

NOTE TO USERS

This reproduction is the best copy available.

UMI[®]





uOttawa

L'Université canadienne
Canada's university

**FACULTÉ DES ÉTUDES SUPÉRIEURES
ET POSTDOCTORALES**



uOttawa

L'Université canadienne
Canada's university

**FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND
POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES**

Jacob Peter Hogan

AUTEUR DE LA THÈSE / AUTHOR OF THESIS

M.A. (History)

GRADE / DEGREE

Department of History

FACULTÉ, ÉCOLE, DÉPARTEMENT / FACULTY, SCHOOL, DEPARTMENT

**Democracy, Duplicity and Dimona:
The United States if America, Israel and the Globe Since 1949**

TITRE DE LA THÈSE / TITLE OF THESIS

Galen Perras

DIRECTEUR (DIRECTRICE) DE LA THÈSE / THESIS SUPERVISOR

CO-DIRECTEUR (CO-DIRECTRICE) DE LA THÈSE / THESIS CO-SUPERVISOR

Ryne Seferdjeli

Heather Murray

Gary W. Slater

Le Doyen de la Faculté des études supérieures et postdoctorales / Dean of the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies

Democracy, Duplicity and Dimona:
The United States of America, Israel and the Globe since 1949

By Jacob Peter Hogan

Thesis submitted to the
Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
In partial fulfillment of the requirements
For the MA degree in name of program

Department of History
Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
University of Ottawa

© Jacob Peter Hogan, Ottawa, Canada, 2010



Library and Archives
Canada

Bibliothèque et
Archives Canada

Published Heritage
Branch

Direction du
Patrimoine de l'édition

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Your file *Votre référence*
ISBN: 978-0-494-65972-4
Our file *Notre référence*
ISBN: 978-0-494-65972-4

NOTICE:

The author has granted a non-exclusive license allowing Library and Archives Canada to reproduce, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, communicate to the public by telecommunication or on the Internet, loan, distribute and sell theses worldwide, for commercial or non-commercial purposes, in microform, paper, electronic and/or any other formats.

The author retains copyright ownership and moral rights in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

In compliance with the Canadian Privacy Act some supporting forms may have been removed from this thesis.

While these forms may be included in the document page count, their removal does not represent any loss of content from the thesis.

AVIS:

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque et Archives Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public par télécommunication ou par l'Internet, prêter, distribuer et vendre des thèses partout dans le monde, à des fins commerciales ou autres, sur support microforme, papier, électronique et/ou autres formats.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur et des droits moraux qui protègent cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

Conformément à la loi canadienne sur la protection de la vie privée, quelques formulaires secondaires ont été enlevés de cette thèse.

Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant.


Canada

Abstract

Democracy, Duplicity and Dimona:
the United States of America, Israel and the Globe since 1949

Jacob Peter Hogan

Dr. Galen Perras

2010

The thesis examines Western complicity in covertly aiding, concealing and covering up Israel's nuclear weapons program and the implications that process had on the Soviet Union and Egypt during the Cold War. At the circumvention of the democratic process, Dimona's history is defined by shadowy scientism, obsequious journalism, secretive bureaucracies, clandestine corporatism and great power imperialism. In late October 1956 Israel acquired from France an atomic weapons reactor, with construction beginning in the Negev desert at Dimona during late 1957 or early 1958. During the ensuing years Israel received heavy water from Norway and Great Britain and uranium from Gabon, Argentina and South Africa. The atomic project was covertly funded by private Jewish donations from Canada, London, Paris and Wall Street. As early as 1958 factions within the State Department, Atomic Energy Commission and CIA factions were cognizant of Dimona's existence yet the bureaucracy chose to remain silent. When Dimona was unveiled by the media in December 1960, the White House salaciously denied possessing any foreknowledge of the reactor's nature, status or origins. The CIA-controlled and Jewish-dominated U.S. media obsequiously followed the state script by informing the public that Dimona was dedicated towards peaceful ends. During the 1960s the U.S. conducted pre-arranged tours of the facility, provided Israel with uranium and missiles to guard the reactor, covered up Israel's nuclear ambitions following China's first atomic test in October 1964, and refused to pressure Israel to sign the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Even though Dimona was the

key catalyst of the conflict, the U.S. also suppressed Israel's nuclear program from emerging as the defining subject of the Six Day War. Armed with intelligence deriving from Israeli sources, in early 1966 the Kremlin began utilizing Cairo as a proxy mouth piece to rhetorically denounce Israel's atomic agenda as Soviet relations with Egypt and the Arabs grew more intimate. In a failed attempt to destroy the reactor, the U.S.S.R. instigated the Six Day War crisis by fabricating false intelligence concerning Israeli troop concentrations and overflying the reactor with its most advanced plane in late May 1967.

Acknowledgements

*“If you wish to understand the world, try to decipher Israel
and if you wish to understand Israel, examine the world within which you live.”¹*

Speaking to the people of New York State in Federalist No. 1, a lawyer and the first Secretary of the Treasury warned that the “fate of an empire” hinged on the deliberation “on a new constitution for the United States of America.”² Alexander Hamilton added that those who “advocate” for the “truth are influenced by purer principles than their antagonists.” Avraham Burg, a former speaker of the Israeli Parliament (Knesset), World Zionist Organization (WZO) head and Israeli Defense Force (IDF) paratrooper, has likewise contended that “the truth suffers because it is surrounded by lies.”³ In a world in which credibility, perception and the suit and tie often supersede reality, however, the largest enemy of the truth is the myth rather than the lie.

I am a bit of a shut in. Serious people have to be. On my most humbling days I spend at least two to three hours reading the news online, including *Forbes*, whose website begins with a historic “thought of the day,” usually from a white male.⁴ The first one I read derived from John Adams: “The jaws of power are always open to devour.” The most striking, however, which best encapsulates my thesis supervisor, came from Michelangelo, who argued that “genius is eternal patience.” Thank you so much Dr. Perras. All mistakes and biases in this thesis belong to me. You were crucial in bringing primary material from the British National Archives into my thesis, discovering the book which has allowed a revisionist perspective of the U.S.S.R.’s role in

¹ Avraham Burg, *The Holocaust is Over: We Must Rise from the Ashes* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), p. xvii.

² Gary Wills, ed., *The Federalist Papers* (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), pp. 2-3.

³ Burg, *The Holocaust is Over*, p. 87.

⁴ “The 100 Most Powerful Women,” *Forbes*, August 27, 2008, http://www.forbes.com/lists/2008/11/biz_power_women08_The-100-Most-Powerful-Women_Rank.html

Israel's nuclear history to be pursued and introducing me to George Orwell's fantastic essay "Politics and the English Language."⁵ Without your conciliatory words, I would have been unable to receive grant money to research at John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson Libraries, where I spent one week in Boston, Massachusetts, and two weeks in Austin, Texas, respectively.

Alongside time spent at the Canadian Library and Archives, I also spent a week each at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas, and the National Archives and Records Administration, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and George Washington National Security Archive (GWNSA) in Washington. I would like to thank my father and best friend for financing these trips and everything else. Keep buying gold and silver.⁶ This thesis is dedicated to him and my sister, who has worked in Hollywood and currently has a show playing on YTV Wednesday and Friday nights, *That's So Weird*. Only you two will understand me when I state that it is truly "only after we have lost everything that we are free to do anything."⁷ Finally, thank you Mary Anne for everything you have done for our family over this past decade. I can not wait to read Tolstoy's *War and Peace*. Following the mantra of a member of Yale's Skull and Bones, former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), U.S. Ambassador to China and the United Nations, Vice-

⁵ Brad Stone, "Amazon Erases Orwell Books From Kindle," *New York Times (NYT)*, July 17, 2009, p. B1 or <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/technology/companies/18amazon.html>

⁶ Daniel Whitten, "Zoellick Says U.S. Dollar's Primacy Not a Certainty," *Bloomberg*, September 27, 2009, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=as9EvmjtjxGG8>; George Soros, "A New World Architecture," Project Syndicate: A World of Ideas, <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/soros52>; Daniel Bases, "Update 1-Israel's Fischer says world most accept a weaker dollar," *Reuters*, December 3, 2009, <http://www.reuters.com/article/usDollarRpt/idUSN0310218520091203>; Martin Morris, "Tehran dumps dollar for euro," *Arabian Business*, September 21, 2009, <http://www.arabianbusiness.com/568241-tehran-dumps-dollar-for-euro>

⁷ *Fight Club* (1999). Written by Chuck Palahniuk and Directed by David Fincher.

President and President, my goal is to inspire others in this postmodern “new world order” that the “worthy” search for the “big idea” is needed now more ever.⁸

⁸ “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,” January 29, 1991, American Presidency Project (APP), *Public Papers of the United States* (PPUS), <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/>. Alexandra Robbins, *Secrets of the Tomb: Skull and Bones, the Ivy League, and the Hidden Paths of Power* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2002), pp. 88-89.

Table of Contents

Abstract	<i>ii</i>
Acknowledgements	<i>iv</i>
Table of Contents	<i>vii</i>
Abbreviations	<i>viii</i>
Introduction	1
Chapter One: Factionalism, Capital Friends and Free Capital	22
Chapter Two: Eisenhower's Bureaucratic Charade	50
Chapter Three: Censorship, Personnel Changes and the Communists	92
Chapter Four: The Bureaucracy's Record and JFK's Rhetoric	126
Chapter Five: Dubious Denial, a Detached Democrat and Deep Diplomacy	157
Conclusion	184
Appendices	201
Bibliography	206

Abbreviations

ACDA	United States Arms Control and Disarmament
AEC	United States Atomic Energy Commission
AIPAC	American Israel Public Affairs Committee
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CFR	Council on Foreign Relations
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DDEL	Dwight David Eisenhower Library
DH	<i>Diplomatic History</i>
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States
GWNSA	George Washington National Security Archive
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Commission
IAEC	Israel Atomic Energy Commission
IAF	Israeli Air Force
IBM	International Business Machine
IC	Intelligence Community
IDF	Israeli Defense Force
JAEIC	Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee
JFKL	John F. Kennedy Library
JP	<i>Jerusalem Post</i>
LBJL	Lyndon Baines Johnson Library
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIE	National Intelligence Estimate
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSA	National Security Agency
NSC	National Security Council
NYT	<i>New York Times</i>
<i>PFIAB</i>	President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
PTBT	Partial Test Ban Treaty
SNIE	Special National Intelligence Estimate
UAR	United Arab Republic
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
USIB	United States Intelligence Board
WSJ	<i>Wall Street Journal</i>
WP	<i>Washington Post</i>
WZO	World Zionist Organization

Introduction

Edward Said once commented that T.S. Eliot's "central idea" was to use poetry to show that "how we formulate or represent the past shapes our understanding and views of the present."¹ Memory is more important than history because the latter feloniously serves only those in power who wish to control it. The West's 60-year complicity in the creation and cover-up of Israel's nuclear weapons program is proof that "there are a lot of people who lie and get away with it." In Munich on February 7, 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was given a chance to prove his own words. Mentioning U.S. concerns about "weapons of mass destruction" in Iraq and Iran, an anonymous Palestinian inquired why the U.S. remained "silent" about Israel when it had "more atomic weapons in the region than any other country." Replying that since Israel is a "democracy" surrounded by hostile neighbors that would like to place it into "the sea," Rumsfeld "opined" that over several "decades" Israel has ensured itself that it would not be driven into "the sea." Surprisingly, few scholars have cared to concern themselves with how Israel's atomic history has affected its relationship with the U.S.²

Exemplified best in a 1998 debate conducted within *Diplomatic History*, Israel's nuclear program has transcended the debate about when the U.S.-Israeli relationship became "special." University of Iowa historian David Shoenbaum identified that successive and anonymous U.S. administrations have "ultimately averted their eyes from Israeli nuclear developments..." His contention that during Allen Dulles' tenure as Director of Central Intelligence (1953-1961) the Central Intelligence Agency's relationship towards Israel was "coolly neutral, if not overtly anti-

¹ The "disquiet" Eliot was the first and last Western literary figure deconstructed by Said in the below cited narrative. Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), pp. 4, 232, 336.

² "Secretary Rumsfeld Availability at the Munich Conference on Security Policy," U.S. Department of Defense News, February 7, 2004, <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2036>; "RUMSFELD'S BEST," <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CEBu2FW7LB8> (2:42).

Israel” was as naïve, uninformed and misleading as his argument that “democracies do not live on geopolitics alone.” Despite recognizing the covert role played by the Agency’s James Jesus Angleton in the bilateral relationship, Shoenbaum was unable to juxtapose the “legendary” spook’s rightful place in Israel’s nuclear history.³ Israeli journalists Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, contending that Angleton, as head of the Agency’s Israeli Desk, “either did not care about...the nuclear program or even looked the other way,” emphasized that it was only in the “twilight” of Dwight Eisenhower’s presidency in December 1960 that the U.S. discovered Israel’s nuclear reactor in the Negev desert.⁴ Still, Dimona is largely absent from narratives stressing that Israel and the U.S. have always possessed a special bond and those purporting that this unique rapport was cemented only after the Six Day War of June 1967.⁵

University of Hebrew professor Ya’acov Bar-Siman-Tov’s only mention of Dimona was in passing as he argued that Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol “apparently gave assurances that

³ David Shoenbaum, “More Special Than Others,” *DH* 22, 2 (1998), pp. 275, 277, 281, 282.

⁴ Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, *Friends in Deed: Inside the U.S.-Israel Alliance* (New York: Hyperion, 1994), pp. 95-96, 113.

⁵ In his 1992 book, *The Passionate Attachment*, former Under Secretary of State and Lehman Brothers’ lawyer George Ball did not raise Israel’s nuclear weapons program until October 1963, aloofly writing that President John F. Kennedy had naively hoped that “Israel would drop its plans for a nuclear arsenal.” He also only commented that President Lyndon Johnson’s decision to sell Israel F-4 Phantom fighters in 1968 without forcing Israel to sign the July 1, 1968, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) presented the “impression” that the U.S. “had not fundamental objections to Israel’s nuclear program.” In his 1978 *Israel: The Embattled Ally*, Harvard historian Nadav Safran mused only that the “nuclear reactor” at Dimona built with French cooperation had “trespassed on the boundaries” of other ministries” within the Israeli government. Dimona is unmentioned in the below cited narratives which are either critical of the U.S.-Israeli relationship due to Jewish domestic influence or outline Jewish financial power in the U.S. Bernard Reich, *The U.S. and Israel: Influence in the Special Relationship* (New York: Praeger Special Studies, 1984); Cheryl Rubenberg, *Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1986); Paul Findley, *They Dare Speak Out: People and Institutions Confront Israel’s Lobby* (Westport: Lawrence Hill & Company, 1985); A.F.K. Organski, *The \$36 Billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics in U.S. Assistance to Israel* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); I.L. Kenen, *Israel’s Defense Line: Her Friends and Foes in Washington* (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1981); Edward Tivnan, *The Lobby: Jewish Political Power and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987); Ethan Nadelmann, “Setting the Stage: American Policy toward the Middle East,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 14 (November 1982), pp. 435-457; George Ball and Douglass Ball, *The Passionate Attachment: America’s Involvement with Israel, 1947 to the Present* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992), pp. 51, 66; Nadav Safran, *Israel: The Embattled Ally* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 321, 370.

the ... nuclear reactor was devoted to peaceful ends...” sometime during the 1960s.⁶ The post-1967 “special” school is also supported by Ohio State historian Peter Hahn. Although tacitly critiquing Bar-Siman-Tov for not dismissing the “U.S.-Israeli conflict over nuclear weaponry in the 1960s,” Hahn glossed over how the U.S. “failed” to promote its “non-proliferation objectives” in the Near East during the “1960s.” He briefly mused that Andrew and Leslie Cockburn’s *Dangerous Liaison* (1991) and Seymour Hersh’s *The Samson Option* (1991) both contended “with a tone of censure” that U.S. and Israeli intelligence services had collaborated to bring Israel a nuclear weapons reactor.⁷ By refusing to elaborate upon their work, he also dismissed the possibility that elements within Washington were complicit in aiding and abetting Dimona, an assertion seconded by historian Douglas Little who has contended that while “Israel has always held a special place in the U.S. imagination.”⁸

In his contribution to Michael Hogan’s *America in the World* (1991), Little reduced the U.S.-Israeli atomic history to a sentence, arguing that “despite what” the Pulitzer Prize winning

⁶ Ya’acov Bar-Siman-Tov, “The United States and Israel since 1948: A ‘Special Relationship’?” *Diplomatic History* (DH) 22, 2 (Spring 1998), pp.237, 238, 240.

⁷ All of Hahn’s primary sources for his *DH* analysis extended from January 30, 1961, to June 3, 1964, effectively omitting any real mention of U.S. policy towards Dimona during Dwight Eisenhower’s presidency. This theme is prevalent in his other work. In a one paragraph analysis in the 2006 edited *The Eisenhower Administration, The Third World of the Globalization of the Cold War*, a recycled cut and past selection from his 2001 book *Caught in the Middle East*, he contended that it was only in the “twilight” of Ike’s presidency when the U.S. intelligence community (IC) “confirmed” that Israel was building a “reactor of producing weapons-grade plutonium,” while emphasizing that Washington was “unequivocally” against nuclear proliferation. In his 2005 *Crisis and Crossfire* Hahn mentioned Dimona once in passing, arguing erroneously that President Lyndon Johnson had “vigorously promoted nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Months after the *DH* roundtable debate, Hahn published an article focused on his archival work in the Israeli Archives also omitting any comment on the atomic subject. Peter Hahn, “Special Relationships,” *DH* 22, 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 266, 269, 269n17; *Ibid.*, “The View from Jerusalem: Revelations about U.S. Diplomacy from the Archives of Israel,” *DH*, 22, 4, (Fall 1998); 509-532; *Ibid*, *Caught in the Middle East: U.S. Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961* (London: the University of North Carolina Press, 2004), p. 264; *Ibid*, “The U.S. and Israel in the Eisenhower Era: The ‘Special Relationship’ Revisited” in *The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2006), p. 234; *Ibid*, *Crisis and Crossfire: The United States and the Middle East since 1945* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2005), p. 49.

⁸ Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), pp. 78, 93.

Hersh “says,” the U.S. has always “consistently opposed” the “acquisition” of a Jewish bomb.⁹ In a 1993 journal article recycled again in his 2004 *American Orientalism*, Little maintained that “by late 1960” President Eisenhower “feared” that Israel “might utilize” Dimona to “develop atomic weapons.” But since he was leaving power in January 1961, however, Ike left JFK “to do all the talking with Ben-Gurion.”¹⁰ University of Tel Aviv political scientist Abraham Ben Zvi, who has averred that seeds of the U.S.-Israeli special relationship were planted during the summer of 1958 before blooming after 1967, omitted Dimona entirely from his 1993 *The U.S. and Israel: The Limits of the Special Relationship*. In his 1998 *Decade of Transition* he was more forthcoming, emphasizing that despite Dimona’s unveiling in December 1960 the Eisenhower administration was still “anxious to leave office with a clean state.” Since the President had no time to direct and dictate “a coherent coercive strategy,” the “lame duck” White House simply decided to “avoid a direct confrontation with” Israel by looking “the other way...”¹¹

Rather than representing the defining and dominant issue of the how “special” debate, Dimona has been largely dismissed, downplayed and denied by the generalized historiography focused on the 60-year Israel-U.S. relationship.¹² In an book praised by *Foreign Affairs*, a journal published by the New York-based Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), as a “very rich account” and by the *NYT* Book Review as “the most sophisticated and nuanced” study of the

⁹ Little has also aloofly argued that “over the years” the CIA and Mossad have “developed an excellent working relationship” but only provided a brief analysis of these ties starting in the 1980s. Little, “Mission Impossible: The CIA and the Cult of Covert Action in the Middle East,” *DH* 28, 5 (November 2004), pp. 692-693.

¹⁰ Douglas Little, “Gideon’s Band: America and the Middle East since 1945,” in *America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941*, ed. Michael Hogan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 477. *Ibid*, “The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and Israel, 1957-1968,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 25, 4 (November 1993), pp. 567-568; *Ibid*, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004), p.94.

¹¹ Abraham Ben-Zvi, *Decade of Transition: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Origins of the American-Israeli Alliance* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 93-95.

¹² The only exception would be Oxford international relations professor Avi Shlaim’s *The Iron Wall*. It touched upon how Israel convinced France in the lead up to the Suez War of October 1956 to provide it with a 24 megawatt reactor. Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000), pp. 175, 176, 187, 204-210, 215-216, 221-223, 298.

Arab-Zionist conflict, historian Benny Morris mentioned Israel's nuclear weapons program just once in *Righteous Victims* (1999).¹³ In *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict* (1985), political scientist Steven Spiegel briefly mentioned the issue twice. Stressing that the U.S. discovered Dimona "in late 1960," he argued only in his footnotes that the reactor was a "concern" for the U.S. under Kennedy and Johnson and "ignored" by President Richard Nixon until after the October 1973 war.¹⁴ The most recent contemporary examination of the U.S.-Israeli relationship also failed to thoroughly address Israel's atomic history. University of Chicago and Harvard political scientists John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt only examined Dimona in the post-Eisenhower context, contending aloofly that during "the early 1960s" the U.S. "clearly wanted to restrain Israel's nuclear ambitions."¹⁵ The overall failure of the U.S.-Israeli scholarship to incorporate the atomic issue into its general analysis is a reflection of the shortcoming and omissions present in the specialized Dimona historiography.

The first monograph focused on Dimona, Fuad Jabber's *Israel and Nuclear Weapons*, was published in London in 1971. At the time a doctoral student at UCLA carrying both U.S. and Lebanese citizenship,¹⁶ Jabber produced a largely theoretical and technical study, derived from

¹³ Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001* (New York: Random House, 1999), p. 454.

¹⁴ Steven L. Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), pp. 113, 446n88.

¹⁵ John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), p. 35-36.

¹⁶ Completing his M.A. at the American University in Beirut, in 1972 Jabber produced another analysis of the U.S.-Israeli nuclear relationship funded by the Ford Foundation, at the time under the management of historian, former Yale Skull and Bones member, Harvard President, and National Security Advisor (1961-1965) McGeorge Bundy. In an understudied piece, the future CIA employee and head of the CFR's Middle East program admitted due to "domestic political imperatives" the U.S. and Israel possessed a "longstanding...special... relationship... unmatched by U.S. relations with any other country..." and that Paris had placed no "restrictions" on Dimona's "nature." Robert E. Harkavy, *Spectre of a Middle Eastern Holocaust* (Boulder: University of Denver, 1977), p. 10; Steven Rosen, "A Stable System of Mutual Nuclear Deterrence in the Arab-Israeli Conflict," *American Political Science Review*, 71, 3 (September 1977), p. 1372; Alan Dowty, "Nuclear Proliferation: the Israeli Case," *International Studies Quarterly* 22, 1(March 1978), p. 85; Fuad Jabber, *The Palestinian Resistance and Inter-Arab Politics* (Santa Monica: Rand Paper Series, 1971), p. 1n; Sol Stren, "Who Thinks In a Think Tank?" *NYT*, April 16, 1967, p.SM15; "Mike Ruppert- CIA and Drug Running (1997)," <http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-700999832425084369> (1:45:44); Paul Jabber, "Sliding to Wider War in the Gulf," *Wall Street Journal (WSJ)*, August 27, 1987, p. 22;

the *NYT* and *Jerusalem Post (JP)* sources, which touched upon the “brief history of the origins” of Israel’s nuclear program. He noted that in 1952-53 Israel began networking with the French and Norwegian scientific communities and that the French-built reactor at Dimona was a “by-product” of the Suez War.¹⁷ Beginning with the canonized argument that Dimona’s “disclosure” to the U.S. occurred only in December 1960, Jabber also made three other key points.¹⁸ In an erroneous judgment disseminated by many others in the scholarship, he maintained that Israel had still “not...built” a chemical separation plant, the necessary component for enriching

Yousff M. Ibrahim and Robert S. Greenberger, “Syria Appears to Be Spoiler of Accord Between U.S., Iran on Hostages, Arms,” *WSJ*, November 6, 1986, p. 3; Fuad Jabber, *Israel Nuclear Option and U.S. Arms Control Policies* (Los Angeles: South California Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar, 1972), pp. i, 22, 38; Fuad Jabber, *Israel and Nuclear Weapons: Present Option and Future Strategies* (Chatto & Windus, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), pp. 10-11.

¹⁷ Jabber, *Israel and Nuclear Weapons*, pp. 10-11, 15-24

¹⁸ The mythic misconception that it was only in the “last days “of the “outgoing” or “lame duck” Eisenhower White House in “late 1960,” “December 1960,” or the “early 1960s” that the U.S. finally became cognizance of Dimona has been largely accepted and perpetuated- both in generalized accounts of the U.S.-Israeli relationship and specialized narratives focused on Dimona- in the below cited works over the past 40 years. Jabber, *Israel and Nuclear Weapons*, p. 35; William Bader, *The United States and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Pegasus, 1968), p. 88; J. Bowyer Bell, “Israel Nuclear Option,” *Middle East Journal* 26, 4 (Autumn 1972), p. 379; Yair Evron, “The Arab Position in the Nuclear Field, A Study of Policies up to 1967,” *Cooperation and Conflict*, 8, (1973), p. 21; Simha Flapan, “Nuclear Power in the Middle East,” *New Outlook*, 17, 6, (July 1974), p. 50; Yair Evron, “Israel and the Atom: The Uses and Misuses of Ambiguity, 1957-1967,” *Orbis* 17, 4 (1974), p. 1326; Harkavy, *Spectre of a Middle Eastern Holocaust*, p. 7; Steve Weismann and Herbert Krosney, *The Islamic Bomb: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East* (New York: Times Books, 1981), p. 116; Shai Feldman, *Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), p.110; Uri Bar Joseph, “The Hidden Debate: The Formation of Nuclear Doctrines in the Middle East,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 5, 2 (June 1982), p. 206; Evron, “The Relevance and Irrelevance of Nuclear Options in Conventional Wars: The October 1973 War,” *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, 7, 1 (1984), p. 145; Leonard S. Spector, *Nuclear Proliferation Today* (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1984), p. 120; Peter Pry, *Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p. 38; Gerald Steinberg, “Ambiguity: Evolution and Evaluation,” In *Security or Armageddon: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy* ed. Louis Rene Beres (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1986), p. 31; *Ibid*, “Examining Israel’s NPT Exceptionality: 1998-2005,” *Nonproliferation Review*, 13, 1 (March 2006), p. 120; Spector, *The Undeclared Bomb* (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988), p. 170; Evron, *Opaque Proliferation: The Israeli Case*,” In *Opaque Nuclear Proliferation*, ed. Benjamin Frankel (New York: Routledge, 1991), pp. 48-49; Aronson, *The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East, 1960-1991*(Albany: State University Press, 1991), pp.70-71; Evron, *Israel’s Nuclear Dilemma*, p.149; Melman and Raviv, *Friends in Deed: Inside the U.S.-Israel Alliance* (New York: Hyperion 1994), p. 96; Levite and Landau, “Arab Perceptions of Israel’s Nuclear Posture,” p. 36; Ben-Zvi, *Decade of Transition*, p. 93; Mordechai Gazit, “The Genesis of the U.S.-Israeli Military-Strategic Relationship and the Dimona Issue,” *Journal of Contemporary History*, 35, 3 (July 2000), p. 418; Zeev Maoz, “The Mixed Blessing of Israel’s Nuclear Policy,” *International Security*, 28, 2 (Fall 2003), p. 46; Warren Bass, *Support Any Friend: Kennedy’s Middle East and the Making of the U.S.-Israeli Alliance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 47; Zaki Shalom, *Israel’s Nuclear Option: Behind the Scenes Diplomacy between Dimona and Washington* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2005), pp. 15-16; Yoel Cohen, “Nuclear Ambiguity and the Media: The Israeli Case,” *Israeli Affairs* 12, 3 (July 2006), p. 542; Jeffrey Richelson, *Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), p. 252; Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy* pp. 35-36.

radioactive material and bomb making.¹⁹ Nonetheless, he still floated the idea that a Jewish bomb would serve Israeli-U.S. interests as it would be an “appropriate and credible deterrent” against an Arab desire to wipe “Israel from the world’s map.”²⁰

Jabber’s implicit support for an Israeli program was echoed again in a more explicit trial balloon in the fall 1972 by J. Bowyer Bell, a Senior Associate at Columbia’s Institute of War of Peace. A former member of the Hudson Institute and Harvard University, Bell declared that Israel needed “in a dangerous and unsure world” an “ultimate weapon” to aide in its “David-vs.-Goliath” struggle.²¹ Admitting that the subject had received little “comment” outside the Near East, Bell revealed that in 1966 Egyptian President Gamal Nasser had made a deal with Moscow enabling “the sale of atomic weapons” to Cairo.²² Although this contention was inaccurate, in 1973 Tel Aviv University political scientist Yair Evron stipulated that Soviet “Marshall Grechko” had traveled to Cairo in December 1965 in order to “increase Soviet influence in Egypt and deter Israel from ‘going nuclear.’” But like the rest of the scholarship, Evron was unwilling to explore Soviet-Egyptian relations vis-à-vis Dimona any further, qualifying that it was “unlikely” that Grechko was in a position to provide Nasser with a Soviet atomic guarantee. Evron briefly generalized that Dimona failed to make Arab “priorities” and Cairo “made no mention of the issue” prior to the Six Day War.²³ Following the October War of 1973 Dimona

¹⁹ This incorrect judgment that Israel was without a chemical separation facility is also perpetuated in the following. Dowty, “Nuclear Proliferation: the Israeli Case,” p. 111; Steven Rosen, “Nuclearization and Stability in the Middle East,” *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, 1, 3 (Spring 1976), p. 27; Jabber, *Israel and Nuclear Weapons*, p. 77; Shlomo Aronson, *Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective* (London: The John Hopkins Press, 1978), p. 18.

²⁰ Jabber, *Israel and Nuclear Weapons*, pp. 77, 133, 146-147.

²¹ “The Kings vs. the Guerrilla,” *Washington Post (WP)*, June 30, 1970, p. A14; J. Bowyer Bell, “Purgatory in Cyprus,” *NYT*, February 1, 1975, p. 22; Karl Hess, “Guerillas: Doomed to Failure?” *WP*, December 31, 1976, p. D6; J. Bowyer Bell, “Israel’s Nuclear Option,” *Middle East Journal*, 26, 4 (Autumn 1972), pp. 383- 384.

²² Bell, “Israel’s Nuclear Option,” pp. 379-381, 386-387.

²³ Building on his 1991 generalization that Moscow has always accepted “the ambiguity of Israel’s nuclear situation,” three years later Evron reemphasized stated that it can be “safely posited” that the Egypt “perceived” the chances of an Israeli bomb prior to June 1967 war, a conflict which had “no connection to the nuclear issue.” Evron, “Opaque Proliferation: The Israeli Case,” in *Opaque Nuclear Proliferation Methodological and Policy Implications*,

received increased scholarly attention with the first real analyses of France's crucial role in the atomic project.

In her 1974 doctoral dissertation Columbia's Sylvia Crosbie examined how Israel, lead by physicist Dr. Ernst Bergmann and Shimon Peres, began making ties in the early 1950s with France's scientific community, a process that culminated sometime in "1956" when France agreed to provide Israel with a reactor. Although unsure if the reactor possessed a "chemical separation plant," she correctly noted that this infrastructure, if it existed, would have had to been built by France.²⁴ She also illuminated how France's involvement in the Algerian Revolutionary War, beginning in 1954, helped to form what Israeli historian Simha Flapan contended in July 1974 was a "common enemy" in Nasser. Flapan correctly identified that in the days before the start of the Suez War in late October 1956 France agreed to provide Israel a 24 megawatt (MW) reactor, but his contention that the Israeli cabinet "approved" Ben Gurion's proposal to build the reactor in "1957" was wrong.²⁵ His statement that Egypt "refused to discuss... Israel's nuclear option" beginning in 1966 also fails to square with the record.²⁶

In 1974-1975 Israel's nuclear weapons program was once again portrayed as necessary for its survival. In the October 1974 edition of *Foreign Affairs* George Quester emphasized that an Israeli bomb would never allow the Arabs to drive Israel "into the sea," adding speciously that "rumors" existed of an Egyptian bomb in the future.²⁷ Later in the year Evron stipulated that an Israeli bomb "would doom all Arab hope of defeating her," while including the familiar trope

edited by Cohen and Benjamin Frankel (London Frank Cass, 1991), pp. 5; *Ibid*, *Israel's Nuclear Dilemma* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 16-17; *Ibid*, "The Arab Position in the Nuclear Field: A Study of Policies up to 1967," *Cooperation and Conflict*, 8, 1 (1973), pp. 22, 26, 28-29.

²⁴ Sylvia K. Crosbie, *A Tacit Alliance: France and Israel From Suez to the Six Day War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 114-120, 166.

²⁵ Simha Flapan, "Nuclear Power in the Middle East," *New Outlook*, 17, 6 (July 1974), pp. 46-50.

²⁶ *Ibid*, "Nuclear Power in the Middle East: The Critical Years," *New Outlook*, 17, 8 (October 1974), p. 40.

²⁷ George Quester, "Can Proliferation Now Be Stopped?" *Foreign Affairs*, 53 (October 1974), pp. 82-83.

that Dimona was not uncovered by the U.S. until “the end of 1960.”²⁸ John Hopkins professor Robert Tucker called for U.S. to embrace Israel’s nuclear weapons program while admitting that the world had become “much more dangerous since” Zionism’s “early days...” Thanking historian Walter Laqueur for his consultation, Tucker argued in *Commentary* that Israel perceived its nuclear option as “a form of insurance against Israel’s desertion” by the U.S. to be used as a “polite form of blackmail...”²⁹ In the same year Robert Pranger and Dale Tahtinen published *Nuclear Threat in the Middle East*. Describing Dimona as cloaked “in mystery,” they were the first to argue that Israel was “stockpiling” an atomic arsenal with a completed chemical separation plant. This bold contention was buttressed by several media stories in 1975-1976, precipitating Dimona to be misrepresented again in the apologetic scholarship.³⁰

Pranger and Tahiten were denounced as having a “pro-Arab” bias by Robert Harkavy in his 1977 *Spectre of a Middle Eastern Holocaust*, which professed that Israel did not make the

²⁸ Yair Evron, “Israel and the Atom: The Uses and Misuses of Ambiguity,” *Orbis* 17, 4 (1974), pp. 1326, 1331.

²⁹ This perception of U.S. abandonment of Israel was highlighted on November 10, 1975, when the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) decreed Zionism a racist ideology. In July 1976 *Commentary* editor Norman Podhoretz stated that U.S. policy towards Israel was “weakening” due to its oil interests in the Near East. He also added that there was “no longer” any doubts that Israel possessed nuclear weapons and warned that if the “intolerable moral pressures” continued then there could also be “no doubt” that the “only democracy in the Middle East” then could “unleash them” if facing its own destruction. This “suicide rather than surrender” Samson mind-frame is also mentioned in a 1972 *Journal of Palestine Studies* article. Norman Podhoretz, “The Abandonment of Israel,” *Commentary* 62, 1 (July 1976), pp. 23-24, 29, 31; Robert W. Tucker, “Israel and the United States: From Dependence to Nuclear Weapons?” *Commentary*, 60, 5 (1975), pp. 29, 34, 40-41; A.B. Zahlan, “The Science and Technology Gap in the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Spring 1972), p. 42.

³⁰ The media’s attention towards Dimona had been catalyzed by several key events earlier in the decade, starting with DCI Richard Helms informing Congress on July 7, 1970, that Israel had the capacity to construct the bomb. Stimulated by India’s first atomic test on May 17, 1974, in August the CIA concluded in a report not publicized until early 2000 that it believed that Israel had already “produced nuclear weapons.” Close to four pages concerning Israel remain censored. In an April 1975 interview with ABC, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin answered “No” when asked if Israel possessed the bomb. With Israel abstaining, in 1975 the UNGA voted 103-0 calling for a nuclear free zone in the Near East. William Beecher, “Israel Seen Holding 10 Nuclear Weapons,” *WP*, July 31, 1975, p. A34; Paper Says Israel Has 10 Atom Bombs,” *NYT*, August 1, 1975, p.8; “A-Bomb Beat,” *TIME*, August 11, 1975, p. 38; Arthur Kranish, “CIA: Israel Has 10-20 A-Weapons,” *WP*, March 15, 1976, p. A2; Robert Pranger and Dale Tahtinen, *Nuclear Threat in the Middle East* (Washington: AEI, 1975), pp. 3, 8, 11-18, 19n45; Dowty, “Nuclear Proliferation: the Israeli Case,” p. 84; Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 4-1-74, “Prospects for further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” August 23, 1974, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB240/snie.pdf>; Amir Oren, “CIA Reveals: We Said in 1974 that Israel had Nuclear Weapons,” *Ha’aretz*, January 13, 2008, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/943729.html>.

decision to build a chemical separation capacity until after the Six Day War.³¹ Harkavy also denounced a story written by former *NYT* reporter Tad Szulc, whom he nonetheless characterized as possessing “impeccable credentials,” professing that claims that elements within the “pro-Israel” CIA had provided “overt assistance” to Israel’s nuclear program following the Suez Crisis as “bizarre.”³² Following Harkavy’s analysis, few in the scholarship have examined the Szulc thesis and none have pursued how the U.S. media has approached and reported on Dimona.³³ Two major events – a highly probable detonation of an Israeli nuclear device in the Indian Ocean near South Africa on September 22, 1979,³⁴ and Israel’s bombing of Iraq’s

³¹ In a March 1978 *International Studies Quarterly* piece in which he thanked Evron, Aronson, Rosen and Tucker for their consultancy, Notre Dame political scientist Alan Dowty also critiqued Pranger’s and Tahiten’s finding that Israel “had developed nuclear weapons” as based on “unconfirmed...judgments” by professing that there was no “concrete evidence” of such a claim. He also foolishly speculated that since the French-Israeli atomic agreements were still secret, he naively assumed that Paris could have implemented its own safeguards. Dowty, “Nuclear Proliferation: the Israeli Case,” pp. 79, 81, 81n3, 109.

³² Harkavy’s study was part of monograph series edited by historian Robert Schulzinger. Harkavy, *Spectre of a Middle Eastern Holocaust*, pp. 13-14, 127.

³³ As a doctoral student in international relations at USC, Peter Pry revealed that Szulc had professed that Angleton had helped provide assistance towards Israel nuclear weapons program in 1957 and 1958. A future employee of the CIA, Pry agreed with Harkavy’s analysis, maintaining that “most accounts of the origins of Israel’s nuclear arsenal” either correctly omit or give “short shrift” to Szulc’s allegations. The only other scholar to touch upon the issue has been St. John’s professor Honoré Catudal, a former research assistant to Eleanor Dulles. In a 1991 monograph read over first by McGeorge Bundy, he reemphasized that the CIA had denied the Szulc allegation. Peter Pry, *Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 9- 10; Peter Pry, *War Scare: Russia and America on the Nuclear Brink* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1999), p. 341; Honoré M. Catudal, *Israel’s Nuclear Weaponry: A New Arms Race in the Middle East* (London: Grey Seal, 1991), pp. 6, 26n9.

³⁴ In February 1980 the *Washington Post* (*WP*) revealed that Raviv, then a CBS radio news reporter, was only the second Israeli foreign correspondent to have his press credentials revoked when he traveled to Rome to announce that Israel could have detonated the bomb off the South African coast with the approval and help of Pieter Willem Botha’s government. Raviv’s sources for his report were Israeli journalists, Eli Teicher and Ami Dor-On, who in 1980 had their manuscript *None Will Survive: the Story of the Israeli A-Bomb* banned by the Israeli censor and threatened with 15 years in jail if they revealed any of its contents. The U.S. reaction was more nuanced and subtle. In the aftermath of the apparent explosion an interagency study was conducted under the auspices of DCI Stansfield Turner, who political scientist Jeffrey Richelson has argued believed that Israel was responsible for the test. After a heavily censored December 1979 interagency report came to this same conclusion, President Carter set up a private committee to find the truth. Shortly after the DCI report was conducted, Richard Garwin, a University of Chicago and IBM physicist, longtime adviser to the CIA, and future Senior CFR science and technology Fellow, was asked to travel to Langley with Steve Lukaski, a former director of the Pentagon’s Advanced Research Projects Agency, in January 1980 where they laid the groundwork for an ad hoc group to be chaired by Jack Ruina, a former MIT physicist. On May 23, 1980, Ruina’s group submitted their final report, concluding that while a “nuclear origin” could not be ruled out it was more likely that the “signal” detected was caused by a “small meteoroid” hitting the satellite. William Claiborne, “Israel Penalizes Reporter for Violating Censorship,” *WP*, February 25, 1980, p. A7; James Adams, *The Unnatural Alliance* (New York: Quartet Books, 1984), p. 1985; Yoel Cohen, “Nuclear Ambiguity and the Media: The Israeli Case,” *Israel Affairs*, 12, 3 (July 2006), pp. 531-532; Jeffrey Richelson,

French-built nuclear facility at Osiraq on June 7, 1981³⁵ - helped to place a renewed scholarly emphasis on Israel's nuclear weapons program by the early 1980s.

In the only monograph focused on the Paris' crucial place in Israel's atomic history, a year later French journalist Pierre Péan published *Les Deux Bombes*. The book, outlining how Paris and Jerusalem in October 1957 secretly agreed to provide the latter with a nuclear reactor, was controversial. The general administrator of the Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique (CEA) during the 1950s, Pierre Guillaumat, tried to block its publication. This increased willingness to discuss and debate Dimona was exemplified in the first Israeli account of the nation's nuclear program. Despite his contradictory analysis of U.S. policy – arguing that Washington was both “firmly opposed to Israeli nuclear nuclearization” while admitting it also failed to gain an “Israel promise not to produce nuclear weapons”- political scientist Shai Feldman's *Israeli Nuclear Deterrence* (1982) was still influential. His declaration that Israel should establish an “explicit nuclear deterrence” set the tone for many of the essays published in Louis Rene Beres' edited *Security or Armageddon: Israel's Nuclear Strategy* (1986).³⁶

Starting with the editor, most of the book's contributors did not accept Feldman's call for Israeli atomic transparency. Beres, who received his Ph.D. in international relations from Princeton, argued that since Israel's “commitment to self-preservation” exceeded that of its neighbors, it was possible that if faced with “the end of the Third Temple” Israel could empty its

Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), pp. 286, 291, 294, 296-297, 303, 314-315; Richard Burt, “U.S. is Unable to Confirm A-Blast,” *NYT*, January 24, 1980, p. B8; Robert Reinhold, “Pentagon renews Ties with Colleges,” *NYT*, May 13, 1980, p. C1; John Finney, “Experts Disagree on Civil Defense,” *NYT*, April 29, 1976, p.3; *Ibid*, “Experts Disagree on Civil Defense,” *NYT*, April 29, 1976, p. 9; Richard Garwin, “Count on Rumsfeld, Not the Missile Shield,” *NYT*, December 30, 2000, p. A15; John Noble Wilford, “New ‘Window’ Opens on Atom as giant Accelerator Passes Full-Power Test,” *NYT*, June 10, 1972, p. 62; DCI, “The 22 September 1979 Event,” December 1979, George Washington National Security Archive (GWNSA), <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAE/BB/NSAE/BB190/index.htm>; Office of Science and Technology Policy, “Ad Hoc Panel Report on the September 22 Event,” GWNSA, May 23, 1980; <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAE/BB/NSAE/BB190/index.htm>.

³⁵ The Israeli strike was conducted by eight U.S.-built F-15 jets. A Dan Reiter, “Preventive Attacks Against Nuclear Programs and the ‘Success’ at Orisa,” *Nonproliferation Review*, 12, 2 (July 2005), pp. 357, 363.

³⁶ Shai Feldman, *Israeli Nuclear Deterrence*, pp. 210-211, 215, 242.

atomic “disposal.” He even suggested that the “morality” of such a decision could be debated. Harkavy questioned Feldman’s call for an open Israeli doctrine, emphasizing that Israel’s nuclear arsenal was the “moral...equivalent to a knife wielded by a scrawny man in a menacing neighborhood.”³⁷ Political scientist Stephen Cimbala avowed that an open Israeli nuclear posture would produce negative implications, while adding that the U.S. and Soviet atomic arsenals during the 1967 and 1973 wars, with particular emphasis on the latter, helped bring “both conflicts to a conclusion.” With the exception of Hebrew University Gerald Steinberg’s observation that the Soviets had threatened nuclear war in 1956 to “dislodge Israel from the Sinai” during the Suez Crisis, there was little analysis of Moscow’s policies toward Israel in the overall monograph. The best essay was provided by philosopher Avner Cohen. Noting Albert Einstein’s 1946 observation that the atomic age has “changed everything save our models of thinking,” he understood how Israel’s clandestine atomic program has caused problems for “its democratic system” as the nation’s military censor had effectively neutered the issue in the press, intelligentsia and Knesset.³⁸ Over a month after the book hit the press on August 23, 1986, the world was introduced to Mordechai Vanunu, a Moroccan-born Jew.

Over a week after the Mossad had drugged, beat and kidnapped Vanunu in Rome on October 5, 1986, the London *Sunday Times* published a three page exposé on Dimona. Vanunu, who had worked at Dimona’s Machon 2 facility from November 1976 to October 1985, ended the debate over whether Israel possessed a chemical separation plant. Machon 2 was unveiled to

³⁷ Two years after chairing an advisory committee for Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Beres chastised University of California political scientist Zeev Moaz’s 2003 call for Israel to relinquish its nuclear arsenal, denouncing the proposal as “naïve legalism.” Louis Rene Beres and Zeev Maoz, “Correspondence: Israel and the Bomb,” *International Security* 29, 1 (Summer 2004), pp. 175-176; Zeev Moaz, “the Mixed Blessing of Israel’s Nuclear Policy,” *Ibid.*, 28, 2 (Fall 2003), pp. 44-77; Beres, “Introduction,” in *Security or Armageddon: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy* (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1986), pp. 5, 10, 194n2.

³⁸ Stephen J. Cimbala, “An Israeli Nuclear Deterrent: Implications for U.S.-Soviet Strategic Policies,” *Ibid.*, p. 139; Gerald M. Steinberg, “Deliberate Ambiguity: Evolution and Evaluation,” *Ibid.*, pp. 30, 40; Avner Cohen, “Deterrence, Holocaust, and Nuclear Weapons: A Nonparochial Outlook,” *Ibid.*, pp. 174, 176, 178, 225n10.

contain a secret underground facility used to enrich radioactive material to build 100 nuclear weapons over the previous 20 years. Dr. Theodore Taylor, a protégé of Robert Oppenheimer, and Dr. Frank Barnaby, a nuclear physicist who had helped Great Britain to develop the bomb during the 1950s, verified Vanunu's story and the 50 plus pictures he had snapped of the facility. The Vanunu revelations forced the scholarship to focus less on whether Israel possessed the nuclear bomb and increasingly on the domestic and foreign tropes of Dimona's history.³⁹

In late 1987 Wisconsin law professor Gary Milhollin touched upon how the U.S. and Norway had provided Israel with heavy water during the late 1950s and early 1960s. In 1991 three scholarly books were published focused on Israel's nuclear origins, Honoré Catudal's *Israel's Nuclear Weaponry*, Shlomo Aronson's *The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East*, and Hersh's *The Samson Option*. The best of these three was Hersh's, thanks to its yeoman probing of the crucial roles played by Dr. Bergmann and a longtime U.S. Ambassador in Tel Aviv, Walworth Barbour, in Dimona's history. Alongside a brief analysis exposing the New York elements which had secretly funded the project, Hersh used interviews with former CIA officials to contend that the CIA and White House were aware of Dimona's existence via U-2 flights as early as 1958 but chose to do nothing. In 1996 Israeli scholars Ariel Levité and Emily Landau provided the first extensive analysis focused on the Arab perceptions

³⁹ In a secret trial, Vanunu was sentenced to 18 years in jail for treason and espionage in March 1988 by the Jerusalem District Court. Barnaby has contended that Israel utilized Vanunu as a convenient proxy to tell the world it possessed a nuclear deterrent, something it could not do without being labeled as a "hypocrite" itself. He was released from Ashkelon prison on April 21, 2004, on the conditions that he could neither leave Israel nor discuss the nation's nuclear program. In December 2009 he was arrested again for allegedly talking to a foreigner, his Norwegian girlfriend, about Dimona. Appendix A was found at www.globalresearch.ca. "Israeli nuclear whistleblower Mordechai Vanunu arrested," *BBC*, December 29, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8433603.stm; Eileen Fleming, "Israel's Nuclear Weapons Program: What Americans Need to know about Mordechai Vanunu," *Global Research*, December 14, 2009, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=16536>; "Dimona and Vanunu," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 16, 2 (Winter 1987), pp. 171-174; Frank Barnaby, *The Invisible Bomb: The Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1989), p. xi; Yoel Cohen, "Nuclear Ambiguity and the Media: The Israeli Case," *Israel Affairs*, 12, 3 (July 2006), pp. 540.

and policies towards Dimona prior to the Six Day War.⁴⁰ Two years later the seminal account of the historiography was published.

In the first Dimona narrative based on archival material, Avner Cohen's *Israel and the Bomb* certainly caused a stir within Israel. After the book was published in 1998 Cohen, who received veiled threats and phone calls from the Israeli Defense Ministry, refrained from returning to Israel until 2002 where upon he was investigated by Israeli police. In response to the book some papers belonging to Levi Eshkol focused on the nuclear issue were taken from Eshkol's surviving widow by Israeli authorities. The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) also censored many documents focused on the subject during Lyndon Johnson's presidency.⁴¹ By tracing Dimona's beginning back to the Israel's early existence, identifying the key bureaucrats and technocrats who drove and debated the program in the shadows, and unearthing the transformative September 1969 accord between Richard Nixon and Prime Minister Golda Meir, Cohen represents the seminal authority within the historiography.

Bilateral narratives devoid of an internationalist trope have defined the most recent Dimona scholarship. Drawing from French and Hebrew sources, University of Ben Gurion historian Binyamin Pinkus demonstrated in a 2002 article in *Israel Studies* how the French-Israeli atomic relationship first began in 1949. In 2005, Pinkus' colleague at Ben Gurion University, Zaki Shalom, produced the archival-based *Israel's Nuclear Option*. Other than a brief blurb in his introduction, Shalom omitted any mention of how Dimona was approached by the Eisenhower administration in a study focused on the atomic policies of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations toward Israel. Shedding new light on how Dimona was secretly financed by a global Jewish consortium and how the Mossad conspired to ensure Egypt was

⁴⁰ Levité, Ariel and Emily Landau. "Arab Perceptions of Israel's Nuclear Posture, 1960-1967," *Israel Studies* 1, 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 34-53.

⁴¹ Yoel Cohen, "Nuclear Ambiguity and the Media: The Israeli Case," pp. 538-539.

unable to build its own deterrent power, a year later Israeli journalist Michael Karpin published *The Bomb in the Basement*. But as with Cohen's *Israel and the Bomb*, none of these accounts analyzed the major shortcoming and weaknesses of the historiography.

The thesis examines Western complicity in covertly aiding, concealing and covering up Israel's nuclear weapons program and its Cold War implications on the U.S.S.R. and Egypt. A revisionist narrative can only emerge after identifying and addressing the historiography's three unexplored and unexplained realms. Firstly, I will refute the mendacious myth that the U.S. had no foreknowledge about Dimona before December 1960 and that it remained uninformed about the Israel's atomic project's origins, nature and intentions during the ensuing decade. In following Alexis De Tocqueville's observation that the "press" represents the great "democratic instrument of freedom," a second revisionist angle will be a critique of the U.S. media's coverage of Dimona.⁴² By incorporating 319 newspaper stories, including 226 *NYT* contributions, I will purport that the subservient U.S. press has intentionally and consistently suppressed, deceived and confused the U.S. public about Dimona since Eisenhower's final days in office.⁴³ Finally, the study will conceptualize an internationalist framework by probing how the Soviet Union, utilizing Egypt and Syria as puppet proxies, instigated the Six Day War crisis in an attempt to provide the context to eliminate Dimona, a reactor whose origins lie in four different continents.

Chapter one will demonstrate that the West's complicity in Dimona began years before the facility was publicly unveiled in December 1960. In September 1948 Israel's David Ben Gurion proudly envisioned that the "intellectual" diffusion precipitated by the global Jewish

⁴² Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (Toronto: Bantam Books, 2000), pp. 877, 209.

⁴³ The majority of these articles were found courtesy of the underappreciated and underused online University of Ottawa ProQuest Historical Newspapers database. Via the internet, I also accessed primary documentation from 17 volumes of the *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)* series, the George Washington National Security Archive, the American Presidency Project and C-SPAN.

Diaspora would enable Israel to “blossom” under the “genius of science.”⁴⁴ From 1949 until his leave of absence in December 1953, he cultivated key individuals within academia and the military to quietly establish Israel’s atomic knowledge base and make first contacts with the other national scientific communities. Proving that alliances are driven by expediency rather than principle, after the Algerian War of Independence commenced in 1954, France turned to Israel for intelligence about Nasser and Egypt’s role in supporting the Algerian revolutionaries. Beginning in September 1955 and picking up again in May and June 1956, Ben Gurion delegated Shimon Peres and other shadowy figures to network in Paris to convince the French government to provide atomic assistance to Israel. Following Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal in late July, bilateral relations drew closer in late September with a deal providing Israel with a nuclear reactor. This accord was cemented by Peres a month later when France, Britain and Israel conspired to wage war against Egypt in late October 1956. After French Prime Minister Guy Mollet began reconsidering the secret accord, Peres convinced Mollet’s successor, Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury, to keep this pledge. In late 1957 or early 1958 French firms began clandestinely building the reactor in the Negev desert at Dimona. Despite the façade of mild French opposition following Charles De Gaulle’s ascent to power in late 1958, the status quo proceeded unabated into the 1960s.

The opening chapter will also reveal the crucial scientific and financial communities which helped construct and finance Dimona. While Peres was the catalyst in acquiring the reactor, Dr. Ernst Bergmann was the guiding force in acquiring heavy water. After years of networking, in the summer of 1958, Bergmann utilized contacts in Norway to broker a three-way deal in which London provided Israel with 20 tons of Norwegian heavy water in 1959-1960. How Israel paid for its nuclear weapons program echoes Immanuel Wallerstein’s theorem that

⁴⁴ Avner Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 11.

capitalism has always been a global “affair” transcending the decadent nation state.⁴⁵ The greatest U.S. support to Israel’s nuclear weapons program came first from Wall Street rather than Washington. In October 1958 Ben Gurion met with lawyer Abraham Feinberg in order to devise a covert financial campaign to finance the project. Working directly with Peres, Feinberg attracted capital from the globe’s richest and most influential Jews. Israel’s public committed little of their own money to build the most expensive project in their nation’s history and was neither consulted nor informed of the state’s atomic agenda.

In refuting William Quandt’s generalization that Near East policy is “usually set” by the President and the Secretary of State, I will argue in chapter two that U.S. policy towards Dimona during the Eisenhower administration was instead driven by “faceless bureaucrats,” Wall Street lawyers, brilliant scientists, and troubleshooting diplomats.⁴⁶ Political scientist Garry Clifford has envisioned bureaucracies as complex and “compartmentalized” machines often producing unintended and unpredictable results, shattering the orthodox perception of the state as a unitary and rational actor.⁴⁷ Machiavelli has contended that one can determinate a leader’s “character” by examining the “sort” of people surrounding them. Sun Tzu placed importance on observing the “doorkeepers...” of power.⁴⁸ In perceiving the CIA as a rogue state within a state, the Company provided atomic assistance to Israel and covered up the reactor’s true intentions as the U.S.’s most powerful, persuasive, and secret bureaucracy.⁴⁹ I will contend that deep factions

⁴⁵ Ole Holsti, “Theories of International Relations,” in *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, p. 66.

⁴⁶ Quandt, *Peace Process*, p. 6.

⁴⁷ Garry J. Clifford, “Bureaucratic Politics,” In *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, ed. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 91.

⁴⁸ Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince* (Toronto: Dover Publications, 1992), p. 62; Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, p. 98.

⁴⁹ Given the expansive and undefined authority to conduct “other functions and duties...” under the July 26, 1947, National Security Act, the CIA was officially established by President Truman on September 18. In February 1947 Secretary of State George C. Marshall cautioned that the new intelligence apparatus would possess “almost unlimited” powers. Michael Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 56; David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, *The Invisible Government: The CIA and U.S. Intelligence* (New York: Random House, 1964), p. 95.

within the State Department, the Atomic Energy Commission and CIA knew of Dimona's existence by early 1958 but choose to remain silent until the reactor was partially unveiled by the *NYT* and *Washington Post* (WP) in December 1960. Following the White House's carefully screened message, the U.S. media deceived the public by downplaying, denying and dismissing the likelihood of an Israel bomb as an unrealistic and bizarre rumor.

Chapter three will analyze and interpret the implications of Dimona on Israel's domestic political scene and its Cold War adversaries from 1961 to 1969. During the early part of the decade, despite his declining power, Ben Gurion was still able to shape the nation's atomic policy and took steps to implicitly demonstrate Israel's new strategic deterrent through Peres and demonstrations of technological innovation. Prior to his June 1963 resignation he was also able, although not as completely, to manage how the issue was presented in the national security apparatus, Knesset and the media. Levi Eshkol, Ben Gurion's successor, possessed some knowledge of the project when he assumed office and even had the nuclear issue used against him by powerful forces in the lead up to the 1965 election campaign. At a time when Moscow and Cairo began criticizing Israel on Dimona, following Eshkol's electoral victory the Knesset and media began to investigate the subject more closely. Neither institution, however, were aware that Israel already possessed the bomb just prior to the Six Day War. Following Eshkol's February 1969 death, Golda Meir cemented her predecessor's policy by refusing to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, a decision quietly supported by Washington.

Chapter three will also contend that following Nikita Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964 Moscow's strove to eliminate Dimona before the reactor could produce a usable atomic weapon. This analysis will lean on Isabella Ginor's and Gideon Remez's *Foxbats over Dimona: The Soviet's Nuclear Gamble in the Six Day War* (2007), a lucid journalistic perspective of the

U.S.S.R.'s perceptions and policies changed towards Dimona during the 1960s.⁵⁰ Embracing the idiom that the “role of intelligence services” represents the “missing dimension of international history,”⁵¹ beginning in December 1965 influential Soviet sympathizers within Israel began informing the Kremlin that Israel’s peaceful atomic proclamations were dishonest. The Kremlin subsequently strengthened ties with the Arab world, culminating in a November 1966 KGB deal with Egyptian intelligence to work together in any future military confrontation with Israel. Utilizing Nasser as a rhetorical mouthpiece throughout 1966-1967, the Soviets engineered a fabricated crisis involving Syria on May 12, 1967, to prod Israel into launching a preemptive strike against the Arabs in order to give Moscow a pretext to eliminate the Dimona reactor.

After demonstrating that Eisenhower intentionally suppressed, manipulated, and censored intelligence on Dimona, de Tocqueville’s mantra that “once put in motion” the “machine” will often progress “self-guided” can be employed to study U.S. policy towards Israel during the 1960s.⁵² Chapter four will highlight the taciturn U.S. support during the Kennedy years from the U.S. national security apparatus at the expense of a political motivated President. During this period the U.S. conducted its first two pre-arranged and contrived visits to the Negev desert in May 1961 and August 1962, and decided to provide Israel the Hawk missile in August 1962 and heavy water in July 1963. How the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) negotiations of 1963 with Moscow conveniently provided the context for the only serious criticism of Israel’s nuclear program from Washington will also be deconstructed. In chapter five the thesis will examine Dimona’s place during Lyndon Johnson’s presidency vis-à-vis the Gilpatric Committee, which

⁵⁰ Fluent in Russian, Ginor is a research fellow at the Harry Truman Research Institute at the Hebrew University and Remez a former journalist and IDF paratrooper during the Six Day War.

⁵¹ Scott Lucas and Alistair Morey, “The Hidden ‘Alliance’: The CIA and M16 before and the Suez,” *Intelligence and National Security*, 15, 2 (Summer 2000), p. 95.

⁵² William Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967* (Berkeley: Brookings Institution, 2005), p. 9; De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, p. 53.

examined nuclear proliferation after China's first atomic test in October 1964, the March 10, 1965, U.S.-Israeli Memorandum of Understanding, the Six Day War of June 1967, and the NPT of July 1, 1968. Both chapters four and five will outline how through the 1960s the U.S. media refused to cover Dimona on a consistent and honest basis while promoting the fantasy that the reactor was still peaceful and the falsehood that Egypt was working on the bomb. The media failed to grasp that during these years U.S. policy continued to be driven by unelected and unaccountable bureaucrats, scientists, lawyers and private individuals. America's 16th President was sometimes wrong. Some "citizens" always manage to escape "history."⁵³

Lawyer Clark Clifford was wrong. It is the President who is the "chameleon" who changes his "personality" according to the "Government" rather than vice-versa.⁵⁴ Presidents need not to make new friends; they just have to keep their old ones. In a revealing diatribe attributed to FDR, Presidents are selected rather than elected.⁵⁵ Since Ike, JFK, LBJ and Richard Nixon all took a detached and dismissive approach towards Dimona, U.S. policy vis-à-vis Dimona illuminates historian Carroll Quigley's trans-partisan dictum that the Democratic and Republican parties are "almost identical" factions of the Wall Street Party.⁵⁶ Power is organized and disseminated by capital, technology and geography before ideology. Proganized and militarized from California and Silicon Valley since World War II, Washington is controlled from first and foremost New York, and then Connecticut, Chicago, and lastly Massachusetts.

⁵³ Sean Wilentz, *The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974-2008* (New York: Harper Collins, 2008), p. 458.

⁵⁴ Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *The Imperial Presidency* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Company, 1973), p. 363.

⁵⁵ "Fall of the Republic – The Presidency of Barack H. Obama- The Full Movie HQ," http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F8LPNRI_6T8 (2:24:23).

⁵⁶ Quigley has averred that the "idea" of two political machines present conflicting "ideals and policies," such as the nihilistic, redundant and simplistic "right" versus "left" or conservative against liberal controlled paradigms, is a "foolish" perception perpetuated and defended by "doctrinaire and academic thinkers." The uniformed and credulous, like the naïve supporters of President Barack Obama, who believe than an election can allow the "rascals" to be thrown "out" are unaware that there have been few "profound or extensive shifts" in U.S. foreign policy since World War II. Carroll Quigley, *Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time* (New York: MacMillan Company, 1966), pp. 1247-1248.

When a Texan occupies the White House the system switches almost completely to auto-pilot.⁵⁷

The U.S., the most powerful state since Rome, represents the most sophisticated, opaque, confusing and elephantine power system in history. A former Canadian diplomat, poet, and Berkley professor has contended that the U.S. possesses both a “regular history” and a “deep history.”⁵⁸ Even though the U.S.-Israel bilateral relationship already straddles this pendulum, I will contend that Washington’s approach to Dimona deserves placement in Peter Dale Scott’s latter category. De Tocqueville averred that while the U.S. was covered “with a layer of democracy” it also possessed a hidden oligarchy of “old aristocratic colors” through a strategic class of “merchants, lawyers” and “physicians.” He added that he knew of “no other country where the love of money has taken a stronger hold.”⁵⁹ Comprised of an “unholy alliance between corrupt business and corrupt politics,” Theodore Roosevelt warned in 1912 as the Progressive Party’s Presidential candidate that an “invisible government” existed in the U.S. “enthroned” above and beyond the “ostensible government.”⁶⁰ Our world is much more complicated and esoteric than most of us think. Our journey begins with how Israel began the process of providing itself with what President Harry Truman paradoxically described as both the “greatest” and “worst thing” ever invented by “organized science in history.”⁶¹

⁵⁷ Over 80 percent of the U.S. Jewish population, roughly 2 to 4 percent of the nation’s total population, are located in just nine states- California, New York, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Maryland, New Jersey and Florida. These states currently hold 202 of the 535 Electoral College’s delegates. Goldberg, *Jewish Power*, pp. 33-34, 57

⁵⁸ “Peter Dale Scott: 9/11, Canada, left gatekeepers & Zelikow,” <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DDZR72PPU0Q> (9:41).

⁵⁹ De Tocqueville, *Democracy and America*, pp. 50, 56.

⁶⁰ The roots of oligarchy extend back to ancient Greece, when Socrates denounced this form of government as an evil system in which the rich possess all the “power” through the “valuation of property” and citizenship and status are determined on how much “money” one possessed. Plato, *The Republic* (New York: Dover Publications, 2000), pp. 204, 210-212; “Progressive Party Platform of 1912,” November 5, 1912, APP, PPUS, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/>; “Progressive Covenant with the People,” American Memory from the Library of Congress, Theodore Roosevelt on Film, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/trooseve_It_film/t_rfpcp.html.

⁶¹ Greg Herken, *The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950* (New York: Vintage Books, 1981), pp. 3, 16, 20-21; *Why We Fight* (2005), Written and Directed by Eugene Jarecki. http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=92198588264_21983682# (1:38:40).

Chapter One: Factionalism,⁶² Capital Friends and Free Capital

Israel's sagacious founding father had a vivid imagination. According to Shimon Peres, his shining protégé, David Ben Gurion was blessed with "earthly realism" and "sky-scraping vision."⁶³ His ability to think big and delegate smartly enabled Israel to obtain the bomb. In March 1948 the Haganah, forerunner of the Israel Defense Force (IDF), created the Science Corps HEMED (its Hebrew acronym).⁶⁴ In August Ernst Bergmann became head scientific adviser to the Defense Minister.⁶⁵ Two months later Ben Gurion announced that the "intellectual" diffusion which had accompanied the Jewish Diaspora would allow "capital" and the "genius of science" to "blossom" in Israel.⁶⁶ In 1949 Giulio Racah of the Hebrew University's selected six Israeli students to study physics abroad.⁶⁷ Another key figure was General Israel Dostrovsky who led a geological mission of the Negev desert for HEMED from 1949-1951.⁶⁸

Israel's first atomic contacts with France also occurred in 1949.⁶⁹ In March French scientist Moshe Sordin secretly met Ben Gurion, admitting later that the Prime Minister was

⁶²James Madison defined factionalism as a cabal of citizens, whether a majority or minority, united and inspired by a universal "interest" unfavorable to the "permanent and aggregate interests of the community." He warned that "causes of faction cannot be removed" only their effects controlled. Admitting that "enlightened" leaders will "not always be at the helm," Hamilton concurred that a government which operates "out of sight" usually does not "act in the people's interest." De Tocqueville mused that when the state is divided into many hostile "factions" the interests of the "majority is often overlooked." See Federalist Numbers 10, 27, 51. Wills ed., *The Federalist Papers*, pp. 43, 45, 132, 262; De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, p. 296.

⁶³ Shimon Peres, *From These Men: Seven Founders of the State of Israel* (New York: Wyndham, 1979), pp. 17-19, 21; Michael Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), pp. 43-44.

⁶⁴ Avner Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 11.

⁶⁵ Bergmann met Chaim Weizmann in London in 1938. Acting on Albert Einstein's advice, Weizmann selected Bergmann to direct the Daniel Sieff Research Institute, funded by the Sieff family. Israeli journalist Michael Karpin has pointed out that after Bergmann's wife died of cancer in 1937, he re-married Weizmann's secretary, which ended ties with Weizmann. Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, p. 35; Peres, *From These Men*, p. 125.

⁶⁶ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 11.

⁶⁷ Amos de Shalit and Igal Talmi went to Zurich, Uri Haber-Schaim studied at the University of Chicago under Enrico Fermi, Gvirol Goldring went to London's Imperial College, whereas Israel Pelah attended Amsterdam University. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 26; Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, p. 48.

⁶⁸ Dostrovsky, holding a doctorate in physical chemistry from London's University, founded the isotopes departments at the Sieff Institute and HEMED C in 1948. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 21, 25.

⁶⁹ Sylvia Crosbie, *A Tacit Alliance: France and Israel From Suez to the Six Day War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 114-115.

extremely “interested in the atom.” In July 1951 Jean-Francis Perrin, High Commissioner of the Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique (CEA), surveyed Dostrovsky’s heavy water research.⁷⁰

Binyamin Pinkus, a historian at Ben Gurion University, has contended that the Israelis were informed that Perrin’s trip was only an innocent “cultural exchange.”⁷¹ According to journalist Pierre Péan, the Israelis were the only foreigners permitted to “move unrestricted” throughout France’s scientific community in the late 1940s.⁷² Ironically, the Israelis more easily discussed atomic issues with the French than amongst themselves.

In July 1951 the Chaim Weizmann-Bergmann feud climaxed when the former informed the latter that his Institute duties were finished. Thirteen days later, Ben Gurion appointed Bergman as scientific adviser to the Defense Ministry and HEMED, proposing a new division focused on long term national research.⁷³ Ben Gurion yearned for Munya Mardor to manage the new ministry but realized that he would need to be co-opted.⁷⁴ In January 1952 Mardor relented but only after gaining control of R&D prioritization at the new Research and Infrastructure Division. EMET, meaning “truth,” was created without a troublesome paper trail. Working with Bergmann, Mardor placed all HEMED laboratories under EMET’s jurisdiction. Scientists from the Hebrew University and the Technion were reorganized into *Machons* (institutes). Sometime in 1952 the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC), headed by Bergmann, was created as a

⁷⁰ Frédéric Joliot-Curie was the CEA’s first High Commissioner. He was replaced by Perrin, a son of a Nobel Prize winner, who had met Bergmann in London in 1940, in 1951 due to his communist and anti-North American Treaty Organization (NATO) beliefs. Binyamin Pinkus, “Atomic Power to Israel’s Rescue: French-Israeli Nuclear Cooperation, 1949-1957,” *Israel Studies* 7, 1 (2001), pp. 105, 114-115; Bertrand Goldschmidt, “The French Atomic Energy Program,” *BAS* 18, 7 (September 1962), pp. 39-42.

⁷¹ Pinkus, “Atomic Power to Israel’s Rescue,” p. 114.

⁷² Pierre Péan, *Les Deux Bombes* (Paris: Fayard, 1982), p. 64; Pinkus, “Atomic Power to Israel’s Rescue,” pp. 115 and 134n40.

⁷³ Bergmann continued researching at Haifa’s Institute of Technology (Technion) and Jerusalem’s Hebrew University, but was banned from the Weizmann Institute’s premises. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 29.

⁷⁴ In October 1945 Munya met Ben Gurion after he had stolen a truck from a British army outpost outside Belsen, Germany, and then sailed with it to Palestine. The truck carried Jews immigrating to Palestine as Mardor was part of the “Ha-Mossad l’Aliyah Bet,” or the “Institute for Illegal Immigration.” In 1951 the Mossad, Israel’s equivalent of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was founded. Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, pp. 10-11, 31.

Defense Ministry subsidiary.⁷⁵ Alongside Dostrovsky and Racah, the IAEC included Shmuel Sambursky, Saul Cohen, Franz Ohlendorf and Ya'acov Dori. Avner Cohen has contended that the IAEC's autonomy was "only a veneer" as Bergmann utilized *Machon 4* to obtain loftier goals, outlined in a 1952 meeting: "First, the reactor... then... research." Amos de Shalit and Uri Haber-Schaim criticized this choice as they envisioned the IAEC as strictly an academic institution.⁷⁶ The intermediary in the Ben Gurion-Bergmann relationship was the new Deputy-Director General of the Defense Ministry, Shimon Peres.⁷⁷

Political changes within Israel in 1953 overshadowed its important atomic discoveries. Sometime in 1952-53 Dostrovsky developed a new formula to enrich water with deuterium to produce heavy water, a precondition for atomic reactors, and invented a cheaper method of separating uranium from phosphate deposits.⁷⁸ These breakthroughs did not prevent a physically drained Ben Gurion from taking a three month leave in July 1953. Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett became interim Prime Minister, while Pinhas Lavon was elevated to Defense Minister. Following the IDF's October 15 reprisal raid on the Jordanian village of Qibya, Ben Gurion returned.⁷⁹ Ben Gurion resigned on December 7, 1953, thus propelling Sharett and Lavon back to

⁷⁵ Translating from Mardor's Hebrew account *Rafael*, Cohen has argued that Mardor viewed EMET's creation as a "long-term" project, dedicated to creating "weapons" capable of preserving Israel's "security" and "existence." Cohen has professed that the IAEC was "quietly" created in June 1952. This assertion has been supported by Jabber, who has contended that the decision was not made public until a November 1954 Bergmann radio address. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 15, 31, 38, 45; Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, p. 42; Fuad Jabber, *Israel and Nuclear Weapons* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1971), pp. 18-19.

⁷⁶ After threatening to resign, Haber-Shaim was asked by Bergmann in early 1953 to study at Saclay. When he refused, he was fired and could not find work in Israel. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 36-37, 39, 358 n45.

⁷⁷ In 1946 Peres, along with Moshe Dayan, was a youth delegate of the Labor Party to the Zionist Congress in Vienna. The next year Peres was recruited into the Haganah by Levi Eshkol, although he never donned a military uniform. In 1949 he became the Ministry of Defense's Attaché in New York, while also studying at New York University and the Harvard Business School. Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, p. 43-44; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 18; William Claiborne, "Boy Wonder," *Washington Post (WP)*, September 24, 1984, p. A26.

⁷⁸ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 32.

⁷⁹ According to Oxford's Avi Shlaim, by the summer of 1953 the 68 year old Ben Gurion was "utterly exhausted." Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), pp. 88-93.

their old interim positions but not before Peres was promoted to Director General of the Defense Ministry and Moshe Dayan became IDF Chief of Staff.⁸⁰

Beginning with his first visit to the facility with Bergman and Mardor in early 1954, Lavon advocated that EMET would divert resources from conventional defense and academic research. On January 20, 1954, he instructed Peres to transfer *Machon 4*'s Physics Department to the Weizmann Institute. Within three months the Department of Nuclear Physics was created with the deal's architect, de Shalit, in charge. Mardor, who had not been consulted, was upset as the decision deprived the IAEC of the physicists which he and Bergmann had been training for the past two years.⁸¹ These internal setbacks and divisions, however, were offset by Israel's growing ties with France's atomic community in 1954.

This groundwork had been laid by Colonel Yuval Ne'eman, Israel's Paris Military Attaché, who began networking with Bergmann in September 1953.⁸² In late 1953 France's atomic centers at Saclay and Chatillon became open to Zvi Lipkin, Israel Pelah and de Shalit.⁸³ After speaking with Dostrovsky on March 15, 1954, Bergmann told Ben Gurion that these discoveries now enabled Israel to sell nuclear products abroad.⁸⁴ Although the exact date is disputed, Cohen has averred that in early 1954 the IAEC sold Dostrovsky's patents to the CEA for 60 million francs.⁸⁵ Bergmann's tireless salesmanship continued.⁸⁶ Conscious that Norway had been providing France heavy water since 1940, on May 10, 1954, he asked Gunnar Randers

⁸⁰ A day after Ben-Gurion resigned, U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower announced his Atoms for Peace plan before the United Nations, which proposed the dissemination of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only.

⁸¹ Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, pp. 49-50.

⁸² In 1969 Ne'eman became the first non-American to win the Albert Einstein Prize for work in physics. Elaine Davenport, Paul Eddy, and Peter Gillman, *The Plumbat Affair* (New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1978), p. 173.

⁸³ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 33 & 36; Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, pp. 47 & 363 n4.

⁸⁴ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 32, 356n23.

⁸⁵ Péan and Pinkus have contended that the agreement was finalized in 1953. According to Cohen, Bertrand Goldschmidt, a member of the Rothschild family by marriage and CEA's chemistry director, argued that he was told by the CEA's general administrator, Pierre Guillaumat, that Israel was "serious" about the transaction. Péan *Les Deux Bombes*, pp. 65-66; Pinkus, "Atomic Power to Israel's Rescue," pp. 105, 115.

⁸⁶ Peres has divulged that chain-smoking IAEC head was seldom "relaxed" or "tired" as he put in eighteen hour work days. Peres, *From These Men*, p. 125.

if the Norwegian Atomic Energy Commission “would be interested” in building Israel a “uranium factory...”⁸⁷ Norway rejected the offer as the U.S. Atoms for Peace initiative rendered Dostrovsky’s patents obsolete. This setback was compounded by an internal debate which surfaced a month later after the Atoms for Peace plan offered Israel a reactor of its own.

Hebrew University historian Gabriel Sheffer has argued that Sharett twice commented in his diary in June 1954 that “atomic” concerns should not be raised with Eric Johnson, the U.S. envoy sent to the region to discuss a water sharing program. Only if Johnson raised the “matter *ad res*” would Sharett have “no objection” discussing the subject but Israel, naturally, would “offer no concessions.”⁸⁸ Drawing from Sharett’s diary of June 18, Cohen has stressed that the response to the offer divided the IAEC along its usual lines.⁸⁹ Confused over the control of atomic policy, on June 28 Sharett wrote that Ben Gurion had told him that it made “sense” to place authority in “the prime minister’s office.”⁹⁰ During the summer Franco-Israeli relations strengthened when the French military invited Dayan to Paris. In July two nameless French professors and a CEA member also toured the Weizmann Institute.⁹¹

These events were overshadowed by an Israeli espionage failure. In early July 1954 Cairo

⁸⁷ Randers, an astrophysicist and University of Chicago fellow, had participated in defense research in London during World War II where he had met Bergmann. In August 1946 he travelled to the U.S. to learn about the Manhattan Project. During the post-war period France received 100 tons of Norwegian heavy water. Astrid Forland, “Norway’s Nuclear Odyssey: From Optimist Proponent to Nonproliferator,” *Nonproliferation Review* 4, 2 (Winter 1997), pp. 1-6; Goldschmidt, “The French Atomic Energy Program,” p. 39.

⁸⁸ Johnson visited Israel on June 20, 1954. Gabriel Sheffer, *Moshe Sharett: Biography of a Political Moderate* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 740-741.

⁸⁹ Sambursky, representing academia, projected a “cautious” policy focused on theoretical research, while Bergmann prioritized the need to acquire uranium in “a few years...” Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 34.

⁹⁰ There is no mention of Prime Minister Sharett’s nuclear policy by Shlaim and Ya’acov bar-Siman-Tov in their respective analyses of Ben Gurion and Sharett. This is odd, since both sourced heavily from Sharett’s diary, edited and released by Moshe’s son, Yaakov, in 1978. Ya’acov Bar-Siman-Tov, “Ben Gurion and Sharett: Conflict Management and Great Power Constraints in Israeli Foreign Policy,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 24, 3 (July 1983), pp. 330-356; Avi Shlaim, “Conflicting Approaches to Israel’s Relations with the Arabs: Ben-Gurion and Sharett, 1953-1956,” *Middle East Journal* 37, 2 (Spring 1983), pp. 180-201; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 34.

⁹¹ A month later Peres and Air Minister Diomede Catroux, with the blessing of Premier Pierre Mendès-France, agreed to sell Israel Ouragan and Mystère II fighters, with an option on another twelve Mystère IV’s and AMX tanks. This deal was kept secret until April 1956. Zaki Shalom, *Israel’s Nuclear Option* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2005), p. 6; Crosbie, *A Tacit Alliance*, p. 42; Pinkus, “Atomic Power to Israel’s Rescue,” p. 116.

and London announced their intentions to withdraw British troops from the Suez Canal Zone.⁹² Seeking to derail this accord, Israeli intelligence, headed by Colonel Binyamin Gilvi, activated a sleeper cell in Egypt. On July 2 bombs struck U.S.-built libraries in Cairo. Three weeks later, three cell members were caught detonating false flag bombs in theatres showing Western films. Givli claimed that Lavon had given him orders to act, while Lavon blamed the fiasco on a pernicious faction of army officers.⁹³ Six years would pass before the truth finally emerged. In the meantime, according to Sheffer, the “Mishap” precipitated a “tremendous crisis” upon a “beleaguered” Sharett, who in the aftermath began to follow “nuclear” issues more closely.⁹⁴ In August Lavon briefed Sharett about the successful negotiations of Dostrovsky’s patents with Paris and London only to have French Defense Minister Jules Moch inadvertently disclose the deal in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in November. On November 16 Sharett informed the Knesset (Parliament), while the next day the French dailies, *Le Figaro* and *Le Monde*, reported on the CEA and the Weizmann Institute collaboration.⁹⁵

All the publicity was for naught as neither France nor the U.K. used the IAEC patents.⁹⁶ These atomic revelations, however, aided Ben-Gurion’s return to power. On December 16, 1954, in an executive session with the Mapai leadership, Ben Gurion proposed fully pursuing the “development of science.”⁹⁷ With the “Mishap” still rousing public opinion, on January 2, 1955, Sharett appointed Judge Yitzhak Olshan and Ya’acov Dori, an IAEC member, to find the truth. The commission, however, produced no verdict, further damaging the government’s credibility.

⁹² This agreement was officially signed on October 19, 1954. Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, p. xxii.

⁹³ Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001* (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), p. 282; Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, p. 112.

⁹⁴ Sheffer, *Moshe Sharett*, p. 753.

⁹⁵ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 33, 357n36; Pinkus, “Atomic Power to Israel’s Rescue,” pp. 117 and 135n48.

⁹⁶ Sheffer has stated that Sharett was “personally involved” in the talks with France and Britain about atomic cooperation. Sometime in August 1954 Lavon briefed Sharett about the “successful conclusion” of these deals. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 34; Sheffer, *Moshe Sharett*, p. 753.

⁹⁷ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 34.

On February 2 Lavon resigned and Ben Gurion became the new Defense Minister nineteen days later.⁹⁸ On February 28 the IDF launched Operation Black Arrow into the Gaza Strip, leading with Egypt's President Gamal Nasser to launch daily *fedayeen* raids into Israel.⁹⁹ Ultimately, it was Nasser who indirectly prompted France and Israel in a security alliance.¹⁰⁰

On October 31, 1954, Front de libération nationale (FLN) was born in Algeria, with a revolutionary message to throw off French colonialism by force and internationalized diplomacy. The following day, All Saints Day in France, seven French deaths occurred in roughly thirty attacks nationally.¹⁰¹ Still only months after its brutal defeat at Diem Bien Phu, France was keen to gain any intelligence about Egypt's role in the war and immediately turned to Israel. Through Colonel Joseph Nahmias, Israel's new Military Attaché in Paris, Peres was met with George Elgozy, a Jewish advisor to Prime Minister Edgar Faure, in April 1955 at Faure's residence.¹⁰² Despite these talks the French arms embargo, a consequence of the May 25, 1950, Tripartite Declaration, remained in place.¹⁰³ While Peres was laying the seeds of a strategic accord with

⁹⁸ Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, pp. 122-123.

⁹⁹ Shlaim, "Conflicting Approaches to Israel's Relations with the Arabs," p. 188.

¹⁰⁰ Political scientist Zaki Shalom of the Ben Gurion University has argued that Ben Gurion always feared the emergence of a "magnetic" leader, with gravitas similar to Turkey's Kemal Ataturk, capable of uniting the Arab world against Israel. Shalom, *Israel's Nuclear Options*, p. 2.

¹⁰¹ The central leadership of the FLN consisted of internal and exiled factions. Within the national Community of Twenty-Two, there existed a nucleus led by Mohamed Boudiaf, Moustapha Ben Boulaid, Mourad Didbouche, Rabat Bitat and Larbi Ben M'hidi. This group was in contact with three Organisation Spéciale exiles stated in Cairo; Ahmed Ben Bella, Kabyle Hocine Amit Ahmed and Mohamed Kihider. John Reudy, *Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1992), pp. 158-159; Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 59.

¹⁰² Throughout 1954-55 Nahmias, behind the back of the Foreign Ministry and Israel's Ambassador in Paris, Jacob Tzur, met with French officials in the attempt to obtain arms. Only Dayan and Peres knew this as Ben Gurion kept the Cabinet in the dark. In May 1955 Nahmias attended a party with French military officers who had served in Algeria where Karpin has argued that the idea of a Franco-Israeli alliance against Nasser first surfaced. Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, pp. 57-60.

¹⁰³ According to Shlomo Slonim of the Hebrew University, the U.S.-British-French declaration aimed "to restrain the arms race and to accord recognition, if not actual guarantees, to" the region's "borders or armistice lines." The Near East Arms Coordinating Committee (NEACC) was set up to oversee and coordinate arms sales to the region. Shlomo Slonim, "Origins of the 1950 Tripartite Declaration on the Middle East," *Middle Eastern Studies* 23, 2 (Spring 1987), p. 143; Zach Levey, "Israeli Foreign Policy and the Arms Race in the Middle East 1950-1960," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 4, 1 (March 2001), p. 38.

France, in an April 24 Cabinet meeting Ben Gurion professed that “atomic research” would heighten Israel’s self-reliance. Implicitly utilizing the Holocaust experience, Ben Gurion announced on May 14 that “History is not determined by statements, but by deeds. Our future does not depend on what the gentiles say but on what the Jews do.”¹⁰⁴

In May 1955 the U.S. and Israel began talks about the peaceful pursuit of civil atomic energy. Six days after the tentative deal was constructed, on May 18 Sharett wrote that he “found no fault” in the agreement as it did not impede Israel from “contacting other powers” as long as the reactor’s only “purpose” was for “research.” In a meeting with Bergmann and Ben Gurion later in the month, Sharett declared that the reactor “would be too small for (plutonium) production. On July 12 the U.S. agreed to provide Israel with a small research reactor.”¹⁰⁵ The Mapai leadership did not want any infighting going into the July 20 general election.¹⁰⁶

From August 8-20, 1955, the first Conference on the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy was held in Geneva. Twenty-five hundred representatives attended, including Bergmann, Dostrovsky, de Shalit, Racah, Cohen, Lipkin and Pelah. After the conference Bergmann urged for Israel to obtain heavy water devoid of “U.S. control,” adding that in the “future” Israel would “have to rely on” itself. On August 28 de Shalit informed Mardor that he did not believe the U.S. would believe that Israel “would” not use the atom “for military purposes...” Understanding his powerlessness, he would leave the issue to “individuals wiser” to decide. He concluded that it

¹⁰⁴ Cohen has described this sentiment as the “motto” of Israel’s nuclear program. Following the Independence Day address, Bergmann conscripted the brightest scientists for the bomb program to Saclay and the Chatillon. Ya’acov Bar-Siman-Tov, “Ben Gurion and Sharett,” p. 331; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 42-43, 359n4.

¹⁰⁵ Sheffer has argued that after convincing the Cabinet to endorse the accord Sharett’s contribution to the issue came to a “culmination” during a period of “wide consensus” on the issue. Pinkus, “Atomic Power to Israel’s Rescue,” p. 113; Sharett, *Moshe Sharett*, p. 852.

¹⁰⁶ Hebrew University political scientist Peter Meddling has emphasized that the 1955 election marked a significant “turning point,” as Mapai lost five of its 45 seats in the 120 seat Knesset. Shlaim has purported that another three months passed before Ben Gurion confronted the Knesset with a working coalition government. During this period Sharett remained Prime Minister but his power was “rendered intolerable” by a “militant defense minister.” Peter Meddling, *The Founding of Israeli Democracy, 1948-1967* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 99, 239-241; Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, pp. 136-138.

was inconceivable that Israel could ever contemplate using such an “unearthly weapon.”¹⁰⁷

The seeds of the Israeli-Franco strategic alliance were planted the next month. On September 12, 1955, Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran, thus blocking Israel’s port at Eilat. Fifteen days later Egypt announced a \$250 million arms deal with Czechoslovakia.¹⁰⁸ Later in the month Abel Thomas suggested to Peres the need form a bilateral Franco-Israeli relationship devoid of the “diplomatic formalities.” When Peres responded that had no qualms about keeping Sharett and Tzur in the dark, he was then quickly ushered to the home of the Interior Minister who held jurisdiction over Algeria. There Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury declared that Adolf Hitler and Nasser were both enamored with their own evil voices. Within months all three men would obtain greater political voices of their own.¹⁰⁹

On November 2 Ben Gurion returned as Prime Minister, demoting Sharett to Foreign Minister.¹¹⁰ That same night the IDF eliminated an Egyptian position in al-Sabha, but an IDF plan to capture the Straits of Tiran was rejected by the Cabinet.¹¹¹ Peres has professed that this desire was attributed to Ben Gurion’s contention that the Negev representing the “potential” for Israel’s “future.”¹¹² Whether the perspicacious old man had linked together the atom and desert by late 1955 is vexing. On August 26, 1955, U.S. Secretary of State John F. Dulles announced the Alpha Plan at New York’s *CFR*, a scheme to provide a land link between Egypt and

¹⁰⁷ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 44-47; Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, p. 53.

¹⁰⁸ Egypt obtained 120 MIG 115 jet fighters, 50 IL-28 bombers, 20 IL-12 transports, 200 T-34 tanks and 200 armored cars. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 48, 360 n25.

¹⁰⁹ Thomas, a gentile officer in the Free French forces in World War II, lost his brother Pierre at Dora-Buchenwald. Years later he declared that he became interwoven with “Israel’s fate from the moment” of his brother’s death. After the war he placed himself under the tutelage of Bourgès-Maunoury, a member of the Radical Socialist Party. Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, pp. 12, 58- 62.

¹¹⁰ The new coalition, 80 seats, 16 larger than the previous government, was distributed between five parties: Mapai (45), Mizrachi-Hapo’el Hamizrachi or NRP (10), Ahdut Ha’avodah (10), Mapam (9) and the Progressives (5). The enlarged Cabinet played to Ben Gurion’s advantage because Mapai, unaffected by a veto threat, controlled all the important ministries. Medding, *The Founding of Israeli Democracy*, pp. 40, 239-241.

¹¹¹ Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, p. 146.

¹¹² Peres, *From These Men*, p. 39.

Jordan.¹¹³ Peter Hahn has argued that the U.S.-inspired peace plan was rendered “stillborn” by Israel’s refusal to concede any of the Negev.¹¹⁴ According to Neil Caplan, in a “heated” talk on November 21, 1955, Sharrett informed Dulles on November 21, 1955, that it was unfair for Israel to cede any of the Negev since it had not built any “roads” there, an honest statement at the time. Within two years, however, this infrastructure was being secretly built at Dimona, 36 KM southeast of Beersheba. Had Ben Gurion surrendered to Arab territorial demands, Israel would have obviated the future home of its atomic weapons reactor.¹¹⁵

This development coincided with political upheaval in Paris to precipitate Israel’s atomic alignment with France. In November 1955, the same month France sold to Israel 100 light tanks, Socialist Guy Mollet was elected Prime Minister, replacing Faure on February 1, 1956.¹¹⁶ Mollet’s ascendancy brought Bourgès-Maunoury to the head of the Defense Ministry, with Thomas close by.¹¹⁷ Crosbie has argued that during this period technocrats and bureaucrats “moved” the French Fourth Republic until its May 1958 collapse. As Cabinet solidarity was

¹¹³ This plan was leaked to the Israelis in the spring of 1955 after Israeli officials in Washington had got some U.S. officials “very drunk.” This helped doom the covert campaign of Connecticut millionaire, future Treasury Secretary (1957-1961), and close friend of Eisenhower, Robert Anderson, who from December 1955 to March 1956 separately met with Nasser and Ben Gurion in a failed attempt to find a panacea. Hahn, “The View from Jerusalem,” p. 524.

¹¹⁴ Hahn, *Caught in the Middle East*, p. 184

¹¹⁵ On April 7, 1955, Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmud Fawzi had informed the British that Nasser had declared that Israel’s southern boundary “should be Beer(s)heba.” On January 23, 1956, Ben Gurion informed Anderson and the CIA’s James Jesus Angleton that there would be no peace if Israel was forced to “give up territory...” The Arab demands for the desert territory back to the promise of Count Folk Bernadotte’s plan which awarded them the Negev in accordance with the U.N. Partition plan of November 29, 1947. Neil Caplan, *Futile Diplomacy: Operation Alpha and the Failure of Anglo-American Coercive Diplomacy in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1954-1956, Volume Four* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 109, 147-48, 190, 231.

¹¹⁶ On Mollet’s first day he instructed Foreign Minister Christian Pineau to repeal the Israeli arms embargo. By circumventing the French Foreign Ministry’s Levant desk, Peres and Nahmias successfully lobbied the Defense Ministry to deliver twelve Mystère fighter jets. In accordance with Dayan’s 1954 summer visit, on April 11, 1956, eight Mystères were delivered to Israel, leaving Tsur shocked by the sale. Peres’ biographer, Matti Golan, has argued that on April 4 Ben Gurion entrusted his protégé with “a *carte blanche* to pursue his maverick mode of operation.” Levey, “Israeli Foreign Policy and the Arms Race in the Middle East 1950-1960,” p. 38; Matti Golan, *Shimon Peres: A Biography* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982), pp. 43-44; Zach Levey, *Israel and the Western Powers, 1952-1960* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997), pp. 68-69.

¹¹⁷ Crosbie has argued that Thomas appealed directly to “special interests” and “unorthodox diplomacy.” The position possessed an incredible amount of shadow power, entrusted with making “ad hoc policy decisions on the run.” Morris, *Righteous Victims*, p. 284; Crosbie, *A Tacit Alliance*, pp. 38-39.

“nonexistent,” power coalitions avoided “contentious issues” to remain in power. Divided by factionalism and traditional rivalries, the French executive and legislature were in constantly in flux, enabling “widespread freedom of action at various levels of the bureaucracy.” By late spring factional elements in Paris were now able to independently conduct their own foreign policy with Peres who was acting without the consent of Israel’s Foreign Office.¹¹⁸

On May 22 Tsur informed Jerusalem that the Algerian war had increased pro-Jewish sentiment in “wide circles in France;” a pure byproduct of “desperation.”¹¹⁹ This anxiety was displayed later that month when Peres first learned of the “serious possibility” of a joint Anglo-French attack against Nasser. At a meeting in Paris, the French Defense Minister asked Peres “how much time... would” it take Israel “to cross the Sinai Peninsula and reach Suez?” Peres quickly answered “probably... five to seven days.”¹²⁰ Tired of being left out of the loop, Sharett resigned on June 19, 1956, and was replaced by Labor Minister Golda Meir.¹²¹ Three days later Dayan and Peres met with Louis Mangin, Director of the Defense Minister’s Office. Golan has argued that the Israelis were surprised when Mangin “softly” asked Peres “Are you prepared to sign?” After penning the document, Nahmias murmured to Peres, “Are you mad? You don’t have any authority.” The deal, which excluded each nation’s Foreign Office, was endorsed by Ben Gurion, who declared it was a “risky venture” but then so was Israel’s “very existence.”¹²²

In July 1956 Bergmann penned to Peres for Israel to build two reactors simultaneously. The smaller research reactor would be built near the Weizmann Institute or in Nachal Soreq; the

¹¹⁸ Crosbie has pointed out that most French naval officers and interior officials were “violently” opposed and considered “friends” to Israel. The archives of the Israeli and French Defense Ministries remained closed to the public. Crosbie, *A Tacit Alliance*, pp. 36-39, 50; Levey, *Israel and the Western Powers*, p. 164n3.

¹¹⁹ Zach Levey, *Israel and the Western Powers*, p. 70.

¹²⁰ Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, p. 74.

¹²¹ Sheffer has mused that “some Israeli politicians” asserted that Sharett’s dismissal resulted from his opposition to the emerging Israeli-French nuclear co-operation. As the decade progressed, he became increasingly “unhappy” over the trajectory of the program. Sheffer, *Moshe Sharett*, p. 952.

¹²² Israel also received 72 Mystère jets worth \$70-80 million. Levey, *Israel and the Western Powers*, p. 70; Golan, *Shimon Peres*, pp. 45-46.

larger one, geared for military use, would be constructed in the Negev. If “all these paths” were followed, Bergmann was “confident that” Israel would achieve its obvious “goal.” This comment drew criticism from de Shalitt, who argued that a 10-MW reactor would violate its July 1955 agreement with the U.S. He urged patience at a time when events were proceeding at a train’s pace.¹²³ On July 27, 1956, a day after Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal; Peres informed Nahmias and Bourgès-Maunoury that Israel was “prepared” to participate in a military strike against Egypt.¹²⁴ In another decision which agitated Tsur, in early August Peres convinced Ben Gurion to send Shalhavet Freier to Paris to acquire a nuclear reactor.¹²⁵

The exact nature of the atomic agreements decided upon in September 1956 remains contested. Pinkus has stipulated that on September 13 both Bergmann and Peres asked the CEA about obtaining a “nuclear capability” with “weapons production.” During this meeting “a small reactor was...never mentioned;” rather, Israel would get a 24 MW reactor. Goldschmidt has revealed that “from the outset it was understood that it would be three times the size.”¹²⁶ These negotiations continued from September 17-22 at Saint Germaine. Goldschmidt’s estimate runs against the arguments of Cohen and Péan stipulating that the agreement only provided a 10 MW reactor to Israel.¹²⁷ The lack of clarity is attributed to the more immediate issues being discussed as the month ended. On September 30 Pineau, Thomas, Meir, Dayan and Peres convened at Mangin’s home where Pineau announced he was “convinced” of the need to “use force against

¹²³ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 77.

¹²⁴ Nahmias later declared that Peres should have been “hanged” for giving such assurances “without prior authorization.” Shimon Peres, *Battling For Peace: A Memoir* (New York: Random House, 1995), pp. 106-107.

¹²⁵ While Freier was the Science Attaché in Paris he clandestinely served as Peres’s atomic delegate in an office autonomous from the Israeli Embassy. He was ordered not to discuss with anyone, especially Tsur, his activities. Freier informed Cohen that were many “things” concerning the nuclear project that “he was the only person to know” about. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 22, 53-54, 352 n9, 366 n44.

¹²⁶ Pinkus, “Atomic Power to Israel’s Rescue,” p. 115.

¹²⁷ Goldschmidt has speculated that the accord was reached on September 17, while Golan and Shlaim have concluded it occurred four days later. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 54; Péan, *Les Deux Bombes*, p. 82; Golan, *Shimon Peres*, p. 49; Avi Shlaim, “The Protocol of Sevres, 1956: Anatomy of a War Plot,” *International Affairs* 73, 3 (1997), p. 523; Pinkus, “Atomic Power to Israel’s Rescue,” pp. 119-120.

Egypt” even though London “had not reached the same conclusion.”¹²⁸

Peres and Thomas met again on October 20, with Pinkus arguing that the atomic accord’s key tenants were formulated during the discussion. Two days later Ben Gurion, Dayan and Peres met outside Paris at Sèvres. In his memoirs Peres revealed that on October 24 he asked Ben Gurion to leave the room so he could meet alone with Mollet and Bourguès-Maunoury. At this time France agreed to build Israel a nuclear reactor.¹²⁹ Karpin has contended that the agreement, which originally provided Israel with a 10 MW reactor, had no troublesome paper trail.¹³⁰ The oral accord was concluded in the conference’s waning moments, without British input, after the three nations had agreed that Israel would attack Egypt on October 29.¹³¹ With the exception of Crosbie, Péan, Golan, Peres and Shlaim, the nuclear dimension to the Suez crisis has been omitted by the scholarship dealing with the war’s causes and consequences.¹³²

According to French archival material, on October 25 Mollet “decided...to instruct the

¹²⁸ Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, p. 72.

¹²⁹ Peres, *Battling for Peace*, p. 113.

¹³⁰ Péan and Cohen also asserted that the deal did not initially cover a “Dimona-type reactor,” but a “small reactor” to be constructed at Rishon Le-Zion near the Weizmann Institute.” Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 54-55; Péan, *Les Deux Bombes*, pp. 82-83; Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, p. 88.

¹³¹ Cohen argued that the deal “was an implicit incentive...not a condition” for Israeli participation in the Franco-British war scheme. Shlaim has contended in the Russian-published *International Affairs* that Israel did not join the plot “in order to get a French reactor” but it did demonstrate how Paris was desperate “to go to war at any price...” Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 54; Shlaim, “The Protocol of Sèvres,” pp. 524 & 530.

¹³² Mordechai Bar-On, *The Gates of Gaza: Israel’s Road to Suez and Back, 1955-1957* (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1994); Selwyn Ilan Troen and Moshe Shemesh, *The Suez-Sinai Crisis, 1956: Retrospective and Reappraisal* (London: Frank Cass, 1990); Hahn, *Caught in the Middle East*; William Roger Louis and Roger Owen, *Suez 1956: The Crisis and Consequences* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Rashid Khalidi, “Consequences of the Suez Crisis in the Arab World,” In *The Modern Middle East: A Reader*, ed. Albert Hourani, Philip S. Houry, and Mary C. Wilson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 377-392; Donald Neff, *Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower takes America into the Middle East* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1981); Uri Bialer, *Between East and West: Israel’s Foreign Policy Orientation 1948-1956* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Bialer, “Top Hat, Tuxedo and Cannons: Israeli Foreign Policy from 1948 to 1956 as a Field of Study,” *Israel Studies* 7, 1 (2002), pp. 1-80; Levey, *Israel and the Western Powers, 1952-1960*; David Tal, “Israel’s Road to the 1956 War,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 37, 1 (February 1996), pp. 59-81; Keith Kyle, *Suez: Britain’s End of Empire in the Middle East* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003); Stephen Freiberger, *Dawn over Suez* (Chicago: I.R. Dee, 1992); Diane Kunz, *The Economic Diplomacy of Suez* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); Michael Oren, *Origins of the Second Arab-Israel War* (London: Frank Cass, 1992).

CEA” to meet the “Israeli requests” and provide them “a nuclear capability.”¹³³ On the same day that Anglo-French forces landed at Port Said, the plan changed when Soviet Premier Nicholas Bulganin told Israel to withdraw from the Sinai “before it” was “too late” on November 5.¹³⁴ Peres has expressed that these “veiled threats” of nuclear blackmail forced him and Meir back to Paris two days later. Stating that France “could not shoot down Soviet missiles, Pineau proposed providing nuclear assistance to Israel in exchange for a Sinai withdrawal.”¹³⁵ In talks with Thomas and Bourgès-Maunoury, Peres, suggested that Israel create “its own retaliation force.”¹³⁶

On December 12, 1956, France and Israel signed a technical agreement providing the latter with an atomic reactor, known then as EL 102, to be built at Richonell-Zion. But since the contract did not include the indispensable chemical separation facility, Cohen has argued that Peres convinced Ben Gurion to construct a 40 MW reactor at Dimona.¹³⁷ Israel also made private contacts with the Saint-Gobain firm, which handled plutonium separation construction, but these talks stumbled when the French Prime Minister began to have some second thoughts. Describing the October 25, 1956, Cabinet decision as “limited,” Emile Noël, the director of Mollet’s office, informed Pineau on May 5, 1957, that any Israeli plutonium production would be “totally unacceptable” and “have unfortunate consequences.” The Prime Minister’s efforts were in vain as his premiership ended sixteen days later.¹³⁸

¹³³The French deal brightened Ben Gurion’s expectations. On November 2 he wrote in the Hebrew publication *Hadoar* that what “Einstein, Oppenheimer and Teller” had accomplished for the U.S “could also be done...in Israel...” Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 12 & 354n19; Pinkus, “Atomic Power to Israel’s Rescue,” p. 121.

¹³⁴ Moscow also removed its Ambassador from Tel Aviv and cut off oil shipments to Israel. William J. Jordan, “Moscow Aroused,” *NYT*, November 6, 1956, p. 1; Uri Bialer, *Oil and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-1963* (Oxford: St. Anthony’s College, 1999), p. 249.

¹³⁵ Peres, *Battling For Peace*, p. 113.

¹³⁶ Pinkus, “Atomic Power to Israel’s Rescue,” p. 123; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 55-57.

¹³⁷ Shalom, *Israel’s Nuclear Option*, p. 7; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 64.

¹³⁸ Pinkus has argued that the Mollet Ministry was also the longest and “friendliest” of the fourteen Fourth Republic governments towards Israel. The incoming Prime Minister was also a “reliable friend” and since Bourgès-Maunoury’s party had only won 240 out of a possible 577 seats in the National Assembly, the Prime Minister was dependent on Socialist support. Pineau remained Foreign Minister and Mollet continued to pull “strings” as the party leader. Pinkus, “Atomic Power to Israel’s Rescue,” pp. 125-126.

Realizing that the ongoing French Parliamentary recess provided only transitory relief, during a Mapai Committee meeting on June 27, 1957, Ben Gurion ominously suggested that Israel use the “interregnum” to “finalize certain matters.” Two days later he wrote vaguely that France was “ready to help us.”¹³⁹ On July 10-11 Peres, Bergmann and Meir met with Pineau and Mollet.¹⁴⁰ Four days later Pineau informed Mollet that Israel now wanted a chemical separation plant, adding that Paris would find itself in a “special political” hotspot if this information became public knowledge. After this exchange Paris refused to sign off on the IAEC and Saint Gobain agreement, with Bourgès-Maunoury announcing to Pineau that he now “opposed” providing Israel “...a plutonium plant.”¹⁴¹ Israel now had to employ some diplomatic charm.

On September 30 Peres assured Pineau that Israel’s nuclear “purpose” was only “for scientific and research development.” According to Golan, Pineau then summoned his secretary to type it out the agreement. After she left the room, Pineau destroyed all the copies except for the original that he and Peres had signed. Peres then drove to the Hotel Matignon to interrupt Bourgès-Maunoury’s final Cabinet meeting and asked an aide to the Prime Minister, “a good friend” and probably Thomas, “to slip a note to his boss.” Maunoury halted the meeting to inform Peres that he would “put matters right before relinquishing office.” Returning to the meeting, he pushed through the agreement the very night he was voted out of power. The next

¹³⁹ The remaining portion of the entry has been censored, an action which Pinkus has “undoubtedly” attributed to its relevance to “nuclear matters.” *Ibid.*, pp. 126, 136-137 n79.

¹⁴⁰ Cohen has contended that following the talks Golda Meir expressed her opposition to the atomic deal, claiming that Peres’ idea was “unrealistic” and “unorthodox.” Peres has divulged that Meir critiqued the program only because she “instinctively opposed anything to do with him.” On July 14 Tsur wrote a six page memo focused on Meir’s recent trip to Paris omitting the atomic subject. He added that there was discussion concerning EURATOM matters, a subject which Pineau orally reported to Bourgès-Maunoury. Thirteen days later the International Atomic Energy Agency, an outgrowth of the Atoms for Peace initiative, was created. According to Article II of its statute, the IAEA was opposed to any “assistance” dedicated to “military” ends. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 58, 364n9; Lawrence Scheinman, *The International Atomic Energy Agency and World Nuclear Order* (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1987), pp. 74, 91; Peres, *Battling for Peace*, pp. 117-119.

¹⁴¹ Pinkus, “Atomic Energy to Israel’s Rescue,” p. 129.

day he arrived at his office at nine a.m. and *signed* the document “after a sleepless night...”¹⁴² On October 2 the technical agreement was signed by Arthur Ben-Natan, Peres and Guillaumat.¹⁴³ The political accord, stipulating that the SIECC would provide Israel with a reprocessing facility, was finalized by Maunoury, Pineau, Peres and Ben-Natan a day later. Still classified today, the Paris Agreements listed the reactor’s power at 24 MW.¹⁴⁴ On October 30 Pineau and Tzur exchanged a set of unpublished letters declaring that France could veto the \$75 million dollar deal if Israel pursued the bomb. Construction at Dimona soon commenced within months.¹⁴⁵

Israel’s scientific community was skeptical about Bergmann’s ability to meet the engineering challenge in building Dimona. Excepting Bergmann, on February 17, 1958, the entire IEAC, which had not met since 1956, collectively resigned for reasons still disputed by the scholarship.¹⁴⁶ To avoid further criticism and to circumvent the IAEC and EMET hierarchies,

¹⁴² Peres, *Battling for Peace*, pp. 121-122; Golan, *Shimon Peres*, pp. 66-67.

¹⁴³ The IAEC was referred as the “client” because the CEA signed the deal directly with Saint Gobain whose role was concealed by its subsidiary, the Société Industrielle d’Etudes et de Constructions Chimiques (SIECC). There was no paper trail leading back to the IEAC as the deal’s cost was hidden from the French Parliamentary budget. Cohen has revealed that several issues about the deal were not written out, but rather agreed upon via “oral understandings between individuals.” *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 59.

¹⁴⁴ This estimate is likely too conservative. Seymour Hersh has argued that the reactor’s power capacity could be “two-to-three times” the capacity of 24 MW. Remi Carle, the CEA’s chief project envoy, told Cohen that the reactor was 40 MW, an estimate supported by an April 1961 CIA estimate. Seymour Hersh, *The Samson Option* (New York: Random House, 1991), pp. 93-95; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 59, 364-65 n19; CIA Franco-Israeli Collaboration, April 6, 1961, NSF, Countries, Israel Subjects, Ben Gurion Visit, The Arab-Israeli Situation (4/6/61), Box 119A, *John F. Kennedy Library (JFKL)*.

¹⁴⁵ Péan and Cohen have speculated that the Dimona construction began “sometime in late 1957 or early 1958,” while Karpin has declared that it occurred by the “end of 1957.” Hersh has emphasized that groundbreaking began “in early 1958” after “hundreds” of French scientists and engineers began entering Beersheba in “late 1957.” A separate suburb was built to house them. The task of building the reactor was left to thousands of Moroccan and Algerian Jews, while European Jews served as technical and bureaucratic managers. Péan, *Les Deux Bombes*, p. 103; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 68; Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, p. 95; Hersh, *The Samson Option*, pp. 60-61; Levey, “Israeli Foreign Policy and the Arms Race in the Middle East 1950-1960,” p. 44.

¹⁴⁶ Jabber has argued that the event was “sparked” by the choice to build Dimona for “military uses...,” while Shlomo Aronson of the Hebrew University has contended instead that the normal bureaucratic issues of allocation of finances and personal disagreements explain why. Cohen has speculated that the resignation, led by Racah, Sambursky, and Ohledorf, was “over procedure, not substance,” admitting that “uncertainty” still exists if all the signatories actually signed their own names to the original letter. Jabber, *Israel and Nuclear Weapons*, pp. 33-34; Shlomo Aronson, *The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapon in the Middle East* (Albany: State University Press, 1992), p. 310n7; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 71 & 368-369n84.

Peres hired Mans Pratt to lead the construction, answering solely to Peres and Ben Gurion.¹⁴⁷

After a leave of absence in early 1957, Mardor returned to the EMET in early 1958 to find “new projects” were quickly emerging. Weeks after Cairo and Damascus formed the United Arab Republic (UAR), Ben Gurion announced to a Mapai gathering on March 4, 1958, that peace was based on “power and security.” On June 3 EMET was reorganized into RAFAEL and removed from the Defense Ministry to avoid a paper trail.¹⁴⁸

While Peres was pursuing French assistance, in August 1956 Bergmann asked Randers about purchasing 10 tons of heavy water. Though Randers replied negatively, he suggested that something could be arranged in the future. In August 1957 Randers informed NORATOM that Israel again desired heavy water.¹⁴⁹ Norway’s commercial ties with the Arabs, however, made Oslo reluctant to agree. To overcome this problem a three-way deal was proposed: Israel would buy NORATOM heavy water sold two years earlier to Britain without safeguards. But when the Norwegian Foreign Ministry insisted on heavy water control, Bergmann protested in July 1958 that the request violated Israel’s “sovereignty.”¹⁵⁰ Compromising, Randers concluded that if the U.S. agreed to the deal, so would Norway. Without mentioning the proposed sale, he asked the State Department’s Special Assistant on Atomic Energy, Philip Farley, whether the U.S would consider Israel’s building of a 40-MW reactor as “ominous.” Farley answered only that the sale

¹⁴⁷ Peres has admitted that Pratt was both “crazy...genius,” while Karpin characterized him as a “shadowy figure.” Peres, *Battling for Peace*, pp. 118-119; Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, p. 264.

¹⁴⁸ According to Mardor, who was named its head, RAFAEL’s goal was to produce “powerful... deterrent weapons that Israel could not purchase elsewhere.” RAFAEL was the Hebrew acronym for the Armaments Development Authority. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 69, 354n20; Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, p. 111.

¹⁴⁹ NORATOM was comprised of Norway’s 45 leading industrial, banking and shipping companies. 86th Congress, 2nd Session, *Review of the International Atomic Policies and Programs of the U.S.: Report to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Committee*, Volume 1-3, October, 10, 1960 (United States: GPO, 1960), p. 620.

¹⁵⁰ Cohen has argued that given Randers’ “technological background,” it was “inconceivable” that he was not aware that Israel’s “true purpose” was to produce the bomb. Randers and Bergmann were very close and spoke to each other in German. The Holocaust also played a key factor in the sale. Prior to the 1940 Nazi invasion there had been 1, 800 Jews in Norway and within two years 769 had been deported to Auschwitz. Only 25 returned. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 61-62, 365n28; Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, p. 143.

presented an opportunity to implement IAEA safeguards for the facility.¹⁵¹

On December 12, 1958, Randers informed Bergmann that Norway's Foreign Office was still "jittery about" providing heavy water to Israel. As the Norwegians refused to budge, Bergmann relented. On February 25, 1959, Chaim Yehil, Israel's Minister in Oslo, and Harald Lange, Norway's Foreign Minister, agreed the heavy water would not be utilized "for any military purpose."¹⁵² Norway had inspection rights but once IAEA regulations were in place, this national responsibility would fall to the supranational bureaucracy.¹⁵³ Norway then asked Britain to return to Norway the 25 tons of heavy water it had purchased in 1956.¹⁵⁴

The British were quick to respond. On August 29, 1958, Britain's Tel Aviv Embassy contended that Finance Minister Levi Eshkol had recently mused that Israel was "...setting up an atomic power plant." Recognizing that "money" was still required, the document divulged that the construction of such a facility "would be ideal for the Negev."¹⁵⁵ In 2005 the *BBC*'s Michael Crick disclosed that in September 1958 the Atomic Energy Office's D.E.H Peirson had

¹⁵¹ In September 1954 Farley was instrumental in laying the groundwork for the IAEA. Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: "Planning for the IAEA," September 7, 1954, *FRUS, 1952-1954*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1984), *National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part II*, pp. 1512-1514; Memorandum of Conversation, "Subject: Planning for the IAEA," September 8, 1954, *Ibid.*, pp. 1515-1517; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 62 & 365n 30.

¹⁵² Thirteen days before this deal was signed, the U.S. agreed to share atomic energy with EURATOM, of which Norway was a member. EURATOM was created on March 25, 1957, by the Treaty of Rome. EURATOM's first president was France's Louis Armand. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 62; *Review of the International Atomic Policies and Programs of the United States*, p. 12.

¹⁵³ Barnaby has argued that Norway only held one "inspection" in April 1961, conducted by Supreme Court lawyer Jen Hauge, who believed that Dimona was only dedicated to peaceful purposes. The Israeli-Norwegian agreement was not publicized until 1970. Frank Barnaby, *The Invisible Bomb* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1989), pp. 70-71.

¹⁵⁴ The first British intelligence of Israel's nuclear aspirations came seven months before the Sèvres deal. On March 27, 1956, Reginald Michael Hadow, head of the Foreign Office News Department, reported that an anonymous Syrian official had informed him that Damascus was "very worried about atomic developments in Israel." A week later, a British document contended that France and Israel had publicly concluded a deal "of a fairly extensive nature" in atomic energy for "peaceful purposes only." Crosbie has argued that there was no written record of British decisions at Sèvres and no knowledge of France's nuclear assistance due to London's explicit "insistence of not being informed." "Britain Names News Aide as Ambassador to Israel," *NYT*, July 29, 1965, p. 2. British National Archives (BNA), Foreign Office Records 371/121822, R.M. Hadow "Israel and the Atomic Bomb," March 27, 1956 VR 124; BNA, Foreign Office Records, 371/121822 Minute by D.V. Bendall, April 5, 1956; Crosbie, *A Tacit Alliance*, pp. 67 & 75.

¹⁵⁵ This document referred to a January 31, 1958, British internal letter highlighting the "probable erection....of a nuclear power station in Israel." BNA, Foreign Office Records 371/134351, M. Wenner to General Division, Board of Trade, August 29, 1958.

informed R.A. Thompson that London would be “overzealous” to “insist on safeguards” in any Israeli deal. Three days later the Foreign Ministry’s Donald Cape had told Peirson “NOT” to “mention this” to the U.S.¹⁵⁶ In 1959 and 1960 two 10 ton heavy water allotments were shipped to Israel from U.K ports.¹⁵⁷ Crick’s intrepid journalism drew a quick response. Lord Gilmour, a former Conservative Defense Minister, described the revelation as “quite extraordinary,” while former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara responded that he was jolted that the U.S. had not been informed.¹⁵⁸ Fantastically, Prime Minister Harold MacMillan and his Cabinet remained totally ignorant of the deal, giving credence to the warning that historians must be vigilant in adjudicating “how much of the buck that stops with the president has already been spent by the

¹⁵⁶ The reason why Cape did not want the U.S. to know is because two months earlier London and Washington had formulated an Agreement on Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes. In 1958 Britain received U.S. assistance on anti-missile warheads and fractional kiloton warheads, while a May 1959 amendment provided Britain with enriched uranium. The July 1958 agreement, which required the U.S. Congress to amend the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, assumed that Britain would not provide atomic assistance to anyone else. When Cape was questioned on the matter he mused that the deal was completed because “nobody suspected the Israelis hoped to manufacture nuclear weapons.” Via the Freedom of Information Act, the BBC’s Meirion Jones has argued that Cape’s own declassified letters from March 1959 demonstrate the opposite. At this time Israel pulled out of deal to buy uranium from South Africa because Pretoria demanded safeguards. Meirion Jones, “Britain’s Dirty Secret,” *New Statesman*, March 13, 2006, p. 18; Michael Crick, “How Britain helped Israel get the Bomb,” *BBC 2 Newsnight*, August 3, 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/4743493.stm>; Ian Clark, *Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 83-97.

¹⁵⁷ The BBC and *Daily Telegraph* have argued that the deal totaled £1.5 million pounds. There was a definite attempt to cover up the transaction as the deal was presented as one directly between Norway and Israel, omitting Britain’s role. An October 9, 1958 Foreign Office document played down Israel’s nuclear weapon aspirations, quoting a recent Bergmann radio announcement that it was not “worth while to build an atomic power state in Israel before 1965...” In 2006 Jones divulged that in November 1959 London also exported a small amount of uranium-235 to Israel. Crick, “How Britain helped Israel get the Bomb,” *BBC 2 Newsnight*, August 3, 2005; “UK helped Israel get nuclear bomb,” *BBC*, August 4, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4743987.stm; Ben Fulton, “Britain Secretly Sent Vital Nuclear Bomb Ingredient to Israel,” *Daily Telegraph*, August 4, 2005, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1495474/Britain-secretly-sold-vital-nuclear-bomb-ingredient-to-Israel.html> BNA, F0 371/134351, “Atomic Power Station in Israel Not Worth While Before 1965,” October 9, 1958, VR 1241/1 (A). Meirion Jones, “Britain’s Dirty Secret,” *New Statesman*, March 13, 2006, pp. 18-20.

¹⁵⁸ Since the atomic files only began to be declassified in 2005, there is no mention of the heavy water deal or the French-Israeli atomic deal at Sevres in McNamara’s *Britain, Nasser and the Balance of Power in the Middle East*, nor in any of the following, Nigel John Ashton, *Eisenhower, Macmillan, and the Problem of Nasser*: (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996); Richie Owendale, *Britain, the United States, and the Transfer of Power in the Middle East, 1945-1962* (New York: Leister University Press, 1996); Clark, *Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship*; Johnathan Spyer, “An Analytical and Historical Overview of British Policy toward Israel,” *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 8, 4 (June 2004), pp. 80-102; Zach Levey and Elie Podeh, ed *Britain and the Middle East: From Imperial Power to Junior Partner* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2008); Michael Crick, “How Britain helped Israel get the Bomb,” *BBC 2 Newsnight*, August 3, 2005; “Former Minister Lord Gilmour Dies,” *BBC*, September 21, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7007648.stm.

bureaucracy.”¹⁵⁹ Like most selfish, insouciant and short-sighted civil servants, Gilmour concluded that Cape, Pierson and Thompson just wanted to earn “a little bit of money.”¹⁶⁰

Alexander Hamilton argued that “money” represents the most “vital principle of the body politic.” There is nothing that governments argue over more than “the payment of” it.¹⁶¹ The question of how Dimona would be financed represented the primary cause of dissent within Israel. Peres divulged that Finance Minister Eshkol and Commerce Minister Pinhas Sapir expressed a “profound lack of enthusiasm,” while David Hacoheh, a leading Mapai loyalist, mused that the project would be “so expensive” that Israel would “be left without bread...” Ben Gurion understood that if he asked the Knesset to fund the entire project, Parliament would gain oversight responsibilities which could threaten the project’s secrecy. As capital needed to be raised “on the side,” Peres constructed a “discreet fund-raising operation.” Influential globalist “friends” quickly emerged, the most important being lawyer Abraham Feinberg, a legend of Wall Street and Pennsylvania Avenue.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁹ Reinforcing the Allisonian-Zelikow model of where one stands is a reflection of where they sit, Clifford has proposed that when a Prime Minister or President is insulated rather than informed there is “no single maker of foreign policy.” Most officials usually can not be controlled by their theoretical superiors because they have access to the resources able to prevent meaningful recourse. De Tocqueville observed that blind “patriotism” is a banal extension “individual egoism.” Proving that men “living in democracies” do “things pretty near alike,” ambition drives most to be “weak” to temptation and aim to enlarge their “house” over their “mind.” Clifford, “Bureaucratic Politics,” pp. 93- 95; De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, pp. 447, 516, 787, 289, 766-767.

¹⁶⁰ Michael Crick, “How Britain helped Israel get the Bomb,” *BBC 2 Newsnight*, August 3, 2005.

¹⁶¹ Refer to Federalist numbers 7, 21 and 30. Willis, *The Federalist Papers*, pp. 31, 143, 102.

¹⁶² In 1946 Feinberg oversaw the Haganah’s illegal immigration in Europe, where he met Mardor and Freier. In June 1946 he was imprisoned by the British on allegations of transmitting military intelligence. He was with Weizmann when the U.N. partitioned Palestine on November 29, 1947, and chaired the U.S. Weizmann Institute of Science Committee for 40 years. In 1948 he raised \$400,000 for President Truman’s successful re-election campaign and following his victory Truman declared that without “Abe” he could not “have been elected.” In late 1952, Feinberg, Clark Clifford, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., and Averell Harriman were selected to raise money to build the Truman Library. On September 18, 1954, he was elected Board President of Brandeis University and a year later President of the Israel Bond Drive (IBO), helping him win *B’nai B’rith*’s man of the year in 1960. Eric Page, “Abraham Feinberg, 90, Philanthropist for Israel,” *NYT*, December 7, 1998, p. B10; “Crum Backs Haganah,” *NYT*, October 17, 1947, p.11; Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, pp. 132-135; Michael Cohen, *Truman and Israel* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 70-73; “Cabinet to Direct Jewish Fund Drive,” *NYT*, January 3, 1950, p. 8; “Truman Library Seeks \$1, 500, 000,” *NYT*, December 21, 1952 p. 40; Hersh, *The Samson Option*, p. 95; “New Yorker Will Head Trustees at Brandeis University,” *NYT*, September 19, 1954, p. 121; “Israeli Bond Unit Elects

On October 31, 1958, Ben Gurion revealed in his diary that he had informed Feinberg that Baron Edmund de Rothschild had offered “two proposals,” while Issac Wolfson had already contributed \$5 million. Feinberg responded that \$25 million was needed to begin.¹⁶³ Ben Gurion then asked for the founding list of the Sonneborn Institute, some 18 North American Jewish millionaires.¹⁶⁴ Alongside Feinberg and founder, Rudolf Sonneborn,¹⁶⁵ Canadian members included Samuel Zacks, President of the Canadian Zionist Organization, Samuel Bronfman, President of the Canadian Jewish Congress, and the Bloomfield brothers. The finances were in the reliable hands of Henry Morgenthau Jr., Secretary of the Treasury during FDR’s entire presidency, while the Sieff and Rothschild families also gave from their deep pockets.¹⁶⁶ Q

President,” *NYT*, May 23, 1955, p. 12; “Israel Bond Sales Total Half Billion,” *NYT*, July 2, 1961, p. 8; Peres, *Battling for Peace*, pp. 117-119.

¹⁶³ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 70.

¹⁶⁴ Karpin has argued that Ben Gurion received the list from Henry Montor, executive director of the United Palestine Appeal, in summer 1945. Along with Ben Gurion, everyone on the list was invited to Sonneborn’s lavish New York home on July 1, 1945, where, after eight hours of discussion, they provided him with millions of dollars. According to biographer Michael Bar-Zohar, Ben Gurion described in his journal that this “Zionist meeting” was the best he “ever had in the U.S.” The Institute paid for the purchase of the *Exodus* ship, which failed in 1947 to carry 4,500 Jewish Holocaust survivors from Europe to Palestine by the British. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 70; Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, p. 26-27, 363n10. Wolfgang Saxon, “Rudolf Sonneborn Dies at 87,” *NYT*, June 4, 1986, p. D26; Michael Bar-Zohar, *Ben Gurion: A Biography* (New York: Delacorte, 1978), pp. 126-127

¹⁶⁵ In 1919 the John Hopkins and Harvard-educated Sonneborn served as an executive secretary to the first Zionist Commission headed by Weizmann. On December 12, 1952 Israel founded its first domestic oil company, the Israel Fund Corporation (Delek) and at thirty percent, Sonneborn possessed the highest stockholding share. He also was the fourth and final husband to Dorothy Schiff, the granddaughter of Jacob Schiff, who had bought the *New York Post* in 1939, a paper founded by Hamilton in 1801. “New National Chairman for the Palestine Appeal,” *NYT*, November 2, 1950, p. 9; “East Side Houses Get New Tenants,” *NYT*, October 3, 1940, p. 47; “Zionism is Asked to Drop Politics,” *NYT*, September 10, 1951, p. 30; “Mercurial Publisher; Dorothy Schiff Sonneborn,” *NYT*, June 24, 1965, p. 24; Bialer, *Oil and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, p. 127; Robert D. Schulzinger, *The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs: The History of the Council of Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), p.7.

¹⁶⁶ In a March 8, 1960, letter to Eisenhower, Secretary of State Christian Herter revealed that since 1948 private American Jewry had donated “something like” \$1 billion to Israel on top of the \$715 million that Congress had provided during this period. Herter also mused that through “various foreign sources” Israel had been obtaining nearly \$350 million in aid annually. Feinberg’s integral role in funding Dimona certainly dispels the contention made by historian Isaac Alteras, who makes no reference to Dimona in his account which ends after the Suez Crisis, that Ben Gurion was “hard pressed to find people as influential” as Feinberg during a Republican White House. In a reference to Feinberg’s campaign, Shoenbaum has contended that Ben Gurion received “private contributions in New York and elsewhere to” fund Dimona. There is no mention of Feinberg’s campaign in A.F.K Organski’s *The \$36 Billion Bargain*, I.L. Kenen’s *Israel Defense Line*, or Edward Tivnan’s *The Lobby*. Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, p. 137; Memorandum for the President, “Subject: Eisenhower’s Appointment on 10 March at 11:00 a.m., David Ben-Gurion of Israel,” 8 March 1960, Israel (1), International Series, Box 32, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Papers as President, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File), *Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (DDEL)*; Isaac Alteras, *Eisenhower*

Gauging the duration and scope of Feinberg's corporatist campaign remains difficult.¹⁶⁷ Cohen has contended that the donations "lasted many years," whereas Karpin has argued they ended in 1960.¹⁶⁸ According to Peres, the campaign raised \$40 million.¹⁶⁹ The program's actual cost also remains disputed. During a December 19, 1960, NSC meeting, President Eisenhower estimated the costs ranged from \$100- 200 million dollars, while future Dimona dissident, Eliezer Livenh, put it at \$300 million.¹⁷⁰ A December 22, 1960, *JP* story estimated the cost to be \$130 million.¹⁷¹ Arnon Dar, a student of de Shalit, informed Cohen that during a meeting Peres had deliberately "missed" one zero, citing the cost at IL 30 million (\$17.5 million U.S.). When de Shalit attempted to correct the error, Peres kicked him underneath the table. It is difficult to know if Ben Gurion was ever informed of the reactor's actual cost.¹⁷²

Dimona was completely absent from Israel's November 3, 1959, campaign and election.

and Israel: U.S.-Israeli Relations, 1953-1960 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993), p. 36; Shoenbaum, *The U.S. and the State of Israel*, pp. 126-127.

¹⁶⁷ Historian Michael Hogan has defined corporatism as "the organizational dimension of decision making" focused "on the role of functional elites rather than the governing classes." Feinberg's financial campaign evades historian John Lewis Gaddis' major critiques of the corporatist theory, beginning with the caveat that the period under examination did not occur in the 1920s, late 1940s or early 1950s. Secondly, since the subject being discussed is nuclear proliferation, it obviously involves the global balance of power. Next, Gaddis has failed to recognize that individuals, like governments, also commit acts for morals reasons, such as "U.S. support for Israel at the expense of its relations with the Arab world ..." Michael Hogan, "Corporatism," In *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, pp. 138-139, 147-148; John Lewis Gaddis, "The Corporatist Synthesis: A Skeptical View," *Diplomatic History* 10, 4 (Fall 1986), pp. 357-361.

¹⁶⁸ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 70; Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, p. 136.

¹⁶⁹ This number is supported by Karpin and Hersh. Peres, *Battling for Peace*, p. 119; Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, p. 136; Hersh, *The Samson Option*, p. 67.

¹⁷⁰ Memorandum of Conference with the President, December 19, 1960, January 12, 1961, Israel (3) (October 1960-January 1961), International Series, Box 32, Ann Whitman File, *DDEL*.

¹⁷¹ Jabber, *Israel and Nuclear Weapons*, p. 35n10.

¹⁷² In 1958 Ben Gurion penned in his diary that he appropriated \$5 million (15% of the budget) to *Mifalei Pituach* (Developments Project), Dimona's administrative code name. Reporter Gideon Thomas has divulged that the capital came via cashier's checks to the Bank of Israel in Tel Aviv to dodge the nation's foreign exchange controls. In August 1962 the *NYT* revealed that the Israeli State Controller, Dr. Ernst Nebenzahl, had complained that Dimona's costs had being withheld from the Knesset since 1958. Hebrew University historian Uri Bailer has avowed that there exists a large documentation gap in the Israeli Finance Ministry from 1948-1956. He briefly raised Dimona only in the final paragraph of a 2002 *Israel Studies* article. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 71,367-68n66; Gordon Thomas, *Gideon's Spies* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2007), pp. 92-93; Uri Bialer, "Top Hat, Tuxedo and the Cannons," pp. 2, 68-69; "Israel Official Says Costs of Reactor Are Withheld," *NYT*, August 1, 1962, p. 3;

This deceptive strategic help further solidify Ben Gurion's strong authority.¹⁷³ Controlling all of the important Cabinet positions, Mapai's Knesset representation enlarged from 40 seats to 47.¹⁷⁴ Following the election Ben Gurion did face some mild internal opposition on Dimona. Meir questioned the trustworthiness of French support and the wisdom of keeping the reactor secret from the U.S. In January 1960 Eshkol quietly advocated for an open debate on Dimona within the Mapai party.¹⁷⁵ Aside from the February heavy water deal with Norway, the first British heavy water delivery in June, and these private Cabinet criticisms, domestic politics pushed Dimona to the backburner in 1959 and early 1960. It did not stay there for very long.

On June 1, 1958, Charles de Gaulle became the last Prime Minister of the Fourth Republic. Six months later nearly 80 percent of France voted to make him President of the Fifth Republic. In his memoirs de Gaulle claimed that he turned his attention to the "irregular" atomic "dealings ...between Tel Aviv and Paris" which had "permanently placed Israelis at all levels" of the French government since Suez. He ended his two sentence analysis with a lie, claiming that he "brought to an end" French assistance in building the "factory near Beersheba."¹⁷⁶ While the excavation work at Dimona had begun a few months before June 1958, the CEA's role in the Negev continued after de Gaulle came to power.¹⁷⁷ Karpin has argued this transpired because Energy and Science Minister Jacques Soustelle, an open "supporter" of Israel, refused to inform de Gaulle about all the details of the French-Israeli atomic understanding.¹⁷⁸ De Gaulle's

¹⁷³ Perhaps if more Israeli citizens had of read Yigal Allon's Hebrew *A Curtain of Sand*, released in 1959, they would have learned about their nuclear aspirations. According to Aronson, Allon, a famous general of the 1948-1949 War, produced the "first open...antinuclear treatise in Israeli history." Shlomo Aronson, *The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East*, p. 23.

¹⁷⁴ The 86 seat coalition Cabinet, the largest to that point, was also comprised of NRP (12), Ahdut Ha'avodah (7), and the Progressives (6). "Ben Gurion Gains 6 Knesset Seats," *NYT*, November 5, 1959, p. 9; Medding, *The Founding of Israeli Democracy*, pp. 239-242; "5 Party Cabinet Named in Israel," *NYT*, December 17, 1959, p. 5.

¹⁷⁵ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 72 & 384n1.

¹⁷⁶ Charles de Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor* (New York: Simon Schuster, 1971), pp. 265-266.

¹⁷⁷ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 73; Péan, *Les Deux Bombes*, p. 127.

¹⁷⁸ Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, pp. 168-170;

inaction about Dimona during his first eighteen months in office was also attributed to a dire economy, the Algerian war and developing France's own nuclear option. Personnel changes in Paris and Tel Aviv, however, threatened to jeopardize the French-Israeli atomic alliance.

In early June 1958 Maurice Couve de Murville was elevated to Foreign Minister. Known to be cool towards Israel, the former French Ambassador in Cairo removed Ambassador Pierre Gilbert from Tel Aviv on November 20, 1959.¹⁷⁹ This decision occurred months after Saint Gobain had begun supervising the chemical reprocessing plant's construction, being built adjacently underground to the reactor. Following France's first nuclear test in the Algerian Sahara on February 13, 1960, Soustelle resigned his post, prompting Perrin to inform a "furious" de Gaulle in April that French corporate assistance to Dimona continued despite his orders. Nearly two months passed before de Murville informed Walter Eitan, Israel's new Ambassador in Paris, that France now required Israel to eventually open the facility to international supervision and to publicly declare its peaceful intentions. The French Foreign Minister notified Meir that Paris was prepared "to stop all nuclear links," including uranium and "return all" of the "money" if this did not transpire.¹⁸⁰

In early June Guillaumat told Peres in Paris that the "project" could not be "kept secret anymore." According to Bar-Zohar, an "anxious" Ben Gurion went to Paris to meet with de Gaulle.¹⁸¹ Cohen has contended that Dimona "was hardly mentioned" during the sit-down, while Shalom has argued that Ben Gurion declared that Israel "had no intention of producing a nuclear weapon..."¹⁸² Three days later Ben Gurion and de Gaulle met again where and, according to

¹⁷⁹ In the *NYT* article covering the change, Gilbert was described as Israel's "best friend in the world." "Popular French Envoy Gets Israeli Farewell," *NYT*, November 21, 1959, p. 9; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 73.

¹⁸⁰ Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, pp. 171-173.

¹⁸¹ Bar-Zohar, *Ben Gurion*, pp. 267-268.

¹⁸² Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 74; Shalom, *Israel's Nuclear Option*, p. 8; Hersh, *The Samson Option*, p. 69.

Cohen, Ben Gurion promised Dimona was dedicated to peaceful purposes.¹⁸³ Hersh has contended that de Gaulle then emphasized that, “I think you exaggerate ...the danger facing you.”¹⁸⁴ On November 10 Peres convinced de Murville to drop France’s international inspection request on Dimona. In return, Ben Gurion would state publicly Israel’s peaceful nuclear intentions. Shalom has avowed that France agreed to suspend its political involvement after a “period of a few months,” but allowed its firms to fulfill their contractual obligations.¹⁸⁵

In the latter half of 1960 evidence emerged that the documents which had indicted Lavon for the July 1954 fiasco had been forged. When Ben-Gurion refused to exonerate Lavon, the latter, before a secret Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee session, lambasted Peres and Dayan for framing him, information which leaked to the press in late September.¹⁸⁶ On December 25 a committee of seven Cabinet Ministers, created by Eshkol and chaired by Justice Minister Pinhas Rosen, exonerated Lavon from any wrongdoing, with Meir and Eshkol voting to absolve Lavon. On January 31 Ben Gurion briefly resigned, arguing that that delay was due to “a certain serious matter,” code for Dimona, after surviving a Knesset no-confidence vote which had allowed him to stay in power until summer elections.¹⁸⁷

With Ben-Gurion’s leadership under fire by Lavon, a series of foreign newspaper stories

¹⁸³ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 74-75.

¹⁸⁴ Bar-Zohar, *Ben-Gurion*, pp. 268-270; Hersh, *The Samson Option*, p. 69.

¹⁸⁵ According to Hersh, Saint Gobain delayed its work on the underground processing plant until 1962, when another firm came to finish that job, staying until 1966. Cohen has purported that Saint Gobain worked until the reactor went critical in late 1963. In 1963 SIECC returned to finish the chemical reprocessing plant, leaving only in June 1965. The unwillingness of the French firms to stop construction, even after De Gaulle’s instructions, proves Rumsfeld’s words that “there are times that corporations do things they should not do...” Hersh, *The Samson Option*, pp. 69-70; Golan, *Shimon Peres*, pp. 95-96; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 75; “McKinney Grills Rumsfeld,” <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eootfzAhAoU> (8:57).

¹⁸⁶ “Israel Reopens Inquiry,” *NYT*, September 27, 1960, p. 21.

¹⁸⁷ Cohen has argued that during this time Ben Gurion’s authority “was at its lowest point,” with his demeanor increasingly more “passive, indecisive, and detached.” Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 138-141; “Lavon is Cleared in Israeli Inquiry,” *NYT*, December 26, 1960, p. 1; Lawrence Fellows, “Cabinet Split by Dispute,” *NYT*, December 28, 1960, p. 1; Lawrence Fellows, “Ben-Gurion wins Israel Test Vote,” *NYT*, January 31, 1961, p. 8.

finally revealed Dimona to the world.¹⁸⁸ On December 21 Ben Gurion was forced to publicly discuss the nation's nuclear program in the only direct statement about Dimona ever made by an Israeli Prime Minister to this day. Ben Gurion told the Knesset announced that "the development of the Negev" was solely for "research in problems of arid zone and desert flora..." The reactor's completion was still "three or four years" and dedicated only "for peaceful purposes." Anything to the contrary was "...a deliberate or unconscious untruth."¹⁸⁹ The media's subservient role meant that Ben Gurion's words were never challenged as the press produced only three stories on the issue, all written at least three weeks after the speech.¹⁹⁰ Unlike the Israeli public reaction to the Lavon affair, there was no letter forthcoming from the credulous and compartmentalized intelligentsia demanding the same honesty about Dimona.¹⁹¹

Ben Gurion's leadership style enabled him to build Dimona without a Cabinet decision, which theoretically superseded his power.¹⁹² Within the Cabinet, only Meir, Eshkol, Sapir and

¹⁸⁸ On December 16 Chapman Pincher asserted in the British *Daily Express* that "Israel May be Making an A-Bomb." Two days Chalmers Roberts contended in the *WP* Israel had been "secretly" developing a reactor, which could produce a weapon in "perhaps five years." The story purported that a nameless British official had recently declared that Israel had "neither the means nor the intention" of building the bomb. Threatening to "radically" alter the Arab-Israeli conflict, this information had come as a "surprise to" Washington. Champan Pincher, "Israel May be Making an A-Bomb," *Daily Express*, December 16, 1960, p. 2; Chalmers Roberts, "U.S. officials state nuclear reactor developed secretly by Israel," *WP*, December 18, 1960, p. A1.

¹⁸⁹ The pages in Ben Gurion's diary covering this period are missing as are many pertinent documents in the Israeli State Archives for this period. Incoming Telegram from Reid to the Secretary of State, December 21, 1960, Israel (3) (October 1960-January 1961), International Series, Box 32, Ann Whitman File, *DDEL*.

¹⁹⁰ Following Israel's independence, Ben Gurion crudely described journalists as "mercenaries of the pen." As Israel has no written constitution, the nation has no freedom of the press guarantee equivalent to the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Knesset has left in place the British Mandate Press Ordinance and the Defense (Emergency) Regulations Acts of 1933 and 1945. The archaic legislation requires that all newspapers be licensed by the state and that all papers, periodicals, and books be submitted to a military censor for publication approval. In 1998 the Knesset passed the Freedom of Information Law, allowing citizens to access government and public documents. Paragraph 14A, however, stipulates that no information concerning the Mossad, General Defense Service (Shabak), military intelligence, and atomic energy can be declassified. Hillel Nosssek and Yehiel Limor, "Fifty Years in a 'Marriage of Convenience'" *Communication Law and Policy* 6, 1 (Winter 2001), pp. 10-11, 16-18.

¹⁹¹ In late December, 50 Israeli intellectuals, led by philosopher Martin Buber, warned that there was no "graver danger" to democracy than an "attitude of impatience with criticism and contempt for opponents." In late January Ben Gurion responded that he held a deep respect for the "rule of law..." Lawrence Fellows, "Israelis Get Plea to End Disputes," *NYT*, December 30, 1960, p. 4; "Ben Gurion Quits Over Lavon Case," *NYT*, February 1, 1961, p. 1.

¹⁹² Political scientist Avner Yaniv has argued that until the end of the 1960's Israel's democracy was personality driven and paternalistic, with the ruling Mapai party described by critics as "Bolshevik." Burg has contended that in the 1950s Israelis looked to Ben Gurion as "a ram before the herd" and it was only through the passage of time that

the longest serving Mossad head Isser Harel (1952-1963) were aware of the project.¹⁹³ During Dimona's construction Knesset members and the media were banned from the site. Every atomic decision was made Ben Gurion and Peres; nothing was ever written down and the word "bomb" was never explicitly uttered. These draconian apparently fooled Israel's enemies for the Arabs apparently knew nothing about Dimona until before the Western media.¹⁹⁴

The Arab reaction tended to give Israel the benefit of the doubt. On December 20, 1960, Mohammad Haikal argued in *Al Ahram* that if Israel obtained the bomb then Egypt would have to follow suit.¹⁹⁵ Three days later Nasser announced at Port Said that only if it was strongly "established that Israel" was pursuing a "bomb" would it mean the "beginning of war." By December 29 Haikal had changed his tone, dismissing Dimona now as a farce intended to frighten the Arabs. A December 30, 1960, telegraph from Canada's Embassy in Beirut argued the Lebanese press was "hesitant" to "admit" that Israel "could...produce the bomb" but "urged"

more people began to open "their eyes" and question the "the father of the nation..." Avner Yaniv, "Introduction," *Ibid.*, p. 3; Burg, *The Holocaust is Over*, p. 133.

¹⁹³ There is only one example that Dimona was ever raised by a Cabinet member of an opposition party. On February 2, 1958, just weeks after Dimona's construction began, Pinhas Rosen, a member of the Progressive Party, argued that if Israel "ever decided" to create "an atomic energy for purposes of war" he was unsure of its implications. The Prime Minister sharply responded that the Justice Minister should "not repeat" his "remark." Rosen's remarks came after the U.S.S.R. proposed a nuclear free Near East, including Israel, in response to an U.S. announcement to deploy intermediate range nuclear missiles to Turkey. Unaware that Ben Gurion had decided to pursue a weapons program, Rosen contended that Israel was "not engaged in this today," but understood that Israel "was capable of it." Such a policy would be "dangerous," and only encourage Moscow to "want to eradicate" Israel. Ben Gurion wisely understood that the "same" forces which worked in Israel's favor in the U.S. operated in the "opposite direction" in the U.S.S.R. Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, *Foxbats over Dimona: The Soviets' Nuclear Gamble in the Six-Day War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), pp. 29, 54, 222-223n3 and 4.

¹⁹⁴ Shaym Bhatia, a foreign correspondent, contended that in 1959 an Egyptian physicist working at the Argonne nuclear center in the U.S., Dr. Ezzat Abdel, noticed two Israeli scientists at the facility. He wrote home but no one in Cairo seemed to care. Salim Yaqub, an international relations professor at the University of Chicago, only raised the issue in last paragraph of his *Containing Arab Nationalism*, reducing the contents of Nasser's December 23 speech to three sentences. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 406n1; Shyam Bhatia, *Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East* (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 54; Salim Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), pp. 266-267.

¹⁹⁵ Ariel Levité and Emily Landau, "Arab Perceptions of Israel's Nuclear Posture, 1960-1967," *Israel Studies* 1, 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 39 & 56n8.

the Arabs to the issue “seriously.”¹⁹⁶ This was unaccomplished as the Arabs generally denied the emerging danger. In early January 1961 Jordan’s Prime Minister, Bahjat Talhun, informed the U.S. Embassy in Amman that “he was not particularly concerned” while a Syrian representative viewed Dimona solely “as a canard, designed to... frighten the Arabs.”¹⁹⁷

Moscow had obtained intelligence on Israel’s nuclear plans prior to December 1960 yet was unable or unwilling to put the pieces together. In June 1960 Kurt Sitte, a German working at Technion, was revealed to have spied for Moscow on IEAC’s activities since 1955.¹⁹⁸ In private communications, however, Moscow revealed its concern with Dimona. Following Nasser’s Port Said speech, the Soviet Embassies in Cairo and Tel Aviv were informed that Israel was “not far from” obtaining the bomb, which could “trigger a serious conflict...”¹⁹⁹ Despite the deterioration of Israeli-Soviet relations, however, Moscow was still unready to publicly confront Dimona or provide Egypt with a matching deterrent. Save from bombing Israel, however, there was not much the Soviets could do without help from the U.S. As the ensuing chapter will demonstrate, such assistance from a complicit and willfully ignorant Washington was not forthcoming.

¹⁹⁶ Memorandum from the Canadian Embassy in Beirut to the Under Secretary for External Affairs (Canada), “Subject: Atomic Reactor in Israel- Lebanese Reaction,” December 30, 1960, Department of External Affairs, RG 25, Volume 7882, File 14003-J-8-1-40, *Library and Archives of Canada (LAC)*.

¹⁹⁷ In early February the Arab League discussed Dimona in Baghdad from January 30 to February 4, 1961, with particular focus on French assistance to Israel. Flapan has stated that the Arabs failed to publish any documents of these discussions. Levité and Landau, “Arab Perceptions of Israel’s Nuclear Posture,” pp. 40, 54 n6; BNA, FO, 371/149586, Memorandum from P.V. O’Regan to Amman, Washington and Cairo, undated, PVOR 30/12; “Arabs to Meet on Threat of Israeli A-Work,” *WP*, December 28, 1960, p. A4; Flapan, *Nuclear Power in the Middle East: The Critical Years*, *New Outlook*, 17, 8 (October 1974), pp. 34.

¹⁹⁸ “Ginor and Remez, *Foxbats over Dimona*, pp. 33-34.

¹⁹⁹ On December 20 Philip Farley informed Tel Aviv, London and Paris that “Radio MOSCOW” was broadcasting that the U.S. was “aiding” Israel’s “nuclear...program.” There is no mention of the Soviet reaction toward Dimona in December 1960 in Hebrew University political scientist Galia Golan’s *Soviet Policies in the Middle East*, Bar-Siman-Tov’s *Israel, the Superpower, and War in the Middle East* nor Yosef Govrin’s *Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1953-1967*. Outgoing Eyes only Telegram from Farley to U.S. Ambassadors in Tel Aviv, Paris and London, December 20, 1960, Israel (3) (October 1960-January 1961), International Series, Box 32, Ann Whitman File, *DDEL*. Gideon and Remez, *Foxbats over Dimona*, pp. 32, 34-35, 225n28.

Chapter Two: Eisenhower's Bureaucratic Charade

Responding to Washington's apparent inability to uncover Dimona before the *NYT* or *WP* did, on December 13, 1960, the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB)²⁰⁰ asked the Joint Atomic Energy Inter-Agency Committee (JAEIC) to prepare a "detailed post-mortem report on why the intelligence community (IC) did not recognize" this reality much "earlier." Eleven days after President Eisenhower left the White House, a 17 page report, *Post Mortem on Special National Intelligence Estimates*, outlining the litany of missed opportunities to uncover Dimona, was delivered to President John F. Kennedy upon "his explicit request." The report purported that the IC naively assumed that Israel "could not" achieve a nuclear program without "outside aid" as such assistance, if provided, would have been "known." Thus, there was a "tendency" to give Israel the benefit of the doubt and to "discount rumors...in the nuclear weapons area."²⁰¹

From 1952-1959 Washington had received "numerous reports" that France was aiding Israel to pursue "nuclear weapons" as part of a bilateral agreement "since 1953." The IC had obtained details of the Franco-Israeli "collaboration" by "early...1957" but this information was not circulated to the highest levels. Had this occurred, then Israel's atomic "intentions" could have been uncovered "one or perhaps two years earlier," possibly in 1958 or 1959. From "early 1960" onwards other pieces of undigested information suggested that France was assisting Israel but this data was never "formally disseminated."²⁰² The SDECE's FBI and CIA liaison in Washington, Phillip Thyraud de Vosjoli (1951-1963), said nothing about France's complicity in

²⁰⁰ Created in late 1957 or 1958 under the authority of the NSC, the USIB, in charge of scrutinizing National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) in their concluding phases, had 11 members. With the DCI as its Chairman, the group had six Pentagon representatives, and one member each from Foggy Bottom, CIA, AEC and FBI. Memorandum from DCI McCone to President Kennedy, "Subject: Reorganization of the USIB," January 7, 1962, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, (Washington, D.C: GPO, 2001), *Organization of Foreign Policy*, Volume XXV, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/xxv/6009.htm> (Document 96); Memorandum from McCone to President Johnson, December 21, 1963, *Ibid*, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/xxv/5362.htm> (Document 114).

²⁰¹ JAEIC, "*Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60: Implications of the Acquisition by Israel of a Nuclear Weapons Capability*," Draft, January 31, 1961, GWNSA, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/israel/documents/reveal/01-01.htm>.

²⁰² "*Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60*."

Dimona. According to journalist Tom Mangold, although de Vosjoli's CIA contacts were supposed to be routed through the Agency's "Fourth Desk," his "special relationship" with Mr. Angleton allowed him to obviate protocol.²⁰³

The *Post-Mortem* also disclosed that on May 25, 1959, the U.S. Naval Attaché in Tel Aviv had reported that the April 26 resignation of General Daniel Tolkowsky, head of the Defense Ministry's Development Authority, stemmed from his opposition to Peres's atomic policy. But as the Attaché "was unable to confirm" this report's validity, "no action was taken."²⁰⁴ The *Post-Mortem* also failed to divulge Britain's intermediary role in the Israeli-Norwegian heavy water deal. Coincidentally, in early December 1960 the U.S. learned that Norway had provided Israel with heavy water via a British source. Still, this revelation did not comprise the first U.S. knowledge of Norway's involvement. On June 5, 1959, a Norwegian Foreign Ministry official had "advised" the AEC that Oslo had concluded a heavy water deal with Israel which falsely "included safeguards and inspection." In July 1959, the same month Israel received its first heavy water shipment from Britain, the U.S. Embassy in Oslo streamlined this information to the AEC and State Department.²⁰⁵ Conveniently, this knowledge was not disseminated to the rest of the IC until December 1960.

To assert that Washington was oblivious to Dimona's existence while elements in Paris, London, Oslo and New York were assisting and financing Israel's atomic aspirations is difficult to believe. Yet this myth has been perpetuated a distinguished array of established scholars who

²⁰³ De Vosjoli had met Angleton in Rome during World War II when the former brought Jews in from Vichy France. During this period Angleton formed a close relationship with French intelligence, eventually enabling him to receive the prestigious Légion d'Honneur. They often ate lunch at the Rive Gauche restaurant in Georgetown. Tom Mangold, *The Cold Warrior: James Jesus Angleton* (London: Simon & Schuster, 1991), pp. 98-99.

²⁰⁴ The Peres-Tolkowsky debate was illuminated in an April 10, 1959, memorandum from the British Embassy in Tel Aviv to London. The document, discovered by Aronson, reveals that Tolkowsky had argued that it would be "foolish for Israel to try and get an atomic bomb" since it would only encourage the U.S.S.R. to "arm the Arabs." Aronson has contended that the telegraph was also sent to the U.S. "*Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60*;" Aronson, *The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East*, pp. 66-67 & 312n21.

²⁰⁵ "*Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60*."

have asserted that the U.S. was unaware of Dimona's origins, nature, or status prior to "late 1960" or even "early 1961." Unfortunately, the scholarship, blindly embracing Dr. Paul Wolfowitz's mantra that in the intelligence world "surprise happens so often that it's surprising that we're still surprised by it," has credulously accepted the *Post-Mortem's* conclusion that all clues were unintentionally "lost in the bureaucratic shuffle."²⁰⁶

According to AEC Commissioner Lewis Strauss (1953-1958),²⁰⁷ Eisenhower's December 8, 1953, UN Atoms for Peace speech yearned to "accelerate the application of peaceful uses of the atom everywhere." In April 1954 in Los Angeles Strauss compared the UN oration to the Gettysburg Address, delivered by the first and "great" Republican President.²⁰⁸ Noting that Ike's speech contained just 3,000 words, Strauss emphasized that the proposal would not be "another move in the chess game of world politics," place naïve "trust where...trust could not be" given or be able "to turn deserts into lush meadows..."²⁰⁹ His place in the historiography- whether he was clueless, careless or complicit- needs to be ironed out.²¹⁰

Following the Atoms for Peace address, Israel was the second nation to express interest

²⁰⁶ The West Point Commencement speech was given on June 6, 2001. "Wolfowitz chilling speech," <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NcxI5wpDucE> (4:44); "*Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60.*"

²⁰⁷ Beginning in 1919, at 23, Strauss began working for the Kuhn Loeb & Company investment bank, then owned by Otto Kahn and Felix Warburg, making partner on December 31, 1928. From 1938 to 1948 he served as President of the Jewish Emanu-El Congregation in New York. From 1950 to 1953 he served as a financial adviser for the Rockefeller family. Herken has pointed out that when it came to "atomic" issues, Strauss' expertise and authority went unchallenged in the Eisenhower administration not even by the President. Oral History Interview with Lewis Strauss #2 of 3, February 14, 1962, Columbia Oral History Project, p. 80, *DDEL*; Alden Whitman, "Lewis Strauss Dies," *NYT*, January 22, 1974, p. 81; George C. Wilson, "Lewis L. Strauss Ex-AEC Chairman, Dies at Age 77," *WP*, January 22, 1974, p. C9; Herken, *Cardinal Choices*, p. 77.

²⁰⁸ Conversely, Abraham Lincoln spoke 270 words in roughly three minutes. Brian MacArthur, ed. *The Penguin Book of Historic Speeches* (London: Penguin Books, 1996), pp. 367-368.

²⁰⁹ Remarks Prepared by Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman USAEC for Delivery to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, April 19, 1954, AEC 1953-54 (4), Box 4, Administrative Series, Ann Whitman File, *DDEL*.

²¹⁰ During a 1962 interview for the Eisenhower Library, Strauss admitted only that they had met Ben Gurion a few times "at the White House." He blamed the Arab-Israeli dispute on "external irritants like the Egyptian dictator," arguing that the peace process would be piecemeal, as "those of us who are alive today may never live to see it." In the end, however, the "situation" would inevitably "iron" itself "out" somehow. Oral History Interview with Lewis Strauss #2 of 3, February 14, 1962, Columbia Oral History Project, pp. 103-105, *DDEL*.

with the AEC in signing a bilateral accord.²¹¹ Negotiations started on May 13, 1955, in Washington between Morehead Patterson, Abba Eban, Israel's U.S. Ambassador, and the Mossad's Reuven Shiloah.²¹² On June 3 Strauss and Eban agreed that the AEC would transmit no more than six kilograms of U-235 with an enrichment level no higher than 20 %. The corporatist framework also enabled "private" firms to "deal directly with private individuals in the other country."²¹³ The agreement was finalized on July 12, 1955.²¹⁴ Foreshadowing future events, a month later at the before mentioned Geneva Conference the U.S. missed a golden chance to uncover Israel's hidden nuclear motives. Meeting with Patterson on August 16, Bergmann asked whether Israel would have "to turn over the plutonium" to the AEC "for reprocessing." Defensively stating "that he had no idea what the answer would be," Patterson questioned if "Israel had considered the political impact on the Arab world" of "producing plutonium." Bergmann responded that since the amount was so small "it could not have possible military implications."²¹⁵ According to an Israeli document with two pages missing, four days later Bergmann asked Strauss for "a real reactor" and "plutonium." Answering that Israel "could not do anything" involved with "the slightest quantities of plutonium," Strauss then suggested

²¹¹ The first was Turkey, signing on June 10, 1955. "Review of the International Atomic Policies and Programs of the United States," p. 494.

²¹² Memorandum of Conversation, "Subject: Bilateral Agreements for the Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy," May 13, 1955, RG 59, State Late Files, Lot 57D688, Box 417, USNA.

²¹³ "Agreement for Cooperation concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy between the Government of the USA and the Government of Israel," June 3, 1955, 108-F-3 (13), Box 534, Central Files Official File, DDEL.

²¹⁴ Letter from Strauss to Eisenhower, June 6, 1955, 108-F-3 (13), Box 534, Central Files Official File, DDEL; Letter from Eisenhower to Strauss, June 7, 1955, 108-F-2 (13), Box 534, Central Files Official File, DDEL; "Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the U.S. and the Government of Israel Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy," *Israel Government Yearbook 1961* (Jerusalem: State of Israel), pp. 388-390.

²¹⁵ Jabber has unveiled that two weeks after the Bergmann and Patterson meeting the AEC provided Israel with 45 volumes on nuclear theory on August 31. This development precipitated the first *NYT* story in the Dimona historiography, a one sentence anonymous blurb written from Tel Aviv. Over the next five years 40 Israelis were trained at U.S. nuclear facilities at Oak Ridge and Argonne National Laboratory. Department of State, Memo of Conversation, August 18, 1955, RG 59, Lot 57D688, Box 417, USNA; Jabber, *Israel and Nuclear Weapons*, pp. 25-26; "Israel Gets U.S. Atom Library," *NYT*, September 1, 1955, p. 3.

the proposal be delivered “to the AEC via the embassy by the end of September.”²¹⁶

During the ensuing five months all U.S.-Israeli nuclear dialogue ceased at the AEC and State. Nonetheless, on January 10, 1956, Israel was added to the Third Category List of the CIA’s Office of Scientific Intelligence (CIA/OSI).²¹⁷ Three months later, Bergmann inquired to the AEC about “training opportunities” for Israeli “specialists and operators” in the fields of “metallurgy” and “reactor components.” This request drew “reservations” from Thomas Jones as certain aspects in this field were still “classified.” Disseminated to the AEC and U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, the anonymously written document optimistically ended by stressing that “it was thought that some assistance might be found.”²¹⁸

Eight days later the two sides met again, with the Israelis explaining that they expected to receive bids from U.S. firms on reactors within the next “five or six weeks.” When Bergmann asked about obtaining some U-235 for experimental purposes, Foggy Bottom’s Harold Beneledorf professed that this request would not pose “any special problems” as long as the material was “used for peaceful purposes.” The AEC agreed to confer “with its lawyers”²¹⁹ to

²¹⁶ In the fall of 1966 Strauss got Bergmann a two month-appointment as a guest fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Princeton where Strauss had been a member since World War II. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 45

²¹⁷ Richelson has asserted this cohort “contained the least important intelligence targets, but not apparently out of a specific concern with its nuclear activities.” Even though Israel was excluded, the IC’s interest in the atomic activities of the “pariah states” began in September 30, 1956, when the CIA/OSI produced a study focused on Asian and African nations. As late as May 24, 1960, Israel was still located in the 2nd Category, a cohort of nations consisting of nations conducting “Non-Bloc nuclear energy research and development ...and the use of such materials for weapons and other purposes...” Richelson, *Spying on the Bomb*, pp. 247 & 605 n45; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 81; “*Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60.*”

²¹⁸ Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: Israeli Atomic Energy Program,” April 11, 1956, RG 59, State Lot Files, Lot 57D688, Box 417, USNA.

²¹⁹ De Tocqueville understood that lawyers represent the only “aristocratic element” of U.S. society because they handle “special information” and serve as “arbiters between the citizens.” With a proclivity to consistently interrupt, utilize hypothetical red herrings and consistently aim to reverse priorities, most lawyers, like “most...men,” are driven by private ends and the myopic “advantages of the moment.” In his denouncement of Foggy Bottom’s “law-office atmosphere,” Kennan warned that a “legalistic-moralistic” foreign policy “approach” could turn the U.S into a “puppet state...” Following the biography is ideology adage, historian John Prados has emphasized that the connection between lawyers “and spycraft is often overlooked.” The current DCI, Leon Panetta, attended Santa Clara Law School (1965-1969) before heading to Wall Street, while the President (Harvard, 1989-1991), who taught Constitutional law for ten years, Vice-President (Syracuse, 1965-1968) and Secretary of State (Yale, 1969-1973) are all lawyers. More than half of the current Senate attended law school. Harvard law school graduate Ralph Nader

ascertain whether Israel's uranium "fabrication" would "pose any legal problems."²²⁰ On July 17, 1956, Bergmann asked Strauss about purchasing 10 tons of heavy water. The AEC lawyers must have done their job because a report, written a month later by Farley, now perceived the request as an ominous signal that Israel was "contemplating the construction of a second reactor..."²²¹ According to Cohen, on September 14 the AEC and State notified Israel that while its requests would be granted, they needed to "take place under" a new bilateral agreement with "a more rigorous safeguards" system. These signs of increased U.S. doubt, coupled with pending deal at Sèvres, explain why Israel dropped its request for a 10-MW reactor. This Israeli policy change was accompanied by a slight personnel shift. On December 4, Dr. Ephraim Lahav, who had no knowledge of Peres's atomic diplomacy in Paris, rather than Eban informed the AEC that Israel this choice was attributed to "indecision regarding" the reactor final site location.²²²

On January 25, 1957, the AEC proclaimed that Ben-Gurion had been informed that "certain types of reactors... planned by Israel, had excessive plutonium production capabilities ..."²²³ This more skeptical AEC and State policy during the midst of the Suez Crisis, did not deter Israel even though it dropped its heavy water request in early 1957. As U.S. government officials asked too many questions, Ben Gurion turned to the private sector. Sanitized sections

mused in a brilliant May 2008 talk before Google that today in the U.S. "80 percent of the lawyers represent twenty 20 of the people." De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, pp. 314-319, 321-324; Kennan, *American Diplomacy*, pp. 91-92, 95; John Prados, *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 42; "Policy Talks @Google: Ralph Nader," May 14, 2008, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K R-V6bl41U> (54:37); "There Was a Lawyer, An Engineer and a Politician," *The Economist*, April 18, 2009, pp. 64-65; "Rage Against the Machine- Testify Music Video," http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1JSBhI_0at0 (3:41).

²²⁰ USAEC, Memorandum of Conversation, "Subject: Meeting with Dr. Bergmann," April 19, 1956, GWNSA, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/israel/documents/before/06-01.htm>

²²¹ Department of State, Memorandum, Farley to the Acting Secretary of State, August 16, 1956, RG 59, State Lot files, Lot 57D688, Box 417, USNA.

²²² AEC, Memorandum of Conversation, "Subject: Presentation of Draft Israeli Power Bilateral," September 14, 1956, RG 59, Lot 57D688, Box 417, USNA; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 60; AEC, Memorandum of Conversation: "Subject: Meeting with Dr. Lahav," December 4, 1956, GWNSA, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/israel/documents/before/07-01.htm>.

²²³ AEC, Memorandum of Conversation, "Implementation of Atomic Energy Program with Israel," January 25, 1957, RG 59, State Lot Files, Lot 57D688, Box 417, USNA.

from Ben Gurion's diary from May 11 and July 11, 1957, indicate that he discussed "how to set up a national nuclear energy program" with the Nobel Prize winning physicist I.I Rabi, a former member of AEC's General Advisory Committee (GAC) from December 1946 to October 1956 and its Chairman since October 1952.²²⁴ Cohen has emphasized that Ben-Gurion "made a point to meet" with Rabi, Robert Oppenheimer and Edward Teller, who also served on the AEC/GAC from August 13, 1956, to October 26, 1956, whenever they visited Israel.²²⁵ A half year passed before a new Israeli request was submitted to the AEC by the New York based American Machines and Foundry (AMF) Company in December 1957.²²⁶

²²⁴ Considering their close personal relationship and Rabi's close ties to Israel, there is little chance that the President was oblivious of Rabi's trip to see Ben Gurion or the possibility of him covertly aiding and advising Israel's nuclear program. In 1937 Rabi became a chemistry professor at Columbia and was granted leave in 1940 to work at MIT on the development of radar and the Manhattan Project. After Ike became Columbia's President in 1948 he and Rabi developed a close bond. Yale historian Daniel Kelves has pointed out that Rabi enjoyed "considerable power as a quiet insider" with Eisenhower. In 1953 alone he spent 120 days advising the administration. He was integral in convincing Secretary of State Dulles to call for the creation of an international atomic energy committee before the UNGA on September 23, 1954. Due to his participation within the UN Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization during the post War years, after the UN passed resolution 810 (IX) on December 4, 1954, Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold formed an advisory committee with Rabi as the U.S. delegate. Following the U.S.S.R.'s Sputnik launch on October 4, 1957, Rabi, who was officially out of government when he visited Israel, was named chairman of the Science Advisory Committee and later served on the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) under MIT's James Killian Jr from 1958 to 1960. In a clear conflict of interest Rabi, who physics Professor John S. Rigden has pointed out was "profoundly Jewish" due to his orthodox Brooklyn upbringing, began increasing his ties with Israel during his PSAC tenure. In 1959 he was appointed a Board of Governors member of Israel's Weizmann Institute. John Shaw, First Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Israel, asserted in a November 22, 1960, memo that Rabi's name surfaced in a meeting between Bergmann and U.S. Ambassador Ogden Reid, when the former "commented very favorably" on a September meeting he had with then AEC Chairman John McCone at the IAEA's Fourth General Conference in Vienna. Bergmann also told Reid that he had informed McCone that Rabi was "highly respected by...other delegations." Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 353 n10; John S. Rigden, *Rabi: Scientist and Citizen* (Basic Books: New York, 1987), pp. 211-21, 236-250. Robert A. Divine, *The Sputnik Challenge* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 51; "Isidor Isaac Rabi: The Nobel Prize in Physics 1944," http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1944/rabi-bio.html; "I.I. Rabi," <http://www.columbia.edu/cu/alumni/Magazine/Summer2001/Rabi.html>; Richard T. Sylves, *The Nuclear Oracles: A Political History of the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1977* (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1987), pp. 22-23, 33, 57, 107, 110; Daniel J. Kevles, *The Physicists: The History of a Scientific Community in Modern America* (New York: Alfred A. Knoff, 1978), pp. 376-377; Memo of Conversation, "Subject: Comments of Professor Bergmann on the Fourth IAEA General Conference," November 22, 1960, RES&D 1-2- Testing- August- December 1960 Folder #2 (1), Box 4, John A. McCone Papers, 1958-1961, DDEL.

²²⁵ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 353 n10.

²²⁶ The AMF's Vice-Chairman when the deal was signed was former DCI Walter Bedell Smith (1950-1953), who began his AMF tenure in April 1955. He conveniently resigned in mid-April 1958, roughly the same time the U-2 flights over Dimona began and a month after the AMF-IAEC deal was formalized. "Newly Formed Concern Appoints Two Officers," *NYT*, April 25, 1955, p. 33. "Gen. W.B. Smith Has Surgery," *NYT*, August 3, 1955, p. 13; "Nuclear Venture Earmarks 2 Sites," *NYT*, August 4, 1955, p. 32; "11 Named to Study of U.S. Stockpiling," *NYT*,

On March 19, 1958, the IAEC and the AMF signed an agreement stipulating that a 1-MW pool reactor, to be built at Nachal Soreq, would be online by June 1960. During these discussions the AEC's Carl Jones asked Lahav whether Israel was still planned to build a 10-MW reactor. Lahav responded that "no firm decision had been taken" as such a choice would be predicated upon "money, manpower, and uranium."²²⁷ Unfortunately, other than Jones, no one else in the AEC or State interpreted this shift in Israeli as a mask for clandestine activity. These talks transpired just as Arthur Lundahl and Dino Brugioni of the CIA's Photo-Intelligence Division (CIA/PIC) began briefing Strauss about U-2 photos revealing Israeli construction of a second reactor in the Negev. In "early 1958" Lundahl and Brugioni began briefing Strauss and "a few AEC aides" on this subject. Brugioni admitted that he met with Strauss regularly but found him uninterested. Confessing to Hersh that he "never knew" what the AEC "was thinking," Brugioni added a "fervor" existed "among New York Jews" to always "protect Israel."²²⁸ On April 1, 1958, Israel's nuclear capacity was pegged by the AEC as in the "research stage."²²⁹

Strauss' AEC tenure officially ended on June 30 yet John McCone only officially took over until July 14.²³⁰ For a fortnight then the AEC was technically leaderless during a vital time

November 3, 1957, p. 37; "Reactor Laboratories Elects New President," *NYT*, April 7, 1958, p. 36; "Extract from MA-Israel: Periodic Intelligence Report," RG 25, July 8, 1960, Volume 7882, File 14003-J-8-1-40, *LAC*.

²²⁷ Memorandum of Conversation, Carl Jones, AEC, and Dr. Ephraim Lahav, March 19, 1958, RG 59, Lot 57D688, Box 417, USNA.

²²⁸ Hersh has averred that Lundahl relayed all nuclear intelligence to the White House and then, "unless directed otherwise," to Strauss and a "few AEC officials." One can speculate that these "officials" could have included Rabi and/or Teller, whom both held close ties with each other and with Strauss and Eugene Wigner since 1939. Although he served after the U-2 flights began under Strauss, Wigner was also a member of the AEC/GAC from September 22, 1952 to January 24, 1957, and December 3, 1959 to May 1, 1964. Strauss, Rabi, Teller and Wigner had also all known each other since 1939 and were the four main catalysts behind the Manhattan Project. On Eisenhower's final day as President, on January 18, 1961, the CIA reported that no one should be surprised that Israel was attempting to build the bomb, simply because "almost every nuclear scientist" who had worked on the Manhattan Project was Jewish. Bass, *Support Any Friend*, 95, 295n53; Gregg Herken, *Cardinal Choices: Presidential Science Advising from the Atomic Bomb to SDI* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 5-11; Hersh, *The Samson Option*, pp. 54-55 & 90-91; Sylves, *The Nuclear Oracles*, pp. 22-23.

²²⁹ Status of Agreements for Cooperation, April 1, 1958, AEC 1958 (3), Box 4, Administrative Series, Anne Whitman File, *DDEL*.

²³⁰ Although now officially a private citizen, Strauss still led the U.S. delegation at the Second International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, a gathering of 69 nations, 9 supranational institutions and 6000

in U.S. policy regarding Dimona. On July 1 the CIA produced NIE 100-2-58 which touched upon the “fourth” country nuclear proliferation problem. Strauss participated in the Intelligence Advisory Committee behind the NIE, but McCone probably had no access to this document as it was conveniently disseminated 13 days before he became Chairman and one day after Strauss had vacated. There is also no proof that Strauss relayed any knowledge to McCone. As Algie Wells, the AEC’s Director of International Affairs (AEC/DIA) in mid-1958, noted to Hersh: “Why would Strauss have told McCone? ... They both had colossal egos.”²³¹ Determining exactly when McCone became aware of Dimona is difficult to ascertain as nearly 40 % of his AEC papers remain locked in the Eisenhower Library’s vault.²³² If McCone was oblivious about Dimona when he became Chairman, the amendments that he helped to implement to the July 1955 accord in 1959 and 1960 should have enlightened him.²³³

As late as June 30, 1959, the AEC/DIA still placed Israel’s atomic “scope of research” capacity in the “research” category, a level below the capabilities of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Norway, South Africa, Peru and Venezuela.²³⁴ Then, on July 29, 1959, McCone informed Ike that the AEC now wanted to sell Israel ten (originally six) kilos of uranium, possessing an increased enrichment of 90 % (originally 20%). The amendment allowed for the transfer of “specific nuclear materials, including U-235, U-233, and plutonium,” based on the confusing language of “an as-may-be-agreed basis.” Five days later Ike proclaimed that this change was

delegates, at Geneva in September 1958. McCone, Rabi and Killian also represented the U.S. “Memorandum: Strauss asserts A.E.C. Job is Last, December 29, 1954,” Atomic Energy Commission 1953-54 (1), Box 4, Administrative Series, Anne Whitman File, *DDEL*. Biographical Note, 79-9, Box 1, John A. McCone Papers, 1958-1961, *DDEL*; Lewis Strauss, *Men and Decisions* (New York: Double Day, 1962), pp. 366-367.

²³¹ Hersh, *The Samson Option*, p. 92.

²³² Scope and Content, 79-9, Box 1, John A. McCone Papers, 1958-1961, *DDEL*.

²³³ In October 1960 the JAEIC revealed that sometime in “1956” the AEC increased the amount of uranium provided in its bilateral agreements, “for certain applications,” from six to twelve kilograms. The enrichment level also increased from 20 to 90 %. What “certain applications” entailed on a country by country basis was left unresolved. “*Review of the International Atomic Policies and Programs of the U.S.: Report to the JAEIC*,” p. 8.

²³⁴ “Status of Agreements for Cooperation in the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy as of June 30, 1959,” Nuclear Non-Proliferation- 5014, Incoming FOIA Documents, Box 6, GWNSA.

“designed to” to prevent anything from being “diverted to non-peaceful purposes.” On August 20 the amendment was signed by the AEC and disseminated to Foggy Bottom.²³⁵

One month later the U.S. was again busy amending the July 1955 accord set to expire on July 11, 1960. On June 4 McCone asked Ike to extend the deal for an additional two years, asserting that it would not be “an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.” The two year renewal also provided both sides with “sufficient time” to reach an accord with the IAEA regarding the “administration of safeguards for the reactor...” The proposed amendment was signed by Robert Winfree (State), Robert Slawson (AEC) and Lahav.²³⁶ Five days later Ike gave his blessing.²³⁷ McCone’s decision to approve the amendments represents an unspoken policy of encouragement for Israel’s atomic agenda. Understanding what Strauss and McCone knew about Dimona and, more importantly, *when* they knew it, is the key.

This bureaucratic theme also encapsulates the HUMINT intelligence, information derived from human sources, collected on Dimona by the CIA and Angleton. As a member of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in Rome during World War II, the Yale lawyer had acquired life-long assets while helping Jews escape the Holocaust. Ian Black and Benny Morris have contended that during this time Angleton met Reuven Shiloah, a future Mossad head (1951-1952) and his deputy, Teddy Kolleck, the future Jerusalem Mayor (1965-1993). He also developed a friendship with Meir de Shalit while the latter was posted in Washington.²³⁸

²³⁵ On March 4, 1960, the *NYT* indicated that the nuclear fuel for Nachal had arrived in Haifa. The one sentence page 11 anonymous story asserted that 6,500 grams of uranium, enriched at 90%, had “been lent” by the AEC “...for peaceful purposes.” Letter to Eisenhower from McCone, July 30, 1959, 108-F-2 (13), Box 534, Central Files Official File, *DDEL*; Letter to McCone from Eisenhower, August 3, 1959, 108-F-2 (13), Box 534, Central Files Official File, *DDEL*; “Israel Gets U.S. Atom Fuel,” *NYT*, March 4, 1960, p. 11.

²³⁶ Letter to Eisenhower from McCone, June 4, 1960, 108-F-2 (13), Box 534, Central Files Official File, *DDEL*.

²³⁷ Letter to McCone from Eisenhower, June 9, 1960, 108-F-2 (13), Box 534, Central Files Official File, *DDEL*.

²³⁸ Prior to operating in Italy, Shiloah and Kolleck worked with the OSS in the U.S, Britain and Turkey. Following Israel’s creation, Meir, the elder brother of Amos, became the main liaison between the CIA and the Israeli government and helped to bring Soviet and Eastern European immigrants to Israel. Angleton and Deshalit ran the “rat lines” which provided the West in the early postwar years with important knowledge of the U.S.S.R. During the

Angleton's fondness for the Jewish underground derived from two factors. First, he felt a moral duty to support a Jewish state; as Kolleck affirmed, Angleton "saw in Israel a true ally" when such sentiment was "rare..."²³⁹ *Boston Globe* reporters Jeff McConnell and Richard Higgins have argued that Angleton's efforts in Rome gave "him a special stature among Israelis for years to come."²⁴⁰ Secondly, he viewed Eastern European Jewish emigrants as a Kremlin ploy to spy on the U.S., a fear exemplified by the 1951 Julius and Ethel Rosenberg trial.²⁴¹

To improve ties with the CIA, Israel needed to convince Angleton that it was firmly aligned with the U.S. in its struggle with the U.S.S.R. This process began in early 1951 when Angleton received the "Israeli account" which was separated from the CIA's Near East Desk. Serving as the Israeli intelligence liaison, Angleton's closest friends worked for the Mossad. Prior to his first visit to the U.S. after Israel's creation, Ben Gurion had been asked by Shiloah to inquire about intelligence sharing between the Mossad and CIA. Speaking to DCI Walter Bedell Smith, Deputy Director Allen Dulles and President Truman in May 1951, Ben Gurion had stated that Israel was "very interested" in a strategic agreement with the CIA. A month later Shiloah traveled to the U.S. to finalize the secret details with Bedell Smith, Dulles, and Angleton.²⁴² By year's end Shiloah had informed the CIA that Israel was carefully screening Jewish immigrants

late 1940s and early 1950s Angleton and Meir met two to three times a week at the Israeli liaison's house on Massachusetts Avenue. Hersh, *The Samson Option*, p. 144-145; Melman and Raviv, *Friends in Deed*, pp. 63-65; Ian Black and Benny Morris, *Israel's Secret Wars* (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991), p. 74.

²³⁹ Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, *Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company 1991), p. 78.

²⁴⁰ A year after his November 1987 death, Israel dedicated a memorial to Angleton located near the King David Hotel, where he stayed when he traveled to Jerusalem. An inscription on a large stone in Hebrew, English and Arabic reads: "In Memory of a Good Friend, James (Jim) Angleton." Raviv and Melman, *Every Spy a Prince*, p.91; Jeff McConnell and Richard Higgins, "The Israeli Account," *Boston Globe*, December 14, 1986, p. 16.

²⁴¹ In 1985 Harel asserted that during the early Cold War it was vital for Israel to "create a positive image" due to Jewish communists like Harry Gold, David Greenglass and British physicist Klaus Fuchs spying in the U.S. during the late 1950s. Black and Morris, *Israel's Secret Wars*, p. 170; Goldberg, *Jewish Power*, p. 118.

²⁴² Ben-Gurion met Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's World War II Chief of Staff, for the first time when Ike had visited Holocaust survivors in German refugee camps. Carved in stone on the exterior wall of the Washington Holocaust Museum are the following words from Ike describing his experience of a Nazi concentration camp: "The things I saw beggar description..." Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life* (Houghton Mifflin Company: Boston, 1999), p. 64; Raviv and Melman, *Every Spy a Prince*, pp. 76-77.

from the Communist bloc.²⁴³ In 1954 Mossad Chief Harel had presented the new DCI, Allen Dulles, with a Persian-Jewish plaque engraved with the unforgettable Psalms 121:4: “The Guardian of Israel neither slumbers nor sleeps.”²⁴⁴ On December 20, 1954, the paramount bureaucratic insider took charge of the Israeli account and became CI Chief, powerful positions Angleton held for the next 20 years.²⁴⁵

The secret Mossad-CIA pact stipulated that they would share strategic intelligence, refrain from spying on each other, and exchange liaison officers in their respective embassies. Angleton sent underlings to Tel Aviv to evaluate the danger of Soviet penetration, while Israel began using its immigrants to supply information about Soviet activities and allowing its own operatives to be used by the CIA as agents and informants. Black and Morris have professed these contacts gave Israel “an invaluable asset in its dealings” with “the legendary ... Angleton.” “We knew much more” than the U.S., Harel recalled, boasting that Israel “had a more accurate picture- than anyone else,” while de Shalit contended that the “fanatical” Angleton began to warm up when “he began to get to know people in Israel.”²⁴⁶ Israel’s role in helping the CIA to uncover Khrushchev’s secret speech of February 26, 1956, to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party, the famous denunciation of Joseph Stalin, cemented future U.S.-Israeli intelligence cooperation. The translated contents of the speech remained unknown to the CIA for nearly two months until Angleton personally delivered it to the DCI on April 17. Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Tim Weiner has stressed Angleton’s role in obtaining the speech made him “the CIA’s one man liaison” with Israel; effectively blurring U.S. “perceptions for decade to

²⁴³ Raviv and Melman, *Every Spy a Prince*, p. 78.

²⁴⁴ Black and Morris, *Israel’s Secret Wars*, p. 170.

²⁴⁵ Yale historian Robin Winks has avowed that by 1954 the CIA was “a relatively entrenched bureaucracy,” with Angleton a “strong minded man surrounded by like-minded men.” With the exception of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, no other senior beltway official held the same job for a longer period. Robin Winks, *Cloak & Gown: Scholars in the Secret War* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1987), p. 411.

²⁴⁶ Black and Morris, *Israel’s Secret Wars*, pp. 136 & 169.

come.”²⁴⁷ The Suez War proved to be an even larger moment in Angleton’s career.

A serious debate existed within the CIA during October 1956 over whether Israel would attack Egypt. Reporter John Ranelagh has contended that on October 26, three days before the tripartite strike, the G-2 Army unit in Washington received a low-grade message from its Tel Aviv Attaché warning of a forthcoming attack. Robert Amory, a CIA analyst (1952-1962), told Ranelagh that the message indicated that “an attack” was coming “Monday morning” as Israel had ordered up “double amputees.”²⁴⁸ Asked about the rising tensions that same day by Dulles, Angleton found Amory’s guesswork “alarming,” professing that after talks with “friends” he was sure that Israel was “certainly not” planning an “attack.”²⁴⁹ Weiner has averred that DCI’s “undying gratitude” towards Angleton allowed Israel to hypnotize “Dulles and Angleton with disinformation...”²⁵⁰ Hahn has emphasized that although Ike publicly opposed the using force, some Israeli officials “interpreted signals” from the DCI indicating that war against Egypt would not weaken U.S. interests.²⁵¹ Amory later professed that he had pleaded with Dulles to either trust him or to put his faith in a “co-opted Israeli agent!”²⁵²

Journalist David Martin has argued that the misanthropic Angleton believed “history was conspiracy.”²⁵³ A July 12, 1976, *NYT* story asserted that in the “wake of Suez” in 1957-58 Angleton sent nuclear scientists to Dimona to help Israel develop “atomic weapons.” Based on an August 1975 *Penthouse* article written by Tad Szulc, a former *NYT* correspondent, the *NYT*

²⁴⁷ Tim Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA* (New York: Doubleday, 2007), p. 123.

²⁴⁸ John Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), p.302.

²⁴⁹ Leonard Mosley, *Dulles- A Biography of Eleanor, Allen and John Foster Dulles and Their Family Network* (New York: Dial Press, 1978), pp. 415-416.

²⁵⁰ By gaining Dulles’ trust, Mangold has asserted that “no-knock Angleton” had “unrivaled personal access” to the DCI “throughout the 1950s,” setting a precedent for future DCIs. At Angleton’s May 15, 1987, funeral, former DCIs Richard Helms and James Schlesinger attended. Ed Knowles, who headed the Soviet Division’s separate CI Branch (1958 -1963), told Mangold that “No one controlled Jim” because he possessed a “marked tendency toward the Machiavellian.” Mangold, *Cold Warrior*, pp. 45, 50-53 180-181, 330-331; David C. Martin, *Wilderness of Mirrors* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), p. 203; Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes*, p. 128.

²⁵¹ Hahn, “The View from Jerusalem,” p. 523.

²⁵² Jeff McConnell and Richard Higgins, “The Israeli Account,” *Boston Globe*, December 14, 1986, p. 16.

²⁵³ Martin, *Wilderness of Mirrors*, p. 215.

piece stressed that one of these men was a British-born physicist who possessed “special and esoteric ties to the CIA.”²⁵⁴ Szulc contended that U.S. assistance was a quid pro quo for an Israeli withdrawal from the Egyptian Sinai.²⁵⁵ The allegation was also categorically denied by the CIA, unsurprising considering its inimical history with the reporter.²⁵⁶ Despite subsequent denials provided by Harkavy and Pry mentioned in the introduction, Wolf Blitzer, a former AIPAC employee, did not refute Szulc’s allegation that Angleton had “secretly aided Israel with technical information during the late 1950s.” Instead, he praised Szulc as a “respected foreign

²⁵⁴ If Angleton executed such a policy, it is not a surprise considering his bureaucratic tendencies, the CIA’s internal subculture and Eisenhower’s governing style. Mangold has argued that Angleton discreetly constructed “an alternative CIA” where he set his own “rules, beyond peer review or executive supervision.” In a December 9, 1961, letter to the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, DCI Dulles admitted that certain “Agency” factions possessed “virtual autonomous functions” fully capable of independent organizational action. This blind eyed delegation was a trademark of Ike, who, other than perhaps Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush, gave the CIA more free reign to operate than any other President. Describing the presidency as an “ephemeral” position, political scientist Fred Greenstein has argued that Ike once told *Time-Life* President Henry Luce that the elephantine U.S. national security bureaucracy had become “too big, too complex, and too persuasive...for one individual to pretend to direct...” Historian Tor Egil Følrand has contended that Ike’s bureaucratic underlings sometimes choose to pursue their own agenda and ignored the “president’s wishes.” Dovetailing nicely into Dahl’s long-time argument that the U.S. is really “polyarchy” or “oligarchic republic,” one of the weaknesses of Ike’s “hidden hand” was that it precipitated a system of “many hidden hands” which could “turn policy in directions unintended by the commander in chief himself.” Informed by Representative Paul Findley (R-Illinois) that few in Congress know how much money the CIA receives and “none” how it is spent, historian Arthur Schlesinger has argued that Ike possessed a sharp “instinct” but did “nothing” to regulate the “secrecy system.” The CIA’s Richard Bissell had doubts whether Eisenhower “was fully knowledgeable about what his administration was doing and whether he was in control of it.” Gaddis has observed that Ike failed to monitor decisions closely with “original intent” and instead employed a “curious unwillingness to grasp the reigns of power at all levels.” There is something unsettling in the statement that “bureaucracies” can not “be trusted to monitor themselves...” Mangold, *Cold Warrior*, p. 306; Memorandum from DCI Dulles to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, “Subject 6th Report to the President by the President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities,” January 9, 1961, *FRUS*, 1961-1963, Volume XXV: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjif/xxv/60.08.htm> (Document 83); Fred Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1983), pp. 3, 5, 9, 57, 81, 87, 92; Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory*, p. 158; Tor Egil Følrand, “Selling Firearms to the Indians,” *DH* 15, 1 (Spring 1991), pp. 222-224; Schlesinger, *The Imperial Presidency*, pp. 304; 327; Richard Bissell and John Lewis, *Reflections of a Cold Warrior* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), p. 114; John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 263; “Article Says Israel Got C.I.A. Atomic Aid,” *NYT*, July 12, 1976, p. 11.

²⁵⁵ Tad Szulc, “Murder by Proxy,” *Penthouse*, August 1975, p. 46; “Article Says Israel Got C.I.A. Atomic Aid,” *NYT*, July 12, 1976, p. 11.

²⁵⁶ Szulc’s most famous *NYT* article, published on April 8, 1961, was entitled “Cuban Intrigue Boiling in Miami as Castro Foes Step up Efforts.” The previous day Szulc had written a piece which indicated that anti-Castro forces had been training in Florida and Guatemala, with CIA guidance and financing, in preparation for an invasion. The *NYT*, however, refused to publish the CIA related sections. The Bay of Pigs fiasco occurred ten days later. In his obituary, Daniel Lewis asserted that CIA files identified Szulc as “anti-agency” and “under suspicion as a hostile foreign agent.” Daniel Lewis, “Tad Szulc, 74, Dies,” *NYT*, May 22, 2001, p. C17.

affairs writer.”²⁵⁷ Cohen has asserted that one of the reasons Dimona kept its reactor secret from the U.S. was because Israel “may also have had friends in high places...who might have helped to suppress the early information.” One of these individuals was Angleton who “jealously” guarded the Israeli desk and “did not share sensitive information with other agencies, and also withheld much of it from other CIA factions.”²⁵⁸

Gauging how much Angleton knew about Dimona is difficult to determine. Stephen Millet, Angleton’s primary aide during the 1950s, admitted that the U.S. had problems collecting quality human intelligence in Israel because “its people” were “more tightly knit” than the U.S. Israeli scrutiny of U.S. officials was smothering. In 1956 telephone bugs were discovered in the U.S. Military Attaché’s office. Stephen Koczak, a former officer assigned to Tel Aviv, asserted that Donald John Sanne, the CIA’s Station Chief in Israel (1953-1956), informed his successor, Harold Williams, that their U.S. Embassy phones were also bugged.²⁵⁹ All Embassy contacts with Israel’s government and citizens were channeled through a “special liaison office” in Israel’s Foreign Ministry. Those who disobeyed protocol were followed. Sanne, Williams, and Koczak were all kept under surveillance during their tenures in country. As the only official able to circumvent Tel Aviv’s tight diplomatic hierarchy, Angleton, according to Hersh, utilized his “close personal ties with the de Shalit family and others” to learn about Dimona.²⁶⁰

Considering Angleton’s relationship with Israel’s IC since 1951, the dearth of U.S. human information on Dimona during the 1950s is unacceptable. Angleton did not have to make new allies. He just had to keep his old ones, namely the DCI which, according to a 1963 Soviet

²⁵⁷ Wolf Blitzer, *Between Washington and Jerusalem* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 88-89; “Wolf Blitzer is a Zionist,” <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2-8aTGnjHnI> (7:16).

²⁵⁸ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 84.

²⁵⁹ Jeff McConnell and Richard Higgins, “The Israeli Account,” *Boston Globe*, December 14, 1986, p. 16.

²⁶⁰ Basing his source on an anonymous “senior official,” Hersh professed that Angleton’s first report on Dimona was filed in the late 1950s without being disseminated to the powerful Frank Wisner’s Directorate of Operations, the body theoretically responsible for clandestine actions. Hersh, *The Samson Option*, pp. 145-147, 162.

document, represents the “most important figure” after the President in organizing U.S. foreign policy.²⁶¹ Angleton never disclosed his informants, not even to Dulles, meaning this paperless trail died with him. Yale historian Sherman Kent, a former head of the CIA’s Office of National Estimates (ONE), correctly professed that in the CIA “valuable employees” were often relieved while those “of a lesser...competence” soldiered “on.”²⁶² The CIA’s HUMINT on Dimona needs to be compared and contrasted with its technical data on the subject.

The historiography of the U-2 missions over Dimona is difficult to decipher.²⁶³ Historian Norman Polmar has contended that on March 11, 1959, two IAF fighters failed to intercept an “an unidentified aircraft.” He did not explain why the U-2, the tightest kept secret of Ike’s presidency, was spying on Israel, only stating that it “overflew Haifa and turned south” before overflying the Gaza Strip.²⁶⁴ The CIA’s Donald Pedlow and Gregory Welzenbach have concluded that “early 1959” saw the U-2 fly “over Middle East countries,” a tacit reference to

²⁶¹ This statement was made by V. Cherynavskiy, a Russian expert in international affairs, sometime in 1963. A Pamphlet about the Chief of US Intelligence, John McCone State Publishing House for Political Literature, Moscow, 1963, NSF, Departments and Agencies, CIA General (1963 and undated), Box 271, *JFKL*.

²⁶² Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 146.

²⁶³ The U-2 made its first flight over the U.S.S.R. on July 1, 1956. Its first flight over the Near East originated from Wiesbaden, West Germany, and landed in Adana, Turkey, on August 29, 1956. The U-2 pictures revealed that Israel possessed 60 Mystère fighters rather than the 24 planes Paris claimed. Two years later the U-2 was back in action after Iraq’s monarchy was overthrown and Chamille Chamoun’s Lebanese regime was threatened by a nationalist revolt on July 14-15, 1958. For every flight, Dulles would first give the “important job of” selecting targets to James Reber. For every flight Brugioni and James Cunningham would calculate the necessary logistics. When the flight plan was completed it was given to Reber to be presented to Ike for approval. Brugioni purported that often U. Alexis Johnson would “look at the memo and make appropriate comments representing the Department of State’s view” until he was named Ambassador to Thailand in January 1958. There is no mention whether anyone filled Johnson’s role after Herter became Secretary of State on April 22, 1959. After Ike approved the mission Reber’s memo would be given to Dulles, “who would forward it to his brother.” In September 1956 the U.S. established the Detachment B base at Adana, later renamed Incirlik. For nearly four years Adana was the springboard for U-2 flights over the Near East and Dimona. Bissell omitted any mention of the U-2 flights over Dimona, but He purported vaguely that “operations over the Middle East were less carefully allocated by the president than those over the Soviet bloc.” Bissell and Lewis, *Reflections of a Cold Warrior*, pp. 120-121. Dino Brugioni, *Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Random House, 1991), pp. 29-33; “Eisenhower names 7 New Ambassadors,” *NYT*, January 24, 1958, p. 13; Norman Polmar, *Spyplane: The U-2 History Declassified* (Osceola, WI: MBI, 2001), pp. 95-96.

²⁶⁴ Polmar, *Spyplane: The U-2 History Declassified* (Osceola, WI: MBI, 2001), p. 122.

the March 11 flight over Dimona.²⁶⁵ Although Chris Pocock omitted this flight in *Dragon Lady*, he has argued that there were “less than...a dozen” sorties “in 1959” and no penetrations until April 1960 when two U-2s overflew “the secret nuclear research facility.”²⁶⁶ These two flights were the only sorties which could have photographed Dimona in 1960. After the Soviets downed Francis Gary Powers’ U-2 on May 1, all flights were halted until late October.²⁶⁷

The U-2 flights which uncovered that Israel was constructing a second reactor in the Negev began in early 1958. As a photo interpreter, Brugioni witnessed activity at an IAF facility south of Beersheba where a large fence in a barren area a dozen miles from Dimona was being assembled. “We spotted it right away,” Brugioni told Hersh, rhetorically adding, “What the hell was that big of a plant...doing there in the middle of the desert?” He regularly briefed Strauss on U-2 intelligence but “I never knew what he was thinking ...I’d get the reaction ‘that’s all right.’” More importantly, these briefings commenced before Strauss resigned on June 30, 1958, proving that the Dimona flights had started months before. Brugioni added that in “early 1958” Israel began digging and pouring cement into heavy foundations: “Whenever you build something nuclear you build it thick and deep. They were pouring a hell of a lot of concrete.” Israel constructed two separate sites, the second one containing the chemical reprocessing plant. Fake plastic trees were also planted in the desert to hinder photo opportunities of the facility.²⁶⁸

The Negev drama was matched by political theatre in Washington. Brugioni maintained that while Dulles occasionally inquired about the “Jewish information,” he would say “his office would call later and tell me to forget it.” “We saw it going up,” he remarked, but the redundant response from on high was ““this isn’t going to be disseminated, is it?” Brugioni admitted that he

²⁶⁵ Gregory Pedlow and Donald Welzenbach, *The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954-1974* (CIA: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1998), p. 165.

²⁶⁶ Chris Pocock, *Dragon Lady: The History of the U-2 Spyplane* (Shrewsbury, England: Airlife, 1989), pp. 40-46.

²⁶⁷ Polmar, *Spyplane*, p. 157.

²⁶⁸ Hersh, *The Samson Option*, pp. 52- 58 & 90.

could never decipher “whether the White House wanted Israel to have the bomb or not.”²⁶⁹ He informed Cohen that when he discussed Dimona with Dulles, “probably in the summer or fall of 1958,” he was barred from inspecting any “sensitive human intelligence material” by Amory’s office.²⁷⁰ Lundahl, head of CIA/PIC, was responsible for delivering the U-2 photos to the White House in “late 1958 or early 1959.” No written notes from his briefings can be found; this was no accident as “Ike didn’t want any notes-period.”²⁷¹ Brugioni told Cohen that Lundahl once returned “in early 1958” from a briefing with Ike and Strauss and confessed that Ike “did not say a word.”²⁷² He also recollected to Hersh that “nobody came back to” him “ever, on Israel.”²⁷³

David Henry Thoreau penned that “if you really wish to do anything, resign your office.” The “revolution is accomplished” only after “the subject has refused alliance.”²⁷⁴ Folk singer Tom Lehrer’s prudent analysis of “bureaucratic politics” explains why Brugioni and Lundahl did not resign in defiance of the CIA’s Alice in Wonderland Dimona policy. In a July 1965 song about a Nazi rocket scientist, Lehrer mused: “Once the rockets are up/ Who cares where they come down?/ That’s not my department!/ Said Wernher von Braun.”²⁷⁵ Careerism usually trumps pragmatism. Yale political scientist Robert Dahl has honestly intoned that “most

²⁶⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 53-58.

²⁷⁰ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 371-372n20.

²⁷¹ Hersh, *The Samson Option*, p. 53.

²⁷² Cohen has been reluctant to consider that the U.S. deliberately manipulated intelligence to cover-up Dimona. Like his own analysis on this crucial caveat, he described Ike’s record on Dimona as “mixed and inconsistent,” arguing that the U-2 photos were “inconclusive” even though once the pertinent intelligence was streamlined with all “governmental agencies” the White House was “forceful in drawing the line.” Contradicting himself pages later, he asserted that Ike’s failure to act set a bipartisan “precedent” for subsequent administrations to organize and prioritize policy toward Dimona “. . . as a special case.” Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 84, 97.

²⁷³ Both Dulles brothers and Bissell joined Ike for the briefings. Bissell has argued that Ike was a “cautious man” who never made a “direct decision in meetings about the U-2 at which” he present. Instead, Eisenhower would “deliberate in private, probably in consultation” with the Secretary of State and his decisions would be transmitted usually by” General Andrew Goodpaster, who was the White House Staff Secretary and liaison with the CIA for the U-2 flights. Bissell has stressed that the “need to know doctrine” meant that Lundahl’s “colleagues and superiors,” with the exception of Amory, “were unaware of his activities.” Bissell and Lewis, *Reflections of a Cold Warrior*, pp. 114 & 105; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 83; Hersh, *The Samson Option*, p. 55.

²⁷⁴ Henry David Thoreau, “Resistance to Civil Government,” In *The Norton Anthology of American Literature*, ed. Nina Baym (New York: Norton & Company, 2003), p. 845.

²⁷⁵ Clifford, “Bureaucratic Politics,” p. 91.

people are egoists, not altruists.”²⁷⁶ Self-censorship breeds conformity but not responsibility. Brugioni confessed that one needed to “be careful” with Israeli information if you valued your “career” and he quickly “read the tea leaves.” Lundahl admitted that he reported all he knew to his “masters...on the mountain.”²⁷⁷ The intelligence process is not democratic, although some believe it “ought to be.”²⁷⁸ Behaving anonymously rather than assertively ensures self-preservation and growth in any bureaucracy.²⁷⁹

Kent has argued that it is difficult to build trust between intelligence producers and consumers even when they reside in “the same...building...”²⁸⁰ A conservative estimate can be made that six CIA officials - Dulles, Bissell, Lundahl, Brugioni, Amory and Angleton - knew that Israel was pursuing a clandestine weapons program. Ensuring that U-2 intelligence remained segregated in this group was a deliberate policy executed by Ike and Dulles. The DCI often repeated the truism of his uncle Robert Lansing, Woodrow Wilson’s Secretary of State, that “it isn’t a lie to withhold information from a person to whom it is not entitled.”²⁸¹ If some secrets are fully streamlined then the “main regional units” would “not have adequate enthusiasm” to carry on the innocuous “scissors-and-paste” roles of their “clerical” jobs.²⁸²

As commander of the Normandy invasion and coiner of the phrase, “military-industrial complex,” Ike arguably possessed more intelligence and military knowledge than any President

²⁷⁶ Robert Dahl, *Controlling Nuclear Weapons: Democracy versus Guardianship* (Syracuse: University Press, 1985), pp. 12 & 28.

²⁷⁷ Kent has argued when policymakers have set the course, “the consumer” has “no more to guide him than the indications of the tea leaf and the crystal ball.” Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, p. 205; Hersh, *The Samson Option*, pp. 53, 55, 58. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

²⁷⁸ *No End in Sight* (2007) Written and directed by Charles Ferguson.

²⁷⁹ Brugioni and Lundahl could not leak Dimona to the press without the fear of being fired without just cause, due process or compensation. A 1974 commission lead by Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller concluded that the National Security Act gave the DCI unlimited and “unreviewable... discharge power.” U.S. Congress, *Rockefeller Commission on CIA Activities with the U.S.*: Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, June 1975. Refer to Chapter 7; http://www.aarcibrary.org/publib/content/s/contents_church.htm;

²⁸⁰ Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, pp. 167, 81, 54.

²⁸¹ Winks, *Cloak & Gown: Scholars in the Secret War*, p. 382.

²⁸² Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, p. 142.

before or since. He also knew how to engineer plausible deniability. No one in his White House explicitly declared that Israel should be allowed to pursue the bomb and nothing existed on paper. White House Chief of Staff Andrew Goodpaster informed Hersh that the Ben-Gurion-Ike exchanges were “very close held.” While the U.S. was concerned about “Dimona,” he could not recall a “specific exchange about a nuclear umbrella.”²⁸³ The intelligence apparatus can only be controlled via an orally interlocking and compartmentalized system where the control of the paper flow must be undeniable.²⁸⁴

Subsumed within the ONE, the Board of Nation Estimates (BNE), with Kent as its Chairman, was responsible for examining the military capacities and intentions of foreign nations. The first NIE on “fourth country” nuclear proliferation was produced on June 18, 1957. Its analysis was inaccurate. It predicted that by 1967 “up to 10” nations could develop a nuclear weapon potential “using only native resources.” Compared to Japan, India, and East Germany, Israel possessed “fewer of the requirements for a successful program and would require major foreign assistance to produce... weapons within” a decade. Three paragraphs later the report stressed that “Israel would almost certainly attempt to achieve” the bomb if it could obtain fissionable material and the necessary financing.”²⁸⁵ Composed months after the first U2 had

²⁸³ Pedlow and Welzenbach, *The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954-1974*, p.267; Hersh, *The Samson Option*, p. 55.

²⁸⁴ Historian John Ferris has asserted that given “Washington’s rule of politics by publicity, the more widely a document is circulated, the more likely it is to be disclosed.” The U-2 operation was the only part of the CIA that had its own communications office and operational cable traffic. All overseas cable traffic went straight to Bissell and no one saw copies without his permission. The CIA’s monthly progress reports for the U-2 were “only about five pages.” De Tocqueville elegantly averred that the U.S. “public administration” prefers to transmit ideas orally and the small portion which is “committed to writing is wafted away forever...” Bissell and Lewis, *Reflections of a Cold Warrior*, pp. 99 & 105; De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, p. 243; John Ferris, “Coming in from the Cold War: the Historiography of American Intelligence, 1945-1990,” In *America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941*, ed. Michael J. Hogan (New York: Cambridge University Press: 1994), p. 568; Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, p. 129.

²⁸⁵ After an unsuccessful attempt in the mid-1990s, in 2001 the GWNSA utilized the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to acquire the NIE. DCI, NIE 100-6-57, “Nuclear Weapons Production in Fourth Countries- Likelihood and Consequences,” June 18, 1957, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB155/prolif-2.pdf>.

over flown Dimona, on July 1, 1958, the BNE produced another estimate, NIE 100-2-58²⁸⁶ Although the NIE only viewed Israel's program in the "moderate stage," interestingly, paragraph 90 stressed that the bomb might soon be produced by a "totally irresponsible government." Offering Israel as the only example, the NIE warned that if a country "for special reasons deeply involved in a controversy of worldwide significance" acquired the bomb it would "be more likely to lead a general conflagration."²⁸⁷ On September 15 the CIA/OSI moved Israel to the Third Category Priority on its watchdog list where it conspicuously remained for the remainder of Ike's presidency.²⁸⁸

When analyzing NIEs 100-6-57 and 100-2-58, one must account for the biases of their authors. Kent, who signed both documents, has argued that the "history of intelligence" has always been an internal battle between "the defenders and detractors of the Jewish national home in Palestine."²⁸⁹ One defender was Angleton who, Mangold has deduced, possessed "remarkable access" to Kent.²⁹⁰ Polmar has contended that Kent was kept in the dark about the U-2 secret by the CIA's Office of Security as the CIA viewed U-2 intelligence as far too sensitive to be used even in classified publications.²⁹¹ The primitive "dry bones"²⁹² analysis apparent in these two NIEs was a consequence of Kent being deliberately kept out of the loop.

²⁸⁶ According to political scientist Lock Johnson, on average, NIE's usually take three to seven months to produce. Based on the three to seven month estimate, therefore, the U.S. IC began to put the pieces together for NIE 100-2-58 anywhere from late December 1957 to March 1958, roughly the same time Dimona's construction was initiated and the U-2 first began overflying the facility. Lock Johnson, "Glimpses into the Gems of American Intelligence," *Intelligence and National Security*, 23, 3 (June 2008), p. 342.

²⁸⁷ Through the FOIA this estimate was declassified in May 2004. DCI, NIE100-2-58, "Development of Nuclear Capabilities by Fourth Countries: Likelihood and Consequences," July 1, 1958, GWNSA, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB155/prolif-3a.pdf>.

²⁸⁸ "Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60."

²⁸⁹ Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, p. 199.

²⁹⁰ Another defender was Harold Linder, a BNE member during the 1950s. Powers was told by a former BNE member that Linder was "a brilliant guy," but "we were always a little concerned about his objectivity when it came to a paper on Israel." Mangold, *Cold Warrior*, p. 68; Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets*, p. 321n36.

²⁹¹ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 372n25; Richelson, *Spying on the Bomb*, p. 249.

²⁹² Ray Cline, a member of Kent's staff, has asserted that NIEs "are the dry bones...attempts by many hundreds of people to express themselves in ways which were circulating in Washington at that time." In the final analysis an

Following the downing of Powers' U-2, the U.S. debated whether the CIA should retain responsibility for the flights. On July 7, 1960, the CIA produced a heavily excised professing that "overflights" had been conducted in "the Middle East...when special circumstances have justified." The report contended that there were presently "no pressing requirement for continuing flights over neutral areas," a veiled reference to Israel.²⁹³ The BNE's September 20 NIE 100-4-60 concluded that only West Germany, Sweden, Japan, and India "could initiate such programs..."²⁹⁴ All references to Israel in paragraphs 36 and 48 remain classified. Before examining Foggy Bottom's policy of inaction concerning Dimona in the four months following NIE 100-4-60, an investigation of its prior policy on the subject is required.

Three sets of evidence indicate that John F. Dulles knew about Dimona prior to his death on May 24, 1959. First, other than maybe the direct Strauss-Ike correspondences, Dulles had access to all pertinent State and AEC documents on the subject. Secondly, he had helped his brother Allen to craft all NIEs and knew about the U-2 flights as Lundahl had briefed both "brothers."²⁹⁵ *The Post-Mortem* contended that sometime in "1956" State "levied" upon Tel Aviv to include "specific sections on the atomic energy developments" in its future reports. When the U.S. Embassy approached Bergmann on March 3, 1958, he falsely responded that "no formal decision on nuclear power had yet been taken. Twenty-four days later the CIA/OSI requested "detailed information" concerning Israel's "uranium and heavy water production." On April 15 Bergmann flip-flopped, exclaiming now that "the decision to build a power reactor had

NIE should "be responsive to the evidence, not the policymaker." On February 12, 2009, the Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair informed the Senate Select Intelligence Committee that NIE publication can sometimes "cause as much harm as good..." Ferris, "American Intelligence, 1945-1990," p. 575; Cline, *Secrets, Spies, and Scholars*, p. 140; Johnson, "Glimpses into the Gems of American Intelligence," pp. 344-345, 351, 353;; "National Security Threats," C-SPAN, February 12, 2009, <http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/284009-1> (2:01:00).

²⁹³ CIA, "Future of the Agency's U-2 Capability," July 7, 1960, GWNSA, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB74/U2-09.pdf>.

²⁹⁴ DCI, NIE 100-4-60, "Likelihood and Consequences of the Development of Nuclear Capabilities by Additional Countries," September 20, 1960, GWNSA, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB155/prolif-5.pdf>

²⁹⁵ Hersh, *The Samson Option*, p. 57.

already been taken,” adding another and another “five to seven” years were needed before a “reactor could be put into operation.” Nine days after NIE 100-2-58’s publication, the *Post-Mortem* declared that these “requirements” were “served almost verbatim” to a “perturbed” Bergmann by a nameless Second Secretary.²⁹⁶

What, if anything, that Dulles passed on to his successor, Christian Herter, before the latter became Secretary of State on April 22, 1959, is difficult to establish.²⁹⁷ His appointment occurred nearly a month after a U-2 piloted by Powers had over flown Dimona and been pursued by Israeli fighters. Whether Herter as Assistant Secretary was briefed about this sortie or any of the flights over Dimona since 1958 is unknown but seems unlikely.²⁹⁸ Hersh and Bissell, while proclaiming that Lundahl regularly briefed Dulles on U-2 intelligence, both have failed to mention whether this process continued during Herter’s tenure. There is also no evidence that he had access to the relevant NIEs on Dimona. Herter once declared that working under Dulles made him a “number two-man in a one-man” production.”²⁹⁹ From the start of Herter’s tenure, Foggy Bottom missed several opportunities to uncover and confront Israel over Dimona. Personnel changes at the highest diplomatic levels helped precipitate this failure.

²⁹⁶ The SNIE indicated that during the spring of 1958 “it was assumed wrongly” by the IC “that the experimental reactor referred to was the small” research reactor,” at Nahal. “Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60.”

²⁹⁷ Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: Call of Senators Regarding Aid to Israel,” April 22, 1959, *FRUS, 1958-1960* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1985) *Arab-Israeli Dispute; Volume XIII*: 168-169.

²⁹⁸ Two days before the U-2 overflew on Dimona, Herter was listed as the “Acting Secretary” in a meeting with Foreign Minister Meir and Eban. This label was also placed on him on April 9, three weeks before he took over Foggy Bottom and six days after Dulles submitted his resignation. Given his own long relationship with the DCI, however, Herter could have easily found out about Dimona if he was inquisitive enough. From 1947 to 1948 Allen Dulles worked as a senior staffer on the House Select Committee on Foreign under the Chairmanship Herter (R-Massachusetts). Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: Israel’s Request for Assistance with its Jordan Water Development Project,” March 9, 1959, in *FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XIII*, pp. 149-150; Memorandum from Eric A. Johnson to the Acting Secretary of State, April 9, 1959, *Ibid*, pp. 151-152; Telegram from the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State, April 17, 1959, *Ibid*, pp. 163-165; Michael Wala, *The Council on Foreign Relations and American Foreign Policy in the Early Cold War* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1994), p. 233.

²⁹⁹ Press Secretary James Hagerty asserted that Ike had “an easier working relationship” with Herter than with Dulles because the former was “a little less arbitrary in his beliefs.” Historian Michael Beschloss has pointed out that when Herter came to visit the Oval Office, Goodpaster and John Eisenhower felt confident enough to take notes, a practice which “never” transpired under Dulles. Beschloss, *Mayday*, pp. 242-246.

According to a withdrawal sheet at the *JFK* Library, on January 1, 1959, Ben Gurion sent Ike a still classified eleven page letter. One can speculate that this document foreshadowed the changes that followed in Washington and Tel Aviv.³⁰⁰ On March 12, 1959, *one* day after a U-2 flew over Dimona, Foggy Bottom announced that the 33 year old Ogden Reid would replace the seasoned Edward Lawson as Ambassador in Tel Aviv.³⁰¹ On June 11 William Rountree informed Reid that Israel represented “a very special place in U.S. international relations.” Reid responded that it would be his “intention to represent” U.S. interest “first” even though he was aware of the “pressure” which could “be brought on” by Israeli “friends.”³⁰² Conveniently, on May 7, 1959, Ambassador Eban informed his hosts in Washington that his tenure was drawing “to a close.”³⁰³ Upon returning home, Eban revealed that Dimona represented for Israel “an enormous alligator stranded on dry land.”³⁰⁴ His successor was Avraham Harman who had served in the *WZO* since

³⁰⁰ The eleven page letter was attached to a two page letter that DCI Dulles wrote for Kennedy on May 27, 1961, focused on Israel’s nuclear program. Three days later JFK met with Ben Gurion at the Waldorf, where Dimona was discussed for the first time at the highest level. This memo is also still classified. JFK Document Control Record, President’s Office Files, Israel Security (1961-1963), Box 119A, *JFKL*.

³⁰¹ Eisenhower retained only five career diplomats from the previous White House, including Edward B. Lawson, Minister to Iceland, and Monnet Davis, Ambassador to Israel. When Davis died in late December 1953, his successor was Lawson, a Foreign Service member since 1939. After graduating from Yale in 1949, Reid joined the *New York Herald Tribune* in 1950 and in May 1953 was named its President and European Editor. Historian Robert Griffith has argued that the “Reid family” was one of the many influential public relations groups who supported Ike during his path to the Presidency. From 1963 to 1974 he served as a New York Congressman as both a Republican and Democrat, serving as ranking member on the House Foreign Relations Committee. “Executive is named to high Navy Post,” *NYT*, June 2, 1951, p. 20; “Envoy to Israel Named,” *NYT*, April 2, 1954, p. 8; “Envoy to Israel Confirmed,” *NYT*, April 10, 1954, p. 6; “New Envoy of U.S. Arrives in Tel Aviv,” *NYT*, November 3, 1954, p. 6. Robert Griffith, “Dwight Eisenhower and the Corporate Commonwealth,” *American Historical Review* 87, 1 (February 1982), pp. 98-100. Biographic Sketch of Ogden Reid, Israel (2) (March-August 1960), International Series, Box 8, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary: Records, 1952-1961, *DDEL*; Biographic Sketch, January 30, 1961, NSF Countries, Israel General (1/61), Box 118, *JFKL*; Alfred McCoy, *The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade* (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 2003), p. xxi.

³⁰² Interviewed for the Eisenhower Library days after the Six Day War’s conclusion, Reid affirmed that Ike was “sympathetic toward Israel.” He generalized that Ike “was deeply concerned to nuclear non-proliferation” and strived “to prevent the development of nuclear capabilities by other non-nuclear countries.” Which nations constituted “non-nuclear countries” was left unsaid. Memorandum of the Record, “Subject: Mr. William M. Rountree’s Briefing of Ambassador Ogden Reid, June 11, 1959,” undated, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, *Volume XIII*, pp. 182-184; Oral interview of June 14, 1967, with Reid, conducted by John Luter, *DDEL*, pp. 3, 12, 13, 15, 18.

³⁰³ Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: U.S.-Israel Relations,” May 7, 1959, *FRUS*, *Volume XIII*, pp. 171-172.

³⁰⁴ Peres, *Battling for Peace*, p. 119.

1953.³⁰⁵ On September 2, 1959, less than a fortnight after the first amendment to the July 1955 accord, Harman arrived in Washington, meeting Ike twelve days later.³⁰⁶

Thanks to these personnel changes, Ike and Ben-Gurion ensured that Dimona would not re-emerge until March 1960. Mentioned earlier, on March 4 the *NYT* article revealed that 6,500 grams of uranium had “been lent” by the U.S. to Israel “...for peaceful purposes.”³⁰⁷ The *Post-Mortem* noted that during the month Bergmann declared Israel needed five years before it could “erect a nuclear power station.”³⁰⁸ On March 20 the *NYT* reported that Moscow had warned “that if the U.S. gave nuclear weapons to its allies Russia would do the same.” The U.S. responded to the story that it would do “no such thing.”³⁰⁹ None of these issues were discussed during Ben-Gurion’s private trip the U.S. that month, including his talk with Ike on March 10. In a possible implicit reference to Dimona, Ike, claiming there could be no security in a “terrible” era of “nuclear weapons,” “doubted” that Moscow “would give nuclear weapons” to Cairo. The President also mused that Ben-Gurion would discuss “some other matters” with the DCI.³¹⁰

These matters began to emerge three months later. On June 9, 1960, the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv “reported rumors that the French were collaborating with” Israel to build an “atomic ...project near Beersheba.” Israel responded that that it was building “a textile plant” and later a

³⁰⁵ Harman studied at the London School of Economics (LSE) and served in the *WZO* from 1937 to 1940 in London and South Africa before working with the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem on media issues for eight years. He worked in Israel’s Ottawa Embassy from 1950 to 1952 before moving to New York to serve as director of the Office of Information. After being replaced by Itzhak Rabin in February 1968, he became President of Hebrew University for the next fifteen years. Biography of Avraham Harman, NSF, Country File, Israel, Eshkol Visit, (6/1-3/64), Box 143, *Lyndon Baines Johnson Library (LBJL)*; Seth King, “Israel Nominates new Envoy to U.S.,” *NYT*, May 30, 1959, p. 5; Marvin Howe, “Avraham Harman is Dead at 77,” *NYT*, February 25, 1992, p. D22.

³⁰⁶ “New Israeli Ambassador Arrives,” *NYT*, September 2, 1959, p. 2; “Israeli Sees President,” *NYT*, September 15, 1959, p. 45.

³⁰⁷ “Israel Gets U.S. Atom Fuel,” *NYT*, March 4, 1960, p. 11.

³⁰⁸ “Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60.”

³⁰⁹ This article was published five days after the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament met in Geneva to discuss nuclear proliferation. “The News of the Week in Review,” *NYT*, March 20, 1960, p. E1; Editorial Note, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1996) *National Security Policy, Volume III*, pp. 832-833.

³¹⁰ Conversation between Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and the President, March 10, 1960, Israel (2) (March-August 1960), International Series, Box 8, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary: Records, 1952-1961, *DDEL*.

“metallurgical research installation.”³¹¹ On August 2 the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv “reported the possible construction of an Israeli...reactor with French assistance.”³¹² Despite this warning, Herter informed Ike that the U.S. “traditional” policy of deterring a Near East arms race had “proven successful.”³¹³ Herter vaguely warned Ben Gurion on August 4 that some were talking about “a nuclear race among the Great Powers,” while emphasizing that in the “Near East a similar, albeit non-nuclear, stalemate had not developed.”³¹⁴ Nothing was further from the truth. On August 9 the U.S. Army Attaché in Israel acquired some “excellent” photos of the Negev “installation” but he “did not identify the facility or appreciate its significance.”³¹⁵ After an anonymous AEC “member’s request,” the JAEIC “discussed” Dimona on August 15 and “requested” its members not to disclose any information until the “next meeting.”³¹⁶ On September 2 the CIA/OSI prepared a report “on the status of the Israeli nuclear... program,” but this was “not disseminated” to the JAEIC for its meeting six days later. On September 19 the CIA/OSI constructed another Dimona “follow-up” report, although a month passed before this analysis was telexed to U.S. Embassies in Tel Aviv and Paris.³¹⁷

³¹¹ “Chronology of Israel Assurances of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy and Related Events,” Israel- Nuclear Energy Program, 1964-1965-March 1966, NSF, Files of Robert W. Komer (1966-1967), Box 30, *LBJL*.

³¹² “Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60.”

³¹³ Memorandum for the President, “Subject: Proposed Reply to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion’s Letter of June 9, 1960,” August 3, 1960, Israel (1), International Series, Box 32, Whitman File, *DDEL*.

³¹⁴ Personal and Confidential Letter from Secretary of State Christian Herter to Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, August 4, 1960, (Chronological File) August 1960 (2), Box 9, Christian A. Herter Papers, 1957-61, *DDEL*.

³¹⁵ Twenty-five days after the U.S. Army Attaché in Israel took photographs of Dimona, 200 of these images arrived in Washington although the pictures were not “made available” to the “atomic intelligence elements” until December 8. On November 9 the U.S. Air Force asked its office in Israel to take pictures of the “Beersheba site,” but it took another week for the Attaché to obtain these pictures. His report and images, however, were not received until December 1 and were not disseminated for another 26 days. Only a “single copy” was processed via CIA channels on December 5 and made available to Congress. “Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60.”

³¹⁶ On October 8, 1960, the JAEIC produced an exhaustive one-thousand plus page report which asserted that the “holds harmless” July 12, 1955, agreement stipulated that “no classified information” would “be exchanged” between Israel and the U.S. In regards to its “future plans” in atomic energy, Israel only yearned to “place emphasis on nuclear research and training rather than power development.” “*Review of the International Atomic Policies and Programs of the U.S.*,” pp. 675-677; “Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60.”

³¹⁷ “Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60.”

One day after the CIA/OSI produced its second Dimona inquiry in a week NIE 100-4-60 was disseminated on September 20. All sections concerning Israel remain redacted, an important caveat forgotten by the historiography.³¹⁸ Historian John Lewis Gaddis has agreed optimistically that the censoring of government documents, “although bureaucratically...easy” to accomplish, unfairly creates a perception of “things imagined” being “more sinister” than in reality.”³¹⁹ Ray McGovern, who delivered the President’s Daily Brief to Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, has admitted that his 27 years in the CIA taught him about the government’s “unlimited potential for screwing up.” He also wisely and courageously pointed out that there are always “other explanations out there” for so-called intelligence failures. The censorship of the Dimona related sections of NIE 100-4-60 sent a message for everyone to continue to “go along to get along” with power’s prevailing wisdom.³²⁰ Firmly in place since early 1958, the reticent U.S. policy of “ignorance,” inaction and indifference toward Dimona would be accentuated rather than abbreviated in Ike’s final four months in office.³²¹

Had Dimona been publicly exposed in late 1960, this revelation might have ignited three landmines for the outgoing White House, beginning in the field of arms diplomacy. While IAEA

³¹⁸ Other than Cohen, only Hahn has argued, albeit briefly, that in September 1960 the U.S. IC “confirmed” that Israel was secretly building at Dimona a reactor “capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium.” Hahn did not mention NIE 100-4-60 as a source for his one-sentence analysis since the document was only declassified in October 2004. Hahn, *Caught in the Middle East*, p. 264.

³¹⁹ Gaddis falls into the coincidence theorist or “no-fault camp” which assumes that intelligence mistakes are “unavoidable;” the only question is their importance and nature. Ferris has also warned intelligence historians not to mistake the “size of the surviving documentation for significance.” Those who assert that individuals, guided by factional interests, are capable of circumventing the system foolishly ignore the broader historical context. John L. Gaddis, “Intelligence, Espionage, and Cold War Origins,” *Diplomatic History*, 13, 2 (Spring 1989), pp. 209-212; Ferris, “American Intelligence, 1945-1990,” pp. 572, 578, 593.

³²⁰ Consult the first video’s final eight minutes. “War and the Media,” “C-SPAN, September 19, 2006, <http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/194565-1> (72:38); “Interview with 27 Year CIA Veteran Ray McGovern,” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M0Au_OqNCYk&feature=related. (56:30).

³²¹ Madison warned that “ignorance” is the tool of the “cunning;” whereas Princeton political scientists Sheldon Wolin has enunciated that power is usually executed in a “context where the participants know their cues.” See Federalist 51, Gary Wills, ed., *The Federalist Papers* (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), p. 265; Sheldon Wolin, *Democracy Incorporated: Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted Totalitarianism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 38.

negotiations were ongoing in Vienna, on September 9 the State Department created the U.S. Disarmament Administration to coordinate policies for arms control. On October 13 the USDA was put to work when the First Committee of the UNGA discussed the prevention of nuclear proliferation and testing. The negotiations lasted until December 20, a day after Dimona was first reported in the *NYT*.³²² This was also a sensitive time in U.S.-Arab relations as Nasser was set to address the UNGA.³²³ The only meeting between Nasser and a U.S. President occurred at the Waldorf Hotel in New York on September 25. Dimona was obviously absent from the conversation, but Ike informed Nasser that “war” had evolved into a dangerous “dimension after Hiroshima.”³²⁴ One day after the discussion, the first televised presidential debate between Vice-President Richard Nixon and Senator John F. Kennedy took place in Chicago.

Dimona’s complete absence from the 1960 campaign demonstrates Sheldon Wolin’s contention of how easily democracy can “be managed without appearing to be suppressed.”³²⁵ The election’s victor intentionally suppressed Dimona during the campaign. In a televised October 21 address, JFK only mentioned Egypt and China as nations which could soon develop a bomb.³²⁶ In a December 6 meeting with Ike, Herter and Clark Clifford, however, JFK predicated that Israel would possess enough plutonium “available for weapons” by 1963, a “highly distressing” possibility. Herter warned JFK that if the Arabs became aware of Dimona’s purpose the implications could be “explosive.”³²⁷ When there exists bipartisan support on an issue, such

³²² Editorial Note, *FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume III*, p. 905; Editorial Note, *Ibid*, p. 912.

³²³ Never a fan of international conventions, Ben-Gurion declared on September 11 that “he had no intention of attending” the UNGA alongside Nasser. “Ben-Gurion Plans no Visit to the U.N.,” *NYT*, September 12, 1960, p. 6.

³²⁴ Ike’s failure to inform the UAR of Dimona’s existence was proof of the U.S. inability to treat the Arab world, according to Nasser, with “dignity.” Memorandum of Conversation, “Waldorf Towers Hotel,” September 26, 1960, *FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XIII*, pp. 600-607.

³²⁵ Wolin, *Democracy Incorporated*, p. 47.

³²⁶ John W. Finney, “U.S. Hears Israel Moves Toward A-Bomb Potential,” *NYT*, December 19, 1960, p.1.

³²⁷ All of JFK’s Dimona comments were omitted from historian Robert Dalleck’s one-paragraph recollection of the meeting. Israel is mentioned just four times in Dalleck’s JFK biography. Memorandum for Record, Subject: Meeting in Cabinet Room with the President and President-elect Kennedy, 11:00 AM, Tuesday, December 6, 1960, Memos-

as unconditional support for Israel, neither party feels the need to elaborate upon it.³²⁸ In regards to Dimona, there was much going on that the public did not know.

Thirty-six days after Foggy Bottom's October 19 request for further information on French-Israeli nuclear "participation" was answered. On November 24 the U.S. Ambassador in Paris, Amory Houghton, informed the AEC that France was "not collaborating" with Israel "in the construction of a nuclear power plant."³²⁹ Two days later, however, he wrote again to Herter indicating that he had received an "urgent and secret" message from Henry Gomberg focused on Israel's "nuclear power reactor." Gomberg, whose name is excised from the memo, emphasized to Houghton that he had been silenced by the U.S. Embassy "in...Tel Aviv" from discussing the subject openly and honestly. Describing Ben Gurion as a "personal friend," the University of Michigan professor revealed that in three weeks Israel would publicly announce the "Beersheba" project to the world.³³⁰ Five days later in Washington Gomberg declared to Farley that he was "convinced" that a "Marcoule type reactor" was being assembled in the Negev.³³¹

Another week passed before the U.S. confronted these allegations in a December 8 NSC meeting, whose protocol has nearly a page and a half excised. Reminding everyone that the U.S. had always "insisted on inspection," Herter "wondered" aloud "whether Israel would be willing to apply safeguards to its nuclear facilities" since the U.S. had not helped build Dimona. The next five lines of the transcript have been censored. Money was probably being discussed as

Staff-re Change of Administration (2), Presidential Transitional Series, Box 1, Ann Whitman File, *DDEL*; Robert Dalleck, *An Unfinished Life* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2003), pp. 302-303 & 822.

³²⁸As early as August 1950 an American Zionist Council (AZC) had announced that "support" for Israel had "always been bipartisan." Pointing to the 1950 Douglas-Taft bill, which provided aid to Israel, the AZC pointed out that the legislation was sponsored by the strongest "Eisenhower Republicans," including Congressman Herter. *The Attitude of the Major Candidates and Political Parties on Israel and the Near East*, August 7, 1950, General Files 122 Israel (1), Box 817, Central Files, *DDEL*; Goldberg, *Jewish Power*, p. 53.

³²⁹ Department of State Telegraph from the U.S. Embassy in Paris to Secretary of State (Herter), November 24, 1960, GWNSA, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/israel/documents/reveal/02-01.htm>.

³³⁰ Department of State Telegraph from the U.S. Embassy in Paris to Secretary of State, November 26, 1960, GWNSA, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/israel/documents/reveal/03-01.htm>

³³¹ *FRUS*, 1958-1960, *Volume III*, p. 557; Memorandum of Conversation, "Subject: Israeli Atomic Energy," December 1, 1960, GWNSA, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/israel/documents/reveal/04-01.htm>.

Under Secretary of the Treasury, Fred Scribner, asserted that the “expensive” reactor was being financed by “Jewish charitable organizations.” Responsible for overseeing the Internal Revenue Service, Scribner admitted great “difficulties” in tracking these funds.³³² Another three lines have been censored, but Dulles then gave credence to the Szulc thesis, by declaring in a Freudian slip that “the U.S. might have provided Israel with some kind of reactor.” After three more censored sentences, the DCI admitted that Israel had obtained “the necessary material from abroad” to be able “to build and operate a nuclear facility.”³³³

The following day the Secretary of State finally asked his counterparts in Paris, London and Tel Aviv what was being built in the Negev. The long day began with Herter informing U.S. Embassies in the aforementioned cities that after showing Harman photos of the “installation,” he had commented that the facility was “10 times” larger than originally envisioned. The next three lines of the memo are excised, but Herter exclaimed “an obvious inconsistency” existed concerning the reactor’s cost, notably an expenditure of “\$80 million” which had never been “mentioned” before. Harman ignorantly denied any “knowledge,” but promised to relay these points to Ben-Gurion “and request urgent advice.”³³⁴ At 5:50 p.m. Herter telephoned the French Embassy’s Claude Lebel to declare that “since 1958” Israel had been constructing a reactor in the Negev. Dimona’s cost now ranged from anywhere from 40 to 80 million dollars.”³³⁵ At 10:00 p.m. he telegraphed an eyes only Farley-drafted message to Tel Aviv, London and Paris re-

³³² “Fred Scribner Jr., 86, Treasury Aide to Eisenhower,” *NYT* January 8, 1994, p. 30; 469th Meeting of the NSC, December 8, 1960, NSC Series, Box 13, Anne Whitman File, *DDEL*.

³³³ That same day the CIA produced SNIE 100-8-60, *Implications of the Acquisition by Israel of a Nuclear Weapons Capability*, which remains classified. Only its post-mortem has been declassified. “469th Meeting of NSC, December 8, 1960, NSC Series, Box 13, Anne Whitman File, *DDEL*; Richelson, *Spying on the Bomb*, pp. 252, 606n65.

³³⁴ Outgoing Eyes Telegram from Herter to U.S. Ambassadors in Tel Aviv, Paris and London, December 9, 1960, Israel (3) (October 1960-January 1961), International Series, Box 32, Ann Whitman File, *DDEL*.

³³⁵ Telephone Log of Secretary of State and Israeli Ambassador, December 9, 1960, GWNSA, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/israel/documents/reveal/06-01.htm>

emphasizing that this was “the first” the U.S. “had heard of such” a “large research reactor.”³³⁶

Over the next week Dimona surfaced just once in the U.S. primary documentation, during U.S.-French-British talks in Paris on December 14-15. The subject did not surface during the lower-level negotiations conducted by the third most powerful person at Foggy Bottom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Livingston Merchant,³³⁷ France’s Charles Lucet and Britain’s Frederick Hoyner-Millar. On the second day of talks de Murville hosted a dinner for Herter and the British Foreign Secretary where they discussed “Laos, the Congo, East-West relations and Latin America.”³³⁸ In an eyes only telegram to Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon, however, the Secretary emphasized that de Murville had told him privately that Dimona, a “replica” of Marcoule, was a culmination of a “very secret agreement reached between Israel and France shortly after Suez.”³³⁹ On the last day of NATO ministerial meetings, on December 18, Merchant met with Home and de Murville to discuss Algeria and Laos.³⁴⁰

³³⁶ One day after Harman confessed to Herter that he would inquire about Dimona, he attended an elaborate Chicago dinner, financed by Feinberg’s *IBO*, to honor Harry Truman as the “Man of the Century.” Others in the audience included former New York Governor Averell Harriman, General Omar Bradley and James McDonald, the first U.S. Ambassador to Israel. “Israel Bond Unit Honors Truman,” *NYT*, December 11, 1960, p. X20; State Department Telegram to the Embassy in Israel, December 9, 1960, *FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XIII*, pp. 393-94.

³³⁷ It is impossible that Merchant was unaware of Dimona’s existence considering his deep place within the IC. According to the GWNSA’s 40 year chronology of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, in December 1960 Merchant, along with Dulles, James Gray, the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, and James Douglas, Acting Secretary of Defense, were permanent members of “NSC 5412/2 Special Group.” The “Special Group” was charged with reviewing and approving CIA black operations - assassinations, coup d’états, election rigging, propaganda and psychological warfare- viewed as too sensitive for the USIB to handle. The origins of this deep faction, essentially a NSC subcommittee, stem back to March 15, 1954, when Ike approved NSC 5412 giving the DCI responsibility, along with State and Defense representatives, for covert operations. On December 28, 1955, NSC 5412/2 was passed giving representation to four members: the Assistant Secretaries of State and Defense, DCI and the President, who was represented by the NSC. It was only after 1959 that “Special Group” meetings were held on a weekly meeting. “Bay of Pigs: 40 Years after Chronology,” GWNSA, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/bayofpigs/chron.htm>; “Note on U.S. Covert Actions,” *FRUS, 1964-1968*, (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2001) *Western Europe, Volume XII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xii/2961.htm>; David Wise and Thomas Ross, *The Invisible Government: The CIA and U.S. Intelligence* (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), p. 263.

³³⁸ Editorial Note, *FRUS, 1958-1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part II*, p. 430.

³³⁹ De Murville believed that the “money came from” U.S. sources, whereas Herter viewed as a combination of U.S. “government or private aid.” Eyes only Dillon from Herter, December 16, 1960, Dulles-Herter Series, Christian Herter, December 1960 (1), Box 12, Ann Whitman File, *DDEL*.

³⁴⁰ Memorandum for Record, Subject: Meeting with the President and President-elect Kennedy, 11:00 AM, Tuesday, December 6, 1960, Memos-Staff-re Change of Administration (2), Presidential Transitional Series, Box, Ann Whitman File, *DDEL*; Editorial Note, *FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume VII, Part II*, p. 430.

The Paris forum was not well timed to introduce Dimona to the world even though the *Daily Express* and *WP* released stories on the subject during the conference. Control over the source providing the first in-depth Dimona narrative was paramount if the White House desired to gauge, influence, and ultimately hide Israel's atomic ambitions. With one exception of one brief blurb, no critique of the U.S. media's December 1960 coverage of Dimona has been conducted by the historiography.³⁴¹ Considering Ferris' reminder that "intelligence leaks better than it disseminates" and Ike's dismissive view of the press, this is quite surprising.³⁴²

On December 19, 1960, a highly probable CIA asset unveiled Dimona in the *NYT*'s front page.³⁴³ Informing Hersh that the story had been "handed" to him "on a platter," John Finney admitted that Arthur Krock had informed him to "call" McCone if he wanted a new scoop. Importantly, McCone leaked just enough information to "plant a story" but not enough to provide the public a complete picture.³⁴⁴ In his NBC *Meet the Press* appearance with Krock, McCone disclosed that all information was still "unofficial" but never mentioned the word "secret." When asked if Israel had been "supplied" assistance from "one of the nuclear powers," McCone "replied that he did not know." Finney weakly argued that the U.S. was still uncertain

³⁴¹ In a sarcastic tone, Shoenbaum has jabbed that Finney's December 19, 1960 story represented the "first among" the Dimona "news the *New York Times* saw fit to print." Shoenbaum, *The U.S. and the State of Israel*, pp.126-127.

³⁴² Greenstein has averred that Ike often surprised his staff them by raising "information" that they had missed in the "morning news." Eisenhower was the first President to employ a Press Secretary, Jim Hagerty, who had previously worked for New York Governor Thomas Dewy. As Hagerty was vetting Ike once for a press conference, the latter mused: "Don't worry, Jim, if that question comes up, I'll just confuse them." Ferris, "American Intelligence," p. 568; Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency*, pp. 26, 41, 61, 69, 107.

³⁴³ There are three pieces of evidence that indicate that Finney represented one of the 10 *NYT* reporters which *WP* journalist Carl Bernstein revealed in *Rolling Stone* in 1977 who worked undercover for the CIA from 1950 and 1966 in Operation Mockingbird. Due to his service in the U.S. Navy during World War II, tenure at Yale after the war - the most closely associated university with the spook world (*Skull and Bones*) - where he was editor of the *Yale Daily News* and stint as the *United Press*' Pentagon correspondent, Finney was an establishment man. He was recruited to the *NYT* in 1957 by James Reston, a confirmed CIA asset, working closely under him on leading national security issues such as nuclear proliferation and the Vietnam War. Bernstein, who broke the Watergate scandal with the better known Bob Woodward, has argued that from 1952 to 1977 400 U.S. journalists worked undercover for the Company. Stephen Labaton, "John Finney, 80," *NYT*, October 30, 2004, p. A17; Carl Bernstein, "The CIA and the Media," http://carlbernstein.com/magazine_cia_and_media.p hp; Cord Meyer, *Facing Reality: From World Federalism to the CIA* (Boston: University Press of America, 1980), p. 87; John Finney, "U.S. Hears Israel Moves Toward A-Bomb Potential," *NYT*, December 19, 1960, p. 1.

³⁴⁴ Hersh, *The Samson Option*, p. 71.

of “Israel’s intentions,” admitted that France was “assisting” and warned that Dimona “might drive” Cairo closer to Moscow “for arms...” The story ended by revealing that “some high” U.S. “officials” had suggested placing the “reactor” under the IAEA inspections.³⁴⁵ Also in the *WP* and *NYT* the same day, Bergmann announced these stories were “flattering...but untrue...,” even though it was revealed that Israel could possess the bomb in “three to five years.” The press even promoted this development, as another anonymous *WP* story informed the public that the U.S. should allow the “free and democratic” Jewish state to gain the bomb.³⁴⁶

This subservient journalism provided the catalyst for a meeting the same day between Ike, Herter, Farley, Gates, Dulles, McCone, Goodpaster, Hagerty and Treasury Secretary Robert Anderson. Proclaiming that Dimona’s existence was “beginning to leak to the press,” Herter proposed misleading the public that reactor was intended for “peaceful purposes” to counter this perception. McCone disagreed, arguing correctly that Israel was building a chemical separation plant “financed from U.S. support.” The subject of capital broke Ike’s insulated approach to the issue. Speaking for the first and only time on the record, the President declared that “evidence now” demonstrated that Dimona’s cost ranged from “\$100 to \$200 million dollars.” Since Israel had voted for the safeguards clause at Vienna in September, Ike was “confident” that Israel would “permit such inspections.” His final statement of the meeting perfectly encapsulated U.S. strategy vis-à-vis Dimona since early 1958: there was “no official information.”³⁴⁷

The *NYT*’s uncritical coverage of Dimona continued the next day. Finney downplayed the

³⁴⁵ John Finney, “U.S. Hears Israel Moves Toward A-Bomb Potential,” *NYT*, December 19, 1960, p. 1.

³⁴⁶ Warren Komberg, “Israeli Reactor ‘Not Revealed to Us,’ Says McCone,” *WP*, December 19, 1960, p. A7; “The Secret Reactor,” *WP*, December 20, 1960, p. A14; “Israeli Denies Report,” *NYT*, December 19, 1960, p. 8.

³⁴⁷ Anderson also stated in the document, circulated only to the rest of the IC on January 12, 1961, that “Jewish charities” were “sending money out without control,” placing into “question as to whether these contributions” qualified “as tax-deductible.” Anderson’s successor at the Treasury Department was Dillon (1961-1965), who had served as U.S. Ambassador in Paris (1953-1957) while the French-Israeli atomic partnership was forged. Memorandum of Conference with the President December 19, 1960, January 12, 1961, Israel (3) (October 1960-January 1961), International Series, Box 32, Ann Whitman File, *DDEL*.

issue's importance, presenting the reactor as merely a "diplomatically embarrassing incident" that the outgoing White House was unwilling to "challenge." When exactly the U.S. first learned of Dimona was left unresolved as this information had only reached Washington "recently" via "unofficial reports."³⁴⁸ The *NYT* also published two shorter wire pieces that same busy day. The first article from Jerusalem relayed that the IAEC professed that Israel was "not engaged in the production of atomic weapons."³⁴⁹ The other story emphasized that France had denied it was "aiding Israel in a nuclear program for military purposes."³⁵⁰ This disinformation campaign coincided with UNGA Resolution 1576, calling "upon all Governments" to thwart "the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons."³⁵¹ Also on this day Harman relayed to Farley that Dimona was intended to promote "agricultural, medical and other scientific purposes," with the latter erroneously alleging that Dimona's construction had begun "one year ago."³⁵² When Harman responded about the "need to say something to the press," Farley concurred that he could

³⁴⁸ Finney, "U.S. Misled at First on Israeli Reactor," *NYT*, December 20, 1960, p.1 & 15.

³⁴⁹ "Defense Ministry Silent," *NYT*, December 20, 1960, p. 15.

³⁵⁰ By examining two other non-nuclear December 20 *NYT* articles, one can contextualize how Dimona paradoxically strengthened U.S.-Israeli relations. On page 29 an anonymous article reported that the Export-Import Bank would provide \$2.6 million in U.S. and local currency to Israel for the "modernizing" of Israel's Lod International Airport. Another authorless article, declared that the night before Governor Nelson Rockefeller had informed 18,000 witnesses at Madison Square Garden that Israel had help stop the "advance of totalitarianism." The Governor proclaimed that the \$465 million in global transactions represented "the most powerful singled instrument in the economic development in Israel." "U.S. Loans Aid Israeli Airport," *NYT*, December 20, 1960, p.29; "Israel Bonds Praised," *NYT*, December 20, 1960, p. 9; "Peaceful Aims Assured," *NYT*, December 20, 1960, p. 15.

³⁵¹ UNGA Resolution 1576 (XV) "Prevention of the Wider Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons," December 20, 1960. <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/153/50/IMG/NR015350.pdf?OpenElement>

³⁵² This was not an honest mistake. Farley committed this error again later in the day when he wrote an "eyes only telegram" to Tel Aviv, Paris and London declaring that Dimona's construction began only in late 1959, "one year ago." Farley contended that the U.S had made the statements inquiring about Dimona "as a result" to "unfortunate volume of press leaks" and a "radio MOSCOW" allegation that the U.S. was "aiding" Israel's "nuclear weapons program." In a conversation with a member of the Canadian Embassy the next day, Farley promised that the U.S. would not accept any Israeli "cover story" or "window dressing" concerning Dimona. Farley's ignominious behavior provides a perfect example of a loyal "lightening rod," which Greenstein has argued were those faceless and nameless bureaucrats delegated with executing Ike's well concealed Cold War policies. Memorandum of Conversation, "Subject: Israeli Atomic Energy Program," December 20, 1960, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Volume XIII, pp. 396-399; Outgoing Eyes only Telegram from Farley to U.S Ambassadors in Tel Aviv, Paris and London, December 20, 1960, Israel (3) (October 1960-January 1961), International Series, Box 32, Ann Whitman File, *DDEL*; Memorandum from Washington to London, Paris and Geneva, "Subject: Atomic Developments in Israel," December 21, 1960, RG 25, Volume 7882, File 14003-J-8-1-40, *LAC*; Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency*, pp. 87-88.

understand if Israel did “not wish to open” Dimona “during the construction period.”³⁵³

With no Dimona media stories on December 21, Ben Gurion had the stage to himself to deceitfully declare Israel’s peaceful atomic purposes. Later that same day Herter told Reid that the U.S. desired a “full and frank account” of Israeli atomic activities. Without transparency these “suspicions” could not be “laid to rest,” resulting in serious “repercussions in the Near East.” To quell speculation, Israel should “permit” a “qualified scientist, preferably an IAEA designee, to visit” Dimona. The U.S., however, should not “initiate” the request but hope that Israel would “extend” an “invitation at” an “early date.” In a second eyes only telegram to Reid, Herter revealed that Harman was unhappy over the “large amount” of Dimona press coverage.³⁵⁴

In a December 22 telegram sent to 35 U.S. Embassies, Herter expressed confidence that Dimona did “not represent cause for special concern.” Future U.S. policy should aim to create a “stilling atmosphere” on the subject. Helping create this perception was a proposed oral statement to the media, cleared by Dulles, McCone and Ike, advocating that U.S. policy vis-à-vis Dimona dovetailed with its policy of “consistently” opposing proliferation globally.³⁵⁵ This message must have also been sent to the *WP* given two obsequious stories published in the paper the next day. On December 23 Lincoln White, Foggy Bottom’s press spokesman since 1948, publicly announced Herter’s words that Dimona that did “not represent cause for special concern...”³⁵⁶ The *WP* also quoted an “authorized” source as describing rumors that Israel was

³⁵³ Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: Israeli Atomic Energy Program,” December 20, 1960, *FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XIII*, pp. 396-399.

³⁵⁴ Outgoing Eyes Only Telegram from Herter to Reid, December 21, 1960, Israel (3) (October 1960-January 1961), International Series, Box 32, Ann Whitman File, *DDEL*.

³⁵⁵ Outgoing Circular State Department Telegram, December 22, 1960, Israel (3) (October 1960-January 1961), International Series, Box 32, Ann Whitman File, *DDEL*; Proposed oral statement to press on Israel’s nuclear energy program, December 22, 1960, (Chronological File) December 1960 (1), Box 9, Herter Papers, 1957-61, *DDEL*.

³⁵⁶ “U.S. ‘Welcomes’ Israel Promises on Reactor,” *WP*, December 23, 1960, p. A2; Wise and Ross, *The Invisible Government*, p. 103.

pursuing a bomb as simply “ridiculous.”³⁵⁷ In the first sentence of his front page chronicle, the *NYT*'s Jewish Alvin Schuster credulously argued that Dimona did “not represent a cause for special concern,” recalling de Tocqueville’s warning that the press produces more “evil” than it cures.³⁵⁸ The story ended by re-emphasizing that the U.S. opposed nuclear proliferation, setting the table for Krock on page eighteen.

The four-time Pulitzer winner began by asserting that Dimona’s secrecy was “so deep that U.S. intelligence was led to believe the installation was a textile plant.” Wisely warning that Dimona “could spark new hostilities in the Near East,” he stated that the U.S. expected the reactor to be made “accessible” to the IAEA. In a rare example of independent journalism, Krock revealed that Dimon’s financial campaign had begun in September 1957 when Leon Keyserling had issued a report focused on Israel’s experimentation with heavy water. In light of the obvious Franco-Israeli “deception,” Ben Gurion now had a perfect opportunity to place Dimona under safeguards thus aiding in the “pursuit of world peace.”³⁵⁹

If propaganda is not on the offensive, then it is on the defensive. To paraphrase Joseph Goebbels, the press acts as an accessible keyboard for the state to play whatever it desires. This theme is evident in the *NYT*'s manipulative coverage of Nasser’s December 23, 1960, speech at Port Said. An anonymous wire story written from Cairo printed the next day denounced Nasser for describing NATO as an “alliance for enslavement” before an Arab crowd yelling “Death to

³⁵⁷ “Israel Say A-Reactor Is for Peace,” *WP*, December 23, 1960, p. A2.

³⁵⁸ De Toqueville’s media analysis is obviously outdated since it was formulated before the internet, Time Warner (*NYT*, *CNN*), General Electric (*NBC*, *CNBC*), Disney (*ABC*), Viacom (*CBS*) and Rupert Murdoch (*FOX*). Writing in the early 1830s, decades before the *NYT* became the most influential paper in the country, he contended that the U.S. had “no metropolis” and “no central control over the expression of opinion...” Using Dimona as a case study, his generalization that even when the press is muzzled “the tongue of the public speaker will still make itself heard” fails to hold weight. Some of his insights remain relevant, pointing out that papers are “historical remains” and the most important “democratic instrument of freedom.” They are usually, however, still “three-quarters” filled with advertisements and “trivial anecdotes,” helping explain why “freedom of opinion does not exist in America.” De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, pp. 24, 208-215, 307, 350-351, 636, 877; Alvin Shuster, “Israel Satisfies U.S. on Use of Reactor,” *NYT*, December 23, 1960, p. 1.

³⁵⁹ Arthur Krock, “In the Nation: The Proof is Available to Israel,” *NYT*, December 23, 1960, p. 18.

Israel.”³⁶⁰ A December 24 telegram sent from Cairo to Foggy Bottom, however, revealed that the Arab crowd made no such statement, an assertion supported by Levite and Landau.³⁶¹

After passing on Ike’s Christmas card, Reid reassured Ben Gurion on December 24 the U.S. did not “want to...exaggerate” the nuclear “issue” any more than that was necessary. Since China could soon develop the bomb, however, Reid emphasized that safeguards needed to be universal anywhere plutonium was produced. Professing some “mild irritation,” Ben Gurion exclaimed that he was “very sorry that he had not been able to tell” Ike about Dimona during his March visit. Nonetheless, Dimona “had to be kept secret.” In a rare moment of honesty, he demanded more help from Washington, London and Paris. A cash donation of “four to five million” would suffice. After Reid inquired about a scientist taking a “look,” Ben Gurion changed the subject, warning that Nasser would soon “attack.”³⁶²

An undated outgoing Foggy Bottom telegraph, drafted by Merchant, provides some clarity about how the U.S. approached Dimona following December 24. The document contended that the U.S. utilize the ongoing Lavon-inspired “Cabinet crisis” as an excuse to deter its questioning even though it did not consider Ben-Gurion’s “statements” on Dimona to be “satisfactory.” Merchant hoped that Harman, now back in Israel,³⁶³ would soon return with a “complete set of answers.” He also wanted Reid to understand that his task was to explain to Ben Gurion that the “tinder box” had been precipitated by a lack of “candor.” Reid was also

³⁶⁰ “Nasser Threatens Israel on A-Bomb,” *NYT*, December 24, 1960, p. 1.

³⁶¹ Telegram from the UAR Embassy to the Department of State, December 24, 1960, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, *Volume XIII*, pp: 609-611; Levite and Landau, “Arab Perceptions of Israel’s Nuclear Posture,” pp. 34-59.

³⁶² Incoming Eyes Only Telegram from Reid to Herter, December 24, 1960, Israel (3) (October 1960-January 1961), International Series, Box 32, Ann Whitman File, *DDEL*.

³⁶³ Since Harman left on December 24, this document could have been written as early as Christmas Day. Although neither the U.S. primary documentation nor the press explain why Harman left during such a crucial period, a January 11, 1961, memorandum from Margaret Meagher, Canada’s Ambassador in Tel Aviv, revealed that Harman chose to attend the *WZO* Congress in Israel rather than face the heat in Washington. Department of State Outgoing Telegram, No Date, Israel (3) (October 1960-January 1961), International Series, Box 32, Ann Whitman File, *DDEL*; Memorandum from the Canadian Embassy in Tel Aviv to the Department of External Affairs, “Subject: Israeli Atomic Energy Program,” January 11, 1961, RG 25, Volume 7882, File 14003-J-8-1-40, LAC.

requested to inquire whether the “IAEA or other friendly quarters” would be allowed to visit the reactor, and if Israel would “categorically” announce it had no plans for producing nuclear weapons. This proposal, however, contradicted an added political message, emphasizing that the U.S. “would not welcome” another “round of alarmist publicity.”³⁶⁴

The *NYT*'s Christmas and Boxing Day coverage of Israel's nuclear weapons program was non-confrontational and nuanced. The second week of the media's Dimona coverage began with an anonymous blurb concluding that any fears about Dimona “were greatly exaggerated.”³⁶⁵ This uncritical narrative was compounded by a William Laurence story which argued a chemical separation plant was “beyond” the financial capabilities of a “small nation such as Israel” and thus any talk about a Jewish bomb was “meaningless.”³⁶⁶ A December 26 *AP* wire story carried by both the *NYT* and *WP* revealed that Senator Frank Moss (D-Utah) suggested that a UN “team to inspect Dimona,” adding that an atomic Near East would be a “serious mistake.”³⁶⁷ On the same day Henry Luce's *Time*, yet another CIA mouthpiece, argued that “the word” was that Israel “was still a considerable way from producing an atom bomb.” The *WP*'s Drew Pearson, who had worked closely with the OSS during World War II, contended that Dimona could “tip” the Near East balance in favor of the U.S.³⁶⁸

The subject re-emerged in a December 28 article by a confirmed CIA asset and the *NYT*'s

³⁶⁴ Department of State Outgoing Telegram, No Date, Israel (3) (October 1960-January 1961), International Series, Box 32, Ann Whitman File, *DDEL*.

³⁶⁵ “Carrot & Stick,” *NYT*, December 25, 1960, p. E1.

³⁶⁶ William Laurence, “Israel's Reactor,” *NYT*, December 25, 1960, p. E8.

³⁶⁷ “Inspection is Urged for Israeli Reactor,” *NYT*, December 26, 1960, p. 2. Jerry T. Baulch, “Israel Urged to Squelch A-Fears by Permitting Nuclear Inspection,” *WP*, December 26, 1960, p. A2.

³⁶⁸ It was Pearson who unveiled to the U.S. public via the radio on February 3, 1946, that a Soviet spy ring operating in Ottawa led by Igor Gouzenko had been stealing atomic secrets from the West. Herken has pointed out that neither Pearson's diary nor collected papers reveal his source for the information, an indication that it probably came from the government. Herken, *The Winning Weapon*, pp. 129, 362n38; “Member of the Club,” *Time*, December 26, 1960, p. 18; Drew Pearson, “A-Reactor Where Abraham Trod,” *WP*, December 26, 1960, p. B25; Prados, *Safe for Democracy*, p. 48; Winks, *Cloak & Gown*, pp. 212-213.

lead foreign correspondent.³⁶⁹ C.L. Sulzberger, whose Jewish family has owned or co-owned the paper since 1896, confirmed that recent rumors indicating that Israel “intended to manufacture fissionable material for arms” had been “denied.”³⁷⁰ That same day Reid sent an eyes only telegram to Herter indicating that if international concern increased the U.S. should ask “known scientists, preferably from the U.S.” to visit Dimona. Any future “inspection,” however, should not reveal the French “firms providing assistance.”³⁷¹ The telegraph’s final four to five lines are censored. Building on the political theme of the December 21 memo to Reid, three days passed before Merchant informed Tel Aviv that all efforts need be directed toward creating a “stilling atmosphere” to prevent another “round of alarmist publicity.” Reid was reminded that the U.S. needed to know whether Israel would “categorically” declare that it had “no plans for producing nuclear weapons” and “permit...friendly” scientists “to visit the new reactor.”³⁷²

The U.S. badly yearned to keep Dimona under the rug until Ike had left office. A nameless January 1, 1961, White House report revealed that on December 19 the Pentagon had

³⁶⁹ Bernstein pointed out that “Cy” was one of the CIA’s most valuable “known” assets, who loved to cooperate” with the spooks. When questioned on the subject, Sulzberger downplayed the relationship as “totally informal,” while admitting that he played golf with McCone when he became DCI under JFK, and got along “well” with Allen Dulles and Frank Wisner, the latter being chiefly responsible for setting up Operation Mockingbird in the early 1950s. Bernstein revealed that the *NYT*’s publisher, Arthur Hays Sulzberger, also held “especially close” ties with Dulles and even signed a secrecy agreement with the Company. Carl Bernstein, “The CIA and the Media,” http://carlbernstein.com/magazine_cia_and_media.php.

³⁷⁰ Dimona then disappeared from the *WP* and another fifteen days passed before the *NYT* produced another story on the subject, the last of Ike’s presidency. An anonymous January 12 piece revealed that the previous day Harman, who had finally returned to Washington after an 18 day hiatus in Israel, had declared that Dimona was “dedicated exclusively to peaceful uses.” The next day a *UPI* wire story in the *NYT* revealed that any of Reid’s Dimona concerns had evaporated as he was now championing Israel’s “national purpose.” On December 18 he delivered a check to Israel for \$506,000 from a “media guarantee” three days after the *NYT* revealed that private donations to the *IBO* in 1960 had totaled a \$51.9 million. C.L. Sulzberger, “Foreign Affairs,” *NYT*, December 28, 1960, p. 26; “Israel Renews Reactor Pledge,” *NYT*, January 12, 1961, p. 4; “Israeli Sense of Purpose Hailed,” *NYT*, January 13, 1961, p. 4; Reid Presents Fund to Israel,” *NYT*, January 19, 1961, p. 14; “Israel Bond Sale Put at \$51,965,300,” *NYT*, January 15, 1961, p. 65; “Israel Planners Seek 437 Million,” *NYT*, January 16, 1961, p. 13.

³⁷¹ Eyes only telegram from Tel Aviv for the Secretary of State (590), December 28, 1960, Israel (3) (October 1960-January 1961), International Series, Box 32, Ann Whitman File, *DDEL*.

³⁷² This memo is the last document in the below cited *FRUS* volume. To access the pertinent Dimona documents in January 1961 one has to examine the *FRUS* documents under JFK, located at a different website. In 1989 William Slany, then the Historian of the State Department, warned that the “compartmentalization of information” has made “the identification and assembly” of the “historical documentary record increasingly formidable.” Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, December 31, 1960, *FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XIII*, pp. 399-400; Ferris, “American Intelligence,” p. 567.

implemented a “Public Affairs Guidance” campaign aimed at Israel’s “Nuclear Reactor.” Under explicit executive orders, any official statement pertaining to Dimona for the “the public, our allies, or the Congress” had to be cleared first by Foggy Bottom. An Eisenhower Library withdrawal sheet reveals that Ike also met with Herter, Farley, Gates and Anderson on January 1.³⁷³ On January 5 Reid sent a still classified 13 page memo to Foggy Bottom.³⁷⁴ Sensitivity was now needed as Congress was beginning to ask questions, albeit, quietly and far too late.

On January 9 Senators Albert Gore, James Fulbright and Bourke Hickenlooper met with Farley and Assistant Secretary of State G. Lewis Jones.³⁷⁵ The Senators admitted they had promised Foggy Bottom “that there would be no publicity regarding” the “informal meeting.” Gore “closely” questioned all the talk of textile plants, while Hickenlooper proclaimed that Israel “had lied.” Bothered by the “secrecy factor,” Fulbright wondered that “if Israel had nothing to hide” then “why did they hide it?” Jumping to Israel’s defense, Jones declared that the “Arabs” would do nothing more than “talk,” while assuring everyone that plutonium production was still “three of four years.” It would be away foolish to “brand Israel as a villain...” so prematurely.

³⁷⁶ On Ike’s last full day in the White House, Under Secretary of State William Macomber Jr.

³⁷³ The three page document is still locked in the Library’s vault. White House Memorandum, “Subject: DOD Public Affairs Guidance 14-C- -Israel Nuclear Reactors,” 1 January 1961, Israel (3) (October 1960-January 1961), International Series, Box 32, Ann Whitman File, *DDEL*; NARA: Withdrawal Sheet (Presidential Libraries), Israel (3) (October 1960-January 1961), International Series, Box 32, Ann Whitman File, *DDEL*.

³⁷⁴ One day later Herter sent an “eyes only” telegram to Houghton warning him “to avoid publicity” about “French-Israeli” cooperation, while admitting that Dimona could precipitate an Arab “preventive” strike against Israel. Telegram 626 from the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State, January 5, 1961, *FRUS, 1961-1962*, (Washington, DC: GPO, 1994) *Near East, Volume XVII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjfxvii/17702.htm> (document 1); Eyes only Memorandum from Herter to the U.S Ambassador in France, January 6, 1961, Israel (3) (October 1960-January 1961), International Series, Box 32, Ann Whitman File, *DDEL*.

³⁷⁵ Hickenlooper (R-Iowa) was on JAEIC, while Gore (D-Tennessee) was the Chairman of the Near East Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Fulbright (D-Arkansas). With the same result, another 15 years passed before the Senate again attempted to inquire about Dimona. Led by the Jewish Senators Abraham Ribicoff (D-Connecticut) and Jacob Javits (R-New York), 13 Senators were banned from visiting the reactor during a trip to Israel in November 1976. “13 Senators in Israel to Study Atom Programs,” *NYT*, November 8, 1976, p. 6; “Israel Bars U.S. Senators From A-Site,” *WP*, November 9, 1976, p. A1.

³⁷⁶ Memorandum of Conversation, January 9, 1961, *FRUS, 1961-1962, Volume XVII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjfxvii/17702.htm> (document 2).

delivered an illuminating telegraph to the JAEIC thanking Congress for “avoiding comment” on the subject. Utilizing a realist script, he argued that “extended public speculation” would not “advance” its long-term “interests.” Thus, the U.S. should pursue “persistent but quiet diplomatic approaches.”³⁷⁷ The ever-changing regional dynamics during the era also why the U.S. supported covertly aided and intentionally turned a blind eye towards Dimona.

Context is king. During the late 1950s concomitant strategic and cultural events strengthened the U.S.-Israeli relationship. Following the Rumsfeld-inspired dictum that “weakness is provocative; strength deters,” in an increasingly anti-U.S. Arab world, Israel had evolved into a U.S. strategic asset by 1960.³⁷⁸ Soon after the UAR’s creation in February 1958 Secretary Dulles declared that Nasser “whipped up Pan-Arabism much as Hitler whipped up Pan-Germanism.”³⁷⁹ With Chamoun’s regime verging on precipice, the Marines landed in Lebanon on July 15, 1958. On August 1, 1958 Dulles informed Ben Gurion that the U.S. held “that Israel should be in a position to deter...aggression” and “was prepared” to “examine the military implications of this problem with an open mind.”³⁸⁰ In September 1958 Leon Uris’s novel *Exodus* was released, helping to usher in the tough Jewish cultural narrative. Portraying Arabs as smiling goats, the novel is a romanticized trope of Israel’s birth, with protagonist Ari Ben Canaan as the ship’s captain.³⁸¹ The book was turned into a Hollywood movie in 1960,

³⁷⁷ The GWNSA has avowed that this document represented the “official record” on Dimona which Ike “passed on to JFK. An attached letter revealed that the U.S. had “been assured categorically” that Israel had “no plans” to build the bomb. The fabrication that Dimona’s “construction” began only in late 1959 was also passed onto Congress. On the subject of “international safeguards,” the memo did not “propose to open Dimona to international inspection.” Summary of Additional Recent Information on Israeli Atomic Energy Program, January 17, 1961, *Ibid* (document 3); Letter from Assistant Secretary of State to the Executive Director of the JAEIC, January 19, 1961, GWNSA, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/israel/documents/reveal/10-01.htm>.

³⁷⁸ *Why We Fight* (2005).

³⁷⁹ Ben-Zvi, *Decade of Transition*, p. 74.

³⁸⁰ In 1959 the U.S began providing Israel with \$100 million over the next two years. Ben-Zvi, *Decade of Transition*, p. 59; Little, *American Orientalism*, p. 94.

³⁸¹ Boston College historian Paul Breines has argued that the novel, which has since sold 20 million copies, helped dispel the “sneaky lawyer” Jewish stereotype by replacing it with the “full blown myth of the superhuman.” The book was even criticized by the real-life captain of *Exodus*, Yehiel Aronowicz, who admitted that the account was

opening in New York days before *Dimona* was unveiled on December 15, 1960.³⁸² The movie added a new angle, with Nazis advising the Arabs on how to deal with “their Jewish problem.”³⁸³ Politics is everything and everything is connected. Cultural space is never neutral. The *Exodus* magic show effectively distracted and mesmerized the public from critically examining the fraudulent news spewing from the *NYT* and *WP*. In the following decade Israel would find it much easier to suppress domestic *Dimona* dissent than external criticism espousing from an increasingly unilateral and militant U.S.S.R.

“neither history nor literature.” The *NYT*’s review denounced the picture, in which Ben Canaan was played by Angleton’s favorite actor, the half-Jewish Paul Newman, “mired with... inconclusive... historical and fictional events.” Nonetheless, people danced in the theatre aisles when “Ha-Tikvah,” Israel’s national anthem, was played. Skipper of *Exodus* Calls Jews ‘Indigestible’ by all but Israel,” *NYT*, February 7, 1961, p. 21; Bosley Crowther, “Screen: A Long ‘Exodus,’” *NYT*, December 16, 1960, p.44; Paul Breines, *Tough Jews: Political Fantasies and the Moral Dilemma of American Jewry* (New York: Basic Books, 1990), pp. 54, 58, 59; Melani McAlister, *Epic Encounters* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), p. 159.

³⁸² Mangold, *The Cold Warrior*, p. 241.

³⁸³ The anti-Arab narrative which runs through Western movies was articulated in Hollywood’s best picture of 2005: “You wanna know what the business community thinks of you? We think a hundred years ago you were living out here in tents in the desert, chopping each others heads off and that’s exactly where you are going to be in another hundred.” This bias is not a coincidence. In an article declaring that “dumb America” is oblivious to the reality that “Jews totally run Hollywood...the news media, Wall Street” and “the government,” *L.A. Times*’ reporter Joel Stein revealed that the CEO of Disney (Robert Iger), President of News Corp. (Peter Chernin), Paramount Chairman (Brad Grey), Sony Pictures Chairman (Brad Grey), Sony Pictures Chairman (Michael Lyton), Warner Brother Chairman (Barry Meyer), CBS Chief Executive (Jeff Zucker) are all Jewish. Joel Stein, “How Jewish is Hollywood?” *L.A. Times*, December 19, 2008, <http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-stein19-2008-dec19,0,4677183.column>; Melani McAlister, *Epic Encounters*, p. 161; *Syriana* (2005) Written and Directed by Stephen Gagan. [http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=27867441856345673#\(2:08:03\)](http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=27867441856345673#(2:08:03)).

Chapter Three: Censorship, Personnel Changes and the Communists

After winning a crucial Knesset confidence vote in late January 1961, the septuagenarian Ben Gurion was the guiding force in evicting Lavon as the *Histadrut's* Secretary-General in early February.³⁸⁴ The Prime Minister's reputation, however, within MAPAI and Knesset circles soon plummeted and he could not form a coalition Cabinet by early March.³⁸⁵ The August election reigned paramount on the political horizon. While Ben Gurion's domestic influence was reduced following the Lavon affair, he remained relatively unchallenged on foreign affairs until his resignation of June 16, 1963. Cohen has contended that in early 1961 there was still "no desire" within Israel to "openly" debate Dimona,³⁸⁶ a privilege enabling Ben Gurion to gauge foreign views on the subject without domestic interference.

In mid-February London's Ambassador in Tel Aviv, Francis Rundall, asked Dr. Haim Yahlil, Director-General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, about Dimona's status. Responding orally, Yahlil declared that Israel's atomic arrangement with France would remain secret and there would be no IAEA inspections of the reactor. In regards to "future plutonium" production, Yahlil answered that this possibility "should be expected," but added evasively that all previous Israeli statements on the issue were "conditional and temporary." According to Shalom, Ben Gurion, who had scripted Yahlil's reply, utilized the exchange to "launch a trial balloon" to measure U.S. attitudes on Dimona. Since the MacMillan government refused to offer any response, Ben Gurion probably deduced that the new White House was also unconcerned.³⁸⁷

³⁸⁴ Lawrence Fellows, "Ben-Gurion wins Israel Test Vote," *NYT*, January 31, 1961, p. 8; *Ibid.*, "Ben Gurion Wins Vote in Party to Restrict Lavon's Authority," *NYT*, February 4, 1961, p. 6; *Ibid.*, "Israeli Party Votes Dismissal of Lavon," *NYT*, February 5, 1961, p. 62; "Ben Gurion Backed for Premier Again," *NYT*, February 7, 1961, p. 3; *Ibid.*, "Histadrut Ousts Lavon from Post," *NYT*, February 10, 1961, p. 22.

³⁸⁵ "Ben Gurion's Plea Rejected by Party," *NYT*, February 28, 1961, p. 3; "Ben Gurion unable to form a Cabinet," *NYT*, March 1, 1961, p. 5.

³⁸⁶ Cohen has added that a fight over Dimona, either domestically or internationally, needed to be "avoided at all costs" until the reactor was fully operational. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 143 & 141.

³⁸⁷ Shalom, *Israel's Nuclear Option*, pp. 120-121.

According to Shalom, on May 29, a day before Ben-Gurion traveled to the Waldorf Hotel to meet with Kennedy, he visited Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker. Shalom has argued that “near the end of the conversation” Ben Gurion brought up Dimona, revealing that two U.S. scientists who had recently visited the facility and had found nothing out of the ordinary.³⁸⁸ He added that Israel was “likely” to build a separation plant capable of producing plutonium, although any amount would “be very limited.”³⁸⁹ If one examines the primary material sourced by Shalom, however, his paraphrased analysis was disingenuous. The Canadian Archives reveal that the two leaders instead met on May 25 and 26. The documents prove that Diefenbaker raised the issue when he ruminated that there was a “genuine” Arab “fear of” an Israeli bomb. Mentioning that two U.S. scientists had “inspected” the facility the previous week, Ben Gurion responded that Israel had “...set up a small pilot separation plant” which could produce 300 grams of plutonium annually. Apparently satisfied, Diefenbaker did not raise Dimona again.³⁹⁰ Ben Gurion likely left Ottawa believing that his meeting with JFK would be a cake walk.

Perceptions indicate that this is exactly what occurred. According to the *NYT*, after leaving New York, Ben Gurion traveled to London and Paris. Returning home “in an exuberant mood on June 8, he announced that his “expectations” for the trip had been “exceeded.”³⁹¹ Ben Gurion utilized this diplomatic breathing space to consolidate domestically. A fortnight before Egypt celebrated its Revolution Day, Peres, Ben Gurion and Mardor witnessed the launching of the Shavit 2 weather rocket on July 5. According to Karpin, the *London Times* argued the next

³⁸⁸ Dalleck has pointed out that from May 16-18 Kennedy visited Diefenbaker in Ottawa. A detailed examination of the first U.S. visit to Dimona on May 20 and the subsequent JFK-Ben-Gurion meeting will be covered later. Dalleck, *An Unfinished Life*, pp. 388-389.

³⁸⁹ Shalom, *Israel's Nuclear Option*, pp. 24-25.

³⁹⁰ Memorandum from the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (L.A.D. Stevens) to the Canadian Embassy in Israel, “Subject: Visit of the Prime Minister to Canada,” June 9, 1961, Visit of Prime Minister Ben Gurion to Ottawa-May 1961, RG 25, Volume 5408, File 10963-A-40, Volume 1.1, *LAC*; Joint Communiqué, May 26, 1961, RG 25, Volume 5408, File 10963-A-40, Volume 1.1, *LAC*.

³⁹¹ “Ben-Gurion is Home; Calls Trip Fruitful,” *NYT*, June 9, 1961, p. 16.

day that the Near East's "strategic situation... would never be the same" if Israel developed a missile delivery system.³⁹² Some in the Knesset cried that stunt was a shallow attempt to win voters, a reminder of Dahl's judgment that politics is just "bribery of the electorate by politicians."³⁹³ Two days before the election, the *NYT* reported that the rocket launch, plus his New York talk with JFK, had boosted Ben Gurion's "badly" tarnished "personal popularity."³⁹⁴

The Prime Minister described the August 15 election result, Mapai dropped six seats, as tantamount to a "national disaster."³⁹⁵ On October 10 MAPI joined in a coalition with Achdut Ha'Avoda after legislative limits were theoretically placed on Ben Gurion's ability to unilaterally act in foreign policy. Since some in Achdut Ha'Avoda were upset that the rocket launch had transpired without a Cabinet vote, the new accord warned that the "development of new weapons" must be raised first in the Defense Ministerial Committee.³⁹⁶ Three weeks later, after eleven weeks of electioneering, a sixty-eight seat government was formed.³⁹⁷

With the election out of the way, Ben Gurion now had to deal with Dimona in the international arena. On November 18 the UN voted 60-16 in favor of a proposed test ban treaty, with the U.S. and all other nuclear powers, except the USSR, voting against. There was also a 57-0 vote in favor of creating an African nuclear free zone with Israel, the U.S., Britain, and France abstaining.³⁹⁸ Possibly responding to the UN vote, the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Security Committee announced that "all nations" pursue a nuclear testing "moratorium" eight

³⁹² Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, p. 198.

³⁹³ Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory*, p. 68.

³⁹⁴ Lawrence Fellows, "Israeli Campaign Limp to a Close," *NYT*, August 13, 1961, p. 15.

³⁹⁵ Lawrence Fellows, "Ben-Gurion Party Wins in Election," *NYT*, August 17, 1961, p. 2.

³⁹⁶ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 148, 386n38.

³⁹⁷ The Cabinet coalition had the following breakdown: Mapai (42), NRP (12), Achdut Ha'avodah (8), Po'alei Agudat Israel (2). From 1961 to 1965 Mapai held 11 Cabinet positions, including the most vital posts: Premiership, Defense, Foreign Affairs, Agriculture, Labor and Education. Medding, *The Founding of Israeli Democracy*, pp. 242, 100, 91; Lawrence Fellows, "Israelis to Form 4-Party Coalition," *NYT*, November 1, 1961, p. 9.

³⁹⁸ Sam Pope Brewer, "U.N. Group Urges Test-Ban Parley," *NYT*, November 19, 1961, p. 23.

days later.³⁹⁹ By early 1962 the Parliament and press finally began to critically examine their nation's atomic policy.

On January 12, 1962, Eliezer Livneh argued in *Ha'aretz* that it would be calamitous if the Near East was nuclearized.⁴⁰⁰ In early March Livneh and a small group of influential citizens signed a petition urging Israel not to pursue the bomb.⁴⁰¹ Later in the month a Livneh-sponsored conference focused on nuclear weapons was cancelled by the Defense Ministry.⁴⁰² Despite the intimidation, the atomic issue was mentioned in two *Ha'aretz* stories published on March 27 and April 15.⁴⁰³ Around this time Amos de Shalit briefed the Knesset on atomic issues for the first time.⁴⁰⁴ Facing increased pressure, Meir professed to the Parliament on June 25 that Israel desired to “reduce nuclear” proliferation and opposed all “double standards...”⁴⁰⁵

With the assistance of WZO President Nahum Goldman, in late July Livneh founded the Committee for the Denuclearization of the Middle East, alongside Buber, Stein, Ollendorf, Leibowitz and Yair Evron. Cohen has dismissed the group as a mere “footnote in history”

³⁹⁹ “Israel Urges Test Ban,” *NYT*, November 29, 1961, p. 20.

⁴⁰⁰ Livneh, “Warning in the Last Moment,” (Hebrew) January 12, 1962. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 385n12.

⁴⁰¹ Alongside Buber, Efraim Auerbach and Yeshayahu Leibovitz, the other signatures included two former IAEC members, Gabriel Stein and Franz Ohldorf, and the Liberal Party's Shlomo Abrahimos. “Professors against Nuclear Armament in the Middle East” (Hebrew), *Ha'aretz*, March 13, 1962, in Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 385n13.

⁴⁰² A day before the conference was cancelled an anonymous *WP* story stated that Israel had already proposed a “totalitarian” law allowing the state to close down any publication “found guilty of publishing two libelous statements in the course of two years.” The *WP* relayed on July 5, 1962, that Livneh's conference had been silenced by Peres. “Gagging the Press,” *WP*, March 12, 1962, p. A16. Alvin Rosenfeld, “Intellectuals Seek Bar to Israel A-Arms Output,” *WP*, July 5, 1962, p. A14.

⁴⁰³ “Unacceptable Intervention” (Hebrew), *Ha'aretz*, March 27, 1962; “Peculiar Decision” (Hebrew), April 5, 1962. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 385n14.

⁴⁰⁴ Key Knesset members to whom the Committee and de Shalit networked with included Israel Barzilay Mordechai Bentov and Pinhas Sapir of MAPAM, Israeli Galili of Achdut Ha'Avodah and Chaim Moshe Shapira of the NRP. From mid-March to early July 1962 these secret gatherings were at the center of five more nameless *Ha'aretz* stories: “Discussions among the Parties on Nuclear Armaments in the Middle East” (Hebrew), *Ha'aretz*, March 15, 1962; “Party Heads Discuss Nuclear Armament” (Hebrew), *Ha'aretz*, May 6, 1962; “The Liberal Party on the Issue of Denuclearization” (Hebrew), *Ha'aretz*, June 17, 1962; “Appeal to MAPAI to Discuss Denuclearization” (Hebrew), *Ha'aretz*, July 7, 1962. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 145-146, 386n 23, 29.

⁴⁰⁵ From Canadian Embassy in Tel Aviv to the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, “Subject: Foreign Minister's Policy Statement in the Knesset,” August 2, 1962, RG 25, Volume 7608, File 11312-40 P.T. 2.2, LAC.

because it used pacifist language such as “deterrent weapons” and “regional denuclearization.”⁴⁰⁶ Other than the Communist Party,⁴⁰⁷ no other party possessed the fortitude to challenge Ben Gurion on Dimona. According to Shalom, the “broad” fear of the perceived Arab threat made the nation’s press and intelligentsia reluctant to cause a “public debate.”⁴⁰⁸

Nasser also helped to keep Dimona on Ben Gurion’s agenda. Nearly one year after Shavit II’s launch, on July 21, 1962, Egypt tested its own rocket program. The next day the *WP* reported that one missile had been fired towards Israel’s “atomic reactor.” When questioned if the rockets could “deliver atomic warheads,” Nasser laconically declared “No, we are against that.”⁴⁰⁹ Egypt’s actions during the month were confusing. If Nasser had wanted to target Dimona, then he should have singled out Israel when he denounced nuclear proliferation at a July 9 non-aligned nations meeting.⁴¹⁰ Later in the month Haikal announced that “the U.A.R. would never allow Israel to achieve atomic supremacy.”⁴¹¹

Cohen has averred that Egypt’s missile firings provided the impetus for Israel to publicly announce its desire to pursue the bomb in the fall of 1962.⁴¹² On August 13 *Yediot Achronot* reported that recent Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee hearings had centered on the need to possess “weapons of deterrence.”⁴¹³ Ben Gurion told the Knesset nine days later that Dimona

⁴⁰⁶ “Scientists Call for Regional Denuclearization” (Hebrew), *Ha’aretz*, July 25, 1962. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 145-146, 386n22-23.

⁴⁰⁷ Formed in 1923, during the 1950s, roughly a third of the Maki’s 4000 party members were Arab. From 1954-1955 the party possessed seven Knesset seats after merging with Moshe Sneh’s Socialist Party. Sneh later joined Maki by late 1965. Meddling, *The Founding of Israeli Democracy*, pp. 53-54.

⁴⁰⁸ Shalom, *Israel’s Nuclear Option*, pp. 47, 170-171.

⁴⁰⁹ Jay Waltz, “Egypt’s Reactor is Put to Work for Isotope Research Projects,” *NYT*, July 29, 1962, p. 6; Jay Waltz, “Four Test Rockets Launched by Cairo,” *NYT*, July 22, 1962, p. 1.

⁴¹⁰ Jay Waltz, “Nasser Condemns Atom Arms Race,” *NYT*, July 10, 1962, p. 18.

⁴¹¹ Jay Waltz, “Egypt’s Reactor is Put to Work for Isotope Research Projects,” *NYT*, July 29, 1962, p. 6.

⁴¹² Other press stories included: Interview with Peres (Hebrew) published in *Davar*, August 24, 1962; Interview with Peres in *Ma’ariv*, July 27, 1962; Unofficial accounts: Elkana Gali, “How Israel would respond to Nasser’s Missiles (Hebrew), *Yediot Achronot*, August 10, 1962; “Defense Outlook in the Missile Age,” (Hebrew), *Ha’aretz*, September 28, 1962. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 144 & 385n19.

⁴¹³ “Stress in Acquisition of Deterrence Weapons,” (Hebrew), *Yediot Achronot*, August 13, 1962. *Ibid.*, p. 385n16.

would “serve the needs of science, agriculture, and industry.”⁴¹⁴ By 1962 that two conflicting military doctrines had emerged on Dimona. The technological approach, supported by Dayan and Peres, advocated that only a nuclear arsenal could secure Israel. A conventionalist school, represented by Allon and Israel Gallili, a former Haganah chief of staff, contended that an Israeli bomb could result in Soviet military action against Israel. On August 24 Peres indefinitely declared that “deterrent weapons” would prevent Israel’s enemies from making the “wrong conclusions.”⁴¹⁵ In mid-September, with Egypt intervening in Yemen’s civil war, he lambasted those who supported a test ban treaty as naïve and weak on security issues.⁴¹⁶

According to a Canadian document, on November 9, 1962, Jerusalem and Pretoria reached a deal providing the former with ten metric tons of uranium.⁴¹⁷ This secretive arrangement transpired while Peres was informing the public of Dimona’s future policy. In late 1962 Peres stipulated in the IDF published *Ma’archot* that if Israel obtained “an unpredictable power... the Arabs would react vehemently,” possibly via a “pre-emptive war.”⁴¹⁸ On December 28, 1962, a day after Meir and JFK met at Harriman’s Palm Beach home, Peres contended in the *Jewish Observer* that the Cuban Missile Crisis had demonstrated that it would be “silly” for anyone to be talking about an “independent” Israeli bomb. He then contradicted himself, admitting that the memories of the Holocaust and current politics meant that Israel should

⁴¹⁴ Chronology of Israel Assurances of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy and Related Events, undated, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Nuclear Energy Program, 1964-1965- March 1966, Box 30, *LBJL*

⁴¹⁵ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 144, 147-150, 385n19.

⁴¹⁶ On September 19, 1962, Yemen’s Imam Ahmad died. His successor and son, al-Badr, was then overthrown a week later by pro-Nasser officers. By mid-November 8,000 Egyptian troops were in Yemen supporting the new President Abdallah Sallal. On December 19 the U.S. recognized the new regime in Taiz. *Ibid.*, p. 386n20; Ethan Nadelmann, “Setting the Stage,” p. 443; McNamara, *Britain, Nasser and the Balance of Power in the Middle East*, pp. 177-178.

⁴¹⁷ The report, which Shalom has contended “undoubtedly” reached the U.S, stipulated that Israel would not use the material for military purposes. The Canadian memo also revealed that Ottawa had been told by Israel and South Africa that the IAEA would be informed about the deal. There is no evidence that this occurred. Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Ottawa) to Vienna, “Subject: South African Sale of Uranium to Israel,” January 23, 1963, RG 25, Volume 7882, File 14003-J-8-1-40, *LAC*; Shalom, *Israel’s Nuclear Option*, p. 80.

⁴¹⁸ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 150-151.

“consider” a “sophisticated deterrent” to preserve its “security and survival.”⁴¹⁹

In early 1963 the Knesset’s Finance Committee established an ad-hoc subcommittee to oversee Dimona’s financial aspects.⁴²⁰ This committee’s creation could have been a response to the Defense Ministry’s December 9, 1962, announcement to create a “special company.” According to a January 22, 1963, telegraph from the Canadian Embassy in Tel Aviv, this autonomous body, which reported only to the State Controller, would raise money and serve as “a special parliamentary authority” on “peaceful” atomic issues. Since this development created an “acrimonious” fight, the ad-hoc committee’s creation seems to have been the result of a compromise between the executive and legislative branches.⁴²¹ Drawing from four coalition members and three opposition members, a similar subcommittee, the Committee of Seven, was formed in the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.⁴²² Despite the illusion of transparency, Dimona was never raised in the Cabinet or by these two sub-committees. There was also another issue, indirectly linked to Dimona, which no one wished not to touch.

Israeli officials viewed Cairo’s rocket firings and Nasser’s intervention in Yemen with

⁴¹⁹ Burg has smartly observed that Peres, currently the President of Israel, still remains “an artist in proving one thing and its opposite” all in the same “sentence.” Oral History Interview with Ambassador Walworth Barbour by Sheldon M. Stern, May 22, 1981, JFK Oral History Project, p. 18, *JFKL*; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 149, 387n41; Aronson, *The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East*, pp. 78-79; Burg, *The Holocaust is Over*, p. 171.

⁴²⁰ On August 1, 1962, the *NYT* had reported that Israel’s State Controller, Dr. Ernst Nebenzahl, had recently “complained” that the true “estimates” of Dimona’s cost were being “withheld from the Knesset.” The grievance, was not been published in the press until Dr. Moshe Sneh, the leader of the Communist Party, raised the issue during the budget debate. In early January 1963 the *WP* reported that Israel was projected to spend roughly \$212.8 million U.S. or 23% of its 1964 budget on national security needs. The article admitted that the language of the defense bill was “designed to camouflage exact defense appropriations, which are kept secret.” “Israel Official Says Costs of Reactor Are Withheld,” *NYT*, August 1, 1962, p. 3; “Israel Budget Defense-Heavy,” *WP*, January 1, 1963, p. A14; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 147, 386n35; Incoming Telegram from Barbour to Rusk, February 8, 1968, NSF, Country File, Israel, Memos (1 of 2), Volume VIII (12-67-2/68), Box 140, *LBJL*.

⁴²¹ The new bureaucracy’s membership included Eshkol, Ben Gurion, Peres, directors from the National Bank and Bank Hapoalm, Solem Boneh, a subsidiary of *Histardut*, and a single representative from the NRP and Ahdut Ha’avoda. A nameless December 12, 1962, *NYT* article incorrectly stipulated that agency had been created by the Foreign Ministry rather than the Defense Ministry. Memorandum to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs from Canadian Embassy to Israel, “Subject: Israeli Atomic Energy Program,” RG 25, January 22, 1963, Volume 7882, File 14003-J-8-1-40, *LAC*; “Israel Starts Up Atom,” *NYT*, December 12, 1962, p. 10.

⁴²² Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 147, 386n35.

unease. Even though Egypt's atomic reactor could not produce enriched uranium, the Mossad was determined to block all Egyptian attempts to obtain the bomb.⁴²³ Beginning in 1959 Egypt began recruiting hundreds of European scientists, including Wolfgang Pilz, a former colleague of Werner van Braun. On October 23, 1962, Dr. Otto Joklik, an Austrian nuclear scientist, informed Israel that Egypt was attempting to produce a "Hiroshima" bomb via project "Cleopatra."⁴²⁴ In late November Pilz's secretary was blinded when she opened a letter bomb. In February 1963 Hans Kleinwachter, head of a Stuttgart missile factory, survived an assassination attempt.⁴²⁵

As the Mossad could no longer operate without impunity, in March 1963 Harel was fired by Ben Gurion. In a March 20 Knesset address, Meir demanded that Cairo and Bonn end its weapons collaboration. Ten of Israel's eleven parties, except the Communists, backed Meir.⁴²⁶ The Communist decision to abstain was followed by a Soviet inquiry into Israel's nuclear program two weeks later. After a discussion with Meir Amit, Harel's successor,⁴²⁷ concerning a proposed Mediterranean atomic-free zone, on March 30 the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Tel

⁴²³ In 1955 the U.S.S.R. erected a 2 MW research reactor near Cairo. A June 27, 1961, telegraph sent from the Canadian Embassy in Cairo to Ottawa revealed that Egypt had pressed Moscow for a 100 MW reactor but the Soviets were "unwilling..." to provide one. Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, p. 202; Numbered Letter from the Canadian Embassy in Cairo (R.A.D Ford) to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Ottawa), "Subject: Scientific Progress in the U.A.R.," June 27, 1961, RG 25, Volume 7882, File 14003-J-8-1-40, LAC.

⁴²⁴ Operation Cleopatra was mentioned by the *WP* on May 1964, in a piece which admitted that "without foreign help, Nasser's nuclear arms program would be severely retarded." "Egypt Is Emerging as A-Force," *WP*, May 4, 1964, p. A16; Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, pp. 205-208

⁴²⁵ Two years passed before Pilz told his side of the story. In a January 9, 1965, *NYT* piece, Pilz naively professed that he was only a scientist who had "nothing to do with politics." Emphasizing that Israel had "disclaimed" all allegations, the story revealed that the German scientists working for the UAR were guarded by bodyguards, had their mail checked and kept their addresses and phone numbers secret. Israel's radical means did justify the ends: in July 1965 Pilz and all the other senior scientists quit the project. Carl Buchalla, "German Rocket Expert in U.A.R. Tells of Fear of Israeli Reprisal," *NYT*, January 9, 1965, p. 1; Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, pp. 207-208; Hendrick Smith, "Leader of German Rocket Team Reported to Have Left U.A.R.," *NYT*, July 9, 1965, p. 7; Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, p. 207.

⁴²⁶ W. Granger Blair, "Israel Demands Bonn End Work of Germans for Cairo on Arms," *NYT*, March 21, 1963, p. 8.

⁴²⁷ Ginor and Remez have contended that Harel was opposed to Dimona "in its entirety" and even argued for scrapping the project, while Black and Morris have contended that Harel and Peres were "bitter enemies." This turf war emerged after Peres created LAKAM in 1960 to gather secret scientific and technological intelligence, perceived by Harel as a threat to his authority. The head of Aman during the early 1960s, Meir Amit, who replaced Harel as Mossad chief, had welcomed LAKAM's creation, a caveat which widened the Harel-Peres dispute. Ginor and Remez, "The Spymaster, the Communist, and Foxbats over Dimona: The USSR's Motive for Instigating the Six Day War," *Israel Studies* 11, 2 (Summer 2006), pp. 96-97; Black and Morris, *Israel's Secret Wars*, pp. 417-418.

Aviv, A.S. Likhachev, informed Moscow that Israel was “concerned not by atomic weapons...”⁴²⁸ On May 20, 1963, the Soviets officially issued their proposal. The scholarship’s view of the Israeli response remains understudied. In his own words, Shalom has vaguely mused that in “early June” Israel answered that it supported “reducing...nuclear proliferation,” while “emphatically” professing that it “possessed no nuclear weapons.”⁴²⁹ Yosef Govrin, the first Secretary of the Israeli Embassy in Moscow during the Six Day War, has argued a less conciliatory response transpired on May 30, stressing that the Arab world supposedly presented Israel with a “direct threat...”⁴³⁰ A Canadian message sent from Tel Aviv to Ottawa on June 11 indicates that the Israeli letter had been sent four days earlier. The memo, however, did not include a copy of the “full text” even though the Embassy was “given” a copy.⁴³¹ Based on all available evidence, including its omission from all U.S. sources, the Israeli response probably remains classified everywhere. Whatever the memo entailed, it placated the Soviets at a time when they were nearing a deal on a Partial Test Ban Treaty with the U.S. Nearly five months after the PTBT was signed, Khrushchev made no mention of Dimona in a December 31, 1963, note sent to Israel advocating that nations pursue “peaceful methods in settling territorial conflicts.”⁴³² More importantly, this letter was addressed to a new Israeli Prime Minister.

On June 16, 1963, Ben Gurion resigned his office, announcing publicly that he needed to attend to “personal needs.”⁴³³ Although U.S rhetoric towards Dimona was climaxing, the

⁴²⁸ Govrin has stressed that the Soviet proposal was linked to the recent entry of U.S. nuclear submarines equipped with Polaris nuclear missiles into the Mediterranean and the possibility of West Germany being allowed to acquire nuclear missiles. Ginor and Remez, *Foxbats over Dimona*, p. 52; Govrin, *Israeli-Soviet Relations*, p. 266.

⁴²⁹ Shalom, *Israel’s Nuclear Option*, pp. 43-44.

⁴³⁰ Govrin, *Israeli-Soviet Relations*, p. 266.

⁴³¹ Memorandum from Canadian Embassy in Tel Aviv to the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs (Ottawa), “Subject: USSR Proposal on Nuclear-Free Mediterranean Zone,” June 11, 1963, RG 25, Volume 7608, File 11312-40 P.T. 2.2, LAC.

⁴³² Govrin, *Israeli-Soviet Relations*, p. 267.

⁴³³ “Ben-Gurion Steps Down; Israeli Cabinet Surprised,” *NYT*, June 17, 1963, p. 1; “Ben-Gurion’s Fourth Time Out,” *NYT*, June 17, 1963, p. 24.

scholarship has generally contended that domestic considerations ultimately forced Ben Gurion to step down.⁴³⁴ With Ben Gurion's approval, on June 22 Mapai unanimously selected Eshkol as Prime Minister.⁴³⁵ Less than 48 hours later, Eshkol lauded Ben Gurion "as one of our people's greatest visionaries" in the Knesset. Dimona was not mentioned.⁴³⁶ During the first few months Eshkol continued to pass atomic information through Ben Gurion and Peres remained on as Deputy Minister of Defense.⁴³⁷ Still, Eshkol was never able to fully escape Ben Gurion's shadow. Mardor penned on June 27 that the old man's exit had "left many question marks."⁴³⁸

Ben-Gurion's removal precipitated increased domestic and international attention on Dimona. On August 7, 1963, the Knesset rejected a motion brought forward by Mosh Sneh of the Communists and Israel Barzelai of Mapam supporting the Soviet proposal to establish an atomic-free zone.⁴³⁹ Nine days later Livneh purported in *Yediot Ahronot* that there was "not one gram of seriousness" to Israel's approach to this subject under its last "pacifist" Prime Minister.⁴⁴⁰ On February 24, 1964, British philosopher Bertrand Russell urged the Arabs and Israelis to embrace "nuclear supervision."⁴⁴¹ Less than a fortnight later, Meir, while in London,

⁴³⁴ Aronson has contended that his growing isolation within Mapai, a desire to reform the nation's multi-party system and Israel's growing "co-operation" with West Germany all attributed to Ben Gurion's downfall. Cohen has generally supported this line, although he has admitted that the conditions surrounding the resignation remain aberrant. Drawing from Ben Gurion's diary, he has admitted that Ben Gurion told the Cabinet that he "must" resign and that "no state problem or event caused it." Bar Zohar has speculated that the 76 year old Ben Gurion's deteriorating physical and mental capabilities, including paranoia and memory loss, contributed. Cohen, however, has hinted that Sapir, Israel Gali, and Ne'eman have all indicated that U.S pressure on Dimona played a "part" in the decision. This contention is supported by Shalom, who has admitted that it is "hard to determine" how much a factor "Dimona" played in the resignation. Aronson, *The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East*, p. 78; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 135; Shalom, *Israel's Nuclear Option*, pp. 52-53.

⁴³⁵ Eshkol, born in Kiev in 1895, became Agriculture Minister in 1950 and the following year Finance Minister. James Feron, "Eshkol on Firing Line," *NYT*, July 25, 1965, p. E4; "Israel's Next Premier," *NYT*, June 25, 1963, p. 2.

⁴³⁶ "Israel Looks to a New Leader," *NYT*, June 23, 1963, p. 149; W. Granger Blair, "Eshkol Presents Cabinet in Israel," *NYT*, June 25, 1963, p. 2.

⁴³⁷ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 220.

⁴³⁸ "Israel Looks to a New Leader," *NYT*, June 23, 1963, p. 149; Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, pp. 240-241.

⁴³⁹ "Israelis Reject Bid on Atom-Free Zone," *NYT*, August 8, 1963, p. 2.

⁴⁴⁰ Shalom, *Israel's Nuclear Option*, pp. 50 & 188n14.

⁴⁴¹ "Arms Curb and A-Controls Urged on Israel and Arabs," *NYT*, February 25, 1964, p. 8.

denied that Israel was attempting to obtain the bomb.⁴⁴² Nothing was further from reality.

Based on a British primary source, Shalom has contended that in the spring of 1964 Ottawa informed the U.K and “most probably” the U.S. that Argentina had agreed to deliver 80-100 tons of uranium to Israel. No inspection or safeguard clauses were included in the accord.⁴⁴³ Soon after his visit to the U.S., Eshkol traveled to Paris where, on July 1, he told the press that Israel would not be the “first” to “introduce ... nuclear weapons in the region.” He added that such a weapon “would be” too “expensive,” which would violate Jewish “spiritual principles.”⁴⁴⁴

Eshkol should have known that his decision in May 1964 to invite Lavon back into Mapai would incite the retired Ben-Gurion. Seeing his chance to replace Eshkol, in October Ben Gurion submitted to the Attorney General a request for a new inquiry into the Lavaon scandal. He also cast the only negative vote when Mapai and Ahdut Ahdut Avoda agreed to align for the 1965 election.⁴⁴⁵ Using a Ben Gurion tactic, Eshkol resigned on December 14, 1964.⁴⁴⁶ Four days later Mapai endorsed Eshkol by stating that it would form a new Cabinet with Adhut Ahdut Avoda, the NRP, and Poelui Agudat Israel. On December 23, a day after the new British Prime Minister Harold Wilson had seconded the Soviet proposal for a Near East atomic-free zone, the Knesset voted 59-36 to support Eshkol’s return to power.⁴⁴⁷

Operating discreetly, Ben Gurion attempted to use Dimona to bring down Eshkol. Weeks after the U.S. had conducted a set of vital Dimona-related meetings in Israel, on March 15, 1965, the *NYT* unveiled that Eshkol had “quietly permitted” U.S. “engineers” to “inspect” Dimona

⁴⁴² “Arms to Arabs Worries Israel,” *WP*, March 6, 1964, p. A17.

⁴⁴³ This report also speculated that Israel could produce a nuclear weapon within twenty months. Shalom, *Israel's Nuclear Option*, p. 80; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 179.

⁴⁴⁴ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 404n38.

⁴⁴⁵ One month later Dayan resigned as Agriculture of Minister. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 220.

⁴⁴⁶ “Eshkol Quits as Israeli Premier After Party Split on Lavon Issue,” *NYT*, December 15, 1964, p. 1.

⁴⁴⁷ Wilson, who had replaced the Conservative Sir Alec-Douglas Home one month earlier, drew criticism for his comments. Conservative MP Frederick Burden informed Wilson that Israel was a “small isolated country” which “should” be allowed to “protect” itself. W. Granger Blair, “Eshkol Restored to Post in Israel,” *NYT*, December 23, 1964, p. 2; Sydney Grusson, “Wilson Proposes Nuclear-Free Zone in Mideast,” *NYT*, December 23, 1964, p. 2.

“about a month ago.”⁴⁴⁸ This disclosure undermined Eshkol as it added to the perception that he was weak on Dimona. Attacking Eshkol to a degree never matched during Ben Gurion’s reign, the domestic press claimed this news threatened Israel’s sovereignty and security. Oblivious that the U.S. had conducted two visits during Ben Gurion’s tenure, the next day *Ha’aretz* chastised Eshkol for allowing the visits against the advice of “senior advisors.”⁴⁴⁹ On May 9, 1965, Ben Gurion argued in *Davar* that Eshkol “was no longer qualified to lead the nation.”⁴⁵⁰ Eleven days later Peres resigned as Deputy Defense Minister.⁴⁵¹ On May 22 the *NYT* asserted that a “political donnybrook” was transpiring in Israel with no indication that Mapai would win the upcoming election.⁴⁵² In a 179 to 103 vote on June 4, Mapai leadership chose Eshkol to represent the party in the election. Twenty-five days later Ben Gurion, who always pursued his myopic self-interest, shocked everyone by creating the Israel Workers’ List Party (Rafi). According to Golan, “solely out of loyalty to Ben Gurion,” Peres also jumped ship to join the new party.⁴⁵³

Cohen has argued that the bitterest election in Israeli history represented the only campaign in which Dimona was brought into the public discourse. Four days after Heikal had announced that Israel planned to test a nuclear bomb “soon,” *Ha’aretz* produced an article on

⁴⁴⁸ John W. Finney, “Israel Permits U.S. to Inspect Atomic Reactor,” *NYT*, March 14, 1965, p. 1.

⁴⁴⁹ The visit took place on January 30, 1965. Editorial *Ha’aretz* (Hebrew), March 16, 1965; *Ha’aretz* (Hebrew) March 17, 1965; *Lamerhav* (Hebrew), March 17, 1965 Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 185, 220-222, 402n 6-8.

⁴⁵⁰ In late July 1965 Eshkol informed the *NYT* that while Ben Gurion was making life “more complicated” for him, he was confident that the Israeli people would not “attracted by the cult of personality.” Avi Dinstein, who worked under Eshkol at the Treasury Ministry, informed Karpin that only those close to Eshkol knew how the comments affected him, to the point where “it even may” have even led to his “death.” James Feron, “Eshkol Saddened by Ben-Gurion’s Bid for Power,” *NYT*, July 29, 1965, p. 2; Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, pp. 266-267.

⁴⁵¹ W. Granger Blair, “2 Israelis Resign in Leaders Resign in Leader’s Rift,” *NYT*, May 21, 1965, p. 9; Golan, *Shimon Peres*, p. 130.

⁴⁵² W. Granger Blair, “Ben-Gurion vs. Eshkol,” *NYT*, May 22, 1965, p. 5.

⁴⁵³ Cohen has argued that by the summer of 1965 the supercilious Ben Gurion “was no longer interested in party politics” but wanted to bring down “Eshkol altogether.” Aronson has contended that the unenthusiastic Peres did not think that Rafi would find much electoral success but understood that without his “old mentor” he would be “left to the mercy” to his many Mapai enemies. Dayan also came to the same conclusion. Golan, *Shimon Peres*, pp.128, 130; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 220-221.

August 25, 1965, entitled “Is Israel Capable of Producing an Atomic Bomb.”⁴⁵⁴ According to Aronson, the atomic issue was introduced into the “ugly” campaign by Peres as a major dividing issue between Rafi and Mapai “even it was never spelled out in public.” Rafi, known by insiders as the “atomic party,” was packaged as a reforming force that sought scientific and technological innovation, while denouncing Mapai as weak on national security. Ben Gurion’s rhetoric “went nowhere” because the confused electorate “had no idea what its leaders were talking about...”⁴⁵⁵ In the November 4 vote Mapai gained 43 seats while Rafi won only ten. Following his defeat, Ben Gurion possessed little desire to attend Knesset debates and votes as Rafi’s leader.⁴⁵⁶

Four days before Eshkol formed a fresh coalition Cabinet, the *NYT* leaked a pending French-Israeli missile deal on January 7, 1966.⁴⁵⁷ This story was likely prompted by the first MD-620 test, a failure, conducted fifteen days earlier.⁴⁵⁸ The Finney piece again played to the critical trope that Eshkol was compromising on Dimona, a perception which the Prime Minister had hoped to shatter after his electoral victory. Beginning with personnel changes in the first half of 1966 and simultaneous shifts in how Dimona was presented in the press and Parliament, Eshkol began to aggrandize power within the embedded atomic bureaucracy. In fact, beginning in early 1964, the Prime Minister had been efficaciously changing Israel’s nuclear infrastructure. At this time Yitzhak Rabin, representing the Allon-inspired conventionalist school, replaced the pro-technology Zvi Zur as IDF Chief of Staff. Following the election, Dinstein, who had no

⁴⁵⁴ This was the only Israeli newspaper article which examined Dimona during the 1965 campaign. “Cairo Editor Says Israel Plans to Test Nuclear Device Soon,” *NYT*, August 21, 1965, p. 2; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 222.

⁴⁵⁵ Aronson, *The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East*, p. 324n44.

⁴⁵⁶ In late August 1966 a new Knesset was built and financed by the Rothschilds. Golan, *Shimon Peres*, p. 132; James Feron, “New Knesset Dedicated in Israel,” *NYT*, August 31, 1966, p. 16.

⁴⁵⁷ The 75 seat coalition consisted of the Mapai-Ahdut Avodva Alliance (45 totals seats), the NRP (11), Mapam (8), Independent Liberals (5), and Po’elai Agudat (2). Eban replaced Meir as Foreign Minister, while Sapir became Finance Minister. John W. Finney, “Israel Said to Buy French Missiles,” *NYT*, January 7, 1966, p. 1; “Eshkol Forms Coalition Cabinet,” *NYT*, January 11, 1966, p. 4; Medding, *The Founding of Israeli Democracy*, p. 242.

⁴⁵⁸ In the two days after the Finney story, anonymous officials in the French and Israeli Foreign Ministries stressed that the allegations were “without foundation.” Rather than missiles, the two nations had been working on “technical cooperation.” Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 232; “French Deny Israel is Buying Missiles,” *NYT*, January 8, 1966, p. 5; “Israel also Denies Report She Bought French Missiles,” *NYT*, January 9, 1966, p. 15.

military experience, succeeded Peres at the Ministry of Defense. He quickly discovered that Peres' byzantine divide-and-rule approach had left the atomic infrastructure in chaos. There was no chain of command, no allocation of resources and nothing was written down.⁴⁵⁹ Peres' fragmented bureaucracy, an interwoven group of ad-hoc agencies reporting only to him, made it difficult for Dinstein to communicate with Dimona. To find a panacea, the reactor's supervisor, Mannes Pratt, was replaced by Yossef Tulipman. Along with his increased marginalization, a key factor in Bergmann's decision to resign as IAEC chief on April 1, 1966,⁴⁶⁰ was Pratt's decision to ban him from Dimona. Eshkol seized this crisis to create a new IEAC to oversee the entire hierarchy, entrenching all power in his hands. After Ne'eman was first offered the job, Dostrovsky eventually replaced Bergmann.⁴⁶¹

Some were not unwilling to embrace the institutional changes. Cohen has contended that the fiercest turf war, stemming from late December 1965 to late April 1966, involved Eshkol's and Dinstein's attempt to reorganize RAFAEL. The idea rattled Mardor who yearned to conserve his autonomous shadow power position. Adamant that the status quo be preserved, he utilized his ties with various scientists, politicians and military officers to campaign for his cause. Roughly a month after a second successful MD-620 test, on April 2, 1966, Eshkol met with Dinstein and Mardor. At this time Dinstein proposed removing "key professional" units from RAFAEL and placing them in a new scientific administration. Eshkol, however, announced two weeks later

⁴⁵⁹ Dinstein later informed Cohen that "everything was small and personal." Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 222-227.

⁴⁶⁰ The Israeli public had no idea about the internal turf war leading to Bergmann's ouster. Since the issue was not discussed in the Cabinet or the Committee of Seven, it was easy to dismiss solely as a personal dispute between Eshkol and Bergmann in the press. Another three weeks passed before *Ha'aretz* commented on the professor's termination. In a May 14, 1966, *NYT* story, Bergmann coyly informed the *NYT* that it was "very important to understand that ...there are no two atomic energies." Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 230, 403n42; Feron, "Israelis Honor Atom Scientist," *NYT*, May 14, 1966, p. 3.

⁴⁶¹ Cohen has argued that Eshkol's and Dinstein's reforms did not democratize Dimona, although Eshkol's regime was "less autocratic than Ben Gurion." Their respective atomic policies were "not that different from each other" as both men enabled Israel to "enjoy the best of both worlds." Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 225-227, 242, 403n39.

that Mardor would remain at RAFEL, with the officialdom retaining all its independence in all R&D matters.⁴⁶² Taking a page from Abraham Lincoln's playbook, having slyly co-opted a man used to answering only to Ben Gurion and Peres, Eshkol understood that one destroys an adversary by making him an ally.

According to Israeli historian and journalist Tom Segev, in "early 1966" the Prime Minister briefed the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on Dimona.⁴⁶³ This exposure tacitly increased the Israeli media's coverage of the nation's nuclear program. Since the handful of journalists conscious about Dimona were forbidden to publish their information, they had to settle for quoting international stories in their bylines.⁴⁶⁴ This censorship drew constrained criticism from the Israeli domestic press. On March 7, 1966, the *NYT* reported that some of Israel's most important editors had recently met with Eban to ask if the state "could relax its ban on discussion of the...nuclear issue."⁴⁶⁵ A day after the *WP* professed that that "a-weapons" were "near for Israel," Eshkol assured the Knesset on May 18 that "Israel had no atomic arms." Nasser and the press were only foolishly "drawing attention" to non-existent "nuclear weapons" in the "region."⁴⁶⁶ Eshkol wisely chose the indefinite verb "introduce," rather than "manufacture" or "develop," to tacitly hint that the perceived Arab strength served as a pretext for Israel's nuclear development. Unlike Ben Gurion's December 1960 Knesset address, Eshkol omitted Dimona's supposed scientific benefits or "peaceful purposes."⁴⁶⁷ Unfortunately for Eshkol, Dimona refused

⁴⁶² Based on "foreign sources," Karpin has professed that RAFEL's budget doubled and hundreds of new workers were hired thereafter. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 230 & 232; Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, p. 266.

⁴⁶³ Tom Segev, *1967: Israel, the War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle East* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2007), p. 164.

⁴⁶⁴ Such examples include: *Ha'aretz*, January 10, 1966, p. 1; *Ibid*, April 19, 1966, p. 1; *Ibid*, April 19, 1966, p.1; *Yediot Aharonot*, January 23, 1966, p. 1; *Ibid*, January 28, 1966, p. 1; *Ibid*, March 3, 1966, p.1; *Ibid*, April 22, 1966, p. 1; *Maariv*, April 18, 1966, p.; *Ibid*, April 22, 1966, p. 11; Segev, *1967*, pp. 164 & 603n50.

⁴⁶⁵ James Feron, "Atom-News Ban End Urged in Israel," *NYT*, March 7, 1966, p. 11.

⁴⁶⁶ Drew Pearson, "A-Weapons Reported Near for Israel," *WP*, May 18, 1966, p. E11; James Feron, "Mideast Atom Curb is Urged by Eshkol," *NYT*, May 19, 1966, p. 1.

⁴⁶⁷ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 233-234.

to go away so easily.

A week after the *NYT* had disclosed that the U.S. had conducted another Dimona “inspection” one month earlier, a serious debate emerged in a July 5, 1966, inter-governmental meeting. Yohan Beder of the Gahal Party argued that the *NYT*’s “serious” leaks were providing “details” to Israel’s “enemies.” Informing his colleagues of the need to maintain good relations with the U.S, Eshkol responded that “an invitation” was “necessary from time to time.” Some did not accept this answer. The Communist Party’s Meir Vilner advocated that an Israeli bomb would be a “deadly poison” and proposed denuclearizing the Near East. Referring to a recent international conference focused on the subject, Peres responded that there was “unfortunately” no way to limit proliferation because the “big powers” could not agree “among themselves.”⁴⁶⁸ Blaming the Knesset for its “daily leaks to the press...,” he questioned why Israel should “reassure Nasser” of its “nuclear intentions.”⁴⁶⁹ This subtle critique was repeated a day later when Peres wrote in *Ha’aretz* that it was fine for Israel to “reassure friends privately” about Dimona but “another thing to reassure Nasser in the Knesset.”⁴⁷⁰ This internal debate over Dimona was largely placed in the background during the second half of 1966.

Cohen has contended that by late 1966 Dimona’s infrastructure was nearing completion, while Péan has speculated that the reactor was producing enough plutonium to construct a bomb by late 1966 or early 1967.⁴⁷¹ By early November 1966 Israel’s nuclear program had reached a watershed moment. Mardor has asserted in his autobiography that on November 2 a test with

⁴⁶⁸ This conference, entitled the International Assembly on Nuclear Weapons, which was held from June 23-26, 1966, in Toronto, was attended by Peres. Sponsored by Columbia University and the Institute for Strategic Studies, Jabber has argued that “contrary” to Peres’ allegations the conference indeed called for a “serious effort” to “negotiate a Nuclear Free Zone” in the Near East. Jabber, *Israel and Nuclear Weapons*, p. 41.

⁴⁶⁹ The fact that Dimona was so widely discussed during this meeting upset Eshkol, forcing the Prime Minister to move the “sensitive matter” to the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee. Jabber, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 38-41.

⁴⁷⁰ According to Segev, four days later a large *Ha’aretz* advertisement griped about the possible “introduction of nuclear weapons into the Middle East. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 404n52; Segev, *1967*, p. 164.

⁴⁷¹ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 230; Péan, *Les Deux Bombs*, p. 120.

“special significance” was conducted.⁴⁷² This success was offset by a December 14 accident at Dimona which killed a technician, forcing the plant to shut down for three months. Eshkol’s visit to the facility earlier in the month was reported in the *JP* on February 3, 1967.⁴⁷³ Six days later Walworth Barbour, the U.S. Ambassador to Israel, pointed out this story represented the first Israeli press report to ever explicitly usher the word “Dimona.”⁴⁷⁴

Mardor has argued that on May 27, 1967, technicians and scientists were “assembling and testing the weapons system.” Although he did not explicitly mention what they were assembling, he wrote that they all “fully recognized the enormous, perhaps fateful, value” of their actions. In an interview with Myer Feldman, who served under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, Cohen was informed that Israel had “two improvised” bombs before June 1967.⁴⁷⁵ In his memoirs, Peres, a private citizen by 1967, argued that through Dayan, who had replaced Eshkol as Defense Minister on June 1, he presented “a certain proposal” that would have “deterred the Arabs and prevented the war.” For “reasons of state security,” Peres did not go into any more detail but one can easily deduce that this suggestion was a nuclear test.⁴⁷⁶

Cohen has argued that Eshkol had adamantly apposed any nuclear test at any time, even though those around him, especially Bergmann before his resignation, pushed for it. Segev and Cohen have argued that an atomic test could have set “history on a different course” by creating “shock waves with unanticipated consequences.” Despite his own analysis, Cohen has argued the

⁴⁷² Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 232.

⁴⁷³ Based on a *Ma’ariv* report, in September 1994 the *WP* pointed out that Abraham Gofar, 22, had been the employee killed. Only after these stories did the IAEC confirm the accident. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 239 & 405n65-66; Carlyle Murphy, “Israel Says ‘66 Mishap Killed 1 at Nuclear Site,” *WP*, September 16, 1994, p. A34.

⁴⁷⁴ Airgram Telegram from Barbour to Department of State, “Subject: Dimona Nuclear Research Center,” February 10, 1967, NSF, Country File, Israel, Cables, Volume VI (12/66-7/67) Box 140, *LBJL*.

⁴⁷⁵ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 173.

⁴⁷⁶ Peres, *Battling for Peace*, p. 145.

Six-Day War had “no-direct atomic dimension.”⁴⁷⁷ By examining Soviet positions vis-à-vis Dimona in the three years leading up to the war, the orthodox narrative advocated by Francis Fukuyama, that Soviet warnings “to intervene” in the Six Day War were all “bluffs,” will be refuted.⁴⁷⁸ Had Israel tested a bomb in 1967, it could have provided a catalyst for World War III.

The U.S.S.R.’s policies vis-à-vis Dimona during the 1960s constitutes a fresh, exciting, and irascible debate within the historiography. Ginor’s and Remez’s trailblazing argument that Moscow, beginning in late 1965, deliberately engineered a series of events to goad Israel into a pre-emptive conventional strike to provide the Soviets with a pretext to destroy Dimona in a subsequent air strike is a convincing one. David Murphy, the CIA’s former head of Soviet operations, argued on the book’s cover that its contents touched upon a subject previously “ignored by Western historians.” Odd Arne Westad, director of Cold War Studies at the LSE, professed that the “revisionist” book would “stand out...” Daniel Kurtzer, a former U.S. Ambassador in Tel Aviv (July 2001-July 2005), described Ginor’s and Remez’s narrative as “provocative.” Another Republican appointed Ambassador (1985-1988), Thomas Pickering, likewise has argued that the “fascinating” book demonstrates that Moscow’s “role now appears to be much...more intensive...”

The scholarly reviews of the book have been polarizing. In the fall of 2007 the first review was published in *Foreign Affairs*. Lawrence Freedman, a professor of War Studies at King’s College, contended the “revisionist” monograph had done much to unveil the “murky” role that Moscow “played” during the period prior to June 1967. Soviet anxiety about Israel’s

⁴⁷⁷ In an interview with Dinsetin, Cohen was told that Eshkol used to rhetorically ask the IAEC head: “Do you think that the world would sit and applaud us for our achievement?” Segev, *1967*, p. 327; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 237, 275-276.

⁴⁷⁸ At the time Fukuyama was working within the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff and the Rand Corporation. Francis Fukuyama, “Nuclear Shadowboxing: Soviet Intervention Threat in the Middle East,” *ORBIS*, 25, 3 (Fall 1981), pp. 576, 581-582;

“imminent” nuclear threat and foolish confidence in Arab military capabilities precipitated Moscow’s plan to destroy Dimona.⁴⁷⁹ This finding was supported by Mark Katz, a professor of Government at George Mason University. Despite being initially “highly skeptical” of the “bold” thesis, Katz became convinced even before finishing the book, due to their utilization of new Soviet documents, that Ginor and Remez had indeed “got it right.”⁴⁸⁰

The reviews composed by Israeli scholars are less conciliatory and concise. In a May 16, 2007, *JP* story, historian Michael Oren avowed that he had not found “any documentary evidence to support” Ginor’s and Remez’s thesis. Although he failed to specify when he went or what he examined, Israel’s current U.S. Ambassador professed that he had found that “not a lot has been declassified” at the Kremlin archives.⁴⁸¹ In March 2008 Amnon Sella, a former visiting professor at Oxford and Georgetown, dismissed the book as “...propaganda.”⁴⁸² Six months later, Israeli political scientist Galia Golan described the book as “dubious,” warning that it would be viewed as “authoritative” in conspiracy “circles.” It took her two pages to introduce the book as she spent most of the review engaging in self-applause.⁴⁸³ By omitting all of the above cited reviews even though they were all published before her piece, she encouraged future likeminded scholarship.⁴⁸⁴ In *The Soviet Union and the June 1967 War* (2008), Yaacov Ro’i, a Tel Aviv University historian, contended that he was unconvinced “by the general thrust” of

⁴⁷⁹ Lawrence Freedman, “Review,” *Foreign Affairs* 86, 5 (September/October 2007), pp. 168-169.

⁴⁸⁰ Similar to the Cuban Missile Crises, Afghanistan in 1978, Chechnya in 1994 and Georgia since 2003, Katz has generalized that Moscow’s actions prior to the Six Day War assumed that it was capable of controlling “the outcome of the crises that it initiated.” Mark N. Katz, “Review,” *Middle East Journal*, 62, 1 (Winter 2008), pp. 178-179.

⁴⁸¹ David Horowitz, “Soviets Engineered Six Day War,” *JP*, May 16, 2007 <http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1178708610161&pagename=JPost/JPArticle/Printer>.

⁴⁸² Amnon Sella, “Review,” *The Journal of Israeli History*, 27, 1 (March 2008), p. 104.

⁴⁸³ Three of the review’s nine footnotes are derived either from Golan’s 1990 *The Soviet Union and the Middle East* or a 2006 *Journal of Cold War Studies* article. Golan, “A (Dubious) Conspiracy of the 1967 War,” *Diplomatic History*, 32, 4 (September 2008), pp. 670-673.

⁴⁸⁴ The failure to encourage or acknowledge a counter perspective within *Diplomatic History* must also be placed on the shoulders of the journal’s editor-in-chief, Robert Schulzinger, who could have always included another review. Schulzinger is also a member of Foggy Bottom’s Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation and the CIA’s Historical Review Panel. “OAH Distinguished Lectureship Program 2008-2009: Robert D. Schulzinger,” www.oah.org/activities/lectureship/2008/lecturer.php?id=259.

Foxbats over Dimona and saw no “reason for altering the conclusions” of his co-edit book.⁴⁸⁵

Rather than simply denouncing Ginor’s and Remez’s work as conspiratorial, scholars should address the book’s major flaw: the chronological gap in Soviet attitudes towards Dimona from December 1960 to late December 1965. Aside from the 1963 Soviet proposal to denuclearize the Mediterranean basin, little is known about Soviet opinions toward Dimona during Khrushchev’s tenure. The Ottawa archives have provided a brief glimpse. On July 19, 1961, Canada’s High Commission in London reported that Moscow might be supplying Cairo with information that Britain was “helping Israel to develop atomic weapons.” Ginor and Remez have argued that Ivan Dedyula, a former KGB agent in Tel Aviv, informed them that by late 1962 he had been ordered “to ascertain...the work for creating atomic arms in Israel.”⁴⁸⁶

In 1964 the U.S.S.R.’s Near East policy was attacked by Jews in New York and Moscow. On January 26 the Free Sons of Israel demonstrated near the Soviet Union’s UN mission against Soviet discrimination against Russian Jews. Days after *UPI* revealed that Meir had “denied that Israel was producing nuclear weapons,” Kremlin officials accused Israeli diplomats for distributing “Zionist literature” in Moscow’s Central Synagogue.⁴⁸⁷ Less than a week after the *NYT* stated on May 5 that Egypt and Israel were both unable to “produce a nuclear weapon,” Khrushchev visited Cairo. This trip could have laid the groundwork for Arab leaders to meet in

⁴⁸⁵ The book was produced by the Woodrow Wilson Cold War International History project thanks to an anonymous grant from the Israel Science Foundation. Yaacov Ro’i, “Introduction,” in *The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War*, ed. Yaacov Ro’i and Boris Morozov, p. xvii-xxiv. (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center and Stanford University Press, 2008).

⁴⁸⁶ Memorandum from the Canadian Embassy in London to the Department of External Affairs, July 19, 1961, RG 25, Volume 7882, File 14003-J-8-1-40, LAC; Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, “The Spymaster, the Communist, and Foxbats over Dimona,” p. 93.

⁴⁸⁷ The *NYT* estimated that at the time Moscow contained 200 000 Jews. “Jews Picket Soviet Mission,” *NYT*, January 27, 1964, p. 14; “Arms to Arabs Worries Israel,” *WP*, March 6, 1964, p. A17; Theodore Shabad, “Israeli Aides in Soviet Accused of Propaganda in Synagogue,” *NYT*, March 12, 1964, p. 1.

Alexandria in late August.⁴⁸⁸ Based on an *Al Ahram* piece, the *WP* revealed on August 28 that a group of unnamed Arab leaders had gathered to discuss “Israel’s potential use of atomic energy” for “military purposes.”⁴⁸⁹ The *NYT* reported the next day that Moscow’s Jewish synagogue was placed off limits to Israeli diplomats for three months. By early September, however, relations warmed as Soviet property in Jerusalem was sold to Israel under favorable terms, effectively ending Moscow’s economic boycott of Israel in place since Suez.⁴⁹⁰

These improved bilateral relations were short-lived. On October 16, 1964, Khrushchev lost power to Aleksei Kosygin in a radical sea change which altered Moscow’s Near East policy.⁴⁹¹ In response to rumors about a pending West German-Israeli arms deal, on November 25, 1964, *Izvestia* published a pugnacious cartoon showing a Nazi general, his sleeve covered in blood, handing a weapon to an Israeli soldier which had been “tested and fired at Auschwitz.” Maurice Eisendrath, head of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, argued in the *NYT* that this drawing represented “the first...anti-Jewish material to appear since” Khrushchev’s ouster. One day later at New York’s Commodore Hotel, the National Committee for Israel implored the U.S.S.R. to pursue a Jeffersonian “bill of rights” for Soviet Jews.⁴⁹²

While London seconded Moscow’s proposal for a nuclear-free Near East and the U.S. press reported that Israeli assassins were facing espionage charges in Egypt, relations between

⁴⁸⁸ “Egyptian Nuclear Breakthrough Not Proved, Says State Dept.” *NYT*, May 5, 1964, p. A12; “Soviet Premier Calls on Arabs to Unite Against Colonialism,” *WP*, May 11, 1964, p. A1.

⁴⁸⁹ This Arab meeting refutes the generalization made by Cohen that Dimona represented an issue of “secondary importance” in the broader Arab-Israeli dispute prior to mid-1965. Similarly, Karpin has argued that prior to mid-1965 Egypt was “completely oblivious to Israel’s nuclear plans.” In a 2002 interview, Haikal stated that Cairo “never imagined that Israel was building a bomb...until the end of 1965.” Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 254-255; Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, p. 201; “Arabs Study Israel A-Arms Potential,” *WP*, August 29, 1964, p. B5.

⁴⁹⁰ “Israeli Detects A Russian Thaw,” *NYT*, September 7, 1964, p. 1.

⁴⁹¹ An October 26 CIA report described Nasser’s initial reaction to the news was that dismiss it as “imperialist propaganda.” The CIA cable, stating that Nasser had “never appeared so depressed and unhappy,” argued that he viewed Khrushchev’s “dismissal” as “worse than Suez.” CIA Intelligence Cable, “Subject: Nasir’s Reactor to Khrushchev’s Ouster,” October 26, 1964, NSF, UAR, Cables 2 of 2, Volume II (6/64-12/64), Box 159, *LBJL*.

⁴⁹² “Jewish Head Scores Soviet Cartoon,” *NYT*, November 26, 1964, p. 2; “Jewish Group Here Asks A Soviet ‘Bill of Rights,’” *NYT*, November 27, 1964, p. 5.

Moscow and Jerusalem deteriorated further in early 1965.⁴⁹³ Two weeks after the *NYT* announced another U.S. “inspection” of Dimona had transpired, Meir vilified a recent Soviet arms sale to Nasser in the Knesset as an a contradiction to Moscow’s issuances of “peace” on March 28.⁴⁹⁴ On May 22 the *NYT* relayed that *Isvestia* had reported that Yosef Tekoah, Israel’s Ambassador in Moscow, had attacked “the human dignity and religious feelings” of Russian Jews everywhere by calling one member of an Odessa synagogue a “Fascist.”⁴⁹⁵ During the month a Syrian envoy also visited Moscow, thus marking the start of Damascus’s role as the “central pivot” in Moscow’s Near East policy.⁴⁹⁶

In late August Haikal, via the *NYT*, announced that Israel possessed a clear “atomic lead on her Arab neighbors” due to an oral deal concluded with France in 1956. Thanks to an estimated investment of \$700 million, *Al-Ahram*’s editor announced that an Israeli bomb was possible “in a few years.”⁴⁹⁷ Since Nasser apparently cared little about Dimona until summer 1965, one can speculate that this monetary estimate, the highest denomination ever attributed to Dimona, was provided to Cairo from Moscow. A month later Tekoah was replaced by Katriel Katz in Moscow.⁴⁹⁸ Then on October 6 Jordan’s Foreign Minister, Hasem Nuseibeh, informed U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk that Amman had received “intelligence” indicating that

⁴⁹³ Sydney Grusson, “Wilson Proposes Nuclear-Free Zone in Mideast,” *NYT*, December 23, 1964, p. 2; Carl Buchalla, “German Rocket Expert in U.A.R. Tells of Fear of Israeli Reprisal,” *NYT*, January 9, 1965, p. 1; Hendrick Smith, “Cairo Charges Four Germans as Spies for Israel,” *NYT*, March 5, 1965, p. 6.

⁴⁹⁴ Govrin, *Israeli-Soviet Relations*, p. 274.

⁴⁹⁵ Theodore Shabad, “Moscow Accuses Israeli of Insult,” *NYT*, May 22, 1965, p. 4; “Russia Attacks Israeli Envoy,” *WP*, May 23, 1965, A22.

⁴⁹⁶ Govrin, *Israeli-Soviet Relations*, p. 276.

⁴⁹⁷ He also cautioned that Israel would not find it “necessary to test” as such a catalyzing event could “turn the world against” the Jewish state. “Cairo Editor Says Israel Plans to Test Nuclear Device Soon,” *NYT*, August 21, 1965, p. 2.

⁴⁹⁸ Tekoah, born in Russia in 1925, became Ambassador in Moscow in late February 1962. On July 21, 1962, Katz was named as Israel’s Consul-General in New York, after serving for four years had served as Chief Cabinet Secretary to Ben Gurion. “Israel’s Voice in the U.N.,” *NYT*, March 23, 1968, p. 2; “Israeli Envoy Shifted,” *NYT*, February 24, 1962, p. A9; Farnsworth Fowle, “Bonn Envoys Joins Salute to Aufuba,” *NYT*, March 22, 1965, p. 15; “Obituary 4- No Title,” *WP*, October 3, 1988, p. D6.

“Israel had already attained the capability to produce a nuclear bomb.”⁴⁹⁹ Weeks before Israel’s election, Heikal wrote a story, reprinted on October 15, 1965, in *Ma’ariv*, warning that the Arabs could “not with wait” to acknowledge and confront the Israeli “atomic menace.”⁵⁰⁰ Weeks after the Israeli election, Maki submitted questions to the Kremlin asking for Moscow’s input into its future party platforms. On November 19 Maki’s M. Suslov and the New Communist List’s B. Ponamarev traveled to Moscow. Govrin has argued during these talks Soslov announced that if Israel obtained the bomb it would “cause a national disaster” and foster deep “enmity” towards the nation.⁵⁰¹ This meeting may have precipitated a curious conversation three weeks later in Israel. According to Soviet documents, on December 13, 1965, Sneh, now a Maki leader, informed the Soviet Ambassador in Tel Aviv, Dimitri Chuvakhin, that he had been told by an advisor of Eshkol, “Gariel,” that Israel intended to produce a bomb.⁵⁰²

Ginor and Remez have emphasized that “Gariel” was the Russian transliteration of the Hebrew name Har’el, or Isser Harel, who on September 15 became a Special Adviser on intelligence and special operations to Eshkol.⁵⁰³ In his 1987 Hebrew account *Soviet Espionage*, Harel argued that Sneh was a political dissident rather than a Soviet asset even though he was placed under surveillance by Israel. This conclusion cannot be trusted, however, because Soviet documents have revealed that Sneh, as Secretary General of the League for Friendship with the USSR, had helped Moscow to funnel money to its agents operating in Israel. Israel Beer, a

⁴⁹⁹ Rusk coyly responded that he was “surprised” that Nuseibeh believed this “information” to be “reliable” and that the U.S. “would look into the matter. October 6, 1965, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Nuclear Energy Program, 1964-1965- March 1966, Box 30, *LBJL*.

⁵⁰⁰ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 257 & 409n48.

⁵⁰¹ Govrin, *Israeli - Soviet Relations*, pp. 84-85.

⁵⁰² Ginor has argued that Sneh viewed Eshkol’s government as “potentially more open to rapprochement with the USSR than” Ben Gurion had been. Isabella Ginor, “The Six Day War as a Soviet Initiative: New Evidence and Methodological Issues,” *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 12, 3 (September 2008), p. 26.

⁵⁰³ Beginning in 1962, Harel, who as head of the Haganah in 1946 had saved Sneh from being arrested by the British, served as an informal conduit with Moscow. Little has been published of Harel’s work as Eshkol’s aide. Ginor and Remez, “The Spymaster, the Communist, and Foxbats over Dimona,” pp. 91, 122n17, 96-97; Ginor, “The Six Day War as a Soviet Initiative,” p. 26.

former colleague of Sneh, was even exposed by Harel himself to be a Soviet spy.⁵⁰⁴ Since the ruthless Harel had opposed Dimona since the early 1950s, it is difficult to determine whether his move to employ Sneh was a deliberate strategy, implemented with Eshkol's knowledge to deter the Soviets, or a move by himself alone to expose the project for selfish reasons. Analogous to Angleton at the CIA, Harel was equipped to conduct his own alternative foreign policy. Regardless, by late 1965 the Soviets had learned that a window of opportunity still existed to prevent Israel from developing the bomb.

Eshkol, who spoke fluent Russian and had three brothers living in the U.S.S.R., was aware that Israeli-Soviet relations were quite bad by early 1966.⁵⁰⁵ In what Govrin has professed “were the friendliest words...ever...expressed by any” Israeli Prime Minister about the Soviets, on January 12 Eshkol informed the Knesset that since Israel did not “participate in...the Cold War” there should be a “greater... understanding” between the U.S.S.R. and Israel.⁵⁰⁶ The Soviets did not buy it. A week later, on Eban's first day as Foreign Minister, Chuvakhin stated that Moscow was very “concerned about the rumors” indicating the possibility of an Israeli “atomic bomb...” Eban “vehemently” denied the allegation.⁵⁰⁷ In the following month, one in which the U.S.S.R. engineered a coup elevating the *Ba'ath* Party to power in Damascus, Moscow's new policies vis-à-vis Dimona began to be announced and enacted.⁵⁰⁸

⁵⁰⁴ Ginor and Remez, “The Spymaster, the Communist, and Foxbats over Dimona,” pp. 93-94 & 123n33.

⁵⁰⁵ A biography of Eshkol at the Johnson Library has revealed that Eshkol kept “in ...close contact” with his brothers. Biography of Levi Eshkol, NSF, Country File, Eshkol Visit Briefing Book (1/7-8/68) Box 144, *LBJL*.

⁵⁰⁶ Govrin, *Israeli-Soviet Relations*, pp. 84-85.

⁵⁰⁷ Ginor and Remez, “The Spymaster, the Communist, and Foxbats over Dimona,” p. 102.

⁵⁰⁸ According to Govrin, from the Ba'ath Party's rise to power on February 23, 1966, to June 1967 the Soviets were set on “sending frequent and severe warnings aimed at deterring Israel from undertaking military action against Syria.” Golan has contended that after the coup Damascus allowed the Palestine Liberation Organization to launch attacks from its territory and conducted a “vociferous propaganda campaign” against the Jewish state. Ro'i has professed that Syria became more confrontational in inter-Arab politics by pressuring Nasser to adopt “an ever-more extremist stance.” Pointing out that the coup elevated Hafeez al-Assad, a Soviet Air Academy graduate, to Defense Minister, Golan and Remez have argued that “Moscow's intensified action on the nuclear issue,” and its move to cement its influence over Syria were two “facets of the same...strategy.” Govrin, *Israeli-Soviet Relations*, pp. 93-94; Golan, “The Soviet Union and the Outbreak of the June 1967 Six-Day War,” *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 8, 1

On February 4, 1966, the *NYT* professed that the previous December Andrei Grechko, First Deputy of the Soviet Defense Ministry, had “promised” Nasser “a guarantee of nuclear protection” if Israel obtained the bomb. Although Moscow was unwilling to provide the bomb, Grechko pledged the Soviets were prepared “to use their own nuclear arms...to safeguard” Cairo.⁵⁰⁹ On the same day *Yedi’ot Aharonot* disclosed that the Soviets were “displaying great interest in the development of Israeli nuclear science.” Nine days later a Soviet document argued that if Israel embarked “on the road of creating its own atomic bomb, as stated by Gariel,” it would result in terrible “consequences.”⁵¹⁰ On February 21 the *NYT* relayed that Nasser had informed the Iraqi press that if Israel developed the bomb, the “only answer” would be a “preventive war.”⁵¹¹ A Soviet document two days later averred that if “Gariel’s” comments reflected Israel’s “real” atomic “intentions,” then Israeli “honesty” was in doubt.⁵¹²

On October 24, 1966, Ambassador Katz contended that beginning in March there had been a “deliberate political change for the worse” in Soviet attitudes toward Israel.⁵¹³ On March 15 Chuvakhin asked Israel to join a “declaration” aimed at removing the “nuclear arms” from the

(2006), p. 5; Ro’I, “Soviet Policy toward the Six Day War through the Prism of Moscow’s Relations with Egypt and Syria,” in *The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War*, ed. Ro’I and Morozov, p. 3; Ginor and Remez, “The Spymaster, the Communist and Foxbats over Dimona,” p. 105; Ginor and Remez, *Foxbats over Dimona*, p. 105.

⁵⁰⁹ Mentioning Haikal’s editorials of August and October 1965, Smith added that U.S. “officials” had reached the “tentative conclusion” that Israel was not using the “large research reactor” located in the Negev for “atomic weapons.” Hedrick Smith, “Soviet Said to Offer Cairo Atom Defense,” *NYT*, February 4, 1966, p. 1.

⁵¹⁰ Ginor and Remez, “The Spymaster, the Communist, and Foxbats over Dimona,” p. 102.

⁵¹¹ Perhaps on instructions from Moscow, Cairo was unwilling to discuss Dimona with the U.S. On February 23, the same day that the NSC’s Robert Komer informed LBJ that the U.S. was “surprised at Nasser’s fears that Israel was going nuclear,” Anwar Sadat, the President of Egypt’s National Assembly, met with Johnson. Interestingly, it was LBJ who raised Dimona, arguing that the U.S. was not “as alarmist as” Cairo on this subject but assured him that the U.S. was “watching the situation very closely.” Sadat never followed up on the issue and allowed the conversation to move to another subject. On the same day Sadat met also with Rusk, where he was told that the U.S. could “see advantages” to a Near East nuclear free zone being advocated by Moscow. Sadat replied that the UAR “suspected” that Israel had turned down all attempts to establish safeguards at Dimona and ended the conversation by coolly stating “very good.” Memorandum for LBJ from Komer, February 23, 1966, NSF, Name File, Komer Memos, Volume 2, 1 of 3, Box 6, *LBJL*; Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: U.S.-U.A.R. Relations,” February 23, 1966, FRUS, 1964-1968, *Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-1967, Volume XVIII*: http://www.state.gov/about_state/history/vol_eviii/zd/html (Document 274); Editorial Note, *Ibid.* (Document 281); Hendrick Smith, “Warning on Bomb Given by Nasser,” *NYT*, February 21, 1966, p. 8; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 261-262 & 265.

⁵¹² Ginor and Remez, “The Spymaster, the Communist, and Foxbats over Dimona,” p. 98.

⁵¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

region. A week later Kosygin espoused in Cairo that “forces” in the Near East may soon obtain “nuclear arms.”⁵¹⁴ Israel was not oblivious to these announcements. On March 30 a top secret and unsigned Prime Minister’s Office Document pointed out that certain Maki “comrades” had recently talked about the “indications” given by Eshkol and Eban of the “sincere intentions to seek a way for nuclear demilitarization.”⁵¹⁵

In April and May 1966 Cairo’s rhetoric towards Dimona increased as Moscow strengthened relations with Damascus. On April 17 Nasser announced that Israel’s was attempting to produce an “atomic” bomb, forcing Eban to reply that Israel had not initiated “the introduction of” any “new arms...” in the region.⁵¹⁶ From April 18-24 a Syrian delegation visited Moscow and on May 8 Nasser told the *BBC* that he was “of course” concerned about Dimona.⁵¹⁷ A day before Eshkol Knesset speech, Kosygin averred in Cairo that the failure to “achieve nuclear disarmament” ensured that no Arab nation could “consider itself safe and secure” on May 17.⁵¹⁸ Moscow was also learning that Washington wanted nothing to do with Dimona.⁵¹⁹ On May 26 Anatoliy Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador in U.S. Ambassador was told by Rusk that Israel was “not planning to make nuclear weapons”⁵²⁰

⁵¹⁴ Although it is not clear if the atomic issue was discussed, on March 11 Katz met with Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny. Ginor and Remez, *Foxbats over Dimona*, p. 108; “Katz Sees Podgorny,” *WP*, March 12, 1966, p. A2.

⁵¹⁵ The document also uncovered that Sneh had recently met with Eshkol. Ginor and Remez, “The Spymaster, the Communist, and Foxbats over Dimona,” pp. 95 & 106-108.

⁵¹⁶ “Nasser Threatens to War on a Nuclear-Armed Israel,” *NYT*, April 18, 1966, p. 6.

⁵¹⁷ During this Syrian visit the Soviet press argued that the “Palestinian tragedy” was the result of the “colonialist policies on part of the Zionists...striving to dominate...and subvert Arab unity.” On May 18 the *WP* reported that the Soviets had provided Syria with \$150 million. Govrin, *Israeli-Soviet Relations*, p. 277; Ro’I, “Soviet Policy toward the Six Day War,” p. 4; “Nasser Cites Need for Nuclear Arms,” *NYT*, May 9, 1966, p. 8; Drew Pearson, “A-Weapons Reported Near for Israel,” *WP*, May 18, 1966, p. E11.

⁵¹⁸ “Nasser Cites Need for Nuclear Arms,” *NYT*, May 9, 1966, p. 8.

⁵¹⁹ Two days later the *NYT* reported that the U.S. had agreed to provide Israel with 48 A-4 Skyhawks, a lightweight attack bomber used by U.S. Navy in the ongoing war in Vietnam. Drew Pearson, “A-Weapons Reported Near for Israel,” *WP*, May 18, 1966, p. E11; John W. Finney, “Israelis Will Buy U.S. Jet Bombers,” *NYT*, May 20, 1966, p. 1.

⁵²⁰ The U.S. must have understood that Soviet policy in the Near East was changing. In a report without any reference to Dimona, two days later the CIA argued that Cairo and Moscow could “be moving toward a period of closer cooperation...” In a 1992 conference held in Rosslyn, Virginia, focused on the 25th anniversary of the Six Day War, Richard Helms vaguely mused that Meir had sent him a 1966 “document” focused on “Israel’s concern” that Moscow could be possibly taking over the area.” When exactly this letter was sent is unknown as Helms could

Israel was by now quite aware of the shift in Moscow's posture. On June 1 Eshkol's top Soviet advisor, Shaul Avigur, told the Prime Minister that the "sharp Soviet offensive on Israel in the press" had left him "amazed and perplexed."⁵²¹ Over a month later, on August 13, David Gavish, Second Secretary of the Israeli Embassy in Moscow, was expelled for thirteen months for espionage offenses.⁵²² By November 1966 Moscow was beginning to plan for war against Israel, a war which would attempt to destroy Dimona in the process.

On November 22, over five years after the UAR's dissolution, Damascus and Cairo signed a defense pact. That same day General Adb al-Hakim Amer, Egypt's second most powerful figure, and Salah Naser, the head of Egyptian intelligence, arrived in Moscow for four days of talks. Ginor and Remez have argued that Amer concocted a plan with Grechko to deploy Egyptian troops into the Sinai prior to any war with Israel. The plan, codenamed "Conqueror," was modeled on the KGB's motto: "shield and sword."⁵²³ These talks must have been monitored by the Mossad. On November 27 Amit suggested that Eshkol "deactivate" Dimona and promote peace talks. The Prime Minister refused.⁵²⁴ For the next two months the Soviets and Arabs were silent on Dimona until Nasser called for an Arab Summit to "confront Israel before" it obtained

not recall the "date." Memorandum of Conversation, "Subject: Nuclear Weapons in the Near East," May 26, 1966, *FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XVIII*: http://www.state.gov/www/about_stat_history/vol_xviii/zd.html (document 294); CIA Intelligence Memorandum, May 28, 1966, *Ibid* (document 295); Richard Parker ed, *The Six Day War: A Retrospective* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1996) p. 216; Editorial Note, *FRUS 1964-1968* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2004), *Organization and Management of Foreign Policy*; Volume XXXIII: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xx_xiii/32677.htm (document 252).

⁵²¹ Over a week later the Soviets established direct air flights between Moscow and Beirut. On July 12 the Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Fiki visited Moscow, and a fortnight later the Iraqi Prime Minister followed suit. Ginor and Remez, *Foxbats over Dimona*, pp. 67, 58; Govrin, *Israeli-Soviet Relations*, p. 284.

⁵²² "Around the World," *WP*, August 14, 1966, p. A22.

⁵²³ A week later Moscow cancelled an upcoming 1967 tour of the Israeli Philharmonic Orchestra, set to play in fifteen Soviet cities. Ginor and Remez, *Foxbats over Dimona*, pp. 69, 95; Govrin, *Israeli-Soviet Relations*, pp. 115-116, 320.

⁵²⁴ Segev has argued that Amit urged that Israel stop its nuclear program in exchange for Nasser to stop compiling conventional arms. In early 1966 Amit proposed to Eshkol that he could travel to Cairo pursue back-channel negotiations with a "senior figure" but Eshkol was again unwilling. Amit later argued that Israel had missed "a historic opportunity" for peace. Ginor and Remez, *Foxbats over Dimona*, pp. 43 & 228n30; Segev, *1967*, p. 166.

“atomic weapons” on February 3, 1967.⁵²⁵ Two days later, in the final public denouncement of Dimona prior to the Six Day War, Nasser warned the *British Observer* that if Israel developed the “bomb,” then “war” could ensue.⁵²⁶ On March 26 Nasser informed a Beirut paper that Israel could be destroyed “in twelve days” if the Arabs were united.⁵²⁷ Preparing for any eventualities, in late February or early March the Soviet nuclear submarine K-172 sailed to Syria.⁵²⁸ In late March Gromyko visited Cairo, demonstrating that Moscow’s relations with Cairo were being formulated by the Politburo.⁵²⁹ One week after Gromyko had visited Israel, the IAF downed seven Soviet-made Syrian fighters over the Sea of Galilee.

On May 12 the Soviets announced to Egypt that that Israel was massing 10-12 brigades on its northern border with Syria for an attack. On May 16 Nasser requested that the UN Emergency Force (UNEF), deployed following the Suez Crisis, be removed from the Egyptian-Israeli border. Most of the UNEF had departed by May 21. Despite scholarly disagreements, Richard Parker, who served as a political counselor to the U.S. Embassy in Cairo during June 1967, has argued that Moscow warned Egypt three separate times during the day.⁵³⁰ The next

⁵²⁵ Ginor and Remez, *Foxbats over Dimona*, p. 76.

⁵²⁶ Levite and Landau, “Israel’s Nuclear Image,” p. 55.

⁵²⁷ Laura James, “Nasser and His Enemies,” *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 9, 2 (2005), pp. 25-27.

⁵²⁸ Ginor and Remez, “The Spymaster, the Communist, and Foxbats over Dimona,” pp. 111, 127n13; *Ibid*, *Foxbats over Dimona*, p. 79

⁵²⁹ Historian Ernest Dawn has admitted that “what really happened” during Gromyko’s visit is unknown, while Ro’i has contended there is no “evidence” to what stimulated these secret talks. This is because Soviet policy makers were more draconian than their U.S. and Israeli colleagues. Ginor and Remez have argued that Anatoly Chernyayev, a former Soviet Presidential Aide, argued to them that since Stalin the Politburo had understood “it was forbidden to record anything.” A number of the FSB’s Central Archival papers focused on the Six Day War were destroyed in 1978, a year before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Parker, *The Six Day War*, p. 58; Yaacov Ro’i “Soviet Policy toward the Six Day War through the Prism of Moscow’s Relations with Egypt and Syria,” pp. 4-5; Ginor and Remez, *Foxbats over Dimona*, pp. 51, 230n6; Ginor, “The Six Day War as a Soviet Initiative,” p. 19.

⁵³⁰ Parker, who also served as a U.S. Ambassador to Morocco, Algeria, and Lebanon, has argued that the fabricated Soviet intelligence was given on May 12 “at a very high level in Moscow,” at a “lower level in Cairo” and to Ahmad Hassan al-Feki, the Egyptian Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, by Dimitri Pojidaev, the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo. The warning was also given to Sadat, in Moscow at the time, by Vladimir Semyenov on the same day. Salah Bassiouny, a member office of the Soviet Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs in Cairo during the war, has argued that it “was not customary for the Soviet Ambassador to deliver such reports to the foreign ministry” since it had “never happened before.” Bassiouny added that KGB’s Cairo liaison also delivered the report to Egyptian intelligence director Salah Nasr, but is unsure whether it was delivered before or after the meeting in the Ministry of Affairs.

day Nasser placed his army on a full state of emergency and Chief of Staff General Fawzi traveled to Damascus to coordinate planning.⁵³¹ The Soviet warning was an erroneous farce. When Eshkol invited Ambassador Chuvakhin to view firsthand the alleged Israeli buildup, the latter coyly replied, "I am not here to observe facts in Israel."⁵³² While the historiography agrees that the false warning was key in precipitating the war, few have attempted to examine the Soviet intentions behind it.⁵³³ Tahsin Basheer, who in June 1967 was part of Egypt's UN mission, has argued that little is known about the Soviet "double game," while Cohen has speculated that the report may have acted as a "pretext for another policy object."⁵³⁴

For the first time since the U-2, foreign aircraft overflew and photographed Dimona on May 17. The reconnaissance mission was laconically reported for the first time by Bar-Zohar in 1970, proclaiming that an Egyptian "MiG-21 equipped with Russian cameras made a surprise raid into Israeli territory and photography the region around Dimona." Israeli Mirages pursued

Princeton historian L. Carl Brown has argued that there is no proof in the Soviet archives of Pojidaev's meeting with Egyptian Foreign Ministry officials. Soviet Ambassadors were not allowed to refer in their cable traffic to the content of Moscow's sent and could only write "that such and such a message had been delivered." Gregoriy Kornienko, Chief of the U.S. department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, has countered that he is "absolutely positive" that "no instructions" were give to Pojidaev to "pass any information on May 12. Such a decision could only occurred due to Pojidaev's "own initiative" or through a KBG contact. Karen Dawisha, a Professor of politics at Maryland, has pointed out that there is a chance that "just before" the conflict began the Soviet Ministry of Defense opened a direct line between the Military Attaché and Grechko in their Cairo Embassy. The KGB station chief would have also had its own channels in Cairo and it is "not inconceivable" that the Soviet military attaché also had contacts outside "normal embassy channels." On May 17 KGB head Vladimir Semichastny, integral in Khrushchev's removal from power, was replaced by Yuri Andropov. Richard Parker, *The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East* (Bloomington: Indiana Press, 1993), pp. 5-6; Parker, *The Six Day War*, pp. 17-18, 42, 55, 68; Boris Morozov, "The Outbreak of the June 1967 War in Light of Soviet Documentation," in *The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War*, pp. 60-61; Quandt, "Lyndon Johnson and the June 1967 War: What Color Was Light?" *Middle East Journal*, 26, 2 (Spring 1992), p. 199n3.

⁵³¹ Janice Gross Stein and Raymond Tanter, *Rational Decision-Making: Israel's Security Choices 1967* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1980), p. 136.

⁵³² Parker, *The Six Day War*, p. 59; Ginor, "The Russians Were Coming: The Soviet Military Threat in the 1967 Six-Day War," *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 4, 4 (December 2000), p. 45

⁵³³ Eban has professed that he "never had any doubt that the decisive link in the chain of events" which led to the war were "forged" by Moscow. Govrin, *Israeli-Soviet Relations*, pp. 306-307; Abba Eban, *An Autobiography* (New York: Random House, 1977), p. 320.

⁵³⁴ Dimona is absent in both of Parker's books. Parker, *The Six Day War*, p. 176; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 260.

but were unable to intercept it.⁵³⁵ Bar-Zohar also never explicitly mentioned that Dimona was the location of Israel's nuclear weapons program. In 1980 Michael Brecher repeated that there was a flyover "of ...Dimona for a minute....," as did political scientists Janis Gross Stein and Raymond Tanter.⁵³⁶ In more detail, Oren has contended that on 4:00 p.m. two MiG-21 jets sliced through Jordanian airspace and "swooped over the top-secret site."⁵³⁷ According to Segev, following the flyover Eshkol informed Rabin that Dimona could be bombed, arguing that "you never can know what might happen."⁵³⁸ With Allon advising that an attack "against Israeli nuclear installations" represented a *casus belli*, Israel called up its army reserves later that evening.⁵³⁹

A day later Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran, also a *casus belli* for Israel since Suez, on May 22.⁵⁴⁰ Shay has argued that Nasser informed the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo before he made the announcement, whereas Basheer has stipulated this never occurred.⁵⁴¹ From May 25-28 Shams Badran, Egypt's War Minister, met with Gromyko and Grechko in Moscow, while Kosygin flew to Cairo. The confusing and conflicting Soviet signals sent during these talks are interesting. Late on May 26 Chuvakin cabled Kosygin that it was "essential to find means to settle the conflict by non-military means."⁵⁴² Kosygin also informed Badran to avoid provoking

⁵³⁵ Michael Bar-Zohar, *Embassies in Crisis: Diplomats and Demagogues Behind the Six Day War* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1970), pp. 36-37.

⁵³⁶ Michael Brecher, *Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 104n38; Janis Gross Stein and Raymond Tanter, *Rational Decision-Making: Israel's Security Choices 1967* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1980), p. 143.

⁵³⁷ Oren has added that even though Nasser did not cite Dimona as a "motive for his decisions," Israel's "fear of the reactor- rather than Egypt's of it- was the greatest catalyst for the war." Michael Oren, *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2002), pp. 75-76.

⁵³⁸ On May 20 Aharon Yariv, Chief of Army Intelligence, informed Eshkol and Rabin that Nasser wanted to destroy Dimona before Israel got the bomb. Segev, *1967*, pp. 229 & 233.

⁵³⁹ Aronson has added that the collective refusal of Bar-Zohar, Brecher, Tanter, Stein and the rest of the scholarship to ignore the role of the "nuclear factor as...the master variable explaining the Six Day War" is a perfect example of the "ambiguity" surrounding Israel's nuclear weapons program in the "academic research." Aronson, *The Politics Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East*, p. 325n52.

⁵⁴⁰ The previous day Eshkol had stated in a meeting that if Egypt acted "to stop Israeli shipping through the (Tiran) straits" then Dimona would soon be bombed thereafter. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 270.

⁵⁴¹ Shaul Shay, "The Israeli Evaluation of the Soviet Position of the Eve of the Six Day War," p. 129; Parker, *The Six Day War*, p. 55.

⁵⁴² Parker, *The Six Day War: A Retrospective*, p. 44; Stein and Tanter, *Rational Decision-Making*, p. 191.

any “war with Israel.” Accompanying Badran to the airport on May 28, however, Grechko informed him that if Israel attacked Egypt then the U.S.S.R. would “come in on your side,” adding that “Our fleet is in the Mediterranean ... Do you fully understand what I mean?”⁵⁴³

Soviets actions trumped their words. During the four-day Egyptian-Soviet talks in Moscow Dimona was again overflown by foreign aircraft. On May 26 Cohen has argued that only two Egyptian MiG 21 fighters were responsible for the surveillance while Oren has countered that four MiG-21s had taken part. Israeli jets were scrambled and Raytheon anti-aircraft missiles were fired but neither downed the planes.⁵⁴⁴ The revisionist work of Ginor and Remez has countered that while four aircraft did overfly Dimona on May 26, they were instead the high-performance MiG-25 Foxbat.⁵⁴⁵ Major General Alaksandr Vybornov has revealed that he flew two flights over Dimona, indicating that the Foxbat was also utilized on May 17.⁵⁴⁶ The Foxbat had a ceiling of 70, 000 feet, one reason why Israeli fighters- which could only reach 55, 000 feet- failed to intercept them. One of the pilots who pursued the enemy planes David Ivry, a

⁵⁴³ Kornienko dismissed this comment as irrelevant since Grechko had only been appointed to Defense Minister in mid-April. Ginor and Remez, “The Spymaster, the Communist, and Foxbats over Dimona,” p. 112; Parker, *The Six Day War*, pp. 72-73; Ginor, “The Cold War’s Longest Cover-Up,” p. 37.

⁵⁴⁴ Oren, *Six Days of War*, p. 99. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 272.

⁵⁴⁵ Since the crux of Ginor’s and Remez’s argument is proving that it was the MiG-25 and not MiG-21 which overflew Dimona, it is no surprise that this point has drawn the most criticism in the scholarship. Ro’i has argued that it is “extremely unproven” that Vybornov actually flew the MiG-25. Golan has professed that only a few prototype Foxbats had been built by 1967 and it was only in 1973 that they planes were sent to Egypt and Syria. Sella has also argued that the MiG-25 was only presented for the first time for the public in July 1967 and the first phase of testing was completed in November 1968. It was only after this point that the Soviets began to produce the plane in mass production, even though Sella has admitted that “theoretically...it is possible” that a few “archetypes available in 1967” were sent to Nasser “to make reconnaissance over Dimona.” None of these critiques address why Israeli pilots were unable to intercept the enemy planes or address the statement made by Russian Major General Vladimir A. Zolotaryov, who has argued that the Foxbat “was used in the late 1960s on the Egyptian-Israeli front as a reconnaissance aircraft.” An August 2007 *JP* story confirmed Ginor’s and Remez’s argument by revealing that, along with Vybornov, Russian Colonel A.S. Bezhevets also flew a MiG-25 renaissance flight over Dimona. The *Pravada*’s Colonel Viktor Baranets argued in the piece that it is now indisputable that Moscow “orchestrated” the June 1967 war and was “prepared for an invasion of Israel.” Yaacov Ro’i, “Introduction,” p. xxii-xiii; Golan, “A (Dubious) Conspiracy of the 1967 War,” p. 672; Sella, “Review,” pp. 105-106; Ginor and Remez, *Foxbats over Dimona*, p. 131; David Horowitz, “Russia Confirms Soviet Sorties over Dimona in ’67,” *JP*, August 23, 2007, <http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1187779146277&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull>.

⁵⁴⁶ Ginor and Remez have contended that these sorties were explicitly approved by the Soviet Ministry of Defense and it is “unlikely” the pilots knew what they were actually spying on “beyond the geographical coordinates.” Ginor and Remez, *Foxbats over Dimona*, pp. 129-132; Ginor and Remez, “The Spymaster, the Communist, and Foxbats over Dimona,” pp. 117 & 130n175.

future IAF commander, has since argued that there was “at least one plane” outperformed the Mirages, leaving them “unseen and unidentified.”⁵⁴⁷

The surveillance flights certainly pushed Israel toward war. Segev has revealed that during a five hour Cabinet meeting also held on May 26, Rabin and Ezer Weizmann, the Chief of Operations, interrupted the discussion by announcing that “four Soviet-made Egyptian planes had infiltrated Israeli airspace” and photographed Dimona. Weizmann then speculated that “signs” deduced that Nasser was “planning to attack Dimona today.”⁵⁴⁸ Eshkol frustratingly responded that “Egyptian planes” were “photographing Dimona and we’re sitting here talking about Ben-Gurion.”⁵⁴⁹ Later in the day the IDF was deployed along the Egyptian border, expecting an attack to commence the following day.⁵⁵⁰ One June 5 the IAF launched a devastating preemptive strike on Egypt, ensuring victory in the war’s crucial opening hours.

Soviet plans to use war as a pretext to destroy Dimona failed because Moscow had foolishly overestimated Egypt’s strength to absorb the initial Israeli strike. Former KGB general Oleg Kalugin, the KGB’s Deputy Resident in Washington during the war, later mused that “no one in Moscow had any doubt” that the Arabs would defeat Israel.⁵⁵¹ Since Nasser’s air force was destroyed in the early hours of June 5, the Soviets lost any cover for a Foxbat strike upon Dimona. Retired Air Force Commander Vasili Reshetnikov has since confessed that the Soviets “had to work under the colors of the Egyptian flag” to conceal their role.⁵⁵² Nikolai Shashkov, commanding officer of the K-172 sub, added that he had received oral orders from Commander

⁵⁴⁷ Ginor and Remez, *Foxbats over Dimona*, p. 129.

⁵⁴⁸ Oren, *Six Days of War*, p. 133.

⁵⁴⁹ Ben Gurion had days before criticized Eshkol as a “cheat and liar.” This pressure on Eshkol was a key reason why he stepped down as Defense Minister in favor of Dayan, a signal that the war hawks would get their way. Segev, *1967*, pp. 15, 263-264; Oren, *Six Days of War*, p. 133.

⁵⁵⁰ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 272.

⁵⁵¹ Ginor and Remez, *Foxbats over Dimona*, p. 98.

⁵⁵² Ginor, “The Cold War’s Longest Cover-Up: How and Why the USSR Instigated the 1967,” pp. 48-49.

Gorshko to launch its nuclear payload if the U.S. or Israel placed ground forces in Syria.⁵⁵³

Incredibly, Israel's swift victory possibly prevented a much more apocalyptic outcome.

Since 35 Soviet advisors stationed in Egypt died during the hostilities, the Six Day War was a definitive moment in the U.S.S.R.'s relations with Israel. While the IDF was capturing the Golan Heights, Moscow severed diplomatic relations with Israel on June 10.⁵⁵⁴ Following the war the Near East assumed new prominence in the Kremlin's thinking. By the latter stages of the War of Attrition, from April to August 1970, 14,000 Soviet advisors were stationed in Egypt.⁵⁵⁵ Soviet attitudes toward Dimona, however, had changed considerably. Understanding that it had lost its opportunity to destroy the reactor, Moscow accepted Israel's nuclear program as a *fait accompli*. It was only in December 1968 that Moscow's London Ambassador informed Lord Sieff that Moscow was concerned that Israel had refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), initialed by the superpowers on July 1, 1968.⁵⁵⁶ Luckily, Israel had dodged a major bullet in a war which forever altered the nation's foreign policy and nuclear program.

In January 1968 RAFI merged with Mapai and Achdut Ha'avodah to form the modern day Labor Party. Israel's victory also dissolved the Committee for Denuclearization of the Middle East, which had been ominously quiet since Ben Gurion's resignation. Sensing the political winds, Livneh formed a new action group, the Movement for Greater Israel, which advocated that Israel annex the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Golan Heights. On June 2 Dayan replaced Dinstein with former Chief of Staff Avi Zur, who was asked to head a new committee, known only to a few Cabinet ministers, responsible for overseeing Dimona. In 1968 Eshkol gave

⁵⁵³ Ginor, "The Six Day War as a Soviet Initiative," pp. 23-24; Ginor and Remez, "The Spymaster, the Communist, and Foxbats over Dimona," p. 111, 127n13; Ginor and Remez, *Foxbats over Dimona*, pp. 79 & 148-152.

⁵⁵⁴ Diplomatic relations between Israel and the USSR were not renewed until October 18, 1991, months before Communism dissolved. Govrin, *Israeli-Soviet Relations*, pp. 156-157; Ginor, "The Russians Were Coming," p. 47.

⁵⁵⁵ Drew Middleton, "14, 000 Russians Play Big Role in Egypt," *NYT*, October 3, 1970, p. 7.

⁵⁵⁶ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 108-109.

Zur the freedom to make decisions on atomic organization, coordination and security. Cohen has intoned that in the aftermath of June 1967 Israel's atomic policy was driven and determined quietly by bureaucratic "custodians" like Zur, Freier, and Dostrovsky.⁵⁵⁷

The NPT was signed by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in Washington on July 1, 1968, without Israel.⁵⁵⁸ Following a slew of articles downplaying the chance of an Israeli bomb,⁵⁵⁹ Eshkol died of a heart attack on February 25, 1969, with Meir becoming Prime Minister on March 17.⁵⁶⁰ She refused to commit Israel to the NPT. Even after reports in early May speculating that Israel possessed five to six nuclear bombs, the Jewish state faced no U.S. pressure to sign the NPT.⁵⁶¹ On September 26, 1969, Meir met with Nixon and upon leaving the U.S. on October 2, stated that she was not returning with a "bag full" of gifts, but only that bilateral relations were predicated upon silence and "sensitivity."⁵⁶² Before studying the cementing September 1969 atomic agreement between the U.S and Israel, one must first examine policy formulated and enacted on this subject under Nixon and Meir's two respective predecessors.

⁵⁵⁷ Less than a week after the Six Day War ended, on June 14, the *NYT* reproduced a *Canadian Press* story entitled, "Israel Said to Plan to Make Atom Bomb." Three days later *Newsweek* stipulated that Israel was "one year" away from a "nuclear deterrent." Cohen has speculated that both of these stories were deliberately leaked by Eshkol himself. "Israel Said to Plan to Make Atom Bomb," *NYT*, June 14, 1967, p. 16; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 279, 291, 415n9, 416n11.

⁵⁵⁸ Juan de Oniss, "Nuclear Treaty Endorsed in U.N. by 92-4 Vote," *WP*, June 11, 1968, p. 1.

⁵⁵⁹ "Israeli Bomb is Doubted," *NYT*, January 10, 1969, p. 3. "Israel Denies Atom-Bomb Report," *WP*, January 10, 1969, p. A12; "TV Report of an Israeli A-Bomb Draws a Denial in Washington," *NYT*, January 9, 1969, p. 2. John W. Finney, "U.S. Aides Doubt that Israel Has Decided to Build A-Bomb," *NYT*, January 11, 1969, p. 3.

⁵⁶⁰ Levi Eshkol is Dead of a Heart Attack," *NYT*, February 26, 1969, p. 49; James Feron, "Thousands Pass Eshkol Coffin," *NYT*, February 28, 1969, p. 2; James Feron, "Eshkol Buried on Mt. Herzl Overlooking Jerusalem," *NYT*, March 1, 1969, p. 14; James Feron, "Mrs. Meir Sworn in as Israeli Premier," *NYT*, March 18, 1969, p. 12.

⁵⁶¹ In response to the stories, a nameless Foreign Ministry Official announced that Israel was "not an atomic power" and would "not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East." "Montreal Paper Asserts Israel Has Atomic Bombs," *NYT*, May 8, 1969, p. 15; "Israel Denies a Report She Has 5 or 6 A-Bombs," *NYT*, May 9, 1969, p. 9; "German Magazine Says Israelis Have ABomb," *WP*, May 9, 1969, p. A24.

⁵⁶² "Mrs. Meir Says Nixon Did not Promise Arms," *NYT*, October 3, 1969, p. 31.

Chapter Four: The Bureaucracy's Record and JFK's Rhetoric

Before becoming President, JFK was severely handled by the Jewish lobby. JFK later told journalist Charlie Bartlett that during the campaign he had attended a New York party where some influential Jews had “offered” money in return for letting them run his “Middle Eastern policy...for the next four years.”⁵⁶³ This meeting transpired sometime in early August 1960 when JFK was summoned to Feinberg's Hotel Pierre apartment.⁵⁶⁴ Dewey Stone, key in helping JFK win his 1952 Senate seat, cultivated domestic questions, while *B'nai B'rith* President Philip Klutznick prepared foreign policy inquiries.⁵⁶⁵ Shoenbaum has argued that over for 90 minutes JFK experienced “heavy grilling” from the nation's 30 most powerful Jews.⁵⁶⁶ They must have been the right ones for JFK was presented with a check for \$500,000. On August 27 JFK announced before a Zionists of America delegation that the Democratic Party owed a “special obligation” to Israel even though that U.S. “friendship” was “not a partisan matter.”⁵⁶⁷

All of this pandering was crucial in helping JFK carry New York by 384, 000 votes, including an 800,000 advantage in Jewish precincts. His 9,000 vote margin of victory in Illinois was helped by a Jewish majority of 55,000 votes.⁵⁶⁸ As the “chief aim” of any first-term

⁵⁶³ Richard Reeves, *President Kennedy: Prolife of Power* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), pp. 143-144.

⁵⁶⁴ Kenen, who attended as AIPAC head, has argued that the meeting took place on August 4, while political scientist Steven Spiegel has speculated that it occurred four days later. Shoenbaum has argued that this meeting was organized by JFK's top advisors, including Myer Feldman, a beltway lawyer before working for the Senate Banking Committee during the mid 1950s. In 1957 he joined Senator Kennedy's staff as an aide for legislative affairs and during the 1960 campaign he operated the “Nixonpedia.” When JFK asked Feldman to serve as his de-facto Israeli liaison as Deputy Special Counsel, he honestly replied that he would give “biased advice.” Unflinchingly, JFK responded: “That's exactly what I want you to do.” Bass, *Support Any Friend*, pp. 57-58; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 101, Richard E. Mooney, “Kennedy Names Bell of Harvard as Budget Chief,” *NYT*, December 3, 1960, p. 1; Shoenbaum, *The U.S. and the State of Israel*, pp. 133-134; Kenen, *Israel's Defense Line*, p. 55; Steven L. Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985), p. 96.

⁵⁶⁵ Hersh, *The Samson Option*, p. 96; Kenen's, *Israel's Defense Line*, p. 155.

⁵⁶⁶ Kenen, *Israel's Defense Line*, p. 155; Shoenbaum, *The U.S. and the State of Israel*, pp. 133-134.

⁵⁶⁷ Speech by Senator John F. Kennedy, Zionists of America Convention, August 27, 1960, APP, *PPUS*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/>; Tivnan, *The Lobby*, pp. 53, 56.

⁵⁶⁸ Bass, *Support Any Friend*, pp. 53-55.

President is to obtain a second one,⁵⁶⁹ Spiegel has averred that JFK's thin electoral victory made him, whom historian Warren Bass has described as a "deeply political animal," even "more dependent" on the Jewish lobby than his two predecessors.⁵⁷⁰ President JFK never threatened Israel with an ultimatum to abandon its weapons program even though he knew what Dimona's true purpose was dedicated to. On January 19, 1961, Herter told JFK point blank that "Israel and India" could soon possess the bomb.⁵⁷¹ The early involvement of an ex-Eisenhower hand demonstrated that U.S. policy vis-à-vis Dimona would not change in the new White House.

During a 45-minute meeting on January 31, Ogden Reid told JFK that the U.S. could "accept" that Dimona was "peaceful" and informed that any inspection of the reactor should be conducted in "secret." Reid concluded that "few people in Israel" were privy to Dimona's "true character."⁵⁷² At a time when the U.S. did not even have an Ambassador in Tel Aviv, Reid's reluctance to reveal anything substantive to JFK carried over into an Eisenhower Library interview in which he vaguely revealed that he "had a long talk" with JFK on a "number of issues."⁵⁷³ On February 3 G. Lewis Jones was told by Harman that as "soon as the publicity died down" Israel would "invite" a U.S. scientist to Dimona.⁵⁷⁴ On February 11 Harman informed

⁵⁶⁹ De Tocqueville warned that the re-election of the President, a "natural evil," is a key factor in the "corruption and cabal" which permeates the U.S. system and questioned whether the Constitutional Convention made an error in "allowing the re-election" clause to enter the final document. De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, pp. 152-154.

⁵⁷⁰ Phillip Talbot, a former head of the Near East Division during the 1960s, was once told by JFK that the "trouble" with him was that he never had to get himself "elected to anything." Oral History with Phillips Talbot conducted by Dennis J. O'Brien on December 5, 1964, For the Kennedy Oral History Interview Project, p. 5, *JFKL*; Bass, *Support Any Friend*, p. 94.

⁵⁷¹ Reeves, *President Kennedy*, pp. 32-33.

⁵⁷² Memorandum of Conversation, "Subject: Ambassador Reid's Review of his Conversation with JFK," January 31, 1961, *FRUS, 1961-1962, Volume XVII*: www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedy/jf/xvii/17702.htm (document 7).

⁵⁷³ Reid's taciturn behavior with JFK could be attributed to a personal feud between him and JFK stemming back to Reid's Senate confirmation. Kenen has argued that Fulbright had identified Reid as a "political appointee" and pledged to vote against his nomination as Foreign Relations Chairman. After some AIPAC lobbying, however, he was convinced to vote for Reid but Kennedy, also a Committee member, still voted against him. Oral interview of June 14, 1967, with Reid, conducted by John Luter, *DDEL*, pp. 12-13; Kenen, *Israel's Defense Line*, pp. 141-142.

⁵⁷⁴ Jones admitted that he was "tipping" Israel "off," while the report noted that this "off the record" conversation would not serve as a precedent for "future" U.S. policy. On the same day the State Department's Executive Secretariat, Walter Stoessel, Jr., informed Goodpaster, who had been designated to work in the early months of the new administration to ensure a smooth transition, that Ben Gurion's domestic problems represented one reason not

Jones that if Ben Gurion remained in power, one of his “first pieces of business” would be for the U.S. to “visit” the reactor.⁵⁷⁵ Based on a March 3 report approved by Farley, Rusk informed JFK on February 28 that Farley would choose the U.S. team once obtaining “the green light from Tel Aviv.”⁵⁷⁶ While JFK was busy placing a new Ambassador in Tel Aviv in early March, Dimona went away for the rest of the month.

On March 7 JFK announced that Walworth Barbour would replace Reid.⁵⁷⁷ Even though Fulbright decried the policy of consistently changing Ambassadors as “idiotic,” the Senate approved Barbour on May 11. On June 12 he presented his credentials in Tel Aviv, beginning a 12 -year tenure transcending three Presidents.⁵⁷⁸ According to Hersh, Barbour transformed the Embassy into “a subsidiary” of Israel’s Foreign Ministry, proving that while Ambassadors may be on Foggy Bottom’s pay roll, they often owe their self-preservation to the President.⁵⁷⁹

to bother Israel over Dimona. Memorandum for Brig. General A.J. Goodpaster, “Subject: Israeli Atomic Energy Activities,” February 3, 1961, NSF, Israel, General (92/61) Box 118, *JFKL*; Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: Israeli Reactor,” February 3, 1961, *FRUS, 1961-1962, Volume XVII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjif/xvii/17702.htm> (document 7).

⁵⁷⁵ Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the UAR, February 8, 1961, *FRUS, 1961-1962, Volume XVII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjif/xvii/17702.htm> (document 9); Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: Israeli Reactor,” February 3, 1961, *Ibid*: (document 7).

⁵⁷⁶ Memorandum from Rusk to JFK, “Subject: Israeli Reactor,” March 3, 1961, GWNSA, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/israel/documents/first/03-01.htm>.

⁵⁷⁷ Following stints as a vice-council in Athens and Naples in the early 1930s, the Harvard-educated Barbour served in Baghdad (1936-1939) and Cairo (1942-1945). By 1949 he had been elevated to Chargé d’Affaires in Moscow and by June 1952 he was responsible for all US-USSR Lend-Lease issues. Within two years he was working under Livingston Merchant. In December 1955 Barbour was sent to serve as the Deputy Chief of the U.S. Mission in London, a post he held until nominated as Ambassador to Israel. Wolfgang Saxon, “Walworth Barbour,” *NYT*, July 26, 1982, p. D7; Biographic Sketch: Ambassador Walworth Barbour, NSF, Countries, Israel (General 7/62), Box 118A, *JFKL*; “The Foreign Service,” *NYT*, May 30, 1936, p. 30; “The Foreign Service,” *NYT*, January 25, 1942, p. 42; Harrison Salisbury, “Vishinsky Sees U.S. Moscow Envoy Before Starting for U.N. Assembly,” *NYT*, September 15, 1949, p. 1; Jay Walz, “Return of 186 Ships Under Lend-Lease Offered by Soviet,” *NYT*, June 17, 1952, p. 1; “U.S. Officials Shun Fete,” *NYT*, November 8, 1954, p. 8; “Talks Scheduled on German Assets,” *NYT*, February 7, 1955, p. 31; “Random Notes from Washington,” *NYT*, December 12, 1955, p. 27; Alvin Shuster, “Barbour Chosen Envoy to Israel,” *NYT*, March 8, 1961, p. 1. Office of the White House Press Secretary, March 7, 1961, White House Central Files, Subject Files, FO 2/C0 THRU 149/A Executive, Box 229, *JFKL*.

⁵⁷⁸ According to Hersh, only three Ambassadors in the State Department’s history have ever served longer in any one post: George Marsh (Italy, 1861-1882), Edwin Morgan (Brazil, 1912-1933) and Claude Bowers (Chile, 1939-1953). Hersh, *The Samson Option*, pp. 159-160; Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: Hawks for Israel,” May 8, 1961, *FRUS, 1961-1962, Volume XVII*: www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjif/xvii/17704.htm (document 43).

⁵⁷⁹ William Dale, who arrived in Tel Aviv 1964 as a Deputy Chief Mission chief, was once told by Barbour that his job to “keep the Jews off” the President’s back and to not listen to the “pipsqueaks” at Foggy Bottom, where Israel

Despite his self-aggrandizing approach, Barbour was well respected. In 1973 the NSC's Robert Komer, a member of the CIA's ONE during the 1950s, labeled him as "four star," while Eban described him as "brilliantly incisive."⁵⁸⁰ In 1975 Sulzberger pegged him as the "best" Ambassador the U.S. had ever had in Tel Aviv. During his tenure Barbour smartly did not draw much media attention to his actions.⁵⁸¹ The decision to nominate a Republican demonstrated JFK's desire for U.S.-Israeli relations to remain sacrosanct. A week after the nomination announcement, the Export-Import Bank provided Israel with a \$25 million loan.⁵⁸²

On April 6 the CIA speciously contended that France had "decided in 1959" to limit its assistance to "peaceful applications" to the 40 MW reactor at Dimona.⁵⁸³ The heavily excised report warned that Israel sought "uranium" from a blanked out nation, while "awaiting a shipment of Argentine uranium."⁵⁸⁴ Four days later Harman communicated to Farley and Jones that the U.S. could "visit" Dimona during the week of May 15. Farley, who penned the memo,

had many embedded "friends." Nearly a year after being replaced as Ambassador by former New York Republican Senator and lawyer Kenneth Keating, on April 3, 1974, Barbour became a board member of the U.S. Branch of Bank Leumi, Israel's state bank. Hersh, *The Samson Option*, pp. 159-161, 171.

⁵⁸⁰ Oral Interview of Robert W. Komer conducted by Dennis J. O'Brien, April 18, 1973, p. 63, *JFKL*; Douglas Little, "From Even-Handed to Empty Handed: Seeking Order in the Middle East," in Thomas Paterson, edited, *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 160; Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict*, p. 99; Eban, *An Autobiography*, p. 297.

⁵⁸¹ Following Barbour's nomination, his name appears four times in the *NYT* and *WP* indexes during JFK's presidency. During the Johnson administration he was mentioned 13 times in the *NYT* but only once in 1965 and 1966. The *WP* covered him four times but just twice before the Six Day War. During Nixon's first five years in office he appeared 42 times in both papers. Hersh has divulged that Barbour "never spoke on the record" and was considered a "non-person" to Israeli journalists. These numbers can be tabulated by entering "Walworth Barbour" into the University of Ottawa Pro-Quest search for the relevant papers in the March 1961 to February 1973 timeline; C.L. Sulzberger, "The Price of Palestine Peace," *NYT*, April 16, 1975, p. 38; Hersh, *The Samson Option*, p. 159.

⁵⁸² "New Loans for Israel," *NYT*, March 16, 1961, p. 14.

⁵⁸³ All of the sources for the report were also blacked out, a probable reference to U-2 intelligence and Angleton. CIA Franco-Israeli Collaboration, April 6, 1961, NSF, Countries, Israel Subjects, Ben Gurion Visit, The Arab-Israeli Situation (4/6/61), Box 119A, *JFKL*.

⁵⁸⁴ In his 1981 JFK Library interview, Barbour contended that it was "probably true" that Israel "zeroed in on France, South Africa, and Argentina" from 1961 to 1963 to obtain uranium for Dimona. Although the record is unclear, there is sufficient evidence that Israel received 80-100 tons of unsafeguarded uranium from Argentina, a member of the IAEA Committee in charge of overseeing and implementing the agency's inspection procedures, sometime during Kennedy's final year in power. Over a year after Canada had informed Britain that Israel had purchased the uranium, on May 10, 1965, the Bureau Intelligence and Research (INR) informed Rusk that the uranium oxide provided to Israel "would last about twenty years." History Interview with Ambassador Walworth Barbour by Sheldon M. Stern, May 22, 1981, for the Kennedy Library Oral History Project, p.2 *JFKL*; CIA Franco-

would “directly” inform Harman about the composition of the U.S. team.⁵⁸⁵ A week later and two days before the CIA’s bungled Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, Feldman, Feinberg, and JFK discussed a future Presidential sit-down with Ben Gurion. A week later Feldman informed Rusk that the date was set for May 30.⁵⁸⁶ Four days later Foggy Bottom informed Tel Aviv that the AEC’s Ulysses Staebler and Jesse Croach would tour Dimona ten days before Ben Gurion and JFK met.⁵⁸⁷ On May 5 Farley implored the AEC to “handle the visit quietly” and not network with the U.S. Embassy during their stay in Israel.⁵⁸⁸

Foreshadowing future trips, the first U.S. visit to Dimona on Saturday, May 20, was a conspicuous one. The U.S. team arrived on the Sabbath at 11:00 a.m. to find that the only personnel on site were “specifically involved” in the tour, including Mannes Pratt. Prevented from taking notes and pictures, the U.S. team was told by Pratt the lie that Dimona’s “ground

Israeli Collaboration, April 6, 1961, NSF, Countries, Israel Subjects, Ben Gurion Visit, The Arab-Israeli Situation (4/6/61), Box 119A, *JFKL*; Shalom, *Israel’s Nuclear Option*, p. 80; Memorandum to Rusk from the State Department’s Intelligence and Research Division (Thomas L. Hughes), May 10, 1965, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Dimona 1964 # 1, Box 30, *LBJL*; Outgoing Telegram from Rusk to Barbour, April 4, 1964, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Cables, Volume II (4/64-8/64), Box 138, *LBJL*; CIA Franco-Israeli Collaboration, April 6, 1961, NSF, Countries, Israel Subjects, Ben Gurion Visit, The Arab-Israeli Situation (4/6/61), Box 119A, *JFKL*.

⁵⁸⁵ Cohen has argued that Ben Gurion approved the visit on March 29, 1961, after being convinced by Feldman and Feinberg that a meeting between him and JFK could be made in exchange for a U.S. visit to Dimona. Feinberg informed Hersh that he was asked by JFK to attend the meeting but he refused, adding that he “fought the strongest battle” to prevent “a full inspection.” Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 104, 376n25; Hersh, *The Samson Option*, pp. 101, 111; Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: U.S. Visit to Dimona Reactor Site,” April 10, 1961, *FRUS*, 1961-1962, Volume XVII: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/xvii/17704.htm> (document 31).

⁵⁸⁶ *FRUS* editors Nina J. Noring and Glenn LaFantaise have noted that due to Rusk’s pressure the President was “reluctant” to meet Ben Gurion, but Feinberg emphasized that Israel viewed the request as “urgent” and convinced him otherwise. Talbot and Bowles also believed that Ben Gurion’s visit would upset the Arabs. Editorial Note, *FRUS*, 1961-1962, Volume XVII: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/exvii/17704.htm> (document 35).

⁵⁸⁷ On May 11, 1961, Bundy informed JFK that Foggy Bottom was trying to persuade Israel to also allow a “neutral scientist” to accompany Staebler and Croach. A week later in an unsigned memorandum to Bundy, however, it was revealed that the U.S. dropped its request to “respect” Israeli “sensitivities.” Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: U.S. Visit to Dimona Reactor Site,” April 10, 1961, *Ibid.*: (document 31); Memorandum for JFK from Bundy, “Subject: A Neutral Scientist to Visit the Israeli Atomic Energy Installation,” May 11, 1961, President’s Office Files, Subject, Staff Memoranda, McGeorge Bundy (5/61-7/61), Box 95, *JFKL*; Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, “Subject: American Scientists Visit to Israel’s Dimona Reactor,” May 18, 1961,” NSF, Countries, Israel General (3/61-5/61), Box 119A, *JFKL*.

⁵⁸⁸ Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: “Visit to the Israeli Reactor,” May 4, 1961, GWNSA, www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/israel/documents/first/09-01.htm; Memorandum from Farley to Assistant General Manager for International Activities, AEC (John Hall), Subject: “Visit to Israel,” May 5, 1961, GWNSA, www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/israel/documents/first/10-01.htm; Memorandum for the President from Rusk, “Subject: Visit to Israeli Reactor,” May 5, 1963, NSF, Countries, Israel General (3/61-5/61), *JFKL*.

breaking” began in 1959.⁵⁸⁹ Five days later Staebler and Croach met with unknown State officials to discuss their findings. This talk was streamlined to historian and Special Assistant to the President on National Security, McGeorge Bundy, on May 26 by Lucius Battle, who professed that the U.S. team had found “no present evidence” of weapons. More importantly a “second visit” would be unnecessary for another year.⁵⁹⁰

In his first Dimona-focused story in six months, Finney argued that if the “nuclear powers” did not agree to an atomic testing moratorium, it could force China, Israel and Sweden to produce their own bomb on May 21.⁵⁹¹ Four days later Rusk informed JFK that if the Arabs decided that Dimona was “contrary to the interests of peace,” they could “appeal” to Moscow.⁵⁹² The next day Feldman suggested to JFK that the U.S. require “similar visits at frequent intervals” in the future and “oppose” Israel’s proclivity for secrecy.⁵⁹³ The U.S., however, was unwilling to provide any example of transparency and DCI Dulles’ two-page May 27 letter to JFK about Dimona remains classified. The day before he met Ben Gurion, Bundy informed JFK that Israel had controlled U.S. policy about Dimona ever since the latter had agreed “not to announce” the

⁵⁸⁹ The GWNSA has pointed out that Staebler and Croach wrote two reports, one of which has since been lost. “Memorandum of Discussion with Mr. Pratt and Staff,” May 20, 1961, GWNSA, <http://www.gw.u.edu/~nsarchiv/israel/documents/first/13-01.htm>.

⁵⁹⁰ Battle, a Special Assistant to Rusk and Stoessel, repeated the Farley-inspired lie that Dimona’s “ground breaking” began in 1959, while speciously adding that the facility’s cost was only \$35 million. Memorandum from Battle to Bundy, May 26, 1961, *FRUS, 1961-1962, Volume XVII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjfk/xviii/17705.htm> (document 45); Wise and Ross, *The Invisible Government*, p. 21.

⁵⁹¹ On the same day the *NYT* revealed that Ben Gurion would privately meet with JFK in New York at month’s end. A week later the paper described Ben Gurion as a “remarkable leader of a remarkable nation.” Following its coverage from December 19, 1961, to January 11, 1961, the U.S. media never again devoted much attention towards Dimona. The press was more consumed with Adolf Eichmann, a former Nazi SS officer, kidnapped by Israel in Argentina on May 11, 1960. If one enters Eichmann’s name into the Pro Quest search engine, using the time period from his capture to his May 31, 1962, execution as the search scope, one will find 140 *WP* and 347 *NYT* articles with either “Eichmann” or “Nazi” in the byline. Over a two-year period this adds up to roughly 20 stories monthly. Finney, “Nuclear Test Debate Points Up the U.S. Dilemma,” *NYT*, May 21, 1961, p. E5; “Ben-Gurion is due to meet Kennedy,” *NYT*, May 21, 1961, p. 23; “Premier Ben Gurion’s Visit,” *NYT*, May 28, 1961, p. E8.

⁵⁹² Memorandum for the President from Rusk, May 25, 1961, President’s Office Files, Countries, Israel Security (Ben-Gurion Visit), Box 119A, *JFKL*.

⁵⁹³ Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman) to President Kennedy, May 26, 1961, “Subject: Discussion at meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion,” *FRUS, 1961-1962, Volume XVII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjfk/xviii/17705.htm> (document 55).

visit without the former's "approval." JFK's objectives were to prod Israel to "release" the U.S. from this "commitment," not to publicize its recent visit to Dimona and to gain Israeli permission to "inform Arab leaders..." about the results of the visit.⁵⁹⁴

According to Bar-Zohar, the Prime Minister was unnecessarily "tense" before his 4:45 pm meeting in Room 28A of the Waldorf.⁵⁹⁵ These fears must have been initially heightened when JFK immediately "plunged into" Dimona, announcing that he "was glad" the U.S. was able to "visit" the reactor. Alluding to the Arabs and the Soviets, JFK admitted more transparency was needed to convince other "nations...disturbed" that Dimona was not "peaceful..." were incorrect. Ben Gurion responded that Dimona was designed for desalinization purposes but added it "might" produce plutonium in "three or four years." JFK's inquiry that the U.S. could pass on the visit's "findings" to the Arabs was met with "no objections." Speaking in the first person to highlight the importance of their bilateral relationship, JFK added that it was in "our common interest that no country" conclude that Israel was developing the bomb.⁵⁹⁶

Unsurprisingly, Ben Gurion received a free pass at the Waldorf.⁵⁹⁷ Shalom has averred

⁵⁹⁴ Memorandum from Bundy to Kennedy, May 29, 1961, "Subject: Specific Answers to your Questions of May 29," *FRUS, 1961-1962, Volume XVII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjfk/xvii/17705.htm> (document 56).

⁵⁹⁵ Feinberg informed Hersh that there "was no way" that Ben Gurion viewed Kennedy "as an equal" because he disrespected the younger generation. Harman, Talbot, Feldman, who took notes for the U.S. side, and Harman also attended the meeting. U.S. and Israeli flags also flew from the Park Avenue Hotel. Memorandum of Conversation, "Subject: Conversation between Kennedy and Prime Minister Ben Gurion," May 30, 1961, *Ibid*: (document 57); Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, p. 192; Bar-Zohar, *Ben Gurion*, p. 273; Hersh, *The Samson Option*, p. 111.

⁵⁹⁶ Memorandum of Conversation, "Subject: Conversation between Kennedy and Ben Gurion," May 30, 1961, *FRUS, 1961-1962, Volume XVII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjfk/xvii/17705.htm> (document 57).

⁵⁹⁷ The scholarship has clumsily perceived the Waldorf meeting as the last significant Dimona related event of 1961 in the U.S.-Israeli relationship. It is only in the aftermath the Cuban Missile Crisis, which Shalom has argued gave JFK the "prestige" to "intensively" confront Dimona, does the scholarship pick-up its examination. He added that one reason why JFK refused to pursue a "hard-line policy on Dimona" was because the White House viewed Israel's political system on the "verge of collapse." Ben Zvi has contended that it was only in the spring of 1963 the White House's "low-key and unobtrusive" position toward Dimona was replaced by an "assertive and forceful" policy. According to Bass, in March 1963 JFK began to issue "icy warnings" towards Israel over Dimona. Cohen has argued that following the meeting an "ambiguous" accord was formulated which pushed Dimona to the back-burner for "almost" the next "two years." In a chapter title, he has averred that in the spring of 1963 the U.S. and Israeli "battle over Dimona" began. Zaki Shalom, "Kennedy, Ben Gurion and the Dimona Project," *Israel Studies* 1, 1 (Spring 1996), p. 3; Ben-Zvi, *Decade and Transition*, pp. 123-124; Bass, *Support Any Friend*, p. 189; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 111, 115.

that Ben Gurion's decision to "put all the cards on the table" derived from Ben Gurion's talks with the British and Diefenbaker.⁵⁹⁸ JFK was calm throughout the meeting, refusing to ask about Israel's future nuclear plans or to inquire why Ben Gurion's tone had changed from his December Knesset address. During the 90-minute meeting, Dimona was discussed for at best 15 minutes as Ben Gurion also asked for the Homing All the Way Killer (HAWK) anti-aircraft missile, with JFK responding that the U.S. was "reluctant" to provide the missile at this time.⁵⁹⁹ While alone with Ben Gurion, JFK's final words encapsulated the entire meeting and future U.S. policy on Dimona: "I know I was elected by the Jews of New York." After the talk the Ben Gurion told his advisors that JFK appeared to be "...a politician."⁶⁰⁰

On June 1 Bowles informed London, Paris, Ottawa, the UN, and eight Arab capitals that Ben Gurion had ensured JFK that Dimona was "devoted solely to peaceful purposes."⁶⁰¹ The next day Talbot personally relayed this same trope to ten Arab Ambassadors in Washington.⁶⁰² In a telegraph also sent to Farley in Vienna, Rusk informed Cairo on June 15 that the U.S. had recently visited Dimona and "found no evidence of weapons production..."⁶⁰³ Some were unwilling to buy the U.S. lies and for good reason. On June 23 Ottawa's Embassy in Beirut reported that Foggy Bottom had informed its Arab-based Embassies to only "verbally" assure

⁵⁹⁸ Shalom, *Israel's Nuclear Option*, pp. 26, 31.

⁵⁹⁹ Press Secretary Pierre Salinger reported after the meeting that JFK "was happy" to meet with Ben Gurion, but did not "go into the substance of the discussions." Another nameless *NYT* piece divulged that both leaders had conducted "fruitful" talks without "any details." Spiegel, "Kennedy and Ben-Gurion hold 'Fruitful' Talk Here," *NYT*, May 31, 1961, p. 1; "Kennedy, Ben-Gurion Hold Fruitful Parley," *NYT*, May 31, 1961, p. A10; Memorandum of Conversation, "Subject: Conversation between Kennedy and Ben Gurion," May 30, 1961, *FRUS, 1961-1962, Volume XVII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/xvii/17705.htm> (document 57).

⁶⁰⁰ In an interview with the JFK Library three years later, Ben Guiron reemphasized that JFK's statements were "in keeping to American politics" as usual. Bar-Zohar, *Ben Gurion*, pp. 273-274; Oral History Interview with David Ben Gurion conducted by E.A. Bayne, July 16, 1965, *JFKL*.

⁶⁰¹ Outgoing Circular Telegram from the Department of State (Bowles), June 1, 1961, NSF, Countries, Israel General (6/61), Box 118, *JFKL*.

⁶⁰² Memorandum of Conversation, "SUBJECT: Discussion with Arab Ambassadors: Kennedy's May 30 Meeting with Prime Minister David Ben Gurion of Israel," June 2, 1961, *FRUS, 1961-1962, Volume XVII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/xvii/17705.htm> (document 59);

⁶⁰³ Telegram from Rusk to the Embassy in the UAR, June 15, 1961, *Ibid*: (document 65).

their governments that Dimona was peaceful. On June 23 the U.S. Embassy in Beirut reported that if Nasser became confident that Israel was “developing the bomb” he could try to “destroy” Dimona.⁶⁰⁴ Aside from a half-hearted U.S. effort to arrange a visit to Dimona by a neutral scientist, for the rest of June and July Dimona disappeared from the primary documentation.⁶⁰⁵

The subject was tacitly covered in the media following Israel’s Shavit II launch. The *NYT* reported on July 6 that in addition to its “research” in missile technology Israel was also “producing a nuclear reactor in the Negev.”⁶⁰⁶ Further proof that Lebanon followed Dimona more closely than any other Arab nation during the 1960s, the next day the *WP* reprinted a Beirut story professing that Israel “might” soon equip its missiles with a “nuclear warhead.”⁶⁰⁷ Without any mention of Dimona in either piece, the month ended with two Sulzberger pieces focused on Israel’s military situation.⁶⁰⁸ The media’s disinterest in Dimona suited the Pentagon just fine.

On August 8 a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) report focused on the “strategic” effects of an Israeli nuclear capability to the Secretary of Defense.⁶⁰⁹ The memorandum revealed that the Pentagon, much as the CIA had done in the Eisenhower era, intended to sideline Foggy Bottom’s ability to set Dimona policy during JFK’s White House.⁶¹⁰ JCS Chairman Lyman Lemnitzer

⁶⁰⁴ Incoming Telegraph from McClintock to Rusk, June 23, 1961, NSF, Countries, Israel General (6/61), Box 118, *JFKL*; Secret Eyes Memorandum from the Canadian Embassy in Beirut to Embassies in Baghdad, Cairo and Tel Aviv, “Subject: Israeli Atomic Reactor Dimona,” June 23, 1961, RG 25, Volume 7882, File 14003-J-8-1-40, *LAC*.

⁶⁰⁵ On June 30 Talbot informed France that the U.S. was interested in having a “neutral” official visit Dimona on terms “palatable” to the Israelis. Chronology of Israel Assurances of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy and Related Events, undated, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Nuclear Energy Program, 1964-1965- March 1966, Box 30, *LBJL*; Outgoing Telegram from Rusk to Tel Aviv, June 22, 1961, NSF, Countries, Israel General (6/61), Box 118, *JFKL*.

⁶⁰⁶ Lawrence Fellows, “Israel Launches Research Rocket,” *NYT*, July 6, 1961, p. 1.

⁶⁰⁷ Incredibly, four days later the *NYT* reported that the U.S. rewarded Israel for its missile launch, by giving it, along with Argentina, \$80,000 worth of civilian related atomic equipment. “Israel Rocket is ‘Lesson’ to Arab Press,” *WP*, July 7, 1961, p. A8; “3 Countries to Get Peaceful Atom Aid,” *NYT*, July 11, 1961, p. 5.

⁶⁰⁸ C.L. Sulzberger, “Foreign Affairs: Israel’s New Missile Diplomacy,” *NYT*, July 29, 1961, p. 18; C.L. Sulzberger, “Foreign Affairs: Isaiah in the Nuclear Epoch,” *NYT*, July 31, 1961, p. 18.

⁶⁰⁹ Paper Prepared by the Joint Chief of Staff, JSCM-523-61, undated, *FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XVII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/xvii/17706.htm> (document 59).

⁶¹⁰ Further proof of Foggy Bottom’s marginalization can be found in an examination of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the Committee of Principles. Beginning with the former, the ACDA was created on September 26, 1961, when JFK signed House Resolution 9118 and announced that William Foster, a Republican

recommended the memo only “be sent to...State for comment” and six days later Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric⁶¹¹ requested Rusk to peruse the report’s “non-military points.” The heavily excised report, the first IC study focused on Dimona since the still classified SNIE 100-8-60 of December 9, 1960, emphasized that Israel would use the bomb to increasingly defer “concessions” to the Arabs. To prevent this from occurring, the U.S. needed to pursue all “official, quasi-official and private” means to prevent Israel from joining the atomic club.⁶¹²

In a letter cleared by Farley, on August 30 Rusk informed Gilpatric that the U.S was “satisfied” with its May 20 visit to Dimona. Even though Rusk concluded that the U.S. would

consultant to John McCloy, would serve as Director. Farley was appointed as Deputy Director, a position he held until 1973 and in 1963 scientist Herbert Scoville, former head the CIA’s Research Division from 1955 to 1963, became Assistant Director. On January 2, 1961, political scientist Richard Neustadt wrote that JFK had a “superficial preference” for locating any arms control agency in the Executive Office “rather than in the Department of State.” McCloy, who was appointed as JFK’s Disarmament advisor in January 1961, confusingly argued that “the organization should be subject to the direction of the Secretary of State, although distinct from” Foggy Bottom. Understanding the composition of the Committee of Principles, an executive inter-agency Cabinet level group created in the summer of 1958 to examine U.S. diplomatic positions at Geneva towards a test-ban treaty, is also crucial in understanding how Rusk was obfuscated from any policy making responsibility. Rusk was Foggy Bottom’s only members, alongside McNamara, Gilpatric, Leminizter, Dulles, Komer, Bundy, McCloy, Foster, Adrian Fisher, a Deputy to McCloy, AEC Commissioner Glenn Seaborg, Arthur Dean, Chairman of the U.S. Delegation for Nuclear Test Ban Talks, and Spurgeon Keeny, Office of Science and Technology. Editorial Note, *FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XXV*: www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjff/xxv/6007.htm (document 74); Minutes of Meeting, August 17, 1961, *FRUS, 1961-1963* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995) *Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume II*: www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjff/vii/50951.htm (document 56); “Remarks in New York City Upon Signing Bill Establishing the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,” September 26, 1961, APP, *PPUS*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/>; “Nixon Accepts with Praise Resignation of 2 Officials,” *NYT*, June 30, 1973, p. 40; Herken, *Cardinal Choices*, p. 112. Ross and Wise, *The Invisible Government*, p. 235.

⁶¹¹ A graduate of Yale Law School, Gilpatric was named Assistant Secretary of the Air Force in April 1951. There he worked under General Hoyt Vandenburg who was integral in helping convince President Harry Truman to create the National Security Act and the CIA. Upon his nomination as the Deputy Secretary of Defense in December 1960, the *NYT* placed him in the trans-partisan category of “pragmatic” men who belonged neither to “left or right.” Alongside leading a major reorganization of the National Security Agency, Gilpatric was integral in creating the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in August 1961 and placing the National Reconnaissance Office under the Pentagon’s authority in March 1963. After Robert Kennedy, he was the highest ranking member of Operation Mongoose, the CIA’s covert war against Cuba after the Bay of Pigs, and convinced JFK to employ a naval blockade rather during the Cuban Missile Crisis as a member of the NSC’s Ex-Comm. Prados, *Safe for Democracy*, p. 34; Eric Pace, “Roswell Leavitt Gilpatric, Lawyer and Kennedy Aide, Dies at 89,” *NYT*, March 17, 1996, p. 41; “Roswell Gilpatric to Succeed Stuart in the Air Force Post,” *WP*, April 29, 1951, p. M1; Joseph Alsop, “Matter of Fact...” *NYT*, December 28, 1960, p. A15; Letter from Gilpatric to Kennedy, August 21, 1961, *FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XXV*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjff/xxv/6008.htm> (document 89); Editorial Note, *Ibid*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjff/xxv/6009.htm> (document 109); Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little Brown, 1971), p. 208.

⁶¹² Paper Prepared by the JCS, JSCM-523-61, undated, *FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XVII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjff/xvii/17706.htm> (document 59).

pay “close attention” to the situation, Dimona disappeared until Battle revealed on September 15 that the U.S had “accepted at face value” that Dimona was peaceful.⁶¹³ Contradicting this analysis, the CIA concluded on September 21 and October 5 that Israel could not produce “a weapon before 1966-1967,” a dangerous outcome which could push the Arabs towards “forceful action.”⁶¹⁴ In a heavily excised memo also cleared by Farley, a fortnight later the NEA’s Armin Meyer emphasized to Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson the Farley-created lie that the U.S. had only uncovered Dimona in 1960.⁶¹⁵ On November 22 Talbot advised Rusk that future U.S. policy should continue to “assure ourselves and others” about Dimona’s peaceful purposes.⁶¹⁶

The best way for the U.S. accomplish this goal was avoidance. Talbot’s memo represents the last time Dimona can be found in the pertinent *FRUS* volume for the next four months. Ongoing UN negotiations to reduce nuclear proliferation and a lukewarm U.S. overture to Egypt explained Dimona’s disappearance. On December 4, 1961, UNGA Resolution 1665

⁶¹³Letter from Rusk to Gilpatric, August 30, 1961, *FRUS, 1961-1962, Volume XVII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyj/xvii/17707.htm> (document 104); U.S. Actions and Attitudes Favorable to Israel since the New Administration’s Inauguration, September 15, 1961, NSF, Countries, Israel General (7/61-9/61), Box 118, *JFKL*.

⁶¹⁴The first CIA report was produced six days before JFK announced that McCone would supplant Dulles as DCI. McCone took over on November 29, 1961. DCI, NIE 4-3-61, “Nuclear Weapons Delivery Capabilities of Free World Countries Other than the US and UK,” September 21, 1961, GWNUSA, www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAE/BB/NSAE/BB155/index.htm; Remarks of the President Announcing the Appointment of John McCone as the Director of the C.I.A., September 27, 1961, NSF, Departments and Agencies, CIA (9/61-11/61), General, Box 271, *JFKL*; DCI, NIE 35-61, “The Outlook for Israel,” October 5, 1961, *FRUS, 1961-1962, Volume XVII*: www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyj/xvii/17708.htm (document 123); Jeffrey T. Richelson, “The Wizards of Langley: The CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology,” in *Eternal Vigilance? 50 Years of the CIA*, ed. Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones and Christopher Andrew (London: Frank Cass, 1997), p. 83.

⁶¹⁵This memo represents the last time Farley’s name can be found regarding U.S. policy vis-à-vis Dimona. According to the *FRUS* documentation, he stepped down as the Special Assistant for Atomic Energy and Outer Space in March 1962. He had served in this position since March 1958, roughly the same time when the U-2 began overflying Dimona. Eight days after penning this memo Meyer was nominated as Ambassador to Lebanon, after Robert McClintock, who had pushed in a March 1 memo sent to all major Near East capitals, Paris, London and Washington that IAEA “inspectors” should “check out the Beersheba reactor,” resigned on September 22. List of Names,” *FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume VI*: http://www.state.gov/about_state/history/volume_vi/persons.html; Memorandum from Beirut to Rusk, March 1, 1961, NSF, Countries, Israel General (3/61-5/61), *JFKL*; “Lebanon Post Filled,” *NYT*, October 28, 1961, p. 87; Memorandum from Armin Meyer to Johnson, October 19, 1961, *FRUS, 1961-1962, Volume XVII*: www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyj/xvii/17708.htm (document 132).

⁶¹⁶Memorandum from Talbot to Rusk, November 22, 1961, *Ibid* (document 143).

called on all nuclear powers to cease from "...transmitting the information necessary" to build the bomb to non-nuclear states. In an idea which never was implemented, four days later Komer proposed a "rapprochement" with Nasser without antagonizing "Israel and its supporters...."⁶¹⁷ Nonetheless, Dimona is still present within the *JFK* and *LBJ* Libraries. Foggy Bottom may have had more pressing priorities than Dimona but not the CIA.

In a heavily excised letter to Bundy, on January 5 Amory repeated the falsehood that Dimona's "ground breaking" had begun in "late 1959." Thirteen days later he asked Bundy to "prod" Foggy Bottom for another U.S. visit to Dimona.⁶¹⁸ Dimona re-emerged within *FRUS* on March 29, 1962. In a defeatist tone, Foggy Bottom's William Crawford mused to the British Embassy in Washington that an IAEA inspection of Dimona was unfeasible, but revealed that the U.S. was considering "another secret visit ..."⁶¹⁹ Dimona then disappeared again until Peres visited Washington from May 21-23.

According to Bill Bundy, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA), Peres' trip was an "unofficial one," a key reason why it went unreported

⁶¹⁷ On January 10, 1962, Rusk suggested to JFK that Nasser visit the U.S. in April, an idea seconded by Bowles after meeting with Nasser in mid-February. After talking with Feldman, however, Komer informed Bundy that any visit would needlessly rile up "sensitive...Jewish feelings" in an election year. Irish Resolution 1665 (XVI): Prevention of the Wider Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons," Problem 3: Non Proliferation Agreements, NSF, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, MLF, Box, *LBJL*. Memorandum from Komer to Bundy, December 8, 1961, *FRUS, 1961-1962, Volume XVII: www.state.gov/tr/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjif/exvii/17710.htm* (document 149); Memorandum from Rusk to JFK, January 10, 1962, *Ibid* (document 159); Memorandum from the U.S. Embassy in Ethiopia (Bowles) to JFK and Rusk, February 21, 1962, NSF, UAR, Security 1962, Box 127, *JFKL*. Memorandum from Rusk to JFK, January 10, 1962, *Ibid* (document 159); Memorandum from the U.S. Embassy in Ethiopia (Bowles) to JFK and Rusk, February 21, 1962, NSF, UAR, Security 1962, Box 127, *JFKL*; McGeorge Bundy/Carl Kaysen, February 13, 1962, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda, Staff Memoranda, Robert Komer, 2/62, Box 322, *JFKL*.

⁶¹⁸ Memorandum for Bundy from the CIA's Office of the Deputy Director (Robert Amory Jr.), "Subject: Israeli Nuclear Program," January 5, 1962, NSF, Countries, Israel General 1/62-3/62), Box 118, *JFKL*; CIA Memorandum for Bundy from Robert Amory, "Subject: Israeli Nuclear Energy Program," January 18, 1962, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Dimona 1964#1, Box 30, *LBJL*.

⁶¹⁹ Seven days earlier Rusk had informed JFK that the U.S. was "pushing ahead on plans for" another "inspection" of Dimona. Rusk's inquiry was prodded by a February 2 story in London's *Jewish Observer and Middle East Review*, entitled "An Independent Deterrent for Israel." Memorandum from the Department of State to the British Embassy, "Subject: Israel's Nuclear Reactor," March 29, 1962, *FRUS, 1961-1962, Volume XVII: www.state.gov/tr/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjif/xvii/17714.htm* (document 227); Memorandum for the President, March 22, 1962, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda, Staff Memoranda, Robert Komer 3/63-5/68, Box 322, *JFKL*.

in the media.⁶²⁰ On May 21 Bill's younger brother had "asked" Peres about "nuclear weapons in the Middle East." Peres responded to McGeorge that warned "if there were signs that others might move in this direction," then Israel would have to reconsider "her own position."⁶²¹ This exchange represents the only time Dimona was discussed during Peres' visit. In a meeting with McGeorge, Gilpatric and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA), Paul Nitze, Peres also contended that Israel needed the HAWK to provide a "convincing deterrent" to against an Egyptian "and/or" Syrian attack.⁶²²

On June 22, the same day that the July 1955 U.S.-Israeli atomic agreement was extended by two years, Talbot informed Harman that the U.S. desired "another unpublicized visit" to Dimona.⁶²³ Since, however, the request was delivered by Talbot rather than Barbour or Rusk, its seriousness must be questioned. JFK was unwilling to pressure Israel on Dimona like had had done in early 1961. With Congressional elections five months away, JFK made no reference to Dimona in his June 13 letter to Ben Gurion.⁶²⁴ In July and early August the White House and media briefly touched upon Dimona while the U.S. was moving towards selling Israel the Hawk. On July 4 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara produced a report indicating that China would

⁶²⁰ Bundy had an intimate perspective of Dimona. After joining the CIA in 1951, similar to Komer, during the late 1950s he served in the ONE under Abbot E. Smith, second in power under Kent. From 1972 to 1984 he was also editor of *Foreign Affairs*. Raymond Garthoff, *A Journey Through the Cold War: A Memoir and Coexistence* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2001), pp. 39-40; Memorandum from Bundy to Talbot, "Subject: Conversation with Shimon Peres," May 23, 1962, *FRUS, 1961-1962, Volume XVII*: www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/xvii/17717.htm (document 273); Antony Sutton, *America's Secret Establishment: An Introduction to the Order of Skull and Bones* (Billings, Montana: Liberty House, 1986), pp. 27, 48.

⁶²¹ Memorandum from Bundy to Talbot, "Subject: Conversation with Israeli Deputy Defense Minister on May 21, 1962," May 28, 1962, *Ibid*: (document 273).

⁶²² Gilpatric and Nitze knew each other quite well after being classmates at Groton prep school. Memorandum from Bundy to Talbot, "Subject: Conversation with Shimon Peres," May 23, 1962, *FRUS, 1961-1962, Volume XVII*: www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/xvii/17717.htm (document 273); Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, *The Wise Men: Six Men and the World They Made* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988), pp. 597-598.

⁶²³ Chronology of Israel Assurances of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy and Related Events, undated, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Nuclear Energy Program, 1964-1965- March 1966, Box 30, *LBJL*.

⁶²⁴ Letter from Kennedy to Ben Gurion, June 13, 1962, *FRUS, 1961-1962, Volume XVII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/xvii/17719.htm> (document 293).

be the next nation to acquire the bomb, with Israel pegged as the next most likely candidate.⁶²⁵ On July 9 Talbot made no mention of Dimona when he told Rusk that the HAWK would “reduce” Israel’s “vulnerability to air attack,” a point repeated a week later by Bill Bundy to James Grant.⁶²⁶ On July 29, a day after *Al Ahram* had argued that Egypt “would never allow” Israeli “atomic supremacy,” Dimona was absent from an inter-agency disarmament meeting attended by JFK.⁶²⁷ During the sit-down Nitze suggested that only China, Sweden, Italy, Japan, Australia and South Africa could develop the bomb in the next decade.⁶²⁸ Leaking that Israel desired the Hawk, on August 6 Sulzberger professed that even though neither Egypt nor Israel possessed an “atomic device.” The CIA asset assured the public that the U.S. was busy containing “excitable elements” in this field. This “quiet diplomacy” was predicated upon deception and disinformation.⁶²⁹

A day after telling JFK that the HAWK should be sold to Israel, Rusk sophisticatedly informed the Soviet Ambassador on August 8 that Egypt was “giving high priority to nuclear physics.” The seasoned Dobrynin, however, “objected” that Egypt would not be a “problem, unless perhaps Israel obtained nuclear weapons.” This rebuttal forced Rusk to quickly change the subject.⁶³⁰ On August 12 the *NYT*’s military editor, Hanson Baldwin, pointed out that Israel was

⁶²⁵ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 99-100.

⁶²⁶ Memorandum from Rusk to Rusk, “Subject: U.S. Policy towards Israel,” *FRUS, 1962-1963* (Washington, D.C.: 1995) *Near East*, Volume XVIII: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/xviii/25415.htm> (document 2); Memorandum from Bundy to Grant, July 16, 1962, *Ibid*: (document 3).

⁶²⁷ Jay Waltz, “Egypt’s Reactor is Put to Work for Isotope Research Projects,” *NYT*, July 29, 1962, p. 6.

⁶²⁸ Memorandum of Meeting with President Kennedy, “Subject: Disarmament Negotiations,” July 30, 1962, *FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume VII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/vii/50954.htm> (document 206).

⁶²⁹ Sulzberger’s piece was written five days after the *NYT* had reported that Dimona’s costs were kept hidden from the Knesset. C.L. Sulzberger, “Foreign Affairs; German Brains and Arab Arms,” *NYT*, August 6, 1962, p. 24; “Israel Official Says Costs of Reactor Are Withheld,” *NYT*, August 1, 1962, p. 3.

⁶³⁰ Memorandum from Rusk to Kennedy, “Subject: Review of U.S. Policy toward Israel,” August 7, 1962, *FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/xviii/25415.htm> (document 2); Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: Non-Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons,” August 8, 1962, *FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume VII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/vii/50954.htm> (document 216).

only “believed” to be pursuing the bomb.⁶³¹ In JFK’s letter to Ben Gurion three days later there was no mention of Dimona, revealing that Feldman would soon be sent “without publicity” to Israel to reach an “understanding” on the Hawk and the Arab refugee problem.⁶³² Under the cover story that he was visiting the Weizmann Institute, three days later Feldman flew to Paris before arriving in Israel on August 18.⁶³³

On August 19, described by Bass as “the birth of the U.S.-Israel alliance,” Feldman met with Ben Gurion, Meir and Kolleck.⁶³⁴ No written record of this discussion is available, but secondary sources have divulged what transpired during the three-hour meeting. In his JFK library interview, Feldman recollected that his hosts were left “ecstatic” after he told them that they would receive the HAWK.⁶³⁵ Ben Zvi, Bass and Shoenbaum have all contended that Feldman then expressed that Israel would participate in “good faith” in the Johnson Plan, even though it never did.⁶³⁶ On the same day Feldman communicated to JFK and Rusk that Ben

⁶³¹ Under the Chairmanship of the editor of the CFR published *Foreign Affairs*, Hamilton F. Armstrong, in 1947-1948 the future Pulitzer Prize winning journalist would comprise a CFR political group with Rabi and two year later a study group focused on aid to Europe under Eisenhower with Kennan and Rabi. Wala, *The Council on Foreign Relations and American Foreign Policy in the Early Cold War*, pp. 252, 254; Hanson Baldwin, “Why We Test the Bombs,” *NYT*, August 12, 1962, p. E5.

⁶³² In August 1961 JFK persuaded Joseph Johnson, the President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, to head the Palestine Conciliation Commission. In early August 1962 Johnson submitted his plan to a skeptical JFK, proposing that Israel take back 100 000-150 000 refugees if the Arabs agreed to resettle the remaining numbers. Ben Zvi has contended JFK did not “seek to make the Hawk deal contingent upon” Israel’s acceptance of the plan. Ben-Zvi, *Decade of Transition*, pp. 112-113; Letter from JFK to Ben Gurion, August 15, 1962, *FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjfk/xviii/26158.htm> (document 21).

⁶³³ This façade worked perfectly. After Feldman ended his visit, Rusk informed U.S. Embassies in Tel Aviv, Jidda, Beirut, Damascus, Cairo, Kuwait City, Baghdad and Amman that if they were queried on the purpose of the trip they were to reply that Feldman was sent to “discuss trade affairs” with the French and then traveled on his own discretion to Israel. On August 21, after a final six hour meeting with Meir, Feldman told some Jerusalem reporters that he did “not believe” they knew why he was “here.” This comment was reprinted the next day in *Ma’ariv*, while the *NYT* and *WP* both reprinted a *Reuters*’ story arguing that Feldman had assured Israel that there would “be no sacrifice of its interests.” Bass, *Support Any Friend*, pp. 169, 171; Outgoing Circular Telegram from Rusk, August 22, 1962, NSF, Countries, Israel General (8/21/62-8/31/62), Box 118, *JFKL*; “Ben Gurion Confers with Kennedy Aide,” *NYT*, August 22, 1962, p. 12; “Talks on Policy Held in Tel Aviv,” *WP*, August 22, 1962, p. A7.

⁶³⁴ The U.S. loaned Israel 70 missiles for \$23 million at an interest rate of 3.5 % over ten years. Bass, *Support Any Friend*, p. 169; Harold Gal, “U.S Will Resume Sending Israeli Defense Missiles,” *NYT*, July 7, 1968, p. 1.

⁶³⁵ Herbert Druks, *John F. Kennedy and Israel* (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2005), p.139.

⁶³⁶ After meeting with some influential New York and Boston Jews, Feldman stressed to JFK that the “faster” the U.S. walked away from the Johnson plan “the better.” He complied. Ben-Zvi, *Decade of Transition*, p. 116; Bass,

Gurion desired “to exclude” any and all weapons from the region.⁶³⁷ But fearing that the Arabs would be agitated and hoping to conceal Feldman’s mission, the White House blocked the HAWK sale story from reaching the press until September 27.⁶³⁸

Whether or not the U.S. tied the Hawk sale to regular visits to Dimona has produced a nuanced yet incomplete debate within the historiography. In an analysis regurgitated by Douglas Little, Bundy contended in 1988 that “in return” for the Hawk Israel agreed to “permit regular” U.S. visits to Dimona. Feldman reminisced in his Kennedy Library interview that JFK had intoned to him before his trip that in exchange for the Hawks the U.S. should be granted “the right to inspect the reactor at Dimona.” During the meeting this condition was accepted by Israel before Ben Gurion assured Feldman that the U.S. need not be “concerned” with Dimona. In an interview with Hersh, Feldman argued that it would be “too strong” to suggest that another U.S. visit to Dimona was a “quid pro quo” in return for the Hawks.” In an allegation raised by no one else in the historiography, Hersh also suggested that Feldman was given a tour of Dimona during his trip. Based on Feldman’s own statements, Shoenbaum has averred that Israel pledged “not to develop nuclear weapons” after receiving the missile, although this tie-in was “disingenuous.” Unacknowledged by Shoenbaum, however, is the reality that Feldman’s memory on the sale has

Support Any Friend, pp. 169-170; Shoenbaum, *The U.S. and the State of Israel*, p. 137; Editorial Note, *FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjif/xviii/26160.htm> (document 50).

⁶³⁷ Eyes only Memorandum from Feldman for President, Rusk and Grant, August 19, 1962, NSF, Countries, Israel General (8/17/62-2/20/62), Box 119, *JFKL*.

⁶³⁸ On September 14 Komer informed Bundy that there should be “no public comment” on the HAWK for another two weeks. A day before the story broke in the *NYT*, *WP*, *AP* and *BBC*. Assuming its role as public relations manipulator, Under Secretary of State George Ball assured Kaysen that Foggy Bottom would employ some “guidance” in an attempt to soften the blow of the “Times” expose. The next day Max Frankel reported on the *NYT*’s front page that Israel would be the first nation “outside the Western bloc” to receive the Hawk, while adding that there were no “political conditions attached to the sale...” Eyes only Memorandum from Feldman for President, Rusk and Grant, August 19, 1962, NSF, Countries, Israel General (8/17/62-2/20/62), Box 118, *JFKL*; Memorandum from Komer to Bundy, September 14, 1962, *FRUS 1962-1963, Volume XVIII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjif/xviii/21658.htm> (document 44); Outgoing Circular Telegram from the Department of State, September 14, 1962, NSF, Countries, Israel General (9/6/1962-9/21/62), Box 119, *JFKL*; Telecom Message from Kaysen to Ball, September 26, 1962, The Personal Papers of George W. Ball, Israel (4/28/62-5/18/63), Box 5, *JFKL*; Max Frankel, “U.S. Will Supply Israel Missiles in Policy Change,” *NYT*, September 27, 1962, p.1.

changed over time. In a June 1968 *NYT* story he contended because Israel “already” had a reactor it did not need to “stop” developing nuclear weapons in return for the missiles.⁶³⁹

Conversely, Cohen has argued there is “no basis” that JFK provided the missiles in exchange for “regular U.S. visits” but admitted that Komer had told him that there was “always really one track” in U.S.-Israeli relations concerning “security” and the “atom.” Questioning Hersh’s analysis and dismissing Feldman and Komer as unreliable “contemporaneous sources,” Bass likewise has argued that linkage could have been transpired orally “but it is not in the documents.” Ben-Zvi argued in *Decade of Transition* that the sale was conducted as part of JFK’s “determined effort” to force Israel to agree to a “system of periodic inspection” but flip flopped four years later in his *JFK and Israel* by stating that Bundy had “mistakenly” averred that there was any “explicit linkage.” In his footnotes, however, he conceded that that it was “interesting” that the second U.S. visit to Dimona on September 26, 1962, transpired “approximately one month” after the sale.⁶⁴⁰ Nonetheless, both scholarly camps have clumsily presupposed that the U.S. was in a greater position of leverage to impose conditions on Israel because it was a superpower. Israel was able to quietly achieve linkage to benefit its most important national security interest. Washington and the U.S. media naively assumed that the Hawk would be employed to protect IAF bases. Ironically, once Israel received the missile in April 1965 it was instead deployed to protect Dimona’s airspace.⁶⁴¹

⁶³⁹ McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival* (New York: Random House, 1988), p. 510; Little, “The Making of a Special Relationship,” p. 569; Druks, *JFK and Israel*, p. 39; Hersh, *The Samson Option*, p. 110; Shoenbaum, *The U.S. and the State of Israel*, p. 139; “61 Pledge to Israel by U.S. is Confirmed,” *NYT*, June 16, 1968, p. 5.

⁶⁴⁰ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 174; Bass, *Support Any Friend*, p. 204; Ben Zvi, *Decade of Transition*, pp. 15, 17; *Ibid*, *JFK and the Politics of Arms Sales to Israel* (London: Frank Cass, 2002), pp. 78, 107n45.

⁶⁴¹ During the first day of the Six Day War the HAWK brought down a wounded Israeli Mirage fighter which had strayed over Dimona’s airspace after losing all communication capabilities. On February 21, 1973, a Libyan Boeing 727 with 113 passengers was shot down during daylight hours by the IAF after straying over Dimona. Warren Unna, “U.S. to Sell Israel Hawk Missiles to Meet Arab’s Threat,” *WP*, September 27, 1962; Letter from Bundy to Grant, July 16, 1962, *FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII: www.state.gov/r/pa/hof/frus/kenned_yjf/xviii/25415.htm* (document 3); Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: Israel’s Security and Other Problems,” February 16, 1961, *Ibid*:

On September 14 Foggy Bottom informed Harman that two AEC scientists already scheduled to tour Nachal in two weeks could also visit Dimona.⁶⁴² Even though little is known about the visit, on October 31 Rusk informed Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Norway, France and Britain that on September 26 Israel had taken, “without prior warning,” the two touring AEC scientists to Dimona. Given a 40-minute tour, they found no “evidence of weapons production.”⁶⁴³ According to two *LBJ* Library documents, however, the U.S. team later concluded that their visit was “not entirely satisfactory.”⁶⁴⁴ Following the Cuban Missile Crisis and Congressional elections, Dimona disappeared entirely from the paper flow.

In preparation for the President’s upcoming meeting with Meir, Dimona was also absent from a December 5 memorandum from Komer to JFK, which admitted that despite its “special” bond with Israel the U.S. had “gotten nothing” for providing Israel the Hawk.⁶⁴⁵ JFK’s and Meir’s 70 minute meeting at Harriman’s Palm Beach home represented the only time Dimona was raised at the Presidential level in 1962. JFK expressed that the U.S. possessed a “special

www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjfk/xvi/i/17702.htm (document 12); Incoming Telegram from Barbour to Rusk, April 19, 1965, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel Security (Missile Development) and Sale of Hawks, 1964-1965-March 1966, Box 32, *LBJL*; Bass, *Support Any Friend*, p. 205; Oren, *Six Days of War*, p. 176; Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, *A Study of Crisis* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), pp. 285-286; James John Tritten, “Is Naval Warfare Unique?” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 12, 4, (1989), p. 483; Gal, “U.S Will Resume Sending Israeli Defense Missiles,” *NYT*, July 7, 1968, p. 1; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 169.

⁶⁴² Four days before the Foggy Bottom request, the CIA’s Deputy Director of Intelligence, Ray Cline, messaged to the Jewish Walt Rostow, Chairman of Foggy Bottom’s Policy Planning Staff, that an Israeli bomb would have a “profound effect on Egypt.” Memorandum for Bundy, “Subject: Second Visit by U.S. Scientists,” September 21, 1962, NSF, Countries, Israel General (9/6/62-9/21/62), Box 119, *JFKL*.

⁶⁴³ On October 22 the U.S. separately informed Egypt of its visit to Dimona. Circular Airgram from the State Department to Certain Posts, “Subject: Israel’s Dimona Reactor,” October 31, 1962, *FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjfk/xviii/26162.htm> (document 87); Chronology of Israel Assurances of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy and Related Events, undated, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Nuclear Energy Program, 1964-1965- March 1966, Box 30, *LBJL*; Background of Israel’s Nuclear Weapons Program, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Dimona 1964 # 1, Box 30, *LBJL*.

⁶⁴⁴ On December 27, the same day JFK and Meir met, Thomas Haycock, the only identified member of the U.S. team to visit Dimona, admitted that he was unsure while at the reactor whether he was a “guest” or carrying out an “inspection” of Dimona. Chronology of Israel Assurances of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy and Related Events, undated, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Nuclear Energy Program, 1964-1965- March 1966, Box 30, *LBJL*; Background of Israel’s Nuclear Weapons Program, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Dimona 1964 # 1, Box 30, *LBJL*; Memorandum from Talbot to Rodger P. Davies, “Subject: Second Inspection of Israel’s Dimona Reactor,” December 27, 1962, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Dimona 1964 # 1, Box 30, *LBJL*.

⁶⁴⁵ Memorandum for the President, December 5, 1962, NSF, Countries, Israel General (12/22/62), Box 119, *JFKL*.

relationship with Israel ... comparable only to” its relationship with Britain before conceding that the Johnson Plan was “gone.” In an example of double speak, JFK ended by emphasizing that the U.S. was “opposed to nuclear proliferation” but conceded that his “interest” was not to intervene into “into Israel’s affairs...” Meir responded there would be no “difficulty” on this subject before quickly changing the subject back to the Arab refugees.⁶⁴⁶

Using the Cuban Missile Crisis as a catalyst, in early 1963 JFK and Khrushchev began to place non-proliferation as the defining superpower issue. In an attempt to establish a PTBT, in January 1963 alone Soviet and U.S. diplomats met ten times in Washington and New York.⁶⁴⁷ In a non-election year, this increased cooperation with Moscow conveniently allowed JFK to employ a lukewarm pressure campaign against Dimona. Shalom has argued that by early 1963 the U.S. began to perceive Dimona as a “global threat” which “transcended” its bilateral relationship with Israel.⁶⁴⁸ Before confronting Israel, however, JFK required two months of inter-agency diplomacy to get the bureaucratic house in order.

At Foggy Bottom’s expense, this transformation in U.S. policy towards Dimona was orchestrated at the highest levels of the CIA, Pentagon and NSC. The CIA concluded on January 23 that the Arabs would not possess the bomb for “many years to come.” On February 12 the Pentagon estimated that Israel, after China, would be the next nation to obtain the bomb, possibly as early as 1965-1966.⁶⁴⁹ Days later Komer asked the AEC to plan another Dimona “inspection” and to formulate a new “scheme” focused on how many U.S. trips would be needed annually to

⁶⁴⁶ In an outgoing January 4 telegram to Tel Aviv, Beirut, Amman, Cairo and London, Under Secretary of State George Ball directly quoted the exchange between Meir and JFK on Dimona. Outgoing Circular Telegram from Ball, January 4, 1963, NSF, Countries, Israel General (1/4/63-1/14/63), Box 119, *JFKL*; Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: Conversation with Israel Foreign Minister Meir,” December 27, 1962, *FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII*: www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/xviii/26200.htm (document 121);

⁶⁴⁷ Editorial Note, *Ibid* (document 258).

⁶⁴⁸ Shalom has argued that by early 1963 the U.S. began to perceive Dimona as a “global threat” which “transcended” its bilateral relationship with Israel. Shalom, *Israel’s Nuclear Option*, p. 38.

⁶⁴⁹ DCI, NIE 30-63, “Subject: The Arab-Israeli Problem,” January 23, 1963, *FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/xviii/26200.htm> (document 139); Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 116.

assure the reactor remained peaceful.⁶⁵⁰ Aware that Israel could produce the bomb “without testing,” Kent and the BNE warned on March 6 that a Jewish bomb would precipitate “disunity” in an Arab world known for its “highly emotional outbursts.” The real concern was that in the Cold War’s zero sum game an Israeli bomb could convince the Arabs that their collective survival was dependent on “Soviet power.”⁶⁵¹

A day after JFK announced to reporters that by the 1970s “fifteen” to “twenty-five” countries could possess the bomb, Komer informed the President that the U.S. was “pushing ahead” for another Dimona “inspection” on March 22.⁶⁵² On March 24 Brubeck reported that the mysterious Robert Webber, the U.S. Embassy’s new Science Attaché, had informed him that it was unlikely Israel would agree to semi-annual inspections.⁶⁵³ Two days later Bundy called on

⁶⁵⁰ Memorandum for the Record by Komer, February 15, 1963, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Dimona 1964 # 1, Box 30, *LBJL*.

⁶⁵¹ Memorandum from the CIA’s BNE to DCI McCone, “Subject: Consequences of Israeli Acquisition of Nuclear Capability,” March 6, 1963, *FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII*: www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/xviii/26203.htm (Volume 179).

⁶⁵² On the same day Komer sent another still classified one page letter to JFK. Memorandum from Komer to Kennedy, March 22, 1963, *Ibid.*: (document 197); John F. Kennedy Document Control Board, March 22, 1963, NSF, Countries, Israel General (3/4/63-4/23/62) Box 119, *JFKL*; “The President’s News Conference of March 21, 1963,” APP, *PPUS*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/>.

⁶⁵³ Considering his military background, close dealings with the CIA, and conspicuous absence in the primary documentation, there is strong evidence that Webber was sent to Tel Aviv to ensure Israel could secretly develop the bomb without threatening U.S. public declarations to the contrary. After earning his doctorate in Physics from Yale, Webber served from 1949 to 1957 at the Naval Laboratory’s cryogenics facility in Washington. Over the next three years he was stationed in London as deputy scientific director of the Office of Naval Research. During his time in Tel Aviv, Webber worked closely with John Hadden, the CIA’s Station Chief in the U.S. Embassy, even though Foggy Bottom strictly forbid its Scientific Attachés from taking part in intelligence gathering. Strangely, even though he served in Tel Aviv until sometime in 1966 Webber’s name is absent from the indexes and personnel lists in the pertinent JFK and LBJ *FRUS* volumes. The decision to send Webber to Tel Aviv was not the only change in U.S. policy during 1963. Sometime in the summer the U.S. Consulate in Haifa was closed, thus increasing Barbour’s ability to independently implement policy from 71 Hayakron Street. Hersh has also pointed out that during the year Hadden was also replaced by Peter Jessup. Letter from the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations to Fulbright, November 20, 1963, *FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XXV*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjfx/v6006.htm> (document 68); Background information, Principle U.S. Officials, NSF, Israel, Eshkol Visit Briefing Book (1/7-8/68), Box, 144, *LBJL*; State Department Memorandum by William H. Brubeck, Executive Secretary, “Subject: Israel’s Atomic Energy Program,” March 24, 1963, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Dimona 1964 # 1, Box 30, *LBJL*; “List of Persons,” *FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/xviii/25838.htm>; “Persons,” *FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XVIII*: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xviii/persons.html; “Index R-Z,” *Ibid.*: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xviii/index4.html; “U.S. Will Study Asian Research,” *NYT*, October 3, 1960, p. 33; “Robert T. Webber, 56,” *WP*, April 10, 1977, p. 108; Ronald Doel and Allan Needell, “Science, Scientists and the CIA,” in *Eternal Vigilance?*, p. 69; Hersh, *The Samson Option*, pp. 164-166.

the NEA's James Grant to organize a working group to study the feasibility of an Israeli-Egyptian arms limitation accord by early May.⁶⁵⁴ On March 27 Rusk informed Barbour that the U.S. desired semi-annual visits to Dimona could "perhaps" transpire in May and November.⁶⁵⁵ Barbour delivered Ben Gurion the message on April 2. The Prime Minister did not "demur" but rather suggested the subject be discussed at their next meeting.⁶⁵⁶

From April 2-4 Peres was in Washington to finalize the HAWK sale with Gilpatric, Nitze and U. Alexis Johnson.⁶⁵⁷ On April 2 he and Feldman were walking in the White House when they bumped into JFK. When the President immediately asked about Dimona, always quick on his feet, Peres gave the answer that Israel still uses today: "...we will not introduce nuclear weapons to the region, and we will not be the first." Peres informed Cohen in 1991 that he did "not want to lie" to JFK but could not reply truthfully either, so he had presented an improvised half-truth instead.⁶⁵⁸ Peres' words could have originally derived from an influential U.S. source. On April 4 Ball informed Barbour that Johnson had told Peres that the U.S. "deeply opposed" the "introduction of nuclear weapons" into the region.⁶⁵⁹ Proof of Orwell's mantra that political language is based on "making lies sound truthful," Peres' words were quickly accepted and

⁶⁵⁴ Other task force members included Henry Byroade, a former Ambassador to Egypt (March 1955- September 1956), William Polk, a member of the Policy Planning Staff, the INR's Robert Elwood, Robert Strong and Rodger Davies of the NEA and Francois Dickman, who handled Egyptian-Syrian issues. When the working group submitted its final report on May 14 there was also one group member's name blacked out, a probable CIA asset. NSAM 231 by Bundy, March 26, 1963, *Ibid*: (document 199); Memorandum from Talbot to Rusk, May 14, 1963, *Ibid*: (document 247); Memorandum for Bundy, "Subject: Arms Limitation in the Arab-Israel Area- Background Report for NSAM No. 231," NSF, Countries, Israel General (3/4/63-4/23/63) Box 119, *JFKL*.

⁶⁵⁵ Telegram from Rusk to Barbour, March 27, 1963, NSF, Israel General (3/4/63-4/23/63) Box 119, *JFKL*.

⁶⁵⁶ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 118; Chronology of Israel Assurances of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy and Related Events, undated, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Nuclear Energy Program, 1964-1965- March 1966, Box 30, *LBJL*.

⁶⁵⁷ Telegram from the State Department to the Embassy in Israel, April 4, 1963, *FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII: www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/xviii/26203.htm* (document 206);

⁶⁵⁸ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 118, 119, 380n21; *Ibid*, "Peres: Peacemaker, Nuclear Pioneer," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 52, 3 (May-June 1996), p. 16.

⁶⁵⁹ Telegram from the Department of State (Ball) to the Embassy in Israel, April 4, 1964, *FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/xviii/26203.htm* (document 206).

regurgitated by Foggy Bottom.⁶⁶⁰ On April 12 Rusk announced to all Near Eastern nations that the U.S. opposed the “introduction of weapons of mass destruction ...into the area.”⁶⁶¹

On the same day JFK told reporters that the U.S. supported the “security of both Israel and her neighbors” by attempting to “limit” the “region’s arms race,” the CIA concluded on May 8 that if Israel developed the bomb then Nasser could “turn to the USSR...”⁶⁶² After two more U.S. requests to Israel for semi-annual inspections of Dimona, Grant’s task force reported on May 14 that if the “secrecy” could be “preserved,” a Presidential emissary could be soon sent to Egypt and then Israel to demonstrate U.S. opposition to nuclear proliferation.⁶⁶³ The report also provided the impetus for JFK personally pressure Israel on Dimona. Two days before Moscow proposed a Near East atomic-free zone, on May 18 JFK warned Ben Gurion that his May 8 pledge to Israel’s “security” could be “seriously jeopardized” if the U.S. learned that Israel was pursuing the bomb. Such a development could force Cairo into Moscow’s arms. In a sign the U.S. was backtracking, however, JFK declared that the U.S. now required “periodic” rather than semi-annual Dimona inspections.⁶⁶⁴ Nine days later Ben Gurion replied that “annual visits” could occur after Dimona’s “start-up time,” sometime later in the year or in early 1964.⁶⁶⁵

On June 10 JFK delivered the best speech of his presidency before the graduating class of American University. JFK circumvented the bureaucracy by confining the speech’s

⁶⁶⁰ Orwell, “The Politics of the English Language,” pp. 146-147, 154.

⁶⁶¹ On April 24 Egypt’s UN representative Mahmoud Riad announced that Israel was “capable of producing atomic bombs.” A day later, in a heavily excised document, U.S. Ambassador in Cairo, John Badeau, asked Rusk whether the U.S. should alter its Dimona “assessments” to Nasser. Telegram from the State Department to the Embassy in Israel, April 4, 1963, *FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII*: www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjfk/xviii/26203.htm (document 206); Outgoing Circular Telegram from Rusk, April 12, 1963, NSF, Countries, Israel General (3/4/63-4/23/63) Box 119, *JFKL*; “U.A.R. Diplomat Says Israel Plans A-Bombs,” *WP*, April 25, 1963 p. A23.

⁶⁶² SNIE 30-2-63, May 8, 1963, *FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjfk/xviii/26209.htm> (document 239); “The President’s News Conference of May 8, 1963,” *APP, PPUS*.

⁶⁶³ Memorandum from Talbot to Rusk, “Subject: Arms Limitation in the Near East,” May 14, 1963, *FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjfk/xviii/26209.htm> (document 247).

⁶⁶⁴ Telegram from the State Department to the Embassy in Israel signed by Kennedy, May 28, *Ibid*: (document 252).

⁶⁶⁵ Letter from Ben-Gurion to JFK, May 27, 1963, President’s Office Files, Israel Security (1961-1963), Box 119A, *JFKL*.

preparation team to a trusted group comprised of Ted Sorensen, Schlesinger, Walt Rostow, Bundy and especially Kaysen. Rusk, McNamara and the JCS were not informed of the address until two days prior.⁶⁶⁶ Calling on the U.S. to work with the U.S.S.R. to establish a “treaty to outlaw nuclear tests,” Kennedy humbly concluded: “We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children’s future. And we are all mortal.”⁶⁶⁷ The “best” Presidential address since FDR reinvigorated the IC’s commitment to semi-annual visits to Dimona.⁶⁶⁸ Two days later Brubeck informed Bundy that if Dimona was dedicated to building a bomb, then it would need to “discharge” its fuel every six months. It was imperative for the U.S. to visit Dimona before the summer’s completion, again in June 1964 and then every six months thereafter.⁶⁶⁹

On Saturday, June 15, Barbour received an “eyes only” letter signed by JFK to be delivered the next day. Reminding Israel that U.S.-Israeli ties could be “seriously jeopardized” if it pursued the bomb, JFK sought another “visit” to Dimona in the next couple months with full U.S. access to “all areas.” The next visit would transpire in June 1964 and then in intervals of every six months thereafter.⁶⁷⁰ Amazingly, due to Barbour’s indolence, Ben Gurion never received the message. Instead of presenting the letter on Sunday, the portly Ambassador decided to play golf instead! When he returned to deliver the letter, Ben Gurion had already resigned. Upon learning of the news, Barbour phoned Foggy Bottom and successfully advocated that the

⁶⁶⁶ On July 22 Strauss phoned his AEC successor to intone his “unhappiness with the prospect of a limited test ban treaty.” On the same day McCone revealed to Rusk, Ball, Bundy, McNamara and Gilpatric that Teller also shared this opinion. Memorandum for the Record, “Subject: Telephone Conversation Mr. Kaysen on 8 June,” June 8, 1963, *FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume VII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjif/vii/50955.htm> (document 290); Memorandum for the Record, “Subject: Special Meeting at State Dept- 21 July- re Test Ban Agreement,” July 22, 1963, *Ibid*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjif/vii/50956.htm> (document 337).

⁶⁶⁷ “Commencement Address at American University in Washington,” June 10, 1963, APP, *PPUS*.

⁶⁶⁸ Khrushchev made this remark to Harriman on July 27 while he was negotiating towards the test ban treaty in Moscow. Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the State Department, July 27, 1963, *FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume VII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjif/vii/50957.htm> (document 354).

⁶⁶⁹ Memorandum from Brubeck to Bundy, “Subject: Reply to Ben Gurion on Dimona Visits,” June 12, 1963, *FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjif/xviii/26211.htm> (document 267).

⁶⁷⁰ Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, President’s Office Files, Israel Security (1961-1963), Box 119A, *JFKL*.

letter not be presented until a new Prime Minister was in place.⁶⁷¹

On the same day Barbour personally informed Nasser that McCloy would soon be sent to Cairo, JFK met with Komer, Bundy, McCone, Talbot, Grant, Foster and McCloy to discuss the upcoming U.S. Near East arms control initiative on June 15.⁶⁷² McCloy was originally set to first visit Cairo in late-June and then Israel in mid-July. In their two hour June 27 meeting Nasser “repeated” several times that Egypt had “no intent or desire” to develop the bomb.⁶⁷³ Since Egypt only had a 2 MW reactor, two days later Nasser admitted that there was “nothing” for anyone “to inspect.” Since McCloy was unwilling to probe the issue, Ambassador Badeau then inquired what Nasser’s “attitudes would be if he learned” that if Dimona was for military purposes. Nasser replied that Cairo would have no “choice” but to launch a “protective war.”⁶⁷⁴

U.S. actions towards Dimona in early July were conspicuously contradictory. Nine days after Eshkol’s rise to power, JFK wrote to the new Prime Minister on July 5 letter that all future U.S. “visits” to Dimona- one before the summer’s end, another in June 1964 and then every six months thereafter- should “nearly” match “international standards.”⁶⁷⁵ In these visits the U.S. should be given access to “all areas” of Dimona, with JFK stating how “vital” Dimona was to the

⁶⁷¹ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 384n81.

⁶⁷² According to a Rusk telegraph to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, on June 19 *Ma’ariv* relayed that the Soviets had once again “rejected” Egypt’s request for “assistance in developing nuclear weapons.” Nonetheless, four days later the *WP* enunciated that a test ban agreement would decrease the “incentive of” both “Egypt and Israel to acquire atomic weapons.” Memorandum for the Record, June 15, 1963, *FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/xviii/26211.htm> (document 273); Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the UAR, June 15, 1963, *Ibid* (document 275); Outgoing Telegram to Moscow from Washington, June 21, 1963, NSF, Countries, Israel General (6/21/63-6/30/63), Box 119A, *JFKL*; Howard Simons, “A-Arms Proliferation,” *WP*, June 25, 1963, p. A15; Memorandum for the Record, June 15, 1963, *FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/xviii/26211.htm> (document 273).

⁶⁷³ Telegram from the Embassy in the UAR to the Department of State, June 28, 1963, *FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/xviii/26211.htm> (document 283).

⁶⁷⁴ In a July 3 after-action report to JFK, Komer “regrettably” emphasized that McCloy “did not” inform Nasser that the impetus for the U.S. “initiative” was its “concern over” Dimona. Memorandum from Komer to Kennedy, July 3, 1963, *Ibid*, Volume XVIII: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/xviii/26215.htm> (document 288); Telegram from the Embassy in the UAR to the Department of State, June 30, 1963, *Ibid*: (document 285).

⁶⁷⁵ Shalom has argued that on July 7 and 9 the *JP* and *Ha’aretz* touched upon the “growing” U.S. pressure on Dimona. Shalom, *Israel’s Nuclear Option*, pp. 62, 190n49.

future of the globe.⁶⁷⁶ JFK was unable or unwilling to pass this message to the bureaucracy. Six days later Bundy informed AEC head Glenn Seaborg, a Nobel Prize winning chemist and former Berkley Chancellor,⁶⁷⁷ that he supported leasing Israel four tons of heavy water. Even though the material was “not” destined “for” Dimona, the AEC sale represented another show of taciturn support for Israel. A day earlier Komer had even suggested to Bundy that the heavy water not be provided until “Dimona was buttoned up.” In late October the *NYT* revealed that the heavy water had been shipped to the Technion in Haifa for “peaceful purposes only.”⁶⁷⁸

The U.S. Ambassador in Tel Aviv let his opinion know that he did not like this increased White House pressure on Dimona. On July 15 Barbour reminded Rusk that the U.S.-Israeli relationship on Dimona dealt with “sensitive” information. The less that was stated “publicly” on the subject the better it would be for Israel, the U.S., and their anonymous “friends” which had financed and built the reactor.⁶⁷⁹ Two days later, Eshkol responded to JFK’s July 5 letter, claiming that he was still “acquainting” himself “with all the details of the Dimona project.” In an oral message passed through Barbour, Eshkol reminded JFK that Israel would pursue its “sovereign” interest, which in the “distant future” could mean a decision to “...to embark on a nuclear weapons program.”⁶⁸⁰ Barbour’s and Eshkol’s responses to JFK’s July 5 letter effectively neutered the White House’s aggressive policy on Dimona. On July 19 Komer informed JFK that the NSC suggested “holding up” on sending McCloy to Israel because Nasser “didn’t buy our scheme.” He emphasized that Israel would not “give any nuclear promises”

⁶⁷⁶ Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, July 4, 1963, *Ibid* (document 289).

⁶⁷⁷ Herken, *Cardinal Choices*, p. 131.

⁶⁷⁸ One of the final messages that Ike passed onto JFK was that one bureaucracy he would find it impossible to “run” was “the AEC.” Memorandum for the Chairman of the AEC, July 11, 1963, NSF, Countries, Israel General (7/1/63-7/25/63), Box 119A, *JFKL*; Memorandum to Bundy from Komer, July 10, 1963, NSF, Countries, Israel General (7/1/63-7/25/63), Box 119A, *JFKL*; “U.S. Aiding Israel in Atom Research,” *NYT*, October 27, 1963, p. 8; Wise and Ross, *The Invisible Government*, p. 201.

⁶⁷⁹ Telegraph from Barbour to Rusk, July 15, 1963, NSF, Israel General (7/1/63-7/25/63), Box 119A, *JFKL*.

⁶⁸⁰ Telegraph from Barbour to Rusk, July 17, 1963, NSF, Israel General (7/1/63-7/25/63), Box 119A, *JFKL*.

unless the U.S. “literally” forced Israel to “back down” or provided the Jewish state with a security guarantee. Four days later Rusk admitted to JFK, that after traveling to Cairo, McCloy had been told by Barbour in Athens that he should not travel to Israel “at this time” since he had achieved “limited results” with Nasser.⁶⁸¹

By this time even JFK was having second thoughts about sending McCloy to Israel. In a July 23 meeting with Komer, Bundy, Nitze, McCone, Talbot, Badeau, Ball and McCloy, JFK failed to inform McCloy or anyone else of his July 5 letter to Eshkol. Although over 28 lines of the meeting are excised, JFK ended any chance of a future McCloy mission to Israel by stating that it was “best not to take any special action with respect to Israel right now.”⁶⁸² Since DCI McCone had vaguely reiterated to him that Israel had not done “very much on nuclear activity recently,” he believed it was best for the “dialogue” to continue to transpire only between Barbour and Eshkol. Concerned over Nasser’s statement that he would launch a “protective” war if he became convinced that Dimona was “manufacturing” the bomb, JFK questioned why he had not “stated this publicly earlier.” Badeau responded that past U.S. guarantees to Cairo that Dimona was peaceful had “helped” in this regard.⁶⁸³ At a time when Harriman was negotiating towards a test ban treaty in Moscow, JFK’s decision to cancel McCloy’s trip to Israel was a missed chance for the U.S. to show Israel that its opposed proliferation everywhere.

Banning all atomic testing in the atmosphere, outer space and under water, the PTBT was

⁶⁸¹ Fifteen lines of Rusk’s memorandum were expurgated. Memorandum from Rusk to Kennedy, “Subject: McCloy Mission on Near East Arms Limitation,” July 23, 1963, *FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjif/xviii/26215.htm> (document 301); Memorandum for the President, July 19, 1963, NSF, Robert Komer, Israel, 1961-1963 (White House Memoranda), Box 427, *JFKL*.

⁶⁸² Cohen has contended that Ben Gurion’s resignation also contributed to JFK’s decision to cancel McCloy’s trip to Israel. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 155-156.

⁶⁸³ Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: McCloy’s Near East Arms Limitation Probe,” July 23, 1963, *FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjif/xviii/26215.htm> (document 303).

initialed by Harriman, Gromyko and Lord Hailsham on July 25.⁶⁸⁴ During the period between its initialing and signing 11 days later, the media examined which nations could try to refrain from signing the accord. On July 27 the *NYT*'s Max Frankel, who worked closely with Finney under Reston, argued that "lawyers and diplomats" would have to work to convince possible "hold-outs" like China, France, Israel and Egypt to join.⁶⁸⁵ A day later the *NYT*'s fatuously stated that it was "believed" that "a special program" was posed by both the UAR's and Israel's nuclear programs.⁶⁸⁶ On July 29 a nameless *NYT* story relayed that Nasser pledged to sign the treaty, while re-emphasizing that both the "UAR and Israel" had accused each other of trying "to develop nuclear weapons."⁶⁸⁷ Three days later another anonymous *NYT* piece revealed that Israel's decision to sign the treaty was "speeded" by Egypt's decision to do so first.⁶⁸⁸

Following July 23 the subject of Dimona disappeared in the U.S. primary documentation until August 5, the same day the PTBT was signed. Arguing that Eshkol had "nothing to lose" by signing the accord, Barbour informed Rusk that Israel viewed the agreement to be a "first step towards a significant East-West détente."⁶⁸⁹ On August 8 Barbour placed the regional arms race in a "global" context, avowing to Eban that U.S. worries about Dimona derived "directly" from concerns connected to the atomic programs of China and India. Eban replied that JFK should not

⁶⁸⁴ The accord was signed by Rusk, who had arrived in Moscow two days earlier, Gromoyko and Britain's Sir Alex Douglas Home. The Senate approved the treaty in a vote of 80 to 19 on September 24. On October 10 it went into effect. Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State, July 27, 1963, *FRUS, 1961-1963* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1996) *Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges*, Volume VI: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/volume_vi/exchanges.html (document 112); Editorial Note, *Arms Control and Disarmament*, Volume VII: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjfk/vii/50957.htm> (document 366); Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State, July 25, 1963, *Ibid* (document 353).

⁶⁸⁵ In 1987 the Jewish Frankel replaced the Jewish A.M. Rosenthal as the *NYT*'s executive director. Max Frankel, "U.S. Aides See Unclear Terms in Treaty Banning Atomic Tests," *NYT*, July 27, 1963, p.2; Stephen Labaton, "John Finney, 80," *NYT*, October 30, 2004, p. A17; Goldberg, *Jewish Power*, 303.

⁶⁸⁶ Tom Wicker, "Harriman Back, Meet Kennedy on Nuclear Pact," *NYT*, July 28, 1963, p. 1;

⁶⁸⁷ Without consulting the Cabinet, Eshkol, after guidance from especially Peres, agreed to the Moscow agreement on July 29 and Israel publicized this decision on August 4. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p.161; "Nasser Says U.A.R. Will Sign Test Pact," *NYT*, July 29, 1963, p.1.

⁶⁸⁸ "Israel will accede to Nuclear Treaty," *NYT*, August 1, 1963, p. 2.

⁶⁸⁹ Airgram from Barbour to the Department of State, "Subject: Israel Decides with Deliberate Speed to Join Test Ban Agreement," August 5, 1963, NSF, Robert W. Komer, Israel Nuclear Program 1963, Box 427, *JFKL*.

“expect a quick reply.”⁶⁹⁰ There was no further U.S.-Israel dialogue on Dimona from August 8 until Eshkol replied to JFK on August 19.⁶⁹¹

During this time the U.S. learned from France and the U.K. that it would be difficult for the White House to exert influence on Dimona. On August 14 the U.S. Ambassador in Paris, Charles Bohlen, relayed to Rusk that Israel was seeking uranium from Gabon, a former French colony.⁶⁹² On the same day Grant was informed by John Killick, a British Embassy Counselor in Washington, that he had received “disturbing signs” that Israel would soon possess a “crude” bomb. In order to prevent this from occurring, Grant maintained that it was vital for the U.S. to convince Israel that such a development could force the Arabs to turn to the Soviets on a “Cuban type pattern.” Pointing to JFK’s re-election campaign, Killick wisely responded that despite the U.S. tough talk there would be no real “change” in its “view.”⁶⁹³

Reminding JFK of his own words to Meir, Eshkol assured JFK on August 19 that he was “fully conscious” of their “special intimacy...” on Dimona. Another U.S. team could visit the “peaceful” reactor “toward the end of 1963.” Avoiding any definitive answer to JFK’s request for U.S. visits “at intervals of six months,” Eshkol averred that the visit schedule could be determined in the “future.” After fibbing that Dimona’s uranium was “fully controlled by Paris,”

⁶⁹⁰ Shalom, *Israel's Nuclear Option*, p. 58; “Israelis Reject Bid on Atom-Free Zone,” *NYT*, August 8, 1963, p. 2.

⁶⁹¹ Shalom has generalized that following the signing of the PTBT Israel’s nuclear weapons program entered a period of “low prolife” for the remainder of JFK’s presidency. Shalom, *Israel's Nuclear Option*, pp. 58-68.

⁶⁹² In May 1965 an INR report which indicated that Israel was attempting to obtain uranium from Gabon. In February 1966 David McKillop, the Director of Western European Affairs, was informed by France’s Ambassador in Washington, Charles Lucet, that due to its opposition to “the production of atomic weapons” Paris had “some time ago” ensured Libreville cease “supplying nuclear raw material to Israel.” Memorandum of Conversation by David H. McKillop, Director of Western European Affairs, “Subject: Israeli Atomic Program,” February 21, 1966, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Nuclear Energy Program, 1964-1965- March 1966, Box 30, *LBJL*. Memorandum to Rusk from the State Department’s INR (Thomas L. Hughes), May 10, 1965, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Dimona 1964 # 1, Box 30, *LBJL*; Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: Israeli Nuclear Program; Security Guarantee,” August 14, 1963, NSF, Countries, Israel General (9/63-9/30/63), Box 119A, *JFKL*.

⁶⁹³ Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: Israeli Nuclear Program; Security Guarantee,” August 14, 1963, NSF, Countries, Israel General (9/63-9/30/63), Box 119A, *JFKL*; Outgoing Eyes only Telegram from Washington (Ball) to Paris, August 20, 1963, NSF, Countries, Israel General (8/20/63-8/22/63), Box 119A, *JFKL*.

he expressed his “deep satisfaction” in the PTBT signing.⁶⁹⁴ On the same day that Eshkol’s letter was sent, Barbour was informed by Director General of the Foreign Ministry Arie Lavavi that that it was best for Nasser kept uninformed about Dimona to deter against any future “Egyptian adventures.”⁶⁹⁵ After being “orally” told by Eshkol that U.S. visits to Dimona after June 1964 would cause “no trouble,” Barbour informed Rusk on August 20 that “contrary” to Ben Gurion’s assurances, Israel wanted no Dimona “information” to “be passed on to Nasser...”⁶⁹⁶

The rest of the bureaucracy was unwilling to challenge Israel on this point. On August 23 Komer informed JFK that even though Eshkol had failed to “meet” the “proposed schedule,” the NSC and Foggy Bottom still believed the U.S. should nonetheless “act as if he did.”⁶⁹⁷ On the same day Ball informed JFK that even though Eshkol’s “reply” was the best the U.S. could “hope” to get. As usual, Israel should be given “the benefit of the doubt,” by granting its wish that no information derived from U.S. “visits” to Dimona be passed onto Nasser. Reminding JFK that U.S. interests could not be “confined to the Near East alone,” however, Ball still warned that if the U.S. was unable to convince Egypt that Dimona was peaceful then it could encourage a pre-emptive “attack on Israel...”⁶⁹⁸ With the PTBT already signed, JFK was willing to forget his previous request for semi-annual inspections.

Even though Eshkol did not agree to “regular visits” but rather a single one in late 1963,

⁶⁹⁴ On September 16 the *WP* only divulged that there had been a “secret exchange” of letters between Kennedy and Eshkol on a “most sensitive subject.” “Kennedy, Eshkol Exchange Notes,” *WP*, September 16, 1963, p. A15; Letter from Eshkol to JFK, August 19, 1963, President’s Office Files, Countries, Israel Security (1961-1963), *JFKL*.

⁶⁹⁵ Incoming Telegram from Barbour to Rusk, Section 1 of 3, March 4, 1964, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Cables, Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, *LBJL*.

⁶⁹⁶ Barbour also disclosed that it was “agreed” that the “press” not be “informed” in his meeting with Eshkol, whose office was now being directed by Kolleck. Incoming Eyes Only Telegram from Barbour to Rusk, August 20, 1963 NSF, Files of Robert W. Komer, Israel (1961-1963), Box 427, *JFKL*.

⁶⁹⁷ Memorandum for President Kennedy from Komer, August 23, 1963, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Dimona 1964 # 1, Box 30, *LBJL*.

⁶⁹⁸ Memorandum from Ball to Kennedy, “Subject: Reply to Eshkol on Dimona Inspections,” August 23, 1963, *FRUS*, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjif/xviii/26376.htm> (document 317).

on August 26 JFK praised Eshkol for “generously agreeing” to this framework.⁶⁹⁹ JFK omitted any reference about informing Cairo about Dimona, while Rusk mused in an attached aside that the U.S. would “of course comply” with Israel’s demand that nothing “be passed on to Nasser.” Rusk added that Barbour should utilize Webber as a “contact” for arranging the “timing” of the “end-1963 visit.”⁷⁰⁰ Without referring to Dimona, on October 2 JFK wrote to Eshkol that he doubted a “more explicit” U.S. public guarantee would enhance Israel’s security any more than his May 8 declaration.⁷⁰¹ Eshkol vaguely replied on November 4 that Israel would “not possess the necessary deterrent capacity” without obtaining “considerable help.”⁷⁰²

Secret talks and the *NYT* consumed U.S. policy towards Israel in JFK’s final weeks in office. Dimona was absent on November 12-13 when Talbot, Komer, and a CIA agent met with IDF Deputy Chief of Staff Rabin and Deputy Director of Intelligence Yariv to discuss Egypt’s missile program.⁷⁰³ On November 16 Sulzberger revealed that Ben Gurion had informed him that Israel “may be experimenting with military atomics.” Three days later an Israeli Foreign Ministry official issued a “flat denial” of the story.⁷⁰⁴ In a story the next day, Sulzberger stated that Israel was “probably” trying to “fabricate” the bomb.⁷⁰⁵ Less than 48 hours later, in broad daylight, JFK was assassinated in Dallas.

JFK’s Dimona record in his final year in office has divided the historiography. Bass has

⁶⁹⁹ A day earlier the U.S. CORONA spy satellite, controlled by the CIA’s Directorate of Science & Technology and the Air Force, photographed Dimona. “Declassified Corona Imagery of Dimona,” Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/israel/dimona_corona.htm.

⁷⁰⁰ Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, August 26, 1963, *FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjfk/xviii/26376> (document 319).

⁷⁰¹ Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, October 2, 1963, *Ibid*: (document 332).

⁷⁰² Incoming Telegram from Barbour to Rusk, Part One of Two, November 4, 1964, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Cables, Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, *LBJL*; Incoming Telegram from Barbour to Rusk, Part Two of Two, November 4, 1963, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Cables, Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, *LBJL*.

⁷⁰³ Bass, *Support Any Friend*, pp. 183-184, 236.

⁷⁰⁴ C.L. Sulzberger, “Foreign Affairs; The Little Old Man in the Desert,” *NYT*, November 16, 1963, p. 21; Telegram from Barbour to Rusk, November 19, 1963, NSF, Countries, Israel General (11/18/63-1/30/64), Box 119A, *JFKL*.

⁷⁰⁵ C.L. Sulzberger, “Foreign Affairs; The Problem of a Garbage Bomb Neither Missiles nor Funds,” *NYT*, November 20, 1963, p. 42.

intoned that the U.S. and Israel were on a “collision course” over Dimona by late 1963, whereas Cohen has countered that JFK and Eshkol were simply falling “further down the path of nuclear opacity.”⁷⁰⁶ The latter analysis is closer to the mark. Had JFK truly wanted to eradicate Dimona, he would have not have cancelled McCloy’s planned trip to Israel, he would have not provided the IAEC with the four tons of heavy water in July, and he would have not backtracked on his original language for “semi-annual” inspections. Most importantly, he would have obtained a written guarantee from Eshkol allowing the U.S. to reassure Nasser that Dimona was indeed peaceful. The PTBT negotiations conveniently presented JFK with a chance to utilize the rare superpower cooperation to personally pressure Israel in writing to disclose its nuclear intentions and open up Dimona to U.S. “visits.” JFK also needed to be perceived as tough on Dimona to convince Moscow, whose call for a Near East atomic zone in May 1963 cannot be overlooked. The fact that the U.S. pressure on Israel ended after the PTBT was signed, demonstrates his politicized approach to the issue. JFK must have perceived 1963 as the last time he could have pressured Israel on the subject without having to face adverse political implications in his re-election campaign on 1964, one which never materialized. According to Bundy, any “close” U.S. “concern” vis-à-vis Dimona effectively “ended with” the President’s “death” in Dallas.⁷⁰⁷ JFK’s Texan successor had other more pressing priorities than confronting Israel over Dimona.

⁷⁰⁶ Bass has speciously envisioned that it is “hard to imagine” that JFK would have caved to Jewish domestic pressure and allowed an Israel to obtain the bomb is very naïve. This counter-factual assertion first neglects Feinberg and Feldman’s integral roles in arranging the first U.S. visit to Dimona and the JFK-Ben Gurion Waldorf meeting. Next, Bass is oblivious to the reality that Dimona largely disappeared in the election year of 1962, a year in which the U.S. covertly engineered the politically motivated Feldman-led HAWK sale to Israel. Cohen’s argument that a “confrontation” with Israel over Dimona would have been “less likely” under LBJ than JFK is a more safe analysis because the former was “less concerned” with nuclear proliferation than the latter. Bass, *Support Any Friend*, pp. 189-190; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 174, 195-196.

⁷⁰⁷ Bundy, *Danger and Survival*, p. 510.

Chapter Five: Dubious Denial, a Detached Democrat and Deep Diplomacy

Consumed with domestic concerns, Vietnam and his own political self-preservation, Lyndon B. Johnson was unconcerned about nuclear proliferation during his presidency. Historian Lewis Gould has described LBJ as “a political animal,” who understood that any personal and persistent pressure on Dimona could deny him victory in November 1964.⁷⁰⁸ LBJ’s grandmother had once informed her grandson: “Take care of the Jews, God’s chosen people...and help them any way you can.”⁷⁰⁹ He did not wait long to fulfill this sentiment. After JFK’s November 25 funeral, LBJ put his arm around Meir and enunciated that even though Israel had “lost a friend” he assured her that he too was “a friend.”⁷¹⁰ By largely obviating himself from all Dimona policy in favor of the bureaucracy, LBJ ensured that his promise to Meir came to fruition.

In the month following JFK’s assassination, Foggy Bottom began pushing for another visit to Dimona as the facility approached its full capacity. In an eyes only December 24 message to Rusk, Barbour relayed that Israel preferred the next Dimona visit to commence on Saturday, January 11, when there would be few “workers on site.”⁷¹¹ Foggy Bottom’s efforts in arranging another Dimona visit were viewed as unimportant by the CIA and the new President. At LBJ’s

⁷⁰⁸ On December 17 the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv stated that a “number of” Israeli papers had argued that LBJ “might be more” responsive to Israeli lobbying “with the 1964 elections approaching” than JFK. The report also indicated that Eban had commented in *Davar* that Johnson would probably not “let the State Department have a free hand in the Middle East.” Incoming Telegram from the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv (Stephen Palmer Jr.) to the Department of State, “Subject: U.S.-Israel Relations after Kennedy: An Analysis of the Israeli Press,” December 17, 1963, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Cables, Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, *LBJL*; Lewis L. Gould, “Never a Deep Partisan: Lyndon Johnson and the Democratic Party, 1963-1969,” in *The Johnson Years*, Volume III, ed Robert Divine (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1994), p. 21.

⁷⁰⁹ Eban, *An Autobiography*, p. 355; Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, p. 243.

⁷¹⁰ LBJ also informed President Zalman Shazar, who also accompanied Meir, that U.S. support towards Israel “might be even greater.” Shazar made this comment when he visited the White House in August 1966, adding that he was “one of the first” foreign diplomats LBJ met with after the funeral. Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: Call on President Johnson by Shazar,” August 2, 1966, NSF, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, May 12-June 19, 1967, Volume 12, Appendix R-R1, Box 21, *LBJL*; Golda Meir, *My Life* (London: Futura, 1978), pp. 259-261.

⁷¹¹ Outgoing Telegraph from Rusk to U.S. Embassies in Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Cairo, Syria and Britain, November 25, 1963, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Cables, Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, *LBJL*; Incoming Eyes Only Telegram from Barbour to Rusk, “Subject: Dimona Reactor,” December 24, 1963, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Cables, Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, *LBJL*.

Texas ranch on December 27, McCone decided not to review the Dimona visit with LBJ until “a later agenda.”⁷¹² McCone’s decision to downgrade Dimona was supported by the NSC and LBJ. In a December 30 message to Harriman, Komer stated that the U.S. had “temporarily...won” its “point” on the reactor.⁷¹³ When LBJ cordially wrote Eshkol on January 2, 1964, Dimona omitted as he friendly suggested they meet “face to face in the not too distant future.”⁷¹⁴

Johnson’s decision to publicly meet with Eshkol made it easier for Israel to place debilitating preconditions on the planned U.S. visit to Dimona. On January 6 Rusk informed Barbour that Staebler, the ACDA’s Clyde McClelland and the AMF’s Richard Cook would visit Dimona later in the month. Rusk’s ability to set the visit’s ground rules was non-existent. In a meeting with LBJ on January 8, McCone beamed that he knew the U.S. was sending a “good” team to Dimona because of his “personal relationship with them.”⁷¹⁵ Providing further proof that LBJ was dictating the visit’s terms, the next day Barbour sent a telegraph to the White House warning that the US team should not apply for visas. On January 17 he instructed that the U.S. team, which had arrived a day earlier, should not meet with U.S. Embassy officials.⁷¹⁶

According to an undated and unsigned report, before their January 18 tour Staebler,

⁷¹² In his only mention of Dimona, University of Maryland historian Warren Cohen spuriously claimed Johnson “fought...most of all” to implement IAEA inspections at the facility, while mentioning that in an election year Israel’s U.S. friends proved “inescapable.” Warren Cohen, “Balancing American Interests in the Middle East: Lyndon Baines Johnson vs. Gamal Abdul Nasser,” in *Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World*, ed. Warren I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 279-280, 289, 293; Memorandum for the Record, “Subject: Discussions with President Johnson at the Ranch,” December 27, 1963, *FRUS, 1962-1963*, Volume XVIII: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjfk/xviii/26387.htm> (document 394).

⁷¹³ Memorandum from Komer to Bundy, December 3, 1963, *Ibid*: (document 376); Memorandum from Komer to Governor Harriman, December 30, 1963, NSF, Files of Robert W. Komer, Israel Security, December 1963- March 1966 (1 of 3), Box 31, *LBJL*.

⁷¹⁴ Letter from President Johnson to Prime Minister Eshkol, January 2, 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1968* (Washington: D.C.: GPO, 2000), *Arab Israeli Dispute, 1964-1967*, Volume XVIII: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xviii/a.html (document 1).

⁷¹⁵ Memorandum for the Record by DCI McCone, “Subject: Meeting with the President- 5:30 on 8 January 1964,” *FRUS, 1964-1968*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2001) *National Security Policy*, Volume X: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x/9015.htm> (document 2).

⁷¹⁶ Outgoing Telegram from Rusk to Barbour, January 10, 1964, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Cables, Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, *LBJL*; Incoming Telegram from Barbour to Rusk, “Subject: Dimona Reactor,” January 17, 1964, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Cables, Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, *LBJL*.

McClelland and Cook had an undocumented talk with Webber. Afterwards, they were accompanied to Dimona by Dr. Ephraim Katchalski, Eshkol's Scientific Advisor. He, along with Pratt, accompanied the team for its tour. The U.S. was prevented from accessing "all parts of every building," and curiously, parts of the facility had no power, forcing the U.S. team to utilize provided flashlights. Since many facets of the peaceful "site" remained "classified," cameras were banned due to Israel's fear that photos could "somehow fall into" Nasser's "hands." Pratt also professed that Dimona's total cost was "about" \$60 million, much lower than Ike's December 19, 1960, estimate of \$150-200 million.⁷¹⁷

Twelve days after the visit, another unsigned report addressed to the USIB stipulated that Dimona was "operating at 15-20%" above its alleged capacity of 26 MW. The January 30 report ingenuously concluded that when Dimona "completed," it was "quite likely" Dimona would be fully "declassified."⁷¹⁸ There is a good possibility that the CIA wrote the report. Less than 48 hours later the CIA's Deputy Director General Marshall S. Carter, briefed LBJ on the visit. Two days later Carter, the CIA's USIB delegate since McCone became DCI in November 1961, penned that while there was "little doubt" that Dimona was dedicated towards "research" Israel still could produce a "small" bomb in the "future" if so inclined.⁷¹⁹

Two politically motivated speeches in early 1964 showed that the new White House would continue the U.S.'s six-year bipartisan policy of deception vis-à-vis Dimona. Strangely, any comment of U. Alexis Johnson's January 20 speech at Manhattan's Shorenham Hotel to the

⁷¹⁷ U.S. Inspection Team Report of Visit of Israeli Atomic Energy Installations, January 16-20, 1964, undated and unsigned, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Dimona 1964 # 1, Box 30, *LBJL*

⁷¹⁸ Memorandum for the U.S. Intelligence Board, "Subject: Report on U.S. Inspection Team to Dimona, Israel," January 30, 1964, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Dimona 1964 # 1, Box 30, *LBJL*.

⁷¹⁹ Memorandum from the Department of State's Executive Secretary (Read) to Bundy, "Subject: Need to Reassure President Nasser on the Peaceful Nature of Dimona," February 11, 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Volume XVIII: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xviii/b.html (document 12); Ross and Wise, *The Invisible Government*, p. 198; Wise and Ross, *The Invisible Government*, p. 198.

Conference on Arab Policy is absent from all of the month's primary documentation.⁷²⁰ Finding his fingers in the most esoteric policy pies,⁷²¹ U. Alexis stated that the U.S. was planning no "fundamental" changes towards the Near East, while emphasizing that future policies would be "put to the test" in the "coming months."⁷²² Delivered days after the Arab League had finished talks in Cairo focused on Yemen, the Algerian-Moroccan border dispute, and Egyptian relations with Syria and Jordan, the speech was a deliberate attempt to derail the goodwill which had emerged from the summit.⁷²³ The Arabs were still reacting to this speech when President Johnson delivered another rhetorical bombshell on February 6.⁷²⁴

LBJ's address to the Weizmann Institute of Science was meant solely to boost his re-election chances.⁷²⁵ His Waldorf audience, treated to a \$250 plate dinner, included Feinberg, Harriman, Arthur Hays Sulzberger, the *NYT*'s Board Chairman, and *NYT* President Arthur Ochs

⁷²⁰ With the exception of Kenen, who has argued that the speech to the pro-Arab group demonstrated the U.S.'s "outrageous bias" towards the Arabs, the address has been unanalyzed by any other author. Kenen, *Israel's Defense Line*, pp. 173-174.

⁷²¹ Since he was Foggy Bottom's member on the Special Group, Johnson enjoyed an incredible amount of shadow power during the 1960s. The subterranean faction's Executive Secretary Peter Jessup, responsible for delivering all Committee briefs to LBJ and monitoring CIA covert operations for the NSC, mused to Bundy on May 19, 1964, the within the "Four Horsemen" Johnson was the "second most powerful man in Washington." McCone and Johnson were not the only group members - which also included Gilpatric's lawyer replacement Cyrus Vance- who possessed knowledge of Dimona. Jessup had served as the CIA's Station Chief in Tel Aviv during the early 1960s and again in the early 1970s. Directly due to the release of Wise's and Ross' *The Invisible Government* in early 1964 the Special Group's name was changed to the "303 Committee" in June 1964. Memorandum from Bundy to LBJ, "Subject: Organization of National Security Staff," August 2, 1965, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, (Washington: GPO, 2004), *Organization and Management of Foreign Policy*, Volume XXXIII: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxiii/32651.htm> (document 155); Memorandum from Bundy to Rusk, December 1, 1965, *Ibid*: (document 158); Memorandum from Jessup to Bundy, "Subject: Proposed Name Change for Special Group," May 19, 1964, *Ibid*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxiii/32652.htm> (document 203); NSAM 303, June 2, 1964, *Ibid*: (document 204); Memorandum for the Deputy Director of CI, undated, *Ibid*, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxiii/32677.htm> (document 254); Hersh, *The Samson Option*, pp. 164-166.

⁷²² "No Change Foreseen in Near East Policy," *WP*, January 21, 1964, p. A2; "Test in Mideast Foreseen by U.S.," *NYT*, January 21, 1964, p. 9.

⁷²³ Jay Walz, "Arab Nations Put on Display of Amity in Cairo," *NYT*, January 19, 1964, p. E5.

⁷²⁴ Following Johnson's speech, Cairo's press retorted that the U.S. was not God's exceptional "shadow on earth," adding that Israel owed its existence to American-Jews who possessed access to the benevolent "door of the White House." Jay Walz, "Arabs Deny U.S. is Neutral in Mideast Disputes," *NYT*, January 23, 1964, p. 8.

⁷²⁵ This speech was missed by historian Robert Johnson, a former Humanities Chair at Tel Aviv University, when he contended that LBJ did not make his first "overtly political speech" until February 29, 1964. Robert David Johnson, *All the Way with LBJ: The 1964 Presidential Election* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 13.

Sulzberger.⁷²⁶ LBJ announced that the U.S. and IAEA would utilize “man’s mastery of the atom” to provide Israel with another reactor to ensure the “tiny nation” could produce fresh water for the Negev.⁷²⁷ LBJ’s first public declaration on the Near East did not go unnoticed. Michel Abdul Jawed boomed in Beirut’s *Al Nahar* that “Johnson the Jew” had reconfirmed Arab fears of an Israeli “bomb,” adding that Israel was equal to the “51st” U.S. state.⁷²⁸

In a theme repeated over the upcoming months, Komer’s Machiavellian doublespeak about how the U.S. should approach Dimona after LBJ’s Weizmann address was erratic.⁷²⁹ On February 19 he characterized Dimona as a “minor” issue, a day after asking LBJ to approach Eshkol about assuring Nasser that Dimona was “peaceful.”⁷³⁰ Describing the request as “not urgent,” Komer messaged Bundy five days later to recommend that LBJ employ “his name to ask” Israel to allay Nasser’s fears about Dimona.⁷³¹ Unlike JFK, LBJ was unwilling to personally write Eshkol and instead delegated this job to Foggy Bottom. On February 27 Rusk informed Barbour to press Eshkol to allow the U.S. to placate Nasser about Dimona’s peaceful nature.⁷³²

⁷²⁶ Homer Bigart, “Johnson Pledges Israel Water Aid with Atom Power,” *NYT*, February 7, 1964, p. 1.

⁷²⁷ “Remarks in New York City at the Dinner of the Weizmann Institute,” February 6, 1964, *APP*, *PPUS*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/>.

⁷²⁸ On February 19 Komer explained to LBJ that U.S. relations with the “half-cocked” Arab world were in “deep trouble.” A week later the CIA’s ONE described asserted that the Arabs were even more “hyper-sensitive” about the possibility that Israel was receiving “special favors” from a White House “in an election years.” Describing all U.S. politicians as “pro-Israel until proven otherwise,” the Arabs were fearful that LBJ would represent the “Democratic” party rather than the “late” JFK, who they had generally perceived as “reasonably impartial.” Memorandum from Komer to Johnson, February 18, 1964, NSF, Name File, Komer Memos, Volume 1, 3 of 3, Box 6, *LBJL*; CIA/ONE Memorandum (Sherman Kent), “Subject: Storm Warning Up for US-Arab Relations,” February 25, 1964, NSF, NSAM 290—Meeting Israeli Arms Requests, Box 3, *LBJL*; Dana Adams Schmidt, “Johnson Speech Infuriates Arabs,” *NYT*, February 8, 1964, p. 1; “Arabs Assail Johnson on Water Plan,” *WP*, February 8, 1964, p. C34.

⁷²⁹ In order to keep “wishes and designs” from being “fully ascertained,” one needs to say and do one set of things “one day,” while doing the exact opposite “the next.” Machiavelli, *The Prince*, pp. 63-64.

⁷³⁰ After a conversation with Gazit a week earlier, Komer had supported the specious estimate that Dimona’s total cost was only \$60 million. Memorandum for LBJ from Komer, February 18, 1964, NSF, Name File, Komer Memos, Volume 1, 3 of 3, Box 6, *LBJL*; Memorandum from Komer to Bundy, February 19, 1964 NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Cables, Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, *LBJL*; Memorandum for Record with Minister Gazit, February 12, 1964, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Memos & Misc., Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, *LBJL*.

⁷³¹ Meeting with Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, February 21, 1964, NSF, Files of Robert W. Komer, Israel Security, December 1963-March 1966 (2 of 3), Box 31, *LBJL*.

⁷³² Outgoing Telegram from Rusk to Barbour, February 27, 1964, NSF, Country File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israeli Presidential Correspondence, Box 26, *LBJL*.

Unsurprisingly, Barbour told Rusk five days later that Eshkol believed that the best “deterrent” was to keep Nasser unformed. When Barbour mused that this policy could precipitate an Egyptian “preventive war,” Eshkol responded that Israel was an extremely vulnerable “lamb among 12 or 13 wolves.”⁷³³

Unable and unwilling to stop Israel, the U.S. instead informed Nasser that he would have to soon accept an Israeli bomb as a *fait accompli*. In a message cleared by U. Alexis, Rostow, Komer and Fisher, Rusk informed Badeau on February 29 that Israel “may” obtain the bomb in the “future...”⁷³⁴ Nasser’s reaction was nuanced. In a denying trope, he contended to Talbot on March 4 that Israel lacked the “resources” to acquire the bomb. In their last conversation together, however, after Talbot mentioned that the U.S. goal of placing IAEA safeguards on Dimona was “now at hand,” Nasser annoyingly chimed that he “got the point.”⁷³⁵

A day after the Talbot-Nasser discussion, Komer asked LBJ for the third time to write Eshkol to gain permission for the U.S. to reassure Nasser on Dimona. Employing a defeatist approach lacking both confidence and conviction, Komer admitted that the U.S. “may not succeed” but should “try” anyway.⁷³⁶ This was all a politically focused President needed to

⁷³³ Incoming Telegram from Barbour to Rusk, March 3, 1964, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Cables, Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, *LBJL*; Incoming Telegram from Barbour to Rusk, Section 2 of 3, March 4, 1964, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Cables, Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, *LBJL*.

⁷³⁴ Outgoing Telegram from Rusk to Badeau, February 29, 1964, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Memos & Misc., Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, *LBJL*.

⁷³⁵ In late September 1964 McCloy reported that Nasser had strangely made “no comment” when he “conveyed... assurances” on Dimona’s peaceful nature after another trip to Cairo. McCloy, who was surely aware that in late August the *NYT* had announced that Arabs had met in Alexandria to discuss Israel’s nuclear program, commented that, unlike his visit in June 1963, he “thought” it was very “significant” that Nasser “did not mention” the threat of “pre-emptive war” if Cairo determined that Israel about to obtain the bomb. “Arabs Study Israel A-Arms Potential,” *WP*, August 29, 1964, p. B5; Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: McCloy’s Impressions of His Meeting with President Nasser on September 28,” October 6, 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1967*, Volume XVIII: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xviii/j.html (document 98); Incoming Telegram to Badeau to Rusk, Section Three of Four, March 4, 1964, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Memos & Misc., Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, *LBJL*; Incoming telegram from Badeau to Rusk, Section 4 of 4, March 4, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Memos & Misc., Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, *LBJL*.

⁷³⁶ Memorandum for Johnson from Komer, March 5, 1964, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Memos & Misc., Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, *LBJL*.

justify his non-response. A day after the *WP* revealed that Meir had “denied that Israel was producing nuclear weapons,” Komer informed Bundy on March 7 that LBJ and Feldman had agreed to invite Eshkol to Washington for June 1. Until this time “everything should be kept quiet,” an order which carried over into U.S. policy towards Dimona.⁷³⁷ On March 10, in a memo which had 9-10 lines of the text and two of three attachments censored, Komer informed Bundy that an atomic bomb, regardless its political “problems,” made “sense” for Israel.⁷³⁸

The NSC, CIA and White House desire to classify all Dimona-related information struck at least one person in Foggy Bottom as a recipe for disaster. A day after the first Dimona-related news story of LBJ’s presidency,⁷³⁹ on April 15 Bill Polk warned that Nasser was “confused” by U.S. “tactics” thanks to the two “harsh” and “pro-Israel” Johnson speeches made at the start of “election year.” With incredible accuracy and foresight, Polk, whom Walt Rostow described as the Policy Planning Staff’s Near East “expert,” warned that Nasser might seek a “Cuba-type” deal with the Soviets. Unlike the Cuban crisis when geography had favored the U.S., in this situation the U.S. would “not have all the cards.” For this reason the U.S. should do everything to halt the “arms race before it reached the nuclear stage.”⁷⁴⁰ None were listening. The next day Eshkol wrote LBJ to express his “regret” that the U.S. could not reassure Nasser about Dimona. Rather than pushing LBJ to respond to the “negative reply,” Komer instead assured LBJ that an

⁷³⁷ Memorandum from Komer to Bundy, March 7, 1964, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Memos & Misc., Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, *LBJL*.

⁷³⁸ A March 26 five page CIA intelligence memorandum sent to Tel Aviv and a one page March 31 report sent from Cline to Bundy remain classified in the Johnson Library. Memorandum from Komer to Bundy, March 10, 1964, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israeli Security (Missile Development) and sale of Hawks, 1964-1965-March 1966, Box 132, *LBJL*; Document Withdrawal Sheet, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Cables, Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, *LBJL*.

⁷³⁹ In a *Reuters* wire story published in the *WP*, the Jewish Arye Wallenstein contended that Israel had prevented little to “trickle” out about Dimona, while emphasizing that the facility was dedicated to “industry, agriculture, health, science...” A week later a nameless *NYT* piece mused that the State Department and AEC were “still hopeful” that Israel could be “persuaded” to accept IAEA safeguards. Arye Wallenstein, “Israel Remains Silent on Negev Nuclear Plant,” *WP*, April 13, 1964, p. B6; “Israelis Balking at Atom Checks,” *NYT*, April 19, 1964, p. 5.

⁷⁴⁰ Memorandum for the President by Bill Polk, “Subject: Our Policy toward the UAR,” April 14, 1964 NSF, UAR, Memos 2 of 2, Volume I (11/63-5-64), Box 158, *LBJL*.

Israeli bomb was still “some years off” and advocated having the subject “full staffed out for you.”⁷⁴¹ The NSC concluded on April 28 that there was no evidence that “fortress” Israel was “producing nuclear weapons.”⁷⁴²

A day before Khrushchev arrived in Egypt, Rusk informed Badeau that it was “hard to see how” the U.S. could stop Israel if it “chose to” pursue the bomb “alone” on May 9.⁷⁴³ As someone who had served as a Professor, Dean and President of Cairo’s American University from 1936 to 1953, Badeau’s close ties to Egypt surely made him feel uneasy about passing on disinformation to Nasser concerning Dimona. On May 16 he resigned from his post and utilized his final weeks in Cairo to air his grievances.⁷⁴⁴ On May 28 Ball wrote to “caution” Badeau for informing Nasser on the “unilateral intelligence” resources of the U.S. and U.S.S.R., helping “undercut” U.S. positions at “Geneva” focused on implementing IAEA safeguards on Israel and Egypt.⁷⁴⁵ Since he remained in Cairo for another month, Ball’s message also served to remind JFK’s Ambassador to stay on message during Eshkol’s upcoming visit to U.S.⁷⁴⁶

LBJ understood how the Electoral College system worked. Despite an oblivious media, Eshkol’s travel schedule during his 12 day U.S. tour was carefully arranged. Aside from his 2.5

⁷⁴¹ Letter from Eshkol to Johnson, April 15, 1964, NSF, Country File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israeli Presidential Correspondence, Box 26, *LBJL*; Memorandum for Johnson from Komer, April 16, 1964, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Cables, Volume II (4/64-8/64), Box 138, *LBJL*.

⁷⁴² NSC Standing Group Meeting of April 28, 1964, “Subject: Meeting Israeli Arms Requests (NSAM-290), NSF, NSAM 290—Meeting Israeli Arms Requests, Box 3, *LBJL*.

⁷⁴³ Eyes Only Telegram from Rusk to Badeau, May 9, 1964, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Memos & Misc., Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, *LBJL*; “Soviet Premier Calls on Arabs to Unite Against Colonialism,” *WP*, May 11, 1964, p. A1;

⁷⁴⁴ “U.A.R. Envoy Quits for Teaching Job,” *NYT*, May 17, 1964, p. 43.

⁷⁴⁵ Three days prior to Ball’s message to Badeau, Khrushchev had promised Egypt \$277 million. “Khrushchev Grants Egypt \$277 Million in Parting Gesture,” *WP*, May 25, 1964, p. A1.

⁷⁴⁶ Badeau conducted his “farewell” meeting with Nasser on June 7 and officially resigned on June 29. In the only coverage of the change, on July 9 the *WP* stated in a nameless story that Lucius Battle would replace Badeau, doing so sometime in September. Deputy Director Helms could have been referring to Badeau when he penned in October 1965 that he could only recall “one instance” when there existed a “difference of opinion” between an Ambassador and the White House during his tenure in government. Telegram from the Embassy in the UAR to the State Department, June 8, 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1967*, Volume XVIII: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xviii/h.html (document 71); Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: U.S.-U.A.R. Relations,” June 29, 1964, *Ibid*: (document 74); “May Be Named,” *WP*, July 9, 1964, p. A17; Presented by Richard Helms, October 4, 1965, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Volume XXXIII: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxxi/ii/32677.htm> (document 237).

days in Washington, two days in Los Angeles and four days in New York, Eshkol spent a day in Philadelphia, toured NASA facilities at Cape Kennedy, visited Texas and received an honorary degree from Chicago's Roosevelt University.⁷⁴⁷ These five states represented 170 of the 270 Electoral College votes in 1964.⁷⁴⁸ Upon arriving in Philadelphia, the *NYT* reported that Eshkol's trip, the first *public* visit by an Israeli Prime Minister to the U.S., was just a part of the U.S.'s continued "support for Israel in the face of persistent Arab pressure."⁷⁴⁹ A day later the *WP* only admitted that there was always a "traditional scramble ...for the Jewish vote."⁷⁵⁰ In a sign that Moscow noticed the political pandering, the Soviet UN Ambassador, Nikolai Fedorenko, boycotted a June 4 UN-hosted Waldorf luncheon awarding Eshkol a key to the City.⁷⁵¹

On June 1 Eshkol flew by helicopter to the White House and was greeted with a 19-gun salute on the south lawn.⁷⁵² Inside the Oval Office, Eshkol and LBJ were initially joined by Harman, Komer and Feldman. LBJ began by proclaiming that "as long" as he occupied the White House "Mr. Feldman," who drafted protocol for the U.S., would continue to serve as his "Prime Minister" on Israel. Turning to Dimona, Johnson espoused that if Israel public announcements were true, there was no reason "why" Eshkol could not "accept IAEA controls" and allow the U.S. to placate Egypt about Dimona. Assuring his guest that he was not being "naïve" about Nasser, LBJ expressed concern that Nasser could move "too far towards the Russians." Eshkol responded that Israel could not allow the "enemy" to be informed of

⁷⁴⁷ Hendrick Smith, "Eshkol to Begin U.S. Visit Today," *NYT*, May 31, 1964, p. 5; Outgoing State Department Circular Telegram to France, Germany, Israel, Jordan, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Britain, June 26, 1964, NSF, Country File, Israel, Eshkol Visit, (6/1-3/64), Box 143, *LBIL*.

⁷⁴⁸ George Tindall and David Shi, *America: A Narrative History* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), p. 1344.

⁷⁴⁹ Hendrick Smith, "Eshkol to Begin U.S. Visit Today," *NYT*, May 31, 1964, p. 5.

⁷⁵⁰ Dan Kurzman, "Israeli Premier Arrives Here Today," *WP*, June 1, 1964, p. A15.

⁷⁵¹ In New York Eshkol commented that Israel was content within its "present frontiers," while informing Feinberg and the IBO at the Waldorf that Israel was harvesting "the...fruits of" the "atomic age." Spiegel, "Israeli Premier Greeted by City," *NYT*, June 5, 1964, p. 36; "Israeli Expansionism is Denied by Eshkol," *NYT*, June 6, 1964, p. 3; Spiegel, "Eshkol Outlines Israel's Needs," June 7, 1964, p. 83.

⁷⁵² Hendrick Smith, "Johnson Hails Eshkol and Calls for Mideast Peace," *NYT*, June 2, 1964, p. 1.

Dimona's "real situation." Peres and Harriman then appeared just as LBJ and Eshkol had broadly concluded that there would be "mutual assistance" and sharing in "intelligence" realms.

Harriman chimed that this sounded like "an excellent idea," and the President conceded "a good beginning" had been forged.⁷⁵³ Less is known about LBJ's and Eshkol's second meeting later in the day. There is no record of the meeting and for the first 10-15 minutes LBJ and Eshkol met privately before being joined by Feldman, Harriman, Talbot, Komer, Harman, Gazit, Peres, Kolleck and Yahil. In front of both delegations as the meeting was concluding, Komer asked LBJ if he had convinced Eshkol to allow the U.S. to reassure Nasser about Dimona and place the reactor under the IAEA. LBJ laconically responded, "No, there was no agreement on that."⁷⁵⁴

The two LBJ-Eshkol meetings covered little compared to the others discussions held between both sides. In a June 3 gathering including Barbour, Peres conceded to Talbot that, because of LBJ's "strong feeling," Eshkol agreed to allow Washington to pass on "information to Nasser." But in a crucial "reservation," there still could be "no mention of the U.S. visits to the installation."⁷⁵⁵ On June 9 Peres and Seaborg agreed to allow the AEC, with "no objections" from State, to lease of 2500 kilograms of uranium to Israel's Technion in late July.⁷⁵⁶ Two anonymous stories published in the final days of the Eshkol's tour, indicated that the U.S. was interested in demonstrating to Eshkol's domestic rivals⁷⁵⁷ that Israel would not surrender its

⁷⁵³ Memorandum of Conversation, "Subject: Johnson/Eshkol Exchange of Visits," June 1, 1964, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Cables, Volume II (4/64-8/64), Box 138, *LBJL*.

⁷⁵⁴ Shalom has contended Komer, wanting LBJ to take off the "kid gloves," told Harman that Eshkol "was a better salesman" because he got "everything he wanted" without conceding an inch. Shalom, *Israel's Nuclear Option*, pp. 191-192; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 205.

⁷⁵⁵ Reassurances to Nasser on Dimona Reactor, June 3, 1964, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Dimona 1964 # 1, Box 30, *LBJL*.

⁷⁵⁶ Memorandum for Bundy from Read, "Subject: Joint Communiqué on U.S.-Israeli Desalting Program," June 9, 1964, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Cables, Volume II (4/64-8/64), Box 138, *LBJL*; Memorandum from Glenn T. Seaborg to Bundy, July 24, 1964, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Nuclear Energy Program, 1964-1965- March 1966, Box 30, *LBJL*.

⁷⁵⁷ Sourcing from a June 9 Israeli document drafted by Gazit, Shalom has contended that sometime during the week, possibly before they intervened in the first LBJ-Eshkol meeting, Peres and Harriman met alone. Informing his guest that they were both "politicians," Harriman declared that LBJ, with ambitions to remain in the White House "for

sovereignty over Dimona.⁷⁵⁸ Aside from the AEC's decision to provide Israel more uranium, Dimona largely disappeared following Eshkol's visit until events in Asia brought the issue back to the forefront in mid-August.⁷⁵⁹

A week removed from the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, on August 14 the Committee of Principles declared that a Chinese atomic test would precipitate a "political and psychological" defeat for the U.S.⁷⁶⁰ This fear of a Chinese bomb illustrates that during the Cold War, especially before the Six Day War, South East Asia represented the paramount region of importance to U.S. interests; with the Near East region only a growing secondary concern. In May the ACDA argued that the Near East's "urgent nuclear problems" paled in comparison to those presented by China.⁷⁶¹ In the domino effect thinking prevalent in Washington at the time, Dimona emerged as a strategic counter to the inevitable paradigm shift in Asia resulting from a Chinese test. Another Committee of Principals study aloofly concluded on August 14 that the U.S. would "continue" to employ an "on going program" to deal with Dimona.⁷⁶² Five days later the AEC extended its civil agreement with the IAEA into April 1965.⁷⁶³ Following China's first atomic test on October 16, nuclear proliferation emerged as a major issue for the White House

another eight years," was interested in keeping Eshkol in power as well. Peres accurately responded that the U.S. could assume that Eshkol would remain in power for "another five years," Harriman affirmed that LBJ's "special attitude" towards Israel was "plain and clear." Shalom, *Israel's Nuclear Option*, pp. 92-93, 195n47, 49.

⁷⁵⁸ One June 9 the *NYT* reported that IAEA controls and safeguards would not be extended to Israel's "experimental power reactor" being built with "French assistance in the Negev and two days later the paper of record mused that Eshkol had declared that Israel "must maintain deterrent military strength to discourage its enemies." "Israel Will Accept Atom Control Shift," *NYT*, June 9, 1964, p. 6; "Eshkol Defends Deterrent," *NYT*, June 11, 1964, p. 10.

⁷⁵⁹ On July 7 the Air Force Attaché in Tel Aviv informed the Pentagon that the "complete exodus" of French corporate employees and their families would be complete by July. Incoming Telegram from the U.S. Air Force Attaché in Tel Aviv to the Pentagon, "Subject: Dimona Atomic Reactor," July 7, 1964, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Cables, Volume II (4/64-8/64), Box 138, *LBJL*.

⁷⁶⁰ Draft U.S. Position Paper Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, August 14, 1964, NSF, Subject File, Disarmament, Committee of Principles, Volume I (1/15/64-1/15/65), Box 13, *LBJL*.

⁷⁶¹ ACDA, Draft U.S. Position Paper, "Subject: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Agreement," May 19, 1964, NSF, Subject File, Disarmament, Volume I, (1 of 2), Box 10, *LBJL*.

⁷⁶² Draft Positions Paper, August 14, 1964, "Subject: Non Proliferation," August 14, 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XI*: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xi/e.html (Document 44).

⁷⁶³ Memorandum from Read to Bundy, "Subject: Agreement for Cooperation in the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy," March 9, 1965, NSF, Subject File, Agreements for Cooperation, Volume I, Box 34, *LBJL*.

for the first time.

The *NYT* and IC responded on a classified case-by-case basis. Compared to Belgium, Canada, West Germany, India, Sweden and Switzerland, on October 18 Hanson Baldwin predicated that “most authorities” conceded that the chances Israel *and* Egypt could “perhaps” develop the bomb by decade’s end were much lower.⁷⁶⁴ Censoring all but one reference to Israel’s atomic weapons program, roughly seven pages in total, the CIA produced NIE 4-2-64 on October 21. Like Baldwin, the report concluded only that Israel, Sweden and now India could “perhaps” obtain the bomb by 1970.⁷⁶⁵ On October 29 Talbot honestly admitted that Dimona did not constitute an “election issue.”⁷⁶⁶ A day later Rusk informed Barbour “not” to “raise” any request for another visit to Dimona until after LBJ’s campaign against Barry Goldwater.⁷⁶⁷

After his crushing electoral victory, LBJ possessed the political capital to act upon the small steps he had taken before the election to address nuclear proliferation. On October 29 Bundy had informed Ball that the White House sought “a higher level” examination of the subject free from the “interhouse machinery.” In short, public tax dollars would fund a private task force. After being informed that LBJ had mentioned Gilpatric to head the study, Ball responded that this would be an “excellent” pick.⁷⁶⁸ On November 23 LBJ wrote to Allen Dulles, fresh off his Warren Commission service, to ask him to help “reduce the danger of

⁷⁶⁴ Hanson W. Baldwin, “China’s Bomb: Grave Problems Posed for West,” *NYT*, October 18, 1964, E3.

⁷⁶⁵ DCI, NIE 4-2-64, “Prospects for a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons over the Next Decade,” October 21, 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Volume X; <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x/9015.htm> (document 57).

⁷⁶⁶ Memorandum from Talbot to Rodger P. Davies, “Subject: Dangers of Delaying Israel’s Request to Defer Dimona Inspection,” October 29, 1964, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Dimona 1964 # 1, Box 30, *LBJL*.

⁷⁶⁷ Outgoing Telegram from Rusk To Barbour, October 30, 1964, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Cables (1 of 2), Volume III (9/64-2/65), Box 139, *LBJL*.

⁷⁶⁸ Hal Brands, currently a Ph. D. candidate in history at Yale, has pointed out that Gilpatric was influential in shaping the group’s final report, while Dulles added “respectability and prestige.” Hal Brands, “Rethinking Nonproliferation: LBJ, the Gilpatric Committee, and U.S. National Security Policy,” *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 8, 2 (Spring 2006), p. 91n27; Editorial Note, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Volume XI: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xi/e.html (document 49).

nuclear war” by joining the Gilpatric Committee.⁷⁶⁹ The interests of Wall Street, state-guided scientists, big business and academia would be represented in the private faction. Alongside Dulles, other lawyers included McCloy and Arthur Dean. Harvard’s George Kistiakowsky and Berkley’s Herbert York comprised the group’s science and technology core, beside Hitler’s favorite capitalist, IBM Chairman Thomas Watson.⁷⁷⁰ Former NATO Supreme Commander Alfred Greuthner, Cornell President James Perkins and William Webster, President of the New England Electric System, rounded out the group. Many in the committee had an intimate knowledge of Dimona as DCI Dulles had admitted that factions of the IC had aided Dimona, while Gilpatric and McCloy were key players in the previous White House. Kistiakowsky,⁷⁷¹ a Manhattan Project physicist, and York were also members of the ACDA’s General Advisory Group on Disarmament headed by McCloy, which included Rabi.⁷⁷² Lawyers ask the wrong questions when they do not want the right answers.

The product is a reflection of the process and the personnel involved in it. At the expense of Foggy Bottom, the Committee was also given a staff responsible for researching and drafting pertinent documents. The Staff director was scientist Spurgeon Keeny Jr., a Committee of

⁷⁶⁹ Letter from Johnson to Allen Dulles, November 23, 1964, NSF, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation: Alternative Courses of Action, Appointment Letters and Responses, Box 4, *LBJL*.

⁷⁷⁰ Germany became the largest customer for IBM after Hitler’s rise to power. Utilizing punch cards, the forerunners for storing information before computers, the Nazis were able to run trains from the ghettos to the concentration camps with greater efficiency and speed. The inhuman brandings first placed on the inmates of Auschwitz (001), was an IBM code number. Edwin Black, *Nazi Nexus: American’s Corporate Connections to Hitler’s Holocaust* (Washington, D.C.: Dialog Press, 2009), pp. 129, 130, 134, 141-143, 159, 160.

⁷⁷¹ Kistiakowsky could have had some knowledge of Dimona during his tenure as PSAC Chair under Ike beginning in the late 1959. Herken has pointed out that in early 1960 Bissell briefed him on the U-2 program but gave no indication about how detailed or how far back this briefing entailed. Herken, *Cardinal Choices*, pp. 118, 120.

⁷⁷² On December 9 Rabbi attended the \$350 a plate dinner for the 20th anniversary of the Weizmann Institute at the Americana Hotel. Other guests included the institution’s president, Sir Isaac Wolfson, a contributor to Feinberg’s financial campaign and Eban. Of the 80 members of the U.S. Weizmann Committee, headed by Feinberg, 50 were New York industrialists and businessmen. Philip H. Dougherty, “Israel Institute Hails its Builder,” *NYT*, December 10, 1964, p. 95; Memorandum from Rusk to LBJ, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Volume XI: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xi/o.html (document 149); Doel and Needell, “Science, Scientists and the CIA,” p. 68.

Principles member and part of the NSC's Science and Technology Office since 1958.⁷⁷³ Charles Johnson and lawyer Steven Rivkin also joined Keeny from the NSC.⁷⁷⁴ Special ACDA Assistant George Rathjens and the Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Murray accompanied Foggy Bottom's sole member, Raymond Garthoff, to round out the staff.⁷⁷⁵ In a heavily censored document, Garthoff, who had previously worked in the CIA's ONE (1957-1961) and Rand Corporation (1950-1957), predicted on page 17 of an undated paper that Israel could "detonate" a bomb within "two or three years."⁷⁷⁶ To prevent this outcome the U.S. should give Israel a "formal security guarantee," a suggestion tacitly supported by Gilpatric in a Rivkin-drafted paper dated December 15, which argued against any "explicit... guarantee."⁷⁷⁷ Garthoff,

⁷⁷³ Mentioned earlier, the Committee of Principles was created by Eisenhower sometime in July or August 1958 to prepare the U.S. for its first negotiations at Geneva focused on forging a test ban treaty. The Cabinet level group originally consisted of the Secretaries of State and Defense, DCI, AEC head, and the President's Science Advisor (PSAC), James Killian. Killian has revealed that while Farley advised Dulles and then Herter, he was helped by Keeny, who was of "great assistance" to him and later to Bundy at the NSC. In a letter to Rusk on December 1, 1965, Bundy revealed that Keeny, appointed in 1977 as Deputy Director of the ACDA, possessed an elaborate "circle of trusted colleagues in every department." This gave him access to "tricky" intelligence sometimes even before the highest levels of the CIA and Pentagon. Memorandum from Bundy to Rusk, December 1, 1965, *FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XXXIII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxxiii/32651.htm> (document 158); James R. Killian, Jr., *Sputnik, Scientists and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977), pp. 108, 159-160.

⁷⁷⁴ "Marian Osterwies Is Married to Steven R. Rivkin, A Lawyer," *NYT*, June 15, 1968, p. 27.

⁷⁷⁵ President's Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation, NSF, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Chronological File (2 of 2), Volume I, Box 5, *LBJL*.

⁷⁷⁶ The government's censorship and compartmentalization of information have been two techniques used to prevent a more lucid picture of the Committee's work, whose documentation was mostly declassified in 1996. In its first meeting on December 1 nearly a quarter of a page focused on an "intelligence briefing" was blacked out. University of Texas historian Francis Gavin has revealed that some of the Committee's files also located at the *JFK* Library. I did not know this when I traveled to Boston. In the interests of transparency and consistency, NARA should place the complete record in both the *JFK* and *LBJ* Libraries or solely in the latter. Garthoff, *A Journey Through the Cold War*, p. 194; Problem 2: Background Paper on Factors Which Could Influence National Decisions re: Garthoff), NSF, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, MLF, Box 1, *LBJL*; Committee on Nuclear Proliferation Minutes of Discussion, First Meeting, Room 303, Executive Meeting, December 1, 1964, NSF, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Chronological File (1 of 2), Volume I, Box 5, *LBJL*; Francis Gavin, "Blasts from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s," *International Security* 29, 3 (Winter 2004/2005), pp. 100, 109n27, 110, n28-31, 111n32-34, 112, n35-37, 113n38-39; Garthoff, *A Journey Through the Cold War*, p. xii, xiii, 194.

⁷⁷⁷ On January 5 the U.S. and Israel planted the seeds for such a secret security agreement when Eban informed Rusk that a "high level-meeting" in March 1965 be arranged between both sides. Outgoing Telegram from Rusk to Barbour, January 5, 1965, NSF, Country File, Israel, Cables (2 of 2), Volume III (9/64-2/65), Box 139, *LBJL*; Problem 2: Background Paper on Factors Which could Influence National Decisions re: Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons (Garthoff), NSF, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, MFL, Box 1, *LBJL*; Four Alternatives to Nuclear Proliferation by S.R. Rivkin, NSF, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Chronological File (1 of 2), Volume I, Box 5, *LBJL*; Brands, "Rethinking Nonproliferation," pp. 95-96.

however, made no mention of Israel at the Committee's December 13-14 meeting, also attended by Rostow.⁷⁷⁸ The former OSS member assured everyone that while Dimona did not threaten U.S. global "influence," it still required "special handling." In a report written for the Committee's first meeting, Rostow had argued that Israel required a "reserve deterrent" in case of a "desperate confrontation with Cairo."⁷⁷⁹ As usual, Foggy Bottom went along to get along. Joined by Ball, Garthoff, and Keeny, in Rusk's only Committee appearance on January 7 he made no reference to Dimona in a meeting mainly focused on Asia and Europe.⁷⁸⁰

The higher priority placed on halting nuclear proliferation elsewhere provided a convenient smokescreen for the U.S. to hide Dimona's existence. In an unsigned December 10 ACDA memorandum focused on the possibility of a NPT, the study dedicated three and a half pages to the nuclear programs of China, India and West Germany but just eleven lines towards Israel's.⁷⁸¹ In a section of NIE 4-2-1964, inadvertently declassified for the Committee, it was fraudulently argued that Israel's program was "less advanced than India's."⁷⁸² Another way the

⁷⁷⁸ Committee on Nuclear Proliferation Minutes of Nuclear Proliferation, Second Meeting, December 13-14, 1964, Executive Office Building, NSF, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Chronological File (1 of 2), Volume I, Box 5, *LBJL*; Wise and Ross, *The Invisible Government*, p. 244.

⁷⁷⁹ A Way of Thinking about Nuclear Proliferation by W.W. Rostow, November 19, 1964, NSF, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, File Copy, First Meeting, December 1, 1964, Box, *LBJL*; Summary of Statement made Before Gilpatric Committee by Walt Rostow, December 13, 1964, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation: Alternative Courses of Action, Briefing, Box 4, *LBJL*.

⁷⁸⁰ A day earlier Barbour informed Rusk that the U.S. would be allowed to visit again Dimona at month's end, emphasizing that the U.S. team "should not...apply for Israeli visas." One day before this was arranged, McNamara had briefed the Committee without any reference to Dimona. Incoming Telegram from Barbour to Rusk, January 6, 1965, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Dimona 1964 # 1, Box 30, *LBJL*; Minutes of Briefing by Secretary McNamara of Issues Related to Proliferation, January 5, 1965, NSF, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Minutes of Meeting, Box 9, *LBJL*; Memorandum of Conversation, "Subject: Secretary's Meeting with the Gilpatric Committee," January 7, 1965, NSF, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Minutes of Meetings, Box 9, *LBJL*.

⁷⁸¹ The report also indicated that Israel "could probably be persuaded to the sign" any such "treaty." Proof that the U.S. was covering up Dimona's true intentions, on the same day a CORONA satellite photographed Dimona from the heavens in Appendix B. Background Paper on National Attitudes towards Adherence to a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and to a Non-Proliferation Agreement, NSF; Memorandum on Nuclear Weapons Programs Around the World, December 3, 1964, NSF, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, NIE 4-2-64—Prospects for a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Over the Next Decade, Box 6, *LBJL*; "Declassified Corona Imagery of Dimona," Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/israel/dimona_corona.htm.

⁷⁸² Memorandum on Nuclear Weapons Programs Around the World, December 3, 1964, NSF, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, NIE 4-2-64, Box 6, *LBJL*.

Committee ignored Dimona was the familiar strategy of perceiving the Near East Arms race to involve both Israel and Egypt. On December 7 Robert Murray warned on December 7 that Nasser, along with all the “Sukarnos and Ben Bellas” plaguing the globe, would soon possess the “capability of destroying tens of millions of American lives.”⁷⁸³

Less than twenty-four hours after LBJ’s inaugural address, the entire Committee, along with Rusk, McNamara, Seaborg, McCone, Foster, Ball and Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, presented the final report to LBJ at 1:00 p.m. on January 21, 1965.⁷⁸⁴ The report, drafted mainly by Keeny, advocated that the U.S. “directly” engage those “individual nations” pursuing the bomb. Israel, however, was still defined as a “non-nuclear power.”⁷⁸⁵ According to York, the “sour” LBJ only sarcastically thanked the Committee for “taking time off from the golf course.”⁷⁸⁶ More than anything else, he desired for the Committee to keep its findings quiet. Attached to the report was a Bundy-scripted note stating that no information was to be disseminated outside the Committee of Principles without the President’s “direct approval...”⁷⁸⁷

The White House’s desire for secrecy foreshadowed its efforts to reach an executive agreement with Israel over Dimona. Following the fourth fruitless U.S. tour of Dimona on January 30, on February 10 Ball informed Barbour that Komer would soon be sent to Israel for a

⁷⁸³ Gavin and Brands both failed to debunk this manufactured perception in their respective analysis. Beginning with the former who derived the funding for his article from the Johnson Library, Gavin utilized an anonymous *JFK* Library document to contend that Israel would be harshly treated “if they sought a nuclear capability.” In a more extensive yet inconsistent examination, Brands’ generalization that “proliferation anywhere” threatened “U.S. policy everywhere” did not apply to Israel. He admitted that all U.S. “efforts” to stop Israel from obtaining the bomb “were... half-hearted” and even cited Hersh to contend that the U.S. had in covertly “aided the Israeli program.” Gavin, “Blasts from the Past,” pp. 100, 110; Brands, “Rethinking Proliferation,” pp. 88- 89, 109n91; Problems of Nuclear Proliferation Outside Europe Problem 2 written by Robert Murray, December 7, 1964, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Chronological File (1 of 2) Volume I, Box 5, *LBJL*.

⁷⁸⁴ Editorial Note, *FRUS 1964-1968*, Volume XI: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xi/g.html (document 63).

⁷⁸⁵ Report by the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, January 21, 1965, *Ibid*: (document 64).

⁷⁸⁶ Herbert York, *Making Weapons, Talking Peace* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1987), p. 230.

⁷⁸⁷ Report by the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, January 21, 1965, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Volume XI: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xi/g.html (document 64).

round of talks centered on the reactor.⁷⁸⁸ Ten days later the *NYT* reported that Eban had arrived in New York and would soon travel to Washington for unstated reasons.⁷⁸⁹ A day later LBJ wrote to Komer and Harriman, who would also make the trip, that if Israel agreed to a “written ...pledge” not to “develop nuclear weapons” he would not “insist on” implementing IAEA safeguards.⁷⁹⁰ With the purpose of their trip unknown to the media, Harriman and Komer arrived in Israel on February 25.⁷⁹¹

Without LBJ’s support, the attempts by Komer and Harriman to implement IAEA safeguards on Dimona went nowhere. When Harriman reminded Eshkol that he had said that Israel would accept IAEA safeguards, the latter retorted he “was just talking” before espousing that Nasser was “working” with “India on nuclear weapons.” Israel would only “foreswear the nuclear option” if it first join NATO or sign a publicized “security pact” with the U.S.⁷⁹² In a meeting the same day with Eshkol, Meir, Rabin, Harriman, Komer and Bundy, Peres offered the familiar statement that “Israel would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the

⁷⁸⁸ Understanding who created Israel’s atomic policy, Ball also informed Tel Aviv that Komer did “not want to spend a lot of time” with the Israeli Foreign Ministry. Outgoing Telegram from Ball to Barbour, February 10, 1965, NSF, Country File, Israel, Cables (2 of 2), Volume III (9/64-2/65), Box 139, *LBJL*.

⁷⁸⁹ Although there is no documentation available of Eban’s talks with U.S. officials, on March 7 he informed *NBC*’s Meet the Press that there was “nothing secretive about” Dimona. AEC, Memorandum from Howard C. Brown, Jr., Assistant General Manager for Administration, to Charles Johnson, April 19, 1965, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Dimona 1964 # 1, Box 30, *LBJL*; “Eban Arrives for U.S. Visit,” *NYT*, February 20, 1965, p. 9.

⁷⁹⁰ Memorandum for Governor Harriman and Komer from Johnson, February 21, 1965, NSF, Country File, Memos & Misc. (2 of 2), Volume IV (2/65-11/65), Box 139, *LBJL*.

⁷⁹¹ On February 23 an anonymous *NYT* article contended that Harriman would travel to Israel to discuss only West Germany’s recent decision to cancel the rest of its secret tank deal to Israel. On the same day Barbour informed Rusk and the White House that the *NYT*’s Granger Blair had told him *Reuters* and the *AP* were carrying the story on Harriman’s “visit,” while pointing out that the *AP* was threatening to sue Israel from preventing them from releasing the story. A day later Blair reported on Harriman’s mission to Israel without mentioning Dimona. “Harriman Going to Israel,” *NYT*, February 23, 1965, p. 7; Incoming Telegram from Barbour to Rusk, February 23, 1965, NSF, Country File, Israel, Cables (2 of 3), Volume IV (2/65-11/65), Box 139, *LBJL*; W. Granger Blair, “Harriman to See Israelis Today on Diplomatic Snarl in Mideast,” *NYT*, February 24, 1965, p. 4.

⁷⁹² The text of this meeting was only disseminated to the rest of the U.S. government on March 1. Copies were sent to the White House, CIA and the U.S. Embassies in Tel Aviv, Amman and Cairo, meaning that Rusk and Foggy Bottom were never directly informed of its content. Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: Harriman Mission- The Nuclear Question,” March 1, 1965, NSF, Country File, Israel, 1965-1968, Volume XII (2 of 2), Box 143, *LBJL*; Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: Harriman Mission- The Nuclear Question,” February 27, 1965, NSF, Country File, Israel, Memos & Misc. (1 of 2), Volume IV (2/65-11/65), Box 139, *LBJL*.

Middle East.”⁷⁹³ A day after Harriman left Israel, the NSC’s Hal Saunders informed Bundy on March 2 that Harriman believed that Israel possessed “no intent to go nuclear.” Realistically, this was the “best deal” the U.S. could hope to get at any time.⁷⁹⁴

On March 10, 1965, Eshkol, Barbour and Komer signed the first written agreement between the U.S. and Israel focused on Dimona.⁷⁹⁵ The executive agreement⁷⁹⁶ formally turned Peres’ words into policy, proclaiming that Israel would “not be the first” nation to “introduce nuclear weapons into” the Near East. Denying the obvious reality that Israel could utilize “combat aircraft” to deliver the bomb, the written accord hinted that Israel could soon be able to receive “U.S.” planes. In the future both states would maintain “full secrecy” until they jointly agreed on “how” to declassify information and “when” to do so. In a reticent reference to the Arabs and Soviets, any “premature publicity” could constitute “serious complications” for U.S.

⁷⁹³ The next day both the *NYT* and *WP* reported that Harriman and Komer’s discussions with Israeli officials had been clouded in a “news blackout.” Again the media erroneously portrayed the catalyst for the talks to derive from West German arms sale to Israel and Israel’s diversion of the Jordan River. “Harriman Continues Talks,” *NYT*, February 28, 1965, p. 3; Terence Lyons, “Harriman’s Israel Talks Kept Secret,” *WP*, February 28, 1965, p. A28; Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: Harriman Mission to Israel,” February 27, 1965, NSF, Country File, Israel, Memos & Misc. (1 of 2), Volume IV (2/65-11/65), Box 139, *LBJL*.

⁷⁹⁴ Memorandum from Hal Saunders to McGeorge Bundy, March 2, 1965, NSF, Country File, Israel, Harriman Mission, 2 of 3 (2/65-3/65) Box 145, *LBJL*;

⁷⁹⁵ Nearly 33 years passed before the U.S. and Israel would again commit their atomic relationship to paper. *Ha’aretz* diplomatic correspondent Aluf Benn has argued that in an appendix to the 1998 Wye River Agreement Bill Clinton secretly promised in writing to Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu that Israel’s nuclear capabilities would be maintained if it continued its policy of “ambiguity.” On February 22, 2000, IAEC head Gideon Frank and Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson signed a “letter of intent” whose mandate was to expand “cooperative technical activities to promote nonproliferation, arms control and regional security.” Foggy Bottom prepared a short press conference sometime in “early 2000,” announcing that the agreement solidified the “global goals” of both nations. Any questions about Dimona were replied unequivocally with “No comment.” Benn concluded that “no classified information” was exchanged between both sides even though that key U.S. envoy for the deal, Undersecretary of Energy John Gordon, had served as CIA Deputy Director from 1997 to 2000 under DCI George Tenet. Aluf Benn, “Quiet Cooperation,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 57, 6 (November-December 2001), pp. 15-18; Aluf Benn, “A President’s Promise: Israel Can Keep Its Nukes,” *Ha’aretz*, March 14, 2000, <http://www.serve.com/vanunu/nukes/20000314haaretz.html>; Jeff Gerth, “New CIA Chief Picks Veteran Staff,” *NYT*, July 22, 1997, p. A12.

⁷⁹⁶ Schlesinger has described the executive agreement as “one of the mysteries of the constitutional order,” which is just one more way the President can secretly circumvent the Congress in the realm of foreign affairs. Unaware of this MOU, he concluded that the U.S. has provided an “indestructible commitment” to Israel without the pretense of a treaty, which is required under the Constitution to be advised and consented by the Senate, or an executive agreement. Schlesinger, *The Imperial Presidency*, pp. 93, 199.

“relations with other states in the area.”⁷⁹⁷ Komer certainly understood the transformative nature of the MOU. In front of Eshkol, Meir, Harman and Barbour, he professed that Israel had just become a “very large nation in terms of oomph.”⁷⁹⁸ At a time in which the U.S. was now fully demonstrating its own oomph in Vietnam, Washington’s policy about reassuring the Arabs about Dimona was ending.

On April 6 Ball informed Battle that Egypt’s Ambassador’s in Washington, Mustafa Kamel, had asked Foggy Bottom for “details” on Dimona’s “potential for producing nuclear weapons.” Kamel was told that due to its “delicate” relationship with Israel, U.S. intelligence on this “subject” could not be disclosed to Cairo. In a two and a half hour conversation with Nasser on April 18, Talbot assured Nasser that the U.S. viewed proliferation as a “global problem” and was not pursuing a separate agenda “with Israel.”⁷⁹⁹ The message coming out of Tel Aviv was as equally dishonest. Under the signature of William Dale rather than Barbour, Webber fatuously contended on April 21 that Dimona, valued at \$60 million estimate and still lacking a chemical separation plant, was still “firmly” dedicated to “peaceful purposes.”⁸⁰⁰

On the same day Peres departed Mapai for Rafi, LBJ wrote to Eshkol on May 21 that the U.S. would not desire another Dimona tour until after Israel’s November election.⁸⁰¹ Even

⁷⁹⁷ Incoming Telegram from Barbour to Rusk, March 10, 1965, NSF, Country File, Israel, Harriman Mission, 2 of 3, (2/65-3/65), Box 145, *LBJL*.

⁷⁹⁸ Memorandum of Conversation, March 10, 1965, NSF, Country File, Israel, Memos & Misc. (1 of 2), Volume IV (2/65-11/65), Box 139, *LBJL*.

⁷⁹⁹ Two days later Komer informed Bundy that the U.S. was winning its “battle with Nasser” and needed to “keep” the situation in the Near East “quiet” when it was already in “trouble in Vietnam.” Outgoing Telegram from Ball to Battle, “Subject: Background Paper for Talbot Conversation with UAR Officials,” April 6, 1965, NSF, Country File, UAR, Cables 2 of 2, Volume III (11/64-6/65), Box 159, *LBJL*; Memorandum from Komer to Bundy, April 20, 1965, NSF, Country File, UAR, Memos 1 of 2, Volume III (11/64-6/65), Box 159, *LBJL*; Incoming Telegram from Battle to Rusk, April 18, 1965, NSF, Country File, UAR, Cables 1 of 2, Volume III (11/64-6/65), Box 159, *LBJL*.

⁸⁰⁰ Dale informed Cohen that Barbour had informed him that it was “time” for “the embassy to write such a report,” adding such an undertaking could not have been done without Barbour’s permission. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 395n59; Incoming Airgram from Charge d’Affaires, William Dale, to the State Department, “Subject: Current Status of the Dimona Reactor,” April 9, 1965, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Dimona 1964 # 1, Box 30, *LBJL*.

⁸⁰¹ A day before penning the letter LBJ met with Feinberg and was reminded that the U.S. should provide Israel with the A-4 Skyhawk planes in order increase Democratic chances during the 1966 elections. Feinberg, who a month

though he conceded that Dimona could precipitate a preemptive attack by Nasser or turn Egypt into a “Cuba” like proxy for Moscow, it was only after this time Israel should “consider” IAEA safeguards on Dimona.⁸⁰² No one in the White House appeared bothered by the fact that it took Eshkol a month and a half to negatively respond to the request, with Komer noting to Bundy on May 26 that Dimona was only a “minor” concern.⁸⁰³ Until Robert Kennedy made his first major speech of his Senate career on June 23, Dimona disappeared entirely from the paper flow.

Based on inside knowledge, RFK professed that White House should utilize the Gilpatric Committee to implement a nuclear non-proliferation treaty before nations like “Israel and India” could develop the bomb, possibly within a “few months.”⁸⁰⁴ Invoking JFK’s name on several occasions, RFK declared that the “most vital issue” facing the globe was not Vietnam or Berlin but “nuclear proliferation.”⁸⁰⁵ Infuriated, LBJ informed Bundy that even if all the “peace lovers” joined “Bobby,” he would not allow the White House’s foreign policy to be shaped by RFK.⁸⁰⁶ By virtue of naming the nation ahead of India, RFK’s declaration that Israel represented the next most likely nation to develop the bomb was ignored by the *NYT*. On the front page the next day, the paper omitted any reference to Israel even though it also reproduced the full text of RFK’s

earlier been awarded the first Coca-Cola franchise in Israel, was told by Komer that “secrecy” would be maintained in the future in all areas. Memorandum for Record by Komer, May 20, 1965, NSF, Name File, Komer Memos, Volume 1, 2 of 3, Box 6, *LBJL*; Thomas Buckley, “Coca-Cola Grants Israeli Franchise,” *NYT*, April 16, 1966, p. 1.

⁸⁰² Letter from President Johnson to Prime Minister Eshkol, May 21, 1965, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Volume XII: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xviii/v.html (document 218).

⁸⁰³ On the same day the *NYT* relayed an anonymous *Reuters* wire story arguing that Israel was the next “most likely” nation to obtain nuclear weapons. “Aide Says Mexico is Able to Produce A-Bomb, but Won’t,” *NYT*, May 26, 1965, p. 18; Memorandum from Komer to Bundy, May 26, 1965, NSF, Komer Memos, Volume 1, 2 of 3, Box 6, *LBJL*.

⁸⁰⁴ RFK must have had a source inside the Committee. Brands has contended that Johnson and Bundy concluded that Arthur Fisher, a Harvard Law School professor who privately consulted the Committee, was a possible leaker. In a 1969 book, Fisher got Teddy to write a brief forward. Brands, “Rethinking Proliferation,” p. 104n73; C.P. Trussell, “Eastland Scored on Passport Bill,” *NYT*, April 29, 1959, p. 25; Herman Kahn, “International Conflict for Beginners,” *NYT*, November 6, 1969, p. BR72.

⁸⁰⁵ *Congressional Record of the 89th Congress*, First Session, Volume III- Part II, June 22, 1965 to July 6, 1965, (Washington, D.C.: GPO), pp. 14566-14568.

⁸⁰⁶ Fearful that JFK’s younger brother would use New York as a springboard for a White House run in 1968, LBJ vigorously fought to keep RFK from being his running mate in 1964 and refused to allow Feldman to support RFK in his subsequent Senate contest with Keating. Johnson, *All the Way with LBJ*, p. 285; Gavin, “Blasts from the Past,” p. 130.

speech on page sixteen.⁸⁰⁷

The media cover-up of Dimona included the nation's most influential journal, published by the *CFR*,⁸⁰⁸ whose president from 1945 to 1975 was McCloy. In a manuscript approved by Keeny and Bundy, Foster, a McCloy protégé, argued in the July *Foreign Affairs* edition that Israel understood that it would "be a mistake" to build a bomb. Providing the usual straw man that the Near East atomic race involved two nations, he professed that if either Israel or Egypt obtained the bomb, it would be "improbable" that the other would not attempt to follow suit.⁸⁰⁹ In the same issue Eban slyly argued that "history" is not "woven by innocent hands," while quoting T.S. Eliot, noting that "Human kind cannot bear very much reality."⁸¹⁰

With Washington now committed in Vietnam, Dimona became a secondary concern for U.S. policymakers in the lead up to the Six Day War.⁸¹¹ Beginning with the March 10 MOU and ending with Foster's *Foreign Affairs* piece, by July 1965 the U.S. had accepted Dimona as a *fait*

⁸⁰⁷ E.W. Kenworthy, "Kennedy Proposes Treaty to Check Nuclear Spread," *NYT*, June 24, 1965, p.1; "Text of Senator Kennedy's Speech Urging Pact to Check Spread of Nuclear Weapons," *NYT*, June 24, 1965, p. 16.

⁸⁰⁸ Quigley has argued that the *CFR*'s formation on July 29, 1921, in New York, led largely by Colonel Edward House, was based upon the British Royal Institute of International Affairs established two years earlier. The *CFR*'s groundwork was laid in June 1918 when Elihu Root, Secretary of State under Theodore Roosevelt, had invited thirty individuals, mostly New York bankers and lawyers, to the Metropolitan Club in New York City. Quigley has contended that JP Morgan and the Rockefellers comprise the *CFR*'s major original groups of influence in the oligarchic faction. During the Truman presidency the *CFR* comprised 42% of the administration, 40% of the Eisenhower administration, 51% of the Kennedy administration and 57% of the Johnson administration. Every Secretary of State since 1944, with the exception of James Byrnes, has been a *CFR* member still holds true today. Speaking at the *CFR*'s new Washington office in July, Secretary of State Clinton admitted that the *CFR* represents a "mothership" of advice for Foggy Bottom. For all confirmed *CFR* members referenced in this thesis see Appendix C. Quigley, *Tragedy and Hope*, pp. 131-132, 582, 952, 992; "Secretary Clinton on Foreign Policy," C-SPAN, July 15, 2009, <http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/287728-1> (1:13:29); Schulzinger, *The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs*, pp. 6, 8, 30; Wala, *The Council on Foreign Relations*, pp. 217n, 237n48; Thomas R. Dye, "Oligarchic Tendencies in National Policy-Making: the Role of the Private Policy-Making Planning Organization," *The Journal of Politics* 40 (1978), pp. 311-316.

⁸⁰⁹ William Foster, "New Directions in Arms Control and Disarmament," *Foreign Affairs* 43, 4 (July 1965), pp. 588-590.

⁸¹⁰ Abba Eban, "Reality and Vision in the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs* 43, 4 (July 1965), pp. 629, 631.

⁸¹¹ In 1992 Komer exclaimed that LBJ dedicated "twenty-times as much time" on the war in Indochina compared to Near East. Parker, *The Six Day War*, p. 229.

accompli.⁸¹² The U.S.'s blind-eye acceptance of Dimona by mid-1965 dovetails with Remez's and Ginor's thesis that the Soviets began planning to eliminate the reactor in late 1965.

Determining when the Soviets and the Egyptians finally grasped that the U.S. was not serious about stopping Israel's nuclear program is difficult to pinpoint. Undoubtedly, the U.S. to remove Badeau from Cairo and to cease informing Nasser about Dimona must have helped speed up this process. The U.S. decision to replace UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson with Arthur Goldberg in July 1965 must have also been viewed with suspect. Goldberg accompanied Rusk on October 1 to meet with Gromyko in New York, with Rusk awkwardly stating that Dimona was "three months pregnant." Assuring the Soviets that the U.S was watching the situation "closely," he added that he wished to privately talk with Gromyko about this issue some more.⁸¹³ By the time of the Six Day War had emerged, the U.S. had conveniently forgotten this meeting.

The primary record focused on U.S. perceptions of Dimona and the U.S.S.R. before, during and after the conflict is difficult to decipher and decode. Days before Israel assembled its first bomb, on May 24 DCI Helms stated at a NSC meeting that he was "positive" there was "no nuclear weapons in" the Near East. Understanding that he was stepping on some big toes, JCS Chairman Wheeler chimed in that he was "skeptical" of the DCI's assertion but

⁸¹² In a February 9, 1966, meeting with Harman, Komer and Foreign Minister Eban, LBJ announced that he saw "nothing" in the future which was going "to disturb" bilateral relations. Three days later the U.S. agreed to sell Israel 48 A-4 Skyhawk even though Komer had correctly observed in October 1965 that these bombers were "highly suitable for nuclear weapons delivery..." On April 2, 1966, April 22, 1967, and July 12, 1969 -all Saturdays- the U.S. again toured Dimona and found "no evidence" of a nuclear weapons program. Zach Levey, "The United States Sale to Israel, 1966: Strategic Exigencies of an Arms Deal," *DH*, 28, 2 (April 2004), p. 272; Memorandum for the Record by Komer, October 18, 1965, NSF, Name File, Komer Memos, Volume 2, 3 of 3, Box 6, *LBJL*; Outgoing Telegram from Rusk to Barbour, February 26, 1966, NSF, Country File, Israel, Cables, Volume V (12/65-9/66) Box 139, *LBJL*; Memorandum of Conversation, "Subject: Meeting Between Secretary McNamara and Israeli Foreign Minister Eban on Saturday, February 12, 1966," Israel, Memos & Misc. (1 of 2), Volume V (12/65-9/66) Box 139, *LBJL*; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 186, 331; Outgoing Telegram from Rusk to Barbour, June 2, 1966, NSF, Country File, Israel, Cables, Volume V (12/65-9/66) Box 139, *LBJL*; Memorandum for the President from Rostow, "Subject: Israeli Aid Package," May 8, 1967, NSF, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, May 12- June 19, 1967, Volume I, Tabs 21-30, Box 17, *LBJL*.

⁸¹³ Memorandum of Conversation, "Subject: USSR Foreign Minister Gromoyko's Dinner for Secretary Rusk," October 1, 1965, *FRUS, 1964-1968, Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume XI*: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xi/j.html (document 97).

admitted he was “less... informed” on the subject.⁸¹⁴ The U.S. desire to cover-up Dimona’s role in the pre-war crisis was best exemplified after the second Foxbat flights of May 26. On the same day at 11:10 a.m. Rostow informed LBJ that the reason “why” Israel was leaning towards a “preemptive attack” could be traced to a still classified telegram sent from the U.S. military Attaché in Tel Aviv to the Pentagon at 8:01 a.m. EDT.⁸¹⁵ Ginor and Remez have argued that the message was sent “during or immediately” after the flight.⁸¹⁶ Meeting at 1:30 p.m. with LBJ, Clifford,⁸¹⁷ Helms, McNamara, Vance, Ball, Battle, Saunders, Rusk, Humphrey, Rostow and Joseph Sisco, Wheeler mused that there had “been two overflight incidents,” proof that the U.S. was aware of the May 21 over-flights as well.⁸¹⁸ Less than six hours later LBJ made no mention of Dimona when he twice told Eban that Israel would “not be alone unless” it decided “to go it

⁸¹⁴ Interestingly, Helms’ name was missing from the list of those present at the meeting, whose protocol was drafted by Saunders. Memorandum for the Record, “Subject: Record of the NSC meeting on May 24, 1967,” May 24, 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2004) *Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967*, Volume XIX: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xix/28053.htm> (document 54); Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 273.

⁸¹⁵ According to Quandt, who served as a deputy under Saunders from 1972-1974 and 1976-1980, during the pre-conflict crisis Johnson conversed with Rostow “more frequently than... anyone else.” In a 1992 *Middle East Journal* article, Quandt completely omitted Dimona’s place in the pre-conflict crisis of the Six Day War. In his 2005 *Peace Process*, Quandt again omitted any reference to Dimona during the context of the conflict and pushed the fantasy that the U.S. relationship towards Dimona began during the mid 1960s rather than in reality a decade earlier, declaring that “...every president from Lyndon Johnson to Bill Clinton” has “tacitly accepted the existence” of a clandestine Israeli nuclear arsenal. In *Decade of Decisions* (1977), he only briefly mentioned that in 1969 President Nixon, State Department and Pentagon “were all concerned” that Israel had “already developed nuclear weapons.” Memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson, May 26, 1967, *Ibid*: (document 70); Quandt, *Peace Process*, pp. 6, 42, 437n56; Quandt, *Decade of Decisions: American Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976* (Berkeley: Los Angeles, 1977), pp. 80, 280, *Ibid*, “Lyndon Johnson and the June 1967 War: What Color was the Light?” *Middle East Journal*, 46, 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 198-228.

⁸¹⁶ Although he made no mention of Dimona, the next day Barbour informed Washington that Israel had been “frightened” by the “four MIGS” which had evaded the IAF. Telegram from the Embassy in Israel to the State Department, May 27, 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XIX*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xix/28054.htm> (document 82); Ginor and Remez, *Foxbats Over Dimona*, pp. 134, 249n50.

⁸¹⁷ By virtue of chairing the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) from 1963-1968 Clifford, who became Secretary of Defense in March 1968, probably knew more about Dimona than anyone else save Angleton and the Special Group. The PFIAB was created in the wake of the Bay of Pigs fiasco on May 4, 1961, via Executive Order (EO) 10938, calling for “qualified persons from outside the government” to consult and advise the executive branch. Editorial Note, *FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XXV*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjfxv/6008.htm> (document 87).

⁸¹⁸ Memorandum for the Record, “Subject: Meeting on the Arab-Israeli Crisis,” May 26, 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XIX*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xix/28054.htm> (document 72).

alone” in the crisis.⁸¹⁹ Following this meeting, Kent informed Helms that that Nasser was not following a “Soviet plan.”⁸²⁰

On June 1 the Mossad’s Meir Amit met with Helms and Angleton. Due to Angleton’s probable inclusion in the document’s text, a five-page June 2 letter from the DCI to LBJ remains classified.⁸²¹ On the same day the NSC’s Nathaniel Davis incorrectly deduced that “Gromyko’s trip” to Cairo in “late March” had “not” resulted in a Moscow-Cairo “attack plan” and that the Soviets had not fabricated “reports of a planned Israeli raid into Syria.” In a paradigm shift, however, Davis vaguely conceded that he “would not be surprised” if some of these “reports were at least partly true.”⁸²² In the war’s aftermath, the U.S. went out its way to deny any role that Dimona and Moscow had played in the hostilities. In an undated *FRUS* report prepared for a Bundy-led NSC subcommittee found in between June 16 and 17,⁸²³ it was erroneously argued that no nation in the conflict possessed “nuclear weapons.” Unlike Suez, the Soviets failed to dictate any “indirect nuclear threats” in 1967.⁸²⁴ In the week after the war’s conclusion the media espoused the familiar trope that both Israel and Egypt were pursuing the bomb.

⁸¹⁹ The next day LBJ left for his Texas Ranch for four days without bringing any foreign policy advisors with him. Memorandum of Conversation, May 26, 1967, *Ibid:* (document 77); Quandt, *Peace Process*, p.437n48.

⁸²⁰ On the same day the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence made no mention of Dimona in its heavily censored comparison of the respective “military capabilities” of the Arabs and Israel. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the CIA, “Subject: Military Capabilities of Israel and the Arab States,” May 26, 1967, *Ibid:* (document 76); Memorandum from Kent to DCI Helms, “Subject: The Middle Eastern Crisis,” May 26, 1967, *Ibid:* (document 79).

⁸²¹ Memorandum of Conversation, May 26, 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XIX:* <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xix/28054.htm> (document 77); Quant, *Peace Process*, p. 38; Quandt, “Lyndon Johnson and the June 1967 War: What Color Was the Light?” *Middle East Journal*, 46, 2 (Spring 1992), p. 218; Memorandum from DCI Helms to Johnson, June 2, 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XIX:* <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xix/28057.htm> (document 135).

⁸²² Memorandum from Nathaniel Davis to Rostow, “Subject: A Scenario of the Soviet Role,” June 2, 1967, NSF, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, May 12-June 19, 1967, Volume 8 Appendices N-0, Box 20, *LBJL*.

⁸²³ On June 17 the CORONA spy satellite once again photographed the reactor. “Declassified Corona Imagery of Dimona,” Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/israel/dimona_corona.htm.

⁸²⁴ Not all in Washington were willing to buy the groupthink assertion that Moscow was a passive witness during the war. Arguing in the *NYT* on September 12, 1967, Richard Nolte, who had replaced Battle as U.S. Ambassador in Cairo in April 1967, professed that Moscow was responsible for “triggering” Nasser’s challenge to Israel. Hedrick Smith, “Ex-U.S. Envoy to Cairo Thinks Soviet Spurred Nasser Challenge to Israel,” *NYT*, September 12, 1967, p. 6; “Paper Submitted by the Control Group to the Special Committee of the NSC,” *FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XIX:* <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xix/28062.htm> (document 305).

Seven days after an anonymous *NYT* piece argued that Israel's next "major...move was to" develop a nuclear bomb, the *WP*'s associate editor, Alfred Friendly, insinuated that Egypt was also pursuing "atomic weapons." Friendly, who had held close government ties and would win the Pulitzer for his coverage of the war, falsely contended that Israeli officials, who admitted that they had "no evidence" to back their claim, had informed him that Egypt was seeking atomic help from "China, India, or both."⁸²⁵ Dimona did not emerge as a relevant issue during the June 23-25 superpower negotiations at Glassboro. When Rusk mentioned the U.S. desire to keep nuclear weapons "out of" the Near East, Gromyko replied only "with a nod."⁸²⁶

Due to Israel's crushing victory, Hersh has argued that following the Six Day War Dimona "disappeared...as a significant issue" in the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv.⁸²⁷ From mid-September to mid-October Barbour vacationed.⁸²⁸ He was out of town when Harvard professor Henry Kissinger⁸²⁹ visited Israel and informed Dale that he was "convinced" Israel was "making nuclear weapons." Dale divulged to Hersh that Kissinger also bluntly warned: "'I'll have your

⁸²⁵ Friendly, whose father was Jewish, attended the Army Intelligence School and spent three years in the Army Air Force during World War II. After joining the *WP* in 1952 he became managing editor in 1959. Following his death the *WP*'s gentile Chairwoman Katharine Graham, whose Jewish father, Eugene Meyer, was a Lazard Freres investment banker, described Friendly as "dear friend and great journalist." Friendly's wife, Jean, later commented that her husband was always "trusted" by the CIA because he "never told secrets." Deborah Davis, *Katherine the Great: Katharine Graham and the Washington Post* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovnovich, Inc., 1979), p. 132; Evan Thomas, *The Very Best Men: The Early Years of the CIA* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), p. 105; Martin Weil, "Alfred Friendly, Ex-Editor Dies," *WP*, November 8, 1983, p. A1; R.H. Melton, "Alfred Friendly's Passion for Life," *WP*, November 8, 1983, p. B5; Israel Said to Plan to Make Atom Bomb," *NYT*, June 14, 1967, p. 16; Alfred Friendly, "Israel Speculates Egypt May Seek Atomic Weapons to Rebuild its Forces," *WP*, June 19, 1967, p. A11; "Pulitzer for Al Friendly," *WP*, May 7, 1968, p. A16; Godfrey Hodgson, "Katharine Graham," *The Guardian*, July 18, 2001, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2001/jul/18/guardianobituaries.pressandpublishing>.

⁸²⁶ Memorandum of Conversation, "Subject: Middle East," *FRUS 1964-1968*, Volume XIX: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xix/28063.htm> (document 321).

⁸²⁷ On August 24 the *NYT* reported that Rabin would replace Harman in Washington in early 1968. James Feron, "Israelis to Appoint Gen. Rabin as Envoy to U.S.," *NYT*, August 24, 1967, p. 18; Hersh, *The Samson Option*, p. 169

⁸²⁸ Limited Official use Memorandum from Saunders to Walt Rostow, September 1, 1967, NSF, Country File, Israel, Cables, Volume VII (8/67-12/67), Box 140, *LBLL*.

⁸²⁹ As a doctoral student at Harvard during the mid 1950s Kissinger was introduced to many of the key individuals who would shape U.S. Dimona policy. While writing his dissertation, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (1957), from 1955 to 1957 Kissinger acted as a study director for a discussion group that met under the *CFR*'s sponsorship to consider the implications of nuclear power, which included Bedell Smith, Rabi, Gilpatric, McGeorge Bundy and Hanson Baldwin. Gregory Cleva, *Henry Kissinger and the American Approach to Foreign Policy* (Toronto: Bucknell University Press, 1989), pp. 119 & 228n2; Schulzinger, *The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs*, p. 19.

ass if this gets out.”⁸³⁰ Edward Teller informed Cohen that following a trip to Israel in late 1966 or early 1967 he had also concluded that Israel possessed the bomb but would be “clever enough ...not to test.” He did not believe Israel should be forced to give it up in order to join the NPT.⁸³¹ No one disagreed. In 1978 Carl Duckett, who in 1968 was the CIA’s Deputy Director of Science & Technology, testified that based upon Teller’s information he had drafted a new NIE focused on Israel’s updated atomic status in the spring of 1968. Duckett indicated that Helms had instructed him not to “publish” a final draft to LBJ and then forget the issue.⁸³² Any leverage the U.S. possessed to compel Israel to sign the NPT was lost when the outgoing White House agreed to provide Israel with 50 F-4 Phantom’s on November 25, 1968.⁸³³

Since the NPT was only ratified by Senate in March 1969 and implemented a year later, the new White House could have still pressured Israel to join the NPT in early 1969.⁸³⁴ President Richard Nixon chose not to pursue this option. In a June 26 meeting National Security Advisor Kissinger advocated that Israeli NPT “adherence” was unnecessary and proposed that Israel and

⁸³⁰ Hersh, *The Samson Option*, p. 169.

⁸³¹ The media was unwilling to pressure Israel to sign the NPT and even denied its existence in LBJ’s final year in office. On May 5 Jewish historian Walter Laqueur omitted any reference to Dimona in a 10 page *NYT* article. On July 9 Chalmers Roberts, who had written first U.S. story on Dimona, guessed that Israel was “expected to sign at some point.” Walter Laqueur, “The Middle East is Potentially More Dangerous than Vietnam,” *NYT*, May 5, 1968, p. SM34; Chalmers Roberts, “7 ‘Threshold’ Nations Haven’t Signed A-Pact,” *WP*, July 9, 1968, p. A7; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 297-298, 421n20, 421n21.

⁸³² Hersh was also told by a “senior intelligence officer” that after June 1967 a “big change took place” within the CIA, with Israeli information becoming “untouchable.” In an *FRUS* editorial note found between April 1 and April 4, 1968, it was revealed that this NIE has never “been found.” In March 1978 Helms informed the *NYT* that he could deny that he gave this order to Duckett but still had “no recollection” of it. Editorial Note, *FRUS, 1964-1968* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2001), *Arab-Israeli Dispute*, Volume XX: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xx/2667.htm> (document 130); Hersh, *The Samson Option*, p. 169; David Burnham, “C.I.A. Man Says Johnson Heard in 68 that Israel Had A-Bombs,” *NYT*, March 2, 1978, p. 5; Richelson, “The Wizards of Langley,” p. 90.

⁸³³ Three days after the NPT was signed, Dobrynin questioned Rostow on why Israel had refused to sign when Syria and Egypt had already done so. Rostow vaguely responded that the “matter was” still “under discussion.” Telegram Rusk to the Embassy in the U.S.S.R. July 4, 1968, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Volume XX: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xx/2669.htm> (document 207); Letter from Paul Warnke to Yitzhak Rabin, November 25, 1968, NSF, Country File, Israel, Memos (1 of 4), Volume X (6/68-11/68), Box 142, *LBJL*.

⁸³⁴ Finney, “Senate Approves Treaty to Block Nuclear Spread,” *NYT*, March 14, 1969, p. 1; Editorial Note, *FRUS, 1969-1976*, (Washington D.C: GPO, 2007) Volume E-2, *Documents on Arms Control, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 1969-1972*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e2/83456.htm> (document 46).

the U.S. to continue to “hide” Dimona’s existence from the “public ...”⁸³⁵ On September 25 Meir and Nixon privately concluded that Israel would not have to sign the NPT in exchange for not testing nor publicly announcing existence. The agreement, which Cohen has argued represents the “cornerstone” for the U.S.-Israeli “special relationship... on the nuclear issue,” appears to have been made orally. Nixon and Meir were smart enough to commit nothing anything to paper.⁸³⁶ There was even no typed protocol of their discussions with Kissinger, Rabin and Secretary of State William Rogers, who was unaware that Israel already possessed the bomb.⁸³⁷ A day later Nixon informed White House reporters that “no decisions” centered on the talks would be announced at the current “time.” In the 40 years since, none have been.⁸³⁸ While receiving New York City’s Gold Medal of Honor four days later, Meir declared that Israel desired for “peace” with its “neighbors” and “for the entire world.”⁸³⁹

⁸³⁵ Two days after the first F-4s arrived in Israel, Helms delivered a report Nixon on September 8, which has since “vanished.” In the same month Israel received a \$22.5 million IMF loan. Grose, “Mrs. Meir Greeted Warmly By Nixon,” *NYT*, September 26, 1969, p. 1; Lawrence Van Gelder, “Mrs. Meir, Hailed by City,” *NYT*, September 30, 1969, p. 1; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 331-333; Rodger Davis to Mr. Austin, “Review Group Consideration of Response to NSSM-40 June 26, 1969,” June 30, 1969, GWNSA, www.gwu.edu/nsarchiv/NSAE/BB/NSAE/BB189/IN-09.pdf; “Israel Crosses the Threshold,” <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAE/BB/NSAE/BB189/index.htm>; “F-4 Deliveries Begin,” *NYT*, September 7, 1969, p. 9.

⁸³⁶ Cohen has admitted that there is no copy of the protocol of the Nixon-Meir meeting either at the Nixon Presidential Library or the Israeli State Archives. Avner Cohen, “*Between Natanz and Dimona*,” *Ha’aretz*, May 17, 2009, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1085633.html>.

⁸³⁷ One reason why Dimona disappeared during the Nixon White House was because U. Alexis Johnson served as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from 1969 to 1973; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 133; Wolfgang Saxon, “U. Alexis Johnson Dies at 88,” *NYT*, March 27, 1997, B19.

⁸³⁸ Richard Halloran, “Mrs. Meir Indicates a Promise by Nixon of Continuing Support,” *NYT*, September 27, 1969, p. 1.

⁸³⁹ Lawrence Van Gelder, “Mrs Meir, Haild by City,” *NYT*, September 30, 1969, p. 1.

Conclusion

Edmund Burke's mantra that "digging into the foundations of the state is always a dangerous adventure" is an accurate one.⁸⁴⁰ A former professor of history at the University of Ottawa who refused to write reference letters for students aspiring towards Law School once told me that if I wanted to grasp the international system's deeper and uglier aspects I should examine U.S. activities and actions towards the "State of Israel." I had entered Professor Brian Villa's office to discuss Operation Iraqi Freedom and unknowingly exited with the beginnings of my M.A. thesis. During this process I have discovered that sometimes the simplest questions can also be the most intense and important. "Who's in Charge?" "Are there conflicts of interest?" "Who advises?"⁸⁴¹ At the circumvention of the democratic process, Dimona's past is prologue narrative is defined by silent consensus, shadowy scientism, obsequious journalism, unelected privilege, secret bureaucracies, clandestine corporatism and great power imperialism. Beginning with the "President's deep personal involvement" or lack thereof, the globe's 60 year relationship with Dimona is best encapsulated through an illuminating 1968 document, drafted by Harold Saunders, outlining the "real lifeblood" of the "invisible system."⁸⁴²

Rather than the first among equals, the U.S. President is the first among elected equals. There is a distinction. Schlesinger's argument that U.S. "democracy" must find a happy medium between the President being a "czar" or a "puppet" is flawed because it assumes that he or she cannot be both simultaneously.⁸⁴³ In this study the President emerges as an insulated role player

⁸⁴⁰ Schlesinger, *The Imperial Presidency*, p. 393.

⁸⁴¹ Edward Said, "Who Is in Charge?" *CounterPunch*, March 8, 2003, <http://www.counterpunch.org/said03082003.html>; "SEN. SANDERS GOES OFF ON BERNANKE_03/03/09," <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rCWXR MCGJT4> (5:43); Herken, *Cardinal Choices*, p. 210.

⁸⁴² Paper Prepared by Harold Saunders of the NSC, March 15, 1968, *FRUS*, Volume XXXIII, 1964-1968: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxxiii/32651.htm> (document 180).

⁸⁴³ Schlesinger, *The Imperial Presidency*, p. 12.

rather than an informed key player who delegated rather than decided. Given the undeniable U-2 evidence, Ike knew of Dimona's existence by early 1958 but did nothing. When the reactor was unveiled in late December 1960 he sought to cover-up the truth. JFK was unwilling to pressure Ben Gurion about Israel's future atomic plans at their May 1961 Waldorf meeting and then promised Meir in December 1962 that Dimona would not infringe on their "special relationship." The only persistent and personal Presidential pressure came in the spring and summer of 1963 as the U.S. and U.S.S.R. were negotiating the PTBT. When the treaty was finalized, however, this pressure ended. Following the March 10, 1965, MOU, which LBJ refused to link to any IAEA safeguards, Dimona disappeared as a significant U.S. concern even during the Six Day War. Nixon's refusal to pressure Israel to join the NPT cemented a decade old trans-partisan policy of support of an Israeli project 20 years in the making.

Ben Gurion's "deep and personal involvement" was vital in enabling Israel to build and finance Dimona without the knowledge of most in Israel's Cabinet, Knesset and press. His personal diplomacy with De Gaulle in August 1960 and JFK in May 1961 ensured that the former kept its pledge to build the reactor and that the latter did not interfere in this process. When Dimona was unveiled in December 1960 no one questioned Ben Gurion's Knesset declaration that the reactor was peaceful. In a tacit show of support for his policy, neither Eshkol nor Meir altered the nation's ambiguous nuclear policy when they assumed power. Ben Gurion's most important talent, however, was his ability to delegate responsibility.

Operating as the Defense Ministry's Director General, Shimon Peres was able to network with Deputy Abel Thomas to forge the beginnings of the Franco-Israeli atomic alliance. He convinced Prime Minister Mollet to provide reactor at Sèvres in October 1956 and when Paris began to demur he pushed Prime Minister Bourgès-Maunoury to keep France's promise in

September 1957. Alongside managing the Israeli side of the globalist campaign to finance Dimona, he also coined the now familiar cliché that Israel “would not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East” in April 1963. The fact that he was only replaced by Eshkol after the November 1965 election demonstrated his esoteric place in the project. Days prior to the Six Day War he hinted at an atomic test, illuminating the incredible amount of shadow power he possessed even as a private citizen.

Exemplified best by Peres in Israel, the “invisible” government’s second vein is the “small number of men” positioned as “under secretaries and assistant secretaries” within the national security structure.⁸⁴⁴ In August 1956 Philip Farley had identified that Israel was considering building a second reactor and was informed by Norway in July 1958 that Israel desired a 40 MW reactor but did nothing to help the U.S. alter the status quo. After disseminating the falsehood that Dimona’s construction had commenced in late 1959, once the reactor was publicly unveiled in December 1960, Farley chose the first U.S. team to visit Dimona in May 1961. Foreshadowing all future visits, this tour found nothing incriminating. Following Farley’s departure in March 1962, the most important Foggy Bottom policymaker on Dimona became the other Johnson and the old crocodile. Serving as the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, U. Alexis Johnson could have provided Peres with the now familiar talking point on Israel’s nuclear doctrine. Alongside Dulles, McCone, Bundy, Gilpatric and a former CIA Station Chief in Tel Aviv, Johnson was privy to all covert and compartmentalized intelligence as a “Special Group” participant from May 1961 to July 1964. His January 20, 1964, Manhattan statement that there would be no “fundamental” changes to U.S. Near East policy was an implicit show of support for Israel’s atomic intentions. Chiefly responsible for negotiating the PTBT, his

⁸⁴⁴ Paper Prepared by Harold Saunders of the NSC, March 15, 1968, *FRUS, Volume XXXIII*, 1964-1968: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxxiii/32651.htm> (document 180).

predecessor Averell Harriman, a former New York Governor, cultivated the basic framework of the transformative March 10, 1965 MOU signed by Eshkol, Komer and the Ambassador.⁸⁴⁵

Saunders warned that “foreign service” individuals with “policy axes to grind” need to be mitigated, while Helms once commented that Ambassadors possess a considerable degree of “veto” power on policy.⁸⁴⁶ This is why Israel’s Ambassador in Paris, Jacob Tzur, was kept uninformed about Peres’ efforts to obtain a reactor in 1955 and 1956. Ambassadors who possess their own politics can be a problem, evident in John Badeau’s exit from Cairo in May 1964 in favor of Lucius Battle. A day after a U-2 overflew Dimona on March 11, 1959, the U.S. announced that Edward Lawson would be replaced with New York’s Ogden Reid ensured that no one in the U.S. Embassy would communicate back to Washington on what was being built in the Negev. Two months later Abba Eban, key in formulating the July 1955 civil atomic agreement, was replaced in Washington with the WZO’s Avraham Harman. When Dimona was publicly unveiled in December 1960, these changes ensured the plausible denial needed to buttress the statements of ignorance which ensued. Illuminated best in his refusal to deliver JFK’s strongly worded June 15, 1963, letter to Ben Gurion, Walworth Barbour largely conducted a unilateral agenda in Tel Aviv. A month later he reminded the U.S. that any further “publicity” on Dimona could injure “friends” everywhere. His refusal to explicitly mention Dimona during the pre-war crisis was integral in keeping the reactor from emerging as the Six Day War’s defining issue. None at Foggy Bottom, not even the Secretary of State, dared to cross him.

Due to his relationship with the DCI and knowledge of the U-2 flights, Secretary of State Dulles was surely aware of Dimona’s existence before his resignation on April 22, 1959. There

⁸⁴⁵ Sutton, *America’s Secret Establishment*, p. 21.

⁸⁴⁶ Paper Prepared by Harold Saunders of the NSC, March 15, 1968, *FRUS*, Volume XXXIII, 1964-1968: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxxiii/32651.htm> (document 180); Presented by the Deputy Director of CI Helms, October 4, 1965, *Ibid*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxxiii/32677.htm> (document 237).

is no evidence that Herter was provided the same information, giving him the necessary plausible denial to announce that Dimona represented “no special concern” on December 22, 1960. His successor was largely omitted from any policy making role in the 1960s and served mainly as a propagandizing mouthpiece on the subject. While bowing to the Israel’s demand that no U.S. intelligence passed onto Egypt focused on Dimona, Rusk was ignored by the Gilpatric Committee and refused to adhere to Bill Polk’s prophetic April 1964 warning that Dimona could force Cairo into a “Cuba-type” deal with Moscow. Since the U.S. had always secretly aided the acquisition of an Israeli atomic stick there was no need for any diplomatic carrots.

Since World War II and the National Security Act of 1947 Foggy Bottom’s ability to shape and implement foreign policy has been severely usurped. Since this time a “new nucleus... key people responsible for specific areas and problems” has emerged.⁸⁴⁷ At the forefront has been the rise of a shadowy “scientific-technological elite” which Ike had warned could gain control over “public policy.”⁸⁴⁸ Especially in the realms of biology, nanotechnology, artificial intelligence and the microchip, in the future power will be increasingly possessed and augmented by nations and institutions with the most brilliant scientists rather than the bravest soldiers. MIT mathematician Norbert Wiener, who refused to take funding from a valueless U.S. government, professed in 1946 that scientists usually place themselves in the hands of the people they should be “least inclined to trust.”⁸⁴⁹ In a Cold War defined by the aircraft carrier, spy satellite and ICBM, “scientific internationalism” effectively eroded national sovereignty as scientists like

⁸⁴⁷ Paper Prepared by Harold Saunders of the NSC, March 15, 1968, *FRUS*, Volume XXXIII, 1964-1968: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxxiii/32651.htm> (document 180).

⁸⁴⁸ Richard Damms, “James Killian: the technological capabilities panel, and the emergence of President Eisenhower’s ‘Scientific-Technological Elite,’” *DH* 24, 1 (Winter 2000), p. 57; “421-Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People,” January 17, 1961, APP, *PPUS*.

⁸⁴⁹ Joseph Manzione, “The legacy of Scientific Internationalism in American Foreign Policy, 1945-1965,” *DH*, 24, 1 (Winter 2000), p. 21, 24n15; Herken, “In the Service of the State: Science and the Cold War,” *Ibid.*, pp. 107-108.

Rabi were quickly elevated to statesman and diplomats.⁸⁵⁰

There is a strong probability that Rabbi, who visited Ben Gurion in 1957 to discuss atomic issues, was also privy to the U-2 information while working under Strauss. The amendments that McCone added to the July 1955 agreement in 1959 and 1960 accelerated this support. Apparently left uninformed about the U-2 flights and pertinent NIEs, McCone possessed the necessary plausible denial that allowed him to leak to the *NYT* that Israel was building a research reactor in December 1960 while in charge of the AEC. Most of scientists who the visited Dimona during the 1960s for the pre-packaged and sometimes lightless tours were AEC employees, an amorphous agency responsible for providing Israel with uranium in July 1963 and 1964. The cryptic Dr. Robert Webber was installed as Science Attaché in Tel Aviv in the spring of 1963. After privately meeting with the U.S. team before their January 1964 tour of Dimona, in which they were informed by Mannes Pratt that the reactor was valued at \$60 million, Webber repeated this total when he declared on April 21, 1965 that Dimona was “firmly” dedicated to “peaceful purposes.” This theme was prevalent in the Gilpatric Committee’s final report, drafted mainly by Spurgeon Keeny, who also reviewed Foster’s July 1965 *Foreign Affairs* piece. Sometime in late 1966 or early 1967 Edward Teller, the father of the hydrogen bomb and a member of the AEC/GAC during the late 1950s, visited Israel and was instrumental in convincing Washington not to force Israel to joint the NPT.

Employing the scientific-strategic class was crucial in Israel’s successful quest to obtain the bomb. In 1949 Ben Gurion secretly met with French scientist Moshe Sordin, paving the way for the CEA’s Jean-Francis Perrin to survey Israel Dostrovsky’s heavy water research two years later. In August 1955 Shalhavet Freier became Israel’s Science Attaché in Paris, working

⁸⁵⁰ Characterizing him as a “hero,” historian Gregg Herken dedicated his 1992 *Cardinal Choices* to Rabi. Manzione, “The legacy of Scientific Internationalism in American Foreign Policy” p. 33n47; Herken, *Cardinal Choices*, p. iv.

covertly with Peres to lay the seeds of the Israeli-Franco atomic relationship. Due to his embedded role in the project at RAFAEL, Eshkol determined it would be unwise to strip Munya Mardor of his authority during his reorganization in early 1966; instead, he provided him with more resources and autonomy. Conducted without the apparent knowledge of Prime Minister Macmillan, in 1959 and 1960 Israel received twenty tons of heavy water in a deal arranged by a Bergmann and a Norwegian astrophysicist. Often after the state has achieved its techno-political strategic objective scientists become expendable. After twelve years, Dr. Bergmann resigned from the IAEC in April 1966 after his ability to shape atomic policy waned during the decade. A private skeptic only, Dr. Amos de Shalit described the bomb as an “unearthly weapon,” while writing to “individuals wiser than him” back in Israel from Geneva in August 1955. In any war, scientists, like soldiers, will always be expendable. Even though Egypt had no equivalent reactor, Israel still assassinated German and Egyptian scientists working for Nasser in late 1962-1963, a policy which ultimately led to the dismissal of the Mossad’s Isser Harel.

Unintended consequences ensued from Harel’s firing within two years. Beginning in late 1965 Harel began informing Moscow that Dimona’s intentions were not peaceful. From this period onwards Harel, Moshe Sneh and the Israeli Communist Party kept the U.S.S.R. apprised about Dimona prior to June 1967. Moscow’s Dimona policy was implemented by a faceless bureaucrat and at the Ambassadorial level. Defense Ministry First Deputy Andre Grechko’s offer to Egypt of a Soviet nuclear umbrella in December 1965 signaled a more aggressive Soviet policy, culminating in the KGB’s November 1966 “Conqueror Plan.” Two days after four Foxbats overflew Dimona; Grechko reminded Egypt on May 28 that the Soviet Mediterranean fleet was prepared for anything. Nikolai Fedorenko’s decision to boycott a UN hosted event for Eshkol during his June 1964 U.S. tour and the Kremlin’s decision to ban Israeli diplomats from

Moscow's Central Synagogue in August demonstrated that Soviet attitudes toward Israel had soured even before Khrushchev's removal. Weeks after Haikal had railed against Dimona; in September 1965 Israel replaced Yosef Tekoah in Moscow with Katriel Katz. This desire to show the U.S.S.R. another angle was displayed by Eshkol in his rhetorical January 1966 Knesset overture towards Moscow. Ambassador Chuvakhin's unwillingness to travel with Eshkol to view Syria's alleged buildup on the Israeli border on May 12, 1967, is the best evidence that Moscow engineered the crisis to provide a pretext to destroy Dimona.

While a revisionist Soviet role has emerged in the scholarship, the Arab place in Dimona's historiography has been pushed to the periphery. A better understanding of Soviet-Syrian relations from the Moscow-inspired coup in Damascus in February 1966 to the erroneous May 12, 1967, intelligence warning is needed. Beginning with the reactor's partial unveiling in December 1960, Egypt's approach to Dimona was centered upon denial and indifference. In a theme also present on the Soviet side, during the early 1960s there is scant evidence of Nasser's policies towards Dimona prior to Haikal's August 1965 announcement estimating that Dimona's total cost at \$700 million. There is ample evidence that the Soviets utilized Nasser as a proxy to air their increasing concerns about Dimona. In his first statement on the issue in six years, Nasser boomed on February 21, 1966, that an Israeli bomb could precipitate "preventive war" was made a fortnight after the *NYT* had revealed Grechko's December 1965 Cairo mission. Nasser's April 17, 1966, statement that Israel was building a bomb came a day before Kosygin announced in Cairo that regional "forces" could soon possess a nuclear deterrent. The Foxbat sorties over of May 17 and May 26, 1967, were also conducted falsely under the Egyptian flag.

Nasser's personality and power are too often interchanged as being equivalent. He once honestly admitted to British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd that his "importance" should not be

exaggerated as he was always just “reacting” to the superpowers.⁸⁵¹ Due to Egypt’s tragic involvement in Yemen’s civil war and inability to produce or acquire its own bomb, Cairo allowed Moscow to try to solve the Dimona problem for itself. Alongside the Soviet-Arab relationship, the roles of Gabon, South Africa, Argentina, Norway, Canada, Britain, France and especially Wall Street underscore the transnational scope of Israel’s nuclear history.

Elitism may be irrefutable but it is still “outrageous.”⁸⁵² Rest assured that anyone who says to not follow the money has already found it. The financiers are even more byzantine than the spooks. Truthdig.com editor Robert Sheer has pointed out that the “banking” syndicate is more secretive than even the Pentagon and CIA.⁸⁵³ The involvement of the Sonneborn Institute, the Rothschilds, Wolfsons and Sieffs in financing Dimona illuminates the NIC’s 2008 prediction that in the future “governments will no longer be kings” as “super-charged individuals” and supranational institutions push towards “global governance...”⁸⁵⁴ Feinberg’s crucial role in raising millions for Dimona demonstrates that if there is an ethno-centric view of U.S. foreign policy it is not from Washington yet rather its largest city, the most obvious home, according to former DCI Michael Hayden, for the IC’s “co-operating domestic entities.”⁸⁵⁵ New York interests were dominant in the outsourced Gilpatric Committee through the legal minds of Gilpatric, McCloy and Dulles, all of whom knew the truth about Dimona. There is now “no clear line” separating government and the private business in the intelligence game.⁸⁵⁶ The U.S.-Israel

⁸⁵¹ Haikal, *The Cairo Documents*, p. 26,

⁸⁵² “Testimony of Hank Paulson, Part 27 (Rep. Stearns Questioning),”

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ngJm9uDNUI> (5:33).

⁸⁵³ “As Wall Street Posts Record Profits and US Hunger Rate Grows, Robert Scheer Asks: ‘Where Is the Community Organizer We Elected?’” *Democracy Now!*, November 19, 2009,

http://www.democracynow.org/2009/11/19/as_wall_street_posts_record_profits.

⁸⁵⁴ NIC, *Global Trends 2025*, p. xii, 1, 3, 81, 83.

⁸⁵⁵ Sally Marks, “The World According to Washington,” *DH* 11, 3 (Summer 1987), pp. 265-282; “Privatization of U.S. Intelligence,” C-SPAN, August 20, 2009, <http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/288482-1> (81:07).

⁸⁵⁶ “Privatization of U.S. Intelligence,” C-SPAN, August 20, 2009, <http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/288482-1> (81:07).

atomic relationship began as a corporatist accord, with a former DCI acting as VP of New York's AMF when the firm signed its deal with the IAEC in late 1957.

Secret bureaucracies usually follow their "own self-interest" too. One should not trust Wall Street lawyer Richard Helm's claim that the CIA is not "a rogue elephant" which abides by "the laws" of the land."⁸⁵⁷ After the threat of global nuclear war, the most important Cold War consequence has been the emergence, in Saunders' own words, of the CIA as an "ivory tower" form of oligarchic "government." At CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, on April 20, 2009, President Obama proclaimed that the Agency is the "indispensible tool" at the "tip" of the U.S. foreign affairs "spear."⁸⁵⁸ In a thesis raised by Szulc and implicitly supported by Blitzer and DCI Dulles, Angleton probably sent a CIA team and nameless British-born physicist to Israel in 1957 to provide atomic assistance. Amazing things can happen from within the Company once conformity, compartmentalization and classification become their own awards. Before Congress in 1975 Angleton quipped that it was "inconceivable that a secret intelligence arm of the government" must "comply with all the overt orders" of its masters.⁸⁵⁹

The IC is an amorphous, entrepreneurial and organic power system. The NSC, the Principles Committee, USIB, PFIAB, and the "Special Group" represent the "interlocking directorates" capable of precipitating the "intra-governmental intrigue" which Kennan warned about.⁸⁶⁰ These black groups within black groups, capable of covert action without even the knowledge of the highest circles, are a consequence of the U.S. failure to adhere to Hamilton's warning that "every...appointment" will always increase the likelihood of "cabal and

⁸⁵⁷ Parker, ed., *The Six Day War*, pp. 259, 161.

⁸⁵⁸ "Presidential Remarks to CIA Employees," C-SPAN, April 20, 2009, <http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/285394-3> (23:41); Paper Prepared by Harold Saunders, March 15, 1968, *FRUS, Volume XXXIII*, 1964-1968: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxxiii/32651.htm> (document 180).

⁸⁵⁹ Church Committee, Volume II: Huston Plan, <http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/contents.htm>.

⁸⁶⁰ Kennan, *American Diplomacy*, p. 158; Paper Prepared by Harold Saunders, March 15, 1968, *FRUS, Volume XXXIII*, 1964-1968: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxxiii/32651.htm> (document 180).

intrigue.”⁸⁶¹ Rather than reducing the “dangers of factionalism,” which Dahl has stressed was Madison’s underlining premise of the anti-libertarian Federalist Papers, big government instead has helped to mask cabal, corruption and “irresoluble conflict.”⁸⁶²

The CIA’s complicity in Dimona was also reflected in its “intelligence-producing side.”⁸⁶³ Key NSC, State and Pentagon officials responsible for implementing Israel policy during the 1960s - Bill Bundy, Garthoff and especially Komer- all worked in the CIA’s ONE during the late 1950s.⁸⁶⁴ Once CIA, always CIA. Angleton’s knowledge and U-2 intelligence was kept from Kent and the BNE in its NIE 100-2-58 of July 1, 1958, which still stipulated that if Israel obtained the bomb then it could precipitate a “general conflagration.” Dulles’ two page letter to JFK days before his Waldorf sit-down with Ben Gurion, and the CIA’s NIE’s and SNIE’s of September 20, 1960, December 8, 1960, and October 21, 1964, all remain classified. Considering the Orwellian atmosphere prevalent in the U.S. today, these documents likely will never be released.⁸⁶⁵ In the honest words from the individual who alone inspired me to become a

⁸⁶¹ See Federalist 77. Wills, ed, *The Federalist Papers*, p. 399.

⁸⁶² Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory*, pp. 167, 169.

⁸⁶³ Paper Prepared by Harold Saunders of the NSC, March 15, 1968, *FRUS, Volume XXXIII*, 1964-1968: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxxiii/32651.htm> (document 180).

⁸⁶⁴ Saunders, who authored the foreword for Parker’s *The Six Day War*, also worked for the CIA before joining the NSC during the Kennedy administration. His “invisible government” document, which described the CIA’s covert faction as “insidious,” was prepared for a presentation to be given to Career Company Trainees. Memorandum from Bundy to Rusk, December 1, 1965, *FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XXXIII*: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxxiii/32651.htm> (document 158); Paper Prepared by Harold Saunders, March 15, 1968, *Ibid* <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxxiii/32651.htm> (document 180); Parker, ed., *The Six Day War*, pp. xi-xiii.

⁸⁶⁵ Two months after 9/11 President Bush issued Executive Order 13233 changing the Presidential Records Act of 1978, granting future President the right to classify any document, specifically any “confidential communicators” between the President, Vice-President and their unelected advisors. Shifting the burden from the state to the scholar to establish a “document need,” in March 2003 EO 13291 replaced the April 17, 1995, EO 129598 extending the waiting period for national security documents from 25 years to 28 years. All CIA documents now have to wait 50 years to be given to NARA. On Obama’s *first* full day in office he decided that he alone would decide which documents would be made available to NARA. EO 13489 stated that any “incumbent and former” President could “identify any” documents which they believed to constitute “executive privilege.” The only way NARA could challenge this order would be for the “incumbent President” to agree a “final court order” from the Attorney General. “Frank Costigliola and Thomas Paterson, “Defining and Doing the History of the U.S. Foreign Relations: A Primer,” in *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, pp. 32-33; Schulzinger, “Transparency, Secrecy and Citizenship,” *DH*, 25, 2 (Spring 2001), pp. 170-171, 176.; “3- Executive Order 13489- Presidential Records,” January 21, 2009, APP, *PPUS*; http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/executive_orders.php.

historian, “a country that hides something is a country that is afraid of getting caught.”⁸⁶⁶

On the cover of Cohen’s *Israel and the Bomb*, Segev commented that the book would “necessitate the rewriting of Israel’s entire history.” Due to Israel’s futile search for absolute security, however, this bold declaration has failed to materialize. In breaking Thomas Friedman’s mantra that transparency and accountability represent the “building blocks” of any democracy, there has always been a weakness in numbers and disclosure mentality in Israel.⁸⁶⁷ Uri Bailer has pointed out that for “complex” reasons Israel retained the British Mandate’s “secrecy” system following its creation. The nation’s “iron rule” 30-year declassification formula for primary documents does not apply to Dimona documents, national security Cabinet meetings have only been publicized up to 1958.⁸⁶⁸ The desire for classification on all sides guarantees that some words in Dimona’s history will probably never reach the public realm because they were never committed to paper. Former Soviet Deputy Foreign Vladimir Semyonov has promulgated that “the revolution is conducted not on paper, but rather in conversation, in things that are said on the telephone...”⁸⁶⁹ History transpires in conversation not citation: “do you ever listen to the sense of the law being written as it is spoken?”⁸⁷⁰ EMET’s January 1952 creation, RAFAEL’s June 1958 reorganization, the French-Israeli atomic agreements, Lundahl’s U-2 briefings to Ike, Feldman’s August 1962 trip to sell Israel the HAWK, and the Nixon-Meir understanding were all made orally outside the eyes of a democracy’s theoretical watchdogs.

Congressman Dr. Ron Paul has argued that a democracy exists when “the purpose of government is to protect the secrecy...of all individuals *not* the secrecy of government.”⁸⁷¹ Israel

⁸⁶⁶ Loose Change Final Cut,” <http://video.google.ca/videoplay?docid=-3719259008768610598#> (2:09:54).

⁸⁶⁷ Schulzinger, “Transparency, Secrecy and Citizenship,” pp. 165, 167-168.

⁸⁶⁸ Uri Bialer, “Top Hat, Tuxedo and the Cannons,” pp. 1-2; Ginor and Remez, *Foxbats over Dimona*, p. 28

⁸⁶⁹ Ginor and Remez, *Foxbats over Dimona*, p. 51.

⁸⁷⁰ With a U.S. flag in the background, this quote occurs in my favorite scene of the film. *Syriana* (2005).

⁸⁷¹ Ron Paul: Don’t Tread on Me,” <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FGHuFtP8w8> (8:25).

is not a democracy but rather a “guardianship,” which exists when rulers believe they are incapable of making “wise and virtuous” decisions under democratic restraints.⁸⁷² Since Israel has no written constitution, Ben Gurion, Eshkol, and Meir all believed that the nuclear issue was too sensitive to be debated by any one in the Knesset, intelligentsia, and the press. Bypassed in the project’s financing, Knesset members were banned from Dimona during its construction and received no information about Dimona until de Shalit began to do so in the spring of 1962. Even when the Finance and Foreign Affairs and Defense Committees began to receive Dimona briefs in late 1962, they still possessed no influence in shaping policy. The Parliament faced no much public pressure to probe the executive for pursuing such a secretive policy. Freedom without responsibility is a terrible consequence of an excess of entitled individuality. Most people prefer to try to outdo those around them rather than question the decisions being made by those above them. Echoing Machiavelli’s observation that when the “state is in need of its citizens” few “can be found,” the Committee for the Denuclearization of the Middle East was an ineffectual group which failed to rally a public manipulated by a state-controlled media.⁸⁷³

With the exception of Hersh, the U.S. media’s deceptive coverage of Dimona followed whatever the White House line. Chillingly, former DCI William Colby’s chilling statement that the CIA “owns everyone of any significance in the major media.”⁸⁷⁴ Angleton alone operated a set of ten reporters to carry out “dangerous” CIA “assignments.”⁸⁷⁵ During the height of the *Exodus* theatre, the CIA-controlled and Jewish-dominated media led by Finney, Sulzberger and Pearson misled and manipulated the U.S. public about Dimona when the story broke. Quoting directly from the state script, on December 23, 1960, the *NYT*’s Alvin Schuster relayed that the

⁸⁷² Dahl, *Controlling Nuclear Weapon*, p. 17.

⁸⁷³ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, pp. 25-26.

⁸⁷⁴ David McGowan, *Derailing Democracy: The America the Media Don’t Want You to See* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2000), p. 13.

⁸⁷⁵ Carl Bernstein, “The CIA and the Media,” http://carlberstein.com/magazine_cia_and_media.php.

reactor was not “a cause for special concern.” During the 1960s the U.S. media downplayed Israel’s nuclear ambitions, while fraudulently promoting that Nasser was pursuing the bomb.⁸⁷⁶

From August 1962 to July 1965, the *NYT*’s Hanson Baldwin and Max Frankel propagandized that both Israel and Egypt were pursuing the bomb. In the week after the Six Day War, probable CIA asset Alfred Friendly erroneously concluded in the *WP* that Egypt was seeking Indian and Chinese atomic assistance. Anonymity also defined the media’s Dimona coverage. On December 20 the *WP* advocated that the “free and democratic Israel” be allowed to pursue the bomb. On December 26 *Time*, owned by a CIA asset, assured that Israel was still a “considerable way from producing the bomb.” Four days after the PTBT had been initialed, a nameless *NYT* article reemphasized that both the “UAR and Israel” were pursuing the bomb. The CIA could have also been behind the nameless Dimona stories found in Operation Mockingbird minions like *Reuters*, *Newsweek*, *AP*, and *UPI*.⁸⁷⁷

Similar to Kennan’s general observation on the bomb, the final record on Dimona is still “not yet in.”⁸⁷⁸ On March 12, 1969, the NSC foreshadowed that an Israeli bomb would endanger its own “future.”⁸⁷⁹ Since Israel already possesses at least 150 bombs, there is no reason why Dimona should not be immediately mothballed. Melman has warned that the 50 year-old reactor is now vulnerable to a “safety mishaps.”⁸⁸⁰ A Chernobyl type disaster at Dimona would place the Marines and Special Forces hospital and “black site” fighter base the U.S. has located in the

⁸⁷⁶ The thesis incorporated 200 anonymously written pieces.

⁸⁷⁷ Carl Bernstein, “The CIA and the Media,” http://carlberstein.com/magazine_cia_and_media.php.

⁸⁷⁸ See Federalist 41. Willis, *The Federalist Papers*, p. 207; Kennan, *American Diplomacy*, vi.

⁸⁷⁹ Talking Points, March 12, 1969, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff (NPMS), National Security (NSC) Files, Country Files-Middle East, Israel, Israel, Volume I, Part I, (January 1969 to May 31, 1969) Box 604, NARA.

⁸⁸⁰ Yossi Melman, “Israel and U.S. sign nuclear cooperation agreement,” *Ha’aretz*, April 14, 2008, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/974486.html>; *Ibid*, “Inside Intel/Is the Reactor coming out of the sealed room?” *Ibid*, January 10, 2008, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/943355.html>; Meirav Arlosoroff, “Huge salaries of Dimona nuclear reactors are state secrets,” *Ha’aretz*, December 7, 2008, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1043824.html>; Israel has at least 150 atomic weapons: Carter,” *Reuters*, May 26, 2008, <http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSL2673174120080526>.

Negev in jeopardy.⁸⁸¹ Still, Israel prefers egotistical denial before rational introspection as it pushes towards war with Iran over Tehran's nuclear program.

There is still no credible evidence that Iran is actually pursuing the bomb. Historian Garreth Porter pointed out in late August 2009 that in November 2007 the IC had concluded that Iran, which began constructing "contingency centers" in preparation for a U.S. attack in early 2002, had stopped its nuclear weapons program in 2003.⁸⁸² Iran has also allowed the IAEA to conduct inspections at its Arak and Natanz facilities and disclosed the existence of its Qom facility to the IAEA on September 21 four days before Obama and two historic allies accused Tehran of hiding the "covert" facility from the world at the G20.⁸⁸³ Scott Ritter, a former Marine and UN Iraq Weapons Inspector, argued soon after that Obama's accusation that Iran was deceiving the world was "technically and legally wrong."⁸⁸⁴ In denouncing a warmongering October 3 *NYT* story, Ritter declared on C-SPAN that Iran is a "threat to nobody."⁸⁸⁵ The U.S. government and media are lying again. The business suit and shiny black shoes are a most clever cover.⁸⁸⁶ In this solipsistic age of instant emotional gratification history has become irrelevant. Ritter admitted that the U.S. people usually always forget their own "history."⁸⁸⁷

⁸⁸¹ Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2004), pp. 153, 338-339n4-5.

⁸⁸² Garreth Porter, "Leaked stories taint Iran Nuclear Debate," *Asia Times*, August 27, 2009, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KH27Ak02.html; *Ibid.*, "Iran Began Preparing for U.S. Bombing in 2002," November 18, 2009, <http://www.afterdowningstreet.org/node/47819>.

⁸⁸³ "Iran 'will co-operate with IAEA'" *BBC*, August 24, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8218607.stm; Porter, "Leaked stories taint Iran Nuclear Debate"; Scott Ritter, "Keeping Iran Honest," *The Guardian*, September 25, 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/sep/25/iran-secret-nuclear-plant-inspections>; David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, "U.S. Allies Warn over Nuclear 'Deception,'" *NYT*, September 26, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/26/world/middleeast/26nuke.html> (See Appendix F).

⁸⁸⁴ Ritter, "Keeping Iran Honest," *The Guardian*, September 25, 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/sep/25/iran-secret-nuclear-plant-inspections>.

⁸⁸⁵ William Broad and David Sanger, "Report Says Iran Has Data to Make a Nuclear Bomb," *NYT*, October 3, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/04/world/middleeast/04.nuke.html>; "Iran Nuclear Program," C-SPAN, October 4, 2009, <http://www.c-span.org/program/289280-6> (34:03)

⁸⁸⁶ Appendix G, my longstanding computer screen background, was found at www.infowars.com.

⁸⁸⁷ "Iran Nuclear Program," Interview with Scott Ritter, C-SPAN, October 4, 2009, <http://www.c-span.org/program/289280-6> (34:03).

The U.S. has done little to discourage or restrain Israel. According to *Ha'aretz*, a week after Obama's election victory a "well placed...source" close to the President-elect stated that the U.S. would provide Israel with a "nuclear umbrella" in case of an Iranian atomic attack.⁸⁸⁸ Following the election, the NIC's *Global Trends 2025* was released weeks later, warning that "a nuclear Iran would increase pressure for" the U.S. to give Israel a "security umbrella."⁸⁸⁹ A day before Obama and Netanyahu met for the first time at the White House, Cohen wrote on May 17, 2009, that the Meir-Nixon 1969 accord and Clinton's 1998 letter to Netanyahu are held in Israel as precedents to avoid linkage to its "silent nuclear monopoly."⁸⁹⁰ Following the Netanyahu-Obama meeting, the U.S. has provided subtle winks that it would turn a blind eye to Israeli military action. On October 8, 2009, Kissinger professed that he could "understand" the "legitimacy" in any future Israeli strike on Iran. Declaring to Harvard historian Niall Ferguson that leadership is proven through the "lonely road" of "moral courage," Kissinger cautioned that the "greatest danger" on this issue was "impatience."⁸⁹¹

With a statue of Lincoln in the background, Obama muttered in his first press conference that he did not "want to speculate" when asked by Helen Thomas if he knew of any Near East nation possessing "nuclear weapons."⁸⁹² Access is power and Israel's dedicated and reflexive Jewish supporters- Strauss, Rabi, Teller, Feldman, Feinberg, Rivkin, Rostow, Frankel and the Sulzbergers- have always had it where it matters. Its neighbors never will. As long as the "power

⁸⁸⁸ Aluf Benn, "Obama's atomic umbrella: U.S. nuclear strike if Iran nukes Israel," *Ha'aretz*, November 12, 2008, <http://haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1045687.html>.

⁸⁸⁹ NIC, *Global Trends 2025*, pp. 93.

⁸⁹⁰ Avner Cohen, "Between Natanz and Dimona," *Ha'aretz*, May 17, 2009, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1085633.html>.

⁸⁹¹ "A Conversation with Henry Kissinger," C-SPAN, October 8, 2009, <http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/28933-1> (51:42).

⁸⁹² "Presidential News Conference," C-SPAN, February 9, 2009, <http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/283922-1> (60:10).

of money” remains equated with free speech Israel will continue to dictate policy to the U.S.⁸⁹³ Politics rarely impedes or informs reality. Madison’s warning that a “bad cause seldom fails to betray itself” echoes Vanunu’s March 2007 revelation that Dimona could precipitate a nuclear war and “second Holocaust.”⁸⁹⁴ There will be no “new beginning” to U.S. foreign policy in the Near East.⁸⁹⁵ The end has no end. True freedom is found in the audacity to lose all hope.⁸⁹⁶ I close with the wise words of Kennan who opposed Truman’s decision to recognize Israel on May 14, 1948, as Foggy Bottom’s Policy Planning Chairman:

History does not forgive us our national mistakes because they are explicable in terms of our domestic politics...Whoever thinks the future is going to be easier than the past is certainly mad.⁸⁹⁷

⁸⁹³ “421-Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People,” January 17, 1961, APP, *PPUS*.


⁸⁹⁴ See Federalist 41. Willis, *The Federalist Papers*, p. 20; “Nuclear whistleblower Vanunu appeals jail term for foreign ties,” *Ha’aretz*, March 3, 2007, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/900309.html>.

⁸⁹⁵ “Presidential Speech in Egypt,” June 4, 2009, C-SPAN, <http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/286821-1> (58:13).

⁸⁹⁶ *Fight Club* (1999).

⁸⁹⁷ On Wednesday, May 12, Clifford, Secretary of State Marshall and Truman met in the White House to discuss Palestine’s future. The iconic General Marshall scolded Truman’s short-sighted approach, declaring that he could not understand “why Clifford” was attending the “foreign policy” meeting since he was a “domestic advisor.” Clifford, the principle author behind the National Security Act, argued that he “functioned” as a de-facto “National Security Advisor” under Truman, foreshadowing future policy debates between Foggy Bottom and the NSC-CIA-Pentagon-IC. Beginning with the above mentioned “Showdown in the White House,” Clifford included the following passage from Angleton’s favorite poet, T.S. Eliot, to open his first memoir chapter: “A people without history is not redeemed from time, for history is a pattern of timeless moments.” Clark Clifford and Richard Holbrooke, *Counsel to the President* (New York: Doubleday, 1991), pp. 3-14; Prados, *Safe for Democracy*, pp. 33-34; Mangold, *Cold Warrior*, p. 331; Kennan, *American Diplomacy*, pp. 66, 73.





Declassified KH-4 CORONA December 10 1965

N 0 100 200 400 meters **Scale 1 pixel = ~ 2 meters**

Global Security.org



Public Eye

**KH-4 Corona Imagery
(Declassified)**

Appendix C- CFR Individual Membership ⁸⁹⁸

Dean Acheson	Graham T. Allison	Robert Anderson
George Ball	Richard Bissell	McGeorge Bundy
William Bundy	Jimmy Carter	Ray Cline
Hillary Clinton	Bill Clinton	Nathaniel Davis
Arthur Dean	Douglas Dillon	Allen Dulles
John F. Dulles	Dwight Eisenhower	Max Frankel
William C. Foster	John Lewis Gaddis	Raymond Goodpaster
Katherine Graham	James P. Grant	W. Averrell Harriman
Richard Helms	Christian Herter	Amory Houghton
Paul Jabber	Charles Johnson	Spurgeon Keeny
Henry Kissinger	Walter Laqueur	John J. McCloy
Robert McNamara	Drew Middleton	Paul Nitze
Richard Neustadt	Richard Nolte	William Polk
William Quandt	I.I. Rabi	Ogden Reid
James Reston	Abraham Ribicoff	Chalmers Roberts
Elihu Root	Walt Rostow	Eugene Rostow
Dean Rusk	David Sanger	Phillips Talbot
Raymond Tanter	Cyrus Vance	Stephen Walt
Robin Winks	Paul Wolfowitz	

⁸⁹⁸ History of the CFR- Council on Foreign Relations,” Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/about/history/cfr/appendix.html>; Perloff, *The Shadows of Power*, pp. 255-26; “U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan,” C-SPAN, October 26, 2009, <http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/289629-14> ((74:49); Wala, *The Council on Foreign Relations in the Early Cold War*; Dye, “Oligarchic Tendencies in National-Policy Making,” p. 31.

Appendix D





Bibliography

Primary Sources

Washington, District of Columbia.

United States National Archives and Records Administration
Record Group 59
Richard Nixon Presidential Materials Collection

George Washington National Security Archive
Gelman Library, George Washington University

Abilene, Kansas

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (Ann Whitman File)
International Series
International Meeting Series
Administrative Series
Dulles-Herter Series
Presidential Transitional Series
National Security Council Series
Central Files Official Files
John A. McCone Papers
Christian Herter Papers
Columbia Oral History Project

Boston, Massachusetts

John F. Kennedy Library
President's Office Files
National Security Files
White House Central Files
Oral History Interview Project
The Personal Papers of George W. Ball

Austin, Texas

Lyndon B. Johnson Library (Papers of Lyndon B. Johnson President, 1963-1969)
National Security Files

Library and Archives of Ottawa, Canada

External Affairs, Record Group 25

British National Archives of London, Great Britain

Foreign Office, Record Group 371

Congressional Record of the 89th Congress, First Session, Volume III- Part II, June 22, 1965 to July 6, 1965. Washington: GPO, 1965.

Church Committee, Volume II: Huston Plan,

<http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/contents.htm>.

Eighty-Sixth Congress, Second Session, *Review of the International Atomic Policies and Programs of the United States: Report to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Committee*, Volume 1-3, October, 10, 1960 (United States: GPO, 1960).

<http://sulderivatives.stanford.edu/derivative?CSNID=00000601&mediaType=application/pdf>

National Intelligence Council, Chairman C. Thomas Fingar, *Global Trends 2025: A World Transformed*, November 2008

http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_2025/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf

United States Congress. *Rockefeller Commission on CIA Activities within the United States: Report to the President*. Washington, DC: GPO, June 1975. Refer to Chapter 7-External

Controls; http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/contents/contents_church.htm

The American Presidency Project, *Public Papers of the United States (1776-Present)*

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/>

George Washington Online National Security Archive

Nuclear History Document Collection

Israel and the Bomb

<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/israel/>

National Intelligence Estimates of the Proliferation Problem

<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB155/index.htm>

Israel Crosses the Threshold

<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/index.htm>

The Velva Incident: Nuclear Test or Meteorite?

<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB190/index.htm>

Eyes on the Bomb: U-2, Corona and KH-7 Imagery of Foreign Nuclear Installations

<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB186/index.htm>

The U-2, OXCART, and the SR-71

<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB74/>

CIA Said in 1974 Israel Had A-Bombs

<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB240/index.htm>

Foreign Relations in the United States (FRUS), 1952-1954, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1984), *National Security Affairs*, Volume II, Part II.

FRUS, 1958-1960, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1988), *United Nations and General International Matters*, Volume XI.

FRUS, 1958-1960 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1992), *Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa*, Volume XIII.

FRUS, 1958-1960 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1996), *National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament (1958-1960)*, Volume III.

FRUS, 1961-1963 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2001), *Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters*, Volume XXV.

FRUS, 1961-1963 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1996), *Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges*, Volume VI.

FRUS, 1961-1963, (Washington: GPO, 1996) *National Security Policy*, Volume VIII.

FRUS, 1961-1962, (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1994), *Near East*, Volume XVII.

FRUS, 1962-1963, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995) *Near East*, Volume XVIII.

FRUS, 1961-1963, (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1995) *Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume VII*.

FRUS, 1964-1968, (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2001) *Western Europe*, Volume XXII.

FRUS, 1964-1968, (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2000) *Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-1967*, Volume XVIII.

FRUS, 1964-1968 (Washington: GPO, 1997) *Arms Control and Disarmament*, Volume XI:

FRUS 1964-1968 (Washington: GPO, 2004) *Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations*, Volume XXXIII.

FRUS, 1964-1968 (Washington: GPO, 2001), *National Security Policy*, Volume X.

FRUS, 1969-1976, (Washington D.C: GPO, 2007) Volume E-2, *Documents on Arms Control, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 1969-1972*.

“Iran Nuclear Program,” Interview with Scott Ritter, *C-SPAN*, Washington Journal, October 4, 2009, <http://www.c-spanarchives.org/program/289280-6> (34:03).

“National Security Threats,” *C-SPAN*, February 12, 2009.
<http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/284009-1> (2:01:00).

“Presidential News Conference,” *C-SPAN*, February 9, 2009,
<http://www.c-span video.org/program/283922-1> (60:10).

“Presidential Remarks to CIA Employees,” *C-SPAN*, April 20, 2009,
<http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/285394-3> (23:41).

- “Presidential Speech in Egypt,” June 4, 2009, C-SPAN,
<http://www.c-spanvideo.org/videoLibrary/video.php?dispid=286821-1> (58:13).
- “Progressive Covenant with the People,” American Memory from the Library of Congress,
 Theodore Roosevelt on Film, Sound Recording Transcriptions,
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/troosevelt_film/trfpcp.html.
- “Privatization of U.S. Intelligence,” C-SPAN, August 20, 2009,
<http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/288482-1> (81:07).
- “Secretary Clinton on Foreign Policy,” C-SPAN, July 15, 2009,
<http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/287728-1> (73:43).
- “Secretary Rumsfeld Availability at the Munich Conference on Security Policy,” U.S.
 Department of Defense News, February 7, 2004,
<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2036>.
- “War and the Media,” C-SPAN, September 19, 2006,
<http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/194565-1> (72:38).
- “White House Daily Briefing,” C-SPAN, November 30, 2009,
<http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/290312-2> (49:54).

Secondary Sources

- “61 Pledge to Israel by U.S. is Confirmed,” *NYT*, June 16, 1968, p. 5.
- “13 Senators in Israel to Study Atom Programs,” *NYT*, November 8, 1976, p. 6.
- “11 Named to Study of U.S. Stockpiling,” *NYT*, November 3, 1957, p. 37.
- “5 Party Cabinet Named in Israel,” *NYT*, December 17, 1959, p. 5.
- “3 Countries to Get Peaceful Atom Aid,” *NYT*, July 11, 1961, p. 5.
- “A-Bomb Beat,” *TIME*, August 11, 1975, p. 38.
- “Aide Says Mexico is Able to Produce A-Bomb, but Won’t,” *NYT*, May 26, 1965, p. 18.
- “Arabs Assail Johnson on Water Plan,” *WP*, February 8, 1964, p. C34.
- “Arabs Study Israel A-Arms Potential,” *WP*, August 29, 1964, p. B5.
- “Arabs to Meet on Threat of Israeli A-Work,” *WP*, December 28, 1960, p. A4.
- “Arms Curb and A-Controls Urged on Israel and Arabs,” *NYT*, February 25, 1964, p. 8.

- “Arms to Arabs Worries Israel,” *WP*, March 6, 1964, p. A17.
- “Around the World,” *WP*, August 14, 1966, p. A22.
- “Article Says Israel Got C.I.A. Atomic Aid,” *NYT*, July 12, 1976, p. 11.
- “As Wall Street Posts Record Profits and US Hunger Rate Grows, Robert Scheer Asks: ‘Where Is the Community Organizer We Elected?’” *Democracy Now!*, November 19, 2009, http://www.democracynow.org/2009/11/19/as_wall_street_posts_record_profits.
- “Ben Gurion Backed for Premier Again,” *NYT*, February 7, 1961, p. 3.
- “Ben-Gurion’s Fourth Time Out,” *NYT*, June 17, 1963, p. 24.
- “Ben-Gurion is Home; Calls Trip Fruitful,” *NYT*, June 9, 1961, p. 16.
- “Ben Gurion Gains 6 Knesset Seats,” *NYT*, November 5, 1959, p. 9.
- “Ben Gurion’s Plea Rejected by Party,” *NYT*, February 28, 1961, p. 3.
- “Ben Gurion Plans no Visit to the U.N.,” *NYT*, September 12, 1960, p. 6.
- “Ben Gurion Unable to form a Cabinet,” *NYT*, March 1, 1961, p. 5.
- “Ben Gurion Urges an End to Proportional System,” *NYT*, December 8, 1959, p. 133.
- “Ben Gurion Quits Over Lavon Case,” *NYT*, February 1, 1961, p. 1.
- “Ben-Gurion Steps Down; Israeli Cabinet Surprised,” *NYT*, June 17, 1963, p. 1.
- “Britain Names News Aide as Ambassador to Israel,” *NYT*, July 29, 1965, p. 2
- “Cabinet to Direct Jewish Fund Drive,” *NYT*, January 3, 1950, p. 8.
- “Career Diplomat Promotions,” *NYT*, August 6, 1964, p. 17.
- “Carrot & Stick,” *NYT*, December 25, 1960, p. E1.
- “Crum Backs Haganah,” *NYT*, October 17, 1947, p.11.
- “Defense Ministry Silent,” *NYT*, December 20, 1960, p. 15.
- “Dimona and Vanunu,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 16, 2 (Winter 1987), pp. 171-174.
- “East Side Houses Get New Tenants,” *NYT*, October 3, 1940, p. 47.

- “Eisenhower names 7 New Ambassadors,” *NYT*, January 24, 1958, p. 13.
- “Envoy to Israel Confirmed,” *NYT*, April 10, 1954, p. 6.
- “Envoy to Israel Named,” *NYT*, April 2, 1954, p. 8.
- “Eshkol Defends Deterrent,” *NYT*, June 11, 1964, p. 10.
- “Eshkol Forms Coalition Cabinet,” *NYT*, January 11, 1966, p. 4.
- “Eshkol Quits as Israeli Premier After Party Split on Lavon Issue,” *NYT*, December 15, 1964, p. 1.
- “Executive is named to high Navy Post,” *NYT*, June 2, 1951, p. 20.
- “F-4 Deliveries Begin,” *NYT*, September 7, 1969, p. 9.
- “Former Minister Lord Gilmour Dies,” *BBC*, September 21, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7007648.htm
- “French Deny Israel is Buying Missiles,” *NYT*, January 8, 1966, p. 5.
- “Gagging the Press,” *WP*, March 12, 1962, p. A16.
- “Gen. W.B. Smith Has Surgery,” *NYT*, August 3, 1955, p. 13.
- “German Magazine Says Israelis Have ABomb,” *WP*, May 9, 1969, p. A24.
- “Harriman Continues Talks,” *NYT*, February 28, 1965, p. 3.
- “Inspection is Urged for Israeli Reactor,” *NYT*, December 25, 1960, p. E8.
- “Israel also Denies Report She Bought French Missiles,” *NYT*, January 9, 1966, p.15.
- “Israelis Balking at Atom Checks,” *NYT*, April 19, 1964, p. 5.
- “Israel Bars U.S. Senators From A-Site,” *WP*, November 9, 1976, p. A1.
- “Israeli Bomb is Doubted,” *NYT*, January 10, 1969, p. 3.
- “Israel Bonds Praised,” *NYT*, December 20, 1960, p. 9.
- “Israel Bond Sale Put at \$51, 965, 300,” *NYT*, January 15, 1961, p. 65.
- “Israel Bond Sales Total Half Billion,” *NYT*, July 2, 1961, p. 8.

- “Israeli Bond Unit Elects President,” *NYT*, May 23, 1955, p. 12.
- “Israel Budget Defense-Heavy,” *WP*, January 1, 1963, p. A14.
- “Israeli Denies Report,” *NYT*, December 19, 1960, p. 8.
- “Israel Denies a Report She Has 5 or 6 A-Bombs,” *NYT*, May 9, 1969, p. 9.
- “Israeli Detects A Russian Thaw,” *NYT*, September 7, 1964, p. 1.
- “Israeli Expansionism is Denied by Eshkol,” *NYT*, June 6, 1964, p. 3.
- “Israeli Envoy Shifted,” *NYT*, February 24, 1962, p. A9.
- “Israel Gets U.S. Atom Library,” *NYT*, September 1, 1955, p. 3.
- “Israel has at least 150 atomic weapons: Carter,” *Reuters*, May 26, 2008,
<http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSL2673174120080526>.
- “Israel Looks to a New Leader,” *NYT*, June 23, 1963, p. 149.
- “Israel’s Next Premier,” *NYT*, June 25, 1963, p. 2.
- “Israeli nuclear whistleblower Mordechai Vanunu arrested,” *BBC*, December 29, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8433603.stm.
- “Israel Official Says Costs of Reactor Are Withheld,” *NYT*, August 1, 1962, p. 3.
- “Israel Planners Seek 437 Million,” *NYT*, January 16, 1961, p. 13.
- “Israel Gets U.S. Atom Fuel,” *NYT*, March 4, 1960, p. 11.
- “Israel Renews Reactor Pledge,” *NYT*, January 12, 1961, p. 4.
- “Israelis Reject Bid on Atom-Free Zone,” *NYT*, August 8, 1963, p. 2.
- “Israel Reopens Inquiry,” *NYT*, September 27, 1960, p. 21.
- “Israel Rocket is ‘Lesson’ to Arab Press,” *WP*, July 7, 1961, p. A8.
- “Israel Said to Plan to Make Atom Bomb,” *NYT*, June 14, 1967, p. 16.
- “Israel Says A-Reactor is for Peace,” *WP*, December 23, 1960, p. A2.
- “Israeli Sees President,” *NYT*, September 15, 1959, p. 45.

- “Israeli Sense of Purpose Hailed,” *NYT*, January 13, 1961, p. 4.
- “Israel Starts Up Atom,” *NYT*, December 12, 1962, p. 10.
- “Israel Urges Test Ban; Knesset Bids Nations to Set Up Effective Nuclear Controls,” *NYT*, November 29, 1961, p. 20.
- “Israel’s Voice in the U.N.,” *NYT*, March 23, 1968, p. 2.
- “Israeli warships rehearse for Iran attack in Red Sea,” *The Telegraph*, July 16, 2009, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/5842963/Israeli-warships-rehearse-for-Iran-attack-in-Red-Sea.html>.
- “Israel Will accede to Nuclear Treaty,” *NYT*, August 1, 1963, p. 2.
- “Israel Will Accept Atom Control Shift,” *NYT*, June 9, 1964, p. 6.
- “Iran ‘will co-operate with IAEA’” *BBC*, August 24, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8218607.stm.
- “Jewish Head Scores Soviet Cartoon,” *NYT*, September 26, 1964, p. 2.
- “Jewish Group Here Asks A Soviet ‘Bill of Rights,’” *NYT*, November 27, 1964, p. 5.
- “Jews Picket Soviet Mission,” *NYT*, January 27, 1964, p. 14.
- “Kennedy, Ben-Gurion Hold Fruitful Parley,” *NYT*, May 31, 1961, p. A10.
- “Kennedy, Eshkol Exchange Notes,” *WP*, September 16, 1963, p. A15.
- “Khrushchev Grants Egypt \$277 Million in Parting Gesture,” *WP*, May 25, 1964, p. A1.
- “Lavon is Cleared in Israeli Inquiry,” *NYT*, December 26, 1960, p. 1.
- “Lebanon Post Filled,” *NYT*, October 28, 1961, p. 14.
- “Levi Eshkol is Dead of a Heart Attack,” *NYT*, February 26, 1969, p. 49.
- “Marian Osterwies Is Married to Steven R. Rivkin, A Lawyer,” *NYT*, June 15, 1968, p. 27.
- “Member of the Club,” *Time*, December 26, 1960, p. 18.
- “Mercurial Publisher; Dorthy Schiff Sonneborn,” *NYT*, June 24, 1965, p. 24.
- “Montreal Paper Asserts Israel Has Atomic Bombs,” *NYT*, May 8, 1969, p. 15.

- “Mrs. Meir Says Nixon Did not Promise Arms,” *NYT*, October 3, 1969, p. 31.
- “Nasser Cites Need for Nuclear Arms,” *NYT*, May 9, 1966, p. 8.
- “Nasser Says U.A.R. Will Sign Test Pact,” *NYT*, July 29, 1963, p.1.
- “Nasser Threatens Israel on A-Bomb,” *NYT*, December 24, 1960, p.1.
- “Nasser Threatens to War on a Nuclear-Armed Israel,” *NYT*, April 18, 1966, p. 6.
- “New Ambassador to Iran Approved by Senate Panel,” *NYT*, March 17, 1965, p. 11.
- “New Envoy of U.S. Arrives in Tel Aviv,” *NYT*, November 23, 1954, p. 6.
- “New Israeli Ambassador Arrives,” *NYT*, September 2, 1959, p. 2.
- “New Loans for Israel,” *NYT*, March 16, 1961, p. 14.
- “New National Chairman for the Palestine Appeal,” *NYT*, November 2, 1950, p. 9.
- “New Yorker Will Head Trustees at Brandeis University,” *NYT*, September 19, 1954, p. 121.
- “Newly Formed Concern Appoints Two Officers,” *NYT*, April 25, 1955, p. 33.
- “Nixon Accepts with Praise Resignation of 2 Officials,” *NYT*, June 30, 1973, p. 40.
- “No Change Foreseen in Near East Policy,” *WP*, January 21, 1964, p. A2.
- “Nuclear Venture Earmarks 2 Sites,” *NYT*, August 4, 1955, p. 32.
- “Nuclear whistleblower Vanunu appeals jail term for foreign ties,” *Ha’aretz*, March 3, 2007, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/900309.html>.
- “Obituary 4- No Title,” *WP*, October 3, 1988, p. D6.
- “Paper Says Israel Has 10 Atom Bombs,” *NYT*, August 1, 1975, p.8.
- “Peaceful Aims Assured,” *NYT*, December 20, 1960, p. 15.
- “Popular French Envoy Gets Israeli Farewell,” *NYT*, November 21, 1959, p. 9.
- “Pulitzer for Al Friendly,” *WP*, May 7, 1968, p. A16.
- “Random Notes from Washington,” *NYT*, December 12, 1955, p. 27.
- “Reactor Laboratories Elects New President,” *NYT*, April 7, 1958, p. 36.

- “Reid Presents Fund to Israel,” *NYT*, January 19, 1961, p. 14.
- “Robert T. Webber, 56,” *WP*, April 10, 1977, p. 108.
- “Roswell Leavitt Gilpatric, Lawyer and Kennedy Aide, Dies at 89,” *NYT*, March 17, 1996, p. 41.
- “Roswell Gilpatric to Succeed Stuart in the Air Force Post,” *WP*, April 29, 1951, p. M1.
- “Russia Attacks Israeli Envoy,” *WP*, May 23, 1965, A22.
- “Skipper of Exodus Calls Jews ‘Indigestible’ by all but Israel,” *NYT*, February 7, 1961, p. 21.
- “Soviet Premier Calls on Arabs to Unite Against Colonialism,” *WP*, May 11, 1964, p. A1.
- “Talks on Policy Held in Tel Aviv,” *WP*, August 22, 1962, p. A7.
- “Talks Scheduled on German Assets,” *NYT*, February 7, 1955, p. 31.
- “Test in Mideast Foreseen by U.S.,” *NYT*, January 21, 1964, p. 9.
- “The Foreign Service,” *NYT*, May 30, 1936, p. 30.
- “The Foreign Service,” *NYT*, January 25, 1942, p. 42.
- “The Nth Power,” *Time*, December 19, 1960.
- “The Kings vs. the Guerrilla,” *WP*, June 30, 1970, p. A14.
- “The Secret Reactor,” *WP*, December 20, 1960, p. A14.
- “There Was a Lawyer, An Engineer and a Politician,” *The Economist*, April 18, 2009, pp. 64-65.
- “Truman Library Seeks \$1, 500, 000,” *NYT*, December 21, 1952, p. 40.
- “TV Report of an Israeli A-Bomb Draws a Denial in Washington,” *NYT*, January 9, 1969, p. 2.
- “U.A.R. Diplomat Says Israel Plans A-Bombs,” *WP*, April 25, 1963 p. A23.
- “U.A.R. Envoy Quits for Teaching Job,” *NYT*, May 17, 1964, p. 43.
- “UK helped Israel get nuclear bomb,” *BBC*, August 4, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4743987.stm
- “U.N. Roll-Call on Nuclear Pact,” *NYT*, June 13, 1968, p. 18.

“U.S. Aiding Israel in Atom Research,” *NYT*, October 27, 1963, p. 8.

“U.S. Envoy to Iran, Mideast Expert, Gets Tokyo Post,” *NYT*, April 27, 1969, p. 1.

“U.S. Loans Aid Israeli Airport,” *NYT*, December 20, 1960, p. 29.

“U.S. Officials Shun Fete,” *NYT*, November 8, 1954, p. 8.

“U.S. Officials Visit Stir Israel Anew,” *NYT*, August 24, 1962, p. 3.

“U.S. ‘Welcomes’ Promises on Reactor,” *WP*, December 23, 1960, p. A2.

“U.S. Will Study Asian Research,” *NYT*, October 3, 1960, p. 33.

“Zionism is Asked to Drop Politics,” *NYT*, September 10, 1951, p. 30.

Adams, James. *The Unnatural Alliance*. New York: Quartet Books, 1984.

Allison, Graham T. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Boston: Little Brown, 1971.

Alsop, Joseph. “Matter of Fact...,” *NYT*, December 28, 1960, p. A15.

Alteras, Isaac. *Eisenhower and Israel: U.S.-Israeli Relations, 1953-1960*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993.

Arlosoroff, Meriav. “Huge salaries of Dimona nuclear reactors are state secrets,” *Ha’aretz*, December 7, 2008, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1043824.html>.

Aronson, Shlomo. *The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East: Opacity, Theory, and Reality, 1960-1991*. Albany: State University Press, 1992.

Ashton, Nigel John. *Eisenhower, Macmillan, and the Problem of Nasser*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996.

Baldwin, Hanson, “China’s Bomb: Grave Problems Posed for West,” *NYT*, October 18, 1964, E3.

Baldwin, Hanson. “If Sixteen Countries had the Bomb,” *NYT*, February 12, 1961, p.SM7.

Baldwin, Hanson. “Why We Test the Bombs,” *NYT*, August 12, 1962, p. E5.

Ball, George and Douglass Ball, *The Passionate Attachment: America’s Involvement with Israel, 1947 to the Present*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992.

- Barnaby, Frank. *The Invisible Bomb: the Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East*. London: I.B. Tauris, 1989.
- Bar-Joseph, Uri. "The Hidden Debate: The Formation of Nuclear Doctrines in the Middle East," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 5, 2 (June 1982), pp. 205-227.
- Bar-On, Mordechai. *The Gates of Gaza: Israel's Road to Suez and Back, 1955-1957*. New York: St Martin's Press, 1994.
- Bar-Siman-Tov, Ya'acov. "Ben Gurion and Sharett: Conflict Management and Great Power Constraints in Israeli Foreign Policy," *Middle Eastern Studies* 24, 3 (July 1983), pp. 330-356.
- Bar-Siman-Tov, Ya'acov. *Israel, the Superpowers, and War in the Middle East*. New York: Praeger, 1987.
- Bar-Siman-Tov, Ya'acov. "The United States and Israel since 1948: A 'Special Relationship'?" *DH* 22, 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 231-261.
- Bar-Zohar, Michael. *Ben Gurion: A Biography*. New York: Delacorte, 1978.
- Bar-Zohar, Michael. *Embassies in Crisis: Diplomats and Demagogues Behind the Six Day War*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1970.
- Bass, Warren. *Support Any Friend: Kennedy's Middle East and the Making of the U.S.-Israeli Alliance*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
- Bases, Daniel. "Update 1-Israel's Fischer says world most accept a weaker dollar," *Reuters*, December 3, 2009, <http://www.reuters.com/article/usDollarRpt/idUSN0310218520091203>.
- Baulch, Jerry T. "Israel Ured to Squelch A-Fears by Permitting Nuclear Inspection," *WP*, December 26, 1960, p. A2.
- Beecher, William "Israel Seen Holding 10 Nuclear Weapons," *WP*, July 31, 1975, p. A34.
- Bell, Bowyer J. "Israel's Nuclear Option," *Middle East Journal*, 26, 4 (Autumn 1972), pp. 379-389.
- Bell, Bowyer J. "Purgatory in Cyprus," *NYT*, February 1, 1975, p. 22.
- Benn, Aluf. "Quiet Cooperation," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 57, 6 (November-December 2001), pp. 15-18.
- Benn, Aluf. "A President's Promise: Israel Can Keep Its Nukes," *Ha'aretz*, March 14, 2000, <http://www.serve.com/vanunu/nukes/20000314haaretz.html>.

Benn, Aluf. "Obama's atomic umbrella: U.S. nuclear strike if Iran nukes Israel," *Ha'aretz*, November 12, 2008, <http://haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1045687.html>.

Ben-Zvi, Abraham *Decade of Transition: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Origins of the American*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998.

Ben-Zvi, Abraham. *JFK and the Politics of Arms Sale*. London: Frank Cass, 2002.

Beres, Louis Rene and Zeev Maoz, "Correspondence: Israel and the Bomb," *International Security* 29, 1 (Summer 2004), pp. 1-14.

Beres, Louis Rene. "Introduction," in *Security or Armageddon: Israel's Nuclear Strategy ed Beres* (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1986), pp. 1-14.

Bernstein, Carl. "The CIA and the Media," http://carlbernstein.com/magazine_cia_and_media.php.

Beschloss, Michael. *Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair*. New York: Harper & Row, 1986.

Bhatia, Shyam. *Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East*. London: Routledge, 1988.

Bialer, Uri. *Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation 1948-1956*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Bialer, Uri. *Oil and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-1963*. Oxford: St. Anthony's College, 1999.

Bialer, Uri. "Top Hat, Tuxedo and Cannons: Israeli Foreign Policy from 1948 to 1956 as a Field of Study," *Israel Studies* 7, 1 (2002), pp. 1-80.

Bissell, Richard and Jonathan E. Lewis. *Reflections of a Cold Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996.

Black, Edwin. *Nazi Nexus: American's Corporate Connections to Hitler's Holocaust*. Washington, D.C.: Dialog Press, 2009.

Black, Ian and Benny Morris. *Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's Intelligence Services*. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991.

Blair, Granger W. "2 Israelis Resign in Leaders Resign in Leader's Rift," *NYT*, May 21, 1965, p. 9.

Blair, Granger W. "Beersheba Hums as Negev's Portal," *NYT*, February 8, 1963, p. 3.

Blair, Granger W. "Ben-Gurion vs. Eshkol," *NYT*, May 22, 1965, p. 5.

- Blair, Granger W. "Eshkol Presents Cabinet in Israel," *NYT*, June 25, 1963, p. 2.
- Blair, Granger W. "Eshkol Restored to Post in Israel," *NYT*, December 23, 1964, p. 2.
- Blair, Granger W. "Harriman to See Israelis Today on Diplomatic Snarl in Mideast," *NYT*, February 24, 1965, p. 4.
- Blitzer, Wolf. *Between Washington and Jerusalem: A Reporter's Notebook*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.
- Brands, Hal. "Rethinking Nonproliferation: LBJ, the Gilpatric Committee, and U.S. National Security Policy," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 8, 2 (Spring 2006), pp. 83-113.
- Brecher, Michael. *Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973*. Berkley: University of California Press, 1980.
- Brewer, Sam Pop. "U.N. Group Urges Test-Ban Parley," *NYT*, November 19, 1961, p. 23.
- Brugioni, Dino. *Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis*. New York: Random House, 1991.
- Buchalla, Carl. "German Rocket Expert in U.A.R. Tells of Fear of Israeli Reprisal," *NYT*, January 9, 1965, p. 1.
- Buckley, Thomas. "Coca-Cola Grants Israeli Franchise," *NYT*, April 16, 1966, p. 1.
- Bundy, McGeorge. *Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years*. New York: Random House, Inc., 1998.
- Burg, Avraham. *The Holocaust is Over; We Must Rise From its Ashes*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
- Burt, Richard. "U.S. is Unable to Confirm A-Blast," *NYT*, January 24, 1980, p. B8.
- Breines, Paul. *Tough Jews: Political Fantasies and the Moral Dilemma of American Jewry*. New York: Basic Books, 1990.
- Caplan, Neil. *Futile Diplomacy: Operation Alpha and the Failure of Anglo-American Coercive Diplomacy in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1954-1956, Volume Four*. London: Frank Cass, 1997.
- Catudal, Honoré M. *Israel's Nuclear Weaponry: A New Arms Race in the Middle East*. London: Grey Seal, 1991.

- Cimbala, Stephen. "An Israeli Nuclear Deterrent: Implications for U.S.-Soviet Strategic Policies," in *Security or Armageddon: Israel's Nuclear Strategy* edited Beres, pp. 133-159. Toronto: Lexington Books, 1986.
- Claiborne, William. "Boy Wonder, 2-Time Loser, Peres Reaches Top Rung," *WP*, September 24, 1984, p. A26.
- Claiborne, William. "Israel Penalizes Reporter for Violating Censorship," *WP*, February 25, 1980, p. A7.
- Clark, Ian. *Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain's Deterrent and America, 1957-1962*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.
- Cleva, Gregory. *Henry Kissinger and the American Approach to Foreign Policy*. Toronto: Bucknell University Press, 1989.
- Clifford, Clark and Richard Holbrooke, *Counsel to the President: A Memoir*. New York: Doubleday, 1991.
- Clifford, Garry J. "Bureaucratic Politics," In *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, ed. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, pp. 91-102. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Cline, Ray. *Secrets, Spies and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA*. Washington D.C.: Acropolis Books, Ltd, 1976.
- Cohen, Avner. "Between Natanz and Dimona," *Ha'aretz*, May 17, 2009, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1085633.html>.
- Cohen, Avner. "Deterrence, Holocaust, and Nuclear Weapons: A Nonparochial Outlook," in *Security or Armageddon: Israel's Nuclear Strategy ed Beres* (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1986), pp. 174-190.
- Cohen, Avner. *Israel and the Bomb*. New York: Columbia University of Press, 1998.
- Cohen, Avner. "Nuclear Weapons, Opacity, and Israeli Democracy," In *National Security & Democracy in Israel*, edited Avner Yaniv, pp. 197-227. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc: 1993.
- Cohen, Avner. "Peres: Peacemaker, Nuclear Pioneer," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 52, no. 3 (May-June 1996), pp. 16-17.
- Cohen, Michael. *Truman and Israel*. Berkley: University of California Press, 1990.
- Cohen, Warren. "Balancing American Interests in the Middle East: Lyndon Baines Johnson vs. Gamal Abdul Nasser," in *Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World*, ed. Warren

- I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopft Tucker, pp. 270-310. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- Cohen, Yoel. "Nuclear Ambiguity and the Media: The Israeli Case," *Israeli Affairs* 12, 3 (July 2006), pp. 529-545.
- Connelly, Matthew. *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Costigliola, Frank and Thomas G. Paterson, "Defining and Doing the History of the United States Foreign Relations," in *Explaining the History American Foreign Relations*, ed. Hogan and Patterson, pp. 10-34. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Crick, Michael. "How Britain helped Israel get the Bomb," *BBC 2 Newsnight*, August 3, 2005 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/4743493.stm>.
- Crosbie, Sylvia. *A Tacit Alliance: France and Israel from Suez to the Six Day War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974.
- Crowther, Bosley. "Screen: A Long 'Exodus,'" *NYT*, December 16, 1960, p.44.
- Dahl, Robert. *A Preface to Democratic Theory: Expanded Edition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006.
- Dahl, Robert. *Controlling Nuclear Weapons: Democracy versus Guardianship*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985.
- Dahl, Robert. *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982.
- Dahl, Robert. *Poynarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.
- Dalleck, Robert. *An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917-1963*. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2003.
- Damms, Richard. "James Killian: the technological capabilities panel, and the emergence of President Eisenhower's 'Scientific-Technological Elite,'" *DH* 24, 1 (Winter 2000), pp. 56-78.
- Davenport, Elaine, Paul Eddy, and Peter Gillman, *The Plumbat Affair*. New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1978.
- Davis, Deborah. *Katherine the Great: Katharine Graham and the Washington Post*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovnovich, Inc., 1979.

DeCarlo, Scott. "The World Biggest Companies," *Forbes*, April 4, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/04/08/worlds-largest-companies-business-global-09-global_land.html.

De Gaulle, Charles. *Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor*. New York: Simon Schuster, 1971.

Divine, Robert A. *The Sputnik Challenge*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Doel, Rondald and Allan Needell. "Science, Scientists and the CIA," in *Eternal Vigilance? 50 Years of the CIA* ed. Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones and Christopher Andrew, pp. 59-81. London: Frank Cass, 1997.

Dougherty, Philip H. "Israel Institute Hails its Builder," *NYT*, December 10, 1964, p. 95.

Dowty, Alan "Nuclear Proliferation: the Israeli Case," *International Studies Quarterly* 22, 1(March 1978), pp. 79-120.

Dye, Thomas R. "Oligarchic Tendencies in National Policy-Making: the Role of the Private Policy-Making Planning Organization," *The Journal of Politics* 40 (1978), pp. 309-331.

Druks, Herbert. *John F. Kennedy and Israel*. Westport: Praeger Security International, 2005.

Eban, Abba. *An Autobiography*. New York: Random House, 1977.

Eban, Abba. "Reality and Vision in the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs* 43, 4 (July 1965), pp. 626-638.

Evron, Yair. "The Arab Position in the Nuclear Field, A Study of Policies up to 1967," *Cooperation and Conflict* 8, 1 (1973), pp. 19-31.

Evron, "Opaque Proliferation: The Israeli Case," in *Opaque Nuclear Proliferation Methodological and Policy Implications*, edited by Avner Cohen and Benjamin Frankel, pp. 45-63. London Frank Cass, 1991.

Evron, Yair. "Israel and the Atom: The Uses and Misuses of Ambiguity, 1957-1967," *Orbis* 17, 4 (1974), pp. 1326-1343.

Evron, Yair. *Israel's Nuclear Dilemma*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994.

Feldman, Shai. *Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982.

Fellows, Lawrence. "Ben Gurion Backed for Premier Again," *NYT*, February 7, 1961, p. 3.

Fellows, Lawrence. "Ben-Gurion Party Wins in Election," *NYT*, August 17, 1961, p. 2.

Fellows, Lawrence. "Ben-Gurion wins Israel Test Vote; He Survives No-Confidence Motion, 77 to 26, but is Criticized over Lavon," *NYT*, January 31, 1961, p. 8.

Fellows, Lawrence. "Ben Gurion Wins Vote in Party to Restrict Lavon's Authority," *NYT*, February 4, 1961, p. 6.

Fellows, Lawrence. "Cabinet Split by Dispute," *NYT*, December 28, 1960, p. 1.

Fellows, Lawrence. "Histadrut Ousts Lavon From Post," *NYT*, February 10, 1961, p. 22.

Fellows, Lawrence. "Israeli Campaign Limpes to a Close," *NYT*, August 13, 1961, p. 15.

Fellows, Lawrence. "Israelis Get Plea to End Disputes," *NYT*, December 30, 1960, p. 4.

Fellows, Lawrence. "Israeli Party Votes Dismissal of Lavon," *NYT*, February 5, 1961, p. 62.

Fellows, Lawrence. "Israelis to Form 4-Party Coalition," *NYT*, November 1, 1961, p. 9.

Fellows, Lawrence. "Israel Launches Research Rocket," *NYT*, July 6, 1961, p. 1.

Fellows, Lawrence. "Israeli Party Votes Dismissal of Lavon," *NYT*, February 5, 1961, p. 62.

Felsenthal, Carol. *Power, Privilege, and the Post: the Katharine Graham Story*. New York: Putnam's, 1993.

Feron, James. "Atom-News Ban End Urged in Israel," *NYT*, March 7, 1966, p. 11.

Feron, James. "Eshkol Buried on Mt. Herzl Overlooking Jerusalem," *NYT*, March 1, 1969, p. 14.

Feron, James. "Eshkol on Firing Line," *NYT*, July 25, 1965, p. E4.

Feron, James. "Eshkol Saddened by Ben-Gurion's Bid for Power," *NYT*, July 29, 1965, p. 2.

Feron, James. "Israelis Honor Atom Scientist," *NYT*, May 14, 1966, p. 3.

Feron, James. "Israelis to Appoint Gen. Rabin as Envoy to U.S.," *NYT*, August 24, 1967, p. 18.

Feron, James. "Mideast Atom Curb is Urged by Eshkol," *NYT*, May 19, 1966, p. 1.

Feron, James. "Mrs. Meir Sworn in as Israeli Premier," *NYT*, March 18, 1969, p. 12.

Feron, James. "New Knesset Dedicated in Israel," *NYT*, August 31, 1966, p. 16.

Feron, James. "Now the Real Fight Starts in Israel," *NYT*, January 28, 1968, p. E3.

Feron, James. "Thousands Pass Eshkol Coffin," *NYT*, February 28, 1969, p. 2.

- Ferris, John. "Coming in from the Cold War: the Historiography of American Intelligence, 1945-1990," In *America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941*, ed. Michael J. Hogan, pp. 562-598. New York: Cambridge University Press: 1994.
- Findley, Paul. *They Dare Speak Out: People and Institutions Confront Israel's Lobby*. Westport: Lawrence Hill, 1985.
- Finney, John. "Experts Disagree on Civil Defense," *NYT*, April 29, 1976, p.3.
- Finney, John. "Experts Disagree on Civil Defense," *NYT*, April 29, 1976, p. 9.
- Finney, John. "U.S. Aides Doubt that Israel Has Decided to Build A-Bomb," *NYT*, January 11, 1969, p. 3.
- Finney, John. "U.S. Hears Israel Moves Toward A-Bomb Potential," *NYT*, December 19, 1960, p. 1.
- Finney, John. "U.S. Misled at First on Israeli Reactor," *NYT*, December 20, 1960, p.1, 15
- Finney, John. "Israel Permits U.S. to Inspect Atomic Reactor," *NYT*, March 14, 1965, p. 1.
- Finney, John. "Israelis Will Buy U.S. Jet Bombers," *NYT*, May 20, 1966, p. 1.
- Finney, John. "Nuclear Test Debate Points Up the U.S. Dilemma," *NYT*, May 21, 1961, p. E5.
- Finney, John. "Senate Approves Treaty to Block Nuclear Spread," *NYT*, March 14, 1969, p. 1.
- Flapan, Simha. "Nuclear Power in the Middle East," *New Outlook*, 17, 6 (July 1974), pp. 46-54.
- Flapan, Simha. "Nuclear Power in the Middle East: The Critical Years," *New Outlook*, 17, 8 (October 1974), pp. 34-40.
- Fleming, Eileen. "Israel's Nuclear Weapons Program: What Americans Need to know about Mordechai Vanunu," *Global Research*, December 14, 2009, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=16536>.
- Forland, Astrid. "Norway's Nuclear Odyssey: From Optimist Proponent to Nonproliferator," *Nonproliferation Review* 4, 2 (Winter 1997), pp.1-16.
- Førland, Tor Egil. "Selling Firearms to the Indians': Eisenhower's Export Control Policy, 1953-1954," *Diplomatic History* 15, 1 (Spring 1991), pp. 221-244.
- Foster, William C. "New Directions in Arms Control and Disarmament," *Foreign Affairs* 43, 4 (July 1965), pp. 587- 601.

- Fowle, Farnsworth. "Bonn Envoys Joins Salute to Aufuba," *NYT*, March 22, 1965, p. 15.
- Frankel, Max. "U.S. Aides See Unclear Terms in Treaty Banning Atomic Tests," *NYT*, July 27, 1963, p.2.
- Frankel, Max. "U.S. Will Supply Israel Missiles in Policy Change," *NYT*, September 27, 1962, p.1.
- Freedman, Lawrence. "Review," *Foreign Affairs* 86, 5 (September/October 2007), pp. 168-169.
- Freiberger, Stephen. *Dawn over Suez: The Rise of American Power in the Middle East*. Chicago: I.R. Dee, 1992.
- Friedman, Thomas. *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*. New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 1999.
- Friendly, Alfred. "Israel Speculates Egypt May Seek Atomic Weapons to Rebuild its Forces," *WP*, June 19, 1967, p. A11.
- Fukuyama, Francis. "Nuclear Shadowboxing: Soviet Intervention Threat in the Middle East," *ORBIS*, 25, 3 (Fall 1981), pp. 576-606.
- Fulton, Ben "Britain Secretly Sent Vital Nuclear Bomb Ingredient to Israel," *Daily Telegraph*, August 4, 2005, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1495474/Britain-secretly-sold-vital-nuclear-bomb-ingredient-to-Israel.html>.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. "Intelligence, Espionage, and Cold War Origins," *Diplomatic History*, 13, 2 (Spring 1989), pp. 191-212.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. "The Corporatist Synthesis: A Skeptical View," *Diplomatic History* 10, 4 (Fall 1986), pp. 357-362.
- Gaddis, John Lewis *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.
- Gal, Harold. "U.S Will Resume Sending Israeli Defense Missiles," *NYT*, July 7, 1968, p. 1.
- Garthoff, Raymond. *A Journey Through the Cold War: A Memoir and Coexistence*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2001.
- Gavin, Francis J. "Blasts from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s," *International Security* 29, 3 (Winter 2004/2005), pp. 100-135.
- Garwin, Richard. "Count on Rumsfeld, Not the Missile Shield," *NYT*, December 30, 2000, p. A15.

- Gazit, Mordechai. "The Genesis of the US-Israeli Military-Strategic Relationship and the Dimona Issue," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 35, 3 (July 2000), pp. 413-422.
- Gerges, Fawaz A. *The Superpowers and the Middle East*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.
- Gerth, Jeff. "New CIA Chief Picks Veteran Staff," *NYT*, July 22, 1997, p. A12.
- Ginor, Isabella and Gideon Remez, *Foxbats over Dimona: The Soviets' Nuclear Gamble in the Six-Day War*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007.
- Ginor, Isabella and Gideon Remez, "The Spymaster, the Communist, and Foxbats over Dimona: The USSR's Motive for Instigating the Six Day War," *Israel Studies* 11, 2 (Summer 2006), pp. 80-130.
- Ginor, Isabella. "The Six day War as a Soviet Initiative: New Evidence and Methodological Issues," *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 12, 3 (September 2008), pp. 17-32.
- Ginor, Isabella. "The Russians Were Coming: The Soviet Military Threat in the 1967 Six-Day War," *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 4, 4 (December 2000), pp. 44-59.
- Ginor, Isabella. "The Cold War's Longest Cover-Up: How and Why the USSR Instigated the 1967," *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 7, 3 (September 2003), pp. 34-59.
- Golan, Galia. *Soviet Policies in the Middle East: from World War Two to Gorbachev*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Golan, Galia. "A (Dubious) Conspiracy of the 1967 War," *Diplomatic History*, 32, 4 (September 2008), pp. 669-673.
- Golan, Galia. "The Soviet Union and the Outbreak of the June 1967 Six-Day War," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 8, 1 (2006), pp. 3-19.
- Golan, Matti. *Shimon Peres: A Biography*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982.
- Goldberg, J.J. *Jewish Power: Inside the American Jewish Establishment*. New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1996.
- Goldschmidt, Bertrand. "The French Atomic Energy Program," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 18, 7 (September 1962), pp. 39-42.
- Gould, Lewis L. "Never a Deep Partisan: Lyndon Johnson and the Democratic Party, 1963-1969," in *The Johnson Years*, Volume III, ed., Robert Divine, pp. 21-52. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1994.
- Govrin, Yosef. *Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1953-1967*. London: Frank Cass, 1998.

- Greenstein, Fred. *The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader*. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1983.
- Griffin, Edward. *The Creature from Jekyll Island: A Second Look at the Federal Reserve*. Westlake: American Media, 2002.
- Griffith, Robert. "Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Corporate Commonwealth," *American Historical Review* 87, 1 (February 1982), pp. 87-122.
- Grose, Peter. "Mrs. Meir Greeted Warmly By Nixon," *NYT*, September 26, 1969, p. 1.
- Gross Stein, Janice and Raymond Tanter, *Rational Decision-Making: Israel's Security Choices 1967*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1980.
- Grusson, Sydney. "Wilson Proposes Nuclear-Free Zone in Mideast," *NYT*, December 23, 1964, p. 2.
- Haikal, Mohammad. *Illusions of Triumph: An Arab View of the Gulf War*. London: Harper and Collins, 1972.
- Haikal, Mohammad. *The Cairo Documents*. New York: Doubleday & Company, 1973.
- Hahn, Peter. *Caught in the Middle East: U.S. Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004.
- Hahn, Peter, *Crisis and Crossfire: The United States and the Middle East since 1945*. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005.
- Hahn, Peter. "Special Relationships," *Diplomatic History* 22, 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 263-272.
- Hahn, Peter. "The United States and Israel in the Eisenhower Era: The 'Special Relationship' Revisited," in *The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War*, edited Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns, pp. 225-243. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006.
- Hahn, Peter. "The View from Jerusalem: Revelations about U.S. Diplomacy from the Archives of Israel," *Diplomatic History* 22, 4 (1998), pp. 509-532.
- Halloran, Richard. "Mrs. Meir Indicates a Promise by Nixon of Continuing Support," *NYT*, September 27, 1969, p. 1.
- Harkavy, Robert. *Spectre of a Middle Eastern Holocaust: The Strategic and Diplomatic Implications of the Israeli Nuclear Weapons Program*. University of Denver: Graduate School of International Studies, 1977.

- Herken, Greg. *Cardinal Choices: Presidential Science Advising from the Atomic Bomb to SDI*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
- Herken, Greg. "In the Service of the State: Science and the Cold War," *DH*, 24, 1(Winter 2000), pp. 107-116.
- Herken, Greg. *The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950*. New York: Vintage Books, 1981.
- Hersh, Seymour. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. New York: Random House, 1991.
- Hess, Karl. "Guerillas: Doomed to Failure?" *WP*, December 31, 1976, p. D6.
- Hodgson, Godfrey. "Katharine Graham," *The Guardian*, July 18, 2001, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2001/jul/18/guardianobituaries.pressandpublishing>.
- Hogan, Michael. *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Hogan, Michael J. "Corporatism," In *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, edited Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, pp. 137-149. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Holsti, Ole R. "Theories of International Relations," in *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, ed. Michael Hogan and Thomas Patterson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 51-90.
- Horowitz, Dan "The Israeli Concept of National Security," In *National Security & Democracy in Israel*, edited Avner Yaniv, pp. 11-55 Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
- Horowitz, David. "Russia Confirms Soviet Sorties over Dimona in '67," *JP*, August 23, 2007 <http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1187779146277&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull>.
- Horowitz, David. "Soviets Engineered Six Day War," *JP*, May 16, 2007 <http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1178708610161&pagename=JPost/JPArticle/Printer>.
- Howe, Marvin. "Avraham Harman is Dead at 77," *NYT*, February, 25, 1992, p. D22.
- Ibrahim, Yousff M. and Robert S. Greenberger, "Syria Appears to Be Spoiler of Accord Between U.S., Iran on Hostages, Arms," *WSJ*, November 6, 1986, p. 3.
- Isaacson, Walter and Evan Thomas, *The Wise Men: Six Men and the World They Made*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988.

- Jabber, Fuad. *Israel and Nuclear Weapons*. London: Chatto & Windus, 1971.
- Jabber, Fuad. *The Palestinian Resistance and Inter-Arab Politics*. Santa Monica: Rand Paper Series, 1971.
- Jabber, Paul. "Sliding to Wider War in the Gulf," *WSJ*, August 27, 1987, p. 22.
- James, Laura. "Nasser and His Enemies," *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 9, 2 (2005), pp. 23-44.
- Johnson, Chalmers. *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2004.
- Johnson, Lock K. "Glimpses into the Gems of American Intelligence: The President's Daily Brief and the National Intelligence Estimate," *Intelligence and National Security*, 23, 3 (June 2008), pp. 333-370.
- Johnson, Robert David. *All the Way with LBJ: The 1964 Presidential Election*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Jones, Meirion. "Britain's Dirty Secret," *New Statesman*, March 13, 2006, pp. 18-21.
- Jorden, William J. "Moscow Aroused," *NYT*, November 6, 1956, p. 1.
- Kahn, Herman. "International Conflict for Beginners," *NYT*, November 6, 1969, p. BR72.
- Karpin, Michael. *The Bomb in the Basement*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006.
- Katz, Mark N. "Review," *Middle East Journal*, 62, 1 (Winter 2008), p. 178-179.
- Kaufman, Burton I. *The Arab Middle East and the United States: Inter-Arab Rivalry and Super-Power Diplomacy*. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1996.
- Kenen, I.L. *Israel Defense Line*. Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1981.
- Kennan, George F. *American Diplomacy: Expanded Edition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.
- Kent, Sherman. *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.
- Kerr, Malcolm. *The Arab Cold War, 1958-1967*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967.
- Kevles, Daniel J. *The Physicists: The History of a Scientific Community in Modern America*. New York: Alfred A. Knoff, 1978.

- Khalidi, Rashid. "Consequences of the Suez Crisis in the Arab World," In *The Modern Middle East: A Reader*, ed. Albert Hourani, Philip S. Khoury, and Mary C. Wilson, pp. 377-392. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
- Killian, James Jr., *Sputnik, Scientists and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977.
- King, Seth S. "Israel Nominates New Envoy to U.S.," *NYT*, May 30, 1959, p. 5.
- Komberg, Warren, "Israeli Reaction 'Not Revealed to Us,' Says McCone," *WP*, December 19, 1960, p. A7.
- Kranish, Arthur. "CIA: Israel Has 10-20 A-Weapons," *WP*, March 15, 1976, p. A2.
- Krock, Arthur. "In The Nation: The Proof Is Available to Israel," *NYT*, December 23, 1960, p. 18.
- Kunz, Diane. *The Economic Diplomacy of Suez*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991.
- Kurzman, Dan. "Israeli Premier Arrives Here Today," *WP*, June 1, 1964, p. A15.
- Kyle, Keith. *Suez: Britain's End of Empire in the Middle East*. London: I. B. Tauris, 2003.
- Labaton, Stephen, "John Finney, 80," *NYT*, October 30, 2004, p. A17.
- Laqueur, Walter. "The Middle East is Potentially More Dangerous than Vietnam," *NYT*, May 5, 1968, p. SM34.
- Levey, Zach and Elie Podeh, ed. *Britain and the Middle East: from Imperial Power to Junior Partner*. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2008.
- Levey, Zach. "French-Israeli Relations, 1950-1960: The Strategic Dimension," in *Reassessing Suez: New Perspective on the Crisis and its Aftermath*, ed. Simon C. Smith, pp. 80-107. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2008.
- Levey, Zach. *Israel and the Western Powers, 1952-1960*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997.
- Levey, Zach. "Israeli Foreign Policy and the Arms Race in the Middle East 1950-1960," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 4, 1 (March 2001), pp. 29-48.
- Levey, Zach. "The United States' Skyhawk Sale to Israel, 1966: Strategic Exigencies of an Arms Deal," *Diplomatic History* 28, 2 (April 2004), pp. 255- 276.

- Levité, Ariel and Emily Landau. "Arab Perceptions of Israel's Nuclear Posture, 1960-1967," *Israel Studies* 1, 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 34-53.
- Lewis, Daniel. "Tad Szulc, 74, Dies; Times Correspondent Who Uncovered Bay of Pigs Imbroglio," *NYT*, May 22, 2001.
- Little, Douglas. *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004.
- Little, Douglas. "Gideon's Band: America and the Middle East since 1945," in *America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941*, ed. Michael J. Hogan, pp. 462-501. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- Little, Douglas. "Mission Impossible: The CIA and the Cult of Covert Action in the Middle East," *DH* 28, 5 (November 2004), pp. 663-701.
- Little, Douglas. "The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and Israel, 1957-1968," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 25, 4 (November 1993), pp. 563-585.
- Little, Douglas. "From Even-Handed to Empty Handed: Seeking Order in the Middle East," in *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963*, ed. Thomas Patterson, pp. 156-176. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.
- Lucas, Scott and Alistair Morey, "The Hidden 'Alliance': The CIA and M16 before and the Suez," *Intelligence and National Security*, 15, 2 (Summer 2000), pp. 95-120.
- Lyons, Terrence. "Harriman's Israel Talks Kept Secret," *WP*, February 28, 1965, p. A28.
- MacArthur, Brian, ed. *The Penguin Book of Historic Speeches*. London: Penguin Books, 1996.
- Machiavelli, Niccolo. *The Prince*. Toronto: Dover Publications, 1992.
- Madden, Richard L. "Mayor, On the Go, is More Relaxed," *NYT*, June 12, 1965, p. 14.
- Mangold, Tom. *Cold Warrior: James Jesus Angleton: the CIA's Master Spy Hunter*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991.
- Manzione, John, "'Amusing and amazing and practical and military': The legacy of Scientific Internationalism in American Foreign Policy, 1945-1965," *Diplomatic History*, 24, 1 (Winter 2000), pp. 21- 55.
- Marks, Sally, "The World According to Washington," *Diplomatic History* 11, 3 (Summer 1987) pp. 265-282.
- Martin, David. *Wilderness of Mirrors*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991.

- McAlister, Malani. *Epic Encounters*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.
- McConnell, Jeff and Richard Higgins, "The Israeli Account," *Boston Globe*, December 14, 1986, p. 16.
- McCoy, Alfred M. *The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade*. Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 2003.
- McGowan, David. *Derailing Democracy: The America the Media Don't Want You to See*. Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2000.
- McNamara, Robert. *Britain, Nasser and the Balance of Power in the Middle East, 1952-1967*. London: Frank Cass, 2003.
- Mearsheimer, John and Stephen Walt. *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*. New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2007.
- Medding, Peter. *The Founding of Israeli Democracy, 1948-1967*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
- Meir, Golda. *My Life*. London: Futura, 1978.
- Melman, Yossi. "Israel and U.S. sign nuclear cooperation agreement," *Ha'aretz*, April 14, 2008, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/974486.html>.
- Melman, Yossi. "Inside Intel/Is the Reactor coming out of the sealed room?" *Ha'aretz*, January 10, 2008, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/943355.html>
- Melton, R.H. "Alfred Friendly's Passion for Life," *WP*, November 8, 1983, p. B5.
- Middleton, Drew. "14, 000 Russians Play Big Role in Egypt," *NYT*, October 3, 1970, p. 7.
- Middleton, Drew. "Jarring Reported Planning Call for Arab-Israeli Talks," *NYT*, March 2, 1968, p. 1.
- Mills, Elinor. "EFF sues feds for info on social network surveillance," *CNET NEWS*, December 1, 2009, http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-10407224-245.html.
- Moaz, Seev. "The Mixed Blessing of Israel's Nuclear Policy," *International Security* 28, 2 (Fall 2003), pp. 44-77.
- Mooney, Richard E. "Kennedy Names Bell of Harvard as Budget Chief," *NYT*, December 3, 1960, p. 1.
- Morozov, Boris. "The Outbreak of the June 1967 War in Light of Soviet Documentation," in *The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War*, ed. Yaacov Ro'I and Boris Morozov, p. 43-64. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center and Stanford University Press, 2008.

- Morris, Benny. *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001*. New York: Vintage Books, 2001.
- Mosley, Leonard. *Dulles- A Biography of Eleanor, Allen and John Foster Dulles and Their Family Network*. New York: Dial Press, 1978.
- Murphy, Carlyle. "Israel Says '66 Mishap Killed 1 at Nuclear Site," *WP*, September 16, 1994, p. A34.
- Meyer, Cord. *Facing Reality: From World Federalism to the CIA*. Boston: University Press of America, 1980.
- Nadelmann, Ethan. "Setting the Stage: American Policy toward the Middle East, 1961-1966," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 14, 4 (November 1982), pp. 435-457.
- Neff, Donald. *Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower takes America into the Middle East*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1981.
- Norris, John G. "Issues Raised in TFX Dispute Center on Contract Pioneering," *WP*, May 13, 1963, p. A1.
- Nossek, Hillel and Yehiel Limor, "Fifty Years in a 'Marriage of Convenience': News Media and Military Censorship in Israel," *Communication Law and Policy* 6, 1 (Winter 2001), pp. 1-35.
- Novick, Peter. *The Holocaust in American Life*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999.
- Oniss, Juan de. "Nuclear Treaty Endorsed in U.N. by 92-4 Vote," *WP*, June 11, 1968, p. 1.
- Oren, Amir. "CIA Reveals: We Said in 1974 that Israel had Nuclear Weapons," *Ha'aretz*, January 13, 2008, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/943729.html>.
- Oren, Michael. *Origins of the Second Arab-Israel War: Egypt, Israel, and the Great Powers, 1952-1956*. London: Frank Cass, 1992.
- Oren, Michael. *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East: The Origins of the Second Arab-Israeli War*. New York: Ballantine Books, 2002.
- Organski, A.F.K. *The \$36 Billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics in U.S. Assistance to Israel*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.
- Orwell, George. "Politics and the English Language," in James Cochrane and John Humphrys ed. *Between You and I: A Little Book of Bad English*, pp. 127-154. Cambridge: Icon Books, 2005.

- Ovendale, Richie. *Britain, the United States, and the Transfer of Power in the Middle East, 1945-1962*. New York: Leister University Press, 1996.
- Owen, Roger and William Roger Lewis. *Suez 1956: The Crisis and Consequences* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
- Plato, *The Republic*. New York: Dover Publications, 2000.
- Pace, Eric. "Roswell Leavitt Gilpatric, Lawyer and Kennedy Aid Dies at 89," *NYT*, March 17, 1996, p. 41.
- Page, Eric. "Abraham Feinberg, 90, Philanthropist for Israel," *NYT*, December 7, 1998, p. B10.
- Parker, Richard B. *The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East*. Bloomington: Indiana Press, 1993.
- Parker, Richard B., ed. *The Six Day War: A Retrospective*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1996.
- Péan, Pierre. *Les Deux Bombes*. Paris: Fayard, 1982.
- Pearson, Drew. "A-Reactor Where Abraham Trod," *WP*, December 26, 1960, p. B25.
- Pearson, Drew. "A-Weapons Reported Near for Israel," *WP*, May 18, 1966, p. E11.
- Pedlow, Gregory and Donald E. Welzenbach. *The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954-1974*. CIA: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1998.
- Peres, Shimon. *Battling for Peace: A Memoir*. New York: Random House, 1995.
- Peres, Shimon. *David's Sling*. New York: Random House, 1970.
- Peres, Shimon. *From These Men: Seven Founders of the State of Israel*. New York: Wyndham, 1979.
- Pincher, Chapman. "Israel May be Making an A-Bomb," *Daily Express*, December 16, 1960, p. 2.
- Pinkus, Binyamin, "Atomic Power to Israel's Rescue: French-Israeli Nuclear Cooperation, 1949-1957," *Israel Studies* 7, 1 (Summer 2002), pp. 104-138.
- Pocock, Chris. *Dragon Lady: The History of the U-2 Spyplane*. Shrewsbury, England: Airline, 1989.
- Podhoretz, Norman. "The Abandonment of Israel," *Commentary* 62, 1, (July 1976), pp. 23-31.
- Polmar, Norman. *Spyplane: The U-2 History Declassified*. Osceola, WI: MBI, 2001.

- Porter, Garreth. "Leaked stories taint Iran Nuclear Debate," *Asia Times Online*, August 27, 2009 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KH27Ak02.html.
- Porter, Garreth. "Iran Began Preparing for U.S. Bombing in 2002," November 18, 2009, <http://www.afterdowningstreetorg/node/47819>.
- Powers, Thomas. *The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms & the CIA*. New York: Alfred A. Knoff, 1979.
- Prados, John. *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006.
- Pranger, Dale and Dale R. Tahtinen. *Nuclear Threat in the Middle East*. Washington: AEI, 1975.
- Pry, Peter. *Israel's Nuclear Arsenal*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1984.
- Pry, Peter. *War Scare: Russia and America on the Nuclear Brink*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1999.
- Quandt, William. *Decade of Decisions: American Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976*. Berkley: Los Angeles, 1977.
- Quandt, William. "Lyndon Johnson and the June 1967 War: What Color was Light?" *Middle East Journal* 26, 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 197-228.
- Quandt, William. *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967*. Berkeley: The Brookings Institution, 2005.
- Quester, George. "Can Nuclear Proliferation Now Be Stopped," *Foreign Affairs* 53, 1 (October 1974), pp. 77-97.
- Quigley, Carroll. *Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time*. New York: MacMillan Company, 1966.
- Ranelagh, John. *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986.
- Raviv, Dan and Yossi Melman. *Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company 1991.
- Raviv, Dan and Yossi Melman. *Friends in Deed: Inside the U.S.-Israel Alliance*. New York: Hyperion, 1994.
- Reeves, Richard. *President Kennedy: Prolife of Power*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993.
- Reich, Bernard. *The U.S. and Israel: Influence in the Special Relationship*. New York: Praeger Special Studies, 1984.

- Reinhold, Robert. "Pentagon renews Ties with Colleges," *NYT*, May 13, 1980, p. C1.
- Reiter, Dan. "Preventive Attacks Against Nuclear Programs and the 'Success' at Orisa," *Nonproliferation Review*, 12, 2 (July 2005), pp. 355-371.
- Richelson, Jeffrey T. *Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006.
- Richelson, Jeffrey T. "The Wizards of Langley: The CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology," in *Eternal Vigilance? 50 Years of the CIA*, ed. Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones and Christopher Andrew, pp. 82-103. London: Frank Cass, 1997.
- Rigden, John S. *Rabi: Scientist and Citizen*. New York: Basic Books, 1987.
- Ritter, Scott. "Keeping Iran Honest," *The Guardian*, September 25, 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/sep/25/iran-secret-nuclear-plant-inspections>.
- Roberts, Chalmers. "U.S. officials State Nuclear Reactor Developed Secretly by Israel," *WP*, December 18, 1960, p. A1.
- Roberts, Chalmers. "7 'Threshold' Nations Haven't Signed A-Pact," *WP*, July 9, 1968, p. A7.
- Robbins, Alexandra. *Secrets of the Tomb: Skull and Bones, the Ivy League, and the Hidden Paths of Power*. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2002.
- Ro'i, Yaacov. "Introduction," in *The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War*, ed. Yaacov Ro'i and Boris Morozov, pp. xvii-xxiv. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center and Stanford University Press, 2008.
- Ro'i, Yaacov. "Soviet Policy toward the Six Day War through the Prism of Moscow's Relations with Egypt and Syria," in *The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War*, ed. Yaacov Ro'i and Boris Morozov, pp. 1-43. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center and Stanford University Press, 2008.
- Rosen, Steven. "A Stable System of Mutual Nuclear Deterrence in the Arab-Israeli Conflict," *American Political Science Review*, 71, 3 (September 1977), pp. 1367-1383.
- Rosen, Steven. "Nuclearization and Stability in the Middle East," *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 1, 3 (Spring 1976), pp. 1-32.
- Rosenfeld, Alvin. "Intellectuals Seek Bar to Israel A-Arms Output," *WP*, July 5, 1962, p. A14.
- Rubenberg, Cheryl. *Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1986.

- Reudy, John. *Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation*. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1992.
- Safran, Nadav. *Israel: The Embattled Ally*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978.
- Said, Edward. *Culture and Imperialism*. New York: Vintage Books, 2003.
- Said, Edward. "Who Is in Charge?" *CounterPunch*, March 8, 2003, <http://www.counterpunch.org/said03082003.html>.
- Salisbury, Harrison. "Vishinsky Sees U.S. Moscow Envoy Before Starting for U.N. Assembly," *NYT*, September 15, 1949, p. 1.
- Sanger, David E. and William J. Broad, "U.S. Allies Warn over Nuclear 'Deception,'" *NYT*, September 26, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/26/world/middleeast/26nuke.html>.
- Saxon, Wolfgang. "Rudolf Sonneborn Dies at 87," *NYT*, June 4, 1986, p. D26.
- Saxon, Wolfgang. "Walworth Barbour, Diplomat Who Served 12 Years in Israel," *NYT*, July 26, 1982, p. D7.
- Scheinman, Lawrence. *The International Atomic Energy Agency and World Nuclear Order*. Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1987.
- Schmidt, Dana Adams. "Israel Assures U.S. on Reactor," *NYT*, December 22, 1960, p. 5.
- Schmidt, Dana Adams. "Johnson Speech Infuriates Arabs," *NYT*, February 8, 1964, p. 1.
- Schlesinger, Jr., Arthur. *The Imperial Presidency*. New York: The Atlantic Monthly Company, 1973.
- Schulzinger, Robert. "Transparency, Secrecy and Citizenship," *Diplomatic History*, 25, 2 (Spring 2001), pp. 165-178.
- Schulzinger, Robert. *The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs: The History of the Council on Foreign Relations*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1984.
- Scribner, Fred Jr., "Treasury Aide to Eisenhower," *NYT*, January 8, 1994, p. 30.
- Segev, Tom. *1967: Israel, the War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle East*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2007.
- Sella, Amnon. "Review," *The Journal of Israeli History*, 27, 1 (March 2008), pp. 104-107.

- Shabad, Theodore. "Israeli Aides in Soviet Accused of Propaganda in Synagogue," *NYT*, March 12, 1964, p. 1.
- Strauss, Lewis. *Men and Decisions*. New York: Double Day, 1962.
- Sylves, Richard T. *The Nuclear Oracles: A Political History of the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1977*. Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1987.
- Shabad, Theodore. "Moscow Accuses Israeli of Insult," *NYT*, May 22, 1965, p. 4
- Shalom, Zaki. *Israel's Nuclear Option: Behind the Scenes Diplomacy between Dimona and Washington*. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2005.
- Shalom, Zaki. "Kennedy, Ben Gurion and the Dimona Project," *Israel Studies*, 1, 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 3-33.
- Sheffer, Gabriel. *Moshe Sharett: Biography of a Political Moderate*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Sherwell, Phillip. "Israel Launches Covert War Against Iran," *The Daily Telegraph*, February 16, 2009, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/4640052/Israel-launches-covert-war-against-Iran.html>.
- Shlaim, Avi. "Conflicting Approaches to Israel's Relations with the Arabs: Ben-Gurion and Sharett, 1953-1956," *Middle East Journal* 37, 2 (Spring 1983), pp. 180-201.
- Shlaim, Avi. "The Protocol of Sèvres, 1956: Anatomy of a War Plot," *International Affairs* 73, 3 (1997), pp. 509-530.
- Shlaim, Avi. *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001.
- Shoenbaum, David. "Commentary: More Special Than Others," *Diplomatic History*, 22, 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 273-283.
- Shoenbaum, David. *The United States and the State of Israel*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
- Shuster, Alvin. "Barbour Chosen Envoy to Israel," *NYT*, March 8, 1961, p. 1.
- Shuster, Alvin. "Israel Satisfies U.S. on Use of Reactor," *NYT*, December 23, 1960, p. 1.
- Simons, Howard. "A-Arms Proliferation," *WP*, June 25, 1963, p. A15.
- Simons, Howard. "Scientist Group Backs Test Ban as Step to Arms Race Control," *WP*, August 1, 1963, p. A13.

- Slonim, Shlomo. "Origins of the 1950 Tripartite Declaration on the Middle East," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 23, 2 (Spring 1987), pp. 134-149.
- Smith, Hendrick, "Cairo Charges Four Germans as Spies for Israel," *NYT*, March 5, 1965, p. 6.
- Smith, Hendrick. "Leader of German Rocket Team Reported to Have Left U.A.R.," *NYT*, July 9, 1965, p. 7.
- Smith, Hendrick. "Eshkol to Begin U.S. Visit Today," *NYT*, May 31, 1964, p. 5.
- Smith, Hendrick. "Ex-U.S. Envoy to Cairo Thinks Soviet Spurred Nasser Challenge to Israel," *NYT*, September 12, 1967, p. 6.
- Smith, Hendrick. "Johnson Hails Eshkol and Calls for Mideast Peace," *NYT*, June 2, 1964, p. 1.
- Smith, Hendrick. "Soviet Said to Offer Cairo Atom Defense," *NYT*, February 4, 1966, p. 1.
- Smith, Hendrick. "Warning on Bomb Given by Nasser," *NYT*, February 21, 1966, p. 8.
- Soros, George. "A New World Architecture," Project Syndicate: A World of Ideas
<http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/soros52>
- Spector, Leonard. *Nuclear Proliferation Today*. Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1984.
- Spector, Leonard. *The Undeclared Bomb*. Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988.
- Spiegel, Steven L. *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985.
- Spiegel, Irving. "Eshkol Outlines Israel's Needs," *NYT*, June 7, 1964, p. 83.
- Spiegel, Irving. "Israeli Premier Greeted by City," *NYT*, June 5, 1964, p. 36.
- Spiegel, Irving. "Kennedy and Ben-Gurion hold 'Fruitful' Talk Here," *NYT*, May 31, 1961, p. 1.
- Spiegel, Irving. "Morgenthau Quits as Head of Appeal," *NYT*, December 16, 1950, p. 25.
- Spyer, Johnathan. "An Analytical and Historical Overview of British Policy toward Israel," *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 8, 4 (June 2004), pp. 80-102.
- Stein, Joel. "How Jewish is Hollywood?" *Los Angeles Times*, December 19, 2008,
<http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-stein19-2008dec 19,0,4676183.column>

- Steinberg, Gerald. "Deliberate Ambiguity: Evolution and Evaluation." In *Security or Armageddon: Israel's Nuclear Strategy*, ed. Louis Rene Beres (Toronto: Lexington Books: 1986), pp. 29-44.
- Steinberg, Gerald. "Examining Israel's NPT Exceptionality: 1998-2005," *Nonproliferation Review* 13, 1 (March 2006), pp. 117-140.
- Stone, Brad. "Amazon Erases Orwell Books From Kindle," *NYT*, July 17, 2009, p. B1 or <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/technology/companies/18amazon.html>.
- Stren, Sol. "Who Thinks In a Think Tank?" *NYT*, April 16, 1967, p.SM15.
- Sulzberger, C.L. "Foreign Affairs: Israel's New Missile Diplomacy," *NYT*, July 29, 1961, p. 18.
- Sulzberger, C.L. "Foreign Affairs: Isaiah in the Nuclear Epoch," *NYT*, July 31, 1961, p. 18.
- Sulzberger, C.L. "Foreign Affairs: Quantum Implications of a New Explosion," *NYT*, December 28, 1960, p. 26.
- Sulzberger, C.L. "Foreign Affairs; German Brains and Arab Arms," *NYT*, August 6, 1962, p. 24.
- Sulzberger, C.L. "Foreign Affairs; The Little Old Man in the Desert," *NYT*, November 16, 1963, p. 21.
- Sulzberger, C.L. "Foreign Affairs; The Problem of a Garbage Bomb Neither Missiles nor Funds," *NYT*, November 20, 1963, p. 42.
- Sulzberger, C.L. "The Price of Palestine Peace," *NYT*, April 16, 1975, p. 38.
- Sutton, Antony. *Americas Secret Establishment: An Introduction to the Order of Skull & Bones*. Billings, Montana: Liberty House, 1986.
- Szulc, Tad. "Murder by Proxy," *Penthouse*, August 1975, p. 46.
- Tal, David. "Israel's Road to the 1956 War," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 37, 1 (February 1996), pp. 59-81.
- Taylor, Ian. *The Superpowers and the Middle East*. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1991.
- Thomas, Evan. *The Very Best Men: The Early Years of the CIA*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995.
- Thomas, Gideon. *Gideon's Spies*. New York: St. Martin's Pres, 2007.
- Thoreau, Henry David. "Resistance to Civil Government," In *The Norton Anthology of American Literature: 6th Edition*, ed. Nina Baym, pp. 837-853. New York: Norton & Company, 2003.

Tritten, James John. "Is Naval Warfare Unique?" *Journal of Strategic Studies* 12, 4, (1989), pp. 494-507.

Troen, Selwyn Ilan and Moshe Shemesh, *The Suez-Sinai Crisis, 1956: Retrospective and Reappraisal*. London: Frank Cass, 1990.

Trussell, C.P. "Eastland Scored on Passport Bill," *NYT*, April 29, 1959, p. 25.

Tivnan, Edward. *The Lobby: Jewish Political Power and American Foreign Policy*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987.

Tocqueville, Alexis de. *Democracy in America*. Toronto: Bantam Books, 2000.

Tucker, Robert W. "Israel and the United States: From Dependence to Nuclear Weapons?" *Commentary*, 60, 5 (1975), pp. 29-43.

Tzu, Sun. *The Art of War*. Mineola, New York: Dover Publication, 2002.

Unna, Warren. "U.S. to Sell Israel Hawk Missiles to Meet Arab's Threat," *WP*, September 27, 1962, p. A18.

Van Gelder, Lawrence. "Mrs. Meir, Hailed by City," *NYT*, September 30, 1969, p. 1.

Vogel, Steve. *The Pentagon: The Untold History of the Wartime Race to Build the Pentagon and to Restore it Sixty Years Later*. New York: Random House, 2007.

Wala, Michael. *The Council on Foreign Relations and American Foreign Policy in the Early Cold War*. Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1994.

Wallenstein, Arye. "Israel Remains Silent on Negev Nuclear Plant," *WP*, April 13, 1964, p. B6.

Walz, Jay. "Arab Nations Put on Display of Amity in Cairo," *NYT*, January 19, 1964, p. E5.

Walz, Jay. "Arabs Deny U.S. is Neutral in Mideast Disputes," *NYT*, January 23, 1964, p. 8.

Walz, Jay. "Egypt's Reactor is Put to Work For Isotope Research Projects," *NYT*, July 29, 1962, p. 6.

Walz, Jay. "Four Test Rockets Launched by Cairo," *NYT*, July 22, 1962, p. 1.

Walz, Jay. "Nasser Condemns Atom Arms Race," *NYT*, July 10, 1962, p. 18.

Walz, Jay. "Return of 186 Ships Under Lend-Lease Offered by Soviet," *NYT*, June 17, 1952, p. 1.

Weil, Martin. "Alfred Friendly, Ex-Editor Dies," *WP*, November 8, 1983, p. A1.

Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the Central Intelligence Agency*. New York: Doubleday, 2007.

Weismann, Steve and Herbert Krosney, *The Islamic Bomb: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East*. New York: Times Books, 1981.

Weller, George. "Nasser Shops again for A-Reactoer," *WP*, September 16, 1963, p. A12.

Wilford, John Noble. "New 'Window' Opens on Atom as giant Accelerator Passes Full-Power Test," *NYT*, June 10, 1972, p. 62.

Whitten, Daniel "Zoellick Says U.S. Dollar's Primacy Not a Certainty," *Bloomberg*, September 27, 2009, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=as9EvmtjxGG8>.

Whitman, Alden. "Lewis Strauss Dies," *NYT*, January 22, 1974, p. 81.

Wicker, Tom. "Harriman Back, Meet Kennedy on Nuclear Pact," *NYT*, July 28, 1963, p. 1.

Wills, Gary, ed. *The Federalist Papers*. New York: Bantam Books, 1982.

Wilentz, Sean. *The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974-2008*. New York: Harper Collins, 2008.

Wilson, George C. "Lewis L. Strauss Ex-AEC Chairman, Dies at Age 77," *WP*, January 22, 1974, p. C9.

Winks, Robin. *Cloak & Gown: Scholars in the Secret War*. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1987.

Wise, David and Thomas Ross, *The Invisible Government: The CIA and U.S. Intelligence*. New York: Vintage Books, 1964.

Wolin, Sheldon. *Democracy Incorporated: Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted Totalitarianism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.

Yaniv, Avner. "Introduction," In *National Security & Democracy in Israel*, edited Avner Yaniv, pp. 1-11. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc: 1993.

Yaquub, Salim. *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004.

York, Herbert. *Making Weapons, Talking Peace*. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1987.

Zahlan, A.B. "The Science and Technology Gap in the Arab-Israeli Conflict," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 1, 3 (Spring 1972), pp. 17-36.

Film

An Unreasonable Man (2006) a film by Henritte Mantel and Steve Skrovan.

Fall of the Republic (2009) an Alex Jones film. "Fall of the Republic- The Presidency Barack H. Obama- The Full Movie HQ," http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F8LPNRI_6T8 (2:24:23).

Fight Club (1999) written by Chuck Palahniuk and directed by David Fincher.
http://tvshack.net/movies/Fight_Club_1999_/a:70949/ (2:13:25) (megavideo).

Loose Change Final Edition (2006) written by Dylan Avery and produced by Corey Rowe, Jason Bermas and Alex Jones,
<http://video.google.ca/videoplay?docid=-3719259008768610598#> (2:09:54).

No End in Sight (2007) Written and directed by Charles Ferguson. "NO END IN SIGHT Trailer," <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vINM0CAysc8&feature=fvst> (2:43).

Syriana (2005) Written and directed by Stephen Gagan.
http://tvshack.net/movies/Syriana_2005_/ (2:07:43) (megavideo).

Why We Fight (2005). Written and directed by Eugene Jarecki.
<http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=9219858826421983682#> (1:38:40).

YouTube and Internet

"Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1774-Present,"
<http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp>.

"Isidor Isaac Rabi: The Nobel Prize in Physics 1944,"
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1944/rabi-bio.html.

"Interview with 27 Year CIA Veteran Ray McGovern,"
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M0Au_OqNCYk&feature=related (56:30).

"I.I. Rabi," <http://www.columbia.edu/cu/alumni/Magazine/Summer2001/Rabi.html>.

"McKinney Grills Rumsfeld," 2006 Defense Department Budget Hearing, House Armed Services Committee, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eootfzAhAoU> (8:57).

"Mike Ruppert- CIA and Drug Running (1997),"
<http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-7009998324250484369> (1:45:44).

"OAH Distinguished Lectureship Program 2008-2009: Robert D. Shulzinger,"
www.oah.org/activities/lectureship/2008/lecturer.php?id=259.

“Peter Dale Scott: 9/11, Canada, left gatekeepers & Zelikow,”
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DDZR72PPUO0>. (9:41).

“Policy Talks @Google: Ralph Nader,” May 14, 2008,
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KR-V6bl41zU> (54:37).

Rage Against the Machine- Testify Music Video,”
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1JSBhI_0at0. (3:40).

“Ron Paul: Don’t Tread on Me,” <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FGHuFtP8w8> (8:25).

“RUMSFELD’S BEST,” <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CEBu2FW7LB8> (2:42).

“SEN. SANDERS GOES OFF ON BERNANKE_03/03/09,”
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rCWXrMCGJT4> (5:43).

“Testimony of Hank Paulson, Part 27 (Rep. Stearns Questioning),”
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ngJm9uDNUI> (5:33).

UNGA Resolution 1576 (XV) “Prevention of the Wider Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons,”
December 20, 1960.
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/153/50/IMG/NR015350.pdf?OpenElement>

“Wolfowitz chilling speech,” June 6, 2001, West Point Commencement Speech.
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NcxI5wpDueE> (4:44).

“Wolf Blitzer is a Zionist,” <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2-8aTGnjHnI> (7:16).