INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.
The Spatiality of the Self
Submitted by Erin McCarthy
in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Ph.D.
University of Ottawa
Department of Philosophy
February, 2000
The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author’s permission.

L’auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

L’auteur conserve la propriété du droit d’auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

0-612-48109-3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis is dedicated to Robert E. Carter, my teacher, mentor and friend, who introduced me to the wonders of philosophy in the first place.

Thanks to the members of my committee – Dr. Geraets, Dr. Dumas and Dr. Carter and my supervisor Dr. Peter McCormick, for their support and assistance throughout. I would also like to thank my family and friends whose support and encouragement over the years helped me complete this degree.
ABSTRACT

In this thesis, I examine questions concerning personal identity from the point of view of the spatiality of the self. In order to investigate this aspect of self, I draw mainly on carefully selected texts from the Continental tradition. The literature and choices are vast, and so, for the purposes of this thesis I examine specific texts from the work of Heidegger and Husserl. I analyse the relevant sections of Heidegger's *Being and Time* — sections 22-24 and 70 — as well as some of his later work, focussing on "Building, Dwelling, Thinking" and "The Origin of the Work of Art." The first chapter critically examines Heidegger's underestimation of the spatial aspect of the self as Da-sein in *Being and Time*. Chapter Two examines Heidegger's later philosophy which can be read as a turning towards the spatial. I investigate whether this later picture of the self and its relations with the spatial complement the views found in *Being and Time*, or whether there is an unavoidable tension in his thought.

From Husserl, I examine the spatiality of the self as found in *Ideas II*, the *Cartesian Meditations*, and some of Husserl’s later meditations on space: "Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature", and "The World of the Living Present and the Constitution of the Surrounding World External to the Organism." Here, I use Husserl as a "corrective" to the gaps in Heidegger’s thought, showing that in Husserl’s thought, self, space and body are interwoven, interdependent concepts.
Finally, I move out of the Continental tradition to examine one more philosophical perspective -- that of modern Japanese philosopher Watsuji Tetsuro. The role of space in the concept of self is critically examined as found in two of his major works -- *Climate and Culture*, and *Ethics*. Here, I show how Watsuji critically appropriates both Heideggerian and Husserlian reflection.

In the final chapter I attempt to articulate some elements for a new philosophical discourse, one which amalgamates temporal and spatial as well as Eastern and Western aspects of the self, providing a fuller response to questions of the self than the picture currently available.
Table of Contents

Introduction .................................................. 1

Chapter I
Heidegger and the Self in Being and Time

1. The rejection of the importance of the spatial in the concept of self ....21
2. The Spatiality of Being-in ................................... 23
3. Being and Time, Sections 22-24: Da-sein’s Spatiality .................. 25
4. Being-with (Mitsein) and Authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) ............... 37
5. The Omission of the Lived Body ................................ 48
6. Being and Time, Section 70: Da-sein as Temporal and Spatial? ..... 55
7. Conclusion .................................................... 62

Chapter II
The Later Heidegger and the Site of the Self .......................... 65

1. Language, Being, Self and Space ................................ 67
2. Spatial terms ................................................... 71
   i) Presence (Anwesenheit) .....................................
   ii) Nearness (Nähe) ...........................................
   iii) The Open (das Offene) ...................................
   iv) World and Earth (der Welt, die Erde) ......................
   v) Dwelling (wohnen) .........................................
   vi) The Fourfold (das Geviert) ................................
3. The Spatial and Being-With-Others ................................ 91
4. The Body/Conclusion .......................................... 95

Chapter III
Husserl, Space and the Self ....................................... 108

1. The Embodied Self ............................................ 109
2. Self, Space and Others ........................................ 118
3. Community .................................................... 127
4. Conclusion .................................................... 135
Chapter IV
Critically Appropriating Heideggerian and Husserlian Reflection: Watsuji Tetsuro ... 137

1. Eastern and Western Concepts of Self ... 138
2. Climate and Culture ... 140
3. Ethics ... 153
4. The Body ... 170
5. Conclusion ... 175

Chapter V
Towards an Implaced, Ethical Self ... 178

1. Space, Self and Technology ... 179
2. Return to the Body ... 186
3. Interconnectedness ... 193
4. Conclusion: Towards an implanted, ethical self ... 199

Conclusion ... 200

Bibliography ... 208
INTRODUCTION

CONTEXTS

Faster is better; more efficient is better; more economical is better. These are three equations which currently dominate our being-in-the-world. Yet, at what cost? Edward Casey gives one timely example:

the massive spread of technology . . . makes irrelevant where you are as long as you can link up with other users of the same technology. [This is a phenomenon that] is truly ‘cosmic’, that is, literally worldwide, and . . . exhibits a dromocentrism that amounts to temporocentrism writ large: not just time but speeded-up time (dromos connotes ‘running,’ ‘race,’ ‘racecourse’) is of the essence of the era. It is as if the acceleration discovered by Galileo to be inherent in falling bodies has come to pervade the earth (conceived as a single scene of communication), rendering the planet a ‘global village’ not in a positive sense but as a placeless place indeed.¹

This thesis aims to open up a dialogue that will begin to form a concept of self that can once again be implanted in the world; a concept in which spatiality has a place.

Evidence of the extent to which the temporal dominates our lives can be seen in many of the current theories of personal identity. Such theories aim to answer the

¹ Edward Casey, The Fate of Place (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997) xiii. Casey’s work on place has become somewhat of a ‘fil conducteur’ for this thesis. I discovered his first work on place, Getting Back Into Place (Bloomington: Indiana U.P., 1993) and the above-mentioned subsequent work on place after I had already determined the original problematic for the thesis and thus decided to keep the general theme “space” and the self, rather than “place” and the self. On my reading, the concept of place includes space. What will become clear is that the notion of human spatiality that I develop throughout the work has much in common with Casey’s theory of place – it is lived space, lived experience.
perennial philosophical questions "Who am I?" and "What makes me who I am?" An investigation of these questions involves looking at various perspectives of who and how we are in the world. Yet in current theories of personal identity, the perspective is often solely a temporal one. The usual accent in such investigations falls on concerns about the identity of a person through time. This concern is evident in the work of Descartes, Locke and Hume right up to the present day as seen in the work of Derek Parfit. These philosophers have treated questions of personal identity usually with respect to memory, psychological continuities, and physical connectedness. All of these issues involve aspects of temporal continuity -- even questions about the body are examined from the temporal viewpoint. Yet this perspective and its temporal point of view fails to take into account a vital aspect of who we are -- our lived experience which reflects our connection to our bodies and the spaces and places around us. The descriptive level of philosophical reflection focussed on temporal existence, often if not always, seems slightly artificial because it does not take enough of our lived experience into account. The first part of this introduction then, aims to lay out the philosophical context out of which the problematic of the thesis arises.

Clearly, how and in what way we remain the same person over the course of our lifetimes is an important philosophical question, but it is only one perspective. We must recognize that our contexts in the world -- our embodiment and the environment around

---

us -- determine to a very large extent, the types of philosophical questions we ask about ourselves as well as the very concept of self. Focussing on these questions solely through temporal concerns does not provide a clear enough picture of who we are -- our spatiality must also be considered. This includes what might be called our intrinsic and extrinsic environments - not only our bodies, but also the spaces and places around us.

Furthermore, because of our contexts, our implacement in the world, we cannot look at questions of the self from an isolated viewpoint, for we are necessarily connected with others.

The Continental tradition is one place which can give us a perspective that goes beyond the descriptive to the reflective level of questions about the self, providing us with different complements to analytic accounts. Talk of self as subject in the Continental tradition implies the fulness of lived experience, the connection between self and world. Scholars of personal identity want to know what it means for a person to exist as the same person over time, while philosophers of the Continental school, particularly those of the phenomenological tradition, search for the self, who and how we are in the world.

To frame the debate in Paul Ricoeur's terms, philosophers of personal identity have been concerned with identity as sameness, which is, he maintains, different from identity as selfhood. This search for identity as sameness is concerned almost exclusively with the questions of permanence in time and leads to "what" questions about persons.³

The emphasis on temporality is what causes the analytic philosophers to make their "wide detour" as Ricoeur calls it, "by means of the questions 'what?' and 'why?', although it will be unable to follow all the way to the end the return route leading back to the question 'who?'"\(^4\) However, Ricoeur maintains that the search for identity as selfhood focusses on the question, "is there a form of permanence in time which can be connected to the question 'who'? inasmuch as it is irreducible to any question of 'what'?"\(^5\) This points in the direction which this thesis will follow -- what happens in the debate if we follow the who? I maintain that it leads to the fact of our irreducible spatiality. The temporal emphasis of the Anglo-American tradition, as well as the leeway given by restricting an investigation to identity as sameness rather than selfhood has meant that philosophers within this tradition have been able to make some fantastic abstractions. If person is an empirical object, something that can be observed and experimented with (even if only through thought experiments), the importance of lived experience and ownership is almost immediately lost.

The questions Parfit (whose work I read as representative of the analytic tradition) asks about personal identity are the following:

1. What is the nature of a person?
2. What is it that makes a person at two different times one and the same person?
3. What is necessarily involved in the continued existence of each person over time?

\(^{4}\)Ricoeur 7.  
\(^{5}\)Ricoeur 118.
(4) What is in fact involved in the continued existence of each person over time?\(^6\)

The temporal focus is obvious, as is the focus on the 'what' rather than the 'who'
pointed out by Ricoeur above. With Parfit's view, "who?" simply does not matter.

Ricoeur here points to the most significant difference between the traditions -- the very
questions they ask. The question is, where does this temporal focus lead us, and what
problems are inherent in this type of view? The view immediately strikes one as artificial.
What, one asks, is the point of an impersonal description of persons? What does it tell us
about how we are in the world here and now?

Parfit, as well as such philosophers as Descartes, Locke and Hume, all use puzzle
cases to investigate personal identity. While they may be thought provoking and
entertaining, as any good science fiction is, nonetheless, such cases depart from important
facts about how we are in the world. We simply are embodied during our lives here on
earth, and replication, or waking up in the body of a cobbler, for example, is not
possible.\(^7\) Ricoeur expresses his doubt about the validity of puzzle cases in the following
way: "these are imaginary cases which remain conceivable, even when they may not be
technically realizable. It is enough that they be neither logically nor physically
impossible. The question will be whether they do not violate a constraint of another

---


order, concerning human rootedness on this earth.”¹ Here Ricoeur alludes to an aspect of the study of self that is for the most part ignored or taken for granted in the Anglo-American tradition -- but the suggestion of which is in the continental tradition -- space and place. It is this suggestion that I will take up in detail in this thesis -- looking at the importance of the spatial in a concept of selfhood and some of the consequences if it is ignored. Ricoeur’s statement about the violation of our rootedness expresses what is missing from the analytic account of personal identity-- lived experience. Puzzle cases allow the philosopher to play with and artificially remove us not only from our rootedness on this earth, but also from the simple fact that we are embodied. Parfit's relation R, with any cause, which is central to his reductionist view, denies this simple fact of human existence. He states: “What fundamentally matters is Relation R, with any cause. This relation is what matters even when, as in a case where one person is R-related to two other people . . . .Two other relations may have some slight importance: physical continuity and physical similarity.”¹° What ‘fundamentally matters’ on Parfit’s view is problematic when including the spatial aspect of selfhood. First of all, the cases where one person is R-related to two people are technological fictions; secondly, as expressed by Ricoeur, “the central phenomenon which the theory reduces is . . . eluded, namely that someone possesses her body and her experience.”¹¹ For Ricoeur it is the “neutralization

¹Ricoeur 135. my emphasis.
¹°Parfit 217. my emphasis.
¹¹Ricoeur 132.
of one's own body” resulting from the impersonal view that is most distressing. He explains:

This neutralization, in all the thought experiments that will now appear will facilitate focusing on the brain the entire discourse on the body. The brain, indeed differs from many other parts of the body, and from the body as a whole in terms of an integral experience, inasmuch as it is stripped of any phenomenological status and thus of the trait of belonging to me, of being my possession.11

This depersonalization of the body and focus on the brain is one way that Parfit and other philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition remove the study of the person from lived experience. It will be seen throughout the thesis that the direction of one’s own embodiment is the way in which we must move to answer questions about self-identity. Parfit simply seems to deny the importance of embodiment for self-identity, and the resulting third-person description gives us “an extremely curious picture of the person from the outside only, an exterior view that the account’s own occasional recourse to literary examples belies.”12 With his reductionist view, Parfit effectively removes the person from real lived experience and can only, as a result, create artificial, unsatisfying examples. We are left with an impersonal description of personhood -- “person” as an object to be examined and analysed, reduced to a formula. Indeed, as Ricoeur points out, it “is clear that Parfit's fictions . . . concern entities of a manipulable nature from which the question of selfhood has been eliminated as a matter of principle.”13

11Ricoeur 132.
13Ricoeur 135.
Parfit, in treating person as entirely individual, stripping it of any meaningful sense of self, makes it impossible for it to have anything important to say about how we are in the world with other people, because on his view, it simply does not matter. Ricoeur, however, asserts that "the selfhood of oneself implies otherness to such an intimate degree that one cannot be thought of without the other, that instead one passes into the other, as we might say in Hegelian terms."\textsuperscript{14} Something about Parfit's and other such views simply do not sit right with us. Indeed Parfit himself is left unsatisfied with the picture he presents: "I can believe this view at the intellectual or reflective level. I am convinced by the arguments in favour of this view. But I think it likely that, at some other level, I shall always have doubts."\textsuperscript{15} That "other level," I believe, is the level on which most of us operate on a daily basis, and is the part of ourselves that we are searching for when we ask the fundamental question "Who am I?"

When we begin to think with Ricoeur about our rootedness, the emphasis in the questions begins to shift -- we move from who and how are we over time, to who and how are we here, in this body, on this earth, in short -- in this space. The shift is suggested, yet not fully elucidated, by Ricoeur in \textit{Oneself as Another}. We saw above the importance of the lived body for Ricoeur. He refers to it as the phenomena of anchoring -- self as "the kind of being that can lend itself . . . to a twofold identification - as an objective person and as a reflective subject."\textsuperscript{16} Parfit's Reductionist view is unsatisfying

\textsuperscript{14}Ricoeur 3.  
\textsuperscript{15}Parfit 279.  
\textsuperscript{16}Ricoeur 54.
because it leaves us with no anchor at all in the world. Ricoeur, on the other hand, stresses its significance, stating that:

The phenomenon of anchoring itself suggests the direction in which we must move; it is the direction . . . [of] the absolutely irreducible signification of one's own body. We recall that the possibility of attributing mental and physical predicates to the same thing seemed to us to be grounded in a twofold structure of the lived body, namely its status as an observable, physical reality and its belonging to what Husserl termed, in the "Fifth Cartesian Meditation," the "sphere of ownness" or of "what is mine." The same double allegiance of the lived body founds the mixed structure of "I so and so"; as one body among others, it constitutes a fragment of the experience of the world; as mind, it shares the status of the "I" understood as the limiting reference point of the world. In other words, the body is at once a fact belonging to the world and the organ of a subject that does not belong to the object of which it speaks. 17

Ricoeur does not deny the fact that the temporal has a place in identity as selfhood; rather he recognizes that this is only one side of being a person in the world.

By treating the fact of our embodiment as important, Ricoeur and other philosophers of the Continental tradition also avoid recourse to contrived technological or science fictions that Parfit and others are forced to invent. Fictions are used in the continental tradition, but there is a major difference between the literary and technological fictions:

Literary fictions differ fundamentally from technological fictions in that they remain imaginative variations on an invariant, our corporeal condition experienced as the existential mediation between the self and the world. Characters in plays and novels are humans like us who think, speak, act, and suffer as we do. Insofar as the body as one's own is a dimension of oneself, the imaginative variations around the corporeal condition are variations on the self and its selfhood. Furthermore, in virtue of the

17Ricoeur 54-55.
mediating function of the body as one's own in the structure of being in the world, the feature of selfhood belonging to corporeality is extended to that of the world as it is inhabited corporeally.\textsuperscript{18}

In contrast, as we saw above, puzzle cases remove our corporeal condition leaving us with the technological dream where the brain is substituted for the person.\textsuperscript{19} It is questionable what these fictions tell us about how we are here and now in the world.

In what direction does this inescapable aspect of our lived body lead us? In the direction of spatiality. We have seen how unsatisfying a picture a strictly temporal view of self creates, and have noted the importance of our "place" in the world -- in a particular body. I contend that in order to come up with a satisfying view of self we must move toward and beyond the direction indicated by Ricoeur -- we must go beyond our body into lived space and place and see what kind of picture of self we arrive at if, alongside our temporality, our irreducible spatiality is considered.

In this thesis, I take up Ricoeur’s challenge to move in the direction of the irreducible signification of the lived body. The manner in which I have chosen to do so is to foreground the issue that lies in the background of the problematic of the body in the context of identity as selfhood -- that of human spatiality. Human spatiality in fact both underpins and includes embodiment. It is not enough to merely recognize “the primordial and intransgressible bond between the corporeal subject and space”;\textsuperscript{20} this relationship must be explored if a satisfying, balanced concept of self is to be reached. The

\textsuperscript{18}Ricoeur 150.
\textsuperscript{19}Ricoeur 150.
importance of spatiality in the constitution of a concept of self has been overlooked -- yet it has been suggested in Husserl's work, and even Heidegger admits he was wrong to overlook it. In this thesis I aim to foreground a central concept that has too long been forced to remain in the background.

In order to investigate this aspect of self, I will draw mainly on carefully selected texts from the Continental tradition. The literature and choices are vast, and so, for the purposes of this thesis I will examine specific texts from the work of Heidegger and Husserl. From Heidegger, I will examine the relevant sections in *Being and Time* - sections 22-24 and 70, as well as some of his later work focussing on "Building, Dwelling, Thinking" and "The Origin of the Work of Art." From Husserl, I will examine the spatiality of the constitution of the self as found in *Ideas II*, the *Cartesian Meditations*, and some of Husserl's later meditations on space "Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature", and "The World of the Living Present and the Constitution of the Surrounding World External to the Organism." Finally, I will move out of the Continental tradition to examine one more philosophical perspective -- that of modern Japanese philosopher Watsuji Tetsuro. The role of space in the concept of self will be critically examined as found in two of his major works -- *Climate and Culture*, and *Ethics*. This comparative or transcultural aspect of the thesis will add a perspective to the literature on the self which is not currently

---

available. Furthermore, adding such a perspective, as we will see, is especially fitting when discussing the work of Heidegger and Husserl.

**HEIDEGGER, HUSSELR AND THE EAST**

As early as 1915, Husserl’s work was being translated into Japanese. The influence of his thought can be seen for example, in the work of Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945), founder of Japan’s Kyoto School. Nishida, himself a contemporary of Husserl, was very interested in European and American philosophy and “was the first one in Japan to present Husserl’s phenomenology in its connection with Neo-Kantianism and with the Brentano school.” Many of Nishida’s students actually travelled to Europe to study with Husserl and Heidegger – so the influence of Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology was present very early on. Watsuji Tetsuro (1889-1960) is referred to as “the leading ethicist of modern Japan,” however, his work has only recently become accessible to the Western reader. While not actually a member of the Kyoto school, being a colleague, rather than a student, of Nishida’s, Watsuji was aware of the ideas being developed there and Nishida’s influence, as we will see, is evident in his work.

Watsuji’s original passion was not for philosophy, but for literature and poetry, especially that from the West. He was “said to have been fired with the ambition to

---


become a poet like Byron.”23 His attempts at success in the literary field were, however, not fruitful and he finished his studies in the Literature Department of the Imperial University of Tokyo with a philosophy concentration in 1912. “His studies of Nietzsche, Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard make amply evident that Watsuji was, like so many Japanese intellectuals since the Meiji Restoration of 1868, profoundly interested in learning about the West and its evident intellectual, scientific, and cultural successes.”24 Indeed Watsuji had intended his Nietzschean Studies as a graduation thesis, but, at “the time the atmosphere in the Faculty of Philosophy was inimical to the study of a poet-philosopher like Nietzsche. Consequently, Watsuji’s Nietzschean Studies was rejected as a suitable graduation thesis and in its place he was obliged to take up the study of Schopenhauer.”25 Watsuji’s thesis was completed just in time to be accepted for graduation.

In 1925, Watsuji was appointed to the Chair of Ethics in the Department of Literature in Kyoto University. He was sent to Germany in 192726, and these travels, combined with the reading of Being and Time upon its publication, inspired his book Climate and Culture, which I will examine in detail in chapter four. He was influenced, however, not only by Heidegger:

25Furukawa 219.
26Carter. p. 4.
he researched the ideas of Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Brentano, Scheler, Schiller, Dilthey, Durkheim, Bergson, Husserl... and others. Rather than abandoning the intellectual and cultural traditions of the West, he critically reflected upon them to illustrate in what ways they are the same or different from those traditions of the East, which he deemed worthy and correct. The result was an East/West dialogue of high quality, a helpful exercise in comparative philosophy that brought to light similarities and differences in a remarkably subtle form.27

Whether or not there was a personal connection between Watsuji and Heidegger, as there was with Heidegger and Hajime Tanabe, Shuzo Kuki and Kiyoshi Miki28 is unclear. There does not seem to be any record of Watsuji actually meeting Heidegger, and indeed his name does not even appear in Reinhard May’s thoroughly researched *Heidegger’s Hidden Sources*.29 However, Yuasa Yasuo maintains that in the opening of *Climate and Culture* when Watsuji is discussing the impact of Heidegger on his thought, one can sense “the subtlety of a ‘personal encounter.’”30 This leads us to a point which it is essential to recognize -- that the relationship between Heidegger and modern Japanese philosophy was not only a one-way relationship, but also ran from the East to Heidegger. We can keep in mind then, that if there was a ‘personal encounter’, it is possible that influence may have been reciprocal between Heidegger and Watsuji. May explains that Heidegger’s direct contact with East Asian thought dates back to his contact with Tanabe in 1922. Over the subsequent 15 years Heidegger came to know Miki, Kuki and

27 Carter, p. 3
28 All members of the Kyoto School.
Nishitani. May’s research also demonstrates the profound influence of Heidegger’s work on Japanese philosophy revealing three surprising facts: 1) that “the first substantive commentary on Heidegger’s philosophy (aside from a few brief reviews) was published in Japan, in 1924”; 2) “the first book-length study of Heidegger to appear was written by a Japanese philosopher and published in 1933”; and 3) “Japan leads the field in translations of Sein und Zeit: the first Japanese version appeared in 1939 (twenty-three years before the first translation into English), and was followed by no fewer than five further translations in the subsequent three decades.”31 As for the influence of the East on Heidegger, May recounts the following telling story. In September 1964 Heidegger had a conversation with a Buddhist monk: “on hearing the Buddhist monk say that ‘nothing is not ‘nothing’, but rather the completely other: fullness. No one can name it. But it -- nothing and everything -- is fulfillment,’ Heidegger responded with the words, ‘That is what I have been saying, my whole life long.’”32 Indeed many of Heidegger’s ideas resonate with East-Asian ideas. Is it a matter of reciprocal influence, or, as Graham Parkes describes it, an instance of a “pre-established harmony” between Heidegger’s thought and certain Eastern concepts? Regardless of the answer to this question, this thesis aims to open up a dialogue that can be mutually fruitful. If we are living in a “global village,” then recognizing that from different places and spaces different thought arises, means that where we are does matter, and that furthermore, this can inform our

32 May 3.
concepts of self. Opening up dialogue between traditions and spaces can help us overcome the "placeless place-ness" that Casey warns us about and instead give us a new reverence for and recognition of the fact that not only do we live in a world of different places and spaces, but also that this can greatly enrich our lives.

This thesis will provide an addition to the literature currently available. While there are a few book-length treatments of Heidegger and Husserl's views on space, none focus solely on the notion of the spatiality of the self. Thus, not only am I looking at the original texts of Heidegger and Husserl in a new light, but scholars' commentaries are also used to a new purpose. Furthermore, there is very little currently available on Watsuji's work in English. As technology continues to make the world smaller, I believe it is essential to look beyond the philosophical confines of the Western tradition, to re-examine problems in a different manner. Taking Watsuji's concept of self into account alongside those of Heidegger and Husserl within the problematic of this thesis, will re-frame some of the current ways of thinking about self; broaden the current philosophical discourse; and allow a truly new concept of an ethical, implicated self to begin to develop.

OUTLINE OF THE THESIS

The thesis opens with the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Despite being of the Continental tradition, Heidegger, in *Being and Time*, provides us with an overwhelmingly temporal picture of the self, where considerations of the spatial aspect are cursory. Heidegger tells us that he is going to give a phenomenological description of being-in-the-world. Yet, despite the spatiality of the term "Da-sein," "there-being," itself, he
focusses on the temporal nature of human existence. In the first chapter, I will critically examine Heidegger's underestimation of the spatial aspect of the self as Da-sein in *Being and Time*. I hope to show that despite his rejection of the importance of the spatial in the constitution of Da-sein, in fact spatiality underlies many of the key aspects of his thought. The spatiality of several key terms -- "nearness," "region," "de-distancing" and "directionality" will be shown. I will also critically examine the lack of spatiality in the concepts of "being-with" and "authenticity" and show the detrimental effects of such an omission. One other major omission in Heidegger's thought is any analysis of embodied Da-sein and this will be looked at especially in relation to its effects on relations with others. The first chapter will close with an analysis of section 70 of *Being and Time*, where Heidegger attempts to subordinate human spatiality to temporality.

Heidegger's later philosophy, however, provides us with a somewhat different perspective and can be read as a turning towards the spatial. In the second chapter then, I will go on to investigate whether this later picture of the self and its relations with the spatial complement the views found in *Being and Time*, or whether there is an unavoidable tension in his thought. I will argue that in his later work, Heidegger turns toward the spatial. The spatiality of the language found in "Building Dwelling Thinking" and "The Origin of the Work of Art" will be examined, as well as aspects of his essays "The Nature of Language," "Language," and *On Time and Being*. I will argue that out of the later philosophy comes a movement towards a more grounded, connected self.
However, I will also demonstrate that Heidegger’s “blind spot” where the body is concerned holds him back from ever actually completing this movement.

The third chapter introduces the thought of Edmund Husserl to the thesis. Ricoeur tells us that the phenomenology of spatiality was “propitiously begun in Husserl”. Here, I will use Husserl as a ‘corrective’ to the gaps in Heidegger’s thought, showing that in Husserl’s thought, self, space and body are interwoven, interdependent concepts. As well as *Cartesian Meditations* and *Ideas II*, the key texts which I will analyse, are, as mentioned above, “Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature,” and “The World of the Living Present and the Constitution of the Surrounding World External to the Organism.” Most importantly, it will be shown that Husserl does not ignore the embodied aspect of the self and recognizes that it is largely the body that allows us to recognize our intersubjective way of being-in-the-world.

In order to open one further perspective on questions of the self, my thesis will then examine the views of a philosopher who represents a tradition where the temporal does not dominate. The work of Watsuji may in fact have gone too far towards the spatial, leaving the temporal aspect of the self behind. But a critical examination of Watsuji’s concept of the spatial self as found in two of his major works nonetheless provides us with a fruitful philosophical counterpoint to what we find in Heidegger and Husserl. I will demonstrate how Watsuji critically appropriates both Heideggerian and Husserlian reflection. The chapter will first juxtapose Heidegger’s notion of Da-sein with
Watsuji's spatial notion of self as found in *Climate and Culture*. I will then go on to trace the development of the spatial self as it is found in Watsuji's *Ethics*. Throughout this critical analysis, I will try to determine whether or not Watsuji tips the scales too far in favour of the spatial, and what effects such an imbalance can have on a concept of self.

In the final chapter I will attempt to articulate some elements for a new philosophical discourse, one which amalgamates temporal and spatial as well as Eastern and Western aspects of the self, providing a fuller response to questions of the self than the picture currently available. Such an account can, I believe, provide us with responses to the equations mentioned at the outset of this Introduction. In this final chapter, I will return to Casey's concept of place. I will build on this concept, combining it with some of the other spatial aspects of the self that will be brought to light throughout the thesis. In doing so, I will begin to lay the framework for a new concept of self -- an implaced self that would also be an ethical self.

This thesis attempts to re-examine questions about personal identity such as "Who am I?" and "What makes me who I am?" from the point of view of the spatiality of the self. It is a response to the dominance of the temporal-technological in our society and the prevailing temporal focus of Anglo-American philosophy. In what follows I will critically examine the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and Edmund Husserl, comparing their treatments of the spatiality of the self. The philosophy of Watsuji Tetsuro will provide a further perspective on this issue -- a perspective not bound by a tradition

---

Ricoeur 328.
dominated by temporal thinking. Finally, critically linking elements of all three philosophers, I will begin to work towards a concept of an implanted self -- a concept which aims to help regain our sense of place in the world, recognizing the need for a balance of the spatial and temporal.
CHAPTER I
Heidegger and the Self in Being and Time

1. The Rejection of the Importance of the Spatial in the Concept of Self

The concept of self Heidegger proposes in Being and Time is neither the traditional concept of self as substance or as subject.¹ Heidegger proposes a new concept of self that shakes free of the hold of the Cartesian and Kantian heritage. This is evident in the creation of the term Da-sein.² What must be kept in mind, however, is that this new concept of self, while not a “subject” understood in the traditional sense, it is still “always a human ‘There-being.’”³ It is still a self that is being analysed, but a self that is both existentiell and existential (that is, both ontic -- analysed in terms of the particular situation in which Da-sein, at any given moment, finds itself -- and ontological -- concerned with the structure of Da-sein’s very existence).

From the outset of Being and Time, Heidegger makes it clear that temporality is the key to a phenomenological analysis of being-in-the-world. Da-sein is to be elucidated in temporal terms and, as we shall see, even Da-sein’s spatiality is to be subordinated to temporality. Heidegger states:

¹Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996). Hereafter, this work will be cited in the body of the text as BT followed by the English/German pagination. BT 281/304, 296/322, 305/332.
²In this thesis, I am using Joan Stambaugh’s 1996 translation of Sein und Zeit. As such, I am following her conventions, such as hyphenating Da-sein, and not capitalizing “being”. One may refer to the translator’s preface for further conventions. Owing to the frequency of use of the term Da-sein, I do not italicize it in the text.
Time must be brought to light and genuinely grasped as the horizon of every understanding and interpretation of being. For this to become clear we need an original explication of time as the horizon of the understanding of being, in terms of temporality as the being of Da-sein which understands being (BT 15/17).

We see immediately that for Heidegger, temporality reigns supreme for gaining any access to being. In inquiring about ourselves, about who we are, as Da-sein, we will gain access to being. For, as Heidegger reminds us: “Being is always the being of a being” (BT 7/9). Being then, cannot be an abstraction. It is not an abstract metaphysical construct; rather it is the way we are primordially in the world. In a marginal note on the same page (BT 7/9) he emphasizes this: “Da-sein is not an instance of being for the representational abstraction of being; rather it is the site of the understanding of being” (BT 7/9).

Here, in the context of his first explanation of the temporal nature of Da-sein, is the first “clue” to the reading of the terms explicating Da-sein’s being-in-the-world that I will elucidate in the first section of this chapter. Through a critical investigation, I will show that, despite Heidegger’s analysis of the temporal nature of Da-sein, there is an essential spatiality underlying Heidegger’s description of Da-sein’s being-in-the-world, that in fact, several of the most important ways in which Da-sein as being-in-the-world is described are spatial. While commentators have examined spatiality in Being and Time to a certain extent, my analysis will focus on the role of spatiality in Heidegger’s new concept of self. The chapter will

---

first briefly analyse the spatiality inherent in the notion of being-in. I will go on to
analyse the spatiality of the following terms in sections 22-24: “Nearness” (Nähe),
“Region” (Gegend), “De-distancing” (Ent-fernung), and “Directionality”
(Ausrichtung). In light of this analysis I will then go on to examine the concepts of
“being-with” (mitsein) and “authenticity” (Eigentlichkeit), and the problems
created by Heidegger’s lack of attention to the spatial. This will lead us to an
analysis of Heidegger’s omission of any discussion of a very basic spatiality
inherent in Da-sein -- Da-sein’s embodiment. Finally, Heidegger’s deliberate
subordination of Da-sein’s spatiality to temporality as found in section 70 of the
second division of Being and Time will be examined.

2. The Spatiality of “Being-in”

Although not explicitly, Heidegger does recognize Da-sein’s spatiality and
its importance to the constitution of Da-sein early on in Being and Time. This
early spatiality is revealed in the concept of being-in-the-world as the fundamental
constitution of Da-sein (BT 49/52). Heidegger’s brief description of being-in in
section 12 is one we will see further developed and expanded when we examine
his later work in Chapter Two. The description of being-in in section 12 is the
first indication that space, and consequently the spatiality of Da-sein, is not to be
understood traditionally. Being-in-the-world is not to be understood as our being
in the world the way that water is in a glass. For, in this case we mean by “in”:

the relation of being that two beings extended “in” space have to
each other with regard to their location in that space . . . . This
relation of being can be expanded; that is, the bench in the lecture hall, the lecture hall in the university, the university in the city, and so on until: the bench in “world space.” These beings whose being “in” one another can be determined in this way all have the same kind of being -- that of being objectively present -- as things occurring “within” the world. . . . They belong to beings whose kind of being is unlike Da-sein. (BT 50/54)

Da-sein, however, does not meet these objects in absolute space, rather:

The things we deal with are near or far relative to us; according to Heidegger, this nearness or farness of things is how we first become familiar with that which we (later) represent to ourselves as “space.” . . . It is because we act spatially, going to places and reaching for things to use, that we can even develop a conception of abstract space at all.4

We notice the stress on Da-sein’s role in becoming familiar with these spatial concepts, for being-in is an existential of Da-sein, a constitution of its being (BT 50/54). The active role of Da-sein with respect to spatiality and its connection to the being of Da-sein becomes even more evident when Heidegger etymologically analyses the word “in,” explaining that “‘In’ stems from innan-, to live, habitare, to dwell. ‘An’ means I am used to, familiar with, I take care of something . . . . The expression ‘bin’ is connected with ‘bei.’ ‘Ich bin’ (I am) means I dwell, I stay near” (BT 51/54). We will see how central this interpretation of “in” is to Heidegger’s later work in Chapter Two. For the moment, it demonstrates the inherent spatiality of one of Da-sein’s existentials, which in turn implies a spatiality central to Da-sein’s being.

---

Let us return to the first “clue” to the reading I propose. In German, the marginal note at page 7/9 reads: “Dasein ist nicht ein Fall von Seiendem für die vorstellende Abstraktion des Seins, wohl aber die Stätte des Seinsverständnisses” (cf. above, p. 22). Stambaugh translates Stätte as “site,” but in German it also has the meaning of place. Either way it is translated, it makes something important very clear: from the earliest pages of *Being and Time*, being, if it is to be understood at all, needs a *place*, somewhere to be — not only sometime. Here Heidegger is telling us that the key to understanding being is Da-sein and furthermore, that Da-sein is a concrete being, which is in turn the site, the place where being itself can be understood. This is a key for our investigation for two reasons. First, it confirms that being itself in *Being and Time* is always going to be mediated through human beings understood as Da-sein. Second, we see that in this small note, Heidegger himself recognized, upon a re-reading of his work, that the spatial does indeed have an important role in the understanding of both being and beings.


Heidegger’s treatment of the spatiality of the world and Da-sein’s spatiality is, as we have seen, something of an inversion of the traditional notion of space as a container. Most important in this “new” concept of space is the active role played by Da-sein in determining, or carving out space. We only come to an
understanding of the space around us by virtue of our participation in shaping it.

We come upon the spatiality of the handiness (Zuhandenheit) of things in any use of the term “handy,” for this handiness implies a nearness (Nähe). This nearness is not however, simply a physical closeness, Heidegger explains that beings “at hand” have their various proximities which are not ascertained by measuring distances” (BT 95/102).

We will see the notion of nearness more fully developed in Heidegger’s later work in Chapter Two. What is important to note is Da-sein’s active role in creating this nearness: “The structured nearness of useful things means that they do not simply have a place in space, objectively present somewhere, but as useful things are essentially installed, put in their place, set up, and put in order” (BT 95/102). It is Da-sein who installs the useful things, creating a place for them:

The actual place is defined as the place of this useful thing for . . . in terms of a totality of the interconnected places of the context of useful things at hand in the surrounding world . . . . Place is always the definite ‘over there’ and the ‘there’ of a useful thing belonging there. Actual belonging there corresponds to the useful character of what is at hand, that is, to its relevant belonging to a totality of useful things. But a whereto in general, in which the positional totality is referred to a context of useful things, underlies the positional belonging somewhere of a totality of useful things as the condition of their possibility. We call this whereto of the possible belonging somewhere of useful things, circumspectly held in view in advance, and heedful association, the region (BT 95/102-3).

Regions are created by Da-sein, for it is Da-sein who creates the places, who holds the region in view and then puts useful things in given positions. In a sense, then, we see how Da-sein creates space -- this is not, however, to imply that the kind of spatiality proposed by Heidegger is purely subjective and dependent on Da-sein, nor is it to be taken as purely objective. Action is the key to the new theory of space proposed by Heidegger. As Yoko Arisaka explains: “Heidegger wants to claim that referential functionality is an inherent feature of space itself, and not just a ‘human’ characteristic added to a container-like space.”

Arisaka further points out that regions not only are determined by us, by our activities but in turn, these regions determine those very same activities performed by us: “Regions ‘refer’ to our activities since they are established by our ways of being and our activities. Our activities, in turn, are defined in terms of regions.”

The interdependence expressed here by Arisaka will be further elucidated in Chapter Four where we see Watsuji Tetsuro’s notion of subjective spatiality discussed. The fact that not only do we create the regions, but that the regions inform our actions as well leads us to an interesting point made by Jeff Malpas.

Malpas points out that often “the idea of . . . a ‘sense of place’ is used to indicate a person’s (or a community’s) sense of self-identity or self-definition as achieved through a particular place or locality.” He goes on to make the claim “not just that persons are identified by reference to places, but that persons are constituted in

---

7 Arisaka, “Heidegger’s Theory” 459.
terms of places, while places themselves are understood almost as persons." We see here an inherent link between spatiality of the type Heidegger is proposing and the constitution of the self; Da-sein, in the space of a region is not only constituting that place, but is itself constituted at the same time.

It is not the case that there is first an empty container-like space which is then filled up with things. Rather, it is the discovery of places within a region which allows us to discover, or posit 'empty' space:

There is never a three-dimensional multiplicity of possible positions initially given which is then filled out with objectively present things. This dimensionality of space is still veiled in the spatiality of what is at hand. The "above" is what is "on the ceiling," the "below" is what is "on the floor," the "behind" is what is "at the door." All these wheres are discovered and circumspectly interpreted on the paths and ways of everyday associations, they are not ascertained and catalogued by the observational measurement of space (BT 96/103).

It is the discovery of these places, through Da-sein's everyday being-in-the-world, and in turn the recognition of a region which has hitherto remained "inconspicuously familiar," which creates the possibility of the observational measurement of space:

Space, which is discovered in circumspect being-in-the-world as the spatiality of a totality of useful things, belongs to beings themselves as their place. Bare space is still veiled. Space is split up into places. But this spatiality has its own unity by virtue of the worldlike totality of relevance of what is spatially at hand. The "surrounding world" does not arrange itself in a previously given space, but rather its specific worldliness articulates in its significance the relevant context of an actual totality of places circumspectly referred to each

---

other. The actual world discovers the spatiality of space belonging to it. The fact that what is at hand can be encountered in its space of the surrounding world is ontically possible only because Da-sein itself is “spatial” with regard to its being-in-the-world (BT 96-97/104).

Heidegger has not only turned the empty container notion of space inside out, but has brought to light the human element inherent in it. As Fernand Couturier points out, Heidegger’s concept of space always appears within the context established by the beings in it, not as “space as such.” The beings in the world establish the space and at the same time then derive their spatiality from this world.⁹

Section 23 deals with two important terms for Da-sein’s being-in-the-world: de-distancing (Ent-fernung) and directionality (Ausrichtung). Once again, we see the active role Da-sein has in Heidegger’s conception of spatiality. As put by Arisaka, what Heidegger “is trying to capture is the difference between the nominal expression ‘we exist in space’ and the adverbial expression ‘we exist spatially.’ He wants to describe spatiality as a mode of our existence, rather than conceiving space as an independent entity.”¹⁰ De-distancing is a manner of Da-sein’s being-in-the-world. However, Heidegger does not intend this notion to be understood as having to do with a notion of measurement or proximity, “we do not

---


¹⁰ Arisaka, “Heidegger’s Theory” 458.
understand anything like remoteness (nearness) or even being at a distance. We use the expression de-distancing in an active and transitive sense” (BT 97/105). Once again we see the dynamic role of Da-sein. Heidegger tells us Da-sein “is essentially de-distancing, that is, it is spatial” (BT 100/108). “De-distancing means making distance disappear, making the being at a distance of something disappear, bringing it near” (BT 97/105). As with nearness, it has nothing to do with physical distance or proximity, although this is not precluded either. It is de-distancing that brings things to hand, ready for use in a given region. De-distancing also reveals something quite surprising about Da-sein.

Despite his assertion of the primordial temporal nature of Da-sein, here Heidegger tells us that it is essentially spatial. While it at first appears that Heidegger is contradicting himself, a closer look reveals that this is not the case. De-distancing, bringing things near, for which Da-sein has a natural tendency, occurs in the inauthentic being-in-the-world of Da-sein, in the world of the they. The de-distancing pushed for in the everyday world of the “they” is not always something positive in fact, as we will see later it results in Da-sein losing itself. So we see that here, Heidegger links Da-sein’s spatiality with inauthenticity and a masking of being.

Despite their occurrence in inauthenticity, however, nearing and de-distancing are still more heedful ways of being than measuring distances ‘objectively.’ “An ‘objectively’ long path can be shorter than an ‘objectively’
much shorter path which is perhaps an ‘onerous one’ and strikes one as infinitely long. *When it “strikes” one thus, however, the actual world is first truly at hand.* The objective distances of objectively present things do not coincide with the remoteness and nearness of what is at hand within the world”(BT 98-99/106). It is the recognition of this nearness or remoteness apart from physical, or mathematical measurement, as Heidegger stresses in several places, that spatiality as Da-sein itself spatializing is first recognized.

Heidegger brings up everyday examples to illustrate this notion:

We say that to go over there is a good walk, a stone’s throw, as long as it takes to smoke a pipe. These measures express the fact that they not only do not intend to ‘measure,’ but that the estimated remoteness belongs to a being which one approaches in a circumspect, heedful way (BT 98/106).

Through determining these sorts of “measures,” which rely on Da-sein’s experience, Da-sein de-distances and in its heedful, circumspect being, it spatializes, bringing close distances of which in a “calculative sense these estimations may be imprecise and variable, but they have their own thoroughly intelligible definiteness in the everydayness of Da-sein”(BT 98/105). It is important to note that Heidegger stresses the fact that this is not merely a “subjective” as opposed to “objective” notion of space:

> When there is a prior orientation toward “nature” and the “objectively” measured distances of things, one is inclined to consider such interpretations and estimates of remoteness “subjective.” However, that is a “subjectivity” which perhaps discovers what is most real about the “reality” of the world, which

---

11Heidegger’s emphasis.
has nothing to do with “subjective” arbitrariness and the subjectivistic “conceptions” of beings which are “in themselves” otherwise. The circumspect de-distancing of everyday Da-sein discovers the being-in-itself of the “true” world, of beings with which Da-sein as existing is always already together (BT 99/106).  

In a 1997 article, Jeff Malpas distinguishes between subjective and objective spatiality. He also uses the term “experiential space” to refer to subjective space, denoting the fact that it is a referential space that involves an awareness of one’s surroundings and action in it -- much like the way Da-sein spatializes in creating regions: “Subjective space is perspectival, but it is also a space that has a certain orientation and extension to it -- it is indeed a space that ‘gives space’ for action.” Malpas’ concept does not focus as much on the spatializing role of the subject, but there is an intimation of this role which supports my use of it in elucidating Heidegger’s concept of space, for Malpas does point out that this ‘experiential space’ indicates “the way in which a creature’s subjective space is precisely the space of that creature’s own involvement with the world, the space of awareness within which it acts and with respect to which its actions are oriented and located.”

Like Heidegger, Malpas is trying to overcome the traditional subject/object dichotomy in notions of space. Malpas explains “objective” spatiality as detached, map-like, objective spatial representation, where no one feature or location has

---

12Heidegger’s emphasis.
14 Malpas, “Space and Sociality” 56.
priority over any other, it is non-perspectival.\textsuperscript{16} However, our role in the constitution even of “objective” space cannot be abstracted. He points out that to “abstract from \textit{all} subjective features of a space . . . is to be left, not with a purely objective space, but with no concept of space at all -- there is nothing ‘left over.’”\textsuperscript{17} Objective space is as much our creation as subjective space.\textsuperscript{18} It arises only out of our abstracting from our subjective experiences and indicates the importance of the role of Da-sein.\textsuperscript{19}

In the end, we find Malpas not that far from Heidegger’s concept. For Heidegger, the key is, if we recall Arisaka, the Da-sein’s active role in spatiality, as existing spatially rather than existing in space. Malpas points out that the concepts both of subjective and objective space and the concept of self are interdependent:

\begin{quote}
In first-person terms one can say that for me to have a concept of myself is for me to have a concept of the space that I inhabit as indeed “mine,” just as it is to have a concept of the experiences that fill my consciousness as also “mine.” And for this to be possible is also for me to be able to have a sense of locatedness, of orientation,
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{15} Malpas, “Space and Sociality” 56.
\textsuperscript{16} Malpas, “Space and Sociality” 58-9.
\textsuperscript{17} Malpas, “Space and Sociality” 63.
\textsuperscript{18} This should not be taken in an idealist sense, as it might if it were read with a strictly ontological interpretation. What I am illustrating here is that Heidegger, Husserl (see note 19) and, Watsuji (see Chapter 4) all recognize that we cannot know ‘objective’ or ‘subjective’ space in any sense without a certain interpretation. Even the idea of ‘objective’ space, something generally held by science to be outside of human creation, comes out of the culture of science. Science teaches us that space is something objective, or empty - something that existed before us, but we have given it this meaning so in this sense the ‘objective’ idea of space is our creation just as much as a ‘subjective’ idea of space. See also Chapter 3, note 40.
within objective space, or more generally within an objective spatio-temporal order, and to have some conceptual grasp of that order.\textsuperscript{20}

This indeed seems to be the way in which Da-sein is in the world when it discovers space in its heedful being-in-the-world.

The other way in which Da-sein exists spatially is through directionality (\textit{Ausrichtung}), an existential character of Da-sein which it has at the same time as de-distancing. It is an orientation of sorts, a particular heading towards: “Every bringing near has always taken a direction in a region beforehand from which what is de-distanced approaches so that it can be discovered with regard to its place”(BT 100/108). Heidegger tells us that “the directionality that belongs to de-distancing is grounded in being-in-the-world. Left and right are not something ‘subjective’ for which the subject has a feeling, but they are directions of orientation in a world which is always already at hand” (BT 101/109).

We see here how this orientation is grounded in Da-sein’s actions, which already played a role in creating a region where Da-sein de-distanced things and made them handy. “Directedness toward the right or the left is grounded in the essential directionality of Da-sein in general, which in turn is essentially determined by being-in-the-world”(BT 102/110). So, even though Da-sein’s directionality may be seen to be “objective” in a sense of the kind of “objective” directions or orientations such as right and left, up and down, Heidegger wished to maintain Da-sein’s role in the determination of these directions -- “subjective” and

\textsuperscript{20} Malpas, “Space and Sociality” 68.
"objective" are not diametrically opposed, rather they are interconnected notions, neither having sense without the other. We will see Heidegger continually collapse traditional dualisms throughout his work, both in *Being and Time* as well as in his later work discussed in the next chapter.

It is not until section 24 that we arrive at that notion of space which has traditionally been taken as our first understanding of space. Throughout the previous sections Heidegger has insisted that bare space, or empty space has been hidden to Da-sein. Da-sein’s concept of spatiality has been determined by its *being-in-the-world*. This kind of space however, Heidegger tells us “does not yet have the characteristic of a pure manifold of three dimensions” (BT 102/110).

Heidegger maintains that in order to come to an understanding of “pure” space, we must first “go back to the world” (BT 105/113). In this section we see another way in which Da-sein, as being-in-the-world spatializes and is spatial. Through de-distancing and directionality, Da-sein allowed beings to be circumspectly encountered, to be brought near. Here, Heidegger refers to this as “giving space” or “making room,” “freeing things at hand for their spatiality” (BT 103/111). This, Heidegger tells us, is how we first discover space: “On the basis of the spatiality thus discovered, space itself becomes accessible to cognition” (BT 103/111).

Space is not “in” the subject, nor is the world in space as it has been traditionally understood; rather it is Da-sein’s spatiality as being-in-the-world that discloses Da-sein to us as “spatial in a primordial sense” (BT 103/111), in which “space
shows itself as \textit{a priori} (BT 103/111). Da-sein then, already has an understanding of “pure homogeneous space” -- but it is only through the spatiality of circumspect being-in-the-world that one can abstract this notion from the world:

Where space is discovered non-circumspectly by just looking at it, the regions of the surrounding world get neutralized to pure dimensions. The places and the totality of places of useful things at hand, which are circumspectly oriented, are reduced to a multiplicity of positions for random things. The spatiality of innerworldly things loses its character of relevance. . . . ‘The world’ as a totality of useful things at hand is spatialized to become a connection of extended things which are merely objectively present. The homogeneous space of nature shows itself only when the beings we encounter are discovered in such a way that the worldly character of what is at hand gets specifically deprived of its worldliness (BT 104/112).

What is important to note here is that this observance, and consequent theorizing and measurement of “pure homogeneous space” is made possible only by Da-sein’s being-in-the-world and its primordial spatiality:

Space does not become accessible only by depriving the surrounding world of its worldliness. Spatiality can be discovered in general only on the basis of world in such a way that space, after all, \textit{also} constitutes the world in accordance with the essential spatiality of Da-sein itself with regard to its fundamental constitution of being-in-the-world (BT 105/113).

We see here a deep interdependence between both “kinds” of space and Da-sein, something which we will see developed by Watsuji Tetsuro in his analysis of spatiality in Chapter Four.
4. Being-with (Mitsein) and Authenticity (Eigentlichkeit)

Heidegger maintains that along with the primordiality of Da-sein’s being-in-the-world, Da-sein is also always already being-with (BT 107/114) and that being-with “existentially determines Da-sein even when another is not factically present and perceived” (BT 113/120). Indeed, one of Heidegger’s criticisms of Kant’s concept of the self as subject, is that “the I again was forced back to an isolated subject that accompanies representations” (BT 295-96/321). However, as Christopher Fynsk points out, despite Heidegger’s break with the tradition of positing an isolated subject as the starting point of an investigation into human being in the world, “his analysis of Dasein in Being and Time leads back insistently to the solitary self.”21 In this section I will first examine the spatiality of being-with. I will then analyse the notion of authenticity and see how these concepts affect the constitution of the self.

I have shown how being-in-the-world is essentially spatial. Furthermore, Heidegger tells us: “This fundamental constitution of Da-sein determines every mode of its being” (BT 110/117). Being-in-the-world, we saw, involved Da-sein’s de-distancing and directionality, its defining of its world and itself in a fundamentally spatial manner. Just as fundamentally, Da-sein’s being-in-the-world is also being-with others (BT 112/118). “The world of Da-sein is a with-world... The innerworldly being-in-itself of others is Mitda-sein” (BT 112/118). These

---

others, Heidegger stresses, are always already there in the world in which Da-sein dwells. Da-sein interprets itself and encounters others in the context of this world, and in being-in-the-world of the other Dasein (BT 112/119, 113/120).

Furthermore, Da-sein both determines and is determined by this place — its surrounding world. Heidegger explains that even Da-sein’s expression “I here,” is an expression of its primordial spatiality as being-in and being-with:

The “here,” “over there,” and “there” are not primarily pure locative designations of innerworldly beings objectively present at positions in space, but, rather, characteristics of the primordial spatiality of Da-sein. The supposedly locative adverbs are determinations of Da-sein; they have primarily an existential, not a categorial, meaning. But they are not pronouns, either. Their significance is prior to the distinction of locative adverbs and personal pronouns. The true spatial meaning of these expressions for Da-sein, however, documents the fact that the theoretically undistorted interpretation of Da-sein sees the latter immediately in its spatial “being-together-with” the world taken care of, spatial in the sense of de-distancing and directionality. In the “here” Da-sein, absorbed in its world, does not address itself, but speaks away from itself, in circumspection, to the “over there” of something at hand and means, however, itself in its existential spatiality (BT 112/119-20).

Da-sein as itself in its existential spatiality is never without relation to other things at hand; this we saw by virtue of its being-in, nor is it ever without relation, existentially and ontologically, to other Da-seins: “The being-alone of Da-sein, too, is being-with in the world. The other can be lacking only in and for a being-with” (BT 113/120).

Once again Heidegger does not intend what one might “normally” understand by being-with, for, as he points out, “factual being alone is not
changed by the fact that a second copy of a human being is ‘next to’ me, or perhaps ten human beings. Even when these and still more are objectively present, Da-sein can be alone” (BT 113/120). As explained by Joel Shapiro, in his analysis of *Mitsein,* “Heidegger is resisting two ghosts: the reduction of Dasein to thinghood, to substance . . . and the solipsism that appears to issue from philosophies of intersubjectivity” where Da-sein is taken first “as an isolated ‘I’ that, hopefully, *then* enters into community with others.”²² Because being-in is spatial, and being-with is being-in, then being-with must also be spatial, spatial in the way that is unique to Da-sein.

According to Shapiro, Heidegger sees the traditional binary “I”/“other” opposition as leading “to a negativity; that is the very division into ‘I’ and ‘other’ that is a negativization, annulment, or splitting up of a more originary being-with.” Shapiro maintains that in fact, in Heidegger’s concept of being-with as an existential of Da-sein, “Dasein’s sociality is disqualified only insofar as the possibility of a more radical or originary being-with is opened up.”²³

We will see, through our investigation of being-with and authenticity whether or not Shapiro’s statement holds. Heidegger himself states that “the understanding of others already lies in the understanding of being of Da-sein because its being is being-with” (BT 116/123) and this would seem to support Shapiro’s claim. However, for the most part Da-sein is not in the world in such a

---

way that it recognizes this understanding of others. And we will see that the concept of authentic being-with is very difficult to understand in terms of a “more originary” being-with.

In everyday being-in-the-world Da-sein is subsumed in the world of the ‘they’; Da-sein is not itself, rather Da-sein as its authentic self disappears:

This being-with-one-another dissolves one’s own Da-sein completely into the kind of being of ‘the others’ in such a way that the others, as distinguishable and explicitly, disappear more and more. In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the they unfolds its true dictatorship. We enjoy ourselves and have fun the way they enjoy themselves. We read, see, and judge literature and art the way they see and judge. But we also withdraw from the ‘great mass’ the way they withdraw, we find ‘shocking’ what they find shocking. The they, which is nothing definite and which all are, though not as a sum, prescribes the kind of being of everydayness (BT 119/127).

In the everyday being-in-the-world the true nature of being-with is masked, for Da-sein has lost itself in the they, where there is no differentiation from one Da-sein to the next, for “Everyone is the other, and no one is himself” (BT 120/128).

One major difficulty in trying to think a new kind of radical being-with, such as that which Shapiro interprets Heidegger as proposing, is the necessity to abandon the Cartesian picture of the self, and the dualism that goes with it. Heidegger must maintain Da-sein as a being which is a concrete site for being, while not making Da-sein a personal subject. Yet this does not mean eliminating any concept of self. As Fynsk explains, “Heidegger seeks to unseat [the] subject from its central position as subjectum but does not renounce all effort to situate or

---

23 Shapiro 401.
position the subject or self; he situates it elsewhere - in relation to the 'there' of Dasein."²⁴ Arisaka too sees this situation or positioning of Da-sein²⁵ which is reflected in her observation that Da-sein is "born at a particular place, lives in a particular place, dies in a particular place, all of which it can relate to in an authentic way. The place Dasein lives is not a place of anonymous involvements."²⁶ However, we will see that unfortunately, Arisaka's statement cannot hold for Heidegger's concept of authentic Da-sein and authentic being-with.

In his discussion of authenticity, Heidegger stresses Da-sein's primordial being-in-the-world just as much as he did in the analysis of inauthentic Da-sein: "As authentic being-a-self, resoluteness does not detach Da-sein from its world, nor does it isolate it as free floating ego. How could it, if resoluteness as authentic disclosedness is, after all, nothing other than authentically being-in-the-world?"(BT 274/298).

There is no question of the fact that even, or perhaps especially, for Heidegger's project, Da-sein is always already in the world, in fact, that Da-sein is spatial, as we have shown being-in-the-world to be just that. Authentic being-towards-death does not "mean a detachment in which one flees from the world, but brings one without illusions to the resoluteness of 'acting.' Nor does anticipatory resoluteness stem from 'idealistic' expectations soaring above existence and its

²⁴ Fynsk 29.
²⁵ See 45.
possibilities; but arises from the sober understanding of the basic factual possibilities of Da-sein” (BT 286/310), one of which is of course, being-in-the-world. The problem is that Heidegger’s insistence on the solitariness of authentic Da-sein makes it difficult to understand how authentic being-with plays out.

We have seen that Da-sein is mostly its inauthentic self, subsumed by the they and not genuinely being-with others. In fact, Heidegger states that “Initially, ‘I’ ‘am’ not in the sense of my own self, but I am the others in the mode of the they. In terms of the they, and as the they, I am initially ‘given’ to ‘myself.’ Initially, Da-sein is the they and for the most part it remains so” (BT 121/129). This is inauthentic being-oneself and inauthentic being-with-others. We also remember however, that primordially, as authentic, Heidegger wants to maintain that Da-sein does genuinely understand others. Only as authentic, then, can this being-with be genuine, originary and radical. The problem arises because of the stress Heidegger places on the solitary nature of authentic Da-sein, which is what we will now examine.

Authenticity as authentic being-towards-death remains for the most part utterly non-relational and Da-sein’s ownmost possibility:

Being toward it discloses to Da-sein its ownmost potentiality-of-being in which it is concerned about the being of Da-sein absolutely. Here the fact can become evident to Da-sein that in the eminent possibility of itself it is torn away from the they, that is, anticipation can always already have torn itself away from the they (BT 243/263).

---

This must introduce a new kind of being-with, for being-with up to this point has been in the everydayness of Da-sein’s being-in-the-world, in its submersion in the they. As Heidegger states:

The nonrelational character of death understood in anticipation individualizes Da-sein down to itself . . . It reveals the fact that any being-together-with what is taken care of and any being-with the others fails when one’s ownmost potentiality-of-being is at stake. Da-sein can authentically be itself only when it makes that possible of its own accord (BT 243/263).

It seems as if any kind of being-with would be incompatible with authentic Da-sein, because, in authentic anticipation of being-towards-death Da-sein must be individualized down to itself only. Indeed, Heidegger’s own insistence on the non-relational aspect of the possibility would lead us along these lines. This is the paradoxical position which led Christopher Fynsk to make his statement regarding the continual return of Heidegger’s analysis of Da-sein to a solitary self.

Michael Theunissen phrases the paradox in the following manner: “Since being-in-the-world becomes authentic together with the self, being with Others must also participate in authenticity . . . . The question is, however, how individualization and authentic communalization can be thought together concretely.”27 Despite the non-relational aspect of authenticity — of Da-sein’s no longer being-in-the-world with others as part of the they — Heidegger is careful to make clear that

---

this does not . . . mean at all that these modes of Da-sein have been

cut off from its authentic being a self. As essential structures of the

constitution of Da-sein they also belong to the condition of the

possibility of existence in general. Da-sein is authentically itself

only if it projects itself, as being-together with things taken care of

and concernful being-with . . ., primarily upon its ownmost

potentiality-of-being, rather than upon the possibility of the they-self

(BT 243-263).

In fact, Heidegger further states that it is precisely the individualizing aspect of
deadth that allows for authentic being-with: “As the nonrelational possibility, death

individualizes, but only, as the possibility not-to-be-bypassed, in order to make

Da-sein as being-with understand the potentialities-of-being of the others” (BT

244/264). Heidegger re-states this later on:

authentic disclosedness then modifies equiprimordially the
discoveredness of “world” grounded in it and the disclosedness of
being-with with others. The “world” at hand does not become
different as far as “content,” the circle of others is not exchanged for
a new one, and yet the being toward things at hand which
understands and takes care of things, and the concerned being-with
with the others is now defined in terms of their ownmost
potentiality-of-being-a-self (BT 274/297-98).

We find Heidegger struggling with this tension between individuation and being-

with and being-in, for despite the nonrelational, individuating aspect of
authenticity, Da-sein remains being-in-the-world. Authentic being-with has
become concerned being-with with the others, which entails a freeing of others.
This is done through resoluteness which “brings Da-sein to the possibility of

letting the others who are with it ‘be’ in their ownmost potentiality-of-being . . .
It is from the authentic being a self of resoluteness that authentic being-with-one-
another first arises” (BT 274/298).

We notice here two things, first of all the stress on the temporal nature of
authenticity, and consequently, the stress on the temporal for Da-sein in its
authentic existence. Second, authentic being-with-one-another not only requires,
but is, in its essence, being individualized. Theunissen explains that the non-
relational character of authentic being-towards death “determines the sense of
‘authentic being-with-one-another’ that springs from individualization . . . The
concrete connection of individualization and authentic communalization lies in
this, that the seizure of the ownmost first frees one for an awareness of the most
alien aspect of the alien -- as the ownmost of the Other.”

Again Heidegger has radically reinterpreted a traditional philosophical
concept. Being-with is something that would normally be construed as relational.
But in Heidegger’s interpretation, authentic relations between people have become
centred on individuation, on freeing oneself precisely from the others in order to
recognize them as apart from oneself. Authentic being-with, we have seen is, in
fact, being alone, freeing the other from me: “Letting be, however, which from a
positive standpoint stands for the recognition of the ownmost being of Others, is,
from a negative standpoint, the dissolution of all direct connection between Others
and me. Others can only be freed for themselves inasmuch as they are freed from

---

28 Theunissen 190.
Da-sein was directly with others only in inauthenticity, in the world of the they; as authentic, Da-sein’s being-with is indirect. In fact, Da-sein “achieves its authentic self without the positive connection of Dasein-with.”

Theunissen explains how this leads to the indirect nature of authentic being-with:

The aloneness that arises in view of this nonrelatedness is the prime fact of the authentic being of the self. Since in the authentic being of the self, this running ahead toward death has to happen continually, it cannot be suspended, so long as the being of the self is authentic. This means, however, that should authentically existing Dasein also exist formally as being-with-Others, the latter can still never work its way into its ownmost [authentic] being.

It is this lack of positive connection that sits uneasily with us as part of a phenomenological analysis meant to elucidate our being-in-the-world which is meant to be at the same time being-with-others. Heidegger proposes a being-with with no concrete relational aspects.

Heidegger’s insistence on the temporal is what causes this problem. This insistence leads to the abstract nature of authentic being-with which, as we have seen, does not address concrete being-in-the-world. Heidegger does however admit an aspect of the spatial in the concept of authenticity, within the concept of resoluteness. Through the authentic being a self of resoluteness, Da-sein creates a

---

29 Theunissen 191.
30 Theunissen 189-90.
31 Theunissen 192 n.34.
32 Theunissen 190.
space for authentic being-in-the-world and being-with one another. This is what Heidegger terms "situation" which he admits, is spatial:

the spatiality of Da-sein, on the basis of which existence actually determines its "place," is grounded in the constitution of being-in-the-world, for which disclosedness is primarily constitutive. Just as the spatiality of the there is grounded in disclosedness, situation has its basis in resoluteness. Situation is the there disclosed in resoluteness -- as which the existing being is there (BT 276/299).

The spatiality inherent in Heidegger's choice of term (situation) which he defines as "position- 'to be in the position of'" (BT 275/299) is clear. We also see the development of the spatializing action of Da-sein mentioned earlier in the chapter, for through resoluteness Da-sein creates situatedness, the there, the place revealed in resoluteness: "Far removed from any objectively present mixture of the circumstances and accidents encountered, situation is only through and in resoluteness" (BT 276/300) and resoluteness is only possible through Da-sein in its leaping ahead of itself to its ownmost potentiality-of-being its authentic self.

Through being resolute then, Da-sein once again spatializes, through bringing "the being of the there to the existence of its situation" (276/300), by bringing authentic Da-sein to a place, to its place in the world. However, Heidegger's concept of authentic Da-sein and the indirectness of authentic being-with serve, as we will see in a moment, to remove authentic Da-sein from having a place that we can make phenomenological sense of.
5. The Omission of the Lived Body

In Heidegger's analysis of Da-sein in Being and Time, Yoko Arisaka points out one of the most troubling results of his insistence on the temporal above all: "If Being-towards-death, potentiality-for-Being, and possibility were 'purely' temporal notions, what phenomenological sense can we make of such abstract conceptions, given that these are manifestly our modes of existence as bodily beings?"33 Heidegger's analysis is meant to be the phenomenological explication of how we are in the world, yet it seems to be detached from lived experience, as we saw with the concept of authentic being-with, and also from our bodily experience of being-in-the-world. In making authentic being-with dependent on Da-sein's individualization, we saw how Heidegger made authentic being-with indirect. This also precludes any authentic being-with that would include Da-sein's embodiment. It is difficult to tell whether or not this is because the body is taken for granted as not important or if it is a deliberate omission on Heidegger's part. Direct being-with is at least implied in inauthentic being-in-the-world. A more radical overthrowing of the Cartesian tradition would have been a bonding of body-mind, which would have truly been an opening of a different concept of self.

Being-in, being-with, encountering other Da-seins in the world -- Da-sein is immersed in the world, and clearly is as we have seen, spatial in the world to a very large extent. Yet, Heidegger maintains at the beginning of his discussion of being-in that, despite the fact that it is an existential, "we cannot understand by
this the objective presence of a material thing (the human body) ‘in’ a being objectively present” (BT50/54). He goes on to explain that

being-in cannot be clarified ontologically by an ontic characteristic, by saying for example: being-in in a world is a spiritual quality and the “spatiality” of human being is an attribute of its bodiliness which is always at the same time “based on” corporeality. Then we again have to do with a being-objectively-present-together of a spiritual thing thus constituted with a corporeal thing, and the being of the beings thus compounded is more obscure than ever. (BT 52/56)

Heidegger’s intention of breaking free from the traditional Cartesian dualistic view of the person is very clear in these passages. However, can he simply dismiss Da-sein’s embodiment, given that his investigation is phenomenological and that many of his notions are indeed “manifestly our modes of existence as bodily beings?”

Being-in-the-world, encountering other Da-seins, using tools, all these things are embodied actions and this cannot be ignored; yet Heidegger consistently skips over this aspect of Da-sein’s being-in-the-world, of Da-sein as a lived-body, a notion developed as we will see, to a certain extent by Husserl.

In section 23, Heidegger makes it clear that Da-sein’s embodiment is not to be discussed: “The spatialization of Da-sein in its ‘corporeality,’ which contains a problematic of its own not to be discussed here, is also marked out in accordance with these directions” (BT 101/109). Heidegger recognizes that there is some sort

---

33 Arisaka, “Spatiality, Temporality” 41.
34 Arisaka, “Spatiality, Temporality” 41.
35 The notion of the lived body was developed by Merleau-Ponty in part as a reaction to its omission by Heidegger. I will not, however, be analysing Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the lived body in this thesis due to limits of length. It is however, an area which bears investigation.
of link between Da-sein’s spatiality and its embodiment, but states decisively that he is not going to investigate it here (nor does he investigate it anywhere else for that matter). The above citation moves on directly to discussion of tools in terms of orientation and distantiality that is somehow removed from the body, even if the tools are used by embodied Da-sein:

Thus things at hand and in use for the body, such as gloves, for example, that must go along with the hands’ movement, must be oriented in terms of right and left. Tools, however, which are held in the hand and moved with it, do not go along with the specifically “handlike” movement of the hand. Thus there are no right- and left-handed hammers, even though they are held with the hand as gloves are (BT 101/109).

Da-sein’s body is made invisible through de-distancing and directionality. It is out of this directionality, Heidegger tells us, that right and left emerge -- but he seems to forget that there would be no point of reference for these directions without Da-sein’s body. Not only is Da-sein’s body made invisible, but those others Da-sein encounters in work in the everyday world too are made invisible as other Da-seins:

“Just as the one for whose body the equipment disclosed in work is supposed to be tailored appears as its bearer and only as this, so the Other is similarly determined, from the determination of the equipment, simply as ‘producer’ or ‘supplier’ of the materials that are made use of.”36 The individual as Da-sein, the other as independent of the tools he or she produces holds no interest for Da-sein,

---

36 Theunissen 183.
according to Heidegger’s interpretation, other than as an anonymous producer or supplier.

Heidegger further distances Da-sein from its embodiment when discussing its being-with. Heidegger tells us that “together with the useful things found in work, others are ‘also encountered’ for whom the ‘work’ is to be done” (BT 111/117):

The field, for example, along which we walk ‘outside’ shows itself as belonging to such and such a person who keeps it in good order, the book which we use is bought at such and such a place, given by such and such a person, and so on. The boat anchored at the shore refers in its being-in-itself to an acquaintance who undertakes his voyages with it, but as a ‘boat strange to us,’ it also points to others (BT 111/118).

In his attempt to demonstrate the always-already nature of being-with, Heidegger in fact separates us from others in the most basic of encounters, that of the face-to-face encounter with another human being. Heidegger’s encounters are always through tools: “the Other is essentially . . . that which is mediated by equipment . . . in the analysis of being-with, the immediacy of the encounter with the Other is discounted . . . because the medium of the ‘world’ is interposed between ‘me’ and Others.” Embodied or not, there never seems to be any direct connection between Da-seins.

Marjorie Grene points out the omission of the body in her discussion of Heidegger’s use of the fable about “care” which he invokes in section 42 to support his position of the primordiality of Da-sein’s temporality (BT 183/196).
For Heidegger the central points are that care has dominion over Da-sein as long as it exists and that its primordial being "is left to Saturn, 'time'" (BT 185/198). Thus, Heidegger explains, "The pre-ontological characterization of the essence of the human being expressed in this fable thus has envisaged from the very beginning the mode of being which rules its temporal sojourn in the world" (BT 185/198-99). Heidegger completely minimizes the role played by Earth in this fable, which serves, on his account, simply to give Da-sein its name, as a descriptor of that of which it consists. As Grene explains:

But in that very story, it was clay, humus, from which man was fashioned, and that is why Earth demanded that he be called after humus, homo. Heidegger took up the cause of Care, who made the creature, but forgot the material it was fashioned from, which is after all just as necessary to shaping its existence as is the 'spirit,' the breath of life, that Jove infused in it. Without clay, without embodiment, there is no humanity, not only nowhere to be . . . but no one to be there.38

Nowhere in Being and Time, does Heidegger discuss Da-sein’s lived body. Da-sein’s embodiment as being-in-the-world, authentically or inauthentically, is eliminated from the discussion.

There is only one place in Being and Time where the body is treated in any detail -- and here it is not the lived body. In section 47, Heidegger discusses the death of others and the body when it is devoid of any humanity -- when it is a corpse. Heidegger states that "the no-longer-being-in-the-world of the deceased

37 Theunissen 182.
38 Marjorie Grene, "Landscape," Phenomenology: Dialogues and Bridges, eds. Ronald Bruzina and Bruce Wilshire (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982) 60.
(understood in an extreme sense) is still a being in the sense of the mere objective presence of a corporeal thing encountered” (BT 221/238). Body becomes merely an objectively encounterable thing, which when it was Da-sein, when it was a lived body was not possible. However, Heidegger insists that

the being still remaining does not represent a mere corporeal thing. Even the objectively present corpse is, viewed theoretically, still a possible object for pathological anatomy whose understanding is oriented toward the idea of life. Merely-being-objectively-present is “more” than a lifeless, material thing. In it we encounter something unliving which has lost its life (BT 221/238).

Here it seems as though perhaps there is at least an implication of a lived body, that Heidegger is recognizing that an aspect of Da-sein’s being-in-the-world as being-towards the possibility of death, is somehow connected to its embodied being-in-the-world.

Part of what precludes us from seeing the corpse as merely a thing, is being-with. The corpse, for those left alive, is still, as Heidegger reminds us above, some sort of being. As explained by Joel Shapiro

even in turning away from other Dasein, even in the most radical indifference toward other Dasein other Dasein are nevertheless disclosed to us as Dasein. ... So powerful is this difference that even the corpse is not a mere inanimate object for us, but calls to us for solicitude (SZ §47). No one would admit to or propose filling an open pit in the earth with corpses as they would filling one with rocks - however disdainfully, disinterestedly, or energetically they disposed of corpses. And yet!39

And yet it occurs and continues to occur; we recall the unearthing of mass “graves” resulting from “ethnic cleansing” being discovered in Rwanda for
example, or more recently in Kosovo. These bodies were flung into a pit in the earth energetically yes, likely disdainfully, but certainly not disinterestedly, precisely because of the fact that while alive, these bodies were sites of being. The unliving body is no longer Da-sein, the "end of the being qua Da-sein is the beginning of this being qua something objectively present"(BT221/238). We see that part of Da-sein's being-in-the-world was as embodied-being-in-the-world or these efforts to remove the bodies, to hide them would not be important to those who killed them, or as offensive to those of us who read about it. Despite the attempts of certain philosophers⁴⁰ to interpret Heidegger differently, there remains a lack of treatment of Da-sein as embodied being-in-the-world in Being and Time, and also, as I will argue in Chapter Two, in his later work.

⁴⁰ See, for example, Peg E. Birmingham's article, "Logos and the Place of the Other," Research in Phenomenology, 20 (1990): 34-54. Here Birmingham argues that "The importance of Mitsein in the authentic response is grasped only by taking seriously Heidegger's previous discussions of the 'Anyone' [das Man], immersion, and embodiment"(35). Birmingham goes on to maintain that Heidegger actually analyzes Da-sein's embodiment and that it is central to understanding mitsein. As much as I would like to find an analysis of Da-sein's embodiment in Being and Time, I must disagree with Birmingham, who bases her analysis on translating "Räumlichkeit des Daseins" as "Da-sein's embodiment", rather than "Da-sein's spatiality" as it would normally be translated and as both Macquarrie and Robinson as well as Stambaugh translate it. Birmingham gives no support for this unusual and misleading translation.

While I am more sympathetic to David Michael Levin's reading of embodiment in Heidegger's later philosophy as found in "The Embodiment of Thinking: Heidegger's approach to language," Phenomenology: Dialogues and Bridges (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982), I must state here that I also think Levin goes too far when he states that Heidegger "not only . . . approved the development of a philosophy of the body, but that he cleared a place for such a philosophy to emerge" and that furthermore "Heidegger constantly and consistently attempted to outline, in quite general terms, a philosophy of embodiment which would correspond to the unfolding of his thinking of Being"(63).
6. *Being and Time*, Section 70: Da-sein as Temporal and Spatial?

It is Heidegger's focus on temporality as the ground of existence that leaves the concept of being-with and treatment of the body wanting. Paul Ricoeur wonders "if it is not the unfolding of the problematic of temporality, triumphant in the second section of *Being and Time*, that prevented an *authentic* phenomenology of spatiality -- and along with it, an ontology of the flesh -- from being given its chance to develop."\(^{41}\) Although there was more discussion of spatiality in Heidegger's treatment of Da-sein's inauthentic being-in-the-world, even this is grounded in temporality (an odd expression itself). Heidegger makes it clear: "The fundamental possibilities of existence, the authenticity and inauthenticity of Da-sein, are ontologically grounded in possible temporalizations of temporality"(BT 281/304). We will now examine Heidegger's treatment of spatiality in the second division of *Being and Time*, section 70.

At the beginning of section 70, Heidegger asks if the temporal analysis of Da-sein can go any further, or whether we must address Da-sein "coordinately as 'temporal' 'and also' as spatial"(BT 335/367). It seems at first as if Heidegger is going to recognize the equiprimordiality of the spatial and temporal, and as if this recognition has not, in fact, brought the temporal analysis to a halt (BT 335/367). However, "undeterred by this frightening possibility (or rather, perhaps motivated precisely by it) he goes on to maintain that the spatiality of Dasein is founded

\(^{41}\) Ricoeur 328.
exclusively in Dasein’s temporality.” Heidegger continues to insist that the
“constitution of Da-sein and its modes of being are ontologically possible only on
the basis of temporality, regardless whether this being occurs ‘in time’ or not’ (BT
335/367), and that “the specific spatiality of Da-sein must be grounded in
temporality” (BT 335-36/367). Despite Da-sein’s own constitution of space and as
a result of Da-sein itself and its being-in-the-world, space as a co-constituting
factor of Da-sein is summarily dismissed. So, how is Da-sein spatial in this
manner which is grounded on time? We know that Da-sein is not in space as an
object is objectively present in space (BT sections 12 and 22-24, 335/367). But in
the earlier sections it seemed as though without Da-sein’s particular spatiality,
there would be no recognition of the world-space Da-sein is in.

Heidegger’s argument hinges on the concept of care, for which “temporality
is the meaning of being” (BT 335/367). Robert Frodeman, however, maintains that
this care is in fact, authentic spatiality, arguing that it calls upon us “to take up the
ineluctable involvement and indebtedness that is part of every situation . . .
grounded in the fact that indebtedness and recompense is impossible unless people
share a space.” It strikes one that care in this light seems much more of a being-
with than Heidegger’s concept of authentic being-with itself. Frodeman explains
the phenomenon of care further: “for a period we step out of time, choosing to

---
42 Edward Casey, “Heidegger In and Out of Place,” *Heidegger: A Centenary Appraisal. The
Seventh Annual Symposium of the Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center*, (Pittsburgh: The
Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center, Duquesne University, 1990) 70.
inhabit a situation with another. Thus a lover's care is shown when every expectation of a time-limit is driven off, when time is irrelevant, because we have decided to see the issue through no matter how long it takes." True care, he maintains, involves our forgetting of time, our absorption in the situation so complete that we cease to be aware of the passage of time. Interpreted in this light, as spatial, care seems to express the kind of being-with that temporally constituted Da-sein could not. Unfortunately, Heidegger does not interpret care spatially, he is in fact, very careful not to do so, stating that "Da-sein can be spatial only as care, in the sense of factically entangled existing" (BT 336/367). And for Heidegger, factically entangled existence is inexorably bound up in temporality. In other words, Da-sein can be spatial only as temporal.

In what follows Heidegger tries to demonstrate the temporality of the spatiality of Da-sein by stressing the movement aspect of Da-sein's spatiality. We get the sense of Da-sein's constant movement through time. Da-sein, he tells us, "takes space in," it makes room for, as we saw in the earlier part of the chapter, Da-sein itself spatializes. Through invoking the aspect of movement, Heidegger is trying to make "making room," "taking space in" temporal. Whereas in reality, Da-sein creates space; more specifically, it creates a place which will become central to being for Heidegger in his later work, as we will see demonstrated in the next chapter. He states that Da-sein "determines its own location in such a way that it

comes back from the space made room for to a ‘place’ that it has taken over” (BT 336/368), and that this making room is in fact “far from identical with the ‘representation’ of something spatial”(BT 336/368). Other than seeming to add the aspect of movement to each mention of spatiality, Heidegger has not yet demonstrated how it is fundamentally temporal. So far, and in the next paragraph of the section, what we are presented with is a summary of sections 22-24 with the contrived addition of this notion of moving through time attached to it. Casey points out that in fact, in section 70 Heidegger presents us with “a tissue of contradictions, an array of assertions parading as arguments.”

Casey argues that Heidegger’s assertion that “[t]he self-directive discovering of a region is grounded in an ecstatically retentive awaiting of the possible hither and wither”(BT 337/368) is peremptory. “We might have conceded that the discovery of a region is accompanied by the temporality of retentive awaiting, but nothing goes to prove that such awaiting grounds the discovery.”

Arisaka also maintains that “temporality temporalizing itself,” ‘Dasein’s projection,’ and ‘the temporal projection of the world’ are three different ways of describing the same ‘happening’ of Being-in-the-world, which Heidegger calls ‘self-directive’” and furthermore, that if this is the case, “then temporality does not found spatiality, except perhaps in the trivial sense that spatiality is built into the

---

44 Frodeman 39.
45 Casey “Heidegger In and Out” 70.
46 Casey, “Heidegger In and Out” 70.
notion of care that is identified with temporality."47 This is not to say that de- 
distancing and distantiality do not each have a temporal aspect, but "this necessity 
does not constitute a foundation [for spatiality]. Rather, they are equiprimordial. 
The addition of temporal dimensions does indeed complete the discussion of 
spatiality, which abstracted from time. But this completion, while it better 
articulates the whole of Being-in-the-world, does not show that temporality is 
more fundamental."48 Yet this is of course, exactly what Heidegger maintains. 
Despite his assertion that "the demonstration that this spatiality is existentially 
possible only through temporality, cannot aim . . . at deducing space from 
time"(BT 336/367), he does just that, stating that because "Da-sein as temporality 
is ecstatic and horizontal in its being, it can factically and constantly take along 
space for which it has made room"(BT 337/369 my emphasis).49 Here it suddenly 
seems as if it is temporality which has done the making room, in other words, that 
temporality has done the spatializing.

As both Casey and Arisaka have pointed out, Heidegger's argument does 
not in fact, support the above conclusion. Nor in fact, does the language 
Heidegger chooses to use. We will see in the next chapter how close the link 
between language and being is for Heidegger and how much importance it takes in 
his later thought and work, but even at this stage of his thought it was central, and

---

47 Arisaka, "Spatiality, Temporality" 40.
48 Arisaka, "Spatiality, Temporality" 40.
49 See also Casey, "Heidegger In and Out" 70.
not chosen lightly. This makes the following assertion at least peculiar, if not suspicious:

The ecstatic temporality of the spatiality of Da-sein makes it intelligible that space is independent of time, but on the other hand this same temporality makes intelligible also the “dependency” of Da-sein upon space -- a dependence that makes itself manifest in the familiar phenomenon that both the self-interpretation of Da-sein and the content of significance of language are to a large extent dominated by “spatial representations” in general (BT 338/369).

The fact that our language, and indeed Heidegger’s own language -- for is not the very term Da-sein, “there-being,” spatial? -- brings the relation between self and space to the fore seems to support the equiprimordiality of space and time, yet Heidegger wants to deny this expression of being. As Casey asks: “does not this domination of the spatial in language reflect something significant in the way things in general are constituted? If not, language would be arbitrary indeed - far from Heidegger’s own view of language.”

His attempt to maintain the primordiality of temporality over spatiality is even more jarring when he states that “This priority of the spatial in the articulation of significations and concepts has its ground, not in some specific power of space, but rather in the kind of being of Da-sein”(BT 338/369) which implies that Da-sein is in a very important sense -- in the way in which it expresses itself through language, in fact, spatial. This would seem to support, rather than deny the fact that space is not something inferior or superior to temporality, it is equiprimordial -- in fact this is seen in Heidegger’s closing words of section 70:
“Essentially entangled, temporality loses itself in making present, and understands itself not only circumspectly in terms of the things at hand taken care of, but from those spatial relations that making present constantly meets up with in what is at hand as present, it takes its guidelines for articulating what is understood and can be interpreted in understanding in general” (BT 338/369). If temporality understands itself through spatial relations, how can spatiality be dependent on it? Casey’s interpretation of this passage is that it argues “for the primacy not of temporality but of its own supposedly derivative spatiality . . . . Not only does Dasein not break into space from temporality, but the very terms of Heidegger’s argument suggest that spatiality is prior to the fallen temporality with which every Dasein is beleaguered.” \(^{51}\) I think that Casey goes too far here, for maintaining the primordiality of spatiality over temporality does nothing to right the imbalance present in Heidegger’s analysis; it only serves to invert it. But the passage at least suggests that the seeds of the impossibility of Heidegger’s attempt to derive spatiality from temporality are imbedded in his work some thirty-five years before his own admission in “On Time and Being,” that the “attempt in *Being and Time*, section 70, to derive human spatiality from temporality is untenable.” \(^{52}\)

---

\(^{50}\) Casey, “Heidegger In and Out” 71.

\(^{51}\) Casey, “Heidegger In and Out” 71-72.

7. Conclusion

The concept of self that Heidegger leaves us with at the end of *Being and Time* is undeniably temporal. Of course, we must recall that Heidegger’s notion of authentic selfhood belonging to Da-sein is not to be understood either as substance or as subject as it has traditionally been understood with Descartes or with Kant. Heidegger believes that both of these doctrines did not even touch on an ontological concept of selfhood. In order to understand Heidegger’s concept of authentic selfhood, it is useful to examine a contemporary assimilation of this notion of self mentioned briefly in our introduction -- that is, Paul Ricoeur’s concept of *ipse* identity. Most of the current theories of personal identity are still predominantly dualistic *and* focussed on the temporal. Paul Ricoeur argues against these dualistic, one sided concepts of selfhood in *Oneself as Another* through the introduction of the notion of *ipse* identity.

Heidegger affirms the following:

Existentially, selfhood is only to be found in the authentic potentiality-of-being-a-self, that is, in the authenticity of the being of Da-sein as *care*. In terms of care, *constancy* [*Ständigkeit*] of the self, as the supposed persistence of the subject, gets its clarification. The phenomenon of this authentic potentiality-of-being, however, also opens our eyes to the *constancy of the self* in the sense of its having gained a stand. The *constancy of the self* in the double sense of constancy and steadfastness is the *authentic* counter-possibility to the lack of constancy [*Unselbst-ständigkeit*] of irresolute falling prey. Existentially, the *constancy of the self* [*Selbst-ständigkeit*] means nothing other than the anticipatory resoluteness. Its ontological structure reveals the existentiality of the selfhood of the self (BT 297/322).
Heidegger is clearly not concerned with the traditional concept of self-identity.

This becomes especially clear when we compare his talk of self-constancy with
Ricoeur’s characterization of ipse-identity, one central feature of which is exactly
this self-constancy expressed through “keeping one’s word.”53 According to
Ricoeur,

keeping one’s promise . . . does indeed appear to stand as a challenge to time, a denial of change: even if my desire were to change, even if I were to change my opinion or inclination, “I will hold firm.” It is not necessary, for the promise to be meaningful, to place keeping one’s word within the horizon of Being-toward-death. The properly ethical justification of the promise suffices of itself, a justification which can be derived from the obligation to safeguard the institution of language and to respond to the trust that the other places in my faithfulness.54

While it is doubtful that Heidegger would have wanted to say anything about the ethical implications of self-constancy, Ricoeur’s description of holding firm rings true for what Heidegger wants to say about the authentic self and its constancy in Being and Time. Ricoeur maintains that opposing the sameness of character (which characterizes Da-sein’s inauthentic self among the they) to the constancy of the self is actually an opposition of “two models of permanence in time -- the perseverance of character and the constancy of the self in promising.”55 The latter is an authentic mode of permanence through time. Given Heidegger’s interest in language, it is also interesting to notice the connection with self-constancy and “safeguarding the institution of language.”

53 Ricoeur 123.
54 Ricoeur 124.
Despite this sympathy between Ricoeur and Heidegger however, Ricoeur recognizes that there will come a time when this temporal aspect of self-identity alone will not suffice. There will come a time, Ricoeur states, “when we shall have to leave the plane of language” and broaden the investigation of being-in-the-world. “The strange status of one’s own body arises out of a wider problematic, where the stakes are the ontological status of the being that we ourselves are, a being that comes into the world in the mode of incarnation.”\textsuperscript{56} Despite the fact that Heidegger’s investigation is about the ontological status of being-in-the-world and hence of beings, he never makes this leap which would have led him to the spatial in all of its aspects. Heidegger remains firmly entrenched not only in the plane of language, but also in temporality.

\textsuperscript{55} Ricoeur 124.
\textsuperscript{56} Ricoeur 55.
CHAPTER II
The Later Heidegger and the Site of the Self

After Being and Time, the famous turn in Heidegger’s later thought might be read as a turn towards the spatial.¹ This chapter will show this shift in Heidegger’s thought as it moved towards recognition of the importance of the spatial alongside the temporal and how this is connected to his understanding of the self. Many of the important terms and concepts in Heidegger’s later work are inherently spatial. Given the importance Heidegger places on language in this later period, it is reasonable to assume that these terms, and the spatial aspects inherent in them, were not chosen lightly.

The first part of the chapter then, will demonstrate the link between language, being and human being in Heidegger’s later philosophy. The chapter will then go on to analyse the particularly spatial terms Heidegger employs in the elucidation of being in his later philosophy: “presence” (Anwesenheit), “nearness” (Nähe), “the open” (das Offene), “world” (die Welt) and “earth” (die Erde), “dwelling” (wohnen), and “the fourfold” (das Geviert). We will see that dwelling is the most spatial of these terms, but that the other terms build up to a comprehension of dwelling.

It is important here to remember Heidegger’s ongoing concern with being. In moving on the way to a recognition of the equiprimordiality of time and space, (although this movement, I wish to argue, remains incomplete) Heidegger was also

¹Yuasa Yasuo, “The Encounter of Modern Japanese Philosophy with Heidegger,” Heidegger and
moving on the way to a more balanced concept of being and, by virtue of being’s inextricable connection with human beings, toward a more balanced concept of what “human being” means, which we can use to inform a fuller concept of self.

The third section of the chapter explores this notion, investigating the idea that in moving toward this balance, the development of human spatiality leads to a fuller concept of being-with-others. Although being itself seems to be abstracted from human being particularly and deliberately in the later work -- the most striking evidence being the disappearance of the term Da-sein -- Heidegger indicates in several spots that, as we saw in the previous chapter, being cannot be comprehended without its human aspect.

One might think that a turn towards the spatial would allow Heidegger to finally recognize perhaps the most simple form of human spatiality -- that of the body. However, it is still absent from his thought. This lack is what will be addressed in the final part of the chapter. Heidegger’s treatment of the body even in the later work remains fragmentary. He stops short of its treatment in “Building Dwelling Thinking,” and mysteriously drops it into “The Nature of Language” without completing the investigation.

The body is perhaps the most evocative expression not only of our spatiality, but also of our human finitude. Through his omission of an adequate treatment of the body, Heidegger stops short of providing us with a full picture of being-in-the-world as finite beings. And it is Heidegger himself who points out

again and again that it is our finitude and recognition of it that opens the way
toward an understanding of being -- that which transcends human being and its
finitude but is possible only through it.

1. Language, Being, Self and Space

A central theme in the later Heidegger's work is that of language and its
relation to being. There is an intimate link between language and being, in
particular, "there is an essential relationship between the essence of man and the
essence of language."² Heidegger believes that man is in and with language.³ We
must then, pay special attention to the language Heidegger uses, recognizing that
the words are carefully chosen and themselves often hold the key to an expression
of being-in-the-world.

In a 1994 article, Jeff Malpas states that "[s]elf and mind are to be found in
the spaces, or places, in which we dwell."⁴ This takes on a particular significance
for an investigation of the later Heidegger's work, where "Language is the house
of Being."⁵ Being then, dwells in language. Due to human beings' use of
language, there is a special link Heidegger believes, between human beings and

² Peter McCormick, Heidegger and the Language of the World: An Argumentative Reading of the
³ McCormick 79.
⁴ Jeff Malpas, "A Taste of Madeleine: Notes Towards a Philosophy of Place," International
Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1971) 63. Hereafter, any works cited from this
collection will be cited parenthetically in the body of the text with the abbreviation OWL, followed
by the page number.
being itself. In looking for what Heidegger might have been expressing about the self then, about human being-in-the-world, the language he chooses to use takes on extraordinary importance.

Speaking specifically about Heidegger’s meditation on Stefan George’s poem “Das Wort,” found in “Words” in On the Way to Language, Peter McCormick analyses this tripartite relation between language, man, and being:

Heidegger’s purpose is to utter what is worthy of thought. What is worthy of thought is the fact that words of themselves say something; that is, that there is a governing power of the word at the origin of the conjunction between poieticizing and thinking. The most ancient name for this power is logos as utterance. Logos however is also the name for being when being is understood as the remaining present (Anwesen) of what is becoming present (Anwesende). Hence, logos as utterance and logos as being belong together. Word and thing also belong together. The riddle of the word is understood in this fuller statement as equivalent to the uttering of the word, since the riddle of the word is equivalent to what is worthy of thought which in turn is equivalent to the uttering of the word. Heidegger’s purpose thus reduces to saying what words utter of themselves. But since the uttering of words is equivalent to that governing power of words Heidegger calls utterance, Heidegger’s purpose is to articulate utterance. But utterance and being are related by reason of the their common bond with the normative Greek word logos. Hence in articulating utterance Heidegger in some way articulates being.

Language then, articulates being. But it is important to note that in any articulation of being, there is always also a relation to human being. In “The Nature of

---

6 I note that other creatures do use language -- chimpanzees and dolphins for example are capable of understanding and using human language, as well as communicating amongst themselves in their own fashion. However, for Heidegger, human language has an extraordinary power that surpasses that used by other creatures, it is, as he says “the house of Being,” and human beings dwell within it in a way unique only to them.
Language”, Heidegger speaks of the need to experience the place, the neighborhood of language in order to “step back into the sphere of human being” (OWL 85) in order not to be subsumed by the technological world that threatens to overtake us. “Language is the house of being,” he tells us, yet the very neighborhood this house is situated in is in danger of being destroyed owing to the modern world’s unthinking acceptance of the technological world-view. We must no longer take this neighborhood for granted: “We are not yet on our way to it. We must first turn, turn back to where we are in reality already staying. The abiding turn, back to where we already are, is infinitely harder than are hasty excursions to places where we are not yet and never will be, except perhaps as the monstrous creatures of technology, assimilated to machines” (OWL 85). We need to find the neighborhood of poetry and thinking in order to be able to use language to unlock being.

This is, I believe, a deliberately spatial example. Language, being, human being, need a place to be, to dwell as we will see later in the chapter. On the page of the lecture preceding the above quotations, Heidegger discusses the challenge and importance of protecting this neighborhood where language along with the thinking of human beings creates a place for being:

What we try to reflect upon under the name of the neighborhood of poetry and thinking is vastly different from a mere inventory of notional relations. The neighborhood in question pervades everywhere our stay on this earth and our journey in it. But since modern thinking is ever more resolutely and exclusively turning into

7McCormick 17.
calculation, it concentrates all available energy and "interests" in calculating how man may soon establish himself in worldless cosmic space. This type of thinking is about to abandon the earth as earth. As calculation, it drifts more and more rapidly and obsessively toward the conquest of cosmic space. This type of thinking is itself already the explosion of a power that could blast everything to nothingness (OWL 84).

Everything could be blasted to nothingness because we would no longer have a sense of place -- we would lose our neighborhood, our earth, that which grounds us, which preserves us, as Heidegger says in "Building Dwelling Thinking", which allows us to dwell and create a place for being to be experienced. We see here our first clue as to how Heidegger is going to treat human spatiality in his later work. It is immediately clear that "cosmic space," the space sought after and held as important by the scientific, technological community, is in fact dangerous, threatening, for the neighborhood of being. It is not cosmic space and technological advances that will foster this neighborhood; rather as we will see, it is a certain kind of human spatiality that will preserve being.

Language, Heidegger tells us, "belongs to the closest neighborhood of man's being," so the language that Heidegger uses in discussing man's being-in-the-world will hold a particular significance. In his attempt to give an idea of the nature of language, Heidegger tells us that this task, this discussion of language, this placing of it "means to bring to its place of being not so much language as ourselves: our own gathering into the appropriation" (PLT 190). The link then,

---

between language, being, and human being is undeniable. For Heidegger language is "a dynamic texture of relations implicating human speaking, the capacity for this speaking, and mysteriously the source of this capacity."\textsuperscript{9}

We see then, how Heidegger's investigation of language implies an expression of human being-in-the-world, of human selfhood. The spatial examples and language employed by Heidegger in the later work are indications of the spatiality of human being-in-the-world. Let us see how this affects the self as subject.

2. Spatial Terms

i) Presence (Anwesenheit)\textsuperscript{10}

We will first examine Heidegger's use of the word presence, (Anwesenheit). In referring to the lectures On Time and Being\textsuperscript{11}, McCormick points out that there are two senses of the term "present": 1) "now" and 2) "presence." Traditionally, since Aristotle's Physics, time has been characterized as the present in the first sense of that term and not in the second. Time then has been understood as the now, the unity of past, present and future in the succession of nows. It is this conception of time that Heidegger wants to put into question. He attempts to show that the fundamental character of time is not the present, the succession of instantaneous nows, but

\textsuperscript{9}McCormick 96.

\textsuperscript{10}Heidegger links Anwesenheit to its Greek origin in ousia or Sein (BT 22/25). For more on Anwesenheit as being in Greek philosophy, see Hans-Georg Gadamer, Griechische Philosophie II (Tübingen: Mohr, 1985) 13-18.

presence. True time, as Heidegger calls it, is what needs to be postulated to account for the unity of future, past, and present. This character Heidegger calls nearness because it allows what is not yet present (the future) and what is still present (the past) to dilate the contraction of the present into something more than the now.12

In terms of presence, more than the now means not merely the now, but the here and now. We see this later conception of time, "true time," being explained in spatial terms, involving "nearness" and "presence" which both have spatial connotations. This is not a mere coincidence. Heidegger, in much of his later work is elucidating this second notion of present, that of 'presence', which is spatial as well as temporal. Presence in this new sense means having a place but also invokes a sense of immanence, a being-there-now. Olafson points out the centrality of the notion of presence throughout Heidegger's work:

The world . . . is not just the totality of entities as it is ordinarily held to be. It is the totality of entities as uncovered or "present". This notion of presence is the most general term that Heidegger uses to convey the status that accrues to entities that are uncovered or cleared, and in his lectures from the period of Being and Time he uses the terms Praesenz and Anwesen/Anwesenheit for this purpose. The first of these later drops out of use, but the latter was to remain a central concept of Heidegger's philosophy in all its periods and, it must also be said, a prime source of confusion as to his intentions in his use of the concept of being as such.13

If one understands present in the second sense, as presence, much of the confusion disappears. In this second sense of presence, Heidegger is evoking the Greek

---

12 McCormick 39, my emphasis.
13 Frederick Olafson, "The Unity of Heidegger’s Thought," The Cambridge Companion to
designation, the "experience of the Being of beings in the sense of presence" (PLT 23). This sense of presence means both the now and the here and this is how human beings experience being in the larger sense -- our experience is never only of the now, the present moment, but also always at the same time and experience of the here, the being in a particular place at a given moment, as subject of experience which is possible only by virtue of being in that given place.

In *On Time and Being*, Heidegger states unequivocally that "Being means presencing" (OTB 5). As pointed out above by McCormick, we know that this notion of presence is not that of a succession of nows; in fact it is as much about the place, the here, as the now. Heidegger himself explains the concept in terms of the here. He gives the example of the phrase, "The celebration took place in the presence of many guests," or "with many guests being present" (OTB 10). He explains that "the present understood in terms of the now is not at all identical with the present in the sense in which the guests are present. We never say and we cannot say: 'The celebration took place in the now of many guests'" (OTB 10).

Presence then, is a spatial notion. In the presence of many guests means that the guests were in a particular place. Being as presencing means allowing to appear, providing an opening for, or a clearing, a *space* for being (OTB 10,14). Heidegger points out a difficulty with this new notion of presence noting that "we are not accustomed to defining the peculiar character of time with regard to the present in the sense of presence" (OTB 10-11). This is precisely because time has,

up to this point, been understood as separate from, and indeed foundational for
spatiality. We recall that in *Being and Time*, space was deliberately subordinated
to time. In *On Time and Being* however, Heidegger recognizes the equi-
primordiality of space and time necessary for the understanding of being.
Heidegger introduces the notion of time-space which is opened for us with the new
concept of presence and explains it as follows:

> With this presencing, there opens up what we call time-space. But
> with the word “time” we no longer mean the succession of a
> sequence of nows. Accordingly, time-space no longer means merely
> the distance between two now-points of calculated time, such as we
> have in mind when we note, for instance: this or that occurred within
> a time-span of fifty years. Time-space now is the name for the
> openness which opens up in the mutual self-extending of futural
> approach, past and present. This openness exclusively and primarily
> provides the space in which space as we usually know it can unfold
> (OTB 14).

It is clear that Heidegger’s notion of space here, of this originary space of time-
space is not that of geometrical space. With the concept of time-space, what
Heidegger does here is collapse the traditional Western dualistic way of
understanding either concept. The difficulty might lie in the boundaries of our
vocabulary which reflects a tradition that has been imbued with dualistic notions
and as a result, with dualistic thinking. We lack vocabulary for such a notion in the
West, because we have no framework for making sense of the Eastern concept of
nonduality. As David Loy explains: “the claim of subject-object nonduality has
been a seed which, however often sown, has never found fertile soil, because it has

---
14 This refers to the dualism inherited from Cartesian mind/body dualism.
been too antithetical to those other vigorous sprouts that have grown into modern
science and technology.”15 Indeed:

Because nonduality is so incompatible with our usual experience --
or, as the nondualist usually prefers, with our usual way of
understanding experience -- it is very difficult to grasp what exactly
is meant when it is claimed that, for example, perception is or can be
nondual. . . . But that nonduality is difficult to understand is
necessarily true, according to the various systems which assert it. If
we did understand it fully we would be enlightened, which is not
understanding in the usual sense: it is the experience of non-duality
which philosophizing obstructs. From such a perspective, the
problem with philosophy is that its attempt to grasp nonduality
conceptually is inherently dualistic and thus self-defeating.16

As Kasulis points out, in order to understand nondualism, “we have to reorient the
grids by which we have traditionally understood the world.”17 With the concept of
time-space, Heidegger is on his way toward this reorientation.18 Through using the
hyphen to join time and space, Heidegger is indicating that one cannot be thought
without the other, that the two notions are interdependent. We will see Heidegger
collapse more of these dualisms as the chapter progresses. In order to get a fuller
understanding of the kind of space Heidegger is invoking here, we need to look at
the concept of nearness.

16 Loy, 5. Loy points out one of the central problems in attempting to discuss the idea of
nondualism. Nondualism as used in this thesis refers generally to the Buddhist sense of *sunnata* or
‘nothingness’ which overcomes ‘Cartesian’ dualism while yet maintaining distinctions. (‘Dualism’
is used to express the Cartesian notion as it has permeated Western philosophy.)
18 As Loy points out, “In Being and Time Heidegger stated that he wanted to ‘overcome’
metaphysics, but the turning included a realization that his own thinking had still been
metaphysical in form. He was still dualistically using thoughts in an attempt to ‘re-present’
Being.”(166). It is in the later work that Heidegger is able to truly begin to move towards thinking
ii) Nearness (*Nähe*)

Heidegger uses "nearness" in his elucidation of the concept of presence. We were introduced to the idea of "nearness" in *Being and Time* and it is a concept which Heidegger develops in the later work. Nearness draws past, present and future together. But what is nearness? We recall from the previous chapter, that it is not simply physical proximity. In "The Nature of Language", Heidegger tells us:

> When we intend nearness, remoteness comes to the fore. Both stand in a certain contrast to each other, as different magnitudes of our distance from objects. The measurement of magnitude is performed by calculating the length or shortness of intervening stretches. The measurements of the lengths so measured are always taken according to a yardstick by which, along which, the number of units in the measured stretch is counted out. To measure something against something else by moving along it is called in Greek *parametrein*. The stretches along which and past which we measure nearness and remoteness as distances are the temporal sequence of 'nows,' that is, time; and the spatial side-by-side (behind, in front, behind, above, below) of the points here and there, that is, space (OWL 102).

We know, however, from the concept of presence, that there will be a problem with nearness understood as measured distance. Indeed Heidegger does not want nearness construed parametrically, anymore than he wants presence to be construed as a sequence of nows, for simple spatial closeness to something is no guarantee of the kind of nearness Heidegger is trying to elucidate. He also uses the notion of nearness in the explanation of poetry and thinking, or language and being. "Neighboring nearness," he tells us, "does not depend on spatial-temporal relation." This kind of nearness "does not depend on space and time considered as nondualistically."
parameters” (OWL 103). We recall from Chapter One that Heidegger began this movement away from a traditional understanding of space in the notions of “de-distancing” and “distantiality” in Being and Time. There, however space was still subordinated to time and we saw de-distancing and distantiality only in the context of inauthenticity. Here Heidegger evokes the same notion of space that de-distancing and distantiality demonstrated, but the inauthentic context is removed. Nearness can be read as a development of distantiality that is certainly in the context of understanding being.

Heidegger continues his investigation, inquiring about how time and space are to be understood outside the traditional, scientific view: “But are time and space something else then, assuming they are at all? Why is it that the parametrical character of space and time prevents neighboring nearness?” (OWL 103).

I wish to maintain here that Heidegger is moving closer to a fuller concept of “subjective spatiality” (although he never fully reaches it). Space understood solely in a parametrical fashion does not take the subject experiencing the nearness into account, its objectivity precludes this. A notion of subjective spatiality, however, takes this fully into account, for it is the subject who experiences the nearness. We recall here Malpas’ explanation of “subjective spatiality” introduced in chapter one as “indicating the way in which a creature’s subjective space is precisely the space of that creature’s own involvement with the world, the space of
awareness within which it acts and with respect to which its actions are oriented and located.”19

This characterization of space seems to be more in line with Heidegger’s expression of “nearness” and explains why it cannot be elucidated with the scientific definition of parametrical space. The latter comes closer to Malpas’ description of “objective space,” which “is not organized around any such subjective capacities or subjectively presented features of a creature’s environment, but is a grasp of space as an extended field that is independent of any particular agent operating within it and within which no single feature or location has any precedence, in spatial terms, over any other.”20 The kind of parametrical, measured-out space referred to by Heidegger is an example of a scientific understanding of objective space which purports to preclude any subjective experience of that space,21 which is necessary for nearness.

Heidegger makes it quite clear that nearness is an experience when he states that the “persisting nature of nearness is not the insterstice, but the movement paving the way for the face-to-face of the regions of the world’s fourfold”(OWL 104, my italics).22 This nearness however, cannot be attained as long as we remain within the parametrical understanding of space and time, for mired in this and only this understanding, there is no space for nearness and hence no space for being as

19 Malpas, “Space and Sociality” 56.
20 Malpas, “Space and Sociality” 59.
21 We recall of course, that even ‘objective’ space is determined by human experience. Cf Chapter One, 11 and fn. 15.
presence, for in "the succession of 'nows' one after the other as elements of parametric time, one 'now' is never in open face-to-face encounter with another" (OWL 104). Bound by the scientific, technological understanding of time and space, there is no place, no openness for presence in which the face-to-face encounter can occur.

iii) The Open (das Offene)

This brings us to another key spatial concept in the later Heidegger's work -- that of openness or the Open. This term figures most prominently in "The Origin of the Work of Art." Although the relation between human being and the world may not seem to be the topic of "The Origin of the Work of Art," as Christopher Fynsk points out, this relation between Da-sein, or man, and being remains central to Heidegger's philosophy and in fact underlies what is going on in "The Origin of the Work of Art." As Fynsk explains it, "the place of Dasein in the history of Being is still irreducible for Heidegger: as he says in his 'Addendum,' 'Being needs man and is not without man' . . . . And so the work of art, inasmuch as it opens a history, as Heidegger asserts in this essay, must necessarily also pose the question of man." 23

Fynsk also points out that, as much as this is a concern for Heidegger throughout his philosophy, it is not elucidated in "The Origin of the Work of Art." In fact, Heidegger fails "to bring forth the relation of Being and human being, and

---

22 The fourfold will be discussed in section vi of this chapter.
23 Fynsk 134.
even fails to conceive it properly.” 24 The admission by Heidegger himself that in the essay “there is concealed the relation of Being and human being” and further, the fact that this omission is “a distressing difficulty” (PLT 87) indicates that although Da-sein may no longer appear to be the main concern of Heidegger’s philosophy, it continues to worry him, twenty years after “The Origin of the Work of Art” is written, which indicates that we can in fact read this relation behind the essay.

In “The Origin of the Work of Art” Heidegger states that the “art work opens up in its own way the Being of beings. This opening up, i.e., this deconcealing, i.e., the truth of beings, happens in the work” (PLT 39). A question might be, how does the work achieve this opening up of being? The work makes space “to liberate the Open” he tells us; the “work holds open the Open of the world” (PLT 45). Furthermore, this “Open happens in the midst of beings” (PLT 53, 55). This space of the Open, this openness of the Open is where the truth of beings happens. The Open itself is won, Heidegger tells us, through conflict of world and earth -- again spatial concepts -- which belong to the Open. Before we unpack the weighty concepts of world and earth, however, notice that in the above explanation we recognize the terms Heidegger uses in elucidating the notion of truth itself. A brief explanation of truth will help us understand the relation between world and earth and the Open itself.

In Being and Time, truth was conceived in an active, yet one-sided way, as

24 Fynsk 153.
*aletheia*, un-concealment of that which had been forgotten or covered over. For example, truth revealed itself through the statement: “To say that a statement is *true* means that it shows, it lets beings ‘be seen’ (apophansis) in their discoveredness” (BT 201/218). Here, the statement is a vehicle which truth uses to show itself. There is a sense of passivity on the part of that through which truth reveals itself. In the later work, however, there is another dimension added to truth. Truth becomes dynamic, a struggle in a sense, and at first seems paradoxical. As Heidegger explains it:

> Truth is un-truth, insofar as there belongs to it the reservoir of the not-yet-uncovered, the un-uncovered, in the sense of concealment. In unconcealedness, as truth, there occurs also the other ‘un-’ of a double restraint or refusal. Truth occurs as such in the opposition of clearing and double concealing. Truth is the primal conflict in which, always in some particular way, the Open is won within which everything stands and from which everything withholds itself that shows itself and withdraws itself as a being (PLT 60-61).

While there is this reservoir of possibilities in untruth, we must also remember that for every truth which is disclosed, something else is covered up, forced into the background. To be Da-sein is “to foreground at the expense of the background.” Da-sein has no choice about this way of being-in-the-world, but should nonetheless be aware of it -- that each time something is revealed, something else is hidden. As Bruns points out, what Heidegger is getting at in this “truth is un-truth” statement, is not that truth is “linked dialectically with its opposite,” but that

---

26 See also PLT 53-55.
truth is always there with its \textit{other}, not its opposite. The otherness of
truth is not merely an accidental divergence from essence, an error or
mistake or falsehood. It is rather that truth itself is inscribed by a rift
that splits it, so to say, lengthwise, joining the familiar and the
strange, openness and refusal, clearing and dissembling,
unconcealedness and withdrawl, darkness and light. Clearly, truth
here is no longer that which takes up its residence in knowledge and
the discourse of propositions.\textsuperscript{28}

Just as space is no longer conceived of as mathematical and calculable, truth too
moves beyond the correspondence, or propositional notion. Truth is an occurrence,
an ongoing process; it is something that happens, and happens when the open is
won in the midst of beings, where being in turn is revealed. However, at the same
time, untruth is a happening, for each time something is revealed, something else is
concealed. How does this lead us back to the world and earth? The same struggle
that inscribes truth inscribes world and earth in the Open.

\textbf{iv) World and Earth (\textit{die Welt, die Erde})}

World and earth belong to the Open but, as Heidegger stresses, world and
earth are not simply opposites; Heidegger stresses that "the world is \textit{not simply} the
Open that corresponds to clearing, and the earth is \textit{not simply} the Closed that
corresponds to concealment"(PLT 55, my emphasis). Rather the notions are
interdependent, distinct yet intertwined, one is not recognizable without the other.
They are not simply opposites, they are interdependent, like truth and untruth,
revealing and concealing, each is always there with its other. Clearing,
characteristic of the world, Reiner Schürmann explains, "must be taken to evoke a

\textsuperscript{27} Robert Carter, e-mail correspondence with the author, June 28, 1999.
setting-out, but not an arrangement settled-in; an event of 'standing out' 
(herausstehen) from concealment, but not the opposite of concealment. So 
metaphorized, the event of clearing explicitly links the processing of absencing to 
the process of presencing.\textsuperscript{29} We see again this dynamic nature that was seen in 
truth. Clearing, opening, the world, cannot be without its other, concealment, 
closing, the earth. Without concealment, clearing would have nothing from which 
to stand out. Heidegger explains: "Concealment can be a refusal or merely a 
dissembling. . . . the open place in the midst of beings, the clearing, is never a rigid 
stage with a permanently raised curtain on which the play of beings runs its 
course. Rather, the clearing happens only as this double concealment. The 
unconcealedness of beings -- this is never a merely existent state, but a 
happening"(PLT 54).

Again we see the dynamic nature of the Open, it is a happening. Heidegger 
tells us that "Earth juts through the world and world grounds itself on the earth 
only so far as truth happens as the primal conflict between clearing and 
concealing"(PLT 55). It is through the earth's jutting into the world and the 
world's grounding itself on earth that the open is maintained. Without the struggle 
between the two the earth would fold back in upon itself and there would be 
nothing to ground the world and hence there would be no place for beings.

Heidegger characterizes the struggle between earth and world as a rift, with

\textsuperscript{28} Bruns 34.

\textsuperscript{29} Reiner Schürmann, \textit{Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy}, trans.
a special meaning, "it is not a rift (Riss) as a mere cleft is ripped open; rather, it is
the intimacy with which opponents belong to each other. This rift carries the
opponents into the source of their unity by virtue of the common ground"(PLT
63). It is the rift that joins the concepts and allows each to appear as itself. We see
how interconnected the two terms are, and it is the interdependence of these two
spaces that allows the Open to be maintained and a place to be created within it.

As Edward Casey explains it:

If it were not for world, there would not be sufficient breadth and
scope for earth to appear: thanks to the expansiveness of the world,
instead of being merely "closed up," the earth comes forth as itself
"openly cleared." If it were not for earth, there would not be
sufficient reserve and resistance to serve as "native ground" in which
world could appear: rather than being free-floating and indecisive, it
sets itself up decisively on the earth. But intrinsic to the
interspatiality of the scene is the fact that the opponents bring each
other into their own: self-seclusion is not fully itself, nor is earth
truly grounding and sheltering, until it arises in the midst of the
world, and the world displays its broad-rangingness only as profiled
against the adversity and constrictedness of earth.30

As much as truth needs untruth, world needs earth and reciprocally, earth needs
world. In order for each to truly emerge as itself, it needs the other to push against,
to allow it to show forth as what it truly is, in its being.

The Open is held open by this rift between earth and world, and it is in this
rift where earth and world both emerge as themselves and allow beings as
themselves to emerge in turn. We can see this in the example of the Greek temple.

---

30 Edward S. Casey, The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
In Heidegger’s description we see the forces of earth and world struggling against one another, and through such struggle allowing beings to truly be:

Standing there, the building rests on the rocky ground. This resting of the work draws up out of the rock the mystery of that rock’s clumsy yet spontaneous support. Standing there, the building holds its ground against the storm raging above it and so first makes the storm itself manifest in its violence. The luster and gleam of the stone, though itself apparently glowing only by the grace of the sun, yet first brings to light the light of the day, the breadth of the sky, the darkness of the night. The temple’s firm towering makes visible the invisible space of air. The steadfastness of the work contrasts with the surge of the surf, and its own repose brings out the raging of the sea. Tree and grass, eagle and bull, snake and cricket first enter into their distinctive shapes and thus come to appear as what they are. The Greeks early called this emerging and rising in itself and in all things phusis. It clears and illuminates, also, that on which man bases his dwelling. We call this ground the earth (PLT 42).

Resonating in this quote we can hear and feel the same dynamism, the movement, the interplay between a concept and its other that occurs when truth happens. The spatial concepts of world and earth are clearly inseparable, interdependent notions that, through maintaining the openness of the Open, make it possible for truth to happen, for us to see beings as they really are, unconcealed and illuminated, where they belong.

v) Dwelling (wohnen)

A term that was first used in Being and Time appears again in “The Origin of the Work of Art” and takes on its greatest significance in “Building Dwelling Thinking.” The term is dwelling, and for our purposes here, it is the richest spatial term used by Heidegger, for it is directly linked both to being and to human being.
The questions that frame Heidegger’s meditation in “Building Dwelling Thinking” are: “1. What is it to dwell? 2. How does building belong to dwelling?” (PLT 145). Heidegger first tells us that bauen, building, in Old English and High German, means to dwell, “to remain, to stay in a place” (PLT 146). Hence, building and dwelling are inextricably linked - not only does one build to dwell, but “in bauen, building, wohnen, or dwelling is already in question.”

Maria Villela-Petit further explains that by this is meant “that we build according to the manner in which we dwell which is, in turn, the manner in which we are on the earth,” which is further an expression of who we are. In the essay, Heidegger stresses the far reaching nature of the notion of dwelling that he touched upon in Being and Time: “That is, bauen, buan, bhu, beo are our word bin in the versions: ich bin, I am, du bist, you are, the imperative form bist, be. What then does ich bin mean? The old word bauen, to which the bin belongs, answers: ich bin, du bist mean: I dwell, you dwell. The way in which you are and I am, the manner in which we humans are on the earth, is Buan, dwelling. To be a human being means to be on the earth as a mortal. It means to dwell” (PLT 147). We see here the notion of dwelling more fully developed and another indication that even though it is not yet entirely explicit, Heidegger realized he had missed something essential about human being in Being and Time, namely our spatiality -- a spatiality that is not subordinated to temporality and that is an important aspect of

---

Da-sein's constitution. As Villela-Petit explains: "It is clear that 'being-in-the-world' is henceforward to be understood in terms of dwelling and that, in consequence, our dwelling and the spatiality which belongs to it can no longer be uncovered on the basis of everyday praxis alone. It encompasses all the dimensions of our human sojourn here on earth."

In Being and Time, Heidegger took pains to make space dependent on time. By the time of the writing of "Building Dwelling Thinking," however, Heidegger had abandoned this "foundational project focusing on temporality" and "the conception of authentic spatiality comes to the fore." As indicated by Heidegger in his explanation of dwelling ("to remain, to stay in a place" (PLT 149)), it is human dwelling, the places we create, that allows for the notion of space.

Heidegger again uses an etymological analysis, this time of the concept of space. Raum, the German word for space, in its ancient meaning designates "a place cleared or freed for settlement and lodging. A space is something that has been made room for, something that is cleared and free, namely within a boundary, Greek peras. A boundary is not that at which something stops but, as the Greeks recognized, the boundary is that from which something begins its presencing" (PLT 154). It is only within a place that presencing can happen. He goes on to say that "Space is in essence that for which room has been made, that which is let into its bounds . . . . Accordingly, spaces receive their being from

---

32 Villela-Petit 150.
33 Villela-Petit 150.
locations and not from ‘space’” (PLT 154).

So here we see that what appeared in Being and Time has undergone a shift. In section 70 of Being and Time, we recall, Da-sein is dependent on space (BT 421/369), we make room for space, but Da-sein’s “specific spatiality must be grounded in temporality” and “Da-sein’s constitution and its ways to be are possible ontologically only on the basis of temporality” (BT 418/367). In “Building Dwelling Thinking” however, locations, or places, the boundaries of a given place, are what allows for the idea of space which is in turn what allows for presencing (i.e., of Being). Genuine dwelling places then, are somewhat akin to works of art in their capacity to let beings be.

This is especially evident if we recall the temple example used in “The Origin of the Work of Art.” In the temple, man’s ground for dwelling was cleared and illuminated (PLT 42). Space, then, is made possible first by place, not time. Place and space both still retain an aspect of the temporal, since a place and hence space, will come into presence at a particular moment, but neither is any longer dependent on, or grounded in temporality. Time and space are equiprimordial .

Heidegger takes pains here once again to distinguish between the Cartesian, mathematical notion of space which pervades the scientific, technological world view, and the kind of space which is opened up by dwelling: “The space provided for in [a] mathematical manner may be called ‘space,’ the ‘one’ space as such.

34 Arisaka, “Spatiality, Temporality” 42.
35 See Arisaka, “Spatiality, Temporality.”
But in this sense ‘the’ space, ‘space’ contains no spaces and no places. We never find in it any locations’ (PLT 155). He does not deny the existence of mathematical space: “Spatium and extensio afford at any time the possibility of measuring things and what they make room for, according to distances, spans, and directions, and of computing these magnitudes. But the fact that they are universally applicable to everything that has extension can in no case make numerical magnitudes the ground of the nature of spaces and locations that are measurable with the aid of mathematics’ (PLT 156).

We see here again reflected the notion of the importance of the active role of the subject in a concept of human spatiality, and recall Malpas’ contention in Chapter One that to abstract all subjective features of space leaves us not with objective space, but with nothing at all. Without the human aspect, objective space cannot be. It becomes clear in “Building Dwelling Thinking” that Da-sein’s ‘specific spatiality’ is not grounded in temporality. In fact, on the relation of man and space he writes: “it is not that there are men, and over and above them space; for when I say ‘a man,’ and in saying this word think of a being who exists in a human manner -- that is, who dwells-- then by the name ‘man’ I already name the stay within the fourfold among things” (PLT 156). In saying the word man, in the simple thought of human being, one’s essential spatiality is thought as well.

Space, then, is not something apart from us. In a sense, space is something that we create, it is an expression of self. Understood in this way, as with
nearness, it is subjective spatiality. We saw the human aspect of spatiality in the
concept of nearness, and this human aspect is just as much an integral part of the
notion of being as dwelling. This is not to say that the concept of “objective space”
is thrown out. What becomes clear is that subjective and objective space are
interrelated, interdependent notions. Heidegger points out that “spaces, and with
them space as such -- ‘space’ -- are always provided for already within the stay of
mortals. Spaces open up by the fact that they are let into the dwelling of man. To
say that mortals are is to say that in dwelling they persist through spaces by virtue
of their stay among things and locations”(PLT 157).

It is here, in the dwelling places that mortals create, that we find the self. It
is the human expression of self that creates the places which allow space to open
up. Let us take Heidegger’s bridge example to explain this. A bridge, he tells us,
allows for the banks which it connects to emerge: “with the banks, the bridge
brings to the stream the one and the other expanse of the landscape lying behind
them. It brings stream and bank and land into each other’s neighborhood. The
bridge gathers the earth as landscape around the stream . . . .The bridge lets the
stream run its course and at the same time grants their way to mortals so that they
may come and go from shore to shore. Bridges lead in many ways . . . .The bridge
gathers to itself in its own way earth and sky, divinities and mortals”(PLT 152-
153). The same idea was present in “The Origin of the Work of Art” in
Heidegger’s description of the Greek temple: “The temple-work . . . gathers

36 See Chapter One 33.
around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire the shape of destiny for human being” and becomes the place which “clears and illuminates...that on which and in which man bases his dwelling”(PLT 42).

The bridge provides such a clearing for dwelling. In fact: “The bridge dwells, and it dwells in our neighbourhood, and our neighbourhood dwells more fully because of the bridge, and the bridge could not dwell unless it dwelt in a neighbourhood, and together our neighbourhood, our dwelling, our land, our river, our buildings, our trees and flowers, and our bridge dwell in our sky in such a way as to enhance one another.”37 To build in such a manner, to enhance one another through building and dwelling is to build and dwell in such a way that one gathers what Heidegger calls the fourfold, das Geviert, “a poetic, mythic description of what this dwelling on the earth implies.”38

vi) The Fourfold (das Geviert)

An important aspect of dwelling that is developed in the later work and leads us along the way to a different understanding of space is that of the fourfold. The fourfold is something of a fullness which emerges when dwelling occurs. The elements are earth and sky, divinities and mortals. The “simple oneness” of these elements is the fourfold and, Heidegger tells us, “Mortals dwell in the way they preserve the fourfold in its essential being, its presencing”(PLT, 150). It is

---

interesting to note Villela-Petit’s analysis of the fourfold: “From a schematic point of view one sees here a kind of ‘square’, which . . . is one of the most ancient figures of space, referring back as it does to the four cardinal regions (Gegende). All the same, for Heidegger, the Geviert is not a spatial representation. It signifies the gathering, the non-separation of terms which are distinct but between which a dwelling is played out.”39 It becomes a place, which in turn, allows for space to open up (PLT 153-54).

In “The Origin of the Work of Art”, the description of the Greek temple has within it the notions developed as the fourfold. Through Reiner Schürmann’s description of the fourfold we can see how the temple was a place that made it possible for the fourfold to be and we also see once again the extreme importance of the link between language, being and human being:

“Geviert” designates first of all the essence of language insofar as it gathers (dichtet, verdichtet), i.e., as it is poetic. But Heidegger also says “Vierung,” translated at “the fouring, the unity of the four” (VA 179/PLT 180). Vierung is a term from the history of architecture. It is the name for the intersection of the nave and the transept in a basilica. Their crossing gives light to the entire edifice since it is surmounted by a dome (Vierungskuppel) and a lantern. The four aisles meet there, so that it is also the point from which the whole interior can be seen. The Vierung or Geviert is the heart of the whole cathedral where it is good to stay . . . . A further connotation, both in English and German, has to do with the cardinal points: a Gevierthof is a yard surrounded by four buildings, forming a farm. The farmyard orients or situates the stable, the barn, etc., by placing them in relation to one another. It is this sense of orientation -- traditionally established in reference to the earth’s two poles and sunrise and sunset -- that Heidegger retains in the word “Geviert.” It

38 Carter 35.
39 Villela-Petit 150.
suggests what is essential about a thing . . . namely, bringing the
regions of the world near.\textsuperscript{40}

Even Schürmann’s description of the fourfold is in spatial terms, and the human
aspect of the creation of the space is evident. The fourfold is at the same time a
unity, a “primal oneness” to which “earth and sky, divinities and mortals -- belong
together in one”\textsuperscript{(PLT 149). It is spatial in that it is where dwelling occurs.\textsuperscript{41} It is part of our situatedness, indeed, “we are already in it insofar as we are in a world
at all.”\textsuperscript{42} Also in the fourfold, the concept of world as distinct and separate has
“become a name for the whole Fourfold.”\textsuperscript{43} Earth includes water, rock, plant,
animal and its counterpart in this new configuration is heaven.\textsuperscript{44}

The final two elements of the fourfold are divinities and mortals. “The
divinities both represent one’s sense of the sacred and imply that what we know
also conceals what is beyond our knowing.”\textsuperscript{45} It is the mortals “who provide the
access to the Fourfold while remaining one of its constituents.”\textsuperscript{46} In fact,
Heidegger tells us, it is mortals’ dwelling that preserves the fourfold:

Mortals dwell in that they save the earth. . . . Saving the earth does
not master the earth and does not subjugate it, which is merely one
step from spoilation . . . . Mortals dwell in that they receive the sky
as sky . . . . they do not turn night into day nor day into a harassed
unrest . . . . Mortals dwell in that they await the divinities as

\textsuperscript{40} Schürmann 348, n.158.
\textsuperscript{41} Bruns 79.
\textsuperscript{42} Bruns 81.
\textsuperscript{43} Joan Stambaugh. \textit{The Finitude of Being.} (New York: State University of New York Press,
1992), 88. See also Bruns 79.
\textsuperscript{44} Stambaugh 88-89.
\textsuperscript{45} Carter 35.
\textsuperscript{46} Stambaugh 92.
They do not make their gods for themselves and do not worship idols. Mortals dwell in that they initiate their own nature -- their being capable of death as death -- into the use and practice of this capacity, so that there may be a good death (PLT 150-51).

The fourfold, that which is in effect our world, but not recognized as such until we authentically dwell, is not possible without mortals. If we are dwelling, then the bridge cannot help but be “thought of in special ways . . . unless it is conceived of as mere instrument or production or convenience. The bridge ‘gathers’ the fourfold, is a site for the fourfold, is an expression of the fourfold, and reminds us of the fourfold every time we ride over it, walk over or under it, or look up at it. The site is a space, a location where the fourfold itself can appear.”47 Dwelling then, needs mortals, to bring the fourfold into view, to save the earth.

It is clear here how far away Heidegger has moved from the ‘scientific’ or ‘mathematical’ notion of space that so dominates the technological world view. This concept of space, that which is opened up by place, is what makes the mathematical, scientific notion possible rather than the other way around. To return to Heidegger’s example of the bridge then, it cannot be viewed merely as a constructed thing. The bridge “gathers the fourfold in such a way that it allows a site for it. But only something that is itself a location can make space for a site” (PLT 154).

We have here a threefold relationship, but it is extremely difficult to pin down any sort of chronological order. We need (i) a location, in order for (ii)
space to open up, and this location is created by building which we recall entails (iii) dwelling, made possible by human beings. In this case, the building of the bridge creates a site which becomes a place as the building is genuine building in the sense of also encompassing dwelling and hence permits space to emerge. This notion of space which emerges, brings with it the scientific notion of space as _spatium_ and _extensio_, but, as Heidegger points out, “building never shapes pure ‘space’ as a single entity” (PLT 158) and in fact, through the space created by location, “building is closer to the nature of spaces and to the origin of the nature of ‘space’ than any geometry and mathematics” (PLT 158). For this more primordial notion of space to emerge, there must be genuine buildings which allow dwelling to presence. “In other words, a place _qua_ dwelling place cannot be defined by simple geometrical co-ordinates and on the basis of a homogeneous representation of space. It is not in space.”48 It is not in space until it is a place, and it is not a place without human beings in it, around it, creating it. Its very creation is an expression of human dwelling, of human being-in-the-world, of our selves, of who and how we are in the world.

3. The Spatial and being-with-others

We have seen how many of the central terms in Heidegger’s later thought are spatial. I have also tried to show that the concern with beings remains constant in Heidegger’s thought throughout this later period. What is also interesting for

---

47 Carter 37.
48 Villela-Petit 151.
our purposes in trying to elucidate the self as subject in Heidegger's thought, is that the later spatial terms also give us a somewhat fuller picture of being-with than what we were left with in *Being and Time*.

In Heidegger's later thought, the other begins to figure much more prominently. Notions like neighborhood, dwelling, and the fourfold, illustrate the stronger ties that human being in the world has compared to the dis-connectedness that we saw in *Being and Time*. Similar to the way in which world needs earth and revealing needs concealing, so the self needs others to fully develop. Heidegger is on the way to "implacing" human beings in the world, and this leads to a stronger connection with others in the world.

Two terms that link the self to the others around it appeared in the discussion of nearness -- neighborhood and face-to-face. Towards the end of "The Nature of Language," the interrelation of nearness, self, the fourfold and the other becomes quite evident. Ziarek cites the following passage, unpacking it as he goes: "Where this [that is, the nearness as the face-to-face of the fourfold] prevails, all things [beings, including humans] are open to one another in their self-concealment; thus one extends [reaches] itself to the other [forgoes itself to/for the other], and thus all remain themselves; one is over the other as its guardian watching over the other."49 We see how for each to be him/her self, the other is needed. The same collapsing of dualisms that we saw happen with concealing and

---

revealing, and space and time, is here happening in the realm of self and other.

In the spatiality of the term neighborhood, the idea of being with others is also instantly evoked. Furthermore, when Heidegger uses the term face-to-face, it cannot at first be understood as anything other than having to do with a human relation. Heidegger tells us that it is being “face-to-face with one another” that distinguishes neighborliness (OWL 103). Nearness can only be understood via neighborliness, being with another human being in one’s community -- be it a next door neighbor, or the family living five miles down the road at the neighboring farm. The concept has little to do with calculated distance, rather it has to do with the betweenness of human relations. Heidegger himself recognizes that we “tend to think of face-to-face encounter exclusively as a relation between human beings”(OWL 103). It is this understanding that allows us the possibility of moving beyond calculative thinking to being able to understand or experience space, or time for that matter, as a “face-to-face encounter of its elements”, as neighboring nearness. The modern technological world, however, makes this move extremely difficult:

the dominance of space and time as parameters for all conceptualization, production, and accumulation . . . encroaches in an unearthly manner upon the dominion of nearness . . . . Where everything is fixed at calculated distances, precisely there, the absence of distance spreads due to the unbounded calculability of everything, and spreads in the form of the refusal of neighborly nearness of the world’s regions. In the absence of distance, everything becomes equal and indifferent in consequence of the one will intent upon the uniformly calculated availability of the whole earth . . . . This [battle for dominion over the earth] is making a
desert of the world’s fourfold -- it is the refusal of nearness (OWL 105).

This battle, in making barren and empty the world’s fourfold, precludes dwelling, and in doing so it obstructs human face-to-face relations. Refusing nearness is to refuse genuine human relations as well. It is against this supreme dominion of technology that Heidegger is fighting. It is language that can bring back the face-to-face encounter of the fourfold, and at the same time, the genuine human relation that exists in the fourfold through dwelling. As Ziarek explains:

Behind the somewhat overdramatized rhetoric of the fourfold lies the invitation to (un)thinking the thing, the one, and the self, along the lines of an originary, that is, essencing, exposition and reaching toward the other. In other words, these texts imply that reaching oneself transpires always as opening and reaching the other. Heidegger carefully notes, though, that this openness does not amount to a disclosure of the content of the other that would simply result in the eventual cognition, thematization, and thus absorption of otherness. Both the other and the one who reaches itself toward the other open themselves as self-concealed (sich-verbergen). What enacts and maintains this movement is nearness itself, "which makes them reach one another and holds them in the nearness of their distance." (OWL, 104) -- not in a dialectics of (re)cognition but precisely in proximity to their respective, non-cognizable otherness. The other thus remains the other, preserves its alterity precisely in its openness, in its face-to-face.  

The development of human spatiality and recognition of the equiprimordiality of space and time in Heidegger's the later work means that the self is not an isolated subject, in fact, it needs the other in order to be its self. The self is implaced in its community, its neighborhood, in its dwelling places, and in the fourfold which could not be without the human aspect as a constituting
member of it. Heidegger is expressing, or on the way to expressing "a mode of relating to otherness and self that would make the movement of reaching oneself near, almost coextensive with, reaching the other as other, that is, the other understood not as the other of the same, its opposite or its differend, but rather as the self-concealed other, the other whose alterity is noted and heeded."  

4. The Body/Conclusion

Although Heidegger moved towards the spatial in his later work, one aspect of this analysis of the self remains conspicuously absent, that is, the body. Edward Casey maintains that it was in fact "precisely by his deliberate refusal to invoke the body . . . that Heidegger made his own way to place."  

I disagree with Casey on this point. I contend that Heidegger's refusal to invoke the body gives evidence that Heidegger was still caught in the very dualisms he was trying to transcend.

We recall Arisaka's critique of Heidegger's omission of the lived body (see Chapter Two) -- that many of Heidegger's phenomenological concepts are extremely difficult to comprehend except as modes of our existence as embodied beings. Unfortunately, this difficulty is not corrected in the work of the later Heidegger. He continues to ignore the fact that the human body is not only an expression of our human spatiality, but is also in large part what makes it possible for us to understand our finitude, our mortality. When we think of death we think of the decay of the body, of its no longer being present. This is not 

---

50 Ziarek 57.
51 Ziarek 58
comprehensible as a *purely* temporal notion, in order for the notion to make
"phenomenological sense" as Arisaka puts it, we need the spatial aspect *as well* as
the temporal aspect of human being recognized. We only witness the decay of the
body over time due to its physical manifestation.

We recall here Villela-Petit's contention that the concept of dwelling and
the spatiality that goes along with it "encompasses all the dimensions of our
human sojourn here on earth."\(^{53}\) Surely our embodiment is an undeniable
dimension of this sojourn. Yet Heidegger ignores this fact -- that one’s body is
where we dwell while we are on earth. The body is, one might venture to say, our
primordial dwelling place, and that which makes dwelling and dwelling places
possible, for "both the continuing accessibility and the familiarity of a dwelling
place presuppose the presence and activity of the inhabitant’s lived body. This
body has everything to do with the transformation of a mere *site* into a dwelling
*place*. Indeed, *bodies build places.*"\(^{54}\) Casey pushes Heidegger, who writes in an
untranslated paper that "the world is the house where mortals dwell" and
maintains that if this is true, then "a house is in turn a body or bodylike."\(^{55}\) Our
body is largely that which allows us to be fully human, to dwell on earth as
*mortals*, as finite beings. We dwell on earth then, in the house of our own bodies.
And, by virtue of dwelling, our bodies would be sites for being. Michel Haar

\(^{52}\) Casey 243.
\(^{53}\) Villela-Petit 150.
expresses the importance of the body by referring to a transcendence, which I believe we can read as being: "The spatiality of the body is inhabited by a transcendence, by unceasing projects without which there would be neither distance or nearing."56 We see here the permeation of the spatial -- the body -- by the temporal -- our projects -- such as building and dwelling.

The connection of body/self/dwelling, ignored by Heidegger, becomes clearer when we examine why and what constructed houses are. Casey tells us that places "built for residing are . . . an enlargement of our already existing embodiment into an entire life-world of dwelling."57 They are spaces which are expressions of our selves, of who we are. We are often most comfortable, most 'ourselves' in our homes. Casey maintains that more than mere comfort is at issue, in fact, "our very identity is at stake. For we tend to identify ourselves by -- and with -- the places in which we reside."58 Recognition of the body and its connection to dwelling places would have given further support to Heidegger's concept of being as dwelling, for, as Casey puts it, "built places . . . are extensions of our bodies."59

Recalling Heidegger's etymology we know that building goes further than the mere construction and inhabiting of a place: "The old word bauen, which says

55 Casey, Getting Back 120.
56 Michel Haar, La Chant de la terre (Paris: L’Herne, 1985) My translation of "La spatialité du corps est habitée par une transcendance, par des projets incessants sans lesquels il n’y aurait ni distance ni rapprochement"(82).
57 Casey, Getting Back 120.
58 Casey, Getting Back 120.
that man is insofar as he *dwell* . . . however *also* means at the same time to cherish and protect, to preserve and care for” (PLT 147). Not only do we take care of and preserve our homes and sacred places, but we also protect, preserve and care for our bodies. We are affronted by places which lack the sense of a dwelling place, which have not been cared for -- the coldness of office buildings, the sterile starkness of a hospital -- there is no self at the center of these places and as a result they are not dwellings, merely buildings. A home, however, a dwelling place, “comes to exist in our image, but *we*, the residents, also take on certain of *its*, properties. *How we are*, our bodily being, reflects how we reside in built places.”

Furthermore, when we see people who do not care for their physical well being -- who take no care for their appearance, or health -- we may say that they have no self-respect, that they have lost their sense of self, of who they are.

This is made even more clear when Heidegger points us to the Gothic version of *bau*en, *wunian*:

*Wunian* means: to be at peace, to be brought to peace, to remain in peace. The word for peace, *Friede*, means the free, *das Frye*, and *fry* means: preserved from harm and danger, preserved from something, safeguarded. To free really means to spare. The sparing itself consists not only in the fact that we do not harm the one whom we spare. Real sparing is something *positive* and takes place when we leave something beforehand in its own nature, when we return it specifically to its being, when we ‘free’ it in the real sense of the word into a preserve of peace (PLT 149).

It is this peace, this possibility of allowing things, people to *be* in Heidegger’s

---

59 Casey, *Getting Back* 120.
60 Casey, *Getting Back* 120.
sense, that we try to create in our most sacred dwelling places -- homes, places of worship -- they are expressions of self in order to create places where we *can* be our selves, where and when we have the opportunity to *be* in its ancient sense, to dwell, to be at peace. This calls to mind Schürmann’s discussion of the origin of the fourfold and its location being the place in the church which was a good place to stay. Unless we recall the true meaning of being, dwelling, we are not capable of creating places which allow us to dwell -- “*Only if we are capable of dwelling, only then can we build*” (PLT 160).

We recall once again the strong connection in Heidegger’s later work between being, human being and language. In “The Nature of Language” Heidegger gives us what I believe is the only indication of a sense of importance of the lived body. Humans are capable of speaking due to our physiology. But clearly Heidegger does not mean simply speaking when he refers to language. The meaning goes much deeper, beyond mere communication to an expression of being and makes the human use of language unique. Fundamentally, however, we first know language, and know it in its most immediate way as spoken by human beings. “If we take language directly in the sense of something that is present, we encounter it as the act of speaking, the activation of the organs of speech, mouth, lips, tongue. Language manifests itself in speaking, as a phenomenon that occurs in man . . . language has long since been experienced, conceived, defined in these terms” (OWL 96).

---

61 See 90.
Heidegger here recognizes the link between the body and language and, following the links we established at the beginning of the chapter, we can see the further potential for a link between body, language, human being and being itself. He says let no one suppose that we mean to belittle vocal sounds as physical phenomena, the merely sensuous side of language, in favor of what is called the meaning and sense-content of what was said and is esteemed as being of the spirit, the spirit of language. It is much more important to consider whether . . . the physical element of language, its vocal and written character, is being adequately experienced; whether it is sufficient to associate sound exclusively with the body understood in physiological terms, and to place it within the metaphysically conceived confines of the sensuous (OWL 98).

Understanding language "merely" or "exclusively" as physiological would be patently wrong. Heidegger seems to think that within the metaphysical confines of the tradition that this would be the only way to understand the physiological aspect. But could we not expect from Heidegger an attempt to move beyond these very confines, as he does with so many other 'traditional' concepts? He even admits that "It is just as much a property of language to sound and ring and vibrate, to hover and to tremble, as it is for the spoken words of language to carry a meaning. But our experience of this property is still exceedingly clumsy, because the metaphysical-technological explanation gets everywhere in the way, and keeps us from considering the matter properly" (OWL 98).

Yet, it seems that Heidegger falls prey to this very metaphysical-technological tradition in that he never takes up the challenge of attempting to think through this bodily aspect of language and beyond the confines of the
tradition. The idea that Heidegger could not get away from, and which may have kept him from analysing the body, is the long standing view of Cartesian dualism — the very dualism he was trying to avoid.\textsuperscript{62} We have seen that in the later Heidegger's work, traditional dualisms collapse -- truth/untruth, self/other, time/space, as each becomes interrelated to its other, no longer exclusive of one another, but quite the opposite in fact. In the dualisms that Heidegger manages to collapse, the notions become \textit{interdependent}, \textit{reciprocal}; to think one means \textit{to think its other as part of itself}.

Understood within the confines of the metaphysical-technological tradition, dominated by Descartes, self is divided into mind and body. Why was Heidegger unable to collapse \textit{this} dualism? With his deliberate forgetfulness of the body, we may even question whether or not he really tried. Not including the body as part of understanding of being-in-the-world somehow does not make phenomenological sense. Does Heidegger make a genuine place for the self, somewhere that “subtends and enfolds us” that “has everything to do with what and who we are . . . \textit{that} we are”\textsuperscript{63} . . . almost. While Heidegger does put more emphasis on spatiality and on the fact that we as human beings create it, the lack of development of our bodily nature cannot be ignored.

In collapsing each of what I have been referring to as traditional dualisms, Heidegger first made a point of trying to fully comprehend each part -- truth and

\textsuperscript{62} See Loy 175.
\textsuperscript{63} Casey, \textit{Getting Back} xiii, xvii.
untruth, for example, each had to be individually investigated before the statement ‘truth is untruth’ could be made in a meaningful way. The same occurred with world and earth, and to a certain extent, we saw at least the beginning of the movement with self and other. However, what makes the full collapse of the self/other dualism impossible is the fact that Heidegger was unable or unwilling to collapse the body/mind dualism. While Heidegger’s notion of human being is not to be understood as equivalent to Descartes’ notion of mind -- it is undeniable that Heidegger’s concept of human being lacks almost any recognition of the body, which is problematic for any phenomenological investigation.

We see the possibility of the collapsing of this dualism, if only Heidegger would have treated the body as well as the rest of the human being. Despite his attempt and success in many areas, of shaking off the Cartesian heritage of the West, “in terms of the broad perspective” having to do with the spatial body “he still remains within the traditional Western mode of thinking.” Western phenomenological studies seem to always stop short of the collapse of this dualism into the Eastern notion of body-mind nondualism. In the particular case of Heidegger, this inability to move beyond the confines of the Western tradition is particularly puzzling, for we now know that by the time of his later work, that Heidegger was indeed familiar with and took a great interest in the philosophical ideas of the East.  

---

64Yuasa, “The Encounter” 45.
65See Reinhard May’s Heidegger’s Hidden Sources: East Asian Influences on his Work, trans.
work of Edmund Husserl. Working from a similar framework, Husserl was able to
make room for many of the concepts that were lacking in Heidegger.

CHAPTER III
Husserl, Space and the Self

In Chapters One and Two we saw how one of the major gaps in Heidegger’s portrayal of self and spatiality was any investigation of the body. When we turn to the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, however, what becomes immediately clear is that for him, self, space, and body, are issues which are very difficult to separate. According to Paul Ricoeur, it is in the fourth of Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations that Husserl’s phenomenology undergoes a shift, “from a phenomenology ‘turned toward the object’ to a phenomenology ‘turned toward the ego,’ where ‘the ego continuously constitutes itself as being.’ . . . It is the ‘explication of self’ (Selbstauslegung).”¹ In this chapter, focussing on selections of Husserl’s later work, we will look critically at how Husserl’s discussions of self, spatiality and body are interwoven and furthermore, how they can be read as a corrective to Heidegger’s portrayal of the issues. Ideas which we had to tease out of Heidegger are explicit and pushed further in Husserl’s later philosophy. As well as the Meditations, we will look at sections of Ideas II, two of Husserl’s daily meditations, “Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature,”² and “The World of the Living Present and the Constitution

of the Surrounding World External to the Organism." These texts demonstrate the link that Husserl recognized between space and self and the constitution of both. We will also see the importance of the body in this context and how Husserl establishes a relational self, in contrast to Heidegger’s dissatisfying concept of *Mitsein.*

1. The Embodied Self

In section 53 of the Fifth Meditation, Husserl establishes the active role of the embodied self in the constitution of space:

As reflexively related to itself, my animate bodily organism (in my primordial sphere) has the central “Here” as its mode of givenness; every other body, and accordingly the “other’s” body, has the mode “There.” This orientation, “There,” can be freely changed by virtue of my kinesthesias. Thus, in my primordial sphere, the *one spatial “Nature”* is constituted throughout the change in orientations, and constituted moreover with an intentional relatedness to my animate organism as functioning perceptually. We see immediately that spatiality is recognized through the movement of the *embodied ego.* As Richard Cobb-Stevens points out, Husserl’s remarks about the body as center of orientation should . . . not be construed as referring to the objectified body. Indeed, he asserts

---


enigmatically that the kinaesthetic system is originally experienced as a spontaneous and undifferentiated field of activity, as an "I can."\(^5\)

So the body is not fragmented and isolated as it was in *Being and Time*, nor is it viewed merely as an object, a merely physical thing. While we saw that Heidegger recognized the role of Da-sein in the constitution of spatiality especially in the later work, he still stopped short of recognizing the role of the body as a part of this spatializing self. Heidegger maintained the clear and distinct Cartesian mind-body separation in *Being and Time*, and did nothing explicitly to correct this in the later work. Husserl however, in *Ideas II* at the very least, recognizes that this separation can only have sense if it is part of a phenomenological abstraction:

> Men and animals have their position in space and move in space as sheer physical things. It will be said that it is obvious that they do so "by virtue of" their corporeal Bodies. It would be bizarre, however, to say that only the man’s Body moved but not the man, that the man’s Body walked down the street, drove in a car, dwelled in the country or town, but not the man.\(^6\)

Husserl’s description of how it would be odd *not* to recognize the ownness of the body may strike some as a far more convincing description of being-in-the-world than Heidegger’s example of tools which we saw make Da-sein’s body invisible through de-distancing and directionality.\(^7\) When Husserl discusses the pure Ego,


\(^7\)See Chapter I, 25-26.
he does abstract from the body. However, it is important to remember that this is only an abstraction, and that Husserl recognizes it as such.  

Now, this is not to say that Husserl completely overcame Cartesian dualism, but that he, like Heidegger, is on his way to a different way of thinking. His work on the body demonstrates that the body

does not fit neatly into a dualistic ontology where everything must be assigned to either one or the other of two mutually exclusive categories such as “mind” or “matter,” “spirit” or “nature” . . . . And although Husserl does not explicitly say so . . . the evidence of the Body not only places into question these particular inherited dualistic schemas, but also the dichotomous, ‘either-or’ habit of thinking itself.  

Again, like Heidegger, Husserl did not completely overcome the dualistic tradition. Take, for example, Richard Zaner’s description of the role of the body in Husserl’s phenomenology as found in Ideas I:

Consciousness can become “worldly” only by being embodied within the world as part of it. In so far as the world is material Nature, consciousness must partake of the transcendence of material Nature. That is to say, its transcendence is manifestly an embodiment in a material, corporeal body. Consciousness, thus, takes on the characteristic of being “here and now” (ecceity) by means of experiential (or, more accurately, its intuitive) relation to that corporeal being which embodies it.

If this was entirely nondualistic thinking, there would be no talk of a ‘relation’ between consciousness and the corporeal being, for this is still thinking in a

---


manner such that "we experience the world itself dualistically . . . as a collection of discrete objects . . . causally interacting in space and time. The negation of dualistic thinking leads to the negation of this way of experiencing the world."\textsuperscript{11}

We can clearly see that above there is still a separation of consciousness and the body, there is a dualism inherent in seeing such a relation. What \textit{is} recognized, is that in order for consciousness to become worldly, to manifest its transcendence, it \textit{must be embodied}. In \textit{Ideas II}, Husserl discusses this relation:

People and animals \textit{have} material Bodies, and to that degree they have spatiality and materiality. According to what is specifically human and animal, that is, according to what is psychic, they \textit{are} however, not material, and, consequently, taken \textit{also as concrete totalities}, they are \textit{not} material realities in the proper sense. Material things are open to fragmentation, something which accompanies the extension that belongs to their essence. But men and animals cannot be fragmented. Men and animals are \textit{spatially localized}; and even what is psychic about them, at least in virtue of its essential foundedness in the Bodily, partakes of the spatial order. We will even say that much of what is included under the broad - and, at first, unclarified - heading of the psychic has something like spread (although not extension in space) (II 36).

Husserl's position here is stronger than the view found in the first volume of \textit{Ideas}. He goes so far as to acknowledge that there is some kind of \textit{essential} spatial element to the self, even beyond embodiment, that extends to the psychic -- although not, perhaps, the kind of spatiality which we usually encounter. Despite the fact that consciousness needs the body in order to become worldly and that the body needs consciousness in order to move from being a mere physical body

(Körper) to being an animate organism (Leib); it is still clear that the psychic is conceived of independently of the body.

For Husserl, any phenomenological discussion of space involves the body. We can only come to know space through our perception of it, and while for Husserl, there is a transcendental consciousness separate from the body (a consciousness which is nonspatial),\textsuperscript{12} before it is "mundanized", transcendental consciousness alone can only constitute "a 'pre-phenomenal' or 'pre-empirical' spatiality or extension."\textsuperscript{13} It is only once this pre-phenomenal spatiality is mundanized, implaced in a living body in the world, that consciousness can spatialize.

Let us take a brief look at what could be meant by "pre-phenomenal" or "pre-empirical" spatiality. "Pre-phenomenal" does not mean "objective" space, or empty space, for, as we saw in the previous chapter, we can only have these ideas by abstracting from our experience of space, which itself is evidently phenomenal. "Präphantomenal" means a level of constitution that is prior to objectivity, for example prior to objective time and space.\textsuperscript{14} It cannot even be equated with a "scientific" definition of space; in the "Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature," Husserl links the origin of spatiality with natural science and the body in the first paragraph: "the following

\textsuperscript{11} Loy 21.
\textsuperscript{12} Rudolf Bernet, Iso Kern, Eduard Marbach, An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1993) 122.
\textsuperscript{13} Bernet, Kern, Marbach 122.
pages are, in any case, foundational for a phenomenological theory of the origin of
spatiality, corporeality, Nature in the sense of the natural sciences, and therefore
for a transcendental theory of natural scientific cognition” (Fl 222). “Pre-
phenomenal” spatiality is spatiality which has no relation to any specific, objective
thing, yet it is the unity which underlies and makes possible our spatial perception
of a thing in the world. Pre-phenomenal spatiality is transcendent spatiality. It
is not that our perception of a thing as spatial makes it appear, as the idealists
would have, but that our perception, the intention of our consciousness towards the
given object, is necessary for a thing to have any sense for us as human beings in
the world. Although spatiality might exist “outside” of the self, that is,
transcendentally, this existence has no meaning or sense, etc., unless it is the
object of the intentional life of consciousness.

In Ideas II Husserl pushes the consequences of the role of the body in
spatializing far beyond even the later Heidegger. Husserl states: “Besides its
distinction as a center of orientation, the Body, in virtue of the constitutive role of
the sensations, is of significance for the construction of the spatial world” (II 62).
Husserl’s statement here underlines the absence of the body in Heidegger’s
concept of dwelling, which, as we saw in Chapter Two, was in part the
construction of such a world. Husserl maintains that two kinds of sensations

\[\text{15Husserl, Ding und Raum 62.}\]
contribute to the construction of spatial representations: constituting sensations and motivating sensations. Most important for our purposes here are the latter type of sensations, for Husserl states that these are "an essential part of the constitution of spatiality" (II 63). Motivating sensations are "kinaesthetic sensations . . . that impel precisely what, in the other discussions of sensation, appear to be wholly passive -- namely, sensations as representing contents." They allow us to have a spatial perception of a thing. Motivating sensations indicate the active role of the embodied self in constructing spatiality. We saw an idea of the active self in Heidegger, but Husserl makes this role explicit through the concept of kinesthesia which we will look at in more detail in a moment. Casey explains kinesthesia as "the inner experience of the moving or resting body as it feels itself moving or pausing at a given moment. . . . A kinesthetic sensation acts to 'motivate' a particular perception in that if I move my body in a certain way, then things will appear differently." The role of the body in spatializing could not be more clearly put than by Cobb-Stevens when he states:

My original sense of position as "here" is not thematized as an objective location. In its original form it cannot be located within objective spatio-temporal coordinates or identified with any physical

---

16 Constituting sensations are those which give, "by means of the apprehensions allotted to them, corresponding features of the thing as such." (Husserl Ideas II, 62) For example, smoothness (i.e., of an apple), appears through the apprehension of the smoothness-sensation.


or geometrical spaces. On the contrary, it is the condition for the appearance of all coordinates and spaces.\textsuperscript{19}

My body, as we saw in the above quotation from \textit{Cartesian Meditations}, is precisely what allows for the appearance of spaces. Later on, in section 53, Husserl himself makes this abundantly clear:

Now the fact that my bodily organism can be (and is) apprehended as a \textit{natural body existing and movable in space like any other} is manifestly connected with the possibility expressed in the words: By free modification of my kinesthesias, particularly those of locomotion, I can change my position in such a manner that I convert any There into a Here -- that is to say, I could occupy any spatial locus with my organism (CM 116).

In "The World of the Living Present and the Constitution of the Surrounding World External to the Organism," Husserl uses the simple action of walking to illustrate the role of kinaesthetic movements of the body in spatializing -- the ability to turn a "here" into a "there." He first abstracts from walking the various kinesthetic movements of the body which it entails (WLP 248). Next, he explains, walking comes into question. It is the unity of the various kinesthetic movements that allows us to explore what he terms our "near sphere" or "core sphere" -- our world, the spatiality of our surrounding world. To use Husserl's expression, I have a core sphere of places into which I can move and act and "I also have apperceived things outside of this core-sphere" (WLP 249). It is the act of walking which makes possible this movement outside my original core sphere of constituted things and indeed for the enlargement of my experience of spatiality.

\textsuperscript{19}Cobb-Stevens 2, my emphasis.
Through walking, things that are not clear or at a distance, far away on the horizon, become closer, move from "there" to "here," which is centered around me; "they enter the core-filled" (WLP 249). What happens is "the apperceptive enlargement of the sphere of closeness (the original core-sphere) into a homogeneous, endlessly open world of space" (WLP 249). He continues: "Distant appearances are first perspectivally transformed into close appearances in the activity of walking, as its acts together with other kinaesthetic activities and the things of a 'core world' that are already constituted by these activities" (WLP 249).

So it is clear that through our walking, the totality and interrelation of our various kinesthetic experiences constitute in an important sense, not just subjective, but also objective space -- it is "not just the 'correlate' of my kinesthetically felt near-sphere but its very 'expansion.'"20 Through walking I get a sense of the organization of my world, I can map it out. Nowhere is this more clear than in walking, for

all worldly things . . . appear to me to be oriented about my phenomenally stationary, resting organism. That is, they are oriented with respect to here and there, right and left, etc., whereby a firm zero of orientation persists, so to speak, as absolute here (WLP 250).

When I move, I am still always "here" by virtue of my body in whatever place I am in, no matter for how short a period of time -- it is an "indissoluble

---

20 Casey, *The Fate of Place* 219.
composition.” In walking, “I am at once actually moving and yet experience myself as a ‘stable null-object.’”

In the “Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature,” Husserl describes the earth itself as body:

The earth is a globe-shaped body, certainly not perceivable in its wholeness all at once and by one person; rather it is perceived in a primordial synthesis as a unity of mutually connected single experiences. Yet, it is a body! Although for us it is the experiential basis for all bodies in the experiential genesis of our idea of the world. This “basis” is not experienced at first as body but becomes a basis-body at higher levels of constitution of the world by virtue of experience, and that nullifies its original basis-form (FI 222-23).

In this essay, Husserl maintains that the earth is the basis for our conception of space. We saw above a mutual relationship between embodied self and space as world. Viewed in this manner, the earth is the basis for our experiences of the world and the discovery of other bodies in it. And it is our movements through our bodies, on the earth as basis body, that allows us to constitute an idea of spatiality.

2. Self, Space and Others

In his evocation of the role of the body, we have seen that Husserl refers not merely to the body as physical object, but as animated, beseelt, or besouled. Husserl explicitly recognizes the role of the complete human subject in constituting spatiality. Elizabeth Behnke points out how much of a role the self has when she states:

---

21Casey, *The Fate of Place* 225.
22Dodd 34; Drummond 239.
Constitutive phenomenology is not merely some sort of abstract intellectual enterprise; it is a demonstration that at very deep levels, the world we encounter is traceable to the attitude we bring to it. This is not to deny the resistance of reality, the intractability of things. But it is to say that our own style of comportment has something to do with the kind of world we live in.\textsuperscript{23}

We will see this notion pushed to its extreme by Watsuji in the next chapter.

The notion of an active self was developed in the later Heidegger -- however, the body as part of this active self was missing in Heidegger's account; not so, as we just saw, in Husserl's later philosophy and in the concept of kinesthesia, which does not just involve the body as a machine which moves, but also the active self. Through kinesthesia, \textit{I can decide} to take this or that path, look at an object from this or that perspective. James Dodd explains:

> the "sensation of movement" refers neither to the objective movement of my body as a thing nor of things placed within the perceptual field. Of far more interest here is a peculiar \textit{mutability} present even when neither the body nor anything else is in motion in the objective sense; to refer solely to objective motion in order to describe the phenomenal field would be to pass over the special sense of this mutability for the phenomenology of space.\textsuperscript{24}

This implies a dynamism inherent in the self. In his introduction to \textit{Idealism and Corporeity: An Essay on the Problem of the Body in Husserl's Phenomenology}, Dodd indicates this when he states that:

> even though we can still speak of the body of the person as an "animated" unity, an expression that presents what is expressed, the style of this unity is very much different, \textit{for it includes the movement of an individual's life} just as much as whatever quasi-

\textsuperscript{23}Behnke 156.
\textsuperscript{24}Dodd 49.
fixed sense that life has a hold of at any given moment (such as “she is here”; “it is too hot for me,” etc.).

Here we can read the body as an expression of a dynamic self --self as acting, willing, growing -- a developing unity -- not just a mere coincidence of body and consciousness. Dodd also points out that “in the final analysis Husserl understands kinaesthesia in terms of ‘change’ and ‘movement,’ phenomenologically understood in terms of a modification of perspective (or series of perspectives).” He reads perspective as a key concept in Husserl, one which describes “the separation of appearance and that which appears.” Perspective is always modified from the point of view of the perceiving subject. Up to this point we have been looking for the most part at the isolated self and spatiality, yet perspective also involves others. Dodd explains that “perspective” not only refers to space as such, but to space organized in accordance with an order of orientation that is not merely that of the intentio. In general, to apprehend is to “take something as something,” a “this here” against the horizon of its essence; to say that such apprehending in turn takes place within a perspective stresses the fact that not only do I take something to be something, but my apprehension itself takes place within and as a context; that its actualization involves a structure that determines in what way apprehension and its contents are going to unfold as an experience.

---

[27] Dodd 49.
[28] Dodd 46.
[29] Dodd 46-47.
Perspective takes place from the orientation not only of the experiencing subject, but within the context of the world co-created by and including a plurality of subjects.

We recall Husserl’s use of the walking example to illustrate how the body spatializes. It is not, however, only the body of the subject, but involves other bodies as well. He tells us, referring to the various kinaesthetic systems of movement of our body, i.e. the motion of my hand, shifting of my eyes, that we have a system of ways of appearing for rest and movement and for alteration and nonalteration for each system; but all this is changed when other kinaesthetic systems enter as cofunctioning. In the total situation, however, they already constitute the changeable physically existent “world”(WLP 248).

While walking, other “kinaesthetic systems,” other people, co-constitute the space in which I, as total organism, am free to move about in; they create the possibility of “a sphere of things to which I can go” (WLP 248). The role of others is crucial in constituting spatiality, and in constituting the self.

It is our experience as subjects of being able to move about in space, to change locations and perspectives, that then allows us to intuit space abstracted from our presence in it and come up with a notion of ‘objective’ space, as we saw in the previous chapters. As Cobb-Stevens puts it:

Since the subject possesses a spatial location by reason of its embodiment, Husserl concludes that spatial objects can only appear for and be constituted by embodied subjects. The body is present in every experience as the “zero point,” “the absolute here,” “the center” around which and in relationship to which space unfolds
itself. The development of objective spatial coordinates refers back to this indexical “here” associated with our embodiment.\textsuperscript{30}

What Husserl makes explicit, even more so than Heidegger, is the active role of the subject in making this possible. We saw the notion of “I can” in kinaesthesia above. This “I can” makes seeing things from a variety of perspectives possible: “perspective drives the apprehension one way or another, opening up the give and take of a more intricate interaction with the world than just ‘seeing what I see’.”\textsuperscript{31}

Space and things appear within the perspective thus created and the perspective is created only by virtue of the body’s kinesthesias:

As Husserl and other phenomenologists have pointed out, this is fundamental for the constitution of a shared spatial world as an intersubjective “system of locations” into which individual, “merely subjective” perspectives fit.\textsuperscript{32}

Husserl recognizes that it is precisely these subjective perspectives that permit the establishment of an objective spatiality/spatial world:

Every subject has his “space of orientation,” his “here” and his possible “there,” this “there” being determined according to the directional system of right-left, above-below, front-back. But the basic form of all identification of the intersubjective givennesses of a sensuous content is of such a kind that they necessarily belong to one and the same system of location, whose Objectivity is manifest in that every “here” is identifiable with every relative “there” as regards every new “here” resulting from the subject’s “moving on” and so also regards every “here” from the viewpoint of another subject. This is an ideal necessity and constitutes an Objective system of location, one that does not allow of being grasped by the vision of the eyes but only by the understanding, that is, it is “visible,” in a

\textsuperscript{30}Cobb-Stevens 1.
\textsuperscript{31}Dodd 50.
\textsuperscript{32}Behnke 147.
higher kind of intuition, founded on change of location and on empathy (II 88).\textsuperscript{33}

We notice that in order to get to this idea of space, this system of location available to everyone, subjective experience is necessary -- subjective experience of “here” and “there” from within my body. It is only by virtue of the body that we can attain an idea of objective space. By virtue of our subjective experiences, our ability to change locations, to move about and see things from various perspectives, we can map out a system of objective space.

In the above citation, Husserl mentions the importance of empathy in creating a shared spatiality. A brief look at empathy further fleshes out the concept of self in relation with others, and again goes beyond the concept of Mitsein found in Heidegger, and also beyond what we examined in his later work.

In Ideas II, from the outset of Chapter Four, “The Constitution of Psychic Reality in Empathy,” Husserl recognizes the role of the body in human relations. While we identify another human being first by recognizing a body similar to ours, empathy is what allows us to complete that picture -- to identify another as being like me:

In my physical surrounding world I encounter Bodies, i.e., material things of the same type as the material thing constituted in solipsistic experience, “my Body,” and I apprehend them as Bodies, that is, I feel by empathy that in them there is an Ego-subject, along with everything that pertains to it and with the particular content demanded from case to case. Transferred over to the other Bodies thereby is first of all that “localization” I accomplish in various

\textsuperscript{33}“Objectivity” is the translation of “Objektivität” (not “Gegenständlichkeit”) -- see translator’s introduction as well as Cairns 88.
sense-fields (field of touch, warmth, coldness, smell, taste, pain,
sensuous pleasure) and sense-regions (sensations of movement), and
then in a similar way there is a transfer of my indirect localization of
spiritual activities (II 172).

Empathy allows us to see the other as similar to ourselves, and this occurs through
the body and in space and time. We have already demonstrated the need for others
in establishing the world in which we live -- this “common system of places” is
what facilitates our relating to others, and helps us to also further define our
selves:

In order to establish a mutual relationship between myself and an
other, in order to communicate something to him, a Bodily relation, a
Bodily connection by means of physical occurrences, must be
instituted. I have to go over and speak to him. Thus space plays a
major role here (II 176).

What is even more clear in the Cartesian Meditations is that, despite our
individuality (which Husserl does not want to lose), even if we never go over and
speak to the other, we still exist intersubjectively. From the outset, Husserl
maintains the following:

within myself, within the limits of my transcendentally reduced pure
conscious life, I experience the world (including others) - and,
according to its experiential sense, not as (so to speak) my private
synthetic formation but as other than mine alone [mir fremde], as an
intersubjective world, actually there for everyone, accessible in
respect of its Objects to everyone (CM 91).

We saw the role of the body mentioned above in recognizing the other to be like
myself -- an animate organism. It is also the other's body that allows me to see
myself objectively. Husserl states that “Each thing of my experience belongs to my
‘environment,’ and that means first of all that my Body is part of it precisely as Body” (II 85-86). My body is part of my environment, yet it is not something that I can know objectively as part of the world - the way I can know a rock for example: “I cannot gain enough distance from my own Body to do this; I cannot jump out of my own skin and walk around myself in order to get a good look at my own Body from all sides.”\(^{34}\) Through empathy however, in a certain sense this does become possible:

Each person has, from the same place in space and with the same lighting, the same view of, for example, a landscape. But never can the other, at exactly the same time as me (in the originary content of lived experience attributed to him) have the exact same appearance as I have. My appearances belong to me, his to him. Only in the manner of appresence can I have, co-give with his Body, his appearances and his “here,” to which they are related. But from that “here” I can then consider even my own Body as a natural Object, i.e., from that “here” my Body is “there,” just as the other’s Body is “there” from my “here,” is there at a point in Objective space, and I consider it like any other thing that is identical not only for me but for every other, and I represent it, the Body, in just the way that it is given to any person who encounters a man as one with it (II 177).

Husserl defines the relation between self and other as a being for one another:

there is . . . an inseparable being-for-one-another [untrennbares Füreinander-sein], neither am I in being for myself separable from the other, nor is the other from me. Each is for itself and yet for the others. . . . This is not an empty mirroring but, if we call an ego an absolute reality, then belonging to such a reality is that its being is inseparable from every other being, and that each intentionally circumscribes every other and carries them in itself in intentional mediatedness, which is not an empty gesture.\(^{35}\)

\(^{34}\)Behnke 146.

What is evident here is that Husserl is seeking a balance -- recognizing that the individual egos are precisely individual, but at the same time interconnected -- necessary for the self-definition of each of the egos.

Yet we must be aware of two dangers inherent in examining the connection of self and other in Husserl’s phenomenology:

The first danger is to misunderstand the exclusive character of the solus ipse as a barrier to the reciprocity of the relation to the alter ego, as if the ipse amounted to a nonrelation to the other. The second danger is the same mistake from the other direction: i.e., to misunderstand the reciprocity of the relation to the other, the being-in-relation to the alter ego, as the dissolution of the isolation of the “I”.

It seems clear that balance is the goal of Husserl’s concept. Rather than trying to carve a radical separation between egos, Husserl instead recognizes that the concept of ego, the very concept of the individual is empty without others from which it distinguishes itself. In fact, as Dodd notes, these others contribute to the development of the self and the world in which we live:

the surrounding world (Umwelt) that I share with others is possible because, in a sense still to be determined, I am a being-there for the others, they “have me” in a certain sense. Among the others, the activity I am, that of understanding, is mediated, formed, influenced, directed and conditioned by other poles of activity.

These “other poles of activity” are where we will now turn -- to the notion of community in Husserl’s philosophy.

---

36 Dodd 15
37 Dodd 22-23.
3. Community

Compared to Heidegger's unsatisfying concept of being-with, we can see how tightly interconnected self and other are in Husserl’s work, and will see such a connection pushed to its extreme in the philosophy of Watsuji Tetsuro in the next chapter. As Drummond writes, referring to Husserl’s concept of self in *Ideas II*:

The individual, personal being, is constituted in those dependencies on intersubjective experiential life which involve communicative experience, for it is in those acts that the individual sets himself or herself off against those other subjects, all of whom together form a social association. Thus, we see that the personal and social are reciprocally co-constituted, for the form of the social community is organized by bonds of reciprocal understanding among individual subjects as persons . . . . A human person maintains his or her individuality in commerce with and over against these communal structures which stand relative to him or her as cultural or spiritual objectivities.\(^\text{38}\)

The individual being is not lost in its relation with others; rather, Husserl recognizes the interconnectedness of self and other and the world they create together. In “Origin of the Spatiality of Nature,” we find Husserl’s concept of a ‘home-place’ which is somewhat akin to Heidegger’s notion of a dwelling place.

What is different about Husserl’s notion is that the role of the subject, of the community in creating these ‘home-places’ and the subjects that live in them, is much more central than in Heidegger. Consider the following passage:

> If I am born on a vessel, then I have a piece of my development on the vessel and that, however, would not be characterized as a ship for me in relation to the earth - as long as no unity with the vessel would

\(^{38}\text{Drummond 243.}\)
be produced. It would itself be my "earth," my primitive home (FI 228).

It would be my home-place precisely because it is where my development took place, through evolving and growing, becoming myself, the place became a home, my first home. It is a part of me just as much as I am a part of it as a home-place. Husserl talks about the "interchange of home-places" (FI 228). For example, the home-place in which I grow up may be different from the home-place in which I now live -- but in order for the place in which I live to become a home place, I must create it in some way. Unless I engage with the place it will not be a home.

Husserl reminds us that:

we must not forget the pregivenness and constitution belonging to the apodictic Ego or to me, to us, as the source of all actual and possible sense of being, of all possible broadening which can be further constructed in the already constituted world developing historically. One need not perpetrate the absurdity, absurdity in fact, of presupposing tacitly beforehand the naturalistic or prevailing conception of the world. We must not perpetrate the absurdity of then seeing human history, the history of the species anthropologically and psychologically within the evolution of science and the interpretation of the world as an obviously accidental event on the earth which might just as well have occurred on Venus or Mars. This holds too for the earth and we humans, I with my animate organism and I in my generation, my people, etc. This whole historicality belongs inseparably to the Ego, and is in essence not repeatable, but everything relates back to this historicity of transcendental constitution as appertinent core and as an ever-widening core (FI 230). 39

39 This translation is somewhat unclear -- especially with respect to the use of the word "appertinent" core. The end of the citation in German reads as follows: "Also auch diese ganze Geschichtlichkeit, das gehört zum Ego unabtrennbar, und das ist prinzipiell nicht wiederholbar, sondern alles was ist, ist auf diese Historizität transzendentaler Konstitution als zuständigen Kern und sich erweiterten Kern zurückbezogen" ("Grundlegende Untersuchungen zum Phänomenologischen Ursprung der Räumlichkeit der Natur," Philosophical Essays in Memory of
Through the experience and actions of human embodied subjects, what is transcendental is mundanized and the world in which we live is in this sense, our creation. In an important sense, we create the world in which we live.\(^{40}\)

In the opening of section 55, "Establishment of the Community of Monads. The First Form of Objectivity: Intersubjective Nature" of *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl states that "it is more important to clarify the community, developing at various levels, which is produced forthwith by virtue of experiencing someone else"\(^{(CM 120)}\). Contrary to the notion of the inauthentic world of the they that we saw in Heidegger, Husserl’s notion of community recognizes the deep interdependence between self and other and how this helps us to define our selves. He goes on to state that

The first thing constituted in the form of community, and the *foundation for all other intersubjectively common things*, is the *commonness of Nature*, along with that of the Other’s organism and his psychophysical Ego, as paired with my own psychophysical Ego \(^{(CM 120)}\).

This goes beyond the relational aspect that was developing in the work of the later Heidegger. In Husserl’s concept of community it is clear how it is both defined and defining for a concept of self. In *Ideas II*, Husserl tells us that the surrounding world

---

*Edmund Husserl*, ed. Marvin Farber (Cambridge: Harvard U.P., 1940) 323.) In French the selection reads: "Cette historicité totale aussi appartient donc de manière inséparable à l’ego et n’est pas, par principe, répétable, mais tout ce qui est, est référé à cette historicité de la constitution transcendentale en tant que noyau pertinent et noyau croissant."\(^{(La terre 26)}\). Another translation for *zuständigen* might be “proper” or “pertaining to.”
is comprised not only of individual persons, but the persons are instead members of communities, members of personal unities of a higher order, which, as totalities, have their own lives, preserve themselves by lasting through time despite the joining or leaving of individuals, have their qualities as communities, their moral and juridical regulations, their modes of functioning in collaboration with other communities and with individual persons, their dependencies on circumstances, their regulated changes and their own way of developing or maintaining themselves invariant over time, according to the determining circumstances. The members of the community, of marriage and of the family, of the social class, of the union, of the borough, of the state, of the church, etc., “know” themselves as their members, consciously realize that they are dependent on them, and perhaps consciously react back on them (II 192).

We see Husserl’s idea of being-there-for-others reflected in his concept of community. The last sentence is of particular interest for us. We see how a community -- be it family, marriage, state, etc., has a hand in defining who we are as individuals.

Like Heidegger, Husserl recognizes the aspect of community that interrelates through objects, like the tools in Heidegger, and the conventions in the world of the they. Husserl also uses the example of tools, or “use-Objects” such as “heating materials, choppers, hammers, etc.” (II 197). Such objects have a purpose, and come to be used not just by me, but by others in the world, and the objects become useful to the entire community. Heidegger’s discussion of tools eventually leads him to the inauthentic world of the they, not so for Husserl. Husserl recognizes the difference between relations through objects, and relations between subjects. And this is where the ethical dimension lacking in Heidegger’s thought,

---

40 See note 19, p.33 and pp.113-14.
early and late, comes into play in Husserl. It is at this juncture that self, body, and space, come together most meaningfully.

First of all, Husserl recognizes an ethical dimension that was lacking in Heidegger. He recognizes that there are certain cases where it may be legitimate to treat a human being as a "mere thing," and states that

it becomes an injustice only if we do not acknowledge at all that the naturizing of persons and souls can allow us to recognize only certain relations of dependency of Objective existence and continuity which obtain precisely between the natural world of things and the personal world of spirits, insofar as both belong to the unity of the Objective spatio-temporal world of realities. Further, it is an injustice if we do not acknowledge that nevertheless spirits make possible and require still an other and more significant mode of research precisely in this respect, that they have, as Ego-subjects, a being properly their own (II 200-201).

It is only the scientist who can legitimately see others as mere things -- and this is precisely not seeing others as persons, but as objects. He goes on to tell us,

In the comprehensive experience of the existence of the other, we thus understand him . . . as a personal subject and thereby as related to Objectivities, ones to which we too are related: the earth and sky, the fields and woods, the room in which "we" dwell communally, the picture we see, etc. (II 201).

Immediately, Heidegger's concept of dwelling is evoked, as well as elements of the fourfold. Yet, already we notice a significant difference in Husserl's philosophy -- there is outright acknowledgment of dwelling with other persons. He goes on:

We are in a relation to a common surrounding world -- we are in a personal association: these belong together. We could not be persons for others if a common surrounding world did not stand
there for us in a community, in an intentional linkage of our lives. Correlatively spoken, the one is constituted essentially with the other. Each Ego can, for himself and for the others, become a person in the normal sense, a person in personal association, only if comprehension brings about the relation to a common surrounding world (II 201).

What lay embedded in Heidegger’s notion of dwelling is here uncovered. Unless in relation with other people through the world in which we dwell, we are not complete, not authentic persons. Drummond outlines the six aspects of Husserl’s thought that determine his concept of community, some of which we have seen already. Grouped together like this, the interconnection of self and the others with whom we dwell becomes crystal clear:

1. that a community is composed of and founded upon individuals . . .
2. that a community is not reducible to the collection of individuals it comprises nor are its achievements reducible to the separate achievements of those individuals . . .
3. that the founding of a community on individuals is mediated by what Husserl calls “social acts” . . .
4. that a community is, or at least some communities are, a “personality of a higher-order” . . .
5. that this ‘personality’ has its own striving and willing life, analogous to that of an individual person . . .
6. that the individual within a community is a representative (Träger) and functionary of the communal will.  

It is manifestly clear then, that the community cannot exist without the participation of the person. Does this also imply the inverse -- that the person cannot exist without the community? Turning to section 56 of the Cartesian Meditations, “Constitution of Higher Levels of Intermonadic Community,” at one level at least, this does seem to hold. Even the “first and lowest” level of

---

Drummond 238.
community, between myself and others is not, as Husserl puts it, "just nothing."

He states:

Whereas, really inherently, each monad is an absolutely separate unity, the ‘irreal’ intentional reaching of the other into my primordiality is not irreal in the sense of being dreamt into it or being present to consciousness after the fashion of a mere phantasy. Something that exists is in intentional communion with something else that exists. It is an essentially unique connectedness, an actual community and precisely the one that makes transcendentally possible the being of a world, a world of men and things (CM 129).

It is this unique connectedness of individuals that makes possible the community, the world in which individuals themselves develop. The relationship between individuals and community is co-constituting, as we saw above. Husserl maintains that even when conceived of as an individual, solitary human being, the sense “member of a community” belongs to her -- “there is implicit a mutual being for one another” (CM 129). We, and the community in which we exist, are mutually constituted. Referring to the community of monads, Husserl explains:

We need hardly say that, as existing for me, it is constituted purely within me, the mediating ego, purely by virtue of sources belonging to my intentionality; nevertheless it is constituted thus as a community constituted also in every other monad (who, in turn, is constituted with the modification: “other”) as the same community -- only with a different subjective mode of appearance -- and as necessarily bearing within itself the same Objective world (CM 130).

This confirms the text by Behnke, cited at the outset of the previous section, that our attitude towards the world has an effect on it. In the sense which Husserl describes, I constitute the community and the other within myself, and in turn I am
constituted within the other who also constitutes the community with me. Self and
other meet together in the space of community,

where men and each particular man are vitally immersed in a
concrete surrounding world, are related to it in undergoing and doing
. . . . With this continual change in the human life-world, manifestly
the men themselves also change as persons, since correlative they
must always be taking on new habitual properties (CM 135).

Again, we see that the self is not static. Through our "undergoing" and "doing"
within our communities, we change the world; as a result, the world changes us.

The body has a central role to play in this forging of community:

Persons apprehend themselves comprehensively not only in the
certainly first and fundamental way, namely that one understands, as
Body, the Corporeality of the other belonging to his surrounding
world and its spiritual sense, thereby interpreting the facial
expressions, gestures, and spoken words as intimations of personal
life, but also in such a way that they "determine one another" and are
active not just as individuals but communally, i.e., as personally
united (II 202).

So here we see the determining of self within the framework of the space of
community facilitated through the body. This interconnection has far-reaching and
exciting consequences. As Behnke writes:

If Husserl is at all correct that my perception of another human being
as a living, feeling person - a fellow creature who suffers, for
instance, when in pain, "just as I do" -- is based on my own ability to
feel my own Body . . . , then we may expect a culture of violence to
be based on practices of disembodiment. And this is in fact what we
find in military training, for example, as well as in the perpetuation
of violence by victims of child abuse, who were able to survive only
by not feeling their own pain . . . . Conversely, it is also possible --
certainly on an individual basis, and perhaps even on a communal
basis -- to cultivate a Body of compassion, an embodied ethics, a
culture of peace, in which a genuine "co-existence in the flesh" would be possible.\textsuperscript{42}

It is to this notion of an embodied, im-placed ethics that we will return in Chapter Five.

4. Conclusion

In investigating the self-space-body connection in Husserl’s philosophy, we have seen how tightly interwoven these concepts are in a description of being-in-the-world. Reading Husserl in light of our investigation of Heidegger in chapters one and two, we were able to use Husserl as a corrective for the gaps in Heidegger’s largely fragmented view of the self. Husserl also recognized the importance of a balance between the temporal and the spatial. In Ding und Raum, he states that “temporal extension is the sister of spatial extension. . . . Like temporality, spatiality belongs to the essence of the thing-appearance.”\textsuperscript{43} We saw how Heidegger eventually came to recognize this. But Husserl recognizes the role of spatiality in our being-in-the-world far more explicitly than Heidegger. He tells us that:

subjects who in general share a \textit{common} world of things, to which they actually relate, hence to which they can relate through appearances, as is required by thingly being, can in principle be relatively “blind” as regards color, sound, etc., i.e., as regards individual senses which provide their own particular sorts of sense qualities. The senses can also be completely different, provided they make possible a common understanding and constitute a common nature as an appearing one. But in principle subjects cannot be blind to space, to motion, to energy. Otherwise there would be no world

\textsuperscript{42}Behnke 156.
\textsuperscript{43}Husserl, \textit{Ding und Raum} 66 (my translation).
of things there for them; in any case, it would not be the same as ours, precisely the spatial world, the world of nature (II 91).

Spatiality then, underlies the world of nature -- more precisely, our world, our dwelling places, our selves. Without spatiality, there would be no world; being-in-the-world is made possible by the spatiality of the world of nature. While this may seem obvious, it is important for our purposes here because it demonstrates that Husserl recognizes the fact that spatiality has just as central and foundational a role to play in the world as temporality.

We will now turn to the work of Watsuji Tetsuro and see a perspective that critically appropriates ideas of both Heidegger and Husserl, producing a picture of being-in-the-world that takes the concepts of self, spatiality and body perhaps to their extremes.
CHAPTER IV
Critically Appropriating Heideggerian and Husserlian Reflection: Watsuji Tetsuro

We have seen in the previous three chapters that the general emphasis on temporality with respect to a concept of self, at the expense of spatiality, has led to portrayals of the self that have not been satisfying. However, this dominance of temporality is not and has not ever been the case in the philosophy of the East -- especially in the philosophy of modern Japanese philosopher Watsuji Tetsuro (1889-1960). In order to begin to open a dialogue with a tradition not dominated by temporality, in this chapter I will critically examine the philosophy of Watsuji and analyse his deliberate attempt to demonstrate that temporality cannot dominate a philosophy of being-in-the-world if it is to give us a complete, balanced picture of what it is to be a human being. Examining the philosophy of Watsuji is particularly appropriate, since, as mentioned in the introduction, one of his first major philosophical works was written as a reaction to the lack of spatiality in Heidegger's analysis of Da-sein.

In this chapter, I will first briefly characterize some of the differences between Eastern and Western concepts of self. I will then specifically examine the role of the spatial in Watsuji’s concept of human being as found in two of his major works, Climate and Culture, and Ethics. Climate and Culture was written as a polemical response to the dominance of temporality in Heidegger’s Da-sein analysis, and will be the first area of investigation. Part two will examine Ethics
where we will see Watsuji critically appropriate not only elements of Heideggerian but also of Husserlian reflection.

1. Eastern and Western Concepts of Self

We have seen the self as portrayed in Heidegger and Husserl. As we begin to examine an Eastern perspective on the self, we will notice that there is a fundamental difference between the very concepts of self in the East and West. In a 1990 article, Alisdair MacIntyre addressed this very difference.¹ He explained that one aspect of the American self is the “capacity of the self to abstract itself from the particular social role which it happens to inhabit and indeed from the whole social order of which that role is a constitutive part, so as to reflect upon itself as an individual *qua* individual, rather than *qua* family member or member of this or that social group.”² Watsuji certainly held this as not merely an American view of self, but as representing the Western view of selfhood in general. The other two aspects of the “self-divided self” that MacIntyre characterizes as American are 1) a self that strives to acquire goods and competes for success driven by society,³ and 2) a self which “looks to institutionalized human relationships . . . for sustenance, restoration, and the resources to discharge the

---

²MacIntyre 491.
³MacIntyre 491-92.
tasks confronting and burdening the self in all its aspects. The result, MacIntyre argues, is a fundamental incoherence and inconsistency. The Western self is a self whose public voice oscillates between phases not merely of toleration, but of admiration for ruthlessly self-serving behavior and phases of high moral dudgeon and indignation at exactly the same behavior, a self which remarkably often no longer sees incoherence in the promises of its political leaders as a disabling fault.

Recalling the discussion of Da-sein as presented in Chapter One, we see that at least the first aspect of this individualism characterizes Heidegger’s Da-sein analysis. And, at least in one instance, in the context of authentic “being-with,” we saw that this led to incoherence. MacIntyre points out further that many of the incoherences in the Western concepts of self come out of their being unable to make a complete break from the past wherein there existed in fact “a conception of the self as soul, as psyche, a self which could achieve its own good only in and through its participation in forms of community in which allegiance to the good of the community educated it toward a supreme good transcending the good of the human community.” Many of the incoherences, MacIntyre argues, arise out of the inability to leave this notion behind. Despite itself, the tradition carries along fragments of the above conception of self which are, of course, incompatible with the individualistic self currently promoted in the West.

The Japanese concept of self, however, does not have these inconsistencies, and indeed part of Watsuji’s work, when read as a critique of Western

---

4MacIntyre 492.
5MacIntyre 492.
individualism, demonstrates that by virtue of not giving a merely one-sided account of human being and recognizing the social as well as individual aspects, many of the incoherences do not appear. In the concept of selfhood in the Japanese understanding, MacIntyre explains, we do not have

the individual with inner and outer aspects and then, independent of these in some way, the institutionalized social order. The outer aspects of the individual are the social order. Or, to put the same point in another way, the individual without and apart from his or her social role is not yet complete, is a set of potentialities waiting to be achieved, just as the social role is empty until brought into actuality by a particular person’s self-completion through it.7

We will see this notion of not only the inseparability of individual and social, but the interdependence of these notions in our analysis of Watsuji, especially evident in his concept of the human being as ningen, which takes both the individual and social aspects fully into account.

2. Climate and Culture

It was after reading Heidegger’s Being and Time that Watsuji Tetsuro became inspired to write Climate and Culture. He writes in the preface:

I found myself intrigued by the attempt to treat the structure of man’s existence in terms of time but I found it hard to see why, when time had thus been made to play a part in the structure of subjective existence, at the same juncture space also was not postulated as part of the basic structure of existence.8

Indeed in Heidegger’s work, he goes on to say, space

---

6MacIntyre 493.
7MacIntyre 493-94.
tended to be almost obscured in the face of the strong glare to which time
was exposed. I perceived that herein lay the limitations of Heidegger's
work, for time not linked with space is not time in the true sense and
Heidegger stopped short at this point because his *Dasein* was the *Dasein* of
the individual only. He treated human existence as being the existence of a
man. From the standpoint of the dual structure -- both individual and social
-- of human existence, he did not advance beyond an abstraction of a single
aspect. But it is only when human existence is treated in terms of its
concrete duality that time and space are linked (CC v-vi).

This basic critique of the philosophy not only of Heidegger, but also of Western
individualism in general, was the inspiration not only for *Climate and Culture*, but
also for *Ethics*. Much of Watsuji's work can be read as a reaction against the
West's individualism which, he thought, ignored the spatial aspect of the human
being and focused one-sidedly on the individual nature of human being, ignoring
the social as a result. Watsuji believed that the West's emphasis on the individual
nature of human being means that "it loses touch completely with the vast network
of interconnections that serves to make us what we are, as individuals inescapably
immersed in the space/time of a world, together with others." In fact, this
underlies a fundamental difference between Eastern and Western concepts of self.

As we may gather from the above quotation that opens *Climate and Culture*,
Watsuji's analysis will seek to demonstrate how this view of the self is one-sided.

---

8Watsuji Tetsuro, *Climate and Culture*, trans. Geoffrey Bownas (Greenwood Press, Inc. in
cooporation with Yushodo Co., Ltd.: New York, 1988) v. Hereafter cited in the body of the text as
CC followed by the page number.
the body of the text as E followed by the page number.
10Robert E. Carter, "Interpretive Essay: Strands of Influence", *Watsuji Tetsuro's Rinrigaku:
329.
As we saw in Heidegger’s philosophy, the concept of space as it is first encountered is not the traditional notion of space. On the impossibility of space as a foundational concept, Watsuji and Heidegger agree. The spatiality analysed by Watsuji is subjective space, the space of experience. In the first paragraph of the preface to *Climate and Culture*, Watsuji introduces this notion in making an important distinction between climate and environment:

My purpose in this study is to clarify the function of climate as a factor within the structure of human existence. So my problem is not that of the ordering of man’s life by his natural environment. Natural environment is usually understood as an objective extension of “human climate” regarded as a concrete basis. But when we come to consider the relationship between this and human life, the latter is already objectified, with the result that we find ourselves examining the relation between object and object, and there is no link with subjective human existence. It is the latter that is my concern here, for it is essential to my position that the phenomena of climate are treated as expressions of subjective human existence and not of natural environment (CC v).

This distinction between climate and environment is a key to understanding Watsuji’s approach to climate and his concept of spatiality. Climate is here opposed to the conventional concept of climate understood as natural environment. Viewed as subject of the natural sciences, environment is analysed in terms of relations between objects. Climate, however, cannot be objectified, nor can it be pinned down as either subject or object. In fact, environmental space which comes merely from the individual is an abstraction and denies the true origins of spatiality:
Environmental space arises when one eliminates the tension spread over subjective spatiality and then stands on the standpoint of the individual . . . . The negation of subjective spatiality, that is, the standpoint of the individual, established these sorts of space. In spite of this, the origin of space lies in the "betweenness" of subjects, that contradicts the standpoint of the individual (E 178).

We see above the beginnings of what will become more clear as we explore the notion of subjective spatiality, that is, that if one is to give a complete account of human being in the world, a concept of self in which there is a balance of the temporal and the spatial, one cannot focus merely on the individual but must recognize one's inherent connection to others, or "betweenness" (aidagara) which Watsuji believes is fundamentally spatial.

Robert Carter explains:

By climate Watsuji means to include not only weather patterns of a region but the natural geographic setting of a people plus the social environment of family, community, society, lifestyle, and even the technological apparatus that supports community survival and interaction. Fudo or climate is the entire interconnected network of influences that together create an entire people's attitudes (or their ways of going about in the world) and that represents geographic and climatic necessities, together with the human transformation of geographic aspects of the environment.¹²

Climate, we saw a moment ago, is an "expression of subjective human existence" and is linked with the spatial. More fundamentally still, as explained by Yuasa Yasuo, "human being as a 'being-in-the-world' must take root in the earth, which

¹²Carter, Introduction 5.
has been spatially shaped, specifically, under natural climatic conditions." The relationship that Watsuji wants to evoke with his concept of "climate" is not as "merely" natural environment. Watsuji's concept runs much deeper than this "commonplace view that influences exist between man and his natural environment" (CC 8). Holding this kind of view, he says, is "to ignore the true nature of climate" (CC 8). Climate's true nature is that within it, "man apprehends himself" (CC 8).

However, not only do I apprehend my self as an individual through climate, this self-apprehension also always at the same time reveals my connection to others. Watsuji explains that even the statement "I feel cold" is not an entirely subjective statement made by a purely individual consciousness. Watsuji maintains that "the cold" and "I" are not entirely independent of one another: "When we feel cold, we ourselves are already in the coldness of the outside air. That we come into relation with the cold means that we are outside in the cold" (CC 3). Furthermore, because we can use "the expression 'we feel cold' without any contradiction, it is 'we', not 'I' alone that experience the cold." He goes on to explain that this "is not an intentional relation but a 'mutual relationship' of existence. Thus it is primarily 'we' in this 'mutual relationship' that discover our selves in the cold" (CC 4). In other words, we discover ourselves in all our aspects of being in climate, for, he goes on,

---

in our relationship with the cold, we come to engage ourselves, individually and socially, in various measures for protecting ourselves from the cold . . . . The apprehension of the self in climate is revealed as the discovery of such measures; it is not the recognition of the subject . . . . We have discovered ourselves in climate, and in this self-apprehension we are directed to our free creation (CC 5-6).

It is not the subject that has been recognized, rather the self, as social and individual in relationship with climate. The proper dimension of climate, until now misunderstood as natural environment only, is neither object nor subject, but rather a relation -- the ground out of which our self-apprehension arises which is at the same time an expression of this very self. It does make possible the subject/object relation but should not be seen exclusively as based on this structure.

The subjective spatiality in climate reflects the structure of Watsuji’s concept of human being as ningen -- as individual and social -- as a dynamic interdependence that moves back and forth between social and individual, climate and history, space and time. Watsuji explains that by “human being” he means:

not the individual (anthropos, homo, homme, etc.) but man both in this individual sense and at the same time man in society, the combination of the association of man. This duality is the essential nature of man . . . . For a true and full understanding, one must treat man both as individual and as whole (CC 8-9).

This concept of human being will form the focus of his study of ethics which we will address later in this chapter. Already, however, we can see how deeply the dynamic nature of ningen resonates in Watsuji’s thinking. Watsuji tells us that the
“activity of man’s self-apprehension, man, that is, in his dual character of individual and social being, is at the same time of a historical nature. Therefore, climate does not exist apart from history, nor history apart from climate” (CC 8). Later on he states: “History and climate in isolation from each other are mere abstractions; climate as I shall consider it is the essential climate that has not undergone this abstraction” (CC 10). As Carter explains, “Climate is correspondent with spaciality, whereas history is correspondent with temporality.”

This explains why Heidegger was incapable in Being and Time, of giving a full account of human being-in-the-world. By virtue of relegating spatiality to something dependent on temporality, he was unable to see that “climate and human social history are mutually determining.” Watsuji does not want to eliminate temporality from a concept of self; in fact he would agree with the importance of the self’s historicity. What he adds to Heidegger’s account is the importance of the recognition that the self’s temporality and spatiality are inextricably linked. While Heidegger came to recognize this only in his later work, Watsuji saw it at once. Yuasa maintains that this was because

Watsuji was already aware, in his own way, of what Eastern spirituality was through his research on ancient Japanese culture and early Buddhism. It is due to this fact that he could immediately point out the ‘limitation’ of Being and Time without becoming captive of the ineffably alluring tone of the work.

---

16 Yuasa, “The Encounter” 167.
The space, the climate one finds oneself in, is the very ground out of which a particular concept of self arises and in turn is created by the very self it expresses. Once one admits the irreducible spatiality of human beings, the concept of self that arises could never be that of the purely individual consciousness which arose out of Heidegger’s key error of ignoring this aspect of Da-sein. For Da-sein, at its most authentic moment, in its being-towards-death, as we saw, is fundamentally individuated and must be so to be truly authentic. Watsuji’s critical appropriation of Heidegger is evident again when, in elucidating the link between climate and history, space and time, he uses the very example used by Heidegger in his attempt to demonstrate the primordiality of the temporal -- death:

No social formation could exist if it lacked all foundation in the space-structure of man, nor does time become history unless it is founded in such social being, for history is the structure of existence in society. Here also we see clearly the duality of human existence -- the finite and the infinite. Men die; their world changes; but through this unending death and change, man lives and his world continues. It continues incessantly through ending incessantly. In the individual’s eyes it is a case of an “existence for death,” but from the standpoint of society it is an “existence for life.” But it is not only history that is the structure of social existence, for climate is also a part of this structure and, at that, a part quite inseparable from history. For it is from the union of climate with history that the latter gets its flesh and bones. (CC 9-10)

Watsuji’s use of the expression “existence for death,” is clearly an appropriation of Heidegger’s “being-towards-death,” which is a “non-relational possibility,” “free of the illusions of the They”(BT 244/264, 245/266). The critique of Heidegger implicit in Watsuji’s use of the expression, is that Heidegger’s
philosophy missed the essential social element of both life and death. Watsuji, as we will see in the second part of the chapter, finds authenticity precisely where Heidegger found inauthenticity, in the world of “the they.”

Another Heideggerian notion that Watsuji appropriates to support his concept of climate is “tools.” Consider the following passage:

There is much to be learnt from the thought that such tools are to be found very near to hand in human life. A tool is essentially “for doing something.” A hammer is for beating, a shoe for wearing. But the object that is “for doing something else” has an immanent connection with the purpose for which it is employed. The hammer, for example is a tool for making shoes, and shoes, again, are tools for walking. The essential character of the tool lies in its being “for a purpose,” lies, that is, in this purpose-relation (CC 13).

Juxtapose the above passage with the following from Being and Time:17

A useful thing is essentially “something in order to . . .”. The different kinds of “in order to” such as serviceability, helpfulness, usability, handiness, constitute a totality of useful things. The structure of “in order to” contains a reference of something to something . . . . As the what-for of the hammer, plane and needle, the work to be produced has in its turn the kind of being of a useful thing. The shoe to be produced is for wearing (footgear), the clock is made for telling time (BT 64/68-65/70).

There can be little doubt that Watsuji borrowed his notion from Heidegger -- and there does not seem to be any critical aspect to that appropriation here, in Climate and Culture. So, one might ask, is there any difference between the concepts? As we will see in the second part of the chapter, the difference is that whereas Heidegger goes on to show, in Being and Time, that the creation and use of tools has its place in the inauthentic world of the “they,” Watsuji will show in Ethics
(where he does take a more critical stance) that it is precisely in the world of the "they," in our being-in-the-world with others where authenticity is to be found. This is foreshadowed even in Climate and Culture. Immediately following the citation above, Watsuji states that “this purpose-relation finds its final origin in climatic self-comprehension” (CC 13). Rather than resulting in an immersion in a world where the self is lost, Watsuji demonstrates that tools, if we examine their origins, lead us to a place in which the self is found.

We recall that Heidegger’s discussion of being-in-the-world did not include the human lived body. We noted Arisaka’s criticism of this gap in a phenomenological description of being-in-the-world. Watsuji, like Heidegger, wanted to avoid the dualism associated with the mind-body problem. While Heidegger chose to ignore it as a problem, Watsuji’s philosophy takes a different approach: “the crux of the problem becomes the realisation that body is not mere matter; in other words, it is the problem of the self-active nature of the body” (CC 11). He goes on to state that the “self-active nature of the body has as its foundation the spatial and temporal structure of human life; a self-active body cannot remain in isolation for its structure is dynamic, uniting in isolation and isolated within union” (CC 11). Even as an individual one is part of the human community, yet as part of this community one is also an individual. For Watsuji, as we saw for Husserl, the body is an inherent part of human being-in-the-world -

17 Note that Stambaugh translates Zeug as ‘useful thing.’
which encompasses human spatiality and being—with other human beings. This is reinforced when Watsuji tells us that

in its most fundamental significance, the relation between body and spirit lies in the relation between the body and the spirit of “man in his social relationships,” the individual and social body-spirit relation which includes the relationship with history and climate (CC 12).

In recognizing the true nature of climate, not only will we apprehend the individual aspect of human being, but also the social aspect of the self: climate “reveals itself in the ways of creating communities, and thus in the ways of constructing speech, the methods of production, the styles of building, and so on” (CC 12). The space of the self, the climate, will express the means of livelihood of a people, their arts, religion, styles of dress, architecture. Augustin Berque confirms Watsuji’s notion of being in relation with climate when he states, referring specifically to Japanese society:

a society produces the space which is its own, and this space is a condition of its existence as a society.\textsuperscript{18}

The spaces created within the given climate further determine a particular concept of self which are further expressions of subjective human existence as climate.

This is what Watsuji goes on to analyze in the rest of Climate and Culture, which we need go into only briefly here. While it is clear that Watsuji goes on to

\textsuperscript{18} Augustin Berque, Vivre l’espace au Japon (Paris: PUF, 1982) 21-22, in the section entitled “La société produit l’espace où elle existe.” My translation. The entire citation reads: “la société japonaise - est bien lui-même condition et dépendance d’autres espaces, qui sont d’une autre échelle; mais l’existence de ces relations n’infirme pas le principe suivant...: une société produit l’espace qui lui est propre, et cet espace est condition de son existence en tant que société.”
focus on the relatedness between human beings, we must always keep in mind that in his notion of ethics, which is inseparable from the concept of human being as *ningen*, "the individual must be conceived as being situated in a spatial field of relatedness or betweenness not only to human society, but also to a surrounding climate . . . of living nature as the ultimate extension of embodied subjective space in which man dwells."^{19}

The most unique, enduring, and ground breaking aspects of *Climate and Culture* lie in the introduction and the first chapter, which we have just analysed -- where Watsuji immediately recognized a limitation of *Being and Time* that Heidegger himself would not recognize (at least explicitly) until 1969 in "On Time and Being." As for the individual studies of climate, as Berque indicates, the rest of the work is, for the most part, traditional geographic determinism, where the traits of natural climate are seen to be the traits of the society.^{20} Berque also points out that Watsuji seems to fall prey to the very view he is trying to argue against, for in his analyses of climates he does seem to do what he expressly states he will not -- that is analyse natural climate and its influence on a people.^{21}

In *Climate and Culture*, we have an example of how too much emphasis on the spatial is as much of a problem as too much emphasis on the temporal.

---


^{20}Berque 496. My paraphrase. The french reads as follows: "le reste de l’ouvrage relève, pour l’essentiel, d’un déterminisme géographique traditionnel, où les traits du milieu naturel sont censés rendre compte de ceux de la société."

^{21}Berque 496.
Consider Watsuji’s description of the character of the Chinese people (determined by their climate) in Chapter Three “The Distinctive Nature of Monsoon Climate”.

After a discussion of the Yangtse River, Watsuji concludes that the immediate impression given by the Yangtse and its wide plain is not that of a vast grandeur appropriate to the word continent but that of an ill-defined monotony. The wide sea of mud gives none of the vivid feel of life appropriate to the sea, nor again does this river of mud, wider than Japan’s “sea” in many instances, have any sense of smooth ease about its flow. In just the same way, the flat continent gives no feel of breadth. Again, to the Japanese mind at least, the plain that stretches from Yangtse to Yellow River may well be several hundred times the size of Japan’s Kanto Plain, yet all that comes into the field of vision of anyone standing on it is merely an insignificant portion of this plain; however far he may walk across it, the only impression he has is of an endless reiteration of identical tiny portions. So the vastness of the Chinese continent is only revealed in the form of a vague and little-changing monotony. . . . Under such circumstances, the passive and resignatory qualities that are characteristic of the monsoon belt become a tenacity of will (from bearing up to this vague monotony) and an abandonment of emotion . . . (CC 121).

Watsuji continually underlines this lack of emotion which he maintains to be characteristic of the Chinese22 going so far as to maintain that it was the “Chinaman’s lack of emotion” (CC 132), which was a major factor in preventing the liberation of China from her colonial status” (CC 132). All this, he maintains, is determined by climate. Watsuji performs similar climate analyses for the rest of the people included in the monsoon climate: “the whole of the coastal belt of east Asia, including Japan” (CC 18); the desert climate: “Arabia, Africa, Mongolia and so on” (CC 39); and the meadow climate which covers all of Europe. Evidently

---

22 See *Climate and Culture* 121-133.
there is some influence between the way a concept of self develops and the climate in which it develops. For example, of the European meadow climate, he says “Man is not run off his feet by nature in western Europe; he can even make nature tread to his own leisurely pace” (CC 107). We can see some truth in Watsuji’s analyses, but he does seem to have lapsed into a sort of geographical determinism, where there does not seem to be much freedom for an individual self to develop.

Nevertheless, this comparative study was one of the first to recognize the importance of the spatial in a concept of self. And we will see next, in the analysis of *Ethics*, how Watsuji presents a more balanced view in his later work.

3. *Ethics*

Watsuji’s study of ethics as *ningen*, he explains in *Ethics*, is to get “away from the misconception, prevalent in the modern world, that conceives of ethics as a problem of individual consciousness only” (E 9). “The locus of ethical problems”, he tells us, “lies not in the consciousness of the isolated individual, but precisely in the in-betweenness of person and person” (E 10). In other words, ethics is the study of human beings as *ningen*, as individual and as social in the betweenness (*aidagara*) among selves in the world. Watsuji tells us that human being understood as *ningen*,

refers not merely to an individual “human being” nor merely to “society.” What is recognizable here is a dialectical unity of those double characteristics that are inherent in a human being. In so far as it is a human being, *ningen* as an individual differs completely
from society. Because it does not refer to society, it must refer to individuals alone. Hence, an individual is never communal with other individuals. Oneself and others are absolutely separate. Nevertheless, insofar as ningen also refers to the public, it is also through and through that community which exists between person and person, thus signifying society as well, and not just isolated human beings. Precisely because of its not being human beings in isolation, it is ningen. Hence, oneself and the other are absolutely separated from each other but, nevertheless, become one in communal existence. Individuals are basically different from society and yet dissolve themselves into society. Ningen denotes the unity of these contradictories (E 15).

Let us look more closely at Watsuji’s notion of selfhood as ningen. He tries to show another way of understanding human being, different from that proposed by the Western tradition and its Cartesian heritage, arguing that even the vocabulary used by the West presented a problem, for “such words as anthropos, homo, man or Mensch cannot denote anything but an individual human being” (E 13). Watsuji, again Heideggerian in his approach, uses an etymological analysis to support his notion. The word ningen is composed of two characters, which signify not only the individual human being, but also “the betweenness of human beings, that is, ‘the public’” (E 14). William Lafleur explains:

The term ningen generally functions in the Japanese language as a classifier, designating man in distinction from other kinds of beings. But according to Watsuji, the term is a very rich one; he points out the significance of the two Chinese characters which together make it a Japanese word. One of these . . . refers to “man” and the other . . . refers to “relationship.” Thus the poles of singularity and plurality are built into the way in which the word ningen is written;

---

23 Watsuji makes a very strong claim here, and one could take issue with his definitions of the above words. See, for example Alain Renaut, The Era of the Individual: a Contribution to a History of Subjectivity, trans. M.B. DeBevoise and Franklin Philip (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997) who argues that the notion of the individual is a purely modern concept.
man is both. Thus, according to Watsuji, both sides of human existence, man’s existence as an individual and his existence as society, are coequal and thought of as such. The important point is that the notion of being in relationship is not secondary or an afterthought but, along with the individuated aspect, constitutive of man from the outset. In such a context it would be a redundancy to speak of man “and his relationships.” Nevertheless, to define man only as a set of relationships would upset the balance in the other direction and lose the individual side of things.24

We saw the later Heidegger moving towards a recognition of the importance of relations for the self -- towards a more complete concept of being-with. However, his concept of self remained largely individual. Husserl’s concept of self and recognition that, from the outset, one is in an intersubjective world, has more in common with Watsuji’s notion, but it too remains based on the intentionality of the individual consciousness. Watsuji takes Husserl’s position further and maintains that it is not that we should look to man and his relationships, or the human being in his relationships, but that “betweenness” is a constitutive part of what human being is and to ignore this is to misunderstand human being at a fundamental level.

With the evocation of betweenness as part of what it is to be human, we see immediately how Heidegger’s concept of Da-sein would not be acceptable to Watsuji. In Heidegger’s Da-sein analysis, individual Da-sein is the focus. Naoki Sakai’s explanation of ningen complements Lafleur’s above, expanding on what the term signifies:

hito, the specifically Japanese pronunciation for the first character of
the compound ningen, contains the viewpoint of another person, in
that hito can never be used directly to designate the self. Hito is used
for the German Man (they, in the English translation of Heidegger)
to show the averageness of “they-self” in some of the Japanese
translations of Being and Time. It either signifies the Other or others
in general who are opposed to “me” or designates “myself,” seen
from the other’s viewpoint. Therefore, nin of ningen should be
understood to imply the mediation of the Other in the human being.
Yet, it is misleading to regard the human being merely as a
composite of individuals mutually mediating one another because the
second character, gen of ningen shows that the mediation of the
Other in the human being is essentially spatial in character. By virtue
of its openness as space, ningen cannot be confined to a one-to-one
relation between two identities. Gen or aidai is associated with the
world (yo) of people (seken), the world of the social space (yo no
naka).

Watsuji demonstrates the intrinsic spatiality and the dynamic nature inherent in the
concept of human being as ningen in his comparison of the German term Welt
(world) with the Japanese yononaka and seen. He argues that, while the German
term includes the significance of the world of nature and the notion of community,
the Japanese terms have a “plus value”:

the term Welt signifies a generation, or a “group,” a sum total of
people or the place where people live. But as time went on, it came
to lose this spatio-temporal significance, and finally came to mean
one-sidedly the world as the sum total of objective natural things.
On the other hand, so far as seen or yononaka are concerned, the
meaning of something subjectively extended, which undergoes
constant transformation, has been tenaciously preserved. Hence, the
concept of seen already involves the historical, climatic, and social
structure of human existence (E 18-19).

---

2Naoki Sakai, “Return to the East/Return to the West: Watsuji Tetsuro’s Anthropology and
We see here again the notion of a dynamic structure that was elucidated in the discussion of *Climate and Culture*, the notion of a constant transformation, of the idea of being in relationship with the world instead of objectifying it -- it is, in fact, the notion of subjective spatiality. We also saw this notion expressed by Behnke in her explanation of constitutive phenomenology -- that the world itself is traceable to the attitude we bring to it.26

In the above elucidations of *ningen*, we see the dynamism of *ningen* which comes out of the dialectical negation inherent in Watsuji’s concept. Watsuji’s concept of human being as *ningen* involves the dynamic understanding of negation and contradiction -- of emptiness which we saw mentioned in *Climate and Culture*. The foreignness of these ideas often leads to the misunderstanding that the Japanese notion of self is “tantamount to the realization of a mere ‘selflessness’ (*muga*) in the sense of a nihilistic void of self-extinction.”27 Odin explains that

Watsuji’s theory of personhood is clearly meant to restore a Buddhist “middle way” (*chudo*) between the extreme positions of eternalism on the one side and nihilism on the other. For, according to Watsuji, personhood is an achievement which is realized only through a dialectical interaction between the individual and social aspects of the self in its dual structure of *ningen*.28

---

26 See Chapter Three, 116.
27 Steve Odin, “The Social Self in Japanese Philosophy and American Pragmatism: A Comparative Study of Watsuji Tetsuro and George Herbert Mead,” *Philosophy East and West* 42.3 (1992): 491. (It is interesting to remember that Heidegger’s philosophy often met with the same misunderstanding.)
28 Odin, “The Social Self” 491.
The notion of self-negation and contradiction is one of the most complex in Watsuji’s philosophy. It takes much from the concept of negation found in Nishida Kitaro’s philosophy, but does not have the same religious framework. Watsuji characterizes the fundamentally negative dialectical structure of a human being as being such that “the negative structure of a betweenness-oriented being is clarified in terms of the self-returning movement of absolute negativity through its own negation” (E 117). Central to this is the constant negating of this negation -- it is something rich and dynamic that, contrary to nihilism, links us fundamentally to others. Watsuji states that

there are three moments that are dynamically unified as the movement of negation: fundamental emptiness, then individual existence, and social existence as its negative development. These three are interactive with one another in practical reality and cannot be separated. They are at work constantly in the practical interconnection of acts and can in no way be stabilized fixedly at any place . . . . The essential feature characteristic of human association is its constantly putting into effect the movement of the negation of negation. When this movement comes to a standstill in one way or another, the association itself collapses . . . the movement of the negation of absolute negativity is, at the same time, the continuous creation of human beings (E 117-18).

Odin characterizes the double negation as a negation “whereby the whole empties into the individual and the individual empties into the whole.” Carter uses the example of sands in an hourglass to illustrate this notion,

where one thing turns into its apparent opposite, the moment of transition where forward motion (at its zenith) becomes receding motion, and which again in turn (at its nadir) becomes forward

---

30 Odin, “The Social Self” 483.
motion again. It is akin to the almost imperceptible flow through the point where the upper sand in an hourglass becomes the lower sand, and then, when the glass is turned over, the lower becomes the upper, only to flow through the vanishing point of opposition once more, becoming the lower yet again.  

As we saw in the Introduction, this was what Heidegger was trying to express in his connection between being and nothingness, which he felt was better elucidated by the Buddhist monk.  

Trying to grasp either fullness in itself or emptiness in itself is not the point – the mutual and constant emptying and filling is at the heart of the notion. In his interpretive essay, Carter uses a Nishidan example to elucidate this notion so foreign to Western logic:

to be able to say that white is a color means that, to distinguish between white and black, one must have already grasped that white and black are located within a developed system of colors. White is located within a system of colors; and even though the distinction of contradiction of white and black is the primary judgment, it rests on what is in fact the real subject, the system of colors that makes distinction possible and unifies all colors into a single system identity -- a unity of opposites or an identity of self-contradiction.

In the same way self and other, individual and social are unified by ningen:

Each of us is both one and many, both an individual as isolated and inextricably interconnected with others in some community or other. As ningen, we negate our individuality to the extent that we are communally connected, and we negate our communality to the extent that we express our individuality. We are both, in mutual interactive negation, as well as being determined by the group or community, and determining and shaping the community. As such, we are living self-contradictions and therefore living identities of

---

31 Carter, *Becoming Bamboo* 93.
32 See Introduction 15.
self-contradiction, or unities of opposites, in mutual interactive negation.\textsuperscript{34}

We hear in Carter’s excellent explanation shades of Climate and Culture, and it becomes clear that the concept of ningen was the foundation for that study.

Despite the centrality of the notion of negation, Watsuji’s study of the human being-in-the-world is anything but nihilistic. In fact, Carter argues that precisely because of the double negation inherent in ningen, there is a ground for a very deep sense of relatedness to others. The negation, or forgetting of the self, “results in an opening of self to a sense of relatedness -- intimate relatedness -- with a greater whole, whether it be that of people in love or that of family, group, nation, or even some sense of cosmic consciousness. In any case, what arises is quite a different sense of self, that of the self as expanded and in a considerably wider relationship.”\textsuperscript{35}

We saw in Chapter One that some philosophers have argued that Heidegger’s concept of “being-with” opens up a way for just this type of relatedness, for a deeper, originary sense of being-with, or a radical intersubjectivity.\textsuperscript{36} We also saw however, the problem inherent in Heidegger’s philosophy that made this quite impossible. In Watsuji’s philosophy, however, betweenness (aidagara) is part of a human being, even as an individual, so one is never without relations to others. Compare this to Heidegger’s philosophy where

\textsuperscript{34}Carter, “Strands of Influence” 340.
\textsuperscript{35}Carter, “Strands of Influence” 334.
\textsuperscript{36}See Chapter One, 38.
concrete relations to others were possible only in inauthentic being-in-the-world. In order to authentically be with others, one first had to remove oneself from entanglements with others, Da-sein had to become its "ownmost possibility," and then, authentic being-with meant freeing the other from oneself -- leaving us with a very abstract idea of what authentic being-with would be. For Watsuji, this individualism is simply an abstraction. Of course there is no satisfying concept of authentic being-with in Heidegger's philosophy, Watsuji might argue. Heidegger was not looking at the whole picture of human being, merely at an abstraction. Community in Watsuji's philosophy permeates all of our ways of being-in-the-world.

In fact, as I mentioned above, the authentic in Heidegger is precisely the inauthentic in Watsuji. Watsuji is very aware of turning Heidegger's concepts upside down, and deliberately appropriates and inverts Heidegger's authentic/inauthentic vocabulary. We saw hints of this in Climate and Culture -- in Ethics, he does this explicitly. As Shigenori Nagatomo explains:

In Watsuji's ethical scheme, where the betweenness of an 'I' and the other is held to be nondual through the mediation of emptiness, what Heidegger called 'authentic' turns out to be inauthentic. . . . . Personal existence gains its status of existence only in opposition to the other, and as such it is the negation of the wholeness of the human being-in-betweenness. However, for Watsuji, living nondual betweenness is authentic, and personal existence returns to this ground of authenticity via self-negation. Heidegger's authenticity is

---

37Carter, "Strands of Influence" 335.
inauthentic precisely because it deviates from nondual betweenness.\textsuperscript{38}

In the context of Watsuji’s philosophical system, Heidegger’s concept was doomed to failure because it did not allow room for the social, for “to attempt to comprehend the individual and society as the double or dual characteristic of ningen and thereby to uncover there humankinds’ most authentic essence, can by no means be implemented from a standpoint that presupposes a primary distinction between individual and society” (E 14). This was why, for Watsuji, an ethics could not come out of Heidegger’s philosophy -- Heidegger viewed relations from a point of view of the individual only. In that of Watsuji, as we saw from the above citation, this is a “misconception” and because his concept of ningen takes both elements of human being in the world into account, any study of the human being will also be a study of ethics.

In Watsuji’s philosophy, because of betweenness, relationship “is ever present, linking subjectivity and objectivity, individual and social, nature and self, and even time and space.”\textsuperscript{39} Much like Heidegger in his method, Watsuji starts off with everyday facts, for “we exist in our daily life in the being in betweenness”(E 57). It is in his examples of daily life that we most clearly see the meaning of betweenness. Watsuji chooses one of these facts to argue against Descartes and those who have followed him. He explains that even in writing, in a solitary room,

\textsuperscript{39} Carter, “Strands of Influence” 335.
alone with one's thoughts, there still exists betweenness among persons. It is these thought experiments that philosophers have used as evidence for the existence of the I... But they assumed a strangely different attitude to the extent that, even though writing about the evidence for the I, they nonetheless did not simultaneously recognize the evidence for the other I. Is one justified in holding that the operation of writing has developed without anticipating its readers? To write that "only I am evident" is itself contradictory. For writing is an expression of words, and words are what have come to shape themselves in anticipation of partners who live and talk together... we can say that for us to read books or to write sentences we are already involved with other persons. No matter how much we concern ourselves with the consciousness of I, this concern itself implies our going beyond the consciousness of I and being connected with others (E 49-50).

We can liken this to Husserl's recognition that we are always, from the outset, in an intersubjective world, and that to isolate the individual self, an abstraction of some sort must take place.\(^{40}\) We can see how betweenness permeates all aspects of our life -- this does not mean however, that we are not individuals, for as Watsuji points out this kind of being in the world -- as betweenness, can be grasped from two angles: "The first is that betweenness is constituted 'among' individual persons. Thus, we must say that the individual members who compose it existed prior to this betweenness" (E 57). This is indeed the "Western" conception of betweenness -- the individual is still the focus, and a group is composed of individuals coming together, for example, owing to a common interest. This notion changes, however, in the elucidation of the second angle:

---

\(^{40}\) See, for example CM, Meditation Five, section 44.
the individual members who compose this betweenness are
determined by it as its members. From this perspective, we can say
that antecedent to there being individual members, the betweenness
that determined them existed. These two relationships contradict
each other, and yet, such a contradictory relationship is taken for
granted as a matter of common sense (E 57-58).

We saw the logic of this unity of contradictories above. The key is to always
consider the other side of the coin as well -- one is never *solely* an individual in
Watsuji’s philosophy. We saw this to a certain extent in Husserl’s idea that the
individual forms the community as much as the community and social
relationships in it form the individual*41* -- but not to such a radical degree as found
in Watsuji.

In Chapter Nine of *Ethics*, Watsuji develops in detail the notion of
subjective spatiality which is betweenness:

This sort of spatiality is not the same as space in the world of nature.
It is not a form of intuition, but rather the manner in which multiple
subjects are related to one another. It is not a uniform extendedness,
but a dialectical one, in which relations such as ‘far and near, wide
and narrow’ are mutually transformed into one another. In a word, it
is the betweenness itself of subjective human beings (E 156).

Because *ningen* is being-in-the-world as betweenness, we see that this concept of
self will always be spatial and will express itself spatially. Watsuji goes on to say:

All expressions that indicate the interconnection of the acts of human
beings -- for example, *intercourse, fellowship, transportation, communication* -- can be understood only with a subjective spatiality
of this sort. Spatial extendedness, as is evident in publication,
communication, and so forth is an expression of this subjective
spatiality.

*41* See Chapter Three 123.
I regard this subjective spatiality as the essential characteristic of human beings. Without it, the systematic relationships between personalities could not be understood (E 157).

We see here that for Watsuji, the space in which we exist and the tools that arise in this space are expressions of betweenness, and are essential for understanding how we are in the world as ningen. Watsuji returns to Heidegger’s concept of tools, this time however, with an intensely critical attitude. As he explains, while Heidegger “set the pattern for explicating the subjective meaning of what is called the world . . . in his philosophy, the relation between person and person lies hidden behind the relation between person and tools” (E 17). This is because of Heidegger’s treatment of Da-sein as that of the individual only. Watsuji argues that in Heidegger’s thought, “the spatiality inherent in ‘a being there’ [Da-sein] is, in the final analysis, attributed to the relationship of concern between I and tools and has nothing to do with the relationship of communication among human beings” (E 174). By not admitting the spatial aspect of Da-sein, rather than being grounds for betweenness and authenticity, space and tools get in the way of the authentic self which must, in Heidegger’s analysis, be grounded in temporality.

As we saw in Chapter Two, the notion of betweenness relations with others in Heidegger’s discussion of authentic Dasein is problematic at best. Watsuji recognizes this problem and responds in the following manner:

Only in the concern with other persons do we find tools. It is not that a shoemaker finds other persons only through the medium of the shoes he produces but that he makes shoes as ordered by other persons. It is not that a scholar finds other scholars only through the
medium of his desk or books but that in thinking through his problems -- and it is not necessary to exclude problems of mere ego consciousness here -- in terms of those human relationships collectively called the academic world, he comes to read books. Heidegger did not heed such self-evident matters of fact (E 176).

This is an interesting progression from the manner in which we saw Watsuji appropriate tools in Climate and Culture. In fact, we could read the citation above as a re-writing of the section on tools in Climate and Culture. Where the focus of tools in the earlier work was on the “purpose-relation” behind them, here we see how completely Watsuji has overturned Heidegger’s concept as found in Being and Time. What we recognize now, is a similarity that resonates with the later Heidegger’s thought.

Consider the bridge example in “Building Dwelling Thinking”-- the bridge was a tool that served to form a community. And this is exactly what the later Watsuji maintains is the function of tools. Tools are expressions of our inherent subjective spatiality and serve to develop both the individual and social aspects of our selves to the fullest extent. Watsuji gives a detailed analysis of how one tool of communication, the postal system, is an expression of subjective spatiality:

the development of postal organizations shows an increase in the extent and intensity of human relationships in a society. Under circumstances in which a response to a letter is delivered after a month’s interval, we cannot be said to be engaging in a conversation in an active manner. If we receive a response at a time when we have almost detached ourselves from the state of mind we were in while writing the letter, then we are unlikely to share the same state of mind. On the other hand, if and when postal services spare no time in delivering words from one person to another both quickly and frequently, then we shall be able to share pleasures as well as
pains. A community of beings would thus be realized. A telephone is designed to strengthen this tendency even further (E 164).

The resonance between the thought of the later Heidegger and the Watsuji of *Ethics* does not stop at their re-workings of the concept of tools and is in fact, quite remarkable. Like Heidegger, Watsuji believes that space cannot be represented as purely empty, as devoid of objects (E 171). Furthermore, he explains that space “is not a merely theoretical or contemplative issue, but must be comprehended in connection with the individual subject. It is called into question in subjective practice” (E 177). We can only come to the notion of “space as such” (the traditional notion of space as empty or void) through the subject and her point of view. This however, is not subjective spatiality, and demonstrates that Watsuji and Heidegger shared the opinion that the idea of homogeneous space cannot arise without human experience. The subjective spatiality analysed by Watsuji is the space of experience, which we saw was essential also to dwelling. What made dwelling, and hence “space as such” possible, was our participation in it.

We saw how understanding “environmental space” in the usual manner is the standpoint of the technological worldview, which examines how we exist in space. Subjective spatiality on the other hand, which does not objectify space, is an expression of how we exist spatially, in our being-in-the-world in betweenness with others, in the way in which we dwell in our neighborhoods and communities.

It is quite remarkable to note how similar the notion of subjective spatiality evident in the phenomena of climate is to Heidegger’s notion of dwelling. *Climate*
and Culture was not published until 1935, and was clearly written, as we saw above, as a response to Being and Time which Watsuji read immediately after it was published in 1927 while he was in Germany. “Building Dwelling Thinking” was first presented in 1951 and later published in 1954. Despite the similarity, Watsuji seems to have entirely ignored Heidegger’s later work.42 There is also very little indication that Heidegger had developed the notion of dwelling to any extent at the time of writing Being and Time. The term “dwell” only appears in the section 12, where Heidegger explains the meaning of innan, which we saw developed in “Building Dwelling Thinking.” This perhaps, makes all the more striking the similarities between the two notions. It does seem to be a case of some sort of “pre-established harmony,” “one of those remarkable coincidences in the history of ideas.”43

We recall that in “Building Dwelling Thinking,” Heidegger insists that being is dwelling, and that dwelling is characterized by the human element within it. Carter explains the fullness of Heidegger’s notion and at the same time captures the richness of Watsuji’s concept of climate:

we dwell in the world, a world . . . that lets us be in such a way that we can be ourselves, can find out who we are and what it means to be ourselves, that allows us to decide who we shall be and how and with whom we should dwell. In return we must dwell on the earth in such a way that we leave the world as it is, at least to the greatest extent possible. We dwell in such a way that we “save” the world,

and "to save really means to set something free into its own presencing."\textsuperscript{44}

Climate, as an expression of subjective spatiality allows for our self-discovery, as does dwelling. Furthermore, in dwelling we also saw the importance of neighborhood and community.

Watsuji’s comments about the telephone indicate that he would scarcely have been able to imagine the great leaps our tools of communication have made since he wrote those words. It brings to light another area where the ideas of Watsuji and Heidegger merge once more -- that of technology. If tools of communication are evidence of an increase “in the extent and intensity of human relationships in a society” what does the advent of communication technologies such as e-mail, the internet, the world-wide-web tell us about our society today? Would one say that human relationships are more intense? -- they are certainly more extensive -- and in one sense the technology available has intensified relationships, allowing us to share pleasures and pains with friends across the ocean in a matter of seconds.

However, there has been another interesting side effect, that of the idea of anonymity. In “chat rooms” on the internet for example, the point often becomes to be anonymous, and even to put on another identity altogether. Indeed, it is now entirely possible to stay inside one’s home for days and be able to communicate, and work, eat, all without any face-to-face human contact. Heidegger sensed this

\textsuperscript{44}Carter, \textit{Becoming Bamboo} 35-36.
danger as early as *Being and Time*, recognizing that due to Da-sein’s tendency towards nearness, we are more or less compelled to go along with the push to overcome distance. He used the example of the radio with which “Da-sein is bringing about today de-distancing of the ‘world’ which is unforeseeable in its meaning for Da-sein, by way of expanding and destroying the everyday surrounding world” (BT 98/105). This became a central theme for Heidegger’s later work where the danger of technology is its enframing us, making us slaves to it, and consequently making us less human.\(^{45}\) This brings us to the issue of the importance of the “face-to-face” in Watsuji’s philosophy.

4. The Body

The technology at our fingertips today presents a problem for Watsuji. In one sense, e-mail messages, and communication on the world wide web are in space -- cyber space -- but it is not clear what exactly cyberspace is. We do have more rapid communication -- it is spatial -- but what it eliminates is the “human,” the personal. The technologies which blur spatial distances and bring people closer in one sense, are the very same tools which provide the means for avoiding “real” contact with other human beings -- a central aspect of betweenness. The danger is a loss of the sense of our place in the world. “Technology such as the internet reduces our humanity by distancing us, disembodying us, de-personalizing us, all rendering the betweenness vast and a vehicle of estrangement - faceless distance.

\(^{45}\)Carter, e-mail correspondence with the author, July 1998.
Our communication is, thus, partial." It is partial because for Watsuji the face-to-face physical encounter with another is of central importance.

For Watsuji, the spatial extendedness of one’s body and its betweenness with other bodies is central to the concept of an authentic or whole self. Yuasa Yasuo in his book, *The Body*, tells us that “Watsuji’s concept of betweenness, the subjective interconnection of meanings, must be grasped as a carnal interconnection. Moreover, this interconnection must not be thought of as either a psychological or physical relatedness, nor even their conjunction.” As the best example to illustrate this notion, Yuasa points to the following example in *Ethics*:

So far as physiological bodies are concerned, they can be spoken of as easily as individual trees. But this is not the case with bodies viewed as expressions of the subjective or as persons in their concrete qualities. A mother and her baby can never be conceived of as merely two independent individuals. A baby wishes for its mother’s body, and the mother offers her breast to the baby. If they are separated from each other, both look for each other with all the more intensity. Since ancient times in Japan, any attempt to isolate two bodies such as these from each other has been described by the aphorism “to wrench green wood.” As is evident, a mother’s body and her baby’s are somehow connected as though one . . . . This power of attraction, even though not physical attraction alone, is yet a real attraction connecting the two as though one. If it is thinkable that a nucleus, with its electrons circulating around it, constitutes one atom and not just separate individuals, then it is equally permissible to think that a mother’s body and her child’s are also combined as one (E 62).

And it is not only this unique sort of relation that Watsuji means when he refers to the betweenness of bodies: “Bodily connections are always visible wherever

---

46 Carter, e-mail correspondence with the author, July 1998.
47 Yuasa, *The Body* 47.
betweenness prevails” (E 62). As ningen, then, as betweenness, an important aspect of subjective spatiality is the spatiality evident through the embodiment of the self. 

How full an expression of self then, is something like communication on the internet -- even, or perhaps especially communication between friends? Watsuji maintains that an important aspect of friendship is at least the potential for bodily connection and attraction. Watsuji explains: “That one wishes to visit a friend implies that she intends to draw near to the friend’s body. If she does go to visit a friend who is at some distance by streetcar, then her body moves in the friend’s direction, attracted by the power between them that draws them together” (E 62). Relationship between two people is therefore, not merely psychological for Watsuji; he maintains that the “mind” relation between two people cannot be separated from the “body” relation. 

However, Watsuji anticipates resistance and poses questions that one might view as coming from the “Western” point of view: “Is it not the case that what I call a connection between one body and another is merely a psychological relation? Is not the attraction between a mother and her child, as well as between friends, psychological rather than physical?” (E 63) In answering these objections, Watsuji illustrates the fact that one cannot treat a human body as a mere physical solid nor as a mere psychic entity:

When I discover a friend of mine waiting for me beside a bronze statue, the friend is never immediately given merely as a material
solid having the same form as the statue. Instead, I discover my friend there, from the beginning. When I shake hands with my friend, it is not that I first touch her hand as a material solid and afterwards come to infer that this material solid is put into motion by my friend’s mind. Rather, from the outset, I touch my friend herself. There is no momentary period of time in which a human body is experienced as a mere material solid (E 64).

As long as the human body plays a role in this “intersubjectivity” we cannot, according to Watsuji, ever treat it as a mere material solid. Watsuji points out that most of the time, in our manner of being-in-the-world, we see another’s body not as a mere physiological object, but as an individual person. In fact, it takes great effort and abstraction to see a person as a mere biological organism. Unless it is a physician for example, who must abstract from the person in order to perform surgery “dispassionately,” we take great offense and are even outraged when a body is not treated as a whole person. Referring to Japan’s long since abolished “licensed quarters,” Watsuji points out that while theoretically it is not so difficult to conceive of another person’s body merely physiologically and to regard it as an object of corporeal pleasures alone. From a practical standpoint, troublesome facilities are required to be set up. . . . Facilities within society are set up to function in such a way as to deprive persons of all their human qualities and isolate sexual intercourse from distinctively human relations. To demand and enter into such constructions is to exhibit one’s intention to treat human beings as if they were animals. Such action must be condemned ethically (E 60-61).

In order to treat a human body as a mere object, one must “artificially eliminate the phenomena of expressions as primarily given in everyday experience” (E 65). This evokes the stance Husserl took in Ideas II, where we saw
he objected to treating human beings as "mere things" unless certain parameters are set up. We see Watsuji here express the same basic criticism that Arisaka leveled at Heidegger’s forgetfulness of the body, that it does not make sense to ignore the fact that much of our being-in-the-world is manifested through bodily expressions. The body is part of a human being’s subjective spatiality, part of our being-in-the-world as betweenness. That our acts are bodily and express relations was ignored by Heidegger in *Being and Time*. For Watsuji, the movement of the body in the carrying out of an act, for example, “as one detects a specific motion in the body of one’s counterpart, one puts one’s own body in motion in a specific way as well.” This is not *merely* a physiological connection from brain to body: “And the movement of the body during this interval of time is not mere physical relations nor biological ones. Instead, it involves as well the relationship between one subject and another, as distinct from the relation between a person and a thing” (E 238).

Heidegger failed to recognize this connection; or if it was at all implied, it was only in the context of *inauthentic* being-in-the-world, mediated by tools. This bodily connection between people, indeed any deep connection at all, in authentic being-in-the-world for Heidegger was impossible owing to his omission of the lived body.

---

48 *cf*, Chapter Two 20.
5. Conclusion

By way of conclusion, let us return now to the notion of subjective spatiality, expressed through the phenomenon of communication. Subjective spatiality reflects the movement, the dialectical characteristic, of ningen. Watsuji states:

> Only because the subject that was originally one, tries to regain this oneness in and through its disruption into many subjects does there arise a movement among these subjects. This practical interconnection of acts establishes ningen sonzai. From this standpoint, we can say that subjective spatiality is, in the final analysis, the basic structure of ningen sonzai. Our endeavor to grasp ningen not only as a human being but also as possessing the dual structure of individuality and at the same time sociality leads us of necessity to this idea of spatial extendedness (E 165).\(^49\)

He goes on to say that “It is not so much that ningen sonzai is constructed in space as that space comes to be found in the field of subjective ningen sonzai. From this viewpoint we can argue that subjective extendedness constitutes basic space” (E 166).

Again there are strong resonances between what Watsuji writes and the ideas found in Heidegger’s “Building Dwelling Thinking”-- where it is human dwelling that opens up the possibility of comprehending “space” as such. Self as ningen, then, in all its aspects as individual and as social creates space in a most basic way. We see this remarkable resonance again where Watsuji expresses his notion of space:

> Space is not a merely theoretical or contemplative issue, but must be comprehended in connection with the individual subject. It is called

\(^{49}\)My emphasis. Ningen sonzai means human existence.
into question in subjective practice, yet not in individual practice such as the concern with tools [which was Heidegger’s point of view and resulting limitation], but rather in those practical activities inherent in human relationships. Subjective extendedness, which is inherent in the activities of \textit{ningen}, is exactly the characteristic of spatiality of \textit{ningen sonzai} from which originates all other kinds of space (E 177).

Subjective extendedness, which recognizes the permeation of human relations in our being in the world, allows for what was most troubling about Heidegger’s Da-sein analysis -- that is, recognition of the importance of the fundamental interconnections between people. Watsuji states that subjective extendedness, such as we find in the phenomena of communication, “arises because human beings, despite dividing themselves into a great number of subjects, nevertheless, strive to constitute a connection among themselves”(E 165). For Watsuji, this kind of connectedness -- concrete connectedness -- is authentic being-in-the-world as a complete human being. Subjective extendedness then, is always a part of how we are in the world as \textit{ningen}. We can see this extendedness in any form of space: tools of communication such as the radio or telephone, or even a house, a garden, or a road; each is an expression of self -- both as social and as individual. The various expressions may be from the standpoint of the individual or the social, but are only possible because the self is always already both in its contradictory dialectical unity.

It is arguable that Watsuji places too much emphasis on the social aspect of the self, at the expense of the individual. Indeed in \textit{Climate and Culture} he seemed
to tip the balance too far in favour of the social and spatial, at the expense of the individual and temporal. People of a given climate, according to Watsuji's analysis, seemed to have to resign themselves to whatever character the given climate dictated. The self presented to us in his analysis was an entirely social self. As Steve Odin notes, in Watsuji's work we find "this tendency to dissolve the individual into the collective whole".\footnote{Odin, The Social Self 496.} It is to the potential harbored in a truly balanced view of self that we will turn next, in Chapter Five.
CHAPTER V
Towards an Implaced, Ethical Self

In the previous four chapters I have analysed of the role of spatiality in a concept of self as found in the philosophy of Heidegger, Husserl, and Watsuji. I provided contexts for these analyses in the introduction where I mentioned that analysis was necessary not only as a response to the general absence of spatiality in current theories of the self, but also as a response to the overwhelming dominance of technology in our society and the equations of "faster equals better", "more efficient equals better" and "more economical equals better." All three of these slogans are temporally driven equations of being-in-the-world that, by virtue of making aspects of life into formulae, fail to recognize that human development -- of the self, of relationships to others and to the earth -- should not be rushed; that such development needs a place as well as time. Such abstract formulations do not recognize the spatiality of human being. We become not "human beings" but "human doings." The technology that promised to enhance our lives has in many ways done just the opposite. I will begin this chapter with a discussion of how the temporal-technological framework prevails and how the lack of attention to human spatiality affects the self.

Some of the consequences of not taking spatiality into account were seen by way of Heidegger's philosophy -- which left us with a disembodied self lacking concrete relations with others. In the second part of this chapter I will analyse the consequences of the imbalance caused when the temporal dominates and the body
is neglected. However, in the later Heidegger there is one concept which is fundamentally spatial and very rich -- that of dwelling. Taking dwelling as one building block, I will add to it, elaborating on what Behnke referred to as a "body of compassion" or an "embodied ethics" coming out of Husserl's philosophy, as well as Watsuji's concept of betweenness to begin to move toward a more balanced concept of self.

The concluding section of the chapter will begin to open a new dialogue on the self, as I link Eastern and Western notions to begin to frame a concept of self as implanted -- a self out of which an implanted or embedded ethics can grow -- where temporal and spatial elements are balanced. This is not something which will be completed in this thesis, but I will begin the way towards a concept that is necessary if we are to regain our sense of place in the world and foster an ethical way of being-in-the-world.

1. Space, Self and Technology

We can read both Heidegger and Watsuji as prescient thinkers on the subject of technology and society. Already in Being and Time, as we saw in Chapter Four,¹ Heidegger was wary of the speed with which great distances could be overcome. We saw Watsuji's analysis of the postal system, which, while providing increased intensity in relationships, nevertheless remained partial when not combined with the real possibility of seeing the person with whom one corresponds. As for the telephone, Watsuji had this to say: "If this method of
communication advances to its fullest extent, then we will be emancipated from the restrictions of distance and will be able to participate in any conversation as freely as we wish"(E 163). That time is here and doubtless many relationships are richer for it, but only if the relationship is already established face-to-face. We saw Watsuji’s recognition of the need for the bodily aspect of communication and relationship, and we found this also present in Husserl’s philosophy: “In order to establish a mutual relationship between myself and another, in order to communicate something to him, a Bodily relation, a Bodily connection by means of physical occurrences, must be instituted. I have to go over and speak to him”(II 176). No more than Watsuji, would Husserl have been able to imagine the technological leaps that have changed this necessity. However, taking into account the important role of the body in intersubjectivity, Husserl’s response to the fullness of electronic communication and relationships would, I believe, be much the same as Watsuji’s -- that without the bodily aspect such communication and relationships remain only partial.

For Husserl, communication involves a bodily relation with the other. It is not the speaking to the other so much as the physical act of going over to the other which is the cornerstone for communication. Denis Dumas has pointed out that

---

1 See 169.
2 Of course, today the technology of video-conferencing makes a certain kind of “face-to-face” possible -- but not the same kind of face-to-face that Heidegger meant, or the kind of intersubjectivity that Husserl meant, or the betweenness of Watsuji’s philosophy. The “face-to-face” afforded by video-conferencing still lacks the carnal aspect of being-with someone. Certainly this would be a more satisfying way of communicating with someone when compared
language is secondary in intersubjective communication and empathy.\textsuperscript{3} He indicated that linguistic mediation has almost no place in Husserl’s theory of empathy; that in the majority of cases Husserl does not use language-based examples and that everything is first mediated through the body. In fact, Husserl even talks about the “verbal body,” or *sprachlicher Leib*. He talks about an expression being a body (*Leib*) for meaning -- so in a sense, my words are bodies for my thoughts and ideas.\textsuperscript{4} On the written word Husserl has the following to say: “Man writes, and writing is a trait of human spirituality. But the written itself is objectively spiritual, with body (*Leib*) and meaning and at the same time characterized as a ‘work’ of a living spirit/mind”.\textsuperscript{5} The written itself is an animate organism. We can see to what extent the spatial, more particularly, the body, permeates Husserl’s thought. Even prior to being able to express something through language, written or spoken, bodily communication takes place -- empathy is bodily. We can conjecture then, that for Husserl, electronic communication would only be partial.

The danger of temporal, technological, efficient, economical thinking is that it makes it increasingly easier for us to abstract from the bodily and spatial aspects of human being, which, taken to its extreme, results in not taking our


\textsuperscript{4} See Dumas 129; Hua. XIII, 65.
humanity sufficiently into account. We can take the recent re-structuring of
Ontario’s health care system as an example. The government decided that our
health care system must be made more efficient. What has been lost (besides many
jobs) as a result of these changes has been true patient care. When my
grandmother had a small stroke and was taken to the hospital, she spent hours on a
gurney in a hallway -- because there was no bed available for her. She was
“healthy” enough to stay alive so, despite her disorientation and fear that someone
would take her purse or do something to her if she fell asleep, in the hall she
stayed until the “efficiently” run hospital had the time to “deal” with her. She was
not taken into account as a whole person, rather, was treated merely as an object --
a machine-like body that needed to be repaired. I am not overlooking the fact that
there has been incredible progress in life saving technology and that it is
improving quality of life for many people. What the above story illustrates is that
there is an imbalance -- that too much emphasis is being placed on the technology
and not enough attention is being paid to the people it has been created for.

Another example of dangerous consequences of technology can be found in
communication on the internet. As mentioned previously in chapter four, one of
the ideas in a chat room is to remain anonymous, or to create an entirely new
identity. A “relationship” that only develops in cyberspace, lacks the bodily
element so central to Watsuji’s concept of subjective extendedness and

---

5 Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjectivität. Texte aus dem Nachlaß, Erster
Teil (HUA XIII), ed. Iso Kern (Den Haag: Husserl Archiv, Universität Koln, 1973) 65; my
translation.
betweenness and to Husserl’s concepts of intersubjectivity and empathy. One could, of course, argue that meeting someone in this manner is in fact more honest, that the “real” person is known, free of prejudices based on looks or social standing for example. However, dangerous consequences abound. For example, there are entire units of police forces set up to try to apprehend pedophiles who lurk in this anonymity, preying on young girls and boys. The spatiality of relationship is lacking in these situations -- the betweenness is only partial and the relationship is not complete, nor is it honest.

In “The Question Concerning Technology,”6 Heidegger warns us against letting technology be pushed to its extremes, recognizing that it has the power to “enframe” us, and chain us to it. Recall the notion of dwelling, which enabled earth, sky, divinities and mortals to reveal themselves in the fullness of the fourfold -- to presence in the clearing we create when dwelling. Technology reveals, Heidegger explains, but not in the sense of letting something presence; a “truth” is revealed, but it is the technologically driven truth, that which serves to further the aims of technology -- speed, efficiency, economy. This kind of revealing removes us from dwelling, for we no longer see our neighbors, plants, trees, flowers, or bridges in the same way, for themselves, but as resources. Take, for example, a piece of land that has been farmed and cared for over generations. Land which has been cultivated, harvested, and let fallow to ensure its future yield has of course been changed by technology in the use of combines and tractors in
place of ox-carts, but there nevertheless remains a relationship between the land and the farmer. The farmer knows that if he does not care for the land -- if he does not dwell -- the land will cease to enhance his life -- it will cease yielding crops.

On the technological worldview however, such a relationship ceases to exist:

a tract of land is challenged in the hauling out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit. The field that the peasant formerly cultivated and set in order appears different from how it did when to set in order still meant to take care of and maintain. The work of the peasant does not challenge the soil of the field. In sowing grain it places seed in the keeping of the forces of growth and watches over its increase. But meanwhile even the cultivation of the field has come under the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which sets upon nature. It sets upon it in the sense of challenging it.\footnote{Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology" 296.}

Furthermore, the coal stripped from the earth is not immediately used up, but stored for future use. No difference is recognized between the standing reserve of coal in the storage facility and the standing reserve of nature in general.

Heidegger saw these dangers in the fifties and today we see, in fact we live, the consequences of an attitude that has continued to prevail. Loss of rainforests, and holes in the ozone layer have caused changes in our global climate that we currently live with today and are alarming enough to be cause for global conferences. We live with the effects that manifest themselves as record high and low temperatures for days on end; stronger UV rays; flash floods and droughts.


\footnote{This is at least true for the 'first world' countries, but in somewhere like India, for example, most farm labour is still done by men and animals.}
We have lost our sense of place in the world; have ceased to see our place in the interconnectedness of the fourfold, which is not, as I read it, a hierarchy as much as an interconnectedness of the four aspects. Technology makes it possible for us to ignore the need to feel connected to the earth and the others around us and even to ourselves. It hides or at least distracts us from the spaces and places we find ourselves in. With cell phones and satellite phones, for example, even in the wilderness one can be in touch with the ‘civilized’ world at the push of a few buttons. Casey tells us that wild places are those that “have not been brought under the modifying and restraining that civilized, settled human existence brings in its train.”9 Owing to the advances of technology, this modifying and restraining becomes easier and easier. For knowing that I can just call a helicopter to rescue me even if I am days away from civilization is itself civilized, and changes my way of being in the wilderness. What it does in fact, is enable me to deny that I am in a wild place, its wildness is hidden, veiled, and I can continue to hide from the challenges that genuine being in the wilderness forces me to face. I mentioned in Chapter Four that technology enables us to live and work completely alone, but at the same time, it also means that I am never alone. Because I can effortlessly bring civilization with me into wild places, I don’t have to be forced to face my solitary self -- a touch of a button and someone is there. Casey describes the power of wild places:

---

9 Casey, Getting Back 188.
The desolate landscape can comfort the human heart and console it, giving to the solitary human being in its forbidding midst a sense of genuine (if nonhuman) companionship, of not being entirely alone, of being-with the land's own austere presence. Although alone with respect to other human beings, the isolated figure in the empty landscape finds in wilderness itself a con-soling partner.\textsuperscript{10}

But technology makes it possible to avoid this kind of isolation, and at the same time, avoid what these wild places may have to teach us about ourselves.

2. Return to the Body

Although Heidegger was aware of some of the dangers of technological thinking, the lack of recognition of the body as a constituting aspect of Da-sein, and the fundamental temporal drive of his thinking led him at the very least to ignore other dangers, if not to become complicit in their diffusion. In the first two chapters I showed that in \textit{Being and Time} Heidegger continued to ignore the body in his philosophy of being-in-the-world and as a result never provided us with a full analysis of spatiality. In a phenomenological discussion of spatiality in all of its dimensions, the body must be included. In fact, it is largely the body which enables us to understand spatiality -- it is from the place/space of our embodied selves that we first experience spatiality or even begin to grasp it as a concept.

A baby experiences space and her own body around the same time. At around 3 or 4 months old, she recognizes that her mother is not an extension of herself, that she has a body of her own, that she can reach something that is "over there" -- that there is an "over there" at all. She looks at her hands in fascination

\textsuperscript{10} Casey, \textit{Getting Back} 193.
until she grasps that they are a part of her own body, that she can will them to 
move. She experiences all of this from her own particular “there-being”-- her own 
body. Even in Heidegger’s later work, we saw that human beings, although more 
implaced in the world through dwelling and the fourfold, remain disembodied.

Throughout his thought, the finitude of human beings remained an 
important theme for Heidegger. As mentioned in Chapter Two, the most 
evocative, powerful expression of this finitude is the body -- yet it remained 
virtually unacknowledged by Heidegger. Often our finitude is not recognized until 
a brush with death which is invariably experienced bodily. A doctor tells a patient 
that he has cancer -- that there is something inside his body which is going to kill 
him if it is not stopped. Someone is in a car accident and sustains life threatening 
injuries. After experiences like this, often the world is brought into sharp relief, the 
fragility of life is recognized, and one is brought face-to-face with one’s finitude, 
with the possibility of one’s own death. I cannot think of an instance when this is 
not recognized through a bodily experience -- whether it happens to me or to 
someone else. Even when the experience is not as dramatic as the above examples, 
we witness the decay of the body as someone ages, or is consumed by an illness. 
Furthermore, death itself does not happen in an abstract way. Death is a physical, 
spatial event -- whether it is peaceful or fought against, we witness it through the 
body. Yet Heidegger never once recognizes these powerful expressions of finitude 
so central to Da-sein’s being-in-the-world.
A brief look at Heidegger’s concept of “authentic” pain is revealing. In the essay “Language” Heidegger explains that “we should not imagine pain anthropologically as a sensation that makes us feel afflicted. We should not think of the intimacy psychologically as the sort in which sentimentality makes a nest for itself.” Pain, on his view, has nothing to do with sentiment or feeling, hence it has nothing to do with the body. Again, in “Language and the Poem,” Heidegger states that the nature of pain “remains impenetrable to any mind that understands pain in terms of sensitivity.” But how else are we to understand pain? Even emotional pain affects us bodily -- it can make us sick, make us cry, keep us from sleeping. What kind of pain is there that is not involved somehow with our feelings? On Heidegger’s view, true pain is something joyful and life giving:

The spirit which bears the gift of the “great soul” is pain; pain is the animator. And the soul so gifted is the giver of life. That is why everything that is alive in the sense in which the soul is alive is imbued with pain, the fundamental trait of the soul’s nature. Everything that is alive is painful.

Once again, however, this pain is not to be associated with feeling. Despite Heidegger’s claim that this soul gifted with pain gives life, that so gifted “it is fit to join in that harmony of mutual bearing by which all living things belong

---

14 Heidegger, “Language and the Poem” 181.
together,”¹⁶ I wish to argue that in fact the opposite is achieved. Pain can serve to link us to others, as we will see in a moment, to open up the possibility of harmony -- but not pain abstracted from human being-in-the-world, not pain abstracted from feeling.

In Demythologizing Heidegger, Caputo discusses Heidegger’s abstract attitude towards pain, noting the following:

Bodies in pain create the space of obligation. The body in pain calls out for help, addresses us, lays claim to us... Obligation happens at the start, as soon as there is being there, as soon as there are bodies, which is very early on. As soon as there is a clearing there are bodies and obligation; as soon as there are bodies and obligation, there is a clearing.

But bodies and pains are just what has been read out from the Wesen of human being...¹⁷

The essence of human being is not embodied, therefore, the essence of pain does not have to have anything to do with the body either:

The Wesen of pain, or of the living body, for Heidegger is uncontaminated by feeling and pain, uncontaminated by everything that we mean by a body. It remains pure and untouched by everything empirical, anthropological, psychological. Heidegger keeps missing the mark of human being, of the place of human being, because he does not know how to situate the human body. Dasein has had the life read out of it and has become evidently a disincarnate, ghostly spectre, a bit of Geist, de l’esprit.¹⁸

Untouched by the anthropological, empirical, psychological, pain is temporalized and technologized. We are left with a ghost of Da-sein, a thing which does not have a body, in which human spatiality has no place or power.

¹⁶ Heidegger, “Language and the Poem” 181.
¹⁸ Caputo 127.
We can see the progression of this abstraction throughout Heidegger’s work. Authentic relation with others was in the end radical individuation:

As the nonrelational possibility, death individualizes, but only, as the possibility not-to-be-bypassed, in order to make Da-sein as being-with understand the potentialities-of-being of the others (BT 244/246).

Authentic space was founded on time:

spatiality is existentially possible only through temporality (BT 336/367).¹⁹

And authentic language was ineffable:

But when does language speak itself as language? Curiously enough, when we cannot find the right word for something that concerns us, carries us away, oppresses or encourages us. Then we leave unspoken what we have in mind and, without rightly giving it thought, undergo moments in which language itself has distantly and fleetingly touched us with its essential being (OWL 59).

If we recall Ricoeur’s phrase from the Introduction, we see that by removing the physical, spatial facts of being-in-the-world, Heidegger is violating the conditions of human rootedness on this earth. It is not just the lack of the body of Da-sein which causes this de-humanizing abstraction in Heidegger’s philosophy -- it speaks to the underlying lack of spatiality and dominance of temporality in his thought in general. For it is when we combine the lack of embodiment of Da-sein, with the lack of spatiality of real connection with the others in-the-world that the most frightening consequences of his thought are revealed. We saw that Heidegger’s concept of being-with was, in the end, a radical individuation. If we

¹⁹ Although, as we saw, Heidegger does recant this later on in On Time and Being, I believe that I have shown that the temporal still dominates his work.
couple this with authentic Da-sein’s experience of pain without feeling, how can this kind of self possibly feel connected in any way at all to its fellow human beings? I mentioned above the apparent lack of true care in our current health care system. This goes along with technological, efficient, temporally driven being-in-the-world. Caputo points out that

Heidegger managed to read the New Testament from one end to the other with his eye set on the categories of care and difficulty, and never to have noticed the lepers and the lame, the blind and the beggars, the widows and the withered hands, the healings and the hungry crowds. . . . He left out the whole thematics of the ethics of mercy, of the cry for justice, the appeal that issues from flesh and pain, from afflicted flesh . . . . Heidegger never noticed that, in the New Testament, ‘care’ also means a deep responsiveness to those who suffer . . . . Cura also meant healing, curing.

This deep responsiveness to others is lacking in our current health care system. The appeal of the flesh and the pain of the body are not just physical sufferings — curing only the body as our system seems to encourage currently, is a symptom of the same sort of attitude that we find in Heidegger.

Take, for example, the case of Mrs. G. — an older woman who was in the hospital for an angioplasty. The hospital had all the technological, state of the art equipment to perform the surgery, and both the surgeon and the nurses had been in to explain the procedure to her. When the occupational therapist arrived to measure her for her tension garments, despite the explanations she had received, Mrs. G’s anxiety and fear were palpable. She was terrified, and, despite the

---

21 This case was related to me by a practicing Occupational Therapist.
technical, procedural explanations that had been given to her, no one had taken the
time listen to her -- to address her fears and concerns. Recognizing the need to
treat the patient as a whole person, not just as a body to be repaired, the
occupational therapist stopped taking measurements and sat, listened, held her
hand and gave her a hug. It was this last act that helped Mrs. G. the most, she later
wrote in a letter, that really made her feel cared for in that hospital.

Heidegger’s concept of care, however, and that which seems to be
encouraged in our hospitals, does not leave time for this kind of care because it
does not recognize human spatiality as one of its elements. We recall Frodeman’s
interpretation of care as spatial from chapter one\(^22\) -- the idea of ceasing to be
aware of the passage of time in order to follow something through to its end. This
is what the occupational therapist did in the above case -- had she stuck to her
schedule and been efficient, chances are that Mrs. G. would not have felt at all
cared for in that hospital. The reality is that all too often, because of the tight
demands placed on their time owing to re-structuring and making the hospitals
more “efficient,” the health care professionals simply do not have the room in their
schedules to make time for such care.

Heidegger seems unable to see the need for this kind of care, for \textit{Cura}, and
we are left with abstract philosophies of care and dis-connected philosophies of
being-with.
3. Interconnectedness

The sense of connection to fellow human beings, to say nothing of fellow creatures or fellow creatures who suffer,\textsuperscript{23} is lacking in his thought. Nevertheless, there are aspects of his thought that have the potential to link us to our fellow creatures and the world in which we live. Recall the notion of dwelling from Chapter Two. If we really do dwell on the earth, we save it, and we allow the fullness of the fourfold to appear. The place of the earth in the fourfold shows us that it is not something simply to be used. As well as the example of the land, Heidegger also uses the example of the Rhine River:

The hydroelectric plant is set into the current of the Rhine . . . . In the context of the interlocking processes pertaining to the orderly disposition of electrical energy, even the Rhine itself appears to be something at our command. The hydroelectric plant is not built into the Rhine River as was the old wooden bridge that joined bank with bank for hundreds of years. Rather, the river is dammed up into the power plant. What the river is now, namely, a water-power supplier, derives from the essence of the power station.\textsuperscript{24}

We notice that Heidegger uses the bridge example once again -- the bridge which enabled beings, land, river, trees and flowers to enhance one another is gone and with it genuine dwelling and the place for the fourfold to emerge have also

\textsuperscript{22} See Chapter One 30.
\textsuperscript{23} Heidegger leaves us not only un-connected to our fellow human beings, but completely ignores creatures who are not human. For an excellent analysis of this see Caputo, who points out that: "In the same way that Being is removed from beings, purified of them, so in a parallel operation that produces an exactly analogous effect, human being, the Wesen of human being, is removed from animals, is not any animal, is purified of its animality, and is raised up into its true, authentic, genuine excellence. The excellence of human being is not that it is an excellent animal, but that it excels anything animal . . . . Human being’s relatives and neighbors are not to be found in the forest but with Being”(123).
\textsuperscript{24} Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology” 297.
disappeared. Heidegger warns us against losing sight of dwelling, which is one result of technology taking over.

Imagine, however, the power in dwelling combined with the recognition of the importance of the body. We saw Caputo’s view above that bodies compel us to become involved in the world. However, bodies bring not only obligation, but as Behnke saw through Husserl’s philosophy, the possibility of compassion. It is my view that this can be naturally extended even further -- bodies not only oblige us, forcing a “duty” to our fellow creatures, but also give us the potentiality to share great joys -- the possibility not only of sharing another’s pain, but also sharing her ecstasy. Recall Behnke’s quotation:

If Husserl is at all correct that my perception of another human being as a living, feeling person -- a fellow creature who suffers, for instance, when in pain, “just as I do” -- is based on my own ability to feel my own Body. . . . it is also possible -- certainly on an individual basis, and perhaps even on a communal basis -- to cultivate a Body of compassion, an embodied ethics, a culture of peace, in which a genuine “co-existence in the flesh” would be possible.25

It would seem natural to extend dwelling to encompass embodiment -- recalling that on the earth, our most primordial dwelling place is the body. The body itself can be a clearing for being, and this clearing could be imbued with compassion. We can also use Husserl’s idea of the earth as body to help extend this notion further -- our compassion could thus be extended to our natural environment. Should the earth be harmed, we could to a certain extent, feel its pain, or at the very least through the metaphor of the lived body, be aware of it as a living
organism. If the body is seen as a constitutive part of Da-sein, then dwelling could be enhanced by this embodied dimension and not only would our buildings, trees and flowers be enhanced, but so would we ourselves, the interconnectedness of the self with the earth would be able to resonate. Adding to this Husserl’s notion of intersubjectivity, which always has a bodily component, we would also be able to dwell more fully in our neighborhoods with our neighbors, for, as we have seen, one of the most distressing aspects of Heidegger’s thought is his insistence on the need for radical individuation in order to be oneself.\textsuperscript{26} The concept of empathy in Husserl’s philosophy, as Behnke points out above, as well as the recognition of the importance of the body gives us the ground out of which to cultivate such an embodied ethics. We recall the necessity of the body in establishing a relationship with an other.\textsuperscript{27} Whereas Heidegger “read (the) life out of Da-sein”\textsuperscript{28} Husserl recognizes a truly living subject who

\begin{quote}
 is the subject of his surrounding world, including his surrounding world of spatial things, but also his world of values and of goods, his personal and social surrounding world. This subject is a person among persons, a citizen of a state, a legal subject, a member of a union . . . . This living subject is the subject of actual life, standing towards his cogeners in a nexus of empathy, in accordance with which he acknowledges himself as first experiencing one and the same common surrounding world, though each has his own subjective ways of givenness of this common world (II 382-83).
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{25} Behnke 156.
\textsuperscript{26} See Caputo \textit{Demythologizing Heidegger}, as well as his article “Heidegger’s Kampf: The Difficulty of Life.”
\textsuperscript{27} Husserl, \textit{Ideas II} 176.
\textsuperscript{28} Caputo, \textit{Demythologizing Heidegger} 125.
While I showed that there is more of a basis for a fuller concept of being-with in Heidegger’s later work, we still had to extract it from the work; it was not explicit. Husserl’s notion took us further, yet always remained from the point of view of the individual consciousness and was still a dualistic way of thinking. Introducing elements of Watsuji’s nondualistic thought can strengthen the connection between people even more.

Watsuji’s view of human being as *ningen* is nondualistic in several aspects. One such aspect is the nondualism of body-mind; another is nondualism of self and other. Yuasa explains that in the Eastern way of thinking, examining the body is not an isolated area of philosophical investigation. “Inquiring what the body is, or what the relationship between the mind and body is, relates to the nature of being human.”²⁹ In other words, an investigation of the concept of body is at the same time an investigation of self, of being-in-the-world. How different this is from the dis-embodied, individuated, authentic Da-sein that Heidegger presents us with. It also gives us an even more powerful view than Husserl provides. If we recall the citations in Chapter Four about the attraction between mother and baby, and the desire to be physically with one’s friend or lover, not only the fact of, but also the *power* of this human spatiality is recognized.³⁰ This is, I believe, the direction in which Behnke leads us with her notion of a body of compassion.

Watsuji’s theory of human being as *ningen* fits well with the idea.

³⁰ Chapter Four 168.
We recall that for Watsuji, the place of ethics lies in the "betweenness" of people.\textsuperscript{31} This betweenness encompasses the, social, individual and embodied aspects of self. We saw that it differs from Husserl's concept of intersubjectivity in that its starting point is not the individual. Rather, in betweenness, a new space of relationship is founded. Watsuji seems to be purposely distinguishing his concept from that of Husserl when he states that:

*betweenness* is quite distinct from the intentionality of consciousness. Activity inherent in the consciousness of "I" is never determined by this "I" alone but is also determined by others. It is not merely a reciprocal activity in that one way conscious activities are performed one after another but, rather, that either one of them is at once determined by both sides; that is, by itself and by the other. Hence, so far as betweenness-oriented existences are concerned, each consciousness interpenetrates the other (E 69).

This notion of interpenetration of consciousnesses goes one step further than intersubjectivity, which always has the starting point of *my* consciousness. In betweenness, there is no one consciousness that has priority, precisely because it is a nondualistic concept. Watsuji also points out that intentionality is most often described in terms of "I am conscious of something." This, in fact, is also true in Husserl's description of intersubjectivity when he explains that our experience of the other "as appearing in my primordial sphere, is first of all a body in my primordial Nature"(CM 121).

What we see here is not only that the starting point is from the individual self, but that the other is first experienced as a thing. However, Watsuji

\textsuperscript{31} Watsuji, *Ethics* 10.
emphasizes that, in everyday life "we look at, doubt, or love a Thou. That is to say, 'I become conscious of Thou.' My seeing Thou is already determined by your seeing me, and the activity of my loving Thou is already determined by your loving me. Hence, my becoming conscious of Thou is inextricably interconnected with your becoming conscious of me"(E 69). Certainly, Husserl recognized that we experience another person, but not in as immediate a sense as we find in Watsuji, nor is there interpenetration of consciousnesses, for Husserl's self remains locked in its own subjectivity. He does recognize that in the appearance of the other person we do not only transfer the physical aspects; we recognize that not only does this other person have a body like mine, but "there also belongs . . . the interiority of psychic acts. In this connection it should be noted that the point of departure is here, too, a transferred co-presence: to the seen Body there belongs a psychic life, just as there does to my Body"(II 174).

Betweenness adds a further element of connection with the other, recognizing that not only do I liken my psychic life to that of the other, but that the psychic life of the other penetrates mine and vice versa: "When Thou gets angry, my consciousness may be entirely coloured by Thou's expressed anger, and when I feel sorrow, Thou's consciousness is influenced by I's sorrow. It can never be argued that consciousness of such a self is independent"(E 69). While adding this to our developing concept of an implaced self allows the concepts of empathy and intersubjectivity to resonate with even more power, I do not want to argue that we must give up all of the aspects of an individual, independent self.
4. Conclusion

The brief examples of the crisis in our current health care system indicate the dominance of temporality in our society. However, we can also see, through Watsuji’s philosophy, that reacting by simply turning entirely towards the spatial presents its own problems. A balance is what is needed. And we can see how well some of the Eastern ideas complement the Western ideas, and how they have begun to come together.

We saw how much richer and more powerful a concept like dwelling can be if we allow its scope to include a place for all aspects of human being-in-the-world. Adding Behnke’s notion of a “body of compassion” enriched it even further. Taking Husserl’s notion of intersubjectivity and Watsuji’s notion of betweenness into account made possible a compassionate recognition of our interconnectedness. Such an interconnectedness might also arise of the fact that we are all embodied in common.

It is through recognizing the speed and force with which technology and temporal thinking are overtaking our lives, and calling for equality of the spatial and temporal that we can regain our sense of place in the world.
Conclusion

I am not advocating a wholesale adoption of Eastern thought in the West -- this is neither possible nor desireable. I do, however, want to propose some sort of interweaving of aspects of Eastern and Western thought. For the purposes of this thesis, I have drawn specifically from modern Japanese thought, even more particularly from the thought of Watsuji. What I hope to have done throughout this thesis, is begin to lay the groundwork for a different concept of self -- a concept of an "implaced" self (to appropriate one of Casey's terms) which would take into account both Eastern and Western elements.

In the first chapter we saw that, despite his claim of the ultimate primordiality of temporality, many of the key concepts Heidegger uses to describe Da-sein's being-in-the-world are in fact spatial. However, I showed that Heidegger chose to ignore this fact and deliberately subordinated space to time. In Chapter Two I showed a shift in Heidegger's thought -- a turn towards the spatial -- most notably in his development of the idea of dwelling. However, Heidegger remained reluctant to push his ideas far enough and left his readers with a concept of self without a body and hence without a real place in the world.

Chapter Three brought us to Husserl, part of whose work I treated as a corrective to some of the gaps in Heidegger's thought. Working from the same basic framework of phenomenology, Husserl was able, especially in his later work, to make room for space, for the body, for the self as spatializing. Owing to the limits of his concept of intentionality, however, the relational space between
people remained grounded in the intentionality of either the self or the other.
Radical enough when compared to Heidegger's notion of "being-with," Husserl's concept of intersubjectivity has its own limitations when juxtaposed with the work of Watsuji.

In Chapter Four, I analysed Watsuji's critical appropriation of both Heideggerian and Husserlian ideas. I showed how Watsuji's recognition of the limitations of Heidegger's stress on the importance of temporality formed the basis for his critical study of climate. Watsuji's continued effort to demonstrate the importance of spatiality in a concept of "being-in-the-world" was demonstrated in an analysis of his *Ethics*. We also saw a further appropriation of phenomenological ideas in the development of the concept of human being as *ningen*. In the end, however, this concept of self tipped the scales too far in favour of the spatial. Rather than having an individuated dis-connected concept of self like Heidegger's, we had a radically social concept of self with little room for individuality.

Throughout the first four chapters I focussed on the philosophers' texts from a new angle -- foregrounding the spatiality of the self which has long been in the background. I confirmed that an unbalanced view of self has dangerous consequences. The addition of Watsuji's work further enriched the investigation by providing a comparative aspect to the usual Western philosophical analyses of the self. The juxtaposition of Western with Eastern thought proved to be mutually fruitful in the concept I developed in the final chapter.
In the final chapter my purpose was threefold. First of all I showed the importance of taking spatiality into account in any fuller concept of self. I illustrated several reasons why this is important in the world in which we live today. Secondly, I suggested the need for a new dialogue on the concept of self. Thirdly, by critically linking Western and Eastern elements of concepts of self which emerged from the thesis, I began building a framework for a new concept of self -- one which is not bound by temporal *or* spatial thinking, by Western *or* Eastern traditions of thought.

In Chapter Four, we saw some dangers of a purely spatial concept of self. In the discussion of Watsuji’s *Climate and Culture*, I mentioned that after the first two chapters, his analysis lapsed into something resembling geographical/cultural determinism. There is definitely some truth in his analysis. In the West, we have been able to manipulate nature -- it was subservient to us, so we can see how technology was able to develop in part because of the climate. However, as we saw, what has happened is that the very technologies that allowed us to manipulate nature have, in a sense, taken over, and now we are treading to the pace of technology. While there are astute analysis in his work, Watsuji is too deterministic. One gets the impression that character is *entirely* geographically, climactically determined, and that we must be resigned to whichever climate we are born into.

Furthermore, we saw how, in *Ethics*, the emphasis on spatiality above all left little room for the notion of an individual -- and the work has been criticized
for precisely that reason. This indicates the link that is often assumed to exist between spatiality and determinism. On the other hand, temporality is often more linked with freedom -- indeed some of the most exciting aspects of Heidegger's Da-sein analysis are the idea of a growing, developing being-in-the-world, free to face its future. There is merit too, in Parfit's view of the self, which is an overwhelmingly temporal picture, as we saw briefly in the Introduction, but provides us with a concept of self that has few limitations. But why must we choose between freedom or determinism, between a spatial or a temporal concept of self?

The West has been dominated by the temporal view of self. In this thesis I have brought out how this is to our disadvantage. And, in bringing the imbalance to light, I have shown that we need to examine the spatial aspect of self as well. I do not believe that it is necessary to be locked in either a spatial or temporal view of self. I believe there is a middle way and that this middle way will make it possible for us to be truly implaced in the world\(^1\) -- recognizing that we are in a particular space at a particular time and that this place resonates globally.

In his recent work, Edward Casey has developed the concept of place. Casey tells us that place has:

> power to direct and stabilize us, to memorialize and identify us, to tell us who and what we are in terms of where we are (as well as where we are not).

\(^1\) In fact, there are several middle ways. I in no way wish to indicate that my proposition here is the only way, but it is an option.
To be in the world, to be situated at all, is to be in place. Place is the phenomenal particularization of "being-in-the-world."\(^2\)

On my reading of Casey’s work, the concept of place is the balance, the particularization, of time plus space. Casey believes that recognizing place is essential, that the time we live in calls for us to "begin to appreciate once more the intrinsic ingredience of place in our time-bound and spaced-out lives."\(^3\) In my analysis, the concept of place includes not only dwelling places such as we saw in Heidegger, but also the lived space of the body which we saw in Husserl, and can, I believe, also include the subjective spatiality of betweenness which we saw in Watsuji. If we extend the concept of place in such a manner, we can apply it to a concept of self -- an implaced self.

A story that evokes the direction in which I am moving is the Hua-Yen Buddhist myth of the Jewel Net of Indra. The story of the Jewel Net of Indra is a view of the world described as an infinitely large net hung in the heavens, with a jewel or mirror in each "eye" of the net which reflects every other jewel in the net. As the net is infinite, the number of "eyes" is infinite, and the number of jewels or mirrors is infinite. As Francis Cook explains, "it symbolizes a cosmos in which there is an infinitely repeated interrelationship among all the members of the cosmos. This relationship is said to be one of simultaneous mutual identity and mutual intercausality."\(^4\) We can use this image in several ways. Let us take the

\(^2\) Casey, *Getting Back* xv.
\(^3\) Casey, *Getting Back* 8.
jewel in each "eye" of the net to represent the self. Immediately we can see how each self is reflective of and reflected by every other self in the world -- not only is the self interconnected with its immediate context -- a relationship or a family -- but also to the larger context -- stretching from local community to the entire planet.

Coming from the East, not surprisingly this is largely a spatial image. But what if we modify it slightly? The net does not have to be non-dynamic or static, which is the impression we get if we picture it as hung up somewhere in the heavens. Imagine instead that it is a sphere, that it encircles the globe, and spins with it. We could even extend this and imagine nets encircling each planet and an infinite net encompassing the entire universe so that the image would not be bound to earth only -- although for my purposes here that will do for now. Nor does it have to mean a pre-determined eternal return, if we think of each jewel as an independent, autonomous self, we quickly see not a pre-determined way of being-in-the-world, but a powerful self, capable of affecting the entire global community. One action in one eye of the net potentially affects every other jewel -- something like a ripple effect. Because the net is infinite, so too is the intercausal/interdependent result of the actions of each self, so the temporal aspect of self, the self being free to choose, or free to develop is not lost. While there is no teleology as such -- no specific beginning, middle and end, the very fact that the net is infinite, and that the number of jewels is infinite, means that the interrelationships and actions go on through time infinitely too. What is gained is
the recognition that while we do have free choice, and are independent individuals, this never occurs in a vacuum -- we always act in a context of some sort. Any action of the self affects the others around us.

Furthermore we can extend this, as not only are other selves the jewels, but so too the other creatures on the earth, even as far as to include plantlife -- in essence all living organisms. If we recall Husserl’s metaphor of earth as body, even this is not an entirely foreign notion.

Furthermore, looking at what I have been developing throughout this thesis, the above image brings together several elements of Western and Eastern thought -- self and other are interrelated -- as we saw in developing a fuller notion of being-with -- and our actions, choices and decisions resonate through the betweenness of people. The image is an illustration of how effective a notion of implanted self has the potential to be. It is necessary in this technologized, displaced world in which we live if we are not to lose our place in the world.

What I am developing is an implanted self -- a self which is powerful, embodied and ethical, recognizing that as implanted, it is interrelated to the other human beings in the world, as well as to its environment. Furthermore this is not a static notion of self -- owing to its interrelation with other selves it is both constituting for and constituted by their concepts of self and hence is dynamic, continually growing and developing while at the same time cognizant of its place in the world.
Implicit in this notion of an im-placed self, which is the result of the analysis of the problematic of the thesis, is that it is a global self. This global concept of self takes into account that we do live in a “global village” -- but this does not have to mean that everything becomes uniform, watered down, or “Westernized.” Rather, such a concept of self as that which I have begun to develop in the thesis leaves room for the recognition of different perspectives and provide us with different ways of looking at how and who we are in the world; different ways of answering the perennial philosophical questions “Who am I?” and “What makes me who I am?”

---

5 There are yet other perspectives I would like to examine in developing this concept of an im-placed self. For example, the problem of the body and spatioity has recently in the West been taken up by feminist philosophers — in particular Luce Irigaray. Also taking issue with the lack of spatioity in Heidegger’s thought, her work seems to have much in common with some of the notions found in Watsuji’s. For example, she sees the place of ethics in the betweeness of a couple. Not only have the philosophical perspectives of other cultures not had much of a voice in the West, but the perspectives of “the other” gender, the space of the feminine, will also need to be taken into account in developing a truly balanced concept of self. See Luce Irigaray, *Sexes et Parentés* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1987) 17-18.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Ogawa, Tadashi "The Kyoto School of Philosophy and Phenomenology",
Annalecta Husserliana VIII. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company,
1978. 207-222.

Ott, Hugo. Martin Heidegger: A Political Life. Trans. Allan Blunden. London:


Parkes, Graham. "Rising Sun over Black Forest." Heidegger's Hidden
Sources: East Asian Influences on his Work. By Reinhard May. Trans.

---. Translator’s preface. Heidegger’s Hidden Sources: East Asian Influences on
his Work. By Reinhard May. Trans. Graham Parkes London and New York:

Renaut, Alain. The era of the individual: a contribution to a history of

Richardson, William J. Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought. The

Ricoeur, Paul. Husserl: An Analysis of his Phenomenology. Evanston:

---. Oneself as Another. Trans. Kathleen Blamey. Chicago: University of Chicago

Sakai, Naoki. "Return to the East/Return to the West: Watsuji Tetsuro’s
Anthropology and Discussions of Authenticity." Boundary 2 18.3 (1991):
157-190.

Shapiro, Joel B. "Heidegger’s Virtue is Knowledge: Being-with and Solicitude in

Shigenori, Nagatomo. Review of “Watsuji Tetsuro, Watsuji Tetsuro’s Rinrigaku:


