards the governance of the ethnic other, which here specifically refer to the Uyghur minority. “Translation” is demonstrated to be a mechanism in which the translating culture can take “text” and subsume that text to support its own domestic context of historical ethnocentrism, i.e. Han privilege, and be completely “blind” to the effects of translation—because “translation” is posited as transparent in public discourse.

Chapter 6, *Translation and Intersubjectivity*, subsequently questions the effectiveness of translation to promote intercultural communication, essentially “intersubjectivity,” in the instance of clear power struggles and differentials, particularly along ethnic lines, as exemplified in the case of the Han-Uyghur relationship in the Chinese context. It engages the school of

philosophy, predominantly born out of one ethnic frame of mind—white, European, male—that presupposes a “universal” human interest, where “commensurability” is the “natural” outcome and goal of communication by juxtaposing this philosophy with the realities of competing ethnic interests, often violent, as the data suggests, regardless of translations purporting to “communicate” in the Other’s language, as the data also suggests. Translation becomes a tool for the strengthening of cultural subjectivity rather than the means to intersubjectivity between cultures. The agency of the individual translator is rendered almost impossible to exercise under these conditions.

Chapter 7, *The Qing Analogy*, cites the Manchu rulers of the Qing dynasty as one example (among many) of ethnic minorities who became “Chinese” rulers. The position of power “Chinese” came to occupy in the hierarchical structure of governance in China’s Han-centric historiography afforded legitimacy to “alien” rulers should they effectively sinicize or, in other words, translate their foreign selves to fit into the Confucian order of things. But agency is only afforded to the powerful. Whereas the Manchus could “choose” to have Chinese translated into Manchu and Manchu into Chinese, to maintain a significance of identity if no longer in substance, the Uyghurs do not have that choice. In stark contrast to the Manchus, the Uyghurs must resist, and resist translation.

Chapter 8, *Significance of Study*, draws attention to the potential of this Han-Uyghur case study to fill research gaps in translation studies, in general, by the very nature of it being outside the traditional (post)colonial discourse on former French, Spanish, and English colonies; and in studies of translation between Chinese and Uyghur, in particular, given that this language pair, within an intra-national context, is usually understudied compared to studies conducted between Chinese-English or other “foreign” languages on an inter-national basis. Through quantitative

keyword searches, it is demonstrated that studies concerning “Xinjiang” and “translation” lag behind those concerning “China” and “translation”—even though in the Chinese context it is also demonstrated by using keyword searches that the Uyghur language is in close competition with the traditionally “powerful” languages of translation—French and German, in particular—in being studied as a translated language pair. Given Uyghur’s strategic importance in governing the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the lack of politically-oriented perspectives and theoretical frameworks that specifically address power relations between the Han and Uyghur demonstrated by two significant Chinese studies on translation between Chinese and Uyghur (Tuerdi 2012; Tong 2005) illustrate the potential of my study to fill in this gap, especially considering the censored environment Chinese scholarship now finds itself in concerning the region.

Chapter 9, *Limitations of Study*, addresses the limitations of this study, namely in the areas of language and identity politics, use of statistics, and positionality of the researcher. It was identified that further research and exploration into these areas would no doubt heed more insight, but for the purpose and scope of this study, these areas would be best approached in future studies, from which this current study could almost certainly be further refined.

The concluding chapter addresses the frequent and disruptive script changes the Uyghur language underwent throughout different political schemes, resulting in the Uyghur people losing a vital connection to their past, traditions, literature, and identity, which breeds resentment and can account for the seeming paucity of translations from Uyghur into Chinese compared to Chinese into Uyghur. Robbed of the agency to use their own language to create their own narrative, and faced with an overwhelmingly number of translations into Uyghur produced by the state, the cyclical nature of violence, and its mirroring trends in translated propaganda, do not

seem at all out of expectations, even if violent uprisings are, ironically, a most undesired result for the state.

In conclusion, “translation” is what allows “China,” not an individual but an ideological entity, to translate both the past and the future—Confucianism in the east and Marxism from the West—into tenets that support its own Han-oriented ethno-nationalism, the built-in propensity for ethnocentrism and exceptionalism that have written the histories of China’s dynasties and informed its interethnic relations within its shifting borders. Translation is ultimately demonstrated to be *unconcerned* with what the “original” said. What did Confucius mean? What did Marx mean? It does not matter so long as their translations afford the party in power its ruling legitimacy.

**PART I**

**NUTS AND BOLTS**

## CHAPTER 1

### METHODOLOGY

#### 1.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the steps taken to investigate what, in the introductory chapter, is framed as the “Xinjiang Problem” by the Chinese state. To further enable the juxtaposition of this problem with translation, it can also be expressed, by means of a different linguistic arrangement, that this study is investigating the “problem of Xinjiang” (the problem the state faces of alternate, cyclical ethnic unrest and suppression) alongside the “problem of translation,” which is the potential problematic, enabling function of translation within this violent state of Uyghur-Han relations signaled by the lopsided trends in translation flows between the two languages, even though the professed goal of ethnic policy is “harmony.” It attempts to discern whether or not there is a relationship between violence and translation, between the intensity of translated propaganda and China’s treatment and behavior toward the ethnic other.

This object of inquiry was born out of a research project I was assigned to—the UNESCO/IATIS Research Initiative: Translation Flows and Cultural Diversity—as a research assistant investigating the translation flows between Chinese and other languages. These languages included traditional “foreign” languages, such as English, Japanese, German, French; but most interestingly, they also included the languages of the ethnic minorities within Chinese borders. The Uyghur language translation flows with Chinese stood out conspicuously because of its lopsided imbalance within the timeframe of that study between 1979-2009: compared to 13 translations from Uyghur into Chinese, there were 695 translations from Chinese into Uyghur. In comparison, the gap in translations flows of another autonomous region with much more

publicized contentious relations with China—Tibet—seemed almost “tame”: compared to 70 translations from Tibetan into Chinese, there were 290 translations from Chinese into Tibetan. This spiked my interest in investigating the function of translation and its significance within the context of Xinjiang’s relations with China. The data sources I use are presented in Table 2 at the end of this chapter.

Prior to detailing the methodology for this study, it must also be noted that my “habitus,” as Bourdieusian sociology would have it, does not stem from a Chinese communist context or “native” Uyghur/Chinese experience. I am outside of that context and those experiences. Instead, my intellectual upbringing consists of education in Taiwan, the US, and Canada. Taiwan, for both postcolonial and political reasons, is ideologically anti-China and pro-American (and to a large extent models its industries and institutions on idealized notions of Euro-American standards of market and democracy); the US and Canada, in regards to the political discourse since the inception of the PRC, can hardly be said to embrace China either. So, to opposing parties, I am of the “West,” and my habitus, in opposition to China. These self-assessed conditions of the production of my knowledge, though performed in the truest pursuit of reflexivity and reflection on positionality, are further underlined by China’s strategically deployed hardline rhetoric towards Taiwan, which it still considers a “renegade province” (Fang 2000) with “splittist” elements (People’s Daily 2004; Pilling 2010).

These contextual factors play a crucial role in the formation of my research question. They have prompted me to proceed from a point of suspicion, meaning that I am not necessarily looking for how translation aids in intercultural communication, but rather how it does *not*, despite the very popular and positive public discourse on the power of translation to bring cultures together. And I attempt this by following a particular mode of inquiry arising from

postcolonial criticism as a subject intimately familiar with authoritarian power while a primary and middle school student under the Nationalist's one-party rule in Taiwan.

## **1. 2 Index Translationum, 1950-2007**

The first step of my research consisted of collecting yearly data on the number of titles being translated from Uyghur into Chinese and Chinese into Uyghur—i.e. the “translation flows” between these two languages—using UNESCO’s online database, Index Translationum (the Index). The period under examination is between 1950-2007 because, at the time this research proposal was put forth, 1950 was the earliest year data was available for China and 2007 the latest. The translated titles are categorized under the classification system specified by the Index and according to year of publication. The nine subject groups of the Index are as follows:

- 1) Literature
- 2) Law, Social Sciences, Education
- 3) History, Geography, Biographies
- 4) Philosophy, Psychology
- 5) Religion, Theology
- 6) Applied Sciences
- 7) Natural and Exact Sciences
- 8) Art, Games, Sports
- 9) Generalities, Bibliographies

The Index is the only source of data I am using for translation flows between Chinese and Uyghur. Created in paper version in 1932, the online version “contains cumulative bibliographical information on books translated and published in about one hundred of the UNESCO Member States between 1979 and 2009 and totals more than 2,000,000 entries in all disciplines” (UNESCO 2016). Though it specifies “1979” as the earliest date for online data

availability, operationally, after querying the database for this study, I was able to obtain data as far back as 1950 for China.

### **1.3 China National Bibliography**

A secondary data source was considered to verify the data provided by the Index. This secondary data source was the China National Bibliography (CNB),<sup>1</sup> an official Chinese government compilation of all publications in China in yearbook format. The rationale for using the CNB was that by looking at its titles and cross-checking them with those from the Index, I could better ensure the accuracy of the data I am working with. “Accuracy” here mainly implies the number of titles translated from Chinese into Uyghur and vice versa, as well as the classification of those titles (Law, Literature, Science, etc), two pieces of information which could influence the conclusions I draw from studying the publication trends of translations.

However, after preliminary attempts at using the CNB, I arrived at the conclusion that additional mining through this secondary source would add undue burden to the reasonable timeframe of a PhD thesis *without* adding significant value to the research results. In other words, from a cost-benefit perspective, its contributions would be negligible. An operational summary of how this conclusion was drawn and how the absence of this secondary source would not significantly compromise the integrity of my research is explained in the next section.

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<sup>1</sup> 全国总书目 quanguo zongshumu

### 1. 3. 1 Reasons for Not Using the CNB

A digitized version of the CNB exists only for the years 2001-2009, and only in CD-ROM format.<sup>2</sup> This is a major shortcoming given the data on violence I have obtained covers 1949-2005 (Bovingdon 2010, 114) and 1990-2009 (Hastings 2011, 899), which is a combined coverage from 1949-2009. But even with the CD-ROMs, information retrieving for the study of translated titles is strenuous since there is no classification for “translations.” I can pull up the number of titles published in Uyghur for a given year since I can search for the language of publication as “Uyghur.” (For example, there were 611 titles published in Uyghur in 2002.) Then I can further whittle down this number into number of translations by filtering with the keyword “译” (“translation” or “translated”) which gives me 178 titles out of 611. But I cannot know if they are translated from Chinese unless I examine the entries individually. After individual examination, 162 titles were translated from the Chinese (after taking out 12 that were translated from a non-Chinese source,<sup>3</sup> 3 on the subject of “translation” but not translations per se, and 1 mentioning that the poet/author had been “translated” into many languages).

However, what proves to be the most insurmountable is the verification of the number of titles translated from Uyghur into Chinese. This means I would need to pull up the publication of Chinese titles for each given year and then determine which are translations from Uyghur. But since Chinese is the default language, there was no function provided to effectively search and

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<sup>2</sup> Among the CD-ROMs, the 2001 and 2004 ones are not functioning properly. In addition, the search options for the rest of the years from 2005 and beyond are designed differently; they actually make it even more time-consuming to look for “translations.”

<sup>3</sup> For foreign (non-Chinese) titles translated into Uyghur, it is difficult to determine whether the Uyghur translation was translated directly from the foreign language or from the Chinese translation of the foreign language. This information is often not made explicit even though two translators (one for Uyghur and one for Chinese) are listed. That is, the Chinese translation might have served as the “pivot” for translation into Uyghur. However, since the purpose of my study is to look at “Chinese” as the source language (not pivot language), I have discounted these titles.

single out the language of publication as “Chinese”; I can only search and single out a specific minority language or foreign language. Furthermore, given the enormous number of titles published in China in a given year (e.g. 102,525 in 2002), sifting for “Chinese” and “Uyghur” titles would be manually impossible for the years prior to 2001 that only have paper-based data. The online catalogue at the National Library in Beijing indicates that physical copies of the CNB might be scattered in different library locations across China, making this task even more difficult. Even if I somehow found a way to determine how many of the 102,525 titles in 2002 were actually published in Chinese, matters would still be difficult because there is no search category for translation from a particular language. I can enter different search criteria, such as particular keywords, that might pull up translations from Uyghur into Chinese. But I would still need to examine the entries individually to verify if they are indeed correct, not to mention that using keywords might either fail to pull up all pertinent entries (resulting in data gaps) or pull up overlapping entries which require additional time to tease out. And, again, the digital CNB only covers the years from 2001-2009. If digitally it already proves time-consuming,<sup>4</sup> the paper-based version offers even fewer options for effective or efficient research within a PhD timeframe.

One possible way around this difficulty is to narrow the reference period from 1949-2009 to a much shorter period. This was considered. However, since discovering the wealth of titles

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<sup>4</sup> Additional problems with using the CD-ROMs: data from different years are scattered irrespective of the given year labeled on the disc. For example, the 2005 disc has data from 2002, 2003, and 2004 that do not seem to be included in the actual discs labeled as 2002, 2003, and 2004. I say “do not seem” because I have yet to cross-check each disc; from preliminary usage, I know some are not included. If I decide to use the CD-ROMs, I would have to cross-check each disc and basically recompile the data manually for each year. I would not be able to digitally search these recompiled versions since I can’t digitally rearrange the data on different discs.

What I have been doing is to make sure I am only looking at titles published in 2002 when I’m using the 2002 disc, only looking at titles published in 2003 when I’m using the 2003 disc, and etc. I do this by limiting the search criteria to a specific year, ignoring the other years. But doing this means I could be overlooking some relevant titles (e.g. when I’m using the 2005 disc, I could overlook a relevant entry in 2003 that is in the 2005 disc but NOT in the actual 2003 disc). To rectify this problem of mutual exclusion, as I have explained, means I would have to recompile all the data on these discs. But because I cannot digitally search these new recompiled versions, recompiling in itself would be a futile task to begin with.

the Index has from 1950-1979 (despite the website saying it only covers the period of 1979 and onwards), I find it would be a terrible waste to not somehow incorporate this data into my research since an overwhelming number of the translations produced during this period are clearly state propaganda. They serve a clear political purpose, which would support my initial proposed theory that translation is not a means of intercultural communication or understanding, but a symbolic act of power to denote who dominates and who is dominated. Coupled with the trends in violence documented by both Bovingdon and Hastings, it would further support my belief that in this Chinese-Uyghur context, such copious amounts of translations that were commissioned during the early founding years of the Chinese state had little impact on mitigating future violence between the two groups.

Another concern that made me reluctant to shorten the period of reference is my emphasis on “trends.” The trends in violence that both Bovingdon and Hastings capture are quite remarkable. It would again be a waste to not somehow fully incorporate their findings into my study, not to mention that the study of “trends” would be less significant if I did not have a sufficient historic timeframe to show the fluctuation of publications versus violence. That is not to say I am commenting on every year between 1949-2009. I focus instead on certain periods within 1949-2009 that present an opportunity to discuss a relationship, or even potential correlation, between the two trends.

Given the span of years I am studying, the CNB was taken out of the methodology to ensure the completion of this thesis within a reasonable timeframe. I believe, for the following reasons, that this decision did not result in an unacceptable compromise of the integrity of the research to investigate my question:

1) *The potential contribution* of the CNB lies in its ability to *add* to the numbers of titles translated from Chinese into Uyghur (ZH > UY) and Uyghur into Chinese (UY > ZH). Currently, the Index gives me 1,728 titles for ZH > UY and 17 for UY > ZH during the period of coverage between 1950-2007. The imbalance in the direction of translation denotes the imbalance in the power structure between the Chinese state and the Uyghur people.

It is highly unlikely that additional titles from the CNB could reverse this imbalance, which is what my proposed theory is based upon. If it could reverse this direction, it would mean that the Index has grievous flaws in its data collection process, which is unlikely as well, or else it would not have been able to count as many as 1,728 titles for ZH > UY or produce the very high numbers for FOREIGN > ZH.

For example, 41,231 titles were translated from English; 7,496 from Japanese; 4,097 from German; even 82 from Tibetan. Since we would have to assume that the methodology for data collection at the Index is the same for all languages, it is very likely that there are only 17 titles from UY > ZH. Furthermore, if the CNB could add titles, it would likely add them in a way that keeps the same imbalance. This of course is hypothetical, but one not without some degree of support based on my preliminary findings of comparing the Index and CNB between 2001-2007 in Table 1:

**CNB:** China National Bibliography

**Index:** Index Translationum

**ZH:** Chinese; **UY:** Uyghur

**ZH > UY:** From Chinese into Uyghur

**UY > ZH:** From Uyghur into Chinese

**Table 1: CNB v. Index: Translations between Chinese and Uyghur, 2001-2007**

A	B	C	D	E	F <sup>1</sup>	G
Year	Total Publications in China in all languages / CNB	Total Publications in Uyghur / CNB	ZH > UY CNB	ZH > UY Index	UY > ZH CNB	UY > ZH Index
2001	CD-ROM not functioning			6	N/A	0
2002	102,525	611	162	13	0	1
2003	106,271	410	106	77	6	6
2004	CD-ROM not functioning			104	N/A	0
2005	103,960	199	72	48	0	3
2006	95,544	272	87	95	4	1
2007	115,464	336	101	60	0	1

If we compare columns D and E, we can see that the CNB overall (except for 2006) adds a considerable number of titles to the translation direction of Chinese into Uyghur (ZH > UY); while a comparison of columns F and G shows that the CNB (except for 2006) does not significantly add to the other direction of Uyghur into Chinese (UY > ZH). This means that when applied, the CNB maintains the imbalance of the power structure I state in my research question (i.e. there are far more titles being translated from Chinese into Uyghur than vice versa, which

<sup>1</sup> Since there is no search category for UY > ZH and it was not feasible to look at all the publishing houses in China and their publications to determine which were translations and which translations were from Uyghur, these numbers are based on looking at the publishing houses that most likely would deal with translations between Chinese and Uyghur, namely: Xinjiang University Press, Xinjiang Education Press, Xinjiang Science and Technology Press, Xinjiang People's Health Press, Xinjiang Arts and Photography Press, Xinjiang Youth Press, Xinjiang People's Press, Beijing Language and Culture Press, Ethnic Publishing House.

denotes the power of the Chinese state in disseminating its ideology). In other words, the conclusion I would likely arrive at by just using the Index as my only data source would unlikely be incorrigibly “wrong” if other data sources, such as the CNB, were factored in as well.

2) *Irrespective of* the hypothetical increase in titles that the CNB could contribute to UY > ZH to reduce or reverse the imbalance, the fact that a considerable number of the titles from the other direction of ZH > UY are propagandist in nature remains intact. The likelihood that there would be additional titles from the CNB which could significantly reduce the proportion of propagandist titles vs. non-propagandist titles is unlikely either, given what we know about the Chinese political context during the years between 1949-1979 (which are the years between the founding of the Communist State under Mao to the end of the Cultural Revolution). So this would continue to support my belief that translation in this context is not about facilitating cultural understanding, but the state disseminating its governing ideology within its borders.

#### 1.4 ‘Propaganda’

Given China’s one-party rule under the Communists, identifying “translated propaganda” as an indicator of state ideology and domination would be much more effective than simply using translations as a given. However, not all of the 1,730 translations recorded in the Index can be classified as propaganda; they run the spectrum of being textbooks for math and science, to popular fiction or folklore, to the purely commercial or functional.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, after selecting my data source as the Index, the next step was to create a self-generated subgroup called “propaganda” among the recorded translations. “Propaganda” was created with the understanding that it is a type of literature that can be present in all nine groups of the Index, thus

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<sup>2</sup> After looking at all 1730 titles, examples I did not classify as propaganda include: *Arithmetic Exercise Book for Workers and Peasants* (1952; gongnong tongyong suanshu keben); *The Topography of Earth* (1985; diqiu de waimao); *The Stubborn Goat* (2003; guzhi de yang; part of Aesop’s fables series); *Professional Accounting in Mandarin* (2004; kuaiji zhuan ye hanyu); *Birthday Gift Readings* (2005; shengriliwuduwu; horoscope series).

still accounting for all of the data provided under the conventional library classification system used by the Index. Being the “deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist” (Jowett and O’Donnell 1992, 4), any communication material can be fashioned into propaganda, making it therefore classification-blind. Because I now target a much better indicator of the state’s political intention (“propaganda”), I could filter all nine categories of translations more effectively.

To be sure, “propaganda” is not the sole prerogative of Communist China. The height of modern propaganda as we know it, the promotion of its applications and deliberations of its effectiveness, can be traced to the two world wars and the world powers entrenched in the attached ideological struggles of, namely, Nazism, Fascism, Marxism/Communism, and Democracy. All parties exhorted propaganda as a must in warfare, a new science in urgent need to be deployed. Edward Bernays (1942), the American pioneer in the field objectively called “Public Relations,” pointed out that the first university-level course was not taught until 1923 at New York University by himself (241). But by 1942, “31 universities were offering 68 courses in Public Relations, Public Opinion, and related subjects” (241). Bernays, in a calling forth of “psychological ramparts” (243) to combat Nazism and Fascism, emphasized the brutal effectiveness of the German propaganda model under the Ministry for National Enlightenment and Propaganda as an “advance building of morale at home” and a “strategy of terror” abroad (242): “Under it the press is subject to the most stringent regulations and close organization ever achieved in any country. Journalists must be registered, and the Press Association is a statutory body under the Minister of Propaganda. Newspaper proprietorship and shareholdings are rigorously controlled, and no joint stock company, cooperative society of public or learned body

of any kind may publish a newspaper” (242). The philosophy behind this would not sound unfamiliar to those with knowledge of Chinese propaganda and censorship, two strategies in shaping public opinion which, according to Walter Lippmann ([1922] 1960), must work hand-in-hand to achieve the desired aims of any propaganda campaign: “In order to conduct a propaganda there must be some barrier between the public and the event. Access to the real environment must be limited, before anyone can create a pseudo-environment that he thinks wise or desirable (43).

In *Public Opinion* ([1922] 1960), Lippmann’s seminal text published on the subject of propaganda and persuasion, in the context between the two wars and ideological struggles, he recognized early on that individuals could only ever operate in “pseudo-environments” of what they *thought* or were *taught* was the world, thus subjecting themselves to easy manipulation once facts could not be readily accessed: “The way in which the world is *imagined* determines at any particular moment what men will do” (25; emphasis added). Lippmann effectively coined this imaginary world: “the pictures in our head” in contrast to “the world outside” (3-34). Therefore, his conclusion on the nature of propaganda: “But what is propaganda but, if not the effort to alter the picture to which men respond, to substitute one social pattern for another? What is class consciousness but a way of realizing the world? National consciousness but another?” (26). Speaking in less philosophical and more operational terms, in the context of the Great War, he described propaganda as “[A] group of men who can prevent independent access to the event, arrange the news of it to suit their purpose. That the purpose was in this case patriotic does not affect the argument at all. They used their power to make the Allied public see affairs as they desired them to be seen” (42).

Through detailed analysis of propaganda efforts during the war, Lippmann effectively exposed the ways the common man was manipulated. He no longer believed in “the original dogma of democracy; that the knowledge needed for the management of human affairs comes up spontaneously from the human heart” (248-49). He believed in the “creation of consent” (248) and advocated an elite-driven model where consent would be created by a professional, specialized class, not left to “arise from the human heart.” The masses could not be trusted to know what is best for them. Authoritarian governments would certainly agree. But “democracies” can be just as exploitive. The American system of information dissemination by “news,” where it effectively exploits this vulnerability of Lippmann’s common man in the name of “democracy” or “justice,” is demonstrated in detail in Herman and Chomsky’s *Manufacturing Consent* ([1988] 2002), but also in full view in the very public debates on “fake news” and the manipulation of social media.

Propaganda, therefore, is not exclusive to a certain era, a certain actor, or any particular ideology. In fact, Paul M. A. Linebarger (1947), part of the American military presence in China during its civil war and author of the textbook classic *Psychological Warfare* (1948), which deals extensively with wartime propaganda, complained in great detail of the lackluster propaganda efforts of the Nationalists compared to the Communists: “[The Kuomintang] do not have the exalted fanaticism of the Nazis or the Stalinists; they are incapable of butchering people, save in warfare, on ‘scientific’ or ‘progressive’ grounds. The Kuomintang rarely acts revolutionary, except to address homiletics to the people” (538). In commanding detail he contrasts the propaganda efforts of the two sides:

No anti-Communist public meeting was ever...held on Communist territory. No anti-Communist paper ever published as much as Volume 1. No magazine hostile to Marxism ever appeared. Yet the Chinese Communists portray themselves as rustic

liberals with a taste for free speech. In contrast, anywhere in Nationalist territory—in war or out—people will tell you they are “oppressed,” will denounce Chiang K’ai-shek’s “fascism,” will describe the “starvation of the masses” while visibly well-fed coolies walk past the door, and will express their mortal fear of Chiang’s “terror”—doing so in loud voices, with gestures, in public places. No visitor ever came back from the Communist areas with the news that people *said* they were oppressed. They are happy, *officially* happy. (538-39, ft 12; emphasis in original)

That the pioneering figures of public opinion and public relations and psychological warfare, Lippmann and Bernays and Linebarger, found their prominence in the contexts of the Great Wars, that the German propaganda model is referenced with equal reverence and revulsion, alludes to the intricate relationship between propaganda and violence, because what is war if not the ultimate expression of violence? The prominence of propaganda, metaphysically, is dependent on and arises from its persuasion to wage violence, from the one party against the other, literally and figuratively, from the Great Wars of One and Two to the “War on Terror”—though, as the experience of all three suggests, even the figurative kind is often a precursor, a “getting-ready-for,” the literal. If “violence” were to be removed from “propaganda,” then propaganda would cease to be “propaganda”; it would be “public opinion” trying to influence “public relations.” In other words, what gives “propaganda” its particular negativity and connotations of malignant intent, distinguished from other forms of “marketing,” is its *id* capacity to incite or suppress violence, its strong association with the workings of wars in the violent ideological struggles between world powers. Thus governments of today, in their public efforts, have largely distanced themselves from the term, even though the word played prominently in the arguments of propaganda strategists like Bernays and Lippmann.

Though the Chinese term for “propaganda,” *xuanchuan*,<sup>3</sup> largely eludes the dichotomy of propaganda/bad vs. communications/good, the Chinese state has also shifted in its propaganda approach. In Anne-Marie Brady’s comprehensive overview and analysis of China’s ethnic propaganda (2012), she point outs that “since the watershed of 1989, rather than to politically indoctrinate, the role of propaganda in China is now to mould public opinion on issues of concern to the government and to build a consensus for the continuance of the current political system” (161). So, evident in the Chinese strategy is also an attempt to disassociate government from “violence”—i.e. forceful ideological indoctrination—and *mould* “public opinion” into “consensus.” Since ethnic issues “are one of the most *serious fault lines* in Chinese politics today...*educating* the Chinese public on ethnic affairs and ethnic policy is a prominent theme of contemporary propaganda” (161; emphasis added). “Serious fault lines” implies, euphemistically, violence. “Education” is propaganda. The system of propaganda through which this education is delivered consists of an intricate network of bodies and agencies in all levels of government. At the national level, the Central Propaganda Department, the United Front Department, and the State Ethnic Affairs Commission work together to “set China’s macro- and micro-propaganda policies on ethnic affairs” (161).<sup>4</sup> The policies must be implemented by the multiple agencies within China’s propaganda system, which include:

[A]ll propaganda cadres and offices installed in party branches at all levels of organisation in both the state bureaucracy and Chinese and foreign-run private enterprises; the political department system of the People’s Liberation Army; the education, culture, science, sport, health, information communication technology, publishing, radio, television, film and media sectors; and all mass organizations from neighbourhood committees to government-operated non-governmental organisations such as the China Society for Human Rights. (161)

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<sup>3</sup> 宣傳

<sup>4</sup> 中宣部 zhongxuanbu, 统战部 tongzhanbu, 国家民委 guojiaminwei

And most interestingly, attesting to the ethnic divide, paradox, and hierarchy within China's ethnic relations is that "[T]he various *non-Han* ethnic groups in China also all have their *own* state-controlled print and online news media, publishing, radio, film and television programming which *must follow party policy* (Bai 2004 cited in Brady 2012, 162; emphasis added). The "non-Han" minority are awarded their "own" media outlets, but these outlets are effectively "state-controlled"; that state is Han. Also within this system is the "network of ethnic colleges and schools that play an important role in educating elites within ethnic-minority communities, as well as specialist research institutes that research ethnic-related policy issues" (162). Brady also includes the Confucius Institutes within this network because she considers "China's efforts to manage international perceptions of what constitutes "Chineseness" part of the government's ethnic propaganda aimed at foreigners" (172). Participating foreign universities "need to accept the 'One China' policy and to avoid interaction with Tibetan, Uyghur, Taiwanese, or Falungong political figures" (172).

Has this vast interwoven system of propaganda, in scope and rigor, deploying both "positive" and "negative" propaganda, respectively targeting the Han, the non-Han, and the Foreigner, succeeded in stabilizing the ethnic "fault line," especially in "periods of crisis," which Brady identified (as case studies) as the events in Tibet in 2008 and Urumqi in 2009 (160)?

According to her, the conclusion is three-tiered:

While China's ethnic-related propaganda has been *relatively successful* in winning over the *Han majority* (and also in gaining some ground in some of the areas where ethnic minorities dominate, such as Yunnan), it has been *less successful* in some of the *most restive areas* of China such as *Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang*, and it has been a *resounding failure* in the battle for influence over *international public opinion*. (177; emphasis added)

In other words, it is more successful in uniting the *Han-majority against the Other*, such as in the instance of the “I Heart China” campaign directed at foreign coverage of the Chinese government’s handling of Tibet leading up to the 2008 Olympics. It counts as a success because “from a domestic propaganda point of view, coverage of the riots in Tibetan areas helped to build mainstream support for authoritarian rule in China” (174). But this hardly means the drivers of violence have been eliminated with propaganda; it almost means the opposite since nowhere in Brady’s analysis are the grievances of the Tibetan or Uyghurs addressed, while now there is even more support for the authoritarian rule that contributed to the crisis. That some “success” was attributed to the management of the crises, was 1) the Han were united in the Tibet crisis; and 2) the Chinese state learned from the Tibet crisis to proactively take control of the framing of the Uyghur crisis before Western media could come in by shutting down Xinjiang’s Internet and allowing the Chinese media to disproportionately report Uyghur inflicted violence on the Han and not subsequent Han-led violence toward the Uyghurs (175-76). They are successful in the “management” of violence to portray the Other as violent, to give cause for suppression; not the elimination of violence by addressing the cause. Indeed, as Brady ultimately concludes: “given the *extreme levels* of popular discontent in China’s ethnic hotspots...force and persuasion are only stop-gap measures that *cannot resolve the issues underlying the violence*” (178; emphasis added).

Brady’s qualitative conclusion points out propaganda’s attempt to resolve violence but ultimate inability to do so. My attempt in this study is to take it further, one step, to see if propaganda might be seen as possibly contributing to violence, despite its expressed communicative goal to bring about national “unity.” Furthermore, it is to situate this study under Translation Studies by marking *translated* propaganda as the primary indicator to trace the trends

of propaganda alongside the trends in violence in a quantitative attempt to measure “effect” or “effectiveness.” Since my primary use of “propaganda” is as an “indicator” and not to debate its nature or origins, the understanding of propaganda applied in this study follows the general understanding of its ideological intentions previously laid out in Lippmann ([1922] 1960), Bernays (1947), and Linebarger (1947) within the Chinese ethnic context of violent undercurrents described by Brady (2012). In order to test my research question using the data provided by the Index, I have, for the purpose of my specific inquiry, subsequently defined “propaganda” as: *any title or author that can be explicitly or readily associated with Chinese Communist Party ideology, narratives, policies, activities, events*. They are identifiable by keywords such as, but not limited to: *Mao (Zedong), Lu Xun (iconic writer), Mao Dun (iconic writer), Lei Feng (iconic figure), Xiang Xiuli (iconic figure), Li Shuangshuang (iconic figure), Yan’an (city; once party headquarters), Nanniwan (gorge; agriculture production site), honglingjin (red scarf), shaoxiandui (young pioneers), dang (party), laodong (labour), douzheng (struggle), sulian (Soviet)*.<sup>5</sup> Keywords represented here as examples were taken from actual titles in the Index.

The emphasis on “explicitly or readily associated with” is to minimize subjective interpretation of whether or not the wording of a title lends itself to the category of “propaganda.” This narrow definition is necessary because the Index only gives me the Chinese titles (in English transliteration) from either direction and, more importantly, I am conducting a macrostudy of trends and not studying the contents of each individual translation. In the cases where I have included a title whose wording is not “explicitly or readily associated with Chinese

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<sup>5</sup> 毛, 鲁迅, 茅盾, 雷锋, 向秀丽, 李双双, 延安, 南泥湾, 红领巾, 少先队, 党, 劳动, 斗争, 苏联

Communist Party ideology, narratives, policies, activities, events,” it is the result of online research that revealed the content to be using language explicitly associated with party ideology.

The number of titles grouped under the category “propaganda” are tallied in two ways:

- 1) for each of the nine (library) categories under the Index, and
- 2) for each year between 1950-2007

The percentage of propaganda produced in a given year was then calculated using the total number of translations produced in a given year provided by the Index. The percentage numbers were then used to produce graphs which illustrated the trends in total propaganda between 1950-2007, according to year and for each of the library categories.

## **1.5 Uyghur Resistance**

Two graphs were then used for the representation of Uyghur resistance in Xinjiang:

- 1) Gardner Bovingdon’s “Organized or Violent Events in Xinjiang, 1949-2005” (2010, 114); see Appendix A.
- 2) Justin V. Hastings’ “Number of Targets in Violent Incidents in Xinjiang, 1990-2009” (2011, 899); see Appendix B.

I used the data that Bovingdon’s graph provides for the years 1949-1990, and compared it with the publication trends of “propaganda” generated from the Index for the same period. Hastings’ data from 1990-2009 was used to compare with the corresponding period of “propaganda” derived from the Index as well. Using two graphs allowed me to take full advantage of the years covered by the Index. If I had only used Bovingdon’s, which ends in 2005, I would not be able to take into account the significance of the Beijing Olympics held in 2008,

which, besides being a major sporting event, was also a major political event with international reverberations.

The reason I chose Bovingdon's graph (2010, 114) is that he clearly states he has "been able to document violent or organized protests or resistance in Xinjiang since 1949, including armed uprisings, peaceful demonstrations, and riots, as well as clearly political violence such as assassinations and bombings" (113), which are represented in graph form in Figure 4.1 (114). He further explains that because his "criteria are more restrictive than those adopted by officially sanctioned Chinese sources" (115), his numbers tend to be lower than official Chinese statistics. Bovingdon's stricter criteria and my narrow definition of propaganda serve similar purposes in terms of addressing criticism that my study would be overestimating the state's domination either by letter or force.

The reason I chose Hastings' graph (2011, 899) is because even though his unit of observation slightly differs from Bovingdon's, and even though he states official Chinese statistics as part of his dataset, he arrives at a very similar trend in violence to Bovingdon's. To a certain degree, Hastings trend can be seen as even more persuasive, since, unlike Bovingdon, who documented the "number of events," he chose to document the "number of targets" in violent incidents, which according to him "are a preferable measure of violent activity since the primary sources often talk of waves of incidents spread over several months rather than individual attacks, making it easier to quantify total targets rather than total incidents" (899).

Besides allowing for greater coverage of the number of years I can examine, the advantage of using two graphs also allows me to potentially demonstrate that a particular pattern of relationship between "violence" and "translated propaganda" is not only present in one study of

resistance, but two, done by two different scholars with different methodologies, making for a more persuasive case.

## 1.6 Relationship Between Propaganda and Violence

A comparison of the trends in translated propaganda against the trends in violence was conducted to determine whether or not there was a particular relationship that could be observed between the two or, more specifically, an *association*. The observation of a mirroring quality between the two trends suggested a type of association, and that translation activities, often promoted as conducive to communication, seemed, in this case, to be intricately linked to the ebb and flow of power struggles between the Uyghur (a nation)<sup>6</sup> and Han (the state). Aside from a descriptive observation of the data, a statistical analysis to determine cross-correlation between the two series of violence and translated propaganda was also performed on Bovington's data set (Figure 1, p. 53), which had the most sufficient data to support an analysis. The results show that among the range of possible associations between violence and propaganda, the strongest supported by a statistical analysis was that *an increase in propaganda can be linked to an increase of violence three years later*. The persistent patterns of irreconcilability were further analyzed against China's shifting sociopolitical contexts and under the theoretical frameworks of, namely, colonialism, ethno-nationalism, and high modernism.

## 1.7 Chinese Milestone Events and Key Policies

Ten calendar points of interest were chosen to anchor the trends in translated propaganda and the trends in violence within specific contexts. These points of interest consist of 7 milestone events and 3 key policy directions that have either had a major impact on governance in China or

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<sup>6</sup> "Nation" in the sense of Stalin's (1913) formulation: "a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture"; it is an identification that engenders tension with the state, which is "Han," not "Uyghur."

international perception of China, or both. Since this is a macro-level study designed to test a relatively new methodology in comparing trends in translation against trends in violence, the events and policies chosen are at an equally macro-level, and can easily be understood and appreciated by the most humble of non-specialists. More complex micro-level events and policy shifts would no doubt add to the sophistication of the arguments being made, but they would also be out of scope for the purpose of this study.

The milestone events and key policies are not meant to be commensurate with one another; producing a nominal consistent list wholly made up of either events or policies was not the primary goal. Nor was the primary goal to articulate the direct impact of these events or policies on the Uyghur population itself. Instead the focus was to select policies or events that could be seen as either *influential* or *in contrast to trends*, in both *propaganda* and *violence*, in that they indicated a major shift in government attitude (e.g. “closed” v. “open”). In other words, the goal was to examine the trends in translated propaganda and violence in light of sociopolitical turns that could be *signaled* by specific events or policies. These policies and events are also “Chinese” ones and not “Uyghur” since the terms of translation are overwhelmingly dictated from the Chinese source culture.

Here listed are the ten points of interest (1949 / 1954 / 1956-57 / 1958-1960 / 1966-76 / 1978-79 / 1989 / 2001 / 2003-04 / 2008); each include a brief description highlighting their importance. Some years are disaggregated to explain successive events individually. Policies are in italics to differentiate from events:

- **1949 The Founding of ‘New China’**

Nothing rings more triumphant and joyful like the birth of a nation. The Gods—Justice, Truth, Beauty—are on “our” side. While Chiang Kai-shek ceded the Mainland to his

rival Mao Zedong and retreated to the island of Taiwan in defeat, China would be made “new” by its people. It would shed its feudalistic past and embrace a new egalitarian future. There would be no Emperor. But humans are creatures of habit; history repeats itself. Shedding centuries of dynastic tendencies—or “5000” years of Chinese culture as the Chinese history books and marketing material so proclaim—is no easy feat, as later events would soon attest. Nevertheless, the mood of the nation, when the “People’s Republic of China” was founded, in contrast to the “Republic of China” then under the regime of the Nationalist Party led by Chiang, was jubilant, forward-thinking, full of hope, and “New China” has since become part of the official Chinese lexicon in reference to the birth of the nation. It can be assured, though, that references to “New China” in Taiwan, which to this day has not yet dropped its official title of “Republic of China,” do not carry the same meaning.

- **1954 *System of Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities in Constitution***

The inclusion of the System of Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities<sup>7</sup> in the Chinese Constitution at the First National People’s Congress is a more self-explanatory event since it signals the official position of the government towards its minorities and the legal basis of its regional autonomy system. According to the Chinese Constitution (NPC 2016) the different ethnic nationalities that inhabit China are “equal” and “discrimination against and oppression of any nationality are prohibited” as is “any act which undermines the unity of the nationalities” (Chap. 1, Art. 3, 1954; Art. 4, 2004 amendment). Though the Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities Act<sup>8</sup> was not enacted until 1984, this 1954 event underlines the romantic/theoretical underpinnings of

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<sup>7</sup> 民族区域自治制度 minzu quyu zizhi zhidu

<sup>8</sup> 民族区域自治法 minzu quyu zizhifa

the Han Chinese government (i.e. the theory of “equality”) and underwrites the pursuit of pragmatic/ideological measures should “unity” be threatened. The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region was established the next year, in 1955.

- **1956-57 The Hundred Flowers Campaign/Anti-rightist Campaign**

To “let a hundred flowers blossom” and “a hundred schools of thought contend”<sup>9</sup> was, according to Mao, in his speech “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People,”<sup>10</sup> a policy “designed to promote the flourishing of the arts and the progress of science.” He explains: “We should not use methods of suppression to prevent them [the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie] from expressing themselves, but should allow them to do so and at the same time argue with them and direct well-considered criticism at them” (NYT 1957). This “well-considered criticism” directed at the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie who answered the call for flowers and thoughts initiated by the party itself in 1956, turned out to be the precursor to the Anti-rightist Campaign in 1957, which saw those who voiced their differing opinions labeled “rightists,” persecuted, and imprisoned. The allusion to the Warring States period (c. 475-221 BC) is obvious, where a “hundred schools of thought” sparred for supremacy (of which Confucianism, Daoism, and Legalism were top contenders); but what was unexpected for the party, or rather Mao, was the flood of criticism which exposed “Socialism” to warrant much more scrutiny and to be far from the supreme ideology it was made out to be. Or was the criticism really unexpected? It remains a question whether Mao’s policy was bait to lure

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<sup>9</sup> 百花齐放、百家争鸣 baihua qifang, baijia zhengming; also known as 双百方针 shuangbai fangzhen [the double-hundred policy]

<sup>10</sup> 《关于正确处理人民内部矛盾的问题》 guanyu zhengque chuli renmin neibu maodun de wenti; this is cited from the official Xinhua English translation published in the *New York Times* on June 19, 1957. The Xinhua version is based on the edited Chinese version of Mao’s speech published in the *People’s Daily* on the same day. The original speech was given on February 27 of that year, at the 11th Session of the Supreme State Conference.

those who opposed him out into the open—all the easier to crush. But no matter the speculation surrounding the original intent, the effect of the two campaigns left Chinese intellectuals reluctant, to say the least, to voice their true concerns. The seeds for self-censorship and unopposed reckless behavior and policy were effectively sown.

- **1958-60 The Great Leap Forward**

The Great Leap Forward<sup>11</sup> was envisioned as a sweeping socioeconomic engineering project that would mobilize the masses to accelerate China's transformation into an industrialized nation rivaling those in the West. But the state-monopolized commune-driven collectivism lacked sufficient expertise in the massive projects it set out to implement, was forcefully imposed, and diverted agricultural manpower into industrial production, most notably in the creation of large-scale irrigation systems and small-scale backyard smelting furnaces for steel; it resulted in high-cost low-quality industrial output and falling agricultural production. But instead of reflecting local realities to the state, grain yields were inflated to satisfy political output targets and to demonstrate "success." Basing grain allocation on inflated numbers meant that too much was taken by the state to satisfy urban consumption and grain export targets, leaving unsustainable amounts for the rural populace. The system, mired in ideological politics, mismanaged and misinformed, coupled with unfavorable natural conditions, produced wide-scale starvation and placed undue burden on famished laborers. Former Xinhua journalist Yang Jisheng (2010) puts the number of deaths from famine at 36 million, unprecedented in Chinese history. Interwoven among the deaths was political struggle, punishment, and persecution for those who did not conform to the ideological demands

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<sup>11</sup> 大跃进 dayuejin

of the progressive visions of nation, policy, and economy. The disastrous outcome left Mao's lustrous authority tarnished and power diminished, which, according to MacFarquhar (1983), motivated his personal comeback in the calamity known as the Cultural Revolution.

- **1966-76 Cultural Revolution**

There is no lack of literature—both scholarly and in story—that describes the horrors of the Cultural Revolution. One very recent attestation to its enduring appeal in literature would be Canadian writer Madeleine Thien's *Do Not Say We Have Nothing*. A finalist for the Man Booker Prize in 2016, the novel “explores the revolution that occurred under Mao Zedong and the many political campaigns that pulled apart people's lives” (Canadian Press 2016). By virtue of it being officially sanctioned as an egregious turn of events in China's strive towards socialism (Gov.cn 2009), the topic itself is far from untouchable, both domestically and internationally. China's recovery from the dark decade only attests to the tenacity of its people and the wisdom of the party's corrective course following the episode. During this decade, hundreds and thousands were persecuted, the country was left in paralysis, entrenched in political struggle with Mao's personality cult at the center of the storm. Politically, culturally, economically, China was at a standstill and closed off to the outside world. Ideology and propaganda and loyalty to “Mao”—the poster figure that gave excuse to the basest of human nature—became more important than family, friends, good governance, “common sense.” It produced a generation—the “lost generation” (Bonnin 2006)—that was robbed of a history of existence that was in any sense “normal.” Political foes were re-educated, children became Red Guards denouncing their families and teachers, “reactionary”

elements were purged from society, and “Down to the Countryside” the youth went in lieu of schools, to learn from the peasants. But it all drew to an end upon Mao’s death in 1976 and the arrest of the Gang of Four. It also set the stage for China’s massive comeback, because never is the human spirit more determined to be born again until it hits rock bottom.

- **1978-79 *Reform and Opening Up; Socialism with Chinese Characteristics***

No informed reference to China’s current economic influence on the global stage can go without mentioning the landmark policy of “Reform and Opening up” led under the auspices of Deng Xiaoping, who made his way back into the leadership circle after being purged during the Cultural Revolution. Just as the Cultural Revolution is officially acknowledged by its government as an unfortunate chapter in China’s history, the Reform and Opening-up policy is officially lauded as what brought China to the forefront of globalization (China.org 2008). It is a policy that set in motion the liberalization and deregulation of China’s economic sectors which had previously been languishing under an inefficient state-owned, planned economy framework; it allowed for small and medium businesses to thrive and foreign investment to flow in, turning China into one of the largest manufacturing economies in the world, indispensable in the global value chain of goods and services. But “reform” and “opening-up” did not mean that the ideological conviction of the Party had changed. That is why simultaneously the Chinese economy, resplendent with all the trappings of a market-oriented economy, is adamantly the fruitful efforts of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.” It is not capitalism, nor is it democracy as known in the West. Consequently, these

“characteristics” allowed the party room to “correct” undesired development, as was demonstrated a decade later.

- **1989 The Tiananmen Square Protests (The June Fourth Incident)**

Almost thirty years later, “Tiananmen,” or “June Fourth (*liusi*),” as it is more commonly known in Chinese, still remains an iron-clad taboo, so much so that references to it in Mainland China and within China’s Internet firewall have undergone extensive diluting or censoring (RWB 2009; NPR 2013; Economist 2016a). But the literature and media accounts outside China surrounding this incident are countless. To the extent that this is an internationally well documented incident, on which information can be readily found in any major media outlet, I will not elaborate on the details of the event, but to say that what started out as peaceful student demonstrations for reform and democracy ended in suppression by force. The event is proof that a decade of “Reform and Opening-up” did indeed instigate change in China, though not exactly how the party had planned. The decision to use force against the demonstrators also signaled a watershed moment within the party, where hardliners won the power struggle against those who sympathized with the students and harbored more progressive views. In the end, it allowed the party opportunity to purge what was ideologically incorrect from within, both people and perspectives, as it continued on its course of steadfast economic development.

Questioning how the event was handled is seen as questioning the legitimacy of the party, and therefore the country itself, though, ironically, the people *are* the country and should have more than a say in how it is run. To a large extent, the tight control (and ever tightening control) over information—internet censorship, firewalling, keeping Facebook, Twitter, Google at bay—can be traced back to this incident. The party must

not let history repeat itself; “stability”—i.e. “power”—must be secured. In other words, foreign investments are welcomed, but not foreign narratives.

- **2001 Accession to WTO**

China’s accession to the WTO in December of 2001 marked its official status as a player in the arena known as “globalization.” Its membership not only galvanized the already remarkable growth of the country’s economy, making it a megapower manufacturer and exporter, but also further opened up access to the Chinese market, a pie long coveted by multinational corporations, foreign investors, startups, and small businesses alike for its promise of a seemingly unending supply of consumer power with its 1.3 billion population. As a WTO member, China was compelled to effectively engage in and negotiate with a multilateral trading body and align itself with international standards on transparency, intellectual property rights, and due process. Upon the tenth anniversary of China’s accession in 2011, then President Hu Jintao called the event “a milestone in China’s reform and opening-up” (WTO 2011). *The Economist* (2011a), unsurprisingly, gives a more nuanced review of the first decade since China’s accession. It cites, on the economic front, the ascent of “‘techno-nationalism’ that protects and promotes home-grown technologies” in the face of foreign competition; on the political front, it quotes “China’s disappointed liberals” who “no longer suggest that freer trade will speed political reform.” This is in stark contrast to Bill Clinton’s argument in support of China’s accession, which he believed would have “a profound impact on human rights and political liberty” (Economist 2011b). Regardless of the outcome of this prediction, China’s influence on the world stage, as well as its domestic grasp on power, has only grown since and because of its economic rise.

- **2003 *Scientific Outlook on Development***

First proposed in 2003 at the Third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), the “Scientific Outlook on Development” has since become the “theoretical guidance for the party” and was written into the CPC’s constitution in 2007, cementing its status in China’s development blueprint. The theory was submitted “against the backdrop of rapid economic growth and a series of problems including excessive consumption of resources, serious environmental pollution and a widening gap between the rich and poor” and meant to address those very issues in a sustainable and scientific manner (Xinhua 2012b). The emphasis on “sustainability”—that ubiquitous policy buzzword—echoes and dates back to the UN Millennium Development Goals put forth in 2000, and demonstrates China’s theoretical alignment with international development values. The emphasis on “scientific” also corresponds to the much proclaimed “science-based” approach in pinning policy arguments and decisions, a strain of Western positivist thought that is very appealing to governments for justification of their policies. This goes hand-in-hand with “Building a Harmonious Socialist Society,” the policy guideline that followed suit the next year.

- **2004 *Building a Harmonious Socialist Society***

The concept of building a socialist “harmonious society” was first brought forth in 2004, at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (China.org 2005). By the Sixth Plenary Session in 2006, “the Resolution on Major Issues Regarding the Building of a Harmonious Socialist Society” was officially adopted and the “principles, main objectives, and tasks” for building this harmonious society by 2020 were put forth (China.org 2006). The concept of “harmony” is meant to address the

potentially destabilizing social and political discord that arose out of China's rapid economic development since its opening-up in 1978, of which the widening gap between the rich and poor, the urban and rural proved the most salient. On the surface, the official call for "harmony" may seem like pure political rhetoric, but it in fact signifies that the party is well aware of the potential fallout of a development policy that places too much emphasis on economic outcome at the expense of all else and is seeking remedial or corrective strategies. Together with the "Scientific Outlook on Development," the "Building of a Socialist Harmonious Society" formed the main theoretical basis for government policy under the Hu Jintao administration, which formally ended in 2012.

- **2008 Beijing Olympics**

Winning the bid to host the 2008 Summer Olympics provided China with the opportunity to show the world it had "arrived" on the international stage. The decision to award Beijing the Summer Games was seen as an opportunity to "accelerate openness in China and facilitate improvement in its record on human rights" (Longman 2001). The stunning infrastructure and architecture that arose out of preparation for the event; the careful, almost tightrope, handling of media and message; and the dazzling success of the opening ceremony signaled that the country once defined by class struggle, political infighting, and poverty, was on par with other world powers in terms of economic, political, and cultural prowess. However, a decade later, China's recent authoritarian turn, marked by the abolishment of term limits under Xi Jinping (AP 2018), now casts doubt on that initial assessment of "openness" via international engagement.

## 1. 8 Time Series

A conceptual grouping of the years of the events or policies I have listed allow for a high-level understanding of the progression and shifts in Chinese society when looked at in terms of different series. **Take the series 1949-1966-1989-2008 as an example.** This series, representing an interval of approximately 20 years, shows a remarkable pattern, or repetition, even, of violent control and/or assertion of power and ideology. **1949** is the wrestling of Communist ideology over Western “democracy,” in which the Communists win; **1966** is the beginning of the consolidation of power under Mao, in the name of Communism; **1989** is the re-assertion of government power over competing ideologies that flowed in via the open-door reforms after the Cultural Revolution; **2008** is the Chinese assertion of power on an international stage, a show of force and strength, outwardly through spectacle and inwardly through heightened police presence in public, against a backdrop of ethnic Tibetan and Uyghur unrest (AP 2008) that preceded arguably the most high-profile international “identity” sports event in the world.

**Another interesting series: 1966-1978-1989-2001.** This series, which represents an approximate interval of 10 years, shows the oscillation between a close-door insular mentality and open-door international engagement. **1966** is the commencement of the Cultural Revolution, where China effectively seals off interaction with the outside world, concentrating instead on domestic power struggles in the name of Communist ideology; **1978** sees the launch of the open-door policy officially known as “Reform and Opening-up,” where, under Deng Xiaoping, a series of economic reforms ensued under the banner of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.” It was an attempt to reverse, literally, the fortunes of the Chinese people without destabilizing the Chinese government’s core ideological identity; **1989**, with the government’s ideology under threat following the first decade of China’s opening-up, is a re-assertion of state power in

defiance of international outcry over the forceful handling of demonstrations in Tiananmen Square; **2001**, after another decade, upon becoming a WTO member, China officially enters the playing field known as “globalization,” where the harmonization of trade and commerce means negotiating with international (competing) forces. In other words, this series offers us insight into the psychology of government and governance, demonstrating that ideology, as immobile and stationary as it may seem, has its breaking point, and must struggle against or succumb to the pressure of “change” that arises domestically or internationally within periodic swings of history’s pendulum. Going forward another decade or so, Xi Jinping’s appointment in **2012** to lead the country increasingly looks like a foreshadowing of another turn, where China emerges with the upper hand in international negotiations, ranging from issues on trade and commerce to national security and human rights.

### **1.9 Key Date Summary of China-Xinjiang Relations**

The following dates, based on Moneyhon (2002),<sup>12</sup> provide a linear, historical overview of China-Xinjiang relations, which can be traced back 2000 years to the Han dynasty (206 BC-AD 220), where the alternating strategy of exploitation/pacification was applied alongside “using barbarians to oppose the barbarians” (124). They are meant to give context to the contemporary political and cultural struggles between the two groups of Han and Uyghur—i.e. the Chinese state’s purported *Xinjiang wenti* (the Xinjiang Problem) of separatism and sovereignty, and the strategies employed to contain separatism and exercise sovereignty.

- The Xinjiang region was not officially incorporated into China’s territorial claim and labeled “Xinjiang” until **1768**, under China’s last imperial dynasty, the Qing (1644-1911).

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<sup>12</sup> Unless otherwise noted, references to page numbers in this section (1.7) refer to those in Moneyhon (2002).

- Periodic revolts ensued, of which the **1862** uprising led to the establishment of the Kashgar Emirate by Yaqub Beg; it lasted until **1877**, after which the region was reconquered by the Qing.
- Between the Republican years of **1911** and **1949**, the East Turkestan Republic was formed in **1944** in opposition to Chinese rule, forcing a brief coalition structure that dissolved in **1947**.
- Running parallel to Republican China, early minority rhetoric adopted by the Chinese Communist Party was extremely generous, among which the **1931** “Jiangxi Constitution” allowed “complete separation from China” and independent statehood (129), an incentive to enlist minority support against the ruling Nationalists.
- By **1938**, in light of potential Soviet-induced secession, Mao signaled self-determination was off the table and equal rights allowed only under the condition of a unified state (130).
- Leading up to “liberation” in **1949**, the metaphor of “family” was adopted to characterize relations with minorities, China cast as the “older brother” (132). In **1949**, the Common Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, while affirming minority rights such as in language and religion, also reaffirmed the prohibition of splittist activities.
- While the Xinjiang Autonomous Region was created in **1955**, the rhetoric of Han superiority remained the backdrop of the “people’s revolution” (134). The theory of national regional autonomy was described in the 1949 Common Program.

- The Implementation (of this theory) of Regional Autonomy for Minorities was passed in **1952**.
- The current scope of Xinjiang's autonomy is defined by the **1982 Constitution** and the **1984 Law on Regional National Autonomy (LRNA)**. According to Moneyhon, the limitations set in the LRNA “give the central government broad power and discretion to suppress, or allow, almost any exercise of regional autonomy” (140). He describes the strategy as “give and take” (137). In his textual analysis of the legal language, for every right and freedom the government gives, there is always a corresponding measure to take it away, ensuring that the definition of “autonomy” ultimately rests with the central government (137-144). I take this to be a continuation of the 2000-year exploitation/pacification strategy Moneyhon identifies very early on in his paper.
- Violent eruptions have not ceased since 1949 or, for that matter, the Han dynasty, culminating in a series of escalated uprisings **in the 1990s**. Notable incidents include the Baren uprising of 1990 and Gulja uprising of 1997. Bovingdon (2010) identifies the two as unprecedented in their “organization, violence, and ideological challenge to the regime” (123) since the founding of the PRC in 1949. Dillon (2004) describes Baren as “the turning point” which “determined the region’s slide into conflict and violence” (62), calling “into question the security of the whole southern Xinjiang region” (73).
- In response to the surge in violence in the 90s, a “Strike Hard” crackdown was carried out by the Chinese government in **1996**, capturing a presumed 2700 “terrorists, murderers, and other criminals” (146). Hastings (2011) underlines the 1996 Strike Hard Campaign, where “the Chinese government cracked down hard, rounding up

thousands and executing hundreds of Uyghurs suspected of violence and ‘separatist’ activities” (893), as a defining moment in the course of violent incidents and their suppression in Xinjiang. According to his data, there was a rise in “logistically sophisticated incidents in Xinjiang” (903) in the months following the campaign. He believes that the rise could be attributed to the heavy-handed crackdown given that “literature on insurgencies has found that the crackdown itself can create new grievances, and violence might actually increase as elements within the newly angered population turn to violence” (903). In this regard, the **1997** Ghulja uprising acquires its significance as the overt violent response to the government’s overt violent crackdown.

- In **1999**, the Go West campaign was launched. Branded as an ambitious economical development plan for the western regions, it served the twin purposes “of facilitating extraction of Xinjiang’s resources and encouraging Han migration—a significant counterthrust to Uighur unrest” (148).
- There has since been more violence recorded, notably suicide bombings in **2008**, surrounding the Beijing Olympics (Watts 2008); and **2009** and **2014**, where death tolls in the hundreds were reported (Lee 2014; Jacobs 2014; SCMP 2014). This effectively questions the “development” approach to quelling unrest and resentment.

## 1. 10 Conclusion

After analysis of the compiled data, taking into consideration the historical context within which it was generated, and alongside pertinent literature concerning the cultural and sociopolitical dynamics of the region, a conclusion was reached regarding the initial research

question that translation, in the China-Xinjiang case, does not function to facilitate intercultural communication between the Uyghur and the Han, but rather serves as an expression of ethno-dominance and a means to strengthen one's own cultural subjectivity and superiority against the Other. The development of this particular argument unfolds in the ensuing chapters.

**Table 2: Data Sources**

<b>Unit of Observation</b>	<b>Data Source</b>	<b>Years</b>	<b>Format</b>	<b>Language</b>
Titles translated from <b>Uyghur into Chinese</b> (totals and genres)	UNESCO's Index Translationum	1950-2007	Online database	English
Titles translated from <b>Chinese into Uyghur</b> (totals and genres)	UNESCO's Index Translationum	1950-2007	Online database	English
Organized <b>protests or violent events</b> in Xinjiang	"Figure 4.1: Organized or Violent Events in Xinjiang, 1949-2005" in Chapter 4, "Collective Action and Violence" from <i>The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land</i> , by Gardner Bovingdon (2010).	1949-2005	Print book	English
	"Figure 1: Number of Targets in Violent Incidents in Xinjiang, 1990-2009" in "Charting the Course of Uyghur Unrest," by Justin V. Hastings (2011).	1990-2009	Print article	English

## CHAPTER 2

### PRESENTATION OF TRENDS

#### 2.1 Introduction

This chapter is a descriptive presentation of the trends. Via graphical representation, it compares the trends in translated propaganda derived from UNESCO's Index Translationum against the trends in violence compiled by Bovingdon (2010) and Hastings (2011), in both translated directions, from Uyghur into Chinese and Chinese into Uyghur, and suggests how these trends could be interpreted as having a relationship, or even a possible correlation. The graphs include a comparison of trends in violence with the total number of translated propaganda by percentage, and also a comparison of trends in violence with the number of translated propaganda according to the nine individual genres categorized by the Index. By proceeding to identify a relationship between the two in this chapter, I suggest that, at the most literal level, translating fewer propaganda (tweaking one data point) could have the potential of decreasing violent confrontations in the Xinjiang region (influencing another data point). The observations in the trends and the patterns they present also suggest that the mirroring cycles of reoccurring violence and violent suppression alongside the translation of propaganda points to a historical construct, or ideology, of how the Chinese state interprets and interacts with the ethnic other, which predates and has the potential of explaining the contemporary struggle witnessed between the Han and the Uyghur.

## 2.2 Bovingdon 1949-1990 and Propaganda Trends, Chinese (ZH) → Uyghur (UY)

The variables present in this graph include the following:

- 1) Years, from 1949-1990
- 2) Bovingdon's documentation of violence ("V") according to year, in blue
- 3) Percentage of "propaganda" ("P") in total translations from Chinese (ZH) into Uyghur (UY), tallied across categories, for each year, in red




Figure 1: Bovingdon 1949-90 and P%\_TOTAL (ZH>UY)

The reason for using percentage numbers, and not the raw number of titles<sup>1</sup> identified as “propaganda” according to my definition,<sup>2</sup> is that percentage numbers better reflect the intensity of propaganda efforts by the state. For example, the significance of 48 titles identified as

<sup>1</sup> Primary data includes: the complete list of titles generated from the Index, in both directions of translation; what was and wasn't marked as “P”; the Excel tables used to generate percentage numbers and the corresponding graphs. Available upon request.

<sup>2</sup> Definition of “propaganda” as described in the methodology chapter: “any title or author that can be explicitly or readily associated with Chinese Communist Party ideology, narratives, policies, activities, events.”

propaganda would be very different if a total of 100 titles were published in that given year versus only 50 titles. The same difference in significance would apply to 3 propaganda titles published among 50 titles versus 5. In both cases, the weight those propaganda titles carry would be much heavier in the latter instances of  $48/50$  and  $3/5$ . Translated into percentage numbers they would be 96% (0.96) and 60% (0.60), respectively.

Using the same two examples, those numbers would be adjusted, by a factor of 10, to 9.6 and 6.0 in the graph to allow for proportionate comparison of trends in a visual manner, since the range of totals calculated for violence within the timeframe of 1949-1990 are under 15. This means that “10” indicates 100% of translations published in that year were all identified as “propaganda,” as in the year of 1951 in the graph. In other words, this means that  $1/1$  would be marked as a “10,” and would carry the same weight as  $25/25$  (i.e. 1 translation identified as “P” out of 1 translation published; 25 translations identified as “P” out of 25 translations published). On the other extreme, “0” would mean that no translations were identified as propaganda, even though there could have been translations published in that year, and perhaps even a great many. The absence of any values means that there were no translations recorded for that year in the UNESCO database I am using as a reference. It does not exclude, however, the possibility that there could have been translations published and recorded in other databases.<sup>3</sup> Under these conditions, the graph presents a notable mirroring of trends between propaganda and violence. Though not identical, the rise and fall—peaks and troughs—between the two trends follow very similar trajectories.

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<sup>3</sup> This could include, for example, the China National Bibliography. However, for reasons explained in the methodology chapter, this study only uses UNESCO’s Index Translationum.

### 2. 2. 1 Propaganda Preceding Violence from a “Peak” Perspective

This section examines the data from a propaganda-*preceding*-violence perspective, which potentially suggests that propaganda could be interpreted as an instigating factor in violence. If we look at the peaks, a peak in “P” precedes a peak in “V” quite closely in a number of years. These years of “P” preceding “V,” or P/V, are:

**Table 3: Peaks P/V, 1949-1990**

P / V
1953 / 1954
1955 / 1956
1960 / 1962
1967 / 1968
1977 / 1980
1983 / 1985
1987 / 1989

Given that within this timeframe there are a total of 9 peaks for propaganda (1951/ 53’/ 55’/ 60’/ 67’/ 77’/ 80’/ 83’/ 87’) and a total of 9 peaks for violence (1950/ 54’/ 56’/ 58’/ 62’/ 68’/ 80’/ 85’/ 89’), 7 peaks of propaganda displaying this *pattern of preceding* a peak in violence so closely is worthy of notice. Even for the two peaks for propaganda that do not follow this pattern (1951 and 1980), they are still very much situated within the general trend of developments: in the instance of 1951, we can observe that there is a downward trend in propaganda going into 1952, which can be seen as preceding the downward trend in violence from 1952-53; in the instance of 1980, it is part of the larger downward trend of propaganda from 1977-84, which is mirrored in the downward trend of violence from 1980-87.

### 2. 2. 2 Propaganda Preceding Violence from a “Trough” Perspective

Another angle to take in examining the possibility of propaganda being one of the instigating factors of violence is by observing the pattern in “troughs,” a diametrically opposed state to “peaks,” to see if we could still arrive at a conclusion similar to the previous section. If we look at the troughs, the preceding pattern of P/V does not seem to match as readily or neatly as the peaks, particularly for the years between 1957-79:

**Table 4: Troughs P/V, 1949-1990**

<b>P</b>	<b>V</b>
1952	1953
1954	1955
1957	1957
1962	1959-61
1969-70	1963-65
1979	1970-78
1982	1982-84
1984	1986-87

However, the more pronounced asymmetry is due to the one-on-one juxtaposition of trough-to-trough when we convert a graphical presentation into a table format. With one adjustment, the P/V preceding pattern emerges again:

**Table 5: Troughs P/V Adjusted, 1949-1990**

<b>P</b>	<b>V</b>
1952	1953
1954	1955
↓	1957
1957	1959-61
1962	1963-65
1969-70	1970-78
1979	1982-84
1982	1986-87
1984	

This is not a sleight of hand. Since there is a conversion process from graph to table, it is a necessary adjustment to reflect and discern the most repeated pattern in the graph: a drop in propaganda precedes a drop in violence.

### **2. 2. 3 The Interpretation of Overlapping “Peaks” and “Troughs”**

Where the peaks of propaganda and troughs of violence directly overlap, namely the years 1953/ 55’/ 60’/ 77’/ 83’/ 87’, it would seem to suggest that propaganda and violence work in negating each others’ effects. In other words, it looks to suggest that propaganda quells violence or that lesser violence is the result of more propaganda. However, considering that propaganda titles published in paper form during those years would need time to circulate and be consumed, their effects can only be reasonably assumed and measured at a later date than their respective

publication years. It is highly unlikely that in the absence of digital forms of social media their effects could be immediate.<sup>4</sup> This is also the primary reason that a time “lag” be taken into consideration when looking at the trends and hypothesizing the relationship between propaganda and violence. That is, if we were to hypothesize propaganda has an effect on violence, then it would be more effective to look at the year(s) that followed a spike or drop in propaganda. This would explain, for instance, why the trough in propaganda for the year 1962 is more reasonably interpreted alongside the trough in violence for the years 1963-65 (i.e. lesser propaganda later gives way to lesser violence), and not directly in tandem with the peak in violence for 1962 (i.e. lesser propaganda immediately results in more violence). Similarly, the peak in the propaganda for the year 1980 is more revealing if we interpret it alongside the peak for violence in 1985. In fact, this allows for a coherent interpretation of the downward trend of propaganda from 1980-84 being mirrored in the downward trend of violence from 1985-87. This again potentially points to propaganda being an influential factor in relation to the instigation or mitigation of violence.

#### **2. 2. 4 Violence Proceeding Propaganda from a “Peak” Perspective**

After observing the possibility of propaganda being an instigating factor of violence, it should also be attempted to see if the opposite could be observed. That is, instead of propaganda preceding violence, could violence precede propaganda, suggesting the possibility of violence playing a part in the motivation for the state to publish propaganda (i.e. step up their propaganda game). This is done in an effort to give due consideration to the other side of the argument,

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<sup>4</sup> To put digital development in perspective, Facebook was only created in 2004, Twitter in 2006, and WeChat in 2011. Apple’s first iPhone, which instigated a competitive surge in computing power in handheld devices and revolutionized the platform on which we communicate and consume information, was released in 2007. The timeframe for my data from the Index ends in 2007, when “friending” and “liking” and “hashtag” still seemed like benign expressions of individual human feeling. The full power of social media, contained in a phone, held in our hands 24/7, as an immediate agent of social and political change—for better and worse—had not yet been unleashed. Certainly, going forward, trends in platforms like these would prove more than interesting to identify and observe.

which could be in the Chinese state's defense that propaganda was published and intensified *because* of an increase in violence. The following table formats the peaks in the other direction of violence-proceeding-propaganda, or V/P:

**Table 6: Peaks V/P, 1949-1990**

<b>V</b>	<b>P</b>
1950	1951
1954	1953
1956	1955
1958	1960
1962	1967
1968	1977
1980	1980
1985	1983
1989	1987

In the case of Table 6, it seems like the possibility of violence preceding propaganda is not as readily observable as the pattern of propaganda preceding violence. However, like in the previous instance, an adjustment is necessary to see if we can better discern a pattern when we attempt to convert a graphical representation into table format:

**Table 7: Peaks V/P Adjusted, 1949-1990**

<b>V</b>	<b>P</b>
1950	1951
↓	1953
1954	1955
1956	↓
1958	1960
1962	1967
1968	1977
↓	1980
1980	1983
1985	1987
1989	Records end in 1987 for this period

After the adjustment, the V/P pattern in Table 7 does seem plausible. However, it might be less persuasive than the opposite pattern of P/V since there needed to be more steps involved in the adjustment, and they resulted in significantly wider gaps of years between V and P, with the more conspicuous gaps being between 1968-1977/1980. More steps and the resulting wider gap years suggest that the V/P pattern does not correspond as well as the P/V pattern. Here, however, the explanation of the Cultural Revolution between the years of 1966-1976 could account for the absence of propaganda and violence being properly recorded, hence disrupting the pattern. Yet,

we must also keep in mind that the opposite P/V pattern does not require this added theoretical interpretation to support it, giving it a slight edge of persuasiveness over the V/P pattern.

### 2. 2. 5 Violence Proceeding Propaganda from a “Trough” Perspective

After examining the potentiality of violence proceeding propaganda from a “peak” perspective, next would be again to turn to take a look at troughs to see if this direction of influence could still be discernible. The following table is the result of adjustments to account for converting from a graphical format to table format:

**Table 8: Troughs V/P Adjusted, 1949-1990**

<b>V</b>	<b>P</b>
1949	1950
↓	1952
1953	1954
1955	1957
1957	1962
1959-61	↓
1963-65	1969-75
1970-78	1979
↓	1982
1982-84	1984
1986-87	Records end in 1987 for this period
1990	

Here we see an increased number of adjustments need to be made so that the V trough years could comfortably proceed the P trough years. And, as in the situation with the peak years in this V/P pattern, the issue of much wider gap years remain, even after adjustment, especially during the years of the Cultural Revolution and leading up to it. In addition, it leaves two V years

unaccounted for. This suggests that this pattern of V preceding P would prove weaker than the P/V one in terms of correspondence with troughs.

### 2. 2. 6 Statistical Cross-Correlation

In addition to a descriptive observation between the two data sets, another way of discerning the relationship would be through statistical analysis to determine whether or not there is a significant positive cross-correlation between the time series of violence and the time series of propaganda—that is, whether an increase in the one level can be *associated* with an increase in the other’s level, and how that association can be characterized. Given that I do not have formal training in statistics, the analysis was performed in collaboration with Dr. Carol Perez-Iratxeta, a research scientist with a background in statistics and modeling.


It was determined that among the data sets provided in this study only the Bovingdon data set (Figure 1, p. 53) had sufficient data to perform a meaningful analysis. As described above, we explored the cross-correlation of the time series of violent incidents and the time series of percentage of propaganda among translations. We refer to these variables as violence, or V, and propaganda, or P. We aim to investigate, in particular, whether an excess of propaganda could be predictive of an increase in violence, since that is the primary interest of this study. Some years had no translations at all, or no propaganda among their translations. We encoded both cases as zeros, given that both would be indicative of a non-effect of propaganda. The mean values and standard deviations for the series V and P are:

**Table 9: Mean Values and Standard Deviations for V and P**

	Mean Values	Standard Deviations
V (violence)	2.357	3.237
P (propaganda)	4.062	3.212

We noted that the median value for V (violence) is 0.0, and observed that records of zero violent incidents tend to be consecutive. In particular, there is a relatively long stretch of zero violent incidents recorded from 1970 to 1978. This period overlaps with the latter phases of the Cultural Revolution, and could be simply indicative of an interruption of collection. However, it is unlikely that the missing values could contribute to any statistical significance that we would observe.

We calculated the correlation coefficients between V and P for all lags (h) between -13 and +13 years (see Figure 1 below). “Lags” refer to the number of years between V and P, going back (-) or forward (+) in years. For example, the calculation for  $h = -4$  corresponds to the correlation coefficient between violence at time (t) and propaganda that was disseminated 4 years *before* (t). The calculation for  $h = +4$  corresponds to the correlation coefficient between violence at time (t) and propaganda that was disseminated 4 years *after* (t). Correlation at lag  $h=0$  measures the contemporary association between violence and propaganda (i.e. simultaneous, when they happen at the same time). In Figure 1, we can observe that the correlation value for  $h=-3$  is beyond the threshold of statistical significance of 0.05 marked by the blue dashed line. No autocorrelation was detected for V or P, meaning that no repeating patterns were detected within the respective series themselves.




**Figure 2: Cross-correlation from  $h = -13$  to  $h = 13$**

In addition, Table 10 shows the numerical values for the subsets of lags between -7 and 7.

**Table 10: Lags and Correlations with  $V_t$  and  $P_{t+h}$  for  $h = -7$  to  $h = 7$ ;  $t = 1949$  to  $1990$**

Negative lag: years going back	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0
Cross- correlation value	-0.122	-0.182	0.012	0.206	0.323	0.191	-0.058	-0.034
Positive lag: years going forward	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Cross- correlation value	0.063	0.055	-0.023	-0.031	0.095	0.181	0.235	

It can be observed that the most dominant cross-correlation occurs within the lag region of (-4, -2) with a maximum at  $h = -3$ . The correlation coefficient is positive, indicating that an above average value of violence can be traced back to an above average value in propaganda 3 years before (-3). To put it in a way that more closely follows the initial question of whether or not propaganda could be seen as contributing to violence, then our findings could be expressed as “an above average value of propaganda is likely to lead to an above average value of violent incidents about 3 years later” ( $p$ -value = 0.01151 for  $h = -3$ ). The association can be visually inspected in Figure 3, below, which shows plots of lagged regression for lags ( $h$ ) from 0 to -5.



**Figure 3: Lagged Regression Plots for  $h = 0$  to  $h = -5$**

After performing an analysis on the possible range of associations expressed in terms of lag of years, visualized in Figure 2 and 3 and Table 9, the best interpretation that the statistical analysis supports is expressed as “an above average value of propaganda is likely to lead to an above average value of violent incidents about 3 years later.” Our main conclusion is therefore that *the increase of propaganda can be linked to an increase of violence three years later in the Bovingdon data set.*

However, it must be noted that there are several limitations to this statistical analysis, namely missing values, non-linear effects, and other variables that could have influenced violence in addition to propaganda. A longer times series and recovery of data for the missing years could possibly contribute to a more meaningful interpretation, though we must also consider that other variables not under the scope of this study, which are independent of propaganda, such as crop yield or natural disasters, could have also influenced the occurrence of violence. For example, when there is a bumper crop, the propensity of violence among the population would likely be lower since this usually indicates better economic conditions. Conversely, the occurrence of natural disasters, which usually leads to a period of economic hardship during recovery, might increase the population's propensity to express dissatisfaction with violence. These limitations are explained to give context to the current interpretation to show that it can be provided as supporting evidence, but like any statistical analysis, it can only do so with limitation.

In relation to the timeframe of our analysis, we believe it is the most ideal to conduct research on the relationship between Chinese state propaganda and ethnic violence given that digital platforms of information distribution have now taken over print media. Because of the instantaneous nature of social media, and the 24/7 consumption of information through handheld digital devices like the smart phone, the relationship between the two variables might prove increasingly complex and difficult to discern. However, a recent study by Müller and Schwarz (2018) on the relationship between social media and violent hate crimes in Germany, using Facebook data, suggests that it is still very much feasible to examine the connection between ideologically motivated "speech" and "violence" in the era of instant social media.

### 2. 2. 7 Conclusion

After descriptively examining the two sets of possible directions—either propaganda preceding violence, positing propaganda as a potential instigator of violence; or violence preceding propaganda, positing violence driving propaganda—it seems like the former presents a slightly more persuasive interpretation. Despite the respective directions, taken as a whole, what this peak-and-trough analysis does is allow us to see that there is a plausible relationship between propaganda and violence. In fact, a statistical analysis performed on the possible range of interpretations for the most viable data set (Bovingdon's in Figure 1) suggests that the most dominant cross-correlation is propaganda leading to violence three years later. Even though a statistical analysis can only suggest cross-correlation between the two sets of data and cannot prove causality, it offers supporting evidence in the direction of my research question, namely that propaganda could be contributing to violence. The suggestion of propaganda being a potential for causality draws one's attention to one possible factor among many which perhaps warrants more resources for further scrutiny. Moreover, the direction—or causal relationship—is less of a concern for the purpose of this study than the fact that they work hand-in-hand. The cycles mirror each other; they appear inextricably linked. If the end-goal is indeed to lessen violence, then the relationship seen here can be used to consider that perhaps lessening the translation of propaganda from Chinese into Uyghur is a viable approach to achieve that goal.

But states do not solely operate on practicality and efficiency of governance. They also operate according to ideological beliefs that can be in conflict with efficient and effective governance. This trough-and-peak analysis is also a testimony to that—because there might be ups and downs in the cycles, but cycles—as defined—do not end. An ideological existence is necessary—running the gamut from dictatorship to democracy to nationalism—for the individual

as for the entity, lest an identity crisis ensues, leaving a vacuum for competing powers to step in. This ideological bearing which necessitates this perpetual cycle of propaganda and violence, which translation plays a part in sustaining, will be explored in the following chapters, where a theoretical framework will be applied to the analysis.

Before we proceed to the next chapter, though, we will first take a look at propaganda trends compared against Hastings' (2011) compilation of violence to see if what was observed with Bovingdon's data is repeated or comparable.

### 2.3 Hastings 1990-2009 and Propaganda Trends, Chinese (ZH) → Uyghur (UY)

The variables present in this graph include the following:

- 1) Years, from 1990-2009
- 2) Hastings' documentation of violence ("V") according to year, in blue
- 3) Percentage of "propaganda" ("P") in total translations, from Chinese (ZH) into Uyghur (UY), tallied across categories, for each year, in red




Figure 4: Hastings 1990-2009 and P%\_TOTAL (ZH>UY)

The conditions are the same as with Bovingdon’s data, of which, namely, the total percentage of propaganda tallied across all categories is adjusted by a factor of 10. An absence of “P” in certain years is the result of the UNESCO database yielding no results.<sup>5</sup>

### 2. 3. 1 Propaganda Preceding Violence from a “Peak” Perspective

As we did with Bovingdon’s data, this is a comparison of the different peaks within the direction of propaganda-preceding-violence, which lends itself to the following table of P/V when examining the possibility of propaganda being an instigating factor in violence:

**Table 11: Peaks P/V, 1990-2009**

<b>P</b>	<b>V</b>
1999	1998
2001	2001
2003	2005
2006	2008

Except for the year 2001, where the two overlap, the most discernible pattern, among possible ones to pick out from the two columns, of “P” preceding “V,” is by two years, if we choose the years 1999 / 2001, 2003 / 2005, 2006 / 2008 to examine. Three peaks displaying the same pattern out of 4 is notable. There is no record of “P” before 1998, which makes it a conspicuous gap given that so far the more persuasive pattern seems to be P/V. Does this gap substantially destabilize the persuasiveness of the P/V pattern? Not necessarily, since in the much longer time series of Bovingdon’s data—42 years vs. Hastings’ 20 years—the pattern was repeatedly discernible.

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<sup>5</sup> Again, this does not exclude the possibility of other databases yielding results. See footnote 3 in this chapter.

### 2. 3. 2 Propaganda Preceding Violence from a “Trough” Perspective

As in the case of Bovington’s data, another angle to look at would be from a trough perspective, to see if propaganda-preceding-violence still felt persuasive:

**Table 12: Troughs P/V Adjusted, 1990-2009**

<b>P</b>	<b>V</b>
↓	1994
1998	2000
2000	2002-04
2002	↓
2004	2006-07
2007	2009

With adjustments, the two-year pattern again appears. Yet, in this instance, it is perhaps more helpful to look at the *downward trends*, instead of the peaks or troughs, to see how persuasive the P/V pattern is:

**Table 13: Downward Trend P/V, 1990-2009**

<b>P trend ↓</b>	<b>V trend ↓</b>
1999-2002	2001-04
2003-04	2005-07
2006-07	2008-09

The peak P years listed here—1999 / 2003 / 2006—are all the starting points of downward trends. The year 2001 would belong within the 1999-2002 trend, instead of itself being a standalone “peak”; this perspective would allow for a more coherent interpretation of the P/V pattern. The numbers correspond remarkably well, from the lag years between the starting P and starting V years, to the duration of the P trends and V trends. Such a direction of correspondence would add

weight to the idea that propaganda could have an effect on violence (i.e. lesser propaganda results in lesser violence).

### 2. 3. 3 Violence Preceding Propaganda from a “Trend” Perspective

Since with Hastings’ data, which is within a shorter timeframe than Bovington’s, it was demonstrated that looking at trends was more effective than simply looking at peaks or troughs alone, here we will proceed to look at violence-preceding-propaganda through upward and downward trends, to see how persuasive violence might prove to be an instigating factor of propaganda. This could lead to interpreting propaganda as the state’s reaction to violence. The following table represents the direction of V/P first with an *upward* trend:

**Table 14: Upward Trend V/P, 1990-2009**

V ↑	P ↑
1994-98	1998-99
↓	2000-01
2000-01	2002-03
2002-05	2004-06
2006-08	Records end at 2007

Then with a *downward* trend:

**Table 15: Downward Trend V/P, 1990-2009**

V ↓	P ↓
1998-2000	1999-2000
↓	2001-02
2001-04	2003-04
2005-07	2006-07
2008-09	Records end at 2007

Table 14 and 15 show a plausible pattern of violence-preceding-propaganda (V/P) without too many adjustments, which is a similar conclusion to the propaganda-preceding-violence (P/V) pattern that was previously examined. This means that both directions can be seen as persuasive in the instance of Hastings' data. However, since the Index does not yet have translated records after 2007,<sup>6</sup> the lack of propaganda records thereafter may give the P/V pattern a slight upper hand. Though that upper hand could be cancelled out by the conspicuous absence of propaganda records before the peak in violence in 1998.

### **2. 3. 4 Conclusion**

Since both directions of P/V or V/P seem similarly plausible at this point, it can be said that the data is observed to show a link between propaganda and violence. This would be similar to the concluding observations made using Bovingdon's data. However, given that Hastings' time series is too short to provide for a meaningful statistical analysis, supporting statistical evidence of propaganda's influence on violence rests with the analysis performed using Bovingdon's data in 2. 2. 6.

### **2. 4 Individual Categories and Trends, Chinese (ZH) → Uyghur (UY)**

The individual categories are less significant in indicating a relationship than the total numbers, since propaganda can appear in any category, so measuring total output would be much more indicative of the state's propaganda intent as a whole, in a given year. But the individual categories would be meaningful in pointing out which ones drive the trends and are more susceptible to carrying propaganda, underlining the category's own built-in propensity for such purposes.

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<sup>6</sup> At the time of this writing, the website of the Index still indicates that 2008 and 2009 data for China are being compiled; the last year China submitted data was 2009. See: <http://www.unesco.org/xtrans/bscontrib.aspx?lg=0>.

### 1) Law, Social Sciences, Education




Figure 5: Bovingdon 1949-90 and P%\_LAW




Figure 6: Hastings 1990-2009 and P%\_LAW

We can see from both graphs that “Law, Social Sciences, Education” can be regarded as a category where propaganda is more pervasive and one that is a significant contributor to the overall trend we see in the total output graph. This is not surprising given that the nature of law, social sciences, and education allows for an almost seamless packaging of political ideology into objective and “neutral” disciplines. “Education,” especially, offers a channel of distribution unrivaled by others.

Examples of propaganda titles translated from Chinese into Uyghur in this category:<sup>7</sup>

1951: *The Chinese Revolution Reader (1) and (2)*<sup>8</sup> (Yu and Wang 1951)

1955: *A Thorough Implementation of the Party’s Class Policy in Rural China*<sup>9</sup>

1960: *A Criticism of Individualism*<sup>10</sup>

1965: *Onwards with the Struggle Against Khrushchev’s Revisionism*<sup>11</sup>

1976: *From Where Does Correct Thought Originate?*<sup>12</sup> (Mao 1976)

1985: *A Brief Q&A on Scientific Socialism*<sup>13</sup> (Xin 1985)

2003: *Learning the Important Thought of the Three Represents: An Outline*<sup>14</sup>

2006: *Eight Honors and Eight Disgraces: A Reader for Party Members and Cadres*<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Titles that do not have authors are listed in the reference section according to their translated English titles.

<sup>8</sup> 《中国革命读本》 zhongguo geming duben

<sup>9</sup> 《贯彻党在农村的阶级政策》 guanche dang zai nongcun de jieji zhengce

<sup>10</sup> 《批判个人主义》 pipan geren zhuyi

<sup>11</sup> 《把反对赫鲁晓夫修正主义的斗争进行到底》 ba fandui heluxiaofu xiuzheng zhuyi de douzheng jinxing daodi

<sup>12</sup> 《人的正确思想是从哪里来的》 ren de zhengque sixiang shi cong nali laide

<sup>13</sup> 《科学社会主义简明问答》 kexueshehuzhuyi jianming wenda

<sup>14</sup> 《三个代表重要思想学习纲要》 sange daibiao zhongyao sixiang xuexi gangyao

<sup>15</sup> 《八荣八耻: 党员干部读本》 barong bachi: dangyuan ganbu duben

## 2) Literature




Figure 7: Bovingdon 1949-90 and P%\_LITERATURE




Figure 8: Hastings 1990-2009 and P%\_LITERATURE

Outside of the years of violence during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) and the Uyghur unrest in the 1990s—during which large-scale violence could have understandably contributed to the disruption of publishing activities—we can see that the category of “Literature” is also a significant contributor to the overall trend. Like “Law, Social Sciences, Education,” it is also a category where political ideology can be seamlessly integrated into the message, albeit under the guise of “art” instead of a learned discipline. In an autocracy, though, which is what China was under Mao and continues to be under the one-party system, there need not even be a guise. As Mao once declared: “Politics first; art second”<sup>16</sup> ([1942] 2002). But even without Mao’s blatant declaration, the production and consumption of art and literature is something that remains strongly tied to the political ideology of the times, whether it be under an autocracy or a democracy, in the “East” or “West.” The production patterns, though, do become more pronounced if the state has ultimate control over the publishing apparatus, and chooses to intervene when it sees necessary, as is the case with China.

Examples include:

1953: *The Autumn Harvest Uprising*<sup>17</sup> (Lin 1953)

1955: *I too Wear the Red Scarf*<sup>18</sup> (Hui 1955)

1965: *Ode to the Red Flag*<sup>19</sup>

1981: *The Red Guerillas*<sup>20</sup> (Cui 1981)

2006: *Lei Feng*<sup>21</sup> (Li 2006)

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<sup>16</sup> 政治标准第一，艺术标准第二 zhengzhi biao zhun di yi, yishu biao zhun di er

<sup>17</sup> 《秋收起义》 qiushou qi yi

<sup>18</sup> 《我也戴上了红领巾》 woye daishangle hong ling jin

<sup>19</sup> 《红旗颂》 hongqi song

<sup>20</sup> 《红色游击队》 hongse youjidui

<sup>21</sup> 《雷锋》 lei feng

### 3) Natural and Exact Sciences




Figure 9: Bovingdon 1949-90 and P%\_NATURAL SCIENCES




Figure 10: Hastings 1990-2009 and P%\_NATURAL SCIENCES

The next-to-zero influence of this category in regards to the overall trend comes as no surprise, since among all the categories, “Natural and Exact Sciences” has built into its ontology the extraction of human pathos and ethos—not that they do not find a way to seep into it, but it is considerably more difficult to do so compared to other categories. The 2 titles that were recorded as propaganda among a total of 216 translations registered as very low percentage numbers (0.05 and 0.14) for their respective years. They are:

1985: *Labour Makes the Man*<sup>22</sup> (referring to Engles’ “The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man” written in 1876) (Shanghai Museum 1985)

2007: *Chinese Encyclopedia for Children: Military and Physical Education*<sup>23</sup> (specifically on the August 1 Nanchang Uprising in 1927 against the Nationalists, which saw the maturing military force of the Communists and set the foundation for the People’s Liberation Army)

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<sup>22</sup> 《劳动创造人》 laodong chuangzao ren

<sup>23</sup> 《中国儿童百科全书: 军事体育》 zhongguo ertong baike quanshu junshi tiyu

### 4) Applied Sciences




Figure 11: Bovingdon 1949-90 and P%\_APPLIED SCIENCES




Figure 12: Hastings 1990-2009 and P%\_APPLIED SCIENCES

Apply the word “applied,” and the entire dynamics of “science” changes, because “application” means adapting science to suit the needs of the “real” world, which is fashioned by the interests of the parties in power, their ideologies, and the strategies they employ to secure those ideologies. We can, therefore, see a markup of influence of this category in relation to the overall trend. An example of this would be the campaign against the “Four Pests”—rats, flies, mosquitoes, and sparrows—at the onset of the Great Leap Forward (1958-62), one of Mao’s many “hygiene campaigns,”<sup>24</sup> which Anne-Marie Brady (2012) describes as a kind of “non-political propaganda and thought work” that “have always been an important theme in the Chinese propaganda system” (20). For this reason, *Eliminate Four Pests*,<sup>25</sup> translated into Uyghur in 1956, has been labeled as “P.” However, other various health-oriented publications were not labeled as “P,” such as *Our Bodies*<sup>26</sup> (Peng 1957), *All Youth Should Have Healthy Bodies*<sup>27</sup> (Wei 1957), and *Women’s Health Q&A*<sup>28</sup> (Li 1965). By Brady’s definition of propaganda, these titles could very well be listed under “P.” But my own definition narrows down the scope of “P” to wording that conspicuously points to the Chinese Communist Party’s ideology or narrative. So “Four Pests” becomes a decidedly idiosyncratic Party campaign, while “health” falls into more neutral territory. This example, though, shows that my labeling veers towards the conservative, and under different interpretations, such as Brady’s, the trends in each category have the potential of being more pronounced. Yet, even with this conservative interpretation, the trends between violence and propaganda are already telling, as have been discussed when I presented the total numbers.

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<sup>24</sup> 卫生运动 weisheng yundong

<sup>25</sup> 《除四害》 chusihai

<sup>26</sup> 《我们的身体》 womende shenti

<sup>27</sup> 《各个青年都要有健康的身体》 gege qingnian douyao you jiankang de shenti

<sup>28</sup> 《妇女卫生问答》 funu weisheng wenda

### 5) History, Geography, Biography




Figure 13: Bovingdon 1949-90 and P%\_HISTORY




Figure 14: Hastings 1990-2009 and P%\_HISTORY

“History is written by the victors.” Whether this popular quote can be attributed to Winston Churchill, as a multitude of online but non-scholarly sources suggest, or was inspired by an even older adage, it points to the nature of this category following along the lines of “Law, Social Sciences, Education” and “Literature.” In fact, it can be seen as an exemplary blend of the two: national narratives packaged in literary persuasiveness and distributed for mandatory public consumption through the educational apparatus. Again, the ideological features of this category are even more pronounced under an autocracy, since competing narratives cannot rely on market forces to survive should the state choose to censor or ban alternative histories and geographies. Given this reason, it, too, comes as no surprise that this category is one of the more influential in terms of the overall trend.

Examples include:

1954: *The Revolutionary History of China's New Democracy*<sup>29</sup> (Hu 1954)

1955: *The American Aggression Towards Taiwan*<sup>30</sup> (Zheng 1955)

1962: *Public Enemy: Chiang Kai-shek*<sup>31</sup>

1964: *Our Islands in the South China Sea*<sup>32</sup> (Chen 1964)

1984: *Martyrs of Xinjiang (1)*<sup>33</sup>

2004: *A Brilliant New Dawn: The Early Years of New China*<sup>34</sup>

2006: *The History and Current State of Xinjiang, China*<sup>35</sup> (Li 2006)

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<sup>29</sup> 《中国新民主主义革命史》 zhongguo xin minzhu zhuyi geming shi

<sup>30</sup> 《美国对台湾的侵略》 meiguodui taiwan de qinlue

<sup>31</sup> 《人民公敌蒋介石》 remin gongdi jiang jieshi

<sup>32</sup> 《我国的南海诸岛》 woguo de nanhai zhudao

<sup>33</sup> 《新疆烈士传》 xinjiang lieshi zhuan

<sup>34</sup> 《在晨光灿烂的年代: 新中国建立初期》 zai chenguang canlan de niandai: xin zhongguo jianli chuqi

<sup>35</sup> 《中国新疆历史与现状》 zhongguo xinjiang lishi yu xianzhuang

### 6) Philosophy, Psychology




Figure 15: Bovingdon 1949-90 and P%\_PHILOSOPHY




Figure 16: Hastings 1990-2009 and P%\_PHILOSOPHY

A notable contribution of this category to the overall trend is apparent as well. Given that “Philosophy” and “Psychology” are disciplines that purport to explain and understand the dimensions of human behavior, thought, and emotions, it would be out of the ordinary if this category did not have a considerable effect on the overall trend of propaganda, not to mention that Marxist thought and related philosophies form the ideological tenets of the Chinese state’s governing legitimacy.

Examples include:

1952: *How to Think and How to Learn*<sup>36</sup> (Xue 1952)

1958: *Learn Marxist Epistemology; Oppose Subjectivism*<sup>37</sup> (Guan 1958)

1959: *How to Teach Peasants Philosophy*<sup>38</sup> (Gao and Zhen 1959)

1982: *Lecture on the Morals of Communism*<sup>39</sup>

1985: *Marxian Economics Q&A*<sup>40</sup>

2003: *Political Thought and Professional Ethics*<sup>41</sup> (Jia 2003)

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<sup>36</sup> 《思想方法与学习方法》 sixiang fangfa yu xuexi fangfa

<sup>37</sup> 《学习马克思主义的认识论反对主观主义》 xuexi makesi zhuyi de renshilun fandui zhuguanzhuyi

<sup>38</sup> 《我们怎样教农民学哲学》 women zenyang jiao nongmin zhexue

<sup>39</sup> 《共产主义道德讲座》 gongchan zhuyi daode jiangzuo

<sup>40</sup> 《政治经济学问答》 zhengzhi jingjixue wenda

<sup>41</sup> 《政治思想与职业道德》 zhengzhi sixiang yu zhiye daode

### 7) Arts, Games, Sport




Figure 17: Bovingdon 1949-90 and P%\_ART




Figure 18: Hastings 1990-2009 and P%\_ART

The insertion of “Arts” in “Arts, Games, Sport” would seem to suggest that this category would be susceptible to much more propaganda titles than what is seen here, as in the case of the “Literature” category. However, there were only three titles published here that qualified as propaganda under “Arts”: one communist anthem and two revolutionary songs, for the years 1963-64-65. Everything else falls under “Games” and “Sport,” which are considerably more difficult to label as propaganda according to my designated definition. As a result, there is minimum influence from this category except from those three years.

The three titles:

1963: *National Anthem of the People’s Republic of China: The Internationale*<sup>42</sup> (which was the national anthem of the Chinese Soviet Republic, 1931-37)

1964: *Eight Revolutionary Songs*<sup>43</sup>

1965: *Selection of Revolutionary Songs (2)*<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> 《中华人民共和国国歌: 国际歌》 zhonghua renmin gongheguo guoge: guoji ge

<sup>43</sup> 《革命歌曲八首》 geming gequ bashou

<sup>44</sup> 《革命歌曲选》 geming gequ xuan

### 8) Generalities, Bibliography




Figure 19: Bovingdon 1949-90 and P%\_GENERALITIES




Figure 20: Hastings 1990-2009 and P%\_GENERALITIES

Except for the year 2007, there is minimal influence from this category, an understandable outcome given its nature—most of the titles published here were commercially-oriented encyclopedias, notably for “world” knowledge targeting children, such as the *100,000 Questions Series 1-10*<sup>45</sup> published in 2003.

The exception:

2007: *Outstanding Heroes of Xinjiang Series*<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> 《十万个为什么》 shiwange weishenme

<sup>46</sup> 《新疆英模人物系列丛书》 xinjiang yingmo renwu xilie congshu

9) Religion, Theology




Figure 21: Bovingdon 1949-90 and P%\_RELIGION




Figure 22: Hastings 1990-2009 and P%\_RELIGION

“Religion” and “Theology” are highly politically sensitive subjects. It is almost redundant to say, as history and current affairs show, that it plays a major role in conflict. To say that it is the origin—or original excuse—of all ethnic conflict might be an exaggeration, but it would be far from indefensible. So, understandably, the state has taken a very conservative approach here, publishing very sporadically throughout the years. And when they do publish, it is a “10” (1958, 1959, 1999), indicating it is with 100% propaganda intentions. The year 2003 is an anomaly. However, the two publications published in this year do have very high potential to be labeled “propaganda” if their content was reviewed—it is only according to their titles and my definition that I did not label them as such. They are *A Dictionary of Islam*<sup>47</sup> (Abulajiang and Jin 2003) and *Economic Thought in Islam*<sup>48</sup> (Liu 2003). Given China’s tight grip on religion and the Communist Party’s official stance of atheism within its ranks, it is hard to imagine that these two publications do not contain ideological traits directly tied to state ideology. They could very well be labeled “P” upon closer examination, and 2003 could be changed to a “10” in propaganda intensity.

The remaining 4 titles (out of a total of 6) labeled propaganda:

1958: *The Resolute Elimination of Scum in the Islam Community*<sup>49</sup>

1958: *Are There Such Things as Ghosts and Gods?*<sup>50</sup> (Gong 1958)

1959: *Educational Outline on Atheism*<sup>51</sup>

1999: *Champion Science; Uphold Atheism*<sup>52</sup> (Xiaokaiti and Yisimayi 1999)

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<sup>47</sup> 《伊斯兰教词典》 yisilanjiao cidian

<sup>48</sup> 《伊斯兰经济思想》 yisilan jingjisixiang


<sup>49</sup> 《坚决肃清伊斯兰教界中的败类》 jianjue suqing yisilanjiao jie zhongde bailei

<sup>50</sup> 《到底有没有鬼神?》 daodi youmeiyou guishen

<sup>51</sup> 《无神论教育提纲》 wushenlun jiaoyu tigang

<sup>52</sup> 《崇尚科学坚持无神论》 chongshang kexue jianchi wushenlun

## 2.5 Bovingdon 1949-1990 and Propaganda Trends, Uyghur (UY) → Chinese (ZH)



**Figure 23: Bovingdon 1949-90 and P%\_TOTAL (UY>ZH)**

The variables present in this graph are identical to the previous graphs except for the direction of the translation flow (*italicized*):

- 1) Years, from 1949-1990
- 2) Bovingdon’s documentation of violence (“V”) according to year, in blue
- 3) Percentage of “propaganda” (“P”) in total translations *from Uyghur (UY) into Chinese (ZH)*, tallied across categories, for each year, in red

Because of the dearth of publications recorded in the database in this direction—only one title published in 1956 and one in 1980—there is little significance in producing graphs for each category as was the case for the other direction “Chinese into Uyghur.” The 1956 title, *The Expert Rice Grower Riakayefu*,<sup>53</sup> was under the category of “Applied Sciences”; the 1980 title,

<sup>53</sup> 《种水稻能手日阿卡耶夫》 zhongshuidao nengshou riakayefu; the transliteration of the name “riakayefu” into 日阿卡耶夫 is my own since I could not locate the actual book to verify the Chinese, nor verify it with online resources.

*Traditional Uyghur Riddles*<sup>54</sup> (Reheman 1980), under “Literature.” Neither fit my definition of “propaganda.” Hence the result of 0% propaganda in this graph for the years where publications were recorded.

This result indicates little to no input from this translation direction in regards to a relationship between propaganda and violence, which would also suggest that the Uyghur minority has very little sway or say in mitigating the violence. If their voices are not heard (in Chinese), what power of persuasion do they have (over the Chinese)? But even this suggestion is superfluous since it is the Chinese state that controls the publication in this direction as well. It does not need to hear what it does not want to hear.

Concerning the two titles, the only suggestive indication of Chinese propensity towards Soviet/Russian ideology (i.e. a hint of “propaganda”) would be the name “Riakayefu,” which looks like a transliteration of a proper name with Russian/Cyrillic origins. But I was unable to verify who this person was and therefore unable to determine this person’s significance in the Chinese communist narrative. So the title was not labeled propaganda. The second title did not fit my definition of propaganda either. However, on a theoretical basis, choosing to publish “traditional riddles” from an ethnic minority rings of soft-core cultural colonialism. Even though it cannot be labeled “propaganda” in this study, it certainly has the potential of being a particular kind of propaganda when it comes to softening the image of an ethnic minority who is known to be at odds, and sometimes violently, with the state.

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<sup>54</sup> 《维吾尔族民间谜语》 weiwuerzu minjian miyu

## 2. 6 Hastings 1990-2009 and Propaganda Trends, Uyghur (UY) → Chinese (ZH)




Figure 24: Hastings 1990-2009 and P%\_TOTAL (UY>ZH)

Again, the variables are the same except for the direction of translation (italicized):

- 1) Years, from 1990-2009
- 2) Hastings' documentation of violence ("V") according to year, in blue
- 3) Percentage of "propaganda" ("P") in total translations from *Uyghur (UY)* into *Chinese (ZH)*, tallied across categories, for each year, in red

And, again, because of the dearth of publications (only 12 in total), it would serve minimal purpose to produce graphs for each category under this timeframe. But the single-digit publication numbers in each year do allow us the opportunity to mine through individual titles for other layers of significance, particularly for 2007, where the sole title published was labeled as propaganda, giving it a 10 (out of 10) in intensity.

In the year 2000, the one title published under the category "Religion, Theology" was *The Uyghur-Turkic Biography of the Seventh-century Chinese Buddhist Pilgrim Xuanzang, Ninth and*

*Tenth Chapters*<sup>55</sup> (Barat 2000). However, according to a book review in the *Journal of Asian Studies* (Deeg 2002, 240-42), the publication was “an attempt to edit and analyze translated Chinese Buddhist texts.” The ninth and tenth chapters were in fact “translated into old-Turkic or Uyghur from Chinese in the tenth century by Singqo Sali Tutung, a Uighur.” So this is no longer a one-dimensional translation from Uyghur into Chinese, in the theoretical sense that the Chinese are “learning” from the Uyghur. The premise of the original publication was that the author, a Uyghur scholar, was attempting to understand what his Uyghur predecessor had translated from the Chinese; the book itself “is an extended version of the author’s doctoral dissertation, submitted to Harvard University in 1993” (240), which would predominantly be in English, except for the texts under study, which would be in Chinese or Uyghur. So it cannot be a Uyghur into Chinese translation in the normative sense if the dissertation was in English. Though a bit of a language labyrinth to follow, at its core, this translation still demonstrates the direction of power emanating from the Chinese (into Uyghur), even though superficially it is labeled as a translation from Uyghur into Chinese.

In the year 2002, the one title published under the category “Art” was *The Collected Works of Teachers of the Fine Arts College of Xinjiang Art University*<sup>56</sup>(Hazi 2002). In fact, the information indicated in the database describes it as the English version of the bilingual Chinese-Uyghur edition, which would mean that, again, it was not a translation from Uyghur into Chinese per se, though it was recorded and filed as such.

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<sup>55</sup> There is no original Chinese title since the book is in English. However, the Chinese text under study in the book is 《大唐三藏法师传》 (datang sanzang fashizhuan; *Biography of the Tang Dynasty Tripitaka Master*).

<sup>56</sup> 《新疆艺术学院美术学院教师作品集: 中维英文本》 xinjiang yishu xueyuan jiaoshi zuopinji: zhong wei ying wenben

The six titles published in 2003 were all under “Literature” and all part of the same series: *Classic Jokes from Afanti 1-6*<sup>57</sup> (Aikebaier 2003). In other words, they were light folk fare of the soft image kind, similar in nature to the “traditional riddles” previously seen in Bovingdon’s timeframe. Again, I did not label this folksy characterization as propaganda because it did not quite explicitly satisfy my criteria. However, it can still be considered cultural propaganda in that it attempts to reduce the foreign other to a caricature of affability—good for fun and jokes, but nothing more sophisticated. Implied is inferiority.

The two titles published in 2005 were *History of Education of the Tatars in China*,<sup>58</sup> under “Law, Social Sciences, Education”; and *The Turkic Genealogy*<sup>59</sup> (Bahadir 2005) under “History, Geography, Biography.” This second title deserves some elaboration. According to a book review published by the Institute of Qing History of Renmin University (Liu 2006), *The Turkic Genealogy* is in fact a Chinese translation of the French translation by Petr Ivanovich Desmaisons published in St. Petersburg in 1874. So *The Turkic Genealogy* was written in Chagatai Turkic in the mid seventeenth century, *but* the Chinese translation here was not directly translated from that language edition. Instead it was translated from a pivot language, French. The more translations, the more room for distortion, whether wittingly or unwittingly. So, again, translation from Uyghur into Chinese proves much less straightforward than the other direction—a much weaker line of direct contact than what is usually needed for understanding between cultures.

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<sup>57</sup> 《阿凡提经典笑话》 afanti jingdian xiaohua

<sup>58</sup> 《中国塔塔尔族教育史》 zhongguo tataerzu jiaoyushi

<sup>59</sup> 《突厥世系》 tujue shixi

In 2006, the one title published under “Literature” was *The Jokester on the Donkey: the Humor of Afanti*<sup>60</sup> (Aikebaier 2006)—where the harmless and comical image of the Other reiterates itself.

In 2007, under “Literature” again, the sole title published was *Lightening atop the Pamirs: Collection of Short Stories by General Rouzi*<sup>61</sup> (Rouzi 2007). Rouzi is a Uyghur general who served in the Chinese army; it would be hard to find a figure more politically correct than this. So even though the author is Uyghur and not “Chinese,” I still consider this to be a form of Chinese propaganda because the Uyghur figure’s position is one of servitude, and serving in one of the strongest enforcers of state power: the military apparatus. Note the irony—publishing the translated short stories of a Uyghur novelist-military general in 2007 did not seem to couch Chinese-Uyghur relations in amenable terms ahead of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, when just days before the games “16 policemen were killed and 16 others injured when attackers threw two grenades into a police station in the [Xinjiang] desert oasis town of Kashgar, in the far west, after driving a truck into the station at 8am.” Moreover: “In the first half of 2008, 82 people were arrested in Xinjiang in connection with terrorist plots aimed at the Olympics” (Wong and Bradsher 2008).

Since the priority of this chapter is the descriptive presentation of the fluctuating patterns of “trends”—examining the up and down movements, and not necessarily the reasons behind those movements—and given the vast number of propaganda titles in some of the categories (e.g. up to 464 in “Law”), only select titles were given as examples.<sup>62</sup> If specific titles were singled

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<sup>60</sup> 《毛驴上的笑星: 阿凡提的大幽默》 maolu shang de xiaoxing: afanti de dayoumo

<sup>61</sup> 《电闪帕米尔: 肉孜将军中篇小说选》 dianshan pamier: rouzi jiangjun zhongpian xiaoshuo xuan

<sup>62</sup> The total number of translations recorded in the Index between 1950-2007, in the direction of Chinese into Uyghur was 1716, of which 736 were labeled as propaganda. In the other direction: 14, of which 1 was labeled propaganda. A complete list of all titles is available upon request.

out and addressed, it was either because there were only single-digit publications numbers in that given category or year, or the trend warranted further explanation and would be better understood by pointing out exemplary titles.

## **2.7 Conclusion**

Through the comparison of trends in violence and trends in translated propaganda, by means of a descriptive examination of upward and downward trends, positing each as a possible cause for the other, this chapter suggests that there is a particular relationship between propaganda and violence. This suggestion is further supported by a statistical analysis of Bovington's data set with a propaganda data set which provides that the most dominant cross-correlation between the two data sets would be that an increase in propaganda could lead to an increase in violence three years later. This in turn suggests that there could be an opportunity for the Chinese state, as the party in power in this Han-Uyghur relationship, to lessen violence by lessening the publication of translated propaganda. In addition to the relationship between propaganda and violence, the visual representation of the mirroring and cyclical nature of the two trends also suggests a possible historical and symbolical explanation for the relationship—a historical construct of ethnocentrism that predates the current struggle between the two groups, but perpetuates and continues to inform how the Chinese state interacts with the ethnic other. The following chapters will further examine the construct of this ethnocentrism through a theoretical framework mainly consisting of colonialism, ethno-nationalism, and high modernism.

**PART II**

**THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

## PREMISE

Power wears many masks and one of them is “translation.” It is a clever disguise because it leverages what Charles Hatfield (2012) points out, problematically, as the belief in “the political value of translation” to be “its ability to promote what is often referred to as ‘cultural understanding’” (8). To give examples of the popularity of this positive value attributed to translation, Hatfield further cites the mission statements of San Francisco’s Center for the Art of Translation and that of the American Literary Translators Association, as well as quoting Edith Grossman’s (2010) argument that translation can challenge “the growth and spread of an increasingly intense jingoistic parochialism in our country” (cited in Hatfield 2012, 8). But as Tymoczko and Gentzler (2002) demonstrate with *Translation and Power*, translation demarcates the hierarchy between languages and the “culture” behind it. It doesn’t just challenge “evil,” it can just as well channel it.

The advancements in Translation Studies scholarship, which rise well and beyond the romantic-liberal-progressive notions of translation being an act of good will or endowed with the power of “good,” are well documented in academic publications. Aside from *Translation and Power*, other notable publications that problematize the idea of translation include: *Siting Translation: History, Post-Structuralism, and the Colonial Context* (Niranjana 1992); *Translation and Empire* (Robinson 1997); *Translation in Systems* (Hermans 1999); *Representing Others: Translation, Ethnography, and the Museum* (Sturge 2007). The issue lies in the fact that these are academic publications, read and consumed within academic institutions and systems of feedback or, even more narrowly, only within the discipline itself. They are separate from the realms of “centers” and “associations”—of “art,” “writing,” “translation”—whose audience are the readership that read translations, not the academic studies on them. They are separate from

mushrooming translation programs who vow to teach students “the practice” of translation for the “real” world, for whom “theory” is the practice of the philosophical elite, eliciting polite ridicule, if not outright eye-roll. It is, on the other hand, translators like Edith Grossman (of *Don Quixote*, 2003, and numerous works by Gabriel García Márquez) who influence this population’s idea of translation as “good” and a force for “cultural understanding,” because they are interviewed and promoted by the literary press and commercial publishers, not scholarly ones.<sup>1</sup>

Though Grossman’s jingoistic “country” is no doubt referring to the United States of America, this “jingoistic parochialism” is not the singular property of American or British hegemony exercised linguistically as the dominance of English at the expense of other languages (Venuti 1998, 159).<sup>2</sup> It emanates from within all centers of power, as within the People’s Republic of China. This chapter attempts to demonstrate how power dynamics subject translation to the role of maintaining—not challenging—the imbalance of power. By interpreting the Chinese-Uyghur power relation under different theoretical regimes, namely colonialism, ethno-nationalism, and high modernism, I will attempt to explain why the cycle of translated propaganda and violence seen in the previous chapter is stubbornly persistent, and why the Chinese state seems predisposed to wield propaganda and the Xinjiang region to respond with violence. The use of a plurality of theories—nominally different, but intrinsically congruent—is to give credence to the stronghold of discriminatory power dynamics that our progressive selves

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<sup>1</sup> Hatfield’s examples underline this problem. The fact that as a literary scholar himself, and as the then editor of *Translation Review* and assistant director of the Center for Translation Studies at the University of Texas at Dallas, he does not seem to note the evolution of scholarship in the field of translation, further underlines the limited reach of the discipline, which likely reflects its own position in the academic hierarchy (especially within the American context of monolingualism). And this is the reason why “power” can continue to take on the disguise of “translation” amongst *the public* (among which also include other disciplines and practicing translators), especially the progressive portion who consider themselves “cultured,” who are outside the fervent scholarship within Translation Studies. The problem is how to bridge this gap. What is needed is translation from “tower” into “town hall.”

<sup>2</sup> This hegemony has yet to relax, given the latest UNESCO translation figures: Over 55% of the translated books recorded in the Index are from English, in contrast to only 6.45% being translated into English; even though 93% of translations are listed as translated from 16 European language, 73% of those translations are translated from either English, French, or German (Brisset 2017, 267).

would like to believe are behind us. We believe we are enlightened by science and modernity, but, as the data shows, often we are not.

The attempt is not concerned with the immediate, individual triggers of either the spike in violent episodes or the hike in propaganda. Scholarly studies and journalistic accounts abound concerning the micro aspects of those events—the alleged instigator, who did what when, where, the number of people arrested, killed, sentenced.<sup>3</sup> Nor is it necessarily concerned with a linear historical approach describing interaction between the two regions and their inhabitants.<sup>4</sup> Rather, my focus is on the *relationship* identified between violence and propaganda, the *mirroring* of the peaks and troughs of the two trends, the *repetitive* cycle of the occurrences; all which suggest something more macro in nature is working behind the scenes. Why do the two lines dance in tandem, hand-in-hand, with such corresponding choreography but ultimately unhappy results on the scoreboard? They danced through the progressivism-patriotism of the early years of the People’s Republic (50s-60s), the darkness of the Cultural Revolution (60s-70s), the liberation of the Reform and Opening Up (80s-90s), the rise of China towards becoming the second largest economy in the world (2000s-). The dance has not changed. The relationship persists. *Why?*

No doubt there are many variables that could be identified as potential causes—like so many stars in the sky—but my choice of looking at that specific variable called “translated propaganda,” as necessitated by my field of study in translation, has led me to form a constellation along the lines of colonialism (for the power structure of the relationship), ethno-nationalism (for the historical roots behind the relationship), and high modernism (for the

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<sup>3</sup> For summarized accounts, in particular, see: Hastings (2011); Chap. 4 in Bovingdon (2010); Chap. 6 in Dillon (2004). For media coverage of unrest in the region, online keyword searches yield plentiful results from various mainstream publications, from which I have also cited in this chapter.

<sup>4</sup> For a comprehensive account of Xinjiang history from prehistoric times to the modern age, see Millward (2007): *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang*.

present-day execution of the relationship). In the course of outlining this constellation, I have taken broad strokes and chosen examples to make what I perceive to be the more thought-enlisting connections, since I could not account for all in the span of this study, and given that my attempt is to provide a macroperspective. But for each connection made in the ensuing chapters, I am infinitely aware of all the other possible configurations of hypotheses that could be drawn or inferred from my own. This, I would like to believe, is the value of my attempt at an answer. In no way am I saying that it is definitive, but in drawing a picture that has not quite been drawn in this interdisciplinary way before, or in such a cultural crossover manner, it endeavors to add to the diversity of questions that can and should be further asked. And depending on how the questions are asked, how translation theories and their propositions are held up against these other theoretical regimes, translation can either be part of the problem, or part of the solution.

## CHAPTER 3

### (POST-)COLONIALISM

#### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter addresses the temptation, controversies, and potential drawbacks of applying the framework of colonialism and subsequent postcolonial scholarship and postcolonial translation studies literature to explain the Chinese state's behavior towards the ethnic other, which in this study, specifically refers to the Uyghur population in Xinjiang. The temptation is there because the control Han China exerts over Uyghur Xinjiang fits the popular perception of colonialism being one dominant ethnicity exerting control over an unwilling dominated ethnicity, where the stark differences between the two groups closely follow the racial, color, religious, language, culture, and economic divide that characterized former colonial powers and the populations they subjugated. But since postcolonial scholarship is specifically born out of the context of these former French, Spanish, British imperial powers and their conquered lands in the Middle East, Latin America, India, and Africa, it does not readily correspond to the conditions in Xinjiang in the Chinese context. As such, arguments as to whether or not China is a colonial power become counterproductive in explaining its interethnic relations, which far predate Western colonialism and the timeframe postcolonial studies typically address, not to mention the difference in the locales and languages most commonly under study. However, given the drawbacks of applying the framework of colonialism, it is nevertheless acknowledged that colonial power relations provide a readily understandable structure of domination for initial interpretation of Han-Uyghur relations.

### 3.2 How Colonialism Fits or Eludes the Argument

If one should cast the governing structure of China in the theoretical terms of power relations, the one majority ethnicity—the Han Chinese, accounting for 91.6% of the population (2010 Census)<sup>1</sup>—would be the indisputable “majority.” But what allows them to dominate over the other 55 officially designated ethnicities is not strength in numbers (colonial governments are, after all, frequently outnumbered by the natives), but the fact that they populate the central positions of power in government, albeit under the pan-Chinese *Zhonghua* nationality<sup>2</sup> and the state banner of “harmony,” and activities that proclaim to contribute to such effect. One of those activities is translation. But instead of promoting “cultural understanding,” I wish to highlight that the practice of internal translation within China pertains to an agenda more akin to colonial dominance and control, which is something of a paradox often unbeknownst even to policy-makers themselves.

Why unbeknownst? Though the Chinese domestic narrative could not emphasize more the crushing humiliations and military aggressions the country suffered from “Imperial Powers” from the mid-nineteenth to early-twentieth century (Mao 1939), Mainland China was never

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<sup>1</sup> “Han,” like “White,” is not monolithic. It is a composite of other Chinese identities that often fall along regional/provincial borders. These identities carry their own distinct cultural and political significance (as well as stereotypes). They include, for example, the Cantonese, from the province formerly known as Canton, now Guangdong, who make up the majority of early Chinese immigration to North America, hence the Cantonese origins and pronunciation of popular dishes in Chinese restaurants; the Hakka, whose name literally translates into “guest family” because the families, originally from the Central Plains of China, went through several waves of southern migration due to upheaval, unrest, and northern invasions throughout the dynasties. Within these different identities power relations can also be discerned. For example, in Taiwan, where there is a sizable Hakka population alongside the Taiwanese population (who largely hail from Fujian), one will find that many more Hakka are “bilingual” and can speak both Taiwanese and Hakka, while the Taiwanese generally can only speak Taiwanese/Fujianese and not Hakka. Like monolingual Americans, they who have the upper hand do not need to learn a “foreign” language. It is also possible to assume multiple identities such as being Cantonese with Hakka roots. Or, as often happens with the lineage of famous figures, claim them as “one of our own.” For example, there are popular claims that the founding father Sun Yat-sen (whose name in Cantonese transliteration remains despite Mandarin being chosen as the state vernacular) and Deng Xiaoping are Hakka (Genova 2015).

<sup>2</sup> 中華民族; the *Zhonghua* Minzu/Nationality/Ethnicity is a pan-Chinese identity created in the early 20th century to incorporate the non-Han populations of China. It is further discussed in the following chapters of Part II.

officially colonized in its entirety by these so called imperial powers,<sup>3</sup> nor was it recognized as a colonizer along the “Western” likes of Spain, Britain or France. Thus it finds itself largely absent from the postcolonial discourse that to this day still resonates across the Middle East, Latin America, India, and Africa, where the colonizer is officially in the wrong and made to face the fallacies of policies it once imposed on its presumed uncivilized subjects. In fact, on an international level, China is more often than not characterized as a victim of orientalism and the colonial gaze, as seen in Sartre’s “From One China to Another” ([1954] 2001), where the philosopher-activist recounts the constructed caricature of the Chinese that frightened his childhood: “They were tiny and terrible, slipped between your fingers, attacked from behind, burst out suddenly in ridiculous din, sliding like fishes along the glass of an aquarium, dim lanterns, incredible and futile refinements, ingenious tortures, jingling hats” (1). Having suffered such indignities creates within the official Chinese discourse a psychological immunity resistant to criticism of being a colonial power.

However, if we examine the conditions under which Xinjiang is governed (or was governed under previous, pre-communist Chinese regimes) alongside Uyghur reception and perception of this governance, such criticism of colonialism would not be unfounded (Benson 2004; Bovington 2002; Gladney 1998; Smith 2000). As such, postcolonial theories would be pertinent to explain the relationship between translated propaganda and violence. They have the potential of showing that translation is not necessarily the product of an individual endeavor by the translator to enhance cultural communication and understanding, but a product created by a

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<sup>3</sup>The emphasis on “Mainland” means that I have excluded Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan in this description. Modern-day references to “China” does not (for the most part) include these three regions (unless in the official literature of the Chinese government). A politically and geographically united “One China” is only in theory and not in practice.

collective ideology to reproduce certain power relations favoring the outlook of the dominating party, in which case would be the Chinese state.

I emphasize *collective ideology* in contrast to individual agency, because belief in the latter offers grounds for the translator's dismissal of colonialism in the practice of translation: *I don't believe* what I'm practicing is colonialism; *I believe* I am doing justice to the cause of enhancing mutual understanding. But it is precisely the collective aspect of ideology that lends individuals to believe they are acting on their own accord. It is an ideology precisely because the individual is not aware of its workings, because it is made to seem "obvious," perpetuated by what Althusser (1971) refers to as Ideological State Apparatuses, collective entities, such as the Church, the School, and the Party (143). In China, the ideology is not necessarily that of Communism or the euphemistic "socialism with Chinese characteristics," but rather the monopoly of power by the Chinese Communist Party, whereby which the State/Party is always assumed to be (in the) "right." Therefore, the ideological oblivion on behalf of the policy-makers and translators can be attributed to the fact that as diligent agents and executors of power, it would be unthinkable to suspect their own policies and practices as bearing any hint of something as loathsome as "Western" colonialism.

### **3.3 How Postcolonial Scholarship Fits or Eludes the Argument**

The inability of Western colonialism to sufficiently account for China as a colonial power also extends to the absence of China being positioned as an imperial power capable of a colonizing agenda within postcolonial translation studies. A representative example of this absence can be seen in Douglas Robinson's *Translation and Empire: Postcolonial Theories Explained* (1997), one of a host of often cited publications marking the turn of translation studies into postcolonial territory. In the mere six pages that "China" or "Chinese" was even mentioned

(pages 9, 26, 33, 54, 81, 97), it was regarded as subject to Western colonial aggression—once an ancient civilization with an empire of its own, but in radical decline towards the advent of modernity, exporting slave labor and disproportionately underrepresented in translation in English. Similarly, *Postcolonial Translation* (Bassnett and Trivedi 1998), another popularly cited English reference published during the same period that brings together postcolonial theory and translation studies, includes no article on China—which is entirely “acceptable” because of the previously mentioned conceptual debates surrounding the definition of colonialism and whether China “fits” a description whose formulation is grounded in the image of Western imperial powers. One exception in Bassnett and Trivedi (1998), though, is Andre Lefevere’s fleeting mention of China translating with the same “imperial” tendencies as the West before “the power structure of the Empire, and with it the exclusive use of classical Chinese among literati, came crashing down” toward the late nineteenth century (78). But, again, Lefevere refers to the practice of the Chinese translating texts from the West with deforming imperial tendencies—not *within* its own borders among its own ethnic languages—until those tendencies were abandoned because the empire crumbled in the face of Western aggression.

Perhaps a more indicative example of a Western narrative on colonialism when it comes to positioning China is Lydia Liu’s *Tokens of Exchange—The Problem of Translation in Global Circulations* (1999). Published during the same timeframe as Robinson (1997) and Bassnett and Trivedi (1998), it is a collection of articles premised on the framework of “East vs. West,” where China is on the receiving end of Western attempts to “translate” China or forced into the position of having to translate from the West and redefine itself within this new (post-)colonial world order of unequal exchange. Liu, as editor, clearly states her focus is “on China’s *interaction with the colonial* and other forces over the century” (5; emphasis added). It is a statement that clearly

positions China as *not* being a colonial power. Among the issues examined in this publication one finds how Jesuit missionaries to China strategically produced “Christian theological readings of Chinese classical texts” (7); the “looting” of Beijing within the “new lexicon of empire and colonialism” (8); and the “pathologization of the Chinese race by the “West” through “scientific and visual translations of Chinese illness and deformity” (9). Throughout, the “Chinese” are taken for granted as one ethnic category: *Han* or sinicized. The default setting for the examination of “translation” in a (post-)colonial framework becomes an interaction with forces *outside* its borders—“the West”; there is no examination of how Han-China or Han-Chinese “translated” the many ethnic populations within its borders following an imperial ethnocentric agenda. Rosemary Arrojo’s (2013) more recent review of Liu’s *Tokens of Exchange* recommends it as “among the most original contributions to translation theory since Derrida’s reconceptualization of translation as a form of regulated transformation” (282). Yet precisely because of its very significant contribution, it stands to cement the perception of China as victim of colonialism and Euro-American global hegemony. It is not so much that there is a lack of attention to the function of politics or power within (post-)colonial translation studies; this has been acutely examined, such as by Talal Asad (1986) in the ethnographic context of “cultural translation,” when the “weaker” language of “primitive” Third World societies cannot resist the translation of their culture into the “stronger” language of the First World ethnographer and the knowledge-producing discipline of anthropology. Rather, there is a lack of critical examination of that function with China as imperial ruler—China as the Ethnographer with the authority to author representations of another’s culture—within China’s own imperial past of conquest and modern, capitalist iterations of its imperial/conquest agenda.

In addition to Liu, Eva Hung and Judy Wakabayashi, prominent scholars within Translation Studies, published *Asian Translation Traditions* (2005), a collection of articles focusing on “East Asia” as a counterweight to “the bias in the contemporary field of Translation Studies, which remains highly Eurocentric both in its theoretical explorations and its historical grounding” (i). But even when China was acknowledged for its historical, outsized cultural dominance in the prevalence of the classical Chinese script adopted by the ruling elite of Korea, Japan, and Vietnam, “China’s *hegemony was largely cultural rather than military, and its neighbours actively sought out this influence, rather than it being imposed on them.* In the context of translation *this gave Chinese source texts great prestige* for hundreds of years” (Wakabayashi 2005, 35; emphasis added). Again, China’s superior power here is not “colonial,” and far from it. In Hung’s own contribution to the volume, a comprehensive overview of translation practices in China from the first century BCE to early twentieth century, she also echoes Wakabayashi in saying that Chinese norms and practices spread throughout the region “more often because of *superiority* in material and/or spiritual culture *acknowledged by the surrounding peoples rather than through military conquest*” (69; emphasis added). This is not to say that the statement is necessarily false, but it does point to the problem in perception of applying the “colonial” label to frame the current Chinese state’s behavior if historical understanding does not support it. Again, here, the implied attitude is that China is *not* the same as the West, and interpretations of state behavior that arise from a Eurocentric milieu, like colonialism, cannot explain the particular cultural context in which the Chinese exerted influence over the Other. In the one instance where a comparison was made with “many nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial administration elsewhere in the world,” Hung was actually referring to “the dynasties founded by *invading peoples,*” which were, by necessity, bilingual or

multilingual (78; emphasis added). So, from a sinocentric point of view, the “Chinese” were never colonial—the “alien” dynasties founded by “invaders” were. The focus of the third and last articles that specifically dealt with China examined it during the “early modern period of 1840-1919,” when China was forced to face a powerful aggressive/progressive West (Wong 2005), which is the most often cited and recognized period in public perception. The humiliation that China suffered during this time hardly lends itself to the association of colonialism. But it must also be noted that in Wong’s (2005) article, the Qing court made a distinction between “Westerners” and “*traditional* barbarians” who invaded Chinese dynasties, and pointed out that destabilizing “massive social unrest and rebellions” *within* China, such as the ethnic Miao uprisings, were also what pushed the country to modernize through a translation program (116; emphasis added). Though this does not directly address the function of translation in relation to the historical “foreign” populations found under Chinese influence within the mainland, it inadvertently reveals the discourse of long-standing discrimination emanating from a sinocentric ideology against non-Han populations.

In light of this theoretical incapacity that arises with “colonialism” displayed in a number of prominent publications and from prominent scholars, it becomes even more important to bring forth the “post”-colonial context of the translation flows between Chinese and Uyghur. Because unlike in Toury’s (1995) functionalist approach, where power struggle between the languages is not factored into target-oriented forces, or in Even-Zohar’s (1990) polysystem approach, where it operates almost as if “the source and target cultures are conceived as substantially different but equal cultural systems that nevertheless have more or less the same power to shape and control the translator’s work to suit target-cultural needs” (Robinson 1997), there are “vast power differentials” (28) that must be addressed between this Chinese-Uyghur translation pair.

In this context, in which the Chinese state controls publishing and narrative, it is no longer what the target culture (Uyghur) demands when translating from Chinese into Uyghur, but what the source culture (Chinese) demands of the target. It can function as such irrespective of who translates (Uyghur or Chinese) and who commissions the translation (Uyghur or Chinese); because both “Uyghur” and “Chinese” in this publishing context follow the same constraints and allowances. They are both subject to the edicts of the Chinese state, the entity which ultimately shapes publishing decisions, outright through censorship and inwardly through “education.” The “Xinjiang People’s Publishing House”<sup>4</sup> does not mean the “Xinjiang people” are really in charge of publishing decisions.

Therefore, the overwhelming number of translations from Chinese into Uyghur (1716), compared to Uyghur into Chinese (14), between the years of 1950-2007,<sup>5</sup> would no longer be interpreted as the Uyghur-periphery filling in a cultural vacuum by voluminously translating from the Chinese (as Even-Zohar’s center-peripheral polysystem theory would suggest), but rather as the Chinese-center imposing cultural influence or, more bluntly, advancing state propaganda through “extranlations” (Casanova [1999] 2004), given that 736 titles out of 1716 were identified as propaganda according to my established criteria.

However, by bringing forth the postcolonial context, I do not mean to apply the postcolonial translation theories advocated by Doris Bachmann-Medick, Michaela Wolf, Homi Bhabha, or Tejaswini Niranjana where the space of translation is endowed with the potential to solve “the fossilized dichotomy of ‘us’ and the ‘enemies’” (Bachmann-Medick 2006, 39); where it enables an “engaged, interventionist translation strategy to come into being” (Wolf 2000, 135); where it is a Third Space of hybridity in which the individual subject is capable of counter-

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<sup>4</sup> 新疆人民出版社 xinjiang renmin chubanshe

<sup>5</sup> Unless otherwise noted, all referenced data are from UNESCO’s Index Translationum.

translating and re-shaping identity (Bhabha 1994); or where it is a space that can be recaptured from Western imperialists and reconceived for resistance (Niranjana 1992). This positively charged notion of translation, of being able to reclaim one's identity through translation is predominantly espoused in the *post-colonial* context of *independence* found in India and other former colonies. It is also grounded in the Romantic view of the Writer-Genius, an ideal of near sublime individual agency, expounded, time and again, and often quite forcefully, by well established and well commercialized literary scholars such as Harold Bloom, from his earlier *Anxiety of Influence* (1973) to his more recent 21st century publication, titled, simply, *Genius* (2002). The poetics of translation found in the writings of Walter Benjamin, Henri Meschonnic, and Antoine Berman also follow this tradition.

This kind of individual agency is only possible by presupposing, once again, that the Self and the Other are on more or less equal terms, that there are either no vast power differentials or that the power has shifted from the once colonizer to the once colonized. This last state of power shift came into being with the de-colonization and independence of former colonies, where the official narrative puts the once colonizer in the moral wrong. Yet, since China was never a “colonizer” and its people never “colonized,” this power shift did not occur between the languages of Chinese Mandarin and Uyghur and the people who speak it. To the Chinese, the Uyghurs therefore do not occupy the moral high ground to accuse them as the evil colonial master; nor is Xinjiang, in this case, a newly independent state in the process of creating a national identity separate from a former colonizing Chinese state.<sup>6</sup> Thus the space of translation

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<sup>6</sup> The territory known today as “Xinjiang” (“new border”) received its namesake in the late 18th century under the Qing imperial regime (1644-1911). After the dynasty's fall, the area briefly fell into the folds of the Republican government (1912-1949) until the ruling Nationalist party lost power to the Communists, who then officially designated the territory as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in 1956. The “Uyghur” nationality is a fairly modern creation: it first gained currency under the Republican government in the 1930s; in 1950 it was officialized by the Chinese Communist State (Gladney 1998, 4).

does not exist for them to negotiate and “write back” (Ashcroft et al. 2002). And insofar as “agency” is not a given but granted, the Uyghur translator is allowed none.

A telling example of this lopsided power balance can be found in the respective Uyghur and Chinese efforts to rewrite their own histories, because, as Bovingdon (2004b) points out, even though “writers in each camp claim to have resolved long-standing disputes by revealing definitive historical truths,” the “Uyghurs can only protest that Chinese historians spread lies,” while “Chinese Communist Party (CPP) officials can accuse Uyghur historians of subversion and declare their works *illegal*” (353; emphasis added). The Chinese wield the power of law and its enforcement against the Uyghurs, so despite the fact that both sides vehemently employ “interpretive stratagems and selective distortions” (358) to reconstitute history in their own favor, one is clearly at a disadvantage against the other. The structural position—one of antagonism—is shared by the two camps; the distribution of power is not. And the act of translation, rather than reversing the imbalance or the animosity, reinforces both. What translation communicates is the predisposed belief that the other side has falsified the truth.

When Uyghurs are confronted with the official Chinese version of history, because, as Bovingdon (2004b) points out, “they assume the government intentionally spreads misinformation, they are predisposed to believe Uyghur authors whose writings differ dramatically from the official version” (354-55). Furthermore, publishing numbers reflect state power and intentions. Between the years of 1949-2007, while 118 translations under the genre “History, Geography, Biography” were published from Chinese into Uyghur, only 1, in 2005, was published from Uyghur into Chinese. Among the 118 translated titles, 57 satisfied my criteria for propaganda, while the lone translation from Uyghur into Chinese did not. So in this Chinese-Uyghur context, what the space of translation reflects and maintains is existing power

relations and mutual misgivings. It is not Iser's (1995) or Bhabha's (1994) or Wolf's (2000) counterhegemonic space that concludes in harmony; it is Tymoczko's (2003) space of ideological struggle.

### **3.4 Symbolic Power Complicated by the Ethnic Other**

Framing Chinese-Uyghur relations in (post)colonial terms allows for a quick grasp of the structural issues of power and domination between the two groups. It also readily exposes the gaps in current postcolonial translation theory regarding its interpretive scope (i.e. mainly European and concerned with former European colonies). Given this gap, I will bring in Bourdieu's theory of symbolic power and the genesis of "ethnicity" (1992, 220-228) as a concept that presupposes and feeds into the normalized desire for both colonial domination and colonial resistance. The reason for adding the dimension of symbolic power to the China-Xinjiang relationship is that the struggle between the Chinese and the Uyghurs is not simply a Marxist class struggle defined by a comparative lack of economic or material capital and means of production. This is why Fanon points out that "a Marxist analysis should always be slightly stretched when it comes to addressing the colonial issue" ([1961] 2004, 5).

If it were simply a class issue, then working class Chinese and working class Uyghurs, both belonging to the underprivileged economic class, would find grounds upon which to build solidarity. Yet the struggle is consistently not framed as a unified working class against the capitalist Chinese government, whether from the Chinese or Uyghur perspective. Rather, the domination of and resistance to a "ruling class" is defined along ethnic lines, or "race," for "[T]he ruling *species* is first and foremost the outsider from elsewhere, different from the indigenous population, the 'others'" (Fanon [1961] 2004, 5; emphasis added). And the struggle between "the outsider" and "the indigenous," this *difference*, is furthered by one group's

comparative lack of symbolic capital and means of symbolic production. What is symbolic is where “the stretch” in Marxism must be applied, an addition to the explanatory limitations of historical materialism in the colonial context.

In the instance of my research, the symbolic capital would be translations and the means of production would be publishing, or control over the publishing apparatus. By controlling the means to publication, one holds the power “of imposing a vision of the social world through principles of division” (Bourdieu 1992, 222). This production of “division” is the premise of power, since it becomes imperative that a difference is created between “us” and “them” to characterize one group’s superiority over another. An example of this in practice would be the previously mentioned struggle over historiography between the Chinese and the Uyghurs. This would also explain that translation, under the Chinese-Uyghur context, cannot function as a power equalizer or effective means of reaching “harmony” because the Chinese control the publishing apparatus—regardless of whether the publishing office is located in Xinjiang or in the Chinese mainland—and have invested interest in maintaining their domination as the superior ethnicity, which they have naturalized as a given under a historical ethnocentric construct of relations, legitimized throughout the dynasties within the all-assuming umbrella of “Confucianism.” The translations (i.e. propaganda), in fact, under this logic, are not meant to be read. Whether or not they are bought and consumed is beside the point (hence propaganda seen either languishing in storage or subject to non-commercial analytical review). This is not a capitalist commercial enterprise; it is an exercise in dominance, or struggle to counter it.

However, it is important to note that, in the Chinese-Uyghur context, Bourdieu’s theoretical formulation has its limitations as well. The context of Bourdieu’s theory presupposes an autonomous field of intellectual and artistic production and circulation, in which the value of

cultural or symbolic goods are measured against their commercial value as commodities. For example, “high” art might yield low commercial value in the short-term, but gain substantial returns in the long-term ([1977] 1993, 97); or the difference between the production of “pure” art versus “popular” art is that the first is seemingly disinterested in commercial success. It is a field that operates in the market context of capitalism, where artists and intellectuals “are also increasingly in a position to liberate their products from all external constraints, whether the moral censure and aesthetic programmes of a proselytizing church or the academic controls and directives of political power, inclined to regard art as an instrument of propaganda” ([1971] 1993, 113). While this is increasingly true for the rest of China, where the adage of the day is capitalism not communism, where subversion to the officially sanctioned narrative can be subtly practiced in the everyday circulation of texts, where the different types of translations between Chinese and other languages attest to Bourdieu’s theory; it is not yet the case for Xinjiang, which has yet to attain what Casanova calls “literary autonomy” via political independence ([1999] 2004, 193). In Xinjiang, the circulation of cultural goods, such as translations, is not defined by a commercial market but an imperialist, and many believe, colonial agenda. What mainly motivates translation in this context is neither “littérisation” (Casanova, [1999] 2004, 135) nor commercial success. It is political domination which can be interpreted under a colonial framework of power. Translation in this context becomes what Bourdieu refers to as “an instrument of propaganda” ([1971] 1993, 113).

### **3.5 The Colonial Debate**

Accusations of colonialism, however, are a highly politically charged matter. Even “Western” scholars—the categorical nemesis in Chinese state narrative—are divided on the issue. While Dru Gladney (1998) cites Michael Hechter’s (1975) theory of internal colonialism as a

highly relevant model in understanding “China’s colonial politics at the end of the twentieth century” (Gladney 1998, 2), Barry Sautman (2000, 253-60) cites official statistics to systematically refute, quite elaborately, the seven criteria of internal colonialism put forth by Stephen Williams (1977, 273-74), directly taking Gladney to task for suggesting that internal colonialism is the reason for China’s policies much like it was for the former Soviet Union’s (Sautman 2000, 262). Though the Gladney-Sautman debate is premised upon antithetical perspectives and therefore unlikely to reach reconciliation, it is significant to the extent that it was cited by Bovington, another prominent scholar in the Xinjiang studies field.

Bovington (2002) cites the debate in an endnote in his “The Not-So-Silent Majority,” explaining that he prefers “the more straightforward category of ‘colonialism’ unmodified” and that his approach to the issue is “phenomenological” in the sense that throughout his two-year fieldwork in the region, the Uyghurs he spoke to “experienced it as such” (69). For him, native popular perception trumps nonnative analysis. And this “native perception” is precisely what Max Weber identifies as the “subjective perceptions” of one group’s “specific sentiment of solidarity in the face of other groups” (cited in Hechter 1975, 60). This is what defines a group, conceptually speaking, as a “nation.” If we further apply Weber’s (1968) definitions of nation (54) and state (922), then the structure of Uyghur and Chinese relations would be that of a Uyghur nation vs. a Chinese state.

But whether or not China is de facto practicing colonialism within its borders, scholars from both sides of the debate seem to arrive at the consensus that there is indeed a structure of domination in place. Sautman (2000) rejects the application of internal colonialism (261), but cites “the legacies of domination that arise from China’s evolution as a conquest state” (Chen 1996) to explain the conditions of China’s minority areas, which would include Xinjiang;

Bovingdon (2002), though avoiding the term “colonialism” in the main content of his article, opens early on with a quote from Eric Teichman, “a former British consul in Beijing and an agent of the British colonial government in India” (40); this quote lays out the thesis of Teichman’s time: there are peoples “made to be ruled by others” (41). Bovingdon attributes this same attitude to the current Chinese Communist Party which “has gone to great lengths to dissociate itself from China’s imperial past (while retaining all the imperial lands),” but “has not entirely abandoned the tropes and strategies of empire” (41). Given these arguments, it is sufficient to say that the specter of colonialism—whether internal or not—is well and alive. For this reason, the use of a colonial-domination framework remains a theoretically apt option, and plausible, despite the terminological debate.

### **3. 6 Going Beyond the Debate**

Yet—and this is a big yet—“colonialism” seems too readily a value-laden accusation against a perceived autocratic and “communist” regime. It is the prevalent strain of political discourse in Translation Studies, no doubt (alongside the literary and the linguistic). But precisely because it is the one political strain, it is too easy a culprit. If we take a closer look at what we refer to as “colonialism,” we will see that it is the derivative product of a much more primitive conflict between what Anthony D. Smith (1988, 1991, 2010) would deem different “ethnies,” a conflict of power between different ethnic populations exacerbated by imperial expansion following the Age of “Discovery” in the 15th century and nation-formation since the 18th century and onwards. In other words, it is “colonialism” insofar as one ethnies attempts to supplant (i.e. “colonize”) another ethnies’s (economic, political, cultural) identity with its own ideologically-correct version, one that strengthens the conceptual unity and central power of the Empire. The debate over the “internal” kind of colonialism, and whether or not it constitutes

“true” colonialism thus becomes difficult and made particularly arduous by the mainstreaming of the idea of “colonialism” along the lines of color, race, and space, of which Said’s *Orientalism* (1979) would be one of the influential sources of this conception.

The wild African jungles, the mysterious Orient, the promised fertility of the Americas, their dark-skinned inhabitants and relationship with a distant European/White metropolis is what came to constitute the popular—and “proper”—representation of Colonialism. Thus “white-on-white” colonialism within the geographical boundaries of one particular state, such as in Hechter’s (1975) *Internal Colonialism*, prove conceptually difficult to mainstream, though theoretically persuasive. Adding to the difficulty of the application of “internal colonialism”—whereby which “peripheral communities are economically and politically subordinated to core ethnies, especially during and after industrialization”—is its failure “to explain the incidence and timing of recent ethno-nationalisms” that seem to “correlate with no specific type of socio-economic background” (Smith 1991, 125).

### **3.7 Conclusion**

It is not that colonialism cannot be practiced internally or, as characterized by Gonzalez (1965), “a phenomenon which is not only international but intranational,” where, after the retreat of foreign powers, “the notion of domination by natives over natives emerges” (27). It is that in the Chinese-Uyghur context the application of “colonialism” or “internal colonialism” or “intranational colonialism” as conceived with a white European antagonist who intruded, only in the last five hundred years or so, into the territories of India, Africa and Latin America, becomes arduous, and easily dismissible by the Chinese. The Chinese interaction with its peripheral regions dates back, on record, two thousand years. They did not “arrive” in Xinjiang like the Europeans in the “New” world, so they never “retreated” either. The Central States and what

constituted the “Chinese” empire shifted with each dynastic succession, accompanied by both aggression and assimilation; the geographical contours ebbed and flowed. The Mongols had a “Chinese” dynasty called “Yuan” (1271-1368). The Manchus had a “Chinese” dynasty called “Qing” (1644-1912). And these are just the more obvious examples. So who colonized whom? The Chinese can cite history and say that it was never a matter of colonization. It was always a matter of the “natural” expansion of the Chinese identity. Moreover, the criteria of “colonialism” increasingly demands that both racial/color discrimination and economic domination be *simultaneously* satisfied in order to qualify a given context as “colonial.” In the case of the Chinese-Uyghur context, we can see that the disagreement between scholars is often the result of pitting racial/color discrimination against economic domination, drawn up as an emotional argument against a rational one, personal testimonials against economic data proving the state’s investment in the region and its corresponding growth in GDP numbers. Once the qualitative and quantitative are at odds, the chance of reconciliation proves difficult, to say the least.

To sidestep this potential typological resistance to the term “(internal) colonialism” within China proper, but still retain the power structure that that term represents, I propose to turn to the ethnocentric forces behind the “nation-state,” which took the place of “empire.”

## CHAPTER 4

### ETHNO-NATIONALISM AND THE NATION-STATE

#### 4.1 Introduction

This chapter begins by using Anthony D. Smith's (1988) six dimensions of *ethnie* (14) to establish the Han and Uyghur as two distinct ethnic communities from which their relations can be further interpreted. This means that the tension and antagonistic displays of violence between the two can now be seen as the result of competing ethno-nationalisms, which arise from a primordial tendency in human relations to define one's "own" community against another's; it predates the acts of "colonialism" and formulations of "nationalism," which, relatively speaking in the history of humankind, are modern concepts that came with the technological advances that enabled exploration and conquest of new territories and the formation of new nation-states in contrast to "empire." Once differences along ethnic lines are established, the chapter further reinterprets the tenets of Confucianism, dating back to the Eastern Zhou period (770-255 BC), as enabling and supporting Han or "Chinese" ethnocentrism in its design, execution, and reinterpretation throughout the dynasties, until the Republic of China and on to the People's Republic of China, by scholars and state alike. It is demonstrated that the "translation" of Confucianism, fueled by an ethnocentric drive, into an ethnocentric ideology, continues to inform modern-day manifestations in ethnic policy; demarcation of space, security, and identity; kinship and outsider; and contribute to the divide and resentment evident in the surveys and studies on the two groups cited in this chapter.

## 4.2 Han and Uyghur: Two Distinct Ethnic Communities

The modern-day creation of the “nation-state,” convenient a terminology as it may seem, has already sewn within its fabric the seeds of tension between “nation” and “state” by virtue of the linguistic conflation tenuously held together by a hyphen. This hyphenated peace between “nation” and “state” stands undisturbed if there is but one kind of people that make up one state. But more often than not, as the history of inner conflict and bloodshed has demonstrated, a state may very well consist of more than one “people”; it can consist of multiple “nationalities,” each locked in the struggle to exert control over the state apparatus and the official narrative disseminated and maintained by that apparatus. Anthony D. Smith’s concept of “ethnie” or “ethnic community” (1988, 1991, 2010) and its engendering of a particular kind of “nationalism” proves persuasive to understand the source of tension between different communities—for this difference is not just constructed from biological or genetic “racial” differences manifested as the color of one’s skin or the shape of one’s nose, nor is it a simple demarcation along religious or linguistic lines. It is a difference that arises from the *self*-identification of a people under a common name, with a common set of “myths, memories, values and symbols” or “myth-symbol complex” (Smith 1988, 15). A particular ethnie perhaps stems from a genetically close-knit population, but has nonetheless grown to incorporate others who have come to identify, willingly or strategically, with the same narrative of creation. This narrative is then perpetuated, or “inculcated,” through the family and education system (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977), the latter of which is in the hands of the state.

The goal of “nation-building,” therefore, is not so much the success of bringing people together, but the successful control of the state apparatus to create and sustain an image perpetuated by the dominant ethnie, delegitimizing competing narratives along the way. This is

why, in explaining the kind of nationalism within China, I prefer Smith's concept of "ethnie" over Dikötter (1997) or Sautman's (1997) "race" or "racial nationalism." The word "race" in the English language is too saturated with the black/white color divide brought upon by America's slave holding history and European colonialism in the African and Latin American continents; it might be an apt lexical choice in understanding power relations in that context, but it is less so for this one, when "color" is not an evident marker of difference. "Racism's" pseudo-scientific past also distracts from examining the core issue of power relations among *people*, not "races." The concept of "ethnie," on the other hand, allows for "imagination" of belonging to a specific group of people when the color lines (i.e. biological features) are blurred as with China's case, a result of thousands of years of mixing among the population due to wars, trade, and changing (political) borders.

When applied to the China-Xinjiang case, Smith's six "dimensions of ethnie" (1988, 22-30), his definition of "nation" (1991, 14) and "nationalism" (73, 84) alongside his "dominant ethnie model" (110) of nation formation offer us a template to examine what the Chinese state deems the "Xinjiang Problem."

*The six dimensions of ethnie*, according to Smith (1988, 14) include:

- A collective name
- A common myth of descent
- A shared history
- A distinctive shared culture
- An association with a specific territory
- A sense of solidarity

A *nation* is “a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members” (14).

*Nationalism* is “an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’” (73); it is “the secular, modern equivalent of the pre-modern sacred myth of ethnic election” (84).

*The dominant ethnical model* is one in which “the culture of the new state’s core ethnic community becomes the main pillar of the new national political identity and community, especially where the culture in question can claim to be ‘historic’ and ‘living’ among the core community.... Though other cultures continue to flourish, the identity of the emerging political community is shaped by the historic culture of its dominant ethnic” (110).

The following fill-in-the-blanks exercise in Table 16 would give us a non-exhaustive comparison of the Chinese and the Uyghurs as constituting two separate ethnicities according to Smith’s six dimensions:<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> This is a highly structuralist approach, which disregards shifting variations within each of the two groups and the historical politics behind the constructions; it functions here for the purpose of demonstrating difference.

**Table 16: Six Dimensions of Ethnic, Chinese and Uyghur**

	Chinese	Uyghur
<b>Collective Name</b>	Han	Uyghur <sup>2</sup>
<b>Common Myth of Descent</b>	The Yellow Emperor	Relative to the modern history of the ethnic category named “Uyghur,” a unified, (relatively) uncontested history of the people has yet to emerge. But the continuous efforts to create one by Uyghur intellectuals to challenge Chinese historiography illustrates the desire for “difference.” <sup>3</sup>
<b>Shared History</b>	The orthodox <i>Twenty-Four Histories</i> covering the reigns of the Yellow Emperor (2698-2598 BC) to the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) (i.e. “5000 years” once the Qing dynasty from 1644-1912 is added). <sup>5</sup>	In lieu of orthodox markers of antiquity, and in illustration of opposition, are cultural heroes such as: Yakub Beg (1820-77), founder of the Kingdom of Kashgaria (1864-77); Abduhaliq Uighur (1901-33), the poet; and Abdurayim Otkur (1923-95), the scholar and novelist.  Also pertinent: many Uyghurs believe that they are descended from the Huns (Rudelson 1992, 218), the arch foreign nemesis of the Han dynasty (206 BC-220 AD), to which the Chinese ethnicity “Han” owes its designation. <sup>4</sup>
<b>Distinctive Shared Culture</b>	Confucianism	Islam <sup>6</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Though a historical name that can be dated back to the *New History of Tang* (1066 AD) compiled in the Song dynasty (《新唐書·列傳》第一百四十二上、下: 回鶻/回紇 *huihe*), the affixation of “Uyghur” to the current oasis-dwelling population in Xinjiang only gained widespread currency in the 1930s; it was accepted by the population themselves on the grounds that it defined and united them against other groups in the region (Kazakhs, Tungan/Hui, etc) who were also strategizing under Chinese rule (Rudelson 1992, 77-79).

<sup>3</sup> For details concerning the complexities of Uyghur and oasis identities and their formations, see Rudelson (1992, 1997). One instance of divergent attitudes is traced along the contours of the following three groups: intellectuals (“Turkic”), the peasantry (“Muslim”), merchants (“PRC/Zhonghua”).

<sup>4</sup> This is based on the Xiongnu-Hun hypothesis, where it is theorized that the Huns are descendants of or related to the Xiongnu in Chinese historical accounts; the Xiongnu were the Han dynasty’s foremost foreign enemy. The *New History of Tang* (1066 AD) places the Xiongnu as forbearers of the Huihe (Uyghur) in Chapter 142 of “Biographies” (《新唐書·列傳》第一百四十二上、下).

<sup>5</sup> 二十四史; since China split into the PRC and ROC, there is no minted “orthodox” 25th history of the Qing in the sense of the succeeding dynasty compiling the history of the former.

<sup>6</sup> Islamification of the region only began in the 10th century. Other existing religious influences included Shamanism, Manichaeism, Buddhism, Nestorian Christianity (Rudelson 1992; 56, 59-61).

<b>Specific Territorial Association</b>	Mainly within the borders inherited from the Qing Empire, with the exception of Outer Mongolia (now Mongolia), but historically revolved around the concept of “Central States” (中原 <i>zhongyuan</i> ) versus “Beyond the Wall/Pass” (關外 <i>guanwai</i> ).	Primarily located within Chinese administered Xinjiang, but strongly identified with oasis cities in and around the Tarim Basin, such as Turpan, Hami, Kashgar, and Khotan; also with the concept of “East Turkestan.”
<b>Sense of Solidarity</b>	To overthrow the Manchu-Qing dynasty, Tongmenghui, a predecessor to the Nationalist party, stated their objective was: “ <i>to expel the Tartar barbarians, revive Zhonghua [China], establish a Republic, and distribute land equally among the people.</i> ” <sup>7</sup>	In opposition to Han Chinese rule, the Uyghurs formed: the <i>East Turkestan Republic</i> (First ETR: 1933-34 and Second ETR: 1944-49); the <i>World Uyghur Congress</i> (2004-present; merger of East Turkestan National Congress and the World Uyghur Youth Congress).

Much of the content in the left column should have a familiar ring for the average Chinese of today. The right column, on the other hand, could just as well remain blank and we would not doubt that its content would vary greatly from the left. In fact, leaving the right column blank would almost seem more appropriate as it would effectively communicate, in dramatic terms, “difference.” But this is after all not an exhibition piece of protest art, so the listed content under “Uyghur” provides us with a textual basis to understand the differences between the two ethnies, which are in opposition enough to warrant that tension and conflict are likely the most natural of outcomes. To put the acuteness of the problem in perspective, we only need to supplant “Uyghur” with “Taiwanese.” The Chinese and Taiwanese have many dimensions in the list that crossover, constituting one ethnies, one may argue; it was only recent political history that drove a wedge between the two. But that was enough to generate cross-strait tension and mounting conflict, culminating in the 1996 missile crisis (Gellman 1998) and an increasingly surveyed independent Taiwanese identity at odds with China’s “Chinese” one (NCCU 2017). If modern politics alone can create such a divide within one historically constructed ethnies, imagine the chasm created by

<sup>7</sup> 1904年中國同盟會總章第二條: 本會以驅除韃虜, 恢復中華, 創立民國, 平均地權為宗旨。

multiple tensions between the Uyghur and Chinese, who have not, to say the least, been historically constructed as “one.”

Hong Kong serves as another example. Since the 1997 handover of the former British colony to the PRC, tension between the Chinese state and the people of Hong Kong—who cannot said to be lacking in any markers of “Chinese” ethnic or cultural identity—have only grown, to the point where its soccer fans can be witnessed booing the national anthem (Ramzy 2017) among other prominent protests (Wong 2017, Ramzy 2016, Bradsher 2014). If a strong shared ethnocultural identity between Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China is not enough to guarantee peaceful communication, it is not difficult to imagine how hard it would be for two parties who share next to nil or, to be more precise, when one’s identity is constructed on the premise to be different from the other.

If we continue to follow Smith’s definitions for “nation” and “nationalism,” the two respective ethnies—Chinese and Uyghur—are both poised for nationhood. Yet, as Smith’s “dominant ethnies model” suggests, only one may emerge the winner: the Chinese. Though it may seem like a game of winner-takes-all, victory by one ethnie by no means erases the aspirations of the other, which continues in the form of nationalism. To be fair, both sides must harness and practice different degrees of nationalism or, more specifically, “ethno-nationalism” (Connor 1994), for political gain. But the winning side’s particular brand of ethno-nationalism is afforded the right to transform itself into an institutionalized “state patriotism” (ibid), while the losing party’s is relegated, at best, to the status of cultural artifact in the service of “multiculturalism” or, at worst, cast as the illegitimate product of “secessionist” or “separatist” agitators/criminals/terrorists.

The concepts of ethno-nationalism and state patriotism are Connor's (1994). However, Connor draws a distinction between the two, maintaining that different ethno-nationalisms can co-exist under one state patriotism; the two should not be confused (i.e. Han Chinese ethno-nationalism is not the same as Chinese patriotism and both can co-exist alongside each other). I, on the other hand, would like to argue that in terms of Smith's dominant ethnic model, ethno-nationalism is conflated with state patriotism by the *ethnie in power* and offered as the only legitimate model of "nationalism" (i.e. Chinese patriotism is the institutionalized Han Chinese ethno-nationalism, so Uyghur ethno-nationalism, in the name of "patriotism," must be extinguished.)

Because of its cornered position, the underdog's breed of ethno-nationalism often acquires a more desperate, vehement, and thus violent overtone, which gives the dominant ethnic in power a legitimate excuse for equal, or even greater, violent suppression in the name of (state) patriotism. Applied in China's case, this would mean that Chinese patriotism is an institutionalized Han Chinese ethno-nationalism with a proclivity to extinguish Uyghur nationalism, or at least play it down to the extent of a cultural stereotype (i.e. "evil separatist" or "Uyghur beauty") that would justify either the state's interventions in Xinjiang's affairs or serve in favor of its multiculturalism-tourism propaganda. This patriotism finds expression in the fervent Chinese student protests, both domestic and overseas, over Western news coverage on the interruptions of the 2008 Olympic torch relay on behalf of the Tibetan cause. Wang (2008) attributes the origins of this display of patriotism to the Patriotic Education Campaign initiated in 1991. He characterizes it as "a nationwide mobilization effort targeted mainly at Chinese youth" (784). Here the implicit identity of "Chinese" is "Han" given the juxtaposition with "Tibetan," the minority ethnicity most popularly recognized as being oppressed by China. Chinese

“patriotism” is therefore the only legitimate kind of nationalism, one reserved for Han ethno-nationalism.

The patriotic education campaign is also further characterized by “a new ‘victimization narrative,’ which blames ‘the West’ for China’s suffering” (Wang 2008, 784)—specifically, “the 100 years of humiliation” from the mid-nineteenth to mid-twentieth century. The campaign was a massive effort to correct course and curtail the confidence crisis the Chinese Communist Party faced in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen pro-democracy movement and amid the worldwide disintegration of communist regimes. According to Zhao (1998), two prominent themes stood out in the campaign: “Chinese tradition and history” and “national unity and territorial integrity” (296). But they stood out not as stand-alone characteristics, but ones in contrast to “the West.” In describing China’s tradition and history: “Special emphasis was given to the Chinese national development process characterized by its unceasing efforts to improve itself and to struggle against *foreign* aggression and oppression after repeated setbacks” (296; emphasis added). In regards to national unity and territorial integrity, “the Communist government took every opportunity to instigate nationalist resentment against *foreign* pressures” (297; emphasis added). Everything from Tiananmen, to the failed bid of the 2000 Olympics, the detection of illegal drugs in Chinese athletes, the debate on China’s Most Favored Nation trade status, Taiwan’s President Lee visiting the US, and Hong Kong residents calling for more democracy were all construed as Western or foreign conspiracies to undermine China or interfere with its domestic affairs (297). Consequently, as the patriotic education movement is closely linked to (outward-looking) national humiliation by the West or the “ethnic foreigner” embodied by Japanese aggression, and thus more of a strategy to solidify the Party-State’s legitimacy

against Western narratives of democracy,<sup>8</sup> the explanatory power of the patriotic education movement in relation to domestic interethnic relations between the Han and Uyghur (inward-looking) in connection with intra-national translations and violence in my study is more limited, though no doubt potent in explaining rising hostility toward Western “interference” with domestic affairs. As such the complications of “nationalism” will be further explored rather than the patriotic movement itself.

### 4.3 Ethno-Nationalism Rather than Chinese Nationalism

It is not surprising that China has been grappling with issues of nationalism, ethnic tension, and ethnic violence within its borders, though as a case study it is notably absent from much of the classic texts on the typologies of nationalism under the discipline of political philosophy, which frequently discusses in great detail the Ottoman and Habsburg reigns, and subsequent Russian, French, and British empires. Given the European origins of what comprises the bulk (if not all) of modern academic disciplines, the relegation of the study of “China” to “Sinology” or “Asian Studies,” or other relatively congenial cultural-regional, passive-descriptive category is, in a (post)colonial sense, of “world order” nature, understandable.

But the effect of primarily filing it under “area” studies or a cultural category makes it a museum piece, encased in glass, static, to be studied for its “uniqueness” (i.e. the neatly sealed and packaged history, language, politics, and economy of that “area”—and whatever “culture” is); it allows China to elude the bare bones scrutiny and interdisciplinary theoretical interrogation that would link its impressive literary and cultural productions to its equally formidable political practices and machinations, comparable on a structural and conceptual level to other practices

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<sup>8</sup> The General Outline (1991) stressed that “history education reform” is China’s fundamental strategy to “defend against the *‘peaceful evolution’ plot of international hostile powers* and is the most important mission for all schools”(Wang 2008, 790; emphasis added).

and machinations, and not defined by descriptive, linear details of its processes. Its civilization is not simply “impressive” or “superior” as the translation of Chinese thought by the Jesuits would seem to suggest to the European thinker.<sup>9</sup> The Jesuits were not colonial subjects who became revolutionary Marxists and overthrew a regime. If they were, they would have seen menace behind all that magnificence and “classical” Chinese.

“China” did not just happen after the Cold War. It is not just a victim of its Cultural Revolution, reduced to accounts of suffering in novels and movies; or a magnificent opulent empire with flying martial artists and wise bearded sages; or a recently turned authoritarian state because of Communist takeover. Aside from being a producer of culture in the form of literature and paintings and hand embroidered silk kerchiefs, and a go-to alternative for new age philosophy, it is, and has always been, a political machine very much capable of wielding “culture” in justification of war, annexation, and discrimination, well before it became “Communist China.”

But the study of Chinese nationalism, as studied in Western scholarship, in relation to the fairly modern notions of “nation” and “nation-state,” exhibits this tendency to explain and offer predictions on China primarily based on its developments to attain “modernity” and becoming a “state” actor in a Western construct of international systems—from the late years of imperial Qing, to Western aggression, Japanese aggression, the Civil War between the CCP and KMT (buttressed by Soviet and American ideologies, culminating in the Cold War), up to the economic reforms of the 1990s. To do so is understandable, because it is only natural that modern discourse adopt the modern nation-state view of an entity called “China,” exhibiting a

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<sup>9</sup> The European thinker, if Said’s (1979) *Orientalism* is of any indication, operates within the framework of exoticism. What is deemed “beautiful” and “superior” is a reflection of a longing for something that must be “better” than the stagnation and ignorance “I” see before me—a promised higher civilization from afar—like the yearnings of Chinese intellectuals for “democracy” (because exoticism works both ways).

kind of “Chinese” nationalism. Even when differing viewpoints surface among scholars concerning the kinds of nationalism China exhibits, they are largely, implicitly referring to, or implying, a Chinese nationalism girded by Han-driven state interests, with the presumed, or most prominent, actor being “Communist” China—a default position that obscures ethnic difference and tension that have run throughout the history of Chinese dynasties, both alien and Han. Moreover, equally understandable, is that the focal concern is most often how Chinese nationalism underlines China’s interaction with the outside world, the foreign—such as, in particular, anti-Japanese sentiments—or, in general, “the West”; or how it contrasts, on a nation-to-nations basis, with nationalism exhibited by other nations; not so much how it informs the dynamics of domestic, interethnic relations. An example of this positioning can be seen in Wenfang Tang and Benjamin Darr’s (2012) survey on “Chinese nationalism” based on a “2008 China Survey” carried out jointly by the College of Liberal Arts at Texas A&M University and the Research Center for Contemporary China (RCCC) at Peking University.

This was a survey carried out in response to the 2003 International Social Survey Programme’s (ISSP) National Identity Survey on 35 countries that “for some reason [it] missed China” (814). The authors state that they focus on “public” nationalism or “mass” nationalism (814). The fact that their statistics-oriented analysis concludes that “[I]nterestingly, the linguistic and religious minorities such as the Huis, the Manchus, the Uyghurs, and the Mongols show *just as high levels* of nationalism as the Han majority” (819; emphasis added) points to the inadequacy of “China” or “Chinese” centered analysis in investigating subnational interethnic relations—most notably with the inclusion of Uyghurs among Huis, Manchus, and Mongols as

exhibiting “high levels” of nationalism<sup>10</sup>—as it conspicuously goes against the findings of grievance and tension by scholars focusing on the region and its people, not to mention journalistic reports that turn up evidence of violent clashes leading up to the years of the survey and, most recently, of forced patriotism in the form of mass re-education camps.<sup>11</sup> Even the authors qualified this conclusion with “interestingly”; that is telling, because it points to a body of knowledge and experiences that would not support it.

Pointedly, the critical work in Jonathan Unger’s ([1996] 2015) excellent collection under the title *Chinese Nationalism*, published at the height of the PRCs market reforms and opening-up to the West, nods to the inadequacy of prevalent Western scholarship on Chinese nationalism. This is very similar to the inadequacy of applying postcolonial scholarship, or the notion of “colonialism,” to my specific study, which I have explained in the third chapter. Unger points out in his introduction to *Chinese Nationalism*:

Notwithstanding this, when Ernest Gellner wrote that ‘It is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way round, and when Eric Hobsbawm wrote ‘nationalism comes before nations,’ their quips did not ring entirely true for China. Unlike much of Europe, China was not carved out of a welter of remnant feudal suzerainties and city-states under the impetus of 19th-century nationalist romanticism (it should be recalled that Italy and Germany did not become nation-states until 1870-71). So, too, unlike the great bulk of the present day nations of the Third World, China was not originally cobbled together by a Western colonial power out of a congeries of disparate peoples. ([1996] 2015, xii)

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<sup>10</sup> For historical reasons, the Huis and Manchus are highly sinicized in comparison to Uyghurs; the Mongols have succeeded in creating a national identity with the creation of the sovereign state of the Mongolian People’s Republic, thus serving as an outlet for ethnic Mongolian nationalism, even if within Chinese borders, the Mongols of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region continue to be subsumed under a Chinese nationality. The quantitative category of “ethnic” minority in this survey obscures this very qualitative difference that would necessarily question the findings.

<sup>11</sup> See Chris Buckley, September 8, 2018, for the *New York Times*: “China is Detaining Muslims in Vast Numbers. The Goal: Transformation”; Stephanie Nebehay, August 10, 2018, for *Reuters*: “U.N. Says It Has Credible Reports that China Holds Million of Uighurs in Secret Camps.” The scholarly community is equally engaged as witnessed in the roundtable discussion on “The Mass ‘Re-education’ Camps in China’s Xinjiang” held at Cornell University on September 10, 2018. [http://events.cornell.edu/event/the\\_mass\\_re-education\\_camps\\_in\\_chinas\\_xinjiang\\_an\\_open\\_roundtable\\_discussion](http://events.cornell.edu/event/the_mass_re-education_camps_in_chinas_xinjiang_an_open_roundtable_discussion).

There is a historical context that complicates the definition and understanding of Chinese nationalism as “nationalism.” When, in Unger’s volume, James Townsend (“Chinese Nationalism,” 1-30) provides a critical commentary on the “culturalism-to-nationalism” thesis,<sup>12</sup> deliberating its strengths and weaknesses, the complex picture that emerges of China is that while culturalism, “as an ideology of empire, justifying Chinese rule over non-Chinese peoples as well as non-Chinese rule over the Chinese [as long as ‘universal’ cultural practices were followed],” seems to allow for a transition into modern “state nationalism” in which theoretically all ethnicities equally participate, it is nonetheless an ideology that “emphasized and extolled *Han* ethnicity” (15; emphasis added). As such, a historical culturalism can only readily shift into a modern state nationalism framed by Han ethnic nationalism. Thus is sewn the tension between the (Han) state and (non-Han) ethnicity, and emerges the contradictory and paradoxical behavior exhibited in the Chinese state’s shifting efforts to unify its people and stabilize its rule.

Prasenjit Duara (1996) applies a post-modernist framework in an attempt to explain and give equal weight to the contesting narratives of Chinese nationalism (“De-Constructing the Chinese Nation,” 31-55) to show that “what we call nationalism is more appropriately a relationship between a constantly changing Self and Other, rather than a pristine subject gathering self-awareness in a manner similar to the evolution of a species” (39). But even so, the most prominent centrifugal and centripetal forces that prevent the formation of this “pristine subject” and its supposed destined evolutionary end emerge, again, as the “grand narrative of rule which eschewed, or rather encompassed at a higher level, both *ethnic exclusivism* and *cultural universalism* as principles defining Chinese community,” an attempt to “harmonize ‘race’

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<sup>12</sup> Townsend traces its influence to James Harrison (1969), who identified the Chinese “self-image as a product of “culturalism” rather than “nationalism” (2), but primarily to Joseph Levenson (1959; 1968) who contends that culturalism—loyalty to a Confucian “culture” not “state”—gave way to nationalism as China struggled to understand the crumbling of cultural superiority and disintegration of empire in the face of foreign challenge and aggression (3).

and culture with the emperorship as its integrating centre” (51; emphasis added). This brings us back to Townsend and the crux of the paradox. By attempting to reconcile ethnic nationalism with culturalism, “the grand narrative” effectively inscribes into “Chinese” nationalism the very destabilizing forces modern “nationalism” is supposed to stamp out. Duara demonstrates how these forces play out in the multiplicity of readings of “Confucianism” amongst the struggle between the elite, such as Kang Youwei (cosmopolitanism) and Zhang Binglin (ethnocentrism); how they underpin the republican revolutionaries’ racially charged strive for a Han nation-state and Sun Yat-sen’s alternating racist call to rise against the Manchus and later reversal to the formulation of a “Chinese” nation-state consisting of five “races” (Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui, Tibetan). This tension, left within the historical sinosphere of Confucianism, translates into the rise and fall of Han-Alien dynasties, but once confronted with the Westphalian system of nation-states and compelled to define itself along these “modern” (territorial) terms, the Chinese “nation”—the multiple “nationalities” it is comprised of—is bound to exhibit an incoherent, paradoxical display of an attempt at “unity.”

For this reason, this study does not focus on development of Chinese nationalism per se, its origins or variations according to differing scholarship, or related patriotic movements, though there exists a wealth of informative literature on these subjects. Since my study specifically looks Han-Uyghur ethnic relations in support of a thesis on “translation,” I have chosen to single out the ethnic component in nationalism and look at “ethno”-nationalism, citing scholarship (Anderson [1983] 2006; Gellner 1994; Smith 1988, 1991, 2010) that could most directly function as a conceptual springboard to trace its *pre*-modern origins and shifting manifestations under guises not necessarily recognized under the concept of “nationalism.” The central thesis is to demonstrate how “translation,” under Translation Studies, is the mechanism that allows

“ethnocentrism”— most conveniently conveyed as “ethno-nationalism” in modern political terms—to be expressed (that is, “translated”) under seemingly opposing ideologies of Communism and Capitalism, Confucianism and Marxism, and contrasting eras of closed-door policy and outward engagement. Because the need to sample a variation of texts to support my interdisciplinary approach within the limited scope of a PhD thesis, including under domains labeled as “history” or “literature” or “philosophy,” as well as public discourse in the media (“news” and “pop” culture), the citations on nationalism may seem restricted in comparison to less interdisciplinary investigations where the concept surfaces. In this regard, my approach is akin to that of Richard Madsen (1993), whom John Fitzgerald (1996) cites as calling for “a new kind of political sociology more sensitive to models of community consciousness outside of the statist framework—in contests over written histories, in commemorative ceremonies, opera and literature, and in the immense storehouse of collective memory, to serve as a corrective to the state orientation of much political scholarship” (83) in order to understand the history of China, “preserved not in records of state but in immense repositories of cultural memory that is captured in story and song, festival and ritual, street news and, today, on television and film” (ibid).

In other words, I limit the citations to allow me enough to define the relationship between the two groups in modern political terms to give interpretation to the mirroring relationship between translated propaganda and violence; but primarily as a conceptual starting point, with room to link this relationship to a larger historical thread that is not just found within the current territorial boundaries of the PRC or the definition(s) of “nationalism.” In fact, if we applied Lucian Pye’s (1996) definition that nationalism “should not be confused with tribalism, ethnicity, or shared cultural, religious and linguistic identities” because “nationalism involves only those sentiments and attitudes basic to *orientations toward* the nation-state, [while] frequently these

other primordial identities *work against* the creation of a unifying sense of nationalism” (87; emphasis added), then what is called Uyghur ethno-nationalism or Han ethno-nationalism would not fall neatly under the realm of Chinese nationalism or Chinese patriotism, because they work against the unification of a Chinese state. Driving in this point in China’s case, Pye asserts that because nationalism is a “modern” sentiment “[H]ence the traditional Chinese ‘Middle Kingdom Complex’ or the concept of Han chauvinism should not be treated as the same thing as Chinese nationalism” (1996, 88). Hence the logic to only treat “nationalism” as a springboard and not the prime point of investigation here, because the ‘Middle Kingdom Complex’ or “Han chauvinism” is actually what is in focus in my study.

My attempt is rather to make sense of the relationship between the Han and its Other drawing from a concept of “Chinese” that is not necessarily confined within the modern Chinese state, but can be seen as coursing through the “four different Chinese nations” that Townsend (1996, 28) identifies in calling for a more complex approach to Chinese nationalism: the one under official state nationalism, of Han and non-Han alike; the second which is the political reality of the PRC’s Han nation; the third, the nation-state both the ROC and PRC conceptualize as consisting of Mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan;<sup>13</sup> and the fourth, the nation of overseas Chinese who identify with a cultural identity of Chineseness. The Chinese attempt to encompass (or to overcome) these political minefields and boundaries of identity is often expressed through the usage of 華 (hua) instead of 中國 (zhongguo) to characterize the multitude of “Chinese” people, languages, cultures and identities. For example: 華語 (huayu) for Chinese

<sup>13</sup> The political regime has switched hands in Taiwan since Townsend’s 1996 article; the definition of ROC is currently severely contested and no longer upheld by Chiang Kai-shek’s once ruling Nationalist party. Hong Kong is also experiencing a shift into “nativism” in protests against the PRC’s increasing forceful hand in defining local freedoms and rights supposedly guaranteed under the Basic Law after the handover in 1997. The expulsion of the *Financial Times* journalist, Victor Mallet, after he hosted a talk with Andy Chan at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club, is a case in point (Ramzy 2018). Chan is the founder of the Hong Kong National Party in favor of Hong Kong independence.

language; 華人 (huaren) for Chinese people; 華裔 (huayi) for people of Chinese descent; 中華 (zhonghua) for “Chinese/China” which features in both the official Chinese state titles of the PRC (中华人民共和国; zhonghua renmin gongheguo) and ROC (中華民國; zhonghua minguo).

#### 4.4 The Juncture Where Old Meets New

The nationalism that modern China exhibits is firmly rooted in history before 1949; and “New China” has some remarkable similarities with the old. So perhaps it is apt to start at the junction where the old became new. Though it cannot be said that there is one singular cause for ethnic tension within China, Communist China’s fervent belief in Marxism as a gateway into modernity and its transformation into state ideology is an accessible place to begin the inquiry.

As Ernest Gellner (1994) points out, in answering the question “What exactly are the units or sub-units in terms of which the structural transformations of human society are to be characterized?” Marxism “notoriously” chooses class over nation (2). Though China incessantly insists that “Western” democracy is an ill fit for the country’s “unique” situation, it did not seem to hesitate to apply the equally “Western” Communist Manifesto’s declaration that “All history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles” as the motivating ideology behind the Cultural Revolution (1966-76). Gellner (1994) does not believe that Marx and Engels were categorically wrong when they chose classes over nations as the engines of historical change; they were quite reasonable in doing so given the then context of the industrial revolution (8-9). But the error that Marxism (Communism) and Western liberal thought (Democracy) both committed was the underestimation of “the political vigour of nationalism,” which makes them equally unfit to effectively address “a marked feature of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries”: “the political salience of ethnic feeling” (34).

Gellner's (1994) definition of "ethnicity," compared to Smith's, seems like a rather matter-of-fact designation when he talks about it being "simply the name for the condition which prevails when many of these boundaries [of food, speech, attire, dance, etc.] converge and overlap, so that boundaries of conversation, easy commensality, shared pastimes, etc., are the same, and when the community of people delimited by these boundaries is endowed with an ethnonym, and is suffused with powerful feelings" (35). However general this description may seem, Gellner nonetheless pinpoints the driving force behind nationalism: *feelings*, and those will never be of the mild and gentle kind. These "powerful feelings" Gellner (1994) speaks of turn into nationalism when a particular ethnic group "is not merely acutely conscious of its own existence, but also imbued with the conviction that the ethnic boundary ought also to be a political one. The requirement is that...above all, the rulers within that [political] unit should be of the same ethnicity as the ruled" (35). This aptly characterizes the situation within Xinjiang and within Han China, when "foreigners, at any rate in large numbers, are unwelcome in the political unit, and quite particularly unwelcome as rulers" (35).

Even if the ethnic component of China's total number of party cadres has increased from "about 10,000 in 1950 to almost 3 million in 2007" (Li 2008, 5), it has been argued that the vast majority maintain lower-level or inconsequential positions (Bovingdon 2004a, 28-30); or if they do assume leadership positions, they would not be effective in maintaining stability in ethnic minority regions because although better educated than previous non-Han minorities of the Mao-era or earlier, they have not been subject to training in "institutes for nationalities or in the Party schools" (Zang 1998, 127). The fact also remains that "none of the party secretary posts in any of the five provincial-level minority autonomous regions are currently [2008] held by an ethnic minority leader" (Li 2008, 2). The party secretary, not the governor, is the ultimate decision-

maker. In Xinjiang's case, no example is more conspicuous than Wang Lequn, the hardline party secretary who presided over the region during two of its most notorious incidents of unrest (1997 and 2009). He held the position from 1995-2010, "far exceed[ing] the 10-year term limit regulated by the Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party" (Li 2008, 2)—and arguably far exceeding the "welcome" of the Uyghur population he was granted the mandate to rule by the Han Chinese party in power. Effectively, in Gellner's terms, the Han Chinese are not about to allow the Uyghurs in consequential positions; nor are the Uyghurs going to readily embrace the Han party secretary.

There is a general tendency, when talking about issues of ethnicity and nationalism, to focus on the "ethnic" side, meaning the minority side composed of people who are darker skinned, less industrialized, "wild," who cannot readily converse in the chosen state vernacular, who have considerable more obstacles to overcome before they can meaningfully participate in the capitalist market. "We"—the ones dictating the terms—are quick to identify the ethno-nationalism of this or that minority, their separatist tendencies and assertions of difference. We are prone to forget that "tension" cannot be created by a party of one, but at least warrant two, if not more. The forgetfulness is the result of our own ethno-centralism. We forget that our own ethno-nationalism is just as much to blame and unequivocally part of the equation. Because "Han" is the de facto ethnicity in majority and in power, it disproportionately drives the tension within Xinjiang—the cyclical recurrence of violence we see in the data—and not the other way around, as it may superficially seem when one refers to "ethno"-nationalism. It is thus from this vantage point I would like to draw attention to the enduring ethno-nationalism of "China," the nation behind the state, and, by proxy, the enduring "salience of ethnic feeling" in *the Chinese*. Though it could be argued that not all nation-states are formed against the backdrop of ethnic solidarity, I

would like to make the case that the urge to do so is always there, primordial and latent in the national psyche; it is suppressed by a theory of human ethics and moral deliberation, but easily awakened and stirred in times of competition, confrontation, and conflict.

#### 4.5 The Genesis of Ethno-Nationalism

*In Of Cannibals:*

I think there is nothing barbarous and savage in the New World, from what I have been told, except that each man calls barbarism whatever is not his own practice; for indeed it seems *we* have no other test of truth and reason than the example and pattern of the opinions and customs of the country we live in (emphasis added).

This was Michel de Montaigne in 1580. And so we are apt to think that only the West practices systemic Orientalism, irrespective of individual and personal philosophical conclusions drawn, from the very West, like Montaigne's, pointing to its (ir)rationality and origins. Less popularized is the same instinct of the "Orientals" themselves, which is highlighted in Benedict Anderson's ([1983] 2006) account of Japan's nation-forming context, as one of three factors that were conducive to forming the "Japan" we now recognize: "Third, *the penetration of the barbarians* was abrupt, massive, and menacing enough for most elements of the politically-aware population to rally behind a program of self-defence conceived in the new national terms" (96; emphasis added). The other two factors were Japan's "ethnocultural homogeneity" (95) and "the unique antiquity of the imperial house" and "its emblematic 'Japanese-ness'" (96).

"Barbarians" is not Anderson's self-imposed term. It is what the Japanese used to identify the Westerners bent on gaining access to its ports and markets in the 19th century. "*Sonnō Jōi*" (Revere the Sovereign, Expel the Barbarians) was the rallying call (94; Anderson's translation),

which is, neither curiously nor coincidentally, one and the same as “*Zunwang Rangyi*,”<sup>14</sup> a line of thought appropriated from *The Commentary of Gongyang on the Spring and Autumn Annals*<sup>15</sup> (651 BC), a tenet explication of Confucianism,<sup>16</sup> applied in the Chinese context of a fractured Zhou dynasty (1046-256 BC) into a legion of feuding states, each claiming and clamoring for legitimacy in the dynastic “Chinese” lineage. What is “Chinese” only has meaning insofar as the Barbarians exist to contrast and threaten it. The “ethnocultural homogeneity” and “unique antiquity” of the Chinese throne must be preserved, a lesson the Japanese dutifully took to heart from Confucianism. Note that this was long before the term “Han” or “Han Chinese” came into currency, the Han dynasty itself having not been founded until 206 BC. Also note that these so-called barbarians in the *Spring and Autumn* context were not white Europeans.

How long has this superiority of the Chinese-before-Han endured? Fast forward to 2016, watch Ali Wong, a Chinese-Vietnamese-American comedian, quip, in *Baby Cobra*, her breakthrough Netflix stand-up comedy special:

But I think that for marriage, it can be nice to be with somebody of your own race. The advantage is that you get to go home... and be racist together. You get to say whatever you like! You don't gotta explain shit. My husband [is] half-Filipino, half-Japanese. I'm half-Chinese and half-Vietnamese. *And we spend 100 percent of our time shitting on Korean people.* It's... amazing. (12'00"; emphasis added)

[...]

I think my husband and I have a huge unspoken understanding, uh, between each other, because he's half-Filipino and half-Japanese and I'm half-Chinese and half-Vietnamese. So, we're both half-*fancy Asian*...and half-*jungle Asian*. Yeah! You

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<sup>14</sup> 尊王攘夷 *zunwang rangyi*

<sup>15</sup> 《春秋公羊傳》 *chunqiu gongyang zhuan*

<sup>16</sup> The *Spring and Autumn Annals* is one of the Five Classics of Confucianism, part of its Four Books and Five Classics repertoire (四書五經 *sishu wujing*). The *Commentary of Gongyang*, is one of the three classic commentaries on the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, alongside the *Commentary of Zuo* (左傳 *zuozhuan*) and *Commentary of Guliang* (穀梁 *guliang*).

guys know the difference. *The fancy Asians are the Chinese, the Japanese. They get to do fancy things like host Olympics. Jungle Asians host diseases.* It's... It's different. (14'30"; emphasis added)

To read Wong's words on paper, contained within the frames of academic austerity, does not do her material justice. The resonance of the "truth" she tells—like all good comics who see through the etiquette and into our deepest, darkest secrets—can be heard in the roaring laughter from the live audience, and from my own (fancy Asian) hand smacking the table where my laptop is perched streaming the show. Girl nailed it. Wong's comedic breakthrough not only brought her a profile article in the *New Yorker* (Levy 2016), it also brings to light the interethnic tension and "racial" pecking order in the Asian universe, where there is no need to label "Chinese" with "Han" to know "who you are" and "aren't."

From Montaigne's "barbarians" to Wong's "Jungle Asians"; from fancy China to fancy Japan; "we" know *who you are* and *where you belong*; millennia has not changed *Sonnō Jōi* or *Zunwang Rangyi*. The popular perception and interpretation of "Chinese" and the centrality of that position—casting down upon its "jungle" neighbors—is evidenced in the deafness of the laughter. The appropriation of orthodox Confucianism in neighboring Japan and Korea all but ensured that both would rival China in their claims for racial distinction and cultural superiority. Hilarity ensues. The consequences of racism and discrimination are no laughing matter, of course; but the laughing matter pierces through the façade of equality the Chinese state would otherwise like its inhabitants (and outsiders) to believe, by qualifying Chinese with "Han," as if a modern prefix could erase the thousands-year-old implied Han-centrality of the word and concept of "Chinese"; as if all of a sudden the playing field could be leveled with players called Han-Chinese, Tibetan-Chinese, Uyghur-Chinese, Mongolian-Chinese. If "Han" should be affixed onto anything to make things clear, then the self-entitled privilege that this ethnic group

enjoys against others should be called “Han privilege,” in the fashion of “white privilege.” It is so much a given that it is invisible to the bearer and needs to be called out.

Ultimately, Anderson’s imagined community of different nationalities under one nationalism is Romantic; not Marxist, Communist, racist, or expansionist. He is somewhat dismayed that many “progressive, cosmopolitan intellectuals” look upon nationalism as “near-pathological” in its hatred of the Other (Anderson [1983] 2006, 141). He is optimistic even in the face of the policy traits of official nationalism—compulsory state-controlled primary education, state-organized propaganda, official rewriting of history, militarism (101)—that nationalism, despite its nastier side-effects, also inspires self-sacrifice for the country because “the great wars of this century are extraordinary not so much in the unprecedented scale on which they permitted people to kill, as in the colossal numbers persuaded to lay down their lives” (144). The logic goes: one might hate the colonial ruler, but one loves thy nation. Poetry, hymns, and songs ensue to sing our love for this land and its people; our love for “us” (141-43). And these are written and sung in the “language-of-state,” that vernacular only made possible and accessible to the masses by nationalism.

For Anderson, the nation is “conceived in language, not in blood” and one could be “invited into” the imagined community, in a process called “naturalization” (145). But if one is familiar with the current debate and bitter struggle over immigration and refugees in the European and North American continents in the name of protecting “national” interests, one is well aware that obtaining a visa is hard enough, let alone “naturalization.” The Asian countries of China and Japan are hardly more inviting when it comes to becoming a Chinese or Japanese national. Citing 2013 OECD statistics, the Economist (2016b) points out that even Japan, “better known for hostility to immigration, naturalises around 10,000 new citizens each year,” a number

far beyond China's, which, according to its 2010 census "has only 1,448 naturalised Chinese in total."

That is why while Anderson, in his *Imagined Communities* (1983), traces the origins of nationalism to the rise of print capitalism in the 1500s and modernity in general, and heavily emphasizes the 19th and 20th century imperial and colonial/expansionist narratives and counter-narratives as the contexts of its modern conception, I would like to point out that this seemingly dual nature of nationalism—on the one hand being accused of perpetuating racism and hatred, and on the other, lauded for instilling a common sense of pride and patriotism—is more persuasively traced further back to "ethnie." *This* imagined community predates the nation, and predates *Zunwang Rangyi*, the call to expel the barbarians in what was not yet known as "China" in 651 BC. It includes language, no doubt, but it is distilled down to the belief in the idea of "blood," which cannot be imagined. If it could be imagined then chieftains and emperors alike would not be marrying off their daughters and princesses to appease their (foreign) enemies, to produce heirs and blood ties to turn rivals into alliances, to incorporate territory and maintain the legitimacy of their reigns; they wouldn't be forbidding intermarriage, that contamination of blood which delegitimizes, which produces "bastards"—except for cases where the Other is willing to convert. Perhaps, it is surmised, under the same God, by His grace, your soul can be saved and your person spared.

Modern nationalism, an evolutionary product of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, with liberal, progressive notions of brotherhood and equality and common humanity irrespective of God and blood, cannot divorce itself from its genetic ancestry. And it is precisely the call for nationalism that stokes the blood gene to life and invites the conflation of ethnie and nation. Racism and anti-Semitism may have not derived from nationalism as Anderson argues (148), but

they derived from *ethno*-nationalism or, rather, the primordial impulse that permits what we call “nationalism” to effectively function as it does. Genocide, ethnic-cleansing, Nazism—call it what you will—the anti-immigration/anti-black/anti-Muslim/anti-Semitic predominantly “white” population that elected Trump to “Make American Great Again” are testimonies to this.

If there is indeed imagination in nationalism, it is one that allows the nation’s inhabitants to imagine they are of the same blood when they are not—to believe in make-believe. Because—is there really only one kind of “white”? And we all just so happen to be part of it? No, of course not. So blood is where the imagination lies, and thus the nation is conceived. Or, in less poetic terms: “the emergence of the nation-state allowed perpetrator groups to conceive of themselves as a unitary body within defined geographical limits whose ideal state was one of ‘racial’ homogeneity” (Savage 2007, 405). Those who are perceived to not be of this “body,” literally and figuratively, provided grounds for surgical removal, otherwise known as “genocide” (405). We will drain your blood to preserve our own. There is little wonder, then, that the Chinese nation should have 91.6% of its population imagining itself to be “Han” (2010 census), a constructed category, or “invention,” to facilitate revolution and inspire nationalism as China sought to reinvent itself as a modern nation-state at the turn of the twentieth century (Chow 1997; Dikötter 1996; Sautman 1997).

When identification is made—i.e. when the boundaries of imagination cease to expand—lines are drawn. Regardless of what the dominant genetic makeup is according to blood tests that claim to scientifically trace one’s ancestry, the choice of “identity”—Black, Asian, Native American—is subjective. Well, it is subjective in societies where the census is filled out by the individual and not a state official in the name of ethnographic work. But even this kind of subjectivity is very largely influenced by “the way we look.” It is far easier to identify with a

group of people who look like you or not identify with people who don't. Yet identification is not solely the choice of an individual when different ethnic interests—of the majority and the minority—are at odds with each other. Who you identify with is often secondary or subject to whom *others* identify you to be with. On one hand, you have the “one-drop rule”; on the other, “blood quantum” measurements. The first means that one drop of black is Black (Davis [1991] 2010). That is why Obama is the “black president” (Coates 2017a) bearing the impossible tragedy and aspirations of an entire population, even though he is unequivocally biracial in the normative sense (mother, white; father, black). By this rule of thumb, the palest of black Americans are still “black.” Inversely, “blood quantum” laws tell you that at “1/16 degree blood” you are *insufficiently* Native American to qualify for recognition in certain tribes, along with the rights and benefits that that recognition confers (Spruhan 2006). In both cases, at the public level, identification is out of the individual's hands.

Even though we'd like to believe that identification is beyond “blood” or “looks,” it is not. This goes beyond being “conservative” or “progressive.” Just witness the calls and importance placed on having role models for children who “look like” them—black characters, Asian actors, Latina heroes, brown comedians—in movies, story books, television shows, advertisements, the fashion runway. These calls for “diversity” are not perceived as racial discrimination; these calls are perceived as *equal representation*. On the onset, these categories are primarily defined by a set of accepted biological features and traits for a given people. This is “blood”; it does not matter that these traits, to be scientifically exact, are transmitted by genetic material and not the red substance we see splattered all over TV crime scenes. So entrenched is the association of “minority” with “color,” that the Canadian statistics agency, for employment equity purposes,

created a demographic category called “visible minority” (Chinese, Black, Arab, etc)<sup>17</sup> so that it could serve as a (color) contrast to Francophones, Canada’s other minority. Without this “visible/color” scheme, the Francophones, being “white,” would be lumped with the Anglophones as being the “majority.” They would become “invisible” to equity schemes, even though that from a “colored” immigrant’s perspective, both Anglophones and Francophones present the same *visibly white* obstacle.

The nation-building project hopes to transcend this bloody instinct; Anderson’s nationalism is supposed to spur a sense of unity despite of it. But the current fractured state of immigrant nations such as the US, or where an influx of immigrants and refugees threatens the “traditional” way of life such as in Europe, show us that tribal sentiments are not so easily overcome. The highest abstract achievements in philosophy for the appeal to a greater good and universal humanity readily buckle when the competition for material resources and immaterial power turns fierce—with people who don’t look like us, worship the same God as us, or speak the same language we do.

#### **4. 6 Survey Studies and the Impermeability of Ethnic Consciousness**

China is not an immigrant nation in the Euro-American sense, nor has it needed to contend with an influx of immigrants and refugees at its borders. Its lack of viable options for naturalization for foreigners who have no documented blood connections through marriage or birth likely does not receive much media scrutiny because it is, understandably, not perceived as the most coveted destination for individuals in search of forging new identities. In contrast to the “American dream,” which was a lure for immigrant aspirations, the “Chinese dream,” in

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<sup>17</sup> See Statistics Canada’s definition of “Visible Minority of Person” at <http://www23.statcan.gc.ca/imdb/p3Var.pl?Function=DEC&Id=45152>. Accessed February 5, 2018.

imitating fashion, is in truth for the Chinese, a call for collective aspirations toward reviving former grandeur (Economist 2013; Wang 2017). But the PRC inherited the boundaries of a multi-ethnic Qing dynasty, which incorporated Xinjiang, conquered by the Manchus in the mid-18th century. Therefore, how to incorporate this non-Han space into the nation-building project has been an on-going effort of which its strategies and policies reflect the shifting ideologies of the state, from Marxism to the market, from class to capital.

But no matter the twists and turns, the center of power remains squarely in Peking, now Beijing, in all its imperial garb. It could be the shifting representations of non-Han peoples in Chinese history textbooks, from invading barbarians to proletariat comrades to citizens of a multiethnic state (Baranovitch 2010); or the shift in official English translation of *minzu wenti* into the “ethnic question” (in the 1990s) rather than the formerly used “nationality question” (Barabantseva 2008), which I (and not Barabantseva) suggest belies an effort to frame the struggle between Han and non-Han as a domestic issue between ethnicities, rather than a “nationality” issue which could be readily conflated into a call for nation and nationalism, which the Soviet states bore witness after the Union’s disintegration.

Whether it be one or the other, what Baranovitch and Barabantseva both demonstrate in their analysis of “shifts” is that there is but *one* dominant ethnic relegating everyone else’s status: Han. It is unquestionably a Han narrative, decided, edited, proofed and published by the Han; or, if not specifically Han, then a Han apparatus, allowing for the fact that editorial teams can consist of “varying combinations of Uyghur, Han, and Hui<sup>18</sup> editors” (Grose 2012, 372). But even with all the “good” intentions of the kind of nationalism Anderson harbors, of patriotism and love for one’s country the Han wish to instill into its citizens, there is no denying that its

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<sup>18</sup> 回; mainly Chinese-speaking Muslims who are perceived to be more assimilated into Han culture. Also known as Dungan or Tungan.

minority citizens do not have much to say in the decision-making process. When they do happen to come across the rare opportunity to insert a non-Han centric perspective, sometimes layering the Han narrative with subtle counter messages, these opportunities come—and go—at the overwhelming discretion of the state, during intervals deemed “loose” (1980s to early 1990s) and “tight” (mid 1990s) by Grose (2012), which he believes does not necessarily follow Baranovitch’s (2010) evolutionary arc of representation (370). But whether in Baranovitch’s study of minority representation in history textbooks from 1949-2003, or Grose’s study of Uyghur language textbooks from 1978-2008, one logic persists: the agency of the minority ethnicity is passive insofar that it can only (re)surface when “permitted.”

And what of the reception towards these Han decrees? Studies attempting to discern Uyghur perspectives from Chinese ones, which either take the form of quantifying surveys to demonstrate collective perception (Yee 2003, 2005) or disarming conversations and personal profiles (Baranovitch 2007; Caprioni 2011; Smith 2000), suggest that there is a spectrum of difference regarding the kind of relation that exists between the Han and the Uyghur in Xinjiang, depending on who you ask and under what circumstances. The respondent could be a student, a cadre, one who lived through the Cultural Revolution or not, or a locally born resident vs. a “new” immigrant; the circumstances could consist of a government approved formal questionnaire or it could be a non-invasive, private one-on-one conversation with no notable record-keeping paraphernalia. On one end, we find 88.1% of Uyghurs answering that they are “proud of being a Chinese citizen” (Yee 2003, 438); on the other, the Uyghur musician sings “I lost, I lost, I lost my home...” (Baranovitch 2007, 482). How does one weigh the legitimacy of a numeric percentage against a line of lyrics; a scientifically designed social survey against the words of a singer-poet? Aren’t science and data supposed to save us from our irrational biases? Aren’t

literature and the poet supposed to yield light on the “truth” of the human condition? At these extreme ends, the quantitative and the qualitative cannot reconcile their findings with one another, because the answers are both, yes and yes.

But despite the post-modern impasse, there is one unifying theme. The very existence of these attempts to determine the state of ethnic relations, with titles reading “*Ethnic Relations...*, *Ethnic Consciousness...*, *Inverted Exile...*, *Daily Encounters Between...*” (emphasis added), is already an affirmation in itself of the very existence of an ethnic divide. In other words, it is a divide among *ethnic* lines. And to the extent that there exists historical records of violence between the two groups of people and a narrative of otherness propagated well before the People’s Republic of China, any foray into objectively determining the state of ethnic relations is already flawed. I suspect no researcher enters this field believing it a state of affairs “up for interpretation,” whether they be Han, Uyghur, or “Western.” And indeed, Yee reminds his reader: “It seems inconceivable that the majority of Uyghurs are proud of being a Chinese citizen. It is possible that, since the question is too sensitive and one of the two interviewers was a Han Chinese, our Uyghur respondents had given a desirable answer to the question” (438).

The researcher could not have reminded the reader had he not been suspect himself. In a subsequent survey, the reminder turns into a warning: “For those who had been interviewed, many tended to give politically correct answers. Our findings may be *seriously biased* and must be read with *great caution*” (Yee 2005, 36; emphasis added). Aside from illustrating the fraught political climate in China for conducting this type of survey, it basically implies that the researcher himself is contrasting the results of his survey with his presumed assumptions, which he believes have much reason to be legitimate, or else there would be no cause for such alarm. The point is not to say whether his assumptions are true or false. The point is to say that,

overwhelmingly, the researchers, given their knowledge and sentiments of the conditions, find it extremely hard to believe that there is a true sense of unity between the two groups. The studies, to a large degree, are almost studies in the scope of divide, not solidarity. If any research does point to solidarity, the authoritarian and political climate in China will almost certainly render the results as seriously questionable outside of China.

It would seem futile then, to use any of these studies, since I could be seen feeding into the bias that the differences between the Uyghur and the Han are irreconcilable. But if we posit the three leading traits of an ethnic group as *language, blood, and religion*—drawing from 1) Anderson’s distinction that language unites not blood, 2) my counter argument that the imagination of “blood” rivals language, and 3) the historical violent dichotomy drawn between faiths—and we look at the variables in these studies that attempt to measure language, blood, and religion, or those that incorporate these concepts, then evidence is strong that much of the perceived irreconcilability arises because the Han and Uyghur strongly identify as distinct ethnicities, which is the precursor to a kind of nationalism that calls for the forming of a state.

In terms of *language*, Yee’s Xinjiang surveys (2003, 2005) show that Uyghurs, compared to their Han counterparts, are much more proficient in Mandarin than the other way around. In the 2005 survey, 46.5% of Uyghurs have a good command of Mandarin over only 11% of Han Chinese having a good command of Uyghur (38); In 2003, the numbers were 47.9% over 3.2% (436). The lopsided numbers are not surprising, and they are corroborated by Baki’s (2012) study, in which it is readily admitted that in Xinjiang the Uyghurs are required to be the “active agents” in this “language contact situation,” where the Han Chinese can remain satisfactorily “monolingual” (48). Framing the Uyghurs as “active agents” is an attempt to neutralize the power imbalance and reduce it to a supposed objective linguistic measurement of “the language

contact situation.” The Uyghurs have no choice but to be “active”; the state vernacular is Mandarin. The numbers show that Mandarin is the language that carries sociopolitical currency in this society. That is why the Uyghurs must be “bilingual” and ideally be proficient in order to be competitive in such a society, and why the Han Chinese are conveniently monolingual. But this lopsided balance also clearly indicates a linguistic divide along ethnic lines, where neither party comes across the other’s language “naturally.” The lines of difference are solidified particularly on the Uyghur side, because there is little choice but to learn “their” language. But lest one thinks that this is a sign towards assimilation, albeit unwillingly, the qualitative reports from other studies, point to the contrary.

According to Joanne Smith’s (2000) account, a Uyghur mother, having been deprived of learning Uyghur when growing up, chooses to send her daughter to Uyghur school to make sure that she “learnt her *mother tongue first*” (206; emphasis added). It is no longer a matter of “language” but of the “mother tongue” given priority over someone else’s language; it is an identity issue. The mother’s decision is reactionary—a reaction to having been deprived of learning her mother tongue and consequently her identity as “Uyghur.” Smith continues to further cite Uyghur intellectuals who “resent the fact that Chinese has been institutionalized as the norm in a society where everyday activities should, in their opinion, be conducted in Uyghur” (209). This is a claim that on *our* land, *our* language should be spoken. Similarly, Baranovitch (2007) traces the awakening of identity along the lines of language as his Uyghur artist living in exile in Beijing gradually moves from singing entirely in Chinese, to singing partly in Uyghur, to singing completely in Uyghur. The Uyghur mother, the Uyghur intellectual, and the Uyghur artist put a face to the surveyed numbers, and a story of resistance to an encroaching Han identity.

Most of Caprioni's (2011) educated Uyghurs "believe that knowledge of Mandarin is nearly a prerequisite in finding a stable, well paying job and improving their social status" (278). But this does not lessen her observations that in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, newspapers, radio, and television are consumed in Uyghur, "in their own language, rather than in Mandarin" (278). The most poignant illustrations of divide along language are in the respective commentaries delivered by Uyghur and Han in relation to the use of language. "In this party only Uyghur language is acceptable," says one Uyghur undergraduate to another Uyghur, a *minkaohan*,<sup>19</sup> who was "caught" speaking Mandarin to the researcher (278). Especially indicative is the Han Chinese taxi driver who says "if Uyghurs want to get into our taxis, they should learn Mandarin, otherwise they could simply ride in the taxis of their compatriots" (279). There is a clear demarcation of "ours" and "theirs" in this comment, the condescending attitude notwithstanding.

How does one expect language to be a unifying force for a unifying "Chinese" identity under these observations of one-way power imbalances and attitudes of mutual resentment? The opposite should be expected. Thus I am in support of Caprioni's conclusion that language "is seemingly used as a means of ensuring the lack of social ties...and simultaneously ensure the foundations of mutual segregation" (279). This is not an impressionistic claim of a language's exclusionary (rather than inclusionary) function in the specific instance of the animosity shared between the Han and Uyghur in the Chinese context. It is a function that is evident in the Canadian context between French and English, as it is in Spain between Catalan and Spanish, where referendums for minority independence from the state were held in both countries, the

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<sup>19</sup> 民考汉; ethnic minority students who take the same Chinese-language university entrance exams as the Chinese students. See: Central Nationalities Cadre School (中央民族干部学院 zhongyang minzu ganbu xueyuan): <http://www.mzgbxy.org.cn/html/mzss/03969-1.htm>. Accessed February 5, 2018.

latest being in 1995 and 2017, respectively. Given the language planning policies the Chinese government has pursued towards its minority populations since its inception, there is not much mystery behind China's much feared "separatist" sentiments.

Dwyer (2005) describes the Chinese policies as overtly egalitarian, but covertly enacting the devaluation of minority languages (10). On the one hand, Article 53 of the 1949 Common Program stipulates that "all minority nationalities have the freedom to develop their languages and script, preserve or reform their traditions, customs and religious beliefs"<sup>20</sup> (cppcc.ov.cn); on the other hand, in the years since this founding idealism, the government has attributed unrest in the region (in the 90s) to its "excessively lax cultural policies" (in the 80s) and initiated an "overt political crackdown" (the 1996 Strike Hard Campaign) "accompanied by largely covert shifts in language and cultural policy aimed at further sinicizing the region" (5). This general direction of "sinicization" has led to the systematic eradication of Uyghur as the medium of instruction in schools, from kindergarten to university; created a "bilingual" education system that in actuality serves to cast the use of Mandarin as the (superior) language of socioeconomic opportunity and mobility (Schluessel 2007). The fact that the authors of *A Handbook of Modern Uyghur* (Engesaeth et al. 2009) explain their reasons for offering it freely online because "there are hardly any non-Chinese language textbooks whose goal is to build comprehensive language competence" (vi) speaks of the degree to which the Uyghur language has been hijacked of its agency by a Chinese gatekeeper.

Both Dwyer and Schluessel deem the policies a failure for their inability to address the concerns of language as an integral part of ethnic identity and the imposition of Mandarin as a

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<sup>20</sup> 中华人民共和国政治协商会议共同纲领, 第五十三条: 各少数民族均有发展其语言文字、保持或改革其风俗习惯及宗教信仰的自由。人民政府应帮助各少数民族的人民大众发展其政治、经济、文化、教育的建设事业。  
<http://www.cppcc.gov.cn/2011/09/06/ART11315304517625199.shtml>. Accessed February 5, 2018.

threat to that identity. This failure is demonstrated by the surveys bearing Uyghur sentiments, and suggested by the “hidden transcripts” of discontent expressed in Uyghur language blogs (Clothey et al 2016). Instead of forging a unified “Chinese identity” via Mandarin, Chinese policies have paradoxically done the opposite by creating a resistance to that identity. The effect is not aided by grossly insufficient numbers of qualified teaching staff in Mandarin (Schluessel 2007, 263-65). Mandarin education to non-native students becomes merely cosmetic, instead producing non-native speakers who are doubly crippled compared to their Han counterparts, by inadequate mother-tongue education and inadequate Mandarin-language education. The irony is that half-baked sinicization, resulting in a population who cannot find a sense of belonging or future in either language,<sup>21</sup> is even worse for the government than none. Anderson’s expectation that language unites, not blood, does not work here. In this Han-Uyghur context, blood precedes language, even if it is imaginary.

“*Blood*” is what I believe to be *the central thesis* of family, clan, tribe, royalty, Korean chaebols, Russian Oligarchs, Murdoch’s News Corp, the North Korea Kim Dynasty, Trump Family Inc, the Mafia, the election of Erkin Alptekin—“son of a former leader of a pre-1949 Xinjiang government”—as the first president to the World Uyghur Congress in 2004, on the grounds of his “lineage” (Dreyer 2005, 79). To be sure, there are democratically pursued successions to corporate empires and government administrations. But that doesn’t mean it started that way. It took much philosophical meandering throughout the centuries to arrive at a belief, in theory, if not exactly in practice, of equality among individuals, no matter the family (read: race, religion, class) one was born into. It also took much plundering of native lands and

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<sup>21</sup> Rudelson (1992, 147-48) mentions the feelings of alienation that many of the *minkaohan* feel. They are Uyghurs educated in Mandarin-speaking schools, thus mainly speak Mandarin and do not have a native command of Uyghur, resulting in being disparaged by their own community as the “14th nationality”—among the 13 nationalities present in Xinjiang, they are the “neither-nor.”

their inhabitants to set up this liberal, social democratic experiment in the “New” World. But as the new world in the form of the United States still applies blood quantum laws to assess how “native” a Native American is according to how much native “blood” he or she presumably has—one-half, a quarter, one-sixteenth—I would like to indeed insist that blood runs thicker than...a lot of things.

There is a reason “family” is evoked in countless rhetoric calling for unity, whether it be global, national, or local. [*Imagine*] if we are one big happy (corporate) family, with the same (capitalist) blood coursing through our veins, how could we not fight for the same (for-profit) cause—or why fight at all. This is the logic behind the 1949 constitutional rhetoric that the People’s Republic of China will “become a big fraternal and co-operative family composed of all its nationalities” (Article 50 of the Common Program).<sup>22</sup> It is also the logic implied (or taken for granted) in a 2014 speech given by China’s president, Xi Jinping—a time supposedly far removed from medieval and tribal impulses. Xi proclaims: “[G]enerations of overseas Chinese [will] never forget their home country, their origins or *the blood of the Chinese nation* flowing in their veins” (Economist 2016b; emphasis added).

An edified term for the *mixing of blood* is “*intermarriage*,” an often cited indicator in the studies on ethnic relations. In Yee’s 2003 survey, in response to the question “Can Uyghurs and Hans get married?,” 52.1% of Uyghurs said “cannot,” while only 10% of Hans objected. On the other hand, 77.9% of Han overwhelmingly agreed that the two could marry, while only 32.4% of Uyghurs expressed the same sentiment (437). The large imbalance—roughly a difference of 40% in both “yes” and “no”—is not surprising. The minority group (i.e. less powerful group) is likely

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<sup>22</sup> 第五十条： 中华人民共和国境内各民族一律平等， 实行团结互助， 反对帝国主义和各民族内部的人民公敌， 使中华人民共和国成为各民族友爱合作的大家庭。 反对大民族主义和狭隘民族主义， 禁止民族间的歧视、 压迫和分裂各民族团结的行为。 <http://www.cppcc.gov.cn/2011/09/06/ARTI1315304517625199.shtml>. Accessed February 5, 2018.

to see “mixing” as a diluting of blood/identity, a threat; while the majority group is apt to see it in the light of its superior assimilating power. Yee’s second survey, in 2005, also includes a question on marriage, but it is in relation to religion and not directly on marriage, asking instead *whether or not the groups believe that religious organizations should interfere with marriage* (48-49). Over 90% of both groups indicate that they should not interfere.

But this is a moot question. “Organizations” are public institutions, whereas marriage is often believed to be a private family choice, even if that choice stems from a religious one. So of course the knee-jerk reaction would be that “organizations” should not interfere. This answer is not surprising or indicative of what the researcher is trying to find out. The researcher would have been better served if the question were phrased as such: “Is religion *a factor* in marriage?” I suspect that the Han Chinese in China, having been under the rule of an official atheist party for quite some time, and having had no “Church” dominate state and vernacular affairs in the Western sense, would have a different response from Muslim Uyghurs.

*“You can get married to anyone: white people, black people, red people, but not Hans”* (Caprioni 2011, 282; emphasis added); “Uyghur men are fundamentalist Muslims, do not respect women, are always drunk, beat up women, and do not like to work...*If you marry a Uyghur man, I would disown you”* (282-83; emphasis added). Note the racial stereotypes and racist tone on both ends. Yee also supplies his own observations outside of the survey proper: “Our Uyghur research assistant, an associate professor from Xinjiang Normal University, insists that he will not let his daughter marry a Han Chinese. If his daughter is married to a Han, he and his family will be looked down upon by his fellow people” (2003, 450). This shows that even among the class of highly educated, the territory of “marriage” is not to be ceded, which neutralizes the possibility of the social exchange theory in marriage, in which individual higher status (in

education) facilitates “upward” mobility via marriage (Mamet et al 2005, 191)—i.e. a “lower” minority status (Uyghur) with higher education attributes marries into the “higher” majority status (Han). This shows that the question of marriage between these two groups is not a question of achieving individual status or love between two individuals, but of loyalty to one’s own, which is a collective identity.

Conspicuously, in these exchanges, the daughters seem to be bearing the brunt in the struggle of identity. But that would be an entirely different thesis on the role of women (as reproductive pawns) in feudal wars concerning bloodlines and territories. Coming back to the role of marriage—it is a significant force in the breaking down of cultural barriers. It forces one to rethink the absolutism of a single “racial” identity in the face of offspring who are mixed and constitute a new reality, who challenge normative expectations about looks and identity, who may grow up into adults who demand a revision of norms. The strong disapproval from the Uyghurs and mutual stereotyping from both groups suggest, though, that the blurring of ethnic divide has yet to be on the horizon, and has persisted since Rudelson’s (1992) observations two decades earlier that in the rare instances where intermarriage does occur “these Uighurs are invariably disowned and told not to return to Xinjiang” and offspring of mixed marriages “are not allowed to attend Uighur funerals” (212).

The unlikelihood of ethnic integration through marriage is also supported by the extremely low exogamy rates of the Uyghur and Han populations in Xinjiang (Mamet, Jacobson, and Heaton 2005). Sampling from the 1990 census data, Mamet et al. showed that both the Uyghur and the Han tend to overwhelmingly marry within their own ethnic groups: only 0.3% of Uyghur men and 0.6% of Uyghur women; and only 1.3% of Han men and 1.2% of Han women “married

out” (195).<sup>23</sup> This is despite steady increase in Han population in Xinjiang—from 2.32 million in 1964 to 5.69 million in 1990 (Xinjiang Census)—which theoretically would have produced more contact opportunities between the two groups and between the Han and other minorities. But against this increase, exogamy rates in 1990 were extremely low, which suggests that marriage within the two largest ethnicities in Xinjiang primarily function against integration.

Could the severe clashes between the Uyghurs and Chinese witnessed in the 1990s have been mitigated by higher exogamy rates (not necessarily with each other, but with other minorities as well, engendering a more inclusive culture in general)? It is a viable hypothesis, and could be examined using Mamet et al.’s methodology with 2010 census data, with even higher numbers of Hans, and against the severity of the clashes in the 2000s. But considering the surveys conducted in the 2000s by Yee and Caprioni, and observations made by Rudelson in the preceding decade, exogamy rates could remain predictably low, while marriage continues to be a battle ground for the preservation of distinct identities, “bloodlines.”

*Religion, though, can perhaps redeem one’s regrettable blood. “...it is believed that a Uyghur man could marry a Han girl to enlarge the Muslim family, only if before getting married, the woman agrees to undergo a aşqazan tazilaş (gastric cleanse) in order to rid her stomach of pork residues and to clean out her blood” (Caprioni 2011, 282). Pork is one of the most glaring manifestations of religious divide between the two groups, with one considering it forbidden, and the other a quintessential ingredient in its cuisine. According to Caprioni, close to half of her Uyghur respondents believe that “if they invite Hans for dinner, they would have to throw away their cutlery after eating because Hans use them in their ‘pork-contaminated’ mouths” (281). But being Muslim in Xinjiang, for a Uyghur, is less about being an observant one, and more about*

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<sup>23</sup> “Marrying-out” includes marrying the other nationalities present in Xinjiang, categorized in the study as Hui, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Mongol, Manchu, and Others.

differentiating themselves from the Han non-believers who do not show due respect to the religion, given that the vast majority of Caprioni's respondents "do not fully observe all five pillars of Islam" but identify as Muslim nonetheless (280).

This observation, that "dedication to Islam is part and parcel of being Uyghur" regardless of whether or not one supports its more fundamentalist or traditional tenets, is also supported by Mackerras in his interactions with Uyghurs (2001, 296). Furthermore, it is not a matter of loosening or tightening religious policy from a Chinese government perspective either that would enhance relations. In fact, Yee (2003) believes that the loosening of religious policy in the early 1980s enabled the large expansion of mosques and religious schools where separatist sentiments were nurtured under the pretense of Islam (450), an observation also echoed by Smith (2000, 208). The dilemma is clearly captured by Rudelson (1997, 47-48) in his field work where he notes: "when they suppress Islam, most Uyghurs feel oppressed and oppose the government; when they allow or encourage it, Uyghurs become more content with the government but their strengthened Islamic practice leads them to feel more separate from and apathetic towards Chinese society" (cited in Mackerras 2001, 296-97). So it is a "damn if I do and damn if I don't" situation for the governing Han. Religion is a marker of identity that further solidifies the Uyghur ethnicity against the Han, despite many religions claiming, under progressive interpretations, their inclusivity. On the contrary: if you are not a believer, you are not one of us.

To a large degree, matters of blood and religion are inseparable, in the sense that conversion to a religion can override blood and allow for marriage (i.e. the mixing of blood). It is therefore not surprising that Caprioni's sample population of Uyghurs consider the "post-Soviet Central Asian populations," who identify overwhelmingly as Muslim, their "blood brothers" (2011, 283). Imagination of a common bloodline allowed by the belief in a common religion

begets inclusivity. Yet there is little chance that the Chinese will convert, nor will the Uyghurs readily allow their daughters to marry non-Muslim Han Chinese men (Yee 2003), or the Chinese allow their daughters to marry Muslim Uyghur men (Caprioni 2011). It is not a matter of policy—unless one considers an ultra-authoritarian state where choice in marriage is considered state jurisdiction and no longer a private affair.<sup>24</sup> But this would hark back to the political strategies of the ruling classes of yore, such as when the non-Han Khitan nobility, who established the Liao dynasty (907-1125) in Chinese fashion, exclusively selected their consorts from the Xiao [Hsiao] family clan of Uyghur descent, which, according to Holmgren (1986), was a system of marriage in “direct response to the conflict between the traditional concept of shared [nomadic] collateral leadership and the newly adopted Chinese model of government” (45).

In other words, for the first Khitan emperor to rule in the “Chinese” style of imperial governance, he had to counter the tribal norms of shared leadership among family members. He did so by forming an alliance with the powerful Xiao family of his wife, who he relied on for “military and political support against his own relatives” (87). Thus was born the tightly regulated marriage system seen throughout the dynasty, which was by no means a failure. The degree in which this Khitan empire was successfully “Chinese” can be attested by the fact that “China” was then known to the Europeans as “Cathay” (Biran 2012, 88) or “Kitai/Khitai” in Persian, West Turkish and East Slavonic Languages (Gernet 1982, 353). It is highly doubtful, though, that modern China, authoritarian as it may be, would willingly mandate a “marriage policy” to secure power over the region; nor would it be likely that the Uyghurs of today would emulate their Xiao forbearers in manipulating marriage to wrest power from the Chinese. That would be too “feudal,” wouldn’t it? Or maybe there is a way around that, considering there have

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<sup>24</sup> Considering the extent which the state and the church still exude influence on the legality of same-sex marriage, “marriage” as an institution has never been a solely private affair.

been reports that Chinese authorities have been offering cash and subsidies to encourage interethnic marriages (Kaiman 2014). How modern. Though this modern approach precisely underlines the fact that without encouragement there is little incentive to marry across ethnic lines.

Aversions to feudalism notwithstanding, Anderson ([1983] 2006), referring to the European context of imperial colonialism, tellingly points out: “In considering the origins of recent ‘colonial nationalism,’ one central similarity with the colonial nationalisms of an earlier age immediately strikes the eye: the isomorphism between each nationalism’s territorial stretch and that of the previous imperial administrative unit” (114). Imperial Qing may have undergone a proletarian revolution to become the People’s Republic of China, but one should “not be much surprised if revolutionary leaderships, consciously or unconsciously, come to play lord of the manor” (160). Because “[T]he more the ancient dynastic state is naturalized, the more its antique finery can be wrapped around revolutionary shoulders” (160); hence claim of lands since “time immemorial,”<sup>25</sup> the fervent worship of Mao/emperor, and references to the offspring of PRC founding revolutionary figures as “princelings” (Lim 2012). In the matter of interethnic governance, the imperial skeleton in the family closet is an added psychological obstacle.

Yet the Chinese government is not singularly to be blamed for current ethnic relations, as Caprioni (2011) also concludes. Its ethnic minority policies could be interpreted in any number of ways: lax, tight, preferential, restrictive, pro-active, regressive, pluralistic, chauvinistic, economically-oriented, culturally-oriented—depending on ever-shifting governing ideologies. But, as I have sought to explain, ethnic identity existed well before the current PRC’s policies.

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<sup>25</sup> 自古以來 *zigu yilai*; the popular timeframe promulgated in official remarks concerning the region and other territorial claims. See, for example, Xinhua coverage of the 60th anniversary of the Xinjiang autonomous region: [http://www.xinhuanet.com/2015-09/29/c\\_1116701269.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/2015-09/29/c_1116701269.htm); or the State Council Information Office on the South China Sea dispute: <http://www.scio.gov.cn/tt/Document/1483517/1483517.htm>. Accessed February 5, 2018.

Studies conducted on the two groups already begin on a premise of ethnic difference. And because the Uyghurs and Han are such distinct identities along the lines of language, blood, and religion, and their relationship drawn against ingrained historic narratives of otherness and Han superiority, no policy will readily blur that distinction in the foreseeable future. It is a distinction that exists as a dichotomy between the Chinese and the Barbarian that has endured for two millennia in the codified animal radicals used in the Chinese characters to describe people outside the supposed realm of civilization: 蠻 *man* (bug) · 狄 *di* (dog) · 羌 *qiang* (goat) · 獬豸 *xianyun* (dog); they are “subhuman” (Fiskesjö 2012). Or they are “slaves,” and particularly disruptive and ferocious ones, considering that the Chinese characters for Xiongnu, the arch tribal nemesis of the Han dynasty (206 BC- 220 AD), are 匈 (*xiong*; disturbance, fierce) and 奴 (*nu*; slave).

Against this historical psychological dynamics between the two, what “minority” policy does, effectively, is motivate the respective groups to be even more aware of their identities, to further segregate themselves along those very lines of language, blood, and religion, figuratively if not always literally (i.e. we may have to work alongside each other, but we may never need to be friends). Or, in Caprioni’s words, they end up “constructing moveable social barriers that result in segregation” (2011, 267). Fiskesjö (2012, 60) even goes a step further to argue that the pursuit of segregation is the latent, or subconscious, reason China (i.e. the Han state) never adopted an outright assimilation agenda for its citizens under a modern pan-Chinese identity of the *Zhonghua* ethnicity (*Zhonghua Minzu*), but instead opted to maintain Soviet-style nationalities and “autonomy” even after they long forsook the Soviet idea of federation. Never mind that the right to “autonomy” ultimately poses the inherent risk of independence. The centrality of Han identity (i.e. the Middle Kingdom/Central State) depended on situating the

“barbarians” at the peripheries—the four cardinal positions of the *Nan Man* (south), *Dong Yi* (east), *Xi Rong* (west), *Bei Di* (north)<sup>26</sup>—so much so that the government ended up pursuing a minority policy that presented itself as a paradox.

#### 4.7 Population, Development, and Security along the Ethnic Fault Line

The migration of Han Chinese into Xinjiang—from 5% of the total population in 1941 (Toops 2000, 159) to 40.5% in 2010 (Xinjiang Census)—serves only to enhance the perceived differences the Uyghurs and Han feel towards each other and their respective needs for a separate distinct identity, as shown in the studies on language and marriage. In this regard, Joniak-Lüthi’s (2015) fieldwork in Xinjiang, where she documents Uyghur spatial-cultural markers (a mausoleum, an oasis, a city), the meaning they ascribe to them, and contrasts how Han Chinese appropriate, rename, or reassign meaning to these same markers, is a strong testament to the emotional workings of “boundary-strengthening” (429) and the need to do so, *on both sides*, to retain or create something each recognizes as their own. The contrast in narrative is striking, if not surprising: to the Han, Xinjiang was “barren” before they came and developed it; for the Uyghurs, the best cities are ranked according to their cultural capital in “Uyghurness”—architecture, tradition, the practice of religion, literary and intellectual history, the absence of Han interference. One group sees a place that is being changed without their consent, memories and a culture eroded; the other, not being of that culture, sees nothing rich in it but a barren land in need of “development.”

And what of the gains of this development in Xinjiang, which saw real per capita GDP rise from 166 yuan in 1952 to 1699 yuan in 2000? (Wiemer 2003, cited in Toops 2004, 1). According

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<sup>26</sup> “東夷 dongyi、西戎 xirong、南蠻 nanman、北狄 beidi” originates from the “Royal Regulations” in the *Book of Rites* 《禮記·王制》 (lijì, wangzhi), one of the Five Classics in the Confucius canon composed of writings from the Warring States period (403-221 BC), but edited into its current form in the early Han period (206 BC-8 AD).

to Toops' (2004) analysis on development and demographics, compared to the north, where most of the industrial output is found and where the majority of Han are concentrated, the south, which is predominantly Uyghur and agriculture, shows lower levels in a number of key indicators including GDP per capita, income, employment, education, and literacy (24). Even at the sub-regional level, within the cities themselves, the Uyghur and Han occupy distinct neighborhoods (21), a pattern also well documented by Caprioni (2011) and Joniak-Lüthi (2015). Suffice to say, there is a clear thesis of segregation running along both demographics and development, in both statistics like Toops' and sentiments like Joniak- Lüthi's, which does not bode well for the premium the government places on "stability," as Han migration continues to excel in the north (exacerbating inequalities) and slowly, by means of infrastructure development, encroaches towards the south (effacing the last stronghold of "Uyghurness").

Indeed, in Dreyer's (2000) detailed analysis of ambitious development efforts in this region of "ethnic unrest" and the less than satisfactory results they brought about, she concludes that the priority placed on "social stability" is "certainly a factor inhibiting economic reform," because "cadres understandably prefer to avoid implementing policies that may cause rebellion, even when those policies make sound economic sense" (151). The Gordian knot is that it is reasoned that development will enhance stability, but at the same time the need for stability stifles development. The "knot" lies in the statistical results where it shows that development favors the Han and is anchored in increasing Han "in-migration" (Becqueline 2000, 74-76). But this knot, bound by ethnic discrimination, is not apparent to the Han, because they are in the privileged position of administrating both development and stability.

Recent acceleration of Han population was most acute between 1990-2000, overlapping with the spike in violent confrontations in the region, of which the 1996 Strike Hard Campaign

and 1997 Gulja incident are representative (Millward 2004, 14-19). According to the fourth and fifth population census, conducted respectively in 1990 and 2000, the Han population increased by 31.64% in the span of a decade, while the minority population increased only 15.89% (which include Uyghurs—the majority ethnicity—among others, such as Kazakh, Hui, Mongol; Xinjiang Census 2000). While the increase in the minority population is largely natural (as opposed to Han families who are subject to population control policies), the increase in the Han population is largely due to migration (Mackerras 2001, 293). Perhaps the most symbolic Han presence is that of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC, *Bingtuan*).

Created in 1954 “to develop frontier regions and consolidate border defense” (Pan 2014), it is a quasi-military outfit that doubles as an expansive state enterprise with stakes in all the major sectors of agriculture, industry, transportation, construction and commerce, accounting for approximately 1/5 of Xinjiang’s GDP.<sup>27</sup> With its own administrative and judicial structure separate from the Xinjiang government, it manages close to 1.25 million hectares of arable land, accounting for 1/5 of the region’s total.<sup>28</sup> Headquartered in the capital of Urumqi, its administrative subdivisions are spread throughout the region and can be found from prefecture-level down to the county-level. Of its total population of 2.7 million, 14% are minorities (Pan 2014), which is safe to say not representative of region-wide minority numbers. But it is not so much the numbers of Han versus the numbers of minorities in this conglomerate, or its impressive GDP, or how it has contributed to the influx of Han migrants that makes it “redolent

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<sup>27</sup> According to XPCC figures, their 2016 GDP was 2134.33 *yi yuan*; according to China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Xinjiang’s 2016 GDP was 9649.70 *yi yuan*. Based on the two figures, the calculation of approximately 1/5 was made. See <http://www.xjbt.gov.cn/bt/> and <http://data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm?cn=E0103&zsb=A0201&reg=650000&sj=2016>, respectively. Accessed February 7, 2018.

<sup>28</sup> Calculations of 1/5 based on Xinjiang’s total arable land of 5.06 million hectares, according to central government posted statistics (Gov.cn 2013). See: [http://big5.gov.cn/gate/big5/www.gov.cn/test/2013-04/07/content\\_2371589.htm](http://big5.gov.cn/gate/big5/www.gov.cn/test/2013-04/07/content_2371589.htm). Accessed February 7, 2018.

of the English East India Company or the Dutch West India Company” (Seymour 2000, 188). It is in the way it functions *figuratively* that makes it a marker of ethnic divide.

Seymour (2000) readily calls the entity’s purpose “to colonize” (188) and categorically describes the history of XPCC in his title as “the sinification of Eastern Turkestan.” But he does not distinguish what kind of “colonization” it practices. What he describes is the Han creating a colony, in response to shifting political upheaval or directions from Beijing, impressive in size and strategy. But it is not in the sense of the Japanese colonizing Taiwan, where the minority colonial government attempts through force and education to remake the Chinese subjects into loyal imperial subjects of Japan. The XPCC is a self-contained entity whose presence functions as a representation of Han interests in Beijing—in terms of national security (to secure our Homeland!) and national economic policy (to develop the West!). Its “success” is not based on profits—because despite the numbers, it is, ultimately, unprofitable in the commercial sense (Becqueline 2000, 80). Its success lies in its symbolic value of reminding the minorities of Beijing’s interests, and the more success it boasts, the more the eyesore.

The Corps is not “sinicizing,” no matter how tempting the allegation. The irony is that if they were, they might have had more success in co-opting the interests of the locals, such as in the case of Taiwan, where the depiction of Japanese colonial rule witnessed a change from “Japanese *occupation*” (*riju* 日據) to “Japanese *governance*” (*rizhi* 日治) after the Democratic Progressive Party’s Chen Shui-bian won the presidential election in 2000 and effectively ended the one-party rule of the Nationalist government since Chiang Kai-shek retreated to the island in 1949.<sup>29</sup> The DPP rose to power protesting Chiang’s regime, which represented “China,” and

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<sup>29</sup> In 2013, under President Ma Ying-jeou’s Nationalist government (the party recaptured the presidency in 2008), the government ordered that all official government documents must revert to using “Japanese occupation,” causing much public debate. Though the government conceded that the Ministry of Education was entirely within its

much of DPP ranks and supporters consist of local Taiwanese whose families had been educated under the colonial regime, or first and second generation members of those families. The fondness and admiration this population exhibits towards Taiwan's colonial past under Japan—no matter if it is more myth and selective memory, and distorted by nostalgia and dissatisfaction with the present—attests to the success of Japanese colonization. The Chinese in Xinjiang have achieved no such success.

What has ensued, instead, is *mutual* complaints of discrimination. The Han complain against the preferential policy towards Uyghurs; Uyghurs voice that they are passed over for Han who speak Mandarin. Resentment becomes a matter of perception and “feelings,” not data. Researchers continue to cite individuals who “complain” to them or “say” or “tell” of personal grievances; personal observations by the researchers themselves, outside the research methodology itself, are not uncommon (Mackerras 2001, 300; Becqueline 2000, 85; Yee 2003, 450). In Xinjiang's highly political sensitive climate, where access to data and identifiable persons for interview can be exceedingly difficult, citing personal sentiments become as legitimate a way of discerning causes of divide as formal surveys, since the latter faces a number of obstacles, exemplified in Yee's repeated warnings of the validity of his 2005 results. The government, repeatedly, has its hands tied—in a knot, a paradox, a catch-22. Forbidding the research of sensitive topics prevents it from assessing the severity of the issue and confronting its realities; not understanding or confronting the actual issue aggravates the divide with ineffective

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jurisdiction to allow both expressions to be used in textbooks, and that both expressions were protected under constitutional rights pertaining to free speech, the order and ensuing debate exposed the heavily divided identity politics in Taiwan, within academia down to the individual (Ni 2015, Li 2013, Yan 2013). The arguments for either/or took on heavy political and cultural significance, often placing one's position in an irreconcilable dichotomy of “pro-China/anti-Taiwanese” vs. “pro-independence/anti-Chinese,” whereas the arguments themselves reveal a much more complex “nationality” psychology.

policy. But by allowing the issue to be studied without state intervention, it risks arriving at a conclusion it does not wish to acknowledge.

The circumstances sound bleak then. But the state's grip is not about securing brotherly love. It is about maintaining national security and territorial integrity along the borders of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Mongolia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, in the face of the Soviet collapse in 1991 and the rise of terrorism in the name of Islam after the 2001 September 11 attacks; it is about geopolitical interests and cultivating regional economic, trade, and political ties to leverage in its favor, to simultaneously contain separatist movements that threaten the dissolution of its borders and secure its interests beyond those borders (Mackerras 2015, Clarke 2010, Kerr and Swinton 2008, Dreyer 2005, Blank 2003).

China officially combats “the three evil forces”<sup>30</sup> of terrorism, separatism, and extremism (Zhao 2017, Dupont 2007); enlisted as partners in this endeavor are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and newly joined India and Pakistan in 2017. Along with China, they form the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a successor to the “Shanghai Five.”<sup>31</sup> But needless to say, vast power differentials exist among these member-states, and what constitutes “terrorism” for one might not be so for the other. The “SCO” might sound more politically correct and less gangster menacing than “the Shanghai Five,” but “cooperation” is no less a loaded word, with competing religious, cultural, and political identities at work. In a way, the region's current security complications, in which China is enmeshed, is elegantly summed up by the observation that “[In] geocultural terms Central Asia is not a region at all, but the

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<sup>30</sup> 三股惡勢力 *sangu eshili*

<sup>31</sup> The original five founding members were China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan. The first round of multilateral talks was held in Shanghai on April 26, 1996.

remnants of failed empires” (Kerr and Swinton 2008, 117). It is the ebb and flow of ghostly borders of empires past that feed the present destabilizing forces of this region.

What we can be sure of, though, is that Chinese “love” for their minority brethren died long ago, after the honeymoon period of revolution and the rhetoric of self-determination and nation-building served its purpose. The Qing emperor is out, as is Lenin’s self-determination and Marx’s class warfare, as are the Japanese, the British and the French, and the Nationalist party behind the “Republic of China.” *This* Chinese empire—in competition with Russian and US influences in the region—must not fail. Hence, for the People’s Republic of China, as a consolidated state under one party with power and territory to uphold, divorce is not an option. Lest the word “empire” strikes as anachronistic and unbecoming of current postcolonial times, it should be reminded that the nation-state in question is not exactly distancing itself from imperial times of expansion in its ambitions to build a new “Silk Road,” now formally known as the Belt and Road Initiative, financed by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank headquartered none other than in Beijing. International support of “warm feelings” notwithstanding, the Silk Road “stirs up equal enthusiasm domestically because it taps into memories of former greatness and its new iterations, placing China once more at the center of the world” (Brown 2014, cited in Mackerras 2015, 27). Thus it is difficult not to make historical and ideological connections concerning a series of escalating conflicts between China and the US and regional claimants in the South China Sea—part of the “maritime silk road” component of the Belt and Road Initiative—where “[R]oughly two thirds of South Korea’s energy supplies, nearly 60 per cent of Japan’s and Taiwan’s energy supplies, and 80 per cent of China’s crude oil imports come through” (Zhong and White 2017, 17).

Andrew Scobell (2018) in fact sees the South China Sea—where China has sought to “change ... the facts in the water by building facilities such as docks and runways and constructing artificial islands,” while also intensifying “harassment and intimidation of the fishing boats and the maritime enforcement vessels of other states” (201)—as the primary “flash point” characterizing US-China rivalry, supplanting even the Taiwan strait as a strategic priority (211). The struggle is portrayed as the US defending the “freedom” of the seas and navigation under international law against China’s assertions of “sovereignty, dominance, and/or control” (201). While the US appeals to “legality,” the Chinese claim a “historical” rationale. To attest to the ideology of a historical “China” that is not confined to current nation-state boundaries, nor to the dichotomy of communism vs. democracy, it should be pointed out that “[T]he PRC’s claims are consistent with the territorial claims of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. Indeed, the PRC inherited its famous “nine-dashed line” map from the ROC” (214). The fact that the Chinese government emphatically rejected the ruling of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea that denied its historical claim over the South China Sea under the nine-dashed line and surrounding waters (Zhong and White 2017, 10), indicates that it is far removed from the “victim-of-the-West” narrative it had once consistently sought to project to the world. It is now confident, and powerful enough—in military presence and the scale and reach of its economy—to challenge the current “international” order, which is code for another power often labeled “hegemonic,” the US. American allies in the region, notably Japan and the Philippines, “[C]onfronted by an expansionist China in the second decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century” (De Castro 2017, 31), have begun to form a strategic security partnership to contain what they see as Chinese territorial aggression. It is hardly an alarmist reaction given that Xi Jinping was quoted in the Singapore *Straits Times* (May 20, 2017) telling visiting Philippine president Rodrigo

Duterte: “We don’t want to quarrel with you...But if you force the issue, we’ll go to war” (cited in Scobell 2018, 209). Unabashed confrontation with hegemony, or its hegemonic order, while suffering little consequence, indicates a corresponding hegemonic position. China has not only “arrived” on the world stage; it is now contending dominance. This is a strong repudiation of the “resistance” thesis—China “resisting” US unipolarity—in Schweller and Pu’s (2011) argument published seven years ago when Xi Jinping had not yet ascended and consolidated leadership.

While Schweller and Pu (2011) framed Chinese state behavior at the time of writing as “resistance,” they acknowledged that “a more appealing and consequential alternative ideology” could be developed as “China increases power and prestige” (52). They likened China’s resistance to “‘prudent opposition newspaper editors under strict censorship,’ wherein subordinate actors must find ways of getting their message across, while staying somehow within the law” (52). The quote is attributed to James Scott’s *Domination and the Arts of Resistance* (1992). The use of this reference is only partially ironic, given that Scott’s powerless populations are not state actors but one’s subjugated by the state or ruling elite. But it presents a gross irony in the particular use of the media censorship analogy, given China’s pervasive censorship practices it imposed on its own citizens well before 2011, the year of the publication of this article. There is little debate now that Chinese censorship extends well beyond its borders, commanding international editors of scholarly journals and commercial companies alike, or anyone wanting access to its market, to adhere to what they can or cannot say about China; most acquiesce. Seven years ago, Schweller and Pu (2011) argued: “Relying on existing institutionalized channels to contest U.S. hegemony, China seeks to increase its political influence and prestige through active participation in, not confrontation with, the existing order” (53). Given China’s open rejection of the International Tribunal’s ruling regarding the South

China Sea; the US navy's perception that "China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States" (Beech 2018); detaining, without due process or explanation, the president of Interpol, a Chinese national, but one in a leadership position of an international organization headquartered in Lyon, France;<sup>32</sup> it is safe to say that China is no longer "resisting" but openly challenging unipolarity. It is noteworthy, too, in the instance of my study, that Interpol had "canceled a Red Notice pushed by Beijing in pursuit of a persecuted Uighur dissident, Dolkun Isa, who fled China in the 1990s" (Editorial, *Washington Post*, Oct. 9, 2018).

While China is increasing its military and political might on the world stage, would its global presence on the economic stage command equal perceptions of power or threat? Peter Nolan's ([2012] 2014) analysis on China's perceived dominance in the global economy seems to assuage fears that Chinese state enterprises are also "buying the world" (218). He points out that an analysis of foreign direct investment, a "central vehicle for the modernization of business practices and the transmission of technical progress from developed to developing countries" (Nolan 2011, 47), shows that inward FDI (investment of foreign companies in China) still far eclipses outward FDI (Chinese companies investing outside of China) (Nolan 2014, 144); even in the amount of inward FDI, China still lags behind other developing regions, such as Latin America and the Caribbean, accounting for only a third of what the latter regions receive in inward FDI (133). In other words, this means that international firms (large multinational firms headquartered in high-income countries) vastly outcompete China in international dominance; it also means that other developing regions are more significant, from a statistical perspective, for

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<sup>32</sup> Reported in most major Western news outlets. See, for example, the *Economist* (Oct. 9) "Some Clues on Why China Arrested the President of Interpol"; Charles Bremner and Didi Tang, for the *Times* (Oct. 6), "Interpol President Meng Hongwei Detained by Beijing."

these firms. Nolan (2014) states that it would be “a serious misunderstanding of the strategy of multinational companies to exaggerate the significance of China compared with other parts of the developing world” (132). He also cites the conspicuous absence of Chinese firms in major international mergers and acquisitions—essential for expanding global business systems—as further proof that China is far from economic dominance (145). Even when China had “four of the world’s top ten banks by market capitalization” (127), “China’s giant banks played no role whatsoever in the massive round of mergers and acquisitions during the global financial crisis” (145). To further his point of China’s low-level dominance and considerable political and ideological opposition it faces to achieve dominance, he lists the few successful bids and failed ones of Chinese firms acquiring foreign companies: Lenovo acquiring IBM’s PC division in 2005—because IBM considered it as a low-profitability business (146); Geely acquiring Volvo in 2010—because it was a loss-making division within Ford (147); a number of attempts by Huawei for international acquisitions or even just a minority share in a foreign company blocked on the grounds of national security (147); CNOOC’s 2005 bid to acquire the mid-size American oil company Unocal also failed because it faced fierce US opposition on the grounds of national security (147); even though CNOOC’s 2012 bid for the Canadian oil producer Nexen was approved, the Canadian government immediately “announced the introduction of tougher rules for acquisitions of Canadian companies by state-owned enterprises” (151).

Nolan’s conclusion of China not (yet) being in a position to “buy the world” is correct from a statistical point of view. But it cannot explain the paradox of governments ideologically opposing Chinese mergers and acquisitions while simultaneously relenting to Chinese ideological demands concerning anything China deems related to sovereignty and territory—even when concerned populations or companies reside outside of Chinese jurisdiction or do not

fall completely within it. It is precisely because that there is so much inward FDI in China, that foreign industries (and governments that court these industries to stay in power) each covet more access to the Chinese market, both for its potential consuming power and low labor costs, that has elevated China's bargaining power. On the one hand, developing countries rely heavily on exports and on high-income countries to consume their products; but, on the other, these multinational firms in high-income countries also rely heavily on developing countries for the manufacturing of cost-competitive products and a market for these products. Each has a stake in the other's growth—so China might “lose” in economic dominance, but it will gain in geopolitical dominance. Because international firms seek global economic dominance and to maintain it, the governments that rely on these firms (i.e. the industries) to stay in power domestically, will cede international political power to China.<sup>33</sup>

So even if Nolan's analysis yields no conclusion as China being a threat economically, it does not mean China's deep integration into the world economy as a manufacturing-oriented economy has not engendered a very powerful player poised to challenge US world order politically. As we witness a “southward drift of China's economic center of gravity” (Scobell 2018, 211), this challenge is now playing out most conspicuously in the South China Sea, where symbolic ideological and political alliances either coincide, clash, or wrestle with economic interests. Chinese investment in the African continent, in comparison, so far has not been portrayed in “flash point” terms, and its engagement is characterized as non-threatening to the US (Thrall 2015).<sup>34</sup> However, Cheng (2011) has noted the discourse of race, or the evolution of

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<sup>33</sup> The outcome of the current US-China trade war would challenge this assumption.

<sup>34</sup> But it should be noted that the South China Sea caught many by surprise as well, “including adherents of geostrategy” (Scobell 2018, 203). This does not delegitimize the predictions or theoretical projections of those studies or recommendations, which are often based on solid research and literature, but only goes to show that it is impossible to incorporate all the variables, both qualitative and quantitative, in a single analysis (which are already biased by the disciplines they fall under). Many predictions about China have not proven to be correct, most notably

racism, that has accompanied China's global economic expansion, identifying Sino-African relations in particular as the "most challenging" (561). Cheng traces the relationship between the expression of racism and the expression of nationalism to "a racial discourse that was constructed in the early stage of modern Chinese history to define China's place in the world order" (562). It is informed by a "traditional Sino-barbarian dichotomy ideology" re-formulated, for modern times, under Social Darwinism, in which blacks were identified as "the most inferior human race" (563). Furthermore, the Chinese are blind toward their own racism because "the official ideology related racism to class exploitation and oppression and maintained that it only existed within Western colonialism" (565). Cheng's analysis of the development of anti-African racism in China, from campus racism in the 1980s to current forms of cyber racism and the "blatant racism against Africans" because of "the presence of large number of Chinese and Africans in each other's lands" (565), gives us reason to believe that even if US-Sino relationships are not yet predicted to rupture because of China's increasing presence in the African continent, racism among the Chinese population—where "Chinese aid to Africa and Africa's indebtedness to China are plain facts" (570)—if left unchecked and unaddressed, will complicate China's emphasis on a "peaceful" rise as a global power and its insistence on victimhood instead of re-enactor of colonialism.

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the prediction that engagement in the market and participation in international norms, marked by the accession to the WTO in 2001, would lead to democratization. Or, going back seventy years, to 1947, when Paul M. A. Linebarger, author of *Psychological Warfare* (1948) and in-the-field observer of Chinese war and politics of the time, declared, after a thorough analysis of the Communist-Nationalist struggle, that "China has long had the spirit of constitutional democracy" and "once democracy gets going, it stands a chance—more than a chance—of becoming deeply Chinese and withstanding even the ruthless pieties of Marxism" (1947, 542). He was referring to the constitutional elected government that was supposedly going to be applied to the "Chinese Republic" under Chiang after December 25, "Christmas Day," of that year (541). This did not happen; going forward, the pro-democracy movement in 1989 led to even more ruthlessness, and not by "Marxism," but by pieties to something "deeply Chinese" that I am attempting to identify in this study, humbly. This does not mean these studies were not informative or illuminating by shedding light on certain aspects of China and its culture. They have built toward a more comprehensive understanding of the subject, indicating in what areas more studies are needed, which is always positive, and to which I hope to add.

In light of China's growing influence on military, political, and economic fronts, and in the form of generous investments in developing nations, one journalist, in an article looking into China's global investment projects, observed: "it's worth remembering that dredging deepwater ports and laying down railroad ties to secure new trade routes — and then having to defend them from angry locals — was precisely how Britain started down the slippery slope to empire" (Larmer 2017). The former Beijing bureau chief for the *The New York Times*, Edward Wong, summarized his decade-long reporting in China since 2008 under the title: "A Chinese Empire Reborn" (2018), explaining the expansion of Chinese power, both domestic and international, in terms of "brute strength, bribery and browbeating," mentioning, among other disturbing developments, the "cycles of violence and repression" in Xinjiang. And it's not just the journalists who see the imperial traits. Scholars have versed as much as well (Terrill 2003, Bovington 2002, Becqueline 2000, Gladney 1998). But turning back to our main concern, which is not China's rising global presence in and of itself, but domestic relations between the Han and Uyghur, with China's growing power and historical racial discourse as a backdrop. What way forward then, for the Uyghurs within this empire and its expanding global reach, if the Chinese state can now openly challenge international norms and seemingly afford impunity from international action because of the power it holds, or the power it projects, over countries and corporations alike? It seems worthwhile here to look for an answer within my data, which are not about quantifying or qualifying "feelings," these perceptions of the Other. Instead of an attempt to capture subjectivity, there are two variables I focus on, both descriptive: the translation of propaganda as I have defined it and the violence between the Han and Uyghur as documented. The trends in the two show a cyclical nature and a mirroring effect, with my observations in Chapter Two being that propaganda seems to precede violence. While it cannot be said that the

cause of violence is propaganda (there are far too many factors to isolate and it can only ever be one among many), the identified relationship between the two suggests that it is worth adjusting the one (propaganda) to see if it influences the other (violence). If one's desired goal is to lessen violence to allow for more regional stability and better governing conditions, then perhaps lessening the publication of propaganda would be a worthwhile experiment.

Moreover, what I find to be the most significant suggestion the data conveys, under the particular framework of ethno-nationalism, is that conflict between populations who strongly identify as distinct ethnicities is extremely difficult to diffuse, since either “lax” or “tight” policies seem both to contribute to the divide. The cyclical nature of the violence—always closely following propaganda in its ups and downs—suggests a futility in the state's fervent endeavor to “communicate” to its minority ethnic population, even in the population's own tongue, given that this propaganda is translated into Uyghur and it is still not “working.” This points to the segregating aspects of language, of which translation, as language, is contingent. As long as these two groups continue to use language to define who they are against each other, translation will serve to mark this difference and remain part of the problem, not a solution. Behavior on both ends will continue to be reactive: violence in reaction to propaganda, propaganda in reaction to violence.

So simply tweaking data points is far from a definite solution. It is instead a suggested way to decrease the incidents of violence, perhaps to the point where less reactive behavior is instigated. If there is enough non-agitated time and space between the two, perhaps there will be hope for more peaceful interaction, which could lead to more instances of intermarriage—because only with the biological mixing of ethnic identities can those ethnic barriers be effectively challenged and overcome. When a child grows up to look like both but not quite

either, then a new identity is forced into being, one which has a much better capacity at compassion towards the Other, because the child is neither. With two “colors” now unmistakably blended into one, the child has no choice but to attempt to reconcile the two identities and the perceived (biological) ethnic traits of each. This theorizing of “hybridity” is proposed from an activist perspective to problematize the dichotomy of being either “Uyghur” or “Han.” It stems from the youth’s nature to rebel and rethink protocol; it is from the bottom up. It is not proposed in the same vein as “diluting” the “ethnic” components of Xinjiang with Han intermarriage, thus paving the way for Han dominance, which is a top-down strategy. It is not policy, which is outside the experience of “body,” but a force emitted from the fusion of opposites that can only happen from within it.

It is a distinctly literary outlook, informed by postcolonial literature in former colonies and literature generated from nations with long-standing immigrant or racially-charged cultures, such as in the United States. It is documented in the election of Barack Obama as the first “black” president—he did not rise to prominence at the Democratic National Convention in 2004 for citing his “blackness”; he did so by citing his white mother as one half of who he is. People like Obama do not happen in a fortnight; but with such prospects in mind, the theory is worth contemplating, which, in simplified terms, is the creation of a less violent environment that may be conducive to producing a hybridity of such kind. This is in contrast from the somber conclusion Moneyhon (2002) draws after a synthesis and analysis of China’s minority rhetoric and policy dating back to the Han dynasty (206 BC- AD 220): “Given the goals of current policy, ‘autonomy’ for Xinjiang means modernization, sinification, and ultimately integration into the Han framework” (151-52).

I do not necessarily dispute Moneyhon's conclusion. In fact, despite not being an analysis on the psychology of nationalism, but on policy and governance, it supports my belief that ethno-nationalism is what drives the contention between the two groups in this Chinese context because, in the end, the winning framework is "the *Han* framework" or, rather, Han nationalism. Moneyhon, notably, does not describe it as any other framework—not the national framework, nor the communist framework. It is "Han." And this is, repeatedly, the underlying basis that frames any study on the two groups in this context: a structural juxtaposition, or opposition, along *ethnic* lines. This might not be so of other kinds of nationalism that arise out of other national contexts, but it is true for this one.

Under Moneyhon's conclusion, drawn on the basis of policy and legal framework, rather than personal narratives of feeling and being, the biracial and bilingual subjects I refer to, instead of questioning the Han narrative, would internalize it. There would be no dichotomy, because it would ultimately be a Han identity, not "multiethnic" as the state claims. But I'm not quite convinced that this will happen in the near future, at least not without a struggle. We stand a decade and a half after Moneyhon's (2002) assessment, and there have been continued recurrences of violence between the two groups, in the scope of my research (Hastings 2011) and beyond, notably in 2009 and 2014, where death tolls in the hundreds were reported (Lee 2014; Jacobs 2014; SCMP 2014). James A. Millward, a scholar who professes three decades of research on the region and author of *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang* (2007), states that "repression in Xinjiang has never been as severe as it has become since early 2017, when Chen Quanguo, the C.C.P.'s new leader in the region, began an intensive securitization program," describing practices such as searching your phone, scanning your ID, your bags, your body, at multiple checkpoints, at banks and supermarkets, because "you are from the wrong *ethnic* group,"

while “members of the *main group* are usually waved through” (2018, para. 1; emphasis added). This is the practice of *segregation*, not integration. If there is an “ultimate” scenario to be had, perhaps it would be that China, after suffering catastrophic consequences as a result of its practices (in contrast to the supposed egalitarian goals of its policies), will ultimately find the audacity in its heart to “let go”—a sentimental poetic assessment versus a political one.

But that is a structural opposition of methodologies, pitting one tradition against another, and not entirely helpful. The fabric in China’s ethos of being, however, its obsession with “unification” and keeping “foreigners” out, that particular brand of *ethno*-nationalism, with the Great Wall serving as both monument and metaphor, does not point to it letting go (or letting any ideas it deems unsavory “in”<sup>35</sup>). “Letting go” is akin to betraying the national ethos, one that has evolved under the benevolent moralist umbrella of “Confucianism” and emerged under times of intense confrontation with foreign forces. Benjamin Schwartz (1964), in his analysis of the quasi-Legalist strain of Confucianism and the Chinese literati’s occupation with the wealth and power of the state in late Qing, identifies it as a particular kind of “muscular” Confucianism, “extraordinary” in its “belligerency” towards the “Western scourge” and “barbarian technology” (15). He traces it back to the Southern Song dynasty (1127-1279), when China was battling the Jurchens,<sup>36</sup> who had conquered Northern Song (960-1126) and founded the Jin dynasty (1115-1234), and the Mongols, who later conquered Southern Song and established the Yuan dynasty

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<sup>35</sup> China has done a remarkable job of controlling the flow of information, from the more primitive burning of books and banning of publications (Bovingdon 2004a, 31), to highly sophisticated technological measures to keep Internet access in check. Only its own social media app WeChat is officially allowed in the country; Instagram, Facebook, Twitter are all banned. A large number of Western news media is inaccessible. Taiwan government sites are inaccessible. The Google platform is inaccessible. The free-flowing information we take for granted outside China can only be accessed via counter-technology measures that are proving increasingly unstable and unreliable when it comes to jumping over China’s Great Firewall. The name is not a misnomer, but a knowing nod to its anti-“barbarian” stance. The ethos has not changed—if there is ever one thing that has remained constant in China’s long, illustrious, and sometimes arduous, history, it is that stance.

<sup>36</sup> 女真

(1271-1368). The embodiment of this “martial ethos” (16) was the Song general Yue Fei (1103-1142), whose story of loyalty to the state and Confucian values (against the backdrop of foreign invasion) are widely circulated in Chinese textbooks<sup>37</sup> and popular culture to this day.

If one is still in doubt of a historical ethnocentric conscious in the Han Chinese psyche, then it would be worthwhile to consider the fact that the origin story of the Mid-Autumn Festival—one of the four officially designated national holidays considered essential to Chinese identity, alongside Chinese New Year, Tomb Sweeping Day (*qingming*), and Dragon Boat Festival (*duanwu*)—contains in it the lore of driving out “outsiders” and their alien regimes. The mooncakes so popularly consumed and gifted during the festival are associated with the uprising against the Mongols who took down General Yue’s beloved Song dynasty. Legend has it that paper messages calling for uprising were slipped into the cakes to be consumed on the night of the festival (Lau 2006; Huaxia 2004). Moreover, the Dragon Boat Festival is heavily standardized as the festival in commemoration of a patriotic poet and statesman, Qu Yuan (340-278 BC), who committed suicide in the name of loyalty to his country. Needless to say the ancient sage-kings he references in *Li Sao*,<sup>38</sup> his epic poem, are Yao and Yu,<sup>39</sup> emblematic of the ideal ruler in Confucianism.

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<sup>37</sup> Yue Fei features as a prominent example in Baranovitch’s (2010) examination of shifting portrayals of historic Han Chinese figures in Chinese textbooks. In an attempt to project the image of an all-inclusive nation, Yue Fei’s traditional “national hero” status had to be modified in the textbooks. This, however, does not preclude his long-standing ethnocentric role in Chinese history. The change in status, according to shifting ideologies of the times (class warfare, economic and cultural liberalization, the threat of ethnic nationalism, etc), was initiated only since the 1960s, whereas he has been ingrained in the national psyche as a “hero” since his death at the hands of the treacherous minister Qin Hui circa 1142. In Taiwan, where Chinese tradition was not disrupted or shaped by Communist ideology or “separatist” concerns, Yue Fei’s patriotic poem, “Man Jiang Hong” (滿江紅) was included in the Chinese literature textbook I read in the 1990s as a middle school student (Yue 1991, 68). Literally translated as “The River Runs Red,” it describes feasting on the flesh and blood of the barbarians (the Jurchens of the Jin dynasty) in revenge for their invasion of China (the Song dynasty).

<sup>38</sup> 離騷

<sup>39</sup> 堯、禹

The degree that these festivals are associated with Confucius tenets can be attested in a study by Yim et al. (2011) that attempts to measure “young children’s expressed views of Confucian values represented in traditional stories of Chinese festivals” in Hong Kong (289), which, after its handover to Beijing is experiencing a reorientation of sorts to “the traditional societies and cultures found in present-day People’s Republic of China,” where “current pre-primary curriculum guidelines also encourage children to ‘develop national identity through an understanding of the Chinese culture’ (Education and Manpower Bureau HKSAR, 2006, 34; cited in Yim et al. 2011, 28). It would not be overkill to also stress that the “Spring” Festival (a name under which Chinese New Year is also known) speaks of the climatic seasons and agricultural practices of the Han space, and have little to do with the space where the nomads roam “wild.”

#### **4. 8 Scholars, Strategies, and the Scholarship of Ethnicity**

“The Taming of the Barbarians” is an elite and elitist thesis and preoccupation that has not changed “since ancient times,” to use one of the PRC’s favorite reasons to cite territorial claim over Xinjiang. It goes hand in hand with a particular brand of ethno-nationalism that places a premium on “unification”<sup>40</sup> under a unifying identity against “foreigners.” Or, more specifically, according to the late Qing revolutionary scholars who debated among themselves the future direction of the great nation, these so called ancient times were divided into the golden age and the dark. The dark age commenced with the Qin’s bureaucratic empire (221-206 BC), the first to proclaim a unified China. The two dark traits of this empire were “the centralization of power in the hands of the emperor who was assisted by bureaucrats trained in Confucian orthodoxy and certified by the civil service examinations” and “the acceleration of this centralization of

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<sup>40</sup> 統一 (天下) tongyi (tianxia); 一統 (天下) yitong (tianxia)

imperial power when foreign ethnic groups like the Mongols and the Manchus ruled China (Hon 2003, 247).

These were Chinese scholars who wanted to overthrow the Qing dynasty, and what they saw was not only a corrupt imperial system, but a system whose most demeaning authoritarian traits were exacerbated in the hands of “foreigners.” The Chinese imperialists were bad, but the foreign imperialists were worse. For them, the golden age was the Zhou dynasty (1046-256 BC) prior to Qin (221-206 BC), and “to revitalize the pre-Qin cultural heritage” required “the abolition of the imperial system and the expulsion of foreign rulers” (Hon 2003, 247). They supposed Zhou was a “Chinese” dynasty and sought to revive it. But how Chinese was “Chinese” in 1050 BC compared to 1905? This attests to the power of Anderson’s “imagination” and the pull of Smith’s “ethnie” to allow the orthodox belief in an undiluted, uncontaminated bloodline and culture stretching thousands of years back into history. How does one expect the brief Soviet honeymoon of class struggle, proletariat revolution, and nationalities-in-the-plural to erase an imagined “5000-year-old” ethnic psyche fortified by an actual 2000-year-old elite ideology, successively reproduced throughout the dynasties via the civil service exam administered by the imperial state? The prevalence of cultural and racial superiority is akin to what is known in the West as “white privilege”—so inherit to the White Man that he sees affirmative action and preferential treatment for minorities and the underprivileged as an affront to his rights to “equality.” Inside the Chinese mind: We are Chinese; everyone one else is “ethnic.” Like elsewhere, “ethnic” denotes skin color that is not the majority color, and colorful dresses and tresses that are not how the majority dresses and wears their hair, which is, now, ironically, the fashion and tastes of an industrialized Western class and couture.

If foreigners become rulers on “our” land, as the Manchus did with the Qing dynasty and the Mongols with the Yuan dynasty, the dream is to one day expel them and reclaim what is rightfully ours; if foreigners reside in “our” land, then they shall succumb to our rule, under the good graces and assimilating powers of a superior civilization. That is the adage. The Realpolitik version of this adage is carried out in the conflicting historical reconstructions of the origins of the Foreigner, as is the case with the archetypal “Xiongnu” in Chinese history, a nomadic tribe frequently challenging Chinese power and (cultural) borders dating as far back as the Warring States period of the late Zhou dynasty (c. 475-221 BC, thereafter which China was united under Qin). As Hirsch (2004) demonstrates, the Xiongnu were *either* recorded as descendants of wolves *or* descendants of the mythical Yu, founder of the first Chinese dynasty Xia (c. 2070 - 1600 BC), depending on the contextual political aims of the times, which could oscillate between countering foreign aggression (wolf = alien blood) or assimilating foreign interests under one Chinese power (look, we’re all descended from the Great Yu). And the strategy works both ways, as Hirsch also demonstrates how the “foreigners” (those outside the orthodox narrative of a Chinese civilization), including both Xiongnu’s Helian Bobo and others like Gou Jian of Yue, asserted the legitimacy of their rise in power by claiming a common Chinese/Han ancestry in Yu (91-92).

However postmodern these Realpolitik findings seem though, with pragmatic purpose trumping racial ideology, the cultural upper hand remains in the hands of the Chinese. Against what is primarily perceived as an oral history of the nomads and other minority ethnicities, the Chinese wield the might of a written language unified under Qin (221-206 BC), the early use of the printing press for “the standardization of Confucian texts used for civil service examinations”

(Tsien 1988, para 6),<sup>41</sup> and the canonization of the 24 dynastic histories, among which the *History of the Former Han* (no. 2) and *History of the Later Han* (no. 3)<sup>42</sup> use explicit “phobic anthropological rhetoric” in describing the Xiongnu as beasts and savages, henceforth creating, for dynasties to come, the “rhetorical template in the political discourse about the northern frontier” (Chin 2010, 361-318; 320). And what of the No. 1 Chinese historical text, *Shi Ji*, or *Records of the Grand Historian*, after which later histories were said to be modeled upon? That was written by Sima Qian (circa 145-86 BC), a Han dynasty official who made no secret of his affinity for Confucian morals and saw himself as the bearer of the tradition of *Spring and Autumn Annals*, a chronicle of the State of Lu traditionally attributed to Confucius. Even if Chin (2010) credits him for deviating from “the traditional moral discourses of the Central States and its Other” (353) in his “Account of the Xiongnu,”<sup>43</sup> the “traditional moral discourses” of denigrating the Other were well and alive as exemplified by the equally influential and orthodox designation of the *Han Shu* and *Hou Han Shu*.

It is certainly enlightening to read Sima Qian’s account of a dialogue between Zhonghang Yue<sup>44</sup> and a Han envoy, wherein which the former dresses down the latter by showing how the Xiongnu ascribe to the tenets of honoring the elderly as much as the Han (Chin 2010, 325), and it is, in fact, the Han who are violent and savage in their competition for dynastic successions (331). But we must bear in mind that this “Han resistance to Han imperialism” (354), against the

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<sup>41</sup> According to Temple (1986, 112; cited in Gunaratnet 2001, 466), “the world’s first official printed publications” were “the 11 Confucian classics - filling 130 volumes - by Prime Minister Feng Dao [of the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period], between 932 and 953.” But even as early as 175-183, “seven Confucian classics, exceeding 200,000 characters, were engraved on some 46 stone tablets” to allow ink rubbings to reproduce the texts from the engravings (Tsien 1985; cited in Gunaratnet 2001, 465). These technical advancements and use of printing guaranteed the survival and proliferation of Confucius ideology.

<sup>42</sup> 《漢書》 hanshu; 《後漢書》 houthanshu

<sup>43</sup> 匈奴列傳 xiongnu liezhuan

<sup>44</sup> 中行說

current state of affairs in China's autonomous ethnic regions, is the exception that did not replace the norm. Sima Qian, after all, is a historian who, in the face of the emperor's anger, had to accept castration to finish his history; and one who had to invoke "Confucius's need for self-censorship" (323) or "veiled words" (Watson [1961] 1993, xiv) in writing about current affairs.<sup>45</sup> And every bit as current is the castrated Chinese intellectual in the face of censorship and an overwhelmingly authoritarian power.

There is little doubt in scholarship that Chinese accounts of history are contentious precisely for these reasons, and specifically because of the historical wealth of production in written Chinese records in the form of both fiction and non-fiction, scholarship and the arts, the bias proves almost too overwhelming to escape. These historical conditions have not changed much in modern times as illustrated in this study, where it is the Chinese who are overwhelmingly producing Uyghur language translations, not the other way around, as would seem one's first logical assumption. It is the Chinese state which has ultimate control of the press and censorship over the production of content, so the odds are strenuous for the Uyghurs if they wish to persuade their Chinese counterparts of anything contradicting Chinese narrative, even if

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<sup>45</sup> 《史記·匈奴列傳》太史公曰：孔氏著春秋，隱桓之間則章，至定哀之際則微，為其切當世之文而罔褒，忌諱之辭也。世俗之言匈奴者，患其微一時之權，而務莖調納其說，以便偏指，不參彼己；將率席中國廣大，氣奮，人主因以決策，是以建功不深。堯雖賢，興事業不成，得禹而九州寧。且欲興聖統，唯在擇任將相哉！唯在擇任將相哉！The Grand Historian remarks: When Confucius wrote the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, he was very open in treating the reigns of Yin and Huan, the early dukes of Lu; but when he came to the later period of Dukes Ding and Ai, his writing was much more covert. Because in the latter case he was writing about his own times, he did not express his judgments frankly, but used subtle and guarded language. The trouble with the ordinary run of men these days who discuss Xiongnu affairs is that they seek only for some temporary advantage, resorting to any kind of flattery in order to have their own views accepted, without considering what the effect may be on all parties concerned. At the same time the generals and military leaders, relying upon the vastness and might of China, grow increasingly bold, and the ruler follows their advice in making his decisions. Thus no profound achievement is ever reached. Emperor Yao in ancient times, as wise as he was, was not completely successful as a ruler; the nine provinces of China had to wait until the reign of Emperor Yu before they knew real peace. If one would establish a truly worthy dynasty such as those of old, therefore, nothing is more important than selecting the right generals and ministers! Nothing is more important than selecting the right generals and ministers! (Translation: Watson [1961] 1993, 162).

it is a Han Chinese, like Sima Qian, who wants to write it. And given what Leibold (2016) has described as “Han cybernationalism,” the struggle, in keeping with our technology-ridden times, is now airborne in the clouds, where, online, Han nationalists are constructing “an alternative spatio-temporal imaginary, one that reconstructs a narrative of Han victimization and redefines the Chinese nation-state as a pure Han state with an unsullied Han culture at its core” (4).

The Internet has proven to be the new frontier to conquer in swaying public opinion, with real-world regime consequences, perhaps best exemplified by China’s fierce online censorship to anything remotely challenging state power, and the accusations and investigations of Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election, which elected Trump, a firebrand, but far from the favorite to win. What Leibold (2016) has identified is not new; it is not so much a “reconstruction” as a continuation of a belief in Chinese superiority, whether falling victim to foreign aggressors or projecting grandeur onto foreign subjects. The sense of superiority justifies being victim and conqueror, accordingly. It dates back two thousand years, as I have sought to trace its lineage, way before it was fashionable and politically correct to prefix “Han” before “Chinese.” But, as Leibold points out, it threatens to undermine “the state’s effort to construct an inclusive, multi-ethnic national imaginary (4).

There have been attempts to address what is now also termed “Han Chauvinism,”<sup>46</sup> notably during China’s endeavor to enter modernity as a nascent republic, after the last dynasty of Qing was overthrown in 1911. However, even at the peak of progressive nationalism that swept the world during the turn of the twentieth century, “tradition” proved hard to resist if we consider that the founding father of the Chinese republic, Sun Yat-sen, delivered a “highly emotive sacrifice before the tomb of the first Ming emperor following the formal abdication of the Qing

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<sup>46</sup> 大漢主義 dahan zhuyi

emperor on 12 February 1912” (Leibold 2014, 5). Sun’s elegy, addressing the first Ming (Chinese) emperor, Zhu Yuanzhang, includes the following:

In twelve years you consolidated the Imperial sway, and the dominions of the Great Yu were purged of pollution and cleansed from the noisome Tartar. Often in history has our noble Chinese race been enslaved by petty frontier barbarians from the north. Never have such glorious triumphs been won over them as your Majesty achieved.  
(cited in Leibold 2014, 5)

In fairness, after the anti-Manchu rhetoric served its purpose of overthrowing the Manchuled dynasty, Sun Yat-sen did shift gears and officially call for a unified nation under the figurative banner of five ethnicities: “Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui, Tibetan” (Chu 1993, 337), but the elegy that Leibold cites is indicative of the underlying anti-“barbarian” dichotomy that fueled the Xinhai Revolution, under which the barbarian rulers of the Manchu-Qing empire must be driven out.

Just as Baranovitch (2010) traces the evolution of the depiction of non-Han peoples in Chinese history textbooks after the formation of the PRC, Leibold (2014) traces the evolution of the depiction of the Xinhai Revolution. Like Baranovitch, he identifies a shifting narrative in relation to the sociopolitical context, from racially motivated uprising in 1911, to anti-capitalist class struggle in 1961, to a post-Mao rhetoric of “national revival,” citing Sun Yat-sen’s (not Mao’s) call for “unity” in 2011. But unlike Baranovitch, who concludes that “there is little doubt that China’s success in maintaining its political unity in an era of rising ethnic nationalism owes much to its ability to incorporate the otherness of China’s minorities on the ideological and discursive level” (116), Leibold believes that the very fact that the state is erasing any trace of anti-ethnic sentiment and persistently reiterating different ethnic categories “renders the idea of a single, shared *Chinese* revolution inherently unstable” (14; emphasis in original). In other words, Baranovitch’s “political unity” is inherently under threat. I agree with Leibold that it is unstable.

The correlated and cyclical data of violence in this study, either in response to or the incentive for Chinese propaganda, supports this instability.

The “incorporation of otherness” which Baranovitch (2010) speaks of is a state scheme. In itself, it is neither right nor wrong, but a necessary strategy in line with the “harmonious society” the state wishes to create. But insofar as non-believers in the party-state see all positive messages to be inherently propaganda, the action of “incorporation” will ring forever hollow and opportunistic; for party-believers and the uninitiated (Han) school children for whom these textbooks are intended, the same “incorporation” will blind them from the reality-based everyday grievances of people they do not see, do not hear, do not interact with. If what they later see outside the textbooks are tightly controlled narratives of unity that leave the state blameless of any wrongdoing, then any altercation between Han and Others will be blamed on Others, further widening the distrust between the Han majority and other ethnic minorities.

Baranovitch (2010) posits that “future resistance to the legitimacy of Chinese rule in minority areas” (116) will become more difficult because of the conscious efforts of the state to paint a multiethnic existence dating back to antiquity. This assumes that both Han and the minorities believe in this story simultaneously. But stories are passive, especially textbook ones. Children outgrow stories. When confronted with reality, they grow up fast, and often only to be locked into the rigidity of adulthood as Grose (2012) cites one of the dialogues included in a Uyghur language textbook published in 1997 intended for *Han* Chinese cadres. The late nineties were marked by a spike in violent uprisings and subsequent forceful crackdowns; the textbook dialogue mirrored those relations in the interrogative nature of the Han Chinese’s questioning of a particular Uyghur’s whereabouts (379-80). In contrast, a textbook intended for a general audience published in the same year, compiled by one Uyghur and one Hui (Chinese Muslim)

professor at Xinjiang University, shows a passage where the Uyghur extends his hospitality to the newly arrived Han Chinese traveler and they become friends (380). Between these two examples, it is not difficult to discern the terms of engagement for the party-in-power versus the party-in-passive. Only one is justified in its interrogation of the other; and the other can only present itself as “friendly.” There is reason to believe that this one-sided goodwill will likely continue to be the norm rather than exception given Leibold’s (2016) documentation of the rise of Han nationalism online.

Online is where our realities are now increasingly created and consumed; and where there is “reality,” there is an “alternative reality.” So what is deemed “resistance” cuts both ways. It is not only minority resistance of Chinese rule that the state must fear, it is also *majority* resistance to an “equality” narrative. If there is anything truly of “antiquity,” that which has been repeated throughout history, it is the Han resistance to that narrative. It is that resistance which threatens to stoke the fires of interethnic conflict. The resurrection of Confucianism under Xi Jinping (China Daily 2017, Economist 2015, Page 2015), an emblem of Han Chinese ruling culture momentarily cast away amid revolutionary zeal—which in fact became state ideology under the Han dynasty (206 BC–AD 220)—serves as a poignant reminder and indicator of that threat. Economically, the resurrection of the Silk Road—the vast trading network consolidated under the Han empire—into what is now known as the Belt and Road Initiative, is also no less a red flag. The irony of this soft-power cultural strategy in invoking ancient sages and silk roads—reflected, for example, in the increase scrutiny directed at China’s international network of more than 500 Confucius Institutes (Peterson 2017, Lim and Furz 2017, Sudworth 2014)—is that the threat China wishes to conceal becomes ever the more conspicuous. The state, fearful of attacks and infiltration from home and abroad, micromanages the minds of its population with

ensorship and selective distribution of information; but in stoking the “greatness” of China, from state propaganda to state-sanctioned scholarship, it is creating an insular, close-minded Han nationalism that threatens the very “harmony” and “peaceful rise”<sup>47</sup> it seeks.

This threat—of unchecked Han nationalism and superiority—can only be effectively countered by its twin, the national ethos of “unity,” which, as aforementioned, dates back to the Qin dynasty (221-206 BC), just one step ahead of the orthodox Confucianism of the Han dynasty (206 BC-220 AD). Thus for unity’s sake, the Han will call for “equality.” Unity—which translates into the material preservation of the territorial lands inherited from the Qing empire—is the reason behind Sun Yat-sen’s shifting trajectory of anti-Manchu sentiment to the “family-of-five” (*Wuzu Gonghe*)<sup>48</sup> and ultimately to the idea that all ethnicities should unite as one *Zhonghua* nationality (*Zhonghua Minzu*); in other words, there must be a unified identity to act against the *foreign* powers who are eyeing Tibet, Xinjiang, Mongolia, and Manchuria (Chu 1993). This Realpolitik evolution of nationalism also echoes the debates being held forth concerning the nation-building project, where the conception of a multiethnic state gradually gained recognition against a purely Han envisioned nation.

This conception can be traced to Liang Qichao (1873-1929), one of the foremost intellectuals during the transitional period from empire to nation-state, who is believed to be the first to put forth the idea of “*Zhonghua Minzu*” ([1902] 1936) and proposed that this *Zhonghua* ethnicity “had not been inherently composed of one single ethnicity, but that it was a hybrid of many”<sup>49</sup> ([1905] 1936). The concept was fully fleshed out by one of the most highly esteemed

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<sup>47</sup> 和平崛起 *heping jueqi*; first proposed in 2003 at the Boao Forum for Asia. <http://www.people.com.cn/BIG5/guandian/8213/8309/28296/2456452.html>. Accessed February 5, 2018.

<sup>48</sup> 五族共和 *wuzu gonghe*; five races under one republic. The five refer to Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui, and Tibetan.

<sup>49</sup> 中華民族自始本非一族，實由多民族混合而成

social anthropologists in China, Fei Xiaotong (1910-2005), when he presented his paper “Zhonghua Minzu: The Concept of Diversity Within Integration”<sup>50</sup> as part of the Tanner Lecture series in 1988, hosted by the Chinese University of Hong Kong. The legitimization of the theory of “diversity within integration,” where all ethnicities could coexist in the spirit of unity, was certainly helped by the fact that Communist China was heavily influenced by the Soviet model and had established “Stalin’s theory of ‘nationality’ as the doctrinal basis of China’s policy regarding minorities” (Ma 2014, 238). The politically correct “multi-national” state thus welcomed the anthropological boost to its claim.

But under this seeming progression from ethno-nationalism to civic-nationalism are the often overlooked details that shaped the closing argument. When Sun Yat-sen proposed that all the ethnic groups within China form one inclusive *Zhonghua* nationality “in the fashion of the United States of America with its black and white and multiple ethnicities,” he appealed to his Han brethren to “sacrifice the Han bloodline, its history, its belief in superiority” to make this happen. “Sacrifice” means: We, the Han, will be the bigger man. In his address to the military, the patronizing undercurrent of Han ethnocentrism was even more blatant:

The Manchus might be gone, but the Republic of China is only quasi-independent. Saying that five ethnicities can govern the country together is fiction. The Tibetans, Mongols, Hui, and Manchus are incapable of self-defense. The realization of nationalism and the assimilation of the Tibetans, Mongols, Hui, and Manchus into the Han nationality in order to build the largest nationality and nation lies in Han self-determination. (Sun cited in Chu 1993, 342-43)<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> 费孝通 《中华民族的多元一体格局》；the English translation is taken from *Globalization and Cultural Self-Awareness* (2015, 77), a compilation of Fei’s writings and speeches.

<sup>51</sup> 今則滿族雖去，而中華民國國家，尚不免成為半獨立國，所謂五族共和者，直欺人之語！蓋藏、蒙、回、滿，皆無自衛能力，發揚光大民族主義，而使藏、蒙、回、滿，同化與我漢族，建設一最大之民族國家者，是在漢人之自決。

There is no mistaking the passive position the minorities occupy. The belief in the superior agency of the Han is apparent. When Fei talks about the national minorities, he cannot help but comment that “for historical reasons, minorities have lagged behind in cultural and economic development” and that necessitates “the principle of ‘the more developed help the less developed’” ([1988] 2015, 107). This is “development” judged on the basis of Han industrialization according to a Western model. These “historical reasons” are reasoned from the perspective of Han history, and insofar as that history has held discriminatory views towards those minorities, the “preferential” policies that Fei speaks of have since backfired, ensuing ill will on each side. Recognizing the failure, and the crisis of “unity,” Ma Rong (2014) has proposed that the Soviet imprint on China’s minority ideology be abandoned and that all citizens, minority or not, be treated equally under the rule of law. He cites the very logical, and ironic, fact that “minority elites who were educated by ‘Marxist theory of nationality’ have shown a stronger ‘nationality consciousness’ in dealing with these issues (238).

Ma instead looks to the US model, where black civil rights have greatly improved, and connects this to the fact that “there are no significant separatist movements in the USA” (240), as if to say that equal rights for blacks prevented secession. Did it really? The black population was imported against their will as slaves to a foreign land with no recourse to return home. There is no ancestral territory in the US to claim as their own (in contrast to the Uyghur and Tibetan situations); of course they can’t “separate.” And one seems to not remember the cause of the Civil War. The South was threatening secession from the Union because they did not want their black slaves to become citizens with equal rights (and they are still struggling with Confederacy-complex to this day, and at times quite violently). Again, this is the “error” of privileged ethnocentrism in seeing only the Other as “ethnic/colored”—Ma only sees that there is no “black”

attempt to secede, while completely overlooking the secessionist ethno-nationalism of the “white” ethnic tribe. This is what I would argue to be the incapacity of the Han scholars to see Han ethno-nationalism equally complicit in “ethnic” tension, if not more responsible, given their overwhelming power (which they acknowledge to have, but are ultimately unaware of its deep-rooted, normalized, elitist tendencies). As for the Native Americans, who do have territory to claim, they are so diminished in power and numbers at the hands of foreign invaders, that even dignity proves a struggle, let alone secession. But perhaps the most naïve and blindly ivory-tower, albeit entirely progressive and liberal, statement is the following:

My ideal type of ethnic relations is that the state and mainstream society treat all citizens as equal individuals, regardless of ethnic backgrounds, and that all rights that concern minorities such as cultural rights (language, religion, customs), political rights (democracy, election, freedom, justice), educational rights (school admission, training programs), economic rights (employment, professional advancement, benefits), and social rights (local participation, healthcare) can be covered by citizens’ rights in a modern democratic society under the rule of law. (Ma 2014, 241)

Ma acknowledges that China has a long way to go, and that “ethnic prejudice and discrimination have a long history among the Han,” so it is “thus in the hands of the Han” (242) that relations be improved. But his “equality” thesis cannot be advanced until that history is reckoned with, in theory (how discrimination—and privilege—has been theorized and internalized throughout history), and in the everyday realities in which it is manifest, in schools, in workplaces, in factories, in religious expression—in expression at all. All this requires scholarship and surveys and speech that are not permissible under this regime. Until they are, even the most sympathetic of Chinese intellectuals, will continue to cling to the “unity” thesis out of “innate” ideological upbringing, making it a sacrilegious cultural betrayal to even approach the subject of “autonomy,” let alone debating the concept and its implementation from *both* sides of the argument to allow for a more-rounded, better-informed solution. They will

continue to cite the “failures” of “Western” liberal democracy, the inability of the masses to “correctly grasp” decisions on “larger matters,” terrorist outside forces waiting to infiltrate via Islam, international powers vying for a piece of China, using human rights as an excuse for violating China’s sovereignty—which are observations made by Sebastian Veg (2008) upon reviewing Wang Lixiong’s *My Far West, Your East Turkestan* (2007).<sup>52</sup>

Wang is the author of two other well-known books: *Yellow Peril* (1991) and *Sky Burial: The Fate of Tibet* (1998).<sup>53</sup> He is also a former political prisoner who has shared his imprisonment with a Uyghur intellectual he identifies as “Mokhtar.” Banned in China and published in Taiwan, his 2007 book on Xinjiang exposes Uyghur discontent and the discriminatory realities of their existence. But even as he sympathizes, his outlook on the “Xinjiang Problem” nevertheless betrays the Chinese intellectual’s impenetrable belief in elitist Chinese “wisdom” and the ever dubious glances at Western “theories.” The wall of censorship that China has created around its citizenry and intellectuals, the filtering of information and white-washing of narrative, has exacerbated these tendencies and created a population defined by neo-ethnocentrism—a return to the orthodox belief in Chinese superiority, boosted not by “culture,” but the material gains of Western capitalism, in wealth and power. The critical gaze can no longer turn inwards because that muscle has shriveled under the state’s deliberate intervention.

The laws exist, in all their fairness and equality, as Fei rightly claims: “Since 1949 after the founding of New China, equality of all ethnic groups has been a fundamental policy and is enshrined in the constitution” ([1988] 2015, 107). The law is not the problem. The *Zhonghua*

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<sup>52</sup> 王力雄 《我的西域，你的東土》 wode xiyu, nide dongtu

<sup>53</sup> 《黃禍》 huanghuo; 《天葬—西藏的命運》 tianzang—xizang de mingyun

*Minzu* “diversity within integration” thesis put forth by Fei explains the improbable number of 91.6% of the population identifying as “Han” (2010 Census)—it took thousands of years of assimilation, acculturation, sinicization, integration, and certainly aggression. But that thesis does not readily cover the other 8.4%, especially the population who has struck fear in the heart of the state. What does the state fear? Could it be the loss of the ethnocentric position of privilege, where it is always on the right side of wrong? How else does one explain the accumulation of ironies, paradoxes, and double-binds it has put itself into on the journey towards modernity.

Among the proponents of a *Zhonghua Minzu*, however, were also historians who were not quite championed by either the Nationalists or Communists, and earned the ire of both, like Gu Jiegang (1893-1980), who never seemed to fit the ideology du jour. Gu was censured, in the 1920s, by the Nationalist party in power, when he refused “to give the Han people a privileged position in historical accounts”; in the 1930s, he favored Hu Shi’s approach to history by means of “reorganizing China’s national heritage”<sup>54</sup> over the Marxist zeitgeist of the times; by the 1950s, due to his allegiance to Hu Shi, a scholar upheld by the Nationalists, he was accused of “bourgeoisie scholarship” under the PRC (Hon 1996, 316). According to Hon, Gu believed that the exclusivity of Han dynasty Confucianism contributed to the downfall of the Han race, while the infusion of “new blood” from foreign tribes was the rejuvenating force behind its survival (320). His vision for a new China lay in the hands of “those who were not contaminated by the Han elite: the uneducated masses, the minority ethnic groups, and those who lived on the borderlands” (321). The mission was to mobilize “these underprivileged groups, bringing them from the periphery to the center” (321). He believed in mass education and empowerment; that is,

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<sup>54</sup> 整理國固 zhengli guogu

both knowledge and power traditionally reserved for the elite and literati in imperial China. Gu's was probably the most romantic vision of all, and likely because of its grassroots romanticism it was the most unlikely to succeed.

#### **4.9 Conclusion**

By establishing the struggle between Han and Uyghur as competing ethno-nationalistic forces, and tracing the ethnic origins of Confucianism, this chapter reframes Confucianism as an ideological manifestation of ethnocentrism, which enabled Chinese rulers, from the dynasties to the republics, to carry out their ethno-nationalist agenda under the cultural umbrella of a grand *Zhonghua Minzu* narrative, supported by scholars that Confucianism has subsumed into effective state actors. This ethnocentric propensity continues to inform the divide witnessed in the surveys and studies cited in this chapter, which are becoming harder to carry out in an increasingly censored environment. What rang true for the castrated Sima Qian, also rang true for Gu Jiegang's romantic vision of a population uncontaminated by the Han elite. In time, romanticism gave way to modernism, and specifically "high modernism," where the state becomes more concerned about management than the people it actually manages. If the powers that be in China had decided on forming a "multiethnic" state, which paradoxically was driven by only one ethnic Han vision, then ethnicities must be identified, categorized, recognized, and consolidated; even created. Thus, for China, it becomes imperative to "see" like a state (Scott 1998) in the fabrication of a unified nation and the distribution of this image, pristine and forward-looking.

## CHAPTER 5

### HIGH MODERNISM AND MARXISM

#### 5.1 Introduction

This chapter further explores how the contemporary execution of this ethnocentrism employs the idioms of the ideologies known as high modernism and Marxism. More specifically, it explores how China translates these supposed “Western” concepts deemed to be “modern” and “progressive” and “scientific” to legitimize the state’s contemporary approach towards interethnic relations and the governance of the ethnic other. The Confucian moral structure is demonstrated to have survived the revolutions that promised China’s entry into modernity, even when scholars called for the translation of modernity, in the form of science and democracy, to abolish the Confucian state at the turn of the twentieth century. It survived because the ethnocentric subjectivity that defines the Confucian scholar translated, equally, the tenets of high modernism as well as Marxism-Leninism into Chinese interpretations supporting China’s ruling ethos of historical exceptionalism that concentrated power in an authoritarian figurehead.

#### 5.2 Seeing Like a Multiethnic State

One would be inclined to think that the Chinese ethnographers were mere executioners of state will from the get-go, when the Chinese Communist Party seized power in 1949. According to Mullaney (2010), though, they weren’t quite handmaidens yet when the need for ethnic classification became apparent in anticipation of the first National People’s Congress to be held in 1954, which was before the apex of the frenzied ideological stronghold unleashed by the Anti-Rightist campaigns (1957-59) and later Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). In 1953, after the results of the first official population census, where respondents were allowed to fill in their own

*minzu*/ethnic group without state intervention, it dawned upon the Party that now “a staggering 400 distinct *minzu* names were registered nation-wide” and “20 of these ‘groups’ were recorded with ‘populations’ of only one” (329). Given that the Congress was to be a symbol of representative government and the “1953 Election Law promised that at least one representative seat would be awarded to each minority group regardless of population size,” the Communist party now faced “the absurd prospect of a single minority delegate literally standing in on behalf of him or herself” (329). Thus was born the need to categorize China’s ethnic groups into manageable populations to enable the function of representational politics. Allowing groups to self-identify became impractical for governance purposes. In other words, according to this account, the Ethnic Classification Project<sup>1</sup> that began in the province of Yunnan, home to 200 of the 400 groups, was not borne out of Han ethnocentrism or state authoritarianism, but practicality.

I suspect it is for this reason that Mullaney (2010) contends the Chinese Communists “did not teach themselves how to ‘see like a state,’ ... at least not when it came to the fundamentally important problem of ethnic categorization” (326). He believes that what the state did was “to the contrary” (326). The contrary-argument goes that the Chinese state was “inexperienced” and needed to rely on “the eyes of its social scientific advisors” and, by proxy, the paradigm of “comparative social sciences” to conduct ethnographic classification (327). I would like to maintain, *to the contrary*, that the state was precisely practicing what Scott is talking about, which is *legibility*—to untangle what seemed like too big a ball of yarn, and make it “legible” for administrative purposes from a central perch. The practice allows what is too messy from the bottom-up to be clear and manageable from the top-down. The fact that the state employed the expertise of “social” scientists does not negate Scott’s political theory; it is part and parcel of it,

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<sup>1</sup> 民族識別 *minzu shibie*

because a State is not an entity run by an individual all-knowing person. It is an entity that employs “expertise,” also known as the “elite,” to allow the government to smoothly carry out its governing ideology, which was, in China’s case at the time, a progressive/revolutionary representative government of the people.

The ethnographic practices Mullaney (2010) describes—such as conducting “only as much fieldwork as was necessary to corroborate or modify” a pre-determined language-based classification model and carrying out “a rapid succession of brief interviews with very few representatives from each of the applicant groups” (331)—were performed in service of the state’s pressing timeline and ultimate goal to successfully convene the first National People’s Congress. They were not in service of the minority population’s initial self-determining categories as the 1953 census made apparent. The researchers “did not have enough time to research all of the applicant groups who showed up,” so priorities were assigned by the state, identifying “political sensitive groups [to be surveyed] before all others,” which referred to the larger ethnic groups with corresponding political clout (335). However, among the larger groups, there were those deemed “a priori”: 14 ethnic groups “whose existence, authorities agreed, was beyond question and did not require any further authentication”; using the pre-existing groups as “receptacle” categories, the researchers would determine “which other applicant groups in the region might feasibly be recategorized as one of these fourteen” (336).

One way of achieving this was through interviewing techniques where researchers “deliberately congregated” members of different ethnic groups which could communicate with each other through shared linguistic traits and “encouraged interaction during the interview in the hope that the interviewees would come to self-identify with the hitherto ‘Other’ group[s]” (337). If “encouraged interaction” was not enough, edifying persuasion was involved (338). Because

the classification model was determined as language-based on the outset, the researchers could now merge the groups based on “objective data supporting their taxonomic recommendation, bolstered by the subjective consent of the groups themselves” (338). None the more glaring here is the adherence to the objectivity of the “scientific” method and the principle of ethics by “consent.” What is “objective” here is in fact an outsider’s condition of examination—the anthropological gaze unto others who are different, rendering humans into slots of (predetermined) scientific categories to be studied like specimen. The colonial bearings of the discipline called “anthropology” are unmistakable here; the power relations between the civilized researcher and unsuspecting native are clear.

Colonial power relations notwithstanding, the ethnographic practices detailed by Mullaney (2010) are the linchpin of Scott’s theory: organizing information in a way that allows the state to efficiently implement what it believes to be the correct structure of governance, irrespective of how remote, in the end, that structure might be from addressing actual on-the-ground needs. It is the removal (or denial) of any contextual incongruities—topographies, human and natural—that could “complicate” The Plan. This governing belief is not totalitarian in and of itself, but it is a marker of totalitarian regimes, whose philosophy is not simply an echo of China’s past. And it is this imposed value judgment onto this governing belief that all too readily links the practice of legibility with malign intentions. Scott’s (1998) examples of catastrophic consequences—from singular programs like the Great Leap Forward to the all-too-common schemes of “Third World” development (3)—aid this perception. So the logic goes that if China employed “scientists” of “social” studies to carry out ethnographic work for representative “democracy,” then it was not “seeing like a state” in Scott’s sense. But it was, as I’ve explained, regardless of its absence of totalitarian intentions and regardless of its “scientific” premise. Mullaney cites the fact that the

14 a priori groups were scientifically established by scholars *before* the Communists came into power as grounds for it not being “state”-determined categories (338); but insofar as ethnography was dictated by a Han/Sinicized intelligentsia and that historical racial undertones nurtured China’s nationalism and the configuration of its nation-state, the “classification” work was a “seeing” top-down process. Ironically, it can even be said that because of its entirely “good” intentions and emphasis on “scientific” methodology, it is, quite classically, “seeing like a state.”

In understanding this seemingly counterintuitive argument, it would help to reveal the complete title of Scott’s book which Mullaney (2010) references: *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (1998). The state’s intention is to *improve* the human condition. It is an entirely noble cause whose ideals stem from the ideology of high modernism, which Scott credits as the driving force behind large-scale state-sponsored social engineering efforts. According to Scott, “high modernism” is:

best conceived as a strong (one might even say muscle-bound<sup>2</sup>) version of the beliefs in scientific and technical progress that were associated with industrialization in Western Europe and in North America from roughly 1830 until World War I. At its center was a supreme self-confidence about continued linear progress, the development of scientific and technical knowledge, the expansion of production, the rational design of social order, the growing satisfaction of human needs, and, not least, an increasing control over nature (including human nature) commensurate with scientific understanding of natural laws. High modernism is thus a particularly sweeping vision of how the benefits of technical and scientific progress might be applied—usually through the state—in every field of human activity. (89-90)

The Ethnic Classification Project might not have been initiated as a meticulously thought-through social engineering project that perfectly matches the cases that Scott presents, but its underlying philosophy carried out by Chinese scholars and its consequences of fixed ethnic

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<sup>2</sup> Recall Benjamin Schwartz’s (1964) description of a “muscular” Confucianism mentioned earlier in Chapter 4, Ethno-Nationalism and the Nation-State.

identities that end up working against the formation of a unified “Chinese” identity are congruous with the high modernist ideals of legibility and improvement and, ultimately, ironic results, if not quite failure. In fact, a further illustration of how the Ethnic Classification Project fits into Scott’s exposition of high modernist statecraft can be seen in *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia* (2009), published a decade after *Seeing Like A State* (1998), where he uses the same logic to explain the behavior of the state within the ethnic context—how it demarcates the civilized-in-the-valley vis-à-vis the barbarian-in-the-hills, how its frontiers are drawn and (the end/beginning of) civilization mapped, making direct reference to the classification practices of Chinese ethnographers in the 1950s in the Yunnan and Guizhou areas, who used “essentially Han technologies and customs” as “the [m]arkers for levels of civilization” (104). Here, the paradox of “technology” is also made apparent.

When Scott (2009, 253) talks about the effects of “distant-demolishing” technologies—such as the railroad, steam power, telegraph; advances in military organization, land surveying, and dissemination of texts—he largely talks about their “homogenizing” effects of, literally, demolishing the distance between the state and its frontiers. The paradox or, rather, irony, in the Chinese-Uyghur context, is that the more the state minimizes the geographical friction created by distance, the greater the figurative distance and the greater the friction it creates between the Han state and its Uyghur subjects, as evidenced in the previously cited studies of mutual resentment and documentation of violence. “Translation”—here meaning the wholesale dissemination of translated propaganda (i.e. “texts”) into Uyghur—may purport to homogenize, but in fact, like the effect of fixed ethnic categories, end up jeopardizing the ethno-nationalist project.

It is true that language—both written and oral—is instrumental in statecraft, or resistance to it. Scott (2009) points out: “Written traditions are of enormous instrumental value to the process of permanent political centralization and administration. Oral traditions, on the other hand, have substantial advantages for peoples whose welfare and survival depend on a fleet-footed adjustment to a capricious and menacing political environment” (237). The problem, here, again, is that the forced imposition of a Chinese written tradition onto the Uyghur population, either through translation or compulsory Mandarin education, fuels the Uyghur to counter with their own written tradition (e.g. competing historiographies); as for the flexibility of “orality” in offering the peripheral population a means to better position themselves “vis-à-vis their powerful text-based neighbors” (237), that does not exist as an “active choice” (237) for the Uyghurs. They are not neighbors of the Chinese state. They are held within it.

Mullaney (2010) absolves the state’s role in the classification of ethnic identities by saying it was in fact the social scientists who were the “lumpers” of ethnic categories (333) and these “scientific” categories were well in place before the creation of the People’s Republic of China (338). But this obscures the other fact that during the turbulent years of power struggle and nation building surrounding the Republican era, scholars carried the state, albeit one fractured by regional warlords (1916-28), the Sino-Japanese War (1937-45), and the Communist-Nationalist civil war (1927-49). As fractured as was the Political State, the Cultural State was held together by high modernist ideals championed by Western-educated and Western-influenced Chinese intellectuals, of which the New Culture Movement (1915-1920s) and May Fourth Movement (1919) marked the pinnacle. Both the Communist and Nationalist leadership of today still celebrate the movement, a testament to the cross-aisle appeal and appropriation of Western

modernist thought along the political spectrum, as well as a nod to the movement's strategic value in the nation-building narrative (JYB 2009, OOP 2009).<sup>3</sup>

### 5.3 The State-Scientist-Scholar Complex

The parallel movements of New Culture and May Fourth called for the abolition of the Confucian State—the traditions of patrimony and hierarchy that kept society stratified to uphold a central authority concentrated in the symbolic hands of the emperor. In other words, they called for the emancipation from China's feudalistic past, symbolized in the bound feet of its women that crippled its ability to keep up and compete with the scientific progress of its times, that made it weak and vulnerable to foreign aggression. The pillars of Science and Democracy were to be the saviors of the nation. And so enshrined they were in the revolutionary conscience that they assumed human form in the rhetoric of Chen Duxiu. In *La Jeunesse (New Youth)*,<sup>4</sup> the progressive magazine he founded in 1915 in Shanghai, Chen, the Xinhai revolutionary, Socialist leader, and soon-to-be founding member of the Chinese Communist Party, declared:

We admit to our crimes. But we commit them in the name of supporting Mr. De-mo-ke-la-xi (democracy) and Mr. Sai-yin-si (science). To support Mr. De, we must oppose Confucianism, Confucian etiquette, chastity, old ethics, old politics. To support Mr. Sai, we must oppose old art, old religion. To support Mr. De and Mr. Sai, we must oppose old culture and old literature. Westerners fought and bled for their support of Mr. De and Mr. Sai, and only after fighting and bleeding were they saved by Mr. De and Mr. Sai, and brought from darkness into light. We believe that only these two gentlemen can save us from the darkness engulfing China's politics and

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<sup>3</sup> In the interest of each party's governing contexts, one celebrates revolution and patriotism (JYB 2009), while the other extols democracy and independent thought (OOP 2009). Neither claims in the versions are innocent in respect to the need for both parties to stay in power—one relies on ideological "patriotism," while the other must convince its constituents to exercise "independent thought" in a democratic voting procedure (i.e. vote for "us" despite what you hear that may be of the contrary).

<sup>4</sup> The inaugural issue was published as 《青年雜誌》 (qing nian za zhi), but was later changed to 《新青年》 (xin qing nian) starting with the second volume in 1916, which literally means "new youth"; *La Jeunesse* is the French title printed on the cover.

morals and scholarship and thought. If we must confront government oppression, social ridicule and attacks, so be it—have our heads and let us bleed.<sup>5</sup> (1919)

It was the kind of Science and Democracy that Walter Lippmann, orator of American progressive liberalism and founding member of *The New Republic* (1913), eloquently championed in *Drift and Mastery* (1914), with prose both nimble and sharp, offering a new future (beyond village mentality and the American prairies) led by a new kind of government (expert-driven, interventionist, “big”) working in the interest of the public (and greater) good, to position the nation for a new future (where the players are not individuals but collective interests on a national scale and global stage). Against conservatives and old sentiments, the Church and orthodoxy, Lippmann (1914) proclaims:

*The rebel program is stated. Scientific invention and blind social currents have made the old authority impossible in fact, the artillery fire of iconoclasts has shattered its prestige. We inherit a rebel tradition. The dominant forces in our world are not the sacredness of property, nor the intellectual leadership of the priest; they are not the divinity of the constitution, the glory of industrial push, Victorian sentiment, New England respectability, the Republican Party, or John D. Rockefeller. Our time, of course, believes in change. The adjective ‘progressive’ is what we like, and the word ‘new,’ be it the New Nationalism of Roosevelt, the New Freedom of Wilson, or the New Socialism of the syndicalists. (xviii-xix; emphasis in original)*

There is more than a ring of familiarity between the progressive West and aspiring East, but there is nothing uncanny about the similarities. The successive and corresponding years of publications and proclamations, of “Newness” and “Rebellion,” in both the *Republic* (1913) and *Youth* (1915) is indicative. It was not by coincidence that Hu Shi, one of the leading intellectuals

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<sup>5</sup> 这几条罪案我们直认不讳。但是只因为拥护那德莫克拉西（Democracy）和赛因斯（Science）两位先生，才犯了这几条滔天的大罪。要拥护那德先生，便不得不反对孔教，礼法，贞节，旧伦理，旧政治。要那赛先生，便不得不反对旧艺术，旧宗教。要拥护德先生，又要拥护赛先生，便不得不反对国粹和旧文学。西洋人因为拥护德、赛两先生，闹了多少事，流了多少血，德、赛两先生才渐渐从黑暗中把他们救出，引到光明世界。我们现在认定只有这两位先生，可以救治中国政治上道德学术上思想上一切的黑暗。若因为拥护这两位先生，一切政府的迫压，社会的攻击笑骂，就是断头流血，我们都不推辞。

of the New Culture Movement and contributor to Chen's *New Youth*, was a student of John Dewey's at Columbia University from 1915-17 and heavily influenced by his philosophy of pragmatism, of which the methodology was "in short, the application of scientific methods and attitudes to new areas of investigation" (Grieder 1962, 93). Hu administered exactly that in his *Outline of the History of Chinese Philosophy* (1919),<sup>6</sup> revolutionizing Chinese scholarship by questioning, from the premise of fact and evidence, what was taken for granted as the authority of the "Classics." If, in the West, the Church was no longer infallible, Confucius, in the East, was far from a saint.

Though Dewey and Lippmann disagreed on the capacity of the masses (and their objective conditions) to uphold democracy as an informed, enlightened citizenry—the former maintained the necessity of a bottom-up process of social inquiry via "news," while the latter was skeptical because of the "manufacturing of consent" via that very same medium—they both emphasized the necessity of education and the development of expertise for the administration of a democratic society (Lippmann 1922, 1927; Dewey 1922, 1927). Though post-May Fourth saw a split between liberal intellectuals like Hu from Marxists like Chen—notably encapsulated in the debate on "-ism's" between Hu Shi (1919) and Li Dazhao (1919)<sup>7</sup>—the two sides were uniform in their belief that it was "tradition" that kept the masses intellectually wanting and fettered to old hierarchies, preventing the wider participation in democracy that China so badly needed. The Venn diagram of Lippmann-Dewey-Hu-Chen would reveal that amid the varied aspects of "progressivism" each exhibited according to what direction they believed the nation should take,

<sup>6</sup> 《中國哲學史大綱》 zhongguo zhexueshi dagang

<sup>7</sup> 胡適: 《多研究些問題, 少談些主義》 (More on Issues; Less on Ism's) in 《每週評論》 (*Weekly Commentary*) no. 31, 1919. <https://zh.wikisource.org/zh-hant/多研究些問題, 少談些主義>; 李大釗: 《再論問題與主義》 (Revisiting Issues and Ism's) in 《每週評論》 (*Weekly Commentary*) no. 35, 1919. <https://zh.wikisource.org/zh-hant/再論問題與主義>. Accessed February 5, 2018.

at the center lay the common belief in the empowerment of the individual (freed from conventional class and creed) to be a part of a larger cause (democracy), to form a community driven by the common good. That was the zeitgeist, *from West to East*, literally, in that direction, aka that *translation flow*. The concrete existence of that flow is seen in Li's rebuttal of Hu's criticism, when Li directly references content from "the American *New Republic*" regarding rumors surrounding the Bolshevik government (para. 5). It might not have been the Internet age of social media and tweets in 1919, but by means of the technological advances achieved in the form of the press, train, and ship; information, like revolutionary zeal, traveled fast.

Scott designates the timeline for high modernism "from roughly 1830 to World War I" (1998, 89). This also roughly corresponds to the demise of the Chinese dynastic empire and the increasing shame and self-loathing the Chinese felt in the face of Western dominance. It is therefore not by accident that the Chinese embarked on a quest for modernity, emulating their Western counterparts in the pursuit of science and technology, reason and rationality, as the answer to its social ills and diminishing geopolitical power. However, in China, what survived the split between Lippmann-Dewey-Hu-Chen and the respective approaches they championed when it came to building "the nation" was not the common core of individual empowerment. What survived against the two-thousand-year-old Chinese ethos of governance, or what Jonathan Spence (1980) called "the strength and impermeability of the Confucian moral structure" (33), was Lippmann's elitism: a top-down, technocrat-approach towards governance. It survived not because it was something "new." It survived because it was *already there*. All it needed was a new coat of paint to reflect the shift in color scheme from one era to another—from imperial yellow to KMT blue to CCP red. China's ruling ethos allowed the manipulation of Dewey's

“education” into propaganda; “elitism” became authoritarian, and “science” a crutch to pseudo-democracy. Just like “Confucianism” became a crutch to imperial rule.

There was, and is, no clear-cut separation between state-scientist-scholar. Just like Walter Lippmann who later went on to advise Woodrow Wilson in his speeches, the intellectuals published in China’s *New Youth* eventually saw the vernacular language they championed become the language of education and literature. The difficulty to separate scholar and state in China, much like the stickiness of church and state in the West, is mired in history. For China, it is traced back two thousand years to the Western Han dynasty (206 BC-24 AD), and specifically to Dong Zhongshu<sup>8</sup> (179-104 BC), the scholar traditionally credited for the consolidation of Confucianism into state orthodoxy, albeit not without contention to the more nuanced details of his teachings and actual authorship of *The Luxuriant Dew of the Spring and Autumn Annals*<sup>9</sup> (Loewe 2011), from which the theory of *sangang*<sup>10</sup>—the hierarchical relationship between Ruler (and his) Ministers, Father (and his) Son, and Husband (and his) Wife<sup>11</sup>—was said to be first propagated. Though it was this very relationship that the modern Chinese intellectuals, both Republican and Communist, deemed feudal and rebelled against, the devotion and loyalty these scholars exhibited towards “the nation” derives its zeal from this very hierarchy. Dong preached divinity in the ruling order; there was a higher order, and if there was not yet a divine figure leading the nation, the nation itself would be divine. For the scholar, the only way to serve the nation is via the state. So the scholar, by default, serves the state. Following this hierarchical logic, there is little wonder that both Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek, as respective heads of state across the Taiwan Strait, enjoyed the (ruthless) power they had no matter their politics. And

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<sup>8</sup> 董仲舒

<sup>9</sup> 《春秋繁露》 chunqiu fanlu

<sup>10</sup> 三綱 sangang

<sup>11</sup> 君為臣綱，父為子綱，夫為妻綱 jun wei chen gang; fu wei zi gang; fu wei qi gang

there is more than a hint of the permanence and “the strength of the Confucian moral structure” in the current appointment of Wang Huning, “the professor-turned-Communist theoretician who has been a major adviser to three Chinese leaders” (Mozur 2017a) to the 19th Politburo Standing Committee under Xi Jinping (October 2017).

It would also merit pointing out that the context of Dong’s “Confucianism”—the emphasis on the uniformity of thought and unification of country—was a Han Dynasty China threatened by both internal strife (Rebellion of the Seven States; 154 BC)<sup>12</sup> and external foreign aggression (Xiongnu).<sup>13</sup> The great emperor was looking for a way to centralize power internally and conquer the barbarians externally; he found his answer in Dong’s governing philosophy. How Chinese history has looked upon this period is reflected in the designated politically correct term “*Han* Chinese.” It was a period that was victorious and glorious, one that solidified the “Chinese” identity and the legitimacy of “Han” rule. It was a belief that was indoctrinated and internalized via civil service examinations administered to flocks of young men eagerly wanting to bring glory to the family name by serving the state. *That*, in China, was the engine of “education.” And the student-scholar identity is so fixed in Chinese lore that countless tales and literature tell of his journey; the hardship he endures on his long trek to attend the imperial exams to realize his dream of serving king and country, or, in China’s case, emperor and empire. It is our odyssey, complete with fox spirit temptresses, the woman left behind, and forces of evil and good. But far from an intellectual reawakening, Benjamin Elman (1991) explains, in strictly Bourdieu terms of class reproduction:

Classical examinations were an effective intellectual, social, and political construction that met the needs of the state bureaucracy while simultaneously

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<sup>12</sup> 七國之亂 qi guo zhi luan

<sup>13</sup> 漢匈之戰 han xiong zhi zhan; a series of wars fought between China and Xiongnu roughly between 133 BC-89 AD.

supporting late imperial class structure. Cultural construction of neo-Confucian orthodoxy through the required educational curriculum for examination candidates guaranteed the long-term dominance of neo-Confucianism in intellectual life. (8)

Although these standardized examinations were not formally in place during the Han dynasty (206 BC-220 AD), when they were in full swing during the Song (960-1279), Ming (1368-1644), and Qing (1644-1912) (i.e. late imperial China), they “tested classical learning based on ancient texts drawn from an antiquity datable to the Chou [Zhou] (1122?-221 BC) and Han dynasties (206 BC-AD 220) nearly fifteen hundred years earlier” (16). So not only was the literati class reproduced to serve and maintain the legitimacy of the ruling class, the ideology that ensured this power relation, even if it dated back 1500 years, was also reproduced. Recruiting “talent,” granted it being the official reason, was secondary to arriving at a homogenized ruling ideology in such a vast territory with competing cultures, languages, and interests. The system was so effective in achieving its goal, it was “scientific,” the very epitome of the scientific management of talent.

#### **5. 4 From Scientific Outlook to the Chinese Dream: A Representation of Han Interest**

History has a habit of repeating itself (or reproducing itself), by way of the minds of men who wish to revive it. And I do mean “men.”<sup>14</sup> Just like how the civil service examinations “remained a symbol of male supremacy in Confucian society” (Elman 1991, 17), the conspicuous lack of any woman serving on China’s Politburo Standing Committee since its inception is very much not out of (Confucian) character. China’s current conditions—geopolitically, economically—and its ambitions of rebranding itself as a world leader abroad and exercising authoritarian control over its image domestically are not so dissimilar from its Han

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<sup>14</sup> There were notable empresses in Chinese history: 吕后 Lu Hou of Han, 武则天 Wu Zetian of Tang, 慈禧 Cixi (Empress Dowager) of Qing. But they remain outliers and were never “great”; they rose out of the ranks of consorts and were “usurpers” of power.

dynasty past or “late imperial” endeavors. Now the dream is called the “Chinese Dream,” a concept Xi Jinping first explained in 2012, when he had just taken the reigns of the party, as “realizing the great renewal of the Chinese nation.” It is “the greatest dream for the Chinese nation in modern history”<sup>15</sup> (Xinhua 2012a). In 2017, five years later, at the 19th National Party Congress where Xi renewed his second five-year term, the “Chinese Dream” was officially integrated into the theme of the Congress, alongside mainstay slogans such as “the banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics” and “building a moderately prosperous society.”

In contrast to the theme of the 18th Congress report delivered by Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, which reads:

The underlying theme of the congress is to hold high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, follow the guidance of Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important thought of Three Represents and the Scientific Outlook on Development, free up the mind, implement the policy of reform and opening up, pool our strength, overcome all difficulties, firmly march on the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and strive to complete the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects.<sup>16</sup> (People’s Daily 2012)

The theme of the 19th report delivered by Xi reads:

Remain true to our original aspiration and keep our mission firmly in mind, hold high the banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, secure a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects, strive for the great success of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era, *and work tirelessly to realize the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation.*<sup>17</sup> (Gov.cn 2017; emphasis added)

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<sup>15</sup> “大家都在讨论中国梦，我认为，实现中华民族伟大复兴，就是中华民族近代以来最伟大的梦想。” Quoted from official English translation.

<sup>16</sup> 大会的主题是：高举中国特色社会主义伟大旗帜，以邓小平理论、“三个代表”重要思想、科学发展观为指导，解放思想，改革开放，凝聚力量，攻坚克难，坚定不移沿着中国特色社会主义道路前进，为全面建成小康社会而奋斗。 Quoted from official English translation.

<sup>17</sup> 大会的主题是：不忘初心，牢记使命，高举中国特色社会主义伟大旗帜，决胜全面建成小康社会，夺取新时代中国特色社会主义伟大胜利，为实现中华民族伟大复兴的中国梦不懈奋斗。 Quoted from official English translation.

China might have gone from being the Great Qing to the Republic of China to the People's Republic of China, but its singular focus on the wealth and power of the state has never swayed, whether by means of a "revival," "renewal" or "rejuvenation." It is no coincidence that "The Communist Party of China...moved to lift the status of the Scientific Outlook on Development [at the 18th CPC National Congress] into a position like the Deng Xiaoping Theory as the theoretical guidance for the Party" (Xinhua 2012b). And it is no coincidence that Xi Jinping's formulations have now been consecrated as "Xi Jinping Thought" into the party guidelines (Xinhua 2017); this elevates his status to the likes of Deng, and gives him the legitimacy to push his agenda just as thoroughly.

According to Hu Jintao, President from 2002-12, the Scientific Outlook on Development "provides new scientific answers to the major questions of what kind of development China should achieve in a new environment and how the country should achieve it" (Xinhua 2012b). The promise of a scientific approach to government and governance, according to the idealist in Lippmann, lies not in the dumbing down of the governed. To the contrary, "the infusion of scientific method, the careful application of administrative technique, the organization and education of the consumer for control, the discipline of labor for an increasing share in management" (1914, 145) will harness the potential of the new modern industries of scale (steel, oil, the railroads) and compel government efficiency. Administration, for Lippmann, in business and in government, is "a science" (42), a learned expertise exemplified by the creation of graduate schools of business administration (46); the scientific method it adheres to is what allows an administration— either under the President or the Crown—to carry out tasks on a scale unheard of in the pre-industrial age (44-45). The educated consumer is what will compel businesses to curb their more capitalist tendencies of cutting costs at all costs; organized labor

will afford the worker a stake in the business, hence a responsibility to see it succeed. Behind all this is the steady guiding hand of the government; both graft and waste will be optimally removed.

The passionate pursuit of scientific answers, like Lippmann's, to the woes of the world is the mark of modernism. Science liberated the people from the stronghold of Church and Monarchy on their minds and bodies (at least in the metropolis, if not the colonies, where both found a second life). Unfortunately, on the road towards modernity, it was not just "good" that was committed in the name of science and scientific development. "Science" derives its legitimacy from a consensus in methodology that appears "objective" and appeals to our desire for "objectivity." The ultimate flaw in this methodology is that any scientific *development* must be advanced by a particular *interest*, a patron, in the form of an individual or institution, with money, or power, to pursue it. This should be distinguished from scientific *discovery*, which could arise out of a single scientist pursuing a singular "truth"—gravity, relativity, nuclear fission. But the atomic bomb was not a pursuit of scientific truth. And Harvard Business School, the progressive beacon of scientific management founded in 1908, played more than a guiding hand in the engineering of modern-day financial scandal and corruption. The business journalist, Duff McDonald, known for profiling the likes of JP Morgan and McKinsey, worded it as "the moral failure of the MBA elite" in the title of his latest book (2017). And why is big data king? Because it can be used as a means to satisfy (or disrupt) any interest.

There might no longer be a church with a capital C or a monarchy with a capital M, but there will always be an interest with a capital I. This interest could range from the elimination or subjugation of a particular people, the bombing of a particular city, the razing of villages and displacement of populations for "development" purposes, to the medical trials pharmaceutical

companies perform for market ends, complete with all necessary “scientific” proof of their drugs superiority and safety. The beauty of science, or rather, in literary parlance, its “tragic flaw,” is that it masks subjectivity as “objective,” private interest as “common good.” So we pursue our ends believing, sometimes quite zealously, that we are doing a service to humankind and society while we might, in effect, be doing the exact opposite, which is the point of this research: to demonstrate that translation as propaganda (or propaganda in the form of translation) is doing the opposite of quelling confrontation between the two ethnic identities of “Han” and “Uyghur.” This is because the interest behind it is Xi’s “national rejuvenation,” and that nation is Han Chinese, not Uyghur.

### **5.5 The Translation of Marxism-Leninism and Scientific Thought**

Why China fits into the category of high modernism can also be explained by its Western lineage, exemplified in the aforementioned translation flow that linked the four illustrious gentlemen scholars from West to East. It might seem sacrilegious to Chinese sensibilities to suggest that the current governing philosophy owes much to Western high modernist visions, given the persistent drumming of its “Chinese characteristics” into Chinese minds. After all, the Chinese are supposedly the victims of these visions that found fertile ground in the revolutionary and colonial regimes of the nineteenth to early twentieth century, where power vacuums created by war, revolution, and colonial conquest allowed for great power to be amassed within an authoritarian state, facing little resistance from the (native) societies the regimes hoped to remake (Scott, 1998, 97). Yet, from the canonization of Marxism-Leninism, down to the strategic importance it places on its Five-Year Plans for the economy—from 1953 to the present—China is the direct descendent of Western high modernism and its most successful flag bearer. Scott points out: “Strong versions of high modernism, such as those held by Lenin and Le Corbusier,

cultivated an Olympian ruthlessness toward the subjects of their interventions” (94). Marx and Engels also figure among the intellectual elites that harbor utopian prospects of humankind under technical progress (94). This top-down approach, from managing the economy to humankind itself, extends itself to the governance of different peoples within one state. It is what Scott deems: “An ideology of ‘welfare colonialism,’” which “combined with the authoritarian power inherent in colonial rule” encourages “ambitious schemes to remake native societies” (97). Because “humankind” is a utopian belief—as if there were ever only one kind of human to govern and no conflicting interests to manage—this approach does not fare well in reality.

A more visual representation of China’s self-perceived legitimacy in the line of orthodox thought would be the propaganda poster that appeared circa 1968, depicting Mao joining the ranks of Marx, Engel, Lenin, and Stalin. Like a line of high modernist kings, the lineage was now complete, with a befitting caption that proclaimed: “Long live Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought!”<sup>18</sup>



**Figure 25: Long Live Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought!**

Of course, the canonization of Marxism-Leninism by no means entails that the Chinese followers are following either Marx or Lenin to the letter. Like all translators who believe they

<sup>18</sup> <https://chinese-posters.net/images/pc-1968-1-005.jpg>. Accessed December 20, 2017.

are “faithful” or “loyal” to the “original,” they’re not really. Even the idea of some sort of fidelity to the “spirit” is fraught with subjectivity—a much deliberated topic in Translation Studies proper, but uncommon still in other disciplines and among the public, who are apt to believe that translators are objective in their pursuits, like the wishful belief in a kind of dictator that is “benevolent.” A telling sign of target culture localization can be found in this very poster. Note the last two characters before the exclamation point: 万岁. Pronounced *wansui*, literally it means to live “ten thousand years.” Traditionally, it is used to wish the emperor and his rule longevity, or “Long live the King!” if we were to domesticate the translation into an “equivalent” idiomatic expression in English. Whether proletariat or peasant, there is only one supreme leader, and it is not the people. Across the Taiwan strait, things were no different with Chiang Kai-shek in power; the placards with the characters 總統萬歲 (Long Live the President) are hard not to notice in the national day parade on October 10, 1970.<sup>19</sup> Taiwan’s ruling ideology—Sun Yat-sen’s The Three Principles of the People—was of course also blessed with imperial longevity: 三民主義萬歲! (Long Live the Three Principles of the People!).

Maurice Meisner’s (1971) populist interpretation of Mao’s adaptation of Marxism would seem to suggest quite the opposite from imperial tendencies. He sees another reality behind the official anointment of Mao as “the true heir of Lenin” and rejects the “truism that Marxism came to China in its Leninist form” (2). He contrasts Lenin and Mao: Lenin distrusts the capacity of the masses and believes in the superiority of the intelligentsia to lead the revolution via an autocratic party of professionals; Mao distrusts urban intellectual revolutionaries and admires the energy and “revolutionary creativity” of the peasants. Then he draws similarities between Mao’s

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<sup>19</sup> See YouTube clip uploaded by EBC News (東森新聞 dongsen xinwen) on October 7, 2017. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=enARpcvoSFk>. Accessed February 5, 2018.

extolment of the “wisdom” of the peasantry and Russian Populist belief in the “innate” socialist potentials of a pre-capitalist uncontaminated countryside. That’s not Lenin. You see, Mao’s “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” was “directed primarily against newly emergent urban elites—the cultural and technological intelligentsia and especially urban-based Party bureaucrats” (22). The picture that emerges from Meisner is a Mao with sentiments much closer to what Lenin would deride as “petty bourgeois romanticism” (20).

But that interpretation itself belies a romantic strain in the Western Left of the 60s. Then the atrocities and absurdities of the Cultural Revolution had not yet come to light, nor was it possible for foreign scholars to gain access on the ground. So Mao’s great proletarian revolution still held hope for the “utopian social goals which Marxism prophecies” (36). Forty decades and some later, we know the romantic revolutionary, if ever he once was, wielded the power the dragon throne afforded him. As the Han Emperor once found his governing ideology in a scholar’s translation of “Confucianism” into tenets that matched his ambitions, Mao took “Marxism-Leninism” and translated it into “Mao Zedong Thought.” It did not matter what the “original” said. Mao needed the peasantry on his side if he wanted to defeat Chiang’s Nationalist Party, who held the cities. After defeating the Nationalist Party, Mao needed to solidify his power against his rivals in the increasingly bureaucratic Chinese Communist Party. He needed the peasant revolution like he needed the proletariat one. Did he really believe in the populist spirit, in “the people”? Maybe, maybe not. But it certainly served him well to do so. Just as it served him well to denounce Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization as “revisionist.” On the surface, the Sino-Soviet split was a struggle over the orthodox interpretation of Marxism; in reality, at stake was Stalin’s “cult of personality.” That must not be delegitimized—or where would that leave Mao?

Meisner (1971) opens his argument with a quote from Isaac Deutscher's (1966) observation of the paradox of the Chinese Communist Revolution as "the most archaic of nations avidly absorbing the most modern of revolutionary doctrines" (2); then adds, in his conclusion, "a paradox within a paradox," that "within the Maoist version of 'Marxism-Leninism' there have emerged powerful 'pre-Leninist' Populist-type ideas and beliefs which Lenin long ago consigned to the dustbin of revolutionary history" (35). But through the lens of the domestication theory in Translation Studies, there is no paradox. *That* is what translation *does*. The target culture filters what the source culture offers according to its own domestic needs. Or, in autopoietic terms (Luhmann via Tyulenev 2011), "translation," as an automated system of language exchange processes that can continuously reproduce the terms of its survival by virtue of it being a necessitated act in any communication, thus becomes the perfect vehicle to reproduce the network of relations the enacting agent/system relies on to survive. The message behind the "text" is inherently unstable because it must pass through the subjectivity of the translator and translating culture—or, more specifically, the system where subjectivity lies and is regenerated. So it is precisely the "archaic" forces of China that I have sought to repeatedly point out—this focus on a *unified empire* and power in the hands of the *emperor*—that have enabled this so-called paradox. Riding the coattails of "revolution" to the throne is nothing new in China's ancient history, as in scheming for it at the cost of the people.

The undeniable power modern China enjoys on the world stage today lies in the very sinicization of Marxism and the thoroughness of the job. In the article, "The Great Victory of Marxism in China,"<sup>20</sup> published in *Social Sciences in China* (2011) and written by Wang Weiguang, Executive Vice-president and Research Fellow of the Chinese Academy of Social

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<sup>20</sup> I am quoting from the official English translation of Wang's article. "The Scientific Concept of Development" is also translated as "The Scientific Outlook on Development," which I have chosen to use throughout my study.

Sciences, the “sinicization of Marxism”<sup>21</sup> (or Marxist theory) is mentioned no less than 15 times in 14 pages. However, the value of this article lies precisely in its very propaganda nature and in the process of sinicization it lays out: from *Mao Zedong Thought* to *Deng Xiaoping Theory* (socialism with Chinese characteristics) to Jiang Zemin’s *Three Represents* to Hu Jintao’s *Scientific Concept of Development*. Wang writes: “Practice tells us that we must constantly achieve theoretical innovation in tailoring Marxism to China’s realities, which is the key to the victory of Marxism in China”(15). It is not so much the key to the victory of Marxism in China than it is the key to the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in China. This “sinicization” has enabled the Party to continue to operate under the highly centralized party apparatus favored by Lenin (i.e. “Marxism-Leninism”) all the while pursuing market reform that has much more in common with capitalism than socialism. In other words, theoretical reconciliation has enabled “Western Capitalism” to be rebranded as “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.” Outlandish, one may think. But repeat it a million times and the populace just might acquiesce, like when you can’t help but click on that link because Facebook keeps pushing it to the top of your newsfeed.

The true paradox, if not irony, is that the very “science” that the modernists celebrated as the savior of nation and state, is the very force that is dumbing down the populace, by means of the elite bureaucratic management it enabled, from Facebook’s fake news scandal, Google’s rigged searched results, to a Chinese citizenry believing that democracy “won’t work” in China. There is a reason Lenin distrusted the masses—that obtuse collective entity which seems so lodged in the past and passivity when compared to the modern scientific intellectual. But entrusting the elite to unlock the “creativity” and “socialist” potential of the masses was not the

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<sup>21</sup> 马克思主义中国化 (makesizhuyi zhongguohua) is translated in the English article as the “sinicization of Marxism.”

answer. A hundred years have gone by since the October Revolution. What was once Mao's unliberated peasantry is now Steve Job's unliberated consumer class. "A lot of times, people don't know what they want until you show it to them," said the latter (Times 2011). Then you make them pay for it, all puns intended. Though even Apple now bows to China. Data centers in China? Sure. VPN apps removed from the Chinese App Store? Sure. (Cadell 2017; Mozur 2017b).

Ross Anderson, in his latest article for *The Atlantic* (December 2017), "What Happens if China Makes First Contact?," brings up the "Needham Question." This question is the driving inquiry behind Joseph Needham's ongoing series: *Science and Civilization in China* (since 1954). Anderson paraphrases the question: Why hadn't the scientific revolution happened in China, "given its sophisticated intellectual meritocracy, based on exams that measured citizens' mastery of classical texts" (49). I have given my own explanations for the purposes of these "exams" in the line of my own inquiry for this study, which is namely the reason behind the failure of "translation" to broker true peace between parties of oppositional interests. The primary purpose of these exams was to secure scholars and civil servants that could maintain the emperor's governing mandate under a fixed hierarchy and purport that this structure was "divine." *That* was the function of "science." Insofar as the monarchy maintained its legitimacy to rule, the questions of the stars and universe (math and astronomy) rested—until the West, with its vastly superior military (i.e. "science"), sliced China apart like a melon.

The "melon" trope is a familiar one in Chinese narrative of its modern history.<sup>22</sup> Anderson, like countless foreign writers explaining China to his English readers, makes use of it, because the history of humiliation by foreign powers beginning in the mid-19th century is retold time and

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<sup>22</sup> 瓜分 guafen

again in textbooks to Chinese students and time and again by scholars like Wang, in articles like “The Victory of Marxism” (2011). It is the official justification for all policies purporting to restore China to its formal grandeur. In short sight, it would seem to be the driving force behind Deng Xiaoping’s “near-religious reverence for science and technology, a sentiment that is undimmed in Chinese culture today” (Anderson 2017, 49). But it is not just any “science and technology” that appeals to the Chinese, not just “modernism” alone, but the “high” kind, the kind that justifies a concentration of power in a few hands alone. It appeals to the Chinese because the ruling ethos of elitism and unification, as I have sought to demonstrate, existed long before “modern” China. Such a successful translation or, more aptly, sinicization, of high modernist thinking, is only made possible because it corresponds so well with what was already there. It fed right into the dragon. Should success be measured in data—what is known as “scientific proof”—in the numbers of households alleviated from poverty, in yearly GDP growth, in trading volume and partners, in “the world’s largest radio dish” built in search of extraterrestrial intelligence (Anderson 2017, 45), then China’s high modernist experiment, the faith it placed in science and technology, in “Marxism,” was a great success. “Data” justifies the authoritarian route China has taken (or continued) and effectively convinces (or silences) its population to ponder whether things should be otherwise.

Liu Cixin,<sup>23</sup> 2015 Hugo Award winner and one of the most well-known science-fiction writers in China (whom even Obama cites reading (Kakutani 2017)), was interviewed for Anderson’s article. When asked about the prospects of China’s radio dish, which Liu had visited upon an invitation by the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the science-fiction writer told the journalist that he doubted an alien civilization would be detected, because “no civilization would

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<sup>23</sup> 刘慈欣

ever send a beacon unless it were a ‘death monument,’ a powerful broadcast announcing the sender’s impending extinction...it might use the last of its energy reserves to beam out a dying cry to the most life-friendly planets in its vicinity” (Anderson 2017, 52). This is, in other words, the “dark-forest” theory—no civilization would be foolish enough to announce its existence lest it attract the hidden hunters to hunt them down. The journalist replied by saying the theory “was too narrow a reading of history” and it inferred “too much about the general behavior of civilizations from specific encounters between China and the West.” The writer countered that “China’s experience with the West is representative of larger patterns” and “examples of expansive civilizations that used advanced technologies to bully others” abound. The Chinese writer then referred to China’s own imperial past, its “long-standing domination of its neighbors” (52). And this past lives on today, because the present is always about the past. Looking into the future is about restoring what once was. “First contact” with an alien species would confer prestige to China’s scientific advancement, and at the same time stage a psychological reenactment of imperial exploration, expansion, and conquest.

Anderson (2017) is right to criticize the thinking that civilizations are ever on a quest for expansion is “woefully anthropocentric” (52). Can we for once think that other species might not be like us? But like God, who created man in his own image, men can only create aliens from theirs. “First contact” speaks to both our naivety and hubris in thinking that the Other will simultaneously harbor unequivocal goodwill and agree with us on the terms of “this relationship” and how it should move forward. Ethnocentrism, if not anthropocentrism, shows that one must acquiesce to the other, and that does not come without resentment. The Uyгур and the Han, two alien species, who cannot comprehend each others’ customs or languages, already demonstrate what Liu, the science-fiction writer, calls “the difficulty of ‘understanding one another across

cosmic distances” (52). We do not need to look into the universe to grasp that. And the data—the relationship between the trends in violence and the trends in translation propaganda—show it.

## 5.6 The Two Movements of Translation

There are two kinds of translation at work in this study, but they work for only one purpose: the justification of subjectivity. *Looking outside* itself, after its doors were blast open by foreign aggressors, the Chinese elite sought to translate from the West what they believe would propel them into modernity: Marxism-Leninism-Modernism. *Looking inwards*, they sought to translate from tradition what would legitimize their rule: Confucianism. The product of this dialectical movement is the current China we now see: a paradox of scientific progressivism and authoritarian conservatism; an outside international influence and an equally far-reaching security apparatus to keep international influence out. But as within all dialectics, crisis underlies movement, and in China, it incubates within the Marxist Proletariat. As Terry Eagleton (2007, xix-xx) points out:

The poor and exploited are a sign of failure of the governing powers, since they illustrate what misery those powers must wreak in order to secure their sway. In this sense, the dispossessed are negative images of the just society. They are, too, in the fact that they have much less to lose than those who lord it over them, and so have a greater interest in working for such a [revolutionary] reversal. (cited in Geng 2012, 331)

Although the context of this critique is Geng Youzhuang’s discussion of Eagleton’s “theological turn” and Eagleton’s suggestion “that there is an inseparable link between *anawim* or the poor in the biblical sense and the Marxist proletariat” (332), the significance (and irony) of this observation is apparent for the current Chinese context, where “splittist forces” and “dissidents” are often the poor and dispossessed or those who speak on their behalf. They are Marx’s Proletariat whom the Chinese communists once extolled and relied on for their victory.

Eagleton himself is one of the most well-known representatives of Western Marxism in China, and one of the most influential due to the Chinese translation of his *Marxism and Literary Criticism* (1976) at the heels of Mao's death and Deng Xiaoping's Reform and Opening Up policies (Geng 2012, 324). Will the officially atheist Communist leadership recognize the relevance in the Marxist's scholar's latest Christian interpretation of Marxism? Would it welcome its translation? My approach towards translation theory, as I have explicated throughout this study, would want for me to say "no." Eagleton was translated and enjoyed popularity because then he was a "Marxist," and the China of then, having just emerged from the ruins of the Cultural Revolution, was "weak" and eager to re-enter the realm of international scholarship, to attempt to reconcile its "Marxism" with "modern" scholarship. It was a time that mirrored the toppling of the last dynasty and the hunger of the nascent Republic for modernity, for an egalitarian position among its nation-state peers, for Fei's proclamation that the *Zhonghua Minzu* would thrive because of its diversity, within which ethnic equality was enshrined in law ([1988] 2015). But once China translated what it needed from the outside, and now stands unaided, even looming over the West, the "West" becomes what it must counter with its "Chineseness," a notion Martha Cheung (2011) points out as being "initially a reaction to the theories, imported through translation, which became so influential on the Mainland after the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) that they came to be regarded not only as a threat to the indigenous modes of scholarship, but also as reflecting a general loss of confidence in Chinese culture" (42) and "deployed by Chinese scholars responding to the theories of postcolonialism, poststructuralism and postmodernism" (44). It "became a strategic, discursive tool for generating a sense of national cultural identity and national cultural self-determination with which to promote cultural diversity and resist the threat of homogeneity posed by the global valorization

of Western scholarship” (44). But the danger of generating “Chineseness” was that when it “became linked with soft power, the possibility grew real that the state would use it to buttress the official line that China should go her own way and reject all attempts to meddle in her internal affairs—the better to suppress voices of dissent and other ‘subversive’ activities” (44).

## **5.7 Conclusion**

The execution of Western concepts, such as high modernism and Marxism in the Chinese context, shows that the translating culture takes “text,” no matter how “modern” or “progressive,” and subsumes that text through the mechanism of “translation” to support its own dominant ideology and the need for that ideology to survive. In China’s case, this is the historical narrative of Han ethnocentrism and authoritarian rule. Because translation functions as such in the Chinese context, even when the Chinese scholar calls for the abolition of the Confucian state, the voice of protest is often neutralized or silenced, because the Chinese scholar is part and parcel of the Confucian order of things—because the loyalty the scholar exhibits towards the nation derives from the very hierarchy of loyalty to ruler and regime. If to unify under Han exceptionalism is the ruling ideology, and has been demonstrated to enjoy a continued lineage into modern times, so “Confucianism,” as much as “Marxism” and all the scientific “thoughts” and “theories” of the Communist canon, will continue to be translated to support it and inform how the state governs its ethnic population, a matter of “internal affairs.”

## CHAPTER 6

### TRANSLATION AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY

#### 6.1 Introduction

In relation to the acute power struggles and vast power differentials along ethnic lines described between the Han and the Uyghur in previous chapters, alongside the demonstration of translation as a mechanism that feeds into Han ethnocentrism in this particular Chinese context, this chapter subsequently questions the effectiveness of translation to promote intercultural communication by engaging the philosophies that presuppose a “universal” human interest, where “commensurability” is posited as the “natural” outcome and goal of communication. It juxtaposes these philosophies with the living realities of competing ethnic interests, often violent, as the data suggests, regardless of translations purporting to “communicate” in the Other’s language, as the data also suggests. The romantic notion of individual agency to do “good” or, specifically, the notion under German Romanticism that translation is amenable toward nation-building, is rendered as an ineffective approach to promote interethnic communication, particularly since these philosophies are predominantly born out of one ethnic frame of mind—white, European, male—which display the tendencies of creating a vision of nation based on the privileged ethnicity, but proclaim this vision to be “universal.” But conflicts between nations and people who identify as distinct ethnicities clearly demonstrate that collective interests are far from universal and, more often than not, in competition, violently. Instead, an alternative philosophy of pragmatism is proposed; one that draws from Richard Rorty, but stops short of, again, the belief in the power of individual agency. It is proposed that in place of “ethical” concerns in communication contexts, what should be stressed is “awareness of positionality.”

## 6.2 The Monoethnic Origins of “Intersubjectivity”

One of the core occupations of Translation Studies is arguably something called “intersubjectivity.” But after such a grim assessment of the Chinese-Uyghur context using theories traditionally not sought after in translation studies nor part of the popular imagination when it comes to thinking and talking about translation, is intersubjectivity still a viable claim for the act? Perhaps this is a moot question. Because no matter the answer, the arguments for either-or, the discipline—and the profession—must, out of necessity for survival, continue to claim that intersubjectivity is “the holy grail” of translation, to borrow Inghilleri’s (2000) metaphor in her essay discussing intersubjectivity and the quest for mutual understanding. Who will come and pay tuition for translation programs, what will we print on our brochures to attract students, how do we get funding for our research if translation does not continue to play the role of the Disney helper in a fairy tale?

Inghilleri’s article, “Intersubjectivity: the Holy Grail of Mutual Understanding?” (2000), is in fact an exemplary article on the feel-good philosophical arc in translation studies, even though her article is not directly about translation. Intelligently laid out and very well informed, the article traces the philosophical lineage and debate of the concept known as “incommensurability,” starting from Kuhn’s scientific paradigm, going back to Herder’s *Kraft*, von Humboldt’s linguistic relativism, Kant’s reason, and traveling forward to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of linguistic determinism, Gadamer’s hermeneutics, and Rorty’s community contingency, to name a few. The question is posed: “what happens when divergent cultures or languages do come into contact—of how, or indeed, if, it is possible to translate a set of ideas, beliefs, and values from one culture or language into another” (133). It is answered in the affirmative, the thesis having rested upon a specific reading of Herder, which suggests “a model of intersubjective

understanding” (145) that “seems to suggest the theoretical possibility of escaping the communicative dead-end of relativism whilst maintaining the inevitability of cultural, historical and linguistic diversity” (144). In other words: win-win.

But either side could have won. None of these philosophers are lightweights, to say the least; the arguments against the conclusion are equally formidable. The reason that Herder won is a choice made by the author to choose a specific kind of reading of Herder and guide the reader to follow that reading in the logic laid out to him or her. The method is scientific; the outcome is rational. Reason, as Kant posits, prevails. But what motivates that choice so rationally laid out? It is faith in the commonality of human good and kindness despite differences. Is faith born out of empiricism and then reasoned to be applicable, or is it innate and a divine attribute to our human species? That is a philosophical debate for another study. But the question points to empiricism as a deciding factor in human thought. How many of these Europeans, white, male philosophers, the founding fathers of Western philosophy and those who uphold the lineage, have experienced or witnessed first-hand the violence of language, of a foreign, even gendered, tongue being imposed upon them through a lens of discrimination, either by brute force and punishment or systematic (re-)education, an indoctrination of inferiority, albeit stealthily? How many have been the product of ethnic or colonial conflict? And I presume none of them experienced gender discrimination, of having to choose their words or inflections because they happened to be women. The subjects of these philosophers were always “human,” as if that pristine category always existed in equality, in reality.

So, if the basis of Inghilleri’s argument stems from Herder (18th century, European, male, white), it is not surprising that she criticizes Gumperz’s (1982) inter-ethnic communication model as being suggestive of incommensurability between cultures (134). According to her, “it

created the assumption that individuals were not capable of interactively ‘reading’ their own and others’ cultures through a process of translation or negotiation of social and cultural conventions into mutually-oriented or orienting communication” (135). The definitive charge to Gumperz was that he “relied on an essentialized view of culture(s) that simultaneously downplayed *variation within* cultural groups” (134) to arrive at this conclusion. There are few things in modern scholarship and lexicon that incite unified accusations more than being called out as an “essentialist.”

To this one-two punch Inghilleri delivers, I reply: Ask any survivor of ethnic conflict or fighter of “a cause,” do they believe worldviews are commensurable? Ask any woman—a “variation” within a cultural group—have they ever been reduced by essentialist views of “womanhood”? Ask *The New York Times* and *Breitbart News* if they can reconcile their coverage on Charlottesville and its aftermath in the summer of 2017. Ask the neo-Nazis and the white supremacists. Ask the Allies. There comes a point where “commensurability” cannot be sought and is not desired. Because we are not simply “human”; we are ideologically ridden beings who fight for—or succumb to—what we believe in. We take sides. And once a side is taken, all information is filtered through the logic and reasoning of that side. Pathos swallows logos whole. The latter is intact, but it functions in the belly of darkness. Jonas prayed; Pinocchio lit a fire. Both escaped, but not everyone does. The so-called “resurgence” of anti-Semitism means that it has always been there, but because it was “on the ‘wrong’ side of history,” it lay dormant after defeat. Suppressed, momentarily, if not exactly oppressed. All it takes is a trigger—a Hitler—to mine that pent up primordial sentiment, to incite the most savage survival instincts in us. To release the Kraken.

Literary allusions aside, the problem with saying Gumperz downplays “variation within cultural groups” is that this “variation” is much more tolerated when the framework is *not* extended to another “ethnie.” Variations of speech within the white community are understood and tolerated when it is a “white-to-white”<sup>1</sup> communicative act. But when confronted with an “outsider,” the variations within the group are homogenized so that *our* group (White) can be contrasted with *that* group (Immigrant); here “difference” comes to the foreground in an effort to separate, not commensurate. Substitute White with “Chinese,” and Immigrant with “Uyghur,” and you have the outcome of your communicative act: “I do not understand you”—not on a grammatical level, but on a cognitive and emotional level. The extreme practical application of this kind of “downplaying” is the tactic of launching foreign wars to quell or obscure domestic infighting. It’s not that Gumperz is downplaying; downplaying—or the inability to discern “difference” as constructive to communication—is part of inter-ethnic communication, the very topic of his research (1983 Gumperz ). By the same token, it’s not that individuals are “not capable of interactively ‘reading’ their own and others’ cultures” to produce “mutually-oriented or orienting communication.” The question is what incentive or motivation is present to trigger that capability. When the “other” is pre-conceived as a rival with a competing truth, i.e. *the enemy*, this capability is shut down.

Much might be made of why I anchored my argument on Inghilleri’s (2000) article. It is because it represents so well, and so elegantly, the mainstream thought process in Translation

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<sup>1</sup> Like in any other process of identification, the premise of “white” is dependent upon who is identified as “non-white” and by whom. The Chinese will consider a Jew “white,” as they would consider a WASP “white.” But the WASP may bristle at the thought of the Jew being “one of us”; and the Jew likely aware of the history of exclusion from that “white” group even if legally according to the American Naturalization Act of 1790, they were considered ‘free white persons’ (Green 2016). That is how anti-Semitism festers and is tolerated within one “white” community, but not in another. The premise of the “white-to-white” communicative act I allude to is that the parties involved identify as the same (white) group. When there is a collective purpose, for example, of protesting racial injustice, identities are merged, thus a White America vs. Black America. Jews are not black. So they become “white” in this identification scheme of the privileged vs. oppressed, even though one can hardly extract “oppression” from the Jewish identity.

Studies I wish to counter, or, more positively, complement with my research. There are two sides to the coin. Inghilleri's argument is sound because it draws its conclusion from Herder, who "drew on the organic metaphors that were prevalent in German Romantic thought in the eighteenth century." For Herder, each soul is "a reflection of a pre-existing harmony that was already completely formed in the mind of God" (140). Translation theory is heavily anchored in that Romantic tradition. Even with later trends and diversification, Schleiermacher's hermeneutics, the tug-of-war between his author and reader ([1813] 1992); Benjamin's mystical vessel ([1923] 1992); and Berman's translation as *Bildung* ([1984] 1992, 43-52) remain seminal and likely the earliest references any student of translation is exposed to. The effect is akin to imprinting: picture Lorenz's goslings following him around in devout filial fashion.

But the context of these philosophical deliberations, the aspirations toward "harmony" and a "whole" are held within *one* ethnic, *one* frame of mind—the "enlightened" kind—informed neither by colonial-ethnic conflict nor gender-racial discrimination, and the (vast) power differentials they produce between the parties of communication. It supposes an autonomous being, atomistic, a creative mind on equal footing with other creative minds, *un-slaved*, literally and figuratively, to class, race, position, interest. But once that argument is informed with the conditioning forces outside that enlightened mind, it cannot stand intact. My study hopes to inform just that, as well as subsequently questioning the pedagogical logic of necessarily introducing translation theories in a chronological fashion separated from current reality, instead of a weighted one, where it could proceed from any number of weighted factors—locale, country, language, school of thought, etc. For example, if arranged along thematic lines, the Syrian refugee crisis could serve as the context for the introduction of postcolonial theories; the #MeToo movement could serve as the context for a gendered or feminist translation approach;

thus when the traditional “Western” approaches are introduced, they would be marked by their lack of representation for other minority identities. Because if Silicon Valley tech companies are said to suffer from a lack of *identity* diversity (Williams 2017), so too do the disciplines of Philosophy and Translation.

Historicism—the attention to a specific time and space—strips idealism down to the conditions of its production; it strips it from its magic, the kind that endowed Bloom’s Shakespeare with literary greatness. Shakespeare was untouchable—and it was made sure that the legions of British subjects in its many colonies *understood* it to be so. Understandably, given Bloom’s (2002) exaltation of “genius,” he has no taste for historicism. But historicism tells us that it wasn’t necessarily “genius” that allowed for Shakespeare’s mandatory global iconic stature in that subject known as Literature. “Taste,” as Bourdieu posits ([1979] 1984), is formed along the lines of class division. Acquire “our” taste and you will be one of “us”; none of your literary figures could ever match Shakespeare, and so you shall forever be aspiring to translate Shakespeare into your language, dance, and art; forever looking up to that great figure and trying to find an equivalence. Of course, there is no equivalence. “The Chinese Shakespeare” is a title you bestow on writers who you hope fervently to be as great as him, to be recognized as great as him. The linguistic act itself already denotes a position of inferiority. What historicism does—be it the branch of New Historicism or New Criticism—is bring to the foreground the role of colonialism and its enduring post-colonial effect that contribute to this inferiority. “Translation” in this contextualized instance is stripped of its nobility and novelty.

Initiated from the source culture, when translating “out,” translation screams of the neediness to be recognized as unique and worthy; initiated from the target culture, when translating “in,” it belies the fetishizing gaze that hopes to keep the foreigner in its place—the

shrewd Chinese and smart Jew; the blonde princess. Or do I mean the shrewd Jew and smart Chinese? Princesses of course are always blonde. In the first instance think (Chinese) government-initiated translations; funds poured into translations that, hopefully, “the foreigner” on the other end will pick up and read and appreciate (our culture). In the latter instance, think...Hollywood films and their stagings of the foreign. We all know which sells better.

But are we really comparing the governance of people to the marketing of Hollywood films to the masses? I just pointed out that “in this contextualized instance” the “nobility and novelty” of translation is stripped. So, yes, we are comparing the two. Accusations of relativism naturally arise against this line of thought, or of post-modernist vacuity. Anything goes, so nothing matters. To each his own. Governments preach; Hollywood sells. But should translation not serve a higher purpose, a higher cause, appeal to the greater good in us to live in harmony with our fellow brothers and sisters of the human race? And if we must counter this ivory-tower universalism, must it be with moral relativism? While Inghilleri offers Herder as a possible way out,<sup>2</sup> I offer Rorty and pragmatism, which Inghilleri touches upon, but does not dwell on.

### **6.3 Drawing from Pragmatism**

My first encounter with Rorty was not via Inghilleri, but by way of Cornel West, the black American activist philosopher. West was mentioned in news articles citing his participation in the Charlottesville protest where white-supremacy, neo-nazism, and racism violently called attention to the ideological chasm present in American society, which had long held fast to the melting-pot narrative and had just seen their first black, biracial president depart office after two full terms. Some surmised that the election of Obama was indeed a turning point in American

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<sup>2</sup> The irony of using Herder becomes apparent when his “*Volk*” (a people) figured into the Nazi ideology of *Volksgemeinschaft* (people’s community); evidently, Hitler did not mean all peoples, which further illustrates the value of “relativism” in pointing out that “good” or “bad” is truly only relative to the argument.

history—not towards a post-racial future, but one even more divided than before, a black presidency that beckoned the resuscitation of white supremacy in Trump to counter it (Coates 2017b). That fear turned out to be true, played out subsequently in Donald Trump’s election to the presidency, his edicts and policies, the fervent support of his base, and the strikingly weak political opposition against him.<sup>3</sup> So the context of my discovery of both Rorty and West (who was heavily influenced by Rorty’s neopragmatism) was an America in the heat of violent interethnic divide. The subject of my research is precisely interethnic violence. Rorty upholds a utopia “where humans cause each other far less suffering than they presently do” (1992, 587); I believe in the necessity of less violence between the two cultures of Chinese and Uyghur because mutual suffering advances no one’s interest.

There is no “higher” cause, because “superiority is, for a pragmatist, always relative to the purpose something is being asked to serve” (Rorty 1992, 589); there is but a means to an end, which is itself a continuum, where “new means continually engender new ends” or vice versa (592). It is not a debate between the spirit or the letter, not an appeal to our conscience, which can be susceptible to such political hijacking that it is often rendered ineffective, or effectively useless (How much will it take before the Republicans take down Trump? Not even Tiananmen took down the Chinese Communist leadership). It is, in Translation Studies jargon, “skopos” (Vermeer 1989). There is a target text and a target purpose for that text; the translation—how it is translated—is a means to that end. Though, in the instance of my research, the *choice of text* is emphasized against the text itself. The data suggests that the choice of translations I define as “propaganda” warrants scrutiny if less violence is the desired outcome. Perhaps less propaganda

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<sup>3</sup> In regard to the hybridity theory I proposed earlier using Obama as an example, this resurgence of white nationalism post-Obama does not necessarily negate the significance his election to the presidency brings to the American slave-holding history. It was once inconceivable for someone with “black blood” to be president. It is no longer.

is the way to go—not an appeal to the universal posits of brotherhood or humanity, or “unity” in the name of the former two.

However, I stop short of Rorty’s full conception of pragmatism. His pragmatic means, ultimately, are meant to fulfill a Romantic end. Rorty’s utopia (1992, 589) is Dewey’s social democratic utopia, where people aspire to be “bigger and better” and “less inclined to exclude...more inclined to embrace” (Rorty 2000, 819). There is “love” (819, 820) and there is “hope” (Rorty 1992, 593). That, in my reading, is ultimately the aspirations of a Romantic, no matter how many times he stresses in writing that he is a pragmatist, and as a pragmatist he would do this and think thus. His exact pragmatism, for me, on the other hand, lies in the abandonment of philosophical deliberation to offer “truth” or “moral” foundations to justify our present actions; it is ineffective to deliberate whether our reasoning of truth or morality fulfills an “antecedently known criteria” for what is “good” (Rorty 2000, 820). In other words, it shouldn’t matter if what we do adheres to Kant or Hegel, the Bible, or the Founding Fathers’ original intent for the Constitution. What matters is that we can redefine a concept, to make it anew for our times, to stoke the imagination to go beyond past confinements:

The advent of Christianity, of the New Science of the seventeenth century, and of the democratic revolutions of the late eighteenth century, did not fulfill antecedently known criteria for good religion, good science, or good politics. Rather, these events changed our notions of what religion, science, and politics might be. Each enlarged our imaginations. Achievements such as these set their own standards. They create the taste by which they are judged. They shatter cultural and disciplinary boundaries, break through the crust of convention and release previously locked-up energies. (Rorty 2000, 820)

So what crosses Confucius and makes Marx roll in his grave, might just be where the answer lies. And this is the pragmatic takeaway for Translation Studies, as demonstrated by the cultural and sociological turns in translation scholarship. “Translation” does not necessarily need

to be “text”-based, does not necessarily need to debate whether an “original” intent of the author was satisfied, its research not limited to source text and target text comparison of two languages, but expanded to see its role and function in serving different interests and behavior in different systems. Whether or not they are “good” interests would be beside the point. And more often than not, the “bad” interests prove the more engrossing ones to examine. Like most “evil” characters in a story, the “thickness” of their evil—like the thickness of ethnographic subjects (Geertz 1973)—tells a much more complex tale of humanity. This is why I chose to examine the connection between translation and violence against the backdrop of China’s state narrative of interethnic harmony and as a contrast to public discourse on translation, which, unlike postcolonial translation studies, harbors an overwhelming positive view of translation’s power to contribute to intercultural communication. Dare to think that translation is not a good tool for intercultural communication, and you just might find a better tool for it. In turn, this enlargement of the concept of translation in the public domain, will provide the translator outside postcolonial studies with an understanding of the positionality he or she occupies as part of a long chain of processes. Maybe she will choose to translate differently, with this tool, or that. Particularly in the context of artistic creation, if not bound by the convention “to do right” by a straw entity/ethnicity or subjugating notion of “authorship,” multiple tools offer the possibility of multiple different creations. But the creative “power” assumed by an individual, whether labeled “author” or “translator,” still falls into the Romantic strain of “agency,” where sometimes it applies effectively, but often less so.

“Less so” would be in the instance of my study. Rorty’s ultimate antidote for human suffering by the hand of others still lies in individual emancipation, or the individual’s hope for such a state; his subject remains the individual. This emphasis on the individual is the defining

tenet of Romanticism. He talks of “self-creation” (1992, 593; 2000, 820), “self-images,” to enlarge “ourselves” (820), the ability to “describe oneself” (823), to “reshape oneself into a different sort of person” (1992, 581). Though he points out Hegel’s criticism of Kant was “his over-emphasis on the individual” and that Kant “did not realize that becoming an individual requires getting caught up in society’s feedback loops,” he nevertheless sees the individual as both starting point and end-goal, because that line of criticism continues on to say that “the bigger and more various such loops become, the more of an individual you get a chance to be” (2002, 150-51). The point is to become a better *individual* who can tolerate, empathize, even love others who are different from us. He concentrates on the half of the population where the individual does *not* get caught up in society’s feedback loop, but rather escapes it and reshapes it.

But there is always the other half, not to mention that on a nation-to-nation premise, where it is not the individual at the negotiating table, but representatives of the nation, “individualism,” by necessity, is reduced to a “national” character, beholding long-held caricatures at its funniest, and animosity at its ugliest. A case in point was a panel convened in 2014 to discuss the future of the euro, which is, by proxy, the future of the “European” project (i.e. the European Union). The respective panelists, all distinguished scholars, were introduced by the moderator, likely in good humor, as “two Germans, a Frenchman, an Englishman, and an American” (Harper’s 2014, 34). Though it sounds like the beginning of a familiar joke, it foreshadowed the thinly veiled nationalistic fault lines that threaten the viability of one, united Europe—one “transnational” or “supranational” democracy. Germany, throughout the discussion, bore the brunt, as both the powerful engine of the European economy, but the one with too much power. The panel closed with Emmanuel Todd’s comment, in response to his fellow German panelist’s call to skip “this outdated notion of national sovereignty” (43). Todd, the historian, social anthropologist, and

political scientist at the National Institute of Demographic Studies in Paris replies: “Let me just close by saying that in France we aren’t so keen on Germans telling us it’s time to lose our sovereignty” (43). What was an economic issue amongst supposedly scientific minds, began and ended on nationalistic lines, on pre-conceived, unnegotiable national differences, which function the same as “ethnic” differences—the identification with a culture and history different, if not necessarily in opposition, to others. The Brexit vote in 2016 and Catalan independence referendum in 2017 further underline the precariousness of relying on “individual” thought to promote unity.

In answer to the question: “[W]hat activities typical of culture are in the best position to mediate encounters between cultures in such a way as to promote rationality?” Rorty suggests to “look to the sort of novels and *memoirs* which are being written by people whose *personal* lives have involved a tension between cultures” (1992, 593; emphasis added). He gives us some examples of those people: “Salman Rushdie, V.S. Naipaul, Kwame Anthony Appiah, Sara Suleri, Kazuo Ishiguro, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, and Ruth Praver Jhabvala” (593). Perhaps these people could offer us a clue on how to, “in the course of self-creation and artistic creation,” find “concrete, non-theoretical ways of blending the modern West with one or another non-Western culture” (593). Memoirs are powerful tools of persuasion, emotive, instigators of empathy. But memoirs are also intensely personal. The reader, as a person, on an individual level, is much more susceptible to what the story has to say, and is much more susceptible to its transformative powers. But corporations—contrary to Mitt Romney’s 2012 campaign pitch—are not people, neither are States. Neither are “ethnie.” They are bound by a collective consciousness that overrides individual nuances and differences and preferences; it is a conscious that homogenizes. If you are a soldier, you will obey command and kill, even if you, as an individual, do not

condone killing without “just” cause. What is “just” is no longer in your hands, or mind. If you are legal counsel to a corporation, you will work to win the case for your corporation, even if it means labor conditions and wages you yourself would not want your children to be under. If you are Uyghur, you will not trust “the Chinese,” even if you and your Chinese neighbor exchange pleasantries just fine, though even that seems a bit of a stretch according to Joanne Smith who recorded Uyghurs responding with “a negative click of the tongue or decisive shake of the head” (2000, 200) when asked if they socialized with Han Chinese in her study of four generations of Uyghur attitudes towards ethno-nationalism.

What Rorty presents is a compelling personal solution. What he hopes is that enough changed individuals will make a difference in the public outcome. But his aspirations, in a sense, are also a “historical contingency,” to use one of his main arguments behind the evolution of truth and morals. They are the historical contingencies of the great American social democratic experiment: *individuals* can make a difference, and they did. They transcended class, race, and religion to no other degree comparable in other societies; hence the almost mystical confidence placed upon the individual. But it is no simple task to close the gap between the personal and the public. There is a reason for the lines to exist and not be blurred. I do not believe that such reasoning would appeal to the Chinese state, because what the Chinese state fears is precisely commensurability—the fear of unity amongst its people, the Han Chinese and all other 55 minorities, to turn against the government. For the state, the lines must exist. So this cannot be the route of appeal. Peerenboom (2000) also takes Rorty, the ironist in *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (1989), to task in the Chinese context, pointing out the challenges Rorty would face “particularly when the other party does not want to talk, or wants to talk but not listen” (57). While Peerenboom attributes the Chinese unwillingness to “talk” to their skepticism of the

superiority of liberal democracy and their views for a “strong (Neo-Authoritarian ) leadership” that is popular even among “the intellectuals and prominent figures of the 1989 demonstrations” (67),<sup>4</sup> I attribute this unwillingness to the party’s underlying fear of the loss of power and legitimacy. But despite our differences, we both recognize the limits of Rorty’s pragmatism in China’s case because of its particular historical contingency. For Peerenboom, that limit is the traits of liberal democracy. For me, it is Rorty’s irrefutable affinity for and belief in the individual.

My particular historical contingency, of being educated under a particular authoritarian Chinese system, informs me that Chinese culture is indeed historically elitist and thinks in terms of “empire.” The masses should be saved, not by themselves, but intellectuals who know better. The country must be fairly governed, but not by a foreign-born notion such as “democracy.” So for any argument presented to the Chinese, in order for it to have any prospect of success, the argument must be intellectual, *technical*; the call for equality must be erased of its “foreignness.” Contrary to Venuti’s (1998) foreignization strategy, which advocates the disruption of a “smooth” reading experience so to jolt the reader from his comfortable “English” (hegemonic) couch, the translation of “democracy” in China must be thoroughly localized and smoothed of its “edginess” for it to stand a chance. This is pragmatism. And that is why I am not talking about “democracy,” but offering a technical solution based on data. The hope is that publishing less propaganda will induce less violence, and less violence will lead to an environment where there is less fear, and

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<sup>4</sup> Speaking of irony, Peerenboom names one of the student leaders who prefer a “strong leadership.” In Chinese, this student is known as Wu’er Kaixi—in Uyghur, he is Uerkesh Davlet. He was one of the most prominent faces during the Tiananmen protests, as well as a product of the *minkaohan* system. According to Rudelson (1992, 146-47), he is a cultural hero in Xinjiang among the Uyghurs. Here, though, Peerenboom quotes him declaring “that his fellow Chinese did not understand democracy and lacked a democratic consciousness” (2000, 67). *If* these were indeed his words, *this* would be the sinicization and colonization I am talking about: a classic reproduction of the elitist Chinese intellectual.

with less fear it would be possible to publish the very novels and memoirs of individuals that Rorty upholds as amenable for mutual cultural understanding.

#### 6.4 The Pragmatics of Ethics and Awareness of Positionality

Inghilleri, in her later work, does step out of the humanistic time-capsule that is often Translation Studies and into the issue known as “conflict” (Baker 2006), in particular the positions of the translators and interpreters who find themselves embedded in the narrative called the “War on Terror” (Inghilleri 2008). This is much called for research on translation’s direct complicity in violence, its corporeal, immediate effect. By presenting the dilemmas of people who find themselves in the translation crossfires of interrogator and detainee at Guantanamo Bay, the notion known as “impartiality,” long held as a universal value in the profession, is called into question. But, again, the title of the essay betrays translation’s Romantic lineage and longing: “The *Ethical* Task of the Translator in the Geo-political Arena from Iraq to Guantanamo Bay” (emphasis added). It presupposes, again, an individual—“the Translator”—with agency to choose. Note the word “task”; it is the hand of Benjamin, like the palm of the Buddha from which the Monkey King could never escape, no matter how clever his tricks, how quick his wit.

There is no Buddha in war. No higher calling. There are only superseding (powerful) interests. If the soldier cannot make an “ethical” choice when pulling the trigger or flying a drone with a mission to kill, how can the translator under the same military command do so? The consequences of working for warring causes—which is not a personal conflict, but a collective ideological one, or one of “bad blood” as the soldier-linguist so accurately puts it (Saar, cited in Inghilleri 2008, 221)—are the same for the translator as the soldier. If you question morality and ethics to the point of not being able to reconcile the conflicting narratives on a personal level, you lay down your uniform and walk away. But we all know that the world, with its bills to pay

and dreams to be fulfilled, is a lot less straightforward. And this is precisely where Rorty, as I, find the ethical debate in philosophy, as in translation, pragmatically out of touch with reality and ineffectual in achieving data-driven goals such as less violence, less incarceration, less medical misdiagnosis of vulnerable immigrant populations.

It is not that there should be no “code of ethics” for the profession. It is that this code should be developed according to the context where translation/interpretation is practiced, respectively—at war, in the hospital, in the courtroom, on behalf of the interest who hires you. Translation is a contingency of the interests it serves. Different contexts involve different stakes—serving corporate interests in a business deal is not the same as helping a sick patient navigate a foreign medical system; the defendant and the plaintiff are necessarily at odds, like the border officer and the undocumented immigrant. One cannot demand an interpreter to simultaneously serve all interests or, paradoxically, serve a universal “human” interest. Language is always partial to the interest it gives voice to, and translation would be best served by substituting “impartiality” for *awareness of the position* the translator inhabits in the chain of communication and the consequences of his or her choices stemming from that position.<sup>5</sup> As an interpreter, pick your clients and priorities accordingly. As an employer, hire your translators accordingly as well. It’s not easy, of course; sometimes the paycheck (or budget) trumps all.<sup>6</sup> But at least one goes into the communication context aware of one’s own position and the words chosen to represent that position; if a choice is made, at least it is informed. The disposal of

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<sup>5</sup> This is analogous to Anthropology’s awareness and concern with the positionality of the researcher (Clifford and Marcus 1986), which also became the central concern of the postcolonial turn in Translation Studies.

<sup>6</sup> Further examination of interpreting practices in contexts where vast power differentials are apparent—such as in the courtroom and at the border—are much needed. The irony remains that highly trained conference-level interpreters will likely never serve the interests of the vulnerable and disenfranchised population who sorely need consequential quality language representation. The limited public budget allocated for “interpreting services” reflects the limited and narrow understanding of the act of interpreting, supposing the interpreter is an over-the-counter machine capable of “impartiality.”

“impartiality” allows for the insinuating effects of “interests” to be exposed and understood, and, consequently, much more effective means to either support or counter those interests to be conceived.

Inghilleri mentions Bourdieu’s *illusio*, “[T]he tacit knowledge that allows social agents to make sense of what is happening around them relatively *unquestioningly*” (2008, 213; emphasis added), in the context of personal conflict the translator potentially faces in the geo-political arena (i.e. the conflict between habitus and field: a Christian belief of love-thy-neighbor versus to fight for God and country). In order for the collective to carry it out its mission, the personal cannot question. An illusion must be maintained to spur belief in a higher cause, something outside the self. But somebody has to cast the illusion. And before being able to perform this trick, the magic—the illusion—must be broken (down) for the magician. Governance is a balancing act, “magic” to the uninitiated. Breaking the illusion is not disillusionment. It is empowerment for the government-magician if the goals of governance are to be achieved. It is empowerment for the translator-magician if the goals of effective and *affective* meaning are to be achieved.

## 6.5 Conclusion

By tracing the origins of the philosophies that promote the act of communication as a means toward “commensurability,” this chapter points out that they are often inadequate or ineffective in addressing interethnic conflict and promoting “intersubjectivity,” such as in the Han-Uyghur case under study, because they originate from a particular privileged white, European, male context (i.e. *one* ethnic context). It then points to the school of thought of pragmatism as being a more effective guide in achieving the desired result of peaceful coexistence, but also reiterates that once pragmatism falls into the particular romanticized notion

of individual agency and the individual's ability and capacity to make a difference, such as later promoted by the philosopher Richard Rorty, pragmatism also falls short in addressing conflicts between nations and peoples, since they are conflicts of a collective nature and not individual. Instead, awareness of positionality is stressed over the concerns of "ethics."

## CHAPTER 7

### THE QING ANALOGY

#### 7.1 Introduction

This chapter proceeds to cite the Manchu rulers of the Chinese dynasty Qing to illustrate the power of the “Chinese” narrative in anointing the legitimate rulers of China, even if they were initially alien intruders, like the Manchus. This narrative—again, the ethnocentric hierarchy of the Confucian order—afforded legitimacy to alien rulers should they effectively sinicize or, in other words, translate their foreign selves to fit into that narrative, employing the language and script of (the) Chinese. This is offered as a stark contrast to the Uyghur population who, unlike the Manchus, do not occupy the position of power to “choose” a Chinese identity as the ruler and mandate official translations between Chinese and Manchu (and other ethnic languages). And thus, it is also offered as an explanation to why the Uyghurs, deprived of agency, must resist translation into the Chinese narrative, literally and figuratively, as a means to maintain their identity.

#### 7.2 The Ethnic Other as Imperial Chinese

The Chinese narrative survived the barbarians and refashioned their alien dynasties into “Chinese” ones, often at the hands of the alien aristocracy themselves (Gernet 1982, 199-200; 352); its language sinicized their names and cultures (Dien 1977) and thwarted the Jesuit attempt at Christian enlightenment and conversion (Gernet 2010); it subjugated their values to a Chinese system of the civilized versus uncivilized, the ruler versus the ruled. “It” is not a physical entity in the form of someone ordering the “barbarians” to instigate change, but a norm unto itself that asks anyone who steps into its ruling paradigm to abide by it in order for the throne to assume

legitimacy; it is a force that evolved and grew synchronically, with the sinicization of different populations and their cultures at each dynastic interval, as well as diachronically, accruing authority by claim of its unsevered lineage stretching back to antiquity.

However, since the postcolonial turn in cultural studies, there has been increasing awareness of the Han-oriented, ethnocentric bias of the “sinicization” theory, an old school, boys’ club version of Chinese scholarship criticized for overwhelmingly relying on Chinese documentation (and sense of superiority) to reconstruct history, overlooking potential documentation in the corresponding “alien” languages, which might have indicated a much more symbiotic process of give and take between the designated barbarian and supposed civilized, such as suggested by Rawski (1996) in her review of Qing governing practices within and outside the Great Wall (833). But the name 理藩院 (*lifanyuan*)—the designated Qing administrative body responsible for managing non-Han affairs in Mongolia, Tibet, Xinjiang, and the Southwest territories—speaks for itself. Coded in 藩 (*fan*) is a feudal hierarchical value denoting the peripheral or subordinate status of its referent. The Manchu rulers might identify as ethnically Manchu, but that does not reverse the Han-imperial narrative they inherited after overthrowing the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). The common English translation provided for *Lifanyuan*—“Court of Colonial Affairs” (833)—does not help either.

Though Chia (1993) informs us that the Manchu name of *Lifanyuan* translates into the “Ministry Ruling the Outer Provinces,”<sup>1</sup> and uses this more neutral title as proof that the Manchu attitude towards Inner Asia was very different from that of the Chinese (61), it would be naïve to think that the Manchu rulers, themselves thoroughly schooled in the Confucius classics, did not grasp the meaning of the Chinese. Could it be that the Manchu script was created as a reactive

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<sup>1</sup> tulergi golo be dasara jurgan

measure for governing purposes, in response to the Chinese script's overwhelming production in historical and cultural records? That it lacked that particular nuanced term that codes condescension within sophisticated brush strokes, honed throughout the centuries of ethnocentric thought? It would be reasonable to assume that the Manchus did not possess that particular kind of terminology—because why would they look down upon themselves as the uncivilized barbarians menacing Chinese borders? But since they now sit on the Chinese throne, at the center of power and civilization, it would be reasonable to assume that attitudes—and language—changed. As Ho (1998) points out, in a rebuttal to Rawski (1996), Qing “relations with other non-Han peoples may not fit post-Tang conventional notions of Chinese rule, but this hardly means that the core of their strategy of rule was not predicated on Chinese political principles” (125). The Manchu general Ortai (1677-1745), after all, did refer to the hill dwelling minorities of Yunnan as “barbarian nomads who were the antithesis of civilized ideals” (cited in Scott 2009, 102).

While Ho's (1998) claim is no doubt Sinocentric, and Chia (1993) presents a valid argument that the Manchus, given their non-Han ethnicity, based their management of non-Han relations on Inner Asian norms rather than Chinese ones (86-87), it would be remiss to assume that the Mongols, Tibetans, and Uyghurs would have so willingly submitted to the trading regulations and rituals of tribute imposed on them by the Manchus had the Manchus not inherited the Chinese empire of the Ming (1368-1644) in the first place. And what of the Manchu prerequisite to effectively control that Chinese empire, as a minority ethnicity historically painted as “barbarian”? It is called “sinicization”—albeit in political strategy, if not in honesty. And it is perhaps even an overdetermination of sinicization on the part of the Manchus.

(Post)colonial history, after all, is ridden with examples of subjects who, once they assume power, are even more unrelenting than their former (white) masters.

### 7.3 Assuming the Script and Language of Power

But my assumption about a certain “lack” in the Manchu script would suggest that the Manchus came riding into Beijing out of thin air in 1644. They did not. They had previously been known as the Jurchens, who established the Jin dynasty (1115-1234) in northern China after conquering the Northern Song in 1127.<sup>2</sup> According to Franke (1994, 319-20), the Jin rulers thought of themselves as “the guardians of the ‘real’ Chinese traditions of the Tang and Northern Sung [Song]” and “confirmed their own inclusion in the legitimate succession of Chinese dynasties in 1203 when the government proclaimed that henceforth the element earth would be assigned to the Chin [Jin] dynasty, succeeding Sung [Song] whose element had been fire” (cited in Ho 1998, 127). Nothing proclaims legitimacy like the anointment of the cosmos. Nevertheless, there was a Manchu script proper that existed for the later Qing. Based on Mongol script, it was created in 1599, “before the Jianzhou Jurchens renamed themselves the Qing,” and it allowed the dynasty to “establish a cultural foundation of linguistic independence” (Murata 2016, 110). But “independence” from whom? This presupposes a formidable competing opponent, which suggests my reactive thesis was not too far off base.

Even though Murata (2016) is a proponent of reassessing Chinese history by recasting the Han majority as “the other” and creating “alternative histories” from non-Han perspectives (121), the reality remains that by mid-Qing, or the Qianlong era (circa 1750), “no matter how often rulers would implement protection and promotion policies, Manchu was on a path of decline”

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<sup>2</sup> The Song dynasty reestablished its capital in the south, in present day Hangzhou, and was known as Southern Song (1127-1279), in contrast to Northern Song (960-1127).

and “the Manchus that lived in Beijing were similar to second or third generation immigrants who had to study their ancestral language as a foreign language (111). It is much like the reality of the supposed Uyghur influence on Mandarin in Baki’s (2012) study, which somehow makes it sound like the Han are embracing their minority brethren’s language, and they have truly become “the other” in this language context. It turns out, however, that Baki’s subjects are “Uyghurs who speak imperfect Putonghua (Mandarin) as a second language” (58). If anyone has heard non-native speakers speak in a second language, it is inevitable that the mother tongue’s linguistic traits are transposed onto the foreign tongue. It is not because the “amenability” of Mandarin to “external” forces (59) or that the Uyghurs just simply decide to “transfer elements of their dominant language to Putonghua [Mandarin] and cause changes in the language” (58). “Dominant”? It is the Uyghurs who have *no choice* but to be “bilingual” and speak Mandarin instead of their mother tongue. They are made to sound “crippled.”

The Chinese, as the dominant ethnies in Xinjiang (not in numbers, but in power), have little incentive to learn Uyghur or use it (like the rest of the Canadian population outside Quebec or outside federal government employment who have little incentive to learn French or use it, and that’s despite Canada’s official bilingualism). The author acknowledges that “language contact between Uyghur and Chinese in Xinjiang requires the speakers of Uyghur to be the active agents in this language contact situation because Uyghurs can be bilinguals while the Putonghua speakers are monolingual” (48). But acknowledging this imbalance of power as a flat fact, without addressing the thorny reasons behind it, gives us a false-positive. Only when that imbalance is addressed can we talk about the “influence of the minority language on the majority language” (42) in the true sense it implies: that the Chinese are influenced by the Uyghurs and they are picking up “Uyghur-Mandarin,” such as in the one example where

Rudelson (1992, 206) documents the Chinese in Turpan adopting the Uyghur word “bika,” turning it into “bai kar” in Mandarin to mean a worthless person or wasted effort. Without examples as such, in an eagerness to prove that the Han can be “the other,” and that “sinicization” is not always a given, one ends up reinforcing the very thesis he or she wishes to disprove.<sup>3</sup>

The position of power the Chinese language assumes can be visually discerned in the following picture of the main gate to the Qing court’s Imperial Mountain Resort in Chengde:<sup>4</sup>



**Figure 26: Lizhengmen Gate at Chengde**

From right to left, the five official scripts of the multiethnic Qing Manchu empire are present: Manchu, Tibetan, Chinese, Chagatai Arabic (Uyghur), and Mongolian. But it is well observed that the placement of languages is not random. Among those five, the Han Chinese script features the most prominently at the center. Inscribed by Qianlong emperor himself (reign, 1736-95), the name of the gate, *Lizhengmen*, derives from the Chinese *I-Ching* (*Book of*

<sup>3</sup> This is symptomatic on the other end of the spectrum as well, such as when Seymour (2000) readily slaps the “sinification” label onto Chinese activities. It appeals to what is in the back of our minds, but if the description doesn’t quite add up to the accusation, it defeats the cause and gives the opponent an easy volley.

<sup>4</sup> Photo: <https://baike.baidu.com/item/麗正門>. Accessed February 5, 2018.

*Changes*).<sup>5</sup> Radiating from the center, this Chinese is not a translation from a classical Manchu text. The direction of this translation flow—from the hands of a Manchu emperor exerting his ruling authority by citing from a Chinese classic—shows where the source of power lies.

“Chinese” is cultural and political capital.

#### 7.4 Conclusion

The inevitable decline of fluency in the Manchu language, if not exactly in its symbolic and political value in official court settings and documents, was the tradeoff to rule a land in which the Manchus were vastly outnumbered by a population that had already been sinicized and become “Chinese” throughout the iterations of dynasties. But, just like how Ho carefully pointed out the particular brand of Confucianism the Qing rulers embraced—the Cheng Zhu school,<sup>6</sup> which has been criticized for justifying totalitarian intents (Wright 1968, 39; cited in Ho 1998, 144)—I would like to point out how Ho’s nuanced interpretation of the success of sinicization in creating Chinese dynasties (such as the Tang, Northern Wei, Jin, and Qing dynasties) was largely a *top-down* process, instigated by the ruling class themselves, to enable their foreign selves to assume a Chinese identity, its norms and morals and literature, so they could rule “the Chinese”—so they could legitimize their regimes as “Chinese” to inherit the empire, or notion of it. The Uyghurs in this research context are *not* in a ruling position—which is the reason for this mini foray into Qing sinicization: to make a contrast with the equally “non-Han” population of the Uyghurs, as the closest analogy. In contrast to the Qing rulers who could mandate through the *Lifanyuan* translations into Manchu—their “own” language—the Uyghurs

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<sup>5</sup> 《離卦·象》：日月麗乎天下，百穀草木麗乎土。重明以麗乎正，乃化成天下。The Li Hexagram (30): The sun and moon cling to the sky, like grains and foliage grow from the earth. Both radiate from the correct path, so they shall shine the way forward for all under heaven. See also James Legge’s (1882) translation: <http://www.sacred-texts.com/ich/ic30.htm>, in the *Sacred Books of the East* series edited by Max Müller (Oxford: Clarendon Press): Volume 16: *The Yi king (I Ching)* (1882). Accessed February 5, 2018.

<sup>6</sup> 程朱理學 chengzhu lixue

do not have the power to maintain even that level of symbolic linguistic identity in the current context. The Qing rulers were at least in possession of a degree of agency to make a choice, even if in reality their language was slowly being relegated to a status of only historical relevance. Because the Uyghurs do not have a choice, their only recourse is, therefore, resistance.

**PART III**

**SITUATING  
RESEARCH AND RESEARCHER**

## CHAPTER 8

### SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY

#### 8.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a quantitative approach in explaining the significance of the research I have undertaken. Through quantitative keyword searches, it shows that studies concerning “Uyghur” and “translation” lag behind those concerning “Chinese” and “translation”—even though according to another keyword search, the Uyghur language ranks just as significant as the more traditionally powerful languages of translation between Chinese, such as French and German. Next, quantifying the results of the keyword searches also shows a particular lack in politically-oriented perspectives and theoretical frameworks that address power relations between the Han State and Uyghur minority when it comes to research between Chinese-Uyghur translation, a conclusion also supported by two significant Chinese studies on Chinese-Uyghur translation issues (Tuerdi 2012; Tong 2005) cited in this chapter. Given the strategic importance of the Uyghur language in domestic governance and the conspicuous translation flow in the particular direction of translations from Chinese into Uyghur initiated by the Chinese state, the political perspectives and theoretical models of interpretation I offer in my study have the potential to address these gaps.

#### 8.2 Filling the Gaps

The significance of this study lies in its potential to fill in gaps of knowledge in Translation Studies by adopting an interdisciplinary approach and underlining the supralinguistic nature of translation. To demonstrate the relative lack or insignificance of publications examining Xinjiang/Uyghur issues in conjunction with translation issues, I performed keyword searches of

publication titles using two well-known online databases for research: 1) ProQuest, for material available in English; 2) CNKI,<sup>1</sup> a Chinese equivalent of ProQuest in China, for material available in Chinese.

The following Table 17 and Table 18 list the results in ProQuest and CNKI in terms of the number of hits each keyword combination generated on January 31, 2013, the year in which the research proposal for this study was put forth. The keyword search results for “China,” “China AND Translation,” “Chinese,” “Chinese AND Translation” are used for contrasting purposes. The reason for limiting the search to “titles” is that terms included in a title would indicate the primary focus of the publication. In other words, I look at the number of publications dedicated to these keywords and try to avoid including those that only make a passing reference to these keywords in their content.

The resulting Table 17 of the ProQuest search covers 44 databases comprised of a comprehensive set of publication types (periodicals, newspapers, dissertations, books, etc) and disciplines (Science & Technology, Medicine, Literature, Social Sciences, etc):<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> CNKI stands for China National Knowledge Infrastructure; 中国知网 zhonguo zhiwang. <http://www.cnki.net/>.

<sup>2</sup> A more detailed description of the 44 databases can be found on the ProQuest search page, which I accessed via the University of Ottawa’s library system: <http://search.proquest.com.proxy.bib.uottawa.ca/?accountid=14701>.

**Table 17: ProQuest Results**

	<b>Keywords in Title</b>	<b>Total Hits</b>	<b>“Translation” %<sup>3</sup></b>
<b>ProQuest</b>	1. “China”	1,050,573	0.04%
	2. “China” AND “Translation”	407	
	3. “Chinese”	420,676	0.28%
	4. “Chinese” AND “Translation”	1,179	
	5. “Xinjiang”	7,795	0.01%
	6. “Xinjiang” AND “Translation”	1	
	7. “Uyghur”	439	0.46%
	8. “Uyghur” AND “Translation”	2	
	9. “Uighur” <sup>4</sup>	1,080	0.46%
	10. “Uighur” AND “Translation”	5	

We can see at a glance that those focusing on Xinjiang/Uyghur translation are much fewer than those on China/Chinese translation.<sup>5</sup> If we look more closely, we can see that when “Translation” is added into the keyword combination, the total hits are significantly reduced in all cases. For example: of the total number of studies on “1. China,” only 0.04% are also focused on translation; of the total number of studies on “3. Chinese,” only 0.28% are also focused on translation; of the total number of studies on “5. Xinjiang,” only 0.01% are also focused on translation. This means that even though studies on “China AND Translation” are already rare

<sup>3</sup> The numbers in this column represent the percentage of studies that *also* focus on “translation.” For example, 0.04 means that only 0.04% of studies with “China” in their title *also have* “translation” ( $407 \div 1,050,573 \times 100\%$ ).

<sup>4</sup> Alternate popular spelling of “Uyghur.”

<sup>5</sup> In fact, for “8. Uyghur AND Translation” there is 1 entry that is duplicate in content. This means that in actuality, there is only 1 hit for this combination. However, my calculation is still based on the number “2,” since I would not be able to go over each entry and adjust for these kinds of duplicates for the other keyword combinations due to the sheer number of hits.

compared to studies with “China” alone in the title, studies on “Xinjiang AND Translation” are even rarer, suggesting the need for more.

Comparatively speaking, of all the studies on “Uighur” or “Uyghur,” a much higher percentage—0.46% in both cases—also focus on translation. That would seem to suggest that “translation” is more relevant when the field of study concerns “Uyghur/Uighur.” But these titles, in reality, number in the single-digits, and a closer examination of their wording shows that they appear to focus on traditional textual or linguistic approaches to translation; or they simply take the form of short news articles. A further look into their content reveals that none of them focus on the political aspects of translation and its function within a power relations framework, which is the main thesis of my study.

The two titles pulled up for “8. Uyghur AND Translation” actually refer to the same news item, but with different publication specifications:

1. *RFA Publishes First Translation of Noted Uyghur Story Author Serving 10-Year Term in Chinese Prison*. PR Newswire [New York] 28 June 2005.
2. *RFA Publishes First Translation of Noted Uyghur Story Author Serving 10-Year Term in Chinese Prison*. PR Newswire Europe Including UK Disclose (Jun 28, 2005).

Though the article’s content reveals the political struggles of the Uyghur people reflected in the prison term of the author, translation itself is not the subject of examination. It appears to be simply a fact: the story was translated.

The 5 titles pulled up for “10. Uighur AND Translation”:

1. *Uighurs in Kyrgyzstan Get Translation of Koran*. BBC Monitoring Central Asia [London] 08 Feb 2003.
2. *Utilizing Agglutinative Features in Japanese-Uighur Machine Translation [L'utilisation de traits agglutinants dans la traduction automatique japonais-ouïgour]*. Mahsut,

Muhtar; Ogawa, Yasuhiro; Sugino, Kazue; Inagaki, Yasuyoshi. *Machine Translation in the Information Age* (Santiago de Compostela, 18-22 September 2001): 217-222. Genève: EAMT. (2001).

3. *The Moen Collection of Eastern Turki (New Uighur) Popular Poetry*. Edited with translation, notes and glossary by Gunnar Jarring. (1996).
4. *The Moen Collection of Eastern Turki (New Uighur): Proverbs and Popular Sayings*. Ed. with translation, notes and glossary by G. Jarring. (1985).
5. *The “Sri-parivarta” (Chapters XVI and XVII) from Sinqu Sali’s Uighur Translation of I-Tsing’s Version of the “Suvarnaprabhasottama-sutra.”* Diss. Finch, Roger. Harvard University, 1976. 0322370.

The first title, a news item, is again simply treating translation as a fact: the Koran was translated. The second title is apparently linguistics oriented; it even talks about “correct” translation in its abstract. Reinhard F. Hahn’s (1998) review of the third title on popular poetry suggests that Jarring’s translations are very useful because he “presents the material practically in its raw form without imposing or suggesting theoretical interpretations,” providing “just enough annotation to help the readers with language and culture-specific information”(382). This indicates that Jarring’s approach is the opposite of mine, which does not seek to make translation transparent but to problematize it. Since the fourth title is the first edition of the third title, it can be assumed that Hahn’s review also applies. As for the fifth title, a dissertation published in 1976, even if it did touch upon the political nature of translation, given the distant date of publication forty plus years ago, my research would provide a timely update to its arguments, not to mention that the dissertation focuses on religious and philosophical texts, while I look at translated propaganda across genres, its relation with violence, and how that relation mirrors the antagonism between the two language groups of Uyghur and Chinese.

The one title pulled up for “6. Xinjiang AND Translation” is “Study on English Translation of Xinjiang Dish and Food Names.” Published by two Chinese authors affiliated with

Xinjiang Normal University, the article argues for a skopos approach, also known as “functionalist,” towards translating dish names, and deliberates the linguistic technicalities found within various translated examples. The content is far from political and rather exhibits the kind of “correct” self-serving stereotypes one comes to associate with government-approved narratives of its minority subjects, such as the characterization of the Uyghurs and Kazaks in Xinjiang as “born warm-hearted, enthusiastic, and also generous and broad-minded” (Chen and Hu 2008, 24). This is hardly the picture that is presented when crackdowns on “splittist” forces are called for.

The following Table 18 shows the number of hits each Chinese keyword combination generated in the CNKI search. The keyword combinations are chosen to mirror those in the ProQuest search.

Table 18: CNKI Results

	Keywords in Title	Totals	“Translation” %	ProQuest%
CNKI	中国 [China; <i>zhongguo</i> ] <sup>6</sup>	1,780,069	0.17%	0.04%
	中国 AND 翻译 [China; <i>zhongguo</i> ] AND [Translation; <i>fanyi</i> ]	2,994		
	汉语 [Chinese; <i>hanyu</i> ]	58,800	2.34%	0.28%
	汉语 AND 翻译 [Chinese; <i>hanyu</i> ] AND [Translation; <i>fanyi</i> ]	1,376		
	新疆 [Xinjiang; <i>xinjiang</i> ]	113,236	0.11%	0.01%
	新疆 AND 翻译 [Xinjiang; <i>xinjiang</i> ] AND [Translation; <i>fanyi</i> ]	129		
	维吾尔 [Uyghur/Uighur; <i>weiwuer</i> ]	10,557	0.65%	0.46%
	维吾尔 AND 翻译 [Uyghur; <i>weiwuer</i> ] AND [Translation; <i>fanyi</i> ]	69		
	英语 AND 翻译 [English; <i>yingyu</i> ] AND [Translation; <i>fanyi</i> ]	9,039		
	日语 AND 翻译 [Japanese; <i>riyu</i> ] AND [Translation; <i>fanyi</i> ]	297		
	法语 AND 翻译 [French; <i>fayu</i> ] AND [Translation; <i>fanyi</i> ]	87		
	德语 <sup>7</sup> AND 翻译 [German; <i>deyu</i> ] AND [Translation; <i>fanyi</i> ]	77		
	俄语 AND 翻译 [Russian; <i>eyu</i> ] AND [Translation; <i>fanyi</i> ]	251		

<sup>6</sup> Format: [English translation of the Chinese; *pinyin spelling and pronunciation of the Chinese*]

<sup>7</sup> One known issue of keyword searches using Chinese characters is inaccurate truncating. In the “德语” (German) search, this title was included among the total hits: 韩理德/语域/理论. The two characters 德 and 语 are present, but the problem is that they belong to two respective “words” 韩理德 (“Halliday”) and 语域 (“register”). So in this case, the actual number of hits that correspond to what I am looking for should be lower than 77.

In the following table, the results of the CNKI search (left hand column) compared to the ProQuest search (right hand column) show that “translation” seems to enjoy a slightly higher percentage of the market share when it comes to publications in Chinese (in CNKI) versus those in English (in ProQuest):

**Table 19: CNKI and ProQuest Translation % Comparison**

	<b>CNKI</b>	<b>ProQuest</b>
China AND Translation	0.17%	0.04%
Chinese AND Translation	2.34%	0.28%
Xinjiang AND Translation	0.11%	0.01%
Uyghur AND Translation	0.65%	0.46%

However, what I wish to emphasize in the Chinese context is the relative importance of Xinjiang/Uyghur translation. This is why for the CNKI search I added the search results for “English and Translation,” “Japanese and Translation,” “French and Translation,” “German and Translation,” and “Russian and Translation” for comparison purposes. According to UNESCO’s Index Translationum, the top five translated foreign languages in China for books are:

- 1) English
- 2) Japanese
- 3) French
- 4) German
- 5) Russian

The number of hits for each of them with the keyword “translation” largely corresponds to this ranking, with the only exception being Russian:

- 1) English and Translation, 9039
- 2) Japanese and Translation, 297
- 3) Russian and Translation, 251
- 4) French and Translation, 87
- 5) German and Translation, 77

Russian occupies 3rd place instead of 5th, pushing French and German one place behind. However, when we consider the historical and political relations between China and Russia, it is not difficult to see why Russian would be on par with Japanese. Both languages played an important role in translating the West into the Chinese context and in the shaping of ideology in China’s pursuit of modernity.

Interestingly, in comparison with these traditional “powerful” languages, the number of titles for “Uyghur AND Translation” is 69. This means it is in close competition with German and French even though it is supposedly a minority language within China—and the language of a disempowered and oppressed people, to be exact, according to numerous studies and journalistic accounts which I have cited extensively in the previous chapter. This relatively high level of interest in the topic of “Uyghur AND Translation” suggests its political and strategic importance in China, even if on the surface it occupies the position of a “weaker” language. A closer look at the abstracts of these 69 articles allows us to divide them into 6 main categories, plus a residual “other” category:<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> For a list of the 69 articles, see Appendix C.

1. Translation strategies/techniques/principles focusing on the textual and linguistic properties of the source and target languages (29)
2. Translation history (overview) of a specific time period (12)
3. Announcements of translation related activities, such as conferences, prizes, and speeches (12)
4. Translator profiles (8)
5. Machine/automated translation (6)
6. Translation pedagogy (1)
7. Other (1 duplicate title in second category)

None of these 69 articles focus on the function of translation in a power relations framework, and of the most popular first category, 10 articles out of the 29 specifically talk about the translation of “proverbs”—a folksy, apolitical topic—highlighting the need for a contrasting political approach. Even when “culture” is mentioned as an important factor in the research, it is mentioned to stress the role of translation as contributing to cultural communication or exchange, rather than being a potential roadblock in the communication pathway. The idea of exchange also supposes that the two cultures involved in the translation process proceed from a basis of equality, disregarding obvious power differentials and the antagonistic nature of the translation context. This is what I would like to contest in my study, which regards translation as another representation of domination or an attempt to dominate, of which the primary goal is not two-way communication but one-way dominance, even if that domination turns out to be solely symbolic and does not at all translate into the desired results of “harmony” between two cultures. In this regard, my research would provide a much-needed political perspective in the discourse on translation using the Chinese-Uyghur context as an alternative example.

Due to the characteristics of the Chinese language, another kind of keyword combination can be explored to denote translation between Chinese and Uyghur: “汉维[hanwei] AND 翻译

[fanyi]” or “维汉[weihan] AND翻译 [fanyi].” The character combinations of 汉维or维汉can perhaps be understood in English as portmanteau words: “Han-Uy” for 汉维 [hanwei] and “Uy-Han” for 维汉 [weihan]. When performing searches using these two combinations, the results—73 titles for “Han-Uy AND Translation”; 24 titles for “Uy-Han AND Translation”—are thus:<sup>9</sup>

**Table 20: CNKI Search Results for “Han-Uy” and “Uy-Han”**

CATEGORIES	汉维 AND 翻译 [Han-Uy; <i>hanwei</i> ] AND [Translation; <i>fanyi</i> ] (73)	维汉 AND 翻译 [Uy-Han; <i>weihan</i> ] AND [Translation; <i>fanyi</i> ] (24)
1. Translation strategies/ techniques/ principles	47	7
2. Translation history	1	1
3. Announcements of translation related activities	0	0
4. Translator profiles	0	0
5. Machine translation	22	14
6. Translation pedagogy	2	2
7. Other	1	0

This time the results are slightly different from the 69 articles in that they slant heavily towards the first category of Translation Strategies—adding both columns (47 and 7), they come up to a total of 54. The runner-up is the fifth category of Machine and Automated Translation. It arrives at a total of 36, but since 7 of the titles overlap, there are only 29 in reality. Despite the

<sup>9</sup> For a list of the 73 and 24 titles, see Appendix D and E.

differences between this table and the 69 articles, the absence of politically-oriented discourse is still apparent. Even though a total of 23 abstracts in these two searches mention the importance of recognizing “cultural factors” or “cultural differences” in the process of translation, they mainly treat these factors or differences as something that can be overcome by certain translation strategies or techniques. The understanding exhibited here is that translation is a words-on-the-page activity that necessarily communicates culture to promote mutual understanding. My research challenges this notion and suggests an alternative interpretation and a more cautionary outlook. It suggests, in fact, that translation is the expression of the mechanism that upholds mutual distrust, not the one that upends it.

### **8.3 Upon Closer Examination**

The one study, under the “other” category, that does open the door to the discourse of power is “The Application of Polysystem Theory in Chinese-Uyghur Translation” (Tuerdi 2012). Even though Even-Zohar’s theory, which provides the main theoretical framework for this 2012 Master’s thesis, does not directly describe translated literature as a type of symbolic capital that endows those who possess it with the power to change the central or peripheral status of a literature, the model described in “The Position of Translated Literature within the Literary Polysystem” (Even-Zohar 1978) nevertheless corresponds to the discourse of power and dominance that appears in the cultural and sociological turns in Translation Studies, such as those based on Bourdieu’s theory of habitus, field, and agent.<sup>10</sup> In fact, when discussing the treatment of polysystem theory by scholars, José Lambert (1995) points out that a key principle

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<sup>10</sup> This, however, is not the emphasis of Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory or Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory, which are also represented in the sociological turn.

in the theory is “the struggle for power” (111), reflecting the Marxist and postcolonial interpretations in literary criticism at the time.

But Tuerdi’s (2012) thesis remains the one scholarly study among many, and it still limits the unit of observation to one literary text—the 1791 Chinese classic, *Dream of the Red Chamber*<sup>11</sup>—and the word-based translation strategies employed within it. In contrast, I look at the trends of cross-genre propaganda in translation and its relation to violent confrontation between the two language groups. Moreover, the conclusion drawn in this supposed polysystem-oriented thesis steers clear of revealing the relative “weaker” or “stronger” positions of Uyghur literature against Chinese literature. Instead of shedding light on the power positions of the literatures involved in the translation activity, which would actually be the signature contribution of Even-Zohar’s theory to Translation Studies, it rather points to the inability of the theory to account for the translator’s “individual cultural attitude” (49) in deciding whether to undertake a “foreignizing” or “domesticating” translation strategy.

I have already stressed, in my previous chapter, the deficiencies in relying on the interpretation of individual intent or agency in examining the supposed power of translation to contribute to intercultural communication in cases such as the Uyghur-Chinese one, where the imbalance of power is glaring and upheld by internalized, historical prejudices towards the Other (not only the Chinese attitudes towards the Barbarian, but also the Barbarian attitudes towards the Chinese). The fact that the author maintains that the Uyghur translation of this Chinese classic is exceptional because it mostly employs “domesticating” strategies, and that one “must focus on target reader needs” when translating cultural terms in order to “attain the goal of cultural exchange” (51) is an indication of the often prescriptive and traditional text-oriented

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<sup>11</sup> 《紅樓夢》 hong lou meng

approach<sup>12</sup> towards translation which I wish to balance with my argument, namely that the latent purpose of the act of translation seen here, and in my study, is not egalitarian cultural exchange, but either a show of power, or an attempt to regain it.

A show of power means, in the case of China and Xinjiang, China translating propaganda regardless of its ineffectiveness to achieve stability in Xinjiang; it is literally for show. To regain power means, in the case of China's quest for modernity beginning in the late 19th century, the profuse translation of Western texts and ideas (Wong 2005)—be it Marxism or modernism or liberal democracy—to free China from its late imperial cocoon and regain its stature as one of the greats among civilizations, if not *the* civilization. As we now approach the second decade of the 21st century, “translation” seems to have worked very well to China's advantage. Today few people would question China's power on both its own citizens and on the world stage. However, in contrast to the success of in-translations (the Chinese translating from foreign cultures), Ni Xiuhua's “Translating the Socialist Nation: Exporting Chinese Literature Under the New People's Republic of China (1949-1966)” (2017) has provided an analysis that shows how ex-translations (the Chinese exporting foreign language translations into foreign cultures) have been counterproductive to the propaganda efforts of the Chinese state in the hope of shaping international perceptions. My study would add to the counterproductive thesis of propaganda by demonstrating that it is also counterproductive in the *intra*-national context among populations that are equally “foreign” with one another, whose relations are perhaps even more exacerbated by one group's imposed boundaries on what constitutes “legal” expression of religious, cultural,

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<sup>12</sup> By “text-oriented” approach, I refer to the approach that proceeds from looking at how the text is altered to interpret the individual strategies of the translator as “foreignizing,” “domesticating,” “feminizing,” etc. It is in contrast to an approach that would proceed from *first* examining the *context* of the two languages involved in the exchange—the historic systems of production that (re)produce their power relations, via war, trade, economics, etc—and then using the structure of that relationship as a framework to interpret what is happening in the text or assign meaning to the translation activity itself—not the words, but the *activity*.

and ethnic identity on the other. Moreover, my attempt to examine source culture initiated translations also answers Ni's call for more integration of "outward translations" into Translation Studies (what I term "ex-translations"), which suggests that there is a relative lack in this direction of study. But even when ex-translations with a specific propaganda bent are studied, such as how the Franklin Book Program funded by the United States Information Agency used translation "to extend the sphere of influence of the United States and to disseminate American values," first in the Arab-speaking world then later to Southeast Asia (Brisset 2017, 270),<sup>13</sup> it is through the lens of how traditionally "powerful" languages of the West are exporting to the "periphery," and there is not necessarily an attempt to measure the effects of that propaganda, nor an attempt to connect it with the most negative of consequences, violence. The relative novelty, then, of my study under Translation Studies, would be to examine the "ex-translations" of a nation traditionally characterized as an "in-translating" one, and how those "ex-translations" are actually targeted at populations within national boundaries and potentially contributing to violent *intra*-national relations.

Incidentally, as per the center-peripheral theory of power relations, conducting my research in English and from a "Western" academic institution also has its advantages. Though Chinese academia does not necessarily hold what is published from the West superior, even at times dismissing it, without irony, as "government mouthpiece" (Pan Zhiping cited in Bloomberg 2011), Chinese scholars nevertheless recognize that procuring and understanding ideas from the West—still the main center for the dissemination and circulation of intellectual capital—is necessary in order to better position themselves on the international stage. This means that the

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<sup>13</sup> Also mentioned in Brisset (2017, 270-71) are the translation programs of France and Germany designed to maintain former colonial influences: France had the Georges Shéhadé Program (1989) in support of Lebanese publishers and the Taha Hussein Program (1990) in support of Egyptian publishers; Germany's most notable propaganda program in translation was the Inter Nationes program, which later merged with the Goethe Institute in 2001 to become the Goethe-Institut Inter Nationes.

likelihood my research will find its way “back” to stimulate domestic Chinese discourse on translation becomes much higher, with a higher chance of circumventing both the material blockade imposed by censorship and the mental blockade by ideology.

However, the power I speak of that China wields over its own intellectuals, from public censorship to self-censorship, is a risk I must weigh in the form of potentially denied visas and research opportunities, and professional ostracization from counterparts, within and outside China, who have vested interest in maintaining cordial relations with China. This is a very real risk considering that 13 contributors of *Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland* (Starr 2004) believe they have been denied visas on the grounds of their studies. Among the scholars who contributed to the volume and were interviewed for *The Washington Post’s* reporting on this incident include those who I have cited for this study, such as Dru Gladney, James Millward, and Gardner Bovington (de Vise, 2011).<sup>14</sup> The reality is even starker for those who have family in China: the *New York Times* reported that the relatives of five Radio Free Asia journalists, four of which were either US citizens or permanent residents, have been detained for alleged retaliation against critical coverage of the region (Ramzy 2018). Anne-Mary Bradie, the scholar whose article on China’s propaganda system and ethnic relations is most closely related to my study was also reported to have been a victim of home burglary where “there was strong circumstantial evidence that agents of Beijing were responsible” (Graham-McLay 2018). Though I am far from the senior and influential positions these 13 scholars have achieved, bans and blacklists are not known for being discriminatory.

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<sup>14</sup> For a detailed account of the unpalatable politics some of these scholars faced—not just from the Chinese government, but from their own institutions who, like many others, have strong financial and political reasons to maintain relations with China—see *Bloomberg’s* “China Banning U.S. Professors Elicits Silence from Colleges” (Golden and Staley 2011).

It must be acknowledged, though, that the keyword search I performed is a generalized approach, and more advanced searches tweaking the parameters can be done to generate more specific results. In addition, more advanced statistical methods could be applied to reduce or account for errors, such as the overlapping of titles or inaccurate truncating of Chinese characters which mistakenly allow for the inclusion of the wrong terms. But since the purpose of this keyword exercise is to demonstrate the relative absence or importance of one designation against another in terms of proportion, I believe it nonetheless offers an indication for the need of research perspectives I am undertaking.

To complement my more generalized approach of showing the comparative lack of politically-oriented perspectives in Chinese-Uyghur translation discourse is Tong Xiangping's "The Retrospection and Prospection of Translation between Chinese and Uyghur in Xinjiang since 1978" (2005). Tong's Master's thesis consists of four main chapters on the past achievements, new perspectives, introspection, and future directions of Chinese-Uyghur translation research activities conducted during the period from 1978-2003.

According to Tong, a total of 280 articles concerning Chinese-Uyghur translation were published in major Chinese journals between 1978-2003 (5); of all 280 articles, 106 articles focus on the "micro" aspects of translation, representing the largest category among the 9 categories she designates, and also by a significant margin, given that the next one down is "Translation Standards and Methods," at 49 articles (15).<sup>15</sup> By "micro" translation articles, Tong means those articles that are concerned with the translation of "grammar and syntax" (14), and by observing the dominance and rise in number of these types of micro-translation articles, she concludes that this can "to a certain degree, be perceived as a deficiency, this emphasis on the

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<sup>15</sup> See Appendix F for Tong's table.

micro at the expense of the macro” (15). This echoes my observation and conclusion after conducting the two sets of Chinese keyword searches, in which my category of “Translation strategies/techniques/principles” would correspond to Tong’s “micro-translation.” In addition, she observes that among these “micro-translation” articles, there are relatively more articles dwelling on the translation of proverbs and idioms (21), which would also support my findings and consequent call for diversification in research topics.

Tong, in the third chapter, where she takes an introspective look at the field of Chinese-Uyghur translation studies, lists four main research areas that she believes need to be addressed:

- 1) the lack of research on theory
- 2) the lack of interdisciplinary approaches
- 3) the lack of integration with Chinese translation studies
- 4) the lack of translation criticism proper (24-31)

She points out that there are extremely few articles that would qualify as theoretical and most do not advance beyond the “how-to-translate” level (26). My research addresses this lack by applying the theoretical framework of colonialism, ethno-nationalism, and high modernism, and by contrasting the conclusion drawn according to those theories with the theoretical approaches in Translation Studies. Tong points out that research heavily emphasizes the “internal,” that is only those aspects concerning translation proper, such as the nature of translation, the principles of translation, the standards of translation, the techniques of translation, translatability, etc (26-27). My research addresses this issue by utilizing the research findings or theories present in political science, anthropology, and philosophy, as well as the arguments presented by scholars who study Xinjiang and its relation with China outside a Translation Studies framework. She points out that while Chinese translation studies scholars have already “begun to experiment with macro, dynamic and rational approaches similar to Western scholars”

(28), Xinjiang scholars still mainly draw conclusions based on the “micro, static, and experience” (28). Though I am not a Xinjiang-based scholar and therefore cannot close the research gap between Xinjiang and Chinese scholars with an identity as such, my research can still contribute to the integration process by bringing in what Tong refers to as “macro” and “Western” perspectives.

The only area that I do not see my research offering direct contribution as prescribed by Tong is in translation criticism, where Tong calls for establishing a “comprehensive system of criticism” to overcome what she deems as a “translation crisis,” where standards of criticism are, to her, alarmingly different and uneven (31). As a proponent of the different but coexisting dimensions of translation, from the grammatical to the contextual to the conceptual, I do not support a unified standard for criticism of all translations. There are simply too many kinds of translations, for different purposes, serving different interests, for a one-size-fits-all standard. It must also be noted that for “criticism” to be effective in revealing new aspects of the same issue, it must take specific aim using specific methods of inquiry. Skopos criticism will not yield the same results as Marxist criticism; each produces specific results, but both results are equally valid within their respective terms of inquiry. Applying one standard risks homogenizing the results and our understanding of the issue. It risks creating a totalitarian regime of interpretation that rules over the production of knowledge. It ossifies the mind, which is what the overdependence on “Confucianism” did. It was a unified standard of inquiry that homogenized the Chinese intellectual to uphold “order”; it resulted in the debacle of the empire.

I do however support Tong’s idea that translation criticism should go beyond the “micro”—venturing into a more conceptual or theoretical approach to language that would engage the issues of identity, gender, ethnicity, and power relations that are present in cultural,

postcolonial, political and social studies—which literature from Translation Studies outside of the scope of Tong’s study has addressed. I also believe it should go beyond what Venuti (2011) identifies as “belletrism,” an approach largely found in the hermeneutic-poetic tradition of Translation Studies, which recalls what Tong refers to as “a general combination of literary, historical, philosophical, aesthetic, artistic contemplation” (28).<sup>16</sup> In this regard, my research injects a political, and by nature, divisive and unflattering point of view, which is something that is already present in Western postcolonial studies circulated in the English milieu, but necessarily absent in the Chinese one, where scholarship cannot be seen as questioning social cohesion or political norms. This political injection not only addresses the current lack in research that Tong points out in the Chinese context of Han-Uyghur translation studies, it also complements the future directions she believes research in this field should pursue.

In the chapter pertaining to future directions, Tong emphasizes the importance of the cultural turn in Translation Studies and notes the increase in articles that reflect the cultural component in translation in the decade leading up to 2005 (33-34).<sup>17</sup> She believes it is an inevitable trend that “culture” will become the center of the argument, considering that cultural differences between China and the West are prominent and that cultural differences among the different ethnic groups in Xinjiang are too (34). But Tong fails to take it further than acknowledging that cultures are simply “different.” She also seems to overlook a particular aspect that underlines the difference between Xinjiang and China: China’s territorial and historical claim on Xinjiang is part and parcel of what the Chinese deem the “Xinjiang Problem” and fuels the discord underlining that difference.

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<sup>16</sup> 多从文史哲美艺等不同角度作笼统的综合思考

<sup>17</sup> As previously mentioned, the “cultural turn” as coined in English in Translation Studies happened circa the 1980-90s, but the concern with “context” as a factor in the process of translation and its ensuing product can be traced back to Eugene Nida’s ethnocultural model in the 1950s, and even back to the Russian formalists in the 1920s, who inspired Even-Zohar’s polysystem theory (Brisset, forthcoming).

Whether or not this is an intentional oversight due to ideological reasons or political censorship, or due to the castrated intellectual environment of China's scholars, we can only speculate. But by venturing where Tong did not tread, my research, in contrast to Tong's, shows that cultures are not only different, they are underpinned by "power differentials"—the trademark thesis of the cultural turn—which have the potential of influencing translation activities beyond the micro level. Consequently, it is on a macro level and in the interpretation of its metadata that the acute significance of a translation activity is laid apparent.

#### **8.4 Conclusion**

This chapter employs a more quantitative approach to illustrate the potential of my thesis to address the gaps identified by keyword searches in relation to research on translation issues between Chinese/Uyghur and China/Xinjiang. It also cites two significant Chinese studies on the state of Chinese-Uyghur translation research to show that my research has the potential of addressing the lack of politically-oriented approaches or theoretical perspectives provided in relation to power relations between the two groups. This is done to complement the more qualitative assessments I have made throughout this study in regards to interdisciplinary research within Translation Studies and to highlight an alternative approach that does not proceed from source and target text comparison, the agency of the individual translator, or the assumption that "culture" can necessarily be communicated in the translation exchange.

It should be noted that here I am primarily addressing the general perception of the act of translation, as experienced when conversing with the common passer-by or everyday acquaintance (whether professional or private) who has never touched a scholarly article on translation, and who has little intention or incentive to do so. This perception is promoted in literary reviews and journals, in interviews with writers and translators, on book jackets, and in

brochures advertising translation programs and projects carried out by governments and institutions. It stands in marked contrast to scholarship within the specific discipline of Translation Studies, where perception has advanced well beyond this point. After the cultural turn in the 1980-90s and subsequent sociological turn, inquiries into the activity of translation are increasingly informed by postcolonial criticism and advancements in sociology. Notable developments include the application of Even-Zohar's polysystem theory; Toury's model of Descriptive Translation Studies; Bourdieu's sociology of domination and theory of field and agent; and Luhmann's social systems theory. Notable publications demonstrating output in this direction: *Translation in Systems* (Hermans 1999); "Connecting Translation and Network Studies" (Folaron and Buzelin 2007); *Translation and Society* (Tyulenev 2014). The challenge I see is therefore how to translate this gap in understanding between implementation and theory to effect change in how resources are deployed to enable translation activities achieve the outcomes they aspire to achieve. This point is similarly addressed in the premise of Part II.

## CHAPTER 9

### LIMITATIONS OF STUDY

#### 9.1 Introduction

This chapter attempts to address a number of limitations the research faced in the pursuit of its findings, namely in the areas of language and identity politics, use of statistics, and positionality of the researcher. The limitations of using a certain set of statistics, in a certain way; the languages I utilized for research, which were primarily Chinese and English, not Uyghur; and my identity as a Han Chinese but with a bilingual and bicultural North American background are addressed in a manner to offer the reader context in interpreting the results and conclusions reached.

#### 9.2 Language and Identity

Due to the mainstream perception of Translation Studies as being primarily occupied with language in the form of words, one of the most often posed questions to my research is whether or not I speak Uyghur and, to a lesser extent, whether or not I am an ethnic minority myself. The fact that I do not speak Uyghur is no doubt a legitimate concern as the access to and understanding of primary “native” sources is often perceived as a necessary condition to establish the legitimacy of the scholarship in question. If my research focused on textual comparison between source and target languages, this language deficiency would indeed become a severe limitation.

However, since what I am examining is the trend in translated propaganda against the trend in violent confrontation between speakers of the two language groups, both which are documented in Chinese and English, two languages I am proficient in, my lack of Uyghur does

not pose a serious obstacle. In addition, hard data in the form of numbers and tallied on Excel sheets are less susceptible to the impressionistic judgment calls that are often offered, in the end, to explain why this translation is “better” or more “beautiful” than the other. In effect, it is less affected by “bellettrism.”

I do acknowledge, though, that reliance on either Chinese or English sources of information can be problematic because in the scheme of power relations, both languages exercise dominance over Uyghur. This means that in answer to Spivak’s (1988) postcolonial question, the subaltern has yet to speak in my study. The citations of Uyghur voices who speak of discrimination by the Han, or who express equal discrimination against them, are documented and reiterated in English, by people who are not ethnic Uyghurs, who do not live permanently amongst them.<sup>1</sup> They are documented to support and advance a specific thesis set forth by outsiders. And my position is even more removed than the English-speaking ethnographer in the field, a third-degree separation (of language, ethnicity, and field of study), if not quite six.

But the potential knowledge gain of carrying out such a study outweighs this uncalculated silence; even if they do not “speak”—a default and unavoidable position any research proceeding from the “outside” will find itself in—the issues they face do come to light and are presented alongside the disclosed positionality of the researcher here, as well as in the methodology chapter. As demonstrated, there are already too few translation studies concerning the language pair of Uyghur and Chinese; the studies that go beyond text-based comparison or conversion are even fewer. So even though my language circumstances fall short of ideal, I nevertheless see positive contributions being made to this field through my research. Moreover, sometimes what

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<sup>1</sup> The exception is Caprioni (2011) who introduces herself to the Uyghurs “as a daughter of an Italian woman and a refugee Uyghur man who could not return to Xinjiang” (272). In this case she establishes kinship relations to the Uyghurs’ cause. But even then she is acting in the position of a Western researcher, using Western sociopolitical theory as a basis for scholarly legitimacy, and not exactly “one of them.”

on the outset seems like a liability—my non-ethnic identity and non-native language proficiencies—becomes an asset, as the status of an outsider is often what is needed to literally think outside the box, to not be confined by the historical and emotional baggage that cannot be separated from the identity, to offer something different.

### 9.3 Statistics

However, even if statistics can be less susceptible to impressionistic skewing or value judgments, there are nevertheless limitations to the numbers presented in UNESCO's Index Translationum. Venuti (1998) pointed out that UNESCO statistics are “incomplete because countries fail to report data and inconsistent because they follow different definitions of what constitutes a book” (60). A decade later, Anthony Pym reiterated similar deficiencies (Poupaud, Pym and Torres Simón 2009, 269). In order to address these issues, I had planned to use China's National Bibliography<sup>2</sup> as a secondary source of data to verify or improve the completeness and consistency of Index Translationum, since, in theory, the CNB lists all titles published in China in a given year. But the Chinese source is not without its existing problems, concerning coverage, quality, and digitization, as described in its 2007 and 2008 electronic version user guides (Xiao and Li 2007, 9-10; Wen 2008, 9). The final decision to not use the CNB, without it affecting the integrity of the research, was explained in the methodology chapter.

Another limitation to my research is that I do not observe the demand side of the equation. I do not have the print run or sales numbers of these publications, nor do I have information on the distribution channels, such as how many of these titles ended up being sold in bookstores, acquired by libraries, included in school curricula, or simply languishing in warehouses. These types of data would reflect the actual circulation of ideas and, to a certain degree, indicate

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<sup>2</sup> 全国总书目 quan guo zong shu mu

whether these ideas were more officially imposed rather than “demanded.” For example, high commercial bookstore sales could indicate popular demand, while books included in school curricula would also show large “sale” numbers, but instead of popularity, they would show the government’s interest in shaping an ideology through education. Similarly, books largely acquired by libraries would indicate a level of institutional interest (but not necessarily popular demand) and books languishing in warehouses would certainly present a case of supply exceeding demand, where strong intentions of circulation never materialized into actual circulation.

Having information of this type would enable the findings of my research to be more robust. The added circulation figures could potentially point out that the translations being published are mainly consumed by institutions—libraries or schools that form part of the ideological apparatus—and not bought by individual consumers. It would offer additional proof that translations could be regarded in certain contexts as staged acts of dominance that have little to do with the elusive concept of “cultural communication” or “cultural understanding” that theoretically should lead to the peaceful coexistence of the two cultures involved in the exchange. But commercial sales numbers can be sensitive information that bookstores or publishers are reluctant to hand out. Including statistics from libraries and schools also means that I would need to further develop channels to obtain these numbers, along with the criteria for the selection of schools and libraries to be included in a sample survey. The web of actors and the amount of data that would need to be aggregated would become too extensive for this study. That is why I have chosen to leave these elements out in my present research. However, the lack of a demand side does not necessarily undercut the findings of this study since the supply side—the Chinese state—is not functioning according to market mechanisms in a market economy when it comes

to interethnic translation between Chinese and Uyghur. It is not a classic matter of “supply and demand.” The study, in fact, shows how the demand side can be ignored. Future incorporation of the demand side, though, could certainly further my proposed theory.

In light of my use of the idea of “correlation” to bring about the conclusions that I have drawn—that the Uyghur predicament is ultimately the Chinese predicament because it is the publisher of translated propaganda and the ethnicity that assumes the power of the state in the instance of violent confrontations (i.e. the dominant ethno-national force)—it would have been more ideal if there had been a longer times series and that there was no data gap for the mid-to-later phases of the Cultural Revolution (1970-78), where neither violence or propaganda was recorded. Given the scale of disruption the Cultural Revolution caused, the gap is not out-of-character. But since it was so disruptive, and no less violent in its events and in the intensity of ideological struggle, it can be reasonably assumed that “violence” and “propaganda” occurred. Recovering this missing data could be part of a future study, where other data sources are uncovered, likely not belonging to the state-sphere (since the state was not functioning during that period), to make the statistical analysis more robust by eliminating the series of “zero” values this study used to account for the missing data. Since, even with the missing values, the current analysis produced an interpretation that supported a positive correlation between propaganda and violence three years after propaganda was recorded, there is a chance of an even better cross-correlation value if missing data could be recovered or accounted for, or if a longer times series were available.

However, statistical analysis provides only one side of the supporting evidence, namely the quantitative. Since there is never “perfect” data that eludes being supported by qualitative information, interpretation and argument, the observations of the trends in and of themselves,

stemming from my analytical capacities within the tradition of the humanities, without mathematical intervention, have nonetheless allowed me to interpret the two trends in ways that a statistical model could not. I see a “dance,” an unhappy partnership, where the Lead (propaganda) and the Follow (violence) are not engaged in harmony but a jagged struggle driven by competing ethno-nationalisms, that run through the ideological iterations of Confucianism to Communism, from past to present, where translation plays a part in reinforcing the very forces of divisiveness. This, in lieu of a statistical marker to prove correlation, is what the inquiry into a possible correlation has led me to discover within the framework of the humanities. I believe this discovery made is still a valuable addition to the core field of Translation Studies where my research is situated. And, characteristic to many research endeavors, what had been the primary object of inquiry (the correlation), in the end takes secondary place to the much more revealing by-product the inquiry led to (the theory behind the relationship).

#### **9.4 The ‘Outsider’**

Lastly, I would like to call attention to the twofold aspect of my “outsider” status. One aspect concerns my area of study, which is in Translation Studies, and not the usual area of studies—such as Asian Studies, Political Science, or Social Anthropology—one would normally associate with a researcher studying the region of Xinjiang and Uyghur-Chinese dynamics. This means I rely heavily on the research findings of scholars in these fields for the parts of my study which pertain to Xinjiang, and I would also necessarily lack a certain sensibility or political sensitivity to the material as compared to the scholars who have accumulated years (and, in many cases, decades) of expertise on this subject matter. But again, as in the case of my language disadvantage, I would like to suggest I can overcome this handicap by presupposing the rigor of the studies I reference, because this is, after all, not dissimilar to the practice of referencing in

general. Firsthand research is ideal, but the absence of ideal circumstances should not deter the research from beginning altogether.

The other aspect of this outsider status constitutes a preemptive answer to the questioning of my allegiance and hence the questioning of my findings because of my allegiance. As mentioned in the introduction to the methodology chapter, my positionality does not stem from a Chinese communist context or “native” Uyghur/Chinese experience. I am outside of that context and those experiences. Instead, intellectually, I was educated in contexts—in Taiwan, the US, and Canada—where the mainstream narrative could hardly be described as pro-China. At worst, China was portrayed as a threat to democracy and human rights, “lost” to the Communists; at best, it was a formidable foreign power which should never be underestimated, if not quite contained or balanced with strategic partnerships. My own work in the professional field of communications and between governments has also informed me that “communication” between collective entities is very seldom based on individual beliefs or principle. It is decidedly a representation of interest.

My stance regarding the function of “translation” and its possibility of fostering communication between parties whose interest vastly differ is therefore critical. And it can only be further informed, if not enhanced, by the experience of being born into otherness, an ethnic Chinese child placed in “French Immersion” amongst a predominantly white milieu in Maritime Canada; who came of age under Taiwan’s education system at the intersection of authoritarianism and democracy, and the island’s legacy as a Japanese colony; who was trained to question “truth” and all its premises in a liberal Iowa university town, simultaneously maligned and extolled for its influence on American literature and how thought should look on a page. But the target of my criticism in this study is not the Chinese government, nor its

communist regime; it is the marketed romanticized notion of translation's supposed inherent positive value in communication, as if it could function outside interests embedded in a network of power relations, as if a translator's individual agency was all that stood between the source and target texts,<sup>3</sup> and that those texts alone anchored the definition of "translation." If my outsider status, the conditions which produced the mechanisms of my mind, allowed me to see the possibility of overturning these notions in the case of China, I consider it fortunate. I also consider it fortunate that I am outside the censorship that renders researching matters concerning Xinjiang, or "thought" itself, a sensitive affair, if not outright taboo.

## 9.5 Conclusion

Further research or exploration into the areas identified as limitations, such as the length of the data series and missing data, as well as demand side statistics, would no doubt heed more insight into the issue of interethnic relations between the Han and Uyghur in the Chinese context; but for the purpose and scope of this study, these areas would be more effectively approached in future studies, from which this current study could almost certainly be further improved and refined. The disclosure of my positionality here, as well as in the methodology chapter, is done in an effort to give context to the findings I have presented and the conclusions I have drawn in each chapter.

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<sup>3</sup> Eloquently espoused by translator-scholars such as Meschonnic (2011) and Berman (2009).

## CONCLUSION

How do you counter someone else's narrative? By producing your own. How do you counter someone else's written words? By writing your own. How do you get that across to the other person if they don't speak or write your language? By translating it. The logic sounds simple enough. But since language is a manifestation of power, and its use a gauge for the relations between different powers, the matter is much more complicated.

On the surface, the paucity of Uyghur translations into Chinese seems to suggest that the former pales against the latter's long history and prestige. That perhaps it did not have that much to say, or the words to say it. However, a closer look at Uyghur script development against the backdrop of Chinese politics would reveal that that interpretation is much like insisting there must be no other poet-dramatist greater than Shakespeare. To be civilized, one must (have) read Shakespeare—says the Englishman who came with the English army.

The Arabic-based script now in use for the Uyghur language in Xinjiang can be traced back to the Islamification of the region beginning in the 10th century (Hamut and Joniak-Lüthi 2015, 112; Janbaz 2006, 2; Dwyer 2005, 19). According to Dwyer: "Nearly all Uyghurs favor the Arabic script for reasons of practicality, aesthetics, and group identity. Knowledge of this script allows access to the largest body of modern Uyghur and premodern Central Asian literature" (2). And this written lineage has yet to take into account the other scripts prevalent before, or concurrent to, the Arabic script, such as the Soghdian script (5-10th and 15-16th centuries), Orkhon-Yenisei script (6-9th), and Old Uyghur script (10-18th) (Janbaz 2006, 1). So there is no doubt orthographic history exists for the Uyghurs. Even if we are not looking at the mythical Chinese standard of "5000 years," surely throughout the 10th century up until the 21st,

the Uyghurs would have much more to say that could be translated into Chinese than what is currently showing up in the data. This is not necessarily saying that the number of Uyghur publications produced in the 15th century rivaled that of China's, but that something within the context of modern Uyghur text production has hindered the ability to draw upon this historical lineage, either to write about the past, or the connection of it to the present.

That something, I would like to suggest, is the succession of script changes made according to shifting political tides in the region. The long held traditional Arabic script was fairly stable until the 1920s, after which Soviet influence precipitated the use of a Cyrillic or Latin-based script for Central Asia (Hamut and Joniak-Lüthi 2015, 116; Janbaz 2006, 2; Dwyer 2005, 19). But Cyrillic never took hold permanently, and “a standardization of the Uyghur Arabic script was proposed by the Uyghur linguist Ibrahim Muti in Ürümchi in 1948” (Dwyer 2005, 19). In 1956, China, still under the influence of its Soviet advisors, initiated a brief campaign to impose the Cyrillic script (Janbaz 2006, 2). In 1959, as the political split with the Soviets became evident, a pinyin-based “New Script” was introduced, eventually becoming the only official script until 1982, after which the Arabic script was reinstated (Janbaz 2006, 3).<sup>1</sup>

One can imagine the disruptive effects to culture and literary production under these changing linguistic regimes, especially the decades-long implementation of the New Script based on Chinese pinyin. As Dwyer points out: “The frequent script changes from the 1950s through the 1980s unfortunately cut off an entire generation of Uyghurs from the large corpus of literature and history in the Arabic script written prior to 1950” (21). And no irony is lost “when

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<sup>1</sup> This is a highly summarized account of script changes. For a detailed look see in-depth Bellér-Hann (1991), Dwyer (2005), Janbaz (2006), Hamut and Joniak-Lüthi (2015). Janbaz (2006), in particular, discusses the adoption of a Latin-based script for the computer in the Internet and social media age, while Hamut and Joniak-Lüthi (2015), a decade after the efforts described by Janbaz, maintain that popularity for this computer script remains low and “even Uyghur linguists tend to use other transliteration forms online and in mobile-phone communication” (115), underscoring the complexities of orthography in the region and efforts to integrate with a wider global community of online users.

Uyghur of the Latin-based generation and those of the Arabic-based generation have to exchange letters in Chinese, as this is the only written language they both understand” (Bellér-Hann, Ildikó 1991, 75; cited in Hamut and Joniak-Lüthi 2015, 117n17). It would be unduly naive to think that the Uyghurs do not harbor resentment when it comes to how their own language came to disconnect them from their own identity. On top of that, to prevent any expression of this grievance, the Chinese government orders a blanket gag order, in the form of censorship not even its own Han citizens are excluded from. Where does grief go if you cannot express it? What does it become? It becomes a jagged trend of violence on a spreadsheet.

So the China-Xinjiang sinicizing scheme seen through the lopsided translation flow of propaganda from Chinese into Uyghur, pushing Chinese content into the Uyghur space, isn't working. Xinjiang continues to be viewed as detrimental to China's territorial integrity and a threat to its national security. The rigidity of the relationship between violence and propaganda, its cyclical repetition in times of sensitivity or crisis, mirrors the rigidity and repercussions of this sinicizing force, which operates under various names—(post)colonialism, (ethno)nationalism, high modernism, Marxism; domestication, localization, translation.

But is there not a way out on a practical level, if not theoretical? Perhaps, in order for translations to “work”—that is, to play a role in diminishing violence—it would be time for the Party to deconstruct its current translation flows with an awareness of competing ethno-nationalist interests and with the failed prophecies of high modernism in mind. It means for the Chinese policy makers to disengage themselves from the high modernist discourse of authoritarian “scientific development” and the nation-building rhetoric of “harmonious relations” to see the workings of power and their own ideological motivations in producing these translations. To do so would allow the Party to reconstruct a new translation flow that gives

voice to the local. This means, in operational terms, to fund translations that stem from a Uyghur perspective, not fear of them; or, even better, fund the capacity to voice their beliefs and concern, in education and the arts (literature, theatre, dance). This does not mean to relinquish power, but rather to allow for the negotiation of power between the state and the nation—because if the latter feels powerless, it is in a cornered position that breeds hostility to any gesture, regardless of its nature.

In fact, according to Dwyer (2005), there is a body of Uyghur literature available for translation. Since the more liberal times of the 1980s Reform and Opening-up era “publishing houses have been the beneficiaries of government support for the widespread dissemination of Uyghur literature. Not only did edited volumes of various literary genres become available (such as prose poems, ballads, and humorous stories), but also a number of quasi-academic journals were launched during this period. These included the literary journals *Tarim*; *Bulaq* (1981–present); and the linguistics journal *Language and Translation* (Til wä Tärjimä/Yuyan yu fanyi)” (45). Bovingdon (2004a, 30-32) and Rudelson (1992, 115) also indicate the flourishing of publications in this period. Yet the fact that translations of this “widespread dissemination of Uyghur literature” is not showing up at all in my data covering translation from Uyghur into Chinese (while it is markedly plentiful in the other translation direction), suggests that there is scant interest from the Chinese in learning about this other culture.<sup>2</sup> But that might be putting it lightly, since following the student protests in the 1980s, censorship tightened, books were banned, and even a book burning event was staged in 2002 (Bovingdon 2004a, 31). Yes, the

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<sup>2</sup> Dwyer is not clear on whether or not this “Uyghur literature” is native Uyghur literature or translations from Chinese sources. The scant translations from Uyghur into Chinese in my data chart could be explained by the fact that perhaps they were originally written in Chinese and therefore needed no “retranslation.” I must point out that Dwyer’s wording certainly sounds like the literature was originally written in Uyghur, but in the case it is not, it still does not alleviate the concern in my conclusion, namely that in either case (written in Uyghur; written in Chinese), the Chinese narrative dominates (the Chinese are not interested in translating from Uyghur; they are only interested in translating from the Chinese into Uyghur).

Chinese might have had a head start with Qin Shihuang<sup>3</sup> standardizing the Chinese script circa BC 221 versus the reinstatement of the Arabic script in 1982. But there is no infallible reason that “younger” scripts cannot compete with Chinese. English did. French did. It is a matter of cultural power (at the heels of the colonial kind) and political will. The Chinese have showed no shortage in taking advantage of political will to advance an agenda. It can only be said that translation from Uyghur into Chinese awaits in earnest for this will to materialize.

In practical terms, that the events surrounding a peak in propaganda data are not congruent amongst themselves, ranging in nature from the forming of the People’s Republic of China, to the dawn of the Cultural Revolution, to preparations for the 2008 Olympics, in fact gives more weight to propaganda in and of itself and its singular nature in precipitating violence. This means that, in practice, tweaking this one factor out of many potential contributors to violence might also have a weighted effect in mitigating that very violence. This is not to say that violence should not be suppressed; the state has no choice in this matter. But it is to suggest that by lessening the production of propaganda, there could be less violence in need of suppression.

However, the question remains whether or not this “scientific” approach to the issue can overcome the built-in propensity for ethnocentrism and the forces of sinicization that have written the histories of China’s dynasties. Even Taiwan’s democracy is commemorated as the “107th Year of the Republic of China,” not 2018. The birth year on my ID card is the “66th Year of the Republic of China,” not 1977.<sup>4</sup> Within each dynasty, each emperor had a reigning title,

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<sup>3</sup> 秦始皇 (259-210 BC); credited as the first emperor to unify China, who issued a series of national standards for script and measurements, and became an emblem of the philosophy for a centralized government. He was also infamously painted by the Han dynasty historian, Sima Qian, as a “book burner” and despot who ordered scholars to be buried alive (焚書坑儒 *fen shu keng ru*), though there is much questioning on the historical accuracy of this accusation, given that Han dynasty historians and scholars would have an incentive to depict the previous ruling dynasty unfavorably.

<sup>4</sup> 中華民國 107 年 *zhonghuaminguo yibailingqinian*; 民國 66 年 *minguo liushiliunian*

and years were calculated within the timeframe of that title. It was never the Year of Our Lord; it was always the Year of Our Emperor. The Republic of China was founded in 1912, hence my birth year of 66', not 77'. The last dynasty might have ended in "the Fourth Year of the Reign of the Xuanton Emperor of Qing,"<sup>5</sup> but the imperial structure remains in *Minguo* (民國; The Year of the Republic). And the People's Republic of China, so long as that *other* Republic exists, remains in a figurative fight for legitimacy for that throne—against "democracy" and any force that threatens to split a "unified" China. It is a psychological shackle rooted in imperial history that threatens to cripple any scientific outlook, on both matters and dialogue, domestic and international.

Taiwan's pursuit of "democracy," its free elections, and speech, and press, came not as a result of a "natural" disposition towards freedom and equality; it came at the expense of losing China to the Communists. Chiang Kai-shek's ruling Nationalist party, once it became clear that reclaiming China was a lost cause, had no choice but to turn to "democracy" for survival among the local population, to fashion itself in the image of American ideals, where a large percentage of Taiwan's intellectual class was already being reeducated in, abroad, on American soil, *in opposition to* authoritarian rule—both in Taiwan *and* as a contrast to Communist China.

"Democracy" became Taiwan's identity against China. It became the most effective weapon the native-born Democratic Progressive Party wielded over the Nationalists, who lost the presidency by the second round of presidential elections, in 2000. The first round was held in 1996; the Nationalists won, unsurprisingly, given entrenched networks and resources. But it took a mere 4 years to see them go, after 50 years of domination. Note the name of the two parties—finally, "democracy" trumps "nationalism."

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<sup>5</sup> 清宣統四年 qing xuanton sinian

But what if China had not been lost? Would democracy not have flourished and its ethnic Uyghurs enjoyed a less oppressive and discriminated existence? If Singapore serves as an analogy and a testimony to the tenacity of Chinese exceptionalism, whether inside China or out, I am not quite convinced that such a scenario would have come about the way it has in Taiwan, where its non-Han population is now afforded the right to protest without fear of retribution.

Singapore, the city-state, once helmed by Lee Kuan Yew and now his son, is exemplar of elitist Chinese governing principles—authoritarian figurehead, obedience or punishment, father-knows-best. The gleaming city of order and cleanliness also had the economic numbers to justify its governing strategies. For the longest time the people in Taiwan asked, in admiration and in shame: “If Singapore can, why can’t we?” There was no reporting on anything else but its successes. But what of the reaction of Singapore’s multiethnic composition to these Han Chinese ethics and its sinicized image?

The Malay comic from Singapore walks on stage. He opens his 2018 Netflix special, index finger circling his face: “If you’re wondering what this is, this is what a Singaporean was supposed to look like.” He continues:

*I must say, being a Malay brother I see a lot of Chinese people. I don’t mean to rip on you all, okay. 不要緊，你不要看到馬來人做表演很奇怪啊，我來這裡不是要偷你們的東西啊，只是跟你們開玩笑而已啊 [Don’t worry. Don’t think it’s odd to see a Malay performing. I’m not here to steal your stuff. I’m just joking with you guys]. Don’t be surprised. I know Mandarin. You know what they say. You have to know your enemy.*

[...]

*Oh, Man. A lot of weird shit happening in Singapore, ladies and gentlemen. For example, not too long ago, China just said: “We don’t want to be friends with you, Singapore. We don’t want to be friends with Singapore anymore.” You know, they had a whole conference in China and did not invite Singapore. That’s some fourteen-year-old passive-aggressive shit. “I’m gonna have a party and I’m not going to invite you.” Passive-aggressive shit, right? And it was big news in Singapore. “What, China’s not our friend anymore. Had a whole conference and didn’t invite us!” And it was big news. Do you know why? Because for the first time ever in Singapore, the majority of Singapore knows what it feels like to be discriminated by Chinese people.*

[...]

*Then they had the whole competition called The Voice. You remember that? Online there was a whole singing competition called The Voice. The Voice. It’s in Mandarin. Why is it in Mandarin? Huh? And everybody was like: “It’s a Mandarin show, of course it’s sung in Mandarin, lah.” Which is okay. I didn’t mind that. What I didn’t like was the fact that my Chinese friends came up to me: “Instead ah of you ah being mad ah that it is a Mandarin singing show ah, you should learn Mandarin lah, so that you guys can sing Mandarin songs.” I said, okay. Then you learn how to sing Majulah Singapura properly. I have never met a Chinese person that can sing the Singapore national anthem properly, okay.*

This was all said in the first 12 minutes of a 60-minute show. The show is titled: Almost Banned.

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
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APPENDIX A

Bovingdon's chart (2010, 114)

FIGURE 4.1 Organized or violent events in Xinjiang, 1949-2005.



COLLECTIVE ACTION AND VIOLENCE




FIGURE 4.2 Protest events in China and Xinjiang, 1993-2005.

violence and terrorist accidents take place very often" (Agence France-Press 1999c; Bao Lisibeng 2002).


The clarity of official numbers became obvious as the statistics promulgated in the State Council's January 21, 2002, press release on "Eastern Turkistan terrorists" were applied without the slightest modifications to very different periods (Guowuyuan xawnen bangongting, 2002). That document asserted that more than two hundred "terrorist events" left 162 dead and 420 wounded between 1992 and 2001. Less than two years later, officials assigned precisely the same figures to the period from 1990 to 2004, implying no one had died in violent attacks between 1990 and 1992, which hard to square with the well-attested evidence of casualties in Baren in 1992 and the bus bombings in Urumqi in 1992, among others. In 2005 the deputy director of Xinjiang's Antiterrorism Bureau used the same figures for the "previous decade," and officials continued to use the exact same numbers in 2006. Yizhak Shidior put the case rather mildly when he observed that this use of an identical set of figures for very different time periods "casts a shadow over the rest of Beijing's arguments" (Shidior 2006b:203).<sup>21</sup>

## APPENDIX B

## Hastings' chart (2011, 899)

Charting the Course of Uyghur Unrest 899

Figure 1: Number of Targets in Violent Incidents in Xinjiang, 1990–2009



Sources:

The vast majority of incidents are taken from START, "Global Terrorism Database"; Xinjiang Tongzhi: Gonganzhi Weiyuanhui, "Xinjiang Public Security Gazette"; Information Office, "East Turkistan' Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity"; and Millward, "Violent Separatism in Xinjiang." The full dataset is available from the author.

numbers of people attacking a target with multiple types of weapons by surprise) in this category. I take logistically simple incidents to be those that require fewer manufactured materials (either guns or explosives), little command and control, and only short periods of time for planning. Into this category fall riots, assassinations, and "creative" attacks such as arson and poisoning or attacks with homemade explosives (although this is a more subjective category), neither of which require the acquisition of guns or manufactured explosives. I consider a single apparent incident to have multiple targets if different sites attacked are far enough apart in time or physical distance to have required, in my judgment, significant additional planning and/or materials over and above what is required for attacking a single target. Targets are a preferable measure of violent activity since the primary sources often talk of waves of incidents spread over several months rather than individual attacks, making it easier to quantify total targets rather than total incidents. These are almost certainly not all the incidents that took place (the Chinese government claims there were over 200 separatist attacks from 1990 to 2001, far higher than the numbers shown),<sup>26</sup> but it is probably safe to assume that there was a surge in incidents from 1996 to 1998 and a lull after 2000, even if we do not know the exact numbers.

<sup>26</sup> Pan Zhiping, "'DongTu' kongbuzhuyi toushi" ("East Turkistan' terrorism perspectives"), *Xinjiang shehui kexue (Xinjiang Social Sciences)* (2002), p. 61.

## APPENDIX C

## “维吾尔 AND 翻译” / 篇名 in CNKI

汉语商标维吾尔语翻译方法研究

谭雪 丝绸之路, 2012 年 18 期, 期刊

作为消费者认识或购买商品的向导,商标在很大程度上决定了产品在市场上的竞争力。本文结合一些汉语商标维吾尔语翻译实例,对一定数量的汉、维语商标名称加以分析,探讨了汉语商标的翻译原则、维译方法及商标译名中存在的一些问题。

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试论古代维吾尔语佛典的翻译

耿世民 民族翻译, 2012 年 02 期, 期刊

维吾尔族历史上曾信仰佛教达千年之久,并把大量佛教文献(包括大、小乘及密宗文献)译成古代维吾尔语。在元代时曾形成比较完整的大藏经(Tripitaka)。公元 10 世纪喀喇汗王朝时,伊斯兰教开始传入喀什。公元 14、15 世纪时,当塔里木盆地北部的吐鲁番、哈密的人民也皈依伊斯兰教后,佛教及其文献才逐渐消失、湮灭。本文概述了近百年来世界维吾尔学家在发现、研究维吾尔语佛典方面所做出的贡献。

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关于我国古代第一个维吾尔族诗歌翻译家斛律金

拓和提·莫扎提 民族翻译, 2012 年 02 期, 期刊

阿六敦(汉译名斛律金),是生活在公元 5 世纪下半叶的敕勒(维吾尔)人,维吾尔族第一个诗歌翻译家。由他翻译并即兴演唱的《敕勒歌》,上千年以来代代相传,脍炙人口,已成为千古名歌。《敕勒歌》不但对于研究我国古代北方游牧民族的民歌、民间文学具有重要价值,而且对于研究文学翻译史、少数民族与汉民族的文化交流史,都具有重要意义。

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当代维吾尔族翻译事业发展历程概述(1966—1976)

伊明·阿布拉 民族翻译, 2012 年 02 期, 期刊

维吾尔族翻译历史悠久,成果丰硕。维吾尔族翻译涉及社会政治、经济贸易、文化教育、军事外交等各个领域。随着时代的变迁,翻译活动时强时弱,社会地位时高时低,但从未中断。“文化大革命”时期(1966 年 5 月至 1976 年 10 月)是一个特殊的历史时期,维吾尔族的翻译事业陷入低谷,但由于“文化大革命”政治宣传的需要,公文翻译、马恩列斯著作和毛泽东著作翻译、政治文献翻译等活动并没有完全销声匿迹。本文就这一时期的维吾尔文翻译活动进行概述。

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### 奈达动态对等翻译理论在翻译实践中的应用

热米拉·阿布都热合曼 中央民族大学, 硕士

谚语是能够反映一个民族在历史长河中经历过的经验和智慧的语言结晶,其内容之丰富涉及到民族的历史、文化、宗教、习俗和语言等诸多方面,俗称为民间百科全书。无论在的日常生活,还是在文学翻译工作中经常会用到它。在翻译实践中,如同其它文体一样,维吾尔语—汉语谚语翻译也是十分重要的种类。通过谚语的翻译,能把不同语言中难以表达和理解的内容具体化、形象化、通俗化、使其易于理解,达到促进维汉语两种语言之间沟通作用。做好此项工作,首先要熟悉谚语。熟悉谚语是掌握一门语言所需必要条件之一,这有助于

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### 当代维吾尔族翻译事业发展历程概述(1949-1966)

伊明·阿布拉 民族翻译, 2012年01期, 期刊

维吾尔族是中华民族的重要一员,历史悠久,文化丰富,语言文字完整,翻译成果较多,研究价值极高。维吾尔族翻译活动体现在社会政治、经济贸易、文化教育、军事外交等各个领域。随着时代的变迁,翻译活动时强时弱,其社会地位时高时低,但从未终断。维吾尔族翻译史作为中国翻译史的组成部分应该成为一门重要的研究课题。60多年来,除了零星的翻译史论之外,还没有比较完整的维吾尔翻译史著作问世,这种现象应该引起我们的重视。本文概述了十七年维吾尔族翻译事业的发展历程。

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### 新疆维吾尔自治区民族语文翻译局正式成立

民族翻译, 2011年04期, 期刊

<正>2011年9月30日,新疆维吾尔自治区民族语文翻译局在乌鲁木齐正式成立。新疆维吾尔自治区副主席贾帕尔·阿比布拉、自治区人民政府副秘书长帕尔哈提·贾拉勒、自治区人大办公厅副主任

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### 论维吾尔比兴手法诗歌中隐喻的翻译及审美接受

再纳汗·阿不多 赤峰学院学报(汉文哲学社会科学版), 2011年10期, 期刊

维吾尔诗歌运用比兴的写作手法繁多,笔者认为我们在翻译此类诗句时在喻体非共知性的状况下把隐喻的内容翻译出来,对于审美接受者来说会更容易感受和理解此种维吾尔诗歌的意蕴。

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### 《民族文学》蒙古文、藏文、维吾尔文版翻译工作座谈会举行

杨玉梅; 鲁波; 俞辉 民族文学, 2011年09期, 期刊

<正>8月9日,民族文学杂志社和中国民族语文翻译局就《民族文学》蒙古文、藏文、维吾尔文版的翻译、编辑、出版工作进行了真诚、热情的交流和探讨。自三种少数民族文字版创刊以来,中国民族语文翻译局就系统承担了翻译工作。两年来,双方的合作非常顺利和愉快,都表示一定要抓住机遇、齐心协力办好杂志,为推动少数民族文学的发展,促进民族  
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### “维吾尔文版中国古典文学名著的土耳其文翻译出版合作项目”签约

亦飏 新疆新闻出版, 2011年04期, 期刊

<正>2011年7月15日,正值七月流火时节。新疆人民出版社举行“维吾尔文版中国古典文学名著的土耳其文翻译出版合作项目”的签约仪式,旨在增进中土两国相互了解,加强文化交流。这是实施中国文化“走出去”战略的举措,又是新疆人民出版社多文种出版优势的体现。自治区党委宣传部副部长、外宣办主任侯汉敏,自治区新闻出版局副局长古力先.吐拉洪及版权部门

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### 维吾尔语中汉族人名的识别及翻译

李佳正; 刘凯; 麦热哈巴·艾力; 吕雅娟; 刘群; 吐尔根·依布拉音 中文信息学报, 2011年04期, 期刊

该文研究了一种维吾尔语中汉族人名的识别和翻译方法。该方法在词典等传统方法的基础上,运用语言模型实现维语中的汉族人名的识别和翻译。针对维语人名的构词和拼写特点,增加了名词词缀识别预处理模块,补充了维语字母到汉语拼音的映射规则,有效提高了人名识别的正确率及召回率。在1000句含有汉族人名的维语语料上进行测试,汉族人名识别的正确率和召回率分别达到75.2%和91.5%。

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张亚军 昌吉学院学报, 2011年03期, 期刊

描述了基于短语统计的汉语-维吾尔语(简称汉维)机器翻译解码器。搜索算法的效率是解码的关键,基于短语统计的搜索算法在汉维机器翻译中是首次使用,并构建翻译备选项列表,基本实现了汉维机器翻译的解码器研究设计。分析对比实验结果,证明该搜索算法的有效性。

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考试是语言教学的重要环节。我校翻译课考试存在不少问题,影响了教学质量的提高。进行考试改革,更好地发挥考试的作用是急需解决的难题。

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张乐 新疆师范大学, 硕士

本文通过对汉语和维吾尔语在颜色词“黑”“白”的汉译范围内进行阐述帮助我们更好地翻译和理解有着不同民族历史、社会制度、思维方式宗教信仰的两个民族的语言,结合对这两个颜色词的对比分析,论述不同的认知机制对于颜色词的不同理解。

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### “三美论”在维吾尔双联式谚语翻译中的应用

胡定军 新疆师范大学, 硕士

维吾尔双联式谚语不仅形象生动,内容精辟,发人深省,而且形式上简短精炼、句式匀称整齐、工整对仗,语音上也响暗交替、抑扬顿挫、回环押韵,极富音乐感。即:具有形式美、音韵美和内涵美。在翻译过程中,如果把翻译谚语看作语言表层结构的机械移植过程,可能会影响到原谚语的修辞艺术在译文中的再现,表达效果大打折扣。所以必须深入深层结构,发掘谚语的真实意境,力求使其原有的音、形、义再现于译文中。在翻译的过程中,具体翻译处理方法,可以借鉴许氏的“三美论”,按照“三美”的原则,对译文做适当的变通

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### 论维吾尔谚语翻译中的音韵美

邓璐莲 新疆师范大学, 硕士

维吾尔谚语语言形式的特色之一就是它的音乐性,它运用音节相似和丰富的修辞手法使其富有音韵美,富于节奏感,读起来琅琅上口。要将其翻译成汉语时,不仅要再现原文的形式还要将原文的音韵美译出来,要将这种音韵美译出来就是一件极其困难的事情。本文就从维吾尔谚语译成汉语时的音节对称方面,即上下两句音节的数量相等,一对一或多对多;韵律

方面,包括押韵,双声叠韵词的使用,叠音词的使用以及词的重复使用;多种修辞手法的运用等三方面入手进行分析,来论维吾尔 谚语翻译成汉语时体现出的音韵美。

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### 维吾尔人的生死观及其在翻译中的处理

马娟 新疆师范大学, 硕士

由于对生的祝福与对死的担忧,“生死”相关的词语,在各种语言中表达的是一种不可抗拒的生理现象。在维吾尔语言系统中也形成了一整套和生死相关的词语,这些词语无论是在日常使用中还是在文学作品创作中,所体现出的语言意义和文化意义都是值得去关注的。从维吾尔族观念中的生死观入手,立足对这一小点的研究,对维吾尔语言系统中表现“生”“死”意义的词语进行梳理,总结出在翻译时一要掌握词语的感情色彩;二要适当使用文化阐释法;三要结合上下文语境,通过以上三点来减少观念差异对翻译的影响,分析得出维汉

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### 维吾尔语对偶词的构成及其翻译

高丽娟 新疆师范大学, 硕士

语言是重要的交际工具,而词语是组成话语的单位。词语的不断丰富和发展,使得语言使用者能更好、更准确的表达自己的思想感情。对偶词就是其中之一,经过长期的发展,维吾尔语中对偶词越来越丰富,无论是名词、动词、副词还是数词、量词,都出现了大量的对偶词,这些对偶词的出现使得我们的话语表达更加的准确,思想感情表达的更加细腻生动。而从语义角度分析对偶词的构成方式有很多种,在实际翻译过程中,关于对偶词的翻译处理方法也有很多种,从语言学角度,可以划分为语义翻译法和语境翻译法两种,而这两种方法

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### 汉维翻译中的词语省略技巧研究

古丽加乃提·亚森 中央民族大学, 硕士

随着汉族、维吾尔族两个民族之间的来往的加强,汉语维吾尔语翻译上作也得到了迅速发展。许多著名的汉语作品翻译成维吾尔语,同时不少维吾尔语名著也翻译成汉语。翻译作品的质量也日趋提高,汉语维吾尔语翻译事业上取得了可喜的成果。可是,翻译理论研究工作一直落后于翻译实践,至今还没有形成较完整的理论体系。省略词语是翻译实践中最常用的技巧之一。任何两种语言之间进行的翻译活动中都会用这种技巧。它起源为解决两种语言之间表达方式和表达习惯的差异。省略技巧使译文语言简明扼要、通顺流畅的,使译文更符

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### 试论古代维吾尔族翻译家胜光法师

耿世民 民族翻译, 2011年01期, 期刊

胜光法师②是生活在公元10—11世纪的维吾尔族伟大翻译家,现存他翻译的回鹘文(古代维吾尔文)《玄奘传》和《金光明经》等著作对于研究古代突厥语、维吾尔语以及民族语文汉译具有重要意义。

被引: 2 下载: 43 发表时间: 2011-03-31

### 论现代汉语被动句的维吾尔语翻译

月里古丽·沙木沙克 中央民族大学, 硕士

被动句是汉语里一种常见的句法形式。在日常生活中,报刊、杂志和文学作品里随处可见。它们在汉语句法里的重要地位是不可忽视的。目前,汉语中关于被动句的研究不少,但对于如何将汉语被动句翻译成维吾尔语的研究文章和论著却极为少见。鉴于此,本文认为有必要探讨一下这一问题。凡是语言翻译者在翻译实践中会遇到很多问题,其中被动句的翻译是难点之一。在句法表达主语与谓语之间的施动或受动的关系过程中,为了使句子更加精通、易懂,许多作家喜欢使用被动句达到该目的。这如其它的作品一样,在阅读著名作家巴金

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### 《红楼梦》中的地名、人名双关语及其维吾尔语翻译

赛文娟 民族翻译, 2010年04期, 期刊

多种修辞手法的灵活运用是《红楼梦》语言艺术的一大特色。其中,双关是运用较为广泛的一种修辞格,它通过一个词或一句话来表达两层或多层含义,"言在此而意在彼"是其主要特点。不论在哪一种语言中,双关语的翻译都是一大难点。由于各民族文化背景和语言习惯不同,双关语在翻译过程中难免会出现信息丢失的情况,这对保持原作语言风格和文化内涵有一定影响。本文通过分析《红楼梦》中地名、人名双关语所包含的意义来探讨其在维译过程中的信息问题。

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### 蒙古、藏、维吾尔、哈萨克、朝鲜、彝、壮7种“少数民族新词术语统一规范”翻译专家工作会议召开

民族翻译, 2010年04期, 期刊

<正>2010年7月19日,中国民族语文翻译局下发《关于召开翻译专家工作会有关事宜的通知》(民译发[2010]9号文件)。在各省民委、民语委大力支持下,中国民族语文翻译局于今年8—10月分别召开了蒙古、藏、维吾尔、哈萨克、朝鲜、彝、壮7个语种的“少数民族新词术语统一规范”翻译专家工作会议。8月15日—16日,哈萨克语翻译专家研讨会在新

疆伊宁市召开。中国民族语文翻译局总会计师郭洁主持会议,副书记、副局长、总译审阿里木江·沙比提亲临指导并讲话,业务处副处长哈尔滨以及哈文室专家

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### 新疆维吾尔自治区维吾尔语翻译专家会议在乌鲁木齐举行

民族翻译, 2010年04期, 期刊

<正>新疆维吾尔自治区维吾尔语翻译专家会议于2010年12月15日至12月17日在乌鲁木齐举行,会议由新疆维吾尔自治区翻译工作者协会主办。来自北京和新疆的20多位翻译专家出席了会议。会议旨在促进维吾尔语文翻译事业的进一步发展,规范和统一维吾尔语文新词术语的翻译,听取专家对公文、法律法规、新闻翻译等方面的意见和建议。会议传达和学习了《国家民委关于进一步做好民族语文翻译工作的指导意见》(民委发[2010]198号)文件精神。

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### 关于维吾尔古典名著《福乐智慧》所用词语附加成分“-gu”及其词义翻译

米热古丽·赫力力 民族翻译, 2010年03期, 期刊

本文首先统计《福乐智慧》中以-gu构成的词语并使用比较研究方法对列出来的段落进行语法分析,再分析《福乐智慧》中的"gu"附加成分的构词形态及其词义翻译。

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### 第十次全国民族语文翻译工作会议暨全国民族译协会长、秘书长工作会议在新疆维吾尔自治区喀什市举行

民族翻译, 2010年03期, 期刊

<正>由国家民委教科司、中国民族语文翻译局(中心)和中国翻译协会民族语文翻译委员会主办,新疆维吾尔自治区民语委和自治区翻译工作者协会具体承办的"第十次全国民族语文翻译工作会议暨全国民族译协会长、秘书长工作会议"于2010年8月30日至9月1日在新疆维吾尔自治区喀什市召开。

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### 基于规则的维吾尔人名汉文机器翻译算法研究

衣马木艾山·阿布都力克木; 吐尔地·托合提; 艾斯卡尔·艾木都拉 计算机应用与软件, 2010年08期, 期刊

人名机器翻译传统的方法是依赖于预先建立的对照词库。这种方法的缺点是,因为不断出现新的人名而建立丰富、全面的对照词库是不可能的。研究了维吾尔人名汉文音译规则: 读音规则,并在此基础上提出了一种新的基于规则的维吾尔人名汉文机器翻译方法。实验

结果表明,该方法不需要建立两种语言的对照词库,完全不用考虑会出现的新的人名,算法实现简单,准确度高,完全克服了传统方法的缺点。

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### 维吾尔谚语翻译策略

赵晓雪 新疆师范大学, 硕士

谚语作为语言的重要组成部分,是人类文明智慧的结晶。谚语翻译的好坏直接影响翻译的质量和文化交流的程度,因而翻译策略的选择不仅要保证谚语翻译的准确性,还要保持其独特的文化内涵。文章对维吾尔谚语的翻译策略进行深入探讨,并针对维吾尔谚语文化词、文化背景及其修辞格等特殊问题进行剖析,探索相应的处理方法,以帮助我们更好的学习和应用维吾尔谚语,提高维吾尔语的理解和表达能力。

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### 《语言与翻译》(维吾尔文)荣获第六届“新疆期刊奖”

语言与翻译, 2010年02期, 期刊

<正>由自治区党委宣传部、自治区新闻出版局、新疆期刊协会共同举办的第六届“新疆期刊奖”评比结果于今年3月揭晓,自治区159种公开出版发行的期刊参加了评选,25种期刊获“新疆期刊奖”。自治区民

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### 简论汉语和维吾尔语互译中缩略语的翻译技巧

热衣汉古丽·马木提 民族翻译, 2010年01期, 期刊

本文简要论述了汉语和维吾尔语中的缩略语构成形式以及翻译方法、技巧等方面的问题。

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### 《红楼梦》中书名的维吾尔语翻译

张红英 和田师范专科学校学报, 2010年01期, 期刊

进行文化交流是翻译的根本任务。在翻译过程中涉及文化个性很强的文化信息翻译时,译者一般应遵循“内容先于形式”的原则。本文运用此原则来分析《红楼梦》中书名的维译,解析译者在翻译这些文化元素过程中的翻译技巧。

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### 小议由“jaxji”、“jaman”组成的维吾尔谚语翻译

艾克拜尔江·艾米都拉 民族翻译, 2009年03期, 期刊

在维吾尔族谚语中,“jaxji”、“jaman”有时可以不用加词就能按照本义翻译,有时需要根据谚语的题旨,在不同的语境中灵活加词。

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### 维吾尔文化在导游词翻译中的体现

陈国静 中国科教创新导刊, 2008年32期, 期刊

翻译不仅仅是两种语言符号之间的一种转换,更是两种文化的交流。只有将原文文化因素在译文中恰当的处理,才能达到准确传达原文思想的目的。本文通过分析喀什导游词的译文,阐述了文化因素在翻译中的地位和导游词翻译时应体现出维吾尔文化的丰富意蕴,以期让人们进一步了解,传承和发扬维吾尔文化。

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### 维汉机器翻译中维吾尔语动词语法属性描写

阿孜古丽·夏力甫 中央民族大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2008年04期, 期刊

源语言维吾尔语词语的语法属性描写是维汉机器翻译系统设置的必经之路,其中动词的语法属性描写更为重要。维吾尔语是以动词为特点的语言,动词有复杂的语法范畴。本文在动词的语法属性字段设置方面提出了初步的设想,并把动词的语法属性分为9个大类48个小类。

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### 杰出维吾尔族翻译家安藏

顾红艳; 王志银 时代人物, 2008年06期, 期刊

新疆古称西域,与中原地区的联系渊源流长,长久以来,为了使横贯欧亚大陆的"丝绸之路"畅通无阻,为了适应东方和西方不同民族,不同语言的人们进行思想,经济文化交流的需要,在古代新疆居住的各少数民族中间曾经产生过许多有卓著贡献的翻译大师。元代杰出的维吾尔族翻译家安藏,就是其中的一位。该文主要介绍了安藏的生平及其所作出的伟大贡献。

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### 论维吾尔翻译文学的历史演变与现状

肉鲜古丽·阿不都 新疆大学, 硕士

维吾尔翻译文学具有漫长的历史。前辈们在几千年的文字文学历史过程中,通过翻译文学不仅开阔了眼界,而且认识了世界并学习了外国文学和国内兄弟文学中的优点,弥补了自己的缺点。不断丰富和发展维吾尔族自己的民族文学。本论文比较全面和系统地阐述了维吾尔翻译文学的历史演变和现状。全文共分五部分。第一部分是绪言,论述论题的国内外研究状况和理论意义,本文的重点,难点和创新点。第二部分是第一章,对相关概念作界定,即对翻译文学与文学翻译进行比较,主要界定翻译文学的定义。还介绍了维吾尔翻译文学的形

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### 义位视域下维吾尔语“baq”的词义及其翻译

阿孜古丽·阿不都热西提; 王德怀 伊犁师范学院学报(社会科学版), 2008年01期, 期刊

义位是现代语义学的分支——词汇语义学的分析单位,是语言系统中最自然、最小的和最具实效的语义解释视域。维吾尔语的“baq”是一个词义较为复杂的外来词,又是一个极易造成误译的常用多义词。以了解义位为主旨和视角,以实例解析“baq”的多义性及词义翻译,通过对“baq”一词深刻内涵的多层面、多角度分析,以获得“baq”各义项贴切的表述。

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### 从文学翻译看波斯与维吾尔族的文化交流

阿布都外力·克热木 民族翻译, 2008年01期, 期刊

波斯文化对中亚、西亚和非洲地区的各民族文化产生过深远的影响。波斯对中国的影响主要体现在对回族、维吾尔族、哈萨克族等少数民族的影响之中。本文从波斯文学作品翻译状况考察了波斯文化对维吾尔族文化的影响,同时探讨突厥语各族(包括维吾尔族)历史人物为波斯文化所作的贡献。

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### 9—19世纪的维吾尔族翻译文学

姑丽娜尔·吾甫力 中国比较文学, 2008年01期, 期刊

翻译文学是维吾尔族文学的组成部分和主要特点之一。唐宋时代和明清时代是维吾尔族翻译文学发展的重要历史时期,以佛教及摩尼教、景教等多元文化为背景的唐宋时期的翻译文学体现出多文化、多语种的特点,明清时代以伊斯兰教文化为主的波斯、阿拉伯文学作品的翻译,对近现代维吾尔文学产生了重要影响。本文通过对这两个历史时期维吾尔翻译文学的整理和总结,指出维吾尔族翻译文学的特性以及在维吾尔文学发展中的重要作用。

被引: 4 下载: 164 发表时间: 2008-01-20

### 9—19世纪的维吾尔族翻译文学

姑丽娜尔·吾甫力 中国比较文学,

翻译文学是维吾尔族文学的组成部分和主要特点之一。唐宋时代和明清时代是维吾尔族翻译文学发展的重要历史时期,以佛教及摩尼教、景教等多元文化为背景的唐宋时期的翻译文学体现出多文化、多语种的特点,明清时代以伊斯兰教文化为主的波斯、阿拉伯文学作品的翻译,对近现代维吾尔文学产生了重要影响。本文通过对这两个历史时期维吾尔翻译文学的整理和总结,指出维吾尔族翻译文学的特性以及在维吾尔文学发展中的重要作用。

被引: 4 下载: 164 发表时间: 2008-01-20

### 从小学教师走向文学翻译的殿堂

铁来提·易卜拉欣□(维吾尔族) 文艺报, 报纸

但是狄力木拉提默默无闻地全身心地投入到了文学翻译工作中, 并一发而不可收……正是十年磨一剑, 在这 10 年里, 不论别人给不给翻译稿费, 也不论能不能出版, 他先后将新疆维吾尔等少数民族作家和诗人们创作的《被沙漠埋没的古城》《越过天险的人们》《...

下载: 3 发表时间: 2007-12-11

### 维吾尔语紧缩谚语及其翻译

谭婧霞 语言与翻译, 2007 年 04 期, 期刊

本文通过对若干紧缩型维吾尔谚语的诠释及解析, 就其翻译问题提出显影思维法、关联思维法, 略陈管见, 以期为以后的翻译理论研究起到抛砖引玉的作用。

被引: 2 下载: 122 发表时间: 2007-11-15

### 维吾尔语新词术语的规范化及其翻译

艾克拜尔江·阿米都拉 西北民族大学, 硕士

Uygur language, as the language which has a long tradition of writing one, is a national tradition and culture and other cultures in the crystallization process of absorption and integration .

被引: 1 下载: 79 发表时间: 2007-04-01

### 英文-维吾尔文人名机器翻译算法的研究与实现

艾山·吾买尔; 吐尔根·依布拉音 中文信息处理前沿进展——中国中文信息学会二十五周年学术会议论文集 中国会议

机器翻译算法的设计算法的主要目的是把提供的英文人名语料翻译成维吾尔文。算法的实现步骤如下: 首先根据特殊对应关系库进行过滤并把符合规则的英文字母或字母组合与相应的维吾尔文字母或字母组合进行替换; 第二: 根据双字符规则库进行过滤并把符合...

下载: 20 发表时间: 2006-11-01

### 议维吾尔语中拈连修辞格谚语的翻译

王德怀; 祖木来提·阿布力克木 语言与翻译, 2006 年 01 期, 期刊

维吾尔谚语优美隽永是因为运用了丰富的修辞手段, 其中拈连修辞格占有一定的比重。但在翻译带有拈连修辞格的谚语时还存在一些问题。本文对维吾尔语中拈连修辞格谚语的翻译进行了探讨。

被引: 3 下载: 139 发表时间: 2006-02-15

### 维吾尔语习语翻译中的形象处理

程龙权 和田师范专科学校学报, 2005年04期, 期刊

习语是语言的精华,它具有鲜明浓厚的民族文化特色,因而必最大限度地采用有效方法加以传译,达到不同民族文化的融合与沟通。在翻译习语的过程中,形象的处理是不容忽视的重要方面。形象处理是否得当,直接影响到翻译的成功与否。

被引: 2 下载: 55 发表时间: 2005-08-20

### 维吾尔族人名翻译中的美学策略

黄晓琴 喀什师范学院学报, 2005年02期, 期刊

分析了维吾尔族人名翻译中存在的问题和原因,并指出解决问题的关键在于译名的汉字选用问题,即美学策略。同时着重从翻译学、语言学、社会学等方面探讨了选字的美学策略,如利用选字使译名既表音又表意、体现男女性别,以及避免使用贬义字、合乎约定俗成的翻译习惯等等。

被引: 3 下载: 95 发表时间: 2005-03-30

### 从维吾尔语词义的角度浅谈“bolmaq”与“qilmaq”的翻译方法

葛勇 新疆职业大学学报, 2003年01期, 期刊

“bolmaq”与“qilmaq”是维语中使用频率多,内容丰富的两个基本动词。它们的基本含义丰富,引申及使用频率很高,应在使用中进一步探索

被引: 1 下载: 24 发表时间: 2003-03-30

### 新疆维吾尔自治区第四届民族语文翻译论文评奖揭晓

依力哈木·吐尔逊 语言与翻译, 2002年04期, 期刊

为了广泛开展翻译理论研究和翻译学术交流,提高我区翻译工作队伍的整体素质,推动民族语文翻译工作的发展,使翻译工作更好地为西部大开发服务,新疆翻译工作者协会于今年8月举行了“新疆维吾尔自治区第四届民族语文...

下载: 12 发表时间: 2002-12-30

### 新疆维吾尔文的波斯文学翻译及研究最新状况评述

美合拉伊·买买提力 民族文学研究, 2001年03期, 期刊

80年代以来,中国学术界对波斯文学的翻译介绍及研究工作,有了长足的发展。尤其是新疆的维吾尔族学者在这一方面所做的研究工作也是比较突出的。不少专家学者,重新发挥自身的优势,对波斯文学进行了不同程度的研究,翻译介绍了部分波斯文学作品,刊布了许多宝贵的资料,发表了不少有分量的学术论文和文章。其中,有关波斯古典文学方面的研究,尤其是翻译介绍方面的工作就比较显著。本文从波斯文学的翻译情况和研究情况两个方面,评述维吾尔文有关波斯文学翻译及研究的最近情况

被引：4 下载：72 发表时间：2001-08-20

新疆维吾尔自治区第四届翻译协会理事会在乌举行

语言与翻译, 1998 年 04 期, 期刊

...克尔、廖泽余、布尔库提、卡克西 6 人为副会长。陈毓贵任秘书长, 阿里木·哈沙尼、苏永成、哈斯亚提·阿布都热合曼、帕尔哈提·努尔任副秘书长。新疆维吾尔自治区第四届翻译协会理事会在乌举行

下载：5 发表时间：1998-11-15

浅谈维吾尔谚语的语义分类及其翻译

李文新 语言与翻译, 1997 年 02 期, 期刊

本文的目的是想从语义角度给维吾尔谚语进行分类, 力求解决长期以来人们在翻译维吾尔谚语时, 遇到的许多棘手的问题, 从而使谚语的翻译做到准确、生动、形象。从谚语的整体和各组成部分之间的语义关系出发, 可把维吾尔谚语分成“融合性谚...

被引：4 下载：78 发表时间：1997-06-15

马列著作及党和国家重要文献维吾尔文翻译概述

伊明·阿布拉 新疆社会经济, 1996 年 06 期, 期刊

<正> 1949 年 10 月 22 日, 中央人民政府民族事务委员会在成立大会上提出, 用各民族文字翻译政治协商会议三大文件, 从此, 拉开了新中国党政文献民族语文翻译的序幕。50 年代初, 新疆人民出版社和中央级民族出版社相继宣告成立, 其主要任务是, 在编辑出版民族文化图书的同时, 用多种少数民族文字翻译出版党和国家的政策文件, 党和国家主要领导人的重要著作以及马列经典著作。这标志着我国党政重要文献和马列著作民族语文翻译出版工作纳入了正常轨道。40 多年来, 广大维吾尔文翻译工作者翻译出版了很多文献

下载：26 发表时间：1996-12-15

维吾尔族翻译文学古今素描

伊明·阿布拉 中国翻译, 1996 年 06 期, 期刊

维吾尔族翻译文学古今素描伊明·阿布拉辉煌灿烂、历史悠久的中国文化, 自有维吾尔族人民的一份劳绩、光荣与自豪。维吾尔族作为中华民族大家庭中的一员, 其祖先至少在公元 5、6 世纪就创制了本民族的文字。在不同的历史时期和不同的地域环境, 先后使用过突厥鲁尼克文、回...

被引：2 下载：122 发表时间：1996-11-15

### 浅谈翻译及其对维吾尔语的影响

米娜瓦尔 语言与翻译, 1996年03期, 期刊

浅谈翻译及其对维吾尔语的影响米吉提·吐尔逊文米娜瓦尔译翻译是一种创造性的劳动。人类的一切成就都要通过翻译才能传播于世。没有翻译, 就没有今天的世界, 同样, 没有翻译, 也就无法描绘未来世界。翻译在维吾尔人民的文明史上曾起过巨大的作用。就我们所掌握的书面资料...

下载: 59 发表时间: 1996-09-15

### 京都维吾尔人——翻译家、作家阿克拜尔·吾拉木

铁来克 语言与翻译, 1996年03期, 期刊

京都维吾尔人——翻译家、作家阿克拜尔·吾拉木铁来克八十年代初, 我偶然从《民族文学》杂志上第一次知道了阿克拜尔·吾拉木的名字。最初我是漫不经心地读他翻译创作的小说和诗歌, 后来, 我被小说和诗歌中燃烧的激情撩拨得不能自己, 更被他作品中蕴含的哲理引发了无尽的...

下载: 33 发表时间: 1996-09-15

### 优秀的维吾尔族文学翻译家、诗人克里木·霍加

刘斌 乌鲁木齐成人教育学院学报, 1996年02期, 期刊

这当中以克里木·霍加为代表的一代人所作出的努力是不容置疑的。除此, 克里木·霍加还用汉文翻译了《黎·穆塔里前诗选》、维吾尔族著名诗人铁依南江·艾里耶夫等人的优秀诗歌、维吾尔族民间故事和著名的维吾尔族古典乐曲什二木卡姆》的歌词...

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### 新疆维吾尔自治区第三届翻译工作会议胜利召开——吾普尔·阿不都拉副主席的讲话

语言与翻译, 1993年04期, 期刊

<正> 同志们: 在自治区第十五个民族团结教育月活动刚刚结束之际, 第三届翻译工作会议召开了。我代表自治区人民政府, 热烈祝贺这次会议的胜利召开, 并向在座的翻译工作者和工作在第一线的各民族翻译工作者致以亲切的慰

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### 谈维吾尔语诗歌翻译的理解

赵国栋 喀什师范学院学报, 1990年01期, 期刊

<正> 理解与表达是翻译的两个相互联系不可分割的基本环节。理解是在整个翻译活动中创造性地运用一种语言再现另一种语言的基础——不理解的事物无法表达; 理解错误必然表达错误, 即使词藻华丽, 语句畅达, 也不能称其为真正的翻译。在诗歌翻译过程中, 有的译者

或因对原作的整体理解得不准、不深,或因对原作的局部理解得模糊、错误,使译文失真甚至背离原作,不能正确地传达原作的思想内容和感情色彩

下载: 22 发表时间: 1990-03-02

### 维吾尔族人名的计算机自动翻译程序

陆秉庸; 王承诒 语言与翻译, 1989年04期, 期刊

<正> 新疆少数民族人民的姓名,在书写时常常有不够规范的情况。尤其是在译成汉文时,由于没有统一的标准,全凭翻译者的随心所欲。因此译名形形色色、五花八门、缺

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### 维吾尔翻译史初探(续完)

李国香 西北民族大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 1988年02期, 期刊

<正> 喀拉汗王国时期维吾尔的语言及翻译理论整个喀拉汗王国时期,虽然没有具体的翻译作品,留传下来,但在语言及翻译理论方面,却远远走在世界各国许多民族之前,提出了一系列极具研究价值的语言资料和细密的翻译理论,对后来的翻译工作者,从思想理论上的培养与武装,提供了大量资料,和成套的方法技术,均是至为难得的。比如语言应该谈得恰到好处,谈到地方上,文贵简练等等。

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### 维吾尔翻译史初探

李国香 西北民族大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 1987年04期, 期刊

<正> 1、序论自古以来,我国就是一个多民族的国家。正因为如此,沟通不同民族语言和思想的翻译活动,远比世界各国,开始得早,成绩也较突出。毛泽东同志说:“各少数民族对中国的历史,都作过贡献。”就翻译史而言,情况也不例外。但古代(包括夏、商、周三代)的翻译,从当时的客观实际来认识,大概也只是口译,至于书面的东西,则是日后的事情。当

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### 民族语文翻译工作在两个文明建设中的重要地位——新疆维吾尔自治区语委副主任、新疆译协副主席艾力·阿比提在伊犁哈萨克自治州译协成立大会上的讲话

语言与翻译, 1987年02期, 期刊

<正> 同志们: 在伊犁哈萨克自治州党委和人民政府的关怀下,经过大家的努力,伊犁哈萨克自治州译协将在这次全州翻译工作者代表会议期间成立。这是自治州各族人民和广大翻译工作者的一件大事,我代表自治区语委和新疆译协以及全疆的四千多名各族翻译工作者向州译协成立大

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### 维吾尔诗歌的翻译问题

张世荣 民族文学研究, 1986年06期, 期刊

<正> 维吾尔族是具有悠久文化历史的民族之一。维吾尔语属阿尔泰语系突厥语族西匈语支葛逻录语组。在数千年漫长的历史进程中,维吾尔人以自己的勤劳和智慧,创造了绚丽多彩的文学艺术,丰富了中华民族共同的文化宝库。纵观维吾尔文学史,除少数散文作品外,几乎全部都是诗歌。诗歌是文学翻译中难度最大的一种。因此,我认为研究诗歌的翻译技巧,对于今后全面、系统地介绍维吾尔文学具有重要意义。维吾尔诗歌中最常见的形式有下两几种: 1.格则勒,即双行诗,每首诗少则八行,多则二十二行,长短视内容而定。

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### 中共新疆维吾尔自治区委员会书记贾那布尔同志在全国民族语文翻译学术讨论会上的讲话语言与翻译, 1986年01期, 期刊

<正> 同志们: 全国民族语文翻译学术讨论会,今天在我区首府乌鲁木齐开幕了。我代表新疆维吾尔自治区党委,自治区人民政府及全疆各族人民,热烈祝贺这次会议的隆重召开,热烈欢迎千里迢迢来参加这次盛会的全国各族翻译界的同志们!并向同志们致以亲切地问候!同志们,你们都是从事民族语文翻译工作的,你们在我国的社会主义革命和建设事业的各项战线上都付出了辛勤的劳动,我们对同志们付出的辛勤劳动和做出的贡献,表示由衷的感谢!

下载: 5 发表时间: 1986-04-02

### 祖国春光的不倦歌者——介绍维吾尔族诗人、翻译家克里木·霍加

陈柏中 民族文学, 1983年09期, 期刊

<正> 克里木·霍加是维吾尔族成绩卓著的文学翻译家,又是植根于民族生活土壤的独具特色的诗人。这使他在维吾尔族当代文学的发展中,有着自己的位置。在他的文学生涯中,创作和翻译,真好比鸟的双翅,车的两轮,相互促进,相得益彰:文学翻译,使他眼界开阔,涉猎广泛,为他的创作提供了多方面的借鉴;而诗歌创作的实

下载: 14 发表时间: 1983-09-28

### 维吾尔族古代翻译家僧古萨里评述

新疆社会科学, 1983年01期, 期刊

<正> 前言公元九至十一世纪是古代维吾尔文化十分繁荣的时期。这时期的维吾尔文化有两个发展中心,一个是以高昌(吐鲁番盆地)为中心的佛教环境中成熟起来的旧维吾尔文化,另一个是以喀什噶尔为中心的伊斯兰教环境中成熟起来的维吾尔文化。从书面语言的角度来讲,前者的代表人物是僧古萨里和波热塔那热克西提等著名的翻译家和文学家;后者的代表人物是马合木德·喀什噶里和玉苏甫·哈斯·哈吉甫等伟大的语言学家和文学家。而十一世纪后,发展成熟起来的喀什噶尔文化和书面语言,是九、十世纪高昌文化和书面语言的

被引: 2 下载: 56 发表时间: 1983-03-02

### 关于维吾尔谚语的翻译问题

马鸿坤 西北民族大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 1980年01期, 期刊

<正> 维吾尔语同汉语语系不同,各自的特点不同。由于两个民族谚语在意义、色彩和使用习惯等方面的不同特点,在把维吾尔语翻为汉语时,要把原文的思想内容与语言风格忠实地表达出来,是件颇为困难但又并非不可克服的难事。现就维吾尔谚语的翻译问题谈点不成熟的看法。翻译谚语大致可采取以下几种方法:

被引: 3 下载: 57 发表时间: 1980-04-01

## APPENDIX D

## “汉维 AND 翻译” / 篇名 in CNKI

当前汉维翻译中存在的问题及其解决方法

买买提尼牙孜·托科提 民族翻译, 2012年03期, 期刊

随着社会的迅速发展,汉维翻译界出现了欣欣向荣的局面。虽然大部分译文的质量较好,但一部分译文仍存在一些质量问题。本文主要就当前汉维翻译中存在的问题及其解决方法进行探讨。

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汉维翻译新视角——就易性原则及内涵刍议

孟毅;肖丽霞 民族翻译, 2012年02期, 期刊

本文从汉维翻译实践出发,提出翻译的就易性原则,探讨其内涵并给予初步的概念界定。在此基础上就其实施条件、路径与形式展开讨论。本文认为就易性原则是对翻译原则的补充和发展,是适应时代发展并着眼于翻译实践的创新,对翻译理论的发展和翻译实践水平的提高有很大助益。

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面向机器翻译的汉维词语对齐规范

麦丽开·阿布德瓦力 新疆大学, 硕士

解决汉维双语语料库机器翻译词语对齐引起的机器翻译问题, 需要一个高质量的汉维双语语料库, 而要建设这样一个双语语料库, 其中关键的技术就是词对齐。本文针对规范汉语和维吾尔语双语语料库建设中词对齐进行了研究。新疆多语种信息技术开放课题组, 双语平行语料库为机器翻译、双语词典编撰, 以及自然语言处理领域提供了重要的资源, 对它的研究有着十分重要的理论研究意义和实用价值。构建大规模的双语平行语料库是基于语料库研究的基础, 而双语词对齐又是构建双语语料库的一个重要环节。因此, 汉维词语对齐研究有

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汉维翻译中隐喻处理的研究

刘艳萍 喀什师范学院, 硕士

隐喻的翻译需考虑两种文化在认知和思维方面存在的共性和差异。由于人类在认知、思维方面本身存在诸多共性,隐喻的翻译应尽量采用直译,只有当喻体在不同文化中的象征意义存在差异时,方可采用意译。

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### 基于实例的汉维—维汉双向机器翻译系统的研究

卡哈尔江·阿比的热西提 上海交通大学, 硕士

机器翻译(Machine Translation)是指用计算机自动地将一种人类语言转换成另一种人类语言,例如将维吾尔语译成汉语或者将汉语译成维吾尔语。在不同策略的翻译方法中,基于实例的机器翻译方法避免了复杂的深层次的语法和语义分析,具有译文精确、翻译速度快、获取翻译知识简单的优点。本文首先回顾了机器翻译发展史、简单地介绍了各种机器翻译方法和机器翻译现状。描述了基于实例的机器翻译方法的原理、系统结构、相关问题以及该方法的优点。在着重描述黏着型语言信息处理以及机器翻译研究现状

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### 多元系统理论在汉维翻译中的应用

热依汉古丽·图尔迪 中央民族大学, 硕士

以色列著名学者伊塔玛·埃文—佐哈尔在 20 世纪 70 年代提出的多元系统理论,对翻译界和文学界产生了深远的影响,为翻译开辟了一条描述性的、面向译语系统的新途径,推动了翻译研究的文化转向。本文以《红楼梦》的维文译本为研究对象,采取分析的方法,来探讨多元系统理论在维吾尔语中的运用。多元系统理论认为,翻译文学在文学多元系统理论的地位决定翻译文本的选择和翻译策略的选择。一方面,翻译文本的选取要看它与目标语文化系统内的主流文化是否相符合。换句话说,目标语文化系统内的社会、文化、政治等情况

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### 面向汉维机器翻译的相关转换及匹配规则设计

贾春兰; 吐尔根·依布拉音 计算机应用与软件, 2012 年 03 期, 期刊

汉语和维吾尔语是在句法结构和语序上差异较大的两种语言。对于一个完备的汉维机器翻译系统而言,进行源语言的分析 and 目标语言时态、语态的准确表达是有必要的。针对统计机器翻译模型中所包含的句法、语义成分较低导致的准确率及语序问题,通过建立相关转换及匹配规则,以期用于机器翻译的混合方法之中来提高翻译系统的工作性能。

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### 基于句法调序的汉维统计机器翻译

陈丽娟; 张恒; 董兴华; 吐尔洪·吾司曼; 周俊林 计算机工程, 2012 年 03 期, 期刊

在汉语到维语的统计机器翻译中,2 种语言在形态学及语序上差异较大,导致未知词较多,且产生的维语译文语序混乱。针对上述问题,在对汉语和维语的语序进行研究的基础上,提出一种汉语句法调序方法,进而对维语进行形态学分析,采用基于因素的统计机器翻译系统进行验证。实验结果证明,该方法在性能上较基线系统有显著改进, BLEU 评分由 15.72 提高到 19.17。

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### 汉维/维汉统计机器翻译中若干问题研究

徐春; 杨勇; 董兴华 计算机工程与应用, 2011年 35期, 期刊

针对汉语和维吾尔语形态差别较大的特点,借助开源的 Moses 工具箱,通过各种翻译模型的对比及相关实验结果的分析,深入探讨了对汉维/维汉翻译有影响的各种因素,包括词对齐问题,汉维翻译中主语、谓语中心词、时态等的一致性问题,维汉翻译中 OOV 的问题,汉维句法结构差异问题。最后给出了提高汉维/维汉统计翻译性能的一些建议。

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### 浅谈汉维语言族情的翻译

武玉洁 喀什师范学院学报, 2011年 04期, 期刊

探讨了在汉维翻译过程中怎样才能传达原作中的族情内容,使译文在不同层次上与原文达到等值。

被引: 1 下载: 32 发表时间: 2011-07-30

### 汉维统计机器翻译中的形态学处理

董兴华; 陈丽娟; 周喜; 周俊林; 吐尔洪·吾司曼 计算机工程, 2011年 12期, 期刊

针对汉语和维吾尔语语序差别(前者是主-谓-宾结构,后者是主-宾-谓结构)及形态差别较大的问题,通过编写调序规则将汉语调整为主-宾-谓结构,将维吾尔语单词切分为词干、词缀等更小的词素单元来训练统计模型,同时测试词素的切分粒度对翻译性能的影响。实验结果表明,对汉语句法结构的调整及以词干、词缀等更小的词素形式参与训练可以有效提高翻译质量。

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### 汉维语中数词的文化涵义与翻译

何燕 新疆师范大学, 硕士

传统意义上数词是表示数目多少或顺序多少的词。汉族和维吾尔族是两个不同的民族,在文化背景、历史传统、宗教信仰、风俗习惯等方面的不同,使汉维语在数词的使用上存在着一定的差异。本文首先从文化内涵的角度,阐述汉维数词的差异,在汉维数词翻译时会采用不同的翻译方法。

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### 汉维翻译中的文化局限词及其翻译方法探析

唐雪梅 新疆师范大学, 硕士

翻译是跨语言、跨文化的交际活动,是各民族之间进行文化交流不可或缺的重要桥梁,其实是文化信息的传递。而在汉维翻译的过程中,由于不同的自然地理环境、风俗习惯和宗教等的影响,译文会不可避免地产生文化不等值现象。本文就文化局限词产生的历史文化,

宗教文化,地域文化,饮食文化,民俗、认知、心理观念等五大因素做了简要分析,并提出了处理文化局限词的翻译策略。

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### 汉维句子主述结构对比及其翻译方法刍议

廖蕊 新疆师范大学, 硕士

本文以三个平面的语法观为指导,借鉴国内外多种语言理论和方法,对汉维两种语言句子中的主题—述题结构进行对比分析,探索汉维两种语言的主述结构之异同,旨在给翻译理论研究与翻译实践提供另一个视角。

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### 汉维比喻中的文化差异与翻译

张婧玮 新疆师范大学, 硕士

通过对比汉维语比喻的类型与结构,分析出两者在结构形式上存在共性,但又具有不同的表现形态。分析汉维比喻中存在文化差异的原因以及文化内涵方面的对比,揭示出翻译的任务不仅仅是翻译表面的文字,实质上是对两个民族之间不同文化的翻译转换。因此在熟知语法的同时更重要的是了解两个民族之间存在的文化内涵差异,并采用适当的翻译比喻之法,以达到最好的翻译效果。

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### 汉维文学作品中的超语言因素及其翻译

杨杉 新疆师范大学, 硕士

语言作为交际的重要工具,它不仅有传递信息的功能而且更是文化的载体。对于语言的翻译,需要我们更多的掌握其内在的文化内涵以及其他可译与不可译的因素。在汉维文学作品的互译过程中,我们常常会遇到很多语言本身因素以外的,如文学历史背景、民俗文化、上下文情景等等诸多超语言因素,如果不能正确的把握和处理这些因素,在翻译的过程中便会出现望文生义或词不达意的情况,尤其作为文学作品的翻译,我们更需要突出译文的生动性和形象性。因此对这些超语言因素及其翻译情况进行讨论,对我们今后的翻译工作有很大

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### 关于汉维翻译中文化词语处理的几点思考

蒋春梅 新疆师范大学, 硕士

汉维语中有着大量的文化词语,由于各自社会文化的不同,生活习俗的不同,使它们具有了不同的文化词语;在汉维翻译中,文化词语的翻译是一个难点。翻译并不仅仅是把一种语言转换成另一种语言,它其中还隐含着深深的文化内涵,译者不仅是在翻译文字,而且还可说是在

转述文化,是把一种读者陌生的文化通过译者呈现在其面前。本文讨论了翻译的标准,提出了文化词翻译的原则,探讨了汉维两种语言中文化词语的分类及其翻译方式。

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### 汉维文化差异及翻译策略研究

郭璐洁 新疆师范大学, 硕士

语言是文化的载体,语言和文化相辅相成又相互交融,其演变、使用和表达方式就必然受到所处文化环境的影响和制约。语言翻译中出现的种种失误与偏颇,许多是因文化误读,或文化语义转换失当造成的。如何跨越文化障碍,进行恰当的翻译,是每一个从事翻译工作的人面临的重要问题。翻译家傅雷所说:“翻译必须像伯乐相马,要得其精而忘其粗,在其内而忘其形。而即使是最优秀的译文,其韵味较之原文仍不免过或不及”。翻译只能尽量缩短这个距离,过则求其勿太过,不及则求其勿过于不及。本文主要从历史文化、宗教文化、

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### 汉维翻译中的不可译性及其补充手段

莎丽塔娜提·阿不都热依木 新疆大学, 硕士

随着全球经济的一体化和信息技术的飞速发展,人与人之间的距离得到了进一步缩短。各民族间在经济、科学技术、文化、教育等各个领域间的相互交流相互学习就变得更加频繁,而这种交流与学习就迫切的需要一种特殊语言作为媒介,而它就是语言翻译。语言翻译是各民族文化交流与相互学习所必需的桥梁与纽带,从事语言翻译的工作者是支撑这座桥连的中坚力量。翻译活动由来已久,但一种语言所表达的内容能否用另一种语言完全表达出来却成为翻译史上长期争论的问题。大量翻译实践证明,因人类的共性,语言的共性不同的语言

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### 基于短语的汉维/维汉统计机器翻译

董兴华; 周俊林; 郭树盛; 吐尔洪·吾司曼 计算机工程, 2011年09期, 期刊

利用电话录音的汉维平行语料库和开源的 Moses 系统构建一个基于短语的统计机器翻译系统。针对汉维平行语料库规模较小和维吾尔语形态变化比较丰富的特点,通过对词级的语料库进行切分得到词素级的语料库,并分别进行词一级的实验和词素级的实验。实验表明,词素级的实验能降低无法识别的词的的概率,提高翻译的质量。

被引: 4 下载: 109 发表时间: 2011-05-05

### 基于统计机器翻译的汉维词对齐研究

刘建明; 吐尔根·依不拉音; 艾山·吾买尔 计算机应用与软件, 2011年04期, 期刊

描述了一个基于统计机器翻译的汉维词对齐系统。系统处理过程分为两个模块:预处理和词对齐。预处理过程包括汉文文本预处理和维吾尔文文本预处理,其中维吾尔文文本预处理过程为:首先将维吾尔文转换成拉丁维文,然后将拉丁维文中个别字符替换为无歧义的字符。词对齐实现过程:首先利用 IBM Model1-3,然后结合 Och 等人提出的启发式的思路进行优化,构建基于统计机器翻译的汉维词对齐系统。实验结果表明此系统可行。

被引: 2 下载: 76 发表时间: 2011-04-15

### 汉维翻译中的词语省略技巧研究

古丽加乃提·亚森 中央民族大学, 硕士

随着汉族、维吾尔族两个民族之间的来往的加强,汉语维吾尔语翻译上作也得到了迅速发展。许多著名的汉语作品翻译成维吾尔语,同时不少维吾尔语名著也翻译成汉语。翻译作品的质量也日趋提高,汉语维吾尔语翻译事业上取得了可喜的成果。可是,翻译理论研究工作一直落后于翻译实践,至今还没有形成较完整的理论体系。省略词语是翻译实践中最常用的技巧之一。任何两种语言之间进行的翻译活动中都会用这种技巧。它起源为解决两种语言之间表达方式和表达习惯的差异。省略技巧使译文语言简明扼要、通顺流畅的,使译文更符

下载: 84 发表时间: 2011-04-01

### 论现代汉语被动句的维吾尔语翻译

月里古丽·沙木沙克 中央民族大学, 硕士

被动句是汉语里一种常见的句法形式。在日常生活中,报刊、杂志和文学作品里随处可见。它们在汉语句法里的重要地位是不可忽视的。目前,汉语中关于被动句的研究不少,但对于如何将汉语被动句翻译成维吾尔语的研究文章和论著却极为少见。鉴于此,本文认为有必要探讨一下这一问题。凡是语言翻译者在翻译实践中会遇到很多问题,其中被动句的翻译是难点之一。在句法表达主语与谓语之间的施动或受动的关系过程中,为了使句子更加精通、易懂,许多作家喜欢使用被动句达到该目的。这如其它的作品一样,在阅读著名作家巴金

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### 统计机器翻译中汉维短语对抽取的研究

任高举; 吐尔根·伊布拉音; 艾山·吾买尔 新疆大学学报(自然科学版), 2010年03期, 期刊  
双语短语对抽取是基于短语的统计机器翻译中短语翻译模型训练的关键步骤,但由于汉维平行语料库规模有限,数据稀疏问题严重.本文提出了一种改进的短语抽取算法,该算法首先考虑词对齐矩阵中一个汉语词对齐到多个维吾尔语词的情况(包括不连续),然后利用 Och

方法抽取短语对,最后考虑维吾尔语 SOV 语序结构特点,抽取双语短语.实验表明,该算法能够较准确地且尽可能多地抽取汉维短语对,从而提高翻译模型的质量.

被引: 2 下载: 51 发表时间: 2010-08-15

### 汉维詈骂语对比与翻译

武玉洁; 李芸 喀什师范学院学报, 2010年04期, 期刊

阐述了詈骂语的概念和汉维詈骂语的研究意义,并进行了分类对比,探讨了其文化内涵,并对汉维詈骂语的翻译方法进行了初步探究。

被引: 1 下载: 73 发表时间: 2010-07-30

### 网络环境下自动获取汉维句子翻译对的研究

姜子进; 吐尔根·依布拉音 少数民族青年自然语言处理技术与进展——第三届全国少数民族青年自然语言信息处理、第二届全国多语言知识库建设联合学术研讨会论文集 中国会议

为基于统计和基于实例等基于语料库的翻译方法提供了新的思路,有效的改进了翻译的质量,另一方面,双语语料库又是获取翻译知识的重要来源,从中可以挖掘学习各种细粒度的翻译知识,如翻译词典和翻译模板,从而改进传统的机器...

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### 基于短语的汉维(维汉)统计机器翻译研究

董兴华; 周俊林; 郭树盛; 吐尔洪·吾司曼 少数民族青年自然语言处理技术与进展——第三届全国少数民族青年自然语言信息处理、第二届全国多语言知识库建设联合学术研讨会论文集 中国会议

基于短语的汉维机器翻译中的形态学处理“复原”成维吾尔语单贰实验中用到的机器翻译框架如下: 基于短语的统计翻译模型把词或短语作为翻译的基本单位,此模型的一个缺陷是没有考虑词与词之间内部关系,如“car”和“。ars”,在...

下载: 31 发表时间: 2010-06-27

### 基于统计机器翻译的汉维词对齐研究

刘建明 新疆大学, 硕士

词对齐技术的研究在自然语言处理领域中对语料库的建设、语音识别、双语词典的编撰、信息检索等提供基础性建设。目前,汉英词对齐技术的研究已取得了准确率 90.0%,召回率 88.2%的成果,然而汉维词对齐技术的研究起步相对较晚。本文的主要工作就是研究句子一级的汉维词对齐,采用的基于噪声信源信道模型的统计机器翻译方法。本文利用 IBM Model1-3 和 Och 的 Heuristic 优化算法构建一个基于统计机器翻译的汉维词对齐系统。系统分为两个模块:预处理模块和词对齐模块。词对齐过程是:首

下载: 73 发表时间: 2010-05-26

### 基于短语的翻译模型中汉维短语抽取的研究

任高举 新疆大学, 硕士

双语短语抽取是基于短语的统计机器翻译中短语翻译模型训练的关键步骤,但由于汉维平行语料库规模有限,翻译模型训练数据稀疏问题严重。目前汉维统计机器翻译领域的研究还处于起步阶段,有必要对汉维短语抽取进行研究。本文利用 SilkRoad 中的开源工具以及词对齐工具 GIZA++,训练汉维平行语料库,完成了整个翻译模型训练,并且改进了短语抽取算法,最终得到了短语翻译概率表,为搭建一个基于短语的汉维统计机器翻译系统做准备工作。本文在 Och 短语抽取算法的基础上,提出了一种改进的短语抽取算法。

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### 基于短语的统计机器翻译中汉维短语对抽取算法改进

任高举; 吐尔根·伊布拉音; 艾山·吾买尔 现代计算机(专业版), 2010年05期, 期刊

提出一种改进的短语抽取算法,该算法首先考虑词对齐矩阵中一个汉语词对齐到多个维语词的情况(包括不连续),然后采用 Och 方法进行判断。如果满足条件则进行短语抽取。试验结果表明,改进后的短语抽取算法能够抽取出更多汉维短语对,提高短语翻译对抽取的效果。

被引: 1 下载: 48 发表时间: 2010-05-25

### 汉维熟语翻译的文化透视

赵江民 新疆社科论坛, 2010年02期, 期刊

汉维熟语互译时要注意处理语言和文化的矛盾,既要译出原语熟语的意义,又要译出原语的民族特色和地域色彩。熟语翻译的好坏直接影响到翻译的质量和文化交流的程度,因此,要保证汉维熟语翻译的准确性,对汉维熟语进行文化透视是翻译的关键。

被引: 2 下载: 149 发表时间: 2010-04-16

### 汉维文化差异对成语翻译的影响

巩晓 语言与翻译, 2010年01期, 期刊

翻译既是语言形式的转换,也是文化模式的转换。成语作为语言中的一种特殊成分,反映了一个民族文化的特色。本文以《红楼梦》中的成语及其在维译本中的翻译为研究对象,通过对作品中翻译实例的分析,从历史文化差异、宗教文化差异、地域文化差异、饮食文化差异等方面分别探讨汉维文化差异对成语翻译的影响。

被引: 2 下载: 285 发表时间: 2010-02-15

### 基于短语统计翻译的汉维机器翻译系统

杨攀; 李淼; 张建 计算机应用, 2009年07期, 期刊

描述了一种基于短语统计翻译的汉维机器翻译系统。首先使用汉维语料进行训练,得到语言模型和翻译模型;再利用训练好的模型对源语句进行解码,以得到最佳的翻译语句。解码的核心算法是柱搜索(beam search)算法。其中维文语料使用的是拉丁维文。实验结果表明,基于短语的统计机器翻译方法可以快速有效地构建一个汉维机器翻译平台。

被引: 3 下载: 150 发表时间: 2009-07-01

### 汉维动物词的文化意义比较及其翻译

卡依沙尔·艾合买提 民族翻译, 2009年01期, 期刊

不同民族由于文化方面的差异,对动物的认识 and 情感不尽相同。熟悉不同文化背景下动物词的文化意义是准确翻译的关键。本文通过比较汉维语动物词所体现的文化差异,探讨汉维动物词的翻译。

下载: 68 发表时间: 2009-02-15

### 翻译与汉维文化差异

艾斯卡尔·依明尼牙子 和田师范专科学校学报, 2008年04期, 期刊

本文就在汉维翻译过程中拟从历史文化、宗教文化、地域文化、饮食文化四个方面浅析在日常汉维互译过程中应该重视的彼此间在文化上存在的差异。

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### 汉维文学翻译中明晰化现象发生原因探析

梁伟 语言与翻译, 2008年01期, 期刊

明晰化是汉维文学翻译中最重要的技巧之一。文章结合《红楼梦》维译实践,从结构因素、行文习惯、文化冲突、审美取向等方面对汉维文学翻译中明晰化现象的成因进行了探讨。

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### 试论汉维语词翻译和文化语境

李纯 新疆职业大学学报, 2007年04期, 期刊

翻译是通过一种语言转达另一种文化信息,因此任何翻译都离不开文化、文化语境。语境的研究由来已久,因为它对于理解语篇语义具有重大作用。遣词造句、篇章结构以及语体形式都离不开语境,学习一种语言过程中研究与语言相关的文化,而大量的文化信息是可以等值传递的。这是两种文化的共性,至于与两种文化差异的内容,它构成了翻译难题。由于这一问题的广泛性、多变性和复杂性,译者不可能全面探索与总结文化与翻译的关系。本文仅从实践中精选一些译例,阐述语境与汉维语词翻译的关系,进一步说明语境,尤其是文化

被引: 3 下载: 84 发表时间: 2007-12-15

### 浅议汉维比喻喻体的文化差异及其翻译

杨梅 和田师范专科学校学报, 2007年05期, 期刊

比喻乃语言精粹,民族风雅之遗产,因而比喻往往都打上了民族文化的烙印,翻译时很难驾驭。本文拟通过对英汉两种语言中比喻喻体所承载的民族文化特色及文化信息差异的比较,探讨其翻译的途径。

下载: 70 发表时间: 2007-10-15

### 汉维翻译与语码转换

乌买尔·达吾提 新疆大学学报(哲学人文社会科学版), 2007年05期, 期刊

前苏联和美国的一些学者认为,转换是翻译的实质,它作为翻译技巧的全部贯穿整个翻译过程;而转换法是宏观意义上的综合性翻译技巧。我们认为对翻译而言,原语和译语就是两种语码,翻译是不同语码的等值转换,而转换法是一种广泛使用的翻译技巧。文章就国内外学术界对翻译的实质及转换法概念加以探讨,并从汉维翻译理论和实践角度论述运用转换法这一翻译技巧的不同类型及其理论根据。

被引: 2 下载: 115 发表时间: 2007-09-15

### 汉维语数字熟语及其翻译

赵建国 新疆大学学报(哲学人文社会科学版), 2007年04期, 期刊

汉维语数字熟语中数目词所蕴涵的文化涵义极为丰富,且比喻意义很少对应,根据汉维语数字熟语中的数目词在翻译过程中传递的文化信息及其差异,汉维语数字熟语翻译主要采用直译法、意译法、对应(借用)法、直译加注法等。

被引: 4 下载: 180 发表时间: 2007-07-15

### 服务于汉维机器翻译系统的双语句子对齐的研究

牛洪梅 新疆大学, 硕士

自上世纪80年代起,由于计算机科学的飞速发展以及计算机技术在语言研究领域中的迅速普及和应用,使得语料库语言学成为研究主流,其中平行语料库和比较语料库已成为语料库语言学研究的一个主要焦点。对于双语平行语料库,其研究工作主要有构建,对齐和标注等方面,其中研究不同级别的对齐技术是一个重要的中心课题,对齐不仅是进一步利用平行语料库获取一些语言知识的必要前提,也是机器翻译系统利用双语知识的重要前期处理。本文从句子对齐这一问题入手,介绍了目前句子对齐的几种基本的方法,之后具体的分析了

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### 法律术语的汉维翻译问题及应遵循的原则

欧伟贞; 阿不都西库尔·阿力木 喀什师范学院学报, 2006年 05 期, 期刊

文章从法律术语概念、特征入手,探讨了几个法律术语在汉语翻译成维语过程中出现的问题,阐明了法律术语在翻译时应注意的问题和应遵循的原则。

被引: 1 下载: 98 发表时间: 2006-09-30

### 汉语教材中汉维翻译刍议

王燕灵 塔里木大学学报, 2005年 03 期, 期刊

在长期从事对少数民族学生的汉语教学工作实践中,笔者认为学生在交际中所犯错误有相当一部分来源于词汇。这除了一般情况下负迁移以及学习环境的影响之外,还有另一个重要的原因就是课文词语的维语翻译存在着不足。本文就课文词语的维语翻译问题,探讨了对少数民族汉语教材中词语汉维译的意义,并提出了翻译时应遵循的一些方法。

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### 面向汉维机器翻译的双语对齐语料库设计与实现

吐尔根·依布拉音; 阿里甫·库尔班维尼拉·木沙江 第十届全国少数民族语言文字信息处理学术研讨会论文集 中国会议

面向汉维机器翻译的双语对齐语料库的构建,对于双语词典编纂、跨语言的对比研究、“民-汉”双语教育的研究以及汉维机器辅助翻译系统研发有重要价值。二、制定汉维双语语料文本收集整理规范制定双语语料库整理过程中需要遵循的原则。对于...

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### 面向汉维机器翻译的双语对齐语料库的构建

毕雪华; 吐尔根·依布拉音 第十届全国少数民族语言文字信息处理学术研讨会论文集 中国会议

我们用这个语料库为基于存储的引擎提供汉维翻译实例,并从中挖掘学习各种细粒度翻译知识,供其他翻译引擎使用。此外,我们也希望该语料库在逐步趋向平衡后,能够服务于汉维双语词典编纂、双语术语自动提取、双语对比研究以及双语教学等...

被引: 2 下载: 48 发表时间: 2005-07-01

### 汉维翻译中的可译性限度研究

李万君 新疆大学, 硕士

翻译活动由来已久,但一种语言所表达的内容能否用另一种语言完全表达出来却成为翻译史上长期争论的话题。大量的翻译实践证明,不同的语言之间是可译的,但由于翻译牵涉两个民族不同的语言和文化,因此翻译中又存在可译性限度问题。目前国内外翻译界对可译性限度的研究并不完善,而汉维翻译更是无人涉足,所以本文在翻译理论研究的基础上,结

合汉维语言特点,对汉译维中的可译性限度进行了较为系统的探讨。本文共分为五部分。第一部分是前言,概述了可译性限度的理论与实践意义以及目前的研究状况  
被引: 2 下载: 174 发表时间: 2005-05-31

### 新疆改革开放以来汉维翻译研究回顾与展望

童湘屏 新疆大学, 硕士

改革开放以来,新疆的汉维翻译研究蓬勃发展,取得了显著的成果,而且在研究领域里推陈出新,出现了许多新观点,涌现出了许多新人物。在这样不断的探索当中,促进了新疆的翻译研究进程。从某种程度上而高,这二十几年翻译研究是稳中求进,不断发展的。回顾历史的目的在于展望未来,通过运用统计法、列表法、图示法、归纳法和演绎法回顾新疆改革开放以来汉维翻译研究的成果及新探索之后,必然会发现一些潜存的问题,同时也可以看到未来发展的方向,这也正是本文的结论所在。本论文主体可分为四部分。第一章:新疆二  
下载: 150 发表时间: 2005-05-31

### 汉维亲属称谓语的对比及翻译研究

徐江 新疆大学, 硕士

称谓语是言语交际中不可或缺的组成部分,它往往是言语交际的开始,对整个交际的成功起着十分重要的作用,从称谓语中可以看出交际双方的身份、地位、亲疏远近、目的动机等。作为语言的表现形式,称谓语必与其所属的文化与社会紧密相连,每种称谓语都有独特的称呼方式和规约,如果交际者忽视了约定俗成的社会规约,交际(特别是跨文化交际)就会受阻,甚至失败。此外,称谓语与语境更是密切相关,每种称谓语都是说话人通过衡量一系列语境而精心选择的。 被引: 1 下载: 247 发表时间: 2005-05-31

### 汉维翻译中文化意象的失落与错位

童湘屏 语言与翻译, 2004年03期, 期刊

本文通过对文化意象的概念和表征的阐释,列举了汉维翻译中文化意象失落与错位现象的一些实例,指出了如何传递文化意象的途径。  
被引: 4 下载: 204 发表时间: 2004-08-15

### 汉维否定句翻译新探

陈玉梅 新疆师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2004年02期, 期刊

由于汉、维两种语言的内部结构以及在否定概念的表达手段上存在的差异,在汉维否定句的翻译中若对否定词语或词缀生搬硬套,势必影响原文的表达效果,甚至完全脱离维语的表达习惯,或者导致意义上的严重错误。文章从汉维否定句构成格式的异同分析入手,简单归纳、阐述了汉译维否定句的几种常用译法,以期抛砖引玉。

被引: 4 下载: 129 发表时间: 2004-06-30

### 汉维机器翻译中维语动词的处理方法

米尔夏提·力提甫; 米吉提·阿布力米提 新疆大学学报(自然科学版), 2004年01期, 期刊  
维吾尔语和汉语属于两种不同的语系.彼此间即有个性,也有共性.维吾尔语和汉语中词是由词根加词缀构成.尤其是约束形势,如:动词和名词后缀很发达,并在句子中扮演着非常重要的角色.这篇论文中,我们提出了汉维机器翻译中处理动词后缀的有效方法.如:人称动词后缀等.

被引: 4 下载: 62 发表时间: 2004-02-01

### 基于翻译记忆库与基于规则的汉维-维汉机器辅助翻译系统方法与框架研究

吐尔根·依布拉音; 艾尔肯·伊米尔; 阿布力米提·阿不都热依木 语言计算与基于内容的文本处理——全国第七届计算语言学联合学术会议论文集 中国会议

乌鲁木齐 830046 本文描述一种基于翻译记忆库和基于规则相结合的方法,对维汉-汉维辅助翻译系统翻译记忆库的框架的构建,维汉-汉维实例的对齐、组合、检索、译词选择、库的扩充,与基于规则翻译引擎的接口等问题作了探讨。提出了基...

被引: 1 下载: 48 发表时间: 2003-08-01

### 汉维比喻性词语的文化内涵及其翻译

史震天 语言与翻译, 2003年01期, 期刊

汉维语中都存在着大量的比喻性词语,由于各自社会文化背景的不同,在比喻的主体与客体之间进行选择也不尽相同。本文从汉维两种语言中比喻性词语的喻体与喻义词的对应关系入手,探讨了其内在的文化内涵并阐述了它们的翻译方法。

被引: 7 下载: 208 发表时间: 2003-03-30

### 汉维成语的翻译

阿布来提·阿布都艾尼; 布佐热·阿布都卡迪尔 和田师范专科学校学报, 2002年02期, 期刊  
本文对汉、维成语及其特点进行分析,从汉、维两个民族的生产方式、地理环境、生活习惯、宗教信仰等方面进行了简要对比。

下载: 1 发表时间: 2002-09-15

### 从异化、归化角度浅析汉维语词汇的文化差异及翻译

刘丽君 语言与翻译, 2002年02期, 期刊

本文从异化、归化角度出发,对汉维语词汇的文化差异及其翻译方法进行了探讨。

被引: 3 下载: 148 发表时间: 2002-06-30

### 汉维语多位数数词称说及其翻译

刘鸿君 语言与翻译, 2002年02期, 期刊

汉、维语具有不同的多位数数词称数方式。从对比的角度出发,本文用简明的语言对汉、维语中多位数数词的称说及其翻译进行了探讨,并归纳出了称说及翻译汉、维语多位数数词的简要方法。

被引: 1 下载: 99 发表时间: 2002-06-30

### 谈汉维翻译中的词义引申问题

艾山江·托乎提 和田师范专科学校学报, 2002年01期, 期刊

词义引申是准确表达原文和使译文符合表达习惯的必要手段和常用技巧。本文从词语的搭配能力、修辞色彩、汉维表达习惯三个方面探讨了汉维翻译中词义引申问题。

发表时间: 2002-03-15

### 汉维语动词“时”的对比与翻译

张宏胜 语言与翻译, 2001年02期, 期刊

本文通过对比和分析大量的语言材料,阐述了动词时态在汉语和维语中的不同表达方法。

被引: 1 下载: 113 发表时间: 2001-06-30

### 汉维语引用修辞格比较与翻译

阿孜古丽·沙来 语言与翻译, 1999年01期, 期刊

...点不大相同,再加上语体风格及文化背景等的差异,在局部问题上则需要加以变通。这样既能保持原文修辞特点,又能适应译文之宜。汉维语引用修辞格比较与翻译@阿孜古丽·沙来\$自治区畜牧科技资料编译室

被引: 2 下载: 74 发表时间: 1999-03-15

### 汉维文化差异与翻译——文化与翻译系列研究(二)

史振天 语言与翻译, 1998年03期, 期刊

汉维文化差异与翻译文化与翻译系列研究(二)@史振天\$新疆大学中语系王佐良;“翻译中的文化比较”,《翻译通讯》1984年第1期。柯平:“文化差异与语义的非对应”,《中国翻译》1988年第1期。屠国元:“翻译中的文化移植--...”

被引: 1 下载: 191 发表时间: 1998-08-15

### 关于高等职业教育汉维翻译专业汉语教学的几点思考

曹春梅 新疆职工大学学报, 1998年03期, 期刊

本文阐述了高职教学汉维翻译专业的具体特点,对高职翻译专业的汉语教学及其他方面提出了自己的看法。

下载: 27 发表时间: 1998-08-15

#### 从一些误译看汉维文化差异对翻译的影响

郭志刚 语言与翻译, 1997年02期, 期刊

翻译实践证明, 汉维文化差异直接影响和制约着汉维两种语言的翻译。美国著名翻译家尤金·奈达说得好“翻译的根本问题并不是语言的差异, 而是文化的差异。”译者要翻译出准确流畅的译文, 就要洞悉与区分本族文化与他族文化背...

被引: 2 下载: 128 发表时间: 1997-06-15

#### 汉维语机器翻译研究中的主要问题与发展

王世杰; 周殿生 语言与翻译, 1997年01期, 期刊

d) 批量机译实现: 在有限的范围内, 对一般文化生活的汉维语句子进行维汉里翻译, 最终生成汉维文对肽义件 (\*, hw 知和维义译文文件 (\*.w 伙: 种翻译结果。?) 适时翻译功能: 适时地用 D 译拆入的句子。o) 电子词典完成: 用户可随时对某一本内或同...

下载: 36 发表时间: 1997-03-15

#### “维汉--汉维”双向翻译电子词典的设计与实现

古丽松. 那斯尔丁; 涂序彦 1996年中国智能自动化学术会议论文集(下册) 中国会议进一步的研究工作是从维汉单词翻译逐步过渡到句子截译、直至篇章翻译, “维汉--汉维”双向翻译电子词典的设计与实现@古丽松.那斯尔丁\$新疆师范大学物理系! 乌鲁木齐, 830053@涂序彦\$北京科技大学计算机系! 北京 100083 根据维吾尔文是从右向左拼...

下载: 34 发表时间: 1996-08-01

#### 汉维翻译中的加注

梁伟 语言与翻译, 1994年01期, 期刊

汉维翻译中的加注梁伟翻译是运用一种语言把另一种语言所表达的内容重新表达出来的活动。由于使用不同语言的人们的思维规律存在着广泛的一致性, 使得翻译这种中介手段得以实现。但是由于文化传统和语言文字结构的差异, 译文有时无法传达原文所表达的信息, 这时加注作为一...

下载: 71 发表时间: 1994-03-15

#### 兼语句汉维翻译浅谈

李军 语言与翻译, 1993年04期, 期刊

<正> 兼语句是汉语特有的一种句法形式。它是汉语中的动宾结构同主谓结构局部叠合套用的产物。这种句式有以下几个特点: 1、动宾结构中的宾语兼任主谓结构中的主语。 2、

充任第一谓语的动词一般是使令动词及含有使令、支配、引导、促成等意义的及物动词或表示存现意义的特殊动词“有”。

被引：4 下载：88 发表时间：1993-12-31

### 汉维语多位数的对比和翻译

阿合买提·牙合亚 语言与翻译, 1993年02期, 期刊

<正> 书面语中用阿拉伯数字表示多位数,是所有民族语言的共同习惯,一般不需要翻译。但是,在不同的语言中,由于多位数的读法和写法不同,翻译时就需要对多位数的数字单位进行互相换算。汉语译成维语也会遇到这个问题。

下载：30 发表时间：1993-07-02

### 文化局限词语翻译途径初探——从汉维语对外来语词的引进说起(续)

马维汉 语言与翻译, 1992年02期, 期刊

<正> 文化局限词语的翻译途径在语际交际中,词语的民族文化内涵一般不存在对应关系,即译者民族的文化特色往往不能出现在译文之中,就是说,原语中词语的指称对象在译语中不存在、不常见或不被注意时才能引进。因此,文化局限词语的翻译途径可在文化对等原则和可接受性原则的指导下探讨。据此,我们依照汉维语词

下载：32 发表时间：1992-07-01

### 文化局限词语翻译途径初探——从汉维语对外来语词的引进说起

马维汉 语言与翻译, 1992年01期, 期刊

<正> 引言语言科学是人类文化研究的带头科学。近些年来,随着中华大地上文化热的兴起,如同在语言研究领域涌现出文化语言学派一样,在翻译领域也萌动着翻译研究的文化学派。文化翻译学派的开拓者们站在广阔的文化视野上思考翻译问题,认为语言是社会文化现象,翻译是一种处于语言世界和文化世界交界线上的活动,是不同民族沟通思想、

下载：37 发表时间：1992-04-01

### 汉维语使动语态的翻译对比

马维汉 语言与翻译, 1990年01期, 期刊

<正> 语言中的动词,据其同主语和宾语的语义关系,通常分为主动态、被动态、使动态。主动态表示动作行为由主语发出,被动态表示动作行为由主语承受,使动态表示动作行为是主语支配或影响宾语发出的。汉维语的动词都有上述三种语态。本文用翻译语言学的方法,对其常见表现形式加以简要对比,目的是探讨对译技巧,并求教于读者和专家。文中例证,汉语的多取自汉语著述家的著述,维语的多取自维语著述家的著述,为节约文字,有的没有注明。

被引：1 下载：66 发表时间：1990-04-02

### 谈谈汉维翻译中的补语问题

唐淑娟 语言与翻译, 1986年04期, 期刊

<正> 汉语的补语是动词或形容词后面的补充说明成分,补充说明动作行为的结果、程度、趋向、数量、时间、处所或性状的程度等。动词、形容词、数量词、介词结构和 谓语性词组,可以充当补语。谓语和补语之间有时可以加助词“得”,按补语的意义可分为五种类型。即:一、结果补语 二、程度补语 三、趋向补语 四、数量补语 五、时间、处所补语 维语的句子成分里没有补语之说。现就下列各种例句,谈谈补语在维语中的翻译方法:

被引: 1 下载: 72 发表时间: 1986-12-31

### 试谈汉维语中一些连词的翻译

郭志刚 语言与翻译, 1985年02期, 期刊

<正> 在汉维两种语言中,连词的定义是一样的,都用来连接词、词组或者句子。然而,这两种语言之间连词的语法意义和用法不同,各种连词之间的用法也有差异。译者 只有了解这些不同的特点,找出规律性的东西,才能翻译得恰当。本文主要就汉语中“和、同、跟、与、及、以及、并、并且”,

下载: 64 发表时间: 1985-07-02

### 汉维成语词典中的翻译问题

傅庭训 辞书研究, 1983年06期, 期刊

<正> 1979年民族出版社出版小型《汉维成语词典》之后,要求编译出版一部收较多成语、附有较多例句和典故、更为实用的中型汉维成语词典的呼声很高。为了尽快编译出版一部这样的词典,我们需要探讨一些与此有关的问题,特别是汉语成语的维语翻译问题。

下载: 68 发表时间: 1983-12-27

## APPENDIX E

## “维汉 AND 翻译” / 篇名 in CNKI

新疆高校维汉翻译理论与实践专业口译课程调查与分析

胡文佳; 安德源 民族翻译, 2012 年 03 期, 期刊

本文对维汉翻译理论与实践专业的口译课程开设情况进行了调查。调查结果显示:维汉翻译理论与实践专业的口译课程教学时数偏少,没能在有限的课堂训练中有效提高学生口译能力;传统的班级授课制,无法全面调动学生学习积极性。本文针对上述问题提出了一些对策建议,祈望对维汉翻译教学有所裨益。

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基于 WCF 的维汉词典及机器翻译系统的设计与实现

赛依旦·阿不力米提 新疆大学, 硕士

维吾尔语-汉语(以下简称维汉)词典及机器翻译系统是自然语言处理的重要组成部分,经过多年的研究,维汉词典及机器翻译系统日趋成熟和完善。现有的维汉词典及机器翻译系统使用面向对象或面向组件的方法。开发人员用这种开发方式解决了以前存在的一些问题,但是,现在的信息技术发展的较快,用那些面向对象或面向组件开发的系统不能满足信息化管理的要求。1995 年前后的 Web 网站模型(将应用托管到 Web 服务器上,用户界面通过 HTML 分发到浏览器)无疑还会继续存在下去,然而组合本地软件和 WCF 服务的

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基于实例的汉维—维汉双向机器翻译系统的研究

卡哈尔江·阿比的热西提 上海交通大学, 硕士

机器翻译(Machine Translation)是指用计算机自动地将一种人类语言转换成另一种人类语言,例如将维吾尔语译成汉语或者将汉语译成维吾尔语。在不同策略的翻译方法中,基于实例的机器翻译方法避免了复杂的深层次的语法和语义分析,具有译文精确、翻译速度快、获取翻译知识简单的优点。本文首先回顾了机器翻译发展史、简单地介绍了各种机器翻译方法和机器翻译现状。描述了基于实例的机器翻译方法的原理、系统结构、相关问题以及该方法的优点。在着重描述黏着型语言信息处理以及机器翻译研究现状

下载: 28 发表时间: 2012-05-01

### 基于短语的数字、时间维汉翻译规则建设

努尔比亚·吐拉甫; 于洪志 生物技术世界, 2012年02期, 期刊

基于规则的方法识别维吾尔文本中的数字、日期、时间等(也称命名实体)短语表达式,将识别之后的维文短语表达式翻译成对应的汉语。本文将研究命名实体的翻译规则并建立规则库,为笔者之后的维汉在线翻译做铺垫。

下载: 28 发表时间: 2012-02-15

### 汉维/维汉统计机器翻译中若干问题研究

徐春; 杨勇; 董兴华 计算机工程与应用, 2011年35期, 期刊

针对汉语和维吾尔语形态差别较大的特点,借助开源的 Moses 工具箱,通过各种翻译模型的对比及相关实验结果的分析,深入探讨了对汉维/维汉翻译有影响的各种因素,包括词对齐问题,汉维翻译中主语、谓语中心词、时态等的一致性,维汉翻译中 OOV 的问题,汉维句法结构差异问题。最后给出了提高汉维/维汉统计翻译性能的一些建议。

下载: 71 发表时间: 2011-12-11

### 联合式多引擎维汉机器翻译系统

宿建军; 张小燕; 吐尔洪·吾司曼; 李晓 计算机工程, 2011年16期, 期刊

根据维吾尔语形态变化丰富的特殊性,搭建一个基于 Factored 的维汉机器翻译系统,将 Factored 系统和基于层次短语的 Joshua 翻译系统以及 Moses 中基于句法的翻译模型进行系统融合,构建混淆网络。提出一种词级和句子级联合融合的维汉机器翻译方法,利用一致性网络进行词级融合,并采用最小贝叶斯算法进行句子级融合。实验结果表明,联合式多引擎方法能提高 1.72% 个 BLUE-SBP 值。

下载: 48 发表时间: 2011-08-20

### 维汉在线翻译网站语音语料库的运用

努尔比亚·吐拉甫 华章, 2011年18期, 期刊

维汉电子词典早已在市场上普及,甚至是维汉英词典也广为用户使用当中,而在线维汉翻译的网站却寥寥无几,即便是在线翻译,可是没有引入词汇的发音功能,即语音识别。笔者在该文章中简单做些自己的网站设计看法。下载: 37 发表时间: 2011-06-30

### 新疆高校维汉翻译理论与实践专业口译课程调查研究

胡文佳 新疆师范大学, 硕士

新疆丰富的语言文化资源、多民族构成的特点决定新疆迫切需要高水平的翻译人才,大力培养高层次的维汉口译专门人才是构建新疆和谐社会、促进民族间交流的必然要求。维汉翻译理论与实践专业的开设将满足该层次人才的需求。探讨维汉口译课程设置的相关问题,既可以丰富口译研究理论,促进口译人才的规范化、专业化培养,提高学生的口译能力与

水平,又可为国家培养出符合实际需要的、既有丰富理论知识、又有高超口译技能的口译人才,满足新疆社会需求,更好地服务社会。口译课作为翻译理论与实践专业的核心课程一直以,下载: 47 发表时间: 2011-06-11

### 谈维汉翻译过程中“我们”的相关问题

马鹏飞 新疆师范大学, 硕士

交际活动是双向的心理活动,所以在交际活动中,交际双方的心理就是决定交际效果不可忽视的重要因素。人称指示语在日常交际活动中发挥着重要的作用。在维吾尔语和汉语中第一人称复数看似简单,但它却是交际与交流的起点,表示着人与人之间的关系,反映着说话人的思想感情,文化修养。第一人称复数的用法非常灵活。随着语言的发展,人们赋予复数第一人称代词的内涵意义也在不断扩大,有时会出现一些从语义上看似乎是异常的现象。要对其进行贴切地使用和准确地翻译,就必须从维汉双语具体的语境出发,对其指称范围,下载: 27 发表时间: 2011-06-11

### 文化语境与维汉翻译

阿迪来·艾山 喀什师范学院, 硕士

语言与文化密不可分,语言是文化的载体,文化是语言赖以生存和发展的土壤。作为跨语言交流的翻译过程不可避免地会受到文化因素的影响。翻译的根本问题不是语言的差异,而是文化的差异。翻译不仅要跨过语言的障碍,还要逾越文化的鸿沟。因此语言的翻译也就是文化的翻译。翻译活动的实质是语言之间意义的转换,包括理解和表达两个阶段。在翻译过程中,不管是理解阶段还是表达阶段,语言意义的确立都必须依靠语境,孤零零的一个词如果没有上下文,人们往往难以确定其意义。过去人们较多注意语言本身的问题,而现在人下载: 210 发表时间: 2011-06-06

### 基于短语的汉维/维汉统计机器翻译

董兴华; 周俊林; 郭树盛; 吐尔洪·吾司曼 计算机工程, 2011年09期, 期刊

利用电话录音的汉维平行语料库和开源的 Moses 系统构建一个基于短语的统计机器翻译系统。针对汉维平行语料库规模较小和维吾尔语形态变化比较丰富的特点,通过对词级的语料库进行切分得到词素级的语料库,并分别进行词一级的实验和词素级的实验。实验表明,词素级的实验能降低无法识别的词的的概率,提高翻译的质量。

被引: 4 下载: 109 发表时间: 2011-05-05

### 维汉文学翻译 60 年成就、特点与展望

伊明·阿布拉 民族翻译, 2010 年 02 期, 期刊

新中国成立 60 年来,维吾尔文学母语创作取得了很大成就,维吾尔文学翻译也得到了长足的发展。单就维吾尔文学汉译来说,虽然从规模和数量来看,比母语文学创作、中外文学作品维吾尔文翻译的成就稍逊一筹,但维吾尔文学中各个时期最具代表性的不同体裁和题材优秀作品基本都译介给了广大汉族读者,能够代表维吾尔族最高水平的作家也在中国当代文坛占据了一席之地。本文从历史的角度对我国“维译汉”文学翻译活动进行了初步梳理,肯定成就,分析特点,对未来发展趋势作出展望。

下载: 33 发表时间: 2010-06-30

### 基于短语的汉维(维汉)统计机器翻译研究

董兴华;周俊林;郭树盛;吐尔洪·吾司曼 少数民族青年自然语言处理技术与进展——第三届全国少数民族青年自然语言信息处理、第二届全国多语言知识库建设联合学术研讨会论文集 中国会议

为了对翻译中无法识别的词做评测,我们定义 OOV 率如下:没有翻译的词数 oov 率二测试语料库中总的词数在基线实验和最好的词素级翻译试验中,维汉翻译中测得的相关数据如下:表 8OOV 率对比总词(索)数没有翻译的词(素)数 oov 率茎线实...

下载: 31 发表时间: 2010-06-27

### 论翻译中维汉熟语形象的灵活处理

王瑞虹 和田师范专科学校学报, 2009 年 03 期, 期刊

维汉熟语中大都具有鲜明生动的形象,因而对形象的理解和处理是熟语翻译成功与否的关键。本文通过探讨维汉熟语翻译中形象处理的方法和技巧,指出翻译中译者应根据具体语境,灵活地选用不同的方法,力求做到形意兼备,使译语达到与原语相同或相近的表达效果。

被引: 1 下载: 70 发表时间: 2009-03-15

### 维汉拟声词的比较与翻译

杜银萍 民族翻译, 2009 年 01 期, 期刊

本文运用语言学的知识,从三个方面对维汉语拟声词进行了对比:拟声词的分类,拟声词的丰富程度及拟声词的语法特点。同时本文也对维吾尔语拟声词的汉译方法进行了探讨,主要分为:直译法、意译法、加词法、转换法和引申法。

下载: 34 发表时间: 2009-02-15

### 维汉机器翻译中维吾尔语动词语法属性描写

阿孜古丽·夏力甫 中央民族大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2008年04期, 期刊

源语言维吾尔语词语的语法属性描写是维汉机器翻译系统设置的必经之路,其中动词的语法属性描写更为重要。维吾尔语是以动词为特点的语言,动词有复杂的语法范畴。本文在动词的语法属性字段设置方面提出了初步的设想,并把动词的语法属性分为9个大类48个小类。被引: 1 下载: 121 发表时间: 2008-07-15

### 论翻译中维汉熟语形象的灵活处理

王瑞虹 和田师范专科学校学报, 2008年02期, 期刊

维汉熟语中大都具有鲜明生动的形象,因而对形象的理解和处理是熟语翻译成功与否的关键。本文通过探讨维汉熟语翻译中形象处理的方法和技巧,指出翻译中译者应根据具体语境,灵活地选用不同的方法,力求做到形意兼备,使译语达到与原语相同或相近的表达效果。被引: 4 下载: 67 发表时间: 2008-03-15

### 维汉机器翻译用电子词典的设计

阿里甫·库尔班; 阿布力米提·阿不都热依木; 吐尔根·依布拉音 计算机工程与应用, 2006年20期, 期刊

电子词典是在机器翻译系统中包含的信息量最大的一个部件,电子词典包的质量和容量直接限定机器翻译的质量和范围。与一般的电子词典不同,机器翻译词典每个词条都要比一般的电子词典增加词类信息、语义类别信息和成语等。文章以频率统计和频率分布统计作为维汉机器翻译词典的词条收录原则,统计维吾尔文中常用的单词数目,论述维汉机器翻译词典的设计思想,用BNF形式语言和Jackson图描述维汉机器翻译词典应包含的词条信息,最后介绍词典的具体构造方法、词条排序原则、索引表和属性库的数据结构和词被引: 3 下载: 133 发表时间: 2006-07-11

### 维汉机器翻译词典的结构设计与实现(英文)

吐尔根·依布拉音; 阿不里米提·阿不都热依木 新疆大学学报(自然科学版), 2005年03期, 期刊

机器翻译词典的设计是机器翻译系统关键之一,机器翻译词典的质量和范围直接限定机器翻译系统的应用领域和覆盖范围。本文介绍机器翻译词典词条收集方法且讨论维汉机器翻译词典的设计原则、构造方法及其数据结构。

被引: 4 下载: 87 发表时间: 2005-08-01

### 基于翻译记忆库与基于规则的汉维-维汉机器辅助翻译系统方法与框架研究

吐尔根·依布拉音; 艾尔肯·伊米尔; 阿布力米提·阿不都热依木 语言计算与基于内容的文本处理——全国第七届计算语言学联合学术会议论文集 中国会议

乌鲁木齐 830046 本文描述一种基于翻译记忆库和基于规则相结合的方法,对维汉-汉维辅助翻译系统翻译记忆库的框架的构建,维汉-汉维实例的对齐、组合、检索、译词选择、库的扩充,与基于规则翻译引擎的接口等问题作了探讨。提出了基...

被引: 1 下载: 48 发表时间: 2003-08-01

#### 基于知识库系统的维汉、维外多文种双向翻译词典研究

古丽松·那斯尔丁 1998 年中国智能自动化学术会议论文集(下册) 中国会议

三、基于知识库系统的多文种双向翻译词典系统的设计维汉、维英、维日、维俄等多文种双向翻译词典系统的设计,是以机器翻译理论为指导思想,公用一个操作平台,同一个主控模块,即维汉、维英、维日、维俄等多文种双向翻译词典系统...

下载: 18 发表时间: 1998-05-01

#### 维汉机器翻译系统电子词典的研究与设计

古丽松·那斯尔丁;买买提·赛福丁 新疆师范大学学报(自然科学版), 1997 年 01 期, 期刊  
根据维、汉文不同的语言特点,在维汉机器翻译系统研究的基础上,提出了该系统不可缺少的子系统——“维汉机器翻译电子词典”的研究与设计方案.

被引: 2 下载: 79 发表时间: 1997-02-15

#### 维汉计算机辅助翻译工具

古丽松·那斯尔丁 微计算机信息, 1996 年 05 期, 期刊

根据维吾尔文是自右向左拼读和书写,而其注音字符和汉文、西文的书写方向相同(自左向右)的特点,提出并编程实现了维文两种字符间的智能转换及维汉单词快速互译。为了提高词典系统的查找效率,采用了联想检索方法。

被引: 2 下载: 77 发表时间: 1996-10-30

#### “维汉--汉维”双向翻译电子词典的设计与实现

古丽松·那斯尔丁;涂序彦 1996 年中国智能自动化学术会议论文集(下册) 中国会议  
进一步的研究工作是从维汉单词翻译逐步过渡到句子截译、直至篇章翻译,“维汉--汉维”双向翻译电子词典的设计与实现@古丽松·那斯尔丁\$新疆师范大学物理系!乌鲁木齐, 830053@涂序彦\$北京科技大学计算机系!北京 100083 根据维吾尔文是从右...

下载: 34 发表时间: 1996-08-01

## APPENDIX F

## Tong's Table (2005, 15)

新疆改革开放以来汉维翻译研究回顾与展望

表三 新疆 1978 年—2003 年翻译论文分类统计<sup>①</sup>

项目 \ 年份	1978-1990	1991-2003	1978-2003
文学翻译	21	27	48
翻译标准与方法	14	35	49
文化与翻译	3	13	16
微观翻译	43	63	106
社科翻译	8	11	19
翻译史	1	5	6
口译	2	3	5
翻译评介	10	13	23
语言与翻译	3	1	4

从以上统计项目来看,改革开放前一时期与后一时期相比较,后一时期所发表的文章数量明显增长较快。除语言与翻译此项无增长,其余各项均有增长。其中翻译标准与方法和文化与翻译这两项增长最快。文化与翻译研究这一项比前一时期几乎增长了四倍,可见译界对于文化与翻译的关系非常关注,研究已向多学科延展。翻译标准与方法研究数量的增长得益于翻译实践的大量展开,译者们始终为探索最适宜的翻译方法而辛勤耕耘。在这九项条目中,数量最多,而且也呈递长趋势的是微观翻译的研究,这也恰恰是本地区乃至中国翻译界的一个特点或者也可以在某种程度上说是一个不足,即重微观而轻宏观。但总体而言,翻译研究是稳步前进,不断发展的。

在以上各个项目中,翻译标准与方法,文化与翻译,微观翻译,语言与翻译这几项具有理论意义,可纳入翻译理论研究范畴。而且也可以把这几项通称为翻译通论<sup>②</sup>(翻译史料和史论,以史料为多;口译则以总结实践经验为主,所以,这两项暂不计入理论文章的篇数)。现将两个时期的各项文章相加,可以看出前后两个时期理论文章在各时期翻译研究文章数中所占的比重。

<sup>①</sup> 统计数字来源于《语言与翻译》(汉),《新疆大学学报》,《新疆师范大学学报》,《喀什师范学院学报》,《西北民族学院学报》等,可参见附录所列文章

<sup>②</sup> 参见方梦之,《20世纪下半叶我国翻译研究量化分析》,外语研究,2003年第3期,第51页