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STREET PROSTITUTION:

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES

Brandon Welsh

1995

Submitted to the Department of Criminology, University of Ottawa, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.
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In memory of my mother,
Ann Elizabeth Welsh.
Her courage radiates still.
ABSTRACT

This study examines law enforcement and alternative responses to street prostitution in those areas where street prostitution has been found to be most problematic: inner-city residential communities. Although not regarded as a serious concern to the majority of Canadians, street prostitution’s impact and associated problems are shown to be of serious concern to this population.

Traditional police suppression measures have demonstrated few gains in curbing street prostitution activities. A failure to employ other models of dealing with street prostitution – community re-design and social development – are found to be serious impediments to current policing policy. Limitations are as well noted by the police not engaging valuable community resources and expertise.

To overcome these barriers this study proposes a multi-agency approach; bringing together police, residents’ groups, and other key agencies in a systematic framework for the delivery of proactive interventions. A review of the literature on multi-agency approaches to address street prostitution reveals a few successes internationally. Findings of an examination of the response to street prostitution in the cities of Calgary and Edmonton reveal traces of success (and potential for) in the use of a multi-agency approach.

Questions over the applicability of demonstrated successes to other settings and weak and sparse evaluation work of the
initiatives in Calgary and Edmonton are sure to present significant barriers to any advancement of this approach. Recommendations are presented for a number of policy and academic directions to test these hurdles.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

For most large Canadian cities, street prostitution presents a host of problems of a wide-ranging nature. Heightened fear, increased incidences of violent and property crime, health risks, economic costs of lost business and decreased property values, and a severe drain on police resources are just a few of the many associated burdens of street prostitution. In the majority of cases, street prostitution and its associated problems have not only recently been causes for concern, but have dominated many municipal government agendas for decades.

With the enactment of new legislation in late 1985, making it illegal to communicate in a public place for the purposes of prostitution, police were furnished with a more hopeful enforcement tool to curb street prostitution. In the first full year following the law's implementation, the number of police reported communicating offenses skyrocketed to an all time high of 6,439; representing close to a threefold increase over the highest recorded level (2,257) under the prior law to address street prostitution (Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, 1993a:12). Since 1986, levels of police reported communicating offenses have further increased, reaching a high of close to 10,000 in 1988 and, for the most part, remaining at this level until recently (Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, 1993a:12).

This, among other indicators, suggests that efforts on the
part of the police have consistently failed to meet the objective of the law: to reduce the nuisances of street prostitution. Positive outcomes, if any, are usually short-lived, often resulting in a re-location of the burdens of victimization, sometimes intensifying previous situations. No long-term gains seem to be apparent.

The purpose of this study is to examine the effectiveness of (or potential for) an alternative approach to police suppression as the principal model to address street prostitution. The approach to be examined is the multi-agency approach, which involves two vital undertakings on the part of the police: (1) shifting from reactive to proactive strategies, and (2) sharing with other agencies in the responsibility for crime prevention and control (Kinsey et al., 1986:105). Within this framework the other two dominant models for dealing with street prostitution are discussed: (1) community re-design through situational crime prevention measures, and (2) social development - addressing the predisposing factors for entry into street prostitution.

This study is limited to an examination of street prostitution, as defined by the visibility of prostitutes and customers communicating in public for the purposes of prostitution, and its associated activities. Off-street prostitution - escort and dating services, massage parlours, etc. - is not discussed. Furthermore, this study is limited to a discussion of adult street prostitution. Youth prostitution, commonly referred to as 'survival sex' (Mathews, 1989) or adolescent/juvenilie, is not
discussed. As well, this study does not address other forms of prostitution: male and transvestite. Instead, the focus is on female prostitutes, which account for the majority of street prostitutes. For the purposes of this study as well, customers of prostitutes are of male gender. As noted by Wolff and Geissel (1994:21), "... it is generally acknowledged that most prostitutes charged are female and most customers charged are male."

The methodology used to achieve this study's aim involved archival research, site visits to the cities of Calgary and Edmonton, semi-structured interviews with police officers and community leaders in these cities, and community research. Archival research was drawn upon for the purposes of presenting the historical background of policing street prostitution in Canada, and the research findings on the three dominant models to addressing street prostitution and the multi-agency approach.

Site visits to the cities of Calgary and Edmonton in Spring, 1993 provided the opportunity to interview police officers and gather valuable police and community documentation and research on street prostitution in these areas. This phase of research was not for case study purposes, but rather as a means to examine the existence and the effectiveness of (or potential for) multi-agency work in a Canadian context.

The cities of Calgary and Edmonton were chosen for a number of reasons, most important of which was the following: their reputation as leaders in policing innovation in Canada; prior knowledge of the work being carried out to address street
prostitution relative to what other cities were doing; and an established working relationship between the author and key individuals in these cities through the author's work with the Federation of Canadian Municipalities' former Urban Safety and Crime Prevention Program.

In the two cities, five semi-structured interviews were carried out with six police officers responsible for the control of street prostitution at various operational levels. The Vice unit, uniform division, and senior executive personnel were interviewed.

Officers were questioned on the area of the city where street prostitution was most problematic, police responses in these areas, the role of the community and their responses to the situation, and possible collaborations between the police and the community, including residents' associations, social agencies, and other organizations. Some of the limitations presented by interviews with police included: reluctance to provide detailed information; personal bias; and a small sample size.

To overcome some of these limitations, information was collected from residents of the communities where street prostitution was identified as most problematic. To obtain community research and documentation letters were sent to key members of residents' associations. Follow-up telephone interviews and informal discussions were held with a number of these individuals between Fall, 1993 and Summer, 1994. Events described in Calgary and Edmonton are limited to the period of mid-1980s to 1993.
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the main pieces of legislation enacted to address street prostitution throughout Canadian history to the present. Four distinct legislative periods are delineated for this purpose: prior to Confederation, 1867 to 1972, 1972 to 1985, and 1985 to present.

Chapter 3 examines to whom street prostitution is most problematic and the impacts of such activity upon this population. The chapter highlights the public’s perception of street prostitution, the dynamics of street prostitution in the cities of Calgary and Edmonton, and the justification to respond to concerns over this activity.

Chapter 4 reviews the key research findings on the limits of traditional policing and describes the current policing strategies used to respond to street prostitution in Canada. An overview of the literature is presented on the predisposing factors for entry into street prostitution.

Chapter 5 examines the foundations of the multi-agency approach and its importance in crime prevention. As well, the chapter reviews the literature on multi-agency crime prevention and its international success in dealing with street prostitution.

Chapters 6 and 7 examine the response to street prostitution in Calgary and Edmonton, respectively. In both chapters, critical elements of multi-agency work are examined to illustrate the potential for effectiveness in addressing street prostitution.

In the last chapter a discussion and conclusion are presented. A number of recommendations are set out for both academic and
policy consideration.
CHAPTER 2

CANADIAN LEGISLATION TO ADDRESS STREET PROSTITUTION:
AN HISTORICAL AND CURRENT OVERVIEW OF AN EXERCISE IN FUTILITY

INTRODUCTION

Street prostitution has existed in Canadian communities even prior to the days of Confederation. Since that time, legislators have continually struggled to arrive at solutions to the changing social problems brought on by street prostitution.

Struggles to arrive at appropriate solutions have been witnessed through attempts to strike reasonable balances between a host of often conflicting issues, such as morality, civil liberties, patriarchy, feminism, and public safety.

At the heart of the morality debate lies the moral opposition to the exchange of sex for money (or for that matter, sex outside of marriage), voiced predominately by churches and traditionalists. Civil libertarians and feminists, on the other hand, argue that prostitutes have a legitimate right to work in this manner. As well, they fight against patriarchal views which identify prostitution in all its forms as a status offence, that is, only women could be charged. The issue of public safety is interpreted as the need to insulate those members of society most negatively affected by the visibility of street prostitution, in turn, placing restrictions predominately on the rights of prostitutes.

It was not, however, until 1972 that legislation enacted to address street prostitution reflected an attempt to deal with all
of the aforementioned conflicting issues. Up until that time, the views of civil libertarians and feminists fell on deaf ears.

Despite this acknowledgment of once left-out views, the federal government, in 1972, failed once again to introduce a workable piece of legislation that could be said to have struck a reasonable balance between the groups in opposition; municipal elected officials, police, and residents’ groups, and the opposing views of civil libertarians, feminists, and street outreach workers. The present law as well is limited in adequately addressing the concerns voiced by those in opposition.

Throughout the history of legislation to address street prostitution in Canada, the federal government has provided Canadians and others abroad with a classic example of legislative ambivalence (Lowman, 1990:38). This ambivalence is illustrated by the fact that street prostitution is essentially legal, yet all of its associated elements have been criminalized. This is precisely the scenario that legislators have strived for, as made evident by Lowman:

On the one hand they can say to civil libertarians and feminists that prostitution is legal. On the other hand they can say to the moral opponents of the sex trade that prostitution is effectively illegal in all but name (1990:40).

This chapter will highlight the main pieces of legislation enacted to address street prostitution throughout Canadian history to the present. Four distinct legislative periods have been
delineated for this purpose: prior to Confederation, 1867 to 1972, 1972 to 1985, and 1985 to present. Special attention will be paid to the latter two periods which are most important to this study. A conclusion follows the discussion.

LEGISLATION PRIOR TO CONFEDERATION

Vagrancy law was the earliest form of legislation directed at street prostitution in Canada. Initially designed to remove indigents and other undesirables from the street, it was readily applied to street prostitutes (CACSW, 1984:7). Lowman (1991:114) notes that the Nova Scotia Act of 1759 contained the first provisions proscribing vagrancy, with "the view that the activities of prostitutes should be prohibited as part of the general delinquency of the growing ranks of the 'idle' or 'undeserving' poor."

In 1839, Lower Canada enacted the first statute designed to directly address street prostitution: "Police were authorized to apprehend all common prostitutes or night walkers wandering in the fields, public streets, or highways, not giving a satisfactory account of themselves" (CACSW, 1984:7).

In 1865, the united provinces of Upper and Lower Canada passed an Act designed to protect military men from contracting venereal diseases believed to be associated with prostitutes (CACSW, 1984:8). This Act made it possible for prostitutes to be subjected to medical inspection and, if found to be diseased, detained for up to three months at certified hospitals (Fraser Committee,
This legislation was rarely enforced and in September 1870, was allowed to expire in accordance with its statutory review of five years.

**LEGISLATION FROM 1867 TO 1972**

In 1867, the Parliament of Canada passed two distinct Acts to address prostitution. The first was *An Act Respecting Offenders Against the Person*, which made it an offence for anyone "procuring the defilement of women under the age of twenty-one, by false pretences, representation, or other fraudulent means" (CACSW, 1984:10). Later that year the Act entitled, *An Act Respecting Vagrants*, was passed. Brannigan and colleagues (1989:51-52) note that, up until July 15, 1972, s. 175(1)(c), otherwise known as "Vag C", was the major *Criminal Code* provision on prostitution:

Everyone commits vagrancy who ...

(c) being a common prostitute or night walker is found in a public place and does not, when required, give a good account of herself.

Although this law was not unsatisfactory from a police perspective, it was, however, not immune from criticism (Brannigan et al., 1989:52). The most significant fault with s. 175(1)(c) was that it was a status offence: the law criminalized one’s status rather than their behaviour. That is, it applied only to females, hence prostitutes.

Brannigan et al. (1989:52) succinctly summarize the two other main criticisms of the law; firstly, it "... made the mere fact of
being a prostitute in a public place a crime, even though prostitution itself was not" and, secondly, "... it did not address the possible criminality of the customer as opposed to that of the prostitute." Public outcry from civil libertarians and feminist groups were clearly a factor in shifting the focus of prostitution law from that of a status offence to one prohibiting solicitation (Department of Justice, 1989:2).

LEGISLATION FROM 1972 TO 1985

"Vag C" was repealed on July 15, 1972. In its place Parliament enacted s.195.1 of the Criminal Code:

Every person who solicits any person in a public place for the purpose of prostitution is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

Section 195.1 appeared to correct the obvious weaknesses of s.175(1)(c). That is, the law equally applied to males and females, prostitutes and customers; criminality was no longer based upon on status, but rather upon conduct (the act of solicitation); and the act of soliciting was specifically required to be for a purpose, that of prostitution (sex for money). However, as the legislation was tested in the courts problems began to appear, hampering police enforcement practices.

The first problem posed by the new legislation was in the meaning of the term 'solicits', as the Criminal Code failed to provide a definition. Lowman (1991:118) provides the following example to illuminate the term's general ambiguity: "Could the
prostitute simply by approaching a customer and mentioning a service and a price, be said to solicit?"

Provincial Courts of Appeal were inevitably asked to rule on what physical actions constituted soliciting; for example, a wink, a nod, or a casual conversation (Department of Justice, 1989:3). In *R. v. Rolland* (1975), the Ontario Court of Appeal indicated that a 'wink' did not constitute the act of soliciting:

Even if the word "solicit" is employed outside the context of prostitution it carries the meaning of importune ((1975), 27 C.C.C. (2d) 485 (Ont. C.A.), as cited in CACSW, 1984:20).

Rulings made on the issue by other provincial Courts of Appeal concurred that where importuning or persuasion was exercised, the act of soliciting had occurred (Department of Justice, 1989:3).

The difficulties over s.195.1 were not, however, confined to the term 'solicits'. Debate raged over the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the term 'public place'. *Falcon* (1989:3) notes that the key to s.195.1 was the term 'public place', based upon the fact that the Criminal Code did not make prostitution illegal, rather the means of obtaining customers or prostitutes in a public place was the offence.

Section 179.(1) of the Criminal Code defined 'public place' as: "any place to which the public have access as of right or by invitation, express or implied". In addition to the general problems brought on by this section, of particular concern was the failure of the law to clearly state whether an automobile
(including both a customer's vehicle and undercover police cars) could constitute a public place. Provincial court rulings on this point did not resolve the ambiguity.

In 1978, the Supreme Court of Canada, in R. v. Hutt ([1978] 2 S.C.R. 476), ruled on both the terms 'soliciting' and 'public place'. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the term 'soliciting' meant 'pressing and persistent' behaviour. As a result of this decision, the police were no longer able to charge prostitutes simply for offering sexual services in a public place, as this act could not, in itself, be construed as 'pressing and persistent' behaviour (Lowman, 1989:31). 'Pressing and persistent' behaviour had to involve some form of public inconvenience (CACSW, 1984:21).

The Hutt decision was later strengthened by subsequent Supreme Court of Canada rulings in R. v. Whitter and R. v. Galjot ([1981], 1 S.C.R. 606), which held that "pressing or persistent conduct must be directed toward a single potential customer, and could not consist of an accumulation of advances toward different potential customers" (as cited in Brannigan et al., 1989:52). In effect, this meant that charges could no longer be laid in those jurisdictions where police had once before defined pressing and persistent behaviour to mean prostitutes approaching a number of potential customers. Following this further refinement, doubt remained as to the type and intensity of conduct required to secure a conviction for solicitation on the basis of 'pressing and persistent' behaviour (Fraser Committee, 1985:420).
In addressing the issue of 'public place' in R. v. Hutt, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that automobiles were not public, but private places. Lowman (1989:31) provides the following example to illustrate the resounding impact of this ruling upon police enforcement practices:

... undercover officers could no longer use cars for s. 195.1 enforcement, but would have to approach street prostitutes on foot. Knowing this, it could be presumed that street prostitutes would only discuss transactions once inside the would-be customer's vehicle, immune from prosecution.

This judgement was not, however, binding on the lower courts as Justice Spence's statement was an *obiter dictum*; the issue was not included in the grounds for appeal (Falcon, 1989:4). As a result, ambiguity continued to surround the status of automobiles as public places. It was not until 1984 that an attempt to rectify this ambiguity was undertaken. The omnibus Bill C-19 made it clear that the term 'public place' included a motor vehicle in a public place (Fraser Committee, 1985:420).

The final controversy over s. 195.1 arose through the interpretation of the term 'every person'. Lowman (1990:14) notes that, in practice, this legislation was almost always used against prostitutes, not their customers. Contradictory rulings of two provincial Courts of Appeal on this issue did not help to remedy this practice.

In 1978, the Ontario Court of Appeal, in ruling on two cases
simultaneously, *R. v. Di Paola* and *R. v. Palatics* ((1978), 4 C.R. (3d) 121), held that the offence of solicitation under s. 195.1 was not limited to prostitutes, but could be committed by customers as well, as long as the approach was made in a pressing and persistent manner in a public place (Horner Committee, 1990:2).

In the same year, the British Columbia Court of Appeal, in ruling on *R. v. Dudak* ((1978), 41 C.C.C. (2d) 31), held that it was not an offence for a customer to solicit a prostitute. It was not until 1984, through the passing of the omnibus Bill C-19, that it was made clear that s. 195.1 applied to customers as well as prostitutes.

The culmination of these court decisions affecting s. 195.1, particularly *R. v. Hutt*, and the problems they posed to police enforcement, in effect prompted many Canadian police forces to discontinue the use of this section to address street prostitution. As a result, numerous police forces resorted to the enforcement of other existing federal and provincial laws believed to provide an adequate alternative. However, Brannigan et al. (1989:53) note that, "on the whole such attempts met with a frosty judicial response - either by interpreting the laws in question as simply not extending to cover the conduct involved [i.e., Alberta’s use of the *Highway Traffic Act*], or by imposing requirements of proof on the prosecution that were frequently at least as difficult for the police to meet as they had found in *Hutt*" (i.e., Winnipeg’s use of the offence of counselling gross indecency).

The ineffectiveness of these creative approaches did not,
however, discourage some cities, notably, Vancouver, Calgary, Regina, Niagara Falls, Montréal, and Halifax, from enacting municipal by-laws to circumvent the federal limitations imposed upon them to address street prostitution. Under the provincial powers granted to municipalities for the purposes of controlling nuisances and the use of the streets, these by-laws made it an offence either to loiter for the purposes of prostitution or to offer to sell or purchase sexual services in a public place (Fraser Committee, 1985:445). However, in keeping with the tradition of failed legislative attempts to address street prostitution, these by-laws were not immune from problems.

From the beginning, the constitutional validity of these municipal by-laws was in doubt, since they appeared to be encroaching upon the federal Parliament’s exclusive power to enact criminal legislation, as provided under the Constitution Act (1867) (Brannigan et al., 1989:53).

City by-laws were soon challenged before the courts on this basis, and in 1983, the Supreme Court of Canada, in ruling on a Calgary by-law which attempted to regulate street solicitation among other street uses (Horner Committee, 1990:2), in R. v. Westendorp ((1983), 2 C.C.C. (3d) 330), held that the by-law was in fact invalid, as it did encroach upon the federal Parliament’s exclusive authority to enact criminal law. The Court based its reasoning on the fact that the by-law was "a disguised attempt to control or punish prostitution rather than to control the use of Calgary’s streets" (Horner Committee, 1990:2). In the end, the
Westendorp decision not only marked the cessation of a brief period of renewed enforcement directed at street prostitution (Brannigan et al., 1989:54), but had a persuasive effect on the demise of other cities' attempts to draft similar by-laws.

With the existence of ineffective federal legislation and the resounding failure of continued attempts to circumvent its inadequacies, the political pressure (voiced primarily through police forces and residents' groups in affected cities) to remedy the street prostitution problem mounted. As a response to this growing public pressure, the federal government in June 1983, established the Special Committee on Pornography and Prostitution (Fraser Committee) with a general mandate to study the respective problems and report to the Minister of Justice.

To ascertain the public's views on the problem of and the solutions to street prostitution in Canada, the Fraser Committee, from January to June, 1984 held public and private meetings in 22 centres, covering each province and territory (Fraser Committee, 1985:10). To support the work of the Committee, the Department of Justice commissioned a program of empirical research resulting in numerous working papers. Legal research was undertaken by the Committee.

Falcon (1989:6) identifies the views of the public as falling primarily into two categories:

1. those who believed that solutions must include the implementation of strong federal laws designed to eliminate street prostitution; and
2. those who believed solutions must include decriminalization of prostitution and the implementation of rehabilitative programs which offer viable alternatives to prostitution.

In essence, the hearings divided the Canadian public on the issue of street prostitution; pitting municipal officials, police forces, and citizens' groups who held the former view, against women's groups, civil libertarians, and social service agencies who espoused the latter (Department of Justice, 1989:4).

Following close to two years of deliberations, the Fraser Committee, in February 1985, submitted its report to the then Minister of Justice, the Honourable John Crosbie. In the Committee's report, prostitution was described in terms of a "social problem that required both legal and social reforms" (Department of Justice, 1989:4). The Committee suggested that levels of street prostitution would most likely not diminish until legislation was passed that stated where prostitutes could in fact work, rather than where they could not (Fraser Committee, 1985:530-553, as cited in Lowman, 1990:25). This was in response to the fact that under the current law (s. 195.1) prostitution was not technically illegal, but rather every associated aspect was indeed criminalized.

However sympathetic the Committee appeared in support of partial decriminalization through provisions to make prostitution in private more attractive, they stated that, "... it would be
naive to suppose that [such] changes will spell the complete demise of street soliciting" (Fraser Committee, 1985:540). Coupled with this belief and the Committee's opinion that the overall 'ill to be addressed' was the nuisance caused to citizens, they proposed that s. 195.1 be repealed and s. 171 of the Criminal Code be amended to provide for a more satisfactory vehicle for proscribing the associated nuisance effects of street prostitution (1985:540). That is, the proposed amendment would not criminalize the offer or acceptance of sexual services for money, but rather some degree of 'disturbing' activity directly associated with street prostitution (disorderly conduct, indecent exhibition, loitering, and soliciting) would also be required (Horner Committee, 1990:3).

LEGISLATION FROM 1985 TO PRESENT

On December 20, 1985, the Federal Government introduced Bill C-49 to repeal and replace s. 195.1 of the Criminal Code. The new version of s. 195.1 (now s. 213) reads:

(1) Every person who in a public place or in any place open to public view

(a) stops or attempts to stop any motor vehicle,

(b) impedes the free flow of pedestrian or vehicular traffic or ingress to or egress from premises adjacent to that place, or

(c) stops or attempts to stop any person or in any manner communicates or attempts to communicate with any person
for the purpose of engaging in prostitution or of obtaining the sexual services of a prostitute is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

(2) In this section, "public place" includes any place to which the public have access as of right or by invitation, express or implied, and any motor vehicle located in a public place or in any place open to public view.

The federal government did not adopt the Fraser Committee's recommendation for the partial decriminalization of street prostitution, but favoured rather the Committee's recommendation to address the nuisances created by street soliciting.

In effect, the new legislation represented an attempt to clarify the ambiguous nature of the prior law. Brannigan and colleagues (1989:55) note that, from a law enforcement perspective, one key aspect was the elimination of the word 'solicit' and its derivatives which effectively freed the law from the restrictions placed upon it through the Supreme Court of Canada's ruling in R. v. Hutt. That is, the focus was now directed upon specific types of activities (defined as nuisances) for which solicitation charges could be laid.

In addition, the new law clarified two other serious impediments to the first version of s. 195.1: the term 'public place', by expanding its definition to include motor vehicles, and the term 'every person', through new wording which explicitly denoted an equal application of the law to males and females, and
customers and prostitutes.

The new law, however, was not immune from criticism. In addition to numerous lobby groups voicing their displeasure through articulated means, others, such as the Mount Pleasant Action Group in Vancouver, resorted to a more direct approach to bring attention to levels of street prostitution and associated nuisances considered equal to that under the prior law. By the summer of 1986, street patrols and open confrontations with prostitutes and customers had become a commonplace measure used by the group (Lowman, 1990:27).

The new law had also failed to avoid challenges on grounds of its legal validity. On December 3, 1988, the Supreme Court of Canada reserved its decision on the constitutionality of s. 195.1, following arguments presented in three cases arising from decisions of the Nova Scotia, Alberta, and Manitoba Courts of Appeal.

The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, in R. v. Skinner ((1987), 35 C.C.C.(3d) 203), struck down s. 195.1 on May 20, 1987, as it was determined to be in opposition to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. As a result of this decision, police enforcement of this section ceased to exist in the province of Nova Scotia, allowing street prostitution to continue unabated.

Pending the decisions of the two Courts of Appeal, police enforcement of s. 195.1 in the respective provinces was as well put on hold, but soon resumed following their favourable decisions.

Legal challenges to s. 195.1 were, however, not confined to those under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as evidentiary issues pertaining to the actus reus of the section, had lead to considerable challenges as well. The jurisprudence predominantly revolved around paragraph (1)(c), since very few charges have ever been laid under other parts of s. 195.1(1) (Brannigan et al., 1989:64). In May, 1990 the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in favour of the validity of the law on all accounts.

This law quickly became known as the 'communicating law' for the police's reliance on paragraph (1)(c) to obtain convictions for soliciting (see chapter 4 for a review of police enforcement practices under this section). With many changes under paragraph (1)(c) and no relevant legislation defining communication, the judiciary were left to interpret what constituted a communication.

To demonstrate its commitment to addressing street prostitution, the federal government included as a part of this new legislation, a requirement that it be reviewed after the first three years. Following the designation or establishment of a committee by the House of Commons for that purpose, the committee was to review and submit a report to the House of Commons (Criminal Code, s. 213). The Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General (Horner Committee) undertook this review and submitted its report in October, 1990.
In addition, the Department of Justice in 1987-1988 sponsored a comprehensive research project to evaluate the effectiveness of the street prostitution legislation during its first three years. This involved five major field studies in Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto, Montréal, and Halifax. Eight secondary studies were conducted in Saint John, Trois Rivières, Québec City, Ottawa, Niagara Falls, London, Winnipeg, and Regina. Results of the three year evaluation are discussed in chapter 4.

CONCLUSION

In all attempts by the legislators to remedy street prostitution legislation that has proven ambiguous and/or biased, legislators have all but entrenched an example of ambivalence in Canadian law. Even today, the present law as an enforcement tool, is largely ineffective in reducing the nuisances associated with street prostitution.

At the same time, the law does very little to satisfy those concerned with the rights of prostitutes, address the excessive violence inflicted upon these individuals, and address the needs of those most negatively impacted by street prostitution and its associated problems - inner-city residential communities.

The following chapter examines the plight of inner-city residential areas affected by street prostitution, and overviews the inattention afforded to such concerns.
CHAPTER 3

STREET PROSTITUTION IN RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITIES

INTRODUCTION

The sensationalistic qualities of street prostitution (i.e., sex, drugs, and violence) continue to attract national attention. Yet, the magnitude of this attention by no means translates to a deeply held desire for changes in an overwhelming majority of the Canadian population. As a result, street prostitution as a national concern requiring attention remains a relatively low priority item.

For the majority of Canadians the repercussions of street prostitution remain foreign. Moreover, for few other criminal activities is the urban/rural distinction of greater significance than it is for street prostitution. It is clearly a problem of large urban centres.

However, within this urban milieu, concern is not widespread. However, when a prostitution stroll, some cities having as many as three or four, impacts upon a residential community the most significant problems arise. It is these areas which garner the most concern and subsequent attention, often finding their respective roots in urban core gentrification, commercial renewal projects, spill-over effects, and political clout and homogeneity of the community.

The cities of Calgary and Edmonton are no exception to such dynamics. For years the residential communities of Inglewood and
Ramsay of Calgary, and Boyle Street and McCauley of Edmonton have suffered from the impacts of street prostitution and its related social ills, each calling for closer attention to similar situations in other Canadian cities.

The purpose of this chapter is twofold: first, to demonstrate upon whom street prostitution and its related problems have the greatest societal impact, and, second, to show that such groups/individuals possess legitimate reasons for voicing concern and demanding action.

To this end, the chapter will address the following areas relating to street prostitution: public perception relating to the seriousness of the problem; concern in relative terms to other crimes and offensive behaviour; explanations for low ratings of concern; and reasons for, and questions arising from, residential areas being most problematic. Additionally, the dynamics of street prostitution in the cities of Calgary and Edmonton will be described, along with a section justifying action to address street prostitution. A conclusion follows the discussion.

**STREET PROSTITUTION AS A SERIOUS PROBLEM**

In a recent survey of Albertans eighteen years and older (Alberta Survey, 1993), it was found that over two-thirds of respondents (68.6%) agreed to some extent (includes categories of strongly agree, agree, and somewhat agree) that prostitution posed a serious problem in Canadian society, with 36.9 percent strongly agreeing with the statement (Gibbs Van Brunschot, 1993:2).
Similar surveys were conducted by Gallup in 1984, 1988, and 1992, using the categories of agree, disagree, and uncertain. Over this period of eight years public attitude over prostitution remained quite consistent, with 27 percent, 27 percent, and 29 percent in agreement with the statement that it is a serious problem in their area (Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, 1984; Gallup Canada, 1988; 1992).

In contrast, the above three surveys revealed a high level of disagreement in public opinion about the degree of seriousness of prostitution in Canadian society: 60 percent in 1984; 61 percent in 1988; and 58 percent in 1992. These findings are of even greater significance because they are reflective of the fact that attitudes to this question vary according to the size of the community of the respondent, and that prostitution is mostly associated with large urban centres.

CONCERN WITH STREET PROSTITUTION IN RELATIVE TERMS

Of greater importance than isolated public perceptions about prostitution are the perceptions of its seriousness relative to other criminal offenses, and in terms of actions considered offensive.

In absence of Canadian data on public perceptions of the relative severity of a range of criminal offenses, including street prostitution, American data will suffice for extrapolations to the
Canadian circumstance.¹ "The National Survey of Crime Severity" (1985), conducted over a period of six months beginning in July 1977, provides the responses of 60,000 persons age eighteen years or older in rating the seriousness of 204 specific criminal events.

To enable the ranking of the responses, a "'single severity score' was developed for each of the 204 crimes [each of which was illegal in at least one State] by scaling all responses as ratios to the severity of a theft of one dollar", thus creating a relationship of one crime to another in terms of seriousness (Wolfgang et al., 1985:vi).

For the criminal offence of prostitution, presented to the respondents by the phrase, "A woman engages in prostitution", the severity score was a mere 2.1. Putting this in context, the highest severity score was 72.1 for, "A person plants a bomb in a public building. The bomb explodes and 20 people are killed", to the lowest at 0.2 for, "A person plays hooky from school" (Wolfgang et al., 1985:vi,ix).

The following are a few examples of offenses which ranked above the offence of prostitution (severity ranking given in brackets): "A doctor cheats on claims he makes to a Federal health insurance plan for patient services" (14.1); "A person cheats on his Federal income tax return" (4.5); and, "A person turns in a false fire alarm" (3.8) (Wolfgang et al., 1985). These examples

¹ A national Canadian study to measure the relative seriousness of a range of criminal and delinquent acts by Akman and Normandeau (1967), a replication of a pilot study conducted in Montréal (Akman, Normandeau, and Turner, 1966), did not include street prostitution, or prostitution in general.
suggest a limited exposure to the impacts of street prostitution by the majority of the population.

In contrast, the relative offensiveness of a wide range of behaviours was examined through a 1983 survey commissioned by the Insurance Bureau of Canada. Only 40 percent of the respondents viewed prostitution as 'very offensive'. In relation to other actions viewed as 'very offensive', prostitution ranked behind picking your nose in public (61%), rudeness (57%), people who litter (57%), tailgating (56%), people who lie (54%), butting into line-ups (53%), cheating on tax returns (49%), and fishing or hunting out of season (41%), to name a few (Goldfarb Consultants, 1983, as cited in Department of Justice, 1988:39).

In addition, the survey examined people's perception of the type of offenders police should spend more time pursuing. Thirty-six percent of the respondents indicated that 'more time' should be spent on prostitutes, ranking behind careless drivers (59%) and people who exceed the speed limit while driving (37%) (Goldfarb Consultants, 1983, as cited in Department of Justice, 1988:40). The following comment is provided on the above data:

These data suggest that numerous oral submissions made to the federal government and the Fraser Committee likely reflect the concerns of very specific interest groups (e.g. citizens in affected areas)...(Department of Justice, 1988:40).
LOW RATINGS OF CONCERN OVER STREET PROSTITUTION: KEY EXPLANATIONS

Community Size

Unlike other illegal activities, street prostitution is predominantly a characteristic of large urban centres or, as in the past, areas known for their large influx of men, such as towns neighbouring military and naval stations.

In the three Gallup surveys (1984, 1988, and 1992) administered nationally to Canadians to determine the public perceptions of street prostitution as a serious problem, demographic analysis of data revealed that community size played a significant factor. Thirty-seven percent, 39 percent, and 38 percent of respondents residing in areas with populations in excess of 100,000 viewed prostitution as a serious problem (1984, 1988, and 1992, respectively). With a community size in excess of 500,000, 40 percent regarded prostitution as a serious problem (Gallup, 1992).

In contrast, for respondents living in communities below 100,000, data showed a sharp reduction in the measurement. Seventeen percent, 15 percent, and 18 percent viewed prostitution as a serious problem in their local area (1984, 1988, and 1992, respectively). In addition, community size below 10,000 showed marginally lower percentages: 13 percent (1988) and 14 percent (1992).

Similar findings on the relationship between community size and concern over street prostitution were found in a national attitude survey entitled "A National Study on Prostitution and
Pornography" (1984), commissioned by the Department of Justice to assist the Fraser Committee. The questioning of respondents on their awareness of prostitution-related activities in their surroundings revealed that 75 percent never see such activities on the streets of their neighbourhoods and 72 percent never see the same activities in the area where they shop (Peat, Marwick and Partners, 1984:II.26). In reporting on the overall findings, the authors note that awareness of prostitution-related activities is not widespread and is higher in specific provinces and larger communities (Peat, Marwick and Partners, 1984:II.28).

Findings of the 1993 Alberta Survey support the above noted assertion that the awareness of prostitution-related activities is higher in specific provinces, but contradict the results of Gallup's three previously mentioned surveys and the above national attitude survey - all of which found a strong link between community size and agreement with the proposition that prostitution poses a serious problem. Sixty-one percent of surveyed Albertans living in villages agreed (includes categories of strongly agree, agree, and somewhat agree) with the statement that "prostitution is a serious problem in our society" (Gibbs Van Brunschot, 1993:2). Higher levels of agreement with this view, thus leading to contradictions with previous opinion surveys are undoubtedly in part attributable to differences in the wording of the survey questions. That is, Gallup surveys conducted in 1984, 1988, and 1992 asked, "In your opinion is prostitution a serious problem in this city or area?". Whereas, the 1993 Alberta Survey asked, "In
your opinion is prostitution a serious problem in our society (province-wide)?

Demographic analysis of 1992 data reported by Gallup revealed that 39 percent of Torontonians and 41 percent of Montréal residents believe that prostitution is a serious problem in their respective cities. These findings are substantiated by Canada's three largest cities, Toronto, Montréal, and Vancouver, accounting for over 60 percent of all reported communicating offenses in 1992, as illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1
Location* of Communicating Offenses, Canada, 1992

* Police Jurisdictions.

In 1992, the City of Toronto, being Canada's largest population centre, accounted for the highest number of reported communicating offenses and, correspondingly, the greatest percentage of Canada's total (30%). On a per capita basis, however, Toronto ranked third in the top five cities. The City of Vancouver with a rate of 311 reported communicating offenses per 100,000 population had the highest per capita ranking of the top five cities. Edmonton and Toronto followed with per capita rates per 100,000 population of 136 and 127, respectively. The City of Calgary followed closely with a rate of 115. Montréal, Canada's second largest city, was fifth with 90 reported communicating offenses per 100,000 population (Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, 1993b).

As revealed by the variations in per capita rates of reported communicating offenses, the overall number of reported communicating offenses in a city police jurisdiction is not a reliable indicator of the prevalence of street prostitutes or johns. Rather, the overall number of offenses reported by police services is heavily influenced by police practices and resources.

This was clearly the case in the City of Edmonton where the police launched a number of specific initiatives in 1992 to curtail an increase in street prostitution problems within the residential neighbourhoods of Boyle Street and McCauley. One such initiative was the 'Year of the John'. This initiative vigorously targeted the activities of johns in addition to the regular enforcement of the activities of street prostitutes, and most likely contributed
to Edmonton's ranking second in reported offenses per capita.

City Cores

Traditionally street prostitution strolls have centred around or near the downtown cores of large urban centres.

There is a 'pull' or attraction to 'downtown activities' for tourists, on-lookers, transients or people generally seeking entertainment. As well, pressure from the central business district often creates a marginal area (rooming houses, cheap hotels, skid rows and industrial buildings) near the core. Street prostitutes, often transients themselves, are able to find clients, cheap rooms and anonymity in these areas (Department of Justice, 1989:67-68).

Following numerous site visits to large urban centres and the receipt of testimonials from residents and business owners of such areas, the Fraser Committee noted the following characteristics which make prostitution strolls attractive to downtown areas of cities:

These are the areas large numbers of people pass through and where the bars and hotels are located. Prostitutes are thus operating in areas where they are most likely to meet the men who will buy their services. At the same time, this allows the customers anonymity because they are away from their home districts and because of the large numbers of people moving about in the downtown
areas (1985:382).

**Victimless Crime?**

In addition to the physical confines of street prostitution there exists a perceptual limitation as well. That is, for the vast majority of the Canadian population who are unaffected by street prostitution, it is largely understood and looked upon as a victimless crime, a crime of a consensual nature, unimposing to any but the actors directly engaged in the transaction of sex for money. This, however, is far from the true picture of street prostitution. A concrete victim does in fact exist, namely, the resident of the affected community. This study will also examine the widely held view that prostitutes are victims as well.

It is a myth to view street prostitution as a victimless crime from the perspective of the affected community. The reality of the victim’s existence, as noted by the City of Edmonton’s Action Group on Prostitution (1993b:1), is that children, youth, and women in neighbourhoods where street prostitution takes place are harassed and threatened by the customers. Public health, safety, and security in the affected areas are threatened by the garbage of cast-off needles used by prostitutes for the consumption of illicit drugs and condoms, and the increased street traffic and noise.

The whole community can be described as a victim in that both community and taxpayer resources are diverted to deal with the problem of prostitution instead of building a more livable, attractive city (City of Edmonton,
1993c:1).

STREET PROSTITUTION IN RESIDENTIAL AREAS MOST PROBLEMATIC: REASONS AND QUESTIONS

Negative Impacts

The Vancouver Police Department’s 1987 Brief to the Law Amendments Committee of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police summarizes some of the major disruptions forced upon residents in prostitution stroll areas:

1. Noise: Conversations and arguments between prostitutes and potential customers, and between prostitutes. This is especially a problem late at night in residential areas.

2. Traffic: Traffic noise, congestion and possible danger are constant problems as potential customers drive around the streets and lanes[.]

3. Confrontations: Frustrated residents frequently confront prostitutes in an attempt to persuade them to move away from their homes.

4. Citizen’s accosted: Citizen’s, including young people going to and from school, are frequently accosted by prostitutes looking for customers and men looking for a prostitute.

5. Litter: Evidence of sexual activity in the form of used condoms and tissues are discarded in lanes, parking lots and school grounds. [H]uman excrement and urine are also frequently discovered.
6. Suspicious persons: Persons, regarded by the residents as undesirable, are cruising the area searching for prostitutes to harass or pick up.

7. Assaults/Fights: Fights frequently occur between prostitutes claiming territory and prostitutes are frequently assaulted by customers.

8. Thefts from and by prostitutes.

9. Bawdy House: Premises in residential areas being used as bawdy houses create many of the previous problems in areas away from the streets used for soliciting.

10. "Affrontery": Citizens are affronted and embarrassed when they see persons openly engaging in a criminal offence, "soliciting," immediately outside their homes, schools and businesses.

11. Role Model: Citizens are outraged at the role model presented to school children, when prostitutes, frequently expensively or scantily dressed, parade on the street in residential areas (as cited in Lowman, 1989:33-34).

Although extremely comprehensive, this Brief overlooks one of the most increasingly significant fears of residents: health risks. As noted in the City of Ottawa’s Report of the Task Force on Prostitution (1992:15), one of the main issues identified by residents in stroll areas is the "fears that children would come into contact with recently discarded condoms, needles and syringes
that littered the streets, parks and school yards ...."

Of equal importance, some would argue, is the detrimental effects of street prostitution upon property values and local businesses. In ascertaining the views of citizens of affected residential areas in Toronto on the extent of nuisance problems, Moyer and Carrington (1989:200) reported that approximately two-thirds of those surveyed believed that property values had been negatively affected. For many concerned residents and businesses wanting to rid their neighbourhoods of street prostitution activities, such concerns sometimes outweigh other reasons for taking action.

**Gentrification and Spill-Over Effects**

With the increasing growth of cities over the last two decades, land values in the immediate urban core and bordering areas have significantly increased contributing to a process known as 'gentrification' or 'revitalization'. As noted by Matthews (1992b:31), gentrification is a destabilizing process and often involves the replacement of families by single people and unmarried, childless couples. Included in this definition is the physical revitalization of buildings and homes.

The City of Toronto provides a classic example of a Canadian city having undergone the process of gentrification. The process began with large Victorian homes being converted to rooming houses and subsequently reconverted by those professionals, and business executives, wanting to live close to their work (Moyer and
Carrington, 1989:4). Flowing from this revitalization process in the area known as Cabbagetown in Toronto was the "disappearance of 'lane life' - drunks and petty hoodlums congregating in passageways and parking spaces behind the homes" (Fine, 1988:A14). For reasons unknown, however, street prostitution continued unabated, rather than being moved from one street to the next through police enforcement. The demand and established market for prostitution in this area most likely contributed to its resilience.

Of equal significance are the spill-over effects of urban core gentrification to neighbouring residential areas resulting from the displacement of prostitution strolls to these areas. The Horner Committee (1990:9) noted that, "When prostitutes ply their trade in residential neighbourhoods, well-established living patterns are disrupted and conflicts erupt over the use and enjoyment of public and private property."

The displacement of prostitution strolls from revitalized areas to neighbouring residential communities is more often than not the result of intense policing practices in response to concerned citizens and businesses. The proximity and safety offered by these communities are often the unintended qualities which in the end attract street prostitutes.

**Political Clout and Homogeneity**

As noted above, cities often have more than one prostitution stroll. Often, these strolls are located close to if not within residential areas, thus affecting directly the local residents.
However, differences exist between the abilities of affected areas in the same city in drawing attention to their plight.

In describing the physical revitalization/gentrification of urban centres in the United States and the subsequent influx of young urban professionals to these areas (similar to the Canadian experience), Matthews (1992b:32) notes that high levels of crime and incivilities do not act as a deterrent to this influx. The transient professionals possess an awareness of holding political clout and have access to the necessary resources to "cushion or deflect the impacts of these phenomena" (Matthews, 1992b:32).

This characterization of the young professionals were repeated in interviews conducted with police officers employed in Calgary and Edmonton. Political clout, it was noted, was the driving force behind the residents' ability to voice their concerns and channel them through the appropriate mediums to obtain action on the part of the police.

The possession of political clout and the necessary resources to ignite action stem largely from the homogenous nature of the affected communities. As noted by Skogan (1990:169), "Voluntary problem-solving organizations are more frequently found in homogeneous, better-off areas."

There is a greater likelihood that medium to high income groupings will take more responsibility for their community than lower income populations, for theirs. This is predominately reflective of the personal stake that members of each group hold in their respective community, and is largely attributable to property
value and ownership.

Property values decrease in the presence of street prostitution and its related activities. This decrease is a serious consequence to owners of real estate. Renters, on the other hand, will suffer no direct or immediate consequence as a result of this decrease and may not associate subsequent reduced maintenance of their premises with the declining property values. Following from this, in lower socio-economic areas where the majority of residents are renters one would not expect any sudden or strong reaction to the advent of street prostitution in their neighbourhoods.

Financial interests, however, are not the only precursor to communities mobilizing for action and acquiring immediate attention. The relationship between residents and the police can play a significant role in this process. For lower socio-economic areas with inordinate levels of crime and disorder (street prostitution often present) police are often perceived as part of the problem. This is particularly the case when such areas have a high proportion of minority residents. As illustrated by Skogan:

Groups representing these neighborhoods will not automatically look to the police for legitimacy and guidance; rather, they are likely to be involved in monitoring police misconduct and pressing for greater political accountability. In poor neighborhoods, community groups can make progress only by extracting resources from the outside; thus, they are much less
likely than groups in better-off areas to accept a narrow, technical view of crime prevention, or see it as a high-priority solution for the problems facing their constituents (1990:172).

THE DYNAMICS OF STREET PROSTITUTION IN CALGARY

As a large urban centre and home to three main prostitution strolls, the City of Calgary is not exempted from experiencing the negative impacts of street prostitution upon residential communities.

Since the late 1980s, street prostitution and its related activities have been of greatest concern to the residents of the community of Inglewood, located in the southeast part of Calgary. The following discussion will focus on the community of Inglewood, and to a lesser extent, upon the community of Ramsay, which has been affected to a lesser degree by the consequences of street prostitution.

Impacts on Inglewood and Ramsay

Known as the oldest community in Calgary, Inglewood has for a long time been close to an area traditionally tolerated as a prostitution stroll. Referred to as 'C' stroll, this area contains the National Hotel, located on 10th Avenue South East, and adjacent side streets.

It was not until 1987/1988 that this stroll began to present problems for residents of Inglewood, largely due to two changes in
activity: (1) prostitutes began moving into residential streets from their traditional 'turf' for the purposes of soliciting customers, and (2) tricks were being performed in back alleys, school yards, and parks three and four blocks away from the stroll area, as opposed to the regular practice of using the National Hotel and immediate surrounding area. It was reported that prostitutes could obtain a room for $26 a night with a $5 refund for returning the key (Board, 1988a:B2).

The latter issue, although of equal concern to both Inglewood and Ramsay residents, has presented itself as more problematic in Ramsay (Cooper, 1993:pers. comm.). Of the four police officers interviewed from the Calgary Police Service, all were in agreement that it is the trick locations that present the biggest nuisance problem to residents: used condoms and needles discarded in public and private properties.

As noted by MacInnes and McCulloch (1993:pers. comm.), "If there is anything that is going to drive a community to take action it is the visible evidence of prostitution." This visible evidence took many forms in Inglewood and Ramsay and is best illustrated by the following:

Cats drag home used condoms; kids find used hypodermic syringes in their yards; screaming matches erupt between homeowners and would-be customers who cruise up and down streets as prostitutes move deeper into residential areas; residents' cars are vandalized by irate men (Climenhaga, 1992:A4).
In addition, serious concern was voiced over female residents being mistakenly identified as prostitutes by johns and subsequently solicited for sexual favours. So serious were these complaints that in January 1992, the Calgary Police Service initiated a month long, joint police/community strategy (although police-led) entitled "Police and Community Response Against Prostitution" (PAC-RAP), to curb these particular nuisances, among others.

In addition to the aforementioned problems in Inglewood and Ramsay are the related activities that accompany street prostitution. As noted by Inspector Yanish of the Calgary Police Service (1993:pers. comm.), "A good way of describing prostitution is that it is like a train with prostitution being the locomotive and behind it comes all the baggage cars: drug trade, violent crime, robberies and assaults, and property crime."

The drug trade is quite prevalent in Inglewood. Informal accounts of police based upon interactions with prostitutes reveal that as many as 80 percent of prostitutes working around the National Hotel area are intravenous drug users (Calgary Police Service, 1992b:4). Large numbers of drug-related charges obtained through undercover operations in the area support such a claim. For example, a month-long operation of 'zero tolerance' by the Calgary Police Service resulted in 128 drug-related charges being laid (Mofina, 1993:B3).

Residents' concerns are largely twofold. Firstly, as discussed above, are the health risks imposed by discarded, used
condoms and needles. As stated by Sylvia Hayward, Co-coordinator of Communities Against Prostitution and Related Activities (CAPRA), an Inglewood-based resident's group, "... the health risk to the community is the really critical issue" (Climenhaga, 1992:A4). Secondly, is the fear of altercations among residents and prostitutes and/or pimps, often perceived to be high on drugs.

MacInnes and McCulloch (1993:pers. comm.) remarked that, beyond the tangible impacts of street prostitution and its related activities is the impact on the community lifestyle in general. This is noted through residents' feelings of insecurity, a fear of walking their streets at night, and allowing their children to play in the park (Calgary Police Service, 1992b:4).

Although largely unsubstantiated, the presence of street prostitution in Inglewood has negatively affected property values, businesses, and inner-city tourism. The media attention alone has the potential of permanently stigmatizing the area, thereby depressing the market value of property for prospective buyers.

**Spill-Over Effects and Gentrification**

As noted above, only recently has an intensification of the consequences of street prostitution and its related activities prompted residents of Inglewood and Ramsay to take action. Two major events are responsible for the current situation in these communities.

The first one relates largely to territorial displacement. That is, when the City of Calgary began the process of cleaning up
its downtown core for the 1988 Winter Olympics, assisted by police enforcement, some of the street prostitutes once working in one of the newly 'cleaned-up' areas moved to the National Hotel area neighbouring Inglewood (Bell, 1993:20). As a result of what could be termed a saturated market in 'C' stroll, prostitutes were forced to work on new residential streets.

The second major event contributing to street prostitution becoming problematic to the residential areas of Inglewood and Ramsay was a combined natural and planned revitalization process primarily taking place in Inglewood.

Evidence of natural gentrification in Inglewood is largely seen through a recent elevation in socio-economic status. As reported in the City of Calgary's Index of Median Incomes by Community, District and Ward (1990), the following are average community incomes from 1985 through 1989, using 100 as a median average:

1. Average income of residents of the Inglewood community rose from 75.8 to 78.5 against the median average; and,

2. The communities which immediately surround Inglewood (Ramsay, Victoria Park, Southview, Bridgeland, and Albert Park) experienced an average 3.42 percent point reduction in average incomes (as cited in Calgary Police Service, 1992b:6).

One of the windfalls of this surge in socio-economic status was a greater number of owner-occupied properties. Rented property
declined dramatically during this period. In commenting on this growth, Jennifer Hyde of the Inglewood Ramsay Business Revitalization Zone stated, "More than $600,000 is earmarked or has been invested by property owners this year [1993]. And some 17 new businesses have opened in the area since March 1992" (Mofina, 1993:B3).

Additionally, real estate prices in the area dramatically increased relative to other communities in the city. A Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation study revealed that since 1986 Inglewood experienced a net gain of 119 percent in real estate prices, while comparatively the city as a whole experienced an increase of only 48.2 percent (Calgary Police Service, 1992b:6).

The planned revitalization process was witnessed through a commercial development plan comprising two main features: a federal government-backed upgrading of Inglewood's business area (Mainstreet Program), and a new residential development on its eastern edge (Climenhaga, 1992:A4).

The combined effect of these events is that long-term and new residents of Inglewood became more established, developing a greater stake in their community. Street prostitution, once tolerated to a lesser extent, no longer fit into the new Inglewood plan. The community was able to utilize its new found political clout and resources to draw attention to their concerns. Action on the part of some municipal elected officials and subsequently the police, although not immediate, did not take long to follow.
THE DYNAMICS OF STREET PROSTITUTION IN EDMONTON

Similar to its southern neighbour of Calgary, the City of Edmonton has been, and continues to be, plagued by street prostitution in residential communities. The activities of street prostitution are limited to three separate geographical areas of the city’s downtown, known colloquially as ‘the Stroll’, ‘the Hill’, and ‘the Drag’ (Edmonton Police Service, 1991:1).

Since the mid-1980s, street prostitution and its related activities have been of greatest concern to the residents of the bordering communities of Boyle Street and McCauley, located in the northeast part of Edmonton, and home to ‘the Drag’. In very close proximity to Boyle Street and McCauley are numerous other residential communities such as, Norwood, Eastwood, Rossdale, Riverdale, Alberta Avenue, McDougall, and Cromdale, which have been affected less significantly by street prostitution. The following discussion will focus primarily on Boyle Street and McCauley.

Impacts on Boyle Street and McCauley

Street prostitution first became problematic to the residents of Boyle Street during the mid-1980s. Prior to this time street prostitution was prevalent in non-residential areas of the downtown area. It was not until the City implemented a traffic plan designed to discourage johns (January, 1989) that the residential community of McCauley (north of Boyle Street) began to share more in Boyle Street’s misfortunes (City of Edmonton, 1993b:3). Street prostitutes were simply displaced to the northern fringe of Boyle
Street and into southern McCauley, "... where they compounded an existing problem that had been building since 1987" (Loyie, 1992:B1).

The activities leading up to the implementation of the traffic plan (i.e., one way streets, permanent and temporary blocked access routes, etc.) were the everyday results of street prostitution: "Condoms and needles, excessive vehicular traffic, harassment of women residents, youth and children being accosted, and generalized fear on the part of the residents" (Payuk 1993:pers. comm.). The following quote taken from an article written during the relevant time period provides a further account of what residents had to suddenly endure:

From midnight until the early hours of the morning, the johns cruise by in their cars and vans, stopping to perform sex acts in the alleys behind the buildings. Come morning, the streets are littered with the evidence of the night’s goings-on (O’Farrell, 1987:23).

Similar to the Inglewood/Ramsay experience in Calgary, whereby tricks are predominately carried out away from the stroll area, some of the above mentioned communities in Edmonton (i.e., Rossdale and Riverdale) are noted only for their trick locations. This, however, is of little comfort for the residents who must endure, some would argue, even greater risks through the exposure to greater numbers of used condoms and needles.

Two main factors reduce this similarity to the Calgary situation, and increase the consequences to the affected
communities: (1) the vast area which 'the Drag' occupies, and (2) the nature of the prostitutes working 'the Drag'.

The former can be explained by the fact the police have been unsuccessful in containing the problem to any one specific area, hence enabling street prostitutes to move more freely between different communities as they see fit, free from the worry of not being found by eager clients. The second factor is of greatest concern. Here, prostitutes are noted for their uninhibited conduct to attract passing motorists (i.e., lifting their skirts or holding their blouses open) (Edmonton Police Service, 1991:2). As well, they are referred to as the 'lower track', those who provide cheaper services, are more likely to have sexual diseases, are less educated, are reliant upon welfare for the support of addictions and children in many cases, are more willing to engage in unprotected sexual activity, and generally are just worse off than the "... cleaner, more affluent and better educated prostitutes of 'the Stroll'" (Edmonton Police Service, 1991:2). Such qualities often preclude any concern over where to engage in sexual activities. That is, whatever is closest and fastest often become the overriding considerations.

In addition, those prostitutes utilizing 'the Drag' are noted for their excessive drug and alcohol use, whether working or not. As observed by Staff Sergeant Bill Mowbray of the Edmonton Police Service, "Many of the prostitutes work and live in the same areas. There are a lot of crack and drug houses in those areas so they can literally get out of bed in the morning and turn a couple of tricks
and go down to the crack house" (1993: pers. comm.). This is of
great concern to residents of Boyle Street and McCauley. Adding
this to the equation significantly heightens the potential for
altercations between residents and any one of the involved actors
(prostitute, john, or pimp), and increases the level of fear and
anxiety amongst residents.

As in the affected residential areas of Calgary, street
prostitution in Edmonton poses numerous health risks to the
residents, particularly children. However, recent developments in
Edmonton have heightened the concern of residents and the need for
further precautions to be taken.

Following a major outbreak of resistant gonorrhoea in Edmonton
in 1992, it was determined that street prostitution was a major
factor in the spread of this disease (City of Edmonton, 1993c:1).
Additionally, informal police accounts cite that "... as few as two
and possibly as many as a dozen prostitutes are believed to be
infected with the HIV virus" (Clark, 1992:16). The lower estimate
is somewhat corroborated by a recent survey of 67 adult prostitutes
who work the streets of the inner-city of Edmonton. Of those
respondents who had an HIV test (60), three admitted to being HIV
positive (Edmonton Social Planning Council, 1993:9). The low
number of respondents and lack of verifiable evidence most likely
contributes to the lower estimate being supported.

Concerns over such risks have prompted a number of preventive
measures being used within the communities of Boyle Street and
McCauley. Most notably, following the emergence of street
prostitution activities around the Sacred Heart Elementary School (northern McCauley) measures have been taken to educate the school children:

At a local school’s awards ceremony the principal reminded students about the dangers which lurked under the melting snow. In unison the students chanted out the school’s 3 rules on what to do if they saw used condoms and syringes in the playground. "Don’t touch. Get away. Call a teacher" (Retson, 1992b:B3).

In addition to the health risks and nuisances, residents of Boyle Street and McCauley express a genuine concern for a larger, more pervasive threat to the quality of life within the community: Larger problems are the climate of fear, anger, and despair that can turn a typical neighbourhood into a ghetto, if residents do not band together. It is easier for other kinds of crime to take root when people feel afraid and lose pride in their neighbourhood. Local businesses find it hard to attract customers they want and may leave the area which results in vacant buildings that create other kinds of problems (City of Edmonton, 1993c:1).

**Spill-Over Effects**

Unlike the lengthier Calgary experience of street prostitution becoming problematic to residential communities, the City of Edmonton’s is rather brief. As denoted by the heading of this
section, the phenomenon of 'spill-over effects' characterizes the Edmonton experience. Gentrification was not a contributing factor.

In a study of four Canadian cities' experiences with addressing street prostitution in residential communities (Vancouver, Edmonton, Winnipeg, and Toronto), Larsen (1992:187) notes that, "... the 'gentrification' of existing inner-city neighbourhoods was an important factor in all cities except Edmonton." Street prostitution had not existed in Boyle Street or McCauley prior to the mid-1980s. As a result, there was not the typical conflict between new middle to upper class residents moving to the inner-city area and failing to tolerate such activities.

The predominant reason for street prostitution moving into residential communities of Edmonton in the first place was a result of a police enforcement strategy to move prostitutes out of a downtown commercial district (Lewis, 1993:B2). Clearly, the result deviated from the objectives.

It is this writer's opinion that a host of ancillary factors may have contributed to the entrenchment and further proliferation of street prostitution in and to these areas. One factor could have been the determination of the communicating law's legal standing by the Alberta Supreme Court (October, 1986 to July, 1987) and subsequent directive of the Attorney General of Alberta to cease enforcement of this law. Of course, this could be argued to be negligible, as Calgary witnessed no similar activity. At the time, however, Calgary was in the process of altering its street prostitution landscape. As well, two separate traffic plans
instituted by the City of Edmonton in Boyle Street in January, 1989 and McCauley in July, 1991 also contributed to the expansion of the residential areas in which street prostitution takes place currently.

The pervasiveness and intensity of street prostitution and its related activities proved to be a key factor in mobilizing citizens to take action and subsequently garnering support from municipal politicians and city police.

DOES CONCERN JUSTIFY ACTION?

As described earlier, three Gallup surveys conducted over a period of eight years showed that only a small percentage of the Canadian citizenry regard street prostitution as a serious problem in their place of residence: 27 percent; 27 percent; and 29 percent (Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, 1984; Gallup Canada, 1988; 1992). Further, the most negative impacts of street prostitution are limited to an even smaller segment of the population: inner-city residential communities. Rightfully so then, the question may be asked: Does concern over street prostitution voiced by residential communities justify action on the part of the police?

Clearly, as demonstrated through the examples of Calgary and Edmonton, the negative consequences of street prostitution are pronounced. Residents of communities in which the activities of street prostitution occur have become the unintended victims, having to endure a host of social, health, physical, and economic ills. For many, everyday tasks and events, from parking the car to
walks at night, are no longer viewed as simple or safe, particularly for women. A once care-free community lifestyle is slowly replaced with a legitimate sense of fear and uncertainty.

Public consultation and survey data gathered from residents of the affected communities in both Edmonton and Calgary respectively, substantiate the magnitude of the problem of street prostitution, and the resultant decline in the quality of life. It must be noted that data gathering was conducted during times in which residents' concerns over street prostitution were at a high level. The public consultation data gathering measure used in Edmonton preceded the creation of a significant enforcement strategy on the part of the police service. In contrast, the data gathering measure used in Calgary followed a month-long, joint police/community initiative.

In the residential communities of Boyle Street and McCauley in Edmonton, more than 850 residents actively participated in a three month long public consultation process designed to gauge the opinions and suggestions of a reasonable cross-section of residents on a number of social and economic issues for neighbourhood improvement. For these residents, prostitution proved to be the "single most urgent issue" of the social dimensions (Bubel, 1991:8). Many themes were consistent throughout residents' comments on their dislike for street prostitution: health and safety risks; nuisances; acts of violence; and general fear.

In a survey of 335 residences and businesses in Calgary's Inglewood and Ramsay neighbourhoods, the majority of themes expressed by the 248 respondents paralleled those of Edmonton's.
The survey was conducted by volunteers of the Communities’ Response Against Prostitution Committee, later renamed to Communities Against Prostitution and Related Activity (CAPRA), following a month-long, joint police/community initiative entitled "Operation PAC-RAP". The overriding objective of the survey was to assess any perceived improvement on three specific issues: traffic volume; litter in the form of condoms and needles; and confrontations with johns or prostitutes. Findings showed that there was little or no perceived success with the first and second issues, while the third was perceived as being partially achieved with a reduction in the anxiety felt by residents (Communities’ Response Against Prostitution Committee, 1992:2).

The fear vocalized by the residents is not generated by the presence of the activities of street prostitution alone, however. Rather, it is accompanied by numerous other incivilities and criminal acts, such as drug use, violent altercations, and property crime, each of which compound the existing problem.

If not for the involvement of the police, communities would be overcome by the activity. In furthering the debate over whether action in response to concern over street prostitution is justified, an important question must be asked: What type of action is needed? Discussion on this question will be highlighted in chapters five, six, and seven.

**CONCLUSION**

Street prostitution and its related activities are
particularly destructive to the social fabric of residential communities. The impacts felt by such communities, although representative of a minority of the population, extend well beyond both geographical and perceptual boundaries. Residents have become victims to an activity often viewed as victimless.

The legitimacy of demands for prompt action on the part of the police against the presence of street prostitution and its related activities is undeniable. In chapter 4 discussion begins on the direction law enforcement agencies should be taking to most effectively address the problems faced by residential communities.
CHAPTER 4

LIMITS OF TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO POLICING:
AN OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH
WITH REFERENCE TO STREET PROSTITUTION

INTRODUCTION

North American policing as it stands today in the 1990s is a product of what may be referred to as a revolutionary, not evolutionary change. Policing today is somewhat a reflection of what it once was at the turn of the Century, and despite numerous technological advances the underlying philosophy during this time was misleading. To unhitch policing from this unproductive path a revolution of sorts was necessary.

The current revolution was sparked by large-scale research projects undertaken with the assistance of Chiefs of Police from major urban centres in the United States. Additional support came from organizations dedicated to research in the field of policing. Soaring crime rates and the inability of the police to deal with the increase in crime prompted an evaluation of the major components of the police response to fighting crime.

Branded as professional policing these mainstay components were seriously questioned. Research findings were far-reaching and provided many insights into what is required to enhance policing effectiveness in addressing many specific types of crimes: discovery (or completed), involvement (or in progress), and even victimless.
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that the police response to street prostitution in residential neighbourhoods must go beyond an autonomous, incident-driven, and reactive model. By doing so, this chapter will set the foundation for following chapters to address an alternative model for dealing with street prostitution in residential areas.

This chapter will carry out the following: review the major research conducted on the limits of traditional policing; specifically, motorized preventive patrol, rapid response, and criminal investigations; briefly discuss the value of traditional policing methods in relation to victimless crimes; discuss and examine the current strategies used by the police to address street prostitution; and discuss the need for a re-orientation in policing strategies through an overview of the literature on the predisposing factors for entry into street prostitution. A conclusion follows the discussion.

THE LIMITS OF TRADITIONAL POLICING

The decades of the 1970s and 1980s witnessed dramatic challenges and changes to policing practices in North America. In response to key research experiments on policing undertaken in the United States, a movement was underway to break from a purely autonomous model and strengthen community ties.

Widespread corruption between police and local politicians in the United States is often viewed as the decisive factor in a movement away from close police-community relations towards what
became known as 'professional policing'. Inefficiency in policing also proved to be a key determinant, largely prompted by new technological advances (ie., the patrol car and radio dispatch systems). "The job of the patrol officer was now one of driving around the streets in a car, isolated from the citizenry, waiting for a dispatcher to send him a call" (Linden and Prairie Research Associates, 1990:58). Policing in Canada was not immune to such changes by its southern neighbour and, subsequently, although largely misplaced, followed suit (Solicitor General Canada, 1990:42).

Two further policing strategies sparked by continued technological advances proved even more influential in distancing the police from the community and in developing so-called 'professional policing':

1. the invention of random motorized patrol as a presumed deterrent to potential criminals; and
2. the invention of rapid response as the uniform response to calls to the police from the public (Solicitor General Canada, 1990:41).

Under this 'incident-driven' approach to policing, service delivery became largely reactive - responding to individual events reported by citizens (Spelman and Eck, 1987:3). As a result, the two main criteria for police performance became:

1. the proportion of charges laid to offences reported to the police; and
2. the response time to calls for service made to
the police by the public (Solicitor General Canada, 1990:42).

Such an approach had managed to gain widespread acceptance from police and citizens alike, with no basis of research showing its potential for success. As noted by Sparrow et al. (1990:6), "The idea of a police force that fights crime vigorously, answers calls promptly, and investigates cleverly draws nearly universal support. Most people can't imagine anything else the police could possibly do."

The efficiency of this reactive model of policing was seriously called into question following extensive research conducted on the effectiveness of these three pillars of police tactics. As to be discussed in greater detail below, "... research on preventive patrol, response time, and investigations showed that merely reacting to incidents had, at best, limited effects on crime and public satisfaction" (Spelman and Eck, 1987:4).

**Motorized Preventive Patrol**

From October, 1972 through September, 1973 the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department was the site for what would later be coined as a truly 'pioneering' experiment on policing effectiveness. The experiment was conceived in light of two widely accepted yet unproven hypotheses on motorized preventive patrol strategies: (1) police visibility deters potential offenders, and (2) police visibility reduces the public's fear of crime (Kelling et al., 1974:iii).
To determine the validity of these hypotheses, five equally matched experimental areas were evaluated on the impact of one of three controlled levels of routine preventive patrol. These levels of patrol included: normal, as before the experiment; a doubling or tripling of the usual; and nonexistent - police only responded to calls for assistance. In testing the effectiveness of the variations, researchers drew from hundreds of sources of measures of crime and fear of crime, some of which involved official crime statistics and household surveys.

As noted by Sparrow et al. (1990:15), "The results dumbfounded the police world." Analysis of data in the three experimental areas unquestionably refuted the hypotheses upon which routine preventive patrols were based, as no significant differences were demonstrated in the level of crime, nor in citizen’s fear of crime (Kelling et al., 1974). At both ends of the spectrum where differences were expected to be noticed, neither the residents of the high patrol area nor those of the non-patrol area were aware that anything had changed (Kelling et al., 1974).

Research aside, Sparrow et al. (1990:46) state that, ... the general inefficacy of random patrol is borne out by the experience of patrol officers themselves, many of whom go years - even whole careers - without happening on a felony. Random patrol is, more than anything else, random.

This view is substantiated by Clarke and Hope (1984:5, as cited in Waller, 1989:28), "It has been estimated that an urban police
patrol officer might be within 100 yards of a burglary every 8 years." Furthermore, Waller (1993:11) asserts that such patrols are irrelevant to violence that occurs in so-called domestic settings (i.e., most sexual and physical abuse against women and children).

**Rapid Response**

In 1977, the Kansas City Police Department was once again the site of an equally innovative study, revealing just as significant findings on the ineffectiveness of traditional policing.

For many police departments rapid response to calls (i.e., 911 service) consume a tremendous amount of resources. However, as the Kansas City response time study revealed, "... a quick response does not increase the probability of making an arrest or of satisfying the complainant" (Van Kirk 1978, as cited in Linden and Prairie Research Associates, 1990:60). Similar studies conducted in other American cities supported these findings.

The most glaring reason for these findings is that only two percent of police department's calls actually merit a rapid response (Waller, 1993:11). That is, for both discovery and involvement crimes, numerous factors, mostly situational and behavioural, diminish the necessity for a rapid response. Understandably, this can be seen with the former in that the offender is long gone, the victim having returned to a vandalized home, for example. Not so, however, with involvement crimes. If rapid response was to prove successful it should be with these
instances of direct confrontation between the victim and offender. Sparrow et al. (1990:16) note, however, that this generally is not the case:

In Kansas City, the chance of arresting a villain at the scene became infinitesimal if victims waited more than five minutes to call police. Unfortunately, most waited far longer.

The ineffectiveness of such incident-driven policing strategies is further supported by the limited target group being served. As noted by Wilson and Kelling (1989:49), "... fewer than 10 percent of the addresses from which the police receive calls account for more than 60 percent of these calls." Waller adds that roughly 10 percent of crime victims account for close to 40 percent of the victimizations (1993:11).

**Criminal Investigations**

Research into the effectiveness of criminal investigations (retrospective investigations conducted by detectives) brought to light further evidence on the limited ability of traditional policing strategies to positively impact upon crime levels.

In 1973, a study was undertaken by the Rand Corporation of the United States to examine the police forces nation-wide in their investigation of serious crimes, with particular emphasis on assessing the contributions made to overall police effectiveness (Greenwood et al., 1977).

The Rand study demonstrated that, "Investigators spend about
93 percent of their time on activities that do not lead directly to solving previously reported crimes" (Greenwood et al., 1977:230). As such, detectives solve very few crimes, let alone make many arrests of suspects. Rather, patrol officers are responsible for most arrests "... by the availability of identification of the perpetrator at the scene of the crime, or by routine police procedures" (Greenwood et al., 1977:225).

Such findings further contributed to a growing body of research which seriously undermined the policing practices of the time. However, the authors of the aforementioned studies were quick to caution readers against viewing such ground breaking findings as a black mark against the ability of the police to control crime, or as an indication to cut back policing services. Rather, conclusions all pointed to the need for a more efficient use of resources: a reallocation of manpower away from reactive, incident-driven, to proactive, problem-driven policing strategies.

**TRADITIONAL POLICING AND VICTIMLESS CRIMES**

The overwhelming ineffectiveness of incident-driven, reactive policing strategies to reduce levels of conventional crime (ie., thefts, assaults, burglaries, homicides, etc.) begs the question: What possible effect could such approaches have on victimless, consensual crimes? Most notably, these crimes include drug trafficking, illegal gambling, loan sharking, and prostitution.²

² The author does not consider street prostitution in residential areas to be a victimless crime. See chapter 3.
One could safely say that without direct testimony from one party against the other, or eye-witness accounts, traditional policing measures will invariably fail at all attempts to reduce the levels of 'victimless' crimes. This position is altogether based upon the need for such policing measures to have a victim in order to start the criminal justice wheels in motion.

By no means is this to say that traditional measures will not prove effective to some extent in controlling the incidents of these activities. Rather, if significant gains (short and long-term) are to be realized in reducing victimless crimes, the underlying problems must be addressed, not simply the incident itself.

The following section highlights the inadequacies of traditional policing strategies to address the so-called victimless crime of street prostitution.

Policing Street Prostitution in Canada: The Ineffectiveness of the Law

With the enactment of Bill C-49 in 1985, which made illegal public communication for the purposes of prostitution (see chapter 2), police enforcement strategies to address prostitution have primarily focused on the street activities. Ninety-five percent of the 10,134 police reported prostitution offenses in 1992 involved communicating offenses. The remaining 5 percent were bawdy house and procuring (i.e., pimping) offenses (Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, 1993a:5). Figure 2 illustrates the magnitude of this focus prior to and following the implementation of the current law.
The reason for the focus on street activities can be traced to the primary intent of the legislation: to reduce the nuisances caused by street prostitution through the removal of its visible aspects (the prostitutes and the johns).

Additionally, there are numerous factors which preclude the police from concentrating on the enforcement of bawdy house (sections 210 and 211) and procuring (section 212) provisions of the Criminal Code. In order to obtain a successful conviction against a pimp under section 212, for example, the police must rely on the testimony of the prostitute(s) working for the pimp. Obtaining the testimony is straightforward compared with the

Figure 2
Prostitution Offenses by Type, Canada

1 Before 1986, soliciting offenses are reported.

often gruelling battle of first having the prostitute lay charges against her pimp.

With regards to the enforcement of section 212, policing practices are slowly changing. That is, more attention is being focused on charging the pimps despite an ordinarily labour intensive process. This is largely due to the spin-off success of the conviction of one pimp: the Department of Social Services in Halifax, Nova Scotia, estimates that for each convicted pimp there are three less female youths prostituting themselves (Welsh 1993:18).

**Operational Use of Communicating Law**

Three essential elements must exist to establish that an offence under the communicating law has occurred: (1) a communication between the two parties, verbal or non-verbal (i.e., indicating sexual acts with hand motions); (2) the communication related to a sexual act in return for payment (money or objects of value, i.e., drugs); and (3) the communication occurred in a public place (Lowman, 1989:37). Non-uniformed, undercover police officers often referred to as decoys are used to obtain this information. Decoys pose as either prostitutes or johns.

Vice or morality squads are the principal divisions within police departments to coordinate and carry out the enforcement of the communicating law. Other units are often drawn upon for additional resources, particularly in large operations that utilize policewomen decoys (i.e., john blitzes). Because of the covert
nature of the operations, police officers are often rotated to avoid detection by the prostitutes.

In either an operation directed at johns or prostitutes the initiator of the conversation is irrelevant. What is of importance, however, is that the police officer not entrap the individual. This may occur when the decoy, not having established reasonable grounds that an individual is in fact a prostitute or john, attempts to have them purchase or sell sexual services. To avoid the defence of entrapment on these grounds the following guidelines were provided to new recruits of the Vancouver Police Department for the apprehension of prostitutes:

(T)he suspect may be unwilling to mention sex and money. If so, play along and attempt to have the suspect mention both. If you have reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect is a working prostitute, after some communication has occurred which establishes that fact, you may mention either a sum of money or what (sexual services) you want (as cited in Lowman, 1989:39).

In the case of apprehending johns, policewomen decoys are used. Back-up surveillance units positioned out of sight of the decoy's position on the stroll are present at all times. These units serve two main purposes: (1) to ensure the safety of the decoy from potentially threatening johns, and (2) to apprehend the john following the determination that evidence of a communication has been established.

As with the apprehension of prostitutes, similar guidelines
concerning the initiation and content of the conversation apply to policewomen decoys attempting to charge johns. However, entrapment is rarely a threat as it is the john who is lured to the so-called prostitute without any provocation, and more-or-less incriminates himself as one looking for sexual favours.

At no point in time will the policewomen get into the john’s car. A simple hand signal to the back-up unit usually finalizes the operation. On occasion, however, body microphones will be used to indicate to back-up units when to move in, while simultaneously recording the conversation for evidentiary purposes. Lowman’s research with Vancouver policewomen decoys showed that the whole process taken to obtain the mandatory requirements to charge a john, unlike undercover male officers charging prostitutes, is rather routine and quick:

... once the suspect mentions a sex act and a price - and police seem to have little difficulty in maneuvering them into doing so - he is susceptible to being charged. The whole conversation usually takes about half a minute (1989:40).

In addition to undercover operations to secure charges against either of the two aforementioned actors, police use, although less frequently, surveillance. This method involves following the john and the prostitute, waiting for a sexual act to be initiated, then obtaining a statement from the john (Department of Justice, 1989:33). The time consuming nature of this approach is often given as the reason for its limited use.
Two major methods of enforcing the law have been used since its implementation in 1985: (1) short periods of intense police 'crackdowns' commonly referred to as sweeps, stings, or blitzes, involving decoy and back-up police officers, and (2) ongoing police patrols in the affected areas. These approaches can be characterized as the mainstays of policing street prostitution. They are largely incident-driven and clearly fall within the traditional policing model.

The practice of sweeps is often referred to as police saturation: large numbers of police in one specific area for a very short period of time. The goal is to accumulate large numbers of arrests of a specific target, usually johns or female prostitutes, but sometimes male prostitutes, with the intent of suppressing the activities for an indefinite period of time. Territorial displacement is not a desired goal of this enforcement practice, but is at times an unavoidable outcome.

Sweeps are often conducted in response to complaints voiced by affected residents, and as such are viewed as reactive measures. Additionally, they sometimes signify the onset of a larger, more pervasive operation in a specific area (i.e., a special task force project).

In reporting on research conducted on the Calgary Police Service's responses to street prostitution, Brannigan and associates (1989:21) note that the majority of arrests arise from sting operations: "Eighty-four percent of arrests occurred in four stings in 1986 and in 59% in one sting in 1987." Other cities show
similar patterns of enforcement.

The second main approach to policing street prostitution is routine patrolling, more frequently by marked and unmarked cars, but occasionally by foot patrol. The premise here is that ongoing enforcement will prevent prostitutes from 'laying low' following a sweep operation and resurfacing after a few days (Department of Justice, 1989:34). Brannigan et al. (1989:21) provide the following example to illustrate this premise:

By parking the squad car and simply watching the traffic, police scare off customers and the other prostitutes become aggravated since the presence of the police works as a collective embargo on everyone working the stroll.

An additional value of this approach is witnessed through the ability of the police to obtain detailed information on prostitutes. This information may later prove vital not only for enforcement purposes, but additionally for their safety (i.e., a prostitute is presumed missing).

Often unintentionally, this enforcement measure occasionally results in arrests of prostitutes. That is, plainclothes vice personnel will have prostitutes solicit them for the purposes of prostitution while in the midst of carrying out other duties.

**Ineffectiveness of Communicating Law**

Findings of the most comprehensive research undertaken to-date on the effectiveness of the communicating law revealed its inability to achieve the desired goal: to reduce the nuisances of
street prostitution through the removal of its visible aspects. More specifically, under the law police have been unable to rid affected residential neighbourhoods of numerous social ills and nuisances brought on by prostitutes, johns, and the associated elements. These findings were derived from five major and eight secondary site evaluations carried out to determine the law’s impact in its first three years of use.

The ineffectiveness of the law is largely attributable to its operational use. As noted in the previous section, the two major police enforcement operations of sweeps and routine patrol are incident-driven. They do not respond to the predisposing factors contributing to entry into street prostitution (ie., childhood abuse, family instability, substance abuse, and structural impediments). Nor do these approaches consistently draw upon community resources through partnerships with residents’ and business groups, social outreach programs for youth and adult prostitutes, health service agencies, and other valuable resources. As well, they do not pose a sufficient deterrent to cruising johns - one area where situational crime prevention measures have demonstrated success (see Matthews, 1993a; 1992a). The following quote provided by the Department of Justice (1989:119) in its final report on the evaluation studies lends support to this position:

Perhaps the clearest conclusion of this evaluation is that the police enforcement of the new s. 195.1 did not suppress the street prostitution trade in most cities. The main effect was to move street prostitutes from one
downtown area to another, thereby displacing the problem.

Despite the absence of an equally comprehensive evaluative study over the last five years (1988-1993), all indicators point to the fact that police enforcement of the law has continued to fail in attempts to significantly reduce the nuisances of street prostitution in residential neighbourhoods. Such indicators, however, are by no means conclusive on their own.

These indicators run contrary to the Department of Justice’s findings on research undertaken in November, 1990 to determine the number and location of street prostitutes in the same five major evaluation sites as the 1987-88 evaluation research. In utilizing very subjective research methods (street counts and interviews with police officers), findings revealed that the number of street prostitutes ‘appears’ to have declined since 1987 (Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, 1991:3). The following indicators provide a different picture.

One indicator is the continuation of high levels of police reported communicating offenses demonstrating a sustained presence of street activities over this five year period (1993 statistics were the latest available at the time of writing). With the exception of 1993 which showed a dramatic decrease (7,987) (Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, 1994), the number of police reported communicating offenses for the years 1988 to 1993 inclusive, have remained fairly stable within a range of 9,000 to 10,000 a year. Additionally, as alluded to in chapter 3, public opinion regarding prostitution as a serious problem has remained
stable over an eight year period from 1984 to 1992. Gallup Canada ... (1992) reported in 1992 that 29 percent of Canadian adults viewed prostitution as a serious problem in their area of residence. This finding was only 2 percent higher than findings of a similar survey conducted in 1988.

Other indicators, although less substantial, include, media reports, predominately print form, and municipal government action. Gibbs Van Brunschot (1993:2) notes that in 1992, the Edmonton Journal contained 73 articles on local prostitution activities. A large number of these media accounts related directly to street prostitution activities in the affected residential neighbourhoods of Boyle Street and McCauley. By contrast, many of the Department of Justice commissioned evaluation studies revealed varied numbers of newspaper articles pertaining to prostitution for the three year analysis period with few reaching such levels.

Municipal government action includes the creation of specific task forces or action groups to address street prostitution, or more general task forces having examined street prostitution as one of a number of issues of concern. Over the last few years an unprecedented number of municipalities have undertaken such work in response to local concerns over increased street prostitution activity in residential areas. Notably, these actions have included the City of Ottawa's Task Force on Prostitution (established in August, 1992), the City of Edmonton's Action Group on Prostitution (established in March, 1992), and Vancouver's Safer City Task Force (established in October, 1991).
It would be inappropriate and insufficient to attribute the sustained levels of street prostitution activity all to the inadequacies of police enforcement. Many factors hinder the police enforcement of the law. The two most noticeable are the law itself and the judiciary's leniency in sentencing practices.

Briefly, the law acts as an imposition because it requires police to utilize undercover operations to obtain the majority of arrests for communicating for the purposes of prostitution. This amounts to an extremely labour intensive and costly undertaking with no appreciable long-term benefits.

The judiciary have not been overly helpful to the police in providing a significant level of deterrence, either specific or general, through sentencing practices. For the police, the concern is primarily in regard to johns. This concern is noted through many police departments adopting enforcement strategies that are directed more at the johns than the prostitutes.

An examination of sentencing patterns for adults convicted of communicating offenses in Ontario and Alberta in the early 1990s by the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics (1993a) revealed significantly low sentences for johns relative to the maximum available: six months in prison, and/or a $2000 fine.

In Ontario median prison terms were 10 days and median fine amounts were $150, while in Alberta median prison terms were 30 days and median fine amounts were $200 (Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, 1993a:8,9). Moreover, prison sentences for johns accounted for 6 percent and 2 percent of all communicating
convictions in Ontario and Alberta, respectively (Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, 1993a:8,9). Fines were the most frequent sentence for johns in both provinces: Ontario (42%), and Alberta (89%) (Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, 1993a:8,9).

In highlighting the many limitations of traditional policing strategies, both general in nature and those specifically focused on street prostitution it would be incomplete to end at this point without a discussion of the factors contributing to a woman’s entry into street prostitution.

ENTRY INTO STREET PROSTITUTION: PREDISPOSING FACTORS

Benjamin and Masters (1964:472) describe three categories of factors contributing to a woman’s entry into prostitution: (1) predisposing factors, i.e., raised in a broken home; (2) attracting factors, i.e., financial rewards; and (3) precipitating factors, i.e., lured by a pimp or friend. A focus on such factors as part of a more comprehensive approach to addressing street prostitution, that is, going beyond a sole reliance on police intervention, is illustrative of a movement away from an incident-driven approach. For the purposes of this discussion, however, the focus will be limited to a review of the literature on predisposing factors contributing to entry into street prostitution.

Before commencing a discussion on the predisposing factors contributing to entry into street prostitution it is, however, imperative to first delineate the differences between male and female street prostitutes, female adult and youth street
prostitutes, and street and off-street prostitutes. Much of the literature which attempts to make comparisons between one research study and another crosses these boundaries rather nonchalantly, some more blatantly than others.

Lowman (1991:125) states that many similarities exist between male and female prostitutes in that both are characterized as having had unhappy childhoods and having voiced dissatisfaction with home life. The sources of this dissatisfaction, however, sometimes differ between the two sexes:

... with males, family problems sometimes related to parental rejection of a boy’s growing homosexual consciousness; a girl’s distaste for home life was more likely to relate to her sexual victimization by family members (Lowman, 1991:125).

Studies carried out to examine early childhood correlates of female entry into street prostitution without hesitation interchangeably compare adult and youth prostitutes. The reliability and validity of this practice is largely attributable to research which has shown that an overwhelming majority of female adult street prostitutes entered street prostitution in their youth (Silbert and Pines, 1982:483; Crook, 1984:27; Lautt, 1984:44; Lowman, 1984a:181).

Without a doubt the greatest distinction to be made between prostitutes is between street and off-street prostitutes or those who work in escort and dating services, massage parlours, and body rub houses. Differences exist at almost all levels between the two
groups (i.e., ethnicity, clients served, earnings), but are no more apparent than in the factors contributing to entry into prostitution.

This difference is highlighted in a comparative study conducted by Perkins (1991) in Australia. Three different sub-groups of women - 128 prostitutes, 115 health workers, and 120 students - were interviewed with the main objective of empirically demonstrating that prostitutes are essentially ordinary women who are only distinguishable from other women by their occupation.

Of the 128 prostitutes interviewed for the study, only 3.9 percent (5) were street prostitutes with the majority of the remaining 123 coming from 36 brothels across the Sydney metropolitan area (Perkins, 1991:173). Perkins' findings revealed that off-street prostitutes are neither the product of broken homes (based on parental relationship), nor significantly more often sexually assaulted in childhood (1991:227). Such findings differ dramatically from the literature on predisposing factors contributing to entry into street prostitution (as will be discussed below). Contributing factors for entry into prostitution for off-street prostitutes appear to fall within Benjamin and Masters' (1964) categories of attracting and precipitating:

... most are women in early adulthood who find themselves in dire financial situations and have someone they trust already involved in the sex industry (Perkins, 1991:349). Literature on predisposing factors contributing to entrance into street prostitution is neither consistent nor agreed upon.
Common and uncommon threads vary throughout the international, American, and Canadian literature on what factors correlate with entry into later youth and adult street prostitution. Early childhood abuse, family instability, substance abuse, and early structural impediments to schooling and employment are the most significant predisposing factors. More often than not, however, the early upbringing of many street prostitutes is characterized by a number of these factors occurring along a continuum of suffering and despair.

**Childhood Abuse**

Abuse is a broad and multi-dimensional term. Definitional problems on what constitutes abuse, particularly sexual abuse, has certainly confounded the literature on this subject. In an attempt to illustrate the relationship between early childhood abuse and later entry into street prostitution, reference will be made to three main forms of abuse: sexual; physical; and emotional.

Numerous American studies have revealed alarming rates of early childhood sexual abuse in the backgrounds of street prostitutes. Most notably, a study of 200 female adult and youth street prostitutes in San Francisco showed that 60 percent of the subjects had been sexually exploited as children (Silbert and Pines, 1982:489). In a similar study conducted by James and Meyerding (1976), 52 percent of those prostitutes interviewed answered affirmatively to the question, "Prior to your first intercourse, did any older person attempt sexual play or
intercourse with you?" (as cited in Silbert and Pines, 1982:490).

Numerous Canadian research studies as well support the findings of their American counterparts, although not of the same magnitude. Studies conducted on street prostitution in the early 1980s, preceding the implementation of the current communicating law, by Lowman (1984a:282) in Vancouver, Gemme et al. (1984:117) in the Province of Québec (predominately Montréal), and Crook (1984:25) in the Atlantic Provinces (predominately Halifax) revealed levels of childhood sexual abuse amongst prostitutes at 50 percent, 44 percent, and 28 percent, respectively. Brannigan and Fleischman (1989:85) refer to such levels of abuse as 'modest', and further note that they are considerably lower than the 'epidemic' levels of all three areas of abuse as reported by social welfare agencies. The authors attribute such variations to a multitude of definitional differences surrounding each study's interpretation of sexual abuse (1989:85).

In a detailed refutation of the Badgley Committee's (1984) finding that childhood sexual abuse is not a predisposing factor to later entry into street prostitution, as reported through their comparative research study undertaken to find out the prevalence of childhood sexual abuse among the general population and the prostitute sub-culture, Lowman (1987:103) firmly establishes that:

... prostitutes were twice as likely to have experienced

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1 Much has been said about the methodology used in the Badgley Committee's Juvenile Prostitution Survey, particularly the use of a female police officer as the principle research associate and interviewer. See Lowman (1987; 1986a).
a first unwanted intrafamilial sexual act involving force or threats of force as other members of the Canadian population.

High levels of physical abuse amongst street prostitutes have been reported in a number of Canadian studies. Crook's study showed that 40 percent of those street prostitutes interviewed were victims of physical abuse during childhood (1984:25), while Lowman's study reported that at least 75 to 80 percent of the respondents came from abusive or assaultive family backgrounds when combining levels of sexual abuse and family violence (1984a:283).

**Family Instability**

Family instability or often termed 'broken home' is a significant predisposing factor to later entry into street prostitution. Parental absence, divorce or separation, poor parent-child relationships, parental neglect, family disputes, and placement in a foster or group home characterize family instability.

In Silbert and Pines' study of 200 female adult and youth street prostitutes in San Francisco three-quarters stated that while growing up one parent was absent from the home at all times (1982:491). Research studies commissioned by the Department of Justice Canada for the Fraser Committee similarly reported a high proportion of prostitutes living in single parent families, foster homes, or other care-giving institutions (Sansfaçon, 1985:58).

Such high proportions of parental absence is reflective of a
high rate of divorce and/or separation. The Badgley Committee (1984:971) found that 48.9 percent of the 229 youth prostitutes interviewed had been raised in families where there had been some form of a marital breakup (divorce, separation, or death). In Crook's (1984:20) study 42.6 percent of prostitutes interviewed came from single parent families (31.9%) and foster or group homes (10.7%). Lowman's (1984b:731) study found that 56 percent of prostitutes interviewed came from single parent families and foster or groups homes.

Poor relationships with one or both parents is a common characteristic of prostitutes (Weisberg, 1985:88). In their study of 200 female youth and adult street prostitutes, Silbert and Pines note that "very few subjects reported having any kind of positive relationship with their fathers or mothers" (1982:491).

The memory of family disputes, particularly between or with parents, consistently appears as the strongest childhood recollection of prostitutes in a number of Canadian research studies on prostitution. The Badgley Committee found that 45.2 percent of male and 52.4 percent of female youth prostitutes recalled continuous fighting and arguments as the strongest memory of their home life (1984:984). In Crook's study of street prostitution in the Atlantic Provinces, 57.4 percent of all prostitutes interviewed recalled continuous fighting and arguments between family members as the strongest childhood memory (1984:20).

As noted above, a number of Canadian studies show that a small number of prostitutes have been placed in foster or group homes for
a period of their childhood and/or adolescence. Weisberg (1985:90) notes that prostitutes are subjected to many shifts in caretakers during childhood. In a 1980 study of female youth prostitutes by James (as cited in Boyer and James, 1983:114), 64 percent of those prostitutes interviewed had been placed in a foster home, group home, or other institution.

**Substance Abuse**

Substance abuse as a predisposing factor to later entry into street prostitution is viewed from both the situational and individual perspectives. Parental alcohol and drug abuse is frequently cited as one of the possible sources of "early psychological scarring in children who later became prostitutes" (Badgley Committee, 1984:973). Fifty-eight percent of the 200 female youth and adult street prostitutes interviewed in Silbert and Pines' study had parents who abused alcohol (1982:478). In the same study a dramatic prevalence of the abuse of drugs was noted: only 8 percent responded that no one in their immediate family used drugs on a regular basis (Silbert and Pines, 1982:478). In Crook's study, next to continuous fighting and arguments between family members, the strongest childhood memory of those prostitutes interviewed was alcohol/drug abuse involving one of their family members (1984:20).

It is often claimed that substance abuse and street prostitution go hand in hand. The use of drugs and alcohol is a means to escape the realities of the life of street prostitution.
Fleischman’s study of prostitution in Ontario showed that of the 22 street prostitutes interviewed (all women), 81.5 percent (18) used drugs on a consistent basis (1984:23). Fifty percent (11) of those street prostitutes interviewed used drugs every day (Fleischman, 1984:23). Of the 78 prostitutes interviewed by Gemme et al. (1984:118) in the Province of Québec, 72 percent (56) admitted to being ‘drinkers’, while 63 percent (49) used drugs to some degree: 19 occasionally; 17 moderately; 10 heavily; and 3 referred to themselves as dependent.

**Structural Impediments**

In addition to illustrating the individual, psycho-social explanations of entry into street prostitution, it is equally important to highlight the structural, socio-economic components. The thesis of the structural, socio-economic model is that:

... society not only allows for, but in fact is responsible for the situation which forces some young people to exchange sexual activities for money. Prostitution would not exist if our society did not value money over people, and was not structured to maintain power relationships between men and women, adults and youth, upper and lower classes, etc. (Youth Services Bureau, 1991:6).

Lack of education, unemployment, and gender and power are those issues which are central to the thesis of the structural model. Presentations by many organizations to the Fraser
Committee’s hearings on prostitution cited the economic plight of women, particularly "young, poorly educated women who are unable to find employment", as the major contributing factor to entry into prostitution (Fraser Committee, 1985:353). Further, these groups stated that:

... in times of economic hardship and high unemployment, those who lack schooling, training or work experience may have no choice but to turn to prostitution to provide the basic necessities for themselves and their dependents (Fraser Committee, 1985:353).

Both the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General (Horner Committee, 1990), and the Badgley Committee (1984) concurred that societal inequalities contribute to one’s entry into street prostitution. In commenting on the evaluation research on the ‘communicating’ law commissioned by the Department of Justice, the Horner Committee noted that most street prostitutes have low levels of educational achievement, have limited or no training for the job market, and live in poverty with prostitution as their only source of income (1990:13). Of the 229 male and female youth street prostitutes interviewed for the Badgley Committee, it was found that 42.3 percent (97) had failed to make it beyond junior high school, and 66.8 percent (153) had not completed more than one year of high school (1984:974).

Through a comparative analysis to ascertain whether this group’s educational achievements were representative of the general population of that age, the Badgley Committee found that 60.7
percent (51) of male and 54.5 percent (79) of female youth prostitutes interviewed had not attained the educational levels of youths their age (1984:975-976). Other studies also show comparatively low educational attainment for male and female youth prostitutes.

Lowman’s study of street prostitution in Vancouver revealed that 70.1 percent of respondents failed to complete secondary school (grade 12 in British Columbia) (1984b:705). Gemme and colleagues (1984:117) reported that 69 percent of the 80 prostitutes interviewed in the Province of Québec had begun high school, but had not completed their studies. In her study of prostitution on the Canadian Prairies, Lautt found that 77.8 percent of the 36 prostitutes interviewed had not completed their high school education (1984:42, as cited in Sansfaçon, 1985:59).

For the majority of street prostitutes, their employment history is either non-existent or characterized by minimal pay jobs. Extreme levels of poverty are highly prevalent amongst the street prostitute sub-culture.

In commenting on the findings of the research studies commissioned by the Department of Justice for the Fraser Committee, Sansfaçon notes that the majority of those prostitutes interviewed "had no other job than prostitution, and few had had any other in the past" (1985:60). Silbert and Pines found that only 14 percent of the 200 female street prostitutes interviewed were employed when they began prostitution, of which 62 percent held jobs in the service sector, meaning low pay and status (1982:484). Similarly,
the Badgley Committee reported high levels of unemployment among those youth street prostitutes interviewed: 54.8 percent of the males and 62.8 percent of the females (1984:1007).

CONCLUSION

Attempts to reduce the nuisances and associated social ills of street prostitution in residential neighbourhoods in the short and long-term will require a drastic change of current policing strategies. At best, a continuation of current approaches will only result in minimal, short-term gains. Furthermore, such gains in one neighbourhood are usually to the detriment of another as a result of territorial displacement.

Long-term gains will require more attention to addressing the underlying problems. Incident-driven approaches have proven ineffective in bringing about positive change. Comprehensive preventive measures will be needed to address the complexities which underlie the reasons for one to become involved in street prostitution. This can only be done by drawing upon the expertise and resources of community groups.

Such measures mark a return to the ways of the historical roots of policing, beyond the traditional approaches, limits which have stagnated policing as a whole and have crippled the potential effectiveness to addressing complex social problems such as street prostitution.

In the following chapter a review is undertaken of a model which has demonstrated success in overcoming such barriers: a model
which engages the police, community groups, and other key agencies in a problem-solving approach. Proven successes in addressing street prostitution in residential areas are highlighted.
CHAPTER 5

THE MULTI-AGENCY APPROACH: IMPLICATIONS FOR ADDRESSING
STREET PROSTITUTION IN CANADA

INTRODUCTION

In chapter 4 it was shown that a focus of police resources on an incident-driven, reactive approach to addressing street prostitution will have negligible results in reducing the nuisances and social ills inflicted upon residential areas. That is, by simply targeting the act of solicitation on the part of the street prostitute through reactive measures, few gains if any are made in preventing one from returning to the street shortly thereafter to 'work off' a fine or jail term.

Although not discussed at great length, chapter 4 as well touched on the need for police to move beyond an autonomous, professional mind-set to bring about positive change in residential neighbourhoods affected by street prostitution. The police operating in isolation have a limited effectiveness. There is a need for the police to draw upon and engage the expertise and resources of residents' associations, community organizations, and other key agencies.

A movement away from the police operating in isolation to a more comprehensive approach that involves a widening of the sense of responsibility beyond the criminal justice system, goes well beyond the realm of policing street prostitution. Its roots can be traced back to a number of broad developments.
Among the many developments which have prompted a movement away from an isolationist perspective in policing, the most notable is the awareness of the limitations of the police. Additionally, Lavrakas (1985) notes two important happenings: (1) "increasing sensitisation to the social problem of the 'fear of crime', and in particular, to the harmful effects which such fear was thought to be having on community life", and (2) "the realisation that many people ... are touched by crime, and that crime is nowadays a common public concern, no longer the sole province of the specialist" (as cited in Hope and Shaw, 1988:11).

The results were a movement by the police towards the establishment of relations with the community. This included working at some level with community groups, citizens, and a broad range of relevant agencies. The following quote provided by a former Commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police, Sir Kenneth Newman (1986:7), illustrates the necessity for such a comprehensive approach to crime reduction:

My strategy continues to reflect the fact that the force cannot provide tidy solutions to the many problems that confront Londoners and impair their quality of life. Indeed, it would be a monstrous deceit for anyone to attempt to sustain such a fiction. The major resources of crime reduction are to be found in the community itself and in other public and voluntary agencies (as cited in Matthews, 1992a:92).

Within this broad-based movement of the police to establish
community ties, numerous labels have been given to the varied working relationships that have been formed. Some of these include: partnerships, strategic alliances, inter-agency, and multi-agency, all of which have overlapping definitions and are often used interchangeably throughout the literature. For the purposes of this chapter, however, the term 'multi-agency' will be used and referred to by way of the definition advanced by Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994c:4), "... work which involves a range of agencies in some form of collaborative or co-operative crime prevention activity."

Kinsey and colleagues (1986:105) support this definition by arguing that a multi-agency approach must involve two vital undertakings on the part of the police: "... the shift in emphasis from crime detection and deterrence to crime prevention ...", and "... the shifting of responsibility from the police alone to the cooperative framework of police plus other agencies ...." This multi-dimensional shift is critical to the overall approach that is supported throughout this study.

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the value in the police adopting a multi-agency approach to addressing street prostitution in residential areas. This chapter will not attempt to quantitatively evaluate the effectiveness of such an approach, but rather will highlight the key components of multi-agency approaches to facilitate an examination of the dynamics of the police response to street prostitution in Calgary and Edmonton, chapters 6 and 7, respectively. The first section illustrates the
broader context of multi-agency approaches - partnerships - and their importance to crime prevention. An overview of the literature on multi-agency crime prevention follows this discussion, detailing the key components of this approach. The third section examines specific multi-agency initiatives implemented to address street prostitution. Key issues are highlighted from impetus for response to evaluation. A conclusion follows the discussion.

FOUNDATIONS OF THE MULTI-AGENCY APPROACH

Prior to a discussion on the workings of multi-agency approaches, it is imperative to first situate this approach in the broader context from which it has evolved. This can best be illustrated through the value that is placed on partnerships for successful crime prevention.

The relationship of 'multi-agency' to that of 'partnerships' is, however, somewhat more distinct in the view of Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994c:4):

Unlike the term 'partnership', the term 'multi-agency' as we employ it simply refers to work which involves a number of agencies as direct participants, and it places no limits on what form this involvement might take. Hence, it can be used to refer to work which is strongly dominated by one particular agency, as well as work which appears to be equally shared or directed by several. However, the roots of the multi-agency approach are derived
from the movement towards a 'partnership' approach to preventing crime. And, as noted by Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994c:4), these two approaches, at least in British Government terms, are viewed as synonymous.

In the context of crime prevention, partnerships are regarded as an inherently vital component to any successful initiative. This importance is well noted throughout both North American and international literature on crime prevention. The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General (Horner Committee), in adopting the 'safer communities' approach to crime prevention, stressed the fundamental necessity of partnerships for effective crime prevention initiatives that must exist amongst "all levels of government, all agencies in the criminal justice system, and non-governmental organizations and interest groups" (1993:12).

These partnerships are of even greater importance at the municipal, 'grassroots' level where the responsibility lies for policing, housing, schooling, urban planning, community health, social services, economic development, and other essential services. As stated by the Canadian Criminal Justice Association through its national strategy paper on crime prevention, "Crime prevention by its very nature must involve the whole range of statutory and voluntary agencies, every sector of the community, and every citizen" (1989:393). As well, this level of involvement is supported and promoted on an international level as noted through the "Final Declarations" of both international conferences on urban safety and crime prevention held in Montréal (1989) and

The use of partnerships in the prevention of crime has shown a number of successes. One such example is the Seattle City Crime Prevention Program instituted under the direction of the Mayor of Seattle, Washington, in the early 1970s. This initiative brought together concerned residents, municipal elected officials, community workers, and the police in an advanced neighbourhood watch scheme targeted at reducing residential burglaries. The advanced nature of this scheme is attributable to a number of skill management techniques used in the implementation phase to enhance citizen input and partnerships (Waller, 1993:15). An evaluation of the Program found a 50 percent reduction in residential burglaries following the first year of implementation, and a reduction at this level for the next two years (Cirel et al., 1977).

Having provided a brief illustration of the general nature and value partnerships play in the prevention of crime, the following section will turn to a more detailed overview of the key workings of the multi-agency approach.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON MULTI-AGENCY CRIME PREVENTION

The overwhelming majority of research undertaken to-date on the multi-agency approach to crime prevention has centred in
Western Europe, predominately in England and Wales. Since the mid-1980s, the British Government has sponsored numerous research studies and produced many policy documents promoting the development of multi-agency crime prevention initiatives. Much of this work has formed the basis for the British Government's apparent move towards a more broadly based conceptualization of crime prevention (Liddle and Gelsthorpe, 1994c:1). That is, a movement away from the police as having sole responsibility for crime prevention.

This section will overview the main findings and arguments presented in the literature on the general workings of multi-agency crime prevention approaches. A number of research projects and academic works will serve as the basis for this overview. Liddle and Gelsthorpe's (1994a; 1994b; 1994c) contribution to the literature provided by their comprehensive two year research project of multi-agency approaches to crime prevention in England and Wales have assisted in delineating the following key areas for examination: structure and organization; agency relations and participation; and styles of approach.

**Structure and Organization**

Throughout the literature it is widely accepted that for the successful delivery of comprehensive, broad-based crime prevention initiatives some degree of multi-agency structure is required (Liddle and Gelsthorpe, 1994c:6; Home Office, 1990:4). The term structure, however, can have varied definitions. Liddle and
Gelsthorpe (1994c:6) define structure as being relatively synonymous with organizational arrangements, and in this context note that structure involves the existence of working relationships in place between participating agencies which allows for "...liaison, co-operation, information-sharing and co-ordination of their crime prevention activities."

The structure of multi-agency initiatives varies quite considerably in its degree of formality, with the two extreme labelled formal and informal. Despite some of the values that informal structures lend to multi-agency initiatives (ie., quick responses to changes in local conditions and avoidance of problems concerning leadership and hierarchy), Liddle and Gelsthorpe found that informal networking raises a number of concerns over accountability and confidentiality (1994c:29), two issues which evoke a great deal of concern throughout the literature.

Matthews (1993a:26) notes that formal scrutiny of decision-making is often compromised at the expense of the use of informal structures, thus leaving no one individual or agency responsible for careless or inappropriate decisions. In commenting on the Danish experience with multi-agency crime prevention forums, Johansen (1988) notes that improper controls on information collected by these bodies have raised a number of fears over the potential abuse of confidentiality (as cited in Graham, 1990:126-127). In the context of informal networkings, Sampson et al. (1988:491) point out that:

A consensus is often negotiated at this informal level
between agency personnel, but then breaches of confidentiality and unacceptable working practices abound - which, because they are informal, are also unaccountable.

The value and flaws of coordination and leadership of multi-agency work are as well highlighted throughout the literature. Research undertaken by Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994c:17) strongly support the establishment of a coordinating mechanism to some degree: "...crime prevention work in the absence of co-ordination can be both wasteful and ineffective." Findings from their research also indicated that in a number of multi-agency groups a lack of clear coordination seriously impaired the overall functioning, and was thought to have lead to the demise of other such groups over time (Liddle and Gelsthorpe, 1994c:17). Whittington (1983) notes that a lack of coordination over such matters as timing and delivery of interventions can seriously jeopardize the overall effectiveness of multi-agency work (as cited in Matthews, 1993a:25).

The issue of leadership of multi-agency work conveys a number of varying definitions. Liddle and Gelsthorpe found that the factors of coordination, commitment of staff and/or resources, and initiative taking, often define the roles for which agency will provide the necessary leadership (1994c:19), particularly in the early stages of the group's work. The authors note, however, that this leadership role is rarely static, and is often framed to allow for shared ownership and control, thus avoiding one agency being
perceived as taking the lead role (1994c:19): a role often dominated by the police.

Although this role of the police pertains more to general relations between the involved agencies (discussed below), concerns expressed about the police dominating the multi-agency group are well described in the literature. Sampson and colleagues argue that by the police taking the lead role it is often the case whereby multi-agency agendas will be shaped to meet their needs and interests at the expense of others involved (1988:480). Research carried out by Blagg et al. (1988:205) support these concerns:

... both voluntary bodies and other state agencies are particularly worried that the 'police view' of local problems and crime prevention will come to dominate inter-agency forums and practical initiatives, to the exclusion of all other interested parties.

In an attempt by many multi-agency groups to avoid placing one agency in the lead position they have subscribed to a shared ownership approach for a range of duties. Liddle and Gelsthorpe note that this approach can best be described in terms of a 'corporate model' (1994c:20). Criticisms of the corporate model are often directed at the rhetoric presented through these approaches being portrayed as homogeneous units with little or no dissent amongst member agencies (Sampson et al., 1988:481).

**Agency Relations and Participation**

Despite a perception that agency relations are
straightforward, as inferred through the wide use of such terms as 'inter-agency cooperation' and 'partnerships', to name a few. Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994b:2) note that in practice this perception is quite inaccurate due to agencies "... seldom shar[ing] the same priorities, working practices, definitions of the problems, power or resource base." Additionally, Liddle and Gelsthorpe's (1994b:2) research indicated that multi-agency relations are "... highly complicated, seldom static, and influenced by a variety of institutional, individual and local/historical factors."

These differences and external and internal dynamics do not, however, preclude, multi-agency work from being successful. What is needed, argues Young (1992:49), is that:

... room has to be made for a healthy debate and conflict of perspectives within a consensus delineated by public demands for the control of specific areas.

Research conducted by Sampson et al. (1988:491) support this claim: "Ideally, we need a multi-agency approach which is capable of balancing power differentials and checking the practices of the more powerful agencies." Such balances are primarily needed between different state agencies (i.e., police, housing department, probation) (Bottoms, 1990:15).

Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994b) identified a number of key agencies and groups involved in multi-agency crime prevention work: police; local authority representatives (chief executive officers of cities and towns); social services; education; housing; elected
members (mayors and councillors); probation; business representatives; and voluntary/community groups. Although not exhaustive of all who participate in multi-agency work, this list of agencies and groups is reflective of the diverse nature of partnerships required to carry out comprehensive and effective community-based crime prevention. For the purposes of this paper, however, only the roles of the police and community groups, specifically residents’ associations/groups, will be discussed.

Mandate and statutory responsibility aside, field research undertaken by Liddle and Gelsthorpe showed that the police continue to play a central role in the delivery and initial development of multi-agency crime prevention groups (1994c:12). Kinsey and colleagues (1986:127) concur with this position: "Of all the agencies in this position [multi-agency networks], the police are at the focal point." This continues to be the practice, despite the movement in England and Wales to lessen the police’s traditional role of ’gate keeper’ over crime prevention activities.

On the other hand, Liddle and Gelsthorpe note that the level of police participation was often described by themselves as ’equal partners’ (1994b:12), not wanting to overshadow others. The authors as well note the practical contribution made by the police as ’information providers’ of statistical data for crime analysis (Liddle and Gelsthorpe, 1994b:13-14). This level of contribution proved vitally important to developing crime profiles, setting objectives and priorities, implementing targeted responses, and evaluating the impact of the interventions.
Within the literature on multi-agency approaches to addressing crime, discussion on the role of residents' associations is rather limited, often categorized under the generic classification of voluntary/community groups. The only contribution to this portion of the literature from Liddle and Gelsthorpe's recent study comes by way of the finding that such groups are under-utilized (1994b:23). In the context of a relatively small multi-agency group (only three distinct agencies), Matthews (1993a:25) suggests that the paramount role of the residents' group is to provide direction and relevant information to the police, which in turn will facilitate quick and targeted responses. In commenting on a multi-agency approach to address street prostitution in Finsbury Park, Matthews (1992a:97) notes that the participation of the residents' association proved vital to the overall success of the interventions and was an essential component in initiating, coordinating, and monitoring numerous processes.

**Styles of Approach**

Although not widely discussed throughout the literature on multi-agency crime prevention, the functioning styles of multi-agency groups are of great importance to their overall effectiveness. Through their research, Liddle and Gelsthorpe found that the most effective styles of functioning were demonstrated in cases where multi-agency groups adopted a problem solving approach (1994b:6). That is, utilizing the four distinct stages of the problem solving process: identification; analysis; response; and
evaluation (impact and process) (Murphy, 1992). Matthews (1992b:47) succinctly notes that:

Strategies, however, which seek to 'implant' a solution without influencing the complex matrix of social relations in a particular locality are likely to be of limited effectiveness.

In Crime Concern's report, A Practical Guide to Crime Prevention for Local Partnerships (1993:16), it is noted that one of the most important objectives of crime prevention programs should be the development of long-term multi-agency strategies that have the ability to hit at those problems considered the most serious.

Another style of functioning as noted by Liddle and Gelsthorpe were those groups that had been formed purely for public relations purposes (1994b:6). That is, groups which simply promoted community safety through advertisement campaigns and community service work, but did very little in the way of substantive work (i.e., identifying and addressing crime problems). Such groups, as suggested by Liddle and Gelsthorpe's research, are less durable than those groups established to take a problem solving approach (1994b:6).

STREET PROSTITUTION AND THE MULTI-AGENCY APPROACH

Few detailed accounts of 'true' multi-agency approaches to addressing street prostitution are evident in the English-speaking literature in the western world. That is, true multi-agency, in
the sense of the definition supplied by Kinsey et al. (1986:105):
the police shifting from a reactive to proactive strategy coupled
with a sharing of the responsibility for crime prevention and crime
control with other agencies.

Lowman (1992:4) speaks of the use of a multi-agency approach
to addressing street prostitution in Vancouver, British Columbia.
Although not specifically stated, it would appear that Lowman's
reference to the use of a multi-agency approach was in fact, a
reference to the approach used in the Vancouver suburb known as
Mount Pleasant during the years from 1985 to 1988. Throughout this
period, the police working with the local residents' group managed
to displace street prostitution on numerous occasions, "sometimes
unwittingly, sometimes deliberately" (Lowman, 1992:9).

Although few details are provided on the nature of the
relationship between the police and the residents' group, it
appears that efforts to suppress street prostitution activities did
not include a sharing of responsibilities with the residents'
group. Rather, the police simply responded to the residents'
complaints (later in the form of a police task force) in an effort
to quell vigilant activity.

Lowman's reference to the presence of a multi-agency approach
in Mount Pleasant is supported on one hand, however, in the
responses of the police: "checking prostitute identities; parking
police cruisers by prostitutes; charging prostitutes for jaywalking
or littering offenses whenever possible; prosecution of kerb-
crawlers for all manner of traffic violations" (Lowman, 1992:11).
A more notable account of multi-agency policing in the North American literature which warrants discussion in light of a number of pertinent characteristics is that of a police-led strategy in Newport News, Virginia, designed to reduce street prostitution and related problems. Under the direction of the local police department, a program was devised to remove street prostitutes from the problem area in order to reduce personal robberies (Eck and Spelman, 1987:78). Here, the prime impetus to taking action and adopting the problem-solving approach was the relationship between the robberies and prostitution.

Although the Newport News police resorted to criminal justice means to bring about an overall positive change in the problem area, they cannot be questioned on their adoption of a proactive strategy, as made evident by their use of problem solving techniques. Where the program did fall short in its adherence to a 'true' multi-agency approach was in the type of partnerships developed between the police, the State's Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, and affected bar owners. These partnerships were not reflective of an attempt to share the responsibility for the problem; rather, it appears that the police more or less co-opted the assistance of others through demanding the enforcement of state statutes and local ordinances in lieu of legal consequences.

Even in England and Wales where a great deal of experimentation with multi-agency crime prevention and control has taken place, more so than in other industrialized countries, Golding (1991) notes that, "... genuine multi-agency approaches
aimed at reducing the problems associated with street prostitution are rare" (as cited in Matthews, 1993a:7). The research in this area is largely based upon the work of Roger Matthews conducted in the London area. Two comprehensive studies of multi-agency responses to street prostitution in Finsbury Park (North London) in the early 1980s and Streatham (South London) in the mid-1980s, a replication of Finsbury Park, highlight this literature. These studies will form the basis of the following discussion. Two less detailed accounts of the use of the multi-agency approach to address street prostitution, Luton and Southampton, as described by Matthews (1993a), will be referred to throughout the discussion.

**Impetus for Response**

With the exception of some minor differences in Southampton, the problems posed by street prostitution to the citizens of these four residential communities were, not surprisingly, strikingly similar. Increased traffic and associated problems brought about by curb-crawling in these areas appear to have been the key motivating factor for action being taken. In addition to the general disturbances created by an increased volume of traffic at all times of the day, there were a number of associated problems. This relationship is best illustrated by an example from the Finsbury Park area:

Heavy traffic was often accompanied by horn blowing and by drivers leaning out of car windows and calling to or shouting at women on the streets. Occasionally bitter
interchanges between curb-crawlers and local residents took place (Matthews, 1992a:94).

Of greater significance to the communities is the latter event. Altercations with street prostitutes, curb-crawlers, and pimps not only endangered the residents' immediate sense of security, but as well produced a general sense of fear throughout the community. Increased criminal activity associated with the presence of street prostitution in the areas also contributed to a general decline in community safety, and the overall quality of life.

**Developing a Response**

In both Finsbury Park and Streatham the genesis of the development of multi-agency responses to addressing street prostitution came from the local residents through their respective residents' associations.

In Finsbury Park local residents organized the Finsbury Park Action Group (FPAG) to mobilize the community and others to attack the problems of street prostitution. The police and local authority were immediately approached to assist in this endeavour. Police were invited to attend regular FPAG meetings which helped facilitate better links between the two groups, while at the same time the local authority were requested to implement a program to restrict access into the area to deter curb-crawlers (Matthews, 1992a:92-93). Matthews (1992a:93) sums-up the collaboration of the three organizations:
Within a relatively short period of time, agreement was reached through a series of regular meetings among the police, the local authority, and the local residents. It was decided that a combined offensive, involving more intensive forms of policing on one hand, should be combined with a traffic management scheme on the other.

The strategy of intensive policing involved a two pronged approach: first, an increase in resources committed to the problem area and, second, a movement away from an unbalanced focus on the street prostitute. An increase in the number of vice personnel were important not only to address immediate concerns in the area, but also to establish a police presence prior to the situational measures being implemented. As will be further discussed, this sequence of events is crucial in order to avoid the possibility that prostitution could take forms that might aggravate and intensify the existing problems (i.e., attract other prostitutes, customers, and pimps - become more entrenched) (Matthews, 1992a:97).

The second approach would require the police focusing their efforts on all of the main actors involved in street prostitution, not just the street prostitute. As a result, curb-crawlers, pimps, and landlords who knowingly rented out their premises for the purposes of prostitution were subject to legal sanctions. A similar intensive policing strategy was developed in Streatham, with the exception of the additional focus on pimps and landlords.

The situational crime prevention technique of "access control"
(Clarke, 1992) was employed in devising the Finsbury Park traffic management scheme. Through a combination of road closures and one-way streets, the purpose of this strategy is to increase the effort required of curb-crawlers to make contact with street prostitutes. That is, by imposing restrictions on a usually free-flowing traffic plan, it becomes more difficult and time consuming for the customer to repeatedly circle in his vehicle to select a suitable partner. Such a strategy is based upon the opportunistic nature of this activity; that is, as research has demonstrated, the curb-crawler expresses a low level of commitment (Matthews, 1993a; 1992a). This strategy was replicated in Streatham, Luton, and Southampton.

In Streatham, a number of active residents' associations merged to form Streatham Against Kerb Crawlers (STAKC). It was initially created for two main purposes: (1) to serve as a vehicle for channelling information between residents, and (2) to provide a mechanism for lobby efforts (Matthews, 1993a:2). As noted earlier, the Streatham initiative was a replication of Finsbury Park, a decision taken by the members of STAKC.

As did the Finsbury Park group, STAKC immediately set out to garner support from both the police and local authority. Increased policing measures and a traffic management scheme were requested from the respective agencies. The local authority welcomed discussions on a proposed traffic management scheme to deter customers of street prostitutes, and its implementation soon followed. Matthews (1993a:3), however, notes that the police needed to be sold on this multi-agency venture:
By arguing to improve the flow of information in relation to kerb-crawling and soliciting, STAKC argued that the best use could be made of police resources and that it would be possible to target the problem more precisely. This encouraged the police to become more interested in the issue and to be more fully involved in discussions about introducing a traffic management scheme into the area to deter kerb-crawlers.

The police soon joined forces with the other groups. As with the experiences of numerous Canadian police forces, this motivation was largely engendered by the ineffectiveness of traditional police practices largely brought about by vague and hindering legislation. Matthews (1993a:5) notes that, as a result "... some extra-legal controls were required and by implication that some form of multi-agency intervention was necessary."

In the course of the development stage of the multi-agency initiatives in both Finsbury Park and Streatham, a number of concerns on the part of the residents of local and surrounding neighbourhoods were raised about the proposed interventions. The most vocalized concerns related to the potential impacts of the traffic management scheme. Residents of both Finsbury Park and Streatham expressed concern over the potential of the intervention to design 'in' the problems of street prostitution, rather than design 'out' the problems. Matthews (1992a:94), in commenting on the concerns of the residents of Finsbury Park, provided the following:
... by placing physical barriers around the area, the enclosed area might become a home for a range of criminal activities and attract a number of "undesirables" who might see the enclosed area as affording them some degree of protection from the police who would have difficulty pursuing them in police cars.

Within the context of designing 'in' street prostitution, concerns were as well expressed by local residents over the possibility that interventions may result in the prostitutes and customers adopting more "... undesirable methods of 'doing business'" (Matthews, 1992a:94). This change in methods to commit similar activities is commonly referred to as tactical displacement (Repetto, 1976).

On the other hand, citing the age-old myth that prostitution was the 'oldest profession' in the world and was therefore unlikely to disappear (Matthews, 1992a:94), residents of surrounding neighbourhoods expressed concerns that the traffic management scheme would simply displace the problems of street prostitution to their streets. The potential for the territorial displacement of street prostitution is widely recognized throughout the North American literature on street prostitution (Lowman, 1986b; Reynolds, 1986).

**Implementing and Sustaining Responses**

The implementation and sustainment of the interventions in both Finsbury Park and Streatham offer a number of valuable
insights into the dynamics of multi-agency approaches in dealing with street prostitution.

The primary consideration worthy of mention has to do with the relations between the participating agencies, specifically the residents' association and the police. Without a strong working relationship and mutual agreement on key objectives, the success of the interventions will ultimately be limited. The Finsbury Park and Streatham experiences demonstrate different degrees of commitment to the overall approach. In Streatham, for example, relations between the police and STAKC were fragile from the start:

On both sides, there were significant reservations and, at times, a lack of trust. The police for their part did what they felt was necessary to placate the residents. Although there was a formal recognition of the problem, there was no clear commitment to removing it. The police response at every level was infused with pessimism ...

(Matthews, 1993a:25).

Finsbury Park, on the other hand, demonstrated successful working relationships between all parties. A reliable and steady flow of information from the residents to the police proved to be a critical factor during the intensive policing stage, enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the deployment of police resources (Matthews, 1992a:93). So great were the links between all three parties that the established multi-agency relationship spilled over to address other issues of concern (Matthews, 1992a:95).
Leadership also proved to be a vital factor in the successful implementation and sustainment of the multi-agency responses in the two areas. Matthews (1993a; 1992a) unequivocally supports both residents' associations taking the lead role in coordinating their respective multi-agency initiatives to address street prostitution. The importance of their leadership role is highlighted through a number of qualities which became apparent during the initiative. None was more significant than their ability to provide a "permanent disincentive", hence providing for the ability to achieve a long-term solution, not just temporary (Matthews, 1992a:97).

**Evaluating the Responses**

Through the combination of intensive policing practices and a traffic management scheme supported through a multi-agency network, all four communities (Finsbury Park, Streatham, Luton, and Southampton) recorded significant decreases in the level of soliciting, curb-crawling, and associated nuisances, with only a minimal level of territorial displacement taking place - Finsbury Park exhibited less than others.

In commenting on the multi-agency work employed in Finsbury Park, Matthews (1992a:94) notes that, "Soliciting and curb-crawling virtually disappeared, and the area was transformed from a noisy and hazardous "red-light" district into a relatively tranquil residential area." Furthermore, the success was achieved in a relatively short period of time. Reported crime was also found to
have decreased significantly - a total of 42 percent from the year prior to implementation to the year following (Matthews, 1992a:95).

Measuring for possible geographical displacement, Matthews (1992c:19), relying on both formal and informal evidence, found that only a few of the Finsbury Park prostitutes had moved to other parts of London, and many were no longer working as prostitutes three years after the intervention was implemented. Explanations for this finding, which was thought by some to be unrealistic (see Lowman, 1992), were evident in the low level of commitment that prostitutes and customers in the area held for this activity (Matthews, 1992a; 1992c).

Although boasting less success than Finsbury Park in terms of the displacement of prostitutes to other areas, Streatham nonetheless demonstrated significant reductions in both the numbers of prostitutes and curb-crawlers in the area. Additionally, recorded crime rates for burglary, assault, and robbery were found to have decreased in the year following implementation of the multi-agency initiative (Matthews, 1993a:31).

For Finsbury Park and Streatham, it is worth noting a number of other shared successes. These include: a reduction in the fear of crime and an overall improved quality of life; an increase in community cohesion; and an improved relationship between all three agencies, most notably between the police and residents (Matthews, 1993a:31-33; 1992a:95).

In the previous section, many of the mentioned factors (ie., working relationship, leadership, and coordination) had a
substantial impact on the success of the interventions. Moreover, research undertaken in Finsbury Park and Streatham suggests that one of the most important factors to the overall success of the respective initiatives rests with the sequence by which the individual interventions were implemented. As stated by Matthews (1992a:97):

... the sequence of intervention is crucially important, since it seems necessary to establish a police presence in the area before the environmental changes take place. If the initiatives occur in the reverse order, prostitution could take forms that might aggravate and intensify the problems.

In later comments on the Streatham experience, Matthews (1993a:33) reiterates the importance of the sequence of interventions:

... [it] is not enough to simply combine certain elements under a multi-agency umbrella. What is critical is how such elements are combined and implemented... if multi-agency interventions are to produce the maximum benefits, then they have to be implemented in a particular sequence with a great deal of thought, care and commitment.

A final vital component to the overall success of the multi-agency initiatives in each of the four areas was the change in the police’s focus of attention. Prior to the multi-agency initiatives, police were primarily concerned with street prostitutes. Curb-crawlers, pimps, and landlords were of little concern, despite their equal if not greater combined contribution
to the overall problem. The lack of legal intervention directed at the customers, particularly in the early stages of the Finsbury Park initiative, was due to the fact that curb-crawling was not an offence. It was not until 1985 with the enactment of the Sexual Offences Act that curb-crawling became illegal and hence subject to police enforcement.

With regards to the curb-crawler, research conducted on both the Finsbury Park and Streatham initiatives demonstrated that a shift in the enforcement focus to this actor is extremely beneficial, extending beyond the principle of equity in enforcement practices. In commenting on the Streatham experience, Matthews (1993b:2) notes the following:

When dealing with the problem of prostitution and kerb-crawling, more consideration should be given to deterring kerb-crawlers as they seem to be the weak partner in the relation. In particular, they appear to express a lower level of commitment but also a higher level of shame.

This low level of commitment on the part of the customers was evident prior to the enactment of the Sexual Offences Act (1985) in Finsbury Park. During this time police resorted to handing out formal and informal cautions to those individuals suspected of seeking the services of street prostitutes. Police records verified that few returned following the receipt of a caution (Matthews, 1992a:93). The success of cautions was as well shown in Streatham (Matthews, 1993a:14).
CONCLUSION

As a vehicle for addressing the problems of street prostitution in residential communities, the multi-agency approach has the ability to overcome many of the limitations of traditional police enforcement in this area. That is, through its underlying principles of a shift in focus of police measures from reactive to proactive, coupled with a sharing of responsibility for crime prevention and control, a number of the complexities inherent in controlling street prostitution, which inevitably contribute to its resilience and, of course, displacement, can be successfully confronted.

For the maximum benefit to be derived from multi-agency approaches to address street prostitution, however, three key points bear repeating. Firstly, at minimum, three essential component parts must be working together: the police; municipal government; and, the driving force, the residents, through an organized body. Secondly, every effort must be taken to ensure that each intervention is implemented in an appropriately thought-out, timely, and sequential manner. Lastly, and most importantly, is the goal of the interventions guided by the style of functioning. A problem solving approach will assist in ensuring that street prostitutes do not bear the sole brunt of the interventions, and in preventing the overlooking of possible preventive or non-punitive measures.

By no means, of course, is the multi-agency approach impervious to constraints and barriers that spring up within such
an advanced partnership model. The elements of structure, leadership, relations, and styles are all complicating features which must be addressed at the outset and continuously re-examined throughout the entirety of the process. The multi-agency approach is a dynamic process which, as stated by Sampson et al. (1988:491):

... should not be critically considered as offering a panacea for the plight of inner cities. It is not necessarily the solution to all social problems. Multi-agency approaches can, and do fail ....

Matthews (1993a:26) unequivocally supports this view and, like Sampson and associates (1988:491), advocates a tightly focused approach, in both the problems to be tackled and the number of interventions to be employed. The successes of both the Finsbury Park and Streatham initiatives demonstrate the value of this principle. As noted by Matthews (1993a:26): "The more ambitious and wide-ranging the initiative, the greater the pitfalls are likely to be."

In the following two chapters these and other characteristics shown to be instrumental to successful multi-agency work will be examined in the context of the response to street prostitution in residential communities in Calgary and Edmonton.
CHAPTER 6

THE RESPONSE TO STREET PROSTITUTION IN CALGARY:
A MULTI-AGENCY APPROACH CONSIDERED

INTRODUCTION

As discussed in chapter three, street prostitution has had a significant impact upon the City of Calgary. More specifically, that impact has been greatest in the residential communities of Inglewood and Ramsay, located in the City's southeast corner. Through the collaboration of the police and an established residents' group acting on behalf of concerned residents, a number of interventions were implemented to address specific problems arising from street prostitution and its related activities.

Drawing upon the research of Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994a; 1994b; 1994c) on multi-agency approaches, this chapter overviews the dynamics of the police and community initiatives to address street prostitution within the framework of three broad components of multi-agency work.

This chapter will first describe a number of critical elements contributing to the structure and organization of the collaborative work between the residents' group and the police. These include: the degree of formality of operations; coordination; and leadership. Second, the police and community relations, both between each other and internally, and the participation of other agencies are overviewed, illustrating the complexities of the multi-agency approach under examination. Emphasis is placed on
discussing the third component: style of functioning. Objectives of the two agencies are discussed in terms of current and past practices and experiences, highlighting collaborative efforts of the residents' group and the police. A conclusion follows the discussion.

**STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION**

The development of a coordinated response on the part of concerned residents of Inglewood, later joined by residents of Ramsay, first came about in 1988. Spearheaded by a lone Inglewood resident to confront the actions of johns and pimps, Communities' Response Against Prostitution Committee (later renamed Communities Against Prostitution and Related Activity, or CAPRA) was born, albeit on an informal basis (Phillips, 1994: pers. comm.).

By September 1991, in response to a resurgence of street prostitution and related activity in the two communities, the Committee had become a more formalized mechanism for garnering support and action for their cause: the elimination of street prostitution from the area. Later that year, the Committee's establishment of four issue-specific sub-committees (Legal Research, Political Action, Community Education, and National Hotel) reaffirmed its durable nature.

Support for the Committee flourished both within and beyond the boundaries of Inglewood and Ramsay. This support proved vital to the strengthening of its resource base and hence, its status as a lead agency in mobilizing a number of initiatives to address
Early on in the Committee's efforts to address street prostitution a working relationship was established with the police. In the beginning, however, this relationship was largely orchestrated by the police in order to avoid potential problems of residents' plans to openly confront prostitutes, johns, and pimps on their streets (Board, 1988b:81). The police maintained a leadership role throughout the working relationship, but with substantial community involvement.

Since 1988, when street prostitution became a concern to residents of Inglewood and Ramsay, two major police-led initiatives have highlighted the working relationship between the police and the Committee. In 1992, a month-long (January 28 to February 28) joint police/community strategy entitled "Police And Community Response Against Prostitution" (PAC-RAP) was undertaken by uniform police personnel from Zone 1-3 (Inglewood/Ramsay). As a "short-term strategy of uninterrupted 'zero tolerance' enforcement", Operation PAC-RAP had eight specific objectives:

1. Reduce the anxiety felt by both the business and residential sectors of the community.

2. Geographically contain prostitutes to a defined acceptable area, through enforcement and negotiated co-operation.

3. Develop a program of public education and awareness.

4. Develop and maintain open lines of communication
with the community.

5. Develop an educational package for community residents.

6. Deter prostitution-related traffic from invading the residential area.

7. Recruit volunteers from the community.


To achieve the objectives of the Operation a number of tailored responses involving community education and intensive policing were implemented on the part of the police. Most of the responses and interventions were, however, not limited to police activity alone, but involved the active participation by Committee members as well (Calgary Police Service, 1992a).

In addition to the extensive collaboration that took place in providing residents and businesses with pertinent information, the Committee played a central role in assisting the police with the development of a longer term strategy of situational crime prevention (i.e., road closures, redirection of traffic patterns, and improved lighting), later utilized in the second police-led initiative. The continuation of Operation PAC-RAP beyond its one month mandate enabled the further advancement of collaborative efforts between the police and the Committee.

The second major police-led initiative in Inglewood and Ramsay
took place from April 11 to May 8, 1993. Entitled Operation Restore, this initiative featured a zero tolerance policy directed at street prostitution and related criminal activity, particularly drug offenses. All totalled, the Operation cost close to $250,000 for an additional twenty assigned officers, and resulted in the following: 275 prostitution-related charges against johns; 36 prostitution-related charges against prostitutes; 128 drug-related charges; and 90 assorted Criminal Code charges (Mofina, 1993:B3). This Operation alone accounted for close to half (45%) of Calgary’s total number of adult prostitutes and johns charged in 1993.

Although not directly involved in the intense policing operations, the Committee, prior to and throughout the initiative proved vital to the effectiveness of the Operation. One of the most important contributions made by the Committee to the Operation was the level of positive media attention generated through interviews which brought attention to the daily impacts endured by the residents. As noted by Inspector Yanish of the Calgary Police Service (1993:pers. comm.), "This media attention coupled with the on-going exposure in the area informed people that if they were going there for prostitution be aware of the consequences."

The follow-up to Operation Restore clearly showed the strong working relationship that had been established between the police and the affected communities. That is, the community now had the lead role in ensuring that the successes demonstrated by the Operation (i.e., reduced levels of traffic, nuisances, and visible prostitutes and customers) (Phillips, 1994:pers. comm.) were
continued. In a press conference on the completion of Operation Restore, Calgary Police Chief Gerry Borbidge stated:

"A new phase of 'Operation Restore' begins today and I believe it's the most crucial phase of the community effort," ... "Beginning today, residents and business people have committed themselves to ensuring such problems do not recur" (Smith and Megrath, 1993:11).

On-going, high visibility evening walks by residents of Inglewood and Ramsay highlighted the efforts of this follow-up phase to Operation Restore. In no way, however, did the police abandon their efforts in the area, rather with the communities' lead the police were now in a maintenance phase of regular patrols and working with the CAPRA Committee for longer term strategies. These strategies included examining many situational measures, such as improved lighting, cleaning park areas, fencing, and street closures (Yanish, 1993:pers. comm.).

Earlier community-led initiatives as well centred on high visibility group walks to deter customers and prostitutes from working in the area. The differences, however, from earlier community-led initiatives to that following Operation Restore are noted in the context in which such action was carried out. That is, as a result of Operation PAC-RAP and its continuation, as well as Operation Restore, Committee members could focus their efforts on actual interventions. Prior to these initiatives being implemented, a great deal of the Committee's efforts revolved around mobilizing residents for their assistance, as well as
garnering support from the police, the police commission, municipal elected officials, and the media.

**AGENCY RELATIONS AND PARTICIPATION**

From the onset of the working relationship between the police and residents of Inglewood and Ramsay conflicting views emerged on how the police should be responding to street prostitution. The residents demanded that prostitution be eliminated from the area regardless of where it may be displaced. The police, on the other hand, were not about to move a long time, designated stroll. As noted by Staff Sergeant MacInnes of the Calgary Police Vice Unit:

> The Calgary Police Service does not move strolls. The simple reason for this is that you are moving an entire industry, not just prostitution but also drugs, violence, johns, and trick locations (MacInnes and McCulloch, 1993:pers. comm.).

This differing view became even more significant with the mobilization of Inglewood/Ramsay residents and subsequent formal creation of the Committee in late 1991. The Committee made it clear from the beginning that its mandate was the complete elimination of street prostitution from the communities of Inglewood and Ramsay (Phillips, 1994:pers. comm.). As later stated by Sylvia Hayward, Co-coordinator of the CAPRA Committee, "[my] neighbors don’t want the impacts of prostitution resolved, and they don’t want it contained. ‘We want it out of here’" (Climenhaga, 1992:A4).
These opposing views had a profound effect on overall police/Committee relations. For example, the Vice Unit who are exclusively in charge of street prostitution withheld any substantial assistance to the CAPRA Committee. Instead, the Vice Unit focused their efforts (as they do today) on assisting the prostitutes to leave the streets through a strong working relationship established between a number of social agencies committed to helping prostitutes find better lives and to ensuring safer conditions while working on the street (i.e., bad date sheets, safe houses, and needle exchanges). In the long run this assists the Vice Unit with addressing their main concern - the pimps (see chapter 4).

The Vice Unit’s involvement with the Committee was largely limited to occasional presentations at Committee meetings. There were no operational means of collaboration. Instead, Vice Unit personnel worked with the Inglewood Community Association (ICA), specifically, the Inglewood Positive Action Committee (IPAC). IPAC were focused on assisting those wanting to leave prostitution through the provision of educational services and drop-in centres.

The uniform division (Zone 1-3) worked closely with the CAPRA Committee. They were instrumental in Operation PAC-RAP, its continuation, Operation Restore, and its follow-up. Despite the adherence to a policy of containment of stroll ‘C’, and to strolls in general, a strong working relationship was nurtured over time. However, prior to these Operations, there was very little support for the concerns of the Committee. It was not until soon after the
month-long Operation PAC-RAP that a working relationship became solidified between the Committee and the uniform police, largely a result of a new Sergeant being assigned to the Inglewood Zone (Phillips, 1994:pers. comm.).

In terms of internal agency relations, very few details were obtained on the dynamics existing between the Vice Unit and uniform division. Interviews conducted with personnel representing both levels suggest that there was no wavering from the Calgary Police Service's policy of containment and control. Rather, what existed was a mutual objective carried out in different ways: the Vice Unit directed at pimps, linking prostitutes with social agencies, and occasional sting operations, and uniform personnel addressing the immediate and long-term community needs through a number of shared initiatives and enforcement strategies.

On the other hand, the internal 'community' relations were found not to be as straightforward. As discussed earlier, the Committee objective differed from that of the ICA. Following the formal development of the Committee the ICA was concerned that negative media attention would be focused on the community. As explained by the Co-coordinator of the Committee, "They were more accepting of it [prostitution], hoping that it would just go away" (Phillips, 1994:pers. comm.).

This concern may have been justified as the community was undergoing a lucrative re-development plan and hence, wanting to attract new up-scale businesses and home owners. However, the ICA soon changed its view towards the Committee and openly endorsed
their activities.

Besides the police/community working relationship that was cultivated over time to address street prostitution in the Inglewood and Ramsay areas, it is important to briefly mention the interaction between the community and other key agencies; most notably, the Calgary Police Commission, the council of the City of Calgary, and the local media.

Both the Police Commission and certain council members played a significant role in solidifying the working relationship between the police and the Committee. That is, through the Committee’s lobbying efforts support was eventually garnered for the Committee’s concerns, in turn prompting the police to place greater priority on addressing the problems of street prostitution in the affected communities. Sergeant Stewart Cooper best sums-up the Committee’s efforts with the following:

The CAPRA Committee was non-confrontational right from the beginning. They used political avenues because they knew the police were doing what they could given the limits imposed by law. They started writing letters to the police, presentations before the Police Commission and to the Ward Alderman, and put on special meetings in which they would invite members of the Vice Unit and Aldermen. The more they made it publicly known the more attention they received. ... They were selective at who they made their presentations to - they were politically astute (1993:pers. comm.).
It is worth noting as well that, in the course of the working relationship between the police and the community, the police, to facilitate successful operations, enlisted the support of key businesses operating in and around stroll 'C'. Of most notable importance were the drinking establishments, hotels, and apartments known to be frequented by prostitutes, pimps, drug dealers, and others contributing to the problems in the area. The main thrust of the police's efforts was directed at convincing the owners of these places that by 'cleaning-up' their clientele, they would receive the community's support and increased business (Cooper, 1993:pers. comm.).

**STYLE OF FUNCTIONING**

The most contentious issue underlying the established working relationship between the police and the community was the overall intent of the interventions. As noted previously, the objective of police interventions was one of containment - keeping street prostitution and its related problems within a defined, manageable area. The Committee, on the other hand, were, from the beginning, in support of the elimination of prostitution from their streets and, hence were opposed to a policy of containment or control. Within the framework of these opposing objectives a number of innovative practices were carried out, largely with the police taking the lead role.
Containment Versus Elimination

The Calgary Police Service's policy of containment or rather its unwillingness to relocate prostitution strolls dates back to the early years of enforcement of the present legislation. Interviews conducted with Calgary police officers by Brannigan et al. (1989:23) during their evaluation study of the first three years of the communicating law revealed that:

... the objective of the police service has been to confine the trade and to control its boundaries - not to put all the hookers and customers in jail.

As noted in the interviews conducted by this author, this objective had not changed for the period under study.

Elimination, as advocated by the Committee, was rather straightforward: they wanted nothing to do with solving its underlying problems; addressing the violence inflicted upon street prostitutes; or its potential displacement to neighbouring communities. The opposition to the policy of containment is noted through the following two arguments forwarded by the Committee:

1. an increasingly family oriented, residential community is an inappropriate and unacceptable location for a "stroll", despite the perceived convenience from a police perspective, and

2. the Police Service policy of containment has not, is not, and will not be successful in solving the problems being faced by residents of our communities. Further to this, we feel that the
only alternative that will solve this problem is to move the "C" stroll and its attendant problems out of the communities of Inglewood and Ramsay (1993:1).

Despite the divergent positions held by the police and the Committee, the collaborative work between the two groups was not jeopardized. It would appear that this working relationship was strengthened through the police's 'zero tolerance' initiatives and commitment to the development of long-term strategies. However, the Committee did not shy away from expressing their displeasure for the continuation of a policy of containment for stroll 'C'. Although not acted upon in this context, a number of community-backed alternatives favouring a more direct, confrontational approach were articulated by the CAPRA Committee:

- "direct" approach with prostitutes and "johns";
- take back the streets (group walks);
- public pressure on owners of National Hotel, Atlantic Avenue Bar, Henri's Galley, and Gresham Block Apartment Building;
- videotaping and photographing related activity and releasing same to media;
- painting license plate numbers on roads, sidewalks, buildings[,] etc.;
- picketing; [and]
- following "johns" home and following up with letter to home (1993:14).
Elements of the Containment Approach

The reasons for the use of the communicating law as a nuisance management tool as opposed to one of elimination are numerous, varying from practicality, to equity in application of the law, to overall effectiveness. Practical reasons include limited resources of the Vice Unit and the fact that the offence itself is only summary conviction - carrying with it a low enforcement priority (MacInnes and McCulloch, 1993:pers. comm.). Most notable, however, is what Brannigan and associates (1989:35) found to be a prevalent view held among those police and prosecutors interviewed, as well as politicians: "... street prostitution is a fact of life which cannot be eradicated but which can be, to a large extent, regulated." Interviews conducted with officers of the Calgary Police Service for this study confirmed the continued adherence to this widely held view.

In terms of equity in application of the law, the reason most often advanced for the use of the communicating law as a nuisance management tool is that it does not unduly subject the prostitute to punitive measures relative to the other involved actors. As made evident by the work of Brannigan et al. (1989:23) in Calgary, this approach in effect avoided

... criticism from the community since there is an opinion widely shared in the city, expressed commonly by vice detectives, by police commissioners and by members of the public that the prostitutes themselves are victims of their backgrounds and their chosen line of work.
Although unsupported by explicit statements as such, for the period under study, it would appear from an examination of recent police statistics that this reasoning has prevailed for the continued use of a containment approach in Calgary. According to police-reported crime for 1992, Calgary recorded 791 charges against adults for contravening the communicating law: 459 males and 332 females (Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, 1993b). For 1993, the number of adult prostitutes charged decreased by 30 percent (233) from the year previous, while the number of adult customers remained relatively stable at 453, bringing the ratio of customers to prostitutes charged close to 2 to 1 (Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, 1994).

In terms of the overall effectiveness of the use of a containment approach, Brannigan et al. (1989:23) note that an adherence to a more punitive approach would contribute to street prostitution and its related activities (i.e., drug dealing) becoming more clandestine, hence less visible and open to police monitoring and control. This would greatly hamper the dual objective of the Vice Unit to assist prostitutes in leaving the street, while also obtaining the required evidence and testimony of the prostitute to secure convictions against pimps.

**Key Collaborative Efforts of the Two Operations**

**Operation PAC-RAP**

The first key collaborative effort of the police and the Committee involved advising the residents and businesses of the
Operation. In addition to word-of-mouth, informational newsletters distributed on the part of the police and the Committee provided details on the forthcoming Operation. As well, this task served to inform individuals on who to contact and how to file a complaint in the event of witnessing and/or being victimized as a result of activities of a prostitution-related nature (Calgary Police Service, 1992a:2). The police attributed these efforts to assisting in the reduction of high levels of anxiety among residents and businesses brought about by increased street prostitution activity and a perceived level of police insensitivity.

A working relationship between the police and the communities was further enhanced through the PAC-RAP officers willingness to participate in meetings of the Committee and its Community Education sub-committee. A number of valuable initiatives came about as a result of these meetings. Most important, was the development of an educational package distributed to 800 households and businesses in the two communities. The package provided individuals with information on ways to assist police in responding to concerns and specific incidents of street prostitution.

Coupled with the cooperative effort of providing residences and businesses with necessary information and education material, the Committee assisted the police in devising one of the interventions. In order to deter customers from cruising 'C' stroll recommendations were made by the police to the Committee concerning the implementation of a number of situational crime
prevention measures (i.e., road closures, redirection of traffic patterns, and improved lighting) (Calgary Police Service, 1992a:4). Although not implemented within the one month mandate of Operation PAC-RAP, this intervention had been previously earmarked as an objective for a longer term strategy (Calgary Police Service, 1992b) and, as will be discussed below, was one component used during Operation Restore.

As a result of the open dialogue formed between the police and the residents of the affected communities, police were able to target their 'high-visibility' patrols in problem areas. One of these areas was residential side streets where johns would cruise in search of prostitutes outside of the immediate stroll boundaries. To deter suspected johns (i.e., those who demonstrated blatant signs of looking for prostitutes: continuous circling of the area, driving slowly past prostitutes, etc.) from returning the police launched a targeted educational campaign, which informed these individuals of the particular nuisances being caused by johns, and the consequences of such action. In the end, a number of those not heeding the warnings of the police found themselves the subject of increased police traffic enforcement (i.e., traffic summonses and vehicle seizures) (Calgary Police Service, 1992a:4).

A final noteworthy collaborative effort between the police and the Committee during Operation PAC-RAP was the evaluation undertaken to determine its level of success. Although the actual evaluation was not collaborative in the true sense of both agencies working together in the evaluation process, it would appear that
the evaluation conducted by the Committee was influential in the
decision of the police to continue with Operation PAC-RAP beyond
its one month lifespan.

**Operation Restore**

As noted above, a strong working relationship existed between
the police and the communities' residents, lead by the Committee,
during and following Operation Restore. The strength of this
relationship was largely a carry-over from the previous work that
had been undertaken by the two agencies. Subsequently, very little
effort, if any, was needed to mobilize residents for assistance or
for educational purposes.

With the onset of a highly visible police presence in the
area, as a part of an overall zero tolerance initiative,
police/community collaboration was limited. The police were in the
lead role with the community primarily providing support and
maintaining open lines of communication.

This support was noted through the implementation of a
community-supported road closure program. The road closure program
evolved from the earlier commitment of the police to engage
residents in the decision-making process of this often
controversial intervention (see chapter 5). The road closure
program involved the night-time closure of 10th Avenue South East,
outside of the National Hotel, with barricades manned by uniformed
police (Bell, 1993:20).

However, during Operation Restore the most notable
collaborative efforts were seen at the police level. As with Operation PAC-RAP and its follow-up, both the Vice Unit and uniform personnel were involved, albeit for different purposes. This level of police involvement was expanded for Operation Restore by the involvement of undercover police officers specializing in narcotics investigations - the Drug Unit. To gauge the level of involvement that prostitutes and others had with drugs and, to some extent, their motivation for remaining in the area, Drug Unit operations preceded Vice Unit stings and numerous operations carried out by the uniform personnel (Yanish, 1993:pers. comm.).

CONCLUSION

The police response to street prostitution in the residential areas of Inglewood and Ramsay demonstrated a commitment to the use of a multi-agency approach. Structure and organization were evident at both the police and community levels to facilitate and foster sustained interventions and more intense police-led operations. Largely operating on an informal basis, collaborations between the police and the residents' group showed strong indicators of coordination and leadership. The strong and, for the most part, consistent leadership demonstrated at both the police (uniform personnel) and community levels greatly assisted in mobilizing for coordinated action.

Although largely police and community driven, the multi-agency work carried out by these two agencies was greatly assisted by numerous others. This assistance was most effective in prompting
the police to act in the early stages.

Opposing intervention objectives of the police and the residents' group spelled a clear sign of potential failure to the partnership from the onset and throughout. The avoidance of this predicament came about from the police's commitment to the implementation of long-term strategies and occasional police operations of zero tolerance. Working within the framework of containment enabled the police to collaborate with the community on a number of fronts, while at the same time attempting to bring about long-term reductions in the number of street prostitutes through a combination of non-punitive measures and targeting of the exploitive elements.
CHAPTER 7

THE RESPONSE TO STREET PROSTITUTION IN EDMONTON:

A MULTI-AGENCY APPROACH CONSIDERED

INTRODUCTION

As discussed in chapter three, street prostitution has posed significant problems to the City of Edmonton. More specifically, that impact has been greatest in the residential communities of Boyle Street and McCauley. To address specific problems arising from street prostitution and its related activities, a strong working relationship was established between a residents' group acting on behalf of concerned residents and the police. Through this medium a number of mutually supported interventions were implemented.

Once again, the research of Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994a; 1994b; 1994c) on multi-agency approaches is drawn upon in this chapter to provide the reader with an overview of the dynamics of the police and community initiatives to address street prostitution. Discussion is centred within the framework of three broad components of multi-agency work.

This chapter will first describe a number of critical elements contributing to the structure and organization of the collaborative work between the police and residents' group. These include: the degree of formality of operations; coordination; and leadership. Second, the police and community relations, both between each other and internally, and participation of other key agencies are
overviewed. Emphasis is placed on discussing the third component: style of functioning. The main objectives and policies of the two agencies are discussed along with key collaborative efforts carried out to address street prostitution in Edmonton's inner-city communities. A conclusion follows the discussion.

**STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION**

Street prostitution first became problematic to the residential communities of Boyle Street and McCauley in the mid-1980s, starting in Boyle Street and later gaining prominence in McCauley. The first signs of a coordinated effort on the part of concerned residents to address street prostitution and its related activities was apparent in 1988 with the organization of a number of 'publicity walks' designed specifically to deter johns from entering residential areas, and to garner public support for their cause. Minutes of meetings of the McCauley Community League (the residents' group in McCauley) during this time (October 13 and 27, and November 17, 1988) demonstrate the community's commitment to addressing street prostitution and related activity in their area. Most notably, this commitment was seen through the designation of a specific committee of the residents' group: the Committee Against Prostitution (McCauley Community League, 1988c:1).

In November, 1989 the McCauley Community League further organized its efforts to address street prostitution with the formal establishment of a resident's sub-committee entitled, Communities for Controlled Prostitution (CFCP). The sub-committee
would come to represent the interests of as many as 14 neighbouring residential communities, all somewhat affected by street prostitution.

The mandate of CFCP is twofold. First, to meet with community leaders of other affected neighbourhoods, street outreach workers, and the police to gain a better understanding of the complexities of street prostitution and to plan appropriate and targeted actions. Second, to focus community actions on the johns (City of Edmonton, 1993b:3). As time progressed CFCP added other objectives to their mandate. The most important ones included:

1. Develop a response, which is fair and reasonable to all concerned parties, especially the communities and prostitutes, and which recognizes the ongoing reality of prostitution, and

2. Encourage and advocate for all preventive responses which seek to decrease the incidence of prostitution in Edmonton (CFCP, 1990a:1).

As well, CFCP advocated moving street prostitutes out of the affected residential areas to zones of tolerance: areas zoned for commercial or industrial use, yet providing prostitutes with a safe and secure environment to conduct their activities.

Right from the onset of the residents' activity in 1988, a working relationship was established between the residents' group and the police. As noted by Detective Payuk of the Edmonton Police Service's Vice Unit, "Very early on a rapport was developed with
the community group [CFCP]. It has become even stronger to this
day" (1993:pers. comm.). Evidence of this early rapport is noted
through police attendance at meetings of the residents' group and
open support for a number of community-led initiatives, such as,
evening protest marches to deter cruising johns and numerous
marches to garner support from politicians and raise public

The strength and durability of the working relationship
between the police and the residents' group is best exemplified
through a number of mutually supported initiatives carried out over
unstructured periods of time. These include: public support and
community mobilization; a number of situational crime prevention
measures; and direct action against johns.

Formal liaisons set-up between the police and the residents'
group ensured police attendance at regular CFCP meetings and other
group functions. The short and long-term benefit realized from
this arrangement was the enhancement of the residents' group's
credibility amongst those communities affected by street
prostitution and the greater Edmonton area. This, in turn,
assisted in garnering public support for the group's cause,
mobilizing residents for action, and increasing the durability of
the group.

The safety of the streets for both the residents of Boyle
Street and McCauley and the prostitutes was a serious concern to
members of CFCP who viewed the safety needs of each group equally.
The residents' group not only viewed prostitutes as victims of the
sex trade, but as equals: "We are sympathetic to the prostitutes as some live in our neighbourhoods and most have suffered a lot of abuse in their lives" (1990d:2).

To address many of the concerns for street safety, the residents' group and the police worked together in identifying problem areas, and developing and implementing numerous situational crime prevention initiatives (Edmonton Police Service, 1993). Many of these initiatives required the assistance of municipal government departments (ie., Parks and Recreation).

Lastly, with the exception of two exclusively police-led initiatives (other than regular sweeps of street prostitutes and customers), direct action against customers was an area where the residents' group and police collaborated extensively. Leadership and coordination for direct actions, such as protest marches, was carried out by CFCP, ensuring the police were well informed of upcoming activities.

AGENCY RELATIONS AND PARTICIPATION

Informal discussions with members of CFCP, police interviews, and a review of minutes of meetings and correspondence of CFCP, police information, and media accounts from the period under study surprisingly revealed very little disagreement between the police (both Vice Unit and uniform personnel) and the residents' group in the type of action the police carried out to address street prostitution. Whether this should be regarded as a surprising find or not, it nonetheless underscores the strong level of commitment
that existed (and exists today) between the two agencies.

The one issue where disagreement between the two agencies was visibly apparent was over the police's reluctance to support the residents' group's call for the establishment of an unofficial zone of tolerance in a non-residentially-zoned area of the city. This was intended to be an area where both soliciting and turning tricks would be tolerated and would be immune from police sweeps of prostitutes and johns (CFCP, 1990e:1). For residents who had to endure on a daily basis the consequences of street prostitution and its related problems, this was a welcomed plan of action.

It must be noted, however, that CFCP was not advocating an 'out-of-sight, out-of-mind' approach (1990b:1). In fact, the residents' group made it clear from the beginning that any consideration of an unofficial zone of tolerance for prostitution in a non-residential area must first take into account the safety of the women (CFCP, 1990c:2). Moreover, this initiative was as well proposed to overcome the continuing problem of the geographical displacement of street prostitution from one community to the next as a result of short-term enforcement strategies.

In the beginning the police response at an operational level (vice and uniform) was optimistic that such an initiative could be executed (CFCP, 1990e:3). It was later expressed in a letter from Police Chief McNally (1990:1) that the Edmonton Police Service was not supportive of the creation of a zone of tolerance for street prostitution. This decision was based upon the negative experiences of similar attempts in other cities, such as,
Metropolitan Toronto.

Despite the inability of the two agencies to agree on this approach, relations between them did not appear to be compromised. The Vice Unit and the uniform division assigned to the area (neighbourhood foot patrol officers) continued to support many of the efforts of CFCP. Although the Vice Unit are not as actively engaged as the uniform division, operational means of collaboration with the residents’ group were uncharacteristically active. In part, this was due to the shared objective of the police and residents’ group in targeting johns and pimps, and assisting prostitutes.

In fact, highlighting the collaborative initiatives of the police (vice and uniform) and CFCP were the open lines of communication between the two agencies. Whenever a demonstration march or direct action was being planned by CFCP the police were immediately informed (Payuk, 1993:pers. comm.). Likewise, the police kept the residents’ group abreast of up-coming events; for example, sweeps to take place in the area. This openness enabled the two agencies to share information more freely, overcoming a hurdle often faced in multi-agency relations.

Drawing upon a number of primary and secondary sources, research conducted on street prostitution in the residential communities of Boyle Street and McCauley revealed strong internal agency relations at both the police and community levels. Although police interviews were limited to Vice personnel alone, there was no evidence to suggest either level held differing views on the
overall approach taken by Edmonton police to address street prostitution.

In addition to the solid working relationship that was established between the police and CFCP, equally strong ties were formed amongst the police and CFCP with the community group, Action Against Johns (AAJ). Formed in March 1992, and advocating a non-violent, non-confrontational approach to ridding Edmonton’s inner-city of johns, AAJ is made up of concerned residents from Boyle Street, McCauley, and other affected residential communities. Through the organization of marches in inner-city stroll areas, AAJ’s goal is to discourage johns from harassing innocent children, women, and youth (City of Edmonton, 1993b:4).

Communities For Controlled Prostitution has also benefited from the support of numerous other agencies, most notably: the council of the City of Edmonton; social outreach programs working to assist street prostitutes; and the Correctional Services Division of the Solicitor General of Alberta.

Numerous City Council members speaking out in support for CFCP and participating in rallies and marches assisted the residents’ group in raising public awareness of the plight of inner-city communities, and garnering further public support for their cause. Financial support was even obtained from some notable politicians, such as the Mayor of Edmonton (Retson, 1992a:B3).

Social outreach programs offering support and assistance to street prostitutes in Edmonton’s inner-city openly endorsed CFCP’s focus of targeting johns and pimps, while at the same time
advocating for increased support and fairer treatment of street prostitutes.

Through a formal liaison with the Alberta Correctional Services Division, CFCP has been able to assist in the placement of convicted Johns to a special community service work program designed to provide those communities affected by prostitution with free labour for odd jobs, while, more importantly, presenting Johns with an opportunity to understand the full impact of their actions on the neighbourhood (Loyie, 1991:B1).

**STYLE OF FUNCTIONING**

**Nuisance Management**

Despite the acknowledgement of the Edmonton Police Service’s commitment to a policy of containment for street prostitution - restricting (and maintaining over time) the stroll area of prostitutes to a very confined geographical area through informal dialogue and enforcement (Mowbray, 1993:pers. comm.), insufficient evidence was obtained to suggest that such a policy was actively carried out. Instead, it appears that the police resorted to an 'ad hoc' nuisance management approach, whereby, wherever prostitutes were displaced as a result of enforcement and/or community action, police would attempt to establish boundaries for where their presence would be considered acceptable. As noted by Detective Payuk (1993:pers. comm.):

A mutual agreement is established between the police and the prostitutes in that the prostitutes know they will
get arrested if they stray into the residential zone or violate certain known conducts.

In fairness to the police, however, it is important to note that a number of external factors did affect (and some conceivably had an impact upon) the potential success of a policy of containment. For example, with the implementation of two separate city traffic plans designed to discourage the cruising of johns in the residential communities of Boyle Street and McCauley (see chapter 3), street prostitution was displaced to other areas within and outside the affected communities. It could as well be argued that the sustained level of action taken by the police and the community against johns could have contributed to the demise of a policy of containment. Limited police resources represent a plausible explanation: time had to be divided amongst a number of initiatives.

**Targeting Customers of Prostitutes**

Central to the style of functioning of both the police and the residents' group in addressing street prostitution is the targeting of johns through direct action. This direct action has included: marches and protests; video-taping; recording licence plate numbers; vehicle check stops by police; letters sent by police to suspected johns; and the publication of the names of convicted johns by the residents' group in the community newspaper, Boyle McCauley News. The police and CFCP collaborated extensively in these actions. The shared initiatives will be elaborated in the
following section.

Underlying the concerted approach taken in focusing efforts on the customers of prostitutes is the shared view that prostitutes are victims, both from their past and immediate circumstances. As such, enforcement efforts are directed at the users and procurers who exploit, manipulate, and inflict violence upon those individuals who, for a number of underlying reasons and immediate needs, resort to prostitution, often as the sole means of income.

An examination of recent police-reported crime statistics for the City of Edmonton reveals that the policy of targeting customers of prostitutes has been continued, although with less effectiveness as of late. In 1992, Edmonton police reported 791 charges against adults for violating the communicating law: 524 males and 267 females (Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, 1993b). This represents approximately a 2 to 1 ratio of customers to prostitutes charged. For 1993, Edmonton recorded 1,055 communicating charges, an increase of 33.4 percent over the previous year. The number of adult prostitutes charged increased dramatically to 524, an increase of 96.3 percent over 1992, while the number of adult customers remained relatively stable at 531, still marginally above prostitutes charged (Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, 1994).

Highlighting the direct action against johns at the police level is the exclusively police-led initiative entitled, 'Year of the John'. Implemented in 1992 and continued in 1993, the program targeted those individuals suspected of actively seeking the services of prostitutes in a known stroll area (Edmonton Police
Service, 1993:38). Following the determination that the individual is a potential john, the police provide him with a verbal notice of the determined effects caused by cruising johns on the local residents. This is followed with a letter sent to the individual's home informing him of his 'unwanted' presence in the area. The intent is to deter suspected johns from cruising the stroll area.

Following the first year of implementation, the 'Year of the John' program showed no significant decrease in prostitution related activity in the Boyle Street/McCauley area (Payuk, 1993:pers. comm.).

**Key Collaborative Efforts Between Police and Community**

Having already provided a brief overview of a number of collaborations between the police and CFCP, this section will provide a number of detailed examples of interventions carried out jointly by the police and the residents' group to address street prostitution.

The implementation of numerous situational crime prevention measures were a strong feature of the police/community activities. As earlier noted, the overall goal of such action was to address the safety needs of both residents and prostitutes. A further goal, however, was to expose the often clandestine activities of street prostitution.

One of the first problems identified by residents was the amount of prostitution activity (soliciting and tricks) being carried out in unlit back alleys and other frequented areas, such
as schools and parking lots. Such activities created a number of nuisances (i.e., noise late at night) and health and safety risks (i.e., littered condoms and needles). Through a coordinated lobby effort by the police and the residents' group to the appropriate municipal departments, natural surveillance measures of increased lighting and the trimming of trees were implemented in Boyle Street and McCauley. Such measures taken to increase the risk of detection of prostitution activity in once hidden areas were found to be extremely successful in reducing the associated nuisances and health and safety risks (CFCP, 1989:4; Edmonton Police Service, 1993:31).

The situational technique of access control was applied to a number of parking lots in the vicinity of Boyle Street and McCauley. Specifically, this involved restricting after-hours access to empty parking lots through the installation of chains and gates. The most important outcome of this action appeared to be the increased safety of street prostitutes.

Situational measures to address street prostitution were complemented with a number of collaborative efforts leading to direct action being taken against johns. The most noteworthy of these efforts involved evening protest marches by residents of Boyle Street and McCauley accompanied by uniform police officers. Designed to deter johns from soliciting prostitutes and to prevent a number of nuisances inflicted upon residents, these marches closely resembled the 'take-back-the-night' campaigns used by Mount Pleasant (Vancouver) residents in the early to mid-1980s (Mowbray,
The significant differences between the Vancouver and Edmonton experiences are found in the vocal support by the Edmonton police and the non-confrontational, non-violent approach taken by Edmonton residents.

In addition to brandishing signs denouncing johns, some of which read, "Johns Go Home" (McKeen, 1992:C3), for instance, residents also utilized more direct measures, such as, photographing and recording licence plates of suspected johns, and video-taping johns conversing with prostitutes (Payuk, 1993:pers. comm.). In November, 1993 the police implemented a similar strategy, whereby a van marked "Anti-Prostitution Video Evidence Unit" travelled the 'Drag' area to deter johns (City of Edmonton, 1993a:2, section 7).

For the police and the residents' group such action signified more than just an attempt to decrease the activities of johns - it was viewed as a fundamental strategy in a concerted effort to address the needs of street prostitutes who were seen as victims. The actions of AAJ, although supported by the police and CFCP, were, however, more limited in scope. As stated by the spokesman of AAJ, "The group isn’t offering long-term solutions to social problems" (Gold, 1992:C3).

To this end, the police and residents' group worked very closely with social outreach programs and shelters in Edmonton’s inner-city area. Special efforts are taken by the police to pick-up youth prostitutes soon after identifying them as 'new' to the street, and put them in touch with either of the groups (Edmonton
Police Service, 1993:35). This initiative provides the police with an opportunity to obtain information about the individual for future purposes (i.e., parental contact). Additionally, both the police and residents' group members assist the outreach programs in distributing 'bad date' sheets, designed to advise street prostitutes of dangerous customers.

CONCLUSION

The police response to street prostitution in the residential communities of Boyle Street and McCauley demonstrated a commitment to the use of a multi-agency approach. The presence of a structure and organization to the multi-agency partnership between the police and the residents' group was visibly evident. Although operating on an informal basis, a strong partnership established early on between the two agencies secured a strong framework for the sharing of the leadership and coordination of activities, with the residents' group taking the lead role in many instances. Open lines of communication between the residents' group and police facilitated strong relations and, for the most part, timely and effective interventions.

Although limited to an examination of the multi-agency work of the police and the community in this chapter, the Edmonton experience demonstrated a number of equally important contributions of other agencies. These agencies spanned the full spectrum: criminal justice; non-governmental; political, municipal and provincial; and voluntary community groups. The multi-agency work
of the police and the residents' group was greatly assisted by such groups.

Overall, the style of functioning of both agencies under study was highly agreeable. Of most importance to this compatibility was the shared view of prostitutes as victims and johns and pimps as offenders. For both agencies this view underscored all activities taken to address street prostitution, enabling both groups to actively pursue and establish strong working relationships with social outreach groups operating in the area. These relationships, in turn, set the stage for a promising approach to addressing street prostitution in Edmonton.
CHAPTER 8

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In the broadest terms, this study set out to uncover a more promising approach to addressing street prostitution in the areas where it has been shown to be most problematic: inner-city residential communities. Guiding this study's aim was the need to examine the three dominant models used to deal with street prostitution: (1) police suppression; (2) community re-design; and (3) social development.

In chapter 2 it was shown that the law has failed to achieve its intended objective - to reduce the nuisances associated with street prostitution. Alone, police enforcement practices have made few gains in addressing the needs of those communities most affected. Where police enforcement has shown success in reducing the nuisances to one residential neighbourhood, the problems are often displaced to an equally vulnerable area.

Important to the response to street prostitution is the knowledge of where it is most problematic. In chapter 3 it was shown that the problems of street prostitution are most pronounced in a relatively small segment of Canadian society; specifically, inner-city residential communities.

Public opinion surveys carried out over the last decade have consistently demonstrated low national levels of agreement about the degree of seriousness of prostitution in Canadian society. Substantially higher levels of agreement were found to exist in
large urban centres. Research carried out to determine people’s level of awareness of prostitution-related activity in their area as well showed that it is not widespread, but rather confined to large urban centres.

Low severity ratings of prostitution relative to other criminal activities and offensive behaviours suggests that such activity is far from pervasive. However, within urban centres not all of the areas noted for their street prostitution activity generate the same level of concern from the public or the police. It is only when aspects of street prostitution come in conflict with residential areas that the issue becomes magnified.

Drawing upon the experiences of Calgary and Edmonton, and, to a lesser extent other Canadian cities, it was found that the impacts of street prostitution upon residential communities go well beyond the simple nuisances most often associated with this activity; for example, increased vehicular traffic, visible signs of street prostitutes and customers, and harassment of residents. Intensifying the growing fear of such a community is the threat of and witness to physical violence, health concerns over AIDS and other sexually-transmitted diseases brought about by discarded condoms and hypodermic needles, and increased levels of property crime.

Compounding the tangible impacts of street prostitution is the cumulative effect of these impacts upon the community lifestyle. This is often exhibited through increased feelings of insecurity. Important as well is the economic impact exhibited largely through
decreased property values and loss of local business. All combined, these elements have a significant impact upon a community's quality of life.

Community surveys carried out in both Calgary and Edmonton to gauge residents' and local businesses' concerns over street prostitution substantiated already widely-held views that street prostitution posed a significant impact to the social fabric of the community.

In chapters 4 through 7 inclusive, four compelling reasons are discussed for the use of the multi-agency approach to address street prostitution in residential communities: (1) research demonstrating the limits of the traditional, reactive model of policing; (2) the limitations of police enforcement to deal with the underlying factors for entry into street prostitution, and to present a sufficient deterrent to the customers in particular; (3) evidence from the international community demonstrating success in the use of the multi-agency approach to address street prostitution; and (4) traces of success (and potential for) from the presented experiences of Calgary and Edmonton.

Major research studies conducted in the United States over the last two decades on the mainstays of policing in North America (motorized preventive patrol, rapid response, and criminal investigations) have soundly pointed to the need for a more efficient use of police resources. That is, a reallocation of manpower away from reactive, incident-driven, to proactive, problem-driven policing strategies. Additionally, these studies
pointed to the need for the police to move beyond an autonomous, 'professional' mind-set - the recognition of the value of engaging the expertise and resources of the community and other appropriate agencies.

As illustrated in chapter 4, a continued reliance on the part of the police to reactive, incident-driven strategies has made few gains in reducing the high levels of street prostitution activity characteristic of many large Canadian cities. Findings of the evaluation studies carried out to determine the effectiveness of the first three years of the communicating law showed its inability to reduce the nuisances of street prostitution. As noted by the Department of Justice (1989:119) in its final report on the evaluation studies, "The main effect was to move street prostitutes from one downtown area to another, thereby displacing the problem."

A number of indicators reviewed to gauge the level of street prostitution activity since the evaluation study (police statistics, public opinion, media accounts, and municipal government response) revealed no decline in such activity. Rather, levels of street prostitution activity appears to have remained relatively stable or increased slightly over the last six years (1988-1994).

The strategies under question include the two traditional mainstays to policing street prostitution: (1) short periods of intense enforcement utilizing plainclothes officers acting as prostitutes or johns, commonly referred to as sweeps, stings, or blitzes, and (2) ongoing patrols. The ineffectiveness of these
strategies is, in part, noted through a failure to address the underlying factors associated with one's entry into street prostitution.

Entry into street prostitution is often greatly influenced by past life events; for example, childhood abuse, family instability, substance abuse, and early structural impediments to schooling and employment. Arrests followed by short jail terms and/or fines has done little to prevent the re-occurrence of this activity. Linking street prostitutes to community agencies which offer support both in the short and long-term have showed successes in providing these individuals with the necessary resources to leave the street.

The ineffectiveness of current police strategies is as well demonstrated through an inability to provide a sufficient deterrent to customers from engaging in street prostitution. Current levels of deterrence amount to insignificant sentences imposed by the court; for example, fines, typically well below the maximum, absolute discharges, and probation. Community re-design through measures to increase the effort and the risks (Clarke, 1992) to engaging in such activity have shown promise (see Matthews, 1993a; 1992a). This success can largely be attributed to what research, albeit limited, has increasingly shown to be a relatively low level of commitment by clients to this activity (Matthews, 1992c:21). Soliciting on the part of the client appears to be more of an opportunistic offence than prostituting one's self.

Recommendation 1

Presently, in Canada, little is known about the clients
of prostitutes. Further research in this area would greatly assist in designing appropriate interventions.

As illustrated in chapter 5, evidence from the international community has demonstrated success through the application of the multi-agency approach to street prostitution. As reported by Matthews (1993a; 1992a), multi-agency work carried out in residential parts of London, England, has shown substantial decreases in the level of soliciting, curb-crawling, and associated nuisances and crime, with only a minimal amount of territorial displacement taking place. Additional indicators of success included: improved relations between those agencies involved; enhanced quality of life; and increased community cohesion.

Evidence of success (and potential for) from the Calgary and Edmonton experiences is noted through both the framework used in the delivery of the interventions and their type, and the results of those interventions, although limited. In each city the existence of a multi-agency approach involving both the police and the community (a defined residents' group in both cases) was found to be noticeably evident based upon an adherence to the principles enunciated through the research of Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994a; 1994b; 1994c).

For the successful delivery of interventions through a multi-agency framework, Matthews (1993a) notes that at minimum three essential agencies are required: the police; municipal government; and a residents' association representing the affected community. In both Calgary and Edmonton, a strong working relationship was
established between the police and a residents' group acting on behalf of concerned residents. In both instances this relationship was established early on and allowed for liaison, cooperation, information sharing, and coordination of crime prevention and crime control efforts, although more pronounced in Edmonton.

As earlier stated, this study is limited to a focus of multi-agency work between the police and residents. Despite the exclusion of a detailed examination of municipal government from this study, research illustrated that in both cities municipal government played a strong role in a number of capacities in the overall response to street prostitution.

In both Calgary and Edmonton, the establishment of a formal residents' group to specifically target street prostitution proved to be invaluable. In fact, it was the efforts of the residents' groups (assisted to some degree by others, notably, municipal council) which mobilized the police to provide assistance and, in effect, establish a multi-agency approach between the police and themselves, albeit on an informal level.

Research carried out by Matthews (1992a) showed that for such an approach to achieve long-term solutions to street prostitution it must be driven from below by a residents' group. The reasoning is based upon the fact that street prostitution in residential areas requires a more "permanent disincentive" than what the police or other agencies are able to provide over the long-term (Matthews, 1992a:97). That is, the police and, if involved, the municipal council, will undoubtedly be limited in the allocation of resources
over time.

This was the case in the communities of Inglewood and Ramsay in Calgary, whereby, following a sustained police-led operation that involved intensive policing among other measures, the residents' group became the lead agency to sustain any success that was achieved. In effect, the community became responsible for the 'maintenance phase' in the multi-agency work.

Other key points important to the success of multi-agency work as identified by Matthews relate to the interventions employed. Findings from Matthews' (1993a) research in Southern London illustrated that the aim of interventions directed at street prostitution must be multi-faceted. More specifically, in addition to an emphasis on reducing the level of nuisances caused by street prostitution, interventions must also be directed at minimizing its social impact - lessening the impacts upon residential areas. Success of such action would not be jeopardized in the event street prostitutes and customers were deflected to non-residential areas thus, demonstrating benign displacement (Matthews, 1993a).

Through the interventions of the multi-agency approach in both Calgary and Edmonton it appears that this multi-faceted aim was maintained. However, the approach advocated by the residents' group in Inglewood and Ramsay did not subscribe to it wholeheartedly. That is, from the beginning their objective was the complete elimination of street prostitution from their communities. No regard was shown for its likely displacement to neighbouring residential areas. In fact, research carried out for
this study demonstrated no attempts on the part of the residents' group to suggest alternative areas that may produce less social impact. The experience of Edmonton, on the other hand, demonstrated a full commitment to the achievement of the multi-faceted aim of interventions.

The success of a multi-agency approach is also greatly influenced by the number of interventions used and the sequence of their implementation (Matthews, 1993a; 1992a). In the case of the Calgary experience, interventions appeared to be tightly focused and not too wide-ranging. In contrast, Edmonton's response could be considered over-ambitious. Interventions were scattered, hence detracting from limited resources being allocated to key problems.

In discussing the importance of the sequence of the interventions, Matthews (1993a; 1992a) is primarily concerned with the relationship between situational crime prevention and policing. That is, the ability of situational measures to design 'in' the targeted problem if not preceded by the establishment of a police presence. Furthermore, situational measures implemented in isolation of a police presence are just as likely to design 'in' as to design 'out' the problem (Matthews, 1992a).

In the second police-led operation in Calgary the former was overcome through the establishment of a police presence prior to the implementation of a road-closure program. According to a community source, street prostitution was in fact designed 'out' (Phillips, 1994:pers. comm.).

In Edmonton, the latter scenario is applicable. Two separate
traffic plans implemented in isolation of a police presence failed to successfully design 'out' street prostitution, but rather, in both cases, displaced it to neighbouring residential areas, thereby, expanding its social impact.

As shown through the research findings of Matthews (1993a; 1992a) and others (Kinsey et al., 1986), the most important indicator of the potential effectiveness of the multi-agency approach involves the adherence by the police to two fundamental principles: (1) shifting the approach to policing from reactive to proactive, and (2) sharing the traditionally-held responsibility for crime prevention and control with other agencies.

The shift from reactive to proactive policing was clearly evident through both the Calgary and Edmonton police employing problem-solving approaches. The police-led operations in Inglewood and Ramsay were genuine examples of a problem-solving approach at work. In Edmonton as well, a number of situational crime prevention measures (i.e., improved lighting) developed in collaboration with the residents' group demonstrated the use of a problem-solving model.

In both cities, although less evident in Calgary, the use of a proactive approach has meant a change in the police's focus of attention from that of prostitutes to customers of prostitutes. Research conducted by Matthews (1993a; 1992a) showed a lower level of commitment on the part of johns relative to street prostitutes thus, establishing that it may be easier to deter the user from continued activities. Whether or not this change in policy in
Calgary and Edmonton has proven successful remains unclear, as no evaluation work has been carried out to determine its effectiveness. What is clear, however, is that there exists a greater level of public support for a policy which targets the clients over the prostitutes (see Brannigan et al., 1989:23).

The sharing of the responsibility for crime prevention and crime control on the part of the police was visibly apparent in both cities, more so, however, in Edmonton. This was largely facilitated by the police entering into more initiatives with the residents' group in the areas of environmental design, public education, community mobilization, and direct action against johns, and carrying out less police-led initiatives. Calgary police, on the other hand, undertook more enforcement-oriented initiatives, opting to collaborate with the residents' group on similar initiatives prior to and following the two police-led operations.

Recommendation 2

Both Vice units and uniform divisions mandated with the responsibility to address street prostitution should re-allocate resources to enhance collaborative efforts with the community through public education, environmental design, and support for other initiatives.

The one negative characteristic common to both the Calgary and Edmonton experiences was the failure to carry out strong evaluative work, both impact and process. This proved to be a serious drawback to the multi-agency work, particularly in the deployment of resources and design of interventions. Assessment studies,
albeit weak, were limited to Calgary.

Following the first police-led operation carried out in Calgary entitled, Operation PAC-RAP, separate assessments were completed by the police and the residents' group. A survey of 335 residences and businesses by the group garnered 248 responses. In evaluating a number of the police objectives of the Operation, the Committee, based upon the findings of the survey and observations of the researchers, concluded that the Operation had realized the following: reduced the anxiety felt by residents and business people and assisted in public education and awareness; partially succeeded in reducing the volume of traffic from the area and minimizing the impact of nuisances on residential streets; and, lastly, failed to explore options for the re-location of the stroll (Communities' Response Against Prostitution Committee, 1992:2,3). In addition, 62 percent (74 of 120 respondents) were of the opinion that the overall situation had improved following Operation PAC-RAP (Communities' Response Against Prostitution Committee, 1992:2).

Following a one year extension of the police operation the residents' group concluded, although unclear of the methodology used, that the police objectives had not been fully achieved (CAPRA, 1993:9,10).

An assessment of the operation based upon the opinions of the officers involved found that each objective was met with success, either complete or partial (Calgary Police Service, 1992a). In addition to the biased nature of the assessment, it was as well limited in its scope to only the views of the two officers
involved. With the exception of the one objective that the residents' group concluded had failed, the findings of both the police and the residents' group appear to be consistent.

Recommendation 3

Impact and process evaluations should be incorporated into the design and development of multi-agency collaborations. Interviews with offenders and the use of public surveys will assist in assessing the value of interventions.

Recommendation 4

Evaluation research undertaken to gauge the effectiveness of multi-agency work to address street prostitution should expand upon the status quo indicators (i.e., crime and victimization rates) to include community satisfaction with police, fear of crime, perceived quality of life, and the relationship between the agencies involved.

Overall, the multi-agency work carried out in both Calgary and Edmonton can be said to have somewhat adhered to each of the three models for addressing street prostitution: police suppression; community re-design; and, to a lesser extent, social development. Clearly, police enforcement strategies dominated the work in each city. However, the involvement of the police was by no means based upon a traditional mind-set, as demonstrated through a commitment to shifting from reactive to proactive strategies, and sharing the responsibility for crime prevention and control with the community.
Recommendation 5

Pilot studies similar to those reported on by Matthews (1993a; 1992a) in London, England, need to be advanced in different contexts to test its applicability elsewhere. Borrowing from Matthews (1992a:§7): "... we need to find out how this strategy needs to be adapted in order for it to be effective in different situations."
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APPENDIX 1

GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS

Escort Service: An operating business that is often found to be a front for prostitution. Often used to refer to off-street prostitution. Other businesses associated with off-street prostitution include: dating services; massage parlours; and body-rub houses.

John: A customer or client of a prostitute. Also referred to as a 'curb( kerb)-crawler'. Reference to the term 'john' is not intended to offend those of similar name.

Pimp: "Someone, usually male, who manages the activities of a prostitute (male or female), provides protection and receives a portion of, and occasionally all of, the prostitute's income" (Mathews, 1989:14).

The Game: The business of prostitution to those who make their living from prostituting themselves. Can apply to both street and off-street prostitution. Also referred to as 'The Life'.

Trick: A customer of a prostitute.

Stroll: The geographical area of a city where street prostitutes advertise their services to potential customers. Usually
encompasses one or two city blocks.

**Sweeps:** The dominant police response to addressing street prostitution under the current law. Also referred to as 'stings' and 'blitzes', this strategy employs the use of undercover police officers disguised as either street prostitutes or customers designed to elicit a communication (verbal or other) on the part of either a known street prostitute or potential customer for the purposes of engaging in prostitution.