

**Three Point Nine Percent Female: A Review of the Barriers to
Increasing Female Troops Participation on United Nations Peace
Operations**

Winter Term 2019

Author: Connor Morris

Supervisor: Dr. Roland Paris

University of Ottawa

Graduate School of Public and International Affairs

Table of Contents

<u>LIST OF ACRONYMS:</u>	<u>2</u>
<u>ABSTRACT</u>	<u>3</u>
<u>INTRODUCTION</u>	<u>4</u>
<u>BACKGROUND</u>	<u>6</u>
WHAT IS THE ISSUE?	6
WHY DOES IT MATTER?	7
HOW DID THE ISSUE EMERGE AND DEVELOP?	9
WHAT ARE THE CURRENT LEVELS?	13
HOW ARE TROOPS CONTRIBUTED?	15
<u>OBSTACLES</u>	<u>19</u>
OBSTACLE 1: LOW PERCENTAGE OF FEMALES IN NATIONAL ARMIES	19
OBSTACLE 2: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES OF THE UN AND UN MEMBER STATES	24
OBSTACLE 3: GENDER PREJUDICES	28
OBSTACLE 4: LACK OF INCENTIVES AND OPPORTUNITIES	30
<u>ATTEMPTS TO OVERCOME OBSTACLES</u>	<u>34</u>
<u>POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS</u>	<u>38</u>
SOLUTION 1: INCREASING GENDER-BALANCE OF TROOPS IN NATIONAL ARMIES	38
SOLUTION 2: OFFERING INCENTIVES AND CHALLENGING DISINCENTIVES TO WOMEN BEING DEPLOYED	41
<u>ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS</u>	<u>48</u>
<u>IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA</u>	<u>52</u>
<u>CONCLUSION</u>	<u>55</u>
<u>BIBLIOGRAPHY</u>	<u>56</u>

List of Acronyms:

AU: African Union

DFS: Department of Field Support

DPKO: Department of Peacekeeping Operations

EU: European Union

FIAP: Feminist International Assistance Policy

GBV: Gender-Based Violence

HIPPO: Independent High-level Panel on Peace Operations

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OSCE: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

SAG: Special Advisory Group

SEA: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

TCC: Troop-Contributing Country

TPCC: Troop and Police Contributing Country

UN: United Nations

UNPO: United Nations Peace Operations

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

UNSCR: United Nations Security Council Resolution

UNSG: United Nations Secretary General

UNGA: United Nations General Assembly

WPS: Women, Peace and Security

Abstract

Since UNSCR 1325 (2000) urged member states to ensure increased representation of women at all levels, the UN has made marginal progress improving the gender balance of troops deployed on UNPO. Despite ambitious targets for increasing the percentage of female troops in these operations, as of January 2019 women made up only 3.9% of all troops deployed on UNPO, up from 1.8% in 2006. Attempts to assess the barriers to improving the gender balance of personnel tend to consider all types of military personnel, police and civilian staff involved in UNPO, rather than focusing on the specific challenges of meeting gender targets for troops. In order to fill the current policy and research gap, this paper considers the challenges to improving the gender balance of troops. Existing studies highlight four possible explanations for the failure to make quicker progress: (1) there are not enough female troops available to contribute to UNPO; (2) UN and UN member states policies and procedures discourage women's inclusion; (3) the gendered predispositions of decision makers and societal norms portray women as needing protection rather than as protectors; and (4) there are few incentives offered to both female troops and UN member states. This paper will evaluate each of these explanations as well as solutions that have been proposed to overcome existing barriers to female troop participation in UNPO. It will conclude with a set of recommendations, calling on the UN and UN member states to: improve recruitment and retention of women in national armies; eliminate unnecessary policies discouraging women's inclusion; directly challenge gendered predispositions that neglect to see women as protectors; and provide financial incentives for UN member states that contribute female troops. The paper concludes by addressing the implications of its research for Canada and analyzing current actions being taken to improve the gender balance of troops deployed on UNPO.

Introduction

The United Nations (UN) has continuously evolved over its 74-year history.¹ The Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda is an example of this development, recognizing and calling for the increased active participation of women in all aspects of the UN's system. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), facing challenges to successfully achieve sustainable peace in regions where United Nations Peace Operations (UNPO) operate, has called for member states to increase the total number and the gender balance of personnel they contribute. The call arose from a normative argument stating that women deserve to be included, and a functionalist argument stating that the inclusion of women improves the operational effectiveness of UNPO. However, progress improving the gender balance of personnel has been slow. In 1993, just 1% of all peacekeepers deployed were women (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, n.d.). As of January 2019, women make up 3.9% of UN military personnel and 14.15% of UN police personnel (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2019). Unfortunately, academia, the UN and its member-states, routinely neglect to breakdown the category of military personnel by its distinctive subcategories, including troops, military observers and staff officers. While troops are the largest personnel type deployed on UNPO, progress improving their gender balance has been the smallest, moving from 1.8% female in August 2006 to 3.9% female in January 2019.² There has been little reflection on why this is the case, as analysis of potential barriers to increasing the number of peacekeepers rarely focuses specifically on troops.

¹ The United Nations was founded on October 24th, 1945.

² The first month the UN has released sex-disaggregated data on troops was August 2006.

This paper will evaluate a number of possible explanations for why UN member states have failed to improve the gender balance of troops on UNPO. It will first look at the history of the issue and discuss the implications of failing to achieve a greater gender balance. It will then synthesize the available research on barriers to increasing the total number and percentage of female troops. Next, it will analyze what actions are being taken and what further solutions could be pursued to increase women's participation. The paper will conclude by considering the implications of its research for Canada.

Background

What is the issue?

United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2242 (2015) called on member states to double the number of women in military and police contingents by the next five years. In October 2015, the same time UNSCR 2242 was adopted, women represented 3.3% of troops on UNPO (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2019). As previously referenced, as of January 2019 women only represent 3.9% of troops on UNPO. With only a 0.6% increase in over 4 years, it is unlikely that the UN and its member states will fulfill their goal of doubling the level of female troops, to 6.6%, by 2020. Even so, the target of 6.6% women in military troop contingents is quite low relative to the United Nations-wide strategy on gender parity, set by the current United Nations Secretary General (UNSG) António Guterres.

Fifteen years after the adoption of UNSCR 1325, the UNSC adopted UNSCR 2122. This resolution requested Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon to conduct a review of the implementation of UNSCR 1325, highlighting its gaps and challenges. After this review was conducted, UNSCR 2122, called for the Secretary-General to submit a report based on its findings. This report acknowledged that severe gaps and challenges exist in fully implementing UNSCR 1325. Since 2010, the UNSC receives annual reports on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and UNSCR 2122, including updates on the progress made throughout the entire WPS agenda. In regard to gender parity strategies in UNPO, the most recent report released on October 2018 stated, “the representation of women is lowest, the rate of change is slowest and the potential impacts on our effectiveness and credibility remains critical” (United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, 2018). The willingness for the UN to establish targets that are either logistically

impossible, or nothing more than rhetorical declarations, has and will affect the way actors judge its capabilities moving forward.

Why does it matter?

Born out of the ashes of two World Wars and a failed League of Nations, the UN has become a fundamental aspect of international relations. It has made considerable progress over the years on its three main pillars of Human Rights, Peace and Security, and Development. It has brought together civil society, government, non-government organization and the private sector to tackle global issues and emerging conflicts. However, it has received considerable and growing criticism for its efficacy.

Skeptics from both civil society and academia question the UN's ability to achieve the lofty goals it sets out for itself. Often the UN and the UNSC have been criticized for its inability to adequately accomplish the mandates of UNPO, including the growing number of multidimensional peacekeeping operations. Many of these skeptics, some within the UNSC, maintain that above all else the UN must respect a state's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The only exception to this under the UN Charter is Chapter 7, whereby the UNSC declares a threat to international peace and security. However, these same council members vehemently defend that there is no clear consensus on the definition of when this is appropriate. Conversely, the UN and UNSC have been criticized for their inaction in cases such as Rwanda, Congo, Srebrenica.³ The UN has also received significant criticism for failing to stop cases of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) perpetrated by UN peacekeepers, and the culture of impunity for these crimes. The UN has attempted to address all of these concerns as it works to improve its "effectiveness, credibility and relevance in an increasingly troubled world" (United Nations

³ Among others, this includes the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, the Second Congo War and the Srebrenica Genocide.

General Assembly PGA). The UN has enlisted several evaluations of UNPO over the years, including a number of high-level reports such as the Independent High-level Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) and the Brahimi report, drafted on November 13th, 2000 and June 16th, 2015 respectively. Both reports offered various recommendations to improve the effectiveness of UNPO. While the UN has incorporated some of the recommendations, many have still yet to be fulfilled.

Those who recommend increasing the presence of women in UNPO have increasingly turned to normative and functionalist arguments. The first, which many consider as the only argument necessary, is that the UN must promote gender equality through its actions.⁴ Improving the representativeness and diversity of its personnel in peace operations is imperative to this. Secondly, many have cited the fact that an increased presence of women in UNPO improves operational effectiveness.⁵ Researchers contend that peacekeeping contingents with women are more trusted by local communities; better equipped to do tasks that require a women such as female body searches; able to make contact with vulnerable groups in conflict zones; help to decrease the occurrence of SEA by other peacekeepers in their contingent and are less likely to perpetrate SEA themselves (Bastick & Torres, 2010) If you accept these claims, then increasing women's representation in troop contingents should improve the effectiveness of UNPO. The caveat is that increased operational effectiveness will not create long-term benefits for women until the culture changes to be more accepting of women and gender norms (Karim & Beardsley, 2017). By achieving its goal of having a greater percentage of female troops, the UN can gain legitimacy in its ability to accomplish the tasks it sets out for itself. As previously stated, this is something that it has increasingly struggled with.

⁴ Consider, OCHR, 2014 Report: Women's Rights Are Human Rights

⁵ These claims are repeated by UN-Women, DPKO, UN member states and several UNSCR regarding WPS.

Beyond normative and functionalist arguments for women's inclusion, a global shift towards populism has shed light on the concerns many have of the UN. As our world becomes ever more interconnected, the UN's role as a global forum has never been more important. In order for the UN to maintain its legitimacy on the global stage, it must achieve the goals it sets out for itself. If it does not, there is potential for people to lose further confidence in multilateralism, and the agreed-upon rules and norms the UN has helped shape.

How did the issue emerge and develop?

During the 1990s there was a proliferation of UNPO's. The UNSC authorized more missions between 1991-1994 than it had done in the previous 45 years. Many of these conflicts occurred in Cold War satellite states, often proxy civil wars. After the Cold War ended, internal and external issues bottlenecked into extremely violent conflicts. Since then, UNPO mandates have started to become increasingly multidimensional. Failures to achieve these mandates, the increase in reports of SEA by UN peacekeepers, and growing pressures by women's rights groups and civil society in the late '90s, led to the formulation of the WPS Agenda.

The WPS Agenda is a call for the full active participation of women as actors throughout the entire peace and security sector, including promoting the importance of gender in security policy. Additionally, it recognizes the particular challenges women face in conflict and post-conflict societies (Jenkins, 2017). The UNSC has adopted a total of eight UNSCR on WPS. These resolutions are UNSCR 1325 (2000), UNSCR 1820 (2008), UNSCR 1888 (2009), UNSCR 1889 (2009), UNSCR 1960 (2010), UNSCR 2106 (2013), UNSCR 2122 (2013) and UNSCR 2422 (2015). The first of these resolutions, which institutionalized the WPS agenda on the international scene, was S/RES/1325. Adopted 31 October 2000, this landmark resolution, colloquially referred to as 1325, for the first time recognized the unique and under-valued impact

women have on all aspects of peace and security. The following seven UNSC resolutions recognize that women and gender play a key role in all aspects of conflict, post-conflict reconstruction, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace negotiations. Additionally, many of these resolutions have recognized and looked to address the issue of SEA.

All eight UNSC resolutions help to provide a political framework for the WPS agenda, showing how both women and gender play a relevant and important role in solving peace and security issues. Similarly, it can also be conceived of as a response to the prevailing structural and institutional barriers that limit the role of women and gender in the security field. A current and prevailing theme within WPS is to frame it as a “women’s only issue” (Oudraat & Brown, 2017). Within the male-dominated security structure, it has often been the case that an issue is delegitimized in this way to make it less of a priority. Nationally and internationally, WPS promotes establishing recruitment and retention policies that have mainstreamed gender throughout. In this regard, strong progress has been made by a broad set of actors including the UN, regional organizations and national governments (Oudraat & Brown, 2017, p. 1). All have established organizational wide policies and national action plans to implement the WPS agenda. In order for WPS to achieve its goal of improving these institutional infrastructures for improved gender mainstreaming, promoting gender perspectives on a national basis is equally as important as inside the UN.

Several events laid the groundwork for the eventual adoption of UNSCR 1325. During the UN Decade of women (1975-1985), women staff members questioned the gender-blind recruitment strategies which severely limited women’s deployment in UNPO (Olsson, Schjølset, Möller, 2015). Their queries eventually led to more equitable recruitment practices in UN missions starting with the UNPO in Namibia (1989). Five years later, the United Nations General

Assembly (UNGA) set gender parity targets for the equal representation of men and women throughout the Secretariat (United Nations General Assembly, 1995). In 1995 UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali extended this target to field missions and mission replacement posts. Just before the adoption of UNSCR 1325, the DPKO adopted the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action in order to improve gender equality and gender balance in UNPO (United Nations General Assembly, 2000). Since UNSCR 1325, the UNSG and DPKO have encouraged troop-contributing countries (TCC's) to deploy more women. Various targets have been set, and consistently missed, like that of 8% women in military positions (UN-Women, 2015). Yet, reports by the UNSG continue to call for member states to contribute female troops to or above the levels in their national armies. The UNSC consistently references in its mandates the need for states to consider female representation, although they lack any formal powers to force compliance. Additionally, UNPO and the UN system more broadly are dealing with significant resourcing issue to achieve its goal.

Friends of WPS, including UN member-states, have increasingly turned to operational effectiveness arguments for the increased representation of women in UNPO.⁶ Some of the most common claims found in the dominant narratives include: a greater presence of female peacekeepers reduces cases of SEA perpetrated by male peacekeepers; victims of SEA are more likely to report cases to female peacekeepers; female peacekeepers increase the mission's credibility with host communities; and women peacekeepers are necessary for addressing the specific skills needed to fulfill activities in the host community where men are prohibited for

⁶ Consider Dharmapuri, S (2011) "Just Add women and stir?"; Dharmapuri (2013) Not Just a Numbers Game: Increasing Women's Participation in UN Peacekeeping,"; DFS (2011) Ten-Year impact study of the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on WPS on Peacekeeping; Carey "Women and Peace and Security"; Bridges and Horsfall (2009)"Increasing Operational Effectiveness in UN peacekeeping: toward a gender-balanced force"; Karim, S (2017)

example, security checks (Coomaraswamy, 2015). The UN DPKO reflect these claims stating that the increased recruitment of women is critical, and the presence of women peacekeepers can reduce conflict, improve access and support for local women, provide role models for women in the community, provide a greater sense of security to locals including women and children, and broaden the skill sets of women. These claims are also spread throughout the DPKO and Department of Field Support (DFS) “Guidelines for Integrating A Gender Perspective into the Work of the UN Military in Peacekeeping Operations” (DPKO/DFS Guidelines, 2010). They claim that mixed teams, referring to the co-deployment of male and female military personnel, are more effective than male-only units.

Understandably, many have acknowledged the unequal treatment of having to prove women’s worth using greater operational effectiveness arguments. This is especially true given the fact that their male colleagues undergo no such scrutiny. Unfortunately, this is a consequence of the institutional power structures which exist within the defense and security sector. These power structures demand functionalist arguments rather than normative values. Due to this, it is important for policymakers to remain attentive to both, functionalist and normative arguments, for the greater inclusion of gender equality and overall empowerment of women. Just how much proof is needed can be a difficult assessment. Whatever the case, an assumption this paper takes moving forward is that both normative and functionalist arguments have been sufficient to undertake solutions, to the barriers of female troops meaningful participation in UNPO.

Compared to research on operational effectiveness of women, there has been considerably less research analyzing the barriers and potential solutions to increasing the number of women deployed as troops on UNPO. One of the reasons for this is that troops have not been a central focus of the UN, often being categorized within the larger military personnel category.

Analyses to date have suffered from focusing on all police and/or all military, rather than focusing specifically on female troops. The recommendations emerging from this research are inadequate in analyzing the challenges that exist for troops, as they are fundamentally different than the other personnel on UNPO.

Personnel that participate in UNPO can be categorized into three types: civilian, military and police. Each of these personnel types can be further subdivided by their roles. For military personnel, there are Military Experts, Staff Officers, and Troops. Troops play a central role in UNPO for many reasons. Troops make up overwhelmingly the largest amount of personnel in UNPO.⁷ Secondly, troops are the most common personnel to interact with locals, making them the face of the mission. Lastly, troops engage in a number of important security duties including protecting civilians, aid workers, and other UN personnel.

What are the current levels?

Historically, women have been underrepresented and under-valued across the UN system. Within peacekeeping, the most documented and well-known aspect of the UN's work, women and gender have been a clear afterthought. This is clear when reviewing the history of data collection on UNPO. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is responsible for collecting and publishing all data on personnel deployed to UNPO. Data collection and presentation has been mixed over the years with it currently being presented in monthly reports sorted by troop and police contributing countries (TPCC), mission, and gender. This is quite a step from previous data collection practices which had not produced gender disaggregated data for troop type until 2005 (DPKO/OMA, 2010). For Police, gender disaggregated data wasn't available until 2009 and from March to October 2009 it had been reported on as one category.

⁷ As of January 2019, troops made up 75,698 of the 79,022 military personnel and 89,409 combined police and military personnel.

By November 2009 they subdivided the category into Formed Police Units and Individual Police. The data on military personnel has been equally problematic. Until late 2009, data on military personnel were separated into the three subcategories of Military Observers, Staff Officers, and Contingent Troops. Then, the subcategory of staff officer was removed from reporting. In 2011, military personnel were divided into two subcategories: Military Expert and Troops. As Olsson and Möller (2013) point out, “it is not clear whether these changes are caused entirely by simply reclassifying the subcategories or if new ones have been included and excluded.” Also, “this decreases both the time span for larger data sets of gender-disaggregated data and the quality as there is no description of coding available.” This had made much of the literature on UNPO relating to uniformed personnel difficult to compare as researchers reflect and compare different types of personnel. This makes it impossible to measure the exact increase of female troop levels from the start of UNSCR 1325 to the present.

We do know that in 1993, women made up only 1% of the military in UN missions, most of which was support staff (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, n.d.). As of August 2006 – the first month which gendered data on Contingent Troops was separated from Military Observers and Staff Officers - there were a total of 63,334 female troops deployed, making up 1.8% of UN troops (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2006). As of January 2019, women made up 3.9% of UN military positions and 14.15% of UN police (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2019). This is far below the targets set by the UN which reaffirmed the UNSC commitment to increase the number of women in troop contingents and police contingents to 15% and 20% respectively. While progress has been slow, researchers have found it to be rare for missions to not have any women peacekeepers (Karim and Beardsley, 2017).

Some have asserted that the efforts to create gender balance in UN police forces have seen greater progress than those in the military due to higher rates of female police in domestic police forces (Olsson, Schjøset, and Möller, 2015, p. 39). Another common claim is that several UN member states do not allow females to be a part of their national armies. Of course, this would disastrously affect the inclusion of women in military units, as they are often deployed in contingents. Without prior experience being in a combat unit, female troops might be disqualified from deployment in UNPO (Ghittoni, Lehouck, and Watson, 2018). This has been pointed to as a serious barrier that impedes women's chances of being deployed and will be considered more thoroughly in the "obstacles" section of this paper.

How are troops contributed?

The UN Charter gives the UNSC the sole authority to authorize UNPO. Once a UNPO and its mandate are authorized by the Council, requests for a variety of personnel are sent. Then, it is up to each member state to decide who and what personnel if any they would like to volunteer for the mission. The UN may ask any person to leave, similarly, member states can choose to retract their personnel at any moment. This has only been done in extreme circumstances such as the Rwandan genocide and the Congolese military troops accused of SEA. Depending on the country, individuals are able to apply to be a part of peacekeeping positions (UN-Women, 2015). In most countries, it is up to the governments and military officials to decide who and what they would like to send.

Considering the potential costs associated with contributing troops to peace operations, several researchers have looked to explain why member states would want to contribute their own troops, police or other personnel. These answers vary depending on political ideologies. Constructivists would say that states respond to social rewards and punishments (Johnston,

2001). Liberal institutionalists argue that states act in order to safeguard their international reputation, simply put, they abide by their commitments (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985). Of course, there are several other reasons why states might contribute personnel including having regional ties to the conflict, gaining favour from others for contributing, making a profit off of the UN reimbursements for troop contribution, and so on.

Researchers have also looked at the distribution of contributions by countries. For example, Crawford, Lebovic, and Macdonald (2015) looked at explaining the variation of gender composition of developed state contributions. They find that “some UN members—by reason of their democratic and rights-observant governance—are peculiarly prone to contribute at least a small number of female personnel to UN operations. This finding holds regardless of the societal equity, available labor pool, or prior mission or UNPO involvement of a given contributor or the characteristics of a mission” (Crawford, Lebovic, & Macdonald, 2015, p. 20). While these personnel are often not troops, it is still noteworthy to explain the variation of contributions by developed states, especially since the study took into account other factors such the type of mission. The authors offer a potential explanation for their claim: Governments act abroad the same way they act at home. From a liberal-normative standpoint, integrating gender and increasing the diversity of national armies is the right thing to do. Of course, with many repeatedly showing their affection for functionalist arguments it stands that there are likely more reasons than just this. Understanding “why” women are being contributed is key to garnering further action by allied states who see it as a priority.

Researchers who have analyzed the deployment of female troops have found that member states tend to deploy females to UNPO with less harmful environments. This is reflected by the mandates of the missions where female troops are deployed which call for the use of force. This

shows an obvious lack of willingness by member states to deploy female military troops to the worst, most violent areas. Karim and Beardsley (2013) accurately note that by not deploying female military peacekeepers to environments where there are high rates of gender-based violence (GBV), gender inequality and gender insecurity, women peacekeepers are being used as token females. In order for female troops to make the most good in UNPO, which includes being beacons of gender equality and encouraging local females to join security sector, it is encouraged that all actions to increase female troops participation considers deployment specifically to these conflict and post-conflict situations.

While outside the scope of this paper, there is merit to the argument that a larger total number - or percentage - of women in military positions, or any position for that matter, does not ensure that women are equally empowered as men inside the deeply patriarchal-security sector.⁸ For if women did make up a larger percentage of the total UN personnel, this does not necessarily mean that they will be valued more within the institutions and structures that have historically denied their value. Nevertheless, this does not deny that increasing female representation is a fruitful endeavor in and of itself. In fact, it may support the further empowerment of females in the security sector, causing a cascading effect to challenge the male-dominated order.

Beyond UNPO, challenges exist for other organizations who strive to increase uniformed women's participation in peace operations. This includes the African Union (AU); the European Union (EU) establishing in 2005 a policy to increase the participation of women in Common

⁸ See for instance: Willett, S. (2010). Introduction: Security Council Resolution 1325: assessing the impact on Women, Peace and Security. *International peacekeeping*, 17(2), 142-158.; DeGroot, G. J. (2001). A few good women: Gender stereotypes, the military and peacekeeping. *International Peacekeeping*, 8(2), 23-38; and Nuciari, M. (2006). Women in the Military. In G. Caforio (Ed.), *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military* (pp. 279–297). Boston, MA: Springer US.

Security and Defence missions; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) establishing a policy in 2007 to help implement UNSCR 1325; and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) establishing a Gender Equality Action Plan in 2004 (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2004). Similar to data on UNPO, data collection has been sparse and inconsistent, especially for the AU which does not make gender-disaggregated data available. While the EU, NATO, and OSCE have all committed to increasing women's participation in their operations, none have shown significant increases in female military troops.

Obstacles

In general, the literature around the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and further WPS resolutions have considered many obstacles for improving the gender balance of UN personnel. As was stated previously, much of this research focuses on obstacles for all military and police personnel. In order to analyze the obstacles relevant to troops, this paper will draw on research that has focused on military personnel in general, while highlighting its specific relevance for troops.

A frequently cited argument for why the UN has failed to increase the deployment of female troops is due to the low numbers of females within national militaries, especially countries who contribute the largest number of troops to UNPO. However, there are a considerable number of other obstacles to increasing women's representation beyond the gender balance of national militaries. As this section will show; the UN and UN member states policies and procedures; gender prejudices; and few incentives given to both women and UN member states; create obstacles for improving the gender balance of troops on UNPO. This section will first consider the research relevant to the claim that the small increase in the deployment of female troops is due to low numbers in national militaries.

Obstacle 1: Low Percentage of Females in National Armies

A commonly referenced argument for why UN member states are unable to increase women's representation for UN troops points to the lack of a sufficient pool of qualified females. The easiest way to validate this claim would be to analyze sex-disaggregated data on all UN member states. Unfortunately, international studies of the world's militaries do not disaggregate by sex, and "very few countries produce country-specific assessments of female participation in their national forces or in their contributions to UN peacekeeping," notable exceptions, are

Britain and the United States (Dharmapuri, 2013, p. 1). While research and data had not been available at the time of Dharmapuri's writing, since then several other countries have released more substantial sex-disaggregated data.⁹ However, this is nowhere near a norm and data analysis for TCC's is still fairly limited.

Consistently researchers exclaim that the largest TCC's have the smallest percentage of females. Unfortunately, the UN does not collect data from member states on their national recruitment strategies (Karim & Beardsley, 2017). It is fair to say that the lack of transparency in this regard increases the likelihood of corruption in deployment choices. Given the prevalence of an "old boys club" in militaries and the security sector, this negatively affects the chances of qualified women being deployed. Nevertheless, in order to analyze the validity of the aforementioned, an analysis of the largest TCC's is necessary. Dharmapuri (2013) considered this hypothesis and evaluated data that is available on TCC's. She found that the TCC's which make the largest contributions to UNPO namely India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, had a low percentage of female soldiers in their armed forces. Additionally, she found that these countries lacked a framework to encourage female recruitment. As of January 31st, 2019, Ethiopia (7571 troops), Bangladesh (6591 troops), Rwanda (6535 troops), and India (6430 troops) are the TCC's which make the largest troop contributions to UNPO. Besides Ethiopia, which has 7.53% women, India (0.34%), Pakistan (0.34%) and Bangladesh (0.86%) maintain a low percentage of female soldiers in their armed forces. Conversely, South Africa who contributes the largest share of female to male troops, with at least 1,000 troops contributed, (13.37% - 146 females and 946 male) has made considerable efforts to recruit women by introducing quotas and removing restrictions on women. Still, the TCC's with the largest percentage of female troops also

⁹ Most of the countries with available data on this are NATO countries.

contribute less than 100 troops, including Belarus (50% female, 2 females, and 2 males); Kenya (21.33% females, 16 females, and 59 males); and Hungary (20% females, 1 female, and 4 males) (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2019). This data shows that really no member state, other than possibly South Africa, is contributing a high level of female soldiers. In this regard, the lack of leaders championing the issue through sustained female troops contributions has prolonged an open uniformity across all TCC's.

After looking at the contributions of the largest TCC's there are still questions left unanswered for why governments are not contributing more women. Karim and Beardsley (2013) point to a different explanation for why governments are not contributing female peacekeepers. They evaluate the hypothesis that female contributions reflect the availability of female troops in TCC's. They find that the variation in the allocation of female peacekeepers to national gender levels is positive but not very strong. While some countries contribute over their levels, many deploy under their levels. Of course, the authors also had to rely on assumptions about the gender balance in national armies, as many do not have available sex-disaggregated data. Another caveat to their research is that they only consider the currently highest rated TCC's. This means that many countries who are currently not contributing many, or at least very few troops are not considered, this includes many high-income western European countries.

Rather than comparing to national levels, researchers have also considered where countries have contributed women. This is done in order to understand more accurately the decisions that governments make when they are deciding to contribute. Crawford, Lebovic, and Macdonald (2015) study looked at the gender variation of personnel contribution to UNPO. Unfortunately, similar to much of the recent research, they consider more personnel than just

troops. Nonetheless, their conclusions can shine a light on the additional barriers that restrict the deployment of female troops. The author's breakdown their research, evaluating 9 hypotheses.

1. Hypothesis 1: The broader the range of political rights possessed by women in a country, the greater the likelihood that it will contribute female personnel to UNPOs.
2. Hypothesis 2: The more democratic a country, the greater the likelihood that it will contribute female personnel to UNPOs.
3. Hypothesis 3: The greater the level of gender equality within a country, the greater the likelihood that it will contribute female personnel to UNPOs.
4. Hypothesis 4: The greater the level of modernization of a country, the greater the likelihood that it will contribute female personnel to UNPOs.
5. Hypothesis 5: The greater the population of a country, the greater the likelihood that it will contribute female personnel to UNPOs.
6. Hypothesis 6: The greater the participation of a country in international efforts to improve the status of women, the greater the likelihood that it will contribute female personnel to UNPOs.
7. Hypothesis 7: The location of a mission in the home region of a country increases its likelihood of contributing female personnel to that UNPO.
8. Hypothesis 8: The specific professional skills that are required in a mission increase the likelihood that countries will contribute female personnel to that UNPO.
9. Hypothesis 9: The overall size of a mission increases the likelihood that countries will contribute female personnel to that UNPO.

After studying the variations, they conclude that states do not contribute female peacekeepers to “Chapter VII missions, which require a larger troop presence and potential combat involvement.” Chapter VII missions are those that the UNSC sanction in order to protect

international peace and security, overriding any sovereignty claims a government might use to restrict states access inside their borders. Personnel from these missions make up around 80% of the total personnel contributed to UNPO, with 80% of these personnel being troops (Crawford, Lebovic, and Macdonald, 2015). The authors state the reasons for this are due to low levels of women in national militaries and domestic policies that restrict women from taking up combat roles. Interestingly, the authors also find that UN member which are democratic and rights-observant governing states, contribute at least a small number of female personnel to UNPO. They find that this trend holds regardless of other factors. However, it is unclear whether these claims hold when isolating just female troops. A country like the United States, for instance, has consistently contributed female personnel to UNPO, but in recent history has decided against contributing contingent troops. This is the norm for high-income countries, most of which are considered democratic and rights-observant states. Further research should look into why rights-observant governments are not increasing their contributions, especially when such governments make growing calls to improve UNPO and women's representation of troop contingents.

One of the more heavily researched areas within the greater UNPO literature has been to explain the different variations in troop contributions by member states. As previously discussed, since the end of the 1990's there has been considerable evidence produced that shows that western states, also referred to as high-income states, do not contribute personnel anywhere near the levels of their counterparts in the developing world. These countries, European and North American, have between 8% and 20% women in their national militaries (Coomaraswamy, 2015). When personnel are contributed from these states, they are almost always police, military observers or support staff. This brings up an important question about the morality of the choice,

and what it says about these countries commitment to achieving the goal of increasing women's participation throughout the entire UN-system.

Recent calls have asked states to contribute – at least – as much women to peacekeeping that there are in their national armies. However, this clearly does not happen, especially considering many countries do not contribute any troops to the UN. Researchers find it difficult to assess gender balance levels nation by nation though because sex-disaggregated data on a lot of countries, especially the TCC's, are not available. While some countries keep their sex-disaggregated data private, presumably there are others that do not have the data to begin with.

Obstacle 2: Policies and Procedures of the UN and UN Member States

In order to improve the gender balance of troops in national militaries and UNPO, researchers have started to analyze the policies and procedures that may hinder women's participation. This has led to some researchers to question current deployment criteria and deployment selection procedures. When looking at specific criteria for potential deployment on UNPO, Ghittoni, M., Lehouck, L., & Watson, C. (2018) find that the years of experience necessary for deployment disproportionately prohibit women from qualifying for UNPO. In some country's this is due to women being restricted from enlisting in the military and in others it is due to family-related interruptions. However, the researchers also point out that the deployment criteria are only relevant to troops being deployed individually and not those as a contingent. Generally, TCC's deploy troops as full contingents, and the number of women deployed in contingents are decided before it is deployed. Thus, in order for more women to not be restricted by this criteria woman can be contributed via contingents.

Other criteria for UN deployment must also be analyzed in order to reflect the changing needs of the modern environments UNPO are deployed. There are a number of physical

obstacles to female troops that potentially are unnecessary and must be further considered. For example, physical fitness tests that do not consider gender have created an obstacle for many women to qualify for positions. Another common issue for female troops is “the ability to drive a manual shift 4x4 vehicle as well as skills in handling light or medium weapons” (Ghittoni, M., Lehouck, L., & Watson, C, 2018). The authors argue that this is a significant barrier to women, as men are more likely to learn how to drive when they are young. Women from Namibia, Tanzania, and Zambia have all cited driving skills as the main obstacle to deployment in UNPO (Bastrick & Torres, 2010). When UN member states are recruiting troops, they must recognize the importance of training troops to be equal in skills and qualifications.

Goldstein (2003) argues that the reason women participate less in military activities is due to societal and biological processes, including men, on average, being more spatially adept and competitive than women. Historically for these reasons women have been absent from participating in military activities. Karim and Beardsley (2013) find that this idea has been internalized by militaries who now demand a number of skill sets associated with masculine characteristics, such as driving and upper body strength. So, while government remain risk-averse in their contribution of women, their national militaries demand specific skills which masculinize the military sector.

Another considerable barrier to ensuring that women are deployed is deployment selection by UN member states. Ghittoni, M., Lehouck, L., & Watson, C. (2018) found that women from some TCC’s suffer from corrupt deployment selection, noting the historical prevalence of allegations against an “old boys club.” While corruption allegations are based on anecdotal evidence, they found that Ghanaian newspapers revealed that corruption was occurring in the selection of police for UNPO. The reasons for this were due to favouritism, political

allegiance, and patronage. The issue of corruption highlights the importance of transparent guidelines that can help to regulate the deployment of troops to ensure that the selection process is merit-based. Unfortunately, the only TCC that has made this selection process transparent is Canada.

Another obstacle to women's participation in the military both nationally and at the UN is the threat of GBV. The case of US servicewomen in Iraq being assaulted by fellow soldiers has been used to show the importance of including women in planning phases (Wolf, 2012). Including female personnel in the base design has been linked to improving the safety of female personnel deployed. In the case of UNPO, SEA allegations have been even more widespread, or at least more well-known, than other military operations. If one were to assume that the safety and comfortability of female troops would affect the deployment of such troops, it is to be expected that improving the policies of discipline mechanisms would not only allow for reduced cases of SEA but also increase the safety, and therefore overall deployment, of female troops.

A considerable amount of research on the instances of SEA in UNPO has developed, much of which reveals a lack of reduction in violations. In 2003, the UN implemented a 'zero-tolerance policy' for SEA by peacekeeping personnel (ST/SGB/2003/13). Due to the severity of the offense and the strong negative response coming from inside and outside the UN, many of the UNSCR on WPS have looked at increasing the UN's powers to mitigate SEA. Today the issue of SEA remains prevalent as the UN routinely fails to ensure that none of its peacekeepers violate the policy. Many stakeholders including the UN and WPS community support the argument that cases of SEA are negatively correlated with a greater number of uniformed female peacekeepers (Karim & Beardsley, 2016). This claim plays a significant role in the operational arguments for increasing the presence of female troops, and other female personnel, in UNPO.

Karim and Beardsley (2013) research show us that “female military personnel have already proven to be important resources that serve on the ground, implementing initiatives such as women’s literacy programs, sexual harassment policies, and training programs on gender for male peacekeepers.”

Unsurprisingly given the cases of SEA, another barrier addressed by researchers are UN troops working environment. Ghittoni, M., Lehouck, L., & Watson, C. (2018) find that denigrating behavior has limited the numbers of female troops. As out-groups, women receive considerable hazing by their male counterparts. Women also receive inadequate accommodations, facilities, and equipment. For example, missions often do not have “at least one female physician as well as specialists in obstetrics and gynecology and a counseling component” (Olsson, 2000). This has been linked to a lack of financial prioritization and some UNPO not considering women’s physiological and biological needs such as separate bathrooms and sleeping arrangements (Pruitt, 2016, p. 109). However, there has yet to be research showing that female troops are not being deployed due to this lack of resources. Still, not providing women adequate resources will negatively affect their own interests in being deployed and certainly affect their performance.

One of the most frequently cited barriers for researchers is the lack of consistent data to help improve accurate measurement. The UN’s DPKO should be recognized for making progress in this regard. Today, data is available by mission, military type, and gender or TCC-gender, military observer/staff officer, and gender. However, data is not available for the gender of military troops by TCC’s. The gap also brings up questions regarding why it is the case for troops but not staff officers or experts. While it has been improved, having better and more

consistent data would help improve research and ensure the adage that what gets measured, gets done.

Obstacle 3: Gender Prejudices

The presence of gender roles and gender stereotypes are well documented in WPS literature. While domestic laws around women and gender equality are very different across all UN member states, there is considerable research to state that gender predispositions which discriminate against women are a considerable barrier for female troops to be deployed on UNPO. In her research, Dharmapuri (2013) found three major barriers to increasing the number of female troops in UNPO. The three problems are a lack of understanding of UNSCR1325 and UN policies towards gender equality; little data and analysis available on integrating a gender perspective into field missions, and a “prevalence of social norms and biases that perpetuate gender inequality within the security sector” (p. 12). These three barriers mirror the most pertinent issues presented for gender prejudices.

Researchers have indicated that the inclusion of women in the security sector is not thought of because women are seen as needing protection rather than as protectors. UN deployment data shows a negative correlation to the proportion of women deployed and the number of fatalities in a UNPO (Ghittoni, M., Lehouck, L., & Watson, C. 2018). The reason for this is due to the subconscious interpretations by both decision makers and societies which have greater concern for the loss of female military personnel (Karim & Beardsley, 2017). This is due to the fact that servicewomen receive considerable pressure from friends and family. However, the authors do not provide evidence for how this is any more effective than pushback given to male counterparts by their families and friends. Nevertheless, this may relate to other societal norms that distinguish men as being protectors and women as being victims. Ghittoni, M.,

Lehouck, L., & Watson, C. (2018) also note many key stakeholders misunderstand the goals and policies of the WPS Agenda and UNSCR 1325. While some find a gender equality norm unconvincing, others are either resistant to use the WPS agenda to promote gender equality or unconvinced that the increased deployment of women will prevent and respond to sexual violence claims (Dharmapuri, 2013). This resistance shows the importance of functionalist arguments to prove the positive operational effects women make.

Oudraat and Brown (2017) find that the UNSC and UN member-states focus on the WPS Agenda has been highly misguided. Their fascination with what they call “the three passive pillars” (prevention of sexual violence, protection from sexual violence, relief, and recovery) continues to consider women as victims (Oudraat & Brown, 2017). This limits the understanding of what women can do and will do when they are contributed and does not challenge gender stereotypes. The deployment choices show that factually, these stereotypes are not being challenged. Karim and Beardsley (2013) study on why governments are not contributing female peacekeepers found that tolerance of casualties and the frequency of multiple missions in one country reduce the number of female troop contributions. Their research shows that rather than being treated as equals, female troops are being protected through decision makers deciding not to deploy them in areas where there is a greater fear of loss of life. Karim and Beardsley (2013) argue that what is important is how we frame the issue of women’s participation. Too often when talking about WPS, many do not reflect on the fact that both men and women consistently question women’s ability to be protectors. While this is a larger issue of reinforcing gender stereotypes, it reflects how the rhetorical commitments have continued to shape the issue as one which neglects to challenge the larger, patriarchal structures, that prohibit women’s inclusion and too often infantilizing them.

Obstacle 4: Lack of Incentives and Opportunities

A common excuse for the low number of women in UN peace operations is that TCC's have a low number of females in their national armies or that their inclusion is just too costly (Kenny, 2016). While the cost can be understood as an evaluation which member states make, claims that the low number of women in large TCC's has not been substantiated. It has been shown that the deployment of women to UNPO do not reflect the percentage of women in national armies (Kenny, 2016). However, it is valid to consider that the low levels of women being contributed by TCC's reflect an unwillingness by countries to deploy them. As has been referenced, this means that additional incentives may be necessary in order to do so, even if levels of women increase in national militaries. A consistent issue with increasing women's participation in UNPO is that financial support by member states has not increased with the increase of rhetorical commitments in national statements. Understandably, the continued absence of financial resources to help support WPS resolutions are a clear detriment to achieving women's participation, both in troops and in peace and security more broadly (Basu, 2017). This has been referred to as "perhaps the most serious and persistent obstacle" since the adoption of UNSCR 1325 (UN-Women, 2015). This reflects a consistent issue with the legitimacy and willingness member states give to increase the participation of women, particularly troops, in UNPO.

While not recognized consistently in the literature, this is one of the major issues raised by high-income states that also have the highest levels of women in their national militaries. They would maintain that they are more equipped to fund UNPO, while low-income states are more equipped to contribute troops. This is a considerable barrier, even if it is due to the universality of reimbursements by the UN which creates an obstacle that high-income states are

not interested in changing. But, by only financing UNPO, high-income countries (mostly western-European states) are singling that they do not want to risk the lives of their own forces but do not mind risking others. This fear, or reluctance, mimics that of TCC's who are reluctant to contribute women to UNPO in areas that are more violent. As we have analyzed, governments are quite risk-averse when it comes to the public cost of losing peacekeepers, and this is very true for women peacekeepers. Previously, high-income states risk aversion has been demonstrated in their immediate reaction to retract all of their peacekeepers after the failures of Rwanda and Somalia.

Researchers have also acknowledged that there are considerable barriers that limit female troops equal access to opportunities. In their research, Ghittoni, M., Lehouck, L., & Watson, C. (2018) find that women lack information on the opportunities for deployment in UNPO. They break this down into three specific areas: women have not been actively recruited in UNPO, women lack information on the kinds of opportunities available on UNPO, and that women need to be encouraged to participate in UNPO while simultaneously ensured that their participation is meaningful. A lack of adequate family-friendly policies has been acknowledged as a barrier to women's deployment on UNPO (Ghittoni, M., Lehouck, L., & Watson, C., 2018). For military troops issue likely effects men and women equally due to their responsibility of deployment. Still, there is a considerable precedent that suggests women would be passed over for deployment due to discrimination based on concerns by employers (or in troops case, other decision makers) that they will want to start families or need maternity leave while posted on UNPO.

A considerable barrier for some women is that they fear that they will both, not be offered equal opportunities on deployment and that they do in fact receive less visible and lower-

responsibility tasks (Kenny, 2017). Similar to previous barriers mentioned, women are seen as needing protection and therefore are given fewer opportunities and hidden in assignments that will not put them in the same danger. Women internalize this perception, which they know well, causing them to not be interested in being deployed on UNPO. The thirteenth barrier to women is unreasonable expectations of women. This is coupled with a social norm that causes women to question their own abilities more than men. For all of these reasons, women are less likely to be interested in being deployed on UNPO. While women have the potential to make considerable leeway in areas like the reduction of SEA or improved relations with locals, sets them up to fail. If they do achieve this, they will likely have to spend extra time doing so, and on an equity standpoint, male troops are not asked to do this to the same degree.

It has been found that women who are highly qualified lack experience to gain new skills and leadership opportunities (Ghittoni, Lehouck, & Watson, 2018). This translates to less interest by the women the UN is trying to recruit. Due to the limited number of women in militaries both in national institutions and at UNPO, “women have less access to mentoring, sponsorship, and information sharing” (Ghittoni, Lehouck, & Watson, 2018). If women are not adequately incentivized to become peacekeepers, or even join the military, then the current gender gap will remain.

Outside of the barriers presented up until this point, researchers have pointed to the limited ability of the UNSC to enforce UN member states to increase their contributions. Karim and Beardsley (2013) note that “the UNSC has provided much rhetoric with regard to gender balancing and mainstreaming but lacks the ability to enforce compliance.” They refer to this as the principal-agent problem, where the UNSC, particularly the permanent 5 members (P5), are unable to induce compliance especially when resolutions closely resemble public goods (Karim

and Beardsley, 2016). This brings up an important distinction, not made until now, that the UN should be conceived as they, rather than it, since they are made up of 193-member states. It is also worth noting that only 3 of the P5, namely China, France, and the UK, contribute troops to UNPO. Of course, mandates for UNPO, which are produced by the UNSC, have not taken a hard stance on calling for female troops. Mandates will ask for troops with specific skill sets and encourage UN members states to contribute more females. But they do not establish quotas for women's representation in any of these roles, even though they acknowledge that women also have specific skills that can help improve the effectiveness of UNPO.

Attempts to Overcome Obstacles

Much of the research analyzed so far has been produced in the past couple of decades, as UNPO have made consistent changes. New data is being produced constantly, and countries are increasingly taking steps to improve their recruitment of women. However, by in large this has not translated to an increase of female troops being contributed to UNPO.

While many initiatives are quite new, there have been a number of developments for WPS, especially in regard to the UN. Today, there has been significant progress in increasing the participation of women inside the secretariat, with more women than ever maintaining leadership roles, participating in peace negotiations, and being deployed as police, civilian and military personnel on peace operations. Currently, many actors (NATO, UN, and over 35 governments) have established national progress reports detailing the steps they have taken to promote the WPS agenda (Oudraat and Brown, 2017). The most comprehensive of these studies is the global report published by UN-Women. They find that “some of the biggest TCC’s are striving to improve their gender balance” (Coomaraswamy, 2015, p 139). For example, the Bangladeshi have established quotas to ensure that women represent at least 20% of the officers in their air force. Quotas were used successfully used in Rwanda as well. In 10 years, they tripled the number of women in their Defence Forces, which is still far below the targets they have set at 30%. The use of quotas was also effective in South Africa which has become one of the top female TCC’s.

The UN has taken several steps in response to calls for improving its support to female military officers. In a call for a military mentor and advisor to help support female troops a gender advisor with the rank of Colonel, was appointed in the Office of Military Affairs (Coomaraswamy, 2015). Similarly, the Female Military Peacekeepers Network was created in

order to provide mentoring, training and advocacy for women in the UN military. Among several initiatives with a focus on women, UN-Women provides specific professional development training in order to encourage women to see the opportunities that exist. This training occurs every two weeks and is exclusively for female military officers.

Attempts to overcome obstacles for women's participation have been marked by a considerable number of "firsts." An issue with this is that it highlights that the marginalization of women in the sector has seriously limited the ability for quick progress to be made. Still, troops do not live and work in isolation, and improving the representation of all UN personnel across all levels can do nothing but positively contribute to improving troops gender balance.

Assessment of the national action plans on WPS highlight various measures countries are taking. UN-Women in their global study on UNSCR 1325 noted the following measures: "targeted recruitment campaigns; removing barriers and exclusion of women from certain categories of military personnel; improving and diversifying employment pathways; using images of female military officers in promotional and communications campaigns; conducting surveys and studies on recruitment and retention of women in the armed forces; tracking accurate data on women's representation and experiences in the military; changes in family policy; reforms addressing sexual harassment and abuse within the force; and changes to facilities, uniforms, and equipment." These measures reflect the steps which UN member states have taken, but it does not show the impact they have made on increasing women's participation. Also, UN-Women did not provide their own analysis of these steps taken, limiting what kind of tangible results can be shared at this time. Further evaluation of the national action plans can help to provide best practices that can be shared with member states to ensure the greater representation of female troops in military positions.

The Canadian government has taken several progressive initiatives to increase women's participation throughout all levels of peacekeeping. In 2018 Canada unveiled its new Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP). Central to the policy is the idea of gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls, which it hopes to integrate throughout Canada's international assistance. FIAP's 6th action area commits Canada to improve the impact of women's participation in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. Through this, Canada has created the Elsie Initiative that helps to improve dialogue, provide financial support to increasing female representation in UNPO, and develop new research on WPS, including the gender dimensions of conflict. Canada has received considerable applause from those who work on WPS, as its Elsie Initiative is in line with the human rights approach that UNSCR 1325 calls for.

In particular, Canada has taken on several programs with the end goal of increasing women's representation and improving the recruitment and advancement of women's participation in peace and security. This includes a barrier assessment of the Canadian Armed Forces; supporting the implementation of a gender integration strategy in Senegal's Armed Forces; providing financial assistance to the DPKO to fund specialized training for women personnel; and more (Canada, 2018). Due to the recency of the engagements made by Canada, it is unknown at this time whether there will be further programs established or initiative's taken.

Two of Canada's actions on peacekeeping are a direct response to calls for improved data sharing and the development of a financial mechanism to increase women's participation in peacekeeping. The Elsie initiative funded a baseline study on the barriers to help share best practices in this arena. On November 15, 2017, Canada announced a contribution of \$15 million to establish a fund to support such financial mechanism. This mechanism will help provide

support to TPCC's for deploying more women uniformed military and police. On September 26, 2018, it was announced that "as part of the Elsie Initiative, UN Women, the DPKO and the Executive Office of the Secretary-General have jointly requested the establishment of a multi-partner fund to accelerate the deployment of trained and qualified women to UN peace operations" (Canada, 2017). In addition, Canada has announced that they will partner with Ghana and Zambia to develop and test innovative approaches to including women in military and police roles. Canada's recently released financial mechanism has answered the repeated call for rhetorical declarations to be accompanied by tangible financing (UN-Women, 2015, p. 4). It will be important to track whether this funding risks "competing" for the same gender equality donors. In order to ensure this does not happen, Canada should advocate for missions to allocate a certain portion of their budget to female military personnel. Again, due to the recency of many of its developments, it remains to be seen whether their commitments will be effective or not.

Potential Alternative Solutions

WPS Scholars have offered a considerable amount of recommendations over the years. Many of them are repeated in statements made by the UN, the DPKO, UN-Women, and UN member states. The most common recommendations called for by the UN-Women and the DPKO is the creation of financial incentives to increase the overall recruitment and retention of women in TCC's national armies. Most recommendations can be divided into either solving the issue of troops in national armies or decreasing the likelihood that female troops would be stopped from being deployed. A detailed example of these solutions is presented below.

Solution 1: Increasing Gender-Balance of Troops in National Armies

To improve women's access to opportunities, informal networks need greater logistical and financial support. While informal networks exist, there is considerable opportunity to strengthen them, making them more formal and accessible. Ghittoni, M., Lehouck, L., & Watson, C. (2018) say that this could be done through funding previous or existing national and transnational networks; supporting South-South mentoring and encouraging member states to take on advocacy campaigns that highlight the career-benefits UNPO have for women. Appointing a previously deployed female troop to look after the welfare of female troops and to contribute to these networks could further improve support for female troops (Ghittoni, Lehouck, & Watson, 2018). While this is not the case everywhere, it would be important to recognize which states are not informing women of the opportunities that exist for deployment. Further research should look at states which have expressed their willingness to contribute more female troops in order to see if women are being adequately informed about the opportunities for deployment.

Removing any barriers that prohibit women in their domestic contexts, such as being excluded from combat roles, would be a clear start to increasing women's participation in UNPO (Ghittoni, Lehouck, & Watson, 2018). Although, it is unknown what the effects of increasing women's participation in national armies have on their inclusion in UNPO since the data previously considered does not reflect a direct link between the two. Nevertheless, this could surely have a spillover effect for furthering the WPS agenda and increasing women's participation in domestic armies can have their own benefits operational and social benefits. If they are treated equitably and are empowered within domestic armies it is conceivable to think that many will rise to be effective leaders in the security sector, helping to challenge the stereotype that women are not protectors.¹⁰

One of the reasons why many women cannot be deployed to UNPO is due to them being unable to meet previous deployment standards. The UN requires peacekeepers to have five years of previous deployment experience before being deployed on any UNPO. However, this is not the case for mixed contingents. Since troops are often deployed as formed units, one obvious way to get around the 5-year restriction for individual women is to integrate them into mixed contingents. For women who cannot or do not have such experience, potentially due to a number of factors such as a lack of opportunity or maternity leave, their inclusion in mixed contingents can be used to ensure the 5-years rule does not hinder them. This would help to improve the overall number of women in UNPO. Researchers also bring up the fact that criteria for deployment prohibit women, especially troops (Ghittoni, Lehouck, & Watson, 2018). They believe research should look to modernize the skills that are necessary for given roles. This not only could help increase the number of female troops, but also male troops. Direct training

¹⁰ While claiming this as a stereotype does not seem to be controversial, one could consider Skaine, R. (2011) *Women in Combat: A Reference Handbook*, 1st ed.

programs could help alleviate the barriers women have in achieving the basic criteria necessary for deployment in UNPO. For instance, in Nigeria and Argentina, female-specific training programs are already being done in order to support their participation (Sotomayor, 2014). Of course, it is also important for women to be trained with men on various skills and tasks in order to ensure they work cohesively as a unit both nationally and internationally, on UNPO. It has been recognized that protecting women in training will not challenge long-term attitudes on gender (Ghittoni, Lehouck, & Watson, 2018).

Changing the narrative on WPS is also important. Connecting it to the social-political factor of increasing women's participation in military positions could help to move beyond the operational effectiveness claims. Of course, these claims have been used to garner support from traditional military actors (Ghittoni, Lehouck, & Watson, 2018). However, what is needed may be to increase support from key political leaders who reportedly respond to other factors.

Ghittoni, M., Lehouck, L., & Watson, C. (2018) take this further in their call to reshape “the discourse to highlight how systematic discrimination and the failure to apply a gender perspective in conflict-related contexts put disproportionate numbers of women into vulnerable situations would make the need for greater women's participation in all aspects of peace operations more evident.”

One potential solution is to revamp training. Ensuring that all UN officials, including all personnel on UNPO, receive training on what the role of WPS is and how women need to be further empowered within the security sector by all actors. As an interview with a Lt Col reveals, to date this has consisted of a few PowerPoint slides (Ghittoni, Lehouck, & Watson, 2018 p. 39). This can ensure widespread support and improve troops understanding of what WPS is, what WPS UNSCR are calling for, and why increasing women's participation is important and

operationally effective. The training is strongly encouraged for military leads who act as role models and an oversight mechanisms for the troops under their command.

Though there have been calls to review the UN criteria for troop contributions, before any changes occur, the UN will need to certify a systematic review of the skills necessary for each personnel type. By modernizing the criteria for troops, there lies an opportunity to increase the operational effectiveness of contingents. While some criteria may be deemed unnecessary, adopting new criteria such as a gender sensitivity criterion, could yield improvements.

Researchers have pointed out that if a troop has predisposed dispositions against women and gender equality then it is likely that their actions would be detrimental to the contingent's effectiveness (Karim & Beardsley, 2016, p. 49). While this could mean fewer total troops deployed, it will improve the operations overall effectiveness in the long run.

Additional criteria which are not considered but valued greatly by the UN includes a troops ability to gain comradery with locals. The UNSG and UNSC have referred to this as essential, especially given their lack of legitimacy in some parts of the world. Of course, the UN should be wary of changing certain criteria, especially in the absence of evidence or the development of good practices. Removing barriers to criteria in the absence of evidence can feed a fear that contingents will not be as effective, increasing the concern for the usefulness of UNPO.

Solution 2: Offering Incentives and Challenging Disincentives to Women Being Deployed

A consistent and relevant solution many have presented is providing financial incentives to states which contribute to higher levels of female troops. These premiums could come in various ways and have been formally endorsed by the UNSC in the adoption of UNSCR 2242.

However, before considering the option of financial premiums, one must understand the way that the UN reimburses its TCC's for the personnel it deployed.

While member states determine the salaries of their own troops, UNGA approves a reimbursement strategy that is fundamentally based on universal burden-sharing. This allows for the equal payment of troops across all countries, with small stipulations and premiums available for a variety of pre-determined factors, for example, key enablers such as special forces, get a slightly higher rate. Recalling previous research presented, high-income states often use the universality of reimbursement levels as an excuse for why they frequently contribute fewer troops in comparison to low-income states.

In 2014 the UN approved changes to the reimbursement strategy that had hardly been adjusted since 1974 (UN-Women, 2014). The UN reimburses TCC's on a per-soldier basis using a flat rate with a few approved additional allowances available. This rate remained largely stagnant from 2002 to 2014. Due to the recommendations made by a Special Advisory Group (SAG), the UNGA approved new methodology and an increase from USD \$1,000 to more than USD \$1,300 a month (United Nations General Assembly, 2014b). Now, the budgetary committee review reports from the Secretariat and approves the increased level and rate every two years. By July 1st, 2017 this rate increased to \$1,410. Beyond the per-head rate, the UN offers a number of premiums such as rapid response and high-risk premiums. While verification and payments for troop contributions can be complex the process can be simplified into a few steps. First, the TCC and the UN come to a memorandum of understanding that declares the terms and the troops being contributed. Then, the UN commences a verification inspection to ensure that contingents are deployed and that both parties are meeting the obligations under the terms of the MOU. Once this is signed off by the appropriate staff on the ground, it is sent to

UNHQ where it is reviewed. Then, reimbursements are calculated and dispersed to the TCC. These claims are submitted on a quarterly basis with payments on March, June, September, and December (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, n.d.).

In 2015, UN Women produced a policy paper acknowledging that UN member-states rarely put forth financial incentives as an option for increasing women's participation in UNPO (UN-Women, 2015). The brief puts forth two options for the UNSG to consider. The first is "Establishing a slightly higher reimbursement rate for the deployment of military women than for military men, all else being equal;" and the second is "Establishing a gender-balance premium by which the TCC receives a reimbursement package that is, e.g. 10-25 % higher if the contingent meets certain criteria: for example, if more than 8% of the contingent's contributions are military women, and a further percentage of them are staff officers, military observers, or other pre-determined functions/categories" (UN-Women, 2015, p. 3). In their analysis of both options, UN Women found that there are various factors to consider. First, no matter what premiums don't affect troop salaries, but instead the different reimbursement rates to TCC's. In order to make it "equal," the TCC could decide to increase overall salaries for both men and women if they get the premium. They also found that it costs more to recruit, train and deploy female personnel, which could be a reason in its own right to argue for an increased reimbursement rate (p.3). Interestingly, they found that an additional cost of USD \$13.3 Million, or 0.1% of the overall UNPO budget would be needed in order to reach a 10% benchmark in 2020. While understanding the UN's financial resourcing issues, an increase of this much is hardly inconceivable for UN donors. It would also be important for any financial incentive to have considerable oversight, as to consider the potential for corruption at the national level (Ghittoni, Lehouck, & Watson, 2018, p. 24).

Policies that allow for gender-neutral parental leave could be directly relevant to increasing women's participation (Ghittoni, Lehouck, & Watson, 2018). Family concerns have been referenced as one of the most common barriers to women joining the military. Once again, breaking down gender-norms and gender stereotypes would play a positive role in increasing the number of women in national militaries. This could provide positive effects for gender equality that go far beyond the deployment of female military troops in UNPO. Consultations with gender advisors and other states who have implemented these policies can contribute to ensuring the most effective and appropriate policies are developed.

If one accepts the claim that SEA by peacekeepers is a reason women do not want to join UNPO. Or, one accepts that a country is less likely to send their military troops to UNPO in fear of GBV or SEA against them. Then one could expect that reducing cases of SEA will, in fact, help to increase the likelihood of female troops on UNPO. Thus, policies and programmes that allow for a decrease in cases of SEA by peacekeepers is a positive one. Of which there is a considerable amount of literature consider the UN's potential options for improving the quality of oversight functions. Karim and Beardsley (2013) point to multiple options for reducing SEA, this includes sanctioning TCC's who do not oversee disciplinary action of their peacekeepers who violate the zero-tolerance party; naming and shaming TCC's; and/or improving quality of reporting mechanisms (Karim & Beardsley, 2013). To their credit, the UN under UNSG António Guterres has started to implement this by providing real-time allegation lists of alleged perpetrators, their countries, and personnel type (United Nations, 2016).

Another recommendation made that has not been talked about yet is including gender advisors and establishing a gender-coaching program. It has been shown that military men in UN operations are interested and open to integrating goals of gender equality and a gender

perspective into their work. Interestingly, often male leaders who are allies to women and gender equality are unaware that other men recognize the importance of women in UNPO. Due to gender norms, there is a persistent lack of information on male allies within the security sector. To overcome this and inevitably cause behavioural change within the security sector researchers have suggested that the UN utilize its Military and Police Advisory Committee, which is a current network of advisers for UN missions (Dharmapuri, 2013). This committee could be leveraged to employ gender coaches that help to provide clarity on the UN's policies related to gender. These coaches will help to increase the number of male allies in the field; unify them as collective, essentially normalizing support for the goals of gender equality; and create a body of male leaders who can help to further promote gender equality within military institutions and UNPO.

While not providing direct solutions, Stiehm and Hicks (2001) acknowledge that the UN, UNSC, and UN member states must “develop a variety of strategies including education, agitation, service in policy positions and as volunteers, and creative example setting to assist in the process of overcoming inertia and resistance” (Stiehm & Hicks, 2001). While institutional challenges exist, developing targets that have accountability measures built in are essential to increasing women's participation. This can come in the creation of mandates, in the selection of female leadership, in the budgeting for UNPO, in the selection of female leadership, in gender training for decision-makers and troops on the ground, and through the support of female recruitment policies for national militaries.

In Karim and Beardsley (2013) study on the gender balancing of UNPO, they accurately make the point that the UNSC and UNSG should ensure that gender balancing makes a difference to the security environment. However, considerations should be made to not

pigeonhole women into roles that cause them to be their brother's keeper. Deploying them to missions which could "use their assistance" is detrimental to their inclusive participation long term. Focusing on programs that provide training for women in national militaries could be one answer. As referenced by female military personnel in UNMIL, women in some TCC's lack the same capacities that men have (Karim & Beardsley, 2013). In connection with the Kofi Annan Institute, Norway gives technical assistance to Ghanaian women in the security sector, although it is unclear whether these women are military troops. Nevertheless, the same type of program could be applied by other states which have high rates of women in their national armies. Furthermore, Karim and Beardsley suggest that the development of female police keeping network can help to encourage the greater participation of female troops.

A potential option when considering one approach taken to increase the number of female police is to send out an entire female contingent (Olsson & Möller, 2013). The success of a Liberian and more recently an Indian all-female police unit could be used to increase visibility and prove the effectiveness of an all-female troop contingent. Further research could look into approaches taken by the UN to deploy all-female police units in addition to recruiting policies for individual police officers. A caveat to this is that there are more women serving in police forces than there are women in the military. Ghittoni, M., Lehouck, L., & Watson, C. (2018) also reveal several issues that need to be considered when creating all-female contingents. Firstly, getting national armies to separate their contingents who do not do so already would create logistical issues. Secondly, it does not help to improve relations between men and women or allow them to work effectively with one another. Lastly, the issue of holding these women up to a higher standard than men may offer further challenges. Nevertheless, if done correctly, an all-female troop contingent could be an appropriate response to challenge various barriers and

gender stereotypes. This would of course have to take into consideration the negative impacts not having men would have on operations, for example male body searches.

Analysis and Recommendations

After carefully reviewing the barriers, the steps taken by the UN and governments, and the proposed solutions offered by researchers, it is clear that more action is necessary to increase the gender balance of troops participation on UNPO. Following the previous research considered, this paper finds that the common claim that there is not enough qualified female in national militaries is unconvincing as an argument for why female troops have not been deployed on UNPO. While researchers have found a connection between the two, TCC's especially developing countries, are not contributing female troops at the same levels of their national militaries. Whether improving sex-disaggregated data on national militaries will help devalue this claim further is unknown. Nevertheless, filling the UN's call to deploy women to national levels would provide a substantial increase for gender balance of troops on UNPO.

Claims that UNPO will be more effective with the inclusion of uniformed women should be developed and articulated carefully. While it is important to recognize the use of these claims to garner support, they must be substantiated. Otherwise the failure of a few women to live up to these claims once they are deployed will result in a loss of legitimacy for all female peacekeepers (Conaway, et al. 2008). Of course, functionalist claims based on comparative advantages of female troops such as female body searches should be vehemently encouraged.

In order for further progress to be made on increasing the gender balance of troops participating in UNPO, a balanced approach must be considered. By not solving any one of the three objectives the UN member states neglect an important barrier in achieving their goals. In no particular order UN member states must: (1) improve the recruitment and retention of female's in their national armies through active engagement efforts; (2) solve the specific concerns women face in entering the military; (3) work to challenge gendered predispositions, in

their own governments and national militaries that reduce women's roles in society, especially those that deny women's capacity to be protectors.

It has been shown that improving the levels of women alone will not be easy. UN member states need to ensure that gender is thought of throughout the entire phase of recruitment and deployment. Countries which lack the capacity for this should take on help from others in order to ensure that not only females but also males are informed about the positive role women play. Those countries with high levels of women in their national militaries need to partner with others to reveal best practices in order to render any doubt that women in national armies are the issue. Gendered recruitment strategies should also be published in order to provide support from countries and provide a clear and transparent system that allows women to see the opportunities that exist.

In order to better understand the concerns of women, national militaries need to ensure that there is a point of contact and a mentor for women. This individual must be able to respond to complaints in a manner that allows for adjustments to be made to solve current and future issues for women. Women both need to know that there are clear allies within the military that will be able to sufficiently challenge the "old boys club." This also means that military leaders within the traditional system must be the trailblazers in efforts to challenge gender-based issues. This can be done by stamping down on discriminatory behaviour or empowering women throughout their career. As was discovered in the research, a network should be established which allows for military leaders to be connected in order to support each other's efforts to challenge the current gender paradigm.

The UN must also take responsibility for the disincentives created that have slowed down the increase of female troop's participation in UNPO. They can solve these issues by (1)

strengthening their zero-tolerance policy and improving its discipline mechanisms in order to entirely eliminate SEA perpetrated by peacekeepers; (2) modernizing the standards of troops which limit women's eligibility for UNPO; (3) including gender sensitivity criteria for troops; and (4) improving their financial reimbursement mechanism to provide financial incentives for countries that deploy female troops on UNPO.

The UN's zero-tolerance policy might have worked to reduce SEA within the UN secretariat, but it has not done so on UNPO. Numbers have not changed, and this means that more efforts need to be made to both limit potential perpetrators from being deployed on missions and eliminating any faulty methods that allow for impunity. The paper started recognizing that a serious issue with UNPO is its effectiveness. Later it recognized that there are a number of functionalist arguments for why women should be contributed in greater number. In order to ensure this is the case, the criteria for troops must be changed. Gender sensitivity of troops has not been initialized yet. This criterion is important, not only because it would help to prohibit troops that have negative views of women and gender norms, but it also supports the UN's shift to further promote the idea of gender equality.

Other steps member states should take to complement the previous recommendations offered include (1) developing access to sex-disaggregated data on their national armies; (2) including a specific gender-balance quota in UNSC mandates. Improving national militaries sex-disaggregated data allows researchers to better evaluate the variation in distributions of troops. Holding member states accountable to who they contribute will improve transparency and challenge discriminatory deployment procedures/patterns. Of course, the most obvious way to ensure women are better contributed is by establishing gender-balance quotas in UNSC mandates. While calls for increasing women's participation have been consistent by the UN and

UNSC, they have not allowed for greater efforts in the contribution of troops. Producing quotas that are binding, overarching, and enforceable will eliminate the issue of non-compliance by member states. While these quotas can start at the current levels, they are encouraged to reflect the needs of the mission. For example, current mandates call for a number of troops with a specific skill set. As has been supported by the UN and UN member states, women have specific skills that they bring to a UNPO which men do not. By enforcing a specific number of women in UNPO, this guarantees these skill sets are present.

Lastly, without a change in the current paradigm which sees developed states not contributing troops, the UN targets will continue to be missed. While often not done, assumingly because of fear of reprisal, few have questioned the amorality of the current political economy which has rich countries financing UNPO, while poor countries have to pay with their blood (Lijn & Smit, 2016). Theoretically, this is an easy solution, but challenging the current precedent is quite unlikely to do unless the reimbursement issue is solved. It is of the authors view that they must match their words with political will and contribute troops. In order to do this, reimbursement changes need to be made to reduce the financial burden of contributing troops. Additionally, these states must be held accountable when they contribute personnel that are not troops. While challenges occur for increasing the number of women in police and other military roles, the smallest change has come from troops. This means that developed states, who possess the will to do so, can make the biggest impact here.

Implications for Canada

The following section of this paper considers the opportunities available for Canada, a strong advocate of UNSCR 1325 and the WPS Agenda. While many countries are moving away from the global multilateral system, Canada has committed to defending it. There was made clear by Minister Freeland's address to the house on Canada's foreign policy priorities (Canada, 2017). Canada has received considerable applause for its leadership in fulfilling transformative change for women in UNPO. The UNSG, in his most recent progress report on WPS, welcomed "the innovative leadership of the Elsie Initiative of the Government of Canada to accelerate our efforts with regard to the meaningful participation of women in peace operations through incentivizing greater numbers of deployments in line with Security Council resolution 2242" (2015). However, as we have addressed previously, words and commitments have not led to an increase in female troops deployment.

Canada has taken various steps to institutionalize the values of the WPS agenda in its work. In its most recent military policy; Strong, Secure, Engaged; and its FIAP there can be found direct and frequent references to WPS. Canada has acknowledged the differing experiences women have in conflict and post-conflict states, as well as the positive effects women can make as meaningful actors in the security sector (Canada, & Ministère de la défense nationale, 2017). In their own self-evaluation Canada found itself to be on track to keep up with their commitments. However, they have only contributed troops to one mission, Mali, and have contributed 0 troops, of any gender, to any other UNPO. These contributions were done recently, with Canada contributing 126 male troops and 12 female troops to MINUSMA, the stabilization mission in Mali (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2019a). This is about one-third of Canada's pledged military contribution of 600 personnel. Regrettably, they are also

failing to deploy female uniformed women to transformative levels, with women currently representing 10% of Canada's total troop contributions.

The author encourages Canada to contribute more male and female military troops, and that at least a 50% balance of women is included. This is likely to cause a ripple effect to the developing states who contribute a larger number of troops. Once women are contributed at an increasing rate and their equal participation is internalized by a large portion of member states, there will be a cascading effect that results in improved gender balance in UNPO, regardless of the government (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Considering that there are also few troops contributed by developed states this could also reverse the precedent that the developing world must pay with blood, while the developed world can pay through their checkbook. Canada is also encouraged to take stock of and publicly release sex-disaggregated data on its national military. Furthermore, Canada should leverage this effort into a larger initiative to call for increased transparency around countries hiring and promoting women in their national militaries. As referenced earlier, Canada is the only country who has made its selection process transparent. Canada should encourage others to follow suit, and work with any member state that needs help to improve its own capacity to do so.

The UNSC and all other UN member-states have a shared responsibility to improve the effectiveness of UNPO and ensure the fulfillment of the UN's commitments. While Canada does not currently have a seat on the UNSC, an election win for the seat in 2021-2022 could amplify their influence. Either way, Canada holds a considerable amount of soft power leading WPS to influence states on the Council, especially the *Permanent 3* (France, UK and the US). They should use whatever resources they have available to encourage states to fight for gender quotas for troops in mandates. The UNSC holds a lot of power to force compliance in this regard, but

they have chosen not to do this. While calling for gender quotas they should maintain that the UNSC and the UN more broadly have already shown their shared value in improving the number of women in all aspects.

Finally, Canada needs to make sure that the fund that they have set up for providing support is directed to instances which will ensure that these women are being contributed. As previously mentioned, the fund must ensure that it does not take away gender funding in other areas. To do both, they also must ensure that a large portion of this fund is set aside specifically for recruiting and deploying troops. Canada must also establish an enforceable commitment with the partnering member state. This will help to ensure that commitments are matched by actions and that UNPO benefit from the greater number of female troops.

Conclusion

When considering the barriers to increasing the total number of female troops on UNPO it was discovered that the issue is far more complex than what is often articulated. There is a considerable amount of evidence to suggest that women are not being contributed beyond the fact that they make up a small portion of national militaries. While increasing the number of women in national militaries will help, various factors discourage women from joining UNPO. Gendered predispositions continue to see women as vulnerable; UN and UN member states, policies and procedures fail to incentivize member states to contribute more women, and women themselves are disincentivized to join UNPO and their own national militaries. Most importantly, the political will of developed countries have not matched the rhetoric which they express. While support is needed from all stakeholders to challenge current barriers, developed states must find the political will to contribute more female troops, or else women will continue to represent an abysmal proportion of troops on UNPO.

Bibliography

- Alchin, A., Gouws, A., & Heinecken, L. (2018). Making a difference in peacekeeping operations: Voices of South African women peacekeepers. *African Security Review*, 27(1), 1–19. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2017.1406381>
- Axelrod, R., & Keohane, R. O. (1985). Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions. *World Politics*, 38(1), 226–254. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2010357>
- Bastick, M., Torres, D. (2010). Implementing the women, peace and security resolutions in security sector reform. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) : New York : United Nations International Research and Training for the Advancement of Women (UN-INSTRAW).
- Basu, S. (2017). The UN Security Council and the Political Economy of the WPS Resolutions. *Politics & Gender*; Cambridge, 13(4), 721–727. <http://dx.doi.org.proxy.bib.uottawa.ca/10.1017/S1743923X1700037X>
- Canada. (2017, June 6). Address by Minister Freeland on Canada’s foreign policy priorities [speeches]. Retrieved March 2019, from https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2017/06/address_by_ministerfreelandoncanadasforeignpolicypriorities.html
- Canada. (2018, March 12). The Elsie Initiative on Women in Peace Operations [backgrounders]. Retrieved March 2019, from <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2018/03/the-elsie-initiative-on-women-in-peace-operations.html>
- Canada, & Ministère de la défense nationale. (2017). Strong, secure, engaged - Canada’s defence policy. Retrieved from http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/201/301/weekly_acquisitions_list-ef/2017/17-23/publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/mdn-dnd/D2-386-2017-eng.pdf
- Caparini, M. (2017). Challenges in Deploying Effective Police to International Peace Operations (SSRN Scholarly Paper No. ID 3013546). Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network.
- Cock, J. (1995). Forging a New Army out of Old Enemies: Women in the South African Military. *Women’s Studies Quarterly*, 23(3/4), 97–111.
- Conaway, C. P., Shoemaker, J., Adams-Alwine, A., & Park, J. (2008). Women in United Nations Peace Operations: Increasing the Leadership Opportunities. Women in International Security, Georgetown University.
- Coomaraswamy, R. (2015). Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. UN Women.

- Crawford, K. F., Lebovic, J. H., & Macdonald, J. M. (2015). Explaining the Variation in Gender Composition of Personnel Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations. *Armed Forces & Society*, 41(2), 257–281. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X14523416>
- DeGroot, G. J. (2001). A few good women: Gender stereotypes, the military and peacekeeping. *International Peacekeeping*, 8(2), 23–38. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310108413893>
- Dharmapuri, S. (2011). Just add women and stir?. *Parameters*, 41(1), 56-71.
- Dharmapuri, S. (2013). “Not Just a Numbers Game: Increasing Women’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping,” *Providing for Peacekeeping No. 4*, New York: International Peace Institute.
- DPKO/DFS Guidelines. (2010) Integrating a Gender Perspective into the Work of the United Nations Military in Peacekeeping Operations. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, March.
- DPKO/OMA. (2010). DPKO/OMA Statistical Report on Female Military and Police Personnel in UN Peacekeeping Operations Prepared for the 10th Anniversary of the SCR 1325.
- Duncanson, C., & Woodward, R. (2016). Regendering the military: Theorizing women’s military participation. *Security Dialogue*, 47(1), 3–21. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010615614137>
- Ellingsen, A. (2013). Norway’s implementation of a gender perspective in military operations in Meymaneh, Afghanistan. *Internasjonal politikk*, 71(1), 7–27.
- Finnemore, Martha and Sikkink, Katherine, (1998). International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. *International Organization* p. 887-917.
- Ghittoni, M., Lehouck, L., & Watson, C. (July, 2018). Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations, Baseline Study. Geneva. The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).
- Goldstein, Joshua S. (2003). *War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Government of Canada. (2018, November 13). Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations. Retrieved February 12, 2019, from https://international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/gender_equality-egalite_des_genres/elsie_initiative-initiative_elsie.aspx?lang=eng
- Heinecken, L. (2017a). Conceptualizing the Tensions Evoked by Gender Integration in the Military: The South African Case. *Armed Forces & Society*, 43(2), 202–220. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X16670692>

- Heinecken, L. (2017b). Transitions and Transformation in Gender Relations in the South African Military: From Support in Warfare to Valued Peacekeepers. In *The Palgrave International Handbook of Gender and the Military* (pp. 355–368). Palgrave Macmillan, London.
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-51677-0_22
- Henry, M. (2012). Peacexploitation? Interrogating Labor Hierarchies and Global Sisterhood Among Indian and Uruguayan Female Peacekeepers. *Globalizations*, 9(1), 15–33.
<http://dx.doi.org.proxy.bib.uottawa.ca/10.1080/14747731.2012.627716>
- IWTC Women's Globalnet. (2004). Part Two: Women, Peace and Security: Report of Expert Group Meeting (p. 1). New York, United States, New York: International Women's Tribune Center.
- Jeanes, E., Knights, D., & Martin, P. Y. (2011). *Handbook of Gender, Work and Organization*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Jenkins, Margaret. (2017). Policy Tensions Related to Gender and Peacekeeping. Georgetown Institute of Women, Peace and Security.
- Joachim, J., & Schneiker, A. (2012). Changing discourses, changing practices? Gender mainstreaming and security. *Comparative European Politics*, 10(5), 528–563.
<http://dx.doi.org.proxy.bib.uottawa.ca/10.1057/cep.2011.35>
- Johnston, A. I. (2001). *International Studies Quarterly* 2001! 45, 487–515. Treating International Institutions as Social Environments.
- Karame, K. H. (2001). Military Women in Peace Operations: Experiences of the Norwegian Battalion in UNIFIL 1978-98. *International Peacekeeping*, 8(2), 85–96.
- Karim, S., & Beardsley, K. (2013). Female Peacekeepers and Gender Balancing: Token Gestures or Informed Policymaking? *International Interactions*, 39(4), 461–488.
- Karim, S., and Beardsley, K. (2016). "Explaining sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping missions: The role of female peacekeepers and gender equality in contributing countries." *Journal of Peace Research* 53.:
- Karim, S., & Beardsley, K. (2017). *Equal Opportunity Peacekeeping: Women, Peace, and Security in Post-Conflict States*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Karim, S. (2017). Revaluating Peacekeeping Effectiveness: Does Gender Neutrality Inhibit Progress? *International Interactions*, 43(5), p. 822.
- Kenny, C. (2016, November 17). Using Financial Incentives to Increase the Number of Women in UN Peacekeeping.

- Kirby, P., & Shepherd, L. J. (2016). Reintroducing women, peace and security. *International Affairs*; Oxford, 92(2), 249–254. <http://dx.doi.org.proxy.bib.uottawa.ca/10.1111/1468-2346.12550>
- Koeszegi, S. T., Zedlacher, E., & Hudribusch, R. (2014). The War against the Female Soldier? The Effects of Masculine Culture on Workplace Aggression. *Armed Forces & Society*, 40(2), 226–251. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X12460019>
- Kotze, E. (2015). Perspectives on Masculinity, Femininity and the South African Military: Gender Relations with Specific Focus on the Impact of the South African Army Women's College and the SADF (1971-1998). (Thesis). Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University. Retrieved from <https://scholar.sun.ac.za:443/handle/10019.1/97909>
- Kreft, A.-K. (2017). The gender mainstreaming gap: Security Council resolution 1325 and UN peacekeeping mandates. *International Peacekeeping*; Abingdon, 24(1), 132–158. <http://dx.doi.org.proxy.bib.uottawa.ca/10.1080/13533312.2016.1195267>
- Lijn, D. J. van der, & Smit, T. (2016, October 31). The state of peace operations: An interview with Lakhdar Brahimi | SIPRI. Retrieved February 12, 2019, from <https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2016/state-peace-operations-interview-lakhdar-brahimi>
- Martin-Brûlé, S.-M., & Hlatky, S. von. (2018). Peace first? What is Canada's role in UN operations? *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis*, 73(2), 187–204. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702018788548>
- Mazurana, D. (2002). Do women matter in peacekeeping?: women in police, military and civilian peacekeeping. *Canadian Woman Studies*, 22(2), 64–71.
- Muriithi, M. J. (2007). United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. *Women's World*; Kampala, (41), 25–28.
- Nuciari, M. (2006). Women in the Military. In G. Caforio (Ed.), *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military* (pp. 279–297). Boston, MA: Springer US. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-34576-0_16
- Olsson, L. (2000). Mainstreaming Gender in Multidimensional Peacekeeping: A Field Perspective. *International Peacekeeping*, 7(3), 1–16.
- Olsson, L. (2001). Gender Mainstreaming in Practice: The United Nations Transitional Assistance Group in Namibia. *International Peacekeeping*, 8(2), 97–110.
- Olsson, L. (2013). Military operations and UN Security Council Resolution 1325: the gender integration process in the Nordic battlegroup. *Internasjonal politikk*, 71(3), 303–326.

- Olsson, L., & Möller, F. (2013). Data on Women's Participation in UN, EU, and OSCE Field Missions: Trends, Possibilities, and Problems. *International Interactions*, 39(4), 587–600. <http://dx.doi.org.proxy.bib.uottawa.ca/10.1080/03050629.2013.805325>
- Olsson, L., Schjølset, A., Möller, F. (2015, April 24). Women's participation in international operations and missions 1. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315755694-3>
- Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (2004, December 7). Ministerial Council Decision No. 14/04 - 2004 OSCE Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality | OSCE. Retrieved February 18, 2019, from <https://www.osce.org/mc/23295>
- Oudraat, C. de J., & Brown, M. E. (2017, November). WPS+GPS: Adding Gender to the Peace and Security Equation. Retrieved April 1, 2018, from <https://wiisglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/7th-WIIS-Policy-Brief-v1-11-7-17.pdf>
- Pruitt, L. J. (2016). *The Women in Blue Helmets: Gender, Policing, and the UN's First All-Female Peacekeeping Unit*. Univ of California Press.
- Refugees, U. N. H. C. for. (n.d.). Refworld | Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) [on women and peace and security]. Retrieved January 31, 2019, from <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f4672e.html>
- Rimmer, S. H. (2016). Barriers to Operationalising the “Women, Peace & Security” Doctrine in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. *Journal of International Peacekeeping*; Leiden, 20(1–2), 49.
- Simic, O. (2009). Rethinking ‘sexual exploitation’ in UN peacekeeping operations. *Women's Studies International Forum*, 32(4), 288–295. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.2009.05.007>
- Simić, O. (2010). Does the Presence of Women Really Matter? Towards Combating Male Sexual Violence in Peacekeeping Operations. *International Peacekeeping*, 17(2), 188–199. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533311003625084>
- Smith, S. (2015). ‘When “gender” started’: the United Nations in post-occupation Timor-Leste. *Global Change, Peace & Security*, 27(1), 55–67. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14781158.2015.994489>
- Sotomayor Arturo C. (2014) *The Myth of the Democratic Peacekeeper: Civil-Military Relations and the United Nations*, p.79
- Stiehm, J. H. (1997). Peacekeeping and Peace Research: Men's and Women's Work. Retrieved February 8, 2019, from https://journals-scholarsportal-info.proxy.bib.uottawa.ca/pdf/01957732/v18i0001/27_papr.xml
- Stiehm, J. H. (2001). Women, Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: Gender Balance and Mainstreaming. *International Peacekeeping*, 8(2), 39–48.

- Tinde, G. T. (2009). Top United Nations Peacebuilders and Advocacy for Women, Peace, and Security. *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, 28(1), 140–150.
<http://dx.doi.org.proxy.bib.uottawa.ca/10.1093/rsq/hdp005>
- UN-Women. (2015, January). Exploratory Options on Using Financial Incentives to Increase the Percentage of Military Women in UN Peacekeeping Missions. Retrieved February 14, 2019, from <http://wps.unwomen.org/resources/briefs/financial.pdf>
- United Nations. (2016, December 1). Sexual exploitation and abuse. Retrieved March 2019, from <https://conduct.unmissions.org/sea-investigations>
- United Nations. (n.d.). Making progress toward achieving gender parity. Retrieved March 2019, from <https://www.un.org/gender/>
- United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. (2006, August). Gender Statistics. Retrieved March 2019, from <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/aug06.pdf>
- United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. (2015, October 31). UN Mission’s Contributions by Country. Retrieved March 2019, from <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/oct15.pdf>
- United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. (2019a, January 31). Monthly Summary of Military and Police Contribution to United Nations Operations. Retrieved March 2019, from https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/msr_january_2019.pdf
- United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. (2019b, January 31). Operational Effect and Women Peacekeepers: Addressing The Gender Imbalance. Retrieved March 2019, from https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/190206_january_2019_oma_women.pdf
- United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. (n.d.-a). Deployment and reimbursement | United Nations Peacekeeping. Retrieved March 2019, from <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/deployment-and-reimbursement>
- United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. (n.d.-b). Gender. Retrieved March 2019, from <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/gender>
- United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. (n.d.-c). Women in Peacekeeping [Women in Peacekeeping]. Retrieved March 2019, from <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/women-peacekeeping>
- United Nations General Assembly. (1995, October 27). Improvement of the Status of Women in the Secretariat, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Document A/50/691, para.59

- United Nations General Assembly. (2000, July 12). Permanent Representative of Namibia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Document A/55/138-S/2000/693
- United Nations General Assembly. (2014a, March 26). A/68/813. Retrieved March 2019, from http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/68/813
- United Nations General Assembly. (2014b, April 30). A/68/859. Retrieved March 2019, from <https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/A/68/859>
- United Nations General Assembly PGA. (n.d.). Revitalization of the United Nations | General Assembly of the United Nations. Retrieved March 2019, from <https://www.un.org/pga/73/priorities/revitalization-of-the-united-nations/>
- United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres. (2018, October 9). S/2018/900. Retrieved March 2019.
- United Nations Security Council (2000), Resolution S/RES/1325, Available at <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1325>
- United Nations Security Council (2015), Resolution S/RES/2242. Available at <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2242>
- Westendorf, J.-K. (2013). ‘Add women and stir’: The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands and Australia’s implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 67(4), 456–474. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2013.803030>
- Willett, S. (2010). Introduction: Security Council Resolution 1325: Assessing the Impact on Women, Peace and Security. *International Peacekeeping*, 17(2), 142–158. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533311003625043>
- Wolf, Naomi. (June 2012) A culture of cover-up: rape in the ranks of the US military, *The Guardian*.