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FORMER ENemies COMe To CANADA:
OTTawa AND THE POSTWAr GERMAN IMMIGRATION BOOM, 1951-57

By

Ronald E. Schmalz

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History
University of Ottawa
Ottawa, Ontario

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ABSTRACT

The 1950s was the decade of the largest volume of immigration to Canada. Germans figured prominently in this great wave contributing 200,000 migrants in the peak years of 1951-57, a number only surpassed by British newcomers. In fact, more Germans came to Canada in this seven year span than during any comparable period in Canadian history. This influx was made possible by the great interest in emigration in Germany and the generous immigration policy of the Canadian government. Indeed, government immigration policies and programs were decisive and determining factors, shaping the size and character of the German influx. Policy makers in Ottawa could and, in fact, did exercise considerably more control over the intake of Germans than was possible for the movement of other immigrant groups. They saw in German migrants a means of meeting Canadian economic and manpower needs, a policy they carried out with mixed success, missing golden opportunities in the first half of the 1950s. This thesis is an analysis of the German immigration boom to Canada from the perspective of Ottawa's policies and programming.

This thesis is the first comprehensive study which addresses the influence of government policy on German immigration to Canada in the 1950s. It assesses Ottawa's policy within the complex context of key domestic and external forces. This study also explores new fields including the developments leading to the government's decision to admit German nationals, the history of the Canadian Christian Council for the Resettlement of Refugees in the 1950s and Canada's role in the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. It is based primarily on records of the government of Canada but also draws on personal interviews, manuscript collections, newspapers and secondary sources, including recent German scholarship in the field. This study argues that Ottawa's German immigration policy was profoundly governed by Canada's economic and political self interest.
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I wish to thank the Chair of German-Canadian studies, Dr. Angelika Sauer, and the German Canadian Studies Foundation for their consideration and generous financial support for this project in the form of the 1998 German-Canadian Studies Manitoba Research Grant and the 1999 Research Scholarship in German-Canadian Studies. This support was crucial for a working father with family. I would also like to acknowledge the valuable advice and information received from staff and experts at various archives and research centres, including the National Archives of Canada, National Library of Canada, the Mennonite Heritage Centre and its former Director, Ken Reddig, the University of Winnipeg Archives and Public Record Office in England. The information contained in the holdings of these institutions forms an integral part of this study. Finally, I thank the two interviewees for providing a revealing and illuminating perspective on the 1950s immigration phenomenon.
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>Air Bridge to Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>Approved Church Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APS</td>
<td>Assisted Passage Scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BWAI</td>
<td>Baptist World Alliance Immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>Canadian Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCCRR</td>
<td>Canadian Christian Council for the Resettlement of Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>Canadian Council of Churches</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>Co-operative Commonwealth Federation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>Close Dependents Scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFA</td>
<td>Canadian Federation of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGIM</td>
<td>Canadian Government Immigration Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIPO</td>
<td>Canadian Institute of Public Opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIAS</td>
<td>Catholic Immigrant Aid Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLIAS</td>
<td>Canadian Lutheran Immigration Aid Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLWR</td>
<td>Canadian Lutheran World Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMBC</td>
<td>Canadian Mennonite Board of Colonisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMMA</td>
<td>Canadian Metal Mining Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNCR</td>
<td>Canadian National Committee on Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNR</td>
<td>Canadian National Railways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPR</td>
<td>Canadian Pacific Railway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DACI</td>
<td>Departmental Advisory Committee on Immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>Department of Citizenship and Immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEA</td>
<td>Department of External Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DL</td>
<td>Department of Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DM</td>
<td>Deutsche Mark (German Mark)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Displaced Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IACI</td>
<td>Interdepartmental Advisory Committee on Immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IB</td>
<td>Immigration Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICEM</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICIL</td>
<td>Interdepartmental Committee on Immigration and Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICMC</td>
<td>International Catholic Migration Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCR</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMOP</td>
<td>Immigration Open Placement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRO</td>
<td>International Refugee Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISCMP</td>
<td>Interdepartmental Sub-Committee on Migration Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOP</td>
<td>Labour Open Placement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LWF</td>
<td>Lutheran World Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCC</td>
<td>Mennonite Central Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHC</td>
<td>Mennonite Heritage Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NABICS</td>
<td>North American Baptist Immigration and Colonisation Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>National Archives of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NES</td>
<td>National Employment Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCWC</td>
<td>National Catholic Welfare Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>OEEC</td>
<td>Organization for European Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OiC</td>
<td>Officer in Charge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCO</td>
<td>Privy Council Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PICMME</td>
<td>Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRA</td>
<td>United States Refugee Relief Act, 1953-1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSSC</td>
<td>Rural Settlement Society of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supt.</td>
<td>Superintendent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UIC</td>
<td>Unemployment Insurance Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRRA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCC</td>
<td>World Council of Churches</td>
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1. INTRODUCTION

GERMAN IMMIGRATION IN NUMBERS

From 1951 to 1957 Canada experienced a veritable boom in German immigration. This huge influx started as suddenly as it ended. The number of German immigrants entering Canada sky-rockeeted from a low of 5,825 in 1950 to 32,395 the following year and peaked in 1953 with 35,051 admissions. After a moderate decline in 1954-55 German numbers again climbed, reaching a momentary high of 29,546 in 1957, the last year of the boom. From this time on German immigration fell precipitously, never again reaching previous levels. The estimated movement of 200,000 Germans to Canada from 1951 to 1957 greatly exceeded all earlier waves of German migrations to Canada, including the high-points in the 1890s, 1910s and 1920s (see Figure No. 1).

Figure No. 1: German versus Total Immigration to Canada by Decade, 1900-90

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>German Immigration</td>
<td>18,502</td>
<td>20,541</td>
<td>62,490</td>
<td>15,399</td>
<td>10,026</td>
<td>219,889</td>
<td>63,865</td>
<td>21,330</td>
<td>18,478</td>
<td>450,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Immigration</td>
<td>1,398,989</td>
<td>1,860,269</td>
<td>1,264,220</td>
<td>252,044</td>
<td>428,733</td>
<td>1,544,642</td>
<td>1,366,025</td>
<td>1,444,917</td>
<td>1,239,827</td>
<td>10,819,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German % of Total</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Statistics Year(s) 1896 to 1989 (Ottawa: 1896 to 1986).

Germans were well represented amongst all immigrants entering Canada between 1951 and 1957. In these years they were only outnumbered by British (360,012) and were closely followed by

1 In this study "Germans" are defined by their ethnic or "racial" origin, as opposed to nationality or place of last residence. Wsevolod Isajiw's definition of ethnicity is adopted here: "An involuntary group of people who share the same culture or to descendants of such people who identify themselves and/or are identified by others as belonging to the same involuntary group." W. Isajiw "Definitions of Ethnicity," Ethnicity 1 (1974), 11-24. The advantages of adopting ethnic origin is that it takes into account non-German nationals such as ethnic Germans (Volkdeutsche) as well as Germans whose last place of residence was not Germany. Also, most of the detailed government immigration statistics are based on ethnic (or "racial") origin data. The shortcomings of Canadian immigration and census "ethnic origin" data are described in N.B. Ryder, "The Interpretation of Origin Statistics," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 21 (1955), 466-79. The chief problem with ethnic origin data is that it is based on self-identification and Germans were at certain times prone to identify themselves as other nationalities. Generally, however, German ethnic origin statistics after 1950, especially after 1953, are reasonably reliable. See R. Vollmer, "The Informative Value of Migration Statistics on Overseas Migrations (1945-1961). Exemplified for Emigrations from Germany," Historical Social Research, Historische Sozialforschung 17, 2 (1992), 65-73. In this study Mennonites have been classified as Germans, albeit with some hesitation because this group can be considered a separate ethno-religious entity. However, most Mennonites who came to Canada from Europe after 1930 were former residents of the Free State of Danzig and Poland who had strong German ties.

2 Canada, Department of Citizenship and Immigration (DCI), Immigration Statistics, 1896-1959, (Ottawa). All German immigration statistics cited for the years up to 1952 include Austrian nationals. No separate statistics for Austrian ethnic origin are available prior to this time.
Italian (174,118) and Dutch (104,350) newcomers (see Figure No. 2). The German movement was especially high between 1951 and 1953, when it surpassed even English migration to Canada. The transition from 1950 to 1951 is startling; the proportion of German immigrants coming to Canada more than doubled from 7.8% to 16.7% of total immigration. Canada's annual intake of Germans averaged 17.6% of the total immigration - or one in every six immigrants - for the period 1951-57. Most of the influx consisted of unsponsored workers taking employment in Canada. Clearly, Ottawa was relying increasingly on Germany as a source of immigrants and manpower.

Consistent with the magnitude of this movement was its great diversity. Germans from practically every confession, occupational category and regional group (Landsmannschaften) entered Canada during the 1950s. Although this movement was of short duration, its size and diversity had a far-reaching impact on the German-Canadian community in Canada, resurrecting German cultural, religious and associational life. Also, the labour component of the movement played a significant part in the Canadian economy and labour scene of the 1950s and 1960s. These subjects, albeit interesting, are beyond the scope of this study.

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\[1\] In this study reference to the term "Germany" or to "German" authorities denotes the Federal Republic of Germany and excludes the German Democratic Republic, unless otherwise stated.
What makes this large influx of Germans so remarkable is that it happened at all. In Germany, prospective immigrants faced shortages of overseas transportation, rising shipping costs and currency exchange restrictions. Many did not have sufficient funds for transportation and settlement in Canada. Even fewer had sponsors to assist them. The prospect of uncertain employment, starting a new life in a foreign environment as well as coping with language barriers and huge travel debts also deterred many from taking the big step of leaving Germany. Limiting factors were also found on the Canadian side. Canada imposed very strict medical, security and civil admission criteria which sharply curtailed the number of Germans who could enter Canada. In addition, various administrative measures were used to keep the German flow in check. The most effective bureaucratic obstacle was limiting the range of occupational categories for which Germans could qualify for admission to Canada. Furthermore, prospective migrants faced long delays in processing their applications, due to shortages of immigration staff in Germany. By the end of 1953 the Canadian immigration office in Germany was sitting on a backlog of some 270,000 cases. Under these circumstances, it is surprising that the movement assumed the proportions it did.

For the most part, the remarkable story of German immigration in the 1950s has escaped the attention of scholars. Interestingly, more work has been devoted to the period immediately preceding the German immigration boom. Studies which review immigration policy and history in the 1950s have either omitted or given scant notice of the German contribution. Better coverage is provided in works which treat this topic as ancillary to their main themes. This thesis is intended

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7 Examples are Johannes-Dieter Steinert’s study of German postwar emigration, Migration und Politik, Westdeutschland - Europa - Übersee 1945-1961 (Osnabrück: Secolo Verlag, 1995) and his concise version, “Drehtsche Westdeutschland: Wanderungspolitik im Nachkriegsjahrzehnt,” in K. Bade ed., Deutsche im Ausland - Fremde in Deutschland. Migration in Geschichte und Gegenwart (München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1992), 386-392. Also see Andrea Koch Kraft’s examination of German immigration and adaptation with regard to Edmonton, Alberta: Deutsche in Kanada: Einwanderung und Adapt[ation]: mit einer Untersuchung zur Situation der
to fill the gap by analysing this movement. Its principal goal is to explain how the German immigration boom assumed the proportions it did, with particular emphasis on the role of the Canadian government.

**IMMIGRATION THEORIES**

Social scientists and historians have developed various theories and models to account for population movements between geographic areas and countries. Migrants' motives for emigrating are often multiple, complex, in a state of flux and vary from individual to individual and by source region. The movement of Germans to Canada in the 1950s was no different and no one paradigm can fully explain this phenomenon. The "migrant social network" hypothesis, which posits that movements of peoples are facilitated by common bonds of kinship, friendship and shared community origin which exist between old communities in sending countries and new communities in receiving countries, holds true especially for "sponsored" German immigration. This web of contacts and sponsors was evident in the case of family members and relatives who followed breadwinners to Canada and in the postwar exodus of Mennonite refugees to Canada. Even for prospective immigrants in Germany without sponsors, positive reports from friends and distant relatives in Canada could decisively influence the big step of leaving one's homeland. Yet the social network construct fails to account for the movement of Germans who came to Canada on their own accord and outside of such contacts. Indeed the rather dispersed settlement of German newcomers throughout Canada, with the exception of Kitchener, Ontario, suggests that there was less chain migration amongst Germans than was the case for other immigrant groups.

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8 Indeed, about 60% of the applicants at Canadian immigration posts in Germany resulted from referrals and letters from friends and relatives in Canada. NAC, RG 76, Immigration Branch (IB) records, Vol. 821, File 552-1-551, Pt. 1, Robillard to A/Chief Op. Div., 29.6.1956.

Government officials interpreted German immigration in the 1950s very much along the lines of a continuum of “push and pull” forces. They saw "push" migration factors at work in Germany, especially during the desperate years of 1945-47, when most of Germany's economy, trade, housing and morale were in utter ruins. The twelve million German refugees who had fled or were expelled from Eastern Europe to West Germany by 1950 caused severe overpopulation and strained the Federal Republic's already thin resources. Many of the refugees who were not integrated into German society opted to emigrate. The economic recession and accompanying high unemployment in 1950-51 brought renewed interest in migration. The great attraction which Canada held out for many immigrants is confirmed by the flood of immigration applications, about 2,000-3,000 per day, received by Canadian missions in Germany in 1951. German opinion polls in the early-1950s also reveal a strong urge on the part of Germans to emigrate. The most frequently cited motive for leaving was unemployment or the difficulty of earning a living. Fear of war and political instability, especially at the height of the Korean war, also led many to seek new homes far from Europe.10

According to senior immigration officials, pull factors came more to the fore after 1954 when the German Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle) was well underway and the worst of the cold-war anxiety in Europe had passed. Of great importance to many Germans was that unemployment was falling and the standard of living was climbing after 1951.11 By 1955, it appears that there were fewer negative reasons for Germans to leave their homeland. This is reflected in the decline in applications and enquiries received by Canadian missions in Germany and in reports from overseas immigration officials. Commenting on the poor recruitment in 1955, the chief of Canada's immigration mission in Karlsruhe, Germany concluded: "What we need these days are selling points for migration as we have certainly moved from a buyer's to a seller's market in the whole

11 Alan Green's analysis of immigration data and unemployment figures found that German unemployment as a push factor exerted considerable influence on German immigration to Canada. See Immigration and the Postwar Canadian Economy (Toronto: Macmillan, 1976), 73.
field of migration."12 Accordingly, Canadian officials responded to these changes in the late-1950s by intensifying promotional campaigns which adroitly "sold" the material and economic advantages of relocating to Canada.

While the push and pull model does encapsulate some of the more salient features of national German migration to Canada, it does not take into account the range and interplay of forces, especially at the local and regional levels, which may have influenced emigration. Furthermore, this theory falls short of explaining why millions of Germans decided to stay put in their homeland. Evidently, "push" forces were less efficacious than might have been expected. In sum, a hybrid model may best describe German immigration to Canada in the 1950s. Many Germans came to this country by way of sponsorship or information networks consisting of relatives and friends. Generally, it appears they were more attracted than pushed to Canada. Economic and employment interests were amongst the most prominent motives for emigrating to Canada, although familial, social and/or political (i.e. cold-war fears) considerations also came into play for many German migrants.13 The social, economic and geographic dislocation experienced by German evacuees, expellees and refugees in West Germany immediately after the war undoubtedly made this group less settled and more prone to migrate.

**OTTAWA'S IMMIGRATION POLICY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE GERMAN BOOM**

During the course of the twentieth century, international movements of immigrants and refugees became increasingly subject to the control and regulation of sending and receiving nation states.14 This was especially evident after World War II, when many European and overseas countries became involved directly in the migration process, with receiving countries always calling the shots on who and how many they would admit. In the case of German immigration to Canada in the

13 Structural theories which see immigration as being generated by economic and political contacts and power asymmetries between sending and receiving countries have not been treated here, because they fail to account for the totality of the German movement.
1950s, Ottawa undisputedly had the deciding voice. German authorities themselves placed virtually no obstacles in the way of their departing nationals. In fact, during the 1950s, Bonn encouraged certain groups and categories of migrants to move, offering transport subsidies, free processing facilities and other inducements. Furthermore, the German citizens' right to freely emigrate was protected under the Federal Republic's constitution. Yet this did not mean that Germans could stream into Canada unchecked and unregulated. Ottawa considered immigration a matter of domestic policy and its control a national prerogative and, accordingly, dictated the terms by which Germans could enter Canada. Not surprisingly, it was Ottawa's immigration, not Bonn's emigration, policy which controlled and shaped the German movement to Canada in the 1950s.

**King's May 1947 Immigration Statement as a Blueprint**

The fundamental principles governing Canada's immigration policy in the postwar period were laid down in Prime Minister Mackenzie King's statement to parliament on May 1, 1947. Immigration was to: (1) foster population growth and promote economic development; (2) be selective and not alter "the fundamental character" of Canada; (3) be related to the country's absorptive capacity; and (4) be subject to the control of Canada alone. These principles were fully supported by all circles within the federal government; after all, the text of King's statement was the product of the input of a broad range of departments. They dominated Ottawa's thinking and formulation of immigration policy until the early-1960s and they were repeatedly and publically endorsed by successive Immigration ministers. These basic tenets were often further elaborated and amplified by the bureaucracy and used as yardsticks by both officials and the public alike in assessing the relative success or failure of Ottawa's programs. Their impact was widespread, affecting the volume, character and timing of immigration to Canada, including the intake of Germans in the 1950s.

King's guidelines stimulated, yet also circumscribed, German migration. At the same time, they

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15 House of Commons, Debates, 1.5.1947; Hawkins, Canada and Immigration, 91.
16 In explaining the intent of Canada's immigration policy in 1957, Immigration's Deputy Minister provided an almost verbatim repetition of King's principles. NAC, RG 26, Department of Citizenship and Immigration (DCI) records, Vol. 90, File 3-1-1, Pt. 1, Fortier to Heeney, 4.10.1957. See also Minister of DCI's speech in Victoria in 1955 in DCI, Vol. 143, File 3-40-21, "Notes...[18.11.1955]."
ensured that overall control of the movement rested with Canada. Their broad effects on German immigration are summarised as follows:

Canada's immigration policy after 1947 was inextricably linked with its broader goal of building a larger population and stronger economy. Shortly after the war, Canadian politicians, government bureaucrats, business groups and the public were acutely aware of Canada's small demographic base - about 12.8 million in 1948 - and of the need to foster population growth in order to strengthen Canada's international position, safeguard its independence and security and promote economic development. Their views were reflected in the findings of the Senate Committee on Immigration and Labour and adopted by King and his government. They also were espoused by Prime Minister St. Laurent, a strongponent of population growth through expanded immigration who advocated a goal of 40 million Canadians by the year 2000.\textsuperscript{17} Immigration, complemented by natural increase, was regarded as an important means of populating Canada. It had the potential of making an immediate contribution to Canada's population and, unlike natural increase, could be more effectively managed for long-term demographic growth. The goal of building a larger population via immigration was greatly advanced with the creation of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration (DCI) in January 1950.\textsuperscript{18} The new department consciously sought to add to Canada's inadequate demographic base, maximising the number of immigrants which the economy could absorb in a given year. It set high immigration targets which enabled greater numbers of Germans to enter Canada.

Similarly, immigration was used by the government to further industrial expansion. It did so in three ways. First, it created a bigger domestic market for Canadian industries, thereby permitting greater economies of scale for manufacturing firms and broadening the range of economically viable industries. A larger population also reduced the per capita costs of government, transportation and communications, and stimulated the development of more specialised services.

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Financial Post}, 18.10.1952. During cabinet sessions on immigration programs, St. Laurent often emphasised the need for an energetic immigration program.
Second, immigration provided an infusion of entrepreneurs, capital, and techniques and technologies. According to the Minister of Immigration's submission to cabinet in 1950, German immigration offered special advantages in this regard: "The effect [of the continuation of state of war with Germany] was to deprive Canada of substantial numbers of immigrants whose professional, technical, or industrial skills would be an asset to the national economy and who would be likely to become loyal citizens." By the early-1950s, the DCI was giving special encouragement to business immigration through its "capital-cases" and "self-establishment" programs for which German immigrants were also eligible.

Third, immigration filled the short-term manpower requirements of the Canadian economy. After 1947, many of Canada's primary sectors experienced acute labour shortages, most notably in agriculture, as well as in service occupations such as domestic work and nursing. Demand for specialists and skilled workers also increased during the 1950s. Domestic supplies of manpower, reduced by the low birth rate during the Depression and the casualties experienced during the war, were insufficient to meet this growing demand. Consistent with its role of greater intervention in the national economy, the government sought to relieve these shortages by recruiting immigrant labour overseas. This policy was first pursued overseas with Polish veterans and displaced persons (DPs) who were brought to Canada on special "bulk-labour" programs and was continued with Germans by 1951. It had a great impact on German immigration because for most Germans their only means of entry to Canada was through labour-related immigration. As a result during the 1950s, Germany became a major source of manpower for Canada, supplying more farm hands and domestic servants than any other country as well as a disproportionately high number of skilled workers.

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18 The role of immigration in demographic and economic growth are summarised cogently in an article by the Deputy Minister of Immigration in NAC, RG 27, Department of Labour (DL) records, Vol. 3022, File Immigration Policy, Correspondence, Pt. 4.
20 R. Whitaker, Canadian Immigration Policy since Confederation (Ottawa: CHA, 1991), 15.
21 Displaced persons (or DPs) were non-Germans who were forced to leave or had fled their homelands during and immediately after the war and who remained in western Europe, primarily in Germany and Austria, after hostilities ended.
While King's objective of population growth and economic development provided an impetus for immigration, his principle of "absorptive capacity" was intended to strictly regulate intake. Specifically this principle involved limiting Canada's receipt of immigrants in accordance with the economy's ability to absorb this manpower.²² It ruled out the possibility of a mass and unregulated movement of people to Canada and thereby assuaged the public's and, in particular, organised labour's concerns about Ottawa's immigration policy. It invariably involved a "tap-on-and-off" approach. Immigration was restricted during downturns and boosted during upturns in the economy. This typically was achieved by lowering or raising the number of unsponsored immigrants that Canada was prepared to accept in proportion to real or anticipated fluctuations in the Canadian economy. Because most Germans came forward as unsponsored immigrants, German immigration was strongly governed by the vicissitudes of the Canadian economy and domestic labour situation. When the Canadian economy boomed, Canada's intake of Germans increased; when it faltered, German immigration was cut.

By the late-1940s, the system of absorptive capacity was being fine-tuned by the immigration bureaucracy. Canada not only regulated the number, but also the occupational categories of labourers coming forward as immigrants. At this time Canada was experiencing chronic labour shortages in certain fields, most notably in agriculture and domestic service, which could only be met through immigration. In recruiting these workers Ottawa was forced to rely on certain sources more than others, as not all countries had the types and volume of workers required in Canada. This pattern had obvious implications for the German movement, considering that Germany in the 1950s provided one of the largest and most diverse pools of readily accessible labour in Europe.

Another restrictive aspect of King's immigration policy was his principle of "careful selection" and his caution that immigration should not alter the "fundamental character of the Canadian people."

"Careful selection" essentially rationalised an immigration policy based on an ethnic hierarchy of preferences and racial discrimination and justified Ottawa's practice of giving greater consideration of immigration from certain countries over others. Ottawa's ranking of immigrant groups was not solely based on racism (i.e. a "White-Canada" policy), but also on the criteria of character, adaptability, language skills, and special contributions, such as skills and capital, that some ethnic groups were felt to possess more than others.\textsuperscript{23} Migrants from the United Kingdom, United States and, later, France were at the top of the list. These groups were not subject to quotas or restrictions, with the exception of basic medical and civil checks. They received a host of inducements not afforded other groups.\textsuperscript{24} The primacy of British immigration was an accepted canon for most anglophone Canadians and the government. Ottawa, with the full support of the public, did everything possible to encourage this group's immigration, even at the expense of other movements. At the other extreme were "non-preferred" immigrants, such as Asians, whose entry to Canada was tightly controlled by quotas.

Germans were in the middle of Ottawa's hierarchy. They fell between citizens from northwestern Europe - Belgians, Dutch, Scandinavians, Swiss - and southern Europeans. Germans' lower standing can be chiefly attributed to the fact that they were not British. There were also other strikes against them, most notably their former status as wartime enemies, the legacy of the record of brutality and bigotry of the National Socialist regime, their prolonged exposure to National Socialist ideology and the political consequences of the divided Germany.

Ottawa's perception and ranking of Germans had considerable significance for German immigration. First, their connection with the war, National-Socialism and the perceived Communist security threat posed by East Germany, meant Germans were subject to more rigorous security screening than other immigrants. All prospective German immigrants were subject to a

\textsuperscript{23} King's May 1947 speech contained specific reference to the preference to be given British immigrants and the restrictions to be placed on Asian immigration, House of Commons, Debates, 1.5.1947. See also Minister of DCI address on May 8, 1955 in House of Commons, Debates, 8.5.1955.
security interview and a myriad of paper checks which acted as a brake on the overall movement.\textsuperscript{25} Second, and most importantly, Ottawa attempted to enforce the principle of maintaining the "fundamental character of Canada," defined by its own racial biases, by regulating the ethnic composition of immigration to Canada. In reply to an enquiry from the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), the Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration in 1950 assured that the entry of Germans, now admissible to Canada, "must not have the effect of altering the fundamental character of the Canadian population."\textsuperscript{26} In a similar vein, the Director of Immigration cautioned his overseas officers in 1951 that while German migrants were considered among the "best type of migrants … this does not mean that the whole movement of migrants in any given year will be 90% Germans."\textsuperscript{27} Although Germans were admissible to Canada on the same basis as other Europeans after September 1950, their movement could still be slowed by various administrative measures and the DCI's broad discretionary powers. This practice was commonly carried out during periods of economic stagnation when immigration needed to be scaled back. It was the groups at the lower end of the ethnic hierarchy, typically Germans and Italians, who experienced the brunt of such cuts, while British and French migration remained virtually untouched.

\textsuperscript{24} British immigrants did not even need to set foot in a Canadian overseas visa office as applications and required information could be processed through the mail. Their medical examinations and processing expenses were covered fully by the Canadian government.

\textsuperscript{25} Upwards of 13 such checks were conducted on an individual applicant. IB, Vol. 882, File 552-1-551, Quinn to A/Chief Op. Div., 3.1.1958.


\textsuperscript{27} DCI, Vol. 95, File 3-7-7, Pt. 1, Director to Smith, 3.11.1951.
Figure No. 3: Percentage Distribution of Immigration compared with Population by Ethnic Origin, Canada 1952-57

Source: National Archives of Canada, Department of Citizenship and Immigration Records, Vol. 72
The policy of regulating immigration on the basis of racial priorities had its drawbacks. Too rigorous an application of this principle would restrict the much needed flow of labour to Canada. This was especially true in the 1950s, when the so-called "preferred" countries alone were unable to provide the volume or type of immigrants required in Canada. As a result, selection of immigrants according to ethnic preferences took a back seat to economic exigencies. This point was conceded by Immigration's Deputy Minister when, in 1953, during a meeting with Ontario officials, he explained that the demand for labour in Canada did not permit selection abroad on a strict ratio basis of the Canadian population. Without doubt, the ability of German immigration to produce the numbers and types of workers required in Canada accounts for the high intake of Germans during the 1950s. As a proportion of total immigration, German newcomers greatly exceeded the German-Canadians' share of the Dominion's population during that time (see Figure No.3). Yet, there was still a ceiling on the total number of German workers the government was prepared to accept.

King's insistence that immigration was a matter of domestic policy and subject to exclusive Canadian control was very much a response to the views held in some international circles that Canada was obliged to do more to resolve the DP problem. Until the 1960s, the concept of Canadian control found considerable support in the DCI and served as the guiding principle and bottom line of the department's dealings with other parties. The department's affinity for this principle may be explained by several factors: its nation-building ethos; its belief that this principle was an affirmation of the powers vested it by the Immigration Act; its suspicions of the ulterior motives of other migration agencies; and its fears that other agencies posed a threat to its exclusive role in regulating immigration. Most importantly, Canadian control permitted the department greater flexibility in adapting to changing domestic circumstances.

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28 DCI, Vol. 71, File Departmental Advisory Committee on Immigration (DACI) 1951-57, Minutes of DACI meeting, 8.6.1953.
According to the *Immigration Act*, the authority of the DCI extended to every aspect of the immigration process both overseas and in Canada. The department jealously guarded its jurisdiction over numbers and selection of immigrants admitted to Canada. Here it encountered the vested interests of outside agencies. The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM), the German government and various international and Canadian voluntary agencies had their own designs regarding German migration. The ICEM pushed Canada to accept more people from over-populated countries in Europe, including Germany. Bonn sought further control over the emigration of its citizens, seeking to reduce the flow of single skilled labourers and encourage the export of surplus unproductive elements to Canada. Voluntary agencies lobbyed to have admission criteria relaxed for their co-religionists. In all these matters the department tenaciously and successfully guarded its prerogative to administer immigration and strictly followed the policy guidelines established by King in regulating the numbers and types of immigrants coming forward. It was willing to work with other agencies, provided it had final say and that objectives coincided with its interests. Clearly, Canada's habit of having the final say had important implications for German immigration.

**The Immigration Bureaucracy's Idiosyncrasies**

In addition to King's five tenets, there were several other principles, ground rules, considerations and characteristics particular to the immigration bureaucracy which influenced policy and either directly or indirectly affected the movement of Germans.

*Nation Building*

Nation building impacted postwar German immigration most profoundly. Broadly accepted within the federal government and bureaucracy in this period, this concept was the cornerstone of the DCI's administration of immigration policy. The department viewed immigration as an integral part of the larger task of constructing a more populous and prosperous Canada. Immigrants were seen as the essential building blocks to this end and, as a result, considerable weight was attached to
choosing suitable material. An ICEM officer touring the department's facilities in 1957 observed that:

... it is the work of this Department which has a decisive influence on the demographic, economic and sociological development of Canada. The features Canada will have in 20-25 years, are being shaped now by this Department. The majority of officers I have met are aware of this challenge in spite of the day-to-day routine which is more heavy this year than ever after the war.\(^{30}\)

Not limited to the immigration bureaucrats, the nation-building ethos inspired all government agencies involved in immigration, from cabinet ministers down to local officials. Instructions issued by a Department of Labour (DL) overseas official are revealing in this regard: "Finally keep in mind when selecting that the daughter of the DP whom you accept today may be the wife of your son in the future. As far as our work is concerned 'THE BEST FOR CANADA.'\(^{31}\) Such was also exemplified by the phrase commonly used by overseas immigration officials in selecting immigrants: "deciding in favour of Canada." Indeed, King's May 1947 statement on immigration policy was itself very much a product of this nation-building mission.

For immigration authorities, the first and most important stage in nation building began with the "careful selection" of immigrants. Six important criteria typically governed selection in addition to health requirements: the character, race, adaptability (or assimilable character), political background, occupational suitability and capital assets of the prospective immigrant. These criteria were applied most vigorously in the unsponsored movement where, in comparison to sponsored immigration, Canadian officials could exercise more discretion in determining the suitability of an applicant.

The most important criterion was the "character" of the individual applicant which included certain personal qualities viewed as essential in making a good future citizen. "Character" was the ultimate test in considering the suitability of an immigrant and was typically assessed by visa officers.

\(^{30}\) DCI, Vol. 97, File 3-11-5, Watzdorf report, 25.9.1957. The report was well received and widely circulated in the DCI.
overseas. The security screening stage, conducted by the RCMP, also involved an element of character appraisal. Collaborators, high-ranking Nazis, Communists and criminal elements were not only deemed to be security risks but also viewed as undesirable by the RCMP on "character" grounds. The racial or national origin of an applicant was also an important indicator of an immigrant's suitability. Certain traits, ascribed to national groups, were considered more compatible than others for integration into Canada. For example, because political and social institutions of Britain, the United States and France were more akin to Canada's own, citizens from these countries were seen as more adaptable to Canadian life. Also important in Ottawa's estimation was the extent to which an immigrant could assimilate into or adapt to Canadian society. After all, in the Canada of the 1950s, an aggressive "melting-pot" policy still prevailed and the maintenance of cultural traits by newcomers was strongly opposed. The applicant's nationality or racial origin was often considered a determinant of his or her ability to assimilate. The political background or orientation of prospective immigrants was also evaluated. Affiliations for or leanings to either extreme of the political spectrum were considered grounds for rejection, especially any signs of Communist leanings. Those harbouring anti-democratic views were considered undesirable future citizens. The comments of an expert consulted by the government are revealing in this regard: "The task of turning a young Nazi into a Canadian citizen would seem to me to be of the utmost difficulty." Economic development went hand in hand with nation building and for this reason the occupational assessment was an important dimension in the selection of immigrants. The occupational skills and capital that an applicant could potentially bring to this task were given due consideration by immigration officials. Indeed, labour shortages in Canada had the effect of assigning greater weight to the occupational credentials of an applicant.


14 R. Whitaker, Double Standard, The Secret History of Canadian Immigration (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys Limited, 1987), 34. Whitaker is correct in asserting that considerable emphasis was given to screening out communists. No evidence was found that this was done at the expense of admitting Nazis, which is the leitmotiv of A. Rodal's work "Nazi War Criminals in Canada: The Historical and Policy Setting from the 1940s to the Present," Ottawa, report to the Deschênes Commission, 1987. See also Kelley, The Making, 314.

German immigration was also subject to Ottawa's nation-building mission and the accompanying selection criteria. Unlike British and American applicants, Germans did not score very high in many of these categories. Their prolonged exposure to National Socialism and separation from western democratic influences for over a decade and a half made them unknown quantities in the early-1950s. Nor could Ottawa draw on the experiences and observations of other receiving countries, as Canada was actually the first overseas country to admit German nationals. Although prospective German migrants were considered "potential loyal citizens" and their compatriots already in Canada had assimilated well and proved to be industrious, no one was entirely sure whether the postwar generation of German immigrants would work out the same.36 Their political suitability was also highly questionable given the Nazi record and the Communist security threat posed by East Germany. Germans' potential capital input to Canada was also limited. Few had funds to transfer and tight currency regulations in Germany limited the amounts which could be brought to Canada. Their contribution to nation-building was primarily in the labour and specific skills they could provide Canada. Judged on the basis of what they could offer Canada, Germans clearly fell short of other groups. As a result, Ottawa's German immigration program, especially in the early-1950s, was characterised by restraint and governed mostly by economic necessity.

**Ethnic Stereotyping**

Ottawa's immigration bureaucrats often engaged in sweeping generalisations about the desirability of prospective immigrants on the basis of their racial or national heritage, while the personal qualities of an applicant were at times overlooked. Occasionally, these views found their way into immigration policy and programming. Very often they were based on Ottawa's initial experiences with a given group and could be positive or negative. The short-lived Italian farm labour program is a case in point. When thousands of Italians brought to Canada to specifically engage in farm work in 1950-51 subsequently abandoned their placements for nearby urban centres, immigration
and provincial authorities asserted that Italians were not amenable for work on Canadian farms and accordingly pulled the plug on the program.\textsuperscript{37}

The German movement appears to have been more positively affected by the stereotyping phenomenon. The legacy of National Socialism and its association with the German people did not quite have the negative impact that might have been expected. Ottawa declared itself willing to accept Germans on the same basis as other immigrants, however, on condition that all Germans would be carefully screened and that politically undesirable individuals would be excluded. When German labour programs went awry, as in the case of the German farm labour movement in 1953, the government did not pin the blame for any shortcomings on the German people as a whole. In this instance, it carefully attributed the problem to the ulterior motives of individual immigrants, the exploitative conduct of certain farmers and the lax selection abroad.

In fact the widespread view of Germans as reliable workers who offered numerous skills appears to have influenced the decision in 1950 to admit Germans. That September, Canada's federal cabinet agreed that continuing the ban against German immigrants would "deprive Canada of substantial numbers of immigrants whose professional, technical or industrial skills would be an asset to the economy." Similar references to the qualities and skills of German workers by employers and government field staff alike gave further impetus to the establishment and growth of the German labour programs in 1951. Notwithstanding the image of Germans as "model" workers, Ottawa sought to secure immigrants from the United Kingdom and northwestern Europe before approaching Germany.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{36} Ottawa had to rely on the track record of the German-Canadian community and its experiences with German POWs interned during the war to assess the desirability of a postwar movement of Germans.

\textsuperscript{37} Interestingly, this negative stereotype proved to be the German farm labour program's gain; by 1952, Germans had replaced Italians in the group farm-labour program. Negative generalisations could scuttle proposed movements of ethnic groups altogether even before they had a trial run as was the case of the Lebanese farm workers' plan. According to the Director of Immigration: "Experience has shown that the Lebanese farmer by the very nature of his agriculture background is not adaptable to Canadian farming methods and invariably he turns to some other means of earning a livelihood, such as shop keeping and peddling." DCI, Vol. 145, File 3-41-15, Pt. 2, Smith to Deputy Minister DCI, 24.4.1956.

\textsuperscript{38} For example, the DCI's Deputy Minister L. Fortier emphasised recruiting in Scandinavian countries first for lumber workers. DCI, Vol. 145, File 3-41-11, Pt. 1, Fortier to MacNamara, 2.5.1951. A similar pattern was followed in the domestics' program. Even by 1955 the DCI considered the "best sources of immigrants" as the U.K., France, Switzerland, the Low countries and Scandinavia. DCI, Vol. 95, File 3-7-7, Pt. 1, Director to Fortier, 19.9.1955.
Immigration's Self-Interest versus Humanitarian Concerns

Ottawa's immigration policy in the 1950s was also characterised by a strong sense of self-interest often at the expense of humanitarian considerations. The DCI did not hide the fact that, with the closing of the International Refugee Organisation (IRO), it was free to pursue a regular immigration program, primarily intended to serve Canadian nation building interests. This was especially noticeable in the department's dealings with international agencies, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the ICEM, which gave great emphasis to the relief aspect of overseas resettlement work. Ottawa's participation in the ICEM was predicated chiefly on the advantages it offered Canada's existing immigration program, such as the provision of sufficient shipping and enabling Canada to have a free hand in tapping northern European immigrants. The objective of relieving Europe's overpopulation problem was seen merely as a beneficial by-product.

The DCI displayed a similar attitude to German immigration in the 1950s. This was reflected in its relations with the Canadian Christian Council for the Resettlement of Refugees (CCCRR). Although the CCCRR was established with Ottawa's approval in 1947 to assist in the relief of the German refugee problem and to meet the often boisterous demands of immigrant sponsors in Canada, it fell into disfavour with the government by the mid-1950s in part due to its emphasis on moving "needy" cases. Voluntary agencies were quick to realise that the government's interests by 1951 were not compatible with their relief mission. As an agency worker in Germany pointed out: "It is becoming clear that the Immigration Regulations have no other aim in view but the recruiting of manpower which is urgently needed in Canada." The immigration bureaucracy's priority on securing German workers at the expense of delaying the movement of their dependants is another example of the lower consideration given to humanitarian concerns.

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39 In fact, some Canadian officials were relieved that the DP program had ended. An exceptional act of compassion was Canada's acceptance of some 37,500 Hungarian refugees who had fled to the West during the abortive uprising in Hungary in late-1956.
40 NAC, MG 28 V 120, Canadian Lutheran World Relief (CLWR) records, Reel H-1390, File CLWR Executive Meetings, Minutes of CLWR officers meeting, 24.4.1951.
41 This policy also found wide support in cabinet. See PCO, Vol.2649, Cabinet Conclusions, 26.2.1952; DCI, Vol. 132, File 3-35-2, Pt. 2, Memo to cabinet, 21.2.1952.
Canada's assistance in the East German refugee problem after 1953 was guided more by self-interest than altruism. Not unlike its dealings with the ICEM, Canada attempted to link its assistance to its regular immigration program; no special relief measures were offered. Immigration officials saw in the refugees first and foremost a fresh supply of farmers and domestics for Canada. Their plight as refugees was a secondary concern. A senior immigration official was reassured, in view of the improved German economic situation, "that Canada need feel no [humanitarian] concern in practising selective immigration in Germany in specific relation to the actual needs of the Canadian community."42

Sensitivity to Political and Public Criticism

Another salient characteristic of the immigration bureaucracy was its sensitivity to public and political criticism. Although the Immigration Acts of 1910 and 1952 afforded the government considerable discretion and a degree of immunity in carrying out its policies and programs, public opinion could not always be ignored. The "criticism-and-suggested-changes" files of the Immigration Branch disclose how sensitive the department was to expressed criticisms and complaints about its work.43 In situations where there was widespread unfavourable comment, departmental programs, policies and procedures were subjected to thorough re-evaluation and sometimes corrective measures. This could often negatively affect a particular program. Such was the case in 1953 when the department faced complaints from the media, provincial governments, the Canadian Federation of Agriculture and its own field workers about the quality and commitment of German workers who were brought over on farm labour contracts. Immediate steps were taken to rectify the situation, including threats of deportation and stricter selection criteria. These reactive measures ultimately led to the collapse of the program by 1955 as there was little interest in applying for this scheme under such terms.

Expense Conscious

After the war, Ottawa also was concerned about keeping immigration expenses down. This emphasis originated in the Finance Department and was adopted by the DCI. It was very much a response to parliament's criticism of the government's alleged 'reckless commitments' in regard to immigration and the public's 'tax psychosis'.\(^{44}\) Throughout the 1950s, Ottawa's immigration budget, published in the Treasury Board estimates, was closely scrutinised and critically assessed by the media and taxpayers.\(^{45}\) Although immigration figured prominently on the government's agenda at this time, it was to be carried out as cost effectively as possible.

The government's parsimony had obvious implications for immigration operations. Fewer dollars imposed constraints on recruitment abroad and reception and integration work in Canada. Canadian immigration facilities in Germany were consistently under-funded compared with operations in Britain (see Figure No. 11). Moreover, unlike in Britain, they received considerably less assistance from outside agencies, such as the railways and shipping companies. However, these potential constraints on the German movement were overcome by two important developments: (1) the additional resources forthcoming from the German government and the ICEM and, (2) most importantly, the great interest of Germans to emigrate. Bonn and the ICEM furnished grants and loans to prospective German emigrants to facilitate their movement overseas. Also, most office expenses of immigration posts in Germany, excluding staff, were initially met by Allied occupation authorities and, after 1955, by the German government. This enabled Canadian missions in Germany to do more with less. The great desire of Germans to emigrate also meant that less money was required for recruitment and promotional schemes, a very expensive component of immigration work. When interest tapered off after 1957, the tables turned and Canada had to pay more to get

\(^{45}\) Amherst News, 7.2.1956 complained that in recent years estimates for the DCI had increased while the numbers of immigrants brought to Canada decreased. A former visa officer also confirmed that the DCI was very expense conscious in its operations. Gunn interview.
more. By 1964, Ottawa was spending more money to attract Germans than on any other group of immigrants.⁴⁶

Although placement work in Canada had improved considerably since before the war, reception work still suffered from funding constraints and the cost-saving attitude of the department. This had negative effects on the overall immigration program. Poor integration increased the risk of re-migration to the United States and return migration. It also resulted in critical reports about life in Canada circulated in the German media or in letters written home and thereby discouraged prospective migrants from coming to Canada.⁴⁷

**Reasserting Jurisdiction and Standardising Procedures**

During the 1950s, the DCI reasserted itself in the immigration field in which various non-governmental organisations, such as railways and voluntary agencies, had previously played a major role and on which the provinces began to encroach. In considering a request from two provinces for wider consultation on immigration matters, cabinet agreed with the DCI that "[i]t did not appear to be desirable to have any general meetings that would give an impression that immigration policy did not continue to be entirely the responsibility of the Federal Government." The department also felt that the assistance of the few remaining voluntary agencies was no longer needed, especially since facilities both in Canada and overseas could now handle Canada's entire intake of immigrants. During the 1950s senior Immigration officials attempted to eliminate, or at least reduce, these outside groups' role in immigration.⁴⁸

Consistent with its "ideal of standardisation and simplification of programs and procedures," the DCI by the close of 1951 had succeeded in eliminating the legion of Canadian relief agencies and their programs which had cluttered immigration work. This meant that immigrants could

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⁴⁷ For shortcomings of placement work, see Hawkins, *Canada and Immigration*, 4, 110.


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increasingly come to Canada through one door only.⁴⁹ The department also attempted to impose this ideal on the DL's group labour schemes which ran parallel to its own programs. Indeed, its efforts in this regard may have retarded general immigration and the German movement in particular. By shutting out other agencies and slashing programs, it was reducing the available resources active in immigration work and limiting the means of entry to Canada. The DL's sugar-beet workers', miners' and lumber workers' schemes which catered specifically to German immigrants fell victim to the DCI's ideal.

**Missed Opportunities: Absence of Long-Term and Strategic Planning**

Another conspicuous feature of Canadian immigration policy in the 1950s was its emphasis on short-term, rather than on long-term, manpower and economic planning. This is startling given Canada's express intention of using immigration as a tool for economic development.

Ottawa's immigration planning rarely extended beyond the immediate or, at best, one year projected needs of Canada's economy and labour market. Little attention was paid to the types of immigrants, especially skilled workers and professionals, who could benefit Canada's economic future in the long run. The crux of the problem was that the department relied almost exclusively on employment field surveys and "Opportunity Assessments" which identified Canada's current manpower requirements but disregarded future manpower trends altogether. Also, the DCI was pressed by various employer groups to assign top priority to their labour requirements which left little time or need to develop a far-sighted recruitment program. This resulted in an immigration program which in the late-1940s and early-1950s sought unskilled or semi-skilled labour and placed less emphasis on skilled workers, technicians, professionals and entrepreneurs. This policy contradicted economic developments in the 1950s when Canada was becoming rapidly more industrialised and experienced a shortage of skilled labour. Only in 1958 was the situation reversed when precedence was given to skilled workers.

The absence of strategic planning was plainly evident in the German immigration program. From 1951 to 1955, greater priority was assigned to the recruitment of farm workers and domestics. Un-sponsored skilled workers were altogether eliminated from the 1952 program and strongly cut back from 1953 to 1955. So strong was their desire to come to Canada at this time that many trained workers misrepresented themselves as farmers to gain admission. German engineers and other professionals who were clamouring to come to Canada in the early-1950s soon found there was no interest for their services. When demand for these occupations picked up in Canada after 1955, Germans' interest in emigrating to Canada had declined.  

A similar course of events transpired for the German movement in general. Despite warnings from posts in Germany in 1951-52 that the supply of migrants would soon dry up, Ottawa imposed further restrictions in 1952-55, limiting transportation loans and the types of un-sponsored workers who could be admitted to Canada. By late-1955, when the economy's demand for labour again picked up, German immigrants were less willing to come forward. While Ottawa's short-term planning adequately satisfied immediate domestics needs, it failed to capitalise on fleeting immigrant manpower opportunities that would have benefited Canada's future. 

**FORMULATING IMMIGRATION POLICY: OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE GERMAN MOVEMENT**

Interests, forces and motives behind government immigration policy are often varied, complex and in a constant state of flux. This appears to have been particularly true for the Canadian experience in the 1950s. In the case of Ottawa's German immigration program, various combinations of these influences were at work, frequently shifting to adjust to new circumstances. The hypotheses which best explain the formulation of Canadian immigration policy are Statism, Nation-Building, Bureaucratic Dominance and Business Dominance. Others - Populism, Pluralism, Cosmopolitan

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50 The DCI realised this in 1963: "We know that the postwar situation, with skilled workers clamouring to enter Canada, no longer exists." DCI, Vol. 161, File 1-16-1, "Survey of Immigration," 28.6.1963.
Elitism and Responsible Government\textsuperscript{51} - appear to have played little or no role in the policy underlying German immigration.

\textbf{Statism and Nation-Building}

The "Statist" hypothesis contends that policies pursued by state institutions are best explained by the interests of these institutions and of their "state managers." The process of decision-making is confined within these institutions and is not affected much by a political process which links these institutions to societal pressures. A characteristic interest of these state institutions and their managers is the goal of nation-building.\textsuperscript{52} The Statist hypotheses perhaps best explains the formulation of immigration policy in the 1950s. It accurately describes the immigration bureaucracy's position \textit{vis-à-vis} societal pressures and its embrace of the nation-building mission. DCI policy makers - essentially the Deputy Minister and his senior officials - were relatively well-insulated from the political process, although shrill and persistent pressure from the public and political circles had to be heeded at times. Only the numerical targets and timing of the annual program required cabinet's approval, while the DCI's implementation of the program and its policy decisions were not subject to legislative control. Furthermore, immigration policy was rarely the topic of serious debate in parliament and never became a big election issue.\textsuperscript{53} Finally, proposals by outside agencies to establish official forums to ensure greater input on immigration matters were rejected by the government.\textsuperscript{54} The Statist model also accommodates the immigration authorities' characteristic penchant for nation-building. As previously noted, the DCI had long-term goals to

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{51} "Cosmopolitan elitism," essentially the influence of progressive values exerted by the "new class" over government policies, appears to have had little impact on immigration policies in the 1950s. The "pluralist model" regards the policy-making process as a product of the compromises which result from the lobbying efforts of organised societal interests and the government's will to pursue its interests. Like cosmopolitan elitism, it was more of a force after the 1950s. The "populist" paradigm which holds that that government policy is influenced by the need for widespread popular support had only a limited impact on Canadian immigration policy. Canadians generally did not consider immigration \textit{per se} an important issue. The "responsible government" model appears to apply the least to the Canadian scenario in the 1950s. German immigration never became a political platform of the major political parties, nor an election issue.


\textsuperscript{54} PCO, Vol. 2651, Cabinet Conclusions, 17.9.1952.}
build a stronger, more prosperous and independent Canada which mirrored King's principles and
the work of the immigration authorities at every level.

Statism also influenced the formulation of German immigration policy. It was strongly guided by
the nation-building mission which assigned German immigration a secondary role in the ultimate
goals of the mission and which emphasized careful selection to identify good and useful future
Canadian citizens. Ottawa's policy-making structure ensured that the German movement remained
firmly in the hands of immigration authorities, immune from outside influences.

**Bureaucratic Dominance**

Closely related to Statism is the "bureaucratic dominance" hypothesis which emphasizes the
tremendous authority of bureaucrats in determining immigration policy. That Canada's senior
immigration officials wielded tremendous power and discretion is undeniable. They had complete
control over implementing programs and applying administrative measures, and even had enormous
say in shaping policy. Moreover, officials exercised considerable discretion in selecting applicants
and in effecting arrests, detention and deportations. Their authority in these matters was conferred
and sanctioned by the 1952 Immigration Act and its Regulations through the medium of the minister
and federal cabinet. The new Act was essentially a codification of the executive practices which
were undertaken under the old Act. Yet bureaucrats could not exercise this authority willy-nilly.
The views and input of other interested parties - other departments, the provinces, labour
organizations and non-government organizations - as well as larger government objectives also had
to be considered.

Most decisions affecting German immigration were made by the Director of Immigration and his
senior officials, with the occasional reference to the Deputy Minister. Virtually all these decisions
reflected the will and interests of the department. The input of outside parties was adopted when it
complemented the department's initiatives and interests but otherwise it was usually disregarded or dismissed. So all encompassing was this authority that outside parties were often compelled to go over the heads of senior officials and appeal directly to the Deputy Minister or Minister to seek changes to immigration policy.\textsuperscript{56}

\textbf{Business Dominance}

Canadian business had a powerful and respected voice in Canada's postwar immigration policy. This was exemplified by its success in liberalising Canadian immigration policy in 1946 and 1947. Among the most vociferous pro-immigration sectors were the railways, various agriculture producers, primary industries and business representatives such as the Canadian Manufacturer's Association and Canadian Chambers of Commerce. All felt they had a stake in immigration and its end result from which all stood to profit. They also had powerful supporters in Ottawa including the DCI, the Bank of Canada, External Affairs, Public Works, Finance and the Privy Council Office and most importantly the Departments of Reconstruction, Trade and Commerce and Defence Production, all of which recognised the economic advantages of an expanded immigration program.\textsuperscript{57}

Immigration authorities took the wishes of Canadian employers to heart, especially when and where these interests corresponded with government goals. In line with Ottawa's greater intervention in the economy, every effort was made to fill labour gaps which might slow down economic growth. Immigration was a key tool in this regard, satisfying both the immediate needs of business and the long-term nation-building plans of government. It therefore offered Ottawa a "win-win" situation. However business interests also had to be balanced with the government's own priorities and the public's interests. There were obvious limits as to how far the government would go on business's


\textsuperscript{57} This was a tactic regularly resorted to by the CCCRR when a negative reaction was forthcoming or anticipated from the Immigration Branch. See chapter six.
behalf. For example, pleas by companies and farmers in the late-1940s to admit German nationals, including interned German Prisoners of War, were refused by Ottawa on technical foreign policy grounds and because it was felt that the public was not quite ready for such a step.

The German movement benefited both indirectly and directly from business's campaign to boost immigration in the 1950s. Industries' orders for immigrant labour which could not be filled from "preferred" emigration countries were transferred to back-up sources such as Germany. In some instances, certain employers specifically requested German workers to fill specific labour requirements. In 1946 Canadian commercial firms were among the first businesses to place orders for Germans, in this case, for scientists and technicians. By 1951, other employers, such as mines, farmers and forestry operations, were pressing the government for even larger contingents of German workers. Labour and immigration authorities eagerly accommodated these demands by including Germans in their immigrant-worker programs. By 1951, the DCI also permitted Canadian companies to sponsor individual European workers, including Germans, provided workers and their qualifications were known by the business concerned. Group orders for skilled workers placed by companies were also accepted by immigration authorities but were normally first reserved for British workers. Taken together, all these requests and special labour programs substantially added to the German boom.

This thesis is organised along thematic and chronological lines. The following two chapters address the setting and important developments in the late-1940s and early-1950s which essentially unshackled German immigration and enabled it to get off to a running start. Specifically, chapter two reviews the antecedents which emerged in the late-1940s. Chapter three describes the important developments in 1950-51 which formed the basis of the 1950s German immigration boom. Both chapters trace the progress and influence of these early developments well into the late-1950s. The influx of German workers, a defining and dominant characteristic of German

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57 As was evident during DACI meetings, these departments consistently argued for an expanded immigration program as the basis of economic growth. See DCI, Vol. 71, File [DACI] 1951-57.
immigration to Canada in the 1950s, is the subject of chapter four. The next chapter examines the
place of the German movement in Ottawa's annual immigration programming and assesses the
DCI's successes and failures in implementing its program and meeting its targets in the years 1951-
57. Chapters six and seven examine the role and impact of external forces - voluntary agencies and
the railways on the one hand and foreign governments and international agencies on the other - on
Canada's German immigration policy and program. These outside organisations made important
contributions in resettling Germans to Canada, in spite of Ottawa's ambivalent and often reluctant
attitude towards them. The central theme of this thesis is Ottawa's use of German immigration to
meet Canada's economic and manpower needs and how, on the basis of this objective, Ottawa
missed numerous opportunities.
2. **ANTECEDENTS TO THE BOOM**

The German immigration boom profited from a number of key developments in Canada and Germany which occurred in the late-1940s, the effects of which were felt well beyond this time. Without these it is doubtful whether the movement would have assumed the magnitude and intensity that it did from 1951 to 1957. In Canada there were significant changes in public opinion, the economy, the labour market, government priorities, the immigration machinery and regulations. All these factors had a bearing on Canadian immigration in the 1950s and directly or indirectly influenced the German program. In Germany, certain national, demographic, economic and labour market developments facilitated the mass emigration of Germans abroad.

**ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PRE-CONDITIONS**

Historically, the scope and size of Canada’s immigration programs have been contingent on the well-being of the economy as well as on national development plans. As the Great Depression demonstrated, a positive immigration policy was not viable politically during economic downturns as governments and the public believed that immigrants competed with native Canadians for scarce jobs and exacerbated local welfare burdens.⁵⁸ Even proponents of increased immigration, such as the Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources, Hugh Keenleyside, realised this limitation: "If we are struck by another depression, however, immigration will be almost the first national activity to be curtailed."⁵⁹ Prosperity, however, afforded the government greater latitude in carrying out an expanded program. The resilience and upward surge of the economy in 1946-47 facilitated the conversion from a war to a peacetime economy and the rapid reintegration of returning service personnel into Canadian civil and economic life, thereby removing two potential obstacles to greater immigration. By this time apprehension that the economy would experience another

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⁵⁸ Arguably, the psychological effects of the depression could still be seen in the January 1944 Gallup poll which revealed that only 13% of Canadians favoured an open-door and 50% a selective immigration policy. Cited in I. Abella and H. Troper, *None is too Many, Canada and the Jews of Europe 1933-1948* (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys Limited, 1983), 161.

postwar downturn were receding, enabling Ottawa to plan a more aggressive immigration policy to relieve emerging labour shortages.⁶⁰

Prosperity may have rendered Canadians more receptive to an expansive immigration policy. A Gallup poll taken in 1947, a year of record low unemployment (2.2%), revealed that, for the first time, the majority of Canadians favoured increased immigration.⁶¹ Although this level of consensus was not reached again, the public continued to show a relatively high level of support for immigration during the 1950s. Good economic times also may have prompted Canadians to be more tolerant about accepting non-British newcomers such as displaced persons (DPs) and later Canada’s former enemies.

After a slight slowdown in 1949-50, the Canadian economy recovered, remaining robust and expanding throughout the 1950s, with the exception of two mild recessions in 1954-55 and 1958-60. The economic boom was fuelled largely by increased exports, massive private and government capital investment, growing consumer demand and a defence build up accelerated by the Korean War. These were truly good times as evidenced by the three major economic indicators which were closely monitored by Ottawa’s immigration programmers (see Figures Nos. 4 to 6). Unemployment was at an all-time low, averaging 3.6% from 1951 to 1957. During this period, the gross national product increased an astounding $12 billion, with annual gains averaging almost $1.7 billion. Capital investment, perhaps the most critical factor driving the immigration boom, was at an unprecedented high level. The ratio of Canadian fixed domestic investment to GNP between 1951 and 1957 was higher than at any comparable period since the turn of the century.⁶²

⁶⁰ National Archives of Canada (NAC), RG 27, Department of Labour (DL) records, Vol. 3029, File Interdepartmental Advisory Committee on Immigration 1947-59, "The Effect of Immigration in Relieving Labour Shortage During 1947," 10.2.1948. Credit must also be given to Ottawa's adroit management of the economy, avoiding such potential pitfalls as the U.S.-Canada postwar dollar exchange crises and spiralling inflation which could have stalled economic growth and set back Canada's immigration program. R.D. Cuff and J.L. Granatstein, American Dollars - Canadian Prosperity, Canadian-American Economic Relations 1945-1950 (Toronto: Samuel-Stevens, 1978).
⁶¹ Coincidentally, a poll taken in the following year disclosed the highest postwar level of support for a larger Canadian population. Tienhaara, Canadian views on immigration and population, An analysis of postwar Gallup polls (Ottawa: Manpower and Immigration, 1974), 2, 8, 18.
This period of sustained economic growth helped to allay fears about Canada's ability to absorb immigrants. It actually prompted Ottawa to pursue a more aggressive immigration policy with the goal of maximising the intake of immigrant labour. While increased exports of raw materials in the decade after the war spurred the expansion of Canada's primary sector, it simultaneously spawned a critical manpower shortage which could not be met by domestic supply which, in turn, had been severely thinned as a result of the low birth rate during the depression and wartime casualties. The decline in immigration from 1948 to 1950 was viewed with alarm by government and business, who feared that economic growth would be stalled. Inspired by Keynesian economic theories and its long-term nation building goals, the federal government assumed a greater role in the economy. Control of immigration to meet Canada's economic objectives and manpower needs was regarded increasingly as a government imperative. By early-1950, immigration itself was considered an economic stimulant by the government, contributing capital and technology, creating jobs, and adding to domestic consumption.

The economic boom and labour deficits of the late-1940s carried over into the 1950s when German immigration was unleashed. The recovery of the Canadian economy in 1951 from the 1949-50
slump coincided rather fortuitously with the easing of restrictions on German immigration. The massive demand for labour outstripped domestic, British and DP supplies of labour and forced Ottawa to rely increasingly on Germany which offered the numbers and types of immigrants Canada sought. Continued economic growth in Canada in the 1950s guaranteed Germans a place in Ottawa's future immigration programs. From 1951 on Germany essentially became Canada's "filler" supply of labour, bridging manpower gaps which could not be filled by other countries. Invariably this meant that German immigration was very much governed by fluctuations in the Canadian economy.

FROM A RESTRICTIVE TO A LIBERAL IMMIGRATION POLICY

The economic prosperity which immediately followed the war did not spark an automatic and instant shift towards an active immigration policy. First, the government's longstanding restrictive attitude to immigration, which was essentially a product of the depression, had to be overcome. At this time more emphasis was placed on limiting immigration, not on encouraging it. This disposition lingered on in many parts of government in the first years after the war. Its removal can be attributed to a number of factors.63

Advocates of expanded immigration such as Canadian business and ethnic organisations played an important role in the change. Canadian industry's interest in increasing immigration was motivated by the immediate need to fill actual and anticipated labour shortages and by the long-term goal of building a larger economic base and consumer markets for their products. As early as 1946, employers in Canada's booming primary sector, chiefly the mining and forestry industries together with farmers, lobbied the government hard, seeking approval to retain German POWs in their employ. Although unsuccessful on this front, their efforts were rewarded in 1946 when the government agreed to admit Polish veterans for farm labour and later DPs for bush, mine, farm, domestic and general labour work. Business interests were well-served by C.D. Howe, the Acting

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63 An excellent study of Canada's restrictive policy is found in Abella and Troper, None is too Many, chapters 1-3, 6-8.
Minister of Mines and Resources, who created and streamlined the DP bulk-labour program to help Canadian industry meet its labour needs. Business organisations such as the railways, the Canada Manufacturers' Association (CMA) and the Canadian Chambers of Commerce called on the government to not only take immediate measures to resolve the labour crisis, but to develop a long-term immigration strategy directed at consolidating economic and population growth. Their motives here were plain: to expand the base for the long-term profitability of their respective industries. Their efforts were successful, as many of these arguments were accepted and adopted by immigration policy-makers by the 1950s.

Ethnic groups in Canada and their spokespersons overseas also exerted considerable pressure on the government to liberalise its immigration policy. Their first interest was to have their close relatives admitted to Canada, especially those amongst the hundreds of thousands of distressed DPs in Europe. To this end they pressed Ottawa to broaden the very restrictive admission criteria for close relatives, making representations to key ministers, senior officials and even to the Prime Minister. Later they also urged the government to have their countrymen included in the bulk-labour schemes. Ukrainian, Baltic and Jewish groups were particularly active and, ultimately, very successful in lobbying the government. In the wake of their gains, lobbies representing Canada's German population and churches, including the Canadian Christian Council for the Resettlement of Refugees (CCCRR), sought concessions from Ottawa as well. Other Canadian agencies interested in the relief of the refugee problem in Europe, including the YMCA and YWCA, various Rotary

64 NAC, RG 2, Privy Council Office (PCO) records, Vol. 2639, Cabinet Conclusions, 29.1.1947. Howe's displaced person (DP) program was clearly intended to serve the interests of industry. See his speech in House of Commons, Debates, 9.6.1947. For the massive lobbying efforts of industry, see the woodworkers, miners and farm labour files in RG 27 and RG 76 (Immigration Branch [IB] records) for the 1940s. See also Danysek, DP, Lithuanian Immigration to Canada after the Second World War (Toronto: Multicultural History Society of Ontario, 1986) 83-85.

65 On this score Deputy Minister Keenleyside shared the views of the business community. See his undated article in DL, Vol. 3022, File Immigration Policy, Correspondence, Pt. 4. Departmental Advisory Committee on Immigration (DACI) meetings reveal that these views had become influential in many departments, especially Trade and Commerce.

66 For the lobbying efforts of these groups, see Abella and Troper, None is too Many, chapters 7-8. L.Luciuik "Searching for Place: Ukrainian Refugee Migration to Canada after World War II." Ph.D. Thesis, University of Alberta, 1984, 174-176, 340-343.
Clubs, the Ecumenical Refugee Commission, the Canadian Council of Churches and the Canadian National Committee on Refugees, also urged Ottawa to reconsider its immigration policy.\textsuperscript{67}

Another powerful voice which pushed the government to relax its restrictive policy was the Canadian media. By mid-1946 the English-language press was almost all in favour of greater, yet selective, immigration.\textsuperscript{68} It also gave liberal coverage to the views of pro-immigration groups such as business, ethnic organisations and provincial agencies.

In the face of such concerted attacks on the government's restrictive immigration policy, the influence of the forces seeking to maintain the status quo began to wane. Most important in this regard was public opinion which by 1947 showed a majority supporting increased immigration. Organised labour, traditionally opposed to immigration, was also changing its tune. At the national level it cautiously approved expanded immigration in keeping with Canada's absorptive capacity while seeking the exclusion of fascists, Nazis and other such undesirables. Veterans' organisations also agreed to changes in immigration policy, provided that veterans were first reintegrated into Canadian life and that future immigration was selective, with preference given to people of British descent.\textsuperscript{69}

The tendency of some provinces to make greater use of their constitutional prerogative in immigration matters after the war undoubtedly jolted Ottawa into greater activity. In August 1947, Ontario jumped the gun on Ottawa's immigrant-labour program and, with little prior consultation, mounted an ambitious scheme of flying in British workers to fill specific employment positions. While federal officials cooperated in this program after the fact, Ottawa's consternation was evident as it felt that its lead in immigration was being challenged. By 1948, Alberta followed Ontario's

\textsuperscript{67} The Canadian National Committee on Refugees (CNCR) was especially well connected with influential circles in Ottawa through its president Senator Cairine Wilson and Executive Secretary Constance Hayward. After the war it sought to have immigration laws relaxed regarding DPs and to educate the Canadian public about the plight of refugees and the need for Canada to accept more of them. See the CNCR resolutions forwarded to King in January 1947 in NAC, MG 28 V 43, CNCR records, File 5.40, Hayward to King, 30.1.1947. Keenleyside acknowledged that the CNCR had helped bring about an improved situation in immigration policy. \textit{Ibid.}, File 5.5, "notes of an interview," n.d.

\textsuperscript{68} PCO, Vol. 82, File 1-50, Pt. 2, Press survey, 18.7.1946.

\textsuperscript{69} DL, Vol. 895, File 8-9-63-1, Pt. 1, A summary highlighting public opinion in 1946.
example and aggressively promoted the movement of skilled and unskilled British immigrants to the province. Newfoundland premier Joseph Smallwood's tour in Germany in 1950 to obtain business investment, businessmen and skilled workers was watched closely by Ottawa and may have prompted a closer look at the potential for German immigration to Canada.70

Quebec's views on immigration gave rise to completely different concerns in Ottawa. Traditionally, Quebec opposed mass immigration directed by the federal government, viewing it as a ploy by English Canada to build its population and electoral base to the detriment of Quebec's influence in the Dominion. The intensity of the anti-immigrant sentiment was evident in 1944, when the Quebec Legislative Assembly passed a resolution threatening to boycott any postwar mass immigration programs. Yet by the late-1940s, Quebec's tone mellowed and criticisms of the more liberal immigration policies of the 1950s remained faint.71

An effective medium used by pro-immigration groups to reach government decision makers was through the various government committees and commissions tasked to investigate and make recommendations on Canada's immigration policy. Virtually all of these bodies of enquiry came to the same conclusion: Canada's restrictive policy needed change, including immediate measures for the introduction of an expanded short-term program. Most decisive in this regard was the Senate's Standing Committee on Immigration and Labour which was called upon in May 1946 to assess the Immigration Act, its operation and administration. Its highly publicised August 1946 preliminary report, which drew on input from a broad range of interest groups and experts, recommended that a policy of selective immigration of agricultural and industrial workers should be announced at once and that priority should be assigned to the movement of relatives and friends of Canadian citizens.

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70 NAC, RG 76, Immigration Branch (IB) records, Vol. 31, File 682, Pt.6, External Affairs (DEA) Circular No. 531, 11.10.1950. It also appears to have been the subject of a DACI's 13th meeting, the minutes of which contain an extract from a German newspaper on Smallwood's visit. See NAC, RG 26, Department of Citizenship and Immigration (DCI) records, Vol. 73, File DACI 1951-57 and G. Basler, "Develop or Perish?: Joseph R. Smallwood and Newfoundland's Quest for German Industry, 1949-1953," Acadia News 15, 2 (1986), 93-119.

It also recommended that the *Immigration Act* and regulations be amended to facilitate the flow of immigrants to Canada. During the debate on the Committee's report which ensued in the House of Commons, all parties agreed on the need for increased immigration based on absorptive capacity.\(^{72}\)

As early as April 1946, the Interdepartmental Committee on Immigration Policy, established by the government to evaluate the domestic implications of expanded immigration, supported an immediate program to admit more relatives and persons with sufficient capital to establish essential industry.

In addition to domestic factors, Canadian immigration policy was strongly guided by international and foreign policy considerations. After the war, the Department of External Affairs (DEA) guided Canada on a course of greater involvement in world affairs. Canada was active in numerous international and Commonwealth organisations. In accordance with this role, Canada was also expected to assume certain responsibilities and duties. Its membership in the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees (IGCR), the United Nations and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, and later the International Refugee Organisation (IRO), obliged Canada to give greater consideration to the refugee problem prevailing in Europe. For the DEA a policy of European relief, specifically through the medium of immigration, affirmed Canada's new standing in world affairs, especially among the western allies, and provided a direct benefit to postwar reconstruction. As the ascendant department in government affairs, the DEA used its presence in cabinet, the Cabinet Committee on Immigration Policy and the Interdepartmental Committee to liberalise immigration policy. Its influence in immigration matters was further consolidated with the appointment of the former DEA official, Hugh Keenleyside, as Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources, who presided over the Immigration Branch.\(^{73}\)

By late-1946, all signs pointed to a greater acceptance of a broadened immigration policy. This development was not lost on the government which scrambled early in 1947 to draft a statement to

express this position. The resulting May 1947 speech by King was important to German immigration in the long run. Although the speech contained no provision for the admission of German nationals, it spelled the end of a potential major barrier, Canada's longstanding restrictive immigration policy. Orders-in-Council issued shortly after the delivery of this speech to ease these restrictions proved a direct impetus to the movement of Volksdeutsche\textsuperscript{74} refugees to Canada.

**Relaxing Immigration Regulations, Administration and Policy**

In the course of charting Canada's future immigration policy and after considerable outside pressure, the government did take gradual steps to relax the admission of certain categories of immigrants to Canada and to facilitate their entry. This was chiefly done by issuing new regulations through Orders in Council. Two main immigrant categories were affected: close relatives and workers. The first such measures were PC 2070 and PC 2071 passed on May 28, 1946. PC 2070 permitted Canadian overseas officials to accept travel documents in lieu of a valid passport to establish the identity of a prospective immigrant. Its express purpose was to further the movement of DPs, including Volksdeutsche refugees, who had had their passports lost or destroyed during the war years. With PC 2071 the progressive broadening of admissible family categories began. This trend was continued with the passing of PC 371 (January 30, 1947) and PC 1734 (May 1, 1947) which were all consolidated in directives accompanying PC 2856 (June 9, 1950). The directives set out the categories of close relatives from Europe, including Germany, who could be sponsored by Canadian residents in the 1950s. They included the husband or wife; son or daughter, brother or sister, together with husband or wife and unmarried children; father or mother; grandparents; orphan nephew or niece under twenty-one years of age; and fiancé(e) sponsored by a legal resident of Canada.


\textsuperscript{74} In this study Volksdeutsche are defined as ethnic Germans born outside the borders of the Third Reich who still considered themselves of German ethnicity after the war.
Immigration authorities also set requirements for Canadian residents wishing to sponsor close relatives. Sponsors had to provide proof of employment and sufficient savings to maintain their proteges in the event they could not find work. They also had to guarantee adequate accommodation. Initially officials ensured that these guarantees and requirements were rigorously met by the sponsor, thereby often holding up the processing of applications. By 1950, to counteract declining immigration, the strict enforcement of the requirements was eased in favour of sponsors, speeding up the processing of applications.\textsuperscript{75} This practice continued into the 1950s and furthered German migration, especially through the church programs which moved many family members to Canada.\textsuperscript{76}

PC 371 was the first major step taken to move immigrant labour to Canada. It enabled distant relatives in agriculture and, most importantly, workers possessing skills as miners and lumbermen to be admitted without requiring capital or a specific sponsor in Canada. It heralded the introduction of the bulk-labour programs which later moved thousands of Germans to Canada. PC 2180 of June 6, 1947, \textit{inter alia}, permitted the entry of 5,000 DPs to Canada via blanket orders from Canadian farmers and industry. Blanket orders enabled groups of workers to enter Canada without the need for case-by-case sponsorship and departmental approval. Rather, groups of companies undertook to employ contingents of workers for a period of one year at prevailing wage rates and pre-pay their rail fare from port of entry to inland destination. This procedure enabled the government to move masses of immigrant workers to Canada, which would have been very cumbersome through the regular route of individual sponsorship. This was clearly meant to meet the labour needs of industry.

The relaxation of regulations and administrative procedures in the years after the war contributed to the German immigration boom in two important ways. It removed many potential barriers in the way of increased immigration, thereby enabling German immigration to get off to a quick start after

\textsuperscript{75} IB, Vol. 804, File 548-10, Pt. 1, McFarlane to Grant, 27.9.1950; and Danys, \textit{DP}, 217-221.
\textsuperscript{76} Voluntary agencies enjoyed a special fast-track process administered at the discretion of the immigration field officer IB, Vol. 650, File B27208, Pt. 1, Chief Operations Division (Op. Div.) to District Supts., 29.9.1952.
the entry ban on German nationals was completely lifted. In addition, it permitted the entry of several thousands of admissible *Volksdeutsche* which broadened the base of sponsors in Canada for subsequent movements from Germany. Of even greater future significance for the German boom was the inception of the group labour programs in 1947. After all, it was mostly as workers that Germans were able to gain entry to Canada. Ottawa's liberalisation of immigration in the late-1940s was not a given, but the result of a series of hard-fought battles by pro-immigration forces.

**REVAMPING THE IMMIGRATION PROGRAM AND MACHINERY**

The increased flow of migrants resulting from the new regulations in 1947 had direct and immediate consequences for the immigration machinery. What followed was a tremendous growth in the size, experience and confidence of the immigration bureaucracy, another critical precondition for the future German movement.

Perhaps nowhere was the sentiment of a negative immigration policy more firmly entrenched shortly after the war than in the Immigration Branch itself. Although the chief proponent of restrictionism, Director Fredrick Blair, had left the Branch by 1946, a cautious, reluctant and rules-bound approach still dominated. Yet this approach had to give way to accommodate a more liberal policy which was being increasingly formulated and decided from outside the Branch. The appointment of Hugh Keenleyside as Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources was an important step in this direction. Keenleyside brought with him a progressive and confident view of immigration and its benefits to Canada and set about instituting certain reforms to reorganise the Branch to meet its new duties. He made the greatest headway in reforming the Branch during C.D. Howe's term as acting Minister of the Department of Mines and Resources in 1947, when immediate results were expected. It was under his stewardship that some of the leading men of the

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77 In 1947 the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugee's representative in Canada reported that "[t]he views of the immigration officials ... have always been cautious, and to a great extent they have become stereotyped as a result of their experience of the past." NAC, RG 25, Department of External Affairs (DEA) records, Vol. 2113, File AR 408/4, Pt.2, Colley to Innes, 15.3.1947. Keenleyside made a similar remark to a journalist about the difficulty of Immigration Branch officials to adjust to a positive immigration policy. Sauer, "A Matter of Domestic Policy?" 233.
future Department of Citizenship and Immigration (DCI) were recruited, including his successor, Laval Fortier.

The new Orders-in-Council brought instant challenges to the Branch. Understaffed and under-funded as result of fifteen years of dormancy, the Branch suddenly had to cope with the tens of thousands of sponsorship applications which had piled up during the war or were submitted in the wake of the new regulations. It was then deluged by thousands of immigrants coming forward under the Polish-veterans and DP-labour programs as well as the Dutch farm settlement scheme. Overseas offices had to be reopened and selection teams sent to Europe. Field staff in Canada had to be augmented and trained to process applications and supervise placements. Systems and processes needed to be developed starting at the stage of selection and ending with placements.

In Germany enormous difficulties were experienced by immigration authorities in the start-up stages. They included the shortage of west-bound shipping, the absence of working facilities, travel restrictions imposed by Allied authorities, problems of finding sponsored relatives and delays in processing caused by security screening. By 1948, significant progress had been made in overcoming these difficulties. The staff had grown from two teams, consisting of about eight officials, in 1947, to nine teams of forty-five officials the following year. Its strength was maintained until the start of Canada's German program in 1950 and increased thereafter. Canadian immigration headquarters in Germany were established in Heidelberg initially in 1947 and moved to Karlsruhe by 1948. The screening process, consisting of occupational, medical, security and civil checks, had been further refined to facilitate the movement of thousands of DPs. The German movement essentially inherited the infrastructure which had been put in place to move DPs. The fact that staff, facilities and an efficient processing system were in place by the time Germans were admitted greatly accelerated the boom starting in 1951.

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A major reason for the success of Canada's immigration program, especially in terms of numbers moved, was the amount of resources and experience the government could bring into this work. In this regard, the Department of Labour's (DL) early presence in immigration-related work also benefited German immigration in the long run.

The DL was involved in Canada's postwar immigration program at the very outset. In 1946 and 1947, it provided valuable input to various committees and bodies, such as the Interdepartmental Committee on Immigration Policy, which were involved in defining Canada's new immigration policy. As early as 1946 the department had secured a prominent place in Canada's "bulk-labour" program which moved persons without family sponsors to Canada on bulk labour orders placed by Canadian employers. The DL first saw action in this field in 1946-47, helping select and place 4,527 Polish war veterans. An even bigger project soon followed: from 1947 to 1951, the DL along with the Immigration Branch organised and operated the DP bulk-labour schemes which brought tens of thousands of needy refugees from war-ravaged Europe to Canada.79

The DL was well equipped to manage these schemes. It occupied a place on the influential Immigration-Labour Committee in Ottawa and had set up staff in Canada and overseas for this work. It had established contacts with both business and labour organisations. It also had some capability of assessing labour and economic conditions at the national and regional levels. Most importantly, it possessed a national chain of 200 National Employment Service offices and Unemployment Insurance Commissions. Traditionally these offices served the employment needs of the Canadian labour force, including returning veterans. After 1946 their tasks included finding jobs and housing for incoming immigrants. The department also used its official contacts with the Federal-Provincial Farm Labour Programs to its advantage, identifying employment opportunities in agriculture, making placements and assessing the success of these placements. Its hostels in Ajax, Ontario and in St. Paul l'Érmité, near Montreal, temporarily accommodated DPs until jobs

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79 The bulk-labour schemes enabled groups of immigrant labourers to be brought forward under blanket authority. For the DL's role in the bulk movement and on the Interdepartmental Committee, see PCO, Vol. 2640, Cabinet Conclusions, 27.3.1947. These
were found for them. All this machinery was co-opted by headquarters for its new assignment, the group labour schemes. Furthermore, the department brought to the task valuable experience which it had gained in managing Canada's labour supply during the unemployment crisis of the depression, during war-time, and in postwar reconstruction. Thus by 1950, when the door finally opened for German immigration, the DL already had a well-established structure and procedure in place for processing immigrant workers. The existing system for DPs was simply re-directed, with few modifications, to move masses of Germans to Canada.

The Immigration Branch greatly resented the DL's presence in the immigration field, considering it an intrusion in its jurisdiction. Labour's activities appear to have roused the Branch from its lethargy, prompting it to review its mandate and operations and to place greater emphasis on developing an immigrant-labour program. The net result by 1949 was the introduction of machinery and specific measures to extend and consolidate the work of the Branch in the immigrant labour and placement field. In contrast to the Immigration Branch, the DL entered the immigration field in 1947 with greater energy and alacrity. In spite of the daunting responsibility of selecting and placing thousands of DP workers in the untested Canadian labour market, it was able to get its programs off the ground relatively quickly and efficiently. This aggressive and confident attitude was later transferred to the German program.

**Waning Anti-German Sentiment in Canada**

The prevailing, or perceived, anti-German attitude in Canada after the war had an important impact on the timing and extent of German immigration to Canada. Although anti-German feelings at this

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81 Decisive in this regard was the formation of the Settlement Service, Order-in-Council PC 2856 and the series of directives on the movement of labour immigrant which followed. See chapter three.

time were not as high as they had been during and after the First World War,\(^{83}\) they still remained strong enough to make politicians and bureaucrats wary of undertaking any initiatives which might be interpreted as too pro-German, including a policy which admitted German nationals. Indeed, Prime Minister King's assessment of the suitability of a Polish mother and daughter as potential cooks for his household while attending the meeting of the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth in London in May 1946, very much reflects this caution towards anything German:

> Also she has been in Germany most of her life and she has an accent that is distinctly German. I am afraid it would create comment at once if I had this Polish girl and her mother who had lived most of the time in Germany.\(^{84}\)

Immigration's position regarding the admission of German nationals was very much guided by the fear of a potential public backlash. In 1949 its director, A.L. Jolliffe, concerned that "there would be an immense outcry against any general opening of the gates to Germans," decided to only gradually extend the entry of certain classes of Germans to Canada in accordance with "the general temperature of the country."\(^{85}\) This view also was shared in some quarters of the DEA. In reply to a recommendation submitted by Canada's representative in Germany, T.C.Davis, in August 1950 to immediately admit German immigrants on the same basis as other immigrants, an official at DEA headquarters replied emphatically in pen: "I don't think Public Opinion is up for this yet."\(^{86}\) The cautious approach adopted by Ottawa may have been influenced by developments in Australia, where the government's announcement that it was considering the admission of large numbers of Germans in 1950 was received with widespread public disapproval.\(^{87}\) While Ottawa's official position for banning German nationals from Canada was based on international considerations - the absence of a Peace Treaty and the need to resolve the DP problem first - unofficially bureaucrats

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\(^{83}\) This may have resulted from Ottawa's propaganda during the war which carefully separated the German people from the evil Nazi regime. See R.H. Keyserlingk, "The Canadian Government's Attitude Toward Germans and German Canadians in World War II," Canadian Ethnic Studies 14 (1984), 16-29.

\(^{84}\) Mackenzie King Diaries, microfiche, Typescript 231 (Toronto: 1980), 504.


\(^{86}\) Ibid., Davis to Secretary of State DEA, 12.8.1950.

and politicians also feared the public fallout that a policy of admitting former enemies might engender.

In the public's mind there were factors weighing for and against German immigration to Canada after the war. Historically, German settlers were perceived as loyal to Canada, prosperous and hard working as well as demonstrating a close association to things British such as the Royal House. They were also deemed to have cultural similarities and racial compatibility. There was a long history of German immigration to Canada which provided Canadians with a broad exposure to and understanding of German-Canadians. For the government, this ethnic group was prominent and vocal enough, especially in western Canada, to warrant careful consideration. On the negative side were the events of the recent war, specifically Germany's standing as Canada's number one enemy, the losses suffered by Canadians at the hands of the German enemy, and the association of Germans with the repulsive ideology and horrific crimes of the National Socialist regime.

Most available indicators suggest that, shortly after the war, many Canadians were against Germans and German immigration but this mood gradually shifted by early-1950 to that of increasing support or neutrality. A 1945 Gallup poll revealed that a quarter of Canada's adult population had intense feelings of "raw hatred" towards German people. Studies that same year showed that more than half of all Canadians over 21 years of age could be classified as antagonistic. However, poll results in 1947 revealed a substantial decline in antipathy towards Germans: 28% of the respondents were "unfriendly" while 41% felt "friendly" towards Germans. By November 1952, the situation had completely reversed itself from 1945: over half (52%) of Canadians felt friendly while only 14% felt "unfriendly" towards their former enemies.

Canadian opinion about German immigration also mellowed over time. The results of an October 1946 poll made it plain that Germans were clearly not the public's favourite immigrants, placing

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88 In the minds of Canadians and officials, it appears that the main selling point for German immigration was the skills and labour it brought. See for example DCI, Citizen, Apr. 1960, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1-11.
89 Results of Gallup polls cited in the Montreal Star, 15.11.1952.
third last with a 34% disapproval rate, ahead of Japanese (60%) and Jewish candidates (49%). This view softened by April 1950 as another Gallup poll disclosed that of the 38% of Canadians who favoured immigration two-thirds supported the admission of Germans. Five years later another poll suggested that the public’s rating of German immigrants had further improved.\(^{90}\)

Government files which record public complaints about immigration policy are also revealing, less for what they say than what they do not say. They are practically devoid of any public criticism directed towards the government’s decision to admit Germans. The few references which address German immigration in the period prior to 1950 generally supported the movement. In the 1950s public criticism was directed more at individual contract-breakers than at the movement as a whole. Moreover, there was not a single complaint registered during this time about Germans taking jobs from Canadians. The government’s decision in 1950 to admit German nationals received scant comment from the Canadian press.\(^{91}\)

The early entry of Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans) appears to have had no tangible effect on the public’s views on German immigrants. This movement was assigned a deliberately low profile by both the government and the CCCRR. Ottawa insisted that the Volksdeutsche coming under the CCCRR’s labour schemes be dispersed throughout western Canada, while the CCCRR deliberately camouflaged the "German" component of this movement. The influx of Germans in the form of Volksdeutsche in the late 1940s seems to have escaped the attention of the average Canadian, who was more likely to view ethnic German refugees no differently than other DPs.\(^{92}\)

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\(^{91}\) For public comment, see IB, Vol. 244, File 165172, Pts. 11-12; IB, Vol. 779, File 537-9, Pt. 1; and DL, Vol. 3532, File 3-26-38-1, Pts. 4-5. Media coverage was more extensive in the Winnipeg Free Press and the German-Canadian ethnic press. See also W. Friedmann, German Immigration into Canada (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1952), 22-24.

\(^{92}\) Media articles about the settlement of the Canadian Christian Council for the Resettlement of Refugee’s (CCCR’S) Volksdeutsche failed to mention that they were Germans. The CLWR and CCCRR’s guiding light, T.O.F. Herzer, was especially wary of assigning publicity to the movement in the late 1940s. The public’s lack of distinction between Volksdeutsche and non-German DPs was noted in the author’s interview with former Executive Secretary of the Canadian Lutheran World Relief (CLWR), Reverend Clifton L. Monk, Winnipeg, 24.4.1999.
The views of certain organisations, especially organised labour, Canadian nativist, veterans and Jewish groups, had an important bearing on German immigration policy as they were seen to have considerable public force. Their attitudes were taken very seriously in Ottawa as a German-Canadian delegation discovered during a February 1950 meeting with the Minister of Immigration who, pondering the German admission question, was noticeably concerned about the "after effects of the war and the stand of the Canadian Legion." These were the same organisations which had raised the stiffest opposition to German immigration in Australia. However, unlike in Australia, these groups in Canada by 1950 stayed clear of labelling all Germans as Nazis. This is evident in their submissions to federal authorities which raised no objections to German immigration per se, but implored that Germans be screened carefully to exclude undesirables. This was a condition which Ottawa could easily live with as it too wished to bar Nazis.

Like the public, the resistance which these groups exhibited towards German immigration gradually subsided in the decade after the war. This was especially noticeable in the case of the Canadian Legion. In 1949, the minister responsible for immigration, Colin Gibson, writing to the Legion to probe their position on the admission of Germans observed that "the bulk of opinion expressed to me by veterans has been that there should now be a relaxation in regulations so as to permit German immigration - particularly of close relatives." The Canadian Jewish Congress carefully worded its appeal regarding the government's decision to admit German nationals, cautioning it to exercise the "greatest reserve ... in all questions regarding Germans and German nationals...." In 1952, the Deputy Minister of Immigration reported that Jewish groups accepted Germans as immigrants but objected to the large numbers admitted.

The softening attitude of the public and influential organisations therefore afforded Ottawa some room to manoeuvre on the German immigration question by 1950, if not earlier. It is startling that

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Ottawa, up to this time, had consistently over-rated the public's opposition to German immigration. This undoubtedly also contributed to Ottawa's delay in lifting the ban against Germans. Yet even after 1950, the anticipated anti-German reaction of the public still strongly influenced government decision-making. This was evident in the deferral of German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's official state visit to Canada in the early-1950s, as the DEA was "not convinced that public opinion in Canada was quite ready to welcome a visit from the German Chancellor." 97 This residual fear of public disapproval and Canada's outright preference for other immigrants may explain in large part Ottawa's policy of limiting the volume of German immigration in the 1950s when the potential intake was almost unlimited.

Ottawa's security-screening policy with respect to Germans was also very much the product of the public's concern and further restricted the flow of Germans coming to Canada, albeit less than might be expected. By the start of 1951 when German immigration to Canada began in earnest, security rejection criteria regarding Nazi elements had been significantly relaxed. German ex-servicemen and former Nazi party members were admissible to Canada by late-1950. Individuals who had been forcibly conscripted into the Waffen-SS after January 1, 1943 were permitted entry to Canada by early-1951. Security rejection criteria were further eased in 1954, narrowing the list of excluded right-wing categories to prominent Nazis, potential war criminals and members of certain reprehensible organisations. Because very few Germans applying for admission to Canada fell under these excluded categories, Ottawa's screening policy for Nazi types had little impact on the volume of German immigration to Canada. 98 The same cannot be said for security measures which addressed the Communist threat. The "two-year residence rule," introduced in September 1952, required all German refugees from East-bloc countries to reside in West Germany for a period of two years before they could be processed for a visa. By the time most East Germans were eligible for consideration, they had been stolen away by the West German economy and were lost to

96 DCI, Vol. 127, File 3-33-13, Fortier to Harris, 22.11.1952.
97 DEA, Vol. 6570, File 10935-B-40, DEA's memorandum for the Prime Minister, 3.3.1953.
Canada. The rule remained in force throughout the 1950s, denying Canada a promising source of immigrants, especially farm labourers and domestics.\textsuperscript{99}

The views of politicians and bureaucrats were also important in determining the course of German immigration policy. These two groups were remarkably tolerant about Germans in general and maintained a clear distinction between Nazis and Germans, as noted in a letter from Prime Minister Louis St.Laurent:

> Canadians of German descent, and all Canadians who believe in freedom and democracy, have deplored the corrupting influence which the Nazi system imposed on the German people for twelve years. During that time the German people were isolated from the rest of the world and subjected to intense propaganda. ...many impressionable people must have been misled in their thinking and attitude by such pressure.\textsuperscript{100}

Surprisingly, by 1949, there was considerable support and mutual agreement among Canada's three major federal parties to loosen some of the existing restrictions against German immigration, especially from the Liberals and the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF). Walter Tucker, a longstanding MP from the "German" riding of Rosthern, Saskatchewan, and leader of the provincial Liberal Party in Saskatchewan from 1948 to 1953, was the most outspoken champion of greater German immigration. Other prominent Liberals either supportive or sympathetic to this cause were the Minister of Agriculture James Gardiner, Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson, Minister of Justice Stuart Garson and North-Winnipeg Liberal Association leader Peter Taraska. Personally, Prime Minister St.Laurent had no difficulties with admitting Germans to Canada.\textsuperscript{101} The Senate also had its supporters, such as T.A. Crerar, W.D. Euler, J.

\textsuperscript{98} For this reason, the subject of security screening will not be addressed in this study. Canada's postwar security screening policy is the subject of a comprehensive study by Howard Margolian entitled Unauthorized Entry: The Truth About Nazi War Criminals in Canada, 1946-56 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000).

\textsuperscript{99} The two-year residence rule assisted RCMP security officers in screening out Communist infiltrators posing as immigrants to Canada. It afforded them more time to gather security information on refugees. The chief of Immigration in Germany, J.R. Robillard, felt that, by strictly enforcing this rule, Canada was losing out on East Germans who "as domestics and farm workers were by far the best crop of such candidates seen in a long time... Those we had selected smelled, acted, talked and looked like farm workers." DCI, Vol. 127, File 3-33-13, Robillard to Chief Op. Div., 6.2.1953.

\textsuperscript{100} NAC, MG 26 L, Louis St. Laurent Papers, Vol. 55, File 1-20-S, St.Laurent to Oberhoffer, 1.6.1949.

\textsuperscript{101} In cabinet sessions of April-May 1949, St. Laurent proposed measures which would have greatly facilitated the flow of German-national close relatives to Canada. He was reminded that these proposals contradicted Ottawa's prevailing policy of barring the entry of German nationals on the basis of their enemy-alien status. PCO, Vol. 2643, Cabinet Conclusions, 4.4.1949; 28.4.1949; 3.5.1949. CCCRR members considered St. Laurent an ally and valued his assistance in removing obstacles to their immigration program. He
Murdock, W.A. Buchanan, G.P. Campbell and R.B. Horner, many of whom went out of their way to extol the virtues of Germans as potential immigrants during sessions of the Standing Committee on Immigration. As early as 1945, Alistair Stewart, the CCF MP for Winnipeg North, expressed concerns about the plight of Volksdeutsche refugees in Germany and later, together with his colleagues Ross Thatcher, A.C. Stewart and the CCF leader M.J. Coldwell, pressed the Liberal government and immigration officials to give favourable consideration to the admission of certain classes of German nationals. For the Progressive Conservative Party, Rodney Adamson (MP-York West) was perhaps the most outspoken proponent of German immigration in the early-1950s. Politicians' motives for supporting a more open German immigration policy varied and included such considerations as pure political calculations, humanitarian concern for the separation of families and the welfare of refugees, Canada's international standing and a sincere belief in the suitability of German migrants. In the latter case a recurring theme was the potential positive economic contribution that Germans could make.

As in political circles, there were few or no sign of a distinct anti-German attitude in the immigration bureaucracy. Bureaucrats' initial resistance to liberalising German immigration was based more on fears of the public's reaction than on personal convictions. However, public reaction was only one factor considered by the government in formulating its German immigration policy. Pressing government objectives, such as the need to relieve labour shortages, to build a strong Canada, and to assist in the relief of overpopulation problems in Europe, caused an

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reportedly had a close relationship with the CCCR's chairman, T.O.F. Herzer, an association which was also strengthened through the friendship of their respective daughters. C. Monk, "Canadian Lutheran World Relief," (Unpublished paper, 1961), 23.

102 Senator Euler was of German Lutheran parentage from the Waterloo area. Virtually all of these senators had links with the agriculture sector and areas of German settlement and thus would have been aware of German achievements in this field. The Canadian Parliamentary Guide (Scarborough, Ont.: Gale, 1949), 65-70, 76, 83.


104 A number of leaders of German voluntary agencies allege that Hugh Keenleyside opposed German immigration but no evidence to support this claim is evident in government records. W. Sturhahn, They Came From East and West: A History of Immigration to Canada (Winnipeg: North American Baptist Immigration and Colonization Society, 1976), 76-77; M. Küster, "Die Baltendeutschen in Kanada," German-Canadian Yearbook V (1979), 60; and Monk, "Canadian Lutheran," 23. Admittedly, Keenleyside cautioned his Minister about the potential public fallout should rules against German immigration be relaxed. DCI, Vol. 151, File 3-32-11, Keenleyside to Gibson, 7.4.1949.
astounding reversal in the bureaucracy’s attitude to German immigration, from grudging toleration in 1950 to positive encouragement in the summer of 1951.

A number of key government offices and senior civil servants figured in this transformation. One of the longstanding supporters was Frank Foulds, Director of the Citizenship Branch, who saw in German settlers a highly assimilable, suitable type of immigrant. Certain senior officials at DEA also realised as early as 1948 that denying all German nationals entry to Canada was detrimental to Canada’s short- and long-term economic interests. They believed that a restrictive policy interfered with German-Canadian cultural relations and with the development of a pro-western and democratic outlook in Germany. Leslie Chance, Chief of the Consular Division, and T.C. Davis, DEA’s representative in Germany, were particularly convinced of the merits of German immigrants. Labour’s Deputy Minister, Arthur MacNamara, and his Director of the Special Services Branch, Walter Dawson, had established contacts with the CCCRR and its member groups by 1949 with a view of supplementing some of their labour schemes with Volksdeutsche migrants. Between 1950 and 1952, they made the transition from experimenting to basing their labour-schemes on German immigration.

Officials in the Immigration Branch also realised the benefits of increased German immigration but reacted more slowly. In 1948, C.E.S. Smith, the Immigration Branch’s Commissioner and future director, acknowledged the usefulness of certain German immigrants but noted problems in their selection and screening. The initial reluctance changed to full endorsement by 1951, when a senior immigration official told a German reporter that German workers were excellent, possessed an admirable eagerness for work and counted amongst Canada’s best immigrants.105 Canadian officials posted in Germany were even more convinced of the desirability of Germans as immigrants.

EASING RESTRICTIONS - PRESSURE GROUPS AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

PC 2653 of September 4, 1939 classified German nationals as enemy aliens and as such barred their entry or landing in Canada. This prohibition remained in place until September 14, 1950, when PC 4364 removed Germans from this category and placed them on the same footing as other immigrants. Ottawa's official line for this delay was that Canada was still in a state of war with Germany, a situation which lasted until July 1951.  

However, in the interim certain measures to ease these restrictions were undertaken by Ottawa. They were important to the overall German movement as they built a base, albeit small, of German sponsors in Canada. For instance, wives and minor children of legal Canadian residents were exempt from the enemy alien restrictions in 1946. The first Order in Council to ease the overall ban was PC 1373 of April 9, 1946. It permitted the entry of enemy aliens who were opposed to the Nazi and other enemy governments. This was primarily intended to facilitate the movement of Nazi victims such as German Jews. It had little effect on the movement of non-Jewish German nationals because the "documentary evidence produced was found to be useless for the purpose, and the RCMP security officers reported they could not verify the individual claims."  

In June 1948, the DEA ruled that citizens of the former Free City of Danzig who had not acquired any other citizenship, were not to be regarded as German nationals and were therefore eligible for entry to Canada. This ruling had little practical consequence. Most "Danzigers," including the Mennonites among them, had acquired German nationality in the interim and in any case were excluded from the IRO's assistance.

In 1949, the government took two further steps in easing restrictions on German nationals. In September, cabinet agreed to consider Special Orders in Council on a case-by-case basis for first-

106 In this month Canada formally terminated the state of war with Germany. The failure to end the state of war earlier with Germany was due largely to abortive attempts by the western Allies to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union on the unification of Germany and the future German state. Interestingly, nationals of Canada's other former enemies - Finland, Hungary, Italy and Rumania - were removed from the ranks of enemy aliens and therefore admissible to Canada by July 1947.

degree relatives of Canadian residents. And in December, the government permitted the
temporary admission of certain students and scholarship recipients as well as German businessmen.
These changes were made on the urging of the DEA which felt the entry restrictions were hurting
Canadian trade and diplomatic relations with Germany. The September ruling was fully exploited
by German ethnic and church groups who instructed all sponsors of German nationals to direct their
appeals to local MPs for special consideration. This was a deliberate attempt to flood the system
with special appeals and thereby render the whole procedure so unmanageable that Ottawa would
be forced to eventually broaden its regulations to admit German nationals under the regular close-
relatives categories.

PC 1606 of March 28, 1950, was the last Order in Council issued by the government before all
restrictions were abolished in September 1950. It broadened the category of German-national close
relatives that Canadian residents could sponsor. Its introduction gave rise to some trepidation at
immigration headquarters which was concerned that the greater numbers coming forward under this
new order might prompt unfavourable public comment. Similar anxiety surrounded the decision
in September 1950 to remove the ban on German nationals altogether. Release of the decision was
deliberately delayed until several weeks later when the order was published in the Canada Gazette.
Fearing that the decision might trigger a massive influx, the government ordered a survey to
determine the number of outstanding Canadian sponsorship applications for Germans on hand. It
was evident that the government had seriously overestimated the repercussions of its decision, as
little adverse public reaction arose and an in-house audit revealed that only 710 immigration
applications for German nationals were on file.

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108 As of September 1949 the following categories of German nationals were admissible: (a) the wife and unmarried children under
eighteen and (b) the husband of a resident of Canada and parents over 65 years of a resident of Canada. House of Commons,
109 Herzer made no bones over admitting this to the Deputy Minister of the DCI. CLWR, Reel H-1399, File CCCRR-Ottawa
110 In drafting PC 1606, cabinet wanted to be clear that this provision was meant to be "permissive in character" and not sanctioning
large-scale German immigration. PCO, Vol. 2645, Cabinet Conclusions, 25.3.1950.
Apart from German nationals, there was a whole category of Germans who were not subject to the enemy alien prohibition. These were the *Volksdeutsche*, or persons of ethnic German origin who were nationals of other countries. During and after the war most were forced to flee or were expelled from eastern Europe to the occupied zones of Germany. Over 12 million *Volksdeutsche* were in Germany by 1951. They had a very large sponsorship base in Canada, consisting of some 50,000-60,000 expatriates, or two-thirds of the German-Canadian population, who had moved to Canada before and after the First World War. This base constituted a formidable lobby group which used its contacts with German-ethnic associations and churches to secure the admission of their relatives and friends in Germany after the war. Up to the end of 1948, the demands of these lobby groups were restricted to broadening the category of close relatives and pressing the cause of *Volksdeutsche* immigration to Canada. Their tactics and objectives became more ambitious by early-1949, when they sought to remove the remaining restrictions on the admission of German nationals. When this objective was achieved in 1950, they continued to press the government to relax security restrictions against East bloc refugees and Germans with former Nazi affiliations and to give special consideration to the movement of family dependants and other compassionate cases.

The *Volksdeutsche* movement to Canada was not without its complications. Although ethnic Germans were afforded the same access to Canada as DPs, the refusal of international organisations, such as the IGCR, and later the IRO, to assist this type of immigrant seriously hindered their emigration from Germany and Austria. Without this assistance, virtually all movement out of the occupied zones of Germany was impossible as the IRO alone possessed the machinery, jurisdiction and resources to carry out this work. In his May 1947 speech to parliament, the Minister responsible for Immigration, John Glen, committed Canada to accept ethnic Germans as immigrants in spite of this group's ostracism by the international community. In June 1947, German voluntary agencies and railways struck upon a solution to this perplexing problem. They proposed the creation of an umbrella organisation, named the CCCRR, consisting of Canada's
major German church denominations and ethnic groups, which would establish its own facilities overseas to process ethnic Germans. Another snag occurred late in 1948 when immigration officials discovered that many of the Volksdeutsche immigrants applying for visas had assumed German nationality, rendering them inadmissible to Canada. A sustained lobby effort by the CCCRR and other groups brought relief to this problem in the form of PC 1606 which admitted refugee ethnic Germans who had not been German nationals before September 1, 1939.

The substantial numbers of Volksdeutsche refugees and German nationals who arrived in Canada prior to 1950, some 30,000 in total, aided the subsequent German immigration boom in two ways. First they provided many sponsors for thousands of Germans who intended to emigrate to Canada later in the 1950s. Second, in representing sponsors' and immigrants' interests in Ottawa, the voluntary agencies developed as effective lobby groups with important political and government contacts.

**Partner Agencies in the Immigration Field**

Non-governmental agencies such as the CCCRR and the railways made a significant contribution to the German immigration boom of the 1950s. They worked alongside government authorities in bringing German migrants to Canada. Their early establishment in the immigration field was also an important pre-condition for the boom.

As noted earlier, the CCCRR was created to assist in the resettlement of admissible ethnic German immigrants to Canada for whom there were no facilities in Europe. It undertook most of the processing work associated with these cases up to 1951 when the government assumed an official role in German immigration. Still, the CCCRR was able to maintain and even extend its operations after this time due primarily to the expertise and resources it had developed. Thus the CCCRR flourished in the 1950s because of its growth as an effective resettlement agency in the late-1940s.

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112 The International Refugee Organisation's (IRO) constitution excluded Volksdeutsche, German nationals, quislings, traitors, collaborators and war criminals from its assistance. Louise Holborn, *The International Refugee Organisation: A Specialised Agency*
The CCCRR was founded on June 23, 1947, during a meeting in Ottawa of representatives of various government, railway and church and ethnic organisations. It served essentially as an umbrella organisation for the various German church and ethnic group associations including the Canadian Lutheran World Relief (CLWR), the Canadian Mennonite Board of Colonisation (CMBC), the Baptist World Alliance Immigration (BWAI), the Catholic Immigrant Aid Society (CIAS) and the Sudeten Committee. The Council's principal purpose was to assemble, pre-process and arrange the transportation of immigrants represented by its constituent members.

Responsibility for the reception, transportation, placement and care of these immigrants upon their arrival in Canada fell to its members. Appointed as temporary chairman of the CCCRR was T.O.F. Herzer, a former itinerant Lutheran minister and general manager of the Canadian Pacific Railway's (CPR) Canada Colonisation Association. The CCCRR maintained a head office and small staff in Winnipeg which administered its finances and transportation billings and circulated information about immigrants' arrival.

Without doubt, the primary motive of the voluntary agencies in resettling German refugees in Canada was a strong humanitarian impulse to relieve the overseas German refugee problem and effect family reunions in Canada. They were also motivated by a shared bond of ethnicity and confessional affiliation. Moreover, some church agencies saw in this work a way of building churches and adding to church membership.\textsuperscript{113}

The CCCRR also was very useful to the federal government. It solved the thorny problem of moving \textit{Volksdeutsche} refugees to Canada stridently demanded by Canadian sponsors without drawing the attention of the public and international organisations who were opposed to any assistance for the \textit{Volksdeutsche}. Ottawa could conveniently distance itself from this program as it was undertaken by an ostensibly "Christian" relief organisation. Up to 1950 the government also

realised a savings resulting from the CCCRR's work as it did not have to set up its own facilities to process German immigrants, including fiancées of Canadian servicemen. As a type of immigration clearing house, the CCCRR also greatly simplified for the government the communication and coordination of all the church groups' activities. Yet considerable credit must be given to Ottawa for initially supporting the work of the CCCRR. It placed Canada as the first non-European country to assist in the solution of the German refugee problem.\(^{114}\)

Without the CCCRR, the member voluntary agencies would have been unable to undertake their resettlement work as they lacked the means to run their own operations overseas. However, their contribution to the movement was equally important. In addition to their lobbying efforts, they also brought experience, machinery and resources to resettlement work. The CMBC, CIAS, and BWAI\(^{115}\) had already been active in colonisation and settlement work prior to the war. The CLWR inherited an experienced immigration staff, many of whom were previously employed with Lutheran and railway colonisation agencies.\(^{116}\) These organisations used their close contacts with individual churches, businesses and railways in Canada to secure sponsors or placement opportunities with which to bring Germans to Canada. Furthermore the CLWR, CMBC, CIAS and BWAI had their own headquarters and regional representatives in the provinces to generate sponsorship applications, develop placement opportunities and assist in the reception, movement, placement and after-care of newcomers.\(^{117}\)

Another advantage which Canadian voluntary agencies brought to this work was money. These organisations established a pool of funds, normally in the form of a revolving fund, with which to advance the processing and transportation expenses of immigrants, who did not have sponsors in

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\(^{114}\) A DEA official who attended the founding meeting of the CCCRR, characterised the group "to be a multiple marriage of convenience." He was also acutely aware of the potential political controversy surrounding the resettlement of \textit{Volksdeutsche} refugees which raged in international circles at this time. IB, Vol. 655, File B41075, Pt. 1, U-Secretary of State DEA to Congdon, 26.6.1947.

\(^{115}\) The Baptist World Alliance Immigration's (BWAI) predecessor, the German Baptist Immigration and Colonization Society, had contacts with the Canadian National Railways (CNR).

\(^{116}\) CLWR members who were affiliated with previous immigration work of the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) included the CLWR Treasurer Herzer, CLWR Comptroller and later Executive Director George Keil, the CCCRR overseas director George Berkefeld and CCCRR staff worker Mrs. H. Hollborn.
Canada and who came forward under agencies' unsponsored labour programs. Most German
migrants either lacked savings or were prohibited from exchanging their *Deutsche Mark* (DM) into
dollars. Canadian church agencies also required capital to cover their administrative and
operational costs. Because few Canadian church agencies had the resources to launch an organised
resettlement program, many relied on the generous funding and technical assistance supplied by
their American or international affiliates.\(^{118}\) Also, Ottawa's contribution of over $134,000 to the
operational costs of the CCCRR from 1948 to 1951 was crucial in enabling the CCCRR get on its
feet.\(^{119}\) This initial infusion of capital and CCCRR's resourcefulness made it self-sustaining after
1951. The even larger funds which international agencies brought to immigration work in the
1950s greatly stimulated the flow of Germans to Canada.

In addition to its resettlement work, the CCCRR was also a powerful lobby. Under the direction of
Herzer, the council served as a united front for the church groups through which to address
problems with Ottawa and to mobilise the influential support of its allies, key politicians and
railway executives. Its chief lobbying strategist was Herzer, who masterminded and co-ordinated
the voluntary agencies' approach with Ottawa regarding German immigration programs.\(^{120}\) His
business and political connections, tact, savvy, organising acumen and exceptionally good
judgement stood the CCCRR and its constituent members in good stead. By the 1950s, Herzer was
recognised in Ottawa as the official spokesperson for the CCCRR and its member groups. At this
time he was instrumental in removing some of the remaining barriers to German immigration in the
1950s and in helping voluntary agencies expand their operations and programs. Many of the
concessions he obtained from Ottawa directly furthered German immigration in general. For this

\(^{117}\) Some offered special services and facilities for newcomers such as CMBC's *Mädchenheime* (women work hostels) and the
CLWR's network of urban immigration hostels. Most of the church groups' resettlement efforts were centred in western Canada.
\(^{118}\) For the CLWR's and BWAI's funding sources see chapter six. The CMBC could draw on its own funds, those of the provincial
*Hilfsräte* (welfare committees) and a line of credit advanced by the CPR. Also, it received organisational and technical support
from the American-based Mennonite Central Committee.
\(^{119}\) Department of Finance, *Public Accounts of Canada* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1948-51).
\(^{120}\) On important initiatives with Ottawa, Herzer insisted that church agencies and German associations leave the organising to the
CCCRR to avoid "confusion" and "piece-meal negotiations." CLWR, Reel H-1393, File CLWR Lutheran Labour Scheme - Corr.
18.5.1950.
reason he was appropriately known in German-Canadian circles as "Vater der deutschen Einwanderung" [father of German immigration].\textsuperscript{121}

Critical to the success of the CCCRR was its establishment of overseas facilities in Germany to move Volksdeutsche refugees. Under the energetic leadership of the first overseas director, Horace Erdman, the CCCRR secured the Mühlenberg camp near Hannover by August 1947. As the camp was soon found to be entirely inadequate to assemble and move the desired number of refugees, the Bremen-Tirpitz camp was acquired in June 1949. This camp offered excellent facilities for both the CCCRR and immigration staff as well as accommodation for up to 1,400 immigrants.\textsuperscript{122} It provided a convenient transportation link with passenger embarkation facilities in the nearby port. Also the camp was strategically located near numerous refugee camps and processing centres, an accessible reservoir of potential immigrants. Also, until the opening of a government immigration mission in Hannover in 1951, it was often used by Canadian authorities to process migrants residing in northern Germany. Most of its administrative costs, including support staff, accommodation and catering, were assumed by local authorities. From 1947 to 1951, the camp's staff grew from five to forty-five members. During this time the camp's management developed an efficient processing system to expedite the examination and movement of large volumes of refugees. The appointment of the respected new director, George Berkefeld, in 1950 brought a "results-driven" attitude to the CCCRR's overseas operations and ended the counter-productive inter-denominational bickering and politics of the camp's management.\textsuperscript{123} The camp's continued use by the voluntary agencies into the 1950s materially furthered the movement of Germans to Canada.

The CCCRR and its constituent members could also tap the resources and facilities of their international counterparts which were committed to material and resettlement relief work,

\textsuperscript{121} NAC, MG 30 C108, Herzer Papers, Vol. 1, File Immigration Activities, Winnipeger Rundschau article (n.d.).
\textsuperscript{122} These accommodations were used in conjunction for inspectional work and pre-embarkation and were ideally suited for refugees who often had no other place to stay.
\textsuperscript{123} CCCRR's overseas director, Berkefeld, was liked and respected by the Immigration Director, C.E.S. Smith, and his senior officer in Germany, J.R. Rebillard, both for his qualities as a good manager and for buying into the Branch's program of increasing visa production. NAC, MG 28 V 18, North American Baptist Immigration and Colonization Society records, File 3.20, Confidential
particularly directed to German refugees. These affiliates undertook the laborious local work in Germany of locating sponsored immigrants, identifying qualified immigrants for labour programs and arranging for their pre-screening, processing, counselling and eventual movement to the CCCRR camp. These working relationships between the Canadian and international agencies were strengthened and expanded in the 1950s.

In 1948, Canadian voluntary agencies sought to broaden their resettlement activities and include unsponsored Volksdeutsche labourers. This was especially urgent by 1948 when the CCCRR's original close relatives program was running out of prospective migrants. Accordingly, Mennonite, Catholic, Lutheran and Baptist agencies applied for and received authority from Ottawa in 1949 to operate their own "farm-labour" programs, initially limited to the sponsorship of several hundreds of workers for whom the agencies had to find sponsors in Canada.\(^{124}\) Immigration authorities saw in these programs a means of getting "the assistance of Church organisations without losing control." Especially valued were the transportation loans advanced by the churches to German immigrants.\(^{125}\) For the churches, these programs were intended as "seed movements," to bring in single workers who could later sponsor family members and thereby regenerate the churches' family reunion programs. Without a steady flow of applications, the CCCRR risked losing its place in the immigration field. CCCRR members also felt that labour programs provided them an opportunity to assist many more truly needy refugees.\(^{126}\) However, these new programs also brought added commitments. They required considerable capital outlay and a system of generating sponsors who could provide housing and jobs for the newcomers in Canada. Yet this initial investment paid long-term dividends after 1951, when these programs grew and moved thousands of unsponsored German workers to Canada.

\(^{124}\) [Undated (circa June 1953) un-addressed memo. He was also highly regarded by German authorities. CLWR, Reel H-1392, File CLWR General Corr. 1946-52, Baetz to Monk 14.1.1954; and CMBC, Vol. 1330, File 991, Maas to Herzer, 29.11.1955.]

\(^{125}\) [DL, Vol. 3028, File Interdepartmental Committee on Immigration-Labour (ICIL) 1948-49, Minutes of ICIL meeting, 18.1.1949; IB, Vol. 655, File B41075, Pt. 2, Jolliffe to CMBC, Catholic Immigrant Aid Society and CLWR on 19.1.1949 and to BWAJ on 8.3.1949. In order not to draw the public's attention to the admission of these Germans, Canadian authorities insisted that these refugees were well distributed throughout Canada, especially in rural areas in the West.]

\(^{126}\) [CLWR, Reel H-1400, File CCCRR, Farm Labour Scheme, MacNamara to Lewis, 1.2.1949.]

In conclusion, the personnel, machinery, capital, programs and contacts built up by the CCCRR and its members by 1950 provided a critical foundation on which their resettlement program was able to expand in the 1950s. The CCCRR was already a noticeable force by 1950 when it had moved a total of 15,000 Germans, almost single-handedly, to Canada.

In Canada railways traditionally have played a central role in immigration. Although they resumed their activity in this field shortly after the war, their previous authority and privileges in immigration matters were strictly curtailed. Of all Canadian businesses, railways perhaps stood to gain the most from a liberal immigration policy, profiting from immigrants' overseas shipping and inland fares, purchases of railway lands by newcomers, and increased freight haul to and from immigrant settlements along railway lines. Their views found wide circulation and recognition in Ottawa. A year after the war had ended, railways were able to re-establish their own programs to recruit farmers and farm labourers from Britain. In the following year they were authorised to extend their recruiting to continental northwestern Europe and in 1951 to Germany, under the so-called railway agreements with Ottawa.127 The postwar railway agreements, renewed annually, were a continuation of similar arrangements made during the inter-war years, except that the previous broad authority of railways to select and move such immigrants was now subject to strict overview by overseas immigration officials. Also Ottawa's direct involvement in recruitment overseas entailed competition for the railways and made them try harder. The net effect was increasing overseas immigration, in this case, from Germany.

Although the railways' direct involvement in German immigration was delayed until 1951, they - or more accurately the CPR - established an early stake in the Volksdeutsche movement through the CCCRR by establishing ticketing offices in Germany and monopolising much of the overseas and rail transportation of CCCRR's clientele. The CPR clearly recognised the potential of this movement and even commissioned a ship, the SS-Beaverbrae, to move Volksdeutsche immigrants
starting in 1948. The railways also assisted with the technical and placement aspects of the voluntary agencies' operations, but not to the point where these agencies became subsidiaries of the railways, as had been the situation prior to the war. In sum, the railways' early immigration initiatives, the establishment of recruiting facilities abroad and the resumption of placement activities in Canada positioned them to take advantage of the 1950s German boom.

**GermANY: THE VAST MIGRANT RESERVOIR AND "DER DRANG NACH DEM WESTEN"**

Unquestionably, another driving force behind the German immigration boom to Canada was the widespread interest in emigration amongst Germans which lasted from the end of World War II to 1957. Without this factor the boom would never have assumed the scale it did.

Interest in emigration was probably at its height in Germany immediately after the war. A February 1947 survey conducted in the French zone of occupied Germany revealed that 46% of respondents wished to emigrate. In the British zone in 1948, 24% of men and 20% of women desired to leave Germany. Tens of thousands of private emigration agencies sprang up in the western zones of Germany in 1946-47 to cater to this demand. Interest in migrating continued to the mid-1950s, although this trend declined over time. During this period about 9.3% of the population, or 4.4 million Germans, were prepared to emigrate immediately. This figure declined to 6% between 1956 and 1962 (see Figure No. 7). This high degree of interest in emigrating combined with the sheer size of the German population (about 47.6 million people in 1951 or three-and-a-half times the size of the Canadian population) made Germany one of the largest potential suppliers of migrants in the 1950s. For receiving countries such as Canada, it offered an immediate, large and varied supply of immigrants or, in consumer-marketing terms, a "one-stop bulk shopping" source for immigrants.

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128 Translated from German to English: "The drive to the West."

Canada, after the United States, was the most popular destination for prospective postwar German emigrants. This interest was particularly strong in the late-1940s when the slightest rumour in the German media about a liberalisation in Canadian immigration regulations triggered a flood of immigration enquiries and applications to Canada's overseas missions. Another sign of German interest in settling in Canada could be found in the POW camps in Canada. Of the 745 German POWs remaining in Canada in 1946, 738 (or 99%) volunteered to remain in Canada. This is an especially startling figure given that many of these men had been separated for many years from their families, friends and roots in their homeland. Even by 1950, overseas representatives of the Canadian National Railway observed that "[w]ere German citizens admissible to Canada on the same footing as other nationalities in Europe there would be a flood of applications." When restrictions against German nationals were lifted in September 1950, there was an immediate throng of enquiries at Canada's mission in Karlsruhe, Germany, leading to a backlog of 5,000 cases a month and a half later. By 1953, this backlog had reached a high-water mark of 270,000 files. At this time almost half of all immigrant applications received at all Canadian overseas missions were from Germans. Thereafter interest fell off to a low mark in 1955, but rebounded considerably in 1956 and grew further in 1957 (see Figure No. 8). This trend was also apparent in statistics kept by the German federal office for emigration which showed that Germans' interest in emigrating to

121 IB, Vol. 31, File 682, Pt. 5, Pope to Secretary of State DEA, 28.2.1947; and ibid. Cormier to Fortier, 12.1.1949.
122 PCO, Vol. 2639, Cabinet Conclusion, 10.12.1946. The 738 were those considered suitable by officials.
Canada had declined steadily from 40.9% in 1953 to 36.8% in 1954 and registered only 27.6% for first quarter of 1955.\textsuperscript{134}

While many prospective German emigrants were attracted to the opportunities and advantages generated by Canada's thriving postwar economy, the stark and intolerable living and material conditions prevailing at home immediately following the war prompted many Germans to anxiously seek new homes abroad. During this time, Germany, despite its heavy war losses of 3.5 million people, suffered from overpopulation. In 1951, West Germany's population was about 47.6 million, compared to 39.4 million who had lived in the same area in 1939. The overpopulation problem resulted from the massive intake of German refugees, numbering about twelve million by 1950\textsuperscript{135}, the destruction or dismantling of much of Germany's industry during and immediately after the war; and the reduction in territory, especially the agriculture and coal-mining areas in the east, with which the population could support itself. In short, more people had to be supported with fewer resources. Economic recovery, which was a key to this problem, was further slowed by the disproportionate loss of much of the productive element of the German population, specifically young working-aged men; Allied restrictions placed on German trade and industrial production; and the additional economic and social burden of receiving and integrating destitute refugees who poured into Germany during and after the war.

The flow of refugees into West Germany continued during the 1950s and consisted mostly of German refugees from the east zone of Germany and eastern Europe, the so-called "neo refugees" (see Figure No. 9). This movement presented an ongoing social, economic and political problem for German authorities. The fewer resources shared by a larger population resulted in a lower standard of living. Furthermore, the influx of refugees aggravated the already difficult unemployment situation. Also, the refugee population consisted of a disproportionate number of agriculturalists who were difficult to place in the predominantly industrial western zones of

\textsuperscript{134} Figures cited in NABICS, File 1.28, Maas to Sturhahn, 15.8.1955.
Germany, but who fit well into Canadian farm-labour immigration. Up to 1952, West Germany's refugee population, consisting of about one in every five Germans, had taken the brunt of the economic deprivation and hardship. They suffered social, economic and cultural marginalisation in German society well into the 1950s.\textsuperscript{136} Not surprisingly, their unfavourable standing made them more disposed to emigrate. This tendency is borne out by 1951 Canadian immigration data which revealed that \textit{Volksdeutsche} were over-represented as emigrants leaving Germany.\textsuperscript{137} In sum, while refugees in the decade after the war further strained the German economy, labour market and standard of living, thereby depressing conditions for all Germans, they also constituted a highly mobile segment of society, having been displaced from their homelands in the mid-1940s.

\textsuperscript{135} This figure represents the refugee population of both the west and east zones of Germany. It includes refugees who fled to Germany during the war, those who were expelled from countries of Eastern Europe to Germany as a result of Article XIII of the Potsdam agreement, as well as those Germans who fled from these East European countries.

\textsuperscript{136} The big improvement in their situation came with the \textit{Lastenausgleichgesetzgebung} (burden equalisation legislation) of 20 August 1952 which sought to economically integrate the expellees. In total more than 114 billion \textit{Deutsche Mark} were paid out for indemnification for material war losses, expulsion and currency reform. Yet, refugees remained economically and socially disadvantaged in German society in the early-1950s. They had higher unemployment rates, poorer housing and lower socio-economic standing. See E. Pfeil, "Soziologische und psychologische Aspekte der Vertreibung," in G. Wülker \textit{et al.}, \textit{Europa und die deutschen Flüchtlinge} (Frankfurt a.M.: Institut für Förderung öffentlicher Angelegenheiten, 1952), 53-55; and International Labour Organisation [ILO], \textit{International Migration: 1945-1957} (Geneva: ILO, 1957), 7-34.

\textsuperscript{137} \textit{Volksdeutsche} represented 20% of the West German population while 40% of their number were admitted by Canadian authorities overseas. Cited in Friedmann, \textit{German Immigration}, 15.
Immediately after the war, much of the German economy lay in ruins and recovery in 1946-47 was slow due to the harsh terms of the Allied peace and serious economic and political setbacks. Although significant improvement occurred by 1948 - especially with the injection of Marshall Plan dollars, currency reform, a new banking system and restructuring of industry - that benefited the economy in the long-run, numerous workers remained displaced in the short-term. Unemployment reached a high-point of 10.3% in 1950, the year in which Canada's German immigration program began (see Figure No. 10). As unemployment in Germany gradually eased after 1950, it conversely climbed in Canada, thus making the prospect of immigrating to Canada less appealing for most

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Germans. However, Canada did offer other selling points. The improvement in real income per capita in Germany lagged behind the progress of the other major economic indices, such as unemployment and GNP. In 1951, German average income was still amongst the lowest in the western world.\(^{139}\) Also, Germany had one of the worst housing shortages in Europe in the early-1950s. In these areas Canada still held a distinct edge over Germany by the late-1950s and could boast a higher real income per capita and a better standard of living and more affordable housing. This fact was not lost on Canadian officials who cleverly accented these advantages in their promotional work.\(^{140}\)

Clearly, economic variables in Germany were an important reason for Germans' interest in emigration. A study of postwar immigration to Canada found that unemployment in Germany was a critical factor prompting Germans to emigrate to Canada.\(^ {141}\) In 1951, the reasons given by Germans wishing to leave Germany, as recorded in order of frequency by the Federal German Office for Emigration, were: (1) difficulties in earning a living or simply unemployment; (2) the

\(^{139}\) F. Edding, "Die wirtschaftlichen Folgen des Flüchtlingszustroms," in Wülker et al., eds., Europa und die deutschen Flüchtlinge, 23.

\(^{140}\) One example was the Deputy-Minister's press release to the German media of 1 Feb 1956 promoting immigration which emphasized additional housing starts and the consumer wealth in Canada. IB, Vol. 821, File 552-1-551, Pt. 1. A German Embassy official in Canada saw the economic advantages for German immigrants in Canada, noting that even skilled workman's helper pay was better in Canada than it was for a journeyman in Germany and the money went further. Lethbridge Herald, 12.8.1957; and E. P. Neumann, , Public Opinion in Germany, 1961 (Allensbach: Verlag für Demoskopie, 1961), 24.

\(^{141}\) Green, Immigration, 73.
wish to join family or relatives abroad; (3) the desire of refugees to find new homes abroad; and (4) the fear of a new war in Europe. Similar findings were made by a 1954 German public opinion survey. Fear of unemployment (30%), political and economic instability (20%), obligatory military service and the housing shortage were cited among the main reasons to emigrate. Surprisingly, pollsters found that a high proportion of emigrants were prepared to abandon flourishing businesses for uncertainties of new life abroad. In addition to economic factors, renewed tensions in Europe caused by the outbreak of the Korean war exerted a significant push force. A sense of restlessness and adventurism after a decade of travel restrictions may also have inspired many to set out overseas.

Before July 1949, large-scale overseas emigration of Germans from Germany was effectively blocked by Allied restrictions on travel. Overseas travel was only permitted under extraordinary circumstances, such as for compassionate cases (i.e. family re-unification), persons with dual citizenship, for scientists and technicians recruited by the western Allies and for Volksdeutsche moved by the CCCRR. These restrictions were primarily based on security considerations, but there were also fears that unrestricted emigration might deplete Germany of essential skilled labour required for Germany's economic recovery. This was a valid concern given the great wanderlust displayed by the German population immediately after the war. In the British zones exceptions were made for the movement of elements considered surplus to Germany's needs. Allied measures effectively checked what could have been a mass exodus of the German population immediately after the war. However, in the process, this further heightened the pent-up desire for travel and migration amongst Germans who, for over a decade, had been subject to relative confinement in

142 Friedmann, German Immigration, 18.
145 The important Allied provisions in this regard were Law No. 161 of 7.3.1945 as well as Proclamation No. 2 of Allied Control Council of 20.9.1945 (Law No. 161 in Military Government Gazette Germany, 21st Army Group Area of Control 1945, No.3; Proclamation No.2, in Military Government Gazette Germany, British Zone of Control 1945). Restrictions affecting certain categories of travellers were relaxed from 1946-48 but without permitting a large exodus of Germans. Steinert, Migration und Politik, 22-24; and Frieler, "Auswanderung," 336.
Europe. When travel restrictions were removed and when doors for German immigrants opened abroad, there was a veritable explosion of German emigration overseas.

The attempt by German authorities to promote, yet also control, emigration invariably affected the flow of Germans to Canada in the 1950s. On the positive side, it induced certain immigrants, considered surplus to the needs of the German state, to emigrate. On the negative side, attempts were made to dissuade the migration of elements required in Germany, especially skilled, young male workers. Indeed, German officials had witnessed first-hand the disastrous effects of an unrestricted emigration policy with the resettlement of DPs from the western zones of Germany immediately after the war. Driven by self-interest, receiving countries took the healthy and able DPs leaving a residue mass of many unemployable and needy cases burdening the German state. German authorities intended to avoid a repeat of this situation. In the case of Canada, their attempts to control emigration met with mixed results. For the most part, Canada retained the final say in its German immigration policy and programs and averted German attempts to secure influence.

By virtue of the joint British-American declaration of July 19, 1949, removing all Allied travel restrictions in the western occupied zones, West Germany regained control over its emigration policy. From the outset, emigration policy was closely linked with its own intake of migrants and refugees from the east; as such, incoming refugees considered economically and demographically useful were encouraged to stay while those not needed by the state were free to re-emigrate. Linking these population flows enabled the German government to re-engineer Germany's lopsided demographic, economic and labour-market structure. Germany thereby safeguarded its economic future and realised its own nation-building plan. The refugees and expellees arriving in Germany made it possible to redress the gender differential of several millions more women to men, the deficit of young men in the 20-40 age cohort and the shortage of skilled

146 "Freedom of Travel for the Western Zones of Germany" cited in Steinert, Migration und Politik, 41.
147 The proportion of men in the age group of 18-45 had declined from 21% of the German population in 1939 to 13-14% after the war. Ibid. 83.
workers which was already emerging in certain sectors of the economy by 1948. Similarly, a selective emigration policy enabled Germany to remedy these imbalances by releasing elements of the population considered surplus. Accordingly, the three main criteria which Germany's emigration policy aimed to control were age, gender and occupation composition of prospective emigrants.

Because of the importance of emigration to German society, many ministries and levels of government became involved in its formulation. Early on, all were agreed that German emigration policy should be closely linked to economic and labour market developments.\textsuperscript{148} The view of emigration as a panacea for Germany's social and economic ills was reflected in a statement by Germany's Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, in April 1950: "Germans have the possibility of final emigration in order to in this way bring about a solution to the refugee and unemployment problems."\textsuperscript{149} With labour shortages arising in some German industries by the 1950s, cooperation between the emigration advisory centres and labour offices intensified and greater efforts were made to prevent the departure of essential workers.

Already in 1949 Canadian authorities were apprised of Germany's emigration strategy.\textsuperscript{150} Interestingly, Canada's immigration and Germany's emigration policies had a common and, at times, conflicting goal: to increase the productive element of the population to foster economic growth. The early success of Canada's German immigration program was largely due to the fact that German emigration policy neatly dovetailed with Ottawa's own interests in certain areas. Canada, for example, sought Germany's surplus women as domestics and unskilled refugee families as farm labourers. Difficult to integrate into the German economy, these groups were encouraged even assisted by Bonn to emigrate.


\textsuperscript{149} Quoted in the German news weekly, Revue, 29.4.1950. The German text reads: "Deutschen ist die endgültige Auswanderung ermöglicht um auf diese Weise eine Lösung des Flüchtlings- und Arbeitslosenproblems herbeizuführen."

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Selective emigration also offered the German state other advantages. It reduced the government's financial obligations in terms of unemployment, welfare and indemnification payments to certain segments of society, such as unemployed workers, war victims, large unplaceable refugee families and single mothers, who decided to leave Germany. It was also felt that a more even distribution of manpower world-wide would enhance the global economy. Specifically, emigration was to stimulate German trade with other immigration countries. The German Ambassador in Ottawa saw such a special role here for the masses of German newcomers arriving in Canada.\(^{151}\) Emigration had other positive spin-offs such as reducing Germany's population density and easing its housing-shortage crisis. Also Germany, as a member of the ICEM, adhered to the motto "the internationalisation of the German refugee problem." Accordingly, Bonn in the first years after 1950, felt bound to accept the assistance offered by immigration countries. These factors explain why the German government in the early-1950s openly encouraged selective emigration and financially sponsored it.\(^{152}\)

Apart from inducements, Bonn had little or no control over the departure of other groups. After all German citizens had a constitutional right to freely emigrate. This played to Canada's advantage. Canada could sign up an unlimited number of prospective immigrants applying directly at its immigration missions without any interference from German officials. The best German authorities could do was to coax prospective immigrants to stay put through their emigration Beratungsstellen (advisory centres). Bonn also desisted from imposing sanctions against Canadian recruiting and promotional methods, such as publicity campaigns and offering transportation loans, which in many instances violated German laws.\(^{153}\) Bonn's attempts to secure greater control over Canadian

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150 DEA noted that Germany saw emigration as a solution to refugee and unemployment problems, excluding certain occupations. IB, Vol. 31, File 682, Pt. 5, Heeney to Jolliffe, 20.10.1949.
152 Yet emigration was only one solution to the refugee problem. Germany's main objective was to secure the social and economic integration of refugees into German society. This was the position recommended in the European Co-operation Administration's 1950 report on the German refugee problem and subsequently was adopted by the German administration.
immigration via bilateral agreements were successfully resisted by Canadian authorities. As a result, Canada was able to maintain a relatively free hand in Germany in determining numbers and types of immigrants. This generous treatment accorded to Canada by Germany in the 1950s may also have been prompted by the recognition that Canada was the first country to open its doors to postwar German refugees.\textsuperscript{154}

Canada also benefited greatly from Germany's policy of subsidised emigration. Overseas officials eagerly took advantage of the recruiting and processing services provided gratis at \textit{Arbeitsämter} (local labour offices) and of the generous, free facilities made available to Canadian staff by German authorities. A senior Canadian immigration official remarked that "[i]n Berlin, Hanau and Hamburg local German authorities are only too pleased to put at our disposal processing facilities which included suitable office quarters, recently renovated and furnished with new office furniture."\textsuperscript{155} Securing the support of both the \textit{Länder} (individual West German States) and federal authorities in Bonn was instrumental in assuring the overall success of Canadian immigrant-labour programs. This often complicated Canadian programs because the \textit{Länder} were not always as supportive of emigration as their federal counterparts. Despite these difficulties, German assistance in 1951-54 contributed substantially to Canada's increased intake of German immigration. It effectively bolstered the resources committed to immigration field work and gave broader coverage to Canadian promotional and recruiting activities. This support was only forthcoming when Canadian initiatives coincided with German interests. When Bonn terminated its help after 1954, the flow of migrants to Canada immediately dropped. Yet, the recruitment efforts of the \textit{Arbeitsämter} only supplemented Canada's main source of immigrants, which consisted of applications for immigration submitted directly to Canadian posts. These so-called "spontaneous" cases were Canada's preferred immigrants as they were felt to be a better class of immigrant.\textsuperscript{156}

\textsuperscript{156} Some voluntary agencies claimed that the \textit{Arbeitsämter} only referred the "dregs of the labour market" for migration. CLWR, Reel H-1393, File CLWR Briefs to Ottawa 1954-55, Baetz to Monk, 1.11.1954.
Bonn's emigration policy also sought to protect the future welfare of German emigrants abroad. It did not simply shunt off misfits, unemployed and welfare dependants on other countries. German authorities were generally reluctant, and some even opposed, to see their citizens leave. This is evident in a proposal made by German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to Prime Minister St. Laurent during his state visit to Canada in 1953. Adenauer sought Canada to offer "temporary" refuge for Germany's neo-refugees until they could be returned to a unified Germany at some point in the future. Bonn felt it had an obligation to protect the welfare of its nationals once they arrived in Canada. It relentlessly pressed Canadian officials for guarantees and safeguards for German emigrants in the area of salaries, labour contracts, working conditions, welfare and social security provisions. In fact, Bonn often made its cooperation in recruiting immigrants for Canada conditional on such assurances. Its well-intentioned paternalism usually hindered more than helped Canadian officials, interfering with immigration planning, timing and targets. Canada could not offer German newcomers anything more than what was available to its own citizens.

As this chapter has set out, the origins of the German immigration boom to Canada lay very much in the late-1940s. The postwar economic prosperity which reached a high-point in the 1950s enabled Ottawa to ease restrictions on immigration and adopt a confident and expansive immigration policy. To carry out the enlarged program, government machinery had to be overhauled and augmented. Also, because of the high immigration targets set, Ottawa was compelled to look to new sources of immigrants other than Britain and the United States. Fortunately for Canada, interest in emigrating was high in Germany after the war and Allied travel restrictions imposed on Germans were lifted in 1949. Non-governmental agencies were able to establish an early presence in the German movement, developing machinery and committing resources which would later play an instrumental part in the German immigration boom. Without these developments in the 1940s, many of which continued into the 1950s, German immigration to Canada from 1951 to 1957 would have been more of a trickle than a flood. The following chapter
focuses on the critical domestic and international developments in 1950 and early-1951 which triggered the German immigration boom.
3. 1950 – 1951: THE BREAKTHROUGH YEARS FOR GERMAN IMMIGRATION

1950-51 was a very significant time for German immigration to Canada. A series of critical events and developments converged in this period, opening doors and creating greater opportunities for Germans to come to Canada. They included the lifting of the ban on German immigration, the creation of a new and more proactive Department of Citizenship and Immigration (DCI), the expansion and rationalisation of immigration machinery, the Korean War, a shortage of immigrants available from non-German sources and the introduction of the Assisted Passage Scheme (APS).

THE DEPARTMENT OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION: MAKING A STATEMENT

The creation of the new DCI was a decisive first step in increasing immigration to Canada in the 1950s. It resulted largely from the growing importance attached to immigration by the government and from the realisation that the Department of Mines and Resources, a "minor backwater" in the federal government, frustrated the administration in pursuing an aggressive immigration policy.¹ In his speech to the House of Commons in November 1949, Prime Minister St.Laurent acknowledged that the Immigration Branch had outgrown its purpose in the old Department, claiming:

> The increasing importance and complexity of immigration required more attention from both the Minister and the Deputy Minister than it was humanly possible to give to the Immigration Branch, included as it was with the numerous other branches of the Department of Mines and Resources.²

The new department formally came into operation on January 18, 1950. Commensurate with its elevated status, the DCI was furnished additional resources to undertake its work. Treasury Board estimates for 1950-51 assigned $664,000 more to its budget over what it had cost the Department of

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¹ House of Commons, Debates, 26.11.1949. By Order-in-Council PC 3073 of 29.10.1917 the Office of Immigration and Colonisation was established, thereby transforming the Immigration Branch of the Department of the Interior into a separate department of the public service. As the importance of immigration waned during the 1930s, King abolished this Department in December 1936, and amalgamated its constituent parts the Immigration Branch, Department of the Interior, and the Indian Affairs Superintendency, into the Department of Mines and Resources. Here immigration matters remained dormant.

² House of Commons, Debates, 26.11.1949. Also, certain business groups, such as the railways, had long pressured the government for such an overhaul in order to give its immigration work more weight. National Archives of Canada (NAC), RG 30, Canadian National Railways (CNR) records, Vol. 5592, Dept. of Colonisation & Agriculture Annual Report - 1950.
Mines and Resources to administer this same work the previous year. The Immigration Branch received a good share of this increment and its budget continued to climb throughout the 1950s. Its overseas service was a major recipient of these additional funds. Offices in Germany and Britain were the principal beneficiaries. For Germany, expenditures jumped from $96,000 in 1951 to $336,293 in 1957, an increase of 250%, whereas for the United Kingdom and Ireland they rose from $430,500 to $756,292, or by 80.5% during the same period (see Figure No. 11). This dramatic hike for Germany was undoubtedly due to the greater importance attached to German immigration by the DCI as the 1950s progressed. It was also an indication that operations in Germany in 1951 were grossly under-funded. The growing overseas budget during the 1950s meant additional staff and offices in Germany which in turn propelled the German immigration boom.

Figure No. 11: Expense of Canadian Immigration Overseas Missions by Country, 1950-58

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Expenses in Germany</th>
<th>Cost per Immigrant</th>
<th>Expenses in Britain</th>
<th>Cost per Immigrant</th>
<th>Expenses in Holland</th>
<th>Cost per Immigrant</th>
<th>Expenses in Italy</th>
<th>Cost per Immigrant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950-1951</td>
<td>$80,643</td>
<td>$3.18</td>
<td>$247,022</td>
<td>$17.77</td>
<td>$38,141</td>
<td>$4.15</td>
<td>$47,064</td>
<td>$4.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-1952</td>
<td>$280,302</td>
<td>$4.70</td>
<td>$374,657</td>
<td>$10.02</td>
<td>$61,079</td>
<td>$3.05</td>
<td>$92,747</td>
<td>$3.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952-1953</td>
<td>$278,528</td>
<td>$10.47</td>
<td>$440,976</td>
<td>$10.98</td>
<td>$78,636</td>
<td>$4.03</td>
<td>$100,251</td>
<td>$5.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953-1954</td>
<td>$351,227</td>
<td>$10.18</td>
<td>$605,661</td>
<td>$12.46</td>
<td>$81,193</td>
<td>$3.94</td>
<td>$95,582</td>
<td>$3.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-1955</td>
<td>$450,241</td>
<td>$15.92</td>
<td>$503,579</td>
<td>$12.26</td>
<td>$90,569</td>
<td>$6.25</td>
<td>$127,950</td>
<td>$5.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-1956</td>
<td>$376,701</td>
<td>$20.60</td>
<td>$502,064</td>
<td>$16.35</td>
<td>$78,737</td>
<td>$11.48</td>
<td>$123,355</td>
<td>$6.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-1957</td>
<td>$406,110</td>
<td>$14.11</td>
<td>$653,916</td>
<td>$9.42</td>
<td>$77,326</td>
<td>$8.89</td>
<td>$124,800</td>
<td>$3.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957-1958</td>
<td>$336,293</td>
<td>$12.62</td>
<td>$776,842</td>
<td>$8.16</td>
<td>$64,964</td>
<td>$5.83</td>
<td>$130,115</td>
<td>$4.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 1950-8 $2,560,045 $11.47 $4,104,717 $10.65 $570,645 $5.95 $841,864 $4.71

Note: The cost per immigrant for the years 1950-1 and 1951-2 include both German and DP immigrants. Note: Figures for German overseas expenses for 1950-1 and 1951-2 include Austrian mission expenses. Note: Expenses for Germany in 1956 include all costs associated with the move and renovation of the new Cologne post; this year can be considered an aberration. Source: Department of Finance, Public Accounts of Canada (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, Annual issues 1950-1958) and National Archives of Canada (NAC), RG 26, Department of Citizenship and Immigration (DCI) records, Vol. 61 D to G.

The importance assigned immigration at the highest political level and in the House of Commons were clear signals for the new department to undertake a more assertive approach. The

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3 Toronto Telegram, 25.2.1950.
4 Department of Finance, Public Accounts of Canada (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1950-51 and 1957-58). In 1951, staffing overseas expanded to meet Canada's new objective. NAC, RG 26, Department of Citizenship and Immigration (DCI) records, Vol. 91, File 3-2-5, Lizotte to Deputy Minister, 13.4.1951.
5 In addition to Karlsruhe, there were visa offices in Hannover from 1951-56 and in Bremen from 1953-55. Offices were opened in Hamburg, Hanau and Munich in 1954, in West Berlin in 1955 and in Stuttgart in 1956. Hawkins, Canada and Immigration. Public Policy and Public Concern (Montreal/Idontown: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972), 242.
appointments of Walter Harris as Minister and Laval Fortier as Deputy Minister of the new department were a move in this direction. The media also greeted their appointments as a positive sign. *Macleans* commented: "Both are young and energetic and both - unlike most of their recent predecessors - think immigration is a good thing. On the other hand they know its a ticklish subject politically." Harris recognised the value of expanded immigration. It had helped bring his province of Ontario, the major recipient of immigrants after the war, considerable prosperity, high employment and many new jobs created by immigrant businesses. Harris and Fortier believed in immigration's long-term benefits in building the economy, the population and, ultimately, Canada's future. They repeatedly defended and promoted their expanded immigration policy in public and within government on these grounds.

The new imperative assigned immigration by the bureaucracy's political masters soon spread into the ranks of the senior management of the DCI. The old director, A.L. Jolliffe, who could not adapt to the new mandate, was replaced in September 1950 by C.E.S. Smith, an austere administrator, but who staunchly supported the new expanded role of the department. Other senior departmental officials who towed the government's new line on immigration were Chief of the Operations Division George Benoit, Chief of the Settlement Division J.A. Paul, and Director of Technical Services and one-time assistant to the Deputy Minister, Jean Boucher. They may have seen in this new mission a means of regaining some of the jurisdiction that their Branch had lost to other departments, particularly to the Department of Labour (DL), in the 1940s. They directed and oversaw the administration of the expanded immigration program, gearing procedures and machinery overseas and in Canada to process a greater intake of immigrants. Their policy recommendations also reflected the DCI's will to boost numbers. Outside observers also noted that

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9 Although this was Walter Harris's first Cabinet post, he had acquired considerable experience in government, representing the Grey-Bruce riding in the House from 1940 to 1957 and serving as Parliamentary Assistant to the Secretary of State for External Affairs (DEA) in 1947 and to the Prime Minister in 1948. In 1954, he was appointed Minister of Finance as Jack Pickersgill assumed his old post as Minister of the DCI. Harris's riding was an area of German settlement in the nineteenth century. Because of his Baptist church affiliation, the Canadian Christian Council for the Resettlement of Refugees (CCCRR), especially the German Baptist immigration society, believed they had a special "in" with him.

7 *Macleans*, 15.5.1950. For Harris's views on the benefits to Ontario, see *Globe & Mail*, 29.4.1950.
"after the creation of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, it became essential to show 'production,' in this case people processed and shipped to Canada."

The most important official, in terms of translating the goal of increased immigration into an enlarged German movement was J.R. Robillard, Canada's chief immigration official in Germany from 1951 to 1956. Robillard's promotion to head of immigration operations in Germany in July 1950 was a most fortuitous turn of events for Canada's German immigration program. He brought to this post his zeal to "increase numbers," an objective which he felt was in line with the general wishes of the Department. This trait was already apparent during his stint as chief of the mission in Austria in 1949, when he used his influence to clear various obstacles limiting the flow of immigrants from Austria to Canada. For Robillard and his staff, promoting German immigration was not a job but a mission, a point he made clear to headquarters: "We were always of the opinion that it was inherent with our duties and aims to do everything possible to help potential migrants fulfil their desire to migrate to Canada." He also was inspired by the belief that Germans made excellent immigrants and future citizens. This view had taken shape early in his overseas' career and is reflected in the following letter to headquarters:

The consensus of opinion of all concerned at this Mission, which includes four different Canadian Departments, and from service and experience in every country in Europe is that, by an outstanding margin, the German and Austrian immigrants are undoubtedly the finest type of future Canadians who could be admitted to Canada at this time. They are indeed suitable immigrants, having regard to the climatic, social, educational, industrial, labour and other conditions or requirements of Canada. ... The past and present achievements of immigrants from Germany and Austria, who were admitted to Canada during the last 50 years, will substantiate these statements. ... This may seem to be an exceptional extollation of the qualities of the German and Austrian immigrants but it is completely justified and unbiased.

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8 Sturhahn, They Came from East and West: A History of Immigration to Canada (Winnipeg: North American Baptist Immigration and Colonization Society, 1976), 89 and Gunn interview. The Immigration Director's commitment to a positive immigration policy is found in his letter to his Deputy Minister (25.5.1951) linking immigration with Canada's development. He was also driven in this direction by the competition from the Department of Labour (DL). DCI, Vol. 96, File 3-11-3, Pt. 4.


As the executor of Ottawa's program overseas, Robillard faced limits on the influence he could bring to bear on the German movement. Yet, he exploited every available opportunity to either influence policy decisions in Ottawa or to implement them in such a way so as to maximise the flow of Germans and especially to give individual deserving cases every possibility of coming to Canada. Many of the letters he directed to Ottawa contain an appeal to boost some facet of German immigration. Certainly, his lobbying had a notable effect on the size and character of this movement. Some of the major reforms and initiatives adopted by the department, such as broadening the scope of APS in late-1955 as well as advance planning of immigration programs, were first recommended by Robillard. The impact of some of these measures extended beyond the movement of Germans and furthered European immigration to Canada in general.

Robillard's key ally in Germany was T.C. Davis, Canada's representative and later Ambassador to Germany, who continually prodded Ottawa to seriously consider the prospect of an expanded movement of Germans to Canada. He saw in this a double advantage for Canada:

... I think that we have a duty to aid this country in the solution of her problem of overpopulation. We can help ourselves both internationally and domestically by the movement of people from here to Canada and I think that now is the time to begin.  

_Fighting Falling Numbers_

A number of important events in 1950 prompted Ottawa to take a more active and direct role in immigration. The first was the revelation that Canada's intake of immigrants declined between 1948 and 1950. By the spring of 1950, this development was met with some alarm in business, public and government circles. The media amplified this concern and noted in particular the falling number of Britons coming to Canada. Criticism of the government's policy was echoed in the House of Commons in April 1950, when the estimates for the new department were introduced. At

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12 On 16.8.1951, Davis presented his letter of credentials as Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany.
13 Davis' two important contributions to the movement were imploring Ottawa to lift the ban on German nationals and promoting the extension of assisted-passage loans and bulk-labour programs to German immigrants. NAC, RG 25, Department of External Affairs (DEA) records, Vol. 6248, File 9408-A-40, DEA Despatch No. 322, 12.8.1950.
least six speakers urged the government to set a target of 200,000 immigrants per year; some also questioned Ottawa's policy of excluding German nationals. In response to this concern, the new Minister publicly pledged "to promote an increase in the population of Canada," and accepted an annual intake of about 1.5% of Canada's population (over 200,000 immigrants) as a workable basis for immigration.

The start of the Korean War in June 1950 also gave renewed urgency to the call for expanded immigration. Government officials and experts feared a repeat of conditions in World War II, when the mobilisation of personnel for the armed forces and intensified war production put a squeeze on the Canadian labour market. Harris recognised the need to further Canada's industrial and economic expansion in order to be an effective partner in preparing western defences. Here he saw a role for immigration in supplying skilled workers for defence industries. Events in Korea and Canada's re-armament program also increased opportunities for the immigration of greater numbers of skilled workers. Previously immigration had been dominated by the unskilled. The international tensions caused by the Korean conflict also obliged Ottawa to take a closer look at helping to relieve the strain of overpopulation in Germany and other European countries in order to ensure political and social stability on the critical European Cold War front.

The Korean conflict certainly helped precipitate the removal of the ban against German immigration. It placed greater emphasis on bringing West Germany into the western camp, especially into NATO. This meant that Canada's continued treatment of the Federal Republic as an enemy state, especially mirrored in its immigration policy, was no longer appropriate. At this time it was also evident that terminating the state of war with Germany was being blocked by the Soviet Union's intransigence on the German unification issue. Following the lead of Britain, the United States and France, Canada decided to end its state of war with Germany "as soon as it was in a

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16 Ottawa Morning Citizen, 22.1.1951. Provincial officials in Ontario were especially concerned that defence industries and large construction projects might fall short of skilled and unskilled workers. See Financial Post, 25.11.1950.
17 In 1950, for example, skilled workers only comprised 15.5% of the total movement.
position to do so. The admission of German nationals to Canada was a first step in this direction. In the end, Canada's immigration restrictions had to be consistent with foreign policy considerations.

Meanwhile as the immigration slump showed no signs of letting up by mid-1950, Ottawa's concern grew. The release of official figures confirming this downturn for 1950, and rising public criticism, forced the government to take serious action in 1951. In part, Harris was pushed in this direction by the Province of Ontario which, disappointed with Ottawa's results in 1950, was again talking of launching its own program to bring 75,000 new workers to the province. To turn the downward trend around and to meet Canada's anticipated labour shortage in 1951, an assertive and open immigration policy was adopted which aimed at securing between 150,000 and 300,000 immigrants from all sources available in Europe, including Britain, northwestern Europe, Italy and, late-in-the-day, Germany.

Streamlining Immigration: PC 2856 (July 1950), IACI and DACI

Steps to increase immigration were already taken by Ottawa with the issuing of PC 2856 on June 9, 1950. This Order, a direct response to the declining numbers of migrants, revolutionised Canadian immigration in the 1950s. It replaced the old cumbersome system of issuing Orders in Council every time a fresh quota of bulk labourers was required. More importantly, the Order substantially widened the admissible classes of non-British European immigrants, hitherto limited to certain semi-skilled categories of immigrant labour, such as farm labourers, miners and loggers. Henceforth, any western European immigrant who had the skills needed in Canada and could become readily integrated into Canadian society was eligible for admission. This was a boon for German immigration to Canada, because Germany had a great diversity of skilled, semi-

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unskilled workers. The new *Immigration Act*, which became effective on June 1, 1953, complemented PC 2856. It confirmed the DCI's discretion to decide which potential immigrants were admissible and to control immigration in accordance with Canada's absorptive capacity without going through the time-consuming process of requiring the consent of Parliament. The new *Act* and accompanying regulations facilitated the practice of selecting nationals from northwestern continental Europe on the basis of trades or skills needed in Canada.

In order to effectively administer PC 2856, cabinet approved the formation of an Interdepartmental Advisory Committee on Immigration (IACI) and a Departmental Advisory Committee on Immigration (DACI). The IACI reported immigration policy problems to the minister and provided for the effective co-ordination of activities of concerned departments. The DACI advised and assisted the minister in the administration of the *Immigration Act* and Regulations, especially in the context of PC 2856.\(^{20}\) It was in the DACI that the fundamental issues governing immigration were debated and often decided, including: the formulation of annual immigration programs; the setting of immigration targets for all countries, including Germany; and the determination of the occupational types of immigrants to be admitted. The resulting policy and programming emanating from the DACI were routinely rubber-stamped by the minister and cabinet.

In comparison to its predecessor, the Interdepartmental Committee on Immigration and Labour, the DACI represented a step up in the level of sophistication in immigration programming. Rather than simply relying on industry to dictate labour needs in the form of orders placed for immigrants, immigration officials through the DACI, for the first time, developed their own capacity to survey national needs. To this end the DACI drew on the expertise of other departments, most notably Trade and Commerce, Labour, Supply and Services, and Defence Production whose representatives

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\(^{19}\) Ottawa *Morning Citizen*, 22.1.1951.

\(^{20}\) DCI, Vol. 73, File Departmental Advisory Committee on Immigration (DACI), Minutes of DACI meeting, 7.7.1950. The Interdepartmental Advisory Committee on Immigration (IACI) was comprised of the Deputy Ministers of the DCI, Agriculture, DEA, Finance, Labour, National Health & Welfare, Trade & Commerce and representatives of the Privy Council Office (PCO). NAC, RG 2, PCO records, Vol. 2645, Cabinet Conclusions of 23.5.1950 & 27.6.1950.
were invited annually to DACI meetings.\textsuperscript{21} By including these departments in its programming, the DCI could also tap the economic and labour-market data that they collected.\textsuperscript{22} The mood which prevailed in the DACI sessions was constructive and generally optimistic and directed to assessing how immigration could be boosted and refined to benefit Canada's development. By the mid-1950s, provincial representatives, organised labour, business and voluntary agencies were also invited to DACI meetings. The significant aspect of the DACI's work was that it closely linked immigration to Canada's business cycles and manpower requirements with a view to optimise the movement of desired immigrants. This approach led to the expansion of Canada's annual immigrant intake and widened the occupational groups admissible to Canada, both of which contributed to the German boom. In short, it marked the transition from an ad-hoc to a planned immigration program.

\textit{Machinery to Gauge Manpower Requirements and Counsel Immigrants}

In addition to the input received during DACI meetings, the DCI developed its own machinery and methods to assess Canada's absorptive capacity which were primarily administered by its Settlement Services Division. This capability enabled the department to better identify labour gaps in particular industries or regions of Canada and thereby fine-tune its immigration programs to fill these demands and, in the process, increase the flow of immigrants to Canada.

The Settlement Service's main function was to link the selection of immigrants to employment openings in Canada. Established in 1949, the service was initially limited to developing opportunities for the settlement of immigrants on farms and in small businesses. By 1951, its tasks broadened. It accepted orders for workers requested by businesses and placed unsponsored immigrants recruited by immigration authorities. At this time its work was coordinated more closely with the Overseas Service. The Service's officers were posted overseas and visa officers

\textsuperscript{21} Also included on occasion were the departments of Finance, DEA and PCO.

\textsuperscript{22} For example, the DCI received estimates for skilled tradesmen from the Departments of National Defence and Supply and Service and tapped into the broad employment and economic data produced by the DL's Economic and Research Branch.
received settlement training. Its consolidated lists of employment opportunities in Canada were circulated to all overseas posts. This represented a marked transformation of the Immigration Branch from essentially a screening agency, ensuring that immigrants complied with medical, security and civil requirements set out in the Act and regulations, to a recruitment office that actively solicited and sought immigrants for Canada. By 1952, the Settlement Service’s capability to survey employment opportunities and to receive and place immigrants had advanced to such a stage that headquarters was convinced it could operate without the DL’s assistance both overseas and in Canada.\(^{23}\) From this time on the Service placed more German immigrants than the DL.

Although its placement functions very much duplicated the work performed by the DL, the Settlement Service offered other useful services for immigrants, including an extended net of job opportunities, better follow-up coverage and specialised placement work (i.e. for farmers, capital and self-establishment cases). Furthermore the Service brought more resources to the placement field including its extensive network of field offices and immigrant hostels in Canada. Its field surveys of employment opportunities were used as the basis of the Department’s immigration programming. The impact of the Service on immigration was twofold: it made possible an expanded immigration by generating greater numbers of employment opportunities for immigrants and it sought to make these placements successful in order to facilitate the integration of the newcomers into Canadian society. Quality placements were essential to the success of the German movement as 60% of the applicants applying at Canadian posts in Germany did so as result of referrals and letters from friends and relatives in Canada.\(^{24}\)

The administration of the new DCI also underwent a major overhaul in 1950-51 which enabled it to run more smoothly and ultimately process more immigrants. More authority was delegated to the posts. For instance, field offices in Canada and posts abroad were empowered to approve certain

\(^{23}\) IB. Vol. 814, File 551-10-1952, Pt. 2, document "1952 PROGRAMME." This is also reflected in the increased number of placements - 31% of the total immigration to Canada - made by the Service in 1952. IB. Vol. 96, File 3-11-3, Pt. 2, Chief Op. Div. to Director, 9.11.1954. Its role in placement activities was consistent with the responsibilities assigned the Branch by the Immigration Act. By 1952, the DCI’s basic area surveys identifying employment opportunities had complete national coverage. DCI, Report of the [DCI], fiscal year ending 31.3.1953.
types of immigration applications. As of February 15, 1951, Immigration headquarters was reorganised on a functional basis, whereby all associated functions were assigned to the following divisions: Settlement, Admissions, Operations, Inspection and Administration. Without these reforms the streamlined processing of the hundreds of thousands of immigrants, including Germans, would not have been possible.25

Other Government Players
What also prompted the DCI to adopt a more active approach was the competition offered by the DL. As the displaced person (DP) program was nearing its end in 1951, the DL aimed to continue its bulk-labour - later renamed "group-labour" - programs and thereby maintain its presence in immigration work both overseas and in Canada.26 As early as 1950, Labour officials overseas were exploring the possibilities which German immigration offered in this regard, even directly approaching various German authorities. The chief Labour officer in Germany realised the value of developing a movement of German miners in 1950. According to him, it would "have far-reaching effects on future policy and procedure in handling of German emigrants for mass labour schemes …".27 Germany offered the DL key advantages, namely a fresh, abundant and skilled supply of labour with which to continue its schemes. Many mining and forestry employers, and later farmers, specifically insisted on German workers. Another advantage for the department was that it already had staff stationed in Germany for the DP movement which could be readily redirected to process Germans. What clinched the department's place in the German movement was the crisis in 1951 when, with the shortfall of DP workers, German labourers were urgently needed to fill the outstanding bulk-labour orders placed by Canadian mines and forestry companies.

26 The importance of immigration to DL's Canadian operations is reflected in a comment in 1953 by a regional labour officer: "The farm employment side of NES will go through a rapid deterioration if our supply of immigrant labour is cut off, and placed by the Immigration Branch." NAC, RG 27, Department of Labour (DL) records, Vol.280, File 1-26-10-2, Pt. 2, Dwyer to Dawson, 19.5.1955. The DL also saw itself competing with other sources such as the railways. DL, Vol. 291, File 1-26-60-4, Pt. 4, Dawson to Brown, 19.10.1953.
Just as with the DP movement, the DL had again beaten their immigration counterparts out of the starting gate in developing a scheme to move German migrants. Its advance scouting activities in Germany in 1950-51 met with stiff opposition from immigration authorities and prompted a senior Labour official to remark:

...our efforts to bring out more people to the country, who would be useful in a productive way, still are subject to the jealousy of Immigration authorities who suddenly woke up and realised that they had a job to do when we first started to find jobs for Displaced Persons in Canada.28

Not only did labour officials assess immigration prospects in Germany earlier, they were also able to interest Canadian employers in German workers sooner. When it appeared doubtful that the International Refugee Organisation (IRO) would be able to produce enough DP miners and lumbermen in 1951, the DL directed the attention of these industries to the possibility of securing German workers. It even boldly suggested that if the trial run to recruit engineers, machinists and domestics in the United Kingdom failed, these orders could be transferred to Germany.29 Its aggressiveness was most evident in its pioneering of the German farm workers' program. Rather than wait for shortages to emerge, it took the initiative in 1951 and solicited orders for German farm workers by writing repeatedly to all provincial agriculture officials and promoting this movement at Federal-Provincial Farm Labour Conferences in 1951 and 1952. The department's efforts did not go unrewarded. Orders for thousands of German farm hands were placed by most provinces in the ensuing years. Evidently, the DL had few reservations about the utility of Germans as immigrant labourers.

The DL furthered the German movement in other ways. Its group labour programs were suited ideally for prospective immigrants who did not have sponsors and jobs nor the funds to come to Canada. In fact, this was the standing of most Germans applying for admission to Canada in the

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28 Ibid., Greene to MacNamara, 8.2.1951. Labour's overseer of the bulk-labour programs, Walter Dawson, was sent on a reconnaissance mission to Germany in 1951. DL, Vol. 290, File 1-26-60-1, Pt.1, Chapdelaine to Secretary State DEA, 10.3.1951.

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1950s. Sponsorship was not required because the department assumed responsibility for the reception, movement and placement of workers in Canada. By 1951, the DL extended overseas and inland transportation loans to Germans applying through its group labour schemes.

Yet the department also had a number of deficiencies. The National Employment Service (NES) essentially functioned as a labour exchange, matching people to jobs and when a person did not match, a placement was not made. Furthermore, it operated on the principle of reserving for Canadians the first choice of jobs which, by default, left unattractive positions to immigrants. This practice was widespread as even orders placed by immigration authorities had to be first cleared through the NES on this basis. It may explain in part the high employment turn-over rate of German newcomers during their first years in Canada.

Certain restrictions and conditions applied to the DL's German labour schemes. In 1951, the DL could only move immigrants who qualified as workers under its farm, domestics, woods, mines, sugar-beet, skilled and general workers' schemes. By 1952, its programs for which Germans could qualify were scaled back to three: farm, sugar-beet and domestic workers. Only workers, not dependants, qualified for transportation loans. Moreover, married heads of families had to proceed to Canada ahead of their dependants who remained in Germany until such time when they could be sponsored. Yet what the department's labour programs lacked in diversity, they made up for in size. They could quickly move many workers in groups to meet urgent labour needs in Canada and were prepared to accept as many German domestics and farm hands as they could place.

The zenith of the department's German group labour schemes was reached between 1951 and 1954, when most of the workers it brought forward consisted of Germans. At this time Germany offered

29 DL., Vol. 290, File 1-26-60-1, Pt.1, MacNamara to Davis, 16.4.1951. Regarding the German miners' and lumber workers' schemes, see chapter four. The Canadian Metal Mining Association actually initiated the request for miners of "German peasant stock" as early as October 1950. DL., Vol. 291, File 1-26-60-2, Pt.1, Wansborough to Fortier, 11.10.1950.
31 Unemployment insurance provisions entailed that priority must be given by National Employment Services to Canadian residents seeking work in order to protect the UI fund. International Labour Organisation (ILO), National Employment Service, Canada (Geneva: ILO, 1950), 4.
an abundant, diverse and readily accessible supply of labour for the department. Although the DL centred most of its recruiting in Britain, the dwindling supply of domestics and farm hands and certain skilled workers there forced it to turn progressively to its offices in Germany for supply. After 1954 DL’s German group labour programs withered as immigration authorities sought to increasingly fill group-labour orders with migrants from other countries. Only its domestics' program continued to produce modest numbers from Germany into the late-1950s. By this time the department's overseas staff was cut drastically and its placement activities "were relegated to a somewhat lesser role." In the final analysis, the DL gave the German movement a kick-start, fresh initiative, additional resources (almost $877,000 for immigration work in 1953 alone) and services. More than 22,000 German workers came to Canada via the DL’s group labour programs from 1951 to 1957.

Labour and Immigration were the major stakeholders in German immigration by 1951. Although the Department of External Affairs (DEA) by the fall of 1950 pushed to have restrictions on German immigration abolished and sought to have Canada assist in solving Germany's overpopulation problem, it played a smaller role in the operational and policy aspects of the German movement to Canada in the 1950s. Its authority in this area was confined to issuing visitors' visas, promoting Canada as a desirable immigration destination, counselling immigration enquiries, directing applications to the Canadian immigration missions and assisting Canadian immigration officials in their negotiations with German authorities.

Canadian immigration missions, working out of separate offices in Germany, operated more-or-less independently of the DEA. Even with the incorporation of immigration missions into Canadian consulates in 1956, immigration work was still effectively divorced from External Affair's functions

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32 A survey conducted by the Baptist immigration agency revealed that job changing was a common feature for German Baptist newcomers in Canada. Sturhahn, *They came from East*, 287.
34 This total consisted of about 8,000 domestics, 5,800 farm hands, 4000-5000 sugar-beet workers, 750 miners, 900 loggers, 2,255 skilled and 1,150 semi and unskilled workers. These figures were derived from various DL operational files.
and responsibilities in Germany.\textsuperscript{36} Perhaps the greatest impact that the DEA had on Canada's German immigration policy was its effort to promote Canada's continuing membership and active and positive participation in the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM).\textsuperscript{37} This ensured that immigration authorities did not lose sight of Canada's role in solving Europe's, in this instance, Germany's overpopulation problem.

The provinces' influence on German immigration was slight and indirect. In the 1950s the view that immigration was primarily a federal concern prevailed in Ottawa.\textsuperscript{38} Although the DCI made a greater effort to consult with provincial authorities on immigration matters in the 1950s,\textsuperscript{39} rarely was German immigration on the top of the agenda.

With regard to overseas immigration work, most provinces concentrated their activities, consisting of counselling, recruitment and promotional work, in Britain where many had established offices by the mid-1950s. No such facilities were established in Germany at this time and promotional work was confined to tours by provincial officials seeking specific types of labourers, events which were closely co-ordinated by immigration authorities. With the exception of Newfoundland's business migration program and Ontario's recruitment of construction tradesmen in the early-1950s, few provinces embarked on their own German immigration initiatives. Most requests for German workers were accommodated by existing federal immigration programs which recruited a pool of labour to fill provincial requests. The DL's German farm-labour program operated very much along these lines. In most instances, there was no need for the provinces to take a greater hand in German

\textsuperscript{36} A proposal presented to cabinet in 1948 to abolish these missions in Germany and Austria and administer immigration from consulates under the direction of DEA and Immigration consuls was scuttled when the Labour minister refused to agree. PCO, Vol.2642, Cabinet Conclusions, 29.9.1948.

\textsuperscript{37} This change was necessitated not out of any need to more effectively link the work of the two departments but because the American occupation authorities withdrew their sponsorship of the missions in May 1955 as Germany assumed the status of a sovereign nation. IB, Vol. 822, File 552-1-551, Pt. 2, "Canadian-German," 19.2.1960.

\textsuperscript{38} The views of the DEA were often consulted on certain issues affecting German immigration such as East German refugee problem in 1953 and Ottawa's review of security screening in 1955. For the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration's (ICEM) role in German migration to Canada see chapter seven.

\textsuperscript{39} Hawkins, \textit{Canada and Immigration}, 179.

\textsuperscript{39} On the insistence of the provinces, especially Quebec and Alberta, Ottawa adopted a policy of greater consultation on immigration matters. DCI, Vol. 73, File [DAC], Minutes of DACI meeting, 10.11.1952. To this end, the Director of Immigration had visited all provincial capitals in 1951 and settlement officers in the field maintained contact with their provincial counterparts. From 1953 on, meetings between senior federal and provincial officials took place.
immigration as they could rely on Ottawa’s existing machinery overseas and in Canada. Provincial governments also worked closely with the NES and Immigration Settlement Service officials in placing and following up new arrivals, including the thousands of German farm workers imported by the Federal-Provincial Farm Labour Committees. These activities applied to the general immigration stream and were not confined to any one national group.\textsuperscript{40}

The provinces’ contribution to the boom in German immigration was two-fold. They contributed to the increase in immigration in the 1950s by seeking workers, sometimes explicitly specifying Germans, through their own programs or those of the federal government. Second, the additional resources they brought to the settlement and placement field assisted Germans in getting established and thereby improved the prospects of a continued movement.

\textbf{LOOKING FOR OTHER SOURCES OF IMMIGRANTS}

By late-1950, all elements required for an expanded immigration program were in place: the political authority and will, the personnel and the machinery. What is startling is that, in charting its massive campaign for 1951, immigration planners for the most part overlooked the substantial contribution that German immigration could make. Only when a deficit of immigrant-labourers emerged by the mid-point of that year did Canada turn to the German manpower supply in a major way.

The most decisive development which turned the tables in favour of German immigration in 1951 was the emerging shortage of qualified DP workers. In 1947, Canada committed itself to assisting in the solution of the DP problem in Europe. It accepted DPs as immigrants on humanitarian grounds and to fulfil its international obligations and to meet manpower needs. Economic considerations strongly governed Canada’s DP program as every year thousands of DPs were sought and secured to fill positions in Canada’s booming economy. Ottawa was counting on a big

\textsuperscript{40} By 1955, seven provinces had entered into agreements with Ottawa for the equal sharing of costs of immigrants who became indigent through accident or ill-health during the first year of their residence in Canada. This no doubt gave good press to Canada’s
intake of DPs for 1951, the last year of the IRO’s DP resettlement operations. Moreover, the IRO led Ottawa to believe that 1951 would be no different from previous years. It undertook to supply virtually all of the immigrant-workers required by Canadian mines, forest industries, public construction projects, as well as many domestics and farm labourers, totalling 16,000 workers. Despite doubts by some government and industry experts about the IRO’s ability to deliver the number and types of workers required, Ottawa decided, on the confident assurances of IRO officials, that the DP labour-program for 1951 would stand without any alterations.\(^{41}\) For federal authorities bringing the IRO’s resettlement project to a successful end had precedence over starting up a substantial German movement.\(^{42}\) There were also practical advantages for Ottawa obtaining DP workers; they could be readily mobilised with all accompanying pre-selection, processing, pre-embarkation and transportation services and costs assumed fully by the IRO. Labour’s Deputy Minister, A. MacNamara, was quite clear on the priority and advantages of the DP movement:

> Canada’s best interest is in clearing up the I.R.O. situation because some of Canada’s money is being spent in this connection. ... The question of German Nationals is complicated by the fact that no one is prepared to pay the cost of passage.\(^{43}\)

Ottawa was compelled to reappraise its priorities and immigration program in April 1951 when the IRO confirmed that it would be able to deliver only one-half of the workers and not on the agreed upon times. Warnings were already sounded as early as February 1951 by Canadian overseas officials who noted that the IRO was behind schedule on filling virtually all of their orders.\(^{44}\) Labour officials were already making contingency plans the following month to recruit German and Italian workers to meet the shortfall for the lumber companies. In June 1951, it became apparent that the IRO’s position was worse than expected, prompting Canadian authorities in Karlsruhe to

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\(^{41}\) By mid-1948 even International Refugee Organisation (IRO) officials admitted “they have just about reached the bottom of the barrel so far as single unaccompanied women for domestic work are concerned.” DL, Vol. 3028, File Interdepartmental Committee on Immigration and Labour (ICIL) 1948-59, Minutes of ICIL meeting, 24.8.1948. DL also felt that the supply of displaced person (DP) miners was exhausted. DL, Vol. 291, File 1-26-60-2, Pt.1, Dawson to MacNamara, 14.10.1950.

\(^{42}\) DEA, Vol. 6248, File 9408-A-40, Consular Div. to U-Secretary State DEA, 25.5.1945; and DCI, Vol. 151, File 3-32-11, Gibson to Cardinal, 8.7.1949. This was a very sensible policy given that Germany was responsible for the DP problem in the first place and DPs had no other backers to turn to. This policy also assisted in the postwar reconstruction of Europe.


\(^{44}\) DCI, Vol. 73, File [DACI], Minutes of DACI meeting, 9.4.1951 & DACI document No. 3.
cable: "DP picture getting more dismal daily please cable authority give absolute priority German Nationals all phases our operations." Clearances were immediately given and the emphasis shifted from recruiting DPs to Germans to fill the outstanding immigrant-labour quotas.

Another factor which led Ottawa to lean more towards German immigration was the perception amongst overseas officials that the general fitness and suitability of the remaining prospective DP immigrants had rapidly diminished by 1951, while the German labour supply remained fresh and virtually untouched. Admittedly, by 1951 the available pool of DP labour had been picked over several times by various immigration countries which in the end left a "residue" of refugees known as "hard-core" cases. Officers in the field brought this to the attention of Ottawa and at the same time made a pitch for German immigration. In 1950, the DEA's representative reported on his conversation with the Chief of Canadian immigration operations in Germany as follows:

...in the field of Displaced Persons they are beginning to scrape the bottom of the barrel and... it is increasingly difficult to fill possible quotas from this source... We agreed that Germans of what is left of Germany and the Germans from Poland formed a very excellent source of new Canadians for Canada.

The IRO was indeed encountering problems in filling orders for workers. In 1951 it began recruiting from amongst DP groups found in other European countries in order to produce workers it had promised Canada. This confirmed the Canadian view that the available supply of "suitable" DP migrants in Germany and Austria was near exhaustion. Canadian officials, moreover, observed that rejection rates for the remaining DPs was very high. In fact, by October 1951, the situation had deteriorated to such a point that the Director of Immigration opposed any further recruitment of DPs who were patently "not of the same calibre as the German and Austrian nationals."

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44 This especially was the case after the U.S. had entered the DP immigration picture in 1949. It also led senior IRO officials to denounce the practice of receiving countries which took only the fit and able and left behind the hard core case. M.J. Proudfoot, European Refugees, 1939-1952: A Study in Forced Population Movement (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1956), 429.
June 1951 therefore marked a decisive turning point from a passive to an active German immigration policy. From this time, Germans supplanted DPs as the chief source of basic labour for Ottawa. They filled jobs for which Canadian workers, British and other northwestern European immigrants were not available. This sudden change over to mass German immigration was facilitated by the existing presence of staff and facilities in Germany which had been used for the DP movement. The continuity between the DP and German movements is reflected in the following stock letter sent by Saskatchewan's Farm Labour Committee to employers applying for immigrant workers:

Your application for an immigrant worker was made when our chief source of supply of labour were [sic] DP Camps in Europe. This source of supply we feel has now been exhausted and arrangements have been completed to bring out German farm workers from West Germany.\(^49\)

**Emigration Disinterest in Britain**

Immigration planners' major goal in late-1950 was to secure more British migrants, especially to offset the declining flow from 1948 to 1950. The need for more Britons was an axiom held by both English Canada and government. Even British High Commission officials in Canada saw the advantages of ensuring a good flow of their countrymen to Canada as a means of keeping strong ties with its Commonwealth cousin whose stature was rising in world affairs.\(^50\) Practically all stops were pulled by Ottawa to attract more British migrants. The Director of Immigration was dispatched to the United Kingdom in late-1950 to seek more shipping and competitive fares for British migrants and to convince London to ease capital export restrictions imposed against emigrants. Immigration staff and facilities in the United Kingdom were augmented and an APS was introduced to entice more immigrants lacking transportation funds to come to Canada.

The results of these efforts were mixed. While in 1951 Canada was able to reverse the trend of falling British immigration by securing more than twice the numbers in 1950, the figures still fell

short of expectations. This was especially noticeable for the British content of total immigration which declined from 18% in 1950 to 16% in 1951. What must have raised eyebrows in Ottawa were the large numbers of Canada's former enemies, specifically Germans, coming forward in 1951. 32,395 Germans alone came to Canada in this year, representing an increase of 456% over 1950. The Italian movement showed similar impressive gains. The public's reaction in 1952 was one of continued criticism that not enough was being done for British immigration.51 This compelled Ottawa to keep the British immigration tap on while reducing the flow of Germans and Italians to Canada. This practice was most evident during downturns in the Canadian economy.

Equally frustrating for policy makers in 1951 was that the British supply was not sufficient to satisfy all immigrant-labour demands in various fields in Canada. Not only did the 31,000 British migrants fail to meet Canada's aggregate manpower requirements, but this group's occupational composition was decidedly lopsided, consisting mostly of professional, clerical and skilled workers. Relatively few British unskilled labourers, agriculturalists and domestics came forward. And most employers were not prepared to go without such workers if British supply was not forthcoming. On these occasions the principle of the primacy of immigration from Britain had to give way to economic realities and to Ottawa's long-term economic and demographic plans.52 Immigrant-worker orders which could not be met by British immigration were directed to missions in continental Europe and, in this way, many invariably found their way to Canadian immigration headquarters in Karlsruhe. Not surprisingly, Germans filled precisely those labour categories which Canada was unable to enlist in Britain.

The flow of German immigrants to Canada continued after 1952 primarily because Britain could not meet all the labour-immigrant needs of Canada's growing economy. There were many reasons for the United Kingdom's failure in this regard. Canada's appetite for immigrant-labour in the

50 The British High Commission in Ottawa was keeping close tabs on the number of non-British immigrants that the Dominion was accepting.
1950s outstripped Britain's capacity to single-handedly feed this demand. Competition for British immigrants was fierce after the Second World War. Also, few British blue-collar workers were willing to emigrate because of the superior wage, working and welfare conditions then offered in Britain in comparison to Canada. High transportation costs, capital transfer restrictions, the devalued pound and the perceived duty to assist in postwar reconstruction undoubtedly dissuaded many Britons from taking this step. Germany therefore remained Canada's fall-back supplier in the 1950s.

Looking Elsewhere in Europe

Similar disincentives to emigrate were evident in other countries of northwestern Europe, including Belgium, Denmark, France, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, in the decades after the war. More so than in Britain, most of these countries laid greater emphasis on retaining the productive elements of their population to assist in postwar reconstruction. With the exception of the Netherlands, none of these countries faced acute overpopulation problems and therefore had little surplus labour to spare for emigration. Accordingly, they sought to limit emigration by imposing or enforcing existing restrictions which made it difficult for their nationals to leave or for overseas countries to carry out active immigration programs. Also, their relatively small populations did not provide adequate bases from which to produce large-scale movements. Nor were sufficient immigration and shipping facilities found in these countries to handle very large movements. Consequently, immigration from this part of Europe remained relatively small throughout the 1950s.

These limitations strongly influenced Ottawa's immigration policy. After Britain, the United States and France, immigration from northwestern European countries received preference from

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52 As the Deputy Minister of Labour replied to a writer bemoaning the shortfall of British newcomers: "I would be one of the happiest men in Canada if I could arrange for a large scale movement of British people to this country, but Britain is sorely in need of all the labour possible and cannot spare any for us." DL, Vol. 3532, File 3-26-38-1, Pt. 5, MacNamara to MacDonald, 27.11.1951.
54 This was evident in immigration planning for 1956. DCI, Vol. 73, File [DACI] 1951-58, Minutes of DCI meeting, 19.3.1956.
Ottawa. Starting in 1948, Ottawa and the railways made a concerted effort to develop a movement from this area as they realised that the DP movement was only a temporary solution for Canada's immigrant-labour demands. Yet these efforts fell short of expectations as immigration from northwestern Europe tailed off or stagnated from 1948 to 1950. Nonetheless, Ottawa redoubled its efforts to increase this flow for 1951, announcing to the Canadian press its optimistic targets set for these countries. Further priority was assigned this movement early in 1951 when the shortfall of DP immigrants had to be urgently made up. It was hoped that intensified promotional work where permitted, negotiations with foreign governments to remove currency restrictions, Canada's liberalisation of immigration via PC 2856, and the APS would turn the situation around. Indeed, these measures did bring results as immigration from northwestern Europe more than doubled from 1950 to 1951, but it still fell far short of contributing to Ottawa's total target of 200,000. Also, this upswing in immigration could not be sustained and numbers dropped precipitously the following year, deteriorating still further in 1954-55 and rebounding slightly in 1956 and 1957 (see Figure No. 2). Furthermore, the two most coveted labour commodities in Canada - farm labourers and domestics - were also in short supply in northwestern Europe. This had important consequences for German immigration. High immigration targets were assigned to Germany after June 1951, while quotas that could not be filled in northwestern Europe were transferred to Robillard's headquarters in Karlsruhe.

The Dutch movement to Canada differed markedly from the pattern of emigration from other countries of western Europe. The Netherlands offered a much larger and more consistent flow of immigrants to Canada from 1948 to 1954. This was primarily due to the overpopulation pressure in the Netherlands after the war and the Dutch government's encouragement of controlled emigration. Canada exercised less control over this movement than it did over immigration from other

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56 Financial Post, 3.3.1951. Ottawa made no reference to German immigrants.
countries. Most of the recruiting, pre-selection and transportation work was carried out by Dutch authorities. As well, various Dutch private agencies in Canada assisted in placing these migrants in Canada. These generous services, as well as the Dutch authorities' interest in controlling this movement, meant that Ottawa was willing to accept the volume and, to a certain degree, the types of workers which the Netherlands offered. As a result, other programs, especially the German movement, were influenced by the immigrant-labour gaps which were not filled by the Dutch, and for that matter, also the British movement. This dynamic appears to have been at work in the German farm labour movement.  

Italy and Germany as a Last Resort

As a result of the onset of the DP labour shortfall in June 1951 and the inadequate and uneven supply of labour from Britain and northwestern Europe, Ottawa's policy makers were compelled in the 1950s to turn to other countries in Europe in order to meet Canada's manpower deficit. Already in 1950 efforts were made to develop programs to move farm hands, skilled workers and general labourers from Europe's other immigrant source, Italy. Indeed, Italian immigration was critical in tiding Canadian industry over the labour shortage in 1951. However, because of difficulties experienced with Italian authorities in organising these movements and widespread complaints from many employers and government officials about Italian workers leaving their job placements, Immigration and Labour authorities abandoned their Italian group-labour programs in 1951-52.  

Undoubtedly ethnic and racial stereotypes also prompted Canadian authorities to give preference to Germans over Italians in certain schemes. In sum, German immigration not only made up the shortage of DP labourers and supplied skilled workers not available from preferred countries, it also filled labour gaps left in the wake of the discontinued Italian program.

59 As the number and percentage of Dutch farm immigrants declined from 1951 to 1953, the volume of German farm workers to Canada correspondingly picked up at this time, evidently taking up the slack left by the Dutch deficit (see Figure No. 27).  
61 This was especially the case in the domestics scheme in which "northern Europeans" were given preference. It is also evident in Canada's use of the ICEM which was to channel Italian migrants to other countries and away from Canada; see chapter seven.
Eventually, by way of a series of misfires experienced with other movements, Ottawa arrived upon the German supply as the solution to its immigration requirements and problems in 1951.\(^{62}\) It was undoubtedly the exigencies of the ambitious 1951 general immigration program which prompted the government to adopt a full-blown German program. Initial positive reports from the field about the suitability of German workers also helped launch the program. The Director of Immigration was so convinced of the desirability of Germans that he recommended to his Deputy Minister in late-1951 that "unless we take immediate action in obtaining the most suitable and desirable immigrants from Germany it will only be a matter of time before we will find the German Government in a mood where they will not permit the free movement of German nationals and established expellees from Germany."\(^{63}\) The considerable success of the German movement in its first big year of 1951 guaranteed a spot for Germans in Ottawa's future immigration programs.

**COMPETITION FROM OTHER IMMIGRATION COUNTRIES**

Shortly after the war, the habit of monitoring the plans and activities of other major "receiving" countries, most notably Australia, the United States and Britain, had become common practice in Ottawa. This was especially true when these countries' interests and fields of operations intersected with Canada's own, as in the case of Australia's program in Britain after the war. The initiatives of perceived competitors often affected policy making in Ottawa. For example, the government's decision to participate in the DP resettlement program sooner rather than later was largely inspired by the calculation that Canada might be left behind other countries in getting the best DP migrants. Developments in the German immigration field were also closely followed and the resulting findings did at times influence Canadian policy.

Ottawa's first reconnaissance in this field was in connection with the German scientists' scheme in 1946-47. In September 1946, the National Research Council noted that German scientists were

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\(^{62}\) This same reasoning was evident during the 9th Federal-Provincial Farm Labour Conference in December 1951 where the future source of Canada's farm labour supply was deliberated. After assessing all possible options, starting with the preferred emigration countries, it was generally agreed that "Germany seemed to be the most logical source of supply." DL, Vol. 876, File 8-7-21-12, Pt. 3, Minutes... November 30, December 1-3, 1951.
being employed in England and the United States and suggested a similar course of action for Canada. By November, this proposal received serious consideration from the Director of Immigration who observed that "Britain, the United States and Russia are scouring top notch men of these classes from Germany." Canada's High Commissioner in London, who was especially sold on the usefulness of these men, advised that Australia and New Zealand had already established contracts for the movement of scientists. Pressure from External Affairs and Immigration gathered, culminating in the federal cabinet's approval of the importation of a limited number of German scientists and technicians to Canada under contract. Undoubtedly, the precedent established by Britain and other Commonwealth countries removed some of the political reservations which Canadian authorities entertained about this scheme. But it was ultimately economic self-interest and Britain's appeal for Canada to accept some of these scientists which ultimately drove Ottawa to adopt this scheme.

In terms of developing a general German movement, Ottawa closely watched the activities of its principal rival, Australia, already in 1948, taking careful note of the recommendations of its Immigration Advisory Council which called for easing the restrictions against German and Austrians with close-relatives in Australia. Also in June 1949, during the 63rd meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee, members were apprised about the proposed "Cellar" amendments to United States DP Act to, inter alia, allocate 50% of the DP quota to ethnic Germans. Eight months later the Committee considered a news item in the Manchester Guardian which provided details about the German domestics' scheme organised by the British Ministry of Labour. As a lobbying strategy, pro-German immigration groups in Canada also made certain that any moves by other

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64 In the context of the Cold War setting, British and American intelligence authorities feared that German scientists and technicians would fall into Soviet hands, either by way of inducements or abductions. Britain essentially regarded Canada as a safe storage area for scientists, far away from Soviet machinations and the European Cold War front. See IB, Vol. 649, File B6737, Pt. 1, Secretary of State for Dominon Affairs to DEA, 1.2.1947. In this way Canada's "German scientists" program met one of the major objectives of the American's "Operation Paper Clip," which was to identify, secure or distance Nazi scientists and technicians from Soviet control.
receiving countries to liberalise German immigration did not escape Ottawa's attention. While these developments were monitored by Ottawa, they did not lead to any abrupt or radical changes, but undoubtedly softened up the immigration bureaucracy's resistance to admitting Germans.\textsuperscript{69} After all, Ottawa had no intention of proceeding with an all out German immigration program until it had some assurances that relations with Germany would be normalised by way of a peace settlement in the near future. When this did happen in the fall of 1950, Ottawa increasingly viewed other receiving countries less as precedent makers and more as competitors in the German immigration field. And, not unlike the IRO situation, Canada by late-1951 felt the urgency to exploit the German immigrant-labour market as soon as possible to get the pick of the crop.

The first signs of this competitive attitude were evident in reports by Canadian Labour officials stationed in Germany who, in probing Germany's immigration potential for Canada in late-1950, had discovered that Britain had already admitted 20,840 single German women workers; New Zealand was now taking Germans and paying their fares; and Australia was close to signing a deal with Germany for a large-scale movement. This prompted the Deputy Minister to reconsider whether overseas transportation loans should be extended to German immigrants as there were "other countries taking Germans and probably getting the better class."\textsuperscript{70} London's decision to admit certain Germans to Britain no doubt represented an endorsement of German immigration at a time when Canadian officials were still somewhat reluctant to take this step.\textsuperscript{71} If German workers were accepted in Britain, then they were surely good enough for Canada.

In addition to Britain, other European countries had already made significant headway in tapping German labour by May 1951 when Canada approached German authorities with its first immigrant-

\textsuperscript{68}\textit{Ibid.} Minutes of 63\textsuperscript{rd}, 28.6.1949 and 71\textsuperscript{st}, 15.2.1950 ICIL meetings. See also \textit{Manchester Guardian}, 2.1.1950.
\textsuperscript{69} Indeed, one of the arguments made to Cabinet to remove restrictions was that German nationals were now entering the U.S. under a generous quota. IB, Vol. 447, File 675985, Pt. 6, Memo to Cabinet, 18.8.1950.
\textsuperscript{71} As early as November 1945, Britain was recruiting German scientists and technicians and by late 1949 had accepted a total of 324. By 1948, German women were being admitted to the United Kingdom under the "Westward-Ho" (634 women plus 744 men), "North-Sea" (9,713) and Sudeten-German (1,104) schemes. The "Blue Danube" scheme secured 2,341 Austrian women for nursing and textile work. See D. Kay and R. Miles, \textit{Refugees or Migrant Workers? European Volunteer Workers in Britain 1946-1951} (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 38, 43, 60 and 147 and J-D. Steinert, \textit{Migration und Politik, Westdeutschland - Europe - Übersee 1945-1981} (Osnabrück: Secolo Verlag, 1995), 63-70.
labour plans. Canadian overseas reports alerted headquarters about the activities of other foreign missions snapping up German workers. Sweden's recruitment of miners and lumber workers and France's and Luxembourg's enlistment of domestics in 1951-52 were seen as competing with Canadian recruiting drives in Germany. After this initial spurt of activity, intra-European immigration came to a virtual standstill and most European countries became increasingly reluctant to encourage permanent settlement. Overseas competition for German immigrants, however, remained vigorous.

The United States was Canada's most serious competitor. It received more German immigrants on an annual basis than Canada during the 1950s, save the years 1951 and 1953. From 1951 to 1957, it welcomed a total of 250,000 German migrants compared to Canada's 200,000 (see Figure No. 12). Of course, considering its size, Canada ultimately accepted an extraordinary number of Germans.

![Figure No. 12: Emigration from the Federal Republic of Germany to all Countries, 1951-57](Image)

American dominance in the German immigration field was achieved for the most part by special programs introduced by Washington which greatly augmented the modest yearly quotas set for German immigrants. The first such initiative was made possible by an amendment to the existing

73 W.R. Böhning, *The Migration of Workers in the United Kingdom and the European Community* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972). In the case of Britain, Europe's largest recipient of refugee migrants, the experiment with imported contract European workers was abandoned by 1951. One reason for this was that interest among refugees in migrating to the U.K. was in serious decline by 1949 because of the restrictive terms and conditions of the British schemes. At this time, North American and Australian programs offered more attractive resettlement opportunities and fewer labour restrictions. Kay and Miles, *Refugees*, 162-166.
American *DP Act* which for the first time permitted the entry German expellees and refugees, upwards of 54,744, to America from June 16, 1950 to June 30, 1952. Known as the German Expellees Program, it offered marked advantages over Canadian schemes. It enlisted Bonn’s services in performing all pre-processing functions at no charge to the immigrant and offered free overseas transportation for these immigrants, while sponsors normally picked-up the expenses of inland transportation. Furthermore, the program targeted those occupational groups, most especially farm workers and domestics, in which Canada was most interested and offered higher wages for these workers. Interest in this program was widespread in Germany, causing Canadian officials to lament that prospective immigrants were "sitting on the fence" in committing to Canada, first assessing their chances of emigrating under the American program.\(^74\)

Undisputedly, America as an immigration destination had greater drawing power than Canada. According to survey results, 47% of potential emigrants enquiring at German emigration offices chose the United States and only 20% Canada.\(^75\) A small edge which Canada retained over the American program was that its recruitment also extended to German *Reichsdeutsche* (native citizens of Germany), a class of immigrant which Canada's Director of Immigration preferred over *Volksdeutsche* refugees. In addition, Ottawa's unsponsored program was better suited for maximising and streamlining immigrant intake from Germany in comparison to the cumbersome system adopted in the American DP and Refugee Acts which required private sponsors to provide assurances of jobs and homes before an immigrant could be admitted. Although it got off to a slow start, the U.S. Expellees Program moved 2,040 immigrants in the fiscal year 1950-51 but 42,796 in 1951-52.\(^76\) The latter figure must surely have put a small dent in Canadian immigration operations, but in the early-1950s German immigrant supply still outweighed demand.

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\(^{74}\) IB, Vol. 673, File C83755, Robillard to Director, 25.9.1951.

\(^{75}\) Friedmann, *German Immigration into Canada* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1952), 21.

\(^{76}\) U.S. DP Commission, *Memo to America: The DP Story* (Washington: 1952), 84. Because the U.S. expellees program only extended to *Volksdeutsche* refugees, many German *Reichsdeutsche* may have signed up for immigration to Canada as a stepping stone to the United States.
Fewer potential German migrants were available by the mid-1950s when America's second major German immigration initiative shifted into high gear. The Refugee Relief Act (RRA) of August 1953 launched a three-year program aimed at securing, among others, 90,000 Germans - consisting of 55,000 German expellees and 35,000 East-bloc escapees - outside the regular annual quotas. As under the previous U.S. Expellees Program, processing and transportation were free, paid for and coordinated by the ICEM, a European resettlement agency heavily funded by Washington. Again, individual sponsors in the United States were relied upon to generate applications for immigrants and to cover their transportation costs from port of arrival to final destination. Also, Bonn again assisted in the American's second program, albeit reluctantly, as it was now facing growing pressure within Germany to restrict the movement of skilled workers. The ambitious targets set for the American program raised considerable anxiety in the minds of Canadian officials as to whether enough suitable immigrants would remain for their program.

Like the Expellees' Program, the RRA's program took time to build momentum, only reaching full stride in its final year. In the end it brought 51,724 Germans to the United States, about 58% of its original target. Canada capitalised on the lay-off between the two major American programs, taking a record number of Germans in 1953 and in the process surpassing America's intake in this year. This success was short-lived. The new American program, Australia's continuing aggressive recruitment, emerging labour shortages in Germany, as well as Bonn's efforts to limit emigration, took a heavy toll on Canada's intake in 1954 and 1955. The flow of Germans dropped by half between 1953 and 1955. Only by launching a vigorous counter-offensive, consisting of an aggressive promotional campaign and attractive immigration terms, was Ottawa able to rescue its

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77 Germany had to comply in making the American scheme a success or jeopardise its foreign relations with the U.S. Steinert, Migration und Politik, 254-5, 330.
78 Canadian church groups in Germany detected this concern among Canadian officials overseas. NAC, MG 28 V 18, N. American Baptist Immigration and Colonization Society records, File 5.59, Berkefeld to Herzer, et al. 18.8.1953.
German program in 1956. Like the previous Expellees' Program, the RRA initiative lured many of the same categories of workers to the U.S. that Canada desired most.\textsuperscript{80}

One of Canada's traditional competitors in the immigration field was its Commonwealth sister Australia, which also pursued an assertive immigration policy after the Second World War for many of the same economic, political and demographic reasons as Canada. Unlike the American immigration program, which was guided by the political objective of ensuring European stability by relieving population pressure,\textsuperscript{81} Australia's immigration policy was linked to that government's overall nation-building program. This accounts for its aggressiveness in the field which carried over into its German immigration program. In spite of its ambitions, Australia consistently fell short of Canada in achieving a high annual volume of German immigration from 1951 to 1957 (see Figure No. 13). This was because of the lower quotas set by Australian authorities and the poorer results of its recruiting drives.

Australia's full-fledged German immigration program got off to a late start, delayed by the protracted negotiations with German authorities and the tenacious political opposition which Canberra encountered to this initiative at home. Its program was officially christened with the signing of the German-Australian migration agreement on August 29, 1952, at the Palais Schaumberg in Bonn. This bilateral agreement offered both advantages and disadvantages over Canada's and the United States's approach of informal negotiations with Bonn. On the positive side, it ensured a relatively steady flow of immigrants, including set quotas of specified categories of workers desired by Australia. In turn, Germany agreed to recruit, process and transport these workers. On the negative side, this agreement limited Australia's flexibility to adapt immigration to short-term economic developments, both in terms of adjusting the volume and types of immigrants

\textsuperscript{80} Warnings to this effect were issued by international Lutheran agencies which noted that the RRA was cutting into the available German manpower pool for Canadian farm labour schemes. NAC, MG 28 V 120, Canadian Lutheran World Relief (CLWR) records, Reel H-1393, File CLWR negotiations 1953-56, Baetz to Monk, 1.1.1955.

\textsuperscript{81} D. Reimers and H. Troper, "Canadian and American Immigration Policy since 1945," in B. Chiswick, ed., Immigration, Language and Ethnicity: Canada and the United States (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1992), 15. In fact, the view widely held in the U.S. in the late-1950s was that further immigration might hinder the rise in productivity and personal income. ILO, International Migration:
coming forward. Canada's approach afforded more room to manoeuvre, especially in increasing
German numbers when circumstances permitted, which was well suited for the 1950s when an
abundant supply of immigrants was on hand in Germany. However, when interest in emigration
evaporated in Germany after 1957, the DCI again reassessed the merits of Australia's more defined
bilateral arrangement. 82

In addition to Canada's "free-hand" approach, other factors gave Canada a decided advantage over
Australia in the 1950s. Surveys taken in Germany reveal that prospective immigrants consistently
preferred Canada over Australia. This may have been due to Germans' greater familiarity with
Canada; the more established German communities in Canada; and a longer tradition of German
immigration to Canada. The greater "tyranny of distance" separating Germany from the land down-
under no doubt also dissuaded many from making the move to Australia. Canada's early entry into
the German immigration field, starting with the Canadian Christian Council for the Resettlement of
Refugees (CCCRR) in 1947 and followed by its own program in 1951, seems to have also primed
the subsequent German movement. After a late start, the Australian program was almost
immediately hit by an economic recession which forced Canberra to cut-back immigration.

Negative press reports in Germany about this crisis further dampened interest in migrating to
Australia. 83 When its economy recovered in 1953, Australia resumed and expanded its immigration
program. In the meantime Canada had registered its three highest successive years of German
intake in 1951-53 (see Figure No. 13). But the revamped Australian program competed effectively
against Canada's own programs in 1954-57 which may, in small part, have hurt Canada's program

Competition between these two countries for German immigrants became fierce. Both closely
monitored each other's programs, seeking ways in which to improve their own initiatives and gain

1945-1957 (Geneva: ILO, 1957), 238. Had the U.S. used immigration in the same way as Australia and Canada did, it may have
overwhelmed both of these countries' programs.
advantages. At December 1950, Canadian officials were prognosticating the impact which Australia's plans would have on its own program in Germany. The Canadian mission in Karlsruhe raised the spectre of the Australian program overwhelming Canada's efforts. At the nadir of German immigration to Canada in 1955 officials in Ottawa sought to learn from Australia's successes and borrowed some of Australia's effective techniques. Drawing on the Australian example, Ottawa invited German officials on a tour of Canada to dispel the bad publicity about Canada's economy and to promote settlement schemes and also made greater use of the ICEM to advertise Canada. Yet, there were limits on how far Ottawa could be driven by competition to develop an increased German movement. For example, Australia's model of covering the full costs of immigrants' ocean fares was rejected by Ottawa primarily out of fear that it would be subject to misuse as a cheap means for foreigners to visit Canada. As a result, much of the fight to acquire Canada's share of Germans was left to the overseas staff who undertook the crucial promotional, recruiting and administrative work. Here, Robillard's energetic administration stood Ottawa in good stead.

The activities of other countries in the field of German immigration had a number of effects on Canada's own German program. On the positive side, they helped convince Canadian authorities to take bolder steps to relax restrictions against German nationals prior to 1950 and to increase the intake of Germans after 1950. The competition, by 1956, also inspired Immigration headquarters and posts in Germany to adopt a more aggressive attitude towards recruiting and to offer more inducements to prospective immigrants. On the negative side, the recruiting drives of other

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84 IB, Vol. 821, File 552-1-551, Pt. 1, Robillard to Chief Op. Div., 9.12.1952. The recession resulted from the balance of payments crisis which had become so serious in 1952 that Canberra was forced to take anti-inflationary measures, one of which was to restrict immigration.

85 For Australia's views on its Canadian competitor, see A. Sauer, "Christian Charity, Government Policy and German Immigration to Canada and Australia, 1947-1952," Canadian Issues 18 (1996), 162.


88 This is salient feature of Robillard's memos in which he asked headquarters for more concessions to effectively compete against Australia and the United States. Also Canada's overseas staff were situated in close proximity to their competitors. Canadian offices in Hamburg and Berlin were in the same buildings as the Australian and the ICEM missions. IB, Vol. 815, File 551-10-1957, Pt. 2, A/Chief Op. Div. to Chief Admin. Div. (Administration Division), 18.9.1957.
countries appear to have cut into the diminishing supply of German immigrants for Canadian programs by the mid-1950s and to have diverted Bonn's valued resources and assistance away from Canada's initiative.\footnote{88}

**Stimulating Immigration: Ottawa's Transportation Loans**

In late-1950, the DCI desperately sought innovative measures to reverse the trend of declining immigration in the previous years. One measure, in part taken from Australia's successful British program, was to ease the immigrant's financial burden of moving to Canada, by way of a system of transportation loans. The resulting initiative, known as the APS, was introduced in January 1951. Its effects were immediate and account for the large jump in immigration to Canada in 1951, when 16,729 APS warrants were issued. It, more than any other measure introduced by Ottawa, contributed directly to the German immigration boom as German migrants were the principal beneficiaries of this scheme.

As with most initiatives to boost immigration, the APS initially was intended to stimulate the movement of Britons. As early as October 1950, cabinet had approved in principle a program whereby domestics and skilled tradesmen from Britain were to be provided with transportation loans on a down payment of £10, the outstanding balance to be repaid by the immigrant after establishment in Canada. With the realisation that the IRO would soon end as a source of immigrants and free loans for DPs and with the pressure applied by outside interests to set up their own transportation loan schemes, the IACI proposed that the government operate its own comprehensive transportation loan system formally known as the APS. This proposal was subsequently approved by cabinet on December 13, 1950, and implemented on January 1, 1950.\footnote{89}

The continuation of the APS was subject to the approval of cabinet on a year-to-year basis.

\footnote{88} This was especially true for the period after 1954, when Bonn, busy with the American and Australian initiatives, gave little attention and even fewer resources to Canadian annual programs. Steinert, *Migration und Politik*, 273.

Under terms of the APS the DCI was authorised to advance interest-free loans to heads of families or single immigrants whose services were urgently required in Canada. Naturally, conditions applied. In order to be eligible for this scheme, workers were required to contribute a minimum of $30 towards the costs of their own transportation and had to accept a designated type of employment for a predetermined period. They had to repay the loans over a period not exceeding two years after arrival in Canada by means of regular deductions from their earnings. The APS was to be financed by a revolving fund of $1 million which was later extended to $3 million in March 1951 and to $9 million a year later. It applied to workers from Britain as well as from most countries on the continent, including Germany. It was only extensively used in Germany after June 1951, when immigration authorities decided to boost the German program.\(^90\) By this time the APS was also extended to Germans coming forward under the DL's group-labour schemes.

Immigration authorities already realised in September 1950 that most prospective German migrants, required financial support for their transportation. Initially they looked to outside agencies to address this problem. At the September, 1950, DACI meeting, it was suggested that voluntary or certain United Nations agencies advance funds to cover the fares of German migrants. The possibility of using the Economic Cooperation Act and Organisation for European Economic Cooperation funds to cover German migrant transportation costs also was explored. Even the International Labour Organisation (ILO) was approached regarding a scheme to establish a revolving fund to move Germans to Canada.\(^91\) With no progress on this front, the matter was finally resolved when Germans were declared eligible for APS loans in December 1950.\(^92\) In the meantime the DL, drawing on its experience with the DP movement, devised its own way of financing transportation. It suggested to certain mining and forestry operations seeking German

\(^{90}\) DL, Vol. 277, File 1-26-1-9, Pt. 1, Smith to Dawson, 28.6.1951. This is also reflected in the original amounts encumbered for the Assisted Passage Scheme (APS) to overseas posts in January 1951: only $120,000 was assigned German immigration compared to $232,000 for the U.K. IB, Vol. 924, File 590-1, Pt. 1, Reid to McPhail, 22.1.1951.


\(^{92}\) DEA’s representative in Germany, T.C. Davis, may have forced Immigration’s hand, when in early December he made a pointed enquiry to Deputy Minister Fortier seeking to know whether Germans were included in the proposed British transportation loan scheme. IB, Vol. 31, File 682, Pt. 6, Davis to Fortier, 5.12.1950 and Fortier’s reply 14.12.1950.
workers that they establish their own revolving funds and advance monies to prospective immigrant-workers on a refundable basis. Their efforts were supported by Fortier who encouraged the creation of such company schemes. However, the resulting company-funded programs were short-lived. By mid-1951, they were overtaken by the APS, as many forestry companies and the Canadian Metal Mining Association (CMMA) insisted that the government assume the risks of moving workers and accordingly abandoned their programs.

The inclusion of Germans under the APS was a godsend to this movement for a number of reasons. Because this scheme catered exclusively to immigrant workers it directly benefited the German movement which was comprised largely of labourers. Initially any worker whose services were urgently required\(^93\) could qualify for this scheme. This benefited German immigrants who offered a wide-range of skills desired in Canada. Also, the APS enabled lower-paid classes of German workers to come to Canada, such as domestics and farm workers, who were in the greatest need of financial assistance.\(^94\) In this way, its most obvious advantage was to offer German immigrants the means of overcoming credit problems and currency restrictions in Germany.

German immigrants' need of financial assistance was very real and acute. Paradoxically, many of the factors which motivated Germans to leave their country, such as high unemployment, low standard of living and low wages, also held them back from realising this goal. In short, most lacked the means or the savings to pay for their transportation overseas, a problem which only began easing by 1956 when the standard of living in Germany improved. This was especially true for German expellees and refugees who generally had little or no savings, and who suffered higher than normal rates of unemployment and required more social welfare relief than native Germans. The consequences of their plight was realised early on by the CCCRR which informed sponsors in Canada that "[s]ome of these people are so poor that they will not be able to emigrate unless we

\(^93\) This was subsequently regulated by the "List of trades, skills & occupations in short supply in Canada," listing 45 occupations for which Germans also qualified. The list was subject to a number of revisions. IB, Vol. 924, File 590-I, Pt. 1, DCI Directive No. 73, 20.1.1951.

furnish them with money to pay other necessary expenses in Germany.\textsuperscript{95} Bonn's strict currency exchange and export restrictions imposed another obstacle to emigration.\textsuperscript{96} They prevented immigrants from exchanging Deutsche Mark (DM) into Canadian currency to pay for their transportation fares and settlement expenses. They also greatly limited the export of DM to Canada. Initially even shipping companies in Germany were prohibited from accepting payment of fares in DM.\textsuperscript{97} As early as October 1950 immigration authorities initiated talks with Bonn to find some way around this impediment. The best that the German government could offer was to permit German immigrants to exchange the equivalent of $30 effective after June 1951. Currency exchange and export restrictions remained a problem for German emigrants until the spring of 1954 when restraints were substantially eased.

Canada's decision to extend the APS to the German movement in January 1951 eliminated many of the financial difficulties. German workers who previously had no way of paying their transportation to Canada could now qualify for travel loans and immediately move to Canada where they could work off this debt. The APS also enabled German immigrants to side-step Bonn's financial restrictions because the transportation warrants issued by the Canadian authorities involved no money exchange or transfers. It also guaranteed immigrants a berth on a ship at the lowest available fare. This was especially important in the early-1950s when shortages of westbound passenger shipping threatened to restrict the flow of immigration from Europe. The only problem which remained for the immigrant was coming up with the funds to pay the $30 down payment required to qualify for the scheme and to convert these funds into dollars. Some relief was forthcoming in June 1951, when cabinet waived this requirement for needy cases and when the German government at the same time permitted the exchange of small amounts of DM.\textsuperscript{98}

\textsuperscript{96} These restrictions were not a device to control or limit emigration but resulted more from Germany's foreign capital deficit and external exchange controls. The German government had to honour currency restrictions applied to countries receiving Marshall Aid. Because of its poor foreign exchange standing in the early-1950s, Germany could ill afford to have emigrants draw on its scarce reserve of foreign funds. IB, Vol. 31, File 682, Pt. 7, Smith to Fortier, 9.11.1951.
\textsuperscript{98} DCI, Vol. 95, File 3-7-7, Pt. 1, DCI Memo to Cabinet, 26.5.1951; IB, Vol. 31, File 682, Pt. 7, Dr. Schone to Benoit, 27.6.1951.
The impact of the APS on the German movement was immediate and massive. Of the 16,729 APS warrants issued in 1951, 11,392 (or 68%) went to German and Austrian immigrants. This trend continued in the 1950s when posts in Germany and Austria issued almost 60% of all APS warrants granted by Canada in 1951-57. This is a surprising result, considering that the scheme was primarily intended to foster British immigration. Only 22% of all warrants issued in 1951 and 29% for the period 1951-57 were from Canadian posts in the United Kingdom (see Figure No. 13).

However, the federal government's initial enthusiasm for the APS soon faded. The scheme had to be temporarily shut down in October 1951 when it was realised that immigration officials had overspent the modest revolving fund. Cabinet approval to bolster the fund was delayed until March 1952. This had a devastating impact on the German movement and Canadian immigration operations in Germany. The sudden shut-down hit just as processing of migrants had reached full stride in Germany, leading to last-minute cancellations of visas and warrants and leaving many bitter applicants. It also left German authorities in the lurch. They had assumed significant costs and committed substantial resources to have hundreds of candidates pre-processed and gathered for inspection only to be turned away. Canadian efforts in November 1951 to have Bonn assume overseas transportation costs to continue the movement of German migrants were unsuccessful.\footnote{Ibid., Smith to Fortier, 9.11.1951. Regarding the consequences of the stoppage of APS see chapter five.}

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<th>YEAR</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>% Total</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>% Total</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>% Total</th>
<th>W.Europe</th>
<th>% Total</th>
<th>S.Europe</th>
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<td>112</td>
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<td>15.1%</td>
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<td>560</td>
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<td>3.2%</td>
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<td>21,820</td>
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<td>7.6%</td>
<td>6,980</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
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* Southern Europe includes posts in Athens and Rome.
The APS was only re-introduced in April 1952 which meant that Canada had missed the boat in securing many of the German workers required for the start of the farming season in Canada. Furthermore, the revised 1952 scheme was restricted to domestics, farm labourers and nurses' aides. Skilled German workers were no longer included until 1956. This reinforced the shift in the German program from one that had targeted immigrants with a broad range of skills in 1951 to one limited to the recruitment of farm labourers and domestics from 1952 to 1955.

There are several reasons why cabinet may have chosen to limit the APS in 1952. All overseas immigration posts were agreed that the scheme generally attracted immigrants of a less desirable type. Also an expanded scheme was difficult and costly to administer and involved financial risk for the government. Most importantly, Canadian officials felt immigrant supply in Europe in the early-1950s was almost unlimited and therefore a generous application of the APS was not necessary. This especially applied to Germany which provided Canada with record numbers of immigrants in 1951 and, as cabinet was apprised, had disproportionately benefited from the APS. This fact as well as the need to maintain a "racial" balance undoubtedly prompted politicians and government officials to reduce the scope of scheme. After all, with the APS the possibilities of recruiting Germans seemed boundless in the early-1950s and, more importantly, difficult to control. Undoubtedly, the German immigration juggernaut could not be permitted to upset the primacy of the Anglo movement to Canada.

From 1952 to 1955, the APS largely remained unchanged for the German movement. In March 1953 overseas offices in Germany were authorised to include meritorious cases under the APS after approval from headquarters. While a good number of German domestics, farmers and a few nurses and nurses' aides and special cases did move to Canada via this scheme during these years, the final

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101 Indeed, a major reason for the suspension of the APS in October 1951 was because Germans had over-subscribed for this scheme. IB, Vol. 31, File 682, Pt. 7, Smith to Fortier, 9.11.1951.
figures fell far short of the peak reached in 1951. As German immigration showed signs of decline in 1954 and then decisively slumped by 1955, Robillard lobbied Ottawa to expand the program but his calls went unheeded. This was a hard sell in Ottawa at a time when the government was battling the effects of a recession in Canada. Only when the economy dramatically recovered near the end of 1955 could the government be convinced, in the same way it had in 1950-51, to adopt an expanded APS to turn around the trend of declining immigration.

The terms of the new APS, introduced in December 1955, were indeed generous. All workers, regardless of occupation, as well as their dependants, such as wives and children, were also now eligible for the APS. This eliminated the prospect of family separation and again enabled broad occupational categories of German immigrants requiring assistance to emigrate. Another innovation introduced in 1956 which surely boosted German immigration was the extension of the APS to airline bookings.

The resulting response in Germany to the new scheme was again overwhelming. APS warrants issued in Germany and Austria rose from a low of 1,138 in 1955 to 11,201 in 1956, representing a staggering 884% increase. The total German movement to Canada increased roughly by the same aggregate number, rising from 18,082 in 1956 to 26,457 in 1957. These figures demonstrate how crucial the APS was to a sustained German movement to Canada. With the continuation of the same generous terms into 1957, similar high returns were achieved; 8,120 warrants were issued and German immigration climbed to 29,443.

The APS's blessings were balanced by its burdens. Because it was only available to workers up to 1956 and not their family dependants, it often induced family heads to proceed to Canada in

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102 In fact, the DCI's memo to cabinet of 21.2.1952 outlined how making APS available to a few classes of occupations could be used to limit German and Austrian immigration. See DCI, Vol. 73, File [DACI] 1951-57. Still, the memo recommended that the APS be applied in its 1951 format. It appears that the decision to restrict the APS was made during the cabinet's deliberations.

advance of their dependants who remained behind in Germany. This led to family separations which were made more difficult by the enormous financial responsibilities which the breadwinner in Canada had to assume. A typical farm-labour immigrant had to work about 2.3 years in order to acquire the savings to pay his debts in Canada as well as family's sustenance and transportation costs (see calculations in Figure No.14). Any lay-offs, sickness or accidents or reductions in pay could ultimately set back a workers' attempts to reunite his family. This may also explain the high job turnover rate amongst German immigrants who sought better wages or more steady work to achieve the goal of early family reunion. High indebtedness and family separation also threatened to slow the integration of German immigrants into Canadian economic and social life.

Notwithstanding the onerous financial burden imposed by the scheme, the vast majority of Germans were able to clear their debts with very few defaults on payments. An audit carried out by the government in 1955 revealed that outstanding loans advanced in 1952 had "been collected from practically all German immigrants."

104 D. Corbett, Canada's Immigration Policy. A Critique (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957), 49.
105 In his study, H. Werner ascribes the high job turnover rate of postwar Volksdeutsche newcomers in Canada to their new-found consumerism in Canada. See H. Werner "Relatives and Strangers: The Identity of Post World War II Ethnic German Immigrants," M.A. Thesis, University of Manitoba, 1996, 65-85. For the first few years, indebtedness was no doubt also an important factor. This is confirmed by an article in the Winnipeg Free Press which reported on 29.8.1951 that the main interest of a group of 120 German farm hands was to save money to bring their families over. In order to succeed in bringing his family over, a worker would need to avoid lay-offs, sickness or accidents or reductions in pay. His first years in Canada were therefore the most precarious.
106 To avoid this very situation, Dutch authorities paid the way of their emigrants to Canada and refused to participate in the APS.
Figure No. 14: Calculation of Savings Required by a German Farm Hand to Reunite his Dependant Wife and Two Children

A. EXPENSES

1. Transportation

- Adult Overseas Shipping Fare @ $175.00 per adult x 2 adults: $350
- Child Overseas Shipping Fare @ $87.50 per child x 2 children: $175
- Adult Rail Fare @ $85 per adult to Winnipeg x 2 adults: $170
- Child Rail Fare @ $50 per child to Winnipeg x 2 children: $100

SUB TOTAL $795

2. Sustenance

- Family Support Payments @ $30 per month x 28 months: $840
- Worker Incidental expenses @ $10 per month x 28 months: $280

SUB TOTAL $1,120

TOTAL $1,915

B. EARNINGS

1st Month Earnings: $55
2nd Month Earnings: $60
3rd Month Earnings: $65
4th Month Earnings @ $70 per month x 25 months: $1,750

TOTAL $1,930

The significant financial responsibilities and the division of families resulting from the APS dissuaded many Germans from signing up for this scheme. Aware of these problems from the outset, Robillard used every means possible to move families as units and thereby boost the overall movement. His officials in Germany attempted to classify as many family members as possible as workers eligible for the APS and to use voluntary agencies to advance monies for the transportation of dependants. He also moved as many meritorious cases, for which headquarters had issued a block of 200 APS warrants, to Canada as he could via the APS. In this way many more thousands of immigrants were admitted to Canada in the 1950s who otherwise might not have had the opportunity to emigrate.108

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1. Shipping and rail fare estimates are for 1952 provided by the Canadian mission in Germany. By 1956, ocean fares had increased to $190 (off season) and $210 (peak); NAC RG 76, Vol. 856, File 555-16, Robillard to Chief Op. Div., 3.10.1952. The rail fare figures are an underestimate since they do not include the cost of meals to Winnipeg.

2. These are the standard sliding wage rate scales set by the Department of Labour for immigrant farm workers, which started at $55 per month and would increase at $5 increments per month until a maximum of $70 was reached; RG 27, Vol. 876, File 8-7-21-12, Pt. 3: Minutes Fed.-Prov. Farm Labour Conference, 3.12.1951.

The APS was a decisive contributing factor to the German immigration boom. Without its introduction in 1951 the movement of many thousands of Germans to Canada would not have been possible or rendered far more difficult, especially in the early-1950s. Over 44,600 migrants from Germany and Austria benefited from this scheme from 1951 to 1957. The importance of APS was not lost upon the DCI. In 1952 in a departmental report to cabinet, it was stated:

Germany and Austria can continue to supply us this year with almost every type of immigrant required, if we reinstitute the Assisted Passage Scheme which was suspended last October. If we do not bring it back into operation, immigration from Germany and Austria would be almost non-existent.  

The APS was therefore an important tool for regulating and tailoring German immigration to meet Canada's needs. It enabled the government to achieve a high annual intake of German immigrants, with the exception of 1954 and 1955, and to fill acute labour shortages with immigrants who were not readily available from other western European countries. It was also a powerful promotional force in and of itself. German interest in emigrating to Canada soared with news of its introduction in early-1951 and correspondingly plummeted when it was cancelled in October of the same year. Robillard acknowledged the great "publicity value" of the improved APS in 1956 to help his missions turn around the trend of declining immigration.

In addition to overseas transportation costs, immigrants also faced the burden of arranging and paying their inland rail expenses from port of entry to final destination in Canada. For most German immigrants the need for financial assistance to cover these costs was as great as those for overseas travel. Again, the poverty of most German immigrants and the German currency restrictions were chiefly responsible for this situation. Depending on the final destination in Canada, inland costs for immigrants could be substantial. In 1952 ocean transportation averaged

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110 Ibid., Durdin to Secretary State DEA, 24.10.1951. In October 1951, the Canadian Consulate in Frankfurt reported that enquiries about emigration had dropped from 107 to 62 per week after the stoppage of the APS was announced in the German press.
111 This is confirmed by the Hamilton Spectator (13.4.1951) which described the first German national arrivals in 1951 as "penniless." R. Helling et al., A Socio-Economic History of German Canadians (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1984), 99.
$175 per adult whereas rail fare from ports in Quebec to Ontario was about $55 and to Winnipeg 85$ per adult.\footnote{112}

Provisions to cover these costs were made late in the day by immigration officials, only after German movement had gathered steam by the summer of 1951. Initially it was hoped that negotiations with Bonn would lead to the removal of currency exchange restrictions and permit immigrants to convert enough DM to cover their inland transportation costs. However, Bonn's per capita concession of $30 fell far short of covering the Canadian rail expenses of most immigrants. This situation affected both self-payers and APS loan recipients. Consequently, by late June 1951, immigration authorities were forced to extend the APS to most immigrants and include inland rail costs in the APS warrants even though the APS was originally intended to only cover overseas transportation costs.\footnote{113} By 1952, the APS warrants incorporated both inland and overseas expenses of immigrants and the government's revolving fund correspondingly was increased to $9 million. This was an important step in promoting German immigration to Canada as even the American government's generous programs stopped short of covering the inland transportation for arriving immigrants.

In contrast to the DCI, the DL had made provisions at the outset of their group-labour programs to cover these costs. Labour officials learned from their experiences with the DP movement and their good scouting work in Germany that many German migrants would be in need of financial support. Germans destined to mines or forestry operations were advanced ocean and rail fares by their respective employers on a recoverable basis. Those coming to Canada under the "buik" farm, sugar-beet and domestics' schemes had their inland rail fares paid by the DL. They were not required to repay the inland fare if they remained at their jobs for the duration of their employment contracts. This bonus was not available to immigrants coming forward under the DCI's auspices.

\footnote{113 IB, Vol. 31, File 682, Pt. 7, Smith to Salzburg 28.6.1951. For negotiations with Bonn see IB, Vol. 924, File 590-1, Pt. 2, Benoit to Director, 30.6.1951.}
until 1955 when the department assumed responsibility for all travel expenses of qualified immigrants. Even then, in 1955, only farm workers were entitled to such non-recoverable loans.

Labour's inland-transportation grant promoted the German movement in a number of ways. It undoubtedly made the prospect of immigrating to Canada more attractive and attainable for individual German immigrants. The lower debt also brought immigrants closer to sponsoring their family members. In Canada, Labour's system of travel grants were especially effective in meeting the needs of those employers, such as farmers and public institutions, who lacked the resources and means to sponsor and secure immigrant labour.

To ensure that western Canada received its fare share of migrants, immigration authorities received authorisation from cabinet in June 1951 to absorb the differential cost of inland rail transportation to points west of Winnipeg for immigrants coming under the APS. This was known as the "Western Differential Payment" (WDP). However, certain strings were attached to the WDP program. It did not apply to those who paid their own ocean transportation and in order to have the WDP portion deducted from their total transportation debts, eligible immigrants were required to remain in their specified class of employment for one year.

Prior to the introduction of the WDP in 1951, most immigrants settled in central Canada while western Canada's distant location relative to Europe discouraged immigrants from heading west because of the higher transportation costs involved. Yet this region was especially in need of immigrant labour later in the 1950s. Therefore WDP was a real shot in the arm for employers in the West, particularly farmers. Although Ontario was still the primary destination for most German immigrants in the 1950s, there was still a good flow of German migrants to western Canada, undoubtedly facilitated by WDP. This program no doubt gave added encouragement to immigrants who desired to settle in western Canada and who lacked funds. It also provided for a more even

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114 In September 1951 the DL joined the Western Differential Payment (WDP) program, assuming the expenses of the WDP for immigrants it placed in western Canada.

115 PCO, Vol. 2648, Cabinet Conclusions, 7.6.1951; DCI, Vol. 73, File DACI 1951-58, Minutes of DACI meeting, 12.3.1952.
distribution of immigrant-labour across Canada and thereby indirectly boosted Canada's capacity to absorb immigrants.

Unquestionably, government transportation loans were intended to benefit German workers more than non-workers in the 1950s. This was not accidental, but a deliberate policy, as the prime utility of Germans to Canada was their labour. Appropriately, a detailed examination of the migration of German workers is the subject of the next chapter.
4. THE IMMIGRATION OF GERMAN WORKERS

SPONSORED VERSUS UNSPONSORED IMMIGRATION

In the 1950s there were only two ways of immigrating to Canada from Germany. One was to be sponsored by a close relative or established employer in Canada. The other, used by immigrants who did not have sponsors, was to apply under specified occupations and be placed in employment by one of the following agencies: the railways, church organisations, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration (DCI) or the Department of Labour (DL).

Unlike Italian immigration, the 1950s movement of Germans to Canada consisted mostly of unsponsored immigrants who qualified for admission to Canada on the basis of their labour qualifications. When German nationals were formally admitted in September 1950, only 800 applications from Canadian sponsors were found with immigration authorities across Canada. This small sum of sponsorship cases was clearly not enough to initiate a large "sponsored" movement of German migrants to Canada. Even with the large wave of Germans in the early-1950s, a substantial chain-migration of German sponsored cases never materialised. German migration to Canada in the 1950s was essentially a movement of unsponsored workers.

Although official statistics are incomplete,¹ it is estimated that from 1951 to 1957, over 129,000 unsponsored German immigrants entered Canada, representing 65% of Canada's total German intake. Canada received an even higher proportion of unsponsored immigrants from the United Kingdom, United States, France and the Netherlands. The exact reverse held true for the Italian movement which consisted almost entirely (over 90%) of sponsored migration to Canada.² Most unsponsored German migrants were single German workers who, unlike British, American and French immigrants, had to qualify under occupational categories in demand in Canada. Also, more unsponsored German workers came to Canada on labour undertakings (informal contracts) than any

¹ This estimate is based on data found in: National Archives of Canada (NAC), RG 76, Immigration Branch (IB) records, Vol. 925, File 590-1, Pt. 7, Memo to Cabinet, 6.11.1956; NAC, RG 26, Department of Citizenship and Immigration (DCI) records, Vol. 73, File Departmental Advisory Committee on Immigration (DACI) 1951-58, Minutes of DACI meeting, 7.5.1954.
other ethnic group. About 44,000 came on Assisted Passage Scheme (APS) contracts and thousands of others arrived as self-payers. Self-payers often signed up for group labour programs or sought the assistance of immigration and labour authorities in being placed.¹ These labour "contracts" directed immigrants to whatever employment opportunities were available in Canada at the time, not unlike the programs which moved displaced persons (DPs). Thus, federal authorities could exploit unsponsored immigration to direct labour to those parts of Canada where manpower demand was the greatest. This was a significant asset for Canada's expanding economy which was generating a high demand for labour in numerous sectors and different regions. Yet its high content of unsponsored and single workers made German immigration less settled and prone to shifting between regions, rural-urban settings and economic sectors in Canada. This at times frustrated Canadian authorities who, for instance, attempted to keep Germans on Canada's farms and in domestic households.

Donald Avery distinguishes between the disadvantaged movement of DP "contract labourers" and the "independent immigrants," the latter including German migrants, who followed them in the 1950s to Canada:

> But this latest wave of workers were not contract labourers or Gastarbeiter. Instead, they were independent immigrants who could pick and choose their place of employment and most chose, as might be expected, not the frontier work world of the DP, but the metropolitan centres of Central Canada.²

This characterisation does not fit German immigrants as neatly nor as accurately as one might expect. Large numbers of German workers entered Canada on labour undertakings and had little say concerning the areas where they were sent.³ Many ended up in the same "frontier" areas where DPs had worked before them and a deliberate effort was made to keep them there and away from

² For 1955-66 unsponsored immigration from the U.K. averaged 89% of the total, U.S. 88.4%, France 81.7%, the Netherlands 70.8%, Germany 68.1% and Italy 8.2%. A. Green, Immigration and the Postwar Canadian Economy (Toronto: Macmillan, 1976), 82.
the cities. Just like the DPs, Germans were only admissible if they matched certain labour slots, and most of these slots were normally left-over jobs such as low-paid farm and domestic service work generally shunned by native Canadians. The initial years were just as hard for German immigrants in the 1950s as they had been for DPs. Many faced the same penury, language barriers, low-status jobs, separation from families and discrimination as had the DPs. Upon arrival in Canada, they often were even more debt-ridden than DPs whose overseas fares were at least paid for by the International Refugee Organisation (IRO).

Yet their hard lot in Canada could not be blamed on the German or Canadian governments or on employers. Virtually all of them came to Canada voluntarily, either to better their situation or to be with relatives or co-religionists. Government immigration-labour programs offered many the first step in becoming established. Obviously, arrangements were not always perfect and problems could originate as much from immigrants as they could from government policies and officials. In spite of allegations to the contrary, German immigrants were generally informed prior to their arrival in Canada about the working, living and other conditions in Canada and were told of their obligations under the labour undertakings. There is little or no evidence that German immigrants were somehow duped or "over-sold" on Canada by Canadian officials overseas.

From 1951 to 1957, only 35% of all German immigrants coming to Canada were sponsored. This low percentage was primarily due to the vast reservoir of unsponsored applications on hand at Canadian missions in Germany up to 1955 (55 unsponsored applications were received for every

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9 In fact many self-payers, who were admissible on the basis of their qualifications, sought the assistance of immigration and labour authorities in being placed in Canada. This was especially true for domestics. Alexander Freund's study of domestics in Vancouver reveals that many women were attracted to this scheme by the safety and security which it offered. Freund, "Identity and Immigration: Self-Conceptualization and Myth in the Narratives of German Immigrant Women in Vancouver, B.C., 1950-1960," M.A. Thesis, Simon Fraser University, 1994, 38-39.

7 Canadian posts in Germany distributed information to prospective immigrants about various labour opportunities which contained frank and accurate information about working, welfare and living conditions in Canada. See DL, Vol. 291, File 1-26-60-4, Pt. 2, Lamarre to Dawson "Farm Work in Canada," 14.3.1952. Labour undertakings were explained to each immigrant. See IB, Vol. 675, File C92672, Pt. 2, Robillard to Chief Operations Division (Op. Div.), 9.7.1952. Similarly the Canadian Christian Council for the Resettlement of Refugees (CCCRR), at the behest of the government, informed its immigrants about working conditions in various areas of employment and the need to honour labour contracts. It even distributed pamphlets to this effect, such as the "Anweisungen für Zuckerriibenarbeiter. [information for sugar-beet workers]." NAC, MG 28 V 18, North American Baptist Immigration and Colonization Society (NABICS) records, File 1.20. For information on labour undertakings, see NAC, RG 2, Privy Council Office (PCO) records, Vol.2650, Cabinet Conclusions, 17.6.1952.
sponsored application). Moreover Canadian authorities encouraged unsponsored immigration as it enabled them to closely control the intake of types and numbers of migrants in accordance with labour force needs.\textsuperscript{8} The flow of sponsored Germans to Canada was more steady than unsponsored migration. Between 1951 and 1957, Canada's annual intake of sponsored workers ranged 67% between low and high years, whereas the unsponsored movement of workers fluctuated up to 144%. This pattern was due to the fact that the government exercised fewer controls over sponsored than over unsponsored cases. As a result sponsored immigration was less affected by boom and recession cycles of the economy. The precise composition of the sponsored movement is difficult to gauge owing to the absence of statistics. It appears to have consisted mostly of immediate family members and close relatives.

Available indicators suggest that only a small fraction of the sponsored German movement comprised of employer-sponsored immigrants. Most of this category consisted of domestics, farm workers and certain skilled workers. The main reason for this was that the personal attributes and qualifications of German workers were generally less known to Canadian employers than those of prospective British and American workers. Also, in the 1950s, federal and provincial governments together with certain industries focussed virtually all of their recruiting for sponsored workers in Britain. Here Canadian efforts usually met with good results. Furthermore, until 1957, the procedure for sponsoring German workers was plagued by bureaucratic red-tape which restricted the numbers coming forward and undoubtedly discouraged employers from submitting applications. Each application was scrutinised closely at headquarters and overseas, and employers had to prove that they were familiar with the individual(s) and their qualifications.\textsuperscript{9} The relaxation of these requirements in 1957 undoubtedly benefited the movement of sponsored German workers to Canada.

\textsuperscript{8} This was clearly the trend by 1954. DCI, Vol. 73, File [DACI] 1951-58, Minutes of DACI meeting, 7.5.1954.
\textsuperscript{9} The NES's approval was also required. DCI, Vol. 132, File 3-35-2, Pt. 3, Fortier to Smith, 22.12.1953.
WORKERS VERSUS DEPENDANTS

What is startling about the German movement is that it had the highest ratio of workers to dependants of all ethnic groups migrating to Canada in the 1950s (see Figure No.15). This may be explained by a number of factors. First, interest in emigration appears to have been highest amongst younger generations of Germans, many of whom were unattached and without families. A similar observation was made by Canadian officials.\textsuperscript{10} Also, the gender imbalance in Germany may have caused many young female workers, whose employment and marriage prospects were poor in Germany, to opt for Canada.\textsuperscript{11} Furthermore, and most important, Canada appears to have pursued a policy of encouraging greater numbers of workers to come forward to Canada. Preference was generally given to the movement of single over married workers.\textsuperscript{12} This was a salient feature of the farm and domestic workers' schemes. In the former, the immigration bureaucracy gave priority to the processing of single unattached men, while married men were at the bottom of the list and could only qualify if they had fewer than two dependants. There were fewer jobs and even less housing for large farm families coming to Canada in the 1950s, except those immigrating under the sugar-beet scheme. The general rule of "workers only" also applied to the domestics' scheme, in which either single unattached females or married childless couples, both of whom had to be workers, could qualify for admission. A special program which admitted single mothers and their dependants was limited to a handful of opportunities. Skilled workers also were encouraged to come ahead alone, but family status was less of an obstacle as these migrants were in a better position to financially support their dependants.

\textsuperscript{10} EMNID poll results during the 1950s conclusively show that younger generations were more interested in emigrating. IB, Vol. 822, File 552-1-551, Pt. 2. Statistics for the age and gender of German immigrants for the Calendar year 1957 reveal that largest age-cohort coming to Canada was 20-24 year olds followed by 25-29 year olds.


\textsuperscript{12} IB, Vol. 674, File C92672, Pt. 1, Robillard to German Labour Ministry, 21.2.1952.
Canada had several reasons for emphasising workers in its German immigration program. Consistent with its view of immigration as an instrument for economic development, the government gave priority to the immigration of workers to meet manpower requirements in Canada. This policy found considerable support in cabinet. The acute overseas shipping shortage and housing crisis in many regions of Canada also forced Ottawa to give greater consideration to the movement of unaccompanied immigrant workers. Workers were encouraged to move their dependants later when adequate accommodation in Canada had been arranged by the breadwinner and when shipping-berths were more plentiful in the off-season. Also, officials felt that immigrants with fewer dependants would have an easier time becoming established in Canada. Also many employers, such as the mining and lumber companies and farmers, expressly requested single workers who were more mobile, easier to accommodate and cheaper to pay.

German officials pushed Canada to accept more dependants, fearing the potential burdens that these cases might pose to the German state. Working with voluntary agencies, Bonn attempted to move more dependants, especially those left behind by workers, by way of subsidies. In this way it attempted to reduce its own welfare costs and the threat of family break ups. The German government also requested that immigration officials accept other dependants such as in-laws and single mothers along with their dependants under Canada's domestic scheme. On the other front, the German government attempted, after 1953, to dissuade single male skilled workers from

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14 According to schedules of wages set by the DL, married farm hands with dependants were to be paid more than single workers.
emigrating, even threatening in 1957 to regulate the application of the APS. However, Bonn's efforts met with limited success and it was ultimately the improving German economy which convinced workers to stay put. As Canada and Germany both aimed to increase the productive elements of their respective populations, conflict over the issue of German migration was inevitable.

Canada received a record number of German workers in 1951 and 1953, when 21,294 and 21,379 immigrated, respectively. This result can be attributed to Ottawa's aggressive campaigns in these years to enlist more workers and the generous assistance lent by German authorities to this end. Also, interest amongst Germans in emigrating was very high in these early years. 1951 and 1953 were years in which the proportion of workers to dependants was the highest: worker arrivals constituted 65.7% of all German migrants in 1951 and 61.1% in 1953. They were followed by years when this ratio declined (see Figure No.16). This pattern may be explained by the delayed movement of dependants who followed family heads to Canada one or two years after the peak worker movements of 1951 and 1953. The high percentage of dependants immigrating to Canada in 1954 and 1955 may also have been induced by the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration and Bonn, both of which subsidised the movement of family members to Canada. A high proportion of German workers were again secured in 1956 and 1957. Undoubtedly the generous admission provisions for German workers and the expanded APS in 1956 influenced this trend.

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German immigrants to Canada in the 1950s were mostly single unattached individuals. This can be inferred from the low number of "dependant" German wives coming forward from 1951 to 1957.

They made up only 17.2% of the total German movement to Canada which was low in comparison to the Dutch, British and Italian movements (see Figure No.16).\(^\text{16}\) Another unique feature of German immigration to Canada was the low ratio of dependent children to dependent wives which came to Canada in 1951-57: for Germans 1.21 children arrived per 1 dependent wife compared to 1.24:1 for the Italian, 1.31:1 for the British and 1.84:1 for the Dutch movements (see Figure No.17). These figures suggest that the average size of German immigrant families was small. This seems to have been the direct result of Canada's German immigration policy which sought to secure first and foremost workers, not dependants, and accordingly gave preference to the movement of unattached immigrants and, failing these, small families.\(^\text{17}\)

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\(^{16}\) Undoubtedly, married women also came forward under the category of domestics.

Although data on female immigrant workers is not available for the 1950s, a breakdown of statistics listing occupations filled almost exclusively by women (domestic servants, stenographers, seamstresses, nurses and others) reveals that approximately 27,000 German working women, equal to 13.5% of all German migrants, came to Canada in 1951-57.\textsuperscript{18} In reality, this percentage was probably much higher since many German women recorded as "dependants" took jobs in the first years after arriving in Canada in order to assist their families in establishing themselves on a sound economic basis.\textsuperscript{19} In absolute numbers, German female migrant workers were only surpassed by their British counterparts from 1951 to 1957. However, their make-up of the total German movement stood at 13.5%, which exceeded the British (11%), Italian (7.7%) and Dutch (6.4%) migrations (see Figure No. 18). In short, the German movement to Canada had one of the highest proportions of female workers. The main cause of this was the huge German domestics' program which brought forward more female labour than any other scheme.

\textsuperscript{18} There are obvious shortcomings with this method of calculating the number of German women labourers entering Canada. For example, some occupations such as domestics and "other clerical workers" included both male and female workers.

\textsuperscript{19} This was the case for many \textit{Volkse Deutsche} women. H. Werner, "Relatives and Strangers: The Identity of Post World War II Ethnic German Immigrants." M.A. Thesis, University of Manitoba, 1996, 79.
Data on the age structure of German immigrants is only available from 1956 onwards. Still, 1957 may be regarded as generally representative for the 1950s German movement as a whole.\textsuperscript{20}

Statistics from this year indicate how remarkably youthful the German movement was compared to other ethnic groups: 55.8\% of all German immigrants were between the ages of 15 and 29, compared to 44.1\% for all immigrants and 41.7\% for Britons. Almost one-third of all Germans coming forward in 1957 were between 20 and 24 years of age (see Figure No.19). The youthfulness of this movement suggests that adventurism and opportunism also factored into the decision of Germans to emigrate. It may also account for the greater regional and socio-economic mobility of the German immigrant labour force in Canada. The overall effect of this "young-adult" migration was to endow Canada with a youthful, adaptable and productive element which contributed to the baby, economic and cultural booms. Especially advantageous for Canada was that the flow of young German males in the age group 20 to 39, representing about 57\% of the German movement, helped make up the deficit of Canadian men in the same age group at only 28.8\% of the population.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{20} The absence of any changes in Canada's immigration program or in social-economic conditions in Germany in the years preceding 1957 would suggest previous years were no different. The German government's announcement in mid-1956, introducing compulsory military service, may have prompted more young Germans to emigrate in 1957 than in previous years. Yet this factor was counterbalanced by the DCI's relaxation of age restrictions, which enabled more older immigrants to come to Canada.

Figure No. 19: German, Dutch, British and Italian Immigration to Canada by Age Cohort, 1957

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE COHORT</th>
<th>German Migrants</th>
<th>% of all Germans</th>
<th>Dutch Migrants</th>
<th>% of all Dutch</th>
<th>British Migrants</th>
<th>% of all British</th>
<th>Italian Migrants</th>
<th>% of all Italians</th>
<th>All Migrants</th>
<th>% of all Migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-4 years</td>
<td>2,274</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>1,485</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>12,323</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>2,439</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>26,185</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9 years</td>
<td>1,974</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>1,454</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>10,489</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>3,045</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>24,414</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-14 years</td>
<td>1,226</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>6,204</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>2,068</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>15,787</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19 years</td>
<td>3,007</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>931</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>5,154</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>3,078</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>19,929</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24 years</td>
<td>8,700</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
<td>2,168</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>19,359</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>5,596</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>53,792</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29 years</td>
<td>4,786</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>1,798</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>22,471</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td>4,471</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>50,570</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34 years</td>
<td>2,803</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>1,287</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>15,493</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>2,945</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>35,143</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39 years</td>
<td>1,641</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>941</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>9,780</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>1,701</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>22,311</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44 years</td>
<td>948</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>4,863</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>1,013</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>12,215</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49 years</td>
<td>832</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>2,735</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>1,011</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>8,400</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54 years</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1,486</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>781</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>5,090</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-59 years</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>3,280</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-64 years</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>2,223</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65-69 years</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>1,470</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70+ years</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>1,355</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All age groups 29,564 100.0% 12,310 100.0% 112,828 100.0% 29,443 100.0% 282,164 100.0%

Source: Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Immigration Statistics Year 1896 to 1961 (Ottawa: DCL, n.d.).

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF GERMAN IMMIGRANTS

Prior to the Second World War most German immigrants settled in western Canada. This was especially evident in the inter-war period when about 80% of all German immigrants headed west.22

The German boom of 1951-1957 represented a significant departure from this trend: 126,387 Germans or 63.8% of all German immigrants listed central Canada as their final destination compared to 68,261 or 34.3% in western Canada. Only 3,391, or 1.7%, went to Atlantic Canada (see Figure No. 20).

Western and central regions of Canada offered obvious advantages for immigrants, including a more promising and variable job market, high wages and greater urban settlement. The heavy concentration of German immigration to central Canada was no doubt due to the greater diversification and development of this region's economy which offered more manufacturing and industrial jobs than other parts of Canada for the many skilled workers coming forward. Also this

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region provided more employment and urban-settlement opportunities as well as more services than other regions in Canada. It was also more accessible from the eastern seaports at which European migrants disembarked. From 1951 to 1957, Ontario received the most German immigrants, followed by Quebec, Alberta, Manitoba, British Columbia and Saskatchewan. Obviously, not all German newcomers stayed put at these destinations. According to census data, there was a gradual shift westward of the German-Canadian population in the decades following the 1950s.  

Figure No. 20: Regional Distribution of German Immigrants in Canada, Total 1951-57

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>Number of German Migrants</th>
<th>% of all German Migrants</th>
<th>% Distribution of Canadian Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>1,645</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td>999</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince Edward Island</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>35,699</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>28.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>90,688</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
<td>33.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>18,517</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>7,797</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>23,825</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>18,122</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yukon and N.W.T.</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>198,159</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Data does not include Germans arriving by air transport.


Nonetheless, from 1951 to 1957, the percentage of Germans destined for central Canada (63.8%) was lower than that of all immigrants (74.6%). The opposite held true for western Canada, where the percentage of German migrants exceeded immigrants of all groups by 11% (see Figure No. 21). In short, the German influx added proportionately more immigrants to western Canada than British, Italian and regular immigration. A number of reasons may account for this pattern. Immediately after the war, western Canada had a stronger German-Canadian population and institutional base than other parts of Canada which may have generated more sponsored immigration. Also, about

23 A. Koch-Kraft, Deutsche in Kanada: Einwanderung und Adapt[ation: mit Einer Untersuchung zur Situation der Nachkriegsimmigration in Edmonton, Alberta (Bochum: N.Brockmeyer, 1990), 28. From 1951 to 1957 many of the German newcomers were heading to B.C. and Ontario and fewer to Quebec, Manitoba and Alberta by 1956-57. See Figure No.21.
half of the combined German farm and sugar-beet labour orders were placed in the prairie
provinces. Immigration field estimates revealed consistently high employment opportunities for
immigrants in the prairie provinces in the 1950s (see Figure No. 22).24 And the government sought
to fill many of these openings with German labour, instructing overseas officers in Germany in
1954 and 1955 to direct more Germans to western Canada.25 Finally, most of the Germans brought
forward by the voluntary agencies were placed in western Canada.

The distribution of the Germans relative to each provinces' population was reasonably
proportionate. Ontario was the greatest recipient of German immigrants in terms of its population
base in Canada. With 33.6% of Canada's population in 1956, it received 45.8% of all German
immigrants coming to Canada in 1951-57, a surplus of 12.2%. Alberta's and Manitoba's
populations also benefited in this regard. This obviously resulted from the strong economies and
greater job opportunities in these provinces.26

**Occupational Structure of German Immigrants, 1951-57**

Whether a prospective unsponsored German emigrant qualified for admission to Canada or not was
very much dependent on their occupational background. The DCI's occupational selection criteria
were an important driving force behind German migration to Canada in the 1950s and very much
determined the size and complexion of this movement.27

24 In 1953, for example, field staff recorded 43.5% of all jobs in the prairie region. IB, Vol. 814, File 551-10-1953, Smith to Fortier,
31.10.1953. This is confirmed by the record low unemployment rate in the prairie region in the 1950s.
26 Jacobson, "The Intergovernmental," 158.
27 Most of the following analysis relies on "intended occupation" data gathered from immigrants at the point they entered Canada. It
therefore only provides an approximate snapshot of the labour occupations engaged in by Germans at the time of their entry. Long-
term patterns of employment, while more significant to the study of occupational structure, are outside the scope of this study.
### Figure No. 21: Intended Destinations in Canada of German Immigrants, 1951-57

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>1951 % of all migrants</th>
<th>1952 % of all migrants</th>
<th>1953 % of all migrants</th>
<th>1954 % of all migrants</th>
<th>1955 % of all migrants</th>
<th>1956 % of all migrants</th>
<th>1957 % of all migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland</td>
<td>37 17.9%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>125 29.1%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>129 29.0%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>170 30.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>266 14.9%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>391 15.9%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>216 10.8%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>225 11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td>180 14.8%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>159 20.1%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>313 34.0%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>87 10.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince Edward Island</td>
<td>1 0.6%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>45 17.6%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>34 15.6%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>12 16.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>5,987 13.4%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>5,320 15.7%</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td>8,186 25.0%</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
<td>5,173 19.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>14,828 14.6%</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
<td>11,534 14.0%</td>
<td>43.0%</td>
<td>14,487 16.8%</td>
<td>41.4%</td>
<td>13,121 16.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>3,273 38.5%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>2,137 33.3%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>3,263 41.3%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>3,572 40.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>1,759 43.8%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>1,454 40.7%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>1,438 41.3%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>1,258 33.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>3,393 29.8%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>3,361 29.9%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>4,904 35.0%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>4,170 34.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>2,670 20.2%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>2,260 16.7%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>2,031 17.5%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>1,949 18.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yukon/ N.W.T.</td>
<td>1 7.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>14 31.1%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>14 23.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>17 24.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL:** 32,395 17.4% 100% 26,800 17.3% 100% 35,015 22.0% 100% 29,845 20.7% 100% 18,082 18.3% 100% 26,458 17.1% 100% 29,564 10.5% 100%

The occupational composition of the German boom marks a distinct break from earlier German migrations. No longer were farmers the predominant group coming forward to Canada; rather the boom was largely a movement of non-rural skilled and semi-skilled workers. The single largest occupational category of Germans coming to Canada in 1951-57 consisted of skilled German labourers in the manufacturing, construction, transportation and communication sectors, numbering over 46,000 or 39% of all German workers. They were followed by service workers, who totalled 23,457 or 19.7% of all German workers; agriculturalists at 21,186 or 17.8%; semi-skilled and unskilled workers in the resource sectors at 15,552 or 13.1%; clerical, commercial and financial workers at 6,102 or 5.1%; and professional and managerial personnel at 3,738 or 3.1%.

Interestingly, this composition of German immigration to Canada matched reasonably well with the occupational stratification of the labour force in Germany (see Figure No. 23). Therefore, it appears that the Canadian program was also guided to a large degree by what Germany's labour market had to offer.

Figure No. 23: Federal Republic of Germany - Occupational Stratification of Labour Force, 1960

The occupational complexion of German immigration in the 1950s shared some important similarities but also demonstrated key differences with regular immigration to Canada (see Figure No. 24). An important feature which both movements had in common was the relatively high content of skilled workers - 39% for German and 34% for general immigration - which reflected the new needs of Canada's increasingly industrialised and diversified economy.¹ In terms of differences, German immigration provided Canada a disproportionately high number of service workers and farm hands compared to normal immigration. Almost 29% of all service workers and 22% of all farm workers coming to Canada in 1951-57 were Germans whereas regular immigration only supplied 11.9% and 14.1% of these categories respectively. In fact, Germany contributed more service and farm workers than any other sending country. Domestic made up the lion's share, about 87%, of the German service workers movement, adding 20,000 immigrants to Canada from 1951 to 1957. In comparison, the flow of German agriculturalists was more modest but still surpassed in numbers the highly-touted Dutch farm movement. The reason for the large movement of German farm and domestic workers is that immigration authorities focussed their recruiting on such workers up to 1954 and received the assistance of German authorities in this regard. Here Canada's and Germany's interests meshed nicely: Germany's surplus of females and refugee farmers up to 1954 filled the deficit of farm workers and domestics in Canada.

The German movement provided proportionately fewer unskilled and semi-skilled resource-sector workers and general labourers than Canada's regular immigration. There was generally no need to recruit this type of worker in Germany because Canadian authorities were generally satisfied that here the Italian-sponsored movement could supply most of Canada's needs. Statistics bear this out: Italy supplied over one third (36,794) of all general and resource sector workers from 1951 to 1957.

¹ This trend represented a marked break from the preceding period of 1948-50, when the annual intake of trained personnel averaged only about 17.7% of all workers.
### Figure No. 24: Occupational Background of German Newcomers to Canada by Sector, 1951-57

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEARS</th>
<th>Professional/Managerial</th>
<th>Clerical/Commercial</th>
<th>Service Sector</th>
<th>Manufacturing, Construction, Transport &amp; Communication</th>
<th>Farming Sector</th>
<th>Primary Industry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total # of Germans</td>
<td>% of all German Workers</td>
<td>% of all Immigrant Workers</td>
<td>Total # of Germans</td>
<td>% of all German Workers</td>
<td>% of all Immigrant Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>1,202</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>1,318</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,738</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>6,102</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DCI, Vols. 61 D to G.
Germany contributed far fewer professional-managerial and clerical-commercial migrants to Canada (7%) than the general immigration stream (11%) from 1951 to 1957. Britain and the United States were Canada's main suppliers here with a combined output of 70% of all white-collar migrants to Canada. Germans either filled gaps left over or came forward as special sponsored or meritorious cases. Technical problems, such as currency exchange restrictions, the language barrier, different training and professional standards and lack of information about placement opportunities also militated against the development of a large German white-collar movement.

Because much of German immigration to Canada in the 1950s was based on the occupational qualifications of migrants, the following sections will examine in closer detail the movement to Canada of the chief occupational categories.

The German Miners' Scheme

The German miners' scheme was the first German "bulk-labour scheme" developed by federal Immigration and Labour authorities. This scheme enabled Canadian authorities to see first-hand how German labour supply could be exploited to meet Canada's manpower needs. It also set in place an efficient system of recruiting and processing immigrants which would be later adapted to process domestic and farm workers. This scheme initiated a close working relationship between Canadian and German authorities which assured Canadian officials of Bonn's support and material assistance in recruiting workers needed in Canada. Although short-lived, lasting only one season, it had a lasting legacy which was important to the German immigration boom.

Demand for labour in Canada's mining sector was high in the years following the war owing to increased exports of ore, together with shortages of available labour in Canada. A proposal submitted to the Senate Committee in 1947 suggested that "[i]f native Canadians refuse to become miners in large numbers, the immigration of skilled miners seems a logical solution." In line with

its economic philosophy of giving priority to the demands of Canada's basic industries, the
government instituted a program to recruit DPs as miners. Yet for many DPs who filled these
positions in 1947-51, mining was also "hard, dirty, dangerous work" in remote locations with little
prospect of family accommodation. Even the comparatively high wages and year-round
employment offered by this industry failed to stem the high rate of worker turnover. As a result,
mines, especially the remote gold operations, were dependent on a steady stream of immigrant
labour up to 1951. Nonetheless, German and DP migrants offered mine operators an advantage
over local residents, namely they could be tied to mine employment through labour contracts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>German miners</th>
<th>% of all miners</th>
<th>% of all German workers</th>
<th>% of all migrant workers as miners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>937</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,658</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DCl, Vol. 61 D to G.

The miners' scheme was the first German group-labour scheme to be developed by the DL in 1950.
Anticipating a shortfall of DP miners in 1951, the DL, on behalf of the Canadian Metal Mining
Association (CMMA), set about developing a new labour program in 1950 to bring forward
European nationals to supplement and ultimately to replace the DP schemes. On CMMA's list of
preferred workers were Germans, Scandinavians and northern Italians. While Labour officials in
Ottawa were busily working out details of the contracts and overcoming the problem of
transportation expenses of this planned movement in late-1950, their overseas staff was staking out

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2 The prevailing economic thinking in Ottawa was that only the basic sectors created lasting jobs which benefited the economy. Hence, federal officials listened closely to the demands of mining and forestry operations and farmers. Ibid.
3 Toronto Telegram, 9.8.1950.
4 The Canadian Metal Mining Association (CMMA) represented most companies situated in central Canada and Manitoba. It was an effective mouthpiece of mining interests in their dealings with federal and provincial governments. Its executive director was V.C. Wansborough.
the availability of this type of labour in Germany. The department's discreet enquiries with German authorities revealed "that the numbers of first class miners available for Canada ... would be limited only by the ability of immigration people to process them." On the basis of these glowing reports and the industry's express preference for German workers, a program to move 500 German workers was approved by the Departmental Advisory Committee on Immigration (DACI) on January 8, 1951. As a result of DP supply problems, this order was increased to 820 workers later that spring.

Arrangements to move German miners to Canada were similar to those for DPs. Successful candidates were obliged to sign a labour undertaking which set out the transportation arrangements, working and wage conditions of the immigrant employee and the obligations of the employer. The undertakings, among other things, committed German immigrants to 18 months of employment at going rates of pay and at comparable working conditions offered native Canadians. Furthermore, they ensured that the transportation fares advanced by the company were repaid by the immigrant. Companies agreed to absorb the costs of inland rail if employees stayed on for the duration of their contract.

In Germany the scheme showed signs of getting off to a good start, especially in January 1951 when, after negotiations with Canadian officials, Bonn gave its approval to this plan and promised to assist in recruiting workers. Even the IRO pledged to make available its assembly and shipping facilities, once exclusively reserved for DPs. Yet, by early spring this and other Canadian schemes had bogged down. The original consensus and support evaporated in February, when various German ministries sought guarantees regarding the social security and working conditions of German workers departing for Canada and when disputes erupted over the role of the IRO in the Canadian schemes. These complications delayed and ultimately threatened the movement of miners and other groups. Nor was the expected cooperation from some of the Länder (State) governments always forthcoming. Some Länder refused to assist in the recruiting and pre-

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processing of candidates for the Canadian schemes, while labour offices which did assist were unable to generate much interest in the program. The situation was made more serious by the high rate of rejection of applicants on physical fitness and medical grounds. Applicants had to meet some of the toughest fitness requirements of any of the schemes to assure Canadian employers and health officials that they were fit for the rigors of mine work.\textsuperscript{7}

Most of these initial problems were overcome by the late summer. The CMMA's decision to relax its tough fitness requirements immediately lowered the visa rejection rate. The situation on the German side had also improved. On the assurances of Canadian authorities, Bonn satisfied itself, at least temporarily, with the terms of the undertakings. Also, it reached a working agreement with the IRO on the processing of immigrants. The Canadian immigration mission in Karlsruhe convinced some of the reluctant Länder authorities to assist in its schemes. In the meantime it processed "spontaneous" applications (applications submitted at the missions) to make up for the slow start. By early September its processing of miners was in full swing, with about 600 miners already provided with visas.\textsuperscript{8}

However, a month later the CMMA cancelled its order for 820 German miners after receiving 735. Some weeks earlier it had discontinued its joint miners' program with the DL.\textsuperscript{9} This action was prompted largely by the sudden drop in demand for labour in this industry. Furthermore, the mines secured additional immigrants from the regular stream of immigration coming under the APS. For companies, there was no reason to continue the DL's program which involved financial risk and paper work when another department offered these services \textit{gratis}. Moreover, some of the German newcomers had not worked out well. Because health standards had been lowered for the scheme

\textsuperscript{6} DL, Vol. 291, File 1-26-60-2, Pt.1, Fortier to MacNamara, 5.2.1951.
\textsuperscript{7} For problems with Länder, see DL, Vol. 290, File 1-26-60-1, Pt. 1, Davis to Sec.State DEA, 19.3.1951 and Lamarre to Dawson, 12.5.1951. Regarding high number of medical rejections see DL, Vol. 279, File 1-26-6, Pt. 2, Dawson to Brown, 6.6.1951.
many Germans were found to be unfit for work in the mines after arriving in Canada.\textsuperscript{10} To correct this situation the DL in 1952 decided to merge the miners' scheme with its general labourers' program and accordingly enlarged the latter program. This made sense because mines were no longer looking for experienced miners but for healthy bodies. The fittest workers were drawn from the general-labour pool for work in the mines while the remainder were assigned to other heavy labour jobs.\textsuperscript{11}

By early-1952, the German miners' scheme officially ended. 1951 marked the last big year for immigrant miners when 3,026 came to Canada, among them 937 Germans. After this time only a trickle came forward and the German content was especially weak (see Figure No. 25). The mining sector had become more capital and less labour intensive as the growth of output exceeded the increase in employment by some 4.67 times between 1949 and 1958.\textsuperscript{12} Despite the initial complications with the first batch of miners, employers seemed to have been satisfied with their German workers. Speaking at the annual meeting of the Canadian Chamber of Commerce in 1957, the Manager of the Sudbury District noted that "Germans and Dutch are considered outstanding workers in the base metal industries." When interest in immigrant miners was rekindled in 1956, half of the mines placing orders specifically requested Germans, the balance preferring "northern Europeans."\textsuperscript{13}

An important offshoot of the miners' scheme was the development of a processing procedure in Germany which was used to generate migrants for other immigrant-labour programs. Applicants were recruited, assembled and pre-processed by German labour offices and then presented to Canadian authorities for inspection. Those failing to meet the rigorous criteria of the miners' program were assigned to the loggers', farmers' or general labourers' schemes depending on their

\textsuperscript{11} DL, Vol. 279, File 1-26-6, Pt. 2, Winter to Dawson, 15.4.1952.
\textsuperscript{12} M. Timlin, "Canadian Immigration Policy: An Analysis," \textit{International Migration} (1965), 64. For German miners statistics see DCI, Vol. 23, File 99-8-19. Even the industry acknowledged that the program was finished. See DL, Vol. 279, File 1-26-6, Pt. 2, Wansborough to Hereford, 16.6.1953.
prior work experience.\textsuperscript{14} This method offered Canadian overseas operations obvious advantages. The work and costs involved in pre-processing, presenting and transporting prospective immigrants within Germany was borne by German authorities. Once rejected there was no need for the candidate to be presented a second or third time for another scheme thereby avoiding further expenses and disappointment for German labour offices. This process enabled Canadian officials to recycle applications and to take maximum advantage of the free services offered by German authorities. By 1953, immigration officials were even referring "spontaneous" applicants appearing at Canadian missions to German labour offices to save them the cost of medical examinations and transportation to inspection points. The Chief of the Immigration Mission in Germany, J.R. Robillard, also ensured that all immigration applications received by German labour offices, but not processed, were forwarded to his mission so that they could be followed up in subsequent years.\textsuperscript{15}

\textit{The German Lumber Workers' Scheme}

The history of the German woodworkers' scheme closely resembled that of the miners' program in terms of its origins, duration and demise. Like the mining sector, the booming postwar forestry sector generated a seemingly insatiable appetite for labour which, up to 1946, was in part filled by German POWs who were then replaced by DPs. In the late-1940s, employment in this sector was characterised by a high labour turn-over rate of about 13\% a week.\textsuperscript{16} The unpredictable duration, harsh conditions and remote locations of bush work made this work unattractive for Canadians and DPs alike. The IRO offered a reliable and ready store of bush workers after 1947 and industry and the Canadian government saw no reason to change suppliers for 1951, when another 6,600 DP lumber workers were ordered.\textsuperscript{17} As a result, the industry was caught off-guard when the DP labour crisis hit and it was forced to change plans in mid-course.

\textsuperscript{14} IB, Vol. 810, File 548-20, Pt. 1, Benoit to Winter, 27.9.1951.
\textsuperscript{15} IB, Vol. 675, File C92672, Pt. 3, Robillard to German Employment Office, 15.6.1953.
\textsuperscript{17} A request by the Abitibi Power and Paper Company to broaden the recruitment base to include Germany was cynically dismissed by DL as a gross exaggeration of the company's labour requirements. DL, Vol. 277, File 1-26-2-1, Pt. 1, Davis to MacNamara, 28.9.1950.
Warning signs that the IRO was behind schedule in recruiting DP loggers surfaced in February 1951. At this time the DL had identified alternate sources including Germany and northern Italy and the DCI added Scandinavian countries to the list. Some companies needed little convincing about the merits of German workers given their positive experiences with German POWs. As a senior executive at Abitibi pointed out: "Our experience during the past with displaced persons and German prisoners of war conclusively indicates that the Germans are the best type of labour for our requirements." When the DP supply crisis hit, DL officials were quick to direct the representative of the Great Lakes Pulp & Paper Co. travelling in Germany at this time to the surplus of experienced German lumbermen and convinced him to place orders through the Department. Other orders, totalling 1,708 workers, soon followed from individual companies and the Ontario Forest Industries Association. The DL adopted the same company-funded transport arrangements and labour contracts as under the mining scheme for the movement of German lumber workers. The DCI filled smaller orders for individual companies. It used the APS to finance the transportation of these workers to Canada which, again, undercut the viability of the DL's German lumber workers' scheme and ultimately rendered it redundant.

Figure No. 26: Immigration of German versus All Lumbermen to Canada, 1951-57

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>German Loggers</th>
<th>% of all German workers</th>
<th>% of all Migrant workers as Loggers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total Number</td>
<td>% of all Loggers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1,664</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,078</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DCI, Vols. 61 D to G.

\[\text{Ibid.}\]
In April 1951, Canadian Immigration and Labour officials sought the assistance and approval of German authorities for their lumber workers' scheme. The timing of their approach was inauspicious as this scheme became entangled in the same difficulties with Bonn, the IRO and the Länder which had complicated and delayed the mining scheme. Only by the summer, after most of these problems were ironed out, did overseas officials resume all-out processing of Germans. Yet when the first large shipments of German workers arrived, companies began cancelling orders. Some timber operators complained that many German workers were leaving their jobs shortly after arrival. Another reason for the disinterest in the German scheme was that most forestry operations had grossly over-estimated their initial labour requirements as most of the vacancies were filled by resident Canadians or DPs who did not encumber the companies with transportation debts.

Still, in 1951, the DL brought 903 and the DCI another 761 German forest workers to Canada. For most of these workers, however, their placements were short-lived. The labour glut and the early cut of timber led companies to scale back their workforce and immigrants were the first to go. This behaviour by the companies as well as the seasonal nature of this employment convinced immigration authorities to discontinue the bulk-labour lumber workers' scheme, a decision which Labour officials had to grudgingly accept. All orders from individual companies were henceforth processed by the DCI. Like the miners' movement, the post-1951 immigration of lumber workers never again reached the huge dimensions it had during the late-1940s. This movement averaged only 529 workers per year from 1952 to 1957 of which the German share averaged 69 immigrants. The industry was no longer reliant on immigrant labour as it had undergone substantial mechanisation. Also, over half of the foreign labour in this industry was now supplied by Scandinavian countries.

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No sooner had the German lumber workers' program been thrown together when it came apart. Its overall success was mixed. A good number of the workers failed to meet the expectations of some employers. For many of them the transition from the predominantly urban environment of Germany to the wilds of Canada proved too difficult. Others may never have intended to honour their undertakings but used the scheme to gain entry to Canada to seek work elsewhere. The balance of the workers appear to have fared well, including many former German POWs who had been rehired by their ex-employers. With the exception of 1951, the movement of these workers was of little consequence to the German boom (see Figure No. 26).

**German Farm Labourers**

The German farm labour movement ranked among the largest worker movements to Canada in the 1950s. It brought more agriculturalists forward than any other ethnic group movement (see Figure No. 27). Of all German programs, it was only surpassed by the domestics' scheme in terms of numbers. It also generated more paper work and vexation in Ottawa than any of the other German programs.

**Figure No. 27: Immigration of German, Dutch, British and Italian Agriculturalists to Canada, 1951-57**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>German Agriculturalists</th>
<th>Dutch Agriculturalists</th>
<th>British Agriculturalists</th>
<th>Italian Agriculturalists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>% of all farm workers</td>
<td>% of all German workers</td>
<td>% of all farm workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>4,248</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td>4,323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>4,566</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
<td>3,734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>6,837</td>
<td>39.6%</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>3,532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>2,493</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>2,254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1,129</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>1,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>1,059</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>854</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>641</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 21,186 22.0% 17.8% 16,278 16.9% 37.0% 8,884 9.2% 4.4% 20,265 21.0% 21.3% 14.1%

Source: D.C. Vols. 61 D to G.

This movement owed its existence to the prevailing conditions in Canadian agriculture in the 1950s. At this time agriculture remained Canada's largest employer. However, the sector was beset with

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20 This was the case in the Port Arthur area. *Ibid.*, Dawson to Andrews, 15.10.1951.
acute labour shortages which began during the war and continued into the 1950s and beyond. At the heart of the problem was the mass exodus of Canadian farm workers to urban areas where wages and working conditions were generally better. In spite of the increased mechanisation and technological advances in the agriculture sector in the 1950s and the influx of immigrant farm labour, chronic labour shortages remained in most regions of Canada. Short supply became particularly acute as a result of the intensification of agriculture and good harvests in the early-1950s. Immigration authorities did everything possible to satisfy the demand for agriculturalists, offering various incentives, such as the APS, to make the farm program more attractive to prospective immigrants. After all, farmers were very important political constituents, especially in western Canada, and their belief of a strong nation founded on a healthy and stable agrarian economy coincided with the views of many politicians and bureaucrats. Immigration was not simply a means of supplying farm labour but to many Canadians it was part of a mission of preserving the essential urban-rural balance of Canadian society. As one senior immigration official stated in 1951:

The large urban areas will continue to attract persons and industries and hence to develop and expand. If the proper balance is to be maintained, a special effort will have to be made to build up and strengthen the villages and small towns and rural areas generally. This is a basic factor in the immigration policy.

In carrying out this mission, Canadian authorities extensively drew on one of the largest pools of agriculture immigrant labour in Europe, Germany. But these high expectations gave rise to false hopes that the newcomers would remain in rural Canada and compensate the outflow of farm labour to the urban areas.

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22 DCI, Vol. 101, File 3-18-5, Winter to Fortier, 4.7.1951. DCI's Deputy Minister, L. Fortier, shared these views stating at the Settlement Service Conference that "Our rural population is still our soundest population, and the ownership of farm or property is the mightiest bulwark against social disorder." DCI, Vol. 90, File 3-1-4, Pt. 1, Minutes, 24.8.1950. The DL held the outdated view that only labour employed in the basic industries stimulated broader economic growth. Regarding federal Liberal party's hold in western Canada in the 1950s see G. Friesen, The Canadian Prairies: A History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), 426. Ottawa also may have imported more farm workers because it faced no opposition from unions and the public in this regard.
Anticipating the eventual demise of the DP farm labour program in 1951, immigration authorities already in 1950 looked to other countries in Europe to fill this void. After it became evident that Britain and northwestern Europe would be unable to boost their output, officials fell back on Italy and Germany. With the abolition of the last restrictions against German immigration in September 1950, a vast reservoir of farm labour suddenly became available to Canadian authorities. Underemployment was high amongst farm workers in Germany during this time, especially for German expellees and recent refugees from the East, many of whom had been farmers in their former homelands. Furthermore, this class of worker showed a greater willingness to emigrate than any other. In the early-1950s Bonn encouraged this trend, attaching special emphasis to the emigration of refugee farm families to Canada. German authorities assisted Canadian operations in recruiting and processing this group of workers. On their side, Canadian authorities gladly accepted these offers and even accommodated German interests by accepting married farm hands provided they came to work in Canada in advance of their families. The net effect of all this promotion was significant. German farm immigration to Canada tripled between 1950 and 1951, rising from 1,515 to 4,248 individuals.

After 1951, Canada increasingly turned to Germany to meet its farm labour supplies. The flow of DPs at this time had come to a complete stop as the IRO had closed shop. The movement of Dutch farmers to Canada was in decline after 1950 as more non-agrarian Dutch migrants came to Canada. The contribution from other countries of northwestern Europe fell off sharply after 1951. Farm labour immigration from Britain remained steady but low. Also the DL's Italian farm program

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23 IB, Vol. 674, File C92672, Pt. 1, Benoit to all posts abroad, 10.4.1951 and replies. See also, Ibid. Immigration Superintendent, London to Director, 16.4.1951.

24 German survey results show that over one-third of the Germans seeking to emigrate were farmers. Friedmann, German Immigration into Canada (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1952), 52. Regarding the high unemployment among German refugee farmers, see Ibid., 15 and E. Pfeil, "Soziologische und psychologische Aspekte der Vertreibung," in G. Wülker et al. eds., Europa und die deutschen Flüchtlinge (Frankfurt a.M.: Institut für Förderung öffentlicher Angelegenheiten, 1952), 57.


failed to live up to expectations. With the exception of Quebec, all provinces placing orders with the DL for their 1952 programs had dropped Italian farm workers from their list and instead ordered Germans. Quebec followed suit the following year. Interest in German farm labourers remained high in most provinces during the 1950s. This is evidenced by the large number of orders placed with the DL: 3,325 in 1952, 2,000 in 1953, 2,100 in 1954, 1,300 in 1955 and 2,800 in 1956.

Labour's own program added to the DCI's intake of German farm labour. It offered German immigrants another route of entering Canada and brought further resources and placement opportunities to the German farm labour movement. In 1951, the DL operated a trial movement of 200 German farm hands to Manitoba. It recruited these workers through its channels in Germany and arranged for their inland transportation to final destinations in Canada. Here National Employment Service (NES) and Federal-Provincial Farm Labour Committees placed them with farmers. Provincial officials followed up placements and collected the APS advances. The apparent success of Manitoba's experiment, broadly advertised by the DL, convinced other provinces to launch their own programs in 1952.

The burst of German farm labourers entering Canada in 1951 was followed by two more good years. The numbers recruited in 1952 (4,566) mirrored the 1951 results and could have been even higher had it not been for the late reinstatement of the APS and the quarantine restrictions imposed on German farm workers as a result of the outbreak of hoof-and-mouth disease in Saskatchewan. 1953 was a record year for German farm workers when 6,837 were recruited, representing 40% of all immigrant farm workers. This success in 1953 can be attributed to better organisation. Overseas operations received advance approval to recruit German farm workers and to administer the APS. This was also one of the few years when the early and full assistance of German authorities was

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27 The mass desertion of Italians from their farm placements to the cities sounded the death knell for this program. The Deputy Minister of Labour commented in 1951: "Putting the matter quite bluntly I would think the experiment of bringing Italians out for farm work on individual farms has proved to be a failure. ... Unless we can get a better quality of Italians I am pretty well through with Italians for farm work." DL, Vol. 291, File 1-26-60-4, Pt. 1, MacNamara to Lamarre, 17.8.1951. Ottawa was also aware that few British agriculturalists would be forthcoming. DCI, Vol. 132, File 3-35-2, Pt. 2, Fortier to Harris, 27.3.1952.
secured in recruiting workers for this scheme. As well, competition from other receiving countries was minimal in 1953.

After 1953, the movement underwent a sharp and steady decline (see Figure No. 27). As a result of numerous complaints by employers and agriculture officials about the quality and commitment of German farm workers, immigration authorities tightened the occupational selection criteria after 1953, accepting only bona fide farm workers who had recent farm experience. This led to an immediate drop in the number of visas issued to farm hands. Also, by late-1954, German interest in emigrating to Canada began to wane, and the number of surplus farmers began to thin.31

Furthermore, American and Australian programs were cutting into this supply by 1955. Nor did Ottawa or farm organisations take any action to make their programs more attractive at a time when Canada was experiencing a recession. In fact, immigration authorities hoped that stricter qualifications for the farm labour program would have the effect of reducing overall German immigration for 1954. Finally, after 1954, Bonn ceased all material and recruiting assistance for this and Canada's other labour schemes. Because of emerging labour shortages and the need of manpower for the new German armed forces, Bonn grew reluctant to part with young male workers.32

In 1956, the economic situation in Canada improved and Ottawa regained its will to embark on a vigorous immigration program. Unfortunately, it was too late to resuscitate the moribund farm workers' movement. Despite Ottawa's best efforts, little interest could be drummed up in Germany for this program.33 The absence of a settlement program for East German refugees, the delayed start to the program, and the poor wages and working conditions in this sector further hindered Ottawa's recruitment campaign. By this time many of the older expellees and refugees, Canada's main source of farm labour, had been fully integrated into German society. So low was the intake

31 German farm workers only represented 14% of the total German working population in 1960. See work force stratification chart.

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of farm labourers in 1957 that this category failed to make the list of the top ten professions recruited from Germany. After 1954, jobs in certain agricultural areas were diminishing or becoming more seasonal and some programs were scrapped entirely. Ottawa was less willing to supply provinces and certain growers with seasonal immigrant labour unless assurances for year-round employment could be made. It was realised that workers engaged in seasonal employment were all too often lost to the farming community after being laid off. Also, selection increasingly targeted specialised farm skills as opposed to day labourers.34

As in the case of most large immigration schemes, problems invariably surfaced in this movement. Initially few Canadian farmers complained about the prospects of employing German workers. Germans in Canada had acquired an enviable reputation of being successful agricultural settlers, second only to the Dutch. This view was reinforced by the positive impression left on Canadian farmers and officials by the German POWs employed on farms during the war and by Volksdeutsche refugee farmers who followed them.35 But beginning in 1952, Canadian farmers and officials faced difficulties keeping some of these workers on farms for the duration of their one year contracts. Complaints also arose that some workers had little or no farm experience. The situation worsened the following year when many provinces reported that upwards of half of the German field hands had abandoned their placements shortly after arriving in Canada, many with outstanding travel debts.36 The resulting outcry from farmers and labour organisations and the negative press that followed forced Ottawa in 1954 to impose stringent qualification criteria and to instruct overseas officers to exercise more vigilance in their selection. These measures improved the type of worker coming forward but at the cost of severely reducing overall numbers. Ironically, when acute labour shortages again appeared in 1956, provincial officials who insisted on tougher selection criteria in 1953 now pleaded with Ottawa to ease up.

35 Robillard cites this as a major reason for the decline in German farm labourers. IB, Vol. 840, File 553-50, Pt. 2, Robillard to Benoit, 6.8.1955. For “10 most visned” occupations, see DCI, Vol. 143, File 3-40-25.
36 Manitoba’s decision to accept German farm labourers was based in large part on its positive experiences with German POWs. DL, Vol. 290, File 1-26-60-1, Pt.1, Bell to Harris, 14.5.1951; DL, Vol. 291, File 1-26-60-4, Pt. 1, MacNamara to Bell, 21.5.1951.
Contract "jumping" had a number of causes. First, immigrants were not always the cause of the problem. Officials in the field reported that 50% of the desertions were due to unscrupulous farmers who failed to honour their undertakings, often laying workers off or reducing their wages after the harvest. The balance who left voluntarily appear to have been drawn to the cities where better wages and more steady work was offered. This was an inexorable trend which even affected German groups with strong traditional ties to the land, such as the Mennonites and Danube Swabians. It was just as widespread in other countries receiving Germans such as the United States, where well over half of the Volksdeutsche immigrant farmers who had come under the expellees' program had left their agrarian placements by 1952. Some immigrants, who had no intention of engaging in agriculture work, had evidently used the financial provisions of the APS to overcome the German currency restrictions which otherwise blocked their entry to Canada. In opportunistic fashion, they misrepresented themselves as farm hands to gain entry to Canada.

One such celebrated case which raised the ire of immigration authorities was a German dentist who had arrived in Canada as a farm labourer with absolutely no experience or will for this work. This practice was not unique to Germans and was apparently common among all migrants who sought

37 An investigation by the German Embassy in Ottawa also found that many Canadian employers were to blame. IB, Vol. 675, File C92672, Pt. 4, Robillard to Benoit, 8.1.1954.
39 The Danube Swabians were German agrarian settlers who had been used by Habsburg rulers in the eighteenth century to repopulate lands in present-day Hungary, Yugoslavia and Rumania which had been taken from Turkish rule. For the most part, they remained in these settlements until the wartime Nazi resettlements or the postwar expulsions carried out by Hungary, Yugoslavia and Rumania. Immediately after the war, they formed a sizeable part of the Volksdeutsche refugee population in Germany. Although Danube Swabians consider themselves farmers, many, if not most, who emigrated to Canada after the war took up non-agrarian pursuits. See K. Stenger-Frey, "The Danube Swabians in Canada: They Call it Their Land, too." German-Canadian Yearbook VI (1981), 80-81.
40 Steinert, Migration und Politik, 147 and 174 ff.
41 There is little doubt that many Germans abused this scheme. About 75% of several hundreds of German farm workers arriving in Canada on the USS General Taylor in 1952 admitted to officials that they had no farming experience. IB, Vol. 674, File C92672, Pt. 2, Benoit to Robillard, 25.8.1952 and reply, 17.9.1952. See also IB, Vol. 810, File 548-20, Pt. 3, Director to Stirling, 23.6.1953. It is difficult to determine how many of the "intending" German farm hands who came to Canada stayed with this employment since follow-up records on immigrants were not kept by Ottawa.
admission to Canada via labour group schemes. However, those who stayed on for the duration of their contracts appear to have generally worked out well and gave Ottawa some encouragement in continuing the program.

The farm labour scheme also made indirect contributions to the German boom and to the Canadian economy. The thousands of married farm workers who came alone to Canada through this program were soon able to sponsor their dependants, relatives and friends which added to Canada's total German intake. German farm workers provided an additional benefit to the Canadian economy. Many had learned secondary trades and skills in Germany which were of great advantage to Canada's other industries in the 1950s and 1960s, especially the booming construction sector.

German Domestics

More German domestic servants came to Canada between 1951 and 1957 than any other type of German worker, including farm hands. Indeed, more domestics immigrated from Germany than from any other country, almost doubling the number arriving from Canada's second largest supplier, Italy. In this regard, the immigration of German domestic was an anomaly as movements of immigrant labourers in the 1950s were usually male-dominated.

The main impetus behind this movement was the great shortage of this type of worker in Canada in the decades after the war. Many Canadian women had retired from the labour force after the war or were pursuing work in industry where pay and hours were better. As well, the postwar economic boom offered well-to-do Canadians more disposable income and employing a domestic became a

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possibility for a greater number. DP women only temporarily filled this void. Many did not stay long, leaving for better paying jobs or for occupations for which they had formal training or experience. By the 1950s, DPs failed to provide a permanent solution to the labour shortages faced in Canadian households and public institutions such as hospitals and old age homes.

Figure No. 28: Immigration of German, Dutch, British and Italian Domestic Servants to Canada, 1951-57

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>German Domestic</th>
<th>Dutch Domestic</th>
<th>British Domestic</th>
<th>Italian Domestic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Number</td>
<td>% of all domestics</td>
<td>Total Number</td>
<td>% of all domestics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>2,119</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>3,336</td>
<td>44.2%</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>4,990</td>
<td>46.1%</td>
<td>1,004</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>3,075</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1,951</td>
<td>31.2%</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>2,361</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>2,274</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 20,108 | 34.5% | 16.9% | 4,450 | 7.6% | 5,514 | 9.5% | 11,009 | 18.9% | 11.6% | 8.6%

Source: DCI, Vol. 61 D to G.

The DL was involved in the domestics' movement to Canada at the outset. It had created its own DP domestics scheme in 1947 which was continued after 1951 with German immigrants. The department attached particular importance to this program which was personally supervised by the Deputy Minister of Labour, Arthur MacNamara. Labour controlled most aspects of this movement, using its own apparatus to make selections overseas and placements in Canada. By 1950, the DCI had also made preparations to move to Canada greater numbers of domestics. Building on Order in Council PC 2856, which freed up the immigration of domestics, the department issued instructions to posts in western Europe to "make a concerted effort to activate a movement of domestics on a continuing basis." The response was disappointing: supply in western Europe was simply insufficient to meet demand in Canada. Labour authorities had reached

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44 This is borne out by census data which reveal that the number of domestics increased from 88,775 in 1951 to 120,392 in 1961. M. Barber, Immigrant Domestic Servants in Canada (Ottawa: CHA, 1991), 7.
a similar point in their DP domestics’ program at this time. The DP pool had run dry and little hope was placed in developing an Italian movement of domestics. The immigration bureaucracy therefore attempted to make up this shortfall primarily with German women. Furthermore, as the movement of British domestics was debilitated by shipping shortages in 1951, greater emphasis was placed on getting German domestics to make up the deficit.  

Germany was a particularly rich recruiting ground for domestics. World War II had left a demographic surplus of seven million more women than men, most falling into the age category of 18 to 40 years. German authorities were anxious to correct this situation and accordingly assisted Canadian immigration officials with their recruiting activities. Many German women were prepared to come to Canada as domestics and their motives ranged from adventurism to establishing a base to sponsor family members. They were less averse to this line of work than their Canadian or British counterparts, possibly because this employment was respected more in Germany. The political misgivings of Canadian officials about this scheme had vanished by 1951 when it was discovered that Britain had been tapping domestics from its former enemy for some time. The identification of Germans under the racial “northern-European” heading may have helped to market this program. Indeed, by May 1951, the Deputy Minister of Labour felt that “500 German nationals as domestics will go over well with housewives.”

Essentially the same selection criteria for the DP scheme applied to the German domestics’ scheme. A premium was placed on youth (18 to 40 years of age), good health and some experience in this


\[48\] DL, Vol. 290, File 1-26-60-1, Pt. I, MacNamara to Fortier, 9.8.1951. Labour officials felt that Italian women were neither interested in nor suitable for domestic employment. They therefore concentrated on developing a German program. See DL, Vol. 291, File 1-26-60-3-1, Dawson to MacNamara, 13.7.1951.


\[50\] R. Helling et al., A Socio-Economic History of German Canadians (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1984), 97. For British and Canadian women this work carried with it a distinct social stigma. Barber, Immigrant Domestic Servants, 18. Alexander Freund’s study suggests that family circumstances as well as economic, social and political conditions in postwar Germany may have influenced women to emigrate. Many sought independence, adventure and economic success in Canada. The domestics scheme was the only route open for many of them to enter Canada. Freund “Identity and Immigration: Self-Conceptualization and Myth in the Narratives of German Immigrant Women in Vancouver, B.C., 1950-1960,” M.A. Thesis, Simon Fraser University, 1994, 3, 23-26.
field of work. Knowledge of English or French was desirable but not essential. Most German
domestics were directed to employment in private homes, while others served in public institutions
such as hospitals, as well as in hotels, restaurants and as waitresses. Many expressed a preference
for working in big cities such as Montreal or Toronto. The DL's scheme required workers and
employers to sign undertakings. Initially workers were tied to eighteen month undertakings. 52
Employers guaranteed steady work at going wages and pledged to help integrate their charges. The
minimum $40 monthly salary paid in Canada was higher than wages offered in Germany in the
early-1950s. But Immigration authorities in Canada attempted to find better paying posts for their
domestics. Yet, it was probably more the opportunity of gaining entry to Canada, than the
uninspiring wages, working and social-security conditions, that prompted many German women to
sign up for this scheme. 53

The big break for the German domestics' program came in early-1951 when it was included in the
APS. As few German women could pay their own way, these loans greatly facilitated their
movement to Canada. 54 A certain urgency was assigned the 1951 campaign in light of the 20,000 -
22,000 job vacancies in this sector. For 1951, the DL embarked on a trial program of 500 German
domestics. Meanwhile, the DCI began recruiting through its normal channels, drawing on its stock
of spontaneous applications. It was agreed that all domestics requiring placement assistance would
be directed to Labour's NES offices in Canada whereas the balance with jobs lined up in Canada
would be handled by Immigration officials. However, this movement progressed slowly due to
financing and currency exchange difficulties and the lack of cooperation from German labour

51 This was the case in the DP scheme where Canadian officials singled out Baltic women as ideal domestics on the basis of their
291, File 1-26-60-3-1, Dewitt to Mortimer, 16.7.1951 and also chapter 3.
52 Contract terms of service were later reduced to one year. The trend of urban settlement was especially noticeable in the province
of Quebec where not only domestics but most German immigrants settled in the greater Montreal area. H.W.Debor, Die Deutschen
53 Voluntary agencies and the DL were aware of the ulterior motives of German domestics. See NAC, MG 28 V 120, Canadian
Lutheran World Relief (CLWR) records, Reel H-1399, File CCCRR - Briefs and Corr. 1950-55, Monk to Berkefeld, 15.10.1951; and
DL, Vol. 291, File 1-26-60-3-1, Brown to MacNamara, 2.5.1952. The wage advantage disappeared by 1955 when comparable or
better benefits were offered domestics in Germany. IB, Vol. 835, File 553-30, Pt. 2, "Comparison of Wages for Domestics," Jan
1955.
54 Immigration and labour officials realised that the success of this movement hinged on funding. See DCI, Vol. 73, File [DACI],
Minutes of DACI meeting, 9.4.1951.
offices. It ultimately came to a crashing halt in September 1951 when the APS was cut off.

Labour's total intake in 1951 was only three domestics, whereas more than 2,000 came via regular immigration.\textsuperscript{55}

The movement was again delayed in 1952 due to the late reinstatement of the APS, quibbling by German authorities over contract terms and competition from other immigration countries. In this year the DL, desperate for workers, abandoned its 500-person quota and set about recruiting as many domestics as it could get. Beginning in 1952, immigration authorities also agreed to accept a limited number of widows with up to two children, a gesture intended as much to gain the goodwill of German authorities as to increase the intake of domestics. They also initiated a childless domestics couples' program which brought several hundreds of such workers to Canada. The slow start to the program was offset by a good finish. By year's end a total of about 3,300 domestics came to Canada, exceeding the previous year's total by 1,000.\textsuperscript{56}

In 1953, Labour and Immigration officials' efforts met with more success. Just as in the farm labour program, the full cooperation of German authorities was secured at the outset and many of the currency exchange and transfer problems were cleared away at the start of the year. Also, interest in emigrating to Canada was still high in Germany at a time when the American expellees' program had concluded and the Australian program was mired in the economic doldrums. The net result was a record year for the immigration of German domestics amounting to almost 5,000, or half of Canada's total intake. The movement declined in the following two years to about 3,000 in 1954 and 2,000 in 1955 (see Figure No. 28). Interest in this scheme and in emigration in general was tailing off in Germany where the employment situation and standard of living had improved. Wages and working conditions for domestics in Germany had caught up and, in some instances, exceeded Canadian offers. Up to 1955, Ottawa insisted on advertising the minimum wage rates for domestic service in Canada in spite of pleas from Canadian officials in Germany that the typically

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\textsuperscript{56} DCI, Vol. 61 G. Immigration statistics.
higher real wages should be publicised.\textsuperscript{57} Also in 1955, Ottawa discontinued its policy of waiving outstanding inland transportation loans for domestics who remained in this line of work for one year. This made the program even more unattractive for prospective immigrants who now had to risk a higher debt load. Paradoxically, as the demand for domestics rose in 1954-55, the DCI removed the few incentives that this scheme offered.

The movement showed slight signs of revival in 1956 and 1957 when about 2,300 and 2,200 domestics, respectively, migrated. This probably resulted from the relaxation of the admission requirements under the domestics' scheme and a broadened APS.\textsuperscript{58} Although domestics from Germany had always been entitled to the APS, the new scheme undoubtedly induced more married German women, who had no work lined up but who wished to accompany their husbands and children, to sign up. However, the gains experienced by the movement were short-lived and numbers again dropped in 1958. Evidently transportation loans were not enough to reverse the declining trend. Guarantees of higher wages, which may have enticed more German domestics to emigrate, were not forthcoming from Canadian recruiters, the absence of which undoubtedly accounts for the general decline of domestics from 1953 to 1957.

The overall success of this program was mixed. Judging by comments from a senior DL official, German domestics fared about the same as other ethnic groups:

\begin{quote}
On the whole employers' reactions have been favourable, although we have heard of some cases where the workers have taken things upon themselves and have moved to more lucrative jobs. This, of course, is nothing new as we have had to cope with a similar situation in connection with the United Kingdom domestics as well as with displaced persons.\textsuperscript{59}
\end{quote}

Understandably, German domestics could not meet all of Canada's needs. Like most other immigrants, they did not make a career out of this line of work. Their job turn-over rate in 1951

\textsuperscript{57} IB, Vol. 835, File 553-30, Pt. 1, Robillard to Benoit, 18.8.1954. The DL and the DCI wanted to ensure that domestics were also distributed to regions of Canada where lower salaries were paid. They therefore insisted on posting the lowest wage rates offered in Canada which hurt the movement in the long-run.

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., Pt. 2, Fortier to Smith, 19.4.1956. That the APS covered children's transportation costs probably prompted more women with dependants to sign up for this scheme.
was over 70%. These desertions in turn fuelled a continuing demand. Ottawa understood these limitations and by 1954, to compensate, increasingly turned to southern European countries and the West Indies. That many German domestics decided to leave this service early is not surprising. Working conditions were far from ideal. Domestic service had the highest rate of immigrant employee and employer complaints. Many women may also have sought more gainful employment to pay off their indebtedness faster. Some authors suggest that immigrant women were misled or ill-informed about the nature of domestic work in Canada. Little evidence of this was found for the German domestics' program. Overseas officials apprised applicants of the conditions prevailing in this service in Canada and even distributed frank and detailed information about the scheme to German labour and emigrant advisory offices. No widespread complaint about such abuses surfaced in Germany or Canada and interest in this scheme remained relatively high. Admittedly, more could have been done by Canadian authorities in following up the placements made in Canada. In this regard, domestics placed by the church groups may have fared better.

**German "General Labourers" Scheme**

Germans accounted for the second highest number of general labourers coming to Canada, exceeded only by Italians. They supplied Canada with 14% of this class of labour from 1951 to 1957, which represented about 10% of all German workers. Almost half of all heavy labourers coming to Canada in these years were Italians (see Figure No. 29) and because this movement consisted mostly of sponsored workers, Ottawa could exercise less control over it. For this reason

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60 CLWR, Reel H-1400, File CCCRR complaints to Bremen, Berkefeld to Monk, 5.12.1951. Apparently, Canadian visa officers had an inkling that many of the Germans signing up for the domestics' scheme were not bona fide domestics. What was important for Canadian officials however, was that they respect the terms of their contracts. Gunn interview.
61 These figures are from the Interdepartmental Committee on Immigration and Labour (ICIL) meetings in 1948-50. DL, Vol. 3028, File [ICIL], Agenda & Minutes of Meetings, 1949-50.
62 A.Koch-Kraft suggests that German domestics were not prepared well for their work in Canada. Koch-Kraft Deutsche in Kanada, 40.
64 Under the heading of general labourers is included unskilled or semi-skilled workers in the primary resource, manufacturing, and construction sectors as well as apprentice tradesmen.
there was little need to look to other sources for supply. It appears that by the mid-1950s the supply from Germany was used primarily to top-up outstanding demand.

In Canada the demand for heavy labour in the primary sectors and construction carried over from the late-1940s into the early-1950s. By 1952, labour requirements greatly diminished in the resource sectors but remained high, albeit irregular, in construction and other industries employing semi- or unskilled labourers. The peak years of the German influx closely coincided with the construction booms in public projects in 1951 and in housing in 1956-57. This movement slumped in 1952 and 1955, when "general labourers" were removed from Immigration's occupational selection list for Germany, but rebounded in 1953, 1954 and 1956 when this class of worker was again eligible for entry. Ottawa tightly regulated the flow of unsponsored German blue-collar workers through administrative measures such as the occupational selection list and the administration of the APS.

Figure No. 29: Immigration of German, Dutch, British and Italian General Labourers to Canada, 1951-57

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>German General Labourers</th>
<th>Dutch General Labourers</th>
<th>British General Labourers</th>
<th>Italian General Labourers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Number</td>
<td>% of all general workers</td>
<td>Total Number</td>
<td>% of all Dutch workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1,672</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>1,551</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>2,613</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1,233</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>2,230</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>1,824</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 11,814 14.0% 9.9% 1,632 1.9% 3.7% 7,803 9.2% 3.9% 34,233 40.5% 36.0% 12.4%

Source: DCI, Vols. 61 D to G.

Throughout the 1950s there was no shortage of unskilled labourers in Germany who were interested in emigrating to Canada. In 1956, when overseas officials searched every corner of Germany for farm and domestic workers, there were close to 1,700 applications from unskilled labourers on hand at Canadian immigration missions in Germany. Many of the German general labourers coming
forward in the 1950s were actually not unskilled but consisted primarily of young men (18-25 years) who had completed an apprenticeship in a trade, but were not considered qualified in their occupation. Most completed their training in Canada. The flow of journeymen was especially strong after July 1956 when Germany passed its universal conscription law for the new federal army. Robillard was quick to pounce on this opportunity, convincing Ottawa to admit as many "draft-dodgers" as possible for the remainder of 1956 and into 1957.65

**Skilled German Labour**

After British immigration, the German movement provided Canada with the highest number of skilled workers, a total of 46,390 or 20% of all skilled immigrants admitted from 1951 to 1957. The Italian movement stood a distant third supplying about half the German number (see Figure No. 30). The figure for Germans can be considered an under-estimate because numerous skilled workers had signed up as farm workers in order to qualify for admission to Canada under the agricultural schemes. For this reason it is impossible to ascertain precisely how many trained German workers came to Canada, though their number certainly topped 50,000.

**Figure No. 30: Immigration of German, Dutch, British and Italian Skilled Workers to Canada, 1951-57**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>German Skilled Workers</th>
<th>% of all</th>
<th>% of all</th>
<th>Dutch Skilled Workers</th>
<th>% of all</th>
<th>% of all</th>
<th>British Skilled Workers</th>
<th>% of all</th>
<th>% of all</th>
<th>Italian Skilled Workers</th>
<th>% of all</th>
<th>% of all</th>
<th>% of all migrant workers as skilled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Number</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>workers</td>
<td>Total Number</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>workers</td>
<td>Total Number</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>workers</td>
<td>Total Number</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>workers</td>
<td>workers as skilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>8,603</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td>40.4%</td>
<td>1,614</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
<td>10,703</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
<td>58.4%</td>
<td>3,657</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>4,614</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>2,416</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
<td>10,263</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
<td>43.0%</td>
<td>4,281</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
<td>34.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>5,985</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>2,565</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
<td>9,584</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>6,838</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
<td>2,792</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
<td>8,341</td>
<td>31.7%</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
<td>2,798</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td>31.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>3,666</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
<td>869</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>4,272</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>2,858</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>7,262</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>46.4%</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
<td>9,188</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
<td>30.7%</td>
<td>4,831</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>33.1%</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>9,422</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>53.9%</td>
<td>1,888</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
<td>21,594</td>
<td>38.6%</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
<td>3,560</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>36.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 46,390 20.2% 39.0% 13,244 5.8% 30.1% 73,945 32.2% 36.5% 24,185 10.5% 25.4% 33.7%

Source: DCl, Vols. 61 D to G.

Skilled immigrant workers were typically recorded under one of the following occupational categories: transportation, communications, manufacturing, handicrafts, construction and industrial group. German immigrants had a very strong presence in the last four groups. Among the specific trades making up these occupation families, German immigrants were clearly over-represented as glove makers (at 47% of this category), cabinet and furniture makers (42%), leather cutters (34%), tool and die makers (33%) and mechanics and repairman (32%). In terms of numbers, the top five skilled German tradesmen entering Canada in 1951-57 were carpenters (3,691), car mechanics (3,389), mechanics and repairmen (3,067), brick and stone masons (3,051) and electricians (2,791) (see Figure No. 31). The flow of German construction tradesmen was at its height in 1956 and 1957 during the construction boom in Canada. Many industrial workers also came forward in these years.

Already in 1950 overseas officials were aware of Germany's capacity to provide "highly skilled workers." Anticipating a heavy demand for labour in virtually all occupations for 1951 in light of Canada's rearmament program, Ottawa broadened its recruiting base and included Germany as a source of workers for its list of "skills in short supply." This was a boon to German immigration, considering there seemed an almost unlimited supply in Germany of many of the skilled occupations found on the list. Priority was given to filling these openings with skilled British workers while German workers filled what was left over.66 Even so, a record high 8,603 German skilled labourers came to Canada in 1951, a sixteen-fold increase over 1950. What also made this large influx possible was the extension of transportation loans to skilled workers and the additional orders placed in Germany by the DL. Labour authorities assisted another 2,365 skilled and 1,151 semi-skilled German workers in coming to Canada in 1951 and during the early part of 1952.67

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66 This practice was further reinforced in 1952 when all orders for immigrant workers were first cleared through the U.K. and only forwarded to continental offices if British workers could not be found. See DCI, Vol. 132, File 3-35-2, Pt. 2, Fortier to Harris, 27.3.1952. Many of these workers were readily available in Germany in 1953. See IB, Vol. 821, File 552-1-551, Pt. 1, Robillard to Benoit, 27.3.1953.

In 1952, when skilled workers were excluded from the APS and struck from the list of unsponsored occupations admissible from Germany, the flow of skilled immigrants plummeted by almost half (4,614) from 1951. Yet the movement rebounded in 1953, reaching almost 6,000 workers, as limited numbers and types of skilled workers were again admissible from Germany, albeit without APS loans. Had it not been for the restrictive administrative measures implemented in 1952 and 1953, the flow of skilled German workers could have turned into a veritable flood. The high incidence of German skilled labourers misrepresenting themselves as farm workers in these years is indicative of the widespread interest of skilled German workers in emigrating to Canada.68

The DCI’s decision in 1954 to assign greater weight to “skill” in its 1954 recruiting program directly benefited the German movement, which gained 1,000 more trained workers than in 1953. At this time it was realised that the Canadian economy was able to absorb many more skilled as opposed to unskilled workers. There was also concern in Ottawa that once a peace treaty was signed with Germany, Canada would "lose the chance of securing many skilled technicians, as … the German Government [would] be loath to let them leave."69 To increase the flow Ottawa expanded the number and types of skilled workers admissible from Germany for 1954. Results in 1955 were less impressive. The recession in Canada which lingered into 1955 forced Ottawa to cut back its intake of unsponsored German immigrants, including the skilled movement which declined by 46% to 3,666 workers. In 1956 and 1957, this trend reversed itself, so much so that skilled workers exceeded all other types of German workers coming forward including domestics and farm workers. This resulted from Ottawa's attempt to increase general immigration by expanding the APS and removing occupational restrictions on German immigration. The complexion of German immigration to Canada fundamentally altered after 1955, from a movement previously dominated by service and farm workers to one consisting mostly of skilled workers.

68 That many skilled workers came to Canada as farm hands, see reports from officials in the field, such as IB, Vol. 810, File 548-20, Pt. 3, Smith to Stirling, 23.6.1953. The skilled workers movement was first suspended in late April 1952. See IB, Vol. 814, File 551-10-1952, Pt. 1, Ottawa to overseas posts, 22.4.1952 and the series of directives which followed this.


Considering the obstacles it had to overcome both in Germany and Canada, the German skilled labour movement to Canada surprisingly assumed rather significant proportions. From the outset Bonn refused to promote the emigration of skilled migrants to Canada. Thus, many such workers who entered Canada between 1952 and 1955 received no material aid from either German or Canadian authorities. Since German offices did not refer prospective skilled emigrants to Canadian missions, immigration officers had to rely on their store of spontaneous applications. Once in Canada, many workers faced difficulties in becoming established in their trade. They routinely were required to accept jobs in different occupations or at lower levels until they had learned English or French, Canadian trade practices, measurements and standards. As immigrants, some were denied membership by certain unions, thereby excluding them from work. Furthermore, local or provincial licensing requirements in certain trades could impede or delay their establishment in a trade. In contrast, British workers did not face the same language or trade qualification obstacles.\(^70\)

Notwithstanding these difficulties, most German skilled workers appear to have excelled in their new homeland. In general, their skills and training appear to have been valued by Canadian employers and, like other immigrants, they brought new ideas and technology to Canada.\(^71\) While Canada did well in acquiring many of these workers, officials in 1963 conceded that they could have done better shortly after the war when "skilled workers [were] clamouring to enter Canada."\(^72\)


\(^71\) Koch-Kraft, *Deutsche in Kanada*, 54. German trade certificates were regarded by visa officers as an indicator of a high level of training in a given trade. Gunn interview.

German Professionals

Several studies have demonstrated that many high-status professions and skilled occupations in Canada were filled by immigrants after World War II. While this may hold true for British and American immigration, the German contribution to Canada's "brain gain" was relatively slight, comprising only 3% of all German workers and 5% of the total professional immigration in 1951-57 (see Figure No. 32). In relation to general immigration, the highest proportion of German professionals were dentists (17.8% of all immigrant dentists) and laboratory technicians (10.1%). Most German professionals coming forward in 1953-57 consisted of "other professional workers" (684), followed by graduate nurses (485), draftsmen-designers (287), laboratory technicians (203) and physicians and surgeons (127) (see Figure No. 33). The volume and timing of this flow to Canada closely matched that of regular immigration, peaking in the early-1950s and in 1956-57 and contracting in the interval. Conspicuously absent from these top categories were German engineers.

Figure No. 32: Immigration of German, British and American Professionals/Managers to Canada, 1951-57

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>German Professional/Managers</th>
<th>British Professional/Managers</th>
<th>American Professional/Managers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Number</td>
<td>% of all</td>
<td>Total Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>German managers/ workers</td>
<td></td>
<td>British managers/ workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,738</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DCT, Vols. 61 D to G.

Figure No. 33: Immigration of German Professionals and Managers by Occupation to Canada versus General Immigration, 1951-57

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROFESSION TYPE</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1954</th>
<th>1955</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>Total # of</th>
<th>% of Germans</th>
<th>% of all Profess</th>
<th>% breakdown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>German</td>
<td>of all profess.</td>
<td>German Profess.</td>
<td>of all profess.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountants &amp; Auditors</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Architects</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemists</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dentists</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draughts. &amp; Designers</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aeronautical Engineers</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Engineers</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Engineers</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry Engineers</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical Engineers</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanical Engineers</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metallurgical Engineers</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining Engineers</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laboratory Teeths</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate Nurses</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physicians &amp; Surgeons</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers &amp; Professors</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Profess. Workers</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>avail.</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL Professionals (1951-7)</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>3,597</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DC1, Vols. 61 D to G.

The first postwar migration of German professionals to Canada consisted of a small group of German technicians and scientists who were permitted to enter Canada in May 1947, not as immigrants, but on Minister's permits as contract workers. This program was truly an anomaly. It was never considered part of regular immigration and was intended to serve British and American Cold War security interests and Canadian business needs. Furthermore, it produced only a small group of persons - 44 workers and their immediate families - and, despite its initial success, failed to inspire any future movements. Contrary to popular belief few, if any, of these workers were employed in defence or high-level research projects. Most were not even scientists, but technicians who were recruited to create new industries with commercial applications in Canada. Nor were they given any preference or special treatment in comparison to other immigrants groups. They came forward on exploitative one-sided contracts which, *inter alia*, assigned Ottawa title to all
inventions, processes or improvements discovered during the contract period and allowed the
government to return scientists and technicians at any time for cause.\textsuperscript{74}

The paucity of German professionals coming forward to Canada in the 1950s was not caused by
any lack of interest or absence of supply in Germany. On the contrary, reports from Canadian
missions in Germany reveal a keen desire among German doctors, physicians, engineers and
technicians to emigrate to Canada. The Professional Association of German Economic and
Industrial Specialists even offered to identify experts, including engineers, chemists and technicians
to work on contract or to come as immigrants in Canada.\textsuperscript{75} Limiting factors were mostly found on
the Canadian side. The most obvious one was the relatively abundant supply of British and
American immigrant professionals which together supplied 71% of Canada's needs between 1953-
57. In fact in 1952, the president of the National Research Council berated immigration officials
for allegedly giving encouragement to German and Austrian scientists to emigrate to Canada. In his
view "there was virtually no assurance that any foreign scientist will find it easy to obtain a position
in Canada at the moment."\textsuperscript{76}

Second, express preference was given to Canadian graduates, followed by British and American
immigrants, in filling professional job openings. They possessed the educational and language
qualifications required by Canadian associations and provincial accreditation authorities. As a
result, certain kinds of professions were not at all accessible to continental Europeans in the 1950s,
including law, the senior civil service as well as public and separate school and liberal arts
university teaching. Many professional associations required non-British immigrants to obtain

\textsuperscript{74} DL, Vol. 3029, File [ICIL] 1947, Mackenzie to MacNamara, 20.6.1947. A. Koch-Kraft asserts they were given preference over
other German immigrants, but fails to note their status as contract workers. She also suggests that the security screening of this
group may have been lax. On the contrary, this group was subject to a two-stage screening process: prior to admission to Canada and
later when applying for landed immigrant status. See Deutsche in Kanada, 41-43, 66. The Deschênes Commission report states that
there were 71 German scientists in Canada by 1951. Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals Report, Part I (Ottawa: Supply and
Services, 1986), 273.

\textsuperscript{75} IB, Vol. 31, File 682, Pt. 6, Professional Association to DCI, 30.3.1951. A 1951 German survey shows that engineers constituted
the fourth largest occupational category of Germans seeking to emigrate. Friedmann, German Immigration, 52. In 1951, the DEA
reported there were numerous German electrical, chemical and aircraft engineers interested in emigrating. DL, Vol. 290, File 1-26-
60-1, Pt.I, Davis to MacNamara, 7.3.1951. In the same year field sources reported that 277 Austrian medical doctors with
specialisation in various fields wished to emigrate to Canada. DL, Vol. 290, File 1-26-59-1, Extract from Minutes of meeting,
5.6.1951.
supplementary education and practical experience before they could be accredited to practise in Canada. In this regard the medical and dentistry associations imposed the most stringent restrictions whereas the Canadian Nurses Association was more open to recognising the credentials of foreign nurses. This may in part explain the high number of German nurses migrating to Canada in the 1950s. Then there were barriers imposed by employers. In the defence production field, which offered excellent opportunities for employing large numbers of German engineers and technicians, security considerations barred all but Canadians and British immigrants from employment.

Finally, language was a decisive barrier to the entry of German professionals to Canada. A high degree of proficiency in English or French was a critical requirement for most immigrant professionals to become established in Canada. Selection instructions issued to immigration officers in Germany specified language proficiency, as well as educational and training requirements for specific professions in Canada.

Despite their small numbers, German professionals, when combined with skilled workers, provided much needed expertise and spared Canada the cost of training these workers. It is estimated that Canada realised a saving of over $13.2 million on the educational costs (in 1961 prices) of German professionals who entered between 1953 and 1957 (see Figure No. 34).

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76 IB, Vol. 844, File 553-80 Pt. 1, Steacie to Heeney, 7.4.1952.
77 There was a chronic shortages of nurses existing in Canada at this time, especially as hospital construction rose considerably after the war.
79 IB, Vol. 814, File 551-10-1953, Smith to Robillard, 29.12.1952. All applications from German professionals were sent to Ottawa for authorisation. The General Secretary of the Engineering Institute of Canada stated that engineers from central Europe would be working "under an almost insurmountable handicap unless they have some facility in our language." DCI, Vol. 73, File [DACI] 1951-57, Wright to Smith, 28.2.1951.
80 In this calculation educational costs include university instruction, books and facilities. Loss of foregone earnings during study time has not been factored in the calculation. Parai, Immigration and Emigration, 4, 10, 79-83. See also figures cited by MP Raynard in House of Commons, Debates, 14.8.1964.
Figure No. 34: Immigrant German Professionals by Occupational Category and Estimated Savings in Educational Costs to Canada, 1953-57

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROFESSION TYPE</th>
<th>Total Number</th>
<th>Estimated educational cost per profession</th>
<th>Total estimated savings in educational costs to Canada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accountants &amp; Auditors</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>$7,472</td>
<td>$336,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Architects</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>$8,851</td>
<td>$513,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemists</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>$8,853</td>
<td>$823,329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dentists</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>$13,023</td>
<td>$403,713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draughtsmen &amp; Designers</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>$3,736</td>
<td>$1,072,232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aeronautical Engineers</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>$8,851</td>
<td>$132,765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Engineers</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>$8,851</td>
<td>$115,063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Engineers</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>$8,851</td>
<td>$831,994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry Engineers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$8,851</td>
<td>$44,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical Engineers</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>$8,851</td>
<td>$955,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanical Engineers</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>$8,851</td>
<td>$1,070,971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metallurgical Engineers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>$8,851</td>
<td>$61,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining Engineers</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>$8,851</td>
<td>$106,212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laboratory Techs</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>$3,736</td>
<td>$758,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate Nurses</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>$1,770</td>
<td>$858,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physicians &amp; Surgeons</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>$17,009</td>
<td>$2,160,143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers &amp; Professors</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>$5,156</td>
<td>$474,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Professional Workers</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>$3,736</td>
<td>$2,555,424</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL** 2,480 $13,274,774

Source: Immigration data from DCI, Vols. 61 D to G. Estimated educational costs of professions from Louis Parai, *Immigration and Emigration of Professional and Skilled Manpower During the Post-War Period* (Ottawa: Duhamel, Queen's Printer, 1965) 4, 10, 79-83.

**German Business Immigration**

The DCI attached particular importance to the immigration of businessmen, hoping to attract innovative entrepreneurs, additional capital, new techniques and technologies in order to generate more employment. The "job-creation" argument was used by departmental spokesmen to defend their policy of expanded immigration from the mounting criticism of unions and the DL.

Despite this emphasis, Canada received few German business managers and owners in the 1950s, only 141 from 1953 to 1957 or 2.2% of all immigrant businessmen. This was due to a number of reasons. First, the United Kingdom and the United States were able to supply most of Canada's needs in the 1950s. Immigrants from these countries possessed the background, language and training most suited for the Canadian business environment and, as such, received preferential treatment from Canadian authorities. On the German side, transfers of even small amounts of funds
were not permitted under Bonn's financial control regulations which remained in effect until May 1954. Consequently, only an estimated twenty German industrial enterprises were started in Canada from the end of the war to 1953. 81 Even after this time, the amount of money that an individual German businessmen could transfer was insufficient to establish a sizeable enterprise. 82 Also, many German businesses suffered from the after-effects of the war well into the 1950s, limiting their possibilities for expansion overseas. Then there was the ever-present bureaucratic red tape. Paradoxically, it was more difficult to emigrate to Canada as a so-called "capital" case than as a regular worker. In addition to having to meet regular civil, medical and security requirements, "capital" cases had to venture large amounts of initial capital and establish a business in Canada within a relatively short period time, or else face deportation.

However, the absence of capital did not stop the growth of a notable class of German immigrant entrepreneurs in Canada during the 1950s. Some of these came to Canada as "self-establishment" cases, possessing useful skills and small amounts of capital, whereas others rose from the ranks of immigrant workers who had saved enough money after years of wage labour in Canada to start their own businesses. The "self-establishment" movement owed its existence to Robillard's resourcefulness. He gave precedence to admitting this group over many ordinary workers and classified many deserving applicants as "self-establishment cases" thereby admitting them even though they may not have qualified for entry on the basis of their occupation. In so doing, Robillard was bending the rules since, officially, self-establishment cases were confined to workers with sponsors in Canada. 83

81 H. Gross, Kanada, Land des Wachstums (Köl., 1954), 275, 281-288, 325-326, 358, 436. The majority of these enterprises were established in Newfoundland. Without the special encouragement and financial arrangements offered by the Smallwood government, this development would not have taken place. G. Bassler, "Develop or Perish: Joseph R. Smallwood and Newfoundland's Quest for German Industry, 1949-1953," Acadiensis 15, 2 (1986), 93-119.
82 After May 1954 immigrants could only take with them Deutsche Mark 1500 ($350) per capita with the provision for periodic transfers of limited amounts of funds left in Germany. In exceptional cases, firms could obtain permission from Bonn to transfer more funds to establish a subsidiary office overseas, provided it would promote German exports to the country concerned. IB, Vol. 921, File 586-5, Robillard to Benoit, 4.11.1954.
The resulting growth of the 'made-in-Canada' German businesses was impressive. Between 1950 and 1959 more German immigrants (1,054) were reported as established in business enterprises than any other immigrant groups.\footnote{The Dutch placed a close second at 1,014, and the British a distant third at 416. See DCI, Vol. 90, File 3-1-4, Pt. 2, Chief Settlement Div. to Director, 17.2.1960, attached table.} The German immigrant business success was also reported broadly in the Canadian press, especially in the latter half of the 1950s.\footnote{Toronto Star, 5.2.1952; Cornwall Standard Freeholder, 27.12.1954; Ottawa Evening Citizen, 12.8.1959 and Montreal Star, 26.8.1959.} It was all the more remarkable given the enormous financial burdens these migrants faced in their first years in Canada, such as outstanding transportation and subsistence debts, and the absence of start-up capital which could be transferred from Germany. They also had to operate in a setting which was foreign to them, with an entirely new clientele. It appears that the majority of these enterprises were small and centred mostly in farming, construction and food processing ventures. Most were established in Ontario, followed by British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba and Quebec.\footnote{Ibid. There were about 437 German farmers amongst this class of small businessmen. Ottawa Evening Citizen, 12.8.1959; T.D. Regehr, "The Influence of World War II on Mennonites in Canada," Journal of Mennonite Studies V (1987), 80-82. The 1961 census results also reflect this make-up of German businesses. See Canada, Report of the Royal Commission, vol. iv, 39, 42; and E.L. Tepper, Self-Employment in Canada among Immigrants of different ethno-cultural Backgrounds (Ottawa: Canadian Employment and Immigration Commission, 1988), 111, 126, 131.}

**Assessment of the Overall German Labour Movement**

For the most part, it appears that Canadian employers were pleased with German immigrants they received either first or second-hand in the 1950s. Perhaps the best evidence of this was the continuing demand for German labour by various employers and by the DCI. According to a former visa officer: "With the exception of the Nazi elements, Germans represented one of the best types of immigrant workers in Europe." They reportedly adapted well, especially in acquiring the English language, and demonstrated a keen willingness and an almost boundless capacity to work, even at lower-level jobs when these were all that was available. As one official at the Ajax Labour hostel observed about German immigrants waiting to be placed, they were "constantly reminding..."
our officers there they came to Canada to work." The Germans' success was also facilitated by their relatively high educational level; about 63% had 9-12 years or more of formal education.\(^8\) Another indicator of their successful adaptation was their low deportation rate. Of the 461 deportees in 1951, only 19 were German nationals.\(^9\) The notable blight of the German workers' movement was the widespread occupational misrepresentation associated with the domestics' and farm labour schemes. While some historians have glossed over, or even justified this practice, it nevertheless constituted a material fraud perpetrated against the government of Canada.

Most German immigrants arriving in Canada during the boom appear to have fared well in the long-run. With the exception of the severe winter unemployment of 1951-52 and the recession of 1954-55, these were times of unprecedented high employment and phenomenal economic growth in Canada, and Germans successfully rode the wave. Postwar German arrivals in general displayed a steady upward social mobility and integrated rapidly into Canadian society.\(^9\) One sign of their integration in Canada was their comparatively low rate of return migration to Germany and of re-migration to the United States. Studies suggest that the outflow of Germans was nominal and even much smaller than the British rate.\(^2\) German statistics reveal that an average of 2,124 Germans returned from Canada annually from 1952 to 1957, a rate which greatly accelerated after 1957 due to the prosperity prevailing in Germany and the higher unemployment in Canada. Interestingly, the percentage of all German newcomers who decided to leave Canada and return to Germany in 1951-57 (7.6%) was smaller than the proportion departing the United States (30.2%) and Australia.


\(^9\) Ibid. German newcomers' level of education was generally higher than that of southern European groups but lower than British migrants. A.H. Richmond, Post-War Immigrants in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), 154.

\(^1\) DFI, Vol. 140, File 3-40-1. Deportees consisted of criminal elements, illegal immigrants, mental patients and public charges. Statistics by ethnic origin are only available for 1951.


(11.7%). This strongly suggests German newcomers integrated the best into Canada. What is also striking is that many of the returnees, after a brief sojourn in Germany, opted to again set out for Canada, apparently experiencing difficulties in re-adjusting to their erstwhile homeland. The number of Germans leaving Canada for the United States from 1957 to 1963, about 5% of the total German immigration, was far lower than the rate for Canadian residents. Subtracting these two outflows from gross immigration, net German immigration to Canada during the boom was over 176,000 immigrants, a figure that could have been higher, but still represented an impressive inflow from a country with which Canada had so recently been at war. As such the next chapter provides a detailed year-by-year description, analysis and assessment of the programs that brought Germans to Canada.

94 The 5% figure is from Pari’s estimate for the years 1957-63. Pari, Immigration, 22. This figure may be too high for 1951-57 because emigration loss was much lower in the early- than in the late-1950s.
5. OTTAWA - KARLSRUHE – BONN AND THE ANNUAL GERMAN IMMIGRATION PROGRAMS

The flow of German migrants to Canada was not a haphazard affair. Ottawa set annual targets for the numbers and occupational types of immigrants it was prepared to accept, then forwarded these to its overseas offices. Its overseas mission in Karlsruhe then either selected prospective immigrants from its store of spontaneous applications or negotiated the German government's assistance in recruiting immigrant workers. An analysis of the Ottawa-Karlsruhe-Bonn immigration axis reveals a system that profoundly influenced the size and character of the German movement.

The 1951 German Immigration Program

Because the ban on German nationals was removed in late-1950, no organised immigration program for Germans was possible for the balance of the year. Relatively few Germans entered Canada in the last few months of 1950, despite Ottawa's decision to permit winter immigration in 1950-51. Much of the last quarter of 1950 was devoted to planning the 1951 immigration program in which, initially, German migrants only played a modest part.

Ottawa appeared to be in no hurry to develop a German program even after the ban on Germans had been lifted. The seriousness of the German overpopulation situation failed to move the Deputy Minister of Immigration, who advised his Department of Labour (DL) counterpart in September 1950 that "[t]his is a problem we must bear in mind, but which does not need an immediate decision."¹ The addition of Germany to the Immigration Director's promotional tour in Europe in the fall of 1950 was more of an afterthought than a focal point of his visit. To be sure, Canada wanted more European migrants, especially to match the growing demand for labour in late-1950 and the anticipated demand in 1951, but little was expected from Germany; only 13,500 immigrants

for 1951.\textsuperscript{2} Top priority was given to boosting British numbers, followed by developing immigration from northwestern European (excluding Germany) and wrapping-up the displaced person (DP) movement.\textsuperscript{3}

Ottawa was also reluctant to expand its program in Germany because of the practical difficulties faced in financing the transportation of Germans to Canada. At this time Germans lacked the financial means and/or were prohibited from exchanging currency to pay for their fares. This factor retarded the development of German group labour schemes early in 1951 and Canadian officials entertained little hope in overcoming this problem in time to meet employers' orders.\textsuperscript{4} No such difficulties were anticipated in other European countries where Canadian officials expected to attract many self-payers. Nor did DPs present problems in this regard as their fares were paid fully by the International Refugee Organisation (IRO). Overcoming the "transportation problem" was at the top of the agenda when Canadian officials met with German authorities to discuss immigration matters for the first time in October 1950. Bonn's proposal to permit immigrants to convert small amounts of Deutsche Mark (DM) and the protracted negotiations which ensued brought no real relief for 1951.\textsuperscript{5} In the end, Canada's own initiative, namely the introduction of the Assisted Passage Scheme (APS), effectively resolved this problem.

Astonishingly, after half a decade of exclusion, admission to Canada for Germans in 1951 was fairly wide open not long after the ban had been removed. Bonn was informed that "any German may enter Canada who can satisfy Canadian authorities that he is in good physical and mental

\textsuperscript{2} DCI, Vol. 101, File 3-18-4, Pt. 1, Interdepartmental Advisory Committee on Immigration Doc. No. 4, 28.11.1950. In an interview for The Albertan (17.11.1950), the Director of Immigration stated that German would not exceed British immigration. For the Deputy Minister's statement to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, see DCI, Vol. 127, File 3-33-13, Fortier to Chance, 21.10.1950.

\textsuperscript{3} This was reflected in the Director's European itinerary See also correspondence in DCI, Vol. 73, File Departmental Advisory Committee on Immigration (DACI) 1951-57, Minutes of DACI meeting, 15.9.1950; NAC, RG 76, Immigration Branch (IB) records, Vol. 814, File 551-10-1951, Fortier's memo for file 25.9.1950.

\textsuperscript{4} This is the chief reason why the German farm labour movement was not developed earlier. As Labour officials explained at the Federal-Provincial Farm Labour Conference in November 1950, it was "not expected that exchange and transportation difficulties would be overcome in sufficient time to permit immigrants from .. [Germany] to come forward in sufficient numbers to meet next spring's farm labour demands." NAC, RG 27, Department of Labour (DL) records, Vol. 876, File 8-7-21-12, Pt. 3, Minutes Fed.-Prov. Farm Labour Conference, 28.11.1950.

\textsuperscript{5} IB, Vol. 31, File 682, Pt. 6, Davis to U/Secretary of State External Affairs, 17.10.1950. In June 1951 emigrants were permitted to exchange $30 worth of Deutsche Mark for use as spending money in Canada.
health and is of good character."6 There were virtually no restrictions regarding numbers, trade or professional qualifications of applicants. Un-sponsored Germans requiring financial assistance could qualify for the APS under a wide range of occupations found on the "list of trades, skills and other occupations in short supply."7 This situation would change in the period 1952-55, when only German agriculturalists and domestics were eligible for the APS. Notwithstanding the liberal entry criteria for 1951, Ottawa initially made no extra effort to recruit any specific categories of German workers, with the exception of miners. Only when it became apparent midway through 1951 that the preferred sources could not deliver the required workers, were programs introduced to bring urgently required groups of German workers to Canada. Few restrictions applied to Germans in 1951 because Ottawa desperately sought to maximise immigration, upwards of 150,000 migrants, from all sources to fill the massive manpower demands anticipated for that year.

With German nationals formally admissible to Canada for the start of the 1951 immigration year, Ottawa sought the approval of the new German government for its 1951 program. This became an annual event up to 1954, usually staged early in the year. A Canadian delegation, headed by the chief of its German immigration mission and usually accompanied by an External Affairs and a DL official, presented Ottawa's yearly German immigration program, consisting of an overall numerical target of immigrants broken down roughly by occupational groups. While these meetings were partly intended to maintain the goodwill of German authorities, they also served as a valuable session to address and solve migration problems. Most importantly, they afforded Canadian officials the opportunity to enlist German assistance for their programs. Although not dependent on this help, the Canadian mission realised that German assistance essentially expanded the recruiting and advertising network for the Canadian program and provided additional resources.8 This partnership benefited the Canadian more than the German side. When Bonn fully came to this realisation in 1954, assistance was discontinued and annual encounters ended.

6 Ibid., DEA Mission Bonn to FRG authorities, 13.10.1950.
In Bonn, Canada's programs were from the outset met with mixed feelings. Canada's freehand approach did not sit well with German authorities who wanted more control over the numbers, occupational types and labour-contracts of Germans departing for Canada. Emigration overseas, if regulated closely, offered Germany the possibility of discharging the surplus and less productive elements of its population. As a result, relations between the two countries in the 1950s in the area of migration were characterised by a continuous tug of war. Matters were further complicated in 1951 by the fact that both sides were relatively new to government-to-government negotiations on migration matters, especially German neophyte bureaucrats. This was painfully apparent during the early negotiations.\(^9\) Procedures as well as a working relationship had to be developed from scratch. Not surprisingly, the first years of the German program were marked by a series of misunderstandings, lack of co-ordination, delays and considerable disappointment, especially on the Canadian side.

Preliminary discussions on Canada's German immigration program of 1951 got off to a promising start. The first meeting took place in October 1950 and addressed Ottawa's main concern, the removal of impediments in the way of freer emigration to Canada. To overcome the transportation problem, German labour officials offered to recommend to the Finance Ministry that monetary assistance be granted to German emigrants. In early February 1951, Canadians again met with German officials, this time to seek Bonn's approval and assistance for the German miners' scheme. Not only did German officials promise "every cooperation" for this scheme but they also offered up other semi- and unskilled workers to Canada.\(^{10}\)

\(^8\) German assistance was especially beneficial for workers with little means. Their pre-processing and transportation costs within Germany were completely covered. See DL, Vol. 290, File 1-26-60-1, Pt. 1, Dunand to Chief of ILO Manpower Division, 18.5.1951.

\(^9\) The DEA's representative in Bonn noted about German officials' negotiating style that "[t]he questions of pride and pre-occupation with their notion of equality are also involved and take the form of wishing to make amendments and obtain inconsequential concessions for the only conceivable reason that they want to be sure that they are still not being dictated to." DL, Vol. 291, File 1-26-60-2 Pt. 1, Davis to Secretary of State DEA, 10.2.1951. German officials appear to have been equally frustrated by Canada's "take-it-or-leave-it" approach which offered them little room to negotiate the terms of the proposed program.

\(^{10}\) DL, Vol. 291, File 1-26-60-2, Pt. 1, Lamarre to MacNamara, 5.2.1951. For results of the first meeting in October 1950, see IB, Vol. 31, File 682, Pt. 6, Davis to U/Secretary of State DEA, 17.10.1950.
The follow-up meeting was intended to finalise the miners' scheme. It was during this meeting however, that the first series of problems surfaced which ultimately delayed recruiting for this and other programs until the summer of 1951. Difficulties emerged when German officials refused to commence recruiting until questions about the general status of social security and working conditions for migrant miners in Canada were satisfactorily addressed. Furthermore, recruiting was restricted to unskilled and unemployed persons. Shortly thereafter, the scheme became embroiled in a dispute between the IRO and German authorities regarding the use of IRO facilities to assemble and pre-screen candidates.\(^{11}\) No sooner had these problems been resolved when Canadian authorities learned in March that many of the individual Länder (states), which undertook the actual recruiting and pre-processing, were not cooperating. It was soon realised that the views and priorities of the Länder authorities did not always coincide with those of their federal counterparts.\(^{12}\) In order to get local offices on side, Canadian officials scrambled to undertake separate negotiations with each of the participating Länder. A valuable lesson was learned: future programs would invariably involve talks both at the federal and state levels.

Initially these problems only affected the miners' scheme, but as other programs requiring the assistance of German authorities came on stream (such as the loggers' program, Manitoba farm labourers' and domestics' schemes) in April and May 1951, they too were drawn into these difficulties. As little headway was made by German labour offices in recruiting applicants by late spring, the Karlsruhe mission decided in mid-May to select workers from its reserve of spontaneous applications (applications sent to the missions).\(^{13}\) This presented a "titanic" challenge to Karlsruhe which now had to sift through thousands of forms and pre-select, assemble for inspection, process and transport immigrants, tasks formerly undertaken by the IRO for DPs on Canada's behalf. While

\(^{11}\) The German side strongly objected to the use of International Refugee Organisation assembly facilities and offered their own camps. IB, Vol. 31, File 682, Pt. 6, Davis to Secretary of State DEA, 28.2.1951.

\(^{12}\) The Bavarian Minister of Labour confided as much to Canada's DEA representative. IB, Vol. 31, File 682, Pt. 7, A/Head Mission Bonn to Secretary of State DEA 29.5.1951. While the federal Ministry of Labour's competence extended to negotiating bilateral agreements and forwarding instructions to the Länder, the latter were not obliged to collaborate or to report on the progress of recruitment.

\(^{13}\) Ibid., Bird to Benoit, 18.5.1951; DL., Vol. 290, File 1-26-60-1, Pt. 1, MacNamara to Fortier, 22.5.1951; and NAC, RG 32, Public Service Commission records, Vol. 1111, File G.R. Benoit, Benoit to MacNaughton, 16.8.1957.
this transition was not without its difficulties, it ultimately paid long-term dividends, laying the groundwork for an efficient processing system of "spontaneous applications," Canada's main supply line of immigrants in the 1950s.

In May 1951, the Chief of Immigration Operations was dispatched to Germany to resolve the looming shipping crisis which threatened to derail a good part of the German movement to Canada. Headquarters discovered at this time that fewer immigrants than expected had come forward early in the year, leaving a huge backlog of migrants with visas for whom there was insufficient commercial passenger shipping for the summer and fall months.¹⁴ To overcome this problem, Ottawa sought to reserve as many commercial berths as possible for the general flow of immigration and use IRO shipping for the bulk labour movements, a plan it executed with great success. In fact, the agreement with IRO securing 16,000-18,000 berths saved the day for the German movement in 1951. Unfortunately, with ample shipping only available during the fall of 1951, the mass of Germans arrived late in the year, just prior to the onset of winter job layoffs, thus causing considerable hardship for many of the newcomers.

By the summer of 1951, the prospects for Canada's German immigration program began to improve. In June, Karlsruhe received permission from Ottawa to apply APS loans to Germans filling labour quotas originally intended for DPs. By July, the German Ministry of the Interior enlisted its 254 advisory officers to encourage immigration to Canada. The Canadian proposal to recruit domestics was positively received by the Federal Labour Ministry, although instructions to the Länder to start recruitment were sent out very late.¹⁵ After painstaking negotiations, the cooperation of most Länder was secured and the number of applicants presented to Canadian teams at labour offices accordingly began to rise by September. Alongside workers coming forward to Canada via the group labour schemes were many thousands of self-payers and skilled applicants who qualified in their own right under the general immigration route. By early October, call-ups

¹⁴ A deficit of 45,000 berths for immigrants was forecast for August 1951. DCI, Vol. 93, File 3-7-1, Pt. 2, Fortier to Harris, 21.5.1951.
for interviews at all posts in Germany averaged 400 applicants per day.\textsuperscript{16} Full credit must be given to the overseas staff who diligently toiled and negotiated to make the German program succeed.

Success, however, was short lived. Two key developments in Canada brought the German movement to a virtual standstill after mid-October 1951. In September, headquarters staff made a startling discovery that the government's APS revolving fund had been overdrawn. Consequently, this scheme was indefinitely halted in October which led to the cancellation of all outstanding orders for German workers. Even self-payers seeking partial APS loans were refused visas.

Alarmed by the decline in job opportunities reported in the field, the Minister of Labour, Milton Gregg, requested that the intake of immigrant-workers cease forthwith. In reply the Minister of Immigration, Walter Harris, argued against such extreme measures, citing the possible damage to the "carefully fostered good-will of the German authorities." Yet an appeal to renew the APS was conspicuously absent in his rebuttal.\textsuperscript{17} Clearly the APS had been too effective in bringing German workers to Canada, especially at a time when the economy could no longer absorb additional workers. Without the APS a sizeable German movement was impossible. Attempts by Canadian officials in November to interest German officials in funding the transportation of its nationals to Canada failed.

The sudden termination of the APS on 12 October 1951 left both German authorities and prospective migrants in an awkward and unhappy position. Many of the applicants affected by the cancellation had gone to a lot of trouble to get passports and x-rays; some had liquidated all their personal assets. For German authorities, payment of these migrants' pre-medicals, x-rays and local transportation represented squandered money. The Chief of the Karlsruhe mission feared that the cancellation would "adversely affect the effective cooperation that careful and patient negotiations

\textsuperscript{15} IB, Vol. 673, File C83755, Bird to Robillard, 17.7.1951. Regarding the assistance of the advisory officials, see IB, Vol. 31, File 682, Pt. 7, Officer in Charge Karlsruhe to Benoit, 14.7.1951.


\textsuperscript{17} IB, Vol. 810, File 548-20, Pt. 1, Gregg to Harris, 20.9.1951 and Harris reply 15.10.1951. When organised labour and the press joined the DL's call to halt winter immigration the following month, any hope of reinstating the Assisted Passage Scheme (APS) quickly faded.
had brought about" and that Canada would lose prospective migrants to other countries.\textsuperscript{18} His fears were justified, as the assistance from German authorities in 1952 was less than expected.

In spite of the series of snags and setbacks experienced in getting the 1951 German program up and running, the overall results greatly exceeded Ottawa's original expectations. Instead of the 13,500 Germans originally forecasted, Canada received 32,395, 66% of whom were workers (all immigration only brought forward 59% workers). Also, the intake of workers included a good mix of all occupation types (see Figure Nos. 24 and 31). Especially well represented were skilled and primary workers who made up over 40% and 20% respectively of all German workers. This result stemmed from Ottawa's open admission policy, the broad application of the APS, and the need to fill the shortfall of DP workers required by the primary sector. Also, interest in emigrating to Canada was great among most occupational groups in Germany. The high intake of skilled workers demonstrated that immigration authorities were able to defy German attempts to prevent the departure of these workers. This was largely accomplished through the spontaneous applications route. Justifiably, immigration authorities seemed satisfied with the movement as the Minister Walter Harris reported to the Cabinet in 1952:

\begin{quote}
Immigrants from Germany and Austria have been of all groups from farm labourers to highly skilled. As a rule, they are the most industrious and the most eager to be satisfactory; although there has been an occasional outburst of arrogance which, of course, gets in the newspapers.\textsuperscript{19}
\end{quote}

\textbf{The 1952 German Immigration Program}

The qualified success of the German program in 1951 ensured its continuation in 1952. But certain events and developments in Canada in late-1950 and early-1951 did not bode well for the movement. Already in late-1951 immigration officials feared a repeat of the shipping shortage for 1952. The situation was especially critical for Germany where additional passenger carriers supplied by the IRO were unavailable after December 1951. Ottawa was able to avoid this potential

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pitfall in December 1951 when the U.S. led Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME and later renamed the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, or ICEM) came into being. The Committee intended to salvage IRO shipping for use in relieving Europe's overpopulation problem. The additional shipping supplied by the PICMME was instrumental in overcoming the shortage of commercial passenger berths in May to July of 1952.\(^{20}\)

Early economic and employment indicators in Canada also did not look promising for an expanded immigration program. Winter unemployment was especially high in 1951-52 with 193,000 jobless in November 1951, among them many immigrant tradesmen. Immigration and Labour authorities were slow in placing immigrants throughout the winter and well into 1952. By early February 1952, government hostels and halls still held 3,333 unemployed immigrants.\(^{21}\) This situation was aggravated by the delayed start to spring in 1952 which slowed the pick-up of employment, especially in the agriculture and construction sectors. Ottawa's economic pundits forecasted a lower level of economic activity in 1952 than in the previous year.\(^{22}\) Closely watched by Ottawa, these indicators weighed heavily in the mapping of the government's 1952 immigration program.

In addition to economic factors, certain political considerations influenced the government's planning in 1952. When immigration figures for 1951 were released late in the year, the government came under fire from the public and the press for not having done enough to foster the British movement.\(^{23}\) Even though more Britons had come forward than in the previous year, their

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\(^{19}\) DCI, Vol. 132, File 3-35-2, Pt. 4, DCI Memo to Cabinet, 21.2.1952.

\(^{20}\) No commercial berths from Germany were available for May 1951 and only a few were available for the following months at exorbitant prices. The committee offered 700 berths for May, 4,000 for June and 6,000 for July. IB, Vol. 31, File 682, Pt. 7, Robillard to Benoit, 29.4.1952.


\(^{22}\) Specifically, the Trade and Commerce Department predicted a half billion dollar decline in capital investment for 1952 compared to 1951 and greater uncertainty in civilian production. Only defence production jobs were expected to increase, while farm and primary employment would remain steady. Ibid.

\(^{23}\) Ibid. As early as June 1951, PC leader George Drew took the government to task for not increasing British immigration. Montreal Star, 29.6.1951. Other groups which petitioned the government in this regard were provincial politicians, the Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire, the Anglican Church, the Orange Order, the Legion and the Canadian Chamber of Commerce. A particularly nasty article appeared in Maclean's (15.2.1952, 16 ff.) by Fred Bodsworth entitled "What kinds of Canadians are we getting?" accused the government of giving preference to continental Europeans over Britons and of dallying while the "Aussies got
numbers failed to keep up with gains registered by other groups. In framing its 1952 program, government officials were undoubtedly aware that British immigration would have to be increased or, alternatively, other movements decreased to ensure a larger British ratio.

Taking all these economic and political variables into consideration, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration (DCI) recommended to cabinet that immigration for 1952 be set at 145,000 newcomers. This included 35,900 Germans, Austrians and refugees of whom 21,000 were to be workers. Most of the workers were to consist of farm hands (8,500), primary workers (6,500) and domestics (5,000). Only 1,000 skilled workers were aimed for which contrasted with the 1951 results, when skilled German workers predominated. This low target undoubtedly was influenced by the high joblessness amongst immigrant trade workers early in 1952 and by the confidence that Britain and western Europe could supply most specialised labour. However, the severe cap placed on the German skilled movement had an obvious result: it would substantially reduce overall German immigration in 1952 when interest in Canada was particularly high among German tradesmen and professionals.

The sluggishness of the Canadian economy in early-1952 also meant that the government was in no hurry to finalise its annual immigration program. Cabinet approval for the 1952 program was only obtained on 26 February 1952 and instructions were sent to the Karlsruhe mission the same day. This adversely affected the mission's operations, delaying its negotiations with German authorities and holding up the processing of applicants. In Germany it could take upwards of four months to process and transport immigrants to Canada because of the numerous civil and security checks involved. To ensure the success of the sugar-beet and farm labour schemes which required immigrants in Canada as early as March, it was imperative for Karlsruhe to begin recruiting as early in the year as possible.

the plums. He also questioned Ottawa's policy of admitting so many Germans given the reported rise of neo-Nazism in the Federal Republic.

This, in fact, was reflected in its targets for skilled workers from Britain (7,000) and western Europe (3,700). DCI, Vol. 132, File 3-35-2, Pt. 4, Memo to Cabinet, 21.2.1952. The emphasis on farm employment was no doubt intended to offset the heavy
Similarly, the federal cabinet was in no rush to reinstate the APS for 1952 despite urgent appeals from Canadian officials in Ottawa and overseas. In Germany the suspension of the APS was disruptive to the whole immigration program, including to self-payers, "as processing was normally all one operation, including the issuing of APS warrants." Also, the success of the domestic and farm labour movements depended very much on the availability of the APS, considering that both programs normally attracted the lower-paid class of workers who could least afford overseas fares. Because domestics and farm hands were to comprise the bulk of the 1952 movement, it was critical that the APS be reinstated early. This however did not happen until early April. By this time many of the prospective immigrants had committed themselves to seasonal farm contracts in Germany or had been recruited by other countries. Furthermore, APS loans until 1956 were restricted to domestics, nurses aides and farm labourers thereby shutting out the largest category of potential immigrants, namely skilled workers, followed by general labourers.

Prospects for the German program worsened in March and April. The farm and sugar-beet workers' movement, the largest component of the 1952 German program, was halted in early March as a result of the outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in Saskatchewan, a contagion reportedly transmitted to this area by a German immigrant. When the ban on German farm workers was eased in mid-April and recruiting overseas resumed in May, the Canadian farm season was well underway and the opportunity to bring in more labourers had been missed. Then on April 22, Ottawa deferred and eventually suspended until March 1953, the issuing of visas to all unsponsored cases from Germany, excepting farm and domestic workers as well as nurses' aides. This measure was necessitated by the higher than expected intake of immigrants (some 62,000) in the first quarter of 1952 and the continuing glut of skilled labour in Canada. Yet the manner in which the

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26 The actual selection of farm workers only got underway in early May. DL, Vol. 291, File 1-26-60-4, Pt. 2, Lamarre to Dawson, 10.4.1952. For the start of the ban see Winnipeg Free Press, 4.3.1952. The suspected carrier of the disease, Willi Brüntjen, had vanished from the infected area and a veritable Canada-wide manhunt for him ensued. He turned up in B.C. and was subsequently
suspension was implemented suggests that Ottawa was attempting to maintain an "ethnic balance." British migrants were not subject to these restrictions, and in fact, were granted further inducements to migrate. Northwestern Europeans, other than Germans, were only nominally affected by these measures. The Italian and German movements, showing robust growth in early-1952, were pruned back the farthest. Consequently, the projected number of Germans to be admitted was reduced from 30,000 to 22,735. This measure dealt a major blow to the German skilled workers movement in 1952, as even workers with enough money to pay their way were effectively blocked from entering Canada.

Canadian efforts to enlist the assistance of German authorities for their group-labour schemes fared poorly in 1952. Realising the need for a good head start on recruitment to meet farm labour orders on time and driven by the recruiting "enthusiasm" carried over from 1951, officials in Karlsruhe approached the German federal Labour Ministry as early as February 1952 - well before the cabinet had even authorised the 1952 program - to obtain approval of their farm labour scheme. In their zeal to get a head start on the program, Canadian missions that same month commenced recruiting in cooperation with certain Länder without awaiting approval from federal German authorities for Canada's 1952 program which had been conveyed to Bonn in February 1952. The Canadians' preemptive action was only discovered in May by German federal officials who, having sat on the plan for some months, and with some chagrin, now insisted that the program first receive Bonn's clearance. Only in early June, after tough negotiations with German authorities, especially over the terms of the farm-labour "contracts" and the inclusion of married farm workers and their

27 A Canadian National Railways (CNR) official warned "of the very serious situation and state of public opinion" in Canada if Ottawa's policy would "inadvertently give benefit to German immigration over that of British." NAC, RG 30, CNR records, Vol. 8339, File 3070-31, Milne to McGowan, 15.5.1952. Accordingly, the Minister of DCI, W.E. Harris, assured the House that every advantage and opportunity would be given to move Britons. House of Commons, Debates, 2.6.1952. Regarding the need to control Italian numbers see NAC, RG 2, Privy Council Office (PCO) records, Cabinet Conclusions, Vol. 2650, 17.6.1952. While German and Italian immigration was being cut back, benefits such as the APS to skilled workers were extended in Britain. Ibid.


29 The Director of Immigration himself, while visiting Germany in late-1951, pressed for an aggressive German program, stating that "unless we take immediate action in obtaining the most suitable and desirable immigrants from German it will only be a matter of time before we will find the German Government in a mood where they will not permit the free movement of German nationals and established expellees from Germany." IB, Vol. 31, File 682, Pt. 7, Smith to DCI Deputy Minister, 9.11.1951.
dependants, did Bonn give "the green light" to the farm labour scheme. Yet, further delays ensued when the Director of the German federal agency for manpower and unemployment insurance refused to implement the Canadian program until Bonn agreed to cover the Länder’s costs for presenting applicants for Canada’s programs. By the time this matter was sorted out it was already July, and Karlsruhe informed German authorities that their assistance was no longer required.  

Negotiations on the German domestics’ scheme started even later, in August, but ran smoother than the farm-worker program. All told, German assistance in 1952 was disappointing: only 3,000 immigrants were referred to Canadian immigration missions.  

The late start in recruiting could not be made up later in the year since immigration was strictly curtailed in the winter of 1952-53. Only domestics were admissible at this time, whereas all German farm workers had to be in or en route to Canada no later than July 31. Furthermore as the farm-labour program fell victim to delay after delay, Canadian farmers lost interest and began cancelling orders. Thus from February to late June of 1951, the demand for German farm hands dwindled from 8,500 to 1,400 orders. While headquarters slashed the German program, the chief of the Canadian mission in Karlsruhe, J.R. Robillard, did his utmost to cut the program’s losses by fitting in as many unsponsored migrants as possible under the farm labour and domestics’ schemes and as “cases of exceptional merit.” He was so successful in salvaging the German program that Ottawa called on Karlsruhe to account for its high-rate of visa production.  

German immigration results for 1952 very much reflected Ottawa’s dilatory conduct and its attempt to jettison the German program. The number of German migrants decreased from 32,395 in 1951 to 28,257 in 1952 and British immigration, conversely, jumped by over 10,000 to 42,675 during the same period. Among German workers, the proportion of farm hands and domestics increased from 1951 to 1952, whereas the number of skilled and unskilled workers fell markedly. The overall

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31 German authorities recruited 1,000 farm hands and 2,000 domestics for Canada in 1952. Ibid.
decline in German migration could have been even steeper had it not been for Karlsruhe's drive to "increase numbers." Again Karlsruhe's recourse to a substantial pool of applications, numbering about 100,000 at the start of 1952, enabled it to maintain a reasonable high rate of visa production when assistance from Bonn was not forthcoming. However, more so than in 1951, Ottawa failed to seize a golden opportunity to obtain many professional, skilled and technical workers who were readily available in Germany in 1952, especially as the competing American program came to a close in April 1952.\textsuperscript{33} Most accounts suggest that government and employers generally were satisfied with the Germans received in this year.

\textit{The 1953 German Immigration Program}

Unlike the situation in 1952, the German program got off to a good start in 1953 and kept improving during the course of the year. Early economic forecasts for 1953 augured well for an expanded immigration program. Based on the anticipated growth of defence production and resource development, employment was estimated to increase 3-4% over the previous year. The performance of the economy was especially strong after October 1952, so much so that Ottawa could have accepted many more immigrants, especially skilled workers and engineers.\textsuperscript{34} The early arrival of spring in 1953 hastened the pick-up of employment and ensured a high intake of immigrants in the first half of the year.

Officials in Ottawa had also learned from their mistakes in 1952, realising that success was contingent upon early preparations.\textsuperscript{35} Planning for the 1953 program was already initiated in October 1952. Field estimates of housing and employment were conducted and overseas posts were requested to prepare for processing of immigrants early in the year. Armed with this information,

\textsuperscript{33} An assessment of immigration programming in 1952 revealed that Canada had not accept enough skilled workers in this year. \textit{Ibid.}, "1952 PROGRAMME" (1963). The DCI reported a good supply of skilled tradesmen and domestics available in Germany in 1952 and a lack of agriculturalists. DCI, Vol. 73, File [DACI] 1951-57, Minutes of DACI meeting, 14.7.1952.
the DCI prepared and submitted to cabinet an immigration plan which recommended 160,000 immigrants for 1953, among them 35,000 Germans and Austrians. Cabinet approved the plan on December 4, 1952, and full details of the German program were forwarded to Karlsruhe three weeks later. To get a head start on the farm-labour movement, headquarters had already authorised Robillard on November 19, 1952, to begin selecting and processing unsponsored immigrants. This early notice was crucial to the success of the German program because six weeks were required for Bonn's approval, a further six weeks to secure the cooperation of the Länder and another six weeks to process applicants. A survey of available shipping conducted by the DCI in December 1952 revealed that PICMME-ICEM charters would again be needed to make up the shortage of commercial berths from Germany, particularly during the first six months of 1953.36

Of the 35,000 immigrants expected from Germany, 20,000 were to be workers, mostly farmers (10,000) and domestics (4,500). Although only 2,400 skilled workers were targeted, other white-collar groups such as professionals, clerical staff and merchants, omitted in 1952, were added to the 1953 program.37 For 1953 it was decided that each overseas immigration post38 would be given a list of specific occupations along with quotas to be recruited. Although unsponsored German skilled workers were no longer excluded, as had been the case in 1952, the list of skilled occupations under which Germans could qualify was much shorter than the catalogue of skills for other western European countries. The approach of assigning quotas of workers to each overseas mission was abandoned altogether in March 1953, when many posts, excepting in Germany and Austria, were unable to meet their allotted orders. In the end, many of the outstanding quotas were transferred to Karlsruhe which had no difficulty in filling these occupations from its backlog of 205,000 unsponsored applications.39

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35 This point was also hammered home by German and Canadian overseas officials who recognised that Ottawa’s tardiness was largely to blame for the poor showing in Germany in 1952. IB, Vol. 774, File 536-31, Pt. 2, Bird to Director, 23.10.1952.
38 The exceptions were Britain and France where no limits applied. IB, Vol. 814, File 551-10-1953, Chief Op. Div. to Director, 27.11.1952.
More cooperation was forthcoming from Bonn in 1953. This change in mood was noticeable as early as October 1952 on the occasion of an informal meeting between Canadian and German delegates attending the PICMME plenary session. The German side indicated that it wished to move over 17,000 persons, mostly domestics and farm workers, to Canada in 1953. This gesture was undoubtedly intended to make amends for Bonn's poor showing on the farm workers' scheme in 1952.\textsuperscript{40} It also represented a shift in strategy. Rather than seeking to influence emigration to Canada, Bonn attempted to direct Canadian efforts to relieve a particularly pressing problem in 1953, the East-German refugee crisis.

Early-1953 saw a renewed flood of East Germans streaming into West Berlin at a rate of about 1,000 per day, causing considerable over-crowding, confusion and distress. The crisis soon received international attention as the German government urgently sought assistance to help ameliorate this potentially destabilising domestic situation. Seeing a role here for immigration countries, the German foreign office approached the Canadian mission for assistance, culminating in a plan in which Canada agreed to select 2,000 immigrants in West Berlin starting in January 1953. However, the plan faltered when RCMP visa-vetting officers refused to screen 90% of the candidates presented to them because many failed to meet two-year residence security rule.\textsuperscript{41} Robillard's appeal to headquarters to amend the rule brought only partial relief. In mid-March, the RCMP agreed to only consider cases of bona-fide political refugees and not residents of the eastern zone. But this concession still excluded the bulk of refugees from immediate consideration and therefore deprived Canada of an excellent source of immigrants in this and following years. The two-year rule also prevented Canada from making an effective contribution to relieving the German refugee problem, leading Bonn to question the utility of assisting Canada with its immigration activities.

\textsuperscript{40} In fact Canadian delegates did not shy away from voicing their displeasure during this meeting, stating point blank "that the Government of Canada was most disappointed in the showing that was made in regard to the recruitment of Farm Labourers during the season of 1952." DCI, Vol. 107, File 3-24-6, Pt. 2, Bird to Director Immigration, 23.10.1952.
Still, in February 1953, Canadian officials had successfully cleared their 1953 immigration program with Bonn.\textsuperscript{42} During the negotiations it was apparent that German authorities expected Canada to assist in the relief of the refugee problem by accepting many East Germans under its 1953 program. And Robillard misled them along these lines, promising that a favourable ruling on the two-year residence restrictions was eminent from Ottawa. Hopeful of Canada’s assistance, German authorities implemented the Canadian program immediately, even offering unprecedented cooperation in advertising and promoting the program while taking great pains to avoid a repeat of the disappointments in 1952.\textsuperscript{43} This showed in the results of German labour offices which were able to recruit many more prospective immigrants for Canada in 1953 than in 1952.

Further impetus for German immigration, specifically the refugee movement, came from the highest political level, the German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer. On a state visit to Canada in April 1953, Adenauer pressed Prime Minister St. Laurent and Immigration Minister W.E. Harris to temporarily admit 200,000 East Germans as farm labourers, who would be returned to Germany after four to five years. Although this blunt and rather unrealistic proposal was ultimately rejected,\textsuperscript{44} it did have the intended effect of rousing Ottawa into greater action on the refugee problem. Although handicapped by the two-year rule, Karlsruhe made every effort to move refugees to Canada in 1953. Refugee camps in Germany were combed and a team was re-dispatched to Berlin to resume processing which had been abandoned in January.

\textsuperscript{42} The controversy arose over Robillard’s understanding that the two year residence rule excluded East Germans whom he considered West-German nationals. The RCMP held East Germans to be non-nationals and therefore subject to the rule. The RCMP’s interpretation ultimately won out. DCI, Vol. 127, File 3-33-13, Chief Karlsruhe to Chief Op. Div., 6.2.1953.

\textsuperscript{43} This was only achieved after Robillard had successfully convinced the German side to drop its condition that Canada guarantee the early reunion of dependants left behind in Germany with their family members in Canada, an issue initially raised during preliminary discussions in January 1953. IB, Vol. 674, File C92672, Pt. 2, Robillard to Chief Op. Div., 27.2.1953.

\textsuperscript{44} Instructions to immediately start recruiting were already sent out to German labour offices on March 12. IB, Vol. 835, File 553-30, Pt.1, Präsident Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung... to Presidents of Land Labour offices, 12.3.1953.

\textsuperscript{45} Having the benefit of advance notice on 6 February 1953, Canada’s cabinet already rejected this proposition as “contrary to normal Canadian policy in immigration matters.” PCO, Vol. 6.2.1953, Cabinet Conclusions, 6.2.1953. Adenauer’s proposal that the movement of the 200,000 refugees be financed through the $5 million in German assets seized during World War II was also declined as most of these monies had already been paid out to victims of the war. DCI, Vol. 127, File 3-33-13, Fortier to Taylor, 2.5.1953 and reply, 5.5.1953.
All told, 1953 was a phenomenal year for German immigration to Canada. All the critical factors - the Canadian economy, Ottawa's political will, German cooperation and emigration interest amongst Germans - came together at the right time to produce 35,015 migrants, a record for German migration to Canada in the twentieth century. Results also roughly matched Ottawa's goals for the 1953 German movement, in terms of total number, total workers and occupational categories of Germans recruited. 21,379 German workers entered Canada (61% of all Germans), including 6,837 farmers, 5,985 skilled workers and 4,990 domestics. Clearly more German trained workers were admitted than originally slated. This was because of the relative abundance of these workers in Germany compared to other European countries. Yet German numbers could have been even higher, considering that Canada failed to take more skilled workers\(^{45}\) to meet domestic demand; balked at accepting more East Germans and confined its APS to farm and domestic workers. Canada's success was also undoubtedly due to the relative inactivity of Australia's and the United States' German immigration programs.

**The 1954 German Immigration Program**

In late-1953, the immigration bureaucrats again looked at forecasts of Canada's economic and employment activity to formulate the upcoming year's immigration program. Despite the uncertainty of some economic indicators and sectors of the economy, government experts in 1953 gave their approval to the continuation of an expanded program for 1954. But by spring 1954, the Canadian economy had taken a turn for the worse, slumping into a year-long recession. Employment opportunities were down 4% over the same period in 1953 as a result of the late start to the farm and construction season and declines in the resource sector. Previous immigration estimates had to be revised and appropriate measures were taken to limit the inflow of newcomers.

Buoyed by the excellent performance of the economy and the high intake of immigrants in 1953, the DCI initially estimated Canada's intake for 1954 at a staggering 222,500 immigrants, including

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46,000 Germans, 24,800 of whom were to be workers. However, in light of technical restraints, such as limited shipping and overseas facilities, a more realistic target of a minimum of 160,000 immigrants was established for 1954.\footnote{The Atlantic Conference anticipated a shortfall of 11,131 berths from northern European ports in 1954. DCI, Vol. 93, File 3-7-1, Pt. 2, Fortier to Harris, 21.1.1954.} Just as in 1953, most of the migrant workers sought from Germany for 1954 were farmers (10,000) and domestics (5,500), yet allowances were made for a higher intake of skilled workers (5,000). After receiving cabinet approval in December 1953, the complete program was forwarded to Karlsruhe on January 1, 1954. Again, Robillard was authorised to start negotiations with Bonn in October 1953 on the German farm labour program. Estimates of available overseas' passenger berths, revealed a continuing need for the ICEM's shipping to meet shortages expected in the summer of 1954.\footnote{The DCI was especially concerned that when Germany achieved its full sovereignty it would be "loath" to let its skilled workers and farmers go. DCI, Vol. 73, File [DACI] 1951-57, Minutes of DACI meetings, 8.6.1953 and 10.6.1953.}

Although pessimistic about long-term supply, Canadian officials were still confident that a large output of immigrants from Germany could be achieved for 1954.\footnote{Steinert, Migration und Politik, 174. Robillard learned from a German official in March 1954 that so long as there was no agreement on the scheme of reuniting dependants, Bonn would be "unable to see [its] way clear to authorise the recruitment of potential farm workers through the Arbeitsämter [German labour offices]." Robillard also suspected that Bonn had delayed sending instructions to labour offices for this very same reason. IB, Vol. 856, File 555-16, Robillard to Benoit, 17.3.1954.} In this they were sadly mistaken. The mood of the German authorities had visibly changed by late-1953. Bonn now dictated restrictive terms for German emigration. For the 1954 farm labour program, Robillard was informed that single workers under the age of twenty-five would not be encouraged to emigrate. Canada was welcome to take farm families, provided that dependants left behind in Germany were reunited with family members in due course. Ottawa's refusal to accede to this latter proviso did little to inspire German cooperation. By July 30, German labour offices managed to present only 860 farm workers for the Canadian program.\footnote{IB, Vol. 856, File 555-16, Robillard to Benoit, 17.3.1954.} Nor were German immigration applications arriving at Canadian missions at the previous years' rates. Germans generally were less interested in immigrating in light of Germany's new found prosperity and high employment. Economic growth was so great that Germany began importing foreign workers in this year. Also, German officials in
the following years were more pre-occupied with the Australian and American programs, assigning less attention to Canada's immigration initiative.

Certain developments in Canada also contributed to the decline in German immigration. The stricter selection criteria applied to the farm labour program, the largest of the German worker movements, increased rejections and discouraged others from applying. Without doubt, the discontinuation of the DL's inland transportation grants made the farm and domestic labour schemes less attractive for prospective immigrants. Also, in order to limit immigration with the onset of the recession, the DCI reduced the number of skilled occupational categories under which unsponsored prospective migrants could enter Canada and advanced the cut-off date for their arrival from October 30 to September 30. This hampered the flow of German skilled workers, which in 1954 still had the potential to fill much of Canada's requirements. Finally, negative publicity about high unemployment prompted many prospective immigrants to defer or altogether reconsider their plans of moving to Canada.

Given these developments, Canada's resulting intake of 29,845 Germans fell well below the 46,000 mark projected at the beginning of the year. Over 17,000 (or 57%) of these migrants were workers, mostly skilled labourers (6,838), followed by domestics (3,075), general labourers (2,749) and farm hands (2,493). This result was at variance with Ottawa's original aim of securing mostly farm workers from Germany. Clearly the collapse of the farm labour movement in 1954 was a major factor in the overall decline of German migration to Canada. In this regard 1954 represents a turning point for German immigration as skilled labourers would dominate future movements. Still the numbers could have been even lower for 1954 had it not been for Robillard's resolve to maintain a high rate of visa production in the face of Ottawa's restrictions. To overcome the lack of German assistance, Canadian missions in Germany relied heavily on their backlog applications and

50 Financial Post, 26.6.1954. Unions and municipal authorities were also urging the government to reduce immigration. Montreal Star, 13.5.1954; and Toronto Globe & Mail, 10.6.1954.
51 Robillard ensured an early start to negotiations with German authorities, sought and received concessions which enabled dependent children between the ages of 16 and 18 to accompany farm working family members to Canada and enlisted the resources
referrals to find recruits. German emigration figures (see Figure No. 12) disclose that the United States and Australia had taken the initiative from Canada in this year in recruiting German migrants.

The 1955 German Immigration Program

An assessment of the economic prospects for the 1955 immigration program was already undertaken in September 1954, the nadir of Canada's mid-decade recession. In spite of the prevailing gloom, the economic and employment situation for 1955 was expected to improve, driven largely by an increase in exports and investments. The predicted upsurge did in fact begin by March 1955 and gained momentum until another downturn of the economy in mid-1957. Driving the economic and employment recovery in 1955 was the rise in consumer spending, residential and government construction and higher expenditures on machinery and equipment.

It was only in late-November 1954 that the DCI began finalising its 1955 immigration program. The modest target of 150,000 immigrants represented a compromise between the positive prognostications of economists and the prevailing reality of high unemployment and poor economic growth, points driven home by the DL, unions and the public. The DCI aimed for 25,300 German migrants, of which 13,060, or 52%, were to be workers. Again, the department hoped to secure mostly farm workers (3,800) followed by domestics (3,465) and skilled workers (3,000). The latter figure confirmed the trend that, despite the obstacles it sometimes erected, Canada was relying more on Germany for skilled workers by 1955. The lower mark set for farm labourers reflected Ottawa's lack of confidence in the German farm labour program and the resulting shift in recruiting patterns from northern to southern Europe. Although Immigration headquarters again authorised an early start to the farm labour scheme, it submitted the overall German program to


Karlsruhe relatively late, thereby impeding recruitment overseas. The availability of shipping at the right times remained a problem, complicating the German movement in the summer of 1955.\textsuperscript{53}

Canada sought Bonn's assistance in 1955, but none was forthcoming. The German economic boom, which had started in 1954, was in full swing by 1955 and Germany could ill afford to lose many more qualified workers. At the ICEM session in late-1954, German delegates announced that receiving countries would be asked to reduce their intake of German migrants.\textsuperscript{54} Although it was subsequently clarified that Canada would be excluded from this request, anxiety lingered about Bonn's general intentions. Also, by the close of 1954, Bonn was aware that its attempts to control emigration through the labour offices was not succeeding. This strategy had failed to accelerate the outflow of surplus population to Canada and to contain the departure of skilled labour. Accordingly, Bonn informed Karlsruhe in April 1955 that assistance from these offices would stop. Little protest was forthcoming from immigration officials who surely realised that they had dodged a more serious threat, namely a request from Bonn to curtail their processing of spontaneous applications and the issuing of APS loans. Without the services of the labour offices, Karlsruhe was henceforth reliant on the applications received at Canadian missions. It also meant that Canada's labour immigration schemes would no longer be advertised in the local press and at labour office locations, further handicapping the 1955 Canadian program. Bonn continued to encourage the emigration of refugees to Canada but offered little support in this direction, even reducing its per-capita grants to the ICEM revolving fund.\textsuperscript{55}

Meanwhile in Canada, immigration was going badly. Already in March missions in Germany and elsewhere were behind schedule in delivering workers to Canada at the desired times. By mid-1955, immigration from Germany had decreased 37% while jobs in Canada had increased in comparison to the same period in 1954. Robillard felt his mission would be "lucky" to secure 60%

\textsuperscript{54} DCI, Vol. 127, File 3-33-13, Robillard to Smith, 8.12.1954. Rumours of Bonn's intentions had already circulated widely in Ottawa in November. Bonn did express interest in this year in developing a farm settlement plan for East German refugee families in Canada. Although discussions began in this year, the plan was only brought to fruition in the early-1960s.
of the 25,000 Germans aimed for and blamed the poor showing on bad publicity about Canada, limited application of the APS, late arrival of instructions, deferrals by intending immigrants and processing delays engendered by security screening. Unmistakably, interest in emigrating to Canada was waning; Karlsruhe received 65% fewer applications in 1955 than it had in 1954.\footnote{Steinert, \emph{Migration und Politik}, 272. Regarding the discontinuation of help from labour offices, see IB, Vol. 821, File 552-1-551, Pt 1, Chief Karlsruhe to Chief Op. Div., 4.4.1955.} As the Canadian economy made rapid gains by the summer and fall of 1955, immigration figures slumped further despite belated efforts by the DCI headquarters to boost the program by extending deadlines for arrivals of farmers and skilled workers and by relaxing occupational selection criteria.

Only 18,082 German migrants, including 9,689 workers (54%), came to Canada in 1955, in what was generally considered a very poor year for immigration totalling a meagre 110,000 persons. The disappointing showing was not due to any lack of effort on the part of an exasperated Robillard and his staff who petitioned Immigration headquarters hard to provide more "selling points." Canada received even fewer German farm (1,192) and domestic (1,951) workers than in the previous year and these figures were far below the high targets set at the outset of the year. This outcome was not unexpected, considering that Ottawa failed to offer more enticements for its worker schemes and because the assistance of German labour offices had ceased. In fact, in this year virtually all recruitment was undertaken by the Canadian missions themselves. Just as in 1954, skilled workers, 3,666 in total, made up the single largest category of German workers entering Canada. Again more of this class of migrant could have been taken as demand still outstripped supply in Canada. Canada's efforts in Germany were also undoubtedly hurt by the American refugee program.\footnote{DCI, Vol. 140, File 3-40-1, Pt. 1, Robillard to Chief Op. Div., 11.7.1955.} German immigration to the United States was more than double that to Canada in 1955, thereby siphoning off prospective candidates from what was a shrinking pool of migrants.\footnote{The American \emph{Refugee Relief Act} aimed to recruit 90,000 German migrants in the three-year period beginning August 1953. It was in 1955-56 that the program began to attract large numbers of Germans. For further details on this program, see chapter three.}
The 1956 German Immigration Program

The rebound of the Canadian economy and the corresponding government optimism about its ability to place more immigrants carried over from the latter half of 1955 into 1956. Capital investment and exports were forecast to exceed 1955 levels. Indeed by early-1956, the resurgence of the economy and the flood of new jobs, especially in construction, agriculture and resource sectors, surpassed all expectations, prompting one federal official to comment: "The prospects for the coming summer are so good as to be almost frightening." DCI surveys revealed a demand for practically all classes of workers for 1956 and a capacity of the economy to absorb 204,000 workers. An estimated 25,000 immigrants were expected from Germany. In 1956, Ottawa's whole approach had shifted from targeting numbers and specific types of workers from various countries to simply getting as many "suitable" migrants from Europe as possible.

To reverse the trend of declining immigration, Ottawa implemented a series of initiatives designed to rekindle European interest in Canada. These included a 1955-56 winter program admitting additional categories of immigrants; grants to children of immigrants in Canada in lieu of family allowances; the extension of the APS to cover all workers and their dependants; the implementation of broader selection criteria which admitted immigrants according to their "suitability, desirability and adaptability" rather than primarily on their occupational background; and the use of one occupational list in Europe, instead of the previous practice of assigning separate lists for each country. These incentives and reforms benefited Germans as much, if not more, than other immigrants from Europe. They ensured that German migrants could now compete on the same footing as migrants from other parts of western Europe in being considered for admission to Canada. The decision to apply a single occupational selection list (which was to serve more as a guide than as a screening tool) for all countries effectively removed the previous occupational restrictions which had constricted the flow of skilled German labour to Canada.

59 DCI, Vol. 101, File 3-18-6, Pt. 1, Summary of Recommendations, 1.11.1955. Initially immigrant children under the age of 16 were not eligible for family allowances during their first year of residence of Canada. The Liberal government also came under fire from opposition parties in 1955 for not doing enough to get Canada's share of immigrants. Toronto Star, 9.1.1956.
Special attention was also given to boosting immigration from Germany. An aggressive promotional campaign was launched, including a visit to Germany by the Deputy Minister of Immigration, Laval Fortier, who advertised the glowing possibilities of life in Canada at a Bonn press conference. In the same vein, Canadian missions distributed leaflets as well as information packages to German emigration advisory offices. Ecstatic about the new APS, Robillard undertook to promote the scheme "by using all official and subterfuge means possible; e.g. planting articles in the press, radio, etc."60 These efforts also helped dispel the negative publicity about Canada which had prevailed during the two previous years. To meet the serious farm labour shortage, the government decided to defer the security screening of East German and Volksdeutsche refugees for a few months and thereby facilitate their movement to Canada.61 However the plan ultimately failed for a number of reasons: cabinet had approved the plan too late in the day; the secrecy surrounding the plan undermined promotional work; and many East Germans in the Federal Republic were reluctant to leave, awaiting indemnification payments from Bonn for their lost assets in the eastern zone. Likewise, a plan to attract unqualified general labourers for farm work came up empty. More success was experienced with skilled workers. The introduction of compulsory military service in Germany in mid-1956 prompted many young trade apprentices to use emigration as an escape route. Always on the look-out for a way to boost German immigration, Robillard sought and obtained special authorisation from headquarters to move as many of these workers as possible to Canada, including during the winter months when immigration was normally curtailed.62

As labour shortages in Germany worsened in 1956, Canadian officials were informed that Bonn "could no longer be expected to recruit workers for emigration countries."63 While German authorities applauded the inclusion of family dependants in the APS and encouraged Canada to

61 PCO, Vol. 5775, Cabinet Conclusion, 5.4.1956. West German residents were also later added to the security screening waiver. Security restrictions barring certain categories of Waffen-SS members were also removed, not so much to boost immigration, but because this category of immigrant was no longer considered a serious security threat.
admit more refugee families, they increasingly attempted to curtail Canadian immigration activities in Germany. One such measure was Bonn's insistence that Canada confine its immigration activities to immigration attachés which would have meant that Canadian immigration operations would have to be moved to the Bonn area and the staff would need to be accredited. While this request logically followed from Germany's new status as a sovereign state and the withdrawal of American sponsorship of the Karlsruhe mission, it was an attempt to secure further control over, and ultimately restrict, Canadian immigration activities. By November 1956, Canadian operations were transferred from Karlsruhe to Cologne. Yet the move may have backfired since Canadians were able to increase their visa production from their new quarters for 1957.

The DCI's hard work and innovative measures to reverse the immigration slump brought the desired results. Immigration to Canada jumped 50% to 164,857 from 1955 to 1956 with the German share rising 46% to 26,457 migrants. The latter result must have come as a surprise to Canadian officials who had given up on Germany as a major source of immigrants. Compared to the two previous years, a higher ratio of workers to dependants (59:41) was achieved. Even more so than in 1955, skilled workers (7,262 or 46.4% of all German workers) eclipsed all other labour categories. The expanded scope of the APS and the discontinuation of occupational selection greatly facilitated the movement of this type of worker. Yet despite the DCI's best efforts, the German farm program could not be resuscitated; the numbers (1,059) continued to slide. Conversely, the movement of domestics made a decent recovery from 1955 to 1956, increasing 21% to 2,361 workers. Again, Karlsruhe showed considerable initiative in maintaining a high rate of visa production without German assistance, and in spite of the high priority assigned to moving Hungarian refugees to

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64 In May 1955 shortly after the entry into force of the Bonn Conventions, the American occupation authorities, to which the Karlsruhe headquarters had been accredited, withdrew their sponsorship of this mission. This rendered the status of all Canadian immigration missions in Germany "virtually non-existent." IB, Vol. 822, File 552-1-551, Pt. 2, Canadian-German Immigration Problems, 19.2.1960. It was at the Four Power Conference on October 23, 1954, that the Bonn Conventions dealing with the termination of the occupation regime in the Federal Republic of Germany were entered into force.

65 The move from Karlsruhe to Cologne had physically shifted Canadian operations to a much more populated and emigrant-rich area of Germany. The German Labour Ministry was chiefly behind this. Steiner, Migration und Politik, 274 and IB, Vol. 822, File 552-1-551 Pt. 2, Canadian-German Immigration Problems, 19.2.1960.

66 In concert with other western countries, Canada agreed to admit a large number of Hungarian refugees who had fled Hungary to neighbouring Austria and Yugoslavia in October and November 1956 during the failed Hungarian uprising. The DCI gave this movement top priority, shifting much of its resources to this front, as well as waiving security and medical screening and providing
Canada. Canada's results in this year were all the more impressive, considering the record number of Germans (47,200) taken by the United States in 1956.

**The 1957 German Immigration Program**

When representatives of various government departments met at the October 1956 session of the Departmental Advisory Committee on Immigration to discuss Canada's 1957 immigration program, confidence in the economy and the government's ability to place migrants was running high. Growth in all economic sectors was predicted to continue into 1957 and estimates of Canada's absorptive capacity for the year soared to 300,000 immigrants, albeit in the end a more cautious mark of 200,000 was set, including 35,000 migrants from Germany. In anticipation of a serious shortage of shipping berths for 1957, arrangements were made early in 1957 to airlift 25,000 migrants from Europe, mostly from Britain, to Canada. Accordingly, APS loans were extended to all eligible air-travellers.

In order to duplicate the success of the previous year, immigration authorities adopted the same formula, continuing the expanded APS and liberal selection criteria from 1956. Other measures were introduced to further boost immigration, including a broader employer sponsorship program and a wide-open 1956-57 winter immigration program. German immigration especially benefited from the latter initiative as Canadian offices in Germany were receiving numerous enquiries, averaging about 300 per pay day, in the first three months of 1957. Clearly, interest in Germany in emigrating to Canada had picked up and remained high throughout 1957, largely driven by glowing reports about Canada's resurgent economy and an effective promotional campaign launched in Germany. Spearheading this latter campaign was the Minister of Immigration, Jack Pickersgill's very successful press conference in Bonn in December 1956 on the occasion of officially opening the new Canadian immigration office in Cologne.

free transport. In 1956-57 over 37,500 such refugees were brought to Canada. G. Dirks, *Canada's Refugee Policy, Indifference or Opportunism* (Montreal/Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977).
Perhaps, however, Ottawa's program was too successful. By the end of March 1957, 62,460 migrants had been admitted and, at this rate, immigration offices were on pace to break the 300,000 mark by year's end. More importantly, the economy unexpectedly had stagnated after 1956 and then declined by mid-1957 with employment falling off in the resource and manufacturing sectors. Problems were also encountered in finding sufficient housing for newcomers. As a result, the immigration program had to be scaled back and administrative restrictions were imposed as early as April 1957. Immigrants were counselled to defer their immigration until 1958; selection again reverted to limited occupational criteria; and no visas were to be issued to unsponsored German immigrants after July 31, 1957. Furthermore, winter immigration in 1957-58 was severely curtailed as Canadian field staff struggled to place 7,000 unemployed migrants registered in October. These measures adversely affected German immigration, essentially destroying the momentum which had been gained in 1956 and setting back the movement well into the 1960s.

As in 1956, Bonn ended up exerting relatively limited control over German immigration to Canada in 1957, a movement that it sought to contain. In June 1957, German federal ministries seriously considered measures to regulate Canadian immigration activities, possibly in response to the remarkable success of Canada's 1956 and 1957 programs which took many young skilled workers away from the German economy. Bonn sought an agreement with Canada which would bar recruitment of men under twenty-five years of age, limit immigration to annual quotas and necessitate the approval of the German government for all APS cases. Bonn stood on particularly solid ground with respect to the latter demand as the Canadians' administration of the APS patently violated the 1897 German Emigration Law which prohibited foreign governments from subsidising the passage of immigrants. However, in the end these demands were never delivered to the Canadian side, possibly because immigration to Canada was on the decline after 1957.67

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67 Steinert notes that the German government did not want to threaten its good trade relations and NATO partnership with Canada by hastily invoking the 1897 emigration law to restrict the APS. This was also an election year and any impression that German citizens' rights to emigrate were being interfered with had to be avoided. In 1955, Canada had reached an agreement with Austria whereby all APS cases would first be cleared by Austrian authorities before they were permitted to emigrate to Canada. German authorities' sought to implement a similar arrangement with Canadian authorities in order to more effectively control German emigration to Canada. Steinert, Migration und Politik, 275-6.
tipped off in June 1957 about Bonn’s intentions, Canadian officials resolved that "[a]ny proposal to limit assisted passage immigrants must be fought." German authorities may have had an inkling about Canada’s position, as the German Embassy in Ottawa, tasked with delivering the German terms to the Canadian government, was loathe to carry out this assignment.

Still, in what was the best year of immigration since 1914, Canada accepted 282,164 migrants in 1957, among them 29,564 Germans. Of the 17,472 German workers received, 9,422 (54%) were skilled migrants, followed by 3,016 (17%) service workers and 2,154 (12.3%) general labourers. All these categories, but especially trained workers, had again benefited from the generous selection criteria and the expanded APS. The farm labour movement, so strong in the early-1950s, had faded into insignificance with only 854 workers. Again, a high ratio of workers to dependants (59:41) was achieved. Certain external factors had also favoured the German movement. Canada remained a popular emigration destination for Germans in this year, especially among young men attempting to avoid the German military draft. As well, American recruiting under its Refugee Relief Act ceased in December 1956.

Despite the apparent success of the German program, greater numbers of migrants could have been generated. The emigration disinterest in Germany was momentarily reversed in 1957 and Cologne reported it had to defer "literally thousands" of applications in July 1957. However, precedence was given to the Hungarian and British programs thereby limiting resources and staffing available to other movements. A concerted effort was made to maximise Canada’s intake of Britons in 1957 in order to capitalise on the Suez crisis which generated great emigration interest in Britain. As expected, when Ottawa began imposing restrictions in April 1957, non-British movements were

69 Steinert, Migration und Politik, 275-6. During informal talks on this matter with German officials, the Canadian chief of immigration operations in Germany was instructed by Ottawa to listen to and report, but not to comment, on the German proposal. See, IB, Vol. 821, File 552-1-551, Pt. 1, A/Chief Op. Div. to Quinn, 16.8.1957. In the end, the Canadian strategy of waiting for German officials to make their demands official won out.
70 Britain’s failed military campaign to retake the Anglo-French Suez Canal Co. which had been seized by Egypt in July 1956 and the resulting national embarrassment prompted many Britons to emigrate from their homeland. A.Richmond, Postwar Immigrants in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), 14-15.
severely restricted while the British flow to Canada was allowed to continue almost unabated. A 1963 immigration study disclosed that Canada could again have taken more skilled immigrants in 1957, of which there was ample supply in Germany at this time.\(^1\)

**The Post-1957 Movement**

As the Canadian and German economies went in opposite directions after 1957, any hope of again generating a large German movement quickly faded. German immigration fell off dramatically, by more than half, from 1957 to 1958, and averaged a paltry 6,400 persons per year in the 1960s. Meanwhile Ottawa's opinion of German immigrants rose. Germany's *Wirtschaftswunder* (miraculous economic recovery) reinforced the image of the "industry and determination of the German people" and the Canadian government committed more dollars and effort towards securing German migrants.\(^2\) Yet by this time it was too late to make up for lost ground.

Canada's annual German immigration programming had a number of distinctive features. It was strongly governed by real or anticipated manpower and economic developments in Canada. These economic factors as well as the need to maintain an "ethnic-balance" were incorporated into annual targets of German immigrants broken down by occupational grouping. The movement could be effectively controlled, even curtailed, by headquarters through the use of various administrative measures, such as limiting the scope of the APS and the occupational groups of unsponsored migrants admissible. Less success was experienced in boosting the movement when the opportunity afforded itself. From 1951 to 1955, German authorities also played a role in Canada's immigration plans as Canadian overseas operations sought Germany's sanction and assistance in their program. Indeed when cooperation was forthcoming, Bonn's contribution, consisting of recruiting, pre-processing and transporting inland prospective immigrants, could make a noticeable difference to Canada's program.

With the exception of 1955, immigration missions in Germany were quite successful in meeting targets set by headquarters. Yet there were also some shortcomings, particularly on the part of the DCI headquarters. Almost annually instructions regarding the German immigration program for the upcoming year were late in arriving at Canadian missions in Germany. This was especially detrimental to Canada's German immigration program as overseas missions needed sufficient notice to receive Bonn's approval for Canadian plans, to organise promotional work and to start recruiting immigrants given the lengthy processing delays. Headquarters at times was out of touch with the practical difficulties experienced at Karlsruhe. Canadian interests came first, leaving little room to manoeuvre on small points which might have won further cooperation from Bonn. Most importantly, headquarters geared its German immigration program too closely to short-term trends in the Canadian economy rather than to long-term goals or to the available supply of immigrants overseas. It was often too slow in adjusting its intake of immigrants to match upswings in the economy as was the case in the latter half of 1955. The failure to accept more German migrants, especially skilled and professional workers, in 1951-54 when supply was abundant, would cost immigration planners in future years when supply in Germany had dried up and when demand for skilled workers in Canada increased.

Outside organisations, such as church groups and railways, were also key players in German immigration programming. They boosted numbers and added additional resources to immigration work. Yet the federal government attempted to increasingly subordinate these groups' activities to its own goals and the aforementioned annual programming. The place of voluntary agencies and railways in the German movement and their often difficult relationship with Ottawa is the subject of the next chapter.
6. NON-GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND GERMAN IMMIGRATION

CANADIAN VOLUNTARY AGENCIES AND GERMAN IMMIGRATION

An account of German immigration to Canada in the 1950s would be incomplete without reference to the voluntary agencies and railways which contributed significantly to this movement. Key in this regard were the Baptist, Lutheran and Mennonite agencies represented by the Canadian Christian Council for the Resettlement of Refugees (CCCR), as well as the Catholic Immigrant Aid Society (CIAS) which had resigned from the CCCR on December 1, 1951. Taken together, these agencies were responsible for the movement of about one-third of all Germans to Canada in the first half of the 1950s.¹

Figure No. 35: Immigrants from Germany assisted by the CLWR, NABICS, CMBC, CIAS-RSSC, CLIAS or their International Affiliates, 1950-57

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<th>YEAR</th>
<th>CLWR</th>
<th>BWAL-NABICS</th>
<th>CMBC</th>
<th>CIAS-RSSC</th>
<th>CLIAS</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% of all German immigration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>unavailable</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>1,256</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1,623</td>
<td>853</td>
<td>1,004</td>
<td>unavailable</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>3,576</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>1,997</td>
<td>821</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>3,525</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>4,667</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>2,155</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>8,760</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>5,104</td>
<td>1,104</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>1,741</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>8,113</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>2,943</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1,161</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4,752</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>1,290</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2,196</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>785</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1,219</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>unavailable</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CIAS-RSSC totals for the years 1952 to 1956 include immigrants sponsored by the RSSC as well as its international affiliates the NCWC and St. Raphael's Verein. Sources: (1) CLWR statistics: C.L. Monk, Canadian Lutheran World Relief (1961 unpublished paper), 33; (2) NABICS statistics: Wm. Sturhahn, They Come from East and West (Winnipeg: NABICS, 1976), 299; (3) CMBC statistics: F. Epp, Mennonite Exodus, The Resettlement of the Russian Mennonites since the Communist Revolution, (Altona, Manitoba, 1962), 408; (4) RSC-CIAS Statistics: National Archives of Canada, RG 30, CNR records, Vol. 8367, File 3200-C-38.**

The Canadian Lutheran World Relief (CLWR)

Among Canadian church agencies involved in German resettlement, the CLWR was arguably the most active, best funded and well connected. From 1951 to 1957, it assisted in the movement to

¹ National Archives of Canada (NAC), RG 26, Department of Citizenship and Immigration (DCI) records, Vol. 73, File [DACI] 1951-57, Minutes of Departmental Advisory Committee on Immigration (DACI) meeting, 14.10.1954.
Canada of some 18,500 migrants, overwhelmingly German Lutherans.\(^2\) This figure surpassed the achievements of all other Canadian agencies in this period. In fact, from 1952 to 1954, the CLWR settled more migrants abroad than any other voluntary agency in the world. The CLWR's resettlement program peaked in 1952-55, accounting for 13% of Canada's total intake of Germans (see Figure No. 35).

The CLWR was founded on March 14, 1946, during a meeting in Ottawa of representatives of Canadian Lutheran churches. Its principal purpose was to address the urgent need to supply material relief to the occupied zones of Germany and Austria.\(^3\) Among its key executive members in the 1950s were its President, Dr. Rex Schneider, Executive Secretary, Reverend Clifton L. Monk and Treasurer, T.O.F. Herzer. Reverend Monk guided the relief and resettlement operations and much of the administration of the CLWR. Herzer's most valuable contributions were in securing funding necessary for CLWR operations and in serving as the CLWR's liaison with the CCCRR and Ottawa.

Realising that material aid was not the long-term solution to problems in war-torn Europe and acting on requests of parishioners to assist in bringing their relatives to Canada, the CLWR by 1947 also committed itself to a resettlement program for close relatives. The following year it added unsponsored immigrants to its resettlement work, successfully completing the Baltic "seed"\(^4\) movement, the CLWR's first embryonic farm-labour program. In 1949, the CLWR received approval from Ottawa to operate a Lutheran labour scheme to bring forward 500 farm workers together with their dependants. By 1951, it was permitted to accept an unlimited number of workers under its labour scheme and was also called upon to supply farm families for sugar-beet labour. These labour programs assured the CLWR of a continued role in resettlement work.

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\(^2\) Figure from C.L. Monk, "Canadian Lutheran World Relief [CLWR]." (Unpublished paper, 1961), 33. In 1951, the CLWR had also brought to Canada fifteen non-German displaced person (DP) families.

\(^3\) Monk, "Canadian Lutheran," 2. Art Grenke marks the founding date of the CLWR as March 6, 1946. A.Grenke, "Canadian Lutheran World Relief," The Archivist 15, 6 (1988), 12. Herzer was very much the driving force behind the early success of the CLWR. His first years in dealing with the government to get the CLWR's relief work off the ground served as a valuable apprenticeship for his later role in resettlement.
Indeed, by 1951, they had grown to such proportions that they surpassed the organisation's close relative and dependants' programs. Yet this growth would not have been possible without government sanction. By 1951, the CLWR had gained the confidence of Immigration and Labour officials through its conscientious placement work, and Ottawa recognised the value of the CLWR and the other agencies in supplying urgently needed farm, sugar-beet and domestic workers as well as meeting the Karlsruhe mission's goal of boosting visa production. The CLWR as well as the Baptist and Mennonite agencies also offered the government convenient services such as the collection of government transportation loans from fellow church migrants.

The resettlement program received an enormous boost in October 1952, when the CLWR reached an agreement with the Lutheran World Federation (or LWF, the CLWR's international affiliate) to carry out an expanded program of accepting more labour and sponsored family cases in return for more funding. Most impressive were the financial terms, which added $16,000 to CLWR's 1953 operational budget, with payments of further subsidies to be reviewed monthly. The two parties concluded similar resettlement funding arrangements in the years following 1953. Furthermore, the LWF established a revolving-loan fund which supplied transportation loans to needy migrants, thereby sparing the CLWR's own shoestring budget. These additional resources were instrumental in removing the funding bottleneck which had limited the scope of the CLWR's resettlement activities prior to 1952.

Yet this resettlement agreement with the LWF came at a price for the CLWR. Heavily dependent on this funding arrangement, CLWR operations were governed increasingly by its international

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4 Ottawa permitted the CLWR to admit about eighteen Baltic German men as farm workers who, after establishing themselves in Canada, would be able to sponsor their dependants and close relatives.

5 Church agencies were relied upon heavily in 1951 to make up the International Refugee Organization's (IRO) shortfall of sugar-beet and domestices. That the Department of Labour (DL) was pleased with the CLWR's placements, see NAC, MG 28 V 120, CLWR records, Reel H-1390, File CLWR Executive and Committee Minutes 1947-55, "The Lutheran Labour Scheme," (circa Nov. 1950).

6 NAC, RG 76, Immigration Branch (IB) records, Vol. 656, File B41075, Pt. 6, Herzer to Fortier, 10.1.1953, attached "Agreement." These funds were over and above the financial support already being received from its regular sources, the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) National Committee for Canada, Lutheran World Service (LWS) and the three Canadian Districts of the Missouri Synod. They enabled the CLWR to hire four additional staff members and open three more hostels.

7 For example, in May 1951, the CLWR was concerned that the DL's request to supply 40 sugar-beet families would severely strain its resources. CLWR, Reel H-1390, CLWR Executive Committee Minutes, 15.5.1951.
counterpart's interests and broader initiatives. The LWF itself had undertaken to assist the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME renamed the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration or ICEM in 1952) with its migration work and in return received a $100 transportation loan plus a $20 outright grant from the Committee for each immigrant it successfully resettled. Furthermore the LWF was entitled to a share of $200,000 set aside by the Committee which was divided up at year's end among various relief agencies according to the numbers of migrants moved.\textsuperscript{8} A \textit{de facto} performance bonus, the LWF-PICMME payment arrangement placed undue emphasis on numbers of migrants resettled. Consequently, considerable pressure was often brought to bear on the CLWR by the LWF to accept as many migrants as possible for placement in Canada\textsuperscript{9} and to collect additional travel loans which the LWF had advanced to cases coming forward under the Department of Citizenship and Immigration's (DCI) own program. At times this severely strained the CLWR's operations to the point where it had to seek the assistance of government officials to place immigrants and to collect outstanding loans.\textsuperscript{10} Still, the LWF's dollars and its great energy enabled the CLWR to increase the number of migrants it assisted from 1952 to 1953 by some 134\% and to maintain this level in 1954 and 1955 (see above Figure No. 35).

Essential to the success of the CLWR's resettlement program was its ability to place immigrants. For this task it could call on an array of resources: (1) its own machinery including its Eastern Office in Ontario; (2) Lutheran immigration offices of the Canada Synod in Windsor, Toronto, Hamilton and Montreal; (3) the LWF's Immigration Committee and the Committee of the Western Canada Synod; (4) individual Lutheran pastors and churches in Canada; and (5) the Canadian Pacific Railway's (CPR's) Canada Colonisation Association. Because of its excellent record of

\textsuperscript{8} NAC, MG 28 V 18, North American Baptist Immigration and Colonization Society (NABICS) records, File 2.46, Monk to Herzer, 6.8.1953.

\textsuperscript{9} At a CLWR officers' meeting it was candidly acknowledged that one of the reasons why the LWF was extending its assistance to migrants falling under the DCI's regular program was to build up its revolving fund with Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) grants. CLWR, Reel H-1390, CLWR Executive and Committee Meetings 1947-55, CLWR officers meeting, 30.8.1954. Yet the CLWR also profited from the agreement as the more persons it moved, the greater the subsidies it received from the LWF. \textit{Ibid.}, CLWR Executive Meeting Minutes, 26.5.1953.

\textsuperscript{10} In July 1953, the DCI was called upon to assist in placing workers coming under the LWF-CLWR auspices. IB, Vol. 892, File 567-41, Pt. 1, Chief Operations Division (Op. Div.) to Chief Karlsruhe, 30.7.1953.
placements, immigration authorities permitted the CLWR to forward workers and families without specific guarantees of employment. This concession greatly facilitated the flow of CLWR cases to Canada. In addition to pure placement work, the Lutheran network of churches, immigration and welfare agencies provided a host of other services to newcomers such as reception work at ports of entry and final destinations, welfare relief (especially during the tough winters of 1951-52 and 1953-54), counselling, loan and settlement investigations and employer-immigrant relations. These services gave the church programs an enviable reputation among prospective emigrants in Germany.  

The CLWR experienced fewer difficulties than the Canadian government in finding enough migrants for its labour programs. Actually, "recruiting" did not fall within the CLWR's mandate but was undertaken on its behalf chiefly by the LWF-Service to Refugees (LWF-SR), which, in turn, relied extensively on the Evangelisches Hilfswerk (Evangelical Welfare Organisation or EH) in Germany to forward applicants. The recruiting apparatus at the disposal of Lutheran organisations was unparalleled. Emigration applications were collected through the EH's chain of eighteen Beratungsstellen (emigrant advisory offices) and direct contacts with twelve Volksdeutsche and five Reichsdeutsche (Reich German) Hilfskomitees (welfare committees) and the Evangelische Auswanderer Mission (Evangelical Emigration Mission) in Hamburg and Bremen. From these sources the LWF-SR was able to accumulate by May 1952, 27,000 family applications representing 120,000 persons. So effective were the voluntary agencies that the railways and the government often turned to them to acquire the workers they themselves had difficulties mustering. 

\[\text{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{11}}\text{ Robillard observed that "those proceeding under Church auspices get the impression that such an umbrella will protect them from all evils and assure them the best available settlement opportunities." IB, Vol. 840, File 553-50, Pt. 1, Chief Karlsruhe to Chief Op. Div., 20.8.1954. The LWF official, R.Baetz, commented that "[n]owhere are the Lutherans so well organised to move people as in Canada." Cited in Monk, "Canadian Lutheran," 34. 
By late-1954, the LWF and CLWR leadership came to the sober realisation that the need for and interest in emigration in Germany was declining. German churches and authorities were beginning to frown on the work of foreign governments and relief agencies in soliciting migrants. In Canada, factors such as the recessions in 1954-55 and 1958-61, the increasing opposition to church-sponsored immigration from within the Lutheran church and the shift in focus from resettling to integrating immigrants also placed a damper on the CLWR's expanded resettlement program. Accordingly, its immigration targets for 1955 were scaled back. Starting in this year, the CLWR reverted to its old program of focusing more on the reunion of families and relatives than on supplying immigrant workers. This transition was complete by 1957 when virtually all cases assisted by the CLWR involved family members or relatives of Canadian residents. With this change in focus, the total number of immigrants resettled by the CLWR-LWF plummeted. By the early-1960s, the resettlement program, deprived of its labour component, withered to a point where the CLWR had fully rejoined its program of providing material relief to needy countries.

German-Lutheran immigration not only played a prominent part in Canadian postwar immigration, but also left its mark on Canadian Lutheranism. It added substantially to the small war-time membership of the Lutheran Church (about 100,000) and contributed to church renewal.

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14 All of these issues received much attention in December 1954 at the ninth annual meeting of the CLWR, where the whole purpose of CLWR's resettlement work was critically re-evaluated. CLWR, Reel H-1390, File CLWR Annual Meetings/Minutes 1946-55, CLWR Annual Meeting Minutes, 7.12.1954. The enthusiasm of German church organisations for emigration work was also fading. The Evangelisches Hilfswerk's advisory offices were dissuading 80% of all emigration enquirers from emigrating. Ibid. Clearly, importing co-religionists was a double-edged sword for the Lutheran community in Canada. It often did not bring the desired results as assisted newcomers either did not show up or fit into the established churches. For an overview of these problems see A. Sauer "Christian Charity, Government Policy and German Immigration to Canada and Australia, 1947-1952," Canadian Issues 18 (1996), 165. The tensions caused by immigration in the Canadian Lutheran Church in the 1950s are reflected in Barta, "Resettlement or Assimilation?" The Canada Committee Quarterly 2, 1 (March 1951), 4.

15 Of all denominations in Canada, the Lutheran Church may have benefited the most from postwar immigration, in terms of proportional increase of membership. It also enabled the Canadian Lutheran Church to achieve greater financial and operational independence from its American counterparts. Norman Threinen notes the impact of the postwar German Lutheran on the Missouri Synod regional districts in Canada in his books: A Sower Went Out: A History of the Manitoba and Saskatchewan District of Lutheran Church-Canada (Regina, 1982), 103 ff; Like a Mustard Seed: A Centennial History of the Ontario District of the Lutheran Church-Canada (Kitchener, 1989), 115-116; Like a leaven: A History of the Alberta-British Columbia District of Lutheran Church-Canada (Edmonton, 1994), 112-116.
The Baptist World Alliance Immigration/North American Baptist Immigration and Colonisation Society (BWAI/NABICS)

By 1950, German Baptists in Canada also had launched an active resettlement ministry under the agency of the Baptist World Alliance Immigration (BWAI) which was based in Winnipeg. It intended to assist their Volksdeutsche, East German refugee and native West-German brethren, in migrating to Canada. The BWAI effectively superseded the German Baptist Immigration and Colonisation Society which hitherto had assisted in moving Baptist close-relatives on a case-by-case basis. Although the Society had already received authority from Ottawa to operate its own immigrant labour scheme, little use of this privilege was made until formal sponsorship from the American-based Relief Committee of the Baptist World Alliance (BWA) for this program was secured. The American parent organisation provided the financial and administrative support to set up BWAI offices in Winnipeg and in Stuttgart, Germany, and established a small revolving fund with which to cover the transportation costs of needy Baptist migrants coming forward under the BWAI's labour program.

Reverend William Sturhahn was appointed Secretary of the BWAI in Winnipeg. This energetic and determined man of God assumed responsibility for managing every aspect of the program in Canada, including placement, reception, loan collection and follow-up work. The BWAI's chairman, Herman Streuber, was dispatched to Stuttgart to assist in establishing an office there. For a short time there he coordinated the selection and processing of migrants to Canada. The BWAI's budget and staffing paled in comparison to the resources at the disposal of the CLWR which accounts in large part for the lower number of immigrants they brought forward. The BWAI had three full-time members in comparison to the CLWR's twelve. However, what the organisation lacked in dollars and manpower, it made up in initiative. It assisted in the resettlement of 5,660

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16 The roots of the Baptist World Alliance Immigration (BWAI) and its leadership date back to 1925-30, when the German Baptist Immigration and Colonization Society (GBICS), in association with the Canadian National Railways (CNR) and Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR), assisted German Baptists in immigrating to Canada. Herman Streuber had a long history of working in the pre-war resettlement field and was secretary of GBICS at the time of the creation of the Canadian Christian Council for the Resettlement of Refugees (CCRR). The BWAI's secretary, Wm. Sturhahn, also had considerable experience in the relief field, working as a relief administrator for the U.S. Military Council for Relief Agencies licensed for operation in Germany. See S.Melnyk, "A Modern
immigrants to Canada during the 1951-57 immigration boom, a remarkable achievement given its meagre means and its other financial and administrative commitments.\textsuperscript{17}

The BWAI's immigration program began in 1951. It included Baptist farm hands, domestics and lumbermen under its labour programs together with close-relatives, family members and nominated cases. Like the CLWR program, the intake of immigrants under the BWAI's program in 1951 and 1952 was held back by a small revolving-loan fund and the slow rate of loan repayments.\textsuperscript{18}

However this situation improved dramatically in late-1952 when the BWAI sealed a resettlement agreement with the World Council of Churches' (WCC) Department of Services to Refugees, an international relief agency committed to resolving the plight of various denominations of refugees. This cooperative partnership, which continued until 1973, injected an additional $3,000 per annum into BWAI coffers in 1953 and 1954, and made available until 1956 WCC transportation loans of up to $110 per immigrant. In addition, creative ways were found to raise money from other sources, including commissions from steamship and railway companies and late loan repayment charges. The additional funds had an immediate impact on the BWAI's program; the number of migrants coming forward under its auspices doubled from 1952 to 1953, followed by another good year in 1954 (see Figure No. 35). The influx in these peak years was dominated by migrants coming forward under the Baptist labour program. Indeed, so high was the intake of labourers in these years that the BWAI was often compelled to call upon the government to assist in placements. Many of the Baptist labour migrants in turn sponsored close relatives and dependants, thereby regenerating the Baptist sponsorship programs. By helping Canadian authorities fill urgent labour

\textsuperscript{17} In addition to its placement work, the BWAI had to also entirely fund its overseas selection and processing operations and assumed financial responsibility for a large colonization scheme in British Columbia. This spread thin its available resettlement dollars. By 1973, the Baptist agency had handled 2,340 accounts involving $1.5 million (1973 dollars). Sturhahn, \textit{They came}, 299.

\textsuperscript{18} In early-1952, the BWAI was in desperate need of more monies to bolster its revolving fund for the upcoming year's program. NABICS, File 1.5, BWAI Committee Minutes, 12.1.1952. The small size of its budget also limited the number of sugar beet families it could bring forward during this year. NAC, RG 27, Department of Labour (DL) records, Vol. 280, File 1-26-10-2, Pt. 2, Sturhahn to Dawson, 14.2.1952.
shortages in Canada, the BWAI secured a continuing role in Ottawa's German immigration program.19

Like the CLWR, the BWAI's success in the resettlement field hinged on its ability to make placements, especially after 1953, when its labour program was no longer so constrained by the absence of funds. The BWAI relied extensively on Baptist pastors, congregations, business contacts, and the settlement offices of both of Canada's national railways to find jobs and accommodation for its migrants. The WCC funds assisted the BWAI in placing migrants, making it less reliant on churches.20 This work became more difficult after 1951 when more skilled immigrants were coming forward. Unlike the CLWR, which maintained a relatively balanced distribution of migrants between central and western Canada, the BWAI placed the vast majority of its cases in the West.

Like the LWF, the WCC placed conditions on cooperation with its Canadian affiliate. For example, the WCC expected the BWAI to maintain a high rate of resettlement activity and to accept members of other confessions who could not obtain the assistance of existing church immigration agencies. This not only included other evangelical groups such as Methodists, Congregationalists and Pentecosts, which the BWAI was already accepting, but also various branches of the eastern Orthodox Church and other faiths. Sturhahn accepted these terms, albeit grudgingly. The result was an increase in the BWAI's intake of non-Baptists from 8.5% to 14% after 1952.21 Whatever tension may have existed between the BWAI and the WCC, the organisations needed one other.

The BWAI required funds to undertake its resettlement ministry, while the WCC sought results in order to fulfil its humanitarian mission and to receive financial credit and recognition from the ICEM. In any event, the BWAI had better relations with the WCC than with its parent organisation in the United States. Owing to competing Canadian and American resettlement efforts and

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19 The BWAI, like the CLWR, was valued for the sugar-beet, general farm workers and domestics it produced for the government labour programs. Labour officials called upon the BWAI to assist in filling these categories in 1951 and 1952. Sturhahn, They came, 167.


personality conflicts, BWAI-BWA relations were strained. In November 1953, the BWA American headquarters transferred responsibility for the BWAI in Winnipeg to the Fellowship Fund Committee of the North American Baptist General Conference. The Conference's support enabled the BWAI to continue its immigration ministry and in January 1954 the BWAI shed its old name in favour of the North American Baptist Immigration and Colonisation Society (NABICS).

After 1954, the NABICS' immigration program tapered off, undoubtedly influenced by the same factors which brought about the decline in the CLWR's initiative. The labour aspect of the movement deteriorated rapidly, and while the flow of sponsored dependants, close relatives and nominated cases continued, it did so at a diminishing rate. Although the Fellowship Fund Committee decided in late-1956 to continue NABICS' immigration program because of the ongoing East German refugee problem, the stringent Canadian immigration security screening restrictions and the rapid absorption of these refugees into German society effectively defeated this initiative.22 To cut costs, NABICS and Lutheran organisations merged their overseas operations in 1957. As church-sponsored mass migration was beginning to wind down by 1955, so too did the large-scale funding.

The Canadian Mennonite Board of Colonisation (CMBC)

In the postwar period, Mennonite relief agencies were among the first church groups active in Europe in resettling their co-religionists. The CMBC, under the leadership of its perennial chairman, J.J. Thiessen, assumed responsibility for this work in Canada at the very outset. It could draw on experience in this field dating back to 1922 when it organised the movement of some 20,000 Mennonites from the Soviet Union (popularly known as Rußländer [Russian Mennonites]) to Canada. In its immigration initiative the CMBC worked in tandem with the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC), the chief international relief agency of the Mennonites. The MCC carried out

22 As noted earlier, many East German refugees were required to reside in Germany for a period of two years before they could be subject to security screening for immigration. By this time, many were absorbed into the West German economy. CLWR, Reel H-1393, File Negotiations Overseas and Ottawa Corr. 1953-56, Baetz to Monk 20.11.1955.
most of the overseas work with the refugees on behalf of the CMBC and represented Mennonite interests and issues internationally. Specifically, it was responsible for the assembly, processing and material support of refugees in Europe. For its part, the CMBC negotiated with Ottawa on Mennonite immigration matters and supervised the reception, placement and follow-up of Mennonite newcomers in Canada. In the latter regard, it possessed one of the best reception and welfare networks of any group, private or governmental, in Canada.

In contrast to the Baptist and Lutheran programs, the CMBC's resettlement initiative was in decline after 1952 (see Figure No. 35). This was because the bulk of postwar European Mennonite refugees had already been moved to overseas destinations by 1951. From 1952 to 1957, only 1,000 European Mennonites migrated to Canada, a far cry from the 7,700 resettled between 1947 and 1951. Shortly after the war, Mennonite relief agencies gave priority to the movement of some 10,000 Rußländer in Europe who were threatened with forced repatriation to the Soviet Union as a result of the Yalta agreement and who were in dire need of material assistance. Mennonite agencies also sought to take maximum advantage of the free services, including overseas shipping, offered to eligible Rußländer refugees by the International Refugee Organisation (IRO) from 1947 to 1951. With most of the Rußländer resettled by 1950, the CMBC and MCC in April 1950 set their sights on moving the remaining 5,000 Mennonite refugees from Danzig (so-called "Danzigers"), former West Prussia and northern Poland as well as individual Mennonites who were previously rejected on medical or security grounds (known as "hard-core" cases).

Critical to the success of this effort was the CMBC's association with the CCCRR. Originally, the CMBC had no need for the CCCRR because it received the IRO's full assistance at no charge. Thus, in 1947, CMBC's membership in the CCCRR was conceived as a contingency plan in the

23 The Rußländer were descendants of early Mennonite colonists to Tsarist Russia who had remained in the USSR during the interwar period and who, with the outbreak of war in 1941, were overrun by German forces in the same year. In the closing years of the war, many were evacuated to the Reich by German authorities, where a good number subsequently managed to flee to areas liberated or occupied by the western Allies.

24 According to a senior MCC official, IRO services had saved Mennonite agencies about $1 million in resettlement costs of their co-religionists. Mennonite Heritage Centre (MHC), Canadian Mennonite Board of Colonization (CMBC) records, Vol. 1389, File 1535, CMBC General Meeting Minutes, 28.1.1949.
event that IRO support was withdrawn, an event which almost transpired on two occasions.\textsuperscript{25} However, by mid-1950, the CCCRR could be put to practical use in moving Danzigers and Polish Mennonites who, considered too German, fell outside the IRO's mandate. Furthermore, when the Mennonite refugee camp in Gronau, Germany, closed in December 1952, the assembly, pre-processing and staging of Mennonite migrants could be resumed at the CCCRR's facility in Bremen. Finally the CCCRR gave the CMBC access to the "church-lobby" with which it could press Ottawa to revive immigration policy to suit its own interests. For example, the CMBC allied itself closely with the CCCRR's campaign to remove the ban on the admission of former Nazi-party and \textit{Waffen-SS} members to Canada, restrictions which threatened to hold up the immigration of the Danzigers.\textsuperscript{26}

Because most of the remaining Mennonites in Europe after 1950 did not have relatives in Canada as sponsors, plans were made to bring 2,000 of them to Canada via the Mennonite farm labour program which had been in operation since 1949. Labour programs of this magnitude required a large pool of money to cover migrants' transportation expenses. The CMBC, in addition to its own savings, succeeded in negotiating a line of credit of $180,000 from the CPR in April 1951.\textsuperscript{27} This credit enabled the CMBC to operate independently, unlike other church agencies who were bound by agreements with their international counterparts. The only condition was CPR's insistence that

\textsuperscript{25} In April 1948, claims about the \textit{Russlander}'s "Dutch origin" were challenged by experts and the IRO. In the summer of 1949, IRO officials had unearthed evidence to show that many Mennonites had misrepresented their citizenship status and others were found to have served in "reprehensible" units such as the \textit{Waffen SS} and \textit{Sicherheitsdienst} (Security Service). DCI, Vol.122, File 3-32-4, Pt. 1. Cohen to Chief Eligibility Officer, 23.7.1949. See also T.D. Regehr, "Of Dutch or German Ancestry? Mennonite Refugees, MCC, and the International Refugee Organization," \textit{Journal of Mennonite Studies}, 1995, 13, 7-25. Herzer aptly referred to the Mennonite strategy of dual IRO-CCCRR membership as "working both sides of the street." CMBC, Vol. 1325, File 958, Snyder to Klassen, 26.6.1947; Vol. 1330, File 988, Cable from Snyder, \textit{et al.} to Klassen, 23.7.1947.

\textsuperscript{26} Mennonite officials feared that many Danzigers would be barred from entering Canada on account of their membership in the Nazi party and \textit{Waffen-SS}. A MCC relief official, disappointed with the security rejections of many Danzigers, saw how the CCCRR could be used to pursue Mennonite interests: "\textit{Dr. Herzer hat solch gut Verbindungen in politischen Kreisen und könnte sicher den Boden sondieren und vorbereiten für eine baldige Aktion.} \textit{[Dr. Herzer has such good connections in political circles and could surely make tentative enquiries and prepare the ground for an early action].}" CLWR, Reel H-1398, File CCCRR Corr., Snyder to Thiessen, 15.5.1950. Yet all evidence suggests that Ottawa bided its time and decided on its own terms which categories of former Nazis it was prepared to admit into Canada.

\textsuperscript{27} The $180,000 was in fact the accumulated interest paid by the CMBC to the CPR on the principal credit of $1.77 million which the CPR had advanced to move Mennonites from 1923 to 1930. CMBC, Vol. 1328, File 975, Thiessen to CMBC members, 5.5.1950. The CPR sought Ottawa's approval to use this credit to move the Danzigers which was initially refused. In time honoured tradition, the CMBC went over the head of senior bureaucrats, appealing directly to the Minister of the DCI, who authorised the loan. The timing of CMBC's appeal was timely as Ottawa was scrambling for workers at this time to make up the DP shortfall. IB, Vol. 855, File 554-22, Pt. 1, Fortier to Cresswell, 3.6.1950 and Fortier to Thiessen, 28.4.1951.
its shipping and rail facilities be used for this movement. Most of the placement work was undertaken by the CMBC's provincial *Hilfskomitees* (welfare committees). Generally few difficulties were encountered in placing these migrants. In fact, so desperate was the Department of Labour (DL) to secure sugar-beet workers that in May 1951 it commandeered a movement of Danzigers destined for Mennonite farms across Canada and redirected them to beet work in Lethbridge. By 1953, fewer Mennonite farm labourers were coming to Canada and many Mennonites now chose to come via the regular immigration program as non-agricultural workers. Even though Germans could qualify for admission under a broader range of occupations after 1952, fewer Mennonites could be coaxed to Canada. Most of those who did come after 1950 settled in the west, primarily in Manitoba and British Columbia, followed by Ontario.

In the end, the "Danzig" and "Prussian" Mennonite immigration to Canada fell short of the CMBC's expectations. Although the program got off to a promising start in 1951, when about 1,000 entered Canada, numbers soon dwindled. Holding a deep affinity for German culture and heritage, Danzigers were more reluctant than their Russian brethren to leave Germany, where many had established roots by the mid-1950s and where their economic circumstances were improving. Nor was immigration seen as an attractive option given the high cost of travel and the prospect of being separated from their family. The MCC itself saw the writing on the wall and by the mid-1950s shifted its emphasis more on accommodating Mennonites who chose or were forced to stay in Germany. The CMBC also changed its global focus at this time, as it coped with the heavy flow of Mennonites desiring to leave Latin America for Canada. What seriously restricted the Mennonite program, in comparison with the Lutheran and Baptist initiatives, was its exclusiveness; normally the CMBC assisted only Mennonites.

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28 Thiessen's prior consent had been received for this action. DL, Vol. 282, File 1-26-25, Pt. 1, Thiessen to Dawson, 9.5.1951.

29 By 1954, Mennonite immigration to Canada from Paraguay had eclipsed that from Europe. CMBC, Vol. 1394, File 1556, "Bericht der [CMBC]." (July 1954). Virtually all of the South American Mennonites were postwar migrants from Europe who decided to re-migrate to Canada.
Catholic Immigrant Aid Society - Rural Settlement Society of Canada (CIAS/RSSC)

Like the Lutheran, Mennonite and Baptist Churches, the Roman Catholic Church in Canada also had an established tradition of assisting German co-religionists in migrating to Canada. The CIAS was particularly active in bringing over Catholics, mostly Volksdeutsche, for settlement to the western provinces in the 1920s. Reorganised by the Catholic Church hierarchy in Western Canada, it resumed this work amongst Catholic Volksdeutsche refugees soon after the war as a member of the CCCRR from July 1947 to December 1951. Its president at this time, Carl Franke, was assisted by the CIAS Secretary, Father A.J. Schimnowski, and by the brothers Noah and Joseph Warnke who served as CIAS western manager and a CCCRR overseas representative, respectively. During its years with the CCCRR, the CIAS was preoccupied chiefly with the immigration of Volksdeutsche close relatives, nominated cases and some domestics. Although it had secured authority from Ottawa in 1949 to move Volksdeutsche farm hands to Canada, initially very little use was made of this provision.

On December 1, 1951, the CIAS withdrew from the CCCRR, ostensibly on grounds that there was no need to continue this resettlement work as a result of the introduction of the Assisted Passage Scheme (APS). Catholic resettlement work amongst Germans was stagnant in 1952. During this year the CIAS and its operations were subsumed under the Rural Settlement Society of Canada (RSSC or Société Canadienne d'Establissement Rural), now recognised by Ottawa as the central coordinating and liaison body for all charitable Catholic immigration work in Canada. The incorporation of the CIAS into the RSSC resulted from the desire to provide a broader base to Catholic migration work in Canada than had been available from smaller Catholic entities such as

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20 CLWR, Reel H-1390, CLWR File Annual Meetings 1946-55, CLWR Annual Meeting Minutes, 5.12.1951. The strained relations between the Catholic Immigrant Aid Society (CIAS) and Lutheran joint directorships of the CCCRR overseas operations undoubtedly contributed to this decision. The Catholic leadership had an even more pointed explanation for their exit, informing the Minister of Immigration that the CCCRR had outlived its purpose. CLWR, Reel H-1400, CCCRR Immigrant Processing 1948-52, J.A. Carley to Harris, 1.12.1951.

31 The Rural Settlement Society of Canada (RSSC) was founded in 1946 by the CNR superintendent, C.E. Couture, and by the 1950s it came under the patronage and direction of Cardinal Jules Leger. Its authority for resettlement in Canada embraced all Catholic countries of Europe and all activity in Canada. The CNR saw this as a great coup because the RSSC under the presidency of Couture, a CNR official, would assure the CNR of revenues from all RSSC immigration traffic and settlement along CNR lines. The CNR's affiliation with RSSC netted it $96,000 in 1954 and $45,000 in 1953 in rail revenues. Also, CNR officials saw the RSSC as a counterpoise to the CPR's monopoly, the CCCRR. CNR, Vol. 8367, File 3300-C-38, Pt. 1, Director to Milne, 14.1.1953.
the CIAS which often had confined their work to specific regions in Canada or to certain ethnic groups. Also, the large-scale resettlement plans and accompanying funding of the international Catholic voluntary organisations, such as the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) and the National Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC), could be better administered and organised by an agency such as the RSSC which was national in scope and possessed a network of Catholic agencies in the field. Thus, an agreement was reached between the RSSC and ICMC-NCWC to assist in the resettlement of Catholic Europeans to Canada. An important element of this agreement was the grant of transportation loans to migrants which removed the funding obstacle holding back Catholic migration after the war.

The RSSC and its new source of funding ushered in a new age of Catholic-sponsored migration to Canada. Priority was given to the movement of dependant women and children to join family heads in Canada. The CIAS continued its work with German migrants in 1953, relying on the St. Raphaels Verein (a charitable organisation of the German Catholic Church) and the NCWC for most of its recruiting. The CIAS's Catholic farm labour program, which had temporarily lapsed, was renewed. The CIAS also successfully petitioned Ottawa for a part in the sugar-beet program which previously had been allotted to the CCCRR. Prospective Catholic migrants recruited in Germany who could not proceed under the CIAS-RSSC program were referred to Karlsruhe for movement under general immigration programs, a practise also followed by Baptist and Lutheran organisations. The high point of the Catholic-sponsored movement from Germany was reached in 1953 when 2,155 German Catholics came to Canada. A large part of this movement was made up of sugar beet workers, totalling 107 families, and farm labourers. Among the RSSC migrants coming to Canada from Europe, Germans dominated in 1953-54, followed by Italians. In 1954-55 the RSSC's German movement fell off slightly and then crashed by 1956-57 (see Figure No. 35).

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32 The ICEM's agreement with the International Catholic Migration Commission's (ICMC) closely resembled the arrangements reached with the LWF and World Council of Churches (WCC). It awarded the ICMC a grant of $100 for each person resettled and an outright payment of $20,000 for administration costs. IB, Vol. 892, File 567-41, Pt. 1, Jacobsen to Norris, 4.7.1952. The agreement was renewed in subsequent years.

This was due largely to waning interest in emigration in Germany, especially among farm workers, and because there was no longer a need for church financing. The enhanced APS strongly cut into the RSSC's and other church groups' transportation loan business.35

The principal duties of the RSSC in Canada were reception, placement, follow-up work and loan collection. Here it could turn to the existing network of charitable Catholic organisations, individual parishes, government authorities, employers and business contacts such as the Canadian National Railways (CNR). Most German Catholics assisted by the RSSC were destined for Ontario, followed by western Canada and Quebec.36 The smaller movement to the Catholic province of Quebec is somewhat surprising. It may be explained, however, by the better employment prospects in Ontario and the prairie provinces in the 1950s. Also immigrants coming under CIAS auspices were usually directed westward.

Other Voluntary and Church Agencies

Other church and ethnic organisations played a role in the German immigration boom in the 1950s. However, lacking recognition in Ottawa, a national infrastructure, financial resources, international affiliates or access to funding, their contribution was less significant than the groups represented by the CCCRR and RSSC.

A number of groups, such as the Canadian Farm and Settlement Association, League of Canadian Germans and International Rescue Committee sought, albeit unsuccessfully, membership in the CCCRR. Others, such as the Canadian Baltic Immigrant Aid Society (CBIAS), made abortive attempts to launch their own resettlement programs but then turned to the established church groups for assistance. Among the more successful groups were those that aligned themselves with the

34 CNR, Vol. 8367, File 3300-C-38, Pt. 1, "Rapport Statistique...au 30 juin 1957."
35 In fact, this lost business was resented by one of RSSC's affiliates, the St. Raphael's Verein, which threatened to bring to Bonn's attention the fact that the Canadian Assisted Passage Scheme (APS) infringed on the German Emigration Law of 1897. IB, Vol. 892, File 567-41, Pt. 2, Director to Deputy Minister, 27.3.1957.
36 Ibid.
railways, especially the CNR, which actively recruited voluntary agencies as satellites through which it could monopolise immigrant rail traffic and settlement.

One such satellite was the Canadian Lutheran Immigration Aid Society (CLIAS) which had collaborated closely with the CNR in German immigration since 1947. Its manager, Reverend G.A. Heimann, a representative of the Western Canada Synod for immigration and settlement, used his contacts in the Lutheran community to generate immigration applications for nominated, close relatives and family cases. Although these cases were the small-end of the immigration business, nevertheless they brought in some revenues for the CNR, such as a total of $5,172 in prepaid transportation in 1954. The CLIAS brought forward an average of about 60 migrants per year between 1951 and 1957, virtually all of whom were placed in western Canada with the assistance of the CNR.  

Another government-recognised voluntary agency which had a small role in German immigration to Canada was the Canadian Council of Churches (CCC). Most of its migration work in the 1950s concerned bona-fide refugees from Mediterranean and Eastern Europe as well as extraordinary cases such as intellectuals, white collar workers, disabled persons and the elderly as well as cases sponsored by individual churches and certain ethnic groups. Not many German migrants figured in this part of its work. However, in March 1953, the CCC accepted the DCI's invitation to participate in the early reunion of wives and children left behind in Germany and Austria by family heads who had preceded them to Canada. Figures on the number of such cases moved by the CCC are not available, but it is safe to assume that they are lower than the numbers brought forward by the Baptist, Lutheran and Catholic agencies.  

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37 The CNR also valued Heimann's services as a contact and source of information about the competition, the CCCRR, which was a CPR confederate. CNR, Vol. 5594, Western Regional Dept. of Colonization and Agriculture Annual Report, 23.1.1953. The Canadian Lutheran Immigration Aid Society (CLIAS) was even provided office space in the CNR buildings in Winnipeg and Edmonton. All CLIAS arrival statistics and CNR income statistics are from CNR Western Regional Colonization and Agriculture Annual Reports found in CNR, Vols. 5589 to 5600.
38 A myriad of church, ethnic, cultural, social, professional, sport and other organisations also devoted themselves to the accommodation or integration of German newcomers in Canada. Their work no doubt provided good publicity for Canada's program in Germany, as interest in emigrating to Canada was strongly influenced by positive word-of-mouth reports from Canada.
CANADIAN CHRISTIAN COUNCIL FOR THE RESSETLEMENT OF REFUGEES (CCCRR)

Church groups represented by the CCCRR were clearly the leaders in the field of agency-sponsored German immigration, assisting over 32,000 Germans from 1951 to 1957. The CCCRR's overseas facilities were indispensable to church groups' resettlement programs, offering pre-processing, examination, and staging facilities together with convenient technical services such as billing, booking and arrival information. The interdependence of the voluntary agencies and the CCCRR was further reinforced in 1953 when Ottawa designated the CCCRR as the coordinating agency for its Baptist, Lutheran and Mennonite member groups, with Herzer assuming the role of official liaison. Thus government officials increasingly treated the CCCRR and its constituent members as one agency. As such, government relations with the CCCRR, as opposed to the individual members, took on much more significance in the 1950s.

The Transition Years, 1950-1951

These were critical years for the future of the CCCRR. In this period, the Council attempted to make the transition from what was essentially a refugee relief operation to a complementary partnership in the government's regular immigration program. In the process it had to overcome government opposition and financial difficulties which threatened its existence.

With German immigration freed of all restrictions in September 1950, the DCI now decided to embark on its own German program. The CCCRR was to have no role in this new program and, in fact, was expected to cease its operations with the closure of the IRO. The department may have had several reasons to seek such action. By bringing the movement of all Germans, Volksdeutsche and Reichsdeutsche (native Germans) alike, into its regular programming, the DCI was reasserting its jurisdiction in immigration matters which had been steadily eroded in the late-1940s. Also, the

39 CCCRR operations were restricted to pre-processing and booking services overseas. The member agencies undertook the actual resettlement and placement work in the field and were driven by their own mandates, policies and objectives and resources.
new department was very clear about its top priority, which was to find immigrants who would benefit Canada, not to solve refugee problems. In government circles, the CCCRR was too closely identified with the latter mission, a label it would wear throughout the 1950s. Furthermore, a number of sore points had arisen concerning the CCCRR's handling of Volksdeutsche immigration up to 1950 which may have caused officials to think twice about its continuing role in this field. Moreover, the CCCRR's enemies in Canada, including the CNR and Regina CCF MP John A. Probe, openly questioned the government about the CCCRR's relationship with the CPR, seeking to have the CCCRR removed from the immigration field. Finally, the DCI no longer saw any point in financing the CCCRR's overseas activities which could readily be undertaken from its new office to be opened in Hannover, not far from the CCCRR camp in Bremen.

The DCI's aim to ensure complete control over the nascent German immigration was already evident in October 1949 when the chief of the Canadian mission in Karlsruhe decided to have the processing of all admissible German nationals delegated to his mission, "as it would not be good policy ... to ask either the IRO or CCCRR to help us in this regard." In September 1950, the Deputy Minister of Immigration, Laval Fortier, broke the news to the CCCRR's chairman, T.O.F. Herzer, that the CCCRR would be expected to cease operations at about the same time that the IRO left the field and that the processing of German nationals in northern Germany would be resumed by a new Canadian mission established in Hannover. In fact, the Director of Immigration was

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40 In this section, the CCCRR will refer to the collective entity of the three constituent members - the CLWR, BWAI/NABICS and CI/ABC - and the CCCRR's administration in Canada and in Germany.

41 In its zeal to have restrictions lifted on Waffen-SS and Nazi party cases, the CCCRR in a petition to the Minister of the DCI appears to have misquoted overseas officials and misrepresented certain points. The report from the overseas mission which brought these points to light, also cast doubt on the reliability of CCCRR's overseas work, especially its pre-screening of migrants. IB, Vol. 31, File 682, Pt. 6, Bird to Stirling, 27.9.1950. Ottawa also saw the CCCRR as complicit in furthering the entry of those Volksdeutsche to Canada in 1947-48 who on account of their German citizenship were clearly not admissible. CLWR, Reel H-1399, File CCCRR Ottawa Meeting-Corr. 1947 and 1950, Minister DCI to Tucker, 15.2.1950. Ottawa also took issue with a Mennonite relief officer's criticisms about the work of Canadian immigration officials which were published in the ethnic press. CMBC, Vol. 1325, File 958, Jolliffe to Thiessen, 17.3.1948.

42 IB, Vol. 655, File B41075, "Information Sheet" and Cresswell to Jolliffe, 9.5.1949. Refused membership in the CCCRR, the League of German Canadians sought the removal of such private agencies from the immigration field. Ibid. Pt. 2 Kaufmann to McKinnon, 14.12.1948. The CNR complained bitterly to Ottawa that the CPR monopolised all transportation business flowing from the CCCRR. Accordingly, the CNR sought the CCCRR's elimination. CNR, Vol. 8367, File 3300-C-31A, McGowan to Devlin, 3.4.1951. Herzer assessed Probe's motives for attacking the CCCRR as "putting himself forward as the champion of immigration of German-Nationals." NAC, MG 26 L, Louis St. Laurent Papers, File I-20-3, Cable Herzer to St. Laurent, 20.6.1949.

43 IB, Vol. 31, File 682, Pt. 5, Bird to McFarlane 14.10.1949. In spite of this decision, the processing of German nationals continued at CCCRR's Bremen camp until a Canadian mission was established at Hannover in 1951.
confident that the new mission would be able to process all Germans, including *Volksdeutsche*. The CCCRR was hit by a second blow in December 1950 when the DCI decided to discontinue funding the CCCRR's overseas operations after March 30, 1951. It was felt that the CCCRR's $35 Canadian sponsor's fee and the generous subsidies provided by local German authorities were sufficient to cover the costs of the Council's overseas operations. The department banked on the fact that without its financial support the CCCRR would eventually cease or at least severely limit its operations.\(^{44}\)

News of the impending shutdown of the CCCRR spread quickly and rallied members to its defence, prompting one senior relief worker to comment: "We have sharpened our swords and are ready to go all the way in the interest of our camp."\(^{45}\) To assure itself a place in future German immigration, the CCCRR had offered to process German nationals and to put its overseas facilities at the disposal of Canadian missions as early as September 1950. These offers were declined as the CCCRR was permitted no foothold in this new growth field.\(^{46}\) In November 1950, Herzer was able to wring an important concession from Fortier who, against the advice of the Director of Immigration, agreed to the continuation of the Council's operations beyond 1951, provided they were self-supporting. At a subsequent CCCRR meeting, members unanimously decided that the Council's operations and programs would continue without government assistance so long as there were sufficient refugees and expellees in Germany. This decision was cabled to Fortier the following day. This show of solidarity was a brilliant tactical move as it now limited the government's options of dispensing with the CCCRR's services unilaterally.

Nonetheless, the serious problem of funding remained. Attempts to counteract this looming crisis by increasing processing charges were failing by April 1951. In a cleverly crafted petition to the Minister of Immigration, Herzer appealed for government money to cover its annual deficit of

\(^{44}\) The DCI fully expected the CCCRR's activities to diminish and for this reason saw no need for government assistance. DCI, Vol.104, File 3-24-1, Pt. 1, Reid to Bethune, 3.4.1951.

\(^{45}\) NABICS, File 1.19, Sturhahn to Streuber, 18.6.1951.
$24,000, warning that the CCCRR's withdrawal would only benefit U.S. immigration as all international agencies would transfer their work from the Canadian to the American program.\textsuperscript{47} Although his request for funds was refused, a key concession was made; the department would grant APS loans to certain categories of CCCRR workers. By this time, events were beginning to unfold in a way which favoured the continuation, if not expansion, of the CCCRR's program. As the IRO was unable to produce the displaced-person (DP) workers it had promised for arrival in the spring of 1951, immigration authorities increasingly turned to the CCCRR to make up the shortfall. Requests for other workers soon followed.\textsuperscript{48} Ottawa's APS grant was intended specifically to stimulate the movement of migrant workers sponsored by the CCCRR and urgently needed in Canada. It also provided greater solvency to the voluntary agencies whose own resources were taxed as a result of moving workers for the government. A second attempt by Herzer to obtain funding succeeded in June 1951 when the Minister of Immigration agreed to pay the outstanding expenses of the CCCRR until the end of 1951.\textsuperscript{49} These funds were sufficient to carry the CCCRR over into 1952 at which time the massive resources from the PICMME program would become available.

The CCCRR and its constituent members had learned from their experiences in 1951 that their existence depended very much on their usefulness to the government's immigration program and their ability to fund their own operations. In subsequent years the CCCRR took great pains to ensure that it was covered on both these fronts. In this regard, 1952 offered unique opportunities. With DP labour no longer available and with Ottawa's own labour schemes effectively grounded owing to the late start of the APS program and the lack of cooperation from German authorities, the

\textsuperscript{47} For example, a request by the CLWR to process German and Austrian nationals married to \textit{Volksdeutsche} was cynically interpreted by one senior official as a ploy by voluntary agencies to extend their mandate to include more German nationals. IB, Vol. 893, File 567-69, Monk to Fortier, 22.1.1951 and Fortier reply, 25.1.1951; Monk to Fortier 25.1.1951 and Fortier reply, 30.1.1951.

\textsuperscript{48} NABICS, File 1.14, CCCRR to Harris, 17.4.1951.

\textsuperscript{49} Sugar-beet workers, needed by May 1951, were recruited by the voluntary agencies followed by miners, general labourers, farm families and domestics. IB, Vol. 655, File B41075, Pt. 5, Benoit to Director, 28.6.1951. The CCCRR was also valued because it could advance the original $30 down payment needed by workers to qualify for the APS. In June 1951 Labour' Deputy Minister, A. MacNamara, reported that the CCCRR's farm labour programs "have been most useful and effective. Needed workers have been obtained and practically no difficulties of any kind have arisen in connection with this plan." IB, Vol. 893, File 567-69, MacNamara to Fortier, 7.6.1951.
CCCRR was again called upon to supply workers urgently needed in Canada. One such niche it carved out for itself during 1951-55 was in supplying thousands of German workers for Canada's sugar-beet growers.

The Voluntary Agencies' Sugar-Beet Labour Scheme

The sugar-beet industry, like the farm labour sector in general, faced chronic labour shortages during and after the war. Sugar-beet production was on the rise, especially in western Canada, where farming was becoming more diversified and where large-scale irrigation projects in the Lethbridge area opened up thousands of additional beet acres. More workers were needed not only for the increased acreage but also to replace the growing number of Canadians and immigrants who were leaving this line of work. After all, sugar-beet cultivation only offered seasonal short-term employment and involved back-breaking labour at low pay. Still, the industry's effectiveness as a lobby group with powerful political backers in Ottawa assured it of a steady supply of immigrant labour in the decade after the war.

By helping the government overcome the shortfall of DP beet workers in 1951, the CCCRR assured itself of a prominent place in Ottawa's sugar-beet labour program, supplying the majority of working families, consisting of about 4000-5000 persons (900 families) in the years 1952-56. The Council's involvement in this program also offered Ottawa special advantages, such as transportation advances to non-working family members, expenses not covered by the government until 1956. Without these loans, very few families would have been able or willing to come forward. Furthermore, the CCCRR's broad recruiting network in Germany and its experience in selection provided the government with a steady and abundant stream of reliable labour which was

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49 CLWR, Reel H-1400, File CCCRR Immigrant Processing 1948-52, Harris to Herzer, 29.6.1951. The Minister's decision was timely as the CCCRR's treasury was almost exhausted at this time. NABICS, File 1.19, Sturhahn to Streuber, 3.8.1951.
50 Indeed, Lethbridge became a principal settlement and mission area for the Lutheran and German Baptist churches. See Threinen, Like a Leaven, 112 and Sturhahn, They came from, 138-142.
51 This was a very vociferous lobby which used provincial governments, its contacts in the Federal-Provincial Farm Labour Committee and direct appeals to Ottawa to get its way. Its most outspoken supporter in Ottawa was Senator W.A. Buchanan who represented the regional interests of the sugar-beet industry in Lethbridge.
no longer available from the IRO.\textsuperscript{53} The Council's overseas camp was especially well-suited to accommodate and process large families for the sugar-beet scheme.

The CCCRR's members were also very much attracted to this program, seeking Ottawa's permission to participate in this scheme on an annual basis. The program offered them an excellent opportunity to fulfil their "relief" ministry. Numerous large and needy German refugee families could be funnelled to Canada via this route. Very few skills and even less capital (only a strong back) were required to qualify for this scheme. What also made this scheme attractive to Canadian church agencies was the minimal investment of church funds. Most of the transportation costs of these families were covered by the APS and the DL's inland grants; only the overseas passage of the non-workers were advanced by the churches. Under this program families could be moved as whole units, rather than being split up as was often the case under other labour schemes. Nor were churches on the hook for placing these labourers, a responsibility which fell entirely to the DL. The majority of the CCCRR's sugar-beet families, between 75-95\% in a given year, were directed to the Lethbridge area. Here a family of four working members, including youths over the age of sixteen, constituted a viable labour unit to work the 40-50 acre plots and could earn a decent living. Unlike other parts of Canada, this area offered abundant, albeit sometimes substandard, housing for whole families. The two-year contracts also assured families of steady employment during their first years in Canada, with the opportunity of becoming established on their own farms.

The CCCRR's production of German sugar-beet families fluctuated according to the quotas and selection criteria set by Ottawa and the available supply in Germany. In 1951, the CCCRR mustered about 100 families for this movement while DP, Italian and Dutch workers made up the balance. In 1952, the CCCRR was allotted the whole sugar-beet quota of 250 families which, despite a late start to recruiting, it was able to fill. In 1953, the CIAS was assigned a portion of the

\textsuperscript{52} 1952-55 figures are from the operational files of the DCI and the DL. Dutch workers were also entering this field in the postwar decade, albeit in diminishing numbers after 1952.

\textsuperscript{53} The CCCRR was aware of the requirements for this program and adjusted its recruitment accordingly, also impressing upon the workers the need to honour their contracts. NABICS, File 3.19, Monk to Berkefeld, 17.3.1952. This conscientious work was
sugar beet quota and, in combination with the CCCRR, a record 317 families were brought to Canada, exceeding the requested figure of 270. This success was due in large part to the early start to recruitment and because the scheme was popular among refugee families who could travel as a unit to Canada. The number of workers mustered by the voluntary agencies decreased thereafter, declining to 130 families in 1954, 56 in 1955 and a couple of dozen in 1956. The most important cause for the decline was the lack of interest in this scheme in Germany after 1954 when many families were becoming integrated into the thriving German economy. Immigration authorities shared some responsibility for the drop in numbers, as they tightened occupational selection criteria, imposed tougher fitness standards and reduced travel grants in connection with this scheme. In 1954, the assistance of the CCCRR and CIAS was no longer sought and in 1956 the scheme was incorporated into the general farm labour immigration. Although excluded from the scheme after 1954, the CCCRR still referred many prospective sugar-beet families to Karlsruhe and provided travel loans to families requiring assistance. For all intents and purposes, Ottawa's interest in this movement had come to an end by 1957 and with it CCCRR's involvement.

**ICEM Money and the Renaissance of the CCCRR**

During the course of 1951, the CCCRR's heavy commitment to migrant labour programs, such as the sugar-beet and farm labour schemes, placed enormous strains on its resources as the majority of these cases required some form of financial assistance to cover transportation and sustenance costs. The overseas camp's operating expenses also were mounting despite subsidies received from German authorities. By the close of 1951, with government support nearing an end, the situation appreciated by officials and employers who renewed orders in subsequent years. CLWR, Reel H-1390, File CLWR Annual Meetings 1964-55, CLWR Annual Meeting Report 2.12.1952, Exhibit G.

54 Ibid., "Church Sponsored Immigration," 7.12.1954. Even the CCCRR lost interest in pursuing the scheme, given the high rate of rejections engendered by the new criteria. Only one out of every four applications were accepted. IB, Vol. 650, File B27208, Pt. 2, cable Karlsruhe to HQ, 23.3.1954. The cancellation of the DL's inland rail grant for dependants accompanying family workers in 1955 was also a serious blow to this program. DL, Vol. 280, File 1-26-10-2, Pt. 3, Smith to Dawson 15.1.1955 and reply, 26.1.1955. By this time churches also were experiencing problems finding the right type of families.

55 Immigrants were only directed to sugar-beet jobs when they requested this work. Ottawa was no longer willing to provide labour to an industry which could not guarantee year-round employment. Furthermore beet cultivation had become more mechanised, albeit unevenly, rendering this employment even more seasonal and less viable as an immigrant labour program. In Manitoba in 1957, 85% of the harvesting was done by machine, whereas seven years earlier most of it still consisted of hand labour. DL, Vol. 781, File 538-31, Pt. 2, Fed.-Provincial Farm Lab. Conference 5-6.12.1957.
was becoming critical. The big break for Canadian voluntary agencies came in January 1952 with the creation of the PICMME and its massive injection of funds into resettlement work.

This new U.S.-led international agency aggressively sought to solve the European overpopulation problem by way of migration overseas.\textsuperscript{56} Although it possessed a generous "operational" budget, funded largely by the U.S., the PICMME was handicapped by the fact that it did not have its own recruiting or placement facilities to carry out extensive migration programs. For this reason it used international voluntary agencies to undertake this work. In return the agencies received a per capita grant for each migrant they moved. The bulk of the grant was allocated to the international agencies' respective revolving-loan accounts which were used to advance the overseas transportation passage of migrants on a recoverable basis.\textsuperscript{57} International agencies also were permitted to retain a small portion of the PICMME grant to cover their administrative expenses. Among the participating international agencies were the ICMC, LWF, NCWC and WCC. These international agencies organised the work of recruiting migrants and dispatching them from Germany and turned to their church affiliates in Canada to make placements and collect transportation loans.

The PICMME and international relief agencies were determined to boost migration to Canada by creating new schemes or accelerating existing ones. Canadian church agencies were the first to take advantage of PICMME funds. Almost all Canadian church sponsored cases requiring financial assistance were channelled to the international voluntary organisations who could qualify these cases for PICMME grants. This included migrants coming forward under the church's labour programs, close dependants' and close relatives' schemes. Ottawa was apparently unaware of the extent of some of these arrangements, nor were the church groups prepared to divulge this information.\textsuperscript{58} Obviously, these funds ameliorated the financial standing of the international and

\textsuperscript{56} See chapter seven for more details on the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe.
\textsuperscript{57} It was also a sound financial decision, as it would have cost the ICEM $200 to process one migrant compared to $85 by the voluntary agencies. IB, Vol. 774, File 536-31, Pt. 8, Meeting of DCI, U.S. State Department and the ICEM, 17.8.1956.
\textsuperscript{58} For example, in 1955 the CCCRR overseas director, G. Berkefeld, nervously reported that the Canadian Farm Association delegates touring Germany were asking whether the $60 paid by Bonn was recollected by the church agencies. CLWR, Reel H-
Canadian church agencies alike. Canadian church groups received subsidies with which to expand their operations in Canada. They could also draw on the revolving-loan funds of their international counterparts without risking their own capital. A portion of these funds were also used to cover the costs of the CCCRR's overseas camp which enabled it to continue operations up to the late-1950s.59

The Abortive Close Dependents' Immigration Scheme

To increase migration to Canada from Germany, PICMME, as early as June 1952, was exploring the possibility of effecting the reunion of dependants left behind in Germany with heads of families already in Canada. The separation of breadwinners from family members, a practise which originated with DPs, was especially commonplace in German immigration. This policy emanated in part from the government's overall goal to boost Canada's intake of labourers over non-working elements. The DL's group labour programs placed particular emphasis on unattached or, at least, unaccompanied workers. Because Germany's supply of single labourers was limited and because Bonn increasingly desired the migration of entire families, allowances were made to have family heads qualify for labour schemes, provided they preceded their kin to Canada. This trend was further reinforced by various government measures and restrictions. One such measure was Ottawa's APS loans and inland transportation grants which up to 1956 were awarded to workers, but not to non-working family members, such as wives and children. Similarly, German currency restrictions prior to 1954 made it impossible for the breadwinner to exchange sufficient Deutsche Mark to pay for the whole family's passage. Practical considerations also encouraged this pattern of migration. Because of acute housing shortages in many parts of Canada persisting well into the 1950s and the uncertainty of employment for the migrant in the first year, breadwinners often first sought to become established in Canada in order to better accommodate family members at the time


59 Ibid., Herzer to Berkefeld, 1.4.1955; CMBC, Vol. 1330, File 989, Herzer to DCI n.d. (circa June 1953). The CCCRR also was able to cover its operational costs by charging migrants higher processing fees.

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of their arrival. Even church agencies, which opposed family separation in principle, accepted this practise until 1952 in order to qualify their own migrants under labour schemes and also to make their small revolving funds go farther. Although Germans were generally successful in affecting the rapid re-union of their family members - normally applying for their families within three to six months after arriving - backlogs of dependants awaiting movement to Canada still persisted and reached several thousand in some years.

By the autumn of 1952, the PICMME's close-dependants' project took shape and international voluntary agencies, specifically the LWF and ICMC, were pulled into this scheme which strongly complemented the humanitarian aspect of their relief work. Meanwhile, official news of the PICMME's larger universal scheme had only reached Ottawa by December, at a stage when plans were already well advanced. Known as the "Canadian Dependents' Scheme" (CDS), it proposed to have voluntary agencies in Germany follow up all cases of kin left behind in Germany and organise their movement to Canada. The financial arrangements envisaged that: (1) the PICMME would advance funds on a refundable basis to cover the overseas travel of dependants; (2) Canadian voluntary agencies (viz. RSSC and CCCRR) would undertake the collection from the breadwinner; (3) the PICMME would set aside for use by the international agency a percentage of the collections to partially offset the agencies' expenditures; and (4) Bonn would make a $60 contribution to the agencies for each migrant resettled without limitation as to its use.

The DCI's initial reaction to the draft proposal was decidedly cool. The Director of Immigration, C.E.S. Smith, slighted by the PICMME's initial lack of consultation with Ottawa, stridently opposed the idea that voluntary agencies should in any way benefit from their participation in this scheme. He also foresaw the department losing control over this movement, fearing that non-working family members would arrive in Canada before breadwinners had time to become established, thereby

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60 The shortfall of transportation facilities during the peak travel season when most workers were needed in Canada meant that family members often had to follow in the winter off-season when more berths were available.

61 In January 1953 the backlog of such cases in Germany stood at 2,800 to 3,000. IB, Vol. 856, File 555-16, Robillard to Chief Op. Div., 28.1.1953. It may have been even higher in the wake of years when Canada's intake of German workers peaked.
becoming a burden on the state.\textsuperscript{63} In contrast, the chief of the Karlsruhe mission, J.R. Robillard, only saw merits in the scheme. If approved, the CDS would assure the department of Bonn's full cooperation in recruiting workers. Moreover, Robillard was certainly aware that by holding out assurances of early family reunion, he could attract more workers for his labour programs. Without doubt, his support for the plan was also governed by a strong humanitarian impulse.\textsuperscript{64}

As pressure for a decision from Ottawa mounted, a response to the plan needed to be drafted quickly and the critical and cynical attitudes of senior officials toned down. By January 1953, the stakes had been raised by German authorities who refused to assist in recruiting workers for Canada until Ottawa agreed to support the ICEM's (formerly the PICMME) dependants' scheme. Also, ICEM officials had taken the matter up directly with the Minister of Immigration. The DCI's counterproposal was indeed measured and constructive.\textsuperscript{65} The department accepted most details of the plan but insisted that applications for kin would only be approved if the head of the family was in a position to offer satisfactory settlement arrangements. Also, Bonn's $60 grant would have to be applied to the immigrants' transportation expenses and could not be recovered by the voluntary agencies. The latter provision ultimately wrecked the plan. In sum, the counterproposal ensured the department's control over all aspects of immigration, even on matters falling outside of its jurisdiction, such as the allocation of German government monies among foreign agencies.\textsuperscript{66}

At first, the department's terms were positively received by the ICEM and Bonn. However, in finalising the scheme, stiff opposition was encountered from international voluntary agencies which, in view of the financial risks involved in the scheme, were unwilling to accept responsibility


\textsuperscript{63} NAC, \textit{Ibid.}, Director to Deputy Minister, 13.1.1953.

\textsuperscript{64} An example of this is Robillard's record of re-uniting families separated on account of the rejection of a family member on medical grounds. He ensured that "100s of such cases were reviewed after the original rejection and mainly from a humanitarian point of view allowed to proceed forward." IB, Vol. 815, File 551-10-1955, Pt. 1, Robillard to Chief Op. Div., 19.10.1954.

\textsuperscript{65} Ottawa's initial opposition to the plan may also have been allayed by the revelation that Australia was making extensive use of ICEM funds to move dependants. IB, Vol. 856, File 555-16, Fortier to Jacobsen, 11.2.1953.

\textsuperscript{66} \textit{Ibid.}, Fortier to Jacobsen, 24.3.1953. The DCI added the Canadian Council of Churches (CCC) and Jewish Immigrant Aid Society to the list of voluntary agencies in Canada which could partake in Canadian Dependents' Scheme (CDS). So confident was it that these measures would be accepted by the ICEM that it already issued instructions putting the plan into effect in March 1953. \textit{Ibid.}, Chief Op. Div. to all District Supts., 3.6.1953.
for moving all dependants without having the option of recovering the $60 Bonn grant from migrants for themselves. This was a puzzling response from so-called "relief" organisations which were now adopting business risk-management practices to relief work. The agencies were supported in their stand by the ICEM and Bonn. The ICEM realised that without the voluntary agencies' participation there would be no CDS. Bonn believed that the relief agencies would give equal consideration to all cases for early migration if they retained the right to recover the grant.

The DCI refused to accede to the international agencies' wishes. It felt that the agencies were not obliged to assume risky cases and therefore they had no need of the $60 grant. Among some senior officials there was also the feeling that the agencies could not be trusted with the administration of these funds. The department also strongly felt that the $60 was better spent paying down the migrants' transportation debts. Here, the department had its own agenda for the grant; by reducing the indebtedness of the immigrant, the DCI thereby limited its own risk in the form of unpaid APS loans or the administration of welfare relief for migrants. In March 1954, when Bonn again threatened to stop recruiting immigrants for Canada, pending Ottawa's acceptance of the ICEM's CDS, the department stood firm and refused to give in. In a letter to Robillard, the German Foreign Office delegate explained that the international agencies' proposal offered the best assurances that cases of "real hardship" would also be accepted for movement to Canada. The prospect of moving "hardship" cases to Canada was no way of gaining Ottawa's approval for the CDS; Ottawa, after all, only wanted "suitable" migrants. The Director, C.E.S. Smith, interpreted Bonn's interest in the CDS as "merely transfer[ing] any problems which Germany may have in the matter of dependants to Canada, enlarging them in the process." Smith's personal mission to eliminate voluntary

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67 Criticisms about Ottawa's proposed revisions were heard as early as October 1953. *Ibid.* Quinn to Chief Op. Div., 15.10.1953. This demonstrates how far international agencies had themselves become bureaucracies, paradoxically more concerned with the business end of international migration than with human need.


69 Robillard's assurances that the $60 grant would not be open to any "racket" on the part of agencies prompted the chief of operations to comment "a pious hope!" *Ibid.*, Robillard to Chief Op. Div., 2.11.1953.

70 *Ibid.*, Director to Deputy Minister, 30.3.1954.
agencies from the immigration field and his lack of sympathy for the cause of early family reunion undoubtedly were considerations in the department's refusal to accept the ICEM's CDS proposal.\(^{71}\)

While the scheme never came to fruition - the talks folded in May 1954 - it did have the potential of generating positive publicity for emigration to Canada and of ensuring Bonn's continued assistance to Ottawa's immigration program. The protracted and often bitter negotiations surely poisoned relations between Canada and the other parties, especially German officials who must have felt betrayed after approving Canada's 1953 immigration program with the hope that Ottawa would accept the CDS. Assessing the damage overseas, Robillard reported that: "[t]here is a genuine desire in Bonn, at least among the officials with whom we deal at the Foreign Office, to help us with our program, but so long as this $60 question is not settled it is a waste of time to attempt to discuss any other point with them."\(^{72}\) After the collapse of negotiations, Bonn informed the Canadian mission that it would no longer lend its assistance to Canadian immigration schemes. Maintaining total authority had clearly come at a price for Canada's German immigration program.

Despite the failure to implement the federally-administered CDS, the Canadian church agencies had successfully launched their own "close dependants schemes" which, since 1952, had moved thousands of family members. Transportation loans for these church "close dependant schemes" were provided by the international voluntary agencies, with the breadwinner providing a small down payment. Unbeknownst to the government, the church agencies were pocketing the very same $60 grant, a practise which officials in Ottawa so stridently opposed.

*The Church Labour Schemes and Approved Church Programs (ACP)*

In addition to the sugar-beet immigration scheme, the CCCRR and the CIAS offered other labour programs for prospective migrants without Canadian sponsors who were willing to come forward as

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\(^{71}\) From the very start and again in 1954, Immigration's Director C. Smith had been at the forefront of seeking to remove voluntary agencies from immigration work. Robillard's observation that certain families might not qualify for travel loans from voluntary agencies was met with Smith's pencilled comment, "work and save like all other heads of family" IB, Vol. 893, File 567-67, Pt. 2, Chief Karlsruhe to Chief Op. Div., 20.6.1955.

\(^{72}\) IB, Vol. 856, File 555-16, Robillard to Benoit, 17.3.1954.
domestics, farm hands and loggers. These programs grew and prospered between 1952 and 1955 due largely to financing from international organisations. This enabled the CCCRR to resettle record numbers of immigrants in the 1950s.

Having narrowly escaped the government's axe in 1951, the CCCRR realised it was important to fit into the government's program in order to justify its existence. The government's interest in immigrant labour offered a promising avenue for the CCCRR to prove its worth. From 1952 to 1955, the Council went out of its way to accommodate government labour programs, referring prospective migrants to Canadian missions; accelerating immigrant processing to meet tight schedules set by employers; selecting qualified workers; producing workers in short supply and collecting transportation debts owed to the government. The director of the CCCRR overseas camp, George Berkefeld, was determined to be of service to the Karlsruhe mission in mustering immigrant labourers. Yet church agencies had their own motives for participating in the labour programs. By moving needy German immigrants to Canada, they helped the international church movement fulfil its larger humanitarian mission of alleviating the postwar overcrowding and refugee problem in Germany. These schemes also contributed to church growth and building in Canada. Finally, they introduced additional revenues and generated immigrant sponsors which helped infuse new life and resources into Canadian voluntary agencies' resettlement ministries.

The inroads made by the churches in the government's labour programs in 1951 were broadened and further consolidated in 1952. With the flow of DP labour coming to an abrupt halt after December 1951, Labour and Immigration authorities turned increasingly to the church agencies to supplement their own programs. The CCCRR was valued for its ability to produce both quantity and quality of workers, especially farm hands and domestics. In 1952, owing to restrictions

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73 Ottawa accepted the Lutheran and Baptist agencies' offers to collect government transportation loans advanced to their cases. NABICS, File 1.29, Reid to Dawson, 21.7.1952; DL, Vol. 277, File 1-26-1-9, Pt. 1, Monk to Dawson, 24.6.1952. This practice also assured the agencies a better chance of recovering their own portion of the loans advanced to the same immigrants.

74 Baptist, Lutheran and Mennonite agencies in Canada made every effort to ensure that qualified workers were recruited and that immigrants honoured their labour undertakings. They realised that if quality slipped their programs would be jeopardised as government and employers would lose confidence in their selection. NABICS, File 3.18, Monk to Berkefeld, 19.9.1951. Available
placed on the admission of all other types of unsponsored workers from Germany, mostly farm labourers and domestics came forward under CCCRR's labour programs. Results could have been even higher had it not been for the late reinstatement of the APS and quarantine measures associated with the outbreak of the foot-and-mouth disease.

The church labour programs experienced much more success in 1953 than in 1952. The farm and sugar-beet schemes got off to an early start which enabled the CCCRR and CIAS to maintain a large flow of immigrants to Canada early in the year until June. As a result, 3,420 farm workers, representing 41% of all church-assisted cases, came forward in the first ten and one-half months of 1953.\textsuperscript{75} The church labour programs also benefited from the fact that the international agencies' funding had come fully on stream by 1953. In April 1953, church labour programs were expanded to include workers other than farm hands and domestics. This initiative, known as the Approved Church Program (or ACP), permitted voluntary agencies to recruit and place a specified number of skilled workers from a government list of occupations and trades in short supply.\textsuperscript{76} This program greatly streamlined the department's tedious procedure which required that CCCRR applications for non-farm or non-domestic workers be painstakingly reviewed on a case-by-case basis. The new program provided the CCCRR a foothold in the lucrative and expanding German skilled workers' movement and safeguarded the Council's right to direct immigrants to parishes and congregations of its member churches. The ACP also gave skilled migrant workers access to church funds to cover their transportation costs. In 1954, the CCCRR's farm labour and domestics' programs were formally merged into the new ACP.

\textsuperscript{75} This figure includes sugar-beet labourers. IB, Vol. 843, File 553-75, Pt. 3, "Group Movements of Immigrants," 15.10.1953. The church labour programs were in fact overly successful; their intake of workers exceeded their ability to place immigrants, which left many in the hands of the government. IB, Vol. 892, File 567-41, Pt. 1, Benoit to all District Supts., 14.10.1953.

\textsuperscript{76} This is how it worked: Upon receipt of this list the CCCRR would determine the categories and numbers of workers it could move to Canada and submit this early each year to Immigration headquarters for approval. Once approved, the list was forwarded overseas where CCCRR representatives identified prospective workers and presented them to Canadian missions for inspection. IB, Vol. 893, File 567-67, Pt. 1, Chief Op. Div. to all district Superintendents and Chief Karlsruhe, 2.7.1953. Prior to the establishment of the Approved Church Program, church agencies could only bring forward industrial workers under exceptional circumstances.
Alongside the ACP, another church program was introduced which specifically had the government's interests in mind. This was the church immigration open placement program (or "church IMOP") which permitted the CCCRR to recruit skilled immigrant workers over and above the numbers specified on the ACP list and for whom the government would arrange placement.77 Actually, this program simply made official an earlier arrangement under which voluntary agencies referred to Canadian immigration missions prospective immigrants who they were unable or unwilling to sponsor. The new program had something to offer both parties. The DCI could tap into the international church agencies' extensive recruiting network and financial reserves, while churches represented by the CCCRR could move more of their co-religionists to Canada. Yet there were also significant drawbacks for the churches. Because the CCCRR had no control over the final destinations of these migrants, it was very difficult for churches to spiritually minister to these newcomers in Canada and to collect outstanding loans.

On paper, the ACP appeared attractive enough for the CCCRR. In practice, however, it did not live up to its potential. Fewer skilled workers were moved to Canada by the CCCRR through the ACP than might have been expected probably because jobs and housing for skilled workers were more difficult to find than for farm labourers or domestics. Furthermore, the CCCRR's lists were invariably pared down by immigration authorities as certain skills were no longer in demand by the time the government approved the types and numbers of workers appearing on the list. Also, the inevitable delays in approving the CCCRR's annual ACP submission meant that when the green light was finally given, few skilled workers could be processed in time to meet the cut off date, normally July 31, for admission to Canada. This pattern repeated itself every year from 1953 to 1956, thereby limiting the effectiveness of this program to move workers. For example, of the 2,000 workers which the CCCRR was prepared to sponsor in 1954, only 460 came to Canada.78 In fact, the vast majority of ACP arrivals from 1953 to 1956 were farm workers and domestics, not skilled workers.

77 Ibid.

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In terms of results, the "church IMOP" performed much better than its ACP counterpart. Because of the delays involved in getting the CCCRR's ACP list approved, many of the skilled workers pre-selected by the church agencies were re-routed to the "church IMOP" which usually was up and running early in the year. Thus, through the "church IMOP," the government could poach cases from the ACP. The "church IMOP" also moved a good number of cases in its own right. Both the DCI and the agencies stood to benefit from such schemes; Karlsruhe raised its visa production and met labour demands in Canada while agencies received the ICEM credit.

No sooner had Ottawa authorised the church labour programs when it decided to shut them down. Both Labour and Immigration authorities had always been of the view that they could manage better without the CCCRR's services. Immigration felt that the additional work and pressure involved in dealing with the church programs outweighed their advantages. Clearly there was also some dissatisfaction with the quality of selection by the agencies which were seen to be "more concerned with the spiritual or religious aspects of the case than in obtaining the best immigrants for Canada." The DL saw no further need for agencies in the placement field as it could assume this work on its own. With the economy in decline by early-1954, what was formerly considered useful assistance on the part of the agencies was now considered intrusion in an exclusive government domain. In October 1954, Ottawa broke the news that it intended to shut down the church groups' immigrant labour programs. The CCCRR and RSSC succeeded in temporarily stalling this action and resumed their operations pending a final decision by the department. Yet certain events in late-1955 had overtaken the department's awaited ruling. The sudden recovery of the Canadian economy caused Ottawa to reverse its position and to again solicit the church groups'...
help to boost immigration. Yet it was too late to expect much more from the church labour programs which were winding down on their own accord. By 1956, there was no longer any need for prospective migrants to turn to the churches for assistance in emigrating to Canada. The DCI offered immigrants liberal access to Canada and generous transportation funding. Moreover, most voluntary agencies had come to the realisation that their labour programs no longer served a relief purpose in Germany. The CCCRR's labour program died a quiet death in 1957 when even the Council made no attempt to apply for its renewal.

The CCCRR’s Roller-Coaster Relations with Ottawa, 1952-57

Although the CCCRR had been reprieved in 1952, its future was by no means certain. There was still the question of selling its services to immigration authorities and finding resources to continue its operations. The results of Herzer's "fact-finding" tour in Europe regarding the CCCRR's future viability was an important turning point for the CCCRR. His findings persuaded Ottawa to allow the CCCRR to continue its operations in Germany and Austria, especially in re-uniting families, for the balance of 1952 and 1953. Herzer also sealed an agreement with the local Bremen authorities for the use of their camp facilities at no charge to the CCCRR for 1953. Furthermore, he brought news that PICMME was making funds available to international church agencies for use as travel loans by migrants coming to Canada under church auspices. Herzer readily grasped the significance of this financing for the future of the church programs, observing that "there has never been a time when funds for travel loans were plentiful and where the chief object seemed to be to obtain as large a visa production as possible."

The new money also brought new friends. With the flow of ICEM funds to voluntary agencies in full force by 1953, Robillard saw the agencies as valuable allies, particularly in advancing travel loans to needy migrants who could not move otherwise. As one senior relief official observed in 1954: "Mr. Robillard still depends upon the voluntary agencies, especially when they have money

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82 Also, financing was no longer offered by international agencies to migrants receiving APS loans.
on hand to loan, which increases his visa production." Collaboration with the agencies offered other advantages. German authorities placed considerable confidence in the resettlement work of voluntary agencies which were given particularly free reign in Germany. This was especially true with respect to their work with East German refugees. By linking up with the agencies, the Karlsruhe mission could exploit this special access to prospective migrants. Indeed, the international voluntary agencies became one of Robillard's best sources of migrants, especially in supplying farm and domestic-service labour. So indispensable did Robillard find these agencies that he even came to their defence upon hearing rumours that the department intended to do away with their services. Clearly the Karlsruhe mission had grown dependent on the agencies' support by 1953 when one-third of all Germans and Austrians arriving in Canada were assisted by them.

Ottawa, however, did not share this glowing appraisal of the Canadian church groups and their international confederates. Tolerating them as a "necessary evil" in 1953, when all hands were needed to increase numbers to Canada, the government thereafter had little use for the voluntary agencies. The sloppy selection and the pressure applied by some of these groups in 1953 to give church cases priority did not sit well with overseas officials. Furthermore, immigration authorities were shocked to learn in the spring of 1954 the extent to which the voluntary agencies were tied to the ICEM's operations and finances. Steps were taken to counter the growing influence of the agencies, specifically the CCCRR and its affiliates, by first cutting them off the APS in May 1954 and then by plotting their elimination from selection and placement work for 1955.

The decisive meeting took place on October 14, 1954, when senior immigration bureaucrats dictated to the CCCRR and other agencies the terms of their future participation in immigration.

83 CLWR, Reel H-1399, File CCCRR Uniting Families Scheme, Herzer memo, 2.10.1952.
All services vital to the government - transportation funding, immigrant reception and integration work and reunion of families - were to be continued by the agencies, while all privileges - immigrant selection overseas and placement in Canada - were to be left exclusively to the government. Furthermore, all placement opportunities and prospective immigrants identified by the church groups were to be turned over to the DCI. These terms had absolutely nothing to offer the voluntary agencies and held every possible advantage for the department. As one official of a church agency observed, Ottawa's decision would limit work and responsibility of voluntary agencies to those of a travel loan organisations. ... the humanitarian element now present in programmes of voluntary agencies would be ruled out entirely. Our programmes would then become a matter of straightforward immigration and manpower redistribution. Economic interest alone would be the governing principle of our Canadian immigration policy.  

Government efforts to contain the activities of the CCCRR may have been unnecessary because by mid-1954 its operations were in decline. Although the CCCRR in the end defeated the government's October 1954 "retrenchment order," the Council was no longer a force in German immigration after 1955. In this year alone it had assisted less than a third of the immigrants it had in 1954. As noted previously, the general reluctance of Germans to emigrate in 1954-55 and after 1957, the dwindling amount of church financing available to immigrants, and Ottawa's generous transportation loans all contributed to the decline of the CCCRR's resettlement program. Even the government's change of heart in late-1955 to enlist the CCCRR's active participation during the winter and in the 1956 and 1957 programs failed to bring the desired results. The CCCRR's machinery for recruiting workers and making placements in Canada was already in the process of being dismantled. For the most part, the CCCRR by 1957 had reverted back to its original 1947 program, moving a handful of family members and relatives to Canada. Thus 1957 marked the end of the great age of church-sponsored German migration to Canada.

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88 The Evangelisches Hilfswerk advisory offices were advised by the CLWR not to refer cases to Canada. CLWR, Reel H-1390, CLWR Executive Committee Meeting, 10.11.1954.
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY INTERESTS

For the railways, the golden age of German immigration had come to a close much earlier with the start of the Great Depression. Their immigration programs in Germany in the 1950s were a mere shadow of their activities in this field during the early-1910s and in the 1920s. There were several reasons for this. With the close of the war, the government had assumed greater control over immigration to Canada, including recruiting and screening immigrants overseas. Placement work in Canada was now largely undertaken by Immigration's settlement service and the DL. The government thereby in essence became the railway's greatest competitor in the immigration field. Furthermore, the terms under which the railways could undertake their immigration work overseas, codified in the annually-approved "railway agreements," tightly regulated their recruiting. Railways were required to submit in advance of every three-month period the number of farm migrants, broken down by country, which they proposed to recruit and place, which, in turn, were deducted from the annual overall immigration targets set by the Immigration headquarters. This placed a cap on the numbers of migrants, excepting British, they could bring forward. Also, shipping and travel agents were more inclined to develop their own applications without reference to the railways. Unlike in previous eras, railways did not grant credit to cover the transportation costs of needy migrants. Because of the prevailing financial restrictions, it was virtually impossible to generate a large movement of German migrants up to 1954 without credit. Finally, railways assigned more priority to their programs in Britain than on the European continent, a policy strongly encouraged by Ottawa.

Railways were first permitted to recruit German farmers and farm workers through their railway agreements once German nationals were admissible to Canada after September 1950. Mustering German farmers with sufficient means (a minimum of $2,000) for establishment in Canada was impossible because of Bonn's financial restrictions. Thus, railways were essentially limited to
recruiting single or farm family labourers from Germany. Early reports indicated an ample supply of these workers for the railways, but the first two years brought very poor results, primarily because Ottawa directed the movement of most German farm workers through its APS and its control over IRO and PICMME shipping. The situation improved somewhat in 1953 when the railways were granted access to the APS and recruiting alliances were forged with German labour offices, steamship companies and travel agents. By 1954, the CNR had found additional helpers, the ICEM and German voluntary agencies among them. The CPR used its contacts with the CCCRR to recruit farm labourers. Yet, by 1955, the railways' programs fell victim to the same difficulties confronting the government's farm labour schemes: the paucity of farm hands in Germany. Statistics on the results of the railway programs are incomplete, but data for the CNR's scheme, the larger of the two programs, suggests that very few Germans were moved. The CNR could only muster six German farm hands in 1950, 41 in 1951, 50 in 1952, 445 in 1953, 158 in 1954 and 14 in 1955. Clearly the achilles' heel of the railway's German program was its limited scope, restricted as it was to the enlistment of agriculturalists.

Though no longer a direct force in generating immigration to Canada, the railways were able to lend their assistance to sponsors in Canada and church groups, realising a handsome profit in the process. Conveying hundreds of thousands of immigrants to Canada was an enormously profitable business for transportation companies. Even voluntary agencies attempted to get a share of this action, seeking commissions to subsidise their operations. According to CNR estimates, 90% of all rail passenger traffic from Europe in 1956 consisted of immigrants. In addition to rail fare, both railways collected commissions on cases they referred to their allied shipping lines. Without its

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89 In exceptional cases railways were also permitted to place domestics and industrial workers. So stringent were German financial rules that Rebillard in 1954 could not recount a single case in which a German immigrant had enough Canadian dollars required to purchase a farm in Canada. See IB, Vol. 675, File C92672, Pt. 4, Chief Karlsruhe to Chief Op. Div., 12.1.1954. For information on the railway agreements, see chapter two.
90 CNR, Vol.8339, File 3070-31, Railways Annual Conference, 16.9.1952. Furthermore the government was very reluctant to refer prospective farm workers to the railways. In October 1952, it even prohibited the railways from recruiting farm labourers until the DL had filled its quota.
91 In 1954 the CPR requested the CLWR-LWF to recruit and fund the transportation of 75 farm families under its farm program. CLWR, Rec 1-1393, File CLWR Negotiations between Overseas and Ottawa Corr. 1953-56, Richardson to Berkefeld, 22.4.1954.
own fleet of ships, the CNR closely aligned itself with various international carriers including Hapag-Lloyd, Arosa, Home Lines, Cunard and Italian Line to carry German migrants to Canada. The CPR had its allies and its own steamship service, including the Beaverbrae, which moved thousands of Germans to Canada between 1948 and 1954. Despite its spartan accommodations, the Beaverbrae was a critical addition to westbound passenger shipping from German ports in the 1950s when demand for berths was always in excess of supply. The profits to be made in passenger traffic alone meant that both railways went out of their way to promote emigration to Canada in Germany and to assist Canadian residents in sponsoring German migrants. The railways' promotional work in Germany was especially encouraged by immigration authorities.

In symbiotic fashion, the railways also attached themselves to church and ethnic immigration organisations to profit from the steamship and rail commissions resulting from the movement of their immigrants. These partnerships were conspicuously one-sided. Railways managed all the profitable assignments such as booking, shipping, inland rail and identifying settlement opportunities, while leaving the risk of finding suitable migrants, advancing and collecting travel loans and assuming responsibility for placements to voluntary agencies. The CPR's relationship with the CCCRR was perhaps the most masterful of such alliances. Virtually all aspects of the Council's operations were used to the CPR's advantage. Starting in 1948, the CPR ticketing office, situated conveniently close to the CCCRR's overseas camp, directed virtually all of CCCRR's clientele to CPR shipping and trains. 94 In 1955, Berkefeld reported that "the railway business accruing to the CPR from the movements arranged by the CCCRR amounted to approximately $84,000 in 1955" with not one penny going to the Council's overseas' operations. 95 Furthermore, the CPR could skirt the German financial restrictions which sidelined most shipping companies in

95 The head of CPR's immigration department, H.C.P. Cresswell, ensured that all inland rail tickets were already booked in Germany, realising that "[w]hen passengers are ticketed at Bremen, Mr. Richardson, as the sole Canadian rail representative in the country, automatically obtains this traffic for the CPR." CLWR, Reel H-1399, File CCCRR General Corr. 1947 & 1949-59, Cresswell to Herzer, 9.12.1953. In 1953 and 1954, the two biggest years for CCCRR operations, the CCCRR was able to direct the largest allotment of passengers on CPR steamships. CLWR, Reel H-1392, File CLWR corr., Berkefeld to Herzer, 9.7.1954.
95 CLWR, Reel H-1399, CCCRR - General Corr. 1947 and 1949-59, extract from Berkefeld report, n.d. 1953 and 1954 were even more profitable years for the CPR in terms of revenues generated through the CCCRR.
1951 and 1952 by booking CCCRR passengers whose travel fares were paid out in dollars by Canadian sponsors or from the voluntary agencies’ revolving funds. Also the CPR used the CCCRR and the voluntary agencies to pre-select workers and finance their transportation in conjunction with the CPR's farm labour program. The CPR even exploited its close links with the CCCRR’s senior management to monitor the activities of its competitor, the CNR.

In return for these benefits, the railways assisted the agencies' resettlement work on several fronts. In Ottawa, the CPR often interceded on behalf of the CCCRR to remove barriers to German immigration. Both railways also occasionally assisted church societies in placing workers they had sponsored. This helped the voluntary agencies boost their intake of German migrants in 1953 and 1954, when the only factor holding back the agencies' output was their ability to make placements. The competition for immigrant business between the two railways had the effect of boosting German immigration, as both did their best to increase their share of the German movement through every avenue available.

Unquestioningly non-governmental organisations share considerable credit for the success of Canada's German immigration program in the 1950s. Key here were the international relief agencies and their Canadian church affiliates, especially those represented by the CCCRR. These groups had a hand in the movement of about one-third of all Germans to Canada in 1950-1955, providing valuable financial, processing, booking and placement services to these migrants. Canada's national railways played a more modest role in postwar German immigration than had been the case in earlier eras. Their contribution in recruiting German agriculturalists for Canada

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96 NAC CLWR, Reel H-1390, File CLWR Annual Meetings, CLWR Executive Secretary Report, 1.12.1953.
97 In 1953, Cresswell instructed the CCCRR’s chairman to report all recruitment activities undertaken by the CNR through the CCCRR-Bremen. CLWR, Reel H-1398, File CCCRR-General Corr., Robertson to Herzer, 25.2.1953. This is one of many examples where the lines between the CPR's interests and the CCCRR's duties were blurred.
98 The CLWR could always count on the CPR to place immigrants they had difficulties accommodating. Monk interview. For the CNR’s placement activities, see CNR, Vol. 5596, CNR Western Region Annual Report, 26.1.1955. Similarly the BWAI used both the CPR’s and CNR's settlement offices in placing German migrants. NABICS, File 2.33, Wieler to Sturhahn, 6.8.1952.
99 Competition was especially heated after the termination in 1950 of the Halifax Agreement which had previously guaranteed a 50/50 split on inland immigration traffic between Canada's two national railways. The CNR was especially driven by this competition. It did everything possible in Canada and Germany to obtain more immigrants, such as soliciting religious leaders in various provinces to develop applications; maintaining contacts with German newcomers for future applications; seeking alliances.
was relatively small and was overshadowed by the technical assistance they offered church agencies and the government in the German migration field. Immigration officials were less willing to acknowledge the usefulness of these outside agencies and give them credit where it was due. They tolerated the activities of these agencies only when they served government interests and exigencies and sought to limit, or even eliminate, the agencies' when they had no use for them. Obviously this was part of the DCI's mission to consolidate its authority in the immigration field. However, a more co-operative relationship with these agencies would surely have lent even greater success to Ottawa's immigration program, especially in Germany, as these agencies offered impressive financial and personnel resources, recruiting networks in Germany along with placement and reception services in Canada. Ottawa's dealings with the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, the subject of the next chapter, very much mirrored its relations with the non-governmental agencies.

7. THE GERMAN OVERPOPULATION PROBLEM, INTERNATIONAL ACTION AND CANADA

GERMAN IMMIGRATION AND THE EUROPEAN OVERPOPULATION PROBLEM

Canada's German immigration policy was not driven exclusively by domestic considerations. Certain international developments as well as Canada's greater involvement in world affairs also factored into this policy, though less than might have been expected. Particularly important was West Germany's lingering overpopulation and refugee problem, the growing international awareness of this problem and the resolve to tackle it. Here Canada, as a perceived "immigration country," was expected to play a part in the solution.

Arguably, Canada anticipated the overpopulation problem which would beset Germany in the postwar period when it assessed the Allies' solutions to the German settlement at the close of World War II. In the face of the sweeping population transfers from eastern Europe to occupied Germany and the transfer of significant amounts of German territory to Polish rule at the end of the war, resulting from decisions made by the major Allies, External Affairs officials submitted that it would be "preferable" for German boundaries to be drawn along ethnic lines. They clearly saw from the start that "extensive movements of populations which are made on political grounds without reference to economic and social conditions have grave disadvantages and may create serious dangers," such as "dangerous overcrowding in Germany." 1 Canada's warning went unheeded, but its prediction came to pass. Some eight to ten million German expellees and refugees flooded the western zones of occupied Germany after the war. 2

Canada's contribution to relieving the German overpopulation problem had to wait until German nationals became admissible to Canada in September 1950. Pressured by close relatives and various lobby groups in Canada, Ottawa took some initial steps when, in 1947, it permitted the

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Canadian Christian Council for the Resettlement of Refugees (CCCRR) to participate in the movement of *Volksdeutsche* close relatives to Canada. Yet this initiative was clearly intended to be limited in scope. The 15,000 *Volksdeutsche* moved from Europe to Canada by 1951 failed to put a dent in the enormity of the overcrowding problem. A more far-reaching solution would have been possible had *Volksdeutsche* been eligible for assistance from the International Refugee Organization (IRO), but this was opposed by the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand in 1947. Although *Volksdeutsche* were considered to "constitute a better source of potentially good immigrants than ... the DP camps," Ottawa was reluctant to press the IRO to include them in its mandate as Canada would be saddled with accepting its "proportionate share of these new wards of the IRO," some additional 60,000 ethnic German refugees.³ Thus, Ottawa was content to wait until the resettlement of displaced persons (DP) was completed and international obstacles in the way of general German immigration had been cleared. Even after Germans became admissible to Canada, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration (DCI) was in no rush to address the overpopulation question.⁴

International awareness of the German overpopulation and refugee problem was slow in developing after the war. From the very outset, France had a keen interest in this problem, grounded not so much on humanitarian, but rather on national security grounds. In the years shortly after the war, French foreign officials relentlessly pressed their Allied partners at every opportunity to consider a proposition for the organised emigration of millions of Germans from the western occupied zones, especially refugees and expellees, to relieve the population pressure and thereby alleviate the military and economic threat as well as political instability on France's eastern flank. These initiatives were effectively stalled by the United States and Britain, both of which wished to study

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² In 1950, Germany's excess population was estimated at 1.3 million, not including displaced persons (DP). National Archives of Canada (NAC), RG 26, Department of Citizenship and Immigration (DCI) records, Vol. 121, File 3-30-1, Tripartite Meeting of Experts on European Migration, Report to Foreign Ministers, 11.8.1950.
³ NAC, RG 27, Department of Labour (DL) records, Vol. 3028, File Interdepartmental Committee on Immigration - Labour (ICIL), Minutes of ICIL meeting, 10.8.1948. Regarding the Department of External Affairs' (DEA) initiative on this front, see Sauer, "A Matter of Domestic Policy?" 241-2.
⁴ Immigration's Deputy Minister, Laval Fortier, saw this as "a problem we must bear in mind, but which does not need an immediate decision." DCI, Vol. 132, File 3-35-2, Pt. 1, Fortier to MacNamara, 20.9.1950.
the situation further before taking action. A far greater imperative for them was to settle the DP 
question. The Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), through its Manpower 
Committee, had concerned itself with the overpopulation issue since 1947 in the context of an equal 
distribution of labour within Europe. It increasingly viewed overseas migration as a solution to 
Europe's surplus of unemployed and unskilled workers. U.S. President Harry S. Truman's four-
point program of 20 January 1949 gave the OEEC's work further impetus, viewing economically 
underdeveloped areas overseas as an outlet for European migration. Linking the Truman plan to the 
German population problem was the U.S. Congress' "Walter report" of September 1949. As a 
solution, the report proposed that, in addition to a program of integration, over a million German 
expellees should be offered the opportunity to migrate. Clearly, the German refugee issue was 
becoming increasingly associated with the general European overpopulation problem.

By 1950, the refugee and overcrowding situation in Germany was attracting broader attention. It 
was recognised as an international problem at the Foreign Ministers' Conference in London in May 
1950, at which a call was issued for a systematic investigation of all emigration possibilities. A 
"Tripartite Meeting of Experts on European Migration" in Paris in July-August 1950 was 
unsuccessful in this regard, but important blockages such as transportation costs and funding were 
identified. Greater progress was made by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), which by 
1950 aggressively aimed to secure for itself a prominent place in European migration work, a spot 
soon to be vacated by the IRO. After hosting an information-sharing preliminary conference on 
migration matters in Geneva in April-May 1950, the ILO moved matters forward quickly. It 
distilled the profusion of proposals, recommendations, information and concerns of various 
governments and international agencies into concrete proposals for the formation of an ILO-

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5 Point four of President Harry Truman's program "to strengthen the free world" called for assistance to economically 
underdeveloped areas with reference to the Marshall Plan for Europe. Although no specific reference was made to mass migration, 
the Truman program saw that economic growth in these areas would boost their capacity to absorb immigrants who in turn would 
contribute to economic development.


7 Ibid., 94. Other conferences giving international attention to the German refugee question were the World Council of Churches 
(WCC) conference in Hamburg (1949) and in Salzburg (1950), the Congress of the Inter-parliamentary Union in Istanbul (1951) and 
the Committee of Experts on Refugees and Overpopulation meeting organised by the Council of Europe (1951).
directed European migration agency which it planned to table at the next migration conference to be held in Naples in October 1951.

The ILO's ambitions and migration plans did not go unnoticed in Ottawa. Indeed, they forced the DCI directly into the European migration debate. In its discussions with the ILO and later with the Americans, the DCI stubbornly clung to Mackenzie King's principle that control over immigration matters, especially over numbers and types of immigrants, rested with the receiving country. Indeed, immigration bureaucrats took this position to the extreme, viewing the formation of yet another international migration agency as superfluous, since Canada was already well-served by its existing facilities and by bilateral arrangements with 'emigration' countries overseas. In short, the department felt it could contribute to relieving the overpopulation problem by way of its regular immigration program and on its own terms. A new agency, it was feared, would bring with it additional financial obligations and the imposition of migration quotas. Nor were these concerns misplaced. When an outline of the ILO's European migration plan was released, it revealed that the proposed migration administration was to move 200,000 migrants in the first year, 300,000 in the second and another 400,000 in the following three years, financed by an initial budget of $10 million and a revolving fund of $25 million - lofty goals indeed! Officials in Ottawa no doubt shuddered to think what Canada's share of the migrants would be as well as the costs associated with the new agency's budget. Although some aspects of the program were considered complementary to Canada's program, it was generally felt that the ILO should limit itself to technical matters and serve more as a clearing house for information on migrant labour supply.

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1 The department had already monitored the International Labour Organization's (ILO's) plans at the 1950 Geneva conference and raised them at the first Departmental Advisory Committee on Immigration (DACHI) that July. It also examined this matter and framed Canada's response through the Interdepartmental Sub-Committee on Migration Policy (ISCMC) which in turn reported to the Interdepartmental Advisory Committee on Immigration (IACI).


4 DCI, Vol. 73, File [DACHI] 1951-57, Minutes of DACHI meeting, 7.7.1950 and 10.5.1951. However, Ottawa found the ILO's idea of an international revolving fund particularly useful.

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Canadian officials must have been relieved to hear in June 1951 that the United States, specifically its leading policy advisor on migration matters, George Warren of the U.S. State Department, also objected to the ILO's plan. Surely Washington, like Ottawa, was troubled that the ILO initiative might comprise its right to determine its own immigration policies. The U.S. had other reasons for opposing the ILO's participation, the most important of which was the Senate and House Conference Committee's refusal to authorise the funding of international organisations, such as the ILO, which had Communist countries as members. Australia also closed ranks with the U.S. and Canada in rejecting the ILO's plan, primarily because of concerns that it might be pressured to accept migrants from ILO-member countries in Asia.\(^\text{12}\) Having secured the support of the two major immigration countries, the United States was assured of defeating the ILO's migration proposal which was to be submitted at the Naples conference in October 1951. Thus, on the opening day of the conference the United States, with the support of Australia and Canada, effectively blocked any further discussion of the ILO's whole plan. This ended the ILO's proposed program and, ultimately, its future role in migration.

**The IRO's short-lived involvement in German Migration to Canada**

The ILO was not the only suitor bidding for the job of Europe's future overseas migration organisation. The IRO also sought to continue its role in resettlement, broadening its mandate to include nationals of European countries. It had some obvious advantages in this regard, including five years experience of resettling DPs as well as impressive inspection and embarkation facilities, including one of the largest passenger fleets in the world. In what was undoubtedly an attempt to win Canada's support for its continued activity in migration, the IRO showed great willingness to

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\(^{12}\) Steinert, *Migration und Politik*, 97-8. Canadian senior bureaucrats thought along similar lines. Declared one memo submitted to the cabinet by the DCI: "Asian countries are members of the ILO and if this organisation were placed in charge of migration work along the lines suggested, this might possibly give rise in future to embarrassing representations by these countries." DL, Vol. 896, File 8-9-63-2-2, Pt. 1, Memo to Cabinet, 13.8.1951. The Americans also did not favour the ILO because of its tripartite structure and its lack of experience in migration matters. See *Ibid.*, Matthews to Under Secretary of State DEA, 17.8.1951.
assist Ottawa with its German immigration program in 1951. By doing so, the IRO contradicted its longstanding policy and its own constitutional provisions which excluded all Germans from any form of assistance. The fact remains, however, that without the IRO's provision of shipping and currency-exchange facilities, the high intake of Germans to Canada in 1951 would never have been achieved.

The IRO's first involvement in German immigration was in conjunction with Canada's miners' program in 1951. Anticipating difficulties in securing commercial shipping for this program, Ottawa broached with IRO's senior officials in Ottawa in November 1950 the possibility of using IRO shipping. The IRO proved very receptive to the idea and offered to make vacant space available for this movement as well as to arrange processing facilities and inland transportation in Germany for the miners. It was agreed that the IRO would bill mining companies for ocean fares and processing costs advanced on behalf of the miners. However, problems soon surfaced after Bonn had approved this scheme in February 1952. German authorities objected to the use of IRO centres for inspection and instead offered their own camps. It was also discovered that the IRO had no legal authority from Allied occupation authorities to make Deutsche Mark (DM) expenditures in connection with this plan in which reimbursements were required. Similarly, the IRO accepted DM in payment for transport fares which enabled immigrants to circumvent Bonn's financial restrictions. This latter service was of great benefit to Canada's program as it significantly alleviated the "funding problem" standing in the way of mass German emigration to Canada in 1951. Many of the early problems were resolved by March without undermining the

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13 The Australians had themselves flirted with the International Refugee Organisation (IRO) in building an organisation to further European emigration. The idea apparently was dropped when the American position became known. Steinert, Migration und Politik, 94.

14 Annex 1, Part II, paragraph 4 of the IRO's constitution placed persons of German ethnic origin outside the concern of the IRO. Only certain groups in Austria were accepted by the IRO.

15 Companies also assumed inland transportation. Migrants were obligated to refund their transportation advances to their employers from monthly deductions made from their salaries.

16 DL, Vol. 290, File 1-26-60-1, Pt. 1, Davis to Secretary of State DEA, 19.3.1951. British and Canadian officials suspected that the IRO was attempting to prolong its existence through these activities.

17 By offering this service, the IRO was contravening the German emigration law of 1897 which again raised the ire of Bonn. Yet Bonn took no action to stop this activity on account of its desire to maintain "friendly relations with Canada." Steinert, Migration und Politik, 164. Ottawa took full advantage of this situation even requesting the IRO to advance the $30 down payment required by migrants to qualify for the Assisted Passage Scheme (APS). DCI, Vol. 73, File [DACI] 1951-7, Minutes of DACI meeting, 9.4.1951.
operation of the miners' scheme. In fact by April 1951, the IRO agreed to extend its services to German lumbermen, farm hands and other labourers urgently required in Canada. This culminated in an agreement between Ottawa and the IRO in late June to move 18,000 Germans by December 31, 1951.\textsuperscript{18} The IRO experienced little difficulty in delivering the promised shipping in 1951 as the collapse of Australia's DP movement led to the availability of sufficient numbers of berths.

With the IRO's cooperation in the German movement at a high-point in May 1951, the IRO Director General, J. Donald Kingsley, took advantage of Ottawa's good will to seek Canada's support for the continuation of the IRO. The IRO's shipping facilities and its record of good service were valued in Ottawa, prompting some officials to endorse the extension of its work. But in the end Canada followed the American line; the refugee organisation would have to go. In hindsight this was also the best possible turn of events for Canada's German immigration program, because German authorities were opposed to cooperating or working with the IRO.\textsuperscript{19} This already was evident during the joint processing of German miners and lumbermen under Canada's immigration schemes, which were being complicated and delayed as a result of the bitter disputes between the IRO and German authorities.\textsuperscript{20} Bonn's relations with the IRO's successor, the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME), were markedly better, ushering in a period of mutual cooperation in migration matters which also benefited the movement of Germans to Canada.

\textbf{The Brussels Conference and the Formation of PICMME and the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM)}

American policy regarding international migration was not limited to scuttling the ILO's and IRO's ambitions in this field. A new organisation was needed. The outbreak of the Korean war highlighted the need to shore up the defences of western Europe and to make better use of labour

\textsuperscript{18} NAC, RG 76, Immigration Branch (IB) records, Vol. 31, File 682, Pt. 7, Kelly to Allied High Commission, 28.6.1951.

\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Ibid.}, Lukashek to Tanner 30.7.1951. German authorities' dislike of the IRO may have stemmed from its preferential treatment given to DPs which they felt had come at the cost of the German people; the exclusion of Germans from the IRO's assistance; the impunity with which the IRO had breached German laws and regulations in carrying out Canada's German programs; and the competition offered by the IRO to Germany's shipping facilities.
for military defence purposes. International migration was one way of meeting both objectives. First, by relieving overpopulation pressure, migration assured greater political and economic stability in Europe, thereby thwarting the spread of Communism. Second, migration better distributed labour so that it could be put to more productive use. This initiative took on added urgency as the IRO's fleet of ships and other facilities were to be disbanded with the termination of the IRO at the close of 1951. By July 1951, George Warren was already clear that some alternative provisional international agency was needed to inherit IRO's shipping and that substantial American funding would be required to cover most of the new agency's operational costs. Having canvassed Canada and other countries about the American proposal, Warren initiated plans in September 1951 to call a separate conference in November in Brussels to discuss the American-led initiative. Details about the plan were released only shortly before the conference. They called for the creation of a program costing $34 million; $20 million was to be allocated for transportation, $11 million for processing and $3 million for administration. In its first year of operations, the proposed agency was to move about 115,000 migrants, consisting of 55,000 from West Germany, 35,000 from Italy, 15,000 from Austria, 6,000 from the Netherlands and 4,000 from Portugal. Of the 115,000 migrants it was anticipated that Canada would accept 40,000, the United States and Australia both 25,000, South America 23,000 and New Zealand 2,000. Clearly, Canada was counted on to make the greatest contribution.

Although the DCI was not overly enthusiastic about Warren's counter initiative, which again called for the establishment of an international migration agency, the American proposal was at least more palatable than its ILO counterpart. Its main objective was to salvage the much-needed IRO shipping for future use in European migration work. This was the key selling point for the DCI because shipping shortages, especially from Germany and Austria, were anticipated in the coming years. Unlike the ILO's proposal, the U.S. initiative ensured that complete control over the selection and numbers of migrants rested with Canada; that use of the proposed organisations'
facilities were optional; that the scheme was an interim measure to be renewed on an ad hoc basis; and that the activities of the new agency were limited to Europe and excluded Communist countries. The plan was also seen as likely to relieve the pressure on Canada to accept certain "non-preferred" immigrants by diverting these to other ICEM-member "immigration" countries. Canada also supported the plan because it was fully endorsed and mostly funded, to the tune of $10 million, by the United States.

However, for the DCI there were also some objectionable features. The 40,000 migrants suggested as Canada's intake raised concerns that Canada was being requested to accept an arbitrary quota. Moreover, the U.S. plan called on the new organisation to provide a host of ancillary services, such as processing and reception facilities, which were not considered essential by DCI and, in fact, were viewed as costly additions which might interfere or compete with Canada's own program. Indeed, Ottawa became obsessed with keeping the mandate and costs of the future migration organisation in check, a point it relentlessly pursued with the PICMME and later the ICEM.

Canada was prepared to accept Warren's plan in principle provided its concerns were met. This was evident in the instructions submitted to the Canadian delegation attending the Brussels Conference. While Canada only sought the use of facilities it considered useful to its program, namely shipping and embarkation facilities, it lobbied hard to have all other services excised from the plan. Ottawa insisted that the proposed organisation's budget be radically cut, including Canada's share of the administrative costs and that Canada should only be billed for services used. The articles of agreement were to be carefully scrutinised to ensure they were acceptable to Canada. Surprisingly, many of Canada's stipulations were accepted at the conference and were embodied in the resolutions establishing the new PICMME.23

22 IB, Vol. 773, File 536-31, Pt. 1, Document IACI-16 and Ibid., Secretary of State DEA to Canadian High Commissioners, 23.11.1951.
23 For the instructions to Canada's delegation, see Ibid. The resolutions establishing the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME) were adopted on December 5, 1951. The Committee grew from its 14 founding members to 27 by 1957. The budget of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) consisted of an administrative part, financed by obligatory contributions from member governments fixed according to an agreed scale, and a larger
In its original form, PICMME essentially represented a transportation company with a skeletal staff and a tightly administered budget which operated on a services-billed basis. Canada's success in having most of its wishes granted may have occurred because it was expected to shoulder the bulk of the PICMME's movement (40,000 migrants) in the first year of operations. Clearly, Ottawa was unwilling to make any additional commitments and contributions to the new organisation which went beyond its regular immigration program. Accordingly, PICMME had to fit into Canada's existing program; otherwise Ottawa had no use for it. Also, Ottawa guarded against the possibility that other receiving countries might benefit from PICMME's services at the expense of its own programs.

The selfish and narrow thinking which influenced Canada's decision to participate in the American initiative also dominated Canada's relations with the newly-created PICMME up to 1957. In its self-appointed and often isolated role as watch-dog of the Committee's finances and programs, Canada sought to minimise its contribution to the Committee's administrative budget and to restrict the Committee's services to those which primarily benefited the Canadian program, namely the provision of transportation. When in October 1952 at the fifth PICMME session, most member governments opted to expand the Committee's functions beyond that of a simple transportation service and to change its character from a provisional to a permanent organisation, Canada energetically fought both initiatives and threatened not to sign the constitution of the renamed organisation, the ICEM.\textsuperscript{24} The results of this resistance were mixed. The ICEM resolved to expand its mandate to include processing, educational and placement services for migrants but assured Canada that it would not be assessed a higher contribution for these additional activities. Canada

\textsuperscript{24} By this time the PICMME and most member governments felt that more than just transport and financial services were needed to spur overseas migration. P. Jacobsen, "The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration," in B. Thomas ed., \textit{Economics of International Migration} (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1958), 115-119.
also exercised the right to periodically assess and renew its membership in the ICEM and to withdraw if it so chose.\textsuperscript{25}

From 1953 to 1957, Canada adopted "a negative attitude towards the organisation and its activities" characterised by tiresome quibbling over budgetary matters and repeated threats to quit the ICEM.\textsuperscript{26} Perhaps the only factor keeping Canada in the ICEM at this time was its dependence on the Committee's shipping. By 1956, dissatisfaction with the ICEM had come to a point whereby Canada seriously considered withdrawing. It was alleged that the Committee was no longer providing any useful services but rather was undermining Canada's immigration programs by giving preferential treatment to Australia's program and heeding Germany's interest of "selective emigration" too much.\textsuperscript{27} In the end the DCI was persuaded to retain Canada's membership when, after meetings with senior U.S. and ICEM officials, it was convinced that the costs outweighed the benefits of quitting. Specifically, Ottawa concluded that by withdrawing its membership, it would jeopardise its immigration programs in Germany, France, Austria, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries whose governments were loyal supporters of the ICEM.\textsuperscript{28} Ottawa also acknowledged that it could better control and monitor the work of the Committee and the constituent governments if it retained its membership. Moreover, American officials made it clear that the ICEM would continue with or without Canadian participation.\textsuperscript{29} Relations with the ICEM improved thereafter as Ottawa offered to make greater use of the Committee's facilities and work more as a partner. In fact, Canadian delegates were instructed by Immigration's Deputy Minister,

\textsuperscript{25} DCI, Vol. 101, File 3-18-4, Pt. 2, Minutes of IACI meeting, 16.2.1954.
\textsuperscript{27} Specifically in Germany, Canadian authorities felt that the ICEM awarded Australia exclusive license to advertise through its facilities. IB, Vol. 774, File 536-31, Pt. 8, Minutes of DCI meeting 16-17.8.1956. In Germany the ICEM set as its priority the moving of non-workers such as family dependants which undoubtedly did not go over well with the DCI. Jacobsen, "The Intergovernmental," 119-123.
\textsuperscript{28} IB, Vol. 774, File 536-31, Pt. 7, Fortier to Pickersgill, 27.8.1956. In fact, Canada's "negative attitude" appears to have alienated some of the ICEM member governments by this time.
\textsuperscript{29} Initially, Canadian officials felt that Canada's withdrawal from the ICEM would precipitate its collapse. Membership in the ICEM had other advantages. It afforded Canada ready access to transportation facilities for its movement of Germans and for immigration emergencies such as the 1956 Hungarian exodus. Second, it provided a forum for the exchange of information on factors influencing migration. Third, according to the DEA, Canadian withdrawal from the ICEM would result in criticisms from NATO, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and the ILO and could compromise Canada's commitment to NATO and the UN to ensure European peace and security. There were also concerns expressed that should the ICEM cease, less suitable organisations such as the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, the ILO or NATO might assume activities in this field. DL, Vol. 3485,
Laval Fortier, to exhibit a positive approach and to assist the ICEM in achieving its objectives in 1958.

Unfortunately, by having elevated Canada's interests above all others in its dealings with the ICEM, Ottawa failed to consider that for many countries, especially those lacking resources, the additional services offered by the Committee were of considerable use. By disregarding the special needs of other countries, Canada thereby complicated and, at times, undercut what was in part a constructive, collective and good-willed mission aimed at relieving a serious population problem. Nor was Ottawa's contribution to the Committee's overall work extraordinary; it did not go beyond what it already provided through its regular immigration program.

**PICMME-ICEM's Contribution to Canada's German Immigration Program**

The ICEM had special significance for German immigration to Canada. Among the overpopulated countries of Europe included in the Committee's program, Germany had the largest "surplus" population. For this reason, Germany assumed considerable importance in the operations of the Committee, exemplified by the fact that Germany was the single largest source of ICEM migrants up to 1955 (see Figure No. 36). The Committee also had at its disposal an extensive infrastructure in Germany, such as migration and booking offices conveniently located near Canadian immigration missions in Karlsruhe and Hannover, embarkation facilities in Bremen and staff working closely with Bonn and the Länder governments. As already noted, it could also draw on the resources and assistance of the international and national voluntary agencies in Germany in furthering its migration work. The Committee also enjoyed good relations with German authorities who recognised the benefits that it brought to their own emigration policies. An agreement sealed with the West German government in July 1952 awarded the Committee a $60 grant for each approved migrant ($40 for single unaccompanied males) it moved. Bonn also assumed all emigration-related costs of resident Germans migrating under the Committee's auspices prior to
Clearly, the Committee, together with its network of allies, was a formidable force in German migration matters and offered immigration countries important advantages.

While the Intergovernmental Committee regarded Germany as the main source of migrants, it considered Canada the principal country of reception. It therefore logically followed that most of the Committee's German migrants would be directed to Canada. This is in fact what happened. Indeed, up to 1956, of all the participating countries in the ICEM, Canada received the largest share of German migrants (67%) moved under the auspices of this Committee (see Figure Nos. 37 and 38). This was not unintended. Arguably, Canada's membership in the ICEM was based primarily on the advantages that the Committee offered German and Austrian immigration to Canada, specifically in the form of shipping. While Italy, Greece, Portugal and the Netherlands were also burdened with excess population, Canada made little use of the Committee's services to move migrants from these countries. Indeed, Ottawa considered the ICEM a useful instrument to keep southern Europeans away from Canada. As one immigration official observed: "ICEM ... has assisted Canada by relieving us of pressure to accept greatly increased numbers of peoples from southern Europe" by directing them to South America and Australia. This left Ottawa with a free hand to fill its annual targets with greater numbers of the "more desirable" northern Europeans.

ICEM statistics indicate that Canada had its way in this regard; from 1952 to September 1956, the bulk of ICEM Greek and Italian migrants were destined for South America (62%) and Australia (26%), while only 4% came to Canada. In contrast, Canada took more ICEM migrants from Germany (36%) than most other countries (see Figure No. 37). Canada was not alone in exploiting the ICEM in this manner. The United States was just as interested to have the Committee "reseed" southern Europeans away from its shores.

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31 The German-PICMME agreement was signed on July 12, 1952, but was retroactive to February 1, 1952. IB, Vol. 774, File 536-31, Pt. 2, "Agreement between ... Germany and PICMME," 12.7.1952.
33 The Director of Immigration reflected that the ICEM left Canada "free to concentrate ... selection on more desirable segments of the population overseas." Director to Deputy Minister, 8.6.1954.

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The Intergovernmental Committee was not to play an intrusive role in Canada’s German immigration program. Its work was to neatly fit and remain subordinate to Canada’s regular German immigration program. Indeed Canada’s annual contribution of $500,000 to the Committee’s operating budget was nothing more than the APS funds which were normally earmarked to cover the transportation loans for immigrants from Germany and Austria.\textsuperscript{34} For the most part, the DCI only made use of ICEM booking and shipping services for its German APS cases.\textsuperscript{35} These cases qualified in their own right to come forward under Canada’s labour programs, with all recruiting and processing undertaken by Canadian overseas staff. This arrangement worked well for both sides. The ICEM could claim credit for the movement of individuals for whom it invested minimal effort, while Canadian authorities could tap the Committee’s transport services and be seen as doing their share in bringing relief to the European overpopulation situation.

\textsuperscript{34} DCI, Vol. 72, File [1ACI] 1950-52, Minutes of IACI meeting, 20.2.1952.
### Figure No. 36: Migrants assisted by the PICMME-ICEM, by Countries of Emigration and Immigration, 1952-57

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sending Country</th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1954</th>
<th>1955</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>TOTAL Number</th>
<th>TOTAL%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>40,300</td>
<td>34,900</td>
<td>21,900</td>
<td>32,700</td>
<td>20,400</td>
<td>188,100</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>6,400</td>
<td>12,300</td>
<td>47,700</td>
<td>49,300</td>
<td>132,300</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>10,100</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>12,700</td>
<td>12,600</td>
<td>9,100</td>
<td>48,200</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>12,300</td>
<td>22,300</td>
<td>54,000</td>
<td>45,900</td>
<td>39,400</td>
<td>43,400</td>
<td>217,200</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>11,800</td>
<td>14,100</td>
<td>11,900</td>
<td>8,600</td>
<td>51,000</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10,400</td>
<td>10,600</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Countries</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>9,400</td>
<td>11,200</td>
<td>12,900</td>
<td>16,200</td>
<td>49,800</td>
<td>104,300</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>76,600</td>
<td>84,000</td>
<td>119,600</td>
<td>119,800</td>
<td>160,600</td>
<td>191,000</td>
<td>751,600</td>
<td>98.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Receiving Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Receiving Country</th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1954</th>
<th>1955</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>TOTAL Number</th>
<th>TOTAL%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>29,300</td>
<td>15,200</td>
<td>8,700</td>
<td>18,100</td>
<td>80,800</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>15,500</td>
<td>13,300</td>
<td>37,800</td>
<td>53,800</td>
<td>41,100</td>
<td>43,700</td>
<td>205,100</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>9,800</td>
<td>12,700</td>
<td>16,400</td>
<td>8,900</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>11,300</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>8,700</td>
<td>36,900</td>
<td>21,300</td>
<td>8,900</td>
<td>11,300</td>
<td>46,400</td>
<td>133,500</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>5,200</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>14,200</td>
<td>25,900</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>5,100</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>38,100</td>
<td>6,400</td>
<td>7,200</td>
<td>20,500</td>
<td>54,300</td>
<td>27,200</td>
<td>153,700</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>7,300</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>5,300</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>4,900</td>
<td>8,600</td>
<td>29,200</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>77,600</td>
<td>86,800</td>
<td>120,500</td>
<td>119,000</td>
<td>139,100</td>
<td>181,000</td>
<td>724,000</td>
<td>94.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Figure No. 37: Country of Origin of ICEM Immigrants entering Canada, Feb. 1952 - Sep. 1956

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sending Country</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Greece Italy/Trieste</th>
<th>Holland</th>
<th>Hong Kong</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada’s Intake</td>
<td>9,743</td>
<td>54,835</td>
<td>2,776</td>
<td>6,462</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>6,216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Emigration from</td>
<td>47,130</td>
<td>154,467</td>
<td>40,106</td>
<td>164,405</td>
<td>36,438</td>
<td>7,249</td>
<td>48,901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada’s % Intake of Total</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the DCI only made sparing use of these services and even downplayed the Committee’s importance to its own operations, the ICEM in reality rendered critical assistance to Canada’s German immigration program in both an official and unofficial capacity. Specifically, it provided valuable shipping, booking, exchange and financial services to German immigration to Canada.
Supplying Shipping

In November 1951, Canadian Immigration officials, while assessing what position to adopt on the American's proposed European migration agency, were painfully aware that, without the IRO's shipping, the movement of Germans to Canada in 1951 would not have come close to assuming the proportions it did. The root cause of this was the shortage of west-bound commercial passenger shipping on the North Atlantic, a problem which originated from the halting of commercial ship construction during the war and the slow refitting of ships from military to regular commercial service immediately after the conflict. This situation was further exacerbated by the outbreak of the Korean war and the need for military preparedness by many western countries which placed a premium on available shipping. As the huge wave of overseas migration from Europe and Britain came on stream after 1947, the available supply of commercial carriers up to 1957 was simply inadequate to handle the sheer numbers of prospective passengers. Immigration from Germany and Britain, large as it was in the 1950s, was particularly affected. Canadian immigration shipping needs were especially critical from late-spring to fall, when most migrant workers were required to arrive in Canada to become established before the onset of seasonal winter unemployment. Yet for commercial lines this was also the high-season for tourist travel which meant that tourists competed with immigrants for available berths. The general overseas transportation situation improved only

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36 Senior officials discussing the American proposal at the ISCMP November meeting noted that “at present, German and Austrian immigrants are being brought to Canada almost entirely through an arrangement with the IRO for the use of their ships. Unless arrangements are made for continuing such facilities, it is doubtful if there would be sufficient space for movement of these immigrants to Canada.” IB, Vol. 773, File 536-31, Pt. 1, Sub-Committee Report (Nov 1951).
after 1957 when immigration from Europe declined and when commercial airlines picked up more of the slack.

Thus, the U.S. pitch in November 1951 to establish what amounted to an European migration transportation agency had a particular appeal for Ottawa. This was an especially timely proposal since the IRO fleet was scheduled to go out of commission on December 31, 1951. It was principally the "shipping" factor of the American plan which sealed Ottawa's support for the new migration organisation and it was the dependency on this transportation which kept Ottawa in this organisation during the 1950s.\(^{37}\) Even though Ottawa gave commercial lines preference in booking migrants from Germany, Canada still had to fall back on the ICEM from 1953 to 1957 to fill supply shortfalls. And some of these shortages could be substantial, as in 1953 when ICEM ships moved 19,730 migrants, most of them Germans, to Canada.\(^{38}\) Without the Committee's supply of transport, the movement of some tens of thousands of German migrants to Canada would not have been possible in the 1950s.

By February 1952, many of the former IRO passenger vessels were successfully transferred to the PICMME. These ships continued where they had left off in 1951, moving many Germans to Canada. The use of the Committee's chartered carriers offered key advantages for the Germany-Canada leg of the movement. The shortage of shipping remained acute between Germany and Canada in the 1950s, while the flow of migrants between these two points was the greatest in Europe up to 1954, second only to the United Kingdom-Canada route. The Committee's carriers could also offer thousands of berths to migrants during the peak travel period of May to September, when commercial shipping was at a premium. This was especially important for most German workers who, by virtue of their employment arrangements, were required to arrive in Canada during this peak season. From 1952 to 1957, Canada's mission in Karlsruhe made extensive use of the ICEM's services during the travel high season. So valuable was the ICEM's shipping that it was

\(^{37}\) Indeed, the DCI narrowly interpreted the whole purpose of the Brussels' Conference to be one of saving the IRO's shipping. DL, Vol. 3495, File I-10P-1046, DCI Memo to Cabinet, 21.1.1952.

soon moving more self-payers and voluntary agency cases than migrants booked on APS warrants. Also, the Committee's transportation services were responsive to the vicissitudes of Canada's German immigration program, when bulk bookings were often made or cancelled on short notice.

Despite being considered "austerity" class shipping, the Committee's carriers made up in value what they lacked in comfort. They offered some of the cheapest overseas shipping in Europe in the 1950s which benefited the Canadian government and German migrants. Lower overseas shipping costs reduced the overall amount of APS loans granted to migrants. This, in turn, reduced the government's financial risk and enabled the APS revolving loan fund to be stretched farther. So attractive were the savings that the DCI decided to make greater use of the ICEM shipping in 1955 despite the greater availability of commercial berths in this year. Immigrants and officials also felt that the Committee's passenger fares kept the commercial lines' rates competitive and prompted the latter to upgrade their class of shipping. This was especially important as short supply of berths could drive up the cost of commercial overseas passenger fares. Cheaper fares no doubt played a role in precipitating quicker family reunions. A government-sponsored commission even asserted that the lower ICEM fares gave Germany an advantage over Britain in terms of immigration.

Furthermore, ICEM shipping was considered more reliable, practically immune from the problems affecting commercial shipping, such as tourist travel commitments and cancellations. Finally, by using the Committee's shipping, the Karlsruhe mission could maintain the goodwill and cooperation of German authorities who received credit for each German passenger processed by the ICEM and were assured that the lucrative passenger business stayed at German ports which serviced the Committee's shipping.

To augment its transportation capabilities, the ICEM after 1953 increasingly used commercial and chartered airlines to move migrants. Airline travel offered distinct advantages over overseas

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41 IB, Vol. 925, File 590-1, Pt. 7, Robillard to Chief Op. Div., 27.4.1956. Most of the ICEM's chartered shipping for Germans operated from German ports. German authorities also wanted to demonstrate that they were seen as assisting the ICEM in its objectives.
shipping. Movements could be achieved on short notice to meet immediate labour needs in a timely fashion and there was greater flexibility in moving migrants as flights could be suspended or redirected. Canadian authorities, however, were slow to make use of this service for their German immigration program even though airline fares were becoming more competitive with surface transportation rates. Still in 1956, the ICEM arranged the air transportation of German farm hands who were urgently required in Canada in the first part of the year.

Transportation Book-Keeping, Currency Exchange and Miscellaneous Services

In association with its transportation facilities, the Intergovernmental Committee also offered immigration countries booking and related travel services. In Germany, these services held certain advantages which could not be matched by travel and shipping agents or by Canadian overseas missions. The Committee assured its clients of the most competitive passenger fares for third- or tourist-class berths. It could do this by acting as a broker, seeking the best value from among its own chartered carriers and commercial lines. Because the ICEM dealt with a large volume of bookings, it had considerable clout in reaching special price arrangements with Shipping Conferences. Moreover, in August 1952, it received clearance from the German government to accept DM from passengers to be used as a down payment on overseas fares. This was a particularly important concession as most commercial lines operating from German ports were prohibited from accepting DM. The Committee also could reserve blocks of berths on their chartered vessels in advance and for longer periods of time than their commercial counterparts. This assured Canada's German immigration program of ample shipping berths for certain labour movements which were required at the height of the travel season. The PICMME-ICEM offered reliable service and had a wealth of knowledge about the industry through its experienced staff, many of whom had worked previously for the IRO. As well, in conjunction with its bookings, the Committee offered passengers use of its convenient pre-embarkation facilities at camp Lesum in northern Germany. Finally, these services were rendered virtually cost-free, which spared immigration countries the expense and hassle associated with this work.
It is not surprising, therefore, that in April 1952 Canadian immigration authorities authorised the Committee to act as the sole agent to book all APS warrants for German migrants. This arrangement eliminated the paperwork associated with bookings and promised passengers the lowest fares possible which, in turn, reduced the size of the APS loans. Most importantly, it enabled German migrants and the Karlsruhe mission to circumvent Bonn's strict currency regulations as migrants could now contribute the initial $30 in DM funds to qualify for the APS, plus whatever additional DM they had to reduce their overall overseas passage. In May 1953, the ICEM expanded this service, accepting DM from migrants it booked to pre-pay their inland transportation costs in Canada as well as providing them $10 in landing money. Likewise self-payers could also skirt exchange restrictions as the ICEM was prepared to accept their full payment for passage in DM. As other shipping companies were still subject to German currency restrictions well into 1953, the Committee provided the only avenue through which most Germans could enter Canada. Clearly, the ICEM's currency exchange service was a huge boost to Canada's German immigration program up to May 1954, at which time Bonn relaxed its restrictions on DM transfers and conversions. At this juncture, there was no longer any need for the ICEM's bookings and they were accordingly discontinued in July 1954 when APS migrants were again free to book with an agency of their choosing.\(^{42}\)

The ICEM also offered a host of other services in countries of emigration including pre-selection, counselling, as well as language and vocational training of migrants. With one notable exception, these services were refused by Canadian authorities because they were considered superfluous or unnecessary. As a goodwill gesture and pressed by labour shortages in Canada, Ottawa accepted the Committee's offer in 1956 to pre-select 100 farm workers from northern Italy, Austria and Germany. The ICEM acquitted itself quite well in this task, recruiting 101 workers, mostly refugee Yugoslav Volksdeutsche, from the Federal Republic and Austria alone. While field staff and senior

\(^{42}\) IB, Vol. 924, File 590-1, Pt. 5, Staff Memo No. 5-6, 23.6.1954. Regarding the ICEM's underwriting the cost of inland travel, see ibid., Pt. 4, Chief Karlsruhe to Chief Op. Div., 14.5.1953.
officials belittled this accomplishment, maintaining that the same result could have been achieved by its own staff, the Deputy Minister of Immigration recognised these complaints for what they were, advising his director that he should be more generous in conceding the assistance provided by the Committee and that "a more positive attitude in cooperating with the ICEM would result in an increased number of migrants to Canada." These words, in a nutshell, revealed the shortcomings of Canada's policy regarding the ICEM. Clearly, the Committee was much more useful, if not vital, to Canada's immigration plans than some officials were prepared to admit.

Financial Services

The Intergovernmental Committee realised from the start that, in addition to the lack of transportation, financing was the other major stumbling block in the way of greater European overseas migration. It was precisely those candidates lacking funds who were most interested in migrating and, due to the absence of credit facilities, had no way of realising their goals. Nowhere was this more apparent than at Canadian immigration operations in Germany, where fully two-thirds of all cases required some form of financial assistance. The Chief of the Canadian mission in Germany, J.R. Robillard, was acutely aware of this situation holding back his visa production. And failing any revision of headquarters' very limited APS, he pursued every means possible to overcome this obstacle. Likewise, the cash-strapped voluntary agencies in 1951 were helpless in moving more of their co-religionists without additional funds. Thus the Committee's agreement with the international relief agencies which set aside vast funds to finance the movement of migrants from Germany came as manna from heaven for Robillard and the church groups.

German immigration to Canada was particularly lucrative for the Intergovernmental Committee because, in addition to the standard $75 per capita contribution received from the United States,

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44 NAC, MG 28 V 120, Canadian Lutheran World Relief (CLWR) records, Reel H-1399, File Canadian Christian Council for the Resettlement of Refugees (CCCRR) - General Corr., Stuhahn/Berkefeld to Herzer, 10.3.1955.
Bonn offered another $60 per capita grant for each approved German resident moved overseas. With these grants in hand, the Committee provided international relief agencies with a $120 subsidy for each migrant moved, $100 of which was to be allocated to the agencies' respective revolving-loan funds, while $20 was retained by the agencies to cover administrative expenses. As already noted, international agencies advanced transportation loans to migrants and subsidised the placement work of their Canadian affiliates. The international agencies' $120 per capita loans covered most of the overseas fare of each migrant which meant that Canadian churches' or sponsors' share of the loan remained very small. It was not long before Bonn's per-capita contribution of $60 for each migrant was cut back and restricted to certain surplus cases and non-APS recipients. To ensure that it would receive the $60 grant, the Committee made its per capita grants conditional on Bonn's clearance of each case which the international relief agencies proposed to move. This enabled Bonn to exercise greater control over emigration to Canada. Still, the agencies represented powerful players in the field of German immigration in their own right as they now possessed the means to overcome the funding obstacle and any inadequacies of Canada's APS.

Officials at headquarters and overseas were quick to see the practical application of the voluntary agencies' revolving loan funds to their own programs, handicapped as they were by the lack of financing. As early as 1951, Canadian church groups were approached by Immigration and Labour officials to cover the travel costs of dependants accompanying sugar-beet families. In 1953, Robillard developed his own variant of the church immigration open placement program (church IMOP) which was intended to boost visa production. He essentially turned the church IMOP procedure on its head. Rather than only accepting referred church cases for processing, the Canadian government missions actively solicited the international voluntary agencies to finance

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45 From the outset the grant was limited to only $40 for each unattached single male worker moved. Bonn also extended such grants to certain non-German refugees such as DP hard core cases.
46 Ibid., Baez to Herzer, 22.11.1955. Starting in January 1954, clearances had to be obtained from the German emigration centre in Koblenz which refused to extend the $60 grant to self-payers and certain categories of workers in demand in Germany. There was apparently also a cap of 20,000 on the number of such grants which could be granted in 1954.
47 This was the program in which the CCCRR was authorised to present to government offices in Germany all those cases it was unable to place in Canada and for which the voluntary agencies offered to advance all transportation costs. See chapter six.
government cases. These cases usually involved individuals who did not qualify for government loans, such as skilled workers, or who required loans for accompanying dependants. Initially, the agencies willingly collaborated, seeking to maintain the goodwill of the missions and receiving the ICEM per capita grant for approved cases in the process. Through his arduous use of the agencies, Robillard was able to circumvent the formidable funding problem. An estimated 3,000-4,000 cases were assisted in this way in 1954, a truly impressive figure in relation to total German immigration to Canada in this year. Lutheran agencies alone financed some 1,500 government cases in 1954, involving several thousand individuals. Robillard admitted as much to headquarters in 1954, reporting that "the movement would have been substantially less if the Voluntary Agencies had not co-operated to the extent of granting hundreds of loans to ... migrants or dependants who were unable to finance their own migration and ineligible for the Assisted Passage." 

In spite of its achievements, the Intergovernmental Committee's funding arrangement had certain flaws which limited its effectiveness and ultimately led to its decline. Administered by international church agencies, the financing was limited to assisting migrants who were normally members of the same faith. Also, by 1955 the agencies were becoming much more selective, turning down more applicants to reduce their exposure to financial risk. This was because the ICEM's per capita grants to the agencies had steadily shrunk from $120 in 1952 to $55 in October 1955, as the ICEM by 1954 was attempting to cut costs to reduce its debt. Furthermore, Catholic and Lutheran groups had over-extended their credit facilities in 1954 and were experiencing great difficulties in recovering their loans from delinquent payers. Some agencies even discontinued extending loans to Canada-bound migrants because they were receiving no assistance from the

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48 The Chief of the Canadian immigration mission in Germany, J.R. Robillard, justified this practice as follows: "When we have a desirable family who wish to travel as a unit, it has been our practice to refer them to voluntary agencies for assistance in connection with the movement of their dependents. This is also done on occasion when the head of a family is eligible occupationally but not for [the APS] and is willing to precede his family; that is, he is referred for financial assistance for his own movement." IB, Vol. 851, File 553-151, Pt. 1, Chief Karlsruhe to Chief Op. Div., 10.2.1955.
49 This estimate is based on data found in Ibid., Chief Karlsruhe to Chief Op. Div., 6.4.1955.
52 CLWR, Reel H-1393, File CLWR Negotiations - Overseas and Ottawa Corr., Baetz to Monk, 26.10.1955. Nor was it unreasonable for the ICEM to cut its grants as voluntary agencies should have been able to build substantial revolving-loan funds from generous contributions made earlier by the ICEM.
Canadian government in obtaining collections. As noted earlier, the ICEM was no longer automatically approving all loan applications proposed by the agencies but only those for which Bonn was willing to make its grant. By 1954, Bonn was limiting its contribution to family dependants and certain individuals considered surplus by the West German state. Finally, fewer German migrants were in need of financial assistance after 1954 given the emerging prosperity in Germany. In the end, voluntary agencies by 1955 either stopped or severely curtailed advancing credit to migrants.

Although strongly endorsed by the Karlsruhe mission, the ICEM’s system of financing found little support in Ottawa. Only the funding extended by Canadian church groups to reunite families was tolerated, probably because it served a practical purpose and did not interfere with the government’s control over selection. Immigration headquarters looked with suspicion on the "financial agreements" between the ICEM and the voluntary agencies which, it felt, bound the agencies too closely to the Committee and encouraged them "to still greater efforts in the field of selection, processing and settlement of immigrants," activities which it wanted to strip from the agencies. Clearly, headquarters felt that the ICEM was using the agencies and the funding as a "back-door" of slipping more immigrants into Canada. The DCI was less interested in moving numbers than in controlling the type of migrants coming forward. When senior officials received word in June 1955 that Robillard was soliciting the agencies to extend loans to cases generated by his missions, it requested him to desist and explained that "[w]e are not exclusively interested in numbers and less still does the Department wish to become obligated to Voluntary Agencies for the movement of immigrants other than those in which they are interested for their own spiritual and humanitarian considerations."

Five months later, Ottawa realised its wish. The introduction of the comprehensive APS in 1956 quietly yet effectively removed the ICEM and voluntary agencies from the financing field. But, in

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the interim, the opportunity to muster more German migrants, who were again in great demand by late-1955, had been squandered.

**CANADA, GERMAN MIGRANTS AND THE ICEM IN RETROSPECT**

It is apparent that the ICEM had many advantages to offer Canada's German immigration program and that, in fact, Canada benefited greatly from the transportation, financing and booking services provided by the Committee. Without the assistance of the Committee fewer Germans would have come to Canada. Furthermore, by cooperating more fully with the Committee, Canada stood to make a more positive contribution to the German refugee and overpopulation problem and thereby fulfil its foreign policy objective of promoting constructive internationalism.

Curiously, in spite of these advantages, Canada failed to play a more constructive role in the ICEM and, moreover, underrated or denied out of hand its usefulness to Canada's immigration program. It may have been because the DCI was wedded too firmly to King's dictum that authority over immigration matters should remain with Canada. Certainly, some of the services offered by the Committee were seen to overlap and even encroach upon Canada's jurisdiction, especially in the field of selection. The ICEM's policy of increasing migration often clashed with Canada's policy to control immigration. It was also feared that the Committee could work to the disadvantage of Canada's own program by giving competing immigration countries, such as Australia, an unfair edge in taking migrants from northern Europe.\(^{57}\) Whatever the reasons for the negativism, a more positive approach to the ICEM could have increased the volume of German migration to Canada, especially considering the common ground shared by both Canada and the Committee on many issues. The ICEM would have also been an ideal medium with which Canada could have achieved the resettlement of many East German farmers to Canada, a program in which Immigration

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\(^{57}\) In 1956, at the height of its dissatisfaction with the ICEM, Canada protested that ICEM transportation subsidies were making it cheaper for Dutch migrants to emigrate to Australia than to Canada. IB, Vol. 774, File 536-31, Pt. 8, Meeting of DCI, U.S. State Department and ICEM, 17.8.1956. The ICEM was alleged to have meddled in Canadian-German immigration negotiations and to have pressed Bonn to insist that Canada provide employment guarantees for German migrants. DCI, Vol. 73, File [DACI] 1951-57, Minutes of DACI meeting, 13.4.1956.
headquarters had shown great interest in 1955 but which was only undertaken in the early-1960s. Moreover, Canada could have greatly boosted its intake of Germans in the low year of 1955 by making more use of the ICEM's financial services. In short, Canada's reluctant participation in the Committee was another missed opportunity in the field of German immigration.
8. CONCLUSION

The German immigration boom of the 1950s was strongly influenced by key developments which auspiciously converged at the same time when the last restrictions on German immigration fell. Changes in Canadian immigration policy were especially important. The immigration bureaucracy had gradually shed most of its restrictive thinking and measures by 1950. Henceforth, it pursued an aggressive policy which, under the direction of the new Department of Citizenship and Immigration (DCI), aimed at maximising immigrant intake in relation to economic and employment growth. And the economy fully cooperated. It posted record growth and high employment from 1951 to 1957 enabling the department to maintain a large and relatively steady flow of German immigrants to Canada in these years. This massive intake of Germans was only possible because an extensive and efficient machinery had been built up in Canada and overseas by 1950 to recruit, process and place immigrants. Measures introduced by the government to boost overall immigration, such as the Assisted Passage Scheme and "group-labour" programs, gave the German movement a decided edge.

There were also factors external to the Canadian government which contributed to the German immigration boom. Public opposition to the entry of German nationals to Canada had dramatically declined by 1950 which enabled Ottawa to ease the ban on their admission. In fact, support for German immigration was building at this time both in and outside of Canada. The urgency of bringing West Germany more fully into the western camp in face of the worsening Cold War situation and the outbreak of the Korean War not only compelled Canada to abandon its restrictions on German immigration but also to give special consideration to the German refugee and overpopulation situation in its immigration policy. Yet it was not so much foreign policy or "relief" considerations which guided Canada's policy, but rather self-interest. By 1951, Canada was running short of migrant workers from Britain, other western European countries and the International Refugee Organisation. The big opportunity for German immigration came in May
1951 when the supply of suitable displaced persons had dried up and German migrants were called upon as replacements. Luckily for Canada, there was great interest in Germany in emigrating to Canada after the war. The removal of Allied restrictions on the foreign travel of German residents and the widespread interest among German nationals in emigrating overseas assured Canada of a large flow of migrants with desired skills.

German immigration to Canada in the 1950s was profoundly shaped by the views, opinions and ideology prevailing in Ottawa in the decade after the war. Immigration legislation and the accompanying regulations provided the means for the government to translate these beliefs into official policy and operational practice. Prime Minister King’s May 1947 speech on Canada’s immigration policy neatly synthesised the government’s views on immigration and set forth the principles which would guide Canada’s administration of immigration well into and in many respects beyond the 1950s. King’s principles contained both catalysts and checks for the German movement. Immigration was to: (1) foster population growth without altering Canada’s “fundamental character;” (2) stimulate economic development but in keeping with Canada’s capacity to absorb migrants; and (3) contribute to the international relief mission in Europe but not at the expense of Canada’s control over immigration. Nowhere were these principles more closely followed than in the German movement. In the late-1950s, policy makers in Ottawa could no doubt look back on the results of their German immigration policy with great satisfaction in having achieved these three objectives almost to the letter.

German immigration made a significant contribution to Canada’s population plans. Between 1951 and 1957, it provided Canada with a tremendous number of new citizens, nearly 200,000, second only to British immigration. This provided a wide range of workers who helped offset the unusually low ratio of workers to non-workers in Canada. German migrants undoubtedly contributed to the natural increase of the Canadian population, as most of the newcomers were young and either single or childless with the prospect of starting families in their new home. Canada
also was able to retain its German immigration gains, because the rate of return migration and re-
migration for Germans in Canada was comparatively low.

However, at the same time German immigration was not permitted to upset the racial balance of
Canada's annual immigration targets and of its population. As the supply of German migrants to
Canada was almost unlimited in the early-1950s, checks in the form of "administrative measures"
were implemented to limit the movement. Consistent with King's principle of "absorptive
capacity," the immigration bureaucracy tailored the German movement to meet economic and
employment needs. Arguably, the prime, if not sole, purpose of German immigration for policy
makers in Ottawa was to feed the Canadian economy with workers who were not available in
Canada or in "preferred" European countries. In this endeavour the DCI was enormously
successful. In most years from 1951 to 1957, the department nearly attained the numerical and, to a
lesser degree, the occupational targets. In these years most of the labourers consisted of farm
workers and domestics, the main staple of the German movement. After 1954, when the emphasis
increasingly shifted to skilled workers, immigration officials experienced few difficulties importing
more trained migrants from Germany. In its administration of German immigration, Ottawa also
met its objective of securing a favourable ratio of workers to dependants. Indeed, the German
movement had the highest ratio of workers to dependants of any ethnic group of newcomers to
Canada. To ensure that the German movement did not overstep Canada's "absorptive capacity,"
administrative controls in the form of regulations and instructions effectively barred German
applicants who lacked skills, personal suitability (i.e. poor temperaments, too large families and
who possessed suspect civil or security records) and resources.

Canada's German immigration policy also complemented its foreign policy objective of relieving
West Germany of its refugee and overpopulation problem. By this method, Canada and several
other western countries hoped to safeguard West Germany's political and economic stability and
prevent the spread of Communism. But in administering this resettlement relief, Canada did so on
its own terms. The focus remained on securing suitable workers from Germany for Canada's
economy. The fact that Ottawa's German immigration program contributed in a small way to alleviating Germany's overpopulation was only an incidental by-product for which Canada could take credit in its international relations. No real concessions, or extraordinary efforts, were made on behalf of the West German government or the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) in resettling Germans to Canada. The DCI jealously guarded its prerogative of administering immigration to Canada. Any activities by Bonn, the ICEM, Canadian church immigration societies, international agencies, railways, and other government departments, which were seen to encroach on the department's exclusive domain or conflict with its interests were strongly opposed and sometimes shut down. As a result, the department's influence over German immigration was almost total and directed almost exclusively to domestic objectives.

Non-governmental organisations, such as the voluntary agencies and railways, also contributed to the immigration boom, assisting about one-third of all German migrants coming to Canada between 1953 and 1955. They provided additional resources, especially financing and staff, used in the recruiting, transporting and placing of German migrants. The voluntary agencies, in particular, had very different motives for working in the field. They emphasised the humanitarian aspect of this work and also benefitted from resulting church growth. Non-governmental organisations were only tolerated in the immigration field when they could deliver useful services for immigration authorities, such as securing workers, and conducted themselves in accordance with government guidelines and regulations. Not surprisingly, Ottawa's efforts to eliminate these groups from this field coincided with those times when their services were required the least.

Through the German immigration program, Canada also achieved the other objective of its "nation-building" mission, namely, acquiring new Canadians who, by all accounts, were "suitable, desirable and adaptable." In the estimation of most observers, German newcomers, on the whole, fit into their new homeland quite well. Economically they were very successful, paying off their travel debts consistently and promptly, as well as founding record numbers of businesses shortly after their arrival. In general, they quickly became established in Canadian social and economic life.
Available indicators suggest that Germans were generally law-abiding and adaptable new Canadians. They settled in areas experiencing economic growth - mostly Ontario and western Canada - and contributed to the prosperity of these regions. The general success of the early German movements ensured the continuation of future German immigration to Canada.

However, while Canadian policy makers did well with their German immigration program, they could have done even better. Opportunities were missed, particularly in the early-1950s, to secure more German immigrants who offered a great variety of skills and expertise of use to Canada. Notable in this regard was Canada's failure to recruit more professionals and trained workers, such as engineers, scientists and technicians, who were in abundant supply in Germany and who could have benefited Canada's expanding postwar manufacturing and tertiary sectors. Indeed, the composition of Germany's labour force in the 1950s, with its heavy concentration of skilled workers in industry and handicrafts, afforded Canada a particularly rich recruiting ground. Unfortunately, Ottawa paid undue attention in the early-1950s to securing German workers for economic fields in which the long-term demand for labour was declining, such as for the increasingly mechanised agriculture sector, or in which the potential for economic growth was marginal, such as domestic service. This is not to say that Canada's agricultural and service sector did not in the short-term require additional workers. Even here Ottawa could have enlisted more Germans by offering more "selling points" for the domestic and farm labour schemes, by easing restrictions such as the two-year residence rule for East Germans, and by working more closely with the railways, voluntary agencies and the ICEM in bringing forward migrants, especially during the leaner immigration years. Perhaps the most fundamental shortcoming of Ottawa's German immigration policy was not

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1 Two studies conducted by the Citizenship Branch for the period 1951-54 placed Germans amongst immigrant ethnic groups with the lowest criminal conviction rate, a level far lower than that for native-born Canadians. DCI, Department of Citizenship and Immigration (DCI) records, Vol. 143, File 3-40-24, Pt. 1, "Report on Criminality among the Foreign Born in Canada" (1954) and Ibid. Schwartz to Boucher, 26.7.1956. German arrivals also were very quick to learn either of Canada's official languages (another indicator of "adaptability"). See A.H. Richmond, Post-War Immigrants in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), 154. A study of citizenship applications filed in Toronto and Montreal in 1959 revealed that German migrants applied for Canadian citizenship sooner than any other ethnic group. DCI, Report CR-2 (Ottawa: March 1961).

2 Indeed, Canadian policy makers were already apprised of the projected decline in agricultural labour in 1947. See the study papers prepared for the Interdepartmental Committee on Immigration: "Immigration in Relation to Agriculture" and "The Effect of Immigration in Relieving Labour Shortages during 1947" in Department of Labour records, Vol. 3028 and 3029, respectively.
taking greater advantage of the ready availability of German migrants in the early-1950s, an opportunity which largely disappeared after 1957.

However, immigration programming in Ottawa was governed by other priorities, practical considerations as well as certain inefficiencies and shortcomings all of which account for an often restrained German immigration program. For most government officials, politicians and the public, it was important to maximise the flow of British migrants and in the process maintain the "fundamental character" of Canada. This obviously set a ceiling on the number of Germans who could be admitted to Canada in a given year, something that was especially evident from 1951 to 1953. Also, British and American migrants could fill many, if not most, of the modest targets for professionals and skilled workers set by the government and they already possessed the language skills and most of the occupational and educational qualifications required for these positions. Another obstacle for Ottawa's German immigration program was that assistance from Bonn was inconsistent and by 1955 had ceased altogether.

Perhaps the most serious flaws in the DCI's programming in the 1950s was its lack of long-term vision and its difficulty in adjusting to changing circumstances. Economic and manpower forecasts did not extend beyond a year which meant that Canada failed to recruit certain types of workers to meet the long-term needs of its economy. This was most evident in the failure to obtain more skilled workers and technicians from Germany from 1952 to 1954. In these years immigration planners curtailed Canada's intake of German trained workers. This was in spite of the fact that supply was plentiful in Germany and that Canada's intake of skilled workers fell short of real demand in every year after 1951. The DCI's conservative and cautious programming was also influenced by the views of labour unions, the public and the federal Department of Labour all of which opposed an aggressive immigration policy. Hence, Ottawa's German immigration programming was often more reactive than planned. Finally, immigration bureaucrats refused to face the fact that real economic growth in Canada was emerging in the non-agricultural fields such as the manufacturing and tertiary sectors. It was precisely in these areas where Germans could offer
skills in great quantity. Influenced far too much by an antiquated perception of Canada, the DCI attempted to boost farm labour and domestics' schemes. Here it committed vast resources which could have been put to better use in securing manpower and expertise for 'growth' fields.

Still, despite the government's short-sightedness, Canada's German immigration program from 1951 to 1957 was generally successful; it brought more Germans to Canada than at any comparable period in Canadian history and at a time in which they could be readily absorbed. The circumstances that gave rise to this boom, both in Canada and Germany, would not surface again. Therefore, some credit must be given to Ottawa for identifying this opportunity and seizing it as it thought best.
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