

COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE IN ONTARIO AND QUEBEC
1968-1973: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS



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Responsibility for all errors in fact and interpretation rests with me.

INTRODUCTION

It is the intention of this study to analyse collective violence in Ontario and Quebec during the period 1968-1973. The purpose of this analysis will be to determine the differences in the nature of this phenomenon in the two provinces, and to identify some of the factors which may account for these differences. It is also hoped that this study may contribute to a better understanding of the pre-conditions and functions of collective violence in this country.

Civil violence has been neglected for some time in Canada as a field worthy of social science research. Canadian scholars and political leaders have demonstrated a propensity to pass off civil unrest, in true tory and whig fashion, as untypical of Canadian history, and thus unnecessary of serious study. This attitude may partially account for the tendency in both political and scholarly circles to view the events of the past decade as an unexpected; and in many ways inexplicable phenomenon which somehow suddenly appeared full blown and in a very threatening form. The unrest of this period was of such magnitude and duration however, that one could not easily ignore the questions it raised. Nevertheless it was only quite recently that studies on civil strife in Canada began to

appear. These studies have without exception concentrated only on the manifestation of this phenomenon in Quebec. Moreover a large number of such studies have been restricted specifically to the analysis of terrorism which occurred in this province.¹ Furthermore those studies which have dealt with the more general forms of civil strife (i.e. demonstrations and strikes) have usually attempted to superimpose popular theoretical models onto this phenomenon without doing the necessary empirical groundwork (i.e. systematic data collection).² A few others have proven to be curious mixtures of pseudo-empiricism and ideological rhetoric.³ As of this moment there has been no attempt to construct a general framework for the systematic analysis of collective violence in this country. Hopefully this thesis will in part serve such a function. While one should remain cognizant of the fact that what is proposed here is a limited comparative analysis which restricts the general application of the findings, it should be further realized that such comparative studies are a necessary first step in the construction of a conceptual framework. Although it

¹See Gustave Morf, Le Terrorisme Québécois (Montréal: Les Editions de l'Homme, 1970); and James Stewart, The F.L.Q.; Seven Years of Terror (Montreal: Simon and Schuster of Canada, 1970).

²A good example of a theoretical study which lacks the essential empirical groundwork is Daniel Latouche's "Violence politique et crise dans la société Québécois" in La Pierre et. al. Essays on the Left (Montreal: McClelland and Stewart, 1971), pp. 175-79.

³See Marc Laurendeau, Les Québécois Violents (Montréal: Les Editions du Boréal Express, 1974).

may also seem a bit unusual that a comparative study is done on a regional basis within a country, rather than between countries, the federal system in Canada and the resultant level of provincial autonomy in both economic and political matters, along with the uniquely different values and political cultures of the two provinces in question, provide a very sound and interesting basis for comparison.

This thesis will examine collective violence in these two provinces systematically and statistically in the hope of constructing a partial framework with which to organize perceptions about the different motives and attitudes involved, the conducive social conditions, and the sectors of the society in which the phenomenon occurred, i.e. industrial or political. The presentation will be divided into three parts. The first chapter will comprise a detailed explanation of the methodology used in collecting and processing the data, along with a list of the variables which were employed. The second chapter will contain an attempt to identify some of the preconditions associated with the outbreak of violence, and some of the environmental factors which influence its nature. The specific intention of this chapter will be the development of a testable hypothesis synthesizing these preconditions and environmental factors. The final chapter will encompass the presentation and analysis of the data as a test of this hypothesis.

CHAPTER I

This first chapter will disclose the methodology which this study has employed in its analysis of collective violence in Ontario and Quebec. The first part of this chapter will be devoted to an examination of the operational definition of collective violence which has been used as a basis for the data collection, and a discussion of the data source and data collection techniques. The remainder of this chapter will contain a presentation of the variables which have been used in this analysis.

For the purpose of this study collective violence has been defined as an incident involving fifty or more participants resulting in physical injury or property damage.¹

The specification of fifty participants as the minimum requirement for the act to be considered collective

¹One might add the further qualification that these incidents must occur within the boundaries of an autonomous political system. This would exclude such events as raiding across international boundaries, and attacks mounted abroad by dissident exiles. See Ted Robert Gurr "A Comparative Analysis of Civil Strife," in Graham and Gurr eds., Violence in America (New York: The New American Library, 1969), p. 545, and Michael Stohl "War and Domestic Political Violence: The Case of the United States 1890-1970," paper presented to the International Studies Association annual meeting, St. Louis Mo., March 1974, p.8.

is to a large extent arbitrary.² It was selected to allow for a maximum number of observations while at the same time excluding most purely criminal acts such as juvenile delinquency.

Defining violence in terms of injuries and property damage is likely to engender a rather lengthy semantic dispute. The word violence has often been used to denote more than physical harm (e.g. psychological violence has often been associated with various forms of terrorism).³ However an attempt to incorporate non-physical factors into the concept of violence used in this study would confront a number of obstacles. First of all the psychometric problems involved in trying to include psychological injuries in this definition would be overwhelming.⁴ Moreover to the

²The term collective poses an obvious definitional problem. The methodological question would seem to be how many members must comprise a group in order to make its actions, in this instance violence, of social import. There is no universally accepted definition among researchers. Previous studies have used minimums ranging from twenty participants to one hundred or more. See Gurr, op. cit., p. 548; Stohl, op. cit.: and Yoshio Sugimoto, "Surplus Value, Unemployment, and Industrial Turbulence, A Statistical Application of the Marxian Model to Post War Japan." The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. XIX, No. 1, March 1975, p. 28. It would seem that any specification which is defensible is acceptable as they are all quite arbitrary.

³Johan Galtung, for example, has proposed the word violence be used to mean that human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations. Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research," Journal of Peace Research, No. 3, 1969, pp. 167-92.

⁴Psychological injuries can only be measured by excessively costly and time-consuming survey research. Furthermore it would be difficult to define the exact source or cause of these injuries on a general level without becoming

extent that such an endeavor requires psycho-social analysis; concentrating on subjective attitudes, it becomes difficult to embrace such a dimension into a study of this type. In an empirical study, if a concept is to remain operational it must be defined in terms of an unambiguous class of observable indicators.

Another possible source of contention is the inability of the term collective violence, as defined here (i.e. fifty participants or more), to encompass the terrorism which occurred in Quebec. This exclusion is due to the nature of the various terrorist groups which existed in Quebec, specifically the F.L.Q. The F.L.Q. was never, as some journalists and police officials contended, a mafia-type conspirational organization with a vast network of agents. Nor did it ever consist of 3,500 heavily armed terrorists, as government officials were to claim during the October crisis in 1970.⁵ Possibly the most striking characteristic of the F.L.Q.,

involved in an unending dialectical dispute, i.e. the value judgements inherent in trying to define social repression or injustice. The resultant measurements would thus be highly unreliable.

⁵According to Robert Chodos, and Nick Auf Der Maur, the Quebec City paper, Le Soleil, spoke to sources high in the provincial government, in the military, and in three police forces, prior to the enforcement of the War Measures Act. These all proclaimed that there were at least 3,500 terrorists armed to the teeth with automatic weapons, and 10,000 sticks of dynamite, who were getting ready to fight. Jean Marchand before the House of Commons reduced this estimate to 3,000. Two thousand, plus, police raids later, the police could only come up with 400 captives, fewer than 100 of which were charged, many on petty offences. See Robert Chodos and Nick Auf Der Maur, Quebec, A Chronicle 1968-1972 (Toronto: James Lewis and Samuels, 1972), p. 54.

especially in view of the inability of the police to infiltrate or break it, was its very lack of organization. After myth is separated from reality, the F.L.Q. of the 1960's emerges as a very loosely knit organization of cells containing 3-6 people who seemed to have very little organized contact between them.⁶ Neither did there seem to be any recognized hierarchy of leadership.⁷ A retrospective look at the F.L.Q. would appear to bear out James Stewart's contention that its membership shared not a conspirational plan of action, but a general attitude, a community of instincts.⁸ The Cross-LaPorte kidnappings of October 1970 can be cited as one example of such a community of instincts. British Counsel James Cross was kidnapped on October 5th, 1970 by a group which designated itself the "Liberation Cell" of the F.L.Q. At the time of this kidnapping those who were later to abduct Quebec Labour Minister Pierre LaPorte were traveling through Texas. The first news that they heard of Cross' abduction was a radio broadcast after which they drove continuously to get back to Quebec. Acting on their own initiative they kidnapped LaPorte on October 10th, 1970.

⁶Morf, op. cit., p. 5.

⁷According to James Stewart, one of those arrested during the La Grenade Operation (Serge Demers) described himself as a member of the group of seven on the F.L.Q.'s Central Committee. Stewart, op. cit., p. 33. The existence of such a committee, however, seems never to have been verified. Moreover it is open to serious question whether such ever existed due to the fact that the F.L.Q.'s "7ième Réseau" of which Demers was a member contained only 12 others. See Laurendeau, op. cit., p. 223.

⁸Stewart, op. cit., p. 6.

The first communication between the "Liberation Cell" and the "Chernier Cell," as those who took LaPorte were to identify themselves, took place on October 14th, 1970, four days after the second abduction. This would hardly seem to indicate that the events were part of a well co-ordinated conspiracy.

A further problem which would have to be confronted in trying to include F.L.Q. terrorism in this analysis is the questionable reliability of the data sources on this subject. One cannot be assured, as were a number of newspapers, in attributing nearly every bombing which occurred in Quebec in the last decade to the F.L.Q. Many of these allegations were, and remain completely unsubstantiated. In general this would make a valid systematic analysis of this phenomenon quite difficult.

The above discussion should not be construed as a judgement of the significance of this terrorism in Quebec. Nor does this study undervalue the role of the F.L.Q. in furthering the climate of general unrest which existed in the province during this period. It is rather an observation as to the amenability of the terrorism of the late sixties in Quebec to systematic analysis as collective violence.

The basic source of events data for the majority of collective violence studies has been the press. It has been suggested that newspapers provide the fullest enumeration

of such incidents.⁹ This study has also depended on newspapers for the greater part of its data, supplementing them in some instances by specific documentary accounts of individual events to fill in some gaps in the data.¹⁰ These instances were however quite rare.

Two newspapers, one from each province, were initially selected as a base for this research. The two dailies that were chosen after a careful examination of the major alternatives were The Globe and Mail (Toronto), and La Presse (Montreal). Both of these seem to give the most comprehensive coverage of their respective regions. During the 1971 strike when La Presse was sometimes unavailable the Montreal Star was substituted, again after a consideration of the alternatives. This analysis was thus essentially a study of collective violence as reported by these three newspapers.

There are some very definite problems inherent in using newspapers in this type of research. Most papers have a very pronounced metropolitan bias, with the result that the coverage of news events in outlying regions may have been less detailed than coverage of Montreal and Toronto. The use of newspapers from all provincial urban centres however would have proven impossible. In some cases where events outside of these metropolitan regions were mentioned,

⁹Charles Tilly, "Collective Violence in European Perspective," Graham and Gurr eds., op. cit., p. 42.

¹⁰The principal supplementary source of information was Chodos and Auf Der Maur, op. cit.

but not adequately described for the purpose of this study, the local press was referred to for fuller coverage. It was impossible, however, for this to be done systematically. It is thus quite probable that a number of events have been overlooked. This study however, makes no claims to be a scientific sample.¹¹

Not being as fortunate as American researchers in having an index such as the one provided by the New York Times, it was necessary to accumulate the data by examining each edition of both newspapers for the period 1968-1973. In order to systematize the data collection the specifics of each incident were recorded on predesigned coding sheets (See Appendix I). For each reported event or group of related events, the recorded information included the date, location, the kinds of socio-economic groups involved, the type of groups involved in the mobilization, the approximate number of insurgents and coercive forces, the motives and objectives of the insurgents, the precipitating incident, whom or what was attacked, the duration of the violence and the cost of the action in terms of property damage, casualties, and arrests.¹²

¹¹Without government and police cooperation it was virtually impossible to compile a comprehensive list of incidents.

¹²Data for some of these were sometimes unavailable in these sources. For some factors like targets, professional and socio-economic status, objectives, and property damage estimates were made on the basis of indirect evidence or otherwise coded N.D. Moreover a good deal of the estimated and reported data were inaccurate in varying degrees. These errors did not appear significant enough however to alter the analysis.

Some 160 incidents (84 Ontario and 76 Quebec) were identified, recorded and coded for keypunching. All tabulations were done with the S.P.S.S. programme.

The Variables

Prior to the commencement of this research, a list of what were considered to be relevant variables for such an analysis was constructed. These variables were not selected with any particular theory in mind. On the contrary, it was decided to develop as many variables as possible to preclude this study from being locked into any specific theory. The list of variables used in this analysis was comprised of the following 17 indicators (described in the succeeding pages), Election Dates, Unemployment Levels by Province, Real Wage Levels by Province, Event Date, Precipitant, Objectives, General Cause, the Number of Insurgents, the Number of Coercive Forces, the Professional and Socio-economic Status of the Insurgents, Targets, Type of Violence, Arrests, the Number of Insurgent Casualties, the Number of Coercive Casualties, and Property Damage.¹³

¹³This list originally included two other indicators which were eliminated after a review of the data showed them to be irrelevant. The two variables were Duration and Location. In the case of Duration, the majority of the violence in both provinces lasted less than one half day (96% of the incidents in Ontario and 85% in Quebec). Moreover the total duration of violence was almost equal for both provinces (44½ days for Ontario, 45 days for Quebec) making this indicator useless in a comparative sense. The same was the case with the variable Location. In both Ontario and Quebec the majority (57% in each province) of the violence occurred in the major metropolitan region i.e., Montreal and Toronto. Otherwise there was no major geographical pattern to the violence in either province.

The first indicator, Election Dates, has been employed as a means of determining if there was any relationship between collective violence and the political process. One could assume, with good historical foundation, that the period around election time, because of a heightened state of political motivation and mobilization, might witness a higher frequency or intensity of violence by groups who wished either, in some way to influence the outcome of the election, articulate grievances which had previously been ignored due to the groups' lack of political resources, or express dissatisfaction with the results of the election.¹⁴

In order to be considered as election related violence, it was deemed that the incident must have occurred within a time period spanning one month previous to, and one month subsequent to, an election.¹⁵ Further speculation about the relationship of the event to the election was based on the character of the specific incident.

¹⁴For an interesting discussion of this aspect of Canadian Politics, see William Perkins Bull, From the Boyne to Brampton (Toronto: George McLeod Ltd., 1936); Orlo Miller, The Donnelly's must Die (Toronto: MacMillan, 1972); and Brian J. Young, "The Defeat of George Etienne Cartier in Montreal East in 1872," Canadian Historical Review, Vol. LI, December, 1970, pp. 386-406.

¹⁵Two Federal elections (June 1968, and October 1972) and three Provincial elections (Quebec, April 1970 and October 1973, and Ontario, November 1971) were used. Incidents in each province were viewed in regard to the Federal election and the respective Provincial election. The time period was chosen because it was felt that the month before the election would be the period of most intense political activity and that the month after would witness most of the response of those dissatisfied with the results.

Survey research has suggested that welfare variables, i.e. hopes and fears about standards of living, are by far the most salient consideration among citizens in general.¹⁶ Based on this suggestion it would seem quite natural to associate social discontent with the quality of economic conditions.¹⁷ Thus the second and third variables Unemployment Levels by Province, and Real Wage Levels by Province have been constructed as indices of economic conditions which have been frequently associated with discontent and ensuing collective violence.

One of the principal threats to economic well being is undoubtedly unemployment. The first economic indicator Unemployment Levels by Province was constructed to reflect the level of this threat in the two provinces.¹⁸ The index

¹⁶Hardley Cantril, The Pattern of Human Concerns (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1965), pp. 276-79.

¹⁷The salience of a class of values for a society, is the average strength of the commitment to a desired value position. Economic variables are more salient for most people than other values partly because some minimal level of economic goods is necessary for continued physical existence. Men also tend to be more sensitive to small changes in economic value positions than to changes on other values because the degree to which they are attained in monetary societies is easily expressed in quantitative terms. Individuals tend to think of their economic well being in terms of monthly incomes of x dollars. Such a calculation is seldom available for their social status, their security or their political participation. See Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 131.

¹⁸This data was extracted from the volume Historical Labour Force Statistics, Actual Data, Seasonal Factors, Seasonally Adjusted Data. Catalogue 71-201, Statistics Canada.

of unemployment levels was developed by aggregating monthly unemployment rates (seasonally unadjusted) into yearly averages for the period 1963-1973.¹⁹

The second indicator of economic performance consisted of a real wage index. This index was constructed by taking the provincial average weekly wage for the years 1963-1973 and calculating their real value in terms of purchasing power. The calculation was done with the use of the consumer price index.²⁰ A real wage measurement was arrived at by reducing actual average wages by the percentage rise in consumer price levels, or increasing them by the amount that price levels fell. Wages thus adjusted may be used to indicate the comparative purchasing power of average earnings if consumption patterns had remained the same.²¹ These figures were then developed into an average monthly index of real wages for the eleven-year period. A further attempt was subsequently made to relate actual economic conditions and consumer patterns through the

¹⁹An 11 year period 1963-1973 was employed in the construction of both indicators to allow for a better perspective in ascertaining the effects of changes in these economic indices..

²⁰The consumer price index, and all wage and salary data, were provided courtesy of Statistics Canada.

²¹This index of average weekly wages in current dollar terms was constructed using the base average 1961=100. The real weekly wages in current dollar terms were determined by dividing the average weekly wage by the consumer price index for Canada for the month following the month to which the wages relate and multiplying the result by 100. A monthly index was obtained by multiplying by 4.

construction of a yearly index which registered the percentage change in earnings over the previous year. This was done by calculating the percentage change (increase or decrease) in real wages in relation to the same month a year earlier.²² These percentages were then averaged to make yearly totals giving an indication of how much wages had increased or decreased over the previous year.

Together the indicators Unemployment Levels and Real Wage Levels are a good reflection of general economic conditions and trends in the two provinces. When these indices are further combined with the fourth variable Date of the Violent Incident, a composite index can be constructed which shows yearly economic conditions and corresponding levels of violence.²³

The fifth variable, Precipitant, seeks in general to

²²This was founded upon the assumption that the average person perceives his economic status by doing a comparison of his situation vis à vis the preceding year. This is probably because most budgets revolve around a yearly cycle. Most major fixed payments and revenues for a family are pegged on yearly factors such as mortgage rates, short term loans, tax returns, wage contracts, salary scales, etc. The individual thus tends to perceive his real wage on a yearly basis.

²³Date of the violent incident means the date the event occurred. One day was used for violence which occurred during a 24 hour period and violence which was continuous beyond a 24 hour period. If however there was a one day gap in the place (a 24 hour gap requiring remobilization) then the incident became a separate case. Thus if the violence was continuous with no 24 hour break, it was coded with the date on which the first incident occurred, and thus counts as one event. Otherwise each incident was coded on the date which it occurred even if some relation could be established between the various incidents.

account for the scenario in which the violence erupted. In particular it attempts to specify the action or incident which engendered the violence. In order to be considered a precipitant the incident was required to have been 1) fortuitous, and 2) immediately related to the outbreak of the violence. This indicator would seem to be a very important factor which many empirical studies of violence have tended to underemphasize. It considered not only who initiated the violence, but the particular circumstances under which it was initiated, and the form which the violence took. Three general precipitant categories and nineteen subcategories were constructed from the hundreds of specific precipitating incidents recorded on the coding sheets. The general categories dealt with the particular scenario of the violence classifying it according to whether the incident was a demonstration, a strike, or a random event. Precipitants under demonstration-related-incidents included "attempts by the demonstrators to force entry," "attempts by police and security personnel to forceably disperse protestors," "resistance by protestors to police directives to disperse," "direct assaults by demonstrators on police and other officials," "direct attacks by demonstrators on property," "arrests by police, and violence between groups of demonstrators." Strike-related precipitants consisted of such actions as "violence by pickets directed at scabs, non-striking workers, and company vehicles, crossing picket lines with police assistance," "violence by pickets directed

at these same objects minus police presence," "violence by coercive forces directed at strikers," "violence by strikers directed at police or security personnel," "direct assaults by strikers on property," "assaults by non-strikers on pickets," and finally "arrests by police."²⁴ Random incidents encompassed "police raids," "vandalism," "motorcycle gang violence," and "general brawls."

Theorists of mass society and a number of psychoanalysts have characterized crowd behavior as atavistic, impulsive, uninhibited, and irrational among other things.²⁵ A Canadian psychiatrist viewing the civil violence of the

²⁴There is an unwitting bias inherent in some of these subcategories. In some cases the way a particular value has been constructed, e.g. strikers attack police, may tend unnecessarily to favour the role of the authorities. For instance the use of police against strikers and demonstrators, although legal, is often highly provocative. It is false to assume that the role of the coercive forces is always that of a conflict manager. Canadian labour history is full of incidents of the state being an active party to a conflict rather than a neutral arbitrator. The 1930's are a monotonous recital of the use of local police and the R.C.M.P. by the State to serve the status quo and the vested interests of employers. The thirties in Ontario was marked by the appearance of Hepburn's Hussars, a private regiment mobilized by Mitchell Hepburn the Premier of Ontario to break the General Motors strike in Oshawa in 1937. Some 12 years later Quebec witnessed a more forceful intimidation of labour when Premier Marcel Duplessis used the Quebec Provincial Police as a private Union National army to destroy the strike at Asbestos. While it is possibly not as flagrant as formerly, the State has not abandoned this role. See Stuart Jamieson, Times of Trouble, Labour Unrest, and Industrial Conflict in Canada 1900-1966 (Ottawa: Task force on Labour Relations, Study 22, 1968; and Desmond Morton, "Aid to the Civil Power, The Canadian Militia in Support of Social Order," The Canadian Historical Review, Vol. LI, No. 4, December 1970, pp. 407-35.

²⁵Gustave Le Bon, The Crowd, A Study of the Popular Mind (London: Univen, 1903); and Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and Analysis of the Ego (London: Hogarth, 1948).

last decade has referred to the era as the age of the psychopath.²⁶ Such characterizations, however, would seem to pale in light of recent commission reports, and empirical studies.²⁷ Quantitative research into civil strife has demonstrated an evident sense of purpose among most of the participants. Active partisans (to use Gamson's terms) usually believe themselves aware of acting on behalf of a defended body of opinion which they believe has been denied expression through the orthodox pathways of political redress.²⁸ Violence, to these people, is often a very realistic way to articulate these opinions.

Assuming then that not all social violence is perpetrated by psychopaths or miscreants it would seem necessary to examine what types of objectives were pursued, or articulated in this manner.²⁹ Most social violence in Canada

²⁶Anthony M. Marcus, "Some Psychiatric and Sociological Aspects of Violence," International Journal of Group Tensions, Vol. 4, No. 2, June 1974, p. 254.

²⁷Thomas E. Bittker, M.D., "The Choice of Collective Violence in Intergroup Conflict," in Daniels Gilula and Ochberg eds. Violence and the Struggle for Existence (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1970), pp. 165-93 and The Kerner Commission, National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968).

²⁸Alan Marsh, "Explorations in Unorthodox Political Behavior, A Scale to Measure Protest Potential," European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 2, No. 2, June 1964, p. 108. See also William A. Gamson, Power and Discontent (Homewood Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1968), pp. 21-36.

²⁹The assumption which underlies the creation of this variable is that collective violence is rational, instrumental behavior aimed at the attainment of a specific result as opposed to non-realistic, destructive behavior involving a reflexive striking out as a response to tension built up

would seem to fall into the dimension which Gurr and others have labelled turmoil, that is violence with limited objectives and a limited scope.³⁰ These limited objectives may be quite varied. For instance some insurgents may be seeking only to influence their particular economic situation, others may be seeking the reversal of government policies which they see as being detrimental to their interests, and still others may be voicing their objections to particular ethnic, religious, or social groups.

The variable objectives have been constructed along the lines proposed by Ted Gurr in his article "A Comparative Study of Civil Strife."³¹ Gurr's categories have been modified however to suit the requirements of this study.

Three general headings have been employed to differentiate

through frustration. Realistic violence is considered as one of many forms of intergroup communication occasioned by the rival ends of antagonistic groups. It is, however, only one of several functional alternatives, a means to an end, and is usually employed when other forms of communication e.g. negotiation, pressure group tactics, etc., have failed to elicit a satisfactory response. The term realistic does not necessarily imply that the means adopted are actually adequate for reaching the end in view, the means may merely seem adequate to the participants. See, Hadley Cantril, "Sentio ergo Sum; Motivation Reconsidered," Journal of Psychology, LXV, January 1967, pp. 91-107; and Norman R.F. Maur, Frustration: The Study of Behavior Without a Goal (New York: McGraw Hill, 1949).

³⁰ Auther Banks, "Patterns of Domestic Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. XVI, No. 1, March 1972, pp. 44-45; See also Ted Robert Gurr, op. cit., p. 558.

³¹ Ibid., p. 562.

among political, social, and economic objectives.³² Each of these general headings was further developed into several subheadings which attempted to render each objective more specific. For example, the subcategories for political objectives contained such objectives as "retaliation for political purposes," "demands for increased political participation," "the promotion of or opposition to a specific government policy or action (whether domestic or foreign)," and a final category which accounted for "diffuse" or unspecified political objectives. The subcategories under social objectives were comprised of such activities as "retaliation," "the promotion of or opposition to a belief system, or an ethnic, linguistic or regional community," "attempts to increase social goods," and again a category for "diffuse social objectives." The last category economic objectives included the subheadings "retaliation," "seizure of economic goods," "attempts to change economic distribution," and lastly "several and diffuse economic objectives."

A few problems arose in the procrustean attempt to fit events in Quebec into these categories. When politics has the added dimension of ethnicity as it does in this

³²To use Gurr's specifications economic objectives comprise demands for material goods and opposition to economic actors (e.g. employers, competitors). Social objectives include promotion of ideational and community maintenance, opposition to members of other belief systems, and communities (linguistic ethnic or religious) and demands for self-realization and interpersonal values. Political motives encompass demands on or in opposition to the regime, its incumbents, its policies, those of foreign governments or competing political groups. See Ted Robert Gurr, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

province it becomes difficult to distinguish between political and social objectives. A case in point would be the Quebec legislature's Bill 63.³³ The incidents surrounding the enactment of this piece of legislation could just as easily have been classified as opposition to an ethnic or linguistic community or opposition to a government policy. The vagueness of the demarcation between social and political objectives in Quebec subsequently caused a revaluation of these categories (social and political objectives) resulting in the combination of the two into a new category labelled socio-political objectives. Although social objectives in Ontario were much more distinguishable from political objectives than they were in Quebec, due largely to the fact that communal issues seldom had political overtones in this province, these objectives comprised only 4 percent of the data set for Ontario. Thus combining social and political objectives in Ontario posed no major complications.

The variable, General Cause was developed in an effort to isolate the immediate preconditions which gave impetus to the violence. These preconditions can be loosely perceived as the proximate source of discontent. This indicator can furthermore be related to the variable "objectives" in that "general cause" attempts to point out the character of immediate environmental factors (issues) which were associated with the various types of objectives.

³³ Bill 63 was a Quebec Government measure which confirmed English as an official language of education, entrenching the existence of English schools in Quebec.

Six general categories of issues were developed for this indicator. The first category "immediate economic issues" encompassed questions related to living and working conditions e.g. inflation, labour contracts, etc. The second category "domestic political issues" was defined in terms of the political environment existing within the boundaries of the Canadian political system. This category comprised policies and attitudes of all levels of government, federal, provincial and municipal e.g. the War Measures Act, Bill 63, Montreal's 1969 anti-demonstration by-law etc. The next category "foreign political issues" embraced such questions as the war in Viet Nam, the invasion of Cambodia, Amchitka etc. The fourth category "combinations" was constructed to account for incidents which were motivated by a multiplicity of issues e.g. a demonstration incident over abortion and unemployment. The fifth category "university affairs" was created after an initial review of the data to consider violence which erupted as a result of particular attitudes or policies of university administrators, or as a result of problems related specifically to the university community. The last category "Other socio-pathological" encompassed incidents which were basically issueless, e.g. vandalism, motorcycle gang violence etc.

Aside from presenting a quantitative morphology of the incidents, the next two variables Number of Insurgents and Number of Coercive Forces give some indication of how pervasive was the discontent and to what extent the state

may have perceived the mobilization to have been a threat to public order.

The specific number of insurgents recorded on the coding sheets has been inserted into a series of geometric intervals, with the lowest value "50-100," and the highest "12,800 or more." In the majority of cases the newspapers gave only very rough estimates. It was also necessary to exercise caution in using figures for very large demonstrations which erupted in violence because the press in most instances only quoted figures for the number of people involved in these demonstrations and not the number of actual participants in the violence. The most extreme cases were the violent St. Jean Baptiste parades in Montreal. There were often hundreds of thousands of people involved in the parade and related activities, yet it was seldom noted how many of these were involved in the actual violence. In such cases the number of insurgents was coded at the highest interval (12,800). Such incidents were however really the exception and therefore did not invalidate the calculations for this variable. In most other cases it was assumed that a large proportion of the demonstrators and strikers were involved in the violence.

The Number of Coercive Forces was also coded into a geometric scale with the bottom interval "1-10," and the highest value "2,560 or more." In some instances the number given in the newspapers represents the number of police deployed at, or in the vicinity of, the incident. In

instances where there was more than one estimate of the number of coercive forces these estimates were averaged.

Insurgent crowds are more than generalized abstractions. George Rude has even suggested that the nature of a disturbance is intimately connected with the social composition of those taking part in it.³⁴ This next variable was intended to define the social composition of the mobilizations in terms of the socio-economic status of the insurgents. This was done for the purpose of obtaining some indication of the pervasiveness, and the nature of the discontent, which engendered collective violence in the two provinces.

The indicator Professional and Socio-Economic Status has been divided into five broad socio-economic categories under which the specific related professions accumulated in the data have been listed. The general categories have been labelled "professional," "white collar," "blue collar," "students," and "other," for those found to be unclassifiable.³⁵ Due to the fact that many incidents of violence involved people of different economic status a further series of values was constructed to reflect inter-

³⁴George Rude, The Crowd and the French Revolution (London: Oxford U. Press, 1967), p. 11.

³⁵The group designated "professional" embraced "teachers," "lawyers," "clergy," etc. "White collar" had but one listing, "civil servants." The group "blue collar" included occupations such as "textile workers," "factory workers," "truck drivers," "bus drivers," "construction workers," "cab drivers," "longshoremen," "garbage collectors," etc.

status group participation. These values consist of combinations of the above general categories.³⁶

This variable was subsequently restructured in order to allow for a more complete examination of the two status groups most frequently involved in the violence, (i.e. blue collar and student), as well as an examination of the potential for class alliances. First, a blue collar recode was constructed using two values. The first value, "blue collar" encompassed all incidents in which this group participated alone, and the second value "blue collar in alliance" comprised all incidents in which blue collar status was listed along with other status groups. A similar recode was constructed for the group "student." The two values established in this instance were labelled "student involvement" and "student non involvement." The value "student involvement" consisted of all codes which included the original value student, that is alone or with other status groups.

Working under the assumption that collective violence is instrumental behavior in terms of the objectives pursued one might also suppose that the participants in this activity would choose targets appropriate to the objectives. This indicator seeks to focus on the targets

³⁶"Professional and white collar," "professional and blue collar," "professional and student," "professional and other," "white collar and blue collar," "white collar and student," "white collar and other," "blue collar and student," "blue collar and other," "students and other," "students," "blue collar and professional," "students," "white collar and blue collar," "students," "professional and white collar," "all."

at which the violence was directed and which may be viewed as symbolic of the grievances of the insurgents. The three categories used here have been derived from Gurr's taxonomy for targets.³⁷ Once again a few modifications have been made in this taxonomy. The general categories borrowed from Gurr reflected the nature of the target. These categories encompassed "property targets," "political actors," and "non-political actors." Each of these was further divided into a number of subclassifications. For example "property targets" had four subdivisions comprising "public," "private," "foreign," and "any property." One category labelled "political actors" had six components including "public figures," "military and police," "private political groups," "foreign public figures," "any political actors," and "several of the above." The last value "non political actors" was subdivided into "communal groups," "economic groups," "several groups or random actors," "gangs and youth groups," and "other."

In many cases, more than one type of target was attacked, for instance an embassy and embassy personnel, the police and non-striking workers, etc. It would seem spurious in these cases to have singled out one specific target and designated it as primary. Furthermore, in instances where police were caught in the middle between insurgents and another target, they would still seem to have constituted a target in themselves, being representatives

³⁷Ted Robert Gurr, op. cit., p. 569.

of public order. In order to take multiple targets into account a further group of values was constructed using various combinations of the three general categories "property," "political actors" and "non-political actors" and the specific value "police and military" for the reasons just noted.³⁸

For purposes of further analysis and crosstabulation the above values were recoded into three new categories determined by the specific character of the target. These new categories were labelled "public authority targets," "private targets," and "both."³⁹

The five remaining variables were constructed to reflect the intensity of the violence and its cost in terms of arrests, injuries and damage.

The first of these variables, Type of Violence indicates whether the violence was "anti-personnel," "anti-property," or "both." The value of this factor as an intensity indicator is based on the supposed cultural prescription which western society places on anti-personnel

³⁸Eight new values were thus created. They were "property and police," "property and political actors other than police," "property and non-political actors," "police and other political actors," "political actors other than police," and "non political actors," "police, property, and other political actors," "police, property and non-political actors."

³⁹"Public authority targets" included "public property," "foreign property," "public figures," "the military and police and foreign public figures." "Private targets" comprised "private property," "communal groups," "economic groups," and "gangs and youth groups." The category "both" embraced any "property," "private political groups," "several groups or random actors" and "all combinations."

violence. Hence incidents of this type were considered to be of greater severity than attacks on property.

The variable Arrests reflected the number of people reported in the news sources to have been detained as a result of the incident. These figures were coded into a series of intervals ranging from "1-10" to "320 or more arrests."

The indicators, Insurgent Casualties and Coercive Casualties must both be viewed with caution. Injury reports for such incidents are always of questionable reliability as minor injuries especially those incurred by insurgents often go unreported. While coercive casualty figures are usually more accurate, they also have a tendency to go unreported unless of significant proportion.

Figures for these variables were coded into interval scales. The intervals for Insurgent Casualties ranged from "1-20" to "100 or more." Coercive casualties were coded into intervals ranging from "1-10," to "40 or more."

The amount of property damage was coded in dollar terms using a series of progressive intervals with the lowest value "\$1,000 or less," and the highest "\$2,000,000 or more." In instances where no value was assigned by the press, estimates were made on the basis of the information given, or otherwise coded N.D.

This chapter has provided an outline of the basic methodology which has been employed in this analysis. In the two chapters which follow, the data which has been compiled, and processed on the basis of the variables.

described herein, will be applied to the construction and testing of a hypothesis incorporating some of the etiological and comparative aspects of collective violence in the two provinces. This will be done with a view to the development of a framework which will hopefully provide some insight into the factors underlying the differences in the character of this phenomenon in Ontario and Quebec during the years 1968-1973.

CHAPTER II

This chapter will attempt to identify some of the basic preconditions associated with the outbreak of collective violence in Ontario and Quebec, and some of the environmental factors which might influence the nature of this violence. In the first part of this section, an effort will be made to determine the relevant preconditions of collective violence through an evaluation of two existing hypotheses which deal respectively with political and economic factors frequently associated with this phenomenon. The first of these hypotheses, the political-historical approach, is founded upon the frequent historical association between collective violence and the electoral process. The other hypothesis to be considered is the relative deprivation approach, a comprehensive theoretical model which assumes a direct association between collective violence and the quality of economic conditions. After these hypotheses have been fully considered, a further review of the data will be made to identify other preconditions which might be associated with this phenomenon. Following the determination of the relevant preconditions, the remainder of this chapter will consider some of the environmental factors, e.g. general economic conditions, political culture, etc., which may influence the nature of the ensuing violence. The overall

intention of this chapter is to present a testable hypothesis synthesizing these preconditions and environmental factors.

A number of theorists have explained the outbreak of collective violence in conjunction with the electoral process.¹ These theorists have essentially regarded such violence as characterizing the struggle for political power by various groups in a society. The occurrence of collective violence around elections is proposed to be a result of attempts by these groups to mobilize political resources in an effort to expand their political influence, or to maintain their present positions of power.

The histories of Ontario and Quebec would appear to confirm that this indicator has some theoretical value. Collective violence was at one time an almost integral part of political campaigning in these two provinces. This was due, to a large extent, to the sectarian nature of the competing political parties. Campaign slogans such as "No Property, No Surrender," or "Vote Conservative or your Barns Burn," were rather typical of elections in the mid, and late nineteenth century.² Elections in the twentieth century, however, have been relatively more tranquil, causing

¹The major proponent of this explanation is possibly Charles Tilly. See Charles Tilly, *op. cit.*

²In the North Hastings' by-election of 1856 in Ontario, the election expenses of one candidate were said to have included "6000 No. 1 hickory axe handles and 60 gallons of good Canadian whiskey." The whiskey, needless to say, was for his supporters. Bull, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

William Rutledge, a prominent Orangeman, to lament the passing of the good old days when, in his words, "any day that happened to be an election day was a day of blood and fist."³ Nevertheless, the first half of the twentieth century was not without its violent elections. The Federal election of 1911 over the reciprocity treaty occasioned numerous incidents of streetfighting in Quebec.⁴ Moreover, the 1935 Federal election was highlighted by a series of sectarian incidents which assumed, according to one historian, the dimensions of a small war.⁵

The data which was compiled for this indicator by this study, while not showing the variable to be completely irrelevant during the period 1968-1973, was somewhat less than conclusive in establishing an association between collective violence and the electoral process. In the case of Ontario, despite the fact that 23 percent of all incidents of violence occurred during an election period, as defined in Chapter I, the specific character of these incidents would seem to preclude relating them to the election itself. For example, 50 percent of all election violence in Ontario occurred during the period surrounding the Provincial election of November, 1971. Fifty-six percent of these incidents had political implications, while

³Ibid., p. 263.

⁴Mason Wade, The French Canadians 1760-1945 (Toronto: MacMillan, 1949), p. 599.

⁵Bull, op. cit., p. 270.

the remaining 44 percent were motivated by immediate economic conditions and were strike-related. Of the incidents with political implications, however, 44 percent were motivated by issues extraneous to provincial politics, i.e. foreign political issues. The sole incident over a domestic issue that was remotely related to an election was a protest occasioned by the first anniversary of the War Measures Act. The case with both Federal elections in Ontario was quite similar in that it was again difficult to relate the issues over which the violence took place to the election. While the electoral process may have provided the stimulus for such incidents, the relationship between collective violence and elections in Ontario was extremely tenuous.

In Quebec however, the situation was slightly different. Overall, 14 percent (11) of all collective violence occurred during an election period. Although the majority of these incidents would again appear to have been over issues bearing absolutely no relation to the election, there were three incidents which seem to have been of direct relevance. The first of these occurred in Montreal on the eve of the 1968 Federal election when militant separatists who had been the subject of constant abuse during Pierre Trudeau's prime ministerial campaign, confronted him on the reviewing stand of the St. Jean Baptiste parade. The result was one of the most savage battles between police and demonstrators since the infamous "samedi de la

matraque."⁶

The other two incidents occurred in the month following the Quebec Provincial election of April 1970. 1970 had been a relatively tranquil year up to this point, especially in light of the tremendous violence which occurred in 1969.⁷ The organized left had begun to occupy itself in more peaceful pursuits, the most prominent of which was the election campaign of the "Parti Québécois". The P.Q. however did not fare well in the election, winning only five seats although it had amassed 24 percent of the vote. The left referred to this "irregularity" as le coup d'état électoral.⁸ Almost immediately the left took its politics back into the streets, with two incidents of violence as a result.⁹ Although there would thus appear to

⁶Le "Samedi de la matraque" refers to an incident which took place on October 10th, 1964 during a visit by the Queen to Quebec. An R.I.N. (Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance Nationale) demonstration was charged by club-wielding police and savagely assaulted.

⁷1969 was one of the most violent years in recent history in Quebec. During this year there were 18 incidents of collective violence and some 30-plus acts of terrorism.

⁸This irregularity has essentially been attributed to the gerrymandered electoral districts in Quebec which caused a heavy concentration of P.Q. support in a few areas.

⁹On May 12th in Montreal, the Valliers-Gagnon Committee led a demonstration over the treatment of political prisoners which ended with an attack on the Quebec Provincial Police Headquarters. This was the first incident of separatist demonstration violence observed for this year. Six days later, Victoria Day, the separatists were in the streets again in a rampaging demonstration against the Victoria Day holiday, the monarchy and Canadian Federalism.

have been some relationship between collective violence and elections in Quebec, the association was possibly too infrequent for this factor to deserve consideration in an etiological sense. On the contrary, the association between collective violence and the electoral process was more likely to have been a result of the peculiar political environment, i.e. nationalist and separatist agitation, which existed in Quebec during this period. Moreover, as shall be seen later, election violence was only one of many tactical forms which this agitation took. Therefore the political-historical approach, if restricted to the electoral process, would seem to have little explanatory power as far as violence in this province was concerned. Furthermore, when the combined data for both provinces was considered, the number of incidents associated with elections was so insubstantial as to completely exclude this factor from consideration as a common precondition of collective violence.

As mentioned in the preceding chapter, some contemporary theorists have also employed economic indicators to reflect the economic conditions frequently associated with the outbreak of violence.¹⁰

While it is impossible to review all of the various theories which employ economic indicators in this manner, the recent literature has been notably influenced by the

¹⁰ See Manoucher Parvin, "Economic Determinants of Political Unrest, An Economic Approach," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. XVII, No. 2, 1973, pp. 271-94.


development of one hypothesis which is generally representative of all such theories. This hypothesis, which emphasizes the relationship of declining economic conditions to civil unrest, is known generically as relative deprivation theory. Although there are a considerable number of variations in the application of this model, the underlying premise is basically the same for all.¹¹ Relative deprivation theory

¹¹There are essentially three major variations of relative deprivation theory. The most prominent of these and the one used below as a general description of the concept has been developed by Ted Gurr.

Besides Gurr, the two other theorists whose frameworks are widely employed are Ivo K. Feierabend and James Chalmers Davies. Feierabend's model is based on the concept of systemic frustration. This refinement of the frustration-aggression hypothesis is based on the assumption that frustration induced by the social system creates social strain and discontent through interference with the attainment of goals, aspirations and expectations. The idea expressed here that collective violence is a product of the ratio of social want formation to social want satisfaction is quite similar to Gurr's proposition. Feierabend departs from Gurr however, by way of his emphasis on modernization and social change (i.e. the conflict model of the transitional process). At the heart of Feierabend's theory is the idea that the modernization process creates wants that the system is incapable of fulfilling thereby creating a pre-condition for violence.

The other hypothesis known as Davies "J-Curve Theory" is quite popular despite the difficulties posed by its operationalization. Davies contends that violence will most likely occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social developments is followed by a sharp reversal. The all-important effect on the minds of people in a particular society is to produce during the former period an expectation of ability to satisfy needs which continue to rise, and during the latter a mental state of anxiety when manifest reality breaks away from anticipated reality. The frustration of these expectations once again is seen as occasioning violent protests.

postulates an essentially linear relationship between socio-economic conditions and social violence. The directness of this association is contingent upon what psychologists have termed the frustration-aggression mechanism.¹² This



See Ted Robert Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Strife," Feierabend's and Gurr eds., Anger Violence and Politics (Englewood Cliffs N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1972) pp. 30-57;

Ivo K. Feierabend, "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross National Patterns," Graham and Gurr eds., op cit., pp. 606-668;

James Chalmers Davies, "The J Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfaction as a Cause of Some Great Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion," Graham and Gurr eds., op. cit., pp. 671-709.

¹²Originally the frustration aggression hypothesis stated that aggression was the naturally dominant response to frustration, i.e., frustration was regarded as the inevitable antecedent of aggression. See J. Dollard et al. Frustration and Aggression (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939).

This construct had to be modified because in some individuals and cultures physical aggression is not the typical response to frustration. In many instances, other behavior patterns such as apathy, resignation, or evasion follow frustration. See Neil E. Miller, "The Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis," Psychological Review, XLVIII, July 1941, p. 339.

Later experimental research caused a redefinition

mechanism, actually a psycho-biological reflex is viewed as the primary source of the human capacity for violence.

According to relative deprivation theory frustration is produced by the perception of a discrepancy between men's value expectations and their value capabilities.¹³ The optimum environment for the outbreak of collective violence is thus presumed to be a scenario where expectations based on one's economic status, and capabilities tied to economic conditions diverge. Using the indicators developed in Chapter I, the frustration of expectations should be most intense when both indices reflect a sudden decline of economic well being, i.e., when unemployment is high and

of the relation of frustration to violence. It is now contended that frustration (defined as the blocking of on-going goal directed activity) as its primary effect increases the motivational energy level of the individual. This in turn leads to that behavior in the individual's habit repertoire which is elicited by the stimulus situation. See Leonard Berkowitz, Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962); and Roots of Aggression, a Re-examination of the Frustration Aggression Hypothesis (New York: Atherton Press, 1969). See also, Frederic W. Ilfeld "Environmental Theories of Violence" in Daniels, Gilula, and Ochberg, op. cit., pp. 79-97.

It is the above modification which is at the base of most relative deprivation theories. For example, if one examines closely Gurr's theoretical premise, it can be seen that he considers the relationship of frustration to violence to be contingent on a complex set of other social and psychological variables (facilitations and justifications), while the Frustration-Aggression hypothesis performs the function of the initial motive state, the outbreak of violence will be determined by the presence of these other factors.

¹³Value expectations are defined as the goods and conditions of life to which people believe themselves justifiably entitled. Value capabilities on the other hand are the goods, etc., they are capable of attaining or maintaining given the social means available to them.

real wages low or declining.¹⁴

The data for the economic indicators seemed, however, to be inconclusive as far as such a relationship was concerned. There was no clear indication of a pattern of association between the level of violence and the level of economic well being as measured by the economic indicators. As can be seen from Tables 1 and 2, which show the yearly indices for the percentage increase in real wages, and unemployment, with the corresponding level of violence, the years with the most unfortunate economic conditions did not experience the highest levels of violence. In Ontario the years 1963, 1965, and 1966, had the lowest levels of change (over the previous year) in perceived real wages ranging from increases of 1.4 percent to 1.9 percent, yet these were all years of a below-average frequency of incidents.¹⁵ Moreover, although 1971 had high unemployment and a high frequency of violence, it also had the highest increase in real wages (5.6 percent) of all the years.¹⁶ Furthermore,

¹⁴Ted Gurr contends that preliminary evidence derived from his cross national study shows that for 114 nations in the early 1960's, a composite measure of short term economic deprivation correlates .44 with the magnitude of civil strife. In other words, about 20 of the variations among contemporary nations in levels of strife is attributable to relative economic decline. Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel, op. cit., pp. 59-83.

¹⁵A high incident frequency for Ontario was assumed whenever there were 12 or more incidents on which adequate data could be obtained for that year. This general average is based on 125 cases between 1963-1973. Since there were 125 cases, an ordinary average was considered to offer sufficient accuracy.

¹⁶Average unemployment for the 11 year period in

the year 1973 which combined high unemployment with the only occasion where real wages actually declined, had a below-average level of violence.

TABLE 1
YEARLY LEVEL OF UNEMPLOYMENT,
WAGES AND VIOLENCE

Years	Wages	ONTARIO Unem- ployment	Frequency of Incidents
'63	1.7	3.6	8
'64	2.1	3.3	7
'65	1.9	2.0	9
'66	1.4	2.5	11
'67	2.8	3.2	6
'68	3.0	3.6	12
'69	2.4	3.1	8
'70	4.9	4.3	15
'71	5.6	5.3	25
'72	3.3	4.9	15
'73	-0.8	4.0	9

Ontario was 3.6%. Anything greater than this was considered to be high unemployment.

TABLE 2
YEARLY LEVEL OF UNEMPLOYMENT,
WAGES AND VIOLENCE

Years	Wages	QUEBEC Unem- ployment	Frequency of Incidents
'63	1.8	7.5	6
'64	2.3	6.4	6
'65	2.5	5.5	13
'66	2.9	4.8	9
'67	3.0	5.3	11
'68	2.8	6.5	9
'69	2.0	6.9	18
'70	3.2	7.8	10
'71	4.2	8.3	13
'72	3.2	8.3	17
'73	-0.5	7.5	9

The figures for Quebec demonstrate a similar pattern. Here 1973, again the only year with a real wage which declined absolutely from the previous year, had a below average level of violence, whereas years with rising real wages such as 1971 and 1972 had relatively high levels of violence.¹⁷ In addition, whereas 1971 had high unemployment, 1969 had below average unemployment yet the highest level of

¹⁷A high incident frequency for Quebec was above the average of 11 observed incidents per year.

violence in the entire period.¹⁸

It thus appears that the relationship between economic conditions and the outbreak of violence that was assumed by relative deprivation theory was also an inadequate explanation of collective violence in Ontario and Quebec during this period.

While the traditional theories would seem to have been of little relevance to this study, there was still a discernable relationship between the data and the level of collective violence. If one examines the high incidence clusters in Tables 1 and 2, it can be seen that both the frequency and intensity of collective violence seems somehow to have been associated with the existence of a paradoxical economic situation where real wages were perceived to have improved for some groups of people, but where other groups (i.e. blue collar elements) were faced with rising unemployment. The greater the sum total of the disparity between the two indicators, the more intense and more frequent the conflict.¹⁹

On the basis of this observation an indicator was constructed which will be henceforth referred to as the

¹⁸ Average unemployment for Quebec during this period was 6.9%. Anything greater than this was considered to be high unemployment.

¹⁹ The theoretical concept which follows from this relationship was developed in the course of a previous study. See J.A. Frank and Micheal Kelly, "La Violence Collective au Québec et en Ontario" paper presented to the annual conference of l'Association française canadienne pour l'avancement de la science, in Moncton N.B., May 11, 1975.

Economic Paradox Indicator (E.P.I.). Tables 3 and 4 show how this E.P.I. was calculated for each province. This indicator will be used as a barometer of collective violence under the assumption that the patterns which associate the increasing frequency of collective violence with the rising level of the E.P.I. indicates a probable correlation between these two factors. (Tables 5 and 6.)²⁰

TABLE 3
UNEMPLOYMENT, PERCEIVED REAL WAGES,
AND E.P.I. AVERAGES PER YEAR
ONTARIO

Year	% Unadjusted Unemployment	% Real Wages Relative To Previous Year	Economic Paradox Indicator*
'63	3.6	1.7	5
'64	3.3	2.1	5
'65	2.0	1.9	4
'66	2.5	1.4	4
'67	3.2	2.8	6
'68	3.6	3.0	7
'69	3.1	2.4	6
'70	4.3	4.9	9
'71	5.3	5.6	11
'72	4.9	3.3	8
'73	4.0	0.8	5

* All figures rounded off.

²⁰From the patterns of relationship in Tables 5 and 6, it seems safe to hypothesize that all things being equal when the E.P.I. "barometer" is high, the frequency of violence is relatively high. This relationship does not

TABLE 4
UNEMPLOYMENT, PERCEIVED REAL WAGES,
AND E.P.I. AVERAGES PER YEAR
QUEBEC

Year	% Unadjusted Unemployment	% Real Wages Relative To Previous Year	Economic Paradox Indicator*
'63	7.5	1.8	9
'64	6.4	2.3	9
'65	5.5	2.5	8
'66	4.8	2.9	8
'67	5.3	3.0	8
'68	6.5	2.8	9
'69	6.9	2.0	8
'70	7.8	3.2	11
'71	8.3	4.2	12
'72	8.3	3.2	11
'73	7.5	-0.5	7

*All figures rounded off.

As can be seen from Table 5, this relationship for Ontario was quite strong as the rise of the E.P.I. was associated with every year of rising collective violence between 1963 and 1973.

appear to be absolute and linear in every case.

TABLE 5
CORRELATION BETWEEN THE E.P.I. AND THE
FREQUENCY OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE
ONTARIO

Year	E.P.I. ²¹		Frequency ²²	
'63	(5)	Low	(8)	Low
'64	(5)	Low	(7)	Low
'65	(4)	Low	(9)	Low
'66	(4)	Low	(11)	Low
'67	(6)	Low	(6)	Low
'68	(7)	High	(12)	High
'69	(6)	Low	(8)	Low
'70	(9)	High	(15)	High
'71	(11)	High	(25)	High
'72	(8)	High	(15)	High
'73	(5)	Low	(9)	Low

In Quebec the same relationship existed for eight of the eleven years.²³ In 1970, 1971 and 1972, a high E.P.I.

²¹The E.P.I. was considered high whenever it reached 6 which was the median average for Ontario between 1963 and 1973. A median average was used to take into consideration wide divergencies for so few figures.

²²See Footnote 15.

²³A high frequency of violence for Quebec was above the average of 11 observed incidents per year. Thus 1970 does not conform technically. This is because the normal progression was interrupted from October on. The War Measures Act effectively impeded insurgent mobilization during this period of political tension. According to data supplied by Department B of the Montreal police, there were no demonstrations in this city from the 3rd of October until almost the beginning of December. Had conditions remained normal, the progression should have registered between 13 incidents (1971) and 18 (1969).

was associated with an above average level of violence, while a low level of economic paradox was associated with low levels of violence in 1963, 1964, 1966, 1968 and 1973.²⁴

²⁴In Quebec, 3 of the 11 years did not conform to this theory. Hence it is quite evident that other factors also contributed to rising levels of violence. A clue to this might be provided by a glance at the 3 exceptional years 1965, 1967 and 1969 to see what they may have had in common. Quebec, during these 3 years, experienced a gradual economic progress, real wages rose gradually while unemployment levels remained relatively moderate, at least by Quebec standards. The salient characteristics of all three years seem however political rather than economic. All 3 years witnessed intense fundamental and strategic political reorientations. New social and political ideals and alliances were in the gestation stage. 1965 witnessed the beginning of the end of the Quiet Revolution. The intellectuals and other reform oriented groups began to re-evaluate the role of the Liberal Party as a vehicle for major social reform. By 1967 an open split had occurred when Charles DeGaulle called for "Québec Libre" and a portion of the political elites of the Liberal Party led by René Lévesque quit the ruling coalition to create the Mouvement Soverieinté Association. Finally in 1969 links began to develop between elite elements and trade union elements and the underprivileged classes establishing the basis for separatism among the lower middle and working class elements of the province.

In looking at the reorientation and realignment which occurred during these years, it is also important to note that this was a period of intense electoral activity in Quebec. The realignments of 1965 were manifested in the election of 1966 which officially terminated the Quiet Revolution. The realignments of 1967 were reflected in the Federal election of 1968 and the separatist violence in the streets of Montreal which preceded it. 1969 witnessed the reorganization of the left into more active citizens groups (e.g. Front d'Action Politique). Many of these new groups engaged in peaceful electoral activity in support of the Parti Québécois election campaign.

It may be inferred that such reorientations and new socio-political alliances jostled many groups into renewed militancy and brought on strong counter measures by the authorities and coercive forces, thereby encouraging new violent scenarios.

Although the relationship was not absolute in all cases, it was strong enough to be indicative of a possible correlation.

TABLE 6
CORRELATION BETWEEN THE E.P.I. AND THE
FREQUENCY OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE
QUEBEC

Year	E.P.I. ²⁵	Frequency ²⁶
'63	(9) Low	(6) Low
'64	(9) Low	(6) Low
'65	(8) Low	(13) High
'66	(8) Low	(9) Low
'67	(8) Low	(11) High
'68	(9) Low	(9) Low
'69	(8) Low	(18) High
'70	(11) High	(10) High
'71	(12) High	(13) High
'72	(11) High	(17) High
'73	(7) Low	(9) Low

An interpretation of the economic paradox in terms of current economic affairs might run as follows. Wages and salaries have been steadily increasing along with ever rising inflation with the result that the rich have been getting richer and the poor, poorer. In addition to this, many capitalist economists have insisted that the only answer to

²⁵The E.P.I. was considered high whenever it reached 9 which was the median average for Quebec between 1963 and 1973.

²⁶See Footnote 17.

this inflation is massive unemployment. What they may really mean is that the only security for the well off and the wealthy is massive unemployment.²⁷

Although the economic paradox may be linked to the inflationary situation and more directly to the vast disparities in wealth which is possibly one of the deepest philosophical and moral problems of capitalism, the environment which is reflected by the E.P.I. has theoretical implications far beyond inflation, unemployment, and real wage levels. Generally the paradox may be considered to be reflective of the dichotomous distribution of values which has been proposed as a fundamental source of conflict in all societies.²⁸ Conflict over values is basically inherent in every social system so far as there are conflicting claims to scarce status, power and resources. Such claims inevitably occur because resources in every society are scarce and limited in such a way as to preclude everyone from obtaining complete fulfillment.²⁹ Such is the case in the political

²⁷J.D. Morton, "Suppression of Bloodless Revolt of Workers," Toronto Globe and Mail, May 29, 1975, p. 7.

²⁸See Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflicts (New York, N.Y.: The Free Press, 1956), p. 54; Johan Galtung "Institutionalized Conflict Resolution: A Theoretical Paradigm," Journal of Peace Research, No. 4., 1965, p. 348; and Mark N. Hagopian The Phenomenon of Revolution (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co, 1974) p. 91.

²⁹"The more there is of yours the less there is of mine" is what Kenneth Boulding facetiously calls the Duchess law in Alice and Wonderland, that is the distribution between two or more parties of some good which is both scarce and valued. Kenneth E. Boulding, "The Economics of Human Conflict," in McNeil ed. The Nature of Human Conflict (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1965), pp. 172-193.

as well as the economic social sphere.³⁰ Moreover in theory a democratic political system with its variety of pluralistic institutions is the most favourable environment for conflict to flourish. It is a major premise of group theory that in a pluralistic society the essence of politics lies in strife and competition for these scarce values by various interest groups.³¹ One, and perhaps the main function, of the political system in such a democratic society is to mediate this conflict, and thus prevent the social order from disintegrating under the stress of unrestricted violent competition. This mediation is theoretically accomplished through the allocation of these scarce resources in a fair and just manner. In a democratic system this just determination of who gets what, where and how is made on the basis of who is capable of exercising the most influence or power. Although it is presumed that in an electoral democracy power becomes diffused throughout the general population so that in some way everyone participates in the allocation or selection of social goals, this

³⁰In both the political and economic sectors of society, there are groups with contradictory interests which compete for the scarce benefits and privileges which each sector has to offer. In essence the capitalist-wage labourer conflict is a microcosm of the general societal conflict between those who control the resource allocation and those who wish to enhance their share.

³¹Lynne B. Iglitzen, Violent Conflict in American Society (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1972), p. 18.

conception hardly conforms to the reality of politics.³²

There are great and obvious differentials of power in every society. Moreover the dominant segments in these societies through their disproportionate share in the nation's wealth, prestige and power in a large part determine the ranking of the lower segments, and hence the resultant division of goods and services. The fact that these values imposed by a dominant group as authoritative for the society at large are often not thoroughly in accord with the desires and attitudes of other segments of the community provides the environment for conflict. When the economic or political system proves incapable of inculcating these segments with the prevailing ideology rationalizing the division of labour and wealth, those groups who feel themselves unjustifiably excluded from a fair share of social economic and political privileges begin to assert progressive demands for change. These demands will likely be opposed by those who have interest in maintaining the status quo.

The economic paradox may be viewed in terms of providing the potential for such intergroup conflicts. As the distribution of resources becomes increasingly inequitable for the lower elements of a society as it does in an inflationary environment, a situation is created in which

³²It would seem that in the more modern democratic systems, the increasing complexity of the decision process and of government functions substantially reduces the effectiveness of conventional methods of participation and consequently reduces the participatory value of the non elite.

people are required to re-evaluate their status in relation to that of others in the society, and in some cases, depending on the nature of the perception of the paradox, in terms of those who hold political power. The paradox causes those of lower status whose economic well being is precarious or threatened to look with envy at others who might be benefiting from rising real wages. Later this segment of the collectivity which is threatened may go further and challenge the justice of the politics criteria for distributing power and allocating resources, and to envision ways to assert their demands through various forms of collective action such as violent demonstrations and strikes.

On the other side there are those who appear to be benefiting from the positive aspects of the contradiction, that is, from the unequal distribution of resources. This segment of the collectivity is bound to react defensively. They move to defend their situation from the dispossessed groups who may be attempting to challenge the status quo. These individuals, by virtue of their position, have a vested interest in the status quo and would likely use their access to the levers of power, and legitimate exercise of coercive violence to maintain their dominance.³³ They

³³The scenario portrayed here is a strong argument for the instrumentality or rationality of violence. These conflict groups do not exist in isolation. They and their tactics of value enhancement and value maintenance are in fact interdependent, and thus the violence is a function of the behavior of both parties. See Thomas C. Shelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard U. Press, 1964), p. 4.

are the natural allies of the coalition in power as their concern grows as the gap between their status and that of the less privileged increases.

While this unequal distribution of scarce values as reflected by the paradox is considered here to be a fundamental source of discontent in both Ontario and Quebec, this study further presumes that the precise nature of this discontent and the forms in which it is expressed will be mediated by particular economic and cultural circumstances, popular attitudes, and institutional factors found in the two provinces.

One factor which should influence the nature and intensity of the discontent stimulated by the paradox is the general character of the economic environment. Economic comparisons between Ontario and Quebec are usually highlighted by some glaring disparities between the two provinces. Income per capita is about 25 percent lower in Quebec than it is in Ontario and this gap has not narrowed substantially since 1926.³⁴ Moreover while three quarters of Quebec's population is urban, the standard of living is more than 10 percent below the Canadian average, and about 27 percent below that of Ontario.³⁵ Forty-three percent of Canada's unemployed are in Quebec where 33 percent of the

³⁴André Raynault, "The Quebec Economy, A General Assessment" in Thompson, Dale ed., Quebec Society and Politics Views from the Inside (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973), p. 146.

³⁵Adèle Lauzon, "The New Left in Quebec," in Rousso-poulos ed., The New Left in Canada (Montreal: Our Generation Press, 1970), p. 126.

population resides.³⁶ In Ontario on the other hand, unemployment has been constantly below the national average. It is thus quite evident that the province of Ontario with 40 percent of Canada's G.N.P. and the most highly developed industrial and manufacturing sector in the country has historically possessed a much more favourable economic climate than Quebec. The relevance of these disparities as far as the intensity of discontent and the occurrence of collective violence is concerned may be considered in terms of Ted Gurr's contention that the past experiences of a group and its environmental circumstances are more immediate determinants of whether its members believe they can maintain or improve their condition i.e., people's previous experiences dominate their anticipation of the future.³⁷ Hence not only were the distributional inequities not as serious in Ontario as they were in Quebec, but the general prosperity of the economic environment in Ontario may have caused people to be more optimistic about moderating distributional inequities thus defusing the intensity of some

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷According to Gurr, if a society has extensive resources and a demonstrated capacity to convert them into the more satisfying conditions of life, and if people have varied and reasonable opportunities for sharing the benefits, hopes are likely to be high. But if resources are limited and past value performances poor, or if opportunities are few and narrow, people are likely to have poor hopes for their future. In such a situation violence is more likely both as a tactic value enhancement, and as a response to attempts by others to improve their relative position than when men believe there are possibilities of generating new values. See Ted Gurr, op. cit., p. 127.

of the discontent.³⁸ On the other hand, the historically bleak economic picture in Quebec may have simply exacerbated the pessimism of elements suffering from these inequities and thus further intensified the discontent.

Another highly significant factor affecting both the severity, and direction of conflicts, is the quality of the political culture. The degree to which citizens in a society voluntarily offer their support and adherence to the existing political system has been seen as having an important bearing on the type and the form of the conflicts which will occur.³⁹ A general distinction is made in the literature between conflicts within the system and conflicts over the system.⁴⁰ Conflicts within the system, or conflicts over means, involves a conflict over the division of labour in the society, that is to say over the terms on which co-operation is to take place. Usually this type of conflict revolves around the distribution of welfare values allocated through the labour economy.⁴¹ On the other hand, conflict may be over the system itself,

³⁸The difference between the average level of the E.P.I. in the two provinces may provide an indication that the distributional inequities were more serious within Quebec than they were in Ontario. In Ontario the average E.P.I. value (sum total of the disparity between the rise in real wages and the level of unemployment) was 6, whereas in Quebec, it was 9.

³⁹Iglitzen, op. cit., p. 15.

⁴⁰Rolf Dahrendorf, Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Palo Alto: Stanford U. Press, 1959), p. 210.

⁴¹Welfare values can be defined as those values which contribute directly to one's physical well being, i.e., to one's standard of living.

that is about ends as opposed to means.⁴² Such conflict is directed not only at the distribution pattern but also at those who wield power and ultimately determine the distribution of values and privileges. In this instance, the entire structure and value system of the political community may be involved as a complete resynthesis of society may be perceived as necessary to alleviate the inequitable distribution. The level of conflict is determined by the amount of ideological support that the system is able to maintain. If the underlying consensual framework which must support the system remains intact, the conflicts which occur will be over means rather than ends. Hence while the potential for collective violence is a function of the extent and intensity of shared discontents, it is the contention of this study that the potential for political violence is a function of the degree to which such discontents are blamed on the political system and its agents. In essence, if people have shared discontents, their attitudes about the legitimacy of their rulers, and political institutions affect the focus,

⁴² Conflict over the system is essentially a conflict over the base value power. According to C.W. Mills "Power is not a facility for the performance of a function in and on behalf of the society as a system, but is interpreted exclusively as a facility for getting what one group, the holders of power, wants by preventing another group, the outs, from getting what it wants." C.W. Mills, The Power Elite (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), p. 139. In other words, if lack of power as a base value is perceived as a threat to maintaining, and increasing a group's economic well being or relative status, a new power configuration will be demanded, that is a restructuring of society. See Harold Laswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society, a Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale Press, 1950), pp. 83-96.

and the nature of the expression of this discontent (i.e. structural issues versus et. al.).⁴³

The political cultures in Ontario and Quebec are quite different especially in terms of the degree of acceptance that the political authority structure enjoys. This difference should then have a discernable effect on the expression of discontent in each province.

Possibly the most prominent aspect of the political culture in Ontario, affecting the way inequities are perceived and acted upon, is the unique synthesis of conservatism and

⁴³ Following David Easton's approach, it is possible to prescribe three dimensions of legitimacy or diffuse support for the political authority structure, 1) endorsement of the legitimating ideology of the regime or the values and norms which constitute its rationale, 2) convictions that the regime structures are worthy institutions, are valuable because of ethical reasons, because they have performed well over a long period of time or just because they are there, 3) trust and confidence in public officials who wield the power of the regime. These dimensions of diffuse support refer to legitimacy sentiment which derives from attachment to the structure and norms of the regime as such or from devotion to the actual authorities themselves because of their personal qualities. Easton calls such legitimacy sentiment ideological legitimacy, structural legitimacy, and personal legitimacy. David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965), pp. 227-340. See also Edward N. Muller "A Test of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence," The American Political Science Review, Vol. 66, 1972, pp. 928-59.

It is the erosion of this legitimacy sentiment that occasions conflicts to be focused on political targets. The strains in an organization that are most likely to lead to an erosion of legitimacy and tend to produce groups in opposition to the community have been suggested as injustice or inequality. The common element in these conditions appears to be an inequitable or arbitrary imposition of a threat to physical and economic security and integrity. Thus deprivation and distribution of rewards perceived as inequitable and arbitrary are seen as leading to distrust and rejection of legitimate authority and to the politization of these inequities.

liberalism which underlies it. The basic values upon which the political society in Ontario was founded have a definite conservative tinge. The tory legacy has emphasized the values of moderation, compromise, gradualism, and the preservation of the existing political order. These ideals were essentially carryovers of British political and social traditions with their well known respect for law and order and parliamentarism, and the resulting inhibitions against engaging in open conflict.⁴⁴ At the same time however the dominant ethic of the province has been liberalism. Nevertheless liberalism has never acquired the status of a creed in Ontario as it has elsewhere in North America. There has been no cult of lockeanism and no rugged individualist ethic. The ascendancy of liberal values has been tempered by the existence of these tory elements in the society.⁴⁵ A major result of this has been a greater acceptance of distinctions of class and rank within the society. This synthesis moreover has influenced the dominant liberal view in Ontario in such a way that the major emphasis of the political culture has been on peace and social stability and a prescription to all forms of conflict which occur outside of normal channels. It is the expectation that these channels will be able to redress grievances and bring

⁴⁴Stuart Jamieson, op. cit., p. 46.

⁴⁵I. Gad Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1970), pp. 5-30. See also Louis Hartz, "Violence and Legality in the Fragment Cultures," Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 2, June 1969, pp. 123-40.

about acceptable social change. It has thus been argued that the political culture was built upon the conservative impulse for stability and the progressive demand for constant but very gradual reform.⁴⁶ The resultant emphasis on cautious reform has pervaded the policies of most Ontario governments since confederation, and has allowed them to provide stable leadership while satisfying the interests of the major groups in society.⁴⁷

Thus with an underlying social ethic which rationalizes the division of labour and wealth in the society, and the fact that the government has managed to satisfy, to some extent, the interests of the majority of the population, the scope of the conflict should be rather narrow. This would seem to suggest that while conflicts over the inequities will occur they will consist mainly of attempts by groups to enhance their economic position (i.e. position on welfare values). Moreover, the legitimacy attributed to the political authority structure, and the laissez faire ideology inherent in liberalism which separates the political and economic spheres, should militate against conflicts

⁴⁶See John Wilson, "The Ontario Political Culture" in Donald C. MacDonald ed., Government and Politics of Ontario (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1975), pp. 211-34.

⁴⁷In the 29 elections since Confederation, power has changed hands just 6 times. The present conservative government has been in power for 32 years.

spilling over into the political arena.⁴⁸

The most influential aspect of the political culture in Quebec, as far as collective violence is concerned, is that the political community possesses not only social structure but ethnic divisions that are related to this structure. This has some very definite implications as far as the legitimacy of the regime is concerned. Much of the special problem that Quebec has posed in recent years in terms of ethnic, language and religious conflicts in the social, political and economic sphere is explainable by the peculiar division of labour in this province with its sharp and glaring inequalities in wealth based on religious, ethnic and cultural differences. Historically the ownership of capital, the control of firms and the distribution of economic power has been to the detriment of the French Canadian in Quebec.⁴⁹ The fact that the Québécois have not controlled their own economy has resulted in their being denied, for the most part, access to high income and high

⁴⁸ Another product of the cultural environment which essentially inhibits the paradox from becoming politicized in Ontario is the character of trade unions. For the most part, the unions in this province are fairly well integrated into the system. Moreover, the dominant ideology of labour in Ontario is market unionism. Market unionism is purely an economic conception, a delimiting role and function imposed by the realities of a specific industrial environment in which the unions operate. Market unionism or labourism is essentially concerned with the general improvement of working conditions and wages through economic action, i.e. bargaining with employers. Only rarely are they involved in political action and this is usually legislative activity. See Walter Galenson, Comparative Labor Movements (New York: Prentice Hall, 1952).

⁴⁹ Estimates of the amount of industry under American and English Canadian control in Quebec vary between 80% and 90%.

power jobs in the private sector of Quebec's economy. The ethnic discrimination in the economic sector is clearly reflected in the relative income levels in Quebec. A study done by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (1968) confirmed that in Quebec a Canadian of British origin earns an average yearly salary of \$5,502, but a bilingual British Canadian earns an average of \$4,772, a bilingual French Canadian earns an average salary of \$4,350, while a unilingual French Canadian earns \$3,099.⁵⁰ Thus a unilingual English Canadian earns almost two times as much as a unilingual French Canadian in Quebec. According to one source, this disparity symbolizes that not only are the Québécois, 83 percent of the population, not masters in their own house, they are servants and poorly paid ones at that.⁵¹

The control of Quebec's economy by "foreign elements" and the economic subjugation suffered by the Québécois in their own homeland results in the French Canadian thinking of himself in terms of a colonial minority.⁵² It is this

⁵⁰Chodos and Auf Der Maur, op. cit., pp. 8-9. Possibly an even more telling comparison noted by this source is the fact that Canadians of British origin have incomes 10% higher in every province except Quebec where they earn 40% more than the average.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²The Afro-Asian decolonization process seemed to have had a very marked psychological influence upon French Canadians. Pierre Bourgault, President of the R.I.N., once proclaimed that "there are similarities between French Canadians and the inhabitants of all colonial countries. The nationalist ideology of the R.I.N. furthered this

particular image that is the source of his nationalism.⁵³ Nationalism essentially represents the fact that the French Canadian has become conscious of his minority status, that he has become aware of his dispossession and that he is alienated from the existing social and political structure which supports his subjugation.

In light of the presence of fairly substantial nationalist sentiment, the economic paradox would seem to have had more serious implications in Quebec than it had in Ontario. The existence of this alternative ideology would seem to indicate that the inequities were perceived in broader and more general societal terms and that the ideology rationalizing the existing value structure was unacceptable to large segments of the community.⁵⁴ Hence

analogy by its conception of Quebec as being controlled by English Canadian and American capital along with a domestic English elite. The elite, according to this ideology, maintain their domination over the French population by supporting a class of roi nègres. Richard Jones, Community in Crisis, French Canadian Nationalism in Perspective (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1972), p. 12.

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴While nationalism can be construed in very general terms as a manifestation of the discontent caused by the distributional inequities, it is also necessary to note the changes in the ideological orientation of nationalism which occurred throughout the sixties. Initially nationalism, in both its parliamentary, and extra-parliamentary expression (the R.I.N.), was a middle class phenomenon. The majority of its exponents during the first half of the decade were members of the technocratic middle class who were discontent over their restricted occupational mobility. The Quiet Revolution and the liberals "maitre chez nous" operation did not include proposals for a structural transformation that would have drawn the lower class closer to the mechanisms of economic and social power. On the contrary, it concentrated on such things as the nationalization of privately

the paradox has more direct political ramifications in Quebec.

One can thus see that the factors influencing the way each provincial population perceived the E.P.I. gap in turn may influence the nature of collective violence in that province. If the general economic conditions were relatively prosperous and if the political authority structure and the rationalization of the division of labour and wealth were generally accepted, the aggrieved segments of the population may limit their demands to changes in the specific labour economy i.e. wage demands. The scope of the paradox would thus be defined in a very narrow sense. If perceived in this fashion the attempted resolution of the paradox should take place by collective action for immediate economic gains at the expense of employers. Consequently such action will frequently take the form of strikes over narrow issues such as wages and the violence

owned electricity companies which benefited only certain elements of the population.

The late 60's (approximately 1968) were marked however by a transformation of this ideological orientation. The middle class R.I.N. fell into the background and was replaced by broader based, more radical groups. Possibly the most important influence on the development of nationalism during this period was the increasing radicalization of the labour unions in both social and political matters. The rise of working class consciousness transformed the previously narrow orientation of nationalism to one which called for a complete economic and political transformation of the society. Possibly the best expression of the ideology of this new nationalism was Louis Laberge's contention that "Quebec is an oppressed, colonized and violent society based upon profit for the few with these crushing any movement which threatened their power profit or privileges." Chodos and Auf Der Maur, op. cit., p. 101.

will often break out in strike related scenarios either as a result of strike breaking by police and scabs, or as a result of striker precipitated actions against employers, police and scabs.⁵⁵

If, on the other hand, the population interprets the causes of the paradox in broader terms (indicating a rejection of the present structural inequality) the implications may reach beyond the immediate distribution of resources and involve the social and political structure of the province. In such cases the issues will be defined in more diffuse or general terms. It will no longer simply be a question of a new wage agreement, wider issues will be at stake which only political action can modify. Thus collective action will be directed more frequently towards relevant social political objectives.⁵⁶ Domestic political issues will frequently generate mobilizations for collective violence since their implications for the individual or for those in power are related to the overall social and political context of the economic paradox. Collective action will often involve multiple political and social objectives. Even when violence breaks out over economic issues, they will not be defined in a narrow sense i.e. wages. Rather the issues

⁵⁵This is not to say that violence with political objectives will not occur. However to the extent that these objectives are unrelated to the paradox and do not directly challenge the authority structure, this study will not consider these incidents as political violence.

⁵⁶This means that the issues over which the violence occurred can be related to the paradox or to the fundamental contradictions within the society.

will be broadly defined involving automation, language rights at work etc. Finally if the causes of the economic paradox are seen broadly, that is to say in terms of political and social structures and power, the nature of collective action will take the form of demonstrations where intergroup alliances can be more effectively mobilized to encompass these broader issues.

In the chapter which follows these contentions will be examined using the data for the remaining indicators.

CHAPTER III

This final chapter will be devoted to testing the hypothesis that the nature of collective violence (i.e. form and substance) is intimately related to the way in which the paradox was perceived. In essence this hypothesis has proposed that if the paradox is perceived in narrow terms, that is in terms of being an economic malfunction, e.g. inflation, collective action to resolve this situation should take the form of strikes having the specific objective of enhancing welfare values, e.g. wages, as a means of regaining or compensating for, lost status. While a narrow perception of the paradox does not preclude the occurrence of demonstration violence, this violence will usually be incidental to the attempted resolution of the paradox. In terms of substance most demonstration violence will occur over specific and immediate issues which are for the most part peripheral to the basic contradictions within the society. On the other hand, if the paradox is perceived in broader, or more general terms, that is in terms of the division of labour and wealth in the society, the expression of collective discontent should reach beyond the economic sector and will likely be directed at the established order which is seen as supportive of the inequitable social structure. In such an event collective action will be more

oriented towards demonstrations which can encompass the wider range of issues which are related to the paradox, and the more heterogeneous social elements that it will effect. While demonstrations should be the most prominent form that the attempted resolution of the paradox will take, strike violence will not be totally insignificant. Moreover many strike issues will also reflect the fact that the paradox was perceived in broader terms. Strike issues will often tend to be diffuse having social as well as economic implications.

This study has essentially proposed two levels for analyzing the paradox. First it is presumed that the perception of the paradox will influence the form that the violence will take i.e. strike vs demonstration, and secondly that it will influence the substance of these two scenarios, that is the nature of the issues which each scenario will involve. In order to examine fully this hypothesis the remaining variables in the data set have been organized in terms of their potential relationship with demonstrations and strikes.

I. The Form of Collective Violence in Ontario and Quebec

It would appear from initial indications (Table 7) that the form of collective violence was significantly different in the two provinces. In Quebec a large majority of the violence, (62 percent) occurred in demonstration related scenarios as compared to 28 percent of the violence

which was strike related. In Ontario on the other hand the percentage difference between demonstration related violence (46 percent) and strike related violence (36 percent) was substantially less. The relatively high incidence of demonstration violence and the low incidence of strike violence in Quebec as compared to Ontario would seem to reflect, on a general level, that the perception of the

TABLE 7
SCENARIO OF THE VIOLENCE¹

	Ontario	Quebec
Demonstration	46% (39)	62% (46)
Strike	36% (30)	28% (21)

paradox was much broader in Quebec than it was in Ontario.

As stated however this analysis takes place on two levels. When attention is directed at the more substantive aspects of the violence, i.e. the type and nature of the objectives, the number of insurgents, their socio-economic status, and the intensity of the violence, the association between the perception of the paradox and collective violence in the two provinces is more clearly discernable.

¹The statistics will not total 100% as random incidents have been deleted.

A. The Demonstration

1) Demonstration Objectives:

As a rule demonstrations involve more general societal issues than strikes which are normally directed at a limited and specific sector of society. It is thus assumed that in most cases demonstration objectives would be defined in broader i.e. political, terms. As seen in Table 8 the overwhelming majority of demonstration violence in both provinces had socio-political objectives.² In absolute terms the incidence of violent demonstrations with such objectives was slightly higher in Ontario (83 percent) than it was in Quebec (76 percent). In terms of the societal relevance (level of politicization) of these objectives

TABLE 8
OBJECTIVES OF DEMONSTRATION
RELATED VIOLENCE

	Ontario	Quebec
Political-Social	83% (29)	76% (31)
Economic	17% (6)	24% (10)

however, the figures listed above may be misleading as the actual political content of socio-political objectives in

²All collective violence with socio-political objectives was demonstration related. Although political objectives can also be pursued through such activities as general strikes, this did not occur during this period.

the two provinces was substantially different.³ As a first step in examining the political content of these objectives they have been classed according to their political context i.e. the political situation to which they may be proximately related. The two classifications used for this purpose have previously been designated "domestic political issues" and "foreign political issues."⁴ The apparent difference in the relative importance of foreign issues versus domestic issues in the two provinces is quite striking.

TABLE 9
NATURE OF SOCIO-POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

	Ontario	Quebec
Domestic Issues	41% (14)	85% (29)
Foreign Issues	59% (20)	15% (5)

In Quebec domestic political issues were by far the most salient impetus to political violence. Eighty-five percent of all political violences (40 percent of all violence) during the period 1968-1973 was related to domestic politics

³This study considers the degree of social relevance of an issue to be determined by the proximity of its relationship to basic problems within a society i.e. basic societal contradictions (the paradox). Foreign political problems which are normally beyond the ability of a society to control, or resolve are not considered to have a high degree of social relevance.

⁴See discussion of General Cause, pp. 21-22.

as compared to 15 percent (7 percent of all violence) which was occasioned by foreign political issues. In Ontario however the situation was quite the opposite. Here 41 percent of all political violence (18 percent of all collective violence) was related to domestic issues as opposed to 59 percent (25 percent of all collective violence) which had foreign issues as its impelling force. These figures would seem to be indicative of a rather substantial difference in the level of political consciousness in the two provinces. The relatively high incidence of violence over foreign issues in Ontario, that is issues which were essentially artificial as far as basic societal problems were concerned, would suggest a very narrow conception or superficial understanding of fundamental social contradictions in this province. The prominence of domestic issues in Quebec on the contrary would seem to allude to a broader, and more general, social awareness.

The salience of foreign political issues in Ontario is quite intriguing in that possibly the most characteristic aspect of violence over these issues was, what might be termed, U.S. cultural penetration. A total of 12 incidents 60 percent of all violence over foreign political issues had some relation to policies of the government of the United States. The majority of these incidents were a response to U.S. involvement in South East Asia. In all there were 9 anti war demonstrations (7 in Toronto, 2 in

Ottawa) which resulted in violence.⁵ Moreover a number of these incidents would appear to have been organized to coincide with similar events in the United States, e.g. a violent anti war demonstration which took place in Toronto on November 15, 1969 the Viet Nam Moratorium Day across the U.S. It might be that some of these coincidences were due to the existence of close ties between anti-war groups in the U.S., and similar groups in Toronto where a large number of active war resisters resided.⁶ Other factors, especially the influence of the American Media, to which Ontario is heavily exposed, can also be presumed to have played a part.

Another American policy, possibly of more direct concern to Canadians, which engendered demonstration violence of notable proportions in Ontario, was the testing of a nuclear device on Amchitka Island.⁷

Not all violence over foreign political issues however was American oriented. A few of the remaining incidents were seemingly the product of animosities which existed in a number of ethnic communities in Toronto, especially the

⁵Includes demonstrations over the killings at Kent State in May of 1970.

⁶A Toronto group called the Viet Nam Mobilization Committee with apparent connections with the Viet Nam Mobilization Committee in the U.S. was responsible for organizing 4 of the above mentioned demonstrations.

⁷The Toronto Viet Nam Mobilization Committee was also involved in organizing one of the Amchitka demonstrations in which violence occurred.

Eastern European Community. Representative of these incidents was an assault by members of the Croatian community on the Yugoslav Embassy.⁸ Another example of such hostilities was the violent anti Kosygin protest by members of Toronto's Ukranian community.⁹

In contrast to the violence over foreign issues, the majority of which possessed something of a common denominator in its opposition to American foreign policies, the incidents which occurred over domestic issues in Ontario had few discernable common characteristics or goals. There did occur a couple of violent incidents which were related to the political situation in Quebec at the time.¹⁰ In addition to this there was also the occasional women's rights demonstration which resulted in violence.¹¹ There were however no recurrent factors in any of these incidents which would suggest the existence of a credible extraparliamentary opposition. Possibly the only notable characteristic of this type of violence was the frequent presence of a political group known as the Edmund Burke Society (later the

⁸Toronto, November 28, 1971.

⁹Toronto, October 25, 1971.

¹⁰The first of these two incidents occurred in Toronto on October 12, 1969. The protest was engendered by issues in the previous weeks Montreal rioting, and by what demonstrators referred to as the "Facist repression of the people of Quebec." The second incident occurred in Toronto on March 28, 1971, as result of a rally in support of political rights in Quebec.

¹¹Toronto, March 3, 1971, and Waterloo, March 23, 1972. Both protests incidently occurred during dinners which Prime Minister Trudeau was attending.

Western Guard), a right wing extremist group which drew its membership from the large anti communist Eastern European element in the Toronto area. Almost 43 percent (6) of all violence over domestic issues involved the Burke Society in some capacity. Most of these incidents were a product of an almost ritualistic ideological combat between the E.B.S. and various leftist elements, especially the Communist Party of Canada. Characteristic of some of the almost ludicrous activities of this group were incidents such as their attempt to exorcize Maoist influence in Toronto's Chinatown (July 11, 1971) during which they ransacked a Chinese bookstore, and their disruption of a dinner marking the hundredth anniversary of the birth of Lenin (Toronto April 4, 1970). The Western Guard received some kind of poetic justice for the last gesture when on July 29th, 1973 their headquarters was attacked by the Communist Party of Canada and other leftist groups during the Guard's celebration of Mussolini's 90th birthday.¹²

Generally the political objectives of collective violence in Ontario during this period appear to have been of a very narrow and immediate nature, i.e. they were usually associated with very specific, and unrelated events or issues, rather than general structural conditions. Furthermore these violent protests seldom directly contested

¹²The activities of the Edmund Burke Society were not limited to domestic conflicts. Five of the 7 violent anti-war demonstrations in Toronto involved the E.B.S. as pro war demonstrators.

the established order. On the contrary a majority of the violence was symbolically directed at extra-societal elements, e.g. the U.S. government. Thus overall, demonstration violence in Ontario was not consistently related to the central contradictions in the society, but instead involved socio-politically peripheral issues. It would even seem a reasonable suggestion that few of the incidents actually constituted political violence as defined by this study.¹³

The nature of socio-political objectives in Quebec was substantially different in a number of ways. First of all foreign political issues would seem to have been irrelevant to Québécois. Only 15 percent of collective violence with socio-political objectives during the period 1968-1973 was related to foreign issues.¹⁴

The great majority of incidents with socio-political objectives in Quebec were related to domestic issues. Moreover 87 percent of these domestic issues were specifically relevant to Quebec Provincial politics.¹⁵ Furthermore most of this violence occurred over matters which can be

¹³Political in the sense of implicating the regime's authority structure.

¹⁴In contrast to Ontario, there were only 3 violent anti war demonstrations observed in Quebec.

¹⁵Possibly the most outstanding incident of social violence which had no direct relation to provincial politics was the destruction of the computer center at Sir George Williams University. The issue which occasioned this incident was the alleged racism of a member of the university's faculty.

associated with the growing nationalist movement in Quebec, that is the desire of French Canadians to repossess their "society" from foreign and English Canadian control in order to accomodate their aspirations and control their own destiny.¹⁶ Possibly the most significant reflections of this feeling of ethnic alienation were the violent language demonstrations which occurred in Quebec between 1968 and 1971. Twenty-three percent (7) of all domestic political violence in Quebec occurred over this issue. The violence began in 1968 in response to the government of Quebec's intention to present legislation to protect the linguistic rights of its Anglophone minority. In 1969, the most violent year of this era in Quebec, four incidents erupted over this issue. In March of that year thousands of unilinguists attempted to occupy McGill University, a major symbol of the English presence in Quebec. They were opposed by the Montreal police, the Quebec Provincial Police and the Canadian Army. A few months later (September) two rather vicious incidents occurred in St. Leonard, a suburb of Montreal. This time unilinguists confronted Italian-Canadians who preferred that their children be educated in

¹⁶A 1963 survey conducted of separatist sentiment among French Canadians showed that of the 40% of those interviewed who claimed to be separatist, none would countenance the use of violence towards that goal. Frank Wilson, "French Canadian Separatism" Western Political Quarterly Vol. XX, March, 1961, p. 126. Throughout the early and mid 1960's most separatist violence took the form of small scale terrorism. In 1968, however, along with the re-emergence of terrorism which had fallen off in the previous year, the mass violent demonstration became the most prominent expression of nationalist discontent.

English. These confrontations had some devastating consequences.¹⁷ The subsequent enactment by the Provincial Legislature of Bill 63 guaranteeing minority language rights evoked further violence later that year with the issue remaining a point of violent contention into the seventies.¹⁸

Another major vehicle for violent nationalist protest was the St. Jean Baptiste Day festivities in Montreal. Between 1968 and 1973 there were three incidents of substantial collective violence associated with this event.¹⁹

Thus the situation in Quebec with regard to collective violence with political objectives was a rather impressive contrast to that which existed in Ontario. Unlike Ontario, such violence in Quebec was characterized by both a discernable uniformity of purpose and a fairly recognizable extra-parliamentary opposition.²⁰ More

¹⁷The first of these incidents occurred on September 3, 1969. La Presse in this instance claimed there were "numerous" casualties. In the incident which occurred on September 10, La Presse reported 100 insurgent casualties and 51 arrests.

¹⁸The first major violent protest over the enactment of Bill 63 occurred on October 31, 1969 in Quebec City. Another incident related to language rights occurred on October 16, 1971 in Montreal. The issue at this time was provincial legislation that would reorganize school boards on Montreal Island in such a way as to guarantee English language instruction.

¹⁹Separatist violence was observed to have been associated with the St. Jean Baptiste Celebrations in 1968, 1969, 1971.

²⁰While the opposition was definitely recognizable, it is difficult to say how uniform it was. Up until the late 60's the major vehicle for separatist sentiment had been the "Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance National"

important, however, was the fact that the violence over domestic political issues in Quebec focused directly on the paradox in terms of its principle manifestation in this province; the quasi-colonial system and its ethnically biased division of labour which allowed an English minority to dominate the society. The anti-English language

(R.I.N.). While the R.I.N. had engaged in violent protests notably the aforementioned "Samedi de la matraque" incident its tone had been basically middle class and peaceful. In the late 60's however, the opposition took the form of a number of leftist groups with ideological stances ranging from separatism to a unique combination of Fannon and Guevara. In 1967 René Levesque left the Liberal Party after the rejection of his manifesto "un Québec souverain dans une nouvelle union" and formed the Mouvement Souvereinté Association. 1967 also saw an open split between the Bourgault and Ferreti wings of the R.I.N. The radical left in the R.I.N. led by Mme. Ferreti left and formed the "Front de Liberation Populaire" (F.L.P.). (The R.I.N. subsequently disbanded in 1968.) The F.L.P. became a coalition of several groups and tendencies, with a Marxist-Leninist platform, and a strategy aimed towards the seizure of power by the working class. It was intended to be a semi underground party of the streets ready to use violence. Associated with it were such groups as the "Mouvement Syndical Politique" (M.S.P.), le "Mouvement de Liberation du Taxi," le "Comité Vallieres-Gagnon" and le "Comité pour l'Indépendance et Socialisme." The F.L.P. supplied the muscle for many of the demonstrations of 1968 and 1969.

Another group which emerged in 1968 and was the major force behind most of the violence over the language issue was the "Mouvement pour l'Intégration scolaire" which subsequently became the "Ligue pour l'Intégration scolaire." This was a group demanding that French be the only language of instruction in Quebec schools. Originally formed to contest school board elections in the Montreal suburb of St. Leonard, it was soon involved in McGill-Francais and most of the other incidents of violence over language rights.

There were also a number of smaller groups like the "Chevaliers de l'Indépendance," a group geared for street brawling.

There was a good deal of cross-membership among these activist organizations, and groups like the F.L.P. often served as umbrella organizations in some of the large mobilizations.

demonstrations, and the nationalist orientation of most of the domestic political violence all indicate, to varying degrees, a collective attempt to resolve the basic societal contradictions in Quebec.

Unlike political objectives which are of such general character that demonstrations are the normal extra-parliamentary vehicle for their articulation, economic issues are normally of a much more restricted, and immediate nature which often precludes their being salient to elements outside of the particular work setting to which these issues are related. Hence the normal channel for the articulation of economic grievances is the strike which involves a much more limited mobilization than demonstrations, both in terms of the nature (members of the affected union), and number of insurgents. Sometimes however economic issues may be perceived as having implications beyond the industrial sector, in which case they may have a tendency to be expressed in demonstrations which can more easily accommodate the various social elements affected by the larger significance of the issue. There are essentially two general reasons why economic issues may be seen as having implications beyond the industrial sector, each of which will influence the character and substance of the subsequent demonstrations differently. On the one hand it may simply be a reflection of the fact that government is involved in the economy through its legislative, and fiscal and monetary powers, (e.g. minimum wage legislation, workman's compensation

insurance etc.). If such is the case the objectives of the demonstration should be directed at a specific governmental power or policy. On the other hand, economic issues may be associated with the fundamental structure of society and its division of wealth, power, and status. In this event there will be a much greater political and social content to the demonstrations, e.g. a demonstration against the capitalist exploitation of the workers. Overall the substance of economic demonstrations may be interpreted as another indication of the way in which the paradox was perceived.

As Table 8 indicates, Quebec had a slightly higher incidence of violent demonstrations over economic issues. Twenty-four percent of demonstration incidents in Quebec were of an economic nature as compared to 17 percent in Ontario. The difference is further magnified however, when one considers that in Quebec 32 percent of all violence occasioned by economic issues was demonstration-related, whereas in Ontario only 17 percent of these issues were related to demonstration incidents. The initial inference that can be drawn from these figures is that economic issues were, on a general level, perceived by the working class as having broader societal implications in Quebec than they did in Ontario.²¹

²¹The year 1971 is a good example. In both provinces this year had the highest level of economic paradox. In Ontario this was the most violent year in terms of the number of incidents. It was also the biggest year for violence with economic objectives. Thirty-eight% (14) of all violence

In terms of the political content of the issues involved however the above difference was really much greater. The six violent economic demonstrations which occurred in Ontario exhibited a very low level of political content. Most of these incidents had very narrow and immediate objectives related directly to the enhancement of welfare variables, e.g. protest over the level of workman's compensation and unemployment payments.²² Generally speaking these incidents did not go far beyond the restricted scope of market unionism. In no sense was it evident that they sought to challenge the legitimacy of the existing division of labour. Nor was there a discernable connection between any of these incidents which might suggest the existence of an active labour movement. Thus

in Ontario with economic objectives occurred in this year. Moreover 1971 was the second biggest year for demonstration incidents in Ontario. Twenty-three % of all demonstration violence occurred in this year. In all there were 9 incidents with political objectives and 14 with economic objectives. At the same time there were 9 demonstrations and 14 strikes. During this same year in Quebec there were 5 incidents of violence with economic objectives, 3 of which were demonstration related.

²²Two good examples of the character of economic demonstration incidents in Ontario were a student-worker rally on behalf of striking Dunlop Company employees (April 2, 1970, Toronto), and a demonstration directed at the Ontario Workman's Compensation Board (August 22, 1973, Toronto). In the first incident the insurgents were protesting the Dunlop Company's intended shutdown of its Toronto operation which it considered uneconomical. The demonstrators were demanding that the Ontario government exert political pressure on the company (a multi-national corporation with operations in 28 countries) to keep the plant open. The Compensation Board incident involved a direct assault on the Board's Toronto office by insurgents protesting low compensation payments.

violent demonstrations over economic issues appear to have had only very limited political significance in Ontario.

In Quebec however the situation was once more quite different. Here violent economic demonstrations would seem to have been a reflection of the development of the labour movement into a major political force in the province, a sign that the workers were beginning to aggregate to pursue their class interests (i.e. a resolution of the structural inequities in the system). The first major economic dispute which resulted in significant demonstration related violence was the Montreal Taxi strike. This conflict had very evident socio-political, as well as economic, implications. The Murray Hill Limousine Company, the target of the strike, was considered by the strikers, and Quebec's radical left, which rallied to their support, to epitomize the economic, and political privileges of the English capitalists.²³ Three incidents of demonstration violence occurred over this issue. The last of these took on the dimension of a small war.²⁴

²³Murray Hill held all sorts of privileges and monopolies; it had the lucrative airport concession, deals with the major hotels, access to the city's Mount Royal Park, tolerance from the police when double parked in front of busy hotels, and a fat charter business. In addition Murray Hill ran what amounted to a taxi service with several hundred vehicles even though it didn't own a single municipal permit. Chodos and Auf Der Maur, op. cit., p. 23.

²⁴The incident which occurred on October 7, 1969 resulted in one policeman dead, 5 people wounded, numerous other casualties, and heavy property damage. After the incident at the Murray Hill garage, many of the demonstrators descended upon downtown Montreal, and with the police on strike, engaged in what the press called the worst riot since the Maurice Richard Hockey Riot of March 17, 1956. The ensuing damage ran into the millions.

Although most of organized labour was still basically unpoliticized at this time as evidenced by its aloofness from the Murray Hill struggle, the lesson and significance of Murray Hill did not seem to have been lost on them. By 1969 the C.N.T.U. which had for the most part previously hesitated to take political action (with the possible exception of the Montreal Central Council under Michel Chartrand) issued a manifesto calling for a second front to sensitize people to what it considered to be the great problems of society. The emergence of labour into the political arena was also a turning point in the evolution of nationalism. Previous to this political opposition forces in the province had been almost exclusively based on middle class French Canadian discontent over their restricted occupational and status mobility. As labour became more politicized however, this orientation changed. The new opposition was developing as a working class movement based on working class aspirations for a more equitable distribution of socio-economic resources, as well as the nationalists' desire for a Quebec free of outside dominance, in essence a complete structural transformation of Quebec society.²⁵

²⁵ About this time the various labour unions began to form common fronts over a number of issues. One incident of violence which reflects this trend occurred on May 1, 1970 when the C.N.T.U., the Q.F.L. and the Quebec Teachers' Federation, in a show of union solidarity, organized a march in support of Montreal's postal truck drivers and the strikers of Maple Leaf Creameries.

It wasn't until mid 1971 however that one could actually speak in terms of a working class movement. Once again collective violence was an important factor in this development. During 1971 the government of Quebec unwittingly provided the impetus for the unions to forego the traditional rivalries which had for long consumed their energies, and form a viable opposition. It was the so-called "La Presse Affair" that furnished this opportunity.²⁶ This

²⁶On the surface the La Presse dispute could be traced to the issue of automation and technological change versus job security. The paper was intending to introduce a sophisticated computerized printing process which would eliminate a good proportion of the newspaper's normal work force. Management's absolute refusal to negotiate with the affected unions, and the lockout after the legally required negotiating period expired, however soon brought to light its more sinister intentions. The management, it seems, was out to provoke a strike by the other La Presse unions, whose contracts were not due to expire until the new year, as a way of getting rid of the paper's journalists who would have respected the picket lines and lost their jobs. According to one former La Presse reporter, Jean de Guise, there was a very conscious feeling among the editorial staff that management felt it was time La Presse returned to being a sedate family newspaper, avoiding controversial subjects. This reflected the thinking in some circles where there existed a desire to put a lid on the Quiet Revolution, and the accompanying attacks on the status quo.

If one considers the major antagonist in this conflict, the picture tends to become quite clear. The Power Corporation has numerous media holdings in Quebec, controlling three other dailies, the Montreal region's three largest weeklies, two Sunday papers, a total of 12 other regional weeklies, ten radio and television stations, a film company, and a publishing house. The Power Corporation is also believed to be one of the Liberal Party's main financial backers, and has very close contacts with the provincial government, often loaning its executives to various ministries. Thus the La Presse affair could be seen as symbolizing a sort of power grab to control information in Quebec in order to stifle the voices of change.

The strike itself dragged on for months as management maintained its intransigent position with the municipal and provincial governments lending their support. The result was numerous acts of harassment and sabotage and some

incident pitted all of Quebec's organized labour backed by the progressive movement, against the Power Corporation of Canada (which owned La Presse), one of the greatest financial empires in the country, supported by the established political powers in Quebec and Montreal. The unionists viewed this confrontation as representing the collusion of political and economic power against the working man. The resultant repressive violence was savage, and the casualties extensive.²⁷ Labour however emerged from this incident united as never before. The colour of the new opposition was indicated in another C.N.T.U. manifesto produced in 1971. The now famous "Ne comptons que sur nos propres moyens" was substantially more radical than the previous one, calling unabashedly for the overthrow of capitalism and power to the working class as a means of resolving basic social inequities.

In 1972 the showdown between the state and the new opposition finally occurred. In April of that year the government of Quebec confronted a common front rival determined to destroy it. The series of incidents which resulted assumed the dimensions of a veritable class war. A common front of labour comprised of the Confederation of National Trade Unions, the Quebec Federation of Labour, and the Quebec Teachers' Union, had been organized to press demands

spectacular mass violence.

For an excellent account of this affair, see Chodos and Auf Der Maur, op. cit., pp. 94-107.

²⁷ The human and physical cost of the La Presse affair were estimated at 250 plus insurgent casualties and \$100,000 plus in damage.

for the needs of 210,000 public and para-public employees.²⁸ While the trade union movement had initially mounted its confrontation within the collective bargaining process, the public service strike brought it into conflict with a government pledged to safeguard a system based on profit.²⁹ The strike was brought to an end through the use of repressive legislation, and the jailing of numerous unionists, including the leaders of the Common Front. Labour's response to this was an unprecedented revolt. In the weeks that followed the arrests, thousands of workers staged walk-outs, occupations, and violent demonstrations.³⁰

The difference between violent economic demonstrations in Ontario and Quebec had evident implications as far as the perception of the paradox was concerned. In Ontario economic demonstration incidents had a very narrow focus aimed at rectifying a specific economic problem. The expression of economic grievances through demonstration incidents was not as much a politicization of the discontent in terms of posing a challenge to the economic and social structure of the society, as it was a reflection of government presence in the economic sector.

²⁸Chodos and Auf Der Maur, op. cit., p. 111.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Notable violent demonstrations occurred in Sept Isles on May 10th, and May 15th, 1972, and in Quebec City on May 10th. The primary target of these demonstrations in both cities was the court house.

In Quebec however, a broad perception of the paradox was evident in the development of labour into a social movement and subsequent incidents like the "La Presse Affair" and the Common Front Strike, which involved a direct confrontation with the dominant segments of the society, and which focused on the structural and distributional inequities between the two parties.

2) The Number of Participants in Demonstration Violence in Ontario and Quebec:

Another assumption made by this study in its hypothesis is that a broader perception of the paradox implies a more general societal or more intense discontent. A general indication of how the paradox was perceived can be obtained from the dimension of demonstration violence as measured by the number of insurgents. As one can see from Table 10, the dimension of demonstration violence was substantially different in the two provinces. Violent demonstrations in Quebec mobilized twice as many insurgents as they did in Ontario which may be taken as evidence that discontent was much more intense and broadly focused, affecting a wider range of social elements in Quebec, thus coinciding with a broader perception of the paradox.

The variable Number of Insurgents can be further used as another indication of the salience of the various issues by classing it according to the type of issue involved. In Ontario for example foreign political issues mobilized five times as many insurgents as either domestic

political or economic issues. Both of the latter appear to have been relatively insignificant in terms of insurgent mobilization. The restricted mobilizations for these two types of issues would again suggest their limited relevance to the society.

In Quebec, on the other hand, domestic issues were by far the most significant impetus for insurgent mobilization. However both economic and foreign issues occasioned the mobilizations of large numbers of insurgents. Violent demonstrations over economic issues averaged 1,200 insurgents, and foreign issues, although statistically insignificant in terms of the number of incidents averaged 1,000 insurgents per incident. In light of the interrelationship between many domestic political and economic issues in Quebec, the sizable insurgent mobilizations for both types of issues would seem to be another indication that the paradox had more general societal implications in Quebec than it did in Ontario.³¹

³¹As collective violence basically involves a group dynamic, it is also interesting to note the behavior of the authorities in the conflicts, i.e. the use of coercive forces. While this variable may have some theoretical potential if developed further, its use at this level is purely speculative. One might however propose that the number of coercive forces employed and the ratio of these forces to insurgents may be some indication of how the dominant segments in the society viewed the salience of the various issues and the threats to the status quo that these issues posed, i.e. the eventuality that demonstrations over these issues might result in violence. It may be assumed that the greater the perceived likelihood of violence the higher the ratio of coercive forces to demonstrators would be, i.e. a show of force as a possible deterrent.

TABLE 11
LEVELS OF COERCIVE FORCE

	Ontario	Quebec
Average number of coercive forces in demonstration violence	172	421
Overall ratio of coercive forces to demonstrators	1/7	1/6
Average coercive forces in Forps incidents	388	157
Ratio to demonstrators in Forps incidents	1/5	1/6
Average coercive forces in Damps incidents	36	580
Ratio to demonstrators in Damps incidents	1/11	1/6
Average coercive forces in Immeccan incidents	15	106
Ratio to demonstrators in Immeccan incidents	1/27	1/11

If one follows this argument it is possible to explain some of the differences in the ratio of coercive forces to demonstrators that the various issues would seem to have elicited. For example foreign political issues the most salient cause of demonstration violence in Ontario in terms of both incidents, and number of insurgents had a 1 to 5 police to insurgent ratio. Domestic issues which follow in importance in Ontario caused a 1 to 11 ratio and economic issues which were the least salient cause of demonstration violence evoked a 1 to 27 ratio.

As far as Quebec is concerned however, this argument would seem to break down a bit. While the most salient type of issues from the insurgents' viewpoint (domestic) elicited a 1 to 6 ratio of police to demonstrators, so did foreign political incidents the least salient. Moreover economic issues which were second in importance in terms of the

TABLE 10
AVERAGE NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS
IN DEMONSTRATION INCIDENTS*

	Ontario	Quebec
All demonstrations	1,300	2,600
Demonstrations over domestic issues	400	3,500
Demonstrations over foreign issues	2,100	1,000
Demonstrations over economic issues	400	1,200

*All figures rounded.

3) The Socio-Economic Status of the Demonstrators:

Another factor possibly more directly indicative of the pervasiveness of discontent in the two provinces is the socio-economic status of the demonstrators. This indicator also reflects, to an extent, the level of working class consciousness in the society. As seen in Table 12,

number of incidents and insurgents had a 1 to 11 ratio. It is difficult to state exactly what the implications of this high foreign political issue ratio are. It may simply be an indication that experiences with these demonstrations, especially anti-war demonstrations, elsewhere in Canada and the U.S. made Quebec authorities apprehensive or heightened their expectations of violence provoking a stronger response. In light of the character of domestic issues in Quebec, however, the high ratio of police to insurgents could be seen as indicating that the regime perceived these issues as a direct threat both to public order and to their authority.

demonstration violence in Ontario was largely a student phenomenon. Ninety-three percent of all demonstration incidents in this province had student involvement. Working class elements, on the other hand, were involved in only 18 percent of such incidents. Furthermore when working class involvement is considered in terms of demonstrations over non economic issues, this percentage declines to 4 percent.³² On the one hand these figures may be indicative

TABLE 12
SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS OF DEMONSTRATORS

	Ontario	Quebec
% of incidents with student involvement	93% (25)	69% (18)
% of incidents with blue collar involvement	18% (7)	30% (14)

of a low level of class consciousness and the narrow focus of trade union activity. They would also seem to be further reflective of the limited scope of demonstration issues in Ontario in terms of their relevance to the average individual.

In Quebec the situation was perceptibly different. Student involvement in demonstration violence in Quebec was substantially less than in Ontario. In Quebec 69 percent of

³²The figure is based on 22 observations of which 1 involved blue collar elements.

these incidents were observed as involving students, whereas working class elements were involved in 30 percent of all demonstration incidents.³³ In further contrast to Ontario, blue collar elements in Quebec participated in 21 percent of the incidents with socio-political objectives.³⁴ This clearly indicates that demonstration incidents in Quebec involved more heterogeneous elements, which further implies a broader conception on the part of the Québécois of relevant social problems.

4) The Intensity of Demonstration Incidents:

A final indication that the character of discontent was different in the two provinces was the intensity of the ensuing violence as measured by the damage. As noted earlier, the indicators used here are of questionable accuracy. Moreover a limited number of observations precludes one from making any kind of definitive assessment. Based on the observations in Table 13 however demonstration violence would appear to have been of greater intensity in Quebec.

³³As determined by the research project which this study drew upon for its data, 93% of all demonstrations in Quebec between 1963 and 1967 involved students. The statistics for the period 1968-1973 would thus seem to verify the contention that in the late 60's and early 70's other elements of the society began to mobilize for violence.

³⁴This figure is based on 19 observations of which 4 involved blue collar elements.

TABLE 13

INTENSITY OF DEMONSTRATION VIOLENCE
(MEDIAN AVERAGES)³⁵

	Ontario	Quebec
% of incidents involving anti-personal violence	64%	37%
Number of arrests per incident	5	15
Number of insurgent casualties	10	30
Number of coercive casualties	5	5
Value of property damage	\$500	\$2,500

Although the incidence of anti personal violence was substantially greater in Ontario, the human damage appears to have been minimal. Property damage was likewise insignificant in Ontario. The relatively low intensity of violence in this province again seems to suggest that the issues over which it occurred were of very limited and superficial relevance.

While Quebec had noticably fewer incidents with anti personal violence (37 percent), the average incident had a significantly greater number of casualties. Property

³⁵ A median average was employed here because of the wide divergence over a few observations. The actual averages per incident for the above values are number of arrests, Quebec 36, Ontario 8; number of insurgent casualties, Quebec 48, Ontario 10; number of coercive casualties, Quebec 16, Ontario 5; Property damage, Quebec \$200,000, Ontario \$4,300.

damage was also substantially higher in this province than it was in Ontario. This greater damage would seem to be related to the pervasiveness of the discontent and to its ideological character. Theoretically the more ideological the issues (i.e. nationalism) the more irreconcilable and stubborn, and hence the more radical the conflict. The more emotional the support that the ideology is able to command, the more rigid and closed it will be in terms of accomodation and tolerance of opposition.³⁶ Moreover, the existence of such an alternative ideology is a very direct threat to the state and those who have a vested interest in the status quo, causing them to react in kind and further escalating the conflict.

The preceding discussion would appear to give a rather clear indication that demonstration violence was, in terms of focus and instrumentality, a completely different phenomenon in the two provinces.

In Ontario most violent demonstrations were of superficial relevance to the general community. This was demonstrated not only by the issues over which such violence occurred (e.g. foreign issues) but also by the relatively low level of insurgent mobilization especially for domestic political and economic demonstrations, and by the restricted intergroup mobilization (the fact that in a large majority of the incidents, the insurgents were mostly students).

³⁶George Simmel, The Web of Intergroup Conflict (Glencoe Ill.: The Free Press, 1955), p. 41.

Another possible indication of the artificiality or superficiality of demonstration related issues was what may be described as the low emotive content of the violence as measured by casualties and damage.³⁷ Generally, then, demonstration incidents in Ontario exhibited few if any traits that would directly link this form of collective action to the economic paradox.

In Quebec however demonstration incidents over both political and economic issues centered on the paradox with general consistency. The existence of a credible alternative ideology which defined the paradox in terms of both an ethnic (nationalism), and structural (the labour movement) problem, provided the context for a majority of these incidents. As a result, the violence was much more pervasive, involving a greater diversity of social elements than it did in Ontario. It was also substantially more intense as measured by its human and physical cost.

B. The Strike

The other major expression of collective discontent examined by this study was the strike. It was proposed in the hypothesis that if the paradox was perceived in terms of being purely an economic problem, e.g. inflation, collective action would have more of a tendency to take the

³⁷ It would seem a logical proposition that issues of fundamental relevance to the society would be more emotionally charged and the conflict of much greater intensity. In Simmel's view, it is probable that the hostility drive adds itself as a reinforcement to controversies which are due to concrete causes. Ibid., p. 32.

form of strikes directed at the immediate, and often localized (its manifestation within a particular work setting) resolution of this problem. It was also proposed that while a broad perception of the paradox does not preclude strike incidents, many such incidents will be more broadly oriented, often combining issues which have social as well as economic significance.

Statistically the incidence of strike violence was slightly greater in Ontario than it was in Quebec. Thirty-six percent (30) of all collective violence in Ontario took place during strikes as compared to 28 percent (21) in Quebec (Table 7). While this may be presumed as a further indication that collective action had a narrower focus in Ontario, once again the statistics understate the actual difference.

1) Strike Objectives:

On a more substantive level, one can see that the nature of strike objectives was remarkably dissimilar in the two provinces (Table 14). In Ontario 50 percent of the objectives of strike violence comprised the traditional demand for higher wages. While another 44 percent of these objectives were classed as diffuse (e.g. overtime, sick pay, etc.) these too in most cases involved contract issues. Hence most strike incidents in Ontario may be interpreted as attempts to directly enhance welfare values as a means of immediately compensating for the perceived effects of

the paradox.³⁸ In Quebec however only 12 percent of the incidents occurred over wage demands. Here the overwhelming majority (88 percent) of strike violence occurred over

TABLE 14
CHARACTER OF STRIKE OBJECTIVES

	Ontario	Quebec
Seize economic goods	6%	0
Change economic distribution	50%	12%
Diffuse economic objectives	44%	88%

diffuse issues. Moreover diffuse objectives in Quebec were of quite a different character than those in Ontario. In Quebec many strike objectives were a mixture of economic and social, especially nationalist, issues such as language rights, foreign control, union recognition etc.³⁹ Thus strike related violence in Quebec often demonstrated a more

³⁸ Archetypical of strike incidents in Ontario was the violence which occurred during the Consumer Glass strike in Toronto on July 20, 1973. The demands of the strikers in this instance involved a salary increase, a cost of living allowance and a pension plan. Violence broke out when the 90 pickets attempted to prevent police escorted trucks from entering the plant where they would be loaded by students and non striking employers.

³⁹ The violence which accompanied the 7-Up strike in Montreal (February 27, 1968) is a representative example of incidents over such diffuse issues. Employees of this company had been mainly trying to negotiate the issue of union recognition with the U.S. owned firm since the summer of 1964. By 1968 the dispute had taken on political, language and anti U.S. overtones. See Globe and Mail (Toronto) February 28, 1968, p. B2. The violence during this strike

generalized conception of the paradox and related societal problems as many of the issues which occasioned strike related violence in this province were beyond the traditional purview of market unionism.

2) Number of Insurgents in Strike
Related Violence:

A further indication of the broader relevance of strike issues in Quebec as compared to Ontario during this period was the number of insurgents which were mobilized for strike incidents in the respective provinces. Although strike violence in Ontario was more significant in terms of the number of incidents than it was in Quebec, the violence in Quebec was of a much greater dimension. An incident of

TABLE 15
LEVEL OF INSURGENT MOBILIZATION
FOR STRIKE INCIDENTS

	Ontario	Quebec
Average number of insurgents	210	760

strike violence in Quebec involved on the average 760 participants, more than three times as many as were involved in Ontario. The restricted mobilizations exhibited by strike

erupted when the 100 strikers and their 2,000 sympathizers attempted to set fire to the factory. Terrorist's bombs were also placed in nearby mailboxes.

incidents in Ontario may be attributed to the specific relevance of the strike objectives in this province to a particular work setting which may have inhibited the recruitment of elements from outside of that setting. This would seem to be further reflective of the fact that the elements who perceived the paradox as an economic problem tried to resolve it within a variety of different work settings, i.e., there did not seem to be a great deal of intra working class or inter union mobilizations. In Quebec however the relatively large number of insurgents involved in the average strike incident would seem to reflect the fact that many strike issues had extra-economic implications, and thus often involved common fronts and political groups.⁴⁰

3) The Socio-Economic Status of Participants in Strike Incidents:

It is of course naturally assumed that the major elements in strike related incidents in both provinces would have been of blue collar status. It is interesting to note however the extent to which another prominent element "the socially conscious student" participated in strike related violence.

⁴⁰The 7-Up strike (February 27, 1968, Montreal) involved groups such as the R.I.N. "le Parti Communiste," the C.N.T.U., the Q.F.L. and the M.S.A.

TABLE 16
PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC
STATUS OF INSURGENTS IN STRIKE
VIOLENCE

	Ontario	Quebec
Exclusively blue collar	70% (21)	81% (17)
Student involvement	30% (9)	14% (3)


While there was student involvement in strike related violence in Quebec this would not appear to have been as substantial as in Ontario where 30 percent of strike related incidents had some student involvement. Moreover in a number of cases student participation was quite formidable. For example in the Peterborough Examiner strike of November and December 1968, the striking Newspaper Guild was unable to obtain picket line support from the unions in Peterborough. Thus it found itself relying heavily on students from universities such as Toronto, Trent, and Waterloo. In the latter stages of the strike the pickets were almost exclusively students.⁴¹ An interesting sidelight of student participation in this dispute was the resurrection of the Industrial Workers of the World by the radical student movement at Waterloo. This

⁴¹In the incident which occurred on December 5th, 250 of the 270 pickets were students.

group was quite prominent in the last month of the strike. Student participation also reached significant proportions in the Texpak strike in Brantford during September and October of 1971. Many of the insurgents in this strike were York University students.

The high level of student participation in strike violence in Ontario has some very interesting implications regarding working class consciousness in this province.⁴²


⁴² An indication of the level of working class consciousness as well as the character of the labour movement in Ontario can be obtained from the following graph which considers blue collar involvement in collective violence in light of the E.P.I. for 1968-1973.



In this graph one can see that there was an interesting relationship between the E.P.I. and blue collar involvement in violence. In 5 of the 6 years when the E.P.I. changed, the level of blue collar involvement changed accordingly. (1973 being the exception.) This might suggest that the working class in Ontario had a very superficial perception of the E.P.I. and was thus only interested in the immediate resolution of economic grievances.

As noted earlier in this chapter, this consciousness was apparently quite weak as reflected by the rather meager participation of blue collar elements in demonstration incidents, especially political demonstrations. In the mid and late 1960's when working class consciousness across most of North America was perceived to be relatively low, elements of the student left, especially groups like the Young Socialist Alliance and the Students for a Democratic Society

If a similar graph is constructed for Quebec it would seem to lend some credence to the argument that labour in Quebec was developing a social consciousness.



In 1968 and 1969 blue collar involvement followed the E.P.I. pattern. In 1970 as mentioned, labour was starting to make the transition and possibly for this reason and others previously outlined (i.e. the War Measures Act) blue collar involvement may have been restricted. It is the last 3 years that are interesting. Note that labour involvement rose dramatically in 1971 the year in which the E.P.I. reached its highest point but that it continued to rise as the E.P.I. dropped. This could be construed as a signal that the labour movement was no longer responding to fluctuations in the economy but was attempting the transition from market unionism to a social movement.

took it upon themselves to assist in its development. This was attempted through a grass roots approach in which students forged links with the working class by actively sympathizing with its problems, participating in its labour disputes etc. It was foreseen that once such ties were established, the student left serving as a vanguard would lead the workers to abandon their parochial concerns.⁴³ Student participation in strike violence in Ontario would seem to have been an indication of such activity. Essentially what the students were trying to do in Ontario was to broaden the worker's perception of the paradox, that is to ultimately make them aware of its political implications.

4) The Intensity of Strike Related Violence:

Although strike violence would appear on the surface to have been of similar intensity in terms of human cost in both Ontario and Quebec. When considered in terms of the ratio of casualties to insurgent and coercive forces, the intensity seems to have been greater in Ontario.⁴⁴ In light of the character of the issues and the number of insurgents

⁴³The fact that workers were not always desirous of such support was evidenced by the behavior of striking railway workers during their march on Parliament Hill on August 30th, 1973. While strikers inside the House of Commons were scuffling with police, strikers outside were punching out student leftist and Communist Party of Canada members, who had turned out to support them.

⁴⁴Ontario had 1 insurgent casualty for every 21 insurgents and 1 coercive casualty for every 8 police. Quebec had 1 insurgent casualty for every 76 insurgents and no observed coercive casualties.

per strike incident in Quebec this is difficult to explain. One possible explanation of the intensity of personal violence in Ontario, especially the coercive casualties, is the fact that strikes over wage and contract issues usually involve more, and often continuous, picket line confrontations between pickets, scabs and police,⁴⁵ whereas in

TABLE 17
INTENSITY OF STRIKE VIOLENCE⁴⁶

	Ontario	Quebec
Anti personal violence	37% (11)	48% (10)
Number of arrests	5	5
Number of insurgent casualties	10	10
Number of coercive casualties	5	0
Value of property damage	\$2,500	\$75,000

Quebec strike violence seemed to be less traditionally picket line oriented⁴⁷ while restricted to an industrial

⁴⁵Eighty-seven % (26) of all strike violence (31% of all violence) in Ontario involved picket line confrontations between pickets and scabs and police.

⁴⁶Again a median average has been used for reasons listed previously. The actual averages for the above values are, Arrests, Quebec 8, Ontario 9; Insurgent Casualties, Quebec 10, Ontario 10; Coercive Casualties, Quebec 0, Ontario 5; Value of Property Damage, Quebec \$280,500, Ontario \$2,166. This last figure is the only one that is substantially different from the median average.

⁴⁷In Quebec only 19% of strike violence (5.4% of all

setting many of these strike incidents took on a character of mass protest involving less of a confrontation with strike breakers and police.

It is evident from this analysis that the relationship between collective violence and the paradox was of quite a different character in Ontario than it was in Quebec. Moreover the evidence presented in this chapter would appear to support the hypothesis associating the nature of this relationship with the manner in which the economic paradox was interpreted.

Based on the data for Ontario, the relationship between collective violence and the paradox in this province could be best characterized as indirect. Although the economic paradox may have provided a general environment that was conducive to the outbreak of collective violence, a significant proportion of the violence which occurred would appear to have been ancillary to the paradox. Lacking a broad perspective or ideology to interpret the paradox in terms of fundamental inter group relationships (conflicts) linking various economic, social, and political issues, Ontarians had little structure or basic focus to their discontent, with the result that the violence broke out over all sorts of issues most of which were ephemerally and

violence involved the traditional picket line confrontations). Another 33% involved strikers assaulting non strikers usually in the context of a C.N.T.U.-Q.F.L. dispute. Twenty-nine % of strike incidents were precipitated by strikers attacking property as in the previously mentioned 7-Up dispute where the strikers and their supporters attempted to set fire to the factory.

artificially salient and inherently unrelated to the paradox. Demonstration incidents in Ontario were the most prominent manifestation of the indirectness of this relationship. The majority of demonstration incidents which occurred in Ontario were occasioned by issues which were irrelevant to basic societal contradictions. The salience of extra-societal issues e.g. foreign political issues, and the relative insignificance of domestic political and economic issues in terms of both the number of incidents and their mobilizations would appear to be the clearest reflection of the fact that Ontarians did not perceive the paradox as a general societal dysfunction. As the paradox was therefore most likely to be envisioned in its most superficial form, that is as being an economic problem, affected elements were more disposed to direct their discontent at the industrial sector. Strike objectives being consistent with this narrow perception of the paradox were thus specifically defined and focused almost exclusively at a monetary solution to the paradox i.e. higher wages as a means of compensating for the immediate effects of the paradox.

In Quebec the relationship however was of a much more direct nature as there was an evident and fairly consistent association between both forms of collective violence and the paradox. In this province collective violence was characterized by discernable in-groups and out-groups that were clashing over a wide range of issues which were

related to the fundamental divisions of Quebec society. The structure and focus of a majority of the violence were provided by the ideological articulation of the paradox which depicted it in terms of being both an ethnic and social division. The character of demonstration violence in Quebec reflected this ideological orientation very clearly. A large amount of the demonstration violence with socio-political objectives during this period focused on the ethnic aspect of the paradox i.e. the tendency for French Canadians to have lower status jobs and lower incomes than English Canadians as a result of the English domination of Quebec society. The violent anti-English language demonstrations were an indication of this focus. As labour began to develop political consciousness, this focus broadened to accomodate fundamental working class aspirations, and subsequent demonstrations began to emphasize the structural aspects of the paradox i.e. the collusion of political and economic power against the working man (e.g.: the La Presse Affaire and the Common Front strike).

Strike incidents in Quebec were also much more broadly focused as consistent with a more comprehensive interpretation of the paradox. Specific wage demands which were so prevalent in Ontario were seldom a cause of strike incidents in Quebec. On the contrary, strike issues in Quebec were likely to have had social as well as economic ramifications as evidenced by their high mobilization potential.

If one looks at collective violence in the two societies in terms of the distinction made in Chapter II, it is now possible to relate the difference between conflicts within the system and conflicts over the system to the perception of the paradox. It is quite evident that the essence of conflict in Ontario was within the system. The effected elements in this province did not interpret the paradox as implicating the basic social structure of the society. On the contrary, the basic conflict in Ontario was limited to the industrial sector of the society where groups attempted to achieve a short-term resolution of the paradox by demanding higher wages and a greater share of the benefits of industrial society.

In Quebec on the other hand, the paradox was perceived in terms which directly put the basic political social structure into question. The conflict in this province occurred over who would control the system and the allocation of resources. Collective violence in Quebec was a demand for fundamental social change. The insurgents were not seeking an economic solution to the paradox but rather a modification or restructuring of the society as a means of alleviating basic social inequities.

CONCLUSION

This study has comprised an attempt to collect systematic data on the incidence and types of collective violence which occurred in Ontario and Quebec during the years 1968-1973, along with an effort to categorize and count the types, motives, objectives, etc. of this activity. On the basis of this aggregation of statistics, an endeavor was made to create a partial synthesis of the etiological and comparative aspects of this phenomenon so as to obtain a better understanding of how and why collective violence differed in the two provinces.

As an initial step in the development of a typology which could be used to analyze collective violence in Ontario and Quebec, an effort was made to identify the major preconditions associated with this phenomenon. In order to do this collective violence in the two provinces was first examined in terms of its relation to two commonly suggested preconditions; elections, a frequent historical precondition in both provinces, and declining economic conditions in the context of relative deprivation theory. The relationship between collective violence and both of these suggested preconditions however was found to be rather inconclusive. Collective violence in the two provinces was neither purely politically or economically inspired. There was no consistent

association between collective violence and elections. Nor was there an evident relationship between this phenomenon and the level of economic well being as measured by unemployment and real wage levels. However, although no relationship was found to exist between collective violence and the economic indices in the context prescribed by relative deprivation theory, a very interesting pattern of association was subsequently discerned. It was noticed that collective violence in both Ontario and Quebec was associated with a kind of economic paradox in which real wages were perceived to improve for some groups of people while the economic status of others was precarious, as evidenced by a high level of unemployment. An indicator termed the Economic Paradox Indicator (E.P.I.) was constructed to reflect this observation. This indicator seemed to suggest that--all things being equal--there was a correlation between collective violence and this economic paradox. This suggestion was based on the observation that in Ontario a high level of economic paradox (i.e. a large increase in real wages relative to the previous year and a high level of unemployment) was associated with a high level of collective violence, and a low level of economic paradox with a low level of violence for each of the years from 1963-1973. In Quebec the same association existed for eight of these eleven years. The character of this association recommended the paradox for consideration as a precondition of collective violence in both provinces during this period.

Ostensibly, the economic paradox was considered as a reflection of the inflationary situation which existed at that time, and the necessity, in capitalist economies that inflationary wage increases be balanced by increasing unemployment. The theoretical implications of the paradox however were seen as being more profound than this. In very general terms this phenomenon, as well as the vast disparities of wealth endemic to capitalist economies appeared relatable to another widely used conflict model which has its foundation in social systems theory. This model posits as a fundamental source of conflict the scarcity of resources with which every society is confronted and which precludes every member of the society from obtaining complete fulfillment. Furthermore this model finds the view espoused by democratic theory that the function of the state is to mediate these conflicts by allocating resources equitably through a process of compromise and peaceful give and take, to be inconsistent with the realities of politics. These reservations about the role of the state in conflict management are possibly best expressed in the words of Thomas Paine who, speaking in 1792, said "If we look back to the riots and tumults . . . , we shall find that they did not proceed from want of a government but that government was itself the generating cause, instead of consolidating society it divided it, it deprived it of its natural cohesion and engendered discontents and disorders which otherwise would not have

existed."¹ The natural cohesion of society of which Paine was speaking is blatantly contradicted by the state sanctioned horizontal cleavages which comprise that phenomenon known as the division of labour. Despite the bureaucratization of power in society there are still identifiable elite or dominant elements, and a mass of non elites with great gaps between the two in terms of power status and wealth.² Furthermore this social division can be seen as implying a zero sum relationship between these higher and lower segments, with the latter able to improve their relative position only so far without impinging on the higher placed groups. The social systems model considers collective violence as one aspect of this group interaction, or conflict, over society's resources. It is viewed as rational, purposive behavior aimed at change. Groups in power (those with a vested interest in the status quo) are seen in the context of this theory, as using violence to resist encroachments on their position, while others marginal or alienated from the centers of power use violence to bring about a change in the status quo. The paradox itself was perceived to reflect such a group interaction as

¹Iglitzin, op. cit., p. 102.

²See G. William Domhoff, The Higher Circles (New York: Random House, 1970), Milton Mankoff "Power in Advanced Capitalist Society: A Review Essay on Recent Elitist and Marxist Criticism of Pluralist Theory," in Milton Mankoff ed. The Poverty of Progress (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), pp. 74-82; and John A. Porter, The Vertical Mosaic; An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968).

it suggested a situation in which the rich were getting richer at the expense of the lower segments. Undoubtedly those losing status would undertake some kind of action to attempt to rectify this situation. Depending on an array of psychological and environmental factors this attempted resolution often involved collective violence.

The nature of collective action to resolve the paradox was developed as the second part of the hypothesis and involved the comparative aspects of strife in the two provinces. It was conjectured that the precise nature of the discontent engendered by the paradox, and the form in which this discontent would be expressed was conditioned by the different economic and political environments in the two provinces. In essence this meant that these environmental factors would influence the way in which the paradox was perceived and the nature of the collective action taken to resolve it.

The first environmental factor which was presumed to influence the nature of discontent in Ontario and Quebec was the general economic condition of each province. Ontario was depicted as having an historically prosperous economy with a lower than average rate of unemployment and a higher than average per capita income. The economic picture in Quebec however was observed to be a direct contrast. Historically the economic outlook in this province had been quite bleak, with its usually high unemployment rate, and its below average per capita income. It was

inferred from this that the discontent resulting from the paradox would be more intense in Quebec than it would in Ontario where the historically sound economy should not have been as severely affected by this economic dysfunction.

Another factor which was assumed to influence the nature of discontent, and the direction of the collective action to resolve the paradox was the political culture of the society, specifically the level of ideological support that the system was able to maintain. It was proposed that if people had shared discontents their attitudes about the legitimacy of their rulers, and political institutions would affect the focus and nature of that discontent. Although it is realized that exhaustive survey research is really the only way to identify the actual level of ideational coherence in a society it was felt that there were very evident factors in both the political cultures of Ontario and Quebec from which the level of legitimacy of their respective authority structures could be inferred.

The political environment in Ontario seemed to emphasize the qualities of stability and general legitimacy. The political culture in this province was looked upon as a rather singular blend of toryism and liberalism with a resultant emphasis on compromise, parliamentarism, and the acceptance of rank and status distinctions. The dominant value of this society was thus depicted as a combination of stability and progressive reform. It was further contended that by incorporating these values into their

political philosophies and policies most Ontario governments had been able to satisfy the major elements of the society maintaining at least acquiescence if not acceptance, as evidenced by the longevity of most of these regimes. Based on these impressions it was thought unlikely that Ontarians would perceive the paradox as implicating the authority structure and the division of labour in this province. It was thus assumed that the paradox was more likely to be interpreted in its most superficial form, that is purely as an economic dysfunction.

In Quebec however there were found to be clear indications that a notable segment of the political community in this province had reservations about the legitimacy of the established order. It was suggested that possibly the dominant feature of this society was the fact that the social structure was based on ethnic divisions. Both the quasi colonial system, which allowed an English minority to dominate the province economically and politically through their "native minions," and the ensuing division of labour and wealth based on ethnic criteria were seen as having direct implications as far as the legitimacy of the system was concerned. Furthermore the existence of a growing nationalist element with a developed counter ideology was taken as evidence of a significant level of alienation in this society. It was thus deduced that the Québécois would most probably have a broader interpretation of the paradox perceiving it as being linked to the division

of labour and wealth in the province and therefore having broader political ramifications.

Based on the contention that the particular environments in Ontario and Quebec caused the paradox to be interpreted differently it was supposed that the nature of the collective action to resolve the paradox would be quite different in the two provinces. It was subsequently proposed that if the paradox was perceived in narrow terms, that is as being an economic dysfunction having few if any actual political implications, its attempted resolution should most likely take the form of strikes directed at an increase in wages or other welfare values, i.e. a monetary solution to what was regarded as a monetary problem. It was furthermore contended that while a narrow perception of the paradox would not exclude collective action from taking the form of demonstrations it would be unlikely that such activities would be directed at the resolution of the paradox. All things considered it was presumed that such incidents would probably be occasioned by specific and immediate political issues with little relevance to the basic structural contradictions in the society. On the other hand it was postulated that if the collectivity perceived the broader implications of the paradox, that is its relationship to the divisions of labour and wealth in the society, the conflict would reach beyond the economic sector to be directed at the authority and institutional structure supportive of the existing divisions. On this

basis it was hypothesized that collective action would be more apt to take the form of demonstrations, as the conflict would be definitely more politicized and would likely involve larger and more diverse segments of the society. It was also proposed that while the paradox was regarded as having political implications, economic activity such as strikes may also be viewed as being instrumental to its resolution. It was further surmised however, that strike incidents would often coincide with a broader perception of the paradox by involving issues of wider social relevance, and thus not being as narrowly focused, and picket line oriented, as most traditional trade union disputes.

When this hypothesis was subsequently tested by analyzing the forms of collective violence in both provinces in terms of their objectives, issues, and number of insurgents; the socio economic status of the insurgents, and the intensity of the violence, there was found to be a generally consistent relationship between the perception of the paradox and the nature of collective violence. In the province of Ontario where the perception of the paradox was held to be narrow, the majority of demonstration incidents as predicted occurred over issues of demonstrable irrelevance to the society in general. The majority of political demonstration incidents, as well as the largest mobilizations were occasioned by issues which were virtually beyond the competence of the society to resolve, e.g. foreign political issues. Violent demonstrations over domestic issues were

also found to be inconsequential having occurred both infrequently and over issues which were seldom relevant to the society as indicated by the negligible number of insurgents which they were able to mobilize. Moreover while demonstration incidents over economic issues were possibly related to the paradox the objectives of these incidents were so narrowly defined as to preclude one from inferring that the incidents had political implications. Rather, such incidents were determined to be a reflection of government presence in the economic sector.

Strike incidents in Ontario were found to be usually consistent with the narrow perception of the paradox as an economic malfunction. Both the objectives and the scenario of strike violence in this province were quite traditional. The objectives of a majority of strike incidents centered on an immediate monetary solution to this economic problem. As a result strike incidents in this province were noted as having had very restricted mobilization with most of the violence occurring as a result of picket line incidents with pickets attempting to prevent their influence from being diluted by the strike breaking tactics of scabs and police.

The hypothesis also proved to be reasonably accurate in its evaluation of the nature of collective violence in Quebec. Coinciding with a broad perception of the paradox, it was found that a large number of both strike and demonstration incidents focused on the social and ethnic divisions

in this province with a good deal of consistency. Demonstration violence in Quebec reflected the transition of the societal conflict from a nationalist struggle involving the desires of the French Canadian middle class to rid the society of all vestiges of English dominance (e.g. language) to a class struggle led by the labour movement aimed at the reformation of the entire social structure in order to accomodate working class as well as nationalist aspirations. Thus while insurgents may have been protesting in Ontario, in Quebec they were rebelling. There was a very discernable in-group versus out-group conflict in this province which led to a more resolute and more intense struggle.

Strike violence in this province was also found to have had attributes congruent with a broader interpretation of the paradox. As opposed to strike incidents in Ontario which were directed at the specific and immediate enhancement of welfare values, such incidents in Quebec frequently occurred over more diffuse economic issues many of which were determined to have had social as well as economic implications. (Because of the "foreign" control of the economy, and the character of the division of labour even a wage dispute in Quebec often had political implications.) As a result these incidents invariably mobilized a larger number of insurgents and were found to often involve common fronts and political groups with the result that they were less typically picket line oriented.

It is quite tempting at this point to play the Cassandra game and attempt theoretical extrapolations and speculative propositions about the root causes of collective violence. This however would be extremely presumptuous given the level of this analysis. Although an attempt has been made to identify some of the preconditions involved in collective violence in Quebec and Ontario during this period, there were just too many intervening variables to permit a diagnosis of causality. From the preceding analysis it should have been quite evident that collective was a result of a cocktail mix of remote causes, immediate causes, catalysts, etc. All of which come together in various configurations to produce the final product. The economic paradox which was presented here as a precondition should not be mistaken as a direct cause of collective violence. It has been proposed rather as an environment that was conducive to the outbreak of violence during this period. The outbreak itself was influenced by a number of factors including institutions prevailing ideologies, issues, objectives, scenarios, etc.

As stated, a major objective of this thesis was the development of a framework to assist in the comprehension of the phenomenon of collective violence as it occurred in Ontario and Quebec during the years 1968-1973. It is difficult however to make assumptions about the potential applicability of this construction outside of the present context. Only further comparative research is capable of

determining this. Moreover when using this framework to interpret collective violence in these two provinces one should be cognizant of its limitations. For instance the manner in which the paradox was perceived should not be misconstrued as having been absolutely deterministic of the nature of collective violence. It would be rather preposterous to presume complete homogeneity in the perception of the paradox, and in the nature of the ensuing collective action to resolve it in the two provinces. Of course not everyone in Ontario perceived the paradox in narrow terms, nor should it be supposed that all the affected elements in Quebec realized the broader implications of this situation. The perception-nature of collective violence association was based on what were deduced as prevalent general attitudes in the two provinces, and a noticable tendency for these attitudes to influence the nature of collective violence when it did occur.

It is quite obvious that further work is necessary within this framework before a transition can be made to another level of analysis. For this reason one may have to be satisfied here with what Hempel has called an explanation sketch rather than a fully developed analytical framework. An explanation sketch consists of more or less vague indications of the laws and initial conditions considered as relevant and it needs filling out in order to turn it into

a full fledged framework.³ This filling out may prove to be unfeasible.

³Carl G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 238.

APPENDIX

COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE IN QUEBEC
AND ONTARIO, 1963-1973

Primary Data

1. (VAR008) DATE OF VIOLENT EVENT: This means the day that the event broke out. Any violent event that overlaps the 24-hour limit and extends for more than one day in a particular locality will still be considered one event. If, however, there is a 24-hour gap, requiring remobilization of coercive and insurgent elements, then the incident becomes a separate entity.
2. (VAR009) LOCALITY AND PROVINCE WHERE EVENT OCCURRED: This should be indicated for each separate locality unless they form the same continuous metropolitan area, because each case consists of a day/town unit of analysis.
3. (VAR010) DURATION OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE: Coded on a scale of geometric progression whose first two intervals are "one half day or less," "one day" etc.
4. (VAR016) PRECIPITATING INCIDENT THAT UNLEASHED THE VIOLENCE: Any fortuitous event or occasion, such as disorderly behavior by a few demonstrators or excessive zeal by police, that bring about a confrontation. State issues that caused the mobilization as well.
5. (VAR018) ESTIMATED NUMBER OF INSURGENT PARTICIPANTS: These will most probably be very rough estimates. Give all figures as well as sources and place the most probable ones in parentheses.
6. (VAR014) ESTIMATED NUMBER OF COERCIVE FORCES e.g. MILITARY AND POLICE, ETC.: (See number five above.)

7. (VAR017) NAMES OF ORGANIZATION REPORTEDLY INVOLVED:
The organizations that sponsored the demonstration or meeting. Give complete names as well as areas they or the affiliate represent.
8. (VAR018) SOCIAL STATUS OF PARTICIPANTS: Their broad professional category, e.g. workers-skilled, students, white collar. Whenever possible also include specific profession, e.g. university student, plumber, etc.
9. (VAR026) PRIMARY TARGETS OF VIOLENCE: (1) Property targets such as public, private, foreign or any property. (2) Political actors and as public figures, military and police, private political groups, several of the above, foreign public figures, any political actors. (3) Nonpolitical actors such as communal groups, economic groups or a combination of these. (Cf. Graham and Gurr, pp. 557-)
10. (VAR031) REPORTED NUMBER OF ARRESTS: (See #5)
11. (VAR032) REPORTED NUMBER OF INSURGENT CASUALTIES:
Include dead and injured. (See #5 also)
12. (VAR033) COERCIVE FORCES CASUALTIES: (See #5 and #11)
13. (VAR034) ESTIMATED PROPERTY DAMAGE: (See #5)
14. OTHER SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION AND COMMENTS:

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