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Interpellative Tautologies: A Critique of Hegel's Philosophy at the University of Berlin

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**Interpellative Tautologies:
A Critique of Hegel's Philosophy at the University of Berlin**

Stephen Turpin

Thesis submitted to the
Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the M.A. in Philosophy

Department of Philosophy
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Abstract: The study undertakes a critical examination of Hegel's philosophy by constructing a Foucauldian critique of Hegel's use of interpellative techniques (i.e. the call to become subjects of Hegelian Science) that rely on tautological arguments. Salient aspects of Foucault's research on history, governmentality, and subjectivity and power are applied, respectively, to Hegel's teleological metaphysics, his concept of Civil Society, and his notion of the State as freedom. Through this Foucauldian reading, poverty is revealed as an endemic feature of the capitalist economy, while war is demonstrated to be a necessary practice of statecraft. By indicating how the interpellation of individuals into subjective categories forecloses alternative arrangements of economic and political power, the study shows that the Hegelian subject is extremely vulnerable to a logic of domination and oppression. The study then unpacks the *truth-effects* of Hegel's pedagogical design for the University of Berlin, revealing that his attempt to construct a subject of the modern liberal State is a gesture of violence with dangerous political implications.

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Introduction: Between Hegel and Foucault

The collusion between philosophy and the State was most explicitly enacted in the first decade of the nineteenth century with the foundation of the University of Berlin, which was to become the model for higher learning throughout Europe and the United States. The goal laid out for it by Wilhelm von Humboldt (based on proposals by Fichte and Schleiermacher) was the “spiritual and moral training of the nation,” to be achieved by “deriving everything from an original principle” (truth), by “relating everything to an ideal” (justice), and by “unifying this principle and this ideal in a single Idea” (the State). The end product would be “a fully legitimated subject of knowledge and society” — each mind an analogously organized mini-State morally unified in the supermind of the State. Prussian mind-meld.¹ — Brian Massumi

Rien n’est plus inconsistant qu’un régime politique qui est indifférent à la vérité; mais rien n’est plus dangereux qu’un système politique qui prétend prescrire la vérité.²
— Michel Foucault

Problem

For my MA thesis research, I consider how G.W. F. Hegel’s philosophy, within the context of the University of Berlin, might be read through a Foucauldian lens in order to indicate some of the more subtle pedagogical complexities that are operating within it. Despite a significant interest in Hegel within the tradition of Continental philosophy, there is little scholarship related specifically to how the University of Berlin was conceived and how the design of this institution reflects, in varying degrees, philosophical and political concerns.³ Given the significance of the university institution within contemporary culture, it is troubling that so little

¹ Brian Massumi, Introduction to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s *A Thousand Plateaus*, translated by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. xi.

² Michel Foucault, *Dits et Écrits II - 1976-1988* (Éditions Gallimard, 2001), p. 1497.

³ Two scholars of notable exception, who have both guided and informed my research, are Jeffrey Reid and Theodor Ziolkowski. Yet, as I indicate in my thesis, the University of Berlin, as a site that brings together significant political and philosophical concerns that remain extremely relevant to contemporary thought, beckons further scholarly attention.

attention has been paid to the founding of the University of Berlin – the template from which most modern European and North American universities derived their institutional design. It is something of a platitude to say that in founding an institution, of whatever type, there is always a variety of interests, or stakeholders, involved. However, the assumption that the founding of the institution is *pure* — that is, the institution accounts for itself, or, its reasoned apologies are in accord within its historical emergence — is often erroneous, if not dangerous. As Derrida writes in the essay “*Mochlos*; or, The Conflict of the Faculties”, “An event of foundation can never be comprehended merely within the logic that it founds. The foundation of a law is not a juridical event. The origin of the principle of reason, which is also implicated in the origin of the university, is not rational. The foundation of a university institution is not a university event.”⁴ It should be stressed that my use of this passage from Derrida is not meant to signify that my own reading of Hegel and the University of Berlin will be an act of “deconstruction” (if such an act is possible), nor will it be a manifesto against the university itself. Rather, my research offers an analysis of how Hegel’s philosophy at the University of Berlin might be read through a Foucauldian critique to better understand the dangerous relationship among history, politics, and truth, while opening a space for contemporary diagnostics.

More specifically, my goal is to demonstrate precisely how Hegel’s metaphysical project constructs important political categories and delimits the possibilities for “alternative” political narratives and systems. Methodologically, I occupy a certain ‘constructivist’ position in that my research aims to create a Foucauldian critique of Hegel’s thought that was never articulated in any

⁴ Jacques Derrida, *Eyes of the University: Right to Philosophy 2*, translated by Jan Plug et. al. (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2004), p. 109.

specificity by Foucault himself. Although Foucault was highly aware of Hegel's place and prominence in the canon of Continental philosophy, as evidenced by his comments in his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France,⁵ he never formulated any extensive critique of Hegel. In fact, other than a relatively small collection of footnotes, periphery remarks, and mentions in interviews, Hegel does not occupy a significant place within Foucault's written work. Yet, Hegel, or, perhaps more correctly, Hegel's effects, have indeed created a significant constellation from which Foucault desires "escape." My research indicates that Foucault's desired lines of flight from the Hegelian apparatus of capture are not due, as some have argued, to a postmodern bias that dismisses, without careful consideration, Hegel's philosophy. Rather, it is Foucault's concern with function and effects — that is, how the dialectic and the Hegelian articulation of history, reason and truth effect an individual's capacity to think about important epistemological questions and political arrangements — that grounds Foucault's concern.⁶

An additional methodological concern is related to the very possibility of my constructing a Foucauldian critique. Within the literature, Foucault's philosophy is often criticized because it allegedly avoids interpretive or qualitative distinctions. This criticism is linked, especially in the work of Jürgen Habermas, to Foucault's failure to introduce any normative notions that would

⁵ Foucault states: "... to truly escape Hegel involves an exact appreciation of the price we have to pay to detach ourselves from him. It assumes that we are aware of the extent to which Hegel, insidiously perhaps, is close to us: it implies a knowledge, in that which permits us to think against Hegel, of that which remains Hegelian. We have to determine the extent to which our anti-Hegelianism is possibly one of his tricks directed against us, at the end of which he stands, motionless, waiting for us." See Michel Foucault, "The Discourse on Language," from *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, translated by A.M. Sheridan (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), p. 235.

⁶ In chapter one I expand on this point regarding my construction of a Foucauldian critique of Hegel.

ground his analysis.⁷ In an attempt to problematize the potentials for any effective resistance to dominant power structures within Foucault's 'political theory', Habermas quotes Nancy Fraser's criticism: "Why is struggle preferable to submission? Why ought domination to be resisted? Only with the introduction of normative notions of some kind could Foucault begin to answer these questions."⁸ With respect to my construction of a Foucauldian critique of Hegel, this concern is, in a sense, doubled. Not only must I account for Foucault's own "value-free" position, but I must also indicate the legitimacy of my construction of a Hegelian critique using these so-called "value-free" Foucauldian analytics.

My response to this problematic is two-fold. First, with respect to Foucault's alleged neutrality, I argue that it is consistent with his position that he is writing *fictional* histories, in the sense that the "power relations ... within which they could be validated don't yet exist."⁹ As Foucault writes, "It seems to me that the possibility exists for fiction to function in truth, for a fictional discourse to induce effects of truth, and for bringing it about that a true discourse exists, that is, 'fictions' it."¹⁰ For Foucault, discourses of truth can be challenged by so-called 'fictions' that question both the veracity and possibility of such truths in anticipation of new arrangements of

⁷ Alternatively, Foucault has been accused of invoking "cryptonormative" ideals which he is said to disguise in his research, though this claim seems have more difficult to explain, given Foucault's extensive comments on the his concept of an open, indeterminate ethic that stresses the potential of the individual to direct his or her own capacities for involvement and extension.

⁸ Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, translated by Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1990), p. 284.

⁹ Michael Walzer, "The Politics of Michel Foucault," in *Foucault: A Critical Reader*, edited by David Couzens Hoy (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1986), p. 52.

¹⁰ Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings*, edited by Colin Gordon, translated by Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, and Kate Soper (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), p. 193.

knowledge and power. However, for Foucault, the emergence of these new regimes need not be ordered from the position of some new dominant truth that simply repeats gestures of repression in order to secure its own hegemony. Therefore, we can see that Foucault's analytic of historical relations of power initiates a critique of those relations that creates the potential for a diagnostics of the present that is important for the very reason that it is indeterminate. Though, evidently, Foucault challenges certain dominant power structures and questions authoritarian regimes of truth in many of his interviews, he does not prescribe a political position that would correct, once and for all, these inequalities of power. Rather, he opens the possibility for the *taking of a position*, relative to contemporary arrangements of power, that is both creative and critical.¹¹

This leads to the second aspect of my response, regarding my construction of a critique, to which question can be raised: does *my* critique imply an unspecified normative value to which I am indebted for my critical position? I believe that it does not. Even if it is agreed that Foucault's analytics are "neutral" — that is, they do not inherently imply qualitative judgements on the validity of a given discourse or practice — the possibility of drawing together aspects of Foucault's analysis to form a critique of Hegel's philosophy is in no way dishonest to Foucault. My construction of a Foucauldian critique is based on the possibility for reading aspects of Hegel's philosophy through a critical lense that unpacks assumptions that are usually accepted as self-evident and implications that are typically located outside the parameters of the literature. In drawing together the aspects of Hegel's thought that I encounter through a Foucauldian analysis, I indicate that the critique of Hegel is not so much reliant on normative or prescriptive judgements

¹¹ The potentials for a Foucauldian ethic will be discussed in greater detail in chapter one and the conclusion.

as it is on the conviction that those truths which are often heralded as the most self-evident are often, in fact, the most in need of problematization and can often be the most dangerous. If there is, in fact, a presumption of normativity in my critique, it is only that individuals are responsible for the proliferation and acceptance of assumptions within the institutions that legitimate their work, which, given the current climate of academia, hardly appears to be a norm.

Summary of Chapters

In chapter one, I begin with a consideration of Louis Althusser's concept of interpellation because it is a fundamental principle in the development of Foucault's analytics of power. I indicate that for Althusser, interpellation — where the individual responds to a call that, only in being recognized by this individual, constructs the individual *as* a subject— is a primarily ideological activity. For Althusser, in order to reproduce the conditions of production, the ruling class must ensure the reproduction the ideological framework that delimits the very possibility of its existence. However, from a Foucauldian perspective, I demonstrate that it is important to understand that Althusser's interpellative analytics can be taken further in order to consider the widespread effects of power that are not solely determined by class distinctions. I argue that Foucault does not reject the use of class as useful category for analysing political and economic relations in certain scenarios. However, for Foucault, there is also a need to consider the complexity of the interpellative language games, as well as implicitly coercive structures, that reinforce and recreate structures that, strictly speaking, are outside the purview of a specifically ideological or class-based analysis.

Having summarized the concept of interpellation that greatly influences Foucault's

discussion of power, I move on to summarize Foucault's own theoretical undertakings in a general description of his key concerns and developments. In order to situate Foucault's overall project in a coherent and manageable presentation, I draw from the work of Gilles Deleuze – one of the few thinkers who has undertaken a study of Foucault's work as a whole. Using Deleuze's major text *Foucault*, as well as many of his essays on Foucault's thought, I create a general description of Foucault's work and concerns and summarize how Foucault's work might be arranged to form a critique of Hegelian philosophy. Linking Foucault's emphasis on genealogical research with Deleuze's description of his inter-related concerns of knowledge, power, and subjectivity, I introduce the three main aspects that anchor my construction of a Foucauldian critique of Hegel: (1) the discussion of philosophico-juridical and historico-political discourse primarily in "*Society Must Be Defended*"; (2) Foucault's discussion of the historical emergence and political rationality of what he terms "governmentality"; and, (3) Foucault's interest, found mainly in his later works, in power and subjectivity. I stress that these three interests must be understood in relation to his genealogical methodology, and not as its product nor its assumption. As a conclusion to this chapter, I consider Hegel's notion of the relationship between the rational and the actual as a point of departure for examining his pedagogical concerns.

In chapter two, I discuss the first anchor point in my construction of a Foucauldian critique of Hegel by summarizing Foucault's "*Society Must Be Defended*." In this 1975-76 Collège de France lecture course, Foucault argues that philosophy often deploys metaphysical arguments to establish a philosophico-juridical paradigm within which marginalised or unrepresented groups are denied access to their historico-political discourses. For Foucault, the historico-political discourses enable a group or nation to contest the teleological narratives of meta-histories by using war as an analyzer of political relations. That is, every position of sovereignty, raised by philosophy to a position of historical necessity (within a philosophico-juridical discourse), could also be narrated from a politico-historical discourse that contests the legitimacy of this sovereignty

on the grounds that it was achieved through coercion, violence, repression and bloodshed. Within this discourse, what underlies all political relations, and the establishment of a sovereign State, is war. War and conflict permit the establishment of a given order that attempts to delimit its own possibilities through philosophical narration. Having summarized Foucault's development of war as an analyzer of political relations in "*Society Must be Defended*", I examine how the *Philosophy of History*, the *History of Philosophy*, and the *Philosophy of Right* can be read, from a Foucauldian perspective, as acts of philosophico-juridical discourse that obscure and refuse historico-political references. Within the context of Foucault's war hypothesis – *that war can be used as an analyzer of political power* – I show that the goal of the State can be understood as *not* simply eliminating war and conflict among groups or nations by controlling their access to historico-political discourses. Rather, the State must also endeavour to appropriate the so-called "right to violence" that is rooted in politics and history and make itself the only institution with this "right." As the conclusion to this chapter, I consider some of the limitations to Foucault's war hypothesis and indicate how these limitations direct Foucault's research toward questions of political rationality.

In chapter three, I consider the second anchor point in my Foucauldian critique of Hegel by considering Foucault's concept of "governmentality," which focuses on analysing the series "security, population, government." Foucault's interest is in determining the specific relationship among governments, populations, and security, within the context of the field of economics. In this respect, Foucault writes: "This, I believe, is the essential issue in the establishment of the art of government: introduction of economy into political practice."¹²

He juxtaposes jurists' conceptions of the common good with what he calls a "a new kind of finality", where "[g]overnment is defined as a right manner of disposing things so as to lead not to the form of the common good, as the jurists' texts would have said, but to an end which is

¹² Michel Foucault, "Governmentality," in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, edited by Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 92.

‘convenient’ for each of the things that are to be governed.”¹³ In my construction of a Foucauldian critique of Hegel, I demonstrate that Hegel’s philosophy can be understood as occupying a historical space that retains aspects of the discourse of sovereignty while, simultaneously, embarking on a trajectory toward an increasingly governmentalized concept of political power.

Moving from a summary of Foucault’s concept of governmentality, I examine how this concept might be applied to Hegel’s discussion of Civil Society in the *Philosophy of Right*. Although the role of Civil Society in Hegel’s political thought has received significant attention, there have been few attempts to consider the how this Hegelian concept might be read critically within the analytic of governmentality.¹⁴ As the second main section of this chapter, I summarize Hegel’s concept of Civil Society and explore the social and political implications of his understanding of economics in order to demonstrate how the Foucauldian concept of governmentality allows for a critical engagement with Hegel’s economic ideas and their political significance in the *Philosophy of Right*.

Foucault’s unique approach to questions of power and subjectivity, which was, in a certain sense, initiated in “*Society Must be Defended*”, as Foucault attempted to dislocate the hegemony of political discourse that centred around questions of sovereignty, is taken up again in his later

¹³ Ibid, p. 95.

¹⁴ A notable exception is Michael Hardt’s essay “The Withering of Civil Society,” in *Deleuze and Guattari: New Mappings in Politics, Philosophy and Culture*, edited by Eleanor Kaufman and Kevin Jon Heller (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), pp. 23-39. Hardt considers the role of civil society from a position of Marxist analysis, noting the significance of the concept in the movement from concrete labour to the organization of abstract labour. Although Hardt suggests that Foucault’s analytic of governmentality corresponds, in some respects, to Hegel’s discussion of Civil Society, he does not fully develop Foucault’s reading as a critique of Hegel’s position. For a more ‘Hegelian’ reading of governmentality, see David C. Durst, “The End(s) of the State in Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*,” in *Beyond Liberalism and Communitarianism: Studies in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, edited by Robert R. Williams (Albany: SUNY Press, 2001), pp. 229-248.

works. In chapter four, I consider the third key anchor point in my Foucauldian critique of Hegel by examining Foucault's later works, again drawing from the exploration of Foucault's thought by Gilles Deleuze. Deleuze explains that Foucault became interested in thinking about "lines of subjection" and that "the discovery of this new dimension arose out of a crisis in Foucault's thought, as if it had become necessary for him to redraw the map of social apparatuses [*dispositifs*], to find for them a new orientation in order to stop them from becoming locked into unbreakable lines of force which would impose definitive contours."¹⁵ Foucault's interest in the "creation" or "production" of different forms of subjectivity and their relation to power makes his analysis especially potent for a critical reading Hegel's philosophy.

Having summarized Foucault's work on power and subjectivity, I consider how his analysis might be applied to Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Encyclopaedia* as interpellative texts that attempt to produce a specific "type" of subjectivity that has extensive political and epistemological implications. In this section, it is my goal to elucidate the possibilities of reading Hegel's pedagogy in its precise intervention into the formation of subjective identities, and I draw specific attention to this subjectification in relation to the reception of the French Revolution in Hegel's thought. Continuing from this analysis, I suggest that effects of this attempt at a politically-determinate subjective construction are not only epistemologically significant, but, when considered in their relation to Hegel's historical narrative and emphasis on governmentality, they are politically dangerous. In this context, I discuss how Hegel's philosophy locates freedom as the proper relationship between the subject and the State. From this discussion, I examine the

¹⁵ Gilles Deleuze, "What is a dispositif?" in *Michel Foucault: Philosopher*, translated by Timothy J. Armstrong (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), pp. 160-1.

State's need for war in order to indicate some of the problems with Hegel's conceptualization of freedom. As a conclusion to this chapter, I consider the relationship between the individual, the State and war, as a means to problematize Hegel's concept of freedom.

In chapter five, the final section of my thesis research, I consider the University of Berlin as the space which, for Hegel, holds the unique position of realizing his philosophical project. That is, through the university, Hegel's theoretical understanding of philosophy can be concretized through his students' realization of the alleged freedom of Spirit. From a Foucauldian perspective, this pedagogical site can be understood as developing a series of tautological interpellative gestures that occur simultaneously on three registers: the historical, the governmental, and the subjective. The significance of this convergence is that the University of Berlin, for Hegel, acts as an institution that attempts to produce a specific understanding of history, in accord with the particular needs of government, through the interpellation of a precise subject of the modern liberal State. In this chapter, I begin with a brief review of some historical conditions relevant to the founding of the University of Berlin, particularly the French Revolution and the Franco-Prussian war. Following this historical discussion, I examine some of Hegel's more explicit claims about the function of education in his letters, as well as his published writings. Finally, I map the links among the three anchors of my Foucauldian critique to demonstrate that Hegel's philosophy at Berlin must be carefully considered with respect to its functions. I argue that the University of Berlin, as the space of convergence that links historical narrativity, governmentality, and political subjectivity, must be considered as a specific event in the formation of Hegelian political philosophy. I examine the tautological aspects of each of these three registers and indicate how they function to reiterate and reinforce one another as a dynamic set of interpellative

strategies. I also indicate how Foucault's analysis of *truth-effects* is particularly relevant to understanding the import of these strategies.¹⁶ In this context, I examine the *truth-effects* Hegel's philosophical tautologies attempt to produce in the registers of history, government, and subjectivity. In order to demonstrate the implications of truth in Hegel's philosophical project, I conclude this chapter by examining how Hegel's philosophical system justifies the colonial genocide in the Americas, not as an aberration that is incongruous with the system, but as a concrete example of its political rationality.

As a conclusion to my research, I argue that the intricate complexities of Hegel's pedagogical philosophy trace the surplus of a individual freedom that is delineated by this very need for educational controls. I return to the question of freedom, initially discussed in chapter four, to consider the possibility for thinking of freedom as the surplus that resists control. From this modest conception of freedom, I move into a discussion of Foucault's understanding of ethics and suggest that the three anchor points in my construction of a Foucauldian critique of Hegel are also valuable as analytical tools that open multiple sites of resistance to modern consumer culture and contemporary discourses that justify war and destruction. Invoking Erin Manning's concept of "response-ability" as a *counter*-logic to tautological pedagogies, I argue that Foucault's work creates openings for resistance to domination and control that contest oppressive political and economic relationships and offers possibilities for building creative and inspiring new relationships for both individuals and institutions.

¹⁶ Foucault's notion of *truth-effects* should be understood as referencing the aggregate of possibilities created by any given discourse that claims, legitimizes, or contests a value as a Truth. For Foucault, the question is not whether a discourse accurately delineates the Truth, but how the concept of Truth is itself related to the formation and legitimation of discourses. By using the term *truth-effects*, Foucault indicates that Truth not only functions in discourse, but that discourses must be understood in their relational capacity for articulating and legitimizing Truth(s).

Chapter 1 — Framing the Critique: Althusserian Interpellation and Foucauldian Analytics

Thought is no longer theoretical. As soon as it functions it offends or reconciles, attracts or repels, breaks, dissociates, unites or re-unites; it cannot help but liberate and enslave. Even before prescribing, suggesting a future, saying what must be done, even before exhorting or merely sounding an alarm, thought, at the level of existence, in its very dawning, is in itself an action—a perilous act.¹ – Michel Foucault

In this chapter, I begin by summarizing Althusser's concept of interpellation and demonstrating how, for him, it is a primarily ideological activity. I then explain how Foucault's analysis of knowledge, power and subjectivity can be read as an augmentation of Althusser's thought whereby Foucault deepens the analytical potential of the concept of interpellation by exploring the multiple possibilities for the exercise of power and the creation of subjectivities. Following this discussion, I provide a brief overview of Foucault's work, using commentary from Gilles Deleuze as well as statements made by Foucault himself. I then explain the primary features of my construction of a Foucauldian critique of Hegel, contextualizing my analytical goals within the general description of Foucault's work that I have sketched. As a conclusion to this chapter, I initiate a discussion of Hegel's concepts of the rational and the actual that defines the parameters of my engagement with his pedagogical concerns.

Althusser, Interpellation and Ideology

Louis Althusser's concept of interpellation, developed most explicitly in his essay *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*, is a fundamental point of analysis that is key not only for understanding the rich heritage of Foucault's philosophy, but also because it anticipates and

¹ Michel Foucault, *Language, counter-memory, practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, translated by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon, edited by Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca, New York: Cornell UP, 1980), p. 5.

informs much of Foucault's historical research, as well as his work on power and subjectivity.²

For Althusser, interpellation — where the individual responds to a call that, only in being recognized by this individual, constructs the individual *as a subject* — is a primarily ideological activity. In *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*, using the example of a man hailed in the street by a police officer, Althusser argues,

*all ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects, by the functioning of the category of the subject ... ideology 'acts' or 'functions' in such a way that it 'recruits' subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or 'transforms' the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have called interpellation.*³

This recruitment of subjects among individuals constructs a new relation among the subjects, where the connection to one another is mediated through the universal Subject which hails each one. According to Althusser, this universally recognized Subject can appear in a variety of forms, or modes, but it is ultimately a manifestation of the Ideological State Apparatus (ISA). Althusser stresses that the ISA “must not be confused with the repressive State apparatus that “functions by violence.”⁴ He explains, “I shall call Ideological State Apparatuses a certain number of realities which present themselves to the immediate observer in the form of distinct and specialized institutions,”⁵ including religious, educational, family, legal, political, communications and cultural ideological apparatuses, among others. Thus, for Althusser, the institutions which

² This heritage links Foucault with Althusser, but also indicates Althusser's relation to Lenin's theoretical writings and the initial problematization of hegemony put forward by Antonio Gramsci. Presently, the details and subtleties of these relations escape the available scope of my research; however, I believe it is important to indicate that Foucault's augmentation of Althusser's work on interpellation represents just one of the many developments within the long, complex, yet often misrepresented tradition of political philosophy.

³ Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Toward a Future Investigation),” in *Mapping Ideology*, edited by Slavoj Žižek (London and New York: Verso, 1994), p. 130.

⁴ Ibid, p. 110.

⁵ Ibid.

constitute the social whole (what Hegel would call *Sittlichkeit*, including the Family, Civil Society as the “external” State, and the State itself), reproduce the conditions of the ruling class by deploying the political rationality of the ruling class through ideology.

However, Althusser stresses that what is important is not where the ISA is designated, because this designation is determined by the ruling class, but, rather, *how it functions*. He explains, “What distinguishes the ISAs from the (Repressive) State Apparatus is the following basic difference: the Repressive State Apparatus functions ‘by violence’, whereas the Ideological State Apparatuses *function ‘by ideology.’*”⁶ He clarifies that neither register is pure, and that both contain elements of the other. However, for the purposes of his analytic of functions, Althusser stresses,

[ISAs] function massively and predominantly by ideology, but they also function secondarily by repression, even if ultimately, but only ultimately, this is very attenuated and concealed, even symbolic. ... If the ISAs ‘function’ massively and predominantly by ideology, what unifies their diversity is precisely this functioning, in so far as the ideology by which they function is always in fact unified, despite its diversity and contradictions, beneath the ruling ideology, which is the ideology of the ruling class.⁷

If, according to Althusser, the ruling class retains control of the ISA across a plurality of social fields, the next important question that must be answered is: “What exactly is the extent of the role of Ideological State Apparatuses?” or, “to what does the ‘function’ of these Ideological State Apparatuses, which do not function by repression but by ideology, correspond?”⁸ His answer is apparent in the title of the section – “On the Reproduction of the Relations of Production” – which begins immediately following this question. Here, Althusser delimits the ISAs’ correlate as economic praxis. He writes, “I believe that the Ideological State Apparatus which has been

⁶ Ibid, p. 111.

⁷ Ibid, p. 112.

⁸ Ibid, p. 113.

installed in the *dominant* position in mature capitalist social formations, as a result of a violent political and ideological class struggle against the old Ideological State Apparatus, is the *educational ideological apparatus*.”⁹ For Althusser, the reproduction of the order of the capitalist system is the precise function of the ISA. However, this reproduction is increasingly determined outside of registers of capitalist production *per se*, and, instead, occurs more and more frequently in institutions such as the education system. Althusser argues that the education system teaches “know-how” that guarantees the reproduction of the current order, even before students enter into the explicit class relations of production.¹⁰ Thus, Althusser summarizes the role of education, writing, “it is by an apprenticeship in a variety of know-how wrapped up in the massive inculcation of the ideology of the ruling class that the *relations of production* in a capitalist social formation, i.e. the relations of exploited to exploiters and exploiters to exploited, are largely reproduced.”¹¹

In the following section, Althusser advances his two main theses on ideology: “Thesis I: Ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence. ... it is not their real conditions of existence, their real world, that ‘men’ ‘represent to themselves’ in ideology, but above all it is their relation to those conditions of existence which is represented to them there”; and, “Thesis II: Ideology has a material existence.”¹² What is most significant about Althusser’s theses for my research is that they both delineate the role of interpellation in the

⁹ Ibid, p. 116.

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 104; p. 118; the use of primary school education to promote the interests of a particular political position which will later be tempered in additional institutions (giving the content its final form) is especially relevant to my reading of Hegel in chapter five. In my consideration of Hegel’s pedagogical writings, I will return to this aspect of Althusser’s analysis to indicate some significant points of contact that highlight Hegel’s own philosophical and ideological concerns.

¹¹ Ibid, p. 119.

¹² Ibid, p. 123-5.

constitution of a subject. With respect to the first thesis — that it is not the real relations between subjects that are represented in ideology, but only their relations to their conditions of existence — what is important is that Althusser is delimiting the possible reach of even the most hegemonic ISA. That is, even when ideology is incredibly persuasive and effective, it does not penetrate the real, actual relationships among individuals. Rather, it represents a certain relation among individuals to others, and in doing so constitutes individuals *as subjects* by calling on them (i.e. *interpellating* them) to recognize their relations in this representation, or abstraction. The second thesis — that ideologically has a material existence — is also important because it defines the practice of interpellation as an act, or practice, and as such, indicates that their effects are visible, or at least traceable. As Althusser affirms, “... an ideology always exists in an apparatus, and its practice, or practices.”¹³ Therefore, the act of interpellation can be isolated, analysed, and even contested, because it is a function, operation, or act that is always related to a specific apparatus and is never reducible to some natural or mysterious power, contract, or ontological condition.

Althusser then moves on to further define the role of ideology in the interpellation of individuals as subjects. He writes, “*the category of the subject is constitutive of all ideology only in so far as all ideology has the function (which defines it) of ‘constituting concrete individuals as subjects.’*”¹⁴ He uses the example of religious interpellation to indicate that it is only God, as the Absolute Subject, which creates the possibility of Christian subjects.¹⁵ Althusser then provides his definitive statement regarding the formation of the subject with respect to ideology, writing:

We observe that the structure of all ideology, interpellating individuals as subjects in the

¹³ Ibid, p. 126.

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 129; however, as we will see in chapter four, as well as the conclusion, for Foucault, the ideological and often hegemonic feature of interpellation in Althusser can be contested within the process of subjectification itself, where the individual contests the hegemonic functioning of power and knowledge (not, for Foucault, ideology) through a process of individuation, i.e. subjectification.

¹⁵ Ibid, pp. 133-4.

name of a Unique and Absolute Subject, is *speculary*, i.e. a mirror-structure, and *doubly* specular: this mirror duplication is constitutive of ideology, and ensures its functioning. Which means that all ideology is *centred*, that the Absolute Subject occupies the unique place of the Centre, and interpellates around it the infinity of individuals into subjects in a double mirror-connection such that it *subjects* the subjects to the Subject, while giving them the Subject in which each subject can contemplate its own image (present and future) the guarantee that this really concerns them and Him, and that since everything takes place in the Family (the Holy Family: the Family is in essence Holy), 'God will *recognize* his own in it', i.e. those who have recognized God, and have recognized themselves in Him, will be saved.¹⁶

For Althusser, the interpellation of the religious individual as the religious subject is emblematic of all ideological interpellation. Thus, the structure of ideological interpellation simultaneously guarantees:

(1) the interpellation of 'individuals' as subjects; (2) the subjection to the Subject; (3) the mutual recognition of subjects and Subject, the subjects' recognition of each other, and finally the subject's recognition of himself; the absolute guarantee that everything really is so, and that on condition that the subjects recognize what they are and behave accordingly, everything will be all right: Amen – '*So be it.*'¹⁷

Thus, the "Amen" of the subject is his acceptance of the call, or hail, that has interpellated him. Not only is his self-image now constituted by his role as a subject, but his identity is framed within this role of subjection, so that his self-relation, as well as his relations to others and to the Absolute subject, all occur within this hegemonic field. Therefore, with respect to the reproduction of the conditions of production, "the vast majority of (good) subjects work all right 'all by themselves' ... They recognize that the existing state of affairs [*das Bestehende*], that 'it really is true that it is so and not otherwise', and that that they must be obedient to God, to their conscience, to the priest, to de Gaulle, to the boss, to the engineer, that thou shalt 'love thy neighbour as thyself', etc."¹⁸ That

¹⁶ Ibid, pp. 134-5.

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 135.

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 135.

is, the obedience of the individual to the structures ensuring the predominance of the capitalist ruling class is guaranteed by conditioning the individual as a subject, so that his understanding of the state of the world via capitalist ideology reproduces, inevitably, the capitalist order.

Therefore, Althusser explains, “subject” means not only an individual responsible for his own actions, but, more importantly, “a subjected being, who submits to a higher authority, and is therefore stripped of all freedom except that of freely accepting his submission.”¹⁹ He concludes,

*the individual is interpellated as a (free) subject in order that he shall submit freely to the commandments of the Subject, i.e. in order that he shall freely accept his subjection, i.e. in order that he shall make the gestures and actions of his subjection ‘all by himself’. There are no subjects except by and for their subjection. That is why they ‘work all by themselves.’*²⁰

The creation of subjects allows the capitalist ruling class to ensure the reproduction of the system which guarantees class privilege. Once interpellated, subjects recognize themselves in this structure and, in identifying with it, guarantee its reproduction “all by themselves.” This aspect of interpellation, the creation of subjects who recognize their freedom as, and *only* as, the freedom to submit, *to be subjected*, is the key to understanding the function of ideology and class struggle. Only when individuals are able to recognize how they are interpellated within the capitalist system, and how the entirety of their relations with others are conditioned and mediated by this interpellation, will they be able to fully engage in the class struggle that, for Althusser, will challenge the structures of the predominant capitalist ideology.

From Althusser to Foucault

For Althusser, it is clear that power, as ideology, functions in a variety of fields through a

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 136.

²⁰ Ibid, p. 136.

dynamic arrangement of multiple sites and discourses. In order to reproduce the conditions of production, the ruling class must ensure the widespread reproduction the ideological framework that delimits the very possibility of its existence. This aspect of production in a plurality of fields that multiply and enforce one another is significant for Foucault, despite his move away from Althusser's ideological framework. Althusser also shares a close affinity with Foucault in his analysis of the significance of language itself. In *Lenin and Philosophy*, Althusser states: "Why does philosophy fight over words? The realities of the class struggle are 'represented' by 'ideas' which are 'represented' by words ... The philosophical fight over words is part of the political fight."²¹ Again, despite Althusser's ideological conviction, the emphasis in this passage on the importance of language resonates with Foucault, especially in his early work on knowledge and discourse.

However, Althusser's understanding of philosophy gives us a specific point of departure where we can see a key distinction between the Althusserian concept of interpellation and how it might be conceptualized in the work of Foucault. In *Lenin and Philosophy*, Althusser writes that philosophy is "the practice of political intervention carried out in a theoretical form,"²² and that by using the dialectical concept, it is possible for philosophy to understand the general laws of nature and thought in order to promote revolutionary class struggle.²³ From a Foucauldian perspective, it is important to understand that Althusser's interpellative analytics can be taken further in order to consider the widespread affects of power that are not solely determined by the dialectic or class distinctions. As Foucault states in *Power/Knowledge*, "it is quite possible that the major mechanisms of power have been accompanied by ideological productions ... but basically I do not

²¹ Louis Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, translated by Ben Brewster (London and New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), pp. 21-2.

²² Ibid, p. 107.

²³ Ibid, p. 59.

believe that what has taken place can be said to be ideological. It is both much more and much less than ideology.”²⁴ Foucault clarifies his hesitations regarding ideologically-based analysis, writing,

The notion of ideology appears to me to be difficult to make use of, for three reasons. The first is that, like it or not, it always stands in virtual opposition to something else that is supposed to count as truth. ... The second drawback is that the concept of ideology refers, I think necessarily, to something of the order of a subject. Thirdly, ideology stands in a secondary position relative to something that functions as its infrastructure, as its material, economic determinant, and so on.²⁵

Therefore, we see Foucault moving from Althusser’s ideological framework toward a deeper analysis of power and subjectivity occurring beneath, or within, the stratified forms of ideological power. Yet, despite Foucault’s criticism of ideology as an analytical framework, I believe that the aspect of interpellation, despite its ideological explanation in Althusser, remains extremely relevant in the work of Foucault. Foucault’s interest in how subjects are created, constituted, and determined, as well as the important questions regarding the possibility of hegemonic interpellations that appear in his work, all signify Foucault’s attempts to rethink the concept of interpellation outside of the ideological framework that is found in Althusser.

Still, the question of how and to what extent Foucault adapts and augments the

²⁴ Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings*, edited by Colin Gordon, translated by Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, and Kate Soper (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), p. 102.

²⁵ Michel Foucault, *Power: Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume 3*, edited by James D. Faubion and translated by Robert Hurley (New York: New Press, 2000), p. 119; also, in the same volume, see “Interview with Michel Foucault,” p. 297. Also, as Deleuze emphasizes, it is important to question Althusser’s topographical model that sees economy as the ‘determination in the last instance.’ For Deleuze, “This is not, however, a question of a linguistic operation, for a subject is never the condition of possibility of language or the cause of the statement: there is no subject, only collective assemblages of enunciation. ... Neither is it a question of a movement characteristic of ideology, as Althusser says: subjectification as a regime of signs or a form of expression is tied to an assemblage, in other words, an organization of power that is already fully functioning in the economy, rather than superposing itself upon the contents or relations between contents determined as real in the last instance”; see Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, translated and introduced by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis & London: Minnesota UP, 2000), p. 105; p. 130.

Althusserian concept of interpellation remains more complex and would require an extensive review of Foucault's intellectual heritage, for which there is little space in this brief thesis. However, without the aid of such an extensive review, it remains useful to consider Foucault's analysis of discourse, knowledge, power and subjectivity as revealing certain interpellative functions, although they cannot properly be described as ideological. As Foucault himself suggested in an interview, when asked about the influence of Althusser on his own work, "Having been his student and owing him a great deal, I may have a tendency to credit his influence an effort that he might question, so I can't answer for his part. ... Open the books of Althusser and see what he says."²⁶ The goal of my research is not to *prove*, in any specific sense, that Foucault is using an Althusserian model in his research; rather, I believe, especially at the level of function and effect, because the concept of interpellation was demonstrably influential on Foucault, it offers an analytical mode through which an engagement with Foucault becomes especially valuable, precisely because of Foucault's break with ideological analysis. As a number of scholars have noted in the literature, Foucault's breaks with ideology, but also with other theories he sees as totalizing, including Marxism and structuralism, because they cannot provide the localized details necessary to understand how power operates in relation to individuals. In the next section, I sketch a brief overview of Foucault's work, drawing from the studies of Gilles Deleuze, as well as from Foucault's own statements about his philosophical concerns, in order to demonstrate how Foucault's concerns are animated by his ambition to redefine the possibilities for critical engagement outside the parameters of ideological, or totalizing, discourses. I will not attempt in this section to provide a detailed account of the role of interpellation in Foucault's work, though I do indicate how such an account could be conceived and why it would be theoretically useful.

²⁶ Michel Foucault, "On the Ways of Writing History," *Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology: Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume 2*, edited by James D. Faubion and translated by Robert Hurley (New York: The New Press, 1998), p. 281.

However, in chapter five, when I consider the University of Berlin as a site of convergence for Hegel's historical, governmental and subjective registers that I have read through a Foucauldian lense, I return to Althusser's concept of interpellation to indicate how the confluence of these three registers may be seen as complementary and mutually re-enforcing by reading them as gestures with specific interpellative and inherently tautological features.

An Overview of Foucault

In order to sketch a brief overview of Foucault's work, I have drawn a number of passages from Gilles Deleuze's studies and reviews of Foucault. Not only were Deleuze and Foucault close intellectual companions, but their work also exhibits a certain continuity and reciprocity that informs the study of either thinker. However, another key reason for my use of Deleuze as a reader of Foucault is that, in my opinion, he is one of the few intellectuals who was willing to engage with Foucault's project in order to investigate its transitions, limitations, and potentials.²⁷ Unlike many liberal critics of Foucault, often caught in rhetorical games of interpretation that discredit Foucault's work as a premise for engaging with it, Deleuze writes, "I'm trying to see Foucault's thought as a whole. By the whole, I mean what drives him on from one level of things to another: what drives him to discover power behind knowledge, and what drives him to discover "modes of subjection" beyond the confines of power."²⁸ Deleuze's search for the movements, breaks, and continuities of Foucault's thought also makes him highly sensitive to its restrictions and potentialities. In "*What is a Dispositif ?*", one of the most important essays written on Foucault's social and political thought, Deleuze explains,

²⁷ Of course, I am not claiming that Deleuze provides a neutral, objective reading of Foucault that cannot itself be questioned. However, Deleuze's intense study of Foucault, their friendship, and complementarity make his work of particular relevance to understanding Foucault's philosophy within the broader context of his intellectual life.

²⁸ Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations*, translated by Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia UP, 1995), p. 84.

Foucault's philosophy is often presented as an analysis of concrete social apparatuses [*dispositifs*]. But what is a *dispositif*? In the first instance it is a tangle, a multilinear assembly. ... the lines in the apparatus do not outline or surround systems which are homogeneous in their own right, objects, subjects, language, and so on, but follow directions, trace balances which are always off balance, now drawing together and then distancing themselves from one another.²⁹

He continues,

These apparatuses, then, are composed of the following elements: lines of visibility and enunciation, lines of force, lines of subjectification, lines of splitting, breakage, fracture, all of which criss-cross and mingle together, some lines reproducing or giving rise to others, by means of variations or even changes in the way they are grouped.³⁰

Thus, for Deleuze, Foucault's work is attempting to delimit the possibilities for seeing, speaking, and understanding, as well as relations of power and subjectification, all in relation to the multiform, shifting, and intersecting *dispositifs* that construct the horizon upon and within which these activities take place.

However, as Deleuze stresses, "Knowledge, Power and Subjectivity are by no means contours given once and for all, but a series of variables which supplant one another."³¹ Therefore, despite the breaks between these fields in Foucault's research, it is important to see them as shifting and changing emphasis, in the same way that *dispositifs* are multiform and variable as they appear in their historical formations. As Deleuze notes, Foucault's early works, focusing on discourses and the knowledges they produce and legitimize, often presumed or implied a certain

²⁹ Deleuze, "What is a *dispositif*?", p. 159.

³⁰ Ibid, p. 162.

³¹ Ibid, p. 159.

conception of power that Foucault himself had not yet fully articulated.³² Deleuze offers a detailed explanation of the relation between knowledge and power that is worth quoting at length. He writes:

Between power and knowledge there is a difference in nature or a heterogeneity; but there is also a mutual presupposition and capture; and there is ultimately a primacy of one over the other. First of all, there is a difference in nature, since power does not pass through forms, but only through forces. Knowledge concerns formed matters (substances) and formalized functions ... it is therefore stratified, archivized, and endowed with a relatively rigid segmentarity. Power, on the other hand, is diagrammatic: it mobilizes non-stratified matter and functions, and unfolds with a very flexible segmentarity.³³

Thus, in Foucault's work, power can be understood as the *non-formal* element, or the play of forces, that occurs between and beneath *forms* of knowledge.³⁴ "Therefore," Deleuze stresses, "we should not ask: 'What is power and where does it come from?', but 'How is power practiced?' An exercise of power shows up as an affect, since force defines itself by its very power to affect other forces (to which it is related) and to be affected by other forces."³⁵ This emphasis of the *practice of power* is key to understanding Foucault's analytics, both in the field of discourse and knowledge, as well as at the level of subjectivity.

Deleuze also emphasizes, "Categories of power are therefore determinations unique to the

³² For early articulations of Foucault's study of knowledge and discourse, see Michel Foucault, "Politics and the study of discourse," *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) pp. 53-72 (originally published in 1968); the lecture delivered at the Collège de France on December 2, 1970, reprinted in Michel Foucault, "The Discourse on Language," from *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, translated by A.M. Sheridan (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), pp. 215-237; and, the complete collection of Foucault's early works in Michel Foucault, *Dits et Écrits I - 1954-1975* (Éditions Gallimard, 2001).

³³ Deleuze, *Foucault*, p. 73.

³⁴ Deleuze, *Negotiations*, p. 97.

³⁵ Deleuze, *Foucault*, p. 71.

‘particular’ action and its particular medium.”³⁶ This aspect of power gives Foucault’s analysis its localized quality. That is, for Foucault, power must be studied in its precise operation in particular aspects of discourse and knowledge. Thus, “Power relations are therefore not *known*. ... relations between forces will remain transitive, unstable, faint, almost virtual, at all events unknown, unless they are carried out by the formed or stratified relations which make up forms of knowledge.”³⁷

Deleuze’s explanation of the function of power in Foucault’s work also provides a clear connection to Althusser, in that Deleuze’s reading incorporates much of Althusser’s theses on ideology, but at the level of a differentiated play of forces (i.e. at the level of power itself), beneath the surface of any stratified form of ideologies. Deleuze writes:

The integrating factors or agents of stratification make up institutions: not just the State, but also the Family, Religion, Production, the Marketplace, Art itself, Morality, and so on. The institutions are not sources or essences, and have neither essence or interiority. They are practices or operating mechanisms which do not explain power, since they presuppose its relations and are content to ‘fix’ them, as part of a function that is not productive but reproductive. There is no State, only state control, and the same holds for all the other cases.”³⁸

This distinction again highlights Foucault’s movement away from the Althusserian/ideological model for studying power. Because this model only examines power in its striated, stratified and determined instantiations, it confuses institutionalized and ideological articulations of power with power itself. For Deleuze, power is *actualized*, that is, concretized in discourse, knowledge, and institutions, as well as subjectivities, only when systems of *formal* differentiation are created and maintained. Deleuze explains,

³⁶ Ibid, p. 72.

³⁷ Ibid, p. 74.

³⁸ Ibid, p. 75.

There is no confusion, therefore, between the affective categories of power (of the ‘incite’ and ‘provoke’ variety) and the formal categories of knowledge (such as the ‘educate’, ‘look after’, ‘punish’, and so on), the latter passing through seeing and speaking in order to actualize the former. But it is precisely for this reason, by virtue of this displacement which excludes coincidence, that the institution has the capacity to integrate power-relations, by constituting various forms of knowledge which actualize, modify and *redistribute* these relations.³⁹

Thus, according to Deleuze, Foucault sees the possibility of analysing power as it becomes manifest in power-relations that give it a determined form. As Foucault writes in *The History of Sexuality*, “We need to take these [mechanisms of knowledge and power] seriously, therefore, and reverse the direction of our analysis ... we must begin with these positive mechanisms, insofar as they produce knowledge, multiply discourse, induce pleasure, and generate power; we must investigate the conditions of their emergence and operation.”⁴⁰ Again, in this passage, we see Foucault’s move away from the Althusserian/ideological framework as he stresses the importance of studying power from the perspective of codification, consolidation and concentration, rather than from a position of alleged exteriority that sees the (Marxist, structuralist, etc.) “truth” of power relations and then constructs a narrative rooted in this truth. Of particular importance for this ascending analysis of power relations is Foucault’s ‘Rule of Immanence,’ which he states in the *History of Sexuality*: “Between techniques of knowledge and strategies of power, there is no exteriority, even if they have specific roles and are linked together on the basis of their difference.”⁴¹ That is, one can never get “outside” of power because the discourses and knowledges that signify its presence *constitute* individuality. However, Foucault’s analysis of

³⁹ Ibid, p. 77.

⁴⁰ Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality. Volume I: An Introduction*, translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), p. 73.

⁴¹ Ibid, p. 98.

subjectification aims to demonstrate that despite this aspect of constitution, there are a plurality of ways of adapting to one's horizon that show how individualities are never entirely *determined* by knowledge and power.

Deleuze explains Foucault's move to the analysis of subjectification, which takes up the last years of his research, writing,

the fundamental question is why Foucault needs yet another dimension [in addition to knowledge and power], why he goes on to discover subjectification as distinct from both knowledge and power. ... Crossing the line of force, going beyond power, involves as it were bending force, making it impinge on itself rather than on other forces: a "fold," in Foucault's terms, force playing on itself. It's a question of "doubling" the play of forces, of a self-relation that allows us to resist, to elude power, to turn life or death against power.⁴²

What Deleuze calls a "crisis" in Foucault's thought is, in fact, the problem that originates in Althusser's theory of ideological interpellation — that is, if the subject is definitively interpellated by ideology, how can one account for the resistances and contestations that occur within its allegedly hegemonic field? Within a Foucauldian context, this problem is translated into the analysis of power, so that, as Deleuze explains, "it had become necessary for him to redraw the map of social apparatuses [*dispositifs*], to find for them a new orientation in order to stop them from becoming locked into unbreakable lines of force which would impose definitive contours."⁴³ That is, Foucault's analysis of subjectification is an attempt to show how individuals, despite being *constituted* by power (via discourses, knowledge, institutions, etc.), are never finally, or completely, *determined* by power.

This conceptualization of subjectification leads to Foucault's ethic of the fold. The fold, as the potential for an individual to "bend" against power and knowledge in order to see himself as

⁴² Deleuze, *Negotiations*, p. 98.

⁴³ Deleuze, "What is a dispositif ?", p. 161.

constructed, but, again, not determined, is also the potential to re-think questions of relations to oneself and to others. That is, the ethic of the fold privileges the capacity of individuals to extend themselves against power and knowledge, struggling with them, and often against their categories and controls, in order to challenge a given discourse of knowledge by undermining perceptions of its rigid determinacy. In contrast to Hegel's ethic of mutual recognition, requiring the mediation of the State, Foucault's ethic opens the possibility for relations not governed by the logic of recognition (this will be further discussed in the conclusion). In fact, Foucault's own historical research, as a genealogical approach to questions of madness, health, prisons, etc., expresses the potentials for folding truths against themselves in order to indicate that the universal conditions and normative judgements that they rely on are not as binding or constricting as they might first appear. That is, Foucault "unfolds" them by folding himself within them, creating, through his research, a space for thinking otherwise. In this sense, it is the search in thought for the outside of thought, the unthought potentials for relations that have not yet been, that resonates at the core of Foucault's ethic. However, the potentials for a Foucauldian ethic require further examination and discussion, and will therefore be developed throughout my research as I construct my Foucauldian critique of Hegel's philosophy.

One additional aspect of Foucault's thought that I want to consider in slightly more detail is his concept of genealogy because it further informs his research on knowledge, power and subjectivity, and also points toward the "solution" to the problem of hegemony (in both Althusser and Foucault). Deleuze writes that, "History is that determination of visible and articulable features unique to each age which goes beyond any behaviour, mentality or set of ideas, since it makes these things possible."⁴⁴ Therefore, history can be seen as a plane, or horizon, upon which

⁴⁴ Deleuze, *Foucault*, pp. 48-9; Foucault's most explicit development of this conceptualization of history occurs in his analysis of biology, political economy and linguistics in *The Order of Things*, translated by Tavistock Publication (Routledge: London and New York, 2002).

certain sets of relations and strategies of contestation are made possible. Genealogy, then, in its most basic definition, is the making visible, or articulable, of the horizon upon which power relations take place. In doing so, the genealogist exposes the discontinuities and breaks in history that signal the possibility for contestation and change. As Foucault says in *Language, counter-memory, practice*, “if the genealogist refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, if he listens to history, he finds that there is “something altogether different” behind things: not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms.”⁴⁵ Therefore, because genealogy exposes the play of power that constitutes meaning through discourses and knowledges in a given historical period or *episteme*, it also indicates that individuals are never entirely determined by this constitution.

The importance of genealogical analysis in Foucault’s work cannot be overstated. In his essay “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”, Foucault explains that Nietzsche’s philosophy

always questioned the form of history that reintroduces (and always assumes) a suprahistorical perspective: a history whose function is to compose the finally reduced diversity of time into a totality fully closed upon itself; a history that always encourages subjective recognitions and attributes a form of reconciliation to all the displacements of the past; a history whose perspective on all that precedes it implies the end of time, a completed development.”⁴⁶

Invoking Nietzsche, Foucault emphasizes the significance of totalizing narratives which assume positions of completion and attempt to convince learners that they are situated within a necessary historical development. Bruce Baugh, in *French Hegel*, considers the important relationship between Hegel, Nietzsche and the French postmodernists, providing a clear analysis of this significant relationship. He writes,

Instead of trying to refute Hegel, Deleuze’s later work, along with Foucault’s, puts

⁴⁵ Foucault, *Language, counter-memory, practice*, p. 142.

⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 152.

Nietzschean philosophy into practice through “genealogical” investigations of the production of subjects, experience, and history. Deleuze develops a good part of the theoretical underpinnings of this stance, whereas Foucault’s historical studies can be seen as its practical and historical elaboration, one that both clarifies and situates Deleuze’s theories by bringing genealogy itself within the scope of genealogical analysis. No longer anti-Hegelianism, this non-Hegelian philosophy claims to discard the categories, problems, and terms of reference of Hegelianism (negation, dialectic, recognition, representation).⁴⁷

In accord with Baugh’s insightful reading, throughout my research I will attempt to demonstrate that Foucault’s resistance to meta-histories does not mean that he carries an unfounded prejudice against Hegel’s philosophy. On the contrary, I indicate that because of the mutual development of Foucault’s genealogical method and his studies of knowledge, power, and subjectivity, a Foucauldian critique of Hegel could *not* proceed from a position that dismisses *de facto* the meta-narrative of Hegelian philosophy.⁴⁸ Rather, it is through Foucault’s unique historical studies of knowledge, power and subjectivity that he comes to reject meta-narratives because of their tautological assumptions and subsequent *truth-effects*, which lead in directions counter to Foucault’s goal of living a “non-fascist life”⁴⁹ by creating dangerous concentrations of both knowledge and power, while weakening possibilities for resistance to domination.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Bruce Baugh, *French Hegel: From Surrealism to Postmodernism* (New York and London: Routledge, 2003), p. 147.

⁴⁸ The question as to whether or not the genealogical method is itself a meta-historical narrative remains to be discussed. Although I take up this question throughout the following chapters and attempt to respond to it directly in the conclusion, the debate over Foucault’s own metaphysical presumptions may remain outside of the limited space of my research.

⁴⁹ Michel Foucault, “Preface to *Anti-Oedipus*,” in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus (Capitalism and Schizophrenia - Part I)*, translated by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: Minnesota Press, 1983), pp. xiii-xiv.

⁵⁰ Although the emergence of Foucault’s position is best understood with the debates and political dialogues he entertained with other thinkers of his generation, I am unable to include many of this significant and formative encounters within my present research. For an excellent collection, see *Foucault and his Interlocutors*, edited by A. I. Davidson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).

A Foucauldian Critique of Hegel

Having sketched, however briefly, a picture of Foucault's general theoretical analysis, I now want to specify, with greater precision, the design for my construction of a Foucauldian critique of Hegel. The three anchor points for my construction of a Foucauldian critique are all developed in their most explicit forms in the last ten years of Foucault's theoretical work (from the period of 1974-1984). These three points of analysis will include: the historical, relating to philosophical-juridical discourses (discussed in chapter two); the governmental, relating to rationality and political economy (discussed in chapter three); and, the subjective, relating to the productive aspects of power, that produce subjects or effects of subjectification (discussed in chapter four). Though these three anchor points can all be applied to aspects of Hegel's philosophy, my division of Hegel's thought is, of course, entirely analytic. For Hegel, the historical, governmental and subjective registers of his philosophy are never divided or parcelled out into clean, defined categories. However, for the purposes of my construction of a Foucauldian critique, I will examine these three aspects of Hegel's thought separately to demonstrate how they might be read through a Foucauldian analysis. In chapter five, I will show how all three registers – the historical, governmental and subjective – function within Hegelian philosophy at the University of Berlin as a unified discourse of truth that has specific *truth-effects* with dangerous political implications.

For Hegel, the goal of philosophy can be summarized as the articulation of the movements of Spirit such that these movements generate their own self-understanding. That is, the truth of history as the rational progress of Spirit will move from an intuitive speculation to a concrete realization. As Robert B. Pippin explains,

Hegel understands all the basic institutions of a historical society as sustained by a kind of ongoing, implicit consensus, a collectively shared view of criteria for evaluation, the good life, the highest things. ... Hegel believes he can describe a general process, a development, in a community's emerging self-consciousness about such criteria that can

account for the periodic breakdown of such consensus and the emergence of a new self-understanding.⁵¹

However, Pippin concedes that, “All of this of course immediately raises new suspicions: whether there really is such a self-determining, internally self-correcting, process or not; whether this Hegelian totality, Spirit, so coherently self-determining in its political, aesthetic, religious and philosophic manifestations, can be defended.”⁵² Thus, my engagement with the “defence” of Hegel’s philosophy will focus on Hegel’s pedagogy, and how the interpellative gestures within it can be subjected to a Foucauldian analysis in order to form a critique of its implications. As Foucault scholars Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow note in their extensive study *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, Foucault’s research is never directed solely at political institutions; rather, “Foucault’s aim is to isolate, identify, and analyze the web of unequal relationships set up by political technologies which underlies and undercuts the theoretical equality posited by law and political philosophers.”⁵³ I believe that through a Foucauldian analysis it can be demonstrated that Hegel’s “defence” of Spirit (as well as the subsequent defence of it offered by many scholars and commentators), both as a historically referential entity and as a dynamic articulation of human self-understanding, relies on a complex assemblage of tautological (though *non-ideological*) interpellative gestures that construct a conception of political subjectivity that is as precarious as it is dangerous.

Regarding the accuracy of my reading of Hegel, there is an important question that remains to be discussed about the relation between the actual and the rational. If, as Hegel

⁵¹ Robert B. Pippin, *Modernism as a Philosophical Problem*, Second Edition (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), p. 67.

⁵² Ibid, p. 69.

⁵³ Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, Second Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 185.

notoriously stated, the rational and actual are unified in Spirit's self-understanding as Absolute Knowledge, it is extremely important to consider how Hegel's philosophy, particularly from a pedagogical perspective, is *prescriptive*. That is, Hegel's Science of Spirit elevates the actual into conceptual rationality – the rationality of the science – with the conviction that philosophy should no longer be a love of wisdom, but wisdom (i.e. science) itself. However, it is clear throughout Hegel's work that despite this alleged conceptual victory of the rational, the actual remains stubbornly and persistently behind, failing to articulate in the real world the scientific rationality that it has been given in thought. This indicates that the rational, as it is conceptually determined in the Science of Spirit, must not only be derived from the actual, in the process of self-knowledge, but it must also be applied back to the actual, to shape it in its own image. The complexity of this relation, evident in Hegel's writings as well as the literature, is immense. However, I want to unpack this problem further because the value of Hegel's philosophical pedagogy hinges precisely on this question.

Despite Hegel's insistence on the pedagogical value of the systematicity of the Science of Spirit, the actual remains a difficult ambiguity to explain in terms of its effects, both conceptually and practically. Even if, at the level of the rational, the correlation between the rational and actual were possible, it has been evident, at least since the opening pages of Plato's *Republic*, that, as Polemarcus indicates, one cannot be convinced of anything if one does not listen. That is, the actual can only be contained, understood, or captured, by the rational, and therefore elevated into the process of Spirit's self-knowledge, if it can first be demonstrated to Spirit's 'constituents' that such an act is both possible and necessary. Or, as Socrates responds to Polemarcus, if they can be *persuaded*. In this context, the Science of Spirit must be understood as a complex, interpellative process whereby students are taught to view history as the progressive development of Spirit coming to know itself *through their own understanding of the Science of Spirit*. However, it is only in the *application* of this understanding to the world outside of thought that the gap between

the rational and actual is closed. Thus, the realization of Hegel's philosophical project to unify, completely, the rational and the actual, requires that their unity is taught (as Hegel's lectures at the University of Berlin) prior to its realization in the actual (as students leave the university and re-create the world in the image of the rational).

Perhaps the most ominous statement Hegel wrote regarding this problem is his famous passage from the Preface of the *Philosophy of Right*:

A further word on the subject of *issuing instructions* on how the world ought to be: philosophy, at any rate, always comes too late to perform this function. As the *thought* of the world, it appears only at a time when actuality has gone through its formative process and attained its complete state. ... When philosophy paints its grey on grey, a shape of life has grown old, and it cannot be rejuvenated, but only recognized, by the grey in grey of philosophy; the owl of Minerva begins its flight only with the onset of dusk.⁵⁴

Indeed, this passage has generated much commentary in both the history of philosophy and the literature on Hegel. Yet, a careful reflection of the precise meaning of Hegel's phrase "a shape of life has grown old and cannot be rejuvenated" is conspicuously absent from the literature. Tom Rockmore notes that, "for Hegel, knowledge, including philosophy, is not and cannot be *a priori*: on the contrary, it emerges in and is the product of the collective human effort of human beings over the course of recorded human history to come to grips with their world and themselves."⁵⁵ Yet, if the owl of Minerva takes flight at dusk, what does this mean for the pedagogical value of Hegel's thought? If students are taught to recognize truth as freedom mediated by the State, and the attainment of absolute freedom as the rational outcome of history, what does it mean for them to enter a dying world as subjects interpellated by this knowledge? It will be demonstrated that Hegel cannot entirely address some of the problems posed with respect to his concept of the State (chapter four). He is also explicit in his statements regarding poverty, and clearly describes a

⁵⁴ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, Preface, p. 23.

⁵⁵ Tom Rockmore, *Before and After Hegel* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 85.

disparity that requires increasing policing and bureaucracy (chapter three). Simultaneously, the interests of civil society require expansion, colonization and warfare to secure the delicate stability of the actualized rationality of the state structure (chapter three and five). Yet, unlike the owl of Minerva, whose vision provides it with the predatory capabilities to fly into the night and kill for its survival, the Hegelian subject, it appears, must struggle to recognize himself in the mirror of a world that is growing dark and passing away, and he may only be capable of sustaining his identity, and perhaps his survival, by clinging to this dying world. It is precisely the strategies, requirements, and dangers of Hegel's political rationality — the desire to (re-)make the world of the actual in the image of rational thought — that implicates his philosophy in a Foucauldian critique of tautological interpellation.

As a final note of caution, I want to emphasize that I am not claiming that a Foucauldian critique of Hegel is either definitive or complete. I am aware that there are many tensions and subtleties within Hegel's philosophy and within the literature that I cannot fully articulate within this project, although I strongly believe that my immersion in the literature has familiarized me with the core debates regarding Hegel's philosophy and its political implications. However, my research has also indicated, to my disappointment, that much of the philosophical discourse and debate regarding Hegel's thought attempts to provide "correct" and "accurate" readings of Hegel, while consistently neglecting considerations of what his system might mean in terms of functions, effects, and more precise political implications. Therefore, I want to stress that, as a Foucauldian critique, my research is not directed toward understanding Hegel's intentions; rather, my construction of a Foucauldian critique is informed by a concern for effects, that is, the function of the system and how it effects the political possibilities. Whether or not a Foucauldian critique is of any relevance to the debates on Hegel within the literature remains a question of the extent to which interpretations and apologies are privileged over implications and practical concerns.

Chapter 2 — The Register of History: Philosophico-juridical Discourses and the War Hypothesis

War is not only one of the ordeals — the greatest — of which morality lives; it renders morality derisory. The art of foreseeing war and winning it by every means – politics – is henceforth enjoined as the very exercise of reason. Politics is opposed to morality, as philosophy to naïveté.¹ — Emmanuel Levinas

In this chapter, I begin with a discussion of sovereignty as the context for Foucault's war hypothesis — *that war can be used as an effective analyzer of political power*. Having provided the context for Foucault's attempt to think a politics outside of the discourse of sovereignty, I summarize his lecture course "*Society Must be Defended*." I then examine Hegel's writings on history, as they relate to the State and its legitimacy as the rational outcome of history. Following this examination of Hegel's thought, I investigate more fully the possibilities for reading Hegel's historical narrative through Foucault's analysis of philosophico-juridical discourses developed in "*Society Must be Defended*." I indicate that, for Hegel, the arguments for the necessity of the State are located in his metaphysical history, and I demonstrate how this historical narrative exhibits tautological and interpellative features. As a conclusion to this chapter, I consider some of the theoretical limitations of Foucault's war hypothesis and suggest how they unfold into his subsequent analysis of political rationality in his work on governmentality.

Sovereignty and the Context of the War Hypothesis

As I indicated in chapter one, Foucault's concern with thinking a politics outside of the political discourse of sovereignty animated much of his research in the final years of his life. As Colin Gordon argues in his introduction to *Power*, for Foucault,

Awakening ourselves to the real world of power relations is awakening ourselves to a world of endemic struggle. The history of power is also a memory of struggles and

¹ Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, translated by Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP, 1969), p. 21.

therefore, potentially at least, a reawakening to refusals and new struggles — not least by showing how contingent and arbitrary the given conditions of the present are which we so readily take for granted.²

That is, the “given conditions of the present,” especially the model of sovereignty as the dominant mode for thinking about political power, have been so entrenched in the cultural and philosophical scholarship of the Western world that this paradigm is no longer even questioned. For Foucault, examining the history of struggles that have contested discourses of sovereignty allows for new political discourses to emerge that are not already conditioned and, in a large part, determined, by the political concept of sovereignty. As Foucault states, “Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination.”³ For Foucault, the genealogical investigation of sovereignty will demonstrate that not only are the universalist claims within the discourse of sovereignty rooted in a politics of domination and struggle, but these claims of universality also function to veil the struggles that they attempt to contain and capture. Foucault contends,

Rules are empty in themselves, violent and unfinalized; they are impersonal and can be bent to any purpose. The successes of history belong to those who are capable of seizing these rules, to replace those who had used them, to disguise themselves so as to pervert them, invert their meaning, and redirect them against those who had initially imposed them; controlling this complex mechanism, they will make it function so as to overcome the rulers through their own rules.⁴

² Colin Gordon, Introduction to Michel Foucault’s *Power: Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume 3*, edited by James D. Faubion and translated by Robert Hurley (New York: The New Press, 2000), p. xx.

³ Michel Foucault, *Language, counter-memory, practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, translated by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon, edited by Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca, New York: Cornell UP, 1980), p. 151.

⁴ Ibid, p. 151.

Therefore, the history of struggle indicates that victors of historical conflicts install and erect systems of legitimacy that will continue to perpetuate the advantages they have gained through conflicts and violence. However, the vanquished, by understanding the functions and effects of the systems of legitimacy within which they continue to be subordinated, are also capable of challenging the rules of these systems and reversing the dynamics of power to their own advantage. If the world of power is, in fact, a world of endemic struggle, it is only because the historico-political discourses can challenge and contest the claims of legitimacy edified by the philosophico-juridical discourses.⁵

For Foucault, this possibility of undermining the power of stratified rules of order and control is directly linked to the question of genealogy. Foucault states,

If interpretation were the slow exposure of the meaning of a hidden origin, then only metaphysics could interpret the development of humanity. But if interpretation is the violent or surreptitious appropriation of a system of rules, which in itself has no essential meaning, in order to impose a direction, to bend it to a new will, to force its participation in a different game, and to subject it to secondary rules, then the development of humanity is a series of interpretations.⁶

In this passage we see that, for Foucault, political systems, as well as their rules and operations, are grounded in the metaphysical histories which guarantee their legitimacy. For this reason, political challenges to dominant discourses of sovereignty that fail to consider the metaphysical justifications for the dominant discourses will be less effective than those challenges that link established political power to the metaphysical narratives of history that lend it legitimacy. By linking political power to the often arbitrary and violent histories that allowed the establishment of

⁵ For Foucault, the suggestion that a struggle for power animates claims to truth does not presume a meta-historical perspective. However, what should be stressed is that, within Foucault's analysis, one does not require a meta-historical perspective to advocate social and political forms of organization that attempt to lessen modes of domination.

⁶ Ibid, p. 151-2.

the political order, the possibility for contestation is awakened. That is, if a political group recognizes that its subordination in the political order is not due to some rational development of history, articulated in the language of the universal power of the sovereign, and, instead, comprehends this subordination as the edification of a struggle that continues through the mechanisms of sovereignty (i.e. the Law), then the group is given a renewed motivation to contest the conditions that secure its repression.

For Foucault, the possibility for contesting dominant political discourses demands a familiarity with historical discourses. Regarding the concept of genealogy, Foucault writes,

a genealogy should be seen as a kind of attempt to emancipate historical knowledges from that subjection, to render them, that is, capable of opposition and of struggle against the coercion of a theoretical, unitary, formal and scientific discourse. It is based on a reactivation of local knowledges — of minor knowledges, as Deleuze might call them — in opposition to the scientific hierarchisation of knowledges and the effects intrinsic to their power.⁷

Foucault's reference to "historical knowledges" in this passage should be seen as signifying all those knowledges which are folded into, or displaced by, meta-narratives of history. As Foucault's research on madness, prisons, and sexuality demonstrated, the historical movements to secure and unify discourses of knowledge, with their attendant truths, are never complete. They are traceable and their effects can be studied and exposed to demonstrate that their universal claims are, in fact, historically motivated and often tautological. Regarding political discourses, Foucault wants to demonstrate that, like the clinic and the prison, the justifications for sovereignty as the dominant mode for analysing political power can be challenged to expose the violence of its history, and, therefore, also challenging its universal claims of legitimacy. In this respect, Foucault stresses,

Our goal ... will be to expose and specify the issue at stake in this opposition, this struggle, this insurrection of knowledges against institutions and against effects of the knowledge

⁷ Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 85.

and power that invests scientific discourses. What is at stake in all these genealogies is the nature of this power which has surged into view in all its violence, aggression and absurdity in the course of the last forty years, contemporaneously, that is, with the collapse of Fascism and the decline of Stalinism.⁸

For Foucault, the ideological projects of Fascism and Stalinism both demonstrate the dangerous possibilities that accompany unquestioned and unchallenged discourses of sovereignty and political power. Specifically, these ideologies indicate that discourses of knowledge can secure truths that are increasingly problematic in terms of their political implications. Of the “knowledges” that Foucault seeks to instigate toward insurrection are, especially, those histories of political struggle that demonstrate that the State, as the *only* political space, and sovereignty, as the *only* political discourse, are simply manifestations and edifications of struggles against historical seizures of political power through violence and domination.

As Judith Butler explains, “Foucault argues that the presumption of immanent rationality is a theoretical fiction historians and philosophers of history employ to defend against the arbitrary and multiplicitous (non)foundations of historical experience which resist conceptual categorization.”⁹ For Butler, “Foucault’s point regarding the multiplicitous character of historical experience is that it cannot be appropriated and tamed through a unifying dialectic.”¹⁰ Butler’s assertion brings Foucault’s genealogical endeavour into an engagement with Hegel, noting that the dialectic, as a conceptual logic that narrates history within a unified field of legitimated knowledges, occupies an important space in relation to theories of sovereignty and the State. This again leads to questions of sovereignty as the dominant model for thinking about political power. Perhaps Foucault’s most famous statement regarding sovereignty — “In thought and political

⁸ Ibid, p 87.

⁹ Judith Butler, *Subjects of Desire* (New York: Columbia UP, 1999), p. 177.

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 180.

analysis we have still not cut off the head of the king”¹¹ — remains a somewhat enigmatic comment outside of any serious consideration of Foucault’s political project. However, taken contextually, within a study of his concern for thinking a politics outside (or against) the dominant model of sovereignty, this statement provides the most concise formulation of Foucault’s research in “*Society Must be Defended*.” In Hegelese, despite the actual political liberation initiated in the French Revolution, the rational conceptualization of politics remains within a hierarchized and stratified field of knowledges, secured by the dominant discourse of sovereignty as “the head of the king.” As Foucault remarks in *Power/Knowledge*,

in reality, the theory of sovereignty has continued not only to exist as an ideology of right, but also to provide the organising principle of the legal codes which Europe acquired in the nineteenth century, beginning with the Napoleonic Code. ... the theory of sovereignty, and the organisation of a legal code centred upon it, have allowed a system of right to be superimposed upon the mechanisms of discipline in such a way as to conceal its actual procedures, the element of domination inherent in its techniques, and to guarantee to everyone, by virtue of the sovereignty of the State, the exercise of his proper sovereign rights.¹²

Foucault’s reference to the Napoleonic Code, as the formal realization of the discourse of sovereignty that remains dominant within contemporary political discourses, should direct our attention toward Hegel’s philosophy, because, as we will see in further detail in chapter four and five, Napoleon’s political successes are highly influential on the Prussian formulation of the University of Berlin as well as on Hegel’s political thought in the *Philosophy of Right*. However, presently, Foucault’s emphasis on the concealment of procedures and elements of domination is meant not only to demonstrate that the discourse of sovereignty, with its attendant claims of

¹¹ As quoted by Arnold I. Davidson in the introduction to Michel Foucault, “*Society Must Be Defended*,” *Lectures at the Collège de France 1975-1976* (translated by David Macey, edited by Arnold I. Davidson. New York: Picador, 2003), p. xvii.

¹² Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 105.

universal right, can be investigated genealogically to show it is grounded in war and violence, but also, and perhaps more significantly, to suggest alternative possible conceptions of political power.

Therefore, as Beatrice Hassen argues, Foucault's research in "*Society Must be Defended*", "occupies a transitional, perhaps even experimental, place in Foucault's developing understanding of power–strategy, power–domination, and power–repression."¹³ That is, Foucault's research begins from the premise that the paradigm of sovereignty and the juridical apparatus in Western political analysis has severely limited the possibilities for conceptualizing political practices, and by initiating a discussion of war as an analyzer of political power, Foucault endeavours to create a space for a discussion of alternative political models and practices.

"*Society Must be Defended*"

In order to more fully articulate Foucault's theoretical concerns, in this section I will provide a summary of the relevant sections of his lecture course "*Society Must be Defended*,"¹⁴ with a specific focus on how Foucault's research attempts to demonstrate the historical violence of the discourse of sovereignty, and how, in fact, this discourse retains a violence within itself as a continuation of war by other means (i.e. the Law). As Foucault states in the opening lecture,

if power is indeed the implementation and deployment of a relationship of force, rather than analysing it in terms of surrender, contract, and alienation, or rather than analysing it in functional terms as the reproduction of the relations of production, shouldn't we be analysing it first and foremost in terms of conflict, confrontation, and war? [...] Power is war, the continuation of war by other means. At this point, we can invert Clausewitz's proposition and say that politics is the continuation of war by other means.¹⁵

¹³ Beatrice Hanssen, *Critique of Violence: Between Poststructuralism and Critical Theory* (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 121.

¹⁴ For a concise description of this lecture course, see Foucault's course summary in Foucault, *Ethics*, pp. 59-65.

¹⁵ Foucault, "*Society Must Be Defended*," p. 15.

For Foucault, the institutions and mechanisms of social and political life do not, by their existence, signify some rational development or reasoned outcome of history. Rather, these institutions indicate that a struggle has passed through a phase transition, from an explicit, violent struggle, or war, into a stratified, hierarchical system of domination that attempts to mask this struggle within its discourses of legitimacy. According to Foucault's analysis,

power relations, as they function in a society like ours, are essentially anchored in a certain relationship of force that was established in and through war at a given historical moment that can be historically specified. And while it is true that political power puts an end to war and establishes or attempts to establish the reign of peace in civil society, it certainly does not do so in order to suspend the effects of power or to neutralize the disequilibrium revealed by the last battle of the war. ... the role of political power is perpetually to use a sort of silent war to reinscribe that relationship of force, and to reinscribe in it institutions, economic inequalities, language, and even the bodies of individuals.¹⁶

Therefore, he claims, "Politics, in other words, sanctions and reproduces the disequilibrium of forces manifested in war. ... We are always writing the history of the same war, even when we are writing the history of peace and its institutions."¹⁷ This statement by Foucault echoes concerns addressed by Althusser, especially regarding the reproduction of the conditions of production as the goal of the capitalist class. However, the distinction between Foucault and Althusser here is that Foucault maintains that the struggles which are reinscribed in relations of force under the Law are not necessarily limited to class struggles. For Foucault, the point of his genealogical analysis is not simply to suggest a given social or political group continues to be suppressed through the juridical apparatus of the State that comes to replace outright war. Genealogical analysis also reveals that the juridical apparatus and sovereignty itself are historically connected to struggle and violence, which, in turn, are veiled through the available discourses of legitimacy. In terms of

¹⁶ Ibid, pp. 15-16.

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 16.

analysing political power, these violent features of sovereign power are of tremendous importance to Foucault. He suggests the key distinction between two modes of conceptualizing political power, that is, between the juridical schema and the war schema.¹⁸ With what Foucault refers to as the “contract-oppression” or juridical schema (i.e. the philosophico-juridical discourses), there is a political rationality that explains abuses or transgressions of political power as aberrations of the universality of the Law. That is, within the juridical schema, there is definitive relationship between historical and metaphysical discourses which legitimizes the repressions of the juridical apparatus of sovereignty. On the contrary, within the “war-repression” or “dominant-repression” schema (i.e. the historico-political discourses), the juridical apparatus itself is understood as an extension and continuation (“by other means”) of the domination and violence that initially permitted its erection and edification. In this sense, the “war-repression” schema unpacks the political power of the juridical apparatus by isolating its roots in the violence and conflict that it later seeks to capture and judge.

In this context, Foucault asks, “What are the rules of right that power implements to produce discourses of truth? Or: What type of power is it that is capable of producing discourses of power that have, in a society like ours, such powerful effects?”¹⁹ In questioning how it is that the philosophico-juridical discourses could achieve such a dominant position, Foucault initiates a new series of questions regarding sovereignty and *truth-effects*. He explains,

To say that the problem of sovereignty is the central problem of right in Western societies means that the essential function of the technique and discourse of right is to dissolve the element of domination in power and to replace that domination, which has to be reduced or masked, with two things: the legitimate rights of the sovereign on the one hand, and the legal obligation to obey on the other.²⁰

¹⁸ Ibid, pp. 16-17.

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 24.

²⁰ Ibid, p. 26.

That is, for Foucault, the discourse of sovereignty operates such that the domination and repression that permit its establishment must be transformed into new modes of power — primarily, the discourses of legitimacy and obedience. Therefore, to contest the hierarchical juridical order erected under the discourse of sovereignty, the transformation from an outright war to a smooth, coded war, must be exposed through the work of genealogy. As Foucault states, “we have to bypass or get around the problem of sovereignty—which is central to the theory of right—and the obedience of individuals who submit to it, and to reveal the problem of domination and subjugation instead of sovereignty and subjugation.”²¹ He continues,

Do not regard power as a phenomenon of mass and homogeneous domination ... keep it clearly in mind that unless we are looking at it from a great height and from a very great distance, power is not something that is divided between those who have it and hold it exclusively, and those who do not have it and are subject to it. Power must, I think, be analyzed as something that circulates, or rather as something that functions only when it is part of a chain. ... Power functions. Power is exercised through networks, and individuals do not simply circulate in those networks; they are in a position to both submit to and exercise this power. They are never the inert or consenting targets of power; they are always its relays. In other words, power passes through individuals. It is not applied to them.²²

This conception of power indicates, again, that Foucault’s analysis extends beyond the parameters of an ideology-based analysis. This distinction between Foucault and Althusser is again significant because, for Foucault, the role of power, as it is coded and striated within discourses of knowledge, must be studied at the level of its application and function, not at the level of intent. This means that in studying political power,

we should make an ascending analysis of power, or in other words begin with its infinitesimal mechanisms, which have their own history, their own trajectory, their own

²¹ Ibid, p. 27.

²² Ibid, p. 29.

techniques and tactics, and then look at how these mechanisms of power, which have their solidity and, in a sense, their own technology, have been and are invested, colonized, used, inflected, transformed, displaced, extended, and so on by increasingly general mechanisms and form of overall domination.²³

The importance of Foucault's statement regarding "an ascending analysis of power" cannot be overstated. For Foucault, the mechanisms and technologies of power cannot be studied from above because of their multiform applications and results. That is, not all technologies of control share a common strategy or goal. Therefore, it is erroneous to begin with this common goal in mind, and then explain technologies according to a logic of intent. In making an ascending analysis of power, genealogy can determine how the divergent and dynamic techniques and micropractices that appear somewhat spontaneously in society are captured and ordered in increasingly general strategies. However, it is also important to note that, as Foucault admits,

It is quite possible that ideological production did coexist with the great machineries of power. ... I do not think that it is ideologies that are shaped at the base, at the point where the networks of power culminate. It is much less and much more than that. It is the actual instruments that form and accumulate knowledge, the observational methods, the recording techniques, the investigative research procedures, the verification mechanisms. That is, the delicate mechanisms of power cannot function unless knowledge, or rather knowledge apparatuses, are formed, organized, and put into circulation, and those apparatuses are not ideological trimmings or edifices.²⁴

Foucault indicates that the value of an ascending analysis of power is that it avoids the methodological error of reducing all activities to simple functions of ideology. This reduction destroys the analytical purchase of any study of power by failing to consider the dynamic flows that link specific, localized technologies and the apparatuses and techniques that adapt them to political purposes. For Foucault, even a highly rigid structure of control reproduces technologies

²³ Ibid, p. 30.

²⁴ Ibid, pp. 33-34.

that were developed outside, including discourses and knowledges that are used to legitimize such structures. This is a key to understanding how power operates because it highlights the modal transformations of techniques and mechanisms of control.

Foucault suggests that, “rather than orienting our research into power toward the juridical edifice of sovereignty, State apparatuses, and the ideologies that accompany them, I think we should orient our analysis of power toward material operations, forms of subjugation, and the connections among and the uses made of the local systems of subjugation on the one hand, and apparatuses of knowledge on the other.”²⁵ In this passage, Foucault indicates that what makes possible the increasing generalization of power, from localized forms of subjugation to networks of political power and control, are apparatuses of knowledge. Thus, as Foucault remarks, “The Hegelian dialectic and all those that come after it must [...] be understood as philosophy and right’s colonization and authoritarian colonization of a historico-political discourse that was both a statement of fact, a proclamation, and a practice of social warfare.”²⁶

The colonization of the historico-political discourses by dialectical philosophy (as well as subsequent totalizing theoretical systems such as Marxism and structuralism) indicates that concentrations of political power rely on discourses of knowledge to capture competing discourses and subjugate them to the Law. This argument does not presuppose some insidious State conspiracy; however, it does indicate that power and knowledge exist in a dynamic relation that affirms and infuses both fields with adaptive potentialities. To reiterate, for Foucault, the philosophico-juridical discourses of thinkers such as Hegel attempt to eradicate access to historico-political discourses, mainly by folding the contingencies of politics and history into metaphysical narratives of truth. This is important because accessibility to a discourses of

²⁵ Ibid, p. 34.

²⁶ Ibid, p. 58.

contestation and struggle allow repressed groups the possibility to challenge powers of sovereignty and law from the perspective of history and politics.²⁷

In the lecture course, Foucault initiates a genealogy of how the discourses of struggle and history take on a particular racialized element. He writes, “Historical discourse was no longer the discourse of sovereignty, or even race, but a discourse about races, about the confrontation between races, about the race struggle that goes on within nations and within laws.”²⁸ Thus, the historico-political discourses, in Foucault’s genealogy, come to primarily articulate a language of racial differentiation.²⁹ In one of the final lectures of the course, Foucault ties together his extensive genealogy, explaining, “I have been trying to raise the problem of war, seen as a grid for understanding historical processes. ... I tried to show you how the very notion of war was eventually eliminated from historical analysis by the principle of national universality.”³⁰ Foucault continues, “I would now like to show you how, while the theme of race does not disappear, it does become part of something very different, namely State racism.”³¹ Gordon notes that,

Foucault’s way of showing the “hypothesis of war” at work was to do a genealogy of its proponents, starting from the English and French authors of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (notably John Lilburne, Henri Comte de Boulainvilliers, and Abbé de Mably) who produced militant rewritings of national history focused on interpretations of historical conquests (Roman, Frankish, Norman) and the historical wrongs committed and suffered in and following these warlike episodes by the ancestors of the social classes and

²⁷ A contemporary example that highlights this relationship would be the Black Panther Party’s use of the history of American slavery and the colonization of Africa as historico-political discourses that challenged the claims of the philosophico-juridical discourses legitimizing the ongoing racial oppression in America. In this context, the BPP could demonstrate that the laws governing black citizens in America were, far from universal claims of freedom, simply an encoded and juridical manifestation of the violence of colonization and slavery that favoured and reproduced white privilege within a systemic operation of war by other means.

²⁸ Foucault, “*Society Must Be Defended*,” p. 69.

²⁹ This topic occupies much of the remainder of Foucault’s course, and will not be summarized in detail.

³⁰ Foucault, “*Society Must Be Defended*,” p. 239.

³¹ Ibid.

estates of the contemporary nation.³²

However, in the context of “State racism,” Foucault argues that the State, having subsumed the earlier historico-political discourse of war under the philosophico-juridical discourse of universal history and sovereignty, now repeats this gesture with respect to the racialized versions of historico-political discourses. That is, the State takes up the discourse of race as a justification for its need to purify (internally) its own population in order to guarantee its health. For Foucault, the phenomenon of health, particularly related to populations, signifies a new political ethos, which he terms governmentality. One aspect of this political ethos is *biopolitics*: “Biopolitics deals with the population, with the population as a political problem, as a problem that is at once scientific and political, as a biological problem and as power’s problem.”³³ Foucault explains that, “It is indeed the emergence of this biopower that inscribes [racism] in the mechanisms of the State. ... What in fact is racism? It is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die.”³⁴ I will return to the concept of governmentality later in the next chapter, however, having summarized Foucault’s use of war as an analyzer of political power to challenge the dominant discourse of sovereignty, I want to now consider Hegel’s use of history to demonstrate how Hegel’s philosophy exhibits features of Foucault’s philosophico-juridical discourse to further the argument that Hegel employs a series of interpellative tautologies in his Science of Spirit.

Hegel, History and the State

In this section, I will take up the question of how Hegel claims the State is a historical

³² Gordon, Introduction to Michel Foucault’s *Power*, p. xxi-xxii.

³³ Foucault, “*Society Must Be Defended*,” p. 245.

³⁴ Ibid, p. 254.

necessity, considering primarily the *Philosophy of History*, *History of Philosophy*, and *Philosophy of Right*. I will demonstrate the role of philosophico-juridical discourses in relation to the State *itself*, not simply with respect to the polemical and historical struggles of a particular State. Specifically, Hegel's narrative of the State indicates that the sovereignty and primacy of the State is legitimized by its rational development in history. How this history forms and determines the political legitimacy of the State shows that, in Hegel's philosophy, the defence of the State itself is premised upon a philosophico-juridical capture of historico-political discourses. That is, the history of the State is a narrative that must subsume or displace all other historical discourses. Of course, this narrative is one that is indelibly tied to the freedom of the subject within the State, which I will discuss in detail in chapter four. In this chapter, I will focus on the historical aspect of Hegel's thought to indicate the interpellative features that animate its metaphysical and totalizing narration of history.

Of particular relevance in this section is Hegel's conception of Spirit. Spirit, for Hegel, should be understood as the metaphysical/conceptual aggregate of historical and cultural self-knowledge. As Hegel explains in the *Philosophy of Right*,

The history of spirit is its own *deed*; for spirit is only what it does, and its deed it to make itself – in this case as spirit – the object of its own consciousness, and to comprehend itself in its interpretation of itself to itself. This comprehension is its being and principle, and the *completion* of an act of comprehension is at the same time its alienation [*Entäußerung*] and transition. To put it in formal terms, the spirit which comprehends this comprehension *anew* and which ... returns into itself from its alienation, is the spirit at a stage higher than that at which it stood in its earlier [phase of] comprehension. The question of *perfectability* and of the *education of the human race* arises here.³⁵

Therefore, because, for Hegel, all of humanity participates in the project of Spirit coming to know itself, the “education of the human race” appears to suggest that individuals must be subjected to the completed Science of Spirit to be perfected and purified in this process of self-knowledge. As

³⁵ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §343, p. 372.

Spirit progresses, knowing itself in its deficiencies, transitions, and dialectical movement through historical time, Hegel will demonstrate that true knowledge, Absolute Knowledge, requires the continuing conceptual understanding of Spirit, through its “constituents,” or the participants in Hegel’s system. This relation already anticipates the interpellative features that will be further investigated in this chapter. If, as Hegel claims, Spirit’s rational triumph in the world is necessarily dependent on the self-knowledge of its “constituents,” the call for students to subject themselves to this system, to involve themselves in the Hegelian project and become both the vehicle of Spirit and its realization, is immediately evident. Still, the significance of this interpellative gesture can only be understood following a closer reading of some key passages from Hegel’s writings on history. As we will see, within Hegel’s narrative, history itself calls the reader to subjugate himself to Hegelian Science in order to participate in the complete and final realization of history.

In the *History of Philosophy*, Hegel claims,

The principle is hereby gained, but only the principle of freedom of spirit; and the greatness of our time rests in the fact that freedom, the peculiar possession of mind whereby it is at home with itself in itself, is recognized, and that mind has this consciousness within itself. This however is merely abstract, for the next step is that the principle of freedom is again purified and comes to its true objectivity, so that not everything which strikes me or springs up within me must, because it is manifested in me, hold good as true.³⁶

That is, despite being realized in principle, the true freedom of Spirit requires a purification of thought, so that truth can be located in the mediated self-knowledge of the Science of Spirit, not simply in the self-determined interests of individuals. The interpellative aspect of this statement is that the reader, conscious of the principles of freedom, is called to take up the task of completing Spirit’s movement toward objective freedom by purifying his thought through the process of

³⁶ G. W. F. Hegel, *The History of Philosophy – Volume Three*, translated by E.S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson (New York: Humanities Press, 1968), p. 423.

mediation narrated by Hegel's philosophy. In the *History of Philosophy*, Hegel goes on to state that,

Philosophy is thus the true theodicy, as contrasted with art and religion and the feelings which these call up – a reconciliation of spirit, namely of the spirit which has apprehended itself in its freedom and in the riches of its reality. ... To this point the World-spirit has come, and each stage has its own form in the true system of Philosophy; nothing is lost, all principles are preserved, since Philosophy in its final aspect is the totality of forms.³⁷

Hegel's divine proclamation suggests that his philosophical system will not only demonstrate why things are as they are and not otherwise, but will also include the totality of human experience, and preserve all of the forms of history that have made thinking their totality possible. In this sense, opposing Hegel's philosophical science would mean siding with only a partial, undeveloped aspect of human history. Only by embracing Hegel's Science of Spirit, and in thinking the realization of this Science for oneself, can the final capstone of historical progress be set in place. As Hegel says, "For in this lengthened period, the Notion of Spirit, invested with its entire concrete development, its external subsistence, its wealth, is striving to bring spirit to perfection, to make progress itself and to develop from spirit. It goes ever on and on, because spirit is progress alone."³⁸ Giving a further explanation of the activity of Spirit, Hegel continues,

This work of the spirit to know itself, this activity to find itself, is the life of the spirit and the spirit itself. ... the history of Philosophy is a revelation of what has been the aim of spirit throughout its history; it is therefore the world's history in its innermost signification. This work of the human spirit in the recesses of thought is parallel with all stages of reality; and therefore no philosophy oversteps its own time.³⁹

In this passage, as Hegel claims that "the history of Philosophy is a revelation of what has been the

³⁷ Ibid, p. 546.

³⁸ Ibid, p. 546.

³⁹ Ibid, p. 547.

aim of spirit throughout its history,” we see again that Hegel’s philosophical position is one of totalization. That is, everything within the history of human life will be contained within the Science of Spirit, but, it will also be the final realization of what human life strived for, but failed to achieve, in its previous forms. Because the Science of Spirit *is* this final realization, Hegel claims,

The present is the highest stage reached. ... all the various philosophies are no mere fashionable theories of our time, or anything of a similar nature; they are neither chance products nor the blaze of a fire of straw, nor casual eruptions here and there, but a spiritual, reasonable, forward advance; they are of necessity of one Philosophy in its development, the revelation of God, as he knows himself to be.⁴⁰

Again, we see that Hegel’s narrative attempts to capture the contingent, accidental and ambiguous aspects of human history within a divine and incontestable logic of progress. In fact, for Hegel, the comprehension of the history of philosophical forms, with their attendant cultural significations, is nothing other than the revelation of God himself. The interpellative aspect of this claim is tremendous: not only does the Science of Spirit claim to reveal the truth of God’s own self-understanding, but it is only in the participation of a community of minds, thinking the Science of Spirit, that God’s self-knowledge is possible. In this sense, the individual is called by Hegel’s philosophy to sacrifice himself to the process of God’s self-understanding, and, in doing so, to think the mind of God. Hegel continues, offering one of the clearest statements in the *History of Philosophy* regarding the Science of Spirit’s capacity for historical comprehension:

The general result of the history of Philosophy is this: in the first place, that throughout all time there has been only one Philosophy, the contemporary differences of which constitute necessary aspects of the one principle; in the second place, that the succession of philosophic systems is not due to chance, but represents the necessary succession of stages in the development of this science; in the third place, that the final philosophy of a period is the result of this development, and is truth in the highest form which the self-consciousness of spirit affords itself. The latest philosophy contains therefore those

⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 547.

which went before; it embraces in itself all the different stages thereof; it is the product and result of those that preceded it.⁴¹

For Hegel, the development of rational progress that is understood within the Science of Spirit includes all the previous shapes of culture. Therefore, within Hegel's theodicy, there should be no desire to contest the outcome of this history because it has progressed rationally into its present form, and nothing has been lost in this development. Regarding the question of political sovereignty and the philosophico-juridical discourse, we see here that the histories of struggles and conflicts are preserved. That is, the conflicts and struggles of history are a part of Spirit's self-understanding as they are sublimated into the truth of the sovereign State; that is, these discourses of struggle and conflict have been resolved in the dialectical conceptualization of the freedom of Spirit. Therefore, they can no longer serve as the basis for challenging the order of the State, or the juridical apparatus, because they have been captured by Hegel's philosophy and now function as explanations of the State's necessity, and legitimacy, rather than as discourses that could contest State power. In this sense, Hegel's metaphysical narrative of history may be understood as an attempt to foreclose the war-repression schema for understanding political power.

Moving to a consideration of Hegel's *Philosophy of History*, we find a similar logic in his explanation of history. Hegel asserts, "The only Thought which Philosophy brings with it to the contemplation of History, is the simple conception of *Reason*; that Reason is the Sovereign of the World; that the history of the world, therefore, presents us with a rational process."⁴² Thus, for Hegel, because history is rational, within the conceptual field of the dialectic, its outcomes are also said to be rational. Within this context, with reason as "the Sovereign of the World," appealing to any previous historical shape is, again, simply a sentimental longing for a former order. Within

⁴¹ Ibid, pp. 552-3.

⁴² G.W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, translated by J. Sibree and introduced by C.J. Friedrich (New York: Dover Publications, 1956), p. 9.

Hegel's logic of history, the shapes of the world that have passed away are now contained conceptually in Spirit's self-understanding. However, for Hegel, this is their *only* value. In passing away, struggles and conflicts allow Spirit to know itself. This history veils the original violence of struggles, especially those against State controls and discourses of juridical power, and suggests that the outcome of history — the establishment of the sovereign power of the State and the Sovereign of Reason — is what each shape of history wanted, regardless of the particular motivations and intentions attributed to the real historical actors.

Hegel continues,

Divine Wisdom, i.e. Reason, is one and the same in the great as in the little; and we must not imagine God to be too weak to exercise his wisdom on a grand scale. Our intellectual striving aims at realizing the conviction that what was *intended* by external wisdom, is actually *accomplished* in the domain of the existent, active Spirit, as well as in that of mere Nature. Our mode of treating the subject is, in this aspect, a Theodicy – a justification of the ways of God – ... so that the ill that is found in the World may be comprehended, and the thinking Spirit reconciled with the fact of the existence of evil.⁴³

Again, Hegel refers to his Science of Spirit as a Theodicy, claiming to explain the totality of the actual world, as well as the existence of evil in the world and in history. This is because, for Hegel, God's plan for human beings is intelligible through the systematic study of human history. However, what is of incredible importance here is that this comprehension of the ways of God is directly linked to the political order of the State. Hegel writes,

a State is then well constituted and internally powerful, when the private interest of the citizens is one with the common interest of the State; when the one finds its gratification and realization in the other ... But in a State many institutions must be adopted, much political machinery invented, accompanied by appropriate political arrangements — necessitating long struggles of the understanding before what is really appropriate can be discovered — involving, moreover, contentions with private interests and passions, and a

⁴³ Ibid, p. 15.

tedious discipline of the latter, in order to bring about the desired harmony.⁴⁴

Clearly, Hegel is aware of the complexities and challenges of political life, especially with respect to the formation of a well-ordered State. Hegel admits the need for the invention of institutions, machinery, and political arrangements in order to satisfactorily realize “what is really appropriate.” That is, despite the conceptual realization of freedom in the Science of Spirit, the actual world remains a site of labour for the rational — it must be “appropriately” constructed through political power. Yet, Hegel offers another perspective on the actual world in his Introduction to the *Philosophy of History*, writing,

The insight ... to which ... philosophy is to lead us, is, that the real world is as it ought to be—that the truly good—the universal divine reason—is not a mere abstraction, but a vital principle capable of realizing itself. This *Good*, this *Reason*, in its most concrete form, is God. God governs the world; the actual working of his government—the carrying out of his plan—is the History of the World. This plan philosophy strives to comprehend; for only that which has been developed as the result of it, possesses *bona fide* reality. That which does not accord with it, is negative, worthless existence.⁴⁵

With this passage we return to the problem of the relation between the rational and actual in Hegel’s philosophy. Hegel claims not only that the world is as it should be, but that it is governed by God and that philosophy can discern, and thus complete, this plan. Therefore, in one sense, the rational and actual are in accord, because “the real world is as it ought to be”; yet, in another sense, philosophy must strive to comprehend the plan. Also, as we saw in the previous passage, “in a State many institutions must be adopted, much political machinery invented, accompanied by appropriate political arrangements,” which suggests that the world may *not yet* be what it ought to be. This gap between the rational and the actual is apparent both in Hegel’s interpellative and

⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 24.

⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 36.

prescriptive statements. However, these statements, taken together, indicate the relative proximity of the rational to the actual, which varies according to Hegel's pedagogical approach, but which he no doubt believes can be overcome. In some instances, the world is as it ought to be, and therefore, the rational/conceptual understanding of the world is also pure. That is, the rational understanding of the world within Hegelian Science is correct, (i.e. True) because the world is as it ought to be. However, Hegel also needs his readers to act back into the world, to accept the rational narrativization of history and apply it back to the world (this will be discussed further in the remaining chapters). In the call to complete the movement of Spirit's self-knowledge, the world is not yet as it ought to be. Therefore, far from suggesting that Hegel's thought is paradoxical or ambiguous with respect to the rational-actual relationship, it seems, at least in the context of Spirit and the narratives of a rational history, that Hegel's seemingly divergent and even contradictory statements reflect different interpellative strategies that he deploys simultaneously. The concerns that might motivate a group or an individual to contest or reject the sovereignty of the State will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapters; however, suffice it to indicate presently that, within Hegel's philosophico-juridical discourse, the interpellated Hegelian subject is subjugated to a logic of history that also determines the categorical definitions of what is rational or irrational, valuable or worthless. Therefore, the metaphysical justifications of history, as a rational, progressive movement that is conceptually understood by philosophy, is also an important step in defining political categories and possibility for participation within the exercise of State sovereignty.

In fact, the State, within Hegel's narration of history, is what "we" have always desired. The "we" of this desire, however, is doubly interpellated – first, the reader, or student of Hegel, is interpellated as a subject that desires to rationally comprehend the development of Spirit's self-knowledge to aid in the progression of Spirit's self-understanding; however, and simultaneously, the interpellated subject of Spirit must see that, through the dialectal logic of history, despite the

conflicting aims and desires of cultures and political organizations, each historical shape has unknowingly desired this ending in articulating the necessary dialectical forms that have allowed progress to occur. As Hegel states,

The State is thus the embodiment of rational freedom, realizing and recognizing itself in an objective form. For its objectivity consists in this — that its successive stages are not merely ideal, but are present in an appropriate reality; and that in their separate and several working, they are absolutely merged in that agency by which the totality — the soul — the individuate unity is produced, and of which it is the result. The State is the Idea of Spirit in the external manifestation of human Will and its Freedom. It is to the State, therefore, that change in the aspect of History indissolubly attaches itself; and the successive phases of the Idea manifest themselves in it as distinct political *principles*.⁴⁶

Therefore, for Hegel, the “objective” necessity of the State can only be understood within the rational narrative of history. Not only does this narrative provide a logical explanation of the movements of history, it also, simultaneously, grounds the political order that is legitimized by this history, *in history*, as its incontrovertible truth.

In the *Philosophy of Mind* (within the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*), Hegel continues his argument for a rational conception of history within his discussion of the State as the realization of freedom. Indicating his disdain for claims that “primitive people” have an intuitive or instinctive (i.e. immediate) relation to knowledge, Hegel condemns “fictions, like that of a primitive age and its primitive people, possessed from the first of the true knowledge of God and all the sciences,” privileging, in opposition to these “fictions,” the objective truth of history, that should be understood “just as a judge should have not special sympathy for one of the contending parties.”⁴⁷ Hegel’s reference to the judge in this passage is particularly revealing. If, like the judge — the administrator of justice within the juridical apparatus of the State — Hegel claims his metaphysical narration of history is impartial in its objectivity, should we not go further to question

⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 47.

⁴⁷ Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §549, p. 278.

the initial assemblage of the juridical apparatus? From a Foucauldian perspective, within the context of the Law, the impartiality of the judge functions to obscure the rigid, hierarchized partiality of the Law itself. That is, the Law, as the concrete form of sovereignty, articulates and maintains the order which established it. If, using Foucault's language of the war-repression schema, we argue that *Law serves Order*, then Hegel's claims about the "objective truth of the history of philosophy" also beckons interrogation. The alleged impartiality of the "objective truth" mirrors the judges' lauded impartiality such that Hegel's philosophy *does* establish and maintain an order — the order of the Science of Spirit, while simultaneously claiming its own neutrality, because this order is the incontestable truth of history.

Further, Hegel also delimits the role of the nation (as a *group*) within his metaphysical narrative, fusing national legitimacy to the apparatus of the State. In fact, only within the State does the nation, or freedom, or history exist. In the *Philosophy of Mind*, Hegel writes, "In the existence of a *nation* the substantial aim is to be a state and preserve itself as such. A nation with no state formation (a *mere nation*), has, strictly speaking, no history – like the nations which existed before the rise of states and others which still exist in the condition of savagery."⁴⁸ Hegel creates a necessary link between the legitimacy of a nation and its establishment within a political State. The State, again, is lauded as the rational outcome of history, and all nations that make dispute the legitimacy of a given order must do so, for Hegel, from *within* the State. This position clearly demonstrates Foucault's concept of the philosophico-juridical discourse in that *only* by way of the Law, of the State and its institutions, can a nation or group contest the legitimacy of the political order. However, the possibilities for contestation within the sovereign order of political power are already seriously undermined by the relation between the Law and order. Thus, despite the claims of universality, the Law will recognize *only* those who are first subjugated to its order

⁴⁸ Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §549, p. 279.

— the order that establishes the Law — and those who refuse, according to Hegel, ought to be dismissed as “savages.” However, in recognizing the State as a legitimate sovereign, and its Law, via the juridical apparatus, as the legitimate arbiter of justice, an individual or group also affirms the order that upholds the Law, and therefore seriously undermines any attempt to challenge the logic of the dominant political power.

Hegel offers another powerful statement on the role of the State in relation to history and necessity in the *Philosophy of Mind*, writing,

The spirit, however (which *thinks* in this moral organism) overrides and absorbs within itself the finitude attaching to it as national spirit in its state and the state’s temporal interests, in the system of laws and usages. It rises to apprehend itself in its essentiality ... the spirit which thinks universal history, stripping off at the same time those limitations of the several national minds and its own temporal restrictions, lays hold of its concrete universality, and rises to apprehend the absolute mind, as the eternally actual truth in which the contemplative reason enjoys freedom ...⁴⁹

This metaphysical manifesto of State power brings together all of the aspects of Hegel’s thought previously discussed in this chapter. The reader of Hegel, already aware that his understanding is the vehicle and realization of Spirit’s self-knowledge, is now moved to subject himself to the possibility of apprehending the “absolute mind.” The laws of the State are described here as the concrete instantiations of reason which surpass the temporal interests of the State and its citizens by reflecting the totality and truth of history. And, Hegel attributes to this relation the quality of Spirit that will occupy much of my analysis in chapter four — freedom.

Anticipating this analysis of freedom in chapter four, I want to briefly note several of Hegel’s comments on freedom, in relation to the history of progress and the necessity of the State, to indicate, at least provisionally, how this aspect of Hegel’s narrative is extremely important and informs any discussion of his political project. In the *Philosophy of History*, Hegel writes,

⁴⁹ Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §552, p. 282.

The State is thus the embodiment of rational freedom, realizing and recognizing itself in an objective form. For its objectivity consists in this — that its successive stages are not merely ideal, but are present in an appropriate reality; and that in their separate and several working, they are absolutely merged in that agency by which the totality – the soul – the individuate unity – is produced, and of which it is the result.⁵⁰

Hegel's mention of historical stages in this passage highlights another important aspect of the philosophico-juridical discourse in Foucault's work. The progress between stages, moving from the historical past into the sovereignty of the present, implies that those political organizations that have not apprehended Spirit in its most complete formulation, as the State, are, in fact, deficient. What this rational deficiency implies, however, is quite extensive and politically significant. How we understand freedom, justice, and humanity itself are all conditioned by Hegel's notion of historical progress. As we will see, the imperial projects of colonialism (in Africa) and the genocide of the Americas, justified in Hegel's philosophy, rely on a similar logic of progress as the metaphysical justification for their campaigns of political and economic expansion.

Philosophico-juridical Discourse in Hegel: The *Necessity* of the State

Following my consideration of Hegel's statements regarding the metaphysical narration of history, I want to further consider how Foucault's research on philosophico-juridical discourses might be formulated as a critique of Hegel's philosophy. Hegel certainly establishes the sovereignty of Reason, and this notion is the key to his historical claims. However, because the State is the realization of freedom, as the rational outcome of history, the State is also mandated as the sovereign that will legislate and realize this freedom in the actual world. Hegel does establish certain hierarchies among States, especially in relation to the stages of historical progress. However, he provides a far more extensive argument for the legitimacy of the State, and its claims

⁵⁰ Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, p. 47.

to sovereignty, in general. To summarize, Hegel articulates a specific relationship among metaphysics, history, and the politics of sovereignty. For Hegel, history is rational and preserves all previous shapes in Spirit. The State is the manifestation of this rationality, as the outcome of history, and is the objective realization of freedom. Finally, the State is guaranteed its legitimacy by this narrative of history. Thus, we see that the metaphysical argument for the rationality of history is grounded in history, but the historical argument is, at the same time, dependent on the metaphysical construct of the dialectic. The content of history thus “demonstrates” metaphysical claims, while, simultaneously, the metaphysical structure determines the appropriate historical content. However, this tautology does not simply animate itself. The student of Hegel’s philosophy is interpellated, that is, called by Hegel’s proposal to think the truth of history and participate realizing Spirit’s mission of self-knowledge — that is, to *think this system of relations* and accept its attendant requirements for political subjectivity. Individuals are thus interpellated to subjugate their thought to the complex tautological formulation of Hegel’s metaphysical history. In this context, because the establishment of the State as the truth of history is also the development of Spirit coming to know itself, the politics of State sovereignty may be transmitted through the interpellative history that is narrated by dialectical metaphysics. With reference to Althusser, we see again that within Hegel’s philosophical system, subjects, by freely accepting this subjugation to the Science of Spirit, act “all by themselves.” That is, the Hegelian subject, initiated into the project of Spirit’s self-realization, should act obediently within the limitations of a politics of sovereignty without any additional need for coercion.

Returning to Foucault, the question of historical narratives as forms of concealment that hide the realities of power’s stratification, is extremely relevant. As Foucault states in *Power/Knowledge*,

My aim, therefore, was to ... give due weight ... to the fact of domination, to expose both its latent nature and its brutality. I then wanted to show not only how right is, in a general

way, the instrument of this domination — which scarcely needs saying — but also to show the extent to which, and the forms in which, right (not simply the laws but the whole complex of apparatuses, institutions and regulations responsible for their application) transmits and puts in motion relations that are not relations of sovereignty, but of domination.⁵¹

That is, despite the universal claims of the Law, like the universal claims of Hegel's philosophy, beneath the language of sovereignty an order is established and maintained that can be understood and analyzed as an extension of warfare and domination. Foucault asserts,

Right should be viewed, I believe, not in terms of a legitimacy to be established, but in terms of the methods of subjugation that it instigates. The problem for me is how to avoid this question, central to the theme of right, regarding sovereignty and the obedience of individual subjects in order that I may substitute the problem of domination and subjugation for that of sovereignty and obedience.⁵²

The importance, for Foucault, of substituting the problem of domination for the problem of sovereignty is that the political discourses that legitimize sovereignty also isolate and protect it as an inviolable truth that cannot be challenged or contested. Like Hegel's metaphysical narrative, within the discourse of sovereignty, the violence and domination of the Law is coded, and guarded with complex metaphysical justifications. It is for this reason that Foucault argues, "rather than ask ourselves how the sovereign appears to us in his lofty isolation, we should try to discover how it is that subjects are gradually, progressively, really and materially constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies, materials, desires, thoughts etc."⁵³ In this respect, too, we should question Hegel's philosophical narrative of history. What type of subject is Hegel interpellating? How does this subject's knowledge of history infuse his political views with

⁵¹ Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 96.

⁵² Ibid, p. 90.

⁵³ Ibid, p. 97.

metaphysical assumptions and thus guarantee the reproduction of the political order? What forms of political organization are legitimated when one is subjugated to this narrative of history? All of these questions will be addressed and discussed again throughout the remainder of my research. However, I want to stress the importance of the relationship between Hegel's historical narrative and the State, or the philosophico-juridical discourse and its attendant claims to truth, because it is precisely in this space, between the rationality of sovereignty and the actuality of its practice, that Foucault wants to intervene in order to suggest the possibility for alternative arrangements of power and knowledge.

As Stathis Kouvelakis argues,

Thanks to Hegel, political philosophy is revealed for what it is: it attains the fullness of its concept in becoming the 'philosophy of the state', 'a philosophical science of the state', the theoretical instance which, motivated by the 'universal estate's' propensity for reform, rationalizes the state's conduct. He can therefore present the state as the solution to the riddle of history: it makes the achievement of the revolution its own even while managing to avoid the revolution itself and make it impossible in the future."⁵⁴

Of course, in this passage Kouvelakis avoids Hegel's additional metaphysical framework — the movement of Spirit coming to know itself *is* the State's legitimacy. Still, as Kouvelakis indicates, the State's sovereignty is rationalized in Hegel's thought as an assemblage of both metaphysical and historical discourses that reinforce legitimize one another. In fact, outside of the metaphysical narration of the State as sovereign, history cannot even exist. As Hyppolite explains, for Hegel, ““organic life has no history.” Only spirit has a history, that is, a development of itself by itself such that it remains its identity in each one of its particularizations, and when it negates them, which is the very moment of the concept, it simultaneously preserves them in order to raise them to a higher

⁵⁴ Stathis Kouvelakis, *Philosophy and Revolution: From Kant to Marx*, translated by G.M. Goshgarian (London and New York: Verso, 2003), p. 34.

form.”⁵⁵ That is, only within the dialectical logic of Hegel’s thought can the rational movement of history be detected. Therefore, Hegel can claim that without this understanding, history is simply an aggregate of accidents and contingencies, and, as such, cannot provide the ground to legitimate any discourse of truth. Therefore, “the identification of logic and history”⁵⁶ is the key for understanding Hegel’s political philosophy, as well as the requirements necessary for the fulfilment his political project. Regarding Hegel’s teleological concept of the state, Robert B. Pippin explains,

On such a teleological view (stated very generally) a development process can be said to exhibit “the work of reason” because the process gradually does result in the living being or the social form becoming “what truly is.” The process has a *logos*; it is not arbitrary or shaped by wholly contingent and, in this sense, meaningless events.⁵⁷

However, the creation of this binary distinction between the rational and arbitrary, more popular among Hegel scholars than Hegel himself, initiates a false dichotomy that paralyses any genuine political consideration. The State has a *logos* because Hegel argues that its development and manifestation in the actual world is based on reason. Or, more precisely, for Hegel, *the State is logos*. However, it does not stand to argue that because the events that form and shape the State can be comprehended within a certain political rationality that the state *is* this very rationality. Adding the suggestion that the only alternative to viewing the State as the rational outcome of history is to view history as a series of chance events with no comprehensible development simply distracts from the question of metaphysical narrativization itself. The question is not whether history can be made intelligible through thought — this much is obvious. Rather, the question that

⁵⁵ Jean Hyppolite, *Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit*, translated by Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1974), p. 33.

⁵⁶ Theodore Ziolkowski, *Clio the Romantic Muse: Historicizing the Faculties in Germany* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004), p. 44.

⁵⁷ Robert B. Pippin, “Hegel and Institutional Rationality,” in *The Southern Journal of Philosophy – Supplement* (Memphis: Department of Philosophy, University of Memphis, 2001), p. 5.

should be stressed within my Foucauldian analysis is how this historical intelligibility reflects political concerns and demands in the present.

Therefore, the question of tautological interpellation should again be posed: if, as Hegel claims, history itself demonstrates that it (history) is a rational progression, and this rational progression demonstrates to philosophy that the State is the logical outcome of this history, are we not caught in a loop of tautological explanation? Stated as simply as possible, for Hegel, metaphysics orders and comprehends history such that history demonstrates the truth of metaphysics — that history is a rational progression of Spirit. What makes this tautological loop more complex, however, is the interpellative aspect of Hegel's thought. For Hegel, only by way of the "constituents" of Spirit coming to know themselves can Spirit gain self-knowledge. The interpellative gestures of Hegel's thought must therefore create subjects, or subjugate readers to Hegel's tautological argumentation, so that their comprehension of Hegel's rationality can be applied back to the actual world. However, if the arguments for the progress of history are tautological, the function of interpellating subjects to complete the Science of Spirit is all the more significant. This is because, as Althusser indicated, good subjects work "all by themselves" — that is, once interpellated into the system of narration within Hegel's thought, the subject is encouraged, if not required, to *internalize this tautology by making it true*. Already, it is clear that this situation is problematic, however, because the political dangers of subjugation to tautological truths will only be fully articulated in chapter five, it is again important to note that the relationship among history, government, and subjectivity has not yet been completely developed. Therefore, this first anchor point in my construction of a Foucauldian critique of Hegel should be seen only as an initial marker, designating Hegel's use of history and metaphysics as a justification of State sovereignty. Only when this aspect of Hegel's thought is brought into its clear relationship with government and subjectivity will we be able to see the larger implications of Hegel's metaphysical narrative.

The Limits of the War Hypothesis

Returning to Foucault's war hypothesis — *that war can be used as an effective analyzer of political power* — I would like to now raise several questions with regard to Foucault's analysis in order to indicate some of the more subtle issues at stake in my construction of a Foucauldian critique of Hegel. Although, as I have demonstrated, the war hypothesis offers a possibility for problematizing certain features of Hegel's thought in relation to his historical narrative, Foucault's analytic is not without its own series of problems. As Gordon argues, the 1976 lecture course "*Society Must be Defended*" was "the testing of the validity of what might be called the "hypothesis of war" — the idea that the notion of war or struggle could serve as the tool par excellence of political analysis."⁵⁸ Gordon provides a clear description of Foucault's theoretical endeavours in the lecture course, writing,

Foucault succeeds in tracing a strand of influence from these writers, by way of the ideas of the French Revolution, down to the French historians of class struggle who influenced Marx, but also down to nineteenth-century theories of racial struggle. By their conclusion, then, the lectures not only provided the promised historical celebration of militant thought but also the limitations and immense dangers of that style of thought through its implication for the history of revolutionary class warfare and state racism. As Foucault makes it into the object of a historical analysis ... the idea of a militant critique that exposes power relations in their nakedness and uncovers as their actual basis the arbitrariness of a primal act of usurpation becomes problematic as to both its reliability and its consequences.⁵⁹

With respect to its reliability, the war hypothesis was too broad for Foucault to retain the precision that typified his previous historical research. Although the exposition of power relations "in their nakedness" allowed Foucault to challenge the dominant paradigm of sovereignty, it left little in terms of a political analysis that could be reliability deployed to effectively contest dominant

⁵⁸ Colin Gordon, Introduction to Foucault, *Power*, p. xxi.

⁵⁹ Ibid, p. xxi-xxii.

political models. In terms of consequences, Foucault's genealogy reveals that historico-political discourses, including those based on race and class distinctions, were especially vulnerable to the State's apparatus of capture, manifesting within the discourses of the sovereign State as heinous policies of State racism and political repression.

Despite these serious concerns, the war hypothesis did allow Foucault to begin to formulate his questions about the political discourse of sovereignty and unpack some of the assumptions that lend this discourse its legitimacy. In *Critique of Violence*, Beatrice Hanssen remarks, "when it came to choosing between the two alternatives the opening lecture outlined, Foucault unflinchingly rejected the view that power amounts to the exercise of repression ... opting instead for the second alternative, or the Nietzschean hypothesis, following which "the basis of the relationship of power lies in the hostile engagement of forces." "⁶⁰ Butler goes on to argue that, for Hegel, "the confrontation between an agency of domination and a subordinate agency always takes place on the presumption of a shared social reality. Indeed, it is the recognition of this common social ground that constitutes each agency as a social agency and so becomes the basis of the constitution of historical experience."⁶¹ What Foucault's use of the war hypothesis indicates is that this "hostile engagement of forces" must be coerced, using a variety of mechanisms and strategies, into a social whole. The "consensus" of history and assumed shared social reality are thus revealed as conceptual ideals of the rational mind that find no correlate in the actual world, except for that which can be manufactured, for Hegel, through the tautological interpellation of the Hegelian Science of Spirit. Therefore, as Butler contends,

Foucault appears, then, to be reversing the Hegelian claim altogether, arguing that historical experience "emerges" precisely at that point where common ground *cannot* be ascertained, i.e., in a confrontation between differently empowered agencies whose difference is not mediated by some more fundamental commonality. ... *Without the*

⁶⁰ Hanssen, *Critique of Violence*, p. 110.

⁶¹ Butler, *Subjects of Desire*, p. 181.

*assumption of prior ontological harmony, conflict can be seen to produce effects that exceed the bounds of dialectical unity and result in a multiplication of consequences.*⁶²

If Foucault's hypothesis on war does not provide him with the space for thinking a politics outside the context of sovereignty, or, at least not without certain dangers that seem too difficult to overcome, it does remain an important challenge to Hegel's 'theory' of the state because it problematizes the smooth narrative of historical consensus by revealing the struggles and dominations that populate the historico-political discourses. These historico-political discourses challenge the metaphysical narratives of history, with their assumed rational progress and consensus development, allowing further challenges to be mounted against dominant political structures that operate within a discourse of sovereignty in the present. However, the war hypothesis also leads into Foucault's research on population as a phenomenon of government. As Foucault states at the end of "*Society Must be Defended*,"

Racism first develops with colonization, or in other words, with colonizing genocide. ... How can one not only wage war on one's adversaries but also expose one's own citizens to war, and let them be killed by the million ... except by activating the theme of racism? From this point onward, war is about two things: it is not simply a matter of destroying a political adversary, but of destroying the enemy race ... war will be seen not only as a way of improving one's own race by eliminating the enemy race ... but also as a way of regenerating one's own race.⁶³

Thus, for Foucault, the historico-political discourses of struggle, especially in relation to their racialized articulations, serve as a new justifications for the State in relation to the health and security of its population. However, the population, as an emerging object of government, also serves as the model for a new economic strategy that enters into a complex assemblage with the discourses of health and security. As we will see in the next chapter, Foucault's interest in the

⁶² Ibid, pp. 181-3.

⁶³ Foucault, "*Society Must Be Defended*," p. 257.

phenomenon of population, initiated in the context of the war hypothesis, will animate his research concerning governmentality as a new mode of political rationality. Within Foucault's analysis of governmentality, we will also discover another possibility for critically engaging with Hegel, in pursuit of a critique that will demonstrate the dangers of his interpellative tautologies.

Chapter 3 — The Register of Government: Population, Political Economy and Civil Society

This governmentalization of the state is a singularly paradoxical phenomenon, since if in fact the problems of governmentality and the techniques of government have become the only political issue, the only real space for political struggle and contestation, that is because the governmentalization of the state is at the same time what has permitted the state to survive, and it is precisely thanks to this governmentality, which is at once internal and external to the state, since it is the tactics of government which make possible the continual definition and redefinition of what is within the competence of the state and what is not, the public versus the private, and so on; thus the state can only be understood in its survival and its limits on the basis of the general tactics of governmentality.¹ — Michel Foucault

In this chapter, I further develop my discussion of Foucault's theoretical movements and contextualize his research on governmentality with respect to the political discourse of sovereignty. I then provide a summary of Foucault's research on governmentality, drawing primarily from the essay "Governmentality," published in *The Foucault Effect*. Following this summary of Foucault's research, I examine Hegel's concept *Sittlichkeit* as the context for his consideration of Civil Society in the *Philosophy of Right*. I then summarize some of the key features of Hegel's notion of Civil Society, and apply Foucault's research on governmentality to the *Philosophy of Right* as a critique that highlights some of the major practical and theoretical problems of Hegel's rationality of Civil Society. Finally, I return to questions regarding the productive nature of power in the work of Foucault to further develop my construction of a Foucauldian critique of Hegel.

Political Reason and the Context of Governmentality

As we saw in chapter two, in an attempt to challenge the discourse of sovereignty as the dominant model for political analysis, Foucault formulated the hypothesis that power could be analyzed in terms of war, conflict, and struggle. Foucault writes,

it is true that political power puts an end to war, that it installs, or tries to install, the reign

¹ Foucault, "Governmentality," p. 103.

of peace in civil society, this by no means implies that it suspends the effects of war or neutralises the disequilibrium revealed in the final battle. The role of political power, on this hypothesis, is perpetually to re-inscribe this relation through a form of unspoken warfare; to re-inscribe it in social institutions, in economic inequalities, in language, in the bodies themselves.²

However, as I demonstrated in the conclusion to chapter two, the war hypothesis could not provide the theoretical reliability necessary to seriously and consistently challenge the discourse of sovereignty because the historico-political discourses which it evoked were extremely disparate and vulnerable to capture by the State's philosophico-juridical discourses. Still, the question of analyzing political power outside of the model of sovereignty had led Foucault to the phenomenon of the population, and its emerging discourses of health and security. The State racism that warned Foucault of the serious political dangers posed by the war hypothesis also signified that the State had adopted a new model of power that beckoned further research regarding the political rationality of the State's relation to the phenomenon of the population. It is in his research on population, security and territory that Foucault formulates a new concept of political rationality which he terms governmentality.

Foucault's basic definition of government, as the 'conduct of others' conduct' is indicative of the openness of his field of analysis. Government, for Foucault, is not simply related to the State, or authoritarian agencies, but to the power relations that form the behaviours and practices that come to constitute cultural and political activity in any given society. Mitchell Dean's study, *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*, provides a set of cursory definitions regarding Foucault's research and indicates the importance of distinguishing between government, governmentality as a political rationality, and governmentality as a historical phenomenon that emerges, according to Foucault, in Western European society alongside the development of

² Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 90.

statistical analysis and the study of populations. Because Foucault tends to move among these three fields in his writing, it is important to note how they are defined and relate to one another to avoid confusion in studying his analytical development. Dean provides a working definition of government, writing,

*Government is any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes.*³

Therefore, Dean explains, “to analyse mentalities of government is to analyse thought made practical and technical.”⁴ Therefore, unlike Althusser’s ideological analysis of interpellation, Foucault’s research into governmentality does not define the activities of government solely by their relation to the ruling class. However, like Althusser’s second thesis on ideology, it is clear that governmentality, as a political rationality, has a material existence. That is, it has a series of consequences, effects and outcomes that allow it to be studied and contested.

According to Dean, governmentality, “marks the emergence of a distinctly new form of thinking about and exercising power in certain societies ... This form of power is bound up with the discovery of a new reality, the economy, and concerned with a new object, the population.”⁵ Within this context, “government must become an *economic* government,”⁶ and thus the discourse of political economy becomes an essential element within the analysis of political rationality. It should also be noted that “governmentality seeks to enframe the population within what might be called apparatuses of security ... [including] the use of standing armies, police forces, diplomatic

³ Mitchell Dean, *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society* (London: Sage, 1999), p. 11.

⁴ Ibid, p. 18.

⁵ Ibid, p. 19.

⁶ Ibid, p. 20.

corps, intelligence services and spies.”⁷ Given the historical emergence of these new apparatuses of security, alongside the phenomenon of population and the study of political economy, a unique horizon of intelligibility also emerges in terms of political rationality. Therefore, as Colin Gordon notes in the Introduction to *Power*, within Foucault’s work on governmentality, a key “methodological principle was a refusal to treat “power” as a substantive entity, institution, or possession, independent of the set of relationships in which it is exercised.”⁸ He explains that, “Introducing into his work the theme of governmental rationalities was partly a manner of providing himself with a fully satisfactory way of drawing together the levels of “micro” and “macro” analyses of power.”⁹ That is, Foucault’s insistence on creating an ascending analysis of power, and of focusing on power’s operations and effects, was initiated in concert with his new interest in populations, economics, and the political rationality of governmentality. However, Foucault does not presume the existence of this new form of political rationality and subsequently apply it to specific activities. Rather, Foucault begins with the activities and mechanisms of control operating in a relative autonomy to systems of power, and traces their effects in ascending generalization to describe a tendency toward governmentality, as “the conduct of others’ conduct.”

It is important to recognize that in this area of his research, Foucault is in a dialogue with liberalism, as the paradigmatic political rationality of Western government, as well as with the concept of government itself. Within the emerging discourse of liberalism, ““civil society” served as a bridge between what had been found to be the discordant orders of political obedience and economic interest; it was a vehicle for (quoting Foucault) “the common interplay of relations of

⁷ Ibid, p. 20.

⁸ Gordon, Introduction to Michel Foucault’s *Power*, p. xxv.

⁹ Ibid.

power and all those things that ceaselessly escape their grasp.”¹⁰ Therefore, the field of Civil Society is a key area of research and study that would allow for an understanding of the application and concentration of governmentality. However, it should be noted that Foucault’s analysis of governmentality, as a logic emerging in the field of Civil Society, is not simply a condemnation of rationality *as such*. In “The Subject and Power,” a key essay for understanding Foucault’s political analysis, he writes,

The relationship between rationalization and excesses of political power is evident. And we should not need to wait for bureaucracy or concentration camps to recognize the existence of such relations. But the problem is: what to do with such an evident fact? ... What we have to do is analyze specific rationalities rather than always invoking the progress of rationalization in general. ... It consists in taking the forms of resistance against different forms of power as a starting point. ... Rather than analyzing power from the point of view of its internal rationality, it consists of analysing power relations through the antagonism of strategies.¹¹

Foucault’s emphasis in this passage on avoiding an analysis of power that focuses on its internal rationality is an important aspect of his research. Within the internal logic of any given political rationality, the tautological features and complex arguments for its legitimacy often obscure the conflicts and struggles that are taking place beneath the surface. The discourse of sovereignty veiled the domination that permitted the establishment of the Law and its order, and this instigated Foucault’s war hypothesis, as a means to challenge the dominant discourse from the outside, at the source of its legitimacy. Again, with the political rationality of governmentality, Foucault wants to demonstrate, by exposing the “antagonism of strategies,” that the practices of government are in conflict with the individuals interpellated as the subjects of government. However, this does not mean that Foucault dismisses rationality *as such*. Rather, as Foucault states in *Power/Knowledge*, “It is only if we grasp these techniques of power and demonstrate the economic advantages or

¹⁰ Ibid, p. xxix.

¹¹ Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” in *Power*, pp. 328-9.

political utility that derives from them in a given context for specific reasons, that we can understand how these mechanisms come to be effectively incorporated into the social whole.”¹² The creation of a materially unified whole of society, by way of the economy, complements the historical consensus narrated within the philosophico-juridical discourse (as we saw in chapter two). In this instance, the general goal of governmentality is to create a unification of the social whole through economic means, while reflecting and further entrenching the historical narratives that lend legitimacy to the State as sovereign. However, Foucault emphasizes that additional concerns, such as health and security in relation to the population, will add to the difficulty of escaping sovereignty as a dominant political discourse. That is, the emergence of governmentality as a political rationality does not eclipse sovereignty, rather, as we will see, it further complicates Foucault’s attempt to *think a politics* outside the discourse of sovereignty.

“Governmentality”

In summarizing Foucault’s essay “Governmentality,”¹³ perhaps the best example of the logic of the economy as it is applied to the population is found in the brief slogan that is literally “coined” on American currency – *E Pluribus Unum* – Out of Many, One. That is, out of the many divergence social and cultural interests existent within a given territory of sovereignty, one *whole* can be formed, and effectively defined and controlled, through the economy. As we will see, the

¹² Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 101.

¹³ For the purposes of my research, I will be relying primarily on the version of Foucault’s 1978 “Governmentality” lecture, reprinted and revised by Colin Gordon in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 87-104; it should be noted that the entire 1978-79 lecture course has recently been made available for the first time, see Michel Foucault, *Sécurité, Territoire, Population, Cours au Collège de France 1977-1978* (Hautes Études: Gallimard/Seuil, 2004). For Foucault’s course summary of “Security, Territory, and Population,” see Michel Foucault, *Ethics: Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume 1*, translated by Robert Hurley and edited by Paul Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 1997), pp. 67-71. For a similar reading of the role of political economy, see the lecture delivered at the University of Vermont in 1982 – “The Political Technology of Individuals,” in Michel Foucault, *Power: Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume 3*, edited by James D. Faubion and translated by Robert Hurley (New York: New Press, 2000), pp. 403-417.

application of economic logic to the new scientific object of the population will have extensive effects on the concept of governance and on possibilities for conceptualizing alternative political arrangements.

Foucault initiates his discussion claiming that he will analyze the series — security, territory, population. He suggests that from the middle of the 16th to the end of the 18th century, the ‘art of government’ becomes a central issue related to many fields, including oneself, souls, children, pedagogy, and the State. Foucault explains that the “government of the state ... what we would today call the political form of government,”¹⁴ is only one of the many aspects of government. Following a detailed discussion of Machiavelli’s *The Prince*, Foucault considers the debates surrounding the re-emergence of Machiavelli at the beginning of the nineteenth century, noting,

It needs to be seen in terms of something which it was trying to define in its specificity, namely an art of government. ... All these authors shared a common concern to distance themselves from a certain conception of the art of government which, once shorn of its theological foundations and religious justifications, took the sole interest of the prince as its object and principle of rationality. ... The essential thing is that they attempted to articulate a kind of rationality which was intrinsic to the art of government, without subordinating it to the problematic of the prince and of his relationship to the principality of which he is lord and master.¹⁵

Foucault explains, for Machiavelli, it was alleged that “the prince stood in a relation of singularity and externality, and thus of transcendence, to his principality. ... the link in any event remains a purely synthetic one and there is no fundamental, essential, natural and juridical connection between the prince and this principality.”¹⁶ Thus, “we find at once a plurality of forms of government and their immanence to the state: the multiplicity and immanence of these activities

¹⁴ Foucault, “Governmentality,” p. 88.

¹⁵ Ibid, p. 89.

¹⁶ Ibid, pp. 89-90.

distinguishes them radically from the transcendent singularity of Machiavelli's prince."¹⁷ In the rediscovery of Machiavelli's political thought, there is an emphasis on the art of government, however, the focus on the immanent activities of government articulates an emerging political rationality with different ends, and consequences, from that of the "transcendental" prince.

Foucault continues,

This means that, whereas the doctrine of the prince and the juridical theory of sovereignty are constantly attempting to draw the line between the power of the prince and any other form of power, because its task is to explain and justify this essential discontinuity between them, in the art of government the task is to establish a continuity, in both an upwards and downwards direction.¹⁸

The continuity moves upwards in the conduct of the subject, who, if he desires a well-ordered government, would need to first learn to govern himself and his family, before being capable of governing a State.¹⁹ The downwards continuity occurs in the sense that a well-ordered State exists when every family and individual within the State is governed in accord with the needs of the State. "This downwards line, which transmits to individual behaviour and the running of the family the same principles as the good government of the state, is just this time beginning to be called *police*."²⁰

Foucault then moves to the question of economics, writing,

The art of government, as becomes apparent in this literature, is essentially concerned with answering the question of how to introduce economy – that is to say, the correct manner of managing individuals, goods and wealth within the family ... and of making the family fortunes prosper – how to introduce this meticulous attention of the father towards

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 91.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid, p. 92.

his family into the management of the state.²¹

Foucault adds, “This, I believe, is the essential issue in the establishment of the art of government: introduction of economy into political practice.”²² Therefore, how the police, as an extension of government, become the enforcement of particular types of behaviours that effect the economy is of tremendous importance. The practice of determining proper behaviours and practices, as well as monitoring and responding to them with appropriate mechanisms, is now seen in a specific relationship to the economy. Foucault argues,

To govern a state will therefore mean to apply economy, to set up an economy at the level of an entire state, which means exercising towards its inhabitants, and the wealth and behaviour of each and all, a form of surveillance and control as attentive as that of the head of a family over his household and his goods. ... it is at this moment becoming apparent that the very essence of government – that is, the art of exercising power in the form of economy – is to have as its main objective that which we are today accustomed to call ‘the economy.’²³

Foucault continues, “The word ‘economy’, which in the sixteenth century signified a form of government, comes in the eighteenth century to designate a level of reality, a field of intervention, through a series of complex processes that I regard as absolutely fundamental to our history.”²⁴ Within the logic of governmentality, the discourse of sovereignty also remains significant, however its modes and forms of articulation are shifted and dispersed into varying mechanisms and apparatuses. Foucault suggests,

sovereignty is not exercised on things, but above all on a territory and consequently on the subjects who inhabit it. ... On the contrary, in La Perrière’s text, you will notice that the

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid, p. 93.

definition of government in no way refers to territory. One governs things. ... The things with which in this sense government is to be concerned are in fact men, but men in their relations, their links, their imbrication with those other things which are wealth, resources, means of subsistence, the territory with its specific qualities, climate, irrigation, fertility, etc.; men in their relation to that other kind of things, customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking, etc.; lastly, men in their relation to that other kind of things, accidents and misfortunes such as famine, epidemics, death, etc.”²⁵

Similarly, Althusser’s first thesis on ideology described a key function of ideology as the production of the *imaginary relations* among subjects.²⁶ That is, governmentality, like ideology (for Althusser), determines the relations among subjects, and between subjects and things, but not the subjects and things themselves. Within the emerging ethos of governmentality, “What counts essentially is this complex of men and things; property and territory are merely one of its variables.”²⁷ If it is to be ordered and controlled, this complex assemblage of men and things must be determined in its relations, and therefore, the relations between subjects, and between subjects and things, must be manufactured.

These relations, in turn, reflect a new finality of government. With respect to the ends of government, Foucault argues,

we can see emerging a new kind of finality. Government is defined as a right manner of disposing things so as to lead not to the form of the common good, as the jurists’ text would have said, but to an end which is ‘convenient’ for each of the things that are to be governed. ... There is a whole series of specific finalities, then, which become the object of government as such.²⁸

This new series of “specific finalities” relate to the science of the population and the control of the

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ For this discussion, see chapter one, p. 4., above.

²⁷ Foucault, “Governmentality,” p. 94.

²⁸ Ibid, p. 95.

economy. If the new end of government can be said to be the convenience of government, that is, the disposing of subjects and things such that ordering and controlling them can be made more efficient, an entirely new set of ends are to be produced in relation to the variety of things that will be governed.

Foucault gives a lengthy but decisive explanation of his concept of governmentality, stating,

with government it is a question not of imposing a law on men, but of disposing things: that is to say, of employing tactics rather than laws, and even of using laws themselves as tactics – to arrange things in such a way that, through a certain number of means, such and such ends may be achieved. ... whereas the end of sovereignty is internal to itself and possesses its own intrinsic instruments in the shape of its laws, the finality of government resides in the things it manages and in the pursuit of perfection and intensification of the processes which it directs; and the instruments of government, instead of being only laws, now come to be a range of multi-form tactics.²⁹

These tactics, however, will be applied to a new object — the population. Foucault notes that “Mercantilism might be described as the first sanctioned efforts to apply this art of government at the level of political practices and knowledge of the state ... Mercantilism is the first rationalization of the exercise of power as a practice of government.”³⁰ However, with mercantilism, “the theory of government suffered from its reliance on a model which ... too weak, and too insubstantial, that of the family.”³¹ According to Foucault’s analysis, “The perspective of population, the reality accorded to specific phenomena of population,” which emerges alongside and interwoven with the theories of political economy, is that which “[renders] possible the final elimination of the model

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid, pp. 97-8.

³¹ Ibid, p. 98.

of the family and the recentring of the notion of economy.”³² Therefore, what “now emerges into prominence is the family considered as an element internal to population, and as a fundamental instrument in its government.”³³ This shift from the family to the population as the model for the economy has massive implications for theories of government. The population emerges as the site, or object, of government as the health and security of the population emerge as discourse legitimizing governmental controls. Foucault emphasizes that,

population comes to appear above all else as the ultimate end of government. In contrast to sovereignty, government has as its purpose not the act of government itself, but the welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health, etc.; and the means that the government uses to attain these ends are themselves all immanent to the population ... the population is the subject of needs, of aspirations, but it is also the object in the hands of the government, aware vis-a-vis the government, of what it wants, but ignorant of what is being done to it.³⁴

Thus, Foucault reiterates, “The new science called political economy arises out of the perception of new networks of continuous and multiple relations between population, territory and wealth; and this is accompanied by the formation of a type of intervention ... in the field of economy and population.”³⁵ However, Foucault stresses that this new form of political rationality does not eliminate the role of sovereignty within political discourse, rather, it “renders all the more acute the problem of the foundation of sovereignty ... and all the more acute equally the necessity for the development of discipline.”³⁶

Foucault then summarizes his goals for analysing the series “security, territory,

³² Ibid, p. 99.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid, p. 100.

³⁵ Ibid, p. 101.

³⁶ Ibid, p. 102.

population” by emphasizing that he is not only interested in developing a genealogical concept of governmentality that would explore the relationship among population, political economy and security, but that he also wants to understand “the tendency which ... has steadily led towards the pre-eminence over all other forms ... of this type of power which may be termed government, resulting, on the one hand, in the formation of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses, and, on the other, in the development of a whole complex of *savoirs*.”³⁷ That is, the development of mechanisms and techniques of control must be examined alongside the knowledges which sanction and legitimate them. This makes a study of the University of Berlin particularly relevant as a site of consideration for the ethos of governmentality. Not only does the institution itself form a new mechanism of control and exhibit new techniques that reflect the mentality of government, but the knowledges produced within the institution also demonstrate the political rationality of governmentality.

Hegel, *Sittlichkeit* and Civil Society

In order to demonstrate how Foucault’s analysis of government can be read as a possible critique of Hegel’s philosophy, it is first necessary to summarize Hegel’s political project in the *Philosophy of Right*. In this section, I will first outline, in general, Hegel’s concept of *Sittlichkeit*, in order to contextualize the subsequent discussion of Civil Society later in this chapter, as well as my consideration of the State, in chapter four. Before initiating this discussion, I want to stress that I am not suggesting that a Foucauldian reading reveals a secret, esoteric truth of Hegel’s political thought. Rather, I believe that Foucault’s analysis of governmentality reveals certain functions and effects that make it an important aspect of a critique of Hegel’s political and economic views, especially when considered in relation to his use of history and notions of subjectivity.

³⁷ Ibid, pp. 102-3.

To begin, it is important to consider the *Philosophy of Right* within the unique political and cultural context from which it emerged. As Terry Pinkard notes in his extensive biography of Hegel, “Hegel’s 1820 *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* was written against the background of the ongoing, intensely fierce debates over the shape of Germany was to assume in the aftermath of Napoleon’s spectacular fall and the conflicts between reformers and reactionaries.”³⁸ Yet, as Shlomo Avineri has noted, “it has to be pointed out that on no account can Hegel’s theory be so construed as to refer to any existing state; it is the *idea* of the state with which Hegel is dealing and any existing state cannot be anything but a mere approximation to the idea.”³⁹ Avineri’s claim is that despite the political concerns relevant to a consideration of Hegel’s thought in the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel’s philosophy should not be taken as a prescription of how political power should be ordered, nor as a precise description of the actual State of Prussia. However, this warning from Avineri returns us, again, to the question of the relation between the actual and the rational in the Hegelian Science. As Hegel states, in the Preface to the *Philosophy of Right*,

The treatise ... in so far as it deals with political science, shall be nothing other than an attempt to *comprehend and portray the state as an inherently rational entity*. As a philosophical composition, it must distance itself as far as possible from the obligation to construct a *state as it ought to be*; such instruction as it may contain cannot be aimed at instructing the state how it ought to be, but rather at showing how the state, as the ethical universe, should be recognized.⁴⁰

Hegel’s insistence on forging a distance between his description of existing State and his prescriptions regarding how it ought to be demands further consideration. If we, as readers of Hegel, are asked to “*comprehend and portray the state as an inherently rational entity*” with Hegel, this act of interpellation must not be understood as a simple epistemological concern.

³⁸ Terry Pinkard, *Hegel: A Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000), p. 469.

³⁹ Shlomo Avineri, *Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1972), p. 177.

⁴⁰ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, Preface, p. 21.

Hegel's desire to portray the State as inherently rational implicates his philosophy in the narrativization of political power. How political power is understood is ultimately inseparable from how it is accepted, practiced and promoted. Therefore, within the rational-actual relationship in the *Philosophy of Right*, it is extremely important to demonstrate how Hegel's claims of objectivity reinforce the prescriptive element of how political power should be understood and subsequently practiced in the actual world. Again, as we saw in chapter two, this gap between the rational and actual should not be dismissed as an ambiguous problem, or error, in Hegel's thought. Rather, the actual is employed as a justification of the political constellations formed in the rational, which, as the truth of the Hegelian Science of Spirit must be deployed back onto the actual world to shape it in its own image. As Allan Patten argues,

[Hegel] thinks he can establish that, if his fellow Europeans think deeply enough about what it is to be free, and about what the implications of this freedom are for the way in which the social world should be arranged, then they will come to see that their social world is a 'home': far from being something alien, it represents the essential condition and locus of the full realization of their freedom.⁴¹

Patten's phrase "think deeply enough" should immediately raise suspicions about the freedom he references. However, it also indicates, again, the important interpellative features of the *Philosophy of Right*. To "think deeply enough" — that is, for Hegel, to think within the conceptual arrangements of the Science of Spirit — means that one will be privy to the truest understanding of freedom. Obviously, when Hegel's readers are called to think the depth of human freedom, and with it the rewards of participating in Spirit's self-knowledge and the completion of the rational progress of history, the interpellative purchase is tremendous. The "Amen" of subjugation is, in the *Philosophy of Right*, the willingness to think the rationality of *Sittlichkeit* and, in thinking it, to fully submit to its logic as well as its attendant demands for actual life. Also of relevance in this discussion is the way in which social problems have already been

⁴¹ Alan Patten, *Hegel's Idea of Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999), p. 104.

posed. That is, as Patten stated, by understanding the social world correctly, by “thinking deeply enough,” about its arrangement and construction, individuals will come to see this arrangement as not only appropriate, but as “home.” Therefore, before any of the problems of Civil Society have even surfaced in our analysis, it is clear that the possibility for solutions to social problems have been delineated. For Hegel, solutions exist in proper concepts, and in the correct formation of the rational constellations which will, in turn, be applied to the actual world. In a word, solutions must be *mediated*; they will be mediated in historical narratives, as well as the ethical world which determines their possible solutions, but, most importantly, they will be mediated by the rational field within the Science of Spirit which elevated them to their conceptual reality.

Moving into a discussion of Hegel’s concept of *Sittlichkeit*, we see that this aspect of Hegel’s thought is extremely important, not only in the *Philosophy of Right*, where it occupies a central position, but also in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Encyclopedia*. In the Objective Mind section of the *Philosophy of Mind* (which corresponds to his more extensive treatment of political life in the *Philosophy of Right*), Hegel writes, regarding *Sittlichkeit*,

The ethical substance is: (a) as ‘immediate’ or natural mind — the *Family*. (b) The ‘relative’ totality of the ‘relative’ relations of the individuals persons to one another in a formal universality — *Civil Society*. (c) The self-conscious substance, as the mind developed to an organic actuality — the *Political Constitution*.⁴²

Thus, *Sittlichkeit*, as the ethical life world, spans Hegel’s three basic organizations in the *Philosophy of Right* — the family, Civil Society, and the State. Although they increase in objectivity, from the family as the most immediate, to the State as the most mediated, each level of organization plays a necessary role within the whole of the ethical substance. In his extensive commentary on the *Philosophy of Right*, Dudley Knowles argues,

The notion of Ethical Life (*Sittlichkeit*) is Hegel’s distinctive contribution to moral

⁴² Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §517, p. 255.

philosophy. ... Hegel's account of Ethical Life ... charts three nested domains of value (Family, Civil Society, and State) which govern the domestic, economic, legal, administrative and political forms of life as these are encountered in the modern world. I say these elements are *nested* because Civil Society consists of families and the Rational State as a whole comprises all of its subsidiary institutions.⁴³

Already, with Knowles' preliminary remarks on Hegel, it is clear that Foucault's concept of governmentality could provide a strong point of critique regarding a system that delimits how the "domestic, economic, legal, administrative and political forms of life" are governed in the modern world. As we saw in Foucault's analysis, a key feature of governmentality is the attempt to unify the political object of the population through economic mechanisms. Kouvelakis explains that Hegel believes he can solve the problem of unifying the State with *Sittlichkeit* "by way of the vertical equilibrium or hierarchical imbrication of levels whose substance is drawn from a unique, indivisible power. The state is accordingly posed as the ultimate, fully accomplished form of social life."⁴⁴ That is, the State, as the hierarchical completion of *Sittlichkeit*, is mandated to construct the social whole which it claims to have realized objectively. Ardis B. Collins notes that, for Hegel, "ethical life must acknowledge a common ground that establishes the necessary connection between ... various factors. Hegel calls this principle the spirit of the nation or folk, which defines the way this society knows the good."⁴⁵ Thus, the nation, as "common ground" used to create a unity within the nation-State, is also inherently tied to the concept of *Sittlichkeit*. Pippin adds that,

Hegel claimed to have developed and defended a unique category of ethical assessment – "*Sittlichkeit*," or "ethical life" ... Although he shares with many other modern philosophers the view that to live righteously is to live freely, and with some classical thinkers the idea that the worthiest life involved active engagement with others, Hegel adds to both positions the claim that to live freely is to participate in certain modern

⁴³ Ibid, pp. 221-2.

⁴⁴ Kouvelakis, *Philosophy and Revolution*, p. 41.

⁴⁵ Collins, "Hegel on Language, Citizenship, and the Educational Function of the Workplace," p. 33.

institutions, to *be* a social and political being of a certain sort.⁴⁶

The “unique category of ethical assessment” is thus delimited as social and political participation. That is, within the realm of *Sittlichkeit*, Hegel is able to define the freedom in a given society by the level of conscious participation enacted by its subjects. The question that we must answer, however, is exactly what “certain sort” of political and social being is constructed within Hegel’s ethical sphere?

Having examined Hegel’s concept of *Sittlichkeit*, we may now more fully investigate the role of Civil Society (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*) in Hegel’s interpellation of political and social beings. I believe that Foucault’s analysis of governmentality is most relevant to this aspect of Hegel’s thought, although, as I have already mentioned, the role of Civil Society, and government, cannot be fully understood without considering the historical and subjective dimensions of Hegel’s thought. Hegel’s discussion of Civil Society in the *Philosophy of Right* is divided into three subsections: the system of needs, the administration of justice, and the police and the corporation. Each subsection locates the economy as a central feature of modern life within the State, and attempts to delimit the possibilities for conceptualizing the role of the economy within the Science of Spirit. Knowles, quoting Hegel, suggests that,

Hegel saw political economy as one of the triumphs of modern science. The facts concerning the production, distribution and sale of goods and services in a modern economy are beyond description. ... The spectacle of economic activity is astonishing in its variety and vitality. The miracle of the economists ... was to have demonstrated *necessity*, that is, reason at work in the ‘mass relations and mass movements in the qualitative and quantitative determinacy and complexity.’⁴⁷

That is, for Hegel, Civil Society, as the locus of economic life, indicates a rational and interrelated necessity inherent in modern existence.

⁴⁶ Robert B. Pippin, *Idealism as Modernism* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997), p. 417.

⁴⁷ Dudley Knowles, *Hegel and the Philosophy of Right* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 265.

In his lectures *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, Habermas notes, “Since the end of the eighteenth century, [politics] has split apart into a social theory grounded in political economy on the one hand and a theory of the state inspired by modern natural right on the other. ... Hegel stands in the middle of this scientific development.”⁴⁸ For Habermas, Hegel is “the first to bring expression to a conceptual framework that is even terminologically adequate to modern society, in that he separates the political sphere of the state from “civil society.””⁴⁹ Hardt, in “The Withering of Civil Society,” also notes that Hegel was the thinker who most clearly made the connection between civil society and the importance of labour.⁵⁰ Hardt explains that, for Hegel, “through needs, work, exchange, and the pursuit of particular self-interests, the “unorganized atoms of civil society” are to be ordered toward the universal ... through the competitive institutions of capitalist production and circulation.”⁵¹ For Hegel, the modern economy demonstrates a dynamic and interrelated system of dependency that can be conceptualized as a unifying ground with the capacity to bring together the divergent interests of society. Raymond Plant explains that Hegel initiated a

philosophical redescription with particular institutions and practices within the economic sphere. Hegel endeavours to produce by reflection a dialectical reversal of this conventional picture by showing that although labor, tools, and property may well be seen to have a strongly individualistic dimension, they nonetheless fall within the public

⁴⁸ Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, p. 37.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Michael Hardt, “The Withering of Civil Society,” in *Deleuze and Guattari: New Mappings in Politics, Philosophy and Culture*, edited by Eleanor Kaufman and Kevin Jon Heller (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), pp. 23-4.

⁵¹ Ibid, p. 24. In his study of Hegel, Solomon also notes that Hegel had studied economic liberalism with great enthusiasm in his youth; see Robert C. Solomon, *In the Spirit of Hegel* (New York and Oxford: Oxford UP, 1983), p. 17. Kouvelakis also stresses the importance of economics as an influence on Hegel’s thought; see Kouvelakis, *Philosophy and Revolution*, p. 36.

domain and are characterized by that integration.⁵²

Even at the level of tools and technologies of production, Hegel sees the economic relations within Civil Society as imbued with unifying possibilities. Of course, as labourers and property-owners, Hegel's contemporaries may not have understood their participation in Civil Society as an objective movement toward the fully-realized universality of the State. However, their material participation in the economy demonstrates *formally* that a unified integration of society is possible through the mediation of the market.

As Hegel explains, "By a dialectical movement, the particular is mediated by the universal so that each individual, in earning, producing and enjoying his own account [*für sich*], thereby earns and produces for the enjoyment of others."⁵³ Stephen Houlgate comments on this mediation, arguing, "Hegel is not concerned with economic activity in so far as it is based on need alone, but rather in so far as it is based on our freedom and right as individuals to satisfy our needs through the free production and exchange of goods."⁵⁴ Knowles adds that, "Working out one's aspirations, developing one's skills through education, applying those skills efficiently in making a living for oneself and one's family: these are concrete elements in the process of *self-determination*."⁵⁵ Yet, the process of self-determination, inherently linked in Hegel's philosophy to private property as the cornerstone of modern economic theory, also invokes the juridical apparatus of the State. This indicates that, for Hegel, the link between Civil Society and the State, within *Sittlichkeit*, is not merely an ideal, but a practical, material reality. Knowles explains, "It is the task of the justice

⁵² Raymond Plant, "Economic and Social Integration in Hegel's Political Philosophy," in *Selected Essays on G.W.F. Hegel*, edited by Lawrence S. Stepelevich (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1993), p. 85.

⁵³ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §199, p. 233.

⁵⁴ Stephen Houlgate, *Freedom, Truth and History* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), pp. 105-6.

⁵⁵ Knowles, *Hegel and the Philosophy of Right*, p. 272.

system to guarantee ‘the *undisturbed security of persons and property*.’ It is the task of the police and the corporations to secure ‘the livelihood and welfare of individuals ... particular welfare should be *treated as a right* and duty *actualized*.’⁵⁶ Therefore, the self-determination made possible by the economy must also be seen as a entrenchment of government, through the juridical apparatus, which is lauded as the sole mechanism by which self-determination is made a “right.” That is, using the language of Foucault’s analysis of governmentality, the economy is applied to the object of the population as a means of social and political unification, or, of prescribing the “conduct of others’ conduct,” while simultaneously legitimizing the juridical apparatus of government as the protector and guarantor of economic “rights.” Thus, as I noted above, the emergence of governmentality as a political rationality does not eliminate the political discourse of sovereignty, rather, it infinitely extends this discourse into the multiform apparatuses and techniques of the economy.

However, it is important to stress, again, that the unifying links within the economy of Civil Society remain only *formal* ties without the State as their complete realization. As Kouvelakis explains,

Civil society, in an intermediate position between the immediate unity of the family and the articulated unity of the state, has a mediating function that creates a certain bond among its members, even if this remains purely an external tie that is incapable of leading them beyond their separate existences as independent individuals. As the merely ‘external state’, civil society reveals that its true foundation is the political state, which is both a power transcending it that full corresponds to true ethical life, and the immanent objective of the relations of governing it.⁵⁷

In the *Philosophy of Mind*, Hegel also argues that the universality of Civil Society can only be achieved formally, writing, “Equality, the familiar proposition, All men are by nature equal,

⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 283.

⁵⁷ Kouvelakis, *Philosophy and Revolution*, p. 34.

blunders by confusing the ‘natural’ with the ‘notion’. It ought rather to read: *By nature* men are only unequal. But the *notion* of liberty, as it exists as such, without further specification and development, is abstract subjectivity, as a person capable of property.”⁵⁸ That is, equality is the equal entitlement, at a formal level, to property.⁵⁹ However, this equal entitlement, even at the formal level, is problematic. As we will see in the next section, not only is the economy used as a new modality of governance, but the problems created by Civil Society serve as justifications for ever-increasing governmental controls.

Governmentality in Hegel: Problems with Civil Society

Despite a number of ideological criticisms of Hegel’s concept of Civil Society, there have been few attempts to employ Foucault’s analysis of governmentality as a critique of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*.⁶⁰ Yet, Hegel’s description of Civil Society demonstrates that there are certain features and antagonisms occurring within the economy that might lead to significant problems for the social order, or even for the State itself. In this section, I will more fully explore the possibilities for using the concept of governmentality to critique Hegel’s thought by examining Hegel’s articulation of Civil Society and its inherent problems. I will examine the educative role

⁵⁸ Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §539, pp. 265-6.

⁵⁹ For a further discussion of the role of property in Hegel’s concept of Civil Society in the *Philosophy of Right*, see Peter G. Stillman, “Property, Contract, and Ethical Life in Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*,” in *Hegel and Legal Theory*, edited by Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld and David Gray Carlson (New York and London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 206-227; and, Peter G. Stillman, “Person, Property and Civil Society in the *Philosophy of Right*,” in *Selected Essays on G.W.F. Hegel*, edited by Lawrence S. Stepelevich (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1993), pp. 116-131.

⁶⁰ For Marxist readings of Hegel’s concept of Civil Society, see Karl Marx, *Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’*, translated by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1970); Shlomo Avineri, “Labor, Alienation, and Social Classes in Hegel’s *Realphilosophie*,” in *Hegel’s Dialectic of Desire and Recognition* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), pp. 187-208; and, Ardis B. Collins, “‘Hegel on Language, Citizenship, and the Educational Function of the Workplace: The Marxist Challenge,’” *Owl of Minerva*, 32, 1, Fall 2000, pp. 21-43. For brief considerations of governmentality as an analysis of Civil Society, see Hardt, “The Withering of Civil Society,” pp. 23-39, and Durst, “The End(s) of the State in Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*,” pp. 229-248.

of Civil Society, followed by an extended consideration of the problem of poverty. Finally, I will discuss Hegel's "solution" to the problem of poverty by summarizing his arguments for colonialism.

To begin, I want to reiterate several important aspects of Civil Society articulated in the *Philosophy of Right*. Hegel indicates that the coherence of society must be achieved such that it is not understood simply as an aggregate body that is only synthetically unified. In the *Philosophy of Mind*, Hegel states, "The aggregate of private persons is often spoken of as the *nation*: but as such an aggregate it is *vulgar*, not *populus*: and in this direction it is the one sole aim of the state that a nation should *not* come to existence, to power and action, *as such an aggregate*."⁶¹ That is, the whole of the nation must be manufactured so as to attain an organic coherence. Weil references Hegel's use of the term populace, "meaning the mass of people who "presuppose ill will or insufficiently good will on the part of the government," who represent "the point of view of the negative."⁶² Thus, for Hegel, the population is a negative condition, existing under the control of the State, that requires intervention, through Civil Society (the "external State"), in order for it to be adequately controlled. In this sense, despite the negative connotations that Hegel adds to the concept, the idea of governing the population *as an object* is in keeping with Foucault's analysis of governmentality. Weil clarifies this aspect of Hegel's thought, writing, "the State has the unquestionable right and duty to intervene in the economy, in the administration of the general wealth."⁶³ As Hegel states in the *Philosophy of Right*, "The differing interests of producers and consumers may come into collision with each other, and even if, *on the whole*, their correct relationship re-establishes itself automatically, its adjustment also needs to be consciously

⁶¹ Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §544, pp. 272-3.

⁶² Eric Weil, *Hegel and the State*, translated by Mark A. Cohen (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 95.

⁶³ Ibid.

regulated by an agency which stands above both sides.”⁶⁴ Hegel’s concern for the proper governance of the economy, understood in relation to his views on the population already suggests that Foucault’s concept of governmentality is of specific relevance to Hegel’s economic ideas.

In a further demonstration of a governmentalized logic of political control, Hegel writes in the *Philosophy of Mind*,

The really living totality — that which preserves, in other words continually produces the state in general and its constitution, is the *government*. The organization which natural necessity gives is seen in the rise of the family and of the ‘estates’ of civil society. The government is the *universal* part of the constitution, i.e. the part which intentionally aims at preserving those parts, but at the same time gets hold of and carries out those general aims of the whole which rise above the function of the family and civil society.⁶⁵

That is, “Only through government, and by its embracing in itself the particular businesses (including the abstract legislative business, which taken apart is also particular), is the state *one*.”⁶⁶

Thus, the key question for Hegel is how to best achieve “*E Pluribus Unum*” without simply making the social order, including the State, a synthetic aggregate of machinic controls. In this respect, we see that each individual must be made subject to the State, and that an exemplary method for achieving this subjugation is to subject the entire population to the economy, as a modality of governance. In order to further consider the implications of this model of political rationality, I will now consider Hegel’s concept of Civil Society with respect to three keys aspects: education, poverty, and colonialism.

Regarding education, Hegel explains that Civil Society provides an important space for the formal realization of the universality of social life. Thus, by participating in the economic life made possible through the institutions and mechanisms of Civil Society, individuals are

⁶⁴ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §236, p. 261-2.

⁶⁵ Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §541, p. 269.

⁶⁶ Ibid, §541, p. 270.

interpellated economically into subjects with an understanding of the correct arrangement of political power within the State. In the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel explains, “Because coercion destroys itself in its concept, it has its real expression [*Darstellung*] in the fact *that coercion is cancelled* [*aufgehoben*] *by coercion*; it is therefore not only conditionally right but necessary – namely as a second coercion which cancels an initial coercion.”⁶⁷ He continues,

Pedagogical coercion, or coercion directed against savagery or barbarism [*Wildheit und Rohheit*], admittedly looks like a primary coercion rather than one which comes after a primary coercion which has already occurred. But the merely natural will is *in itself* a force directed against the Idea of freedom as that which has being in itself, which must be protected against this uncivilized [*ungebildeten*] will and given recognition within it.⁶⁸

That is, for Hegel, the natural will is directed against the freedom guaranteed by Civil Society, and the universal freedom of property rights guaranteed by the juridical apparatus of the State.

Because of this allegedly natural inclination, Hegel argues that the coercion of the pedagogical apparatus is excused because it is a sublimation of immediate human needs toward the higher, objective ends of State-sanctioned freedom. In his justification of the pedagogical coercion of Civil Society, we can see that, for Hegel, the coercion of the economy, as a mode of governance that subjugates all individuals within the population as *subjects of the economy*, is acceptable because it sublimates the individual desires of the natural will into the (formally) universalized will of the greater social whole.

In this context, Civil Society (as the “external” State) takes on the role of the educator that leads each individual into a relationship of subjugation with respect to the economy. Hegel writes,

In this character as the *universal family*, civil society have the duty and right, in the face of *arbitrariness* and contingency on the part of *the parents*, to supervise and influence the *education* [*Erziehung*] of children in so far as this has a bearing on their capacity to become members of society, and particularly if this education is to be completed not by

⁶⁷ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §93, p. 120.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

the parents themselves, but by others. If so far as communal arrangements can be made for this purpose, it is likewise incumbent upon civil society to make them.⁶⁹

Therefore, the State, through the external mechanisms of Civil Society, must intervene in the education of children because their correct interpellation into the economy is necessary, “in so far as this has a bearing on their capacity to become members of society.” However, it should be stressed that the “capacity to become members of society” is here meant to designate certain attitudes and behaviours that are advantageous to the convenience of government. As Hegel stresses, “*Education*, in its absolute determination, is therefore *liberation* and *work* towards a higher liberation; it is the absolute transition to the infinitely subjective substantiality of ethical life, which is no longer immediate and natural, but spiritual and at the same time raised to the shape of universality.”⁷⁰ He continues, “education irons out particularity to make it act in accordance with the nature of the thing [*Sache*].”⁷¹ Thus, education within Civil Society will condition individuals as subjects of the economy and the State by “ironing out” the particularities of their individual interests and concerns, leveling them against the social norms and values that sustain the coercion of the economy and the legitimacy of the State. Hegel’s justification of these coercions can therefore be understood as a metaphysical description of the negativity of unmediated desire. That is, for Hegel, only when individuals, subjected to the economy and the governance of the State, come to value this subjugation, can they truly experience freedom.

Returning to Foucault’s analysis, it is important to consider how this discourse of natural freedom and necessary participation can be unpacked through genealogy to reveal its functions and effects. Burchell explains,

⁶⁹ Ibid, §239, p. 264.

⁷⁰ Ibid, §187, p. 225.

⁷¹ Ibid, §187, p. 226.

Civil society is not, Foucault says, a kind of aboriginal reality that finally we are forced to recognize; it is not a natural given standing in opposition to the timeless essential nature of the state. ... It is, he says, the correlate of a political technology of government. The distinction between civil society and the state is a form of 'schematism' for the exercise of political power. Foucault describes civil society as in this sense a 'transactional reality' existing at the mutable interface of political power and everything which permanently outstrips its reach.⁷²

This passage is especially important in the consideration of the educative aspect of Civil Society. The "transactional reality" that Foucault describes is of considerable value to the State in that it allows for an experimentation with technologies of government, while, simultaneously, coding these experiments of control within the legitimate discourses of the external State, or Civil Society. Again, it should be stressed that although many of the technologies of control adopted by the State through the economy are not primarily related to government, their capture and subsequent deployment signify an ever-increasing movement, on the part of government, toward a rigid and insoluble unification of the political body — that is, the creation of a population to be governed. Burchell continues,

For Foucault, the political objectification of civil society plays a central role in determining a relatively open-ended and experimental problem-space of *how* to govern: that is, of finding the appropriate *techniques* for a government oriented by a problematic of security. This 'transactional' domain at the frontier of political power and what 'naturally' eludes its grasp constitutes a space problematization, a fertile ground for experimental innovation in the development of political technologies of government.⁷³

Michael Hardt also notes that Hegel's philosophy emphasizes the important pedagogical aspect of civil society because, for Hegel,

civil society takes the natural human systems of needs and particular self-interests, puts

⁷² Graham Burchell, "Peculiar interests: civil society and governing 'the system of natural liberty'," in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, edited by Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 141.

⁷³ Ibid, p. 141.

them in relation with each other through the capitalist social institutions of production and exchange, and thus, on the basis of mediation and subsumption of the particular, poses a terrain on which the State can realize the universal interest of society in “the actuality of the ethical Idea.” Hegelian education in civil society is a process of formal subsumption, that is, a process whereby particular differences, foreign to the universal, are negated and preserved in unity.⁷⁴

The formal subsumption of individuality is therefore achieved by subjecting each individual to the economy. The significance of this rationality, in terms of education, is that while “educating” the particular interests of the individual through the apparatuses of civil society, each individual must also, simultaneously, be educated regarding the need for such a formal structure. That is, the individual must be interpellated as a subject of the economy through his own willful recognition that this subjugation is both necessary and advantageous to this own desire. As Hardt argues,

The same educative social process that Hegel casts in terms of abstraction and organization, Foucault recognizes in terms of training, discipline, and management. The channels, or striations, in which these processes function, recognized as social institutions by Hegel, are characterized by Foucault in terms of deployments (*dispositifs*) and enclosures (*enfermements*). Civil society, from this perspective, in the productive site of modern economy.⁷⁵

Thus, we see in this passage that, for Foucault, the technologies of government are considered as aspects and features of control. For Hegel, however, these aspects of control form the necessary education within Civil Society that will engender an appropriate comportment toward the State and its institutions, and, in doing so, signify a proper understanding of freedom within the State. Despite the divergent views of Hegel and Foucault, what is important here is that both regard this pedagogical aspect of Civil Society as creating a unified social whole, and a coherence that must be manufactured and maintained to guarantee the health and security of the social order.

Education also remains an important aspect of Hegel’s discussion of poverty, particularly

⁷⁴ Hardt, “The Withering of Civil Society,” pp. 24-5.

⁷⁵ Ibid, p. 28.

because subjects are intended to have a specific understanding poverty that is mediated through social whole within the Science of Spirit. Hegel's explanation of poverty in the *Philosophy of Right* is unequivocal. He writes,

If the direct burden of support were to fall on the wealthier class, or if direct means were available in other public institutions ... to maintain the increasingly impoverished mass at its normal standard of living, the livelihood of the needy would be insured without the mediation of work; this would be contrary to the principle of civil society and the feeling of self-sufficiency and honour among its individual members. Alternatively, their livelihood might be mediated by work ... which would increase the volume of production; but it is precisely in overproduction and the lack of a proportionate number of consumers who are themselves productive that the evil [*Übel*] consists [*besteht*], and this is merely exacerbated by the two expedients in question. This shows that, despite an *excess of wealth*, civil society is *not wealthy enough* – i.e. its own distinct resources are not sufficient – to prevent an excess of poverty and the formation of a rabble.⁷⁶

Therefore, for Hegel, Civil Society cannot address the problem of poverty through a system of transfer payments (i.e. social insurance) because this would offend the rationality of independence within the economic model of modernity. However, the problem of poverty is created and maintained in Civil Society. Therefore, within the analytic of governmentality, we see that Hegel privileges the logic of the economic model over the actual concerns and suffering of the poor within society. The problem of overproduction, which, for Hegel, is directly linked to poverty, is referred to as an “evil,” although this “evil” is, in fact, inherent to the design of the economy itself. Therefore, despite this inherent “evil,” the government of the population is filtered through the demands of the economy, which, in turn, legitimizes further governmental controls.

Within the literature, a number of scholars offer justifications for Hegel's views on poverty. Plant argues that, “poverty as both a relative concept and a state makes contact with Hegel's other view that there are social attitudes that are characteristic of poverty: a sense of rootlessness and alienation, a set of social attitudes that leads to the formation of rabble existing, so

⁷⁶ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §245, p. 267.

to speak, on the edges of society.”⁷⁷ In this explanation, Plant suggests that Hegel clearly grasps the problem of poverty because he understands its negative effects on the social whole. However, as Knowles notes, Hegel does not attribute the problem of poverty to the ambitions of the poor themselves, as many of his contemporaries had done. Rather, “Hegel argues that poverty is not merely a problem of personal indigence, but, more importantly, is a consequence of the economic mechanism slipping out of gear.”⁷⁸ This passage is particularly telling — if the economic model itself is described as an “evil” by Hegel, this inherent feature cannot simply be dismissed as a phase shift where the economy is said to be “slipping out of gear.” To argue that the creation of poverty is simply an aberration, as Knowles does above, functions to veil the inherent and necessary creation of poverty within the design of the economy itself. This is contrary to Hegel’s own description of the evil of the modern economy, and, in fact, further legitimizes governmental intervention into a problem created, according to Hegel, by the mechanisms of government.

In this context, David C. Durst argues,

The state is strengthened by fostering the development of societal relations, in which the individual’s desire for happiness is linked to institutional power. In light of this political economization of life, the happiness of the modern individual no longer represents the highest end of the modern state; instead, it enters into the calculations of this new governmentality to the extent that the well-being of citizens becomes a factor in the solidification of state power.⁷⁹

That is, poverty is a concern because of the problems it creates for the maintenance of government power, not because of the suffering endured by the poor. This description clearly articulates Foucault concept of governmentality, where the rationality of government convenience is

⁷⁷ Plant, “Economic and Social Integration in Hegel’s Political Philosophy,” p. 98.

⁷⁸ Knowles, *Hegel and the Philosophy of Right*, p. 288.

⁷⁹ David C. Durst, “The End(s) of the State in Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*,” in *Beyond Liberalism and Communitarianism: Studies in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, edited by Robert R. Williams (Albany: SUNY Press, 2001), p. 229.

privileged above any other concerns.

However, by further exploring why poverty is considered a negative condition within Hegel's philosophy, it becomes clear that this negativity functions within a dialectical narration that leads to the increase of governmental control. As Knowles argues, "The great evil of poverty is that it creates a rabble (*Pöbel*). ... Their life is vicious and corrupted. With no work available for those lacking minimal capital and skills, and likely to be in poor health, the rabble become lazy, malevolent and dishonest."⁸⁰ Thus, poverty creates a "moral" challenge in that the poor no longer internalize the proper respect for and comportment toward the State and its institutions.

Kouvelakis adds,

The internal development of civil society tends to (re)produce, through the play of its own contradictions, a *polarization* of social conditions that calls the very unity of society into question, threatening to destroy the 'estates' [*Stände*] by transforming them into 'classes' [*Klassen*]. Antagonism, temporarily displaced by foreign expansion, colonization and wars of conquest, seems to Hegel to be an ineradicable feature of civil society. Only the state makes it possible to restore unity by fully internalizing the characteristic mediations of the family and civil society, appearing, in its turn, as their true foundation.⁸¹

Again in Kouvelakis' description we see that while the State and the economic model it employs as a mechanism of control ultimately creates the problem of poverty, this problem is lauded as the justification for further control, as well as for expansion and colonialism. Stephen Houlgate also notes that, for Hegel,

'the modern problem of poverty is significant because the result is the creation of a rabble of paupers [*Pöbel*].' The poor who have sunk to this level of deprivation and degradation come to feel excluded from and rejected by civil society, and develop a feeling of envy, resentment and indignation against, and a consequent lack of respect for, society as a whole and the rich in particular – a resentment which frequently leads to crime.⁸²

⁸⁰ Knowles, *Hegel and the Philosophy of Right*, p. 289.

⁸¹ Kouvelakis, *Philosophy and Revolution*, p. 35.

⁸² Stephen Houlgate, *Freedom, Truth and History* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 112.

Despite the absurdity of a crime based solely on resentment (as if the conditions of poverty allowed for the leisurely plotting against the rich, as opposed to crimes of necessity based on hunger and deprivation), Houlgate's commentary is extremely telling. In Houlgate's analysis, it is clear that the problem of poverty has little, if anything, to do with the poor themselves. Again, it is the mentality of the poor, and their antagonism toward to mechanisms of the State, that is emphasized as Hegel's primary concern. However, as Houlgate notes, "Hegel argues that poverty is a problem which civil society, and the public authority which oversees it and ensures that trading is free and fair, is unable to solve," and, ultimately, that, "the main methods available to a public authority to enable it to restore to the poor what is due to them by right as members of civil society are more likely to intensify the problem of poverty and the 'rabble' mentality than alleviate it."⁸³ Therefore, if we understand the problem of poverty as an inherent feature of the modern economy that cannot be solved, the needs for its suppression will include a variety of mechanisms and techniques that will not address the creation of poverty, but will instead address the social relations to the condition of poverty (or, the *concept* of poverty).

A key aspect of addressing this relation will occur, again, through the apparatuses of education. Durst notes that "education (*Bildung, Pädagogik, Erziehung*) and the positive interventions of the police (or the public authorities) would play a central role in the promotion of social integration."⁸⁴ He continues, "Although these positive interventions into the moral and cultural attitudes of the poor indeed cannot really solve the economic problem of poverty, they promise to contribute to the reduction of the sociopolitical dislocations resulting from it in a law-governed state."⁸⁵ Therefore,

⁸³ Ibid, p. 113.

⁸⁴ Durst, "The End(s) of the State in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*," p. 237.

⁸⁵ Ibid, p. 239.

The positive interventions of educational institutions and the public authorities therefore do not just simply break the resistance of the subject or instill in citizens a work ethic necessary for the functioning of modern civil societies; more broadly, these disciplinary institutions play an important role in erecting the sociocultural hegemony of ethical life over the individual, which ... augments the negative or repressive interventions of the state by cultivating in individuals interests that promote their more habituated, normalized, and 'spontaneous' support for the state.⁸⁶

In the cultivation of positive individual interests, Civil Society avoids appearing as an extremely coercive structure, and thus legitimates its intervention (again, as the "external" State) by coding its practices within the discourses of health, security and freedom. However, education alone cannot alleviate the problem of poverty and the disparity it engenders. As Weil indicates, "Society has brought the populace into existence," although,

it is equally incapable of finding a remedy for the populace's ills and that within its own sphere it does not even possess the potential to do so since it cannot go beyond benevolence and good will. Not only is good will an inadequate resource for a State, which as a rational organization must keep itself independent of the feelings and opinions of its citizens as it is acting to realize its ends, but this good will only serves to aggravate the evil it is seeking to combat.⁸⁷

Despite Weil's analysis, which, by highlighting the State's indifference to the condition of poverty afflicting its citizens, defines a governmentalized logic, a more moderate Hegelian explanation would likely stress that the State is independent of "the feelings and opinions of its citizens" because it *is*, in fact, their true will, or their most adequately expressed realization of freedom (as demonstrated in chapter two). It should be noted, however, that in Weil's explanation, the "evil" that cannot be eradicated by Civil Society's good will, or the State's intervention, refers equally to the condition of poverty or the existence of the poor, created by this condition. This ambiguity is

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Eric Weil, *Hegel and the State*, translated by Mark A. Cohen (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 95.

extremely important in terms of the possible “solutions” to the problem of poverty. If, within the broader social discourses, the poor and the condition of poverty can be referenced interchangeably, then the remedies for the problem of poverty can be interchanged with the policies directed at the poor themselves. Although, as Hegel himself indicated, it is the systemic overproduction of the modern economy that is true “evil,” the ambiguous description of this problem allows a political rationality that addresses the problem of poverty by introducing further governmental controls over the poor, and, in doing so, shifts the site of responsibility for poverty from the economic system on to the poor themselves.

If, for Hegel, the populace is meant to designate the “rabble” who lose respect for the State and its institutions because, in poverty, they do not recognize themselves in these institutions, then the increasing levels of disparity in society, alongside an increasing bureaucracy to account for them and keep them under control, could eventually come to designate the majority of society as a whole. That is, the need to control the rabble and stabilize the social whole will inevitably extend into other aspects of society, leading to an ever-increasing drive to monitor and control “the conduct of others’ conduct.” Within a Foucauldian framework, we could say that what Hegel designates as a problem of poverty becomes emblematic of the problem of governing all aspects of social life, or, *governmentality*. In terms of poverty, the disparity created within the rationality of private property and the modern economy justifies the initial protection of private property in the juridical apparatus by suggesting that it is only within this system of rights can property be protected from the poor. Thus, the existence of poverty is narrated, in a sense *retroactively*, to legitimize the State’s juridical apparatus as a guarantor of private property rights. However, the problem of poverty, because it cannot be “solved,” also leads to an ever-increasing need for control of the poor themselves. As the disparity between rich and poor increases and is further entrenched through the juridical apparatus, the condition of poverty is evoked as a problem that requires further control. Thus, the population, as a set of individuals said to be indifferent to the

ends of government, emerges as the object of government that is in need of control and administrative intervention at every level of existence. This political rationality also binds Civil Society to the State in a relation of dependence that demonstrates the symbiotic characteristics of the modern economy and the State.

However, I want to stress that Hegel's dialectical logic of the problem of poverty, used to legitimize further aspects of governmental control, should not be underestimated — it is, in fact, the key to understanding to ever-increasing controls within Civil Society that Hegel celebrates as educative features formally defining the universality of the State. In a defence of Hegel, Raymond Plant notes, "In considering the police functions of the state in securing the equilibrium of the system of needs," Hegel definitively "rejected any idea of intervention that smacked of rigidity or dictatorship."⁸⁸ That is, "Mere control will not suffice for Hegel. The equilibrium of the system of needs is important, but the equilibrium should not be secured by the state at the risk of stifling the individual in his pursuit of subjective freedom within the market by the rigidity of its control."⁸⁹ Yet, it is important to question who, in the actual world, is "stifled" by this equilibrium. Within Hegel's philosophy, those without property are not entitled to the same protections of the juridical apparatus as property-holders. Therefore, the State will not intervene on behalf of the poor if this means that the interests of the wealthier class of subjects are jeopardized or contested. However, this inequality is not only limited to the sphere of the property rights and entitlements. It also leads to questions about the role of police in modern society. As Hegel argues,

The relations [*Beziehungen*] of external existence [*Dasein*] fall within the infinite of the understanding; consequently, no boundary is present *in itself* between what is harmful and what is harmless (even with regard to crime), between what is suspicious and what is not suspicious, or between what should be prohibited or kept under surveillance and what should be exempted from prohibitions, surveillance, and suspicion, inquiry and

⁸⁸ Raymond Plant, "Economic and Social Integration in Hegel's Political Philosophy," in *Selected Essays on G.W.F. Hegel*, edited by Lawrence S. Stepelevich (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1993), p. 91.

⁸⁹ *Ibid*, p. 92.

accountability. The more precise determinations will depend on custom, the spirit of the rest of the constitution, prevailing conditions, current emergencies, etc.⁹⁰

Thus, for Hegel, the police will exercise an indeterminate amount of power, and cannot be subjected to any specific, pre-determined limitations or conditions. In fact, the “prohibitions, surveillance, and suspicion” deployed against the population by the police cannot be formally limited by any specific methods of “inquiry and accountability” because this would limit the effectiveness of the police as a mechanism of social control. Yet, should we not see that Civil Society *is*, inherently, an increasingly complex “*emergency*” that is located in the disparity between the propertied class and the impoverished “rabble”? If so, then the need for policing, surveillance, prohibition, and a general disregard for privacy, are, ultimately, endemic to life in the State, particularly within the economic logic of control made possible through the institutions and apparatuses of Civil Society.

In this context, Civil Society is an essential aspect of State control, especially when viewed from Foucault’s analytic of governmentality. As Knowles suggests, “We must not think of the Police (*die Polizei*) as merely the police force ... We must think of it as a public authority charged with the *infrastructural* tasks necessary for the effective operation of the economy and the administration of justice.”⁹¹ Knowles’ description of the public authority in this passage is emblematic of governmentality — the police will control the population for the convenience of government, both in terms of the application of the economy and the juridical apparatus. This means that not only does the need to control the population evoke ever-increasing mechanisms of

⁹⁰ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §234, p. 261. For Foucault’s description of the role of police in relation to political economy and governmentality, see, “Omnes et Singulatim” in Michel Foucault, *Power: Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume 3*, edited by James D. Faubion and translated by Robert Hurley (New York: New Press, 2000), pp. 298-325; and, in the same volume, “Space, Knowledge, Power,” p. 351; also, see Pasquale Pasquino, “Theatrum politicum: The genealogy of capital – police and the state of prosperity,” in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, edited by Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 105-117.

⁹¹ Knowles, *Hegel and the Philosophy of Right*, p. 285.

control, such as the police, but the organization of government itself must be continually expanded in the form of a growing bureaucracy. Kouvelakis explains,

Public affairs, for Hegel, are above all the business of those ‘who know’, not of the ignorant populace, which can, at any moment, change into an uncontrolled threatening mass. ... the philosophical utopia of a knowledge as transparent as it is omnipotent reappears here in all its purity, because the cohesion of the whole depends, in the last instance, on the ‘universal class’ that possesses this knowledge, though it does not, precisely, derive any power of its own from exercising this function.⁹²

Regardless of the power derived from these exercises of control ordered by the bureaucracy, it is clear that Hegel’s philosophy articulates the governmental problem of convenience. That is, for Hegel, Civil Society, as a universal economic modality, makes the governance of the populace more convenient, and, even though this logic creates unanswerable problems, such as poverty, these problems can be seen to function dialectically as a mandate for further governmental intervention, necessitating an ever-increasing bureaucracy with a need for more and more control.

As Hardt and Negri contend,

even if Hegel exaggerates a bit in his quasi-theological consecration of the body of state employees, at least he makes clear their central role in the effective functioning of the modern state. Bureaucracy operates the apparatus that combines legality and organizational efficiency, title and the exercise of power, politics and police. The transcendental theory of modern sovereignty, thus reaching maturity, realizes a new “individual” by absorbing society into power. Little by little, as the administration develops, the relationship between society and power, between the multitude and the sovereign state, is inverted so that now power and the state produce society.⁹³

In reference to the relationship between the actual and rational in Hegel’s philosophy, Hardt and Negri are extremely revealing in this passage. If, as they suggest, the State, through Civil Society (especially economic controls and the police) produce society, we can see that Hegel’s relationship

⁹² Kouvelakis, *Philosophy and Revolution*, p. 41.

⁹³ Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2000), p. 88.

between the rational and the actual is again definitive. The political rationality of governmentality, as a model of controlling the population through the economy, is wedded with the juridical apparatus to form an administrative body capable of creating society as a social whole, or, perhaps more accurately, of manufacturing and mediating the totality of social relations. For Hegel, we may consider this power to remake society as a unified, coherent, ordered whole as that feature which best demonstrates that the State is the realization of historical progress. However, this extensive power to mold and manufacture the possible relations of society is not without serious political dangers.

With respect to problem of poverty in the actual world, the danger is that the condition of poverty offends the rationalization of a system that creates this very condition. The actual poor in society cannot be helped because it would undermine the rationality that justifies the system that creates, and sustains, this disparity. Knowles notes that the possible solution Hegel considers is simply making citizens work. However, “Hegel thinks this policy, too, has obvious defects if the structural cause of the poverty that has created the rabble is overproduction and correlatively insufficient consumer demand.”⁹⁴ Therefore, within the Hegelian Science, the logic of the modern economy subsumes concerns about social welfare and individual well-being, locating their solutions within a limited logic of additional governmental controls. However, as Peter G. Stillman states, “human development — individual *Bildung* — necessarily requires that there be some scope in social life where the norms and practices of abstract right do not predominate. Political life does not exist in order to extend property rights and rules, but to develop and encourage the many different dimensions of human flourishing.”⁹⁵ This passage indicates a serious

⁹⁴ Ibid, p. 291.

⁹⁵ Peter G. Stillman, “Property, Contract, and Ethical Life in Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*,” in *Hegel and Legal Theory*, edited by Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld and David Gray Carlson (New York and London: Routledge, 1991), p. 223.

tension in Hegel's thought, especially when considering his economic theories in the *Philosophy of Right*. Although Hegel cannot be accused of failing to appreciate the significance of cultural expression, the political rationality of governmentality must subsume all concerns to the logic of the economy. In doing so, the State and its institutions are legitimized as the administrative apparatus for the unified population. However, what is lost is the possibility for cultural considerations to outweigh those of the economy so that, despite Hegel's obvious interests in cultural life, his own philosophy can be seen to truncate "the many different dimensions of human flourishing." That is, within the logic of governmentality, cultural concerns, individual provisions regarding privacy and well-being, as well as the creative potentials of human life in general, must all be subordinated (or *reshaped*, to use contemporary political discourse) to fit the order of the economy and its administrative controls. Although the argument that cultural life is preserved conceptually within the Hegelian dialectic might appease some concerns, it should be stressed that what is preserved in the concept, for Hegel, is also killed in the world of the actual. In this sense, real, actual cultural is destroyed as it is sublimated into the economic relations that will come to dominate social life. Thus, despite Stillman's concerns for a space for human life to thrive outside the economy, given the problems of poverty inherent in Civil Society, and the necessary increase in the governmentalization of human life that creates, and addresses, this problem, the possibilities for retaining a space of "human flourishing" within Civil Society becomes not only problematic, but increasingly difficult and unlikely. However, colonialism, as Hegel's response to the problem of poverty, also indicates that the economy, as a mode for increasing State control, will come to effect the possibilities for autonomous human flourishing of everyone, even those outside of the initial sovereign territory within which governmentality is deployed.

Hegel's "solution" to the problem of poverty, articulated in his discussion of Ethical Life in the *Philosophy of Right*, clearly indicates how the logic of governmentality leads to a dangerous concentration and execution of political power. However, I want to stress that I am not using the

Hegel's discussion of expansion and colonialism as a rhetorical exaggeration of the problems of Civil Society. In fact, colonialism is an important aspect of Hegel's theory of Civil Society that has, to my disappointment, received little serious consideration in the literature. It is also, perhaps even more significantly, an important concept to consider in light of contemporary arrangements of political and economic power, as well as concerns regarding neo-imperialism, neo-colonialism and the possibilities for resisting these modes of domination.

Hegel argues that the "fully developed civil society is driven" to begin the process of colonization to provide "a new market and sphere of industrial activity."⁹⁶ Hegel continues, writing, "Civil society is driven to establish colonies. The increase of population alone has this effect; but a particular factor is the emergence of a mass of people who cannot gain satisfaction for their needs by their work when production exceeds the needs of consumers."⁹⁷ For Hegel, sending the poor "rabble" to colonies provides a solution to the problem of poverty in that the excess producers are removed from the territory of the State, and, at the same time, the colony itself becomes a new market for consumption. This "solution" indicates that, for Hegel, the economy is the central feature of political organization — production, consumption, and the population itself require extensive control if the economy is to gain stability and thrive. Thus, not only do we see that, as Foucault indicates, the economy comes to be the means of controlling the population, but the health and security of the population are also lauded, at the same time, as the justification of these controls. Knowles refers to the "final solution" to the problem of poverty, noting that for Hegel, not only overproduction, but overpopulation as well, serve to create the problem of poverty. In this claim we not only see a direct correlate to Foucault's analysis of governmentality, but perhaps one of the most problematic aspects of Hegel's thought. Knowles writes, "move your

⁹⁶ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §248, p. 269.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

poor abroad and thus both problems are solved at once: otherwise surplus productive capacity can be enlisted to export goods to those who have been encouraged to emigrate to colonies (and to the indigenous population who can no doubt be educated to demand them).’’⁹⁸ Thus, we see that expansion and colonization are the best possible solution to the problem of poverty, and, indeed, as Hegel says, a solution to which civil society “is driven.” Yet, as Hegel admits earlier in the same section, no amount of wealth can ever solve the problem of poverty. Therefore, even *if* this form of colonial expansion is considered a “solution,” it can be seen as anticipating the logic of corporate externalization, as society directs the costs for its own survival and profitable stability outwards, into new colonies. Ultimately, given the finite size of the planet, as well as the limitations on population growth and resource consumption, the “solution” of colonialism appears as little more than a rationalization for exporting violence through an externalizing economic logic that perpetuates the problems of poverty, and their attendant social and political manifestations, elsewhere.

Of course, within the literature, Hegel’s colonial logic is not left without explanation. Knowles writes, “Having diagnosed the social problem so carefully and having articulated his criticisms, I am not minded to criticize him in turn for not having a stack of policy options up his sleeve. He insists that this is not the task of the philosopher, and with respect to this social problem at least, he is quite right.”⁹⁹ There are several questions that Knowles’ argument should provoke. First, was the problem “carefully” diagnosed? Within the context of a critique of Hegel, his concern for the “rabble” created by the conditions of poverty appears to be emblematic of a governmentalized logic that legitimizes further administrative controls. Second, and perhaps more importantly, Knowles’ rhetorical reference to Hegel not having “a stack of policy options”

⁹⁸ Knowles, *Hegel and the Philosophy of Right*, p. 291.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 293.

functions to divert attention away from the more serious and important question: if Hegel cannot “solve” the problem of poverty that is such a terrible “evil” in society, how can he advocate this same society as a perfectly-reconciled development of freedom? Horst Althaus argues that, “every individual is naturally exposed to the threat of poverty,” and that, “the danger here is that civil society merely perpetuates the misery of one on part of society.”¹⁰⁰ However, we should ask — how “natural” is the threat of poverty if it is created and maintained by the rational economic model in Hegel’s philosophy?

This question returns us, again, to the relation between the rational and actual. If Hegel’s argument for colonialism is defended on the grounds that he is simply “describing” the events of the actual within the Science of Spirit, how can this defence account for its inherently prescriptive features? As we have already noted above on several occasions, Hegel’s interpellative gestures are meant to call his readers to subject themselves to the Science of Spirit so that, in their thinking and acting in the world, the fullness of Spirit can be realized. To claim that Hegel’s argument in favour of colonialism is simply a description is therefore only a partial explanation because it fails to account for this prescriptive aspect of his philosophical project. To remake the actual world in the image of the rational/conceptual assemblage that Hegel presents is, in this instance, to argue that colonialism is not only rationality defensible, but also that it is politically advisable, and should be carried out in the actual world as a solution to the problem of poverty.

Therefore, from a Foucauldian perspective, Hegel’s philosophy can be described as emblematic of governmentality, in that its conceptual arrangements and arguments mirror Foucault’s description of this inherently imperial political rationality. However, Hegel’s philosophy, in its interpellative modality, also calls on individuals to subject themselves to this political rationality and thus guarantee its further realization in the actual world. As Hardt and

¹⁰⁰ Horst Althaus, *Hegel: An Intellectual Biography*, translated by Michael Tarsh (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), p. 172.

Negri emphasize,

The institutions that constitute civil society functioned as passageways that channel flows of social and economic forces, raising them up toward a coherent unity and, flowing back, like an irrigation network, distribute the command of the unity throughout the immanent social field. These non-state institutions, in other words, organized capitalist society under the order of the state and in turn spread state rule throughout society.¹⁰¹

That is, Civil Society, in Hegel's thought, acts as the space for increasing governmentalization, where social unity is achieved on the plane of the population through economic forces, while, simultaneously, the State and its institutions are legitimized and their increasing measures of control are mandated by the hierarchical ordering of the economic system. Individuals must be subjected to both the economy and the State, and, in this respect, both registers reinforce and reinscribe each other's power through the dynamic assemblages of the modern political economy.

Before concluding this section, I would like to add a few final remarks on governmentality, with respect to the modern discourses of liberalism and Marxism, in order to again indicate Foucault's position regarding ideology and to further clarify my construction of a Foucauldian critique of Hegel. In *Power/Knowledge*, Foucault questions whether "the analysis of power or of powers [can] be deduced in one way or another from the economy,"¹⁰² and argues that both liberalism and Marxism, despite their differing views of political power, are closely related because their respective economic models both assume the logic of governmentality. He suggests that the question of economy and power can be divided into two sets of questions:

in the first place, is power always in a subordinate position relative to the economy? Is it always in the service of, and ultimately answerable to, the economy? Is it destined to realise, consolidate, maintain and reproduce the relations appropriate to the economy and essential to its functioning? In the second place, is power modelled on the economy? Is it something that one possesses, acquires, cedes through force or contract, that one alienates or recovers, that circulates, that voids this or that region? Or, on the contrary, do we need

¹⁰¹ Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2000), p. 328.

¹⁰² Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, pp. 88-9.

to employ varying tools in its analysis — even, that is, when we allow that it effectively remains the case that the relations of power do indeed remain profoundly enmeshed in and with economic relations and participate with them in a common circuit?¹⁰³

Foucault follows this question with the suggestion that a “non-economic analysis of power” could intervene in the debate that is initiated by Hegel, and that sees power as essentially repressive.¹⁰⁴

This non-economic analysis, would, of course, study the economy, however, it would also consider the roles that power forms, creates, deploys and motivates that remain outside the scope of a liberal or Marxist analysis. For Foucault, a non-economic analysis would also concern itself with the formation of increasingly generalized forms of political power by studying how they capture and subsume technologies that are outside the purview of a strict economic analysis. Foucault, commenting on the Marxist tradition and his studies with Althusser, states, “I don’t think that [Marx’s] economic analyses escape from the epistemological space that Ricardo established. On the other hand, we can assume that Marx inserted a radical break in people’s historical and political consciousness, and that the Marxist theory of society did inaugurate an entirely new epistemological field.”¹⁰⁵ That is, despite Marx’s break with the British economist David Ricardo in terms of struggle and political engagement, the political rationality of governmentality — the use of the economy as a mode for the control of the population — remains as prominent in Marx as it was in the British economists. Therefore, not only is a Marxist analysis hindered by its ideological convictions (regarding truth), which, as we have seen, make it particularly suspicious for Foucault, but Marxism also fails to recognize governmentality as a key condition of its own possibility.

¹⁰³ Ibid, p. 89.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, p. 90.

¹⁰⁵ Michel Foucault, “On the Ways of Writing History,” *Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology: Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume 2*, edited by James D. Faubion and translated by Robert Hurley (New York: The New Press, 1998), p. 282.

By way of a conclusion to this section, I would like to stress again that in his analysis of governmentality, Foucault is critiquing a particular form of political rationality, not *the rational* as such. This is an important distinction, especially because liberal critics tend to group Foucault, along with Nietzsche, into a political position of *irrationalism*. What Foucault is attempting to determine is the extent to which the political rationality of governmentality can be discovered in the mechanisms of its operation and its effects on the political body. Therefore, it is a specific political rationality, one that attempts to secure the stability of populations within an economic logic of convenience, that is Foucault's concern. For Foucault, the genealogy of this political rationality leads to questions of alternative arrangements of political power — or, *how it could be otherwise*. That is, what forms of political rationality are possible? How does a logic of governmentality effect human life and the potential for alternative arrangements of power? How are ideologically-based analyses of economic power deficient? What forms of non-economic analysis are possible? The political implications of governmentality, which lead from the coercive educative features of Civil Society, to a justification of poverty and a call for colonialism, also lead to more specific ethical questions. Specifically, within Hegel's Science of Spirit, what ethical possibilities are available to those interpellated as participants in the realization of Spirit's self-knowledge? How can individuals form *other* types of relations, based on affinity, complementarity and mutual aid, if they are subject to Hegel's political rationality? Again, these questions will occupy much of the discussion in the following chapters. However, as a point of conclusion in this chapter, I would like to briefly consider Foucault's concept of power and its aspects of productivity because it emphasizes certain key features in Foucault's analysis that will allow us to engage more fully with the questions above in the subsequent discussions of subjectivity and truth.

Questions Regarding Productive Power

For Foucault, the political logic of governmentality cannot be seen as simply restriction or prohibitive. As Hanssen notes, “Marxism and psychoanalysis were said to meet each other halfway insofar as both interpreted power as repressive — a figure, Foucault added, that both traditions borrowed from Hegel.”¹⁰⁶ For Foucault, power must be understood in its capacity to repress *and* to animate behaviours and activities. Of course, Foucault’s discussion of biopower¹⁰⁷ (as a specific mode of analysing human life in terms of economic productivity) is relevant here; however, for Foucault the “productive” aspect of power is not only related to biopower, but a plurality of technologies that create, and animate, subjects.¹⁰⁸

As Butler notes,

Although Foucault occasionally refers to the shift from juridical power to productive models of power as if it were an inevitability in a world no longer structured in Hegelian terms, he also makes clear that this shift is not a purely logical necessity, but, rather, a condition of historical circumstances. ... Foucault attributes the emergence of productive power in modern times to the growing cultural and political influence of war.¹⁰⁹

However, this understanding of productive power, regardless of Butler’s reference to “a world no

¹⁰⁶ Hanssen, *Critique of Violence*, p. 110.

¹⁰⁷ As mentioned in chapter two, for a concise description of his lecture course on biopower, see Foucault’s course summary in Michel Foucault, *Ethics: Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume 1*, translated by Robert Hurley and edited by Paul Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 1997), pp. 73-79; for the complete lecture course, see Michel Foucault, *Naissance de la Biopolitique, Cours au Collège de France 1978-1979* (Hautes Études: Gallimard/Seuil, 2004). For Deleuze’s reading of Foucault’s concept of biopower, see Deleuze, *Foucault*, p. 92.

¹⁰⁸ In relation to the productive capacities of power, the possibilities for a Foucauldian critique of Civil Society could be further specified to examine technologies that Foucault studied in his earlier works, particularly in *Discipline and Punish*. For a reading of Hegel and civil society in relation to physical bodies, see Angelica Nuzzo, “Freedom in the Body: The body as Subject of Rights and Object of Property in Hegel’s “Abstract Right,”” in *Beyond Liberalism and Communitarianism: Studies in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, edited by Robert R. Williams (Albany: SUNY Press, 2001), pp. 111-124; for a discussion of Hegel and punishment, see Dudley Knowles, “Hegel on the Justification of Punishment,” in *Beyond Liberalism and Communitarianism: Studies in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, edited by Robert R. Williams (Albany: SUNY Press, 2001), pp. 125-146.

¹⁰⁹ Judith Butler, *Subjects of Desire* (New York: Columbia UP, 1999), p. 225.

longer structured in Hegelian terms,” is, in fact, precisely related to the role of Hegel’s philosophy inasmuch as Hegel’s thought is determined to produce a specific model of political subject that will act in concert with the needs of the modern liberal State. Again, as we saw above, the modern economy legitimizes the sovereignty of the State by relying on the juridical apparatus as the guarantor of economic rights. However, in its rationality of production, the modern economy also creates a disparity of wealth that is narrated within Hegel’s thought as a mandate for further State intervention and control. This mandate demonstrates that power is productive in that the State, through the economy, in addition to other mechanisms and institutions, will produce subjectivities by determining the relations among its subjects. Although Hegel may see political power as essentially repressive, through his complex interpellative gestures, he also clearly understands that power (in this instance, as the knowledge of the Science of Spirit) has the ability to produce relations and, therefore, produce forms of subjectivity.

Butler’s statement above also indicates the coherence in Foucault’s line of investigation — despite shifting his emphasis from the war hypothesis to the analysis of political rationality, Foucault’s research indicates that war, as a modality of human political behaviour, remains a key aspect of governmentality (especially with respect to the logic of expansion and colonialism) and is also indelibly related to the emergence of productive power in modernity. The continuity in Foucault’s thought is again visible in his shift from the study of governmentality to his research on power and subjectivity. For Foucault, the significance of productive power that is evident in the genealogy of governmentality also indicates that the production of subjectivities is a field that must be investigated. Therefore, as we will see in chapter four, Foucault’s genealogy of subjectification, as a resistance to dominant political power, emerges primarily from Foucault’s research into governmentality. With his study of forms of subjectification, within his larger consideration of power, Foucault initiates the lines of questioning that will examine how individuals have “governed” or conducted themselves *against* the political horizons that have attempted to

prescribe their conduct and behaviour. In this research, we will also discover an additional point of critique against Hegel, as Foucault's concept of subjectivity initiates a critical examination of Hegel's notion of freedom within the State.

Chapter 4 — The Register of Subjectivity: Power, Subjectification, and Subjugation

The State as the model for the book and for thought has a long history: logos, the philosopher-king, the transcendence of the Idea, the interiority of the concept, the republic of minds, the court of reason, the functionaries of thought, man as legislator and subject. The State's pretension to be a world order, and to root man.¹ — Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari

In this chapter, I summarize Foucault's analysis of power and subjectivity, demonstrating that his conception of power is, contrary to much of the literature on Foucault, neither reductionist nor hegemonic. I also indicate how his conception of subjectification compliments and informs his work on power. Following this summary of Foucault, I examine Hegel's thought in relation to the German "reception" of the French Revolution. I argue that Hegel's conceptualization of the French Revolution is a key to understanding his ideas for political subjectivity. I further define Hegel's interpellative gestures in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Encyclopedia*. I then explain Hegel's concept of subjectivity in relation to the State, as the guarantor of the subject's freedom, and discuss the problems associated with interpellating subjects to understand the State as an organism. Finally, I contrast Foucault's concept of subjectification with Hegel's political subjectivity by summarizing Hegel's views on war, demonstrating the dangers inherent in the Hegel's politics of recognition.

Power Analysis

As we saw at the end of the chapter three, power is not only repressive, it is productive and it creates subjects, but is not simply an effect or result of ideology. The productive aspect of power is obviously related to the previous two chapters — the role of historical and governmental discourses could be, within a Foucauldian analysis, discussed as the effects of power that

¹ Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 24.

interpellate individuals *as subjects* within the respective narratives of history and political rationality. In “The Lives of Infamous Men,” Foucault remarks, “How light power would be, and easy to dismantle no doubt, if all it did was to observe, spy, detect, prohibit, and punish; but it incites, provokes, produces. ... it makes people act and speak.”² That is, power is traceable through the discourses, knowledges, and institutional structures through which it operates and *creates subjects*. However, unlike Althusser’s ideological interpellation of individuals as subjects, Foucault’s interest in subjectification emphasizes the plurality of modes of interpellation that cannot be accounted for within a strictly ideological analysis. In “*Society Must Be Defended*,” Foucault had already formulated an understanding of subjectivity and power that would blossom in his later essays, writing,

We should be trying to study power not on the basis of the primitive terms of the relationship, but on the basis of the relationship itself that determines the elements on which it bears: rather than asking ideal subjects what part of themselves or their powers they have surrendered in order to let themselves become subjects, we have to look at how relations of subjugation can manufacture objects.³

In this passage we see Foucault’s unique approach to questions of power and subjectivity, which I will attempt to delineate more fully in the opening section of this chapter. Again, we should note that against Freudian and Marxist notions of repressive power, Foucault stresses the importance of conceptualizing the productive aspects of power that complicate any analysis of power relations. The *relational* quality itself should also be stressed, because in developing Althusser’s model of analysing the specular form of ideology, Foucault maintains that power must be understood in its relations, so that power is studied “on the basis of the relationship itself that determines the elements on which it bears.” That is, subjects are created, or interpellated, into certain, specific sets

² Foucault, *Power*, p. 172.

³ Foucault, “*Society Must Be Defended*,” p. 265.

of relations analogous to the imaginary relations in Althusser's analysis of ideology. Therefore, the role of subjugation is not to create subjects *as such*, but to subject individuals to certain sets of relations that determine in advance the possibilities for their comportment to themselves and to others. Therefore, it is important to note that in the following discussion the suggestion that certain power relations create *subjects* refers specifically to the condition whereby individuals are subjugated to a given set of relational possibilities through their willful acceptance of roles as subjects.

Colin Gordon clarifies Foucault's concerns in the Introduction to *Power*, writing,

The two ideas that came to guide Foucault's own investigation were those of the *productivity of power* ... and the *constitution of subjectivity through power relations*. ... In addition to contesting the neo-Marxist idea, current at the time, that (bourgeois, capitalist) power is maintained partly through the propagation of pseudo-knowledges or ideologies, Foucault also wanted to challenge the neo-Freudian idea that power acts like a lawgiver that forbids and represses.⁴

In *Power/Knowledge*, Foucault also contrasts his analysis of power with theoretical (i.e. structuralist) notions of power. He states,

If one tries to erect a theory of power one will always be obliged to view it as emerging at a given place and time and hence to deduce it, to reconstruct its genesis. But if power is in reality an open, more-or-less coordinated ... cluster of relations, then the only problem is to provide oneself with a grid of analysis which makes possible an analytic of relations of power.⁵

Power, as a relation of forces, must be made intelligible through a grid of analysis that allows the relations of power to be analysed and contested. In this context, it is important to emphasize again that sovereignty remains a significant concept within Foucault's analysis, despite his extensive attempts, discussed in previous chapters, to avoid it as a dominant model for political analysis.

⁴ Gordon, Introduction to Michel Foucault's *Power*, p. xix.

⁵ Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 199.

Foucault states, regarding his analysis of power, “It is in this sphere of force relations that we must try to analyze mechanisms of power. In this way we will escape from the system of Law-and-Sovereign which has captivated political thought for such a long time.”⁶ He adds, “The analysis, made in terms of power, must not assume that the sovereignty of the state, the form of the law, or the over-all unity of a domination are given at the outset; rather, these are only the terminal forms power takes.”⁷ Therefore, power, as a concept, must be studied and interrogated outside the logic of sovereignty as well as ideology, but not simply within the binary, oppositional logic that Foucault had experimented with in “*Society Must be Defended*.” Thus, Foucault’s analysis of power must retain the concerns regarding struggles and strategies initiated in the lecture course, but also consider the dynamic assemblages of power and knowledge that cross over and bridge the divisions between the historico-political and philosophico-juridical discourses.

In order to delineate this complex assemblage of power, Foucault attends to questions regarding the space of power’s operation, or, *where power functions*. In *Power/Knowledge*, Foucault explains, “Power must be analysed as something which circulates, or rather as something which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localised here or there, never in anybody’s hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organisation.”⁸ He continues, “In other words, individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application. ... the individual is an effect of power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent to which it is the effect, it is the element of its articulation. The individual which power has constituted is at the same time its vehicle.”⁹ Therefore, Foucault’s analysis

⁶ Foucault, *The History of Sexuality. Volume I: An Introduction*, p. 97.

⁷ Ibid, p. 92.

⁸ Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 90.

⁹ Ibid.

indicates that individuals, as subjects of power, are both created by power and, simultaneously, the vehicles, or points of operation or articulation, of power. Foucault offers a further clarification of his analysis in *Power/Knowledge*, writing,

the important thing is not to attempt some kind of deduction of power starting from its centre and aimed at the discovery of the extent to which it permeates into the base, of the degree to which it reproduces itself down to and including the most molecular elements of society. One must rather conduct an *ascending* analysis of power, starting, that is, from its infinitesimal mechanisms, which each have their own history, their own trajectory, their own techniques and tactics, and then see how these mechanisms of power have been – and continue to be – invested, colonised, utilised, involuted, transformed, displaced, extended, etc., by ever more general mechanisms and by forms of global domination.¹⁰

Again we see that Foucault emphasizes the importance of an “*ascending* analysis” of power that traces effects at the level of function and deployment toward increasingly generalized strategies of control. However, the question of an *outside of power*, or the possibility of escaping the historical horizons delimited by power relations, must also be considered.

In an interview with Duccio Trombadori reprinted in *Remarks on Marx*, Foucault clarifies the question of hegemony with respect to his research on power. He states,

There have been gross understandings, or I have explained myself badly: I have never presumed that “power” was something that could explain everything. It was not my objective to substitute an explanation based on power for one based on economics. ... For me, power is that which must be explained. Every time I think about the experiences lived in contemporary societies, or about the investigations I have made, I always come up against the question of “power.” It is a question that no theoretical system — whether it be a philosophy of history or a general theory of society or of politics — has ever managed to account for.¹¹

Foucault insists that his analysis of power is not meant as a substitute for an economic, or

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 99. For additional decisive statements on power by Foucault, see Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, pp. 141-2 and Foucault, *The History of Sexuality. Volume I*, pp. 93-5.

¹¹ Michel Foucault, *Remarks on Marx*, translated by R. James Goldstein and Duccio Trombadori (New York: Semiotext(e), 1991), pp. 148-9.

ideological, analysis. Rather, the study of power initiates a critical examinations of the operations of power, and the extensive conceptual field of power relations, in order to better articulate a method for thinking these relations and to problematize the assumptions about power made in contemporary political discourses. However, if power is not meant to “explain everything,” as Foucault insists, yet it remains a fundamental feature of the modern subject and his relational possibilities, how can a hegemonic understanding of power be avoided? That is, given the extensive role that power occupies in Foucault’s analysis, how can he suggest that power does not determine all relational possibilities such that the potentials for resistance to dominant power relations are not theoretically foreclosed, as they were in Althusser’s hegemonic conceptualization of ideology.

Subjectivity

To answer the question of how Foucault avoids a hegemonic construction of power, we return to his concept of subjectification (initially discussed in chapter one), to more fully develop his analysis. In his research on the subject, Foucault makes clear that despite the construction of the subject by power, the possibilities for relations among individuals can never be entirely determined by power. In a 1983 interview with Gérard Raulet, Foucault remarks,

Is the phenomenological, transhistorical subject able to provide an account of the historicity of reason? Here, reading Nietzsche was the point of rupture for me. There is a history of the subject just as there is a history of reason; but we can never demand that the history of reason unfold at a first and founding act of the rationalist subject.¹²

Drawing from Nietzsche’s writings published in *The Will to Power*, Foucault’s concern for the creation of the subject comes to animate his new formulation of power, challenging any hegemonic conception of power relations as well as signalling a new genealogical direction in his

¹² Michel Foucault, *Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977-1984*, translated by Alan Sheridan and edited by Lawrence D. Kritzman (New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 23.

research. Deleuze explains Foucault's so-called "return" to the subject, writing,

Foucault had up to that point analyzed formations of knowledge and apparatuses of power; he'd reached the composites of power and knowledge in which we live and speak. ... But I think that he must have come up against the question of whether there was anything "beyond" power— whether he was getting trapped in a sort of impasse with power relations.¹³

In *Foucault*, Deleuze adds that, "If at the end of it Foucault finds himself at an impasse, this is not because of his conception of power but rather because he found the impasse to be where power itself places us, in both our lives and our thoughts, as we run up against it in our smallest truths."¹⁴ That is, according to Deleuze, Foucault's analysis of power demonstrated that subjects are constructed by power, but not determined by it. Therefore, the "smallest truths" through which we encounter the limitations of power refers to the moments of individuation that allow us to see ourselves as constituted by power and knowledge, but also free to reconsider the possibilities for relations through practices of individuation.

This practice of individuation is also referred to, especially in Foucault's later work, as the care of the self. In "Subjectivity and Truth," Foucault claims, "The history of the "care" and the "techniques" of the self would thus be a way of doing the history of subjectivity ... And in this way one could take up the question of governmentality from a different angle: the government of the self by oneself in its articulation with relations with others."¹⁵ In "The Hermeneutic of the Subject," Foucault also notes that the care of the self, or the practice of applying oneself to oneself, emerges as a pedagogical function, but develops to privilege the functions of criticism, struggle, and healing. In this context, the task of self-cultivation would see the increasing awareness of

¹³ Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations*, translated by Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia UP, 1995), p. 109.

¹⁴ Deleuze, *Foucault*, p. 96.

¹⁵ Foucault, *Ethics*, p. 88.

one's ability to "un-learn" [*de-discere*] habits and opinions, as a critical aspect; it would provide the courage and preparation needed for contestation, as an aspect of struggle; and, it would develop "curative and therapeutic" functions, as an aspect of healing that gains a closer proximity to medicine than to pedagogy.¹⁶ Therefore, Foucault explains, "if I am now interested in how the subject constitutes itself in an active fashion through practices of the self, these practices are nevertheless not something invented by the individual himself. They are models he finds in his culture, and are proposed, suggested, imposed on him by his culture, his society, and his social group."¹⁷

Deleuze's interest in the overall development and articulation of Foucault's thought makes his work particularly attentive to Foucault's consideration of forms of subjectification as strategies that challenged hegemonic conceptions of power. Deleuze addresses critics who argued that Foucault was forced to return to the subject as a universal concept in philosophy, writing, "To imagine that Foucault rediscovered, came back to the subjectivity he'd initially rejected, is a fundamental misunderstanding ... I think subjectification has little to do with any subjectivity. It's to do, rather, with an ... individuation taking place through intensities ... it's to do with individuated fields, not persons or identities."¹⁸ Deleuze adds that this mode of individuation is what Foucault has called "passion," and argues that, "It's very difficult to express, to convey — a new distinction between affective states. Here we come up against the unfinished character of Foucault's work. ... It should teach us, at least, to be very careful about what he calls a mode of "subjectification." For such modes involve subjectless individuations. That may be their main

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 97.

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 291.

¹⁸ Deleuze, *Negotiations*, p. 93.

feature.”¹⁹ That is, individuation, as a practice, should be considered as an alternative process of subjectification, outside of the field of subjugation and its attendant modes of determinate subjectivity. Rather than attempting to delimit the possible relational capacity for a given individual, as is the case with Hegel’s form of subjectivity, Foucault’s concept of subjectification stresses the potential of the individual to express and define herself through a process that remains open and incomplete, as an indeterminate comportment toward intensities and potential rather than fixed ends and definitive categories. Deleuze stresses, “He’s talking about inventing ways of existing, through optional rules, that can both resist power and elude knowledge, even if knowledge tries to penetrate them and power to appropriate them,”²⁰ adding in “*What is a Dispositif ?*” that,

a line of subjection is a process, a production of subjectivity in a social apparatus [*dispositif*]: it has to be made, inasmuch as the apparatus allows it to come into being or makes it possible. It is a line of escape. It escapes preceding lines and escapes *from* itself. The Self is neither knowledge nor power. It is a process of individuation which bears on groups and on people, and is subtracted from the power relations which are established as constituting from of knowledge [*savoirs*]: a sort of surplus-value.²¹

This aspect of “surplus value” will be further developed in the conclusion of my thesis. For now, I want to stress that what Deleuze is emphasizing is that although the processes of individuation occur through the channels of knowledge and power, subjectification (or individuation) remains an open practice in terms of how an individual develops and articulates power and knowledge through her theoretical interests and comportment toward the world. For Foucault, the indeterminacy of the possible responses, creative solutions, and potential relations that are available in thought can never be reduced to an entirely reactionary, predicable, or calculable set of

¹⁹ Ibid, pp. 98-9.

²⁰ Ibid, p. 92.

²¹ Deleuze, “*What is a dispositif?*” p. 161.

practices that power has determined in advance.

This indeterminacy also returns us to the concept of governmentality, because it is in the possibility of governing, or conducting oneself, that Foucault discovers the potency of subjectification as a mode of resistance to dominant structures of power. Foucault writes, “I believe that the concept of governmentality makes it possible to bring out the freedom of the subject and its relationship to others — which constitutes the very stuff [*matière*] of ethics.”²² Thus, returning to governmentality as “the conduct of others’ conduct,” Foucault also locates the significance of the “conduct of one’s own conduct” as a creative possibility that is not entirely *determined* by the power/knowledge horizon. Foucault wants to see how individuals have governed themselves through their forms of subjectification as indeterminate practices that resist dominant power. With respect to Althusser’s remark that subjects work “all by themselves,” we should see that, for Foucault, this subjective obedience is never fully determined. That is, unlike Althusser’s analysis of ideology, power, for Foucault, should be understood as a relatively open field of relations that can be contested and challenged by forms of subjectification. Of course, in its stratified and edified forms, power does attempt to limit the possibilities for contesting its own hegemonic ambitions, however, Foucault sees that even within an extremely limited space of articulation, forms of subjectification that contest the dominant order and embrace alternative possible relations are present.

Although Foucault’s research on resistance is often linked to specific techniques and practices, this potential resistance to dominant power is also articulated in thought itself, which, for Foucault, is always struggling to seek its own Outside as a possibility of what has not yet been thought. In more explicit political terms, for Foucault, there is always a potential for thinking *otherwise*, that is, for resisting the dominant structures of knowledge and power in order to think,

²² Foucault, *Ethics*, p. 300.

and practice, relations to others that are not dictated, encouraged, fostered, or demanded by the dominant political order. As Burchell notes,

Governed individuals may be identified by their governors as members of a flock to be led, as legal subjects with certain rights, as children to be corrected and educated, as part of a natural resource to be exploited, or as living beings who are part of a biological population to be managed. In each case the subjective self-identity of governed individuals presupposed or required by the exercise of power will be different.²³

Therefore, despite the extensive interpellative and coercive strategies that attempt to capture subjects within modes of subjugation that will determine their relational potentials, individuals exhibit a recalcitrant capacity to think the Outside of their existing relations, and therefore practice modes of ethical comportment that challenge and contest dominant and repressive political orders.

Hegel and the French Revolution

My construction of a critique of Hegel's notion of the State will take a somewhat indirect route to arrive at its destination while continuing to develop much of my analysis regarding history and government already discussed in earlier chapters. In the remainder of this chapter, I will summarize Hegel's views on the French Revolution; examine the interpellative features of his key pedagogical texts; summarize Hegel's notion of the State as the realization of freedom; explore the concept of the State as an organism; and, finally, undertake a detailed examination of one of the key requirements of the State – war.

In order to first situate Hegel's concept of the political subject, it is extremely important to understand his conceptual reception of the French Revolution because this unprecedented event greatly influences Hegel's notion of the type of subjectivity required for a successful modern State. Of course, I understand that Hegel's reception of the French Revolution is complicated and would

²³ Graham Burchell, "Peculiar interests: civil society and governing 'the system of natural liberty'," in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, edited by Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 120.

require a vast analysis.²⁴ My only aim here is to demonstrate that the reception of the French Revolution within Hegel's thought signifies the optimistic position that a similar paradigmatic political shift could take place within German society without the bloodshed that occurred in France. In this sense, the possibility of an "internal" revolution must be emphasized because it indicates a specifically political narration of history (as seen in Hegel's section 'Absolute Freedom and Terror' in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*), as well as signalling the demand for an educational program to achieve the intended results of this internalization. Hegel realizes that the momentum of the Revolution, left to its own devices, does not produce the desired result within his metaphysical narrative. For Hegel, only when it is narrated from within the dialectical logic of Spirit does the French Revolution gain its positive place within history as that event which is ultimately sublimated into German statehood.

Within Hegel's rationalization of the French Revolution, Karlheinz Nusser explains,

The Revolution is the final phase of culture and thus of self-alienated spirit. The thought at this level has its presupposition in utility, for on the basis of this principle the Enlightenment makes everything into its own property and pleasure and is real consciousness ... At the same time, this principle is the dissolution of itself, that is, it has alienation immediately in itself and sublates it.²⁵

This sublation, for Hegel, also has a more precise political meaning. The subjective consciousness of the constituents of Spirit must be educated to understand this dialectical progression of Spirit's self-understanding in the historical actuality of the Terror. By grasping the necessity of this development in the rational, Hegel believes that it can be incorporated into consciousness without the actual experience of the Revolution itself. Stathis Kouvelakis provides a detailed explanation

²⁴ For valuable contextual discussions, see Robert C. Solomon, *In the Spirit of Hegel* (New York and Oxford: Oxford UP, 1983), p. 17; and, Stanley Rosen, *G.W.F. Hegel: An Introduction to the Science of Wisdom* (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine's Press, 2000), p. 211.

²⁵ Karlheinz Nusser, "The French Revolution and Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*," in *The Phenomenology of Spirit Reader: Critical and Interpretive Essays*, edited by Jon Stewart. Albany: SUNY Press, 1998), p. 295.

of Hegel's notion in *Philosophy and Revolution*, writing,

For, if civic and spiritual education – *Bildung* in Fichte's terms – or the slow spread of 'publicity' or 'aesthetic education' in Kant or Schiller's, or even the 'reform in inwardness' (that is, in the sense of culture) celebrated by Hegel do not simply signal so many inevitable detours ... but clearly mark out a distinct German path ... when they do not name a historical possibility *superior* to the 'French original', then the whole meaning of the France-Germany relationship changes. Germany ceases to be a laggard, a mere spectator of events unfolding on a remote state which is like no other; it becomes the protagonist of a distinct process, inasmuch as it strikes out on a path which – even if it remains, in a sense, derivative of, and dependent on, the revolutionary prototype – nevertheless *displaces* that prototype beyond the bounds of the political domain, and thereby *supersedes* it even while managing to do without it.²⁶

Therefore, as Kouvelakis emphasizes, "German Idealism, once posited as the philosophy of revolution, takes its place under the sign of a paradoxical dialectic of compromise: to keep faith with the revolution, one must finally demonstrate that one can do without it, even if this requires transposing it to a very different realm."²⁷ Kouvelakis also adds that, "Because the Germans have not tried to realize the principle of freedom that they themselves have produced at the theoretical level, says Hegel, they lag behind the moment of the French Revolution; but they are also, in a certain sense, in advance of it, thanks to the intellectual movement rooted in that 'other' revolution known as the Reformation."²⁸ Therefore, in a certain sense, for Hegel, the Germans have already internalized the Revolution on a spiritual level through the cultural activity of the Reformation. What remains is to adequately incorporate the progress of revolutionary politics into the everyday life of German society, that is, at the level of *Sittlichkeit*. As we saw in chapter three, Hegel's concept of *Sittlichkeit*, as the ethical substance, includes the family and Civil Society, as well as the State, as the full objective realization of ethical freedom. Therefore, with respect to the reception

²⁶ Kouvelakis, *Philosophy and Revolution*, pp. 11-12.

²⁷ Ibid, p. 12.

²⁸ Kouvelakis, *Philosophy and Revolution*, p. 32.

of the French Revolution, for Hegel, the aim of the State is to produce the desirable political arrangements made possible by the Revolution while simultaneously acting as a guarantor preventing any future revolution.

Of course, the possibility of incorporating the Revolution into the rational politics of the State requires an extensive metaphysical apparatus that can accommodate the seemingly purposeless violence of the Terror in an inclusive, progressive narrative. In a radical criticism of Hegel's attempt to provide this narrative through the dialectical metaphysics of the Science of Spirit, Adorno, in *Negative Dialectics*, remarks, "It would take the most wretched nitpicking garbed as scientific acribia to blind us to the fact that the French Revolution, for all the abrupt concurrence of some of its acts, fitted into the overall course for bourgeois emancipation."²⁹ Yet, despite this intense criticism, for Hegel, the "wretched nitpicking" that Adorno condemns is, in fact, the metaphysical narration that legitimizes the State as the moral legislator. Within the Hegelian Science, the narrative of the Revolution provides a ground for the sovereignty of the State, as the structure which guarantees the rights-based politics that emerged from the Revolution, while, simultaneously, providing a mandate for the State to construct the necessary mechanisms and apparatuses to prevent further revolutionary activity. In this sense, within Hegel's metaphysical narrative, the actual Revolution provides the justification for the State's sovereignty, juridical power, and, most importantly, its "right" to control the subjects within its jurisdiction as a measure of its own security (i.e. as an aspect of governmentality). However, what is important here is that, for Hegel, the control the State retains against its subjects cannot appear to be imposed from the outside, as a set of mechanistic functions of the State and its institutions. For Hegel, the importance of the Revolution is that it be *internalized*. Therefore, as we will see, the interpellative functions of Hegel's philosophy are at the core of this possibility for an internal revolution that

²⁹ Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, translated by E.B. Ashton (New York: Continuum Publishing Company, 1973), p. 301.

converts the actual Terror into a rational subjugation to the sovereign State as the legitimate authority mandated to prescribe the behaviours and relations that are most advantageous to its own security.

The State as Organism: The *Necessity* of Freedom

Having demonstrated the significance of the French Revolution in Hegel's philosophy, we may now turn to the question of how, specifically, is the Hegelian subject hailed, or interpellated, in order that each individual may respond to the precise moral *Aufhebung* that Hegel understands as the necessary German response to the French Terror. In this section, I will briefly consider Hegel's interpellative use of "we" in his philosophical writings, and then initiate a discussion of the concept of the State as an organism in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Encyclopedia*. I will also consider some of the explanations in the literature regarding Hegel's claim that the State, as the ethical entity, is the greatest realization of freedom in history, and demonstrate that many of these justifications rely on dangerous tautological arguments.

Clearly defining Hegel's use of the referent "we" is one of the most difficult aspects of understanding his philosophical project, and, as readers, our relation to it. "In the realm of great philosophy," Adorno remarks, "Hegel is no doubt the only one with whom at times one does not know and cannot conclusively determine what is being talked about, and with whom there is no guarantee that such a judgement is even possible."³⁰ As Adorno indicates, understanding "with whom" Hegel is speaking is a complex and, perhaps, at times, indeterminable puzzle. However, as we have already noted above, in many instances, Hegel is clearly addressing his readers with a specific call to join in the movement of Spirit's self-realization by adopting the rationality of the Hegelian Science. In *Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative*, Jean-Luc Nancy comments on the

³⁰ Theodor W. Adorno, *Hegel: Three Studies*, translated by Shierry Weber Nicholson (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), p. 89.

“we” in Hegel’s philosophy, writing,

“we” designates neither a corporation of philosophers nor the point of view of a more elevated knowledge — and this, quite precisely, because this “we” is *us*, us all. If the moment of philosophy — of the knowing, the work, and the patience that are proper to it — must initially posit itself as a separate knowledge, as an abstract discipline of thought and as a book difficult to read, a book one will have to reread or whose reading will have to be effaced in order to penetrate the sense (but whose rereading, as a separate act, in never not indispensable to the experience of truth) — if this separation is therefore necessary, it is only so as to expose this: that it is indeed a matter of *us*, and that the truth or sense staged before us as “philosophy” only has sense and truth for us.³¹

That is, for Nancy, as readers of and participants in Hegel’s philosophy, “we” are those for whom the Hegelian Science “has sense and truth” as it is “staged before us.” Yet, despite the eloquence of Nancy’s description, what he is essentially saying is that the truth of the Hegelian Science is true for those who subject themselves to its logic and adopt its conceptual apparatus as a lense through which the actual world is viewed and understood. In this respect, the interpellative aspect of Hegel’s “we” is seen in its full form — only by subjugation to the constellations of Hegel’s metaphysical narratives are “we” capable of accessing the wisdom of Hegel’s philosophy. Therefore, in order to achieve the project of Absolute Knowing, and, in a sense, contribute to this rational progression by thinking it and arranging the actual world in its image, “we” are called to freely accept the conceptual “prerequisites” of the Hegelian Science in order to know its truth. Kenley R. Dove adds that, “On the one hand, therefore, “we” seem to be merely describing what the active experience of consciousness presents for phenomenological description; on the other hand, however, “our” observation is also seen to be an act (“*unsere Zutat*”) which plays a constitutive role in the drama as a whole.”³² Again, the understanding of the reader, as a

³¹ Jean-Luc Nancy, *Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative*, translated by Jason Smith and Steven Miller (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), p. 76.

³² Kenley R. Dove, “Hegel’s Phenomenological Method,” in *The Phenomenology of Spirit Reader: Critical and Interpretive Essays*, edited by Jon Stewart (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998), p. 61. Dove also provides an analysis of what other Hegel commentators have concluded about Hegel’s “We”, see pp. 62-5. For additional

participant in the realization of Spirit's self-understanding, functions to interpellate him within Hegel's system, making its outcome — the concrete realization of Absolute Knowledge — dependent on the reader's recognition of his own role in the system. Therefore, Hegel's "we" is a referent used to interpellate his reader into the general organization of the Science of Spirit. Within this organization, however, it is important to further question what role the subject will have with respect to the political organization of the State, which is said to be the realization of objective freedom within Hegel's narrative.

Yet, before more fully developing the precise political meaning of subjectivity within the Hegelian Science, I want to examine more closely two fundamental texts that explicitly deploy interpellative strategies within the overall pedagogical structure of their narratives. As Robert B. Pippin explains, "in Hegel's account of why we have come to regard some set of rules or a practice as now authoritative or then as discredited, his system has a place in it for both the "logical" insufficiencies of the "forms of thought" deeply presupposed in such activities, and the social or "existential" manifestations of such insufficiencies in concrete historical life."³³ Pippin continues, "The latter appears most prominently in the great work of his youth, the *Phenomenology of Spirit*; and the former concerns seemed more of interest to the mature Hegel, of the *Science of Logic*, and, especially, the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*."³⁴ In Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, his account of the social insufficiencies of concrete historical life provides a series of clear interpellative gestures. Hegel's own advertisement for the *Phenomenology of Spirit* states, "The wealth of the appearances of spirit, which at first glance seems chaotic, is bought into a scientific

comments on Hegel's "we," in terms of the normativity created by the intersubjective play of mutual recognition, see Terry Pinkard, "Hegel's *Phenomenology* and *Logic*: an overview," in *The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism*, edited by Karl Ameriks (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000), p. 173.

³³ Robert B. Pippin, *Modernism as a Philosophical Problem*, Second Edition (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), p. 67.

³⁴ Ibid, p. 67.

order which presents them according to their necessity in which the imperfect ones dissolve and pass over into higher ones which constitute their next truth.”³⁵ Hegel’s claim that the scientific narration of his system will indicate how the truth of Spirit is to be understood already suggests a certain interpellative feature. That is, as we saw with Nancy’s description, in order to comprehend the Science of Spirit, individuals must willingly subject themselves to its metaphysical narrative. In the Preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel explains, “The true shape in which truth exists can only be the scientific system of such truth. To help bring philosophy closer to the form of Science, to the goal where it can lay aside the title of ‘love of knowing’ and be *actual* knowing—that is what I have set myself to do.”³⁶ Here we see one of the rare instances in which Hegel implicates himself in his philosophical narration. Yet, regarding the interpellative design, we should not underestimate the suggestion that, within the Hegelian Science, those who have subjected themselves to its logic will be privy to *actual* knowing, or truth, and will thus satiate, with Hegel, their longing for knowledge. In the section on Absolute Knowing that concludes the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel writes,

The *goal*, Absolute Knowing, or Spirit that knows itself as Spirit, has for its path the recollection of the Spirits as they are in themselves and as they accomplish the organization of their realm. Their preservation, regarding from the side of their free existence appearing in the form of contingency, is History; but regarded from the side of their [philosophically] comprehended organization, it is the Science of Knowing in the sphere of appearance: the two together, comprehended History, form alike the inwardizing and the Calvary of absolute Spirit, the actuality, the truth, and certainty of his throne, without which he would be lifeless and alone.³⁷

Therefore, because Spirit cannot simply know itself conceptually (i.e. formally), it must study its

³⁵ G. W. F. Hegel, *Miscellaneous Writings*, edited by Jon Stewart (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern UP, 2002), p. 282.

³⁶ Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §5, p. 3.

³⁷ *Ibid*, §808, p. 493.

own history in the shapes of consciousness that populate its past. Because Spirit emerged as a historical phenomena, the only true way for it to know itself is to fully comprehend its own self-realization in the history of human cultures. That is, *Bildung*, as the recollective educational modality of Hegelian philosophy, will demonstrate to the learner that through his own apprehension of the truth of Spirit in history, Spirit is coming to know itself.

In *Philosophy Without Foundations*, William Maker argues that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is designed “either to present a demonstrative argument whose function is to establish and ground the nature and validity of absolute knowing, or, according to those who see the argument to be more rhetorical and persuasive than demonstrative, to elevate the reader propaedeutically to the level of absolute knowledge and to convince him thereby of its validity.”³⁸ Although both possible readings suggested by Maker rely on interpellative designs that incorporate the reader into the Hegelian system, it is important to understand that these two readings are not mutually exclusive. In fact, *both* aspects are prevalent in Hegel’s philosophy because the interpellative gestures of the *Phenomenology* rely on the interplay of persuasive *and* demonstrative features. That is, the interpellation of subjects into the Science of Spirit requires that Hegel first (and repeatedly) persuade each reader to subject himself to the system and then demonstrate to himself the truth of the system by *thinking* the logic of its metaphysical construction. As an initial point of critique, Butler explains that, for Foucault, history should be understood as “multiplicity, the radical heteronomy of events, forces, and relations which historiographers have concealed and rationalized through the imposition of orderly theoretical fictions.”³⁹ She continues, “we can understand the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as precisely such an orderly theoretical fiction, an account of increasingly complex historical experience through a metaphysics of dialectical unities which is

³⁸ William Maker, *Philosophy Without Foundations: Rethinking Hegel* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), p. 70.

³⁹ Judith Butler, *Subjects of Desire* (New York: Columbia UP, 1999), p. 180.

ever-accommodating.”⁴⁰ However, before fully developing a Foucauldian critique, we must also consider Hegel’s interpellative gestures in the *Encyclopedia*.

In the *Philosophy of Mind*, Hegel writes, “The State is *self-conscious* ethical substance, the unification of the family principle with that of civil society.”⁴¹ He continues, “As a living mind, the state only is as an organized whole, differentiated into particular agencies, which, proceeding from the one notion (though not known as a notion) of the reasonable will, continually produce it as their result.”⁴² In this passage, we begin to see the political aspect of Hegel’s interpellative design in that the “reasonable will,” as narrated within the Hegelian Science, will rationally “produce” the State. Hegel continues,

The free will is: (A) Itself at first immediate, and hence as a single being — the *person*: the existence which the person gives to its liberty is *property*. The *Right as Right* (law) is *formal, abstract right*. (B) When the will is reflected into self, so as to have its existence inside it, and to be thus at the same time characterized as a *particular*, it is the right of the *subjective* will, *morality* of the individual conscience. (C) When the free will is the substantial will, made actual in the subject and conformable to its concept and rendered a totality of necessity — it is the ethics of actual life in family, civil society, and State.⁴³

In this passage, Hegel’s narration of the logic of the State is clearly delineated: the immediacy of the will is elevated into the conceptual abstract of right, further actualized in morality, and finally realized in its most complete articulation in *Sittlichkeit*, including the actual life of the family, Civil Society and the State. Therefore, within Hegel’s encyclopaedic formulation, it is clear that every individual who accepts the metaphysical construct underlying Hegel’s Science of Spirit should understand the State as the rational process of history itself, since, for Hegel, history does not exist

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §535, p. 263.

⁴² Ibid, §539, p. 265.

⁴³ Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §487, p. 243.

outside of the State. Tom Rockmore explains that Hegel employs the term “encyclopedia” in a variety of senses, including as “an abbreviation of the philosophical sciences”; “a presentation of this knowledge in the form of a manual prepared for students”; “the official exposition of Hegel’s system of philosophy”; and, “with respect to the Greek etymology of the word “encyclopedia,” we can say that this work is the circle of knowledge.”⁴⁴ Perhaps this circle of knowledge, as a tautological justification, is most evident in Hegel’s theory of the State. As I demonstrated in chapter two, Hegel’s claim that the State is the realization of political freedom requires a vast metaphysical construct that grounds the authority of State in the rational progress of history. However, what I want to stress in this section is that Hegel’s metaphysical narration has its correlate in the promise of real political freedom within the State, as its logical guarantor. Therefore, subjects interpellated into the Hegelian Science are not only subjugated to Hegel’s rational organization, but they also, in freely accepting this rationality, are brought into a specific relation with the State as an actual political entity, which they are led to believe is the sole guarantor of their freedom. It is precisely this series of actual political effects that is at the core of Foucault’s concern regarding metaphysics. That is, if individuals subject themselves to the metaphysical order of Hegel’s Science of Spirit, their potential for political engagement is also already determined by this order; however, as we will see, the acceptance of the State as both the mediator and guarantor of political freedoms is not without serious dangers.

In the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel’s conviction that the State is the ultimate guarantor of objective freedom is stated unequivocally. He writes,

The present has cast off its barbarism and unjust [*unrechtliche*] arbitrariness, and truth has cast off its otherworldliness and contingent force, so that the true reconciliation, which reveals the *state* as the image and actuality of reason, has become objective. In the *state*, the self-consciousness finds the actuality of its substantial knowledge and volition in

⁴⁴ Tom Rockmore, *Before and After Hegel: A Historical Introduction to Hegel’s Thought* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 120.

organic development ... in *science*, it finds the free and comprehended cognition of this truth as one and the same in all its complementary manifestations; i.e. in the *state*, in *nature*, and in the *ideal world*.⁴⁵

For Hegel, the State — “as the image and actuality of reason” that “has become objective” — should be recognized as the actualization of human freedom. Of course, as we saw in chapter two, the justification for this claim relies on the metaphysical argument that history is a rational progression that can be understood and articulated within the Science of Spirit. Again, as we noted in chapter two, Hegel’s argument is tautological in that it attempts to ground its own metaphysical claims in history, while justifying the historical content through this same metaphysical narrative. Indeed, the literature on Hegel’s notion of the State as the actualization of freedom also deploys a variety of tautological explanations, which, I believe, indicate the difficulty, and perhaps impossibility, of explaining Hegel’s conception of freedom without resorting to tautological argumentation.

In his extensive study *Idealism as Modernism*, Pippin explains that,

Hegel never argues for the rationality of modern institutions simply by describing them and then insisting that, whatever they are, they must be rational because we know a priori that history is rational. However one interprets and defends the claim that “history” has produced these rational institutions, one is independently committed to some interpretation and defense of the claim that they are rational.⁴⁶

Despite this initial indication that an interpretation and defense of Hegel’s metaphysical claims would be a necessary aspect of justifying Hegel’s political position, Pippin, for his part, appears to get lost in his subsequent discussion of freedom and fails to clearly articulate such a defense. However, for Hegel, the claim that history is rational is justified by the metaphysical narrative of

⁴⁵ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §360, p. 380.

⁴⁶ Pippin, *Idealism as Modernism*, p. 422. See also, Robert B. Pippin, “Hegel’s practical philosophy: the realization of freedom,” in *The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism*, edited by Karl Ameriks. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000, p. 194

the dialectic within the Science of Spirit. Yet, because this narrative is, in fact, grounded in the historical content that it determines, we see again that this claim to legitimacy is tautological. With respect to the institutions that Hegel claims to be rational, Pippin notes that an independent defense of this position would be necessary before its veracity could be secured. For Hegel, this independent defense is again found in the metaphysical narration of Spirit itself. That is, Spirit, as understood within the Hegelian Science, is actualized in *the* rational institution of the State. However, this claim initiates another tautological argument — to claim that the State itself is rational because Spirit is rational is tautological because in order to demonstrate the rationality of Spirit, Hegel's metaphysical narrative presumes the rationality of history. In brief, for Hegel, we know the State is rational because history is rational; however, we know history is rational because it progresses toward the rational entity of the State.

Furthermore, in summarizing Hegel's idea of freedom in relation to the State, Allan Patten writes, "The set of institutions that make up the modern social world, and that include the state, represent the minimum self-sufficient institutional structure that is capable of mediating mutual recognition."⁴⁷ Yet, how Patten could ever demonstrably determine the "minimum self-sufficient institutional structure" outside the metaphysical narrative of Hegelian Science is extremely ambiguous. In fact, Patten recognizes the difficulty of making this claim with finality, asking, "Why should we accept Hegel's claim that there is anything peculiarly rational or valuable about a life of citizenship in the modern state? In particular, why should we accept it if we abstract, as Hegel would have us do, from the contingent fact that citizenship is central to the identity and self-understanding of many people?"⁴⁸ Patten notes that Hegel never directly answers this question, however, he sides with Hegel, claiming, "An agent can develop the capacities and attitudes that

⁴⁷ Alan Patten, *Hegel's Idea of Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999), p. 135. For a similar argument, see p.186.

⁴⁸ Ibid, pp. 192-3.

make up free and rational agency *only* in the context of a community of mutual recognition.”⁴⁹

Thus, we see that despite Patten’s important concerns, he accepts the discourse of mutual recognition within the Hegelian Science as a metaphysical justification for Hegel’s political claims. This is an important concession in that, despite an obvious objection, or at least a clear hesitation, Patten refers back to the metaphysical apparatus that anchors Hegel’s political project. In this deferral, it is again made clear that in order to seriously critique Hegel’s political thought, I must formulate a critical analysis of the political rationality that he espouses, as well as its complex metaphysical justifications.

Knowles, in his commentary, also offers an optimistic, yet deficient argument regarding freedom in Hegel’s philosophy, particularly with respect to the institutions of Civil Society and the State. He writes,

If the structures of domesticity, economic, legal and civic order, and the political constitution of the state, are rational, then the demands made by these institutions are also rational. ... Rationality surely demands that the subjective will understands and endorses the claim that the objective ethical life of the community is a valid set of social norms. Ethical life must pass inspection by the rational inquirer before its demands can be recognized as valid. ... rationality also demands that the enquirer accept that, in principle, before an enquiry is complete, the demands of a specific form of ethical life may be wrong.⁵⁰

Despite this extensive defense of Hegel’s concept of *Sittlichkeit*, it is unclear how the Hegelian subject, once interpellated into the Science of Spirit, is capable of “inspecting” the rationality of social norms because he has already accepted that *Sittlichkeit* occupies a position of completion in Hegel’s narrative. That is, within the conceptual model that Hegel offers, *Sittlichkeit* is nothing other than the irrefutable actualization of human freedom. In this respect, despite Knowles’ cautious remarks, it is clear that, for Hegel, history, as a rational progression, has already

⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 195. My italics.

⁵⁰ Knowles, *Hegel and the Philosophy of Right*, p. 195.

determined the valid set of social norms that Hegelian Science has elevated to the conceptual level of ethical life. Therefore, the “rational inquirer” is not to be concerned with evaluating these forms of normativity, rather, he must learn to think their logic, and demonstrate to himself through his own understanding of Hegel’s system that the normative behaviours of the modern liberal State are, in fact, rational. In this respect, Weil’s argument is also particularly revealing:

We are certainly free to refuse reason, just as we are free to assert anything we please. But if we do so, we thereby deprive ourselves of the means to convince and refute other and to speak rationally of the State. We can choose passion over will, arbitrary decision [*l’arbitraire*] over freedom. But then we must be consistent (for the sake of the discussion) and agree that for our part we are opposed to the State, any State, that we would abolish all and any principles of organization and any positive freedom, any freedom to act, plan, or realize and find satisfactions in rational action, which is the rational organization of the community and of all communities of men.⁵¹

This attitude, rhetorically charged as it is, provides a clear insight into Hegel’s logic of the State. By framing the question of political organization in binary terms — the State *or* total chaos — Weil forecloses any debate about actual, viable, political alternatives to the modern State. However, outside of the rhetorical polemics that Weil is committed to upholding in this argument, there is simply no clear reason why alternative forms of political organization could not also exemplify the realization of human freedom. If, in fact, these alternatives are excluded from the field of political possibilities because, for Weil, Hegel’s metaphysical narrative indicates their deficiency, then Weil’s argument simply repeats that tautological argumentation of Robert Pippin and Allan Patten, already discussed above. However, Weil continues, “Hegel’s position is shocking, and it would be easy to succumb to the temptation of calling him an advocate of the autocratic or police state.”⁵² Regardless of the “ease” of suggesting that Hegel advocated a police state, few scholars in the literature have been swayed by this temptation, and many, including

⁵¹ Weil, *Hegel and the State*, p. 55.

⁵² *Ibid*, p. 74.

Weil, have stealthily avoided the difficult political problems in Hegel's thought. Instead, many Hegel scholars simply return, uncritically, to the metaphysical justifications for the sovereign State and its exclusive power, in order to declare, like Weil, "the Hegelian theory of the State is correct because it provides a correct analysis of the State as it was in Hegel's time and in ours."⁵³ Yet, as we saw with Jean-Luc Nancy's analysis of Hegel's referent "we" above, Hegel's system can only provide the "correct" analysis of the State for those who have subjugated their thought to the rational parameters of Hegel's metaphysical narrative, which, as we have seen, is demonstrably tautological.

Shlomo Avineri also provides an example of this tautological argumentation with respect to the State and human freedom, writing,

The state embodies man's highest relationship to other human beings yet this function of the state is conditional, not absolute. In order to qualify for such a role, the state has to reflect the individual's self-consciousness. Hence not every state qualifies for those attributes with which Hegel invests the idea of the state. Furthermore, it is the way the institutions of the state are organized which determines whether individual self-consciousness does or does not find its adequate expression in any individual state.⁵⁴

Here we see that, for Avineri, the State is a legitimate authority only inasmuch as it is capable of reflecting the individual self-consciousness of its constituents. However, for Hegel, the State exists only because it is objectively capable of this reflection, and, therefore, Avineri's argument is redundant. Even though Avineri stresses that individual States may not adequately express the conceptual relation that, for Hegel, guarantees their legitimacy, this deficiency does not mean the State itself is inadequate. Instead, as we have seen above, for Hegel, the State, as the rational realization of objective freedom, is mandated to create the necessary forms of subjectivity to guarantee its own security. Therefore, despite Avineri's hesitancy about the idea that the actual

⁵³ Ibid, p. 75.

⁵⁴ Avineri, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State*, p. 177.

State should have absolute power to mediate human relations, Hegel's rational narrative has already determined that the State will determine the relations among its subjects and that this power belongs solely to the State. Therefore, as this brief survey of the literature indicates, justifications for Hegel's concept of the State often deploy tautological arguments that either repeat the initial tautologies developed in Hegel's philosophy, or develop their own in defense of Hegel's system.⁵⁵ However, the explanation of why, precisely, the State should be the sole guarantor of subjective freedom, mediating all relations to this end, remains unexplained, unless one includes the tautological arguments coded in metaphysical narration as legitimate explanations.

Yet, these tautological arguments often utilize additional conceptual metaphors that further complicate and obfuscate their analysis. Of particular significance is the argument for understanding the State as an organism. Within this justification of the State, the individual functions as an independent organ within the larger organism of the State. In the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel argues, "The state in and for itself is the ethical whole, the actualization of freedom, and it is the absolute end of reason that freedom should be actual. The state is the spirit which is present in the world and which *consciously* realizes itself therein."⁵⁶ He continues, "The state

⁵⁵ For similar statements that rely on metaphysical tautologies to justify Hegel's claim that the State is the objective realization of freedom, see, for example, Sally Sedgwick, "The State as Organism: The Metaphysical Basis of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*," in *The Southern Journal of Philosophy – Supplement* (Memphis: Department of Philosophy, University of Memphis, 2001), p. 182; Richard L. Schacht, "Hegel on Freedom," in *Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays*, edited by Alasdair MacIntyre (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press), p. 304 & p. 314; Stephen Houlgate, *Freedom, Truth and History* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 84; Horst Althaus, *Hegel: An Intellectual Biography*, translated by Michael Tarsh (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), p. 175; Eric Weil, *Hegel and the State*, translated by Mark A. Cohen (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1998), pp. 73-4; Walter Kaufmann, "The Hegel Myth and Its Method," in *The Hegel Myths and Legends*, edited by Jon Stewart (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern UP), 1996, p. 91; Walter Kaufmann, *Hegel: A Reinterpretation* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978), p. 266; Franz Grégoire, "Is the Hegelian State Totalitarian?," in *The Hegel Myths and Legends*, edited by Jon Stewart (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern UP), 1996, p. 105; and, Shlomo Avineri, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1972), p. 177.

⁵⁶ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §258, p. 279.

consists in the march of God in the world, and its basis is the power of reason actualizing itself as will. ... one may easily fall into the mistake of overlooking the inner organism of the state in favour of individual [*einzelne*] aspects.”⁵⁷ Hegel criticizes the attention to particular features of the State that may not exemplify his narrative of rational progress. In this argument, Hegel indicates that we should not concern ourselves with actual examples of why the rational narrative of the State may be problematic, even if these examples (such as poverty, as discussed in chapter three) may prove to be endemic deficiencies of the modern State. Hegel goes on to assert,

The state is an organism; i.e. the development of the Idea in its differences. These different aspects are accordingly the various powers with their corresponding tasks and functions, through which the universal continually produces itself in a necessary way and thereby preserves itself, because it is itself the presupposition of its own production. ... It is in the nature of an organism that all its parts must perish if they do not achieve identity and if one of them seeks independence. Predicates, principles and the like get us nowhere in assessing the state, which must be comprehended as an organism, just as predicates are of no help in comprehending the nature of God, whose life must instead be intuited as it is in itself.⁵⁸

Again we see that, for Hegel, the State should not be judged according to its actual functions or limitations, but only as a conceptual entity or organism. However, Hegel’s description of the organism in this passage is particularly revealing. If, as Hegel asserts, “It is in the nature of an organism that all its parts must perish if they do not achieve identity and if one of them seeks independence,” then the State, as an organism, must retain the capacity to manufacture the coherence of its organs (i.e. individuals), against all attempts to achieve “independence.” In this sense, any individual desire for a freedom that is not mediated by the State signals a direction that threatens the existence of the State itself, and, therefore, must be eliminated.

Another important description of the State as an organism is provided in Reid’s reference

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid, §269, p. 290.

to the controversy in the German universities following Sand's murder of Kotzebue. Reid notes,

No doubt, from Hegel's point of view, Sand's action was an extreme expression of purely subjective, abstract freedom, the actualizing of the "philosophy" of thinking-for-oneself. Such an action rips apart the organic wholeness of the state, to the extent where it reacts, as would an external, mechanistic power, against one of its corporations, and certain individuals. This is the state's right because it is ultimately seeking to reestablish its lost wholeness. The teaching of philosophy must preserve the state from such rips in its fabric, for what is in fact taught is freedom, not the abstract, subjective variety but freedom engendered by the reciprocal recognition at work in the organic state ...⁵⁹

Here we see again that "thinking-for-oneself" must be understood as a threat to the State, as that organism which mediates true, objective freedom. What is of tremendous importance in this passage is Reid's reference to the State "seeking to reestablish its lost wholeness." As we have seen with respect to history and governmentality, the State has never, in fact, been whole. Both in terms of historical narration and governmental controls, the State must continually manufacture the unity that it claims to preserve. Moreover, it is especially through the assertion that this unity is in danger, or at risk of deteriorating, that the State grounds its legitimacy and further entrenches its logic of control (i.e. *governmentality*). However, if we understand that the unity the State claims to protect is only ever tautologically defined, the question of the legitimacy of the State can be fully articulated. That is, having escaped the series of questions that interrogate the "why" of State power under the presumption that a rational account is available, Foucault's analysis allows us to consider "how" the State manufactures its own legitimacy through the complex assemblages and mechanisms it captures and deploys for this purpose. Therefore, in considering the series of questions that examine the "how" of political power, Foucault's analytic allows a genuine and critical engagement with questions of legitimacy because it does not presume the rational, progressive narrative that subordinates the functions and effects of political power to a celebration

⁵⁹ Jeffrey Reid, "Hegel and the State University: The University of Berlin and its Founding Contradictions," in *The Owl of Minerva* 32:1, Fall 2000, p. 17. Additional details and context regarding this controversy are also available in this article.

of its logical ends and intent. Returning to the concept of the State as an organism, what is significant is that only within the organism does the organ have an appropriate order and possibility for survival. In this sense, the use of this metaphor situates the State as the necessary unity that permits the very survival of the individual (as we will see in chapter five, this metaphor has broad implications for the concept of the human). Pippin notes that according to a certain misreading of Hegel,

Hegel was an “organicist” about politics, someone who believed that the individual parts of this ethical organism have no more claim to individual standing and intelligibility than a severed hand, a kidney or a lung might have. Each could only be what it *truly* is within some self-sustaining and supra-individual whole.⁶⁰

Yet, as Hegel’s own statements indicate, this “misreading” is actually quite plausible. Michael Quante’s suggestion that, “Hegel’s basic idea is that in the notion of an organism we have a notion in which the unity of the whole *and* the independence of its parts are integrated,”⁶¹ demonstrates the counterpoint to Pippin’s concern regarding the organicist “misreading.” However, we must ask: how can the organs of an organism be said to act independently of the organism? As Hegel stressed above, the life of the organism depends on the unification of its organs toward the common end of survival. Therefore, even though the organism analogy creates the picture of a natural integration or systemic unity, where the State is not seen as an alien entity that imposes a unity through force, determining how individuals, as organs, are free remains extremely ambiguous. Indeed, the function of this metaphor should be seen as twofold: in one instance, it suggests that a natural, coherent unity is realized in the State, making its mechanism and coercive

⁶⁰ Robert B. Pippin, “Hegel’s practical philosophy: the realization of freedom,” in *The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism*, edited by Karl Ameriks. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000, pp. 181-2.

⁶¹ Michael Quante, ““Organic Unity”: Its Loose and Analogical and Its Strict and Systematic Sense in Hegel’s Philosophy,” in *The Southern Journal of Philosophy – Supplement* (Memphis: Department of Philosophy, University of Memphis, 2001), p. 189.

apparatuses appear only as secondary corrections to transgressive behaviours that threaten its security; in another instance, the metaphor demonstrates that, within the State, the individual is only one of many organs that must function to preserve the survival of the State.

Yet, despite my examination of the tautological arguments for the State as the realization of freedom, and the demonstration that the concept of the State as an organism functions to veil the unity that the State must manufacture as a retroactive justification for its sovereign power, the question remains—*so what if it is a tautology?* Indeed, many Hegel scholars have argued that this tautology is justified for no other reason than its historical necessity. That is, regardless of the coercive designs of the State and its tautological explanations, its historical emergence should be understood as a positive development in human history because, despite its many problems, the State does, in a very real sense, guarantee the freedoms of its citizens. In response to these objections, I want to stress that the most dangerous aspect of Hegel's philosophy is not simply that it is tautological with respect to the justification of the State. Rather, Hegel's philosophical project is dangerous because his interpellative tautologies demand the willing subjugation to a rational order that limits the possibilities for ethical and political autonomy and dissent. The Hegelian Science defines freedom as a possibility that *must* be mediated by the State and thus forecloses the possibility of an ethical practice outside of (or against) the normative social values that Hegel's conceptualizes within *Sittlichkeit*. Also, as we will see in the next section, the State, as the guarantor of subjective freedoms, extracts a number of costs. As I demonstrated in the discussion of Civil Society in chapter three, the problem of poverty, created by the modern economy, initiates a response that function to legitimize the State and increase control within the political rationality of governmentality. Analogously, the subjective freedoms allegedly guaranteed by the State also introduce conditions to which the state must respond with additional mechanisms of control and, specifically, through warfare.

War

For Hegel, objective freedom can only be practiced within the State. That is, only when freedom is mediated by the State and its institutions can individuals realize the rational development of historical progress within the field of *Sittlichkeit*. However, the State has certain necessary features of its own; particularly, as we saw with the discussion of the State as an organism, the State must not only guarantee the subjective freedoms of its citizens, it must also ensure that each citizen *recognizes* the State as this guarantor, or, more precisely, acknowledges the necessity of this mediation by the State in their individual experience of freedom. In this context, I believe a cursory review of Hegel's statements on war will inform our understanding of his notion of political subjectivity, as well as provide further details regarding the role of the State in the mediation of freedom. Though I acknowledge that any interpretation of Hegel's views on war will be highly contentious and I recognize that the debates over Hegel's intent continue to be vigorously pursued in the literature, in this section I will provide a reading that focusses specifically on the role of war as a mode of mediation between the State and the individual. In doing so, I will demonstrate that, despite the neglect of this important feature of ethical life in the scholarship on Hegel's political thought, war is an inherent necessity in the life of a State that drastically and systemically compromises the freedom of the individual within the State.

Complicating any reading of Hegel's views on war is, again, the question of the relationship between the rational and actual in Hegel's philosophy. That is, because Hegel claims to be giving a philosophical description of war, a number of scholars have suggested that he is not implicated in the political arrangement that he describes. Contrary to this position, I want to assert, again, that Hegel's philosophy has definitively prescriptive elements, and that subjugation to the Hegelian Science must be considered with respect to its political effects in the actual world. Therefore, if Hegel is *simply* giving conceptual expression to the actual reality of war between States, he is also, at the same time, articulating a relationship between the State and its citizens that

is prescriptive inasmuch as Hegel sees this rational articulation as the objective realization of historical progress. Because, as we have already noted, the State must not only guarantee the freedom of its citizens, but it must also guarantee that citizens know, in a very real, physical, and existential sense, that it is the only guarantor of this freedom, it is clear that subjugation to the Science of Spirit has precise political implications for individuals within the State.

Hegel's states his position on war explicitly in the *Philosophy of Right*, arguing,

War is not to be regarded as an absolute evil and as a purely external accident, which itself therefore has some accidental cause, be it injustices, the passions of nations or the holders of power, &c., or in short, something ... which ought not to be. It is to what is by nature accidental that accidents happen, and the fate whereby they happen is thus a necessity. Here as elsewhere, the point of view from which things seem pure accidents vanishes if we look at them in the light of the concept and philosophy, because philosophy knows accident for a show and sees in it its essence, necessity. ... in the ethical substance, the state ... the necessity is exalted to be the work of freedom, to be something ethical.⁶²

That is, for Hegel, war is only seen as a historical accident if it is not properly viewed from the philosophical perspective that sees the State, the very perpetrator of war, as a necessary outcome of the logic of history and as *the* ethical organism. Hegel goes on to claim,

War has the higher significance that by its agency, as I have remarked elsewhere, 'the ethical health of peoples is preserved in their indifference to the stabilization of finite institutions; just as the blowing of the winds preserves the sea from the foulness which would be the result of a prolonged calm, so also corruption in nations would be the product of prolonged, let alone 'perpetual', peace.'⁶³

Again, the literature regarding Hegel's conception of war offers a sustained, apologetic tone that deploys as series of tautological explanations for Hegel's views. Harry Brod confirms that, for Hegel,

war confirms the infinite authority of the state by demonstrating the finitude of the finite.

⁶² Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §324, p. 209.

⁶³ Ibid, p. 210.

In concrete terms, war shows the transience of property rights, and even the right to life itself to each individual, in contrast to the enduring substance of the state that lasts through the devastation of war. The obligation of individuals to risk their lives to defend the state in times of crisis ... demonstrates the insufficiency of theories that attempt to account for the origins and purposes of the state solely in [terms of contract theory]. War is the living negation by *via negationis* of contractarian or economic theories of the state.⁶⁴

Following a similar logic, Avineri defends Hegel's position, writing,

War is thus the ultimate proof that the values of civil society are only relative. This leads Hegel to his radical conclusion of the dangers of continuous peace would be to give rise to the illusion that the power of civil society is absolute and extreme. ... A situation in which people do not hold anything beyond civil society as binding upon them, is a situation of social disintegration – and of hubris. Hence Hegel is led to see in war the *momento mori* which shakes human beings out of their complacent preoccupation with their narrow and limited self-interests.⁶⁵

Stephen Walt also explains that,

In times of peace, civil society ... dominates the relationship of the citizen to the state. Individuals pursue their own interests, and their relation to the state is seen to be a contingent one which exists only so far as such interest are satisfied. War, however, forces citizens to abandon their self-interest and adopt interests common to the state.⁶⁶

Walt goes on to emphasize that, "Hegel justifies war, as has been shown, in terms of the ethical relation of the individual to the state which is strengthened or maintained by its occurrence."⁶⁷ D. P. Verene also notes that, "War makes the individual citizen realize that his existence is bound up with a larger whole. War, by having within it the possibility of destructing the social order, forces

⁶⁴ Harry Brod, *Hegel's Philosophy of Politics: Idealism, Identity and Modernity* (Boulder, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press, 1992), p. 158.

⁶⁵ Shlomo Avineri, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1972), pp. 196-7.

⁶⁶ Stephen Walt, "Hegel on War: Another Look," in *The Hegel Myths and Legends*, edited by Jon Stewart (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern UP), 1996, p. 172.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, p. 177.

the individual citizen to realize that his private world of family, marriage, and property ultimately exists because of the public world of the state.”⁶⁸ That is, the unity of the state, as an allegedly organic “individual,” retains its unity through warfare, coercing its citizens to murder the citizens of other States and risk their property, family, and even life itself in the most binding and irreversible practice of “state cohesion.”

Hegel scholar Michael Inwood provides a concise summary of Hegel’s views on war in the *Philosophy of Right*, arguing,

(1) The state is more than a device for regulating the conduct of its citizens. It makes them into full human beings, and permeates their nature. (2) Just as there cannot be one free individual alone, but only a multiplicity of them, each recognizing others, so there cannot be one state alone ... (3) War is not simply a response to external accidents, any more than eating is simply an animal’s response to the accidental presence of food. Warfare is an essential feature of the state. States are founded by war and preserve themselves by war.⁶⁹

That is, for Hegel, war is the activity of the State which creates new, and objectively more advanced forms of Spirit, while, simultaneously, demonstrating the rational progression of Spirit in the actual world. Moreover, we see again that Hegel’s metaphysical narrative is linked to political power as the justification of victories and defeats. As Weil indicates,

The new form of spirit and the new organization of rational life are not created by philosophical discussion or sermons and moral lectures but by the struggle between “national spirits” and the organizing principles of freedom as they are actually present in different States. It is from the perspective of universal history that spirit judges the particular forms in which it was incorporated at one particular stage of its development [*devenir*].⁷⁰

Avineri also supports this claim, writing,

⁶⁸ D.P. Verene, “Hegel’s Account of War,” in *The Hegel Myths and Legends*, p. 144.

⁶⁹ Michael Inwood, *A Hegel Dictionary*, p. 307.

⁷⁰ Eric Weil, *Hegel and the State*, translated by Mark A. Cohen (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 85.

Thus even war itself, with all its negativity, does finally receive a meaning within the wider scheme of things. Out of the vortex of clashes characterizing international relations, an inner order emerges and reason appears in history not as something given *a priori* – as an axiomatic system of norms – but as an end product of a long, arduous and sometimes seemingly meaningless process. The various principles underlying the different states, the *Volksgeister*, in contending blindly with each other, are nothing else than tools in the hands of reason.⁷¹

Therefore, within the literature, it is clear that Hegel's narrative is accepted as a rational description of the necessity of war between States. In fact, not only is war a necessary result of the independent relations among States, it is also an activity that demonstrates the rational progress of Spirit inasmuch as war allows for the objective development of different forms of Spirit, where the weaker, inefficient forms are defeated and sublimated into the objective content of the victors' establishment of a new order with new powers. The tautological presumption underlying all of the arguments is clear — war indicates the prominence of *the* ethical entity – the State – by demonstrating that the State can and should instigate its citizens to risk their lives to murder strangers on its behalf, thus foreclosing the possibility of any ethical relations outside of those mediated by the State. That is, the necessity and legitimacy of the State is predicated on its capacity to retain the position as the exclusive mediator of individual freedoms, and, in order to perpetuate this position of mediation, it eliminates these freedoms through violence, coercion and murder, against its enemies and its own citizens alike.

However, war not only binds the individual to the State, it also indicates that the State is *the true individual*. Regarding the concept of the State as an organism, discussed earlier in this chapter, we see that through war the State completes its organic totalization, further subjugating its citizens within the ever-expanding narratives that legitimize its own power. Hegel writes,

the state is an individual, and negation is an essential component of individuality. Thus, even if a number of states join together as a family, this league, in its individuality, must

⁷¹ Shlomo Avineri, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1972), p. 206.

generate opposition and create an enemy. Not only do peoples emerge from wars with added strength, but nations [*Nationen*] troubled by civil dissension gain internal peace as a result of wars with their external enemies. Admittedly, war makes property insecure, but this *real* insecurity is no more than a necessary movement.⁷²

Hegel emphasizes the impossibility of mediation between states as individuals, stressing, “There is no praetor to adjudicate between states, but at most arbitrators and mediators, and even the presence of these will be contingent.”⁷³ In the *Philosophy of Mind*, Hegel explains his position similarly, writing, “In the state of war the independence of States is at stake. In one case the result may be the mutual recognition of free national individualities.”⁷⁴ Thus, war confers upon the State its wholeness as an individual, not only by consolidating its internal parts, but also by initiating a confrontation between States, analogous to that of the Slave and Bondsman in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. As Verene explains, “War arises from the fact that politically organized nations act as individuals without a common superior; thus, no treaty or agreement is ultimately binding. Any treaty may be broken when it is not in the interest of one of the parties.”⁷⁵ What is startling in this analysis is not what Verene indicates about the State in the context of international affairs, but what he implies about the individual in relation to other individuals. If States, as individuals, war with each other unless they are prevented by a “common superior,” then, should we not wonder about the relations between actual individuals? That is, for Hegel, the State, as the truth of freedom realized in history, acts as the “common superior” to citizens because they recognize this entity as their common, and rational, superior. But, as Verene has indicated, “when it is not in the interest

⁷² Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §324, p. 362.

⁷³ Ibid, §333, p. 368.

⁷⁴ Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §547, p. 276.

⁷⁵ D.P. Verene, “Hegel’s Account of War,” in *The Hegel Myths and Legends*, edited by Jon Stewart (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern UP, 1996), p. 145.

of one of the parties,” the negation of any contractual arrangement (i.e. war) is a likely outcome. Thus, we see in this analysis that the relations between individuals, or groups (within the State) must be controlled by the “common superior” of the State that guarantees its superiority by interpellating all individuals to recognize it as this superior, even if this requires acts of war to terrorize citizens into the recognition of their relative finitude. This indicates that, as we have already noted above, the State’s allegedly organic unity is, in fact, achieved through a complex and dynamic set of interpellative tautologies and violent coercions.

Yet, what is missing from the literature regarding Hegel’s conceptualization of war is the regular acknowledgement that the State is *the* perpetrator of war. In many of the discussions regarding war among Hegel scholars, despite the clear governmental advantages gained by the State through war, the phenomenon of warfare seems to emerge from some mysterious and indeterminable location. However, as Hegel readily admits, as one State among many others, the State must make war. Therefore, in recognizing that the State makes war to demonstrate to its citizens that, without question, they are unmistakably bound to it as the guarantor of their freedom, should we not ask that how it is that individual accept the legitimacy of the State? Within the context of a Foucauldian critique of Hegel, the emphasis on the “how” of power, on the functions and effects of political power that demonstrate the actual movement and activity of power, is again shown to be decisive.

In reference to Hegel’s conception of war, Inwood writes, “in peace citizens become absorbed in their own affairs and interests, and cease to identify with the state. The state will thus cease to exist as an individual, unless it draws them back into unity by warfare, which requires the citizen to be ready to sacrifice his property and life for the state.”⁷⁶ For Hegel, even the strict adherence to the Law of State sovereignty and its attendant Order cannot prevent the need for war.

⁷⁶ Inwood, *A Hegel Dictionary*, p. 307.

In fact, periods of relative peace and lawful stability only serve to weaken the individual's attachment to the State. However, conflict within the State is also alleviated by directing the attention of citizens outward and unifying them in a campaign against a foreign enemy. As Luce Irigaray writes, in the context of Hegel's reading of *Antigone*, "All those who persist in following the dictates of individualism must be taught by government to fear a master: death."⁷⁷ That is, for Hegel, "nations [*Nationen*] troubled by civil dissension gain internal peace as a result of wars with their external enemies."⁷⁸ Therefore, war is an expedient and effective solution to the "problem" of peace, as well as to concerns regarding individualism and internal conflicts within a State. However, internal peace is only a problem inasmuch as the State must retain its monopoly on the meditation of freedom. Inner conflict, on the other hand, is not actually resolved or mediated by the State, rather, it is directed outward at an enemy that will unify the State through conflict. Thus, it appears that, within Hegel's conceptual explanation of war as an expression of the freedom of the State, war takes on the function of guaranteeing the legitimacy and supremacy of the State as the mediator of freedom. That is, the State must perpetuate war so that it can continue to guarantee its citizens the ethical freedom they cannot experience in war.

Therefore, are we not inclined to question the legitimacy of the State itself, in Hegel's philosophy, as an entity that threatens freedom and the possibility of ethical relations? David MacGregor's reference to "the current mood of despair and foreboding about the state, both in its growing failure to protect individuals from the ravages of capital and in its malevolent capacity to destroy all life on earth,"⁷⁹ indicates that individuals in contemporary society have some valid reasons to question the legitimacy of the State as the objective mediator of freedom. However, as

⁷⁷ Luce Irigaray, "The Eternal Irony of Community," in *Feminist Interpretations of G.W.F. Hegel*, edited by Patricia Jagentowicz Mills (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State UP, 1996), p. 46.

⁷⁸ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §324, p. 362.

⁷⁹ David MacGregor, "The State at Dusk," in *The Owl of Minerva*, 21, 1 (Fall 1989), p. 51.

Dallmayr asserts, “our age is segregated from Hegel’s by the effects of the industrial revolution, the expansion of markets and media networks, and the resulting consolidation and diversification of “civil society”, ” and, in fact, “the rise of large-scale bureaucracy and the succession of two world wars have weakened, if not eroded, confidence in the ethically benign character of the modern nation-state.”⁸⁰ However, given the discussion of Hegel’s conceptualize of the State above, should we not question whether the entity of the State was ever “ethically benign”? As Bernhard Schlink correctly emphasizes, “Whatever the time difference between Hegel’s world and ours, and however atomized our social world may be, the state has remained. It is an even stronger presence today than it was in Hegel’s time.”⁸¹ Thus, we see that the State is an institution that is viewed as ethically ambiguous, if not outright dangerous, but that is also remains a central feature of the organization of contemporary life. Recognizing the perilous state of existence within the political logic of weapons of mass destruction, poised to eliminate all life on earth at the decision of a few powerful and distant elites, should we not question what interpellative gestures, diffuse and multiple strategies, and complicated and coded tautologies have led to us to this nihilistic precipice? With respect to a critique of Hegel’s philosophy, therefore, we should question what possibilities for political and ethical relations are available to individuals subjected to the Science of Spirit if they are interpellated into a logic that locates freedom solely within the parameters of the State-mediated behaviours. With Foucault, therefore, we should ask what possibilities are there for *thinking otherwise*, with respect to ethical and political potentials, for those who willingly subjugate themselves to Hegel’s interpellative tautologies? However, before addressing these concerns by developing the potential, through Foucault’s research, for possible

⁸⁰ Fred Dallmayr, “Rethinking the Hegelian State,” in *Hegel and Legal Theory*, edited by Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld and David Gray Carlson (New York and London: Routledge, 1991), p. 322.

⁸¹ Bernhard Schlink, “The Inherent Rationality of the State in Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*,” in *Hegel and Legal Theory*, edited by Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld and David Gray Carlson (New York and London: Routledge, 1991), p. 347.

resistances to tautological interpellations, I will, in the next chapter, complete my argument regarding the dangers of Hegel's philosophy by considering the registers of history, government, and subjectivity as aspects of Hegel's construction of truth through the institutional apparatus of the University of Berlin.

Chapter 5 — The Apparatus of Capture: The University of Berlin and the Effects of Truth

State I call it where all drink poison, the good and the wicked; state, where all lose themselves, the good and the wicked; state, where the slow suicide of all is called “life.” Behold the superfluous! They steal the works of the inventors and the treasures of the sages for themselves; “education” they call their theft—and everything turns to sickness and misfortune for them.

— Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*

Having outlined the three anchor points in my construction of a Foucauldian critique of Hegel, in this chapter I will assemble these critical elements to fully articulate the dangers of Hegel’s interpellative tautologies at the University of Berlin. I will begin by revisiting Hegel’s conceptual reception of the French Revolution, and further analyze its actual reception through the Franco-Prussian war. Within the context of Napoleon’s defeat of Prussia, I will consider some of Hegel’s key statements regarding education. I will then examine the University of Berlin as an apparatus of capture in relation to the registers of history, government, and subjectivity, indicating how the institution is, for Hegel, the key mechanism that is capable of bridging the gap between the actual and the rational. Following this examination, I will investigate the *truth-effects* of Hegel’s philosophical project at the University of Berlin, juxtaposing Hegel’s notion of truth with Foucault’s concerns regarding the political implications of “truth-telling.” Finally, I will demonstrate the serious dangers that are made possible through the relation among history, truth, and politics in an extensive consideration of Hegel’s justification of colonialism in Africa and the genocide in the Americas. As a point of conclusion in this chapter, I will pose some questions regarding Hegel’s “success” and the potential for criticisms of the contemporary university institution in light of my Foucauldian critique of Hegel.

Napoleon and the Context of Prussian Politics

Returning to the question of the French Revolution in Hegel’s thought, it is important to

recall the significance this event has for Hegel because it indicates some of the necessary conditions for political subjectivity in the modern liberal State. Again, as we saw in chapter four, Hegel's interest is in developing the concept of the French Revolution such that its desirable political ends can be incorporated into the ethical life of German statehood without the violence and destruction that accompanied the Revolution in France. In the *History of Philosophy*, Hegel explains,

In Germany this principle has burst forth as thought spirit, Notion; in France, in the form of actuality. In Germany, what there is of actuality comes to us as a force of external circumstances, and as a reaction against the same. The task of modern German philosophy is, however, summed up in taking as its object the unity of thought and Being, which is the fundamental idea of philosophy generally, and comprehending it, that is, in laying hold of the inmost significance of necessity, the Notion.¹

In this passage, the significance of internalizing the Revolution as a mediated ethical concept within Hegel's thought is clear. However, the French Revolution did not only reach Prussia as a thought to be internalized. In fact, Napoleon, as a culmination of the revolutionary spirit in France, arrived on the actual battlefield in an event that is key to understanding Hegel's political philosophy.

Napoleon had not only radically transformed the system of education in France (reforming every level of education, including the creation of the *Grandes Écoles*), but he had also based his pedagogical designs specifically on the military needs for *La Grande Armée*. For Napoleon, the creation of citizens and construction of soldiers was an identical enterprise — the specificity of their education differed only in relation to their proximity to the front line. Napoleon's state war-machine was thus comprised of "citizen soldiers," with his civil servants educated in the *Grandes Écoles* and acting in service of the military apparatus. In his book *The Napoleonic Wars*, David Gates explains how this smooth State machine, under Napoleon, made the organization of the Prussian government and military, in contrast, an embarrassing failure. He writes,

¹ Hegel, *History of Philosophy*, p. 409.

The Prussian leadership had little information as to the precise whereabouts of Napoleon's army. Nor could they agree on a plan with which to confront it. In a series of protracted and often acrimonious councils of war, they repeatedly adopted new schemes, only to jettison them shortly afterwards. Unlike their adversary's, their army's basic building block remained the regiment; there was no permanent structure of corps or divisions, and foot, horse, and artillery units were cobbled together as and when required. Neither was there a general staff to coordinate the activities of the army's myriad elements, not a clear chain of command to implement any decisions that were taken.²

The Prussian forces lacked a clear goal and a structure that would assure that orders were not only coherent, but also that they were hierarchically arranged to guarantee their efficiency throughout the ranks. The tangible successes of Napoleon's State organization, the education of soldiers and citizens as a unified project, and that the subsequent impact of this project on the Prussian government and citizenry should not be underestimated. The interest in emulating the organizational structures of Napoleon's State-machine, with respect to National education, the military, and the rights-based politics that had emerged from the French Revolution, had considerable and lasting effects on the Prussian political stage. Weil indicates that, the Napoleonic Wars were to have greater repercussions [in Berlin] than in any of the other great capitals ... In the space of four years Prussia was transformed: land became alienable (with the sole exception of entailed land), the peasants were freed, the *corvées* abolished within almost all its domains, the towns given great administrative autonomy, the provincial diets allowed to meet again and reformed, the greater part of the nobility's special privileges abolished, intellectual life [*la science*] freed from direct supervision of the State, and the professional army transformed into a national one.³

Despite this important influence, the actual results of Napoleon's victory over Prussia make his reception in Hegel's thought particularly complex. Without encumbering my analysis with an extensive review of the literature, within which Hegel's response to Napoleon remains an area of intense scholarly debate, I would like to suggest that, in general, the achievements of Napoleon's

² Gates, David, *The Napoleonic Wars 1803-1815* (London, Pimlico, 2003), p. 54.

³ Weil, *Hegel and the State*, pp. 10-11.

campaign are demonstrable throughout the Prussian political scene and should therefore be seen as the backdrop to any consideration of Hegel's philosophy at the University of Berlin. As Napoleon himself was well aware, "You must not fight too often with one enemy, or you will teach him (all) your art of war."⁴ Indeed, the Prussians had definitely learned some powerful lessons about State organization and education from Napoleon.

Due to the pedagogical core of these political lessons, they initiate a discussion of the founding of the University of Berlin.⁵ In 1810, approximately four years after the Napoleonic forces had easily conquered the Prussian army and Prussia had surrendered to France (November 7, 1806), Wilhelm von Humbolt, at the behest of the reformist Prussian government, founded the University of Berlin on October 10, 1810, as the "Mother of all modern universities."⁶ Humbolt had conceived of a university which would "achieve a unity of teaching and research and provide students with an all-round humanist education. This concept spread throughout the world and gave rise to the foundation of many universities of the same type over the next century and a half."⁷ Reid notes that, "The fact that [the University of Berlin] was a State university ensured it was largely free from religious and princely interference but it was fully dependent on the State. Thus, the University was expected to produce highly-skilled Prussian civil servants and military leaders,

⁴ *Napoleon on War*, http://www.napoleonguide.com/maxim_war.htm, October 19, 2004.

⁵ For discussions of the historical context, see Karl Ameriks, "Introduction: interpreting German Idealism," in *The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism*, edited by Karl Ameriks (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000), pp. 1-17; and, Frederick Beiser, "The Enlightenment and idealism," in *The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism*, pp. 18-36. For the relationship between Hegel and Kant that is a key aspect of this historical context, see Paul Guyer, "Absolute idealism and the rejection of Kantian dualism," in *The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism*, pp. 37-56; and Ardis B. Collins, "Hegel's Critical Appropriation of Kantian Morality," in *Beyond Liberalism and Communitarianism: Studies in Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, edited by Robert R. Williams (Albany: SUNY Press, 2001), pp. 21-40.

⁶ "History of Humbolt-Universität," http://hu-berlin.de/hu/geschichte/hubdt_e.html, October 12, 2004.

⁷ *Ibid.*

following the successful Napoleonic model of the *grandes écoles*.⁸ Reid's insightful reading goes on to stress the significance of the University of Berlin as an event that is emblematic of the philosophical ambitions of German thinkers, including J.G. Fichte, Friedrich Schleiermacher and Wilhelm von Humboldt. However, what is perhaps most important in Reid's analysis is that the University of Berlin is not abstracted from the political considerations that formed an important part of the debates that led to its founding and initial design. In the remainder of this chapter, my goal is further Reid's analysis of the University of Berlin by continuing to problematize the smooth, apolitical narrative that describes the university as a site that emerges to perpetuate humanistic concerns and facilitate intellectual research. In fact, within Reid's analysis, the political nature of the University of Berlin is immediately evident in a consideration of the diverse perspectives suggested by Fichte, Schleiermacher and Humboldt, all of whom ascribe to the university apparatus specifically political functions. Indeed, all three thinkers can be seen to articulate the need for an educational apparatus that reflects political concerns and, despite the clear differences in their interests and affiliations, the goals they set for the institution have important and unavoidable political dimensions.⁹ However, in a further consideration of Hegel's views on education and his goals for the University of Berlin, I will indicate that it is Hegel's

⁸ Jeffrey Reid, "Review — *Clio the Romantic Muse*," in *Clio*, 34, 1-2 (Fall/Winter 2004-2005), p. 199.

⁹ For Hegel's views on Fichte, within the context of the history of German philosophy, see G. W. F. Hegel, *The History of Philosophy – Volume Three*, translated by E.S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson (New York: Humanities Press, 1968), pp. 479-506; on Schleiermacher, pp. 508-510. For additional claims that indicate the political significance of the university for Fichte, see J.J. Chambliss, editor, *Enlightenment and Social Progress: Education in the Nineteenth Century* (Minneapolis: Burgess Publishing Company, 1971), pp. 25-27; H.C. Engelbrecht, *Johann Gottlieb Fichte: A Study of his political writings with special reference to his Nationalism* (New York: AMS Press, 1933), p. 100 & p. 123; and, H. S. Reiss, Introduction to *The Political Thought of the German Romantics: 1793-1815*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955), pp. 18-19. For the political function of the university according to Schleiermacher, see F. E. D. Schleiermacher, "On the Concepts of Different Forms of the State," in *The Political Thought of the German Romantics: 1793-1815*, edited by H.S. Reiss (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955), p. 183 & p. 193; Theodore Ziolkowski, *Clio the Romantic Muse: Historicizing the Faculties in Germany* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004), p. 23; and, Reiss, Introduction to *The Political Thought of the German Romantics*, p. 36. For Humboldt's views on the university and its relation to politics, see Ziolkowski, *Clio the Romantic Muse*, p. 25.

pedagogical project at the University of Berlin that demonstrates a dangerous formalization of the relationship between truth, political power and subjectivity.

Hegel's Conception of Education

Hegel's views on education must be further interrogated to develop the possibilities for a Foucauldian reading of the University of Berlin.¹⁰ As Reid indicates, for Hegel, the university is not the site of cultural culmination for a people or State, rather, "The university is a preparation for active involvement, a place where man learns formally what he will effect in earnest within the public sphere, i.e. within the state taken as the expression of actual freedom."¹¹ Reid's explanation returns us to the relation between the rational and actual in Hegel's thought. It is important to note again that, for Hegel, the concept of the State and its attendant need for war (chapter four) is realized theoretically in the *Philosophy of Right*, however, this realization requires a systematic educational apparatus that will create its correlate in the actual world. In this sense, the pedagogical functions of the university institution indicate the gap between the rational and actual. At the same time, for Hegel, the university institution represents the highest possibility for overcoming this gap. In his estimation of the University of Berlin, Hegel breaks with the ideas of its original founders by proposing specific ends to which the students of the university will be directed — that is, the realization of the Science of Spirit in the actual world. As Reid notes, the determinate goal of Hegel's philosophical project, as it culminates in the university, is at odds with

¹⁰ Ian Hunter, in "Assembling the School," provides a review of many genealogies of education and examines the possibility of incorporating Foucault's work into an analysis of educational institutions. Despite his informative treatment of many aspects of the school systems, Hunter's brief mentions of Hegel fail to articulate the significance of Hegel's thought, as well as that of German Idealism and the University of Berlin, on the contemporary institution of the university. See Ian Hunter, "Assembling the School," in *Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, neo-liberalism and rationalities of government*, edited by Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 143-166.

¹¹ Reid, "Hegel and the State University," p. 13.

the earlier series of more indeterminate ends that led to its founding. Reid explains,

Philosophy, i.e. science, as represented by Fichte, Schelling, Schleiermacher, Humbolt, and Pestalozzi, not only provided the theoretical underpinnings of the institution, but expressed its very spirit, its freedom conceived as an expression of self-determination taking place within a broader expression of national self-determination. Hegel, when he arrived at Berlin in 1818, strongly challenged these philosophical foundations and their attendant notion of freedom, along with the ontological status of the university itself.¹²

Hegel's dissonant conceptual vision for the University of Berlin is also described in Althaus' biography of Hegel, where Hegel's view of academic freedom is clearly distinguished from that of Fichte, Schleiermacher, and Humbolt. As Althaus indicates, it is precisely Hegel's unique conception of the State *as* freedom that is at the root of this distinction. He writes,

In October 1829 Hegel was elected Rector of the University of Berlin. Hegel's one-year tenure of the office marked the first time that the position was combined with that of Deputy Government Representative. This arrangement hardly corresponded to the spirit of Humbolt's original university reforms. The government clearly saw Hegel as the appropriate man to discharge this new double function and they were certainly right in this. As the philosopher of freedom and the philosopher of a state where freedom and law essentially came together, at least in his eyes, Hegel was pleased to celebrate the academic freedom of teaching and learning at the University of Berlin in his Latin rectorial address delivered on 18 October.¹³

Again, for Hegel, it is the institution of the university that will be the site of production for the correct understanding of history, government, and political subjectivity itself, all within the Science of Spirit. In contrast to Fichte, Schleiermacher and Humbolt, Hegel sees the determinate realization of his philosophical system, whereby the rational constellation of the dialectic is mapped onto the actual world, as the goal of the university institution. Again, because the teleological narrative of Hegelian Science can only be fully completed by closing the gap between

¹² Reid, "Hegel and the State University," p. 11.

¹³ Horst Althaus, *Hegel: An Intellectual Biography*, translated by Michael Tarsh (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), p. 267.

the rational and actual, for Hegel, the pedagogical functions of the University of Berlin must interpellate students as subjects of the Hegelian system who can enter to actual world and shape it in the “correct” image of the rational.

In addition to Hegel’s explicit pedagogical concerns noted in the biographical literature, and his obvious interest in education within his published writings, several of his personal letters also provide a clear insight into his pedagogical theory and its political implications. A major concern he articulates in several letters is that the study of philosophy, as a science, should be reserved for the university. The basic content of thought (i.e. historical events and cultural knowledge) should be taught to younger students at the gymnasium only in anticipation of the philosophical redescription that will elevate this material into its proper conceptual assemblage later, in the institution of the university. In a letter written to Niethammer on October, 1812, Hegel explains,

It is that perhaps all philosophical instruction in the gymnasium might appear superfluous, that the study of the ancients may be best adapted to gymnasium youth and, in point of substance, may be the true introduction to philosophy. ... my more immediate interest would be for professors of philosophical sciences to be declared superfluous in the gymnasiums and either given another task or sent elsewhere.¹⁴

Similarly, in a letter to Von Raumer, written 2 August, 1816, Hegel writes, “When the young begin the study of the sciences they have already been touched if only by the uncertain rumor of other ideas and methods, so that they approach this study without the requisite preconceived idea of their authority and importance.”¹⁵ In the same letter, he continues, “Youth, at the outset of the new philosophy, at first found it agreeable to be able to polish off the study of philosophy and even

¹⁴ G. W. F. Hegel, *The Letters*, translated by Clark Butler and Christine Seiler, with commentary by Clark Butler (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1984), p. 283.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, p. 338.

the sciences in general by means of a few universal formulas that were supposed to contain all.”¹⁶ Therefore, Hegel argues, “philosophy instruction in the universities can accomplish what it ought — an acquisition of definite knowledge — only if it adopts a *definite methodical procedure*, encompassing and *ordering detail*.”¹⁷ For Hegel, this “ordering detail” must begin at the level of the gymnasium, where students are taught the historical content appropriate to the subsequent conceptual description provided by Hegelian Science in the university. As we saw in chapter two, this philosophical narration of history has its correlate in Hegel’s metaphysical construction, which is both the ground and realization of this historical narrative. Thus, what is evident from these personal letters is that, for Hegel, the best way to achieve the necessary historical narration within the metaphysical confines of the Science of Spirit is to prepare each student in advance with a focused and specific knowledge of history that anticipates the Hegelian Science.

Hegel’s reference to the definite knowledge that philosophy “ought” to accomplish is described more fully in the *Philosophy of Right*. In the following passage Hegel provides a clear and unapologetic description of the goal of education, writing,

Education [*Pädagogik*] is the art of making human beings ethical: it considers them as natural beings and shows them how they can be reborn, and how their original nature can be transformed into a second, spiritual nature so that this spirituality becomes *habitual* to them. In habit, the opposition between the natural and the subjective will disappears, and the resistance of the subject is broken; to this extent, habit is part of ethics, just as it is part of philosophical thought, since the latter requires the mind [*der Geist*] should be trained to resist arbitrary fancies and that these should be destroyed and overcome to clear the way for rational thought.¹⁸

For Hegel, the “arbitrary fancies” of the individual that must be “destroyed” in the service of rational thought will necessarily include any practices of individuation that deviate from the ethical

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 339.

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 340.

¹⁸ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §151, p. 195.

and political narration of the Science of Spirit. Therefore, any political practices that do not recognize the State as the objective guarantor of freedom, or any ethical practices that avoid or subvert the mediating role of the State, or Civil Society, must be “destroyed” by an educational apparatus that will habituate each individual as a subject of Spirit by breaking his resistance to these practices of mediation.

For Hegel, the pedagogical practice that will conquer the resistance of the individual must be understood in the context of *Bildung*. As Reid explains, “*Bildung*, human culture, is neither an expression of nature nor of the fundamentally natural entity that is the nation. *Bildung* is a particular form of objective spirit, situated within a more general manifestation of objective spirit: the state.”¹⁹ Reid continues, “In Hegel, *Bildung* represents an intermediary instance and not the final, recapitulating moment of objective spirit which is the state. The university moment, which is part of *Bildung*, only acquires meaning within the passage from the natural immediacy of the family to the generality of the state.”²⁰ That is, the university itself is a mode of mediation that participates in the subjugation of the individual to the State. Therefore, as Reid indicates, “The university is a preparation for active involvement, a place where man learns formally what he will effect in earnest within the public sphere, i.e. within the state taken as the expression of actual freedom.”²¹ In this sense, the university is an essential apparatus through which the behaviours necessary for life in the modern State are manufactured. The university is where the subject will learn to willingly accept his subjection to the State and its attendant “right” to mediate his freedom. As Reid and Althaus both noted, this determinate pedagogical function that Hegel ascribes to the university should be understood in a strong contrast to the goals of the university (as an open space

¹⁹ Ibid, pp. 11-12.

²⁰ Ibid, p. 12.

²¹ Ibid, p. 13.

for the creative and indeterminate realization of culture and personal freedoms) that were articulated by Fichte, Schleiermacher and Humbolt.

In this contrast, the coercive aspect of education in Hegel's thought also becomes increasingly apparent. Robert R. Williams' discussion of pedagogical coercion in his article "Reason, Authority, and Recognition in Hegel's Theory of Education," is of particular relevance to the development of a Foucauldian critique. Williams explains that, "Education in its most basic sense is a process of appreciating and becoming a universal person."²² Williams continues, noting that the pedagogical transformation "from nature to spirit is not an automatic or instinctual one. It involved conflict and opposition, and ... involves a struggle."²³ This struggle is, again, related to the process by which the individual will learn to willingly accept his subjugation to the forms of mediation imposed upon him (theoretically) through the Hegelian Science and (practically) through the State. Williams also indicates that Hegel's pedagogical aspirations include disciplinary functions that will lead individuals to fully accept their role as subjects. He writes,

Education involved the disciplining and cultivation of natural drives so that they cease to be arbitrary and self-seeking. This will involve not their extirpation but their disciplining and transformation. Hegel maintains that human beings do not become what they ought to be by instinct. Rather, the instincts and drives must be disciplined and sublimated in order to become ethical.²⁴

In this passage it is clear that, for Williams, the individual must be transformed, or interpellated, into a subject so that he will become what he "ought to be" within Hegelian Science. This transformation does not alter the individual as such, but, again, as we saw with Althusser's theses on ideology, creates categorical limitations on the potential for extensive relations. That is, the

²² Robert R. Williams, "Reason, Authority, and Recognition in Hegel's Theory of Education," in *The Owl of Minerva* 32:1, Fall 2000, p. 54.

²³ Ibid, p. 55.

²⁴ Ibid.

individual, in accepting his subjection, does not undergo a substantive change in his own person, rather, he accepts his subjectivity as a set of possibilities regarding his relational potential. As a subject within Hegelian Science, the individual will *only* extend himself, or relate to others, through the mediation of *Sittlichkeit*, with the State as its highest mode of objectivity. In this context, Williams goes on to defend Hegel's seeming insistence on coercion, writing, "This disciplining of the arbitrary will is not its suppression. Rather Hegel insists that it is the liberation of the arbitrary will (*Willkür*) from narcissistic self-seeking, which is unfreedom, to conformity with the universal-rational will, which is genuine ethical freedom. They must learn obedience ... so that their will may be liberated."²⁵ In this passage we see that subjection and freedom are inextricably linked in Hegel's thought. The coercion required to "destroy" the "arbitrary fancies" of non-mediated relations is justified by claiming that this process of subjugation is, in fact, a liberation. Therefore, as Williams explains,

a coercive but legitimate authority must be obeyed because it is the means to liberation and freedom. ... At the heart of the pedagogical project lie not coercion and violence per se as ends in themselves, but the rejection of these, because the project of education aims at an ethical transformation of the human being into an independent, yet other-regarding self.²⁶

Williams concludes, "What makes this coercion legitimate is its telos of evoking in the pupil independent, habitual, universal ethical freedom that renders the authoritative inequality temporary and authority itself ultimately superfluous."²⁷ Returning to Althusser's claim that subjects must be interpellated such that they can act "all by themselves," we see that, for Hegel, the university is the pedagogical space where this process of internalized subjugation is completed. The coercion of

²⁵ Ibid, p. 57.

²⁶ Ibid, p. 59.

²⁷ Ibid, p. 60.

the Hegelian pedagogy is justified, for Williams, by the fact that this coercion eventually becomes superfluous. However, what must be stressed in this explanation is that this form of interpellation — whereby the individual willingly accepts a new set of relational possibilities within the mediated freedom of the Science of Spirit — is an extremely dangerous form of coercion. The danger is located precisely in the act of internalization, which makes each subject particularly vulnerable to the political power of the State and the economic power of Civil Society by eliminating the potential to contest these dominant structures *as mediators*. If the power of Civil Society is drawn from its pervasive modes of mediation by way of an ever-expanding economy, and the power of the State is derived from its mediating role as the objective guarantor of freedom, then, within the logic of Hegelian Science, the individual who has subjected himself to these modes of mediation can only contest their dominant tendencies by appealing to them (i.e. recognizing them) *as mediators*. In short, within this mode of subjection, resistance to these dominant structures of mediation will be, at best, a reformist criticism that reaffirms the mediating structures that are at the core of the alienation that the subject aims to critique (this is especially true with respect to the endemic problems of poverty and war, in relation, respectively, to Civil Society and the State). By interpellating individuals as subjects to the mediation of Civil Society and the State (with Hegelian Science), and locating the value of their identity within this limited field of relational possibilities, Hegel's philosophy constructs a subjective modality that is dangerous precisely because it is trapped within a tautological network of truths. In this arrangement, the subject cannot engage with fundamental causes of alienation that are located in the mediating functions of Civil Society and the State without destroying his own identity. If, for Hegel, the conceptual mediation of the French Revolution was meant to prevent further revolutionary activity that would challenge the State, it does so by engendering the conviction in each subject that the price one must pay for revolutionary change is his own identity. Yet, as we

will see in the conclusion, these notions of identity and freedom can also be unpacked to reveal the potential for revolutionary political change. However, presently, we must further demonstrate the role of the University of Berlin in achieving the desired political subjectivity of Hegelian Science.

The University of Berlin

For Hegel, the University of Berlin is the apparatus by which the gap between the rational and actual can be finally be sutured, and, therefore, the significance of the university in Hegel's thought cannot be overestimated.²⁸ The Foucauldian critiques of the historical, governmental and subjective registers, separated analytically in the previous chapters, may now be brought together to develop a more complete criticism of the University of Berlin as an institutional site for the production of truth. That is, we must determine how these registers function to reinforce and reestablish one another in a specific relationship that is indelibly related to truth. In this, we should ask: how, for Hegel, is truth produced in the university? What does this institutional truth reveal about the political and economic structures that are articulated within its discourses? What does this truth require of the individual? And, perhaps most importantly, how does the function of truth at the University of Berlin demonstrate the serious political dangers of Hegel's interpellative tautologies?

Within the register of history, we have seen that Hegel evokes the neutral movement of history as a justification for the metaphysical claims of the dialectic; however, this dialectical

²⁸ It is important to note that while Hegel taught his *Philosophy of Right* and *Encyclopedia*, he never lectured on the *Phenomenology of Spirit* while at the University of Berlin, and, in 1825, is said to have disavowed it as the appropriate introduction for his system of philosophy. However, as Pinkard notes, he "[signed] a contract in 1831 (the year he died) to publish a revised edition of it." See Terry Pinkard, "Hegel's *Phenomenology* and *Logic*: an overview," in *The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism*, edited by Karl Ameriks (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000), p. 161. Despite this ambiguity regarding Hegel's own perception of the *Phenomenology* while at Berlin, it remains a key text for students of Hegel's philosophy and its relevance to understanding Hegel's system should not be discredited simply because it was not taught at the university.

narration also determines the content of the history that it claims as its ground. In this sense, in the register of history, Hegel's philosophy deploys a tautological narrative. It also incorporates interpellative features that call on the individual to participate in the realization of history, as the culmination of Spirit's self-knowledge, by thinking the logical necessity of the progress of history. This method of interpellative creates a conceptual enclosure in which the subject of Hegelian Science must admit the logical, progressive and necessary development of history in order to gain access to the truth of the system. In this sense, history and truth form a bond that ties the Hegelian subject to a history which claims his subjugation is the only comportment to the world which will reveal its Absolute comprehensibility.

At the level of governmentality, we saw that Hegel's argument for the educative value of Civil Society advanced the position that poverty, as a necessary condition of the modern capitalist economy, could not be overcome. Within a Foucauldian critique, we saw that the increasing levels of disparity in society animate the need for more police, bureaucracy, and coercion. It was also demonstrated that, for Hegel, the solution to the problem of poverty, resulting from overproduction, was colonial expansion that would create larger markets while also alleviating problems of overpopulation. Within the context of the University of Berlin, what is important here is that Hegel's description of these aspects of economic life is also a prescriptive gesture. By suggesting that the State *is* freedom, and that its institutions, including those within Civil Society, articulate the highest form of objective mediation, Hegel displaces the issue of poverty. In doing so, the problem of poverty as a necessary feature of Civil Society is lauded as the reason for colonial expansion. Therefore, Hegelian Science interpellates individuals as subjects of the economy through Civil Society, as a mediator of freedom, in relation to the State, whose juridical apparatus guarantees contractual freedoms in relation to private property. In this sense, the Hegelian subject must recognize the several mediated truths: poverty is a necessary condition of

modern economic life; and colonial expansion is a reasonable, albeit imperfect solution to this problem. Because these economic features are necessities within the narrative of progress, the Hegelian subject is again caught in a loop of truth. If the narrative of Civil Society into which the Hegelian subject is interpellated claims that economic disparity and colonialism are necessary truths within the progress of history, any challenge to the economy as a mediator of freedom is foreclosed.

Finally, regarding Hegel's claim that the State *is* freedom, we saw that, within a Foucauldian critique, a subject must be a *subject of* something. For Hegel, because the State is the highest form of objective freedom, each individual must be interpellated to recognize this truth. In this sense, only by subjecting himself willingly to Hegelian Science, and, practically, to the State, is the individual free. For Hegel, the individuals' subjugation to the system is his liberation within it. However, as a subject of the State, within Hegelian Science, the subject is also required to recognize the State as the sole guarantor of his freedom. In order to maintain this relationship of recognition, the State must perpetuate war with other States. In war, the State manufactures a coherent social whole by demonstrating to each of its subjects that their property, family, and life itself is expendable. In times of peace, as well as those of social upheaval and instability, the State enacts its "right" to create war as a means to retain its predominance as the sole mediator of the freedom of its subjects. Therefore, because Hegel's narrative locates the truth of the State in its function as the mediator of objective freedom, the Hegelian subject must accept the necessity of war, along with all its senseless atrocities, if he desires freedom.

These three registers come together as the philosophical narrative that, for Hegel, the university must create, through its discourses of knowledge, as truth. In this sense, subjects are bound by a truth that is recognized as a part of themselves, as a feature that both permits and stabilizes their own identity. Having willingly accepted their subjugation in order to gain the

knowledge of truth offered by Hegelian Science, the potential for ethical and political relations are conditioned by the mediations required by this system and its institutional correlates in the actual world. Within this system, concerns regarding society, politics and culture that question the role of mediation at the level *Sittlichkeit* are reduced to “misunderstandings.” As we have seen in the literature, the criticisms of Hegel’s political and economic theory are often dismissed for failing to fully appreciate the larger metaphysical narrative of the system. However, as we have seen, these explanations, in Hegel’s own philosophy as well as in the literature, rely on a complex assemblage of tautologies that function to continually re-emphasize the truth of the system.

Therefore, if, as Reid explains, for Hegel, “[t]he place where truth is *taught* is the university,”²⁹ then we must also further specify the dangers of truth within this institution and trace its effects. Perhaps the most immediate and obvious example of the danger of *truth-effects* that comes to mind in the history of philosophy is Heidegger’s speech “The Self Assertion of the German University,” because this speech not only explicitly justified the political ambitions of National Socialism, but it, at the same time, linked these ambitions to the realization of truth as it was understood within Heidegger’s philosophy and its articulation within the university institution. Heidegger states,

Out of the resolve of the German students to stand firm in the face of the extreme distress of German fate comes a will to the essence of the university. This will is a true will, provided that the German students, through the new Student Law, place themselves under the law of their essence and thereby delimit this essence for the very first time. ... The German student’s notion of freedom is now being returned to its truth.³⁰

Clearly, Heidegger’s egregious support for the Nazi regime in this passage highlights, at least provisionally, the dangerous relationship between politics and truth. However, this example of the

²⁹ Reid, “Hegel and the State University,” p. 15.

³⁰ Martin Heidegger, “The Self-Assertion of the German University,” in *The Heidegger Controversy*, edited by Richard Wolin (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1993), p. 34.

essence of the university being evoked in relation truth and freedom as justifications for Fascism still fails to provide us a complete picture of the danger of *truth-effects*. However, it does indicate that, within the university institution, truth claims should be questioned with respect to their attendant political motivations, even if these motives are not as explicit as those in Heidegger's speech. With respect to Hegel, we must determine how, precisely, within a Foucauldian critique the University of Berlin, the institutional capacity for producing truth is a serious danger.

In his extensive review of Hegel's thought, Michael N. Forster states that one of the metaphysical tasks of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* was to "[demonstrate] that truth is constituted by enduring communal consensus, and ... [establish] an enduring communal consensus in favour of Hegelian Science in order to make possible and actual Hegelian Science's truth."³¹ However, as we have seen, demonstrating and establishing a "communal consensus" *as truth* over the course of human history requires a vast metaphysical narrative that will interpellate individuals into accepting their subjugation within this system as the very condition of possibility for *knowing the truth*. Hegel affirms this position in the *Philosophy of Mind*, writing,

This notion of philosophy is the self-thinking Idea, the truth aware of itself — the logical system, but with the signification that it is universality approved and certified in concrete content as in its actuality. In this way the science has gone back to its beginning: its result is the logical system but as a spiritual principle: out of the presupposing judgement, in which the notion as only implicit and the beginning an immediate — and thus out of the *appearance* which it had there — it has risen into its pure principle and thus also into its proper medium.³²

³¹ Michael N. Forster, *Hegel's Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 193.

³² Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §574, pp. 313-4. For further considerations of the function of the Absolute in Hegel's system, see Mitchell H. Miller Jr., "The Attainment of the Absolute Standpoint in Hegel's *Phenomenology*," in *The Phenomenology of Spirit Reader: Critical and Interpretive Essays*, edited by Jon Stewart (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998), pp. 427-443; John Burbige, "Hegel's Absolutes," in *The Owl of Minerva*, 29, 1 (Fall 1997), pp. 23-37; Simon Lumsden, "Absolute Knowing," *The Owl of Minerva*, 30, 1 (Fall 1998), pp. 3-32; Rob Devos, "How Absolute is Hegel's Absolute Knowing?," *The Owl of Minerva*, 30, 1 (Fall 1998), pp. 33-50; Stephen Houlgate, "Absolute Knowing Revisited," *The Owl of Minerva*, 30, 1 (Fall 1998), pp. 51-67. For a discussion of absolute knowing in relation to Idealism, see William Maker, "Idealism

For Hegel, the realization of Absolute knowledge is the culmination of Spirit's self-knowledge, however, this possibility is not simply an epistemological emancipation. The desire for Absolute Knowledge requires that the Hegelian subject accept the terms of mediation that make this knowledge possible. As we have seen, the prerequisites of epistemological freedom (the freedom of Absolute Knowledge) are explicitly political. Of course, a key feature of Hegelian scholarship demonstrated in the previous chapters is the attempt to forge a separation between the metaphysical (rational) freedom in Hegel's philosophy and its political (actual) correlate. As Solomon stresses,

the general German tendency to depoliticize "freedom" and relegate it to the realm of metaphysics and personal morality" should make it "evident that one can talk quite sensibly and unobjectionably of Hegel use of the word "freedom" to characterize his enterprise without introducing distinctly political questions ... Freedom, for Hegel, has to do with identification — how one sees oneself (as citizen, as rebel, as stoic, as master as slave), it is not the political question of societal restraints and duties.³³

Yet, should we not assert, against Solomon's argument (as we have seen in the previous chapters) how individuals understand themselves and their relational potential has everything to do with politics in the actual world? In fact, Foucault's research reveals the importance of developing a critique of the metaphysical structures that form the basis of identity, because it is in this conception of oneself that the relational potential for politics and ethics is located. In Hegelian Science, the understanding of real political freedoms in the State cannot be separated out from Hegel's concept of subjective identity without obscuring essential features of Hegel's narrative. Within a Foucauldian critique, it is this very relation, between the individual, as a subject, and the

and Autonomy," *The Owl of Minerva*, 34, 1 (Fall/Winter 2002-03), pp. 59-75; Jean Hyppolite, *Logic and Existence*, translated by Leonard Lawlor and Amit Sen (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997), pp. 177-8; Will Dudley, "Systemic Philosophy and Idealism," *The Owl of Minerva*, 34, 1, (Fall/Winter 2002-03), p. 101; and, W. T. Stace, *The Philosophy of Hegel* (Toronto: Dover Publications, 1955), p. 440.

³³ Ibid, p. 20.

State and its institutions, as the necessary mediators of actual freedom, that must be emphasized. In this respect, Foucault foregrounds the problem of political subjectivity by locating its construction within the meta-historical and sovereignty-centred discourses of the modern political State. Regarding subjectivity, Butler suggests that with Foucault, “the ‘subject’ and its ‘desire’ have come to suffer the process of historicization, and the presumed universality of the Hegelian discourse becomes increasingly suspect. Indeed, it becomes crucial to ask just how this subjected is constituted, under what conditions, and by what means.”³⁴ With my construction of a Foucauldian critique, the means by which the subject is constituted, for Hegel, are a series of tautological interpellations whereby the individual willingly subjugates himself to Hegelian Science, so that, through this subjugation, he might participate in the truth of Spirit’s self-understanding. That is, again, Hegelian Science hails or calls each student of the system to recognize himself in the truth of its narrative and, as a participant, further propagate its narrative as truth.

However, I want to stress that the conclusion of my construction of a Foucauldian critique cannot simply re-emphasize that Hegel’s philosophy is tautological. In fact, as many commentators have explained, philosophy itself has a tendency to evoke complex tautological arguments that are, in fact, a key feature of its own mode of expression. Kevin Thompson stresses this point, writing,

Philosophy must be uniquely self-justifying. Reason must set its own standards, and it must itself judge whether it has in fact complied with them, thereby demonstrating its right standing before its own tribunal. ... To justify such a system as this thus requires that philosophy be inherently circular. The system must circle back upon itself so as to validate its beginning, its methodology, and, in turn, its completion, the whole it forms.³⁵

³⁴ Judith Butler, *Subjects of Desire* (New York: Columbia UP, 1999), p. 232.

³⁵ Kevin Thompson, “Systematicity and Experience: Hegel and the Function of the History of Philosophy,” in *Hegel’s History of Philosophy: New Interpretations*, edited by David A. Duquette (Albany: SUNY Press, 2003), p. 171.

Of course, within the history of philosophy, this explanation of tautological thought — as a circular epistemology — appears quite reasonable. To further complicate the critique of Hegel's tautological narrative, we should also consider what may be the most important statement regarding this aspect of Hegel's philosophy. In his 1930-31 lecture course on Hegel, Heidegger explains,

We *must* repeat again and again that *Hegel presupposes already at the beginning what he achieves at the end*. But we ought not to bring this up as an objection to the work. It should not be brought up as an objection, not because it does not touch Hegel, but because it completely misses the point of philosophy. ... what does it mean to enter into philosophy? It means that we yield to what is essential in philosophy, so that, in view of the tasks shown there, we may gain clarity *about ourselves* — whether we still have or can have essential tasks, and, if so, what kind of tasks.³⁶

Indeed, Heidegger's assertion that Hegelian philosophy is valuable because its circular epistemology reveals essential truths about "ourselves" provides a strong retort to any claim that the tautological aspect of Hegel's thought makes it objectionable. However, the critique that I have constructed using Foucault's research has specifically avoided any *de facto* assertions about the value of Hegel's thought, focusing on the effects his circular epistemology has in real political terms. In this sense, we can agree with Heidegger and claim that Hegel's thought should not be dismissed merely because of its tautological design. However, we must also go further than Heidegger and ask: what, precisely, does the tautological Hegelian narrative reveal that is essential (i.e. true) about ourselves? As we have seen in the previous chapters, Hegelian Science articulates the human condition such that the only true, objective freedom that we can experience is that which is mediated by the State — *freedom which is the State itself* — even if the State requires

³⁶ Martin Heidegger, *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, translated by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana UP, 1994), p. 31.

extensive measures of control, violence and war to demonstrate this to each free subject. The Hegelian subject, in accepting the political rationality of the State as true, also becomes subject to this truth such that any resistance to the mediators of the system threatens (theoretically) to destroy the very possibility for subjective identity. As Foucault states,

There can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth which operate through and on the basis of this association. We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth. ... In the end, we are judged, condemned, classified, determined in our undertakings, destined to a certain mode of living or dying, as a function of the true discourses which are the bearers of the specific effects of power.³⁷

As we will see in the final section of this chapter, Foucault's statement that we are "destined to a certain mode of living or dying" as a function of *truth-effects* is far from hyperbolic. In fact, truth, especially within the Hegelian system, has an essential role in determining what lives and dies.

***Aufhebung* and Genocide**

I have chosen to deal with the question of genocide in the Americas because, for me, it is a concern that demonstrates the seriousness of *truth-effects*, while also indicating, at least partially, the cultural blindness that we often perpetuate in dealing with our own political and geographical history in North America. In *Language, counter-memory, practice*, Foucault describes his reading of "effective" history as an engagement which,

deprives the self of the reassuring stability of life and nature, and it will not permit itself to be transported by a voiceless obstinacy toward a millennial ending. It will uproot its traditional foundations and relentlessly disrupt its pretended continuity. This is because knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting.³⁸

³⁷ Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 93-4.

³⁸ Foucault, *Language, counter-memory, practice*, p. 154.

If, as Foucault says, knowledge is a tool for cutting, it is my aim, in this section, to use Foucault's analysis to dissect the *truth-effects* of Hegel's philosophy to demonstrate, clearly and without apology, that the Hegelian system of philosophy was employed as a *justification* (not simply an explanation) of the genocide in the Americas. I do not mean to indicate that this justification was an aberration in Hegel's thought, or a clumsy accident within his philosophy. Rather, it will be demonstrated that Hegel's argument regarding the genocide of the Americas is in complete continuity with Hegel's thought as he claims to explicate the rational truth of history in the Science of Spirit. In this argument, I hope to indicate, without hyperbole, the devastating and dangerous effects that the relationship among history, truth and politics can produce. Of course, I recognize that an argument supporting the genocide in the Americas is not the only *truth-effect* related to Hegel's thought; however, if there is an aspect of Hegel's political philosophy that has been avoided and underestimated in the literature, it is precisely this: what are the specific ethical and political implications for a philosophical system that accommodated the genocide of an entire continent as a necessary moment in the progress and triumph of reason, the objective freedom of the State, and the truth of history?

However, before I further develop a Foucauldian critique of Hegel's philosophical relationship to the genocide of the Americas, I want to take up the claim, prevalent among liberal critics of Foucault, that his genealogical project fails to clearly mark the distinction between totalizing and totalitarian systems.³⁹ At the most fundamental level, this criticism is based on the conviction that Foucault obscures the distinction between thought and action, or philosophy and politics, by criticizing, on an equal plane, (theoretically) totalizing systems of thought and (politically) totalitarian systems of government. In my opinion, this criticism fails to take into account Foucault's own unique philosophical intervention whereby he challenges the very

³⁹ For the most concise statement of this criticism, see Hanssen, *Critique of Violence*, pp. 152-157.

distinction between these two regimes. For Foucault, there cannot be a totalitarian political system that is not supported by its own logic of necessity. That is, every political order manufactures narratives regarding its own claims to legitimacy, and, despite the violent repression and lack of political freedoms associated with totalitarian governments, *every* sovereign State must, at the rational level, provide some account of itself. From the other side of the argument, Foucault sees that all totalizing narratives, by their very design, aspire, so to speak, to this privileged position of realization in which theoretical ambitions are manifest in the actual structures and institutions of politics. In *Hegelese*, the rational desires actualization as much as the actual desires rationalization. Therefore, for Foucault, criticism it is not a question of maintaining the distinction between these two fields; rather, critical analysis should endeavour to locate the precise point of contact between the rational and the actual in order to demonstrate their co-dependence and potentially intervene. It is not enough to simply condemn totalitarian regimes without critically engaging with the logic that supports them, and, at the same time, it is necessary to critique totalizing narratives as they endeavour, through multiple, and often complex and diffuse channels and apparatuses, to ascend to political reality. As Foucault contends, “Knowledge does not slowly detach itself from its empirical roots, the initial needs from which it arose, to become pure speculation subject only to the demands of reason; its development is not tied to the constitution and affirmation of a free subject; rather, it creates a progressive enslavement to its instinctive violence.”⁴⁰ In this passage we see, again, that the rational seeks out actualization as a feature inherent to its own existence. Therefore, the implications for the connection between the rational and the actual must be fully developed to understand the inherent political significance of meta-historical narratives.

Returning to Hegel, it is important to emphasize again that Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*

⁴⁰ Foucault, *Language, counter-memory, practice*, p. 163.

argues in favour of colonial expansion as a result of the economic model (within *Sittlichkeit*) that it describes as the realization of freedom. Hegel writes,

it is precisely in overproduction and the lack of a proportionate number of consumers who are themselves productive that the evil [*Übel*] consists [*besteht*] ... This shows that, despite an *excess of wealth*, civil society is *not wealthy enough* – i.e. its own distinct resources are not sufficient – to prevent an excess of poverty and the formation of a rabble.⁴¹

As we saw in chapter three, it is this problem of overproduction within the modern capitalist economy that leads Hegel to argue in favour of colonial expansion as a solution to the problem of poverty. This concern for expansion leads directly to Hegel's views on colonialism and genocide. Michael H. Hoffheimer writes, "America offers the most extreme example of Hegel's effort to ground world history on a racial hierarchy. His exclusion of American Indians from history was more complete than any other group."⁴² Hoffheimer refers to Hegel's position on the colonization of the Americas as "ambivalent rationalizations for European colonial genocide."⁴³ However, read closely, and within the context of Hegel's philosophy of history and science of the State, I believe that a Foucauldian critique demonstrates that Hegel's statements are anything but ambivalent. Hoffheimer quotes Hegel's lecture notes, compiled as the *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*:

The tribes of North America have in part disappeared, and in their part withdrawn from contact with the Europeans. Their degeneration indicates that they do not have the strength to join the independent North American states. *Culturally inferior nations such as these are gradually eroded through contact with more advanced nations which have gone through a more intensive cultural development.* For the citizens of the independent states of North America are all of European descent, and the original inhabitants were

⁴¹ Ibid, §245, p. 267.

⁴² Michael H. Hoffheimer, "Hegel, Race, Genocide," in *The Southern Journal of Philosophy – Supplement* (Memphis: Department of Philosophy, University of Memphis, 2001), p. 35.

⁴³ Ibid, p. 35.

unable to amalgamate with them.⁴⁴

In this passage, Hegel explains that the “erosion” (i.e. genocide) of “culturally inferior nations” is explained by their insufficient cultural development, in contrast to European Nation-States, and is therefore both a logical and necessary outcome within Hegelian Science. Although Hegel’s statements on the genocide of the Americas provide a clear indication of how the truth of history, within his system, leads to this defence of the eradication of the “culturally inferior,” Hegel’s comments on colonialism are not isolated to America. Hegel also proposes that Africa must be understood as culturally inferior, arguing in the *Philosophy of History* that, “Africa proper, as far as History goes back, has remained — for all purposes of connection with the rest of the world — shut up; it is the Gold-land compressed within itself — the land of childhood, which lying beyond the day of self-conscious history, is enveloped in the dark mantle of Night.”⁴⁵ Hegel explains the geographical impediments that have restricted development in Africa, noting that “want of self-control distinguishes the character of the Negroes,” and concluding, “[Africa] is no historical part of the World; it has no movement or development to exhibit.”⁴⁶ Of course, for Hegel, because African nations have not expressed themselves as States, they can have no history. However, when we see the actual political implications of this metaphysical claim — that is, when Hegel clearly argues that Africa is rightfully a site of colonial expansion because it lacks the cultural advancement of the modern European Nation-State, the relation between the meta-narrative of historical progress and the actual political violence that it sanctions is overwhelmingly evident.

⁴⁴ Ibid. My italics. Hoffheimer cites G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, translated by H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991), pp. 163-4. Although the debate in the literature over the veracity of the lecture notes published under Hegel’s name continues, I believe that it can be demonstrated that this passage is in keeping with Hegel’s political philosophy. Also, despite these ongoing debates, the lectures are not so questionable as to prevent their publication under the auspices of the Cambridge University Press.

⁴⁵ Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, p. 91.

⁴⁶ Ibid, pp. 98-99.

As we saw in chapter two, Hegel's metaphysical narrative links the legitimacy of a nation to its articulation through the institution of the State — for Hegel, *there is no nation, history, or freedom outside of the State*. In the *Philosophy of Mind*, Hegel contends, “In the existence of a *nation* the substantial aim is to be a state and preserve itself as such. A nation with no state formation (a *mere nation*), has, strictly speaking, no history — like the nations which existed before the rise of states and others which still exist in the condition of savagery.”⁴⁷ Hegel also clearly defines the development of Nation-States within a narrative of progressive that sees the telos of history as the modern European Nation-State. He writes, “As this development is in time and in real existence, as it is a history, its several stages and steps are the national minds, each of which, as single and endued by nature with a specific character, is appointed to occupy only one grade, and accomplish only one task in the whole deed.”⁴⁸ He continues,

The presupposition that history has an essential and actual end, from the principles of which certain characteristic results logically flow, is called an *a priori* view of it, and philosophy is reproached with *a priori* history writing. ... That history, and above all universal history, is founded on an essential and actual aim, which actually is and will be realized in it — the plan of Providence; that, in short, there is Reason in history, must be decided on strictly philosophical ground, and thus shown to be essentially and in fact necessary.⁴⁹

In this passage, we see that, for Hegel, philosophy must demonstrate that the modern European Nation-State is the highest and most complete expression of freedom within the Science of Spirit. This means, *de facto*, that the genocidal conquest of the Americas, as well as the colonization of Africa, must also be demonstrated as logical, rational necessities. Of course, this claim returns us to the question of the relation between the rational and actual in Hegelian Science. If, as Hegel

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, p. 277.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

claims, the Science of Spirit is the rational articulation of objective freedom *as* the (modern European) State, then, the correlate in the actual political world is its triumph over weaker forms of cultural and political organization.

Within the literature on Hegel's political thought, a variety of (often egregious) explanations have been offered to clear Hegel of any charge that his philosophy expounds a racialized and teleological explanation of colonialism and genocide. Will Dudley argues, "if the conditions of a rational state are not recognizable in a particular, historical state, if people in an existing state are indeed unable to restrain their particular interests, and are indeed unable to guarantee work for those who are willing and able, then those people are simply not free."⁵⁰ Although Dudley's claim does not explicitly justify Hegel's account of genocide, it does articulate the political rationality that underlies Hegel's position. That is, any people who "are simply not free," are, within the political rationality of Hegelian Science, in a position of subordination to those who experience freedom as the State. Of course, it is obvious that, in this context, this rank is not simply an epistemological measure, but, in fact, a clear justification for actual political domination. Regarding Hegel's philosophical description of Africa, Althaus offers the following apology:

Africa remains shut up and in itself and appears untouched by the advances of world history, while its inhabitants are merely ascribed great physical prowess and characteristics of untamable wildness. It is described as a 'land of gold' and a 'land of children.' ... None the less, in contrast to the dominant opinion of the time, Hegel entertains no doubts about the potential educability of its native peoples.⁵¹

Indeed, Hegel certainly espoused the "educability" of African peoples because once the colonies

⁵⁰ Will Dudley, "Freedom and the Need for Protection from Myself," *The Owl of Minerva*, 29, 1 (Fall 1997), p. 58.

⁵¹ Horst Althaus, *Hegel: An Intellectual Biography*, translated by Michael Tarsh (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), p. 177.

were subjected to the expanded markets of their European colonizers, the logic of the State (via the juridical apparatus which ensures contractual arrangements) would allow for the accumulation of capital in the form of private property. This logic is in accord with the discussion of the educative value of Civil Society discussed in chapter three as governmentality, although it is now exported to the colonized peoples of Africa, who, with some additional coercions and violence, would inevitably subject themselves to the principles of the modern capitalist economy, despite their obvious disadvantage in the “free market.” Althaus then explains the distinction between Africa and America, writing, “America is presented as the land of the future, especially for all those for whom Europe has lost its former historical attraction. *It is a land of independence which no longer has to bear the burden of the past* and thus recommends itself to strong new possibilities.”⁵² It is this contrast, between the “educability” of African peoples and the “land of independence which no longer has to bear the burden of the past” that we witness Hegel’s *Aufhebung* of genocide. Kaufmann clarifies the movement of this bloody sublimation, quoting Hegel (citing the German works):

Suppose that ... one now wished to think of great epics which might exist in the future: they would only have to represent the victory of the living rationality which may develop in America, over the incarceration into an infinitely progressing measuring and particularizing. For in Europe every people is now limited by one another and may not, on its part, begin a war against another European people. If one now wants to go beyond Europe, it can only be to America.⁵³

In Althaus’ account and Hegel’s own description (as quoted by Kaufmann), America represents the totally objective freedom that accompanies the *Aufhebung* of “the burden of the past” — in this sense, the sublimation *is* the eradication of the limits that would constrain America, like the

⁵² Ibid, p. 172. My italics.

⁵³ Walter Kaufmann, “The Hegel Myth and Its Method,” in *The Hegel Myths and Legends*, edited by Jon Stewart (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern UP), 1996, p. 99.

European States, if the colonial genocide had not occurred. Therefore, not only is the genocidal occupation of America a logical, rational outcome within the Science of Spirit, but, for Hegel, it is also an *Aufhebung* that inaugurates “strong new possibilities” for the articulation of objective freedom as the State.

The literature also provides more general justifications and explanations for Hegel’s position regarding colonialism and genocide. Kevin Thompson writes, “Hegel clearly affirms that the turmoil of world history is a result of the natural limitations in which rational states must exist ... But he just as adamantly holds that it is in and through this conflict, this struggle between the spirits of the peoples, that a transition to a higher level of determinacy is achieved, that the limited character of nations is overcome in what he calls the “*universal spirit, the spirit of the world.*”⁵⁴ T. M. Knox also affirms this position, writing, “Hegel’s belief that it is possible to discern in history a progressive development — a development of mind — is doubtless open to numerous difficulties, but it is to turn his doctrine upside down to hold that he thinks that the triumph of one “world-historical” nation over another is a triumph of mere brute force (or *Naturgewalt*) when he thinks in fact that it is a triumph of reason.”⁵⁵ In these passages we see that the “higher level of determinacy,” for Thompson, and the “progressive development,” of Knox both articulate a logic that justifies the political eradication of weaker and less (objectively) defined States by those who have achieved higher levels of cultural and political objectivity (i.e. the modern European State). What is of additional significance in Knox’s analysis is that the “triumph of mere brute force” is raised to the conceptual, meta-historical level as a triumph of reason. That is, the colonial conquests of the modern European States over Africa and America do rely on the “brute force” of

⁵⁴ Kevin Thompson, “Reason and Objective Spirit: Method and Ontology in Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*,” in *The Southern Journal of Philosophy – Supplement* (Memphis: Department of Philosophy, University of Memphis, 2001), p. 122.

⁵⁵ T. M. Knox, “Hegel and Prussianism,” in *The Hegel Myths and Legends*, edited by Jon Stewart (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern UP, 1996), p. 78.

military violence and occupation, however, within Hegelian Science, it is only because these States have achieved a higher level of objective freedom that they have the “right” to exercise their military power in the form of genocide and colonialism. In this sense, we should see that the dangers of conflating of reason and political power are not simply indicative of poor scholarship. In fact, the use of a meta-historical (rational) narrative justifies the actual political domination of the colonized peoples of Africa and America. It is precisely for this reason that both Thompson and Knox are implicated in the Foucauldian critique of Hegel’s philosophy — their uses of meta-historical discourse as a justification for the actual political repression that accompanies colonial occupation make them complicit in its violence.⁵⁶

In the context of these apologies, the role of the State *as* freedom remains extremely important because of its decisive relation to truth. Within the Hegelian Science, delimiting *freedom as the State* has extensive political implication for the very definition of *what is human*.

As Houlgate notes,

the state constitutes the objective reality of human freedom, and so cannot simply be assailed or undermined by any individual who chooses to do so, but, once established, *must be respected by all free beings within it as a sphere of inviolable right*. Indeed, as the most developed form of objective freedom, the state constitutes the highest right for free beings and thus has a legitimate claim to ultimate authority over the less developed forms of human freedom.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Of course, there are some scholars who raise concerns about Hegel’s arguments for the *Aufhebung* of genocide, although many of the potentially more rigorous discussions of Hegel’s political thought and its implications are lost in laconic defences of Hegel and his relationship to Nationalism. For a debate on Hegel’s relationship to nationalism and German National Socialism involving T. M. Knox and E. F. Carritt, see Hegel’s Political Philosophy, edited by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Atherton Press, 1970), pp. 1-54; also, see Shlomo Avineri, “Hegel and Nationalism,” in *The Hegel Myths and Legends*, edited by Jon Stewart (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern UP, 1996), pp. 109-128. For additional concerns about the political implications of Hegel’s position on colonialism, see Stephen Houlgate, *Freedom, Truth and History* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 102; H.S. Harris, *Hegel: Phenomenology and System* (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1995), p. 5; and, Barry Cooper, *The End of History: An essay on modern Hegelianism* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), p. 17.

⁵⁷ Stephen Houlgate, *Freedom, Truth and History* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 120. My italics. For a similar statement, see Robert R. Williams, “Reason, Authority, and Recognition in Hegel’s

In this description, the “less developed forms of human freedom” should be understood as referencing both the culturally-inferior Nations (with respect to their articulation as a State), but, also, human beings in general. Despite the Hegelian assertion that the State is nothing other than the subjects and institutions that comprise it, it is clear that, for Hegel, the State *as freedom* is an individual (as we saw in chapter four) with a higher mode of being than the subject. Subjects within the State occupy a certain category of disposability, in comparison to the permanence of the State, which sends its subjects to war as a means to revitalize its own authority as the sole guarantor of freedom. In this sense, the “ultimate authority” that the State wields must also be understood as the power to determine life and death. If the narrative of the State, within Hegelian Science, sets the rank among Nations and among individuals, it is clear that the State, as the objective realization of freedom, has the capacity to make decisions regarding the life and death of its subjects. The question of what *defines the human* is also of importance here, because within Hegelian Science, it is precisely the argument that certain peoples have not achieved a complete articulation of themselves (via the State), and are therefore not *truly free*, which ultimately functions to rank them as less-human (or more expendable). Of course, the abuses of the category of the human are evident from the atrocious events of the 21st century. Still, what is important with respect to a Foucauldian critique of Hegel is that what lives and dies, according to the logic of the State, is determined within the triad of philosophy’s most traditional questions — god, nature and man, or, theology, biology and politics. That is, the Hegelian narrative creates a condition of truth related to the teleological progress of history (i.e. Hegel’s theodicy), with man as the highest articulation of nature that further sublimates himself into the organism of the State as a subject/organ (biology), and justifies the actual politics of domination which he practices. Thus, Hegel’s explanation of the genocide in the Americas is far more than descriptive; the truth of the

Theory of Education,” in *The Owl of Minerva* 32:1, Fall 2000, p. 46.

system is the meta-narrative of progress that sees the eradication of less-objectively defined Nations as a logical and necessary moment in the triumph of reason.⁵⁸

Therefore, we must stress that the education of individuals — the interpellation of subjects within the university, tempered by their studies of history, the logical necessities of government and the needs of subjectivity, all fused and purified in the truth of their rational articulation — is not just a conceptual exercise. How individuals understand their own capacities for extensive relations is clearly constituted by a meta-historical narrative that ranks existing beings, with humans as the highest articulation of nature, and the State as the most objective realization of freedom. Interpellated into this process, the institution creates discourses of knowledge that account for the politics of expansion and colonialism within a meta-historical narrative that interweaves the logic of governmentality with the notions of freedom and subjectivity, and the truth available to the Hegelian subject becomes an ethical and political straightjacket. For this subject, extensive relations must be mediated by the institutions of *Sittlichkeit*, and, at the same time, he must articulate the behaviours necessary to achieve the ends that have been determined by these mediating powers. Therefore, his ethical relations and political convictions must be in accord with the political rationality of Hegelian Science, or he is barred access to the truth of the system. In this context, we should ask, again, for a subject of Hegelian Science, how can an individual effectively challenge modes of domination once he is interpellated into a position of subjectivity

⁵⁸ For another decisive statement regarding Hegel's position on colonialism, see Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2000), p. 82. It should be noted that another key argument used in the literature to avoid a direct engagement with Hegel's claims about colonialism and war is that of Errol E. Harris: "Hegel knew nothing of atomic bombs and intercontinental ballistics; could he have foreseen high explosives, aerial bombardment, fragmentation bombs, napalm, chemical and bacterial warfare, he might well have concluded, as we should, that the patriotic virtues could be no countervailing advantages," see Errol E. Harris, "Hegel's Theory of Sovereignty, International Relations, and War," in *Selected Essays on G.W.F. Hegel*, edited by Lawrence S. Stepelevich (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1993), p. 113. As I have researched the literature on Hegel, war and colonialism, I believe Harris' statement is emblematic of a trend of apologetics that claims Hegel's views on war cannot be seen as entirely problematic because war, in Hegel's time, was not as devastating as it is today. I only note this line of argumentation to indicate the level of complicity in justifying warfare that can be found in the literature; however, I feel that the argument itself is simply so steeped in historical revisionism that it does not even require a rebuttal.

that recognizes their mediations as necessary?

As a conclusion to this chapter, I would like to return briefly to some questions regarding Hegel's philosophical "success," and raise some concerns regarding the contemporary university institution. First, it must be stressed that Hegel did not *cause* the genocide in the Americas. It should be emphasized that, in the argument above, this reading of Hegel *does not* suggest his philosophy was the work which led, causally, to this form of political domination. However, if his philosophical system is deployed, explicitly, to explain the most comprehensive genocide in the history of human existence as a necessary moment in the triumph of reason, we should, indeed, have some serious concerns about what types of subjects this philosophy attempts to produce, and question the value of these limited modes of subjectivity. Second, we must ask how successful Hegel really was in achieving his pedagogical goals at the University of Berlin. Harry Brod explains that, for Hegel, "a political theory must not merely make it possible that what should happen will happen, it must bring it about that what should happen will happen," and, concludes that, because of this position, "Hegel himself failed to adequately realize his project."⁵⁹ However, the impact of Hegel's philosophy on the actual world cannot simply be dismissed because it did not realize itself as a global political doctrine. The point of the Foucauldian critique is, again, not to simply criticize Hegel or Hegelianism, but to examine Hegel's effects in relation to the philosophical explanations of truth and the actual political correlates to these explanations. In this sense, what is of importance is how the categories of political subjectivity that Hegel constructs remain important features of our contemporary experience of ethical and political life. Our

⁵⁹ Harry Brod, *Hegel's Philosophy of Politics: Idealism, Identity and Modernity* (Boulder, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press, 1992), p. 164. For considerations of the practical effects of Hegel's philosophy, see Horst Althaus, *Hegel: An Intellectual Biography*, translated by Michael Tarsh (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), p. 259; Henning Ottman, "Hegel and Political Trends: A Criticism of the Political Hegel Legends," in *The Hegel Myths and Legends*, edited by Jon Stewart (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern UP, 1996), p. 58; and, Eric Weil, *Hegel and the State*, translated by Mark A. Cohen (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 3.

experience of poverty, war, and even genocide remain couched within the discourses that make them articulable. Politically speaking, how these aspects of our experience are narrated is an essential aspect of how we might contest the logic which permits them. In terms of the ethical implications of Hegel's thought, in relation to our contemporary experience, we should take up the question of mediation — that is, does ethical practice require mediation? What types and modes of mediation are narrated as necessary in the contemporary world? How do these narratives of necessity echo and reflect Hegelian Science and its dangers? And, finally, in what ways, in the contemporary world, are we constituted by power and knowledge? If we want political and ethical alternatives that challenge the alleged necessity of poverty, war and genocide, what institutional possibilities are available to help in articulating these alternatives?

This question, in the context of Hegel's *truth-effects*, should also direct us to more specific questions regarding the function of the university institution today. We must ask: what are the effects of the university today? How can we understand the University of Berlin in relation to our own situation, and what types of subjects are interpellated within the contemporary university classroom? Are these subjects capable of dealing with the difficult and pressing political realities of the contemporary world and what theoretical and practical tools are they being given to engage with the actual world? Are they simply being interpellated as subjects of knowledge in order to re-enter the world to *actualize* the rational that is marketed as truth in the classroom?⁶⁰ For Foucault,

The university stands for the institutional apparatus through which society ensures its uneventful reproduction, at the least cost to itself. The disorder within institutions of higher learning, their imminent demise (whether real or apparent), does not extend to the society's will for conservation, identity, and repetition. You are asking what can be done to disrupt the system's cycle of social reproduction; and it isn't enough to suppress or

⁶⁰ For an insightful reading of how the corporate-consumer paradigm effects university education, see Henry A. Giroux, "The Corporate War Against Higher Education," <http://louisville.edu/journal/workplace/issue5pl/giroux.html>, 12 October, 2004.

overturn the university. Other forms of repression must also be attacked.⁶¹

In this passage, it is essential to see that Foucault's challenge to the university is not to change the world, but to recognize its inherent relation to the multiform assemblages of power and knowledge that operate outside its walls. In this sense, we should see the university is a plane of intersection where the production of truth and subjectivity can repeat the logic of dominant structures, or, if it is desirable, challenge their claims to truth. However, these challenges cannot occur within the university alone, and it cannot be a space of pure research because the discourses of knowledge and the categories of subjectivity that it creates are always part of a larger assemblage in the social whole. What is most important, then, is how the university creates a horizon of knowing, or a potential for self-understanding, through its own discourses of knowledge. As we saw in the introduction, Foucault's desire to "escape" the Hegelian project signified his conviction that despite being constituted by power and knowledge, individuals could challenge, undermine, redirect and reconstitute power/knowledge relations because they were never entirely determined by them. With respect to the contemporary university, we must continue to investigate how modes of domination are grounded in narratives that foreclose the potential for contestation through evocations of necessity and truth.

⁶¹ Foucault, *Language, counter-memory, practice*, p. 224.

Conclusion — “Response-ability” and the Ethic of the Fold

For to say that there cannot be a society without power relations is not to say either that those which are established are necessary, or that power in any event, constitutes an inescapable fatality at the heart of societies, such that it cannot be undermined. Instead, I would say that the analysis, elaboration, and bringing into question of power relations and the “agonism” between power relations and the intransitivity of freedom is an increasingly political task — even, the political task that is inherent in all social existence.¹ — Michel Foucault

The study of the variations in the process of subjectification seems to be one of the fundamental tasks which Foucault left to those who would follow him.² — Gilles Deleuze

By way of a conclusion, I want to suggest the possibility of an alternative philosophical pedagogy that is manifest in the work of Foucault. Ultimately, a critique that cannot bear the weight of its own implications by offering potential alternatives remains, at best, only partially useful, and, at worst, a nagging complaint. Though it is obvious that any serious philosophical pedagogy would require more than a few brief concluding pages to merit any extensive consideration, I believe, nonetheless, that it is important to at least frame some potentials for the Foucauldian ethic in order to state with conviction that the interpellative tautologies of Hegel’s thought might be demonstrated to be, in some critique more encompassing than this brief Foucauldian construction, as violent and dangerous as they are unnecessary. I argue that an important reconsideration of freedom — as a surplus of the practices of control — is evident from my construction of a Foucauldian critique of Hegel’s thought. Within the context of this modest conception of freedom, I discuss Foucault’s line of flight from the Hegelian apparatus of capture in order to suggest that, in opposition to the tautological interpellations upon which Hegel’s philosophy depends, an ethic and pedagogy of “response-ability” provides an opportunity for individuation as a meaningful political practice.

¹ Foucault, *Power*, p. 343.

² Deleuze, “*What is a dispositif ?*”, pp. 161-2.

Control and its Surplus

In “Guidelines for the *German Journal of Literature*,” Hegel writes,

Criticism must above all direct inquiry against tradition ... It is precisely what is customary, what has tradition on its side, what is considered long known ... it is precisely this that most needs to be set on its head and challenged, in order first at least to stir up amazement and perplexity and then to give matter for reflection.”³

Perhaps Hegel’s assessment of the value of criticism in this passage offers a certain encouragement for re-evaluating, *against* Hegel, the concept of freedom, especially in relation to contemporary structures of political power and concentrations of capital. Pippin explains that, for Hegel, “the dissatisfactions responsible for historical change ... stem from an original failure of self-consciousness, an original inability to understand the self-determined character of human history and its institutions and so an inability to account reflectively for those institutions or to defend them from skeptical attack.”⁴ However, as we saw, for Foucault, as well as Deleuze, there is no legitimacy to this claim of a prior ontological unity because it presupposes the whole that is seeks to create. As Deleuze writes, regarding Foucault’s genealogy, “The universal, in fact, explains nothing; it is the universal which needs to be explained. ... The One, the All, the True, the object, the subject are not universals, but singular processes – of unification, totalization, verification, objectivation, subjectification – present in the given apparatus.”⁵ That is, the presuppositions, particularly in Hegel’s philosophy, are far from innocent and must be interrogated to determine their effects and consequences.

Yet, as Foucault is well aware, Hegelianism, by design, is equipped to absorb and

³ G. W. F. Hegel, *Miscellaneous Writings*, edited by Jon Stewart (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern UP, 2002), p. 277.

⁴ Pippin, *Modernism as a Philosophical Problem*, p. 70.

⁵ Deleuze, “*What is a dispositif ?*”, p. 162.

incorporate criticism with an unparalleled intensity.⁶ In his study *Gilles Deleuze*, Michael Hardt notes that Deleuze, as well as those of his intellectual generation, including Foucault, set out to challenge the Hegelian system by re-evaluating all of its main conceptual features in order to avoid falling back into the system, or strengthening it, by only critiquing certain aspects. In this context, Deleuze delineated a non-dialectical conception of difference that would challenge the role of negation as a predicate to (dialectical) resolution.⁷ The role of the subject, too, needed to be challenged because, for both Deleuze and Foucault, the conception of subjectivity that sought to define individuals by their *lack* — their inability to reconcile themselves with their desire — was a dangerous philosophical mistake. As Deleuze writes in *Anti-Oedipus*, “Lack (*manque*) is created, planned, and organized through social production.”⁸ Immediately, within the contemporary context of consumer capitalism, a conception of subjectivity based on either a psychological or ontological lack should appear suspicious, and, indeed, relative to any political engagement with

⁶ Michael Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. xi; for a similar discussion, see Judith Butler, *Subjects of Desire* (New York: Columbia UP, 1999), p. 176; p. 184. Butler’s analysis of Hegel’s role in French postmodernist philosophy considers Lacan, Deleuze and Foucault, and she locates the commonality among these theorists in their concern with articulating the “subject of desire.” Within this analysis, she situates Foucault and Deleuze as positing a “productive” or affirmative desire, that is, one that is not predicated on a lack, as in Sartre’s adaptation of Hegel’s thought, or in Lacanian psychoanalytic discourse. To state the distinction in a somewhat crude formulation, I believe there is a reading of desire as centrifugal in Deleuze and Foucault that counters the centripetal conception of desire in Sartre and Lacan. For a more complete reading of Hegel’s role within Lacanian analysis, see Slavoj Žižek, *Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel and the Critique of Ideology* (Durham: Duke UP, 1993); and, Slavoj Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology* (London and New York: 1999).

⁷ As Foucault remarks, speaking of his generation in the 1950s, “Our rejection of the world in which we lived was definitely not satisfied by Hegelian philosophy”; see Michel Foucault, *Power: Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume 3*, edited by James D. Faubion and translated by Robert Hurley (New York: New Press, 2000), p. 119. For a brief discussion of another French postmodern reaction to Hegel’s speculative philosophy, see Fred Dallmayr’s reading of Jean-François Lyotard, in “Rethinking the Hegelian State,” in *Hegel and Legal Theory*, edited by Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld and David Gray Carlson. New York and London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 336-7.

⁸ Gilles Deleuze, and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia I*, translated by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), p. 28.

the oppressive and destructive forces of capitalist political economics.⁹ For Hardt, the realities of 20th century warfare, as a key component of capitalist economics, also made the challenge to Hegelian dialectics overwhelmingly real. He writes, “The negation of the bomb is nondialectical in its actuality, not in the planning rooms of Washington but in the streets of Hiroshima, as an agent of total destruction. There is nothing positive in the nondialectical negation, no magical resurrection: It is pure.”¹⁰ As Foucault himself stated, “In actuality, dialectics does not liberate differences; it guarantees, on the contrary, that they can always be recaptured. ... now, it is necessary to free ourselves from Hegel – from the opposition of predicates, from contradiction and negation, from all of dialectics.”¹¹ Yet, despite the concerns of Foucault and Deleuze regarding an emancipatory ethic that could challenge the dominant discourses of contemporary political and economic regimes *and* their philosophical correlates, there has been, contrary to the realization of this ethic of potential, an ever-increasing tendency toward what Deleuze refers to as “control” societies. In “Control and Becoming,” he writes,

We’re definitely moving toward “control” societies that are no longer exactly disciplinary ... [Foucault] was one of the first to say that we’re moving away from disciplinary societies, we’ve already left them behind. We’re moving toward control societies that no longer operate by confining people but through continuous control and instant communication ... One can envisage education becoming less and less a closed site differentiated from the workplace as another closed site, but both disappearing and giving way to frightful continual training, to continual monitoring of worker-schoolkids or bureaucrat students.¹²

⁹ For further elaboration on the relationship between desire, conceived as a lack, and capitalist economic systems, see Judith Butler, *Subjects of Desire* (New York: Columbia UP, 1999), p. 205.

¹⁰ Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze*, pp. xii-xiii.

¹¹ Michel Foucault, *Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology: Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume 2*, edited by James D. Faubion and translated by Robert Hurley (New York: New Press, 1998), pp. 358-9.

¹² Deleuze, *Negotiations*, p. 175.

In “Postscript on Control Societies,” Deleuze affirms his position, writing, “The key is that we’re at the beginning of something new. ... In the *school system*: forms of continuous assessment, the impact of continuing education on schools, and the related move away from any research in universities, “business” being brought into education at every level.”¹³

From this point of concern, I want to suggest an alternative conceptualization of freedom. Rather than conceiving of freedom as a relation of mutual recognition, would it not be plausible, especially in light of the Foucauldian critique of Hegel, to conceptualize freedom as the recalcitrant and spontaneous resistance that ultimately “requires” such extensive measures of control? In making this suggestion, I am not appealing to some “natural” sentiment of freedom,¹⁴ rather, I hope to indicate that, far from signifying only the repressive aspects of society, such extensive controls actually trace the contours of a freedom that affirms the struggle to resist these very apparatuses of control. This is the freedom described by William Burroughs, in *The Adding Machine*, when he writes,

A basic impasse of all control machines is this: Control needs time in which to exercise control. Because control also needs opposition or acquiescence; otherwise it ceases to be control. I control a hypnotized subject (at least partially); I control a slave, a dog, a worker; but if I establish complete control somehow, as by implanting electrodes in the brain, then my subject is little more than a tape recorder, a camera, a robot. You don’t control a tape recorder—you use it. Consider the distinction, and the impasse implicit here. All control systems try to make control as tight as possible, but at the same time, if

¹³ Deleuze, *Negotiations*, p. 182

¹⁴ As Nietzsche asserts, “Imagine a being like nature, wasteful beyond measure, indifferent beyond measure, without purposes and consideration, without mercy and justice, fertile and desolate and uncertain at the same time; imagine indifference itself as a power — how *could* you live according to this indifference? Living — is that not precisely wanting to be other than this nature? Is not living — estimating, preferring, being unjust, being limited, wanting to be different? And supposing the imperative “live according to nature” meant at bottom as much as “live according to life” — how could you *not* do that? Why make a principle of what you yourselves are and must be?” See Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), p. 15.

they succeeded completely, there would be nothing left to control. ... When there is no more opposition, control becomes a meaningless proposition. It is highly questionable whether a human organism could survive complete control. There would be nothing there. ... The concept of suggestion as a control technique presupposes that control is partial and not complete. You do not have to give suggestions to your tape recorder nor subject it to pain and coercion or persuasion.¹⁵

I believe it is in this distinction between control and use that we can locate the possibilities, and the potency, of freedom. Although this conceptualization of freedom lacks the virtue or grandeur of Hegel's notion of freedom, as realized through history, ever-progressing toward greater self-awareness and expansion, it does resound with a certain complementarity when we consider, both historically and in our own lives, the stubborn, creative, and fascinating capacities of human thought. This conception of freedom also returns us to the question of government because, as Dean notes, "The notion of government as the 'conduct of conduct' presupposes the primary freedom of those who are governed entailed in the capacities of acting and thinking."¹⁶ Or, as Foucault himself says, "Freedom is the ontological condition of ethics."¹⁷

At the most basic level, freedom is the condition of ethics *as their potential*, and it is the possibility of thought, of thinking about the relations we have to ourselves and others, that offers a resistance the hegemonic ambitions of contemporary apparatuses of control and domination. As Foucault writes in *The Order of Things*, "[We] cannot discover the unthought ... without immediately bringing the unthought nearer to [ourselves] — or even, perhaps, without pushing it further away, and in any case without causing man's own being to undergo a change by that very

¹⁵ William S. Burroughs, "The Limits of Control", *The Adding Machine*, pp.117-8.

¹⁶ Dean, *Governmentality*, p. 15.

¹⁷ Michel Foucault, *Ethics: Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume 1*, translated by Robert Hurley and edited by Paul Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 1997), p. 284. For the two essays that most clearly articulate Foucault's ethical thought, see "The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom" in Foucault, *Ethics*, pp. 281-301; and, in the same volume, "Technologies of the Self," pp. 223-251.

fact.”¹⁸ Deleuze summarizes this point, writing, “The problematic unthought gives way to a thinking being who problematizes himself, as an ethical subject.”¹⁹ Thus, for Foucault, *thought*, as the freedom and activity that searches for possibilities — for the unthought, for what is not yet related or problematized — *is the fundamental ethical act*. For tape recorders, or robots, relational possibilities are entirely determined; ethics are impossible. However, as long as we continue to relate to ourselves, and one another, with the possibility of thinking these relations, we possess the potential for thinking other possibilities, that is, for *ethics*. Perhaps it is precisely in the spontaneous and indeterminate capacity of thought, of thinking other possible relations, that ethics can exist. It is this modest conception of freedom that is, in my opinion, a worthwhile place to begin the search for an alternative philosophical pedagogy because it is a reminder of the extensive freedom that we have to individuate ourselves as distinct from, and even in opposition to, dominant politic structures.

Folds and Lines of Flight

Having opened the discussion of a Foucauldian ethic, I would like to return briefly to some methodological concerns regarding Foucault’s philosophy. Deleuze writes,

the question raised in objection to Foucault – the question as to how the relative value of a social apparatus [*dispositif*] can be assessed if one cannot evoke transcendental values by way of universal co-ordinates – is a question which leads us backwards and which, in itself, also risks meaninglessness. Does this mean that all social apparatuses [*dispositifs*] are equally valid (nihilism)?²⁰

Deleuze responds to this controversial question by invoking Nietzsche and Spinoza, who, he

¹⁸ Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things*, translated by A. Sheridan (New York: Pantheon, 1970), p. 327.

¹⁹ Deleuze, *Foucault*, p. 118.

²⁰ Deleuze, “*What is a dispositif?*”, p. 163.

claims, “first began to show that modes of existence have to be assessed according to immanent criteria, according to their content of ‘possibilities’, liberty or creativity, without any appeal to transcendental values.”²¹ Of course, Deleuze would also situate his own philosophy within this context of a “meaningful” immanence, but it is neither my aim here to argue on Deleuze’s behalf, nor to delineate the possibilities for a philosophy of immanence that would situate qualitative distinctions within a complex ontology of difference.²² Rather, I want to stress that Foucault’s “immanent” philosophical position, far from being trapped in a nihilistic discourse of non-differentiation, is just one unique articulation in the complex lineage of philosophers of “immanence.”²³

Hegelians might respond to this point with the criticism that the possibility of a line of thought does not guarantee its validity, let alone permit it to stand as a criticism. As William Maker asserts, “postmodernism ... can be helpfully thought of as a version of zombie philosophy: it is philosophically neither alive nor dead, but undead, and has as its goal the recruiting of new zombies from among the dead as well as living philosophers.”²⁴ Clearly, as Maker’s statement indicates, Foucault’s anti-foundationalist stance has raised the question of its relevance and validity in contemporary politic discourses. As I noted in the introduction, Habermas’ critique of Foucault, popular among liberal critics of his ‘value-free’ analysis, evokes Nancy Fraser’s criticism: “Why is struggle preferable to submission? Why ought domination to be resisted? Only

²¹ Ibid.

²² For Deleuze’s own elaboration on this fundamental philosophical topic, see Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, translated by Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

²³ For a particularly sharp statement of this position, within a discussion of Nietzsche’s “monumental history,” see Foucault, *Language, counter-memory, practice*, p. 161. For Deleuze’s clearest articulation of the philosophy of immanence, see Gilles Deleuze, *Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life*, translated by Anne Boyman (New York: Zone Books, 2001), pp. 25-34.

²⁴ William Maker, *Philosophy Without Foundations: Rethinking Hegel* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), p. 196. For a more complete version of Maker’s embarrassingly uninformed argument against postmodernism, see chapter nine, “The Dead End of Postmodernism,” pp. 179-198.

with the introduction of normative notions of some kind could Foucault begin to answer these questions.”²⁵ Yet, Foucault’s analysis of knowledge, power and subjectivity — as a series of challenges that engage normative assumptions — should not be seen as attempts to re-inscribe dominant discourses, but as interventions meant to indicate the potentialities for thinking *other* possible relations, both to oneself and to others. As Paul Allen Miller states:

Foucault sought to elaborate an ethics founded not on the juridical, authoritarian, or disciplinary structures of modernity, but on what he refers to as an ‘art’ or ‘stylization’ of existence. The purpose of this stylization was not self-absorption, but to offer a new means of resistance to the normalizing structures of the market, scientific and social institutions, and the state. An ethics and aesthetics of existence, resistance to the commodified, sexualized, and normalized subject of capitalist modernity.²⁶

Again, in Miller’s description, we see the importance of thinking the relations between knowledge, power and subjectivity in order to open a space, or create a fold, to think other possible relations.

In *Foucault*, Deleuze also stresses this aspect of Foucault’s work, claiming that, “These three dimensions — knowledge, power and self — are irreducible, yet constantly imply one another.”²⁷ He continues, “What in fact they present is the way in which the problem appears in a particular historical formation: what can I know or see and articulate in such and such a condition for light and language? What can I do, what power can I claim and what resistances may I counter? What can I be, with what folds can I surround myself or how can I produce myself as a subject?”²⁸ This question of subjectification is the key to Foucault’s ethic of the individuation. Of particular relevance to this concern is Paulo Virno’s reading of Gilbert Simondon, where individuation is

²⁵ Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, p. 284.

²⁶ Paul Allen Miller, “The Art of Self-Fashioning, or Foucault on Plato and Derrida,” in *foucault studies* (No. 2, May 2005), p. 56. See also, Colin Gordon, Afterword in Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 237.

²⁷ Deleuze, *Foucault*, p. 114.

²⁸ Ibid.

discussed as an analogous movement (or becoming) to Foucault's concept of subjectification.

Virno states:

individuation is never concluded ... the pre-individual is never fully translated into singularity. ... the subject consists of the permanent interweaving of pre-individual elements and individuated characteristics; moreover, the subject is this interweaving. It is a serious mistake, according to Simondon, to identify the subject with one of its components, the one which is singularized as the 'I'.²⁹

With respect to Foucault, this process of individuation, or subjectification, should be seen as a project that counters oppositional dialectics with a philosophy of difference, re-thinking allegedly dialectical oppositions as variable intensities in specific antagonisms that cannot be universalized without destroying the unique specificity of the relations and, therefore, without eclipsing the relations within speculative abstractions.³⁰ In this context, the ethic of the fold, as an ethic of individuation, is never complete, but always in a process of becoming and extension that maintains the specificity and unique singularity of the event. Within Simondon's logic, the individual, unlike the Hegelian subject, is never completed, or determined; although we use the referent "I" when describing the aggregate of affective meaning and personal histories that comprise an individual life, this linguistic signifi- cance is merely habitual, and no more accurate than the claim to

²⁹ Paulo Virno, *A Grammar of the Multitude*, translated by Isabella Bertolotti, James Cascaito and Andrea Casson (New York: Semiotext(e), 2004), p. 78. Simondon's work was an important influence on Deleuze and Foucault. For the most relevant text regarding the concept of subjectification/individuation, see Gilbert Simondon, *L'individuation psychique et collective*. Paris: Aubier, 1989. For a brief but clear discussion of Simondon's concept of subjectivity, see Virno, *A Grammar of the Multitude*, pp. 76-80.

³⁰ For Deleuze's most precise criticism of dialectical philosophy, see Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, translated by Paul Patton (New York: Columbia UP, 1994). For reviews of Deleuze's philosophy of difference as an ontological criticism of Hegelian philosophy, see Bruce Baugh, *French Hegel: From Surrealism to Postmodernism* (New York and London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 147-173; Butler, *Subjects of Desire*, pp. 205-217; and, Michael Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy* (London and Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), pp. ix-xv. For further comments regarding the intellectual relationship between Foucault and Deleuze, see Foucault, "Theatrum Philosophicum," in *Language, counter-memory, practice*, pp. 165-196; Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 80; Deleuze, *Negotiations*, p. 89; Baugh, *French Hegel*, p. 172.

have witnessed a sunrise. By contesting the philosophical emphasis on the unity of the subject, and considering the complex multiplicity of the process of individuation, Foucault, like Simondon, indicates that the “I” of the subject is not, despite its habitual prominence, the fundamental feature of individual. Then, if we are to consider this process of individuation within the context of the ethic of the fold and Foucault’s search for a non-fascist life, we must conclude that this search is never completed, and is, and can only be, *a life*.

Interpellative “Response-ability”

The ethic of the fold can be seen, concretely, in a variety of instances where struggles and criticisms attempt to create a space for thinking the possibility of other relations outside of dominant discourses and social order. When we challenge patriarchy, misogyny or racism, all of which are grounded in certain discourses of truth, we enact the potentials for other possible relations. That is, we challenge the discourses of truth with the potential for other relations that question the need for domination and the knowledges that seek to legitimate it. Foucault states,

I do not think that a society can exist without power relations, if by that one means the strategies by which individuals try to direct and control the conduct of others. The problem, then, is not to try to dissolve them in the utopia of completely transparent communication but to acquire the rules of law, the management techniques, and also the morality, the *ethos*, the practice of the self, that will allow us to play these games of power with as little domination as possible.³¹

For Foucault, the reasons for desiring “as little domination as possible” are as multiple as the possibilities for realizing non-dominant relations, again making the question of normativity irrelevant. This does not mean that, for Foucault, all forms of social and political mediation are unnecessary. Rather, Foucault’s analysis indicates the importance of an ongoing interrogation of

³¹ Foucault, *Ethics*, p. 298.

mediation that examines claims of necessity and reveals the potential of other possible modes of relation. Perhaps the key to understanding this ethic, especially for hesitant liberal critics of Foucault, is to recognize that the unprecedented levels of control in the contemporary world of global capitalism have also created an unprecedented challenge to thought: to think the outside of these governed, stratified hierarchies and work to realize other possible relations. As Foucault explains,

Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are but to refuse what we are. ... the political, ethical, social, philosophical problem of our day is not to try to liberate the individual from the state, and from the state's institutions, but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of individualization linked to the state. We have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of individuality that has been imposed on us for several centuries.³²

However, it must be stressed that this promotion of new forms of subjectivity is not, for Foucault, the task of ivory tower philosophers or new legislators, who will inform the masses of their roles and potentials. As I noted at the end of chapter two, the 20th century proved to be a stark for Foucault warning against any hierarchical ideological experiments that sought to impose the truth of the rational onto the actual. Rather, as Foucault explains in *Remarks on Marx*,

the problems that I pose are always concerned with local and particular issues ... because it seems to me that none of the major discourses that can be produced about society is so convincing that it may be trusted; and if one really wants to construct something new and different, or in any case if one wants the great systems to be open to certain real problems, it is necessary to look for the data and the questions in which they are hidden. And then I'm not convinced that intellectuals — starting from their bookish, academic, and erudite investigations — can point to the essential problems of the society in which they live. On the contrary, one of the main opportunities for collaboration with “non-intellectuals” is in listening to their problems, and in working with them to formulate these problems.³³

³² Foucault, *Power*, p. 336.

³³ Michel Foucault, *Remarks on Marx*, translated by R. James Goldstein and Duccio Trombadori (New York: Semiotext(e), 1991), p. 151; for a similar statement on the relationship between intellectuals and non-intellectuals, see Foucault's interview with Gilles Deleuze in Michel Foucault, *Foucault Live: Collected*

In *Hegelese*, the intellectual, equipped with concepts, has the privilege of working in the world of the actual, not in order to impose on the world his constellations of rationality, but so that she may test the value of her concepts and determine if they might help in the articulation of problems and the creation of less-dominant structures of political and social power. This cautious ethic of extension indicates an intellectual modesty that may be unfamiliar to most philosophers.

However, it is this caution, this notion that intellectuals could help articulate the problems of society, rather than telling society what its problems are, that indicates another aspect of Foucault's own lived ethic of the fold, as well as the potential for an alternative philosophical pedagogy. That is, intellectuals can, in opposition to tautological interpellations, extend themselves such that the discoveries of the thought of the Outside are shared with the communities whose needs they address. Or, again, that intellectuals can extend themselves in an ethic of friendship, rather than as the detached legislators of truth.

The ethic of friendship, or affinity, between the intellectual and the community appears in opposition to the tautological features that attempt to limit the possibilities for individuation and extension, privileging instead systematicity and conformity. In this sense, Erin Manning's notion of "response-ability" is an apt alternative expression that articulates Foucault's ethic of the fold, especially with respect to one's self-relations. "Response-ability," that is, working to conceptualize our situations in such a way that our responses are not reactionary, but affirming their relational potentialities and opening spaces of contestation, re-invigorates our conception of freedom through practices of engagement. That is, "response-ability" signifies our potential for thinking Outside the parameters of dominant discourses, taking it upon ourselves, in affinity with others who oppose violence and domination, to think alternative possibilities, and live them out as an

Interviews 1961-1984, translated by Lysa Hochroth and John Johnston, edited by Sylvère Lotringer (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), p. 75.

ethical practice. In his essay “Mochlos,” Derrida states,

would it not be more interesting, even if difficult, and perhaps impossible, to think a responsibility — that is, a summons requiring a response — as no longer passing, in the last instance, through an ego, the “I think,” intention, the subject, the ideal of decidability? Would it not be more “responsible” to try and think the ground, in the history of the West, on which the juridico-egological values of responsibility were determined, attained, imposed?”³⁴

This responsibility, the “response-ability” of the “*still to come*,” as Derrida says, “would be the chance for the task of thinking what will have been, up to this point, the representation of university responsibility, what it is or might become, in the wake of upheavals that we can no longer conceal from ourselves, even if we still have trouble analysing them. Is a new type of university responsibility possible?”³⁵ Returning, with Derrida, to the question of the university, I want to stress that my construction of a Foucauldian critique of Hegel’s philosophy at the University of Berlin in no way determines what is possible for the university. However, demonstrating how the university and its foundational claims to truth can be critiqued and critically engaged indicates an important possibility — that the *taking of a position* within the university institution is never entirely determined by the institutions’ own narratives of truth. Our capacity to challenge dangerous institutional *truth-effects* indicates, precisely, our “response-ability” with respect to the university. In this context, Foucault offers a description of his own work that is particularly insightful:

I think that there are a thousand things that can be done, invented, contrived by those who, recognizing the relations of power in which they are involved, have decided to resist them or escape them. From that viewpoint, all my research rests on the postulate of absolute optimism. I don’t construct my analyses in order to say, “This is the way things are, your

³⁴ Jacques Derrida, *Eyes of the University: Right to Philosophy 2*, translated by Jan Plug et. al. (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2004), p. 91.

³⁵ Derrida, *Eyes of the University*, p. 91.

are trapped.” I say these things only insofar as I believe it enables us to transform them. Everything I do is done with the conviction that it may be of use.³⁶

In this passage it is clear that Foucault’s ethic, in contradistinction to the tautological gestures of Hegel’s philosophy, is exemplary. That is, Foucault’s work, research, writing, and engagement with political actions in the world is itself an example of the possibility to individuate ourselves as distinct from the traditions out of which we learn and come to understand this very possibility. In this sense, Foucault’s ethic is never prescriptive, and does not call for emulation. Rather, its interpellative quality, as exemplary, suggests the rich, creative potential of thinking for oneself and re-examining and critically questioning ethical relations.

Therefore, within Foucault’s logic of subjectification, there is a precise possibility for “derivation or differentiation” which “must be understood in the sense in which the *relation to oneself* assumes an independent status.”³⁷ As Deleuze explains, “It is as if the relations of the outside folded back to create a doubling, allow a relation to oneself to emerge, and constitute an inside which is hollowed out and develops its own unique dimension: ‘enkrateia’, the relation to oneself that is self-mastery, ‘is a power that one brought to bear on oneself *in* the power that one exercised over others.’ ”³⁸ This formulation of the relation to oneself is Foucault’s response to dominant power structures in the search for a “non-fascist life.” If power is a relation of forces that one experiences in nearly every aspect of life, these relations can be folded, or doubled, that is, bent so that one recognizes oneself as distinct from the operations of power, and, therefore, free to determine how one exercises power over oneself, and, therefore, over others. As Deleuze writes, “Foucault’s fundamental idea is that of a dimension of subjectivity derived from power and

³⁶ Foucault, *Power*, p. 294.

³⁷ Deleuze, *Foucault*, p. 101.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

knowledge without being dependent on them.”³⁹ The fold, the space recreated by the relation to oneself, is the opening of the unthought, or that which has not yet emerged as a possible comportment to oneself and to others. In this way, “the problematical unthought gives way to a thinking being who problematizes himself, as an ethical subject.”⁴⁰

Thus, in Foucault, the very act of thinking, creating the space of the fold, as one individuates oneself in a process of distinction from the effects of knowledge and power that make this self-relation possible, is, fundamentally, *the* ethical act which allows for a multiplicity of ethical relations. That is,

Thought is not what inhabits a certain conduct and gives it its meaning; rather, it is what allows one to step back from this way of acting or reacting, to present it to oneself as an object of thought and to question it as to its meaning, its conditions, and its goals. Thought is freedom in relation to what one does, the motion by which one detaches oneself from it, establishes it as an object, and reflects upon it as a problem.⁴¹

The value of this horizon is that it allows for an ethical life outside of the dialectical abstraction of recognition. In fact, a Foucauldian ethic would not be a reversal of Hegel’s ethical mode — for Foucault, it is no more desirable for an individual to recognize herself in history than it is to fail to do so. Each individual is simultaneously much more, and much less, than the power and knowledge that comprise a historical horizon. Thus, we see that Deleuze’s philosophy of difference, articulated in Foucault’s ethic of the fold — as a spontaneous and undetermined relation to oneself, created by oneself — is never reducible to a formulaic template (the categorical imperative) or an abstract necessity (the dialectic). Rather, the ethic of the fold is both the possibility for a relation to oneself *and* the space that one creates, as thought, to think this relation,

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 118.

⁴¹ Foucault, *Ethics*, p. 117.

and with it the relation to others.

What a truly Foucauldian pedagogical or political space would look like remains to be determined.⁴² It seems that, like any great thinker, his thought is still to be discovered and realized as a conceptualization of (ethical) practice. And, perhaps, this is the greatest gift of his analysis, and its greatest possibility — that it is *in-potentia*. For each individual who, in reading Foucault, has the pleasure of discovering the incredible potentiality of thought, also discovers that an ethic of freedom remains, in contemporary life, a thought out of season, to be realized in the creative, fragile, engaged but indeterminate practice of a “non-fascist life.”

⁴² There have been, in fact, several recent attempts to incorporate the work of Foucault, as well as Deleuze and Simondon, into an explicitly *political* philosophy. See, for example, Paulo Virno, *A Grammar of the Multitude*, translated by Isabella Bertolotti, James Cascaito and Andrea Casson (New York: Semiotext(e), 2004); and, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004). For an interesting discussion of the lineage of such a political philosophy that traces the philosophy of difference and the politics of the multitude back to Spinoza, see Warren Montag, *Bodies, Masses, Power: Spinoza and his Contemporaries* (London and New York: Verso, 1999). For an elaboration on the significance of Spinoza's understanding of power, see Gilles Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, translated by Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1992), pp. 83-95.