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Hegel's Logic:
Its Function, Method and Necessity

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Presented to the School of Graduate Studies
at the University of Ottawa in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Master's degree in philosophy.

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August 8, 1996
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I have used the following abbreviations to refer to Hegel's works:


P.G. Phänomenologie des Geistes. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1993).


In all references to the Encyclopedia Logic, with the exception of references to the prefaces, I have given the paragraph number instead of the page number, indicating with an R that the reference is to be found in Hegel's remark or with an A that it is to be found in the addition. In cases where there is more than one addition, I have indicated the number of the addition after the A, e.g., A1, A2, etc.
Abstract

This thesis is essentially an attempt to grasp the nature of Hegel’s logic as a whole. In my first chapter I consider what Hegel is trying to accomplish in the logic. Here we see that Hegel’s logic is not only a science of thought but a metaphysics as well. In my second chapter I examine Hegel’s famous dialectical method by criticizing two previous interpretations of this method and by arguing for a third interpretation. In my last chapter I develop an interpretation of logical necessity by considering Hegel’s comments on this topic as well as his discussion of the concept of necessity at the end of the “Doctrine of Essence”.
Forward

When I started to search for a suitable thesis topic related to Hegel's logic, my mother advised me that it would be wise if I did not try to set the world on fire with my M.A. thesis. Since my mother's advice seemed sound, I decided to choose a topic with a relatively narrow scope, a topic which I could examine adequately in a year or so and which would not pose interpretive challenges beyond my capacity. At the same time, my choice of a thesis topic was also influenced by a different, perhaps conflicting objective: I hoped by the end of my research to achieve a fairly good understanding of Hegel's logic as a whole. With these two objectives in mind, I picked the necessity of the dialectical development in Hegel's logic as the subject for my thesis. At this point I had little idea of what I would argue in my thesis but it seemed to me, first, that this subject would allow me to shed light on the logic as a whole and, second, that it was not too big a subject for me to handle in an M.A. thesis.

After I had begun working on my thesis, I realized that it is difficult to isolate and analyze any particular aspect of Hegel's philosophy without considering the other aspects of his thought. This is appropriate since Hegel believes that the part can only be properly understood within the context of the whole. It was soon clear that if I was to understand the nature of dialectical necessity, I would have to consider the nature of Hegel's famous dialectical method. Since the dialectical development is necessary only by virtue of the dialectical method, the particular character of the dialectical method must determine the way in which this development is necessary. As is so often the case with major features of Hegel's philosophy, the nature of the dialectical method is disputed by scholars and cannot be taken for granted. Thus, if I was to understand dialectical necessity properly, I would have to consider the dialectical method to some degree.

Originally my analysis of the dialectical method was to be a means in my study of dialectical necessity. However, as my research proceeded, the dialectical method became a subject of inquiry for me in its own right. Now my thesis would no longer be focused completely on one issue. It would consist of two sections, each dealing with separate, though closely related features of Hegel's logic. It would no longer be called
"The Necessity of the Dialectical Development in Hegel's Logic" but "Hegel's Logic: Its Method and Necessity".

I incorporated this change into my thesis plan and continued my research. I was making progress but there was still a fundamental question about the logic which I had not answered for myself: What is Hegel's purpose in the logic? This question became more and more pressing for me. I knew that its answer could shed light on the dialectical method and dialectical necessity, but, perhaps more importantly, I saw that this question, as long as it remained unresolved, prevented me from understanding the logic as a whole. Up to this point, I could see some of the trees, but my view of the Hegelian forest was blurry at best. I decided for my own sake to address this difficult question on the function or purpose of the logic, although I was not exactly sure at the time how this section would fit into my thesis.

With this second major change, my thesis is now very different from what I originally thought it would be. The scope of my thesis is broader and more ambitious; to a large extent I have given in to my inclination to deal with the logic as a whole, but I hope that I am still heeding the advice of my mother. In my thesis I attempt to address two general questions about the logic: first, what does Hegel try to accomplish in the logic? and, second, how does Hegel try to accomplish this? My thesis consists of three chapters. In the first chapter I try to give a general answer to the first of my two questions by considering the function or purpose of the logic. My second chapter deals with the dialectical method and the dialectical development. This chapter allows me to answer the second of my two general questions, since, as we shall see, the dialectical method is what permits Hegel to accomplish his objectives in the logic. In a sense, my third chapter on the necessity of the logic lets me complete my response to the two questions that I have mentioned above. For Hegel, one of the main objectives of the logic in particular and philosophy in general is to demonstrate the necessity of their subject matter. However, in the first two chapters of my thesis I do not consider either what this objective really entails or how Hegel accomplishes this objective. Only after examining the nature of logical necessity closely in the third chapter of my thesis can we hope to deal with these two, more specific, questions.
Before one can criticize the work of a philosopher properly, one must first understand clearly what that philosopher is trying to say. I believe that many Hegel scholars have broken this rule to at least some degree. As our understanding of Hegel progresses, we see that many previous, critical evaluations of Hegel are either wrong or, more often, not even criticisms of Hegel’s true position, since those who make these criticisms have failed to grasp the full meaning of Hegel’s philosophy. Hegel has an uncanny way of having the last word with his interpreters: generally it is not Hegel who is wrong but his critics.

My objective in this thesis is not to evaluate Hegel’s philosophical position or to test its truth and relevance but to make sense of Hegel’s logic as best I can. In other words, my approach is not critical but merely expository. In my work I am guided by the assumption that despite its difficulty Hegel’s thought is ultimately intelligible. At times I doubt whether my assumption is completely justified, since there are still some major aspects of Hegel’s philosophy which I cannot make sense of for the life of me. However, rather than assuming as a result of my incomprehension that Hegel’s position does not make sense, I leave the matter open. I refrain from criticizing Hegel’s philosophy not because I feel that it is beyond criticism but because I feel that I am not yet in a position to criticize it. I have yet to figure out to my own satisfaction what Hegel is up to in the logic.

Like the development in the Phenomenology, the evolution of Hegel scholarship is, in a sense, a path of despair or a trail of errors, errors which nevertheless have a positive role to play in developing our understanding of Hegel. These mistakes are not due to the incompetence of Hegel scholars for the most part, but to the difficulty of the material which Hegel has left us. Since we still have many unanswered questions about both the small details and the fundamental aspects of Hegel’s thought, I see little reason to suppose that the trail of errors will not continue. Thus, although I am confident in the quality of my work, I present the results of my research to you with humility, aware of my debt to the Hegel scholars that have come before me and knowing full well that my study of the logic is bound to fall short in some ways.
Chapter 1: The Function of Hegel’s Logic

One’s first encounter with Hegel’s logic is almost inevitably a confusing experience. This is due in large part to the difficulty of Hegel’s writing style and to the abstract nature of his subject matter. However, even if one has overcome these obstacles and one is able to follow the dialectical development from stage to stage with relative ease, one is still faced with the following simple questions: Why did Hegel go through the trouble of producing something as odd and unique as the dialectical development in the logic? What is the purpose or function of Hegel’s logic? Hegel himself saw the importance of explaining the objectives and significance of his logical project, since he attempted to provide this information for the reader in the preliminary sections of both the Science of Logic and the Encyclopedia Logic. He could speak freely here of what motivated his science of logic because these sections are not a part of the logical development itself. By drawing upon the preliminary sections of both Logics, I will discuss in this chapter what I take to be Hegel’s main objectives in the logic. I will argue that the logic serves two essential functions, although, as we shall see, these two functions cannot ultimately be distinguished from each other. The logic is, first, a science of the structures of thought and, second, a metaphysics or ontology. I will now examine each of these functions in turn.

1A. Hegel’s Conception of Thinking

If we are to understand properly how Hegel’s logic functions as a science of thought, we must first understand what thinking means for Hegel and how it relates to the other human activities. On the one hand, Hegel acknowledges that thinking can be taken as one human activity among many (E.L. §20). In addition to thinking, these human activities include, for example, sensation, intuition, imagination, desire, volition. In his attempt to show what distinguishes thinking from the other human activities, Hegel compares thinking with sensation. The object of sensation is always a singular amongst a host of other singulars (E.L. §20). When I sense, I always sense a this, e.g. this ball or this chair. In contrast, thinking deals with the universal. “What it produces, the
determinacy or form of thought, is the *universal*, the abstract in general.” (E.L. §20). This activity of thinking, which Hegel distinguishes from the other human activities, he refers to as “thinking-over”. Hegel also describes thinking-over as “the reflective thought that has *thoughts* as such as its *content* and brings them to consciousness.” (E.L. §2R). This second account accords well with Hegel’s initial explanation of thinking-over because the thoughts which thinking generates, the thoughts with which it deals, are by their very nature universal. For one cannot genuinely express the singular either in thought or in language (E.L. §20R). Thus, thinking as thinking-over is this reflective activity which deals with its content in terms of thoughts or concepts.

When thinking and the other human activities are each viewed simply as one activity among many, each activity is essentially independent of the others. Although one can imagine a new car and desire a new car at the same time, one can also imagine a new car without desiring it and vice-versa. Similarly, instead of desiring my new car, I can simply think it over. If, on the one hand, Hegel accepts that thinking can be taken as only one human activity among the others and that each of these activities can be taken as independent of the others, on the other hand, he also claims that thinking is involved in all our human activity. “But if it is correct (as indeed it is), that the *human being* distinguishes itself from the lower animals by thinking, then everything human is human because it is brought about through thinking, and for that reason alone.” (E.L. §2). This position is supported by Hegel with two different arguments. First, Hegel maintains that sensation, feeling, willing, thinking, etc., constitute the various *forms* of human activity. If I desire something and if I think about that same thing, the form varies in the case of each activity but, contrary perhaps to first impressions, the content remains the same (E.L. §3). For example, when I desire a new car, the form of my activity is different than when I am thinking about my new car, but in both instances the content is the new car. Hegel believes not only that the content of all human activities can be thought-over but that it must be thought-over if its true nature is to be fully revealed. He writes that: “the genuine *content* of our consciousness is preserved when it is translated into the form of thought and the concept and even that it is not placed in its proper light until then” (E.L. §5). If the content of all our human activities can be thought, then in a sense it is
impossible to completely distinguish and isolate thinking from the other human activities. Thinking permeates all our human activity and, in so doing, includes these activities within itself (E.L. §20R).

Hegel's second argument for the presence of thinking in all human activity is even stronger than the first one. For in the first Hegel claims that the content of our human activity can be thought, whereas in the second he argues that all human activity is always accompanied by thinking.

To this extent, "I" is the existence of the entirely abstract universality, the abstractly free. Therefore "I" is thinking as the subject, and since I am at the same time in all my sensations, notions, states, etc., thought is present everywhere and pervades all these determinations as [their] category. (E.L. §20R)

Self-consciousness always involves thinking; in self-consciousness we each know ourselves as "I". Because all human activity except in extreme cases is accompanied by self-consciousness to some degree or another, human activity involves thinking to that same degree. For this reason, those in Hegel's time who rigidly opposed thinking to the other forms of human existence were wrong to do so. Whether humans are sensing the world of nature or feeling the rapture of God, each can only know himself as sensing and feeling if he is thinking as well.

If it is true that thinking permeates all our human activities, activities which are closely bound with the sensible or the singular, it is also true that the sensible, to a large extent at least, permeates our thinking. This element of the sensible is present in most of the concepts that we employ. In Hegel's example "This leaf is green" (E.L. §3R), 'leaf' is a sensible concept because it refers to a particular type of object in space. This concept is associated with all the particular sensibly-determined properties and functions that are ordinarily associated with a leaf: e.g., a particular, approximate size, mass, shape, colour, the particular location in the sensible world where it can usually be found, etc. Although mathematics abstracts from all the particular contingencies of quantity and space, the sensible element is present even in our mathematical concepts (E.L. §19A2).

However, in addition to the great number of concepts which have a sensible content, there are also certain concepts from which all sensible content has been
abstracted. When dealing with these concepts, thought deals with the “supersensible” world (E.L. §19A2). “Thought says farewell even to this last element of the sensible, and is free, at home with itself,” (E.L. §19A2). These fundamental concepts which are free of sensible content Hegel sometimes refers to as the categories.

As we have seen, all thoughts or concepts are in one sense universal. A concept is universal because it necessarily refers to every single object within the set of objects which it denotes. A concept cannot be used to refer to only one particular object within this set. Even expressions like ‘here’, ‘now’ and the ‘singular’ do not refer to what we mean, namely this now, this here or this singular (E.L. §20R). The ‘here’, the ‘now’ and the ‘singular’ also refer to all other heres, nows and singulars. But if all our concepts are universal in this sense, in another sense some of our concepts are universal, i.e., the categories, while others are not. As Hegel tells us, the determination of the sensible is singularity (E.L. §20R). When the sensible is present in our concepts, it inevitably limits their scope. For example, because the concept ‘leaf’ refers to a particular type of sensible object, it does not refer to all possible objects or all possible states of affairs.

The sensible element in concepts such as ‘leaf’ restricts the range of objects to which it refers, and, as a result, its range is, in this second sense, not universal. In contrast, if the sensible element particularizes our concepts or limits their scope, and if certain concepts are free of sensible content, these fundamental concepts or categories will have a universal range, i.e., they will be applicable to all states of affairs. Hegel’s example “This leaf is green” contains the fundamental concept or category of ‘being’, a concept which is applicable not to a limited set of objects but to all possible objects. Because the categories have a wider range than ordinary concepts, because they are universal, they are of fundamental importance and play a role in all our thinking. Yet because these concepts no longer contain a sensible element and because it is the sensible element with which we are so familiar, we often overlook the presence and importance of the categories in our thought.

As we will see, these fundamental concepts or categories are what Hegel deals with in his logic. But before we examine Hegel’s conception of logic, we should first consider the form of logic which was prevalent in Hegel’s time.
1B. Hegel’s Science of Thought as a Science of Concepts

Hegel’s science of logic is in large part a reaction to the logic of his own day. The logic of Hegel’s time is essentially the same as today’s formal logic, although the latter is a significantly refined version of the former. Both of these versions of formal logic distinguish between the various formal structures of thought by virtue of which our arguments are valid or necessary and the content of these formal logical structures. Formal logic deals only with the structures of thought which have been isolated from all content and it expresses these structures by means of empty variables. The function of formal logic is to test the validity of particular arguments by determining what the inherent structures of these arguments are and by then ascertaining whether each of these structures matches one of the structures of a valid argument. However, because formal logic deals only with the form of proper argumentation, it cannot tell us by itself whether the conclusion of a particular argument is necessarily true. In order for the conclusion of an argument to be necessarily true, the argument must not only possess a valid logical structure but its content, or the propositions which constitute it, must be true as well. Formal logic cannot determine whether the content of an argument is true; this must be done by empirical or other means.

But if logic is the science of thought, why does formal logic deal only with the forms of thinking? Why does this science not examine the various concepts which, as the content of thought, constitute a part of thought? I believe that the logician would respond on behalf of formal logic in the following manner. Although concepts are indeed a part of our thought, the logician would say, there is no real need to examine our concepts closely and, for this reason, concepts are not considered in formal logic. Traditional logic is grounded in a metaphysical view which separates thought from the objects themselves. Hegel describes this position as follows:

First, it is assumed that the material of knowing is present on its own account as a ready-made world apart from thought, that thinking on its own is empty and comes as an external form to the said material, fills itself with it and only thus acquires a content and so becomes real knowing. (S.L. 44; W.L. 36-37)
According to this metaphysical view, we are dependent in one sense upon the material world for our concepts. For it is only in our encounter with the material world that we are able to form the concepts which allow us to know these objects. However, even if we must begin with the material world when we form our concepts, it is we who invent new concepts and rethink old ones. As an example, Hegel himself acknowledges that the concepts of force and polarity had risen to prominence in the science of his time (S.L. 32, 33; W.L. 21). The traditional logician would likely argue that humans had generated these concepts for themselves in order to better understand the objective world around them. Since it is we who invent concepts in the process of inquiry, these concepts, unlike the syllogistic forms of thinking, are not necessary structures which determine our thinking. As our creations, the logician would say, they are nothing beyond what we make them. If we, as humans, have created the concept ‘bachelor’ for ‘unmarried man’, then this is what bachelor refers to and nothing else. Thus logic need not include an investigation of our concepts because there is nothing for us to discover about these concepts.

The traditional logician would likely accept that once we have invented a concept, we then employ this concept along with the others as a means to think. In our experience we encounter the world of objects and we draw upon the concepts that we have developed in order to express what we know or have learnt about these objects. For example, when I encounter a leaf and describe it by thinking “This leaf is green”, I choose the appropriate concepts like ‘leaf’ and ‘green’ from the multitude of concepts available to me, and I employ these concepts in my description. Although the subject matter that we deal with in each particular instance may influence our choice of concepts, we are ultimately in control of how we employ our concepts.

Contrary to what the formal logician may believe, Hegel maintains that a proper science of logic must investigate our concepts. For Hegel denies, first, that we simply invent our concepts. As we have seen in our discussion of Hegel’s conception of thinking, the content of representations, like the content of all other human activities, implicitly contains categories or concepts. When we think about them, these categories are “freed from the material in which they are submerged in self-conscious intuition”
Hegel also tells us that in the order of time humans develop representations before they develop concepts (E.L. §1). Now, if representations contain concepts and if we have representations before we are conscious of the concepts contained in these representations, then, properly speaking, we do not invent our concepts at all. Rather we discover concepts by uncovering what is implicit in our representations.

Before we develop our concepts explicitly, however, these concepts are implicit not only in our representations but also in the things of the world itself. As we shall discuss in more detail in the latter part of the chapter, Hegel denies any absolute distinction between thought as form and the things themselves as content (S.L. 44,45; W.L. 36,38). The conceptual for Hegel is the substantial or the foundation of things (S.L. 36-37). Since the world of things or objects certainly existed before humans explicitly developed their concepts, and since these things have the conceptual as their foundation, concepts for Hegel subsist implicitly in the things of the world before we develop them for ourselves. Once again we see that when we develop our concepts, we do not simply create them out of a vacuum; we become aware of meaning that lay dormant in the things of the world.

If it is the case for Hegel, as I believe it is, that our concepts are implicit in our representations and the things of the world before we discover these concepts, our concepts assume an objective existence above and beyond our self-conscious, subjective thinking. When I say that concepts exist objectively, I do not mean that they are material entities in space. Nor do they inhere in things like objects in a box. Concepts in general and the categories in particular are objective in so far as they cannot be restricted completely to the domain of subjective thinking. Concepts are obviously an integral part of subjective thinking and it is only in subjective thinking that concepts are explicitly as concepts. However, the conceptual is not just the essence of subjective thinking but the foundation of both the subjective and the objective, their common element which binds them into one universe of meaning. Thus, when I claim that concepts for Hegel have an objective status, I do not mean that they have only an objective status, i.e., that they are purely objective as opposed to subjective. I mean only that our concepts are not entirely
subjective either. Since concepts are not simply invented by us but have an objective status that transcends merely subjective thinking, the nature of our concepts for Hegel must be investigated.

Hegel opposes not only the view that our concepts are invented by us, but also the view that our concepts are a mere means for us. Since our concepts are not simply created by us but have an objective status above and beyond our subjective thinking and since we must employ these concepts whenever we think, our subjective thinking is, in a sense, determined or structured by these concepts from the outside. We do not dominate our concepts; our concepts dominate us.

but still less shall we say of the concepts of things that we dominate them, or that the determinations of thought of which they are the complex are at our service; on the contrary, it is our thinking that must accommodate itself to them and our caprice or freedom ought not to want to mould them to suit itself. (S.L. 35-36; W.L. 25) ¹

Although there are many aspects of Kant’s theory of the categories with which Hegel does not agree, Hegel does agree with Kant on this fundamental point. Hegel criticizes the Kantian view that restricts the categories to the domain of subjective thinking and denies that the categories can be applied to things-in-themselves (S.L. 44-45; W.L. 37, 38). He also accuses Kant of failing to derive his categories adequately and of neglecting to investigate the meaning of his categories (S.L. 63; W.L. 60-61). Nevertheless, Hegel, like Kant, accepts that our most basic concepts are not mere tools which we employ at our convenience but that these basic concepts or categories determine our experience and our thinking.

But if Hegel is correct in his view that our concepts dominate our thinking, he provides a second reason that a proper science of logic must investigate concepts. If we are to understand our thinking properly, a thinking that is determined or structured by our categories, we must understand these categories. For the reasons I have given, Hegel denies the view that our concepts need not be investigated. As we shall see, Hegel’s logic differs significantly from traditional, formal logic because his logic is a logic of

¹ Throughout my thesis, wherever Miller translates der Begriff as ‘the Notion’, I will replace it with ‘the Concept’.
concepts, a logic in which he examines the categories which play a role in all our thinking.

1C. The Tasks of Hegel's Science of Thought

Hegel's science of logic, as a science of thought, attempts to perform three tasks. First, it investigates the various meanings of our fundamental concepts or categories. Second, it considers how our various categories are related to one another. Finally, it attempts to demonstrate the necessity of these categories.

Unlike formal logic, a proper science of logic must investigate the meaning of our fundamental concepts. Although these concepts are employed regularly and although their meanings are often taken for granted, our fundamental concepts often have a different meaning than they appear to have. When this is the case, our categories are not 'genuine'. At various places in the logic Hegel demonstrates that certain categories are not genuine by showing that such categories contradict themselves. For example, when one considers a commonly accepted view of the infinite closely, i.e., the view of an infinite which entirely excludes the finite, one discovers that this infinite is in fact limited or finite (E.L. §95R). Hegel then develops a new concept of the infinite, one which resolves the inherent contradictions of the previous concept and thus proves to be the genuine infinite. In instances like these, Hegel demonstrates that our ordinary, commonly used categories can contain inherent meaning which must be made manifest if these categories are to genuinely express what we intend them to express.

When the genuine meanings of our concepts are different than the meanings which we ordinarily attribute to these concepts, our thinking becomes unclear.

Faced with the baldness of the merely formal categories, the instinct of healthy common sense has, in the end, felt itself to be so much in the right that it has contempuously abandoned acquaintance with them to the domain of school logic and metaphysics; at the same time, common sense fails to appreciate the value even of a proper awareness of these fragments and is quite unaware that in the instinctive thinking of natural logic, and still more in the deliberate rejection of any acquaintance with or knowledge of the thought determinations themselves, it is in bondage to unclarified and therefore unfree thinking. (S.L. 38; W.L. 28)
If one employs concepts which are not genuine in common sense, scientific or philosophical judgements, one inevitably distorts the true nature of the subject matter which one is describing. For example, if one were to understand God's infinite nature as an infinite which is strictly opposed to the finite, God would in truth be merely finite. For when the infinite nature of God is viewed as opposed to and exclusive of the finite realm, the infinite becomes the finite other of the finite realm and each in turn limits the other. Thus, though one may believe that God is truly infinite when one describes Him as infinite in this way, in actual fact one bestows upon God a finite nature which one did not originally intend to bestow upon Him. If we are to avoid unclear thinking which occurs when the meaning of our fundamental concepts is taken for granted, we must consider the meaning of these concepts closely. This then is the first task which Hegel's new science of logic must assume if it is to remedy the defects of traditional logic.

As impulses the categories are only instinctively active. At first they enter consciousness separately and so are variable and mutually confusing; consequently they afford to mind only a fragmentary and uncertain actuality; the loftier business of logic therefore is to clarify these categories and in them to raise mind to freedom and truth. (S.L. 37; W.L. 27)

Because common sense, the empirical sciences and traditional philosophy are not founded upon a science of logic which examines the categories, these standpoints not only take the meaning of the categories for granted, as we have seen above, but they also take the form of the categories for granted. These standpoints view concepts from the perspective of the understanding which takes things in their fixed determinacy and which sees each thing in its fixed determinacy as completely separate from the others (E.L. §80). A particular concept A for the understanding only has meaning A and not meaning B or C. This is consistent with the principles to which the understanding adheres rigidly: A is A and ~A is not A. In this way the meaning of concept A is isolated from the meaning of concept B. Because common sense, the empirical sciences and traditional philosophy all assume that our concepts stand side by side as separated, fixed determinations, these standpoints would see no reason to consider whether and to what extent our concepts are related to each other.
One of Hegel's main objectives in his philosophy is to overcome the thinking of the understanding in general and its view of concepts in particular.

When they [logical forms] are taken as fixed determinations and consequently in their separation from each other and not as held together in an organic unity, then they are dead forms and the spirit which is their living, concrete unity does not dwell in them. (S.L. 48; W.L. 41)

Hegel does not reject the view of the understanding completely, since this thinking has its own relative truth as a necessary element of logical thinking or reason. He describes how the understanding is indispensable in all spheres of life, both theoretical and practical (E.L. §80A). However, for Hegel one cannot stop at the thinking of the understanding; one must go on to demonstrate the identity or the relatedness of the objects which the understanding holds apart. This is what Hegel attempts to do with our fundamental concepts in the logic when he shows how these concepts develop into each other and form the living unity of the Concept.

If we are to comprehend the nature of the Concept, we must first take note of Hegel's distinction between ordinary concepts and the Concept (E.L. §9R). The domain of ordinary concepts includes everything that philosophers would traditionally label a concept, concepts like dog, truck, lecture, heat, love, etc., which we use all the time whenever we employ language. Each of these concepts is accorded a fixed meaning and each can only possess this fixed meaning by having another from which its meaning is distinguished. The other circumscribes or defines the meaning of the particular concept and in this way makes its clear meaning possible. At the same time, the other limits the meaning of the concept and renders it finite.

In contrast to the finite concept, the Concept, which is developed explicitly as Concept throughout the whole third book of the Logic, represents the culminating phase of the logical development. The Concept "in its simple self-relation is an absolute determinateness which, however, as purely self-related is no less immediately a simple identity." (S.L. 582; W.L. II 251-252). To the extent that it is a determinateness, the Concept contains parts within itself, but these parts, as moments of the Concept, are identical with the other parts encompassed by the Concept and with the Concept itself.
As the differentiated union of all its parts, the Concept is the totality (E.L. §160). It is not this or that finite concept but "that same Concept which is the foundation of the specific concepts" (S.L. 39; W.L. 30); it is that which unites all the finite concepts in the development of the logic while allowing them to still maintain their distinction. As the totality which holds the development of thought within itself, the Concept constitutes the all-encompassing universe of meaning, "the absolute, self-subsistent object [Sache], the logos, the reason of that which is, the truth of what we call things;" (S.L. 39; W.L. 30).

Why is it important for Hegel to show that our fundamental concepts are interrelated or that they are a part of the unity of the Concept? If we are to understand Hegel's logic properly, this question requires an adequate answer, but it is, at the same time, a difficult question. I believe that it is important for Hegel to show that our fundamental concepts are a part of the unity of the Concept because he believes that these concepts cannot stand on their own; they only have true subsistence when seen as a part of the totality of concepts or of meaning. This is, Hegel tells us, because these concepts lack content when taken individually (S.L. 48; W.L. 41), a content which Hegel further defines as follows: "The content which is missing in the logical forms is nothing else than a solid foundation and a concretion of these abstract determinations;" (S.L. 48; W.L. 41).

From the point of view of ordinary consciousness, concepts lack substance because they are distinct from the things of the world themselves (S.L. 47-48; W.L. 41). The world for ordinary consciousness is fundamentally a world of things; the substantial or the metaphysical is physical substance. Because thoughts are generally not viewed as physical entities, ordinary consciousness has difficulty in assigning a metaphysical status to thoughts and tends to view them as less substantial or less actual than physical objects. This deprecatory view of thoughts on the part of common sense is acknowledged by Hegel: "we say on the one hand, "That is only a thought," and we mean thereby that thought is only subjective, arbitrary, and contingent, and not the matter that really counts, not what is true and actual." (E.L. §19A2).

Hegel would agree with ordinary consciousness that our individual concepts lack a substantial foundation (S.L. 39; W.L. 30), but the reason that Hegel gives for this is
very different than that of ordinary consciousness. Hegel does not believe that our concepts lack substance because they are unlike the physical objects which we encounter in the world. Rather, whether our concepts possess or lack a foundation depends for Hegel upon how they are viewed in relation to other concepts (S.L. 48; W.L. 42). When taken in isolation from each other, our fundamental concepts lack content but they gain this content when viewed as a necessary part of the totality of interrelated concepts or the universe of meaning. In order to show that our concepts are in truth substantial, Hegel does not try to demonstrate that they possess a physical nature like the material objects of the world. Instead he tries to show their substantial nature by demonstrating that our concepts are all related to each other in an organic unity.

From this we see that our concepts can lack content for Hegel in a very different way than they do for ordinary consciousness. This is because Hegel sees a problem with the understanding’s view of concepts which ordinary consciousness — that of common sense, the empirical sciences and traditional philosophy — does not. Hegel realizes that when our concepts are viewed as fixed determinations, these concepts contradict themselves. If concept A is completely distinct from other concepts, the meaning of concept A should exclude the meaning of other concepts. Yet Hegel shows that this concept presupposes or entails other concepts or other meaning in a way that is not initially apparent. For example, the spurious infinite is not merely what it claims to be, the infinite, but it is also the finite. What initially appeared to be an isolated concept turns out to be more than it initially claimed to be. We see now that its meaning cannot be thought apart from the meaning of another concept. Since the concept as a fixed determination should exclude the meaning of other concepts and since the meaning of this fixed concept in truth includes other concepts, the concept, when viewed as a fixed determination, contradicts itself. Because it contradicts itself, the isolated finite concept as a strictly finite concept is not. It is in truth a mere appearance and as such it lacks a content or a substantial foundation. Thus, ordinary consciousness is mistaken in believing that its concepts can be viewed simply as a set of distinct determinations.

However, if, on the one hand, our concepts lack a substantial foundation when taken individually, Hegel believes, on the other hand, that our finite concepts possess
this foundation when they are considered in the proper manner, namely, as a part of the living unity of the Concept.

The passage from necessity to freedom, or from the actual into the Concept, is the hardest one, since independent actuality has to be thought of as having its substantality only in its passing into, and its identity with, the independent actuality that is other than itself; thus the Concept is also the hardest, because it is itself precisely this identity. (E.L. §159R)

As the final stage of the logic, the absolute Idea is not merely another particular concept; it is the Concept which embraces all particular concepts within itself, the whole universe of meaning. Beyond the absolute Idea there is strictly speaking no further conceptual dialectical development. Unlike all of our finite concepts, the infinite Concept does not contradict itself but contains contradiction sublated within itself. Because it does not contradict itself, it is not illusory or transitory but simply is what it is. It is the truth, the content that agrees with itself; it is substantial. ²

Thus, with the Concept in its fulfilled form we return to the being with which the logical development begins.

The method is the pure Concept that relates itself only to itself; it is therefore the simple self-relation that is being. But now it is also fulfilled being, the Concept that comprehends itself, being as the concrete and also absolutely intensive totality. (S.L. 842; W.II. 572)

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² One might argue against my interpretation as follows. Hegel claims that our finite concepts acquire a substantial foundation as a part of the Concept but I have only shown how finite concepts acquire a substantial foundation as a part of the absolute Idea. Therefore, one might say, I have failed to explain Hegel’s claim properly. This argument assumes that the Concept is distinct from the absolute Idea. This is in one sense true. As a form of the Idea which is the unity of the Concept and objectivity (E.L. §213), the absolute Idea contains the Concept as a mere part within itself and is, therefore, above and beyond the Concept. However, one can also argue in two ways that the Concept is identical with the absolute Idea. First, since the whole third book of the logic is the doctrine of the Concept, the absolute Idea is nothing but the Concept in its most fulfilled form. Second, as I mentioned, the Idea is the unity of the Concept and objectivity. Because the Concept is the truth of objectivity, objectivity is, in essence, nothing but the Concept. The Idea, as the unity of the Concept and objectivity, does not truly contain any content beyond that of the Concept, since the objectivity held within the Idea is essentially the Concept in the form of externality (E.L. §213) But if this is the case, the Idea and the absolute Idea, as the idea which thinks itself (E.L. §236), are also essentially the Concept. Because the absolute Idea is synonymous with the Concept in the way that I have shown, it is fair to claim that by demonstrating how our concepts acquire a substantial foundation in the absolute Idea, I am also demonstrating that these same concepts acquire a foundation in the Concept.
By claiming to be pure immediacy, pure being shows itself to be untrue and sublates itself. In contrast, the absolute Idea, which is the whole, is, like pure being, the totality of all that is, but unlike pure being it does not sublate itself, because it contains mediation within itself.

As we shall see in the next chapter, the various finite concepts which appear in the logic prove to be a fundamental part of the dialectical development which leads to the absolute Idea and in which each concept is closely related to the others. Since the dialectical development is the self-development of the absolute Idea and constitutes its content, these concepts are also a fundamental part of the absolute Idea. As such, they share in the being or the substantiality which belongs to the absolute Idea. Therefore, when these concepts are taken not as isolated, independent concepts but as vital moments within the living unity of the Concept, they possess a substantial foundation. "When those determinations of thought which are only external forms are truly considered in themselves, this can only result in demonstrating their finitude and the untruth of their supposed independent self-subsistence, that their truth is the Concept." (S.L. 39; W.L. 30).

Ordinary consciousness would likely point out that even if the absolute Idea overcomes the limited nature of finite concepts and does not contradict itself in the same way that they do, it is still just a concept. Even as the totality of our concepts or of meaningfulness, it is still distinct from the material objects of the world and, as a result, it still lacks content or substance. Hegel would not regard this as a valid objection because he does not accept any ultimate distinction between thought and the things of the world in the way that ordinary consciousness does. Far from lacking substance, the Concept or the absolute Idea constitutes the very truth or substance of objects themselves or reality. I shall discuss this in greater detail in the last part of the chapter.

Before we consider how the logic functions as a metaphysics, I must mention a third task which not only the science of logic but all branches of science must perform: they must demonstrate the necessity of their subject matter. In the introduction to the Encyclopedia Logic, which is, in fact, an introduction to the whole Encyclopedia or the whole system of sciences, Hegel compares the empirical sciences with his conception of
science. Although Hegel acknowledges that the empirical sciences strive to discover necessary laws and relationships in our world of experience (E.L. §7), he tells us that, unlike true science, the empirical sciences do not present their subject matter in a necessary way (E.L. §9). In the empirical sciences the content of investigation is “merely immediate and simply found” (E.L. §12). The empirical sciences see no need to justify the existence of their subject matter any further. For example, the zoologist does not attempt to show that animals in general and the various species of animals in particular exist necessarily. Rather, she takes their existence for granted as a part of our experience and proceeds to investigate their particular empirical nature. Similarly, the empirical scientist does not consider whether the various elements within her science are related in any necessary way to the others.

In the kind of science mentioned above [see par. 7], the universal (the genus, etc.) contained in it is not determined on its own account, nor is it intrinsically connected with what is particular; but universal and particular are mutually external and contingent, just as much as the particularities that are combined are, on their own account, external to each other and contingent. (E.L. §9)

In this respect traditional logic is similar to the empirical sciences.

Even in logic, for example, we may be told perhaps that ‘logic has two main parts, the theory of elements and methodology’, then under the former there straightway follows perhaps the superscription, Laws of Thought; and then, Chapter I: Concepts. First Section: Of the Clearness of Concepts, and so on. These definitions and divisions, made without any deduction or justification, constitute the systematic framework and the entire connectedness of such sciences... The procedure consists, perhaps, in grouping together what is similar and making what is simple precede what is complex, and other external considerations. But as regards any inner, necessary connectedness, there is nothing more than the list of headings of the various parts and the transition is effected simply by saying Chapter II, or, We now come to judgements, and the like. (S.L. 55; W.L. 50-51)

Since Hegel believes that a proper science of logic must demonstrate the necessity and the necessary connectedness of its subject matter, his version of logic will have to overcome this defect of traditional logic in some way. However, at this point it is not clear what type of necessity Hegel has in mind or how he ought to go about demonstrating that the subject matter of his logic is necessary. For the time being we
will leave these issues and we will take them up again in the third chapter of my thesis, when I examine the notion of logical necessity in detail.

Besides traditional logic, were there any other forms of logic at Hegel’s disposal which overcome the problems that Hegel attributes to traditional logic? Kant’s transcendental logic may seem like a possibility. Unlike the traditional variety, transcendental logic deals with concepts which are a necessary part of our experience of the world. However, as we have seen already, Hegel has several criticisms of Kant’s transcendental logic and his theory of the categories. If Hegel is to remedy the problems of both traditional logic and transcendental logic, he must attempt to develop his own science of logic. This is what he does.

1D. Hegel’s Logic as a Metaphysics

Hegel also distinguishes his science of logic from traditional logic by making his logic into a metaphysics (S.L. 27; W.L. 16). This contradicts the practices of traditional philosophy which has always viewed logic and metaphysics as two distinct disciplines. Since Hegel develops his metaphysical logic in large part as a reaction to the views of his own time, it would be of benefit for us to examine these views once again before we consider the metaphysical function of Hegel’s logic.

Hegel begins his preface to the first edition of the Science of Logic by discussing how the science of metaphysics has been virtually abandoned in his time. “That which, prior to the period, was called metaphysics has been, so to speak, extirpated root and branch and has vanished from the ranks of the sciences.” (S.L. 25; W.L. 13). The demise of metaphysics resulted in large part from the prominence of Kantian philosophy. According to the traditional interpretation of Kant’s thought, the interpretation which Hegel accepts, Kant’s metaphysical and epistemological position is as follows. Knowledge involves two faculties: the faculty of sensibility and the faculty of the understanding. The faculty of sensibility receives sense impressions from the objects themselves while the faculty of the understanding imposes the fundamental categories or concepts of knowledge upon what is provided to us by sensibility. This second faculty allows us to know our object in terms, for example, of quality, quantity and the object’s
relationship to other objects. According to Kant, the true act of knowledge must involve both faculties. "Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind." (CPR A51, B75).

Kant's theory of knowledge, when held consistently, inevitably limits the range of our knowledge. If we accept his theory, then we must accept that we cannot know what things are like in themselves apart from human experience. For to know things as they are in themselves would require that we have direct exposure to these things. In Kant's theory we do not even have such direct exposure in sensation, since our intuitions in the faculty of sensibility assume the a priori forms of space and time. Our direct exposure to the things themselves is further lost when the active faculty of the understanding transforms the matter of sensibility with its concepts. In this way, concepts for Kant become a medium which separates us from things in themselves (S.L. 36; W.L. 25-26).

Similarly, if Kant denies that we can know of things in themselves through direct experience, he also denies one of the fundamental presuppositions of traditional metaphysics, namely, that we can know the true nature of things in themselves by means of pure thought or reason. The proofs of traditional metaphysics, Kant would say, are not grounded in experience. Rather, they take concepts of our experience and apply them without justification to objects which are beyond our experience. Because these proofs do not involve the faculty of sensibility or are not grounded in experience, their results, according to Kant's epistemology, cannot be considered knowledge.

Since Kant's philosophy denies that it is possible to know objects in themselves beyond sense-experience and since the traditional task of metaphysics is to investigate such objects, Kant's philosophy reduces metaphysics to a discipline whose objectives are impossible to attain and are, therefore, no longer worth pursuing. This conclusion was well-received in Hegel's time by ordinary common sense. As a result, philosophy and common sense worked together to bring an end to metaphysics (S.L. 25; W.L. 14).

At the outset of his introduction to the Science of Logic, Hegel discusses certain views which are either implicit or explicit in Kant's epistemology and which, "as they bar the entrance to philosophy, must be discarded at its portals" (S.L. 45; W.L. 38). First,
as we have seen, Hegel rejects any absolute split between the form and the content of thought (S.L. 43-44; W.L. 36), like the one that Kant establishes by distinguishing clearly between the faculties of the understanding and sensibility. Second, Hegel denies the view that objects themselves stand as they do independently of thought and that thought is dependent upon these objects if it is to reach the truth (S.L. 44; W.L. 36-37). Third, Hegel denies the Kantian claim which follows from these two first views that thought cannot know the thing-in-itself (S.L. 45; W.L. 37).

Although Hegel reproaches traditional logic for separating form from content or thought from the object itself, Hegel himself distinguishes thought from the sensible in at least one manner. As we have seen, Hegel’s logic deals with the categories, concepts which are free of any empirical or sensible content. But if logic is concerned with thoughts which are free of the sensible or the empirical and if metaphysics is the science of that which is or that which has a concrete existence, then how can Hegel’s logic be a metaphysics? Along with traditional metaphysics, Hegel shares the conviction that we discover the true nature of things by thinking about them (E.L. §27). This means that the concepts which we use to describe the true nature of things are not merely in our heads but are attributes of the object itself.

The indispensable foundation, the Concept, the universal which is the thought itself, in so far as one can make abstraction from the general idea expressed by the word ‘thought’, cannot be regarded as only an indifferent form attached to a content . . . the profounder basis is the soul [Seele] itself, the pure Concept which is the very heart of things, their simple life-pulse, even of the subjective thinking of them. (S.L. 37; W.L. 26-27)

For example, if I claim that a particular object possesses quantity, this quantity is not merely a feature of the object as I apprehend it but is a feature of the object itself. The object cannot be apart from the concepts or categories which apply to it because these concepts constitute the essence itself of the object.

But if the truth of the matter is what we have already stated and also is generally admitted, namely that the nature, the peculiar essence, that which is genuinely permanent and substantial in the complexity and contingency of appearance and fleeting manifestation, is the concept of the thing, the immanent universal, and that each human being though infinitely unique is so primarily because he is a man, and each individual animal is such individual primarily because it is an
animal: if this is true, then it would be impossible to say what such an individual could still be if this foundation were removed, no matter how richly endowed the individual might be with other predicates, if, that is, this foundation can equally be called a predicate like the others.” (S.L. 36-37; W.L. 26)

Since logic deals with the categories and since these categories, the most basic elements of our thinking, describe the essential characteristics of objects, logic also deals with the various fundamental characteristics of objects. To put it another way, since logic is the science of thinking and since thinking reveals and constitutes the true nature of objects, logic is also the science of the objects whose true nature it reveals and constitutes. Thus, logic is also metaphysics. Hegel’s logic is not a metaphysics because it deals directly with concrete objects as concrete objects but because it deals with the essence of concrete objects, that without which these objects would not be. Although one can abstract the empirical content from thought in order to reach its categories, one cannot abstract the thought content from the empirical. Thus thought includes its object within itself. “It will be seen in the Logic that this is just what thought and the universal are: that thought is itself and its other, that it overgrasps its other and that nothing escapes it.” (E.L. §20R).

Because thought constitutes the substantial essence of the things of appearance, the science of logic has a special status amongst both of the other branches of philosophical science as well as the ordinary empirical sciences. Logic is “the all-animating spirit of all sciences” (E.L. §24A2), the science whose subject matter permeates every facet of human experience and every form of inquiry. It examines the various categories which the other sciences employ to express the nature of the objects that they are studying. In contrast to the logic, the sciences of nature and spirit are applied sciences. They do not deal with the pure categories of thought but seek “only to [re]cognise the logical forms in the shapes of nature and spirit” (E.L. §24A2). It is, at the very least, helpful for someone pursuing the other sciences to be familiar with logic, if that person is to carry out the task effectively.

In what we have seen thus far, Hegel has not yet attempted to refute Kant’s position. He has merely offered a different view of the relationship between thought and
the thing-in-itself, a view which is similar in many ways to the traditional metaphysics
which Kant criticizes. Hegel cannot take it for granted that thought is the truth of being,
since this is precisely what Kant would deny. If Hegel’s position is to be tenable, he
must respond to Kant and his theory of the thing-in-itself by justifying his own
metaphysical view.

Hegel can attempt to establish this identity of thought and being either within the
logic itself or prior to the logic. If he were to justify the identity of thought and being
within the logic, all the categories which he had considered before his justification would
be at first only implicitly metaphysical. Only after Hegel had established the identity of
thought and being could we recognize retrospectively that the initial categories were not
just thoughts in our heads but the truth of things as well. In the logic Hegel reveals the
true nature of his dialectical method in this way. Although he employs this method
throughout the whole logic, it is not until the end of the logic that the structure of the
method becomes explicit for us. Looking back over the whole dialectical development
from this standpoint, we see that this method has guided the development all along. If
Hegel reveals the nature of the dialectical method within the logical development itself,
could he not demonstrate the metaphysical nature of our categories in this way as well?

I do not think that he could for the following reason. If Hegel is to justify his
claim that thought and being are identical, he must be able to change the minds of those
who deny this claim. Let us assume that a Kantian is following Hegel’s dialectical
development in the logic and that the various concepts in the dialectical development are
at first only subjective thoughts with no metaphysical pretensions. Let us say that the
dialectical development leads to a concept like the Idea which posits the identity of
thought and being. Even if Hegel had developed his dialectic properly up to that point,
he would still be unable to convince the Kantian that thought and being are identical.
The Kantian would say that Hegel had succeeded in showing that the dialectical
development leads necessarily to a concept which denotes an identity between thought
and being, but he would say that this was still just a concept. Hegel would not have
shown that the state of affairs which this concept denotes actually exists but only that
such a concept arises in the dialectical development. The moral of the story, a moral
which we can learn from the whole development of modern philosophy, is that once we have separated thought from its object, it is impossible to bridge the gap again from within thought. Hegel cannot begin the logic with subjective thought and then try to show that it is identical with being. Rather, he must establish the identity of thought and being before the logic even begins. This is what he attempts to do in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

The Concept of pure science and its deduction is therefore presupposed in the present work in so far as the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is nothing other than the deduction of it . . .

Thus pure science presupposes liberation from the opposition of consciousness. It contains thought in so far as this is just as much the object in its own self, or the object in its own self in so far as it is equally pure thought. As science, truth is pure self-consciousness in its self-development and has the shape of the self, so that the absolute truth of being is the known Concept and the Concept as such is the absolute truth of being. (S.L. 49; W.L. 43)

Because the phenomenology is the science of consciousness, Hegel does not restrict his investigation to subjective thought taken in isolation but examines the relationship between thought and its object, a relationship which is always a part of consciousness. Hegel’s objective in the phenomenology is to consider each position of consciousness in which the subject is opposed to its object and to demonstrate that each is inconsistent or self-contradictory. When overcome, each shape of consciousness leads to a higher shape and the development continues until the inconsistencies of consciousness are overcome in absolute knowing. Here we have discovered the truth about consciousness; the subject knows its object as its own self and the distinction between the knowing subject and the thing-in-itself vanishes. In this way consciousness makes itself explicitly what it was implicitly throughout the whole philosophical development.

Absolute knowing is the *truth* of every mode of consciousness because, as the course of the *Phenomenology* showed, it is only in absolute knowing that the separation of the *object* from the *certainty of itself* is completely eliminated: truth is now equated with certainty and this certainty with truth. (S.L. 49; W.L. 43)

At the same time, we have discovered the truth about thought: the concepts which we employ are not just in our head, so to speak, but are the true being of our object. Thus
the phenomenology allows us to pursue the science of logic or the study of thought with a proper understanding of the nature of thought. As Hegel tells us at the end of the *Phenomenology*, spirit has achieved "the pure element of its existence" (P.S. 490; P.G. 588) or the "ether of its life" (P.S. 491; P.G. 589); thought has discovered the truth about itself. At this point in the dialectic we have reached the threshold of the Concept or of logic. Having demonstrated the unity of being and thought, Hegel can now proceed to develop his metaphysical logic.

In the *Encyclopedia Logic* Hegel presents a shorter, less complicated introduction to his system in general and the logic in particular. In this introduction Hegel's approach is different. He does not employ the dialectical method as he does in the *Phenomenology* but simply describes and argues for his position (E.L. §25R) in a way that only a preliminary section outside of the science would allow. However, even if Hegel's approach in the "Preliminary Conception" is different from his approach in the *Phenomenology*, his objective is essentially the same: to demonstrate that thought is the truth of its other.

but its principal aim is to contribute to the insight that the questions about the nature of cognition, about faith and so on, that confront us in the [realm of] representation, and which we take to be fully concrete, are in point of fact reducible to simple determinations of thought, which only get their genuine treatment in the Logic. (E.L. §25R)

In the "Preliminary Conception" Hegel defends the metaphysical character of the logic with a much simpler argument against Kant's position. Kant claims that we cannot know the thing-in-itself. It is beyond the grasp of our experience and of our thought. Hegel argues that Kant's position entails in fact what it denies. If there were things in themselves, at the very least one could attribute the quality of being to these things. But being is itself a category of thought. Thus, contrary to Kant's claim, the thing-in-itself does fall within the domain of thought and we are at least able to know the thing-in-itself as something which is.

But this view [that of critical philosophy] can be countered by the simple observation that these very things which are supposed to stand beyond us and, at the other extreme, beyond the thoughts referring to them, are themselves figments
of subjective thought, and as wholly indeterminate they are only a simple thought-
thing — the so-called thing-in-itself of empty abstraction.” (S.L. 36; W.L. 26)

For Hegel we employ the categories as soon as we claim anything. When we make a
statement about an object, even if such an object is purported to be beyond our sensory
experience, we still have knowledge of the object to at least some degree. Thus, Kant
contradicts himself by stating that things-in-themselves cannot be known and, therefore,
he does not refute Hegel’s claim that we know the true nature of objects in thought. If
Kant is to retain the thing-in-itself without contradicting himself, the only possible option
open to him, an option which Adorno tries to pursue, is to deal with the thing-in-itself by
indirect means, i.e. to deal with the thing-in-itself without referring to it.

If Hegel’s argument against Kant is simple, resolving the debate between Kant
and Hegel on the thing-in-itself is certainly more complex. I do not pretend to claim that
Hegel has had the last word in this debate or that one could not perhaps formulate a
counter argument against Hegel on Kant’s behalf. However, this much at least is clear.
Although Hegel’s thought is similar in certain ways to pre-Kantian metaphysics, he does
not simply ignore the discoveries of Kant by returning to a naive metaphysical view. Nor
does Hegel simply assume that we have some sort of intellectual intuition which allows
us to bridge the knowledge gap first established by Kant between thought and the thing-
in-itself. On the contrary, Hegel shows in both the Phenomenology and the “Preliminary
Conception” that his metaphysical view is implicit in any position which separates the
object from thought and is, therefore, a view which any such position cannot avoid. Even
if Hegel shares the view with traditional metaphysics that the true nature of things
themselves is revealed in thought, his metaphysics is no longer naive like the traditional
version, since it does not simply take its own truth for granted. Hegel’s metaphysics is
one which has confronted its antithesis, critical philosophy, and has affirmed itself in the
face of this antithesis.

In this chapter we have seen that Hegel’s science of logic is not only a science of
thought but, because of his view of the relationship between thought and objects, we
have seen that it is also necessarily a metaphysics. Hegel does not attempt to
demonstrate that his logic is metaphysical within the course of the logical development
itself. Rather, as he tells us in the preliminary sections of his work, the logic presupposes the unity of thought and being from the beginning. Although Hegel expands and develops his metaphysics with each new step of the logical development by presenting new categories which convey the true nature of reality, in another sense his metaphysical project is complete at the beginning of the logic. For, once he has established that thought expresses the true nature of actuality, he need no longer attempt to prove this in the logical development itself. By examining the nature of our categories, Hegel is automatically examining the nature of actuality as well.

If, on the one hand, Hegel establishes the possibility of his metaphysical project prior to the logic, on the other hand, he investigates the meaning of our categories, their relatedness and their necessity in the logic itself. Let us now consider how Hegel tries to accomplish these tasks.
Chapter 2: The Dialectical Method in the Logic

Hegel, like certain other great thinkers, dealt with many different subjects in his philosophy. Hegel has something significant to say about logic, metaphysics, human history, the natural sciences, mathematics, politics, religion, art and the development of philosophy itself. Although he focuses on many different subjects, in each case he approaches his subject matter in the same way. He never presents his work as a collection of loosely related claims assembled in a random order. In his mature philosophy at least, Hegel always develops his subject matter in accordance with his infamous dialectical method.¹

In the logic the dialectical method is the tool -- although this expression is somewhat misleading -- that Hegel uses to accomplish the logical tasks which I discussed in the previous chapter. However, the nature of the dialectical method is by no means clear and is still disputed by scholars today. Before we can understand how Hegel attempts to accomplish his objectives in the logic, it is important first to understand how the dialectical method functions. I will focus on this issue in much of this chapter by considering two previous interpretations of the dialectical method and by opposing them to a third interpretation which I believe is the correct one. In my discussion of this third interpretation I will also consider how the logical dialectic begins and proceeds in accordance with the dialectical method. This will allow me to present certain features of the dialectic, an understanding of which is required for my third chapter. Having established the nature of the dialectical method, I will be able at the end of the chapter to show how the method allows Hegel to fulfill at least some of his logical objectives.

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¹ If Hegel does not explicitly employ the dialectical method in certain areas of inquiry like the philosophy of history or the history of philosophy, nonetheless he still orders his subject matter in these cases "in a way that corresponds to the inner sequence of the Concept" (E.L. §16R). In other words, although Hegel does not employ the method rigorously in these cases, he still tries to show that various elements of his subject matter are related to each other in an intelligible way.
2A. The Logical Dialectic

Before I examine the debate over the nature of Hegel's dialectical method, I wish, by way of introduction, to briefly consider Hegel's general conception of dialectic itself. In the Logic Hegel employs the term 'dialectic' in two different, though related, senses. First, he occasionally refers to the whole development of his subject matter as the dialectic. For example, he writes: "In the Phenomenology of Spirit, . . . the procedure adopted was to begin from the first and simplest appearance of the spirit, from immediate consciousness and to develop its dialectic right up to the standpoint of philosophical science." (E.L. §25R). The dialectic in this sense of the term begins in the Logic with the most immediate or the most indeterminate thought possible, the thought of pure being, and from there it develops through many stages until it finally arrives at the level of the fulfilled Concept, the absolute Idea. At this point, Hegel brings the logical dialectic to completion but he has laid the groundwork for a new dialectic in the element of nature.

Hegel also uses the term 'dialectic' in a second manner to describe a particular moment within the structure of the logical development. In the negatively rational or dialectical moment we see that a determination of the understanding, whose meaning is fixed and viewed as independent of its opposite, contradicts itself by revealing itself to contain its own opposite within itself (E.L. §81R). During the course of the logic Hegel demonstrates that the dialectical moment is an inevitable part of everything finite, because the finite is susceptible to change. In so far as the finite can be altered, it contains the seed of its opposite within itself, that which it is not yet but which it would be after it had been transformed (E.L. §81A1).

Throughout my thesis whenever I refer to Hegel's dialectic and his dialectical method, I have in mind the first as opposed to the second meaning of the term 'dialectic' which I have outlined. In other words, I am referring in such instances to the development of the logic as a whole and to the method which Hegel employs throughout this development. However, it is not merely coincidental that the name which Hegel sometimes gives to the total development is employed to describe the second logical
moment, since it is the dialectical moment, the moment of contradiction, which sets the
dialectical development in motion.

Now the negativity just considered constitutes the turning point of the
movement of the Concept. It is the simple point of the negative relation to
self, the innermost source of all activity, of all animate and spiritual self-
movement, the dialectical soul that everything true possesses and through
which alone it is true; (S.L. 835; W.L.II 563).

The dialectical moment sets the development in motion because the finite concept at this
stage contradicts itself and must change to overcome this contradiction.

Hegel is not the first thinker to develop the dialectical principle in his philosophy.
He, of course, is himself aware of this, since he makes some brief comments on the
history of dialectical thinking. Although Diogenes Laertius names Plato as the founder of
dialectic (S.L. 831; W.L.II 557), the dialectical moment is present even prior to Plato in
the philosophy of the Eleatics. Both Plato and the Eleatics demonstrate in particular
instances that a finite determination contains its opposite within itself. For example,
Plato reveals to us in the Parmenides that the one entails the many (E.L. §81A1) while
the Eleatics show the self-contradictory nature of movement (S.L. 832; W.L.II 558).

According to Hegel, Kant also employs the principle of dialectic in the antinomies of the
Critique of Pure Reason (E.L. §81A1), where he demonstrates that contrary assertions
can be derived about certain concepts like space, time, matter, freedom, necessity and the
world. By showing that each of these concepts is consistent with the sense in which it is
employed in each of its contrary assertions, Kant demonstrates, implicitly at least, that
these concepts are self-contradictory.

The dialectical development in Hegel’s philosophy is similar to the philosophy of
these thinkers in so far as it too involves dialectical arguments in which the immanently
contradictory nature of concepts is revealed. The major difference between Hegel’s
dialectic and that of his predecessors is as follows: Hegel in his philosophy pushes on in
an attempt to resolve the contradictions which arise from within finite concepts while his
predecessors stop their analysis at the level of contradiction and assume that the
contradictions which they have revealed cannot be overcome. When a philosopher takes
dialectically revealed contradiction as the final truth, he is generally apt to draw one of
two conclusions. First, he may conclude that the object of thought is self-contradictory,
and that as a result this object cannot exist as previously conceived. This response to the
dialectical moment assumes that thought reveals the true nature of its object and that the
object cannot be self-contradictory. The Eleatics, for example, react in this fashion when
they deny the existence of the world or of motion (S.L. 832; W.L.II 558). According to
the Eleatics, when one thinks carefully about these objects as they are revealed by the
senses, one sees that they are internally inconsistent, and, therefore, one's senses do not
reveal the true natures of these objects. Second, the philosopher may conclude, as Kant
does in the antinomies, that the dialectical contradiction resides not in the object of
thought but in thought itself. Unlike the Eleatics Kant does not accept that thought
reveals the true nature of things-in-themselves. On the contrary, he stressed that there
can be no knowledge by means of concepts alone and that knowledge must be grounded
in intuition. Since the objects with which the antinomies deal do not have a firm basis in
experience or are never given in experience in their entirety, Kant interprets the
contradictions in the antinomies as confirmation of thought's inability to go beyond what
is given in experience. These contradictions clearly indicate that when thought
transcends the limits of its proper function, it inevitably fails to function coherently.
Whereas the Eleatics connect contradiction with the object of thought, contradiction for
Kant is a fault of thought itself.

In opposition to both of these positions, Hegel claims that one cannot and should
not stop one's philosophical inquiry at the level of the dialectical moment. As Hegel
states at the outset of his Logic in the form of preliminary remarks, and as he attempts to
demonstrate throughout the whole course of the logic, the dialectical moment already
contains the seed of reconciliation within itself.

But then philosophy does not stop at the merely negative result of the dialectic, as
is the case with scepticism. The latter mistakes its result, insofar as it holds fast
to it as mere, i.e., abstract, negation. When the dialectic has the negative as its
result, then, precisely as a result, this negative is at the same time the positive, for
it contains what it resulted from sublated within itself, and it cannot be without it.
This, however, is the basic determination of the third form of the Logical, namely
the speculative or positively rational [moment]. (E.L. §81A2)
By developing a concept to the level of the speculative moment, Hegel sublates the moment of the understanding and the dialectical moment. On the one hand, since the speculative moment overcomes the contradiction of the understanding made explicit in the dialectical moment, it surpasses these moments. On the other hand, since the speculative moment arises from the moment of the understanding and the dialectical moment, it contains these moments within itself as a part of its own nature. However, the speculative moment for Hegel is not just a result but also a new beginning. For if the speculative moment is to be determinate, it must be thought in terms of the understanding: "without the understanding there is no fixity or determinacy in the domains either of theory or of practice" (E.L. §80A). When this fixed determination, which was formerly the speculative moment, is thought in terms of the understanding, new contradictions associated with this determination or concept arise, contradictions which must be resolved. Thus the speculative moment is not a final achievement but involves a return or a falling back to the moment of the understanding and the cycle of dialectical development.

Contemporary interpreters of Hegel generally refer to the development of the logic as a dialectic, but this is not the term which Hegel himself normally employs for this purpose. More often Hegel denotes the content of the logic as the development or the self-unfolding of the Concept. For example, at one point in the Science of Logic Hegel equates the exposition of logical subject matter with "the spontaneous progressive determination of the Concept" (S.I. 55). In other instances Hegel refers to the logical development as the self-unfolding of the Idea. "The science of it [the Idea] is essentially a system, since what is concretely true is so only in its inward self-unfolding and in taking and holding itself together in unity, i.e. as totality." (E.L. §14). If we are to properly understand Hegel's dialectical development, we must have some idea of what he means when he refers to the dialectic as the development of the Concept or the Idea. Let us consider this issue here briefly.

The logical dialectic can be described as the development of the Concept or the development of the Idea for the following reason. The dialectical development in the
logic is equivalent to the development of the Concept in so far as the Concept embraces within itself the whole logical progression leading up to the highest point of the logic, the absolute Idea. The Concept contains this development within itself as its content, and makes it its own. In this sense, the dialectical development of the logic is nothing but the development of the Concept's own content. As Hegel writes, the Concept "both encloses the plenitude of all content within itself, and at the same time releases it from itself." (E.L. §160A). In the logical dialectic the Concept is present from the very beginning and each step in the development is itself the Concept (S.L. 829; W.II 555). As I mentioned earlier, the Idea for Hegel is "the unity of the Concept and objectivity" (S.L. 756; W.II 464). The Concept and the Idea are distinct from each other in the sense that the forms of the Idea in the logic constitute the most developed forms of the Concept. The Idea, unlike the Concept with which we began in book 3, has generated its other, objectivity, from itself and has posited the other as identical with itself. Yet the content of the Idea is ultimately identical with that of the Concept. As the unity of the Concept and objectivity, the Idea also contains the whole content of the logical development and for this reason the dialectic in the Logic can also be described as the development of the Idea.²

As I have shown in my discussion of the dialectic as the development of the Concept, Hegel makes the claim that each step in the dialectical development is itself the Concept. This claim must now be further qualified. Hegel writes: "Hence it may indeed be said that every beginning must be made with the absolute, just as all advance is merely the exposition of it, in so far as its in-itself is the Concept" (S.L. 829; W.II 555). What does Hegel mean here when he states that the beginning and advance of the logical development are in-themselves the Concept? If we are to answer this question, we must recognize that there are two different perspectives for Hegel from which the logical development can be viewed. The first point of view is that of ordinary consciousness or thought which follows and develops the dialectic from the beginning through all of its intermediate stages. At all of these levels in which the dialectic has not yet attained the

² For the sake of brevity, I will only discuss the dialectical development as the development of the Concept from now on and I will take the development or the self-unfolding of the Concept as synonymous with that of the Idea.
point of completion, there is for our consciousness a strong distinction between our consciousness as subject and the subject matter of the dialectic (S.L. 827; W.L.II 552). This consciousness is finite and limited in so far as its knowledge of the course which the dialectic will follow is restricted. It is familiar with the dialectical content which it has developed prior to whatever point in the dialectic it has reached, but it cannot foresee the direction that the dialectic will assume as it continues to progress. At the end of the logical development, however, the logical dialectic is viewed from a much different perspective. There finite consciousness comes to recognize that the logical development is not merely the result of our subjective acts, as if our consciousness and its dialectical subject matter were completely diverse from one another. Rather when finite consciousness comes to an awareness that its own consciousness is itself the Concept, the logical dialectic reveals itself to us as the Concept's own self-development. Finite consciousness discovers that:

The method is this knowing itself, for which the Concept is not merely the subject matter, but knowing's own subjective act, the instrument and means of the cognizing activity, distinguished from that activity, but only as that activity's own essentiality" (S.L. 827; W.L.II 552)

This second perspective of the dialectical development is that of the Concept which knows its object as its own self. It is our consciousness after it has recognized that throughout the whole dialectic we, as thinking beings, have been developing nothing but the structure of our own thought. Given this, we can now claim that the logical dialectic is the development of the Concept in an even stronger sense than the one I have already outlined. The dialectical development is the Concept's own not only in the sense that the whole dialectic is the unfolding of the Concept's content, but it is also from the very beginning the Concept's own self-development or self-unfolding, since it is the Concept itself, implicitly in our finite consciousness, which develops its own content as Concept.

From this higher, more developed perspective of the dialectic, the dialectic is for itself the self-unfolding of the Concept because consciousness at this stage knows the dialectic to be such. The consciousness following the dialectic has reached the end of the development and through this process consciousness has discovered what the logical
dialectic's highest form is. Because it has reached the end, consciousness sees that the whole dialectic from the start is nothing but the development which leads to the fulfilled Concept and is nothing but the content of the Concept. In addition, it sees that this development is the Concept developing itself since its own consciousness which performed the development is nothing but the Concept itself.

However, from the perspective of the ordinary, finite consciousness which is still involved in the development of the dialectic and has not yet attained its completion, the dialectical development is only in-itself the development of the Concept. In other words, the dialectical development is implicitly the development of the Concept, but finite consciousness does not yet know it to be thus. Since the consciousness involved in developing the dialectic has not yet reached the end of the development, it does not know where the development will lead. The dialectical development has not demonstrated that it is the Concept's own self-development, and, as a result, finite consciousness is left without any other means to determine this beyond completing the dialectic. For the nature of the dialectic as the development of the Concept cannot be presupposed or taken for granted (S.L. 43; W.L. 35-36).

This yields an important consequence which we must bear in mind in our discussion of the dialectical method which will soon follow. In the logic finite consciousness employs the dialectical method from the outset to develop the dialectic. As we have pointed out, finite consciousness at this point does not yet know that the dialectical development is the development of the Concept, because it has not yet shown this and it cannot presuppose it. Yet finite consciousness is still able to proceed in the dialectical development. This means that finite consciousness must be able to define the dialectic and employ the dialectical method without presupposing any knowledge of the dialectical development as being that of the Concept. Let us consider what the conception of the dialectical method from the perspective of finite consciousness may be.
2B. Two Interpretations of the Dialectical Method

Michael Forster in the recently published *Cambridge Companion to Hegel* presents the following account of Hegel’s dialectical method, an account according to which the method involves a clear, detailed, step-by-step approach. At the outset of his article Forster quickly gives us a strong indication of the nature of the account which he will defend. Not only does he reject the views of certain scholars like Solomon who claim that Hegel did not truly have a dialectical method, but he also criticizes the interpretations of others like Acton or Popper for outlining the method in a vague manner.³ Acton, for example, writes that the method is ‘a method in which oppositions, conflicts, tensions, and refutations [are] courted rather than avoided or evaded’ while Popper claims that it is one which follows the structure of thesis, antithesis, synthesis. Although these scholars are not blatantly wrong in Forster’s eyes when they present the dialectical method in this way, he believes that the method can and should be described in more detail than this. Stating that the dialectic in the logic has a “certain primacy” over the dialectic in Hegel’s other works, Forster limits his treatment of the dialectical method to its presentation in the logic.⁴ Forster’s interpretation of the dialectical method is along the lines of the thesis, antithesis, synthesis interpretation given by Popper, but Forster presents his version in much more detail. His account is as follows:

Beginning from a category A, Hegel seeks to show that upon conceptual analysis, category A proves to contain a *contrary* category, B, and conversely that category B proves to contain category A, thus showing both categories to be self-contradictory. He then seeks to show that this negative result has a positive outcome, a new category, C (sometimes referred to as the “negative of the negative” or the “determinate negation”). This new category unites — as Hegel puts it — the preceding categories A and B. That is to say, when analyzed the new category is found to contain them both. But it unites them in such a way that they are not only preserved but also abolished (to use Hegel’s term of art for this paradoxical-sounding process, they are *aufgehoben*). That is to say, they are preserved or contained in the new category only with their original senses modified. This modification of their senses renders them no longer self-contradictory (and not a source of self-contradiction in the new category that contains them both). That is because it renders them no longer contraries, and therefore no longer self-contradictory in virtue of their reciprocal containment.

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⁴ ibid.
At this point, one level of the dialectic has been completed, and we pass to a new level where category C plays the role that was formerly played by category A. And so on.  

Having laid out what he believes to be the intended structure of Hegel’s dialectical method, Forster then proceeds in the remainder of the article to explain the various important functions of the method in Hegel’s philosophy and he tries to respond to certain frequently raised criticisms of the method.

In stark contrast to Forster’s position, Kaufmann seems to adopt a view essentially like that of Solomon which Forster criticizes. On more than one occasion, Kaufmann states quite plainly that there is in his opinion no true dialectical method in Hegel’s philosophy.

He [Hegel] assumes that philosophy requires a distinctive method of its own and sometimes writes as if he had such a method; but in fact, as we follow his procedure closely, we find that he did not.”

There is a legend abroad that the student of Hegel must choose in the end between the system and the dialectic, and it is widely supposed that the right wing Hegelians chose the system while the left wing, or the “young” Hegelians, including Marx, chose the dialectic. But I am by no means rejecting the dialectic in order to elect the system; I disbelieve both. And I am not so much rejecting the dialectic as I say: there is none. Look for it, by all means; see what Hegel says about it and observe what in fact he does. You will find some suggestive remarks, not all of them in the same vein, as well as all kinds of affectations; but you will not find any plain method that you could adopt even if you wanted to.

Yet in other places, Kaufmann writes as if Hegel does employ some sort of method.

The fact that Hegel himself never used the dialectic to predict anything, and actually spurned the very idea that it could be used that way, suggests plainly that Hegel’s dialectic never was conceived as what we should call a scientific method, and that his deductions were admittedly ex post facto. In other words, Hegel’s dialectic is at most a method of exposition; it is not a method of discovery.

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5 ibid. 132, 133.
6 Walter Kaufmann, Hegel: A Reinterpretation, 159.
7 ibid. 160, italics added.
8 ibid. 161, 162.
Although on the surface Kaufmann appears to be contradicting himself, I believe that he holds the following consistent position. When he claims that Hegel’s philosophy does not involve any method, he means that Hegel does not employ what Kaufmann would call a rigorous method, a clearly defined external method of the type which Forster attributes to Hegel. Since Kaufmann seems to presuppose that this is the only possible type of true method, its absence in Hegel’s philosophy renders this philosophy essentially methodless. His philosophy might be called dialectical in so far as it involves “a vision of the world, of man, and of history which emphasizes development through conflict, the moving power of human passions, which produce wholly unintended results, and the irony of sudden reversals”\(^9\). However, once again, from Kaufmann’s perspective this does not constitute a method in the true sense of the term.

Kaufmann seems to base his conclusion that there is no method on the following simple evidence. First, claiming that the three terms ‘thesis’, ‘antithesis’ and ‘synthesis’ belonged to Fichte and Schelling, Kaufmann states that Hegel “never once used these three terms together to designate three stages in an argument or account in any of his books.”\(^10\) One would assume that if Hegel did adhere to this structure as closely as many scholars claim he does, he would certainly have made more mention of it than he does. Second, although Kaufmann admits that Hegel is fond of triads\(^11\), he states that one does not generally find Hegel’s philosophy developed according to the order of thesis, antithesis and synthesis.\(^12\) Because the various branches of Hegel’s philosophy are, for the most part, not developed according to the triadic method, for the most part he concludes that there is no true method in Hegel’s work.

Both interpretations of the dialectical method which we have just considered require a particular interpretation of dialectical necessity. Since Forster views the dialectical method as a three step process along the lines of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, one would presume that for Forster any necessary dialectical development would involve this triadic structure in some way. In other words, the dialectical

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\(^9\) ibid. 161.
\(^10\) ibid. 154.
\(^11\) ibid.
\(^12\) ibid. 198.
development would be necessary from Forster’s point of view only if it involved, to put it simply, the development of a contrary category B from a category A and in turn a reconciliation of these two in a category C. For if it is only by means of the method that Hegel establishes necessity in his dialectic, then presumably he would have to employ the method correctly in order to achieve this necessity. In fact, Forster does present an interpretation of dialectical necessity along these lines in his article, in which he argues that the dialectical development involves two different kinds of necessity. First, the transition from category A to category B (or from thesis to antithesis) involves a type of analytic necessity.\textsuperscript{13} Second, Forster claims that the transition from category B to category C (or from antithesis to synthesis) is necessary in so far as category C best sublates category A and category B while \textit{“remaining closest to them in conceptual content”}.\textsuperscript{14} For example, at the beginning of the logic, becoming is the necessary synthesis of being and nothing. Although other categories like beginning could also serve this function, becoming is the necessary synthesizing category because, unlike the other possibilities, it is nearer to being and nothing in conceptual content.\textsuperscript{15} In his discussion of the necessity of the dialectic, Forster presupposes that any necessary development should follow the triadic structure, because he has defined dialectical necessity in terms of the three moments of this structure.

Unlike Forster, Kaufmann does not discuss the nature of dialectical necessity in detail, although he does make a couple of comments on the subject. In any case, since he denies the existence of the dialectical method, I believe that his interpretation of dialectical necessity would not be difficult to determine. Kaufmann would most likely argue that there is no genuine dialectical necessity in Hegel’s work because, he would say, Hegel does not provide any genuine dialectical method that could give the dialectical progression the necessity which Hegel claims it possesses. This interpretation of Kaufmann’s view is supported by his claim that Hegel frequently “misused” the word

\textsuperscript{13} Michael Forster, \textit{“Hegel’s Dialectical Method”}, 145. 146.
\textsuperscript{14} ibid. 148.
\textsuperscript{15} ibid. 147.
necessity in his philosophy. As further evidence, Kaufmann writes with regard to the philosophy of nature that:

Plainly, no "necessary" progression from stage to stage is suggested — at least not in any ordinary sense of "necessary". What is wanted is a sensible arrangement of the topics that Hegel, living in a particular period of history, considered it "necessary" to cover.17

Let us consider whether Forster's interpretation of the dialectical method is tenable. In order to evaluate his view, we must first look closely at what Hegel says about the nature of his dialectical method. In the first preface to the Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel tells us that true philosophy does not involve an external method.

But in any case, I believe that, although the side on which the content is closer to representative awareness and to what is empirically familiar necessarily had to be restricted in the present exposition, I have still managed to make it evident enough . . . that the method of the forward movement is quite distinct, both from the merely external order that the other sciences require, and from a certain mannerism in dealing with philosophical topics that has become quite usual. This fashionable procedure presupposes a schema, and uses it to establish parallels in the material just as externally and even more arbitrarily than the external procedure of the other sciences; and, through a misunderstanding that is really quite remarkable, it claims to have given every satisfaction to the necessity of the Concept with accidents and arbitrary associations. (E.L. 1-2; Enz. 11-12)

As Hegel points out in this quote, the various sciences possess an external method. This is the case in so far as their method can be defined independently of and prior to scientific investigation. The method includes the fundamental axioms of the science, which constitute the presupposed foundation of that science. Hegel tells us that certain forms of philosophy also employ an external method, and it appears in this instance that Hegel has certain followers of Schelling's philosophy in mind.18 Their type of philosophy involves the presupposition of a particular, philosophical approach and the universal application of this approach to its subject matter without requiring that attention be paid to the specific nature of its subject matter. In contrast, Hegel’s form of philosophy does not involve an external method, since he believes that philosophy, unlike

16 Walter Kaufmann, A Reinterpretation, 231.
17 ibid. 238, 239.
the other sciences, does not have the luxury of being able to presuppose its method (E.L. §1). Philosophy involves a different procedure in which the content of philosophy generates the method which is particular to it.

Philosophy, if it would be science, cannot, as I have remarked elsewhere, borrow its method from a subordinate science like mathematics, any more than it can remain satisfied with categorical assurances of inner intuition, or employ arguments based on grounds adduced by external reflection. On the contrary, it can be only the nature of the content itself which spontaneously develops itself in a scientific method of knowing, since it is at the same time the reflection of the content itself which first posits and generates its determinate character (S.L. 27; W.L. 16)

Because the method cannot be presupposed but is given in the philosophical development, the structure which philosophy's method will assume cannot be stated before or apart from philosophical inquiry.

But not only the account of scientific method, but even the Concept itself of the science as such belongs to its content, and in fact constitutes its final result; what logic is cannot be stated beforehand, rather does this knowledge of what it is first emerge as the final outcome and consummation of the whole exposition. (S.L. 43; W.L. 35)

As a result, unlike the scientific method which can be determined independently of its specific subject matter, the philosophical method is not external.

However, Forster's interpretation of the dialectical method makes the method into an external one. As I have described, Forster presents the method as consisting of a series of steps which one applies in the process of developing the dialectic: category A must be shown to yield its opposite, category B while category C should sublate both, overcoming them while retaining them within itself. It seems clear from Forster's discussion that, when one employs the dialectical method, these steps are to be applied in all cases, irrespective of the method's particular content. If this is the case, the dialectical method, like scientific and mathematical methods, becomes independent of its subject matter. That Forster at least implicitly views the dialectical method as an external one is supported by his reference to it as having an "intended general structure". ¹⁹ An intended general structure is one which a person has in mind or presupposes beforehand and which

¹⁹ Michael Forster, "Hegel's Dialectical Method". 155.
she plans to apply. But if Hegel, strictly speaking, had the method fixed in his mind before developing the dialectic, he would be using an external method in his logic. Similarly, we see that Forster views the dialectical method as external when he criticizes Hegel for deviating from "the intended general structure of the method in more or less extreme ways" and claims, as a result, that Hegel’s use of the dialectical method in practice is generally unconvincing. 20 His criticism is grounded in the assumption that Hegel must follow the structure which Forster has outlined if he is to apply the dialectical method correctly. Once again, this presupposes that Hegel has fixed the structure of his dialectical method prior to the development of the dialectic. Since Hegel claims that the dialectical method is not an external method and since Forster interprets the dialectical method as being external, one can argue that Forster’s interpretation of the dialectical method is incorrect.

Forster seems to have a response to my objection against his interpretation. More than once, Forster suggests that the dialectical method is not a presupposition made by Hegel, but that it is a hypothesis which could only be proven true at a later point.

If one is looking for a general way of thinking about the method, I suggest that one should understand it as the core of a grand hypothesis — concerning the structure of our shapes of consciousness, our categories, and natural and spiritual phenomena — whose fascination for Hegel lies in the fact that, if true, it promises a sweeping solution to a host of philosophical challenges. 21

Forster could argue that the dialectical method, as a hypothesis, would no longer be a presupposition, since a hypothesis, unlike a presupposition, is not assumed true at the outset, but requires further proof. However, even if the method which Forster attributes to Hegel were a hypothesis and not a presupposition in the sense that I have mentioned, this would not alter the fact that it is an external method. Although one does not necessarily assume prior to its application that the hypothetical method is the correct method, a hypothesis is still a presupposition in so far as it is an independently determined structure which is applied uniformly to all logical subject matter, irrespective of the particular nature of that subject matter. Therefore, even as a hypothesis, Forster’s

20 ibid.
21 ibid. 140, 141.
version of the method would be inconsistent with Hegel's description of it. In addition, as Michael Rosen correctly points out, Hegel states explicitly that his dialectical method is not a hypothesis. "But because it is the result which appears as the absolute ground, this progress in knowing is not something provisional, or problematical or hypothetical; it must be determined by the nature of the subject matter itself and its content." (S.L. 72; W.L. 71). Thus, even if Forster could avoid my initial criticisms by interpreting the dialectical method as being initially a hypothesis, his interpretation would still be incorrect because Hegel clearly denies that his method is hypothetical.

Before we evaluate Kaufmann's interpretation of the dialectical method, I wish to point out the manner in which Forster fails to make complete sense of Hegel's project. Because, as Forster acknowledges, Hegel in many instances does not develop his dialectic in accordance with the method as Forster has interpreted it, there is according to Forster's interpretation an element of division or conflict in Hegel's thought. On the one hand, Hegel lays out a clear method by which the dialectic must be developed, but, on the other hand, Hegel contradicts himself by developing the dialectic in ways which diverge from the intended method. It seems difficult for me at least to believe that a philosopher like Hegel, who is obviously no dullard, would make such a blatant mistake. This does not mean that Forster's account is refuted for this particular reason, that it is impossible that Hegel could have contradicted himself. However, all things being equal, an interpretation which explained Hegel's dialectical method and which avoided attributing this error to Hegel would certainly be prima facie more desirable than Forster's.

I believe that Kaufmann's interpretation also fails to make complete sense of the dialectical method, since Kaufmann, like Forster, claims that there are contradictory tendencies in Hegel's approach. As we have seen already, Kaufmann holds that Hegel does not employ any true dialectical method in his philosophy. Yet Kaufmann is also aware of numerous statements in which Hegel claims that his philosophy is developed according to a method. Thus we see that Kaufmann contradicts Hegel's claims when he denies that Hegel's philosophy involves a dialectical method. Kaufmann gets around this

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22 Michael Rosen, Hegel's Dialectic and its Criticism, 50.
23 Walter Kaufmann, Hegel: A Reinterpretation, 159.
by portraying Hegel as a thinker who is faced with the dilemma of either pursuing philosophy in the manner that he thinks he ought to or of practicing philosophy in the way that he wants to.

For the present we may conclude that the Hegel of the Phenomenology was still a man divided against himself and did not achieve the harmonious totality he sought. Like Schiller, he spurned the split in Kant’s moral agent between duty and inclination; but he himself was quite similarly divided between what his reason told him ought to be done and what his genius was bent on doing. The classical formulations are Paul’s: “what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do I” (Romans 7: 15), and “ye cannot do the things that ye would” (Galatians 5: 17). This phenomenon is generally associated with religion and morals, but it is at least as interesting — and deserves more study — in the case of writers and artists. Hegel is a case in point.  

In the end, Hegel never really makes a clear decision between what he ought to do and what he wants to do, and as a result his philosophy ends up being a mixture of both. On the one hand, Hegel claims to have developed his philosophy according to his own particular method and occasionally employs what look like dialectical deductions. On the other hand, throughout his work Hegel presents his “many superb insights” without worrying much about his philosophical method. In spite of what Hegel may claim, his work from Kaufmann’s point of view consists of a collection of ideas which are put together in an order devoid of any inherent structure. “The Logic is the work of a man who has a vast number of things to say, and who asks himself afterwards how best to arrange what he has said in an orderly fashion.” In Kaufmann’s interpretation Hegel comes across in one of two ways. Either we presume that Hegel was not aware of the inherent contradiction in his work, in which case he is someone who has deluded himself into thinking that his philosophy involves a rigorous method when it does not; or we presume that Hegel was aware of the contradiction in which case he comes across as someone who was deceiving his readers about the true nature of his work. Since in

24 ibid. 158. Although in this quote Kaufmann is referring to the Hegel of the Phenomenology in particular, I believe that his attitude toward the later Hegel is essentially the same. As Kaufmann indicates, Hegel in the Logic, as in the Phenomenology, simply compiles his material without a method (187, 188). This shows that for Kaufmann there is still a conflict in Hegel’s work between what Hegel claims to be doing and what he in fact does.

25 ibid. 159.

26 ibid. 160.

27 ibid. 206, see also ibid. 187.
Kaufmann’s explanation, like in Forster’s account, Hegel contradicts himself, Kaufmann has failed to make full sense of Hegel’s dialectic and its method; he has failed to interpret Hegel’s project as a coherent whole. Again, this does not necessarily mean that Kaufmann’s account is false. After all the evidence has been considered, it could turn out that Kaufmann’s is the best possible explanation and that the contradiction in Hegel’s work which Kaufmann has pointed out cannot be resolved. However, Kaufmann’s interpretation initially at least leaves room for a better interpretation which would make more sense of the dialectical method.

Kaufmann’s account of Hegel’s dialectical method is flawed, because it rests implicitly upon the mistaken assumption that any true dialectical method would have to be an external one of the type that Forster attributes to Hegel. Kaufmann denies that Hegel employs a true dialectical method, because he does not find any evidence in Hegel’s dialectic of a clearly definable structure, which would be present were Hegel employing an external method. But Kaufmann cannot draw his conclusion from this evidence. Just because Hegel does not employ an external type method in the dialectical development does not mean that he has no method at all, since his dialectical method could be one which does not have an external structure of the type which Kaufmann seeks. If indeed Hegel were following such a method in the dialectic as I believe he is, its presence would not be indicated by any consistently recurrent structure in the development. As we have seen already in the criticism of Forster’s interpretation, the dialectical method for Hegel does not involve an externally imposed structure; the structure of the dialectical development arises from the content with which the dialectical method deals. Since Hegel’s method is not external, it is consistent for Hegel to claim to have a method particular to philosophy while not showing much evidence that he is employing a method in the ordinary sense of the term. Kaufmann concludes without justification that Hegel has no method because Kaufmann overlooks the possibility of a non-external, dialectical method.

Nevertheless, even if Kaufmann’s argument is flawed, the conclusion of his argument could still be true; it could still be the case that Hegel’s logic involves no method at all. Hegel’s own claims in the logic seem to refute this conclusion but, as we
have seen, Kaufmann gives reasons for disregarding these claims. If I am to prove that
Kaufmann's conclusion is false, my best option is to show that the logic does involve a
non-external method of some type. This I will attempt in the next section.

To sum up, one could say that Forster is correct to the extent that he claims that
Hegel does indeed have a dialectical method, but he is mistaken in so far as he attributes
a concrete structure to this method, thereby making it an external one. In contrast,
Kaufmann is correct in holding that Hegel does not follow an external, pre-determined
method in his dialectic. He is mistaken in concluding from this that Hegel has no method
in spite of any claims that Hegel makes to the contrary. In what follows I wish to present
and defend a third interpretation of the dialectical method, an interpretation which I
believe overcomes the difficulties of the two other views which I have considered. In a
sense, this third interpretation occupies a middle ground between Forster's account and
Kaufmann's. Like Forster and unlike Kaufmann, I argue that Hegel does in fact employ a
method in his dialectic. However, like Kaufmann and unlike Forster, my interpretation
takes account of the fact that Hegel's dialectic does not involve the mere application of
an external method.

2C. The Interpretation of the Dialectical Method as a Method of Immanent Criticism
and Development

According to the interpretation of the dialectical method as one of immanent
criticism and development, the dialectical method involves both a positive element and a
negative element. In other words, the method indicates both what one should do and
what one should not do in order to employ the method properly. On the one hand, the
consciousness developing the dialectic must make its subject matter the sole object of its

\[28\] The following commentators all support the fundamental claims of my interpretation: Adorno (1993)
(1973) 49-64; Winfield (1988) 45-57; Winfield (1990) 45-53. Although these commentators may disagree
with each other on some minor points, all accept the following: (1) that the dialectical method does not
involve the application of an external structure to the content of the dialectic, and (2) that the dialectical
method involves allowing the content of the dialectic to guide the development in some way. I am
particularly indebted to Adorno and Houlgate for putting me on the right track in my investigation of the
dialectical method. However, because all the necessary evidence to support my interpretation can be found
in Hegel's writings and because this evidence is what I ultimately relied upon in forming my interpretation, I
refer little to Adorno and Houlgate or any of the other commentators in my investigation.
attention and it must consider this subject matter closely as it is in itself. On the other hand, consciousness must avoid making any presuppositions about the nature of its subject matter or about how it is to deal with its subject matter. These positive and negative requirements of the dialectical method are closely related to one another. If one is to pay close attention to the true nature of one’s subject matter, one cannot make presuppositions about that subject matter, since presuppositions about a particular object by their very nature are not demonstrated as true by the object itself but are held to be true by consciousness prior to or independently of any consideration of the object. When presuppositions influence consciousness’ consideration of its subject matter, consciousness, in fact, is not truly attending to its subject matter as it is in itself but is imposing external constraints on this subject matter. Similarly, if one is to avoid making any presuppositions about one’s object of inquiry while one is examining it, one must make a strong effort to consider one’s object as it is in itself. For it is only knowledge derived from the object itself which is well-founded and which is not in need of further justification.

If one considers the evidence closely, one will conclude, I believe, that these two closely related requirements are essentially what Hegel’s dialectical method involves. In the various sections in which Hegel discusses his method, he never tells us explicitly that the development of the dialectic demands the formal application of rules along the lines of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Rather, he claims that the method involves absorbing oneself in one’s object of investigation.

The absolute method, on the contrary, does not behave like external reflection but takes the determinate element from its own subject matter, since it is itself that subject matter’s immanent principle and soul. This is what Plato demanded of cognition, that it should consider things in and for themselves, that is, should consider them partly in their universality, but also that it should not stray away from them catching at circumstances, examples and comparisons, but should keep before it solely the things themselves and bring before consciousness what is inmost in them. (S.L. 830; W.L.II 556-557)

Elsewhere Hegel indicates that once the dialectical development is under way, thought need only give its full attention to its subject matter in order to develop the dialectic properly.
Now starting from this determination of pure knowledge, all that is needed to ensure that the beginning remains immanent in its scientific development is to consider, or rather, ridding oneself of all other reflections and opinions whatever, simply to take up, what is there before us. (S.L. 69; W.L. 68)

In this description of how the dialectic should be developed, Hegel mentions not only the positive demand of the dialectical method, but also the negative component of this method. In the process of attending to the content itself, as the method requires, one must free one’s mind from all presuppositions, by “ridding oneself of all other reflections and opinions”. In Hegel’s philosophy one sees a great effort on his part to avoid making any needless presuppositions.\(^{29}\)

This claim must be qualified because there is a sense in which philosophy is presuppositionless for Hegel and there is a sense in which it is not. Philosophy is not presuppositionless to the extent that it relies upon the wealth of human experience for its content (E.L. §1). In the order of time, we form representations and concepts within the different domains of experience before we understand our representations and our concepts philosophically. The various concepts that humans have developed to make sense of the world, the various attitudes and events of history, the various accomplishments of human culture and discoveries about the natural world, these are what philosophy deals with. Philosophy cannot ignore the context from which it arose by attempting to generate its own content out of a void.

But although philosophy presupposes that its content be given to it, it cannot make any presuppositions about the nature of this content. Hegel takes this requirement very seriously in the logic. First, one cannot assume that one already knows the true nature of the various concepts which appear in the logic. For example, one cannot simply assume that being and nothing are concepts whose meanings are opposed to each other and mutually exclusive of each other. Second, according to Hegel, one cannot

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\(^{29}\) Recent commentators like Stephen Houlgate and Richard Dien Winfield have brought our attention to certain similarities between Hegel’s method and Descartes’ philosophical approach. According to them, both Hegel and Descartes in one way or another seek to develop a presuppositionless philosophy. A detailed comparison of Hegel’s and Descartes’ respective methodological approaches has to the best of my knowledge yet to be undertaken and this subject certainly warrants further investigation. However, this question is beyond the scope of my thesis.
presuppose anything about the general structure of the logical dialectic or the order in which the logical content will appear. For example, before actually developing the content of the logic, Hegel cannot know that it will be divided into the three main sections of Being, Essence and Concept, since the structure of the logical development must emerge from the content itself (S.L. 54, 55; W.L. 50). Third, one cannot presuppose anything about the nature of the dialectical method, since once again this can only be revealed within the logical development (S.L. 53; W.L. 49). Fourth, the strict demands of Hegel’s philosophy do not even permit one to make assumptions about the general nature of its subject matter, namely thought (S.L. 75; W.L. 75). As we shall see shortly, the person developing the dialectic does not even make the arbitrary choice of examining this particular subject matter in the Logic, since the subject matter is provided for her. Thus, Hegel’s philosophy is presuppositionless in the sense that it does not allow one to make any concrete assumptions about its content before one considers this content as it is in itself.

Prior to the actual dialectical development Hegel does indeed make comments about the structure of the logical dialectic, the dialectical method and the nature of the logical. However, he emphasizes that these comments are to be taken as preliminary remarks which are external to the dialectic, remarks which have no bearing upon the dialectic’s results and which are still in need of dialectical proof.30 Because of this, Hegel’s preliminary comments are not presuppositions about the content of the logical dialectic. Their function is not to lay a foundation upon which to ground the science of Logic but to orient the reader before she embarks upon this science. Hegel repeatedly reminds us that his comments are preliminary because he does not want us to think that he is making presuppositions about the dialectic before he actually develops it.

Because the dialectical method as I have interpreted it is not an external method, it is very different from ordinary methods like the one employed in the empirical sciences. Before a scientist carries out an ordinary scientific experiment or investigation, she knows under what conditions the claim that she is testing will be true and under what conditions it will be false. Because she can determine the criteria of truth prior to the

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30 See for example E.L. §19R, §79R; S.L. 59, W.L. 56.
experiment itself or prior to engaging with the subject matter, her method is external. For example, let us say that she is investigating whether the force of gravity is weaker on the surface of the moon than it is on the surface of the earth. If she were to discover that the properly measured acceleration of an object dropped while standing on the moon is less than 9.8m/s², she would know that "The gravity on the moon is weaker than on earth" is a true claim. If its acceleration were to be equal to or greater than 9.8m/s², the force of gravity on the moon would not be less than on earth and the claim would be false. In this example, the scientist's method is external because she knows these truth conditions before she even carries out the experiment.

Because empirical science employs an external method, it is much easier for the scientist to prove to others that the results of her method are true. Once the truth conditions of a scientific claim have been established by all involved, these conditions can be clearly expressed prior to the experiment and are binding on all involved. In order to demonstrate that her scientific claim is true, the scientist must then merely show the others in an appropriate manner that the truth conditions for that claim are satisfied. For example, in order to show that the claim "The force of gravity on the moon is less than that on earth" is true, one need only demonstrate in some direct manner that the acceleration of a dropped object on the moon is less than 9.8m/s².

In contrast, since one develops the dialectic solely by attending to the matter of the dialectic itself, and since one cannot make any assumptions about the results of the dialectic before engaging with its subject matter, one cannot say that condition X or condition Y must be met by the dialectical development if its course is to be correct. This makes it difficult for one to prove to others that the results which one has obtained by employing the dialectical method are correct. One cannot prove this by establishing truth conditions and by demonstrating that one's results meet these conditions. One can only convince others that one's dialectical investigation has led to correct results by getting them to carry out the dialectical investigation for themselves. Because one is not able to establish intersubjectively accessible and intersubjectively acceptable conditions for a correct dialectical development, it may seem that one can make the results of the dialectical development into whatever one wants them to be and, as a consequence of
this, these results may appear to be merely relativistic. However, this appearance is false. Even though it may be significantly more difficult to achieve consensus on the true course of the dialectical development than on the truth of scientific results, the truth of the dialectical development is not simply whatever one wants it to be but is revealed when one attends to the dialectical subject matter as it is in itself.\footnote{Houlgate (1991) writes: “There are no external logical criteria which can be called upon to evaluate or criticize Hegel’s new logic, because what he is proposing is itself nothing other than the scientific process of determining — without presuppositions — wherein genuinely rational thinking actually lies. Any rational principles which are brought to bear on presuppositionless thinking thus always beg the very question such thinking is trying to answer: how should we think? However, this does not mean that Hegel’s logic is utterly uncriticisable. . . What needs to be established is whether Hegel succeeds in developing and rendering explicit only what is implied by the concept under review, that is whether the derivation of the categories is strictly immanent, or whether Hegel introduces illegitimate ‘external’ factors, such as metaphorical association or (as Schelling claimed) an anticipation of the result and goal of the science, to move the logic along. That, it seems to me, can be assessed by anyone: it can be publicly determined.” (67).}

Thus far I have presented my interpretation of the dialectical method in a preliminary manner and I have provided textual evidence from both the greater and lesser Logic to support my interpretation. Let us now examine in more detail how this method functions in the logic. Before Hegel can develop the logical dialectic, he must begin somewhere and for him it is important to begin in the right way. As a result, he spends a whole section in the Science of Logic discussing and justifying the beginning that he proposes. We will see that the dialectical method, when interpreted as one of immanent criticism and development, has an important role to play in determining the beginning of the logic.

For Hegel a proper beginning in the logic must meet two criteria. First, the beginning of the logic should not occur as the result of a subjective decision. Hegel should not be investigating thought in the logic simply because he, as a subjective individual, chose to investigate thought as opposed to some other subject. For by beginning the logic in this manner, Hegel would begin the logic arbitrarily. But if Hegel is to develop the logic in a necessary way as he intends to, the beginning which he makes cannot be arbitrary. The beginning of the logic must be provided for him in some necessary manner. Hegel must “ensure that the beginning remains immanent in its [pure knowledge’s] scientific development” (S.L. 69; W.L. 68). Second, Hegel must see to it that “no presupposition is to be made” (S.L. 70; W.L. 68) and that “the beginning itself is
taken *immediately*" (S.L. 70; W.L. 68). For if the beginning is mediated, it is by its very nature not a true beginning. Something mediated is "an other to a first" (S.L. 72; W.L. 72); it presupposes an other for its very being. Because it presupposes an other, it cannot stand on its own as the very first from which everything else derives. Thus, a true beginning cannot be mediated. The beginning of the logic must be immediate because only the immediate does not presuppose an other.

By requiring that the beginning of the logic meet these two criteria, Hegel has set a difficult task for himself. On the one hand, the beginning must be provided for Hegel in a necessary manner by some other source. On the other hand, the beginning must be purely immediate. But these two demands seem to be completely incompatible with each other. For if the beginning of the logic must be provided for by some other source, it cannot be immediate, since such a beginning is obviously mediated by the source which provides it. For this same reason, if the beginning of the logic is to be immediate, it cannot be provided for Hegel by some other source. Let us consider whether Hegel succeeds in his difficult task.

Hegel determines the beginning of the logic in two different ways. First, he does so by following the dialectic in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* through to its completion in absolute knowing and by developing it beyond this point. As we saw in chapter 1, absolute knowing is the standpoint from which consciousness overcomes the alienation of the object from itself and recognizes itself in its other. In this way, the phenomenological dialectic enters the realm of pure knowing, which for Hegel is also the realm of the logical (S.L. 68; W.L. 67). If one wishes to determine that with which the logical dialectic must begin, one need only apply the dialectical method as was done previously throughout the phenomenology by attending to the shape of absolute knowing itself. Pure knowing is a unity in difference, since it knows the other, which is still distinct from it, as its own self. Yet, Hegel claims that the distinction between subject and object in pure knowing collapses because the subject of pure knowing envelops its object within itself. Since the object defines the subject’s own self-identity, the subject also disappears with the disappearance of the object in the subject; the annihilation of the object within the subject leads to the disappearance of the subject itself as subject (S.L.
69; W.L. 68). After the removal of the distinction between subject and object in absolute knowing, we are left with a state of pure undifferentiated immediacy (S.L. 69; W.L. 68). Because pure knowing as simple immediacy is not differentiated within itself at all, it is, but it is not a specific something; it is pure being (S.L. 69; W.L. 68).

It is important to note that Hegel in this instance establishes the beginning of the logic by following the dialectical method as a method of immanent criticism and development in the Phenomenology. By determining how to begin the logic in this way, Hegel succeeds in meeting the positive and the negative requirement of the dialectical method: he not only attends to the content of the Phenomenology as it is in itself but he also avoids making presuppositions about his object of inquiry in the logic. In so doing, Hegel begins the logic differently than one would the empirical sciences, since he does not presuppose either his topic of inquiry or his starting point within this topic by choosing them arbitrarily. Because the starting point of the logic and even the subject matter itself of the logic have arisen from the previous dialectic and have presented themselves to the phenomenological observer as objects of further inquiry, Hegel is not required to begin by choosing a starting point and a subject matter arbitrarily. Therefore, the beginning which Hegel proposes, pure being, satisfies the first criterion which a proper logical beginning must meet.

Because the beginning which Hegel proposes has arisen from the conclusion of the Phenomenology, this beginning is mediated (S.L. 69,70; W.L. 68). However, if pure being is to be a true beginning, it cannot be mediated; pure being must be a purely immediate beginning in some way. In an effort to overcome this difficulty, Hegel discusses a second way in which we can attempt to determine the beginning of the logic: having resolved to examine the nature of thought, we try simply to determine some immediate starting point within thought. As immediate, the beginning which Hegel seeks cannot presuppose anything, since to presuppose something is to be mediated by it and is, therefore, to no longer be immediate. Because it cannot presuppose anything, the beginning cannot contain any content, since to have content is to presuppose something. Anything with content is an interrelationship of moments, moments which mediate the existence of that thing and upon which the thing is dependent for its existence (S.L. 70;
The determination which contains no content is pure being and, therefore, it is pure being which constitutes the beginning of the logic (S.L. 70; W.L. 69).

Hegel shows us that pure being is not only the beginning provided for us by the phenomenological dialectic but that it is also the immediate starting point of the logic. Thus Hegel has discovered a beginning which meets both of his criteria. As far as Hegel is concerned, the question of where to begin the logic is now settled. "To enter into philosophy, therefore, calls for no other preparations, no further reflections or points of connection." (S.L. 72; W.L. 72).

Yet Hegel seems to have contradicted himself. On the one hand, pure being is the purely immediate beginning of the logic. On the other hand, we have seen that pure being is mediated by the result of the phenomenology in so far as pure being arises from absolute knowing. But how can pure being be both purely immediate and mediated? Is this not a contradiction? Although Hegel does claim in one place that pure being is mediated and in another that it is immediate, Hegel, I believe, does not ultimately contradict himself, because pure being can be taken in two different ways. If pure being is considered within the context of the dialectical development which ends in the phenomenology with absolute knowing and which carries over into the logic, pure being is mediated. But if the thought determination of pure being is considered on its own, it is purely immediate. To understand why this is the case, we must briefly reconsider the nature of the transition from the phenomenology to the logic. When absolute knowing passes into pure being, the distinction between subject and object disappears. In this way, the differentiated structure of absolute knowing suffers a complete collapse into indeterminacy. Because the structure of knowing collapses, this structure is no longer to be recognized in the indeterminacy of pure being. Pure knowing "is without any distinction and as thus distinctionless, ceases itself to be knowledge" (S.L. 69; W.L. 68).

Unlike so many transitions in the logic in which the content of an original concept is preserved in the content of a newly developed one, the content of pure knowing is not preserved in pure being. Because pure knowing is no longer to be found in pure being, pure knowing in a sense disappears for pure being. "Pure knowing as concentrated into this unity has sublated all reference to an other and to mediation" (S.L. 69; W.L. 68).
Pure knowing, which has transformed itself into pure being, has ironically severed its connection with its former self. Having sublated that which mediated it, pure being establishes itself as the purely immediate. Therefore, although pure being can be viewed as mediated by the phenomenological dialectic and absolute knowing, Hegel is also justified in claiming, at least at this point, that pure being is the purely immediate beginning of the logic.

Hegel can now proceed to develop the content of the logic in accordance with his dialectical method by observing his beginning closely. There is no guarantee prior to engaging with this subject matter that the dialectic will develop at all. It could be that our beginning contains no immanent meaning beyond its initial meaning and does not lead to a dialectical development. However, this is, in fact, not what occurs. Since Hegel has established that the logic must begin with pure being, we must proceed by attempting to think pure being or, otherwise put, by attending to pure being as it is in itself. Of pure being we can only say that it is pure indeterminacy (S.L. 82; W.L. 82). If pure being were differentiated within itself in any way, it would no longer be purely indeterminate; it would no longer be pure being. Because pure being is completely void of determination or content, it is nothing (S.L. 82; W.L. 83). There is no way to distinguish the emptiness of pure being from that of pure nothing. Thus, by attending to pure being in this way, we have discovered something about pure being.

If we continue to attend to the content of the dialectic, we see that pure nothing is itself pure being. When we attempt to think pure nothing, we still think some meaning. This meaning is not nothing; it is (S.L. 82; W.L. 83). Therefore, when we attempt to think pure being, we think pure nothing and when we attempt to think pure nothing, we think pure being. For this reason, pure being and pure nothing are the same (S.L. 82; W.L. 83). Yet they are also completely distinct from each other (S.L. 83; W.L. 83). Were they only the same as each other, there would be no movement at all from pure being to pure nothing and vice-versa. At this point, however, their diversity is "what cannot be said"; it is "what is merely meant" (E.L. §88R). When we attempt to attend to pure being and pure nothing, each of these vanishes immediately into the other, slipping instantly from our grasp like a wet bar of soap. But through our inability to clearly
distinguish between pure being and pure nothing we discover something new about these thought determinations. Pure being and pure nothing are this oscillation between themselves; they are becoming (S.L. 83; W.L. 83). “Becoming is simply the positedness of what being is in its truth” (E.L. §88A).

Although in this example we see how the dialectical method functions as a method of immanent criticism and development, the development of the dialectic from pure being to becoming is in at least one sense very different from the rest of the development: the beginning of the dialectical development does not yet involve concrete, determinate concepts. With determinate concepts we are able, at least initially, to establish their meaning clearly. But with the pure being and pure nothing we cannot even get that far. For as soon as we attempt to elaborate the meaning of one, we come up with what the one is not, namely the other. In this way, we fail to establish clearly what either pure being or pure nothing are. Because pure being and pure nothing are not determinate concepts, the dialectical movement from pure being to pure nothing to becoming cannot properly be said to involve any transition. For a transition is the becoming of one entity into another. Because the meanings of pure being and pure nothing cannot be properly established to begin with, there can be no becoming of one fixed entity into another in the oscillation between pure being and pure nothing.

However, when the dialectical development reaches the first determinate concept, i.e., becoming, the dialectic progresses by means of a series of transitions from one determinate concept to another. As we see in the whole course of the logic, when we consider a finite thought determination very closely and avoid making presuppositions about it, we discover meaning in this thought determination which was not previously explicit. By making the new meaning of the thought determination explicit, we show that the original thought determination entails a meaning or a thought determination which is other than the original determination. Since the original determination has been shown to contain the other of itself within itself, the original determination has contradicted itself. At the same time, by making the implicit meaning of the original thought determination explicit, we discover a new thought determination. The dialectical
method requires that we consider the new thought determination as it is in itself and this can lead to further dialectical transformation.

In one sense, the development of the logical dialectic involves a series of transitions from one thought determination to a different thought determination. For example, the last chapter of the doctrine of essence begins with the determinate concept of substantiality. When we attend closely to substantiality, the logical dialectic passes on to causality. When considered closely, pure nothing in turn leads to yet another determinate concept, reciprocal action. In so far as each subsequent thought determination is not explicitly contained in the previous one, each step of the dialectical development produces a new result. In this sense, the dialectical development in the logic is synthetic (S.L. 830; W.L.II 557).

In another sense, however, each subsequent stage of the logical dialectic is identical with the preceding one. If the dialectical method is one of immanent criticism and development, as I have suggested, one develops the logical dialectic by attending to the current thought determination and by not making any presuppositions about that thought determination. If this is done successfully, there will be no external factors influencing the development; any new thought determination arising from the preceding thought determination will be completely immanent in the preceding one. In this way, the dialectical development is also analytic (S.L. 830; W.L.II 557). Because the resulting thought determination is nothing but the previous one with its content made explicit, the resulting thought determination is identical with the previous one. As Hegel tells us, the end result of the dialectical development, the Concept, is completely implicit in the first stage of the logic, pure being. "Hence it may indeed be said that every beginning must be made with the absolute, just as all advance is merely the exposition of it, in so far as its in-itself is the Concept" (S.L. 829; W.L.II 555). If the end result of the logical dialectic is present from the beginning and if each stage in the dialectical development is identical with the others in the way that I have described, there is in a sense no development at all in the dialectic. The dialectic is the development which is not a development. However, because the Concept is only implicit in pure being, the end result is also absent at the beginning of the logic. Since one must develop the dialectic in order to make the
Concept explicit, the dialectical development is not a superfluous exercise (S.L. 829; W.L. II 555).

As a development, the logical dialectic is not only an advance from the beginning, pure being, towards more concrete thought determinations; it is also a retreat into the ground of the beginning (S.L. 71; W.L. 70). On the one hand, when we develop the logical dialectic by considering a particular concept X closely, we discover that the meaning content of concept X contains concept Y implicitly. In so far as we are led from concept X to concept Y by investigating the meaning of concept X, we can say that we have advanced from concept X to concept Y. Because concept Y arises from concept X, it is mediated by concept X. In turn, one considers concept Y which leads to another concept Z and the advance continues in this way to the absolute Idea. On the other hand, as I discussed in my first chapter, Hegel tries to demonstrate in the logic that our finite concepts cannot stand in isolation from each other. Hegel does this with each transition in the dialectical development by demonstrating that concept X, from which arises concept Y, can only be thought as concept X if it is thought in conjunction with concept Y. Concept X is mediated in this way by concept Y. Although pure being and pure nothing are not determinate concepts, this principle applies to them as well. To think pure being and pure nothing in their truth, we must think becoming. For this reason, becoming, as a condition of pure being and pure nothing, mediates them. Thus, the transition from a particular concept X to a particular concept Y is not only a forward movement but also a retreat from concept X towards its condition or ground.

In this way, pure being, which initially seemed to be the immediate starting point of the logical dialectic, shows itself to be mediated (S.L. 71,72; W.L. 71). Pure being cannot be thought on its own but can only be thought as pure being if one thinks pure nothing as well. Therefore, pure being presupposes pure nothing and is mediated by it. Pure being eventually finds its ultimate ground at the end of the dialectical development in the absolute Idea.

However, Hegel's philosophy can be presuppositionless without having an absolute beginning because the dialectical development in the logic takes the form of a circle. "The essential requirement for the science of logic is not so much that the
beginning be a pure immediacy, but rather that the whole of the science be within itself a circle in which the first is also the last and the last is also the first.” (S.L. 71; W.L. 70).

The logical development from pure being to the absolute Idea is a circle which returns upon itself in so far as it is both an advance towards its most concrete expression and a retreat towards its ground. In this way, the logical dialectic moves in two directions. As an advance it goes from pure being, which is the immediate beginning in this instance, to the absolute Idea as mediated result. When Hegel tells us that the dialectical development is also a retreat from pure being into its ultimate ground, this claim assumes that the development also proceeds from the absolute Idea, as the immediate beginning in this context, to the mediated result of pure being. Here we see that the whole dialectical development leading to the absolute Idea returns upon itself and retraces its steps towards pure being, making the first also the last and the last also the first, as Hegel describes above. In a circle like this, there can be obviously no true beginning, but this is not a problem for Hegel’s system. Because his philosophy has a circular form and is not merely a linear development, each part or concept within his philosophy is mediated by the others within the system and, therefore, does not presuppose anything outside the system which the system could not account for. Since a true presupposition is that which one does not account for, Hegel’s philosophy, although it does not have a purely immediate beginning, can still be presuppositionless.

If we interpret the dialectical method as one of immanent criticism and development, we are better able to explain certain claims that Hegel makes. This further supports my interpretation.

1. Hegel indicates that the general development of the dialectic, which I have described above, can be viewed in two different ways.

   On the one hand, this development is just a taking up of the content and of the determinations that it displays; but, on the other hand, it also gives these determinations the shape of coming forth freely (in the sense of original thinking) in accordance with the necessity of the matter itself alone. (E.L. §12)

First, one can see the development as one in which we are active. By making an effort to pay close attention to the subject matter and to avoid making presuppositions about this
subject matter, we discover the contradictions inherent in finite thought determinations and make them explicit. Yet, from another point of view we are not active at all in the dialectical development but merely look on as the thought determinations develop of themselves. In the dialectical development we make no real contribution of our own; the whole development is present in the content of thought and arises from this content. When Hegel talks as if the determinations of thought develop themselves, he does not mean that thought or the observing consciousness is dispensable in the dialectical process. The dialectical development could not actually take place on its own, somewhere 'out there', but only in the consciousness of a person engaging in the dialectic. However, in so far as the true dialectical development is independent of the particular, contingent views and assumptions of the person developing the dialectic, Hegel can say that the dialectic develops of itself. Since consciousness in the dialectical development is in this sense passive, Hegel also describes the dialectical method as “the consciousness of the form of the inner self-movement of the content of the logic.” (S.L. 53; W.L. 49). Hegel can only define the dialectical method in this manner because it is a method of immanent criticism and development. If the method involved the application of rules to the content of the dialectic, the development of the content would in no way be its self-movement. In this case, the dialectical content would be completely dependent upon the external method contributed by thought to give it form. In contrast, when the method is interpreted as one of immanent criticism and development, the structure which the content will assume is immanent to the content and is, therefore, self-generated.

2. Because the content of the dialectic produces the structure of the dialectical development, Hegel claims that there is an identity of method and content in the logical dialectic (E.L. 1; Enz. 11). The function of the dialectical method is to guide us in the dialectical development. Since the structure of the dialectical development arises from the content itself and is not imposed upon the content from the outside, consciousness must develop the dialectic by discovering the dialectical structure implicit in this content. Because it is the content which reveals the structure of the dialectical development, it is this content which guides us in the dialectical development and hence performs the
function of the method. For this reason, method and content in the logic are indistinguishable.

This is self-evident simply from the fact that it [the method] is not something distinct from its object and content; for it is the inwardness of the content, the dialectic which it possesses within itself, which is the mainspring of its advance. (S.L. 54; W.L. 50)

If one interpreted the dialectical method as an external method, Hegel’s claim that the method is identical with its content would make no sense. An external method is as its name says, external to its content, and, as a result, it must be distinct from its content. In contrast, I have shown that Hegel’s comment does make sense if we interpret his method as one of immanent criticism and development.

3. As we can see from my exposition, Hegel’s dialectical method is quite different from most regular methods. Unlike ordinary methods in which the necessary procedure which one must follow is clearly defined, the dialectical method, as I have interpreted it, requires a completely open mind and a willingness to allow one’s subject matter to guide one’s investigation. Stephen Houlgate draws a close parallel between the attitude of the person engaging in the dialectic and the religious attitude.\(^{32}\) Saint Luke tells us ‘whosoever shall seek to save his life shall lose it; and whosoever shall lose his life shall preserve it’ (Luke 17: 33).\(^{33}\) Similarly, in Hegel’s dialectical method we must let go of everything that we previously held to be true and abandon ourselves to the subject matter in order to reach the truth. In one sense, the dialectical method demands of us the easiest of tasks, because it involves the exposition of the most basic concepts which underlie all forms of human knowing and are, therefore, most familiar to us. For the same reason, however, the dialectical method demands of us the most difficult of tasks because we most often take for granted that which is most familiar to us. Hence, philosophy’s requirement that we think these thought determinations as they are in themselves, free from presuppositions, makes the pursuit of truth “the hardest road to travel” (E.L. 4; Enz. 14) and requires “the bitter labour of the spirit” (E.L. §19A1). Hegel himself makes his


\(^{33}\) Ibid.
own comparison between philosophy and religion when he indicates that philosophy involves the rigours of a religious life:

And when we want to discuss and pass judgements about philosophy in a religious perspective, more is required than our just being quite accustomed to the language of the consciousness of our day. The foundation of scientific cognition is the inner basic import, the idea that dwells in it, and the vitality of that idea which is stirring in the spirit; just as religion involves no less a thoroughly disciplined heart and mind, a spirit awakened to awareness, and a fully formed import. (E.L. 11; Enz. 24)

We see, therefore, that the dialectical method for Hegel is not an easy method to follow, just as one would expect from a method which lacked an external, pre-determined structure.

The interpretation of the dialectical method as one of immanent criticism and development manages to overcome the difficulties of the two previous interpretations which I examined. On the one hand, I have shown that Kaufmann’s interpretation of the dialectical method is incorrect because it claims that there is no dialectical method. In the account which I have defended, the dialectical development does indeed involve a clear, rigorous method, even though this method, as I have shown, is very different from an ordinary method. On the other hand, I claimed that Forster’s interpretation was mistaken because it views the dialectical method as external in spite of what Hegel says to the contrary. In my account the method is not external since according to it the content of the method generates the form of the dialectical development.

I believe that my interpretation of the dialectical method is also more desirable than the other two interpretations because it presents Hegel’s position on the dialectical method and its function within the system as a coherent one. In other words, it does not view Hegel’s position as involving some form of inherent self-contradiction. In my account, unlike Kaufmann’s, Hegel is not deceiving himself when he claims to employ a dialectical method, nor does Hegel fail according to my interpretation to use his own method properly, as Forster alleges he does, in places where the dialectic does not follow the model of the triadic formula. Hegel seeks to develop a philosophy free from presuppositions and he establishes a method which he feels is suited for this purpose.
Can Hegel use his dialectical method to successfully demonstrate what he claims to demonstrate? Is the dialectical development present in his logic correct? These are other complicated questions, which my interpretation does not address. However, the interpretation of the dialectical method as one of immanent criticism and development succeeds, at least, in making sense of Hegel’s approach in the logic. It does justice to Hegel’s project by taking into account Hegel’s various claims about the dialectical method and the logical development in general.

2D. Criticisms of the Interpretation of the Dialectical Method as One of Immanent Criticism and Development

Before I consider the necessity of the dialectic in the third chapter of my thesis, I will first respond to two possible criticisms of the interpretation of the dialectical method which I have defended. In the introduction to the Greater Logic, Hegel writes the following:

All that is necessary to achieve simple scientific progress -- and is essential to strive to gain this quite simple insight -- is the recognition of the logical principle that the negative is just as much positive, or that what is self-contradictory does not resolve itself into a nullity, into abstract nothingness, but essentially only into the negation of its particular content, in other words, that such a negation is not all and every negation but the negation of a specific subject matter which resolves itself, and consequently is a specific negation, and therefore the result essentially contains that from which it results; which strictly speaking is a tautology, for otherwise it would be an immediacy, not a result. Because the result, the negation is a specific negation it has a content. It is a fresh Concept but higher and richer than its predecessor; for it is richer by the negation or opposite of the latter, therefore contains it, but also something more, and is the unity of itself and its opposite. It is in this way that the system of concepts as such has to be formed -- and has to be complete itself in a purely continuous course in which nothing extraneous is introduced. (S.L. 54; W.L. 59)

In this quote Hegel seems to explicitly presuppose that a person developing the dialectic must recognize that a content which contradicts itself does not become empty of content. Rather, she must realize that the process of dialectical negation in turn produces something positive. If it is indeed the case that in Hegel’s view one must presuppose this
claim before engaging in the logical dialectic, then it would appear that my interpretation of the dialectical method is inconsistent with Hegel’s conception of it. For according to my interpretation Hegel is trying to avoid all presuppositions in his dialectical method.

In his book *Hegel’s Dialectic and its Criticism* Michael Rosen draws upon this quote as evidence against an interpretation of the dialectical method as immanent criticism and development. According to Rosen, Hegel in this quote is telling us that, if one is to develop the dialectic properly, one must presuppose that negation leaves a positive remainder. Contrary to what Hegel states, Rosen argues that the truth of Hegel’s presupposition, which Rosen refers to as the doctrine of determinate negation, is not self-evident. He breaks down Hegel’s doctrine of determinate negation into two statements:

1. negation is not all negation but the negation of a determinate matter which dissolves
2. that from which it results is essentially contained in the result

Rosen claims that statement #2 in the doctrine of determinate negation does not follow from statement #1. By appealing to a principle like the law of conservation of mass, one could perhaps argue that statement #1 entails statement #2 in the case of the negation of a material substance. However, Rosen points out that there are cases in which negation is not a physical negation of this kind and in which the result in no way contains that which was negated. For example, when one unravels the knot in a piece of string, the knot completely disappears or is completely negated. Therefore, Hegel cannot just assume that negation in the dialectic leaves a positive remainder but he must justify this claim in some manner. According to the interpretation of the dialectical method as immanent criticism and development, Hegel relies upon the process of immanent criticism to justify any philosophical claim. But in this particular case, Hegel cannot rely upon immanent criticism to justify this fundamental presupposition of immanent criticism because this would be viciously circular. Hegel does not attempt to justify the

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34 Rosen refers to this method as the method of immanent critique but to avoid confusion I will continue to refer to it as I have thus far.
36 Ibid. 32.
37 Ibid. 33.
38 Ibid. 33, 34.
principle of determinate negation in this manner, nor does he do so in any other manner. Rosen sees this as a stumbling block for the interpretation of the dialectical method as one of immanent criticism and development\(^{39}\), because Hegel appears to contradict this interpretation by founding his method on a presupposition.\(^{40}\)

In response Houlgate argues that Rosen has not paid sufficient attention to what Hegel really says in this long quote dealing with the doctrine of determinate negation. Hegel does not claim that negation leaves a positive result in all cases but only that it leaves a positive result when a content contradicts itself.\(^{41}\) Houlgate believes that this more modest claim on Hegel’s part is justifiable.\(^{42}\) The process of self-contradiction does not lead to the annihilation of the content which contradicts itself but rather to its redefinition, because “this self-contradiction reveals the inherent logical complexity of the category which the initial, finite determination concealed.”\(^{43}\)

I believe that Houlgate’s argument against Rosen is sound to the extent that the principle of determinate negation can be justified in the manner which Houlgate has done. However, the quote in question from the introduction of the *Science of Logic* still poses potential problems for us. According to the view of the dialectical method as one of immanent criticism and development, Hegel tries even to avoid making presuppositions which are apparently self-evident. We see this, for example, when Hegel distances himself from formal logic which takes the laws of logical deduction for granted. At the outset of the dialectical development, Hegel refuses even to assume the truth of the laws of identity and non-contradiction\(^{44}\), laws which most people would claim are self-evident. Therefore, even if the principle of determinate negation were apparently self-evident, as an explicit presupposition made by Hegel it would still count

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\(^{39}\) ibid. 51.

\(^{40}\) Rosen also argues that the interpretation of the dialectical method as one of immanent criticism and development is incorrect since it cannot account for the *ex aude* character of the dialectic development. I do not consider this objection here because Houlgate responds to it nicely in his article and because it results from a misunderstanding of the nature of the dialectical method as one of immanent criticism and development.


\(^{42}\) ibid. 217.

\(^{43}\) ibid.

\(^{44}\) Stephen Houlgate, *Freedom, Truth and History*, 55, 56.
as evidence against the interpretation of the dialectical method as one of immanent criticism and development.

Is the principle of determinate negation a necessary presupposition of Hegel's dialectical method? I do not think so. First, it is important to note that one need not presuppose knowledge of this principle in order for one to develop the dialectic in a proper manner. On the contrary, I believe that the principle of determinate negation is justified in the process of developing the dialectic. When consciousness attends to the dialectical development closely, it sees that our finite concepts contradict themselves. However, it also sees that this contradiction resolves itself in another determinate concept. In this way Hegel tells us that the dialectical development itself demonstrates to consciousness the truth of the principle of determinate negation. As a result, consciousness is not required to presuppose it in order to engage in the dialectic.

I believe in fact that in the quote in which he presents the principle of determinate negation Hegel is once again making a preliminary comment about the dialectical development of the logic. He does this in order to prepare the reader for what is to follow in the logical development itself. We must bear in mind Hegel’s claim at the outset of the chapter in which the quote dealing with determinate negation appears.

Consequently, what is premised in this Introduction is not intended, as it were, to establish the Concept of logic or to justify its method scientifically in advance, but rather by the aid of some reasoned and historical explanations and reflections to make more accessible to ordinary thinking the point of view from which this science is to be considered. (S.L. 43; W.L. 35-36)

In the quote on determinate negation Hegel is telling the reader that she should not stop at the negative dialectical result, if she wishes “to achieve scientific progress”. Rather, she must recognize that the negative is also positive, a recognition which, given the benefit of hindsight, Hegel can say the reader will achieve if she continues to attend closely to the subject matter. In essence I believe that in this quote Hegel is trying to help the reader to keep her mind open to the course of the dialectic, once the dialectical development has begun.

Dialectic does not therefore dogmatically presuppose a questionable doctrine about negation as ROSEN claims; rather it demands that when consciousness is
confronted with its inherent contradictions it will not block the implied redefinition of its terms.\textsuperscript{45}

If it is the case, as I have argued, that Hegel does not presuppose the principle of determinate negation prior to the dialectical development, then Hegel's claims in this instance do not contradict the interpretation of the dialectical method as a method of immanent criticism and development.

Hegel's comments on the nature of the dialectical method at the very end of the \textit{Science of Logic} also seem to challenge my interpretation of the dialectical method. In this chapter on the absolute Idea, Hegel appears to claim that the dialectical method follows the structure of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.\textsuperscript{46} In his discussion of the determinations of the method, Hegel first examines the beginning of the method, just as he does in the same chapter in the \textit{Encyclopedia Logic}. This beginning, which is immediate and universal, is pure being (S.L. 828; W.L.II 553-554). As we have seen, the beginning "shows itself to be the other of itself" (S.L. 833-834; W.L.II 561). With this, Hegel says, judgement and difference first arise and the dialectical progression is underway. By contradicting itself, the original immediate determination leads to a second determination which is the negative of the first and is mediated by the first (S.L. 834; W.L.II 561). However, in the dialectical development this second determination also mediates the third determination (S.L. 834; W.L.II 562), the negative of the negative, which by sublating the contradiction of the previous two opposing determinations, overcomes them while preserving them within itself. Hegel indicates later that the negative of the negative, or the third term, is itself an immediate like the first term, but unlike the first term, this immediate contains mediation within itself (S.L. 837; W.L.II

\textsuperscript{45} Stephen Houlgate, "Some Notes on "Hegel's Dialectic and its Criticism"", 218.

\textsuperscript{46} There are other spots in Hegel's texts where he breaks up the dialectical method into three parts but nowhere does he attribute the general structure of thesis, antithesis and synthesis to the dialectical method as clearly as he does in the last chapter of the \textit{Science of Logic}. In the section on the absolute Idea in the \textit{Encyclopedia Logic}, for example, Hegel divides the method into (1) the beginning or pure being, (2) the development, which includes all the intermediate stages of the dialectical progression, and (3) the end or the realized Concept. Here he does not discuss anything resembling the structure of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. In the "More Precise Conception and Division of the Logic" Hegel examines the three sides or moments of the logical. Though these three moments certainly seem to correspond to the three terms of the thesis, antithesis and synthesis structure, nowhere does Hegel indicate that the three sides of the logical are the logical terms of the dialectical method. This method is not even mentioned anywhere in the original chapter i.e. if one excludes the \textit{Zusätze}.
From here the dialectical advancement continues. "On the new foundation constituted by the result as the fresh subject matter, the method remains the same as with the previous subject matter." (S.L. 838; W.L.II 566-567). Since the method, as he has described it thus far, involves the transition from the immediate to its negative and from the negative to the negative of the negative, it would appear from this quote that the dialectical development succeeding this triad also follows this pattern.

According to the interpretation of the dialectical method as one of immanent criticism and development, the dialectical method does not involve the application of an external structure to the content of the dialectic. Yet in his discussion of the dialectical method in this chapter on the absolute Idea, Hegel seems to indicate, as I have shown, that the dialectical method does involve a fixed, triadic structure along the lines of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Granted, Hegel does indicate that it is not in itself important that the dialectical method have exactly three sides. The number three itself has no special value for Hegel, and, depending upon how one views the dialectic, one could also interpret the method as a quadruplicity (S.L. 836; W.L.II 564). Nevertheless, Hegel shows clearly that for him the triplicity is "the shape of the rational" (S.L. 837; W.L.II 565). If Hegel does indeed attribute a fixed, triadic structure to the method, it would seem that the interpretation of the dialectical method which I have defended is not consistent with the method as Hegel describes in the logic.

In responding to this argument against my interpretation of the dialectical method, one need not necessarily concede, given the evidence at the end of the *Science of Logic*, that the whole dialectical development for Hegel follows the triadic formula. When Hegel claims that in the new development "the method remains the same as with the previous subject matter", he could mean simply that the dialectical method requires that the individual developing the dialectic continue to attend to the subject matter of the dialectic itself.⁴⁷ Yet, even if Hegel does claim that the dialectical development involves

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⁴⁷ From Hegel's discussion in this chapter, it is not entirely clear to what extent he thinks that the dialectical development involves the triadic structure. As Forster and Kaufmann point out, there are places in the dialectical development which do not seem to follow the model of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. If, according to one's interpretation, Hegel does indeed claim that the dialectic consists entirely of the transition from the immediate to the negative to the negative of the negative, which sublates the previous two determinations, then one would have to account in some way for the places where the method does not seem
the traditional triadic structure in all cases, I believe that this does not contradict the interpretation of the dialectical method as one of immanent criticism and development. At the beginning of this chapter, I make a distinction between the point of view of the consciousness which is in the process of developing the dialectic and that of the consciousness that has reached the end of the dialectical development. As I stated, from the former point of view the dialectic is in itself the self-unfolding of the Concept while from the latter point of view it is for itself as such. One could argue similarly that, from the perspective of thought developing the dialectic, the dialectical method only implicitly involves the triadic structure, while thought at the end of the dialectic, by looking over the whole dialectical progression, is able to see for itself that the method is triadic in form. This would explain why Hegel waits until the end of the logic to discuss the structure or the determinations of the dialectical method, since it is only then that the structure can become apparent. Because Hegel draws his conclusions at the end of the dialectical development, he need not and, I believe, does not presuppose a structure when he is actually employing the method to develop the dialectic. Even though from the very beginning the dialectical development may in itself follow the triadic form, the finite consciousness engaging in the dialectic does not know this, and it cannot assume that the development involves this structure. Since Hegel's claims at the end of the Science of Logic do not entail that the actual employment of the method presupposes a dialectical structure, these comments are not inconsistent with my interpretation of the dialectical method. When finite consciousness develops the dialectic by the method of immanent criticism and development, it is entirely possible that this development will conform to the triadic structure.

It is important to note that even as Hegel is discussing the structure of the dialectical method in this last chapter of the Science of Logic, he continues to emphasize that this structure cannot be presupposed in any way but must result from the content of the dialectic itself. For example, he tells us that the negative of the negative, in which one sublates the contradiction between the immediate and its negative, is, like the

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to follow this structure. In any case, as I show, it is not important to determine Hegel's exact point of view on this issue in order to defend my interpretation of the dialectical method.
transition to the first contradiction, not "an act of external reflection" (S.L. 835; W.L.II 563). Similarly, Hegel condemns the merely external application of the triadic structure when he writes:

Formalism has, it is true, also taken possession of triplicity and adhered to its empty schema; the shallow ineptitude and barrenness of modern philosophic construction so-called, that consists in nothing but fastening this schema on to everything without Concept and immanent determination and employs it for an external arrangement, has made the said form tedious and given it a bad name. (S.L. 837; W.L.II 565)

This evidence indicates that in the last chapter of the Science of Logic Hegel does not present the dialectical method as an external method with a fixed structure.

2E. Fulfilling the Functions of the Logic

In my first chapter we saw that the logic, as a science of thought, attempts to accomplish three objectives. First, the logic re-examines the meaning of our fundamental concepts closely; second, it shows that our concepts do not have meaning on their own but only as a part of the whole to which they belong; and, third, it demonstrates the necessity of its logical content. Having investigated the nature of the dialectical method in some detail, we are in a position to consider how Hegel accomplishes these first two objectives in the logic.

If we are to investigate the true meaning of our fundamental concepts, we must avoid taking the meaning of these concepts for granted. We cannot simply assume that the concepts which we are investigating have the meaning which has been traditionally attributed to them. Rather, we must reject any such pre-conceived ideas and examine these concepts as they present themselves to us. But, as we have seen in this chapter, Hegel's dialectical method involves exactly what I have just described. In the logic one employs the dialectical method by avoiding all presuppositions related to the concepts one is investigating and by attending to these concepts as they are in themselves. Thus, Hegel accomplishes the first of his three logical tasks simply by following the principles of the dialectical method.
In the same way, Hegel also demonstrates that the meanings of our concepts cannot be completely separate from the meanings of our other concepts. At each stage in the logical development, we try to think the concept presented to us as it is in itself. If we are applying the dialectical method properly, we do not presuppose that this concept is related to other concepts in any way. However, we find that each finite concept which we are considering on its own is grounded in another concept. In this way we discover by means of the dialectical method that the concept which we are considering cannot be thought apart from this other concept. Its meaning cannot be isolated but is intimately related to the concept which succeeds it in the dialectical development. Likewise, since the concept we are examining has arisen from a previous concept and contains the previous concept sublated within itself, this previous concept is a part of the meaning of the concept that we are considering. Again, therefore, we see by means of the dialectical method that the finite concept presupposes an other. For if the meaning of the previous concept is a part of the meaning of the concept we are considering, we must think the former in order to think the latter.

But if, on the one hand, the dialectical method demonstrates that the meanings of our concepts are not completely distinct from each other, that they lack substance when viewed as being exclusive of other concepts, this method also allows us to discover that these concepts have their substantiality within the whole of the Concept. The dialectical development in the logic ends with the fulfilled Concept as the absolute Idea. All the intermediary stages within the dialectical development are sublated by the absolute Idea and are contained within it as its content. Since the absolute Idea is the last stage of the logical development, its content is the whole logical development. It is the totality of the Concept. In addition, because the logical development does not continue beyond the absolute Idea, the absolute Idea, unlike the previous logical stages, is not grounded in a more concrete concept. Hence, there is no other concept beyond the absolute Idea that must be thought in order to think the absolute Idea. The absolute Idea, with the total content of the logic sublated within itself, stands on its own. Unlike all the previous finite concepts, it has substantiality. When the finite concepts of the logic are viewed not as mutually exclusive individuals but as a part of the content of the self-standing whole,
these concepts share in the substantiality of the whole or the Concept. But these concepts are only a part of the whole or the fulfilled Concept in so far as they are a part of the dialectical development leading to the fulfilled Concept; and the immanent development is only possible because it follows the principles of the dialectical method as a method of immanent development and criticism. It is the dialectical method which demonstrates the inter-relatedness of our concepts and, in so doing, binds them together to form the whole.

We will discover that the dialectical method also allows Hegel to demonstrate the necessity of his logical subject matter, but I am jumping ahead of myself. For we have yet to figure out what the necessity of the logic means for Hegel. Let us now consider this question.
Chapter 3: The Necessity of the Logic

3A. Tackling the Problem of Necessity in the Logic

If the nature of Hegel’s dialectical method is obscure, as I have claimed at the outset of my second chapter, the nature of dialectical necessity is perhaps even more obscure. Hegel tells us clearly in the logic that its content and its dialectical development are necessary but he offers no sustained, explicit, definitive explanation of this necessity. We find only a brief comment here or there which sheds some direct light on the issue. Because Hegel leaves us little to work with, it is difficult for us to develop an accurate account of logical necessity. The various scholars who have tried to explain dialectical necessity in recent years have presented a whole range of views on the issue. Yet it is undoubtedly important that logical necessity be understood. As I have indicated in my first chapter, philosophy for Hegel sets itself apart from the empirical sciences by demonstrating the necessity of its subject matter. Hegel believes that this task is an essential requirement for philosophy. Thus Hegel scholars seem trapped in this instance between a rock and a hard place. Either they must attempt to piece together an interpretation of dialectical necessity with the limited resources that they have available or they must avoid the issue altogether and, in so doing, leave an important facet of Hegel’s philosophical project unexplained.

Despite the difficulties, I will attempt in this chapter to explain the necessity of Hegel’s logic. If I am to do this adequately, I must perform two tasks in my interpretation. First, I must determine exactly what necessity means for Hegel or, to put it more accurately, the form which necessity takes for Hegel. As with so many other of Hegel’s terms like reason, Idea, Concept, infinity, etc., one cannot take Hegel’s view of necessity for granted by assuming that Hegel understands necessity in the ordinary way. As Hegel maintains, the true meaning or form of our concepts must reveal themselves in the course of the logic itself and this is where we must look to determine the true form of necessity. We shall see that Hegel’s interpretation of necessity is very different in certain ways from what we ordinarily conceive of as the necessary. Second, I must show that the form of necessity which reveals itself in the logic is the form of necessity which Hegel
associates with the dialectical development as a whole (if this is indeed the case) and I must illustrate how the dialectical development is necessary in this way.

Before we consider how I may accomplish these tasks, we must first examine our various, available resources. First, Hegel provides us with a few preliminary comments on the necessity of the dialectical development, comments which are to be found for the most part in the prefaces and introductions of the greater and lesser Logic. The advantage of these comments is that they treat the question of logical or dialectical necessity directly. The disadvantage of these comments, as I have alluded to already, is that they are not detailed enough to ground an interpretation of logical necessity on their own. Second, there are the various sections throughout the logic in which Hegel discusses the necessary in some form or another: sections like the chapter on actuality in which Hegel investigates three different types of necessity, the sections on the judgement of necessity and the syllogism of necessity, as well as the section on synthetic cognition towards the end of the Logic. These sections, especially the chapter on actuality, offer detailed discussions of necessity and help us to understand what necessity means for Hegel. However, Hegel does not tell us explicitly that the necessity of which he speaks in these sections is equivalent to the necessity of the logical development. Third, there are places throughout the logic where Hegel claims that a particular transition in the logical development is necessary. This evidence is not very helpful for the most part because Hegel generally does not explain this necessity any further. In these instances we have no way of knowing anything about the type of necessity which Hegel has in mind.

Given these resources, how may I go about developing an interpretation of logical necessity? If, on the one hand, Hegel’s preliminary comments from the prefaces and introductions are too meagre by themselves to support an adequate interpretation of logical necessity, they can provide at least an initial interpretation. By considering these comments closely at the outset of my investigation, I will formulate a tentative interpretation of logical necessity. Since this tentative interpretation is by itself inadequate, I must try to understand logical necessity in some other way. To do this, I believe we must examine Hegel’s discussion of necessity in the section on actuality, as
well as the transition from this necessity to the Concept. This will allow me to accomplish the first task of my investigation by showing what necessity means for Hegel, since it is in the section on actuality that Hegel analyzes the category of necessity itself and determines its true form. I will also be able to accomplish my second task by showing indirectly that the true form of necessity from the chapter on actuality is the same type of necessity that governs the content of the logic. In my argument I will try to prove that "absolute necessity" from the section on actuality is immanent in the freedom of the Concept and that this form of necessity is, therefore, essentially the same as the necessity of the Concept. Since the development of the Concept is synonymous with the dialectical development in the logic, I can conclude that the necessity of the logical dialectic is a form of absolute necessity.

For the reasons I have given, most of my analysis in this chapter will deal with Hegel's discussion of necessity in the section on actuality and with the relation of this necessity to the Concept. However, since Hegel also makes relevant comments on logical necessity throughout both Logics, I will try whenever it is expedient to draw upon these comments in support of my argument.

3B. A Preliminary Interpretation of Dialectical Necessity

In the previous chapter I presented and argued against two very different interpretations of the dialectical method. Defenders of the first interpretation claim that the dialectical method involves the application of a fixed, external procedure to the subject matter of the dialectic; while defenders of the second interpretation claim that, in spite of what Hegel may say, his philosophical development involves no true method. I also showed that each interpretation of the dialectical method entailed a particular interpretation of dialectical necessity. Since I have refuted the views upon which each of these interpretations of dialectical necessity are founded, I am now able to respond to these two interpretations of dialectical necessity as well.

First, contrary to Forster's view, Hegel's dialectical development is not necessary because it follows certain pre-determined rules or a certain external structure, since the dialectical method, which ensures the necessity of the development, does not involve
such rules or such a structure. In this way, the necessity of Hegel's project is not like that of traditional logic. As we have seen already, traditional logic deals with the formal structure of correct argumentation. An argument is necessary in traditional logic if and only if it is consistent with certain basic, pre-determined laws of valid thinking. When one generates an argument with a necessary conclusion or when one evaluates an argument to see if its conclusion is necessary, one applies these laws irrespective of the particular content of one's subject matter. As a result, one employs an external method in traditional logic to determine whether the conclusion of an argument is necessary. Since Hegel's method is not external but requires that one proceed by attending to the subject matter of the dialectic itself, one cannot say that Hegel's logical development is necessary by virtue of its conformity to certain fundamental principles like those we find in traditional logic.

Second, since I have demonstrated that the dialectical development does involve a method, Kaufmann is no longer justified in claiming that Hegel's philosophy lacks necessity on the grounds that the dialectical development is without a method. However, Kaufmann's conclusion could still be correct. The dialectical method as I have interpreted it might not lead in any way to a necessary dialectical development. In this chapter I will try to demonstrate that Kaufmann's conclusion is wrong by showing how the dialectical development in the logic is in fact necessary.

A good place to begin our investigation of logical necessity is with Hegel's preliminary remarks on this subject in both versions of the logic. In several of these remarks Hegel equates the necessary dialectical development in the logic with an immanent dialectical development. In the second preface to the Science of Logic Hegel writes: "To exhibit the realm of thought philosophically, that is, in its own immanent activity or what is the same, in its necessary development, had therefore to be a fresh undertaking, one that had to be started right from the beginning;"(S.L. 31; W.L. 19; italics added). In the italicized portion of the quote Hegel states clearly that the necessary development of thought, which is demonstrated in the logic, is an immanent development. Later in this preface Hegel writes:
No subject matter is so absolutely capable of being expounded with a strictly immanent plasticity as is thought in its own necessary development; no other brings with it this demand in such a degree; . . . Such an exposition would demand that at no stage of the development should any thought-determination or reflection occur which does not immediately emerge at this stage and that has not entered this stage from the one preceding it — (S.L. 40; W.L. 30-31)

The exposition of thought in its necessary development requires that each new stage of thought develop entirely from the stage which precedes it. This development cannot be influenced in any way by external views, i.e., views which do not reveal their own truth in the dialectical development itself. We see again, therefore, that the dialectical development is necessary in so far as it is an immanent development. In his discussion of pure being and pure nothing in the Encyclopedia Logic Hegel also states:

All that really matters here is consciousness about these beginnings: that they are nothing but these empty abstractions, and that each of them is as empty as the other; the drive to find in being or in both [being and nothing] a stable meaning is this very necessity, which leads being and nothing further along and endows them with a true, i.e., concrete meaning. This progression is the logical exposition and course [of thought] that presents itself in what follows. The thinking them over that finds deeper determinations for them is the logical thinking by which these determinations produce themselves, not in a contingent but in a necessary way. (E.L. §87R)

Hegel indicates that the logical exposition is necessary if one thinks its determinations over and allows them to develop of themselves. This is just another way of saying that the necessary dialectical development must proceed immanently.

This explanation of dialectical necessity accords well with my interpretation of the dialectical method. In my interpretation the dialectical method, when followed correctly, leads to the immanent development of the dialectical content. But a necessary dialectical development is also one in which the dialectical content develops immanently. Thus, if one follows the dialectical method correctly, the development for Hegel will be necessary. This is what one would expect.

But, one may ask, why is an immanent development in the logic a necessary development? In an immanent development from dialectical stage X to dialectical stage Y, one develops stage Y from stage X simply by considering stage X as it is in itself. Since one does not make any external assumptions about stage X in this immanent
development, the sufficient condition for the immanent development from stage X to
stage Y is nothing more than stage X itself: if one thinks stage X in its truth, then one
must also think stage Y. If the sufficient condition for the immanent development of
stage Y is stage X, then stage Y follows necessarily from stage X. Thus, the immanent
development of the logical dialectic is necessary for Hegel because each stage of the
immanent development constitutes the sufficient condition for the stage which succeeds
it.

However, as we have seen, the logical development is not only a progression from
the immediacy of pure being to the most concrete logical form, the absolute Idea. It is
also a retreat towards the absolute Idea as the ultimate ground of pure being and the
logical in general. In each transition from stage X to stage Y we see that stage X cannot
be thought on its own but must ultimately be thought in conjunction with stage Y; we see
that we can think stage X in its truth only if we also think stage Y. In this way, thinking
stage Y is the necessary condition of thinking stage X. The immanent dialectical
development is necessary not only because it advances necessarily from the abstract to
the complex. It is also necessary because it involves a necessary retreat from pure being
to its ultimate ground, the absolute Idea, a retreat in which each stage is the necessary
condition for the stage which precedes it.

3C. Hegel’s Discussion of Necessity in the Chapter on Actuality

Having formed a preliminary interpretation of dialectical necessity, let us now
examine Hegel’s discussion of necessity in the chapter on actuality. I propose to consider
two different forms of necessity which Hegel presents in the Science of Logic: “real
necessity” and “absolute necessity”. As we shall see, necessity in its true shape is
different from traditional conceptions of necessity.

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1 The section on actuality in the Science of Logic and its counterpart in the Encyclopedia Logic are in
certain ways different from one another. Most significantly the discussion of actuality in the E.L does not
deal with the Absolute at all, a topic which occupies the whole first chapter of the section on actuality in the
S.L. In addition, the section on actuality in the E.L leaves out much of the detail included in the S.L. In the
E.L., for example, Hegel does not go into the various types of actuality, possibility and causality. Only in
the case of necessity does Hegel discuss more than one type, but even here the distinction is neither named
clearly nor indicated clearly. However, despite these differences, Hegel’s presentation of the dialectical
In order to comprehend real necessity properly, we must begin our investigation a bit earlier in the dialectical development with real actuality. Real actuality is "the existent world" (S.L. 546; W.L.II 208); it is the whole of actuality in a particular, determinate state. Real actuality is not just an external manifestation like appearance but is the external which has its ground in itself and is the expression of this in-itself. The relationship in real actuality between the in-itself and its externality is one in which each side of real actuality relates to itself. "its externality is an inner relationship to itself alone" (S.L. 546; W.L.II 208). At the same time, real actuality has the power to act (S.L. 546; W.L.II 208) because its in-itself is that which has the potential to be externalized; it is possibility. The in-itself of real actuality is not simply an empty possibility. As the reflection into self of its own externality, it is a definite manifold or "the in-itself as pregnant with content" (S.L. 547; W.L.II 208). Unlike empty, formal possibility, in which everything is possible as long as it does not contradict itself, this possibility is the real development from necessity through to the Concept is the same in its essential features in both the S.L. and the E.L.

In my discussion of actuality and necessity in section 3C of my thesis, I rely primarily on the S.L. whereas in my discussion of the development from substance to the Concept in section 3D, I generally follow Hegel's presentation from the E.L. This approach requires justification. I chose to rely primarily on the S.L. in my examination of actuality and necessity because I felt that Hegel's presentation of necessity in the E.L. was too meagre in places. Since my argument requires a good understanding of what necessity means for Hegel, the minute detail of the S.L. was more suited to my purpose. In contrast, I found that Hegel's presentation in the E.L. of the development from substance to the Concept is clear and succinct. Since my argument only requires that I show in general terms how necessity leads to the Concept, Hegel's version of this development in the E.L. was sufficient for my purposes and easier to present than its counterpart in the S.L. However, as I have stated already, both the S.L. and the E.L. versions of the development from necessity to the Concept are essentially the same as each other. Where possible, I have supplemented my discussion of necessity and my discussion of the development from substance to the Concept with references from the E.L. and the S.L. respectively.

Hegel's discussion of real actuality is a good example of how Hegel can drive his interpreters stark, raving mad. Regarding real actuality Hegel writes: "Real actuality as such is in the first instance the thing of many properties, the existent world;" (S.L. 546; W.L.II 208). From this one cannot tell whether real actuality denotes only the particular individual object amongst other objects or whether it denotes all of determinate actuality. Here Hegel seems to affirm both of these mutually incompatible possibilities. On the one hand, Burbidge seems to accept the former possibility when he describes real actuality as "a contingent actual" or "a thing without any determinate properties" (1992: 44), while di Giovanni, on the other hand, seems to accept the latter possibility when he identifies real actuality with a "manifold of existents" (1993: 49). I interpret real actuality as the entire realm of manifold existents like di Giovanni, because I believe that this interpretation is more consistent with Hegel's discussion in the chapter on actuality. First, it allows us to explain why Hegel refers to real possibility as the "totality of conditions" (S.L. 547; W.L.II 209). For if real actuality were only a thing among things, it would be, as real possibility, only a condition, not the totality of conditions. Second, I believe that real actuality must be interpreted as "the existent world" if one is to make proper sense of absolute actuality in section C of this chapter.
possibility of another actuality. "The real possibility of something is therefore the existing multiplicity of circumstances which are connected with it" (S.L. 547; W.L.II 209). If, on the one hand, the in-itself and the externality of real actuality are identical in so far as they share the same content, on the other hand they are distinguished from each other in a different way. The external side of real actuality has immediate actuality while its in-itself, as real possibility, has the potential to become the immediately actual. For Hegel, real actuality is, first, an immediate existence and, second, the real possibility not of itself but of an other. As such, real actuality is the totality of conditions (S.L. 547; W.L.II 209). For a condition is, by its very nature, something which has an external existence but whose essence is only fulfilled in an other.

Something has a real possibility of becoming actual if and only if the totality of conditions which make its actualization possible are present. When all the conditions for a state of actuality are present, it becomes actual. In this process there is a transition involved, in so far as the possibility present in the conditions becomes actual. However, in a sense no transition is involved at all. For the content of the resulting actuality is none other than the content of the conditions from which this resulting actuality arose (S.L. 548; W.L.II 210). In this way, an identity is maintained between the totality of conditions and the new actuality. Possibility comes together with itself in its actualization and the duality of actuality and possibility is sublated.

But if the totality of conditions which make a result really possible are present, then that result not only can arise but must arise. For a particular result is a real possibility if and only if the conditions which make it actual are present. But if the conditions which make it actual are present, the result cannot remain a mere possibility; it becomes a necessity. With formal possibility something either may be the case or it may not be the case but a real possibility must come to pass (S.L. 549; W.L.II 211). This for Hegel is real necessity. Thus Hegel shows that there is only an apparent distinction between real possibility and real necessity by demonstrating that real possibility is, in truth, real necessity.

We can see that the result in real necessity is necessary by virtue of an other, namely, the totality of conditions which must be met if the result is to become actual.
Hegel’s real necessity has the same sort of structure as the traditional and much criticized notion of causal necessity (S.L. 570; W.L.II 238). An occurrence is never causally necessary on its own but always as the result of some external factor or set of factors which lead inevitably to that occurrence. Because these factors lead inevitably to the occurrence, one could argue that they contain this occurrence implicitly, as the conditions in real necessity contain their result implicitly.

However, if we consider real necessity closely, we see that it is ultimately relative (S.L. 549; W.L.II 211). In real necessity the necessity of the result is conditioned because the result is necessary only if the conditions for that result are present. However, as Hegel tells us, these conditions are themselves contingent (S.L. 549; W.L.II 211). Being finite and determinate, these conditions need not necessarily be present since they could have been otherwise. If the conditions in real necessity are contingent, the result which follows from these conditions will also be contingent. For if the result is only necessary given the presence of its conditions and if these conditions could have been otherwise, the result of real necessity could also have been otherwise.

One might argue that the conditions of real necessity need not be contingent, since they would be necessary if they themselves were ultimately conditioned by some necessary and self-evident principle. Hegel does not deal with this possibility but one could respond on Hegel’s behalf in the following manner. The conditions of real necessity could not be grounded in some other determinate principle which is necessary in itself, because such finite principles or conditions are not possible for Hegel. The finite, when taken on its own, is by its very nature contingent, since it is limited by its opposite. As Hegel tells us, that which is limited by its opposite is the contingent. “The contingent is an actual that at the same time is determined as merely possible, whose other or opposite equally is.”(S.L. 545; W.L.II 205). Because the finite is always defined in relation to an other, the possibility of the finite thing being actual is always accompanied by the possibility of it not being actual. Thus, the possibility of not being actual belongs inherently to the essence of finite things. If the finite thing always

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3 It should be stressed that real necessity is more general than causal necessity if one restricts the range of causal necessity to the domain of physical objects. Real necessity is present in all cases where the necessary is necessary by virtue of an other or others.
contains the possibility of not being actual along with the possibility of being actual, the
finite thing on its own can never be necessary in itself. As a result, the conditions in real
necessity cannot be grounded in some other determinate principle which is necessary in
itself.

There is, thus, a difference between what real necessity claims to be and what real
necessity is in truth. Although in real necessity a result is necessary if its conditions are
present, the result is not necessary tout court. Real necessity contradicts itself because it
is a necessity that is also contingent (S.L. 550; W.L.II 212). At the end of the section
Hegel gives an important general assessment of real necessity:

Thus in point of fact real necessity is in itself also contingency. This is manifest at
first in this manner: though the really necessary is a necessary as regards form, as
regards content it is limited, and through this has its contingency. (S.L. 550;
W.L.II 212)

Real necessity is necessary as regards form because, as we have seen, the content of its
conditions is identical with the content of its result. For this reason, real necessity has the
infinite form in which each side has itself in its other, while the two sides stand together
in a relationship of identity in distinction. Because real necessity possesses this form,
because the two sides share the same content, real necessity is necessary. For if the
content of the conditions is the same as the content of the result and if the conditions are
present, then the result is also necessarily present along with the conditions.\footnote{Hegel
then goes on to tell us that the form of real necessity is also contingent. “But
contingency is also contained in the form of real necessity; for, as we have seen, real
possibility is only in itself or in principle the necessary, but it is posited as the
otherness of actuality and possibility towards each other.” (S.L. 550;
W.L.II 212). As we will see at the end of Hegel’s discussion of absolute necessity, necessity is
blind. This is the case because necessity itself is not aware that the content of its manifold
parts is identical throughout. This awareness only first appears in the Concept when blind
necessity becomes freedom. However, even if the identity of its content in its various
parts is not for necessity, this identity, as Hegel tells us, is still present in itself or from
the perspective of us who are developing the dialectic. Therefore, real necessity in itself
is still necessary as regards form.} However, real necessity is limited as regards content because the content which is found identically
in both the condition and the result is a finite content. This finite content constitutes the
limit of real necessity. For, as we have seen, a finite determinate content is itself
contingent. Even though, given the conditions, the transition from the conditions to the
result is a necessary transition, there is no reason that this transition need take place,
since the contingent content which constitutes the condition of the transition need not exist. The result in real necessity therefore also need not exist; it is contingent.

We see from our discussion that the limited or finite content of real necessity makes real necessity contingent. Absolute necessity will show that it is the truth of real necessity by overcoming this deficiency of real necessity. For, as we will discover, the content of absolute necessity, unlike that of real necessity, is infinite because absolute necessity is a necessity of the whole. However, before Hegel’s dialectic moves to absolute necessity, it first reaches the stage of absolute actuality.

Absolute actuality arises from real necessity when real necessity is viewed as the unity of its two sides: the totality of conditions — the immediate actuality that is the real possibility of another — and the state of actuality which arises from this possibility.

For, as real necessity, it [necessity] is the sublatedness of actuality in possibility, and conversely; because it is the simple conversion of one of these moments into the other, it is also their positive unity, since each, as we saw, unites only with itself in the other. But as such it is actuality; an actuality, however, which only is as this simple coincidence of the form with itself. (S.L. 551; W.L.II 214)

Real actuality is the domain of all that is immediately actual, but it does not include the real possibility of the immediately actual as actualized. Absolute actuality, as the unity of real actuality and the actuality which arises from the real possibility of real actuality, includes not only the immediately actual but also all the forms of the actual which arise necessarily from this immediate actuality. Thus, absolute actuality embraces actuality in its entirety, whether it be the actuality which is immediately present or the actuality which is only implicit in the immediately present actuality. For even though real possibility is not immediately actual, it is still actual because, as real possibility, it must come to be actual; and if it must come to be actual, it is in a sense already actual.

Thus absolute actuality at this point is the mediated unity of real possibility and the result which arises from this real possibility. In so far as real possibility and its result are still distinct from one another, mediated absolute actuality still contains difference within itself. However, since the mediated form of absolute actuality involves the unity of its moments, the distinction between these moments is sublated and absolute actuality
presents itself as an immediacy.\footnote{Its [actuality's] negative positing of those moments is thereby itself the presupposing or positing of itself as sublated, or of immediacy.” (S.L. 551; W.L.II 214).} In addition to mediated absolute actuality, we now have another form or way of viewing absolute actuality. As immediate absolute actuality, it is an immediacy which embraces everything that is actual.

Since immediate absolute actuality sublates mediated absolute actuality, it overcomes mediated absolute actuality on the one hand and contains it within itself. On the other hand, immediate absolute actuality determines itself by this same act as the negative of mediated absolute actuality;\footnote{"But it is in this very act that this actuality is determined as a negative:” (S.L. 551; W.L.II 214).} mediated absolute actuality is the other from which immediate absolute actuality develops. But for this very reason, immediate absolute actuality and mediated absolute actuality share the same content and each unites with itself in its other.\footnote{"It [immediate actuality] is a union with itself out of the actuality that was real possibility, thus this new actuality develops only out of its in-itself, out of the negation of itself” (S.L. 551; W.L.II 214).} Because it arises from its other, immediate absolute actuality is only a possibility whose actualization requires its other, mediated absolute actuality.\footnote{"It [immediate actuality] is thus at the same time immediately determined as possibility, as mediated by its negation” (S.L. 551; W.L.II 214).} This possibility of immediate absolute actuality is the in-itself belonging to mediated absolute actuality. The latter is the real possibility of immediate absolute actuality: it is the in-itself or the possibility of immediate absolute actuality which also has an immediate existence as mediated actuality. As a real possibility which is this unity of the in-itself and immediate existence or of possibility and actuality, mediated absolute actuality is a positedness.\footnote{"But this possibility is, therefore, immediately nothing but this mediating, in which the in-itself, namely, the possibility itself and immediacy, both in the same manner, are positedness.” (S.L. 551; W.L.II 214).} Since mediated absolute actuality contains the possibility of immediate absolute actuality as its in-itself, and since this possibility which is a real possibility, must be fulfilled, the in-itself or possibility in mediated absolute actuality is also the necessity of sublating mediated absolute actuality by positing the possibility which this in-itself contains, immediate absolute actuality. But since this necessary result is mediated by and dependent upon mediated absolute actuality, immediate absolute actuality is the necessary which arises contingently.\footnote{"It is thus the necessity which is equally the sublating of this positedness or the positing of immediacy and the in-itself, and in this same act is a determining of this sublating as positedness. It is therefore necessity itself which determines itself as contingency --” (S.L. 551; W.L.II 214).}
Hegel then goes on to tell us that absolute necessity is "only this simple self-identity of being in its negation, or in essence" (S.L. 551; W.L.II 214).\textsuperscript{11} We have seen already that absolute actuality has two sides. On the one hand, immediate absolute actuality sublates mediated absolute actuality and we are left, therefore, simply with immediate absolute actuality. As a pure immediacy that embraces everything that is or is actual, immediate absolute actuality is pure being. On the other hand, when immediate absolute actuality sublates mediated absolute actuality, immediate absolute actuality also shows itself to be posited by mediated absolute actuality. Immediate absolute actuality has mediated absolute actuality as its other but as an other in which it finds itself. When taken in this way, absolute actuality is pure essence; it is an "inward mediation of itself with itself" (E.L. §112R). Since absolute actuality is both a pure immediacy or pure being and a mediated relationship of itself to itself or pure essence, these two sides of absolute actuality are identical with each other. In absolute necessity, which is the union of these two sides of absolute actuality, pure being is identical with its other, pure essence. "It [absolute necessity] is as much simple immediacy or pure being as simple reflection-into-self or pure essence; it is this, that these two are one and the same." (S.L. 552; W.L.II 215).

If we are to understand why absolute necessity is necessary, we must first recognize that absolute necessity is the totality. "This being [of absolute necessity] is substance; as the final unity of essence and being it is the being in all being;" (S.L. 555; W.L.II 219). The following claim also indicates that absolute necessity for Hegel is the totality. "Absolute necessity is not so much the necessary, still less a necessary, but necessity -- being, simply and solely as reflection." (S.L. 554; W.L.II 217). Absolute necessity is not the necessary or a necessary because both of these expressions imply that absolute necessity has limits. The range of absolute necessity can only have limits if it is opposed to an other. But if absolute necessity were opposed to an other, it would no longer be the totality. Thus, Hegel does not refer to absolute necessity as the necessary or a necessary in order to avoid contradicting his claim that absolute necessity is the totality.

\textsuperscript{11} Hegel confirms this on the next page: "It [absolute necessity] is, as we have found, that being which in its negation, in essence, is self-related and is being." (S.L. 552; W.L.II 215).
On the one hand, absolute necessity is pure being; it is simply that which is. As pure being, absolute necessity is necessary because it is the totality. As we have discussed, the finite is always limited by its other and, as a result, the possibility of a particular finite thing being the case is always opposed by the possibility of its other being the case. In every instance the other of the finite thing could have been the case instead of the finite thing itself. Therefore, the finite thing need not be the case; it is contingent. The totality, however, does not have an other opposed to it. For if it did, it would no longer be the totality. Because the totality has no other, there is no possibility that something other than the totality will come to be. As a result, there is no possibility of the totality being other than it is. Therefore, absolute necessity, as this totality of pure being, is not contingent but necessary. It is not necessary by virtue of an other, as is the case with real necessity, but on its own. “That which is simply necessary only is because it is; it has neither condition nor ground.” (S.L. 552; W.L.II 215).

On the other hand, absolute necessity is pure essence, since it is mediated within itself or “simple reflection-into-self” (S.L. 552; W.L.II 215). As pure essence, absolute necessity has an other but this other is only itself. Since this other is absolute necessity’s ground or condition, absolute necessity, as pure essence, is necessary by virtue of this other. But since this other is only itself, absolute necessity is necessary by virtue of itself. “it is, because it is” (S.L. 552; W.L.II 215).\(^{12}\)

The necessity of absolute necessity as pure essence resembles real necessity. In both real necessity and absolute necessity as pure essence, we see that a result is necessary because its content is identical with that of its conditions. When the conditions are present, the result is also necessarily present. We also saw that real necessity proves to be contingent or relative because the content of the conditions is limited and,

\(^{12}\) On the topic of absolute necessity Di Giovanni (1993) writes: “The move with which Hegel rids the logical process of its contingency is so simple that it runs the risk of going unnoticed. Hegel’s claim is simply this: Ultimately, reality needs nothing else but itself in order to account for its own presence.”(52). Although I agree with Di Giovanni on this point, I disagree with his suggestion that absolute necessity, as pure being, is contingent (53). As we have seen, I have argued that absolute necessity, as pure being, must be. Burbidge (1992) appears to agree with Di Giovanni: “It is completely contingent that there be anything at all. It could have been absolutely otherwise.”(48). Houlgate (1995), however, seems to agree with my position on this issue: “To say that being is absolute necessity is thus to say that there must be being as such and all that being involves; and it is to say that there must be being because it is the very nature of being to be”(46).
therefore, contingent. However, absolute necessity as pure essence is not relative in this way because the content of the condition in absolute necessity is no longer limited or finite. Absolute necessity as pure essence is the totality reflected into itself. Its condition is not an other, i.e. one other among many, but the other, the whole of that which is opposed to absolute necessity. But if the other of absolute necessity is nothing but itself, then absolute necessity has no genuine other at all. Absolute necessity and its condition are each themselves the totality and together constitute the totality. Since the condition of absolute necessity is the totality or possesses infinite content, this condition is not itself contingent. For as we have seen in our discussion of absolute necessity as pure being, the totality is necessary. Therefore, because the condition of absolute necessity is necessary in itself, absolute necessity as pure essence does not prove to be contingent or relative in the way that real necessity does. As pure essence, absolute necessity is necessary because it follows necessarily from a condition which is necessary in itself.\footnote{In this footnote I will try to show briefly that Hegel's conception of necessity in the \textit{Encyclopedia Logic} is the same as the one we have found in the \textit{Science of Logic}. In the \textit{Encyclopedia Logic} necessity arises as the circle of conditions and of actualities generated from these conditions. This circle is, first, the totality of content (E.L. §147); its content is the infinite content or the content of the whole. However, this circle is also the totality of form (E.L. §147) because the conditions have themselves in their actualities and vice-versa. For Hegel, necessity is this whole or totality of active conditions and actualities. It is "[developed actuality as the coincident [in Ein fällende] alternation of what is inner and what is outer, or the alternation of their opposed movements which are united into One movement" (E.L. §147). For Hegel this necessity can be viewed either as an external necessity or as a necessity in which the externality of its moments is sublated. Necessity is external when all the moments involved in necessity are viewed as independent of each other (E.L. §148). When the moments in necessity are viewed in this way, the form of necessity becomes finite or restricted. If the form of necessity is restricted, its content is also restricted (E.L. §148). For if all the moments involved in necessity are viewed as being independent of each other, they will no longer be viewed as sharing the same content either. Each moment will have its own restricted content. However, if the various moments involved in necessity are, in one way, independent of each other, the independence of these moments is also overcome in necessity. "As what is through an other, the necessary is not in and for itself, but is something that is merely posited. But this mediation is just as immediately the sublation of itself; the ground and the contingent condition is translated into immediacy, whereby that positedness is sublated into actuality, and the matter has gone together with itself." (E.L. §149). The necessary is only necessary because of the implicit identity of content between the conditions and the actualities arising from these conditions. If the various moments in necessity, which together form the totality, implicitly share an identity of content, necessity is also the One in which the distinctions of its content are no longer. "In this return into itself the necessary simply is, as unconditioned actuality." (E.L. §149; translation modified). In this way, we see that the necessary in the E.L. is ultimately the same as it is in the S.L.; it is the unconditioned totality which simply is. As such, one could say that it is being. But one could also say that it is essence. Like absolute necessity from the S.L., necessity in the E.L., as this immediate totality, is also mediated by the totality as a totality of independent actualities. The necessity in the E.L. is a necessity that is by virtue of an other, but by virtue of an other which is only itself. "The necessary is so, [because it is] mediated by a circle of circumstances: it is so, because the circumstances are so, and at the same time it is so without mediation — it is so, because it is." (E.L. §149).}
Hegel then shifts his discussion from absolute necessity as a whole to the differences within absolute necessity. Absolute necessity’s “differences do not have the shape of the determinations of reflection, but of a simply affirmative [seiende] multiplicity, a differentiated actuality which has the shape of others, self-subsistent relatively to one another.” (S.L. 552; W.L.II 215). On the one hand, these various sides, which stand in a relationship to each other of possibility and actuality, are independently of each other. Both as possibility and as actuality, these sides are “free actualities, neither of which is reflected in the other, nor will let any trace of the relation to the other show in it.” (S.L. 552; W.L.II 216). Hegel sees that the various sides within absolute actuality must be self-standing if absolute actuality is to be differentiated within itself.

In their self-based shape they are indifferent towards form, are a content, hence distinct actualities and a determinate content. This content is the mark impressed upon them by necessity -- which in its determination is absolute return-into-self -- when it let them go free as absolutely actual; (S.L. 553; W.L.II 216-217)

For if the sides, as parts within absolute actuality, were not self-standing in some way at least, there would be no different sides at all, only pure immediacy. At this point, the connection between these self-standing actualities is hidden; each stands on its own unrelated to the others. Each is what it is not because of an other but because it is what it is: each is “the necessary in its own self” (S.L. 552; W.L.II 216). Because there is no necessary relationship between these actualities at this point, there could be contact between these actualities but any such contact would be merely contingent (S.L. 553; W.L.II 216).

On the other hand, Hegel then goes on to discuss how these various actualities do not stand independently of each other but in a relation of absolute identity to each other. They are in truth only as a part of the totality of being. In so far as these various actualities are completely independent of each other, their relationship to one another is one of complete negativity. This relationship between the being of each actuality and the being of the other actualities is self-contradictory because it contradicts being as pure being, a being in which being is not separated from itself but in which all being is part of the whole of being. Thus, Hegel tells us, the negative breaks forth from this fragmented form of being in the form of pure being. Pure being is the negation of these completely
self-standing actualities since it demonstrates that they are not completely self-standing. Because we cannot fail to recognize that this being is also the being of these self-standing actualities, we see that what previously were taken to be independent actualities are in truth identical with each other as pure being. But in this identity, the distinction between them disappears and with this the actualities themselves disappear. Because the independent actualities perish within the identity of pure being, the manifold of actualities is, on the one hand, an illusory show on the part of being. In relation to the pure being from which it broke forth, the manifold is nothing. Nevertheless, since the manifold of actualities is the illusory showing of pure being, this illusory showing or reflection is identical with pure being. For substance is pure being which in its external reflection is united with itself.

Hegel tells us that in this relationship between being and its external reflection “contingency is absolute necessity” (S.L. 553; W.L.II 216). The external reflection, which is differentiated within itself, consists of a manifold of finite entities. Since each of these finite entities is contingent, each could have been other than it is. If each finite entity within the external reflection could have been other than it is, the external reflection, as the totality of all these finite entities, could also have been other than it is. Therefore, as an external reflection that is differentiated within itself, absolute necessity or substance is contingent. However, since this contingent, external reflection in its totality is identical with the totality of being, and since the totality of being is absolutely necessary, the contingent external reflection is also necessary. It is important to note that

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14 “The simplicity of their being and their self-support is absolute negativity; it is the freedom of their reflectionless [scheinlos] immediacy. This negative breaks forth in them because being, through this its essence, is self-contradiction, indeed [it breaks forth in them] against this being in the form of being, therefore as the negation of those actualities, which is absolutely different from their being, as their nothing, as a equally free otherness over against them as is their being.” (S.L. 553; W.L.II 216; translation modified).

15 “Yet it [the negative breaking forth] could not but be recognized in them. In their self-based shape they are indifferent towards form, are a content, hence distinct actualities and a determinate content. This content is the mark impressed upon them by necessity — which in its determination is absolute return-into-self — when it let them go free as absolutely actual; to this mark necessity appeals as witness to its claim, and, smitten by it, the actualities perish” (S.L. 553; W.L.II 216–217).

16 “the showing or reflection which breaks forth is, in that which simply affirmatively is, a becoming or transition of being into nothing.” (S.L. 553; W.L.II 217; translation modified).

17 “But conversely, being is equally essence; and becoming is reflection or a showing. Thus the outwardness is its inwardness, their relation is absolute identity;” (S.L. 553; W.L.II 217; translation modified).
it is not this or that finite thing or actuality on its own that is necessary but only the contingent manifold of external reflection as a whole, since it is only as a whole and not in its parts that the contingent manifold is identical with the totality of being.

With this Hegel ends his analysis of necessity in the *Science of Logic*. If we look closely over Hegel’s discussion of real necessity and absolute necessity, we see that the true form of necessity for Hegel is very different from our traditional conceptions of necessity. In real necessity a finite actuality, which is necessary merely by virtue of another finite actuality, is ultimately contingent. Thus, we do not find true necessity in this kind of relationship between finite entities. True necessity for Hegel is what one might call a necessity of the whole. Only the whole or the totality is without the possibility of an other. The finite can only be necessary therefore as a part of the whole.

3D. The Necessity of the Concept

Having completed our analysis of what necessity means for Hegel, we have good reason to suppose offhand that the necessity of the logical dialectic is the true shape of necessity, absolute necessity. As I discussed in my first chapter, Hegel maintains that we cannot take the meaning of our concepts for granted, but that we must discover their true form in the course of the logic. It makes sense, therefore, to assume that Hegel sees the necessity of the logic as a form of absolute necessity since we have discovered in the logic that this is what true necessity involves. However, we can show this with greater certainty if we can demonstrate that the necessity of the Concept is absolute necessity. To do this, we must consider the dialectical development which leads up to the Concept as well as Hegel’s discussion of the Concept itself. As I hope to show, the dialectical development from substance to the Concept simply makes explicit in the Concept what is implicit in absolute necessity or substance. If this is the case, the Concept has essentially the same structure or form as absolute necessity. I will argue that since absolute necessity is necessary by virtue of its particular structure and since it shares this structure with the Concept, the Concept, to the extent that it is necessary, is necessary in the same way that absolute necessity is necessary.
As we have seen, both real necessity and absolute necessity are necessary by virtue of an identity of content. In real necessity, the matter follows necessarily from the conditions because its content is identical with that of the conditions. Likewise, we only comprehend absolute necessity when we recognize the immediacy or simple identity of absolute actuality. The differentiated actualities contained within absolute necessity are only necessary in so far as they are a part of this simple identity. For Hegel both real necessity and absolute necessity are blind because their identity, which makes them necessary, is “something merely inner” (S.L. 581; W.L.II 251). In the section on real necessity, we who are following the dialectical development see that the totality of conditions and the matter which arises from these conditions share the same content and that this identical content makes the matter arise from these conditions in a necessary manner. However, at this point the identity is still hidden for necessity. On the surface, the conditions and the result in real necessity do not appear to possess the same content at all. Each is itself an independent actuality which is different from and opposed to the others.

Similarly, in absolute necessity we see that the necessary is the self-identical whole. However, absolute necessity as substance does not yet know itself as what it is in truth. As a result, it is blind; its inner identity has not yet been made explicit for itself. Absolute necessity at this stage is explicitly merely what it is on the surface. It is the manifold of external actuality beneath which its identity and its necessity are “concealed” (S.L. 552; W.L.II 216). Because absolute necessity does not yet know itself as absolute necessity, Hegel speaks in the future tense about these independent, external actualities revealing their essence or their absolute necessity. “But their essence will break forth in them and reveal what it is and what they are.” (S.L. 553; W.L.II 216). Thus, although in one sense this essence breaks forth in the present tense or at the stage of absolute necessity itself, since we who follow the dialectic recognize that this essence must break forth, in another sense this essence breaks forth only later when substance as the Concept becomes for itself what it was previously only in itself.

Necessity overcomes its blindness by passing from substance to causality and from causality to reciprocal action, which stands at the threshold of the Concept. As we
have seen, substance is, on the one hand, the immediate being of the totality, in which the independent actualities within the multiplicity of actuality lose their individuality and are overcome. On the other hand, substance is also this multiplicity of independent actualities; it is its own showing or accidentality. Because accidentality is substance's own showing, substance or the inward is identical with accidentality or the outward.

Substance, therefore, is the totality of the accidents; it reveals itself in them as their absolute negativity, i.e., as the absolute might and at the same time as the richness of all content. The content, however, is nothing but this manifestation itself, since the determinacy that is inwardly reflected into content is still only a moment of the form, which passes over into the might of the substance. (E.L. §151) ¹⁸

To the extent that substance and accidentality are identical, substance, by positing itself as accidentality, is only the might which posits itself. However, substance and accidentality are not only identical but distinct. For one is the inward being of the totality and the other is the external manifold, substance's showing. In so far as substance and its accidents are different from each other, substance, when it posits accidentality, is no longer positing itself but an other. This is the relationship of causality (E.L. §152). ¹⁹

As a cause, substance is no longer reflected only in accidentality. Rather it is inwardly reflected and is, therefore, a thing (E.L. §153R); it stands on its own apart from what it posits. When it fulfills its function as cause, substance sublates its own inward reflection and posits it outside itself as its effect. The effect, which is the necessary posit of the cause, is itself an immediate thing (E.L. §154). This effect, as an immediate thing, can also be the cause of a new effect, which in turn can be yet another new cause. This leads to an infinite progress from cause to effect. Similarly, the causal chain can also regress infinitely since the cause is itself caused by another cause, which itself has a cause, etc. (E.L. §153R).

In the causal relationship, the effect, like the cause, is inwardly reflected as its own substance. But if the effect is itself a substance which is distinct from the cause, the cause not only posits its effect but it also presupposes its effect (E.L. §154). As a result,

¹⁸ "Conversely, this being[that of substance] is only the posedness that is identical with itself, and as such it is totality that shows itself, accidentality." (S.L. 555; W.L.II 219; translation modified).
¹⁹ See also S.L. 557; W.L.II 222.
the effect is both active and passive in its relationship to its cause. On the one hand, the
effect is passive in so far as it is acted upon by an other, the cause. On the other hand,
when the cause acts upon the effect, the effect, which is itself a substance, *reacts* (E.L.
§154).\(^{20}\) When it becomes other than what it was before the action of the cause, the
effect itself acts by sublating its own self. But if the cause is to be a cause, it requires an
effect, and it only has an effect if the distinct substance which is to be the effect sublates
itself. Therefore, by reacting as it does, the effect makes the cause a cause or fulfills the
nature of the cause. In this way, the effect causes the cause. When the nature of the
original cause is fulfilled by the effect acting as cause, the original cause is effected by its
cause passively. However, as the effect did, the original cause also reacts to its cause, the
effect (E.L. §154). Now causality no longer involves an infinite progress or regress, since
causality has been bent back upon itself into a relationship in which the cause causes the
effect and the effect in turn causes the cause. Thus, the truth of causality is reciprocal
action (E.L. §154).\(^{21}\)

Reciprocal action is itself not yet the Concept, but we need only consider its
structure closely in order to arrive at the Concept. Reciprocal action is at first a
relationship between two distinct substances (E.L. §155)\(^{22}\) in which each is the cause of
the other and each in turn is also the other’s effect. As an example of reciprocal action
Hegel gives the relationship between the Spartan constitution and Spartan customs as an
example of reciprocal action. On the one hand, the Spartan constitution caused the
Spartans to have their particular, warlike customs; on the other hand, it is the Spartans’
warlike customs which caused them to possess such a constitution (E.L. §156A).

If we consider reciprocal action closely, we recognize that reciprocal action in
truth is not as it initially appears to be: it does not involve two determinations which are
distinct from each other. As we have seen, each side in the reciprocal relationship is
equally cause and effect. The original cause is only a cause in so far as it is caused by the

\(^{20}\) See also S.L. 568; W.L.II 236.

\(^{21}\) “That first cause, which first acts and receives its effect back into itself as reaction, thus reappears as
cause, whereby the action, which in finite causality runs on into the spuriously infinite progress, *is bent
round* and becomes an action that returns into itself, an infinite reciprocal action.” (S.L. 569; W.L.II 237).

\(^{22}\) See S.L. 569; W.L. 238.
original effect, whereas the original effect, because it causes the original cause to be a
cause, is itself a cause. Since each side in the reciprocal relationship is cause and effect,
we recognize that each side is in itself identical with its other (E.L. §155),\(^{23}\) just as we
recognized that the apparently distinct actualities in necessity are in themselves identical.

However, the identity between the two sides in reciprocal action is no longer just
in itself or for us. It is also now for itself. This is the turning point in the transition from
substrate to the Concept, since it is here that the blindness of necessity and substance is
overcome.

(B) But this unity is also for-itself, since the whole exchange is the cause’s own
positing, and since only this positing of it is its being. The nullity of the
distinctions is not only in-itself or [due to] our reflection (see the preceding
paragraph). On the contrary, the reciprocal action is itself also the sublating-again
of each of the posited determinations and its conversion into the opposite one;
and hence it is the positing of the nullity (which is [at first] in-itself) of the
moments.” (E.L. §156)

As Hegel tells us, the identity in reciprocal action is for-itself because the two sides posit
themselves as identical. In necessity, the various actualities were related to each other as
conditions related to the actuality arising from these conditions. This relationship is
essentially a passive one, since it does not necessarily entail any action on the part of the
conditions towards their actuality or vice-versa. Because condition and actuality are
passive in relation to each other, they themselves do not bring about or posit their own
identity in any way. It is we who must recognize it. Reciprocal action, in contrast, is
active, since each cause brings about the other as effect and each effect brings about the
other as cause by their own activity. In this relationship, each cause actively posits itself
as its other and, in so doing, returns into itself. It is in this way that each side posits its
identity with its other. Since this identity in reciprocal action is revealed through the
activity of its sides, the identity is no longer concealed or below the surface. Reciprocal
action is for itself this identity and the blindness of substance and necessity is sublated.

When reciprocal action becomes for itself, the logical dialectic first reaches the
stage of personality. As I have already discussed, Hegel claims that necessity is blind

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\(^{23}\) See S.L. 569; W.L. 238.
since its identity is merely inner. However, Hegel also tells us in other places that necessity is blind or deficient because it lacks personality or purpose.

Substance is an essential stage in the process of development of the Idea, but it not the Idea itself; it is not the absolute Idea, but only the Idea in the still restricted form of necessity. Now, God is certainly necessity or, as we can also say, he is the absolute matter [die absolute Sache], but at the same time he is the absolute Person, too.” (E.L. §151A)

It is usually said about necessity that it is “blind,” and this is quite right, inasmuch as purpose is still not present explicitly as such in the process of necessity.” (E.L. §147A)

Because necessity does not posit itself as what it is in itself, it is not for itself; it lacks the principle of personality and is blind. However, now that reciprocal action is for itself what it is in truth, the principle of personality proper to the Concept emerges from blind substance. In this way, we see again that the blindness of substance and necessity is overcome at this stage of the dialectic.

Concerning reciprocal action as this positing of itself which is for itself, Hegel concludes: “Hence, this pure exchange with itself is unveiled or posited necessity.” (E.L. §157). He then goes on to explain:

The bond of necessity as such is the identity that is still inner and hidden; for it is the identity of those [terms] which count as actual, although their independence should precisely be the necessity. Hence, the course of substance through causality and reciprocal action is just the positing [of the fact] that independence is the infinite negative relation to self -- negative indeed [because] distinction and mediation became in it the originality of actualities that are independent vis-à-vis each other -- infinite relation to itself because the independence of these [terms] is just nothing but their identity.” (E.L. §157)

In this quote, Hegel explains clearly that the dialectical development from necessity to this point involves making explicit what was inner or implicit in necessity.  

24 Hegel confirms this in the Science of Logic: “The exposition of substance (contained in the last book) which leads on to the Concept is, therefore, the sole and genuine refutation of Spinozism. It is the unveiling of substance, and this is the genesis of the Concept, the chief moments of which have been brought together above. The unity of substance is its relation of necessity; but this unity is only an inner necessity; in positing itself through the moment of absolute negativity it becomes a manifested or posited identity, and thereby the freedom which is the identity of the Concept. The Concept, the totality resulting from the reciprocal relation, is the unity of the two substances standing in that relation; but in this unity they are now free, for
reached the stage of “unveiled” or “posited” necessity. In blind necessity the identity by virtue of which the necessary is necessary is present, but it is present as an in-itself. With reciprocal action we have reached the stage of “unveiled” or “posited” necessity because this identity is no longer merely inner. Necessity is for itself what it was earlier in itself. In one sense necessity has changed by developing into reciprocal action because it is no longer blind but is for itself. However, in another sense, necessity has not changed in this development, since unveiled necessity, a necessity which is for-itself, is still necessity.

The necessity which knows itself as it is in truth is the Concept.25 Unlike blind, absolute necessity, the Concept is for itself: it is a “movement of exchange with itself alone that remains at home with itself” (E.L. §158). However, like blind, absolute necessity, the Concept is the totality (E.L. §160) which “is the repulsion of itself from itself into distinct independent [terms], [but] which, as this repulsion, is identical with itself” (E.L. §158). The Concept is, on the one hand, the differentiated whole or the whole which is mediated within itself; it is individual (S.L. 582; W.L.II 252). On the other hand, since these elements within the Concept as individual posit themselves as identical with each other, the Concept is also the immediate identity of the whole; it is universal (S.L. 582; W.L.II 252). Qua individual and qua universal these two forms of the Concept are distinct. But since each of these forms is itself the Concept, the difference between them proves to be merely illusory and each is identical with the other. As the immediate identity of the whole, the Concept is pure being and as the differentiated whole, it is pure essence. Because the Concept is the identity of itself as differentiated whole and as immediate identity of the whole, the Concept, just as blind,

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25 In the Logic Hegel seems to make contradictory claims about the relationship between necessity and the Concept. In certain places he claims that the Concept is necessary: “however, it is the Concept itself that is for itself the might of necessity as well as actual freedom” (E.L. §159R). In other places, Hegel seems to deny that the Concept and its freedom involve necessity. Of reciprocal action, which is the stage leading to the Concept, he writes that “necessity and causality have vanished” (S.L. 570; W.L.II 239); or when Hegel tells us that “freedom reveals itself as the truth of necessity” (S.L. 578, W.L.II 246), he gives the impression that freedom overcomes necessity and leaves it behind. However, these claims seem to contradict each other only because Hegel has employed his terminology loosely. When he distances necessity from the Concept, Hegel is distinguishing the Concept from blind necessity. In contrast, when Hegel associates the Concept with necessity, he has unveiled or posited necessity in mind, the necessity which knows itself as it is and is, therefore, free.
absolute necessity, is the identity of being and essence. "The Concept, therefore, is the truth of being and essence, since the shining of reflection within itself is, at the same time, independent immediacy, and this being of diverse actuality is immediately just a shining within itself." (E.L. §159; translation modified).

The Concept is necessary in the same way that absolute necessity is necessary because it has the same structure as absolute necessity. It is necessary as a unity of universality and individuality, of being and essence. Hegel confirms this in his discussion of the disjunctive judgement.

Hence the disjunctive judgement is objective universality posited at the same time in union with the form. It therefore contains first concrete universality or the genus in simple form as the subject, and secondly the same universality but as totality of its distinct determinations. A is either B or C. This is the necessity of the Concept" (S.L. 653; W.L.II 339)

As the totality which is pure being, the Concept is because it is. It is necessary because it does not have the possibility of an other. As pure essence, the Concept is because it is. It is necessary by virtue of the other but the other is none other than itself.

However, if the Concept is unveiled necessity, it is not only unveiled necessity but freedom as well.

With the Concept, therefore, we have entered the realm of freedom. Freedom belongs to the Concept because that identity which, as absolutely determined, constitutes the necessity of substance, is now also sublated or is a positedness, and this positedness as self-related is simply that identity. (S.L. 582; W.L.II 251)

For the thinking of the understanding, this claim is self-contradictory, since the understanding sees freedom and necessity as mutually exclusive categories. Either an action may be free or it may be necessary but it may certainly not be both. In spite of what the understanding may hold, Hegel's claim that the Concept is both free and necessary is not self-contradictory, because Hegel's conception of freedom, like his conception of necessity, is very different from ordinary conceptions. Freedom does ultimately have the same meaning for Hegel as it does for the understanding: freedom is self-determination. However, freedom or self-determination in its truth is not abstract freedom of choice, a freedom which lacks all content (E.L. §158A) and in which,
therefore, one can choose to do anything. On the contrary, true freedom for Hegel is essentially concrete or determinate within itself (E.L. §35A); it is the freedom of the Concept. The Concept for Hegel is free because it has the same structure as unveiled necessity and because, as unveiled necessity, it knows that it has this structure. On the one hand, the Concept is the totality of being. Because the totality can have no other opposed to it, it cannot be determined by an other. But if it knows that it is not determined by an other, it knows itself to be self-determined; it is free. On the other hand, the Concept as essence is determined by an other. But since it knows the other to be its own self, the Concept knows itself to be self-determined and is again therefore free. Thus, unveiled necessity for Hegel is freedom. “Necessity does not become freedom by vanishing, but only because its still inner identity is manifested,” (S.L. 571; W.L.II 239). The Concept is for itself both “the might of necessity, as well as actual freedom” (E.L. §159R).

3E. Drawing Conclusions about Logical Necessity\textsuperscript{26}

In the analysis of the logic which we have just completed, we have discovered the true form of necessity for Hegel, as well as the shape of necessity that belongs to the Concept. Having accomplished these two tasks, we may now assess my initial, tentative interpretation of dialectical necessity in light of what we have learned.

Originally I claimed that the dialectical development in the logic is necessary because it is an immanent development. A new stage Y arises immanently from a previous stage X if it arises when we consider stage X as it is in itself. In this case, stage X is the complete or total condition for stage Y and, as a result, stage Y arises necessarily from stage X. If we compare this account of dialectical necessity with real necessity, we see that these two types of necessity are very similar. Dialectical necessity, like real necessity, is a necessity in which the necessary is dependent upon an other. In real necessity we know that an actuality is necessary if its totality of conditions is actual. Likewise, in dialectical necessity we know that stage Y arises necessarily given its total

\textsuperscript{26} Besides Forster and Kaufmann, the following commentators offer either interpretations of logical necessity or general interpretations of necessity in Hegel's philosophy: Bergmann (1964) 189-204; Burbidge (1981) 195-202; Findlay (1970) 74, 81-82; Flay (1990) 153-169.
condition, stage X. But we saw in our discussion of real necessity that this dependence of the necessary on another subverts its necessity because its other is contingent. As a result, the necessary in real necessity also shows itself to be contingent and real necessity shows itself to be relative. Since the necessary in dialectical necessity is dependent upon an other as it is in real necessity, its necessity, if it is simply the result of an immanent development, is also ultimately contingent. Stage Y arises necessarily from stage X, but if stage Y is to be truly necessary, stage X must be necessary in itself. Now perhaps stage X is itself the necessary development of a previous stage, but this merely puts off the problem, since this previous stage must then be necessary in itself somehow. If we regress far enough in this manner, we come eventually to the beginning of the immanent development, which in the case of the logical dialectic is pure being. If each new stage which develops from this beginning in an immanent manner were to be truly necessary by virtue only of this immanent development, this beginning would have to be necessary in itself. However, because the beginning is merely a finite starting point, at least as far as we are aware at the beginning, this starting point is not necessary in itself but contingent. For the time being there is nothing that guarantees the necessity of the logical shape which constitutes the beginning. Since the beginning of the immanent development is contingent, every shape which follows within this development will also be contingent, even though each of these shapes arises within this development in a necessary manner. Thus, my previous account of dialectical necessity accurately describes the conditions under which one logical concept or shape follows necessarily from another; a particular stage Y arises necessarily from a particular stage X if and only if the development from stage X to stage Y is an immanent one. My previous account does not tell us, however, how each stage of the logic is itself necessary.

In this discussion a distinction has emerged between two levels of necessity, a distinction which I did not acknowledge earlier. On the one hand, there is the necessity of the dialectical development. This is the necessity with which one stage of the dialectic follows upon another. On the other hand, there is the necessity of the logical subject matter tout court. If the logical subject matter is necessary in this way, it must simply be the case. As we have seen, the former type of necessity does not guarantee the latter.
Even if the dialectical development proceeds immanently, its stages or shapes could still be in themselves contingent. Yet Hegel claims clearly that philosophy must demonstrate the necessity of its subject matter, not just the necessary connectedness of its subject matter. "But when we consider something in thought, we soon become aware that thoughtful consideration implies the requirement that the necessity of its content should be shown, and the very being, as well as the determinations, of its objects should be proved." (E.L. §1). Since our preliminary account of logical necessity explains the necessary connectedness of the shapes of the logic but does not explain the necessity of these shapes themselves, we must come up with an account of logical necessity which does clarify this facet of the logic.

From our previous analysis of the logic, we know that the Concept as a whole is necessary for Hegel. This in itself is not a sufficient account of logical necessity since we are not interested in the necessity of the Concept as a whole but in the necessity of its various shapes. However, if we know that the Concept as a whole is necessary, this can help us to determine how the various shapes of the Concept are necessary. As Hegel himself indicates, one can only demonstrate the necessity of one’s content in philosophy by considering it within the context of the whole:

A philosophising without system cannot be scientific at all; apart from the fact that philosophising of this kind expresses on its own account a more subjective disposition, it is contingent with regard to its content. A content has its justification only as a moment of the whole, outside of which it is only an unfounded presupposition or a subjective certainty.” (E.L. §14R)

If the Concept as a whole is necessary and if the various shapes of the Concept are a necessary part of the Concept, then these shapes will also be necessary. Therefore, we must see whether we can explain the necessity of the various shapes of the Concept by showing somehow that each is a necessary part of the Concept. I will argue that a

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27 In his discussion of the synthetic method, Hegel also writes: "Moreover, there is no necessity at all in the content of the objects defined. We are supposed to admit that there is space, that there are plants, animals, and so on; and it is not the business of geometry, or botany, etc., to exhibit the necessity of the objects in question. And for this same reason the synthetic method is just as unsuitable for philosophy as the analytic one, since philosophy must above all justify itself with regard to the necessity of its objects.” (E.L. §229A).
particular shape of the Concept is a necessary part of the Concept because it is a part of the logical development that leads to the absolute Idea. This claim requires clarification.

First, each shape within the logical development that leads to the absolute Idea is a necessary part of the development. Since the dialectical development beginning with pure being proceeds immanently, each stage in this progressive development follows necessarily from the previous one. When the logical dialectic leading to the absolute Idea is viewed purely as a linear development, each shape is a necessary part of the development which arises from pure being. However, as we have seen, the logical development is not only a forward progression from the simple to the concrete but also a retreat into the ground of each logical shape. This transforms the logical development from a pure linear progression into a circular development, in which each shape is mediated by the others and in which, as a result, there is no purely immediate beginning. Since each shape is mediated by the rest of the shapes within the circle, the various, logical shapes need not presuppose anything outside the circle. As this circle, the logical development forms a self-contained system. Because each shape arises necessarily or is grounded necessarily within the system, each shape is a necessary part of the system, although we do not know yet if each is necessary in itself.

Second, the logical development, as the development which leads to the absolute Idea, is the self-unfolding of the Concept in its totality. The absolute Idea is the stage with which the logical dialectic ends because this stage, unlike the previous ones, does not contradict itself or show itself to be untrue. As the last stage of the logical development, the absolute Idea is preceded by the whole logical development. The absolute Idea contains this whole logical development sublated within itself as its content. It is, as such, the form of the whole, the Concept in its fulfilled form. Since the whole logical development leads to the fulfilled form of the Concept, this development is nothing but the Concept's own self-development or self-unfolding, a development in which the Concept is implicit from the beginning.

Because each shape in the circle of development which leads to the absolute Idea is a necessary part of this development and because this circle of development is the self-unfolding of the whole or the Concept, each shape within this development is a necessary
part of the development of the Concept. But if each shape is a necessary part of the
development of the Concept, it is also a necessary part of the Concept itself. For, as we
have seen, the Concept, as the absolute Idea, includes the whole logical development
which precedes it within itself as content. Since each shape in the dialectical
development is a necessary part of the Concept or of its content and since the Concept, as
the whole, is absolutely necessary, each of these shapes within the dialectical
development is also absolutely necessary. Therefore, a shape or concept within the
logical development is necessary if it proves to be a necessary part of the whole, and it
proves to be a necessary part of the whole if it is a necessary part of the immanent
development which leads to the whole. The various shapes within the logical
development are necessary if and only if they arise within the immanent dialectical
development of the whole.

As we have seen, each new stage in an immanent development is identical in a
sense with the stage that preceded it because the new stage is nothing but the previous
one with its content made explicit. In this way, each shape within the logical
development, including the absolute Idea, is identical with the others. The absolute Idea
should not be viewed simply as a whole in which the various stages of the logical
development inhere as parts. Because the absolute Idea as the fulfilled Concept is
identical with each of the shapes of the dialectical development, each shape is itself the
whole which the Concept is (E.L. §160). The Concept is the whole which contains all its
moments within itself, but since each of its moments is the whole that it is, the Concept
is the whole which finds itself in each of its moments. Hegel supports this identity of the
Concept and its moments when he tells us that “the various stages of the logical Idea can
be considered as a series of definitions of the Absolute” (E.L. §160A). The identity of
the Concept with each of its moments reinforces my interpretation of logical necessity.
For if the logical shape, when viewed as a part of the necessary development of the
Concept, is also the whole, then each shape, as a necessary moment of the whole, will
itself possess the necessity of the whole. Each shape in this context will be absolutely
necessary. However, it is important to note that the various shapes of the logical
development are only necessary in so far as they are a necessary part of the whole. When
viewed from the perspective of the understanding, each of these shapes or moments is a finite concept opposed to other concepts. As such, these shapes are no more necessary in themselves than any other finite entity. When these concepts are considered from the perspective of positive reason which “apprehends the unity of the determinations in their opposition” (E.L. §82), only then are they necessary. Thus the various shapes of the Concept are either necessary or contingent; this depends upon how they are viewed. As moments in the necessary development of the whole, they are necessary, but as individual concepts standing on their own, they are contingent.

In the discussion of logical necessity I have distinguished between the necessity of the dialectical development and the true necessity of the logical subject matter. We have seen that a necessary dialectical development in itself does not ensure that each of the shapes in this development is itself necessary. These shapes are only necessary themselves as a necessary part of the whole. However, even if the various shapes within a necessary dialectical development need not be necessary themselves, the necessary dialectical development plays an indispensable role in determining whether these various shapes are in fact necessary. The concepts within the logical development are themselves necessary in so far as they are a necessary part of the development of the whole, and they are a necessary part of the development of the whole in so far as they are a part of the immanent dialectical development which leads to the whole. Therefore, the logical dialectic must proceed as an immanent dialectical development if Hegel is to have any chance in the logic of demonstrating that the various logical concepts are necessary. An immanent dialectical development in the logic is not sufficient to prove that the logical content is necessary but it is a necessary part of such a proof. As we have seen, Hegel produces an immanent development in the logic by following the principles of his dialectical method as a method of immanent criticism and development. Since one of Hegel’s main tasks in the logic is to demonstrate the necessity of its subject matter and since this task requires an immanent dialectical development made possible by Hegel’s dialectical method, we see, once again, that the dialectical method is what allows Hegel to accomplish his objectives in the logic.
Conclusion

In my forward I stated that my thesis was to achieve two main objectives. It was to show what Hegel tries to accomplish in the logic and how Hegel tries to accomplish this. In my first chapter I argued that Hegel performs three tasks in the logic. First, he tries to determine the true meaning of our fundamental concepts or categories. Second, he tries to show that the meaning of each individual category does not exclude the meaning of the others. Third, he tries to demonstrate that the logical categories are necessary. We have seen that the dialectical method, when followed correctly, is all that Hegel requires to accomplish his first two objectives and is a prerequisite for him to accomplish his third. Thus we have confirmed that the dialectical method is a central feature of Hegel’s logical project.

In my forward I also expressed the hope that my thesis research would help to give me a grasp of the logic as a whole. Now that my thesis is complete, I believe that I have succeeded in meeting this personal objective. For in my thesis I have provided the basic elements for a general account of the logical dialectic’s structure and dynamics.

According to this account, the nature of the logical dialectic can be summarized as follows. The logical development begins with the most abstract concepts and, as it gradually proceeds, it moves onto more and more complex concepts. When each of these concepts or categories is attended to as it is in itself, when each is thought in its truth, each contradicts itself. But from this contradiction arises a new category, the next stage in the development. By developing in this way, the logical dialectic proceeds immanently from beginning to end. This immanent development is not only a forward movement but also a retreat towards the ultimate ground of our categories. For when a category is attended to as it is in itself and a new category arises, we discover that the previous category can only be thought in its truth if it is thought in conjunction with the new category. In this way the new category grounds the previous one. Since the logical dialectic involves not only a forward development but also a retreat towards a ground, the logical development is not merely linear but circular. At the end of the logical development we attain the concept that no longer contradicts itself, the Concept as
absolute Idea. The absolute Idea is, first, the culmination of the logical development; second, it is the whole which contains the whole development as its content; third, it is the whole that is identical with each of the concepts in its development. Because each of these categories in the development arises immanently from the category which precedes it, each step in the development is a necessary step. Because each category is a necessary part of the development of the whole, each category is, as such, necessary in itself.

While my thesis may give a good general account of the logic and of the logical dialectic, it is important that we be aware of the inherent limitations of such an account. A general account of a particular subject serves an important function because it provides an overview of the subject. In so doing, it allows one to grasp the subject as a whole in a way that one would not be able to were one to attend only to the subject matter's detail. The general account succeeds in giving an overview of its subject because it reduces its subject from the complex to the simple. In generalization simplicity is a virtue. But in the act of simplification the generalization also in a sense distorts its subject matter. By leaving out most of the detail of the subject with which it is dealing, the generalization fails to present its subject as it is in itself. It gives us the bare bones of what the subject is in truth. In addition, the generalization will often ignore certain features of the subject that it is treating, features that do not fit in with the account that the generalization is giving. For a good generalization, if it is to remain simple and effective, cannot afford to qualify its most basic claims to any significant extent.

The summary account of the logical dialectic which I presented above is itself guilty of these shortfalls. For example, in this summary I give the impression that all of the stages leading up to the absolute Idea are determinate concepts. However, as I discussed earlier in my thesis, pure being and pure nothing, the thought determinations with which the logical dialectic begins, cannot properly be called concepts. Thus we see that in my effort to present the logical dialectic succinctly, I have chosen to ignore an instance in the dialectical development which is not consistent with my account.

In the main body of my thesis I did mention this exception to my general model of the dialectical development but there may be others which I have missed. A general account of the logical dialectic is important for a proper understanding of the logic since
such an account helps us to grasp the logic as a whole. However, examples like the one from the beginning of the logic remind us that we cannot take the model of the logic for the logic itself. To know the logic in its truth we must not only try to grasp the whole. We must also pay close attention to what Hegel does at every particular logical stage; we must be sensitive to the peculiarities of each book in the logic and of each section within each of these books. Where the logical development does not coincide with our model, we may in certain instances be able to accommodate these exceptions by altering our account, either by mentioning these exceptions in our account or by acknowledging that our account, which is general by its very nature, does occasionally distort the truth of the logical development. In other cases, however, we may be forced to accept that the logical dialectic, as Hegel presents it, fundamentally contradicts our model. Here we have again two options. First, in such instances we may claim that Hegel has failed to follow his own dialectical method correctly. Second, if enough such instances resist our general account, we may be forced to abandon it in favour of another one.

In short, my investigation of the logic is not finished; it has just begun. Having proposed a general explanation of the structure and dynamics of the logic, I must put this explanation to the test by attending closely to the logical development in all its rich and painfully obscure detail. But this task I will put off for a little while longer. Right now, I'm tired.
Bibliography


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