

PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE CULTURAL OTHER

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Abstract

This dissertation examines the idea of a “phenomenology of the cultural Other” in its two sides: the phenomenological and cultural sides. To address the phenomenological side, this dissertation critically examines phenomenologies of the Other in Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, along with their prominent commentators. This group of philosophers has produced works that constitute a category of philosophical literature that may be referred to as a “phenomenology of the Other.” To address the second, cultural side, a cultural aspect is added to the phenomenology of the Other.

To cover the two sides of the question on the phenomenological appearances of the cultural Other, my study of will have three phases, that are presented in three chapters. In each chapter, I will look at the specific type of relations that are discussed in the phenomenologies of the Other within the philosophical traditions I mentioned above, and accordingly, I will describe a cultural phenomenon which reflects the attitude of the self toward the Other. In chapter one, the Other appears as the negation of the self and vice versa. In chapter two, the Other appears as the opposite pair of the self, and, in the final chapter, the Other appears as the co-existing pair of the self. For these three phenomenological appearances of the Other, I will suggest three considerations of the cultural Other respectively: the dehumanized Other, the Orientalized Other, and the cosmopolitan Other.

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Introduction: What is the Phenomenology of the Cultural Other?

The main question of the dissertation

The question of the cultural Other is one of the most important philosophical problems of our time. This dissertation is motivated by the thought that some crucial philosophical questions about racism, gender equality, social/economical equality, global ethics, multiculturalism, colonialism, and cosmopolitanism, would be aided by addressing a common question: *How does the cultural Other appear for the self?* In order to answer this question, one must bear in mind that the question touches upon two issues: (1) the Other as a phenomenological concept, and (2) the phenomenon of the Other as a cultural Other.

To address the phenomenological side, this dissertation will critically examine phenomenologies of the Other, mostly in the Hegelian tradition.¹ In particular, I will focus on certain works from Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. In each part, I will also rely on prominent commentators of these philosophers. This group of philosophers has produced works that constitute a grouping that may be referred to as a “phenomenology of the Other.” The aim of this phenomenology is to discuss different phenomena of the Other as it relates and appears to the self.

¹ I call it Hegelian because most of the terms I am going to use in order to describe the self-Other relation have Hegelian roots. He was the first to establish a web of interconnected concepts concerning the Other. This web includes concepts such as subjectivity, intersubjectivity, objectivity, negation, opposition, alienation, appropriation, indifference, exploitation, freedom, mastery, enslavement, embodiment, and recognition. These concepts permeate all phenomenologies of the Other after Hegel. Philosophers such as Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty have provided Other complementary concepts such as intersubjectivity, *mit-sein*, the “they,” shame, love, the look, passivity and activity.

To address the second, cultural side, a cultural aspect is added to the phenomenology of the Other. The Self and Other are flesh and blood human beings living in a cultural context. The 'self' and 'the Other' can know each other, can look at one another, can hate each other, can love each other, can touch each other, can exploit one another, can seduce one another, and may have a whole spectrum of relations proceeding from pure knowledge to bodily interaction. However, after conceiving of these cognitive and concrete relations, one can still ask: Where do these two consciousnesses come from? This question leads to the cultural side of my study of the various phenomenologies of the Other.

In order to cover the two sides of the question on the appearance of the cultural Other, my study of the phenomenology of the cultural Other will have three phases. In each phase, I will look at the specific type of relations that are discussed in the phenomenologies of the Other within the philosophical strand I mentioned above, and accordingly, I will describe three cultural phenomena which reflect these attitudes of the self toward the Other: The Other as negation of the self and vice versa, the Other as opposite pair of the self, and the Other as co-existing pair of the self. For these three phenomenological appearances of the Other, I will suggest three following cultural phenomena respectively: dehumanization, Orientalism, and cosmopolitanism.

One may ask what is the relation between the phenomenological side of this study (discussing three types of relation as negation, binary opposition, and co-existence) and the cultural side (discussing dehumanization, orientalism, and cosmopolitanism)? Are the latter examples for the former? For instance, is orientalism an example of the second type of relation, namely, binary opposition? I suggest in my

analysis that orientalism does display a binary oppositional relation but I am not claiming that this exhausts the essence of orientalism. Therefore, instead of saying that orientalism is an example of binary opposition, or that cosmopolitanism is an example of co-existence, it would be better to say that binary opposition can be a helpful model to describe the phenomenon of orientalism, or co-existence can be helpful to describe cosmopolitanism. In this way, I discuss the cultural phenomena not as examples for the phenomenological side but as some counterparts that the phenomenological concepts can describe.

Three chapters of my study

In chapter one, I consider the first relation between self and the Other. I will consider the idea of negation as the overarching theme: when the self views itself as an absolute subject and the Other as an absolute object. I begin this examination with a study of Cartesian solipsism. Sartre's concepts of the look and shame will be studied in the second step of this chapter. In the third step, I will discuss the concepts of annihilation and *Kampf auf Leben und Tod*² in Hegel. Using these concepts of Cartesian solipsism, Sartrean objectification, and Hegelian annihilation, I will describe the cultural phenomena of dehumanization and genocide.

In chapter two, moving from the attitude of negation to another type of relation, I consider the two consciousnesses as pairs in a binary opposition. They become opposite to one another; one becomes superior and the Other becomes inferior. After a life-death struggle in Hegelian terminology, one side becomes the conqueror and the Other side becomes the subjugated. One must be the recognized and one must be the

²- Life and death struggle.

recognizing. The point, here, is that the words “recognized” and “recognizing” have a reflective relation. I would argue that this opposition is the nature of the second attitude. In this new kind of relation, the self needs more accurate knowledge about the Other, through which it can define itself. In this relation, the self does not negate the Other completely, quite the contrary, it uses different terms to accurately describe what the Other is and what it is not. I will argue that most of these terms are binary or reflective: the self is knower, the Other is known; the self is white, the Other is black; the self is free, the Other is a slave; the self is Aryan, the Other is a Jew; the self is a Westerner, the Other is Oriental; the self is rational, the Other is emotional; the self is active, the Other is passive, the self is male, the Other is female. Because of this reflective relation, I consider the attitude of binary opposition to be the essence of this type of relation. In Hegel, this type of relation is represented by the master and slave dynamic. Master and slave are two opposites. One sees a similar description of this type of relation in Sartre. Sartre explains this reflective/oppositional relation with the two concepts of the lover and the beloved, and other related concepts such as hate, desire, sadism, and masochism. In this relation, we see a reflection or duality.³ Sartre also gives a sexual motif to this discourse in order to explain the relation. All terms like “seduction” (seducer/seduced), “desire” (desirer/desired), “body” (toucher/touched), “love” (lover/beloved) and “sadism”/ “masochism” are used by Sartre to display this reflective relation. For instance, in love, the lover places himself in a binary opposition

³ Although Sartre discusses different aspects of this relation and does not focus on the theme of duality (the self’s struggle to control the other’s representation of itself in some fashion, for instance), I will focus on the concept of duality and use it in my interpretation of orientalism.

to the beloved. The lover seduces the beloved in order to be loved; therefore, love is not a unidirectional act, it is binary. It is a reflective action. To present a cultural phenomenon for this type of reflective/oppositional appearance of the Other for the self, I examine the idea of Orientalism. Many of the historical facts which Edward Said discusses in his book can be interpreted using the logic of opposition. Even the very concept of 'Orientalism' implies this binary of the occidental and the oriental. Not only is the very concept of orientalism reflective, the results of orientalization are also binary concepts: rational/emotional, wise/ignorant, developed/developing, just/unjust, democratic/despotic.⁴

The third chapter addresses the theme of co-existence. In this type of relation, the two consciousnesses understand that they are essentially connected to one another. In the third chapter, I begin with Hegel's theory of mutual recognition in relations between family members, between citizens and other citizens and between citizens and the state. Afterwards, I study the role of Husserl in this step, a role which

⁴- One can keep adding new binary concepts to the list. One noteworthy pair of binary concepts, which I do not mention in this dissertation for the sake of brevity, is diligent/lazy. According to colonialist language, the Oriental is presented as a lazy person who does not care about working hard and being ambitious to succeed. Hussein Alatas in his brilliant analysis, in *The Myth of the Lazy Native: A Study of the Image of the Malays, Filipinos and Javanese from the 16th to the 20th Century and Its Function in the Ideology of Colonial Capitalism*, shows how the colonial system utilized this concept of the laziness of natives to justify the colonial system of suppression and exploitation. He contends that before the arrival of Europeans, other Asian nations like Persia and China had been trading with Malays and Filipinos; however, they never considered colonialism and exploitation as an option. But when the Europeans came, they began to think that, to further benefit themselves, they should conquer the land. They started to create the concept of the lazy native who should be managed and controlled by the colonizer—otherwise, they could not benefit from the natural resources. See: Hussein Alatas. *The Myth of the Lazy Native: a Study of the Image of the Malays, Filipinos and Javanese from the 16th to the 20th Century and Its Function in the Ideology of Colonial Capitalism* (London: Frank Cass, 1977), 25.

is both crucial and controversial. In explaining his theory of intersubjectivity, I will rely on the concept of analogy to build up what I need on the cultural side. I will focus on the idea of analogy as it is used in Husserl. Going through theories of co-existence, I will pause on Heidegger's concept of *Mitsein* ("being-with"). The idea that Dasein is essentially and mundanely with Others. It is being-with-others even when no other is present or perceived. Sartre has no satisfactory contribution at this stage. Arguing for *Mitsein*, he claims that the two consciousnesses get together via the look of a third party. They become a "we" under the unifying and objectifying look of some other. As we can see, even in the 'we' relation, the element of antagonism and objectification remains alive; therefore, Sartre cannot reach a peaceful co-existence relation. Merleau-Ponty is my final stop in this chapter before switching to the cultural side. Abandoning the Cartesian dualism between self and the Other, Merleau-Ponty suggests a new meaning for subjectivity that is objective as well. It is a subject-object. In this we-subject-object, the body is no longer a tool in the hand of my consciousness. The body is not a passive area between my subjectivity and the Other's subjectivity. I am subject-object, and, at the same time, my subjectivity is a we-subjectivity. The ultimate result of these phenomenological descriptions of the self-Other relation is that the traditional distinction between self and Other is seen as false. The self and the Other are no longer two separate beings; they are always together. After considering these phenomenological investigations about the co-existence of self and the Other, I will describe a cultural phenomenon with the help of concepts I gathered in this chapter. I will focus on the phenomenon of cosmopolitanism, because, regardless of its political or ethical interpretations (cosmopolitan governance, global affairs,

international trade, global environmental issues, global ethics, and global threats like terrorism), it can be described by phenomenological concepts such as intersubjectivity, *Mitsein*, and subject-object relations. On this topic, I will examine the works of philosophers like David Held, Anthony Appiah, Seyla Benhabib, and Martha Nussbaum.

Four Important Considerations:

1- How phenomenological side of this project connects to the cultural side

Before going to the main body of the thesis, I must explain four important points. The first important point in this dissertation, and also the most challenging, is the juxtaposition of two elements: the phenomenological and the cultural. As the reader will see, each chapter of this work has been divided into two parts. In one part, I will discuss the phenomenological relation between the self and the Other. I will consider Hegel, Sartre, Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty as the core philosophers of my study. This part of my work has its own methodology. As I explained above, I will categorize the self-Other relation into three themes: negation, binary opposition, and co-existence. In the other part, I propose three cultural counterparts to the three phenomenological categories, that are, respectively, dehumanization, Orientalism, and cosmopolitanism. Going through the chapters, the reader might find this move from the phenomenological to the cultural a little challenging. For instance, one might ask (in chapter one) how it is possible that the philosophical problems of Cartesian solipsism and Sartrean objectification cause dehumanization in a cultural context. I must emphasize that there is no cause and effect relation in question. The use of the phenomenological concepts borrowed from the philosophers (such as Cartesian

solipsism, Sartrean objectification, Hegelian negation, Husserlian intersubjectivity, etc.) is not meant to suggest that these philosophical theories can be foundations for culturally positive or negative behaviours in ordinary life. In everyday life, many other non-philosophical elements are practical. I am just putting the phenomenological and cultural sides together, because I think they exhibit similar, mutually enlightening logics. I will use some parts of phenomenology of the Other to describe the cultural phenomena, because I think they are helpful in illuminating the cultural phenomena of dehumanization, orientalism, and cosmopolitanism.

In this case, if I claim that, for instance, the self dehumanizes the Other in a way similar to Cartesian solipsism or Sartrean objectification, it should not be taken to mean that I am merely *reducing* dehumanization to a philosophical notion in which the connection between the self's mind and the Other's mind has been blocked. In other words, I am not a reductionist who offers only one reason for the phenomenon of dehumanization. I am attempting to offer an assimilation, saying that the logic of dehumanization is negation.

Whenever we say such a thing, it's a mere analogy or assimilation, and depending on the case in question, it is not necessarily the best analogy. It is only possible to describe what goes on when the cultural self dehumanizes or orientalizes the cultural Other. Let us consider the dehumanization case again. Chapter one will argue that Cartesian solipsism and Sartrean Objectification can help us understand how the sub-human Other appears to the self. In this case, I do not argue that ordinary people have a philosophical mind in their racist behaviors. I present the philosophical context as expressing tendencies of the human psyche, which are visible in relations

towards the cultural other and between individuals. Keeping the importance of analogy, I pull out these tendencies and make them explicit before continuing to the cultural phenomena.

2- A moral consideration on the project

Working on issues such as dehumanization, genocide, and colonialism requires one to touch on some cultural phenomena about which remaining neutral is difficult. The essence of such issues naturally pushes one to be morally evaluative. For instance, it might be an unrealistic expectation for one who writes about the massacring of millions of Armenians by the Turkish government, or Jewish people by Nazis, or Palestinians by Israeli militia in Deir Yassin, Sabra and Shatila, or Gaza, to remain morally neutral. Can anyone remain “morally neutral” on this question at all? Thus, working on historical-cultural confrontations between the self and the cultural Other forces one to choose a position. Thinking about cultural and racial confrontations likely brings up the general criticism of structures of power as well as the will to dominate the Other. In connection with this, all unpleasant attitudes between the cultural self and the cultural Other, racist and racialized, sadist and masochist, recognized and recognizer, superior and inferior, civilized and barbarian, the Occidental and the Oriental, need to be criticized. Having a critical approach to unequal systems of power, my language will be implicitly normative and evaluative. Nevertheless, I will not enter into explicit and sustained moral debate. Remaining neutral is a meaningless claim in this context; however, I will attempt to consider each confrontation from a phenomenological point of view for two reasons: 1- morally evaluating these relations would require another project, and this is not the aim of this

project; 2- the ontological relation between the cultural self and the Other is *per se* normative, and so, in this context "what it is" is not distinct from "what it ought to be."⁵

3- The role of body throughout the study

The third point concerns a need to consider the role of the body in the relation between self and the Other. Throughout all of the stages of the phenomenology of the cultural Other that I will consider, the role of body and the relation between mind and body is crucial. This is because the body is the first Other for the mind. Moreover, bodies (the self's body and the Other's body) are mediators between the self and the Other. Thus, we will see that in any kind of relation between the self and the Other, the role of the body comes to the fore. Sartre puts it very clearly:

[M]on corps comme chose du monde et le corps d'autrui sont les intermédiaires nécessaires. L'âme d'autrui est donc séparée de la mienne par toute la distance qui sépare tout d'abord mon âme de mon corps, puis mon corps du corps d'autrui, enfin le corps d'autrui de son âme.⁶

Any mind-body discussion or any attempt to explain the relation between mind and body should be regarded as an introduction to the discourse on self and Otherness.

⁵ - In "Ethical Perfectionism in Social Ontology—A Hegelian Alternative," Heikki Ikäheimo discusses an opposition similar to the relation between the normative and the descriptive that I am describing here. He raises the question of how social ontology can be broadly ethical. On one side, he presents Max Weber and John Searle, who believe in the neutrality of social ontology with regard to ethical evaluation or normativity. On the other hand, Ikäheimo presents Hegel, who posits a normative essence for human social relations. See: Ikäheimo, Heikki. "Ethical Perfectionism in Social Ontology—A Hegelian Alternative," 49-67.

⁶- Jean-Paul Sartre. *L'être et le néant: essai d'ontologie phénoménologique* (Paris: Gallimard, 1979), 261. English Translation:

"My body as a thing in the world and the Other's body are the necessary intermediaries between the Other's consciousness and mine. The Other's soul is therefore separated from mine by all the distance which separates first my soul from my body, then my body from the Other's body, and finally the Other's body from his soul." See: Jean-Paul Sartre. *Being and Nothingness: an Essay in the Phenomenological Ontology* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1984), 303.

The body is the first Other or, so to speak, it is the closest Other to the self. Any suppressive or affirmative attitude or approach concerning the relation of the mind to the body may analogously inform one's attitude to the relation of the self to the Other. If a philosophical position asserts the superiority of mind over the body, it would result in an assertion of the superiority of the self over the Other, and vice versa.

4- Why Levinas was left aside in this study

The last, but certainly not the least, point concerns the work of Emmanuel Levinas. Anyone who read this study may ask why Levinas is not included. He is certainly a philosopher who has devoted the main part of his philosophy to caring for the Other, however, I have decided not to include him for the following reasons.

Levinas rejects the modern and Western tradition of philosophy initiated by Descartes, and my whole project concerning the "phenomenology of the cultural Other" is based on Cartesian and Hegelian philosophy. Contrary to Hegel and Descartes, human existence for Levinas is not characterized by an ego or an I. He argues that at the center of subjectivity we do not see a for-itself ego who experiences being-for-the Other in later stages. Alterity is the very center of subjectivity. Therefore, the process of experiencing the Other is totally different than what we see in Descartes, Hegel, Sartre, and any other philosopher who considers the relation of the self and the Other through the modern concepts of consciousness and self-consciousness. The relation for Levinas cannot be conceptualized in the Hegelian phenomenological terminology (subjectivity, objectivity, desire, recognition, hate, love, for-itself, in-itself, freedom, bondage, subject-object, intersubjectivity, and so on). The "face-to-face" relation is something beyond all these terms. The self is ontologically born with the

Other, and responsibility for the Other becomes a philosophical task for the self. In this task, the self is responsible for the Other and cares for the Other even without expecting similar recognition from the Other.

Levinas thinks that the consciousness-based philosophy is a kind of totalitarianism in which consciousness wills the conceptualization of everything and leaves nothing outside or beyond this totality. Any Otherness in reality should be reduced to sameness by cognition. Therefore, the infinite (the Other, God, transcendence, everything outside) should be finally conceptualized by cognition. This is the totalitarianism of modern philosophy. If we want to recognize the Other truly, according to Levinas, we should respect the foundational and unconceptualizable Otherness of the Other. We should accept that the Other is respectable beyond the conceptualization of our consciousness. In this approach, the Other maintains his or her absolute uniqueness and Otherness. This Otherness of the Other that escapes from consciousness's conceptualization is called "face" by Levinas.⁷ The "face" disrupts and destabilizes consciousness and its tendency towards totality and sameness. This absolute Otherness of the Other even undermines the importance of autonomy and the freedom of consciousness.⁸ Consciousness for Levinas is first responsible for the Other and then it is free or autonomous.⁹ Looking at this new picture of the self-Other relation drawn by Levinas, one might find it impossible to put his philosophy of the

⁷- Emmanuel Lévinas, *Ethics and infinity* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985), 101.

⁸- Richard Cohen, *Face to Face with Lévinas* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), 27.

⁹- Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity; an Essay on Exteriority* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 85.

Other in conversation with Hegelian tradition, whose terminology has permeated the works of all his successors, such as Heidegger and Sartre.

The other difference between Levinas and the modern philosophical tradition is that Levinas mixes ontology and ethics. Ethics for Levinas is the starting point of the act of philosophizing. His definition of ethics is quite different from what we usually see in moral philosophy. Ethics is not asking about the moral ought(s) or right and wrong actions.¹⁰ Ethics or responsibility for the Other is considered by Levinas as first philosophy. As he says, Ethics and alterity (Otherness), rather than ontology (knowledge of being and reality), is “first philosophy.”¹¹ This type of ethics involves more questioning about ethics than setting rules for ethical decision.¹² In this ethics, the self recognizes the Other without expecting to be recognized. This relation is beyond what we see in Hegel or Sartre. Levinas calls it substitution:

[T]o substitute oneself does not amount to putting oneself in the place of the Other man in order to feel what he feels [as psychoanalysis tends to conceptualize empathy]; it does not involve becoming the Other or, if he be destitute and desperate, the courage of such a trial. Rather, substitution entails bringing comfort by associating ourselves with the essential weakness and finitude of the Other; it is to bear his weight while sacrificing one’s interestedness and complacency-in-being, which then turns into responsibility for the Other.¹³

¹⁰- Emmanuel Lévinas, *Is It Righteous to Be? Interviews with Emmanuel Lévinas* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2001), 48.

¹¹- Emmanuel Lévinas, *Existence and existents* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1978), 98.

¹²- Derrida: “It is true that Ethics, in Levinas’s sense, is an Ethics without law and without concept.... Levinas does not seek to propose laws or moral rules, does not seek to determine a morality, but rather the essence of the ethical relation in general. But as this determination does not offer itself as a theory of Ethics, in question then, is an Ethics of Ethics...Is this Ethics of Ethics beyond all laws? Is it not the Law of laws?” See: Jacques Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics: an essay on the thought of Emmanuel Levinas” in *Emmanuel Levinas Critical Assessments, Vol I*. (London: Routledge, 2005), 88-173.

¹³ - Levinas, *Is It Righteous to Be?*, 228.

All these major differences between Levinas and modern Cartesian/Hegelian phenomenology of the Other forces me to exclude Levinas from my analysis. In Levinas we cannot even talk about a “phenomenology” of the Other because the Other is not a phenomenon. The Other exists even more certainly than the self. The Other also does not change his face in Levinas, therefore, we cannot talk about a variety of phenomena in regard to the Other. After this explanation, I do not think that remaining in Hegelian tradition means rejecting Levinas. I think they are incompatible, and because of this incompatibility, one cannot choose one over the other. Levinas is critical of the Hegelian tradition and thinks that to solve the self-Other problem, we should begin from another starting point, namely, ethics and not metaphysics. We will see that although I criticize some points of the Hegelian tradition (for instance I will criticize Sartre’s approach), I nevertheless stay within Hegelian tradition, because, adding Levinas to my study would entail engaging with two different and incompatible languages. I intend to revisit the topic with a focus on Levinas in another separate study in the future.

Chapter One: Phenomenological Negation, Cultural Dehumanization

Summary of the chapter

The first type of relation states that the self and the Other are separate entities, with each one engaged in its own affairs without any specific attention to/need of the Other. They each consider themselves as an absolute subject: everything should be for the self. In such a situation, they express no care for the Other. Each claims to be independent, essential, solipsistic, absolute, negating, indifferent, and objectifying.

To study the phenomenological fundamentals of this type of relation, I will refer to Descartes, Hegel, and Sartre. I will study solipsism in Descartes, as well as Hegel's concepts of life-death struggle, negation, desire, indifference, and the essential self. Sartre will be important as well, in order to explain the concepts of the objectifying self, the look, and shame.

In order to start this journey, Descartes cannot be neglected. The main philosophers in my study, namely, Husserl, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty have started their phenomenologies of the Other with a look to Descartes. They have done so because, although Descartes has not discussed the idea of the Other as an independent

philosophical question, his philosophy touches upon the issue when the Cartesian ego wants to reconstruct its relation to the rest of the world.

Hegel will be crucial in order to explain this type of relation; in order to do so, one ought to look to the very beginning of the master-slave story. I would suggest, however, that a preliminary stage exists before the stage of master and slave. Hegel is also helpful in the first part of his logic. In the *Phenomenology*, at the beginning of the lord and bondman section, he describes two confronting consciousnesses as two negating ones. The self is essential, and it seeks to annihilate the Other as the only reasonable way to interact, because the only necessity for each consciousness is its own "I" and "each is indeed certain of its own self, but not of the Other."¹⁴

Sartre is helpful in describing this stage if one looks to his concept of the objectifying self. The self looks at the Other as an inert object. The Sartrean metaphor that explains negation between self and the Other is that of 'the look' or 'the gaze.' By the 'look,' the self objectifies the Other. It is a unidirectional act. The self is either looking at or is looked at; there is no middle, mixed option. In the time of looking, the self is one who looks and the rest of the world is what is looked at. In this type of relation, the self does not care about the rest of the world because the self is *essentially* distinct from all else. In the time of being looked at, the self is absolutely the one who is looked at, with no sense of power. Sartre's term for this kind of being-looked-at is "shame." When the Other looks at the self, the self loses its power, and it becomes

¹⁴ - Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), §86.

ashamed. Shame results from the awareness of being observed. The self feels shame when it becomes aware that it is being seen doing something shameful.

Switching from the philosophical analysis of the negation between the self and the Other to the cultural side, I will appeal to the notions of dehumanization and genocide. I think dehumanization displays the negation between the self and the Other in a cultural context, because, in the representation of the Other as less-human, the self is in a state of absolute subjectivity, independence, indifference, and negation in relation to the Other. In dehumanization, the self reduces the Other to lower levels of being, relative to human beings. In a more radical approach, the self wants the annihilation of the Other; the self feels endangered by the existence of the Other. That is genocide in a cultural context. I will discuss dehumanization and genocide as two phenomena of objectifying the Other (according to Sartre) and annihilating the Other (according to Hegel) respectively.

Descartes, the Uncertain Other

Vincent Descombes, in his study, *Le même et l'autre*, a history of the Hegelian tradition in 45 years of French philosophy, asserts that the whole story of the self-Other conflict begins with Descartes:

La guerre des consciences est en germe dans le cogito cartésien. Dans ce qu'on appellera la « philosophie de la conscience », c'est-à-dire dans la tradition cartésienne, le « je pense, je suis » est à la fois l'origine et la règle de toute vérité. C'est la première vérité, c'est la vérité qui est au principe de toutes les autres, et c'est enfin l'exemple même de la vérité. L'ego, tel qu'il est donné dans ego cogito, ego sum, est l'absolu à quoi tout est relatif: sa vérité, qui ne dépend d'aucune autre, conditionne toutes les autres. Ce mot d'«absolu», destiné à une brillante-carrière dans la philosophie moderne, est précisément celui que Descartes utilise dans les *Regulae ad directionem ingenii*. Or il ne peut pas y avoir simultanément plusieurs absolus. Un deuxième absolu (autrui) signifie

nécessairement un rival du premier absolu (moi, ego). Le passage du cogito au cogitamus n'est pas du tout le passage du « je » de la méditation solitaire au « nous » d'une République des esprits. Au pluriel, les absolus ne sont plus que des prétendants à l'absolu, ce sont des concurrents qui s'entredéchirent autour du trône.¹⁵

In this section I will expand upon what Descombes says in this brilliant summary of the self-Other relation based on Cartesian philosophy. Descartes, for the first time, declares the total uncertainty about the existence of the Other. This is a new philosophical point of departure in regard to thinking about the Other.

However, it would be somewhat ironic to begin discussing the philosophical relation between the self and the Other by appealing to the work of an introvert and pacifist philosopher like Descartes, who was very keen to escape any conflict—even when he was deployed to the battlefield in the Thirty-Years War, he retained his habit of sleeping until ten in the morning—and conclude with a discussion of barbarianism, annihilation, the death of the Other, dehumanization, and genocide. It will be a difficult to explain how Descartes' philosophical views on Otherness could provide a basis for genocide. However, I will argue that the gap between the world of the self and the rest

¹⁵ - Vincent Descombes, *Le Même Et L'autre, Quarante-Cinq Ans De Philosophie Française 1933-1978* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1979), 35. English translation:

"The conflict of consciousness exists in embryonic form within the Cartesian cogito. For what was known as 'the philosophy of consciousness', that is, for the Cartesian tradition, the 'I think, I am', was at once the origin and the rule of all truth. It is the first truth, the truth which inaugurates all Others; it is the exemplary truth. The ego, as it is given in *ego cogito*, *ego sum*, is the absolute to which all else is relative; its truth, independent of any Other, is the condition of all Others. The word 'absolute', destined for a brilliant career in modern philosophy, is the one used by Descartes in the *Regulae ad directionem ingenii*. Now there can never be several simultaneous absolutes. A second absolute (an Other) is necessarily a rival of the first (myself, *ego*). The movement from the *cogito* to *cogitamus* is not at all the same as the movement from the 'I' in solitary meditation to the 'we' of the Republic of minds. In the plural, absolutes are no more than pretenders to the absolute. Competitors clawing over one another for the throne." See: Vincent Descombes, *Modern French Philosophy* (Cambridge [England: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 22.

of the world, which includes the Other, offered by Descartes, can become a philosophical ground for genocide.

To see how this is possible we need to review what Descartes put forward as his main task in his philosophical work. At the outset of *Méditations*, he asks “what certain and undoubtful knowledge can [one] have?” Searching for a reasonable answer, he was able to convince himself in Meditation One that there might be nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Only one thing exists: the thinking I.¹⁶

The start of solipsism

To prove the existence of the I, he felt nervous about beginning with hyperbolic doubt, as if he knew that he was exiling the I to a deep, dark crypt of solipsism, or as he described his experience: “it feels as if I have fallen unexpectedly into a deep whirlpool which tumbles me around so that I can neither stand on the bottom nor swim up to the top.”¹⁷

To find an indubitable foundation for knowledge, Descartes began to re-examine what he had affirmed, up to that point in his life, to be knowledge. What about the existence of world? Is there any certainty that the external world exists? No, philosophical doubt does not allow the existence of the external world to be maintained with certainty. How about the existence of Other people? Do they exist? There might be some robots under their clothes and hats, not living, thinking people

¹⁶ - René Descartes. *Meditations on First Philosophy: with Selections from the Objections and Replies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 17.

¹⁷ - Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, 16.

like oneself. Do I have a body? A demon might have deceived me about my having a body. Perhaps I am dreaming about all these things. The only thing that I can be sure of is that “I think.”

The existence of this “thinking I” is necessarily true and does not require any proof. This “thinking I” has disconnected itself from everything else, even its body, and has become pure thinking. This thinking thing is a mind, an ideal substance. Who is the subject of this thinking?

Any given action needs a subject. It is me or you or she that thinks? Thinking without a thinker is impossible. The act of thinking needs a subject. For Descartes, the subject of this certain thinking is nobody else than “I.” You, he, she, i.e., *Others*, belong to those domains of knowledge that have already been suspended by Descartes’ methodological skepticism. That “I think” is certain, but that “you think” or “she thinks” remains very doubtful.

For Descartes the question of “who thinks” does not matter. He wants certainty for all knowledge, and he finds this certainty in the “I think.” A problem arises once he wants to obtain a similar degree of certainty concerning Other things, such as existence of one's body, the world, and Other people. He is sure about one thing, the *cogito*, but how can he reconstruct certain knowledge about his body and the rest of the world? His confidence and certainty about the *cogito* is much stronger than his knowledge about his body or the external world. The Cartesian subject has lost all its sure connections with the external world, including Others.

In Meditation Three, Descartes tries to return to the external world from the “thinking I.” He has ascertained that only one thing is certain: the thinking I. But this

‘thinking I’ has some further concepts stored within itself; some appear to be invented by this thinking I and some appear independent from the I.¹⁸ For instance, if I feel heat, this heat should have a source outside of me, but Descartes has already discussed that sensation is not reliable when one wishes to know about the being of the external world. The ‘thinking I’ is sure that it is not the cause of the heat, therefore, a third party should be the cause. And Descartes concludes that:

Nempe si realitas objective alicujus ex meis ideis sit tanta ut certus sim eandem nec formaliter nec eminenter in me esse, nec proinde me ipsum ejus ideae causam esse posse, hinc necessario sequi, non me solum esse in mundo, sed aliquam aliam rem, quae istius ideae est causa, etiam existere.¹⁹

This is the first time that the Other reappears after the thunder of Cartesian skepticism. The ‘thinking I’ confesses that it is not alone in the world. There is another entity capable of causing an idea in the ‘thinking I.’ This Other might be Other humans or God. Descartes refuses the former because the only thing the ‘thinking I’ knows about Other humans is that they have extension, shape, position, and movement, very similar to objects. Again the ‘thinking I’ has no proper tool to know these elements Other than sensation, and sensation has already lost its creditability. Descartes concludes that this Other should be God.

¹⁸ - Ibid., 26.

¹⁹ - René Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy, with Selections from the Objections and Replies: a Latin-English Edition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 58. English translation:

“If the objective reality of any of my ideas turns out to be so great that I am sure the same reality does not reside in me, either formally or eminently, and hence that I myself cannot be its cause, it will necessarily follow that I am not alone in the world, but that some Other thing which is the cause of this idea also exists.” See: Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy: with Selections from the Objections and Replies*, 26.

Many commentators are not satisfied with this solution. They believe that this way of returning to certainty about the existence of the external world does not work well because the 'thinking I' does not infer the existence of the external world. It has no tool to do so and so it always needs a benevolent God who can transfer the ideas stemming from the external world into the mind of the 'thinking I.' Why is this so? Because Descartes has reduced the I to mere thinking. If the I is mere thinking and nothing else, then the consequence of this is that the I has been separated from everything Other than the I forever.

Thinking is separation

Descartes regards the act of thinking as, essentially, separation. The certainty of my existence is separated from the certainty of Others' existence and consequently their existence is deprived of any certainty. In other words, because I am only a thinking substance, I am separated from any Other kind of being. From the mere fact that each of us understands himself or herself to be a thinking thing and is capable of excluding from himself or herself every other substance, whether thinking or extended, it is certain that each of us, regarded in this way, is, in reality, distinct from every other thinking and extended substance.²⁰

I can certainly claim that I am thinking, and if I am thinking, that is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for my existing. If I think, then I exist; if I stop thinking, I might stop existing. Thinking is the essence of my being. If this is so, I am, at my origin, divided or separated from Others, because I can only experience my own thinking, therefore, I can only experience the one being/substance that is mine. I

²⁰ - René Descartes, *Principles of philosophy* (Holland: Reidel, 1983), p 27.

cannot experience the being (or thinking) of any Other. How can I establish certainty in regard to the existence of Other subjects, who traditionally are considered capable of thinking, i.e., Other people? In other words, are there Other possible thinking subjects? How can I make sure that Other people really think, and, therefore, that they exist as human beings?

At this stage in the Meditations, Descartes finds no such assurance. I see signs of thinking in Other people, but the essence of thinking in them is inaccessible for me. I see that they express their ideas, they speak, they use language, and all of these activities are signs of thinking, but the very act of thinking remains elusive for me. Looking to people around me, my father whom I remember when I was leaving our little town, or right now, sitting on a bus looking at this boy playing with his gloves, or that lady reading something on her smart phone, I ask myself: "Are they real?" By this question, I mean: "Do they think in exactly the same way that I think?" It is, at least, not impossible that all of them are just some data within my mind. But I talk to them; I touch them. Still, one might say, all of these communications are simulated. Some unknown powers have confined you to a controlled area in which every person you interact with is only a human-simulated robot, with the same flesh as your body, with similar processes of thinking, arguing, and a similar way of talking. You are, indeed, alone. All of the people around you are not humans.

Dualism

This separation between the self and all Others is problematic and implies a correlated philosophical dichotomy: the separation of my mind from my body. On this conception, if I am made of pure thinking and my body is an extended material substance, then I

am not only separated from Others, but I (as a thinking I) am also separated from my body. This second separation is referred to as dualism. Descartes believes that if my mind and body have come together in a close relation, it is an accidental interaction, not an essential unification. For Descartes, two substances are distinct if, in thinking of the two substances “we can clearly understand one apart from the Other.”²¹ Elsewhere, he defines two substances as distinct “when each of them can exist without the Other.”²²

Sartre against Cartesian dualism

In this way, Descartes is responsible for establishing a dualism in philosophers’ conception of the human being and creating a difficult problem in regard to trying to unify these two. Jean Paul Sartre describes and criticizes Cartesian dualism in *Being and Nothingness*. Without mentioning Descartes directly, Sartre claims that if someone considers body as a living object composed of a nervous system, digestive, respiratory, and circulatory organs that can be analyzed chemically into atoms; and consciousness as a thing which is reached only by inner intuition, then unifying the body and consciousness is insurmountably difficult. Sartre criticizes this view arguing that one has never found one’s body as such. I have never seen by my brain. What I have seen is the cadavers of men dissected. Because I read articles on physiology and I consider my body as an object out there, I conclude that my body is an extended substance separated from my consciousness.²³ Sartre believes that this is wrong, and he rejects

²¹ - René Descartes, *The philosophical writings of Descartes. Vol II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 213.

²² - Descartes, *The philosophical writings of Descartes. Vol II*, 114.

²³ - Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 303.

this Cartesian dualism. Sartre thinks that this is *not* how we perceive or conceive of our bodies. In another analysis, he writes that I have sensations by my hand; my hand touches things and reveals to me the resistance, hardness, and softness of things, but my hand does not touch itself. It cannot reveal itself to me, therefore, talking about my hand as if it is a separated thing from me is wrong.²⁴

Sartre considers the body as a way through which we experience the world, not a thing in the world. When I use tools, when I touch things, when I handle something, when I walk in my house, at the end of these experiences I discover that my body made the experiences possible. I live my body. It is not the case that my body is given to me first, and then it reveals things to me. My experiences indicate my body to me.²⁵

Is Descartes dualist? Yes and no

Is Descartes, therefore, a dualist? Many commentators, such as Fred Sommers, believe that the Cartesian man is not a genuinely united individual. Sommers believes that the Cartesian man is a juxtaposition of two distinct substances.²⁶ Etienne Gilson also asserts the dualism saying that medieval philosophy did not distinguish soul and body to the extent that Descartes did. He believes that medieval philosophy has less difficulty than Descartes' in unifying soul and body.²⁷

²⁴ - Sartre, *L'Être et le Néant*, 366.

²⁵ - Sartre, *L'Être et le Néant*, 389-390.

²⁶ - Fred Sommer, "Dualism in Descartes: The Logical Ground," in *Descartes: Critical and Interpretive Essays*, edited by Michael Hooker (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 224.

²⁷ - Étienne Gilson, *Études sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien*. 3 éd. (Paris: J. Vrin, 1967), 250.

On the other hand, Paul Hoffman believes that Descartes regards the unity of soul and body similarly to the inherence of form in matter. He calls it a hylomorphic conception of the union of mind and body, the *per se* unity of human being.²⁸ Supporting his argument Hoffman refers to several quotations by Descartes in which he asserts the unity of mind and body. In one of these references, Descartes writes, to Regius:

Whenever the occasion arises, in public and in private, you should give out that you believe that a human being is a true *ens per se*, and not *ens per accidens*, and that the mind is united to the body in a real and substantial manner to the body. You must say that they are united not by position or disposition, as you assert in your last paper—for this too is open to objection and, in my opinion, quite untrue—but a true mode of union.²⁹

Hoffman also refers to Meditation Six, in which Descartes asserts that the mind is not present in the body as a sailor in a ship, but the mind is closely joined and, as it were, mixed together with the body, so that mind makes up one thing with it.³⁰ In the Replies to the Sixth Objections, Descartes says that the mind is a quality of the body to which it is connected.³¹

To explain what kind of connection there is between mind and body, Descartes compares the connection with what we see between gravity and a stone. So, it is no

²⁸- Paul Hoffman, *Essays on Descartes* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 17.

²⁹ - René Descartes, *The philosophical writings of Descartes. Vol III: Correspondences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 206.

³⁰ - René Descartes, *The philosophical writings of Descartes. Vol I.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 56.

³¹ - Descartes, *The philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol II*, 297-298.

harder for us to understand how the mind moves the body than it is for us to understand how gravity moves a stone downwards.³²

Although Hoffman provides several quotations from Descartes showing that Descartes had a strong desire to prove that mind and body are intermingled inseparably, he stops here and does not go further to argue – in appealing to Descartes– how the unity is possible. Even if we accept Hoffman’s efforts to show that Descartes was against mind-body dualism, the result of Cartesian skepticism remains the same. Hoffman’s efforts show that Descartes’ main philosophical argument for the certainty of the existence of the “thinking I” is in opposition to his wish to join mind and body inseparably, and Descartes has been unable to match his philosophical argument with what he wishes to prove.

A New Solution by Descartes

The last thing I wish to mention here is an interesting comment, made by Descartes, that distinguishes his position from Hoffman’s depiction of it. In a noteworthy comment, Descartes declares that the meaning of body and how we define body is important in this context. He offers two meanings for body and suggests that a body that is unified with a mind is distinct from a body as pure material. In a letter to Mesland, Descartes explains the difference as follows:

I consider what exactly is the body of a man, and I find that this word ‘body’ is very ambiguous. When we speak of a body in general, we mean a determinate part of matter, a part of the quantity of which the universe is composed. In this sense, if the smallest amount of that quantity were removed, we would judge without more ado that the body was smaller and no longer complete; and if any particle of the matter were changed, we would at once think that the body was no

³² - Descartes, *The philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vols III, 206.

longer quite the same, no longer numerically the same. But when we speak of the body of a man, we do not mean a determinate part of matter. Or one that has a determinate size; we mean simply the whole of the matter which is united with the soul of that man. And so, even though that matter changes, and its quantity increases or decreases, we still believe that it is the same body, numerically the same body, so long as it remains joined and substantially united with the same soul; and we think that this body is whole and entire so long as it has in itself all the dispositions required to conserve that union. Nobody denies that we have the same bodies we had in our infancy, although their quantity has much increased, and according to the common opinion of doctors, which is doubtless true, there is no longer in them any part of the matter which then belonged to them, and even though they no longer have the same shape; so that they are only numerically the same only because they are informed by the same soul. [...] In that sense, it can even be called indivisible; because if an arm or leg of a man is amputated, we think that it is only in the first sense of 'body' that his body is divided—we do not think that a man who has lost an arm or a leg is less a man than another.³³

The difference that Descartes describes here is very promising, if one wished to maintain a genuine unity between mind and body. Here we see that he offers a meaning for body that is not merely material; it is material with some qualitative aspects. It is an object that, when we remove a piece of it, it remains the same. This Body is not an object like other mere objects; it is a phantom-like body, a body that changes in every cell, but remains the same. Descartes could have gone on to devise a new theory of the mind-body relation, but unfortunately, he stops here. For instance, although he offers this promising theory, he still considers the body as an inferior substance in relation to the mind. Body cannot be an active partner in the process of knowing; it is a pure means by which the mind knows the world. Moreover, in the picture Descartes offers, we see that body has the qualitative aspects that Descartes

³³ - Descartes, *The philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol III, 242-243.

describes above because it is under the unifying power of mind. Body, in and of itself, does not share any aspects with mind. For instance, Descartes does not talk about the role of body in perception, or how the body can affect the mind. It is only mind that provides unity and gives the body a sense of non-embodiment. The superiority of mind over body is the same as the superiority of form over matter. Therefore, although Descartes tries to solve the problem of dualism, we see that there is still much that must be added to his theory in order to account for a genuine unity between mind and body.

Solipsism, Others as automatic machines?

If this distinctness is incontrovertible, then how can we ensure that any Other thinking substance exists at all? The self only experiences one subjectivity, *viz.* its own subjectivity. I cannot experience the Other's mind; I cannot see the Other's thinking; I only see the Other's body; therefore, how can I justifiably come to say that another thinking substance exists at all? This skepticism provokes this reflection from Descartes:

Nisi jam forte respexissem ex fenestra homines in platea traseuntes, quos etiam Ipsos non minus usitate quam ceram dico me videre. Quid autem video praetor pileos et vestes, sub quibus latere possent automata?³⁴

This is the loneliness of the Cartesian subject, what is normally called Cartesian solipsism. A single subject that either does not see other subjects or cannot be sure

³⁴ - René Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy, with Selections from the Objections and Replies: a Latin-English Edition*, 42. English translation:

"Then if I look out of a window and see men crossing the square, as I just happen to have done, I normally say that I see the men themselves ... Yet do I see more than hats and coats which could conceal automatic machines?" See: Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy, with Selections from the Objections and Replies*, 21.

about the existence of the subjectivity of Others. One sees that Others are walking on the street, the same as oneself. They eat foods that one usually eats. They exhibit similar behaviors; they pull their hands away when they touch a hot iron, or they laugh when they hear a joke. They are also capable of causing pleasure or pain. Sometimes they speak. One understands what they say. Sometimes, one even engages in an intimate physical-emotional relation with them, touching their hearts and their bodies. However, despite all these interactions, one cannot be certain that there is subjectivity behind any of these appearances. Looking through the pupil of the Other's eye, one sees the darkness of uncertainty. What is behind this eye—another mind like me, or a computer program? This is a modern equivalent of the aforementioned Cartesian question: what is under these hats and coats? A real man or an automatic machine?³⁵

The radical dualism Descartes describes between the world of the “thinking I” and the rest of the world, even his body, has resulted in what is called Cartesian Solipsism. By “solipsism” it is meant that the self knows only that it is the only thinking and sentient being in existence. The self can only come to know the existence of the Other in its thoughts or consciousness. But the problem is that consciousness is self-contained and cannot reach what lies outside it, if anything exists outside it at all.³⁶

³⁵ - Anita Avramides, in *Other Minds*, asks a noteworthy question. She asks why Descartes says that the people in the street might be machines and not dogs? The answer is that, for Descartes, creatures are divided into two groups: 1) imbued with soul or mind and 2) devoid of soul. Therefore, there is no difference between dogs and automatons. All animals except humans are automatons. Anita Avramides, *Other Minds* (London: Routledge, 2001), 54-57.

³⁶ - In this definition I rely on the definition Ilham Dilman suggests for Cartesian solipsism in *Existentialist Critiques of Cartesianism*. Ilham Dilman, *Existentialist Critiques of Cartesianism* (Lanham, Md: Barnes & Noble, 1993), xi.

Albert A. Johnstone, in his book *Rationalized Epistemology, Taking Solipsism Seriously*, identifies seven scenarios of Cartesian solipsism. He tries to prove that all of these seven versions of Cartesian solipsism have theoretical problems. The first scenario is that Descartes cannot ensure that what he is seeing and feeling is not a dream. It has happened several times for him that he thinks he is sitting by fire with a piece of paper in his hands, but indeed it has been a dream. This solipsism is called *Oneirata Solipsism*. The second scenario is that Descartes in his thinking about the world might have been deceived by a malicious demon. This solipsism is called *Demoniac Solipsism*. The third scenario stems from Descartes' experiences of the unreliability of sensation. It is not prudent to trust senses that have deceived me even one time, therefore, if my senses tell me that this table is flat or this apple is red, I cannot trust them. This is called *Sensa Solipsism*. The fourth scenario is that the world is a generalized illusion. There is nothing beyond sensation, and we just imagine that something is stimulating our sensation. This is called *Phantasmata Solipsism*. The fifth scenario shows that things can cease to exist when they are unobserved by oneself. The world is there if it is perceived by oneself, therefore, world in its existence depends on perception of oneself. It does not exist for itself. This is called *Ephemerata Solipsism*. The sixth scenario is a radicalized version of the fifth one. If there is no reason that an existing thing unifies different sensations and, beyond this redness and sweetness and roundness, there is no apple, then the world is reduced to an assembly of unrelated sensations. This solipsism is called *Sense Data Solipsism*. Finally, the last scenario of

solipsism involves doubt as to whether Other people have minds like the 'thinking I' or not. This one is called *Monopsyche Solipsism*.³⁷

Marion against solipsism

Some commentators such as Jean-Luc Marion argue against understanding the Cartesian self as solipsistic. In "The Originary Otherness of the Ego" Marion argues that the ego in the *cogito* is in a dialogical relation from the beginning. He believes that the solipsist reading of the *cogito*, while it is a canonical interpretation, should be challenged if we reread the second meditation more carefully. Marion believes that the solipsist interpretations rely on the formula of *ego cogito, ergo sum* in which the *ego* is nothing other than *cogito*. However, in the second meditation, Descartes uses another version of the formula as *ego sum, ego existo*. This new version brings out an originary Otherness of the ego.

To clarify what Marion means, one can ask, in the "I think, I exist" formulation, what or who is the cause of this thinking? We know that Descartes has asserted in previous stages of his skepticism that an evil demon may force me to think that things in the world exist when they do not. Descartes has even argued that I may have no body and that my senses are entirely untrustworthy, therefore, I cannot be or I am not able to be the cause of my own ideas.³⁸ From here, Marion argues that the cause of the thinking is not the ego, but an anonymous Other who puts into me the thoughts I am now having. Therefore, the ego is essentially the second self. There is another self (the

³⁷ - Albert Johnstone, *Rationalized Epistemology: Taking Solipsism Seriously* (Albany, N.Y: State University of New York Press, 1991), 4-10.

³⁸ - Descartes, *The philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol III, 24.

Other) behind the ego's thinking. That self is the original self and the ego is the Other. According to this formula, the ego is not firstly a thinking thing, but it is a thing that has been deceived or persuaded to think. The ego is not an "I." It is a "me." It is an object for the Other; "the ego does not attain itself," Marion says, "except by the interlocation whereby an Other than itself establishes it prior to every self-positing."³⁹

Although Marion offers a genuine way to make the self an "Other" intrinsically, and the genuine Other is God, his theory does not help one make the self an "Other" for another person. Marion's theory is a theological approach to the self-God relation. In other words, it places God in the first position, and the self in the second and is silent about the human Other. If this is so, the self might have a reciprocal connection with God, but it remains solipsistic or separated from other humans.

Sartre against solipsism

Sartre also criticizes this Cartesian solipsism. Section two of the third part of *Being and Nothingness* is titled 'the reef of solipsism.' Here Sartre accuses realism of being neglectful of the idea of the Other. Sartre explains that *knowing*, for realism, is the presence of a temporal-spatial thing in my consciousness. The body of the Other points to the soul of the Other but does not deliver it. Therefore, the Other's soul is just an absence. Therefore, based on realism that relies on intuition, there is no place for the Other. According to Sartre, realists do not feel the weight of the problem of the Other because they have taken the existence of Others as certain. They usually come to know the existence of the Other by analogy. They think that similar to my body that has a

³⁹ - Jean-Luc Marion, "The Originary Otherness of the Ego: An Rereading of Descartes' Second Meditation." in *On the Ego and on God: Further Cartesian Questions* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007), 26.

soul behind it, the Other's body analogically should have a soul behind it. And Sartre claims that this is sophistry because if this knowledge is conjectural, then the existence of the Other is conjectural as well.⁴⁰

Therefore, how does one successfully bridge the gap between the self and the Other? It is obvious that Sartre is against solipsism, against the Cartesian approach to Others as automatic machines covered by hats and coats. Against this Sartre argues that when I see the Other, I do not see him as a body, as a corpse, or flesh extended out there. I see the very Other in his body. Given what we saw about Sartre's criticism of Cartesian Dualism, the Other's body is not an inert object, it is a *psychical object*.⁴¹ When I see this psychical object, I see the Other first and then his body. When I see that my friend is lifting his arms to greet me, I do not see an arm or some flesh going up. I see my friend greeting me, lifting his arm. He is his body.⁴² In this, Sartre believes that there is no gap between the self and the Other because the self can see the Other right from seeing his body. The Other's mind is not hidden behind his body, inaccessible for the self. The consciousness of the Other is visible in his action, in his behavior, and in his body. This is the first Sartrean counterargument against Cartesian solipsism.

The second Sartrean argument against Cartesian solipsism focuses on the world or the context in which the self encounters the Other. One of the Cartesian approaches to the self-Other relation is due to the reduction of the self to pure thinking, which means that the only way to encounter the Other is through thinking. In Other

⁴⁰ - Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 304-305.

⁴¹ - Sartre, *L'Être et le Néant*, 414.

⁴² - Ibid., 413.

words, Descartes has only one way to prove the existence of the Other, i.e., argumentation in inference. Sartre thinks that this is an incorrect presupposition. There is no proof or argumentation for the existence of the Other. Similarly, if we want to refute Cartesian solipsism, argumentation is vain.⁴³ Sartre believes that the self and the Other experience each other before any argumentation to prove or refute the existence of the Other. The Other lives in my world. He enters my life immediately. Sartre believes that this living together is not a matter of knowledge, it is a mode of being.⁴⁴ It is a social space in which I live with the Other before arguing for his existence.

Although we see that Sartre takes a position against Cartesian dualism and solipsism, it seems that in his alternative theory he cannot separate himself from Descartes. In the next part, I will explain his position in more detail, but before closing this section on Descartes, I think mentioning a similarity between Sartre and Descartes may be worthwhile.

The noteworthy issue in Descartes' above-noted analogy (that of looking through a window to see automatons covered by hats and clothes) is conveyed when one pays attention to associations surrounding the concept of watching, or the window. To show why this solipsism is stronger than one might expect, we must notice a hidden element in Descartes's example of watching people on the street from a window. Human beings have five senses. Among these five, the most useful one to show the difference between my subjectivity and the Other's potential subjectivity is

⁴³- Ibid., 317.

⁴⁴- Ibid., 319.

that of sight. The other human senses incorporate a sense of passivity in the one sensing; my hand senses solidity when it touches the table; my tongue senses the sweetness of chocolate; my ears feel the sound-waves of the speaker; my nose senses that something wafted into it and I can tell that something is rotten. In comparing the senses of hearing and smelling with seeing, there is another noteworthy difference. In hearing and smelling we sense something, but we do not know the direct source. By contrast, in seeing we do not know what happens to us, but we see the source: that red flower, or this black box, etc. In seeing, something is exposed to us and, therefore, we do not posit a difference between ourselves and our seeing. We are our seeing. In seeing the object, we are seeing that it is entirely an object and we are entirely the subject. The object is there, extended in front of us, and it shows every angle of its body; but our seeing, our subjectivity is hidden in the darkness of our eyes.

Seeing is the most proper sensation to consider in order to demonstrate the nature of the subjectivity of Cartesian thinking. Indeed, in some languages, such as English, the verb "to see," in some contexts simply means "to know." After listening to some explanation, a person will say, 'Oh! I see,' which means: 'I understand.' It would be strange if one says: 'Oh! I smell' or 'Oh! I touch.' Now, if one rethinks the example of watching people on the street through the window, one may see that the subject is using sight as the medium between itself and the people on the street. Seeing is the most subjective sense for a person. Below, when I discuss the concept of the "gaze" or "look," in Sartre, we will see that Sartre claims that looking is a one-way relation. You either look or are looked at. When you look, you are an absolute subject and when you are looked at, you are an absolute object. Therefore, in Descartes' example of looking

through the window, one sees a demonstration of absolute subjectivity and, as such, absolute loneliness.

Now, it is time to answer the question of how the Cartesian issues of dualism and solipsism can be translated into the phenomenology of the cultural Other. When the mind is so solipsist because it has no ontological connection with Others, it cannot consider Others as true Others. Others will be, ultimately, automatons that have a human appearance but not a human reality. In such a context, the solitary mind can do whatever it wishes with hats, coats, and the machines that lie beneath them. In the second half of this chapter, I will explain how this degrading of Others to semi-human machines, can take a violent aspect in cultural encounters. I will call it dehumanization. The Cartesian solipsism can express a tendency of the human psyche to consider others superficially, as walking hats and coats, while being sunk in a kind of solipsism. I do not argue that people are ordinarily academic Cartesian sceptics. Obviously, they're not. And Sartre was right in criticizing Descartes that in ordinary life we do not encounter our bodies in a solipsist way. But they do sometimes fail to really register that the other is a conscious being, and even more so when the others seem alien in their appearance and comportment. This ignorance toward considering the Others as conscious beings is what I pick from Descartes and will use it in my analysis of dehumanization.

Sartre, The Objectified Other

In the previous section, we saw that the Cartesian 'thinking I' was standing behind the window, watching people on the street and imagining that these people could be simply walking automated machines under the cover of clothes and hats. Four

centuries later, another French philosopher gives us a similar example to explain how he conceives of the self-Other relation. Sartre even reuses the metaphor of automated machines. He asks how I can be sure that the voice I am hearing is of a man and not a perfect robot.⁴⁵ To expand what he means we can consider another example which Sartre provides. He describes a scene in which he is sitting on a park bench and looking around; he looks at the trees, the lawn, and the benches. Everything in this scene is part of a space at which he is the centre. The nearness or farness of everything depends on where he sits. In this moment another person shows up, passing him.

Je suis dans un jardin public. Non loin de moi, voici une pelouse et, le long de cette pelouse, des chaises. Un homme passe près des chaises. Je vois cet homme, je le saisis comme un objet à la fois et comme un homme. Qu'est-ce que cela signifie ? Que veux-je dire lorsque j'affirme de cet objet qu'il est un homme? Si je devais penser qu'il n'est rien d'autre qu'une poupée, je lui appliquerais les catégories qui me servent ordinairement à grouper les « choses » temporo-spatiales. C'est-à-dire que je le saisisrais comme étant « à côté » des chaises, à 2,20 m de la pelouse, comme exerçant une certaine pression sur le sol, etc. Son rapport avec les autres objets serait du type purement additif ; cela signifie que je pourrais le faire disparaître sans que les relations des autres objets entre eux en soient notablement modifiées. En un mot, aucune relation neuve n'apparaîtrait par lui entre ces choses de mon univers : groupées et synthétisées de mon côté en complexes instrumentaux, elles se désagrègeraient du sien en multiplicités de relations d'indifférence.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ - Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 340.

⁴⁶ - Sartre, *L'être et le néant*, 293. English translation:

"I am in a public park. Not far away there is a lawn and along the edge of that lawn there are benches. A man passes by those benches. I see this man; I apprehend him as an object and at the same time as a man. What does this signify? What do I mean when I assert that this object is a man? If I were to think of him as being only a puppet, I should apply to him the categories which I ordinarily use to group temporal-spatial "things." That is, I should apprehend him as being "beside" the benches, two yards and twenty inches from the lawn, as exercising a certain pressure on the ground, etc. His relation with Other objects would be of the purely additive type; this means that I could have him disappear without the relations of the Other objects around him being perceptibly changed. In short, no new relation would appear through him between those things in my universe:

This is one way of approaching this walking man as an object among the Other objects, such as trees, benches, and the lawn. But there is another way of approaching this matter. What does it mean if I say this object that is walking by in the park is *a man*? It means that he creates another space beside my space for himself. In other words, he creates another centre, for himself, and adds a new dimension (nearness and farness to *him*) to the scene; he becomes another centre of the scene and, by doing so, he decentralizes me. The grass is not merely for me, it is for him. But not only does the grass escape me and enter his space, *I myself* become an object for him beside the benches and trees. This is the meaning of the decentralization of self for the sake of the Other.

Le percevoir comme homme, au contraire, c'est saisir une relation non additive de la chaise à lui, c'est enregistrer une organisation sans distance des choses de mon univers autour de cet objet privilégié. Certes, la pelouse demeure à 2,20 m de lui ; mais elle est aussi liée à lui, comme pelouse, dans une relation qui transcende la distance et la contient à la fois. Au lieu que les deux termes de la distance soient indifférents, interchangeables et dans un rapport de réciprocité, la distance se déplie à partir de l'homme que je vois et jusqu'à la pelouse comme le surgissement synthétique d'une relation univoque. Il s'agit d'une relation sans parties, donnée d'un coup et à l'intérieur de laquelle se déplie une spatialité qui n'est pas ma spatialité, car, au lieu d'être un groupement vers moi des objets, il s'agit d'une orientation qui me fuit.⁴⁷

grouped and synthesized from my point of view into instrumental complexes." See: Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 341.

⁴⁷ - - Sartre, *L'être et le néant*, 293. English translation:

"Perceiving him as a man, on the other hand, is not to apprehend an additive relation between the chair and him; it is to register an organization *without* distance of the things in my universe around that privileged object. To be sure, the lawn remains two yards and twenty inches away from him, but it is also as a lawn bound to him in a relation which at once both transcends distance and contains it. Instead of the two terms of the distance being indifferent, interchangeable, and in a reciprocal relation, the distance *is unfolded* starting from the man whom I see and extending up to the lawn as the synthetic upsurge of a univocal relation. We are dealing with a relation which is

Self, Other, and nothingness

Before going on to discuss the details of this decentralization of the self and its negating attitude toward the Other, we should establish a foundation for our understanding of Sartre's approach to the issue. *Being and Nothingness* is the main text for this topic. Asking ourselves why Sartre choose such a title for the book can be a good starting point to see the commentary on the self-Other relation that the text will eventually make. The book is a project to analyse the being of man in the world. It is a question about the relation between man and being. Being is always positively being; it does not convey non-being. This is humans who injects nothingness in being. Sartre gives an example: I expect there to be fifteen hundred francs in my pocket, but I count the money and find out that it is thirteen hundred. Two hundred *is not*; this is the negation man projects into being. And a second example in which we find a human-projected nothingness: I have an appointment with my friend Pierre in a cafe; I arrive late and I know that he is punctual. He *is not* there. This act of creating nothingness or seeing nothingness is only the act of man.

Consequences of the idea of nothingness

Creating the idea of nothingness has some consequences. Like creating the idea of nothingness, humans can add the idea of destruction to the world. As Sartre puts it, an earthquake, or a volcano does not destroy things. An earthquake is just a shaking of the earth, and everything that happens afterwards is a natural effect of such shaking.

without parts, given at one stroke, inside of which there unfolds a spatiality, which is not my spatiality; for instead of a grouping toward me of the objects, there is now an orientation *which flees* from me." See: Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 341-342.

If humans look at a destroyed city and say that the earthquake destroyed it, this concept has been created by humans. Sartre concludes that destruction is essentially a human creation in the face of nothingness.⁴⁸ The concept of destruction is not the only consequence of nothingness. Being influenced by Heidegger, Sartre mentions other attitudes which imply a projection of Nothingness: hate, prohibition, regret, anguish.⁴⁹ It is not our job here to explain these concepts but to lay a foundation for our goal that is a description of the self-Other relation. Therefore, I should explain that every one of these concepts has an element of nothingness. Hate can be regarded as desiring the nothingness of something. Prohibition can be understood as ordering the nothingness of something. Regret can be considered as regret for the nothingness of something. And anguish can be interpreted as an encounter with nothingness. In this part of the project concerning the self-Other relation, I will argue that besides hate, prohibition, regret, anguish, and many other human attitudes, objectification and dehumanization of the Other are also two consequences of the idea of nothingness introduced into the world by man.

Objectification of the Other

The self-Other relation, for Sartre, is interwoven with the idea of nothingness. The self and its Other are the nothingness of each other, that is, they see the nothingness or absence of themselves in the Other. If we refer back to the example of the man in the park, the appearance of the Other in the visual horizon of the self is the beginning of the self's nothingness. This is the meaning of the decentralization of the self. The

⁴⁸ - Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 40.

⁴⁹ - Ibid., 50.

arising of this new subject is a challenge for the self. Until the arrival of the Other, the self was the only subject and the rest of world was its objectified universe. Now, this new subject, with his human actions, presents a crack in the self's universe.⁵⁰ In this situation, the self needs to change the approach that it has so far had toward the world. Both the self and its Other need a radical conversation to come to accept one another as subjects.⁵¹ The problem is that the self in such a context knows only one way of approaching Others; that is, objectification. The self is very skillful in utilizing things as objects, as instruments. But this new thing that has arisen in the self's vision is not put in the same category as other things; it wishes to objectify the self.

The look

Sartre explains this reciprocal objectification using the idea of the look; I can *look* or be *looked at*. I am either looking at or am looked at.⁵² The look creates a sense of antagonism between the self and the Other. Each one seeks to objectify the Other. I discover myself as an object through the Other's look, and I see the death of my possibilities in the Other's look.⁵³ Why? Because, before the rise of the Other, I felt myself to be the master of my situation, but now when the Other appears, I am no longer master of my situation.

To understand further what Sartre means by the look, we must consider his main discussion of it in *Being and Nothingness*. Sartre gives us an example for explaining self-awareness through awareness of being seen by another: the self is like

⁵⁰ - Ibid., 344.

⁵¹ - Ibid., 345.

⁵²- Ibid., 347.

⁵³- Ibid., 354.

a person who is peeping through a keyhole. In this scenario, the self is not under any look; therefore, his subjectivity is safely hidden. He sees (knows) almost everything inside the room with no danger of himself being discovered. He is in a state of absolute tranquility. But suddenly, he hears footsteps in the hall. Someone is looking at him looking through the keyhole. What does this mean? It means that he is suddenly affected in his being and that essential modifications appear in his ontological structure. Once the self hears the floorboards creaking behind him it means that he is vulnerable.⁵⁴ The self discovers himself as an object through the Other's look because the Other, with his look, can make the self an object.

Danger of the Other

Sartre also puts this in Hegelian terminology: when the Other appears, the self is no longer the master of the situation.⁵⁵ If the Other looks at the self, the self loses its power.⁵⁶ Losing power means being in danger. The look of the Other puts the self in perpetual danger, because the self loses its power of subjectivity. It becomes a vulnerable object.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ - Ibid., 347.

⁵⁵ - Ibid., 355.

⁵⁶ - Ibid., 356.

⁵⁷ - This overarching danger which Sartre sees between the self and the Other seems very Hobbesian. In the beginning of *Leviathan*, Hobbes is elaborating his political theory. He believes that the state of nature is a state of war. Each man is in a constant danger from the Other. One might think that one can, by the help of bodily or mental power, secure himself from the Other, but nature has given everyone almost equal bodily and mental power to compete for a desirable object. Hobbes says that the weakest has enough power to kill the strongest, either by a secret plan or by a confederacy with others. If we translate this Hobbesian theory of all-encompassing danger for everyone into a Sartrean language, we could say that everyone is in danger because everyone can be the object of the objectifying look of the Other.

Although there is a subjectivity that the self sees in the Other, the self is in-itself a being-for-Other; the self looks at itself and attains a knowledge of itself through the Other. Without the Other, self cannot describe itself. Sartre puts it as follows: "The Other teaches me who I am."⁵⁸ Here we can find two descriptions of the self. First, the description of the self by the self through the Other's look; and second the description of self offered by the Other. The latter is not necessarily entirely available to the self. Once the self is aware that there is another description of itself totally independent of it and too far to reach, the self finds itself uneasy.⁵⁹

Paying attention to these two descriptions of the self, we recognize an important aspect of the self-Other relationship. The self by-itself is vulnerable to the Other. Using the metaphor of 'the look,' the self by-itself is visible, whether there is an Other or not. The self is seen by the Other or it can *probably* be seen by the Other. This probability applies to the self by-itself, not to the Other. In other words, the self is, by-itself and regardless of the existence of the Other, looked-at. Sartre again gives an example: At the top of a hill there is a house. It is occupied by an enemy. They probably are looking at commandoes from the height. Regardless of looking or not looking of enemy, the commandoes are visible, and they feel that they are being looked-at.⁶⁰ Therefore, the self's vulnerability comes from the self first. The self is certainly looked-at. How? By the Other or by the self's potentiality to be looked at? We don't know. Sartre says that, in all likelihood, the eyes that the self feels are fixed on itself are not

⁵⁸ - Ibid., 366.

⁵⁹ - Ibid., 367.

⁶⁰ - Ibid., 368.

real eyes. However, the self feels unease because, regardless of the true existence of the Other, the self is in a state of being-looked-at.⁶¹

Schroeder on Sartre

Here we can consider some criticisms of Sartre's theory of the look. One famous criticism has been offered by Williams Ralph Schroeder in *Sartre and His Predecessors, the Self and the Other*, published in 1984. Before going through Schroeder's objections, it would be helpful to present Sartre's theory of the look as Schroeder understands it. I think Schroeder has succeeded in understanding the theory perfectly.⁶² Going back to Sartre's example, when I am peeping through the keyhole at the door, and suddenly I hear that the floor creaks, five things change for me:

1. So far, I was beyond having a definition. Now, from the eyes of the Other, I can be an intruder, spy, or traitor.
2. The world is no longer my object. I become a part of the world.
3. I lose innocence. The Other judges me. I become the subject of a moral judgement.
4. I am placed in objective time and space.
5. I lose control of the situation. I find myself enslaved by the Other-as-subject.

All five of these changes can be summarized in one sentence: the self's subjectivity transforms into objectivity. Through these changes the self finds an ontological aspect of its existence. The self is a social self, whether it accepts it or not.⁶³

⁶¹ - Zygmunt Bauman has a brilliant psychological analysis of this sense of the vulnerability or danger to strangers; in his paper "Strangers are dangers...Are they, indeed?" he explains how people in urban areas feel uncomfortable living with strangers; they prefer to live with familiar people in comfort zones. He describes the phenomenon of closed/fenced communities or neighbourhoods in which people pay a lot of money for armed guards to protect their neighbourhoods from unpermitted arrivals. See: Bauman, "Strangers are dangers...Are they, indeed?" in *44 Letters from the Liquid Modern World* (Uk: Polity, 2010).

⁶² - William Ralph Schroeder, *Sartre and His Predecessors: The Self and the Other* (London: Routledge, 2019), 183-184.

⁶³ - Schroeder, 185.

In such a situation, placed under the look of the Other, the self struggles to control the situation. In this situation, the self has only two choices: constantly objectify the Other, if possible, or to induce the Other to look at the self as a desirable subject.

After this summary of the theory, Schroeder offers his objections to Sartre. He is critical of Sartre, claiming that Sartre's theory of the look is not realistic. Schroeder claims that the look is not always objectifying, and he names different types of *looks*. If I appear, for instance, in a way that the Other looks at me as a valuable subject, then the objectifying look has not occurred. Schroeder knows that Sartre has already responded to this objection; Sartre has said that in this case the self is not absolutely objectified, however, the self cannot ever completely control the Other's look. If the Other wishes, he can change his mind at anytime, and take the validating look away. Schroeder even knows that Sartre's second reply would be that, in this case, the Other is an objectified-subject.⁶⁴

Schroeder continues to offer some Other types of relation in which a mutual relation can be sought through a look. For instance, in a game or a musical ensemble, one's fusion with Other participants can occur. It is a collective subjectivity, according to Schroeder. In some other cases, we can be at the same time both subject and object. For instance, when a soldier hears a suspicious rustling noise. He experiences the Other-as-subject and he is vulnerable, but at the same time he intensifies his watchfulness and prepares himself for any surprise. Or in competitive sports we

⁶⁴ - Schroeder, 187-8.

experience the opponent both as object and as subject. The case is the same in a sexual relation.⁶⁵

My response to this objection – without wanting to defend Sartre, but just in order to read him correctly – is that the concept of the look, in Sartre, has a metaphorical function to show that the self-Other relation is always a one way street. Cars cannot move in both directions at the same time. Of course, there are Other types of look, but for Sartre looking means being the subject, and to be looked means being the object. If we accept that subjectivity cannot be objectivity at one and the same time or that being a subject and being an object are two opposite things, then we can understand the meaning of the look for Sartre.

In addition, Schroeder claims that some looking, such as looking angrily, intently, doubtfully, devotedly, or blankly, do not reveal the social self, therefore, the look does not always reveal the social aspect of the self.⁶⁶ Again, I think Schroeder has missed Sartre's point. First of all, Sartre does not use the phrase "social self." The paragraph that Schroeder refers to as the starting point of the social self is as follows.

When I encounter the Other:

[J]'ai tout d'un coup conscience de moi en tant que je m 'échappe, non pas en tant que je suis le fondement de mon propre néant, mais en tant que j'ai mon fondement hors de moi. Je ne suis pour moi que comme pur renvoi à autrui.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ - Ibid., 196-7.

⁶⁶ - Ibid., 190.

⁶⁷ - Sartre, *L'Être et le Néant*, 260. English translation:

"All of a sudden I am conscious of myself as escaping myself, not in that I am the foundation of my own nothingness but in that I have my foundation outside myself. I am for myself only as I am a pure reference to the Other." See: Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 349.

The core of this sociality of the self is being *objet-pour-autrui*. Therefore, saying that the look puts the self in the situation of being the *objet-pour-autrui* means transforming from being the subject to being the object for the Other. In this transformation, any type of look has the same result because it does not matter whether the look is positive/affirmative or negative/refusing. The look means that I am not the source of judgement, although for Sartre this transformation has a negative tone.

After the objections we discussed above, Schroeder offers his main objection to Sartre, which I think is noteworthy. Schroeder contends that if the self feels that it has been placed under the look of the Other, or the self experiences the look of someone else, this feeling or experience does not necessitate the existence of the Other. It is not correct to say that the Other must exist because I had the feeling that the Other was looking at me. Schroeder provides another example to clarify this objection. We ask from a man of faith why he thinks that God exists. In response, he says because he feels God's eye upon him. He feels, in a special state of mind, that he is exposed to a heavenly light. Should we accept this argument from the man of faith as an argument for the existence of God? Schroeder concludes that this feeling does not necessitate the existence of God, and it is the same for the existence of the Other.⁶⁸

In response to this objection, and again to clarify Sartre's position, I should say that Sartre does not try at all to offer an argument for the existence of the Other. The self finds the Other within itself. In other words, the self cannot be the self if the

⁶⁸ - Schroeder, *Sartre, and His Predecessors: The Self and the Other*, 217.

concept of the Other does not exist. As we saw in Sartre's criticism of Cartesian solipsism, Sartre thinks that there is no proof or argumentation for the existence of the Other. The self and the Other experience each other before any argumentation can prove or refute the existence of the Other. The Other lives in the self. The Other enters the self's life from the beginning. This living together is not a matter of knowledge, it is a mode of being.⁶⁹ It is a social space in which the self lives with the Other before arguing for his existence.

Warnock on Sartre

Mary Warnock, in her book *The Philosophy of Sartre*, has explained this point very clearly. She explains that for Sartre the self becomes aware of itself at one and the same time that it becomes aware of the Other's existence and the Other's observation of the self. If the self were not aware of this fact, it could not be conscious of itself; it could follow plans and thoughts, but it cannot be conscious of itself. Self-awareness is identical with Other-awareness.⁷⁰ Warnock interestingly describes the shift in Sartre's attention from the traditional question on the Other, to what Sartre is launching as a phenomenology of the Other:

The problem, as we saw, was traditionally posed in the form: 'How do I know that there are Other minds than my own?' But Sartre asks rather: 'What is the fundamental relation that holds between one person and another?'⁷¹

Warnock attributes this shift from "how do we know?" to "what do we do?" to Sartre's Marxist approach. For Marxist philosophers, it is not knowing but doing that

⁶⁹ - Sartre, *L'Être et le Néant*, 319.

⁷⁰ - Mary Warnock, *The Philosophy of Sartre* (London: Routledge, 2019), 65.

⁷¹ - Warnock, *The Philosophy of Sartre*, 67.

is the point of philosophy; therefore, Sartre rejects pure epistemology (awareness) as an insufficient way to encounter the Other, and focuses on other concrete situations that obtain between self and the Other such as striving, struggling, aiming, desiring, wishing, loving, and hating.⁷²

Another noteworthy point is that two human subjects can be present before one another or look at one another even across a large physical distance. The Other can be my friend Pierre in relation to me; the Other can be an old man in relation to the young, a judge in relation to a criminal, a member of the bourgeoisie in relation to a worker, a man in relation to a woman, or an Asian or *Negro* for the European Self.⁷³ This point is very important for the phenomenology of the cultural Other; Sartre himself expanded the possibilities of self-Other relations from pure concepts of self and the Other, to sexual relations between a man and a woman, social contexts such as worker or bourgeoisie, and cultural relations between the Jew and anti-Semite. What I am doing in this dissertation is continuing this expansion to Other cultural phenomena.

Returning to the idea of the look, we saw that the self recognizes its vulnerability and its being-looked-at through the Other's look. Sartre concludes that the look shows us that the self's existence is for-Others. The nature of the relation constructed upon the look seems antagonistic and negative, and Sartre makes explicit this negativity.⁷⁴

⁷² - Ibid.

⁷³ - Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 373.

⁷⁴ - Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 374-384.

The look as torture of the Other in Huis Clos

This negativity of the look has been depicted in the Sartre's famous play *Huis Clos*. In this play, the look of the Other, even if there is no communication, becomes the harshest torture for the self. Three characters, Estelle, Inez, and Garcin, enter a locked room. They find out that they have died and are in the afterlife. They also know that they should have gone to hell because they are guilty of having committed evil deeds in life. So, they wonder why there is no instrument of torture or torturer where they are. They do not know that everything has been planned and designed deliberately. First, there is no sleep here. Not being able to sleep means not being able to close one's eyes. In other words, not being able to stop seeing or being seen. Second, in this room, the light is always on. Nobody can turn it off from inside the room. Again, the situation has been designed in a way to increase the chance of seeing or being seen. The three persons find out that they have been place together not by chance. They are locked in this room to torture each other. Inés thinks, what a strange hell this is:

Vous allez voir comme c'est bête. Bête comme chou! Il n'y a pas de torture physique, n'est-ce pas ? Et cependant, nous sommes en enfer. Et personne ne doit venir. Personne. Nous resterons jusqu'au bout seuls ensemble. C'est bien ça? En somme, il y a quelqu'un qui manque ici : c'est le bourreau.⁷⁵

And immediately she finds the answer:

Eh bien, ils ont réalisé une économie de personnel. Voilà tout. Ce sont les clients qui font le service eux-mêmes, comme dans les restaurants coopératifs.⁷⁶

⁷⁵ - Jean-Paul Sartre, *Huis-Clos* (Paris, Gallimard, 1947), 41.

⁷⁶ - Sartre, *Huis clos*, 42.

They think if they stay with each other with no word or action, everyone silent in her or his corner, they will be able to escape from this torture. Again, here we see the role of the look. Even if they stay silent and do nothing to each other, they will torture each other because they look at each other. After a while, Estelle needs a mirror to apply her lipstick. There is no mirror, but Inés suggests being mirror for her. Garcin reproaches them for starting to talk; Inés responds that they cannot forget one another; they are there all the time and watching each other.

Afterward, Estelle shows romantic interest in Garcin, and wants to dance with him. Garcin accepts Estelle and bends to embrace her, however, Inez complains that under her eyes they cannot do that. All of these problems that the characters encounter are related to “the look.” Garcin expresses the foundational issue of the situation:

Le bronze ... (Il le caresse.) Eh bien, voici le moment. Le bronze est là, je le contemple et je comprends que je suis en enfer. Je vous dis que tout était prévu. Ils avaient prévu que je me tiendrais devant cette cheminée, pressant ma main sur ce bronze, avec tous ces regards sur moi. Tous ces regards qui me mangent ... (Il se retourne brusquement.) Ha ! vous n'êtes que deux ? Je vous croyais beaucoup plus nombreuses. (Il rit.) Alors, c'est ça l'enfer. Je n'aurais jamais cru ... Vous vous rappelez : le soufre, le bûcher, le gril... Ah ! quelle plaisanterie. Pas besoin de gril : l'enfer, c'est les Autres.⁷⁷

⁷⁷ - Ibid., 41. English Translation:

“This bronze. [Strokes it thoughtfully.] Yes, now's the moment; I'm looking at this thing on the mantelpiece, and I understand that I'm in hell. I tell you, everything's been thought out beforehand. They knew I'd stand at the fire-place stroking this thing of bronze, with all those eyes intent on me. Devouring me. [He swings round abruptly.] What? Only two of you? I thought there were more; many more. [Laughs.] So this is hell. I'd never have believed it. You re-member all we were told about the torture-chambers, the fire and brimstone, the "burning marl." Old wives' tales! There's no need for red-hot pokers. Hell is—Other people!” See: Sartre, *No Exit, and Three Other Plays*. (New York: Vintage International, 1989), 45.

Shame

The *enfer*, indeed, is the look of Other people. Through this look, we become in-itself objects for the Other as a free subject. To show this sense of objectification, we can analyze another concept Sartre discusses that is in close relation to the concept of “the look.” Sartre gives a phenomenological analysis of shame. Shame occurs in a situation in which we encounter the Other and feel vulnerability in front of him. In shame, we discover the existence of the Other, and his power of objectification. For instance, if I make a vulgar gesture and suddenly raise my head and see somebody has seen me, I am ashamed.⁷⁸ But if we reduce the cause of shame to a wrongdoing and being seen by Others, we will not understand what Sartre means by the concept. We feel shame even when we do not do anything wrong; an innocent child feels shame because he is exposed to Others; his shame stems from being watched and being the object of the judgment of Others. We feel shame because we feel we are under the look of Others. We lose our subjectivity and become a vulnerable object.⁷⁹

⁷⁸ - Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 302.

⁷⁹ - Dan Zahavi in “Shame and the Exposed Self” challenges this Sartrean use of the word “shame.” He thinks that Sartre’s account of shame is too simplistic and covers a limited range of cases. For instance, he distinguishes between *honte* and *pudeur* in French or *Schande* and *Scham* in German. He argues that there are some types of shame that are self-centered. For instance, when we self-evaluate and we come to a feeling of shame due to an action that we did while it was better not to do it. In this type of shame, the Other has no role. In addition, some types of shame do not involve negative or degrading feelings. It is a virtue, for instance, to have a shame that is meant to help ourselves avoid making an ethically wrong decision. Although these elaborations about the different meanings of shame help to clarify Sartre’s usage of the word, I think this cannot contribute to an argument against Sartre that he is simplistic in using the term. Every philosopher takes a word in a very specific way that he wants. Words always have slightly different meanings and it is the philosopher that uses them in his own way proper to his philosophy. See: Dan Zahavi, “Shame and the exposed self.” in *Reading Sartre: On Phenomenology and Existentialism* (London: Routledge 2010).

Sartre calls this universal feeling of shame *chute originelle*, original fall.⁸⁰ Similar to the 'original sin' that affects everyone in virtue of being human and a descendant of Adam and Eve, original shame affects everyone, not on account of committing this or that deed, but simply in virtue of necessarily becoming an object. I have 'fallen' into the world amongst other objects, degraded and fixed as an object in the look of the Other.⁸¹

At this stage of the Sartrean self-Other relation, we may see that the look and shame are the key terms. The look is a matter of an absolute subjectivity's representations for itself and the one who is looked at is the object. In this web of looking and being looked at, or feeling shame in front of the Other, what plays a primary role is the body. As Sartre puts it: my body is being-for-Others.⁸²

The role of body in the look and the shame

When I say that I, as a subject, can touch things, it means that the world and objects appear to me as instruments.⁸³ In relation to man, objects are instruments, otherwise they are nothing and I am indifferent to them.⁸⁴ When dealing with things, there is a moment in which I discover an essentially new thing: the body of the Other. This body

⁸⁰ - Sartre, *L'Être et le Néant*, 328.

⁸¹ - Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 288-289.

⁸² - Ibid., 403.

⁸³ - Ibid., 425.

⁸⁴ - Sartre gives a historical example to explain what he means. He indirectly refers to a Latin oratorical phrase pronounced by Cato the Censor, a politician of the Roman Republic. The phrase is "Carthago delenda est" that means "Carthage must be destroyed." Sartre explains that Carthage is a thing that should be destroyed for the Romans, but for Carthaginians it should be "servanda," or "saved." Sartre says that Carthage by itself is an indifferent thing, its instrumentality depends on the approach we take to it. See: Ibid.

is neither an inanimate object nor a consciousness. It is something in between. The body is the meeting point between the self and the Other. The self does not know how it should approach this new thing. The self wants to stay in its comfort zone and, because it knows only one way of dealing with the world, regards the body as the same as Other objects. The self seeks to consider the Other and his body as an instrument.⁸⁵ In other words, the self prefers to reduce the Other to merely a thing.

Body as a psychological object

Although this is what the self prefers, very soon it finds out that this instrument is not under its control. This body is an arrow indicating something much more serious. The body is a transcendence-instrument.⁸⁶ This indicates another centre, one Other than the self, for all objects of the world. This room indicates that Pierre is absent.⁸⁷ Handwriting in a letter indicates one's beloved. Therefore, when we observe the physical behaviour of another's body, we understand that they refer to psychological moods. For instance, when we see a closed fist, we understand "anger." Sartre says the body is a psychological object *par excellence*.⁸⁸

The Other appears by his body. He appears to the self as a body, but the self does not appear for itself, therefore, the concept of character is applicable only to the Other. Consciousness does not know its own character.⁸⁹ It is the Other who can be described by assigning to him different characters. The self remains free of any

⁸⁵ - Ibid., 403.

⁸⁶ - Ibid., 447.

⁸⁷ - Ibid., 449.

⁸⁸ - Ibid., 455.

⁸⁹ - Ibid., 457.

confining description.⁹⁰ Therefore, the Other is a collection of characters represented in body, and the self is the pure look, beyond bodily representation.⁹¹

Facticity

Stuck in bodily existence and being objectified by the Other is what Sartre calls facticity. Sartre takes the concept from Heidegger. Facticity for Heidegger is a kind of being-in-the-world that is specific for Dasein.⁹² It is different than the being-in-the-world of other things such as wood or stones. Heidegger uses facticity to refer to a human life in-the-world in such a way that man understands himself as bound up in his 'destiny.' In other words, if man knows the necessities and binding conditions in which he is born, and then goes after his possibilities based on these factual conditions, these seized conditions are his 'facticity.' Sartre takes this idea and adds the role of body to it. Sartre considers the body as the presentation of human being-in-the-world. Whatever makes me what I am, my time, my location, my race, my family, my social

⁹⁰ - Ibid., 458.

⁹¹ - This freedom of the self from being cast in a strict definition and propensity for the Other to be easily confined in a limited character was examined by psychologists. A team of psychologists led by Emily Pronin gave a group of people a word-completion task: they gave people a list of words with two blank letters and asked them to fill in the blank spaces. When people did so, the psychologists asked them, "What do you think your choices say about you?" For instance, they would ask, "if you completed TOU__ as TOUCH, does that suggest that you are a different kind of person than if you completed it as TOUGH?" Most of the respondents took the position: "These word-stem completions are not a measure of my personality." But in the second phase of the experiment, Pronin gave the group other people's words and she asked the same question: What do you think this stranger's choices reveal? This time, respondents completely changed their minds and started to judge others based on their choices. The same person who responded to the first question by saying that "these word completions don't seem to reveal much about me at all" turned around and said that the person is such and such because they chose this word and not another. See: Malcolm Gladwell, *Talking to Strangers: What We Should Know About the People We Don't Know* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2019).

⁹² - Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*. (New York: Harper Perennial, 1962), 82.

class, and even my past, is my facticity. And my body represents this facticity. Another word for facticity is birth. I arise from my birth, i.e., I arise from my facticity.⁹³

Alienation

My facticity helps the Other to ignore all my possibilities and all my freedom in order to objectify me. This objectification is called *alienation*, according to Sartre. When the self feels ashamed under the look of the Other, it means the authenticity and genuine freedom of the self has been neglected. The self is looking through the keyhole, and suddenly it hears footsteps behind it. Now the Other can judge the self as a voyeur. The self does not like to be judged like this. The self knows that it is beyond any definition. It is living and changing every moment of its life. It is first and foremost free to be authentic, however, in this situation, it is deprived of its power and becomes a person with a fixed nature as a voyeur. The deprivation of the authentic and unlimited freedom and being captured in a fixed nature is alienation.

This struggle to alienate the Other becomes the main theme of the relation between the self and the Other. I am trying to highlight this struggle to alienate or as many commentators call it, the conflict of objectification. Considering concepts such as the look and shame, it seems as though Sartre thinks of the relation between the self and the Other as an antagonistic and conflictual relation. But is Sartre that pessimistic about the mutual recognition between the self and the Other? How we should interpret

⁹³ - Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 431.

his judgment when he says: *Le conflit est le sens originel de l'être-pour-autrui*?⁹⁴ Or "Unity with the Other is therefore in *fact* unrealizable."⁹⁵

Jonathan Webber on Sartre

Jonathan Webber, in *The Existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre*, does not think that this is Sartre's main point concerning the relation between the self and the Other. Webber contends that when Sartre says that conflict is the original meaning of being for the Other or when Sartre says that hell is Other people, Sartre is saying that this problem arises due to bad faith. Bad faith distorts our social interactions with one another.⁹⁶

Before we go on to explain Webber's perspective, we need to know what bad faith is for Sartre. Very briefly, bad faith means that, when we ignore our true freedom or our consciousness and reduce our conscious and free existence to a *fixed nature*, we act in bad faith. We, indeed, refuse to consider our real situation and pretend that we are not responsible for the situation. Sartre gives very famous examples to explain this: A ticket collector who regards himself merely as a ticket collector and nothing else,⁹⁷ or the woman who goes out for the first time with a man and when the man touches her hands as a sign of intimacy she pretends that it is not her that is being touched; it is her hand. She thinks of herself as only disembodied mind.⁹⁸ Sartre also gives another

⁹⁴ - Sartre, *L'être et le néant*, 404. English translation:

"Conflict is the original meaning of being-for-Others" See: Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 475.

⁹⁵ - Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 477.

⁹⁶ - Jonathan Webber, *The Existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 118.

⁹⁷ - Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 496.

⁹⁸ - Ibid., 96-7.

famous example of a waiter. In a café, a waiter acts as if he is merely a waiter and nothing more.⁹⁹ All these examples are given as vignettes of bad faith.¹⁰⁰

Returning to our focus on the relation between the self and the Other, Webber claims that conflict between people is a consequence of regarding ourselves and Others as unchangeable and fixed entities. According to Webber's reading of Sartre, the conflict is not the primary theme of the relation between the self and the Other. If we see conflict as the dominant theme between people, it is due to bad faith. We try to ignore the true nature of Others as free humans, or Others try to dominate us in the same way that they dominate other fixed-nature objects, therefore, we conflict with each other.¹⁰¹

The Other sees me as having certain fixed character traits, which I find alienating and therefore attempt to undermine by considering that person to have certain fixed character traits. Thus, it is that 'my constant concern is to contain the Other within his objectivity and my relations with the Other-as-object are essentially made up of ruses designed to make him an object' (B&N: 320).¹⁰²

⁹⁹ - Although these cases have been discussed often as vignettes of bad faith, Jonathan Webber, in another paper titled "Bad faith and the Other," argues that bad faith is not an individual failing, it is a social disease. Others impose a fixed nature on the self and, in an ironic response, the self plays the role of a fixed nature that refuses the ascription. See: Jonathan Webber, "Bad faith and the Other" in *Reading Sartre: On Phenomenology and Existentialism* (London: Routledge. 2010), 183-188.

¹⁰⁰ - Although I think most of these examples are problematic, I am presenting them as Sartre does, only to explain his conception of bad faith. For more details on these examples and the concept of bad Faith in Sartre, see the chapter titled 'authenticity' in Christine Daigle, *Jean-Paul Sartre* (New York: Routledge, 2010).

¹⁰¹ - Jonathan Webber, *The Existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre*, 118-120.

¹⁰² - Ibid., 120.

Webber analyzes shame in the same vein. The view of the Other alienates the self in the sense that it is a view of the Other than the one the self prefers.¹⁰³ The nature that is ascribed to the self is distinct from the one that it would ascribe to itself, consequently, the self is ashamed.

Webber mentions an important point: The self is not ashamed because a bad/unpleasant trait has been ascribed to it. Sometime the self is described positively and still the self is ashamed. This is the shame that we feel in pride. If someone ascribes to me traits that I do like to be identified with, it means I have a fixed nature, and so this is still a matter of shame. The point of alienation is being described as a fixed-natured or having fixed traits, not being described negatively.¹⁰⁴

In this case, conflict, alienation, and objectification do not indicate Sartre's foundational theory of the relation between the self and the Other. Webber thinks that a beneficial mutual recognition between the self and the Other is possible if we leave bad faith aside and try to not see Other people as having fixed natures. We should consider them as free consciousnesses, just as we see ourselves in that way. If we abandon bad faith and replace it with authenticity, we will reach a true relation between us and Others.

I think Webber is right, because this interpretation is in complete harmony with Sartre's philosophical principle of human freedom. If we agree that the first philosophical principle for Sartre is the precedence of human existence over essence, then we should accept that all those people who do not accept their responsibility and

¹⁰³ - Ibid., 123.

¹⁰⁴ - Ibid., 125.

deceive themselves with bad faith (the woman on the date, the waiter, the ticket collector) are wrong. If they are wrong and they are ignoring their true human freedom, this ignorance should not be said to happen only to them, but should also happen to Other people. In other words, we should be aware that neither us nor Other people have a fixed nature. If we accept this, the conflict between the self and the Other will be dissolved.

Accepting Webber's interpretation, however, does not mean that the issue of conflict between the self and the Other in a phenomenology of the cultural Other is dissolved. Because this phenomenology is about concrete relations between people from different cultures, Sartre's analysis of the look, shame, objectification of the Other, and conflict between people is still helpful to study how conflict between cultures happens. In the next section I will study a cultural phenomenon in which the self objectifies the cultural Other, namely, dehumanization. In dehumanization, what happens is that one considers people of Other cultures as non-human fixed natures.

The Dehumanized Other

From Cartesian solipsism and Sartrean look to dehumanization.

Having analysed the self-Other relation according to Cartesian *cogito* and Sartrean objectification, I can now discuss a cultural phenomenon as a cultural counterpart of this approach. In short, I can say that there is a similar, implicit logic in Cartesian solipsism, the Sartrean look, and what I am going to call "dehumanization." Before giving a clear definition of the concept, and discussing several cases, I need to explain how this similarity is possible.

Let us begin with two questions. Can we consider the Cartesian look through the window onto automatic machines covered by hats and clothes as a foundation for dehumanization? Certainly, we know that Descartes does not conclude that those humans are in fact machines. He makes the statement in an epistemological context. He offers that analogy to explain that, in our knowledge or *episteme*, we have no way to reach the minds of Other people. But consider another formulation of the question: Can this epistemological problem cause a moral problem? If we cannot reach the minds of others, might this barrier force us to conclude that they do not have minds? What about the Sartrean look? Can it be a philosophical theory that explains why dehumanization occurs? My response would be in the affirmative to the questions. In other words, if the self is solipsist, it has no reliable way to recognize the mind and rationality of the Other, and philosophically sees no justification in considering them as human. And if the self can objectify the cultural Other through the Sartrean look, the next step for the self in a cultural context is dehumanization. We should mention that dehumanization has many other social causes. Racism is the main social cause, however, if we want to analyze the phenomenon of racism and dehumanization phenomenologically, one way of doing so can be by asking about the path through which the self reaches the mind of the Other. If the path is blocked epistemologically, a lazy self can conclude that a lack of proof of the existence of the Other's mind means that the Other is perhaps less than human.

The Cartesian *cogito* finds something unique in itself: thinking; it is in absolute certainty that it thinks. This unique capacity puts the self at the core of existence. Every other thing, other people, other minds, are put in the sphere of uncertainty and doubt.

Therefore, although they have similar behavior, their capacity for thinking is always in doubt. If we simplify this Cartesian approach, we should say that, although other people have a human appearance, there is always a possibility that they are not human. This is akin to the logic of dehumanization. In what follows, inspired by Livingstone Smith's work *Less than Human*, we will see that, in dehumanization, the dehumanized has a human appearance but under this human skin there is a sub-human nature.

According to Sartre's theory of the look, the self feels that it is under the Other's look, but it wishes to destroy this look and become the only looker in the world. In other words, the self sees a similar subjectivity in the Other, but prefers to suppress the Other's subjectivity in order to become the only subject of the world.

The Concept of the Barbarian

"Dehumanization" is a very recent term. But to return to the history of cultural encounters, we find a concept that is very much in line with the idea of dehumanization. It is the 'barbarian'. This phenomenon occurs when one takes a cultural approach to the Other in which absolute negation, the objectifying look, and uncertainty about the thinking capacity of the Other create a cultural narcissism. A cultural self, either an individual or a nation, approaches its cultural Other from the point of view of the negation of the Other.

When a cultural self calls the Other a "barbarian," it means that the Other is sub-human, compared to the self. The self is the full version of humanity and the Other is something lower, therefore, the cultural self is the negation of the barbarian. The self has a language, in the highest sense; the self's language is fully meaningful. The

barbarian produces a bundle of meaningless and ear-splitting sounds.¹⁰⁵ A contemporary North American might call barbarians “the blah, blah people.” The self has the capacity to think—involving logos, logic, and law; the barbarian is babbling, dumb, animalistic, irrational, and lawless. The self is civilized, and the Other is an uncivilized, brutal, cruel, warlike, and insensitive creature.

Historically speaking the term of barbarian (βάρβαρος; *barbaros*) was coined in Ancient Greece and was applied to all non-Greeks, including Egyptians, Phoenicians, Phrygians, Thracians, and particularly Persians. In the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, Homer used the term to describe the incomprehensible language of the Carians in the Trojan War.¹⁰⁶ Jacques-Benigne Bossuet in *Discours sur l'histoire universelle* says that the most loathly thing for the Greeks were the barbarians.¹⁰⁷

Heraclitus of Ephesus, in fragment 107, says “the eyes and ears are bad witnesses for men if they have barbarian souls.”¹⁰⁸ This picture of a barbarian soul and its connection with eyes and ears is very much in line with what we will discuss about dehumanization further on in this chapter. Here Heraclitus is declaring that is it

¹⁰⁵ - Cacophony, the iteration of non-Greek sounds that gives an exotic impression of a foreign language. See: Helen H. Bacon, *Barbarians in Greek Tragedy* (New Haven: Published for Smith College by the Yale University Press, 1961), 15-16.

¹⁰⁶ - “Νάστης αὖ Καρῶν ἡγήσατο **βαρβαροφώνων**.” (*Iliad* 2, 867, emphasis added.) English translation:

“Nastes led the Carians wild with barbarous tongues.” See: Homer, *The Iliad*. trans. by Robert Fagles. (U.S.: Penguin Books, 1990), 127.

¹⁰⁷ - Amir Mehdi Badi' in *Les grecs et les Barbares* attacks this interpretation and claims that the whole story of hatred between Greeks and Persians (barbarians) is an unrealistic myth. He shows that many western thinkers such as Plato and Xenophon have admired Persians for their morals and political structure of the civilization.

¹⁰⁸ - Kathleen Freeman, *Ancilla to The Pre-Socratic Philosophers* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1971), 32.

possible that some people have a human face and human appearance, with the same eyes and ears, but their souls are less-human.

The term and its negative connotations became a Hellenic stereotype in the works of Herodotus and Isocrates. According to them, the barbarians are unable to speak or reason, unable to control their appetites and desires, and unable to govern themselves politically.

Aristotle is another philosopher of ancient Greece who adopted this perspective. He believed that slaves are naturally less than human. He does not assert that they are non-human but thinks that they are 'incomplete' humans.

[M]en who differ from Others as much as the body differs from the soul, or an animal from a man (and this is the case with all whose function is bodily service, and who produce their best when they supply such service)—all such are by nature slaves. In their case ... it is better to be ruled by a master. Someone is ... a slave by nature if ... he participates in reason to the extent of apprehending it in another, though destitute of it in himself.¹⁰⁹

Because barbarians are between animals and humans, it is beneficial for them to be brought into human civilization, even by force. Because they are born for subjugation, this force is just.¹¹⁰ One reason that a culture dehumanizes another, in the sense of barbarianism, is that, because the Other culture is not capable of speaking one's own language, it is assumed that they are unable to think. Heraclitus of Ephesus declares that the eyes and ears of men 'with barbarian souls' bear bad witness. He

¹⁰⁹ - Aristotle, *Politics*, trans. Ernest Barker (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), I.6,1254b, 27–39.

¹¹⁰ - Aristotle, *Politics*, 1256b, 23–26. Cited and translated by B. Isaac, *The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity*, 178–179.

says, "Eyes and ears are poor witnesses for men if their souls do not understand the language."¹¹¹

Aeschylus writes about barbarians in *The Persians*. The play depicts the defeat of barbarian immorality, arrogance, ignorance, and tyranny by Hellenic morality and wisdom. Xerxes, the king of Persia, has ignored his father's advice not to invade Greece. As a result of his arrogance, his commanders and army have been annihilated by the powerful Greek army.

Hall, in *Inventing the Barbarian*, argues that Greek writings about barbarians are an exercise in self-definition, because the barbarian is imagined as the negation of the Greek. The behaviour of the barbarian is described as hierarchical, immoderately luxurious, and unceasingly emotional. These three traits find correlative virtues in the character of the Greek as egalitarian, austere, and self-disciplined. Therefore, Hall believes that the Greeks were more concerned with self-definition than with knowing the Persian temperament.¹¹²

Jumping from ancient times to the modern era, we can find other examples of the concept of barbarianism. John Stuart Mill has a short but important essay titled *A Few Words on Non-Intervention*. In the essay, he discusses the conditions under which a country (in this case England) should or should not intervene in the internal affairs of another country. The topic can be regarded as a preface to what he calls

¹¹¹ - Kathleen Freeman, *Ancilla to The Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, 32.

¹¹² - Edith Hall, *Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 80

“international morality.”¹¹³ Per this morality, countries come to a reciprocal recognition or a kind of agreement in order to manage their relations. For instance, it is criminal if we go to war to impose our ideas upon other nations. It is the same if we wage a war that is aggressive (not defensive) in order to obtain more territory or revenue. Although these criteria can be universal rules for everyone, there are cases in which it is allowable to go to war, even without having been attacked or threatened. In other words, before following these international rules, we should consider another proposition. We should consider whether both sides, or the two countries, belong to same stage of civilization or not. As Mill puts it:

There is a great difference (for example) between the case in which the nations concerned are of the same, or something like the same, degree of civilization, and that in which one of the parties to the situation is of a high, and the Other of a very low, grade of social improvement. To suppose that the same international customs, and the same rules of international morality, can obtain between one civilized nation and another, and between civilized nations and barbarians, is a grave error.¹¹⁴

Mill offers two reasons for this exception. First, he argues that his international morality does not apply to barbarian nations because international morality requires reciprocity, but barbarian nations are not capable of reciprocating. A civilized nation cannot expect them to observe any rule. Why? Because their mind and their will are not capable of valuing the importance of having and obeying rules. Second, Mill believes that the barbarous nations do not know what independence is, and what nationality is. They are immature and it is beneficial for them to be conquered and

¹¹³ - John Stuart Mill, *Essays on Equality, Law and Education (includes Subjection of Women)*, *Collected Works of John Stuart Mill - Vol 21* (London: Routledge, 1996), 118.

¹¹⁴ - Ibid.

subjugated by civilized nations. Based on these two reasons, Mill declares that “the sacred duties which civilized nations owe to the independence and nationality of each other, are not binding towards those to whom nationality and independence are either a certain evil, or at best a questionable good.”¹¹⁵

The Barbarian is an ancient concept used to describe the less-human cultural Other. In the history of interactions between nations, we see that dehumanization takes different shapes. The cultural Other is sometimes called ‘the barbarian,’ and is sometimes compared to demonic creatures, predators, pests, microbes, vermin, and lice. Let us have a look at some cases.

In 1946, twenty Nazi doctors stood accused of crimes against humanity in the Nuremberg trials. They were accused of participating in the Nazi euthanasia program in which they performed medical experiments on mentally and physically handicapped people. Thousands of these people were Jewish, Russian, Roma, and Polish prisoners. They were tortured to death in the name of medical science. These people suffered very brutal atrocities just because they were not considered by their murderers to be individuals. They were worse than animals. Some of them were exposed to low levels of oxygen to simulate parachuting from great heights. In other experiments, they were exposed to mustard gas to examine the body's reactions and explore how scientists can discover how to protect soldiers against the gas. Victims were exposed to malaria, bacteria to induce gangrene, or deadly diseases. Doctors made incisions in their flesh to simulate wounds, inserted pieces of broken glass or

¹¹⁵ - Ibid., 119.

wood shavings in them, and then tied off the blood vessels.¹¹⁶ Why were the scientists able to do commit such atrocities against their victims? To answer the question, the concept of dehumanization comes to mind:

The Nazis were explicit about the status of their victims. They were *Untermenschen*—subhumans—and as such were excluded from the system of moral rights and obligations that bind humankind together. It's wrong to kill a person, but permissible to exterminate a rat. To the Nazis, all the Jews, Gypsies, and the Others were rats: dangerous, disease-carrying rats.¹¹⁷

The dangerous dehumanized

In addition to simply being considered less than human, the less-than-human is considered dangerous to humans, because he has some human capabilities that can threaten “real” or “true” or “full” humans. The Jew is a danger for national purity. If a Jew marries an Aryan, or a Jew becomes the teacher of Aryan kids, the disease of Jewishness will spread all over the Europe. Semitic culture can degrade art, the moral and social values of the Aryan race as Alfred Rosenberg, the ideologue of the Nazi Party, writes in his book *The Myth of the Twentieth Century*. An important point about the dangerousness of the dehumanized is that the dehumanizer knows that the dehumanized have some human capacities. These human capacities enable the dehumanized to harm the dehumanizer. Jews are semi-rational agents and the Nazis felt endangered by the Jews’ conspiratorial agency.

¹¹⁶ - G. J. Annas, *The Nazi Doctors and the Nuremberg Code: Human Rights in Human Experimentation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 67.

¹¹⁷ - David Livingstone Smith, *Less Than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate Others* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2011), 15.

In 1937, Japanese troops captured the Chinese city of Nanjing. They killed, mutilated, raped, and tortured thousands of Chinese civilians. The soldiers disembowelled pregnant women and stuffed hand grenades in women's vaginas and then detonated them. A soldier raped a woman while her infant stood by crying. He took a living human child and threw him into boiling water.¹¹⁸ How can a man be so cold-hearted? Because Japanese soldiers called the Chinese 'chancorro' which means *less than human*, like bugs or animals.¹¹⁹

In 2003, many Muslim prisoners were killed, raped, tortured and humiliated by U.S. military personnel at Abu Ghraib prison. When the scandal became public, an American radio broadcaster with 13 million listeners defended the dehumanizing behavior of U.S. officials by describing the prisoners as less than human. The broadcaster described the prisoners as sick, perverted, dangerous, subhuman, and human debris.¹²⁰ The broadcaster's approach was the same as what U.S. officials in the Abu Ghraib prison thought of the prisoners. A major general was always highlighting to the officers that the prisoners should be treated like animals because, if they are allowed to believe at any point that they are more than a dog, then they will become rebellious.¹²¹ Another broadcaster characterized Islam as a "deadly virus spreading

¹¹⁸ - H. Katsuichi, *The Nanjing Massacre: A Japanese Journalist Confronts Japan's National Shame* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), 119–121.

¹¹⁹ - D. C. Rees, *Horror in the East: Japan and the Atrocities of World War II* (New York: DaCapo Press, 2002), 28.

¹²⁰ - Quoted in S. Kinzer and J. Rutenberg, "The Struggle for Iraq: American Voices," *New York Times*, May 13, 2004.

¹²¹ - "Iraq Abuse 'Ordered from the Top,'" BBC News, June 15, 2004. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3806713.stm>

through Europe and the West.”¹²² And a Pulitzer prize winner and columnist of *New York Times* wrote that Muslim terrorists are “replicating and coming at us like cockroaches.”¹²³

Two elements of dehumanization

Having described historical cases of dehumanization, I want to highlight two major elements of the notion. As we saw in Aristotle, the dehumanized person does not totally descend to non-humanity. This is the first element. The dehumanized remains similar to the human. He is just less than human. Like the walking man in Sartre, the barbarian for Hellenic culture, the Jews for the Nazis, and Muslims for Western media, the dehumanized is a semi-human. This similarity creates two feelings toward the dehumanized. First, by this similarity the dehumanized becomes dangerous. The dehumanized has some human capabilities. Aristotle said that the barbarian has rationality but not in a complete capacity. Sartre believes that the Other has the power of the look, similar to me, therefore, the dehumanized Other can be a serious danger to the self.

The second element of dehumanization is that the dehumanized is stuck in its sub-human nature. The essence of sub-humanity is eternal. It does not change. Like natural elements such as water (H₂O), the dehumanized has an unchanged essence. The Jew has been an eternal Jew from the outset of history to the present. The self is free of definition. It is free to move, to become, to change. The self enjoys authentic agency. On the contrary, the dehumanized Other is condemned to essentialism.

¹²² - Boortz, Neal. “Islam is a deadly virus” *Media Matters for America*, October 18, 2006.

¹²³ - M. Dowd, “Empire of Novices,” *New York Times*, December 3, 2003.

Because the dehumanized Other has been deprived of human freedom, he is confined to an unchanged and static nature. And due to this static nature, the Other cannot emancipate itself from sub-humanity.

Sartre and the eternal Jew

An outstanding example to show this difference between the liberated self and the chained Other is the German propagandic film *The Eternal Jew*.¹²⁴ Made in 1940, the film is one of the first, and most influential, propagandic tools against the Jewish people. As the title displays, it depicts Jews as people who never ever change. They are a disease of humanity and have been the same across history. Besides presenting Jews in a grotesque picture as: parasitic, cunning, plague-like, demonic, behind the corruption of mankind, neglected, manipulative, criminal, soulless, uncivilized, vermin, rats, abnormal, depraved, and different in every way. But an outstanding Jewish trait is that they are unchangeable in these racial characteristics. The narrator explains that:

The Jews are a people without farmers or workers: a race of parasites. Wherever the body of a nation shows a wound, they anchor themselves and feed on the decaying organism. They make business out of the sickness of nations. And therefore prolong all conditions of sickness. That's how it is in Poland, and was in Germany. The Jews have been in this way throughout their entire history. Their face's bear the age-old features of perpetual sponger, the eternal Jew. Who in the course of time and worldwide has been always the same. There is no difference between these Jews in Poland and those in Palestine, though the two are geographically separated.

This is the eternal character of the Jew who cannot emancipate himself from his essence. Jews are the same, in spite of time and place. It makes no difference that a

¹²⁴ - Fritz Hippler, Franz R. Friedl, and E. Taubert. *Der Ewige Jude* (Chicago, IL: International Historic Films, 1988). The film is available at <https://archive.org/details/TheEternalJewDerEwigeJude1940>

Jew lives in Mesopotamia 2000 years ago or lives in Germany in 1940. He is always the same no matter whether he lives in Poland, England, Egypt, or Palestine. They are all the same and always unwelcome by nations.¹²⁵

The unchangeability of the Jew is, apparently, perfectly represented in their customs. The film shows scenes of Jewish slaughtering methods. *Our will and Way*,¹²⁶ a Nazi Party monthly publication, describes these scenes as so terrible that it is hard to watch. The unknown author explains that, stubbornly, the Jews hold to their methods of slaughter and defend it against the horror of the civilized world.¹²⁷

Sartre, in *Anti-semitism and Jew*, analyses this eternity of the Jew. He argues that the Jew is eternal from the anti-Semite's perspective for two reasons. First, the anti-Semite as a racist is intellectually too lazy to go after the truth and reality. Instead of going after historical facts to know the truth about the Jewish culture, the anti-Semite prefers to remain in the realm of imagination.¹²⁸ He creates an imaginary personality

¹²⁵ - Jewish people are not the only people who suffer from this essentialism. Black people find themselves the same situation. In a note-worthy paper titled "White Gazes, What it Feels Like to Be an Essence," George Yancy describes black people's experience of being regarded as an unchanged essence. He describes the phenomenon of 'Kicking.' When white people see a black person on the street, they lock their cars. This sound of clicking reminds the black person that he or she is a danger, no matter who he or she is. When a black man is accused of rape without evidence, when a black woman is raped with no real option of legal recourse, and when the police arrest a black professor just for being a suspicious black man, all these cases show that the black person has an unchangeable essence. See: George Yancy, "White Gazes, What it Feels Like to Be an Essence," in *Living Alterities : Phenomenology, Embodiment, and Race*. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2014).

¹²⁶ - *Unser Wille und Weg*

¹²⁷ - *Unser Wille und Weg*, 10 1940, 54-55. Available at <https://research.calvin.edu/german-propaganda-archive/ewig.htm>

¹²⁸ - This laziness in going after the truth is not the only reason for the racist. Sartre explains another reason in another work: *The Childhood of a Leader*. In this play, Sartre provides a psychological analysis of an anti-Semite. Lucien has been a vulnerable child in his childhood. He was sexually

as “the Jew.” The racist chooses the passion of hate and anger, because looking at truth rationally requires hard work and uncertainty. Seeking truth is difficult and what one obtains is always in question. The racist does not want to be involved in this hard process, therefore, he supposes an eternal picture of the Jew.¹²⁹

The second reason for the eternality of the Jew is that the Jew has lived all his history in an unchanged and eternal condition. Here we need to understand what Sartre means by ‘human condition’ before understanding his point about the eternal condition of the Jew. Sartre, here and in his other works such as *Being and Nothingness*, offers an argument about the criterion of being human. Against a long tradition of essentialism, Sartre believes that we cannot suppose a common essence for all humans. Instead, the common thing among all humans is living in a human condition. What makes humans human is not the essence of humanity, such as rationality or using language, but it is a common situation. For instance, all humans have to deal with being born in a social class, in a geographical, cultural, and political situation, and all

assaulted and always felt defenceless in front of the world around him. When he grows up, by joining an anti-Semite group, he thinks that he is liberated from that sense of humiliation and vulnerability in his childhood. This story by Sartre is interestingly similar to what happened to Christian Picciolini, the previous leader of American neo-Nazis. In an interview, he explains that he was a vulnerable and lonely boy in both his school and home environments. He explains that, after befriending a Neo-Nazi leader in America, he left all those negative and stressful feelings behind and became a confident, powerful, and energetic boy. See: Christian Picciolini and Dave Davies, “A Former Neo-Nazi Explains Why Hate Drew Him In – And How He Got Out” *NPR*, 18 January 2018.

Another reason has been discussed by Albert Memmi. In *The Colonizer and the Colonized*, Memmi describes a situation in which the colonizer recognizes his own mediocrity and inadequacies. He knows that he has no superiority over the colonized. He knows that he is a usurper. To suppress this feeling of shame or guilt, the colonizer absolves himself. He falsifies history and extinguishes certain memories. He exaggerates his own value and devalues the colonized. In other words, the colonizer dehumanizes the colonized willingly in order to forget his guilt surrounding colonialism, usurpation, and mediocrity.

¹²⁹ - Jean-Paul Sartre, *Anti-Semite and Jew* (New York: Schocken Books, 1967), 18, 19, 27.

have to deal with death. This is common for all. These conditions make us what we are. Some of these conditions are common for all and some of them are unrealistically assigned to a group of people. A Jewish group of people have been always in the condition of being Jews. They have always been oppressed and deprived of basic needs. They have been always deprived of having property or land. This situation has been imposed on them, therefore. There is not race of Jews, what we have is an imposed situation to a group of people called Jews.¹³⁰

In analyzing the historical background of the situation, Sartre argues that Christians have always considered the Jews as murderers or the descendents of murderers. The church has forced Jews to follow unproductive activities because they were not allowed to have land or property. Now the Jewish people are condemned for this lack of productivity. Instead of asking "what is a Jew," one should ask "what have you made of the Jews."¹³¹ The Jew is a Jew, whether he accepts it or denies it. He can be a good or bad person but after all he is a Jew. The yellow star that the Jews were given in the Nazi camps was a sign to remind them and Others that the Jews are Jews. By this analysis Sartre argues that the eternality of the Jewish character is not a matter of nature, but it is a matter of a situation in which Jews have been forced to live.¹³²

¹³⁰ - Sartre, *Anti-Semite and Jew*, 59-67.

¹³¹ - Ibid., 68-69.

¹³² - This is not the only place that Sartre talks about the function of dehumanization in depriving cultural minorities of their basic human rights. In his introduction to Albert Memmi's book, *The Colonizer and the Colonized*, Sartre explains how the colonizer dehumanizes the colonizer to deprive him of his rights. He considers the sub-humanity of the colonized as justification for the colonizer not to respect the human rights of colonized people. From a perspective critical of human rights theory, Sartre sarcastically says that human rights are for all human beings but that human beings only live in European countries. The rest are not human enough; therefore, we do not need

Although the holocaust is one of the most famous cases of dehumanization, there are many other cases in the twenty century. Let us consider another case. In 1945 an American propagandist film was produced against the Japanese. The film was called *Know Your Enemy: Japan*. In the film, Japanese are called “Japs.” This is offensive for many Japanese. The common rhythm between “Japs” and “rats” was used in a WWII propaganda poster depicting a rat wearing a war helmet with Japan’s flag on it. The rat is approaching the map of Alaska and the poster offers a rhyming slogan: “Alaska, death-trap for the Jap.” The film also depicts Japan as an octopus using each arm to conquer a piece of the world. Another key characteristic of the Jap, according to the film, is that the Japs are born and are educated, live and die as if there is no individuality among them. All of them, from an infant to the emperor, are pieces of a war machine that wants to overcome the whole world. All of them, with no exceptions, live and work to establish the worldwide empire of Japan. In many scenes of the film, “the Japs” are seen engaging in physical exercise as large groups, working in factories, marching, or even dying *en masse*, exactly like ants or rats who live *en masse* and are killed *en masse* by pesticides. After depicting “the Japs” as a serious danger for the world, the American troops appear as the saviours of the world. The American army destroys the Japs in huge groups, similar to a pesticide that kills ants collectively.

to respect their human rights. “Since the native is sub-human,” Sartre says, “the Declaration of Human Rights does not apply to him.” According to this logic, dehumanization is a project to deny the humanity of the colonized by oppression, colonialism, and violence. See: Jean-Paul Sartre, Introduction to *The Colonizer and the Colonized*, by Albert Memmi (London: Earthscan, 1990), 20-22.

Our marines topped their glorious fighting history by killing 20 000 Japanese on Awoe. On Okinawa we trapped and destroyed over 100 000 of their best troops.¹³³

This type of mass killing is an element of dehumanization. They should be *trapped* and killed because they are all the same; a pest for humankind. The dehumanized Other is just a member of a herd, a species. They have similar faces, similar houses, similar lifestyle, and a similar fate. One of the shocking depictions of this namelessness of the dehumanized has been provided by Gorge Orwell, in his famous essay *Marrakesh*. In a journey to the country, he describes the situation of colonized people:

When you walk through a town like this--two hundred thousand inhabitants, of whom at least twenty thousand own literally nothing except the rags they stand up in--when you see how the people live, and still more how easily they die, it is always difficult to believe that you are walking among human beings. All colonial empires are in reality founded upon that fact. The people have brown faces--besides, there are so many of them! Are they really the same flesh as yourself? Do they even have names? Or are they merely a kind of undifferentiated brown stuff, about as individual as bees or coral? They rise out of the earth, they sweat and starve for a few years, and then they sink back into the nameless mounds of the graveyard and nobody notices that they are gone.¹³⁴

Why is the cultural Other a nameless creature? Because he is not human. He is a semi-human creature with a human face and an animal nature. He cannot be an individual, because individuality is the result of rationality. If we recall the relation between thinking and being-separate in Descartes, we understand that if one thinks,

¹³³ - *Know Your Enemy - Japan*. Directed by Frank Capra (U.S: War Department Orientation Film, 1945) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BQRAqOaLZBM>

¹³⁴ - George Orwell, "Marrakech" in *A collection of Essays* (San Diego: Harvest-Harcourt, 1953).

one becomes an individual. Therefore, the cultural Other cannot think and is not able to be an individual. Thinking means separating the thinking I from the rest of the world. The thinking I excludes itself from every Other substance. But when a semi-human barbarian, Jew, Jap soldier, or a colonized Moroccan is not able to think properly, he cannot separate himself from the world. He becomes a part of the world, instead of an observing mind separated from the world.

Outgroup homogeneity bias

This bias against the nameless cultural Other is called the “outgroup homogeneity bias.” Everyone who belongs to our cultural group is a free person enjoying the right of self-determination. Everyone grows up differently and chooses an individual identity created by the different options that a culture provides to its members. But the other groups are, in themselves, homogenous.

Essentialism

So far, we have seen that dehumanization could be the result of the objectifying look. When a group of people consider themselves as the only group of humans who enjoys a specific humanity and they cannot be sure about the humanity of other groups, they objectify Others as sub-humans. Some philosophers like David Livingstone Smith think that dehumanizing other groups has its roots in the very concept of humanity. When we essentialize the nature of humans and call it humanity, any person with human appearance but deprived of this humanity will be sub-human. In *Less Than Human*, he argues that when we dehumanize people, we consider them, indeed, as counterfeit human beings. They are creatures with human faces but not endowed with human *essence*. Smith explains this approach by saying that our mind has a cognitive structure according to which we think about natural kinds as essence-based kinds. He insists

that we have dehumanized Others because our mind is structured to think about everything as a thing with an essence. One of these things is humanity and, so, the basis of dehumanization is explained:

Given that human beings do have a human essence, could something be human without having this essence? Given that humans are this kind of being, any Other being, even though it looks human and is found in the very places where we in fact find human beings, would not be human. It would be some Other creature which was a counterfeit human.¹³⁵

Per this explanation, one of the causes of dehumanization is essentialism. Smith argues that essentialism is a kind of cognitive bias in our mind. Our cognitive machinery, cognitive structure, or cognitive module of our mind is inclined to categorize everything, including human beings and cultures.¹³⁶ This cognitive machinery forces us to think of humans and cultures as natural species that have essences. In this case, when a subset of human beings or cultures do not show signs of such essences, they are categorized as less than human or non-cultures.

One might object that this explanation is not enough to show the true story of dehumanization. If essentialism causes a cognitive bias, one may ask why this cognitive bias occurs only toward the cultural Other. If we accept essentialism as the dominant cause, we should also accept that it can cause a cognitive bias for Other humans who do not have this essence but belong to our culture. For example, take rationality as the essence of humanity. If we apply Smith's arguments, Jews for the anti-Semite, Japanese for the Americans, and the Moroccan colonized for the French colonizers, are deprived of this rationality, therefore, they are dehumanized. In this

¹³⁵ - Smith, *Less Than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate Others*, 101.

¹³⁶ - Ibid., 75, 197, 203, 208, and 210.

case, one might ask, why does dehumanization not happen for an American child who has no full capacity of rationality but still is considered human? This counterexample shows that if we dehumanized the cultural Other, it is not merely a cognitive bias.

Smith asserts that cognitive bias is not the only cause of the dehumanization. He accepts that we might absorb dehumanization from our culture. According to him, essentialism is what makes dehumanization *possible*. Its occurrence can certainly be the result of a cultural bias, and he's not denying that. "Dehumanization is," he says, "a joint creation of biology, culture, and the architecture of the human mind."¹³⁷

Having considered Cartesian solipsism, Sartrean objectification, and the phenomenon of dehumanization, we ought to ask the main question of this chapter: What do Cartesian Solipsism and Sartrean Objectification help to reveal in the phenomenon of regarding the other as sub-human?

In regard to Descartes, we focused on the topics of solipsism, dualism, and hyperbolic doubt concerning the existence of other minds. In regard to Sartre, we discussed the concepts of the objectifying look, the vulnerability of the self under this look, shame, the freedom of self vs. the fixed nature of the Other. In the section on

¹³⁷ - Ibid., 4. In a similar analysis Alia Al-Saji has a paper on how seeing can be culturally essentializing. In "A Phenomenology of Hesitation, Interpreting Racializing Habits of Seeing," Al-Saji explains that vision is not a mere neutral recording of the visible. We learn to see culturally, and we develop the habit of seeing bodies in a racialized context. She even goes further to say that racialized bodies cannot be seen otherwise. The racialized look does not wait for new data but sees the whole racialized body at once as an essence. For instance, a racist teacher sees Muslim students all in one moment with no differences. See: Alia Al-Saji, "A Phenomenology of Hesitation, Interpreting Racializing Habits of Seeing." in *Living Alterities: Phenomenology, Embodiment, and Race* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2014).

dehumanization, we discussed the topics of the cultural Other as less-than-human, dehumanization, and essentialism.

Here, I want to interweave these concepts and claim that dehumanization can have a phenomenological description (independent of other cultural, religious, economical, or political reasons), which is the inability, on the part of the self, to secure the existence of another equally human mind. In other words, when a cultural self cannot guarantee that the cultural Other has a human consciousness equal to that of the self, it concludes that the cultural Other can be less-than-human. I must emphasize that using Cartesian and Sartrean concepts is not meant to imply that Cartesian solipsism or Sartrean objectification lead to racist behaviors in ordinary life. In this process, I see the phenomenological analyses capable of describing mental structures or tendencies or possibilities which we can see at work in the cultural phenomena. The phenomenological accounts describe the way the mind works in dehumanizing the Other.

This “can” should be explained. When the human consciousness of the Other is in doubt, or the equality of his consciousness with the self is in doubt, the self might regard him differently than when the self is certain that the Other has an equal human consciousness. This is similar to the *automata* in Descartes, that can be regarded as less-than-human entities. If the Cartesian approach to the Other cannot prove the existence of the Other’s mind, and the self is doomed to be a solipsist, the Other might be regarded as an unessential less-than-human being.

When the mind is reduced to a solipsist context because it has no ontological connection with Others, even with its own body, it cannot consider Others as true

equal consciousnesses. Others will be, ultimately, less-than-humans that will be perceived as humans in appearance only, but not be humans in reality. In such a context, the solitary mind can do whatever it wishes with hats, coats, and the less-than-human consciousness that lie beneath them.

Objectifying look and essentialist dehumanization

On the other hand, Sartrean objectification and putting the Other under the dominating and objectifying look can give birth to a dehumanizing look. As we saw in examples of dehumanization, the cultural self feels threatened by the semi-human powers of the cultural Other. We saw that, from a Nazi point of view, the Jew can be a danger to national purity. The Jew (as less-than-human) has the capacity to present himself as a full human, and may marry an Aryan, or the Jew may achieve a position as a teacher of Aryan children, and through all these activities he can spread the disease of Jewishness all over the Europe. To defend against this threat, the Aryan should defeat the Semitic look by turning the direction of the look toward the Jew. This subjective power will equip the Aryan with an objectifying look. The look condemns the Jew to be an eternal entity, a fix-natured pest of humanity that should be driven into extinction. Therefore, I see a short path between the Sartrean objectifying look and the possibility of taking up an essentialism of the dehumanized Other.

Hegel, The Annihilated Other

Hegel, annihilation, and genocide

In the two previous sections of this chapter, we considered two sides of the negation approach to the cultural Other: uncertainty about the humanity of the Other, and the objectification of the Other. Cartesian solipsism and what Sartre calls objectification of

the Other, opened the way to regarding the Other as sub-human. In this approach, the Other was a dangerous, wild semi-human who should be oppressed, conquered, and subjugated. The self sees no common interest with the Other and is the negation of the Other. Degrading the Other into a lower level of existence, considering the Other as dehumanized, can be one's first reaction. When the self feels that the Other is a danger and it can threaten the self's existence, dehumanization would be a form of preparation for extermination. The self then wishes to kill the Other. Annihilation of the Other can secure the self forever. This annihilation has been discussed in Hegel's *Phenomenology*. I am going to analyze this type of relation with the help of Hegelian phenomenology. When this annihilation of the Other is placed in a cultural context, it appears as the phenomenon of genocide. Therefore, I will end this chapter by analysing the phenomenon of genocide as another cultural phenomenon that can be analyzed by the concept of the negation between self and the Other.

The concept of Otherness is one of the key terms in Hegel's philosophy. The Other sometimes appears as a concept for another concept in the *Logic*, e.g., nothingness as the Other for being.¹³⁸ In other cases, it appears as an opposing subject against another subject, as in the *Phenomenology*, i.e., as the master and slave dynamic. And sometimes it appears as a counterpart subject, i.e., one who respects the Other's rights, in *Philosophy of Right*.

¹³⁸ - Hegel's *Logic* illuminates the nature of negation in the first doctrine of the logic, the doctrine of being. In this doctrine, one might see a specific relation between concepts that can be described as negation. In this step of the Hegelian logic, Hegel develops his concepts to the point where they leave no room for Others. For instance, the concept of Being is the absolute negation of the concept of nothing. This absolute negation means in moving from Being to Nothing, and all elements of Being vanish.

However, all these accounts of the relationship between the self and the Other fall under a higher order account. Hegel's principal focus is how consciousness can reach the stage of self-consciousness and freedom. But, along this path, consciousness needs to encounter the Other numerous times. In other words, to show how consciousness (Spirit) becomes completely aware of what it is and fully actualize its potentialities, it must encounter the Other everywhere.

Encountering the Other

Encountering the Other happens on the Spirit's journey toward self-consciousness. Consciousness begins the journey from itself, then encounters the world around it in various, subsequent steps. In each step, it experiences a new form of knowledge of the world, and it takes a specific attitude toward the world based on that type of knowledge. In the world in which Spirit is looking and knowing, there are stones, wood, minerals, and all the things that make up the inert world. But there is also something else in the world, something special. This thing is not like the inert world of stones and wood, nor like consciousness itself. It is something in between; it is a material that behaves like consciousness. It is another consciousness.

This is an outstanding step in the life of Spirit. But in confrontation with things distinct from mere objects, i.e., another consciousness, the former consciousness must take on a new attitude. The two consciousnesses begin to act and react to each other. In this back and forth, each attains a new knowledge of itself and becomes *self-consciousness*, *Selbstbewusstsein*.

The absolute I

Consciousness in front of an object is like a pure “I.” This “I” is full of certainty¹³⁹ and self-confidence. This is similar to the Cartesian *cogito* that was unsure about everything except itself and the existence of its own thinking. Things appear independent to the “I,” but sooner or later, they will be defeated by consciousness’s will. This is the “I” who can only use things. It is the first I in the world with no Other yet in existence. It cannot even imagine that another I may exist.

Because it thinks of itself as the only I in the world, it considers itself as the only independent power of knowing and doing. It thinks of itself as a force of pure negation. It is a negative essence. This I is the engine of negativity, or as Hegel puts it: “*Das Eins ist das Moment der Negation.*”¹⁴⁰ The relation between this I and the objects in the external world is not merely knowing the things; it devours objects; it uses them up; it annihilates them in order to attain its goals. Interestingly, Hegel does not see knowing and annihilation as two separate things. The activity of annihilation, negation, or dissolution is “the power and work of the Understanding.” The power of negation is the power of thought.¹⁴¹

Desire for objects

The relation between consciousness and things has two sides: a speculative and a practical side. From the speculative side, the relation between consciousness and thing is perception, and from the practical side the relation is desire (*Begierde*). When consciousness wills itself to possess things, to appropriate them, to use them, or to

¹³⁹ - G.W.F Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 109.

¹⁴⁰ - G.W.F. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970), 95.

¹⁴¹ - Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 31.

annihilate them, in order to achieve a sense of satisfaction, this attitude is called desire.¹⁴² The concept has a mundane connotation. Usually it is used in the context of sexual desire or desire for food. After appropriating the object of desire comes the time of satisfaction (*befriedigung*). With respect to desire, there is always a moment of completion or fullness, a moment of saying “that is enough” (*satis*). But the question is: Can a consciousness do the same thing with another consciousness?

When confronted with another consciousness, it is an entirely different matter. Thus far, consciousness was dealing with inactive things, stones, wood, or, at most, with animals. But in the case of being confronted with another consciousness, there is a pair of eyes that are gazing back at the self and the self has a new, strange feeling: the self feels being endangered. The Other consciousness is dangerous because the self sees the same power it has in the Other. It can desire things and annihilate them, thus achieving satisfaction. The self sees that those eyes gazing at it might be able to do the same thing to the self that the self does with Other objects. I see subjectivity in the dark holes of his pupils. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, there are some hints of this equality between two consciousnesses; this comes before the lord and bondage stage. In this pre-war stage, “the Other is equally independent and self-contained.”¹⁴³ It is something that has an independence of its own; “[e]ach sees the Other do the same as it does; each does itself what it demands of the Other.”

¹⁴² - Ibid., 109.

¹⁴³ - Ibid., § 182.

Desire for the humans

But consciousness seems uneasy to fully accept this second self-consciousness. It pretends that, although this new thing seems different and dangerous,¹⁴⁴ it is at most a dangerous animal and not a dangerous human. To prove this, it uses the same weapon it has hitherto used for other inert things to deal with this new “at-most-an-animal.” It uses desire to deal with the Other consciousness. The former consciousness desires another consciousness. As Hegel puts it, “each seeks the death of the Other.” This fight between two consciousnesses is called, by Hegel, a *Kampf auf Leben und Tod*, a life-and-death struggle. Each tries to show that it is not attached to the necessities of everyday life; it is free; it is active; it is the only subject in the world. To demonstrate this, the self must go to war, a war which can have only one winner: the war of negating the Other.¹⁴⁵

The life-death struggle

Hegel does not provide us with any details of *how* the life-and-death struggle happens. As in a film, when an editor decides to juxtapose only the scenes right before and after the war, skipping the battle scene itself, here we see only the antecedent and the consequent stages of the life-and-death struggle. Emerging from battle, one consciousness is the winner, the Other is the loser. Only the former has proven itself independent. Was the Other killed? Not physically, perhaps, but spiritually. It is not an independent consciousness anymore, or at least for a while. It becomes a dependent

¹⁴⁴ - Alexandre Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel* (London: Cornell University Press, 1969), 10.

¹⁴⁵ - Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 187.

consciousness, immediate (secondary) consciousness, and inessential. Why does the winning consciousness not kill the defeated?

Death vs. enslavement

The answer is that the losing consciousness is not a corpse, or a slice of pizza to be merely grabbed, possessed, and enjoyed. Consciousness is a subject. It is a state of mind. Therefore, in desiring another consciousness, the former consciousness desires the subjectivity or freedom of another consciousness. By doing so, it seeks to prove that the real consciousness is only itself. It is the only essential consciousness, and it is free from the labor of natural life. Anything else, even this semi-consciousness that has appeared before the former consciousness is nothing in comparison to it. Because of these considerations, the winner does not kill the loser. It makes the loser a slave and itself the master. The etymology of the word servant shows that the word comes from the Latin *servus* ("slave"). The slave or servant is one who has been saved from a war. He has been saved for forced labor, instead of being killed.¹⁴⁶

Kojève on Hegel

This antagonistic reading of the Hegelian dialectic between the self and the Other is consistent with Alexandre Kojève's reading in *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*.

¹⁴⁶ - Similar to before when I compared Sartre and Hobbes, we see here a similarity between Hegel and Hobbes. Leo Strauss, in his classic book, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Genesis*, claims that Hobbes influenced Hegel. He claims that Hobbes focuses on the struggle over possession, while Hegel focuses on the struggle for honour or recognition. In chapter three, we will see that Hegel's antagonism will be denied by my commentators such as Robert Williams and Ludwig Siep. Siep specifically wrote a paper to refute Leo Strauss's position. In "The struggle for recognition: Hegel's dispute with Hobbes in the Jena Writings," Siep argues that the struggle between consciousnesses is a preliminary stage of the Hegelian dialectic and at a final stage (the ethical life) individuals reach mutual recognition. See: Ludwig Siep, "The struggle for recognition. Hegel's dispute with Hobbes in the Jena Writings." in *Hegel's Dialectic of Desire and Recognition* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996), 282.

Here I will explain Kojève's interpretation, and his critics, leaving alternative interpretations for my third chapter. For Kojève the essence of self-consciousness is desire. Although consciousness begins with a knowing self, the act of knowing does not lead consciousness to self-consciousness. Because

L'homme qui contemple est «absorbé» par ce qu'il contemple; le «sujet connaissant» se «perd» dans l'objet connu. La contemplation révèle l'objet, et non le sujet.¹⁴⁷

The "absorbed" subject is "brought back to himself" only by the act of desire, because only by desire or appropriation does the subject retake its freedom. According to this interpretation, if I know an apple, this knowledge does not give me self-consciousness. When I eat the apple that I've already known, then this act of eating gives me self-consciousness. This desire to eat the apple constitutes my being as an 'I.' In the step of knowing the apple, it is impossible to say, "I know the apple" because everything is perceiving the apple. We can say "knowing the apple" without indicating the subject of the act. But when the act of eating the apple occurs, I can say "I eat the apple" because eating is, so to say, active, while the act of knowing is passive.¹⁴⁸

In this process, desire puts the object in front of me; and I can consider myself as different and opposed to it. This difference or opposition brings me to self-consciousness. Desire moves me to action. I act to satisfy my desire, and I satisfy it by

¹⁴⁷ - Alexandre Kojève, *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel* (Paris: Gallimard, 1947), 11. English translation:

"The man who contemplates is "absorbed" by what he contemplates, the "knowing subject" "loses" himself in the object that is known. Contemplation reveals the object, not the subject." Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, 3.

¹⁴⁸ - « La connaissance qui maintient l'homme dans une quiétude passive. » Kojève, *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel*. 11.

*négarion, destruction, or transformation de l'objet désiré.*¹⁴⁹ To satisfy hunger, for example, the food must be destroyed. In this way, we see that self-consciousness is essentially connected to destruction.

But there is a problem. If desiring an object brings to me self-consciousness, can we say that this self-consciousness is human self-consciousness? Animals do the same when they desire something and eat it in a natural biological process. What is the difference between human self-consciousness and animal self-consciousness? Kojève distinguishes these two with *conscient de soi* (being self-conscious) and *Conscience de soi* (being Self-Conscious).¹⁵⁰ He believes that the only way to reach human Self-consciousness, is desiring another desire:

*Pour qu' il y ait Conscience de soi, il faut donc que le Désir porte sur un objet non-naturel, sur quelque chose qui dépasse la réalité donnée. Or la seule chose qui dépasse ce réel donné est le Désir lui même.*¹⁵¹

The only non-natural thing available to a desire is the very act of desire. All Other things are natural concrete objects. Only desire is an emptiness that wishes to suck things into itself. Therefore, to be humanly self-conscious, we need to desire another desire. This necessitates a multiplicity of desires. In a society we can have a plurality of desires:

¹⁴⁹ - *Ibid.*, 11.

¹⁵⁰ - Another way to distinguish these two is that we translate them as "being 'aware' of oneself" vs. "being self-conscious". In the former case one can be aware of oneself due to purely material needs. Hunger signals that I need to eat - I am aware of my own need to fulfil some basic desire.

¹⁵¹ - Kojève, *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel*, 11. English translation:

"For there to be Self-Consciousness Desire must therefore be directed toward e non-natural object, toward something that goes beyond the given reality. Now, the only thing that goes beyond the given reality is Desire itself." Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, 5.

*pour que la réalité humaine puisse se constituer à l'intérieur de la réalité animale, il faut que cette réalité soit essentiellement multiple. L'homme ne peut donc apparaître sur terre qu'à l'intérieur d'un troupeau. C'est pourquoi la réalité humaine ne peut être que sociale.*¹⁵²

In a human society we find a new type of desire. This desire is not an animal desire. Kojève calls it *anthropogenic Desire*. This desire is toward a non-positive object. It is toward another Desire. In a man-woman relationship for instance, one side desires something beyond the body of the Other. One desires the freedom, the will to desire the Other. What does “desiring another desire” mean? It means that the former desire wants to be desired, to be loved. I, as a free will, ask the Other to accept me as a free will. Another name that Kojève gives to this “being desired” or “being loved” is to be *reconnu*, to be recognized. Therefore, when two human beings with Self-Consciousness, desire each other, it means desire 1 asks desire 2 to desire desire 1:

The human being is formed only in terms of a Desire directed toward another Desire, that is -finally- in terms of a desire for recognition. Therefore, the human being can be formed only if at least two of these Desires confront one another.¹⁵³

Because each is in the position of desiring, they do not want to lose the game. Seeing the relations between humans in this context, Kojève concludes that human society and human history is always the scene of a fight, because we are always in desire-full-ness. Sometimes the self wins and becomes autonomous, sometimes it

¹⁵² - Kojève, *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel*, 11. English translation:

“In order that Self-Consciousness be born from the Sentiment of self. in order that the human reality come into being within the animal reality, this reality must be essentially-manifold. Therefore, men can appear on earth only within a herd. That is why the human reality can only be social.” Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, 5-6.

¹⁵³ - Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, 7.

loses and becomes independent.¹⁵⁴ It is very interesting and relevant to the previous section on dehumanization that Kojève pictures the confrontation as follows:

When the “first” two men confront one another for the first time, the one sees in the Other only an *animal* (and a dangerous and hostile one at that) that is to be destroyed, and not a self-conscious being representing an autonomous value.¹⁵⁵ [Emphasis added.]

In this confrontation, each side attributes absolute value to itself and wants the Other to recognise this value. Kojève looks at this call for recognition as a fight for recognition. This call/fight can end in the death/annihilation of one side, because each side is human to the extent that it is recognized:

To speak of the “origin” of Self-consciousness is necessarily to speak of a *fight* to the death for recognition.¹⁵⁶ [Emphasis added.]

Here we encounter a division in commentators on Hegel. As stated, Kojève understands the call for recognition as a fight for recognition. In this approach, recognition is a monological or one-way road on which only one side can call for recognition, and the Other must (or is forced to) respond to this call. In other words, for Kojève recognition is always an unequal relation. As he expresses it, to be recognized is to be desired.

Sartre on Hegel

Sartre reads Hegel according to Kojève’s approach. Similar to Kojève, Sartre takes the fight/struggle for recognition as the main theme of the relation between the self and

¹⁵⁴ - Ibid., 7-8.

¹⁵⁵ - Ibid., 10.

¹⁵⁶ - Ibid., 7.

the Other in Hegel. Considering the Hegelian approach to the self-Other relation, Sartre says:

*Pour me faire reconnaître par l'autre, je dois risquer ma propre vie. Risquer sa vie, en effet, c'est se révéler comme non lié à la forme objective ou à quelque existence déterminée; comme non lié à la vie. Mais en même temps je poursuis la mort de l'autre.*¹⁵⁷

As we saw in the previous section on Sartre, this “*mort de l'autre*” is the core of the self-Other relation in Sartre’s understanding of Hegel and his own theory. Although Sartre admires Hegel as a further step toward intersubjectivity—compared with Husserl, which we will discuss in the third chapter—he thinks that Hegel remains in the antagonistic stage of the self-Other relation and cannot reach the stage of reciprocal recognition. Hegel, according to Sartre, remains in the ontological (eidetic) type of relation between the self and the Other, and cannot arrive at the ontic (empirical) level of the relation; therefore, reciprocal recognition cannot be achieved correctly. This means that Sartre thinks that true recognition can be achieved through existential phenomenology in which self and Other encounter one another not only in theory (only knowing each other), but in reality, with their concrete existences. He claims that Hegel ultimately remains with metaphysical idealism instead of entering into realism:

D’après Hegel, l’autre est objet et je me saisis comme objet en l’autre. Or, l’une de ces affirmations détruit l’autre : pour que je puisse m’apparaître comme objet en l’autre, il faudrait que je saisisse l’autre en tant que sujet,

¹⁵⁷ - Sartre, *L’être et le néant*, 274. English translation:

“In order to make myself recognized by the Other, I must risk my own life. To risk one's life, in fact, is to reveal oneself as not-bound to the objective form or to any determined existence-as not-bound to life. But at the same time I pursue the death of the Other.” Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*. 320.

*c'est-à-dire que je l'appréhende dans son intériorité. Mais en tant que l'autre m'apparaît comme objet, mon objectivité pour lui ne saurait m'apparaître : sans doute je saisis que l'objet-autre se rapporte à moi par des intentions et des actes, mais du fait même qu'il est objet, le miroir-autrui s'obscurcit et ne reflète plus rien.*¹⁵⁸

As we see here, because self and Other appear to each other as objects, they are not able to see the subjectivity of the Other, therefore, the Other becomes *obscurcit* (darkened).

Robert Williams on Kojève

Robert Williams is critical of Kojève and Sartre in their readings of Hegel. In chapter three, I will explain his position concerning intersubjectivity in Hegel. Here, I will confine myself to his critique of Kojève and Sartre. Williams believes that Kojève's interpretation is misleading, because he grasps the concept of recognition at a lower level, where conflict and fight appear absolute with no chance of mediation between the self and the Other. Williams thinks that Kojève's position would be deficient¹⁵⁹ because he has distorted the meaning of recognition in Hegel. He believes recognition for Hegel is a reciprocal acknowledgement of the Other's freedom, not a one-way call for recognition and response from the Other side. Williams accuses Kojève of this

¹⁵⁸ - Sartre, *L'être et le néant*, 281. English Translation:

"According to Hegel the Other is an object, and I apprehend myself as an object in the Other. But the one of these affirmations destroys the Other. In order for me to be able to appear to myself as an object in the Other, I would have to apprehend the Other as subject; that is, to apprehend him in his interiority. But in so far as the Other appears to me as object, my objectivity for him can not appear to me. Of course I apprehend that the Other-as-object refers to me by means of intentions and acts, but due to the very fact that he is an object, the Other-as-a-mirror is clouded and no longer reflects anything." Sartre. *Being and Nothingness*. 327.

¹⁵⁹ - Williams, *Hegel's Ethics of Recognition*, 20.

distortion and believes that it is continuing in present-day interpretations of Hegel. Williams calls this a contemporary "dogma" about Hegel.¹⁶⁰

According to Williams, for Kojève and Sartre, the life and death struggle is the final stage of recognition for Hegel, whereas for Hegel, the struggle is the first stage. Williams believes that the struggle ceases in family relations (between man and woman or between child and parents) or in social relation (between individual and the state). These new areas are what Williams calls "ethical spheres," in which a 'we' or an ethical life is possible.

Williams's critique of Sartre in his reading of Hegel has two aspects. First, Williams thinks that Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* does not display Hegel carefully and precisely. Williams claims Kojève has been the only source for Sartre on Hegel¹⁶¹ until 1945, when Sartre starts to get closer to Hegel again and, in the meantime, collects his notes on a possible ethics in *Cahiers pour une morale*. The other aspect of his criticism is that Sartre's philosophy does not allow him to read Hegel correctly. For Sartre, according to Williams, being a subject and being an object are two different types of being. They are incompatible, therefore, the Other appears to the self in only one way, either subject or object. For Sartre, according to Williams:

The Other as subject and the Other as object are incomparable because they are two entirely separate orders of being. Sartre's claim that reciprocal recognition in Hegel's sense is impossible depends on these dualist ontological premises.¹⁶²

¹⁶⁰ - William, Hegel's Ethics of Recognition, 10.

¹⁶¹ - Williams refers to an interview with Sartre in which he was asked whether he had read Hegel when he wrote *Being and Nothingness*. He replied, "No. I knew of him through seminars and lectures, but I didn't study him until much later, around 1945." P. A. Schilpp, ed., *The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre* (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1981), 9.

¹⁶² - Williams, *Hegel's Ethics of Recognition*, 375.

Butler on Kojève and Sartre

This dualist ontology keeps Sartre always away from thinking of the possibility of true recognition. Williams, in this critique of Kojève and Sartre, is not alone. Judith Butler's approach supports him. In *Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France*, Butler believes Kojève is influenced by classical liberalism in which the individual outweighs the community. According to Butler, in individualistic approaches to recognition, the individual forms the community and remains independent from the community. The community, in response, facilitates the development of individuality and not its transcendence.¹⁶³ According to this meaning of recognition, the Other is not a genuine subjectivity *par excellence*. The Other appears only as a tool or a vehicle for the recovery of the self. The Other merely provides an occasion for self-reflection and self-consciousness. In this context, the key role to achieve self-consciousness is desire.¹⁶⁴

Butler believes that Kojève reduces the whole dialectic of the self and the Other into desire because Kojève, from the beginning, refuses the Hegelian assumption that ontological unity between the self and the Other is possible. By this refutation, desire becomes the main theme of relation. For Kojève, according to Butler, desire is a negating act that separates the self from the world. For Hegel, however, desire is an action within the context of the world. Through this separation, the self for Kojève

¹⁶³ - Judith Butler, *Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 77.

¹⁶⁴ - Judith Butler, *Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France*, 66.

becomes a metaphysical, abstract subject, but for Hegel it is a concrete one that is rooted in nature.¹⁶⁵

Sartre, according to Butler, cannot escape from this ontological dualism in reading Hegel. Desire remains for him as crucial as it was for Kojève: *le désir est l'être de la réalité-humaine*.¹⁶⁶ And to create this reality, the subject puts itself in opposition to the world:

Sartre views the world as forever external to consciousness, an exteriority that can never be assimilated. Because the world cannot be reclaimed as a constitutive aspect of consciousness, consciousness must set up another relation to the world; it must interpret the world and imaginatively transfigure the world. Desire becomes a way in which we impulsively situate ourselves in the world: it is the primary act, an act incessantly performed by which we define ourselves in situation.¹⁶⁷

Descombes on Kojève

Have Kojève and Sartre understood Hegel wrongly? Some people like Robert Williams answer quickly in the affirmative. We saw that Williams believes Kojève has distorted Hegel's philosophy, and his interpretation is misleading. There is, however, another approach which states that Kojève's introduction to Hegel was not intended to be faithful to Hegel's thought. Descombes shows in *Le Même Et L'autre Quarante-Cinq Ans De Philosophie Française (1933-1978)* that Kojève's approach is an anthropological version of Hegelian philosophy. In this reading of Hegelian phenomenology, Kojève gives a humanistic sense to nothingness and negation. Human freedom is nothing

¹⁶⁵ - Ibid., 69-70.

¹⁶⁶ - Sartre. *L'être et le néant*, 621. "Desire is the being of human reality."

¹⁶⁷ - Judith Butler, *Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France*, 96-97.

other than negation, therefore, consciousness is negation of the world. This negation is not only between the self and the world, it is between nature and history, and between being-in-itself and being-for-itself. For Kojève, Hegel's philosophy is a good stage to depict the bloody dialectic of human history:

De façon générale, son interprétation, loin de mettre l'accent sur l'aspect raisonnable et pacifiant de la pensée hegelienne, insiste avec complaisance sur les moments paradoxaux, excessifs, violents et surtout sanglants. Lors des événements de mai 1968, Kojève aurait dit, à ce qu'on raconte: le sang n'a pas coulé, il ne s'est donc rien passé... Son commentaire de la *Phénoménologie de l'esprit* présente celle-ci comme un récit de l'histoire universelle dans lequel ce sont les luttes sanglantes - et non « la raison » - qui font avancer les choses vers l'heureuse conclusion.¹⁶⁸

Looking at history as "*luttes sanglantes*" means that the engine of history is struggle. Descombes thinks that this is Kojève philosophy, not Hegel's, however, Descombes does not charge Kojève with distorting Hegel and misleading French contemporary interpretations of Hegel.

We can pause here and return to the main question of this dissertation. How can this antagonistic approach to the Other help us to describe an culturally annihilating approach to the Other? I believe we can consider the phenomenon of genocide and analyze it with the help of this Hegelian theory of annihilation.

¹⁶⁸ - Descombes, *Le Même Et L'autre, Quarante-Cinq Ans De Philosophie Française (1933-1978)*, 25-25. English translation:

"In general terms, far from emphasising the reasonable and conciliatory side of Hegel's thought, his reading dwells on its paradoxical, excessive, violent, and, above all, sanguinary features. In the face of the events of 1968, Kojève is reported to have said that, since there had been no bloodshed, nothing had happened ... his commentary on the *Phenomenology of Mind* presents it as an account of universal history in which bloody strife – and not 'reason' – is responsible for the progress of events towards the happy conclusion." Descombes, *Modern French Philosophy*, 13.

Genocide, The Massacred Other

Genocide, an equivalent for Hegelian concept of annihilation

In this chapter, so far, we saw that when the negating self comes to a cultural context and confronts a cultural Other, it sees nothing valuable in the life of the Other. The Other is of no worth or meaning. The Other is a sub-human being which the self must get rid of by any means necessary. Dehumanization is a psychological preparation to annihilate the Other. Now as the radical form of negation, annihilation happens. Annihilation is, indeed, the climax of the negation. We are still in the same stage. Similarly, in the cultural side, genocide is the climax of dehumanization. Although I discussed some cases of annihilation in the previous section, my focus was on the concept of dehumanization. The sub-human Other either remains alive with limitations or cannot be tolerated and must be killed.

By “annihilation” is not necessarily meant *physical* annihilation; sometimes it takes the form of intellectual annihilation. As we saw earlier, the concept of annihilation was important to describe one stage in the Hegelian dialectic between two consciousnesses. If we translate the concept into a cultural context, the equivalent would be “genocide.”

History of the concept and its instances

The term itself does not have a long history, despite its historical instances which date back to the early stages of human life on earth. The term “genocide” was coined in 1943 by Raphael Lemkin, a lawyer of Polish-Jewish descent and professor of law at Yale university.¹⁶⁹ The concept is composed of *genos* (Greek for race) and *-cide* (from the

¹⁶⁹ - Raphael Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress* (New York, H. Fertig, 1973).

Latin “*occidere*” for “to kill”). The essence of genocide for Lemkin is the aim of annihilating a group completely. He associates ‘extermination’ and ‘crippling’ with the concept of ‘genocide.’¹⁷⁰ When a human group destroys or cripples another human group in a way that the latter is annihilated permanently, we can say that the former has committed genocide. The two terms of extermination and crippling (paralyzing) indicate two types of genocide.

Two types of genocide, physical and cultural

First, combining the language of this dissertation with Lemkin’s, one can say that if the Other is exterminated it would be a biological genocide. In this case, people of a certain culture are killed in an act of mass murder, such as what happened to the Tutsis in Rwanda, or African people in the time of colonialism. This is a biological extermination or annihilation.

The second type of genocide can be called cultural genocide or ethnocide. In this type, there is no biological annihilation, or at least physical annihilation is not the primary means of the annihilator. Instead, the annihilator destroys all ways of living for the victim. The annihilator, for instance, forces the victims to migrate from their homeland. He destroys all the ways in which the victims can relate to their culture. Economical and cultural resources are destroyed. Practicing their religious rituals, teaching their native language to a new generation, keeping their businesses, etc., becomes forbidden for the victims. The result is that after a few generations, the culture is extinct, and we see new people who have no connection to their religion,

¹⁷⁰ - Raphael Lemkin, “Genocide as a Crime under International Law,” *American Journal of International Law* 41:1 (1947), 147.

language, rituals, and lifestyle; in a nutshell, they have lost their culture. In this case, the victims have not been physically annihilated, but their culture has been targeted and they have become a rootless people. Usually the predators/annihilators tries to replace the victims' culture with their own culture, but because culture is not like clothing that one can simply take off and put on, this process is never fully completed, and the victim is left culture-less.

Compared to the first type of genocide, the second type of genocide is implicit and hard to discover. But as the second article of *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* insists, killing is only one way of committing genocide. The article names other ways such as causing serious bodily or mental harm; inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; or transferring children of the group to another group.

Examples for the first type of genocide are as follows: The destruction of Carthage, the destruction of Albigenses and Waldenses, the killing of Christians under the Ottoman Empire, the massacres of the Herero in Africa, the extermination of the 1.5 million Armenians in Turkey between 1914 and 1923, the slaughter of Assyrians in Iraq, the slaughter of 800,000 Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994 within three months, the destruction of the Maronites, the perishing of 300,000 native Americans in California from 1769 to 1821, and the most famous case of the Holocaust.

Examples of the second type of genocide are as numerous as the first type. One of the most available examples for Canadians is that of the Indigenous residential schools. The slogan "kill the Indian in the child" is exemplary for second type of

genocide. It means precisely leaving the victim biologically alive but depriving the victim of all cultural resources such as language, religion, family relations, and lifestyle. The Other example can be what has been happening to Baha'i people in many Muslim countries. They are deprived of public education, employment, running their own businesses, or even enjoying the right of property ownership. Life for this religious group is so hard that they have to leave their homeland and migrate to Other countries with the hope of a peaceful life. Another example would be the conflict (1636-1637) between Pequot nation, the native American people of Connecticut, and the English colonial troops, the nation was defeated and was forced to accept a treaty to not use their tribal names or have access to their ancestral lands. The goal of such a treaty was to interrupt the nation's remembrance of their culture.¹⁷¹

Sometimes the killing process is a combination of mass killing, letting die, deprivation of basic needs, and the separation of children from their families. The case of Armenians genocide was like this. The process began with the arresting and killing of Armenian elites. In the second step, the Armenians' property was confiscated for Turk Muslims. Then, the government began the deportation of the Armenians. The Armenian population was forced to leave their homes and go toward the Syrian border. During the deportation, Armenian men were killed in a number of stages. When families were passing cities on the way, they gave up their children because they knew that a massacre was inevitable. After killing the men, systematic rape was inflicted upon the Armenian women. Deportation had some costs for the government.

¹⁷¹ - Gregory D. Smithers "Rethinking Genocide in North America" in *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 331-333.

They had to hire guards for the exile, but the government found a humiliating way to fund the process. The government used the proceeds from the Armenian properties to finance the deportation. At the end of journey, the survivors found themselves trapped in the Syrian desert. The officials exposed them to contagious and fatal diseases such as typhus. They refused to provide them water and food. A local governor burned a thousand children alive.

Sartre on genocide

Sartre also addresses the problem of genocide in his famous speech to the Russell Tribunal in 1968. The tribunal was held to investigate allegations of international law violations committed by the United States in Vietnam. In his speech, Sartre addresses genocide as a deliberate plan to destroy a nation. Because every individual in the victim-nation (any peasant or labourer) can be a potential soldier, the invader prefers a total war to destroy the Other nation totally.

This complete destruction can be carried out in the two forms of genocide we discussed above; physical annihilation, or cultural annihilation. Sartre focuses on the case of France and Algeria to explain cultural genocide. When the *Code Civile* was imposed on the Algerian economic structures, bourgeois jurisdictions divided the Algerians' inherited property. The property that was in the hands of a family and they knew how to work on it collectively, by bourgeois jurisdictions it is divided to smaller pieces in the hands of individuals. The result down the road is that the Algerian farmers cannot manage their property individually and the property is passed from

the hands of peasant tribes to the merchants of France.¹⁷² This is a cultural genocide that destroys systematically the economic structure of the country. Through this systematic destruction, the Algerians lost their personality, their culture, their customs, and even their language.

Sartre also explains the concept of genocide in its typical meaning, namely, physical annihilation. In Sétif, 1945, French troops massacred 45000 Algerians who rose up against the occupying colonial forces. This mass killing is very much in line with what we discussed earlier in this chapter about the objectification and dehumanization of the cultural Other. Sartre formulates this as follows: Settlers are superior in arms, the colonized in numbers.¹⁷³ The result is clear: genocide. Dealing with pests, or as Gorge Orwell puts it in his essay "Marrakesh," the undifferentiated brown stuff, bees or coral insects, requires complete annihilation. "The villages are burnt," Sartre says,

the population has to endure massive and deliberately destructive bombardments, the cattle are shot out, the vegetation is ruined by defoliants, what does grow is ruined by toxic elements, machine guns are aimed haphazardly, and everywhere there is killing, rape, and pillage."¹⁷⁴

¹⁷²- In *Colonialism and Neocolonialism*, Sartre depicts Algeria under the colonial system. Through "Frenchifying" and dividing up property, the structure of the old tribal society was broken. The colonial system enacts this destruction systematically because, first, it suppresses the forces of resistance and, second, because it creates labour. The colonial system turns the Algerians into slaves who work on the lands that belonged to them in the past. By planting vines, the Algerians are deprived of staple food resources. The best lands in the country were devoted to wine-growing, and the consequence was that in 1871, there were 500 kilos of grain for each inhabitant, in 1901, 400 kilos, in 1940, 250 kilos, and in 1945, 200 kilos. See: Sartre, *Colonialism and Neocolonialism* (London: Routledge, 2001), 13-14.

¹⁷³ - Jean-Paul Sartre, *On Genocide: and a Summary of the Evidence and the Judgments of the International War Crimes Tribunal* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968). The statement is available at: <http://www.brussellstribunal.org/GenocideSartre.html>

¹⁷⁴ - Ibid.

It is a lose-lose game for the victim. Referring to American troops' atrocities committed against the Vietnamese, Sartre sees no way of escape for the victim. If they resist American gun machinery, they will be killed sooner. If they surrender and join the concentration camps, they will be killed more slowly. Life in the camps inevitably ends in death: surrounded by barbed wire, suffering malnourishment, lacking sanitation, packed into tents or primitive huts. In the concentration camps, social structure is deliberately destroyed to kill the spirit of the prisoner before killing her/him biologically. Families are disintegrated. Husband is separated from wife, and mother from children. Due to this tactic, the birth rate is diminished. In next steps, cultural or religious life is abolished. As Sartre puts it, "there is only a choice between immediate violent death and a slow death after mental and physical degradation."¹⁷⁵

Finally, Sartre considers genocide as a contemporary/modern phenomenon, as *systematic* annihilation/destruction. When the American army destroys hospitals, schools, places of worship, we can say that it was committed suddenly, in a flash of passion. It is conceivable that in the past, in the midst of a tribal or feudal conflict, one side wished to annihilate the Other nation, but the American anti-guerrilla genocide, Sartre believes, "is a product of our times that necessarily entails organization, bases and, therefore, accomplices (from a distance) and the appropriate budget. It needs to be thought over and planned."¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁵ - Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ - Ibid.

Dehumanization, a pre-stage for genocide

In both cases of physical and cultural genocide, dehumanization works as a pre-condition. People dehumanize the Other national, ethnical, racial or religious group before annihilating them in a genocidal action. In 1906, a military handbook was published for British soldiers and given to all British colonial territories around the world. The handbook is about small wars. The author, a colonel, defines the term 'small war' as "practically it may be said to include all campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides consist of regular troops. It comprises the expeditions against savages and semi-civilized races by disciplined soldiers."¹⁷⁷ As this definition indicates, this type of war is not against troops, it is against civilians who, for any reason, have come to fight with British soldiers. These non-troop people are perceived as savage and only semi-civilized. This dehumanized people can be mass murdered because they do not have complete human standing. One might ask what the reason for fighting would be? A page later, the author explains the cause of a small war: it occurs "when a Great Power adds the territory of barbarous races to its possessions." The colonel gives examples of actual cases, and thus is entirely clear what type of war he is referring to:

The suppression of the Indian Mutiny and the Anglo-French campaign on the Peiho, the British operations against the Egyptian army in 1882, and the desultory warfare of the United States troops against the nomad Red Indians, the Spanish invasion of Morocco in 1859, and the pacification of Upper Burma, can all alike be classed under the category of small wars.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁷ - C. E. Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 21.

¹⁷⁸ - Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*, 22.

Throughout the whole handbook, the phrase “savage and semi-civilized races” represents the rival in small wars. In some cases, it accompanies other typical stereotypes such as ‘Orientals’¹⁷⁹, ‘Asiatic and Red Indians’¹⁸⁰ or ‘cut-throat mountaineers or African savages’.¹⁸¹

If such wars are waged against savage semi-civilized races, according to dehumanization theory, it is acceptable to use poisonous gas to kill them *en masse*, as we do with ants or other pests. In 1920, the British army used poison gas against Arabs in Iraq and Winston Churchill, Secretary of State for War in that time, wrote: “I do not understand this squeamishness about the use of gas. I am strongly in favour of using poison gas against uncivilized tribes.”¹⁸² In 1936, in a war between Italy and Ethiopia, the Italian army installed special sprayers on aircrafts and crop dusted a deadly rain over vast areas of the territory. According to the reports, this deadly rain drenched soldiers, women, children, cattle, rivers, lakes, and pastures. Everything succumbed in a few days to dreadful suffering.¹⁸³

¹⁷⁹ - Ibid., 49.

¹⁸⁰ - Ibid., 95

¹⁸¹ - Ibid., 229.

¹⁸² - David E Omissi, *Air power and colonial control: The Royal Air Force, 1919-1939* (England: Manchester University Press, 1990), 160.

¹⁸³ - Dominik j. Schaller, “Genocide and Mass Violence in the ‘Heart of Darkness,’ Africa in the Colonial Period” in *Genocide Oxford Handbook* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 357.

Chapter Two: Philosophical Opposition, Cultural Orientalization

Summary of the chapter

In the previous chapter, I considered a type of relation in which the self is the absolute subject of the world. It believes itself to be absolute and therefore takes on an attitude of negation toward anything other than itself. When there is nothing else besides the self, the self is absolute, but also alone, as we saw in our consideration of Cartesian solipsism. In such a situation, the self has no option except to think of itself as the only subject in existence. It regards the whole world as a collection of objects. Even when it encounters the Other, the self tries to objectify it, as we saw in Sartre, or the self struggles to eliminate the Other, as we saw in Hegel. We saw that such a philosophical conception of the self, in a cultural context, can be a self that thinks of itself as an absolutely civilized subject, who regards the Other as a non-human. Only brutality, anti-civilization, ahistoricity, and irrationality can be ascribed to the sub-human Other, therefore, he is a dangerous sub-human entity, and the self should defend itself against it. In the most extreme cases, a genocidal attack occurs.

But one may ask: Is this negation relation the only possible relation between the self and the Other? Can we find another type of relation described in the works of philosophers who have discussed the phenomenology of the Other? Instead of engaging in the absolute negation of the Other, the self starts to establish an oppositional binary role with the Other. The self becomes the opposite of the Other. Binary and oppositional concepts that Sartre uses (such as lover and beloved) to explain this type of relation display the nature of this relation.

In this stage, the self learns that the Other has noticeable capabilities, but the self remains in opposition to the Other. Because of this, the self comes to know the Other in a more serious way than before. The attitude of negation was one of ignoring the Other. In this new kind of relation, the self needs more accurate knowledge about the Other, through which it can define itself. In this relation, the self does not negate the Other completely, quite the contrary, it uses different terms to accurately describe what the Other is and what it is not. I will argue that most of these terms are binary or reflective: the self is knower, the Other is known; the self is white, the Other is black; the self is free, the Other is a slave; the self is a Westerner, the Other is oriental; the self is rational, the Other is emotional; the self is active, the Other is passive. Because of this reflective relation, I consider the attitude of binary opposition as the essence of this type of relation.

In the second type of relation, the self needs the Other in order to define itself. Therefore, instead of knowing the Other on certain occasions, the self tries to know the Other in depth. In this Other-ology, every aspect of the Other's life must be discovered, known, and categorized. Because the self's life has different aspects—for

instance cultural, economic, emotional, or political—the Other must be examined in all of these spheres. The more knowledge the self can achieve concerning the Other, in various contexts, the greater possibility there is for the self to define itself in each context. This self-defining has an oppositional style. The self posits itself or defines itself as opposite to the Other. Because there is still a state of conflict between the self and the Other, the self always puts itself in opposition to the Other and they become a pair. With respect to each kind of knowledge of the Other, the self centralizes itself.

In the previous stage, the self sees no similarity between itself and the Other. Here, in the second stage, a minimum level of similarity is seen. This similarity inspires new feelings in the self. It sees that the Other shows a level of rationality, freedom, and will, but this level is not enough to be equal with the self. The Other seems to be able to make plans and act freely. In such a situation, the self comes to the conclusion that, instead of annihilating these faculties and freedoms of the Other, it is better to overcome them, and then benefit from them. To overcome the Other successfully and benefit from the domination of the Other, first, the self must know the Other.

In Hegel, this type of relation is represented by the master and slave dynamic. Master and slave are two opposites, and the one cannot be defined without the other. In confrontations with the Other, and after the *Kampf auf Leben und Tod*, the self and the Other exit the relation of pure negation. They arrive at another stage of relation that has been built on top of the struggle. One becomes the winner and enjoys the benefits of the conquest, the Other becomes a loser and has to endure the consequences of its failure.

One sees a similar description of this type of relation in Sartre. Sartre explains this reflective/oppositional relation with the two concepts of the lover and the beloved, and other related concepts such as hate, desire, sadism, and masochism. In this relation, we see a reflection or duality. Although Sartre discusses different aspects of this relation and does not focus on duality (the struggle to control the Other's representation of me in some fashion, for instance), I will focus on the concept of duality in order to use this duality in my interpretation of orientalism. Sartre gives a sexual motif to this discourse in order to explain the relation. All terms like seduction (seducer/seduced), desire (desirer/desired), body (toucher/touched), love (lover/beloved) and sadism/masochism are used by Sartre to display this reflective relation. For instance, in love, the lover places himself in a binary opposition to the beloved. The lover seduces the beloved in order to be loved; therefore, love is not a unidirectional act, it is binary. It is a reflective action.

In the cultural context, the Other is no longer an anti-culture barbarian, a dehumanized pest that should be driven into extinction through genocide. It becomes an Other who has many resources, capabilities, and benefits that should be in service to the self. An example of the Other in this stage is the Oriental, or the colonized, who should be known and exploited. In this cultural encounter, the self, for the first time, seeks to establish *knowledge* of the Other. Orientalism is a good example for this power-related "knowledge." Knowledge that is sought in order to exploit requires a system of information classification—information about the Other's language, the Other's religion, the Other's physical shape, the Other's customs, etc. The self works tirelessly to know the Other, because knowing the Other is the first step in controlling

the Other. The more knowledge the self can gain concerning the Other, the more power the self can achieve over the Other. In Hegel, the master plans to control the slave; in Sartre, the lover works on the beloved to seduce him/her according to his/her plan. In Orientalism, the orientalist studies the Oriental from different aspects to be able to exploit it.

Orientalism can be an exemplary case for any reflective cultural relation. Many historical facts that Edward Said discusses in his book can be interpreted using the logic of opposition. Even the very concept of 'Orientalism' addresses this binary of the occidental and the oriental. The occidental knows the oriental according to a specific discourse to get a specific result: exploitation. Not only is the very concept of orientalism reflective, the results of orientalization are binary concepts: rational/emotional, wise/ignorant, developed/developing, just/unjust, democracy/despotism. This reflective difference between two groups of concepts is the logic of orientalism or any similar attitude for knowing a cultural Other that is represented as opposite. In Orientalism, Said discusses the Orientalist's indirect goal: defining the occidental by defining the Oriental. By knowing and controlling the Orient, the Occidental proves its power in knowledge (even self-knowledge) and politics. In other words, Orientalism (orientalization of the Other) can be a doorway to Occidentalism (authenticity of the Occidental, shown by the suffix "ism.") This type of relation is not imaginary (in contrast with dehumanization). The Orientalist makes a life-long effort to know the oriental. He has a strong desire to spend all of his life on tiny grammatical points of forgotten Asiatic languages, for instance. He/she works to

know the Other because profound Other-knowing is profound self-knowing. Through Said's explanation, we see this reflective relation:

England knows Egypt; Egypt is what England knows; England knows that Egypt cannot have self-government; England confirms that by occupying Egypt; for the Egyptians, Egypt is what England has occupied and now governs.¹⁸⁴

In many similar examples, Said explains this opposition, the occident is rational, autonomous and manly, and the orient is irrational, dependent and the object of sexual desires.

Hegel, the Enslaved Other

In my first chapter, I studied the Hegelian relation between the self and the Other as pure negation. This pure negation was expressed through the notions of desire and life-death struggle. That pure negation and will to annihilate led to two consciousnesses fighting to the death. Here in the second phase of the self-Other relation, we will study the result of that struggle and see how this can aid us in discussing the second type of relation between the self and the Other. I think we can call the second relation: opposition. In this kind of relation, the self knows that it is not independent of the Other. The self is theoretically and practically dependent on the Other. Therefore, instead of negating the Other, the self seeks to know the Other, and through this knowing aims to control/exploit the Other. This relation is apparent when one considers the relationship that obtains between the master and the slave.

¹⁸⁴ - Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 2003), 34.

Opposition

The nature of this second type of relation is reflective opposition. The point in the Hegelian system in which this relation of duality or opposition comes to the fore is in the master and slave section in *Phenomenology of Spirit*.¹⁸⁵ The conceptual/logical analysis of the relation can also be found in *The Encyclopedia Logic*, in the essence doctrine.¹⁸⁶ In these two contexts, Hegel considers concepts that are reflective of each

¹⁸⁵ - In "Notes on Hegel's 'Lordship and Bondage'" Gorge Armstrong Kelly explains that this duality of master and slave has two expressions. The first expression is in society. The second is a single consciousness. By this is Kelly means that, at first, it is one consciousness that splits into two, and one becomes master and the other becomes a slave. See: Gorge Armstrong Kelly, "Notes on Hegel's 'Lordship and Bondage'" in *Hegel's Dialectic of desire and recognition* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996).

¹⁸⁶ - In the *Logic*, the key term Hegel uses to describe this relation is *reflection*. As the phrase 'negation of negation' shows, the doctrine of Essence is a chapter within Hegelian logic that covers binary concepts. Everything in this doctrine is in a binary relation. In contrast to the doctrine of being, the sphere of essence is the proper place for mediation. Nothing is immediate, independent, or indifferent. Therefore, in this sphere, we have binary concepts: essence and appearance, positive and negative, matter and form, matter and content, whole and part, inner and outer. Because of this binary, the doctrine of essence is the best place to see a vivid picture of the relation between the opposing self and the Other, or master and slave. The sphere of being was the place of pure negation. Here we have a reflective relation. In the previous sphere, the self and the Other were able to exist independently, in the doctrine of essence; although they are opposites, they cannot be defined without the other. The self and the Other need each other essentially. The positive, for instance, is meaningless if we consider it alone. It only makes sense when we put it in relation to the negative. Therefore, the categories in question are negative and at the same time essentially dependent. Hegel calls being negative and essentially dependent on the Other *opposition*.

In the sphere of Essence, there is no "negation," rather we have reflection (*Reflexion*) or shining (*scheinen*). Hegel emphasises this difference saying that, in essence, the other is not *an other* of the self, it is *its other*. They are strictly related. Their relatedness (*Bezogenheit*) is not implicit (*an sich*), it is posited (*gesetzt*; Hegel, *The Encyclopedia Logic*, § 111). In the Doctrine of Being, we had a diverse relation between categories; they were independent. In the Doctrine of Essence, an opposition (*Entgegensetzung*) exists between pairs.

In the Doctrine of Essence, Hegel discusses the differences between diversity and opposition, identity and difference, equality and inequality, and so on. For instance, he explains that a pen and a camel (like being and nothing) are "diverse" because there is no common base for their relation, but a beech and an oak, or a temple and a church are "unequal." (Hegel, *The Encyclopedia Logic*, §118) There is also a difference between diverse and different. Diversity creates a sense of

other. Meanwhile these elements are in opposition to each other. Although they are oppositional, the nature of these two opposites forces them to be dependent on one another. Each needs the Other for its own definition. Robert Williams describes this move from negation to opposition:

The upsurge of the other is the self's discovery that it is not universal but rather is a particular opposed to another particular. This is a

indifference, whereas two different things are connected to each other. Stephen Houlgate describes this by referring to "difference" and "otherness." Otherness is a relation between something and something else. It means they stand in relation to each other and depend on each other. But with respect to "difference," there is no relation with something else; this is "the simple not": A and not-A. Diversity is the name of this independent relation in which two sides are "indifferent" to each other. (Stephen Houlgate, "Essence, Reflexion, and Immediacy in Hegel's Science of Logic." in *A Companion to Hegel*, 147.)

The positive and the negative are opposites. This means that each of them "is on its own account only in virtue of not being the other one, each shines within the other, and is only insofar as the other is." (Hegel, *The Encyclopedia Logic*, § 119) Hegel believes that, in spite of opposition, showing that things are dependent and mediated by each other is the ultimate purpose of philosophy. Philosophy must show that spirit and nature are not two indifferent things. They are not diverse, they are opposites, and each one confronts "not only *an* Other, but *its* other" (*nicht nur ein Anderes, sondern sein Anderes*; Hegel, *The Encyclopedia Logic*, §119.) This is one of the most illuminating phrases in *The Encyclopedia Logic*.

Karin De Boer in the paper "Hegel's Account of Contradiction in the Science of Logic Reconsidered" separates distinctness (Verschiedenheit) from opposition (Gegensatz), and contradiction. Arbitrary difference between various roses is distinctness. Non-arbitrary differences between positive and negative is opposition. When two opposite thing that are dependent to each other present themselves as independent, it is contradiction. Therefore, in the Doctrine of Essence, essence and appearance are two mutual opposites that present themselves contradiction. (See: Karin De Boer, "Hegel's Account of Contradiction in the Science of Logic Reconsidered" *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 48. no. 3. (2010), 359.)

John McTaggart and Ellis McTaggart in *A Commentary on Hegel's Logic* indicate that the Hegelian category of identity is not a tautology, whereas the Law of Identity is a tautology. Difference is a thought movement from A to not-A, not an Other-being of Determinate Being, because A and not-A are related to each other but Other-being and Determinate Being are primarily isolated and secondarily related. Variety is another category. Two things are various when they are indifferent to each other. When they are different a common base exists between them, they are like or unlike. When two things are different (not indifferent), and moreover, essentially against each other, like the positive and the negative, they are opposite. Now in the relation between West and East, both are opposite to each other but spontaneously dependent to the other (John McTaggart. *A Commentary on Hegel's Logic*, 103.) Using the Hegelian terminology, they are different and not indifferent.

reversal of the initial naive, immediate self-understanding. The starting point was that the self is absolute, unqualified, and not a mere particular; but this posture self-destructs and the truth turns out to be the opposite of what it was originally taken to be: the "absolute self" is a particular! This reversal leads to the second moment in the process of recognition, namely, *opposition* between particulars.¹⁸⁷ (Emphasis added.)

The life-death struggle ends at master-slave relation

We saw in the previous chapter that two consciousnesses can encounter each other while each supposes itself to be the only absolute subject in the world. We discussed how each of them considers the Other as nothing and they establish a life and death struggle against one another. But, at the end of the life and death struggle, one consciousness will have won and the Other will have lost. The winner becomes an independent or self-dependent consciousness. It has proven that it is purely for-itself and it is really what it claims to be. It does not admit to a dependence upon anything.

However, despite the seeming finality of "a life-and-death" struggle, the winner can never annihilate the loser completely, because the winner needs the loser to profess the subjectivity of the winner.¹⁸⁸ The winner needs to keep the loser semi-alive, at the border of life and death, because someone must exist to recognize the winner as winner. If the winner kills the loser, then there will be no one to confirm the victory. The winner must be recognized as the true subject, as superior, and the loser must be transformed into an inferior.

The transformation from two equally absolute consciousnesses into two unequal consciousnesses is critical. As we saw above, the winner of the life-and-death

¹⁸⁷ - Robert Williams, *Hegel's Ethics of Recognition*, 54.

¹⁸⁸ - Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 188.

struggle cannot annihilate the Other or negate it completely. In order to remain the absolute subject and to not negate the Other completely, the winner forces the Other to negate itself. Here the winner disregards taking the life of the loser and instead it seizes the autonomy of the loser. Kojève has clearly noticed this exchange of autonomy and life. The winner spares the loser's life and destroys the loser's autonomy. In other words, the winner enslaves the loser. Through this process, the autonomous consciousness becomes the master, and the dependent consciousness becomes the slave.¹⁸⁹ In response and appreciation of this forgiveness, the slave accepts to submit and recognize the master as a free and autonomous consciousness, and denies its own autonomy and freedom. Kojève even claims that the slave prefers life as an animal to death. The master becomes the holder of dignity and the slave declares his inferiority.¹⁹⁰ From now on, the master will be considered pure being-for-itself and the slave will be considered an in-itself and for-the-Other.

Unilateral recognition

The key term that Hegel uses in speaking of this self-denial of the slave and the recognition the master as master is *anerkennen*, what is usually translated into English as "recognition." *Anerkennen* is a conjunction of *an* + *erkennen*. *Erkennen* means to recognize, to realize, or to know. The prefix *an-*, when attached to some verbs, makes the action related to another. For instance, *melden*, in German means to inform or to let know, and *anmelden* means to inform another person. *Fragen* means asking and *anfragen* means asking another person. Thus, we may see that *an-erkennen* means

¹⁸⁹ - Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, 15.

¹⁹⁰ - Ibid., 16-19.

recognizing another person. The verb refers to another person.¹⁹¹ In the master-slave relation, it is the slave who recognizes the mastery of the master. This recognition occurs only in one direction, i.e., the slave does not receive any recognition. Hegel puts it as *einseitiges und ungleiches Anerkennen*, a one-sided and unequal recognition.¹⁹²

Between one-sided recognition and two-sided recognition there are intermediate levels. For instance, we can have a two-sided recognition that is not equally mutual, i.e., one side receives more recognition than the other. In this chapter, I am going to remain at a stage before equally mutual recognition. I will discuss equally mutual recognition in chapter three by considering several interpretations of the phenomenon by various commentators. Here, we have to remain at a level of unilateral recognition that happens between the master and the slave. We know that the master receives full recognition from the slave. However, the question is whether the slave receives any level of recognition.¹⁹³

Sartre on Hegelian master-slave relation

This consideration of the “level” of recognition the slave may receive, or the level of subjectivity that remains for the slave in this relation, has raised many questions. One

¹⁹¹ - For an account of the varied meaning of “recognition” in Hegel, see “Hegel’s Concept of Recognition—What is it?” by Heikki Ikäheimo. See: Ikäheimo, Heikki. “Hegel’s Concept of Recognition—What is it?” 11-38.

¹⁹² - Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 191; and Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, 152.

¹⁹³ - In “Conceptualizing Causes for Lack of Recognition—Capacities, Costs and Understanding,” Heikki Ikäheimo discusses some other reasons beyond animosity that people may fail to give recognition to others. He asks why people often fail to give others recognition. He explains that sometimes, giving (or receiving) recognition requires capacities or skills. Sometimes, recognition may involve costs, and people are reluctant to pay the price. The third reason is that recognition requires some intellectual capacities or understanding that individuals do not necessarily possess. See: Ikäheimo, Heikki. “Conceptualizing Causes for Lack of Recognition—Capacities, Costs and Understanding.”

might ask several challenging questions such as: Is the slave really the master of work? Can the slave liberate himself by work?¹⁹⁴ Is the slave the hero of the master-slave dialectic? Does the master truly need recognition from the slave? Does the master rely on the slave in reality? Sartre, in *Notebooks for an Ethics*, has discussed some of these questions. He offers four objections to Hegel's master-slave theory, showing that master-slave relation is not in a reciprocal situation and the way of freedom for the slave is much more harder than what Hegel has imagined.

1- The slave, in reality, is not the master of the work. He does not improve through the work. Hegel says "through work, however, the bondsman becomes

¹⁹⁴ - Steven B. Smith, in "Hegel on Slavery and Domination," argues that not work but Christianity saved/emancipated the slave from slavery. Christianity brought the idea of egalitarianism and universal recognition for the first time to history. Smith refers to parts of Hegel's *Philosophy of History* in which Hegel asserts the role of Christianity in the emancipation of the slave (Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, 19). Smith claims that this over-emphasis on the role of work was a distortion of interpreting Hegel by Marxists like Kojève. Kojève, however, is not alone in this interpretation.

The starting point of this interpretation goes back to Marx himself when he admires Hegel for grasping labor as the principle of self-creating of man. (Marx, "Critique of Hegel," in *Hegel's Dialectic of Desire and Recognition*, 38-39.) György Lukács also mentions the importance of work for Hegel. He connects the theme of work with class struggles and comments that "the high-road of human development, the humanization of man, ... can only be traversed through work." (Lukács, *The Young Hegel: Studies in the Relations Between Dialectics and Economics*, 327.) Other commentators express similar leftist views. See for example:

1- "Fear and service cannot by themselves raise the slave's self-consciousness to genuine independence; it is labor that transforms servitude into mastery." See: Jean Hyppolite, *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind*, 175-6.

2- "Through work, the slave rises from the disintegrative to the productive and self-productive consequences of negativity. ... In making things himself, the slave substantializes himself in the products of his labor." See: Stanley Rosen, G. W. F. Hegel: *An Introduction to the Science of Wisdom*, 163.

3- "Labor is ... the vehicle that transforms this relationship. The laborer's action does not disappear when the products of his labor appear, but is preserved in them. ... The objects of his labor are no longer dead things that shackle him to other men, but products of his work, and, as such, part and parcel of his own being." See: Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution*, 116.

conscious of what he truly is.”¹⁹⁵ Sartre thinks that this is unrealistic. The slave is too weak to be able to invent anything of technological significance. He is merely a domestic, agricultural worker. He is pure labor, not a master of the work who can challenge the master with his technique. Not slaves, but free men of the middle class were those who made technical inventions and discoveries.¹⁹⁶

2- Hegel claims that after working on the objects for the master, the slave reaches a stage in which he is free in thought. The slave becomes aware of itself “as essential being, a being which *thinks* or is a free self-consciousness.”¹⁹⁷ In this *thinking*, the slave finds that he is simply and solely in communion with himself. This stage of the slave’s movement toward freedom is comparable with Stoicism, because the basic principle of Stoicism is that consciousness is a being that thinks and this thinking determines what is true or good.¹⁹⁸ Sartre disagrees and argues that Stoicism was created not by slaves in history, but by masters. In Rome, stoicism was a theory for

¹⁹⁵ - Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 195.

¹⁹⁶ - Jean-Paul Sartre, *Notebooks for an Ethics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 73-74. We can consider what H. S. Harris argues, in Hegel’s Ladder, in response to Sartre. Harris argues that this “struggle for recognition” between the master and the slave is only logical, not historic. Harris shows that Hegel knew that servitude—neither in ancient times nor in the middle ages—arose from military defeat and submission. For instance, through his interest in the work of Solon, Hegel probably knew that many agricultural populations had originally accepted servitude without fighting. Harris thinks that this division between the master and the slave is not easily applicable to the Greek world (where usually the loser would be executed instead of kept alive for servitude). Harris thinks that the world of the Universal Roman Empire and the Universal Church is the hinge of the logic of the concept of recognition within history. When the Universal Empire reduces all the natural communities of Europe to political submission, the logic of recognition coincides with historical fact. See: H. S. *Hegel’s Ladder*. Vol. 1, 358.

¹⁹⁷ - Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 197.

¹⁹⁸ - Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 198.

masters. You must have goods first and then detach yourself from them to be a stoic. Slaves have nothing from the beginning, so being stoic is meaningless for slaves.

3- Hegel explains that the slave considers himself as absolutely nothing compared to the master. Sartre argues that working in a state of fear is true only for the first generation of slaves. And it is not the case in regard to subsequent generations of slaves. Many slaves who are born as slaves and do not experience the life and death struggle live in peace with their masters. This peace is unilateral. It is an imposed peace on the slaves, and its other name is brutal repression. We can imagine that Sartre does not mean that the second generation of slaves is happy with their slavery life. He probably means the suppression has reached a higher level in which the slaves cannot imagine themselves going to a life-death struggle. A generation of suppressed people likely has no energy and sees no reason to challenge the suppresser. The Colin Samson in his book mentions a historical fact that proves Sartre's idea. In 1859, when the Congress of United States debated a return to the Legal slave trade, President James Buchanan disagreed with the idea because, if they imported new wild, heathen, and ignorant barbarians as slaves, they would corrupt the sober, orderly, quiet slaves whose ancestors have been in America for several generations.¹⁹⁹ Another example that disproves this fearfulness of the slave before the master is the history of the Middle Ages. Sartre claims that that history is full of peasant revolts against their

¹⁹⁹ - Colin Samson, *The Colonialism of Human Rights: Ongoing Hypocrisies of Western Liberalism* (Cambridge and Medford: Polity, 2020), 79.

masters; therefore, we should accept that they did not fear risking their lives against that of the master.²⁰⁰

4- Above, we mentioned that the slave is the hero of the story and Hegel follows him through the subsequent stages of improvement. It seems that Hegel compares the history of slaves to the history of Spirit (or the history of mankind.) Sartre complains that this comparison is not reasonable, as the history of mankind is the history of masters. What is especially absent in history is the history of slaves:

It would be nice if History were the history of slaves but the fact is that slaves were ahistorical in antiquity: the general and repetition.²⁰¹

Fanon on Master-Slave relation

Another historical and cultural approach to the master/slave relation in Hegel is that of Frantz Fanon. Fanon puts the relation in a concrete, modern, imperialist context. He describes the relation between the white and the black in French colonialism. In France, the white, or the master, has given a type of recognition to the slave that cannot fit into the Hegelian theory. In a section titled "the Black man and Hegel," in *Black Skin White Masks*, Fanon describes a situation in which the black has been granted recognition, but something is wrong with this recognition. To see what is wrong, one can consider what is wrong with the situation of a servant who is allowed to dance in the drawing room once a year, or a servant who is occasionally allowed to eat at the master's table. Such a servant has not become an authentically free subject. He has merely been allowed to imitate the master's attitude.

²⁰⁰ - Sartre, *Notebooks for an Ethics*, 75.

²⁰¹ - Ibid., 74

In this picture, Fanon is describing the independence or recognition of the black nations after everything in their countries has been destroyed or plundered by white colonialists. Colonialism has created a new French black who speaks, thinks, and wears clothing like the French. In this situation, one day the white master says, in a “humanitarian” idiom, “Let’s be kind to the niggers,” and another responds, “yes, slavery shall no longer exist on French soil.” And the black becomes free without knowing from where this freedom was given. This freedom reaches the black man from the outside, and this free black man is still in slavery as he was before. This slave who is only apparently free has

values that were not engendered by his actions, values not resulting from the systolic gush of his blood, whirled around him in a colorful dance. The upheaval did not differentiate the black man. He went from one way of life to another, but not from one life to another. Just as a patient suffers a relapse after being told that his condition has improved and that he will shortly be leaving the asylum, so the news of emancipation for the slaves caused psychoses and sudden death.²⁰²

This concrete context discussed by Fanon shows that mutual recognition between master and slave is almost impossible, even if the master grants recognition to the slave. The slave who has been entirely alienated by the master, physically and mentally, does not know what his authentic freedom is. Sometimes, he may fight for liberty or justice, but what he means by these words has a European/white flavour.²⁰³

Another important point raised by Fanon, concerning the Hegelian master-slave relation, is that the master may not need recognition from the slave. We saw in

²⁰² - Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (New York: Grove Press, 2008), 194.

²⁰³ - We should note here that Fanon makes a distinction between black people in France and black people in United States. French blacks were set free without a fight, while the black Americans are in a constant battle. What Fanon is explaining here is applicable to French blacks.

the *Phenomenology of Spirit* that the master receives recognition from the slave through the domination of him. In a very important footnote, Fanon declares:

Nous espérons avoir montré que le maître ici diffère essentiellement de celui décrit par Hegel. Chez Hegel il y a réciprocité, ici le maître se moque de la conscience de l'esclave. Il ne réclame pas la reconnaissance de ce dernier, mais son travail. De même l'esclave ici n'est nullement assimilable à celui qui, se perdant dans l'objet, trouve dans le travail la source de sa libération. Le négre veut être comme le maître. Aussi est-il moins indépendant que l'esclave hégélien. Chez Hegel, l'esclave se détourne du maître et se tourne vers l'objet. Ici, l'esclave se tourne vers le maître et abandonne l'objet.²⁰⁴

The most important part of this paragraph is that, at least sometimes, the master does not need recognition from the slave. The only thing he wants from the slave is work. He is in a position of absolute dominance and receives his required recognition from other sources than the slave. The master is satisfied by the esteem which he receives from other parts of society and he has no need of recognition from the slave. A duke whose position is recognized by other first class people does not need recognition from his servants. A retail shop owner who has a team of employees and pays them the minimum wage and offers them no insurance or benefits does not need recognition from his employees. He is not even truly dependent on their labour. Very

²⁰⁴ - Frantz Fanon, *Peau noire, masques blancs* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1952), 179. English translation:

We hope we have shown that the master here is basically different from the one described by Hegel. For Hegel there is reciprocity; here the master scorns the consciousness of the slave. What he wants from the slave is not recognition but work. Likewise, the slave here can in no way be equated with the slave who loses himself in the object and finds the source of his liberation in his work. The black slave wants to be like his master. Therefore he is less independent than the Hegelian slave. For Hegel, the slave turns away from the master and turns toward the object. Here the slave turns toward the master and abandons the object.

easily, he can replace them with new hungry applicants who are ready to work for even less.

I have experienced this personally; I used to work for a billionaire who paid us less than the legal minimum wage with no employment insurance or any benefits. A group of 40 to 50 people were working for him and most of them looked up to him as their role-model or their hero. One time, a small group of employees, including me, tried to negotiate with the owner. We thought that if we challenged him, by going on strike, he would be shaken and alter his attitude toward his employees. But we were absolutely wrong. He was able to replace all of us in a very short time with minimal damage to his business. He did not want recognition from us, obviously. He did not even know our names. He looked at us as numbers, or as easily replaceable labour machines.

The importance of Fanon's perspective is that he considers the situation from the slave's perspective. As a descendant of slaves, he looks at the master-slave relation differently and knows that the slave has a very hard road to freedom, much harder than what Hegel can imagine. Belonging to the side of the slaves gives him a realistic understanding of the situation. The oppression and domination of the master (white Europe) has numerous mental and physical aspects. Overcoming this harsh situation requires self-analysis by black people.²⁰⁵ Because of that, Fanon criticizes black people with white masks as alienated and oppressed slaves who are unconsciously reproducing the culture of colonialism.

²⁰⁵ - Hussein Abdilahi Bulhan, *Frantz Fanon and the Psychology of Oppression* (New York: Plenum Press, 1985), 120.

Although the master has proved that he is not dependent on anything else. He has proved his honour and prestige and his own opinion of himself, and what he really is. But this is only a façade. There is an implicit need here on the part of the master. That is, the master needs the slave in two respects: first to recognize him as master, and second to work for him as a slave. In other words, there are two dependencies here: a theoretical dependency, and a practical dependency.

Theoretical and practical dependencies between the master on the slave

The theoretical dependency of the master on the slave is dependent on the fact that, without recognition from the slave, the master cannot be a master. A defeated consciousness (slave) needs to declare that the master is a master, otherwise the definition of the master is not complete. The master knows that other un-conscious entities in the world such as animals or things cannot call the master “master.” Only another consciousness can do that. The master needs the slave to call itself a master.²⁰⁶ On the other hand, the master depends on the slave practically. The master desires and appropriates things in the world without any work or effort on his part. It is the slave who has been put to work to satisfy the master’s desires. The master makes a plan, a project from which he can reap the benefits, and the slave, through his labor, puts the plan into practice.²⁰⁷ One might see a separation of work and labour here. The master

²⁰⁶ - Elliot L. Jurist, in “Hegel's Concept of Recognition,” analyzes the concept of ‘recognition.’ He, notably, describes the meaning of ‘recognition’ in Greek tragedies. In Greek, the word *αναγνώρισις* (*anagnōrisis*, recognition) is related to the concept of reversal. Oedipus knows himself through others. The question about who his parents are leads him to knowledge of who he is. In other words, the question about the identity of Others is interrelated with the question of self-identity, and self-identity is achieved through interaction with Others. See: Elliot L Jurist, “Hegel's concept of recognition.” *The Owl of Minerva* 19, no. 1 (1987), 14-19.

²⁰⁷ - Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §190.

works, but not by his own hands. He works through the slave's labour. The result of the work is the master's enjoyment; that enjoyment passes by the slave and is received only by the master. In other words, the slave mediates between the master and the desired outcome of the master's work. By this interposition, the master can achieve pure enjoyment.²⁰⁸ The slave is a mediator, and neither the original plan nor the result of the plan belongs to him. Although the master is the owner of the work and the receiver of the enjoyment of the results of the work, without the slave he cannot put the plan into practice.²⁰⁹

On the other hand, the slave is theoretically and practically dependent on the master. He works for the master's satisfaction because he owes his life to the master. He was supposed to be dead, and now, if he is alive, he is nothing in himself, nothing but a thing-for-the-master. The slave declares that he is not important and essential, and it is the master who is important and essential. He finds his essence, reality, and

²⁰⁸ - Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, 146; *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 115-116.

²⁰⁹ - Here we should pay attention to the importance of work. Hegel declares that in the dialectic of master and slave, the slave is the hero of the story because he is the one who works. Work and putting will into things in order to reshape them and enjoy the results is the secret path to freedom. The master places the slave between himself and the thing; because it is the slave who works, the slave becomes an autonomous consciousness. (Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, 20).

The master has nothing to change. The slave has many things to change: his position, his skills, his fate, the level of his capabilities. Therefore, the slave becomes master of nature by escaping from his actual situation.

In this case, work for the slave is a suppressed desire. When he postpones his mere enjoyment, he suppresses his desire to transform the thing into a better form. This is the definition of work. (Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel* 24). In this way, work is a type of self-transformation or self-education. Through this self-education, the slave realizes himself as *man*. On the other hand, mastery is a dead-end when one lacks the will to work. This point in Hegel has been appraised by Marx. In "*Critique of Hegel*" Marx admires Hegel for this point, although he comments that Hegel focuses merely on the positive aspects of work.

definition in the master, because he is an absolutely threatened existence. His whole being is seized by dread and dependence on the master:

Zunächst ist für die Knechtschaft der Herr das Wesen; also das selbständige für sich seiende Bewußtsein ist ihr die Wahrheit, die jedoch für sie noch nicht an ihr ist. [...] Dies Bewußtsein hat nämlich nicht um dieses oder jenes, noch für diesen oder jenen Augenblick Angst gehabt, sondern um sein ganzes Wesen; denn es hat die Furcht des Todes, des absoluten Herrn, empfunden.²¹⁰

We understand the depth of dependancy of the slave on the master when we consider that the master is not only a dominant power over the slave, the master is pure truth in the eyes of the slave. In other words, the slave's dependency is beyond practical dependancy. The slave feels nothing of himself when faced with the absolute truth of the master. The slave not only recognizes the master as an independent self-consciousness, but declares his own dependence and nothingness. Jean Hyppolite calls this the self-humiliation of the slave.²¹¹ We will return to this sense of self-humiliation in subsequent sections, where I will discuss masochism in Sartre or cultural masochism in Fanon's theory of black interiorized inferiority.²¹²

²¹⁰ - Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, 151-151. Miller's translation: "to begin with, servitude has the lord for its essential reality; hence the truth for it is the independent consciousness that is for itself. [...] For this consciousness has been fearful, not of this or that particular thing or just at odd moments, but its whole being has been seized with dread, for it has experienced the fear of death, the absolute Lord."

²¹¹ - Jean Hyppolite, "Self-consciousness and life: the independence of self-consciousness," 84.

²¹² - Jessica Benjamin in "Master and slave: the bonds of love" discusses this sense of masochism based on Hegelian master-slave relation. She applies the Hegelian theory of the idea of sexual masochism. *Story of O* is a novel by Pauline Reage in which the masochistic and erotic desires of a woman are described. The woman submits voluntarily to a group of male masters. She considers herself as nothing, and this nothingness gives her a sense of enjoyment and fulfilment. Benjamin interestingly compares this Hegelian concept of master-slave struggle with the Freudian theory of repression. In *Civilization and its Discontents*, Freud explains that the natural aggressive instincts of a human child are suppressed by society. But these aggressive instincts are not eliminated; they

A binary relation

We have discussed so far that the relation between the master and the slave is an unequal and unilateral relation, as Hegel puts it in the phrase “one-sided and unequal recognition” (*einseitiges und ungleiches Anerkennen*). However, we also saw that both the master and the slave depend on each other in their theoretical identities and in their practical lives. The relation is unequal and exploitative, but the logic of the relation is binary, or reflective. In section 182 of the *Phenomenology*, Hegel says that the action and reaction between the self and the Other is a “double movement,”²¹³ and in section 184 he says that each self-consciousness in this relation is “for-itself and at the same time for-Other.”²¹⁴ The master needs the slave in his master-ness and the slave needs the master in his slave-ness.²¹⁵ However, the situation is not pleasant for the slave, and he must look for liberation from the situation; as long as he remains in

just turn inward, or they are directed back against the ego. Freud argues that this introjected energy of violence is the primary core of conscience, which punishes the ego for its transgressions. This introjected violence produces the feeling of guilt. According to Freud this feeling of guilt and repression of our instinct are the price we pay in order to live in civilization. Jessica Benjamin compares this sense of guilt and repression with the subjugation of the slave in Hegelian theory. When the slave accepts that he cannot fight with the eradicated power of reality (the power of the master), his aggressive instinct is not annihilated. It is just turned inward. This is what Benjamin and Sartre call masochism.

²¹³ - Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §182.

²¹⁴ - Ibid., §184.

²¹⁵ - Gadamer in “Hegel’s dialectic of self-consciousness,” compared this dialectic with the act of greeting. When the self asks the other to recognize the self as a free subject, and the Other enacts this recognition willingly and freely, two selves here are confirmed: the self of the self and the self of the other. Both sides of an act of greeting reciprocally react to one another. If you greet someone and he does not respond, you feel humiliated. The master who depends on the servant is no longer a master; he is a farcical form of mastery. On the other hand, the servant not only obeys the master, but he also regards the master as truth. He looks at things from the viewpoint of the master. See: Gadamer. “Hegel’s dialectic of self-consciousness” in *Hegel’s Dialectic of desire and recognition* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996), 156-162.

bondage, he is definitionally in need of the master. On the other hand, the master does not like to confess such dependence, but he is deeply in need of the slave. In a sense, he is even more dependent on the slave than the slave is on him. As Hegel explains, the one that *works* is the slave and not the master, therefore, the slave is freer than the master. The master loses its independence because he is not certain of its being-for-itself as the truth of himself.²¹⁶ Regardless of the unequal aspects of this relation in which the master first takes the upper hand and then the slave becomes free, the essence of this relation is reciprocity. Both the master and the slave attain *self-consciousness* only through this reciprocal relation. It is through being for-itself and for-the-Other that both become self-conscious. The first sentence of the lordship and bondage section in the *Phenomenology* shows this binary:

Das Selbstbewußtsein ist an und *für sich*, indem und dadurch, daß es für ein Anderes an und für sich ist; d. h. es ist nur als ein Anerkanntes.²¹⁷

As we see here self-consciousness (*Selbstbewußtsein*) is only possible when consciousness confronts the Other. We saw that this confrontation may lead to an unequal master-slave relation, however, self-consciousness is the positive result of this confrontation. One may object that the slave does not receive recognition (*Anerkennung*). We should notice that the slave receives “recognition” but at a lesser degree than the master. It is not true that the slave does not enjoy any recognition at all. For instance, the master and the slave both remember the capabilities of the slave

²¹⁶ - Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §192.

²¹⁷ - Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, 145. Miller translation: “Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged.” Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §178.

in the past struggle. They know that the slave is potentially capable of endangering the superiority of the master again. Also, the master may acknowledge that without the slave's labour, the master is not able to put his plans into practice and enjoy the result, because according to Hegel, the slave is the master of the work and of tools. In addition, the hero of the story, for Hegel, is the slave, because Hegel does not follow the master and focuses on next stages of the slave's life. This is the slave who moves on toward true, free self-consciousness. All these points prove that here in the master-slave relation we see recognition on both sides, but in unequal proportions. Maybe because of these differing amounts of recognition, Hegel sees it as a *Bewegung des Anerkennens*, a "process (or movement) of recognition."²¹⁸

In the last part of this chapter, when I analyze the phenomenon of Orientalism, I will come back to this concept of recognition. I will describe the theory of Orientalism through this perspective that the Occidental and the Oriental are placed in a matrix of scientific and political relations in which the ultimate goal is recognition. Of course, the two have oppositional positions; however, the Occidental achieves recognition more than the Oriental.

Sartre, the Beloved Other

In Chapter One, we analysed a negative relation between the self and the Other in Sartre. In negation, two concepts were crucial: the look and shame. In the look, the self wishes to objectify the Other. On the other hand, when the self finds itself under the look of the Other, it feels itself become an object and is ashamed. In negation, both

²¹⁸ - Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §178; *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, 146.

sides try to ignore the consciousness of the Other and reduce its existence to mere body. In this chapter, we are discussing a new type of relation. The self does not want the Other as a pure body; quite the contrary, it wants it as a consciousness. In other words, the self wants the Other's consciousness. When the self switches the scope of its will from body to consciousness, the nature of its attitudes towards the Other inevitably changes. In this case, the self enters into a binary opposition to the Other.

When the self wants to appropriate the consciousness of the Other, by this it is meant that the self wishes to appropriate freedom of the Other. There are two problems that stand in the way of establishing the Other's freedom. First, freedom is not a thing which we can grab with our hands or place under our look. Freedom is an abstract notion and catching it requires a new strategy. Second, freedom cannot be confined. Once we confine or possess a freedom, it transforms into something else. Therefore, saying I want to possess your freedom is a contradiction. Therefore, in willing the freedom of the Other, the self needs to be very cunning and deceitful. Instead of possessing the Other's freedom forcefully, the self should convince the free Other to use its freedom to desire the self. This is a reciprocal relation. The self should convince the Other to make itself, freely, an object for the self. If we consider certain aspects of this binary opposition and look for an example of it in human relations, we see that love is one of the relations that fits within this framework. In love, the lover wants to have the freedom of the beloved. The lover wants to be loved by the Other or, as Joseph Catalano has perfectly put it, the project of love is to be loved.²¹⁹ In this

²¹⁹ - Joseph S. Catalano, *A Commentary on Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 181-182.

willing, the lover should convince the beloved to love the lover freely. If the lover possesses the beloved forcefully, the freedom of the beloved disappears, and therefore, love is annihilated. The only way to keep the love alive is by asking the beloved to love the lover freely. Is this possible? Sartre does not think so, however, the example shows a notable type of relation between the self and the Other.

Love is a conflict

In one section of *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre discusses love, language and masochism as attitudes toward Others. He starts with the point that the self and the Other, initially, both try to keep their independence and freedom. This freedom must be absolute and enslavement of the Other cannot be part of it.²²⁰ As we discussed in chapter one, Sartre thinks that the original meaning of this being-for-Others is conflict;²²¹ unification with the Other is therefore unrealizable. Now, there are two ways we can solve the conflict. First, the self can objectify the Other forcefully and put him in a position of inferiority. This is the idea of the look and shame that we have already discussed. The second is taking the look of the Other, or as Sartre puts it “taking the Other’s point of view on myself.”²²² Taking the point of view of the Other on myself is intended to avoid occupying the whole existence of the Other and make him nothing compared to the self; the self leaves the Other free, but constructs a situation in which the Other chooses the self freely as a valuable entity. In this way, the self can assure his freedom from danger of negation or annihilation. The self creates a

²²⁰ - Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 475.

²²¹ - Ibid.

²²² - Ibid., 476.

picture of itself in the mind of the Other and this picture convinces the Other to accept the value and freedom of the self. This is still a conflict but, so to speak, a soft conflict. It is still a conflict because, by acting on the Other's freedom,²²³ the self still wants to prove itself as essentially valuable. Sartre calls this willing of the Other's will, an "ensemble of the projects." This means that the self's project (catching the Other as object), unifies with the Other's project (catching the self as object.) Another name for this "ensemble of the projects," according to Sartre is love:

Love as the primitive relation to the Other is the ensemble of the projects.²²⁴

As already mentioned, because the self's project in love is controlling the Other's freedom or making the Other's freedom subject to the self's freedom, love remains a conflict. If the lover physically possesses the body of the beloved, they will take the beloved's freedom. Even if the lover makes the beloved physically and mentally dependent on the lover,²²⁵ the lover still fails in his/her project. The lover only has one way to prove his freedom: to be loved freely by the beloved. Sartre writes that the lover wishes to capture the consciousness of the beloved.²²⁶ The lover does not desire the enslavement of the beloved. He does not wish to possess a slave or an automaton.

The total enslavement of the beloved kills the love of the lover. The end is surpassed; if the beloved is transformed into an automaton, the lover

²²³ - Ibid., 477.

²²⁴ - Ibid.

²²⁵ - For instance, putting the beloved in a social/economical situation that the beloved mentally feels dependence to the lover. Sartre refers to Proust's hero in *In Research for Lost time*, who locks his mistress in his home and can see her and possess her at any time.

²²⁶ - Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 478.

finds himself alone. Thus the lover does not desire to possess the beloved as one possesses a thing; he demands a special type of appropriation. He wants to possess a freedom as freedom.²²⁷

“Possessing a freedom as freedom” is a contradiction. Freedom is not something to be determined from the outside. Asking someone “love me freely” does not make sense at all in this context. A person either loves one and this love is evident from the beginning, or does not love one, and asking for love is nonsense. But the lover, as Sartre describes him/her, does not understand this truth. He/she falls in love unilaterally and then, in a second step, asks the beloved to love him/her.

The lover is self-centered

Why does the Sartrean lover do so? Because he/she begins in absolute selfishness. The lover cares first of all about his/her freedom. The ultimate goal for the lover is self-determination. On the way to this self-determination, the lover encounters another consciousness. To show that he/she is still an independent consciousness, despite the existence of another consciousness, the lover falls in love. Love for the lover is a valuable project; by being in love, he can add value to his existence, therefore, he intentionally throws himself in love. He wants the Other both free and yet chained.²²⁸

The lover does not love because the beloved is lovable, indeed, the lover loves because:

If the Other loves me then I become the *unsurpassable*, which means I must be the absolute end. In this sense, I am saved from *instrumentality*. My existence in the midst of the world becomes the exact correlate of my transcendence-for-myself since my independence is absolutely safeguarded. [...] I am protected against any eventual devalorization. I am the absolute value.²²⁹

²²⁷ - Ibid.

²²⁸ - Ibid., 479.

²²⁹ -Ibid., 481.

Returning to the theory of “the look,” we can say that, by being loved, the lover is no longer the object of the look of the beloved; as such, the lover escapes from ‘thisness.’ If the self is beloved, it is no longer limited in what it is (facticity). It can move toward its transcendent possibilities,²³⁰ because it is endorsed as a free and desirable entity.

At this point, Sartre writes that what he is saying about the lover and the beloved is in line with the master and the slave section in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. He clearly asserts that what the master is for the slave, the lover wants to be for the beloved. The lover wants to be chosen as the absolute value, similar to what the master wants. The lover does not like to hear that he/she has been chosen by accident from among Others. He/she wants to be the only choice.²³¹

Seduction

Now, the lover arrives at the hardest and most important part of his job. If he wants to possess the freedom of the Other without damaging that freedom, and wants to consciously convince the beloved to love him, all these actions can be grouped under the notion of *seduction*. In order to have the freedom of the beloved, to ask her to love the lover as the only absolute value in the world, the lover should shape himself in a seductive way.²³² Seducing the beloved means putting the lover under the look of the beloved. The lover has been the hero of the story, but here he needs to leave that role behind, at least for a while, and become a desirable or fascinating object for the

²³⁰ - Ibid., 481-482.

²³¹ -Ibid., 482-483.

²³² - Ibid., 484.

beloved. The complexity of the act of seduction is that although the lover makes himself an object for the look of the beloved, he at the same time produces a sense of nothingness in the beloved. By looking at the fascinating lover, the beloved feels that he/she is nothing. This is the philosophical meaning of seduction by Sartre.²³³

This desire to appropriate the subjectivity of the Other through seduction does not only belong to the lover. The lover asks the beloved to be lover of the lover. There is a reciprocity in a loving relation: each side wants to be loved by the Other. The lover asks the beloved to love him/her. This means the lover asks the beloved to look at the lover as an absolute choice, a full and fascinating being. The lover asks the beloved to objectify the lover as an absolute subject. On the other hand, the beloved wants the same. He/She wants to be a lover who is beloved. Sartre calls this love situation: the game of mirrors.²³⁴

The game of mirrors

This endless reflection can last forever. It needs a third person in order to end. Sartre argues that, if the lover wants the freedom of the beloved, and vice versa, both should *be looked at* as objects at the same time. This is realizable only through a third look. By the addition of the third person, the lover suddenly sees that the beloved is not the only Other; a third person exists as well. This third person can narrate the whole story of love between the lover and the beloved in a single package. The whole story becomes an object for this third person, and this is the end or destruction of love.²³⁵

²³³ - Ibid.

²³⁴ - Ibid., 490.

²³⁵ - Ibid., 490-91.

Because the context of the relation between this third person and the love is “the look,” similar to what we discussed in chapter one, this look does not necessitate the actual existence of the third person. It is possible that there would be no actual third person, however, the lover and the beloved are intrinsically vulnerable to the look of all Other consciousnesses.²³⁶

Masochism

When one side of the love relation sees that love is impossible and his/her subjectivity cannot be attained through the love of the Other, he or she may despair. This despair may provoke a new need. If the self cannot attain its subjectivity (making the Other its object), it may attempt to get rid of its subjectivity and be a mere object. It accepts objectivity as its essence. This is masochism, for Sartre. He describes the masochistic attitude as: “I shall project causing myself to be absorbed by the Other and losing myself in his subjectivity in order to get rid of my own.”²³⁷ In other words, my freedom wills the denial of my subjectivity, or I freely put myself under the objectifying look of the Other. This is an abdication of my claim of transcendence for the Other. I confess that I am an in-itself. I want myself to be an in-itself. I project myself as an object. This is called masochism, and because it is mixed with an intentional will to self-objectification, it always accompanied by a sense of guilt.²³⁸

But, similar to love, masochism fails because the masochist uses the Other to consider him as a mere object. This is a contradiction. In masochism, one wills oneself

²³⁶ - Ibid., 491.

²³⁷ - Ibid., 491.

²³⁸ - Ibid., 492.

to be an object, and this willingness reveals his subjectivity. Therefore, a state of masochism never can completely conceal or annihilate one's subjectivity. Every time he wants to be an object, he is thrown back into his subjectivity.²³⁹

The concept of masochism is very important for me. In the next section, where I will describe Orientalism as a cultural phenomenon that can be analyzed by the relation of binary opposition. I will also return to this concept and discuss the phenomenon of cultural masochism.

Sadism

When the self desires to give up its subjectivity and wants to be pure body, it is masochism.²⁴⁰ On the other hand, if I deny my incarnation, and jump out of it in order to take the Other in his incarnation, I am confronting pure flesh. I desire the Other in order to possess him as a unified body/consciousness, but in the process, I decide to reduce him to mere flesh and take that flesh in my hands. In this situation, I am like a sleepwalker who grabs something in a dream, but when he wakes up he sees that he is gripping the edge of the bed while he cannot recall what provoked his gesture in the dream. Sartre thinks this is the origin of sadism.²⁴¹ The self wanted to take both the body and the consciousness of the Other, but it reduces the Other to mere body. This is sadism. In sadism, the reduction of the Other to mere flesh is usually done by violence and by imposing pain on the Other.²⁴²

²³⁹ - Catalano, *A Commentary on Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness*, 183.

²⁴⁰ - Ibid., 516.

²⁴¹ - Ibid., 517.

²⁴² - Ibid., 519.

Similar to love, masochism and sadism are both deemed failures because they are all cases of bad faith. The masochist is not mere flesh, nor can the sadist actually reduce the Other to mere flesh. Therefore, they cannot attain success in their projects. The problem is that both the masochist and the sadist ignore the reality of the unity of body and consciousness. For instance, the act of sadism is controversial *ipso facto*. The sadist wants to torture the Other's consciousness and by mistake focuses on his body. Because of this contradiction, the sadist wants to break the consciousness of the Other, but he breaks the victim's bones. Sartre explains that the highest level of pleasure for the sadist is when he hears the victim ask for pardon. By forcing pain upon the Other, the sadist wants to hear the Other ask for pardon, or for the Other to humiliate himself. This call for pardon is the voice of his consciousness, not the body of the victim. When the victim asks for pardon or humiliates himself, the sadist sees the enslavement of freedom. The sadist sees the mix of the body and the consciousness of the Other in the call for pardon. This is the moment of pleasure for the torturer, and that very pleasure shows the contradiction of sadism.²⁴³ Sadism is doomed to failure because the sadist cannot escape from the freedom of the victim. Even if the victim is dead, his eyes look at the sadist from a higher position of freedom and power. Sartre refers to a scene in the novel *Light in August*, written by William Faulkner. In one scene, a group of white people have hunted down a Negro character and castrated him. The victim is laying on the floor, unmoving, at the point of death. His eyes are staring up at the white people

²⁴³ - Ibid., 522-523.

with a serene and triumphant silence. Although they have killed him, they will never escape from his look. This is the contradiction of sadism.

Sartrean interpretation of desire

Although love and its two extremes, sadism and masochism, are doomed to failure, Sartre's concept of sexual desire perfectly represents the binary opposition of this relation. In Chapter one, we discussed the concept of "desire" in Hegel. We saw that when a consciousness encounters another consciousness, it wishes to have the same attitude that it has had toward inert objects, i.e., desiring, or annihilating the Other consciousness. This desire was equivalent to willing the death of the other consciousness, which Hegel called *Kampf auf Leben und Tod*. Sartre brings the analysis of desire to a higher level. If a consciousness desires another consciousness, this does not mean that it wants the annihilation or death of the Other. If the object of desire is something non-material, i.e., the very consciousness or freedom of the Other, the self should not annihilate it, because if the Others' consciousness is annihilated, the Other becomes an inert soulless object, and victory over an inert object is not valuable for the self.

Similar to what the Hegelian master does with the slave, here in Sartre we see that the self lets the Other maintain his consciousness, and the self desires both the body and the consciousness of the Other simultaneously. In this way, desire for Sartre is not just a physical appropriation, it is psychological as well. Desire is the self's attempt to get ahold of the Other's free subjectivity through his objectivity-for-the self.²⁴⁴

²⁴⁴ - Ibid., 497.

Sexual desire as manifold approach to the Other

Among the various aspects of human existence, sex is the best example of something that represents the idea of desire. For Sartre, sexuality is not only a psychological or physical issue. It is related to my situation in the world in relation to the Other's situation in the world. In other words, sex is a multi-layered attitude toward the Other. In sex, the Self approaches the Other based on many factors such as physical attraction, mental need, social and economical situation, and various systems of values. Sartre believes that the Other's sexual existence is not confined only in his or her sexual organs. We exist for the Other sexually and sexual desire is not suppressed by a sexual act or a physical possession. When I desire the Other sexually, I come to understand him as a desirable being in terms of mentality, physicality, social situation and so on.²⁴⁵

Unity of body and consciousness like a troubled water

Through this sexual desire the self encounters the Other in a single relation with two aspects; that is, the self encounters the Other, in sexual desire, both bodily and consciously. Through sexual desire, the body and the consciousness of the Other join together and compose a unified entity, because the desire wants both. But this unity of body and consciousness is like troubled water.²⁴⁶ One cannot separate pure water from the dirt that floats within it in troubled waters. Similarly, the object of sexual desire is a mix of body and consciousness. In desire, the body is not an instrument. Body itself is the goal. Not only does the lover want the body-consciousness of the beloved, but the lover wants to be a seductive body-consciousness to convince the

²⁴⁵ - Ibid., 499-500.

²⁴⁶ - Ibid., 503.

beloved to want the lover. In this process consciousness wants to be body, and the self makes itself flesh in order to appropriate the Other's consciousness and body.

In this type of relation, the self does not merely look at the Other. In chapter one, we discussed the look and its role in the objectification of the Other. Here, in the case of sexual desire, Sartre offers an alternative for the look. The look was unilateral and objectifying. In love, we have the caress that is a mutual relation. The self, in caressing, is active and passive both, therefore, the self and the Other meet each other bilaterally. In caressing, the self is not the pure consciousness of the look, it is a bodily consciousness or a conscious body, therefore, the relation is not mere objectification. In caressing, the self incarnates its consciousness and contacts the Other's consciousness through their bodies.²⁴⁷ Sartre calls it "incarnation of consciousness" or "clogging of consciousness" or "troubled consciousness." Through this new type of relation, possession receives a new definition. In the negation relation we discussed in the previous chapter, possession was tantamount to annihilating the consciousness of the Other and using him as an object or a tool. Here, in loving and caressing, as a relation of binary opposition, the self wishes to possess the Other's body, because his body is the incarnation of his consciousness. Sartre remarks that this is a profound meaning of possession.²⁴⁸

To sum up, we should recall that the type of relation on which all of these attitudes (love, masochism, and sadism) is based was binary opposition. Opposition is the basis of all of them because the relation between body and consciousness remains

²⁴⁷ - Ibid., 506-508.

²⁴⁸ - Ibid., 511-12.

unsolved in Sartre, and the problem is reflected in the self-Other relation. Because Sartre cannot solve the body-consciousness problem properly, the Sartrean self is always reduced to consciousness, and not to the unity of body and consciousness. As a result, the self cannot have *mit-sein* with the Other. The clearest sign of this unsolved problem is that Sartre himself declares this failure. After the failure of love, Sartre declares that the self and the Other cannot even leave one another alone with an ethics of *laissez-faire* and tolerance to respect the Other's freedom: "From the moment that I exist" Sartre says, "I establish a factual limit to the Other's freedom. I am this limit."²⁴⁹ A little later he restates his opinion and says that "respect for the Other's freedom is an empty word."²⁵⁰

I must stop here for two reasons. First, because judging Sartre's success to reconcile the self and the Other is beyond the scope of this dissertation. In this dissertation, I am using Sartre's analysis concerning the relations between self and the Other and using them in a cultural context. For instance, Sartre himself asserts that love is doomed to failure, however, this failure does not make his analysis of love useless. We can use it in analyzing a type of relation between self and the Other. Second, it will be beneficial to consider his third type of relation, called *Mitsein*, in the third and final chapter of this dissertation.

²⁴⁹ - Ibid., 530.

²⁵⁰ - Ibid., 531.

The Orientalized Other

In this chapter, we have examined a type of relation between the self and the Other, that is Oppositional. Although the self opposes the Other, in a reciprocal relation it needs the Other practically and theoretically. As we did in the first chapter, after analyzing the issue in philosophical terms, we ought now to analyze a cultural phenomenon that expresses the philosophical elements already discussed. We can ask, in what cultural relation between the self and the Other can we see reflected the Hegelian master-slave relation, or the lover-beloved relation of Sartre? What type of cultural phenomenon do we find in which one side has conquered the Other and has exploited it due to the superiority that it has gained. It seems that the phenomenon of Orientalism can be an illustrative case.

The definition of Orientalism

The very concept of Orientalism shows the duality or oppositional reciprocity that we see in the master-slave relation or lover-beloved relation. We will see that the oriental/occidental display behaviours which can be understood in the philosophical terms we have discussed above. The definition of Orientalism by Edward Said shows this duality. Orientalism, according to him, is a style of thought that is based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction between “the Orient” and “the Occident.”²⁵¹ Through this distinction, Orientalism becomes a system of representations of the Orient that bring the Orient into Western learning, Western consciousness, and Western Empire. This school of interpretation, called Orientalism, is essentially political because its subject matter—i.e., scholarly studies on

²⁵¹ - Said, *Orientalism*, 2.

civilizations, peoples, localities, languages, cultures, religions, and histories of the Orient—is considered not just as knowledge for knowledge’s sake, but in order to assist Western colonialism to exploit the Orient.²⁵² In what follows, we will review the idea of Orientalism according to Edward Said. We will highlight those points that are in line with the topic of this chapter.

The Orient as the opposite for the West

First of all, at the beginning of the book, Said writes that throughout history, the Orient has always been the “deepest and most recurring images of the Other” for Europe.²⁵³ This picture has helped Europe define itself; the Orient is Europe’s contrasting image, idea, personality, and experience. Who is the self in this relation? In other words, who is the Westerner/Orientalist? Said believes that it can apply to anyone who takes the approach of orientalizing the Oriental, i.e., defining the Oriental as the opposite of the Occidental. It can apply to a long list of poets, novelists, philosophers, political theorists, economists, and imperial administrators; they can all fit into the role of the orientalist. Any writer, in the history of the West, who has taken for granted that there is an ontological distinction between the Orient and the Occident, can be an orientalist. In this case, the list can include names such as Aeschylus, Victor Hugo, Dante, and Karl Marx.

As an example, to show how the Orientalist puts the European in an oppositional relation to the Oriental, we can refer to Evelyn Baring Cromer, a British diplomat and colonial administrator in Egypt in 1870s. In his book, *Modern Egypt*, he

²⁵² - Said, *Orientalism*, 202-203.

²⁵³ - Ibid., 2.

compares an Oriental mentality with a European one. He declares that, as a maxim, we (Europeans) should always remember that accuracy is abhorrent to the Oriental mind. The Oriental mind is marked by untruthfulness, ambiguity, contradiction, and illogicality. On the contrary, the European is naturally logical (even if he may not have studied logic), and always requires proof before he accepts the truth of any proposition. For Cromer, the distinction does not merely reflect mental capabilities. He associates other traits with the Oriental such as being lethargic, suspicious, being a flatterer, intrigue, cunning, unkindness to animals, and being inveterate liars. On the contrary, the Anglo-Saxon race enjoys clarity, directness, and nobility.²⁵⁴ Through this listing of opposite traits, Cromer concludes that:

I content myself with nothing the fact that somehow or Other the Oriental generally acts, speaks, and thinks in a manner exactly *opposite* to the European. (Emphasis added.)²⁵⁵

This positioning of the Oriental and the European in an oppositional relation recurs in the works of any Orientalist. Each Orientalist focuses on a specific group of traits. Some may analyse the opposition in regard to nationality, another on linguistic grounds, another in regard to matters of health, and so on. But if one puts of all these traits together to see what the Oriental is and what the Occidental is, I think it can be summarized as: enslavement and liberty respectively. The Oriental, with all his deficiencies, is enslaved, and the Occidental, with all his merits, is liberated. This is the central aspect of the difference. By being free and liberated, the European is the full

²⁵⁴ - Evelyn Baring Cromer, *Modern Egypt* (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1908), V 2, 146-167.

²⁵⁵ - Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, V 2, 164.

picture of humanity throughout history, and the Oriental struggles toward this admirable goal, but often fails because he is naturally inferior. We can see this ultimate differentiation in the words of Chateaubriand. In his *Oeuvres*, Chateaubriand writes, on the Crusades:

The Crusades were not only about the deliverance of the Holy Sepulchre, but more about knowing which would win on the earth, a cult that was civilization's enemy, systematically favorable to ignorance [this was Islam, of course], to despotism, to slavery, or a cult that had caused to reawaken in modern people the genius of a sage antiquity, and had abolished based servitude? ²⁵⁶

Orientalism as a discourse

Another important principle for the theory of orientalism is that orientalism is not only a theoretical approach to the Orient. It is an overarching approach that includes knowing, experiencing, describing, settling, teaching, conquering, occupying, and ruling over the Orient. It is not only a theory. It is a system of knowing and behaving. Said finds Michel Foucault's notion of *discourse* useful to clarify what he means by the term. The discourse of Orientalism is an "enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage – and even produce – the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period."²⁵⁷

Discourse is interwoven with the idea of power. When the orientalist endeavors to know the Orient from numerous angles, the result is not the production of a pure knowledge for knowledge's sake. This knowledge is *used* for a secondary purpose that

²⁵⁶ - Chateaubriand. *Oeuvres*. 2: 702 and note. Quoted and translated by Edward Said in: Said, *Orientalism*, 172.

²⁵⁷ - Said, *Orientalism*. 3.

is the domination of the object: the Orient(al). And because that knowledge is manifold, the produced power is also manifold. It takes different shapes, such as political power, cultural power, intellectual power, and even moral power. The political form of its power is presented in colonial or imperial establishments. The intellectual form of its power shows itself in reigning sciences like comparative linguistics or anatomy, or any of the modern policy sciences. Its cultural form of power can be seen in orthodoxies and canons of taste, texts, and social values. And finally, its moral form of power condemns any behaviour that is outside the moral norms of modern, liberal, western countries.²⁵⁸

To display this alliance between knowledge and power, let us take as an example the case of Napoleon. Napoleon had studied greatly about Egypt and was very interested in conquering the country. He wished to reconquer Egypt as a new Alexander, and looked at the country as the perfect place for the realization of French colonial ambition. To realize his hope, when he invaded Egypt, a team of Orientalists was accompanying him. This team of chemists, historians, biologists, archeologists, surgeons, and antiquarians was the scientific division of Napoleon's army.²⁵⁹ This alliance between knowledge and power causes: knowing the Orient, conquering it, and reshaping it. The idea of the Suez Canal is the conclusion of this alliance. Said very brilliantly put it in the following words:

In the Suez Canal we see the logical conclusion of Orientalist thought, and more interesting, of Orientalist effort. [...] The Orient needed first to be known, then invaded and possessed, then re-created by scholars, soldiers, and judges who disinterred forgotten languages, histories,

²⁵⁸ - Ibid., 12.

²⁵⁹ - Ibid., 82-84.

races, and cultures [...] as the true classical Orient that could be used to judge and rule the modern Orient.²⁶⁰

An A-Z knowledge about the Orient

As we see in these words, knowledge in the service of power is comprehensive knowledge. We cannot dominate a nation with limited knowledge of the nation. According to Lord George Nathaniel Curzon, a British statesman who served as Viceroy of India from 1899 to 1905, England should establish a school about the Orient if it wants to win:

Our familiarity, not merely with the languages of the people of the East but with their customs, their feelings, their traditions, their history and religion, our capacity to understand what may be called the genius of the East, is the sole basis upon which we are likely to be able to maintain in the future the position we have won, and no step that can be taken to strengthen that position can be considered undeserving of the attention of His Majesty's Government or of a debate in the House of Lord.²⁶¹

Edward Said also quotes Lord Curzon five years later in another speech, with the same topic: the necessity of creating a school for Oriental studies. Lord Curzon thinks that lacking such school is a significant issue for Britain:

In my view the creation of a school [of Oriental studies—later to become the London University School of Oriental and African Studies] like this in London is part of the necessary furniture of Empire.²⁶²

This encompassing approach to investigate every tiny corner of the Orient has led to creating astonishing volumes of research by Orientalists. *Commission des sciences et arts d'Egypte* published 23 volumes titled *Description de l'Egypte* between

²⁶⁰ - Ibid., 91-92

²⁶¹ - George Nathaniel Curzon, *Subjects of the Day: Being a Selection of Speeches and Writings* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1915). Quoted in: Said, *Orientalism*, 214.

²⁶² - Ibid.

1809 and 1829.²⁶³ Another example is *Bibliothèque orientale* by Barthélemy d'Herbelot published in 1697 and, according to Edward Said, one of the main milestones that considered the knowledge of the Orient to be a "rational Oriental panorama, from A to Z." Said thinks that this A to Z approach is an element of Orientalizing the Orient.²⁶⁴ It means that the next generation of Orientalists do not need to study the Orient in its reality, they can rely on previously-produced texts instead.²⁶⁵ Said counted 60000 books about the Orient.²⁶⁶ We should note that this number goes back to 1979, the year *Orientalism* was published.

In line with this all-encompassing approach, Said mentions conferences and congresses which are held with general topic of "knowing the Orient." These conferences put together a vast number of scholars with varying forms of expertise on the Orient, from geography to philology. The only common interest between them was the Oriental. The Orientalist scholars who participated in these conferences were always considered for advisory positions in colonial institutions.²⁶⁷ Besides Orientalist conferences, which were held annually, many Orientalist institutes were created, that were always consulted by Western governments on political issues such a security and

²⁶³ - Commission des sciences et arts, *Description de l'Egypte* (Paris: Imprimerie impériale, 1809-1828.)

²⁶⁴ - Said, *Orientalism*, 65.

²⁶⁵ - Ibid., 67.

²⁶⁶ - Ibid., 204.

²⁶⁷ - Ibid., 210.

policy. The American Oriental Society and the Middle East Institute are two examples.²⁶⁸

Essentialism

Another element of Orientalism that stems from this A-Z knowing/ruling approach is that the Orientalist takes the Orient(al) as a fixed and unchanging entity. Technically speaking, the Orientalist essentialized the Orient. In Said's word, this essence is like a Platonic essence that any Orientalist can examine, understand, and expose.²⁶⁹ To do so, the Orientalist needs to simplify the characteristics of the Oriental and remove all his/her complicated traits. Said thinks of this essentialism as reducing the Orient to a kind of human flatness, which exposes its characteristics easily to scrutiny without any complicating humanity.²⁷⁰ Another side of this essentialism is generalization. When the Orientals are reduced to a common essence and their individual differences are ignored, what remains is a general perception of the Oriental:

Orientalists are neither interested nor capable of discussing individuals; instead artificial entities, perhaps with their roots in Herderian populism, predominate. There are Orientals, Asiatics, Semitics, Muslims, Arabs, Jews, races, mentalities, nations, and the like.²⁷¹

²⁶⁸ - Ibid., 295

²⁶⁹ - Ibid., 38.

²⁷⁰ - Ibid., 50.

²⁷¹ - Ibid., 154-155.

What is Herderian populism, which is condemned by Said, here? In the 1960s, Isaiah Berlin published a long paper titled "Vico and Herder." In a section on Herder and the Enlightenment, Berlin presents Herder as a critic of the Eurocentric Enlightenment. Berlin argues that, for Herder, cultural practices and values must be judged within the specific context of that very culture. This criticism of the Enlightenment leads Herder to a kind of cultural relativism. Berlin presents this relativism in three concepts: populism, expressionism, and pluralism. (Berlin, *Three Critics of the Enlightenment*, 28). Populism refers to the value of belonging to a group or culture. Expressionism refers to the fact that human activities (art in particular) express the personality of the individual or the group. And Pluralism refers to the multiplicity and incommensurability of the values of

This essentialism is deeply connected with ethnic typology and racism. When the Orientalist essentializes the Orientals and categorizes them in separated silos as nations, races, or species, he, indeed, detaches them from their histories. They become unchanging objects that have no history. Having history makes sense when a person changes over time and presents himself in various shapes. When a person or a nation does not change over time, it means that they are a-historical. These a-historical

different cultures. Berlin argues that Herder expresses his criticism against the Enlightenment (and its universalistic claims of rationalism) by these three interwoven concepts. Introducing these three concepts, Berlin regards Herder as a cultural relativist who believes that cultures are like separated islands, and their values are equally valid and there is no common or universal value by which we can make cross-cultural judgments. This interpretation has become widespread. Being accused of relativism has brought another consequence that Herder regards cultures as monadic essences that do not change and do not communicate with each other. In other words, Herder has been accused of relativism and essentialism. It seems that Edward Said is influenced by this interpretation. Herder's being relativist/essentialist or universalist has been a controversial topic for Herder scholars in recent decades. Kia Nielson in "Cultural Identity and Self-Definition," for instance, accused Herder of this relativism/essentialism. On the other side, Vicky Spenser in "Beyond Either/Or: The Pluralist Alternative in Herder's Thought," argues that although Herder accepts diversity between cultures, he is not a relativist. He accepts a few universal values that can be applied to all cultures. Sonia Sikka has discussed both sides of this debate. In *Herder, On Humanity and Cultural Difference, Enlightened Relativism*, Sikka concludes that Herder is a relativist, but not in the sense that all cultural practices are equally valid (Sikka, *Herder on Humanity and Cultural Difference: Enlightened Relativism*, 13-15). In other words, Herder is a relativist who accepts a set of basic human inclinations. Sikka argues that Herder endorses a weak form of universalism in which freedom, humanity, capacity for reason, and artistic capabilities are universal values. Any culture that endangers these values for humans should be condemned. Sikka continues that Herder is not neutral in his evaluations of different societies. However, he insists that different societies should be understood from their own perspectives (Ibid., 26). For instance, Sikka argues that Herder is strongly relativist when he insists that two things are very specific to a culture, the meaning of happiness and the meaning of virtue (Ibid., 34-40). Ultimately, Sikka concludes 1- Herder accepts a set of basic human inclinations (universalism). Based on this universalism some cross-cultural judgements can be valid. 2- Human practices, values, and beliefs must be understood within their social context. 3- Happiness and virtue of individuals can only be measured in their own specific values. (Ibid., 43). Putting Sikka's conclusions in a nutshell, we should reiterate F. M. Barnard saying that, although for Herder cultures are separate, they can communicate with each other. They are Herderian monads that have windows. (Barnard, *Herder on Nationality, Humanity, and History*) Given these explanations, we should note that Said is not very accurate in his judgment here that Herder is populist/essentialist, in the sense that Berlin provides.

objects or nations can be called *homo Arabicus*, *homo Aegypticus*, or *homo Africanus*. They are unchanging ethnic species under the look (recalling Sartre) of the researcher as “normal man,” the Orientalist, the European.²⁷² This creation of an ethnic typology and essentialism opens the way to racism. Based on this essentialism, Emmett Tyrrell in *Harper's* magazine argues that Arabs are essentially murders, and violence and deceit exist in the Arab genes.²⁷³

Occidental self-definition through Orientalism

Another important component of an orientalist approach is that, although it entirely seems Other-oriented, it is essentially self-centered. Orientalism, as the term itself illustrates, is about the Orient, however, it is equally about the Occident. Because the orientalist posits the Orient in opposition to the Occident, whenever he is describing the Orient, he is, indeed, describing the Occident. When he says the Oriental is illogical, simultaneously, he is saying the Occidental is logical. Therefore, we can conclude that Orientalism is about Occidental self-definition. Said highlights this aspect of Orientalism in many places in *Orientalism*. As he puts it, the Orient is observed for the sake of European consciousness.²⁷⁴ One of the noteworthy phenomena in which we see this egocentrism is the first encounters between Christian Europeans and Muslim Orientals. An egocentric-Christian-European mind approaches Islam in the same way that a Christian understands Christianity. First of all, they do not take Islam to be a pagan religion. They consider Islam as a misguided version of Christianity.²⁷⁵ Because

²⁷² - Anouar Abdel-Malek, “Orientalism in Crisis,” *Diogenes*, 11, no 44. (1963): 107-108.

²⁷³ - Robert Emmett Tyrrell, “Chimera in the Middle East,” *Harper's*, November 1976, 35-38.

²⁷⁴ - Said, *Orientalism*, 158.

²⁷⁵ - *Ibid.*, 61.

of this mis-representation, Islam is called Mohammedanism and put in opposition to Christianity. They thought that, like Christianity, which is centered around the character of the Jesus Christ, this misguided version of Christianity, is centered around the character of Mohammed. In Dante's *Divine Comedy* (as a literary work influenced by the discourse of Orientalism) Mohammed is in the depths of hell, not because he is enemy of Christianity, but because he is an apostate.²⁷⁶

Another phenomenon that displays this egocentric approach to the Orient is romanticism. Said explains that Romantics were always interested in the Orient *for themselves*. They always regarded the Orient as an aspect of the West. Some German Romantics, for instance, regarded Indian religions as an Oriental version of Germano-Christian pantheism. In this way,

[T]he Orientalist makes it his work to be always converting the Orient from something into something else; he does this for himself, for the sake of his culture, in some cases for what he believes is the sake of the Oriental.²⁷⁷

The romantic Orientalist goes to the Orient as an internal journey to find himself. Literary pilgrims to the Orient, such as Chateaubriand, were going on a kind of existential vocation to find their own private myths and obsessions located in the Orient. In his *Itinéraire de Paris à Jérusalem*, Chateaubriand talks about himself more than any other topic: "je parle éternellement de moi." He goes to the Orient with very

²⁷⁶ - Ibid., 69.

²⁷⁷ - Ibid., 67.

heavy load of personal objectives in order to convert the real Orient into what he needs it to be.²⁷⁸

Imagination, Orientalizing the Oriental

Going to the Orient in order to find private vocations and myths requires ignoring the reality of the Orient and involves interpreting it only in line with one's own mission. This means that, in all cases, the Orientalist does not look after the real and true Orient, he goes after what he has imagined about the Orient. In this way, imagination becomes another cornerstone of Orientalism. Romantics were the masters of this imagination.

In a section titled "Imaginative Geography," Edward Said explains this role of imagination in Orientalizing the Oriental. In other words, the Orientalist studies the Orient with propositions and then presents these propositions as true knowledge of the Orient. The Orientalist does not care whether the Oriental acknowledges these propositions or not. It is enough for him to distinguish the Oriental from the Occidental through this imaginative knowledge.

What we have discussed so far in this section is the basic aspects of an Orientalist approach: the Oriental as the opposite of the Occidental, Orientalism as a discourse, its relation to power, Orientalism as an all-encompassing approach, essentialism, and generalization. In what follows, I will focus on three oppositional representations of the Orient in reference to the Occident. In these three oppositional roles, the Oriental and the Occidental play an oppositional dance. The three roles are the *autonomous vs. incapable of self-governance*, the *agent male vs. the sensual/sexual female*, the *rational vs. the irrational*.

²⁷⁸ - Ibid., 170-171.

Autonomous vs. unable of self-governance

In this binary opposition, the Occidentals are presented as members of the nations of freedom. On the contrary, the Orientals are unable to determine their own way of social life. The Occident is always entitled to question the statesmen and ask for *liberté*, *égalité*, and *fraternité*. The Oriental is always dependent, kept in enslavement and deprived of freedom. Chateaubriand describes this enslavement as a childish stage of the civilization of Muslim countries:

Of Liberty, they know nothing; of propriety, they have none; force is their God. When they go for long periods without seeing conquerors who do heavenly justice, they have the air of soldiers without a leader, citizens without legislations, and a family without a father.²⁷⁹

The apex of this approach can be seen in the theory of Oriental despotism. Looking at the Orient as a favourable place for despots (having luxurious and lavish lives while oppressing their people) goes back to ancient Greece. It was Edward Gibbon who coined the term in *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, published in 1776-77. Gibbon thinks that the Oriental style of despotism adopted by the late Roman emperors was a principal reason for the fall of the Roman Empire. This is a picture of an Oriental despot, as depicted by Gibbon: diverted by the most trifling amusements, wearing robes of silk and gold, numerous gold collars and bracelets adorned with gems of an inestimable value, and extravagant facial cosmetics.²⁸⁰

Examining the case of Karl Marx provides many insights. According to Said, Marx accepts the domination of India by the British colonial system because England

²⁷⁹ - Chateaubriand, *Oeuvres*, v 2, 1069. Quoted and translated by Said in: Said, *Orientalism*, 172.

²⁸⁰ - Edward Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952), 52.

can play a key role in overthrowing the Oriental despotism. In his 1853 analyses of the role of the British Empire in India, Marx argues that the economic/social structure of Indian society has deprived its individual members from having the energy to liberate themselves from enslavement under the traditional rules. Therefore, although England has caused violence in India, it is playing the historical role of emancipating the people from Oriental despotism:

The question is, can mankind fulfil its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever may have been the crimes of England she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution. Then whatever bitterness the spectacle of the crumbling of an ancient world may have for our personal feelings, we have the right, in point of history, to exclaim with Goethe:

Sollte diese Qual uns Gualen
Da sie unsere Lust vermehrt
Hat nicht Myriaden Seelen
Timurs Herrschaft aufgezieht?²⁸¹

Neither Marx, nor Goethe, experienced the invasion of the Mongols. If they had experienced the invasion, they would not write such romantic verses. If one should want to respond to Goethe by the language of a victim nation, the famous Farsi statement should be mentioned here: When the Mongols invaded Bukhara, they destroyed everything. One person escaped the invasion. When he was asked to describe the event, he said:

²⁸¹ - Should this torture then torment us

Since it brings us greater pleasure?

Were not through the rule of Timur

Souls devoured without measure?

Karl Marx, *Surveys from Exile* (London: Pelican Books, 1973), 306-307.

They came, they sacked, they burnt, they slew, they plundered, and they departed.²⁸²

I think if one wishes to compare the role of England in India with the role of Timur in Iran, one should bear in mind this famous description in *The History of The World Conqueror*. To return to our discussion of Orientalism and the binary opposition between the Orient and the Occident, this Marxian picture depicts the opposition very clearly. India is in a perpetual state of enslavement and only England is the source of liberty.

This ironic interpretation of invasion or war waged against the Cultural Other for the sake of the Other's liberty has been repeated and again in European literature. Sometimes, it is not even said that Europe invades the Orient for the Orient's liberty; the Orient cries out to be occupied by Europe, because being occupied and under the yoke of Europe is much better than suffering under Oriental despotism. Alphonse de Lamartine in *Voyage en Orient* depicts an Orient that calls for Europe's occupation of itself. Europe is consecrated and has the right to occupy, because the "nations without territory, parties, rights, laws or security [...] waiting for the shelter."²⁸³

Almost hundred years later Arthur James Balfour, a British statesman (and later the Prime Minister of the U.K.) repeats Lamartine's logic. He gave a lecture to the House of Commons on why the U.K. colonial apparatus should remain in Egypt. The proposal of his lecture is the same as Lamartine: Western nations have been always

²⁸² - 'Ala al-Din 'Ata Malek Joveyni, *History of The World Conqueror*, V 1 (Harvard University Press, 1958), 107.

²⁸³ - Alphonse de Lamartine, *Voyage en Orient*, V 2, (Paris: Hachette, 1887), 92-93.

cable of self-government, and, in what is called, broadly speaking, the East, one never finds traces of self-government:

One domination has followed another; but never in all the revolutions of fate and fortune have you seen one of those nations of its own motion establish what we, from a Western point of view, call self government.²⁸⁴

Then he repeatedly insists that what he is saying is not a question of superiority or inferiority. It is the mission of the European civilization to teach “political philosophy” to these enslaved nations in order to help them with self-government. He claims that experience has shown that the nations under U.K. control have had far better government than they managed in their whole history before England’s influence. In order to prove this claim, he says:

Certainly if you had consulted the *fellaheen* [Egyptian peasants] immediately following the period when we relieved them from the abominable treatment to which they were subjected before we went into Egypt, I have no doubt they would have expressed great and genuine gratitude.²⁸⁵

What is the conclusion of this argument by Balfour? The U.K. is occupying Egypt, not for colonial proposes, but for the glory of civilization in Egypt. If the U.K. leaves the country, the native population will lose all sense of *order*, which is the very basis of the civilisation the U.K. has given to Egypt.

The male dominant Occident vs. the seducing female Orient

This call for being occupied and being under control/order leads us to the next binary opposition between the Oriental and the Occidental. What is that social/natural entity

²⁸⁴ - Arthur James Balfour, “Problems with Which We Have to Deal in Egypt,” in *Imperialism in the Modern World*, 39.

²⁸⁵ - Ibid., 40.

that has always been, historically speaking, calling or seducing the Other to occupy it? If the discourse of Orientalism is the discourse of calls for occupation and exploitation, then it can receive a sensual/sexual interpretation. The Orient, in a sexual binary opposition, would be definitely considered female. The Orient is not only a place for political adventures, it is a place for nudity and sexual desires, mixed with the warm colours of silk and velvet curtains, hot sunny days, exotic spices, and feminine mysteries. Flaubert is the best example in this case. His letters from when he was traveling through Egypt and his novels' female characters stemmed from his actual experiences. These writings represent this sensual/sexual approach to the Orient. In Egypt, he met an irresistibly attractive *Kuchuk Hanem* (which literally means "little woman"). She is a dancer and a prostitute. Flaubert watches her dance and sleeps with her. He describes her as mysterious and different sensual creature:

La femme orientale est une machine, et rien de plus; elle ne fait aucune différence entre un homme et un autre homme. Fumer, aller au bain, se peindre les paupières et boire du café, tel est le cercle d'occupations où tourne son existence. Quant à la jouissance physique, elle-même doit être fort légère puisqu'on leur coupe de bonne heure ce fameux bouton, siège d'icelle. Et c'est là ce qui la rend, cette femme, si poétique à un certain point vue, c'est qu'elle rentre absolument dans la nature.²⁸⁶

First, we see a vivid case of generalization. *Kuchuk Henem* becomes *la femme orientale* immediately. Second, she is not a human being, she is a machine for sex and

²⁸⁶ - Gustave Flaubert, *Correspondance* (France: Charpentier, 1889), 182. English translation:

"The oriental woman is a machine, and nothing more; she doesn't differentiate between one man and another. Smoking, going to the baths, painting her eyelids and drinking coffee, such is the circle of occupations which make up her existence. As for physical pleasure, it must be very slight since they cut off that famous button, the very place of it, quite early on. And for me, this is what renders this woman so poetic, that she becomes absolutely one with nature." (Quoted and translated by Lisa Lowe. See: Lisa Lowe, *Critical Terrains: French and British Orientalisms* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 75.

sensuality, indifferent to what goes on around her. Although she is deprived of sexual pleasure, this point does not raise any sense of sympathy in Flaubert. Quite the contrary, she seems very *poétique*. She seems *poétique* because what Flaubert has enough of back in his homeland is rationality; he has come to Egypt to experience the “*bizarre jouissance*”²⁸⁷ of the completely different and exotic/erotic world. Or, as Edward Said puts it: the Orient as a living tableau of queerness.²⁸⁸ In a passage quoted by Said, Flaubert depicts the queerness of the Orient. A man takes a woman in a Cairo bazaar, couples with her on the counter of the shop while the shopkeeper smokes his pipe calmly. A man is buggered by a monkey. An idiot, but known by people as a saint marked by God, dies after all the Muslim women come to see him and masturbate him constantly from morning to night. Another priest walks naked through the streets of Cairo, and women, who want children, put themselves under his urine.²⁸⁹

This sexual queerness, and especially appearance of the Orient as a strange and exotic and seductive female form, helps Flaubert to put the Orient in a binary opposition with the European. The Orient becomes an *anti-figure* that, as an opposite, articulates the desired traits of the nineteenth-century French bourgeois community: “as she is insensate, vulgar, and licentious, they are sensitive, bourgeois, and discreet.”²⁹⁰ This concept of anti-figure (perhaps we can say “anti-hero”) is one that Lisa Lowe uses, which is very similar to what I mean by binary opposition. The picture

²⁸⁷ - Said, *Orientalism*, 103.

²⁸⁸ - Ibid., 103

²⁸⁹ - Flaubert. *Correspondance*. Ed. Jean Bruneau (Paris: Gallimard, 1973). 1. 542.

²⁹⁰ - Lisa Lowe. *Critical Terrains, French and British Orientalisms*, 78.

that Flaubert depicts of the Orient is very helpful in order to know what the Occident is or should be. We discussed two of these anti-hero traits so far: being incapable of self-government and being symbolized as an exotic sensual woman.²⁹¹ The third and last trait that we ought to discuss here, before ending this section on Orientalism, is that the Orient is emotional vs. the Occident that is a rational.

Rational Occident vs. emotional Orient

Being exotic and mysterious means having a logic or rationality that is not easy to notice. This is a good faith approach to what we do not understand. When we come across strange behaviour that we do not understand, if we interpret it in a spirit of good will, we may think that although it seems irrational to us, it may have a logic which is unknown to us. This unknown rationality may be superior to our rationality, therefore, we prefer to speak politically about it and call it “mysterious.” There is, however, another approach. If we do not understand some strange behaviour, and right away conclude that it is inspired by nonsense, this means that that behaviour is simply illogical and irrational. This strangeness is not born of a higher or unknown rationality, it is merely an irrationality. Thanks to Said, we have three brilliant examples of this approach expressed by two Orientalists in different time periods. The first one is from 1908. Cromer, in *Modern Egypt*, writes:

Sir Alfred Lyall one said to me: “accuracy is abhorrent to the Oriental mind. Every Anglo-Indian should always remember that maxim.” Want

²⁹¹ - This being sexually attractive and mentally incapable of self-governance has high costs for non-western women, especially if they are black slaves in the hands of white masters. To read a short explanation of the catastrophes associated with this topic, see: Colin Samson, “Slavery and Its Afterlives,” in *The Colonialism of Human Rights: Ongoing Hypocrisies of Western Liberalism* (UK: Polity, 2020).

of accuracy, which easily degenerates into untruthfulness, is in fact the main characteristic of the Oriental mind.

The European is a close reasoner; his statements of fact are devoid of any ambiguity; he is a natural logician, albeit he may not have studied logic; he is by nature sceptical and requires proof before he can accept the truth of any proposition; his trained intelligence works like a piece of mechanism. The mind of Oriental, on the other hand, like his picturesque streets, is eminently wanting in symmetry. His reasoning is of the most slipshod description. Although the ancient Arabs acquired in a somewhat higher degree the science of dialectics, their descendants are singularly deficient in the logical faculty. They are often incapable of drawing the most obvious conclusions from any simple premises of which they may admit the truth. Endeavor to elicit a plain statement of fact from any ordinary Egyptian. His explanation will generally be lengthy, and wanting in lucidity. He will probably contradict himself half-a-dozen times before he has finished his story. He will often break down under the mildest process of cross-examination.²⁹²

This inaccurate and asymmetrical thought is something that another Orientalist begins his lecture on *Modern Trends in Islam* in 1945. H. A. R. Gibb writes as follows:

It is true that there have been great philosophers among the Muslim peoples and that some of them were Arabs, but they were rare exceptions. The Arab mind, whether in relation to the outer world or in relation to the processes of thought, cannot throw off its intense feeling for the separateness and the individuality of the concrete events. This is, I believe, one of the main factors lying behind that "lack of a sense of law" which Professor Macdonald regarded as the characteristic difference in the Oriental. [...] The rejection of rationalist modes of thought and of the utilitarian ethic which is inseparable from them has its roots, therefore, not in the so-called "obscurantism" of the Muslim theologians but in the atomism and discreteness of the Arab imagination.²⁹³

In these two statements, we see that the Oriental mind is described as irrational in order to reaffirm the rationality of the European mind. To return to what we

²⁹² - Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, quoted in Said, *Orientalism*, 38.

²⁹³ - H. A. R. Gibb. *Modern Trends in Islam* (Chicago: university of Chicago Press, 1947), 7.

analysed in chapter one, we should consider the difference between a barbarian mind and an Oriental mind. The barbarian mind was considered outside of humanity. It belonged to a sub-human classification. We saw that the Dehumanized Other is reduced to an animal state of mind. However, in Orientalism, we see that the Other's mind has developed to a slightly higher level. The Oriental can think, but his thinking operates at a lower level compared to the mature rational thinking of the European and such thinking is based on symmetry or imagination. The Oriental thinks differently, and the sub-human/barbarian cannot think at all. Therefore, the self's approach to these two will be different. The self wishes to annihilate the barbarian Other, but it wishes to possess and exploit the Oriental Other. When the Other cannot think like a human, it is better to get rid of it by genocide or massacre. But when he thinks the other is mysteriously different, the self is tempted to take the control of it and manipulate it.²⁹⁴

Self-orientalization

Up to this point, we have been analyzing the Occidental approach to the Oriental based on the theory of Orientalism. Now, we ought to consider the matter from the other side, how the other side, the Oriental, may understand or look at the relation. I should emphasize that I am not going to discuss an alternative for the Orientalist perspective.

²⁹⁴ - Claude Lévi-Strauss, in his classic book *The Savage Mind*, discusses the cognitive bias a culture might have toward the other. He explains that some cultures are regarded as less progressed in terms of abstract thinking only because the language used in the culture contains less abstract concepts. Lévi-Strauss argues that this difference only shows a differentiation of interests. Many cultures, natives in the Philippines for instance, have a very rich treasury of words for objects, plants, birds, and snakes and this shows their detailed and practical mindset. In other examples, Lévi-Strauss shows that some traditions seem illogical but if we know the practical benefit behind their tendencies, we can feel more sympathy with the people who practice other traditions.

I am not going to offer a picture of the Oriental free from Orientalism. In the picture that I am going to offer, the Oriental is the very Oriental who has accepted that he or she is unable to self-govern, is emotional. He suffers an interiorized sense of inferiority. This Oriental has accepted his destiny in the way that Sartre puts it, as bad faith. I want to consider that story from his/her perspective. As one may see, this Oriental has left aside his all claims and hopes for being an authentic subject in his own life. He suffers from lack of self-esteem and dignity. I am going to discuss a cultural phenomenon for this interiorized sense of inferiority, and that is the phenomenon of “black skin, white masks.”

Fanon on black interiorized inferiority

I call it the phenomenon of “black skin, white masks” because the phenomenon is not limited to what Fanon considers in his book with the same name. Following Fanon, social critics have applied the theme of Fanon’s book to their own cultures. Here, I will mention two of them. The first one was titled *Brown Skins White Masks* by Hamid Dabashi published in 2011²⁹⁵ and the Other one *Red Skin White Masks* by Glen Coulthard published in 2014.²⁹⁶

²⁹⁵ - Similar to Fanon who accuses the native writer Lucette Ceranus for her lack of self-esteem towards the white race in *I Am a Martinican Woman*, Dabashi criticizes Middle Eastern writers such as Azar Nafisi for her novel *Reading Lolita in Tehran*, and Ibn Al-Warraq for his book *Why I am not Muslim*. Dabashi argues that Nafisi offers an unrealistic picture of Iran which justifies President Bush's warlike foreign policy in the Middle East. Dabashi argues that picturing Iran as an entirely oppressive and destructive regime in the region was very helpful in allowing the U.S. to intervene in the Middle East. Dabashi also criticizes Ibn Al-Warraq. He clearly describes Al-Warraq as a "Muslim masochist" who, as a Muslim, cannot even read Arabic but enjoys a masochistic pleasure by refusing Islam in general in some of his books about the history of Quran and Mohammad.

²⁹⁶ - In his well-received book, Coulthard goes back to Fanon’s theory and applies it the situation of indigenous people in Canada. In a critique of the “politics of recognition” of Charles Taylor, Coulthard argues that even if the colonizer left the colonized alone (in this case, indigenous

To return to the principal elements of the theory of black skins white masks, the phenomenon Fanon presents can be described as a case of interiorized inferiority. First of all, Fanon himself declares that the theory of black skin white masks is a psychological analysis²⁹⁷ concerning the current situation of black people who have been injected with despair and a lack of confidence. They have forgotten that they can have subjectivity equivalent to all other nations, specially the white nations.

In the first chapter of Fanon's book, we see how the black has accepted himself as an inferior in terms of language. For black people, any native language (for instance Creole, the native language of Antilles) is not a true language indeed. They are ashamed to use their native language because, compared to the language of civilization and humanity, their language is very childish and primitive. The black middle class speak Creole only when they talk to their servants, or mothers ridicule their children if they speak Creole.²⁹⁸ They are willingly renouncing their mother tongue in order to be adopted by the language of civilization, French. When they go to France, the land of *liberté*, they try to forget their native culture and language as if all of it was a dream. They try to speak French even better than the French people. Fanon sarcastically

people), the hegemony and dominance of the colonizer remains the same and the colonized cannot stand independently in a stance of self-determination because his values, culture, language and worldview have been manipulated by the colonial system. Coulthard argues that the contemporary liberal form of government in Canada promises to reproduce the same configurations of colonialist, racist, patriarchal state power because all the liberalist approaches to recognize indigenous people has roots in the past colonial system of legislation and jurisdiction. In this situation, any effort for the independence of indigenous people is refused because the very structure of legislation within which the indigenous people try to negotiate with the Canadian government is colonialist.

²⁹⁷ - Frantz, *Black Skin, White Masks* (New York: Grove Press, 2008), 12.

²⁹⁸ - Fanon, *Black Skin White Masks*. 20.

claims that even their bodies change when they arrive in France. When they return to their home land to pay a visit to their families, when they are visiting their father's farm, they ask "tell me what does one call that apparatus?" and the father replies by dropping the tool on his feet, "and the amnesia vanishes."²⁹⁹

When the alienated Black debases his mother tongue, when he talks about Montesquieu as a sign of his rational maturity, when he wishes to accompany a white partner in order to be counted as an equal, and when he/she uses various cosmetic powders and perfumes to elevate himself as a civilized person, all of these behaviours show that this Black person suffers from a lack of self-esteem that I call cultural masochism. The Black person does not want to value his subjectivity. He accepts that he is a member of a lower level of humanity and he must work tirelessly to hide his origin. He accepts that he has a long way to go to be the subject and agent of his life. He is more body than consciousness. He is more entangled with the physical aspects of his existence than his consciousness.

From Hegel and Sartre to Edward Said

In this chapter we discussed a type of relation between the self and the Other that can be summarized by the term opposition. In this relation, we saw, the Other does not appear as a negation of the self (relation type one, discussed in chapter one), but as a member of a binary, the opposite of the self.

In Hegel, this relation is represented as the master-slave relation. We discussed that the master and slave both depend on each other theoretically and practically. The master needs the slave to be recognized as a free consciousness, and also needs the

²⁹⁹ - Ibid., 24.

slave to put the slave between himself and nature as his executive arm. In this way, the master enjoys freedom and the results of the slave's work. On the other hand, the slave also needs the master. For the slave, the master is not just a dominating conqueror; he is also the truth for the slave. The slave feels self-humiliation before the master. Also, in a practical context, the slave needs the capital, the tools, and the knowledge of the master, otherwise he is unable to work.

In Sartre, we discussed the love relation as an example of the opposition relation. Love for Sartre is implicitly antagonistic. The lover loves to be loved. In this way, love for Sartre is a battle to be loved. Sometimes this battle is very apparent and becomes sadistic. In this case, the self physically and mentally forces the Other to acknowledge the self as valuable and confesses himself as inferior. Sometimes the love battle becomes more complicated, and the lover presents himself as a valuable and desirable object to seduce the Other. This seduction implicitly compels/convinces the Other (beloved) to love the lover. In this process of seduction, if the lover fails and cannot attract the beloved, he collapses into deep despair and becomes a masochist. In this case, the self places itself under the dominant superiority of the Other and through this self-humiliation, it attains a sense of enjoyment.

After discussing the opposition relation between self and the Other in philosophical terms, we moved on to the cultural side of our work and discussed the phenomenon of Orientalization as a cultural example of the philosophical issue of the opposition relation. In Orientalization, we see reflective interactions between the cultural self and the Other. First of all, the nature of this relation is binary and, at the same time, oppositional. The Oriental is not a savage, barbarian, or dehumanized Other

(as what we saw in chapter one). The Oriental, although still in opposition to the European, seems to have something to offer. Secondly, the Oriental, with all its natural resources, beauties, rich and imaginative literatures, and sense of obedience, is highly desirable for the occident. The occidental (the master in Hegel, or the lover in Sartre) desires the Orient. It wishes to overcome and occupy the Orient as a lover who occupies the body and the mind of the beloved. The occidental wishes to define itself as a free, powerful, essential, manly, autonomous, and rational entity. In order to attain this goal, the occidental considers the oriental as an opposite and describes the Oriental as enslaved, weak, unessential, womanly, dependent, and irrational.

Another element of this oppositional relation that we discussed in Sartre, Fanon, and Said, was the phenomenon interiorized sense of inferiority. The alienated Oriental who has failed to prove himself for himself and for the Other, falls into the abyss of interiorized sense of inferiority. The Oriental not only does not try to liberate himself from the dominance of the Occidental, but he reinforces that dominance by accepting it, or by declaring that the occidental is the source of truth.

Chapter Three: Co-Existence

Summary of the chapter

The third context in which the Other appears to the self is in that of co-existence. In this context, the two consciousnesses come to understand that they are not indifferent negations of one another (attitude one), nor binary opposites of one another (attitude two). They are essentially and intrinsically connected to one another. The self comes to understand that an internal part of itself is rooted in the Other. The independent self and the Other are superficial and presuppositional concepts with no concrete application in reality. The reality is that they have co-existence.

As in the two previous chapters, in this chapter I begin with Hegel. I will explain his theory of mutual recognition in the relations between family members, citizens, and between citizens and the state. I will argue that if we are to be able to achieve these types of relations between *cultures*, we will have to achieve mutual recognition between them. I will argue that although Hegel himself did not apply the theory of mutual recognition to matters beyond the state, the theory has that potential.

The role of Husserl here is also crucial, but controversial. Some commentators like Dan Zahavi argue that Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity opens a way to co-

existence, or being-with, between the self and the Other. But some, like Sartre, Alfred Schutz, and Paul Ricoeur, disagree. I will discuss both sides in detail. In my conclusion, without judging between the positions of the various commentators, I will rely on the concept of analogy to establish what is needed on the cultural side of the matter. I will use the concept of analogy when I discuss what I mean by phenomenological cosmopolitanism. In brief, I will argue that, similarly to the Husserlian ego that transfers the meaning of ego to the Other through analogy, a cultural self in a phenomenological cosmopolitanism will transfer elements of value (such as rationality) to the cultural Other by the very same process of analogy.

In addition, what we see in *Cartesian Meditations* concerning intersubjectivity, could have been the result of the influence of Heidegger on his teacher (*Cartesian Meditations* was published in 1931, four years after *Being and Time*). Heidegger's theory about Dasein's *Mitsein* is another piece of the puzzle in regard to the co-existence of the self and the Other. Heidegger suggested a wider relation between the self and the Other, rather than the narrow view found in Husserlian transcendental philosophy. *Dasein* is essentially and mundanely with Others. However, in order to be authentic, he must individually choose his own way of life. For Husserl, the subject comes to find out that in experiencing and knowing the world, it is connected to other subjects. Dasein, on the contrary, is being-with even when no other is not present. We see that for Heidegger, the connection is not only established through the subjectivity of *Dasein*; it occurs in the very existence of Dasein. This type of relation is more fundamental than the one we see described in Husserl.

As a result of these considerations, we may note that Sartre's contribution is unsatisfactory. The first issue is that Sartre talks about *Mitsein* very briefly and with no convincing explanation. Secondly, there seems to be a misunderstanding in his argument concerning *Mitsein*. Sartre regards *Mitsein* as an equivalent for 'we.' Arguing for a version of *Mitsein*, he claims that two consciousness come *together* via the look of a third party.³⁰⁰ They come to find out that they are not alone, there might be a third party that can look at them both. In such a situation, they become a "we" under the unifying and objectifying look of some other. We may see, therefore, even in Sartre's 'we' relation, there is still the element of antagonism and objectification. Sartre cannot reach a peaceful 'we' relation.

Merleau-Ponty has a vital role in this stage of the phenomenology of the cultural Other as well, because he provides the means to complete the phenomenology of the Other. If one considers Sartre as a transitional figure who is on the threshold of abandoning the Cartesian dualism between the self and the Other, Merleau-Ponty has certainly exited that dualism. For him, the ego cannot escape from solipsism if it remains merely a subject (knower). It is not enough for the subjective ego to have a conscious body (as in the case of Husserl) or to be *sometimes* an objective ego (as in the case of Sartre). For Merleau-Ponty, the self has a kind of subjectivity that is no longer Cartesian. He suggests a new meaning for subjectivity, a kind of subjectivity that, from the beginning, is objective/social. It is a we-subject-object. In this we-subject-object, body is no longer a tool in the hands of my consciousness. In contrast

³⁰⁰- Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 540-541.

to Sartre, body for Merleau-Ponty is not a passive area between my subjectivity and the Other's subjectivity. I am not a subject that has a body; I am not an entity that has two parts: consciousness and body. I am subject-object and at the same time my subjectivity is a we-subjectivity.

To understand the position of Merleau-Ponty, the works of contemporary German phenomenologist Bernard Waldenfels will be helpful. Waldenfels analyzes the idea of the Other and especially focuses on the idea of the passivity involved in the self-Other relation. In *Phenomenology of the Alien* and *The Question of the Other*, he argues that the distinct self and the Other are fanciful or unrealistic ideas. He contends that there is no pure self, no pure Other. They are just two names that we give to two parts of a process of becoming and happening. He depicts a spectrum of objectivity-subjectivity in which sometimes there is no difference between being a subject and being an object. For instance, he discusses situations in which I make it possible for something to happen to me. When the light from a flower comes to my eyes and I see the flower, this event is a combination of objectivity (being affected by the light reflected to my eyes) and subjectivity (having the potency to see). The traditional duality between cause and effect, therefore, is a false description of reality. In the relation between the self and the Other, the situation is the same. The self and the Other are in a matrix of actions and reactions. In this matrix, the body has a key role in connecting the self and the Other.

The ultimate result of these phenomenological descriptions is that, in the self-Other relation, the traditional distinction between self and Other is revealed as false. The self and the Other are no longer two separate beings; the self and the Other are

always together, and, even in regard to their consciousnesses and respective bodily existences, they overlap and cannot be perfectly distinguished. If one moves through the overlap, the self becomes the Other and the Other becomes the self, very softly, so to speak. If the relation between the self and the Other is a combination of action and reaction, if the self's consciousness-body is both influencing and being influenced by the Other's consciousness-body, then the self is essentially with the Other even if it has never physically met the Other. If the self puts itself in a situation to be affected by the Other (that is, if the self subjectively makes itself an object), then the result is that we cannot talk about the self and the Other as two separate things.

After considering these phenomenological investigations about the coexistence of the self and the Other, I will provide a cultural phenomenon to demonstrate this being-with. The cultural phenomenon ought to be able to show how a cultural self can come to understand that its cultural Other is not an outsider or alien; rather, it is with the self substantially. To find an appropriate cultural phenomenon, one might ask: Where do the cultural self and the cultural Other accept one another as inevitable companions? Where are they positioned in a matrix in which what happens to one affects the Other as well?

It seems that cosmopolitanism can be described in this way, because in addition to political, ethical, and cultural interpretations of the idea (cosmopolitan governance, global affairs, international trade, global environmental issues, global ethics, global threats like terrorism, cultural hybridity), the concept has a phenomenological component that can allow it to be considered as an equivalent to phenomenological co-existence.

All kinds of cosmopolitanism (political, ethical, or cultural) can be distilled into two fundamental elements: **(1)** I, as a consciousness, feel myself to be in a matrix of relations. Besides being citizens of my nation, I am a citizen of the globe. I am not an isolated subject; I am constantly interacting with Others. This 'I' can be an individual, a community, or a nation. The central theme of this element is the interconnectivity or globality of my existence. **(2)** Between me and the Other, there is always a shared zone, i.e., my existence overlaps with the Other's existence. Similar to the previous element, this 'I' can be a cosmopolitan individual, a community, or a nation. Therefore, in cosmopolitanism, I never will be sure where the distinguishing line between me and the Other is located; I cannot be sure because there is a "grey area" or a common *cosmos* between me and the Other. Following the idea of a conscious-body or bodily consciousness in Merleau-Ponty, I will argue that, in the phenomenological aspect of cosmopolitanism, the self has a bodily consciousness that is accessible by the political, ethical, or cultural Other, and vice versa.

Hegelian Mutual Recognition

So far, we have examined two types of relationships between the self and the Other in a Hegelian context. Now, we are going to discuss the last and the most important type. In this type of relation, the self and the other come to a reconciliation. In this relation, both the self and the Other become parts of a bigger encompassing and unifying solidarity, the *Geist*. This key Hegelian term should not be regarded as an individual consciousness. It is a universal we that can encompass every singularity of the self(s) and Other(s). This Geist, as a social we or a social organism, furnishes the individual

self-consciousnesses with a communal context in which everyone feels like an 'I' of a 'we'.

We mentioned this stage of the relation very briefly in chapter one when Kojève's interpretation was discussed. There we presented Kojève's interpretation as the most antagonistic reading of the self-Other relation. We saw that Kojève believed in the substantiality of desire and enmity in the relation. The relationship between the self and the Other was characterized by enmity. We mentioned that this interpretation is an extreme one and the opposite to it is the view of Robert Williams. Williams believes that Kojève has distorted the concept of recognition. Williams believes that one does not get the true meaning of recognition in Hegel if one confines the concept of recognition in master and slave relation. As we saw in chapter two, this recognition is a unilateral recognition and the slave receives nothing. Williams thinks that the master-slave relation is just the first step toward mutual recognition. True recognition will be reached later. Williams thinks that the self and the Other can become members of a family, or citizens of a polis, in which mutual recognition will be realized. To what extent this new reading of Hegel will be useful for this dissertation (*cultural* mutual recognition) is a very important question. After sufficiently explaining this type of relation, I will return to this question and try to provide an answer. Putting it briefly, I think that, although the Hegelian self-Other relation in the family or polis works very well *within* a culture, there is no help coming from Hegel for how to apply it *between* cultures. I will discuss this further at the end of this section.

Unilateral recognition is not sufficient

In the second stage of the master-slave relation, we saw that recognition was introduced but it was one-sided or unilateral. To deal with the other, the self has had, so far, two options—first, eliminating the Other, second, keeping the Other alive and overcoming him in order to get recognition from him. The first option had the problem that if the self annihilates the Other, the action, indeed, deprives the self of the possibility of the other's recognition. The second option was also problematic because, even if the master receives recognition from the slave, because the slave does not do so freely and willingly, this type of recognition is not satisfying for the master. If the desire for recognition is to be fulfilled, each side should recognize the other side freely.³⁰¹ In order to fulfill true recognition, it must be two-sided and reciprocal. Hegel expresses the need for the reciprocal recognition in *Phenomenology of Spirit*:

Diese Bewegung des Selbstbewußtseins in der Beziehung auf ein anderes Selbstbewußtsein ist aber auf diese Weise vorgestellt worden als das Tun des Einen; aber dieses Tun des Einen hat selbst die gedoppelte Bedeutung, ebensowohl sein Tun als das Tun des Anderen zu sein; denn das Andere ist ebenso selbständig, in sich beschlossen, und es ist nichts in ihm, was nicht durch es selbst ist. Das erste hat den Gegenstand nicht vor sich, wie er nur für die Begierde zunächst ist, sondern einen für sich seienden selbständigen, über welchen es darum nichts für sich vermag, wenn er nicht an sich selbst dies tut, was es an ihm tut. Die Bewegung ist also schlechthin die gedoppelte beider Selbstbewußtsein[e]. Jedes sieht das Andere dasselbe tun, was es tut; jedes tut selbst, was es an das Andere fordert, und tut darum, was es

³⁰¹ - Gadamer, in "Hegel's dialectic of self-consciousness," compares this call for recognition with the act of greeting. When the self asks the other to recognize the self as a free subject and the Other does this recognition willingly and freely, this means that two selves here are confirmed: the self of the self and self of the other. This reciprocity is like a greeting. Both sides of an act of greeting react to one another in a reciprocal manner. If you greet someone and he does not respond, you feel humiliated. The master who depends on the servant, is no longer a master. He is a comical form of mastery. On the other hand, the servant not only obeys the master, he regards the master as truth. He looks at things through the view of the master. (Gadamer, "Hegel's dialectic of self-consciousness," in *Hegel's Dialectic of desire and recognition*, 156-162).

tut, auch nur insofern, als das Andere dasselbe tut; das einseitige Tun wäre unnütz; weil, was geschehen soll, nur durch beide zustande kommen kann.³⁰²

This reciprocal recognition is missing in the Master-slave relation because Hegel does not put the master and slave in a social context. It seems that they confront one another in a non-social context, and the lack of social institutions between them prevents the reciprocity of recognition. The master-slave relation is not like what one may see in annihilation or slaughter (or as I called it in chapter one: genocide). The master-slave position is a middle way between the slaughter of barbarianism and the mutual recognition of an institutionalized society.³⁰³

Because the master and the slave are on the way toward true recognition, the recognition they manifest is not satisfactory. The master's goal is receiving true

³⁰² - Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, 146. English translation:

"Now, this movement of self-consciousness in relation to another self-consciousness has in this way been represented as the action of *one* self-consciousness, but this action of the one has itself the double significance of being both its own action and the action of the other as well. For the other is equally independent and self-contained, and there is nothing in it of which it is not itself the origin. The first does not have the object before it merely as it exists primarily for desire, but as something that has an independent existence of its own, which, therefore, it cannot utilize for its own purposes, if that object does not of its own accord do what the first does to it. Thus the movement is simply the double movement of the two self-consciousnesses. Each sees the *other* do the same as it does; each does itself what it demands of the other, and therefore also does what it does only in so far as the other does the same. Action by one-side only would be useless because what is to happen can only be brought about by both." Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 111-112.

³⁰³ - Although I am describing the situation of master and slave as a half way point moving toward true and full reciprocal recognition, I do not mean that Hegel himself has regarded the master-slave stage as an intermediate level of recognition. As I will discuss later in this section, it seems that Hegel provides two levels of recognition in the Jena period and in the *Phenomenology*, respectively. In the Jena period, we see a form of reciprocal recognition and later in the *Phenomenology* we see unilateral recognition between master and slave. Henry Harris in "The concept of recognition in Hegel's Jena manuscripts" explains that in the Jena manuscripts Hegel does not ask how the relation is first established or how it develops from the master-slave relation into a love or fellow-citizen relationship. (Henry Harris "The concept of recognition in Hegel's Jena manuscripts," in *Hegel's Dialectic of desire and recognition*, 238).

recognition from a free and valuable consciousness, not recognition from a coerced and enslaved one.³⁰⁴ This recognition thus seems very distorted to the master. Because of this distortion, Robert Williams thinks that recognition in the master-slave relation is totally different from the recognition between family members or citizens in a society that Hegel discusses in the *System of Ethical Life* and in *The Encyclopedia III*. Williams even claims that Hegel is inconsistent, using recognition in two different senses.³⁰⁵

Freedom in mutual recognition

In an equally reciprocal recognition, the other must be affirmed in his difference. Only on this condition can the 'We' emerge as a universal consciousness and an intersubjective community. This intersubjective community sublates otherness and atomic particularity is transcended. In this community, each self freely recognizes the Other and is recognized also by the free Other. In *The Encyclopedia III* Hegel explains this reciprocal freedom:

ist nötig, daß die beiden einander gegenüberstehenden Selbste in ihrem Dasein, in ihrem Sein-für-Anderes, sich als das setzen und sich als das anerkennen, was sie an sich oder ihrem Begriffe nach sind, - nämlich nicht bloß natürliche, sondern freie Wesen. Nur so kommt die wahre Freiheit zustande; denn da diese in der Identität meiner mit dem anderen besteht, so bin ich wahrhaft frei nur dann, wenn auch der andere frei ist und von

³⁰⁴ - Philip J. Kain, in *Hegel and the Other, A Study of the Phenomenology of Spirit*, explains that the main point of recognition is receiving it from a valuable source, not from a suppressed and degraded slave. By negating the other and ranking it below us, the other's recognition of us becomes worthless. Kain believes that the most crucial point in recognition is respecting the 'otherness' of the Other. The Other must be free to be totally different than us, and in this situation, if he recognizes us, we have received true recognition. (pages 56 and 65.)

³⁰⁵ - Williams, *Hegel's Ethics of recognition*, 388.

mir als frei anerkannt wird. Diese Freiheit des einen im anderen vereinigt die Menschen auf innerliche Weise.³⁰⁶

This passage shows that true recognition is achievable when master and slave achieve a mutual freedom jointly. As long as they remain in the master-slave relation, they both remain in slavery. In the master and slave relation, freedom only exists in a negative sense. Each tries to negate the other and liberate himself. In another stage, when the master and slave affirm each other equally (and I believe they are no longer a master and slave, but equal citizens of a society), we see the positive aspect of freedom. In a unifying community, the master and slave find some common needs and concerns. In order to meet these needs and satisfy themselves, they must consider each other as free human beings:

Auf diesem Standpunkte haben sich also die aufeinander bezogenen selbstbewußten Subjekte durch Aufhebung ihrer ungleichen besonderen Einzelheit zu dem Bewußtsein ihrer reellen Allgemeinheit, ihrer allen zukommenden Freiheit und damit zur Anschauung ihrer bestimmten Identität miteinander erhoben. Der dem Knecht gegenüberstehende Herr war noch nicht wahrhaft frei, denn er schaute im anderen noch nicht durchaus sich selber an. Erst durch das Freiwerden des Knechtes wird folglich auch der Herr vollkommen frei.³⁰⁷

³⁰⁶ - Hegel, *Werke, Band 10 - Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse III* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970), §431. English translation:

“It is necessary that the two selves standing over and against one another in their determinate being for others, posit and recognize what they implicitly are, or are according to their concept, namely they are not merely natural [things] but are rather free. Only in this way does genuine freedom come about, for since freedom consists in the identity of myself with the other, I am truly free only when the other is free and I recognize that the other is free. This freedom of the one in and through the other unites human beings in an inner way.” See: Hegel, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind: Part Three of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, §431.

³⁰⁷ - Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse III*, §436. English translation:

“At this standpoint, therefore, the mutually related self-conscious subjects, by sublation of their unequal particular individuality, have risen to the consciousness of their real universality, of their freedom befitting all, and hence to the intuition of their determinate identity with each other. The

When the master releases the slave to be free, like himself, both of them regain their absolute independence. Each becomes a universal self-consciousness, and each finds himself recognized by the other free person insofar as he recognizes the other as a free person. Robert Williams finds another term in Hegel to express this new type of recognition. He explains that Hegel puts aside the term *Anerkennen* (to recognize) and uses a new form of it: *Anerkanntsein* (being-recognized). Williams thinks that *Anerkanntsein* denotes recognition no longer as a mere ought of the slave toward the master, or a single interpersonal action between the master and the slave as individuals, but as a pattern of recognition in a universal we. When the freedom of the master becomes equal to the freedom of the slave and the master understands that, besides his own rights, the slave also has rights, his freedom becomes being-recognized.³⁰⁸

Now that we have considered the necessity of mutual recognition, we ought to ask where this recognition can be found? Hegel finds it on two levels. The first is an interpersonal or intersubjective relation; that is, Hegel finds it in love or in the

master confronting the bondsman was not yet genuinely free, for he was still far from intuiting his own self in the other. Consequently, it is only by the liberation of the bondsman that the master, too, becomes completely free." See: Hegel, *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind: Part Three of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, §436.

³⁰⁸ - Hegel, *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind: Part Three of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, §484: "Freedom, which has grown into the shape of an actual world, receives the form of necessity, whose substantial connections constitute the system of freedom's conditions, and whose phenomenal connections constitute freedom's power, its being-recognized [*Anerkanntsein*], its validity in consciousness."

family.³⁰⁹ The second level of mutual recognition is found in a social and institutional context, in relations between citizens in a society or between individuals and the universal.³¹⁰

³⁰⁹ - In his early writings, Hegel compares Judaism with Christianity in a context that is comparable to what we discuss here about the difference between unilateral recognition and bilateral recognition. For Hegel, Judaism is in the master-slave stage. It addresses a God who is like a controlling master or father. He is the master, and the rest are slaves. In Judaism, we see the mastery, or the kingdom of God. In contrast, Christianity is the religion of love, in which we see a reunion of lover and beloved. In Christianity, people, through Jesus, become children of God. And as children are from the father, people are from God. People are parts of God. (Williams, *Recognition, Fichte and Hegel on the Other*, 77-81.)

³¹⁰ - In the third phase of Hegelian logic, the doctrine of the Concept represents this type of recognition. The Concept for Hegel is like Leibniz's monad. It is complete; viz, a thing that is a totality and contains itself and its antithesis at the same time. When Hegel says "the Concept is *totality*" or "the Absolute is the *Concept*" (*Encyclopedia* 236-7), what is meant is that, in the third phase of his logic, concepts do not stand beside their others negatively (like the doctrine of Being) or reflectively (like concepts of the doctrine of essence). However, they are in as much as complete that each concept has its opposite (so to speak) in itself. When a concept becomes complete and enriched in itself, it becomes bigger and bigger and finally it encompasses another concept in itself instead of being passed over it or being reflected in it. Therefore, in the third phase of logic we see concepts that are enough complete to cover themselves and their apparent (or let say linguistic) other:

The progression of the Concept is no longer either passing-over or shining into another, but *development* for the [moments] that are distinguished are immediately posited at the same time as identical with one another. (Hegel, *The Encyclopedia Logic*, §161)

Therefore, the relation between concepts in this stage of logic is completion, or evolution. If we look at the concepts Hegel discuss in the third part, we see this sense of evolution. He talks about the Concept of *individual* that is not an opposite or alternative for *universal*, however the *individual* is an initial version of *universal*, or vise versa, the *universal* is an advanced version of *individual*. Here we cannot say that *individual* is opposite of *universal* as well as *positive* that is the opposite of *negative*. Although linguistically there is a sense of reflection between an *individual* and *universal*, similar to the reflection between *positive* and *negative*, Hegel alarms that the relation is different. To see the difference, we must note that the *positive* and the *negative* are independent from each other, in other words, they are two things, but there is not such relation between the *individual* and the *universal*. They are two form for one thing, what Hegel calls it *singular*.

In order to clarify the nature of the relation between the *individual* or the *Universal*, Hegel gives an example that is helpful. To show how concepts in a way of development become the other, he gives the example of the germ and the whole plant. The plant is a developed version of its germ. Plant's parts such as root, stem, and leaves are already contained in the germ (Hegel, *The Encyclopedia Logic*, §161, addition.) and when we provide appropriate time and place for the germ,

we see that the germ *becomes* a plant. In this *becoming* the germ is not annihilated, it is transformed to a plant. It is a germ that is a plant in the same time.

Before going over my application from these Hegelian Investigations and applying them to self-other relation, may be it is better to discuss two other concepts in this part of Hegelian logic: the *concept* and the *object*. Instead of saying that what is conceptual is not objective and what is objective, it is not abstract and conceptual, what common language evokes, Hegel suggests that both the *concept* and the *object* are different nuances of ONE thing, the *idea*. Hegel claims that it is wrong if we think of the *idea* as something abstract, the truth is that the idea is abstract and concrete equally (Hegel, *The Encyclopedia Logic*, §213). The *Concept* can develop and on its way to become a real concept it becomes a *real* concept, vz. a concept that is real and concrete. If we think on this way about the *concept* and the *object*, truth is no longer a *correspondence* between an external thing and its presentation in our mind. According to this new type of relation that things develop and become each other, truth should be the equality of objectivity and the Concept. Truth is "what is rational is real, what is real is rational."

In this type of relation there are apparently two things, two concepts, but indeed they are not two, they are the same, as Hegel says, "we are not dealing with this or that" (Hegel, *The Encyclopedia Logic*, §213); we are nor dealing with this concept or that object, we are not dealing with this representation and that external thing, we are indeed dealing with one thing: an objective concept or an abstract external thing.

This is a very important achievement to show that all concepts that are dualistic, or opposite, or different than each other, are indeed one thing. Hegel claims that this achievement is done by *Reason*, philosophically meant, unity of subject and object. Hegel tells is by a hyphen (albite in English): *Reason* is subject-object (Hegel, *The Encyclopedia Logic*, §214). In describing this rational unity it Hegel says, *reason* is

unity of the ideal and the real, of the finite and the infinite, of the soul and the body, as the possibility that has its actuality in itself, as that whose nature can be comprehended only as existing, and so forth (Hegel, *The Encyclopedia Logic*, §214).

Does this "so forth" allow me to add another pair: the self and the Other? By this question I want to transform all these Hegelian explanations into what I need in this step: the unity of the self and the Other. Taking that *rational* approach to unify all dualistic concepts, I am going to claim that the truth, according to Hegelian logic, is not found in the self or in the Other, not in this self or that self, but the truth is in self-Other.

In previous chapters I discussed two type of relation between the self and the Other, between the cultural self and the cultural Other. *Grace* a the third part of Hegelian logic, one can imagine a third party for the relation. The self is not something independent from and indifferent to the Other, it is another version of the Other. The Other is developed shape of the self and the self is developed shape of the Other. Accordingly, a cultural self does not need to leave itself (like the first layer of dialectic and the Concept of barbarianism) or to reflect itself to the Other (like the second layer and the case of Orientalism) to be able to meet the Other. According to the logic of *development* the cultural self must complete itself, and in this way of development it becomes the cultural Other.

Recognition in love, and in social life

In love the self and the Other approach each other with trust. They recognize themselves immediately in the other. The self's essence becomes the Other's essence. They look and judge themselves based on what the Other thinks about them. In love, satisfaction is not an individual goal. The self finds its satisfaction in the satisfaction of the Other. In such a relation, *desire*, using the technical meaning we discussed in chapter one, has no place. In marriage, for instance, the physical desire of sex transforms into ethical life. Disregarding its patriarchalism, in Hegel's view, we read that

The woman comes to be a being on her own account for the man. She ceases to be [simply] an object of his desire; desire becomes something ideal, and a [conscious] intuiting, it comes to be inclination. Desire thus frees itself from its connection with enjoyment, it comes to be an immediate union of both in the absolute being for self of both, i.e., it becomes love; and the enjoyment is this intuiting of oneself in the being of the other consciousness. This connection becomes in the same way the being of both, and something that abides as much as they do separately, that is, it becomes marriage.³¹¹

Another opportunity for mutual recognition is found in society, in which individuals regard themselves and Others as equally free members. Each member enjoys equal rights and freedoms because a social reconciliation of wills has determined that each member has equal status in the society. In a state of nature, according to Hegel, freedom has no meaning. Everything is left unjudged and ethics-free. In the state of nature, doing right or wrong has no sense. But when the spirit, as a universal we,

³¹¹ - Hegel, *System of Ethical Life (1802/3) and First Philosophy of Spirit (part III of the System of Speculative Philosophy 1803/4)*, 231-232.

appears in a society that has law, the words 'right' and 'wrong' make sense.³¹² In such a moral context, every person is free and also obliged to respect the freedom of Others. If the context of the master and slave relation was dominance and recognition, here in society and ethical life, the concept of right is important. Right is the recognition of the other as other. In master-slave relation each side cares about its own liberty, in society each side is careful to respect the rights of the Other.

Possession vs. property

One of the other distinctive aspects of society, compared to the master-slave relation, is the difference between the concepts of 'possession' and 'ownership.' Possession signifies that a self (let us say the master) places his will on a thing. He appropriates and possesses something and embodies his will in that thing. In possession, the self does not care whether the Other affirms this possession or not. The Other is forced to affirm. On the contrary, ownership or property is a possession that is recognized intersubjectively. In other words, ownership is a recognized "expression of the person's freedom, activity, and presence in the world, in things."³¹³ In ownership, the self is secured with its property and no violence threatens his property. The exclusion of others from the self's property constitutes a private sphere that is distinct from solipsism. It does not undermine intersubjectivity. It is a universal concept: "The

³¹² - Hegel. *Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), §2.

³¹³ - Williams, *Hegel's Ethics of Recognition*, 141.

security of my possession becomes the security of the possessions of all; in my property, all have their property."³¹⁴

The concept of a contract comes to fore here. It shows that, in a universal we, mutually recognized common will is expressed in the contract. Common customs become the laws of the society and upon such laws people can define what is wrong and what is right. When an individual violates these commonly recognized contracts, he is called a wrongdoer. What is *wrong* is a violation of the *Anerkannt* contract.

Robert Williams on recognition

In chapter one, we saw that Williams accuses Kojève of distorting the concept of recognition in Hegel. After explaining the possibility of mutual recognition between members of a family or a state, as Hegel relates it in the Jena period, now we can understand what Williams means by the true interpretation of recognition in Hegel. Williams believes that the institutions of ethical life, including the family, civil society, and the state, are not limitations of recognition or freedom, quite the contrary; they are conditions of a true freedom.

In *Hegel's Ethics of Recognition*, Williams criticizes Kojève in arguing that true freedom is possible only through intersubjectivity and the ethical life. In an individualistic situation, one in which consciousness is the absolute and single subject of the world, freedom makes no sense.³¹⁵ Williams shows that, for Hegel, the complete

³¹⁴ - Hegel, *Jena Realphilosophie 1803/04*, cited by Avineri in: Shlomo Avineri. *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 88.

³¹⁵ - Freedom is not individualistic, it only makes sense in a social unity.

form of freedom is depicted not in the Master and Slave relation in the *Phenomenology*, but in the *Philosophy of Right*, where Hegel asserts this transformation:

The point of view of the free will, with which right and the science of rights begin, is already beyond that false [unwahren] point of view whereby the human being exists as a natural being ... and is therefore capable of enslavement. This earlier and false appearance [Erscheinung] is associated with a spirit that is only at the standpoint of its consciousness; the dialectic of the concept and of the as yet only immediate consciousness of freedom results in the struggle for recognition and the relation of master and slave. However, that the objective spirit, the content of right, should no longer be apprehended merely in its subjective concept, and consequently that the human being in and for itself is not destined for slavery, should no longer be conceived as something that merely ought to be, is an insight that comes only when we recognize that the Idea of freedom is truly actual only as the state.³¹⁶

By going beyond natural life, and entering the social or ethical life, reciprocal recognition becomes possible. Williams sees this moving from natural life to ethical life as a move from the view of recognition in the *Phenomenology* to the view of recognition in the *Encyclopedia*. Because of the immaturity of the view of recognition in the *Phenomenology*, Williams thinks that desire has a key role in the *Phenomenology*. As we saw in chapter one, desire represents a lower and premature stage of recognition in which the self is naively self-centered and narcissistic. The self wants to consume the Other, even if this consumption results in solipsism and egoism.

Habermas on social recognition

Another notable commentator who is in line with Williams' approach is Jürgen Habermas. In his essay, "Labor and Interaction," he discusses the concept of recognition in Hegel's early Jena manuscripts. He thinks that the reciprocal concept of

³¹⁶ - Hegel, *Elements Philosophy of Right* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), §57.

recognition in the Jena manuscripts is overridden by a monological and self-centered subjectivity in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. For Habermas, Hegel's Jena writings are not a preparatory stage for the *Phenomenology*, despite the common interpretation. The texts offer a distinct system. Habermas believes that recognition in community is a higher level of recognition than that which is achieved in the subject-object paradigm of master and slave, in the *Phenomenology*.

In a free community, participants stand on a common tradition. They establish solidarity as a group and want no longer to master one another.³¹⁷ Language, tools (labor), and family (reciprocity) are three fundamental elements of this reciprocal recognition. In other words, the full picture of the *Geist* can be seen as an aggregate of these three components of social recognition. In the Jena period, Habermas argues that *Geist* is not only the individual subjectivity of the self, it is a medium in which an I communicates with another I.³¹⁸ *Geist* is a communicative universal I that includes all 'I's. Because of this communicative aspect, we can use the word "Geist" to mean a "national spirit," a "team spirit," or the "spirit of an epoch."

In this communicative picture of human society, language, love, culture, collective morality and labor (trade and contract) are tools of achieving a free and reciprocal recognition. Love for instance dissolves the conflictual relation between the self and the Other.³¹⁹ And through culture and morality, the 'I's communicate to each

³¹⁷ - Jürgen Habermas. "Labor and Interaction: Remarks on Hegel's Jena Philosophy of Mind," in *Hegel's Dialectic of desire and recognition*, 140-141.

³¹⁸ - Habermas, "Labor and Interaction: Remarks on Hegel's Jena Philosophy of Mind," 126-7.

³¹⁹ - Ibid., 128.

other under a unifying universal moral law. And labor causes the exchange of money, contracts, and agreements between individuals.

Honneth on social recognition

Another important commentator who should be mentioned here is Axel Honneth.³²⁰

In *Struggle for Recognition*, Honneth describes three positive forms of recognition in a society: intimate relations such as love, legal relations such as the relation between the individual and the state, and the solidarity of the people through common traditions and values. Through these relations, a person achieves three forms of self-affirmation. Through love the person achieves self-confidence. Through social rights a person achieves self-respect. And through social esteem a person develops self-esteem. Correspondingly, if a community member violates the rights of others in these three forms of relation he commits the abuses of rape, exclusion, and denigration, respectively.

Similar to Habermas, Honneth believes that recognition in Hegel's early writings is distinct from recognition in the *Phenomenology*. And, again similar to Habermas, he thinks that the former conception is more intersubjective and reciprocal and the latter is more monological and self-reflective.³²¹

³²⁰ - The list of commentators who believe in the possibility of mutual recognition is significantly longer than this. For instance, in a political/liberal context, Sybol S. C. Anderson, in *Hegel's Theory of Recognition, From Oppression to Ethical Liberal Modernity*, argues that Hegel has created a reliable foundation for liberal democracies to respect equality and freedom and justice. He believes that Hegel in *Philosophy of Rights* (§154) defends "the right of particularity" according to which every individual in a society is free for agency and various identities.

³²¹ - Axel Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition: the Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996).

Theunissen and impossibility of intersubjectivity

Contrary to the position of Robert Williams, Habermas, and Honneth—who all see a sense of intersubjectivity in Hegel's ethical life theory—Michael Theunissen, in "The Repressed Intersubjectivity in Hegel's Philosophy of Right," believes that community for Hegel is a substantial entity which leaves no room for individuality. Therefore, in the family or state, intersubjectivity is repressed. Theunissen believes that although Hegel may attempt to ground intersubjectivity, he cannot do so because the family and the state, for Hegel, are one entity and the members of these entities are only accidents of them. When individuals are accidents of a community, communal freedom or intersubjectivity is impossible.³²²

In a family, state, or civil society, people exist for each other in an unindividuated manner. These structures alienate individuals from each other. They become an indifferent member among other members with no specific characteristics. Thus, in civil societies individuals are self-alienated.³²³ Before entering a society, self-consciousness has an individualized form of freedom. Once the individual enters the society, it loses its essentiality. From now on, the society is the essence, and from this new essence no particularity will arise. In such un-individualist universality, talking about intersubjectivity does not make sense.³²⁴

³²² - Michael Theunissen, "The Repressed Intersubjectivity in Hegel's Philosophy of Right," in *Hegel and Legal Theory*, 12.

³²³ - Ibid.

³²⁴ - Sartre in *Notebooks for an Ethics* has a similar critical approach to Hegelian mutual recognition. If we recall his theory of the mirrors game and the impossibility of love, here Sartre sees the same impossibility in reciprocal recognition. He says, "reciprocal recognition is a game of mirrors, which finally ends up as a lie" (Sartre, *Notebooks for an Ethics*, 70). Recognition should be unilateral. In the past, an absolute witness was able to recognize me without any need for reciprocity. He was

Ludwig Siep and a new meaning for intersubjectivity

If we return now to consider commentators who do believe that intersubjectivity is possible in Hegel, we may mention Ludwig Siep. To explain his position, let us reconsider the problem Theunissen raised and called the alienation of the individual in community. We can reframe this question by asking what happens to the individual and its transcendental self-consciousness when it moves into a community. Is the individual self-consciousness who lives in a community the very same individual self-consciousness who used to live in the natural state? If it has changed or transformed, through this movement, can we call it alienation, as Theunissen does? Ludwig Siep agrees that there is a transformation, but this transformation is not alienation. Siep argues that Hegel tried to reconcile two absolutes, or Hegel tried to escape dualism—specifically, the dualism between absolute individual freedom and absolute communal freedom. Siep calls this a reconciliation between Aristotle (priority of nature over individual freedom) and Kant (absolute autonomy and freedom of the Individual). Hegel has overcome the duality between provincialism and the autonomy of the individual, between natural principle and individual freedom. To permit this reconciliation, Hegel has used some concepts such as love, recognition, and even Geist, which all are intersubjective concepts. All of them refer to an I that is also a ‘We.’

The transformation that individual self-consciousness experiences in the transition from a natural state to a social state is that it becomes an I who is a We at

the God. Then, when this witness is no longer available, we try to replace it with human recognition. Sartre thinks that it is illusory. In another stage we replace the recognition between individuals by recognition between men and the state; however, the state can recognize me only as a universal citizen, it cannot recognize me in my individuality. (Ibid., 70-72)

the same time. The I that is recognized in social life is not a transcendental a priori subject; it is an I that is also a We. It becomes a social I. This is a new existence for the I.

Consciousness undergoes a complete change in this process by gaining a new existence which consists in annulling its isolated existence and existing only as recognized. Nevertheless in this new form of existence it does not lose itself but rather finds its identity.³²⁵

With the help of this new picture of the individual, Siep concludes that in *Realphilosophie* (Jena Manuscripts) individual consciousness is not lost. It is both cause and effect of the general consciousness, i.e., a 'We.' Living in a community is not a limitation or diminution of freedom. It is the only true way to reach a free self-determining self-consciousness. In this way, the transcendental ego cannot be free outside of the community. It can be absolutely free only in the community. In this way, intersubjectivity obtains a new meaning. In a community, we do not ask about intersubjectivity between private, isolated, individual, self-conscious beings. Intersubjectivity is possible in a community because each individual is a We by itself. Intersubjectivity, in this situation, does not begin in encounter between the self and the Other, it actually begins within the self.³²⁶

³²⁵ - Ludwig Siep, *Anerkennung als Prinzip der Praktischen Philosophie*, 671..

³²⁶ - Despite Siep's response to Theunissen, the recognition he identifies in the relation between the individual citizen and the state can be called asymmetrical. In "Mutual Recognition: Hegel and Beyond," Siep is rather skeptical that mutual recognition could be achieved in social ontology. He sees three problems in social ontology which cannot be sufficiently treated by a theory of recognition. The first problem in which the theory of symmetrical recognition falls short is the question of distributive justice. The second is the idea of a well-ordered pluralistic society. And the third problem appears in the relation between humankind and nature. See: Siep, Ludwig. "'Mutual Recognition: Hegel and Beyond,'" 117-144.

How Hegel's theory can help me: Possibility of cultural recognition

Having reviewed the various positions on the concept of recognition in Hegel, we come to the question I raised at the beginning of this section: Can a Hegelian theory of recognition between loved ones or between citizens in a state, or between individual and community be expanded to a broader scope and account for recognition between cultures? To answer the question, we should note that a common context exists in recognition. Individuals in a family or in a society have customs and laws in common. Charles Taylor even thinks that language is a common context in Hegel.³²⁷ Indeed, this common context necessitates recognition of the Other as an equally free person relative to the self. Regarding our cultural question, we should look at whether Hegel sees any common context between different cultures. Does Hegel see a common language between cultures? One passage from *Vorlesungen uber Rechtsphilosophie* shows that Hegel does not see such common context:

The 'welfare of all' is an empty word. For are not both the dead and future generations are naturally to reckoned among the 'all'? Or does it simply refer to those who are contemporary [*Mitlebenden*]? How can I advance the welfare of the Chinese? The Bible is more rational when it commands, Love your neighbor as yourself, that is, love the human beings with whom you are in relation or with whom you come to be in relation. 'All' is merely empty bombast. The universal formal aspect of good 'cannot be fulfilled as an abstraction; it must first acquire the further determination of particularity.'³²⁸

This passage shows that Hegel sees no "relation" between the German and the Chinese

³²⁷ - Charles Taylor, "Hegel's Ambiguous Legacy for Modern Liberalism," in *Hegel and Legal Theory* (London: Routledge, 1991).

³²⁸ - Hegel, *Vorlesungen uber Rechtsphilosophie 1818-1821*. Quoted and translated by Williams in: Williams, *Hegel's Ethics of Recognition*, 189.

(as a cultural Other). Therefore, one might conclude that the universal we can be realized only in a local society; or it can be expanded only as far as the borders of a nation. Beyond a limited society exists no universal law. I think, however, this conclusion is based on premises that simply assume a lack of common/universal law, customs, and needs. If we update such premises according to our contemporary situation, in which a virus from China can affect the whole world and forces German pharmacists to work on a vaccine, we may accept that some kind of universal recognition between cultures is possible. A concept like universal law was not unfamiliar to Hegel. Kant had written about it before Hegel; therefore, I think that by expanding the concept of community in Hegel to a universal context, we can apply his theory of recognition in a universal context. In universal recognition, cultures become members of a universal community, and cultural elements do not remain private and local elements, they become common between cultures. This commonality can cause mutual respect between cultures. I will return to this topic when I consider phenomenological cosmopolitanism at the end of this chapter. In anticipation of those considerations, I should discuss a few more theories of intersubjectivity.³²⁹

Husserl, Transcendental intersubjectivity

Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity can be seen as the beginning of a path that leads us to co-existence. However, Husserl is in the middle, so to speak; he opens the door

³²⁹ - To see how Hegel's practical philosophy may help revitalize current debates about the relation between the state and individual citizens, see "The contemporary relevance of Hegel's practical philosophy" by Ludwig Siep. See: Siep, Ludwig. "The contemporary relevance of Hegel's practical philosophy" in Hegel: New Directions. edited by Deligiorgi, Katerina. 143-158. London: Routledge, 2014.

for intersubjectivity, and mutual-reciprocal relationship between the self and the Other. But the extent to which he was successful in his project is in question.

Transcendental ego

Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity is presented in the fifth meditation of *Cartesian Meditations*.³³⁰ According to his phenomenological method and the theory of intentionality, he begins with a primordial reduction; this means parenthesizing all of the objective world and reducing everything to the transcendental ego.³³¹ In this primordial world, the self is the center. Everything around the self, including the alien, is for-the-self. Everything is intended by the self's intentionality, and the self is in a world that is entirely for-him. Husserl himself asserts that this primordial world might be accused of solipsism. The self is alone in its world, or as Husserl puts it, it is a *monade* for itself.³³²

³³⁰ - Husserl also talks about the theme of intersubjectivity very shortly in sections 29, 46, 53, in the first volume of *Ideas* where he gives an analysis of the natural attitude. The Objective world is accepted by the self and also by an alter-ego. In this objective world, the self and the Other can communicate and have reciprocal understanding. They share a natural empirical unity in which they can have empathy with each other. See: Edmund Husserl, *Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy*, First book: General introduction to a pure phenomenology (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1983).

The theme of intersubjectivity also is repeated in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, sections 95 and 96. Here Husserl discusses how an objective world that is mine can be shared with the Other. How can the world be a world for all of us? To constitute such a common world, the transcendental ego needs to reach the Other in his mental state. Is this possible at all? Husserl thinks that it is possible because the body of the Other appears to me as a living body and I experience his psychic life.

³³¹ - Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1960), §42-45.

³³² - Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, § 44.

Experiencing the Other

From this monadic world, the self looks outside and sees that there are some objects that seem to have subjective behaviour like the self. They are “Ego-like living beings.”³³³ But experiencing these others attests to a positive and negative state of affairs. It is positive because the experience indicates to us that there is really an other there, and it is negative because in this experience we do not experience the other’s subjectivity, but only his body.³³⁴

Apperception

The experience of the other’s body is an apperception. By apperception Husserl means making conclusions concerning certain aspects of an object by looking at other aspects. For instance, when I look at this ceramic vessel in front of me on the table, I see only the half of it that is exposed to my eyes. By seeing this side of the vessel, I conclude the other face of vessel, or in other words, its back is apperceived to me. As in the case of seeing objects, when the self experiences the other, it sees only his body, but the self can apprehend his interiority or his subjectivity through experiencing his body.

Körper vs. Leib

In this process of apperception, i.e., on the way to concluding that the other’s subjectivity exists by experiencing his body, we need an intermediary step. The question is how a body is able to appresent a soul or a subjectivity. The solution is in the fact that there are two Husserlian conceptions for body. If body appears as a purely material object similar to other objects, it is *Körper* or “physical body.” If a body

³³³ - Ibid., §44.

³³⁴ - Michael Theunissen, *The other: studies in the social ontology of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Buber* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1984), 58-59.

indicates a soul behind its material appearance, for instance by moving or making noises like talking, then it is not merely a material object, it is *Leib* or “organic body.” Now, in the context of the connection between the self and the Other, Husserl argues that by switching from looking at the physical body of the Other to seeing the organic body of the Other, the self concludes that there is a soul, or a subjectivity, behind this body. The organic body, like everything else, has its unseen sides. I can imagine those sides without seeing them directly. This is apperception of the other’s subjectivity.³³⁵

Analogy

The problem remains as yet unsolved. Offering two perspectives on body as *Körper* or *Leib* does not solve the problem. One might ask, what convinces the self to turn its look from the other’s physical body to his organic body? Husserl responds that there is a motivation behind this step. By seeing similar actions performed by the other’s body, the self is motivated to form a “similarity” between its organic body and the Other’s physical body. Based on this similarity, the self carries over the meaning of organic body to the other’s physical body. Husserl calls it “analogizing” or “assimilating apperception.”³³⁶

An important point, in order to understand what Husserl means by “assimilating apperception,” is that this apperception is not an *inference*. As I put it in the previous paragraph, it is a motivation. By seeing an analogy between the behaviours of its organic body and the Other’s physical body, the self does not conclude (infer) that the

³³⁵ - Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, §54.

³³⁶ - *Ibid.*, §50.

Other's body is an organic body. It is simply motivated to think as such without any mediating thought. It is "in no way an inference from analogy," Husserl emphasizes.³³⁷

The primal instituting original

To understand this process of analogizing, another Husserlian concept is helpful. When the self experiences pregiven objects for the first time, it obtains a primal sense of them. Husserl calls it "the primal instituting original" or *urstiftende Original*. Afterward, every time the self encounters an object *similar* to that primal object, it transfers that original sense to this new object.

Apperception of things vs. the alter ego

This primal instituting original has two different roles when the self needs to know inert things in its primordial world or when it needs to know the alter ego. Knowing inert things, the self transfers the past primal sense to a thing that is present to it in the moment. In this way, the primal instituting original belongs to the past. The self looks at a tree and refers to the concept of tree, and judges that this is a tree. Similar to this process, when the self looks at the body of the other, it refers to the concept of its own organic body, and then judges that this is not a physical body, it is an organic body in which a subjectivity exists.

As we said above, this process of apperception (knowing the other side of the physical body, that is, organic body) is not an inference. It happens to the self. This body that the self sees has a *harmonious behavior*. This harmonious behavior has a physical side that indicates something psychic behind it.³³⁸

³³⁷ - Ibid.

³³⁸ - Ibid., §52.

The self's body has the mood of "here." Everything else, including the Other's body have the mood of "there." The self can move and change any "there" into "here." And when the self gets there, it sees that that the previous "here" now is "there." By this experience the self understands that it has been "there" for everything that has been "here." The other as well has had a "here" for himself and the self has been "there" for the other. Therefore, when the self is here, it cannot completely perceive itself and his perspective from there. It can understand its "there-ness" only when it moves to there and looks at "here" from a new perspective, or as Husserl puts it: "what if I were there?" But if the self moves there and looks at here from there, in this time, the self is no longer here.³³⁹ This game of mirroring "here" and "there" shows that the self cannot understand its being as a physical body without the Other. The self always finds its body as an organic body, but when looks at itself from the Other's position, it finds a new concept of his body that is physical body. In this case, the Other is part of an essential pair for the self—not only in seeing its physical body, but also in experiencing the objective world. We will see that the Other helps the self discover the objective world.

Pairing

The essential role of the Other, in observing the world around the self, makes the self and the Other each part of an inseparable pair. This paired-ness is completed by transferring the subjectivity of the self to the Other through *assimilative apperception*. What is meant by this is that the external and physical body receives analogically the

³³⁹ - Ibid., §53.

sense and organism belonging to another 'world,' that is the self's world.³⁴⁰ This apperception gives the self and the Other a chance to have co-existence, because the self's primordial world overlaps with the Other's primordial world. Physical bodies that appear organic to the other are the common area of the self and the Other. Husserl calls this associative paring: fusion.³⁴¹

Community of monades or transcendental intersubjectivity

This overlap or fusion creates a community of monads. The first thing in common between the self and the Other is *nature*. The Self's nature is the Other's nature. Furthermore, through this community of monads we can build up the objective world. The objective world is the shared world between the self and the Other. The world that appears in the Other's appearance-system is the same world that I perceive in my appearance-system.³⁴² In other words, if I penetrate into the Other's horizon of ownness, my animate organism lies in his field of perception and he experience me as an Other, just as I experience him as an Other.³⁴³ This common world that is achievable in a community of monads can be regarded as transcendental intersubjectivity.³⁴⁴

Having a common objective world is the first level of transcendental intersubjectivity. At a higher level of this intersubjectivity, the self finds itself in a community of humans and, at the furthest extent, it arrives in a community that can be called a culture. Each human community has a culture. Nature or the objective world

³⁴⁰ - Ibid., §54.

³⁴¹ - Ibid.

³⁴² - Ibid., §55.

³⁴³ - Ibid., §56.

³⁴⁴ - Ibid.

is shared by everyone but bordering worlds of various cultures are different.³⁴⁵ Everyone in the world of a certain culture regards the other worlds of other cultures as alien, but he must open up ways of access to a sympathetic understanding. My culture is primordial over against every alien culture. The center is my culture, just as my consciousness was the central primordial stage, but any alien culture is accessible by a kind of “experience of someone else,” or by a kind of “empathy.”³⁴⁶

At this stage, Husserl offers a new definition of the transcendental ego. At the beginning, with the phenomenological reduction, we grasped an ego who is a monad and the rest of its knowledge about the world was in *epoché*. Here at the end of story, we have a transcendental ego that is not reduced to a single and separate monadic life. It is a universal I, or a universal monad. The transcendental ego unifies all monads. It is not an individual "I", it is a universal "I." This transcendental ego experiences within himself a world, including alter egos.³⁴⁷

The Charge of solipsism

This universal or transcendental ego helps Husserl escape from the charge of transcendental solipsism. At the beginning, we mentioned that Husserl was aware about the problem of solipsism when he was enacting the phenomenological reduction. The problem is that if we begin with the transcendental ego of the phenomenological reduction and thenceforth restrict every phenomenon in his world, phenomenology will be incapable of proving the objective world.

³⁴⁵ - Ibid., §58.

³⁴⁶ - Ibid.

³⁴⁷ - Ibid., §59.

Here in the last section of the fifth meditation, Husserl responds to that problem of solipsism. He affirms that the Other is always present in the ego's experience of itself: "in my own experience, I experience not only myself but others."³⁴⁸ In a more detailed statement Husserl explains:

daß auch das transzendente, konkret gefaßte ego (das in der transzendentalen Reduktion vorerst mit unbestimmtem Horizont seiner selbst inne wird) sowohl sich selbst in seinem primordialen Eigensein als auch, in Form seiner transzendentalen Fremderfahrung; Andere, andere transzendente ego.³⁴⁹

We have been dealing with the problem of solipsism from the beginning of this dissertation because of the Cartesian roots of the self-other relation. In chapter one, we saw that if the self is confined in the abyss of pure thinking or pure consciousness; it becomes disconnected from the objective world, and this will lead to the problem of solipsism. Here it would be helpful to recall the problem as expressed in Descartes. Since Descartes, there has been a disagreement between two groups of philosophers. One group considers the self as a transcendental ego that, at first, appears as subject, a pure consciousness, in relation to the other, and secondarily as an object in the moment that the other objectifies it. This approach has Cartesian roots. We saw that it was Descartes who confined the "I" to pure "thinking." The second group, including Husserl, regards the self as a bodily consciousness or a conscious body (physical body vs. organic body) that appears at the same time as a *subject-object* in relation to the

³⁴⁸ - Ibid., §62.

³⁴⁹ - Ibid. English translation:

"the concretely apprehended transcendental ego (who first becomes aware of himself, with his undetermined horizon, when he effects transcendental reduction) grasps himself in his own primordial being, and likewise (in the form of his transcendental experience of what is alien) grasps others: other transcendental egos."

Other. This is a major disagreement in much phenomenological literature that is concerned with the self-other relation. In the case of Husserl, we must consider two different interpretations of him. Sartre, Alfred Schutz, and Paul Ricoeur believe that Husserl cannot escape from Cartesian subjective solipsism. On the other hand, some commentators like Dan Zahavi and Peter Hutcheson defend Husserl, claiming that his critics are labouring under a misunderstanding.

Alfred Schutz and impossibility of transcendental intersubjectivity

On the side of the critics, let us begin with Alfred Schutz. Schutz has written much on Husserl, but for the sake of brevity, I refer only to his influential paper “The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl.” In the paper, Schutz contends that Husserl’s attempt to constitute transcendental intersubjectivity has not succeeded because Husserl tries to build intersubjectivity upon the operations of the consciousness of the transcendental ego. Schutz thinks that the problem of intersubjectivity cannot be solved by transcendental philosophy, but it is a fundamental ontological category of the human. In all his criticisms, Schutz focuses on certain flaws in Husserl’s argument. For instance, Schutz argues that reciprocal understanding and communication presupposes a common surrounding world and not the reverse. We saw that Husserl takes the existence of a common world as a premise for having intersubjective communication. Schutz maintains that communications, as personal events, happen before constituting a common world and nature.³⁵⁰

³⁵⁰ - Alfred Schutz, “The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl” in *Collected Papers (III)*, *Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 72.

Another criticism by Schuts concerns discovering the ego of the Other. He argues that even if we accept that, by appresentation of another's body, we can consider his body as a living body and not a corpse, the sphere of his ego remains unavailable to the self. The Other's ego cannot be appresented; "[s]upposing that the transference of sense from my body to the co-existing body of the Other succeeds," he says, "the Other would be given to me as another psychophysical I; however, this would still not suffice to constitute a sphere of what is 'properly' of his ego."³⁵¹

Another noteworthy criticism by Schuts concerns the problem of the similarity the self sees between his and the Other's body. We saw in Husserl that the similarity between the Other's bodily actions and the self's living body makes the apperceptive transfer of sense possible, from the Self's body to the Other's body. Schuts asks to what extent, however, does such similarity work? Schuts argues that the self's body is perceived from the inside. It is present to an inner perception and is perceived as a primal instituting organ. The other body, quite the contrary, is visually perceived. The way that it is perceived is entirely different from the way that the self perceives his own body. This difference makes the similarity between the self's living body and the Other's body impossible. The transference of the sense from the self to the Other's body would be possible if the way that the self perceives his body was similar to the way it perceives the Other's body.³⁵² Schuts sees this criticism as being in line with

³⁵¹ - Alfred Schuts, "The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl," 67-68.

³⁵² - Ibid., 63-64.

what Sartre argues when he distinguishes between the ontological dimensions of the body, *mon corps pour moi, et mon corps pour autrui*.³⁵³

Sartre and his critique on solipsist transcendental knowledge

Schuts' criticism of Husserl is similar to Sartre's; both of them think that the connection between the self and the Other must go beyond transcendental knowledge. It should be, so to speak, an existential connection. Sartre, in *Being and Nothingness*, criticizes Husserl in a similar way. Sartre contends that the existence of the Other is a required condition for knowing the world.³⁵⁴ If the objective world exists, it is because of a commonality between what I understand from the world and what the Other understands from it. Sartre thinks that in trying to prove the existence of the objective world and the Other, Husserl relies only on a knowledge-based connection, and this is the problem of Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity. Because Husserl reduces being to meaning, the only connection between my being and that of the Other is a connection of knowledge. Therefore, Husserl cannot escape solipsism.³⁵⁵ And, finally, Sartre concludes that the only way to escape solipsism is to prove that my consciousness, in its very being, is affected by existence of other consciousnesses.

Ricœur and the respect for otherness of the Other

Paul Ricœur, in *Husserl, an Analysis of His Phenomenology*, has a similar critical approach to Husserl. He believes the whole Fifth Meditation presents a tension between two types of constitution the Other; constituting the Other in me and constituting him as Other. In other words, Ricœur thinks that the Other for Husserl

³⁵³ - José Ortega y Gasset has similar criticism to Husserl in *Man and People*.

³⁵⁴ - Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 316.

³⁵⁵ - Ibid., 318.

remains confined in the primordial world of the self and cannot become a true Other who is independent of the self. Ricoeur thinks that this tension is the result of two different methodologies in the Fifth Meditation. On the one hand, Husserl tries to meet the requirement of the method of reduction and on the other hand he needs to offer his phenomenology as a description of the world. According to these two methodologies, the Other at one time appears as a modification of the self, and at another time appears as a real other person.³⁵⁶ Ricoeur asks how the Other can be a free Other when his ego is produced in me and then is transferred from me to the Other. In this way, the otherness of the Other is not respected and the Other, at most, can be an alter-ego or alter-self.

How does Husserl try to reconcile these two types of constitution of the Other? Ricoeur believes that the answer is the theme of analogy. He thinks the theme of analogy is the pivotal point of the Fifth Meditation. By the theme of analogy, Husserl tries to offer some form of respect for the otherness of the Other as a transcendental experience "in" the primordial experience of the ego.³⁵⁷

Ricoeur identifies three stages in the analogy: 1- seeing an association with the Other (what Husserl calls pairing) and transferring the sense of ego to him; 2- interpreting the Other's behaviour as a presentation of his psyche; and 3- imaging that his "there" is the same as my "here"; therefore, if I were over there, I would be him.³⁵⁸

³⁵⁶ - Paul Ricoeur, *Husserl, an Analysis of His Phenomenology* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967), 116-117.

³⁵⁷ - Paul Ricoeur *Husserl, an Analysis of His Phenomenology*, 124.

³⁵⁸ - *Ibid.*, 125-129.

However, Ricœur believes that there is no reason to argue that my “here” is the same as his “here.” His “here” does not belong to my world; it is an absolute freedom, therefore, I cannot transfer the sense of ego from my “here” to his “there.” Finally, Ricœur concludes that my “here” and his “there” are exclusive.³⁵⁹

Are Schuts, Sartre, and Ricœur right in their criticisms of Husserl? Is he finally able to escape from the accusation that his transcendental philosophy cannot access the Other in his otherness? Is his philosophy solipsistic or not?

Zahavi in defense of Husserl

Dan Zahavi thinks that the matter is more complex than refusing solipsism or accepting it. He categorizes criticisms of Husserl into two groups: 1- How is the ego able to constitute the Other when the Other must be considered as something more than a mere product of constitution? 2- How can the existential being of the Other be phenomenologically described when the Other’s subjectivity is characterized by its inaccessibility?³⁶⁰

In order to solve the problem of these two groups of criticisms, Zahavi suggests that we should see Husserl's analysis of intersubjectivity in connection with his theory of intentionality. In this way, Husserl’s goal is not to give a description of the concrete relations between the self and the Other, but it is precisely to formulate a theory of transcendental intersubjectivity. In this theory, body has a key role. It is the unique status of body as a subject-object that permits the self to recognize the Other’s body as a foreign embodied subjectivity. When my left hand touches my right hand, I have a

³⁵⁹ - Ibid., 130.

³⁶⁰ - Dan Zahavi, *Husserl’s Phenomenology* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2003), 110.

double sensation that I can compare with encountering the Other. I do not experience the Other as a mere intentional object, quite the contrary, I experience him as a subject-object. The Other is experienced in its subjective inaccessibility.³⁶¹ The statement saying that “the Other is experienced in its subjectivity” or “I experience the Other’s subjectivity” seems hard to understand, but it is a good example of what Husserl means by the theme of subject-object. This being subject-object creates an asymmetry in the self-Other relation.

In response to Schuts, Sartre, and Ricœur, Zahavi argues that when Husserl constitutes the sense of the Other based on the primordial experience of the ego, he never claims that the ego constitutes the self-givenness of the Other. Zahavi explains that Husserl repeatedly emphasizes that the ego does not create or invent the Other when the ego constitutes the Other. The ego only constitutes the meaning of Otherness because the Other is an Other for the ego and not in relation to itself.³⁶²

Analogy between cultural behaviors

I should explain how I am going to use Husserl’s theory in what I will discuss, at the end of this chapter, under the heading of phenomenological cosmopolitanism. Regardless of his success or his failure to construct a philosophically defensible theory of intersubjectivity, Husserl is important for my study because of the concept of analogy. The self cannot recognize the Other if it does not see the similarity between its behavior and the Other’s behavior. As Ricœur mentioned, the theme of analogy is the pivotal point of the Fifth Meditation.

³⁶¹ - Dan Zahavi, *Husserl’s Phenomenology*, 111-113.

³⁶² - Ibid., 114.

Using the concept of analogy in my theory of phenomenological cosmopolitanism, I will argue that a cosmopolitan mind goes beyond cultural borders and sees the fundamental similarities between cultural behaviours. By seeing similarities, the cultural self transfers the concept of reasonability and rational behaviour to the cultural Other and, in this way, does not accuse him of irrationality. I will discuss this point at the last stage of this chapter.

Heidegger's Theory of *Mitsein*

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger tries to revive the question of being in an entirely new way, distinct from the traditional method of what he terms “metaphysics.” He believes that the traditional way of understanding Being has been misguided, influenced by the dominance of subjectivism throughout the entire history of Western philosophy, especially after Plato. In the subjectivist approach to Being, philosophers have supposed an independent and neutral subject who can know the world objectively. Descartes is a prime example of a thinker in this tradition. Heidegger thinks that this subjectivism is a misdescription of how we in fact understand the world, therefore, he tries to replace the subject-object view with a relation between man and world. We will see that he does so by suggesting being-in-the-world as an *existentiale* for Dasein.

Heidegger declares that the main question of *Being and Time* is the question concerning Being. In searching for the meaning of Being, human existence, Dasein, has the most important role, because it is Dasein and its specific way of being that reveals Being. In other words, Heidegger's point is that to interpret the meaning of Being, we should begin by investigating the being of that entity which understands Being. As a result, knowing Being requires knowing Dasein. Heidegger believes that if we are to

avoid misconceptions about Being in general and Dasein specifically, in the first instance, we must consider Dasein in its average *everydayness*.³⁶³ By this method he means to avoid a merely subjective conception of Being and Dasein.

Existential: Fundamental features of Dasein

Dasein has fundamental features that determine its being. These constitutive fundamentals are what Heidegger refers to as *existential*. These existential fundamentals are referred to in order to distinguish the way we consider Dasein from (1) the way we consider other entities; (2) the way traditional metaphysics looks at all entities (whether man or other entities) via Aristotelian "categories." Accordingly, in his "existential analytic," Heidegger elucidates the fundamental features of the everydayness of Dasein.

The first fundamental feature of Dasein is being-in-the-world.³⁶⁴ Being-in-the-world has a practical aspect, i.e., Dasein considers objects as equipment to reach a goal. However, it is possible to draw back from practical engagement with a thing and inspect it as present-at-hand. If things in the world appear to Dasein as tools, they are called ready-to-hand. If they appear merely as things with no equipmental function, they are called present-at-hand.

In the next step of the existential analysis of Dasein, Heidegger raises the question of who is Dasein in its everydayness.³⁶⁵ Answering this question, Heidegger delineates a further essential structure of Dasein, i.e., *being-with*. For Heidegger, the

³⁶³ - Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1962), 38.

³⁶⁴ - Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 79-80.

³⁶⁵ - *Ibid.*, 149.

‘who’ of Dasein is not some isolable, present-at-hand subject, cut off and separate from the world and others in it. Dasein is essentially *with* others. To understand the foundation of this being-with, it is important to rethink the *existential* of being-in-the-world.

To encounter other Dasein

We saw that Dasein is concerned with its projects in the world. In this situation, the world appears as a workshop within which Dasein works toward its goals via available possibilities. Working in this workshop, Dasein necessarily comes “to encounter” the others. This encounter sometimes happens directly; for example, a shoemaker sells shoes to a wearer. Sometimes, others are alluded to indirectly. We see a boat anchored at shore and we come to know someone has used it. Whatever the nature of the encounter is, Heidegger’s point is that the Other is not encountered merely as equipment, nor as an isolable object in the world. Dasein comes to experience the other as another Dasein. Indeed, Heidegger tells us:

die Seinsart des innerweltlich begegnenden Daseins der Anderen sich von Zuhandenheit und Vorhandenheit unterscheidet. Die Welt des Daseins gibt demnach Seiendes frei, das nicht nur von Zeug und Dingen überhaupt verschieden ist, sondern gemäß seiner Seinsart als *Dasein* selbst in der Weise des In-der-Welt-seins »in« der Welt ist, in der es zugleich innerweltlich begegnet. Dieses Seiende ist weder vorhanden noch zuhanden, sondern ist so, *wie* das freigebende Dasein selbst – es *ist auch und mit da*.³⁶⁶

³⁶⁶ - Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tuebingen: M. Niemeyer, 1967), 118. English translation:

“the kind of Being which belongs to Dasein of Others, as we encounter it within-the-world, differs from readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand. Thus Dasein’s world frees entities which not only are quite distinct from equipment and Things, but which also –in accordance with their kind of Being as Dasein themselves are ‘in’ the world in which they are at the same time encountered within-the-world, and are ‘in’ it by way of Being-in-the-world. These entities are neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand; on the contrary they are like the very Dasein which frees them, in that they are there too, and there with it.” See: Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 154.

Therefore, being-in-the-world leads Dasein to being-with others. One can ask in what sense we can talk about 'the Others.' Heidegger emphasizes that the Others are not all people except me. I do not stand out of them; I start my existence by being with them in a practical and everyday way of being. Although Heidegger calls this starting point of being-with inauthentic, and later he distinguishes it from authentic "liberating solicitude," the point remains that we as Dasein experience our existence from the beginning with others, within project-oriented activities as part of a group of human beings who all are Dasein. In other words, before recognizing others, we already have been placed in the midst of some activity which relates us to others whom we are *with*.

Heidegger declares that we find ourselves as members of a human network or environment. It means, we do not experience ourselves as remote individuals who afterwards encounter others; however, the following paragraph raises a problem in regard to establishing intersubjectivity between Dasein and others:

The expression 'Dasein', however, shows plainly that 'in the first instance' this entity is unrelated to Others, and that of course it can still be 'with' Others afterwards.³⁶⁷

Isn't this contrary to what Heidegger has maintained so far? Is Dasein 'in the first instance' unrelated to others? If it so, then what should we do with the *existential* of being-with? What should we do with Heidegger's position against subjectivism? As Mahon O'Brien says, "the use of the word 'afterwards' in terms of how Dasein can be with others after initially being unrelated to them would be terribly problematic."³⁶⁸

³⁶⁷ - Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 156.

³⁶⁸ - Mahon O'Brien, "Leaping Ahead of Heidegger: Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity in Being and Time" in *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 22. no 4. (2014): 541.

Approaching the problem, commentators have undertaken two opposite interpretations. Some of them have read this as a foreshadowing of the authentic self or authentic existence of Dasein. But the problem is if we are to read it as such, it “would resurrect a spectre of the subjectivism and solipsism which [Heidegger] had done so much to discredit.”³⁶⁹ Due to this problem, some critics have concluded that *Being and Time* ultimately recapitulates the traditional account of subjectivity, along with a sense of solipsism and a rejection of the social world as inauthentic. Jürgen Habermas is one of them.

Habermas, and problem of subjectivity in Heidegger

In the fourth part of his successive lectures, published under the title *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, Habermas comments on Heidegger’s philosophy. The title of the section is “Undermining of Western Rationalism: Heidegger.” Habermas refers to Heidegger’s efforts to work against the metaphysical rationalism that he believed predominated all history of western philosophy. He explains that mutual understanding³⁷⁰ can potentially shape the world of intersubjectivity in Heidegger’s philosophy. However, Habermas believes that Heidegger’s effort still tinged with the problem of solipsism.³⁷¹ Habermas thinks that Heidegger,

de-structs the philosophy of the subject in favor of a frame of reference that first makes possible subject-object relationships, in his second step he falls back into the conceptual constraints of the philosophy of the subject.³⁷²

³⁶⁹ - Ibid.

³⁷⁰ - *Verständigung* and not *Verstehen* understanding

³⁷¹ - Jürgen Habermas, *The philosophical discourse of modernity: twelve lectures* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1987), 149.

³⁷² - Habermas, *The philosophical discourse of modernity: twelve lectures*, 150.

The cause of the problem, according to Habermas, refers us back to more fundamental tenets of Heidegger's philosophy. In other words, the problem is not seen only in the relation between Dasein and the other, but between Dasein and Being at more basic levels. The problem is that Heidegger remains in the mode of a transcendental ontology. According to Habermas, transcendental ontology (Heidegger's ontology) is guilty of the same mistake that it attributes to classical epistemology (what Heidegger criticizes). Habermas explains that giving any primacy to the Being-question or to the knowledge-question is a *cognitive* relation to the world and if we do so, subjectivity holds a monopoly over other types of relation to the world.³⁷³ Habermas is saying that Heidegger did not leave the traditional subjectivist approach as he had believed and, indeed, he has continued the architectonic structure of Husserlian phenomenology in which:

there is necessarily a place for the subject that constitutes objective realms by way of the transcendental conditions of knowledge. Heidegger fills this place with something that is productive in another way, namely, by the creation of meanings that disclose the world. Just as Kant and Husserl contrast the transcendental with the empirical, so Heidegger distinguishes the ontological from the ontic, or the Existential from the *Existentiell*.³⁷⁴

In his conclusion, Habermas admits that Heidegger remains in the realm of metaphysics, subjectivism, and therefore, solipsism.

³⁷³ - Ibid., 151.

³⁷⁴ - Ibid., 152.

Dallmayr and Heidegger's Husserlian solipsism

As Habermas mentions, this problem of subjectivism, reappearing in Heidegger, is rooted in Husserl's philosophy. Fred R. Dallmayr, in his paper titled "Heidegger on Intersubjectivity," explains these Husserlian roots. Dallmayr explains that, according to Husserl, there are two levels of intersubjectivity. On a mundane level, intersubjectivity is possible in practical experience, and on a reflective level, intersubjectivity needs certain investigations in order to derive the other subject from the ego.³⁷⁵ The reflective level is a combination of bodily perception and intuitive empathy. Answering the question as to how the 'other man' emerges in my vital world, Husserl says, as a sensible presence, all that I have of him is a body.³⁷⁶ I sense a body and assume that there is an ego behind it. I do so by looking to the similar connection between my body and my ego. This is the subjective or reflective awareness that I can have from the being of the other.

Afterwards, Dallmayr elucidates two critiques directed toward this Husserlian reflective intersubjectivity. His criticisms are very similar to the criticisms of Schütz, Sartre, and Ricoeur—which were explained in the previous section. What Dallmayr thinks is similar between Heidegger and Husserl is that in Heidegger a conflict exists between the social being and the individual being of Dasein, or between the mundane existence of Dasein and the subjective existence of Dasein.³⁷⁷ When Dasein goes into its social life, it becomes inauthentic. When it comes back to its subjective existence, it

³⁷⁵ - Fred R. Dallmayr, "Heidegger on Intersubjectivity," in *Human Studies* 3, (1980), 222.

³⁷⁶ - Dallmayr, "Heidegger on Intersubjectivity," 223.

³⁷⁷ - *Ibid.*, 229.

becomes authentic. Dallmayr sees this fluctuation as an problem in Heidegger's theory of *Mitsein*.

Theunissen and the problem of missing face-to-face relation in Heidegger

Michael Theunissen also criticizes Heidegger's account of intersubjectivity. In his book, *The Other, Studies in the Social Ontology of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Buber*, Theunissen presents Heidegger's 'social ontology' as a "modified restatement of Husserl's theory of transcendental intersubjectivity." Theunissen asserts that there is a major difference between the two thinkers: Heidegger presents the notion of "being-in-the-world" based on mundane existence and the "concrete human being" and, in contrast, Husserl emphasizes an epistemological subjectivity. However, Theunissen accuses Heidegger of being neglectful of direct interpersonal contact. According to Theunissen, Heidegger puts his finger only on "the worldly and quasi-external presuppositions of co-being", i.e., Heidegger presents the Dasein-Other connection as an adjunct or derivative of impersonal, practical, and equipmental affairs. In other words, according to Husserl and Heidegger, a mundane thing, a body, a practical issue, equipment, or the world in general mediates between Dasein and the other. Theunissen and Dallmayr critically ask why there is no direct connection between Dasein and the other.

This critique seems noteworthy because sections 26 and 27 of *Being and Time* are very problematic; however, we should clarify a point to be able to judge the alleged solipsism of Heidegger. In a few examples that Heidegger uses to show the encounter between Dasein and the Other, he refers to practical and worldly things. First, he says that when a craftsman makes shoes out of leather, a possible wearer of this product

would be the other. In the second example, he says that when we look at a piece of land, or a boat anchored at the shore, we encounter the other who uses these things. These examples show that since the encounter happens in the world (and the world is a collection of significances, situations, and possibilities which Dasein has been thrown into), then the encounter is worldly and practical. We should notice that Heidegger says that these things make reference to the Other, and that Other is encountered through them. He isn't saying that it is first through examining equipment that we come to "realize" that others exist. What is problematic is that Heidegger does not thematize the face-to-face relation. How can Heidegger describe, for instance, the relation between a mother and her baby? His theory of encountering the Other Dasein doesn't adequately capture the nature of the relation between a mother and a baby, which is beyond an inter-subjective relation. We will see such relation in Merleau-Ponty, which I will discuss later in this chapter.

All objections to Heidegger's positions circle around the problem of subjectivity. Some critics like Habermas say that, in spite of Heidegger's efforts, he cannot leave the realm of subjectivism. Other critics like Theunissen claim that Heidegger has left the realm of subjectivism but not in sufficient way. On the other hand, there are some commentators who defend Heidegger. They claim that one can find a sense of consistency in Heidegger's project of intersubjectivity. In what follows, I will explain their defenses.

Schatzki in defense of Heidegger

I will consider two commentators who defend Heidegger in this matter: Mahon O'Brien and Theodore R. Schatzki. In his paper, titled "Early Heidegger on Sociality,"

Schatzki defends Heidegger against many charges. First of all, he clarifies that the encounter between Dasein and the Other can happen in different ways. According to Schatzki:

There are four basic ways other Daseins bear on a Dasein's existence:
(a) one encounters them out of the world; (b) one acts toward them;
(c) one shares with them the world in which one lives; and (d)
worldhood is largely the same for all involved.³⁷⁸

Schatzki regards the indirect encounter between the shoemaker and the possible wearer or the encounter between one who walks on a field and the owner of the field as encounters in the world. He concludes that encountering other Daseins does not require always meeting them experientially. He calls this type of relation a non-face-to-face interaction.³⁷⁹

O'Brien in defense of Heidegger

Another defense of Heidegger is offered by Mahon O'Brien, in his paper "Leaping Ahead of Heidegger: Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity in *Being and Time*." Referring to the apparent contradictions in Heidegger's text, O'Brien suggests a common sense solution:

readers are faced with an interpretive choice: they can read Heidegger's account as though it did sporadically succumb to a form of subjectivism/solipsism which he had previously resisted with some vigour – a kind of momentary relapse of a recovering subjectivist, if you like; they choose to believe, in that case, that his account is guilty of grotesque duplicity on the question of subjectivity. Or the reader can invoke something like a principle of charity and search for an

³⁷⁸ - Theodore. R. Schatzki, "Early Heidegger and Sociality," in *Blackwell Companions to Philosophy: A Companion to Heidegger*. (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2005), 234.

³⁷⁹ - Schatzki, "Early Heidegger and Sociality," 235.

interpretation which would look to cohere with the underlying arguments.³⁸⁰

O'Brien himself decides to use the "principle of charity." O'Brien proves that Heidegger's main aim is to discredit Cartesian dualism. It is obvious that the whole of Heidegger's project is challenging the traditional subjectivism of metaphysics. Heidegger clearly has declared this. If this is so, we must find a way to reinterpret those parts that apparently contradict that main goal. He encourages readers to muster all of their "interpretative efforts to resist that interpretation since it so clearly flies in the face of everything Heidegger has argued and will continue to argue."³⁸¹

One might ask how we should interpret these parts to make them harmonize with the main body of Heidegger's philosophy? What O'Brien suggests is similar to Schatzki's defense. We might be tempted to read Heidegger as considering the authentic mode of Dasein to be found when it is 'alone'. O'Brien does not reject this interpretation, if we accept that one is alone as a creature that is a being-with. According to O'Brien, Dasein's experience of "aloneness is a deficient mode of our ineluctable 'being-with-ness', which means of course that even in our being alone, as a deficient mode of being-with, Dasein is in fact related to Others" (O'Brien 543). The ineluctability of 'being-with-ness' means Dasein cannot lose its being-with-ness, even if it is alone and far from others (O'Brien 2014: 544). Contrary to some critics such as Habermas, who are adamant that Heidegger unwittingly relapses into subjectivism,

³⁸⁰ - O'Brien, "Leaping Ahead of Heidegger: Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity in Being and Time," 537.

³⁸¹ - Ibid., 541.

O'Brien believes authentic being of Dasein in solicitude does not negate its being-with-others. He quotes from Heidegger:

Resoluteness, as authentic Being-one's-Self, does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating 'I'. And how should it, when resoluteness as authentic disclosedness, is authentically nothing else than Being-in-the-world? Resoluteness brings the Self into its current concerned Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with Others.³⁸²

O'Brien finally suggests the shortcoming of language as the cause of this problem. Referring to Habermas, he says that the shortcomings of Heidegger's language have led unsympathetic critics to characterize Dasein as solipsistic. This kind of Dasein can occupy the place of transcendental subjectivity in Husserl philosophy, but the point is, as we see in the above quotation, authentic Dasein is not detached from the world and the they.³⁸³

To sum up, critics believe that either Heidegger cannot escape the dominance of subjectivism (Habermas), or he is unable to get away sufficiently from its gravity. On the other hand, on the defensive side, commentators claim that either there is no contradiction between 'unrelated' Dasein' and 'authentic' Dasein in solitude, or if there is, it is due to a shortcoming of metaphysical language.

I think this is a strong defense. Dasein's individuality is not something opposite to its sociality. Both aspects of Dasein, being-with others and its ability to be alone, are involved with one another. Dasein is essentially being-with others. It is thrown into a world in which others already exist. The aloneness of Dasein also takes place on the

³⁸² - Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 344–345.

³⁸³ - O'Brien, "Leaping Ahead of Heidegger: Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity in Being and Time," 548.

very same social ground. The point is that being alone is relational – only an entity that is primarily being-with can find itself “alone”. The point of the objections is that Heidegger refers to Dasein’s singularity as authentic, and requires Dasein to stay away from the ‘they’. This doesn’t require *not* being-with; there is also authentic being-with. The “they” is not a bunch of people; it is the pseudo-subject of a possible way of being. However, this does not mean that when Dasein leaves the averageness of the ‘they’ and undertakes its own way of life it has left the ‘they’ entirely. It is not about deciding to live in an a “different” way; one might decide to loyally follow the traditions of one’s community, for instance; that isn’t inauthentic, on Heidegger’s account. The difference consists in either taking hold of one’s own life or drifting along with the crowd without making any genuine decisions at all.

Sartre and the Objectifying We

Matrix of objectifying looks

In the third section of chapter three of part three of *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre considers the concept of ‘we.’ He knows that the relation between self and the Other has been conflictual so far, and now it is time to find a way toward peace. He declares that we are not always in conflict with the Other, therefore, sometimes we can talk about a ‘we’ or a community of subjects.³⁸⁴ In this ‘we,’ the Other escapes from my objectifying look, or I get rid of his objectifying look. In the ‘we,’ nobody is the object, and one sees a plurality of subjects. When two strangers have a common experience, they become ‘we.’ Two passengers on the sidewalk see each other first as strangers.


³⁸⁴ - Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 534-5.

Then, suddenly, a collision happens on the street. They become a 'we' in looking at the collision.

This *we* that is being-with-others needs a foundation, or a transcendence-transcending. Before I and the Other feel ourselves as together, as we, we should have the foundation of *mitsein*. This *mitsein* is being-for-others. Being-for-others precedes and founds being-with-others. *Mitsein* has two sides. If we is the subject, it is a subject-we; if it is the object of a third look, it is an us-object.³⁸⁵

As is clear, Sartre still analyses the relation by an objectifying look. The us-object occurs when a community feels shame under a look. One can call it a common shame. Sartre gives a very bourgeois example: a beautiful and elegantly dressed lady visits a group of convicts in their ship, with their rags, their labor, and their misery. In this situation, they feel a common sense of anger and shame.

Sartre discusses different possible look-matrices. In all of them the 'looked at,' either a single person or a group of two, loses its possibilities and freedom under the objectifying look of the third person. In the figure below, we can see the different




shapes of various look-matrices. In each shape, when a person does not look, he loses his possibilities and becomes a mere object.

³⁸⁵ - Ibid., 536-7.

Us-object

But when two people are found under a third look, they become a we or an us-object. They are dead-possibilities, because the situation is outside of their world; it belongs to a third world. In the situation below, A and B are equivalent structures and they feel solidarity with each other under C's look.



In the absence of any third person, A or B can describe themselves individually as “I am fighting against the Other.” But as soon as C appears, the possibilities of A and B are leveled into dead-possibilities. By this common pain, the relation becomes reciprocal, and they are forced to confess that “we are fighting each other.”³⁸⁶ A and B becomes “us,” or an objectified we.

The us-object relation has some nuances. Sometimes A and B are working together on something and then they are apprehended by C, and then they become an us-object.³⁸⁷ Sometimes A feels himself together with B, and C is not present. C would be the rest of humanity. A and B feel solidarity under the look of humanity. This solidarity between A and B can be called a group or a class consciousness.³⁸⁸ The master, the feudal lord, the bourgeois, or the capitalist for instance, all can be the *third*

³⁸⁶ - Ibid., 541.

³⁸⁷ - Ibid., 542.

³⁸⁸ - Ibid., 543.

person for a community of the oppressed.³⁸⁹ By and through the look of masters, the workers feel themselves members of a working community.

the oppressed class finds its class unity in the knowledge which the oppressing class has of it.³⁹⁰

We-subject

If one changes one's perspective and looks at the workers from the master's point of view, then one finds another sense of being "we," which Sartre calls "we-subject." Sartre specifically sees this we-subject in a capitalistic context in which a group of people (workers) work and produce something, and another group of people (consumers, who have enough money to buy and enjoy the products) consume the product. A consumer feels himself a member of a we-subject community that enjoys the result of a worker's labor.³⁹¹ "the manufactured object, Sartre says, "makes me known to myself as 'they.'"³⁹²

But Sartre does not regard this type of "we" as original; or, as he prefers to put it, it is psychological and not ontological. The we-subject is not an ontological relation with others, like *mitsein*. *Mitsein* is a concrete ontological relation with others. It is being-for-others. The we-subject is just a feeling that I can have during an experience.³⁹³ It is an individual psychology and does not imply a similar and

³⁸⁹ - Ibid., 544.

³⁹⁰ - Ibid., 545.

³⁹¹ - Ibid., 547-8.

³⁹² - Ibid., 548.

³⁹³ - Ibid., 550.

correlative experience in others. The 'I' in the we-subject is an anonymous member among thousands, and because of this feeling, the we-subject is unstable.

The second point, which is a consequence of the point above, is that the we-subject cannot be primary. It can not constitute an original attitude toward others. When I see the signs of "Exit" or "Entrance" and walk towards the "Exit" sign to the street, they are indeed humanized objects. I recognize the Other's existence by them, because the Other is speaking to me through them. I am in a dialogue with the Other through them, but Sartre thinks that this dialogue is not primary. He refers to Heidegger's examples to explain this point. Heidegger says that, through a manufactured object (the shoe), I feel the existence of the Other. Sartre contests that in order for the object to appear as manufactured, it is necessary that the Other be first given in some other ways. A person who had not already experienced the Other would in no way be able to distinguish the manufactured object from the pure materiality of a thing which has not been worked on.³⁹⁴

The conclusion is that the we-subject is secondary. It is based on a previously established experience of the Other. Sartre's critical approach to the we-subject does not end here. As we mentioned above, the 'I' in the we-subject is an unknown member. And the others are also unknown. The we-subject is a "mass." In a mass of consumers, everyone is undifferentiated. But in *mitsein*—which is, for Sartre, the ideal condition of being-with-others—it is important to know who I am and who the Other is. In the ideal condition of *mitsein*, an awareness of who the self and the Other are should be

³⁹⁴ - Ibid., 552.

involved,³⁹⁵ and because the nature of the relation is still a matter of the objectification of the Other(s) and producing an us-object or a we-subject, Sartre concludes that

we should hope in vain for a human “we” in which the intersubjective totality would obtain consciousness of itself as a unified subjectivity.³⁹⁶

In other words, the true ‘we’ is a dream and the dream has only a psychological cause. It has no ontological rationale. After an unsuccessful effort to create the we, Sartre returns to his original point of departure, and confesses that this ideal itself implies the recognition of the conflict of transcendences as the original state of being-for-others.³⁹⁷

As we saw above, for Sartre, the relation between the we-subject and the us-object is crystalized in a capitalist context between the working class and the bourgeoisie, or, in other words, between the oppressed class and the oppressing class. In the last pages of his discussion of the Other in *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre returns to this case and claims that even the we-subject class cannot feel itself as a united we, because the core of this class is competition. The class sometimes calls for a meaningless solidarity between the oppressed class and the oppressive class, a unity between workers and capitalists. Sartre declares this unity as an impossibility, and revolutionarily declares that when the workers take the power, they will “look-at” the oppressing class and, at that time, it will be the bourgeoisie that will feel itself to be an us-subject.³⁹⁸

³⁹⁵ - Ibid., 553.

³⁹⁶ - Ibid., 553.

³⁹⁷ - Ibid., 553-554

³⁹⁸ - Ibid., 554-555.

Sartre concludes that both the us-subject and the we-subject are not natural results of the development of consciousness. The us-subject is the result of, and dependent on the third. The we-subject is a psychological feeling. Therefore, a real we will be an unrealistic dream.³⁹⁹ And Sartre falls back into his original dichotomy, or as he calls it here a dilemma:

one must either transcend the Other or allow oneself to be transcended by him. The essence of the relations between consciousnesses is not the *Mitsein*; it is conflict.⁴⁰⁰

Sartre ends with a reference to myth of Medusa. In Greek mythology, Medusa is a gorgon with a power in her gaze: those who look at her turn to stone. A lone consciousness can use and annihilate the things of the world. It, indeed, can transcend the world, but when the Other rises up into the world of the self, it confers on the self a being-in-itself. The self becomes a thing among things in the world. Sartre finds an analogy between the petrifying gaze of Medusa and the look of the Other.

The Other in Notebooks for an Ethics

Although the story of self and the Other has no happy ending in *Being and Nothingness*, it becomes milder in *Notebooks for an Ethics*. Sartre himself declares that the relation in *Being and Nothingness* remained oppressive. It was “the hell of passion” and each one was trying to objectify the other.⁴⁰¹ In *Notebooks for an Ethics*, Sartre tries to show that despite that hell, there is a generosity and a sense of creation in the relation between the self and the Other. When the self is alone in the world, no one considers

³⁹⁹ - Ibid., 555.

⁴⁰⁰ - Ibid.

⁴⁰¹ - Sartre, *Notebooks for an Ethics*. 499.

the self as an object. The self cannot be an object in an Other-free world. It is only through the existence of the Other that the self takes the opportunity to become an object.

The interesting point is that we see a turning point in Sartre's opinion. He no longer consider objectification as a negative situation. He clearly declares that it is in no way a fall or threat for the self. The objectification of the self is a threat if the Other refuses the self's freedom. If the Other does not endanger the freedom of the self, the self can enjoy the two aspects of its existence—being an existing freedom as well as a being an object. By adding the aspect of objectification to the aspect of freedom, the Other, indeed, enriches the self's existence. The Other adds meaning to the life of the self. The self knows that he has a passive aspect as well. This addition to the self's existence was impossible in a world in which no Other exists.⁴⁰²

Merleau-Ponty: true unity between self and the Other

Merleau-Ponty begins with a criticism of scientism. He declares that the phenomenology of perception is against scientism, and phenomenology in general is a way to return to the things themselves. All sciences, such as physical, social, and psychological sciences, should be regarded as secondary compared to my consciousness and how it knows and contacts the world. In the realm of consciousness' experiences, what matters is description, not explaining or analyzing, as the sciences claim.

⁴⁰² - Ibid., 500.

Scientific understanding of body vs phenomenological understanding

In this same vein, perception is not a science of the world, it is a context for all those secondary sciences. One of the topics that analytical reflections cannot describe for us is the problem of other minds. The sciences presuppose a universal truth under which the Other and the ego become united. For the sciences:

Il n'y a pas de difficulté à comprendre comment Je puis penser Autrui parce que le Je et par conséquent l'Autre ne sont pas pris dans le tissu des phénomènes et valent plutôt qu'ils n'existent. Il n'y a rien de caché derrière ces visages ou ces gestes, aucun paysage pour moi inaccessible, juste un peu d'ombre qui n'est que par la lumière.⁴⁰³

Merleau-Ponty admires Husserl because Husserl knew that the problem of other people is a paradox. The self and the Other appear to each other as exterior phenomena. Therefore, the relation is a paradoxical and dialectical relation. Then, in a kind of Kantian/Copernican revolution, Merleau-Ponty describes phenomenology as the way the world appears to us:

Il ne faut donc pas se demander si nous percevons vraiment un monde, il faut dire au contraire : le monde est cela que nous percevons.⁴⁰⁴

⁴⁰³ - Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception* (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), vi. English translation:

"There is no difficulty in understanding how I can conceive the Other, because the I and consequently the Other are not conceived as part of the woven stuff of phenomena; they have validity rather than existence. There is nothing hidden behind these faces and gestures, no domain to which I have no access, merely a little shadow which owes its very existence to the light." See: Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, xi.

⁴⁰⁴ - Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, xi. English translation:

"We must not, therefore, wonder whether we really perceive a world, we must instead say: the world is what we perceive." See: Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, xv.

Time, association, and attention: other aspects of our senses

In the process of perceiving the world, we perceive sensible things with our senses but, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, this “with” does not present our sense-perception as an instrument. Our senses are not mere conductors or media to transfer sense data to our consciousness.⁴⁰⁵ They are involved in how the data is created. For instance, we add a temporal aspect to sensible things. When we look at a circular table, we need time to sense the circularity of the table when our eyes move between point A to B to C on the circle.

The other mental faculty that acts as a kind of foundation for our senses is attention. When we pay attention to something, we sense it differently than when we do not pay attention to it. Attention is a presupposition for sensation. It affects the way consciousness is present to its objects.⁴⁰⁶ All the examples above show that sensation, first, is not a mere conductor of sense data, and second, it is not the starting point of our knowledge about the world.

La pure sensation, définie par l'action des stimuli sur notre corps, est l'« effet dernier » de la connaissance, en particulier de la connaissance scientifique, et c'est par une illusion, d'ailleurs naturelle, que nous la mettons au début et la croyons antérieure à la connaissance.⁴⁰⁷

⁴⁰⁵ - Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 8.

⁴⁰⁶ - Ibid., 25.

⁴⁰⁷ - Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, 46. English translation:

“Pure sensation, defined as the action of *stimuli* on our body, is the ‘last effect’ of knowledge, particularly of scientific knowledge, and it is an illusion (a not unnatural one, moreover) that causes us to put it at the beginning and to believe that it precedes knowledge.” See Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 33.

Body as an inert object or as expression of the ego

Scientific knowledge has detached sense experiences from their foundation and regarded them as mere points of reception. This detachment of the senses from their affective and mental functions has reduced the body to a thing among other things in the world. In this perspective, the body is no longer the expression of an ego. Similarly, the body of another person does not appear to me as a sign to another ego. It seems more like a machine. In such a situation, the co-existence between the self and the Other is annihilated.⁴⁰⁸

Through this objection to scientism (or the scientific understanding of the body), Merleau-Ponty discusses several observations that show that, in many cases, the body is something entangled or interwoven with the mind. The first case is the phenomenon of phantom limbs. When a person loses a part of his body, he may feel that the limb is still there and has sensation. The limb is indeed amputated or missing, but the person feels that the limb is still attached. Merleau-Ponty claims that modern physiology has nothing to say in explanation of this phenomenon.⁴⁰⁹ He claims that phantom limb syndrome is something in the middle, between being and nothingness. It is the ambivalent presence of a limb. Then he concludes that

Le membre fantôme n'est pas le simple effet d'une causalité objective, pas davantage une *cogitatio*. Il ne pourrait être un mélange des deux que si nous trouvions le moyen d'articuler l'un sur l'autre, le « psychique » et le « physiologique », le « pour soi » et l'« en soi », et de ménager entre eux une rencontre.⁴¹⁰

⁴⁰⁸ - Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 49.

⁴⁰⁹ - Ibid., 49.

⁴¹⁰ - Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, 92. English translation:

Body mixes with its surrounding

By the help of the example of the phantom limb, we come to the meaning of body as not only an object. The border between body and the sphere around it is not very sharp and they mix together. If we look at a ship on the shore, its funnel and masts merge into the background of the ship. Then we take the forest and the sand dunes behind the ship as parts of the meaning of the ship. like the case of the ship that Merleau-Ponty discussed, the body is mixed with its surroundings like the ship that is mixed with the forest and shore around it. Through the body, that has no sharp border with the world and with its special and temporal extension and so mixes with the world, Merleau-Ponty challenges objective and scientific understandings of the body.

Man is not a juxtaposition of psyche and organism. He is an existence that at one time takes a corporeal form, and at another time the same existence becomes a psyche:

Les motifs psychologiques et les occasions corporelles peuvent s'entrelacer parce qu'il n'est pas un seul mouvement dans un corps vivant qui soit un hasard absolu à l'égard des intention psychiques, pas un seul acte psychique qui n'ait trouvé au moins son germe ou son dessin général dans les dispositions physiologiques.⁴¹¹

"The phantom limb is not the mere outcome of objective causality; no more is it a *cogitatio*. It could be a mixture of the two only if we could find a means of linking the 'psychic' and the 'physiological', the 'for-itself' and the 'in-itself', to each other to form an articulate whole, and to contrive some meeting-point for them." See: Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 67.

⁴¹¹ - Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, 104. English translation:

"Psychological motives and bodily occasions may overlap because there is not a single impulse in a living body which is entirely fortuitous in relation to psychic intentions, not a single mental act which has not found at least its germ or its general outline in physiological tendencies." See: Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 76.

Double sensation, an exceptional capability of body

This fusion of the psychic and the physical is what Cartesian physiology could not explain.⁴¹² The unity of the psychic and the physical is not an amalgamation between two essentially different substances, as we discussed in chapter one. If this union is essential, then we cannot distinguish the soul from the body, and so the way I observe external things is different from the way I observe my body. I experience objects by/with my body, but cannot experience my body with my body, or at least I should accept that the latter body should be different from the former body. My body can play the two roles: observing the objects and observing itself.

En d'autres termes, j'observe les objets extérieurs avec mon corps, je les manie, je les inspecte, j'en fais le tour, mais quant à mon corps je ne l'observe pas lui-même: il faudrait, pour pouvoir le faire, disposer d'un second corps qui lui-même ne serait pas observable. Quand je dis que mon corps est toujours perçu de moi, ces mots ne doivent donc pas s'entendre dans un sens simplement statistique et il doit y avoir dans la présentation du corps propre quelque chose qui en rende impensable l'absence ou même la variation.⁴¹³

Body is the subject of perception

This double role that my body can play gives me a sense of double sensation. I touch my left hand with my right hand. Can I say my right hand is touching and my left hand is touched? The answer is no; both hands are touching and being touched. Double sensation means that any of my hands has two sensations in a single moment. The

⁴¹² - Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 77.

⁴¹³ - Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, 107. English translation:

"I observe external objects with my body, I handle them, examine them, walk round them, but my body itself is a thing which I do not observe: in order to be able to do so, I should need the use of a second body which itself would be unobservable. When I say that my body is always perceived by me, these words are not to be taken in a purely statistical sense, for there must be, in the way my own body presents itself, something which makes its absence or its variation inconceivable." See: Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 79.

hand that is touching is being touched at the same time. Therefore, my body has an extraordinary capability to touch itself.

Le corps se surprend lui-même de l'extérieur en train d'exercer une fonction de connaissance, il essaye de se toucher touchant, il ébauche.⁴¹⁴

What does this double role of the body show us? It shows that we are our body. Body is not a vehicle or a ship which is ridden by the soul. The soul is the body. This theory of perception shows us that body is not a tool for perception. It is a natural self, or the "subject of perception."⁴¹⁵

If the body is the subject of perception and this perception is different from what the empiricists think about the process of sensation, we can ask how the body senses things. Here Merleau-Ponty discusses his theory of the relation between the sentient and the sensible. Contrary to what empiricists maintain, the sentient is not a mere recipient of sense data. The sentient prepares the situation for the sensible to come forward and touch the sentient. In other words, the sentient calls for the sensible.

Merleau-Ponty gives an example:

Les rapports du sentant et du sensible sont comparables à ceux du dormeur et de son sommeil : le sommeil vient quand une certaine attitude volontaire reçoit soudain du dehors la confirmation qu'elle attendait. Je respirais lentement et profondément pour appeler le sommeil et soudain on dirait que ma bouche communique avec quelque immense poumon extérieur qui appelle et refoule mon souffle, un certain rythme respiratoire, tout à l'heure voulu par moi, devient mon être même, et le sommeil, visé jusque-là comme signification, se fait soudain situation. De la même manière je prête l'oreille ou je regarde

⁴¹⁴ - Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, 109. English translation:

"The body catches itself from the outside engaged in a cognitive process; it tries to touch itself while being touched." See: Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 80.

⁴¹⁵ - *Phenomenology of Perception*, 184.

dans l'attente d'une sensation, et soudain le sensible prend mon oreille ou mon regard, je livre une partie de mon corps, ou même mon corps tout entier à cette manière de vibrer et de remplir l'espace qu'est le bleu ou le rouge.⁴¹⁶

In this picture the sensible does not invade the sensor. The sensor subtends the sensible. My look calls for the colour and it is in the same continuum as the colour. My hand is in the same continuum as the object. My hand and I, in general, are connatural with the world.

If we recall the idea of the look in Sartre that was very objectifying and oppressive, and we compare it with this meaning of the look in Merleau-Ponty, we see how different these two are, or even how opposed they are. The look, here, is in absolute harmony with the looked. The looking and the looked are two sides of one thing. They call each other to come forward and offer a bridge of sensation. The looking wills itself to be affected by the looked. It uses its subjectivity to be passive.

dans cet échange entre le sujet de la sensation et le sensible on ne peut pas dire que l'un agisse et que l'autre pâtisse, que l'un donne sens à l'autre.⁴¹⁷

⁴¹⁶ - Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, 245. English translation:

"The relations of sentient to sensible are comparable with those of the sleeper to his slumber: sleep comes when a certain voluntary attitude suddenly receives from outside the confirmation for which it was waiting. I am breathing deeply and slowly in order to summon sleep, and suddenly it is as if my mouth were connected to some great lung outside myself which alternately calls forth and forces back my breath. A certain rhythm of respiration, which a moment ago I voluntarily maintained, now becomes my very being, and sleep, until now aimed at as a significance, suddenly becomes a situation. In the same way I give ear, or look, in the expectation of a sensation, and suddenly the sensible takes possession of my ear or my gaze, and I surrender a part of my body, even my whole body, to this particular manner of vibrating and filling space known as blue or red." See: Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 189.

⁴¹⁷ - Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, 248. English translation:

"in this transaction between the subject of sensation and the sensible it cannot be held that one acts while the other suffers the action, or that one confers significance on the other." See: Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 191.

Cultural world

By having this new structure of the relation between the mind and body, on the one hand, and body and things, on the other hand, the way toward reaching the Other's consciousness is very flat. I live existentially connected to the world around me. In this situation, I am in the middle of places and things. I am even the connecting point between past and future. Another world that I am living within is the cultural world. I am in direct contact with the Other and his/her body through his/her behaviour.

Referring to Cartesian dualism, Merleau-Ponty is aware of the problem. According to an objective or dualist line of thought, there are two modes of being: an in-itself that is being an object arrayed in the world or being-for-itself, an independent consciousness. If we think objectively, another person (the Other) cannot be both. He should be either an object among other objects in the world or be a consciousness that wants to perceive me (the self).⁴¹⁸ But, with the help of the notion of body-consciousness fusion, Merleau-Ponty solves the problem:

Si j'éprouve cette inhérence de ma conscience à son corps et à son monde, la perception d'autrui et la pluralité des consciences n'offrent plus de difficulté. Si, pour moi qui réfléchis sur la perception, le sujet percevant apparaît pourvu d'un montage primordial à l'égard du monde, traînant après lui cette chose corporelle sans laquelle il n'y aurait pas pour lui d'autres choses, pourquoi les autres corps que je perçois ne seraient-ils pas réciproquement habités par des consciences ?⁴¹⁹

⁴¹⁸ - *Phenomenology of Perception*, 313.

⁴¹⁹ - Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, 403. English translation:

"If I experience this inhering of my consciousness in its body and its world, the perception of other people and the plurality of consciousnesses no longer present any difficulty. If, for myself who am reflecting on perception, the perceiving subject appears provided with a primordial setting in relation to the world, drawing in its train that bodily thing in the absence of which there would be no other things for it, then why should other bodies which I perceive not be similarly inhabited by consciousnesses?" See: Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 314.

My consciousness is interwoven with my body; why should the Other's body not have a consciousness? The body as a living organism is not an object; we cannot call it merely flesh. Therefore, when I see the Other's body, I, indeed, see the Other's consciousness. Our bodies are manifestations of our consciousnesses, and if we regard each other in this way, positing the Other does not reduce the status of the self to that of an object.⁴²⁰

Discovering the Other

Discovering the Other's consciousness interwoven with his body puts the self and the Other on the same page. They can live in a common world. The common world is created because the self and his body/consciousness does not have a world with clear borders. Its world is like a cloud or mist with unclear limits.

désormais, comme les parties de mon corps forment ensemble un système, le corps d'autrui et le mien sont un seul tout, l'envers et l'endroit d'un seul phénomène.⁴²¹

My body is mixed with the Other's body because the two are two sides of a single phenomenon. My body and the Other's body are parts of a whole, like the parts of my body that together comprise a whole. Similar to our bodies that are interwoven into a single fabric of nature, my consciousness and the Other's consciousness are

⁴²⁰ - *Phenomenology of Perception*, 315.

⁴²¹ - Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, 406. English translation:

"Henceforth, as the parts of my body together compromise a system, so my body and the other's are one whole, two sides of one and the same phenomenon." See: Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 317.

interwoven in a cultural object: language. In the world of language, neither of us is the absolute creator. I and the Other are in a state of reciprocal communication.

Il y a là un être à deux, et autrui n'est plus ici pour moi un simple comportement dans mon champ transcendantal, ni d'ailleurs moi dans le sien, nous sommes l'un pour l'autre collaborateurs dans une réciprocité parfaite, nos perspectives glissent l'une dans l'autre, nous coexistons à travers un même monde.⁴²²

With this co-existence of me and the Other, Merleau-Ponty gives a new meaning to solitude. We remember that in Descartes and other philosophers (as we discussed in chapters one and two), solipsism was a severe problem. Here, Merleau-Ponty argues that talking about solitude is possible because it is placed upon a foundation: communication. The relation between communication and solitude is similar to the relation between reflection and the unreflectable. We can talk about the unreflectable because it has a connection with reflection. The unreflectable is not entirely independent from reflection, otherwise talking or thinking about it would be totally impossible. Similarly, solitude is meaningful because it is founded on a sense of communication. If the self was entirely disconnected from the Other, we would have no occasion to speak of solitude. In that case, talking about the inaccessibility of the Other would be meaningless.

Ce qui est donné et vrai initialement, c'est une réflexion ouverte sur l'irréfléchi, la reprise réflexive de l'irréfléchi, — et de même c'est la tension de mon expérience vers un autre dont l'existence est

⁴²² - Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, 407. English translation:

"We have here a dual being, where the other is for me no longer a mere bit of behaviour in my transcendental field, nor I in his; we are collaborators for each other in consummate reciprocity. Our perspectives merge into each other, and we co-exist through a common world." See: Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 317.

incontestée à l'horizon de ma vie, même quand la connaissance que j'ai de lui est imparfaite.⁴²³

By this relation between solitude and communication, Merleau-Ponty finds a solution for the problem of the objectifying look (or gaze) in Sartre. Objectification of the Other by the look is a kind of refusal of his subjectivity; however, Merleau-Ponty sees an assertion, or recognition so to speak, in this objectification. The self finds a subject in the Other, and because of that it tries to objectify it. I feel shame before a human look. If I try to refuse this look, it does not mean that I am in solitude. Finally, Merleau-Ponty encapsulates his entire argument in one sentence:

Le refus de communiquer est encore un mode de communication.⁴²⁴

This co-existence between the self and the Other in Merleau-Ponty has continued in the works of German phenomenologist, Bernhard Waldenfels. The concept of the Other has been the main topic of Waldenfels' academic career and he has written several papers and books on the topic. His approach can be regarded as the culmination of Merleau-Ponty's theory of perception. Waldenfels focuses on the passivity of consciousness instead of the subjectivity of consciousness. In *Phenomenology of the Alien*, he claims that the process of creating a self happens with the accompaniment of the Other, from the very beginning. If we claim that someone

⁴²³ - Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, 413. English translation:

"What is given and initially true, is a reflection open to the unreflective, the reflective assumption of the unreflective—and similarly there is given the tension of my experience towards another whose existence on the horizon of my life is beyond doubt, even when my knowledge of him is imperfect." See: Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 322.

⁴²⁴ - Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, 414. English translation:

"The refusal to communicate, however, is still a form of communication." See: Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 323.

can bound himself, without the existence of the Other, something is wrong with our claim. It is paradoxical because the self is the result of the act of bounding. Therefore, it cannot have a pre-existence before the act of bounding. Therefore, we cannot say the "self bounds itself."⁴²⁵ Secondly, this bounding does not happen in no-place. It happens in a group. The self discovers itself by bounding itself and separating itself from the rest of his group. In this way, the concept of Otherness begins in the self's own house.⁴²⁶

Similar to Merleau-Ponty, in a groundbreaking approach to metaphysics, Waldenfels challenges concepts such as subjectivity and causality. He focuses on the theme of *pathos*, by which we describe our being affected by something. But this being affected also involves a sense of subjectivity. In pathos, we call something to affect us. In this way, pathos can disturb the traditional distinction between subject and object.⁴²⁷

Examples of pathos show this subjectivity-objectivity. Pain and pleasure are neither subjective acts nor passive acts. They happen to one because one has the capacity to receive them. In this way, pain and pleasure evade causality in its traditional forms. It is not true to say that something happens to me, therefore, it is the cause and my situation is the effect. "It happens to me" means I have the capacity to accept what happens to me, therefore, the relation does not fit into a cause-effect

⁴²⁵ - Bernhard Waldenfels, *Phenomenology of the Alien: Basic Concepts* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2011), 14.

⁴²⁶ - Waldenfels, *Phenomenology of the Alien: Basic Concepts*, 17.

⁴²⁷ - Ibid., 27.

relation.⁴²⁸ Similar to pain and pleasure, perception is not a purely subjective act. It does not start with a subjective act of observation. On the contrary, it happens when my attention is aroused by what strikes me.⁴²⁹

It is the same with my relation to the Other. In a phenomenology of the Other based on pathos, the Other calls for a response from the self. It is not a passive object laying there waiting for the self's subjective action to know it or act on it. The other calls the self to action.⁴³⁰ In another book, *The Question of the Other*, Waldenfels tried to replace intentionality with the theme of responsivity. The self is always acting in response to the Other's demand even when the self does not respond. Not to respond is also a response.⁴³¹

In terms of body also, Waldenfels has a notable opinion. Referring to Merleau-Ponty's theory of the subjectivity of our bodies, he claims that I refer to things by my body. In this case my body is subjective; therefore, it is wrong to say "I" have body. When we say I have body, it might mean that the "I" is a separate being that can obtain or take control of a tool, like the body. I *am* my body, and it is different saying I *have* a body.⁴³² Through all these revolutionary phenomenological explanations, Waldenfels concludes that Cartesian dualism was a misunderstanding from the beginning. Descartes claimed that there are two substances: thinking and extension; however,

⁴²⁸ - Ibid., 26-27.

⁴²⁹ - Ibid., 45.

⁴³⁰ - Ibid., 36.

⁴³¹ - Bernhard Waldenfels, *The Question of the Other*. Albany (NY: State University of New York Press, 2007), 28-29.

⁴³² - Waldenfels, *Phenomenology of the Alien*, 43-44.

Waldenfels objects that our body is neither a thinking substance nor an extended one. According to Descartes, mind was a subject that sees but cannot be seen, and things were seen but cannot see. Waldenfels maintains that our body is an exception to this dichotomy; it sees and it is seen by itself.⁴³³ Similarly to what Husserl and Merleau-Ponty explained, my body is a *Leibkörper*, and this is the end of Cartesian dualism.

Cosmopolitanism

At this stage, I want to analyse a cultural phenomenon with the help of the phenomenological concepts discussed above. Cosmopolitanism seems to have the potential to assimilate this kind of relation in which the separation between the self and the Other is arbitrary, hypothetical, and unrealistic. Cosmopolitanism is not a new theory; its roots reach back to ancient Greece. The idea of not belonging to a specific dominant culture in a society, the idea of belonging to a family of mankind, all having the same human nature, go back to Cynic and Stoic philosophers. It was Diogenes of Sinope who was asked where he was from and he answered, "I am a citizen of the world."⁴³⁴ Diogenes was critical of the luxurious and neglectful lifestyle of the Athenians. He believed that poverty, self-control, and self-sufficiency were necessary conditions for a life of virtue. Then, as a man who used to live in a large ceramic jar in

⁴³³ - Ibid., 49.

⁴³⁴ - Robert F. Dobbin, *The Cynic Philosophers: from Diogenes to Julian* (London: Penguin Books, 2012), 49.

public spheres, sleeping always under the sky and being able to carry all he owned on his person, Diogenes was able to consider himself as a citizen of the world.⁴³⁵

In what follows, I will argue that the unity between citizens in a state in Hegel, living in a common world such as language in Husserl, being-with-others as an essential feature of Dasein in Heidegger, the we in Sartre, and the passive-active self in Merleau-Ponty, can all lead us to a cosmopolitan view. If the self finds itself in an essential connection with the Other, it will be a cosmopolitan self. The bottom line of cosmopolitanism is that one can be a member of a world-encompassing society.

Before addressing some classic ideas about the theory of cosmopolitanism, I should clarify that cosmopolitanism has been regarded, most often, as a universalistic political, ethical, or cultural approach to the idea of the Other. David Held numerates eight cosmopolitan Principles: 1-equal worth and dignity of all human beings, 2- active agency, 3- personal responsibility and accountability, 4- consent; 5- collective decision-making about public matters; 6- inclusiveness, 7- avoiding serious harm; 8- sustainability.⁴³⁶

Although these aspects of cosmopolitanism are very important in ethical, political, or cultural theories, I am going to argue that we need a more philosophical tool to reach the core of cosmopolitanism. I will argue for a phenomenological

⁴³⁵ - Although the word *kosmopolites*, cosmopolitan, was coined by Diogenes, we should be careful about anachronism in regard to the term. In ancient Greece, there was no nationalism, since there were no "nations" in the contemporary sense; therefore, the cosmopolitanism of Diogenes is not an anti-nationalism. *Kosmos* for Diogenes means natural order, and when he says he is a *kosmopolites*, he means that he is a follower of the natural order and not a follower of human order like education, religion, money, and convention (Ronald Stadel, "Citizens of Everything, the Aporetics of Cosmopolitanism" in *We the Cosmopolitans*, 29-31).

⁴³⁶ - David Held, *Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2010), 69.

cosmopolitanism. Being tolerant of the ethical values of other cultures, or having an international law to govern relations between states are very helpful practical results of a phenomenological cosmopolitanism. By phenomenological cosmopolitanism I mean a type of being or human existence that is in essential connection with the cultural Others. I call it 'phenomenological' because, based on phenomenologies of the philosophers I discussed in this chapter, such cosmopolitanism is possible. Based on a Hegelian universal ethical life, for instance, or a Husserlian intersubjectivity, we can imagine a world that covers different human societies. The 'Others' in this universal human society are not limited only to others in my family, or my community. It can go beyond the borders of my culture. In other words, if I understand my existence as an entity connected with the existence of other people around the globe, then we can see a phenomenological aspect of cosmopolitanism.

Political cosmopolitanism

In order to illustrate what I mean by political cosmopolitanism, ethical cosmopolitanism, or cultural cosmopolitanism; it would be helpful to provide a few examples of each. First, we can begin with political cosmopolitanism. Immanuel Kant seems to originate the idea. In his short essay titled "Idea of a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose," Kant compares states with individuals. Like individuals who need a social contract to unify them and help them to enjoy and flourish, states need a universal or cosmopolitan law to bring them order and peace and let them grow toward perfection. In this theory, Kant argues that individuals cannot develop their rational faculties if they live individually. A context of togetherness in addition to

competition is required to develop the faculty of thinking and reasoning.⁴³⁷ In a nutshell, antagonism is required for developing human faculties. As soon as an individual is placed in a society, he wishes to conquer and control Others. In this struggle for conquest, we need a balance between freedom of the individual and the freedom of Others. This balance is established in a just, civil constitution.⁴³⁸ Kant gives a helpful example: Humans in society are like trees in a forest. Each try to reach sunlight sooner than the others. In this competition, each try to grow upward more and more. This effort helps them to grow beautiful and straight, whereas if we put the trees in a context of isolated and separated freedom, they grow stunted, bent, and twisted.

States are like individuals. They desire to control others and deprive them of resources. On the other hand, they need other states to be in an economical or political community with them. To solve this problem, they need an agreement on a universal context that can manage the relations between states, or as Kant puts it, a universal constitution.⁴³⁹ This universal constitution enjoys a system of united power to enforce law, condemn violators, and support the violated. Kant calls this a *cosmopolitan system* of general political security.⁴⁴⁰ The conclusion of Kant's essay is that states are

⁴³⁷ - Or as Martha Nussbaum puts it in "Kant and Cosmopolitanism" the human community makes sense because all humans have reason in common. It is reason, indeed, that makes humans fellow citizens. See: Martha Nussbaum, "Kant and Cosmopolitanism" in *The Cosmopolitanism Reader* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2010), 30.

⁴³⁸ - Immanuel Kant, "Idea of a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose," in *The Cosmopolitanism Reader* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2010), 20.

⁴³⁹ - Kant, "Idea of a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose," 21-22.

⁴⁴⁰ - *Ibid.*, 23.

connected economically and politically, therefore, they head towards a universal cosmopolitan existence.⁴⁴¹

This political version of cosmopolitanism has been under criticism from a patriotist or nationalist point of view. The question is: to what extent a person should have cosmopolitan concerns and commitments when he has commitment to his local society? Martha Nussbaum in "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism" addresses this question. Nussbaum begins with a reference to Richard Rorty's essay published in *The New York Times* in 1994. In this essay, Rorty explains that having a sense of shared national identity and giving importance to national commitments is not an evil. Every citizen can rightfully take his country and its problems seriously. And this patriotism is not incompatible with respect for cultural differences. It is an absolutely essential component of citizenship, of any attempt to take our country and its problems seriously. There is no incompatibility between respect for cultural differences and patriotism.⁴⁴² Similar to Rorty, Nussbaum argues that there is no contradiction between being a patriotic citizen of the U.S. first and then being a citizen of the world of human beings.⁴⁴³ Nussbaum depicts this harmony between patriotism and cosmopolitanism as a series of concentric circles, in which the smallest circle can be a

⁴⁴¹ - David Held in *Cosmopolitanism, Ideas and Realities* defines political cosmopolitanism as "the development of regional and global governance and the creation of a political mechanism to regulate global affairs." See: David Held, *Cosmopolitanism, Ideas and Realities*, 105.

⁴⁴² - Richard Rorty, *The Unpatriotic Academy*, New York Times, Feb. 13, 1994.

⁴⁴³ - Martha Nussbaum, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," in *The Cosmopolitanism Reader* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2010), 156-7.

family, then a community, then a city, then a country, and the biggest circle can be the world.⁴⁴⁴

Seyla Benhabib, in “The Philosophical Foundations of Cosmopolitan Norms,” pursues this question of local law and universal law. The challenge is how we can construct a jurisprudential theory that can reconcile positive (local) law and universal human rights. For instance, Benhabib discusses the challenge of asylum seekers. Are states obliged to welcome asylum seekers with hospitality (a Kantian term)? This question expresses a dilemma: how to create legally binding obligations through the voluntary commitment of states to asylum seekers.⁴⁴⁵ Finally, Benhabib concludes that the right of hospitality (which Kant discusses) or the right to have rights (which Arendt discusses) are those universal moral obligations that can become a legal or political obligation.⁴⁴⁶

Moral cosmopolitanism

As we see, in this approach to cosmopolitanism, philosophers discuss the political requirements of inter-state relations in a global context. The second approach to the idea of cosmopolitanism can have an ethical root. This approach has two premises; 1- there are universal ethical problems which affect all humans around the world; and 2- there are a minimum list of values that are applicable to all humans or cultures in the world; and these universal values can help humans with different cultures to come to a common ethical decision. This moral approach to cosmopolitanism can also be called

⁴⁴⁴ - Nussbaum, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,” 158.

⁴⁴⁵ - Seyla Benhabib, “The Philosophical Foundations of Cosmopolitan Norms,” in *Another Cosmopolitanism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, 23.

⁴⁴⁶ - Benhabib, “The Philosophical Foundations of Cosmopolitan Norms,” 24.

a global ethics and works such as *One World Now: the Ethics of Globalization* by Peter Singer or *The Globalization of Ethics* by Kymlicka and Sullivan can be example of this approach.

In ethical cosmopolitanism, concepts such as empathy and the capacity for suffering become the key concepts to creating a universal moral status for everyone. If everyone is equally capable of suffering, then everyone morally ought to sympathise with suffering people. Nussbaum defines ethical cosmopolitan empathy as an imaginative reconstruction of another person's experience. When someone sees that a stranger is suffering, through this imaginative reconstruction of the sufferer's experience, one can cross the border and offer empathy. In a well-read paper titled "Cosmopolitan Morality in the British Immigration and Asylum System," Alexandra Hall explains a situation in which officers of a refugee camp sympathised with detainees. Although the management system of the camp considered the officers human and the detainees not fully human, when a detainee committed suicide, an officer violated the rules of the asylum system and tried to help.⁴⁴⁷

Cultural cosmopolitanism

The third approach, that is interwoven with the political and moral approach, is the cultural approach to cosmopolitanism. In this approach, topics such as cultural hybridity and cultural fluidity are under consideration. In this approach, people are regarded as hybrid and mixed cultural entities who cannot be confined within the borders of one single culture. In other words, specifically in the contemporary era,

⁴⁴⁷ - Alexandra Hall, "Cosmopolitan Morality in the British Immigration and Asylum System" in *We the Cosmopolitans* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2014).

people cross cultural borders everyday and, therefore, we cannot define them as members of only one culture. Fluidity of culture also expresses that cultural essentialism is wrong. Cultures are not fixed and unchangeable essences. They are always in dialogue with each other, receiving and transferring cultural elements from or to the other cultures.

One of the exemplary cases of this approach is found in Anthony Appiah's works. In *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics of a World of Strangers*, for instance, Appiah explains his own experience as a cultural hybrid person who has lived with two different systems of values in England and Ghana. This cultural hybridity helps people like Appiah understand that cultural positivism does not work in the contemporary world in which cultures are in direct contact with one another. Appiah argues that this moral relativism helps people to tolerate one another, however, we must pay enough attention to the need for conversation between cultures.⁴⁴⁸ In a cosmopolitan context, cultures need to come to a common conclusion, therefore, some universal values that encompass all cultures should be accepted.

David Held has a similar approach to the cultural cosmopolitanism. Cultural cosmopolitanism for Held starts with mediating national traditions. When people are capable of having a dialogue between their traditions, they, indeed, expand the horizon of meaning and prejudice for themselves. In this situation, geographical boundaries are overcome and individuals experience cultural events outside of their own culture.

⁴⁴⁸ - Anthony Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006), 31.

In this way, the core of cultural cosmopolitanism becomes the fluidity of individual identity.⁴⁴⁹

Phenomenological cosmopolitanism

Now by considering these three aspects of idea of cosmopolitanism (political, moral, and cultural), I want to add another aspect to them that seems more profound and is more dependent on a phenomenological approach. I call it phenomenological cosmopolitanism. In this approach, we need recall the concept of mutual recognition in Hegel, intersubjectivity and analogy in Husserl, *mitsein* in Heidegger, and the subject-object in Merleau-Ponty.

A cosmopolitan self is a subject-object consciousness who is essentially connected to Others. This cosmopolitan consciousness can transfer its authenticity to the cultural other because by looking at substantial similarities between itself and the Other it can conclude that beyond this strange and alien appearance, there is a similar structure of rationality and freedom. In this situation, the cosmopolitan self knows that a universal law or a universal system of values can encompass all, including itself and the Other; therefore, the self regards itself and the Other as citizens of a single universal society. I know that if I respect the rights of the Other, my own right will be respected; it recognizes the Other and calls for the Other to respond to this recognition.

Since passing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 until now, numerous similar attempts have been enacted to confirm that all humans have equal human status in a universal law or global ethics. Let us take a look at a list:

1948, Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
1948, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,

⁴⁴⁹ - David Held, *Cosmopolitanism, Ideas and Realities*, 110-112.

1951, Convention relating to the Status of Refugees,
1966, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
1966, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
1970, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
1984, United Nations Convention against Torture,
1984, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
1989, convention of the rights of the child,
1990, International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families,
1993, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women,
2006, International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,
2006, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
2007, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

The common theme in all these conventions and declarations is that all humans have equal dignity and equal moral status in a universal society. Although this universal society has not yet become a universal nation with an all-encompassing universal law; the main idea is that reaching a universal law is not impossible. If Hegel could not enlarge his ideal state to a universal state in which all people can be equal citizens, human beings living in the twenty-first century are able to imagine that universal society, or universal family. In this universal society, the Hegelian unity between the individual and his society can be expanded to the unity between the individual and his universal society.

The efforts to achieve a universal agreement on equal human status for every single person are not confined to the UN's mandate. Local nations all around the world have been trying to adjust their local laws with universal human rights and values. The list below shows how Muslim countries have been trying to adopt universal rights of man:

1990, Cairo declaration on human rights in Islam,

1990, Moroccan National Charter of Human Rights,
1994, Arab Charter of Human Rights (revision 2004),
2008, Doha Declaration for Democracy and Reform,
2013, Sana Declaration on Asylum and Migration,
2020, The Organization of Islamic Cooperation's declaration on human rights.

All of these efforts show that people in each small town, small village, or metropolitan city are becoming subjects with similar rules. Although most of the declarations have no enforcement power and are not legally binding, over time they may become conventions that are legally binding under international law.

Now let us see how the idea of analogy in Husserl can describe the phenomenon of the cosmopolitan self. For decades, the hijab was a sign of inferiority for a Muslim woman. A French partisan schoolmaster in Paris might believe that a hijab should be banned for teachers and students because, in looking at a face covered by a hijab, he would not see rationality through it. But a cosmopolitan Christian might think that, similar to a cross that has a cultural, historical, and religious meaning for a Christian, a hijab might have a meaning beyond religious limitations for woman. How can a cosmopolitan liberal Christian schoolmaster tolerate the hijab? I think the answer is "by Husserlian analogy." By analogy he can conclude that, similarly to his situation—insofar as a cultural and historical reason can justify hanging a cross on his neck or on his wall—a hijab can have a historical and cultural background. He can come to understand that a hijab might not be a symbol of the arbitrary subjugation of women. It can be a cultural choice for the Muslim woman. In this case, the schoolmaster will understand that common rationality covers both his cultural preferences and the woman's hijab. Similar to the Husserlian subject that, by analogy, comes to understand the subjectivity of the Other, the schoolmaster accepts the subjectivity of the cultural

other and becomes a cosmopolitan subject. The case is the same when analyzed in the other direction: suppose a Muslim who believes in the cultural and religious symbolism of the hijab (e.g. the value of public modesty) comes to understand that women can freely choose what clothes they may wear, similarly to their free will in everyday life. In that case, the belief in free will can be a common value for both the Muslim and the unveiled woman. Through this commonality, the Muslim can transfer his/her subjectivity to the unveiled woman and become a cosmopolitan Muslim.

Now, let us see how the theory of extended body in Merleau-Ponty, by moving beyond the traditional definition of body can help us imagine a cosmopolitan cultural subject. We saw in Merleau-Ponty that the body has extending borders. My clothes, glasses, room, even my loved ones, and the environment around my body can be regarded as extended parts of my body. In this environment in which my body extends itself, Others exist as well. And they have the same extended body. Therefore, the environment becomes a common body for both me and the Other. Through this common *Lebenswelt*, the self and the Other come to a co-existence.

But how can we reproduce this common *Lebenswelt* in a cultural relation? Can we imagine a common cultural *Lebenswelt*? To do so, we must first render the idea of extended body in a cultural context. We should first wonder how our body can have a cultural appearance? Or, putting it another way, what are the parts of a cultural body and how it can extend into a cultural *Lebenswelt*?

Our bodies have some biological parts. We saw in Merleau-Ponty that some objects attached to my body can become another parts of my body. Now, if a cultural object or a cultural environment is assigned to my body, it can be regarded as the

cultural part of my body. My culture has shaped the specific type of clothing that I wear; therefore, I can say I have a cultural body. Sometimes even a natural part of my body can take on a cultural role. The color of my skin, the texture of my hair, the form of my face, or even the geographical context of my body can be regarded as cultural parts of my body.

All these points show that my body is not a culture-free object. It has been, from the outset, a cultural object. Now the question is, if I have a cultural body, can it extend itself to a common environment in which another cultural self exists, and in that common cultural world, can both the Other and I be members of common cultural *Lebenswelt*?

Let us imagine: you are a member of visible minority, who lives in a metropolitan city, and you have a partner from another culture. You appear in the workplace in business attire,, and you participate in a collective dance in a community ceremony on the weekend; however, you get upset if someone violates your personal space on the bus or subway. In this case, you probably have a bodily cultural *lebenswelt* that can be shared with Others from other cultures.

This cultural, bodily, and common *lebenswelt* can give a cultural subject a chance to feel the subjectivity of the cultural Other. In this case, the cultural subject can be called a cultural cosmopolitan. He or she knows that individual freedom is a basic value that applies to everyone; however, it is important to fight for the collective rights of minorities. He knows that discrimination against black people in the job market is a reality; however, he sympathizes with a white lower-class family suffering

from unemployment. He or she knows that imposing the hijab on women has the same logic as uniform rules for female athletes.

Epilogue: Towards Political Phenomenology

In this dissertation, I have analyzed three phenomenological approaches to the Other: negation, binary opposition, and co-existence. I also discuss three cultural phenomena that illustrate the three approaches, respectively: dehumanization, Orientalism, and cosmopolitanism.

What has been accomplished? It is encapsulated in the title “phenomenology of the Cultural Other”; I discuss the attitudes that a self can take in relation to the Other in a cultural context. This attitude does not occur in an abstract sphere; it happens in a concrete context. We experience these attitudes in our everyday lives. Therefore, a phenomenology of the cultural Other can be regarded as a social theory. When people consider the other group as less-than-human, or they allow another group to enjoy a peaceful existence only outside the bounds of their own culture—any phenomenology that describes these sorts of relations becomes a social phenomenology.

Phenomenology, descriptive or normative?

But one problem is that phenomenology has been described as a descriptive science and not a normative science. Husserl called it the science of science, and because of that descriptive role, he considered his philosophy to be “an entirely unpolitical

one.”⁴⁵⁰. If phenomenology is descriptive and not normative, one may ask how phenomenology can position itself politically.

'The political' addresses all human affairs that people can experience when they live in a *polis*. Therefore, if phenomenology addresses any aspects of a people's life, i.e. the lives of persons in a group, it can be considered as making a political statement or having political implications. In other words, when we analyze the phenomena of social life such as racism, altruism, shame, solidarity, compassion, and so on, we are indeed doing political phenomenology. In addition, and in a deeper way, if we accept that we are in-the-world entities, and this being-in-the-world is a substantial element of our existence, and it is concretized in living in a *polis*, then we are ontologically political. Any phenomenology that addresses this political ontology can be described as a political ontology.⁴⁵¹

Although Husserl was reluctant to call his philosophy a political one based on its descriptive role, later philosophers such as Sartre and Fanon insisted that phenomenology should leave its descriptive role and undertake a normative role. Sartre and Fanon are critical of the conventional way of thinking (Sartre calls it

⁴⁵⁰ - Edmund Husserl, *Familienbriefe: Husserliana: Dokumente 3. Bd. 9* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), 244.

⁴⁵¹ - Thomas Bedorf and Steffen Herrmann, in their introduction to the volume titled *Political Phenomenology, Experience, Ontology, Episteme*, distinguish among types of political phenomenology. When the phenomenology describes political experiences such as trust, power, and authority or dispute, hatred, and resentment, it becomes a phenomenology of political experience. If the phenomenology describes human ontology as a substantially social and being-in-the-world entity, it is called a phenomenology of political ontology. They regard Hannah Arendt's work, *Human Conditions*, as the best case of this type of political phenomenology. See: Thomas Bedorf and Steffen Herrmann, *Political Phenomenology: Experience, Ontology, Episteme* (New York: Routledge, 2019), 1-14.

“analytical”). They think that a new way of thinking (perhaps a political phenomenology) should replace it.

If phenomenology is against the conventional way of thinking, it should introduce a new language of thinking that is not merely theoretical and abstract. It should be a kind of thinking that gives birth to action. In *Search for a Method*, Sartre connects analytical, critical rationalism of the Cartesian variety to the French bourgeoisie and its claim to be a universal class; its consequence is the ‘atomization’ of the proletariat.⁴⁵²

Fanon, as well, thinks that analytical thinking suffers from a dichotomy that is visible in colonialism. Colonialism is based on “pure Aristotelian logic”⁴⁵³ in which the colonizer and the colonized experience a mutual exclusion. This mutual exclusion is a bourgeois logic that must be undermined by a new way of thinking. Practical thinking, or as Sartre names it, *praxis*:

[Is] an organizing project, which transcends material conditions towards an end and inscribes itself, through laboring in inorganic matter as a rearrangement of the practical field and a reunification of a means in the light of the end”⁴⁵⁴

Through this praxis, a concrete thought is born, which is also transformative. This concrete thought is a phenomenology that is in the service of practical goals such as de-colonialism, or, when it focuses on racism, it shows that racism is beyond being

⁴⁵² - Jean-Paul Sartre, *Search for a Method* (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), 5.

⁴⁵³ - Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, (New York: Grove Press, 1963), 38.

⁴⁵⁴ - Jean-Paul Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason* (London: Verso, 2004), v1, 734.

merely an individual behaviour problem. It is a social, systemic issue produced by colonialism.⁴⁵⁵

A case: phenomenological approach to human rights

In order to see the difference between a phenomenological approach to 'the political' and the classical approach to 'the political,' allow me to give an example. Human rights theory was born in the post-world-war years in response to a need: a means of curbing the human tendency towards committing the kinds of atrocities seen in WWII. And a way of achieving those means was put forward: a declaration of universal, basic, human rights. The theory was not born in a vacuum. It was born in a liberal context with an emphasis on the dignity of the human person, the rights that people have based on their inherent dignity, and the individual as the rights-bearer. All these elements (dignity, right, and the individual) stem from a liberalist heritage. Because all of these elements belong to liberalism, their acceptance was problematic for any cultural/political system that cannot be easily harmonized with a liberal framework. Although the call for the universal acceptance of basic human rights seems inevitable for different cultures, once they come to respond to the call, they encounter theoretical problems. Usually, non-liberal systems have difficulty with the following questions: Why do we have to assign intrinsic and equal dignity to all persons? Why does the

⁴⁵⁵ - Robert Bernasconi has a brilliant analysis of praxis and political phenomenology in Sartre and Fanon in his paper titled "Dialectical Praxis and the Decolonial Struggle, Sartre and Fanon's Contributions to Political Phenomenology." See: Robert Bernasconi "Dialectical Praxis and the Decolonial Struggle, Sartre and Fanon's Contributions to Political Phenomenology." in *Political Phenomenology: Experience, Ontology, Episteme* (New York: Routledge, 2019.)

Universal Declaration focus on rights instead of obligations or duties?⁴⁵⁶ Why is the Declaration so individualistic and overlook collective rights?

Non-liberal systems are not satisfied with the answers offered to these questions from the liberal side; therefore, they become reluctant to accept the declaration of universal rights of man. Although I am absolutely aware that there are other reasons for this disagreement, as long as we do not solve the theoretical problem, other reasons hide themselves behind this problem. Let me explain: Many despotic political systems do not accept human rights theory, not because they have theoretical/philosophical problems with the theory, but because the mere fact of accepting the theory is equivalent to the elimination of their despotic systems. Leaders of the Iranian, Islamic, so-called Republic do not want at all to assign equal and universal rights to all their political subjects. Instead of expressing this position clearly, they veil it with philosophical concerns.

Regardless of the hidden reasons certain governments and political figures may have, motivating them not to recognize all humans under one unifying universal set of rights, we should note that, as long as human rights theory is interpreted/regarded through one political theory (that is, liberalism, in this case) the dubitability of the universality of human rights remains. It seems that defending universal rights needs a universal theory that goes beyond liberalism. I think a phenomenological approach can, at least, gesture towards that universal theory. Phenomenology is philosophizing

⁴⁵⁶ - Chung-Shu Lo, a Chinese philosopher commented on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by saying that in Chinese social relations, fulfilling duties to one's neighbor precedes claiming rights. See: Chung-Shu Lo, "Human Rights in the Chinese Tradition," in *Human Rights: Comments and Interpretations* (London: Allan Wingate, 1950), 186-190.

about everyday lived experience. In a phenomenological mode, one can start with minimal presuppositions or pre-conditions. If, in human rights theory, we need a common, universal point of departure, one may place this point in our everyday experiences of the Other. If the self and the Other are indeed interwoven with one another live in a common world, to the extent that we can see co-existence between them, then the rights of the Other are another form of the self's duties and vice versa. This lived experience of co-existence is beyond any limited political theory such as liberalism or socialism. It begins one's political considerations from the departure point of everyday life. In a phenomenological approach to human rights, the Other's rights go along with the self's rights because there is mutual recognition in place. In this case, the concepts of duty and right are not two opposite concepts, they are the same. In this phenomenological approach to human rights, the self does not claim rights while the Other is suffering. The basis of one's rights is not the self's claim for recognition, it is the compassion that goes out to Others when they suffer. The self is implicated in the lives of others and it cannot remain indifferent to their suffering. If we accept that, based on phenomenological co-existence, there is no sharp border between the self and the Other, then this interrelatedness causes one to assign dignity and rights to all suffering Others.

When we read human rights theory through the social-contract theory and classical liberalism of John Locke, we encounter the competition of individual rights that have to reconcile at the end on the basis of the equality of each person. On the contrary, a phenomenological approach to human rights theory reminds us that we

might live in a universal and common; therefore, it is better to understand reality instead of ignoring it and claiming rights unilaterally.

Political embodiment

Thinking generally about the various aspects of political phenomenology, one can identify a couple of main points. First is the role of body in politics. We already sufficiently analyzed the role of body in the phenomenology of the Other in this dissertation. What a political phenomenology can add to political philosophy is more attention on the issue of body. We are our bodies. We are a mix of flesh and thought, and through this mixture we co-exist with others as intercorporeal subjects. We live from the first moment in a society as embodied subjects; therefore, embodied sociality should be taken seriously in any political theory. This is missing in classical political theories such as Strauss's philosophy. It is also a notably missing part of another dominant political theory: political behaviorism. Classical political theories consider the body as an object. It is consciousness that is considered to be the subject of the political life; however, without body we cannot even imagine how a political/social life could be. Without body, there would be no sociality. We saw that Merleau-Ponty contended that perception (the act of body) precedes conception (the act of consciousness). Using these terms, we can claim that the body is political before the politicality of our consciousness, or as Hwa Yol Jung puts it, in a volume titled *Political Phenomenology*, "the body is the umbilical cord to the social world. To be social is first and foremost to be intercorporeal."⁴⁵⁷

⁴⁵⁷ - Hwa Yol Jung, "introduction," in *Political Phenomenology* (Switzerland: Springer, 2016), 13.

Another crucial aspect of a political phenomenology is the avoidance of the dualism of politics and ethics. It is common in political theories to separate political philosophy from political science. Political philosophy is usually assigned to subjective value preferences in political life. On the other hand, political science is usually described as a neutral science that studies value-free political facts. Political phenomenology avoids the separation of values from facts. John Wild understands this unity of values and facts in social life; he writes:

In the Lebenswelt, value is not a later addition. It is constitutive of the thing. ... A human culture is not a neutral structure with approvals and disapprovals added on. It is of approvals and disapprovals.⁴⁵⁸

This unity of values and facts leads us to the unity of ethics and politics. A phenomenology of the Other is substantially ethical and political. In this political phenomenology, the self does not focus on its claim for recognition. The call for recognition is replaced with a call for responsibility. Instead of asking how I should be recognized by the Others, the self asks, how I should be responsible for Others. When being recognized is replaced with being responsible for the Other, freedom is no longer an individual matter. Freedom makes sense when I respond to the human condition of the Other. In this sense, freedom is not liberation from constraints; it is the way I respond to challenges the Other puts before me.

⁴⁵⁸ - John Wild, *Existence and the World of Freedom* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), 54.

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