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The Professionalization of English
Canadian Philosophy

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The Professionalization of English Canadian Philosophy

I  The Significance and Nature of Professionalization

i  Introduction

The professionalization of the humanities in North America took place between 1850 to 1920. The motivation was to receive recognition as independent and legitimate fields of inquiry. It was anticipated that the adoption of the scientific model of research would enable each discipline to reach a higher level of erudition.

The object of this study is to examine the effects of professionalization upon the pioneer figures of Canadian philosophy. I will study the work of two philosophers. James Beaven (1801-1875) wrote The Elements of Natural Theology which is the first Canadian full length philosophical book written outside of Quebec. John Clark Murray (1836-1917) who came to Queen's University in 1862 was Sir William Hamilton's most promising student. Murray's prodigious philosophical corpus will be presented. I will argue that both authors were working during a period of transition to professionalized philosophy, and further, that their hybrid form of philosophy has qualities worthy of reconsideration. In brief, the value of their work is that it combined rigorous scholarship with an optimism that their ideas held moral relevance for an audience outside of philosophers.
There are three aspects of professionalization. First and foremost is specialization. The nature of knowledge itself was becoming specialized causing many competencies to become professionalized. There were distinct sub-divisions of knowledge within academic disciplines: "Within each field of effort we find not one world of participation among insiders, but multiple worlds, curiously isolated from each other." (Veysey in Oleson, p. 65) According to John Higham, specialization is the predominant theme for university organization in the late nineteenth century. (pp. 3-4) People deliberately sought to purify scholarship by following the European model. The difference was that specialization in Europe was centralized and elitist, whereas specialization in the United States was deliberately set up to create "a great decentralized democracy of specialists". (Higham in Oleson, p. 9) Daniel Walker Howe describes the cultural landscape:

That which we would regard as 'high culture' was characteristically undifferentiated in the Victorian world; the specialized "expert" had not yet become prominent. College professors taught what seems to us a bewildering variety of subjects; ladies and gentlemen of letters felt free to pontificate on all topics. Only recently--namely the twentieth century--did scholarship and some of the arts become so recondite and specialized, so consciously exclusive, as to be inaccessible to all but a handful of initiates. (p. 518)

For philosophy, specialization means that academics study certain ideas and periods in depth rather than seeking the traditional synoptic view. Participants are experts in a particular sphere rather than investigators of philosophic truth
wherever it may be. This is of course only a generalization with many exceptions. It is however true that one finds a plurality of Higham’s ‘worlds’ or schools of philosophy with little to say to one another.

The second aspect of professionalization is relative academic insularity. This involves the self-generation of scholarly debate with little regard for outside conditions. Philosophy responds to its own movements rather than the concerns of society. Kuklick explains the change in the United States:

After Royce and James established a framework for speculation, and specialization became professionalized in the twentieth century, society ceased to be a direct influence in shaping philosophical ideas, and the link between personality and philosophy dissolves. (p. xviii)

Insularity also means the exclusion of non-professionals. Laurence Veysey calls it "a special intellectual universe of insiders". (p. 59) In nineteenth century North America, the educated upper middle class commonly looked to philosophy for personal moral guidance. (Kuklick, p. xxiii) Charles Rosenberg discusses the effects of the new field of social science displacing the previous centrality of philosophy:

The philosopher’s evolution from moral teacher to discipline-oriented academician is particularly striking and instructive. Moral philosophy was still central to the learned man’s intellectual world in 1865, by the 1920s academic philosophy had turned away from consideration of those eternal human problems that philosophy had always addressed. The increasingly internal orientation of the philosopher has made the products of their scholarship well-nigh unavailable to the society that supports his linguistic, logical or mathematical investigation. (p. 455)
And third is the establishment of a standard methodology upheld by university departments which is the procedural and institutional requirement. The intellectual community determines the rigid criteria for acceptability of a theory, i.e. journals, conferences and professional associations. Philosophy became a world unto its own whose vocabulary excluded an outside audience:

Philosophy had always been technical, but it became more technical; the non-technical interests of philosophers declined, and they stopped thinking that what they did was significant for public affairs. Philosophy lost its overall synoptic role in the university specifically, and in intellectual life generally; the historical conception of the subject changed. (Kuklick, p. xxxv)

In short, at this time philosophy ceased to be an area of public interest. There are of course some philosophers who appeal to a wider audience, but they are rare exceptions rather than the norm. I do not wish to gloss over the fact that philosophy in its highest sense is forbiddingly difficult. High abstract thought has never received an extensive following. My point is that there has always existed a popular facet of philosophy until relatively recently.

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Daniel J. Wilson includes in his definition of professionalization substantive intellectual consensus. (p. 124) American philosophers for a time held that the model of scientific research team was ideal for their own progress. This criterion may be applicable to other fields. Philosophers historically have never achieved widespread agreement but are rather loosely divisible into competing schools of thought. Disagreement seems to be inherent in the nature of the field itself. Wilson provides no strong argument for it to be otherwise.
As proof of philosophy's present lack of an outside audience, I cite Quine's comparison between scientific philosophy and organic chemistry. He recognizes the importance of the latter, but has no curiosity about it. He has a taste for physics, but only when an accessible discussion is available. It is possible that someone could give a digestible exposition of current technical philosophical debates, but it "would take artistry, because not all of what is philosophically important need be of lay interest even when clearly expounded and fitted into place." (p. 192)

Rigorous logic and philosophy of science may be of little interest to outsiders, but it should be the case that social and political thought should be of universal interest. Perhaps the most prominent work in this area in the English-speaking world is John Rawls' A Theory of Justice. Let us suppose an educated reader who wants to study this classic. The writing is not very difficult to read in spite of the author's turgid style. However, it is presumed that readers already have a thorough knowledge of utilitarianism and intuitionism. Furthermore, the subject of justice is discussed only at an abstract level from which Rawls does not descend to contemporary political affairs. He holds that philosophy permeates moral-decision-making: "A conception of justice characterizes our moral sensibility when the everyday judgments we do make are in accordance with its principles." (p. 46) The question is whether such abstract principles really do filter down into moral behaviour. The loss
of specificity in moral guidance is identified as part of the shift to professionalized philosophy by Alasdair MacIntyre:

For it was not merely that academic enquiry increasingly became professionalized and specialized and that formal education correspondingly became a preparation for and initiation into professionalization and specialization but that, for the most part and increasingly, moral and theological truth ceased to be recognized as objects of substantive enquiry and instead were relegated to the realm of private belief. (p. 217)

MacIntyre is saying that academic philosophy says 'to each his own' in regards to personal moral beliefs. The hypothesis that philosophy isolates itself by eschewing non-professionalized and moralizing philosophy deserves more research than I can presently give it, but it would seem likely that philosophy loses its relevance as it restricts itself to perfecting theories and fails to connect them to existing situations.

This is a short account of the character and ramifications of professionalization. As Clifford G. Holland has noted, there has been minimal research to date in the field of Canadian intellectual history. Very little has been written by historians concerning professionalization of the humanities and philosophy in Canada. By contrast a considerable amount of work has been undertaken in the United States. As there was much academic overlapping between the two countries, I will give an account of the phenomenon there and then relate it to the Canadian situation. English Canadian philosophy likewise had this popular aspect until the discipline became fully professionalized.
ii) Professionalization of philosophy in the United States

Gladys Bryson attests to the historic break in the nature of philosophy which is attributable to professionalization. She says that from Socrates until the emergence of social science in the nineteenth century, "moral philosophy consistently offered the most comprehensive discussion of human relations and institutions". (1932, p. 304) Moral philosophy was particularly dominant in the Victorian era as it had directly superseded theology as a foundation for dealing with religious doubts. (Veysey, p. 78; Rorty, 1979, p. 4; Kuklick, p. xviii) Bryson notes that today we equate moral philosophy with only ethics, whereas previously it consisted of a comprehensive view of all human relations and institutions.

To avoid confusion, I will refer to this broad sense of moral philosophy as 'moralizing philosophy'.² This is the project of theorizing about how to live. The aim is to cultivate virtue in daily conduct. Murray justifies this practical strain of philosophizing with a citation from Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*: "We do not make these inquiries in order that we may know what virtue is, but in order that we may become good men". (1981, p. 9) This is probably the best short explanation of moralizing philosophy.

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²Of course, moralizing is a pejorative term, but for the purposes of this thesis I have adopted for its sense alone.
One of the indications of professionalization is the existence of institutional forums. In 1892 the Canadian-born Jacob Gould Schurman, President of Cornell University, wrote the following to the Chairman of a philosophical exhibit in Chicago:

I feel very keenly the unorganized condition of philosophical work in America; and it has been on my mind for some time to endeavor to form an American philosophical association. The sciences supply us with the model, and what you say of medical societies shows the immense convenience of having such organizations at hand. (President's correspondence, October 10)

This letter indicates that philosophy deliberately sought to alter its status in the university context. Schurman was the founder and co-editor of the first English speaking journal devoted strictly to philosophy. This is The Philosophical Review to which Murray was a contributor. Schurman was also a keen admirer of Murray's work.

Schurman anticipates two events in the Prefatory Note of the first issue (also in 1892). First, he predicts that America, being the nation of expansive growth, will be the new Athens in philosophy. As old ideas become quickly dated, people will seek new first principles. And second, the fast growth of professorships and schools combined with the new journal would allow philosophy to flourish: "It is fortunate, indeed, that the spirit of specialization has taken possession of Philosophy..." (p. 5)

What is also interesting in regard to the aforementioned popular facet of philosophy is that Schurman seems to believe that many of the educated elite would read The Philosophical
Review. The prefatory note ends with the declaration that a non-dogmatic publication "is herewith presented to the public". (p. 8) Schurman is not so naïve as to believe that the journal would be widely celebrated, but his letters indicate that he did think it would maintain a small but loyal following. And indeed, he often took the time to respond personally to many laymen's queries concerning philosophy in his correspondence. The articles in the first volumes are relatively easy to read and general enough to be accessible to an educated reader. The journal however quickly became technical within a few years as it developed internal debates. It is doubtful that The Review would henceforth be of much interest to outsiders.

One of the most interesting lessons of history is that intentions are often far from the results. J.E. Creighton, Schurman's colleague and co-editor who brought him from Acadia, came to regret the adoption of the scientific model for philosophy. Creighton's concern was that extreme attention to technical rigour and focus on research had caused the discipline to overlook content. The philosophy practised by Schurman had a deliberate moralizing philosophy orientation. His writing not only critically evaluated a theory, but it also was designed to edify readers so that they would make themselves more noble.

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For example, Schurman wrote to Mr. A.H. Hollenbeck to explain that Kant's idea of knowledge prior to sense experience is "knowledge of their spacial element, which element is the creation of the mind" (October 21, 1893). He responded to the inquiry of Miss Margaret K. Smith of the Oswego State Normal School concerning the nature of the Ego (November 16, 1895).
Creighton was the first president of the American Philosophical Association. In three essays written during the early 1920s, he argued that philosophy and science were separate inquiries, and that philosophy offered the truest and most complete conception of the real. He came "to think more of philosophy as representing an attitude of mind and a level of experience, and less of it as a 'subject' or 'science' composed of a body of propositions to be taught and learned." (Quoted in Wilson, p. 159) Creighton was lamenting the loss of the synoptic vision once offered by philosophy. He went so far as to say that philosophy, and not science, offered the truest vision of reality.

Creighton and Schurman were trained in Germany with a focus on Kantian philosophy. Germany was the first nation to professionalize philosophy. It would appear that Creighton was concerned that professionalization had become gathered its own momentum and had become too extreme. Wilson relates his conception of philosophy:

Creighton claimed that the aim of philosophy was "to construct an orderly world in terms of the relations of concrete individuals." Unlike the sciences, which abstracted the particulars into generalizations and which valued the generalization above any particular, philosophy needed to maintain the integrity and importance of the concrete and individual. Philosophers did not need to remain mired in particularity, for their ultimate goal was "synoptic vision, seeing things whole," without losing a sense of the individuality of the particular. Philosophical intelligibility, for Creighton, meant the attainment of "a concrete universal which expresses the inwardness and essence of individuals through the grasp of their constitutive relations." (pp. 159-160)
In short, Creighton believed that breadth was integral to philosophy. The detailed and exacting analysis prevalent in journals and books of philosophy defied the true essence of philosophy.

Previous to the professionalization of philosophy in the United States, there existed another extreme of instilling moral beliefs and practices without regard for theory. I will argue that there was a transitional type of philosophy between the two extremes. Further, this mode finds its parallel in English Canadian philosophy in the writings of Beaven and Murray.

A young Harvard graduate student by the name of G. Stanley Hall remarked upon the impoverished state of philosophy in 1876. The educational goal was not learning but moral brainwashing:

the whole field of study is generally given into the hands of one of the older and 'safer' members of the faculty, under the erroneous belief that it should be the aim of the professors of this department to indoctrinate rather than to instruct--to tell what to think, than to teach how to think." (quoted in Wilson, p. 40)

According to D.H. Meyer's The Instructed Conscience: The Shaping of the American National Ethic, academic philosophers in the Victorian age were relied upon as the "moral navigators" of society. (p. 11) This is the tradition of outright academic moralism. This form of moral philosophy included not only ethics but the social sciences. The prime objective was neither a matter of philosophy nor religion but to give the educated public a viable personal system of morality that would address most concerns. All American colleges gave required courses on the
"science" of what it is to be ethical.

In the face of the instability of modernity, philosophers were given the task of restating and inculcating eternal moral truths and principles. This task was inherently impossible:

The Mid-Victorians believed that they could translate an old morality into a new language without fundamentally altering its meaning, that a new intellectual system could preserve traditional moral values." (Meyer, p. 23)

In short, philosophers were given the pedagogical assignment of maintaining the civic and personal rectitude of the civilized elite.

I propose that there was a transitional type of philosophy between the extremes of fully professional philosophy and navigating philosophers. It has been identified specifically as "American Public Philosophy" by Royce. His associate figure was William James. According to Kuklick, they lectured to the cultured elite on contemporary moral and religious issues with popularized versions of their philosophies serving as their basis for analysis. Kuklick discusses the integration of theory and practice:

The technical provided the ground or justification of the practical; and, for Royce and James, pursuing technical problems was the focus of work and judged only by scholars, but it resulted in the proper end of philosophy, an activist moral and religious creed. (emphasis mine, p. xxiii)

This is exactly the same mix found in Beaven's and more especially Murray's philosophical writings minus the overt religious preaching as the Canadian situation differed significantly (see the next section). I shall argue that the
blend proved to be very worthwhile in the Canadian context. The test for assessing the value of this type of philosophizing is that it must be insightful enough to rise above platitudes. Meyer says that the fruits of the labour of American textbook moralism "were usually neither original nor profound." (p. 6) My argument is that philosophy which treads a fine line between professionalized theory and moral sermonizing could be revived to good effect.

iii) The general academic situation in Canada

The Canadian situation differed from the American one in several respects. John Irving notes that in Central Canada, unlike the United States and Britain, philosophy flourished only in the universities. (p. 25) There was no tradition of amateur scholars and gentlemen. (Higham, p. 3) However, this is not to say that the inception of philosophy in Canada was fully professionalized. It was only partially so as it took distinct measures to maintain accessibility and interest to society at large. Another difference is that science was not taken as a model on its own but was subsumed under the jurisdiction of religion. (McKillop, p. 61) Further, in Canada philosophers tended to appeal to the community rather than to the individual. Meyer describes the object of study of American philosophers as "the moral man" who "turned out to be an abstraction, a fictive being". (p. 115)

I shall now proceed to give an account of the general
Canadian intellectual context. As mentioned previously, relatively little has been written in this area. I will address the more specific climates Beaven and Murray responded to in their separate sections. There are three aspects of the time I wish to cover: the view of religion, dominant philosophical trends, and professionalization. Very little has been written on the last topic. I hope to contribute to this area through exegesis of Murray's and Beaven's work.

Leslie Armour and Elizabeth Trott have the best account of the peculiar relation between philosophy and religion in English Canada. It begins with the hypothesis that the practice of philosophy becomes necessary when there is a clash of intuitions. Reason is the medium for determining the best values. Social and geographic factors in Canada promoted reason as a medium for a bridging sort of unity:

Dominantly in English Canadian philosophy reason is used as a device to explore alternatives, to suggest ways of combining apparently contradictory ideas, to discover new ways of passing from one idea to another. Only rarely is it used as an intellectual substitute for force—as a device to defeat one's opponent, to show his ideas to be without foundation, or to discredit his claims to philosophical thought. There is, in short, a kind of philosophical federalism at work, a natural inclination to find out why one's neighbour thinks differently rather than to find out how to show him up as an idiot. (1981, p. 4)

The role of philosophy in these circumstances was to surpass denominational differences and seek the common good in an effort to unite communities. Armour contends that there is good evidence that early nineteenth century English Canada there was a firm belief that society must have a coherent theoretical view on
religion, politics and economics rising above the constituent communities. Further, this super-structure of belief must not itself be founded in religion. Rather, "only reason, it was supposed, could provide the larger unity beyond religion."

(1985, p. 147) Armour calls this Canadian phenomenon "rational religion".

It is important to note that this term does not refer merely to a philosophical vision of religion itself but to a reasoned and systematic framework beyond religion. Rational religion is not to be confused with Kant's religion within the limits of reason alone. To explain in a more practical light, in the event of a conflict between religious propositions and reason, the latter takes priority.

Charles W. Hendel implicitly concurs with Armour. He notes that Canadians were very conscious of religion as a divisionary factor to be overcome. He writes that philosophers tried to contribute solutions to the problem:

... for philosophers are liable to an illusion that they can produce greater agreement by their arguments. In this case their philosophy made an extraordinary claim to be the fulfilment of the Christian religion. (p. 30)

John A. Irving agrees that religion was central to Canadian philosophy but sees it in a different way than Armour and Trott do. Between the years 1850 and 1925 "philosophy in Canada was the shield of religion." (1952, p. 10) This metaphor wrongly implies that philosophers used reason simply to protect religious
beliefs. He suggests that English Canadian philosophers deliberately accepted only intellectual perspectives conducive to supporting rational religion—these included Common Sense and later Idealism. Defences were established against hostile doctrines such as positivism, utilitarianism and empiricism. Irving contends that the tenacious adherence to rational religion stunted progress. (1950, p. 286) His final assessment is that English Canadian philosophers, unlike their American and British counterparts, broke no new ground. He overlooks the fact that English Canadian philosophers proved themselves capable of advancing sound and to some extent original philosophical theories.

This introduces the second topic of philosophical trends in the Victorian age. According to Irving, there are three phases of development in nineteenth century English Canadian philosophy. (1950, p. 283) First, colonization established a Christian world-view. Irving notes that the first objective of United Empire Loyalists and British immigrants was to subdue the harsh northern environment. It is surprising that the colonists founded institutes of higher education given the natural obstacles they encountered. By the mid-eighteenth century there were eight universities.

The second phase is the domination of Scottish Common Sense between 1850 and 1872. In brief, the central idea of this

\*For proof, see the following accounts of Beaven and Murray and the interpretations of other philosophers by Armour and Trott in *The Faces of Reason.*
movement is that everyday reasoning can solve all philosophical dilemmas. The judgement of the ordinary person is equal to that of the trained philosopher. While the Common Sense position denies that philosophers possess a privileged capacity for reasoning, it does not claim that the common man's reasoning cannot be improved upon. Indeed it was recognized that reasoning could become technical. Common Sense philosophers aimed to dispel what they deemed to be outlandish fictions such as Humean skepticism and Ideas.

Murray was educated in this tradition and Beaven was influenced by it. The writings of one famous Common Sense figure, Sir William Hamilton, were studied in almost all of the colleges in Canada and Maritimes. Common Sense texts dominated the calender lists to the exclusion of all other philosophies as late as the 1870s when the tradition had been long dead everywhere else. (Scarfe, pp. 348-9) Indeed, there are no fewer than seventy entries of Hamilton's works in Canada's Union Catalogue.  

The third phase is the last quarter of the century which saw the rise of British Idealism under Edward Caird and T.H. Green. This schema is not absolute as Beaven and Murray had more complex roots and they both showed some degree of originality. Irving simply gives an indication of the main currents of thought. A

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These are works (primarily textbook editions) procured by Canadian universities. These include a Canadian collection edited by S.S. Nelles of Toronto entitled Chapters in Logic: Containing William Hamilton's Lectures on Modified Logic and Selections from the Port Royal Logic, 1870.
more detailed account of the influence of Common Sense will be
given in the section on Murray. I will argue that it is
impossible to precisely locate Murray in the Common Sense
Tradition as Irving does. Indeed, the meaning of Common Sense is
unclear today and it was to Murray also.

Irving notes that philosophical inventions of the Americans
such as pragmatism and naturalism received little attention in
Canada. He says that there was a deliberate effort on the part
of Murray and his later colleagues to avoid doctrines such as the
theory of evolution that challenged Christianity. Rather than
creating or adopting American or European new ideas, Canadians
tended to devote their studies to the history of philosophy.
(1952, p. 12) He contends that it is in this area that they have
excelled.

Irving's historical account suffers from obvious vagueness
and a lack of substantiation. I will address his assessment of
early English Canadian philosophy as a regressive phenomenon in
the section on Murray.

I turn to the work of A.B. McIllop who characterizes
philosophy in English Canada as a peculiar variant of moralizing
philosophy. Colleges in British North America in the mid-
nineteenth century promoted knowledge not for itself but as a
means for "cultivating a disposition of mind." (p. 14) In fact,
the prime motivation behind education was to instil strong
principles of morality. The overarching justification behind
studying even subjects like geology and literature was to show
the necessity of a proper relationship to God.

McKillop’s thesis is that: “a central and continuous element of Anglo-Canadian intellectual life—so much as to constitute a virtual imperative—has been its moral dimension.” (p. ix) Canadian academics, unlike Americans, were not concerned with the details of philosophical systems. (p. 58) McKillop discusses the context:

Caught historically between a British heritage, which many of them conceived to contain the best elements of Western civilization, and an American neighbour, which advanced ineluctably towards modernity its modes of thought and action, Anglo-Canadians in the Victorian era sought to establish and to preserve in Canada a broad moral code that would constitute the core of a way of life reconciling belief and inquiry, tradition and innovation, concern and freedom. (p. ix)

The sustenance of a moral code based upon rational religion while Americans and Europeans sought novelty is perhaps attributable to the fact that many of the immigrants to English Canada had either missed the Enlightenment, or had explicitly rejected it. (Armour, 1985, p. 146) These groups believed in an organic society, that is, one in which all parts function together. This would be consistent with a common concern for morality in its broadest sense. "Disciplined intelligence" referred to in the title of McKillop’s book means that the goal of English Canadian philosophy was to combine piety and critical endeavour in such a way as to direct intellectual freedom.

The remaining question is the uniqueness of the English Canadian perspective. McKillop agrees that the moral imperative is universal, nevertheless:
What is most distinctive about this phenomenon in Anglo-Canadian thought is that despite its inevitable twists and turns its different intellectual shapes and emotional shadings, the basic lesson has nevertheless remained constant from generation to generation, and it has also been given a sustained voice. The Anglo-Canadian intellectual elite, whether living in a God-centred North American nation, has consistently urged that it is necessary to reach a modus vivendi between intellectual inquiry and conventional wisdom, between individual autonomy and the social good, between the myth of freedom and the myth of concern. (p. 231)

In short, there was a deliberate balance sought between science and scholarship, and between religion and moral belief. To add a twist on a Gadamerian term, there existed a selectively open horizon in early English Canadian thought. Philosophical inquiry was not free, but directed so as to guard people from dropping into potentially bottomless craters of unbelief. This theme is stronger in Beaven's view than in Murray's.

Lastly I will discuss what has been said about the professionalization of philosophy in English Canada. No philosophical journals were published in English Canada and the first association commenced just before World War II. The only general organization was the Royal Society of Canada of which Murray and his philosophical contemporary John Watson were charter members. There were no graduate schools there in the nineteenth century unlike in the United States.

*These two foundational myths are from Northrop Frye's *The Critical Path*. Myths are the central motifs structuring tradition and thought. The myth of concern, rooted in religion, binds society together with common acts and assumptions. The subsidiary is the myth of freedom which consists of individuals' inner identity and its outward expression before others. I interpret McKillop as saying that these often conflicting myths are balanced in the Canadian collective consciousness.
This lack of professional organization across Canada did not prevent Canadians from publishing widely. Murray and Watson were as prolific as other philosophers. Irving assesses their contributions:

Their professional contributions to philosophy were probably superior to, and certainly the equal of, anything that was being produced at such leading American universities as Columbia, Yale or Princeton between 1870 and 1900, or even at Harvard before the advent of William James and Josiah Royce. In fact only a few philosophers even in twentieth century America, which has replaced Germany as the home of professional scholarship, could match the productivity of Murray and Watson either in quality or quantity. (1950, pp. 294-5)

According to McKillop's work, the nature of philosophy changed in Canada just as we have seen it did in the United States. He says that one must keep in mind that nineteenth century philosophy differed vastly from its twentieth century academic counterpart:

Any examination of nineteenth-century moral philosophy and its influences cannot limit its inquiry solely to "doctrine", for it will fundamentally miss the point of the entire enterprise—which was to instil a general philosophical outlook that could be used in the everyday experience of living. (p. 31)

According to Janet Scarfe, English Canadian founders of universities had a complimentary vision of education. They believed that the benefits of higher education were not restricted to the denominations supporting the colleges but were of value to society as a whole. The moralizing function was part of this endeavour:
Their professors were the necessary instruments of learning and piety, their principal function to understand and implement the colleges' purposes of educating young men for service in church and state by disciplining their minds and fashioning their morals. (p. 50)

For both Irving and McKillop, Murray was the first professional philosopher in English Canada. I argue with Armour that Beaven was the first due to the style of argument employed in *The Elements of Natural Theology*. In spite of its title and religious intention, this is a work of professional philosophy for the most part. My study will show the traits of professionalization by analysis of texts. To reiterate, I will be looking for a professional treatment of the subject matter by the criterion of thorough, detailed and technical philosophical discourse.
II. James Beaven

i) Introduction

James Beaven was born in 1801 in Wiltshire and educated at Oxford. He was an Anglican minister whose first writings consisted of strictly religious tracts. Bishop Strachan chose him to be professor of divinity for King’s College in Toronto in 1843. When King’s College ceased to function in 1850 Beaven became the first professor of philosophy (Metaphysics and Ethics) at the University of Toronto. This was the first Canadian Chair of philosophy, that is, one not affiliated with a specific denomination. Alongside Beaven also served the university in a religious capacity as Chaplain. He conducted daily services according to the Prayer Book and offered religious instruction to undergraduates.

In English Canada, the diversity and sparseness of denominational populations encouraged the establishment of common educational institutions. (Armour and Trott, 1981, p. 33) The highly influential Egerton Ryerson as Superintendent of Schools of Upper Canada in 1846 was concerned with accommodating denominational diversity. Beaven contributed to solving this dilemma by writing a work of rational religion whose unifying goal I have already described.

Clifford Holland has commented on Beaven’s teaching aspirations. Holland notes that Beaven’s fear of boundless critical inquiry was not uncommon at the time for his
ultraorthodox circles. According to Holland's subject, the man
of letters William Dawson LeSueur, Beaven sought to impose
intellectual strictures around his students:

Free thought could only lead the students into the
darkness of the pit, "into depths in which painful
doubt and fear may agitate his soul, as to the grounds
and foundations of all religious truth." (Quoted in
Holland, p. 115)

LeSueur says that he deliberately rejected Beaven's narrow minded
dogmatism and instead searched for truth which could lie outside
of religion. Holland writes: "Despite the best efforts of James
Beaven, his formal education had taught him to value the
intellect." (pp. 18-19) Holland contends that his intention for
writing *Elements of Natural Theology* was to provide students with
arguments which would form a protective shell against infidelity.

Religious belief was to be safeguarded at all costs:

Beaven felt it his solemn duty to warn his students of
the danger presented to their faith by the pursuit of
independent critical thought and inquiry, for the end
result of this could only be to sever their intellect
from that of the Deity. (p. 15)

Scarfe further attests to Beaven's unpopularity. Since
1843, he required his students take word for word the notes he
ddictated on various textbooks. His student and subsequent
colleague James Loudon regarded Beaven's lectures as "most
tedious and unpopular with the students." (quoted in Scarfe, pp.
343-344) According to Paxton Young, Beaven was pensioned off
after twenty years of serving an institution he disapproved of,
following many years of failing to "incite an interest" in
metaphysics and ethics. (quoted in Scarfe, p. 218)
Holland's and LeSueur's assessment of Beaven is borne out to some degree in *The Elements*. This is a work of both religion and philosophy. These critics are overly harsh as Beaven's use of argumentation manifests a high regard for the persuasive power of philosophic reason. This is no small consideration. Beaven's wish to limit the freedom of intellectual speculation is by no means admirable in our time. Nevertheless, the method by which he tries to prove his thesis on God is philosophically sound. Specifically, Beaven's method is to examine the premises of the standard arguments for the existence of God both in terms of validity and persuasive effectiveness. That is to say, Beaven implicitly addresses the concerns of two sorts of readers, laymen and professionals, questioning the existence of God. In spite of Beaven's stated belief that religion is prior to philosophy, it is philosophy which predominates in his book.

I shall set up my discussion on Beaven's work by first presenting Mckillop's work on the historical background. Mckillop suggests that the overwhelming power of nature had an effect upon the psyche of intellectuals at North American universities. The study of nature was, with all other subject matters including science, grounded in Christian doctrine. (p. 59)

The ideas of William Paley (whose famous version of the argument from design was developed by Beaven) served as a bastion against intellectual anarchy. Paley wrote at the beginning of the century. By early nineteenth century he was an authority in
the English speaking world. The essence of the argument from *Natural Theology* is that nature manifests design, and that a design cannot exist without a designer. From this Paley derived a theory of moral obligation. Paley's natural theology was de rigueur in English Canada. In contrast, Paley's influence upon American textbook moralism ended in 1835. (Meyer, p. 9)

McKillop notes that after 1854 the only required subjects at University of Toronto's four year program were metaphysics and ethics. After the publication of Darwin's evolutionary theory (1859) the metaphysics course was displaced by natural theology and the evidence of Christianity. These last two courses remained the only mandatory ones until 1877. Beaven's book is the first adaptation of natural theology for Canadian universities.

Beaven says that he makes no pretension to originality and McKillop says the same. However, Leslie Armour credits Beaven with insightful novelty into the design argument. For a full assessment of Beaven's merits see the commentaries by Armour and Trott in *Religion and Science in Early Canada* and *The Faces of Reason*. I will not be judging the quality of Beaven's philosophy but rather his philosophical intentions.
i) The distinction between theology and philosophy in *The Elements of Natural Theology*

*The Elements of Natural Theology* begins with terminological distinctions. Revealed theology is the knowledge given by God to mankind. This is a direct, strictly theological notion. Natural theology is knowledge of God via human sense perceiving the indications of Him in the world. The primary objective of natural theology is to prove the existence of God. Beaven asserts that all cultures have at least a shadowy conception of a higher being. Only natural theology gives a true and as complete as possible description. He credits the Greeks and Romans for ascertaining that nature manifests the mark of intelligent creation.

Beaven clearly states the motivation of his endeavour. First he wants to provide his young Christian students with sound arguments against the sceptics. Second, he is worried that their private speculation on these matters could lead to doubt. Third is his conviction that natural theology adds to one's knowledge of God. This 'science' underscores the fact that God is present throughout the world and hence should be consciously appreciated.

At this point we are presented with an unabashedly religious intention behind the work. In the history of philosophy, it is well recognized that proofs for the existence of God frequently have an ulterior, i.e. theological, motivation. What is unusual here is Beaven's affirmation of belief buttressed by public reason. Not only must the young student be assured in his personal belief in God, but he must be able to argue his case
before his wayward peers and society at large.

I shall show that there is a mixture of professional and non-professional writing in the book. Beaven expects that a wide audience will not only read but will consider his ideas to be very important to the maintenance of civic virtue. Beaven's objective for giving a complete treatment of Paley's argument from design is to: "pave theology for better consideration of the evidence of revealed religion, and of the philosophy of morals, by whomever treated of." (p. 51, emphasis mine)

He deliberately strives to maintain accessibility. And yet, at the same time, I shall show that the actual argument is in its technical version quite difficult to grasp by non-philosophers. I will be quoting fairly extensively at times to indicate the level of rigour reflected in his style.

The first philosophical work Beaven accomplishes is to appraise the advantages and disadvantages of different general kinds of proof. The two categories are authority or prescription and prevalent opinion. He contends that the former is stronger as reason is the cause of one argument displacing another. Beaven assigns some weight to prevalent opinion as a viable argument for truth. His justification is that received opinion is likely to be either well founded on reason or handed down from an original source of information. Beaven claims that there is often a forgotten primary cause of opinion determining the human mind.
Natural theology is said to cover both types of evidence. It is claimed to be a strong argument in itself that most societies posit a supreme being. Without revelation this intuition remains obscured, especially insofar as cultures adopt polytheism. Beaven is open enough to praise non-Western civilizations for realizing this fact: "Indeed, in some extremely ancient nations, such as the aborigines of North America, the supremacy of one Great Spirit is clearly held." (p. 34)

He is also not adverse to citing arguments of the ancient 'pagans' in support of the argument he will offer; in fact he turns to them rather than to Scripture throughout the book for sustenance since they came so close to the truth without Christianity. He lauds Plato and Aristotle for their presumption of a first cause and Zeno and the Stoics for their notion of an intelligent power pervading the world. Beaven thinks that the latter were very astute to have seen that this intelligent power must possess reason. He cites at length the arguments of Zeno. As a whole, their fault was pantheism—they did not see that the intelligent power must be above all being. In his conclusion, Beaven says that the result of this error was blindness to God's moral powers:
The Socratic school saw that Deity must be pure and holy in itself and the author of purity and virtue in man, but they did not therefore see that man must seek from Deity his further improvements in moral excellence.

The Stoic school, the Peripatetic and older academic schools, were right in believing that there must be some certainty of moral truth and in reasoning as though they disbelieved many truths which they actually received. But their plan of searching for truth everywhere was useful in preparing men's minds for the reception of Christianity. (p. 31)

The evidence from the two groups of opinion of Natural Theology, namely authority and general prevalence, are sufficient in themselves except in a climate of doubt. Rigorous proofs then become necessary. Beaven analyses the value of the various types. He distinguishes two kinds of proof: abstract and practical. Practical proofs draw upon concrete evidence discernible to everyone whereas abstract proofs rely upon reason in its speculative sense. In a way which is reminiscent of Blaise Pascal's Pensées, Beaven analyses these types of proofs in terms of their effectiveness.

The core intuition of the Greek philosophers is that all things are caused by others and yet an infinite regress is senseless; therefore there must exist a First Cause. The second stage of the argument says that only mind can move matter, therefore the creator must be composed of mind. Beaven takes some time to comment on the Stoics' position concerning gradations of being. He also refers to his contemporaries' work. On his reading of Lord Brougham's Discourse on Natural Theology (Part i) and Dr. Clarke's On the Being and Attributes of God, the argument based on infinite regression is a posteriori and relies
upon a limited number of facts.

As mentioned in the introduction, it is a feature of academic professionalism to address literature which the reader is unlikely to have read. Beaven does not dwell upon any secondary works other than Paley’s treatise. Beaven reduces the argument of Brougham and Clarke to the following: all known systems require a governing centre; by analogy the universe should also have one. (p. 41)

Beaven does not comment upon the validity of abstract arguments (i.e. those not dependent upon empirical evidence) for the existence of God with the exception of Brougham’s argument from mind. This says that from one’s personal awareness of agency a creator can be inferred. Beaven dismisses Brougham’s argument as an instance of begging the question.

He says that there are two main flaws with abstract proofs for the existence of God. Firstly, although he acknowledges that "the most cultured men" beginning with Socrates were coming close to the truth,

all these men without exception, rendered their worship and homage not to the great First Cause, but the host of inferior supernatural beings, whom they supposed to be subordinate to the First Cause and to the actual governors of this lower world. (p. 42)

The abstract argument attests to the limits of reason unaided by revelation.

The second flaw of abstract proofs is the lack of persuasive power. Beaven has taken it upon himself to convince everyone including diehard unbelievers to accept Natural Theology. Even
the most painstaking explanation of abstract arguments for God's existence is insufficient to sway most people. Such arguments are not self-evident as "some of them require the most minute metaphysical examination of preliminary matter before they convince in any degree those who advanced them." (p. 42) Beaven recalls that even Aristotle saw that metaphysical arguments are only relatively effectual. Only a minority can perform abstract reasoning. Herein one can detect Beaven's method of persuasion by a reliance upon the meticulous development of certain proofs for the existence of God.

It would seem that Beaven is drawing upon the Common Sense tradition which Irving says dominated this period. Beaven refers to the "ordinary man" who can be shown the truth via a suitable argument.7 This will lead to an attempt to contribute to social and moral unity of the community.

ii) The argument from design

Although he respects them, Beaven quickly eschews abstract proofs for practical proof in the form of an elaboration of Paley's argument from design. This famous argument asserts that the orderly arrangement of the world indicates a purposeful designer who is identified as God. Beaven's updated version of

7McKillop suggests that there was a conflict between Beaven's attempt to enlighten people and the Common Sense criterion of truth of the common man's untrained faculty of reason. (p. 70) I think McKillop goes too far here as Beaven expresses no explicit or detectably strong implicit affiliation with Common Sense.
the argument has two components. First is the idea that God must have given nature its structure. Second is an inference that God similarly created a coherent moral sphere for humanity.

Up until now, Beaven has not explored any philosophical issue in depth. He does make a number of scholarly references here and there, but it would not be difficult for the non-philosopher to follow the line of thought. In spite of his promise of ease of understanding, there are technical aspects of his first account of the argument from design which are not very accessible to outsiders. Beaven is also deliberately thorough in his presentation as he holds that the more minutely he extends this inquiry, the more his reader will perceive a connection throughout nature.

Beaven's introduction to Paley quotes extensively from the author. The essential argument is quite simple to grasp, and it is commonly known as the most intuitively conceived argument for the existence of God. Paley says that if one finds a watch in the desert one will presume a maker. Equally, the eye must have been created by a higher power as a telescope for the mind. Paley and later the Bridgewater Treatises elaborate on this point to claim that design must be the cause of many circumstances in nature as opposed to chaos. Beaven carefully reviews the various objections the sceptic would pose. These revolve around the facts that God's alleged products are imperfect, often inscrutable as to their purpose, and manifest no evidence of actual construction. The argument of Democritus is that the
properties of creatures regardless of ad hoc design
justifications are accidental. Beaven thinks that the design
intuition can be salvaged if we take a different perspective:
"But would it be a rational way of accounting for the existence
of a watch to say that it was only one of the possible
combinations of material forms?" (pp. 59-60)

The solution is to see God not as the maker of specific
watches and specific creatures, but as the creator of a system of
laws whose coherence allows creatures and their attributes to
develop. According to Armour, Beaven was taking up William
Whewell's idea that nature is law-like. Whewell is not saying
that these laws rigorously determine phenomena; rather it is the
form of the laws that provide an intelligible order for natural
events to inhere in. (Armour and Trott, 1981, pp. 83-84)

It is also possible that Beaven was influenced by his
research on St. Ireneus. Ireneus was one of the early Greek
Fathers whose ideas were revived by Friedrich Schleiermacher.
While in England Beaven wrote a theologically oriented biography
of Ireneus called An Account of the Life and Writings of St.
Ireneus. According to John Hick, Ireneus believed that God
intended the world to be a realm of growth for human potential.
Instead of creating a world subject to human whim, God arranged a
natural order with stable and objective laws with which people
must contend with. (p. 273)
Beaven argues in *The Elements* that the ability to create laws is a power beyond human capability. The machines we invent upon the regularity of nature, indicating a higher power which we cannot fully comprehend. Beaven also notes that the intelligibility of nature to human knowledge itself reflects the natural order. If the sceptic acknowledges that there exists a harmony among the laws of nature, then "it is but a step to believe that the being who gave laws to this vast machinery, must be the very being who devised and constructed the machinery itself." (p. 65)

An adamant atheist may continue to insist that an infinite series of causation created the system of laws. This position for Beaven commits her to do the following: 1) establish from the earliest point in history that there is no sign of the present situation; and 2) prove that the causes producing a combination of adaptations were brought about either by their own agency or a previous cause.

This particular section of the book is the most difficult to grasp. Beaven does not appear to realize that it takes a degree of abstract reasoning to understand the organizing power to form laws. I do not anticipate that the average reader could figure out the chain of reasoning behind the following:

It requires as much a determining will, anterior to these motions [perpendicular and curvilinear as discerned by science] to fix them in direction and number, as it does to devise and settle all the various forms which we believe to have been the work of a creator. (p. 62)
Accordingly, the prose becomes somewhat technical in this section. To apprehend God as the creator of a system of laws requires probably as much metaphysical contemplation as does the notion of an infinite regression. However, I do not think that the layman reader who cannot catch on at this point is left in the dark. Seventy pages later in a different section Beaven gives a looser and more digestible version of the argument.

But to follow the chronology of his book for now, his next move is to advance the argument by recounting the details of God’s ingenuity. He extols the myriad of uses of the human hand, explaining that he could do the same for every part of the human body. He discusses thoroughly the interdependence of birds, fish and plants. There exists a remarkable gradation of scale in creation. And it would seem that Canada’s nature had an influence upon him as McKillop says is true of early Canadian intellectuals. For example, Beaven tells us how the motionless oysters, polypes and sponges connect to fish and plants:

The sensitive plant and the pitcher plant of Upper Canada connect plants and animals: for their nutriment is composed in part of animal substance (feeding on flies); and the latter shrinks from the touch. (p. 125)

The second version of the design argument from laws begins with the contention that the unity of God is necessary as objects are moved in accordance to laws as opposed to each moving by a separate agency. (p. 130) For example, carrot seeds do not produce mustard. God is explicitly defined as the Author, Governor and Preserver of the laws of the universe. It is not
required that God determine events specifically, but simply create an objective framework:

Events are brought about, not by isolated interpositions of Divine power, exerted in each particular case, but by the establishment of general laws. (p. 131)

Beaven assures readers that God is not unconcerned with small details as Infinite being considers the differences between the great and small to be insignificant. He says that Butler noted that we cannot know which occurrences, including miracles, fall under laws. Beaven holds that God may directly intervene when situations are worthy, but for the most part there are no particulars undetermined by the system of laws. (p. 213, 217) Beaven hopes that his readers will now understand the "habitual properties" of God's nature. (p. 133)

His next move is to extend the attributes of God as creator of laws and physical matter to everything else including in particular Spirit, the capacity of mind to move matter. Beaven slips in a traditional metaphysical proof for the existence of God: effects must resemble the cause; from self-examination of our minds we infer a Supreme Being. (p. 138) This is identified as the Moral God. This part of the book is very swift and philosophically tenuous unlike his thesis concerning God as law maker.

It should be evident at this point that Beaven is striving to satisfy two audiences almost simultaneously. First and foremost are his students and through them the general public. And second are his peers who are the only ones who could fully
appreciate God as the keeper of order. In Pascal's terms, this is a form of the philosopher's god and not the god of the heart (i.e. the Moral God). In both cases, the goal is to employ reason towards taking unbelief on its own grounds and eventually drive the sceptic out of his "refuge of lies". (p. 238)

Beaven's account of the moral deity does admittedly veer away from philosophy toward religion. The two great "religious truths" are that there is a God, and he rewards his seekers. Seeking means acquiring knowledge of His moral attributes: goodness, justice, holiness and our own obedience. It would seem that having taken care of the rational argument hurdle, Beaven feels at ease to praise God's benevolence at length. To give LeSueur and Holland their due, I acknowledge that Beaven has some harsh words about the unrestricted use of reason. At the very end of the book, he says that the legitimate use of reason is fruitful,

But when we likewise reflect how dimly and imperfectly men arrived at truth by the use of unaided reason—that all the heathens who arrived the nearest to it was Socrates, who professed himself to be enlightened and guided by supernatural aid,—we must surely be most thankful that God has cast our lot amongst those whom He has not left themselves, but whose reason He has cleared and directed by his revealed Word and his enlightening Spirit. (p. 240)

In spite of the fact that Beaven locates the ultimate epistemological truth in Revelation over reason, this book relies upon philosophical reasoning and not theology to establish its thesis. In other words, religion may be the stated foundation of philosophizing, but in effect reason remains the basis for
steadfast adherence to religious belief. Beaven makes far more references to Greek philosophers in support of his contentions than to Scripture and theologians including Irenæus. Furthermore, in case of inconsistency among revelations Beaven states in no uncertain terms that he is prepared to use reason to adjudicate. (p. 283)

Beaven uses reason to tackle the problem of evil in a fairly competent way. He defends God's benevolence by appealing to the limitations of our knowledge of the good. The fact that no one had discovered a good resulting from an insect bite does not mean that one does not exist. Beaven's justifications of the possible good effects of a seeming evil do end as he admits that he cannot explain why the majority suffer. (p. 37) He is troubled by the fact that most of this segment of the population are given little opportunity for moral instruction which could at least lift them in spirit from their miserable condition. He says that even the ancient Greeks failed to find an adequate explanation of evil. Beaven suggests that God's system of laws may not be perfectly coherent and he also resorts to some traditional metaphysical responses. For the most part, he wants the attention to be directed to God's fundamental benevolence. In a somewhat Romantic vein, he suggests that the Designer wanted to make humans comfortable*. In this section Beaven is neither original

*In this respect, Murray does not follow the general tendency of authors who upon encountering the harsh climate of Canada, became disillusioned with nature. See Margaret Atwood's *Survival*.
nor enlightening, nevertheless, his arguments are based upon sound critical reflection.

The last evidence of God's existence I wish to mention is the influence of moral laws in all political structures. *Recreations of a Long Vacation, or a Visit to the Indian Mission in Upper Canada* (1846) describes his travels without condemning the native way of life; thus in spite of his partisanship for Christianity, he was open minded enough to discuss morality in a cross-cultural sense. He says that without direct intervention, communities are alleged to naturally encourage virtue by laws and customs. (1850, p. 175) Beaven is careful to extrapolate that God, on top of giving each individual a moral nature, "puts us in a condition of influence of promoting justice." (p. 177) Here Beaven bears out the Armour and Trott thesis that Canadian thinkers were concerned with public reason (i.e. theories that are directed more to laymen readers as opposed to fellow academics). Unfortunately Beaven does not pursue this aspect of God's influence in any depth.

Contrary to the view of Holland, Irving and McKillop, Beaven is a philosopher (albeit not a pure one) because his work depends upon theoretical reason. He strives to be both a professional and a public philosopher at the same time, putting him into the previously discussed category of transitional philosophers. To reiterate Beaven's method once again, he deliberately employs philosophic reason as a means to obtaining community consensus regarding the fundamental religious issue.
iv) The moral consideration

Concerning the theme of moralizing philosophy, Beaven fits in as he anticipates that students will act in accordance with their belief in God as the creator of moral law. In this book, proper knowledge of divinity is sufficient for his purposes. Beaven also makes a few remarks here and there on the individual responsibility for moral self-improvement. He does however engage in moralizing philosophy to a greater degree in his preface to Selections from Cicero. He argues that the Ethics of Aristotle is vastly superior to any work by Cicero, however, the latter does not make the error of giving the state the task of societal regeneration: "they [Cicero and later Locke and Paley] recognize the duty of each person to acknowledge his own responsibility and to attempt his own improvement." (1853, p. v)

Beaven is the first pioneer in the history of Anglo-Canadian philosophy. The work of John Clark Murray is more extensive and prodigious. He practices full fledged moralizing philosophy. My final word on Beaven is that if for nothing else, his presumption that his philosophical writing will be meaningful and effectual to non-philosophers makes him worthy of attention as a historically significant figure of Canadian thought.
III John Clark Murray

i) Introduction—The Social Gospel Movement

Reverend Murray was born in 1836 in Scotland at Thread and Tannahill near Paisley. His early education was spent at the Free School Church in Kilmarnock. He received his higher education from the University of Glasgow where he distinguished himself in philosophy, classics and English. He was Sir William Hamilton’s most promising student and he was recommended by Edward Caird in 1862 to hold the chair of Logic, Metaphysics and Ethics at Glasgow. Murray was insufficiently partisan within the sectarian disagreements among Presbyterians to acquire an academic post. It is likely for this reason that he went to Canada. (Terpstra, p. 9)

He was Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy at Queen’s College, Kingston from 1862 until 1872. He then took an equivalent position at McGill University until 1903. Murray is renowned at Queen’s for having championed access to higher education for women. He overcame administrative opposition to offer women three classes in rhetoric and logic, English and natural history. (Neatby, 133)

In contrast to Beaven, Murray was an exceedingly popular teacher. He is described by Scarfe as ‘indefatigable’. Whereas his predecessor at Queen’s, James George, taught moral philosophy and logic for only the required ten hours per week, Murray extended the curriculum to include metaphysics and rhetoric and he taught for fifteen hours per week. (Scarfe, p. 396)
In an 1872 speech Murray said that the two great social inequities of the time were the status of women in society and the question of capital and labour. Murray’s longtime concern with economic reform is likely attributable to his roots. His father, David Murray, was Provost of Paisley where a serious depression occurred in the late 1830s and 1840s. Paisley was a small town seven miles away from Glasgow whose employment centred around cloth-manufacturing. A loss in trade caused the bankruptcy of the local manufacturers, small businesses and in turn the town itself. Paisley’s council, adhering to strict free market economics, refused to initiate subsidies. Murray’s faith in the natural laws of Political Economy changed with experience, but he had a lifelong concern to raise the standard of living of the poor through economic reform guided by moral principles.

Murray’s scholarly output was prodigious. His first book, *Outline of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy*, is the second work of serious philosophy written in English Canada. *An Introduction to Ethics* was recommended as the best introductory text of the subject by Schurman’s review in *The Philosophical Review*. His unpublished manuscript, *The Industrial Kingdom of God*, is full of insightful ideas about modern society which are worthy of consideration today. Murray also wrote articles for both scholarly and popular journals. Furthermore, as he still lived in a time when one could be seen as an expert in many fields (i.e. pre-specialization), his topics of study also extended to literature, psychology and theology. Irving says that Murray was
also unusually well versed in science for a philosopher as he had studied physics in Scotland and Germany. (1950, p. 279) He kept abreast of the latest developments, giving his writings a certain concreteness not found in the work of his English Canadian colleagues.

There are many facets to Murray's life as a scholar. There is textual evidence that Murray ultimately believed that religion was the foundation of philosophy. By contrast with Beaven, Murray did sometimes call upon religion to take the place of philosophical argument. Terpstra argues that towards the end of his career, Murray eschewed philosophy for the more suitable mode of fiction. My focus is on Murray as a philosopher. Though some of his work was not professional as it was written for popular magazines, a good proportion of his work was scholarly in the strictest sense. Murray was a philosopher's philosopher meeting the standards of fully professional philosophy. I will argue that he was successful in the two capacities as public sage

*Terpstra uncovered Murray's 1904 novel *He That Had Received the Five Talents*. Terpstra contends that this book marks the point when Murray finally found the appropriate form for delivering his message on industrial reform. Terpstra fails to prove the value of this book as his own presentation of the plot makes it sound facile and pedantic. Murray's published literary pieces are poor. For example, "The Merchant of Venice as an Exponent of Industrial Ethics" make the dubious claim that Shakespeare's intent was to discern the essence of industrial morality. (p. 349) Also the twelve page poem *Epimetheus, to my students* is a feeble attempt to inspire others to see the intellect as a natural wander. A sample of Murray's literary talents: "The Sovereign Reason of the world; Throughout the Ages is unfurled" (p. 11) In short, even if Murray saw himself as an author, his literary side (unlike his philosophy) does not deserve to be remembered.
and as specialized intellectual.

Before giving an account of his work I will briefly touch
upon the nature and influence of nineteenth century philosophy in
Canada. The Scottish tradition is associated with a strong
democratic tendency. The education system sought to develop a
broadness of intellect with the study of philosophy being
dominant. This objective was consciously seen as antithetical to
specialization. John Higham notes that late eighteenth century
Scottish philosophers had learned the contradiction of
specialization:

They acclaimed it as the prime cause of the rise of
civilization, while, at the same time, they feared it
as a profound threat to civic virtue and social
solidarity. (p. 5)

From the short list of Murray's writings, it would appear that
Murray sought this broadness.

As mentioned previously, Murray was trained in the Common
Sense tradition. This movement combats Hume's scepticism that
common sense beliefs can never be justified and that they are
contradicted by experience. The Common Sense school argued that
beliefs of common sense are reliable for experience, and they are
defensible only to a point at which they are empirically
defensible at which mystery takes over.\[10\]

\[10\]The nature and scope of the Scottish Common Sense school is highly problematic. The basic idea may be simple but its adherents were extremely varied. There has been little interest in trying to characterize the movement as a whole. My treatment of the Common Sense school is deliberately cursory as Canadian philosophy is distinct from its origins and deserves evaluation on its own merits.
Irving asserts that the Common Sense tradition was the often hidden but the constant underlying influence in his work. (1950, p. 279) This is unlikely as the disintegration of the tradition had already occurred during his years in Scotland. (Armour and Trott, 1981, p. 105; Grave, p. 257; Davis, p. 303) There was a debate between Hamilton and Ferrier by which the common sense criterion was eventually dissolved. Influenced by Kant, Hamilton's axiom of relativity says that there can never be a complete match between the knower and the known object. Ferrier went further and Hegelianized the Common Sense tradition. He argued that there is no ignorance without veritable knowledge. (Grave, 129)

While it is known that Murray read Ferrier, he does not express a decisive opinion on the issue. Most importantly, there is no textual evidence to support Irving's analysis. Murray's book on Hamilton gives a neutral but comprehensive presentation of the subject. In the nineteenth century, the norm was not to hold back support for someone when due. And his four part series of articles on Hamilton in The Canadian Journal of Industry, Science and Art along with his commentary in "The Scottish Philosophy" were highly critical. In art IV of the latter, Murray says he too is unclear on the limits of this tradition. In the latter, he clearly eschews the aforementioned premise behind the Common Sense school:

But every philosopher of common sense, if not of the Common Sense School, must see that such propositions [of Reid] are of no philosophical value till purified by reflective analysis—till we can show that we have
accurately interpreted the language in which they are expressed, and that language represents with scientific exactness the mental phenomena of which it is the revelation between man and man. (1878, p. 121)

I think it is best to see Murray as an individualist (not politically but academically that is)—a characteristic of the Scottish intellect. (Davie, 280) Murray’s philosophical sympathies are more aptly characterized as an eclectic idealism—that is, he takes up this thread from historically diverse sources including the Stoics, Aristotle, Berkeley, Rousseau, Spinoza and Kant.

Lastly I wish to discuss Murray’s contribution to the Social Gospel movement in English Canada. This was a program of Christian thought and action which occurred between 1890 and the 1930s. Richard Allen characterizes it as follows:

The reform movement may be viewed from many standpoints, but only when it is looked at as a religious manifestation, a striving to embed ultimate human goals in the social, economic and political order, is its success and failure fully appreciated. (p. 272)

The principal concern was economic disparity between owners and workers. The origins of the movement were British and American. In the United States the issue is admitted to be too amorphous to pin down: "the social gospel is a phenomenon that is difficult to define or contain." (White and Hopkins, p. xii) These authors claim that it was not an organized movement but a "network of movements operating in different contexts".
The Canadian version had distinctive features. While continuing the main emphasis on reform, it also absorbed some nationalism in order to assimilate foreign immigrants. (Grant, p. 101) The dominant Protestant denominations were Anglican, Methodist and Presbyterian. Presbyterians were particularly notable. They proposed a moderate approach to reform that "sought to promote social harmony through moral persuasion, education and legislation." (Fraser, p. 35) Fraser says that no one has yet determined the theological system of the Canadian variant of the Social Gospel movement. (p. 45)

Ramsay Cook's *The Regenerators* is a substantial effort in this area. He says that economic injustice was connected to an intellectual crisis. People questioned the role of the church in modern society. Religious leaders felt a responsibility to ameliorate the situation. The reaction was: "the social gospel purported to provide a new rationale for Christianity and a new mission for the church." (p. 175) In its most extreme form, the sole goal of Christianity was social reform. The characteristic ideal of this movement was brotherhood which would displace class conflict. Cook credits Murray with the identification of the equitable distribution of wealth as a religious question. (p. 184) A corollary thesis was that ethics and economics were ultimately inseparable. For Murray, economic laws were not

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11 The Social Gospel movement in the United States has been linked with a service ideal involved in the moral justification for professionalization and specialization. (Marsden, 19) No such connection has been drawn in the case of English Canada.
analogous to physical laws but to flexible moral precepts.

Cook asserts that in at least the sphere of social and political philosophy, Christianity was the explicit foundation of theory. There are two problems with Cook's somewhat indirect attribution of leadership in the social gospel movement to Murray. The first is historical and the second is philosophical.

To begin with the historical problem, John Webster Grant says that Cook's study is flawed as it discusses figures who were marginal to the churches. (p. 225) Neither Fraser nor Allen mention Murray. Murray was trained as a clergyman as were most Scottish intellectuals, but he did not distinguish himself as a church authority among his active roles in the community.

The true mentor of the movement in Canada was Salem Bland. (Richard, 273) His arguments for reform clearly depend upon the Church's role:

In the name of the brotherhood of Christianity, in the name of the richness and variety of the human soul, the Church must declare a truceless war upon this sterilizing and dehumanizing competition and upon the source of it, an economic order based on profit-seeking. (Bland, p. 27)

In contrast to this approach and in opposition to Cook's interpretation, Murray does not employ Christian doctrine and its institutions as the foundation of his social and political thought.

Equally, American social gospellers promoted religion as the solution to labour's predicament. For example, Washington Gladden, religious leader of The Independent, admitted to not understanding economics but asserted that "Christian principle"
could ameliorate the worker's situation. (Handy, p. 33)

I think that Cook fails to look beyond the surface rhetoric in Murray's writing and see that Christianity is not the basis of his arguments, although it is perhaps their inspiration. Indeed, the very title of the book is typical of works of the Social Gospel movement. What is important is that in spite of Murray's reliance upon theology at times, he does make a number of invaluable arguments concerning the moral nature of social and economic relations worthy of deeming The Industrial Kingdom of God a classic of Canadian thought. In short, I am claiming that the best way of seeing Murray's relation to the Social Gospel movement in Canada is as an outsider influenced by the currents of thought of his day.

ii) Moralizing philosophy--Social and Political Theory

To continue with the theme of the Social Gospel movement I shall begin my exposition with Murray's social and political philosophy. His magnum opus is his unpublished (during his lifetime) The Industrial Kingdom of God. This is one work of Canadian practical and theoretical philosophy worthy of study.

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12 Terpstra contends that Murray's motivation for not publishing the work was that he had outgrown philosophy to the more suitable medium of fiction. (20) Terpstra's own description of the novel He that Had Received Five Talents (1904) does sounds neither appealing nor enlightening. Terpstra is simply speculating, and even if were true, Murray's intentions are not a concern. Regardless of his reasons for not publishing the manuscript, The Industrial Kingdom of God is an invaluable book.
today. It offers a solution to the problem of the equitable
distribution of wealth which takes an entirely different approach
from Marx. In contrast to Marx's call for revolution, Murray
lays out a plan of social reform by moral enlightenment of the
opposition. It is utopian insofar as it is improbable that any
argument can convince the majority that it is in the interests of
all members of society including owners that workers should earn
a decent wage. This book is not in itself an implausible vision
of a just society whereby everyone has the means to attain
intellectual, cultural and spiritual fulfilment.

I agree with Terpstra and Cook that Murray was probably
prompted to push for reform by a religious impetus. Indeed,
throughout The Industrial Kingdom of God there are frequent
appeals to Christian hearts. For example, Murray mentions the
proverbial difficulty for the rich to enter heaven as support for
his belief that wealth accords greater social responsibility.
And the epigraph to the work is "The Spirit of the Lord is upon
me, because He hath anointed me to preach the gospel to the
poor." (Luke iv., 18) Again, in spite of Murray's stated
religious intentions, the book contains many interesting
philosophical arguments for reform that make a secular reading
worthwhile. This is my focus in drawing out the elements of both
professional and moralizing philosophy.

By way of introduction I shall first comment on Murray's
other writings related to encouraging moral progress.
"Philosophy and Industrial Life" published by The Monist gives
his view of the proper relation between philosophy and politics. Murray's thesis is that the world of the scholar and the world of the industrial labourer are not distinct as is commonly supposed but interdependent. It is a precondition of truly successful societies that surplus wealth must be devoted to education and culture rather than to the military sphere.

Industrialism's fruit is to support intellectuals who reciprocate by encouraging "the internal conditions of thought and sentiment." (p. 534) Murray affirms the potential of philosophy to raise the quality of people's lives. In this passage he outlines the philosopher's influence upon industrial society:

For not only does the general habit of reflexion tend to cultivate those peaceful sentiments which are essential to the success and the continuance of industrial activity, but this activity is rendered all the more successful especially by reflecting on the ultimate significance and end of existence, inasmuch as the conception of that end must give a clearer direction to all aims of human exertion, and therefore to the special aims of industrial activity. (p. 545)

This project of moralizing philosophy is taken up at length in The Industrial Kingdom of God. What is of interest here is that Murray, like Beaven, appears to sincerely believe that others are interested in his reflections. The style of writing displays vitality and optimism that philosophy's suggestion may be taken up by others: "what philosophy has to demand of economics is that it shall not inculcate any industrial arrangement of society which is incompatible with the full recognition of right." (p. 540) This is evidently political theory designed for non-
philosophers.

It is worthwhile at this point to take note of Murray's original target audience. The book appears to be based upon speaking notes for a lecture at the Cooper Union in New York. (Preface by Armour and Trott to Murray, 1981, p. xxvi) The institute was dominated by technocratic sceptics whose views needed to be changed.

Murray's message is that wealth is not an end unto itself, but a promoter of the condition of well being. He believes that philosophy does a service for a market oriented society by considering the overall direction. Ethical theories cannot make an absolute separation between industrial production and moral life. His criterion for genuine wealth is "the sum of these external or material conditions which are essential and favourable to morality." (pp. 538-9)

The next line of argument taken by Murray is that the evolution of society as a whole requires the eradication of the perpetual condition of poverty. If an undue proportion of wealth is allocated to a segment of unproductive consumers, then the productive power of the entire community will be crippled as most workers will remain impoverished. Insightfully, Murray adds that this chronic condition of industrialized nations prevents the world from producing the wealth that it ought to enjoy.

The solution to the problem, given only briefly in this piece, is to tame unbridled capitalism with a system of co-operation between owners and labour with the result that everyone
will have the basic comforts and leisure time needed for personal spiritual development. Murray is also concerned that the normal lifestyles of the rich lessen their own potential for moral development. In summary, this article gives a philosophically based analysis and remedy of a social and economic crisis. The proposal is developed in *The Industrial Kingdom of God* (albeit with the taint of religious sermonizing).

In other writings Murray also employs prescriptions based upon philosophy. The public address "The Higher Education of Woman" is a short piece arguing (unfortunately with little elaboration) that it is unjust for society to exclude women from jobs they are capable of performing. He says that the industrial experience shows that it is better to be a factory girl than a rich woman who wastes her time on frivolous pursuits. (p. 13)

Murray admittedly gets a bit carried away with moralizing philosophy in "The Merchant of Venice as an Exponent of Industrial Ethics". He claims that Shakespeare discerned the severe ramifications of industrialism. Murray here uses extremely bad literary criticism to portray the plight of workers. Suffice it to say that Murray shows a continuing interest in using philosophy as a medium for encouraging societal improvement.

It is revealing to read in full the Prefatory Note to *The Industrial Kingdom of God* as it gives a good defence and description of moralizing philosophy:
There are two ways in which a practical or moral question may be treated. One is to assume certain practical truisms, and enforce these by anecdotal illustrations of their application in actual experience. Another is to explain the theoretical principles, upon which practical rules of conduct rest, so as to satisfy the craving of educated intelligence for exact or scientific knowledge. The former method is available in dealing with the simple, universally acknowledged rules of duty, when the aim is, not to convince men that the rules ought to be obeyed, but rather to persuade them to observe rules, of the obligation of which they are already sufficiently convinced. But such a method is useless, when, instead of simply illustrating the plain virtues of life, we are seeking to find a moral guide through the complicated relation in which we are placed with our fellowmen. Such is obviously the nature of an inquiry into the moral relations, into which men are brought as labourers, on the one hand, as owners of property on the other. Here the difficulty is precisely, to see how the general principles of a spiritual morality are to be traced through all the entanglements of men's industrial relations. Such a problem is to be solved, not by the declamation of vague moral platitudes, but by examining with earnest patience all the bearings of the situation, carrying with us the light of the highest moral teaching as a lamp to guide our feet. To do this it seemed to me necessary to look calmly, but boldly, at the sternest facts of our industrial situation, and to interpret them in the light of those elementary principles of economical science, which are generally accepted by all schools of economists. For this reason a brief exposition is given of the elementary conceptions connected with labour and property. But the key to the situation is to be found in the disadvantages under which labour suffers, inasmuch as these, more than anything else, determine the obligations both of labourers and of wealthy men; and it is for this reason that so much prominence has been given to the subject. (p. 5)

This is a summary of Murray's methodology. Industrial relations are a contentious issue but they can be fruitfully elucidated by philosophy with a warranted expectation of productive results. The key is to show that moral obligations exist between the two seemingly opposing sides. Economics will
provide a map of the territory but it is the philosopher who
serves as guide.

Specifically, Murray propounds Christian Ethics as his
starting point. This is allegedly the only "perfect" doctrine.
True to Victorian parochialism, Murray deems Christian Ethics to
be universal\textsuperscript{13} (i.e. universal in the sense of being above and
beyond other possible ethics or the ethics of other societies).
Religious rhetoric aside, Murray's main objective is to
demonstrate that the question of industrial relations is as much
a moral one as it is a material or economic one. (p. 13) The
aim of this book is not to convert readers to Christianity, but
to encourage moral behaviour:

Every great moralist recognizes the truth, that the
main object of human life is not to obtain a
speculative theory of virtue, but to cultivate virtue
in our daily conduct... For all the interests of human
life it is infinitely more important, in every sphere
of action, that a man should be able to do what is to
be done, than that he should merely know what is to be
done without being able to do it. (p. 9)

The book begins with a very basic introduction to the
science of economics. The remaining chapters are devoted to the
task of setting out the moral obligations of labour and then of
property. These are two separate sections. Following Murray I
will begin with labour.

\textsuperscript{13}Murray is more emphatic on this matter in \textit{A Handbook of
Christian Ethics}. My quick characterization of all Victorians as
parochial is contentious. Ernest Gellner argues against the
thesis of Edward Said (\textit{Orientalism} and \textit{Culture and Imperialism})
that some scholars of the period made a conscientious effort to
understand and appreciate values outside the West. (p. 3)
Murray's theory of labour rights begins with the Hegelian idea (not identified as such) that rights and obligations are interdependent. It follows: "All men possess certain rights, because all men are under certain obligations." (p. 26) Murray does not dwell upon this point but takes it as the theoretical premise for his more concrete analysis of industrial relations. This starting point may seem to be old hat in our time, but it is still fresh and vital for Murray. His empirical observations never cause him to stray far from this guiding premise.

According to Murray, there are two types of rights, real and personal.\(^4\) Real rights, or the right to property, means that workers deserve the means for existence plus some wealth for leisure. Murray berates employers who pay their workers the smallest possible salary. It is a false myth that it is natural for the manual labourers to receive only a small portion of wealth. He establishes the principle that the worker is entitled to a share of the product proportional to the value of his contribution to the whole.

The other type of rights are personal. This is fundamentally the recognition of workers as persons and not as things. Persons are ends unto themselves. As such, they cannot be slaves or instruments of production. The agent's essential right is freedom which has two aspects: freedom from constraint and freedom from restraint. In regard to labour, the former

\(^4\)It should be noted that Murray makes no attempt to justify this initial distinction.
means that one may refuse to work at a particular occupation. The latter means that one can resist direct attempts to impede one's choice of occupation. Murray urges people not to see labourers as mere commodities determined by the whim of the Law of Supply and Demand. (p. 29) It is the mark of a truly civilized nation to adhere to this account of labour. (p. 29) The correct way to see the relation is as a contract of service.

This is the ideal. Murray explains why the situation of workers has remained unjust for so long. He shows solid knowledge of the history of labour enabling him to draw a fair portrayal of his own time. In short, a chronic state of labour excess has allowed employers to dictate wages. Murray notes that conditions do not differ in North America:

The time was when the cities of the New World had as yet no sad experience, except perhaps in a few isolated cases, of the overcrowding which still forms an almost desperate problem in the civic economy of the Old World. But that happy exemption is no longer ours. The same shadow which seems to follow the light of industrial enterprise everywhere, is already darkening the lanes of all the great centres of industry on this side of the Atlantic, to which the working classes are attracted in large numbers by the hope of remunerative employment. (p. 39)

Murray adds that the problem is compounded by the harsher climate of North America. His prose is literary with the purpose of evoking sentiment concerning the plight of workers. He proceeds to challenge directly the reader's moral sensibility: "Think, O friends, who live in idle enjoyment; if the power of sympathetic fancy has not been wholly enervated by luxurious indulgence, think of the doom of these armies of toiling fellowmen!" (p. 39)
This predicament is particularly unjust as industrial nations depend upon labour.

In response to Carlyle's romanticism concerning the physical will of the working population, Murray warns that there is a danger of ill health weakening their constitutions. He refers to statistics showing average heights to be decreasing. City dwellers exposed to pestilence and poor air quality lack vigour. New machinery means that farms are being amalgamated to form agricultural domains with the result of overcrowding even in the country. In short, Murray is aware of the potential for abusing workers as technology advances.

Workers themselves are not entirely blameless in Murray's estimation. By having too much sex they produce too many children who sustain the surfeit of labour. Also, many are thriftless which causes a self-imposed reduction in their standard of living. They have a duty to improve themselves.

All is not bleak. Murray notes that there are virtuous employers who show that the Law of Supply and Demand is not inexorable:

Men are men; and in making contracts with one another they are not guided solely by the meanest ambitions of pecuniary gain, they are apt to be influenced by all the infinite variety of motives that sway the human mind. (pp. 53-4)

Murray has confidence that the higher values can move men and women to act from more than self-interest, and that philosophy can help to thus persuade people.
By way of theory, he relies upon a distinction between laws as results and laws as tendencies. The distinction is said to arise in logic and the philosophy of science. Laws as results are inevitable and necessary. Laws as tendencies are natural inclinations. All economic laws and even natural laws consist of the latter. (p. 138) Most individuals will act in self-interest in accordance with the law of supply and demand, but the few who do not prove that it is not absolute. What is truly universal is the moral law which must be seen in a new light in every age.

Murray does not think that human history is predetermined. He praises Marx's Capital as "probably the most systematic defence of industrial socialism ever written" but faults it for being overly scientific. (p. 60) Murray agrees with Marx insofar as he says that history consists largely of class struggle. (p. 64) He is also concerned with the unnatural benefits of being a capitalist. The advantages of wealth are often accidental (e.g. stock market) as opposed to being the fruits of endeavour. More importantly, wealth can develop monopolies which tend to take advantage of communities. He describes their ramifications at length.

Unlike Marx, Murray accords some responsibilities to labour within the present system and he devotes an entire chapter to their unfulfilled obligations to society. First and foremost, workers should not consume their energy with a self-indulgent lament, but should realize that happiness exists on the inside. He quotes Robert Burns extensively to this effect. The message
is that workers should be proud and content to do what they do. At this point Murray bases many of his remarks on Christian Ethics but those ideas are sustainable without reference to their source. For example, Christian obligation does not require us to view the condition of the poor labourer as one of irremediable wretchedness, but rather as one adapted for that wholesome discipline by which the best features of human character are brought out, and the highest ends of human life secured. (p. 73)

The best workers will be rewarded. If a workman fails to obtain the highest position or largest wage possible within his circumstances, then he has only himself to blame. Furthermore, at another level he is responsible for making use of the public library to improve his intellect for its own sake, and to develop the means of pursuing reform as a citizen. Those who waste their free time in "Bacchanalian excitements" cannot contribute to improvement of the situation of labour or to the common good in general.

Murray is highly critical of trade unions that place limit on the work allowed to be accomplished. This only encourages sluggishness and discourages those who naturally excel. The accompanying decline in productivity benefits no one. Murray applies the principle that individual freedom should be as great as possible without placing a burden upon the community. The measures imposed by unions upon members often disregard this principle.
These are the personal duties of labour; I will proceed with the social duties. A labourer must recognize his employer so as to see his perspective. At a more mundane level, workers must fulfil their contractual obligations to the best of their abilities. The second part of "a fair day's wage for a fair day's work" is all too often overlooked. In short, it is not just the employers who must look inward and become moral, but the labourers must also do so:

the only hope for the amelioration of the labourers' condition rests on the prospect of men rising into a higher moral plane, on which the spirit of justice and kindness and pity shall banish the selfish desire to exact all that our position gives us power to claim. (p. 90)

The ideology of might makes right must be surpassed in order to make way for progress.

Murray's solution to the problem of class conflict is a system of co-partnership between labour and owners. After all, this is the true relation anyway. In contrast to Marx, Murray deems capitalists to be a necessary part of the economy. He says that the ideal system of industrial organization must emerge from the present one, and that it is therefore undesirable that capitalists should vanish. Without their leadership and resulting organization, the workers would not even know what to do. (p. 101) Murray accepts the at least short term necessity of a minority controlling tools, machinery and long term investment capital as it is the most efficient system. It would be impossible for individual workers to each possess their own means of production. Together, both groups seek to produce "the
commodities that are necessary to the life and happiness of men". (p. 86)

Murray recommends payment by piecework as one of the most feasible methods of implementing justice for work done. Notwithstanding Marx's criticisms, Murray anticipates that this remedy will lead to a higher system of complete co-operation whereby wealth will be equitably distributed. (pp. 88-89) Eventually, the distinction between owners and workers should naturally dissolve with the latter collectively owning their companies.

There is one universal law of human society applying to co-operation and that is that there ought to be "as large an amount of individual liberty as is compatible with practical co-operation." (p. 93) This includes liberty within a trade union.

Murray does not dwell upon theorizing but continues with practical advice rooted in his assumption of the organic nature of society. He warns that strikes should be only a final resort. Not only are they likely to fail causing damage to the company and the morale of workers, but if successful, they may have unintended consequences:

For the increased wages obtained by the workmen will naturally tend to diminish the demand for these, since people cannot buy so much at the higher price as they bought before at the lower. The ultimate result is therefore likely to be, that the strikers will find there is less demand for their labour, and that they are occasionally, if not frequently, thrown out of employment. (p. 99)
This sort of explanation is reminiscent of the very philosophical account by Max Weber of the unintended economic benefits of Calvinism in *Protestantism and the Capitalist Ethic*. Very briefly, Weber’s methodology of the social sciences established the importance of ideas and their unforeseen consequences in economic history. Weber is noted for discerning the logic of Calvinism: adherents, worried as to whether or not they would receive God’s grace, worked extremely hard, saved and invested in a spirit of piety; they consequently became prosperous without this initial aim. I compare this theory to Murray’s logic whereby a short term gain causes unemployment and all its accompanying ramifications.

Part II deals with property. Terpstra is incorrect to suggest that Murray ultimately demands equal self-sacrifice on the part of the two parties as the basis for reform. (p. 15) Murray clearly lays the preponderance of the burden on the shoulders of the capitalist owners: "the evils complained of are not irremediable, and the remedies are largely in the hands of the propertied classes." (p. 117)

Murray recognizes the right to property as has already been stated, but not absolutely. Justice and law do not permit one to dispose of property without regard to the interests of society. He draws from this that "the way is thus left open for new adjustments of our social system, which would make it possible to secure a more equitable distribution of wealth." (p. 118) Affluent people are under the false impression that they own
their wealth as much as a man owns his labour. They ought to be aware that the system of private property depends upon society's administration of justice. Murray agrees that government interference is in principle undesirable, but he accepts social action when individual action is inadequate. (p. 128)

Wealth, as it raises the opportunities of doing good, confers correspondingly high responsibilities. Murray lapses here into reminding readers how difficult it is for the rich to enter heaven. (p. 120) But he also extols the moral virtue of beneficence in itself. He recounts the traditional obligation of the aristocracy--noblisse oblige. Murray reviews some of the major vices of capitalists and condemns them. He urges the well off to fulfill their positive duties to the community, as it is the community which allowed them to flourish in the first place. (p. 126) He quotes Andrew Carnegie at length to buttress his views.16

In the way of theory, Murray says that in spite of the fact that government interference is undesirable, it is permissible when individual action is inadequate to promote the good of society. He writes: "social action becomes justifiable and even obligatory." Murray's writing is choppy and less effective in

16The most inspiring sentence Murray quotes is: "I could repeat to you names--at least, I could obtain names--of hundreds of wealthy men in America, who have during their lifetime... devoted their surplus wealth for the good of the community, regarding it, not as their own property entirely, to be largely distributed at their death among their immediate families, but as a sacred trust to be wisely administered during their lifetime for the good of the community--for the mass of the people, by the labours of whom they have amassed that surplus. (p. 127)
terms of persuading and uplifting readers than in Part I. And his suggestions for Christian philanthropy are admittedly quite patronizing as he describes them. He suggests building comfortable homes, supplying wholesome food and the establishment of coffee houses where people can socialize without the baneful presence of alcohol. What is also not very helpful is the consolation brought by the knowledge that the rich are often tempted by their surfeit wealth to engage in "enervating idleness" preventing them from being happy. (p. 73)

Murray does stray towards political naivete here, but he at least partially counteracts it by undermining the interest of the wealthy in keeping workers poor. He responds that an 'educated moral sentiment' demands that a person consider their right of excess material gratification when so many suffer abject poverty. And from the perspective of an organic society, he argues that the spread of wealth increases the whole to everyone's benefit:

Now suppose that the idle capital, and the wealth expended in useless luxuries by capitalists had been distributed in additional wages to labourers, the purchasing power of the labourers would have been increased, they would have bought a large quantity of the commodities for which there is now no buyer, a new demand for these commodities would have sprung up, the labourers would have been kept in employment, and capital would have been in request for productive purposes instead of lying idle. It is of the highest importance therefore to the economy of society, that the labouring classes should not be starved, but liberally rewarded: for they are the principal consumers; and, if their power of consumption is restricted, it cannot be supplemented by their wealth going into the hands of a few, whose power of consumption is of course limited by nature. (p. 143)

Again, this is a Weberian type of economic explanation which also
includes an exhortation to act morally. It is a compelling combination. If members of the two basic social strata fulfill their obligations and enjoy their rights in an enlightened way, society will progress towards even higher states of ethical life. Murray presents a self-contained moral argument which is entirely separable from the overall stated religious incentive.

From his own prefatory note that we began with, the question is whether Murray lived up to the criterion for successful philosophy of employing a theoretical ideal concretely to a contemporary crisis. Murray does indeed make explicit the interdependence between rights and obligations. He is balanced and thorough in his proposed solution. Moral theory is not defended at length, but simply asserted and applied in detail.

Murray determines the common ground between what are presumed to be two supposed naturally conflicting societal groups. The remedy of co-partnership was an unlikely probability; what is of critical importance is the insistence of moral links between the two side. This is not a self-evident hypothesis even in our own time. For this accomplishment alone, The Industrial Kingdom of God is worthy of present consideration.

At the level of moralizing philosophy, this book can be appreciated for its methodology. As should be clear from some of the longer quotes, Murray occasionally becomes caught up with the problems and his prose reflects his exuberance. These moments are not part of professionalized philosophical writing, nevertheless, they are perhaps more effective at instilling moral
ideas than dry, bare bones theory.

ii) Popular writings

This section will examine with varying degrees of detail thirteen of Murray's popular pieces. I will begin with the articles and then proceed to the textbooks. The publications in non-philosophical journals indicate the existence of a popular audience.

I start with the barely philosophical pieces which reflect Murray's eclectic knowledge. I shall begin with "Dreams" from New Dominion Monthly. It is a very light article presenting amusing anecdotes about dream life followed by a scientific explanation. Murray shares one of his own nightmares which inadvertently conveys something about his conception of philosophy. He describes a nightmare in which he is unable to communicate brilliant ideas to eager students. And Murray does believe that his ideas are invaluable. This trait is also seen in Epimetheus, to my students, a twelve page poem devoted to the intellect as a wonder of nature. The key image is ascension from the darkness of deception to attain eternity or light.

He similarly indulges his literary pretensions in The Ballads and Songs of Scotland. In the prefatory note he says this book is a break "from severer professional work". (p. 8)

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16) The conclusions to this section apply to the aforementioned political pieces "A merchant of Venice as an Exponent of Industrial Ethics" and The higher education of women; an address at the opening of Queen's College at Kingston.
The introduction is quite philosophical as it advances a theory of the relation between national character and art.

As mentioned previously, the predominance of experts in specialized fields is a recent phenomenon. Accordingly, Murray wrote diverse pieces. He translated the autobiography of Solomon Maimon (published posthumously without an introduction by him), some introductory texts to psychology, and even a novel. He republished his valedictory address, *A Vindication of Theology*, which he said is valuable for its argument but not for its juvenile style.

What is of more interest are Murray's popular articles. These aim to enlighten either the general public or another field by philosophy. I will address them in chronological order.

"The Scottish Philosophy" (*MacMillan* s) asserts that this nation made an enormous impact upon the history of philosophy. It is a discussion of Dr. James McCosh's history of the topic. Murray gives a concise account of the influences upon and evolution of Scottish speculative thinkers. A consistent theme is that some of these philosophers attained the highest levels of thought itself. In contrast, Thomas Reid's thesis that the objects of knowledge are not ideas but apprehensions of reality is deemed lowly: "Reid's thinking never represents the speculative toil of a philosophic intellect, but merely the refined opinions of ordinary intelligence." (p. 121)

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17Articles from the previous section also apply here. These are "Philosophy and Industrial Life", "The Higher Education of Woman" and "The Merchant of Venice...".
This article is for the most part a very soft presentation of the topic. At a few points he does become rather academic. His charge that Hamilton misinterpreted Kant’s view on necessity is a case in point. Murray is however focused on impressing his thesis upon the reader’s mind. He credits Scottish philosophy with profound speculative and moral vision:

The Scottish thinkers may have failed to solve, and in many cases even to comprehend, the problems which they took in hand; yet they accomplished what some of themselves would have acknowledged to be a still moral essential work by the philosophical spirit which they kept alive. (p. 129)

MacMillans was a general review containing articles on things like countries, history and literature. Judging from the tables of contents of the time, only approximately twenty percent of the contributions were written by professors.

From the same periodical, "The Revised Study of Berkeley" opens by noting that the English literary tradition was slow to recognize this philosopher. Murray describes Berkeley’s contribution as a fantastic advancement in man’s understanding of metaphysics:

To break down the apparently indecomposable simplicity of visual perception, to show that it is not the immediate and inexplicable revelation of a thing outside of all intelligence, was to open up a path for psychological discovery—a path to profound insight into the nature of knowledge and reality, such as had scarcely ever been trodden before. (p. 164)

This is quite an exceptional accomplishment. Murray distances himself from materialism and suggests seeing all things in nature as a book written by the greatest mind. Berkeley makes proofs for the existence of God redundant as we already see “the living
Person" whenever we open our eyes.

This article presents Berkeley from a narrative perspective with his theory receiving only a poetic gloss as opposed to technical exposition. Murray recommends Berkeley's "Minute Philosopher" for its dramatic liveliness as a dialogue and for its linking of philosophy with "daily concerns". (p. 71) Murray writes this piece with three features appealing to a popular audience: metaphysical edification, a promise of a better quality of life, and a narrative structure which is easy to read. The effect is edification from having encountered divine purpose: "To him [Berkeley, a genius] that the world is not a mere piece of splendid mechanism moved by unconscious forces; it is the existing ideas of the living God speaking to us through all our various senses." (p. 167)

There is a change of direction in "Christian Ethics" (Presbyterian College Journal). Murray proposes that people need instruction in moral matters. The main points are that only Christian ethics is perfectly true, and that philosophy is only complete when they are joined. Pure philosophy "must make no assumptions". (p. 341) Murray does indeed here place the foundation of social reform in religion. Notwithstanding discouraging signs of social decay, he is optimistic that the Church, which has redeemed society throughout history, can do so again.
Returning back to moralizing philosophy which makes no references to religion, "The Education of the Will" gives advice to members of the education profession on building character. It begins with the statement "All education is, in a sense, education of will." (p. 57) This article is a rather loose discussion of the relationships between will, intelligence, and emotion. In short, education is shown to be the exertion of will to direct intelligence towards certain emotions, while controlling feelings.

The moralizing philosophy there is present in a different way than previously seen. In this article, Murray emphasizes the necessity of emotions accepting the truths of morality. The wise teacher must be conscious of both the good and bad sides of emotion. For example, unhealthy sentimentality can lead to an avoidance of "earnest study" and will result in the incapacity "for the active luxury of doing good." (p. 63) Murray also takes a stab at analyzing the malaise of education:

But not only are our educational methods defective in failing to provide any such discipline [that is, self-imposed discipline to cultivate strength of will] for the education of the will, the whole temper of our age seems to be represented in this defect.) p. 67

The philosopher's task here is to extol the virtues lacking in his time.

The last article is "Psychology in Medicine" from The Montreal Medical Journal, a journal aimed at another profession. Murray argues that psychology is an integral part of the practice of medicine. He gives an overview of the philosophical debates
surrounding the mind-body problem beginning with Descartes. This particular theory is deemed incredible due to the experience of medical practitioners. The fact that patients can use their vocal chords to indicate pain proves that there must be a real relation between mind and body. Science cannot determine a general law on the subject as science cannot find general laws but only particular ones. (p. 886) There is a technical discussion of this point.

Murray recounts with considerable thoroughness how mind and body affect one another. Just as he said that economics ought to be guided by ethics, so should the noble profession of medical doctors be aware of this philosophical problem: "A true physiological psychology forces us to a peculiar conception of the human organism". (p. 894) This responsibility is supported by moralizing philosophy:

the profession of the medical practitioner is invested with an inspiring sacredness, when it is viewed as seeking to persevere, in the highest state of efficiency, that marvellous instrumentality which has been provided by the Maker of all for working out the vocation of intelligent moral beings. (p. 895)

All of these articles in various ways aim to incite their readers to reach a higher standard of moral thought and behaviour by philosophical reflection. This trait is even more dominant in Murray's two textbooks on ethics, An Introduction to Ethics and A Handbook of Christian Ethics. The former is philosophical while the latter is more a work of religious education approached by a philosophical methodology.
Schurman’s review in The Philosophical Review claims that An Introduction to Ethics is the best textbook for beginners. In brief, it systematically categorizes and analyzes moral concepts drawing out their practical applications and gives useful historical discussions of their evolution. Schurman’s highest praise is directed towards its moralizing proficiency. He says that Murray’s detailed accounts of the concepts never lose sight of the truth that “moral obligation points rather to a general spirit of life than to specific acts”. Schurman is also appreciative of the author’s style: the tone is intellectually stimulating and “morally bracing”. (p. 198) Likewise, in a letter to Murray, Schurman calls Handbook of Christian Ethics the best of its kind.

These works are not themselves very interesting to us now as they rely upon an unsophisticated conception of human nature. I do believe that Schurman’s praise for them was based upon their potential to provoke moral thought and behaviour. And there is legitimacy to Murray’s argument in An Introduction for the necessity of moral instruction:

in the one art which is the common concern of all men—
the art of virtuous living—this rudimentary principle
[discipline of self-denial of certain gratifications]
of all learning is very generally ignored; and the
power of self-control is left to be trained at random,
by such restraints as may happen to be enforced by
physical and social surroundings. (p. 386)

I will give an overview of An Introduction highlighting the moralizing philosophy aspect. The treatment of the Handbook will be shorter owing to its religious moralizing.
An Introduction purports to study the 'science' of virtue. There are two parts: determining what man is (Psychology) and what he ought to be.

In the preface, Murray promises that his textbook differs from others of its kind by venturing beyond the abstract universality of moral concepts to bring them to the level of "ordinary thoughts". In this regard he claims to be following the older tradition of applying concepts to duty. (pp. iii-iv)

Most importantly, the good of society is recognized not to be an abstraction but an order instantiated in the world enabling individuals to flourish.

This is not to say that moral conduct is unconnected to a higher power. God creates eternal laws but they are beyond the scope of human knowledge. The conclusion is that ethics touches upon both politics and theology. Murray definitely grounds his project in religion, but as in The Industrial Kingdom of God, his arguments do not depend upon references to Christian doctrine.

Book I begins with typical nineteenth century speculative social science before developing a theory of moral intelligence. At this time, psychology was not yet a rigorous and scientific discipline; it was also not separate from philosophy. Murray deliberates on topics such as the evolution of consciousness from primitive man. The conclusion that he wishes to draw is that the thesis of psychological determinism overlooks the fact of

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18 This can be seen clearly in the numerous articles concerning psychology in the early issues of The Philosophical Review.
morality. Murray holds that too much attention should not be devoted to the question of the degree of selfishness or benevolence found in natural impulses:

The conviction that I am under an infinite obligation to do an action, is not the consciousness of any merely empirical fact in regard to it at all; it is the consciousness of a principle transcending any fact that may occur in our experience of the action. (p. 55)

Moral consciousness is not causally determined. Reason can defy even infinite power. Murray cites the resolution of Prometheus against the immoral Zeus. He contends that there are distinctly moral emotions inspired by the pure moral law which is transcendental. It is part of the philosopher’s role to awaken these emotions:

In minds of larger culture, the abstract moral law is in itself calculated to awaken a peculiar emotion; and most of the great writers, who have undertaken to expound its infinite and imperative claims, manifest in the tone of their language the glow of feeling with which they touch their theme. (p. 106)

Murray’s own concrete advice is to actively employ moral intelligence towards piercing through the confusion and injustices of the sensible world to see the operation of eternal laws. He suggests that each moral agent’s greatest challenge is to combat baneful beliefs and thoughts:

The masterful suggestiveness of unwelcome thoughts or desires, and the endeavour to repress them, give rise to the sternest warfare of human life; and it is in this internal warfare that all our decisive conflicts are fought. (p. 113)

Book II called Ethics Proper inquires into the universal standard of ethics. It is a much larger section than Book I. Murray develops a program of reflection enabling students to
aspire to a higher state of virtue. Again, Murray stresses the practical implications.

Part I, "The Supreme Law of Duty" says that there are two approaches to the question of what is the *summa bonum*. These are Epicureanism and Stoicism. To be brief, Murray locates Utilitarianism in the former's tradition and condemns it. It is a truth that the pursuit of pleasure for its own sake is certain to lead to disappointment as efforts to realize pleasures are either thwarted or less satisfactory than anticipated. Moreover, there is an irresolvable tension between altruism and utilitarianism. If personal happiness is the object of life, there is no basis for its sacrifice for the good of all. Paley's solution of promising a joyful afterlife in return for a pious lifestyle lapses into theological egoism as it merely substitutes the pleasures of this world for those of another.

Murray is more sympathetic to Stoical theories of morality because the virtuous life will naturally bring happiness. But this doctrine fails since it cannot furnish a scientific definition of morality. (p. 215) This is a Hegelian-type of criticism insofar as the universal emerges concretely through history: "For every particular rule, though emanating from an universal principle, must be modified, and therefore more or less limited, by the particular conditions to which it points." (p. 231) Murray says that an updated account of morality must adapt to present conditions.
Kant represents the modern development of Stoicism. His contribution was great, but his theories were unconnected to human reality. It is this problem of abstract ethics which Murray seeks to overcome in the remaining two sections of the book.

Part II classifies moral obligations. These are duties to society a step beyond those demanded by the law. The writing is loose and repetitive. The textbook format forces Murray to restrain his inspirational allusions and to be rather heavy handed with his moralizing. The scope is wider than that of The Industrial Kingdom of God, but for the most part what he proposes so vehemently are moral truisms or moral prescriptions. He insists at length that people must rise above bodily impulses and exercise discipline which includes temperance and chastity. Other concrete precepts arising from eternal moral law are: treat people as ends in themselves; your level of prosperity dictates the responsibility to help others; avoid corrupting others (the highest obligation of justice in regard to mental life); tell the truth; and follow the Duty of Benevolence.

Indeed, this is an often patronizing book clearly designed to inculcate civic virtue into the young. It is impossible to say whether a book like this one would change its readers. The textbook format forces Murray to restrain his more poetic comparisons when extolling virtue. The breadth of its mission and the textbook format with its immoderate repetition make for often tedious reading. In contrast, The Industrial Kingdom of
God is succinct and powerful. However, its underlying theme is not a truism and it is something that deserves to be discussed in our day. I refer to the notion that the happiest life is one of rational virtue. Murray writes: "it is by the light of its moral end alone, that life receives any rational meaning".

(1891, p. 403)

And there are moments of insight when Murray makes concepts concrete. Here is one concerning the loss of a superior way of seeing friendship:

The student of ethical literature can scarcely fail to be struck by the fact, that friendship forms a much more prominent factor of the moral code in the ancient world than in the modern, in which it is treated rather as a mere sentiment; and when we recall some of the splendid examples of friendly devotion by which the moral life of antiquity was enriched, the query will naturally occur to the mind, whether modern life has not lost something which it would have been well to retain, by friendship losing its ancient moral dignity.

(p. 334)

And finally, regarding the issue professionalization, Murray expresses a concern about the division of knowledge: "Every man is something more than a specialist: a considerable part of his life must always be made up of the general activities of a human being." (p. 345) Without a general moral education, Murray believes that people will only haphazardly acquire their moral knowledge.

*A Handbook of Christian Ethics* also has plenty of moralizing, but it is directed towards religion. The treatment of the Handbook will be brief as it is essentially a a strict religious guide to students and thus contains little philosophy
of any interest. The premise of this textbook is the truth of the Christian ideal as the foundation of moral philosophy. However, the method by which Murray says he will treat Christian ethics is that of moral philosophy. (p. 12)

A few things are worth noting. There is an interesting argument for the primacy of love (both Christian and pagan). Murray says that justice proscriptes only the adherence to rights and obligations. It is rigid and narrow. Love has a wider horizon:

It enlarges the sentiment of obligation by making it more exacting, while it frees from self-assertive exaction the sentiment of right. As sometimes expressed, the idea of right falls into the background, while the idea of duty comes to the front as the leading motive of life. (p. 46)

Murray has a rich conception of human agency which includes intellect, spirit, virtue and the emotions working together as a harmonic unity.

This book is a philosopher’s guide to the proper moral attitude toward a Christian lifestyle. The content is religion; the very titles of chapter headings show this, e.g. "The Christian Ideal as the Realization of Man’s Love to God" and "The Moral Ideal in the Teaching of the Apostles".

The last textbook I wish to take up is Outline of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy. This is the second work of technical philosophy written in English Canada. It is specifically a textbook for students facing the complexity and vastness of Hamilton’s system which spans many difficult writings. In the preface, Murray says that he will refrain from
assessing the merits of Hamilton in any way. Instead, he purports to offer the most complete exposition of the author to date. It is largely a book about faculty psychology mixed with metaphysics.

Murray assumes that his reader has no experience in philosophy. Every basic term is defined. The style facilitates ease of understanding, but the sheer complexity of Hamilton's system probably forced him to make technical distinctions without the framework of the "spirit" of philosophy. There is no moralizing philosophy here. The most memorable element of the book is its countless distinctions. An example of terminological excess is nomological Psychology or Nomology of Mind which investigates the necessary and universal laws by which our faculties are governed; the three parts are Nomology of the Cognitions, Nomology of the Feelings and Nomology of the Cognitions--each is only briefly described by means of other terms previously introduced. There is no conclusion which ties all the strands together.

The dryness of style is evident in the following passage from a chapter which claims to make Hamilton's abstractions concrete:

The sublime may be divided according to the three quantities into the sublime of extension, the sublime of protension, and the sublime of intension; or, what comes to the same thing, the sublime of space, the sublime of time, and the sublime power. In the two former, the cognitive, in the last the conative powers come into play. (217)
An Outline of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy moves toward professional philosophy. It is a monotonous, highly academic book that places high demands upon the reader as there is no central theme. It is highly unlikely to provoke anyone to investigate philosophy or to ameliorate their personal moral outlook. It is best described as a test for a student memorization capacity. By contrast, Mill's book on Hamilton, although written as an attack of associationism more than an exposition, is far easier to follow as the author explains contextually the significance of each element of Hamilton's system.

The point I wish to make concerning Murray's popular writings is that it is possible to water down philosophical ideas and offer them to the public if they are somehow made relevant. A literary and exuberant style is also helpful. More particularly, what is of interest to us is Murray's belief that his work will provoke people to pay attention to their level of "moral intelligence" and therefore improve society as a whole. In the next section, we shall see the root of Murray's key ideas defended in the professional format of the essay.
iv) Professional philosophy

This section looks at Murray's technical and rigorous philosophy. This consists of six essays and a review.¹⁷ He proves to be a precise thinker. Due to his eclectic interests, it is difficult to characterize Murray's work as a whole except to emphasize the continual interest in promoting the importance of moral activity and his predilection for idealism. The articles are published either in philosophical journals or interdisciplinary professional reviews.

To continue with Murray's former teacher, "Sir William Hamilton's philosophy: an exposition and criticism" unlike An Outline of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy does critique the philosopher, and quite severely so. It is a succinct and demanding piece. Part I gives historical background with the expectation that the reader is familiar with Kant's influence. Murray gives a solid presentation of the debates on the nature of ideas in Scotland and the continent. Part II is a nineteen page exposition of Hamilton's system. Needless to say, it is very condensed in contrast to his book on the topic--this section is composed of for the most part a series of terms and definitions. One learns quite efficiently "Special Conditions of Consciousness". No attempt at summarizing is made at the end.

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¹⁷The previously described political essay "Philosophy and the industrial life" published in Monist.
Parts III and IV are criticism. Murray comments on Hamilton's conception of physiology, phrenology and psychology. An example of a more philosophical criticism concerns Hamilton's attempts to prove the fact of consciousness. As consciousness is the foundation of this project, Murray says its presence should be established, and the best way to do so is to call it self-evident in itself. The Cartesian cogito is the most elegant model. By entertaining the possibility of a deceiving God who gives people the impression of consciousness, Hamilton undermines himself:

While he maintains that it is impossible to doubt a deliverance of consciousness as a testimony to the fact of its own actuality, it is possible, he admits, to question the truthfulness of its testimony to anything beyond that fact. (p. 387)

This is an informative and technical article. In this and the other professional articles, Murray makes little or no attempt to make the philosophical ideas 'concrete', but sticks to the task of interpreting and criticizing ideas.

"What should be the attitude of teachers of philosophy toward religion" is a response to an article by Royce advocating that teachers refrain from expressing religious opinions. Murray argues that the difference between philosophy and religion is "a mere abstraction of thought" with no clear line of demarcation. (p. 355-6) Against Royce, he claims that a religious perspective is integral to the practice of philosophizing:
may it not be said that religion develops in an unreflective form, that spiritual endeavour which becomes reflective in philosophy, to reach the divine that is, the universal and eternal point of view. (p. 355)

But once again we can discern that Murray's conception of religion is more a matter of reason than traditional theology. I believe that his concern is that agnosticism will produce empty and fruitless philosophizing. Philosophy starting with Christianity is profound and impassioned--its apprehension by reason makes the world intelligible and hence the intellect's importance comes to light. Against Royce's stance that the teacher of philosophy need only do his job well and not necessarily be philanthropically active in the community, Murray argues that religious devotion requires charity and it is important for conscientious philosophers to conduct themselves morally as well as to study the good.

No specific religious prescriptions are offered. Murray's object is to refute Royce's position. He says that teachers who both say and act upon the truth are best able to convince others to do likewise.

"Atomism and Theism" also argues for the acceptance of the intelligibility thesis (God's existence enables human knowledge) but this time the opponent differs. Professor Tyndall was a British physicist and natural philosopher whose atomism led to determinism and agnosticism. He denied the existence of anything beyond mental and physical processes.
Elizabeth Trott calls Murray's response "rational theology" which asserts that Reason has a separate existence from the material. It is an absolute whose nature follows a tradition laid by Hegel and Augustine. (Rabb, 48-50) But in contrast to Augustine, reason has its own divine grounding without appealing to faith.

Tyndall allied himself with Democritus whose contribution to metaphysics Murray readily acknowledges, however, his supersession by Plato and Aristotle was warranted in Murray's estimation. The problem with atomism then and now is its failure to account for all phenomena in an ultimate sense. Murray is willing to accept a limited version of the theory which he expresses here in Kantian terms:

the hypothesis would be regarded as fulfilling its legitimate function in merely regulating the inquiries of scientific students, so that they may conduct their inquiries as if the hypothesis were true, while they avoid making the hypothesis a constituent fact in the real system of the universe. (p. 30)

Thoughts and feelings may depend upon the existence of atoms and molecules, but they are not collections of them. Murray's answer to the question of what is an atom is that it is an indivisible component of matter composing substances whose organization is attributable to a higher will.

Tyndall and the other atomists use words like power, force and cause to express the origin of material movement without giving clear definitions as this entity is unknowable. And yet, they contradict themselves according to Murray by claiming that the Supreme Power cannot be conscious or intelligent. (p. 36)
Murray's critique ends by opening a space not so much for religion as for ethics—another sphere governed by the Supreme Will of interest to everyone. In this way he overcomes the natural ally of atomists, namely, Herbert Spencer's scepticism. God's ethical side is equally worthy of investigation as is his physical nature:

The demand that we shall do to others what we would have them do to us—the Moral Law, as it is called, in whatever terms expressed—is meaningless if there is any doubt if our knowledge is limited to what has been and is likely to be, if we do not know what must be by the very nature of the Will which rules through all things. (39)

"The Dualistic Conception of Nature" similarly defends ethics against the incursions of science. I think that Murray makes some creative philosophical connections here. The paper is a defence of monism as a necessary concept of science against the baneful influence of dualism. The thesis is that dualism reduces intelligibility and moral understanding.

Murray traces the debate to the Greeks. The Ionians were monists as were the Pythagoreans initially. Nature was one. The Eleatics posited appearance and reality, but this was not yet true dualism as reason can explain appearances. The Stoics made the division between reason and the senses firm, and they were consequently seen as opposites. The result was a sharp distinction between moral and immoral types of people. And this is the dualism which corrupted Christianity

by holding forth a peculiarly noble idea of life as the fruit of the spirit, Christianity degraded into a more violent contrast the shortcomings of man's actual conduct, to which the flesh drags him down. (p. 384)
Murray notes the influence of Augustine and Manicheanism in this area. He praises the early Greek Fathers who did not fall prey to the illusion of dualism. Origen, for example, repudiated hell for the triumph of good over evil.

Hobbes, Rousseau and Spinoza all fall prey to dualism by postulating a state of nature in opposition to civilization. This is a fiction which misleads as humanity lives in societies.

Modern science abets dualism by splitting man from the universe. But nature includes man with his capacity for reason and morality:

the evolution of the universe with the history of man eliminated is the drama of Hamlet with the part of Hamlet left out. It is the life of man that at once forms the most essential part of the problem of all science, and furnishes the most essential data for its solution. (p. 387)

And from the essential unity of the universe Murray concludes:

Science therefore must give way to the reality of this power a prominence equal to the reality claimed for the force of non-moral causation, and it can escape from an incomprehensible dualism only by advancing to a conception of nature which embraces both in intelligible harmony. (p. 395)

Murray gives an eloquent and well considered defence of the philosophical perspective on the nature of reality against a strictly scientific account.

The next three pieces are from The Philosophical Review. They are all entirely professional and would likely be acceptable for the same prestigious present day journal except for insufficient footnoting and somewhat grandiose language in the
conclusions—traits shared by other contributors at the time.

"An Ancient Pessimist" presumes that readers have some knowledge of the Greek language, culture and philosophy. Its aim is to find the root of the tradition of pessimism in Western literature. Murray promises to cast light upon modern pessimism by examining the thought of the obscure Hegesias the Cynic. Hegesias was the first and only philosopher to have set out an explicit system of pessimism. (p. 24) Murray is responding to Mr. Sully's book on this perspective which ignores Hegesias.

We are told that the sources on Hegesias are few. Murray quotes at length Diogenes Laërticus' summary. In short, the purpose of life is to find pleasure and avoid pain, and consequently values do not exist. The theory of happiness became more complex as they claimed that the absence of pain is pleasure, and the absence of pleasure is pain.

The problem with this approach is that there is no space for ethics. Murray says that Cyrenaics did not shirk the problem of convincing people seeking sensual gratification to live virtuously:

they claimed to solve it by the same general explanation which subsequent hedonists have repeated,—by showing that the so-called sacrifices of a spiritual and disinterested morality are only apparent or temporary. (pp. 29-30)

This is "complacent Optimism" which is subsequently adopted by the Epicureans. It presumes that the virtues of civilization are coincident with sensual bliss. Virtue is not necessarily pleasant. It is this logic which forced Cyrenaic Pessimism to
become hedonism. Murray writes: "The fact [this counter-intuitive association] points not merely to a fortuitous association in history, but to an inevitable connection in logical thought". (p. 34)

These logical links apply equally to modern pessimism and hedonism. The thesis is unorthodox and it is properly substantiated.

The next article has the same qualities. "The Idealism of Spinoza" contributes significantly to Spinoza scholarship. (Armour, 1992, pp. 52-62, 121) It is another difficult article rivalling his piece on Hamilton. Murray delves into the structure and elements of The Ethics.

The article opens with the establishment of the hermeneutic principle that works should be interpreted as a whole in contrast to focusing on inconsistencies in details. Murray admires Spinoza for advancing intellectual knowledge and consequently raising emotions to the level of joy. He also commends his teaching that ethics can be based upon our knowledge of God. Spinoza's rigid geometric method transcends its technical apparatus to achieve an idealist standpoint:

Spinoza follows Plato in his ascent to those serene heights of mental life in which genuine knowledge is illuminated with a moral splendour, by being identified with genuine love; while the fierce light of geometrical demonstration, which seemed to fuse all existences into a violent mechanical union, becomes mellowed into a glorious horizon in which the finite spirit feels as if all its harsh self-association faded away into a mystical communion of love with the Infinite Spirit, in whom all live, and move, and have this being. (p. 486)
This somewhat uplifting moral conclusion emerges from a discussion of Spinoza's system as a whole. Murray says that for Spinoza substance is an empty concept until defined by attributes in their modes. From these three entities, Spinoza employs axioms and postulates to eventually explain how the will (active power) becomes in effect the intellect (power of cognition).

He agrees with the general criticism that Spinoza was wrong to begin by assuming certain data in the form of these axioms and postulates since philosophy, unlike science, seeks to uncover the truth upon which experience depends. Nevertheless, in the context of an interpretation of the whole, the assumptions are justifiable:

The statements imply that the data are assumed on the ground of their being necessary to intelligibility; in other words, because without them not only could there be no intelligible system of Philosophy, but there would be no intelligible universe, of which Philosophy could be called to give an account. (p. 486)

In short, the driving force behind Spinoza's system is the idea that reality is intelligible.

"Rousseau: His Position in the History of Philosophy" consists of Murray's reflections on the legacy of the French philosopher. Rousseau introduced a new mode of thought to the intellectually stagnant eighteenth century. It was a time of excessive regulations infringing upon all aspects of human endeavour. Social activity appeared to have "no foundation in any laws which nature herself has imposed upon human life". (p. 358)
Murray claims that the problem of man's freedom related to the state of nature is the question of human nature. He traces the thesis of reason's primacy to Anaxagoras and then Plato whose ideas came to the Stoics. Christianity with the Augustinian concept of grace was the next shift whose line of thought was upheld by Hobbes. The historical sketch allows the reader to situate Rousseau in the three areas of influence: state of nature, civil society and education.

Murray is of course critical of Rousseau's naive portrayal of man without civilization; he says that Rousseau perverts an important truth:

the truth in this case is a protest, partly against the overestimation of a culture that is purely intellectual, partly against the frequent perversion of intelligence to corrupt the moral life in general, but especially in its untutored innocence. (p. 365)

And as far as civil society is concerned, Murray argues against Rousseau that true tyranny is not a matter of a theoretical abstraction, but it rather arises from the fact that women cannot vote. On the issue of education, Rousseau's pedagogical ideal amounts to "the crudest hedonism". (p. 369)

What Murray appreciates is Rousseau was his attempt to reach the original facts of human nature. This was what attracted Kant to him also: "in Kant's mind the vague endeavour to return to nature translated itself into a critique of pure reason". (p. 370) Rousseau's long lasting influence is his inadvertent turn of Kant towards extreme Stoicism.
These articles establish that Murray did conduct professional philosophical research. Some of the topics he addressed are of course out of date now, but it is clear that he addressed the philosophical debates of his time with rigorous analysis. Furthermore, it is evident that he expects his readers to be other professional philosophers who are of course familiar with the history of philosophy. The only significant difference I can find when I compare these writing to those of contemporary authors is that Murray is not a dry writer and he is unafraid to express passion about his work. Perhaps the near complete loss of enthusiasm for philosophy does an injustice to the practice. In the last piece I want to talk about, Murray gives an inspiring vision of philosophy.

Murray reviewed the Canadian philosopher George John Blewett's *The Study of Nature and the Vision of God: with other Essays in Philosophy*. Murray appreciates that a Canadian publisher overtook his British and American counterparts to undertake this book which "appeals to a peculiar and limited order of minds". He claims that its publication marks a new epoch in the higher literature of Canada. (p. 202)

Murray reveals his own motivation for loving philosophy in this commendation of the first essay for its clear, unfaltering recognition of the fact that the solution of the problem of philosophy cannot be merely an evolution in the intellectual life of any individual philosopher, but must be, more fully and more truly, an evolution of philosophic thought toiling at the problem of throughout successive generations. (p. 203)
Murray was himself a significant contributor to the "toiling" since he sincerely sought to find philosophical truth, defend it before his colleagues and critics of other disciplines, and subsequently popularize it for his non-professional audience who were the main beneficiaries.
IV. Conclusion

i) The conceptions of philosophy of Murray and Beaven

Comparison is difficult as Beaven's corpus does not match that of Murray. Nevertheless, there are a few points in common worth noting. Both subscribe ostensibly to the precedence of religion over all else, and yet they both devote much more space to employing philosophical arguments to demonstrate the importance of reason and to promote civic virtue. Beaven's version of the design argument is designed to guard students against scepticism and rebellion leading to immorality. Murray promises that those who develop their intellect and philosophize will lead more honourable and happier lives.

In Canadian intellectual history, I believe that both can be seen as transitional figures between pre-professional and fully professional philosophy. Beaven's Elements of Natural Theology is quite technical when it comes to the main argument, but all else can be understood, appreciated and applied by educated laymen. As I have shown, Murray wrote some things specifically for his fellow philosophers, and others for the public. The two are not unconnected as Murray applies his professional understanding of ethics, metaphysics and science to practical problems.

Their work and experience shows that professional Canadian philosophers lost their audience but they could regain it if the proper measures were taken. A critic may argue that professionalization aside, the nature of philosophical has
inextricably changed as we no longer require religion or strong
metaphysics as a 'foundation' for our lives, and it is precisely
these things which give philosophers an air of sagaciousness.
But ethics possesses a sphere unto its own and its connection to
rational thought is often tenacious. Moral concerns are of
interest to almost all members of society, and it is here where
the philosopher still has a pertinent contribution to offer. In
this respect, contrary to the view of John Irving that the
pioneer philosophers were backward, their work with its emphasis
on community may activate a new trend.

Moralizing philosophy had two principal aspects. The first
is the study of human nature or how man conducts himself in
society—this was rightly taken over by the social sciences. But
the task of providing moral guidance on how to live is left to
chance. I repeat Murray's favourite expression: "men are not
born with a moral-wit". If philosophers can convince the
educated elite that ethics and true happiness are interdependent,
this audience could be retrieved.
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