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
IN THE WAKE OF PONTIAC:
ANGLO-AMERINDIAN RELATIONS AT DETROIT, 1763 - 1775

by
Robert D. Jeens

Thesis submitted to
the School of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- C.O.T.G.....Carter, Clarence Edwin (ed.), The Correspondence of General Thomas Gage with the Secretaries of State, and with the War Office and the Treasury, 1763 - 1775, 2 Vols., Archon Books, 1915.
- D.R.C.H.C.....Shortt, Adam and Arthur G. Doughty (eds.), Documents Relating to The Constitutional History of Canada, 1759 - 1791, Vol. 1, Ottawa, 1907.
- I.H.C.....Alvord, Clarence Walworth and Clarence Edwin Carter (eds.), Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library, Vols. 10, 11, 16, Springfield, 1915 - 1921.
- J.P.....Flick, Alexander C. and Milton W. Hamilton, Papers of Sir William Johnson, Vols. 3 - 13, Albany, 1915 - 1921.
- N.A.C.....National Archives of Canada
- N.Y.C.D.....O'Callaghan, E.B (ed.), Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York, Vols. 7, 8, Albany, 1856, 1857.
- T.W.B.R.....Lajeunesse, Ernst (ed.), The Windsor Border Region: Canada's Southernmost Frontier, Toronto, 1960.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Detroit was a gateway to the interior of North America in the years preceding the American War of Independence. The Lords of Trade viewed Detroit as the great centre of Amerindian trade. It stood amidst numerous tribes of Indians, where many French families still remained. In 1768, they considered it to be of more importance than either Michilimackinac or Niagara.¹ Sir Thomas Gage, Commander in Chief of the British forces in North America, believed that Detroit was "kept up for the Purposes of being some Check over the Indians, by having a Force with Military Stores lodged in their Country, Serving as [a place of] Rendezvous in Case of a war with them [and a market] for the Trade."² Experience had taught Gage that many Amerindians thought of British forts "as Bulwarks erected in their Country, with a design to Subject them."³ These comments illustrate that, from 1763 to 1775, the British conducted much of their Amerindian trade and diplomacy out of Detroit. They also illustrate that British and Amerindians might conceive of the function of Detroit from different perspectives, even if both saw it playing the same role.

This thesis will examine Anglo-Amerindian relations in the Detroit area, from the ending of "Pontiac's War" in 1763, to the beginning of the American War of Independence in 1776. Throughout the period, the British and Amerindians cooperated in certain economic, military and diplomatic

activities based in Detroit. At the same time, both sides had some serious misconceptions of the nature of the other society, as well as of the ultimate ends that they perceived would develop through their relationship. Policies were created out of pure expediency, and deceit played a prominent part in their formulation. After Pontiac's War, both the British and Amerindians around Detroit had little choice but to accept their neighbours as large, powerful and continuing influences on their own affairs. Thus, conflicts will be analyzed from the perspective of how issues of contention that arose between the two parties were resolved.

Even the concept of two "sides" of this story must be modified by the recognition that there were many competing interest groups among both British and Amerindians. These interest groups allied or competed amongst themselves, as well as with the those on the other side of the Amerindian - Euroamerican divide, depending upon what they believed would further their own concerns. Such groups amongst the British included fur traders, working illegally or legally, farmers, the military, various British imperial agents, and colonial officials. Amerindian interest groups included confederacies of tribes, individual tribes, villages, clans, peace or war chiefs, warrior societies, shamans, or women's societies. Cooperation was achieved only because those groups which found cooperation to be in their best interest managed to gain predominance on both sides.

The study will have a certain progression. First, I will attempt to relate my research to existing interpretations. The new perspectives this study isolates will be specified. I will review books that were found to be useful for this examination of Anglo-Amerindian relations and how the themes of this study fit into them. The precursor of the system set up in Detroit after 1765, that of the French regime from 1701-1761, will be briefly considered. Next, I move to a discussion of Detroit from 1763 to 1775. I analyze the flurry of diplomacy that ended Pontiac's War. What were the agreements that were made in order to bring about peace? Finally, I will consider how these agreements were worked out over the following years. What were the issues that disturbed relations, and how were they dealt with by the different parties?

The sources that were used in this study are problematic. Generally, these consist of letters or reports from one British military or civilian official to another, which have been preserved and published in large documentary collections. The problems with these sources are both general and specific. As Amerindians were illiterate, their perspective on a situation must be deduced from Euroamerican accounts. Euroamerican reporters were hardly uninterested, unbiased observers. Their observations were affected by their own beliefs about the nature and merits of their own and Amerindian societies. For example, Major Henry Gladwin's comment that "The Indians here are lying

treacherous Brutes"⁴ must be tempered by the knowledge that he had commanded the garrison at Detroit throughout the seige of Detroit, an event filled with bloody and horrifying consequences for those who fell into the hands of the Amerindians.⁵ As well, the authors could distort the record in their own service. Sir Jeffrey Amherst, Commander in chief of the British army in North America until November, 1763, wrote that the Amerindians had "treacherously, and without any provocation on our side, attacked our Posts, and butchered our Garrisons,"⁶ while Sir William Johnson, Superintendant General of Indian Affairs for the Northern Colonies, wrote to the Lords of Trade outlining those very provocations.⁷ Not coincidentally, Amherst was the official immediately responsible for the policies that caused Pontiac's War, while redressing the injustices that Johnson enunciated was to be accomplished by giving an increased budget and powers to the Indian department of which he was head.⁸ The conflict between Johnson's public advocacy of the preservation of Amerindian lands and his private purchases from the Six Nations provide a good example of the sort of dissimulation that can be revealed in the documents.⁹ At times, conclusions had to be made from scanty sources. When Captain Thomas Morris travelled the Maumee River in 1764, he recorded that, on his way to Roche de Bout, he was met by a party of mounted Ottawa warriors, who gave some horses to his companions.¹⁰ From this, it is possible to deduce that the Ottawa at Roche de Bout had

horses; but how many is still unclear. This study attempts to make allowances for these source problems; but recognizes that they will never be completely eliminated.

This thesis sets out to correct two historiographical misconceptions of previous authors writing on the ending of Pontiac's War. Some authors wrote that Pontiac's War specifically and Amerindian-Euroamerican relations generally epitomized a racial struggle between "savagery" and "civilization." This is the position taken by Francis Parkman in The Conspiracy of Pontiac and the Indian War after the Conquest of Canada (1898), and Howard Peckham in Pontiac and the Indian Uprising (1947). For these men, the savage Amerindian race is characterized by irrationality, violence and inflexibility, while the civilized English race is characterized by rationality, an aversion to violence and flexibility.¹¹ Behavior was explainable according to race, and since race could not change, therefore behavior was predetermined. Amerindians and Euroamericans were locked into an "inevitable conflict,"¹² that caused the Amerindian and "his forest...[to]...perish together."¹³ This emphasis on race as an explanation has been replaced by an emphasis on culture. Behaviour is reinterpreted through a cultural matrix and, like culture, is variable and adaptable.¹⁴ This thesis will demonstrate that both Amerindians and Euroamericans were motivated by an awareness of their surroundings and a desire to further their own goals. Rationality, the use of or aversion to violence and

flexibility were not the exclusive preserve of either group. Conflict and cooperation were both policy goals that could be resorted to by either group, depending upon circumstances.

A more persistent historiographical flaw is the belief that Pontiac's War was ended primarily through the use of British arms and without the achievement of Amerindian goals. The role of diplomacy and the meeting of Amerindian demands are discounted as factors contributing to the ending of the war. Parkman and Peckham both highlighted the role of British arms, and categorized Pontiac's War as a failure,¹⁵ and this has been accepted in some modern writings.¹⁶ The Historical Atlas of Canada: Volume 1: From the Beginning to 1800 (1987) claims that, "by the autumn of 1764, they [the Amerindians involved in Pontiac's War] were forced to submit."¹⁷ This study will show that, in the Detroit area, most Amerindian demands were realized in the diplomacy that ended the war, and further, over the next ten years, Anglo-Amerindian relations at Detroit were characterized by intercultural bargaining and mediation, not the military domination of one side over the other. While this study will also discuss other matters of historiographical debate, these are the main theses that will be challenged and overturned.

There were three books that had a great deal of influence on the approach this study takes. In Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies, and Tribes in the Seven Years War

in America (1988) Francis Jennings reinterpreted the Seven Years' War in North America, including "The War called Pontiac's," by attempting to provide a variety of viewpoints. Rather than concentrating on the culture, policy and motivations of one group, he attempted to define relations between the groups, given what we already know about the cultures involved.¹⁸ Jennings differentiated between the French, English, colonials, and the Amerindians, the latter being not an undifferentiated mass but individuals and collectivities with accomodating or conflicting goals. He rejected impersonal historic forces, seeing history as the "cumulative action of individual persons, often with unintended and unpredictable outcomes."¹⁹ Jennings did not reject hindsight as a valuable tool of historical analysis; rather he insisted upon the primacy of the unknown future for the historical actors of the time.

Gregory Evans Dowd explained his view of Pontiac's War and the subsequent decades in A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745-1815. Dowd offered an account of attempts at anti-British intertribal unity among the Creek, Cherokee, Delaware and Shawnee. For Dowd, there was no distinction between the sacred and the political in Amerindian cultures, and this was reflected in their intertribal and interracial relations. Powerful nativistic movements sweeping across Amerindian America at different times during the period influenced Amerindian

diplomacy. Such nativistic elements most often sought unity with other people of similiar beliefs across tribal boundaries, thus setting themselves up in opposition to more accomodationist tribal chiefs. They sought unity with each other, in opposition to British power and those factions within their own communities which would accomodate the British, through spiritual practices such as the use of ritual and the political idea of a separate independent Indian identity. Dowd sees Pontiac as a "true believer" in the Delaware prophet Neolin's message.²⁰ Dowd thus gets inside Amerindian society in order to outline the anti-British elements among many tribes, their common ideology and the links between them. Those who sought accomodation in Amerindian society had to work against the Amerindians of Dowd's interpretation.

In The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (1991), Richard White attempted to outline those forces in Amerindian and Euroamerican societies that worked for the accomodation of the other. He believed that this accomodation was brought about through economic and military necessity, and that it was expressed through attempts to understand and take into account the culture of the other.²¹ White highlighted the structure of Amerindian society and government to show how Euroamericans utilized their knowledge of it in order to support those within Amerindian communities who were willing to accomodate the newcomers. He also described situations

where those who were ignorant of these structures, and the need to support them, were instrumental in provoking conflict with little means to contain it. In a way, Dowd and White have highlighted two sides of Amerindian society. White describes the forces of accomodation, while Dowd picks up the story when these voices were drowned out.

This thesis uses the helpful perspectives of Jennings, Dowd and White, coupled with research into the peculiar situation of Detroit during the period 1763 to 1775, to disprove the Parkman-Peckham line of historiographical reasoning. Rather than theories about the inevitability of conflict between savages and the civilized, Jennings has contributed an emphasis on the role of the individual and varying, competing groups in, collectively, providing the basis for what later came to be described as large, impersonal historic forces. He wrote that the Seven Years' War must be studied "in its own right, not merely as a precursor."²² Likewise, the system set up at Detroit to regulate intercultural relations must be seen in its own right, not merely as a failed paradigm that ended in the historical wastebasket. Dowd provides a possible explanation for, or at least description of, those Amerindians opposed to the accomodation emphasized in this study. White emphasizes cooperation and accomodation in much the same manner as will be attempted here. While White seems to emphasize more the cultural side of the relationship, this thesis is more materially based.²³ These

explanations serve as anthropological and historical models which we can test. Did anti-British Amerindians exhibit the behavior Dowd claims is typical of them all? Did the system White claims emphasized cooperation between the cultures exist at Detroit as White described it?

In addition to these helpful and varying perspectives, this study also has to deal with the problem of place. The previous studies emphasize relationships--the basis for them and a description of their development. This study will also concentrate on why relations existed as they did at Detroit. The physical and cultural geography of Detroit and its surrounding area will be emphasized as some of the factors that influenced the sort of relationships that developed. It will also attempt to analyze the importance of Detroit to both British and Amerindians. Looking at relations from the viewpoint of Detroit - as a centre of trade and diplomacy - should allow us to get a closer look at Anglo-Amerindian connections. It will be possible to look at how British Imperial policy, made at Whitehall or Johnson Hall, was affected by those charged with implementing it, as well as the reactions of the local Amerindian actors to these initiatives. To move from the broad picture to focus on the less known individuals and less spectacular events we redirect the historiographical process along a new course.

Endnotes

- 1 Representation of the Lords of Trade on the State of Indian Affairs, 7 March, 1768, N.Y.C.D., 8, 26.
- 2 Thomas Gage to the Earl of Shelbourne, 3 April, 1767, I.H.C., 11, 545.
- 3 Thomas Gage to the Earl of Hillsborough, 10 November, 1770, C.O.T.G., 1, 276.
- 4 Major Henry Gladwin to William Johnson, 11 May, 1764, J.P., 11, 191.
- 5 M.M. Quaife, ed., The Siege of Detroit in 1763: The Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy and John Rutherford's Narrative of a Captivity, (Chicago: Donnelley, 1958), 39, 112-115, 229.
- 6 Jeffrey Amherst to William Johnson, 30 September, 1763, N.Y.C.D., 7, 569.
- 7 William Johnson to the Lords of Trade, 13 November, 1763, N.Y.C.D., 7, 572-581.
- 8 Francis Jennings, Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies and Tribes in the Seven Years' War in America (New York: Norton, 1988), 314.
- 9 Julian Gwyn, "Sir William Johnson," Dictionary of Canadian Biography, 4, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 397. Jack Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness: The Middle West in British Colonial Policy, 1760-1775, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), 181-210.
- 10 "Journal of Captain Thomas Morris," Early Western Travels, 1748-1846, 1, Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., (Cleveland: Arthur Clarke Company, 1904), 304.
- 11 Francis Parkman, The Conspiracy of Pontiac and the Indian War after the Conquest of Canada, 1, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1908), 1-6, 43-49. Howard Peckham, Pontiac and the Indian Uprising, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), 13, 319-322. Francis Jennings, "Francis Parkman: A Brahmin among Untouchables," William and Mary Quarterly, 42, (July, 1985) 316-318.
- 12 Peckham, op. cit., 321.
- 13 Parkman, op. cit., 48.

14 Francis Jennings, "A Growing Partnership: Historians, Anthropologists and American Indian History," Ethnohistory, 29, (Spring 1982), 27-31. Bruce Trigger, "Ethnohistory: Problems and Prospects," Ethnohistory, 29, (1982), 1-19. Bruce Trigger, "The Historian's Indian: Native Americans in Canadian Historical Writing from Charlevoix to the Present," Canadian Historical Review, 67, (1986), 323-342.

15 Francis Parkman, The Conspiracy of Pontiac and the Indian War after the Conquest of Canada, 2, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1908), 304, 314-315. Peckham, op. cit., vii, 319.

16 Willis F. Dunbar, George S. May, Michigan: A History of the Wolverine State, (Grand Rapids: Herdmans, 1988), 83-84. Bruce A. Rubenstein, Lawrence E. Ziewacz, Michigan: A History of the Great Lakes State, (Arlington Heights: Forum Press, 1981), 43-45.

17 W.J. Eccles, M.N. McConnell, Susan L. Laskin, "Indian War and American Invasion," Historical Atlas of Canada: Volume 1: From the Beginning to 1800, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 110.

18 Jennings, op. cit., (1988), xxii.

19 Ibid., xx.

20 Gregory Evans Dowd, A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745-1815, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 35.

21 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), x.

22 Jennings, op. cit., (1988) xx. Jennings realizes that the British were not locked into some sort of inevitable conflict destined to result in the dispossession or death of thousands of people. Conflict or cooperation were both policy alternatives to which individuals and collectives could turn.

23 White op. cit., 129 - 141, goes so far as to suggest that the importance of trade goods to Amerindians was more an expression of alliance than of material dependence. While I agree with White that trade and military necessity formed the basis of cooperation, it will be demonstrated that Amerindians were more materially dependent on European goods White asserts.

CHAPTER TWO: THE FRENCH, THE AMERINDIANS, AND DETROIT,

1701 - 1760

In order to understand the relationships established by the British with the Amerindian groups around Detroit, it is necessary to realize that the British were following in the footsteps of the French.¹ Detroit was founded by the French. They set up a small garrison, encouraged trade with Amerindians, and aided the settlement of Amerindians and French in the immediate vicinity of the post. The relationships that were established with these Amerindian groups will be explored. These relationships were important because Amerindians became conditioned to expect certain things in their dealings with imperial, Euroamerican powers, and these expectations affected their dealings when the British took over the post. There were differences between the occupying powers; but the military, economic and commercial balance of power in the Detroit area ensured that the English could not ignore the example set by the previous Euroamerican claimants.

In 1701, Antoine Laumet de La Mothe, Sieur de Cadillac, founded a post and colony at Detroit for geographical and political reasons. Detroit was strategically located to serve as a centre for the fur trade and Franco-Amerindian diplomacy. Situated in the heart of the Great Lakes region, at the juncture of lakes Erie and Huron, with links to the whole continental plain bordered by the Great Lakes, the

Mississippi, the Ohio and the Appalachians, Detroit was well located to reach its markets in both Europe and the North American interior. It was also to provide a block to the Iroquois or renegade coureurs de bois who were transporting merchandise from the Amerindians of the pays d'en haut, or Upper Country (roughly, the territory around Lakes Erie, Huron, Michigan, and Superior, west to the Mississippi River) to the English.²

The French used two routes to supply Detroit. There was the early Ottawa River, French River, Lake Huron route to the upper country, as well as the more southerly St. Lawrence, Great Lakes route that was opened up with the peace with the Iroquois in 1701. Traders in the English interest were bringing English manufactured goods via the Hudson River, Mohawk River, Lake Ontario and Lake Erie route to the upper country. The French wished to use Detroit as a means of blocking this route of the English.³

During the course of the French regime, a number of Amerindian groups made the Detroit region their home. They acted as hunters for the fur trade, as well as fishing and tending their own fields for subsistence. Cadillac invited the Algonkian and Huron speaking tribesmen from further west and north to settle around Detroit in order to become acculturated to European norms. Michilimackinac was to be abandoned by both French and Amerindians in order to promote this new post.⁴ The longest lasting settlements were made by Ottawas from the northern part of what is now lower

Michigan, Potawatomis from Lake Michigan, Hurons from Michilimackinac and Ojibwas from Sault Ste. Marie and other locations.⁵ Some Miami who had been living in the St. Joseph's River valley, and some Fox also called the Detroit area their home in the early part of the eighteenth century.⁶ Although they settled in their own villages, near the French fort, bringing these disparate groups together resulted in tensions between them, as they tried to gain primacy in politics, trade and hunting rights over their new neighbours. The Miamis and Hurons fought the Ottawa in 1706. The Fox at Detroit were almost totally wiped out by their neighbours in 1712. The Hurons tried to reach a peace agreement with the Catawbas independently of their neighbours in 1730. These conflicts required resolution which could only be provided by the power which had brought about their alliance in the first place.⁷ If differences were not resolved, it could result in escalating conflict, for example the Fox Wars, or the exit of the Amerindians from Detroit, as in the departure of the Miamis to the Wabash Valley.

Among the Amerindians living around Detroit, the Hurons had some degree of primacy over their neighbours. Other groups, particularly the Ottawas, challenged this status, at times successfully.⁸ The Hurons were recognized by the French as the elder brothers in the alliance,⁹ and the Hurons, along with the Ottawa, took the lead in representing Amerindian views at conferences with the French.¹⁰ As an

Iroquoian tribe, they were accorded a higher formal status than their Algonkian neighbours, being allowed to speak first in council. They controlled the land south of Lake Erie, so that all who settled there needed their permission to do so. The council fire for all the nations living around Detroit was at the Huron village by the 1720s.¹¹ This formal status, however, did not translate at all into absolute leadership. For instance, when the Hurons made peace with the Catawbias, their neighbours did not, and almost forced the Hurons to move to Montreal.¹²

Despite official encouragement through the importation of seed and livestock, French settlement around Detroit did not expand quickly. In 1710, there were 63 whites living in the Detroit settlement, exclusive of the garrison.¹³ Only after 1730, did the population begin to increase as voyageurs, immigrants and discharged soldiers began to settle. Again, from 1749, the Crown encouraged immigration to Detroit, with some success. By 1750, there were 550 non-native residents at Detroit. Immigration continued throughout the Seven Years' War, with Detroit taking refugees from farther east.¹⁴

Agriculture was an important component of the economy at Detroit. The fertile soil around Detroit ensured good yields with a minimum of effort. Farms were laid out in the familiar pattern of the St. Lawrence Valley, spread out along the river, with narrow waterfrontage and long fields falling back from the water.¹⁵ Detroit, Kaskakia and

Cahokia were the major agricultural settlements in French western North America. Other settlements that sprang up during the Eighteenth Century, such as at Kekionga, Vincennes and Ouiatanon, were more specialized, being oriented almost exclusively to the fur trade. Detroit farms often provisioned the trade at these other settlements.

What all these settlements had in common was close contact with the Amerindians in the area. Many of these settlers were voyageurs, who were familiar with the territory and took up agriculture at Detroit as a part of their livelihood. They farmed and traded with Amerindians as complementary means of providing subsistence for themselves and their families. Contact included sexual relations and the establishment of a Metis population. Kinship ties were established between the Amerindian hunters and the French or Metis traders, which could be used to facilitate the commodity exchanges necessary for the continuance of the fur trade and the political alliance between the French and Amerindians. This practice was not as prevalent at Detroit during the later part of the French regime as it was in the other, more specialized fur trading centres, but it continued to exist. Kinship, trade and alliance politics provided the glue holding the Amerindians to the French, and the French to the Amerindians.¹⁶ Such ties could break down. The alliance was not absolute. The exchange of cultural information was facilitated, and some degree of trust between the parties was established. The

situation appeared to a knowledgeable but less than impartial George Croghan that the Amerindians and French had:

been bred up together like Children in that Country, & the French have always adopted the Indians Customs & manners, Treated them Civily and supplied [sic] their wants generously, by which they gained the Hearts of the Indians & commanded their Services.¹⁷

Cadillac made a mistake in assuming that the founding of Detroit would block English goods from the upper country. In fact, he displaced large numbers of Amerindians from an area they had moved to in order to remove themselves from Iroquois influence and brought them to a place where they could more easily gain access to British and Iroquois traders at Albany or Oswego, the British post on Lake Ontario that had been built in 1727. As well, traders from Pennsylvania used the Ohio River to travel to such formerly French allied groups as the Miami, who settled on the Wabash and Great Miami rivers and the Wyandots, a splinter group from the Detroit Hurons, who had settled at Sandusky. Lower British prices for most manufactured goods meant that this threat was all too prevalent for the entire French regime.¹⁸

The French found ways to counter this English commercial and imperial competition. The French were willing to subsidize their fur trading relationships with the Amerindians at Detroit, as they were doing throughout their North American Amerindian sphere of influence, in order to gain their political and territorial ends. Detroit was one of the first of a series of posts that were built

after 1700 in order to cultivate Amerindian alliances and to hem the English colonists in east of the Appalachians.¹⁹ For their part, Amerindians conceived of the fur trade as one part of a political alliance that included the exchange of goods. French leadership in these alliances came at the price for the French of being the source of more goods than they received. The French Crown developed the practice of giving annual goods to allied Amerindian chiefs as payment for allowing French garrisons, missionaries, settlers and traders on their lands. These goods enhanced the status of these chiefs in their villages, as they in turn redistributed them to their followers. French goods provided a material expression of Franco-Amerindian alliances. Blacksmiths, interpreters and doctors were provided by the Crown at Detroit for the use of the Amerindians, while individual traders also gave presents as a preliminary ceremony to trade. Payments were also given for services rendered, such as military expeditions against such foes as the British or the Fox. French presents could soften disputes between French allies, for example, they were used to ameliorate sentiments after inter-alliance killings.²⁰

Despite Franco-Amerindian ties, disagreements over trade, politics, or other matters could erupt. The French and Amerindians therefore built up ways of regulating the intercultural violence that sometimes resulted from such disagreements. The French knew of one way to atone for a

killing within their own society -- the death of the murderer. Amerindians preferred to deal with the killing of an ally by the distribution of goods in compensation. The Franco-Amerindian alliance required that the groups develop a mutually satisfactory method to deal with these killings. Eventually, after many cases, an amalgam of the two systems came into being. The French were usually satisfied if the Amerindians turned over killers of Frenchmen to the authorities. In return, the French would release the offenders and accept goods in compensation for the killings. White described this as a "ritual of surrender and redemption." Both groups continually tried to gain the upper hand on the other in order to impose their cultural standards, but the interests of continuing economic and military contact prevented either side from gaining total predominance. Isolated intercultural killings could thus be prevented from developing into more serious situations, though both sides would not be completely satisfied with the solution.²¹

As these customs characterized the French-Amerindian alliance generally, certain practices sprang up in order to counteract the perceived British-Iroquois threat at Detroit specifically. Cadillac was a great exponent of the brandy trade. English rum was capturing the trade of some Amerindians previously in the French interest, so, despite Jesuit opposition, Cadillac made Detroit a great centre for the brandy trade, a position it kept throughout the

following years.²² As well, Detroit received furs from lands south of the area that was best for beaver. Beaver from Detroit never rivalled, in quality or quantity, that from more northerly posts such as Michilimackinac, while English traders provided a market for deerskins and other pelts such as racoon and bear. Although the French did not have a good market for these pelts, a trade in these other furs became important at Detroit. French traders took them in order to keep Amerindians in their alliance rather than for immediate commercial gain.²³

The French and Amerindians built up a system of interaction during the years from 1701 to 1760. Both French and Amerindian settlers had come to live around the post. and were engaged in the fur trade and agriculture. Although the communities were distinct, contact resulted in sexual relations, the establishment of a Metis population, and the involvement of the French in the kinship politics of the Amerindian villages. The French tried, in the interests of continuing trade and an anti-English alliance, to mediate most intertribal and Franco-Amerindian disputes. Such mediation, and the continuance of military alliances, necessitated a regular flow of goods from the French to the Amerindians. This flow of goods took place independently, and was supplementary to, the continuing fur trade. In the Detroit area specifically, the use of brandy and the gathering of furs other than beaver, were local adaptations

the French made to hold the Amerindians close to their alliance and keep them out of the influence of the English.

To some extent, the balance of power system in place during the eighteenth century was the wellspring of Franco-Amerindian relations. The French were compelled by English competition to comply with Amerindian demands. In turn, Amerindians could play the two European powers off against each other in order to maximize the benefits for themselves. Ostensibly, this system could only last as long as there was competition. When one power won, the logic of the situation was that it would break down. However, in the 1760s and 1770s, the Amerindians grouped around Detroit ensured that it did not.

Endnotes

¹ The Parkman-Peckham school of historiography could not recognize this. The British and French occupations had to be entirely different due to the different "racial" characteristics of the British and French. Francis Parkman, The Conspiracy of Pontiac and the Indian War after the Conquest of Canada, 1, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1898), 50-54, 179-198, 222-223. Howard Peckham, Pontiac and the Indian Uprising, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), 68-69, 319, 321.

² Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815, (New York: Cambridge University Press), 1991, x.

³ Alma E. Parkins, The Historical Geography of Detroit, (New York: Kennikat Press, 1918), 36-38.

⁴ Ibid., 56.

⁵ Ernst Lajeunesse, ed., The Windsor Border Region. Canada's Southernmost Frontier, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960), xliii.

⁶ White, op. cit., 83, 154.

⁷ Ibid., 83, 153-159, 193.

⁸ Ibid., 192-196, for hatred of Hurons at Detroit by other groups, and a good example of how limited their leadership was.

⁹ Ibid., 88.

¹⁰ Ibid., 153.

¹¹ P.D. Clarke, Origin and Traditional History of the Wyandotts, and Sketches of other Indian Tribes of North America, (Toronto: 1870), 18.

¹² White, op. cit., 193-196.

¹³ Lajeunesse, op. cit., xlii.

¹⁴ Silas Farmer. History of Detroit and Wayne County and early Michigan: A Chronological Cyclopedia of the Past and Present, (Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1969), (1890) 333-334.

¹⁵ Lery's Report of his Journey to Detroit, 22 October, 1749, Lajeunesse, op. cit., 46-48.

16 John McDermott, "French Settlers and Settlements in the Illinois Country in the Eighteenth Century," The French, The Indians and George Rogers Clark in the Illinois Country: Proceedings of an Indiana American Revolution Bicentennial Symposium, (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1977), 3-33. Jacqueline Peterson, "Ethnogenesis: The Settlement and Growth of a "New People" in the Great Lakes Region, 1702- 1815," American Indian Culture and Research Journal, 6, (1982) 23-64. White, op. cit., 60-75.

17 George Croghan to William Johnson, November, 1765, I.H.C., 11, 53-54.

18 William J. Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, 1534-1760, (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), 136.

19 Ibid., 145.

20 For discussions of the forms of this gift giving see: Cornelius J. Jaenen, "The Role of Presents in French-Amerindian Trade," Explorations in Canadian Economic History: Essays in Honour of Irene M. Spry, Duncan Cameron, ed., (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1985), 231-251. White, op. cit., 94-141.

21 Ibid., 75-93.

22 Lajeunesse, op. cit., xiv. White, op. cit., 131.

23 Ibid., 124.

CHAPTER THREE: THE ENDING OF PONTIAC'S WAR IN THE DETROIT REGION, 1763-1765

Anglo-Amerindian relations began to acquire a cooperative basis in the Detroit region only in the wake of Pontiac's War. It was a statement about the relative limits both of British power and that of the local tribes. Initially, after the conquest of Quebec, the British were unwilling to put diplomatic and trading relations on a basis satisfactory to Amerindians. Tribes resorted to armed conflict as a way of protesting these British terms of association. The British and Amerindians had common economic interests which each wanted to maintain, and they realized during the course of the war that they were not capable of exterminating or militarily subduing each other. Instead, they could best serve their own interests by bringing into being a regime that was similar to the Franco-Amerindian alliance. The British would have to distribute goods to the Amerindians independently of the continuing fur trade, recognize an Amerindian title to their land, and recognize the cultural mores of both sides in regulating intercultural violence. Rather than simply dominating the Amerindians, the British were forced to implement a policy that was capable of settling disputes between the two groups as harmoniously as possible.

This chapter will analyze this the peace-making process at the end of Pontiac's War. It will investigate how the

war aims of both British and Amerindians were replaced by into peace treaties. What arrangements were made in order to bring peace to the region? The context in which this process was carried out will be discussed, specifically centred upon the question of the respective roles of diplomacy and coercion in the process. What the opposing sides were willing to give up in order to make peace and what they were willing to fight to maintain will be investigated.

Sir Jeffrey Amherst, a man deeply ignorant of the importance of good relations with the tribes to British policy, believed that the British conquest of Quebec led to a situation where Amerindians no longer had two Euroamerican, imperial powers competing for their trading connections and military alliance. He therefore determined that British policies towards Amerindians would have to be for the British benefit, regardless of what the Amerindians thought. Amerindians believed themselves to be "of more consequence than they really are," and would have to be convinced of their loss of relative power that this new situation had brought about.¹

Some Amerindians were unconvinced of this loss of power, and were not ready to live according to British imperial rules. Three years of mismanaged relations had led these Amerindians to desire to rid their country of the British. When they began the siege of Detroit, the goal of Pontiac and his allies was to exterminate, or at least

dislodge the English from Amerindian lands in general and from Detroit in particular. Pontiac and his allies intended "to exterminate from our lands this nation which seeks only to destroy us."²

There were two central issues: trade and land. Amerindians were habitually abused by British officers and enlisted men at the posts, including Detroit, and there was little recourse for them to obtain a redress of their grievances. Secondly, the English would not give credit to the Amerindians in the fall for ammunition for the winter hunt.³ Thirdly, the rum trade was limited or banned. Fourthly, the distribution of ammunition to Amerindians was severely curtailed, so that hunting was made more difficult, leading to hardship and starvation, and the idea that the English did not want Amerindians to have the capacity to defend themselves.⁴ Fifthly, since the British occupation of French North America, the British increased their garrisons in the West, repaired and upgraded some of the former French forts and reinforced their garrisons. Sixthly, British also refused to pay "rent" as an expression of their Amerindian alliances and for their occupation of the interior posts and the right to trade, something the French had always been careful to do.⁵ Finally, Euroamerican settlers lawlessly encroached on Amerindian lands, without the permission of British governments or Amerindians. While this was not yet a major problem in the Detroit area, Amerindians here were in constant

communication with those in areas that were under threat.⁶ Amerindians believed, under these circumstances, that the English, by occupying and rearming the former French posts in their country were plotting to displace and exterminate them.⁷ More generally, the British ignored covenants that had existed with the previous Euroamerican power and trading partner. These covenants were seen by Amerindians as essential to the continuing relationship between the groups. Amerindians not surprisingly now charged the British with behaviour that endangered cooperative relations between them. The British, for their part, were unable to convince them that they had no such wish.

The accomplishments of the Amerindians in Pontiac's War were numerous. In May, Pontiac led the Ottawa, Potawatomi, Ojibwa and Wyandot who lived around Detroit in their rising against the British fort.⁸ Over the summer, they were joined in the seige by Ojibwa from Saginaw Bay and the Thames River, so that Pontiac was "over chief" of 250 Ottawa, 150 Potawatomes under Ninivois, 50 Hurons under Takay, 250 Ojibway under Wasson, and 170 Ojibway under Sekahos.⁹ Though these tribes were ultimately unsuccessful in taking the fort, Pontiac managed to keep together this unusually large conglomeration of Amerindians, coordinating their efforts toward a single goal, and warding off challenges to his leadership,¹⁰ for the entire summer. Of all groups who broke out against the British, Pontiac led the largest. Besides the situation at Detroit, 13 other

British forts were attacked, nine of which were taken. Forts Sandusky, St. Joseph, Miamis, Ouiatanon, Michilimackinac, Edward Augustus, Venango, Le Beoeuf, and Presque Isle fell over the summer of 1763, while the garrisons at Niagara, Fort Ligonier, Fort Bedford and Fort Pitt held out.¹¹ It was estimated that the subsequent attacks against frontier settlers in Pennsylvania, Virginia and elsewhere cost over 2,000 British lives, and thousands more fled from their farms.¹² Not all Amerindians supported the war. For instance, the Ottawas at L'Arbre Croche saved the Michilimackinac garrison and escorted them to safety, and Five of the Six Nations stayed loyal to the British. Yet the insurrection was general enough, and successful enough, that the military power of the disgruntled Amerindians was amply demonstrated.

Amherst wanted to use force rather than diplomacy to deal with the uprising. Despite Amerindian military successes, he had a low opinion of the military resources of Amerindians in general and the hostile groups in particular. Such offenders were to be severely punished for taking up arms. He threatened to "put an effectual stop to *their very being*" [italics mine]. British military forces should be put into the field to effect the subjugation, if not extermination, of hostile nations. To prevent allied nations from thinking themselves too important, British forces alone were to be used for this mission. The use of diplomacy and the realization of Amerindian demands were not

to be considered. He did not want to "reward" the Amerindians for their use of force. Rather, they should be convinced of the capacity of the British military to force them into submission.¹³

Circumstances mitigated against this outcome. Amherst was not supported in his position by Sir William Johnson, Superintendent General of Indian Affairs for the Northern District. After Amherst went back to Britain in November, 1763,¹⁴ he left Johnson free to work out policy with his successor, General Thomas Gage. Johnson was much more respectful of the military capacity of Amerindian warriors, and more aware of the causes of their disaffection.¹⁵

I look upon the Northern Indians to be the most formidable of any uncivilized body of people in the World. Hunting and War are their sole occupations...they have few wants, and those are easily supplied, their properties of little value, consequently, expeditions against them, however successful, cannot distress them.¹⁶

The policy worked out by Johnson, Gage and the British officials to whom they were responsible, was a combination of intertribal and Anglo-Amerindian diplomacy, with the use of a limited amount of force. Johnson advocated meeting Amerindian demands for better trade terms, a restoration of rent payments, and a secure title to their lands. This offer was to be made with the threat that it must be accepted or the recalcitrant would have to face the wrath of the British military and their Amerindian allies. Johnson made pacts with 5 of the 6 Nations¹⁷ and the 7 Nations of Canada¹⁸ to accompany any British military expedition.¹⁹

This marked the true beginnings of Johnson's post-war divide and conquer tactics for managing the British-Amerindian alliance.²⁰ Rather than mediating disputes among Amerindians in order to gain credit for their achievements, the British were to ally themselves with certain groups for mutual benefit, and against others who were proving troublesome. Amerindian unity became something to be avoided while Amerindian conflicts were to be encouraged for the British interest.²¹ Although the British mediated disputes between the Menominees and the Ojibway²² and the Illinois Confederacy and the Shawnees, Delawares and Six Nations, these examples were departures from the norm. The first dispute was mediated by Major Robert Rogers at Michilimackinac without his superiors' approval,²³ and the second was only accomplished because it was essential to British-Amerindian peace in 1765.²⁴ For Amerindians around Detroit, this policy had certain ramifications. If they identified themselves as sincere members of the British alliance, they could obtain certain benefits. If they refused to manifest the sort of behavior that was expected of allies, they could be sure that the British would not hesitate to use any intertribal conflicts they might be experiencing to the advantage of the British and the enemies of the recalcitrant peoples.

Further inducements were made to Amerindians to make their peace. The King released the Proclamation of 1763 in October of that year. Although this was issued not because

of Pontiac's War, but rather because of promises made to various Amerindian governments during the Seven Years' War, it had the effect of assuaging Amerindian fears about their land. Land could only be surrendered by Amerindians in public assemblies of their chiefs and warriors and to a representative of the British Crown appointed for this purpose. Illegal settlers were not to be permitted on Amerindian lands, while fraudulent land claims would be much harder to enforce. Trade was to be opened up so that all British citizens could engage in it, goods of all kinds were to become freely available, and officers were to be appointed to prevent the kinds of abuse of which Amerindians were complaining.²⁵ Although the long term effects of these policies is open to debate, they affected the conciliatory course of events over the next few years, laying down foundations for peace in the period from 1763 until the summer of 1765.

By October, 1763, the confederacy brought together at Detroit to oppose the British had disintegrated. The "good" Hurons, under Teata and Baby (or Odinghquanoron), had only taken part in the seige because of threats that "the Ottawas and the Potawatomies and even those of our own nation, would fall upon us and kill our wives and children."²⁶ They made a truce in June after their Jesuit priest, Father Potier, threatened to refuse them the sacraments.²⁷ They withdrew from hostilities, not because of British might, but rather because of the strength of their Roman Catholic faith.

Neolin's separatist spirituality did not appeal to the Christian Hurons. The "good" Hurons counselled the "bad" to make a truce, which was granted in July, when they supposedly returned all the merchandise and prisoners they had seized during the war. There was another, intertribal, imperative that may have influenced the Hurons for peace. Their status as elder brothers among the villagers surrounding Detroit was reinforced or even boosted by Sir William Johnson during his trip to Detroit in 1761, when he incorporated the Western Amerindians into the Covenant Chain structure and recognized the Hurons as the head of an Amerindian Western Confederacy. The Western Amerindians became brothers of the British, and the Hurons, elder brothers.²⁸ Pontiac, an Ottawa, had obviously become the leader of this regional block, holding conferences where he wished, rather than in the Huron village, where Johnson, following the French lead, had placed the council fire for all nations. Pontiac had enough authority to threaten recalcitrant Hurons. Peace with the British might restore the Hurons' previous status, perhaps even reinforcing their authority to a position they had never really previously enjoyed.

The defections from Detroit continued. On 9 September, 70 Potawatomis from St. Joseph's made their truce. Next, a faction of Ottawas banded together under Manitou, disowned Pontiac as their chief and moved to Sandusky. On 3 October, the schooner *Huron* managed to reach Detroit and resupply her

beleagured garrison with 185 barrels of provisions. By the end of the month, the French inhabitants had sold 8,000 pounds of wheat to the garrison, relieving it from immediate distress and assuring its survival for the winter.²⁹

Wabbicomicot, an Ojibwa chief from the Toronto area, arrived at Detroit on 1 October. Although many Ojibwa joined the war against the English, he had most likely kept the peace among his own people during the summer. He consulted the other Amerindian chiefs present, and on 7 October, asked Gladwin if he could come in and talk peace on the behalf of the Ojibwa and Ottawa. On 8 October, about 100 Miami from Kekionga arrived at Detroit; but, finding Amerindian councils divided, half went home while the others remained, awaiting developments. Wabbicomicot met with Gladwin from the 11 to the 13 October³⁰ and on the 14th, the Ojibwa sent in 6 prisoners as evidence of their desire for peace. Wasson, the leader of the Ojibwa beseiging Detroit from Saginaw Bay, Manitou and 4 other Ojibwa and Ottawa chiefs counselled with Gladwin on 17 October. The last of the Potawatomis left at this time, as well as the mostly young, propertyless French men who had sided with Pontiac. On 23 October, Ojibwa and Ottawa delegations were again inside, trying to come to a truce agreement. In response to a previous letter, word came from the French commandant on the Illinois that there would be no help forthcoming from him on 29 October. Pontiac and the remaining Ottawa and Ojibwa left the Detroit region on October 31: the seige was

over. They had not made peace - Gladwin told them he had to wait for word from his superiors - but a truce was established.³¹

The seige was lifted for a variety of reasons. Winter was coming on, and the groups around Detroit always left for their hunting grounds around this time; their departure was a part of their natural subsistence cycle.³² The letter from the Illinois dashed their hopes for help from the French.³³ Furthermore, they were low on ammunition,³⁴ while the successful resupplying of the garrison made it apparent to the besiegers that they could not starve it into submission. Their lack of success in making the garrison submit undermined their unity. It was extremely unusual for such large, tribally mixed groups to keep up such a sustained seige for any length of time. Their methods of wartime leadership were loose and fluid enough, that when large groups of warriors wanted to leave, the consensus necessary to keep the action alive ceased to exist.³⁵ Intertribal diplomacy, of which Sir William Johnson was the best informed among the British, also contributed to the truce, with his enlistment of five of the Six Nations and the Seven Nations Confederacy of Canada to proceed on an expedition against the Western Amerindians in the summer of 1764. The Seven Nations sent a message to this effect to Detroit in August, 1763.³⁶ Johnson knew that, backed by British arms and ammunition, the Iroquois were powerful,

giving "our Enemies...much more Reason to fear the Indians than the Best Troops in the World."³⁷

The winter of 1763/4 passed without incident. Pontiac and his Ottawa followers and rivals went to hunting camps on the Maumee, the Hurons were to be found on the Huron and Sandusky rivers, and the Potawatomi had gone into the interior of Michigan.³⁸ They received supplies from French traders who imported and exported via the Mississippi.³⁹ These and other hostile groups such as the Miami, Shawnee and Delaware remained in their villages, secure from British attacks because of the winter weather.

The summer of 1764 brought from the British offers of peace, while threats were directed against those who did not come to terms. While a peace conference was planned with the Western nations at Niagara, a military expedition was organized, under Colonel Bradstreet, to proceed against the Shawnee and Delaware villages on the Scioto and Muskingum, the Wyandots on the Sandusky, and then to Detroit. Those who refused the peace were to feel the wrath of the allied British and Iroquois military forces. This column was to operate in conjunction with another under the command of Colonel Henry Bouquet, who was to proceed from Fort Pitt to the Shawnee and Delaware villages.⁴⁰

Unfortunately for Bradstreet, his instructions were unclear. What was once to be a force of 4,000, designed to attack with surprise in early spring, became a force of 1,400, operating in conjunction with Amerindian allies in

late summer, and whose effectiveness was questioned by its commanding officer. Bradstreet's powers to discuss peace rather than simply force subjection were also disputed.⁴¹ Bradstreet had some experience dealing with the Amerindians when he was posted at Oswego during the Seven Years' War, and fancied himself an "Indian diplomat."⁴² Rather than working with the existing British Indian department, Bradstreet used his influence to advance his own interests, and became a rival of Sir William Johnson and his followers.⁴³ These problems came to create confusion in the British peace making process.

Responses to this initiative were mixed. Gladwin had a conference at Detroit in May, where "Peter the Mohawk" invited the Hurons to the Niagara conference. Not surprisingly, since those who had coerced him into fighting were gone, Baby replied that the Hurons at Detroit were disposed for peace.⁴⁴ They would be at Niagara. Others would not. The winter truce was now over, so that the Ottawas were sending delegates to the Illinois, again looking for help from the French there. Gladwin supposed it was only their lack of ammunition that kept them from attacking Detroit again.⁴⁵ Teata tried to get the Hurons of Sandusky to join him in the peace conference, but they, along with the Delaware and Shawnee temporarily residing with them, refused.⁴⁶ The Miami also refused their invitation. Perhaps they were of the same opinion

concerning the chances of success of the British column as Bradstreet himself. He commented:

What Exploits may be expected of 1400 Men, one half of them new raised Provincials, and the half of the other half but lately the Subjects of the French King, acting in the Center [sic] of the Savages surrounding the great Lakes, known be to our inveterate Enemies, I know not, but sure I am, if the whole were of the best Troops his Majesty has, the Number is far from being equal to Service.⁴⁷

The results of the conference at Niagara, held in July, 1764, reflected this mixed response. The different tribes represented here included Ottawa from L'Arbe Croche, Ojibway from near Georgian Bay and Toronto, some Sacs, Foxes and Menominees from Green Bay, the Seven Nations, and Mohawk, Oneida, Tuscarora, Onandaga, and Cayuga warriors who were to accompany the expedition; but only the Detroit Hurons and the Genesee Senecas had been engaged in hostilities during the previous year. Most came to assure the British of their friendship, renew the Covenant Chain, and engage in the trade from which the war had cut them off. Contrary to Peckham's view that this conference "was of little value,"⁴⁸ bringing the Genesee Senecas and Hurons of Detroit to peace was important. The Genesee Senecas had ambushed and defeated a British column at Niagara, and had influence in the Six Nations council that Sir William Johnson depended upon for support among the Amerindian tribes.⁴⁹ The Hurons at Detroit were already beginning to be thought of by Johnson as suitably compliant heads of a Western Amerindian confederacy. This achievement marked the beginning of a

series of agreements bringing hostile groups to peace. Johnson held conferences separately with each group, in order to emphasize their relationship with the British and deemphasize their relationships with each other. The Iroquois and Seven Nations warriors were a visible reminder of the British alliances, now with no French "father" to help contain them. Colonel Bradstreet and his troops were present, waiting to proceed against those who did not show up. Of perhaps even more importance, Johnson allowed trade at the Congress and promised more later. He liberally distributed the "presents" or rent the British now understood they were to pay for their priveleges in Amerindian territory. Johnson distributed goods worth 38,000 Pounds Sterling, a huge sum, the equivalent of 760,000 livres tournois.⁵⁰

The Hurons agreed to a set of provisions that went a long way toward meeting Amerindian demands and once more put relations on a cooperative basis. They were again admitted into the Covenant Chain alliance structure on the same basis as before, that is, as the heads of a Western Confederacy. They gave up their three remaining prisoners, and promised to use their efforts to get those who were in the hands of their neighbours; they were to become enemies with the enemies of Britain, agreeing to help protect the navigation of the passage from Lake Erie to Lake Huron; and they acknowledged "His Britannic Majesty's right to all the lands above their Village,...in as full and ample manner as the

same was ever claimed or enjoyed by the French."⁵¹ The military commitment would not have been resented by the Huron. They had such an arrangement with their former French "father" so that they would have expected this as part of any close relationship. Rather than giving anything up, the Hurons now had a better title to their lands; the land their village was situated on was recognized as their own and the British claimed only the title to the rest that the French enjoyed. What exactly this title was remained to be worked out, with the help of the Proclamation of 1763, over the coming years. In keeping with these new alliance obligations, Johnson agreed to give the Hurons annual presents from the British Crown,⁵² as rent for the lands the fort at Detroit stood upon, and as a toll for passage across their lands.⁵³ Cooperation with the British brought the rewards of secure title to their lands, restitution of the payment of rent, and recognition as the chief British allies in the west. Parkman and Peckham, by downplaying the significance of this conference, were able to ignore these significant provisions and the recognition of Amerindian demands that they signified.

With the conclusion of the peace conference, Bradstreet began his expedition to the enemy villages. The British forces were accompanied by over 300 Mohawk, the Seven Nations, and other Canadian Indians.⁵⁴ Overtures to make peace began coming to Bradstreet from the Amerindian groups that he was to encounter, so that he felt it was not

necessary to proceed against some of the villages he was to attack. As Bradstreet was about to leave Niagara, he received a letter from Major Gladwin that "the Sandusky Savages have lately offer'd [sic] to make Peace...The Putewatames [sic] have also offered Peace...[and that]...the Outawas ask Peace & have brought in three Prisoners."⁵⁵ Such peacemakers were not representing their whole tribes; rather they represented villagers who had a better opinion of the chances of the expedition than Bradstreet himself, and wished to make their peace. For example, Gladwin claimed that the Ottawas had made peace; but he had only spoken to proponents of peace under Manitou and Attawang. Pontiac continued to lead a large faction of hostile Ottawa. Amerindian diplomacy was attempting to deflect the British military effort. Colonel John Bradstreet, leading a force he judged to be inadequate for the task ahead, and yearning for the personal glory he felt would be his if he could bring the recalcitrant tribes to terms, was ready to listen to peace overtures, whether they coincided with his orders or not.⁵⁶

Bradstreet's ambivalence about the use of violence became more apparent as he advanced. When the army reached Presqu'Isle, Bradstreet held a council of war with his officers and the Iroquois, and it was decided to proceed.⁵⁷ The next day he encountered ten Amerindians who purported to be representatives of the Sandusky Huron, the Shawnee, Delaware and Mingo, treating for peace.⁵⁸ They were led by

a Sandusky Huron named Killbuck. It was decided that they would meet Bradstreet at Sandusky within 25 days, delivering up Pontiac and their prisoners, so that a general peace could be concluded.⁵⁹ Later, General Gage reported that they were there only to observe the army's march, with their credentials as peacemakers in doubt because of their small number. They did not possess any wampum belts with which to make peace, and the Shawnee and Delaware continued to raid the frontier. According to this explanation, such Shawnee and Delaware successfully used subterfuge to misdirect the expedition, thereby rendering it impotent. This explanation has been accepted by historians who did not investigate the collapse in Amerindian demands that Bradstreet's agreement would have signalled.⁶⁰

The explanation for the failure of this Huron, Shawnee, Delaware, and Mingo peace initiative lay in the unacceptable peace terms Bradstreet tried to impose upon the Amerindians. Those he treated with at Presqu'Isle only claimed to be representatives of more prominent peace and war chiefs from their respective tribes, so that their terms could be rejected by these chiefs. Bradstreet insisted that the British "be at liberty to build, and erect as many Forts, or Trading houses, as they may find necessary."⁶¹ British incursions into Amerindian territory were one of the causes of the war, so that the leaders may have decided that continuing frontier incursions might convince the British of Amerindian military power and the need for better terms that

would lead to a more equal, cooperative relationship, rather than one based on British military dominance. Either way, the force that the British had put together was undermined by the diplomatic ineptness of its commander, the confusing nature of the instructions he received from his superiors, and the diplomatic initiatives of Amerindians.

Bradstreet sent a party under Captain Thomas Morris up the Maumee to tell the Amerindians living there of the supposed peace.⁶² Morris left in the company of Jacques Godfroy and Mini Chesne (Pontiac sympathizers, involved in the taking of Fort Miami and pardoned by Bradstreet in return for going on this expedition), Oneida chief Thomas King and twelve of his warriors, five Mohawks, Wasson (the formerly hostile Ojibwa chief from Saginaw Bay) and Attawang (an Ottawa chief at Roche de Bout and proponent of peace). The party was met at Roche de Bout by several hundred hostile warriors, who separated Morris from his Amerindian escort. Morris met with Pontiac and St. Vincent, a French Canadian from Detroit and Pontiac sympathizer. They were not in favour of peace, telling Morris of the reported coming of a French army up the Mississippi that "would drive the English out of the country." Later, Morris had to hide in a cornfield when the warriors got drunk and wanted to kill him. Pontiac saved Morris' life by pointing out his status as an ambassador; and by the end of Morris' visit, he told him that he believed peace was coming, although he did not want to be a part of it.⁶³ Pontiac asked Thomas King

the sentiments of the Six Nations, who he claimed had incited him to his efforts⁶⁴ and upbraided them for now helping the English.⁶⁵ In the end, the Amerindians allowed Morris and his party to proceed;⁶⁶ but he had made no engagements, peaceful or of any other kind, while at Roche de Bout. Morris was lucky to be allowed to continue, as the village was divided into factions: some, following Attawang, wanted peace; others, following Pontiac, wanted to continue the war.⁶⁷

There was further evidence of factionalism regarding a proposed peace with the British on the Maumee. At the next Ottawa village, Morris' party met the chief Katapellecy, who, in Morris' words, offered "his hand to all my fellow-travellers, but not to me." They continued on their journey, but were joined by the now pro-British Pontiac's nephew, two other Ottawas and St. Vincent, a former Detroit resident who had supported Pontiac.⁶⁸

Morris was greeted with open hostility at Kekionga. The Miami had been recently stirred up in their anti-English sentiment by a Shawnee and Delaware delegation who requested the Miami kill Morris.⁶⁹ He was bound to the torture stake; but his life was spared. This incident reveals much of the feelings at Kekionga. At his arrival, Morris was refused the peace pipe; but was then sent across the river to the former Fort Miami to keep him out of harm's way. Two warriors, Vis en l'Air and the son of Chat Blanc, dragged him across the river and tied him to the torture post. The

Amerindians and French accompanying Morris tried to calm the crowd of hostile warriors. Naranea, the Miami war chief,⁷⁰ took Morris' part. Another Miami chief, le Cygne favoured Morris because his children were hostages at Detroit. Finally, Pacanne, "king of the Miamis nation...untied me, saying, "I give that man his life. If you want meat go to Detroit, or upon the lake and you'll find enough. What business have you with this man's flesh, who is come to speak to us?"⁷¹ Morris' status as an ambassador saved him once again. The Miami council exhibited their continuing hostility to the British by informing Morris and his party that if they continued on, they would be killed. Wisely, they returned to Detroit.⁷²

Bradstreet's expedition was having an uneven impact. While Morris was being received on the Maumee, Bradstreet was making peace treaties at Detroit. Bradstreet did not realize that he was making agreements with only those groups who came to see him. As Morris' account indicates, Amerindian groups in the interior remained hostile. Factionalism prevailed in Indian councils, with those who wanted peace going to Detroit to treat with Bradstreet, while those who advocated war remained safe in their villages in the interior. The behaviour of the Miami provides a good example of this factionalism. Anson suggests that the Miami were not actually politically disunited: they were, rather, trying to discern the stronger party by having representatives strive for peace and war

simultaneously.⁷³ This was happening literally, as 7 September was both the date that Morris had his nearly fatal reception at Kekionga and the date the Bradstreet met with Miami representatives at Detroit.⁷⁴ White claims that the Miamis were split into factions, with those at Detroit only observing the proceedings.⁷⁵ Given Morris' reception and treatment at Kekionga, this view would seem reasonable. Bradstreet's expedition was deflected by Amerindian diplomacy, and a British commander who did not understand it. Under these circumstances, Amerindians on the Maumee, Wabash, Scioto and Muskingum rivers perceived no military reason to come to terms with the British. They believed they could continue to be supplied with European goods via the French on the lower Mississippi, so that they also had no economic incentive for making peace.

The Detroit conference with factions from the Ojibwa, Ottawa, Wyandot, Miami and Potawatomi lasted from the 7 to the 10 September. Wasson, on behalf of the assembled Ojibwa and Ottawa, asked Bradstreet for forgiveness for their outbreak, while Bradstreet was inclined to grant them their wish. The chiefs listed as present were Wasson, Attawaky, Shamindawa, Attawang, Butawang, Apockess and Abbetts.⁷⁶ Not present was the promised Pontiac. Unknown to Bradstreet, he continued to actively work against peace with the English, sending out a belt inviting "all the red men to aid him and then he threatens with his hatred and that of all his people if they do not wish to join him."⁷⁷ Shamindawa, an Ottawa

chief, gave a slanted account of the disposition of Pontiac, reporting that when Pontiac met Morris, he stated "that he was heartily Ashamed of what had happened and if he could be forgiven he would be very thankful; and do all the Service in his power to the English." Wasson blamed their conduct during the war on the old chiefs. "This day, the Young Chiefs broke all their old Chiefs."⁷⁸ This was a strange statement, because Wasson was the old chief. On 29 September, Youngwate and Datoraha, with 100 warriors of the Sandusky Hurons, arrived and were granted peace on the same terms as the Detroit Hurons had been granted at Niagara.⁷⁹

Bradstreet and the assembled Amerindians agreed to a set of terms to end the hostilities between the signatories. The Amerindians were to become "subjects and children" of the King of England, who had "Sovereignty Over all and every part of this Country in as full and as ample a manner as in any part of his Dominions whatever;" all nations agreed to act in concert against any that broke the peace; if any Amerindian killed a white, he was to be delivered up to the commanding officer at Detroit for a trial; all prisoners and deserters were to be delivered; the Amerindians agreed to evict French settled in their villages; and Pontiac, based on Shamandawa's false statement, was pardoned, supposed to meet Bradstreet at Sandusky, where he was to be sent back to the white settlements and given a government pension.⁸⁰

Like the agreements that has already been made with the Detroit Hurons, the relationship thus established with the

Ojibwa and Ottawa built upon traditions that were developed in the Franco-Amerindian alliance; but also added clauses which would cause difficulties over the ensuing years. The demand for military alliance and the surrender of prisoners were clauses which sprang from the Franco-Amerindian alliance. The claim of British sovereignty, the demand to surrender murderers for trial, rather than for the classic pattern of "surrender and redemption" and the call for the evacuation of the French from Amerindian villages were provisions with which these Amerindians were likely to disagree. The fate of these provisions will be explored in subsequent chapters.

A messenger was sent to publicize and confirm the peace in the Amerindian villages on Georgian Bay. Bradstreet sent M. Marsac to Saginaw Bay, Michilimackinac, Sault Ste. Marie and L'Arbre Croche. Our concern lies only with Saginaw Bay, as the other villages were contacted via Michilimackinac. Marsac arrived in the spring of 1765, produced some valuable wampum belts, and the Ottawa chiefs Ondacquoi and Echeouabemet and the Ojibwa chiefs Manitou-Abek and Quoimiguen agreed to accept the designation of children rather than brother. Taken with Wasson's activities, the Saginaw Bay communities became reconciled to the British.⁸¹

Bradstreet's terms were severely criticized by Sir William Johnson for misrepresenting the actual political agreement the Amerindians had signed. As is apparent by Marsac's report, the Amerindians had agreed to recognize the

English as "father" rather than "brother." This did not amount to recognizing English sovereignty.

[I]t is necessary to observe that no Nation of Indians have any word which can express, or convey the Idea of Subjection, they often say "we acknowledge the great King to be our Father, we hold him fast by the hand, and we shall do wt. [sic] he desires" many such like words of course, for which our People too readily adopt & insert a Word verry [sic] different in signification, and never intended by the Indians without explaining to them what is meant by Subjection...but you may be assured that none of the Six Nations, Western Indians &ca. ever declared themselves in that light whilst they have any Men, or an open Country to retire to.⁸²

Given the distinctions between Amerindian and Euroamerican beliefs about the relative duties and responsibilities of a "father" and his "children", even the strength of the term "father" must be qualified. Jennings is wrong when he states that Bradstreet "made them accept Britain's sovereignty over their lands and people."⁸³ In Amerindian cultures, children were raised in a less formally disciplined manner than in Euroamerican communities, and, at least in the matriarchal cultures (e.g. the Wyandots and Six Nations Iroquois) any discipline that was provided, was usually supplied by the maternal uncle. Rather than conferring the power to order children around, the designation of father conferred obligations to provide for one's children, and to mediate disputes between them.⁸⁴

Other terms agreed to at the peace treaty were accepted by Bradstreet's superiors. Johnson did not criticize the terms requiring Amerindians to give up any who killed a white to the commander at Detroit or the clause requiring

them to evict French settled in their villages. These clauses were problematic and remained thorny issues.

Bradstreet's expedition travelled to Sandusky to await the delivery of Pontiac and the promised prisoners. By 5 October, Bradstreet realized that the prisoners were not going to be given up, and had heard that the peace he had negotiated was not being honoured by the Shawnee, Delaware or Bouquet. Not only was it too late in the season for Bradstreet's troops to advance into Shawnee or Delaware territory without running the risk of becoming caught in winter storms, but Bradstreet's forces were also very fatigued and running out of provisions.⁸⁵ He gave a war belt to the Five Nations forces with the British expedition. They were to attack the Delaware and Shawnee alone. Thomas King, the Oneida chief in charge of the Six Nations force with Bradstreet, rejected this option.⁸⁶ The Five Nations were not prepared to attack an enemy alone when they originally were to have the help of a British army.⁸⁷ Bradstreet decided Lt. Col. Campbell, now in command at Detroit, should get the Detroit Indians to do the work neither he nor the Five Nations were prepared to do. On 10 October, he wrote to Campbell to send out "all the Parties of Indians in Friendship with us you can possibly collect."⁸⁸

A fall storm blew up just as Bradstreet's forces were leaving Sandusky, and many of his boats were destroyed. Bradstreet sailed back to Niagara and left his Indian allies

to fend for themselves. The Iroquois had to walk back along the southern shore of Lake Erie toward Niagara, so that some of them finally reached Johnson Hall in December, "naked and almost famished."⁸⁹

Bradstreet's mission was not a total failure, but his success was far from complete. He had not succeeded in properly bringing Amerindian enemies into the British alliance system. Many of the peace terms he agreed to were either rejected by his superiors, or continued to be problematic for several years. Due to his desire to be an Indian diplomat, and his willingness to be distracted from the task at hand, large factions among the St. Joseph Potawatomi, the Miami Confederacy, the Illinois and Ottawa still remained hostile.⁹⁰ He had not contributed to the pacification of the Shawnee and Delaware as per his instructions. Moreover, those Amerindian allies upon whom the system depended were alienated by Bradstreet's conduct. First, their councils had been ignored at Sandusky, when, according to the terms of their agreement at Niagara, they advocated attacking the Delaware and Shawnee. Then they were abandoned on Lake Erie, and subject to all the hardships Bradstreet himself escaped. Bradstreet's expedition predisposed some groups for peace. The Hurons of Detroit and Sandusky, the Potawatomi near Detroit, and many Ottawa and Ojibway made their peace with the British at this time.⁹¹

There were several factors that accounted for Bradstreet's uneven results. The British threat of force had limited results. The Shawnee and Delaware had yet to be pacified by Bouquet's expedition, so that Amerindian groups in the interior still presented a united anti-British front, a front that had prevailed over British forts and troops. Second, Bradstreet's military expedition never travelled to the places he was supposed to go. British troops and Iroquois warriors did not travel down the Cuyahoga, the Sandusky or the Maumee in order to engage the hostile groups. Only factions within certain of these villages decided to make peace. It may be significant that the groups who made peace with Bradstreet at this time, notably the Ojibwa from Saginaw Bay, and the Wyandots of Detroit and Sandusky were within range of the boats and ships of the British force upon the Great Lakes. Bradstreet chose to use diplomacy to pacify. He was hindered in this by the unacceptable peace terms he first tried to impose, by his lack of understanding of the factionalism within Amerindian communities, and the lack of support of Sir William Johnson, who regarded him as his rival. At Presque Isle, Bradstreet refused to recognize the Shawnee, Delaware and Sandusky Wyandot's title to their land that they believed they possessed. It may be significant that the Detroit Wyandots had their rights to their lands guaranteed, and so, finally, did the Sandusky Wyandots, when they made their peace at Detroit in September, 1764. Finally, Bradstreet believed

those who were bargaining with him spoke for larger communities. He believed he had pacified entire communities; but he had only made agreements with those chiefs and their followers who he talked with, who did not have the authority to enforce their decisions on the larger communities of which they were a part.

An incident in November, 1764, illustrated the problems that Bradstreet had left his successors to manage. Two soldiers of the Detroit garrison were killed. Campbell had not been informed of the truce brought about by Bouquet's expedition, and believed this was the work of the Shawnee and Delaware. In accord with the peace terms, parties of Detroit Hurons and Ojibway from Saginaw Bay set out to punish the aggressors. While the Hurons soon learned that the attackers were not the Delawares or Shawnee, the Ojibwa "struck" the Shawnee three times in retaliation before they were informed of the mistake.⁹² The perpetrators of the killings were some Potawatomis from near St. Joseph's, who carried out the killings in retaliation for the killing of some of their relatives by the British in 1763.

Campbell decided to use diplomacy to deal with this incident, and to bring the Potawatomi from near St. Joseph's to a peace agreement. The Potawatomi chiefs Machioquise (Mishikee)⁹³ and Makisabe from near Detroit were sent to bring in their recalcitrant brethren. This resulted in a conference between Campbell and the St. Joseph Potawatomi on 26 January, 1765. Mishikee and Makisabe brought with them

the St. Joseph chiefs Peshibaon (Peshibon) and Nangisse (Onangizes).⁹⁴ Mishikee spoke for the St. Joseph Potawatomies, who promised they would bring in those responsible for the killings, as Campbell had "promised not to hurt them." Amerindians were to be delivered up - for what? They were not to be harmed, when English law would normally require them to be tried and hanged. It seems that Campbell agreed to the familiar form of "surrender and redemption" that had characterized intercultural murders during the French regime. The St. Joseph representatives had not made peace. Rather, they left two hostages for their good behavior and promised to erase hostilities by sending a larger representation to Detroit in the spring, with the killers and all their prisoners.⁹⁵

A diplomatic offensive was planned for 1765, because of the mixed results of the military offensive and in order to get the Amerindians of the Illinois and Wabash to come to Detroit and agree to peace. Two French Canadians from Detroit, one of whom was Francois Maisonville, a fur trader who was familiar with the Illinois and Wabash villages, were sent to the Wabash and Illinois in the fall and early winter of 1764, asking Pontiac and the other chiefs to attend a conference planned for Detroit in the summer of 1765.⁹⁶ As well, Lt. John Ross was dispatched to the Illinois from Fort Pitt. While under the protection of the French garrison at Fort de Chartres, he held conferences with most of the groups living around the French post, including the

Kaskaskia, Peorias, Cahokias, Michigameas, the Osages and Missouries, though he never talked to Pontiac. Due to the hostility of these Amerindians, Ross decided to retreat down the Mississippi on 7 April, 1765.⁹⁷ Pontiac still continued to work against the English interest, and was characterized by Charles Phillipe Aubry, a French official in Louisiana, as "the firebrand of all the nations."⁹⁸ Even though a party of Ojibway was sent from Detroit to talk to them of peace in the early spring, most of the Miami and their confederate nations continued to be hostile. In May, Campbell characterized the Potawatomi at St. Joseph as hostile, despite their previous conference. They did not bring in their prisoners, and asked for the return of their hostages.⁹⁹

This behaviour on the part of the St. Joseph Potawatomi can be explained. In the documents, the chiefs are described as representatives of the St. Joseph Potawatomis. However, there were several villages of Potawatomis in the St. Joseph area and further to the south west, so that while the villages the chiefs representated may have wanted peace, other villages, which would not have sent peace representatives to the British, may have been sending out war parties at the same time. As well, this sort of raiding could be carried out without the approval of the chiefs even within a village. While chiefs may have recommended peace, in the final analysis, they had no power to stop small parties of young warriors from going out against the British

in order to gain status for themselves and avenge some wrong, whether real or imagined.¹⁰⁰

That the British managed to get Pontiac and most of the Amerindian groups on the Wabash to come to Detroit in the summer of 1765 and agree to peace was due largely to the efforts of Sir William Johnson's deputy, George Croghan. Croghan was much more experienced in the ways of Amerindian diplomacy than Bradstreet. He had run a trading post among the Miami, at Pickawillany, in the 1740s and was active among the tribes during the Seven Years' War. Croghan's way was prepared for him by Lieutenant Alexander Fraser and Francois Maisonville, who left Fort Pitt before Croghan, and arrived in the Illinois in April.¹⁰¹ Fraser claimed to have disposed Pontiac towards peace by the time he left;¹⁰² but the hostility of the other Illinois tribes necessitated he leave the area via the Mississippi before Croghan arrived.¹⁰³ Fraser was almost killed by the Potawatomi and Ojibwa; but Pontiac protected him and his men.¹⁰⁴

Croghan's success was due both to his knowledge of Amerindians and also to fortuitous circumstance. Croghan was travelling down the Ohio with deputies from the Shawnee, Delaware and Senecas, with whom he had recently made peace, when his party was attacked by about 80 Kickapoo and Mascoutin warriors on 8 June, 1765. This attack caused a rupture between these allies and the Amerindians who attacked them.

A Deputy of the Shawnesse [sic] who was Shot thro [sic] the Thigh...came up to them and made a very bold speech telling them that the Whole Northward Indians would join in taking Revenge for the Insult and murder of their People this alarmed thoss [sic] Indians very much they began excusing themselves.¹⁰⁵

These warriors let the Amerindians go and proceeded with Croghan and his party to the Piankeshaw village by Vincennes. The chiefs here reprimanded the warriors, telling them to take good care of Croghan until their chiefs returned from the Illinois, where they had gone to wait for Croghan's arrival. The warriors had attacked a delegation with whom even their own chiefs had been wanting to speak. Proceeding on to Ouiatanon, Croghan was well received there by many who formerly knew him, and when the chiefs arrived from the Illinois they "expressed great concern at what had happened." From 4 to 8 July, Croghan held conferences with the Ouiatanons, Piankeshaws, Kickapoos, and Mascoutins:

in which I was lucky enough to reconcile those Nations to His Majesties Interest & obtain their Consent and Approbation to take Possession of any Posts in their Country which the French formerly possessed, & an offer of their Service should any Nation oppose our taking possession of it.¹⁰⁶

Croghan felt the attack upon his party was the deciding factor in bringing these people to peace. The strains this brought to the Amerindian confederacy opposing the British were intense, so that:

itt [sic] has broke & Devided [sic] that Great Confederice [sic] of Eighteen Westren [sic] Nations which the french has been this three years Indeavoring [sic] to bring About with Great pains & Expencc [sic] to opose [sic] our Geting posision [sic] of the Cuntry [sic]...the killing those three Shanna [sic]

Deputies has Intierly [sic] broake [sic] upp [sic] this
Confederacie [sic] & there is Nothing those Nations
Dread More then [sic] a Warr [sic] with ye. Six Nations
Dallaways [sic] & Shannas [sic].¹⁰⁷

The attack was an important catalyst, but it was not singly responsible for bringing peace to the region. Important Amerindians were already considering British peace proposals. It most likely had the effect of giving peace proponents another argument for reconciliation and proponents of continuing the war a pause for thought. Instead of a large Amerindian alliance facing the British, they would now also have to fight their former Amerindian allies. The Wabash villagers now needed a mediator with the Shawnee, Delaware and Senecas. Croghan was bright enough to fulfill this role in return for peace with the British.¹⁰⁸

The agreements that were subsequently made reflected this exchange of British mediation in return for peace with the British, and incorporated other agreements as well. Messages were sent to the Miami at Kekionga to come to Ouiatanon and make peace. On 13 July, the Miami chiefs arrived, and Croghan made peace with them, promising to help them make up the difference with the Shawnee, Delaware and Six Nations.¹⁰⁹ Their fear of being dispossessed by the British was also resolved at this meeting. These Amerindians agreed to let the English take possession of any formerly French posts in their country; but did not look upon this as giving the English any sort of a claim on the rest of their territory.¹¹⁰

The offer of British mediation was also accepted by Pontiac. Croghan met with Pontiac, who was accompanied by the Amerindian deputies Croghan had with him on his trip down the Ohio. These delegates told Pontiac they would not treat with him until he made peace with the English.¹¹¹ Additionally, Pontiac was disposed for peace for reasons other than the offer of mediation. The English were willing to abide by Amerindian terms for the occupation of their country. Meanwhile, although some French traders supported him, French military officials had been rejecting Pontiac's appeals for aid for the last two years. Pontiac agreed to the same terms as the others. He insisted that the French had no right to give Amerindian land to the English "as they had never sold any part of it to the French."¹¹²

The enlarged party proceeded on to Detroit to conclude the peace proceedings through the distribution of the required rent payments.¹¹³ With Croghan's help, the previous invitations to a conference were honoured. Along the way, Croghan had all the English prisoners delivered to him from the Miami and Ottawa villages.¹¹⁴ This expedition was successful in working out terms agreeable to the Amerindians, so that whole villages honoured the peace agreed upon by factions from them with Bradstreet the year before.

The impetus for peace was kept up with the arrival of the party at Detroit on August 17. In response to Maisonville's invitation of the previous year, large groups

of Ottawa, Potawatomi and Ojibwa were already assembled at Detroit. Wabibicomicot was also there, with a deputation of Niagara Ojibwa and a message from Sir William Johnson for the Western nations to make peace or face the wrath of the British and their Six Nation and other allies.¹¹⁵ Under the circumstances, this must have seemed ominous to the gathered Amerindians. The first order of business was a request by the Miami, Ojibwa, Piankeshaw, Kickapoo and Mascoutin to the Shawnee, Delaware and Six Nations to forgive the attack on their deputies. They then expressed their desire for Croghan's help in resolving their differences with their disaffected allies and for peace with the English. As previously, they agreed to call the English their fathers instead of brother. Croghan made the same mistake as Bradstreet in claiming that this designation meant that they had "given up the Soverignty [sic] of their Country to me for His Majesty." These Amerindians agreed to let English traders and soldiers travel through their country unmolested. Thus was peace with them ratified.

Croghan and Campbell then negotiated with Pontiac, the Ottawa, Ojibwa, Potawatomi, and the Wyandots of both Detroit and Sandusky. The condolence ceremony was performed, belts were exchanged, and peace was declared. The safety of traders and soldiers was guaranteed. Wabicommicot delivered his message from Sir William Johnson. Pontiac spoke, declaring he had already made peace with Croghan upon their first meeting, and he was now meeting in order to let Sir

William Johnson know of it (and to collect the required rent, which had been plundered from Croghan during the attack). He also desired better trade terms; that his people might be given credit for goods over the winter. This was granted. He reemphasized that the French had only possessed certain concessions in Amerindian territory and that they would only give up to the English what "was Necessary for their Fathers the English, to carry on Trade at."

The Wabash Amerindians made this point even stronger.

[W]e tell you now the French never Conquered [us] neither did they purchase a foot of our Country, nor have [they a right] to give it to you, we gave them liberty to settle for which they always rewarded us & treated us with great Civility while they had it in their power, but as they are become now your People, if you expect to keep those Posts, we will expect to have proper returns from you.¹¹⁶

The British would be entitled only to those rights which the French had enjoyed, and only if they kept up their side of the bargain. Campbell and Croghan distributed "presents" just after this statement was made; their acknowledgement of the rent now to be paid by the British. This was the "sovereignty" spoken of by Croghan.

There were two late arrivals at Detroit. The Grand Saulteur, with his band of Ottawa and Ojibway from Chicago, came in and made his peace with the English on the same terms as the rest. The last group treated with were some Potawatomi from St. Joseph. They brought in their prisoners, blamed their past conduct on their "foolish young

men" and declared that they had given up their English prisoners at Michilimackinac. Campbell received them into the peace at their apparent compliance to the British terms.¹¹⁷

The last order of official business was to set up a meeting with all the Amerindian groups present with Sir William Johnson. It was arranged that they would meet with him at Niagara the next summer in order to ratify and confirm the proceedings that had taken place in the Illinois and at Detroit over the summer.¹¹⁸ This conference produced no new agreements and no other groups were added to the alliance structure. Probably, the best way of analyzing this conference would be to class it as the first of the promised annual conferences that the British had agreed to host. The purpose was to distribute the rent due the Amerindians for the British occupation of their country and to deal with issues at dispute between the groups.

It is thus clear that the Amerindians were not "forced to submit"¹¹⁹ by the fall of 1765. Rather, the British, after having seen their military forces suffer major reverses in the summer of 1763, modified their strategy from Amherst's no compromise stance to Johnson and Gage's more flexible position. They wished to accomodate Amerindian demands about their land and trade practices, while threatening recalcitrants with a British-Iroquois armed response. The course this armed response took, in Bradstreet's expedition, was problematic. Bradstreet was

able to agree to peace terms with several formerly hostile groups, while others received no military penalty for their intransigence. A measure of the importance of the recognition of Amerindian demands can be deduced from the Shawnee and Delaware's rejection of the peace terms agreed to by their deputies at Presque Isle in the summer of 1764. George Croghan, through his superior understanding of Amerindian diplomacy, and the circumstances brought about by the attack upon his group upon the Wabash, was able to bring most of these interior groups to peace through the use of British mediation. Amerindians of the Illinois and Wabash needed someone to intercede with the Shawnee, Delaware and Six Nations, whose deputies they attacked. This mediation was important, but it was not capable of bringing peace unaided. Important Amerindians, including Pontiac, were able to broker a peace that forced the British to recognize Amerindian rights and a more equitable balance of power. Amerindians were rewarded for their cooperation. The Detroit Hurons were to become heads of a Western Confederacy, Pontiac was allowed to speak for most of the western Amerindians at conferences, and other groups had their title to their land and trade recognized. The British were not to dominate Amerindians in the interior, they were to trade with them and recognize their rights. Pontiac's War did not prove that "savages could not defeat civilized men [sic],"¹²⁰ it coerced the British into implementing a

policy of cooperation with Amerindians who forcefully and successfully, protested against British violations.

Peace had been brought to the area surrounding Detroit, but peace was not unqualified. War parties from groups such as the St. Joseph Potawatomis continued to cause problems. Trade, land and intercultural murders remained contentious issues. Serious disputes arose. Still, a mechanism had been set up through the peace making process that would enable the two sides to discuss and resolve most of these disputes. In the next chapters, the way in which dispute-settlement took place will be analysed by concentrating on the themes of trade, land, British "presents", and killings. This discussion will prove that Amerindians in the Detroit area were not ready to "submit" to the British, that they jealously guarded their rights, and that the British continued to recognize this fact of existence in the North American interior.

Endnotes

- ¹ Francis Jennings, Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies and Calumets in the Seven Years War in America, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1988), 438-442. Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 256-257.
- ² M.M. Quaife, ed., The Seige of Detroit in 1763. The Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy and John Rutherford's Narrative of a Captivity, (Chicago: Donnelly, 1958), 22.
- ³ Ibid., 22.
- ⁴ William Johnson to the Lords of Trade, 13 November, 1763, N.Y.C.D., 7, 575.
- ⁵ William Johnson to Cadwallader Colden, 30 December, 1763, J.P., 4, 281-282.
- ⁶ George Croghan to the Lords of Trade, January, 1763, N.Y.C.D., 7, 603.
- ⁷ William Johnson to the Lords of Trade, 1 July, 1763, N.Y.C.D., 7, 525.
- ⁸ For statements on Pontiac's leadership at Detroit see: The Seige of Detroit in 1763, 7, 17, 20-24, 30, 38, 45, 57-58, 60, 63, 87-89, 100, 197-198.
- ⁹ Ibid, 128-129.
- ¹⁰ Ibid, 143-144, 169, 175, 255-256.
- ¹¹ Howard Peckham, Pontiac and the Indian Uprising of 1763, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 156-170.
- ¹² George Croghan to the Lords of Trade, January, 1764, N.Y.C.D., 7, 603. Thomas Gage to William Johnson, 26 December, 1763, J.P., p. 278. William Smith, ed., An Historical Account of the Expedition Against the Ohio Indians in the Year 1764, Under the Command of Henry Bouquet, Esq., (Ann Arbour: University Microfilms, 1966), (1776), xii.
- ¹³ Jeffrey Amherst to William Johnson, 27 August, 1763, N.Y.C.D., 7, 545. Jeffrey Amherst to William Johnson, 30 September, 1763, N.Y.C.D., 7, 658-569.
- ¹⁴ Earl of Egremont to Jeffrey Amherst, 13 August, 1763, N.Y.C.D., 7, 538-539.

15 William Johnson to the Lords of Trade, 13 November, 1763, N.Y.C.D., 7, 572-581.

16 William Johnson to the Lords of Trade, 13 November, 1763, N.Y.C.D., 7, 574.

17 The Senecas joined the anti-British confederacy, while the Mohawk, Oneida, Onandaga, Cayuga and Tuscarora remained allied to Britain. William Johnson to the Lords of Trade, 13 November, 1763, N.Y.C.D., 7, 576.

18 The Seven Nations of Canada were a confederacy of Amerindians who resided in French missions along the St. Lawrence River, and who had made their peace with the British following the conquest of Quebec. They included the Iroquois, Algonquin and Nipissing from Oka; Iroquois from Caugnawaga; Abenaki from St. Francis and Becanour; Huron from Lorette and Iroquois from Akwesasne. Helen Hornbuck Tanner, The Atlas of Great Lakes Indians, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press), 1986, 46.

19 William Johnson to Eyre, 29 January, 1764, Diary of the Seige of Detroit in the War With Pontiac. Also a Narrative of the Principal Events of the Seige, by Major Robert Rogers, A Plan For Conducting Indian Affairs by Colonel Bradstreet, and other Authentik Documents Never Before Printed, Franklin B. Hough, ed., (Albany: Munsell, 1860), 237.

20 For significant statements on the advisability of dividing Amerindian councils see: Gage to Johnson, 26 December, 1763, J.P., 4, 278. Johnson to Gage, 5 August, 1764, J.P., 11, 324. Johnson to Gage, 8 December, 1769, J.P., 7, 294-295. Johnson to Gage, 18 November, 1772, J.P., 8, 638-640. Conference with Kayashuta, 5-15 January, 1774, J.P., 12, 1044-1060.

21 The Amerindians that Dowd describes worked against these forces. In this context, Amerindian unity became an automatically anti-British movement. Gregory Evans Dowd, A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745-1815, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 36-49.

22 Johnson to the Earl of Shelburne, 26 October, 1767, N.Y.C.D., 7, 988-9.

23 William Johnson to the Earl of Hillsborough, 17 August, 1768, N.Y.C.D., 8, 94.

24 George Croghan's Journals, August 27, 1765, I.H.C., 11, 43-44.

- 25 Proclamation of October 7, 1763, D.R.C.H.C., 1, 121-123.
- 26 Quaife, op. cit., 64.
- 27 Ibid., 76, 81, 138.
- 28 William Johnson's Detroit Journal, 15 September, 1761, J.P., 13, 256-257. William Johnson at Detroit, 9 September, 1761, J.P., 3, 476-477, 494.
- 29 This is in opposition to Peter Schmalz, The Ojibwa of Southern Ontario, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 75, who accurately reports that, on October 1, the garrison only had supplies for three weeks. Unfortunately, in his effort to make Wabbicomicott the "savior of Fort Detroit" he does not report these resupplies after October 1.
- 30 Schmalz, op. cit., 75, gives Wabbicomicott much of the credit for bringing the other chiefs to a realization that they must look for peace, and for brokering the ensuing truce. This depends on whether we contend that the chiefs were already disposed for peace because of other factors and simply used Wabbicomicott as a go-between (my analysis) or whether he arrived at Detroit and almost single-handedly talked hostiles into a truce (Schmalz's analysis).
- 31 Peckham, op. cit., 232-238. Louis Chevette, "Pontiac," Dictionary of Canadian Biography, 3, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 529.
- 32 Francis Parkman, The Conspiracy of Pontiac and the Indian War after the Conquest of Canada, 2, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1886), 111.
- 33 Dowd's interpretation of these attempts to restore the Franco-Amerindian alliance as an effort of the Amerindians to influence the French, rather than, of the French to influence the Amerindians must be balanced against Jennings exposition of the interests some young, unpropertied French in Detroit and those trading with Amerindians had in inciting them to oppose English influence. Gregory Evans Dowd, "The French King Wakes Up in Detroit: "Pontiac's War" in Rumour and History," Ethnohistory, 37, (Summer, 1990), 254-278. Jennings, op. cit., 444-446.
- 34 Thomas Gage to William Johnson, 26 December, 1763, J.P., 4, 278.
- 35 Chevette, op. cit., 529.
- 36 Message of the Canada to the Western Indians, August, 1763, N.Y.C.D., 7, 544.

- 37 William Johnson to Eyre, 29 January, 1764, Diary of the Seige of Detroit., 237.
- 38 Robert Rogers to William Johnson, 7 October, 1763, Diary of the Seige of Detroit, 178.
- 39 William Johnson to Cadwallader Colden, 30 December, 1763, J.P., 4, 282.
- 40 William G. Godfrey, Pursuit of Profit and Preferment in Colonial North America: John Bradstreet's Quest, (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1982), 186-187.
- 41 Ibid., 176-177.
- 42 Ibid., 64.
- 43 Ibid., 73.
- 44 Indian Conference, 7-10 May, 1764, J.P., 11, 177.
- 45 Henry Gladwin to William Johnson, 11 May, 1764, J.P., 11, 191.
- 46 Henry Gladwin to William Johnson, 9 June, 1764, J.P., 11, 227-229.
- 47 John Bradstreet to Jeffrey Amherst, 6 April, 1764, Diary of the Seige of Detroit, 273.
- 48 Peckham, op. cit., 253.
- 49 Jennings, op. cit., 440, 446.
- 50 Listed at the conference were 45 Mohawks, 124 Caenawagues and Canyesadaguss, 14 Schahanies, 57 Canajoxeries, 120 Oneydas and Tusceroras, 115 Onandagas, 117 Aquagaws, 178 Senecas, 273 Tennessess, 146 Cayugas, 99 Menomenies, 71 Jibbeways, 173 Ottawas, 16 Huron and Wyandot, 27 Sacs and Foxes and 150 women and children. Nations At Indian Congress at Niagara, July, 1764, J.P., 11, 276. William Johnson to Thomas Gage, 22 August, 1764, J.P., 11, 337.
- 51 Articles of Peace between Sir William Johnson and the Huron Indians, 18 July, 1764, N.Y.C.D., 7, 650-651. William Johnson to Cadwallader Colden, 23 August, 1764, J.P., 4, 512.
- 52 P.D. Clarke, Origin and Traditional History of the Wyandotts, and sketches of other Indian Tribes of North America, (Toronto: 1870), 49.
- 53 William Johnson to the Lords of Trade, 13 November, 1763, N.Y.C.D., 7, 575.

54 William Johnson to the Lords of Trade, 26 December, 1764, N.Y.C.D., 7, 326.

55 John Bradstreet to Jeffrey Amherst, 5 August, 1764, Diary of the Seige of Detroit, 279-280.

56 Godfrey, op. cit., 187, 188, 192-194.

57 Henry, op. cit., 178 states that the conference took place at Sandusky Bay and that Bradstreet was to have the prisoners delivered up at Detroit within 15 days. However, Henry was writing of these incidents over 40 years after they took place, and other evidence, recorded at the time, refutes this. Treaty of Peace, Lake Erie Camp, 12 August, 1764, J.P., 11, 329-333. William Johnson to the Lords of Trade, 26 December, 1764, I.H.C., 10, 388.

58 John Bradstreet to Thomas Gage, 14 August, 1764, Diary of the Seige of Detroit, 281. William Johnson to Cadwallader Colden, 11 December, 1764, J.P., 4, 616.

59 John Bradstreet to William Johnson, 28 August, 1764, J.P., 11, 340. Thomas Gage to William Johnson, 10 March, 1765, J.P., 4, 667.

60 Parkman, op. cit., 2, 189-190. Peckham, op. cit., 255-256. White, op. cit., 291-292.

61 Treaty of Peace, Lake Erie Camp, 12 August, 1764, J.P., 11, 331.

62 Henry, op. cit., 178. John Bradstreet to William Johnson, 28 August, 1764, J.P., 11, 340.

63 Journal of Captain Thomas Morris, Early Western Travels, 1748 - 1846, 1, R.G. Thwaites, ed., (Cleveland: Clarke, 1904), 303-308.

64 According to Jennings, op. cit., 439-440, the Senecas played a major role in inciting the uprising.

65 Testimony of Thomas King, 3 October, 1764, J.P., 11, 369.

66 Morris' Journal, op. cit., 309.

67 Ibid., 304, 308.

68 Ibid., 309-310.

69 Ibid., 313-314.

70 Bert Anson, The Miami Indians, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1970), 69.

- 71 Morris' Journal, op. cit., 313-316.
- 72 Ibid., 317-328.
- 73 Anson, op. cit., 1970, 71.
- 74 Morris' Journal, op. cit., 312.
- 75 White, op. cit., 292.
- 76 Congress with the Western Nations, 7 September, 1764, J.P., 4, 526-527.
- 77 St. Ange to Dabbadie, 9 November, 1764, I.H.C., 10, 356. There is a debate about Pontiac's actions and attitudes during this time. Jennings, op. cit., 445-446, paints Pontiac as a leader who had lost his following, claiming that "Of all the Indian leaders of that misnamed "Pontiac's Conspiracy," Pontiac was almost the least successful." Pontiac's modern biographer, Chevrette, op. cit., 529-530, never really addresses Pontiac's political status, confining himself to a description of available records. White, op. cit., 268-305, points out that, while Pontiac's influence among the Ottawa was on the wane, he was able to establish himself as an intertribal leader on the Illinois and Wabash by appealing to factions within villages who were susceptible to the pan-Amerindian religious and political notions he was espousing; first as a war chief in opposition to the British, then making the transition to peace chief when reconciliation became desirable. The British desire to bring him to terms, as a symbol of Amerindian resistance, enhanced his power when he decided to make peace. His was an unstable position, and, in the tradition of Amerindian leadership, he held more influence than power or authority in the European tradition. He used mediation between the British and Amerindian recalcitrants to enhance his own position, although this ultimately proved fatal for him.
- 78 Congress with Western Nations, 7 September, 1764, J.P., 11, 350.
- 79 A Conference Between Bradstreet and the Wyandots, Detroit, 29 September, 1764, J.P., 4, 547.
- 80 Congress with Western Indians, Detroit, 7-10 September, J.P., 4, 526-527. Thomas Gage to the Earl of Halifax, 12 October, 1764, I.H.C., 10, 342.
- 81 Marsac to John Campbell, 29 July, 1765, J.P., 4, 803-808.
- 82 William Johnson to Thomas Gage, 31 October, 1764, J.P., 11, 394-395.

- 83 Jennings, op. cit., 450.
- 84 White, op. cit., 17-18, 84-85, 117-119.
- 85 Godfrey, op. cit., 215.
- 86 Indian Conference, Sanduskey Lake, 5 October, 1764, J.P., 11, 373-375.
- 87 William Johnson to the Lords of Trade, 26 December, 1764, N.Y.C.D., 7, 686.
- 88 John Bradstreet to John Campbell, 10 October, 1764, Diary of the Seige of Detroit, 286-288.
- 89 William Johnson to Thomas Gage, 20 November, 1764, J.P., 11, 472. Indian Proceedings, Johnson Hall, 2-16 December, 1764, J.P., 11, 500-508.
- 90 Thomas Gage to the Earl of Halifax, 12 October, 1764, I.H.C., 10, 342.
- 91 See a similiar list of Bradstreet's successes and failures in Godfrey, op. cit., 222. Thomas Gage to Henry Bouquet, 7 December, 1764, I.H.C., 10, 371.
- 92 Alexander McKee to William Johnson, 14 January, 1765, J.P., 11, 531.
- 93 James Clifton, The Prairie People, Continuity and Change in Potawatomi Culture, 1665-1965, (Lawrence: Regents Press, 1977), 162.
- 94 Ibid., 162.
- 95 Conference with the St. Joseph Potawatomis, Detroit, 26 January, 1765, J.P., 11, 547-551. John Campbell to William Johnson, 20 February, 1765, J.P., 11, 587-589.
- 96 Ross to Farmer, 21 February, 1765, I.H.C., 10, 442. Thomas Gage to William Johnson, 18 January, 1765, J.P., 11, 540.
- 97 St. Ange to Dabbadie, 21 February, 1765, I.H.C., 10, 439. St. Ange to Dabbadie, 7 April, 1765, I.H.C., 10, 468. Peckham, op. cit., 269.
- 98 Aubry to Stewart, 20 December, 1764, I.H.C. 10, 381.
- 99 Courts of Inquiry, Detroit, 11, 28 March, & 6 April, 1765, J.P., 4, 670-676. John Campbell to William Johnson, 21 May, 1765, J.P., 11, 744.

- 100 Clifton, op. cit., 173-175.
- 101 Thomas Gage to John Bradstreet, 25 April, 1765, I.H.C., 10, 487.
- 102 Alexander Fraser to Thomas Gage, 26 May, 1765, I.H.C., 10, 515.
- 103 Thomas Gage to Welborn Ellis, 20 August, 1765, 263, Volume 6, W.O. 1, N.A.C.
- 104 Alexander Fraser to Thomas Gage, 15 May, 1765, I.H.C., 10, 491.
- 105 George Croghan's Journal, 15 May-8 October, 1765, I.H.C., 11, 30.
- 106 Ibid., 41.
- 107 George Croghan to William Johnson, 12 July, 1765, J.P., 11, 838.
- 108 White, op. cit., 303-304.
- 109 George Croghan to William Johnson, 12 July, 1765, J.P., 11, 841.
- 110 George Croghan to William Johnson, 17 August, 1765, J.P., 11, 900-901.
- 111 Ibid., 900.
- 112 Croghan's Journal, op. cit., 42.
- 113 Croghan had been plundered of his goods when his party was attacked, and was emphatic that it was necessary to distribute "presents" liberally upon this occasion. George Croghan to William Johnson, 12 July, 1765, J.P., 11, 839.
- 114 Croghan's Journal, op. cit., 43.
- 115 William Johnson to John Campbell, 26 June, 1765, J.P., 11, 810-811.
- 116 Croghan's Journal, op. cit., 46-48.
- 117 George Croghan to William Johnson, 17 August, 1765, J.P., 11, 900. Croghan's Journal, op. cit., 50-52.
- 118 George Croghan to William Johnson, November, 1765, I.H.C., 11, 55.
- 119 W.J. Eccles, M.N. McConnell, Susan L. Laskin, "Indian War and American Invasion," Historical Atlas of Canada:

Volume 1: From the Beginning to 1800, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 110.

120 Peckham, op. cit., 322.

CHAPTER FOUR: DETROIT'S FUR TRADE, 1765-1775

Attention must now be given to the pattern of Anglo-Amerindian relations at Detroit from 1765 - 1775. Building on the spirit of diplomacy that ended Pontiac's War, those on both sides who actively cooperated to ameliorate disputes that arose, were able to prevail. The situation was not tranquil, and the attainment of this relationship was not easy. Both sides displayed conflict, aggressiveness and fear. Much of the time cooperation occurred because it was forced upon the parties by complex circumstances. The situation of Detroit demanded that elements in both communities ensure that interaction continue in a manner with which the other could live.

In order to understand this situation, we will look at how relations developed in four potential areas of conflict. These areas are: trade, land, the distribution of British "presents", and intercultural killings. As the fur trade was the main reason for contact at Detroit, the management of trade will be handled first and separately from the other topics. Amerindians and British were able to work out a system that provided for many of the material and cultural needs of both sides. The system worked imperfectly, and factions on both sides were dissatisfied with the quality of the relationship. Amerindians had to compromise, as did the British and some Amerindian grievances about the trade regime were never met, although they did successfully obtain

a redress of others. Part of the problem was a lack of Amerindian unity. While some saw certain regulations as being for their benefit, others worked against these same rules. Amerindians received the best redress when their interests coincided with others, such as merchants or colonial officials, who could then present the case to those with the power to change them.

Analyzing relations in a time of peace has historiographical consequences. Along with the racist assumption of inevitable conflict between Euroamericans and Amerindians, went an emphasis on the study of wartime relations. Rather than analyzing the causes and consequences of conflict, emphasizing peacetime relations forces the historian to discuss those practices which promoted closer connections and cooperation. Thus, the thesis that Pontiac's War forced the British to modify their stance and cooperate with, rather than attempt to dominate the Amerindians around Detroit, will be strengthened. I will discuss the bargaining and cooperation that defined this regime over the ten years from 1765 - 1775.

The British integrated Detroit into their Atlantic trading network, as part of a transportation system that began in Europe or the Carribean.¹ Goods were sent to Detroit in one of two ways. Trade goods were produced in Britain or the Carribean, and were imported either via Montreal, up the St. Lawrence, through Lake Ontario, Niagara and Lake Erie,² or via New York, up the Hudson via Albany,

to Oswego, and then through lakes Ontario and Erie.³ The competition between Quebec and New York traders for Detroit did not go away when the British took over Quebec, it was merely modified so that it was now a matter of economic rather than imperial interest.

Detroit benefitted from its position on the Great Lakes. Water access facilitated bringing in troops in times of trouble,⁴ which were now transported by boats or by the sailing ships that the British, as well as the French, began building upon the lakes during the Seven Years' War.⁵ That these sailing vessels were an improvement upon the earlier boats was made evident during the siege of Detroit. With their cannon, they could successfully withstand assaults by larger numbers of Amerindians, whereas the boats fell prey to attacks.⁶ Boats were susceptible to attack at night because they had to put in to make camp, whereas the sloops could stay out on the water.⁷ At first, these ships were built near Niagara on Navy Island, but from 1771 onwards, they were built at Detroit. There were at least four ships, varying from four to ten cannon capacity, on the lakes by 1775. By 1775, there were also five private vessels in the service of the fur trade.⁸ Detroit became an important transshipment point for goods reaching Michilimackinac.⁹ Nearby Ojibwa were employed in order to get the vessels past the sand bars and rapids in the river.¹⁰

From Detroit, there were several routes into the interior. It was close to the divide of the St. Lawrence

and Mississippi river systems so that canoe loads of goods could be easily transported via the various rivers and portages, to the Amerindian villages located there. Access was even easier when many of these portages flooded during the spring and fall. Of particular importance to Detroit were the Fort Miami portage, from the Maumee to the Wabash; the portage near Snips from the Sandusky to the Scioto; and the portage from the Rouge to the St. Joseph in lower Michigan.¹¹ Detroit was close to the mouth of the Thames, leading into southern Ontario. Various villages on lakes Erie and Huron could also be reached by canoe.

A revolution in transportation was taking place in many Amerindian villages, affecting Amerindian trade and Anglo-Amerindian relations in general. The horse was coming into widespread use among Amerindian groups, while the use of the canoe was declining. This phenomenon was more prevalent to the west. While the numbers of horses involved is uncertain, certain references make their existence and importance clear. The Ottawa on the Maumee were using both the canoe and the horse by 1764.¹² By 1764, the Hurons at Detroit and Sandusky were using both horses and canoes.¹³ Amerindians on the Wabash also had "herds" of horses by 1765.¹⁴ By 1775, the Potawatomes of St. Joseph and further west had abandoned their canoes for horses.¹⁵ In 1777, a map of the area gave travel time estimates for the Wabash and Illinois in terms of days on horseback rather than by river.¹⁶ At first used primarily as pack animals, this new

means of transport allowed Amerindians to carry more goods further and for longer periods of the year than by canoe. Land trails rather than the river systems became the regular means of travel, so that prairie lands were considerably opened up to these groups. Hunting bison from horseback began on the Illinois-Wabash plains.¹⁷

The use of horses had repercussions on inter-group relations in various ways. Amerindians had to obtain horses from somewhere, and the obvious place was from Euroamericans. Although purchase was a possibility, horse stealing was considered something of a virtue in Amerindian society. There are reports of horses being stolen from both the French and British at Detroit.¹⁸ Raids upon British hunters and traders in the interior featured the rich prize of horses as well as scalps and trade goods.¹⁹ This sort of behaviour was not conducive to better relations. Horses facilitated the movement west, onto the prairies, of the various groups that were engaging in this transitional activity. This had the effects of removing these groups from Detroit's trading sphere of influence and increasing intertribal strife as over-harvesting began and competition for the bison became widespread. The movement west of refugees from further east ameliorated this situation somewhat into the 1770's.

Other changes to the Amerindian lifestyle were brought about through trading with Euroamericans. Amerindians had adapted to the natural resources available for human

exploitation over centuries, so that a balanced ecosystem developed, of which human beings were a part.²⁰ Their relationship with Europeans, however, had influenced them to increase their harvest of the animal resources at their disposal; furs came to be gathered for the European market, while the harvesting of other resources could be curtailed because of an overemphasis on hunting fur bearing animals. Eventually this could result in the overharvesting of these animal resources, so that the very things that had sustained them and that were the basis of their trade with Europeans became scarce. In such a case, movement out of the affected area, into one where game was still abundant, was one possible way of coping. Such a move was potentially a trespass on the grounds of groups already utilizing them; or, a move might be handled through peaceful diplomacy. The course taken would depend upon preexisting relations and the capacity of the regional resources to support both groups. For example, one can contrast the peaceful settling of Mahican and Delaware refugees on Wyandot lands with the more violent push of the Potawatomi into the Illinois.²¹

Although overharvesting was generated by the Euroamerican demand for furs, Amerindians had their own reasons for participating in this ultimately self-destructive activity. By the 1760's Amerindians in the Detroit area were incapable of existing as they wished without the European goods that trade brought them.²² White has illustrated the political uses of European trade goods

in Amerindian society. The distribution of these items could mediate disputes between Amerindians or between Amerindians and Euroamericans. As well trade goods were distributed through certain chiefs, bringing them closer to the Euroamerican alliance and strengthening their own position in Amerindian society. Thus a decrease in the availability of these goods could disrupt inter-tribal peace and intra-village relations.²³ Besides these political uses, European goods had important material benefits. They facilitated success in war, hunting, farming, domestic chores, and generally raised the Amerindian standard of living.²⁴ Some historians argue that the Iroquois wars had demonstrated the advantages Amerindians armed with muskets had in battle over those who were not.²⁵ Muskets and iron tipped arrows and spears were better hunting tools than those made from stone. Iron hatchets made clearing land for planting much easier and faster than girdling the trees with stone hatchets. Metal kettles made cooking easier than in the days when hot stones had to be dropped into bark vessels to boil soups.²⁶ This is not to say that European goods completely replaced local Amerindian products, or that Amerindians were incapable of surviving without European goods. It was in the Amerindians' interest to ensure their continued appearance in their villages. Without them, their standard of living and military and political power in relation to their neighbours who still had them, would be adversely affected. One of the causes of Pontiac's War was

Amerindian dissatisfaction with the British restriction of these trade goods, specifically, guns and ammunition. Furthermore, by the end of Pontiac's War, those Amerindian groups that had had trade cut off were suffering.²⁷ Even if the Delaware prophet, Neolin, preached separatism from the British, such separatism was a practical impossibility.

Around Detroit, the gathering of fur was an activity that required cooperation. A symbiotic relationship emerged. As in earlier times, Amerindians hunted the animals and dressed the skins, while British traders put them on the European market. Manufactured goods helped Amerindians achieve their own cultural goals more efficiently. In return, Amerindian furs could make Euroamerican traders rich. Except for the area to the southwest, where Euroamerican hunters were encroaching on Amerindian hunting grounds,²⁸ overharvesting had not yet become a problem. There were still large amounts of game present on the Upper Wabash and Maumee, and in the interior of what became Michigan and southern Ontario.²⁹

This cooperative fur trade regime was damaged by Amerindian complaints about the rum trade. The harmful effects of too much alcohol in Amerindian communities have been well documented, and the area around Detroit was not exempt from these consequences. Conflict increased within communities³⁰ and this violence could also erupt against British traders. Sometimes, intoxicated Amerindians would beat or kill to get additional drink from a trader reluctant

to give them more. Alcohol might bring out hidden resentment for some past slight. Some traders cheated intoxicated Amerindians, causing resentment the morning after. Cheated of their furs, they might steal to recover what they had lost through intoxicated deal making.³¹ Being intoxicated was considered by Amerindians as a valid excuse for otherwise reprehensible conduct; so much so that when it came time to make amends for Pontiac's War an Ojibwa chief, Kinisshikapoo, excused his participation on the grounds that "I have been a little drunk myself."³²

We must move from this general discussion of the fur trade at Detroit, to an examination of the specific regulations and practices the British attempted to implement in administering the trade, and the Amerindian inputs into this process. The British and Amerindians, in the course of the peace negotiations ending Pontiac's War, laid down a few rules for trade, but not much of substance was discussed beyond the fact that trade would be reopened.³³ British plans were made in response to Amerindian demands and British needs, as filtered through the reports of people like Sir William Johnson, his deputy, George Croghan, and the Superintendant-General of Indian Affairs for the Southern District, John Stuart. The Lords of Trade issued a "Plan for the future Management of Indian Affairs" in July, 1764.³⁴ Sir William Johnson used this as a basis for his "Orders for the regulation of trade," released in January, 1765.³⁵

Johnson tried to control the fur trade through these new regulations. The Proclamation of 1763 had ensured that any subject could engage in the trade; but it was necessary for him to obtain a pass from the governor of the colony from which he came and to post a bond for his good conduct. The trade plan of 1765 set out several other conditions. In order to prevent fraud and other abuses, trade could only be carried out at British posts. Traders were not allowed to go to the Amerindian villages. All traders were to place their liquor in a common storeroom at the posts, and could only sell it to Amerindians as they were about to depart. Prices were fixed. Provisions were made for the delivery of "presents" by the commanding officer to the Amerindians.³⁶

Many established New York merchants desired to keep trade confined to the posts. They had set up a system whereby they supplied Iroquois middlemen from their posts to go trade in the Amerindian villages, so that confining the trade was supported by many, especially among the Dutch merchants.³⁷ To limiting the trade to the posts would take away much of the Quebec traders' advantages of experience in the Amerindian trade, with their better knowledge of Amerindian languages, customs and geography. This attitude would change in time.

These plans were never approved by Parliament,³⁸ and this weakness would be ably exploited by opponents. Instead of having his own budget, Johnson remained financially dependent upon the military and General Gage.³⁹ Johnson set

up a list of regulations which had no legal basis, so that their enforcement created serious problems.

It was thought that the commandants' lack of experience in Indian Affairs had been one of the causes of the estrangement that led to Pontiac's War, so commissaries were sent to the respective posts as special officers in charge of Indian affairs and trade. The commandants were ordered to aid the commissaries in carrying out their duties and to certify any expenses incurred by them.⁴⁰ Detroit was singled out as being especially in need of a commissary because there were "so many different Nations to Manage."⁴¹ Jehu Hay was appointed commissary at Detroit in 1766. He had been in service during the Seven Years' War, had played a prominent part during the seige of Detroit and was generally well acquainted with both the military and Amerindians.⁴² In response to Amerindian needs, and following in the footsteps of the French,⁴³ the commissary was accompanied by a blacksmith to repair Amerindian arms and other implements and two interpreters to translate Ottawa and Huron into English.⁴⁴

The new system was explained to the Detroit and other Western Amerindians at Niagara in July, 1766. Sir William Johnson met with Pontiac, Teata, and other chiefs of the Ottawa, Huron, Potawatomi and Ojibway. They were informed that commissaries, "men of honor and probity are appointd [sic] to reside at the Posts, to prevent abuses in Trade, to hear your complaints, and such of them as they can not

redress they are to lay before me."⁴⁵ They were also told that traders would not be allowed to "ramble thro' your Country without any check."⁴⁶ Teata spoke for the Detroit Hurons in approving of these arrangements, telling Johnson it was not prudent to let the traders go where they pleased. Teata thought Jehu Hay a good choice for commissary as he was well known to him and his people.⁴⁷ When Johnson met with the other Western nations some were not so pleased with the decision to retain trade only at the posts.⁴⁸

The differing opinions of the Detroit Hurons and the rest can be readily explained. The Hurons would not be inconvenienced by the decision to confine trade to the posts. Given their proximity to Detroit, they might have seen an opportunity to become involved in the carrying trade to villages further away, thus ensuring a larger supply of European goods for themselves. The control of these goods would have reinforced their and Johnson's idea of putting them at the head of a Western Confederacy. Political authority would be reinforced by economic power. Cooperation with the British system would have its rewards. The other Amerindians, accustomed to the convenience of having traders come to their villages with goods, did not want to travel on long voyages in order to procure their wants. Those who made the voyages would be travelling rather than hunting, fishing or making war, thereby weakening the economic and military strength of their home villages. For these more distant Amerindians, having

traders come to them, as distributors of European goods and as people without another economic role in their community, was preferable to internally weakening themselves.⁴⁹ They may also have been wary of the power such a system would put in the hands of groups closer to the Europeans, such as the Detroit Hurons, who might be able to capitalize on their geographic position to gain economic and political ascendancy.

Some factors did not agree with the new trade arrangements. The Quebec traders who operated out of Michilimackinac wanted permission to winter at the Amerindian villages. They knew that the more distant Amerindians with whom they traded would be dissatisfied with this system.⁵⁰ Some Amerindians serviced by Michilimackinac threatened to revolt if traders were not allowed among them, so that the commandant, Captain Howard, allowed a few traders to winter at their villages.⁵¹

The Michilimackinac traders petitioned their governor, James Murray, to allow all of them permission to winter at the Amerindian villages.⁵² Johnson believed this would put Detroit traders, confined to their post, at a disadvantage. It put the whole system in question.⁵³ The commissaries would not be able to oversee the trade, the liquour trade would not be regulated and the set prices would not be followed. The Quebec traders pressed on, petitioning Johnson⁵⁴ and their new governor, Guy Carleton, who took their part with Johnson and the Lords of Trade.⁵⁵

Another worry to the Detroit merchants was the fact that French merchants from the Mississippi were trading up the Wabash and Illinois, living in the Indian villages and importing and exporting via the Mississippi.⁵⁶ Such traders did not want the new Anglo-Amerindian relationship to succeed, as they could best keep their business through its disruption and thereby engross all the trade to themselves. They worked towards this goal.⁵⁷

Although Jehu Hay withheld permission from the Detroit traders to go to the Indian villages in the summer of 1766, this did not stop those who wanted to go.⁵⁸ Some traders who had been granted passes by their governors chose to ignore the provisions in them and trade where they pleased. Traders on their way to Detroit often stopped at Sandusky or on the Maumee. Those with passes for the Illinois could trade on the Wabash.⁵⁹ Legal traders, from their warehouses in Detroit, sometimes would supply others with no licenses who would go out on the country.⁶⁰ The nature of the Detroit settlement, spread out along the river, made it impossible to stop settlers from gliding out of the settlement at night, on their way to trade at the Amerindian villages. Finally, traders who were in debt to larger outfits often went into the Amerindian territory to escape prosecution for their debts, and traded with the French there.⁶¹ They openly defied Hay, while Gage despaired of being able to prosecute these men.⁶² By 1767, there were

reported to be 40 illegal traders at Kekionga; "a parcell of rascals, who mock at authority and Government."⁶³

These traders may have been flouting British authority; but were responding to Amerindian demands. The French had established posts along the Wabash, and the Miami wanted these continued. Their loss was a blow to the local economy. High prices were charged by traders travelling from Fort Pitt, Detroit or the Illinois and the liquor traffic continued unchecked.⁶⁴ The Miami wanted an official post, with an officer to oversee the trade.⁶⁵ If the garrison were kept to 20 or 30 men, as in the French regime, it would have been able to keep the traders in line, yet present no military threat to the Miami. Moreover, an official post would have been a conduit for the distribution of rent to the Miami, a demand they had been emphatic about achieving in the peace negotiations. The Miami chiefs asked at Detroit for a post to be re-established among them, and when they were refused they became:

very Sulky and complain that the English despise them, and say, that is the reason they do not establish a Place of Trade in their Country, as they have among all the other Nations round them, -- That the French Traders who come into their Country, sell them goods as Dear as they used in time of War, and that the English even try to prevent them of getting Goods that way, -- by Ordering the French Traders to leave their Country, -- That if the English did not fix Places of Trade, and open a Trade with them, as they promised and had given to the Nations round them...they would Plunder both the English and French, as they must live and have Cloaths [sic].⁶⁶

The British did not set up the required posts, and then made the supply of goods even more problematic for the Miami by

trying to get the French traders established among them to vacate Miami territory.

The Trade plan's lack of a formal legal basis created problems when traders blatantly disregarded the authority of the commissary to regulate trade even at Detroit itself. In each of the three cases on record where Hay attempted to use his authority as commissary to regulate traders, he was threatened with a civil suit in New York for exceeding his authority.⁶⁷ Johnson felt that the officer stood at risk of being arrested if he appeared in New York owing to "the disposition and prejudice of the Inhabitants."⁶⁸

Such problems increased throughout 1767, and eventually Gage was persuaded to support Carleton's, the Quebec traders' and the farther Amerindians' view.⁶⁹ As a special concession to the situation of the Michilimackinac traders and their far flung trading network, he permitted traders to winter among the tribes north of Lake Huron and west of the Ottawa River.⁷⁰ This was not enough for Carleton or the Canadian traders, who wanted to be allowed into the Wabash and Illinois territory, to counteract the Mississippi French influence there, and who felt their natural advantages over the other traders were being lost.⁷¹ Some Michilimackinac traders simply used their permission to leave the post to trade also in such places as the Wabash and Illinois areas.⁷²

Detroit's function as a centre for the liquor trade during the French regime was expanded with the British

occupation because of the interests of the New York merchants. New Yorkers could undersell Quebecers through the marketing of rum, imported from the Carribean or manufactured in New York.⁷³ The less experienced New York merchants could use rum to give them a quick entry into the Amerindian trade, so that they could compete with the Canadian merchants, who had already established ties of kinship, alliance and trade with Native peoples.⁷⁴ However much some might protest its presence,⁷⁵ liquor attracted Amerindian customers. Many traders attributed their success to their stores of liquor, or their lack thereof to its absence.⁷⁶ By 1767, Hay was commenting to Croghan on the "Surprising...Quantity of rum that is daily coming to this place." In fact, the King's store could not contain all the trader's liquor. Without this containment, Hay lost control over the liquor trade.⁷⁷ In 1767, 24,105 gallons of rum were sold at Detroit. Only 6,500 gallons were sold that year at Fort Pitt.⁷⁸ This includes only the legal trade, so that the actual figures were probably higher.

The fur trade regulations came to be challenged formally at Detroit. The Albany merchants petitioned Johnson about the behaviour of Hay, who they claimed was letting the French go trading out of the post. They were also upset that he was inspecting trade goods and enforcing set prices. George Croghan was sent to Detroit in order to inquire into the alleged abuses and disputes.⁷⁹

When Croghan found Hay not guilty of the trader's charges in November, 1767,⁸⁰ the traders seem to have realized that their problems were not with the commissary, but with the regulations. They therefore petitioned Johnson. The first, unsigned petition, was sent in French by the "old as well as new subjects of his Majesty." This petition strikingly illustrates the Quebec merchants' opposition to an expanded liquor trade and their understanding of some of the problems liquor caused in Amerindian society. They claimed that Amerindians in the Detroit area were consuming liquor instead of manufactured goods from Britain. Moreover, Amerindians who had procured credit for their winter hunt in the fall would sometimes trade their furs for liquor in the spring rather than pay their debts. They also wanted permission to winter in the villages, citing competition from Michilimackinac and the Mississippi as reasons. They endorsed the idea of a garrisoned post at Kekionga or Ouiatanon, to ameliorate the sentiments of the Miami and to keep the traders in check.⁸¹

The same day, another petition, signed by both English and French traders at Detroit, and endorsed by Turnbull as being "for the good of the Service" was sent. This petition also decried the volume of the liquor trade, and offered some solutions. All liquor should be kept in a central storehouse, no merchants should be allowed to carry more than 15 gallons to an Amerindian village for the winter, and no boat should be loaded more than half full of liquor.

Again, permission was sought to winter among the Amerindians.⁸²

These merchants were campaigning for a managed rum trade, rather than an end to the liquor traffic. Most of the more influential New York merchants had come to the realization that the long term interests of the trade demanded a reduction in the amount of liquor traded. However, most continued to use rum as their major trading commodity.⁸³ Their problems were with the smaller traders who they claimed thwarted the efforts of the larger traders to impose some sort of management on the liquor trade.

[E]very Subject who has Credit or money to the amount of Fifty Pounds new York currency has it in his power, to become an Indian trader, with this trifling sum a battoe load of rum can be bought, hence one third of the Indian trade is carried on by people without Character or property, who bring nothing from the Colonies but Rum; by this means the Sale of British Manufactories is lessen'd [sic] the Indian Kept drunk and idle about the Fort, & the trade in general hurt.⁸⁴

The New York merchants were advocating a continuing, but managed trade in liquor that would be controlled by themselves. Amerindian demands for a lessening of the trade could only be heard in this context.

In 1768, the system that was set up in 1765 for the management of the fur trade was overturned. The Lords of Trade took the administration of this trade out of the jurisdiction of the Indian Department and into the hands of the colonies. This would lead to the traders being allowed to trade where they pleased. Any hope Detroit merchants and Amerindians might have for a managed liquor trade would have

to be put in the hands of the colonies most interested in the trade there - New York and Quebec. Many of the posts in Amerindian country were to be abandoned. The only posts the Lords of Trade recommended keeping possession of were Detroit, Michilimackinac and Niagara. Their position on the Great Lakes made them relatively easy to supply, and they supplied large numbers of Amerindians.⁸⁵

These changes were carried out as part of a general policy of retrenching expenses associated with the British North American military and Amerindian establishments. The Crown was unwilling to continue financing expenses it felt the colonies should themselves support. Garrisoning and supplying western posts, hiring officers to manage the trade, and the "presents" necessary to pay the Indians for privileges they extended in their country were seen as a heavy burden for the crown to bear.⁸⁶ They wished to shift as many of these expenses as possible to the colonies, or eliminate them altogether. Meeting the Miami demand for an official post on the Wabash would have been costly, and was therefore not granted. To enforce rules for managing the distribution of liquor would have required an increased official expense, in hiring officers to enforce the regulations, carrying out prosecutions, and building stores to hold the liquor. It was on this basis that the trade was allowed to continue unabated.⁸⁷

Some changes coincided with and were made partly because of Amerindians' objections. The Shawnee and

Delaware, for example, objected to the existence of Fort Pitt.⁸⁸ The demand by some of the more distant Amerindians that traders visit their villages was met.

Now that traders were officially to be allowed into the Amerindian villages,⁸⁹ the British traders at Detroit had another problem. Along the Wabash, and in the Illinois territory, because of the British refusal to accede to the Miamis' trade terms, few English traders were allowed in the Amerindian villages. French traders from both the Mississippi and Detroit were allowed to monopolize the trade, giving one ethnic group a distinct advantage.⁹⁰ In May, 1768, Gage therefore ordered Turnbull to send messages to the villages that no trade would be permitted any nation where the English did not enjoy the same rights as the French.⁹¹ There was no way to enforce a trade embargo. Many British merchants adapted to the situation by acting as wholesalers, selling from their Detroit warehouses to French factors in the villages, while others simply took their chances, sometimes with fatal results; but at other times successfully.⁹²

The colonies were not able to come to any agreements for jointly managing the Amerindian trade.⁹³ Quebec felt that it had no reason to cooperate with the other colonies. The superior experience of her traders, combined with the colony's access to the interior, and the non-importation agreement of 1769 gave her an advantage in the Amerindian trade. The non-importation agreement caused shortages of

goods for the Amerindian trade, disgruntlement among the affected Amerindians, and a loss of trade for the affected colonies.⁹⁴ The other colonies reestablished trade with Britain and the Amerindians in 1770; but their lost status, combined with pressure from British officials who did not believe in intercolonial conferences at this time of political ferment, ensured that Quebec did not send delegates to a 1770 conference called to establish joint regulation of the fur trade. Recalling previous intercolonial meetings such as the Stamp Act Congress, which attempted to disallow the right of the British parliament to levy American taxes, Lord Hillsborough, the Colonial Secretary, prohibited the proposed meeting of colonial commissioners to establish joint regulations for the fur trade.⁹⁵ Additionally, Cadwallader Colden, the Lieutenant Governor of New York, felt that the different interests of the colonies would have prevented any effective agreement.⁹⁶

With the breakdown of the movement for intercolonial regulation of the fur trade, new plans were made. Responsibility for the posts was assigned to the different colonies. Gage gave control of Detroit to New York, expecting it would vote money in its assembly in order to continue supporting the commissaries, smiths and interpreters in their tasks at the post.⁹⁷ New York attempted to take some action. The Assembly voted 150 Pounds to keep the interpreter and two blacksmiths at Detroit. In order to finance the trade on a more permanent

basis, they put a 1 shilling per gallon duty on rum, and a 3% duty on all dry goods sold at Detroit and Niagara. In recognition of the influence of the other colonies, the latter provisions were only to take effect if Quebec and Pennsylvania passed similar resolutions.⁹⁸ Gage used the military budget to continue to pay the smiths and interpreters, although the commissaries were withdrawn by the end of 1769 and the Amerindians told to transact their business once more with the post commandant.⁹⁹

Amerindian reaction to these policy changes was probably more or less indifferent. They depended on the blacksmiths to repair their arms and hoes, and the interpreters to communicate to officials their inclinations. The continuance of these positions was crucial. Less important was the reform putting the post commandant in charge of Amerindian affairs. The chief liability of this action was that some of Detroit's commandants lacked experience in Amerindian affairs,¹⁰⁰ and were therefore not as effective as a commissary who knew them intimately. This problem was compounded by the high turnover in commandants at Detroit in the period from 1763 to 1775.¹⁰¹ The withdrawal of the commissaries alleviated the problem of defining the bounds of his authority. At Michilimackinac, the commissary and commandant had disputed the limits of their powers, much to the confusion and alienation of the surrounding Amerindians.¹⁰² To withdraw the commissaries

would allow Amerindians to deal with one official with clearly defined powers.

To allow traders to go among the Amerindian villages affected the amount of furs being brought to all the posts, including Detroit. Gage claimed that the only trade being carried on was by Amerindians who went there on business with the commandant or to get their "presents."¹⁰³ This statement must be put into context. Traders increasingly visited the Amerindian villages, but some Amerindians were making annual visits to Detroit to exchange their winter take for trade goods. These were mostly Ojibways, Hurons, Potawatomis and Ottawas who resided along the Detroit, Huron and Rouge rivers. The Amerindians came to hold councils with each other and the commandant and to receive their "presents." Any visit by a group to Detroit would necessarily involve an exchange of gifts, so that whereas Gage claimed that they were only at Detroit to get presents, the reception of gifts was only one part of their visit. While here, there were games and ceremonies to participate in, alliances to renew with both the British and other Amerindians, and also the requisite amount of drinking and feasting.¹⁰⁴

Such annual visits were thus transforming into longer stays during the summer. This longer and closer contact resulted in cultural differentiation between the groups who came to spend most of their summers near Detroit, going to their hunting camps in the winter, and those who lived

further away and let the traders bring their goods to them. The Hurons, who lived closest to Detroit, were Christians and shared a church with the French inhabitants. Some of the Ojibwa who lived on the St. Clair River were engaged in wage labour, being paid for helping the ships over the rapids on their way to Michilimackinac.¹⁰⁵ The greater availability of alcohol made it more of a problem near Detroit.¹⁰⁶ The British often used Potawatomi chiefs from villages near Detroit to find out information about the more hostile Potawatomis living further away, and tried to get them to influence their further brethren.¹⁰⁷ Such an impact on Amerindian life created problems among the Amerindians themselves, dividing them politically as well as culturally and economically, as some chiefs and villages became more reliant on the presence of the British alliance and trade goods to maintain their status among others. Their efforts at mediation and their more Europeanized ways made them targets for the more militantly anti-British.¹⁰⁸

In response to the ineffectiveness of previous attempts, efforts were made at Detroit to try to control the liquor trade. In 1768, the merchants agreed to put their liquor into a common storehouse, and give bonds to each other that they would not give more than a glass per day to any Amerindian. This was unsuccessful due to the fact that not all the merchants followed their own guidelines.¹⁰⁹ In 1772, the commandant of Detroit, John Stevenson, ordered traders not to bring rum to the villages. His orders were

ignored and he named New York based merchants as leaders of the disobedient group. Stevenson also recognized the Amerindian role in the trade. He requested the chiefs not allow the liquor traders into their villages.¹¹⁰

The chiefs to whom Stevenson appealed did not have the authority to stop the trade by themselves. They had to build a broad base of support for this within their own community. In this building of consensus against the liquor trade, it is possible that the help of the women in a village was crucial. In the two recorded instances of liquor being thrown away upon its arrival at Detroit, the women acted in conjunction with the chiefs to break the kegs before the warriors could get to them.¹¹¹ The access to liquor that their gender gave Amerindian women again made them an important factor in any attempts to limit the trade.¹¹² When the Shawnee, citing the liquor trade as one factor, expelled all the traders from their villages, it was the action of more than just a few chiefs.¹¹³ An appeal to the chiefs was not sufficient to deal with the presence of alcohol in Amerindian communities.

Johnson reported, in 1770, that "many Traders carry little or nothing else [except rum]." He was unable even to stop liquor traders from disrupting treaty negotiations held at German Flats that summer.¹¹⁴ This liquor trade began seriously and adversely to affect relations by 1771. The Wabash and Ohio Amerindians cited this trade as one of the reasons for their discontent, blaming many of the killings

of English traders and hunters on the Wabash on the drunken state of their warriors, or the resentment caused when they realized they had been defrauded of their furs through the medium of drink.¹¹⁵

Confirmation of Amerindian dissatisfaction with the trading system came in 1773. In response to an initiative by Sir William Johnson and Kayashuta, an important Seneca chief,¹¹⁶ exhorting the western tribes to stay at peace despite anti-British intrigues and British machinations,¹¹⁷ an unnamed Detroit Huron chief, speaking for the Hurons, Delawares, and Ottawa, enunciated their grievances with British trading practices.

Brethren

You are sensible that the Complaints of all Nations this way have been frequent against Spiritous Liquors being carried amongst them; This, Brethren, is the Source of many Evils, and Cause a great deal of Unhappyness [sic], by it our Young Men are not only reduced to the Necessity of stealing to recover what they loose [sic] by Drunkenness, but deprived of their Reason and render'd [sic] incapable of listening to or taking the Advice of their Wise People.--

Brethren

If you who are Traders had conformed to orders by continuing to deal at the several posts which were fixed upon for this Purpose at the End of the last unhappy Disturbance it wou'd [sic] have prevented a great deal of Trouble to us both. We therefore now request you to take into serious Consideration & do it, as it will be undoubtedly for both our Advantage; When any Indian Nations have Peltries to trade there are none who want Horses to carry them to Market.¹¹⁸

Aware of the abuses that had been occurring as a result of the unregulated trade, in 1774, Johnson once more appointed Jehu Hay to be commissary at Detroit. He told the Hurons Hay was to "communicate to me whatever you may at any

time have to say, and the same from me to you." Hay's presence was felt necessary as the West entered into the turmoil surrounding Dunmore's War. Hay could possibly keep the northern warriors out of southern wars. Appointing Hay was easier than keeping the liquor traffic out of Amerindian villages or stopping the Euroamerican settlement of the Ohio Valley. Hay was to help bring to fruition Johnson's idea to put the Detroit Hurons at the head of a Western Confederacy.¹¹⁹ They had proved their loyalty in several missions they had been sent on in the period 1763 - 1774, so that Johnson would have preferred to deal with a unified Western Confederacy under the compliant control of the Detroit Hurons rather than the constantly shifting alliances and anti-British scheming that prevailed among some of the tribes and villages in the region.

The Quebec Act was an attempt to put relations in the interior under some sort of control. The Quebec government and merchants were the only ones who had impressed the imperial government with their successful dealings with Amerindians. As well, there were several French settlements in the interior that had been under military government.¹²⁰ The Quebec government was granted legal jurisdiction over the territory formerly governed by the Proclamation of 1763.¹²¹ Quebec merchants were encouraged by a gradient of duties of the importation of rum. Rum imported from New York was taxed at 9 pence per gallon, while rum from the Carribean was taxed at 6 pence per gallon, and that from

Britain at 3 pence per gallon.¹²² Quebec would reap the benefits and bear the expenses of the fur trade. Due to the American Revolutionary War, these provisions were never enacted.

It is possible that, had the war not interfered, the Quebec Act could have greatly ameliorated some of the trade complaints that Amerindians voiced. While small British posts would not be forthcoming, the outlawing of New York rum in the interior was an important step in bringing the liquor trade to heel. Those most interested in continuing the liquor trade were to be forbidden from participating. The extension of Quebec law to the interior meant that those contravening the law could be prosecuted. The Act would not have resolved all disputes; but its promulgation was one more action whereby certain British interests were able to move British policy toward the amelioration of the sentiments of Amerindians because it was in their interest to do so.

After Pontiac's War, British officials established regulations they believed would allow traders to deal fairly with Amerindians. Trade was limited to the posts to keep it under control of the commissary and the liquor traffic regulated. The expense of this system, the activities of the Mississippi French, and the objections of Quebec merchants and certain Amerindians combined to persuade officials to discontinue this regime and revert to a system of colonial control. When, due to the rapacious nature of

many traders, the increased liquor traffic, and the lack of cooperation between the colonies, this system proved unsatisfactory to most Amerindians, the system was again modified. The Quebec Act was an attempt to respond to Amerindian demands by providing for regulation of the fur trade by the colony most successful at it, and by keeping out those most interested in debauching the tribes with rum.

By looking closely at Detroit, we can see how Amerindians reacted to and influenced British fur trade policy. The British integrated Detroit into their existing Atlantic trading network, and used established river systems to reach their markets in the Amerindian villages. Some Amerindians accepted the British goods and the alliance that this entailed. The chief defaults of this system were the potential for overharvesting, the cultural and political differences that sprang up between Amerindians who accepted the British presence and those who removed themselves from it, and the liquor trade. Although overharvesting was not yet a problem in the Detroit area, Amerindians living close to Detroit identified themselves as British allies, sometimes in opposition to those who did not, and the liquor trade expanded. Competing Amerindian interests sometimes allowed the British to choose policies which reflected their interests, while appealing to those Amerindians who agreed with them. The Hurons wanted trade confined to the posts to enhance their own status, while those living further away wanted traders in their villages. They were successful in

encouraging traders to ignore regulations, and trade in their villages. When the British did not comply with Amerindian demands, their trade was impeded. When the British refused Miami invitations to establish a post among them, the Miami interpreted this as an unfriendly act, and, under the influence of the French who were trading with them, refused to allow British traders on the Wabash. The British were forced to adapt by selling from Detroit to those French who were allowed to trade on the Wabash, or watch all the trade from this region flow down the Mississippi. The Quebec Act illustrated the continuing British desire to ameliorate their Amerindian ties. Controls were to be put on the liquor traffic and the disorganized legal status of the interior was to be sorted out, for the benefit of Amerindians as well as British subjects.

Not all Amerindian demands regarding the fur trade were met, and those that were were supported because there were powerful British interests who shared their goals for their own reasons. The British were not in a position to dictate to Amerindians the conditions under which trade would take place. If they did, they created more problems for themselves.

Endnotes

- 1 Thomas E. Norton, The Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 1686-1776, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), 205.
- 2 Daniel Campbell to Sir William Johnson, 6 June, 1770, J.P., 7, 714.
- 3 Phyn and Ellice to James Stirling, 23 August, 1769, 200, Letterbook of Phyn and Ellice, A1, M.G., 19, N.A.C..
- 4 Compare Bouquet's march to Fort Pitt, with his battle with the Shawnee at Bushy Run, in William Smith, An Historical Account of the Expedition Against the Ohio Indians in the Year 1764 Under the Command of Henry Bouquet, Esq., (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1966) (1776), viii-xiii, to Bradstreet's sail to Presque Isle, Sandusky and Detroit, in John Bradstreet to William Johnson, 28 August, 1764, J.P., 11, 340.
- 5 D. Peter MacLeod, "The Canadians against the French: The Struggle for Control of the Expedition to Oswego in 1756," Ontario History, 80, (June, 1988), 143-157.
- 6 M.M. Quaife, ed., The Seige of Detroit in 1763: The Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy and John Rutherford's Narrative of a Captivity, (Chicago: Donnelley, 1958), 73, 152.
- 7 William Johnson to the Lords of Trade, 20 January, 1764, N.Y.C.D., 7, 600.
- 8 Nelson V. Russel, The British Regime in Michigan and the Old Northwest, (Northfield: Carleton College, 1939), 74.
- 9 William Maxwell to William Edgar, 3 September, 1767, 136, Correspondence of William Edgar, A1, M.G. 19, N.A.C..
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- 10 Speech of Massiggihash with 22 other Chippewas, 28 April, 1769, J.P., 6, 716-722.
- 11 Alma E. Parkins, The Historical Geography of Detroit, (Port Washington: Kennikat Press, 1918), 9. Helen H. Tanner, ed., Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1986), 41.

12 Captain Morris' Journal, Early Western Travels, 1748-1846, 1, R.G. Thwaites, ed., (Cleveland: Clarke, 1904), 303-304.

13 Ibid., 324.

14 George Croghan's Journal, 15 May-8 October, 1765, I.H.C., 11, 32.

15 James A. Clifton, The Prairie People: Continuity and Change in Potawatomi Culture, 1665-1965, (Lawrence: Regents Press, 1977), 129.

16 Map of the Illinois Country, 1777, N.M.C., 0007505, N.A.C..

17 Clifton, op. cit., 129.

18 George Turnbull to William Johnson, 9 September, 1769, I.H.C., 16, 594.

19 George Morgan to Bayton and Wharton, 20 July, 1768, I.H.C., 16, 355.

20 Tanner, op. cit., 20.

21 George Croghan to William Johnson, 22 December, 1769, J.P., 11, 589. Thomas Gage to the Earl of Hillsborough, 12 August, 1769, I.H.C., 16, 576.

22 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 140, believes that Amerindians were not dependent upon European trade goods. It is true that, if all European goods were taken out of the villages, Amerindian culture would not collapse. However, a material and political system had been created by this time that would have had adverse consequences for Amerindians if it was dismantled.

23 White, op. cit., 94-119.

24 My argument is in substantial agreement with Peter S. Schmalz, The Ojibwa of Southern Ontario, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 36.

25 Thomas B. Abler, "European Technology and the Art of War in Iroquoia," Cultures in Conflict: Current Archaeological Perspectives, Diana C. Tkaczuk and Brian C. Vivian, eds., (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1989), 193-282. Bruce G. Trigger, Natives and Newcomers: Canada's "Heroic Age" Reconsidered, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985), 262-282. Denys Delage, Bitter Feast: Amerindians and Europeans in Northeastern North America,

1600-1664, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1993), 117-120, 130-136, 142-154.

26 Trigger, op. cit., 208-209.

27 A Conference with the Hurons of Detroit, 17 July, 1764, J.P., 8, 238.

28 This was especially true around the Ohio, lower Scioto, Miami and Wabash. Morgan reported that "you will not see the 1/20 Part of the Qty. [of game] as formerly" in the lower Ohio region. George Morgan to Bayton & Wharton, 10 December, 1767, I.H.C., 16, 132. William Johnson to the Earl of Dartmouth, 20 June, 1774, N.Y.C.D., 8, 460.

29 Croghan's Journal, 28 February-8 October, 1765, I.H.C., 11, 36. Silas Farmer, History of Detroit and Wayne County and Early Michigan: A Chronological Cyclopedia of the Past and Present, (Detroit: Gale Research, 1969) (1890), 13. Schmalz, op. cit., 86.

30 Quaife, op. cit., 116-118. Benjamin Roberts to William Johnson, 23 June, 1766, J.P., 5, 276.

31 William Johnson to the Earl of Hillsborough, 29 June, 1772, N.Y.C.D., 8, 300. William Johnson to the Earl of Dartmouth, 4 November, 1772, N.Y.C.D., 8, 315. Indian Conference, Pittsburgh, 9 October, 1773, J.P., 12, 1035.

32 Journal of Indian Affairs, Johnson Hall, 4 June, 1765, J.P., 11, 772.

33 George Croghan promised credit for the winter for Pontiac and the other Amerindians at the Detroit conferences of August, 1765. Croghan's Journal, 28 August, 1765, I.H.C., 11, 46.

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35 Orders for the regulation of trade, 16 January, 1765, J.P., 11, 535-536.

36 Orders for the regulation of trade, 16 January, 1765, J.P., 11, 535-536.

37 Murray G. Lawson, Fur: A Study in English Mercantilism, 1700 - 1775, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1943), 57.

38 Lords of Trade to William Johnson, 10 July, 1764, N.Y.C.D., 7, 634.

- 39 List of works which must be undertaken by the Commander in Chief, and which will not admit of Delay, 1 April, 1765, 173, Vol. 6, W.O. 1, F2, M.G. 19, N.A.C..
- 40 Deputy Adjutant General's Orders, 14 June, 1766, J.P., 5, 337.
- 41 Thomas Gage to William Johnson, 22 June, 1765, J.P., 11, 803.
- 42 William Johnson to George Croghan, 15 March, 1766, J.P., 5, 75. Peter E. Russell, "Jehu Hay," Dictionary of Canadian Biography, 4, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 336-337.
- 43 William Johnson with the Hurons at Detroit, 17 September, 1761, J.P., 3, 496.
- 44 William Johnson to Thomas Gage, 6 July, 1765, J.P., 11, 831.
- 45 Proceedings of Sir William Johnson with Pontiac and other Indians, 23 July, 1766, N.Y.C.D., 7, 855.
- 46 Ibid., 857.
- 47 Ibid., 859.
- 48 Ibid., 860-861.
- 49 Memorial of merchants to James Murray, 30 March, 1766, J.P., 5, 131. Van Schaak and other traders to Hay, 4 September, 1767, I.H.C., 16, 4. A good illustration of these effects can be found in Bruce Trigger's description of the downfall of the Huron in the 1640's. Trigger, op. cit., 184-198.
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- 53 William Johnson to Thomas Gage, 4 July, 1766, J.P., 5, 302-303. William Johnson to Daniel Claus, 10 September, 1766, J.P., 5, 370.
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- 60 Flambarty to William Edgar, 29 October, 1766, 95, William Edgar Papers, Vol. 1, A1, M.G. 19, N.A.C..
- 61 Van Schaak and other traders to Hay, 4 September, 1767, I.H.C., 11, 4., 5.
- 62 Thomas Gage to William Johnson, 5 October, 1766, J.P., 5, 386.
- 63 Fr. Flambarty to William Edgar, 23 March, 1767, 104-107, William Edgar Papers, A1, M.G. 19, N.A.C..
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- 65 Speech of Mehamie Indians, 7 May, 1767, J.P., 5, 546. Message from Miamis to Commander at Detroit, May, 1767, J.P., 5, 558.
- 66 Croghan's Journal, 17 October, 1767, J.P., 13, 434.
- 67 Court of Enquiry, Detroit, 12 November, 1766, J.P., 12, 216-217. George Turnbull to William Johnson, 14 October, 1767, J.P., 5, 726-727.
- 68 William Johnson to the Lords of Trade, 15 January, 1767, N.Y.C.D., 7, 895.
- 69 Thomas Gage to William Johnson, 8 February, 1767, I.H.C., 11, 505.
- 70 Thomas Gage to William Johnson, 13 April, 1767, J.P., 5, 536.

- 71 Guy Carleton to William Johnson, 27 March, 1767, I.H.C., 11, 532-535.
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- 76 Fr. Flambarty to William Edgar, 8 May, 1767, 111, Correspondence of William Edgar, A1, M.G., 19, N.A.C.. Ferril Wade to William Johnson, 29 May, 1771, J.P., 8, 118.
- 77 Jehu Hay to George Croghan, 25 September, 1767, J.P., 5, 703.
- 78 Return of the Amount of Merchandise brought to Detroit from the 14th to the 10th November, 1767, for the Indian Trade, J.P., 12, 398. Return of the Amount of Merchandise brought to Fort Pitt in the year 1767, J.P., 12, 396.
- 79 William Johnson to Thomas Gage, 21 August, 1767, J.P., 5, 630.
- 80 Jehu Hay to William Johnson, 23 November, 1767, J.P., 5, 815. William Johnson to Thomas Gage, 22 January, 1768, J.P., 12, 424.
- 81 Memorial of traders to Johnson, 22 November, 1767, J.P., 807-811.
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- 83 Norton, op. cit., 207-208.
- 84 From Henry Van Schaak et al, 26 November, 1767, J.P., 5, 826-830.
- 85 Sosin, op. cit., 163-169.
- 86 Lords of Trade to the Earl of Hillsborough, 17 March, 1768, N.Y.C.D., 8, 19-31.
- 87 Representation of Lords of Trade on the State of Indian Affairs, 7 March, 1768, N.Y.C.D., 8, 20-21.

88 Thomas Gage to the Earl of Hillsborough, 10 November, 1770, C.O.T.G., 1, 276.

89 Schmalz, op. cit., 1991, 96, states that the traders were not allowed to leave the posts as late as 1771. He accuses Sir William Johnson of allowing his trading partner, Ferril Wade, to trade illegally at Toronto. By this time, the rules had been changed and what Johnson and Wade were doing was perfectly legal. Representation of the Lords of Trade on the State of Indian Affairs 7 March, 1768, N.Y.C.D., 8, 24.

90 Court of Inquiry, 11 March, 1765, J.P., 4, 670. Maisonville to William Johnson, 20 November, 1767, I.H.C., 16, 109.

91 Thomas Gage to the Earl of Hillsborough, 15 May, 1768, I.H.C., 16, 288.

92 Guy Johnson to Thomas Gage, 20 May, 1768, J.P., 12, 509. George Turnbull to Thomas Gage, 23 February, 1768, J.P., 6, 121. Fr. Flambarty to William Edgar, 29 October, 1766, 95, Correspondence of William Edgar, Vol. 1, A1, M.G. 19, N.A.C.

93 William Johnson to the Earl of Hillsborough, 15 February, 1769, N.Y.C.D., 8, 151.

94 Phyn and Ellice to James Stirling, 23 August, 1769, 200, Correspondence of Phyn and Ellice, B5, M.G. 19, N.A.C.. William Johnson to the Earl of Hillsborough, 26 August, 1769, N.Y.C.D., 8, 184. Thomas Gage to the Earl of Hillsborough, 9 September, 1769, I.H.C., 16, 596. Daniel Campbell to the Sons of Liberty, 14 November, 1769, J.P., 7, 251-252.

95 Sosin, op. cit., 214.

96 Norton, op. cit., 216-217. Sosin, op. cit., 211-217.

97 Thomas Gage to William Johnson, 3 April, 1769, J.P., 12, 710.

98 Plan for Indian Trade, New York Assembly, 19 May, 1769, J.P., 6, 762-764.

99 Thomas Gage to the Earl of Hillsborough, 9 September, 1769, I.H.C., 16, 596.

100 James Stevenson to William Johnson, 17 July, 1770, J.P., 7, 802.

101 The list of commandants at Detroit is as follows:
1763 - 1764, Major Henry Gladwin; 1764, Colonel John Bradstreet; 1765, Colonel John Campbell; 1766, Major Robert

Bayard; 1767, Captain George Turnbull; 1770, Major T. Bruce; 1771, Captain James Stephenson; 1772, Major Henry Bassett; and 1774, Major R.B. Lernout. Ernst Lajeunesse, ed., The Windsor Border Region: Canada's Southernmost Frontier, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960), 356.

102 William Johnson to John Brown, 31 October, 1766, J.P., 5, 404-405. William Johnson to the Earl of Shelburne, 3 December, 1767, N.Y.C.D., 7, 999.

103 Thomas Gage to the Earl of Hillsborough, 10 November, 1770, C.O.T.G., 1, 276.

104 W.E. Connelley, "The Indian Gamblers," Huron and Wyandot Mythology, With an Appendix Containing Earlier Published Records, C.M. Barbeau, ed., (Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1915), 370.

105 Speech of Massiggihash with 22 other Chippewas, 28 April, 1769, J.P., 6, 716-722.

106 Henry Van Schaak et al to William Johnson, 26 November, 1767, J.P., 5, 827.

107 Indian Speeches, 14 August, 1768, J.P., 12, 585.

108 For a discussion of this phenomena among the Ojibwa, see Peter Schmalz, op. cit., 87-91. For reliance on European goods and alliance to maintain or enhance status relative to others see Clifton, op. cit., 59, and White, op. cit., 99-104.

109 Guy Johnson to Thomas Gage, 20 May, 1768, J.P., 12, 508.

110 John Stevenson to William Johnson, 8 January, 1772, J.P., 8, 363.

111 Quaife, op.cit., 74-75, 116.

112 White, op.cit., 334.

113 Alexander McKee's Journal, 25 September, 1774, 15, Records of the Western Posts, Volume 1836, A1, R.G. 10, N.A.C..

114 William Johnson to the Earl of Hillsborough, 14 August, 1770, N.Y.C.D., 8, 226.

115 William Johnson to Thomas Gage, 19 September, 1771, J.P., 8, 262.

116 For an account of Kayashota's life, his role in Pontiac's War, and his services as an intermediary between the British and Ohio Amerindians see: Thomas B. Abler,

"Kayashota," Dictionary of Canadian Biography, 3, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 408-410.

117 For accounts of these see: Gregory Evans Dowd, A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745-1815, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 44-46. White, op. cit., 51-65. Randolph C. Downes, Council Fires on the Upper Ohio, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1969), 140-180.

118 Indian Conference, Pittsburgh, 9 October, 1773, J.P., 12, 1035.

119 Conference with Kayashuta, Johnson Hall, 5 - 15 January, 1774, J.P., 12, 1055 - 1058.

120 Sosin, op. cit., 241.

121 The Quebec Act, 1774, D.R.C.H.C., 1, 412.

122 Quebec Revenue Act, 1774, D.R.C.H.C., 577.

CHAPTER FIVE: LAND, RENT, AND INTERCULTURAL KILLINGS:
SELECTED ASPECTS OF INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS AT DETROIT,
1765 - 1775

Three areas of Anglo-Amerindian relations will be analyzed in this chapter. The distribution of land between Euroamericans and Amerindians was seen as being of utmost importance to both Amerindians and the British during the 1760's and 1770's. Both at Detroit and elsewhere, various efforts were made to alienate land for Euroamerican settlement. Only those attempts which affected relations at Detroit will be considered here. One of the causes of Pontiac's War was the breaking off of British "presents" to the Indian nations, and one of the conditions imposed upon the British for peace was the restoration of this system. We will consider what became of such promises. Finally, we will ascertain what happened when cooperative efforts failed or were ignored. Intercultural killings disturbed relations in the Detroit area, and the management of the amelioration of sentiments after these took place will be examined.

The cooperation, which became evident at Detroit, was not necessarily the rule elsewhere. The course of relations at Detroit was affected by new illegal European settlements on the borders of Virginia and Pennsylvania, the controversial Treaty of Fort Stanwix, and the settlement of the upper Ohio. Intercultural killings were more prevalent, and less recourse was available for the victims, on the

borders of the "American" colonies than in the Detroit region. Amerindians at Detroit were aware of these setbacks experienced by their fellow native peoples, and at times became embroiled in their disputes. The cooperative system that developed at Detroit did much to ameliorate hostile sentiments. Also, the British encouraged intertribal disputes to try to break up the alliances between the different Amerindian groups. In a sense, the treatment given at Detroit encouraged cooperation from groups there so that the British could deal alone with recalcitrants such as the Shawnee, who were closer to the Euroamerican settlements and had more reasons to dispute with their British neighbours. Whatever the reasons, in the years between Pontiac's War and the outbreak of the American Revolutionary War, Amerindians and British were able to work out at Detroit arrangements which took into account the needs of the other in the years after 1764.

BRITISH ATTEMPTS TO ALIENATE AMERINDIAN LAND AT DETROIT,
1765-1775

No land was officially transferred from Amerindians to Euroamericans at Detroit between 1764 and 1775. Some Euroamericans attempted to purchase Amerindian land, but British officials used the Proclamation of 1763 to ensure that no Amerindians were allowed to alienate land to

Europeans before 1775. This policy had unintended consequences which will be investigated.

Land policy elsewhere influenced relations at Detroit. The 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix, negotiated by Sir William Johnson and the Six Nations Iroquois, recognized the surrender of Iroquois title to the land south of the Ohio as far as the Cherokee River.¹ This surrender was disputed by the Shawnee, Delaware, Cherokee and Mingo, who claimed the land as their hunting ground, and were upset that they had not been included in the distribution of goods in payment.² They stirred up Amerindians throughout the interior in support of their point of view,³ including a council at the Huron village at Detroit with the Detroit Hurons, Ojibwa, Ottawa and Potawatomi in September, 1769. The Delaware received permission from the Hurons to establish a town near Cuyahoga in order to settle refugees from the Susquehanna, who had been displaced by the Treaty of Fort Stanwix. Such surrenders to the imperial government were made worse when Euroamerican settlers moved into the area, without the permission of the imperial government or Amerindians. Amerindians took matters into their own hands when the imperial government seemed unable to stop the settlers. The Detroit conference was part of a long-term Shawnee strategy to develop intertribal Amerindian alliances to counter the Six Nations - British alliance.⁴ In turn, Johnson and the Iroquois attempted to break up these Shawnee efforts, by sending their own delegations to Amerindian councils,

advocating the British alliance.⁵ Johnson had the commandants hold annual conferences at Detroit to renew the British alliance,⁶ sent Iroquois delegates to Detroit in 1773⁷ and 1774, and sent the Hurons from Detroit on peace missions to the Wabash in 1773 and 1774.⁸

The Shawnee and Mingo also were upset at the creation of a new colony in this area in 1772,⁹ and again sought support for their position throughout the interior, including Detroit.¹⁰ Although no other tribes joined them officially, the Shawnee persuaded small groups from the Wabash and other tribes to support them in their raids upon the frontier in Lord Dunmore's war in 1774.¹¹ This sort of pressure on Amerindians who lived in the area bordered by Euroamerican settlements made all Amerindians wary of their land. Looked at in such a way, the land policy at Detroit was perhaps an overreaction in the Amerindian's favour, so that British behaviour was exemplary here in compensation for transgressions elsewhere.

When Colonel Bradstreet was at Detroit in 1764, he granted some lands to his officers and some to the French inhabitants. Bradstreet envisaged Detroit as one of a series of military colonies that would be planted in order to provide a buffer between the eastern colonies and Amerindian territory.¹² Bradstreet and the Amerindian participants considered this grant as being within the conditions of the Proclamation of 1763, as it was granted to the crown (or its officers) and took place at a large

assembly of Amerindians. Sir William Johnson opposed Bradstreet's grants, not because of Amerindian discontent, but rather because he believed such grants were beyond Bradstreet's authority.¹³ Given the rivalry that existed between the two men, the proposed colony might have given Bradstreet a power base to rival Johnson's.

George Croghan likewise was involved in the granting of lands when he arrived at Detroit in 1765. Pontiac and the Ottawa had abandoned their Detroit village site, and agreed to grant this to various Detroit residents.¹⁴ As with Bradstreet, the Amerindians seem to have been content with this cession. Unlike Bradstreet, Croghan's grants were not immediately challenged. Croghan was Johnson's deputy, and acted in his name.¹⁵ Rather than providing a challenge to Johnson's authority, Croghan's acts extended Johnson's dominion.

The most serious dispute at Detroit regarding Amerindian lands involved Father Potier, the Jesuit priest in charge of the Huron mission. He sold some of the mission lands in order to build a new chapel for the French inhabitants.¹⁶ Apparently, the Hurons did not agree with this cession of their lands, and accused the French of encroachment. The Hurons had agreed at the Niagara peace treaty of 1764 only to give up rights to their land that the French had previously enjoyed. This did not extend to letting their priest sell off their mission land without permission.

The disagreement between the Hurons, Potier, and the French who had settled on Huron lands, caused tensions to escalate to a point where hostilities threatened to break out in the spring of 1769. The trader's boats were held up at Fort Erie, in fear of being attacked by the Hurons, so that commerce was interrupted between Niagara and Michilimackinac.¹⁷ The inhabitants on the south shore took measures for their defence. The six or eight families involved built a stockade in which to place their cattle, and a fort to protect themselves. The commanding officer, George McDougall, gave them two cannon.¹⁸ In a good example of how intertribal diplomacy could be affected by land disputes, some Shawnee, Delaware and Mingo, freshly upset over the terms of the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, were said to be ready to come to the aid of the Hurons at Detroit.¹⁹ Apparently, the show of French force, supported by the English garrison, was enough to put a stop to the tensions by June, 1769. The Hurons were stymied by this alliance of the two ethnic groups.²⁰

Settlement occurred on the land granted by Croghan. Some French families erected houses and began farming on the land that had formerly belonged to the Ottawa. As well, the garrison was cultivating crops on Hog Island for their own support, claiming that this land was granted by Pontiac in the presence of Croghan.²¹ By 1770, the Hurons again complained of the French inhabitants settling on land alienated by Potier.²²

In 1771, Gage ordered all people to remove from the lands granted since the end of Pontiac's War. He asserted that the only people with authority to alienate Amerindian land were the governors or the Superintendant General of Indian Affairs, who themselves needed the permission of the King to do so. No land grants could be considered valid without these procedures being followed.²³ Gage did not want practices which he believed were used to alienate Amerindian land elsewhere to prevail at Detroit.

[W]hite people...have defrauded them of their lands by making a few of them drunk, & getting them in that condition to give away their country to the great disgust of the rest of that Nation...This has happened to many Indian Nations & unless you stop it in the beginning at the Detroit, the same thing will happen here.²⁴

Bradstreet's, Croghan's and Potier's grants were disallowed. The garrison at Detroit was employed to tear down all the buildings that had been put up on disputed lands.²⁵ Amerindian grievances were actively redressed with the support of British troops.

Settlers left because their children had no prospect of inheriting new lands, which the father might elsewhere have purchased. By 1770, several families had left the Detroit area for the Maumee. Once there they were granted lands by the Amerindians to settle and farm.²⁶ The evidence indicates that the French removing to the Wabash were not there primarily to engage in agriculture. Their move would seem to have also involved a move from the more

agriculturally oriented economy at Detroit to engaging in the fur trade in the interior.²⁷

The Proclamation of 1763 was interpreted to mean that all the French who had settled at the villages on the Wabash were to leave. The terms of the Plan for Trade of 1765 forbade trading with Amerindians except at the posts, so that the status of all the interior trading settlements was in jeopardy. Although their rights to the land would seem to have been reinforced when the plan was abandoned in 1768, the British continued their efforts to remove them from the settlements. In 1768, Turnbull was ordered to demand the removal of all French settlers "where the English have not an equal liberty to trade."²⁸ James Stevenson, the commandant at Detroit in 1770, ordered the French who had recently settled on the Maumee to leave.²⁹ While at Detroit, Gage's injunction of 1771 applied only to lands alienated since 1763; at the Illinois, the injunction commanded all the settlers to leave, even those who held their land through a title given by the former French regime.³⁰ Unlike at Detroit, where the British garrison had the power to enforce rulings having to do with land, the balance of power was much different on the Wabash. Here, the French settlers sent two deputies to Gage to prove their title, while the Wabash Amerindians threatened to kill the person who delivered the order to depart.³¹ Amerindian hostility to the idea of removing their link to outside

trade goods is understandable. The delegates made their point, and the French were allowed to remain on the Wabash.

The Quebec Act of 1774 was to be the final accomodation of these people. The interior settlements were to have secure title to their lands, and the establishment of a civil government, through the expansion of Quebec to the area previously covered by the Proclamation of 1763. At the same time, under the Proclamation of 1763, only land grants made under the French regime were allowed, with those since 1760 being disallowed. Although the expansion of other colonies, such as Virginia and Pennsylvania, had occured because of population pressures on Amerindian lands, the expansion of Quebec was an attempt to limit this pressure. It was thought that the use of the Quebec civil code and the lack of an elected assembly³² would keep out English settlers.³³ The interior was to be preserved for the Amerindians and the traders. French or English agricultural settlers might be tolerated; but not encouraged.

As a short term policy, these provisions of the Quebec Act had much to recommend them; but, as a long-term policy, it was more doubtful. The American colonists and land speculators resented this attempt to limit their settlement. The Quebec Act provisions were counted by some New Englanders as important grievances, though it hardly was a reason for the War of Independence which followed. The willingness of the Imperial government to placate Amerindian fears about their land at the expense of relations with

their own colonists makes apparent the importance it placed on its Amerindian alliances.

GIFTS, PAYMENTS AND COMPENSATION

Related to both trade and land policies were commitments the British made to Amerindian groups to make payments for the privilege of establishing posts and trading on their territory. These agreements had been made at the peace conferences ending Pontiac's War. The distribution of goods had many uses in Amerindian society, and the British were forced to accede to those who demanded tangible expressions of the British alliance. British goods were redistributed by those who received them in Amerindian society in order to reinforce their own status as conduits of Euroamerican products. Through the distribution of goods, the British built up a system of chiefs who would mediate intercultural disputes in return for the status access to these products brought. Conversely, a lack of the same could result in charges that the British were neglecting those whose interest it was in to keep the alliance alive.³⁴

There was the example of the Wabash Amerindians to consider. According to Andrew the Huron, Maisonville and George Croghan, the loss of the official trading posts on the Wabash and the goods that were distributed from them, was one of the causes of the discontent evidenced by the

Wabash tribes throughout the 1760's and 1770's.³⁵ British efforts at ameliorating the sentiments of the Potawatomis from St. Joseph's and the Illinois, who were operating in alliance with the discontented upon the Wabash, were also unsuccessful, at least in part because the British never had an opportunity to establish a method of regularly distributing European goods in their villages. They did not allow their traders to visit the villages until 1768, and, without British goods, those chiefs who might be persuaded to support the British did not have ready access to the British goods which would be necessary to improve their own status in their village, and to keep the warriors from following their own path. These goods continued to be supplied largely by French traders from the Mississippi.³⁶

The supply of presents or rent was a necessity. Annual conferences were held at Detroit to distribute British goods to the Amerindians in alliance to the British.³⁷ British "presents" had to be distributed to Amerindians coming to Detroit on trade and diplomatic missions, as an expression of friendship and alliance. This transaction took place either as a preliminary display of goodwill before trading commenced or even as an act of charity to a band who needed to be supplied in the fall so that they could hunt during the winter.³⁸ If an Amerindian was killed by the British, goods had to be distributed to that person's clan in order to cover the dead. The British routinely gave gifts to parties restoring prisoners to them.³⁹ Gifts were

also necessary to settle intertribal disputes the British wished to mediate.⁴⁰

Amerindians earned returns for services they performed. The Ojibway who lived upon the St. Clair River were paid for helping bring the vessels up the rapids, and protested vigorously when attempts to reduce their payments were made. The payments were restored to their former level.⁴¹ Various Amerindians were also employed in carrying messages for or communicating messages to the British.⁴²

Payments were delivered in various ways. One or two interpreters were kept at Detroit, in order to enable the different groups to communicate, while a blacksmith was also present in order to repair arms and other implements for Amerindians coming to Detroit. When the Plan for Trade of 1768 put the Indian trade under colonial control, the value of these offices was recognized so that they continued to draw their pay from the army.⁴³ During his tenure as commissary, Jehu Hay was able to draw on the army for expenses relating to the giving of gifts to Amerindians. These included such items as food, arms, ammunition, alcohol, medals and various other trade goods. The Hurons at Detroit had Sir William Johnson find a bell for the steeple of their church.⁴⁴

When the office of commissary was discontinued and control of Amerindian trade given to the colonies, the British were unable to discontinue the distribution of gifts

as well. George Turnbull, commandant at Detroit in 1769 explained that:

I still continue to give the Indians Provisions and a Little Rum and Tobacco now and then, nor is it in my Power to do otherwise Whilst I am obliged to Detach small Parties of the Garrison to cutt [sic] wood and Burn Lime and Charcoal we are by no means in Condition to put them on any other Footing⁴⁵

The British could either pay, or retreat to the walls of their fort to await the inevitable reprisals.

The British used several methods to finance Amerindian expenses. The commanding officer received an extra 5 shillings per day to help cover the cost of gifts for the Amerindians.⁴⁶ Johnson also received 3000 Pounds Sterling per annum in order to cover the expenses of his department, some of which went to Detroit. Additionally, he could call upon the military for cash in certain emergency situations.⁴⁷

Certain groups, located on the Wabash and the Illinois, and separated from the British by distance, continued to receive most of their European goods via the Mississippi. For the groups close to Detroit, the method and amount paid by the British seems to have been sufficient to keep them allied to the British and permit their traders among them. The British honoured the agreements they made at the end of the war, and set up a system for the distribution of the necessary goods.

INTERCULTURAL KILLINGS

Sometimes, the payments the British made were not sufficient to halt violence. Intercultural killings were evidence of both conflict and cooperation throughout the 1760's and 1770's. The themes already studied were usually the basis for them: disputes over land or trade could escalate to the point where someone was killed. The British and Amerindians recognized this, and their methods of managing the issue reflected the fact that they had to deal with the underlying causes of the killings. If this was impossible, a certain number of casualties would have to be accepted. Moreover, they had to come to an agreement on how the killings themselves would be managed. In this process, both Amerindians and British actively tried to accommodate the interests and culture of the other.

Amerindian attitudes were shaped by the frequency of killings, existing Amerindian customs, and the methods the British took to ameliorate them. Killings on the frontier were much more frequent than in the Detroit area. On the borders of Pennsylvania and Virginia, there was competition for land and animal resources between the Amerindian and Euroamerican populations, so that disputes tended to flare up into violence. Amerindians were subject to attacks on their persons by parties of frontier inhabitants. Due to their support among the local populace and the inadequate judicial controls upon them, these people went almost always

unpunished for their actions, so that Amerindian grievances here went unanswered. In the interior, the basis of contact was usually through the fur trade. It was in both parties' interest that this activity continue, so that disputes usually only arose on the terms under which the trade took place. In the majority of cases, alcohol was involved. It was in everyone's interest to make amends for the killing, and mediate the dispute responsible for the death.

Amerindians had methods of dealing with killings in their own society. The killing of a member of one group demanded retribution on the group which had responsibility. Murder was a collective offence against another collective: individual responsibility was not a consideration. Guilt was not an issue, only liability. In attributing liability, it was enough that the victim was under the care and control of the liable party. For example, if a prisoner died in a British prison, it did not matter if the British actually killed him: it only mattered that they had responsibility for his life, and failed to preserve it.⁴⁸ Both the groups involved were usually clans, although, in the absence of a definable clan on which to seek revenge, ethnicity or some other relationship might be a basis for identity. In keeping with group responsibility for the behaviour of the individual, any member of the offending group could be killed in revenge for a killing.

There was a spiritual side to the blood feud, as Europeans came to call this Amerindian way of responding to

a killing. The death of a clanmate was a blow against the spiritual energy of the whole clan, and the impact would continue to be felt until revenge was sought.⁴⁹ Revenge was not just a means for warriors to seek prestige: it was also a rejuvenation which revitalized the power of the warrior and his clan.

If the two groups were allied, Amerindians preferred to provide compensation to the affected group rather than invite retaliation. The injured party, in order to prevent an escalation of violence, was predisposed to accept such compensation. A slave might be offered to replace the dead warrior ("to raise up the dead") or a gift of goods to the affected clan might be sufficient to atone for a killing ("to cover the dead"). The accused party would thereby replace the value of the dead member and their acknowledgement and restitution was sufficient to restore the spiritual energy of the affected clan.

The British tradition stressed individual responsibility for crimes committed by an individual. An individual who killed another was answerable to the Crown, which then decided and inflicted punishment. Murder was punishable by the death of the guilty party, after being found culpable through the court system. The British emphasized identifying exactly who the offender was, and directed resources towards inflicting punishment on him. There were problems admitting the Amerindians to this system. Amerindian testimony was not accepted in British

courts, so that they could not be called as witnesses to convict someone accused of murdering one of their own or to speak in their own defence. Guy Johnson, Sir William's successor, believed that, added to the inclination of Amerindians to prefer their own laws and customs to those of the British, this liability was crippling to British efforts to enforce the universality of their laws.⁵⁰

These differing perspectives came to be worked out over the years between Pontiac's War and the American Revolution. Both sides tried to impose their own values on the other; but neither had the strength to do so. Compromises were worked out based upon what each group considered would ameliorate the situation through their understanding of the cultural background of the other, the circumstances of the killing and the precedents they established over time.⁵¹

Both the British and Amerindians officially accepted that any losses incurred by them during Pontiac's War were put behind them. This was the purpose of the condolence ceremony performed at the beginning of each of Croghan's councils. The calumet was handed around and smoked, and goods were exchanged to "cover the graves of the dead."⁵² Thus, it is with killings that took place after peace had been declared with which this chapter is concerned.

In November, 1765, an Ojibwa man was found dead shortly after he and his wife had been drinking with some battoemen from Schenectady. After the imprisonment of the suspects, a court of inquiry was held, but there was not enough evidence

to proceed further. After the Euroamerican inquiry, the Ojibwa did not receive goods to "cover the grave" of the deceased or any conviction in the British courts against the alleged murderers. The peace chiefs managed to keep their warriors from striking the British in revenge; but this incident was not forgotten.⁵³

Two British soldiers were killed while cutting firewood at the Rouge River in February, 1766.⁵⁴ The perpetrators were Potawatomis from northern Illinois, who were returning from a trading visit to Detroit. Motivations for the killing are unclear. Perhaps the party was dissatisfied with the trade they had met with at Detroit, or the disbursement of goods they had received. Or, the group may have had members among it who did not consider that the Potawatomis from St. Joseph who had made peace with the British after Pontiac's War represented them. The Potawatomis tried (unsuccessfully) to take one of the soldiers prisoner back to their village, perhaps to replace a dead warrior, or, in their terms "to raise up the dead."

John Campbell sent an armed party after the Potawatomi. They returned with only the bodies of the deceased, finding that their presence was known and that "all the Cabbins they came to were deserted by the Indians." Campbell orderd all trade cut off with St. Joseph's, though he knew this was a futile measure "as they can employ other Indians to dispose of their peltry."⁵⁵

Those in favour of peace among the St Joseph Potawatomi attempted to smooth over matters before they escalated. They did it in a manner they themselves recognized, and which John Campbell did not. They attempted to raise up the British dead by offering Panis slaves to the British at Detroit. Instead of accepting them with the Potawatomi's apologies, Campbell ordered out another party to attack them, and captured one woman and two men. The woman was released, while the two men were kept as hostages "in hopes it may be the means of bringing the Aggressors to Justice."⁵⁶

Rather than convincing any Potawatomis of the need to adjust their practices to British norms, this incident only served to alienate those clans that had taken the peace initiative. The hostages were not even taken from the group responsible for the killings. The raiders were from the villages in northern Illinois, while those who tried to accomodate the British were from St. Joseph's.⁵⁷

The affair dragged on. Pontiac interceded on the behalf of the Potawatomis, relaying the information that the prisoners were not from the same village as the attackers. They requested that their hostages be released: Johnson recommended this course to Gage.⁵⁸ With his knowledge of Amerindian affairs, Johnson was astute enough to recognize a problem, and a solution, that Campbell could not. If the perpetrators of the killings were not given up, Campbell advocated attacking the villages at St. Joseph's.⁵⁹

In May, 1766, a black slave raped and killed two Ojibway women. Campbell tried to bring this offender to justice using the British system. He wanted the man tried and killed at Detroit in front of the Ojibway in order to atone for the deaths.⁶⁰ By the provisions of the Mutiny Act, Campbell did not have the authority to preside over this civil trial. The accused would have to be sent back to Albany to be tried and hanged out of sight of the Amerindians.⁶¹ General Gage proposed sending some of the concerned Ojibways to Albany to witness this.⁶²

Given the killings on the frontier, and the nature of the situation in which the Potawatomi hostages were being held, Johnson felt it was the best policy to be forgiving to Amerindian breaches of the alliance and to try to enforce British laws on their own inhabitants. The hostages would be released and the slave was to be prosecuted.⁶³

Before word could get to the Potawatomis of the British good intentions, they decided to get their hostages back by their own means. In the summer of 1766, parties from either northern Illinois or St. Joseph's⁶⁴ took three British prisoners near Fort Chartres in the Illinois, in order to exchange them for their hostages.⁶⁵ That summer, they were also contemplating an attack on Detroit in revenge for their treatment, but were apparently persuaded to hold back by Louis Chevalier, a French trader residing at St. Joseph. Chevalier was intermarried with the Potawatomi, and had been trading with them for years. He was characterized at this

time as having "a great deal of interest" with the St. Joseph Potawatomis and having "a verry [sic] honest character."⁶⁶

The Potawatomi hostages and the killings by the slave were dealt with by Sir William Johnson and the assembled Western Amerindians at the Oswego conference of July and August, 1766. Johnson explained that the Potawatomis had been held for the conduct of the killers because, two years earlier, they had agreed to surrender killers to Detroit. He did not mention whether those who agreed to this had any authority to speak for other Potawatomis. In return for the release of the hostages, the Potawatomis were required to return the prisoners they had taken and provide compensation. They both covered and rose up the dead. Johnson tried to disassociate the British from implication in the crime of the black man. "[H]e is of a different Colour & disposition from us, so that his action can not be attributed to the English." He was to "meet with the punishment adequate to the crime and your people may be present to see it inflicted." As the man was a slave, the Amerindians looked upon him as the property and responsibility of the British. He was sent down to Albany, but no positive evidence could be found of his conduct. It appears that having found him with a shirt covered in blood and a witness in the person of a French boy was not sufficient to convict him.⁶⁷ General Gage ruminated that "it was a great mistake sending the fellow down the

Country." The Amerindians "Should not have been withheld from doing themselves Justice on such a Villain."⁶⁸ He was kept in jail. Neither the Amerindians nor British were satisfied with the outcome of this incident.

Johnson outlined the system he would have preferred at the Oswego congress. Amerindians and Euroamericans were to be delivered up for trial in all cases of intercultural killings. Teata, of the Detroit Hurons, spoke first, evading a direct answer. He could not "answer word for word what has been spoken to us" until the whole village council met to consider Johnson's proposal. This was probably the truth, and the fact that no answer was ever forthcoming gives a good indication of the stand the council took. Pontiac likewise avoided a direct answer, confining himself to thanking Johnson for the delivery of the hostages and assuring him of his friendship.⁶⁹ This proposed system was never implemented, though British attempts at implemenatation occurred, and disturbed relations until they accomodated Amerindian customs and practices into their responses.

A servant of Lieutenant Sinclair was killed by two Saginaw Ojibwa on Lake Huron in the spring of 1767. Apparently, the two warriors were taking revenge for the man's past abusive treatment of Amerindians. Lieutenant Sinclair, who was captain of one of the vessels supplying Michilimackinac, took the two Ojibwa prisoners on board his vessel, intending to send them back to the colonies for

trial. Although the Chief (Wasson) declared that the action was taken against the "Sentiments of his Nation" and disclaimed any part in it,⁷⁰ he also reminded the British that the Ojibwa had not received any satisfaction for the killing of either the man who had been drinking with the boatman or for the raping and killing of the two women by the black slave.⁷¹ The commanding officer of Detroit sent the two prisoners to Johnson Hall so that Johnson could have charge of them. Despite his stance at the Oswego congress, in the light of these previous killings, Johnson believed that Sinclair's actions were "unlucky."⁷² Gage accepted the link between the killings done by the black slave and this one. The British must "talk loudly" but could not expect the Amerindians to be brought to a British idea of justice when they were unable to execute the slave.⁷³ The two Ojibway must not be sent to trial.⁷⁴ When Pontiac was at Detroit in the summer of 1767, he too asked Hay that the Saginaw Ojibwa's behavior be forgiven.⁷⁵

When George Croghan was sent to Detroit to look into the trader's complaints about Hay, he was also to oversee the handing back of the Ojibwa prisoners.⁷⁶ Gage's feelings about sending Croghan were mixed. On the one hand he felt that Croghan should "demand Satisfaction for an Injury the Indians have done us, not to ask Favors of them." On the other, he acknowledged that Lieutenant Sinclair's servant was "a bad Man, and had behaved ill" and that the Ojibwa had not received any satisfaction from either the British or

Amerindian justice systems for those who had been killed by the British.⁷⁷ Gage was beginning to recognize that Amerindians had their own way of dealing with those who abused the recognized terms of trade. Given the breakdown of the proposed British system for controlling intercultural killings, Gage was willing to let Amerindian norms influence his response.

Again, British delays exacerbated an already bad situation. Ten Ojibway and Ottawa from Saginaw Bay, led by Pontiac's nephew, killed and plundered 11 British in two boats upon the Ohio.⁷⁸ Most of these men were the relations of the two who had been taken prisoner by Sinclair, and were acting in revenge for the British sending them to Albany.⁷⁹ The Saginaw chiefs, along with 34 of their men, arrived at Detroit to "beg mercy" for their young men who had killed the British on the Ohio. They brought with them Pontiac's nephew and most of Sinclair's servant's personal belongings.⁸⁰ The Saginaw Bay Amerindians were willing to admit individual responsibility in so far as they identified the individual they felt was responsible for the attack. They also brought compensation in goods for their conduct -- the belongings of Sinclair's servant. Jehu Hay handled the situation with intertribal diplomacy. The Ojibwa chiefs and warriors met with Hay in the presence of Attawang, the Ottawa chief of Roche de Bout, an Ojibway chief and 3 Huron chiefs. The Hurons, acting as speakers for British allies in the Western Confederacy, gave the Saginaw Bay chiefs a

belt and exhorted them to behave well in the future and not disturb the alliance. Hay reprimanded the Saginaw Bay delegates for their behavior and told them he had to wait for the judgement of his superiors to know if the killings would be pardoned.⁸¹

The tardy Croghan left for Detroit from Fort Pitt on 24 October, 1767. When he met some Delawares at a hunting camp, Croghan had a lesson in Amerindian perceptions of intercultural murders and the way that British breaches of Amerindian norms were transmitted intertribally. He told them that he was going to Detroit to restore the two Ojibwa prisoners. The Delawares:

Answered, that they were glad to hear it, as the Nations over the Lakes were making a great complaint to their Allies -- that every little Crime which any of their People committed in their drink -- was taken great Notice of by the English, and their People sent Prisoners to be hanged -- When the English at the same time refused to punish their Negroes for Murdering their People before their faces, and that they could never obtain Justice from the English for any injuries they did them.⁸²

The Ojibwa prisoners and Croghan arrived at Detroit with new clothes and gifts, including a belt of wampum for Wasson with a speech from Johnson telling him to remember his pledge of friendship made at Niagara in 1766. He was to work to prevent his young men from breaking the treaties made with the English.⁸³ Johnson was working here to improve the standing of Wasson as a chief in the British interest, by showing leniency to the accused, providing goods and actions that would increase Wasson's status in his

own community, and illustrate to the young warriors that it could be in their own interest to keep the British alliance.

When he arrived at Detroit in November, 1767, Croghan called a meeting of all the Amerindians living near Detroit and accused them of violating "all their Engagements to Us,...[and]... that they had from Time to Time been forgiven when they deserved the Severest punishments....[T]o convince them of the Humanity and Clemency of the British Nation," they were given back the two prisoners who had killed Lieutenant St. Clair's servant. He spoke to them about the killing of the 11 men on the Ohio. Croghan believed that the perpetrators of the act would be demanded from their nation, but counselled the Ojibwa to wait for the decision of General Gage or Sir William Johnson. As an example to the rest, the Hurons were delivered a belt for behaving "themselves remarkably well." Wasson thanked Croghan for the release of the prisoners, promising future good conduct, but reminded Croghan that he could only speak for those who were at the council, and that he would have to call a larger council at Saginaw Bay in order to ratify this sentiment. Wasson brought a message from the the Ottawas chiefs at Saginaw Bay, again laying the responsibility solely on Pontiac's nephew, disowning his conduct, and agreeing that he would be delivered up if necessary.⁸⁴

The British recognized the right of Amerindians to regulate the use of their hunting grounds. A party of Amerindians from Vincennes captured and plundered eight men

they found poaching in the summer of 1767. They killed two of the men and set the rest free.⁸⁵ Already upset that the British refused to establish posts among them, these particular Englishmen were seen as suitable subjects for a warning that trade and hunting violations would not be tolerated forever. Significantly, the Miami chiefs were not seen at a British post asking for forgiveness for their "foolish young men." They remained silent and let the British reach their own conclusions. The British took no action in this affair. In a similar incident, a British party hunting bison and deer was killed, except for Simon Girty, and plundered by "St. Joseph" Potawatomis on the Shawnee River. This same party attacked a party of Virginians hunting on the Green River a few days later. The Potawatomis were assisted in this activity by some Piankashaws, Weas, Kickapoos, Mascoutins and Vermillion warriors. It appears that those discontented with British relations were banding together to make themselves stronger in alliance.⁸⁶

These attacks were excused.⁸⁷ Gage wrote that "the Indians were not so much to blame as the Hunters...[as they]...were hunting on Indian Lands, for the Sake of Bear, Beaver, Deer and other Skins."⁸⁸ It was recognized that Amerindians had the right to protect their hunting grounds. No Amerindians were seized. Their apologies were accepted.⁸⁹ The traders were to understand that "they must Expect no Protection in such Undertakings."⁹⁰

Potawatomis at St. Joseph's managed to temporarily meet British demands for a display of alliance at the cost of the internal stability of their settlement. In August, 1767, the Potawatomi released the prisoners they had captured in revenge for their men being held. Of the three men captured, one was dead, one escaped, and only one remained. It seems those who had charge of the prisoners at St. Joseph's (probably the clan whose warriors had taken them) could not agree with the clan whose chiefs had received their hostages back from Johnson at Niagara and agreed to the release of prisoners. The clan chiefs did not have the authority to order the prisoners from the warriors of the other; but such a breach of agreements was serious. The clan chiefs eventually prevailed upon the warriors to agree to the release; but their community was divided by this action.⁹¹ In the summer of 1767, the differences between them led to a situation where they engaged in a drunken brawl in which 24 men were killed. One of the clans therefore left its village and went into the woods.⁹² This was probably the element against accomodation. The fact that the hostage was delivered up spoke for the victory of those inclined for peace. Victory did not mean unity. Pro-British chiefs continued to try to use their European connections to enhance their authority at home, while the anti-British leaders used those very connections to attempt to discredit their opponents.

Jehu Hay rewarded and supported the accomodationist Potawatomis when they gave up their prisoner. When the Potawatomi chiefs met the British, they expressed concern over what the British would do about the dead British prisoner. Hay told them they would have to wait for his superior's judgement. He wrote to Croghan, counselling caution and explaining that he may not have been generous enough with presents to keep the surrounding Amerindians firmly attached to the English; but he was worried if he spent too much his accounts would be returned. In this particular instance, he wished to give medals to the St. Joseph's Chiefs.⁹³ Hay, the veteran officer, knew the value of generosity in smoothing over quarrels, the role a lack of the same could play in exacerbating tensions and that the medals would be visible, material symbols of the alliance that the accomodationalist chiefs could use to argue against their anti-British rivals.

The continuing factionalism at St. Joseph's was again illustrated in the winter of 1768. Some Potawatomis had a council at Louis Chevalier's where they decided to kill and plunder a Lieutenant Rogers who was at Kankakee trading. The killing demonstrated a resolution they came to at this council that they "would not suffer any English man to come near the Place." In fact, they claimed that they had only made peace in 1765 under the terms that no English would be allowed to trade amongst them.⁹⁴ Five of these Potawatomis killed and plundered a trader named Hombach at Kekionga.⁹⁵

Contrary to the previously favourable reports of Chevalier, he was now seen to be at the bottom of the problems at St. Joseph. Chevalier was known to be indebted to Hombach, and the Potawatomis refused to give up some of Hombach's papers which apparently proved this. This killing was even more serious because of its intertribal aspects. By carrying out the killing among the Miami, the Potawatomis had implicated them in the murder. While some Wabash warriors gave the Potawatomis their support, the Miami chiefs were reported to resent the Potawatomis at St. Joseph for shedding blood in their village, and the Ottawa were also reported to be disturbed by the murder of Hombach.⁹⁶

General Gage reacted strongly to news of the latest killings done by the St. Joseph Potawatomis and the Ottawa and Ojibwa at Saginaw Bay. He believed the French were behind the murders, so that this reinforced his desire to deny them contact with the Amerindians. Satisfaction was demanded lest the murders continue. He looked to the French regime for a precedent. "I see no better Method, than to follow the example set us by the French in Affairs of this kind, whenever one Nation killed their People they had others ready and willing to Assist to Chastise them." Instructions were sent to Detroit to implement such a policy. In the meantime, no trade was to be allowed "any Nation, where the English are refused the same Liberty of trade as the French."⁹⁷ To this he added that the Miami must also provide satisfaction for the killing of Hombach,

as it took place in their village while "under their protection." The perpetrators of the killings on the Ohio among the Ottawa at Saginaw Bay were not to be delivered up. Commandant Turnbull was only to "demand satisfaction" for the killings.⁹⁸

A policy of differing responses to Amerindian killings was being formed. The Ojibwa, who recognized their alliance with the British, were largely successful in keeping their community united in their attempts quickly to make amends for any killings that did occur, so they were to be excused for the occasional misstep. The fact that British law was ineffective in prosecuting either them or Euroamericans involved in intercultural killings was also an important factor in this decision. The factionalism evident among the Potawatomis at St. Joseph mitigated against keeping the amount of violence offered to the British to a minimum, and also interfered with meeting British demands for a show of alliance once an act of violence had been committed. In the absence of British law, intertribal diplomacy was resorted to in an effort to stem the killings.

The Potawatomi chiefs denied any involvement in, or responsibility for, the attack on Hombach in the Miami village. Apparently, the dispute between anti-British and pro-British factions continued. They explained that the killing was "committed by some who have left their Village & disregard their Admonitions." Perhaps this was the clan who had been driven out of their village the year before. This

was not good enough for Guy Johnson, temporarily in charge of Indian Affairs, who regarded the explanation as a "stale excuse."⁹⁹

Jehu Hay's policy was more lenient than Gage wished. Hay's leniency sprang from several factors. Although some Amerindians were killing British traders, some British were also guilty of killing Amerindians. There was the usual frontier violence, but also a Huron at Sandusky was murdered by a trader in the winter or spring of 1768. Complicating matters was the fact that the Huron's brother had been killed by a soldier in 1764, so that his clan now had two deaths to account for. Instead of ordering the French from the country, Hay called the English traders together and they agreed to hire French men to protect their stores in the Amerindian villages. In an effort to ameliorate the liquor trade, which they acknowledged to be at least the immediate cause of most killings, they also agreed to limit their rum trade to giving only a glass per day per Amerindian. The first resolution recognized the facts of existence in Amerindian territory, and was an effective way of dealing with a problem, while the second was purely voluntary and open to abuse. This resolution did not last.¹⁰⁰

Chiefs at St. Joseph managed to arrange the surrender of the two men allegedly responsible for the killing of Rogers at the Kankakee. They gave themselves up at Detroit in the spring or summer of 1769. Although this would appear

to be, ostensibly, what Gage was trying to arrange, he outlined the difficulties this surrender produced.

[A]ltho' [sic] this may be a Proof of some Subordination on their Part, as well as of their Desire to live amicably with us, yet it gives Rise to a Difficulty how to dispose of them, they can't be knocked in the Head in cold Blood, neither can they be legally tried at Detroit, and if they are sent down to Albany and tried there, there is no Evidence to appear against them....[We]...must endeavor to make the best of it, and attribute our Releasing of them, to our Wish of conciliating their Affections by fair Means.¹⁰¹

The prisoners, by escaping, solved Gage's dilemma for him.¹⁰²

By now, the British response to killings by "friendly" Amerindians was more respectful of Amerindian norms. John Stevenson, the new commandant of Detroit, heard of the killing of a trader by a Wyandot from Sandusky in the fall of 1771. He accepted the Wyandot apology for the actions of the killer. The contradictions of British policy were exposed when Stevenson went through the forms of asking that the killer be given up to him; but wrote to Johnson that he realized that the killer probably would not be. If delivered up, there was no way to punish him, and if the prisoner was sent back, it would make the British look "ridiculous."¹⁰³ The British were satisfied with Amerindian apologies and compensation. Although they wished to have Amerindian killers of British subjects delivered up to the British justice system,¹⁰⁴ they realized they did not have the legal or military tools to do so.

In the spring of 1772, there was a serious breach in relations throughout the lower Great Lakes due to the killing of eight Ojibwa on Lake Erie by a British trader named Ramsey. He killed three in a quarrel over liquor, then kidnapped their children. The kidnapping was discovered, and Ramsey was captured by other Ojibwa. He escaped from them, killing another five people in the process.¹⁰⁵ Ramsey excused his conduct on the basis that he thought that the British and the Ojibwa were at war. Sir William Johnson believed Ramsey was motivated by "wantonness and cruelty."¹⁰⁶

Amerindians and British took different paths to ensure justice was done. Ramsey was confined by the commanding officer at Niagara, and was ordered to Montreal to stand trial.¹⁰⁷ Johnson acknowledged the weakness of the colonial courts when he foresaw that Ramsey would be acquitted due to prejudice against Amerindians and the influence of his creditors. George Etherington, the commandant of Niagara, was ordered to call together the Ojibwa near him to condole them on their losses, distribute condolence presents, and disassociate the British as a whole from the actions of the individual. The Ojibway were to be warned that if they sought revenge, the British would cut off trade. Etherington was also to call all the traders in from the Ojibwa villages for their own safety.¹⁰⁸

A party of 15 Ojibwa, representing the killed, went to Johnson Hall seeking compensation. Johnson performed the

condolence ceremony to cover the graves of their lost, dispensed a large payment in restitution to them, and sent a speech to the Ojibwa at Niagara outlining official British regret.¹⁰⁹ The Ojibwa delegation promised to keep the other traders among them safe from the resentment of their warriors. They also revealed their understanding of justice in this matter, claiming that they did not "desire the Death of the man Who has murdered our friends."¹¹⁰ Johnson pointed out that the dead had some agency in the killings - they had threatened Ramsey - but he believed that the ability of Ramsey to kill as many as he did was good evidence that his life was not in danger.¹¹¹

The band from which the dead came (the Ojibwa living on the Thames River)¹¹² went to take revenge on the trader's boats that were operating between Niagara and Detroit. About eighty Ojibwa were on their way to Lake Erie when they were met by Wade and Keuiser, two traders who had been among them for a couple of years, who gave them a condolence present of 50 pounds worth of goods. Wade and Keuiser, their lives safeguarded by this gift and by their friends among the Ojibwa, were told that they should retreat to Niagara, as their lives were still in danger from those seeking revenge. They left.¹¹³ When the party of Ojibwa arrived at Lake Erie, they robbed a French trader and sent him home.¹¹⁴

Another delegation was sent to Johnson Hall, consisting of "Paupinnash the Chief of ye Messissages" [Ojibwa] and

Tescapuech, who had been with the first delegation. Johnson went through the condolence ceremony with them and distributed more condolence goods. He had not been generous enough the first time to sufficiently atone for the number and seriousness of the killings. Johnson brought Amerindian dependence on British trade goods into his speech, hoping:

"that they will not look upon what one Man does as a Sufficient reason to break with a People who disapprove of that Action as much as they do, & on whom they depend for every [sic] necessary of life."¹¹⁵

Captain Stevenson, the commander of Detroit, had to condole some of the Ojibwa around Detroit for the killing of their friends. His conduct was approved of by them as he managed to keep them quiet despite rumours of their hostility. They gave him a belt of wampum to show their regard for him.¹¹⁶ Not including presents given by Wade and Keiuser, or the commandants of Detroit and Niagara, the Ramsey murders cost the Crown just over 260 pounds New York currency to cover the graves.¹¹⁷

Ramsey's killings had ramifications beyond the Ojibwa. The Hurons at Sandusky refused to give up the man who had killed an English trader the year before, on the grounds that they would wait to see what the British did to Ramsey, and "that it is our own Fault that Rum is carried amongst them."¹¹⁸ The Hurons believed the British were responsible for their own demise, as the liquor they brought to the community was the immediate cause of their deaths. As mentioned before, the British knew their system of justice

was inadequate and were willing to accept this linkage of policy.

In the fall of 1772, some Ojibwas from Saginaw Bay killed Peter Pond and his two servants on Lake Huron. Pond was trading liquor to a group of Ojibwa and, as they became intoxicated, they tried to steal the rest of Pond's rum. A fight broke out, Pond fired on an Amerindian, missed him, and he and his servants were killed. Saginaw Ojibwa chiefs went to Detroit, disavowed the conduct of these young warriors and promised to deliver them up for punishment. Instead of accepting the policy linkages already established, the new commandant, Major Bassett, ordered trade cut off with them until they did. Johnson believed the killers would not be delivered up as long as Ramsey was alive. "[T]he murders committed by Ramsey can not be easily forgotten by them especially when disguised by Liquor which they always consider as a mitigation of the offence."¹¹⁹ Gage ordered Bassett to "make as much Merit as we can of our Clemency, and forgive with a good Grace."¹²⁰ The only sanction taken was to insist upon the return of the furs and personal effects of Pond and his boatmen. The British wished his creditors to be paid off.¹²¹ The Amerindians probably would have interpreted this as covering the grave of the departed with goods, and a sign of forgiveness.

Unexpectedly, Ishwabama, Shawnee and Mintowabe, three Saginaw chiefs, showed up with 16 warriors and the three killers of Pond in May, 1773. They arrived in consequence

of agreements already made with the British and the experience they had had in delivering up killers before. The Saginaw chiefs did not expect their men to be tried for murder. Rather, their surrender was considered to be a form of conciliation whereby the Ojibwa acceded to some British demands in return for considerations given them. The return of the men was expected. Bassett took the men prisoner while forgiving the rest and officially restoring trade to their village. He had to write to Johnson and Gage for instructions.¹²² Johnson ordered Bassett to summon the Saginaw chiefs to a council at Detroit, and release the prisoners to them there.¹²³

In keeping with Gage's suggestion that alliances be used to control violence, Johnson utilized intertribal diplomacy after a further two killings and an attempted murder by St. Joseph Potawatomis. Cornelius Van Slyck, a Detroit merchant, was trading at St. Joseph's. While there, he was in an argument with and kicked the son of Louison Chevalier. The younger Chevalier's mother was a Potawatomi, so that an insult against him was also the business of his clan. Tension mounted within the village against Van Slyck. Either with Chevalier's encouragement, or on their own, six warriors attacked Van Slyck's party, killing his two companions. The Potawatomis and Chevalier then plundered all the trader's goods.¹²⁴ Before he had the whole story, Johnson offered to set parties of the Six Nations against the Potawatomis.¹²⁵ The Six Nations agreed to send belts to

the Potawatomis to repent of their conduct or face a Six Nations assault.¹²⁶ Gage discovered the circumstances of the assault, and given Van Slyck's role in his own demise, counselled caution.¹²⁷

The message had its effect on Anglo-Potawatomi relations. Pitchbaon, Scinatchowin, Wiakosee and Quikiobeenang, chiefs of the Fort St. Joseph Potawatomis, arrived with 22 men to ask forgiveness for their young men who had committed the attack. Pitchbaon explicitly outlined the problems chiefs inclined for peace with the British had at St. Joseph's.

[T]here are Jealousies amongst us which have caused our People to separate into different Bands, and those who are at the Head of these Separations, are always doing Bad things as if on Purpose to Embarass the Old Chiefs.¹²⁸

The lack of power of these chiefs over the recalcitrant is obvious in that they never managed to have the killers delivered up, and could only continue to apologize for the behavior of their young men.¹²⁹

We can see differing responses to killings on the part of both the British and various groups of Amerindians around Detroit in the period 1765 to 1775. While at first the British tried to pursue justice through their own court system for both Amerindians and British, such efforts were unsuccessful. Amerindians were dissatisfied with a process which led to their own warriors being held captive for a long period of time, and the British were hampered by the fact that they could not get convictions of their own

offenders. Some Amerindians, notably the ones more closely allied to the British, accomodated British demands that the individuals responsible for killings be delivered up and held captive for short periods of time. The British accomodated the Amerindians by accepting goods such as the furs taken from the killed as compensation for the injury, rather than trying to have the offenders executed. It was realized by both British and Amerindians that other issues, such as the distribution of alcohol or the misuse of Amerindian hunting grounds, were at the bottom of many of these killings. If the underlying causes were not dealt with, a certain number of casualties would have to accepted. In these instances, both Amerindians and the British were building upon a system that had worked much the same way as it had for the French. It is worthy of notice that the British also resorted to Amerindian norms in considering a collective punishment on the St. Joseph villages when they were unsuccessful in having many of the individuals responsible for killings delivered to them.

The dispensation of Amerindian land, the distribution of British goods, and the settlement of intercultural killings, demonstrated the cooperation that was evident between the British and Amerindians in the Detroit area from 1765 - 1775. The British used the Detroit garrison to respond to Amerindian demands to remove settlers they considered trespassers. The removal of settlers from the lands granted by Croghan and Potier illustrate that British

officials were not willing to let the same sort of illegal land grabs prevail in the Detroit area that were occurring nearer the frontier. Also, the British used the Quebec Act to accomodate those French settlers in the interior when the Amerindians demonstrated forcefully that they wished to allow them in their villages. The Quebec Act was also an attempt to limit all "American" settlement in the interior, including Detroit, and demonstrated the British willingness to accomodate their Amerindian allies even at the expence of their own colonists. The British honoured agreements they made at the end of Pontiac's War and set up a system to distribute gifts to their Amerindian allies. These payments were made to ensure the British right to establish their posts and to travel over Amerindian territory in pursuit of their trade. They supported those in the Amerindian villages who favoured the British alliance and paid for services the Amerindians provided. In those areas where the British goods did not reach, they were never really successful in establishing lasting alliances. French traders from the Mississippi dominated the trade on the Wabash and the Illinois, so that the British were not successful in keeping Amerindian groups cooperative. Intercultural killings were an unlikely source of cooperation. Both the British and Amerindians had to compromise their methods of dealing with killings and accept new methods to ameliorate sentiments. The British did not hang any Amerindians for killing Europeans in the Detroit

area, while Amerindians allied to the British were willing to temporarily surrender the perpetrators. Amerindian chiefs who supported the British alliance attempted to stop their warriors from seeking revenge for killings carried out by British subjects, while the British distributed compensation payments to the affected clans rather than hanging the Euroamerican murderers. Both Amerindians and British realized that the killings were the product of problems with the arrangement of Anglo-Amerindian relations at Detroit, notably the alcohol trade or other abuses by traders, and attempted to smooth over disputes according to their understanding of the culture of the other.

Cooperation was not absolute. The British did not extend their system of gift giving and alliances to the Wabash or the Illinois. The actions of local officials, notably some of the Detroit commanders, could harm relations when they were unfamiliar with the system set up to ameliorate relations. Factions within Amerindian communities carried out actions that contradicted the words of those who were in favour of a British alliance. Disputes over land and killings were more prevalent on the "frontier" of the "American" colonies. Such problems did not cancel the gains made by the British in the Detroit area. In the short term, the British and Amerindians generally managed to keep the peace and cooperate for their mutual benefit from 1765 to 1775.

Endnotes

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- ² Thomas Gage to the Earl of Hillsborough, 9 September, 1769, I.H.C., 16, 596.
- ³ Journal of Alexander McKee, Summer, 1769, J.P., 7, 184. Information concerning an Indian Conspiracy, 7 March, 1771, J.P., 8, 6-9. Randolph C. Downes, Council Fires on the Upper Ohio, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992), 142-180.
- ⁴ George Croghan to William Johnson, 22 December, 1769, J.P., 7, 315 - 316. Thomas Gage to the Earl of Hillsborough, 6 January, 1770, J.P., 7, 332. Gregory Evans Dowd, A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745-1815, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 40-46.
- ⁵ William Johnson to the Earl of Hillsborough, 14 August, 1770, N.Y.C.D., 8, 244. William Johnson to Thomas Gage, 16 November, 1771, J.P., 8, 317-318. Downes, op. cit., 145-149. Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 354-355
- ⁶ James Stevenson to William Johnson, 8 May, 1772, J.P., 8, 469.
- ⁷ Speech of Pitchibaon, 18 September, 1773, J.P., 8, 887.
- ⁸ Conference with Kayashuta, 5-15 January, 1774, J.P., 12, 1044-1059. Guy Johnson to Thomas Gage, 6 October, 1774, J.P., 13, 686.
- ⁹ Earl of Dartmouth to William Johnson, 2 October, 1772, N.Y.C.D., 8, 311.
- ¹⁰ Conference with Kayashuta, Johnson Hall, 5-15 January, 1774, J.P., 12, 1044-1060. Alexander McKee to William Johnson, 3 March, 1774, J.P., 8, 1057-1059.
- ¹¹ Bert Anson, The Miami Indians, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1970), 80.
- ¹² Colonel Bradstreet's thoughts on Indian Affairs, 4 December, 1764, N.Y.C.D., 7, 693-694.
- ¹³ William Johnson to the Lords of Trade, 26 December, 1764, I.H.C., 10, 388.

- 14 Abstracts from the Detroit Notarial Records, 17 September, 1765, T.W.B.R., 312.
- 15 Croghan's Journal, 25 August, 1765, I.H.C., 11, 44.
- 16 Father Potier to Bishop Briand, 6 September, 1768, T.W.B.R., 118.
- 17 Norman Macleod to William Johnson, 10 May, 1769, J.P., 6, 750.
- 18 Norman Macleod to William Johnson, 22 May, 1769, J.P., 6, 769. Thomas Gage to the Earl of Hillsborough, 22 July, 1769, C.O.T.G., 1, 239.
- 19 Norman Macleod to William Johnson, 10 May, 1769, J.P., 6, 751.
- 20 William Johnson to Thomas Gage, 24 June, 1769, J.P., 7, 28.
- 21 George McDougall to William Johnson, 11 July, 1769, J.P., 7, 56.
- 22 James Stevenson to William Johnson, 18 December, 1770, J.P., 7, 1040.
- 23 Thomas Gage to the Commander at Detroit, 8 April, 1771, T.W.B.R., 64.
- 24 Ibid., 65.
- 25 John Brown to William Johnson, 8 July, 1771, J.P., 8, 178. Thomas Gage to William Johnson, 14 August, 1771, J.P., 8, 224.
- 26 James Stevenson to William Johnson, 18 December, 1770, J.P., 7, 1041.
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- 30 Thomas Gage to the Commander at Detroit, 8 April, 1771, T.W.B.R., 64.

- 31 Thomas Gage to William Johnson, 15 December, 1772, J.P., 8, 661.
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- 33 Isaac Todd to Rankin and Edgar, 26 August, 1774, 443, A1, M.G. 19, William Edgar Papers, N.A.C.. Jack Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness: The Middle West in British Colonial Policy, 1760-1775, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), 239-248.
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- 35 George Croghan to William Johnson, 18 October, 1767, J.P., 12, 373. Croghan's Journal, 16 October-17 December, 1767, J.P., 13, 434, 438-439.
- 36 John Campbell to William Johnson, 24 February, 1766, J.P., 12, 30. William Johnson to Thomas Gage, 15 January, 1767, I.H.C., 11, 483. Speech of Pitchbaon, Scintchowin, Wiakosee and Quikobeenang, 22 May, 1773, J.P., 8, 804. White, op. cit., 322.
- 37 P.D. Clarke, Origin and Traditional History of the Wyandots and sketches of other Indian Tribes of North America, (Toronto, 1870), 49-50.
- 38 Jehu Hay's Journal of Indian Transactions, 29 August-13 September, 1767, J.P., 5, 669-676.
- 39 Speech of Ishwabama, Shawnee & Mintowabe Chiefs with 16 Saguinan Indians, 9 May, 1773, J.P., 8, 787-792.
- 40 W.E. Connelly, "The Indian Gamblers," Huron and Wyandot Mythology, With an Appendix Containing Earlier Published Records, C.M. Barbeau, ed., (Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1915), 372. George Croghan's Journal, 23 August, 1765, I.H.C., 11, 43-44.
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- 42 John Campbell to William Johnson, 20 February, 1765, J.P., 11, 587.
- 43 William Johnson to Thomas Gage, 6 July, 1765, J.P., 11, 831. Thomas Gage to William Johnson, 11 December, 1769, J.P., 7, 298.

44 William Johnson to Thomas Gage, 22 January, 1768, J.P., 12, 424. James Stevenson to William Johnson, 8 May, 1772, J.P., 8, 469.

45 George Turnbull to William Johnson, 9 September, 1769, I.H.C., 16, 594.

46 Valentine Jones to Barrington, 10 October, 1772, 253, Vol. 9, W.O. 1, F2, M.G. 19, N.A.C..

47 William Johnson to the Earl of Hillsborough, 20 July, 1768, N.Y.C.D., 8, 86.

48 The description of Amerindian customs regarding killings is summarized from the following sources. James A. Clifton, The Prairie People: Continuity and Change in Potawatomi Culture, 1665-1965, (Lawrence: Regents Press, 1977), 173. Michelle Daniel, "From Blood Feud to Jury System: the Metamorphosis of Cherokee Law from 1750 to 1840," American Indian Quarterly, 11, (Spring, 1987) 98 - 102. White, op. cit., 76.

49 Clifton, op. cit., 173.

50 For Amerindians not allowed to testify see: Guy Johnson to Lord George Germain, 26 January, 1776, N.Y.C.D., 7, 655.

51 The pattern was more complicated than White, op. cit., 347 claims. While he states that two cases in 1767 "put an end to the entire British pretense of a rule of law," he does not take into account the actions of subordinates to those making policy, and the impact of their decisions. The understandings and actions of officers in the field, namely the commandants and commissary at Detroit, had a significant impact on whether or not accomodation was achieved.

52 George Croghan to William Johnson, 17 August, 1765, J.P., 11, 900. Croghan's Journal, 27 August, 1765, I.H.C., 11, 45.

53 Johnson wrote that the Ojibwa "have lost so many of their people without obtaining satisfaction particularly One killed by a Battoeman at Detroit..." William Johnson to Thomas Gage, 6 August, 1767, D.H.N.Y., 2, 500.

54 This was not done in revenge for the rape of two Amerindian women as White asserts, op. cit., 345. The rapes ocured after this incident.

55 John Campbell to William Johnson, 24 February, 1766, J.P., 12, 29-30.

56 John Campbell to Thomas Gage, 10 April, 1766, J.P., 5, 159.

- 57 R. David Edmunds, The Potawatomis: Keepers of the Fire, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press), 1978, 97.
- 58 William Johnson to Thomas Gage, 14 June, 1766, J.P., 12, 105.
- 59 Thomas Gage to William Johnson, 16 June, 1766, J.P., 5, 271.
- 60 John Campbell to William Johnson, 10 May, 1766, J.P., 5, 161.
- 61 The Mutiny Act, 24 March, 1765, I.H.C., 10, 484.
- 62 Thomas Gage to William Johnson, 16 June, 1766, J.P., 5, 271.
- 63 William Johnson to Thomas Gage, 27 June, 1766, J.P., 12, 115-117.
- 64 Edmunds, op. cit., 97.
- 65 Edward Cole to William Johnson, 30 June, 1766, I.H.C., 11, 330. Jehu Hay to George Croghan, 13 - 17 August, 1767, J.P., 5, 618.
- 66 William Johnson to Thomas Gage, 12 December, 1766, J.P., 12, 228.
- 67 Thomas Gage to William Johnson, 1 June, 1767, J.P., 12, 322.
- 68 Thomas Gage to William Johnson, 4 May, 1767, J.P., 12, 307-308.
- 69 Proceedings of Sir William Johnson with Pontiac and other Indians, 24-27 July, 1766, N.Y.C.D., 7, 856-859.
- 70 Thomas Gage to William Johnson, 12 July, 1767, J.P., 12, 335.
- 71 Richard White, op. cit., 348.
- 72 William Johnson to Thomas Gage, 11 July, 1767, I.H.C., 11, 582.
- 73 Thomas Gage to William Johnson, 12 July, 1767, J.P., 12, 335.
- 74 Thomas Gage to Shelburne, 24 August, 1767, I.H.C., 11, 595.

- 75 Jehu Hay to George Croghan, 28 August, 1767, J.P., 5, 644.
- 76 William Johnson to Thomas Gage, 21 August, 1767, J.P., 5, 630.
- 77 Thomas Gage to William Johnson, 7 September, 1767, J.P., 5, 659-660.
- 78 Alexander McKee to George Croghan, 20 September, 1767, J.P., 5, 686.
- 79 George Croghan to William Johnson, 18 October, 1767, J.P., 12, 373.
- 80 Jehu Hay to William Edgar, 2 November, 1768, 186, William Edgar Papers, A1, M.G. 19, N.A.C..
- 81 Jehu Hay to George Croghan, 15 October, 1767, J.P., 5, 728-729.
- 82 Croghan's Journal, 28 October, 1767, J.P., 13, 435.
- 83 Journal of Indian Affairs, 14 September, 1767, J.P., 12, 364.
- 84 Croghan's Journal, 22-23 November, 1767, J.P., 13, 440-443.
- 85 Croghan's Journal, 15 November, 1767, J.P., 13, 438- 439.
- 86 Morgan to Baynton and Wharton, 20 July, 1768, I.H.C., 16, 354-363. This is a good example of the intertribal alliances between anti-British factions, who Dowd, op. cit., 16-21, claims allied themselves also against the pro-British factions within their own villages.
- 87 For other attacks on hunters see; Randolph C. Downes, Council Fires on the Upper Ohio, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1969), 11-13.
- 88 Thomas Gage to the Earl of Hillsborough, 9 October, 1768, I.H.C., 16, 415.
- 89 Thomas Gage to William Johnson, 10 October, 1768, J.P., 6, 433-434.
- 90 Thomas Gage to Wilkins, 11 October, 1768, I.H.C., 16, 419.
- 91 Jehu Hay to George Croghan, 13-17 August, 1767, J.P., 5, 618-621.
- 92 Croghan's Journal, 15 November, J.P., 13, 439.

- 93 Jehu Hay to George Croghan, 21 September, 1767, J.P., 5, 687 - 688.
- 94 Guy Johnson to Thomas Gage, 20 May, 1768, J.P., 12, 508.
- 95 George Turnbull to Thomas Gage, 23 February, 1768, J.P., 6, 121.
- 96 Thomas Gage to Guy Johnson, 16 May, 1768, J.P., 12, 500-501.
- 97 Thomas Gage to William Johnson, 2 May, 1768, J.P., 12, 486-487. Thomas Gage to the Earl of Hillsborough, 15 May, 1768, I.H.C., 16, 287-289.
- 98 Thomas Gage to Guy Johnson, 29 May, 1768, J.P., 12, 517-518.
- 99 Guy Johnson to Thomas Gage, 20 May, 1768, J.P., 12, 507.
- 100 Guy Johnson to Thomas Gage, 20 May, 1768, J.P., 12, 508.
- 101 Thomas Gage to the Earl of Hillsborough, 12 August, 1769, I.H.C., 16, 578.
- 102 Jehu Hay to William Johnson, 13 August, 1769, J.P., 7, 93.
- 103 John Stevenson to William Johnson, 8 January, 1772, J.P., 8, 363.
- 104 Proceedings of Sir William Johnson with Pontiac and other Indians, 24-27 July, 1766, N.Y.C.D., 7, 856. Review of Trade and Affairs in the Northern District of America, 22 September, 1767, I.H.C., 16, 44.
- 105 Peter S. Schmalz, The Ojibwa of Southern Ontario, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 89-90.
- 106 William Johnson to the Earl of Hillsborough, 29 June, 1772, N.Y.C.D., 8, 300-301.
- 107 Thomas Gage to William Johnson, 3 June, 1772, J.P., 12, 964.
- 108 William Johnson to George Etherington, 7 June, 1772, J.P., 8, 512-513.
- 109 Johnson's speech to the Chippewas at Niagara, 7 June, 1772, J.P., 8, 514-515.
- 110 The heads of the Messawaga's Speech at Johnson Hall, 26 May, 1772, J.P., 12, 963.

- 111 William Johnson to Thomas Gage, 27 May, 1772, J.P., 8, 497.
- 112 Schmalz, op. cit., 91.
- 113 Wade and Keuiser to William Johnson, 28 May, 1772, J.P., 8, 499.
- 114 Wade and Keiuser to William Johnson, 15 June, 1772, J.P., 8, 519. Daniel Claus to William Johnson, 8 July, 1772, J.P., 12, 973.
- 115 Journal of Indian Affairs, 6 July, 1772, J.P., 12, 969-970.
- 116 Daniel Claus to William Johnson, 8 July, 1772, J.P., 12, 973. William Johnson to Thomas Gage, 13 August, 1772, J.P., 8, 572.
- 117 Account Against the Crown, 24 October, 1772, J.P., 12, 999.
- 118 Thomas Gage to William Johnson, 28 July, 1772, J.P., 8, 551-552.
- 119 William Johnson to the Earl of Dartmouth, 4 November, 1772, N.Y.C.D., 8, 316-317. Thomas Gage to the Earl of Dartmouth, 4 November, 1772, C.O.T.G., 1, 338.
- 120 Thomas Gage to William Johnson, 15 December, 1772, J.P., 8, 660.
- 121 Henry Bassett to Thomas Gage, 24 December, 1772, J.P., 8, 673-674.
- 122 Speech of Ishwabama, Shawnee and Mintowabe, 9 May, 1773, J.P., 8, 787-782.
- 123 Henry Bassett to Frederick Haldimand, 14 June, 1773, J.P., 8, 819-820.
- 124 Speech of Pitchbaon, Scinatchowin, Wiakosee and Quikobeenang, 22 May, 1773, J.P., 8, 804. Cornelius A. Van Slyck to William Johnson, 24 December, 1773, J.P., 8, 971-974.
- 125 William Johnson to Thomas Gage, 13 April, 1773, J.P., 8, 364.
- 126 Proceedings of Sir William Johnson with the Six Nations, 7 April, 1773, N.Y.C.D., 8, 368,

127 Thomas Gage to William Johnson, 25 April, 1773, J.P., 8, 779.

128 Speech of Pitchbaon, Scinatchowin, Wiakosee and Quikobeenang, 22 May, 1773, J.P., 8, 804.

129 Edmunds, op. cit., 99 says that the Potawatomis at St. Joseph made peace at this time. They did not. Rather, those in favour of peace made a demonstration of their commitment to the same, while those who were anti-British continued their activities.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS

In the years between Pontiac's War and the American Revolutionary War, Detroit was a focal point for Anglo-Amerindian relations. It was a centre of trade, diplomacy and military activity. Its location on the Great Lakes, on the continental plain bordered by the Appalachians, the Mississippi, the Ohio and the Great Lakes, gave it access to the transportation systems whereby European manufactured goods were imported and the Amerindian territories where fur was gathered. This trade made Detroit an important contact point for the British and Amerindians, and a natural centre for diplomatic activity between the cultures. The importance of Detroit as a meeting place of cultures also made it a target for the armies of those who wished to change the status quo.

The decisions of local British officials had a significant impact on Anglo-Amerindian relations at Detroit. Policy was made in Johnson Hall or Whitehall, but was carried out by officials at Detroit, notably the post commandant and the Indian commissary. They judged the circumstances under which certain initiatives would be carried out. They were the representatives Amerindians and British subjects in the area had to deal with most closely. Their actions, whether in attacking a party of Potawatomi who had come to make restitution for previous killings, or in suggesting English merchants hire French factors to sell

their furs in the Amerindian villages rather than withdrawing them from the villages entirely, as was ordered, influenced the ways British and Amerindians associated with each other. Trade policy was enforced according to their criteria. They decided to whom British goods would be distributed. Some of them took it upon themselves to grant land Amerindians considered their own. Amerindians or British accused of killings were at their mercy. As can be gathered from the examples above, they sometimes exacerbated tensions, and at other times ameliorated sentiments. Their actions were crucial.

The Parkman-Peckham line of historiography has been overturned. Race did not predetermine behaviour. This thesis analyzed behaviour according to the influences of culture and interest group for both British and Amerindians. In the Detroit area, Pontiac's War was not a failure for the Amerindians. It did not establish a situation in which the British could militarily dominate the Amerindians. Pontiac's War illustrated the limits of both Amerindian and British military force. After a brilliant initial display, Amerindian forces were divided; but not beaten. British forces did not "punish" the recalcitrants. Diplomacy ended the war. The most extreme on both sides had to compromise. The Amerindians could not call back their French father to replace the British, while the British had to meet Amerindian demands for fair trade terms, a guarantee of their lands, a restoration of their system of gift

distribution, and for the mediation of intercultural killings. Not all these terms were agreed to in the peace treaties that ended the war, but those that were not were worked out in the following ten years.

The system that was implemented at Detroit to regulate intercultural relations resembled that set up by the French. If the internal organization of the fur trade differed between the French and English regimes, Detroit remained under the British a centre for the liquor trade both before and after the conquest and quantities increased during the British regime. After 1768, traders were allowed entry into Amerindian villages as they had been before 1760. Many were French men from Detroit, the Mississippi Valley, or the Amerindian villages, who continued much the same as before the conquest. Some of them now sold English wares rather than French. Some of Detroit's French residents became diplomatic as well as economic middlemen between British and Amerindians. For instance, the trader Maisonneuve was sent to the Wabash to prepare the way for George Croghan's mission in 1764. Only the 1774 Quebec Act signalled an official return to the domination of Quebec in the fur trade in the Detroit area. The British were forced to resume the distribution of goods as an expression of alliance, in payment for their forts, and for the right to trade with Amerindians. Land policy under the British was more restrictive than it had been under the French. The Detroit settlement was not allowed to expand, and the British made

efforts to get settlers to depart from the Illinois. The Quebec Act, which guaranteed the land rights of the French settlers, discouraged the arrival of new British settlers. After initial efforts to impose the British judicial system in cases of intercultural killings, a similiar system of "surrender and redemption" came into being during the British regime that had existed during the French. Amerindians thus required the British to set up a system that resembled that which had prevailed during the French regime. Besides such similarities, the British instituted some changes in Euroamerican-Amerindian relations at Detroit. Rather than following the French practice of mediating disputes between their allies, the British implemented a policy of divide and conquer. They looked to their Amerindian allies to help control those the British believed were hostile. Amerindians around Detroit benefitted from this system. The Hurons at Detroit were recognized by Sir William Johnson as the nominal heads of a Western Confederacy of Amerindians, in opposition to efforts by peoples hostile to the British, such as factions from the Shawnee, Delaware or Potawatomi. They spoke to allies such as the Ojibwa, exhorting them to keep their warriors under control, and were sent on diplomatic missions to the Wabash and Ohio for the British alliance. For the British, this system had some success. Few northern warriors joined the Shawnee in Dunmore's War, and the area immediately adjacent to Detroit was safe for British soldiers, traders, and other

subjects. Detroit's Hurons reaped benefits by the having the weight of the British alliance behind them, ready access to British trade goods, and a secure title to their lands, enforced by the British military. Cooperation had its rewards.

Such cooperation with Amerindian groups near Detroit was a reflection of the acculturation of Amerindians who lived closer to Detroit. Their summer trading and diplomatic visits to the post developed into longer stays, and they became more materially and politically dependent upon the British. Their closer ties made them useful to the British, as they could be sent on missions to influence their further brethren. The Potawatomis near Detroit, for instance, were sent to get Potawatomis from near St. Joseph's to return British prisoners. As this was advantageous to the British, it could create tensions between those who held to the British alliance and trade and those who removed themselves from it. As well, those who relied too heavily upon the British for political power and material goods suffered from a lack of independence that was evident to those who had not yielded to these temptations.

A dichotomy between those who advocated close British ties and those who advocated a more independent stance was also found within some Amerindian communities. Such factionalism was observed among the Ottawa, Ojibwa, Miami and Potawatomi during the ending of Pontiac's War, and among the St. Joseph Potawatomi during the whole period. The

Ojibwa at Saginaw Bay also suffered from this to a certain extent, when some took revenge for British killings in a way reserved for enemies rather than allies, and who killed those British who offended too much. Usually, these intravillage disputes were either settled with the political victory of one side or the disagreeing parties split up; but they could erupt into violence. Factionalism and fragmentation boded ill for the future, and hindered efforts to provide a coordinated response to British initiatives.

Some British subjects continued to refuse to recognize Amerindian rights, and as a consequence disturbed relations at Detroit. Euroamerican settlers and hunters encroached upon Amerindian territory in the Ohio Valley, without the permission of the imperial government or Amerindians. The rum trade was a source of continuing friction. Some traders abused Amerindians. British officials had to recognize, over the years, that if they could not control their people, Amerindians would. When British subjects violated Amerindian norms and were killed for their transgressions, in some instances, the British learned to accept this.

The British were not successful in establishing lasting peace with the Potawatomis near St. Joseph's or on the Illinois, or with the Miami confederacy on the Wabash. This was due largely to the British refusal to agree to Amerindian terms of trade and rules about intercultural killings. At the first post-war instance of Potawatomis killing British, in 1765, the commandant of Detroit refused


to recognize their methods of ameliorating sentiments after a killing. He attacked and captured the delegates sent to make restitution. In addition to this provocation, British traders were not allowed to visit Amerindian villages until 1768, so that French traders from the Mississippi were able to establish their influence among the Potawatomi. The British refusal to establish a post on the Wabash, as a centre of trade and for the distribution of goods, and their efforts to get the French traders from among the Miami, alienated these Amerindians, and prevented the distribution of British goods in this area. These peoples also continued to be supplied via the French on the Mississippi. By 1768, when the British began to allow their traders to go among the Amerindians, it was too late. No British traders were allowed by the Miami or the Potawatomi in their villages, so that channels for trade and the distribution of goods could not be set up. Still, these groups became somewhat more pacific in the years between 1763 and 1775. Anti-British Potawatomis no longer came to Detroit looking for victims. They contented themselves with waylaying traders and hunters, who they believed were invading their territory. They also moved further from the British sphere of influence at Detroit and physically as well as politically closer to the French and Spanish traders on the Mississippi.

Part of the problem was that accomodating Amerindians had to be done largely by changing imperial regulations governing intercultural relations. Grievances of

Amerindians could be redressed only when Amerindians allied themselves with those British interest groups whose aims coincided with their own. Quebec merchants, for example, were successful in presenting their and the more distant Amerindian's case for allowing traders to go to Amerindian villages, while New York merchants and the Detroit Hurons, who benefitted from keeping trade confined to the post, lost this privilege. The Quebec Act, which gave Quebec economic and political control over the area covered by the Proclamation of 1763, was a triumph of the Quebec merchants, but was also passed because it was felt its provisions would ameliorate several Amerindian grievances. So long as Amerindians had allies such as these influencing imperial decisions they could have an impact on the policy making process. When they did not have allies strong enough to advance their position with the imperial government, local relations at Detroit could be adversely affected.

Despite these complications, conflicts between the cultures in the Detroit area continued to be resolved. Pontiac's War illustrated the costs of violence to both British and Amerindians. The interests of trade, and the interests the British had in keeping further Amerindians from interfering in disputes between colonists and Amerindians closer to the frontier, helped ensure continuing British compromise. Trade policy was reformed due to the pressures of the purse, merchants, colonies and Amerindians, so that accomodating Amerindian sentiments had to be done

within certain limits. Land policy could be generous to Amerindians at Detroit, while at the same time the British annexed land on their frontier. The payment of British "presents" in order to cement trading and alliance ties was accepted, even if the amount necessary to do this was disputed at times. Finally, the British became open to Amerindian influence in deciding what measures would be taken in cases of intercultural killings. In the years between 1763 and 1775, the British and Amerindians in the Detroit area accepted their neighbours as large, powerful and continuing influences on their own affairs. They also learned that cooperation was more effective than force.



DETROIT AND SURROUNDING SETTLEMENTS, 1765 - 1775¹

Tribe/Village

1. Huron/ Wyandot

- a) Detroit
- b) Junundat
- c) Lower Sandusky
- d) Upper Sandusky
- e) Snips

2. Ottawa

- a) Detroit
- b) Roche de Bout
- c) Pontiac's band
- d) Cuyahoga
- e) Sandusky
- f) Maumee
- g) Other settlements

3) Ojibwa

- a) Saginaw Bay
- b) Saginaw Bay District
- c) Thames River
- d) Lake St. Clair, Thames River and Lake Erie

4) Ojibwa and Potawatomi

- a) Tonquishs
- b) Seginsewins

5) Potawatomi

- a) Detroit
- b) Moccasin Bluff
- c) Parc au Vache
- d) Petit Couer de Cerf
- e) Terre Coup
- f) Kankandee
- g) Des Plains
- h) Gomos
- i) Prairie Ronde
- j) Kekalimazoo
- k) Spring Arbour
- l) Macon
- m) Salt Springs
- n) Other
- o) Post Vincennes (mixed village of Potawatomi, Piankeshaw, Wea, Kickapoo, Miami, and Vermilion)

6. Miami

- a) Fort Miami
- b) Kekionga
- c) Kenapekamequa
- d) Mississinewa
- e) Kithtippecanume
- f) Fort Vincennes

7. Mohican and Delaware

8. Mingo

- a) Caunawagas and Senecas
- b) Salt Licks
- c) Logans
- d) Logstown
- e) Darbys
- f) Hell

9. Shawnee

- a) Shawnee Woman's
- b) Wakatomica
- c) Snakes
- d) Little Shawnee Woman's
- e) Chillicothe
- f) Piqua
- g) Grenadier Squaws
- h) Blue Jackets
- i) Cornstalks
- j) Kispoko
- k) Mequashake
- l) White River
- m) Loramie's Store
- n) Waccachalla
- o) Chillicothe

10. Delaware and Shawnee

11. Delaware

- a) Cuyahoga
- b) Custalogo
- c) Beavers/Tuscawaras
- d) Killbucks
- e) Bullets
- f) Kuskuski
- g) Shenango
- h) Pymatuning
- i) Salt Licks
- j) Mahoning
- k) Wills

- l) Connors
- m) Toms
- n) Tullihass
- o) Andersons
- p) Newcomers
- q) Beavers/Assinink
- r) Killbucks II
- s) White Eyes
- t) Coshcocton
- u) Munsee

12. Kickapoo

- a) Fort Ouiatanon
- b) Vermilion
- c) Terre Haute
- d) Post Vincennes

13. Wea

- a) Fort Ouiatanon
- b) Terre Haute
- c) Lower Wea
- d) Fort Vincennes

14. Piankeshaw

- a) Vermilion
- b) Fort Vincennes
- c) Other settlements

15. Mascoutin

- a) Fort Ouiatanon
- b) Vermilion
- c) Kankakee

16. Euroamerican Settlements

- a) Detroit
- b) Fort Miami
- c) Fort St. Joseph
- d) Ouiatanon
- e) Vincennes
- f) Michilimackinac
- g) Fort Pitt
- h) Niagara

Footnotes

¹ Base map taken from Alfonso Wilson and Kathleen T. Iseri, "River Discharge to the Sea from the Shores of the Coterminous United States, Alaska and Puerto Rico." Revised, 1969, 1:5,000,000 (Hydrological Investigations Atlas, HA-282, Sheet 1 of 2). The rest of the map is taken from the following sources: Lester B. Cappon, ed., Atlas of Early American History: The Revolutionary Era, 1760-1790, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 20-21. George Croghan to William Johnson, 22 December, 1769, J.P., 7, 316. George Croghan, "A List of the different Nations and Tribes of Indians in the Northern District of North America, with the number of their fighting men," Early Western Travels, 1748-1846, 1, R.G. Thwaites, ed., (Cleveland: Clarke, 1904), 167. R. David Edmunds, The Potawatomis: Keepers of the Fire, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1978), 96. "Journal of Captain Thomas Morris," Early Western Travels, 1748-1846, 1, R.G. Thwaites, ed., (Cleveland: Clarke, 1904), 309. Maisonville's Account of Indian Nations, October, 1771, J.P., 12, 931. Map of the Illinois Country, 1777, N.M.C., 0007505, N.A.C.. Morgan to Bayton and Wharton, 20 July, 1768, I.H.C., 16, 363. Helen Hornbuck Tanner, ed., Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1986), 59-60.

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