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**Sound Translation:
Poetic and
Cinematic Practices**

Candidate: Ryan Fraser
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Abstract

A text is not merely a pattern of semantic designations. If composed in a phonetic alphabetic, it is also a pattern of graphemes eliciting a pattern of vocal sounds or phonemes, which in turn elicits a pattern of phonating movements. In the typical translating scenario, where a negotiation between natural languages takes place, these vocal sound patterns are virtually always regarded as the variable element in the process. They are deemed expendable, and are summarily transformed for the purpose of constructing semantic affinities between source and target texts. There is a margin of translation activity, however, that has devised strategies and techniques for creating vocal sound affinities between texts, and at varying degrees of expense to both the source text's semantics, as well as to target language convention.

This dissertation reflects upon the ways in which translators deal with the sonorous dimension of texts. Four principle questions will guide this reflection: 1. How does inter-linguistic translation typically discard vocal sounds in its conception and rendering of source text form? 2. Does the written word itself, as visual/spatial medium and technique, somehow orient the translator's consciousness away from the oral/aural dimension of the text? 3. How might one conceive modes of reading a text in language sound as opposed to language sense? 4. What are some of the marginal practices that do indeed strive to re-construct a source text's sound pattern?

To answer these questions, I will draw on both classical and contemporary language philosophies that illuminate the translator's bias both toward and against the sonorous dimension of language. Under examination as well will be certain revolutionary movements in twentieth century poetics, movements that help conceptualize not only the motivation but also the operative techniques behind many of these marginal sound translation practices. The goal, ultimately, is to make tentative steps toward a theoretical framework in which these marginal practices may be addressed positively and in their own right, rather than simply as lunatic-fringe specimens defined against the norm.

Résumé

Ce n'est pas uniquement dans le sens verbal que l'on peut saisir un texte. S'il est composé dans un alphabet phonétique, il présente en plus une chaîne de graphèmes, symboles à la fois d'une suite de phonèmes et de gestes phonatoires. En règle générale, lorsqu'il s'agit de traduire un texte, ces chaînes phonémiques sont transformées, voire sacrifiées, à la construction d'un rapport dans le « sens » ou le « message », lieu privilégié de la traduction. Il n'en reste pas moins que certains traducteurs, œuvrant en marge des pratiques conventionnelles, ont mis au point des techniques visant à construire entre des textes en langues différentes un rapport sonore qui fait varier, voire même suspend, la valeur sémantique du texte source ainsi que les normes grammaticales de la langue cible.

Cette thèse est une réflexion sur la manière dont la traduction, en général, dispose des sonorités du texte. Au cours de cette réflexion, je soulèverai quatre questions fondamentales: 1. Comment la traduction conçoit-elle typiquement la forme d'un texte source pour pouvoir ensuite faire abstraction de sa sonorité ? 2. Le mot écrit, saisi par la vue et dans l'espace de la page encrée, serait-il fait pour rendre le traducteur sourd à la dimension sonore d'un texte ? 3. Peut-on concevoir des modes de lire et d'interpréter un texte dans ses sons plutôt que dans son sens ? 4. Quelles sont ces pratiques marginales qui traduisent le son et comment la théorie peut-elle les encadrer conceptuellement ?

Pour répondre à ces questions, je ferai appel à des philosophies langagières classiques ainsi que contemporaines qui éclairent les idées reçues du traducteur envers la dimension sonore du texte. Seront également adressés certains mouvements poétiques du vingtième siècle qui serviront à encadrer non seulement la motivation de la traduction sonore, mais aussi les techniques qui opèrent derrière sa production. Le but, en dernier lieu, consisterait à développer des outils théoriques pour penser la traduction sonore d'une manière positive, au lieu d'en rester avec la définition négative qui court, celle qui ne fait autre chose que la penser en opposition à ce complexe d'idées reçues qui constituent la norme de l'activité traduisante.

Hickory dickory dock.
The mouse ran up the clock,
The clock struck one,
And down he ran,
Hickory dickory dock

Et qui rit des curés d'Oc?
De Meuse raines, houp ! de cloques.
De quelles loques ce turque coin.
Et ne d'ânes ni rennes
Écuries des curés d'Oc.

D'Antin van Rooten, *Mots d'heures,*
gousses, rames (1980: 6)

Just before finishing the final draft of this project, I learned that my subject was scandalous. I knew of course that I was addressing a relatively marginal type of translation, but never once did a word like “scandalous” come to mind. Yet here is Paul Mann on two of my featured poets, Louis and Celia Zukofsky: “For most translators, the name Zukofsky represents a scandal. It is a name better left unspoken, and when it is spoken it inevitably signifies grotesque infidelity, gratuitous distortion, the deliberate abuse of a poem for the translator’s own aesthetic satisfaction.” (Mann 1986: 3)

Just to be clear, the Zukofskys (1969) are among a marginal group who turn a text from one language into another in such a way as to create an affinity in vocal sound patterns, and at varying degrees of expense both to the source text’s semantics and to the target language’s grammatical conventions. The d’Antin van Rooten poem cited above is of course the Mother Goose rime “Hickory Dickory Dock.” The Zukofskys, for their part, translate Latin phrases like “tum Thetidis Peleus incensus fertur amore” into English phrases like “T’m’y Thetis this Peleus incandesced fair thru his armor.” (Zukofsky 1969: 64) I suppose that when critics speak of “grotesque infidelity and gratuitous distortion,” they are referring to the language conventions that are consciously and willfully overturned in order to formulate such solutions.

What I had considered to be a mode of translational experimentation, comparable to other modes that turn the phoneme, is apparently scandalous. Maybe it is because what such experiments achieve, this vague affinity in vocal pattern, seems rather paltry in light of what they sacrifice. Maybe it is because they are taken as an explicit mockery of conventional translation. Or maybe it is quite simply a matter of language sensibilities. I recall reciting a French traduction at a conference in Barcelona. The sound of Blake's "Tiger, Tiger, burning bright" channeled through French vocal patterns such as "tailles guerre, tailles guerre, beurre naine brailles-te" was enough to make a few patient attendees grimace.

Maybe this sort of translation is scandalous, then. For the researcher, there is an upshot to speaking the activity better left unspoken, and that is of course that for theory this remains relatively virgin territory. Therein is a vicious circle, however. Sound translation is deprived of theoretical reflection because it is considered an aberration, and it is considered an aberration because it is deprived of that same theoretical reflection that might help de-mystify it, bring it into the fold as it were. I am quite happy to make other researchers' qualms my own window of opportunity. The focus of this project, then, is sound or vocal pattern translation. How might one define the bias against it? What broader questions with regard to orality and writing does it elicit? With what philosophical and poetic traditions might it line up? Could one find it a family of related modes, and so make the first step toward undoing its mystique, its status as aberration or limit case? In this sense, I am allowing Mann's article to give this project, conceived primarily as a general investigation, an additional element of defense and apology.

0.1 A Blueprint of the Dissertation

Mann's own defense of the Zukofskys might just be a clarion call for this type of project. His brief article has two main purposes: "to suggest that Zukofsky's Catullus project is worth more serious consideration than one's initial revulsion would recommend...and to sketch a few condensed lines of approach to these strange texts." (Mann 1986:5) I could easily bounce off of his first "condensed line of approach" in order to explain what is to come in the following chapters:

Zukofsky seems at first to be making merely phonetic or acoustic translations, gratuitously and mechanically transposing Latin sounds into English. Even if this were all he was doing, these would be interesting translations, for they would point up some of the ways other translators automatically *dispose* of Latin sound.
(5)

The phenomenon of sound translation, Mann argues, is helpful as a foil of sorts. Counter-defined to conventional modes, it helps to illuminate them. By privileging vocal patterns over semantics, sound translation may help explain just how traditional modes discard these patterns.

The aberrant translation is instrumental in determining how the conventional translation works. This is a notion reminiscent of medical experimentation, where examination of the diseased organ furthers knowledge of that organ's normal functioning. Sound translation is proposed here as the pathological limit case, against which traditional attitudes toward sound might be gaged. The Zukofskys elicit revulsion, a sort of immune response that both upsets and illuminates a scale of values, in which semantics or the abstractable denotation occupies the first rank. Such a scale:

Has to do with our culture's extreme emphasis on communication—on writing as instrumental, a vehicle for transporting detachable and repeatable meanings—which itself has to do with the socio-historical development of a discursive

economy in which meaning, like any other currency, must be exchanged to be truly useful (6).

What Mann formulates here in socio-linguistic and economic terms is the ideological language bias under examination in the first section of this dissertation.

0.1.1 Section One: Classical Thinking and Its Bias

My reflection on this bias privileging detachable meanings over vocal patterns is not based in socio-linguistic or economic practices, however, but rather in the thinking of the Church Fathers, specifically Saint Augustine considered in the context of the Platonic thinking that influenced him. In Augustine is the overt expression of a language ideology that demotes the voice and its patterns to the realm of the abject sensorial, and which elevates the *eidos*, the abstractable essence or concept, to the realm of the divine. In Augustine, I find the illustration and defense of the two fundamental abstractions guiding the translator in his or her solutions: a semantic *eidos*, the abstraction that has come to be known broadly as content meaning ; and a numeric *eidos*, the abstraction that has come to be known broadly as form.

Perhaps it is better to suggest that literary translators may or may not be receptive to this sonorous dimension, but their solutions typically do not reflect it. Whenever a translator claims to have captured a source text's vocal pattern and play, it is always only an idea or schematic of this pattern and play, a measurement that can usually be explained in numeric terms. It is never the pattern itself. "Sein oder nicht sein," "être ou ne pas être" : these may well approximate Shakespeare's "to be or not to be" in syllable count, or in repetition of vocal pattern x at phrasal beginning and end, but they bear not the slightest resemblance in their exquisite articulation of phonemes, in their vocal

patterning. Conventional translation, despite protests to the contrary, does not work with sounds, but rather with the concept of meter thought large as measuring, counting, quantifying proportions.

One thing that an experiment like the Zukofskys' reveals is the difference between a translation demonstrating true phonemic affinity, and one whose pattern affinities depend upon the prior abstraction of a number. Here is a more pointed response to Mann's question: one way that tradition automatically discards the text's vocal pattern is through the abstraction of a numeric template that can serve as a foundation of structural invariance while vocal materials themselves are transformed. Sound play, for example, is traditionally schematized according to its measured repetition in things like rime (ABAB) and rhythmic stress (iambic pentameter). In the second chapter, I will discuss this type of schematizing with reference to specific examples.

This first section, then, is dedicated to the exposition and illustration of a language ideology that is biased against vocal sounds, as well as the status-quo method for disposing of them. Defined against the phonemic affinities achieved by translators like the Zukofskys are conventional translation's strategies for turning form without ever needing to factor in the specificity of the source text's voice. Finally, to close the section, I will put this classical numeric, this rational and perhaps "bloodless," conception of the text's sounds to debate, and enquire whether or not there are other ways of thinking the question. Under examination here will be French theorist Henri Meschonnic's reflections on rhythm and translation, as well as his tentative and inconclusive steps toward the inclusion of the source text's vocal specificity within the translator's purview.

0.1.2 Section Two: A Broader Reflection on Writing, Reading and Vocal Sounds

It is one thing to bounce off of sound translation and criticize the status quo, and quite another to speak of sound translation positively, that is to say not as an aberration but simply as another valid way of negotiating between languages, one governed by its own unique principles, one sharing characteristics with other related modes. Put simply, it is one thing to let the translational monster elicit reflection on conventional modes, and quite another to make sound translation less “aberrant” by speaking about it on its own terms.

This is a step that neither Mann nor theory in general seems to have taken. Even the most forward thinking theorists, those most open to shedding a positive light on marginal phenomena have contented themselves with the rather simplistic dichotomy of beauty vs. the beast, the “translational doxa vs. the para-doxa,” to put it in Annie Brisset’s terms (1985: 191). Here I come to what has been by far the most difficult task in the course of this project, that of speaking about sound translation in a way that does not simply pit it against conventional forms and underscore its abusiveness, whether this abusiveness is considered scandalous or necessary in order to shake up the sclerotic status quo.

Early on, I understood that doing this would require a broader reflection on vocal sound patterns and their representation in writing. A broader reflection, as well, on sound motivated interpretations of both texts in general and of the verbal sign’s relationship to its object. Needed, in other words, would be a reflection that would open out beyond the realm of translation per se, and search for language philosophies that are not only sympathetic to the abandoned creature that is the sound translation, but would help

explain its *raison d'être*, shed a positive light on the compositional methodologies behind it. The eighty-or-so pages comprising the second section are dedicated to just this contemplative opening out.

Mann cites the written word as the “transporter of detachable meanings,” (1986: 6) and indeed the written word will be the first question that I address in this contemplative opening out. The written word, both as medium and technique, its relationship with aural/oral language, and subsequently its relationship with the translator, provides initial matter for reflection in the second section. Integrating critical voices like Derrida (1976), Havelock (1982), McLuhan (1964) and Ong (1982), I will explore the written medium’s capacity to orient language consciousness away from vocal sounds. Has entrenchment in the text, in writing, with its primarily visual, linear and spatial logic, somehow deafened the translator to language sounds?

Or does writing suggest its own unique mode of conceiving and manipulating language sounds? The written word, I will argue, presents a very specific transformative potentiality that sound translation exploits systematically, and that conventional translation, for the most part, ignores. Sound translation exploits the type of transformation at the sub-word level known in rhetoric as “metaplasm.” (Groupe μ 1970) This is to say that it conceives and manipulates the word in its exquisite phonemic articulation, a language level to which conventional translation has very deliberately turned a deaf ear. The non-signifying sub-word level is alien territory to an activity that makes semantics its near exclusive focus.

Mann himself, perhaps unwittingly, falls victim to conventional biases when he suggests: “Zukofsky seems at first to be making merely phonetic or acoustic translations,

gratuitously and mechanically transposing Latin sounds into English.” (Mann 1986: 6)

Why does Mann use words like “merely”, “gratuitously,” and “mechanically” to describe the translation of vocal sounds? Reason suggests that any translation concerning itself with a specific dimension of the source text, and with this dimension exclusively, would display certain motivation, and therefore be anything but gratuitous. The Zukofskys’ Catullus is by any account a sound-motivated translation. How then can it be qualified as “gratuitous,” a word that seems to suggest no motivation whatsoever?

Mann seems to assume here the same narrow view that he accuses theory at large of entertaining. “Gratuitous, mechanical”: tellingly, these qualifiers come into play only when vocal sound is the concern. Would Mann have thought to use them if semantics were the translator’s primary concern? Would he accuse Ezra Pound, for example, of gratuitously and mechanically transposing Catullus’s sense or message into English? Translating a poem’s semantics is no simple manner. Why should translating its sounds be? Behind Mann’s defense of the Zukofskys seems to lurk the assumption that texts should be read primarily for their information content and only secondarily for their articulation in vocal sounds.

At stake here, it seems, are value judgments with regard to reading and interpreting texts. Is the written word really only a vehicle for semantics, for the message? Could it not just as easily be a vehicle for the actualization of vocal sound? What is there to prevent the reader from apprehending a text at both of these levels, or at one of them at the expense of the other? The second part of chapter five is dedicated to the question of reading in sense or in sound. What is a sense oriented reading, and what distinguishes it from a sound oriented one? Northrop Frye’s vectorial metaphor of

centrifugal and centripetal reading will serve as a broad conceptual anchor (Frye 1957). As sound translation is the focus, it will become important to break away from those readings that are oriented in sense exclusively and to begin nuancing the notion of a sound oriented reading, and this in order to nuance, further down the road, the notion of a sound oriented translation.

Chapter six is dedicated to two modes of reading a text's sounds, modes that inform the translations under examination in the third section of this dissertation. The first mode interprets a text's vocal patterns as mimetic of sense. This is to say that the vocal patterns composing the verbal sign are considered of an essence with the sign's most conventional object or designation. This would be a "Cratylan reading," and its origins date back to Platonic philosophy. The second mode interprets the text's vocal pattern as reflexive or self-referential. In this case, the vocal patterns composing the verbal sign are considered as severed from any and all conventional designations or objects. This I have called a "schismatic reading," and I will explore its roots in the poetic principles of Futurism and Dada.

0.1.3 Section 3: The Translation of Vocal Patterns

The Zukofskys are not the lone voice in a translational no man's land. These Cratylan and schismatic modes of reading, I will argue, inform a tradition of sound translation that not only includes the Zukofskys, but other related modes as well. The third section of this project, beginning with the seventh chapter, is intended as a first step toward uncovering these modes, exploring their commonalities and their differences. Six modes of sound translation will be addressed. Three of these result from Cratylan readings of the source and comprise the eighth chapter: the translation of accents or socio-lects,

foreign language film dubbing and the Zukofskys' experiment. Three result from the so-called schismatic readings and comprise the ninth chapter : the traduction and two of its related paradigmatic modes.

The basic blueprint of this project, if one stands back and takes a broad view, is a three times three: three sections of three chapters each. The first section addresses conventional modes of translating text form. The second section opens out onto a broader reflection on the written and spoken words, on modes of reading texts in sense and sound, and on the distinction of the two modes that I am qualifying as Cratylan and schismatic. In the final section, I examine the six modes of sound translation mentioned above, with a view to uncovering the principles that distinguish them, as well as those which unite them as a family.

0.2 The State of Research: Zukofskys, Van Rooten

The paltry amount of research dedicated to vocal pattern translation is already a good reason for looking further into the question here. This is not to suggest that sound translation never surfaces in theoretical reflection, but as I have just discussed, its appearance is virtually always in passing contradistinction with those conventional, inter-linguistic modes that are the critic's real concern. The latter either sides with convention and labels the sound translation pathological, or argues its value as a foil for questioning sclerotic ideologies. Once again, I have never encountered this type of translation addressed for its own sake, and by a critical ear attuned to its own subtleties.

In *Palimpsestes*, Gérard Genette (1982) makes passing reference to d'Antin van Rooten's poetry as a form of "translation abuse." (50-52) However, of all the critics who

take a negative stance with regard to sound translation, the stand out is probably André Lefevere in *Translating Poetry: Seven Strategies and a Blueprint* (1975). Here is the careful catalogue of the Zukofskys' failures to translate either sense or sound, their servitude to the tyrannical phonemic imperative, and their apparent mindlessness of any and all venerable traditions. Lefevere's critique of the Zukofskys' Catullus will receive some further attention later on.

Beyond Mann, a number of critics have used vocal pattern translation for the purpose of interrogating traditional modes. Annie Brisset (1985) mentions Lefevere's critique while framing the dichotomy of sound translation and conventional modes as a tension between the translational doxa and the "para-doxa." Like Mann, Brisset cites D'Antin van Rooten as a limit case against which the ideologies governing theory—specifically its entrenchment in functional, communicative modes of translation—become clear. She suggests, moreover, that these prescriptive lines between "use" and "abuse" can become as fixated in the critic's thinking as any natural law. Translation is the inter-linguistic, and purely functional communication of a text's semantics, just as the earth orbits the sun. This is why cries of scandal erupt when people like the Zukofskys begin sacrificing the message for vocal sound. Theory's blindness to its own entrenchment in the doxa of its own creation results in obstinate deafness to unconventional modes.

Some critics have used vocal sound translation to question traditional notions regarding the text and reading. Keith Cohen (1977), in what is perhaps sly intellectual maneuvering, uses the Zukofskys as a springboard into more weighty post-modern issues. Because sound translations are not self-standing texts, because understanding them

requires constant cross-referencing with the source, they illustrate perfectly the Derridian notion of writing in “differance.” They show how texts provide no direct pipeline to the transcendental signified, but rather deflect laterally to other texts ad infinitum. If traditional reading (“lire”) is the illusion of presence, then the Zukofskys constitute a post-modern reading defined as absence. Their Catullus is an “un-reading,” a “dé-lire.” This postmodern angle is for others to explore. I signal it here, rapidly, as one of the few theoretical lines of approach that have condescended to address sound translation.

There is perhaps one final vector left to signal, however. It appears from Paul Mann himself at the close of his article, and may well be conceived as a rhetorical maneuver, a way of seducing the reader. Perhaps Mann wishes to finish this defense of the Zukofskys on the same scandalous note with which he begins, for he takes sound translation to a libidinal place, improvises on Cohen’s dé-lire and on the notion of fidelity. He launches into epistemological metaphor, equating the Zukofskys’ textual transgressions with sexual ones:

...all sexuality desires in some respect to transgress the law, and the law must try to suppress these transgressions, or re-inscribe them within its code. In Zukofsky’s Catullus, the struggle between textual (sexual) desire and textual (sexual) law is played out for once in the open. And it is in this connection that we can also, finally, confront the question: *Why Catullus?* Why choose a poet with so stable a rhetorical surface? Wouldn’t a poet like Mallarmé have been more suitable? One possible answer is that Catullus is himself an explicitly erotic poet and here he gets fucked by Zukofsky...” (Mann 1986: 9)

If I had encountered this sort of discourse before my research into the sound poetry of Futurism and Dada, I would have dismissed it out of hand as blatant flirting at the close of an article that obviously revels in the scandal surrounding its subject matter. Looking back on my research into sound poetics, however, I am struck by frequent reference to the libidinal impulses motivating it. Here again in the context of sound translation, the

libido seems to become a factor. Why not succumb to temptation a little? For what it is worth, Mann and his erotic vector will surface again briefly in my examination of the Zukofskys, and the “cold shower” that Lefevere makes them take.

0.2.1 State of research: Film Dubbing

Compared to the paucity of critical investigation into the type of translation practiced by poets like the Zukofskys and d’Antin van Rooten, research into the area of foreign language film dubbing is considerably more prolific. I address dubbing in this project because it demonstrates a fundamental stratagem shared by all of the other types of sound translation under examination: the effort to align source and target language texts phonemically and phonetically. Like the other modes as well, film dubbing translates sound with specific recourse to the metaplastic manipulation of texts. To be sure, this manipulation follows the additional constraints of film time and the moving image, but a closer look at the technical and textual dimension of the process demonstrates the same underlying principle: construct as close a vocal pattern affinity as possible.

Most of the research into film dubbing that I have come across skirts the questions of text and technique in order to address the broader issue of intercultural reception. This angle seems to vary in focus from more straightforward socio-economic accounts gauging public expectations regarding dubbing and sub-titling—what audio-visual materials get dubbed and why?—to questions addressing the phenomenon of “inter-cultural ventriloquism.” When it comes to the socio-economic angle, two critics emerge repeatedly in the bibliographies: Paul François Caillé (1960) and Hans Vöge (1977), both of whom draw basic distinctions between different techniques of cinematic translation and address the linguistic expectations of cinemaphiles.

It was only in the mid to late nineties, however, that research into film dubbing's role in the inter-cultural sphere began gaining steam, that dubbing began to be approached as one of the ways that translators run a receptive interface between cultures, "play the ventriloquist," as it were. Translators, Levefere has suggested (1992), are part of the institutional forces that manipulate representation. The careful selection of foreign materials to be dubbed, and of voice types to portray cinematic and television characters, is one way that the studios and the dubbing industry exercise this type of manipulation. Scholars like Antje Ascheid (1997) and Eric Plourde (2003) argue dubbing as a means of appropriating the materials of, and defining a collective identity against, a dominant cultural other. Translator Robert Paquin (2001) relates his own intimidating experience giving a Francophone voice to Julie Taymor's script adaptation of Shakespeare's *Titus Andronicus*, and offers a first hand account of the translator as cog in the machinery of the studio.

Pervasive in both of these reception angles are accounts of esthetic reactions to dubbed cinema's strange language—coined "synchronian" by the actors required to speak it—which seem to go hand in hand with impressionistic assessments of the dubbed film's accuracy or fidelity with regard to both the moving image and the source script. The most baroque example of this sort of commentary comes undoubtedly from Jorge Luis Borges:

The Greeks engendered the chimera, a monster with the head of a lion, the head of dragon and the head of a goat...Hollywood has just enriched this frivolous, teratological museum: by means of a perverse artifice they call dubbing, they offer monsters that combine the well known features of Greta Garbo with the voice of Aldonza Lorenzo...(Cozarinsky 1988: 62)

There are myriad articles commenting with the same impressionistic revulsion on dubbing's weird, synchronically distorted language (Joffe 1992), or suggesting ways to fix it. (Herbst 1987)¹ In a recent article, Luise von Flotow (2005) addresses the effectiveness of the foreign language dubbing of cinematic songs, where exacting synchrony of language sounds and moving lips often results in the strangest of foreign language formulations.

Of greater interest to me in this project, however, is foreign language film dubbing as writing technique used in the cinematic manipulation of vocal sound, and in this area I have found only approximative research, case studies like that of Maurice Voituriez (1989), who addresses the difficulties involved in finding solutions that line up phonetically and synchronically with the film's image track, and who opts to analyze a corpus of translation solutions that he considers successful or unsuccessful instead of offering some deeper insight into the technique involved in producing any one solution. To read Voituriez and others, one would never suspect that a lengthy process of inscription and adaptation is often involved in film dubbing, or that the target text is inscribed any differently than the source script offered to the original actor.

A route into the graphic treatment of sounds in foreign language film dubbing came to me through Yves Gambier's collection of essays *Les transferts linguistiques dans les médias audiovisuels* (1996). Here I was introduced to the technique of the *rhythmo bande*. Further research into this technique revealed an intriguing method of translation that involves both the phonemic and temporal manipulation of texts. Of all the

¹ Thomas Herbst, for example, proposes an approach that would sacrifice exacting phonetic synchronization in favor of a more pragmatic, "plot oriented" form of dubbing that would be more idiomatic. More of a running commentary than an illusion of transplanted voices.

techniques in practice, this is the most suited to my interests in this project and will form the focus of my discussion in the eighth chapter. The other researcher who will make a brief appearance in this discussion is Thomas Herbst (1987) with his thoughts on the different aspects of phonetic synchrony.

0.2.2 The State of Research: Accenting

Finally, I will touch upon another mode of sound translation that is perhaps only indirectly related to the ones just described. The translation of accents—specifically an inscribed imitation of socio-lects—is the very first type of vocal pattern translation examined in the eighth chapter. I have defined it as a peripheral mode, for unlike film dubbing or the schismatic modes, it does not attempt to construct an affinity in vocal patterns between source and target, but rather adopts the source text's rhetorical technique for marking the voice in its socio-cultural specificity.

While poets like the Zukofskys and d'Antin van Rooten tend to escape the radar, and while the area of film dubbing is generating theoretical literature as a field on its own, the question of socio-lects has been an ongoing sub-topic in culturally oriented reflection on translation. I will content myself to mention the work, recent enough, of the GRETI researchers and the McGill Project, which resulted in an issue of *Texte, Traduction, Rédaction* (1994) that invited contributions on the question of socio-lect representation and translation, the standout for me being Bernard Vidal's lengthy essay on the translation of African American vernaculars (Vidal 1994).

The Zukofskys, D'Antin van Rooten, foreign language film dubbing, the translation of socio-lects: this may appear at first to be a motley assemblage of texts and techniques. All have been addressed from different critical stances: some rejected as

scandalous (the Zukofskys), some appreciable as sub-topics in cultural studies (the translation of socio-lects), some treated as virtually autonomous fields just now opening up to research (film dubbing). What is more, they all negotiate between languages using different technical strategies. In the end, however, they all relate in the sonorous dimension of language that they focalize and manipulate. I have yet to encounter these modes linked together in what is without doubt the primary ambition behind them: creating a translation that recalls in some way the vocal pattern of its source.

0.3 A Clarification of Terms: “Literal Translation”

Before launching into the first section on conventional numeric modes of translating form, I should take a moment to clarify certain terms that will emerge frequently throughout. Many of these terms are polyvalent in theoretical discourse, and because of this they remain ill-defined, nebulous. It became clear that I would have to take my meta-language firmly in hand, make my terms, as I choose to use them here, as explicit as possible. “Literal translation,” “equivalence,” “the voice,” and the “eidos:” these terms appear constantly in the pages to come, and so it seems important to define them as clearly as possible from the outset.

Whenever I speak of the “letter” and “literal translation,” I refer concretely to the graphic character, the alphabetic sound and their translation between languages. This point is worth stressing, for the letter has a history of being construed cavalierly by translation theory. Construed metaphorically, it is perhaps wiser to suggest. Borges, in a 1968 Harvard seminar, makes the distinction: “We’ll come to another problem, the problem of literal translation. Of course, when I speak of *literal translations*, I am using a wide metaphor, since, if a translation cannot be true word-to-word to its original, it can

still less be true letter-to-letter.” (1960: 19:00)² In this metaphorical space, as well, is where Berman conceives his “letter” in “l’auberge du lointain” (1985). Suffice it to say that I am not thinking metaphorically in this project. Here, translating the letter means, quite literally, constructing affinities between source and target texts in their letters and sounds.

0.3.1 Clarification of Terms: “Equivalence”

To be sure, not one of the sound translations under examination in this project pretends to be identical letter-for-letter or sound-for-sound to its source, and this leads me to the second term: “equivalence.” Orbiting around the latter is a universe of other terms that are virtually synonymous with it—“fidelity,” “accuracy,” etc.—or that have been thought up to replace it—Toury’s “adequacy,” (1995) Gutt’s “relevance,” (2000) etc. All of these define a conceptual space where texts and their translations relate semantically. None of them, it seems safe to argue, were conceived to address a perceived affinity in sound pattern. What is more, I had no interest in bending any one of them to my purpose, for the theoretical baggage it would bring would only complicate the question. It seemed important, therefore, to come up with another term to describe the types of pattern resemblance achieved in sound translation.

Terms relating to music, like “consonance” and “harmony,” suggested themselves initially. The problem with these is that they too have been thought large. When it comes to describing sounds, they have become synonymous with a musical impressionism dictating which sounds go well together, and which sounds clash. In the

² The lecture in question is on audio-tape. I have therefore stated the precise location of the quote in minutes.

end, I settled on the term that I have been using thus far: “affinity,” specifically “vocal pattern affinity.” I am partial to this term, which conveys a tacit resemblance in the sound patterns of two texts, without going so far as to suggest that these patterns are identical in any objective sense, or that they are implicitly pleasing or offensive either to the ear or to the translator’s sensibilities.

The term “affinity” attracts me for another reason: it communicates the sense of a relationship between source and target texts, of their belonging together, of their need for each other. As discussed earlier with regard to Keith Cohen and the Zukofskys, most sound translations do not behave as self-standing texts that read as if they were conceived in the target language. Rather, they deflect laterally to the source text, upon which they are modeled sonorously. Every link of the sound translation achieves its sense by reference to the corresponding link of a source sound pattern, which must be clear in the reader’s mind. In a way, sound translated source and target texts are bound like Siamese twins. They not only reference each other, but are quite literally woven into each other in a way unknown to conventional translation.

0.3.2 Clarification of Terms: “The Eidos”

My reader will also discover that I have opted to use a Greek etymology “eidos,” instead of the more conventional “idea.” Because the modern sense of the word leads the reader reflexively to undesirable conceptions, I prefer this etymological form. The word “idea,” especially in thinking on translation, seems irremediably related to all things semantic, and is consistently defined against all terms relating to text form, style and pattern, including vocal pattern. The text has its ideas on the one hand, its form on the other: a

naïve notion, considering the fact that any conception of any text dimension is performed as an idea.

Any translator re-writes his or her source with reference to a type of idea he or she gains of it, be this the idea of its semantics, of its metricity, of its sound. So to broaden the notion of the idea beyond the realm of the purely semantic, where it seems to be mired, I adopt its Greek etymology “eidos” (“abstractable essence”, “mental image”), and use it throughout to refer to the sense gained of any textual dimension or pattern, be it one of denotations and connotations (a semantic *eidos*), or of metric relativities (a numeric *eidos*), or ultimately of phonemic or second articulation relativities (a vocal *eidos*).

0.3.3 Clarification of terms: “The Voice”

Last and perhaps most important is my conception of the term “voice” in this project. This is a term that circulates widely in theory, and nowadays mostly in its discursive sense: the speaking “I” engaged with the listening “you.” It is in this sense of discursive engagement that one understands notions like the “narrative voice,” the “poetic voice,” or expressions like a “voice gone unheeded,” “a voice in the wilderness.” In all of these cases, the “voice” refers rather broadly to the intentions of a subjectivity manifesting through language. I should make it clear from the outset that this project does not approach the voice from this discursive stance.

Sound translation is not conceived here to initiate a line of enquiry into the intentions of a vocalizing subject in the specificity of his or her discursive context.

This is a less fashionable dissertation, perhaps, a throwback to a perspective more firmly grounded in the sign, and bordering on a structuralist point of view. When I use the term “voice,” or “vocal patterns,” “sound translation,” or “phonemic translation,” I refer very concretely to the textual representation of second articulation sound features or phonemes. My “voice” is an organization of graphemes representing an organization of phonemes (a phono-structure), itself representing ultimately a sound emitting gesture (a phonetics). It is in this more static, semiotic conception that the lunatic translations under examination here reveal their underlying logic.

To be clear, just because I have reserved for the voice a more structuralist conception does not mean that discursivity is absent from these deliberations. On the contrary, while specific vocal affinities between source and target text are best seized phono-structurally, the prime mover behind the creation and practice of all these sound translational modes is inescapably discursive, for it is grounded in conceptions of language and poetics made clear in the voices of historical dialogue dating back to antiquity, voices dictating, reacting to, and rebelling against prevailing conceptions of language and poetry. The reasons sound translation emerged on the landscape are to be found in the voices of Socratic dialogue, religious authority and poetic dissent, the most remarkable of which being Saint Augustine himself.

Section 1, Chapter 1

The Translator's Deafness: Refuge in the Number

When I suggest that translators turn a deaf ear toward their source text's vocal sound pattern, I get one of two responses. The first usually comes from the more functionally minded translator, who assures me that this is precisely how it should be. After all, the idea is to help cultures transcend the mutually incomprehensible vocal sounds dividing them. These sounds: are they not the obstacles to comprehension, the source of the Babelian chaos that the translator fights to overcome in his or her function as mediator, communicator? This first response, in other words, is one that sets the text's communicable message above everything else, and relegates sound to a more expendable rank in the hierarchy. For the information oriented translator, text sounds usually are not even on the radar.

The second response is more argumentative, and comes ironically from translators like myself, who deal with literary and specifically poetic texts. The latter insist that they not only pay attention to their source's sounds, but also make great efforts to convey them in their target. What makes literary translation such a formidable enterprise, they argue, is the attention it affords to these prickly matters of form, to the text's music, the quality and organization of its sounds, and the sum effect of all these things on the global sense. After this parade of terms—"form", "music", "global sense"—wielded so incomprehensibly, comes the argumentum ad hominem: I am young and still have much to learn about how literary translators go about their business. I certainly can not argue with that, and the conversation usually ends there.

Sometimes, showing replaces arguing. I pull out Schiller's version of some carefully metered Shakespeare, just a simple line from *Macbeth*: "Fillet of a fenny snake, in the cauldron boil and bake" (Shakespeare 1974: 1329) → "Schlangen die der Sumpf genährt, kocht und zischt auf unserm Herd." (Shakespeare 1999: 257) When I propose that there is nothing of Shakespeare's sounds in Schiller's German, my objectors are quick to challenge me. They point out the meticulous attention that Schiller has obviously afforded Shakespeare's sound play. I object once more that for all this attention, the German text gives no indication of what these sounds might have been. They concede that Schiller's sounds are not the same—the target is in German after all—but that they nevertheless reflect something of these sounds. When I ask what that "something" is, they refer to Shakespeare's meter, his rime, his use of assonant and consonant features, etc.

That is when I show them the playful *traducson*: "hickory, dickory dock..." → "et qui rit des curés d'oc..." (D'Antin van Rooten 1980: 6) In this case, the French target does indeed offer a sense of the sounds of the original, at the very least a broad indication of how the source text is put together phonemically. Once they find out that this is the sort of text I have in mind, the reaction is usually one of amusement. I am being playful. This is not a serious translation, not even a serious text. In fact, it is a mockery of both texts and translation. Of what possible relevance could it be to Schiller's masterful Shakespeare? What could it reveal about conventional translation and its treatment of source text sounds?

First and perhaps most obviously, the *traducson* reveals a distinction often overlooked by those who claim to translate sound—often referred to in haphazard,

blanket terms like “musicality,” “rhythmicity,” “melody”—in one stroke with that equally vague notion called “form.” The translation of form has nothing to do with the translation of a vocal or phonemic pattern. In fact, judging by conventional methods, the translator’s notion of form seems to be much like his or her notion of semantics. Both of these are addressed as detachable or abstractable from vocal pattern. Form, as much as denotation and connotation, seems conceived in a transcendent space beyond the source text’s voice, a space that is a refuge from this voice. How else could a translation still recall some idea of the source text’s structure, even in the face of such profound vocal transformation?

A source text’s form or structure, as it is traditionally conceived by translators for translation, is not its sound pattern, for the simple reason that from source to target, an idea of this form can hold constant in the face of seismic vocal transformations. The first section of this project revolves around one question: how does a translator go about abstracting this voiceless foundation of structural invariance? Here I find myself at the threshold of the so-called “black box,” those inner zones of the translator’s thought processes, zones that I do not dare to attempt to know in any objective way. So I will depart from a more modest position, perhaps an all too obvious one.

My strategy now is to seize upon the translator’s most visible and demonstrable mode of conceiving and schematizing text form, and then to begin following it through some philosophical reflection, making it clear from the start that there is no “must” or “invariably” in my thinking, and certainly no pretension of arguing this or any mode of conceiving text form as the only plausible one. To me it is simply the most *obvious* one, and for this reason serves as a reliable thread to grab hold of and to follow for a short

while through some philosophical reflection. Where it leads will doubtless prove no more conclusive than where it was picked up.

I will let the obvious guide me then. If I want a clue as to how translators conceive text form, it seems that a good place to start is with the traditional schemata that they employ to map out this form, schemata that often serve as a blueprint or template for the organization of target language materials. Such models are usually viewed as heavy handed technical sketches, crude devices for organizing thought before the real business of translation begins. However, the fact that they are so readily dismissed as the beginning translator's training wheels is what makes them all the more interesting, for these are the rudimentary modes of conceptualizing that form the basis for more complex ones later on.

Gideon Toury includes a short chapter on the norms of conceiving form in his *Descriptive Translation Studies and Beyond* (1995). The chapter is aptly entitled "Literary Organization and Translation Strategies: A Text is Sifted Through a Mediating Model." (Toury 1995) Under scrutiny is the Hebrew translation of a German fairy tale entitled "Das Schlaraffenland." Toury argues that typically, decisions regarding the translation of text form "are far from erratic. Rather...they tend to be highly patterned." (147). This is to say that a translator will tend to rely on some mediating structural model when organizing his or her solutions. This model may be abstracted from the source text's organization—iambic tetrameter for iambic tetrameter for example. Or it may be abstracted out of the target culture's literary conventions, essentially casting the source text into a new form.

In both cases, there is this sifting through a mediating model, an abstraction of form, an *eidos*. It is not long before Toury demonstrates the principle of this *eidos*, which comes through in his description of the Hebrew translation's rime scheme:

The following is the rhyme-scheme of the Hebrew text: aa bb cc dd ee ff/ aa bb cc ddd ee ff gggg hh ii jj kk/ aa bb cc dd ee/ aa bb/ aa bb cc dd eee(e)ee/ aaa 0. A numeric representation of the realization of the various rhymemes would look as follows 222222/22232242222/22222/22225(6)/ 3 0" (149).

This is the schema or model, the eidetic principle of the Hebrew text's organization. This is the template for the target text's structure. It represents a group of six riming couplets, followed by a group of nine couplets interrupted by three and four riming lines respectively, and so on.

The governing principle of this model seems rather evident: it is the number. Notwithstanding the false distinction that Toury makes, both of these schemata are fundamentally *numeric*. Obviously, the letters that compose his first rime scheme are not activated linguistically, that is to say phonetically and grammatically, but rather algebraically. Each numeric pair symbolizes a riming pair. How this riming pair is constructed and with what vocal sounds is up to the discretion of the translator. To put it simply, Toury has cast the text's structure as a numeric relativity transcending vocal accident, as an eidetic template to remain constant as sound structures shift and change. He has projected this text as a numeric *eidos*.

1.1 Text Form Cast Numerically: A Classical Conception

A numeric *eidos*, a text's form cast by the translator as a numeric relativity: what I see here is a translational mathesis of sorts, demonstrated by Toury as a norm of literary translation in contemporary times, but which evidently has roots in classical conceptions

of form. I mentioned before that my strategy was to pick up a single thread and follow it into the labyrinth. In this numeric *eidos*, I see one mode of conceiving form that effectively trumps the specificity of the text's vocal pattern, allows the translator to transcend this pattern, to relegate it to a realm of lesser importance. The text's number is privileged as universal principle, while the text's vocal specificity is undervalued as a passing accident. Here is a thread worth following back into some classical reflection, not only on the subject of translation, but also on texts and language in general.

1.1.1 Why Classical Thinking?

Toury suggests that this sort of numeric schematizing is prevalent enough as a contemporary translation strategy. So why resort to classical and early medieval thinking for further perspective on the matter? The answer is in the frank explicitness of its biases. In the Platonic orientation of Saint Augustine's thinking, I see a philosophy of poetic form (and indeed language in general) that not only privileges the number as the governing principle of structural organization, but which also condemns language's sonorous dimension to the inferior realm of the senses. This type of religious reflection, advocating a path of transcendence from vocal sound to the language meaningful (words bearing semantic meaning, numbers bearing formal meaning), effectively casts the dye for the translator's modern conception of the expendable signifier and the universal signified.

In my research, I have found with Augustine an illuminating comparative reflection on the lowly language sound and the eidetic language number. This is not to suggest, however, that a numeric conception of form is absent from historical reflection more directly oriented toward translation. Indeed, it surfaces in the thinking of Etienne

Dolet (1509-1546), who recalls the thinking of Leonardo Bruni (1369-1444) a century earlier. I would like to take a brief look at the mathetic inclinations of these two Renaissance thinkers. Only a brief look, however, because neither of them reflect on the number, the text and language as thoroughly as Augustine. Nevertheless, they do introduce the matter in a translational context, and solidify certain basic notions. As such, they serve as a good preliminary to the Church Father.

1.1.2 Dolet and Bruni: Oratorical Numbers

Etienne Dolet's unfortunate end prevented him from completing his *Orateur François*, which was published in parts in the six years before his death. One of these parts is the much cited "La manière de bien traduire d'une langue en l'autre," published circa 1540. Here, Dolet invokes the question of translating text form in patently numeric terms. His fifth rule of good translation reads as follows:

Venons maintenant à la cinquième règle, que doit observer un bon traducteur. Laquelle est de si grande vertu, que sans elle toute composition est lourde, et mal plaisante. Mais qu'est ce, qu'elle contient? Rien autre chose, que l'observation des nombres oratoires : c'est effectuer une liaison, et assemblément des dictions avec telle douceur, que non seulement l'ame s'en contente, mais aussi les oreilles en sont toutes ravies, et ne se fachent jamais d'une telle harmonie de langage...

De ces nombres oratoires je parle plus copieusement en mon *Orateur* : par quoi je n'en ferai ici plus long discours. Et derechef j'avertirai le traducteur d'y prendre garde : car sans l'observation des nombres on ne peut être admirable en quelque composition que ce soit : y sans lesquels (les nombres), les sentences ne peuvent être graves, et avoir leurs poids requis, et légitime...

Ou c'est autant, que de divers instruments musicaux mal conduits par les joueurs ignorants de l'art, et peu conaissants les tons et mesures de la musique...Entre les Latins Marc Tulle Ciceron a été grand observateur des nombres. Mais ne pense pas que cela se doive plus observer par les Orateurs que par les Historiographes. Et qu'ainsi soit, tu ne trouveras Caesar et Salluste moins nombreux, que Ciceron.

Conclusion quant à ce propos, sans grand observation des nombres un Auteur n'est rien. (Dolet 1972 : 15-16)

What does Dolet mean by “nombres oratoires”, an expression repeated at least five times in this passage and linked strongly to other terms related to music: “harmonies, tons, mesures...” In this and other editions, this notion of oratorical numbers is glossed with the more familiar words “form” and “style.”

It is not hard to surmise what he means here, however. Indeed, the number seems to refer quite concretely to those countable or quantifiable dimensions of the text: to things like meter—syllable, word and verse count; to the organization, distribution and relative proportionality of phrases, clauses, sentences; to repeating sound and stress features as they underscore and reinforce semantic features; to the periods or intervals between repeated or stressed features. Overall, it is the sense of the order in which language elements fit together, the “music” they make. This connection with the principle of music is important, but must be qualified. This is not music in any broad or general sense, but rather in a specific classical conception: music as artful measure, as the organization of tones in periodic structures governed by the number.

With Dolet, the reader is obliged to make this sort of broad, educated guess as to what these oratorical numbers refer to exactly. Following the thread back further to Leonardo Bruni (1369-1444) however, one gets a more explicit idea. Bruni’s *On the Correct Way to Translate*, published circa 1424, goes a bit further in complementing Dolet’s thinking with regard to the text number and its translation. Like Dolet, Bruni’s essay is prescriptive, a set of guidelines. And like Dolet, the source text’s musical dimension is vitally important: “[the translator] must possess a sound ear so that his translation does not disturb and destroy the fullness and rhythmical qualities of the original” (Bruni 1997: 59).

Unlike Dolet, however, Bruni offers a better idea of the type of numeric schemata involved. The number, for Bruni, seems concomitant with the notion of the text's periodicity: "[The translator] cannot possibly preserve the sense to advantage unless he insinuates and twists himself into the original's word order and periodic structure with verbal propriety and stylistic faithfulness." (59) Bruni even goes so far as to break the text down into countable dimensions: "In rhythmic prose, one must carefully observe and follow the cola [clauses or clause-groups], commata [smaller groups of words], and periods to precisely and squarely mark off the word order." (59) It is the countable "period", or the rhythmic interval between one stressed element and the next, that gets Bruni's special attention, however.

What is the countable period? Following Bruni, it seems to be a flexible unit determined by a stress interval that repeats itself more or less regularly. This unit could be construed largely as the stanza, or more narrowly as the verse or line. Bruni seems to levy this conception when observing that within the period are a number of phrases organized in specific proportion to each other, and when insisting that the translator observe this proportion closely: "If he is translating Cicero...he must fill up the entire period with large, copious, and full phrasings...if he translates Sallust, he must needs decide in the case of nearly every word to observe propriety and great restraint, and to this end must retrench and cut down." (59)

The period could also be the smallest rhythmic interval between one audibly stressed syllable and the next. It is the text's pulse or beat, in other words, the number of syllables that make up what is commonly referred to as the metric "foot:" the iamb, the trochee, the dactyl etc. Bruni refers to the latter as "schemes" and explains how they are

often exploited in texts to vital rhetorical effect: “Again, the darts which sometimes the orator throws strike with force only when they are discharged rhythmically.”(59) Once again, the number emerges as the period’s governing principle. The rhythmical effect is produced “when two phrases employ the same number of syllables.” (59)

Of special importance in both Dolet and Bruni is their ongoing connection of literary and musical principles. References to the translator’s trained ear, or to his or her role as composer harmonizing instrumental parts are brief and relatively superficial, and for this reason may not retain the critic’s attention, or be passed off as broad metaphors. However, I see this invocation of music in relation to the translation of text form as another intriguing thread to pick up and follow. For the remainder of this chapter, then, I will let the question of translation fade into the background somewhat (although it remains of course firmly connected to all of these deliberations) and concern myself with this connection between linguistic, poetic and musical principles. Specifically, I will address classical modes of thinking that rationalize these principles mathematically, and in so doing express their disdain for the lowly vocal sound.

1.2 Augustine’s Bias

Numeric modes of abstracting text form are evidenced in the very notion of meter, and therefore in virtually any rhetorical treatise, classical or modern, on poetic form. So why pay particular attention to Augustinian philosophy? It is not that Saint Augustine is defter than others at theorizing the number behind creation, literary or otherwise. If this were the only question I wanted to examine, I would begin more logically with Pythagoras. In Augustine, however, is the all important reverse side of the question.

Just to recall, the thread that I took up was not only the revelation of the number behind language and texts, but also an explicit antagonism toward vocal sounds.

Augustine not only privileges the number as the most perfect expression of language form, but also conceives a religious philosophy made to discard the sonorous dimension of language as he does all of the sensorial, passing things of the world. No other philosopher that I have crossed in my research has developed so explicitly this hierarchy of values from the lowly vocal sound to the rationally ordered word, bearer of the divine *eidos* both semantic and numeric. It is Augustine who comments most pointedly and extensively—with all the zeal of a church father—on the iniquities of the vocal order of language, as can be found in the *Sermons*, *De Doctrina Christiana*, *De Ordine* and other texts. There is also plentiful reflection on the connection of language, poetry, music and the numeric *eidos* in his *De Musica*, a treatise written in Socratic form between master and student.

Augustine will have central focus in the remainder of this chapter, then. However, because the Bishop's thinking offers threads leading further back through Platonic philosophy, because it seems to connect with numeric conceptions of music and language present in the Socratic dialogues, my plan is to contextualize Augustine in the tradition of classical thinking. For my purposes here, the most illuminating dialogues connecting language, music and the number are to be found in book two of *The Laws*, book five of *The Republic*, and in *Philebus*. All privilege the number as the governing principle of linguistic and musical form, but are nowhere near as thoroughgoing in their disdain of the lowly vocal sound as Augustine.

1.2.1 Venial Sounds vs. Divine Words

In Augustine's thinking, the components of the verbal language sign do not relate harmoniously, but rather antagonistically. The sign's sonorous envelope is systematically divided against the meaningful word it constructs. This antagonism seems to emerge from a more fundamental one opposing the flesh and the spirit, the senses and reason. Works like *De Doctrina Christiana* (397 A.D.), *De Ordine* (386 A.D.) and *De Musica* (408-409 A.D), along with the *Sermons*, lay out an ideological blueprint that seems startlingly in keeping with how translators relate to the sonorous exterior of language that they deem expendable.

The voice for Augustine is nothing more than a sensory envelope, and like all things of the flesh, it is to be transcended, repressed. He has little use for the material dimension of signs, which are there only to serve as conduit to the object signified. In Book 2 of *De Doctrina Christiana*, he argues: "Ayant à parler des signes, je préviens qu'il ne faut pas s'attacher à ce qu'ils sont en eux-mêmes, mais à leur propriété significative, ou à l'objet qu'ils désignent." (Augustine *De Doctrina* 1864 :19). The sign's relevant dimension is not the impression that it makes upon the senses, but rather the movement it produces within the comprehending mind: "L'unique fin que l'on se propose en adressant un signe à quelqu'un, c'est de faire passer dans son esprit ce que l'on conçoit dans le sien." (19) In the same sense, the verbal language sign's sonorous exterior has little value in itself. Relevant only is the comprehending movement of the spirit that conceives from this exterior a word, and from this word an *eidos*.

The sound of the human voice is a wretched, fallen thing, says Augustine in his sermons. For if it can be used as vehicle for the words of language, it can also be used to

babble, cry out, or express base appetites. The words of language, for their part, are of a higher order, for they are already the result of the internal, spiritual movement that conceives from sound something properly significant and enduring. Moreover, words do not need fleeting vocal sounds to be produced, or to be internalized and understood. Through reading and writing, for example, the spirit can conceive and reflect upon them in pious silence. Put simply, vocal sounds that do not produce words are but savage phenomena. Words that do not externalize themselves in a voice, however, are all the more meaningful, are conduits to the divine:

The voice, though it be but sound, make an irrational noise, such as the sound of one merely crying out, not speaking, can still be called a voice; it cannot be called a word...The word even without a voice can effect much, the voice without the word is an empty thing... In me, in the apex of my heart, in the secret chamber of my mind, the word precedes my voice. The voice has not yet sounded in my ear, but the word is already in my heart... In me there is first the word and afterwards the voice. (Augustine *Sermones* 1945: 375)

First the word, then the voice. First is the word cloistered inside, secreted away from the world in the chambers of the heart and mind. I am reminded of the Trappist monks in Holland, Manitoba where I grew up. I am reminded of their vow of silence. Things like prayer and penance were a monologue to be reiterated internally, never externalized in vocal sounds.

For Augustine, the word's chamber is the heart and mind, a spiritual place, an eternal place. The voice's chamber is merely the ear, a sensory channel as imperfect and fleeting as any corporeal thing. The voice diminishes and dies just like the flesh, while the word is eternal, with God. In this passage from the Sermons, Augustine constructs a striking analogy of this notion using the figures of Christ and John the Baptist:

But to thee, so that thou mayest understand, the voice comes first to thy ear, in order that the word may find its way into thy mind... Therefore if the voice is

John, the Word Christ; before John, was Christ with God; after John was Christ with us. Voices die but the word increases... the ministry of the voice diminishes as the mind makes progress towards the Word. Thus Christ must increase, but John diminish. ... John was diminished, his head cut off. Christ was lifted up, increased, so to speak, on the cross. (375)

Here is a striking divergence, as the voice and the word set off on opposite vectors: the voice diminishing, decaying; the word increasing on a transcendent path toward the divine. The words of language are aspects of the original Word, the Logos. For this reason, they rise up. The vocal sounds of language are aspects of the body and the earth, and to the earth they return.

It is interesting to note how Augustine invokes the manner of Saint John's execution here. At first reading, it comes across as a bit of gallows humour. One would be wrong to take the Bishop lightly here, however, for he goes on to describe the death of Christ in similar terms. Diminishment of the voice is quite literally a diminishment of the body. For the unlucky evangelist, this means a mouth and ear falling to the earth and decaying within it. The rise of the word, by the same token, is literally the raising of the body onto the cross, the progress of the soul's transcendence. For Saint John, moreover, it means a death surrounded by morbid eroticism. For Christ, one of selfless self-sacrifice.

1.2.2 One Church, One Gospel, One Idea

Augustine's philosophical descendancy helps one to gain a clearer understanding of this rift between language sounds, words, and the eidos. At the time, Christian ideology was

evolving out of classical models (O'Connell 1968).¹ Augustine's reflections, like those emerging from the Platonic dialogues, bore on a conceptual split between ideal and fallen worlds. What is God if not the ideal agent poorly reflected in the fallen world of human agents? What is Logos—the original enunciation—if not the expression of an absolute Word forever adulterated in the fallen realm of the human voice?

For Augustine, the fall of language began long before the Babelian splintering into thousands of tongues. It began when language became sound in the first place, something external to the self, something material, worldly. It seems that vocal sounds themselves constitute both language's and man's first great fall. They are the consequence of original sin. In *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*:

Avant le péché...il y avait une source intérieure pour arroser cette créature [l'homme] ; Dieu parlait d'une manière immédiate à son intelligence : ainsi qu'elle n'avait pas à recevoir du dehors les paroles divines...L'homme condamné maintenant à travailler sur la terre a besoin de la pluie des nuées, c'est-à-dire d'un enseignement formulé dans le langage humain... (Augustine, *De la Genèse*, 1864 : 108)

Before sin, the Word sprung directly, unmediated, like a font from within. Once again, the internal, the implicit and secret word precedes the voice. Now, however, the word's precedence is formulated in the most essentialist of terms. In the order of creation, Augustine argues, the implicit word precedes all external human vocalization in its unpredictable variability, in its potential opacity. The word was handed down to man perfect, voiceless. Then man sinned, and only then did the word fall, become flesh by becoming sound, by voicing itself out into the world.

¹ This is a book that explores, among other things, the connection between Saint Augustine, Plotinus and the African Neo-Platonist tradition. A book connecting Augustine to his classical forbearers, in other words.

How is the internal font restored? Through The Gospel, of course. For Augustine, the latter integrates all fallen signs into a single text united in Truth. It replenishes the internal font that was lost: “Car notre Seigneur ayant daigné prendre le nuage de notre chair, a répandu la pluie très abondante du saint Évangile; il a même promis que quiconque boirait de son eau reviendrait à la source intime et ne chercherait plus la rosée extérieure.” (108) The principle of the Gospel is a soul’s redemptive progress, an internalizing of God’s word and a replenishing of the font. Man traffics with a world of fallen signs so that he might recover eventually, through reasoned reflection, something of its originary perfection. Eventually, the language sign no longer needs to impinge from without, but can once again spring from within.

1.2.3 Plato: The Numeric Relativities of Musical and Linguistic Sounds

The perfect thing, handed down from above, is corrupted by the material world, by the senses, and reason strives to recover something of its first perfection. The Gospel is not the only way of this striving, however. Augustine sees it in artistic pursuits, as well, specifically in those of poetry and music. The essence of these is a principle of proportion describable simply as Beauty, a principle most purely expressed in the language of numbers. And once again we find Augustine firmly grounded in classical, and specifically Platonic thinking.

In Plato, music and poetry, largely undifferentiated, did not originate in any human potentiality. They were rather forms passed down from the gods. Their essence was this divine conception. Their existence in the world was a corruption, simply because they had to be channeled through the human senses and set in forms that men

could imitate. That poetry and music are gifts bestowed from above, independently of the artist's innate abilities, is Socrates' position in the *Ion*, specifically in his discussion of the magnet or Heraclea stone (Plato 1952: 402-447). The Muse attracts the poet to her and imparts him with a divine magnetic charge, which draws other artists to him, inspires in them the desire to repeat, imitate. In this way, human forms of artistic expression proliferate at ever further removes from their divine origin. At every mimetic remove, the expression is less beautiful.

As fallen as the realm of art is, it still retains something of the divine principle of its creation. Men, argues Socrates in *The Laws* (1967) and again in *The Republic* (1959), should be encouraged to develop rational tools for comprehending beauty in their artistic endeavours. The greatest of these tools is the number and the art form that best exploits it is music. An education in music imparts a sense of divine proportionality, and ultimately teaches the student to shun the sensory world and the base imitations of art:

Si la musique est la partie maîtresse de l'éducation, n'est-ce-pas, Glaucon, parce que le rythme et l'harmonie sont particulièrement propres à pénétrer dans l'âme et à la toucher profondément ?... L'éducation musicale convenablement donnée fait sentir très vivement la négligence et la laideur dans les ouvrages de l'art et dans ceux de la nature. (Platon 1959: 402)

1.2.3.1. *Philebus* and the Numeric Principle: Finite Sets and Repetition

How music and its numbers reveal beauty, and specifically how they reveal language, is one of the themes of *Philebus* (1952: 197-399), where Socrates, Philebus and Protarchus inquire into the nature of reason, and specifically its faculty for creating conceptual unities. The gift of this ability comes from the Promethean flame. The way of this ability, Socrates argues, is the number, which helps man to overcome his own

helplessness in a seemingly chaotic world. Conceived as infinitely variable, and thus without predictable properties, such a world is made to overwhelm and consume him. The number, however, allows him to conceive phenomena as essentially finite and invariable, and in this way to assume rational control, to contain chaos in a finite conceptual space.

Close reading of *Philebus* reveals two numeric principles helping man to contain chaos. The first is the principle of the finite set. Reason makes the infinite finite by enumerating, that is to say differentiating and measuring against each other the operative elements of a set, which is then conceived as forming a functional whole. Music is cited as the running example of this sort of articulation. Each musical mode is conceived as a scale of seven differentiated tones measured against each other in specific intervals. Following traditional compositional technique, the score's key signature would be the index of this finite set of tones out of which all of the score's figures are ostensibly conceived. Moreover, each measure in a musical composition constitutes a finite set of rhythmic beats or pulses, as indexed by the score's time signature. A time signature of $\frac{3}{4}$ implies three beats (1,2,3) to the measure.

The second principle is that of repetition. The finite set repeats, and through this repetition is achieved a unified order, an "equal and double everything which puts an end to the differences between opposites and makes them commensurable and harmonious by the introduction of number..." (251). Music is once again the running example. Any of the melodic elements—tones and beats—making up the measure are in themselves unlimited, infinite, until they are first measured off as a limited set and then made to repeat over and over:

In the acute and the grave, the quick and the slow, which are unlimited, the addition of these same elements (their repetition) created a limit and established the whole art of music in all its perfection. (251)

Two types of set repetition are implied in musical composition. In the first instance, the seven tones of the musical mode or scale are made to repeat in the re-combined figures of the score, figures which themselves repeat in the harmonic re-combination of chord inversions. In the second instance there is rhythmic repetition, as each measure of the score makes up a finite number of beats or pulses repeating consistently throughout. A time signature of $\frac{3}{4}$ implies a repeated count of 1-2-3, 1-2-3, 1-2-3..., the first beat receiving the stress.

What is most important for my purpose here is the application of these principles to language and translation. Indeed, Socrates proposes these two numeric principles of set articulation and repetition as the very essence of language. The latter, he argues, is explainable in musical principles: “that which makes each of us a grammarian is the knowledge of the number and nature of sounds...And it is this same knowledge which makes the musician” (223). Then comes a lengthy narration by Socrates of the hypothetical first attempt to count out the finite set of language sounds. The grammarian begins with a crude sense that the sound coming from his mouth is both infinite (one undifferentiated and chaotic flow) and variable (describing an infinite number of phonetic variations).

Only through the number does man begin to gain knowledge of language, only when he succeeds in differentiating out of the vocal infinite a finite set of sounds. Doing this means counting—dividing, grouping and re-combining—until he arrives at a limited number of sound principles, the alphabet, which founds the unity of his language and the

science of his grammar. Through the number, therefore, the infinity of vocal sound becomes a conceptual finite, a unity: one alphabet, one grammar, one language system.

Socrates illustrates his argument with a direct analogy to the musical arts:

Sound is one in the art of music also, so far as that art is concerned....but, my friend, when you have grasped the number and quality of the intervals of the voice in respect to high and low pitch, and the limits of the intervals, and all the combinations derived from them, which men of former times discovered and handed down to us...with the name of harmonies, and also the corresponding effects in the movements of the body, which they say are measured by numbers and must be called rhythms and measures—when you have thus grasped the facts, you have become a musician.... (225-226).

After the principle of the finite set comes that of repetition, and two types of set repetition are implicit in the articulation of language: 1. Alphabetic sounds repeat as they recombine into other finite sets, that is to say the syllables, words and phrases of language, which in turn repeat themselves. 2. The sound producing movements of speech repeat (the movements of the body), each repeating movement being measurable in a finite set of stressed and unstressed, or accented and lax syllables.

1.2.3.2 Translation and the Numeric “Equal and Double Everything”

How would this principle of set articulation and repetition, of the set’s numeric “equaling and doubling,” apply to the translator’s conception of text sounds? Two types of counting and doubling seem to govern conventional translation’s methodology. The first seems to be the simple or straight count. Here the translator might count the sonorous features of his or her source in terms of the finite and repeating graphic, lexical and grammatical sets into which they are organized: characters, syllables, words, phrases etc. To put it simply, depending on where the parameters of the set are fixed, the translator

would count the source in terms of its individual graphemes (the minimal set), its syllables (the sub-word set), its words (the lexical set), its phrases (the syntagmatic set), keeping in mind all the while that these graphic sets are only very loose and approximate indicators of the actual number of vocal sounds that they synthesize. I certainly do not wish to fall into the error of presuming that the count of a word's graphemes necessarily equals the count of its vocalized sounds, that there is this sort of direct symbolic pipeline between the components of the written and spoken words. The latter exist in a very complex relationship, one that I will address in the next section of this project. For now, however, I would maintain that translators tend to rely at least partially on a count of graphic elements as an approximative benchmark in determining a count of actual vocal sounds.

Having taken this count, the translator would then strive to construct an equal or double of it in the target. Shakespeare's /double, double/, for example, offers a total of twelve letters representing two words, four syllables and approximately eight articulate sounds /d-ou-b-le, d-ou-b-le→1234, 5678/.. Schiller's German target /rüstig, rüstig/ proposes a total of twelve letters representing two words, four syllables, and approximately twelve articulate sounds /r-ü-s-t-i-g, r-ü-s-t-i-g/. He exceeds Shakespeare by four sounds here, but the counts at the level of the letter (twelve for twelve), the syllable (four for four) and the word (two for two) do indeed double the source. Here, in other words, the sense of numeric equaling and doubling is achieved when Schiller's sounds are subsumed within the parameters of repeating syllabic and lexical sets.

In addition to this simple count there is what could be called a "complex count." The source text's countable set is not only determined by graphic, lexical and

grammatical features. Quite often it is also determined by carefully measured poetic modes of sonorous repetition. Taking up the /double, double/ example once again, I could perform a simple count of twelve characters /123456, 789101112/, four syllables /12, 34/ or two words /1, 2/. Eventually, however, I would have to acknowledge that this phrase is also a single word repeated in careful poetic measure, a twice repeated sonorous configuration, and that my numbers can account for this at all of the above levels: the graphic /123456, 123456/, the syllabic /12, 12/, the lexical /1,1/, and the sonorous /d-ou-b-le, d-ou-b-le→1234, 1234/. My numbers now assume the dual role of taking count and symbolizing sonorous repetitions occurring internally. In a sense, they now function both summatively and symbolically.

Poetically speaking, these more complex internal repetitions are most readily grasped as the notions of rime and rhythm/meter. Rime (and in a larger sense things like assonance and consonance) is implicit in sounds and sound combinations that repeat at regular metric intervals. Measured rhythm, for its part, would be implicit in the speech movement that repeats regularly in the finite sets of metric intervals or feet. Now the translator's task takes on an added dimension of complexity, as he or she not only strives to construct the numeric equal or double of the source text's simple count, but also that of its complex count, of its internal repetitions. Put enigmatically perhaps, it is now a question of constructing the "numeric equal or double" of a system of numeric equals and doubles, the repetition of a system of repetitions. Schiller's "*Rüstig, rüstig, nimmer müde*," just to recall, conveys four trochaic feet, and the first two words constitute a repeated phonemic or riming configuration. As translator, Schiller's concern, whether intuitive or thought out, would have been to make a numeric equal or double of both

Shakespeare's rhythmic (the four trochees of his "*double double, toil and trouble*"→1', 2', 3', 4') and sonorous repetitions (/double, double/, →1234, 1234).

I am the first to admit that when laid out in these sorts of equations, the numeric principle at work in translation comes across as overly rational, and of a certain far flung idealism. It is true enough that such abstractions are always in the ideal, and that source and target texts can no more be perfect numeric doubles than they can be perfect semantic or sonorous doubles. Schiller's German target does not "double" all of Shakespeare's sonorous repetitions. /Nimmer müde/ does not take up poetically the sounds of /rüstig, rüstig/ in the same way that /toil and trouble/ takes up /double, double/. The reality of the target text inevitably falls short of the ideal, but this is perfectly understandable, as the numeric eidos exists not as a goal attainable in any way that could be described as absolute, but rather as an eidetic "way of striving," to put it in Benjamin's terms (Benjamin 1973).²

The fact that the translational reality does not measure up to the numeric ideal should not suggest that this ideal or mode of striving is for naught. The gut reaction to the flawed reality, all too often, is to put the ideal in question. If Schiller conforms to Shakespeare's numbers, he also deviates from them substantially, and therefore the Philebean notion of the numeric equal or double becomes untenable. Such a conclusion seems to betray the type of all-or-nothing mentality that fails to distinguish between guidelines and rules. Perhaps I am to blame somewhat for blurring this distinction, for the context of *Philebus* and the desire to examine meticulously has resulted in the type of close counting—complete with a teasing apart of text elements and an assignation of

² The translator's mode of thinking, argues Benjamin, is idea and ideal driven: "Die des Übersetzers [ist] eine abgeleitete, letzte, ideenhafte Intention..." (Benjamin 1973: 164).

numeric sequences—that appears to suggest the possibility of precise, mathematical equation between source and target. In praxis, however, the idea of the source text's count would remain in the back of the translator's mind as more of a loose guideline.

A guideline that is palpable in the target text despite its deviations. Schiller's sense of Shakespeare's numbers, as well as his efforts to double them, can indeed be gained through the solution he has proposed, even though it strays from the perfect numeric equaling or doubling proposed in *Philebus*. There are simply too many instances of proximity—same syllable and word count, same repetition of rhythmic and phonemic configurations—to dismiss the eidetic number as an operative guideline. Based upon the preponderance of the evidence, it does not seem too much to assume that in the back of Schiller's mind was a numeric matrix derived from Shakespeare's source, and against which potential German solutions were matched and tested before a final version was decided upon. Ultimately, this final version would be a negotiation between adherence to this matrix and a target text that would read easefully in German. I will speak further of this type of negotiation in the third chapter.

It is not lost on me that the example I have chosen is a rigidly metered poetic text, and that such texts tend to be the ones where this sort of strict measurement seems to apply. This should not suggest, however, that numeric guidelines apply only to the most metered poetic texts and their translations. They may assume a special complexity in these sorts of texts, as well as a certain preeminence in the translator's consciousness, but they are palpable in prose texts as well. Literary prose is also a locus for the type of simple and complex counts I have just discussed, as I will demonstrate in the next chapter. Even prose of a non-literary or pragmatic nature makes use of numeric

guidelines. The latter are more lax, and they are expressed in different terms, but they are there nonetheless and continue to be observed. A word count is implicit in the pragmatic translator's efforts to produce a target text of roughly the same length as the source, in his or her effort not to overly inflate the target. It is also implicit in the most pragmatic consideration of them all: remuneration. The presumption that roughly a numeric equal or double of the source will be produced is what determines whether or not it would be more profitable for the translator to demand payment by the word or by a flat fee, for example.

Perhaps the principle becomes more evident if I shift for a moment into a negative mode of arguing, for it has been my experience that when it comes to the question of the count, translators are more acutely aware of what they *can not* or *would not* do rather than what they are actually doing. Indeed, the only idea more suspect than a perfect numeric doubling is excessive numeric incommensurability. When it comes to translating a count of repeating sound sets—whether the latter are set at the single sound, the syllable, the word, phrase, or the metric foot—there is a margin of allowable variance. In the typical scenario, however, and barring some deliberate strategy to deviate from the original's form, there is a threshold beyond which numeric incommensurability becomes patently unacceptable. A translator may well be able to get away with turning /Double, double/ into three, six or eight German syllables. He or she may even be able to get away with turning it into a full line of German prose, but a paragraph long explanation of them would not do. There is a point beyond which deviation from the source text's count makes translation phase into other types of re-writing, into periphrase or definition, for example. I will take a closer look at this principle in the next chapter.

1.2.4 Augustine: *De Ordine, De Musica*

In the tradition of this Platonic thinking comes Augustine, who also addresses the question of musical proportion, of numeric set articulation and repetition in poetry. Unlike his classical forbearers, however, he takes care to pit the rational principle of the number against the esthetic or sensorial principle of the voice. The divinity of music and poetry are in their science, and their science is the number. The fall, the diminishment of music and poetry are in their performance, and their performance is quite specifically vocalization. Following Augustine, to count music and poetry is to appreciate their divine rationality. To voice them is to diminish them.

Reason, the Bishop explains in chapter XIV of *De Ordine*, thirsts for beauty. Astonishingly enough, it seeks out beauty without recourse to the senses, “sans nuages et sans les yeux du corps” (Augustine, *De l'ordre*, 1864: 234). The senses, however, constantly impede this striving with their troublesome “noise” filtering in from the world outside. Reason has little choice but to find a path to beauty through them, and in spite of them. The senses, it would seem, are not only a conduit for, but an aspect of, the brute materials of the world. By this logic, the noise channeled by the ear or vocalized through the mouth can never be beautiful in its own right, but only by virtue of the relativities and proportions that reason imparts upon it for the purpose of ordering it into a signifying structure, a word.

This is of course a tenet of structuralist thinking. The material medium is divided against the rationality that orders and shapes it. The sculpture is not of the stone, but of the relativities and proportions that reason has imparted upon the stone. In the same sense, the painting is not of tinted oils, and *the words of language are not of vocal*

sounds. This conceptual division between vocal substance and the signifying structure of language is one of the founding tenets of Saussurean linguistics: “Ce qui importe dans le mot, ce n’est pas le son lui-même, mais les différences phoniques qui permettent de distinguer ce mot de tous les autres.” (Saussure 1969 : 163). Derrida sums up this structuralist position particularly well, as one which essentially denies language an existence as vocal substance. Language is voiceless, incorporeal:

It is impossible for sound alone, a material element, to belong to language. It is only a secondary thing, substance to be put to use. The linguistic signifier... is not [in essence] phonic but incorporeal—constituted not by its material substance but the differences that separate its sound-image from all others. The idea of phonic substance that a sign contains is of less importance than the other signs that surround it. (Derrida 1976:120)

All language begins with this fundamental structuring of vocal sounds, and this structuring is conceived as a rational principle that is not of sound, but rather of the non-substantial differential opposing one sound to another.

The language sound which defers any sense of its substantiality to other sounds, which in turn defer the sense of theirs ad infinitum: this seems to be the structuring principle brought to bear in the modern conception of the phoneme. In classical thinking, by contrast, it seems to be through deference to the structuring number that reason defers consideration of the text’s sonorous materials. Here, language ceases to be a stream of sounds, and becomes a series of metric—that is to say countable and commensurable—divisions. The structuring logics governing classical and postmodern thinking are of course radically different, but ultimately they have one effect in common: to vacate language of any concrete sense of its sonorous materials, to exclude these materials from the language “order” (both in the sense of “regime” and structural “organization”).

Augustine even goes as far as to demonize vocal sounds, to portray them as a sort of nemesis to reason, which beats them down, effectively breaks them through the imposition of a number. In the following passage is a sort of battle between reason and the ear (as conduit of vocal sounds) over possession of language:

Aussi commença-t-elle [la raison] à diriger son activité sur [les sens] qui prétendaient hautement posséder la vérité et qui par leurs cris importuns empêchaient l'essor de la raison. L'oreille disait donc que le langage était de son ressort, et le langage avait déjà servi à former la grammaire, la rhétorique et la dialectique. D'un œil perspicace, la raison distingua le son de l'idée qu'il exprime. Elle reconnut que l'oreille ne peut juger que du son...[de] la voix de l'être vivant (Augustine, *De l'ordre*, 1864 : 234).

Alone, argues the bishop, the ear is incapable of judging anything but brute sound and its provenance. An animal would be capable of the same or better. It takes reason to modulate these sounds, to organize them “par la mesure du temps en une sage alternative de lenteur et de rapidité.” (234) Through the intervention of reason, lowly vocal sounds become a countable measure, and only then do they become language.

The comparison of this structuring principle of language to that of music is not long in coming. For Augustine, language, ideally, is structured in the same way that music is, as a repetition of carefully measured numeric sets. At one point, the student foolishly assumes that the science of grammar has the last word on language. The master responds: “ne penses-tu pas qu’il existe un autre art qui embrasse tout ce qui regarde le nombre et l’harmonie dans les mots ? ...tu n’ignores pas sans doute qu’on accorde aux Muses une sorte de souveraineté sur le chant; et c’est là, je crois, ce qu’on nomme la musique.” (Augustine, *De Musica*, 1864: 398) In true form, Augustine reduces music and language to the same principles of numeric set repetition, and the types of finite sets that he privileges are predominantly the ones fixed by classical meter in poetry. Books 2

through 5 of *De Musica* comprise a detailed and closely examined division of poetic language into the various syllabic measures of classical meter, which are compared tirelessly to the repeating measures of music.

Augustine echoes Socrates in the ninth chapter of *De Musica* where he vaunts the numeric principle of the repeating set over the notion of unlimited and incommensurable phenomena. The exact numeric equal and double, Augustine calls it the “connumerated” or rational movement and it is characterized by the repetition of the same finite set (2,2,2,2) or by the repetition of sets in sequence where the components are divisible by each other exactly (2,4,6,8). The “dinumerated” or irrational movement, on the contrary, is made up of incommensurable and therefore potentially unlimited components that are mutually indivisible and non-repeating (3, 7, 10) or (4,9,11). In the connumerated movement—the perfect numeric “equal and double”—is the principle of conceptual harmony and perfection. In the dinumerated movement, that of imperfection and chaos. Augustine’s thinking here is a near perfect echo of *Philebus*.

Augustine goes Socrates a step further, however, and pits this numeric conception of music against all aspects of musical praxis and performance. This is not surprising, given his antagonism toward the voice. The musical equivalent of the lowly voice would naturally be the sounds of the performing instrument. Instrumental execution of music, like the vocal execution of language, constitutes for Augustine a fall, a diminishment:

Déjà [la raison] voyait avec la plus grande peine que [les nombres de la musique] perdaient de leur éclat et de leur pureté en passant par des bouches humaines ; et comme ce qui fait l’objet des contemplations de l’esprit est toujours présent, immortel ; comme les nombres étaient tels, tandis que le son, parce qu’il est sensible, passe... (Augustine, *De l’ordre*, 1864: 234).

Music has only to be bodied forth and it becomes mortal, fleeting. The virtuoso performer on the cithara or flute, Augustine contends, does not possess music by virtue of this performance. Neither the practiced ear nor hand makes the musician. Performance, like vocalization, is a lowly gesture of the body, not a conception of the intellect. Practising the same piece over and over is similar to acquiring skill with a hammer or axe: “les arts mêmes qui nous plaisent par le talent d’exécution, quand les effets en sont puissants, dépendent immédiatement, non de la science, mais du concours des sens et de la mémoire” (Augustine, *De Musica*, 1864 : 402).

Language and music are in the science of their numbers, not their sounds. The numeric relativities revealed in a musical score, or those revealed by the scansion of a piece of poetry, would be more of music and of language than the sounds of speech or musical instruments. *De Musica*, a treatise that begins on the premise of examining the connection between language and music, ends by exalting the numeric principle uniting them. In book six, the Bishop gets carried away in an ecstasy of sorts, equates the principle of the numeric equal and double to all imaginable wordly harmonies—the cycles of moon and tide, the seasons. Worldly harmonies are then equated to spiritual harmonies and ultimately to cosmic or divine ones:

Quel est le principe de cette analogie, de ce rapport qui fait sortir, dans une exacte proportion, la longueur du point géométrique, la largeur de la longueur, la profondeur de la largeur ? Quel en est le principe, sinon la source éternelle et suprême de l’harmonie, de la proportion, de la symétrie et de l’ordre...la loi de Dieu, cette loi sans laquelle une feuille ne tombe pas d’un arbre et pour qui nos cheveux sont comptés, se communique sans intermédiaire à ces harmonies auxquelles obéissent la terre et les enfers (490).

Section 1, Chapter 2

Translating Sound By the Number

2.1 Reining in Focus: Text Form to Text Sound

All things of this world are ultimately a language of numbers, as they describe their own proportions and the relation of their proportions to those of all other things. Mathematics and music are the keys to understanding the universe. I would ask my reader not to confuse Augustine's voice with my own. I am the first to concede that this discourse is rather heady, dizzying. In this view of a universe harmonized through the infinite repetition of finite sets, language and translation are bound to fit conveniently. The problem with such molecular or atomistic views is precisely this: everything fits. The boundaries are far too loose and debate quickly runs aground.

The numeric thread that I have been following has proven deceptive, for it has begun to split and branch off in many directions. Getting hold of it again, getting behind the question of the number and debating it will require a narrowing of scope. Form is as dizzying a notion as the number. It can mean anything from the text's grammatical organization (syntax, sentence and paragraph structure etc.), to its sonorous organization, to the visual/spatial organization of its typography, and even to its thematic organization: the strategic repetition of images, themes and arguments, for example. Form seems to be a conceptual grab bag to be used whenever the reader speaks of text organization at any conceivable level. Numeric schematizing, it would seem, is there to inform any and all of the text's potential repetitions.

So I would like to leave the notion of form behind and bring tighter focus on the question of vocal sound patterns. When speaking of the latter, I have some specific parameters in mind, parameters that will determine the corpus of examples from which I

will be drawing. Because vocal pattern or sound translation is the subject here, vocal patterns or sounds are my corpus of examples. When speaking of the latter then, I refer concretely to a string of acoustic features or phonemes considered for the main part at the sub-word level and represented by the text's graphic symbology. This parameter set at the phonemic or sub-word level is a rather important restriction, for the impulse is strong to get lost in the text beyond the sound. Texts after all are conceived on an increasing scale of structural unities: from the phoneme to the syllable to the word to the phrase, etc. The further one slips away from the sub-word level and into these larger structural dimensions, the quicker one loses the sonorous thread.

For this reason, I have vowed not to stray too far from the sub-word level, and to propose my examples first and foremost as vocal sound strings or chains, and only secondarily as the structural building blocks of an argument. The number will help me set limits on the size of these strings. Generally speaking, my examples will not exceed a single stress or rime interval and its very next repetition. They will be no smaller than the sound features composing two continuous metric feet (the two trochees of */double, double/*, for example), and no longer than those composing two continuous full stop sentences or verses (double, double toil and trouble/ Fire burn and cauldron bubble), keeping in mind once again that I am assuming the sentence and verse first and foremost in their capacity as metric stress or rime interval and only secondarily as grammatical construction. Any of the translational phenomena described in this project will be detectable in the sound features composing this relatively small textual space, and if I provide more text than necessary in a given example, it is simply to show the phenomenon in its continuing repetition.

2.1.1 Reining in Focus: Text Sound to the Stress and Rime Interval

This first restriction of scope, from the broad notion of form to the vocal sound string within the tight textual parameters just set, will hold true through the entire project. Now I would like to make a further restriction of scope that will hold for the remainder of this first section on the number and the translational status quo. Of all possible ways of conceiving a text's sounds numerically, only two will interest me now: the minimal interval of repeating sound stress, commonly referred to as the rhythmic or metric interval and occurring either from one foot to the next (*Double, double toil and trouble*), or from one phrase to the next (*Double double toil and trouble/ Fire burn and cauldron bubble*) ; and the minimal interval of repeating sound class, commonly referred to as rime (*double, double, toil and trouble*). In the latter category, I will also touch upon phenomena like assonance or consonance (*double, double, toil and trouble*).

This is not an arbitrary restriction, by any means. Rhythm and rime are not only effects of the text's sonorous dimension, but they also appear to be the specific aspects of this dimension that the translator is most likely to schematize numerically. Searching the previous chapter for the numeric notions that most readily carry over into the translator's conception of text sounds, I find that those relating to the measured repetition of stress and sound class stand out. Just to recall, all of this began with Gideon Toury's schematic. Here it is again, this time more extensively quoted:

The following is the rime-scheme of the Hebrew text: aa bb cc dd ee ff/ aa bb cc ddd ee ff gggg hh ii jj kk/ aa bb cc dd ee/ aa bb/ aa bb cc dd eee(e)ee/ aaa 0. A numeric representation of the realization of the various rimemes would look as follows 222222/22232242222/22222/22225(6)/ 3 0...The riming segments reveal no other metric regularities, which is why the mode has been presented as rimed prose. (Toury 1995: 149).

This model can now be addressed in light of classical thinking of the previous chapter. Which of the notions discussed in this chapter bear most directly here, not only in terms of what the schema reveals, but also in terms of what it discards?

Discarded here is the vocal specificity of the Hebrew target. This schematic allows Toury, in true Augustinian fashion, to conceive the text's sound pattern in a rational, scientific way, without recourse to the senses, to the voice. Here is the poem's finite sets—specifically sets of two or couplets—in harmonious and unifying repetition. Here is the musical pattern abstracted beyond any sense of the sounds required to utter it. This numeric template is the universal mediator of form, the model that would be relevant to the reader who has no inkling of the sounds of Hebrew. Because of this, it merits a place in the body of Toury's chapter. As for the actual Hebrew version fleshed out in full voice, it is annexed to the end of the chapter as an afterthought. (Toury 1995: 164-165)

If the voice is what this schematic discards, then rime and meter are what it reveals, rime being the most obvious. The model, in other words, is offered as a numeric abstraction of how sounds from the Hebrew alphabet are brought to repeat poetically in articulate re-combination. Revealed as well, because of its absence made explicit by Toury, is that other type of numeric set repetition, that of "metric regularity," created by poetic articulation. The model indicates that the text is a riming prose piece, because of the absence of some specific metric indicator such as iambic pentameter. If the absence of the indicator means prose, then it seems safe to conclude that when present, metric regularities would be indicated in the model. At the very least, it is not difficult to imagine its inclusion if it were a mitigating factor.

2.2 Translating Sound by the Number

The numeric abstraction of sound class (rime, assonance and consonance) and sound stress interval (measured rhythm or meter), both repeated in careful measure, seems to be a conventional translator's rational tool for negotiating vocal sound patterns between languages. I will dedicate the remainder of this chapter to illustrating this type of abstraction with concrete examples. Before beginning, however, I would like to clarify that my objective does not lie with all of the specific ways in which different cultures establish metric conventions. The classical system counts syllables, for example. French, Spanish and Italian systems are like this as well. The English system counts its stresses or accents rather than its syllables. In the German system, sound type or quality also factors into the measurement of the foot.

These differences in metric convention—which are based of course on each culture's relationship with its own language and literature—are not what interest me here. I am content to establish from the outset that there is no overcoming them. The only thing I want to reveal is the number behind them. Precisely how they count does not interest me as much as the idea that they do count. Indeed, counting seems to occur even when there is no specific metric convention being followed. Translators count intuitively without the benefit of any specific education in poetics or rhetoric. They count regardless of text type, the moment they strive to make their target an equal or double of their source in any of its formal dimensions.

The following are offered as some tentative examples of the measured repetition of sound stress and sound class in texts and their translations. For the remainder of this chapter, I will sketch out some examples of numeric measurements of text rhythm and

rime. As already discussed, numbers are what get the translator to an ideal space beyond the vocal specificity of the source text. This is not to suggest that actual numbers always materialize in the translator's mind, or that like Toury the translator always conceives some elaborate numeric template. Nor should it suggest that there is one correct measurement. The following examples are by no means prescriptive, and any number of other measurements could be valid. Once again, I am not interested in how the count occurs or in arguing the validity of a given measure. The only thing I want to illustrate is the principle of the count itself.

2.2.1 Measured Rhythm

I will keep the following examples of vocal sound patterns strategically simple, and within the tight parameters set earlier, for the simple reason that my efforts in the remainder of this chapter are to give a broad sense—without getting bogged down in needlessly lengthy analyses—of the numeric principle operating behind the translator's abstraction of the source text's sounds. To this purpose, the rudimentary equations behind “Old Mother Hupboard” (*The Real Mother* 1916) suffice every bit as much as the more complex ones behind something like Baudelaire's “L'Harmonie du soir.” (Baudelaire 1991). I do not want to get lost in this mathetic mindset for too long, my ultimate purpose being to move beyond it, probe deeper into the text's vocal pattern.

I like Étienne Souriau's numeric definition of rhythm in *La correspondance des arts*, for its simplicity more than anything: “C'est la forme conférée à une progression par le retour, à intervalles égaux, des éléments d'une organisation cyclique à laquelle préside

un schème aussi simple que possible, reproduisant indéfiniment et continument ses effets.” (Souriau 1969 : 189) The critic speaks true to Augustinian form here. There is a rational ordering and the imposition of a numeric model (“conferred form,” “cyclic organization,” “simple schema”). There is also the notion of repeating sets (regular intervals). Only the slightest modification—perhaps “progression sonore” instead of simply “progression”—and it is particularly well suited for the phenomena discussed in the remainder of this chapter on the translational status quo.

2.2.1.1 Pulse Rhythm

I would call “pulse rhythm” the smallest possible sound stress interval. This stress repetition occurs at the level of the syllable and describes a pulse or beat, which itself is a finite set made up of unstressed and stressed portions, specifically of one or more weak rise tones (arsis) and a stressed fall tone (thesis). This sonorous alternation might read so evenly in a text, so periodically, and with such a punch on the fall tone, as to make it obvious that the writer has constructed it deliberately. Such is the case in rigidly metered poetry and song. Take Bertolt Brecht’s *Three Penny Opera* ballad “Jenny die Seeräuberbraut,” composed for the main part in galloping anapests, that is to say in repeating sets of two unstressed rise tones and one fall tone:

Meine *Herrn* (1) heute *seh’n* (2) Sie mich *Glä* (3)ser abwaschen(4),
Und ich *make* (1) das *Bett* (2) für jeden (3).
Und Sie *geb’n* (1) mir ein’n *Penny*, (2) und ich b’danke (3) mich *schnell* (4)...
(Brecht 1978: 175)

This is not to suggest that this sort of pulse rhythm can not be measured in prose texts as well. The latter demonstrate a more conversational rhythm, but one that is just as

measurable, and indeed is measured either consciously or intuitively by the translator.

Take the following passage from Patrick Süskind's *Das Parfum*:

Da (1) *erwachte* (2) *das Kind* (3). *Es erwachte* (1) *zuerst* (2) *mit der Nase* (3).
Die *winzige* (1) *Nase* (2) *bewegte sich* (3), sie *zog* (1) sich nach *oben* (2) und
schnupperte (3). (Süskind 1985: 20)

The translator takes a cue from his or her own count of the source text's pulse, however he or she decides to execute this count. From the above passage, he or she might get a sense of the number of audibly stressed elements per phrasal or sentence unit, and will pay close attention to the specific elements that take this stress, realizing that this proportion between acoustic stress and the higher grammatical order is vital in signification. His or her solution usually will not stray too far, either in the number of pulses per unit, or in the elements receiving the stress.

John Willet, for example, tailors the following English translation of the Brecht text to measure:

Now you *gents* (1) all *see* (2) I've the *glasses* (3) to *wash* (4),
When a *bed's* (1) to be *made* (2) I *make* it (3).
You may *tip* (1) me with a *penny* (2) and I'll *thank* (3) you very *well...* (4)
(Brecht 1977: 164)

Here, stress recurs at more or less proportionate intervals—like with Brecht, beats per verse run 4-3-4—and it falls upon proportionate semantic elements (*Herrn/gents*; *sehen/see*; *gläser/glasses*; *mache/make*; *Bett/bed*). Slight metric variations between the two are buried in the unstressed portions of the feet (*Herrn heute seh'n: gents all see*). At the very least, Willet's count of Brecht's original is evident in his English language pattern.

The following Spanish translation of the Süskind passage displays a similar proportionality, with the recurring stressed elements occurring at proportionate intervals:

Entonces (1) el *niño* (2) se despertó (3). Se despertó (1) primero (2) con la *nariz* (3). La *naricilla* (1) se movió (2), se estiró (1) hacia *arriba* (2) y *olfateó* (3). (Süskind 2004: 21)

Here are three sentences written in a relatively free prose style. This Spanish target, on the face of it, seems to vary metrically from the German source. But these variations are relatively superficial, judging by the overall uniformity of stressed beats per unit measure, understanding the unit as the full stop sentence. The German text counts 12 beats total, 3 beats per sentence times 4 or 3-3-3-3. The Spanish text counts 11 beats total, each sentence counting 3 beats except the third, or 3-3-2-3.

2.2.1.2 Phrase Rhythm

The pulse is of course not the only way of actualizing a text's rhythm, which is in fact a complex layering. This is to say that sound stress intervals are measurable at multiple organizational levels, and that while pulse rhythm is countable underneath, other types of rhythm become detectable and countable over top. For example, I can take that patented sample phrase: "The cat sat on the mat," and count out a pulse rhythm: "The *cat* sat *on* the *mat*," as well as phrasal rhythm over top of the pulse, a gradual arsis over the first five words and then a final thesis or stress on the very last word: "The cat sat on the *mat*." The pulse would be the smallest rhythmic set determined by sound stress. The phrase, for its part, would be the largest, and is typically understood at the inside as the syntagm cohering around a single grammatical feature (the noun phrase, verb phrase, the clause

etc.), and at the outside as the full stop sentence. To simplify matters here, I will treat the phrase as the latter.

The question now becomes: how do sound stress intervals recur at the level of the sentence? As a rule of thumb, in phrasal meter the fall tone or thesis falls on the final elements of the phrase. In English (and I would venture to assume in many other languages as well) intonational patterns tend to describe peaks and valleys of stress. The peaks usually coincide with the terminal element of a phrase. Martha Kolln furnishes the following example of an intonational pattern in English (Kolln 2003: 47):

	<i>Important</i>		<i>Rhy</i>
	<i>Aspects</i>		
		<i>sentences</i>	
One of the most		of your expertise with	is your sense of thm.

All of the stressed elements in this intonational contour fall in terminal phrase positions: the adjectival phrase (most *important*), the noun phrase (most important *aspects*), as well as prepositional phrases (with *sentences*; of *rhythm*).

Of all these peaks, the highest seems to occur at the end of the largest phrasal unit, the sentence itself. This notion of the greatest stress occurring at sentence end is common enough to have its own linguistic concept: “end focus.” A special intonational high peak, Martha Kolln explains, tends to occur on the newest elements of sentence information, which tend to be expressed in the terminal portion of the predicate:

The sentence subject, when it is known information, will usually be a valley or a low peak in the intonation contour; the prominent peak of stress will occur in the predicate, on the new information, generally on the last or next-to-last slot in the sentence. Linguists describe this common rhythm pattern as end focus. (49)

The terminal elements of the sentence have special sound stress owing to their special semantic importance, and this is not lost on the translator. When translating a question and answer such as: “When will she do it? She will do it Thursday,” it is understood that “Thursday” occurs in terminal position and with end focus stress, because it is the answer to the “when” question. Therefore, a French solution conferring a similar rhythmic stress would be appropriate: “Elle le fera jeudi” or simply “jeudi,” or by using the so-called “it-cleft,” which displaces predicate information, as well as stress, to the beginning: “C’est jeudi, qu’elle le fera.” A rhythmic misstep, however, would be a solution such as “Jeudi elle le fera,” with its end focus stress on the verb rather than “jeudi,” the answer to the question.

Each full stop sentence with its end focus would form in itself a finite rhythmic set, and a cyclic repetition of sets would become abstractable and countable as one reads through a succession of sentences. Take a random example from some straightforward literary prose, Jorge Luis Borges’s short story “La intrusa.” I will dispense with the pulse here and show only the end focus stresses:

Orillaron un *pajonal* (1). Cristián tiró el cigarro que había *encendido* (2)
y dijo sin *apuro* (3):
— A trabajar, *hermano* (4). Después nos ayudarán los *caranchos* (5).
Hoy la *maté* (6). Que se quede aquí con sus *pilchas* (7). Ya no hará más
perjuicios (8). (Borges 1995:18)

This sort of rhythmic stress could vary depending on the parameters set for the sentence. Two sentences coordinated with a conjunction could just as easily be read as a single sentence and with only one end focus stress, for example: “Cristián tiró el cigarro que había encendido y dijo sin *apuro*.” To be sure, within the arsis leading to end focus

stress are the aforementioned series of smaller peaks defining the intonational contour, falling generally on phrasal heads: “A *trabajar* [smaller peak], *hermano* [end focus].”

As luck would have it, these phrasal rhythms tend to transpose naturally, assuming of course that the languages involved demonstrate comparable ways of organizing sentences grammatically. As long as the translator follows source text sentence divisions carefully, then the number of intervals will usually be proportionate, in this case 8 to 8. Take Norman Thomas di Giovanni’s version of the same passage:

They skirted a growth of tall *reeds* (1); Cristián threw down the cigar he had just *lit* (2) and said *evenly* (3), “Let’s get busy, *brother* (4). In a while the buzzards will take *over* (5). This afternoon I *killed her* (6). Let her stay here with all her *trinkets* (7), she won’t cause us any more *harm* (8). (Borges 1973: 102)

Again, variations are possible. Like Borges’s original, the sentence with the coordinating conjunction could easily have only one end focus: “Christian threw down the cigar he had just lit and said *evenly*.” Di Giovanni’s solution to the “caranchos” sentence might well be an example of a rhythmic misstep in translation. The strong end focus stress falling on Borges’s “caranchos”—“Después nos ayudarán los *caranchos*”—is deflected in the English target, where “buzzards” receives a lesser, mid-sentence peak and where the listless verb “take over” gets end focus privilege. A more rhythmically aligned solution might have been “The rest we’ll leave for the *buzzards*.”

2.2.1.3 Prosodic Features

Stress does not have to occur where it is expected. It can obviously be made to fall on any discursive element for the purpose of giving it greater semantic profile. Going back to that sample sentence: “The cat sat on the mat,” there are potentially three rhythmic levels to attend. First the pulse rhythm: “The *cat* sat *on* the *mat*.” Then phrase rhythm:

“The cat sat on the *mat*.” Finally, any number of other prosodic features or “free radical stressers” would be possible, depending on the desired semantic spin: 1. “*The* cat sat on the mat” (The very same cat we all know and love). 2. “The *cat* sat on the mat,” (not the dog, or the ferret for that matter). 3. “The cat *sat* on the mat” (It did not play, lie or nap on it). 4. “The cat sat *on* the mat” (neither near nor beside it, but directly on it). 5. “The cat sat on *the* mat” (on the very same mat that I just finished cleaning). 6. “The cat sat on the *mat*” (not on the chair, the dining room table or the television). This sort of unexpected stress, as should be clear from the above example, is usually inscribed with italics.

Prosodic features like these do not demonstrate the type of regular repetition that one hears in pulse and phrase rhythms, and therefore seem to fall outside the realm of numeric abstraction. Closer consideration, however, suggests that they do indeed relate to the numeric principle in so far as they are defined against it. In other words, the perception of such prosodic anomalies depends very much upon the expectations created by the regular pulse and phrase stress. Moreover, such features do not necessarily have to run counter to rhythmic expectations. At times they can converge with both pulse and phrase stress to give a specific word extra force, a triple rhythmic punch as it were. A perfect example would be the Brecht poem cited earlier. At one point, Jenny the pirate queen is asked which of her captives is to be executed. Her reply: “Und da *werden* Sie mich *sagen* hören: *alle!*” (Brecht 1978: 175) That final “*alle*,” gets the triple punch, receives the stress of the pulse, the end focus of the sentence, and the added prosody achieved by the colon. The latter has the singular ability to create a subtle rhythmic counter-step in the form of suspenseful pause. Jenny hovers for a second or two on the

slack syllable, gathers her strength, and then finishes the phrase like she plans to finish her prisoners. When her final word finally falls into place, it achieves a singular elocutionary force.

The translation of such prosodic features often poses problems, specifically because they derive the least from expected cyclic patterns, and they often lead into the more affectively nuanced, oral and aural realms of signification that are not easily negotiable between the writing conventions of different languages. This type of stress differentiates between significations, for example: “I love you, but I do not *love* you.” Depending on how fussy the editor is, a solution marked prosodically in this way may or may not be deemed acceptable, and an alternative might have to be found: “je t’aime bien, mais je ne suis pas amoureux de toi.” Often, the affective state indicated by such stresses is so complex that they become near impossible to render in all of their nuance. Take, for example, the typical English phrases: “How *do* you do?” or “How *are* things?” Both of these expressions have any number of semantic trajectories depending on whether the affect or tone is enthusiastic, ironic, etc., and I remain at a loss when it comes to French solutions that would be anywhere near as evocative.

When turning such prosodic features, it seems that one is always at loggerheads with the writing conventions of the target language. This is my experience, anyway. French editors, I have found, are phobic of italics. They do not seem to tolerate, in general, stress retrieved in this more oral/performative way. Rather, they prefer some more neutral, syntactically recombinant way, the so-called “it-cleft,” for example. A phrase like “*I* want to speak to you” will become “C’est moi qui veux te parler,” (It is I, who wish to speak to you); and similarly “I want to speak to *you*,” will become “C’est à

toi que je veux parler.” Two grammatical solutions for two very oral, very performative English utterances.

2.2.1.4 Internal Proportions of the Pulse or Phrase: Sound Quantitative Measurements

Until now I have been speaking about the repetition of rhythmic sets. However, to recall *Philebus*, there is another mode of conceptualizing where the number is also at work, and that is the establishment of the finite set itself, independently of its repetition. Rhythm or meter defines the countable repetition of the pulse or the phrase. However, within each pulse or phrase is also a set of sonorous relativities culled from the alphabetic set and articulated in unique re-combination. When certain sonorous features making up one rhythmic set repeat consistently in the same position through successive sets, there is rime, and I will speak of this shortly. However, the elements composing the finite set itself—the pulse and the phrase—are also abstractable numerically. This is to say that the translator typically measures the pulse’s or the phrase’s internal proportions and attempts to equal or double them in the target.

In a first instance, these proportions are subject to a quantitative measurement. The pulse is typically measured by its syllable count and by the position of the stress within this count. Iambs are two syllables with stress on the second, for example, whereas dactyls are three syllables with stress on the first. The phrase, for its part, offers more complex modes of measurement. Like the pulse it offers a syllable and word count (The cat sat on the mat: 6 syllables, six words). It also offers a measurable dimension I would call geometric. Take a phrase from DiGiovanni’s translation of Borges, for example: “Cristián threw down the cigar he had just lit and said evenly.” To speak in

terms of 12 words gives only the broadest indication of the phrase's internal proportions. However, I can speak in terms of a longer 9 word clause (Cristián threw down the cigar he had just lit) coordinated with a short 3 word clause (and said evenly), and already my measurement becomes more precise. In that 3 word clause, I could oppose the longer measure of the last word with its 3 syllables (evenly) to the monosyllables of the two words leading up to it.

So the translator goes about counting the internal elements of the phrase and measuring how they cohere together. Elements like letters and syllables are counted and measured in the way that they cohere into words. Words are counted and measured in the way that they cohere in the phrase, and so on. What I am describing here, essentially, was already put by Leonardo Bruni in the previous chapter: "If he is translating Cicero...he must fill up the entire period with large, copious, and full phrasings...if he translates Sallust, he must needs decide in the case of nearly every word to observe propriety and great restraint, and to this end must retrench and cut down." (Bruni 1997:59) This "copiousness" would be the measure of a quantity, a generosity of elements composing long and satisfying phrases. In the case of Sallust, a sparseness—fewer words and shorter phrases pared of oratorical excess.

Bruni's rule for good translating is Umberto Eco's operating definition of translation. (Eco 2001) For Eco, strict observance of the source phrase's internal proportions is the principle distinguishing translation from periphrase, definition, and virtually all other forms of re-writing. In translation there is symmetry of phrasal proportion between source and target texts, symmetry in the distribution of the

“substance of expression,”³ even if the substance itself has been phonemically transformed. In periphrase or definition, on the contrary:

As long as we identify the same substance of the content, we are extremely indulgent as far as the substance of the expression is concerned. To interpret *buongiorno* as ‘an expression with a phatic function, with which we hope that the interlocutor has a day devoid of worries and full of satisfaction...’ is wholly satisfactory from the point of view of rewording because the ‘physical weight’ of the substance of the expression is not pertinent. This is why a treatise in ten volumes on the cats can be understood as a satisfactory interpretation, of encyclopedic size, of the word *cat*, *but not a translation*. (Eco 2001: 87)

In translation, the proportionality of expressive materials between source and target becomes important. Once again, the language of numeric relativities and quantities returns. Eco refers to phrasal ‘weight’ as the organization of sounds “in a syntagm in accordance with the laws of quantitative meter, or in accordance with the number of syllables and their accent.” (88)

The encyclopedic definition of “cat” will jar the ear because of its terribly disproportionate quantity of acoustic elements. “Cat” demands a target solution bearing the same quantity of elements cohering in the same way, in other words a solution that comes as close as possible to 3 letters cohering in a single word: “chat”, “gato”, “Katze.” This principle seems laughably obvious, but it is not to be underestimated, because along with the criterion of the movement between two languages, this sort of phrasal proportionality is what theory cites to draw a distinguishing line between translation and

³ Eco is using Hjelmslev’s terminology here. The latter (Hjelmslev 1943) proposed a six tier language model ranging from the lower levels of expression to the higher levels of semantic content. The baseline level being a sonic continuum. The next level, or the “substance of expression” describes the division of the sonorous continuum into actual enunciations. The third level is the “form of expression,” which enters with the sonic continuum into a relationship of mutual determination, giving the continuum “purport”. The form of the expression, together with the continuum, make up the “system” of forms specific to a given language

other practices of re-writing. Doubtless the best illustration of the pulse and phrase translated in their internal proportions is to be found in poetic verse. This English translation of Wilhelm Busch's *Max und Moritz* displays symmetry in the internal proportions of the set (all trochees) as well as in the set's repetition (four trochees per verse phrase):

<i>Ach, sie bleiben an dem langen Dürren Ast des Baumes hangen Und ihr Hals wird lang und länger, Ihr Gesang wird bang und bänger (Busch 1982: 23)</i>	<i>Gracious me, all tangled now And suspended from a bough! Their laments grow keen and keener, And their gullets lean and leaner; (24)</i>
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2.2.1.5 Rime

Rime happens when a sound feature occurring in a stress position in one pulse or phrase repeats in the proportionate stress position of successive pulses or phrases. For true rime, of course, these repeating sound features have to occur at word end. Pulse rimes would be detectable in successive stress intervals within the same phrase: "The *Cat* in the *Hat*," (Dr. Seuss 1957) "Little Miss *Muffet* sat on a *tuffet*..." (The Real Mother 1916) Phrasal rimes, for their part, would occur in the end focus of two successive phrases, like in the following phrases from Borges's "Un cuchillo en el norte": "Tras el cristal/ que dora un sol *amarillo*,/ A través de años y casas,/ Yo te estoy viendo, *cuchillo*." (Borges 1999:254) Often, in exceedingly metered poetic texts, one will find both pulse and phrase rime used consistently throughout. Robert Service, for example, is a master of combining internal pulse rime and phrasal end focus rime:

There are strange things *done* in the midnight *sun*
By the men who toil for *gold*;
The Arctic *Trails* have their secret *tales*
That would make your blood run *cold*; (Service 1907:50)

Often these repeating sound features will occur in the initial or middle position of words, forming alliterative consonance or assonance, but not true rime: “The spot on your skin is a **sh**ocking disease” (Auden 1961:42).

One has only to recall Toury’s schema, invoked quite enough already, to understand how rime lends itself to numeric abstraction. The best way to put it is that translators do not re-construct vocal sound features in their targets, but rather the numeric principle of their repetition at proportionate stress intervals of the pulse or phrase. The same sort of schema could be created for the Borges stanza just discussed:

Tras el cristal (1) Que dora un sol <i>amarillo</i> , (2) A través de años y casas, (3) Yo te estoy viendo, <i>cuchillo</i> .(2) (Borges 1999: 254)	Behind the glass (1) That has been lent a golden <i>hue</i> (2) By a yellow sun, through years and houses, (3) Blade, I am beholding <i>you</i> . (2) (255)
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In the translation of rigidly metered poetic texts demonstrating complex rimes recurring in strict metric regularity—especially in the end focus position of the phrase—there is usually some sort of effort toward the re-construction of sound repetition, if not full rimes then partial or so-called slant rimes.

One might even be able to speak of a translational hierarchy of rime features in metered texts. If the translator is interested in observing these features, chances are he or she will observe phrasal or end-focus rime most strictly, and exercise greater liberty with internal pulse rimes as well as with assonant and consonant features. Take that bit of

witch's chant from Macbeth one last time. (Shakespeare 1974: 1329)⁴ I have marked the trochaic stresses in italics and the riming phonemes of the couplets in bold. Beside each phrase I have also provided a list of some repeating assonant and consonant features, as well as analogous syllable and word repetitions, perceptible within the phrase or across adjacent phrases. Along side is the rime schematized numerically:

<i>Fillet of a fenny snake</i> , (1)	(/f/, /n/)
<i>In the cauldron boil and bake</i> : (1)	("aul/oil," /b/)
<i>Eye of newt and toe of frog</i> , (2)	("of," "and")
<i>Wool of bat and tongue of dog</i> , (2)	("of," "and")
<i>Adder's fork and blind-worm's sting</i> , (3)	("and")
<i>Lizard's leg and howlet's wing</i> , (3)	(/l/, /w/)
<i>For a charm of powerful trouble</i> , (4)	(/ul/, "powerful," "trouble")
<i>Like a hell-broth boil and bubble</i> . (4)	(/b/ /l/)
<i>All. Double, double toil and trouble</i> ; (4)	("double," "trouble," /t/)
<i>Fire burn and cauldron bubble</i> . (4)	(/b/)

When it comes to the retrieval of sound class repetition, each of the following translations displays two things in common: a greater attention paid to the construction of a parallel phrasal rime, and a more loosely conceived parallelism in those assonant and consonant patterns internal to the phrase. This proportion in phrase ending rime does not necessarily entail a proportion in rime complexity, of course.

First up is Schiller's German translation of the second witch's chant. (Shakespeare 1999: 257) For some inexplicable reason, however, Schiller has the first witch speaking it:

<i>Schlangen, die der Sumpf genährt</i> , (1)	(/sch/, /s/, /d/)
<i>Kocht und zischt auf unserm Herd</i> . (1)	(/z/ /s/ /sch/ /t/)
<i>Froschzehn tun wir auch daran</i> , (2)	(/sch/ /z/)
<i>Fledermaushaar, Hundeszahn</i> , (2)	(/s/, /z/)
<i>Otterzungen, Stacheligel</i> , (3)	(/t/, /z/, /el/, /en/)
<i>Eidechspöten, Eulenflügel</i> , (3 slant)	(/f/, /el/, /en/)
<i>Zaubers halber, wert der Müh</i> , (4)	(/ber/)
<i>Sied' und koch; wie Höllenbrüh</i> . (4)	

⁴ Act IV, Scene I for original and all versions.

Alle: <i>Rüstig, Rüstig! Nimmer müde!</i>	(4 slant)	(“rüstig,” /m/, /ü/)
Feuer, brenne! Kessel, <i>siede!</i>	(4 slant)	(/e/, /s/)

Schiller has obviously privileged metric over semantic concerns in his turning. Witness the freedom he has taken with the types of ingredients and with the order of their addition, both of which one might presume important in matters of black magic brewery: the snake becomes “snakes” (“Schlangen”); a dog’s tongue is now a dog’s “tooth” (Hundeszahn), and so on. Obviously keeping count of stress and rime is more important than matching ingredients. Metrically, Schiller’s translation matches Shakespeare pulse for pulse. Verses four through eight deserve special attention, however. Here Schiller puts an even bolder line under the trochaic tetrameter by turning the source’s “ands” into caesurae, dividing the verses exactly in half. The effect in performance is to underscore the chant’s periodicity even further.

Schiller’s rime is proportionate, but does not demonstrate the same complexity. Each of Shakespeare’s verse-ending rimes are complex, meaning that they extend over at least two phonemic elements. The final ensemble chant rime /trouble/: /bubble/ even extends over three. Schiller’s rimes, however, tend to slant. Indeed the only rime that seems spot on is between /Müh/ and /Höllenbrüh/. Others take a slight slant: /genährt/: /Herd/.” Still others a more obvious slant: /Stacheligel/: /Eulenflügel/; /müde/: /siede/. It seems then that the quality of the vocal match is not quite as important as the numeric principle of repetition.

When it comes to sound feature repetition internal to the verse, Schiller is rather more creative. The first two verses of source and target both display their own internal consonance: in Shakespeare a recurrence of /f/ and /b/, as well as the analogous cluster

/aul/ and /oil/; in Schiller a recurrence of fricatives, all gravitating around the /s/ formant: (/sch/, /s/, /z/, /ch/). Should the reader be hearing the swamp snake's hiss? If so, Schiller may have added a mimetic dimension missing in the source. Where the translation may disappoint, however, is in the final ensemble chant: "Double, double, toil and trouble/
Fire burn and cauldron bubble." For this is where Shakespeare "turns up the heat", so to speak. This is where internal pulse rimes also recur in the final phrase position, and receive end focus: "trouble" and "bubble" harmonizing internally with "double." Schiller's sonorous repetitions are proportionately poorer in these last two verses.

The following French translation by Jean-Michel Déprats (Shakespeare 1985: 81-82) demonstrates a stronger riming symmetry with the source. Like in Schiller's German text, there is a certain irreverence toward semantics, namely the order of ingredients. Its phrase rimes, however, demonstrate a complexity that is more proportionate with Shakespeare's. There are no slant rimes here, and most of them are complex, extending across more than one sound element. It is important to remember that in French verse, the silent "e" at the end of a word is pronounced and counts as a syllable:

Duvet de chauve-souris (1)	[/v/, /chau/]
Dans le chaudron bous et cuis ; (1)	[/chau/, /ans/, /ons/]
Tranche de serpent des mares, (2)	[s formants : /ch//s/]
Et la patte d'un lézard, (2)	[/des mares/ /lézard/]
Langue de chien, œil de triton, (3)	
Et d'un orvet l'aiguillon, (3)	
Aile de hibou, dard d'aspic, (4)	[/d/]
Pour un charme maléfique, (4)	[/m/]
Et l'orteil d'une grenouille, (5)	[/n/]
Que ce brouet d'enfer bouille. (5)	[/b/]

Toutes	
Double, double peine et tourment	[/double/]
Chaudron bouille à feu brulant.	[/b/]

It might be demanding too much to require proportionate riming complexity in that final ensemble chant, but the rest displays a substantial improvement over the German version. At the same time, I would note that Schiller's metricity, especially in those four middle verses, seems a good deal more fine tuned.

2.2.1.6 Internal Proportions of the Pulse or Phrase: Sound Qualitative Measurements

Just before getting into rime, I discussed how the translator might measure the pulse's or the phrase's internal proportions by what Eco calls quantitative meter. There is a final type of internal proportionality to consider however. It is fair to say that most poetically inclined readers get a certain sense of the text's phonemic contour, that is to say of the relativities between one perceived sound and the next in the chain. The sense of this is usually described as the text's "melody," and it is a qualitative sense rather than a quantitative one. This is without doubt the most difficult type of measurement to demonstrate because out of all the numeric dimensions described so far, it is the one that is most closely derived from the text's vocal specificity, the one that seems to escape numeric definition within the type of clean riming schematic seen with Toury, or the summary rhythmic schematics of meter, with its iambic pentameters etc.. Perhaps it should not even be called a "measurement," because it seems rather to be something between an assessment and an impression. The phrase's phonemic chain has an inexplicable quality or "feel" that very much depends on the sensibility of the reader and translator.

Take, for example, a phrase from another poem of Borges, “Las cosas,” which is simply a list of disparate things parading through the poet’s thoughts. One of these things is the enigmatic: “El texto de las no cortadas hojas.” (Borges 1999: 318-319). As I read aloud and savor the phrase, I get the feel of its alternation of back vowels both low and high: o-a-o-o-a, divided by those liquids and those resolute stops: l, t, d, l, c, t, d. Without getting into the complicated question of how this melodic impression ties into the generation of poetic connotations, I can still understand this sonorous articulation as poetically motivated, and follow my impression in providing an equally motivated articulation in the target. Alastair Reid opts for an alternation of high vowels /i/ with smoother fricatives and liquids, perhaps to exchange Borges’s “chopping” melody with a “slicing” one: “The volume with its pages still unslit.” (318-319)

Is the number really applicable as a way of abstracting this sort of poetic melody into a schema? Certainly not as easily as with the other sonorous dimensions under discussion. Rhythm and rime present rather neat numeric schematics based on regular repetition of sets. The internal proportions of the pulse or phrase can be measured in quantitative terms: a syllable or word count, a clause length etc. However, the sonorous relativities internal to the pulse or phrase seem to be more the domain of phonetics than numbers, of the voice itself and not any sort of model or schematic abstracted from it.

How does one translate a particular use of sound features, or a conception of the writer’s specific way of chaining these features together? The connecting *eidos* would not be numeric. If anything, it would have to be the translator’s sense of some global authorial strategy with respect to the use of sonorous features. In any typical circumstance, such a strategy would be supremely difficult to circumscribe, let alone

demonstrate in analysis. One more demonstrable circumstance comes to mind, however. Sometimes a source text is couched to reflect a certain socio-lect or vernacular. The translator can detect such a strategy and turn it accordingly. What results is a translation that doesn't "capture" the source's vocal articulation, but rather the motivation behind it.

Take Keith Ellis's translation of one of Nicolas Guillen's *Motivos de son* (1930). The source poem "Si tu supiera" (Ellis 2003: 46) is written in a vernacular with a strong Cuban (specifically Afro-Cuban) accent. By deviating from Spanish orthography, it demonstrates a very specific motivation: the invocation of a cultural milieu by virtue of its unique way of phonating language. In a case like this, there is a very specific authorial strategy behind the articulation of sound features, and the translator can respond with some parallel strategy. Ellis, for his part, puts the text in a West Indian English vernacular, specifically Jamaican:

¡Ay, negra si tú supiera! Anoche te bi pasá y no quise que me biera. A é tú le hará como a mí, que cuando no tube plata te corrite de bachata, sin acoddate de mí Sóngoro cosongo, songo be; sóngoro cosongo... (Ellis 2003: 46)	Oh mi fickle black woman if you only did know! Laas night ah see you passin' an ah didn' want you to see me. yu goin' du im juss like you du me, for when ah didn' have no money dere went mi honey, out spreein' widout me. Sóngoro cosongo, songo be; sóngoro cosongo... (47)
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Of the many qualitative traits defining the vocal articulation of the original, one is rather obvious: the typical Afro-Cuban contraction of words and the omission of final consonant

closure, leaving most of the signifier vocally open and expansive: /supieras/→/supiera/; /pasar/→/pasá/; /vieras/→/biera/; /harás/→/hará/; /tres/→/tre/, etc. This vocalic opening and extension is a quality that seems to dominate the target text's Jamaican English as well. Vowels are extended (/I/→/Ahh/; /Last/→/Laas/), while many terminal consonants are omitted, leaving open vocalic or liquid elements: /didn't/→/didn'/; /four/→/fo/. Telling as well is Ellis's simple transposition of the non-linguistic chanted melody. What defines this poem is the specificity of its sonorous articulation, and therefore when vocal features do not contribute to any semantic sense, do not signify beyond themselves, they are to be transposed untouched.

Section 1, Chapter 3

Rhythm Put to Question

If I have pushed these numbers further than necessary, I apologize. However, when it comes to determining how translators go about negotiating source text sounds, the repeating numbers of rhythm and rime seem to be one of the more important schematic pivots at their disposal. Needless to say, this should not prevent the critic from enquiring into alternatives to this Platonic, perhaps over-rational and bloodless conception of text sounds. Contemporary thinking on poetic rhythm is striving to move beyond the number, to spring rhythm from the bonds of classical meter and argue it as a more immanent, impenetrable formant of the text considered as discursive gesture. A central voice on this question has been French theorist Henri Meschonnic, who is the focus of this chapter.

3.1 Meter is a Number

In any discussion of rhythm, it becomes necessary at some point to make a distinction between the notions of rhythm and meter, which I have used interchangeably so far. Indeed, it would seem that the type of numeric rationalization that has prevailed thus far is more in keeping with the notion of meter. The translator operates in a realm of rational or artful measure when it comes to abstracting his or her models. The translator's rhythm is implicitly a measured one, and in this respect recalls Aristotle's distinction:

L'imitation, la mélodie et le rythme (car il est évident que les mètres sont une partie des rythmes) nous étant naturels, ceux qui à l'origine avaient les meilleures dispositions naturelles en ce domaine, firent peu à peu des progrès, et à partir de leurs improvisations, engendrèrent la poésie. (Aristotle 1990: 1449b).

Rhythm is a natural movement, an innate quality. In language it would correspond quite simply to discursive motion or elocutionary gesture, the natural and spontaneous

movements of the body as it emits its stream of acoustic magnitudes and intensities. This natural or innate discursive motion would then be ordered into the artful measure that is poetic meter, rendered as an entity measurable by the intellect.

Rendered as a number. When Aristotle says “les mètres”, he refers of course to those conventional metric paradigms in which poetry was composed in his day. I would like to follow him in his thinking toward a slightly broader understanding. “Meter”, for my purposes here, would refer to any rational and numeric indicator abstracted from the text’s sonorous dimension. In short, whenever I detect that text sounds have been measured, counted, assigned a number, I will consider myself in the realm of metrics. This is not such an outrageous extension of the notion, especially if one uses etymology as a guide, “meter” coming from the Greek “metron,” or “measure.” As such, it seems logically to be the most fitting term for any phenomenon that has been numerically actualized.

Meter would be the principle of rational and numeric intervention into natural rhythmic phenomena. The word is used as a verb as well. The rate of recurrence of natural phenomena can be “metered.” When it comes to the even and steady count of musical rhythm conceived as a number of beats per minute, the metronome is what marks the pulse. Meter does not correspond to the type of organic rhythm that Aristotle defines as a natural capacity or disposition, specifically because it tends to impose its own perfect, co-numerate repetition upon rhythmic phenomena that are in nature di-numerate, irregular and imperfect. For example, a chronometric heart rate of 120 beats per minute, determined by taking a patient’s pulse over ten seconds and multiplying by six, does not

really correspond to the heart's natural motion, to its variant speeds or even to the actual number of times the patient's heart really beats in the course of that or any other minute.

Artistic pursuits that are firmly grounded in metric traditions—classical verse and music specifically—tend to rely on rigid numeric conceptions only in the repetitive technical training that prepares for performance. Strict attention to meter is a training wheels of sorts. Ultimately, the desired effect is for this meter to become so internalized that it begins “conversing” with the body's natural rhythm. The performance, then, becomes a combination of artful measure and innate rhythm: a body's natural rhythm constrained in artful measure, and a poetic meter liberated through the body's natural and spontaneous movement. Counterpointed with the more elastic and flexible rhythms of conversational speech, meter is *sprung*.

The notion comes from Gerard Manley Hopkins. “Sprung rhythm,” he explains in his preface to “The Wreck of the Deutschland,” (Manley Hopkins 1970) is the principle by which the exacting co-numerate repetitions of classical meter are subject to the dinumerate and irregular rhythms of natural or conversational speech: “Sprung rhythm is the most natural of things, for it is the rhythm of common speech and of written prose, when rhythm is perceived in them. It is the rhythm of all but the most monotonously regular music...” (Hopkins 1970: 49). Important to note is that sprung rhythm, in Hopkins's conception, does not undo or replace metric rhythm (or what Hopkins calls “running rhythm”). Rather, it is the effect of multiple rhythmic possibilities that suggest themselves to the reader and interact in his or her actualization of the verse. In this sense, sprung rhythm is not a freedom from measurement, but rather the result of a mix of many possible measures, what Hopkins calls a Logaoedic rhythm. (46)

Natural discursive rhythms end up counterpointing metric regimes. The result is a reading that comes off as a negotiation between artful measure and easeful conversation. The most metered of the language arts is without doubt classical art song. Even here, however, this negotiation between exacting metricity and conversational rhythm is what marks the consummate interpretation. Myriam Alió, chair of Song at the Conservatorio Superior Municipal de Música in Barcelona, stresses this principle in her *Reflexiones sobre la voz* (1983). In performance, she maintains, one must: “procurar que la lengua actue *siempre* como si estuviésemos hablando.” (Alió 1983:101). The singer, for example, may be confronted with the daunting task of vocalizing the most unnaturally metered word—one that may last ten seconds and demonstrate multiple pitches and volume fluctuations—as if speaking it in a typical conversation.

The principle of sprung rhythm would apply to translation as well. I mentioned before that numeric schemata like Toury’s are considered a metric translator’s training wheels. As important as they are, they give only the broadest of structural guidelines. In the confines of the latter, the translator is still held to produce a text that reads like easeful conversation. This means knowing how to negotiate between the artful measure of a numeric template derived from the source text, and an innate elocutionary rhythmicity, his or her sense of what would read easefully in the target language. Every bit as important as the metric model, then, is the translator’s ability to “spring” it, and produce a target text that produces its own unique and natural discursive motion.

A good example of a translational sprung rhythm can be found in Stefan Zweig’s German versions of Baudelaire, collected and published in 1983. Here, sprung rhythm results from the subtle negotiation between a source text’s metric specifications and the

translator's sense of his or her own language's natural rhythmicity. The target text, in this sense, becomes a conversation between a metric regime transposed from the source, and an entirely new discursive motion bodied forth by the translator. It is at once a numeric double or equal of its source, and a wholesale rhythmic departure. It is this departure that Zweig's editor stresses in his explanation of the volume's title *Rhythmen*: "Der Titel dieses Bandes wurde aufgrund des besonderen Charakters der Nachdichtungen Stefan Zweigs gewählt, die sich bei persönlicher Melodie stets um die Erhaltung des originalen Rhythmus eines Gedichts bemühen." (Zweig 1983: i). This commentary is slightly misleading, seems to suggest that Zweig went his own impressionistic way in translating his poetic sources.

A closer look at the translations reveals that this is not the case. What happens in Zweig's versions is neither a pulse-for-pulse metric conformity to the source, nor a free reformulation, but rather the type of negotiation between metric constraint and conversational rhythm just discussed. The first stanza of Baudelaire's "Le chat," (poem 34 of *Les fleurs du mal*) reads:

*Viens, mon beau chat, sur mon cœur amoureux ;
Retiens les griffes de ta patte,
Et laisse-moi plonger dans tes beaux yeux,
Mêlés de métal et d'agate.* (Baudelaire 1991: 85)

A quick metric assessment suggests roughly three or four pulses per line with a phrasal rime pattern of 1,2,1,2. It would be foolhardy to suggest that Zweig did not keep this schema in mind when coming up with the following solution. The rime scheme does match up, even with the slanting rime (schön→seh'n), and like in Baudelaire's source, one counts roughly 4-3-4-3 pulses per line:

Komm' an mein Herz, du Kätzchen so schön,

Doch *berge* die *spitzigen Krallen*
Und *lass* in die *grünlichen Augen* dir *seh'n*
Mit dem *Glanz* von *feuchten Metallen*. (Zweig 1983: 181)

It would be unwise to presume that Baudelaire's metric paradigm is for little in Zweig's conception. It would be equally unwise to presume that this metric paradigm is anywhere near sufficient in explaining this new discursive movement put forth by Zweig. The moment one's conception of rhythm begins to encompass any and all aspects of the natural, generative movement behind the text—both the movement that produced it and the movement it is capable of eliciting—then that transposable metric regime reveals its limitations rather quickly. Those parameters of 3-4 pulses per verse, and that rime scheme of 1-2-1-2, begin to appear rather like conceptual flood gates straining to contain the movement of an altogether different speech flow. The metric gates are there and they do hold up, but they do not go very far in explaining the nature of the new discursive motion that is versed through them.

3.2 Rhythm is Organic, Fleeting, and Unknowable

The better part of language rhythm seems to escape numeric abstraction, to slip this type of analysis. The number is insufficient, a static conceptual category providing only the most limited notion of rhythm in its gestural plenitude. There is perhaps no other dimension of language where the modes of experiencing and explaining are so incommensurable. Language rhythm would be a discursive actualization, the actual physical gesture of speaking and writing, reading and hearing. Rhythm is motion, the impulse and follow-through of discursive locution, the gestures of soma: the vocal articulators, the moving pen or fingers on the computer keyboard. Rhythm materializes

in the ear or in the dance of the intellect as the text manifests in the reading or writing mind. Meter, on the other hand, exists on the analytical outside of this gesture, would inform any attempt at formal analysis involving academic distance, analytical tools for the dissection of the text's interacting structures.

Rhythm would be as fleeting as the gestures that realize it, for its movement is actualized in potentially infinite, unrepeatable and analytically uncircumscribable ways. Its movement occurs every time in its unique node of circumstances discursive, historical, psychological, and somatic. Meter, however, has a conceptual solidity, or at least offers the illusion thereof. Seized on the analytical outside of rhythmic motion, seized rationally as objective phenomenon of textual and linguistic organization, manifesting in the conceptual perfection of the number, meter is the piece of rhythm that can endure in the idea and be readily communicated. The experiential plenitude that it lacks is perhaps compensated for by this conceptual solidity.

Perhaps a fitting analogy to this distinction between rhythmic motion and metric measurement would be in the mythological figure of the Fates. The first is Clotho, who spins the thread. She is the ineffable motion producing the thread of life, and in this sense is like the rhythmic gesture behind language's actualization through reading or writing. Only then comes Lachesis, who executes an exacting measurement of the thread, and who recalls in this sense the rational principle of meter. Based on this measurement, Atropos then cuts the thread off. When it comes to texts, it is only through the measurements of Lachesis that theory seems able to rationalize the ineffable movement of Clotho. Only through the numeric measurement of a text already spun does the critic get a sense of the movement behind its creation. If the critic is classically

minded, this measurement may well satisfy. If the critic is in search of more, of some sense of the discursive gesture in all of its plenitude, then the number will inevitably frustrate, come up lacking.

3.2.1 Henri Meschonnic: A Frustrated Lachesis

What happens when the critic becomes all too conscious of both the traditional centrality and the implicit shortcomings of the number in conceptualizing the text's generative movement, its rhythm? You get a frustrated Lachesis, who realizes that analytical modes of measuring are woefully inadequate to the task of comprehending rhythm in its plenitude, but who realizes that there are really no other conceptual tools at her disposal. You get a critic who meters the text while rejecting the principle of metrics, a critic who at the same time exploits and denies rational modes of analyzing the text's rhythmic dimensions, a critic who, to put it simply, holds his own conceptual tools in contempt.

French theorist Henri Meschonnic seems to be one of these critics. Inspired by Benveniste's short chapter on rhythm in *Problèmes de linguistique générale* (1966), Meschonnic defines rhythm in dynamic discursive terms, as a general principle of movement in language.⁵ He defines rhythm holistically, in other words, as a diffusive and all pervasive principle determining the unfolding of the utterance at every level and stage of its becoming: its becoming physiological movement or vocalization; its becoming meaningful inter-subjective exchange. Poetic rhythm, therefore, is not the

⁵ (Benveniste 1966) Perhaps I am being a little expeditious in my argument here. Benveniste's chapter on rhythm is a discussion on classical uses of the word. The argument is structured around the tension between the notions of natural and measured rhythm. Under examination are two Greek uses, the first referring to the principle of a body's movement in dance: "la forme ou mouvement que le corps accomplit dans la danse" (334), the second to the numeric law to which this movement is ultimately submitted. In the classical conception, Benveniste argues, the number wins out. This is important to remember, for unlike Meschonnic, Benveniste does not make any presumption regarding the number's insufficiency in conceptualizing rhythm.

property of abstract numeric matrices, but rather the elemental formant of every discursive act. Permeating every language level, it implies the collapse of those conceptual boundaries treasured by the likes of Augustine, specifically those boundaries separating the text's vocal substance from its eidetic dimensions. For Meschonnic, rhythm is every bit as much of the text's sounds as it is of abstractions either numeric or semantic.

Rhythm pervades every language level, binds the signifier in its specific articulation into complicated and unpredictable relationships with the signified, relationships that defy extrication or stratification into conceptual orders like form and sense, signifier and signified, that defy in other words the abstraction of transposable meanings so central to the notion of translation. Rhythm defies the "découpage" or the marking of the text's repeating numeric sets. Rhythm defies any conception of the text in terms of interacting levels and structures. Rhythm defies, in short, all of the analytical modes fastidiously employed to measure it. Here is Meschonnic's wonderfully self-negating definition:

Je définis le rythme dans le langage comme l'organisation des marques par lesquelles les signifiants, linguistiques et extralinguistiques (dans le cas de la communication orale surtout) produisent une sémantique spécifique, distincte du sens lexical, et que j'appelle la signifiante : c'est-à-dire les valeurs, propres à un discours et à un seul. Ces marques peuvent se situer à tous les "niveaux" du langage : accentuelles, prosodiques, lexicales, syntaxiques. Elles constituent ensemble une paradigmatique et une syntagmatique qui neutralisent précisément la notion de niveau. (Meschonnic 1982: 217)

A jarring sort of definition this is, marvelously iconoclastic. First the classical mind is seduced with a rhythm defined as measurable text property, one subject to analytic dissection. Meschonnic teases apart a number of language levels: there is lexical sense

and an organization of “marques accentuelles, prosodiques,” which presumably compose the text’s meter; there is even the Saussurean structural division of the text along syntagmatic and paradigmatic lines. Lachesis seems to be measuring the text with all of the rational tools at her disposal. Rhythm seems to be something knowable through this sort of measurement. So far I read Meschonnic in a rational or metric mode, one privileging a numeric notion of text proportionalities.

Then I find out why Meschonnic has placed the word “niveaux” in ironic quotation marks: he is fixing to pull the rug out from underneath it all. Ultimately, the sum effect of measuring these levels *is to neutralize the very notion of level*. This sum effect, in other words, seems to form a “plenary discursive oneness” that neutralizes the very means through which it is conceived rationally. Rhythm’s ultimate effect, then, is to render null and void the very parameters that help the intellect measure it in the first place. In these seven some-odd lines, Meschonnic condenses the complexity of text rhythm, while in the same stroke canceling out the analytical modes by which the intellect comes to know it. This is what I mean by the frustrated Lachesis who measures out the thread, and then denies the validity of both her measurements and her tools.

3.3 Meschonnic on Translating Rhythm: Numeric Prescriptions

Meschonnic, ironically, is both the great exponent and adversary of a staunch numeric schematizing in the translation of text rhythm. A text’s rhythm, in the plenitude of its actualization through the gesture, is ineffable and untranslatable. It is unknowable in rational terms, that is to say in terms of sign theory and its modes of measurement. Organizing the text on structural axes, breaking it down into repeating sets defined by

mark or accent, counting letters, syllables and words, measuring phrasal proportions: these are fundamentally inadequate to the task of circumscribing rhythm, which is held by Meschonnic as trans-semiotic. *Infra-semiotic*, it is perhaps better to say, for preceding and pervading the sign that “says or means something” is a language movement, a gesture that “does something,” a gesture that is indescribable because it evades the logic of the sign:

Il s’agit de montrer l’incapacité des modèles vénérables à rendre compte de ce que fait le langage. Tout semble dit, en apparence, dans la notion—indiscutable, d’ailleurs—que les mots *disent*, que le langage dit, qu’on dit telle chose, ou qu’on n’arrive pas à dire...ce qu’il y a d’abord à penser, c’est que le langage *fait* en même temps qu’il dit. Et peut faire autre chose que ce que disent les mots qu’on dit... (Meschonnic 2000 : 12).

The number is an aspect of what language “says or means,” an aspect of the sign, and as such is insufficient in revealing what language “does,” of circumscribing the nature and force of its rhythm.

The number inevitably fails, but it is the only way to circumscribe rhythm analytically. As insufficient as it is, the number *is still of rhythm*, and this notion becomes especially important in Meschonnic’s reflection on translation. The numeric sign of its rhythmicity is what defines the poetic text against language conventions at large, against “langue.” When translating poetic texts, any violation of the source text’s specific structural organization in favor of an organization more typical to target language convention is for Meschonnic particularly grievous, for the text is not primarily of langue, but is rather “un système sui-référentiel, sui-constitutif,” signifying through its own structural logic, and only remotely and indirectly through the larger socio-discursive systems to which it relates. (Meschonnic 1982:179)

For Meschonnic, it seems that an exacting structural affinity between source and target is preferable to the observance of the target langue and its grammatical, lexical and stylistic conventions. In *Pour la poétique II*, good translating means translating by the number:

Le rapport poétique entre un texte et une traduction implique la construction d'une rigueur non composite, caractérisée par sa propre concordance...et par la relation du marqué pour le marqué, non marqué pour non marqué, figure pour figure, et non-figure pour non figure (Meschonnic 1970: 317).

I interpret this “rigueur non-composite,” as the privileging of a single unifying logic in the turning of the source, the effects of which would create a structural rapport, that is to say a rapport in the numeric eidos conceived from the repetition of finite sets defined around the mark or stress (“la relation du marqué pour le marqué, non marqué pour non marqué”). This as opposed to an “approche composite,” which would have the translator obeying a disparate mix of overarching logics, trying to negotiate a compromise between the text’s structure, the target language’s stylistic conventions, the desires of a specific market or readership, etc.

To sum up, when Meschonnic is not addressing translation, he espouses a discursive, holistic and trans-semiotic view of both rhythm and the text, one based in an always ill-defined (perhaps because indefinable) “gestuelle” and evident in the use of nebulous terms like “signifiante.” When he is prescribing a poetics of translation, however, rhythm is always measured. Moreover, this measurement is of the text’s structural specificity first and foremost, and is only secondarily bound to source and target language conventions, to langue. I can not stress enough the importance of Meschonnic’s stance with regard to langue (with its lexical, grammatical and stylistic sub-systems). He calls for a loosening of the latter’s stranglehold on the translator.

Indeed, language conventions often reject modes of source and target rapport that would be quite possible if translation were approached primarily as a text-to-text, structure-to-structure negotiation.

3.3.1 Meschonnic on Translating Rhythm: The Question of Vocal Sounds

What are these close “rapports” permitted by the text, but forbidden by language conventions? Given the issues discussed in this first section, the most expected rapport would be a structural one derived from close observance of stress and rime features, the latter conceived in the type of numeric schematic discussed earlier with Toury. Less encumbered with target language convention, it is possible to translate source text pulse and phrase rhythms more closely, Meschonnic argues:

On peut construire un *rapport prosodique* entre les structures du signifiant, d'un texte de départ à sa traduction-texte, là où l'opinion, opposant deux phonologies sur le plan de la langue, et terme à terme, concluait à l'intraduisible. En effet, on ne traduit pas une phonologie. Mais on ne traduit pas de la langue non plus, dans un texte. On construit et on théorise un rapport de texte à texte. (Meschonnic 1970: 314)

There is something more intriguing about this citation, however, and that is the mention of phonological systems in parallel to those of “langue.”

When it compares “deux phonologies, sur le plan de la langue,” Meschonnic suggests, opinion is bound to reject certain modes of relating texts through translation. Does this mean that other modes of relating would become possible the moment opinion begins to compare “deux phonologies sur le plan du texte”? If the chief concern is for how the source text articulates sound, and not for how the target language does this, then what other modes of translation become imaginable? Already, by virtue of the latter, closer prosodic relationships become possible. This Meschonnic states outright. The

logical next question, however, concerns the text's vocal specificity, its deep phonemic articulation. By opposing phonologies in their textual organization—and not by virtue of how they are wielded in “*langue*”—could I construct closer phonological relationship between my source and target? Could I render my source in its very chain of vocal sounds?

Meschonnic opens a door here that he does not pass through, makes an intriguing suggestion that he does not follow up on. When telling the translator that he or she might translate *textually* without necessarily being bound to the conventions of *langue* or the inter-*langue*, just what does he mean? Just how far can the translator go in observing the articulate logic of a text while compromising the conventional logic of “*langue*?” What is the finest articulate link that a translator can re-construct in his or her target, and how would he or she go about doing it? Is this finest link a numeric one, or could it indeed be a vocal or a phonemic one?

3.3.1.1 “From Jonas to Jona:” A Yearning for the Vocal Rapport

In Meschonnic, there is a diffusive conception of rhythm, implicating every text level—phonemic, numeric, semantic—and denying the very notion of level. Rhythm pervades that vocal dimension of the text that the translator discards for the number. The voice is the rhythmic component that escapes the measurements and abstractions of Lachesis. The latter might count every link of Clotho's thread, but she yearns to produce the thread itself. Meschonnic may count every letter, syllable and word of the source, but it is possible that in some instances what he yearns to do is re-construct the *actual sound chain of the source*, those most immediate components of the text's discursive gesture.

Is a phonology translatable when considered at the level of the text, and not langue? Meschonnic is silent on the subject in theory, but forces the question in spite of himself when he comments upon his own translations. In his 1981 article “Traduire la Bible, de Jonas à Jona,” and in his book published in the same year, *Jona et le signifiant errant*, he comments on his own Hebrew-to-French translation of the Book of Jonah, and compares his efforts with those of the French Rabbinate. It is the title of the essay, however, that fixes my attention: a French “Jonas” cropped of its /s/ for the purpose of effecting a closer textual rapport with the Hebrew /Yona/, a French “Jonas” deliberately interfered with in its phonemic structure, brought outside of French language conventions, in order to make it sound like its Hebrew source.

This vocal rapport that Meschonnic constructs in his title is unlike any conventional semantic or numeric translation. The method involved in achieving it, as well as the required mode of conceiving the target language, is rather unique. Meschonnic first has to notice that /Yona/ and /Jonas/ already share a core phono-structural affinity. Then he would have made the decision to reinforce this affinity by figuring the French /Jonas/ through a rhetorical operation I will be discussing in depth later: a *metaplasme*. In this case, the metaplasme involves a suppression of the phoneme /s/: /Jonas/→/Jona/. Briefly put, here is a translation that is both an inter-linguistic negotiation and a plastic manipulation of the target language at the infra-linguistic or phonemic level. Here is a translation that ventures where no conventional translation treads, into the phono-structure of target language elements, which it re-shapes subjectively to create a rapport in the sound chain.

Meschonnic has performed a vocal pattern translation of the type I will be exploring in the third section of this dissertation. However, he ventures into these new waters only for his title, and only to translate the name of the prophet. This vocal pattern translation of the prophet's name is integrated seamlessly, without reflection or differentiation, into an otherwise strictly numeric or metric translation. After the title's rhetorical punch, the critic retreats without further ado into more predictable modes, into numeric affinities that take no further account of the source's sound structure. Meschonnic goes on to approximate syntagmatic/grammatical relativities, syllable counts, phrasal proportions, accents and pauses. From the Hebrew incantation: "vayehi / devar-adonay // el-yona ven-amitay / lémor //" (Meschonnic 1981:45), comes the following numeric approximation: "Et il y a eu la parole d'Adonai vers Jona fils d'Amittaï pour dire." (Meschonnic, *Jonah* 45).⁶

It is clear that Meschonnic has his sights on a larger objective, which prevents him perhaps from differentiating between the ways he goes about achieving it. The larger purpose behind his translation is clearly stated: to oppose the version of the French Rabbinate, which "transports" the original, assimilates it to the target culture by doing away with source text rhythms altogether, and then proposes a text that could have just as easily originated in French: "La parole de l'Éternel fut adressée à Jonas, fils d'Amittaï, en ces termes." (45) His defiance, moreover, is in the name of a "mode of orality" that he proposes as the "mode of striving" of literary culture:

Le primat du rythme sur le sens lexical, le primat du rapport sur le transport, du décentrement textuel et culturel sur l'annexion définissent une Théorie critique de la traduction... Ce primat de la rythmique impose alors...de sortir des

⁶ The French target text even marks with spaces the incantational pauses (marked with slashes) of the source: one space for a single slash or short pause, two spaces for a double slash or longer pause.

conventions de l'écrit, qui marquent toutes les traductions, y compris la réaction du calque, pour retrouver le mode de l'oralité qui est son "mode de visée." (38)

All of this culminates in a defense of the so-called "sourcier" translation. The translator, Meschonnic argues, should get over his or her grievous reaction to calquing, for therein lies the retrieval of the source text's unique organization. What is a calque if not a textual rapport close enough to offend the conventions of langue?

I will fall back on my previous point, however: not all ways of creating this textual rapport are equal, and because Meschonnic adopts this diffusive and all pervasive view of rhythm, because he implicitly equates the vocal sound translation of his title with the essentially numeric translation of the text in the global effort to capture a "mode of orality" that he never really defines, his argument loses a much needed dimension of finesse. In fact, by equating these modes of translation, he seems to break his own cardinal rule regarding "une rigueur non-composite." I find myself agreeing wholeheartedly with his principle, but at the same time demanding acknowledgement that this title, "De Jonas à Jona," invokes a translational principle and methodology that is unique unto itself and not to be summarily "swallowed up" into the type of close numeric mode that he goes on to employ.

Perhaps the French "Jona" was swallowed up by number because it constitutes a translational ideal that quickly seems untenable, absurd even, when pursued further than the proper name of the prophet. What if Meschonnic had felt as free to turn the rest of the text the way he turned the prophet's name in his title? What if he had felt as free to thwart French language convention, to select and re-figured *all* of his solutions for the sole purpose of creating a vocal sound affinity with the Hebrew source? What if he had

really sent the signifier on the type of errant course he seems to espouse in that title? A true “rigueur non-composite” with regard to the translation of sound would have taken him in another direction entirely, may well have resulted in a target text too alien even for him. In this title, Meschonnic picks up a thread that he is unwilling to follow, for it leads into the “lunatic” territory of sound translation.

There is always certain bravado in Meschonnic’s criticism of the translator’s servitude to “langue,” a bravado often expressed in the shape of rather peremptory and foreboding ultimatums. Translation, he argues in “La femme cachée dans le texte de Kafka” : “signe, en choisissant la sécurité de la langue, et le primat herméneutique des signifiés, son arrêt de mort....”. (Meschonnic 1985 : 84) I do not wish to sign my death warrant, here. Rather, in the sections that follow I will step outside of the security of both “langue” and the “signified,” and follow the sound translational thread where it leads, and to the extent of the possible, “selon une rigueur non-composite.”

The predominant idea emerging from Meschonnic’s vocal negotiation from “Yona→Jona” is the translator’s creative implication in a realm of the text where he or she typically does not venture, the realm of the text’s exquisite vocal articulation, of the infra-linguistic or sub-word level. Put simply, the textual dimension that normally is not thought to signify, the realm of sonorous articulation, becomes conceivable now as a dimension that is not only translatable, but that can be manipulated creatively for the purpose of constructing a sonorous affinity between source and target. Because this manipulation occurs within the graphic elements of the text as they relate to vocal sounds, it seems important now to open out into reflection on the relationship between

the graphic symbols of writing and the verbal sounds that they symbolize, between the written and spoken word.

Section 2, Chapter 4

Writing vs. Speaking

I do not blame my reader for feeling somewhat out-numbered at this point. A word of reassurance, then, should preface this second section. First of all, it bears repeating that it was never my intention to present this numeric *eidos* as the universal principle governing the translator's conception of form. There was never any "must" or "invariably" in my purpose, which was simply to grasp the conceptual thread offered by Toury's schema and follow it within the restricted parameters discussed: 1. The repetition of acoustic phenomena in close textual proximity; 2. The effort to construct co-numerate sets organized around sound stress (rhythmic) and sound class (riming) features. Already with the type of qualitative or melodic sense described at the end of the second chapter, it is clear that the number becomes debatable.

Nor do I mean to suggest that the translator is always schematizing, drawing up numeric templates, like the one from Gideon Toury. In fact, this numeric *eidos* is usually conceived with minimal calculation, a sense of proportionate patterning being part of the translator's hardwiring, praxis and pattern memory having made him or her capable of conceiving proportionate patterns on a large scale. At the same time, however, praxis does seem to credit the notion that the more the source text demonstrates special metric complexity with regard to rhythm and rime, the more the translator will actualize numeric schemata. In the model of Western translation, poetic forms like sonnets, pantoums, or haikus are more likely to compel a deliberate and conscious process of counting and schematizing than a paragraph of prose, for example, although all these text types are perfectly susceptible to measurement.

2.4.1 To Include the Voice and its Patterns, Not Tear the Number Down

Secondly, I wish to reassure my reader that my efforts here are not to refute or otherwise undermine this numeric *eidos*, but rather to complement it with other eidetic paradigms arising from the vocal pattern of the source text. The text's numeric presence has never been in question. Indeed, translation exists because of a certain hard-nosed faith in the transcendent signified. The number would be an aspect of this signified, the back of the Saussurean leaf that can be separated from the front. It is as Derrida points out:

Il n'y a de traduction, de système de traduction, que si un code permanent permet de substituer ou de transformer les signifiants en gardant le même signifié, toujours *présent* malgré l'absence de tel ou tel signifiant déterminé. La possibilité radicale de la substitution serait donc impliquée par le couple de concepts signifié/signifiant, donc par le concept de signe lui-même. Qu'on ne distingue le signifié du signifiant, avec Saussure, que comme les deux faces d'une même feuille, cela n'y change rien. (Derrida 1967: 311)

Saussure insists that the signifier and the signified are two sides of the same leaf, that is to say inseparable. Derrida, however, asserts that the translator's rationale is otherwise. Indeed there could be no translation without this fundamental belief that the material and eidetic components of the language sign can be split apart.

Platonic modes of conceptualizing seem to be an inevitability in translation. They can not be escaped, but they can certainly be afforded a greater complexity. Meschonnic shows insight in his nuanced distinction between "langue" and the "text," in his advocacy of a translational rapport in the text's number as rational (though insufficient) indicator of its rhythm, of the motion behind its creation. He demonstrates oversight, however, when his wholistic conception of rhythm causes him to collapse or disregard the text's structural levels. In the Jonas (1981) article, I have argued, there is a decided lack of

nuance in Meschonnic's thinking. Here, "rhythmicity" and "orality" become leviathan-like notions that swallow up all modes of textual rapport into one digestible mass. Here is where the unique type of vocal rapport announced in the title is subsumed without finer distinction by the traditional numeric rapport. Here, an attempt to create an actual vocal pattern affinity heads off an article that has nothing further to do with vocal pattern affinities, but which transitions without further distinction into affinities of metric proportion.

Both Meschonnic's insight and his oversight are made to spur me on, however. The insight into the text-langue distinction compels me to put the conventions of langue and signified between parentheses and to explore a depth of structural rapport that can only be "text-to-text:" a vocal rapport. By the same token, his oversight regarding the distinction between numeric and vocal pattern translation compels me to explore the types of ideas that emerge from vocal patterns and are specifically *of these patterns*. Meschonnic's French "Jona" suggests that vocal patterns do not only give rise to a semantic or numeric conceptuality, but to a vocal conceptuality as well, to the idea of their own sonorous articulation, and that this conceptuality is translatable following its own specific techniques and methodology. This conceptuality, distinct from both a semantic and numeric one, could rightfully be called a "vocal eidos."

However, before delving into vocal patterns, the ideas they elicit, and how they are translated, some more preliminary reflection seems appropriate. In a project concerned with translation and vocal sounds, one issue demands attention sooner or later, and that is the question of texts, writing and reading, and how these relate to vocal sounds. This issue becomes all the more important as translation scholarship seems to

have afflicted itself with certain crude theoretical distinctions arising mainly from deontological concerns. I am thinking specifically about the distinction between translators and interpreters. Translators, the axiom goes, work with texts, interpreters with vocal sounds. Translators read and write, and interpreters speak. It would be unfortunate indeed if this sort of reductive statement blinded anyone to the truth, which is that both these types of language professionals, depending on their activities, rely on both the written and spoken words.

It seems true, however, that the translator does not typically deal in the word's more exquisite articulation, so it seems wise to begin by providing some tools for addressing this articulation as it presents itself in texts. Up next, then, is a broader reflection on the relationship between speaking and writing in the phonetic alphabet. How are the spoken and written word motivated through each other? Does writing restructure language consciousness? Could there be such a thing as a "graphic seal" making translators seers rather than hearers of language? If so, might there be ways of opening their ears to the text's sonorous dimensions?

2.4.2 Refuge in Writing?

Does privileging the graphic medium deafen the translator to the text's voice? Does the technology of writing short circuit his ear for language sounds and the dimensions of meaning they convey? Such questions really address the broader issues of orality and literacy, which have been the object of much theoretical controversy over the last fifty years, the most fundamental question of all being how to define the relationship between written (literate) and spoken (oral) language.

Passé now is the belief that the written word is beholden to its vocalized counterpart. Behind this rift is of course Derrida, who made a mission of excoriating the notion of the direct referential pipeline between the written and spoken word, a notion that he famously dubbed “logophonocentric.” The reality, Derrida argues in *Of Grammatology* (1976), is that writing is a phenomenon independent from speaking. To assume otherwise is to labor in the illusion of “presence,” that is to say the illusion that the spoken word (as signified) is somehow present in the written word (as signifier). On the contrary, Derrida argues that the relationship between any signifier and its signified is not one of presence, but rather of absence. The signifier is the trace of a signified that is forever differed. And from there, the leap into a flummoxing ontological argument: the trace of an absence can not really *be* anything. As essentially “self-erasing”—this is how Derrida re-conceives the language sign.

There is no need to enter into a treatise on deconstruction, however, to retain the basic Derridian principle that the written word functions in absence of its voiced counterpart, that writing, in this important sense, is governed by logic all its own. This principle finds half-hearted support among the Anglo-American thinkers whom I will be addressing shortly: Eric Havelock (1982), Marshall McLuhan (1967) and Walter Ong (1982). Like Derrida, these theorists have dedicated intensive reflection to the disjunctives dividing written and spoken language, to the distinctive ways that each shapes language consciousness. At the same time, however, they provide a necessary foil to Derrida, who makes his case for writing’s autonomy by taking a rather extreme position against the spoken word’s hegemony, against this mindset that he has termed “phonocentric.”

The reason that the support of these American critics is half-hearted lies in Derrida's anti-phonocentric extremism. His schismatic logic, his rupture between the written and spoken word hardens quickly into axiom. It is one thing to argue the complexity of the written word's relationship to speaking, a complexity that necessarily implies points of disjunction, Walter Ong argues in *Orality and Literacy* (1982). It is quite another to throw up a hermetic barrier between the two, to emancipate the written word from its spoken counterpart altogether:

Derrida is of course quite correct in rejecting the persuasion that writing is no more than incidental to the spoken word. But to try to construct a logic of writing without investigation in depth of the orality out of which writing emerged and in which writing is permanently and ineluctably grounded is to limit one's understanding (Ong 1982: 77).

By affording the written word an unwarranted ontological supremacy over its vocalized counterpart, Derrida has taken a position that is every bit as extreme, every bit as untenable, as the phono-centrism he contests. He has swung to the opposite pole, one that Walter Moser has termed "grapho-centric:"

On the one hand, there is the oral or vocal tradition that gives preference—chronological priority as well as ontological supremacy—to representations produced by the voice (*phonè*) or the mouth and perceived by the ear. On the other hand, the written (*graphè*) or visual tradition favors representations produced by the hand...and exclusively addressed to the eye. I propose to call phono-centrism the tendency to give preference to oral-auditory over graphic-visual representations. Accordingly, the opposite tendency will be called grapho-centrism (Moser 1992: 210)

Somewhere between these opposing poles of phono- and grapho-centrism must be compromise, a middle road position.

Among theorists like Havelock, McLuhan and Ong, a common position seems to emerge: written language does indeed evolve out of spoken language, out of an orality *that came before*. There is a definite primacy, in the sense of "preceding and

determining” afforded to spoken language. However, this is a primacy tempered by a concession: that writing is indeed a specialized technique displaying its own unique logic, a technique that structures language consciousness in its own unique way. I find this middle-road approach praiseworthy, and I will do my best to adopt it in this project. There is one major criticism to be raised against Havelock, McLuhan and partially against Ong, however. All of these theorists seem to argue the relationship between the spoken and written word from two fundamental perspectives. First, there is what seems to be a synchronic perspective. Here, the modalities of speaking and writing are explored and compared, as well as their differing effects upon language consciousness. This, for me, is the perspective that yields the most fruitful insight.

Underpinning—and I believe undermining—this synchronic perspective, however, is a rather loosely propped up diachronic one. This is to say that these theorists have a tendency to compare the spoken and written word in relation to a historical paradigm that is largely of their own conception, a paradigm that can often come across as “mythical” in its simplicity. Time and again, Havelock, McLuhan and Ong refer to some prior mode of orality transitioning, with a certain uni-dimensional linearity, into a succeeding mode of writing in the phonetic alphabet. Tribal or oral man is “literally” revolutionized.¹

To put it simply, the synchronic comparison of A and B is systematically undermined by a concurrent historical and periodizing mode of thinking governed by the facile assumption that A transitioned into B abruptly at some point in the timeline. It is this periodizing tendency, this conceptual space propped up at the end of a fully

¹ Frederic Jameson (1991), with *Post Modernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, offers a much needed differentiation between these two modes of thinking culture: either synchronically (or within a single era), or diachronically (as passage between eras).

developed and complex oral culture and the nascence of a written one, that makes the comparison tend toward the reductive. The facility of the periodizing argument necessarily carries over, determines the nature of the synchronic comparison. The result is a synchronic comparison formulated in terms of gains and losses. What did oral or tribal man lose when he became alphabetic man? What did he gain? What communicative potentialities did writing open up or shut down?

McLuhan's diachronicity is by far the most facile. There is no doubt that this theorist's insight into the nature of media is complex and innovative. However, his insight into the evolution of media through history has an almost mythological simplicity, and doubtless owes much of its compelling force to this. McLuhan is always ushering in entire new eras and slamming the door on others. Moreover, he is always characterizing these eras with unidimensional bravado: the era of pre-literacy; the era of alphabetic writing; the era of print (or the Gutenberg era); the industrial era; the electronic era, all of these eras characterized by their own unique state of mind.

McLuhan's mentor Eric Havelock is less the prophet, but he too argues in terms of large scale historical shifts from oral state A to literate state B. Indeed he posits this transitioning space as the larger argument uniting his book *The Literate Revolution in Greece and its Cultural Consequences* (1982): "Underlying the analyses, and for the most part unstated but perceptible, lies the possibility of a larger and more formidable proposition, that the change became the means of introducing a new state of mind—the alphabetic mind, if the expression may be allowed." (Havelock 1982: 7) This shift from the oral to the alphabetic mind comes across as all too abrupt and univocal, all too linear.

Just how does this diachronic argument impoverish the comparison between the written and spoken word? As I have just suggested, it seems to formulate this comparison in terms of gains and losses, the most substantial gain of the written word being the ability to cast evanescent sound in visual, spatial and permanent form. At one point in *Understanding Media* (1964), McLuhan takes an interest in the African Prince Modupe's first encounter with the written word:

The one crowded space in Father Perry's house was his bookshelves. I gradually came to understand that marks on the pages were *trapped words*. Anyone could learn to decipher the symbols and turn the trapped words loose again into speech. The ink of the print trapped the thoughts; they could no more get away than a *doomboo* could get out of a pit. (McLuhan 1964: 81)

The rise of the phonetic alphabet and writing; the oral and aural language symbol trapped in a visual/spatial medium—with these, McLuhan goes on to argue, come freedom and power. Freedom, first of all, from tribalism and the temple economy, from the interpersonal constraints and forced proximities of a culture bound by verbal dialogue and memory. Language can now be a private affair, as people communicate in seclusion from both their interlocutors and their fellow citizens.

Then comes power in the form of imperial expansion, as language becomes a specialized technology and people are able to communicate across great distances. Central authorities can now exert control over vast territories. For McLuhan, writing in the phonetic alphabet is a specialized technology of aggressive order and precision. In this sense, it is not like writing in other pictographic or ideographic forms. Hieroglyphs or Chinese ideographs are complex loci of representation, are interpreted along multiple axes. They are for McLuhan as culturally rich as they are non-democratic and ultimately inefficient as a technology of mass communication. Writing in the phonetic alphabet,

however, is a starkly linear succession of a limited number of “semantically meaningless letters corresponding to semantically meaningless sounds.” (83) McLuhan deems it culturally poorer than pictographic and ideographic forms, while at the same time astoundingly efficient as a technology of communication and imperialism. Hence his enduring analogy between writing and the dragon’s teeth from the Cadmus myth:

That the power of letters as agents of aggressive order and precision should be expressed as extensions of the dragon’s teeth is natural and fitting. Teeth are emphatically visual in their lineal order. Letters are not only like teeth visually, but their power to put teeth into the business of empire-building is manifest in our Western History (83).

This comparison between sequential phonetic letters and the dragon’s ripping teeth seems quite as forced as it is forceful. It not only suggests the violence of imperial expansion, but also this abrupt diachronic tear, as an era culturally rich in oral and iconographic practices gave way to an era of recombinant phonetic symbols, which promptly savaged the image, causing a monumental loss of creative forms.

It is an analogy that has lingered, however, in the writings of more than a few followers of McLuhan. German theorist Norbert Bolz evokes a similar tear in history:

Von den magischen Praktiken bis zu den rechnergestützten Permutationsspielen prozediert der Menschegeist als Manipulation von Buchstaben und Zahlen; was sie ermöglicht, ist Schrift. Das heißt aber: In der Welt der Bilder kann sich eine solche Form von Geist und Kreativität nicht entfalten. Hier trennen sich Weltalter. (Bolz 1993: 183).

In other words, there are modes of thought and creativity that are specific to pre-literate and post-literate worlds, the modes of the former being unthinkable in the latter and vice versa. This notion of violent tear and separation re-emerges with Vilém Flusser (1991): “Der ritzende Stilus ist ein Reißzahn, und wer in Schriften schreibt, ist ein reißender Tiger: Er zerfetzt Bilder.” (Flusser 1991: 17) For Flusser, it is not only the image that

suffers under the tyranny of the written word, but the spoken word as well: “Das Alphabet schreibt die gesprochene Sprache nicht nieder, es schreibt sie auf. Es erhebt die Sprache und nimmt sie in seinen Griff, um sie nach seinen Regeln zu ordnen. Auf diese Weise regelt und ordnet das Alphabet auch das von der Sprache Gemeinte: das Denken.” (Flusser 2002: 36) The linear and visual progression of alphabetic letters is at once a set of dragon’s teeth, tiger’s claws, the wound of a stylus/sword, and an iron fist around the language user’s mind. How could such draconian conclusions *not* orient any comparison of writing and speaking in terms of dramatic gains and losses?

With the gain in extension permitted by the written word, comes a loss of oral depths and intensities of meaning, a loss of the resonance and tonality, of the sensuous involvement of interpersonal dialogue, of the voice’s immediate and spontaneous reactivity to a given situation. The graphic signifier, following McLuhan, “neutralizes a thousand shades of vocal expression, each nuancing meaning in its own way.” (McLuhan 1964: 77-89) This argument comes across as facile, to say the least. Perhaps alphabetic writing is more efficient and democratizing than other pictorial forms. The twenty some-odd characters of the alphabet are more easily apprehensible and maneuverable than the thousands of ideogrammatic characters that a Mandarin speaker spends a lifetime learning. However, the notion that writing is starkly linear and simplistic, culturally poorer, and offering minimal depth for interpretation, is at the very least debatable. As a medium, alphabetic writing has a potential for hermeneutic complexity that these theorists seem unwilling to acknowledge.

McLuhan manifestly has only the “ortho”-graphic, the most normalized form of writing in mind. For phonetic writing as a whole demonstrates an impressive complexity.

Both handwritten and print forms can be analyzed along multiple axes both aural and visual. It is surprising that McLuhan, who in works like *The Mechanical Bride* (1951) and *The Medium is the Massage* (1978) proved so adept at analyzing the print forms of billboard advertisement, didn't see fit to acknowledge the hermeneutic complexity of iconicized writing and print in his more academic works. I am not only referring to poetry that is organized pictographically, or in intriguing visual/spatial ways, like Apollinaire's calligrammes or Mallarmé's "Coup de dés." It need not be as high brow as this, for there is hardly a written word in advertising that is not also an image in some way, be it the Greek restaurant with marquee characters resembling Corinthian columns, or the horror film whose title drips in garish red.

Alphabetic writing in the phonetic alphabet can and routinely does act pictographically, does offer up multiple axes for visual interpretation. It also offers a greater capacity for vocal interpretation than these critics seem to suggest. Phonetic nuance and distortion, including nonsense sound, is commonly represented in writing through deviation from orthographic norms. I would venture to argue that when it comes to the sounds of speech, the phonetic alphabet opens worlds of representation unknown to previous pictographic forms. Is a hieroglyph or an ideogram capable of onomatopoeic representation, such as in the dry, hacking cough of Rabelais' Janotus de Bragmardo: "hen, hen, ehen, hasch!...ehasch, grenhenhasch!" ? (Rabelais 1968: 102) Could it represent a word in the specificity of its vocalization, such as in the lament of Alex's mother in *A Clockwork Orange*: "Where is the poor boy now? Gone back owwwwwwme!" (Burgess 2000: 128). Or in the specificity of a dialect, such as in the poetry of Robert Burns: "Wee, sleeket, cowran, tim'rous beastie..." (Burns 1993: 67)

These written words, which attempt to extend their phoneticity through their own visual and spatial means, may come across as feeble, an insufficient mimesis of a vocal complexity. It remains true nevertheless that this capacity for phonetic imitation is still a potentiality of alphabetic writing only. It is an axis of expression and interpretation that does not exist in ideographic forms.

Paradoxical graphic configurations aside, McLuhan's notion of efficient linearity in phonetic writing is also suspect. The picture, here as well, is far more complex than that row of dragon's teeth. The orientation of the graphic line can vary according to language and text type. Some texts read from left to right, some right to left. Others read vertically. Languages that inscribe accents above or below their characters would plausibly have both a horizontal and vertical dimension. What of texts that read like the meeting of coordinates on a graph: indices, concordances and dictionaries, with their alphabetic verticality and definitional linearity? Then there's the intricate architecture of word games, where one frequently reads diagonally.

McLuhan is silent on the expressive complexity of the written word. He is also silent on the potential linearity, permanence and remoteness of the spoken word, as well. Telephone and recording technology make oral communication every bit as remote, private and uninvolved as written communication. Linear as well is the magnetic tape to which the spoken word is routinely conferred. The voice on this tape is quite as permanent and storable, as subject to archiving as any written form. Moreover, the spoken word needn't necessarily involve complex shades of meaning and dialogic participation. The drone of the news anchor on the radio is perfectly uninvolved and non-participatory.

Havelock and McLuhan fall into the same trap as Derrida. All three, in their own way, become prisoners of their own disjunctive logic, one conceived to expel the voice from the written word and place them in frank opposition with each other. With Derrida, the rejection of presence and the notion of the trace disjoin the written signifier from its spoken signified. Havelock and McLuhan force a diachronic split between oral and alphabetic “states of mind” effecting a similar disjunction. Derrida expels orality from writing by force of philosophical persuasion. Havelock and McLuhan mourn an orality lost to writing as a tyrannically imperialistic and democratizing medium.

2.4.2.1 McLuhan’s Prosthetics

It is time to ask the question: if phonetic writing evolved out of the speaking, then should it not follow that these two media, notwithstanding the differences that oppose them, should also identify at some level? At some level, are they not bound up within each other in a manner so complex as to defy the sort of extrication and opposition that our critics have argued thus far? Happily, when McLuhan leaves off this opposition of crudely conceived historical periods and starts examining the nature of technology itself, a more complex relationship between the spoken and written word emerges, a relationship that seems to allow for their distinctive functions, but which also concedes to their underlying identity, one that I feel helps keep the middle road position between the logophonocentric attitude of presence and the equally pernicious argument of absence and disjunction manifesting in Derrida, Havelock and McLuhan arguing historically. I would like to turn now from McLuhan the historian to McLuhan the media theorist comparing the spoken and written word synchronically and technologically.

McLuhan has a “prosthetic” view of technology. All technology, he argues, is an extension, as well as an acceleration and enhancement, of the body’s senses and functions. The invention of the wheel, the car, the train, was an extension of the foot. In a similar way, the telephone and the radio extended the ear, and electricity extended the nervous system. As each new medium extends the old, it also retrieves and contains it. Television, for example, would contain film, which would contain the comic strip, which would contain the photograph, which would contain the painting or drawing, which would contain the eye. The content of any medium is a virtual mirror tunnel of other media extending back to the senses. Hence the expression “the medium is the message.”²

Replacing this simplistic conception where one medium succeeds another in a diachronic tear seems to be a more complex telescopic one, where a previous medium extends into and through a succeeding one, which both retrieves and enhances its function. The spoken word, for McLuhan, is a technological innovation extending thought processes, through the voice, into the world outside and thus enhancing communicative ability. Writing, for its part, is the further innovation that extends and enhances speech:

This fact, characteristic of all media, means that the content of any medium is always another medium. The content of writing is speech, just as the written word is the content of print, and print is the content of the telegraph. If it is asked “What is the content of speech,” it is necessary to say, “It is an actual process of thought that is itself non-verbal.” (McLuhan 1964: 9)

² See *The Extensions of Man: Understanding Media*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964. Of particular interest here are chapters 1 (“Medium Is the Message”), 4 (“The Gadget Lover: Narcissus as Narcosis”), and 6 (“Media as Translators”).

The written word contains the spoken word. This would seem to suggest that writing is somehow like speaking, possesses something of the spoken word beyond the grapheme-to-sound symbology that we all learn as children.

That their relationship may well be “prosthetic.” How does one typically conceive a prosthesis or prosthetic device, like a pair of eyeglasses, a hearing aid or an artificial limb, for example? Generally, these things invoke a functional and conjunctural relationship with the sense or function they retrieve. This is to say that in a concrete way, and following their own more rudimentary techno-logic, they behave functionally like these senses and functions, and usually in physical conjunction with them. Eyeglasses, like the eyes, function on the lens principle, and they work along with the pair of eyes seeing through them. Hearing aids, like the inner ear, function by capturing and amplifying sound waves, and they are fitted into the ear. Artificial limbs, the more advanced they get, approximate in their own way the functioning of the real limbs they extend or replace.

In its own way, writing in the phonetic alphabet functions like speaking, that is in a way above and beyond the specific knowledge of the letter-to-sound symbolism involved. In both systems, the reader/listener attends a succession of shapes. The written word proceeds from one graphic shape to the next in temporal fashion, just as speech proceeds from one phonological shape to the next. The relation between the written letter or grapheme and the vocal sound is symbolic, a matter of convention. However, the movement from one grapheme to the next involved in synthesizing these sounds into larger, meaningful structures is less symbolic than it is prosthetic. Indeed, the only thing convention imparts of this movement is the basic direction that the reading eye is to

engage: does it move from left to right over the succession of graphic figures, or from right to left, or up and down? Once pointed in the right direction, the eye's movement becomes a technique, the string of graphic shapes over which it moves an approximation through visual/spatial means of the speech flow's functional unfolding. Moreover, the written word frequently functions in close physical conjunction with the spoken one, and in a manner that is bi-directional. As one reads a text aloud for example, the written word extends into the realm of acoustic phenomena. The reverse holds true as well. As one dictates a message to a secretary for example, the voice extends into the more permanent realm of visual, spatial phenomena, as can be observed in film sub-titles, or in the scrolling captions of television programs. Voice-recognition software is perhaps the most evocative example of the vocal shape stream extending into a graphic one almost contemporaneously, and without the intervention of typing fingers.

2.4.2.2 Double Articulation

Doubtless the most compelling evidence of the prosthetic relationship between speaking and writing in the phonetic alphabet is the unique structural principle they share: that of double articulation. The idea of the sound and graphic "shape stream" ties directly into this most basic concept of structural semiotics, a concept that is particularly useful in distinguishing between language's functional sound elements and its higher levels of signification. The idea is that verbal language is a semiotic code conceivable along two structural levels: a higher level termed the 'level of first articulation' and a lower level termed the 'level of second articulation.' (Nöth 1990) Language's first articulation level (also the grammatical level) is the chain or pattern of meaningful units, the smallest of

which is the fully realized lexical item, the word. In the Saussurean sense, first articulators would be the smallest language structures that could plausibly be called signs, that would consist of a signifier and conventional signified. Below this higher grammatical level is the level of second articulation, which consists of a relatively limited number of recombinant sound features, a sort of language DNA. Second articulators are the phonemes of speech and the letters of writing. (Innis 1986) These units are non-signifying, their sole purpose being to synthesize the properly meaningful structures of first articulation.

McLuhan's prosthetic argument becomes attractive in the light of this second articulation level, where writing and speaking both demonstrate a succession of purely functional figures—letters and phonemes—synthesizing higher, more meaningful structures. The design of both systems, then, is similar at a profound functional and structural level. Structurally, both are a stream of minimal functional sound shapes that synthesize larger, properly signifying shapes. It is precisely this similarity of design that has led theorists like Culler (1975) and Lotman (1990) to conceive writing as a sort of “superstructure,” a secondary system built upon the design of the verbal system for the purpose of extending its function. A graphic sign system constructed upon the functional model of a verbal one: Lotman's notion of writing as ‘secondary modeling system’ has a strong affinity with McLuhan's prosthetics.

As usual, enthusiasm should be tempered with critical circumspection. McLuhan's extension theory is rather broadly conceived. This notion of media containing other media, of this “mirror” tunnel of forms leading back to the body's senses and functions: as intriguing as it is, it also has the rather messy effect of confusing true

prosthesis with what we might best describe as functional metaphor. The arguments linking writing to speaking prosthetically are compelling. However, McLuhan does not limit his vision to these media. He sees the eye in cinema, the foot in the supersonic jet, the nail and tooth in the sword and the bullet. The functional comparisons are evident enough. Could I convincingly argue, however, that all of these technologies have a prosthetic function, that they behave structurally like the function they retrieve?

If the answer to this question is yes, then another question inevitably arises: how does one go about voyaging back through the mirror tunnel? How does one go about describing the complex imbrication of technological devices that would lead us from the fingernail to the sword, for example? These things relate functionally in their capacity to offend. They may even vaguely resemble each other in their shape and in the way they are wielded. But can we really draw the type of structural and conjunctural relationship required to make the sword an “extension” in a more concrete, prosthetic sense of the word? In the end, the structural differences separating these forms become as evident as those relating them. The same goes for the relationship between the spoken and written word. Important is the structural principle that identifies them (second articulation), but this should not blind the critic to other obvious structural principles differentiating them: the written word is a chain of symbolic graphemes, visual and permanent, each of these graphemes bearing no natural resemblance to the sounds they symbolize; the spoken word, on the contrary, is a rippling of muscles and a passage of air producing a series of vocal and aural figures, an *evanescent* speech stream.

The adjective is Walter Ong’s, and serves to describe speech phenomena that evaporate as soon as they materialize: “When I pronounce the word ‘permanence’, by the

time I get to the ‘-nence’, the ‘perma’ is gone, and has to be gone.”(Ong 1982: 33) The visual/spatial grapheme, on the other hand, materializes and remains. There is an evanescence implicit in the spoken word, in the temporal unfolding of speech. This is because sound is by definition action, mobility. Sound can only exist in the event of movement that sends waves rippling through the atmosphere. One can not cease the action producing the sound *and still have sound*: “There is no way to stop sound and have sound...If I stop the movement of sound, I have nothing—only silence, no sound at all. All sensation takes place in time, but no other field totally resists a holding action, stabilization, in quite this way.” (32) Ong contrasts this principle of mobility and evanescence with the potential immobility and permanence of visual/spatial phenomena:

I can stop a moving picture camera and hold one frame fixed on the screen...Vision can register motion, but it can also register immobility. Indeed it favors immobility, for to examine something closely by vision, we prefer to have it quiet. We often reduce motion to a series of still shots the better to see what motion is. There is no equivalent of a still shot for sound. (33)

Afterwards, Ong describes the attendant consequences of this visual/spatial immobility as it relates to the graphic signifier and writing in general. Essentially, he formulates the notion of a language “reified”, frozen in linear space, subject to dissection by the disambiguating intellect: “All script represents words as in some way things, quiescent objects, immobile marks for assimilation by vision” (91).

2.4.2.3 Writing’s Evanescence: Audio-Visual Technology

Here I find myself squarely back in the disjunctive paradigm I attempted to transcend by appealing to McLuhan’s prosthetics. Ong’s conception of written word as quiescent

object is reminiscent of McLuhan and Havelock's "alphabetic state of mind." Of course, after Ong takes position, the pendulum must swing back once again. Hoping my reader will excuse the pun, I can no more take Ong's argument for wrote than McLuhan's. Is the written word really this permanent, quiescent object, this reified speech token that can be dissected at will? Such assertions are becoming less tenable in the light of developing technology, as the written word's relationship with speech reveals not only deep structural affinities, but potential affinity in these same principles of motion and evanescence that Ong ascribes to sound exclusively.

While still visual and spatial, writing can now be every bit as evanescent and motion determined as speech, it seems safe to argue. It is not hard to conceive the possibility of a text unfolding, evanescent and disappearing in the absence of a sound generating motion. One only has to see the scrolling captions that prosthetize and transcribe speech sounds on the television. Here graphic strings are made to unfold simultaneously with vocal ones, to appear and evanesce in roughly the same temporal arc. To be sure, these scrolling captions have potentially all the permanence of any graphic representation, and they certainly do not disappear as quickly as the sounds they represent—in fact they even tend to stack or pile up in mini-texts before disappearing—but they do reveal writing's potentiality for non-permanence, and it would be a relatively easy matter to make those graphemes scroll faster, materialize and evanesce in locked step with the phonating voice.

Technology is causing a drift of graphic forms toward a more oral mode of unfolding. For all his talk of graphic permanence, Ong does demonstrate elsewhere a singular consciousness of this drift of writing toward oral and evanescent modes. From

him, after all, comes the notion of “secondary orality.” Electronic writing, Ong argues, has allowed the written word to be bodied forth with the same action, the same sensuous involvement and sense of inter-personal participation that one normally attributes to spoken dialogue. In the internet chatroom, for example, the written word is being utilized and transformed into a shorthand that accommodates the speed of talking, as well as all manner of connotations that typically come across in intonational cues. People are engaging in dialogue with remote partners in real time through the gesture of typing fingers. This oral manner of interacting and conversing is extending through the written word, Ong affirms, with the attendant consequence that self-consciously “oral” or informal styles are being committed to print on top of traditional writing styles, effectively swelling the output of written material beyond what has ever been seen before, and dispelling the notion that writing is being phased out by electronic technology.

Ong echoes McLuhan here in his notion of the word accelerated and intensified through electronic technology: “...the sequential processing and spatializing of the word, initiated by writing and raised to a new order of intensity by print, is further intensified by the computer, which maximizes commitment of the word to space and to electronic motion...” (137). The effect of this acceleration and intensification, like with McLuhan, is a reversal into this less specialized and more organic conversational mode:

This new orality has striking resemblance to the old in its participatory mystique, its fostering of communal sense, its concentration on the present moment, and even its use of formulas...Like primary orality, secondary orality has generated a strong group sense, for listening to spoken words forms hearers into a group, a true audience... (136).

Like with McLuhan, this secondary orality mirrors primary orality in many ways, but is radically different both in its new, massive scale and in its implicit self-consciousness, its concerted effort to thwart the formality and precision of traditional written forms.

Ong's secondary orality argues the drift of the written word toward more oral modes of expression. Unfortunately, the theorist doesn't seem to follow his own insight to another important end: that of sound's potential permanence as it is recorded either magnetically or digitally. If the written word has drifted toward oral modes of expression, *then the spoken word has also drifted toward more permanent graphic modes of inscription and manipulation*. Scholars have also cited Ong's notion of secondary orality in reference to innovations in vocal sound recording, for example. Sound poet Steve McAffery makes implicit reference to Ong when describing the contributions of recording technology to the art of sound poetry. A better evocation of the voice's era of secondary orality, I have not found:

Realizing also that the tape recorder provides the possibility of a secondary orality predicated upon a graphism (tape, in fact, is but another system of writing where writing is described as any semiotic system of storage) then we can appreciate other immediate advantages: tape liberates composition from the athletic sequentiality of the human body, pieces may be edited, cutting, in effect, becomes the potential compositional basis in which time segments can be arranged and re-arranged outside of real time performance. (McAffery 1978: 10)

When set down in recordings, which McAffery understands as a sort of acoustic graphism, the spoken word is made to transcend its evanescent temporal manifold and its physiological provenance. It becomes every bit as permanent as the written word, and can be manipulated in this permanence at will.

2.4.2.4 Comfort with Complexity

It would seem that the best comparison of the spoken and written word is one that steers clear of categorical assumptions, of the effort to reduce, disambiguate. Comfort with complexity seems to be the only way of comprehending the nature of the relationship between the spoken and the written word. Every reductive or extremist argument demands to be balanced by an equally plausible counter-argument. So I will conclude this reflection by opposing one of Walter Ong's more categorical statements regarding the relationship between the spoken and written word, and then by leaving the question appropriately unresolved, and as such appropriately addressed.

Walter Ong, consummately even-handed in his arguments, nevertheless lowers the boom on the issue of the written word as language sign. For Ong, no written word can be a sign. The logic behind this assertion is that the word and the sign are signifying entities invoked in consciousness through sound and sound only. Put simply, the word occurs in the chamber of the mind and not on the page. The graphic sequence I see on the page is itself no sign, no first articulation. It is of the realm of non-signifying second articulation only, a-semantic graphemes representing a-semantic phonemes:

...a textual, visual representation of a word is not a real word, but a secondary modeling system....Thought is nested in speech, not in texts, all of which have their meanings through reference of the visible symbol to the world of sound. What the reader is seeing on this page are not real words but coded symbols whereby a properly informed human being can evoke in his or her consciousness real words, in actual or imagined sound. (Ong 1982: 75)

This statement veers uncomfortably toward the sort of phonocentrism invoked by Derrida. Writing is certainly double articulated, as was discussed earlier. But this is not a licence to conclude categorically that the "properly informed human being" accesses

the word through its component sound elements exclusively, be these elements voiced or imagined. It is not outside the realm of possibility that graphic configurations alone are enough of a structural cue to access the word or sign. Many readers assimilate texts rapidly and visually without ever actualizing them vocally.

Ong seems to suggest here that writing does not reflect verbal language's first articulation, that it does not account for the word, but is merely a succession of graphic symbols representing a succession of phonemes. Of course, such an assumption bears out neither in the rudimentary characteristics of writing nor in the observance of reading behaviours. First of all, alphabetic writing is not just a succession of second articulation features. First articulation bears heavily upon the text's organization, as graphic sound features are grouped and spaced in accordance with larger signifying units. All properly signifying combinations—inflections, words, phrases and paragraphs—are set off from each other by the use of spacing and mechanics. Is this not a graphic manifestation of first articulation? Is this not a representation of the sign on the page?

Writing, Ong seems to suggest, is merely a cue to actualize sounds in the eidos and then construct out of these sounds the meaningful sign. Writing represents the sounds that construct the sign in the mind. Such an argument comes dangerously close to suggesting that vocal sound only is at work in the conception and reception of the written signifier, a position that becomes highly problematic in light of the chasm separating orthographic regimes and the flux of the enunciating vocal organ. The differences separating vocal sounds and the symbols representing these sounds orthographically is considerable enough to discount any argument that writing is grounded in vocal patterns exclusively.

First of all, each alphabetic grapheme signals a great variety of possible phonemes, which themselves signal a potentially infinite array of phonetic manifestations. The English language counts twenty-six alphabetic letters for fifty some-odd phonemes, which manifest phonetically in infinite and unaccountable ways. Then there is orthography. Naïve is the notion that sound only is at work behind the establishment of orthographic norms. Spelling, Einar Haugen points out, is very much determined by writing convention itself, specifically grammar and etymology. For example, the /s/ at the end of /dogs/ should by all phonological accounts be a /z/. This, however, would destroy its grammatical identity with /cats/. (Haugen 1966: 21) Other words, like /plastic/ and /plasma/, share an etymological relation, and so the grapheme /s/ pertains to both, despite the fact that /plasma/ is pronounced with a /z/ and /plastic/ with an /s/. Moreover, there is no phono-logic that could explain why the distinctive sounds of words like /dough/, /tough/ and /through/ should bear such graphic resemblance.

In all these examples, the sound takes its graphic shape by virtue of its insertion within larger grammatical and orthographic systems. Once again, writing determines writing, and as I tease myself away from Ong's conjunctive argument (the written word *is* sound, the voice), I find myself vacillating back into the Derridian disjunctive. This to and fro could continue endlessly. The truth is, I am in the most complex of realms when trying to sort out conceptual boundaries between the written and spoken word. Even more so when trying to sort out their respective psychodynamics. With writing, I am confronted with a medium that both *is* and *is not* couched in the voice.

Where the two media cut across each other is always also where they diverge. The result can neither be schism, as with Derrida, nor a wholesale assimilation of writing

to a purely phonological paradigm, as in Havelock, McLuhan, and this last argument from Ong. The chosen stance, then, is comfort with complexity, and I leave the reader the power to motivate language visually or vocally as he or she sees fit. At the end is the rather banal truth that the graphic medium is in itself no refuge from vocal sounds, but rather a locus of many possible actualizations: there are modes of reading that actualize the text in its sound fabric exclusively, and other modes that actualize it visually and semantically, with little to no attention afforded to sound. Between these two extremes is a vast middle ground where vocal sounds and their graphic symbols intersect in ways too complex to extricate.

Section 2, Chapter 5

Reading the Text in its Vocal Sounds

The text is no refuge from orality. There is no deafness implicit in the written word *per se*, only in reductive modes of actualizing it. Havelock, McLuhan and Ong have argued that the medium takes charge of consciousness, orients the reader toward specific modes of perceiving language. It would be easy enough to extend their reasoning to include the translator and his or her relationship with texts. The translator's deafness, I could go on to argue, is the result of a rank servitude to writing's visual and spatial forms. Ong contends that "all script represents words as in some way things, quiescent objects, immobile marks for assimilation by vision." (Ong 1982:91) I could argue along with him that the translator, trading in texts, risks not attending the word in its sound features, that he or she is a prisoner of that linear space where language signs are always seen and never heard.

2.5.1 The Graphic Signifier: From Tearing to Floating Dragon

I could adopt this line of thinking with its venerable tradition, but I will not. It is difficult for me to accept this notion of the written word as a vice around the mind. Rather I prefer to take a different position. Alphabetic writing, I would argue, offers a unique potentiality when it comes to vocal sounds, both in their conception and in their manipulation. First, it opens a precious space in the idea where vocal sounds can be conceptualized. Secondly, it offers an articulation of graphic symbols that can be transformed to represent these vocal sounds in their flux. In other words, alphabetic writing is an architecture that

is just solid enough to help grasp vocal sounds conceptually, and just fluid enough to follow these sounds in their unpredictable transformations.

I might illustrate my point better by turning McLuhan's beast against him. I too can construct clever dragon analogies. Hopefully, this one will be more equitable to the graphic signifier as it relates to the sounds of language. For me, the written signifier is more comparable to the dragon's body than its tearing teeth. The dragon is a mythological animal with a body represented in dual and conflicting fashion. Often in iconography, it is depicted as fully constructed, with a head, a tail, four legs, scales and of course the requisite sharp claws and teeth. Yet just as often, it is depicted as a head with a light makeshift body that floats, twists and coils like a kite. Often, it appears to assume simultaneously this fearsome animal architecture and this serpentine flexibility. In the dragon's body, a principle of solid, articulated structure meets a principle of looseness, elasticity, plastic malleability.

Does the graphic signifier not demonstrate this same dual principle? First, the concrete, articulated structure. When vocal sound is cast in writing, it acquires a strong conceptual architecture. When reading, I get a greater sense of my language's sound patterns, specifically because these patterns are stabilized in that spatial organization of graphic symbols. When the flux of phonated language is cast in the orthographically normalized permutations of those twenty some-odd alphabetic symbols, I realize not only a visual, but a strong eidetic sense of each sound class articulating the word. The vocal flux, in a very real sense, becomes anchored conceptually when couched in writing. Here is where McLuhan's beast may be relevant. Here is perhaps where the written word has the teeth to tear language away from sensory experience, for this anchoring effect is also

necessarily a normalizing effect, as the near infinite manifestations of /b/ in the vocal flux are reduced to one convenient grapheme. The problem, however, is that McLuhan demonstrates only one side of the coin when it comes to the graphic signifier's relationship with the voice. It seems that another question remains to be asked: what happens when the written word is submitted to the vocal flux? If the voice becomes anchored through writing, then can writing not just as easily become *disanchored* through the voice, destabilized and set adrift?

What is the secret of the floating dragon? Why is its body so flexible? Of course, the animal in question need not be a dragon. It may be a snake or any other remarkably supple vertebrate. The flex of all these animals, it would seem, is in their many-jointed backbones, in which each vertebra maintains its degree of independent movement. When I look at the written word, I see the same exquisitely articulated structure, the most minimal joint describing a passage from one grapheme to the next, one discreet sound property to the next. Furthermore, I know that each joint in the articulation enjoys a large degree of autonomous movement, of transformative adaptability to the vocal flux. I can alter any joint of the written word's articulation to reflect the shifting voice, and I can alter it in any number of conventional and creative ways.

This notion is nothing new. The written word's flexing backbone, its capacity to transform in its sounds or second articulators, is recorded in rhetorical principles dating back to antiquity. Such a transformation is called a "metaplasm." Implicit in the word is of course the Greek "plassein," meaning "re-shape", as well as cognates designating flowing, mouldable substances, all of which invoke the sonorous dimension of verbal language, which is often conceived as something liquid: the speech stream. Metaplasm is

a conceptual mainstay in classical rhetoric's thinking on figured language. The groupe μ (1970) offers a serviceable definition and description: "le métraplasme agit sur l'aspect sonore ou graphique des mots et des unités d'ordre inférieur au mot." (Groupe μ 1970:33).

Put simply, metaplasms are the partial transformation of any written word in its second articulation, its sound structure. Such a transformation usually involves the suppression, adjunction, substitution or permutation of second articulators, be these phonemes or phoneme clusters like syllables. Examples of this are frequent enough. Phonemic suppression is a conventional transformation in languages that use contracted forms: /did not/ → /didn't/. It can also be used creatively, as in the Guillén poem discussed earlier, where Ellis fabricates his Jamaican accent by deviating phonemically from English orthography. Many of these deviations involve phonemic suppression: the final /g/ in /passing/ and the final /t/ in /didn't/ → /passin'/, /didn'/, for example. Guillén's Cuban accent in the original showcases this sort of suppression as well, in this case /l/ and /s/: /A é- tu le hará- como a mí/. There is even an /s/ suppressed mid-word: /te corrite de bachata.../.

Vocal effects are often created by phoneme adjunction as well, that is to say by the addition or extension of second articulators. For example, voice might be added to typically non-voiced phonemes, as in the nasally-challenged utterance of the cold sufferer: /I'm all ztuffed ub/. It could also involve the temporal extension of single vocal sound. The Guillén poem transforms /last/ into the Jamaican /laas/ by extending the /a/ sound through adjunction, and by suppressing the /t/. Multiple adjunctions can prolong the extension, such as in the panicked vocalization of the Spanish comic strip character

Mortadelo, whose tongue is caught in a mousetrap: /Aiiiiiii! Qué dango me hangceeee!/.
Phonemic or syllabic adjunction is used often enough in the imitation of stuttered speech:
/I c-c-c-c-an't spea-speak./

Second articulators are often substituted and permuted as well. The Guillén poem offers examples of substitution, as /v/ is replaced with /b/ in /no quise que me biera/ and as /l/ is replaced with /Ah/ in /laas night ah see you passin'/. And of course, /th/ is systematically replaced with /d/ in /dere went mi honey out spreein' widout me/ and /Yu goin' du im juss like yu du me./ Perhaps the best examples of permutation are to be found in language games, where words are summarily fragmented along second articulation lines and re-combined to whatever sonorous effect. The re-arrangements of playful “Pig Latin” come immediately to mind. Here, words are fragmented just before the first vowel. The phoneme cluster broken off from the beginning is then re-attached to the end, and an /ey/ is adjoined, so that “I speak Pig Latin” becomes: “Iay eakspey Igpey Atinley.”

Play on this plastic dimension of language need not necessarily imply the transformation of conventional signifiers. New graphic configurations are constantly emerging as second articulators are freely combined to whatever sonorous effect. Onomatopoeic constructions, for example, range from the fully lexicalized to jazz-like improvisations. Anthony Burgess covers the gamut in *A Clockwork Orange* (2000), where lexicalized onomatopoeias like “He dropped his noz with a *tinkle tankle*” (11) share the page with forms that are improvised further—“He suddenly found himself all opened up like a peapod, letting in old Dim with his chain snaking

whisssssshhhhhhhhh.”—and with other forms that are not words at all—“As they were going out, we handed them a bit of lip-music: *brrrzzzzrrrr...prrrrzzzzrrrr.*” (12)

It goes without saying that this type of transformation, the mark of an oral style, becomes more or less prevalent depending on text type and reader expectation. However, the simple fact of its existence and frequent practice—regardless of how far one wishes to go in experimenting with it—has at least the merit of demonstrating the written word’s capacity to transform with the voice at a more nuanced level than critics like McLuhan and Ong seem to contend. At the very least, it seems safe to argue that the types of transformations just described do not motivate the written word as some quiescent crypt for sounds, as the killer of sensory experience, but rather as a plastic cell whose boundaries can be expanded, twisted and flexed to represent an experience in the voice that is very live, very dynamic.

My greater purpose in this discourse on metaplasms is not simply to take the critics of the previous chapter to task, or to exchange dragon metaphors with Marshall McLuhan. This notion of the written word as plastic sound cell susceptible to creative manipulation is fundamental to vocal pattern translation, and metaplastic techniques emerge consistently in all six of the translation modes examined in the third section. In fact, it is safe to say that this type of sonorous manipulation is as familiar to the vocal pattern translator as lexical and grammatical manipulations are to the conventional translator. While the latter looks for target language words and phrases to substitute, the vocal pattern translator looks for the sound or sound cluster to substitute, suppress, compress or extend in order to line up with the source pattern phonemically. I will address these unique transformations in detail in the third chapter. For now I would ask

my reader to keep the written word's metaplastic potentialities, this principle of the "floating dragon," firmly in mind.

2.5.2 Reading in Sense or Sound?

For now I would like to return to this bias lurking behind the attitude that Havelock, McLuhan and Ong all assume, at some point, against the written word. Why do they overstate the notion of vocal sounds frozen in quiescent, graphic structures while failing to acknowledge the very real plasticity of these structures? Why do they insist on phonetic writing's evolution from orality, yet at the same time disregard its potential to express this orality? This bias arises, it would seem, from the assumption that writing is somehow the medium of a single and uncompromising mode of reading, and so answering these questions would be a matter of gaining some sort of understanding of the ways a reader might actualize a text. What type of reading would be primarily information-oriented? What type would be more sound-oriented?

When comparing Havelock, McLuhan and Ong, one can not help but see a trend emerge, specifically this notion of writing as a democratizing medium. The alphabet, itself conceived as a reductive enumeration of the otherwise ungraspable realm of language sound, becomes an organizing principle for civilization in expansion. The effect of the written word seems to be an explosive "rippling outward" into the social organization of tribal societies, which ultimately fall into locked step and begin entertaining ideas of nationhood. Again, I come back to McLuhan's metaphor of the dictatorial dragon's tooth. The value of the written word seems to be its power to forge a collective consciousness or identity.

Writing asserts. It, consolidates language convention, and becomes a force for cultural homogeneity. The facility of this argument has already been taken up in the previous chapter. What interests me now is the outward vector that this particular conception of the written word seems to describe, a vector orienting writing toward a social functionality in much the same way that the sign itself is functionalized by semantic theory. The latter, I am reminded as I look back into Yves Roberge and Anne-Marie Brousseau's textbook on semantics (2001), traditionally cites four criteria for determining the linguistic sign, written or spoken. As with McLuhan, these criteria start in the human senses and orient themselves outward toward a broader social consciousness:

1. The sign must be recognizable as such, perceptible by the senses (sight, hearing, touch). A certain number of invariables must be conserved in every repetition of the sign.
2. A sign must *represent something* or indicate something. A sign is *not* an independent phenomenon, one which can be considered an object in and of itself. Rather, the sign transmits a "sense" beyond itself. It enters into a relationship with *something else*, an association referred to as *signification*.
3. A sign must be a sign for *somebody* (for the person who produces it or for the person who receives it). Linguistic signs require the participation of a group of persons who use and understand them.
4. A sign belongs to a system of signs. Linguistic signs belong to the system of language. (Brousseau and Roberge 2001: 148-149)

This progression outward, beyond the sensory and into the social, becomes palpable in the progression from one criterion to the next. First the verbal sign exists as a phenomenon of the voice and ear. Secondly, it references an object outside itself, beyond itself. The third criterion specifies social consensus, and finally the sign becomes part of a consolidated language system. The movement outward begins the moment that sign is

required to signify something beyond itself, and social functionality is consolidated from the third criterion onward.

It seems clear that McLuhan, Ong and the others functionalize the written word in much the same way as the sign is functionalized here. Writing, by virtue of its normalizing influence on language, anchors the subject in habits that make him or her viable socially and professionally. For these critics, writing seems to be synonymous with the notion of orthography and its concomitant sense of language orthodoxy. On the contrary, the type of vocal accident demonstrated by a technique like metaplasma represents an undesirable regression of writing (and reading) back toward the vocal/sensorial, the first of the four criteria. Such orally infused writing, omnipresent in most cultures that use phonetic alphabets, would not be on these critics' radar, specifically because it manifests this other inward or regressive actualization of the sign, one that abandons graphic and often semantic norms to manipulate its body in sound.

2.5.2.1 Northrop Frye: Centrifugal vs. Centripetal Reading

Dominating our critics' reflection on the written word, then, seems to be this outward or democratizing vector assumed without regard to an equally valid inward vector reconnecting the written word with sensory experience. This orientation toward the functional "outside" or the esthetic "inside" brings to mind Northrop Frye's metaphor of reading in *Anatomy of Criticism* (1957). Following Frye, every reading of a text is at once "centrifugal" (an orientation toward the functional outside of the sign), and "centripetal" (an orientation toward the verbal and sensorial inside of the sign):

Whenever we read anything, we find our attention moving in two directions at once. One direction is outward or centrifugal, in which we keep going outside our reading, from the individual words to the things they mean, or, in practice, to our memory of the conventional association between them. The other direction is inward or centripetal, in which we try to develop a sense of the verbal pattern they make. (Frye 1957: 75)

The centrifugal reading, then, seems to interpret the signs of written language as a reference to real world phenomena, which they convey with conventional accuracy. The centripetal reading, on the contrary, would interpret these signs in their verbal pattern, understandably as well in their pattern of sonorous motifs. In the centrifugal or outward type of reading, I transcend the sonorous structure of the verbal sign in favor of conventional designations. In the centripetal or inward type, I attend the text's sonorous structure, question and complicate its relationship with semantic ideas, allow it to lead me down unexpected paths of interpretation.

Such directional metaphors are always troublesome, because the vectors they describe can often be reversed depending on the critic's point of view. From a Saussurean perspective, for example, the vocal dimension of the verbal sign, "the signifier" would constitute an esthetic exterior or outside, and the "signified" a conceptual interior or inside. In this case, the four criteria from Brousseau's textbook would describe an inward radiation, from the sign's sonorous exterior to a conventional signified—referentiality, social consensus, and insertion into broader systems—deemed *implicit*, or on the *inside* of the sign. This point of view is perfectly comprehensible, and finds support in the felt truth that esthetic experience is necessarily a connection with the physical exterior of things. If I attend a word in its sonorous dimensions, I am attending that word's exterior, the material attributes that it offers up to the senses.

This should not suggest, however, that Frye's opposing directionality is any less valid, or that it is without supporting ideology. Perfectly plausible is this more Platonic mode of thinking, which proposes the intangible space of the idea as a teleological "outside," and the tangible space of the senses as an immanence, an inside. This point of view finds support in the felt truth that sensation is something immediate and internal, and that intellection and abstraction are inherently remote, beyond the self and something to be reached for. In this sense, vocal sounds in their spontaneity and immediacy could well be construed as the esthetic inside, whereas the language sign that they construct would suggest abstraction, and ultimately a path leading beyond the self and the sign and into the eidetic outside. Frye describes this same Platonic motion when he speaks of moving "outside his reading"—outside the vocal immanence of language sounds and outside the signs or words themselves—to access meaning.

I certainly do not plan to concern myself unduly with whether or not the voice should be considered as the sign's inside or outside, but I will make use of Frye's vectors if only as a heuristic tool to orient my own thinking, to conceive two potential modes of actualizing text meaning (modes that are by no means mutually exclusive): 1. outward or centrifugal, which would actualize the verbal sign in terms of a conventional meaning, and would interpret it as the enforcer of a language orthodoxy 2. inward or centripetal, which would actualize the verbal sign in terms of its structural and sensory components, and which might ultimately interpret it at the unorthodox level of its vocal specificity.

Reason would suggest that both of these vectors are operating simultaneously in the reading of any text. Equally reasonable, however, is the notion that one of these vectors could be privileged at the expense of the other, depending on the reader's interest.

If I am interested in information gathering, I will read outwardly, in the direction of conventional designation. My efforts will go toward the rapid synthesizing of information, and any play of verbal motifs will go unattended. On the contrary, if language play is my concern, I will read inwardly, and the disposition of verbal structures, including the chain of vocal sounds, will assume a special importance. The relationship between these motifs and higher semantic patterns will no longer seem arbitrary.

When referring to the reader's motivation, I am drawing a rather firm line between the interpretive liberties that a reader assumes and the interpretive laws imposed by the historical, socio-cultural, political and ideological parameters set up by what has come to be known globally as the "interpretive context." To be clear, I have no intention of taking Frye's inward and outward vectors to the type of prescriptive conclusions that the *Anatomy of Criticism* helped formulate in the era of structuralism. This was the time when scholars were laboring in a scientific mindset, striving to circumscribe literary phenomena within its own unique context of interpretation. These notions of centrifugal and centripetal reading had a larger purpose: to draw a firm line between literary and pragmatic texts. Indeed, Frye's reader does not have to wait long before the declaration:

But the verbal structures may be classified according to whether the *final* direction of meaning is outward or inward. In descriptive or assertive writing the final direction is outward. Here the verbal structure is intended to represent things external to it, and is valued in terms of the accuracy with which it does represent them. Correspondence between phenomenon and verbal sign is truth; lack of it falsehood.

In all literary verbal structures the final direction of meaning is inward...In literature, questions of fact or truth are subordinated to the primary literary aim of producing a structure of words for its own sake, and the sign-values of symbols are subordinated to their importance as a structure of interconnected motifs. (74)

Here, Frye's argument establishes a "final direction of meaning" based upon the text's generic context. The reader's agency is now tempered by modes of interpretation that are imposed from without.

The push and pull of subjective and objective forces governing the reading of texts lead ultimately into a vast body of reception theory that can not be adequately explored in the confines of this dissertation. I will limit myself, then, to the adoption of what I feel is a reasonable critical standpoint concerning the reader's agency. By no means is it my objective here to dispute either the existence or the importance of the interpretive context. Any act of reading invariably occurs in a context that transcends it, guides it and therefore determines it, at least partially. Eco's well known *Limits of Interpretation* (1994) invokes this act as a dialogue between the intention of the reader (*intentio lectoris*) and that of the work (*intentio operis*), which subsumes these external forces operating in the larger context of interpretation. A good decade before Eco, however, Stanley Fish (1980) put the authority of context in more explicit terms. Fish argues unequivocally that the reader has little choice in the matter, that he or she can do little else than construct an interpretation based upon complexes of received ideas enforced by the interpreting community at large.

It would be a mistake, however, to presume that the authority of the interpretive context alone determines how a text will be read, for the reader is not without the power to create for him or herself a margin of freedom within these constraints. Here is where Eco's notion of the "*intentio lectoris*" assumes some admirable nuance. Eco makes a firm distinction between two types of reading intentions. The first is what he calls a

“semantic reading,” which is a naïve reading that is lead blindly by the forces determining interpretive convention. The second is what he calls a “semiotic reading,” which is a critical reading that is not blind to the fact that it is being lead, that attempts to determine just how it is being lead, and that seeks out within the text’s structure alternative ways of being lead (Eco 1994: 54-55) . The critical reader, in other words, is able to force open a margin of subjectivity within those external constraints that confer upon the text its supposed objectivity.

The position that I will assume and maintain here is that there are aspects of any text’s structure that pass unacknowledged, unnoticed even, in semantic readings occurring within the constraints imposed by the interpretive context, aspects that can become manifest in readings of the more critical type. One of these aspects is the text’s structure in vocal sounds. I would also argue that there can be—and indeed have been, as will become evident enough soon—critical readings that deliberately obviate, suspend, or break away from interpretive norms in order to receive the text as a fabric of sounds exclusively. This suspension of norms, and this raising of the text’s vocal sounds to a preeminent position over semantics, occurs in degrees. A traditional semantic reading would disregard the text’s sound chain entirely and comprehend the text along the most normative hermeneutic lines. A critical reading might make tentative steps into the text’s sounds, acknowledging them and interrogating their relationship with conventional semantic designations. Or it may make more substantial steps, raising sound to the fore and making a game of suspending semantic constraints entirely, effectively thumbing its nose at hermeneutic conventions.

The raising of sound and suspension of conventional interpretive modes would occur in degrees, then, and this is why Frye's spatial metaphor becomes useful. I will avail myself of it when interrogating the ways in which translators negotiate inward or centripetal readings, that is to say readings that make the text's vocal sounds the primary objective. It bears repeating that I am not referring to translators who strive in their target to invoke the same impression or quality rising from the sound patterns of the source, efforts that usually result in much moaning over having lost the music. Rather, I am referring to translators who strive to create a palpable affinity in these sound patterns, and at varying degrees of expense to both the source text's semantics and to target language convention. Capturing the verbal motif in its second articulation: this would be the translator's primary motivation. Such a mode of reading and translating is oriented gradually toward what one could call a "centripetal extreme."

The idea of centrifugal or centripetal orientations necessarily invites speculation as to the type of reading that would take place at either end of the paradigm. What would constitute a centrifugal or centripetal reading *in extremis*? I would hazard to propose that McLuhan's motivation of the written word is centrifugal in the extreme. The theorist could not have picked a more militant metaphor. After all, the dragon's teeth of the Cadmus myth become Spartan soldiers. Implicit in these deliberations is the written word's capacity to elicit blind adherence to conventional designations, to make language users fall into the illusion of "presence," of the direct pipeline to the verbal sign and object, and ultimately fall into line and locked step. Going by these metaphors, I can not help but interpret this excessive movement to the functional outside as a sort of language fascism exercised through the text and enforced by a lexical and grammatical authority.

Such a statement may be strong and of a unidimensional simplicity, but stronger still, I would contend, are the words of the theorists who have provoked it, and I am speculating in the realm of extremes, which seems usually to be the realm of reductive simplicities.

The same sort speculation could apply to the opposite vector as well. How might one define a reading at the centripetal extreme? What happens when attention fixates exclusively on the written word's jointwork of second articulators, on the dragon's floating body in sound rather than on its fierce teeth? The lure of the word's vocal plasticity, evidenced in the use of metaplastic transformations—which I introduced earlier, and which will take on a special importance in chapters to come—can easily lead the reader to a place where verbal signs cease to signify beyond their sounds, where the connection between verbal sign and object is severed. The result, I will demonstrate in the next chapter, is a sort of poetic anarchy. Severed from semantic convention, the verbal sign that references nothing beyond the sensory components making it up is hardly a sign at all, but a sonorous free-radical to be enjoyed at face value, to be played with in a sort of hedonistic delirium.

A word vacated of its conventional modes of signifying entirely and assimilated to the affective rule of a sound obsessed subjectivity is necessarily a word that has lost its capacity to be read in any objective sense, a word that has been “un-read,” as it were. If one understands this centripetal extreme as a radical movement toward a subjective interiority, where the words of language cease to exist as external and objective entities governed by their own hermeneutic laws that resist the subject's affectivity, then Frye's centripetal movement meshes remarkably well with Jean Starobinski's notion of the “*cercle herméneutique*” (2001). According to Starobinski, the interpreter can

comprehend his or her object in two ways. The first is what he calls an “objective interpretation,” and recalling Frye, he describes it as a movement toward the outside. In this mode of interpretation, the object is acknowledged as existing outside or beyond the subject, as being governed by laws transcending the subject’s own imagination and impulses. The exteriority of the object—in its “objectivity”—is held up against the interpreting subjectivity, resists this subjectivity.

Then there is what Starobinski calls a “subjective or projective interpretation.” Here the interpreter makes no movement at all toward the exterior, but rather does quite the opposite. The subjective interpreter does not acknowledge the exteriority of his or her object, but rather draws it vortically into the interrogation of a pre-imagined fiction of his or her own making. Such an interpreter is in dialogue with him or herself exclusively, and any object he or she interprets is little more than a pretext for furthering this dialogue. For this reason, the hermeneutic movement involved is one that is exclusively internal. It begins and ends with the subject:

Que vienne à prévaloir, en effet, le cercle de l’interprétation subjective, que l’objet extérieur, perdant sa réalité autonome, en vienne à se soumettre aux exigences d’une fiction antécédente, que cet objet ne soit plus qu’un moyen dans le processus d’une auto-interprétation où le sens de la situation est d’emblée pré-jugé affectivement... L’interprétation objective n’a plus son moment propre : elle est comme devancée par l’interprétation *projective*, qui part du sujet et fait retour au sujet. (Starobinski 2001 : 183)

This situation, suggests Starobinski, effectively opens the possibility for a sort of hermeneutic delirium:

Voici ouverte la possibilité du délire...le discours interprétatif, ignorant la résistance spécifique de l’objet, plie le monde à sa propre loi, au prix d’une méconnaissance radicale de l’extériorité de l’autre (183).

Not knowing, or refusing to acknowledge the objective outside, the interpreter bends reality to a law of his or her own making. Reality becomes subordinate to the affective motions of the unchecked ego, and the subject enters a sort of delirium.

This notion of hermeneutic delirium, it seems to me, connects well with the preceeding speculation on centripetal extremes in the reading of text sounds. In French, the word “*délire*” lends itself to the type of opportunistic punning that results in epistemological metaphor. A reading that vacates the text of its objective exteriority, of the grammatical and semantic laws that govern its interpretation, could well be considered a type of delirium, as Starobinski suggests. As such, it could also be considered an “un-reading,” a “*dé-lire*.” The latter can be observed in the Futurist and Dadaist sound poetry that will form part of the focus of the next chapter. Here, sound obsessed poetic revolutionaries, obeying a preconceived notion (a fiction?) of language sound’s unjust subordination to semantic convention, or simply indulging in the pleasure of a language materiality that they have divested of any and all objective exterior, “float the dragon,” indulge hedonistically, libidinally, in the words sonorous envelope, twist and pull at this fabric with no regard to the grammatical or semantic conventions that contextualize it and orient its interpretation.

Section 2, Chapter 6

Reading Vocal Sounds: Cratylan and Schismatic Motivations

Borrowing a concept from Northrop Frye, I have described as centripetal a mode of reading that would comprehend a text primarily in its vocal sound patterns, and only secondarily in its semantic designations. Now, I will assume that such a reading is plausible, or at least debatable, and further nuance the question by introducing the two modes of reading sound that will inform the translations discussed in the third section of this project. Both of these modes arise from the type of inward orientation just discussed, although the first does not move to the centripetal extreme of the second. Rather, it interprets verbal sound in a constant dialogue with conventional meaning. It is the mode that interrogates and complicates the relationship between the language-conceptual and the language-sensorial, and consistently re-affirms the continuity between the verbal sign's object, its sounds, and the phonetic movement behind these sounds. This first mode of reading could be qualified as "Cratylan."

2.6.1 *Cratylus*

Plato's *Cratylus* (1998), a seminal philosophical work in semantics, is where the relationship between language sound and meaning receives its first detailed reflection. The theme of the dialogue is "ta prôta onomata" or "the original giving of names." Under debate, specifically, is the question of how verbal names (understood here as verbal signs in general) relate to the objects that they designate. At either end of the debate are the students Hermogenes and Cratylus. Following Hermogenes, convention

and the authority of the name-giver are the only factors determining the relationship between the sign and its object:

No one is able to persuade me that the correctness of names is determined by anything besides convention and agreement. I believe that any name you give a thing is a correct name. If you change its name and give it another, the new one is as correct as the old...No name belongs to a particular thing by nature, but only because of the rules and usage of those who establish the usage and call it by that name (*Cratylus* 1998: 384 c10-d8).

Hermogenes' position might well be summed up in Juliet's line from the balcony: "What's in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet." (Shakespeare 1974: 1068). So formulated, the link between verbal sign and object is determined exclusively by convention: the authority of the naming voice, the rule of consensus, the forces functionalizing the verbal sign socially. I find myself moving outward, once again, in Frye's centrifuge. I am reminded once again of the aggressive, democratizing orientation of McLuhan's thinking and of the criteria that semantic theory uses to circumscribe the verbal sign. All the more so, since the example that Hermogenes brings forth in support of his argument is the re-naming of slaves as they pass from master to master. (384 d) The slave's value does not vary as he or she is assigned a new name, so this must mean that one name is worth another.

Opposing Hermogenes is Cratylus, who is of the opinion that a verbal sign's structure in sounds or letters not only can, but indeed should imitate the object to which it refers: "The correctness of a name consists in displaying the nature of the thing it names." (76) Although the name, he concedes, is not the same thing as its object, it is nevertheless held to imitate its nature. Through its sonorous features, the verbal name must invoke the thing it describes, otherwise it is ill-given. In other words, recalling

Shakespeare once again, a “rose” is so-named because that particular combination of phonemes /r-o-s-e/ is the pattern that naturally fits, the one that invokes the essence of the flower. Cratylus’ position is of course at the polar extreme of Hermogenes’. Now, it is no longer convention that determines the relationship between sign and object, but rather co-substantiality of pattern: “a name will describe the thing well...if it includes the thing’s pattern.” This is to say that verbal signs and their objects would relate by virtue of a similarity perceived in their structural components. The best way to describe such a relationship would be iconic, recalling the resemblance between pictographic signs and their objects. The word /r-o-s-e/, in the pattern of sounds structuring it, would somehow mimic the flower right down to its stem, thorns and red petals, as if the name-giver had painted a portrait with his component sounds.

Indeed, the language of iconicity, of visual pattern resemblance, is a running metaphor through Cratylus, especially the second dialogue. “A name is an imitation,” he argues, “just like a painting is.” (431A). In what appears to be a confusion of both sensory and representative media, words are argued here to paint a sort of phonetic portrait of the things they name. The realm of the verbal/acoustic seems to be summarily identified with the realm of the iconographic/visual.³ A word’s component sounds, it seems, would represent that word’s meaning in the same way that a portrait’s component shapes would represent its object. The vocal articulation /d-r-a-g-o-n/ is so perfectly suited to the fierce animal it signifies, that it invokes the latter as readily and spontaneously as any picture.

³ This frequent evocation of verbal patterns as images in *Cratylus* will take on a special significance in the third section of this dissertation, when I address the question of film dubbing, where verbal patterns are crossed with the image and effectively take on a true iconic dimension.

Herein lies an important distinction. Many assume that Cratylus' position amounts to the global reduction of language to the principle of onomatopoeia. This would seem to be a false assumption, for the Cratylan mindset goes to a much further and almost incomprehensible extreme in the type of mimesis it proposes. Onomatopoeia, just to be clear, involves the formation of a word for the purpose of imitating some sound of the world, be it linguistic or non-linguistic, human or non-human. Put simply, it is word sound imitating world sound. Cratylism, however, goes much further in its mimesis. As I have just evoked, and this will become clearer shortly when I examine Socrates' phono-symbolism, it effectively crosses and confuses sensory channels and modes of representation, and in the end one is confronted with the notion of word sounds imitating not only world sounds, but also images, odors, tactile sensations, and even conceptions of space, time and movement. In other words, the sounds /d-r-a-g-o-n/ are not only mimetic of the sound a dragon might make, but also of the dragon's image, its odor, its temperament as well as any and all of its other defining characteristics.

The verbal sign's object, the concept as well as the image that this sign invokes, becomes co-substantive with the sign's pattern of vocal sounds. The sounds /d-r-a-g-o-n/ construct the animal's portrait, and such a perfect portrait that the association between the sign and its object need not be established by any rule or convention, but would be made spontaneously, naturally. Needless to say, this notion undermines the symbolic nature of language, and describes the failure of certain fundamental abstractions allowing the latter to develop to any degree of expressive complexity. Of course, Cratylus' position is as untenable as Hermogenes'. Between the latter's deference to the naming power and the former's deference to the naming pattern mediates Socrates, and ultimately the dialectic

unfolds as an unresolved vacillation, the philosopher steadily arguing his students out of their narrow mindsets and toward a more sage, middle ground.

To Hermogenes' argument that any word will do, Socrates opposes one based on language usage and the unalterability of fixed associations. The example of master and slave is not indicative of all sign-object relationships, Socrates argues, for if the sign can be changed arbitrarily in this case, it can not in cases where it corresponds to an accepted designation. Once language norms are established, a sign can come to fit the object it designates so completely, that it is felt to be of an essence with that thing. Some sign-object relationships are so comprehensibly learned and practised as to become indissociable. This is to say that although the sounds of the sign do not paint the portrait that Cratylus would have, they can indeed become of a pattern with their object, and so much so that a felt identity between them forbids changing the association arbitrarily. Socrates finds evidence of this in the naming of natural offspring, for example. It would feel incorrect to name the offspring of a lion anything other than "lion," (393 c). Put simply, there is a suitability or correctness in signs. The vocal patterns forming them come to fit their objects much as a key would fit a lock, or a tool its function (387-390).

To be sure, it is not only the question of usage that weakens Hermogenes' position. Other factors make a sign so suited to its object that it could not be cast aside arbitrarily for another. Indeed, signs often have carefully thought out semantic dimensions. Some not only designate but also define or periphrase their objects. There is nothing arbitrary, for example, about calling the king of Troy "Hector," or his son "Astyanax," because the former means "possessor" (hektôr) and the latter "lord-of-a-city" (astu anax). (392) Signs, in this sense, are expertly tailored by a name-giver to suit

their objects. This idea of expertise in the creation and conferring of signs seems at odds with Hermogenes' position that one sign is worth another.

As for the component vocal sounds of signs, Socrates' notion of pattern suitability extends deep into the realm of second articulation. Letters and syllables, he argues, display a palpable correspondence with the object of the sign that they compose. The phoneme /r/, for example:

...seemed to the name-giver to be a beautiful tool for copying motion, at any rate he often uses it for this purpose. He first uses this letter to imitate motion in the names 'rhein' (flowing) and 'rhoê' (flow) themselves. Then in 'tromos' (trembling) and 'trechein' (running) and in such verbs as 'krouein' (striking), 'thrauein' (crushing), 'ereikein' (rending), 'thruptein' (breaking), 'kermatizein' (crumbling), 'rhumbein' (whirling), it is mostly 'r' he uses to imitate these motions. He saw, I suppose, that the tongue was most agitated and least at rest in pronouncing this letter, and that's probably why he used it in these names (426 d-e)

By no means does Socrates contend that all signs imitate their objects in sound, or that such phonemic correspondences are always perfect and thoroughgoing. Quite the contrary, this same type of phono-symbolism is brought to bear against Cratylus as well. Suffice it to say, for now, that Socrates hears in the sounds of words something to justify, be it tentatively, the Cratylan position that a verbal sign's sounds could be of an essence with the sign's conventional meaning.

This should not suggest, however, that Socrates sides with Cratylus in the dialogue. Every bit as untenable, he argues, is the latter's argument of vocal patterns as portraits of the objects they signify. Two important arguments undermine this position, the first an obvious material and structural one. Socrates asks: "Can names ever be like anything unless the things they're composed out of have some kind of likeness to the things they imitate?" (434a) Verbal signs and their objects are obviously not composed

of like patterns. They differ naturally in both the materials they exploit and their way of structuring these materials. The vocal sounds /r-o-s-e/, for example, are suited to their object's image neither in their component materials (which are of course verbal sounds and not leaves, thorns and petals) nor in the way they structure these materials (an articulation of sound shapes, not an articulation of leaves, thorns and petals).

On top of this structural argument comes the part of convention and a swing back toward Hermogenes' position. Cratylus' argument hinges on the idea that the qualities of the object are patterned into the word's component sounds, and indeed much time is spent comparing the qualities of word sounds with those of the idea expressed. Unfortunately, as often as the correspondences seem evident, they seem faulty. For example, should the word sklêrotês, which means "hard", contain the letters /l/ and /r/, which themselves seem to convey motion and liquidity? (435a). Given this sort of incomparability between pattern and idea, how is it possible to understand this word at all, if convention plays no part?

The name I utter is unlike the thing I mean—since /l/ is unlike hardness. But if that's right, surely you have entered into a convention... and the correctness of names has become a matter of convention for you, for isn't it the chance of usage and convention that makes both like and unlike letters express things? (435a)

Ultimately then, the debate is resolved by a healthy adoption of the middle line. Both the principles of convention and pattern suitability are in play. Both careful crafting as well as arbitrary convention connect the sonorous patterns of verbal signs to their objects. Usage ultimately turns this connection into an indissociable bond, which at times seems particularly suitable or mimetic, and at others totally fortuitous.

2.6.1.1 The Iconicity of Vocal Sounds: A Myth of Origins

It should be pointed out that Cratylus' notion of iconicity or structural mimesis between sign pattern and object has a strong resonance in modern semiotic thinking, and has been hypothesized as a sort of primordial strategy of representation. A tradition of sign theorists—Locke (1979), Peirce (1998), Cassirer (1955), Sebeok (1976)—posits iconicity as the very first strategy of representation, one which would develop only later into more abstract, symbolic regimes (Danesi 1998: 17-20). Mimetic signs, in other words, are at humanity's expressive origin. The visual icon (the sign simulating the world's visible structures) or the vocal icon (the sign simulating the world's sonorous structures) have been deemed the first, the most direct and unmitigated of all representations (17-20). Language, in its infancy, is a series of hewn images and onomatopoeic vocalizations. The first recorded inscriptions are images on cave walls. The first words a baby utters are in imitation of a gesture seen, a vocal pattern heard. Some theorists have concluded that buried in the history of all language structures is an iconic link with some primal pattern—gestural or sonorous—imitated from the world outside. Some have even concluded that body movements are implicit in the conceptualizations of grammar. Linguist Ron W. Langacker (1987), for example, argues the gestures implicit in grammatical classes like nouns and verbs: the former are static; they circumscribe, embrace, contain; the latter are kinesic; they move.

This so-called "iconicity hypothesis" (Danesi: 18) could be interpreted as a defense and illustration of the Cratylan viewpoint. The problem is that, given the language-present and its complicated imbrications of mimetic and conventional motivations, it comes across as more of an ideal, a utopian myth of origins. It is one

thing to explore the mimetic or onomatopoeic dimension of verbal sign production, and quite another to defend it as a primordial strategy of representation. What is needed here, obviously, is the Socratic middle line. Socrates himself confesses a penchant toward this sort of Cratylan idealism, but realizes the difficulty involved in defending it:

I myself prefer the view that names should be as much like things as possible, but I fear that defending this view is like hauling a ship up a sticky ramp...and that we have to make use of this worthless thing, convention, in the correctness of names (Cratylus 435 b).

What is this sticky ramp, precisely? What would be involved in defending the iconicity hypothesis? Essentially, one would have to compare the components of the sign's sound pattern to the sign's object and argue comparable qualities between the two. These components, for Socrates, are the letters and syllables of words, which would have to be divided up and set against the thing named in a type of examination best described as "phonesthetic":

Socrates: So if someone were able to imitate in letters and syllables the being or essence that each thing has, wouldn't he express what each thing itself is?

Hermogenes: He certainly would...

Socrates: If that's true, doesn't it seem that we are now in a position to investigate each of the names you were asking about...to see whether or not he has grasped the being or essence of each of the things they signify by imitating its being or essence in the letters and syllables of its name. Isn't that so?

Hermogenes: Certainly.

Socrates: ...Since an imitation of a thing's being or essence is made out of letters and syllables, wouldn't it be most correct for us to divide off the letters or elements first, just as those who set to work on speech rhythms first divide off the forces or powers of the letters or elements, then those of the syllables, and only then investigate rhythms themselves? (424 a-c)

2.6.1.2 Socrates' Phonesthetics

This is precisely what Socrates does. *Cratylus* is one of the first known reflections on a potential symbolism of word sounds. Interrogating the notion that verbal signs are sound portraits of their objects, Socrates proposes a semantics of second articulation. This attribution of meaning to traditionally non-signifying sound elements proceeds on a logic that is essentially “phonesthetic,” involving complicated correspondences between word sounds and conventional meanings, as well as between sounds and the other senses. The following examples, summed up in a table by Genette, give the best sense of what this sort of examination entails:

- *r* : mouvement. Exemples : *rhéin* (couler), *rhoè* (courant), etc. « Tous ces mots-là, en général (l’auteur des noms) les rend expressifs au moyen du *r* : ils voyaient, je suppose, que c’est sur cette lettre que la langue s’arrête le moins et vibre le plus.
- *i* : légèreté et capacité à traverser toutes choses. Exemples : *iénaï* (aller), *hiesthaï* (s’élancer).
- *Ph, ps, s, z* : aspiration, souffle, agitation. Exemples : *psukhron* (froid), *séiesthaï* (agiter). Tous ces phonèmes comportent en effet une « aspiration ».
- *d, t* : enchaînement (*desmos*), arrêt (*stasis*) : ces articulations « compriment la langue ou appuient sur elle ».
- *l* : lisse (*léion*), glisser (*olisthanein*), onctueux (*liparon*), collant (*kollodès*) : « la langue glisse particulièrement sur le *l* ».
- *gl* : visqueux (*gliskhron*), poisseux (*gluku*), gluant (*gloïodès*) : le glissement lingual du *l* est arrêté par l’effet du *g*.
- *n* : intériorité : *endon* (dedans), *entos* (intérieur) : caractère « interne » de l’articulation du *n*.
- *a* et *è*, voyelles longues : grandeur : *méga* (grand), *mèkos* (longueur).
- *o* : rondeur. Exemple: *gongulon* (rond). (Genette 1976: 30-31)

In each of these examples there is a verbal sound and its definition, which is some esthetic quality related to the acoustic (“soufflé”), the tactile (“lisse,” “visqueux”), or the

visual/spatial (“intérieur,” “grandeur,” “rondeur”). Then, the sound is used in words that seem to designate these same qualities. /Ps/ is found in the word /psukhron/ (cold), for example, and its sound in this word might describe the effect of, say, a chilling wind. Finally, the gesture itself is described, the movement of phonetic articulators responsible for the chilling effect: “ces phonèmes comportent une aspiration.”

For obvious reasons, this sort of symbology raises doubts. Who is to say that these sound elements imitate their word’s designation naturally? Perhaps it is simply the word /rheien/, along with its designation of “flowing,” that leads Socrates to associate the sound /r/ with movement. Of course the most cursory look at the myriad uses of /r/ in words—in Greek or any other language—that have nothing whatsoever to do with movement, seems enough to shake this sort of phono-symbolism at its foundations. The sounds /s/ or /ps/ may relate to the puff of air in /psukhron/ or /séiesthaĩ/, but how does this aspiration relate to the notion of “cold” or “to shake”? Perhaps some metonymical vector has been interpolated: “where there is cold, there is wind. Where there is wind, there is a blowing sound.” However, the doubt remains: Why should /r/ imitate movement any more than /c-h-i-e-n/ should bite or fetch a stick?

These knots of corresponding sounds and images are obviously founded upon a phonesthetic impressionism that offers little possibility of any sort of coherent system. The question now is: does this really matter? Is the theoretical viability of Cratylism important? Much more interesting to me is the obvious motivation underpinning it: the movement against the notion of arbitrariness in the sound-sense connection, and the interrogation of this connection in general. The truth is that Cratylism is really a poetic motivation, and corresponds to a felt truth that the sonorous patterns of language

can connect to the object they signify so inextricably that they have only to be uttered to make the object's presence fully felt. At any rate, *Cratylus* is a document expressing a language motivation that was and for many still is. It is the motivation itself, rather than its theoretical viability that interests me here. Genette, in the opening lines of his *Mimologiques* (1976) puts it rather stylishly: "Le mot 'chien' ne mord pas... mais rien n'interdit à quiconque d'opiner au contraire, ou de tendre l'oreille, ou de garer ses fesses." (Genette 1976: 9).

Cratylan motivation of language stands as fact, and Genette's *Mimologiques* (1976) is an attempt at a comprehensive history of this fact through its shifting philosophical focuses. Starting from Plato, Genette follows the Cratylan thread through Saint Augustine (1864) to Wallis (1653), Locke and Leibniz (1966), to de Brosse on hieroglyphics and Nodier on onomatopoeia (1808), to Mallarmé's "Crise de vers" (1945) and his phono-symbolism of English, then to Saussure's (1969) and Jakobson's (1966) thinking on the sound-sense relation. Throughout, the fundamental question dividing Hermogenes and Cratylus remains the same: do the sounds of the verbal sign imitate the object, or is the relationship between sign-sound and object arbitrary? Moreover, virtually all of these philosophers invoke the sort of phono-symbolism brought to bear in *Cratylus*.

2.6.1.3 Mallarmé: Cratylan Philosopher

Of course, all these philosophers would be of interest to this dissertation. It would be unwise at this point, however, either to continue superficially with a synopsis of their views, or to lose my own Ariadne's thread in a lengthy comparative study. The synopsis

would prove too little for a scholarly work. A lengthy comparison would compromise the forward momentum of this dissertation without adding much in the way of cognitive value. For this reason, I would humbly refer those interested in a “voyage en Cratylie” to Genette’s fine book.

My strategy now will be to focus on one language philosopher who exemplifies this Cratylan motivation, but who also serves the immediate future of this dissertation, a language philosopher and poet situated at the threshold between the two centripetal motivations that concern us in this chapter and in the section to come: the Cratylan motivation (which I have been discussing) and the schismatic (which will follow shortly.) I am referring to Mallarmé, whose most intriguing Cratylan works are *Les mots anglais* (1945) as well as an essay on poetry “Crise de vers.” (1945)

The notion that Stéphane Mallarmé is the Cratylan poet par excellence is an unfortunate overstatement. I can recall more than one seminar where the key to Mallarmé was uncovering the hidden message relating to the verse’s dominant letter or sound. This usually involved a good deal of creative interpretation of the word’s sound play. Take for example, this first stanza from the *Feuillets d’Album*:

Tout à coup et comme par jeu
Mademoiselle qui voulûtes
Ouïr se révéler un peu
Le bois de mes divers flûtes... (Mallarmé 1945:59)

Careful attention, we were told, reveals that the whole stanza refers tacitly to the sound and the graphic architecture of the letter /û/. There is the alliteration of rounded vowel sounds, and one needs only adjust the words /voulûtes/ and /flûtes/ slightly to arrive at the

words /voûte/ and /fût/, which naturally referred to the graphic /û/'s shaft or column, as well as its circumflex accent. The whole poem is a precious ode to those kissing /ou/s and /û/s with their rounded lips.

This sort of Cratylan exercise, applied mechanistically to Mallarmé's poetry, has always seemed woefully exaggerated to me. However, it is not completely unjustified in light of a work that pushes the signifying power of the word's second articulation to a baffling extreme. In *Les mots anglais* (1945), Mallarmé attempts a symbolism of the letters of the alphabet by examining their usage in English words. Here two projects are implicit: one relatively modest and one more idealistic. The modest project is a poetic study of the music of English words: "au poète il appartiendra de rapprocher des termes unis...pour concourir au charme et à la musique du langage." (Mallarmé, *Mots anglais*, 1945: 921) The idealistic aim seems to be the contribution to an eventual history of the letters of the alphabet describing "quelle était presque leur absolue signification, tantôt devinée, tantôt méconnue par les hommes, créateurs des mots." (921)

What follows is an elaborate phono-symbolic tableau, where every letter of the alphabet is examined in the signification it affords to English words when found either in initial position or in combination with some other letter. The combination /sn/, for example, "impressionne un lecteur de l'Anglais comme un sinistre diagramme...oui, /sneer/ est un mauvais sourire et /snake/ un animal pervers..." (921). Another example is the letter /b/ : "qui fournit de nombreuses Familles; et s'appuient sur toutes les voyelles, peu d'entre les diphtongues et les seules consonnes /l/ et /r/: cela pour causer les sens, divers et cependant liés secrètement tous, de production ou enfantement, de fécondité, d'amplitude, de bouffissure et de courbure...puis de masse ou d'ébullition, et quelquefois

de bonté ou bénédiction.” (929) The examination continues thusly, detailing the connotations of second articulators in every morphological position, accounting all the while for grammatical and etymological categories. Does the sound connote differently when found in a noun or verb? Or when the word’s origin is Anglo-Saxon, French, Latin? In every case, the underlying logic might be summed up in the following (false) syllogism: each letter/sound of the word elaborates a more complex sound tissue or structure; this complex structure motivates a conventional meaning; therefore each of these letters and sounds must be of an essence with the total organ of meaning they compose.

2.6.1.4 Mallarmé’s Phonesthetics

Meaning, for Mallarmé in *Les Mots Anglais* as for Socrates in *Cratylus*, seems to be obtained by teasing the word’s sound pattern apart at the seams and by bringing each sound element to correspond with the conventional meaning of the whole. Another of Mallarmé’s works, however, lays out in more explicit terms this methodology’s poetic motivation, this being “Crise de Vers,” the second essay of *Variations sur un sujet*. (1945)

In “Crise de vers,” Mallarmé is tired with poetic convention that does little more than bury the sounds of language in fixed metric structures, like alexandrines or hexameters. These structures mask the wonder of these sounds by forcing a summative reading, one oriented by larger meaningful units, by the text’s first articulation. Put in other words, the metrics enforced by poetic convention organize language along principles that consistently allow the reader to avoid attending its exquisite second

articulation. The reader can no more hear individual voices than he or she can hear each individual instrumental voice in a symphony.

What Mallarmé is expressing here is an idea very similar to the argument prevailing in the first section of this dissertation. Metrics is an organizational principle that transcends the text's vocal organization, allows one to read the text's form without attending its sound pattern. Meter counts and organizes language, abstracts it out of its sounds, or perhaps dissimulates its sounds (those "mille éléments simples"): "Toute la langue, ajustée à la métrique, y recouvrant ses coupes vitales, s'évade, selon une libre disjonction aux mille éléments simples ; et, je l'indiquerai, pas sans similitude avec la multiplicité des cris d'une orchestration, qui reste verbal." (Mallarmé, *Crise*, 1945: 361)

Whether the sclerosis of conventional form is due to the authoritarian voice of Victor Hugo, as Mallarmé contends, is of course debatable. It is clear, nevertheless, that he sees Hugo's death as a moment of crisis, where set poetic forms are falling into dissolution. This dissolution, he describes as a fragmenting of the verse into its elemental forms. Free verse is now overtaking set forms. Poets now are making a seductive game of breaking familiar forms into segments to be re-examined in disjunction from the whole: "je connais qu'un jeu, séduisant, se mène avec les fragments de l'ancien vers reconnaissables, à l'éluder ou le découvrir." (364)⁴ The poetic verse is both "eluded" and "discovered" through the examination of its minimal elements.

I would hazard to suggest that most readers of poetry have had this experience of eluding and discovering through the fragment. On one hand, when attention is focused

⁴ Mallarmé, of course, would become one of the first exponents of such subversive play, although his most famous experiment with pattern fragmentation, *Un coup de dés jamais n'abolira le hasard* (Mallarmé 1945: 460-473) would address the typographic and visual/spatial dimensions of the verse rather than its properly sonorous dimension.

on the smallest joint in the pattern, there is a sentiment of being brought out of the verse. It is as if these smallest differentials described in the poem's second articulation (t-o-b-e-o-r-n-o-t-t-o-b-e) were so many cracks to slip through. They offer the possibility of reading without synthesizing higher meanings. On the other hand, there is also the sentiment of being brought into the verse at a new and unexplored level of immanence, at a perspective that casts the whole in a new light (or sound, as it were), causes the reader to re-discover the poem.

Recalling Frye's spatial metaphor, what Mallarmé seems to be describing here is an increasingly inward or centripetally oriented reading. The progression is palpable: from ideas elicited by the verse, there is a movement toward a consciousness of conventional verse forms; then, the dissolution of these conventional forms and a "prise de conscience" of their fragments or motifs. Ultimately, it is to presume that this inward movement would lead to the re-discovery of the smallest element of the pattern, the phoneme that is interpreted phonesthetically and examined in its correspondence with the whole it helps to integrate.

Mallarmé does not disappoint. Frye's centripetal movement is Mallarmé's dissolution or descent into pure vocal sound. Poetry, now, is where the word and its conventional motivation in meaning descend into the music of the voice and its inter-related tonalities, where "l'élocution descend au soir des sonorités." (365) After total dissolution, the smallest elements of the pattern are what remain. They are what Mallarmé calls "parole," which is not language in any conventional motivation, but rather a vocal essence, pure gesture and tonal pattern, uncorrupted by the forces of language convention. A pattern left to correspond to the memory of the conventional meaning it

once composed. The corrupting influence of convention becomes apparent in the woeful dissonance that often arises between these sound patterns and the designation that convention has assigned to them.

Here is where Mallarmé subjects the French words “jour”, “nuit,” “ombres,” and “ténèbres” to Cratylan examination. The naming power, foolishly, has forced a dark pattern of sounds /j-o-u-r/ to designate the brightness of day:

...mon sens regrette que le discours défaille à exprimer les objets par des touches y répondant en coloris ou en allure, lesquelles existent dans l'instrument de la voix, parmi les langages et quelquefois chez un. À côté d'*ombre*, *ténèbres* fonce peu ; quelle déception, devant la perversité conférant à *jour* comme à *nuit*, contradictoirement, des timbres obscur ici, là clair. Le souhait d'un terme de splendeur brillant, ou qu'il s'éteigne, inverse... (364).

These ill-fitted correspondences, these “disappointments” and “perversities,” Mallarmé attributes them to perverse convention, to blind obeisance to the naming authority, which inevitably dulls receptivity to the pattern's phonesthetic dimensions, to “parole.” What forms here is a schism comparable to the one dividing Hermogenes from Cratylus: on one side, the primacy of the naming power, functioning along conventional principles; on the other side, the primacy of the naming pattern, itself functioning along phonesthetic principles. The problem now is that there is no Socrates to see the problems implicit in both viewpoints and to argue the question toward the sage middle ground. Mallarmé seems less comfortable with ambivalence. Instead, he emerges with a rather utopian vision.

What is the role of the new poet, standing in the breach between pattern and power? It is henceforth to abolish arbitrariness in the sound-sense connection. Through painstaking attention to this connection, the poet's task is to reverse the sound-sense

inequities imposed by the naming power. His is to stamp the familiar word with a new strangeness, a strangeness that is not the effect of a dissonance, but rather the effect of an absolute consonance or harmony of motivations. The familiar word is strange because it is now “complete.” The reader, having lived impoverished in a language divided against itself, is now struck with the full force of the word united in all of its motivations:

Le vers qui de plusieurs vocables refait un mot total, neuf, étranger à la langue et comme incantatoire, achève cet isolement de la parole : niant, d’un trait souverain, le hasard demeuré aux termes malgré l’artifice de leur retrempe alternée en le sens et la sonorité, et vous cause cette surprise de n’avoir ouï jamais tel fragment ordinaire d’élocution, en même temps que la réminiscence de l’objet nommé baigne dans une neuve atmosphère. (368)

This is the language of Cratylan utopianism. It is the role of the poet to create, through painstaking attention to sounds, a “total language.” To deny, with “sovereign strike,” any notion of a sound-sense connection that is arbitrary, left to the whims of the naming power. Like the wholistic vision of rhythm discussed earlier with Meschonnic, Mallarmé’s integration of sound and sense seems so complete that it neutralizes the very notion of level. “La retrempe alternée en le sens et la sonorité,” is henceforth an artifice and vestige of the schismatic regime the poet attempts to overthrow. The “total word” would deny the very idea that verbal sounds and their ideas could ever be extricated from each other conceptually.

2.6.2. From Cratylan Integration to Schism

The problem with such utopian visions is that they always carry implicit within them a vacillation toward other more revolutionary extremes. Mallarmé espouses a “sovereign

strike” to abolish arbitrariness by integrative means, for this Cratylan vision is essentially integrative. It aims to re-unite language in all of its motivations. The poet enters in a moment of crisis like a specialist prepared to repair the damage caused by convention, to bridge the schism between naming powers and naming patterns. The question now becomes: what if this schism is deemed unbridgeable? What if the perverse influence of language convention is considered forever irreconcilable with the expressive potentialities of the pattern? What if saving the latter were no longer a matter of integrating it with the naming power, but rather emancipating it from this power altogether?

Following Mallarmé’s Cratylan integration is a more violent revolutionary strike, a centripetal orientation to the vortical extreme. Earlier on, I asked the question: what happens when the connection with conventional sense is severed? When attention fixates exclusively on the dragon’s flexible body in sound, on the written word’s jointwork of second articulators, which are left to flex and coil, to dis-articulate and reassemble freely? It is the schismatic logic of Futurist and Dadaist poetry that proposes an answer to this question. Two principles seem to prevail among the poets I am about to discuss. The first is the axiomatic principle of the genre as a whole: the pattern must be liberated from the tyranny of conventional signification. The second principle is methodological, and describes how they go about achieving their poetic ends: this liberation is brought about by the fracturing and subsequent re-combination of familiar verbal patterns.

2.6.2.1 Futurism and Dada: Breaking Conceptual Frames by Breaking and Re-combining Familiar Patterns.

I called Mallarmé a threshold thinker who forges a connection between the Cratylan and schismatic points of view. And indeed, before this poet pronounces his vision of Cratylan unification, he leads his reader toward the troubled waters of the verse in dissolution, in a descent “au soir des sonorités.” He suggests as well that through this dissolution into sound elements, language is both eluded and re-discovered. This elusion, perhaps, is better characterized as a break of conceptual frames, as focus on the sound element impedes or at least slows down the synthesizing function that helps frame this element in increasingly complex signifying patterns.

It would be up to the Futurists, as well as the Dadaists, to follow this dissolution to its schismatic extreme. Their work, of course, was only partially dedicated to language sounds, but their guiding principle is a constant: the abolition of normative conceptual frames through the breaking and re-setting of the structural patterns responsible for them. All patterns—the verbal patterns of language, the visual patterns of art and architecture, the sonorous patterns of music—become a crypt once they are subordinated by some normative conceptual framework. Once convention takes hold, the pattern becomes ensconced, a quiescent architecture in service to a functional logic. The latter is seen as the death of creativity, and Tzara’s *Dada Manifesto* (1918) is a call for its abolition:

Abolition of logic, which is the dance of those impotent to create: Dada; of every social hierarchy and equation set up for the sake of values by our valets: Dada...abolition of memory: Dada; abolition of archeology: Dada...Freedom; Dada Dada Dada, a roaring of tense colors, and interlacing of opposites and of all contradictions, grotesques, inconsistencies: LIFE. (Lippard 1971: 20)


In the citation are the two principles of fragmentation just described. There is the general revolutionary principle: this breaking of conventional hierarchies and equations. Then comes the methodological principle: the dis-articulation and re-assembly of patterns in ways contrary to expectation and norm, this “interlacing of opposites and of all contradictions.”

The Dada manifesto is of course another extreme form of idealism, by its nature untenable. From Mallarmé’s utopian vision grounded in Cratylan unity, I pass to a dystopic vision, one grounded in schismatic and anarchical principles. The question is worth examining: is there absolute freedom in Dada? Long familiar by now is the Ernst drawing, the Duchamp painting and the Schwitters collage, and their way of articulating disparate elements into strange and sometimes startling patterns. However, a cursory look at Dada’s status as genre, and at the materials and methods it uses, is enough to conclude that absolute originality, total disjunction from the logic of normative patterns, is never really the question.

There is no absolute freedom in Dada, despite Tzara’s imperious declaration. Like any genre, it is beset on all sides by norms. First there is a normative frame set by generic context and receptor expectation. After all, when the informed receptor expects frames to be broken, is this breaking not itself the fulfillment of a certain logic, a falling into norms? Secondly, there is the normative frame created by the elements composing the work itself. At the heart of the new pattern are usually elements of the known.

In this drawing by Max Ernst (Hedges 1983: 116), I encounter elements that are quite familiar: the brick wall, the window, the fingers reaching through, the walnut, the piercing hooks and harpoons, the bird’s heads, the hot air balloon. The break from

convention, here, is rather in the larger pattern that these elements form, in the startling way that they have been pieced together:




Finally, a third normative frame emerges from consideration of the work as whole. Even though the latter represents the familiar in an alienating arrangement, it is nevertheless synthesized by an integrating logic manifest in the title: *Oedipus Rex* (1921). Ostensibly, its imagery would either represent the Oedipus myth or comment upon it. At the very least, it gives the receptor a clue as to how to begin interpreting those composite images metaphorically: the harpooned walnut, manipulated perhaps by the hand of Fate, may condense the notion of sexual transgression, for example.

Perhaps the best way to characterize Dada in its philosophy, then, is the artist and receptor swinging in subversive dialogue with a palette of familiar patterns inherited from a broad cultural inter-text, and a palette of familiar promises offered by the genre and the context of representation. And the best way to characterize its methodology would be in the metaphor of the collage, where familiar patterns are recycled, cut away from the cultural frames in which they traditionally appear, segmented into smaller elements

(perhaps re-shaped as well), and then re-assembled into a new pattern whose components strike as familiar in their detail, but which together configure something altogether unconventional and alienating.

Here is where the chasm between pattern and convention opens, in the odd arrangement of the familiar. Underneath the chasm, however, is always a safety net, always the reassurance that integrating the work, justifying it perhaps, is a logic grounded in the expectations generated by the genre, the artist and the receptor. Here is a classic piece of Dada visual art, the principles of which are comparable to the language/acoustic art I will address next. The artist is Marcel Duchamp and the piece: *La mariée mise à nu par ses célibataires, même*. (Hedges 1983 : 118)



At first glance, this appears to be a baffling arrangement. Nevertheless, the receptor is not without normative frames to guide him or her. The most obvious is the piece's title, which offers a clue to the logic of the diptych, the top image corresponding to the subject (*la mariée*) and the bottom to the predicate (*mise à nu par...*). To aid reflection, the receptor has another normative frame in the elements of the pattern, as many of these are part of his or her cognitive context. The top image of the diptych shows a piece-meal arrangement of metallic hardware: saws, scythes, spades, and a fork crowning an engine spewing a grey cloud with three white squares blooming in the middle. The image on the bottom shows the pole and joists of a parasol planted in a table that also blooms into geometric shapes, all of which together appears to describe a sort of carousel. To the immediate left is a line with clothes hung out to dry. Underneath is a sort of mill or grinder attached to the joists of the carousel, perhaps causing it to turn.

Ultimately it is up to the receptor to interpret this strange pattern in a way deemed more or less suitable to the integrating vision of the title. The bride in the top image is a mechanical creature with unrealized potential. She stands vertical with her severe, wasp-like frame, facing left through her veil. Perhaps the white squares suggest her purity or her prudishness. In the bottom image—suggestive by this position in the diptych alone—she explodes into a conglomerate of horizontal, domestic imagery. Her motor has been activated, as it were, and the garments formerly concealing her have been hung out to dry.

2.6.2.2 The Sound Poets: Dada and Futurism

This principle of seizing familiar structures from the world and then fracturing and re-arranging them in unconventional yet ultimately explainable ways, remains a constant in both Futurism and Dada, whether these structures are visual/spatial, or whether they are the sonorous structures of language. With language and sound poetry, however, there is an important precision to be made. When tearing down language into graphic and sonorous bits and fragments, Dadaists and sound poets had a slightly more lofty aim: *to expose language in its purest state*. With language, it was no longer just a question of juxtaposing random items in alien ways, but rather of dissolving a system of conventions—deemed sclerotic and moribund—into its most minimal material elements. By fragmenting and recombining these minimal elements, they were not only subverting the system—flushing it out and giving it a fresh start—but also vindicating the sound element's importance to the system.

The Russian and Italian Futurist poets, as well as the Dada poets shortly thereafter, fractured and recombined language sounds both to liberate them from the tyranny of a systemic logic and to demonstrate their importance to this logic. Who are the sound poets? How did they conceive language and what techniques did they use to communicate this conception in their works? The spirit of such poetry is radical and revolutionary, and it seems fitting enough that its tangible beginnings fall in the context of the political revolutions in Europe during the first half of the century. The genre begins in Russia (ca. 1910) with the work of Velimir Khlebnikov and Alexei Kruchenyk, who directed their interests solely toward the phonic aspect of language.

Vladimir Markov, author of the first history of Russian Futurism, sums up Alexei Kruchenykh's pamphlet "The New Ways of the Word": "A proof that the word has been in chains is its subordination to meaning. The futurists have discovered this shortcoming and have devised a free language, transrational and universal (zaymnyi)." (Markov 1968: 127) The revolutionary principle here is wholly comparable with that of Dada. Every bit as much as the patterns of the visual realm, those of verbal language are also susceptible of being fixed in normative frames ("chains") binding them to conventional signifieds.

The method of liberating the word proceeds along the same logic of fragmentation and re-assembly just discussed in the framework of the Dadaist image. The linguistic inter-text offers a palette of second articulation elements, of sounds and syllables that can be cut away from their traditional framework in langue, which can be further segmented and recombined in startling ways that subvert conventional signification. The Futurist free language "Za-um" ("beyond mind" or "trans-rational") is a subversive dialogue with the polyphony of Russian and Slavic "lects" deriving from the cultural intertext and composing Khlebnikov's palette. It is a piecemeal of hybrids and permutations of Russian and Ukrainian roots and affixes, which make it both autonomous and obtuse, "une langue à part, indifférente à l'égard de l'objet de l'énoncé," as Jakobson would describe (Jakobson 1977: 35)

Zaum is language whose eidetic governance is little more than the pattern of second articulation elements making it up. Here is an excerpt from the poem "Zangezi," where the root /Um/ ("mind") is re-combined freely with a variety of affixes both real and invented:

Praum

Prium
Nium
Véum
Roum
Zaum
Vyum
Voum
Boum
Byum

Bom!” (Khlebnikov 1980: 25).

The poem is more than just a series of jazz-like improvisations on a single sound, an experiment with pattern permutation. It is a statement of pattern’s autonomy, language sound’s value in its own right.

For Khlebnikov and Kruchenykh, sound is meaning. Two words are more similar in their idea the more similar they are in sound, regardless of how much they differ semantically. For example, the Latin /gladiators/ would not translate into the Russian /mechari/ (“swordsmen”), even though they have the same semantic designation. A better synonym for /mechari/, Kruchenykh contends, would be the Zaum permutation /smekhiri/ (“laughing ones”), for no other reason than its proximity in sound. In their manifesto “The Word as Such,” which appeared in Moscow in 1913, one finds the “Declaration of the Word as Such.” (Markov 1968: 130-131). Here is their translational axiom, which will become especially relevant in the third section of this project: “It is better to substitute for a word one similar in sound, than one similar in idea.” (Markov 1968: 131)

Sound structure is conceived as the innermost alchemy of the word, the conjunction of elements constituting the word's essence, which is ultimately corrupted by the assignation of a conventional meaning. To slough off this meaning through the free segmenting and re-combination of second articulators is to extract this essence in its purest form. Indeed, Ines Hedges begins her *Languages in Revolt* (1983: 4-35) with specific references to the stages of the alchemical process, which seem to mirror the vision and methodology of Dada. The first stage of the process is "separatio" or dissolution, whereby matter is separated into component elements. Then comes "coniunctio" or the wedding of opposites, whereby these elements are conjoined in a manner that defies convention, thus forcing the third and fourth stages of morbidity and cleansing, "putrefactio" and "ablutio." Here, the phoneme sloughs off the bonds that hold it in captivity to the verbal sign and its conventional object. Here, in this process of dissolution and re-integration, the language element regains its vital force, and its role becomes obvious.

Fragmentation and schismatic re-integration of second articulators, a re-integration forcing elemental sounds into evidence, asserting their autonomy and interrogating their nature: this seems to be the principle behind both Futurist and Dadaist sound poems. However, like I demonstrated with the paintings, it is important not to lose oneself completely in speculation of this nature. As with the paintings, so with the poems. Dissolution and schismatic re-integration, here as well, are beset on all sides by normative frames. Take a passage of Hugo Ball's "Die Elefantenkarawane," for example:

jolifanto bambla ô falli bambla

grossiga m'pfa habla horem
égiga goramen
higo bloika russula huju
hollaka hollala
blago bung
blago bung
bosso fataka
ü üü ü
schampa wulla wussa ólobo
hej tatta gôrem
eschige zunbada
wulubu ssubudu uluw ssubudu (Ball 1995:12).

Prevailing here are the same fundamental disjunctions, as well as the same normative frames discussed earlier with regard to the paintings. First there is the title with its suggestion of a global motivation, a title which has led more than one eminent receptor, in this case George Steiner, to explain the piece as a bit of “onomatopoeic foolery.” (Steiner 1975: 204). There is no denying it. Those patterns may well imitate the sounds of elephants and their riders thundering by.

The other normative frame is established by the poem’s component elements: all conventional graphemes form conventional phoneme clusters and syllables that are least voiceable, even if they do not synthesize a level of first articulation. There are some suggestive “near-words” (“jolifanto,” “blago”), and perhaps even a “near-sentence” or “argument” of sorts, if I interpret the second line as a polyglot assemblage of distorted yet still meaningful fragments: “grossiga m'pfa habla horem”→”big (grossiga) oompa (noise) is spoken (habla) and heard (horem). The “noise” of this poem—second

articulation disengaged from further grammatical hierarchy—is obviously predicated on the hypothesis that such a hierarchy existed, and that these are its liberated elements.

I could hazard the same conclusion here as with the paintings earlier. The freedom of Dada is bound within the normative frames it generates as genre, those it assigns to each of its works, and those it attempts to subvert as it plunders elements of the familiar. Again, with language as with the paintings discussed earlier, the chasm opened between pattern and idea is the exponential amplification of these elements' combinatory potentiality. Atomic sounds are free-radicals to be considered in isolation (ü, üü ü) or to be organized in any conceivable pattern, which may offer total or partial access to a conventional idea (/jolifant/, /horem/), or which may serve to occlude this access altogether (/hej/ /tatta/, /gorem/).

2.6.2.3. The Lyrical Obsession with Language Matter/ The Material obsession with the Language Lyrical

This leads me to another important methodological principle in sound poetry. This free combination of sound elements, this privileging of the sonorous dimension of language naturally raises the question of the transformative principle at work in sound poetic formulations. When a word's sound is conceived as en-"crypt"-ed in conventional representation, when the objective is to "spring" word sounds from this crypt, the poet must conceive a technique to force sound into high relief, to re-establish its dominance in expression and its influence upon connotation. It is Marinetti, in his *Parole in Libertà* (1986) who ordained the sound poet's technique for springing sound.

A technique founded in violent play upon sound, in flexing and twisting the matter of language in its exquisite second articulation. The poet, Marinetti maintained, must shift his focus, “remplacer la psychologie de l’homme, désormais épuisée, par l’obsession lyrique de la matière.” (Marinetti, *Mots en liberté*, 1986: 20) According to Marinetti, the Romantic and post-Romantic impressionist and symbolist periods enforced a conception of the world as an extension of human consciousness. This is to say that when man looked upon the material world and its objects, he learned to see little more than the image of himself, which transfixed him, blinded him. This sort of narcissistic contemplation had no way of adequately invoking the mechanized world of the twentieth century. Instead, Marinetti proposed a radically materialistic and technocratic view. The world has its own material logic, he argued, with its own autonomous mode of functioning. Ours is to try to know this matter for its own sake:

Gardez-vous de prêter des sentiments humains à la matière, mais devinez plutôt ses différentes poussées directives, ses forces de compression, de dilatation, de cohésion et de disgrégation, ses ruées de molécules en masse ou ses tourbillons d’électrons. Il ne faut pas donner les drames de la matière humanisée. C’est la solidité d’une plaque d’acier qui nous intéresse par elle-même, c’est-à-dire l’alliance incompréhensible et inhumaine des ses molécules et de ses électrons, qui s’opposent par exemple à la pénétration d’un obus...(Marinetti, *Mots en liberté*, 1986:20).

It is important here to consider these remarks from a critical distance. Questionable, of course, is this injunction to divorce the self from the contemplation of the world. The last line of this citation tells much about the constellation of crises surrounding Marinetti and his *Futurist Manifesto*, both historical and philosophical. The philosophy of Italian Futurism is one of aggression arising from aggressive times. The *Futurist Manifesto* and the *Parole in Libertà* were originally published in 1909 and 1919 respectively, that is to

say at both ends of the conflict that left in ruins the Europe in which the Romantics, the Neo-romantics, the impressionists and symbolists had passively contemplated themselves.

Bullets, shells, steel plates and factory towns: this was the Italy surrounding Marinetti, the Italy that we see in his poetry “rat-tat-tatting” with the sounds of machine-gun fire (“Bombardamento di Adrianapoli”). Marinetti’s Futurism seems to encourage a libidinal investment in a violent new world conceived in materialistic, and from there atomistic terms: “ses ruées de molécules en masse...ses tourbillons d’électrons.” (Marinetti, *Mots en liberté*, 1986: 20) The accelerated motion of matter—shock, integration and disintegration—were an inspiration and preoccupation. To read the Manifesto is to experience a youthful enthusiasm unfettered by moral consequence and empathy, fomenting a frank love—machistic and anarchistic—of temerity, physical danger and violence:

1. Nous voulons chanter l’amour du danger, l’habitude de l’énergie et de la témérité.
4. Nous déclarons que la splendeur du monde s’est enrichie d’une beauté nouvelle : la beauté de la vitesse. Une automobile de course avec son coffre orné de gros tuyaux tels des serpents à l’haleine explosive...une automobile rugissante, qui a l’air de courir sur de la mitraille, est plus belle que la *Victoire de Samothrace*.
9. Nous voulons glorifier la guerre—seule hygiène du monde—le militarisme, le patriotisme, le geste destructeur des anarchistes, les belles idées qui tuent, et le mépris de la femme.
10. Nous voulons démolir les musées, les bibliothèques, combattre le moralisme, le féminisme, et toutes les lâchetés opportunistes et utilitaires. (Marinetti, *Le premier manifeste*, 1986: 51)

“Une obsession lyrique de la matière.” A lyrical obsession with matter. There is song in the dynamism of matter, Marinetti argues. When one strikes at it, transforms and distorts it, twists and tears at the seams binding it.

However, one could just as easily invert this proposition, and invoke “une obsession matérialiste du lyrisme.” This is how Marinetti conceived poetry. The “matter” of the poem is a tissue of graphemes symbolizing a molecular tissue of sounds. This tissue is forced into evidence by contracting and dilating it, by twisting and flexing it. Even by disintegrating and exploding it. In *Parole in Libertà*, Marinetti proposes a revolt against the norms of syntax and orthography, the suppression of punctuation, the alteration of typographic dimensions and their spacing. The word, both the graphic and the spoken, was matter to be toyed with:

En outre, notre ivresse lyrique doit librement déformer, modeler les mots en les coupant ou en les allongeant, renforçant leur centre ou leurs extrémités, augmentant ou diminuant le nombre des voyelles ou des consonnes. Nous aurons ainsi la nouvelle *orthographe* que j'appelle *libre expressive*. (Marinetti, *Mots en liberté*, 1986: 51)

Marinetti takes metaplastic technique to an entirely new creative level. The disposition of his free expressive orthography is as much a matter for pictographic as for vocal interpretation. Each verse form has the quality of a sono-graphic Rorschach test, and is intended as a locus of verbal improvisation. Visual, typographic, spatial arrangements of elements are there to trigger whatever lyric qualities they happen to inspire. They can be simple onomatopoeic representations, such as machine gun fire: *tatatatatatatata*. Or they can describe any of the metaplastic alterations invoked by the μ group, as well as new and more suggestive modes: the amplification or reduction of typographic dimensions, for example: **FUMEER**. The result is typically a constellation of re-figured orthography, describing a sort of word picture:



The title of the piece, hidden innocuously at the bottom center, is “Verbalisation dynamique de la route.” (Marinetti 1986, *Mots en liberté*: inset without page number) It exploits every revolutionary principle in the *Parole in Libertà*: distortion of typographic dimension and cryptic dis-organization of graphemes and syntagms—those monumental disjoined “M”s, “A”s and “N”s appear to explode in waves from the passionately voiced epithets: “Vive la France” “Ma petite”; “Mon ami”; “Mort aux boches”; phonemic adjunction gives force to cries of enthusiasm (Mon amiiiiii) and a super-sonic rattle to those roaring car engines (vitesseeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee); numbers and mathematical symbology give a sense of mechanism and cool material quantity; then there is the onomatopoeia both mimetic (machine-gun fire ta-ta-ta-ta-ta-ta) and abstract (viamelokranu bimbim).

The text is exciting visually. I see an effort here to recover a depth of orality by compounding alphabetic/phonetic representation with one bordering on the ideogrammatic. As engaging as the piece is as a sort of cubic word painting, however, we’d do well to remember that it was intended for vocal performance as well. The manner of this performance would depend entirely on the interpreter’s unique

intersection with this score of sorts. Through study and practice, he or she would develop a way of converting this score or part of it into a series of vocalizations.

Italian Futurism's lasting contribution to sound poetry, and the reason for its importance to this dissertation, is its revolutionary mode of notation, which exploits to an intensive degree the types of metaplastic figurations marking the text's vocal motivation. There is intense play upon those adjunctive, suppressive and substitutive operations, as well as a jazz-like way of improvising on the visual and phonic matter of poetry. This style would be taken up and developed in the following decades by Dadaists like Hugo Ball and Raoul Hausmann, the Dutch de Stijl school and the French Lettristes. In the fifties, these pictographic modes would be reinforced with technological tools: the transformative potentialities of the magnetic tape. Sound poet Henri Chopin, for example, would use tape to slow down, speed up and super-impose the word in ways inconceivable to previous orthographic modes.

Nowadays of course, computer installations with interactive graphic and sonorous features have become the major forum. Techniques may have multiplied, and sound poets nowadays may be experimenting with media that are far more developed than Marinetti's calligraphy and typeset, but the principle underlying the genre, the lyrical obsession with language matter, has remained constant. So too has the transformative principle defining the genre's method for exercising its obsession. This method is, as it always has been, a metaplasma, a manipulation of language in its first articulation, a flexing and coiling of the signifier conceived as plastic entity, as "floating dragon." The media of this manipulation may have multiplied, and poets may be discovering through

these new media previously unexplored dimensions of vocalized sound, but Marinetti's basic tenants regarding the genre's focus and treatment of language still hold.

2.6.2.4 Metaplasma and the Text's Psychosomatic Provenance

This talk of metaplasma, of manipulating the sensory material of language, of re-experiencing its provenance in sound and oral gesture: it all has a very sensuous feel to it. Many are those who conceive this type of transformation as a libidinal outlet. Jakobson viewed Italian Futurism as a desire "de communiquer les nouveaux faits du monde physique et psychique." (Jakobson 1977: 24). Is Marinetti's poetry the sign of a dynamic, mechanized world psychologically internalized and then re-expressed as inventive language materiality? Are these atomized second articulators the effect of a libido externalized in particles of language exhaust? The hypothesis seems plausible, at least worth further investigation. Marinetti's Futurist Manifesto, after all, is explicit in the nexus it describes between mechanization, linguistic volubility, sound play, and violent compulsion. I can not help but recall Anthony Burgess's *A Clockwork Orange* (2000), that enduring example of libidinal aggression couched in a language set in metaplastic overdrive. George Steiner, as well, touches upon possible "affinities between pathological erotic compulsion and the search, obsessive in certain poets and logicians, for 'private language,' for a linguistic system unique to the needs and perceptions of the user." (Steiner 1975:41).

In any case, the Futurists have received much psychoanalytic treatment. Their babble is routinely interpreted as springing from the subconscious, that "machine à désirer" as Deleuze has referred to it. Zaum, for some, represents a sort of Oedipal

regression. It is language's psychosomatic provenance trumping over-coded grammatical and semantic conventionality. Christian Prigent, in *La langue et ses monstres*, describes Khlebnikov's language as "quasi glossolalisée, un voyage décomposant vers la mère." (Prigent 1989:103). On the subject of Khlebnikov's contemporary Vladimir Mayakovsky, one finds a similar discourse:

Il y va de l'engagement subjectif (inconscient corporel) du poète dans son propre geste sur la langue. La réalité phonétique du mot, d'abord parce qu'elle récusé la pure et simple fixation sémantique, est la forme informe, instable, abstraite, où vient s'incarner une énergie transversale à toute déclarativité oratoire ou lyrique. Des « marques » (libidinales, pulsionnelles) que la fixation discursive censure, reviennent là comme trace de l'effort qu'accomplit le langage poétique pour faire résonner une langue plus intime. (92)

Sound poetry crosses inevitably with Dadaism and related notions of private language and automatic writing. Randomness of phonation and inscription are a manifestation of the language sub-conscious: this is the vein in which Steiner treats poets like Hausmann and Ball. Dada constructs a language which signifies on the immanent or "private" side of the object: "One need only recite Ball's *Klanggedichte* to a child to realize that a great deal of meaning, of presence—partly musical, partly kinetic, partly in the form of incipient or subliminal imagery—is being communicated." (Steiner 1975: 206).

Transformative action upon the phonetic envelope of language, upon the somatic next implied: does this constitute a release of libidinal energy? Contemporary sound poet Steve McAffrey offers a response that is rather intriguing. He refers to the word as "frozen energy", a constrictive aggregate anticipating thaw and a subsequent release of energy (McAffrey 1978: 72). The graphic signifier, in this sense, would be a crypt of frozen energy. The sound poet releases this energy by twisting and pulling at the phonetic envelope. The passage has appeal, so I will quote it at length:

What the sound poet practices is the deformation of linguistic form at the level of the signifier. For it is the scripted signifier, the phonematic unit that marks the crypt of a vast repression, where energy is frozen in the articulated and subordinated elements of representation. Language, through its nature as representation, its functioning by means of arbitrary, articulated signs, by means of rules, conditions and prohibitions, becomes a huge mechanism for suppressing libidinal flow...

Sound poetry is much more than simply returning language to its own matter; it is an agency for desire production, for releasing energy flow, for securing the passage of libido in a multiplicity of flows out of the Logos. To experience such flows (as a break-through in a break-down) is to experience the sonic moment in its full intensity of transience. That discharge close to the Sadean moment of erotic point—as Duvergier tells Juliette ‘one swims in the current or drowns battling it.’ (73)

The modern sound poet reiterates the basic tenants of Dada as it applies to language. Convention, with its rules, conditions, and prohibitions, is a repressive en-“crypt”ion. By breaking down language matter and forcing its outpouring in private dialogue with the self, one achieves a therapeutic break-through of sorts.

Then of course there is this notion of “securing a passage for the libido in flows out of the Logos,” of vocalization as release and outpouring of human matter, fluid, sexual excreta. McAffrey is in good philosophical company when formulating this idea. Deleuze, in *Capitalisme and Schizophrénie* (1972), describes all verbalized sound chains as an expression of the libido: “Produire du désir, telle est la seule vocation du signe, dans tous les sens où ça se machine.” (Deleuze 1972: 47). Barthes, in *Le plaisir du texte* (1973), likens the movement of typing figures to the infant’s sucking reflex. Steiner’s formulation remains for me the most evocative, however: “The interactions of the sexual and the linguistic accompany our whole lives...Ejaculation is at once a physiological and a linguistic concept...Semen, excreta, and words are communicative products. They are transmissions from the self inside the skin to reality outside.” (Steiner 1975: 41).

Such assertions are compelling, and they seem to correspond to felt truths about language and its manifestation through soma. That there is something visceral, compulsive about Dada's transformative techniques upon language, there can be little doubt. This movement toward the intimate, sensuous side of the language sign naturally implies a movement into the psycho-somatic mechanisms behind their production. The sounds of the sign describe an infra-semantics, a private meaning attributed to what could be considered language's sensitive underbelly. This meaning may well define itself not only in opposition to normative conceptual frames, but perhaps as unadulterated somatic emission as well, as babble flowing out of the libidinal font.

Both positions are valid, of course. To lay stake in either one exclusively would be foolish. To claim that Dada is pure babble is to deny the very real conceptual architecture underlying it, the revolutionary principles defining it and the normative frames in which it functions as genre. On the other hand, to claim that Dada is strictly a conceptual art form is to deny the materials that it exploits as well as their provenance, in this case the sounds of language and the body. I am content to leave the question of Dada's motivation open. What interests me from this genre, and what will help illuminate the types of translation addressed in the section to come, are its more tangible, textual manifestations and the metaplastic techniques—flexing, fragmenting and re-assembling language in its second articulation—used to achieve them. I will conclude now this general exposition of Cratylan and schismatic modes and move on to the illustration of specific translation phenomena.

Section 3, Chapter 7

Preamble: Cratylan and Schismatic Translation?

My intent in the preceding section was to open out of a traditional numeric mode of translating text form and into a broader reflection on the relationship between the spoken and written word, as well as on the potential ways in which a text might be interpreted in its vocal pattern or sound. After benefiting, hopefully, from this contemplative opening out, I would now like to rein focus back on translation. The obvious first question: how would these Cratylan and schismatic modes of reading vocal sounds intersect with the practice of translation? Could one imagine such a thing as a Cratylan or schismatic translation?

From the Cratylan logic discussed in the previous section, one principle seems to prevail: the absolute unity of the language sign's vocal pattern and its object or conventional designation. Naturally, when the sounds of a word are considered of an essence with that word's sense, then the very idea that the latter could be extricated and arbitrarily re-constructed in other sounds becomes problematic, untenable even. Mallarmé's vision of the total word rejects—"d'un trait souverain" no less—any conceptual separation of the word's sonorous and semantic strata, "la retrempe alternée dans le sens et la sonorité." It seems to reject, then, the possibility of translation. It would be foolhardy, however, to align the principle of translation reflexively with Hermogenes's position, when indeed it is the wisdom of the Socratic middle line that better serves, for there are modes of translating that demonstrate the type of Cratylan striving discussed earlier with Mallarmé—modes that not only acknowledge the source

text's vocal pattern as an inextricable component of the sense it constructs, but that also attempt to re-construct something of this pattern in the target.

3.7.1 Cratylan Translation

How then could one imagine Cratylan translation? First and foremost, it would approach any text as fundamentally united in its vocal and semantic dimensions. It would value the re-expression of the source's sound pattern every bit as much as its conventional sense. The Cratylan translator would assume that this pattern is so instrumental to sense, that he or she would have recourse to specific stratagems and techniques to recover some idea of it in the target. At the same time, he or she would know that any translation that does not attempt to recuperate something of this vocal pattern would be insufficient.

Two important distinctions should be kept in mind, all the while. The sound pattern valued by the Cratylan translator is *not* the traditional mathetic abstraction, the proportional schemata discussed at length in the first section of this dissertation, but is rather the pattern implicit in the actual shape stream of the voice, in the movement from one second articulator to the next. Important to remember, as well, is that in a Cratylan translation, the vocal pattern of the source would not trump conventional sense, and that what the translator would attempt to achieve is really a best of both worlds scenario, where the source text's conventional sense, as well as something of the pattern constructing this sense, is detectable in the target.

The Cratylan translator would be receptive to the vectors of signification implicit in the text's pattern of vocal sounds, vectors that do not necessarily emerge from the denotation, and that would fall by the wayside if a conscious effort were not made to

achieve a sense of them in the target. What might these vectors be? Sherry Simon, in a recent conference for the Canada Research Chair of Literary and Cultural Transfers, formulated a useful analogy using the metro.¹ Many are familiar with those electronic maps in subway stations. One presses the button corresponding to the name of a destination, and a route lights up on the map, a guiding vector often involving complicated correspondences with other vectors.

I find this to be a useful analogy, for a text's vocal patterns can by themselves describe vectors of signification, three of which I will address in the next chapter. First of all, when one reads a text for its sounds, there is always a vector of signification described through the body, as the text is interpreted as an expressive gesturing of this body: a pattern of breathing, a movement of vocal articulators, etc. Breathing along with Catullus seems to be the motivation behind the Zukofsky's sound translations, which I will examine later on. When a gesturing body is projected as a cinematic image, then the text's vocal pattern may well intersect with this image. The foreign language dubbing of films is where this particular vector becomes important. The very first case I will examine, however, involves accented texts, where vocal patterns describe a vector through the cultural landscape, take the reader to a specific geographical location, time, and context of utterance.

Simon's metro analogy is helpful for yet another reason, for the route that lights up on the map describes a theoretical connecting thread between places that are in reality remote from one another. As any traveler knows, the mapped route is frequently undone by the reality of the systems involved in moving from point A to point B. Bad

¹ The analogy was formulated in respect to her exploration of translation practices in Montreal, the subject of her forthcoming book: *Translating Montreal: Episodes in the Life of a Divided City* (2006).

conditions, delays, breakdowns, accidents of all kinds, are consistently obstructing this unified pathway conceived with electronic rapidity on the map. The map, like the ideal it represents, is merely a hypothesis from which the traveler proceeds tentatively, with caution, fully aware of the contingencies that may lead him or her on different paths altogether.

This same hypothesis of unity, tempered with the sense of contingency, prevails in the translator's attempt to render a unity of vocal and semantic motivations. Consistently at odds with the accident of disparate vocal patterns, always confronting target language patterns that defy affinity with those of the source, the translator never achieves the Cratylan unity of motivations to which he or she aspires, but is content rather with a game of partial and parallel correspondences, of incomplete approximations, a game proceeding in a touch-and-go manner. This is a dimension of tentative exploration where the translator displays his or her ingenuity and inventiveness, devises technical stratagems to help in the task. The remainder of this investigation is dedicated to the examination of some of these techniques of parallelism and vocal approximation.

3.7.2. Schismatic Translation

Opposing this inclusive Cratylan vision is of course the subversive schismatic one, which demonstrates little to no concern for unified motivations or larger networks of signification. There are modes of translation—the traducson for example—that not only privilege the source's vocal pattern over its sense, but which leave sense by the wayside entirely. These are the modes that take the words of Kruchenykh in his 1913 manifesto as axiom: "It is better to substitute for a word one similar in sound, than one similar in

idea.” (Markov 1968: 131) Such translations represent the vortical extreme of centripetal reading. Unfettered by conventional modes of signification, they manipulate the target language’s second articulation freely, and for the sole purpose of reconstructing the source text’s pattern of vocal sounds.

In a “Cratylan” mode of translating, sound pattern is wed with conventional semantic sense. In the schismatic mode, it is bound to no higher signifying logic. With this mode comes a gradual dissolution of all higher organizing principles, both those synthesizing first articulators or words, as well as those organizing words into syntactic structures, and beyond this into the system recognizable as langue. True to the principle of Dada, the “paradigmatic translations” examined in the ninth chapter are a target language torn down into a palette of fragments, of second articulators that can be re-assembled at will, and to any sonorous effect, including that of approximating the sounds of the source text.

Interestingly enough, the further I follow this schismatic mode of translation in its disintegration of langue—the more fragmented or atomized the elements exploited—the more I see a convergence with another completely pragmatic form of re-writing: phonetic transcription. The smaller the sound element in the target-language palette, and the freer its ability to combine with others, the more possible it becomes to create close sonorous affinities between source and target texts. In this intriguing scenario, Dadaesque forms that are alien to the conventional logic of the target language nevertheless recover a certain functionality as guide for the production of phonetic movements.

Another major distinction divides these schismatic translations from the Cratylan ones. Because the latter persist in servitude to the conventions of the target language, they stand autonomous. Read on their own, they are fully comprehensible, fully functional. Obviously, accented translations or dubbed films do not need to be compared with their source texts to uncover the logic unifying them. The schismatic translations, however, have emancipated themselves from this servitude to the higher organizing systems of langue. Their only servitude—and their only cohering logic—is the vocal pattern of the source text. And for this reason, they are not autonomous, but stand rather in constant comparison with their sources.

In other words, the schismatic mode is one that obeys the logic of its text exclusively. Back in the first section of this dissertation, I reflected upon the thinking of Henri Meschonnic. The latter argued that translation was first and foremost “un rapport de texte à texte, et non pas de langue à langue,” and lamented the translator’s servitude to those conventions of the target langue that lead him or her astray from the text’s specificity. In the schismatic mode, I see a technique of translating that is profoundly text oriented and langue subversive. And in fact, I would argue that Meschonnic makes an incipient movement toward this schismatic mode in his own homophonic rendering of “Yona” into the unconventional French “Jona.”

Before I attract the ire of fellow Meschonnic admirers, I should assure my reader that I have no intention of proposing Dadaism as a solution to this theorist’s malaise with the translator’s servitude to langue. I am quite sure that the critic did not have something like the whimsical *traducson* in mind when defending the textual rapport between source and target. And of course, he never proposed this radical amputation of langue from the

equation. In fact, I see his “signifiante” as something more resembling the Cratylan “total word,” the defense of a more integrated consciousness of the text in all of its dimensions, both those which are circumscribable by the theory of the sign (its semantic and structural organization) as well as those rhythmic dimensions which escape circumscription.

Advocating this integration, however, means championing a dimension of the text that is routinely ignored or silenced by servitude to *langue*. For Mallarmé, this is “parole”, “le soir des sonorités.” For Meschonnic, likewise, it seems to be this “gestuelle” evidenced in the elements of the text’s articulate tissue. One can easily perceive, especially in the Jonas article (1981), a drift toward a translational paradigm where articulate sound tissue is raised up over *langue*, valued over *langue*. In this respect, the *traducson* is the one lunatic animal that not only makes this tissue paramount in its consideration, but finds therein its entire logic and justification. Put in other words, one can not conceive a type of translation where the rapport is more completely “texte à texte.”²

Of course, there is much of Meschonnic’s notion of the text that I am conveniently dodging here. Complex questions of subjectivity and historicity—everything that makes the text an act of discourse rather than a sign—are without doubt key in this critic’s vision. Then again, I would also recall, in my own defense, that whenever this complex notion of textuality is brought to bear upon translation, Meschonnic falls back squarely into the same cult of the sign that he otherwise seems to

² In fact, if I had to conceive the polar opposite of Meschonnic’s infamous “traduction-introduction”—the translation entirely steeped in *langue* and inattentive to the text’s specificity—it would probably be the *traducson*, steeped entirely in the pattern of the text and virtually oblivious to the conventions of the target *langue*.

disdain. It is in the numeric eidos, and in the resulting structural affinities at the level of the signifier, that Meschonnic's textuality always seems to manifest in translation. Mathetic conceptions of the text always seem to subsume these ineffables: subjectivity, historicity, discursive movements, etc. Or perhaps it is through these mathetic conceptions that the ineffables are deemed to manifest, albeit imperfectly and insufficiently.

Ultimately in translation, Meschonnic's text-to-text rapport always comes back to appreciable pattern affinity at the level of the signifier. This affinity is usually numeric, but I would recall the instance where it was in fact vocal. The Hebrew /Yona/ is better translated /Jona/ because of a greater affinity in sonorous pattern. This is a perfectly sign-based observation in the tradition of a structural linguistics that Meschonnic rejects. Whether or not this vocal affinity entails some more thoroughgoing historical, subjective or discursive affinity, whether or not one can rightly claim to translate "in signifiante," I am not here to enquire. What interests me, rather, is what invariably results from these deliberations, and that is ultimately a structural affinity in numeric or vocal pattern. For me, a text oriented translation would be one that takes care to re-construct the source signifier's pattern at the expense of target language conventions. A langue oriented translation would serve target language writing conventions exclusively.

3.7.3 Uniting the Texts to be Examined: A Centripetal Progression

It is with a logic conjugating this notion of "text vs. langue" (my restrictive, doubtless opportunistic take on Meschonnic's view) with Frye's centripetal reading, that I conceive a certain progression in the order of the texts under examination here. With each passing

mode of translation, the reading will become increasingly centripetal—that is to say increasingly focused upon the source text’s vocal pattern, and increasingly evasive of target language conventions. The Cratylan translations in this chapter demonstrate a greater servitude to the conventions of the latter. Nevertheless, from accenting to dubbing, and finally to the Zukofskys’ experiment, the rule of langue will palpably diminish in favor of a pattern based logic. Then, with the schismatic translations of chapter nine, langue will be all but overthrown, and source-text vocal patterns will be the exclusive focus.

3.7.4 Defining the Texts to be Examined: Metaplasme

Along with this progression uniting the texts of this section in logical sequence of examination should also come factors, which unite them as a corpus. As discussed in the introduction, none of the conventional parameters—authorial, historical, generic—prove useful in this sort of dissertation, the voice being a motivation in any text conceived and written in the phonetic alphabet. I have found that in this case, the best way to unite translated texts into a corpus is along technical lines. In all of the translations I am about to present, the same vocal/graphic technique emerges as key in the process of negotiating a passage from source to target.

This technique, discussed at length in the previous section, is metaplasme. All of the translations examined will involve, at some key point in their process, the plasmic manipulation of second articulators for the purpose of conforming to a vocal *eidos* gained from the source text’s pattern. In other words, translation is not only a question of choosing words, phrases or sentences to construct a target text, but also of re-configuring

these words, phrases or sentences in their second articulation, and in a way that defies writing conventions. Recalling another metaphor, I could put it this way: all of the following translations exploit the written medium in its capacity as “floating dragon.” They will all make use of orthographic deformation for the purpose of representing a vocal flux.

This technical criterion has proven quite useful as a restricting guideline. Of course every translation presents a transformation of sound pattern, at some level. There are relatively few, however, that motivate the target word’s second articulation in unorthodox ways for the sole purpose of constructing an affinity with the sound pattern of the source. Accenting involves transforming the target text’s second articulators to reflect a speech anomaly or sound. Film dubbing alters the shape of second articulators using an elaborate calligraphy, and this for the purpose of synchronizing a target text with the film’s original language and image tracks. Finally, with the Zukofskys begins the trend of the dadaesque target language collage, the technique of fracturing and re-assembling target language sound elements for the purpose of constructing vocal pattern affinities.

3.7.5 Affinities in the Vocal Eidos

Just before embarking on his phono-symbolic exploration, Socrates asks a question fundamental to his dissertation: “Indeed, don’t color and sound each have a being or essence, just like every other thing that we say ‘is’?” (Plato 1998: 423e). That a text’s sound can elicit the “idea of itself,” is a banal enough observation. That a reader can interpret a text in such a way that the idea of its sound pattern prevails should by now be

plausible, or at the very least debatable. More interesting now are the potential ways to conceptualize this *eidos* arising from vocal patterns. How does one invoke, let alone talk about the idea of a sound? The first step, it would seem, is to make a finer distinction between the types of ideas a voice might elicit.

3.7.5.1 The Phono-structural or Phonemic Eidos

It seems plausible, first of all, that one could gain an idea of a text's sounds in their chains of discrete units or phonemes, without necessarily having to visualize a situation of utterance or ascribing much importance to a gesture, or a movement of vocal articulators (lips, tongue, respiration). There is a sense gained from the sound chain itself, whose components are not considered in and of themselves, but rather in the signifying structures that they synthesize. The phono-structural *eidos* would be a sense of text sounds as synthesizing structures in service to the semantic *eidos*, sounds whose chief role is to structure a signifier capable of eliciting a signified.

This phono-structural or phonemic logic is conceptual by nature, meaning it is derived eidetically by reducing all manner of phonetically distinct enunciations to discrete structures capable of signifying linguistically. Phonetically distinctive manners of vocalizing, in other words, are reduced to a common sound concept serving as a baseline for comprehension. The phono-structural, therefore, would be the conceptual level of language recognition where all phonetically variant transformations are reduced to the most familiar, properly meaningful structure in sound. It is the conceptual level where the sound chain of the playful Pig Latin phrase "I eakspey Igpey Atinley" would be re-set by the listener to the more familiar configuration: "I speak Pig Latin," for

example. Or where Dim's snaking chain "*whisssssshhhhhhhhh*" would be reduced to the conventional onomatopoeia "whish." Linguist Nicolas Ruwet (1972) used the principle of phonetic variance and phono-structural affinity to describe the relationship between the metaplasmodically transformed language of art song and the conversational language of typical speech. The same text, sung and spoken normally, would produce two readings that diverge phonetically, that is to say that diverge radically in the types of gestures required to utter them, but that are considered phono-structurally identical. This leads me to the next vocal eidos, the "phonetic eidos."

3.7.5.2 The Phonetic Eidos

From vocal sound patterns, one might also get a sense of the physical movement or gesture required to produce them: the movement of physiological articulators—respiratory tract, glottis, tongue, lips; or any other gesture involved in bodying them forth: the movement of the eyes and face, even of the arms, legs and feet. The phonetic eidos would be a sense of the utterance's existence as gesture, as a body's movement, and of this movement's specific inter-action with the text that it bodies forth. Although I am assuming this movement in the very concrete sense, as one which structures language sound, it could just as easily intersect, from a poetic perspective, with Paul Zumthor's notion of the voice as gesture that "*projette le corps dans l'espace de la performance et vise à conquérir celui-ci, à le saturer de son mouvement.*" (Zumthor 1984 : 47).

In Zumthor's examination of oral poetry, the body's movement constitutes a "*bruitage [auquel] le texte réagit et s'adapte.*" (38) The text is in this sense versed through the movements of the performing body, re-structured through these movements.

The phonetic eidos, then, would necessarily require the presence of a performing body, such as the one provided by an actor in a theater, an oral poet before his or her audience, or by the moving image of cinema. It is this last case that interests me here. In the realm of foreign language film dubbing, a complex of visible phonetic gestures becomes part of the translator's baggage as he or she is required to voice a new text within the tight parameters fixed by the phonetic movements in the montage. Film dubbing is another example that I could give to draw the distinction between this phonetic eidos and the phono-structural eidos just discussed. The foreign language track of the dubbed film is constructed to achieve a certain phonetic affinity with the source film's image (affinity in gesture or lip movement) in the face of massive phono-structural difference, as the film has been translated inter-linguistically. In this important sense, affinity in phonetic movement, in the vocal gesture producing two signifiers, does not necessarily mean affinity in phonemic structure.

By the same token, two signifiers demonstrating affinity in their phono-structure do not necessarily demonstrate affinity in the phonetic movement required to produce them. I just discussed Ruwet's phonetic distinction between sung and spoken versions of the same text, versions that would demonstrate a fundamental phono-structural affinity. Burgess's "wish" and "wisssssssshhhhhh" also demonstrate affinity in phono-structure while diverging phonetically. To sum up the distinction, then: source and target texts that demonstrate affinity in the vocal movements or body gesturing required to vocalize them would demonstrate affinity in the phonetic eidos. Source and target texts that demonstrate affinity in the sound chains forming their signifiers would demonstrate affinity in the phono-structural eidos.

3.7.5.3 The Phono-graphic Eidos

It seems only fitting, because I am addressing the voice as represented by the graphic signifier, to include here a potential eidos emerging from the sound-to-grapheme relationship. When reading his or her text in its sounds, a reader often gets the sense of an affinity between “graphic characters”—letters and letter combinations—based upon the similar sound they are perceived to elicit. The Anglophone learns early on to connect in the idea graphic formations such as /ow/, /oe/, and /ough/ (snow, toe, dough), for example, as all are capable of suggesting a similar vowel sound.

In this sense, the phono-graphic eidos would be where orthography meets sound, and it would enter into play whenever homophony is conceived between graphic structures. These might be words that elicit—either partially or completely, by themselves or in combination, within or between languages—the same idea in sound despite potentially varying orthographies: /dye/, /die/, /d’ail/, /tailles/. At the level of second articulation, these might be phonemes or syllables: /ai/ (French); /ay/ (English); /e/ (Spanish). Graphic formations demonstrating affinity in sound could come from the same or from different alphabetic codes as well.

Most all of the texts under examination here, because they demonstrate vocal pattern affinity through graphic and alphabetic (if not necessarily orthographic in the sense of “orthodoxically graphic”) constructions, will also demonstrate affinity in this particular eidos. From film dubbing onwards, one of the fundamental techniques of vocal pattern translation is to choose graphic constructions from the target language that recall source constructions in sound either broadly (/false move/→/fausse manoeuvre/) or more

closely in the case of schismatic translation (/yesterday/→/y'est-ce terre dé/). Affinity at this level is perhaps most pronounced in those schismatic translations that resemble phonemic transcription, that move between alphabetic codes, as I will discuss in chapter nine.

Section 3, Chapter 8

The Cratylian Modes

3.8.1 Accenting or Socio-lect Translation

The first Cratylian mode I would like to examine likely represents the overwhelming majority of inter-linguistically translated texts that also mark the voice. Coming back to Simon's metro analogy, a text's motivated vocal pattern often lights a path through the cultural landscape. Accenting, for my purposes, would be evident in a source text whose second articulation has been motivated in a way that deviates from orthographic norms, and in this deviation strives to imitate a mode of phonating that is specific to a cultural context. The accent of virtually any Robbie Burns poem, for example, would light a path through the Scottish countryside of the 18th century:

November chill **blaws** loud **wi'** angry **sugh**;
The **shart'ning** winter-day is near a close;
The **miry** beasts retreating **frae** the **pleugh**;
The **black'ning** trains o' **craws** to their repose. (Burns 1993: 100)

3.8.1.1 Accenting: A Type of Onomatopoeia

Of course, the moment one begins using the characters of language to imitate sounds, be these linguistic or non-linguistic, human or non-human, one ventures into the greater realm of onomatopoeia. The latter, by definition, is evident in any text whose second articulation strives to imitate any acoustic phenomenon whatsoever: this may be the imitation of distinctive regional accents or vernaculars, as I am discussing in this section. However, it could be many other types of sound imitation as well. For example, onomatopoeic constructions frequently imitate the sound patterns of affective, traumatized, or impaired speech arising from specific dramatic or narrative situations.

They also imitate all manner of non-linguistic and non-human sound phenomena. To put it simply, accenting would form a sub-category in the otherwise immense field of onomatopoeia. Wisdom would suggest, therefore, that I say a few words about these other modes of imitation, if only to set them apart and explain their lesser importance to my purpose.

The last two types of onomatopoeic imitation are of less interest to me here, and for the following reason: graphic formulations that imitate affective anomalies of pronunciation, or that imitate non-linguistic or non-human sounds, tend to be extremely localized, turning up here and there to describe momentary sound effects. These sudden bursts of acoustically motivated writing—comic book “zings,” “zangs,” and “vroum vroums”; an animal’s cry; a character’s stutter, cry of pain, or difficulty speaking because of a tongue caught in a mousetrap—undoubtedly generate excitement. However, both the sounds that they imitate and the situations that they specify tend to be fleeting. Moreover, unless they have been lexicalized (words like “screech”, or “hoorah”), or integrated into convention at some level, their status as linguistic sign is marginal at best. Rather, they tend to operate as sensory adjuncts or auxiliaries to other more conventional signs.

Onomatopoeia can be localized and fleeting, I have just suggested. When referencing non-human sounds, or human sounds other than phonated speech, it typically imitates acoustic phenomena as they surround or befall some protagonist in a narrative. Such formulations tend to burst out of the narrative’s progression as a sort of sound effects, but do not contribute much to this progression other than a certain sensationalism. Often they fade from memory as soon as they are read. Do I need the word

“whissssssssssssssssh” to understand that Dim is swinging his chain? Are those non-linguistic body noises of the Clockwork-Orange droogs (bzzzzzzzzzzzzrrrrrrrr) particularly memorable? Fleeting as well are those onomatopoeic constructions that imitate affected or traumatized speech. I have before me the Spanish comic strip *Mortadelo y Filemón* (Ibáñez 2004). At one moment, poor Mortadelo gets his tongue caught in a mousetrap and shrieks out: “!Ayyyyyyy. Qué dango me hangceeeeee!” (3D)

These sorts of onomatopoeia owe their fleeting nature perhaps to their marginal status as linguistic signs. Often they do not function as signs per se, but rather as sensory auxiliaries springing from the known context. Without this context, without prior knowledge of the types of sounds being imitated, these formulations often risk losing their mimetic and referential dimension altogether. Even in the rare case where a text is constructed entirely in mimetic sound effects—as examined in some detail earlier with the Futurist and Dadaist poets—the reader is usually provided with some perfectly conventional explanation of what is being imitated.

The Ball piece examined earlier, for example, provides a title to set the scene for its sonorous imitations: “Elephantenkarawane.” (1995) The same goes for virtually all of Marinetti’s onomatopoeic poetry, where the object of sonorous imitation invariably figures in the title. When properly performed, pieces like “The Bombing of Adrianapoli” or “The Microbe” (Marinetti 1984) are galvanizing. Their shrieks, whistles, automotive “clang-clangs,” machine-gun “ratatatatas” or test-tube “glubglubs” may well illustrate with a sensational vividness the context from which they spring. However, one would be foolish to suggest that in themselves, they have enough signifying power to generate this

context. Without its title, there would likely be very little of the elephant or the caravan in Ball's poem.

3.8.1.2 The Accent as Mark of Cultural Provenance

Graphic, onomatopoeic imitations of specific, socio-cultural modes of phonating are another matter entirely. They are not fleeting, nor do they exist merely as sound effect. Because they are human, rooted in regional linguistic practices, and because they make use of standard orthographic forms as a baseline from which to deviate, they not only function fully as linguistic signs, but they signify through this imitation *beyond* conventional designation. The way of phonating that they elicit can create powerful associations with vocal patterns deemed specific to, and ongoing within, a socio-cultural landscape.

They create associations with what is usually described as a “dialect,” an “idiolect,” a “vernacular,” or more recently a “socio-lect.” The latter, as Chapdelaine and Lane-Mercier point out, “désigne en sociolinguistique tout langage propre à un sous-groupe social déterminé... définissable à partir de critères proprement sociaux, culturels, économiques et institutionnels.” (Chapdelaine 1994: 7) Whatever the term of choice, and against whatever contextual or discursive backdrop one wishes to speculate on precisely what is being represented by this sort of sonorous imitation, I make a specific point of subscribing it to the rhetorical dimension implicit in the word “onomatopoeia.” The first and most obvious reason is a “sound” one: the type of socio-lectal representation under examination here is that which strives for an acoustic imitation in the graphic signifier's second articulation.

The second reason is that these representations are appreciable not only as evocative of those language groups they strive to imitate, but as a literary technique as well, a rhetorical device. Here is the angle from which I prefer to conceive this phenomenon of poetic accenting: as signifiers that are phonemically “non-standard” in their written representation. It is this deviation from standard orthography that generates a vector of signification leading the reader into the culturally specific. This vector is less dependent on any perceived accuracy of imitation than it is on the deviations that oppose it to a perceived language norm. Lane-Mercier and Chapdelaine put it well:

Se dessine de la sorte une dichotomie entre la langue officielle, correcte, non marquée et des langages « illégitimes », incorrects, marqués—dichotomie à la base d’une mise en place et du maintien de hiérarchies et de divisions langagières socialement pertinentes. (8)

The conception of these hierarchies and divisions is by no means based exclusively in the reader’s knowledge of the sociolect being imitated, but perhaps to a greater extent in his or her familiarity with standard usage and orthography. The representation of sociolectal sounds in writing assumes much of its significance as it is counter-defined to standard writing.

Take the following poem from Nicolás Guillén’s *Motivos de son* (1930), for example:

Búcate plata

Búcate plata
búcate plata
poqqe no doy un paso má:
etoy a arró con galleta,
na má.
Yo bien sé cómo etá to,
pero biejo, hay que comé:
búcate plata

búcate plata
 poqqe me boy a corré.
 Depué dirán que soy mala,
 y no me quedrán tratá,
 pero amó con hambre, biejo,
 ¡qué ba!
 Con tanto sapato nuebo,
 ¡qué ba!
 Con tanto reló, compadre,
 ¡qué ba!
 Con tanto lujo, mi negro,
 ¡qué ba! (Guillén 2003: 48)

This is Guillén's native Cuban dialect, specifically that of the Afro-Cuban slave class. These metaplasmodically altered graphemes profile a dialect of Spanish that routinely drops final fricatives, aspirate and liquid sounds, as well as entire syllables both from the ends of words (/arró/, /na má/, /tratá/) and from articulating positions at the subword level (/bucate/, /etoy/, /poqqe/, /depué/).

Moreover, they set up an implicit dialogue between more localized modes of speaking and the Castilian norm. Is this a dialogue of conflict, as the Afro-Cuban mode of phonation usurps traditional Spanish orthography? Is Guillén fabricating a socio-lect to pit against the language orthodoxy of the dominant culture, like Michel Tremblay closer to home? Is he experimenting with the expressive horizons of Spanish by exploring new orthographic possibilities? Or is he simply singing the song of his own culture through its own voice, which is his voice? All of these are valid questions, and they spring not from the plight of an angry housewife who needs money, but from the way this angry housewife phonates her plight.

Another question arises. Does the reader have to comprehend the exact provenance of this dialect, or is the evidence of accent inscription alone sufficient to

begin asking these questions? It would seem that one does not necessarily have to be familiar with Spanish regional dialects to infer that some distinct mode of phonating is being pitted against some standard mode, and this inference alone seems enough to beg many of the questions just asked. Regardless of the specific cultures involved, the text's specificity of vocal pattern opens a breach, a conceptual "écart," between orthodox and unorthodox modes of expression, even if this "écart"—both in the "norm" and the "deviation" it implies—is an illusion generated by a technical artifice, as I will soon discuss.

Another significant vector rises out of this poem's vocal motivation: a subjective one. Doubtless the most important distinction between this sort of pattern imitation and those other onomatopoeic forms is its profoundly human dimension. A way of phonating language is very much like a finger print, and so a phonetic anomaly that permeates the speech of a character has the immediate effect of distinguishing that character from all others, even if the reader has no other clue as to his or her identity. When onomatopoeic formulations imitate non-human, non-linguistic phenomenon, they have a certain generic quality. Given similar circumstances, any chain like Dim's would go "whisssssshhhhh!" Any machine gun, when fired, would go "ratatatatatat."

Only one human voice, however, could emit language in the way this woman does in this instance. The reader does not know who she is by name, by any other conventional cue or defining characteristic. Nor does her situation, gathered by the poem's basic information, really distinguish her from the myriad other women one could imagine in her predicament. Her renegade speech pattern, however, goes a long way in suggesting a vocal profile, around which a sense of the particular woman behind the

monologue might be imagined. Her speech is evidently accelerated, with little care afforded to articulate precision. There is also a hint of the unrefined in her reduction of subtle phonemic distinctions—between /v/ and /b/—to the simplest possible articulation, the universal /b/. Moreover, compulsive repetition of clipped, exclamatory phrases reveal her anger toward her worthless husband. Those “!qué ba!’s” virtually bark off the page.

3.8.1.2.1 Inscribing the Accent: A Medium, a Technique

It would be naïve, however, to assume that what Guillén offers here is a phonetic blueprint of a voice “prise sur le vif,” that he has somehow caught the subject and his or her culture in the reality of its vocal gesturing. This text, like any other, is art and therefore artifice, at least to an extent. Guillén’s artistic medium does not “capture a voice,” or even a Cuban way of phonating, really. Rather, it constructs a representation of this voice using a specific compositional technique.

This medium is of course the written word. I argued in the second section that writing in the phonetic alphabet offers a substantial gift to vocal representation, the gift of its orthodoxy, its normalizing effect on language, first of all. I would recall the principle of the constructed dragon. Standard orthography creates a strong conceptual sense of the sound classes involved in pronouncing words. In so doing, it generates and sustains the illusion of a vocal orthodoxy that does not really exist, of some standard, non-motivated way of phonating language. At the very least, standard orthography provides a conceptual baseline of neutrality, from which any deviation might be appreciated.

Then of course there is the gift of unorthodox representation through the written word’s malleable second articulation, the principle of the floating dragon. Here the

metaplastically altered word pits itself against standard orthography, and the breach between modes of phonating becomes evident. This is perhaps the most important insight into this mode of representation: accenting is very much founded in a writing technique. Vocal anomaly is represented through graphic anomaly, through the reader's consciousness of how Spanish "should" and "should not" be written. This consciousness, for its part, is generated by the metaplastic disruption of the otherwise unquestioned sound-conceptual anchors set by orthographic norms.

It is easy enough to illustrate this disruption. On the left is Guillén's metaplastically figured poem. On the right is a conventional Castilian baseline. Adjoined phonemes, syllables and words are presented in outline in the figured source text. I have also counted the addition of the Spanish stress accent as a type of vowel adjunction (*arró*, *comé*). As for suppressed and substituted phonemes, syllables and words, these are marked in the baseline text as struck through (~~a~~), and in bold (**a**) respectively:

Búcate plata	Búscate plata
Búcate plata	Búscate plata
búcate plata	búscate plata
poqqe no doy un paso má:	porque no doy un paso más
etoy a arr ^é con galleta,	estoy a arroz con galleta
na má.	nada más.
Yo bien sé cómo etá to,	Yo bien sé cómo está to e
pero biejo, hay que com ^é :	pero viejo, hay que comer:
búcate plata	búscate plata
búcate plata	búscate plata
poqqe me boy a corr ^é .	porque me voy a correr.
Depué dirán que soy mala,	Después dirán que soy mala,
y no me quedrán trat ^á ,	y no me querrán tratar,
pero amó con hambre, biejo,	pero amor con hambre, viejo
¡qué ba!	¡qué va!
Con tanto sapato nuebo,	Con tanto zapato nuevo,
¡qué ba!	¡qué va!

Con tanto rel ., compadre, ¡qué ba! Con tanto lujo, mi negro, ¡qué ba! (48)	Con tanto reloj, compadre, ¡qué va! Con tanto lujo, mi negro, ¡qué va!
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Such metaplasms are even quantifiable, if one likes. There are 34 in total here, privileging suppression at the phoneme and syllable levels. Notable is the typical Cuban omission of /s/ and /r/ before consonantal stops like /c/ (búscate), /t/ (estoy), and /p/ (después), and /q/ (porque), as well as the omission of final liquids and aspirates like /r/ (tratar) and /j/ (reloj).

The medium of the written word, as well as the technique of metaplasms, are responsible for constructing a representation of something called the Afro-Cuban accent. Vitally important is this distinction of the technical plane from that of representation, and of representation from the essentialist notion of the cultural entity being represented. It is important, because these planes elicit very different questions, are subject to different types of debate. Is there such a thing as a Cuban voice or accent? What modes of conceptualizing culture inform this notion of a group bound by a way of phonating language? Supposing there were such a thing, how would it manifest through the technique of representation employed here? Simply put, just what is being represented and how?

The “what” is of course highly problematic. Is this an Afro-Cuban accent? Most certainly not. Is this a valid representation of said accent? Maybe, and maybe not. The answer would depend entirely on the reader’s cultural experience, on the text triggering through its orthographic anomalies a sort of phonological memory of speech associated

with this region. The “how,” on the other hand, the technical strategy involved in constructing this representation, is much easier to circumscribe. It is easier to see what Guillén has done to achieve his effect than to determine whether or not he has achieved it. This technique raises its own set of questions, however: the greatest perhaps being the one discussed in the fourth chapter of this dissertation, namely the nature of the relationship between the written and spoken word, and the ways in which the written word adapts to represent the vocal flux.

3.8.1.2.2 Translating the Accent: Parallelism

Translating this sort of vocally motivated language naturally means coming to grips with all of the factors just discussed: 1. The source’s mode of phonating describes a crucial vector of signification. 2. This vector has the effect of distinguishing the poetic voice in its cultural provenance and its subjectivity. 3. This effect is ultimately founded in a writing technique opposing metaplasmodically altered language to an orthographic norm. The first factor would prevent the translator from simply reducing the vocal pattern of the source to standard English. The second and third would orient him/her toward certain strategies for constructing a target that demonstrates a similar sort of cultural/subjective specificity, as well as a similar writing technique.

The result is usually a type of vocal parallelism. The translator gets a sense of these cultural specificities and tensions described by the source text’s mode of phonating: between linguistic norm and variation, between the orthodox and unorthodox speech practices of dominant and marginalized groups. Here is the voice of the Afro-Cuban poor usurping Castilian orthographic norms. Here is a sort of agonistic struggle played

out through language sounds. Implicit in Guillén's accenting is a history of colonization, slavery, skirmishes between the cultural centre and the margin. The translator would then search for some parallel nexus involving interacting cultures in the history of the translating language. If English is the translating language, British imperial culture in the West Indies may offer a fitting parallel. Keith Ellis, himself a native Jamaican, translates Guillén's poem using an English accented to reflect Jamaican pronunciation:

Go Get Money	Go Get Money
Go get money, go get money, for a <u>ca</u>n go a step fuder: a <u>da</u>wn to rice and crackers, dat's all. A <u>da</u> know very well how tings are, but goodness man, a <u>da</u> got to eat: go get money go get money, else a <u>da</u> goin' see anod <u>da</u>. Den dey'll say a <u>da</u> bad and won't want to deal wid me, but love wid hunga', man what de hell! Wid so much new shoes, what de hell! Wid so much watches, mi fren', what de hell! Wid so much luxuries, mi brod <u>da</u>, what de hell! (Guillén 2003:49)	Go get money, go get money, for I can't go a step further: I'm down to rice and crackers, that's all. I know very well how things are, but goodness man, I got to eat: go get money go get money, or else I'm going to see another. Then they'll say I'm bad and won't want to deal with me, but love with hunger, man what the hell! With so much new shoes, what the hell! With so much watches, my friend, what the hell! With so much luxuries, my brother, what the hell!

Here, I count a similar number of metaplastic transformations (38 or so). Ellis seems to privilege phonemic substitution. Some familiar traits of the Jamaican dialect include this flattening of the diphthong and the prolongation of first person pronoun (/I/→/Ah/; /can't/→/cahn/). There is also the familiar reduction of the fricative /th/ to the stop /t/

(/things/→/tings/). A similar metaplasism occurs with voice, as /th/ becomes /d/ (/brother/→/brodda/; /the/→/de/). Finally, the suppression of final consonants that also typifies Guillén's source (/friend/→/fren'/; /hunger/→/hunga'/). There may even be a type of compound metaplasism occurring in transformations like (/I'm bad/→/Ah bad/; /I'm going/→/Ah goin'/) as English orthography undergoes an initial contraction: /I am bad/→/I'm bad/, only then to receive Ellis's accent: /I'm bad/→/Ah bad/.

The same goes for Ellis's translation as for Guillén's original. What is a Jamaican accent, and has Ellis represented it here? Maybe and maybe not. Are the tensions between British and West Indian cultures comparable to those opposing Spanish and Afro-Cuban cultures? Once again, these are questions that I would be in a poor position to address in this dissertation. More relevant here, once again, is the "how." What technical strategy has Ellis employed to construct his parallel representation? Evidently, Ellis follows Guillén in his writing technique, even though he deviates substantially in the new cultural nexus he uses.

I would venture to argue that attention to writing technique has effectively trumped any desire to give a sense of the source text's specific cultural provenance. More relevant for Ellis than the source text's Cuban roots, is this series of inter-cultural breeches opened by Guillén's writing technique: the breach between orthographic norm and deviation; and through this a breach between dominant and marginal language use; and through this a breach between dominant and marginalized groups. Once this is understood, then virtually any other language, with its own orthographic norms and its socio-cultural deviations, could serve as a model for translation.

3.8.1.2.3 Translating a Technique, Not a Pattern

It is obvious that with this first Cratylan mode of negotiating vocal patterns, the translator is not really concerned with creating an eidetic affinity between the patterns of source and target. There is nothing in Ellis's translation that would recall the source text's passage from one second articulator to the next. The rule of langue trumps that of the text considered as sound tissue or weave. Global substitutions of radically differing sound structures within differing language systems are still in play at this early stage in my centripetal progression. At this point it would be abusive to attempt a connection between Guillén's source and Ellis's target in any of the vocal ideas presented earlier.

What emerges from Ellis's translation of Guillen's accents, rather than an affinity in vocal patterns, is an affinity in technical strategy regarding the representation of these patterns in writing. In both the source and the target, one detects the methodical, metaplastic inscription of a breach between culturally normative and deviant modes of phonating. I chose this type of negotiation for my very first Cratylan example, because it represents an approach to translating that regards the motivated vocal pattern of the source as crucial to higher semantic regimes, but that does not yet attempt to reconstruct the pattern itself in the target text. From here, I would propose to take a further centripetal step and address another mode that makes inroads into a more concrete pattern affinity, specifically the foreign language dubbing of films.

3.8.2 Foreign Language Film Dubbing

The voice of the accented text lights a path through the socio-cultural landscape. The voice of the cinematic film lights a path through the moving image. In *Cratylus* (1998),

as I discussed in the last section, there is a running analogy—better to say a running confusion—between the sonorous patterns of the verbal language sign and the visual patterns of the iconic sign, of the portrait or image. Cratylus's position, just to recall, is that the verbal sign imitates its object sonorously in the same way that a painting imitates its object iconographically. In other words, the sounds making up the word /dragon/ would be so suited to the fierce animal that they would serve interchangeably with any image for the purpose of invoking it. The next step in this baffling logic would be to conclude that the animal's image and the sounds making up its name are literally of one essence, that they serve somehow to structure each other.

The verbal sounds of language structure the image to which they refer: the notion is intriguing, because as linguistically counterintuitive as it seems, it is nevertheless apt in characterizing the nature of contemporary audio-visual media, specifically cinema. Cinematic language sounds and images do indeed structure each other, if in a very specific sense. To be sure, the sounds of the word /dog/ uttered in a film still do not bite, nor do they structure the image of the biting animal. However, they can and routinely do structure the image of the moving body—the lips, face and hands—that articulates them. Implicitly Cratylus is the rapport that binds the sign's vocal pattern to this image, for it is a rapport of strict structural compatibility. A rose by any other name may smell as sweet, to recall Hermogenes' position, but only a rose by the name /r-o-s-e/ could possibly suit the motion of Juliet's lips as she utters the word from the balcony. The vocal pattern is as one with the image of its own phonetic articulation, an image that—along with the aromatic flower itself—it may be said to signify.

3.8.2.1 Cinematic Fusion of Image and Sound: “Synchresis”

Cinema’s implicitly Cratylan dimension naturally implicates a complex relationship forged between image and sound, a relationship that warrants some brief examination before approaching the question of foreign language dubbing. How does one go about conceptualizing this relationship? Is one held to the traditional notion of cinema as a montage of moving images compounded with secondary or auxiliary sound supports? Is a film first and foremost a moving image emitting a sound? Or could one interpret a film as a ballet of sorts, a creative montage of sounds—verbal, musical and otherwise—whose structures are represented visually in the movements of the image track? Is it the cinematic tree I see falling in the woods that emits the sound of cracking wood, or is it the sound of axes and cracking wood that emits the image of the falling tree?

The answer to these questions is moot, really, for closer examination of the principle involved in integrating cinematic image and sound reveals both of these positions to be the result of an illusion created through the artful *synchrony* of semiotic regimes. The relation between image and sound is not really co-substantive, as the spectator/auditor is led to believe. This is to say that cinematic images do not emit sounds any more than cinematic sounds emit images. The reality is that these sounds and images occur, quite simply, *at the same time*. The image of the tree falling occurs at the precise moment that the sound of cracking wood does. Any one illusion resulting from this synchrony is quite worth another. In the mind of the spectator, the tree may as well go /crack/ as the /crack/ paints the image of a tree.

Synchrony is the real technique by which images and sounds are fused. Temporality is behind the integration of cinema’s five autonomous tracks: the moving

image, recorded language sound, recorded noises, recorded musical sounds, and writing (credits, sub-titles and inter-titles). One could argue that much of the cinematic whole is neither image nor sound. A fifth—albeit a crucial and defining fifth—of this whole involves the treatment of images. Three fifths involves treatment of sounds, verbal and otherwise. However, not one component of this whole, considered by itself or in integration with other components, escapes the rule of time.

These five tracks, even when running together in a screening, demonstrate a substantive autonomy from each other. They function in parallel as isolatable and individually variable strata in the cinematic medium. This is to say that any one of them can be separated from the rest, shut off, altered, or replaced without affecting the progress of the others. Any film dubbed in a foreign language replaces language and text tracks without altering image or music tracks, for example. Subtitled films both replace and add text tracks. There are also instances when a film is re-released with a substituted music track. April of 2006, for example, marks the re-release of *The Wizard of Oz* (1939), its music substituted with Pink Floyd's *The Dark Side of the Moon* (1973), in order to create *The Dark Side of Oz* (2006). Finally, any black and white film that has been colorized has had its image track globally altered without any change to the text, language, sound and music tracks.

Substantively, then, these five tracks demonstrate a degree of autonomy from each other. Temporally, however, they are utterly inter-dependent. In the sequencing of their effects, measured by the millisecond, not one of these tracks stands alone. Each is conceived, rather, in precise relativity with all the others. It is this exacting temporal relativity, this synchrony, which creates and sustains the illusion of co-substantiality

discussed earlier. Put simply, in cinema, synchrony entails “synthesis.” When I hear the wood cracking and see the tree falling at precisely the same instant, I believe that the image is making the sound and vice versa. Film theorist Michel Chion (1994) has coined the term “synchresis”—a combination of the words synchrony and synthesis—to characterize this illusion. “Synchresis” would be the notion that the synchronically aligned patterns of autonomous film tracks effectively fuse together in the mind of the spectator/auditor, that they absorb each other.

Chion defines synchresis as a sort of “*trompe-l’oreille*,” an illusion of image-sound co-substantiality through the artifice of synchronization. Because time is at the heart of the technique, virtually any sound pattern can be synchronized with a film’s image track to generate the illusion. Covered by the tic-tic-tic of a typewriter, Chion suggests, a shot of a moving train is spontaneously interpreted as the tic-tic-tac of a moving train. So thoroughgoing is this *trompe-l’oreille*, that cinema routinely defines for its spectators many of those exotic sounds that they have yet to hear in real life. Ask someone to imitate the sound of a gun or a bomb, and chances are their reference will be some syncretic illusion generated by cinema.

3.8.2.2 Foreign Language Film Dubbing: a *Trompe-l’Oreille*

The foreign language dubbing of a film is perhaps the most methodical form of cinematic *trompe-l’oreille*. The idea, of course, is to substitute a film’s original language track with a translated foreign-language track. The latter is re-integrated synchronically with the original, whose other tracks remain for the most part unchanged. It is the most methodical type of *trompe-l’oreille*, because it strives to re-create what is by far the most complex of all syncretic illusions, that which welds together audible language patterns

with a visible pattern of moving lips. Of the distinct modes of phonating described by a film's language track—"on-off screen, (whether one sees the source of the language sound); diegetic/non-diegetic (whether the language sound issues from the fictive world or not); direct or post-synchronized (whether the sound was recorded in concurrence with shooting or afterwards)"—dubbing targets that mode, which is most directly related to visible gesturing: synchronous phonation, or the exact co-relation between moving lips and heard speech." (Stamm 2000: 216).

To synchronize visible lip movements and the audible vocal patterns of the language track is to sustain the delicate illusion that those lips on the screen are speaking those words. To recall Cratylus, in cinema the object of the audible verbal sign is now also the moving image, a visual pattern to which the sign's acoustic pattern is perfectly suited. The movement of this image is both part of the audible sign's structure and part of its signification. Cinema has the potential to convert any audible language sign into the dynamic portrait of its own phoneticity, its own visible movement through time. Synchronizing a new target language with a source image's phoneticity is the goal of foreign language film dubbing, a goal that is as counterintuitive linguistically as it is often surprisingly achieved.

3.8.2.2.1 Film Dubbing and the Phonetic Eidos

Doubtless the most intriguing aspect of the film dubbing process is its counterintuitive goal, which becomes apparent the moment one considers the vocal eidos it strives to translate. Dubbing is about synchronizing a foreign language track with a source image's speech movements. The idea is to formulate a translation that not only turns the source

text inter-linguistically, but also describes a phonetic affinity with the source image. By “phonetic,” just to recall, I am referring to the physiological movement of speech articulators (lips, tongue, glottis, the muscles of respiration, etc.) It is the film dubber’s task to isolate those segments of the image track that display the greatest visible detail in phonetic movement, and then to create a foreign language track that feeds back, as seamlessly as possible, into this original movement.

Such a process is linguistically counterintuitive. Film dubbing attempts to generate the syncretic illusion—to cheat the ear—by means of an artifice that runs against certain natural laws of speech production and cognition. Normally, the phonetic is the realm of expressive variability in language. Language perception involves being bombarded with a speech stream of potentially limitless phonetic variation. As no two movements of the body can ever be exactly identical, no word is ever heard exactly the same way twice. Language users, however, are born with an innate ability to reduce phonetic variance to the phono-structures that compose the known signifiers of language. To put it simply, out of phonetic difference in speech phenomena, language users normally derive phono-structural affinities.

Dubbing effectively reverses this paradigm, and with intriguing results. First of all, the film’s language track is translated inter-linguistically, which produces a target track that is radically different phono-structurally from the source. Then, this target language track is re-synchronized with the source image track, during which time it is re-motivated to achieve a certain harmony with the phonetic movements of the image. In other words, two different languages, two radically differing phono-structures, are made to structure the same phonetic image, the same visible movement of face, lips and tongue.

The natural law seems effectively reversed: within profound phono-structural variance, the film dubber attempts to derive phonetic affinities.

3.8.2.2.2 Synchronian: The Film Dubber's Motivated Language

Accomplishing this involves a complex process of transcription, translation, adaptation and re-vocalization, all of which generates a singular sort of translationese: that somewhat unnatural or synthetic sounding language that one hears in dubbed films; that language that comes across as something half-way between an actual dialogue between film characters and a voice-over by foreign language commentators. This translationese has even been given an informal name by the French dubbing community: "synchronien" (in English "synchronian"). It is Luise von Flotow who brought this term to my attention, and she describes it as "the artificial version of spoken language that [dubbing actors] talk in film, and which translators assemble under the direction of the studio." (Von Flotow 2005: 2)

Naturally, the film-goer's experience of synchronian is passive. He or she will be struck by the film character who not only speaks in an alien tongue, but speaks that tongue in a way alien to the aliens themselves. This receptive and passive angle, however, does not intrigue me nearly as much as the active, authorial angle implied in the term itself, which evokes a language literally constructed out of cinematic time, a language created out of the source film's phono-temporal motion. Understanding synchronian means understanding the dubbing process out of which it is created. The process and technique I will demonstrate here is the one developed by French studios, the so-called "bande rythmo." Involved here is an elaborate, step-by-step writing process resulting in a text that is quite literally scripted in film time, a text containing in itself the

temporal and phonetic cues to guide the performing voice as it reads the translation back into the image track.

3.8.2.3 The Dubbing Process

There are essentially three scribes at work in the dubbing process. The first is a translator in the traditional sense, who converts the text of the source film into the foreign language; the second is a “detector,” the third an “adaptor” or “dialogist.” The relationship between the translator and these two other figures is not the traditional writer-editor relationship. Rather, the translator is part of a writing team, and is aware from the outset that his or her text will be adapted, perhaps extensively, when fitted back into the moving image. Text-image synchrony is not the translator’s primary concern, moreover. He or she might view the original film to gain an idea of the interaction between image and language sound, but his or her primary working medium remains the film’s script.

3.8.2.3.1 Detection

The second scribe is more directly concerned with the text-image relationship. The detector’s task is to perform a sort of phonetic reconnaissance mission, to compare analytically the original film’s language and image tracks. This analysis involves transcribing the language track onto what is called a “bande mère,” which is a ribbon of 35 mm film. It is in this transcription that the detector encodes his or her analysis, marking first of all the phonetic features of the language track considered in concert with the image. As a general rule, only a handful of these features are considered important, specifically those displaying the greatest visible detail and expressive range of movement: labials like /b/ and /p/, and labiodentals like /f/ and /v/, as well as rounded

vowels /oo/. Marked as well are temporal pauses before, during and after speech, as well as the order and visual detail of the montage. Jean Yvane gives a sense of the types of symbols that can mark the detected text:

P.I. Première image	↑ Pre-articulation pause
↓ Post-articulation pause	_ Labials
^ Rounded Vowel	> Open mouth
_ Off	Camara shift
P.E. Plan éloigné	P.G. Plan général
G.P. Gros plan	D.I. Dernière image
(Yvane 1996 : 136)	


Of course, these symbols are not rigidly codified and the detector has a margin of freedom to adapt them according to the medium's near infinite phonetic possibilities. Generally speaking, the detector is free to mark everything from the overall mood of the characters to breathing patterns, forcible language gestures like yelling and crying, rises in pitch, or non-linguistic verbal sounds like lip smacking or whistling. To mark, in short, the mouth and face's expressive dance as it bodies the text forth.

3.8.2.3.2 The Detector's Temporal Metaplasms

Marking visible moods and phonetic features is not the only task of the detector, however. He or she must also perform a temporal re-inscription of the original language track. In synchrony, speech and image demonstrate together their own unique organization in film time. Words and phrases can be uttered slowly and with careful measure (in a courtroom scene, perhaps), or they can be torn off with colloquial rapidity (as in the clipped exchanges of action film characters). To inscribe this temporal organization, the detector makes a certain length of the bande correspond to a number of

milliseconds of film time. Then, he or she re-writes the source language track, all the while compressing and dilating text letters to occupy their allotted time.

This is one instance where modern typography does not suffice for inscribing the plasticity of vocal execution into the signifier, for “floating the dragon” as it were. Rather the detector uses Indian ink and calligraphic inscription. Here is a digitized section of a bande mère that demonstrates this principle of temporal compression and dilation, as well as the use of calligraphic inscription lain over traditional typography:³



What is most striking about this bit of track is its retrieval of outmoded technological forms. I am reminded of another notion of Marshall McLuhan, that of “reversal.” (McLuhan 1964) His idea is that a technology can become accelerated to a vortical speed, which means that it can become so advanced that it involutes or describes a return to the older technologies from which it evolved. Here I see a perfect example of such involution as accelerated computing technology retrieves its ancestral forms in orderly succession. The oldest and the most important form in this paradigm is the spoken word, which is represented most palpably in the amplitudes of the spectrograph, and which receives top position in the clip. Next in line comes the manuscripted or calligraphic word, the second oldest medium and the next here in order of importance, being the

³ http://www.dubstudio.com/images/rythmoband_clip_image002.jpg (site consulted 11/04/05)

textual dimension of the translation. Finally, relegated to the third and least important position is typography or print form, which is younger than both speaking and writing, but which is couched innocuously underneath the calligraphy and does not seem to have any operative function here whatsoever.

It is in the cursive writing or calligraphy that the principle of metaplasma becomes manifest. Typographic forms are obviously deemed insufficient to the task of representing the voice, and so the film's text must be taken in hand, as it were. It must be "manuscripted" in the most literal sense. A type of manual extension and compression is needed, one that only the writing hand can provide. It is as if the film's text were taken up, kneaded, stretched and compressed in its second articulation like a sort of bread dough, in order to occupy the necessary temporal space. Film time in milliseconds ticks away across the top of the track. Just underneath is a spectrograph describing the amplitude of vocal sounds in the phases of their production. Underneath that is the calligraphy itself, which is made to scroll from right to left across the track. Finally, intersecting with the text is a vertical marker, which is the reader's most important landmark. The sound passing under the marker is the one being phonated in any given millisecond. Naturally, this calligraphic kneading gives individual sounds as long or short a passage under the marker as is necessary to fill out their temporal allotment.

The preceding example is rather simplistic however, as only one film voice is speaking. Of course, there are often multiple voices on the source film's language track speaking at once, all synchronizing polyphonically. The detector must deal with this situation as well. While marking phonetic gestures temporally along the horizontal, he

or she also uses the vertical space of the bande to layer two or more simultaneous voices, as in the following clip⁴ :

12.05.14

↑ _____ (angry) h↑ He can't do that!
We must do something. uhh h...

This would be a bit of dialogue between two screen characters speaking simultaneously. On the top, the detector has marked voice 1 as “angry.” This voice has obviously suffered a couple of “false starts,” been cut off at an initial /h/ by the interrupting voice 2 underneath. Between each false start is a lapse of time—the first longer, the second shorter—marked by the upward arrow (the symbol for pre-articulation pause), and the length of the flat line. During speech as well, the prolongation of vowels in voice 1’s /that/ and voice 2’s /something/ is marked by a “stretching out” over the lapse of film time they occupy.

In addition to the synchronization of phonetic gesturing with the image, one sees marked in this bit of dialogue another type of synchronization that is no less important, one occurring in the vertical space of the bande in order to align the sounds of the two speaking voices. The flat lines that one sees in mid-articulation (/uhh__h/, and /somethi__ng/) presumably extend the vowels or consonants they follow, delaying the end of the word so that it may be pronounced in precise synchrony with a sound from the

⁴ http://www.dubstudio.com/images/rythmoband_clip_image002.jpg (consulted 11/04/05)

voice above or beneath. Voice 1's /h/, for example, would sync up with the /m/ in voice 2's /something/. Voice 2 would prolong the last syllable of /something/, during which time voice 1 would speak the word /he/. Between /do/ and /that/ would come a short pause for voice 1 while voice 2 extends its dazed /uhhhhh/.


This polyphonic principle, whereby vocal sounds are synchronized along the vertical, becomes especially important in the adapting phase of the process, when the foreign language track is synchronized with the source track. Before I proceed to this next phase, however, I would point out something that should be patently clear from this example. The logic guiding the detector as he or she re-inscribes the source language track has little to do with this track's first articulation. Neither this inscription of phonetic temporality, nor this synchronization of phonemes along the vertical have anything to do with the synthesis of grammatical language patterns—or even signifying ones for that matter. The detector is not listening for subjects, predicates or arguments. Rather, all vocal sounds that can be seen as moving lips on the screen are synchronized in time and with each other polyphonically, meaningful or not. The detector, like the adaptor afterwards, works in film language's second articulation.

3.8.2.3.3 Adaptation: Phonetic Affinity through Phonemic Alignment

After detection, another scribe intervenes: the adaptor or dialogist. The latter works primarily with the translator's foreign language text and with the detector's *bande mère*. His or her task is to adapt the translator's text to the temporally re-inscribed, phonetically marked source language track on the *bande*. The technique he or she employs is similar to one the detector uses to synchronize polyphonic dialogues. The idea there, just to

recall, was to use the vertical space of the bande to coordinate the sounds of all relevant voices with each other in time.

The adaptor performs a similar vertical layering, comparison and temporal coordination. He or she transcribes the foreign language track just underneath the detected source language track. Then begins the adapting process, where the target text is adjusted both phonemically and temporally to fit the source. The ideal is to achieve a situation where both source and target, when aligned vertically, display some common phonemic properties, properties that would require the dubbing actor to produce phonetic movements comparable to those produced by the lips on the screen. Here is an example of such an alignment:



This bit of track is a strong indicator of how similar phonemic structures are made to line up temporally in the vertical space between source and dubbed language tracks. Just to recall, the most important phonetic cues from the source are the visible labials, labiodentals and rounded vowels. In this clip are a number of aligned or near-aligned phonemic properties that would subsequently harmonize the dubbing actor's vocal gesture with that of the character on the screen. There are the perfectly aligned labiodentals /f/ and sibilants /s/ in ("false"→"fausse") and the labial /m/ ("move"→"manoeuvre"). Near alignments can be detected between the /n/s of /one/ and /une/, as well as between the /t/s of /train/ and /train/.

The foreign language track's temporality is organized around this phonemic alignment. If certain elements of second articulation are to line up on the vertical paradigm in the manner just discussed, then other surrounding elements of the new foreign language track would have to be adjusted temporally to fit, to be compressed or dilated on the horizontal. In other words, these aligned phonemes generate landmarks around which to organize the rest of the French language enunciation temporally. For example, the alignment of /f/'s in /false/ and /fausse/ would necessarily entail a temporal compression of /une seule/, which would have to be articulated more precipitously, as two French words fitting into the temporal space of the English /one/.

Perfect or near perfect temporal alignment is not the adaptor's only concern, however. He or she also keeps in mind what I would call a "summative phonetic effect" of the *bande mère*. In the rapidity of on-screen enunciation, the spectator usually has no precise appreciation of any one visible phonetic movement, unless of course this movement is pronounced with particular expressive force, as is often the case in obscene words and epithets. In general, the spectator achieves only a broad sense of a flow of multiple gestures. For this reason, the adaptor fits his or her foreign language track with many phonemic structures that are only vaguely approximative, ones that do not match up precisely but could presumably cheat the ear. For example, there is a broad phonetic similarity in the second articulators of /move/ and /manoeuvre/. /They/ and /et ils/ have a broad affinity in their diphthong.

Perhaps the best example of this alignment in "summative phonetic effect" occurs between the structures /off the train/ and /en bas du train/. It begins with the alignment of the labial /b/ in /bas/ with the approximative labio-dental /f/ in /off/. Then, the English

voice recedes back into the relatively invisible, and rhythmically unstressed, inter-dental /the/. The adaptor glides the French text through this point of non-stress with a temporal extension of the vowel in /bas/, then arrives at /du train/, two words which would bear their strongest phonetic resemblance with the single English word /train/. Articulating both, one produces essentially the same two movements, a rounding of lips after the initial alveolar—French /du/, English /tr/—and a subsequent opening out onto the vowel /ain/. To exploit this resemblance, the adaptor organizes an entire cluster of French phonemes, those of /du/ and the initial /t/ in /train/ to phonate in the orbit of the English /train/'s initial /t/.


This summative phonetic effect creates the illusion of an affinity that really is not there. As I have just discussed, in the preceding example there are only three alignments that one might call precise: /f/ and /s/ in **false/fausse**; and /m/ **move/manoeuvre**. However, when considered together with all of the “near hits”, all of the French sounds that vaguely approximate the time and lip movements of the source, then the illusion of a much closer affinity emerges. Well over half of the formants seem about the same: **one false move and they'll toss us off the train (/n, fs, move, ey'll, f, train/)** → **Une seule fausse manoeuvre et ils nous jettent en bas du train (/n, fs, m, oeuvre, et ils, b, du train).**

Of all speech producing movements, that of visible articulating lips is paramount in the adaptor's consideration. However, lips are not only moving articulators involved in speech production. To use the language of pragmatic linguistics, every utterance forms the nucleus of a veritable constellation of gestures. The concept seems to be cellular metaphor, whereby the language is seen as the center of a complex of movements

radiating outward from the flux of respiratory muscles to the movements of glottis, tongue and lips, to accompanying facial gestures like the raising of eyebrows, the tensing of the jaw line, gesturing of head and hands, etc. Ideally, the adaptor's efforts should synchronize the target language not only with the moving lips of the image track, but with the entire array of gestures surrounding it. Thomas Herbst, in "A Pragmatic Approach to Dubbing," calls this global attention "nucleus synching." (Herbst 1987: 22)

3.8.2.3.4 Re-vocalization

Once the foreign language text has been adapted to the language and image tracks of the source, then comes a final transcription and the actual re-vocalization. The adapted foreign language track is transferred onto the larger bande rythmo, which will ultimately scroll across the top of the film screen and in synchrony with the moving image, to be read by a performing actor and ultimately mixed into the film's other tracks. The technical principle behind the reading is demonstrated in the earlier example provided:



This is a bande mère, but it still demonstrates the dynamic temporal principle governing the re-vocalization of the foreign language track. As the latter scrolls over the screen in time with the image, the text passes under a vertical marker that tells the actor what

sound is being voiced in any given millisecond of film time. The actor—or actors in a polyphonic scene—reads along with the scrolling foreign language text.

“Reads along” is probably an unfair way of putting it, for beyond the technical dimension of the reading is of course an equally important artistic dimension. Dubbing actors are not only required to read, but to find their characters and play them convincingly. Conjugating these technical and artistic dimensions raises its own set of difficulties, and for this reason any one fragment of dialogue usually requires multiple takes in a given session. This is especially the case with polyphonic dubbing, where several actors have to speak in concert. Their job is in some ways more difficult than that of the original performing actors, whose vocalization was not bound temporally to any previous one, whose script was not written in synchronian.

Without doubt the greatest difficulty raised by this conjugation of technical and artistic processes, for the dubbing actor at least, is the incarnation of this synthesized language, this synchronian. Ironically enough, all of these temporal metaplasms and phonemic alignments, all that is undertaken in the quest for synchretic illusion, results in film language that seems neither completely of the film and its characters, nor of the foreign language reality as it is produced by the speaking community at large. Von Flotow puts it simply: synchronian seems to be a “langage de nulle part.” (2001) “De nullepart” is perhaps putting it a bit over-dramatically. There is something of artistic sensibility in such a statement. It is not really that difficult to surmise where synchronian comes from, given the process just discussed. The choice of the French “une fausse manoeuvre” for “one false move” is motivated by all of these phonemic and synchronic alignments, and not exclusively by the criterion of what a Francophone character might

or might not say in the same situation. When one is aware of the entire process, this “*langage de nulle part*” could just as easily be described as a Cratylan “*langage de toutes parts*,” the result of a striving toward the best-of-both-worlds scenario where both the language sign’s vocal pattern and object carry over into the translation.

3.8.2.4 Conclusion

Cratylan unity of sign pattern and object is behind the syncretic *trompe-l’oreille* that is film dubbing’s ultimate goal. Whether this goal is more or less achieved, or whether this is a translational situation of “*qui trop embrasse, peu étreint*,” is a matter of individual sensibility. The Cratylan motivation is once again a constant, regardless of whether or not the syncretic illusion itself is deemed successful. Indeed, virtually all commentary on film dubbing seems to begin with the always pernicious critique of fidelity, pernicious because it leads to an *aporia* of sorts. The movements do not match the voice; the language seems stilted; it is poorly done; or one studio does it better than another: none of these arguments seems to elicit anything more than tacit agreement.

And agreement there usually is, as the language of dubbed film characters will always seem disincarnated, strange. This strangeness, as just discussed, is due not only to the inevitable disparities between the image track’s visible gesture and the sounds of the target language track. It is also, ironically, the effect of their successful alignment, as synchrony forces adaptors to choose target words and phrases that are not necessarily idiomatic. Nevertheless, with this process of detection and adaptation, I see the first real translational consideration for the establishment of pattern affinities at the deep, sound structural level. This brings me to my integration of film dubbing in the centripetal progression of translated texts I am examining in this section.

How would dubbing fit into this continuum? How does it make more progressive inroads into the text's vocal pattern than the accented text described earlier? Is dubbing "text" or "langue" oriented? I would argue that with film dubbing there is a heightened concern for the text itself that one does not see in accenting. The latter, I would recall does not strive for actual affinity in sound structure. In dubbing, however, these carefully constructed temporal and phonemic alignments, this effort to achieve a syncretic fusion of the translated language track to the phonetic movements of the original image track, do indeed reveal a heightened attention to text pattern, and toward the construction of a palpable resemblance in the vocal *eidōs*.

This headway into text or pattern resemblance is made—I think it is also safe to say—at the expense of language convention. Synchronian, this synthetic, disembodied language, is not really that unorthodox. However, when one looks closely at the types of pattern resemblance constructed "*en filigrane*" by the adaptor in the examples discussed, a question arises: does dubbing not begin to undermine the hermetic logic separating one *langue*, or language system, from another? Does one not get an incipient sense that the "sound boundaries" between two language systems traditionally considered distinct, can in fact be made porous? Does the fact of a foreign language phono-structure spoken through a source-language phoneticity, even if only partially convincing, not at least beg the question of just how distinct these systems are?

I will venture up to this threshold and then retreat. There can be no mistake here. At this depth of my progression, the dominant concern is still for *langue* and the inter-*langue*. Foreign language dubbing still privileges the formal and semantic conventions of the latter, despite the potential awkwardness of synchronian. The next text under

examination, however, describes another centripetal step inward. This example comes from the realm of poetic experimentation, and strikes at what I would call the absolute threshold of Cratylan translation, the threshold where increasing affinity in vocal pattern begins to stress affinity in the realm of sense while further undermining the conventions of the target language.

3.8.3 Sound Translation: The Zukofskys' Experiment

Louis and Celia Zukofsky, with their English Catullus in the late sixties, wanted to create a translation that would “breathe the source text’s literal meaning with him.” (Zukofsky 1969:1) Implied here seems to be a complicity of phonetic movement. The translator would body forth a target text with the same gesture as the poet, a gesture evident, apparently, in Catullus’s Latin language phono-structure. To breathe Catullus’s texts with him, the Zukofskys adopted a strategy similar to that of the adaptor in the dubbing process. They chose English words and phrases that align phonemically with Catullus’s. Moreover, they did so with the intention of remaining true to the source poem’s conventional sense. They too championed a Cratylan best of both worlds scenario, where the source text’s vocal pattern as well as its sense would carry over into the target.

However, what sets the Zukofskys apart is the closeness of the vocal pattern affinity they achieve, and their inroads toward the type of affinity I have called “phono-structural,” that is in the idea of the source text’s deeper phonemic organization. In film dubbing, just to recall, relatively few close phonemic alignments suffice to fit the target track roughly into the visible gesture. The Zukofskys, however, pay a more painstaking attention to their Latin source’s movement from one sound element to the next, and

construct English chains so reminiscent of these patterns that they begin veering toward a sort of phonemic transcription.

Unlike film dubbing, this closeness of vocal pattern affinity comes at a cost for the construction of higher meaning. The closer the vocal affinity between translated texts, I have suggested, the more the text's connection to linguistic convention is compromised. Film dubbing produces synchronian, this synthetic sounding discourse that comes off as strange yet still perfectly comprehensible. The Zukofskys, for their part, produce a discourse that veers further off center, to the point where the English reader's comprehension is strained. Strained, but not undone completely. If the reader reaches a little in his or her interpretation, then a connection with connotations of the source poem can be achieved.

3.8.3.1 Lady Ipsitilla.

The following poem is Catullus's infamous number 32, the epigram to the prostitute Ipsitilla. Before I give the Zukofskys' version, I would do well to offer a more traditional, semantically driven and idiomatic one for comparison. On the left is the Latin original with an English crib underneath to orient the reader. On the right is Charles Martin's 1979 version, the most straightforward, idiomatic (and uncensored) one I could find:

XXXII Amabo, mea dulcis Ipsithilla, <i>Please, my sweet Ipsithilla</i> Meae deliciae, mei lepores, <i>my delights, my charms</i> iube ad te veniam meridiatum.	32 I beg of you, my sweet, my Ipsitilla, my darling, my sophisticated beauty, summon me to a midday assignation; and, if you're willing, do me one big favor: don't let another client shoot the door bolt,
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<i>command to you I should come at noon</i> et si iusseris, illud adiuvato, <i>and if you command it, it would help</i> nequis liminis obseret tabellam, <i>if nobody would close the door</i> neu tibi lubeat foras abire. <i>And if you would not leave,</i> sed domi maneat paresque nobis <i>but stay at home and ready us for</i> novem continuas fututiones. <i>nine continuous fucks.</i> verum, siquid ages, statim iubeto: <i>Truely, if you plan to act, give me</i> <i>instructions</i> nam pransus iaceo, et satur supinus <i>for here I lie, stuffed and satiated</i> pertundo tunicamque palliumque. <i>and thrusting through tunic and pallium</i>	and don't decide to suddenly go cruising, but stay at home and get yourself ready for nine—yes, nine—successive copulations! Honestly, if you want it, give the order: I've eaten, and I'm sated, supinated! My prick is poking through my cloak and tunic (Martin 1979:32)
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The reader gets the semantic drift from Martin's version. Now see how the Zukofskys choose English patterns that recall the phono-structural play of the source. I have set the parallel sound structures beside each other:

Amabo, mea dulcis Ipsithilla, meae deliciae, mei lepores, iube ad te veniam meridiatum. et si iusseris, illud adiuvato, nequis liminis obseret tabellam, neu tibi lubeat foras abire. sed domi maneat paresque nobis novem continuas fututiones. verum, siquid ages, statim iubeto: nam pransus iaceo, et satur supinus pertundo tunicamque palliumque.	I'm a bow, my dual kiss, Ipsithilla, my daily key, eye, my eye's little leap- horse, you bid me to "when," I'm your meridian. That: so you see as sure as that adjuvant, no case, limb, menace obscure your tableland. no tidbit love you outdoors far as a bier. Stay home, my man he asks we pair us—no bis— nine continuous gasps, no refutations. very, so he could, yes start if you bid to: he's primed now, a joke-stuffed satyr, so pin us! Pert under the tunic, pulling up the quilt. (Zukofsky 1969: 32)
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The effect of such a version is to strike a very tenuous affinity at both the phono-structural and the semantic levels.

First, phono-structural affinity. It is clear that the source text's second articulation has guided their solutions. For example: "Amabo"→ "I'm a bow"; "nequis liminis"→ "no case, limb, menace." Some of these phono-structural pattern affinities are rather covert, stretched over two or three separate words, and have to be teased out through repeated reading: "iube ad te veniam"→ "you bid...to when I'm". The closest affinities, it seems, are in the articulating consonants, while component vowels tend to "float" freely from position to position: "si iusseris"→ "so you see as". However, an effort for vowel affinity is also manifest, especially in the case of syllable articulating vowels or diphthongs: "deliciae"→ "daily key, eye."

"Deliciae" draws slowly over these two English words set off from each other by commas. It seems that an entirely new mode of reading is introduced by this sort of translation, one that proceeds slowly from letter-to-letter and with one eye (and ear) constantly trained on the source text. The reader proceeds sporadically, in stops and starts, and the text seems to lose its global, semantic effect for a more atomized, sensory one founded deep in the vocal grain. In other words, the vocal parts rise above the semantic whole. Sound ingredients are to be savored for themselves, slowly and separately: "deliciae"→daily, key, eye.

Beyond its sound structure, what is "daily, key, eye" supposed to mean? The Zukofskys' ambitions are Cratylan, and therefore their sights are also set on the source text's semantics as well. It does not take long for the reader to realize, however, that affinity at the semantic level is far from immediately appreciable. Obviously, for the

purpose of offering themselves a more varied palette of English sound structures, the translators have reached further into the realm of metaphor. “I’m a bow” suggests perhaps an amorous tension. “Keys” and their key-holes are a more classic sexual metaphor. Then of course the “leap-horse”, which conjures up its own share of pornographic images. Other solutions are rather ingenious. “Sed domi maneat paresque nobis” becomes “Stay home, my man asks we pair us.” “Stay home” approximates the sound structure of “Sed domi—” while also conveying the central idea of the verse. This leaves the Zukofskys room to incorporate a playful anthropomorphizing of the phallus, ubiquitous among children: “—mi maneat”→ “my *man* he asks.” The “man” becomes a running character, accounting for the “he” in “so he could”, which turns the sounds of the Latin “siquid.” In the next verse, both the poet and his “man” become the “us” in “so pin us!”, turning the sounds of “supinus.”

3.8.3.2 The Zukofskys’ Fragmentary Metaplasms

Once the hermeneutic spiral is allowed to commence, one could continue reaching for semantic affinities endlessly. More interesting now is the way in which the Zukofskys treat the English language metaplasimically. Here is the glimmer of a new transformational logic that becomes more explicit in the schismatic translations of the next chapter. Consideration for the text as sound tissue, and the desire to create redundancy in the fine grain of this tissue, is now causing a shift in the way the target language is focalized. When one reads a phrase like: “no tidbit love you outdoors far as a bier,” one notices two things immediately. The words themselves are perfectly

conventional, ascribable to the target language. Their combination, however, is not grammatical.

One gets the sense here that the Zukofskys are beginning to conceive English along its paradigmatic rather than its syntactic or grammatical axis, to recall Saussure's conceptualization. (1969) The only constraints of English language convention that they obey systematically, in other words, are those set by the vertical axis of selection, the palette of potentially usable English words. They must choose words that pertain to the English paradigm, but in combining these words they are free to force syntactic convention. Paradigmatic constraint, relative syntactic and grammatical freedom: this is the way they are able to create ever closer phono-structural affinities with their Latin source.

The selection of conventional and familiar language materials, the freedom to articulate these materials however they see fit: here is a familiar concept echoing back to the previous section of this dissertation, specifically to the examination of Dada. The strategy behind the sound poetics of Khlebnikov, Kruchenyck, Marinetti, and Ball, to recall, was to fragment language into its minimal elements and to re-combine these elements unconventionally. This seems to be the strategy emerging here with the Zukofskys as they corrode the syntactic conventions of English and re-pattern its more familiar paradigmatic elements according to an unconventional phonologic. This erosion of the target language's combinatory conventions puts the Zukofskys' experiment on the verge of the schismatic translations that I will be examining in the next chapter, translations that effectively toss both semantics and target language syntax to the wind and function along a paradigmatic and phono-structural logic exclusively.

3.8.3.3 On the Verge of Schism

For the moment, however, the Zukofskys are only on the verge. English syntactic conventions are certainly stressed, at times impenetrable (“no case, limb, menace obscure your tableland”), but at other times they are comprehensible enough to connect source and target in meaning (“you bid me to ‘when’”; Stay home, my man he asks we pair us). As for phono-structural redundancy, at times it is evident enough (/amabo/→/I’m a bow/), at other times less so (/palliumque/→/pulling up the quilt/), and sometimes not at all (/illud/→/sure as that/). In the end, I see here a mode of translation that divides its consideration over many criteria. Neither fully conventional nor fully schismatic, it hovers in a sort of no man’s land between sense and sound translation.

Yet perhaps it is just this trait that makes this the ultimate in Cratylan translation. The Zukofskys have salvaged as much of Catullus’s sound pattern as they possibly could without sacrificing his semantics entirely, and they managed to do so within the constraints of English language convention. Of course, in order to create room for this sort of phono-structural affinity, they had to force these constraints to a threshold of maximum tolerance. There is the sense that if they went the smallest step further in their observance of the source pattern, if the latter was even the slightest bit more recognizable in the target, then English syntax, as well as any semantic connection to the source, would be lost altogether.

A step further in pattern affinity, and the target text would probably cease to appear English, and might read like a phonemic transcription of Latin. Indeed, how far is /daily key eye/ from an alternate spelling, or perhaps an alternate pronunciation, of /deliciae/? To what extent can an English language text dawn the patterns of Latin

without becoming itself a text in Latin? In this important sense, the Zukofskys have tested the centripetal limit of inter-linguistic translation. By pushing phonemic pattern calquing to the limit, they have opened a path for translation through certain types of phonemic transcription. All that remains is to acknowledge this path and follow it where it leads.

3.8.3.4 Lefevere, the Zukofskys and the “Tyrannical Phonemic Imperative”

It is this path that I propose to follow in the next chapter, where the translations under examination sever vocal sound pattern from semantics entirely. A good way of framing this centripetal path into the pattern is by contrast with André Lefevere’s methodology in *Translating Poetry: Seven Strategies and a Blueprint* (1975). The Zukofskys are where I intersect with Lefevere, who has a brief skirmish with their Catullus at the beginning of his book. The seven strategies begin with what he calls “phonemic translation” and proceed progressively through less pattern-based strategies. After phonemic translation, for example, comes “literal translation”, then “metric translation,” then “poetry into prose” and so forth. With each passing strategy, target language writing conventions gain in their importance and application, and pattern affinities become less and less relevant.

In this progression emerges a palpable ideological bias that recalls the Platonic and Augustinian language ideologies explored in the first section. In Lefevere’s schema, the Zukofskys’ Catullus seems to emerge as a hypothetical first stage of translation’s evolution away from the “tyrannical phonemic imperative”. These are the critic’s words. The Zukofskys’ solutions are ill-conceived because they are “forced...by the tyrannical phonemic imperative” (Lefevere 1975:25). One can not help recalling the notion of a

natural or biological imperative. Here is a sense that the translator is enslaved to sound structures, incapable of basic language abstractions. The myth of vocal origins, the iconicity hypothesis, rears its head once again. In Lefevere's progression, this is translation's Neanderthal origins, mired in servile pattern imitation.

There may not be a great difference between the notion of the translator mired in a biological imperative, and that of the translator selfishly indulging the sensorial, fleshy dimension of language for his or her own sexual pleasure. There is a frankly erotic dimension to Catullus's poetry. Could the Zukofskys' treatment of it—all this breathing with the poet—possibly be considered transgressive in an erotic way as well? Recalling the poets of the previous section, I would signal the trend of arguments citing the libidinal motivation behind sound poetry. The lyrical obsession with language matter, vocal sounds shaken loose from convention and expressed in libidinal flow, as McAffrey puts it (1978): if these arguments apply to sound poetry, it seems that they could just as easily apply to sound poetic translation, especially when the poet is Catullus.

With the Zukofskys there seems to be an indulgence in a sensory dimension of language that is largely ignored by conventional translation. I have already cited Paul Mann's sexual take on the relationship between Catullus and the Zukofskys. Usually, Mann argues, the source poet or author plays the dominant role and the translator the passive. According to Mann, Zukofsky has cast off the role of the passive, faithful translator who would bring forth an English Catullus according to the rules. Instead he has succumbed to a type of sexual "dé-lire," has taken charge of his encounter with the poet, has introduced a type of textual/sexual play bound up in breath and vocal pattern, and resulting in a wholesale defiance of convention. Catullus, following Mann, "gets

fucked by Zukofsky...betrayed by Zukofsky for the sake of a special textual pleasure..." (Mann 1986: 9).

I will not push this erotic interpretation too far. Suffice it to be aware that it exists, and seems to suggest itself overtly from virtually every angle of approach both to the Zukofskys and to sound poetry in general. There is Lefevere, whose "tyrannical phonemic imperative" seems to suggest servitude to a contemptuous natural law. Then there is the affinity with the libidinal motivations of the sound poets. Then there is Mann's sexual/textual metaphor of partners dominant and passive, faithful and unfaithful, repressed and sexually liberated. All of these angles place an erotic spin on the question. Any one of them alone would be purely speculative. However, when a single idea springs up often enough, a trend emerges and the critic is forced to take notice. I merely signal the trend here and leave it up to my reader to give it credit or not.⁵

This sexual/textual dimension aside, one thing becomes abundantly clear from Lefevere's criticism: nothing good can come of slavish phonemic imitation. The bent of the critique is negative on the whole, has no mind for the Zukofskys' Cratylan motivation and its place in the philosophy of language or poetry, but orbits entirely around the notion of fidelity, and thus leads to aporia. The translators, he reiterates throughout, have represented neither sense nor sound accurately: "One of the weak points in any 'phonemic' translator's attempt to render the source text 'sound for sound' [is that] he does not render the sound of the source text in the target language. His target text is

⁵ The notion of translation as a sexual dynamics is perhaps best illustrated in feminist approaches to the subject. Mann's metaphor of active and passive partners emerges in Lori Chamberlain's "Gender and The Metaphorics of Translation." *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*. 13 (3) pp. 454-472. Rosemary Arrojo contributes a critique of this viewpoint in "Fidelity and The Gendered Translation." *TTR*. 7,2, 1994. Translation's intersection with feminism and gender studies is the subject of Luise von Flotow's "Feminist Translation: Contexts, Practices, and Theories." *TTR: Études sur le texte et ses transformations*. 4 (2), pp. 69-84.

merely an approximation to the sounds of the source text as filtered through the ‘phonemic grid’ of the target language.” (Lefevere 1975:20) The analysis continues in this tone, underscoring the extent of the translators’ failure. One has to ask the question: against what criterion of perfection, or even adequacy, is Lefevere setting the Zukofskys’ work?

It is the value judgment inherent in this type of criticism that leads to aporia. How does one respond directly to Lefevere’s argument, other than simply to agree. No one would dispute his judgment of the Zukofsky’s “accuracy.” No one text, when read twice, will ever sound or connote in the same way, let alone when it is filtered through the conceptual landscape of another culture, and through this other culture’s modes—and these modes themselves are infinitely variable—of phonating its language through its orthography. In this light, it is rather surprising that vocal pattern affinity could be achieved at all. So for what it is worth, Lefevere’s criticism is valid, elicits consent but beyond this nothing more.

Another point of contention in Lefevere’s critique is his use of the Zukofskys to demonstrate the principle of phonemic translation as a whole. Here is where the critic himself fails to distinguish between subtleties of motivation. Phonemic translation strives for vocal pattern affinities, he affirms. It does this by filtering the source text “through the phonemic grid of the target language.” (Lefevere 1975:20) The first statement is valid but also reductive, for it fails to see that phonemic affinity is not the only reason that sound translation is carried out, that there are a variety of other contingent motivations that affect how this phonemic affinity manifests from mode to mode. For example, the Zukofskys read Catullus as a Cratylan unity of sound and sense, and

attempt a type of translation that describes an affinity in both. The specific way in which they go about turning the source text's sounds depends entirely upon this motivation. The schismatic translations of the next chapter, however, demonstrate a dadaesque motivation that severs sound from sense altogether, and this motivation results in the sound turning techniques and strategies that I will address next.

In his second statement, Lefevere contends that phonemic translation filters the source text "through the phonemic grid of the target language." (20) This time, he has not only oversimplified sound translation's technical strategies, but has attributed to the Zukofskys a strategy that they manifestly do not use. They do not construe the English paradigm at the level of its phonemic grid, but rather choose English words and phrases displaying broad phono-structural affinity with the source. Moreover, they choose these words and phrases while mindful of semantics. There are forms of phonemic transcription that do indeed approach this grid conception—the form examined in the very last schismatic mode presented in this project—but the Zukofskys are no example. To put it simply, when it comes to sound translation, there is a whole spectrum of motivations and techniques. Lefevere has reduced it to but one motivation (phono-structural affinity) and one technique (the use of the phonemic grid), and he cites this technique where it least applies.

One might also ask why Lefevere has chosen the Zukofskys. More widely known than this one experiment are the schismatic traductions or the stylistic experiments of Queneau. Perhaps the answer lies in another tyranny governing Lefevere's thinking on translation: that of the semantic imperative. The Zukofskys are among the only sound translators who are truly Cratylan, who at least attempt to unify sound and conventional

sense as an inviolable whole, and who make semantics an imperative as well. Their abuse of the source text's semantic regime through obedience to sound may perhaps have been a logical place for Lefevere to start his progression. From there onward, I described earlier, is the slow and steady removal of sound from the equation, as the tyranny of source text patterns is overthrown and the rule of semantics and target language convention become more firmly enshrined.

This semantic imperative may well have blinded Lefevere to the potential complexity of the question raised by an experiment like the Zukofskys'. It would seem that there are two parts to this question: is it really a phonemic imperative that is adversely affecting the translator's efforts to construct semantic affinities, or could it be a semantic imperative that is adversely affecting the translator's efforts to construct vocal pattern affinities? Lefevere really addresses only the first of these two questions, answers it in the affirmative and anticipates his future strategies, where the translator is progressively liberated from his or her servitude to the voice. In other words, Lefevere conceives the Zukofskys as a logical place to begin his centrifugal movement outward toward the rule of semantics and target language convention.

The second question hangs unresolved, however. Lefevere does not address the possibility that a progression could be made in the opposite or centripetal direction, *from the Zukofskys inward*. Following this orientation, the voice would effectively transcend lexical and grammatical sense, be liberated from the semantic imperative and would be able, in its freedom, to construct increasingly close phono-structural affinities. He does not address this inward vector that brings source and target voices closer, makes of translation a *dada*, and results ultimately in a functional pattern guide for speakers in

different languages and cultures. This inward vector is the subject of the next and final chapter. On to the schismatic modes, then.

Section 3, Chapter 9

Negotiating the Voice: The Schismatic Modes

Here I would like to recall my reflection in the second section of this project, and specifically the zaum manifesto of the Russian Futurists Kruchenyk and Khlebnikov. The third tenet of their “Declaration of the Word as Such,” I suggested, makes an axiom of the translation strategy under examination in this chapter: “A verse presents, unconsciously, a number of series of vowels and consonants. These series are untouchable. It is better to substitute for a word one similar in sound, rather than one similar in idea...” (Markov 1968: 131).

Sound *instead* of sense, is Kruchenyk’s poetic philosophy, and not sound mimetic of sense or sound united with sense. The Futurist declaration is an overt call for translational schism, ostensibly for an overthrow of conventionally organized target language discourse for one organized on the basis of the source text’s phono-structure. Here is the end of the Cratylan imperative of united motivations, and the beginning of the vocal pattern’s dominant role in determining translation solutions. It is the centripetal step beyond the half-sense, half-sound solutions of the Zukofskys. Instead, what is promoted is the free selection and organization of language fragmentals along a homophonic logic. The result is an alienating, perhaps humorous arrangement of incompatible language elements, a translational Dada. Take for example the following piece of macaronic poetry by Luis D’Antin van Rooten:

Mise treize mairie quoi y êtes contrée riz
Ah ! d’azur garde en gros
Huit Silvère belles en écho que l’échelle
Un preux, Diomède, Alain héros. (Van Rooten 1980: 18)

Like the dada pieces examined in the last section, I see here an a-syntactic and a-grammatical pattern of language fragmentals (in this case words and small phrases) culled randomly from the French lexicon. Like the dada pieces as well, there is method to the madness, a normative frame overarching and governing the text's disturbed logic. Explaining the piece is obviously a vocal pattern affinity with the Mother Goose Rime:

Mistress Mary, quite contrary,
How does your garden grow
With silver bells and cockle shells
And pretty maids all in a row (*The Real* 1916: 18)

The van Rooten piece is of course the by now infamous traducson, and I will look more closely at this particular type of sound translation shortly.


For the moment, I would like to address the internal logic of the traducson—and indeed all of the schismatic translations examined here—from a structural linguistic point of view. There seems to be a basic structural principle and methodology running through all of the examples here. Exposing this principle is rather important, as it helps bind more bizarre translations like the traducson conceptually and theoretically to other more functional sound translations, like those forged at the target language's syllabic and phonemic levels. For all of these translation modes, creating vocal pattern affinity means conceiving the target language paradigmatically.

3.9.1 A Brief Return to a Saussurean Concept

The Zukofskys, just to recall, began assuming artistic control over their English target language's axis of combination. They did this while following strictly the conventions of English's paradigmatic axis, the so-called "axis of selection and substitution". The translations in this chapter do precisely this, although each construes the paradigmatic

axis in increasingly narrow terms. First things first, however. I should not presume that my reader is familiar with this basic schema of Saussurean structural linguistics.


Elements of language, according to Saussure (1969), display two modes of relating to each other, both governed by restrictive conventions. They can form syntagmatic relations, as they precede and succeed each other in sequence. Or they can form paradigmatic relations, so-called “relations of substitutability.” Both of these are commonly represented as the two axes of a graph: the horizontal x axis being the syntagmatic axis, or the axis of combination; the vertical y axis being the paradigmatic axis of selection and substitution:



One gets a sense here of the rules guiding the combination of these elements: the conventional subject-verb-object organization of grammatical roles in the sentence. One also gets a sense of the rules governing paradigmatic substitution: one can substitute, depending on the sense one wishes to convey, elements of the same grammatical role (“A” for “The”, “rug” for “mat”, etc.) Of course, Saussure meant this conception to

describe an organization of “signs” in langue, that is to say of first articulators following conventional grammatical rule. This is why the narrowest construction of the paradigm is generally the word proper and its potential substitutes. The smallest syntagmatic relation, for its part, would be between two words in grammatical sequence.

The sound translations under examination here all use this schema in a novel way. Two important re-conceptions make their paradigmatic and syntagmatic relativities different from Saussure’s: 1. The syntagmatic axis is conceived as a tissue of language sounds and not grammatical roles. 2. Phono-structural, rather than semantic affinity is the criterion for paradigmatic substitution. If I went through it step-by-step, I would begin by casting their source text cast along the syntagmatic axis like this:



I would then take a measure of this source text’s phono-structure in accordance with the types of target language structures with which I intend to replace them. Just to recall, this combinatory axis is the *wild card*. I can divide it up into substitutable structures as I see fit: as word, syllable, and phoneme clusters, even as individual phonemes. In this case, the following measure in words and word clusters is possible:

Humpty	Dumpty	saton	awall

In the translation, I would go about substituting each isolated element with a like-sounding element from the paradigm of target language structures. The resulting translation will produce along the axis of combination a structure that is freely construed at best, if not completely non-grammatical and non-sensical:

Humpty	Dumpty	saton	awall
Un petit	d'un petit	s'étonne	aux Halles

Aside from the obvious effort to establish phono-structural affinity, there seems at first glance to be very little systemic logic guiding this sort of translation. I have drawn my syntactic divisions arbitrarily, and I could have substituted those English structures with many other vaguely homophonous French ones.⁶ The translation bears no semantic relevancy with the source. And to read it by itself, it is semantically as well as grammatically obtuse.

3.9.1.1 Sound Translation's Systematicity in Langue

⁶ I could just as easily substitute these elements with other vaguely homophonous English language ones, as is demonstrated in the word game Mad Gab.

I am loath to dismiss sound translation so quickly, however, or to label it an “abuse of translation,” as Genette does in *Palimpsestes* (1982: 50-52). What may seem at first glance to be a pointless word game may actually be a mode of inter-linguistic negotiation employing a logic similar to that of other more functional modes, a logic that can be found in the translator’s way of conceiving the paradigmatic axis itself. Looking back at the *traducson* example, I see a common systemic trait uniting all of these target structures. /Un petit/, /d’un petit/, /s’étonne/: these are all full French words and word clusters. In this mode of sound translation, it appears, the target language is conceived as a paradigm of individual words or small phrases that are combined freely to produce a phono-structural affinity with the source text.

Here is where this sort of sound translation demonstrates its systematicity in *langue*: *in the way it construes the paradigm of the target language*, or in the way it conceives the *extension* of target sound structures allowed to stand in for those of the source. For every sound structure detected in the latter, and no matter where the divisions are drawn, I see three types of target language structures standing in: 1. entire target language words and phrases; 2. target language orthographic formants or syllables; 3. target language characters in their alphabetic symbology. In short, I see the target language conceived along an increasingly narrow paradigmatic axis.

Put in simpler terms, the translator will decide whether to turn the sounds of his or her source into target language words and phrases, into target language syllables, or into target language alphabetic characters. In each case, he or she will be consistent in this decision, and the choice of paradigm will be applied throughout the text. As the paradigm narrows, more functional modes of sound translation come to light, and the line

between inter-linguistic translation and phonemic transcription becomes blurred, and I see a new type of metaplasme emerge, by which the word is transformed acoustically by translating its vocal fragments—be these words, syllables or phonemes—into fragments recognizable as belonging to another language system. I will examine these three paradigmatic levels more closely now.

3.9.2 Paradigmatic Translation: Source Text Sounds into Target Language Words and Word Clusters

Source sound structures substituted with like-sounding target language words and small phrases: this is the first of the paradigmatic conceptions, and the one employed to dadaesque effect by d'Antin van Rooten in the piece just demonstrated. Noted for his traductions of Mother Goose (1980), this American translator/poet has inspired his share of followers. Ormonde de Kay, for example, published her own anthology of *N'heures Souris Rames* (1980). Then there is John Hulme, who authored the German *Mörder Guss Reims* (1981) as well as a collection, in French, of more lofty English poetry from Shakespeare to Blake and Byron: *Guillaume Chequespierre and the Oise Salon* (1985).

As I have just demonstrated, the strategy of the traduction is quite simply to treat the target language as a paradigm of words and small phrases, and to chain the latter together in a way that recalls the sound chain of the source text. Unlike the Zukofskys, the creator of a traduction can choose freely among target language elements, with no regard to their lexical sense or to the grammatical correctness of their combination. The translator is free, in other words, to combine these elements in any way at all so as to create a phonemic pattern affinity with the source. The only condition is that the target be

recognizable as a series of full words and phrases, each lexically viable when taken on its own. Here's Hulme's traduction of William Blake:

Tiger, Tiger burning bright	Tailles guerre, tailles guerre, beurre naine brailles-te
In the forests of the night	Un deux foreuse, t'œuf de n'ailles-te ?
What immortal hand or eye	ou ôter mort ta lande or ail.
Could frame thy fearful symmetry	Coude frais me taille fière foule si ; mettre- y !
--W. Blake	--G. Blèque

This small example demonstrates amply this trait common to all traductions. Every source text sound to be rendered—be it a word, a syllable, or a phoneme—is cast in the target text as a word at the very least, and as a small phrase at the most. The English /ti-ger/, divided syllabically, gets a full word per syllable /tailles-guerre/. As does /burn-ing/→/beurre-naine/. Monosyllabic English words are divided arbitrarily and engender two French words /frame/→/frais-me/. Even English minimal elements or phonemes are rendered by full French pronominal forms, the /t/ in /bright/ becoming the pronoun /te/. The same goes for the /y/ in symmetry.

An important distinction should be made here, however. For the traduction, as I have just explained, the minimum extension of the sound fragment chosen from the target language is the word. This should not suggest, however, that the word as semantically meaningful language entity, the word as first articulator, plays any sort of role in this type of translation. It does not take long to realize that these French elements are “words” in structural extension only, and not in their capacity to signify. Structures like /tailles guerre, tailles guerre/ are rather phoneme clusters masquerading as words. To understand

them as words is to be drawn into a deliberate and playful deception, into the traducson's dadaesque counter-dialogue.

3.9.2.1 The Traducson's Counter Dialogues

Dada, I brought out in the previous section, is an art form that is counter-defined, that is to say defined negatively against conventional modes of artistic representation and interpretation. Tzara's rebellion against logical forms; Klebnikov and Kruchenyk's overthrow of semantic regimes in language; Marinetti's departure from Romantic modes of self-representation and his obsession with the matter of poetic language: all conceptualize their new genre in terms of what it is "not". It is *not* interpretable according to any conventional logic semantic or otherwise, and is *not* a reflection of consciousness, but rather an indulgence in the dynamic nature of language sounds. Implicit in Dada, then, is a running counter-dialogue with those modes of representation it attempts to mock, to subvert, to transgress.

This running counter-dialogue is not only explicit in the traducson, but emerges as its defining motivation. It is all of the "nots" described above. It is not interpretable according to any conventional logic semantic or translational, and it is not a reflection of consciousness, but rather a simple and playful indulgence in the dynamic nature of language sounds. This explicit counter-dialogue is what differentiates the traducson from the Zukofsky's Cratylan endeavors. The Zukofskys were serious, and perhaps this is why they drew Lefevere's fire. Theirs was a sincere attempt to reconcile sound with conventional sense. The traducson, on the other hand, is a boutade, a nosethumbing at conventional modes of reading and translating. Its humor effectively puts it beyond the pale of criticism. To become critical of this sort of translation is to enter into its game.

Inscribed explicitly in any collection of traducsons are three counter dialogues: one to mock conventional modes of reading; another to mock semantic convention; and finally one to mock translational convention. The traducson mocks conventional reading by passing itself off playfully as an original. On the cover of the *Mots d'heures gousses, rames* (1980), I read: "discovered, edited and annotated by Luis d'Antin van Rooten." The pretence is that these lunatic texts are all originals, bits of obscure French poetry to be read and interpreted as any other poetic text. Hulme's ruse is even more elaborate, and perhaps a little vulgar. This translator masquerades his traducsons as the original works of a school of French poets who meet regularly by a pissoir to recite their creations. The group is aptly called the "Oise Salon" ("Wazz Salon") and calls a certain Guillaume Chequespierre its leader.

The ruse is explicit, the pretence ridiculously overstated and therefore thin, and this has the ironic result of making it more sophisticated. The reader does not suspect for one second that these are originals, and the author knows perfectly well that the reader does not suspect this. It is all a sham, but the enjoyment of the text is derived from the obviousness of the sham and a tacit agreement between author and reader to exploit it together. It is this complicity that makes the traducson hermeneutically multivalent, and therefore a poetic entity unto itself. Through this complicity, the traducson elicits multiple readings in the "as if" mode. One can enjoy such a text as if it were somehow perfectly conventional, and reach far to infer some cohesive semantic and grammatical logic. One might also read the text as if it were pure Dada without the sound translational element, and attempt to ascribe some other internal logic to it. For example, I could give the Hulme piece an enigmatic title like "Small Sacrifices" and expected the reader to find

this concept in that eclectic imagery of dwarves, corsets, drills and fine herbs. Of course, one could also enjoy reading with the source text in the back of one's mind, as if the *traducson* were little more than a comical vocal deviation from this source text, an English rime read with a buttery French accent.

Other explicit devices are there to mock semantic convention. Both d'Antin van Rooten and Hulme furnish their poems with ample footnotes containing false glosses, to help the reader penetrate the text's obtuse meanings, or to lead the reader further astray, depending on how one looks at it. The first two lines of the Hulme poem, for example—"tailles guerre, tailles guerre, beurre naine brailles-te/ Un deux foreuse t'oeuf de n'ailles-te"—refer naturally to "war waists, a popular name for the Paris fashions during the 1870-71 siege". Against this bleak backdrop of a Paris besieged is the story of a "female dwarf who argues over butter and is compared to a drilling machine" (Hulme 1985:24). D'Antin van Rooten, for his part, offers the following explanation for "Mise treize mairies quoi y êtes contrée riz: "Undoubtedly, this refers to a very heavy rice tax, payable at the town hall." (Van Rooten 1980:18)

By far the most obvious counter-dialogue of the *traducson* is in its portmanteau appellation: the mockery of conventional translation practices. The latter are supposed to provide a service, to convey a message across linguistic and cultural boundaries. D'Antin van Rooten and Hulme have turned this noble pursuit into a game of sorts, a sound puzzle. The *traducson* is meant to conceal the conventional phono-structure of the source behind a phonetic transformation generated by paradigmatic elements of the target language. Conversion back to a phono-structural baseline is the name of the game.

When I read the traducson out loud, an affinity with the source emerges at the infra-linguistic level, an affinity close enough to jar my memory and make me cry “eureka!”

3.9.2.2 Phono-Structural Recognition and the Text-Oriented Translation

It is because of this game of recitation and recognition that I would argue the phono-structural as the type of vocal eidos connecting the traducson with its source. Just to recall, this is the eidos at work when strange phonetic variations are reduced to the more familiar signifying patterns of language. What the traducson presents really is a phonetic variant of the source text masquerading in the orthographic formants of the target language. When recited over and over, this variant jars the memory and is then reduced to the more familiar and properly signifying pattern of the source text.

Just how does recognition occur in a traducson? Certainly not by savoring sound ingredients, like one is apt to do with the Zukofskys. The latter want the reader to enjoy Catullus’s song, to linger over the syllable, the phrase. By treading a fine line between phono-structural and semantic affinity, and by ensuring a degree of conventionality in their English language formulations, the Zukofskys often deviate substantially from Catullus’s sounds. The traducson would fail in its game if it proceeded in this way. Jarring the reader’s phono-structural memory requires repeated recitation and a steady, unhindered movement from sound to sound. Moreover, every link in the sound chain must contribute to a sensed pertinence between source and target phono-structures. For this reason alone, the traducson is the most centripetal or text-oriented mode of sound translation examined yet.

3.9.2.3 The Traducson and the Phono-graphic Eidos

As source and target texts display greater phono-structural affinity, one has to rely less on actual sound to tell them apart and more on the way in which their sound is inscribed orthographically. The phono-graphic eidos, to recall my classification earlier, is the sense that two orthographic constructions belonging to two different language systems relate in the sounds that they symbolize. Being texts, all of the translations that I have examined so far naturally demonstrate affinity at this level. Beginning with the traducson, however, this phono-graphic eidos assumes a special importance, for as these source and target texts display greater phono-structural affinity, their graphic dimension becomes the only factor keeping them from confounding with each other entirely, the only factor marking clearly their pertinence to their respective language systems.

If the phono-structural eidos reveals their growing affinity and interdependence, the phono-graphic eidos serves to keep them apart conceptually and ensure their status as source and target texts in source and target languages. Considered independently of French orthography, as a purely vocal phenomenon with no graphic representation, the traducson is virtually indistinguishable from an English source text transformed phonetically by a thick Francophone accent. Both source and target could be considered one and the same text by virtue of the solid phono-structural bedrock binding them conceptually. This becomes clear when I flush the texts of all graphic formants that would tie them to their respective systems and show only those letters where they connect in sonorous affinity:

T...g...r t...g...r b...rn...ng br...t	T...gu...r t...gu...r b...r n...n br...t
...n th...f...r...st...f th... n...t	...n d...f...r...z t...f d...n...t

w...t ...m...t...l h...d...r....	/ouô/...t...m...t...l...[]...d...r....
c...d f...m th...f...f...l s...m...t...r...	c...d f...m...t...f...f...l s...m...t...r...
W. B...k..	G. Bl...que...

Comparing the sequences, I find enough common points of phono-structural articulation to imagine the scenario that these two texts could represent the same discrete sound structure in two different phonetic and phono-graphic manifestations.

Looking back at the fully fleshed out traducson—"Tiger tiger burning bright"→ "Tailles guerre tailles guerre beurre naines brailles-te"—I could make the following observation: *the source signifier defines the target signifier phono-structurally, while target language convention defines the target signifier both phonetically and phono-graphically*. This brings me to the thorny question of whether the traducson is really and truly inter-linguistic, or whether it is a sort of phonemic transcription using French orthography. Hulme himself informs us: "It is not necessary to be able to read a word of French to appreciate the subtlety of the verses written by the Oise Salon" (Hulme 1985:1). Are the Oise poems really in an English cleverly channeled through a repertoire of French orthographic clusters chosen carefully to reconstruct the original's sound differentials?

Is French a fully functioning language here, or is it merely an orthographic medium used to shift English signifiers phonetically, to alter them metaplasmically, to float the dragon, as it were? The question becomes all the more relevant as the paradigm is set narrower. The traducson, I discussed, is the least functional mode of an otherwise ubiquitous phenomenon: phonemic transcription. What makes it strange is the target

language paradigm it chooses for its substitutions—the extension of those target structures standing in (in this case words and small phrases). With the more functional types of sound translation to come, the paradigm of the target language is more narrowly construed. Target language syllables and phonemes are used to fabricate even closer vocal pattern affinities with the source. The next logical step in my inward progression would be the syllable.

3.9.3 Paradigmatic Translation: Source Text Sounds into Target Language Syllables

Earlier on I put forward the following question with regard to the traduction: what makes these artfully assembled phoneme clusters look like target language words and phrases? What device sustains the dimension of the inter-lingual, even as texts begin phasing into each other phono-structurally? In the voice alone, sound translated texts become less and less distinguishable. It is on the page, and in writing, that they continue to display their adherence to a given source or target language system. Increasingly, orthographic convention rather than standard pronunciation becomes the factor determining the translational dimension of these negotiations. Until now, I have let my third vocal eidos—the phono-graphic eidos—remain implicit in all of the text types under examination. Of course, from film dubbing onward, every mode that I have examined has negotiated pattern affinities between language systems by using like-sounding orthographic constructions: dubbing (/move/→/manoeuvre/); the Zukofskys (/deliciae/→/daily key eye/); the traduction /Mistress Mary/→/Mise treize mairie/).

By the same token, until now phono-structural and phonetic differences dividing source and target texts have been enough to ascribe them to their respective language

systems. With dubbing, the Zukofskys and perhaps still marginally with the traducson, the sound patterns of source and target alone were quite enough to distinguish between the different language systems in play. Now however, as the paradigm narrows and inter-linguistic negotiation veers toward phonemic transcription, orthography becomes increasingly important. Now, the manner in which a given language scripts its sounds conventionally rivals in importance with the manner in which it phonates. Orthography sustains the boundaries between systems that become blurred by the vocal reality. More and more, the text's linguistic provenance will be a matter of how it is couched in writing, and when the paradigm is construed at the narrowest possible level, the phoneme, written representation becomes the only way of distinguishing between separate codes.

At this stage of my centripetal progression, the paradigm is set at the syllable. In the traducson, just to recall, the source text's sound structure is re-written as a series of target language words and phrases. In this next category, the source text's sound structure is re-written as a series of target language *syllables* as they are represented in conventional target language orthography. This translational methodology has a very common functional dimension, as I will discuss shortly. A good starting place, however, would be a poetic text that exemplifies it throughout. It could only be a matter of time before Queneau surfaced. The following text is from the *Exercices de Style* (1947). Once again, the source text is on the left, the target on the right:

Pour les Anglais	Poor lay Zanglay
Un jour vers midi j'ai pris l'autobus pour le port champs des prés. Il était complet,	Ung joor vare meedee ger preelotobüs pour la port Changparay. Eel aytay congplay,

presque. Je suis monté quand même et là j'ai vu un homme avec un long cou et un chapeau entouré d'une sorte de fil tressé...	praysk. Jer mongtay kang maym ay lar jer vee ung ohm ahvayk ung long coo ay ung chahrpo hangtooray dünn saught der feessel trayssay. (Queneau 1947: 126)
--	--

As the title suggests, Queneau has re-figured his French text for an Anglophone readership. This would be a translation, in other words, from French to English. As in the traduction, target language sound elements have been seized and represented with total combinatory freedom (les Anglais→lay Zanglay; pris l'autobus→preelotobus). This time however, the rule governing the translator's decisions is that the finished product be recognizable not as a series of English small words and phrases, but rather as a series of English *syllables* as represented by English orthographic convention.

3.9.3.1 The Syllable Paradigm and the Phono-graphic Eidos

By syllables, I am referring to those sub-word divisions that separate words into phoneme clusters, to word parts as they are represented in familiar orthographic formants. Queneau has manifestly measured his source text in syllables, and has formulated his target text in syllables whose phoneme clusters are represented in an orthography that is patently English. Most all of the syllables of the target correspond to English writing conventions. The graphic cluster forming the syllable /eel/ in "Eel aytay congplay...", for example, is to be found in many English words, to which it confers phonographic affinity: /f-eel/, /st-eel/, /r-eel/, /kn-eel/.

Queneau chooses this graphic cluster to translate the sound of /il/, because he knows that it belongs to English writing convention. He knows that if an Anglophone vocalizes it as any Anglophone in his or her own language would, he or she would have

the best possible chance of approximating the sounds of the French source. The same goes for the rest of Queneau's English phoneme clusters:

	/Joor/	/vare/	/mee/	/dee/	/ger/
	/poor/	/ware/	/see/	/deed/	/ranger/
	/spoor/	/mare/	/flee/	/need/	/danger/
	/moor/	/glare/	/tree/	/seed/	/Roger/

Ultimately in this sort of translation, then, French orthographic formants—/jour/, /vers/, /midi/—describe an affinity with English formants--/joor/, /vare/, /midi/--in that vocal eidos I have called the phono-graphic.

3.9.3.2 Inter-linguistic Translation or Phonemic Transcription?

The question raised with regard to the traducson becomes all the more relevant here, where the target language is being viewed as nothing more than a paradigm of syllabic formants as represented by writing convention: is this really a translational—that is to say an inter-linguistic—negotiation, or is it phonemic transcription? I am certain that my esteemed reader has doubts when I suggest that Queneau's target text is in English. As familiar as its graphic sound constituents are to an Anglophone reader, Queneau's target text is still utterly incomprehensible as an English language entity.⁷ Putting it more

⁷ A good argument, by the way, in support of the concept of double articulation and the distinction between articulate levels: a single text can pertain to one language in its first articulation (its signifying stratum of lexical and grammatical constituents) and to another language in its second articulation (the graphemes and grapheme clusters that make up its sound chain).

simply, Queneau's target text may make sound with English orthography, but it continues to make lexical and grammatical sense in French.

Is this translation or phonemic transcription? Is English really a functioning target language here, or merely a medium used by Queneau to shift his source text phonetically off-center, to inscribe a comical Anglophone accent? On this question, it would be foolish to entrench oneself in any single position. For those accustomed to the more traditional, the more comfortable face of translation, this type of paradigmatic negotiation between texts and languages would seem closer to phonemic transcription, would not constitute a true negotiation between language systems. Such a position seems rather lacking in nuance. Moreover it neglects—perhaps fails to conceive even—this type of negotiation's true inter-linguistic and intercultural function.

Every argument has its counter-argument, and so do those that oppose phonemic translation's inclusion in the traditional inter-linguistic conception. One of these arguments might contend that Queneau's source and target texts sound the same, and it is their deep vocal pattern affinity that makes it difficult to accept that they belong to different language systems. Another argument would bring the schism from English language convention to bear: how can one call Queneau's target text English when its organization obeys only this minimal syllabic dimension of English orthography, and totally disregards any and all other important conventions? A third argument might be a functional one: Queneau's phonemic translation, like the *traducson* and the Zukofskys' endeavors, belong to the realm of poetic and stylistic experimentation. These are language games, and have no functional application whatsoever.

These three arguments are perfectly valid, but they should be allowed to vacillate in dialogue with the following counter-arguments. I would caution those who contend that two texts with like sound patterns must belong to the same language system. Such a position veers uncomfortably toward the phono-centric, assumes that the differing orthographic structures used in Queneau's source and target are for nothing in the systematicity of language, that they play no role in distinguishing one language from another. A French text whose sounds have been rendered through English orthography may not be totally English, but can it be construed as totally French either? Would a Francophone acknowledge such an odd inscription as part of his or her language universe? Would a Francophone totally unfamiliar with English orthography be able to read Queneau's target? Systemic differences, it would seem, are still palpable in this orthographic dimension.

The second argument contends that Queneau's translation can not be inter-linguistic because it obeys only a minimal orthographic dimension of the English language, and effectively disregards all higher grammatical and semantic conventions. Once again, this is a defensible argument but not an unassailable one. The baby should not be thrown out with the bathwater. The fact that translators like Queneau, Hulme and d'Antin van Rooten disregard certain target language conventions does not mean that they disregard all of them. Considered within the limits of the sound translator's chosen paradigm, all target language combinations are in fact quite conventional. If syntagmatically their solutions are phonemic transcription, then paradigmatically they are every bit the conventional inter-linguistic negotiation. D'Antin van Rooten and Hulme use perfectly conventional target language words and phrases. Queneau, for his part, uses

perfectly conventional English syllabic formants. In the end is a glass-half-empty-or-half-full scenario. If one is prepared to deny sound translators their status as inter-linguistic negotiators based only on the extent to which they subvert target language conventions, then it seems only fair that they be granted this status based on the extent to which they do indeed obey these conventions.

Finally, there was the functional argument. Is phonemic translation really only an obscure exercise for poets, a translational Dada? Does it really find no tradition in functional, inter-linguistic and inter-cultural negotiation? The ease with which Lefevere consigns this type of translation to a no man's land, to a realm of extravagant poetic experimentation, is symptomatic of a theoretical blindness (or perhaps deafness). His condemnation is as sweeping as it is unjust: "The phonemic translator, out on his own, pioneering, no doubt, on the confines of language, or, rather, in the no-man's land where languages supposedly overlap, clearly has no use for tradition whatsoever..." (Lefevere 1975: 21). Is a target text like Queneau's pure style without function? Is it to be excluded from a conception of translation that is essentially inter-linguistic and communicative?

The answer may well be yes if, like Lefevere, one makes the Zukofskys exemplify all phonemic translation, or if one marvels at the Dada of the traducson without stopping to consider their underlying paradigmatic logic, a logic that connects these admittedly bizarre phenomena to other more functional modes of translating vocal pattern. As a matter of fact, the moment the paradigm narrows to the syllable—as is the case with Queneau—a striking inter-linguistic and inter-cultural functionality emerges. Queneau's method of constructing phono-graphic affinity between words at the level of

the syllable, of translating the sounds of source-language words into target-language orthography, is exploited in virtually every foreign language pronunciation guide.

If Queneau were really toiling in the phonemic translator's no man's land, if his method had no tradition, no real value beyond that of stylistic exercise, then I probably would not find it applied consistently in the following pronunciation guide for Anglophones learning French, a guide taken at random from a website:⁸

é

is pronounced as a long **a**

Examples: donné /dun nay/, écu /ay kY/

è

is pronounced as a short **e**

Examples: très /treh/, mère /mehr/

ei

is pronounced as a short **e** like in "bed"

Examples: reine /ren/, Seine /sen/

eil

is pronounced as a long **a** like in "late"

Examples: pareil /pa ray/, vieil /vyay/

euil, euille, uel, and uelle

are pronounced as a palatalized German **ö** but are well approximated by an English **oy**

Examples: fauteuil /fo toy/, accueil /ak koy/

A negotiation between systems seems irrefutable here. The translator conceives the source signifier as the purveyor of a phono-structural and ultimately a phonetic message. The information conveyed by the French /fauteuil/ is ultimately the idea of the phonetic

⁸ www.ldmissions.net/fpm/fpg/.html (consulted 11/16/05)

gestures required to utter it. To convey this message, the word is broken into syllables—/fau-teuil/—and these syllables are then translated into an orthography familiar to the Anglophone: /fo-toy/. It is this target form that cues the right phonetic gesture, and therefore the right chain of phonemes.

In foreign language pedagogy as well, the sounds of foreign language words and phrases are often translated into the more familiar syllabic formants of the mother language. Recently, I purchased for my six-year-old niece a book to help her with her Spanish. The book, I discovered later, was actually conceived to teach English to Hispanophones: *Esconde y Habla Inglés* (Bruzzone and Martineau 2003). As I leafed through, I met with English words and phrases whose tone clusters were faithfully translated into Spanish orthography so that Hispanic children could get a good start in pronouncing them in something approaching a standard mode : soap→sóup; towel→táuel; toothpaste→túspeist, etc.

The above examples follow the methodology of Queneau's stylistic exercise to the letter. To be sure, formulations like /fo toy/ and /túspeist/ do not themselves constitute any orthographic norm or convention, and they are ultimately only stepping stones toward a complete comprehension of the word's sound. This should not suggest, however, that these formulations, as well as the sound translational principle behind them, take place in a "no man's land outside of language...with no use for tradition whatsoever." (Lefevere 1975: 21) If they were that arcane, would they be mobilized in a book for children? Quite the contrary, they appear to form part of a pedagogical tradition of communicating the idea of a language's sounds between remote cultures.

In the end, I do not see this as being an either/or situation. These paradigmatic modes that re-construct the vocal patterns of the source text in the orthography of the target language: why not grant them their ambivalence, their complexity? On the one hand, they are a mode of phonemic transcription by virtue of their wholesale assimilation of target language orthography to source text vocal patterns, of their disregard for target language combinatory conventions, and ultimately by virtue of the phono-structural affinities that they invoke. On the other hand, they are translation by virtue of the way in which they construct their target texts orthographically, of their fidelity to their chosen target language paradigm, and of course by virtue of the important inter-linguistic and inter-cultural negotiations that they are instrumental in carrying out.

3.9.4 Paradigmatic Translation: Source Text Sounds into Target Language Characters

This brings me to the final paradigmatic mode, which is both the most narrowly construed and the most functional. Just to recall, the traducson set its target language paradigm at the word or small phrase. Queneau's text, as well as the pronunciation guides just examined, set their paradigm at the syllable or phoneme cluster as represented by the target language's orthographic conventions. The final paradigm, narrower than the syllable, would naturally be the target language phoneme as represented by the individual graphic character or alphabetic element. What would it mean to turn the sounds of a source text into a target language conceived as a paradigm of individual alphabetic elements? Earlier on, Lefevere contended that the Zukofskys were filtering Catullus's Latin sounds through the phonemic grid of the English language. This final paradigm is

where this technique actually applies. Here, a source text's sounds are reconstructed following the target language's phonemic or alphabetic grid.

I am referring, essentially, to the translation of a source text's sounds into those of a target language that uses a different alphabet. When it comes to negotiating between languages with different alphabets, such translation is the principle mode of turning proper names and borrowed terms. However, it may just as easily turn any articulation, including Queneau's French language text, whose sounds are translated here into Arabic characters. The source text, just to recall, was the following:

Pour les anglais

Un jour vers midi j'ai pris l'autobus pour le port champs des près. Il était complet, presque. Je suis monté quand même et là j'ai vu un homme avec un long cou et un chapeau entouré d'une sorte de fil tressé... (Queneau : 126)

In Arabic, a comparable phono-structure would appear as the following chain of characters, read from right to left.

بُورْ لَآيْ زَانْجَلَايْ

أَنْ جُورْ فِيرْ مِدْ جَايْ بَرْ لَوْتْ بُسْ بُورْ لْ بُورْ شَمْ دَايْ بَرَايْ. إِيْلْ أَيْتَايْ كَمْبَلَايْ، بَرَايْسَكْ.
جْ سَوِيْ مُوْنْتَايْ كُنْ مَمْ أَيْ لَا جَايْ فَهْ أَنْ أَمْ أَفِيْلْ أَنْ لَانَ كُوْ أَيْ أَنْ شَابَاوْ أَنْثُورَايْ نُنْ
سُورْتْ ذُفِيلْ ثَرَاْسَايْ...

For those who are as unfamiliar with Arabic as I am, my translator was kind enough to re-direct the text with the following crib. The interconnectivity of Arabic orthography makes the inscription difficult for non-readers to parse along character lines, so for the first two sentences I have included a count of Arabic characters to match against the

count of the French source, first the number of consonant characters per word, and then in parentheses the number of vocalic characters. In this translation, the number of Arabic characters to French phonemes is pretty evenly matched.

Pour les anglais
زَانْجَلَاي لَآي بُورْ

Un	jour	vers	midi	j'ai	pris	l'au	to	bus	pour	le	port	champs	des	près.
أَنْ	جُورْ	فِيرْ	مِدْ	جَايْ	بِرْ	لَوْ	تْ	بُسْ	بُورْ	لْ	بُورْ	شَمْ	دَايْ	بَرَايْ
2	3(1)	3(1)	2(2)	3(1)	2(1)	2(1)	1(1)	2(1)	3(1)	1(1)	3(1)	2 (1)	3(1)	4 (1)

Il	était	complet,	presque.
إِلْ	أَيْتَايْ	كَمْبَلَايْ	بَرَايْسَكْ
3(1)	5(1)	6 (1)	6 (1)

Je	suis	monté	quand	même	et	là	j'ai	vu	un	homme	avec	un	long	cou
جْ	سُوِيْ	مُونْتَايْ	كُنْ	مَمْ	أَيْ	لَا	جَايْ	أَنْ	أَمْ	أَنْ	أَفِيكْ	أَنْ	لَانْ	كُوْ

et	un	chapeau	entouré	d'une	sorte	de	fil	tressé...	⁹
أَيْ	أَنْ	شَابَاوْ	أَنْثُورَايْ	دُنْ	سُورْتْ	دْ	فِيلْ	ثَرَاَسَايْ	

The inscription of Arabic characters follows the articulation of enunciated phonemes in the French source text. If there are more characters in the source than in the target (homme → أَمْ), then chances are the source contains graphic characters that are non-vocalized. The inscription /homme/, for example, has five characters, but motivated vocally it demonstrates only two phonemes, represented by the two Arabic characters. In other words, the transcription reveals the French text's active sounds. The translating alphabet takes on the functionality, and obeys the logic, of a phonetic alphabet.

I have included this final mode as the logical conclusion to my trend of narrowing target paradigms, keeping in mind of course that a major difference separates this last mode from the first two. In the word and syllable paradigms, target formulations were

⁹ My thanks to Smaïl Khris for his transcription.

specific to target language systems. In this last mode, however, the grip on inter-linguistic negotiation becomes all the more tenuous. The negotiation here, rather, is between or within all conceivable alphabetic codes. This may imply a negotiation between natural languages, like the above example. Then again, it may not. Morse code, or transcription into the International Phonetic Alphabet for that matter, substitutes one alphabetic character for another from a different code without implying a movement between natural languages. Translation at this imminent phonemic level need not even imply a negotiation between alphabetic systems like the Roman and Arabic ones just discussed. It would apply, for example, in intra-linguistic encryptions where the letters of words are substituted with others from the same alphabet: (/sound translation/→/zxdcr mlocziomqxc/).

This slip out of the inter-linguistic paradigm only makes sense. Even in the word and syllable paradigms, I had a grip on the inter-lingual that was tenuous at best. The paradigm can only be narrowed so far, until I arrive at minimal graphic elements that in themselves may pertain to the larger structures of any number of languages, or that cannot really pertain to any language as long as one does not have a sense of how they combine with other elements. It is at this narrowest level that I exhaust the paradigmatic modes of vocal pattern negotiation between languages, and appropriately, it is at this most immanent level that I close this final chapter and section.

Conclusion

10 To Sum Up

In the previous section, I examined six modes of sound translation. First was the translation of accents or socio-lects. Then came foreign language film dubbing, with its temporal metaplasms and its incipient steps toward phonemic alignment. The Zukofskys' alignments then brought the target text to the threshold of schism from semantic and grammatical norms. Finally came the schismatic modes themselves, with their fragmentary metaplasms and their complete disregard for semantics as well as the combinatory conventions of the target language. Through all of these modes, I brought out a progressive intersection of inter-linguistic and sound transcriptive negotiations, until eventually they phased into phonemic transcription altogether, substituting minimal sound elements chosen from any available alphabetic grid.

By way of summing up the project in reverse, I would go on to remind my reader that these six modes of translating are interpretable within the framework of two essential types of reading: the Cratylan, which understands the connection between the verbal sign's vocal pattern and its conventional sense as non-arbitrary, and which therefore strives to negotiate both pattern and sense; and the schismatic, which comprehends the sign's vocal pattern as self-standing, severed from conventional sense, and therefore makes no attempt to turn the source text's semantics or to follow the target language's combinatory conventions. In sound translation, this schismatic reading can manifest as a counter-dialogue to conventional readings in sense (the Dadaesque *traducson*), or it can manifest as a functional guide to pronunciation, as is the case when sound translation intersects with phonemic transcription.

10.1 A Critical Eye Turned Inward

Before this came an examination of conventional modes. The idea in the first section, just to recall, was to use sound translation as a limit case. Profiled against the latter, conventional numeric strategies for negotiating sound were revealed. What followed was some classical thinking condemning the voice as an aspect of the flesh, and raising the number as the divine (because rational) principle governing matters of form. Ultimately, this led to the idea that translation privileges the abstraction of repeating numeric sets—measured rhythm and rime—when negotiating sounds between source and target, and I illustrated this notion with a tentative sketch of some translational metrics.

Admittedly, this first section was a set up of sorts. When profiled against sound translation, conventional modes revealed their numeric unidimensionality, came up lacking. There was my cue to launch into the second section, where I made the case for complicating the idea of the text's vocal patterns, for speaking positively about sound translation and the types of reading that motivate it. In so doing, I set up the third section, where I proceeded through the specimens of a sound translational typology of sorts. This, to sum up, was my agenda, which I hope was transparent enough in my introduction.

The trouble with agendas, so important in the design of any dissertation that hopes to achieve and maintain forward momentum, is that they tend to prevent all aspects of the question from being treated according to their natural complexity. At some point, the critic must strategize, attack the question from an angle that illuminates certain dimensions, touches on others superficially, and leaves others in relative obscurity. A case in point is the criticism that I leveled at those theorists who have brushed up against

sound translation superficially for the sole purpose of interrogating conventional modes. I argued that these critics use sound translation as a foil of sorts, a pathological specimen serving to bathe the real object of investigation in a certain light. The foil, because it is not the real object of study, is invariably treated superficially.

No sooner did I make this criticism than I realized that I would probably deserve it myself at some point, but with the terms reversed. All things considered, the first section of this project—the one dedicated to the number, to Augustinian thinking and the sketching of a translational metrics—served a dual purpose. On one hand, it examined convention as revealed by sound translation. On the other hand, it set up convention as a foil, for ultimately the idea was to bounce off of this numeric conception—presented implicitly as insufficient, lacking complexity with regard to vocal patterns—and into the broader reflection of the second section, which itself would lead into the examination of the six modes of the third section.

This, I have found, is a rather sensitive situation. Revealed by sound translation, conventional modes became an important focus and therefore deserved a certain depth of interrogation. However, as a foil to sound translation, which would ultimately become the principal object of investigation, convention had to be examined with a certain promptness in order to maintain the project's forward momentum. A tenuous balance between thoroughness and expeditiousness had to be struck, and the question inevitably received a more superficial treatment than intended, came off perhaps as the proverbial straw man set up to be knocked down immediately afterward. An all too superficial treatment of the foil seems to be the fate of an argument structured antagonistically in this

way. On this point, I fully expect the criticism that I sent around in my introduction to come around.

One must also be wary of paradigms conceived to classify phenomena and then to present them in more or less linear progressions, like the one driving the third section of this project. There are many dangers in such paradigms, no matter how painstakingly they are thought out. While it is true that they give the project a firm direction and logic, they can also result in a certain tunnel vision, which reflexively excludes phenomena and points of view that do not fall neatly into step. What is worse, they can lead the critic into essentialist attitudes toward the paradigms of his or her own invention. The latter take on such an importance, that discourse often shifts imperceptibly from a point of view that assumes the paradigm as man made and therefore fallible, to a point of view that assumes it as unquestioned fact.

My intention was never to subsume all sound translation phenomena within these Cratylan and schismatic classes, nor to suggest that they could all be organized in this tight progression of the narrowing paradigm. This would have been theoretical hubris, and if I have been guilty of it despite myself, I apologize. On the contrary, I will assure my reader now that this syntagm of the Cratylan and schismatic has indeed caused the exclusion of other translation practices that would have been admissible had different classes been chosen. I can offer a concrete example. Early in this project, I wanted to include the melodic interpretation of poetic texts (the setting of texts to music), as well as certain techniques of cinematic sound editing. I discovered along the way, however, that these examples did not fall as neatly into class with the others, nor into their progressive centripetal step. They were therefore put aside for another time, another project.

On this point, I can say no more in my defense than that I would have wanted to do more. Such is the nature of conceptual classes. They set parameters, put the project on a specific path, lead both the writer and the reader through the question in a way that is helpful enough to avoid getting lost entirely, but also univocal enough to exclude other potentially related questions. Of course, irrigating this path are a multitude of other theoretical voices, of other examinable phenomena, each an invitation to stray. Had I opted for a different paradigm than the one set up by *Cratylus* and the schismatic poetics of Futurism and Dada, the third section would have had a very different face, and may well have excluded the work of film dubbers and the whimsical poetry of D'Antin Van Rooten and Hulme. This too would have been a loss.

I am also the first to admit that a certain rigid structuralist imperative has governed my conception of the word "voice" from the beginning. My justification for this, quite simply, is that there is no other conception that testifies as well to the principle relating the texts under examination in the third section. Had I defined the voice in terms of a discursive intentionality differing from situation to situation, then the principle connecting modes of translation as seemingly disparate as film dubbing and the Zukofskys' experiment, would not have surfaced. The notions of the text's second articulation, of metaplastic manipulation, of phono-structural, phonetic and phonographic affinity, constitute a thread connecting these modes of sound translation into a family of sorts.

Conceived as a family, these types of translation become more attractive to theory. At the very least, they become together something more than so many limit cases orbiting in the valence of conventional translation practices. They even suggest an axis of

research through more functional modes of phonemic transcription. Simply put, my effort here has been to construct some much needed conceptual bridgework between those modes of translation that make efforts to re-construct their source in its second articulation, modes that for the most part have remained off the radar of conventional scholarship, let alone unified by any model. Doing this required, I believe, this initial stage of speculative optimism, where the critic treats these modes within their commonalities rather than their differences.

10.2 Qui s'excuse, s'accuse

Perhaps here is where I should end this discourse of "qui s'excuse, s'accuse," for I am not without a sense of my achievements in this investigation, the first being the vindication of a translational underdog of sorts. The objective, just to recall, was to bring sound translation out of the theoretical obscurity where it has remained, to break the vicious circle where it is deemed aberrant because theoretically obscure, and theoretically obscure because aberrant. Breaking this circle meant explaining these modes in more positive terms, making an initial movement toward the establishment of a philosophical framework which would treat them for what they are rather than for the conventional modes that they are not.

Of course, it would be foolish to assume that this circle is easily broken, especially since schismatic translations like the *traducson* insist on keeping it going by trumpeting their own lunacy in the face of convention. How does the critic speak positively about a type of sound translation that, like Dada, insists on defining itself negatively? The answer, as I discussed in the second section, may well be to see through

the sound and fury of rebellious declarations like those of Dada. Just as the perceptive critic can see through the alien configurations of Dada and uncover the normative frameworks integrating the piece logically, he or she can see through the alien configurations of the traducson and uncover the perfectly conventional methods it employs: the paradigmatic techniques of phonemic transcription. A conventional technique lies at the heart of a mode of sound translation that sets great store on defining itself as unconventional, rebellious, lunatic. It is this *modus operandi* of the traducson that I wanted to make evident in chapter nine's progression of paradigmatic modes. By relating it to more functional modes of phonemic transcription, I feel that I have been successful in shedding a positive light even on the traducson, on defining its conventionality *in spite of its own poetic pretensions*.

There is a larger and more singular achievement in this project as a whole, however. At more than one moment, it dawned on me that I was writing a dissertation that dealt with translation, but that also placed the all important semantic designation in the margin for the purpose of addressing questions of form and vocal sound exclusively. A work of translation scholarship that does not make the semantic designation its primary and exclusive focus, or that does not reflexively reduce all aspects of the text's sounds to semantics, is a decided rarity in a field whose theory tends to be elaborated around the all important denotation or message. If I have accomplished only one thing, I would hope it is to demonstrate that translation can be talked about in the way it treats text sounds, and without suborning the latter reflexively to semantic regimes.

Speaking the translation "better left unspoken" naturally meant creating a conceptual framework within which to speak it. A background in poetics and language

philosophy had to be plundered and experimented with. Philosophical tenants had to be culled, re-thought, and integrated. Much working and re-working of conceptualities had to be accomplished before the seemingly simple syntagm of Cratylan and schismatic readings and translations became the operative framework adopted here. Much paper was blackened and thrown out, and during the entire process, I was acutely aware that I was working without a coherent and relevant body of translation scholarship to aid or encourage me. I feel that this project has helped in an all important first effort to construct this body of scholarship.

10.2.1 Axes of Investigation: Sound Translation's Potentiality

With a new niche come new avenues of research. This project points up some of the ways in which sound translators manipulate texts metaplasimically, "float the dragon" as it were. This view of translation as sound manipulator, as spatiotemporal extender and compressor, fragmentor and re-combiner of language sounds: here is a vista of untapped potential for translation scholarship, an axis of investigation into sound processing and patterning techniques that have traditionally escaped the radar. Film dubbing, for example, offers translation scholarship an axis of investigation into the broader realm of cinematic sound editing, as well as into the study of musical texts. The traducson and its related paradigmatic modes, for their part, propose a Dadaist principle of language sound fragmentation and re-combination that suggests intriguing axes into the technological development of musical art forms.

10.2.2 The Potentiality of Foreign Language Film Dubbing

Foreign language film dubbing, first of all, offers a direct vector through other cinematic modes of language sound processing. In fact, it is really only a translational extension of the dubbing or looping processes involved in the addition of dialogue to films. It is often the case that the film's original dialogue is performed post-production, in a studio by an actor who records over the image of his or her own moving lips. Involved here is neither the *rhythmo-bande*, nor any manner of scrolling textual representation. Rather, digital technology of automatic dialogue replacement (ADR) now assists in the metaplastic operation of stretching and shrinking replacement dialogue to synchronize with the original. This sort of technology is only useful, however, when the target text is more or less identical to the source, when perfect or near perfect synchrony is possible.

It is precisely because of foreign language dubbing's imperfections, its incomplete phonemic alignments, that it escapes the pattern matching abilities of digital technology, that it remains dependent on texts, writing, and the type of calligraphic metaplasma examined in section three. At any rate, foreign language dubbing is a potential gateway to future research in the domain of language sound editing. It would be interesting to see how the technologies of foreign language dubbing and post-production dubbing evolve in tandem, and to see whether digital technology finally finds a way to replace the metaplastic calligraphy of the *rhythmo-bande*. Will a system be devised that could automatically fit the foreign language track to the image's moving lips, but only in the event of certain key phonemic alignments, leaving the rest to float in vague approximation? And will it be able to do so without completely de-naturing the foreign language track?


Foreign language film dubbing is really only an adjunct to many other techniques of sound representation and manipulation developed by cinema. In this sense, the temporal metaplasms of the *rhythmo-bande's* calligraphy may well serve as a springboard for future investigation into the many ambient technologies informing the sound editing process in cinema. It opens a door, for example, to the examination of cinematic sound effect. Cinema, I discussed, dedicates an entire track to non-linguistic sound patterns: noises, bumps, thuds and cracks, etc. Such patterns, I also discussed in reference to Chion's work, are mediations. Cinema pulls its ambient sounds out of a palette of usable patterns, much in the same way that a painter dips into his or her palette when choosing colors to mediate the visible forms of the world.

A question for the future would be how cinema translates this world of ambient sound. From here, an intriguing universe of sound archives and stock piles opens up, as well as the technologies of audio signal processing that have been instrumental in shaping the sound imaginary of generations of listeners whose only exposure to acoustic phenomena like gunfire or fistfights has been through the movies, or whose notion of the sound emitted by things like dinosaurs or spacecraft has been dictated by Hollywood sound archives. In an important sense, translation, as it is typically understood, is the transformation of the meaningful sound patterns of language, for the purpose of referring to the same conceptual phenomena. From there, it is not that great a leap to the transformation of any and all meaningful sound patterns for the same purpose.

Foreign language film dubbing could ostensibly open vistas for research into the translation of vocal music as well, specifically of vocal music as it is scripted in song scores. In my examination of film dubbing, I addressed a technique that seems to share

some intriguing commonalities with the translation of song texts. The *rhythmo-bande* technique, just to recall, involves the inter-linguistic translation of a film's language track and its subsequent metaplastic alignment with a pre-existing temporal regime. From here, the leap toward the translation of song texts is not a great one. Song texts fit into the temporal paradigm organized by a musical matrix. The song signifier conforms to this matrix, as sounds are stretched and compressed into synchrony with musical time. Translating a song text into another language involves the same sort of inter-linguistic exchange followed by the same metaplastic alignment of source and target signifiers.

By way of brief illustration, I include here a clip from a translation of one of Ricard Strauss's Four Last Songs, "Frühling." There is only one syllable here, the first of the German /vogel/ and its translation into the English /thrushes/. The musical time for the enunciation of the entire word is over nine seconds. The word is appropriately divided at the vowel, which bears the brunt of its time, and is stretched over a corresponding allotment of space, similar to the technique of film dubbing, although a hyphen is used and the letter's shape is not altered. Moreover, the translator has chosen a vowel that is appropriately "open" (the /u/ in /thrushes/) to align with the Strauss's treatment of the German /o/ in /Vogel/.



The parallelism of this type of song translation with the *rhythmo-bande* process of foreign language film dubbing is striking. Both choose target signifiers that approximate corresponding source signifiers phonetically. However, the most appreciable parallelism emerges when one takes a step back and compares these two processes in their common dependence on temporal regimes. Music and song, like cinema, are art forms forged out of time, specifically out of the precise synchrony of temporal strata. Cinema is a synchrony of five autonomous tracks. Musical texts, for their part, are a synchrony of any number of autonomous melodic lines. The translation of song texts, therefore, could be understood, like film dubbing, as the replacement of a single temporal layer, the score's "language track," as it were.

I do not mean to suggest that these two modes of translation are in all respects similar. Of course, there are worlds of difference between the way film and musical time are conceived, between the cinematic millisecond and the musical time signature. Fundamentally different as well are the materials that both art forms organize temporally, cinema synchronizing layers of imagery and linguistic, verbal, non-verbal and musical sounds; song scores synchronizing layers of instrumental melody and linguistic sounds. These differences, however, make the tentative parallelism of these two related forms of translation all the more fascinating. In film dubbing, translation seems to consolidate a relationship with a musical sister art. The connection is at the very least worthy of exploration.

10.2.3 The Potentiality of Translational Dadaism

Does a phenomenon like the *traducson* suggest paths for research? Perhaps the most obvious line of enquiry opened up by poets like the Zukofskys and d'Antin van Rooten is

the one I have already explored in this project: the axis through the renegade principles of Futurist and Dadaist poetics as they persist in contemporary sound poetics. Kruchenyk's dictum in the "Declaration of the Word as Such" (1968) continues as the mantra of those poets who work in vocal sound instead of language sense, who continue forcing open the crypt of the signifier.

The *traducson* connects directly with sound poetic principles. Perhaps the question to be asked now is the following: do sound poetic principles open up paths for research into the use of sound in contemporary cultural objects? This principle, just to recall, was the artistic re-assemblage of sounds, which are torn out of their traditional frames of reference, then torn to pieces, and ultimately reconstituted in unconventional patterns. The *traducson* is in this sense a target language torn up, reduced to a confetti of graphic sound symbols—be it words and small phrases, syllables or letters—and re-assembled following the sound logic of the source text. In a larger sense, then, the *traducson* demonstrates kinship with all phonic art forms, whose synthesizing logic can be described as an assemblage of disparate sound fragments recycled from the cultural sphere.

This line of enquiry into the sound bits that make the whole, and specifically into the recycling of these bits to create new objects, is becoming increasingly topical. The argument that Western Culture has entered into a phase of massive recycling has indeed become commonplace. Art forms that deal in sound are no exception. The last ten years of popular music, for example, have seen the emergence of audio sampling and the "mash album." In sampling, the artist can collect language sound fragmentals—like the schismatic modes of chapter nine these fragmentals can vary in extension from the

culturally recognizable word or syntagm to the unrecognizable phoneme—into data bases where they can be stored, altered and re-organized into any conceivable syntax. Likewise, to create the “mash album,” an artist may cull vocal sound fragments—quotes of sung text and musical motifs—from his or her own past creations and piece these fragments together in new and innovative arrangements.

The playful traducson, as well as the other paradigmatic modes, could be considered a type of sampling or mashing, as translators mine the target language system for bits and fragments to piece together. If the Dadaist principles informing it give it a modest place in a poetic avant-garde of the early twentieth century, then these very same principles make it relevant to the processes of artistic creation in our Post-Modern age. This relevance, this modest status, is a rare privilege, and I daresay one that has been to date underappreciated by translation scholarship. The latter seems all too often mired in purely functional and communicative mindsets that have little mind for translation’s more creative dimensions. The latter, along with the paths that they suggest through the related scopes that I have just discussed, are being ignored.

10.3 Closing Remarks

I opened this project on a note of scandal, and on a similar note I will close it. My intent in this project has been to discuss sound translation from a more positive and nuanced perspective than those critics who cite it merely as a pathological limit case, useful only for illuminating conventional modes. By examining various types of sound translation—some approaching conventional modes, others phasing more toward phonemic transcription—my hope has been to give the phenomenon some much needed

complexity, and to demonstrate that between conventional modes and the “limit case,” there are a number of intermediate phases negotiating sound, phases which intervene to invalidate the type of clear cut, and binary oppositions formulated by theory thus far.

De-mystifying sound translation, then, has been a chief goal here, demonstrating where it integrates with conventional modes on one hand, and where it integrates with other functional, phonemic transcriptive modes on the other. Sound translation does not, as Lefevere suggests, function on its own, in a no man’s land, and with no regard for tradition. The principles that it follows are simply other than those composing the conventional translator’s ideological blueprint. Even here, however, I have gone too far, for many points of convergence with conventional modes have emerged from close critical reflection as well. Perhaps the only culprit in sound translation’s alienation is lack of critical attention, a hard headed obstinacy not to think the matter through at all, to turn a deaf ear, to cry scandal.

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