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UMI®
W.V. QUINE & LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN:
TWO APPROACHES TO PHILOSOPHY
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores the works of W.V. Quine and Ludwig Wittgenstein. It provides a detailed and comprehensive discussion of their distinct conceptions of philosophy. It shows how Quine is involved in a scientific philosophy aimed at the discovery of truth and explanation. It also demonstrates how Wittgenstein’s critical approach attempts to dissolve philosophical problems and theories. The main purpose of this work is to explain how a proper understanding of each philosopher’s framework of study, is crucial to the understanding and criticism of their respective philosophical ideas. The only way to properly refute Quine’s theories is to evaluate them in a scientific framework. Any other interpretation could change his intention and weaken his arguments. Similarly, the only way to refute Wittgenstein’s claims is to interpret them in everyday language. However, this is not to say that either view can be refuted. It is simply to point out that any attempt to oppose Wittgenstein’s claims from a scientific viewpoint, or Quine’s from a non-scientific perspective, will be flawed since it is contrary to the way in which each view was conceived.
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Introduction

What is contemporary philosophy? Different thinkers will have different answers to this question depending on their backgrounds and influences. For example, W.V. Quine proposes a scientific conception of philosophy. His system amounts to a reformulation of traditional philosophical problems into scientific problems, in order to provide them with scientific solutions. His main concern is to answer the epistemological question of how our physical theories derive from the information provided by our senses. Throughout his work, Quine couples this epistemological problem with the ontological problem regarding what exists in the world. The latter concern illustrates his scientific tendency to provide explanations of physical phenomena.

Quine’s philosophical system centres on the key concepts of naturalism, physicalism and empiricism. Each of these doctrines is tailored to finding a scientific solution to his epistemological and ontological concerns. In fact, every philosophical move made by Quine occurs within a scientific framework. Thus, his theories and arguments are formulated in the language of science. In order to properly understand Quine’s work, this point must be kept first and foremost in mind.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, another important contemporary philosopher, has a different view of the discipline. He advocates a form of critical philosophy. Wittgenstein’s project is two-fold. It involves presenting, evaluating and rejecting possible solutions to philosophical problems, in order to show that the problem itself is
flawed. His approach also involves uncovering the linguistic confusions that exist in the formulation of traditional problems, in order to dissolve these problems. These two exercises are inter-related and purely descriptive. They involve neither explanation nor constructive theorizing.

In Wittgenstein’s view, scientific explanations are philosophically uninteresting. Thus, he strongly rejects the assimilation of philosophy to science. Wittgenstein denies the utility of views such as Quine’s on a general level. In other words, his rejection does not pinpoint specific arguments proposed by a scientific view of philosophy, but focuses on the practice itself. It is in this sense that Quine’s and Wittgenstein’s views are diametrically opposed.

There are numerous references to Quine and Wittgenstein in philosophical literature. In most cases, commentators recognize the great impact these two thinkers have had on the discipline. For example, in the introduction to the collection entitled *Wittgenstein and Quine*, Robert Arrington and Hans-Johann Glock claim: “Quine and Wittgenstein rank as two of the leading philosophers of the twentieth-century. Indeed, in the arena of analytic philosophy, they are arguably the two most important philosophers of the century.” The importance which Arrington and Glock bestow on these two thinkers is not unfounded. Quine and Wittgenstein have each developed a radical and attractive view of the discipline. For this reason, they are highly regarded and often discussed. Furthermore, their philosophical approaches are largely dissected and imitated.
Aside from references to their influence on twentieth-century analytic thought, one of the most common aspects discussed about Quine and Wittgenstein is their similarity. Commentators often attempt to show that the two thinkers agree despite their diametrically opposed approaches. For example, in his essay entitled “Quine, Wittgenstein and Holism,” Roger Gibson investigates each philosopher’s conception of holism. In the end, he concludes:

In the final analysis, I believe it is fair to claim modestly that Quine’s and Wittgenstein’s holistic tendencies are not as dissimilar as ... their different philosophical methods might at first appear — which proves once again that great (original) minds (sometimes) think alike!°

The discovery of a similarity in Quine’s and Wittgenstein’s works is quite an accomplishment, given their diametrically opposed ideas on the nature of the discipline. However, the authenticity of such a discovery greatly depends on the author’s ability to fully comprehend both views.

Many commentators also emphasize the great dissimilarities between Quine and Wittgenstein. Perhaps the most significant and obvious difference is their thoughts on the relation between science and philosophy. Quine takes philosophy to be a branch of science. It is an integral part of his work. For Wittgenstein, science and philosophy are two completely distinct disciplines. He claims that philosophy is concerned with the clarification of language while science deals with the explanation of phenomena. Wittgenstein further claims that any thinker who believes that philosophy ought to be scientific is confused. Douglas G. Winblad nicely summarizes Quine’s and Wittgenstein’s positions when he says: “Philosophers exhibit a variety of attitudes
towards scientific inquiry. Quine and Wittgenstein appear to lie at opposite ends of the spectrum in this regard.\(^3\)

Some commentators who pinpoint the differences between Quine and Wittgenstein focus on the very issues on which they seem to have similar views. For example, in his essay “The Passage into Language: Quine Versus Wittgenstein” John Canfield argues: “I believe the similarity between the two writers is superficial; they are worlds apart. Far from reinforcing Quinean points, Wittgenstein’s later thought helps us see the central flaw in Quine’s philosophy: its distorted picture of the nature of language.”\(^4\) Canfield not only questions the common view that the two are similar, he also isolates a place where Wittgenstein’s work exposes, what he takes to be, an error in Quine’s thought. As we shall see, this type of exercise is problematic since it neglects the conceptual scheme upon which Quine’s theory depends.

The tendency to reject one philosopher’s theory from the viewpoint of a different philosopher is quite common within the discipline, despite its obvious downfalls. In the case of Quine and Wittgenstein it proves to be even more problematic than usual. If we attempt to understand Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy from a scientific point of view, it seems narrow and limited. Wittgenstein promotes the investigation of language as a way of ridding the discipline of pseudo-problems. A scientific philosophy such as Quine’s, on the other hand, is involved in constructing theories about the world. The elimination of traditional philosophical problems through their translation into the
language of science is secondary. In other words, what Wittgenstein presents as the role of philosophy is simply one small part of Quine’s philosophical project.

Conversely, if we attempt to understand Quine’s view from a Wittgensteinian standpoint it appears inconsequential. Wittgenstein claims that science is uninteresting from a philosophical point of view. These are completely distinct disciplines. Thus, any combination of the two confuses the goal of science with that of philosophy. In his view then, Quine’s whole philosophical system is based on a confusion. This point becomes even stronger when we take into account Quine’s assimilation of philosophy to science. Quine has not only confused the goal of philosophy with that of science, he has knowingly transformed one into the other. Wittgenstein could then argue that Quine should concentrate on science and leave philosophy aside. However, Quine’s preoccupation with epistemological concerns, whether they are worded in a scientific language or not, establishes his link to the discipline of philosophy.

Since Quine and Wittgenstein differ on such a fundamental level, any attempt to understand Quine’s individual claims from Wittgenstein’s point of view, and vice versa, will be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. For commentators to fully understand Quine’s conception of philosophy, they must allow that philosophy can be treated as a science. Furthermore, for these commentators to understand Wittgenstein’s view, they must recognize that philosophy is not involved in explanation, it is purely descriptive. Those involved in the Quine—Wittgenstein debate must realize that in order to refute the
opposing view, they must first consider it in the framework in which it was conceived. This is the only way in which an argument against either Quine or Wittgenstein can be convincing. However, this is not to say that either one of the two approaches can actually be refuted from within. This is simply to suggest that any attempt to oppose Quine’s or Wittgenstein’s views must begin with a clear investigation of the view as it was intended.

In this dissertation, I begin by discussing Quine’s conception of philosophy. This involves clarifying his understanding of naturalism, empiricism, naturalized epistemology, holism and language. My goal is to show how each element in his system is geared towards solving his central epistemological problem. This problem can be summarized as follows: ‘How do we construct true theories based on the meager input we receive from our senses?’ By working through Quine’s treatment of this epistemological concern, I hope to provide a concrete example of Quine’s philosophical approach. I also hope to demonstrate the strength and credibility of Quine’s system and to correct the numerous misinterpretations of his view that exist in the literature.

Next, I investigate Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy. I consider his thoughts on language, the origin and dissolution of philosophical problems and the human condition. I show how Wittgenstein’s philosophical investigations can be applied to a specific problem in order to better explain his conception of the discipline. Furthermore, I discuss Wittgenstein’s views on metaphysics and scientific philosophy and show how his philosophical project differs from these practices. Just as in my presentation of Quine, I
hope to demonstrate the strength and credibility of Wittgenstein’s ideas. In doing this, I hope to show how Quine’s and Wittgenstein’s systems each deserve consideration and how neither can be easily rejected.

In the final part of the dissertation, I attempt to provide an interpretation of the debate between Quine and Wittgenstein which does not take one theory to prevail over the other. I do not compare what each philosopher says about different issues in order to discover which is correct. Nor do I attempt to discover whether Quine’s and Wittgenstein’s views are similar or dissimilar. These kinds of investigations have often been pursued. My intention is show how commentators influenced by Quine do not generally understand Wittgenstein’s descriptive view of the discipline. Likewise, those influenced by Wittgenstein do not fully understand Quine’s scientific system.

I attempt to explain how to overcome the problem of misinterpretation in philosophy by recognizing the framework in which both philosophers have built their views. One can only understand Wittgenstein’s philosophical project, if one recognizes that he transforms the metaphysical wording of traditional philosophical problems back into everyday language. In doing so, Wittgenstein claims to dissolve the original problems. A proper understanding of Quine’s project, on the other hand, requires recognizing that he transforms the metaphysical wording of traditional philosophical problems into a scientific interpretation. In Quine’s view, this clarifies the expression of the problem and allows for a greater degree of resolution. In my discussion, I shall show
how these facts, and others like them, are essential to understanding Wittgenstein’s and Quine’s different philosophical endeavors.

Chapter 1 - Quine’s Scientific Philosophy

It is rare that W.V. Quine will directly address the nature of philosophy in his work. However, some notable references can be found in the vast quantity of his philosophical essays. For example, in “Has Philosophy Lost Contact with People?” he notes that philosophical issues have been continuously debated and rejected, thus, the nature of the discipline is rather vague and unstable. He claims: “Philosophy has long suffered, as hard sciences have not, from a wavering consensus on questions of professional competence.”5 This belief is neither novel nor particular to Quine. In fact, many philosophers of the past have attempted to increase the force and credibility of the discipline by adjusting its method to model that of the hard sciences. Immanuel Kant, for example, felt that the discipline of philosophy could greatly benefit from embarking on “the secure path of a science.”6 He too recognized that philosophy could yield stable and credible truths by modeling the methodology of science.

Quine holds that the method of science is firmly established and reliable. In Word and Object, he notes that the scientific method produces a “theory whose connection with all possible surface irritation consists solely in scientific method itself, unsupported by ulterior controls. This is the sense in which it is the last arbiter of truth.”7 In other words, no theory obtained using the scientific method has to go outside science for justification.
The theory is conceived within science, thus, all its operations occur within this framework. As Quine explains in *From Stimulus to Science*, he seeks "no firmer basis for science than science itself." This reflects his confidence in the self-sufficiency of science. He is satisfied with the fact that science presents, defends and justifies its own findings. Although he admits that it is fallible and open to revision, he argues in favour of its use until a better or simpler system is introduced.

For Quine, science is continuous with common sense. It is not conceived as an alternative which provides extraordinary explanations about the things we experience in our daily lives. As he observes:

> science is not a substitute for common sense, but an extension of it. The quest for knowledge is properly an effort simply to broaden and deepen the knowledge which the man on the street already enjoys, in moderation, in relation to the commonplace things around him.⁹

Implicit in this remark is the idea that there is no mystery to science. It does not conjure up metaphysical entities for observation or study, rather it discovers information about the physical things which surround us. This empirical grounding of science is greatly beneficial to Quine’s philosophical system. By assimilating philosophy to science, Quine removes the element of mystery which is prevalent in a large percentage of traditional theories. Consider the ancient philosophical debate on the eternal nature of the soul for example.
Aside from the physical bodies that surround us, Quine’s theory postulates the existence of abstract, mathematical entities such as numbers and classes. Quine argues that science acknowledges the positing of anything that will aid in its advancement. As he explains in *From Stimulus to Science*, it is the science of physics itself which brings out the necessity of abstract entities:

Science would be hopelessly crippled without abstract objects. We quantify over them. In harder sciences, numbers and other abstract objects bid fair to steal the show. Mathematics subsists on them, and serious hard science without serious mathematics is hard to imagine.¹⁰

In Quine’s scientific view, he requires physical objects to account for mass terms such as ‘water’ and ‘sugar’. He also needs to specify which part of these mass terms he is referring to with space-time regions such as ‘all the water in the world on September 2, 2000’ or ‘all the sugar in the kitchen at 123 Long Rd. on September 14, 2000’. From here, Quine can assemble similar bodies into sets such as that of all things which ‘exist in the world on September 2, 2000’ or the set of all things found ‘in the kitchen at 123 Long Rd. on September 14, 2000’. Physical objects, space-time regions and sets are all abstract entities which contribute to the precision and clarity of science. They allow for precise hypotheses to be formed based on physical evidence. Thus, science creates the need for abstract entities in its own ontology.

Let us turn back to our discussion of the relation of science and common sense. In some ways, science surpasses and even revises common sense. For example, the scientist’s investigation of the things which he or she uncovers is infinitely more careful
than the commonsense person’s. Quine explains: “The scientist introduces system into his quest and scrutiny of evidence.” He or she investigates the information received by our sensory surfaces in a methodological way. He or she also faithfully adheres to a strict method when formulating a theory based on sensory evidence.

The notion of simplicity plays a significant role in the theory-building process. Most scientists recognize that a simple theory has a better chance of being accepted than a more complex one. In “On Simple Theories of a Complex World”, Quine explains why we favour the virtues of simplicity and uniformity. He claims that “the cause of the belief [in the maxims of simplicity and uniformity] is to be found in our perceptual mechanism: there is a subjective selectivity that makes us tend to see the simple and miss the complex.” Therefore, if two scientific theories accurately explain a certain phenomenon, the scientist will ultimately opt for the simpler theory. These are preferable since they omit unnecessarily complex information. They also avoid presenting claims which oppose pre-established natural laws. A simple theory faithfully conforms to observable evidence in the least complicated way.

Quine’s scientific tendency plays an important part in ensuring the strength and credibility of his philosophical system. The adoption of a scientific method contributes to its agreeability with common sense and to its simplicity. These qualities promote a better understanding of his claims which contributes to the strength of his system as a whole.
Quine's scientific view allows for the possibility of its own revision in the light of future scientific discoveries. This point is intrinsically related to the strength of his view. All of Quine's theories are conceived within the conceptual scheme of science. In other words, his claims and theories are framed within the language of science. Now, when a philosopher decides to oppose his view he or she has two options. The first is to consider it from an alternate framework, while the second is to opt for a scientific point of view. If the philosopher opts for the former choice, they run the risk of misinterpreting Quine's scientific claims and constructing arguments against a view that is not his. Their argument is therefore weak and easily opposable by Quine or anyone familiar with his work.

Let us then consider a case in which a philosopher attempts to oppose Quine's view from a scientific perspective. Conceivably, this thinker would present scientific arguments which contradict Quine's claims. However, even if these new findings turn out to be true, this could not be considered as a refutation of Quine's view. It is simply its replacement. This is due to the fact that Quine recognizes the revisability of science and would accept any argument which presents a simpler or more efficient alternative to his own theories. This allowance for the replacement of his theories by other scientific theories, indicates that Quine's system is more accommodating to progress than most philosophical views. This quality certainly enhances the strength and credibility of his system.
One of the main advantages of Quine’s view is that it handles traditional philosophical problems in the conceptual scheme of science. The problems become clearer, more specific and are resolved in a methodologically sound way. Furthermore, their translation into the language of science eliminates any subsidiary worries which occur as a result of their expression in metaphysical terms. Consider Quine’s treatment of the traditional problem of dualism for example. This view, that the body and the soul are two independent entities with different natures, underlies many different theories about personal identity. Some problems which occur as a result of these theories are: the interaction between the mind and the body, the mysterious nature of the mind, and the possibility of disembodied minds. In Quine’s view, these problems are inconsequential since he explicitly rejects the initial notion of dualism. In *From Stimulus to Science*, he says:

> Monism is now the order of the day. Dualism can be trivially dissolved, if we do not try to allow for disembodied spirits. Every state of mind corresponds to a distinct state of the body, trivially if not otherwise; it corresponds at least, as the dualist must grant, to the bodily state of having a mind in that mental state. Acting on this triviality we can simply transfer the mentalistic predicates to the body, bypassing the purported mental substance.\(^{13}\)

Quine’s dissolution of the problem of dualism relies on an extensional definition of mental states. In an extensional language, we can apply mental states equally to the mind and to the body. For example, as Quine suggests: “we can say of John’s body not only that it broke a leg, but that it hurt, and that it sees how to prove Fermat’s Last Theorem.”\(^{14}\) This is due to the fact that the terms ‘mind’ and ‘body’ consist of the same extension. The extension of term ‘mind’ covers a vague area located somewhere within the body. Thus, we can substitute ‘body’ for ‘mind’ in a sentence, without changing its
truth value. Consider, for example, a case in which the sentence “My mind feels fatigue” is true. It is conceivable that the truth value would not change if we replace the term ‘mind’ with ‘body’ to form the sentence “My body feels fatigue”. This extensional agreement between the two terms explains how Quine’s theory can account for mental states without depending on a vague and inexplicable notion of a mind. He simply assigns the mental states to the body.

The previous example shows how we can eliminate the dualist view by appealing to an extensional language. For Quine, the language of science is extensional. In other words, the truth value of a complex expression in the language depends on the truth value of its simple parts. The truth values of these parts, in turn, depend on the extensions of their individual terms. For example, the sentence ‘The evening star is Venus and the morning star is Venus’ is only true if ‘The evening star is Venus’ is true and ‘The morning star is Venus’ is true. Consequently, both ‘The evening star is Venus’ and ‘The Morning star is Venus’ are true if ‘the evening star’ and ‘the morning star’ refer to Venus. Furthermore, we can replace ‘evening star’ with ‘morning star’ in a sentence without altering its truth value. For example, the sentence ‘The evening star is Venus’ would remain true if it were reformulated as ‘The morning star is Venus’.

In an extensional language, we can exchange single, general, and combinations of terms within a sentence without changing its truth value so long as the two elements have the same extension. For example, we could exchange ‘Wittgenstein’ for ‘Quine’ or
‘Russell’ in the sentence ‘Wittgenstein is a philosopher’ without affecting its truth. Or, we could replace ‘is a philosopher’ with ‘is mortal’ in the sentence again without falsifying it.

An extensional language differs from an intensional language by focusing on the extension of terms (what they refer to) rather than on their sense or meaning. In our previous example, ‘the evening star’ and ‘the morning star’ can be interchanged in an extensional language, since both refer to Venus. However this is not the case in an intensional language since the meaning of the words differ. Consider a case in which someone believes that the morning star and the evening star are two different things and only the morning star is Venus. We could not then replace ‘morning star’ with ‘evening star’ in the sentence ‘Tracy believes the morning star is Venus’ without falsifying it. This is the difference between an intensional language and an extensional one.

Scientific philosophy offers a greater degree of resolution to philosophical problems since it renders them more precise. Many contemporary philosophers will agree that the traditional problems of philosophy are vague and unclear. Some, like Wittgenstein, handle this concern by focusing on the linguistic aspect of the problem. As we shall see, he tries to show how a philosophical problem falls apart when its terms are translated from a metaphysical language back into everyday language. In a way, Quine is no different. However, his goal is to transform philosophical problems into scientific ones in order to solve them scientifically. The fact that this translation eliminates existent
linguistic confusions is simply secondary. As we saw in the dualism example, Quine proposes the notion of monism as an alternative to the problematic traditional view. He considers the vague and inexplicable nature of the mind, along with the problematic results of a dualistic theory, and opts instead for a scientific explanation which focuses on the body. Thus, he reinterprets the original philosophical problem (What is the nature of the mind and how does it interact with the physical body?) into a scientific problem (How can we account for mental states without the unclear notion of a mind?) and provides it with a scientific solution (We apply mental states to bodies due to the extensional agreement between ‘mind’ and ‘body’). The fact that the subsidiary problems regarding the existence of other minds or of disembodied minds, are no longer relevant is secondary. Quine’s method focuses on eliminating the initial philosophical concern.

It is evident in Quine’s treatment of dualism, as in all his philosophical investigations, that he believes explanation to be a major task of philosophy. If we go back in the history of the discipline, this project is quite common. However, there are some contemporary philosophers who believe that their field of study is not an attempt to provide explanations. Wittgenstein, for example, emphasizes that philosophy can only describe things. It cannot provide any new information about the world. He claims that the attempt to provide explanations in philosophy is a result of confusing its goal with that of science. If we consider Quine assimilation of philosophy to science, however, we begin to see how the idea that philosophy can provide explanations is not so misguided. For Quine, there is no separating philosophy and science. One is the same as the other.
Therefore, the scientific pursuit of attempting to explain the physical things that surround us is the same for philosophy.

In an attempt to better explain this point, let us turn to a line of reasoning which could possibly elucidate Quine's belief in the explanatory power of philosophy. In a scientific investigation of phenomena, scientists use what is called the hypothetico-deductive method. They begin by presenting a hypothesis and predicting a specific set of consequences which will ensue from the experimentation of this hypothesis. They then test the hypothesis and decide whether or not to accept it as a convincing explanation of phenomena based on its consequences.

As we can see from Quine's understanding of the hypothetico-deductive method, the hypothesis plays a central role in a scientific investigation. Furthermore, a general hypothesis is equivalent to an explanation:

Hypothesis, where successful, is a two-way street, extending back to explain the past and forward to predict the future. What we try to do in framing hypotheses is to explain some otherwise unexplained happenings by inventing a plausible story, a plausible description or history of relevant portions of the world.15

Since the hypothesis and the explanation are necessary components of the scientific method, they must also be necessary to the practice of philosophy for Quine. As he explains, philosophy is "not to be distinguished in essential points and method from good and bad science."16 Explanation is the ultimate goal of science regardless of whether the
discipline is correctly or incorrectly practiced. Therefore, given Quine's association of philosophy to science, explanation also acts as the ultimate goal of philosophy.

1. Naturalism

Quine practices scientific philosophy because he believes that the philosopher must work within a framework and the only framework available to reasonable people is the scientific framework. For Quine, philosophy's setting is "the physical world, seen in terms of the global science to which, with minor variations, we all subscribe." This idea captures the essence of the doctrine of naturalism. Naturalism is the denial of a first philosophy. It rejects the view of the discipline as a fundamental field of knowledge or as a foundation for all other disciplines. Instead, it promotes the idea that philosophy is a discipline like any other. Furthermore, it claims that we must practice philosophy from within the framework of everyday life.

In *Word and Object*, Quine shows how the search for a first philosophy can lead to an infinite regress. I shall attempt to explain his point with an example. Philosophy is said to work within framework 'A'. From within this framework, it studies scheme 'B'. However, framework 'A' must first have been subjected to the same philosophical scrutiny as 'B'. Thus, in order to investigate framework 'A' philosophy must work from within a more fundamental framework. Consequently, this framework will require the same philosophical scrutiny. It is evident that this line of reasoning could continue indefinitely. The doctrine of naturalism avoids this problem by rejecting the original
notion of a first philosophy. In Quine's view, philosophy studies the physical world from within the framework of science.

Naturalism is important to Quine's system since it frees him from attempting to establish a philosophical basis for science. It "sees natural science as an inquiry into reality, fallible and corrigible, but not answerable to any supra-scientific tribunal, and not in need of any justification beyond observation and the hypothetico-deductive method."\(^19\) Natural science is justified by the adherence to a strict method which involves inference and hypothesis. Quine's conception of philosophy, in turn, is justified by its relation to science. It too adheres to a strict method which minimizes the risk of error. It can therefore attempt to establish testable theories which accurately conform to observable evidence. In this sense, Quine's assimilation of philosophy to science enhances the strength and credibility of his view.

2. Naturalized Epistemology

Naturalism is central to Quine's system. This is evident in the ways in which he interprets philosophical issues and positions. Consider for example, the study of epistemology. In "Epistemology Naturalized," Quine explains how many philosophers have come to repudiate epistemology due to the irreducibility of all sentences to "observational and logico-mathematical terms."\(^20\) He claims that Carnap and the members of the Vienna Circle have associated the term "epistemology" with the same meaninglessness as the term "metaphysics". Meanwhile Wittgenstein has presented his
‘therapeutic’ philosophy as a way of curing philosophers from attempting to solve epistemological problems which do not exist. For his part, Quine claims: “I think at this point it may be more useful to say rather that epistemology still goes on, though in a new setting and a clarified status.”^21 This new setting is naturalism.

In broad terms, the study of epistemology amounts to the construction of a theory of knowledge. There are two ways in which one can proceed when doing epistemology. On the one hand, a philosopher may choose to ensure the strength of his or her theory by establishing a firm foundation for knowledge. On the other hand, a thinker may choose to reinforce his or her theory on the basis of the strength of its connected parts. In this case, there is no foundation. Quine opts for the latter view and refers to the former as “the Cartesian dream of a foundation for scientific certainty firmer than the scientific method itself.”^22 As we have seen, he believes that science is self-sufficient. He does however admit to being a believer in the central tenet of the traditional view of epistemology. He insists that there is a relation between science (knowledge) and sensory data (experience). This belief derives from the doctrine of empiricism.

As we have seen, epistemology is the study of knowledge. It focuses on method and evidence. Since Quine supports the doctrine of empiricism, which claims that all evidence is sensory evidence, his version of epistemology naturally involves empiricism. If we consider the importance of naturalism to his system, we are faced with a hybrid, namely, naturalized epistemology. As Quine argues: “Naturalism does not repudiate
epistemology, but assimilates it to empirical psychology.” For many philosophers, this relation to science separates epistemology from philosophy. However, Quine views the assimilation of epistemology to empirical psychology as a positive move since it means that all the resources of empirical psychology become available to the epistemologist. Epistemology thus becomes a systematic method of investigation, a scientific study of the workings of the human mind.

Understanding the relation between epistemology and natural science is crucial to understanding Quine’s philosophical system. As he notes in “Epistemology Naturalized”, this relation is mutual:

Our very epistemological enterprise ... and the psychology wherein it is a component chapter, and the whole of natural science wherein psychology is a component book — all this is our own construction or projection from stimulations like those we are meting out to our epistemological subject. There is thus a reciprocal containment, though containment in different senses: epistemology in natural science and natural science in epistemology.

Thus, epistemology is a part of natural science through its relation to psychology. However, natural science is also a part of epistemology. As we have seen, Quine’s epistemology is founded on empiricism, which claims that all evidence is sensory evidence. Therefore, natural science owes its evidence to empiricism. Since empiricism is a part of epistemology, natural science must then also be contained in epistemology. Let us consider this point in a different way. It is fair to say that the doctrines of epistemology, psychology and natural science are all constructed from the stimulations of our sensory surfaces. As we shall see, Quine believes that we build theories based on the
information provided by our senses. This is the focus of epistemology. Therefore, since natural science is built up in the same way, it can be argued that it is itself contained in epistemology.

Some argue that Quine’s argument for the mutual containment of natural science and epistemology is circular. However, we must remember that Quine’s epistemology is a ‘naturalized’ epistemology. He rejects the portrayal of epistemology as a first philosophy or as a foundation for science. Thus “we are free to use the very fruits of science in investigating its roots.” 25 There is no vicious circle, every move is made from within.

3. Physicalism

Just as Quine’s conception of epistemology benefits from the resources of empirical psychology, his system as a whole benefits from the advances of physics. The doctrine of physicalism plays a significant role in Quine’s philosophical system. It arose out of the belief in the primacy of bodies. Quine summarizes its main principle as follows: “there is no difference in the world without a difference in the positions or states of bodies.” 26 Every change which occurs in a body will consequently affect the world. Consider a watch. It is safe to say that the cogs, dials and springs which make up the watch are its fundamental parts. Consequently, if the watch begins to incorrectly report time, we could trace the problem back to a failure of one of its parts. This is the way in which the physicalist understands the influential force of bodies over the world. In our
example, the cogs, dials and springs are physical bodies, while the watch itself represents the world.

Some could argue that physicalism is simply a dogmatic promotion of the science of physics. However, the physicalist principle “is a way of saying that the fundamental objects are the physical objects. It accords physics its rightful place as the basic natural science without venturing any dubious hopes of reduction of other disciplines.” Physicalism is not an attempt to reduce all disciplines to physics; it is simply the view that physics is the most fundamental science.

Quine’s physicalist strategy allows him to promote an ontology consisting solely of physical objects and mathematical entities such as numbers and sets. This eliminates the mentalist tendency to advance claims which can neither be proven true or false, and to justify these claims by appealing to the argument that the workings of other minds are unknown to us. If our ontology consists mainly of physical objects, we are bound to advance and defend our claims on the basis of sensory evidence. In short, our theory begins and ends with science. We do not go beyond its limits to create or to defend arguments. The doctrine of physicalism determines the ontology for Quine’s system as a whole. As Quine claims in “Facts of the Matter”: “If inquiry is to begin with what is clear, then let us begin as physicalists.”
4. Language Learning and the Epistemological Problem

Quine's physicalism influences his conception of language since our introduction to objects is the first step towards mastering the use of sentences. The steps by which we learn a language are the same as those by which we proceed from the meager input of the senses to our sophisticated theories about the world. Thus, by examining Quine's theory of language learning, we get a glimpse of him at work on solving his central epistemological problem.

Quine's treatment of the problem of moving from sensory data to our theories of the world is similar to his view of language learning in that both begin from the stimulation of our sensory surfaces:

I am a physical object sitting in a physical world. Some of the forces of this physical world impinge on my surface. Light rays strike my retinas; molecules bombard my eardrums and finger tips. I strike back, emanating concentric air waves. These waves take the form of a torrent of discourse about tables, people, molecules, light rays, retinas, air waves, (...)²⁹

This passage indicates how Quine thinks we acquire knowledge of the external world. Our neural receptors are stimulated by physical forces. We are thereby caused to respond in certain ways due to the pattern and order of the receptors which are triggered. For example, one's experience of an apple consists of the triggering of a specific set of receptors in a specific order for that person. The experience of a desk is the triggering of a different set of receptors in a different way. Meanwhile, in the experience of the fact that
it is snowing yet another set of receptors is triggered in another way. The same is true of all our experiences of physical objects. The recognition that objects trigger our sensory surfaces is the first step towards Quine’s solution to the epistemological problem of moving from stimulus to science. It is also the first stage of language learning.

When faced with the stimulation of our sensory surfaces, the first sentences we form what Quine calls ‘observation sentences’. An observation sentence describes an event or fact which is easily observed by anyone. It is either true or false depending on the observable circumstances in which it is uttered. Furthermore, these circumstances will either prompt universal agreement or disagreement on the truth of the sentence by those who are privy to the circumstances. For example, the sentence ‘It is sunny’ will be held true by anyone who has mastered the English language and is in the presence of the shining sun. The sentence would be universally denied by speakers of the English language if it were raining at the time it was uttered.

An observation sentence need not consists of several words such as ‘It is raining’ or ‘She is six feet tall’. In Quine’s view, individual terms such as ‘Red’, ‘Mama’ and ‘Cat’ also count as sentences. These observation sentences are the first to be learnt and they are mostly taught by ostension. For example, a mother points to a cat when teaching her child the use of ‘Cat’. The child is then rewarded for uttering the sentence ‘Cat!’ whenever a similar animal is present. The child’s vocabulary increases as he or she learns the use of other such sentences.

* In his discussion of observation sentences, Quine explains how a child cannot initially distinguish

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After learning observation sentences, Quine argues that the child is taught to form ‘observation categoricals’. These sentences express an expectation that a specific event will occur in the wake of another specific event. For example, consider the sentences ‘If it rains, it pours’ or ‘Where there is smoke, there is fire’. In each of these, the occurrence of the consequent depends on that of the antecedent. As Quine explains, observation categoricals “are our first faltering scientific laws.”

We can test them by waiting for the event described in the first observation sentence to occur or by inducing the event ourselves. For example, we could wait to see if it pours when it rains. Or, we could test the sentence ‘Where there is smoke, there is fire’ by creating smoke. In any case, our theory can be tested by evidence. Quine claims that in a primitive way “we have a sketch of a causal chain from the impacts of rays and particles on our receptors to a rudimentary theory of the external world.”

Our use of observation categoricals is thus the second step in language learning and the first glimmer of Quine’s response to the epistemological problem. As we have seen, Quine shows how we learn words by reacting to objects impinging on our sensory surfaces. From here, we learn to associate individual sentences such as ‘Rain’ with complex sentences such as ‘When it rains, it pours’. In which case we come to recognize a primitive link between physical objects and our use of language. This is the first element of the epistemological problem. The second is how we move from our knowledge of language to the formation of a physical theory.

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between terms which denote objects such as ‘cat’ and sentences such as ‘This is a cat.’ This is due to the child’s innocence “of any thought of reification and reference.” [From Stimulus to Science, p.23]
It is important to keep in mind that observation categoricals are *rudimentary* theories. In order to build a more sophisticated theory, we would also have to construct theoretical sentences which imply the categorical. The observation categorical then is simply a small part of a theory. When taken in isolation, it is either proven or disproved by empirical evidence. There is no theory behind it which can be adjusted to either conserve or reject it.

It is at this point that Quine distinguishes between ‘free observation categoricals’ and ‘focal observation categoricals’. The sentence “Whenever there is a raven, there is a black raven” is an example of the former. He claims that this particular sentence is not sufficient for a sophisticated scientific theory since it can also apply to albino ravens if they were always found alongside a black raven. Quine therefore presents the focal observation categorical “Whenever there is a raven, it is a black raven” to apply to all black ravens. The difference between the two sentences revolves around the use of the pronoun ‘it’. Quine explains how ‘it’ is an *essential pronoun* in the focal observation categorical “Whenever there is a raven, it is black”. He notes that if we were to replace ‘it’ with the expression ‘a raven’ we would revert back to the previous free observation categorical. Therefore, the sense of the statement is altered by the change. In the statement ‘I hit my toe and it is broken’ on the other hand, the pronoun ‘it’ is not essential since we could easily say ‘I hit my toe and my toe is broken’ without changing the sense of the sentence.
The introduction of the focal observation categorical is Quine’s solution to the insufficiency of the free observation categorical as a base for sophisticated scientific theories. The focal observation categorical allows for reification or for the link between language and physical bodies. Thus, it ties our scientific theories to physical objects. Quine shows how we can move from the focal observation categorical “Whenever there is a raven, it is a black raven” to “Whenever there is a raven, it is black” to the traditional categorical “All ravens are black”. These categoricals make up a scientific theory and contribute to our recognition of bodies. For example, the categorical “All ravens are black” allows us to make a connection between ravenhood and black. We come to realize that these two characteristics exist within a single body, namely a raven. Thus, we learn to relate physical objects to our use of language.

Sentences such as ‘All ravens are black’ also contribute to an extensional language. As we have seen, Quine claims that the language of science is extensional. Thus, it is not surprising that his scientific theories are formulated in this language. The sentence ‘All ravens are black’ introduces quantifiers and variables into our theories. Thus, it can be reduced into the formula ‘All s is p’ in which s and p act as variables. These sentences then become models upon which our scientific arguments are based. For example, we could include the argument ‘All whales are beings which feed off their mother’s milk’, ‘All beings which feed off their mother’s milk are mammals’, therefore ‘All whales are mammals’ into our theory of whales. Quine’s presentation of the focal observation categorical allows for such an argument.
In this discussion, we have seen how Quine uses language learning to explain how our formulation of theories about the external world are connected to the reception of information by our sensory surfaces. It is in this context alone, that language is important for Quine's philosophy. He is not, as commonly believed, a philosopher of language. In other words, he does not investigate how we learn language in order to form a theory of language suited to all its applications. His sole concern is with answering the epistemological question regarding how we proceed from the stimulations of our neural receptors to the formulation of a systematic theory of the world.

Quine places a considerable degree of importance on answering this epistemological question, since he believes that our scientific theories derive from the input we receive from our senses. Philosophy is simply another branch of theory, constructed in the same way. There is no difference in kind between a philosophical theory and a scientific one. The only difference is one of subject matter. A scientific investigation tells us what exists in the world. Whereas, a philosophical study will explain how we acquire our knowledge about the world. Thus, if Quine can explain how we arrive at our scientific theories about the world, he can also explain how we arrive at our philosophical theories as well.
5. Summing Up Quine

Quine’s philosophical system is simultaneously complex and simple. It is complex in that it involves many different elements such as naturalism, empiricism, epistemology, holism, language learning, and physicalism. Yet, it is simple in that each aspect directly addresses Quine’s epistemological concern. Perhaps the most important aspect of Quine’s theory is the mutual containment of natural science and epistemology. Understanding this relationship is crucial to understanding Quine’s view. As we have seen, Quine investigates science from within the conceptual scheme of science. Therefore he begins from the information we receive from our sensory surfaces since these are the simplest and clearest elements. He claims that we cannot separate ourselves from the physical world in order to investigate physical things. However, the evidence provided by science is the very evidence we use to investigate our scientific theories. Thus, science does not have to rely on a more fundamental field for justification or defense.

The mutual containment of epistemology and natural science contributes to the fact that Quine’s system is arguably one of the most complete and self-contained of modern philosophical systems. The ontology provided by his physicalist standpoint admits of only those entities which are necessary to the advancement of his system. Furthermore, each element of the system itself is necessary to the formulation, presentation and justification of its claims. Therefore, it does not lack any means of justifying itself and all of its parts are interrelated. For this reason, it is almost impossible
to refute from a scientific point of view. For Quine, a scientific argument against one of
his views is acceptable if it is simpler and more efficient. Thus, he is fully supportive of
the revision of his scientific claims by other scientific claims. In fact, he insists on it.
However, the revision of some, or even all, of his theoretical claims does not entail a
refutation of his system. The basis of the theory remains. The system is simply improved
based on new scientific facts. It is not completely rejected in favour of an alternative
theory that does not involve science.

After presenting Quine’s philosophical system, it may seem useless to present
another. To be convinced of the truth of Quine’s view, is to accept the fact that
philosophy must be practiced scientifically. In fact, it is to be unable to see any alternative
given our epistemological situation. Quine’s system is based on a severe break with
tradition in that it offers a new way of investigating and understanding philosophical
problems. This is perhaps the most appealing quality of his work. However, Quine is not
the only contemporary philosopher to pursue this angle. Ludwig Wittgenstein offers an
equally radical and comprehensive philosophical approach. Thus, it seems only natural to
investigate his conception of philosophy as well.

Chapter 2-Wittgenstein’s Critical Philosophy

Unlike Quine, Wittgenstein often discusses the nature of philosophy in his work.
The most important discussions occur in The Big Typescript, the Philosophical
Investigations and the Cambridge lectures which Wittgenstein gave between 1930 and
1935. I will focus on the section entitled "Philosophy" of The Big Typescript and sections 114 to 133 of the Philosophical Investigations. Later thought may be mentioned in passing but will not be emphasized.

For Wittgenstein, philosophy involves a critical investigation of philosophical problems with the aim of showing that they are spurious. Much like Quine, Wittgenstein attempts to rid the discipline of confusions which lead to irresolvable pseudo-problems. As we have seen, Quine eliminates the linguistic confusions of philosophical problems by transforming them into scientific problems. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, shows how philosophers can avoid the problem altogether by interpreting words in everyday language. It is important to keep in mind however that Wittgenstein is not an ordinary language philosopher. He does not promote a theory of language use. He simply feels that the move from the way we speak in everyday interactions to a metaphysically charged language is unnecessary.

Wittgenstein deals with philosophical problems by uncovering the linguistic errors from which they arise. As he says: "problems are dissolved in the actual sense of the word - like a lump of sugar in water." He thus attempts to eliminate problems rather than to solve them. This distinction is important to understand since it is a significant aspect of Wittgenstein's approach. Any attempt to solve a problem implies that there exists a solution. It suggests that the problem is genuine. Wittgenstein’s philosophical
investigations are meant to show how the problems of philosophy are in fact pseudo-problems, that they are the result of linguistic confusions.

In Wittgenstein’s view, philosophy is not a means of providing solutions to traditional problems that continue to plague the discipline. It is not an exercise in constructive theorizing. On a basic level, his conception of philosophy is the act of gathering together considerations which may have been overlooked. It is a means of recollection for the purpose of easing philosophical puzzlement. “The work of the philosopher” he says “consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose.” Wittgenstein uses the term ‘reminders’ here, since philosophy only points out what is already available to us. For example, he presents possible cases or ways in which the problem could be solved. He then examines each of these individually and shows how they can be broken down. His technique, as described here, is very similar to the Socratic method of questioning. The only difference is that Wittgenstein does not believe that there exist solutions to philosophical problems. He does not even believe that philosophical problems themselves are genuine. Socrates, on the other hand, thinks that there are answers to his philosophical questions. He just shows how many of these answers are problematic.

Wittgenstein’s philosophical investigation “puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. — Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain.” By defining the role of philosophy in this way, Wittgenstein voices his
aversion to the practice of constructive theorizing. He claims that this exercise is futile. The only thing that philosophy can do is describe what is already evident.

We may wonder about the worth of a philosophical approach that simply points out what is already evident. Let us consider an example in which Wittgenstein’s philosophical procedure applies to a specific problem. In section 17 of the Brown Book, Wittgenstein explores the issue of comparison. The problem can be described in this way: Is it possible to find one mental experience that encompasses the total process of comparison?

In this example, Wittgenstein asks us to imagine a case in which a worker examines the colour of a sample. He is then directed to five different coloured bolts of cloth and ordered to bring back one which is slightly darker than the sample. The first step in Wittgenstein’s investigation of this problem is to point out some of the different ways in which the worker may accomplish this task ‘from memory’, that is without the presence of the sample. This step in his examination amounts to assembling reminders. Wittgenstein suggests three possible scenarios. In case 1, the worker retains a mental image of the sample and compares it to each bolt before settling on the fifth. In case 2, the worker examines the bolts without a mental image of the colour. Instead, he simply feels a sort of mental strain which loosens when he sees the fifth bolt and selects it. In case 3, the worker approaches the bolts, again without a mental image, and studies one bolt after the other before choosing the fifth.
After presenting these options Wittgenstein exclaims: "But this can't be all comparing consists in."³⁷ It would seem that the process of comparison must be more involved than our three cases suggest. Wittgenstein proposes that when we compare two objects we hold them together for a period of time, look from one to the other, and study them under certain lights. Furthermore, we think up hypotheses, create mental images and experience certain feelings such as mental strain and dissatisfaction.³⁸ When we consider the three previous cases, none of them seem sufficient for describing this total process. Wittgenstein explains that we cannot isolate one specific mental experience which epitomizes the act of comparison: "We find that what connects all cases of comparing is a vast number of overlapping similarities, and as soon as we see this, we feel no longer compelled to say that there must be one feature common to them all."³⁹

In case 1, our worker had a mental image of the colour which he used to compare with the different bolts. It is evident that thought was involved in this choice. In case 2, our worker acted in response to the lessening of his feeling of mental strain. This strain could have been caused by the fact that the first four bolts did not resemble the colour of the sample as he remembered it. In case 3, there does not seem to be any reason for the worker's choice. He appears to have acted automatically. In each of these cases, the worker begins by examining the sample of the colour. Wittgenstein does not specify the length of this process but we can assume that it was equal for each case. The worker also studies the colours of the bolts in each case. Thus, two of the actions featured in the total act of comparing are evident in all three cases. There is the inspection of the colour and
that of the bolts. However, from here we can distinguish many differences between the three cases. The lack of explanation for the worker’s action in case 3 prompts Wittgenstein to investigate this solution more closely.

Wittgenstein claims that case 3 differs from cases 1 and 2 in that it does not involve any recollection of the colour. As described, our worker simply looks at each bolt, without recalling an image or feeling a mental strain, and chooses one. The question therefore remains why he chose that particular bolt of cloth. When responding to this question, Wittgenstein distinguishes between looking for the cause and looking for the reason. He claims that if we want the cause of the worker’s actions “it is easy enough to think up a physiological or psychological hypothesis which explains this choice under the given circumstances.” He then delegates this task to the experimental scientist. If we are looking for the reason for the worker’s action, he responds: “There need not have been a reason for the choice. A reason is a step preceding the step of the choice. But why should every step be preceded by another one?” As we have seen, the worker simply looks at the bolts and chooses one. A line of reasoning is not included in this process.

We are now faced with a different question. If the worker did not rely on a mental image or a lessening of mental strain, then can we not say that he lacked the means of recognizing the material as being the correct one? To this Wittgenstein responds: “if you have become aware of the fact that the processes which we call processes of recognition form a vast family with overlapping similarities, you will probably feel not disinclined to
include [case 3] in this family too.” Here, Wittgenstein is claiming that the process of comparison, recognition and selection cannot be epitomized by a single mental experience. It is found in many different cases other than the three we have been reviewing. The only difference between the three cases is the way in which the worker proceeded.

In his discussion, Wittgenstein shows how case 1 is not any more reliable than case 3. As he explains, our worker could have brought back an incorrect bolt in either situation. In case 1 for example, his mental image could have changed in the time it took him to study each bolt, or the lighting could have been different, or the proximity of the bolts could have confused him. Many such explanations could be involved. The possibility of error exists equally case 1 as in case 3.

Wittgenstein’s philosophical investigation into the problem of comparison helps us see how we can be misled in philosophy. When we consider each case, it would seem that case 3 is the least likely to define the process of comparison and recognition. This is due to the absence of an accompanying mental image, mental strain or line of reasoning. However, as Wittgenstein observes, our feeling of uneasiness towards case 3 is unfounded. The procedure in this case is as effective as that of the first two. Thus, none of these cases is sufficient for capturing the ‘essence’ of the process of comparison. There are many different ways in which the worker could have proceeded which are interrelated.
through a network of similarities. Which leads us to question whether or not a general account of the act is possible or even necessary.

Wittgenstein suggests that comparison cannot be defined by a single process by pointing out possible cases. He simply reminds us of some of the ways in which the worker may proceed. He then investigates the one which seems most suspect and shows how it is no less reliable than the other two. By breaking down the cases in which we have the most confidence, Wittgenstein shows how no case is sufficient for describing the act of comparison.

Wittgenstein does not go on from here to construct a theory based on his findings. He examines philosophical problems, points out possible solutions and shows how each can be broken down. For example, he shows how in case 1, the worker is as prone to error as in case 3. The same can be said of case 2. The worker could easily choose an incorrect bolt by relying on the lessening of mental strain since there could be many different reasons for the strain. It could be caused by the tension or stress of carrying out the order. It could also be due to the worker's state of mind at the time he was accomplishing the task. In short, there is a possibility of error in each of the three cases. Thus, none of them can account for the act of comparison, even though each represents a common way of accomplishing the particular task. By presenting these examples and breaking down our confidence in each, Wittgenstein shows how it is futile to define the act of comparison by
using a single mental experience. Thus, he dissolves the initial problem rather than providing a solution to it.

When we think of philosophy as a means of pointing out evident possibilities, it seems to be a rather trivial practice. However, this apparent triviality is misleading. As Wittgenstein notes: “Philosophy unravels the knots in our thinking; hence its results must be simple, but its activity is as complicated as the knots it unravels.” In Wittgenstein’s view, philosophical results cannot help but be simple or almost trivial since they deal with information which is available to us on a daily basis. As we have seen, philosophy simply shows us possibilities. However, the practice of philosophy is both necessary and complex. Consider Wittgenstein’s treatment of the previous example. He begins by proposing numerous cases and possibilities which are simple and evident. Yet, his investigation of the problem is complex since he must go through each case and show how it can be broken down. Only then can we be convinced that the problem of relating the act of comparison to a single mental experience is spurious.

When we consider Wittgenstein’s investigation of the problem of comparison, we realize that he never provides any new information. Each case or conclusion he presents is information that could be deduced by anyone. We can compare this view of the discipline, as Wittgenstein does in section 87 of Philosophy, to the character of the simile. Wittgenstein claims that although a simile accomplishes a particular task, we cannot draw any conclusions from it. It simply retains its standing as a simile and does not offer any
pertinent information beyond itself.43 For example, consider the proposition ‘Kate is as sly as a fox’. This sentence tells us nothing more than Kate is sly. The comparison to a fox is simply used for effect. It adds nothing to the information provided by the sentence ‘Kate is sly.’ Wittgenstein’s understanding of philosophy is very much like this. It reminds us of things which we may have overlooked, yet does not offer anything beyond what is already available to us. For this reason, we cannot infer anything from the findings of philosophy. As Wittgenstein explains in section 128 of the *Philosophical Investigations*, philosophy simply reminds us of things we may have missed.

Furthermore, any thesis deriving from philosophy will be widely-accepted and appear trivial. Thus, any attempts to devise such theses are futile.44 Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy remains important, however, since it clarifies certain confusions which occur on a daily basis in the discipline.

Wittgenstein also describes the role of philosophy as “rejecting false arguments.”45 In his view, rejecting a false argument consists in determining where the linguistic error took place, then showing how the view is weakened once this error is rectified. It does not involve the conception or presentation of an alternate theory.

Consider Wittgenstein’s views on solipsism. In broad terms, solipsism is the belief that only myself and my personal experiences exist. Wittgenstein quotes the solipsist as saying: “Only my experiences are real” which he claims “is absurd if taken to be a statement of a fact.”46 As Wittgenstein notes, someone could object to the meaninglessness of the solipsist’s statement. For, to say ‘Only my experiences are real’ is
to deny the reality of all other experiences. In which case, there is nothing to compare the reality of the solipsist's experiences to. Thus, the application of the term 'real' to 'experiences' is meaningless. The same is true of the solipsist's use of the term 'I'. If he denies the existence of others, there is nothing left to compare himself with. Thus, the expression of the solipsist's position is shrouded in a linguistic confusion. The position itself may be valid, however any attempt to express it will meet the same objections.

It is important to note at this point that Wittgenstein's investigation of philosophical problems consists of many different steps. As we have seen, he assembles reminders or possible ways in which the problem could be solved. He then proceeds to tear these down. Eventually, this leads to a feeling of uncertainty with regards to the nature of the problem itself. However, Wittgenstein also attempts to dissolve the problem by focusing on its wording. He proposes that we transform a metaphysical expression of a problem into an everyday expression. In doing so, terms which are problematic in the first case, become unproblematic in the second. Thus, the concern is altered and in some cases, even eliminated.

Each element of Wittgenstein's investigation accomplishes its own specific task and meets a certain demand. For example, his practice of assembling reminders relates to the problem of presenting and defending a false argument. As we have seen, Wittgenstein's goal when presenting possible solutions, is to show how they are ineffective to answering the question. This is due to the fact that the question itself is
spurious. His translation from a metaphysical language to the everyday use of language responds to the problem of misunderstanding in philosophy. He shows that by clarifying the question, we clarify its problematic terms. Thus, we can begin to illustrate how the focus of the problem is different than it first appeared. Eventually, we aim to show how the question itself is no longer problematic in its revised state. Let us consider an example.

It is a common, yet unintentional, philosophical tendency to interpret words in odd and confusing ways. In fact, many philosophical debates are irresolvable due to an implicit and unrecognizable disagreement about the use of a specific word. For example, two philosophers could disagree over the sentence ‘The door is brown’ since one could believe that ‘door’ and ‘brown’ are not equivalent. In other words, he or she could interpret ‘is’ to mean ‘is equivalent to’. Without an explicit declaration of this belief, the philosophical disagreement could go on indefinitely. Wittgenstein explains how such disputes come about: “In the theories and battles of philosophy we find words whose meanings are well-known to us from everyday life used in an ultra-physical sense.” In other words, philosophical disagreements arise from an unfamiliar use of words. Without a clear definition of each term, these problems cannot be easily resolved. It is no wonder, then, that we often become confused by fairly common terms in philosophy since they are

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*It is important to note at this point that the term philosophy is being used in two different ways. In the first case, it refers to Wittgenstein’s vague conception of what has been and continues to be done in the discipline and in the second case, it refers to his own interpretation. This double use of the term will occur throughout my essay and I shall try to make it clear which of the two I am discussing.
used in uncommon ways. It would seem that all that is required to end such philosophical
debates is an agreement between the relevant parties on the use of everyday language.

However, this agreement about language does not resolve the problem
satisfactorily since it neither applies to the work of past philosophers nor to that of many
contemporary ones. It is always difficult to understand exactly what an author is trying to
convey. Any combination of words may be interpreted in numerous ways. More often
than not, the force or intention of the author’s work is changed by our attempts to
reinterpret the language used. Therefore, we can never assume that a translation into
everyday language is possible without completely altering the author’s intention.

Consider an example. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant defines ‘intuition’ as: “that by
which a cognition refers to objects directly, and at which all thought aims as a means.” Intuition, in this sense, plays a specific and necessary role in the creation of concepts. In
its everyday use, an intuition is simply a feeling or an immediate insight into something.

It is a way of explaining how we know something when no evidence supports this
knowledge. In this case, we can see a clear difference between the two uses of the word
‘intuition’. However, if Kant had not provided such an explicit definition, and we
attempted to attribute the everyday use to this term as it appears in his work, we would
become completely confused. Furthermore, Kant’s message would be rejected as
incoherent due to our incorrect reading of the term.
We can see from the previous example how the metaphysical use of words may cause problems in the work of past philosophers. Most writers do not present explicit definitions of the words they use. Therefore, reading a philosophical essay in which certain terms are used metaphysically, amounts to decoding the meaning of these words along with attempting to understand the author's message. Commentators often attempt to accomplish this task but end up misrepresenting the author's intention by misunderstanding the words that are used. This can lead to confusions which cause irresolvable philosophical problems. Despite these negative results, philosophers continue to attribute their own meanings to everyday words. This is due to the fact that it is easier to redefine a known term than to find one to suit a particular purpose. For this reason, it may be difficult to convince some thinkers to forego these interpretations in favour of the everyday use of words. In which case, philosophical problems will continue to arise due to linguistic confusions.

In order to resolve a philosophical problem, Wittgenstein's philosopher makes "a tracing of the physiognomy of every error." As we saw in the example of comparison, Wittgenstein clearly presents the line of reasoning which could lead to problematic theories. Only by examining numerous cases could he genuinely convinced us that there exists an error in this way of thinking. In order to fully grasp Wittgenstein's task, let us consider a general example. I believe that a whale is a fish. I think this because whales live in the water and are shaped like fish. Furthermore, I believe that their young feed off of the resources of the sea. For someone to convince me otherwise, in the manner
suggested by Wittgenstein, he or she would have to investigate the beliefs which led to my false conclusion. Eventually, this person would claim that I am wrong in thinking that the young feed off of organisms in the sea. They would show me that the young feed off of their mother’s milk. Consequently, I would have to admit that a whale is a mammal and not a fish.

This example demonstrates the procedure by which Wittgenstein’s philosopher eliminates philosophical confusions. (It is clear that once the confusion is eradicated, there no longer exists a problem.) The difference between my example and a philosophical situation is that traditional philosophical arguments are more abstract. We can easily remedy the previous empirical example by turning to evidence and facts. In philosophical arguments, no such straightforward facts exist. For example, in the problem of the existence of other minds we cannot point to another mind in order to prove our beliefs.

1. Language and Philosophy

The more specific description of the discipline as a means of eliminating false arguments is one of the first steps towards showing the relation between language and philosophy. Since language is essential for the expression of thought, it is only reasonable to regard it as one of the main subjects of philosophy. In a philosophical investigation, we describe language in order to expose linguistic confusions. Philosophy does not attempt to reinvent language, or to establish a more fundamental one than that used everyday. As
Wittgenstein claims, philosophy "leaves everything as it is."\textsuperscript{50} Its role is simply to indicate where the pitfalls occur. Linguistic traps are: "one or another piece of plain nonsense" and "bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language."\textsuperscript{51}

Wittgenstein’s reference to the ‘limits of language’ can be understood in terms of his distinction between what can be said and what can only be shown. Wittgenstein believes that some things cannot be expressed in language. Consider the example he provides in section 78 of the \textit{Philosophical Investigations}. He claims that we cannot say ‘how a clarinet sounds’.\textsuperscript{52} However, it is obvious that the sound of the clarinet can be shown by either playing one or playing a recording of one. When we attempt to go beyond the limits of language in philosophy, we are trying to say things that can only be shown. In other words, we are attempting to describe the particular sound of the clarinet.

Although the improper use of language is especially common in philosophy, it is not confined to it. Wittgenstein argues: "People are deeply embedded in philosophical, i.e., grammatical confusions."\textsuperscript{53} In other words, we are all faced with the possibility of misinterpreting words on a daily basis. For this reason, Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy is of an ongoing process. Some may argue that it makes itself obsolete by clarifying all philosophical confusions. However, due to our daily misuse of language, grammatical confusions will continue to arise. Also, as we have seen, philosophers will
continue to interpret words in a metaphysical way which will lead to further philosophical problems.

It is difficult for us to avoid grammatical confusions since our grammar itself is unclear. It does not provide us with a strict set of rules regarding the use of language. As Wittgenstein explains: "we do not command a clear view of the use of our words." For this reason, we sometimes remain at a loss when attempting to determine which terms to employ in order to express ourselves. One possible solution to this problem could be to establish a strict set of rules describing the proper use of words in every circumstance. This would give us "complete" grammatical clarity. Furthermore, we could begin to eliminate and prevent philosophical problems with such a precise grammar. Unfortunately, Wittgenstein points out that our grammar lacks this type of clarity. Thus, the possibility of everyone understanding and using words in the same way, under the same circumstances is doubtful.

Wittgenstein claims: "Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and you know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about." In other words, the unclarity of our grammar allows for several different ways in which words may be used. For example, a word may be perfectly understandable in its everyday usage. However, the same word may be the source of great confusion when used in a metaphysical sense. Consider the case of a mother using the proposition 'This is the number three' when teaching her child numbers.
To an outside observer, this sentence could be interpreted in two ways. In the first case, the mother could be uttering a demonstrative sentence. In the second case, she could be making a metaphysical claim regarding the existence of an abstract object. It is this latter case which causes irresolvable philosophical disagreements on matters of existence, ontology and abstract entities. This example suggests that philosophical mistakes are bred from the tendency to complicate language. It seems evident that the mother simply meant to teach her child the number three by pointing to it while uttering the sentence. However, depending on one's view of language, the sentence could be understood in the metaphysical way. For this reason, Wittgenstein often stresses the importance of the use of everyday language in philosophy.

2. Wittgenstein's Treatment of Philosophical Problems

Our use of language is an important issue since it acts as the source of philosophical problems and as a means of their resolution. In the former case, philosophical confusions are caused by the philosopher's habit of reinterpreting everyday language to suit his or her own needs. In the latter case, the Wittgensteinean philosopher transforms this metaphysical use of language back into the everyday use, in the hopes of clearing up these confusions. These opposing tendencies are characteristic of two forms of philosophical endeavors, one bad and one good according to Wittgenstein.

Philosophical problems arise in the traditional practice of constructive theorizing. Meanwhile, these problems get dissolved by Wittgenstein's critical investigation.
Wittgenstein argues: “Philosophy isn’t anything except philosophical problems, the particular individual that we call ‘philosophical problems’.” Most philosophical investigations deal with a philosophical problem. Many thinkers attempt to solve these problems by creating theories which act as explanations of the phenomena in question. We saw an example of such a practice in our discussion of Quine’s system. Philosophers such as Wittgenstein, on the other hand, are involved in clarifying the linguistic confusions which lie at the root of philosophical problems. His project is to show how each possible solution can be broken down. In the example of comparison, Wittgenstein introduces three possible cases and shows how each is insufficient to exemplify the total process. Eventually, this leads to the doubts regarding the nature of the problem itself. This deceptive character of philosophical problems is what Wittgenstein is alluding to when he says ‘the particular individual that we call “philosophical problems”.’

In his lectures at Cambridge, Wittgenstein is reported to have said: “Instinctively, we use language rightly; but to the intellect this use is a puzzle.” The problems of philosophy are caused by such linguistic confusions. Consider for example, the proposition ‘2 plus 2 is 4’. Wittgenstein claims that we may be confused into thinking that there exists a philosophical problem due to the use of the term ‘is’. For example, one might claim that the expression ‘2 plus 2’ is not the same as the term ‘4’, despite the fact that four is the sum of the equation. In order to avoid this type of philosophical worry, Wittgenstein suggests replacing ‘is’ with ‘=’. In this way, the expression ‘2+2=4’ no longer poses a problem of identity. It claims that ‘4’ is the sum of ‘2+2’. In this case, the
problematic results that could ensue from the original wording are avoided. The mathematical expression remains without any theoretical disputes over the existence of abstract entities or over the differing natures of ‘2 plus 2’ and ‘4’.

In *Philosophical Grammar*, Wittgenstein provides another example of how linguistic confusions cause what appear to be deep-rooted philosophical problems. Consider the question “How is it possible to measure a period of time, since the past and the future aren’t present and the present is only a point?” It is obvious that such a question is not a serious concern for historians who dedicate their lives to the study of time periods. Nor is it first and foremost in the minds of people who check their watches on a daily basis in order to gauge how much time it will take them to accomplish a certain task or arrive at a specific location. In everyday life, a period of time is measured in seconds, minutes, hours, years, and so on. This question becomes problematic only when it is given a philosophical interpretation. We then begin to doubt our ability to measure time and overlook the obvious answers. In order to eliminate this problem, Wittgenstein would show how each proposed explanation is problematic. In other words, he would break down each theory which attempts to explain the problem. This would eventually lead to doubts regarding the genuine nature of the problem itself and would elevate our doubts regarding our ability to measure time. This example shows how the move from the everyday interpretation of words to a metaphysical understanding is problematic.
Many commentators refer to Wittgenstein’s philosophy as a therapy. In “Wittgenstein on the Nature of Philosophy”, Anthony Kenny states that Wittgenstein “thought of philosophy as being like physical medicine, as like a cure for physical diseases.” He states that Wittgenstein’s approach is like medicine in two ways, as a cure and as a preventative. It cures diseases by clearing up the linguistic confusions of traditional problems. Furthermore, it prevents any more confusions from arising by showing how problems can be broken down into manageable states. We saw an example of this when Wittgenstein presented the possible ways in which a worker may carry out the task of bringing back the right colour of cloth. In this example, Wittgenstein took a general problem, introduced a scenario in which it is realized and proposed several possible solutions. He then proceeded to investigate these cases one by one in order to show how the problem itself is spurious.

The idea of philosophy as a cure is also evident in G. Hallett’s chapter “Philosophy as Therapy” in A Companion to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. Hallett directly quotes from Wittgenstein by saying that philosophy does not “form hypotheses or theories; for its goals are not positive but therapeutic. It does not aim to explain anything but to straighten out our thinking.” As we have seen, Wittgenstein often stresses that philosophy cannot be used to discover, create, or explain anything new about the world. We saw this in the example of comparison. Wittgenstein simply points out possible ways in which the problem could be resolved. This information is readily available to everyone familiar with the case. He does not proceed to present a theory of
his own. In fact, by showing how each possible case can be broken down, he establishes the futility of even attempting to provide a solution in the first place. As he explains in section 88 of the *Big Typescript*: “All that philosophy can do is to destroy idols. And that means not creating a new one — for instance as in ‘absence of an idol’.”62 This statement shows once again how Wittgenstein distances his project from the practice of constructive theorizing.

The description of philosophy as being destructive of idols may lead some to interpret Wittgenstein’s view as an attempt to rid the discipline of everything that is philosophically important. Wittgenstein addresses this idea in section 118 of the *Philosophical Investigations*. He argues that the problem does not lie with the destructive nature of the discipline, but rather with the things that are being eliminated. He claims: “What we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are clearing the ground of language upon which they stand.”63 It is evident from this statement, that Wittgenstein has a different conception of what is philosophically important than his critics. His view is that philosophical queries, in the traditional sense, are futile since they do not allow for any type of solution. Thus, the questions that philosophers consider to be important are nothing other than pseudo-problems.

3. *Wittgenstein’s Critique of Metaphysics and Scientific Philosophy*

Wittgenstein often emphasizes the great difference between his conception of philosophy as a critical investigation and the more common view of the discipline as a
theoretical enterprise. He says: "A common-sense person, when he reads earlier philosophers thinks—quite rightly—"Sheer nonsense." When he listens to me, he thinks—rightly again—"Nothing but stale truisms." That is how the image of philosophy has changed." Wittgenstein recognizes a shift in the way philosophy has been understood and practiced. In the past, it amounted to the practice of philosophical speculation that led to the construction of theories that go beyond the limits of language. In the present, it is understood it as a means of analyzing possible solutions, in order to do away with philosophical problems. This shift is important to recognize since it is central to understanding Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy.

Although Wittgenstein does not explicitly associate constructive theorizing with the practice of metaphysics, it may be argued that this move is implicit. As I have noted, he thinks metaphysicians reinterpret everyday language to suit their own purposes. They move from the way we use words in daily conversations to a metaphysical use of words. In most cases, these metaphysicians fail to provide a list of definitions to accompany their unique conceptions. Thus, irresolvable philosophical disagreements ensue based on the failure to recognize the new interpretation of a word. Consider the case of philosophers X and Y. X attributes his own interpretation to the term 'existence' that does not imply the occupation of a place in space and time. Y, on the other hand, believes that existence does imply spatio-temporality. X and Y then engage in a debate over their distinct ontologies. X claims that entities such as Pegasus and the round square exist. Y argues that 'existence' does not apply to these types of entities since they do not occupy a place in
space and time. So long as both philosophers fail to realize that each has a different conception of existence, their debate will be irresolvable.

Some philosophers would suggest that the use of everyday language is not necessary to this case. All that is needed is an explicit definition of X’s and Y’s understanding of ‘existence’. Once this has been provided, X and Y can engage in a genuine philosophical debate. The difference between Wittgenstein and these philosophers is that Wittgenstein does not believe that this debate is genuine. Even if X and Y recognize an inconsistency in their uses of the term, they are still promoting and defending oppositional theories. Thus, their ontological debate would continue. For Wittgenstein, this means investigating each proposed theory, since he believes philosophical theories to be as spurious as the problems they resolve. As we have seen, he breaks down philosophical views by analyzing each possible case and showing how it is problematic. Eventually, this brings to light the problematic nature of the theory as a whole.

Wittgenstein suggests that a philosophical problem can be dissolved if the philosopher recognizes the linguistic confusion which caused it. This can only be accomplished by going through the arguments or theories and breaking them down. Once this is done, the dubious nature of the initial problem becomes evident. Metaphysicians involved in providing solutions to philosophical problems do not accomplish this task. They use verbs like ‘to be’ and words like ‘true’, ‘false’, and ‘identical’ in metaphysical
ways without realizing that this is the root of their worries. For this reason, they are continually faced with philosophical problems based on linguistic confusions. From here they construct theories that attempt to provide solutions to these problems. Their theories are then criticized and replaced by alternate views. Subsequently, seemingly irresolvable disagreements ensue due to the initially unresolved linguistic confusion.

We have just seen Wittgenstein’s presentation of the futility of metaphysical theories. Let us now examine his discussion in their lack of explanatory power. Consider the problem regarding the existence of the external world. Any attempt to solve it would have to include explanations of how things are in the world, how they relate to us and what effect we have upon them. These are simply a few of the issues to consider when presenting a theory that addresses this concern. As we have seen however, Wittgenstein repeatedly emphasizes the descriptive role of philosophy and rejects the possibility of it having any explanatory power. In fact, it is only by describing obvious cases and then showing how they are ineffective that a philosopher can actually begin to deal with philosophical problems. However, Wittgenstein’s idea of dealing with a problem amounts to showing how it is spurious rather than providing it with solutions.

The idea that philosophy is purely descriptive is also the basis of Wittgenstein’s argument against scientific philosophy. In section 109 of the *Philosophical Investigations*, he discusses how philosophical concerns cannot be scientific. This is due

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*This claim directly opposes his discussion in section 128 on the futility of advancing theses in philosophy. Throughout this chapter, I have shown many examples of Wittgenstein’s aversion to constructive theorizing in philosophy. However, it would now appear that he is explicitly arguing that philosophy is not
to the empirical character of scientific worries and to the worthlessness of empirical
discoveries in philosophy. Wittgenstein's point is that "we may not advance any kind of
tory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away
with all explanation and description alone must take its place." This is not to say that he
dissolves empirical findings as unimportant. He simply shows how they belong in the
discipline of science and how science and philosophy must be kept separate.

One of the important differences between science and philosophy is the nature of
their problems. In the opening of the Big Typescript, Wittgenstein claims: "Difficulty of
philosophy not the intellectual difficulty of the sciences, but the difficulty of a change of
attitude." Science proceeds by following a strict method. The scientist gathers
information, presents hypotheses and tests them. He does not stray from this established
procedure since any deviation could negatively influence his findings. In this case then,
the scientist's personal attitude has no influence at all on his investigation. Philosophy, on
the other hand, does not admit of a single way of proceeding. * Wittgenstein claims:
"There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods..." This
absence of a strict method makes philosophy more susceptible to the influences of our
temperaments since our performance is not regulated. We attack philosophical problems

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* I should note that in Lecture B1, Series B of the Cambridge lectures, Desmond Lee quotes Wittgenstein as
saying that we now have an established philosophical method by which we may judge the skill of the
philosopher. He compares this new situation to that of chemistry, where, a good chemist is judged by his or
her adherence to the procedure. However, he claims: "philosophy is now being reduced to a matter of skill
and the philosopher's nimbus is disappearing." (Lee, Wittgenstein's Lectures, p.21) As far as I can tell, this
discrepancy is simply the result of a change in Wittgenstein's opinions. I will therefore concentrate on the
view quoted from the Philosophical Investigations.
and positions in different ways, thus, our judgments may sometimes be influenced by our emotions.

Another difference between science and philosophy is a difference of method. Wittgenstein addresses this issue in his lectures at Cambridge. He claims that the method of science begins by establishing a firm and untouchable foundation upon which to build a theory. This allows for a kind of assurance that the theory will not be flawed right from the start. Philosophy, by contrast, is like cleaning up a room. We have to move and replace things a dozen times. Wittgenstein argues: “The only way to do philosophy is to do everything twice.” In Wittgenstein’s view, philosophy does not aim at providing truths upon which a theory may be built. As we have seen, it is not involved in constructive theorizing. It simply aims at clarifying the linguistic confusions which cause philosophical problems. The philosopher accomplishes this task by investigating faulty lines of reasoning and establishing where the linguistic error took place. When going through these different arguments, he may come upon words which he had previously made clear in the past. In this case, he may have to repeat the same steps he had previously taken to clarify the confusion. This is due to the fact that Wittgenstein’s view does not aim at providing a strict set of rules regarding language use. It is simply a way of showing the metaphysical philosopher where he or she went wrong in reinterpreting specific terms. Therefore, it is a way of engaging philosophers to participate in this critical form of philosophy or, a means of making philosophers realize that their metaphysical use of language is at the root of their philosophical problems.
4. Summing Up Wittgenstein

Wittgenstein’s view retains its force and attraction in contemporary analytic philosophy due to its radical break with tradition. For Wittgenstein, philosophy is entirely critical. It is an attempt to investigate philosophical theories and in order to show how the problem lies with the original philosophical concern. This view is purely descriptive, it does not advance any theories about the world. As Wittgenstein claims in The Big Typescript: “taking care of a philosophical problem is not a matter of pronouncing new truths about the subject of investigation.” As we have seen, it is simply the act of proposing and analyzing possible solutions. Anything that results from this examination is trivial since it is based on readily available information.

Some argue that Wittgenstein’s view is completely devoid of theory in general. They claim that his work remains faithful to the conception of philosophy he presents. However, a close reading of some of the passages in the Philosophical Investigations shows how this claim can be challenged. For example, Wittgenstein’s explicit denial of the use of science in philosophy in section 109.

The view that Wittgenstein’s work is devoid of any theory is difficult to support and also to deny. Some of his claims certainly appear to be theoretical. However, if we consider Wittgenstein’s message, we arrive at some sort of paradox. In section 109 Wittgenstein states that philosophy should not be practiced scientifically. The idea behind this claim is that a scientific conception of philosophy aims at providing explanations...
about the world in a theoretical form. The paradox is that Wittgenstein’s ‘thesis’, which
rejects the use of science in philosophy, is actually a warning against such a theoretical
view. Therefore, his claim may appear to be theoretical in nature, yet its message
opposes the idea of theory in philosophy.

The Wittgensteinian philosopher dissolves philosophical problems in order to
attain peace of mind. As Wittgenstein notes: “The strange thing about philosophical
uneasiness and its resolution might seem to be that it is like the suffering of an ascetic
who stood raising a heavy ball, amid groans, and whom someone released by telling him:
‘Drop it’. He claims that if philosophical problems make us uneasy, we should
abandon those sentences or words which cause that feeling, much like the ascetic should
let go of the ball. The trouble is that we hold to such sentences since they seem to be an
integral part of the system to which we faithfully adhere. Let us return to our example of
the problem of comparison. Wittgenstein points out that it is common to feel that case 3
is not equivalent to cases 1 and 2 as a means of defining the process of comparison.
However, as he shows, cases 1 and 2 are no more reliable than case 3. Thus, the feeling of
uneasiness towards case 3, is somewhat lessened when we investigate the status of 1 and
2.

*The issue of Wittgenstein’s faithfulness to his proposed project is difficult to settle by solely
concentrating on the passages in which he discusses ‘philosophy’. This is due to the critical and anti-
thetical view he promotes. I feel that the paradox I have mentioned will continue to arise. Conceivably,
the proper way of settling this issue would be to investigate the rest of his work for ‘theses’ and decide
whether or not they qualify as opposing his intended project. Unfortunately, this will not be undertaken
here since it strays from the purpose of the discussion.
If we generalize Wittgenstein’s analogy of the ascetic and his ball, we can see how the traditional problems of philosophy survive through the years. If a thinker advances what appears to be a genuine concern, and this problem remains unresolved, any philosopher who follows may see fit to take up the problem once again. This may be due to the fact that he or she respects the philosophical system set up by the earlier thinker. It could also be due to the sense of uneasiness caused by the philosophical concern. However, if a linguistic confusion exists in the original concern, it is sure to be passed along with the problem. Thus, the problem persists along with the feeling of uneasiness. Since both of these are caused by a linguistic confusion, there is no real possibility of ever resolving the philosophical concern.

Chapter 3- Understanding Quine and Wittgenstein

Quine and Wittgenstein are two of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. As we have seen, each of them presents a radical interpretation of what it means to do philosophy. Furthermore, each of them explicitly rejects the practice of transcendental speculation. However, they reject it for different reasons.

Wittgenstein’s rejection of philosophical speculation means recognizing that philosophy is not a matter of constructive theorizing. It means realizing that the discipline is involved with description which contributes to the dissolution of philosophical problems, rather than to their solution. In order to illustrate this point, consider a brief discussion of his treatment of the problem of meaning. In The Blue Book, he explains
how questions such as ‘What is a meaning?’ lead to philosophical uneasiness. He claims: “We feel that we can’t point to anything in reply to [such a question] and yet ought to point to something.” Theories involving meanings as abstract entities cater to this feeling of philosophical uneasiness. Many philosophers believe that a meaning must be a ‘thing’ which directly corresponds to a word in order for there to be semantic agreement. For example, the term ‘cat’ must refer to a general idea of a cat in order for two people to agree on the use of the term. Here, the problem of meaning is based on the feeling of uneasiness that we get from attempting to explain the essence or nature of words. Wittgenstein suggests instead that we focus on the question “What is an explanation of meaning?”. He claims that this will allow us to arrive at an answer to our first question about meanings, without the philosophical uneasiness. He argues: “Studying the grammar of the expression ‘explanation of meaning’ will teach you something about the grammar of the word ‘meaning’ and will cure you of the temptation to look about you for some object which you might call ‘the meaning’.” As we can see here, Wittgenstein translates the original philosophical question, which demands a search for the essence of the term, into a general question regarding the term itself. This translation allows the philosopher to focus on defining the term rather than on finding some abstract entity to attribute to it.

The idea that the traditional problems of philosophy are spurious is behind every philosophical move made by Wittgenstein. This is the main difference between his philosophical approach and that of a philosopher involved in constructive theorizing. Wittgenstein’s project is to illustrate how philosophical solutions and theories are futile.
He accomplishes this task in many ways. First, he examines the wording of the philosophical problem. He then attempts to show how the problem can be dissolved by translating it back into everyday language. This is evident in the previous example of meaning. Wittgenstein suggests a different wording of the problem that directs the focus away from searching for the essence of the word. If a translation into everyday language is not sufficient for dissolving this concern, Wittgenstein would point out possible ways in which the problem may be solved. He would then show how each of these options can be broken down. In other words, he would illustrate how each option is problematic as a solution to the problem. We saw an example of this in the problem of defining the act of comparison. Ultimately, Wittgenstein’s point is to show how the practice of constructive theorizing is futile.

Quine is similar to Wittgenstein in that he believes that the theories and problems of traditional philosophy should not be ignored. However, they differ in that Quine attempts to revive the discipline by taking as much from the ‘abyss of the transcendental’ and assimilating it into a scientific framework. His project is to translate metaphysical concerns into the language of science. Once this has been accomplished, he attempts to resolve the problem in a scientific manner.

Let us examine Quine’s thoughts on meaning. Much like Wittgenstein, Quine disagrees with the view of meanings as entities. He claims: “we are rather rushing matters in supposing there to be such things as meanings; for one can perhaps talk of meaning
without talking of meanings.” Quine separates the notion of meaning into two distinct branches: being alike in meaning or synonymous and having a meaning or significance. He claims that once we distinguish the meaning of words from their reference and recognize what is involved in a theory of meaning, namely synonymy and significance, “meanings themselves, as obscure intermediary entities, may well be abandoned”.

After clearly identifying the problem, Quine begins to examine the notions of synonymy and significance. He refers to the former as cognitive synonymy and defines it as follows: “a word is cognitively synonymous to a word or phrase if substitution of the one for the other always yields cognitively equivalent sentences”. Consider the sentence ‘Some men are bachelors’. We could exchange ‘bachelors’ for unmarried males’ without altering the truth value of the sentence. Thus, the expressions ‘bachelors’ and ‘unmarried males’ are cognitively synonymous. As Quine elaborates, cognitive equivalence between two sentences amounts to the speaker’s disposition “to give matching verdicts when queried in matching stimulatory circumstances.” In our example then, the sentences ‘Some men are bachelors’ and ‘Some men are unmarried males’ are cognitively equivalent since the speaker will agree to both in the same circumstances.

Quine’s discussion of the significance of an expression relates to his ‘behavioural doctrine of meaning’. This theory claims that the meaning of a word relates to its use within a sentence. For example, the meaning of the word ‘rock’ could relate to all the sentences in which it is used by a certain speaker. Furthermore, these sentences relate to
all the sensory stimulations which caused them. For instance, the sentence ‘There is a blue rock’ could be caused by the impact of seeing a blue-coloured rock. The use of a term can then be said to relate to both the sentences in which it is used and the sensory stimulations which prompt each sentence. The problem with such a view however, is deciding what is to count as relevant circumstances of use. As Quine suggests, we could include into our theory, all sentences which could include the term ‘rock’ and all their relevant sensory stimulations. The list is endless. The point is that the meaning of the term ‘rock’ relates to how we use it in the sentences we construct.

In Quine’s view, the traditional philosophical problem of meaning is rejected in favour of a clearer and more precise scientific concern. He focuses on two terms being alike in meaning and each term having a meaning instead of the general and ambiguous question ‘What is a meaning?’ In this way, he is able to preserve the term ‘meaning’ without appealing to the notion of meanings as entities. This practice is fairly common in Quine’s work. He retrieves a notion from ‘the abyss of the transcendental’ and reformulates it into the conceptual scheme of science. This allows him to provide scientific solutions to the philosophical problem.

1. An External Refutation of Quine’s and Wittgenstein’s Views

Thus far, we have seen how both Quine and Wittgenstein deal with traditional philosophical problems and theories. Let us now consider how they would handle each other’s views. On a general level, it seems that each view rejects the other. Quine
advocates a pursuit of knowledge, explanation and truth derivative of his scientific methodology. Wittgenstein takes philosophy to be purely descriptive and without explanatory power. Thus, their views on the role of philosophy are diametrically opposed. We could argue that Wittgenstein’s view is even destructive of the theories put forth by a practice such as Quine’s, since it explicitly denies the use of science in philosophical pursuits. It therefore attacks the very core of Quine’s system.

This same argument can be made for Quine. He claims that philosophy aims at providing explanations. It is therefore greatly involved in constructive theorizing. Wittgenstein’s view is completely devoid of theory. He believes that if we translate the problems of philosophy into everyday language, we can begin to dissolve the problems. The elimination of linguistic confusions is the essence of his philosophical project. For Quine, philosophical problems are eradicated in a scientific manner. He therefore reinterprets them in the language of science. Although this translation manages to eliminate inherent linguistic confusions, Quine’s purpose is to work out the problems from within the framework in which he exists. The act of ridding the discipline of linguistic confusions is simply a consequent of his philosophical method and only a small part of his overall project. He could therefore reject Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy on the grounds that it is too limited.
2. The Internal Consistency of Quine's and Wittgenstein's Views

I have suggested that Quine's and Wittgenstein's views could refute each other on a general level. That is, Wittgenstein could reject Quine's approach due to its confusion of the goal of philosophy with that of science. Similarly, Quine could refute Wittgenstein's view due to its lack of providing explanations. However, this argument becomes difficult to support when each view is considered in a more detailed way.

It is not easy to show how Quine could refute Wittgenstein's philosophical approach from his scientific perspective. This is due to Wittgenstein's strict separation of science and philosophy. In order to properly refute Wittgenstein's view, Quine would have to interpret his claims in everyday language and refute them in this same scheme. He would have to show how Wittgenstein's critical and non-theoretical points can be opposed. However, as we have seen, Quine is not prepared to go outside the framework of science since he believes that we are surrounded by it. Thus, his criticisms would be narrow and problematic.

It is easier to show how Wittgenstein could reject Quine's system. As we have seen, Quine dedicates himself to a scientific practice of philosophy. For him, the conceptual scheme of science is that of everyday life. For Wittgenstein to properly refute Quine, he would have to analyze his theories from a scientific point of view. This situation is entirely possible since Wittgenstein's critical approach centres on investigating different views in order to show how they are flawed. The only way to
properly convince someone of a flaw in their way of thinking is to interpret their view as accurately as possible. One of the best ways of ensuring accuracy is recognizing and adopting the conceptual scheme in which the theory was conceived. We saw an example of Wittgenstein's method in his treatment of the problem of comparison. Essentially, the idea was that we could find a single mental experience to capture the notion of comparison. As we have seen, Wittgenstein did not directly oppose this idea at the outset, instead, he proposed several possible alternatives. He then demonstrated the fallibility of each of these solutions. Eventually, he showed how any attempt to resolve the problem would be flawed since the question itself is problematic. In a refutation of Quine's view, Wittgenstein would proceed in the same way. He would investigate and analyze each claim and show the inherent errors. Eventually, this would lead to doubt regarding the view as a whole.

Despite the possibility of opposing Quine's view from a Wittgensteinean standpoint, many philosophers have failed to establish an error in Quine's system. This is due to the fact that they attempt to interpret his theories from a non-scientific point of view. The problem with this procedure is that Quine's philosophy can only be understood from a naturalistic perspective. Any reinterpretation of his system is bound to weaken or to falsify it. Moreover, any argument which ensues from this inaccurate interpretation will be unfair since it addresses a version of Quine's view rather than the view itself.
There are many examples of the misrepresentation of Quine’s view by Wittgensteineans. These show how most recognize the necessity of addressing Quine’s system. However, they also demonstrate how many commentators fail to consider the theory from within the framework in which it was conceived. Consider what P.M.S. Hacker says about the distinction between Quine and Wittgenstein on the subject of the revisability of beliefs. Hacker explains Quine’s view by quoting from the famous passage in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”:

> Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system. Even a statement very close to the periphery can be held true in the face of recalcitrant experience by pleading hallucination or by amending certain statements of the kind called logical laws. Conversely, by the same token, no statement is immune to revision.78

Certain aspects of Quine’s theory become clear from this claim. First, Quine considers all truths to be on equal epistemological footing. That is, he does not distinguish between the epistemological status of so-called analytic truths such as ‘All black cats are black’ and that of empirical truths such as ‘The sun will rise tomorrow’. Second, any change which occurs in a theory may affect the theory as a whole. This is evident in his explanation of holding a sentence true by altering other sentences of the theory. And third, all truths are open to revision. With these points in mind, Hacker concludes that in Quine’s system all sentences, including logical and mathematical truths, are revisable without altering the set of beliefs which frame the way we think. Hacker contrasts this view with Wittgenstein’s belief that “fundamental propositions of logic; such as the law of noncontradiction ‘~(p & ~p)’, or the tautology ‘p & (p⇒q)⇒q’, are renouncable only at the cost of renouncing all
thought and reasoning.”⁷⁹ Wittgenstein’s point is therefore that thought cannot exist without the order established by the laws of logic.

I shall begin by clarifying the points which Hacker brought to light in order to show how he misinterprets Quine’s intention. Quine believes that all truths are on the same epistemological level due to the absence of the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic. An analytic truth is generally defined as being true by virtue of the meaning of its terms. For example, the sentence ‘All bachelors are unmarried males’ is true if ‘bachelors’ and ‘unmarried males’ mean the same thing. For Quine, this definition of analyticity is unclear since it depends on a view of meanings as entities. As we have seen, for Quine, the meaning of a term relates to its use within a sentence. It is not an entity which we can identify and compare in cases of sameness of meaning.

In “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” Quine investigates other definitions of analyticity and concludes that none provide a clear enough explanation of the term. An extensional definition of ‘analytic truth’ must show how it differs from other truths. For Quine, all truths are epistemologically equivalent. Since this had not been accomplished, Quine rejects any distinction between analytic and synthetic claims.

A belief in the epistemological equivalence of all truths does not preclude the thought that all truths are alike in character. In “Carnap and Logical Truth” Quine explains: “it must be conceded that logic and mathematics do seem qualitatively different
from the rest of science. Logic and mathematics hold conspicuously aloof from any express appeal, certainly, to observation and experiment." Thus, in Quine’s view, logical and mathematical claims differ from empirical statements in that their truth values are immune to the changes in the world.

Let us now investigate Hacker’s claim that any change in a theory will affect a considerable amount of the theory as a whole. This idea relates to Quine’s theory of holism. We can describe Quine’s understanding of a theory as a spider’s web, with the truths of logic and mathematics in its centre and other truths moving towards its edges depending on their ‘germaness’ to experience. When a theory proves to be problematic, we proceed by investigating those claims which are closest to observation and experience first. This is due to the fact that any change in these claims will produce a less drastic effect on the rest of the theory. As Quine explains in his introduction to *Methods of Logic*:

Conjectures of history and economics will be revised more willingly than laws of physics, and these more willingly than laws of mathematics and logic. Our system of statements has such a thick cushion of indeterminacy, in relation to experience, that vast domains of law can be held immune to revision on principle.

In Quine’s view, the preservation of logical and mathematical laws is due to the virtue of conservatism. However, there could be a case in which the demands of simplicity supersede those of conservatism. In this case, the laws of logic or mathematics may have to be sacrificed in order to produce a simpler theory. Such revisions have been suggested in quantum physics, for example. Thus, the laws of logic and mathematics are open to
revision, as Hacker rightly emphasizes. Still, Quine insists that due to their centrality to our system, "any revision of them is felt to be the adoption of a new conceptual scheme, the imposition of new meanings on old words." Thus, if Quine were to revise or change the logical and mathematical claims that lie at the centre of the web, he would be rejecting the conceptual scheme of science in favour of a different framework that depends on a different set of laws.

Hacker describes Quine’s view regarding the rejection of logical truths as ‘inconvenient’. He contrasts this idea with Wittgenstein’s belief that this rejection could lead to the collapse of our web of belief into “a knotted tangle of incoherence.” However, as we have just seen, Quine claims that to reject fundamental laws is to reject the conceptual scheme in which they exist. It would mean that our words, which we previously understood in the language of science, would take on new meanings. These, in turn, would depend on the conceptual scheme in which we choose to work. Conceivably, this new scheme will correspond to the changes we have made in our fundamental laws. Thus, for Quine, the rejection of logical and mathematical laws which underlie our scientific language, amounts to the rejection of the language itself.

This example illustrates the problem of attempting to understand Quine’s claims from a non-scientific point of view. His belief in the centrality of the laws of physics and mathematics underlies his scientific project. It also conforms to the doctrine of naturalism since these beliefs lie at the core of a scientific framework. If we had simply considered
Hacker’s narrow description of Quine’s position, we would agree that Quine treats the abandonment of these laws as ‘inconvenient’. We would not realize how crucial they are to his scientific conception. Thus, it is only by closely examining Quine’s system as a whole that we recognize how his claims have been misinterpreted.

Unfortunately, many commentators present Quine’s position by emphasizing a few, well-chosen passages. This procedure is highly problematic since a reading of the passage alone can lead one to draw incorrect conclusions. When attempting to understand Quine’s point of view, we need to recognize most, if not all, aspects of his system due to their interrelationships. Let us consider another example of how the focus on individual claims leads to a misunderstanding of Quine’s view. In “The Passage into Language: Wittgenstein Versus Quine”, John Canfield argues that although Quine’s and Wittgenstein’s views appear similar, they differ on the topic of ‘use’ in their discussions of meaning. He claims that Quine and Wittgenstein hold a different understanding of a ‘language-game’. Furthermore, although he does not explicitly admit this, Canfield argues that Quine is to be faulted for his misinterpretation of Wittgenstein’s term.

Canfield states that Quine’s system does not include a progression in language-games towards that of science. He feels that Quine only allows for the conceptual scheme of science and either ignores or fails to recognize any other. He notes that in Quine’s view, “the language-game of science is It.”° He interprets Quine’s thought as follows: “language arises when noises take on the function of affirming a particular type of
stimulus-noise match, and of eliciting a corresponding affirmation or denial on the part of the hearer. These noises become words in the language-game involving observation sentences such as ‘Rabbit’ or ‘Chair’. Furthermore, by simply extending this language-game to include observation categoricals and theoretical sentences, it can be transformed into the language-game of science. As we can see from this summary, Quine’s system moves from the language-game of observation sentences employed in language learning, straight to the language of science. It doesn’t seem to allow for any intermediary or additional language-games.

Canfield contrasts Quine’s ‘misguided’ understanding of a language-game with Wittgenstein’s more sophisticated conception. He claims that for Wittgenstein, noises assume functions in pre-verbal, gestural language-games. He concludes: “The march from childhood to adult language involves a progressive complication, extension and intertwining of the earliest, foundational language-games. Science must be conceived as growing piecemeal out of that enriched set of language-games.” For Canfield, Quine’s lack of such a diverse view of language-games prohibits him from recognizing the internal relation which exists between speech and action. In Wittgenstein’s pre-verbal language-games, we communicate with the use of body language. For example, a child may indicate that she wants some juice by pointing to her empty cup. This act of pointing may be accompanied by a noise which also indicates what she intends. These noises therefore serve particular functions for both the child and her mother. This necessary relation between action and speech, Canfield claims, is lacking in Quine’s understanding

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of language. He insists that Quine fails to recognize how language is built up from these functional noises and gestures. Therefore, Quine could not possibly understand the notion of a language-game as it is presented by Wittgenstein.

Canfield’s argument centers on Quine’s misinterpretation of Wittgenstein’s term. He admits in passing: “it might be said, Quine nowhere denies the existence of other language-games: he just pretty much ignores them. He focuses on one particular one—namely the one that lies at the root of science, for it is science he wishes to study.”

The problem with Canfield’s argument is that, although he seems to recognize Quine’s point of view, he faults him for misunderstanding Wittgenstein’s notion of a ‘language-game’. However, if Canfield did in fact understand Quine’s view, he would know that Quine is more concerned with language than with language-games. In the essay “On the Very Idea of a Third Dogma”, Quine explains how he understands a conceptual scheme as “ordinary language, serving no technical function.” He later admits that the term ‘conceptual scheme’ is interchangeable with ‘language’. The thing about Quine, as Canfield himself notes, is that he works from within the conceptual scheme of science. Therefore, in a philosophical arena, it is not surprising that he limits his discussion to this particular conceptual scheme. However, this is not to say that he ignores other conceptual schemes. Canfield is wrong in faulting Quine for misunderstanding Wittgenstein’s notion of a language-game, then claiming that Quine is wrong for only considering the conceptual scheme of science. In short, Canfield refuses to recognize Quine’s point of
view. He simply presents Wittgenstein's view and shows how Quine's understanding differs from it. If we consider that each thinker is working from within a different conceptual scheme or language-game, this point is rather trivial.

Canfield's argument against Quine's view of language is a good example of an unsympathetic interpretation of a philosopher's view. Many philosophers recognize that other thinkers practice the discipline in different frameworks. Furthermore, some attempt to be as charitable as possible with the view they oppose. The argument is not that philosophers intentionally misinterpret other philosophers' views, since most recognize that this would lead to a weak and easily-opposable argument. It is simply that many are often unaware that the conception they are presenting is problematic. This results in irreconcilable disputes and a considerable amount of wasted time. The purpose of this essay is to bring this phenomenon to light in the history and treatment of the Quine-Wittgenstein debate. It is an attempt to raise awareness and appreciation of the strength of each view and to show how one system should not be regarded as undermining the other.

The problem of misinterpretation which is present in the debate between Quine and Wittgenstein is not limited to critics and commentators. Quine himself misunderstands Wittgenstein's views on several occasions. Let us turn to one of two such instances in *Word and Object*. In section 24, Quine discusses the notion of identity. He claims that philosophers often tend to confuse a sign with an object when dealing with this issue. He refers to Wittgenstein's claim at 5.5303 of the *Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus as an example: “to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing.” Quine argues that Wittgenstein denies the possibility of saying that two individual objects are identical because he confuses the sign with the object. As Quine explains: “the statements of identity that are true and not idle* consist of unlike singular terms that refer to the same thing.” In Quine’s view then, a statement of identity such as ‘The Evening Star is identical to the Morning Star’ is both true and not idle since these different terms refer to the same object, namely, Venus.

If we take Wittgenstein’s claim at 5.5303 at face value, as Quine does, it would appear that he is confusing the sign with the object. However, this seems improbable given Wittgenstein’s extensive discussion of logic in the Tractatus. We need only to look at what Wittgenstein says at 5.53: “Identity of the object I express by identity of the sign and not by means of a sign of identity.” Wittgenstein’s point here, and at 5.5303, is not to discuss the notion of identity as Quine does. His focus is rather on the fact that the symbol of identity is unnecessary. He explains this at 5.5333: “The identity sign is therefore not an essential constituent of logical notation.” He claims that we could substitute ‘f (a, b) . a = b’ with ‘f (a, a)’ or ‘f (b, b)’. Quine’s error, in interpreting Wittgenstein’s view, is overlooking the bigger picture. I made this same objection earlier, to P.M.S. Hacker’s reading of Quine. The tendency to overlook the whole in favour of some of its parts, is central to the problem of misinterpreting another philosopher’s view.

* Conceivably, Quine’s use of the term ‘idle’ in this passage is meant to oppose Wittgenstein’s notion of nonsense. However, since Quine does not distinguish between sense and nonsense, to be idle could mean to be uninformative.
Let us consider a different example of Quine’s misunderstanding of Wittgenstein. In section 53 of *Word and Object*, Quine discussed what he takes to be Wittgenstein’s notion of explication. He describes this process as the elimination of the problematic aspects of expressions or forms of expressions. \(^{94}\) He claims that a certain expression, which is essential to a theory, may contain an inherent confusion. The practice of explication clarifies this confusion and allows the expression to accurately perform its designated task within the theory. Quine compares this practice with Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy:

According to an influential doctrine of Wittgenstein’s, the task of philosophy is not to solve problems but to dissolve them by showing that there were really none there. This doctrine has its limitations, but it aptly fits explication. For when explication banishes a problem it does so by showing it to be in an important sense unreal; viz., in the sense of proceeding only from needless usages. \(^{95}\)

Quine sees Wittgenstein as dissolving philosophical problems in order to clear up philosophical positions. This misses the purpose of Wittgenstein’s approach. As we have seen, Wittgenstein’s philosophy is essentially non-theoretical. It promotes description and strongly opposes constructive theorizing. Wittgenstein does not advance any ‘doctrine’. Therefore, it is inconceivable that he would be involved in the clarification of language for the sake of preserving theories. When Wittgenstein deals with a philosophical problem, he does not clear up the confusion in order to preserve the deeper importance of the question. For Wittgenstein, there is no deep importance. Philosophical problems are pseudo-problems. Furthermore, the theories which attempt to resolve them are inherently flawed.
Conclusion

This dissertation has been an attempt to correctly portray the views of W.V. Quine and Ludwig Wittgenstein in order to show how they have been misrepresented in the past. Quine’s conception of philosophy is predominantly scientific. He equates a philosophical investigation with the practice of constructive theorizing. For Quine, explanation is the key. The translation of traditional philosophical problems into scientific concerns is an essential step towards this goal. In Wittgenstein’s view, philosophy and science are two completely distinct disciplines. Philosophy is involved in dissolving traditional philosophical problems. The philosopher accomplishes this task by relying on the everyday use of language, by presenting possible scenarios then showing how they are insufficient as solutions to the problem, and finally by casting doubt upon the nature of the problem itself. Every aspect of his approach is meant to be non-theoretical. Wittgenstein claims that the presentation of theses based on philosophical findings is futile since philosophy only points out readily available information.

This dissertation also shows how Quine’s system is composed of many closely-knit aspects, which must all be considered in the investigation of his work. As we have seen, it is highly problematic to consider Quine’s claims in isolation. The same is true of Wittgenstein’s observations.
Quine and Wittgenstein each present convincing and highly influential ways of dealing with the philosophical problems which have plagued the discipline in the past. Their respective notions of doing philosophy have often been compared and contrasted. However, when engaged in the debate between Quine and Wittgenstein, the attempt to accurately portray their similarities and differences should be subordinate to the attempt to accurately portray their intentions. As we have seen, this is no small feat. When dealing with Quine and Wittgenstein specifically, we must consider their distinct frameworks and attempt to understand their messages from within these frameworks. We must also consider that this difference in frameworks prohibits us from rendering their views commensurable. Quine’s scientific approach to philosophy is not philosophically important according to Wittgenstein. Scientific pursuits must be confined to the discipline of science. Philosophical pursuits differ by being descriptive and non-theoretical. For Quine, on the other hand, philosophy is science. The act of clearing up linguistic confusions is simply a consequent of the scientific method. Therefore, from Quine’s point of view, Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy is only a small part of a philosophical investigation.

The most important step in any analysis or criticism of a philosopher’s view is proper understanding. It is to recognize that others have different perspectives of the world which frame and guide their philosophical theories. Furthermore, it is only by understanding their world view that we can begin to understand the theories which stem from it. In the case of Quine and Wittgenstein, the most interesting investigations are
those which go beyond comparing and contrasting their views. They are those which attempt to fully understand their intentions and recognize that any criticism of them is difficult if not impossible.

Quine and Wittgenstein are, quite possibly, two of the most influential and important contemporary philosophers. Their views are an essential part of any historical account of the discipline. They have acted as guides and models upon which many philosophical theories have been built. For these reasons, a proper understanding of their philosophical practices and intentions is absolutely necessary.
2 Roger Gibson, “Quine, Wittgenstein and Holism” in Wittgenstein and Quine, p.95
3 Douglas Winblad, “Scepticism, Science, Quine and Wittgenstein” in Wittgenstein and Quine, p.97
4 John Canfield, “The Passage into Language: Wittgenstein Versus Quine” in Wittgenstein and Quine, p.118
10 Quine, From Stimulus to Science, p.40
11 Ibid, 220
12 Quine, “On Simpler Theories of a Complex World” in Ways of Paradox, p.243
13 Quine, From Stimulus to Science, p.85
14 Idem
16 Quine, Word and Object, pp.3-4
17 Quine, “Things and Their Place in Theories” in Theories and Things, p.21
18 Quine, Word and Object, p.275
19 Quine, “Five Milestones of Empiricism” in Theories and Things, p.72
21 Idem
22 Quine, Pursuit of Truth, p.19
23 Quine, “Five Milestones of Empiricism” in Theories and Things, p.72
24 Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized” in Ontological Relativity, p.83
25 Quine, From Stimulus to Science, p.16
27 Ibid, 163
28 Ibid, 159
29 Quine, “The Scope and Language of Science” in Ways of Paradox, p. 215
30 Quine, From Stimulus to Science, p.25
31 Ibid, 26
32 Ibid, 27
33 Idem
36 Idem
38 Idem
39 Ibid, 87
40 Ibid, 88
41 Idem
42 Ibid, §90,183
43 Ibid, §89,177
45 Wittgenstein, “Philosophy” §87, p.165
47 Wittgenstein, “Philosophy” §91, p.193
49 Wittgenstein, “Philosophy” §87, p.165
51 Ibid, §119, 48e
52 Ibid, §78, 36e
53 Wittgenstein, “Philosophy”, §90,p.185
54 Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §122, p.49e
55 Ibid, §133, 51e
56 Ibid, §203, 82e
60 Kenny, “Wittgenstein and the Nature of Philosophy”, p.2
62 Wittgenstein, “Philosophy”, §88, p.171
64 Kenny, p.22
66 Wittgenstein, “Philosophy” §86 p.161
69 Wittgenstein, “Philosophy” §89, p.173
70 Ibid, 175
71 Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books*, p.1
72 Ibid
73 Quine, “Things and Their Place in Theories” in *Theories and Things*, p.23
74 Quine, “Use and Its Place in Meaning” in *Theories and Things*, p.45
76 Quine, “Use and Its Place in Meaning” in *Theories and Things*, p.51
77 Ibid, 50
78 Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” in *From a Logical Point of View*, p.43
79 P.M.S. Hacker, “Wittgenstein and Quine: Proximity at a Great Distance” in *Wittgenstein and Quine*, pp.24-25
80 Quine, “Carnap and Logical Truth” in *Ways of Paradox*, p.122
81 Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” in *From A Logical Point of View*, p.43
83 Ibid, 3
84 Hacker, p.25
85 Ibid, 132
86 Ibid
87 Idem
88 Ibid, 133-134

91 Quine, *Word and Object*, p.117

92 Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, p.45

93 Idem

94 Quine, *Word and Object*, p.260

95 Idem
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