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An Analysis of Preventive Rationalities and
Panopticism in Relation to an Expanding Technology of
Social Control

By
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Thesis submitted to the Department of Criminology, University of
Ottawa, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts (M.A.)

October, 2000

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0-612-58518-2
Abstract

At present, we are increasingly both the object of surveillance and the observers of images gathered through various surveillance practices. Although camera surveillance is a situational crime prevention (SCP) practice that is expected to deter criminal incidents and victimization, there is the potential for these panoptic technologies to produce more widespread and subtle social control effects. Contemporary liberal-based governments have constructed new modes of governance that delegate responsibility for risk-management to their populates in specific ways. The use of camera surveillance is an extension of such a mode of governance that encourages individuals to identify with and adopt the preventive rationalities that underlie the use of these technologies. Consequently, camera surveillance practices have the potential to encourage individuals to monitor their own thinking and conduct and govern themselves in accordance to what is deemed to be appropriate behaviours. This thesis undertakes to explore the potential social control effects of current camera surveillance practices.
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Acknowledgements

I would like to extend my sincere appreciation to my supervisor Dr. Maria Los, for her collaboration, insights, and guidance throughout this project – Dzie-kuje- Bardzo. Without her support this would certainly be a far lesser (and likely very different) thesis than it is. A tremendous thank you also goes to Dr. Michael Petrunik and Dr. Ross Hastings, whose comments on earlier drafts were invaluable, and who took the time, on extremely short notice, to review this thesis – your advice and support are greatly appreciated.

Throughout this project, I was fortunate to be in the company of a great group of friends, who assisted in this project directly through the exchange of ideas, and most often indirectly by grounding my life in other activities – thank you Joel Duff, Omid Payrow Shabani, Chris Russill, Bill Clancy, Sascha Maicher and Simon Wakelin. Without your fellowship the process of writing would have been a far lonelier experience than it was. A big thank you also goes to Barbara and Michael Weston, my parents, and Simone and John Kendall for all their support throughout this Master of Arts program.

I also would like to extend an enormous heartfelt (and typed) hug to my wife Roxana, whose friendship, encouragement, and patience throughout my studies are deeply appreciated and are important reasons why my Master of Arts degree, generally, and my thesis, specifically, have been accomplished – merci beaucoup.
The black-moustachio’d face gazed down from every commanding corner....BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU, the caption said, while the dark eyes looked deep into Winston’s own (Orwell, 1987: 4).

As inheritors of Orwell’s vision, we are unable to grasp the soft tyranny of today’s surveillance society, where authority is so diffuse it’s discreet (Boal, 1998: 6).

Introduction

For most people, the notion of Big Brother conjures up negative images of omnipresent surveillance. It is unsurprising that the flourishing use of camera surveillance (and other surveillance practices) encourages a label, acknowledgement and/or warning that Big Brother is indeed everywhere. One need only look to recent Canadian newspaper headlines to see the reference to the concept of Big Brother in relation to surveillance practices: “Big Brother is watching” (Landon, 2000a: A6); “Big Brother files raise privacy fear” (McCarthy, 2000: A1); “Feds to zap ‘Big Brother’ files” (Bronskill and Cryderman, 2000: A1); “Big Brother is finally here” (Landon, 2000b: A9). Further, according to Davies (1998), “[t]he new generation of closed-circuit television (CCTV) surveillance equipment comes closer to the traditional perception of Big Brother than any other technology” (p. 150). If the use of the image of Big Brother insinuates our increasing potential to be under surveillance at anytime, then it is used with some accuracy in this regard; however, such usage ignores the totalitarian underpinnings of the concept, and, indeed, Orwell’s (1987) intended criticism of these regimes.

The concept of Big Brother represents a dominant and centralized form of government that exercises ubiquitous and coercive power over a population. Stripped of
its deeper meaning, in our social context, Big Brother becomes a cultural cliché that can be dismissed as mere paranoia. If Big Brother is the archetype to which we compare the ‘oppressive’ nature of our surveillance practices, we might view much of the anxiety that surrounds current use of these technologies as misguided, since the modes of governance we take part in are vastly different from that which is displayed in Nineteen Eighty-Four. Nevertheless, a specific question deserves attention: in what ways do the subtle effects of omnipresent surveillance in our society mirror the effects of similar technologies in totalitarian regimes? Maria Los and Andrzej Zybertowicz (2000) discuss a modified form of surveillance premised on the Panopticon, present in Poland under communism. They suggest that, in this social context, the Panopticon (the ‘all-seeing eye’ of the ruler) was internalized by the populace in the form of a widespread, although unverifiable, belief in the omnipresence of secret police and their covert informers. This made individuals police themselves, while they were also simultaneously turned into ‘potential policemen’ in the eyes of others.

That there may be similarities between the various practices of democratic and totalitarian forms of governance is the disquieting possibility to which the quotation from Boal (above) alludes. In other words, the alleged distinctions between contrasting styles of governance may not be so evident. Such a possibility provides the impetus for further research that undertakes to explore the possible shared rationalities and practices of various and contrasting modes of governance. First, however, we must seek a greater understanding of contemporary surveillance practices, their effects, and their affiliations with particular modes of liberal governance. In this thesis I will address these latter concerns.
Currently, technological innovations and preventive rationalities have made possible the use of more efficient and effective surveillance practices (for example, camera surveillance) in our daily lives. Although surveillance technologies are often specifically designed to deter particular categories of offences and offenders, the introduction of these technologies carries the distinct possibility of producing other, both subtle and pronounced, effects on individual thinking and behaviour and social interactions, generally. Perhaps the speed at which these technologies are being applied stems from our fixation with the search for the techno-quick fix or ‘silver bullet’ solution to the recurrent problems associated with crime (Marx, 1995). However, despite the increasing use of these technologies, and pleas from opponents to halt the unchecked and intrusive nature of surveillance practices (see, for example, Flaherty, 1998; Crew, 1997), very little research has been undertaken to ascertain the long-term effects of these technologies.

It is conceivable that an individual’s awareness of the increasingly omnipresent ‘gaze’ of camera surveillance may result in constant self-monitoring and in changing the appearance of activities that fall outside ‘acceptable’ parameters. In this way, camera surveillance may be conceptualized as a medium that is capable of inducing discernible, intended and unintended, effects on social behaviour. Intended effects include the deterrence of various instances of criminal behaviour and consequently the prevention of victimization; unintended effects might include more subtle instances of individual behavioural constraint (for example, avoiding public displays of affection) or psychological changes related to the constant awareness of the possibility of being watched. Further, it is possible that the ubiquitous nature of these technologies
encourages behavioural self-constraint, whether one is actually being observed or not. In other words, the effects of these technologies may extend beyond the limits of actual physical surveillance and have a greater and more long-lasting impact on individual behaviour than might be intended.

The preventive rationalities that underlie the use of camera surveillance are reflective of a particular mode of governance that expects and/or encourages individual responsibility in relation to risk-management. Consequently, a population generally adhering to the expectations of surveillance technologies may serve to legitimize the use of various preventive practices, and by extension, the governing bodies that promote them. This thesis will commence with an exploration of camera surveillance as a preventive strategy/practice and a discussion of its deterrent effects. This introduction to camera surveillance (in chapter 1) will provide the foundation from which to explore camera surveillance in relation to two key (and interrelated) areas that are the pivotal focus of this thesis (chapter 2 and 3), namely camera surveillance as a panoptic technology and as a method of governance.
Chapter 1: Camera Surveillance – A Preventive Practice

This chapter serves as an introduction to the use and evaluations of the effectiveness of camera surveillance as a preventive practice. There is limited research from which to ascertain the effectiveness of camera surveillance in reaching its intended goals. I will bring together some of the information that is available so as to provide an introductory discussion of the deterrent effect of these technologies.

Crime Prevention and Camera Surveillance

Crime prevention is a term that encompasses a broad array of ideas and strategies which attempt to reduce incidents of crime and victimization, involve the community in reducing the risks associated with crime, and strive to quell citizens’ often exaggerated fears of victimization (Cunningham and Griffiths, 1997). Crime-reducing strategies involve three levels of intervention: primary, secondary and tertiary (Ibid.). Primary prevention strategies endeavour to extinguish various problems associated with crime before they have arisen, thereby making it difficult or impossible for both offenders (or potential offenders) to participate in crime and for potential victims to be victimized. Secondary prevention strategies seek to alleviate situational risk factors already present that are associated with particular types of crime and victimization. Tertiary crime prevention programs are implemented after a criminal incident or victimization, and are therefore focused on reducing the likelihood of recidivism or revictimization, i.e. specific deterrence (Ibid.). Although the use of camera surveillance as a preventive tool/practice is found in each level of intervention, it appears to have the greatest potential within the second level of intervention, specifically situational crime prevention.
Formal and informal surveillance practices are part of many ‘crime prevention through environmental design’ projects. In a pure form they would exemplify primary level intervention strategies, yet the expense of constructing fully panoptic spaces ensures that cheaper surveillance-based technologies are usually utilized as add-ons to existing environments. The monitoring of patients in mental institutions or inmates in prisons is an example of camera surveillance used ‘after the fact’ in the tertiary level of intervention. Nevertheless, surveillance is utilized in this way to prevent inappropriate behaviour within the institution, and therefore is situationally focussed and more reflective of the secondary level of intervention. An exploration of the key ideas that inspire secondary crime prevention, and its relationship to camera surveillance follows.

In recent years, there has been a movement, both theoretical and pragmatic, towards the utilization of the model of situational crime prevention (SCP) to address the recurrent problems associated with crime. Currently, SCP strategies provide us with a quintessential example of secondary level intervention practices. There are three principal elements of SCP theory. First, dispositionally-based theories of criminality are shunned, in favour of a rational choice perspective toward crime and victimization. This latter perspective “assumes that potential offenders are (imperfect) rational decision-makers who seek to benefit themselves economically and otherwise through the commission of crime” (Rosenbaum, Lurigio, and Davis, 1998: 155). Second, proponents of SCP presume that situations are more stable, less variable, and therefore more predictable than individuals. The prevention focus, then, moves away from individual indicators of criminality and risk of victimization, to the utilization and accumulation of actuarially-based information that focuses on categories of crime and victimization in
relation to various settings (for example, geographic crime mapping). Third, no longer is individual criminal motivation the focal point of preventive strategies. Instead, there is an increased emphasis on the way that opportunity facilitates crime and victimization. According to O’Malley (1992), however, SCP theory infers that “[o]pportunities only exist in relation to potential criminals who convert open windows into windows of opportunity for crime” (p. 264). In short, SCP represents a body of theory and practices that attempts to analyze and explain situationally-specific crime and victimization and alter environmental arrangements believed to facilitate particular categories of crime and victimization (Clarke and Homel, 1997). For the potential offender, the perceived rewards of criminal activity must be assessed to determine if they are outweighed by any risks or difficulties associated with the commission of a crime. For the potential victim, the assessment and management of risk becomes a primary consideration in decision-making with regard to most behaviours in everyday life (Rosenbaum, Lurigio and Davis, 1998; Newman and Marongiu, 1997; Wortley, 1997).

Ronald Clarke and Ross Homel (1997: 17) reflect the motivation/opportunity dichotomy represented in SCP theory when they state that there is a difference “between crime prevention measures designed to reduce criminal motivation and those designed simply to reduce opportunities for crime”. Further, they situate SCP exclusively in the opportunity-reducing category of crime prevention. Clarke and Homel base the distinction between ‘motivation’ and ‘opportunity’ on the assumption that criminal motivation is tied to the generalized need or disposition of potential offenders. On the theoretical level, SCP’s focus on situational ‘determinants’ of crime and victimization, and not offender disposition, clearly invites consideration of ‘opportunity’ while ignoring
or downplaying offender ‘motivation’. The problem with this approach, however, is that it does not encourage discussion on the relationship *between* these two (allegedly exclusive) categories in relation to SCP. SCP proponents fail to explore the possibility that an individual’s internalization of opportunity-reducing strategies (for example, vis-à-vis the use of camera surveillance) may, in fact, reduce (generally) individual motivation towards committing criminal and/or other deviant acts. In this way, opportunity-reducing strategies may directly fulfill their mandate by instantly deterring crime, while concurrently producing the indirect effect of reducing an individual’s present or future motivation towards engaging in any kind of risky and/or forbidden activity. Since SCP theory does not focus specifically on individual motivation, there is the possibility that it is limited as both an explanatory and strategic model. Consequently, individual motivation must be included in the discussion on panopticism (chapter 2) and governance (chapter 3) in relation to camera surveillance.

Ronald Clarke anticipates and attempts to circumvent such criticism by differentiating between individual ‘motivation’ and ‘motives’. The former category encompasses a general propensity and/or need that is manifest in criminal acts, although there is no particular target for such acts. The latter category recognizes the immediate, and therefore opportunistic, needs which provide the incentive to commit specific acts aimed at a particular target (Newman, 1997). Clearly, quelling situationally-specific ‘motives’ is the target of SCP measures; yet, simply adhering to the ‘motive/motivation’ and/or ‘motivation/opportunities’ distinctions, discourages any exploration and explanation of possible effects (whether intended or not) that strategies which target
individual opportunity or motive, like camera surveillance, may have on individual motivation.

Camera surveillance is a preventive practice that is both publicly and privately promoted and funded. Yet, in all its various forms and applications, camera surveillance is utilized to yield a set of very specific results that fit within the purview of SCP theory. Principally, camera surveillance can be conceptualized as a SCP tactic because it focuses on the criminal event rather than the motivated offender. Both offenders and victims are presumed to exercise rational choice in their decision-making. Therefore, the introduction of camera surveillance attempts to disrupt the undisciplined behavioural choices of potential offenders and victims by altering particular environments that are thought to encourage offending and victimization. The use of camera surveillance is believed to be effective precisely because a particular context or situation is manipulated in ways that increase “the opportunities for surveillance and thus the risks associated with offending” (Brown, 1995: 5). In this way, the use of camera surveillance reflects the rational choice perspective that underlies SCP strategies.

‘Routine activities theory’ is another set of ideas that inform SCP theory and practice. Here, three elements are thought to converge in producing activities generally, but offenses specifically: “a motivated offender, a suitable victim and the absence of a capable guardian” (Brown, 1995: 4). Nick Tilley (1993) suggests that camera surveillance can deter crime by disrupting any of these three factors. Surveillance cameras may increase the perceived risk of offending, thus deterring crime; CCTV cameras invite individuals to conduct themselves in a more ‘security conscious’ manner, thereby reducing the number of potential victims; cameras (themselves sentinels)
facilitate faster security/police response times and thereby increase levels of guardianship. The effect of encouraging individuals to adopt risk-reducing strategies/behaviours is an important factor, since it speaks to the possibility of more widespread behavioural effects of camera surveillance than may be generally intended (a discussion of this possibility will take place in chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis).

**Camera Surveillance: Form and Practice**

A precise description of camera surveillance is hampered by the diversity of technological options available and variance in their use. Surveillance cameras range in size from the more obvious models currently seen in a variety of public and private settings, to covert models that are the size of a small coin and can be hidden in a variety of seemingly ‘benign’ objects (for example, wall clocks, VCRs, and stuffed animals). Nonetheless, there are some basic requirements to most camera surveillance systems. Closed Circuit Television (CCTV), perhaps the most popular version of camera surveillance in use, is a video camera-based surveillance technology with three essential requirements: a video camera (with zoom lenses) that captures observable images\(^1\); a VCR or digital recorder that records the images ‘captured’ by the surveillance camera; and a monitor (black and white or colour) that allows one to view real-time and recorded images. A variety of additional features that can be added to enhance surveillance capabilities include a processor that allows one to view the images transmitted from numerous cameras at a central location; software that permits digital images to be

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\(^1\) The quality of images gathered has increased dramatically in recent years. Oft seen were the grainy black and white surveillance pictures that featured barely recognizable images. Currently, picture clarity is good enough with some systems to enable one to “recognize a cigarette pack at 100 meters” (Davies, 1998: 150).
transmitted via the Internet; movable bases that allow camera operators to gather images from a variety of positions from a single camera; protective screens that obscure the visibility of surveillance cameras, allowing more clandestine images to be gathered, while also protecting the camera from damage; and night vision technology that allows images in the dark to be viewed as one would see them in daylight (Davies, 1998).

Private uses of this technology are numerous and varied; however, generally, surveillance cameras are utilized in specific contexts to address particular categories of crime. Retail stores, banks and other businesses, for example, use this technology to deter internal and external theft, track productivity and protect the company against liability (Boal, 1998). Yet, as one store manager commented, placing “the cameras too prominently may instill undue concern in the minds of the general public that the [area is]...‘a dangerous place’” (Honess and Charman, 1992: 7). Publicly, local governments place cameras in common areas to deter specific crimes, collect evidence of crime, coordinate public resources (like police deployment) efficiently and effectively, and reassure the public that something is being done about criminal activity and victimization (Ibid.). As Montalbano (1996) argues, camera surveillance technologies are “[w]idely accepted in modern crime fighting. They cannot replace police patrols, but they can be invaluable silent partners, [making offenders] [e]asier to catch, easier to prosecute and easier to get off the streets” (p. A13). However, Graham, Brooks and Heery (1996) suggest that, although surveillance cameras are used to combat crime, the perception or fear of crime, not actual crime rates, is what perpetuates the use of these technologies. In other words, these initiatives may be more about showing the public that something is being done about crime, than actually reducing crime. This may help explain why,
despite limited evidence to suggest that camera surveillance is an effective crime deterrent, governments and the general public continue to support these strategies so strongly.

Although many cities worldwide are participating in camera surveillance related intervention strategies, none come close to the coordinated effort currently being made in Great Britain. As part of a government promoted SCP program, CCTV systems are being utilized throughout Great Britain to monitor individuals in public settings. In fact, the rate of growth in the use of CCTV technology in Great Britain led it to surpass all other western nations in the use of camera surveillance (Graham, Brooks and Heery, 1996). This fact is particularly disconcerting for opponents of camera surveillance, when one considers that the public surveillance networks often fill-in the spaces not covered by countless private CCTV systems. Although figures are changing rapidly, a report published in 1996 suggested that when private and public camera systems were considered together there were an estimated 150,000 surveillance cameras in place throughout Great Britain. Further, it was estimated that 500 new surveillance cameras were installed each week (Ibid.). One may presume the number of cameras in use has grown exponentially since these figures were cited, considering Home Office sponsorship of these programs continues, and camera surveillance remains a central feature of crime prevention strategies. Hundreds of millions of pounds have been spent on camera surveillance technologies to deter and detect crime by providing “an extra set of eyes for the police,....always ‘on the beat’ and able to provide an accurate and permanent record of what and who has been seen” (BBC News, 2000). Acknowledging the extent to which public and private space is now being monitored in Great Britain, Duffy (1999) suggests
that individuals no longer have the opportunity to be camera shy, since individuals within some cities are observable on CCTV every 5 minutes.

However, the use of surveillance technologies, particularly camera surveillance, is not without its opponents (Flaherty, 1998; Crew, 1997). Advocates of civil liberties argue vehemently against the expanding use of surveillance technologies which, in the name of public safety, are encroaching on private space, and thus appear to be eroding individual autonomy and dignity. Although the vagueness of opponents’ demands limits the strength of their arguments, they convey a sense of urgency in their requests for the prevention of unnecessary and unchecked surveillance practices. Accordingly, these organizations, groups and individuals argue the necessity of providing strict policy guidelines and legal limits to the use of these technologies and the information that is gathered from them. These general types of concerns were mirrored in information gathered in the early 1990s from a public survey about the use of camera surveillance in Great Britain. Those surveyed were asked to identify possible negative implications of camera surveillance practices. Although the specific answers of individuals varied, Honess and Charman (1992) found that responses generally related to six key categories of concerns:

(i) Controllers might ‘look for’ incidents to justify installation costs
(ii) Controllers of CCTV might abuse the system
(iii) Once installed, CCTV might be used in covert ways
(iv) There was a general unease at ‘being watched’
(v) CCTV ‘evidence’ might be misleading
(vi) There may be a gradual erosion of civil liberties (p. 8).

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2 Central to this criticism of surveillance (in a variety of forms) is the issue of privacy, which (although outside the scope of this thesis) deserves increased attention in theoretical analysis because of the extent of present-day surveillance practices and their incremental encroachment on what has traditionally been regarded as private space. For an introduction to the main arguments in this area respective to both data and image surveillance, see Agre and Rotenberg (1998), Gandy (1993), and Bennett (1992).
Reflecting on evidence suggesting limitations to the long-term effectiveness of camera surveillance in deterring crime, Crew (1997) asks that we consider less intrusive “strategies or devices [that] might be employed at less cost or with greater likelihood of success”. Specifically, Crew is asking us to consider the financial ‘cost’ of camera surveillance. The question being raised is whether there are less costly methods of achieving the intended crime-deterrent effects of these technologies? However, and more importantly for this discussion, the notion of ‘cost’ also challenges us to contemplate possible iatrogenic effects of the use of camera surveillance technologies.

In reference to this latter consideration, four main iatrogenic ‘costs’ or effects have been identified in the literature in relation to the widespread use of surveillance technologies. First, it is probable that surveillance technologies have some displacement effect on crime. In their analysis of the effectiveness of camera surveillance in deterring crime in South Africa, Glanz and Nacerodien (n.d.) suggest that a general pattern of crime displacement is a contributing factor in explaining reduced crime rates in a specific area after the installation of cameras. Other authors (see Brown, 1995; Tilley, 1993) studying the deterrent-effect of camera surveillance have similarly drawn the conclusion that crime displacement may be occurring within particular categories of crime in specific situations; however, this is an extremely difficult assertion to either prove or deny. For example, Poyner (1992) found no displacement effect after surveillance cameras (two functional and three fake) were installed on five buses in Great Britain. In fact, this study found that vandalism was reduced in the entire 80 bus fleet after the introduction of this intervention strategy; however, any enthusiasm that stems from these findings must be tempered, somewhat, by an acknowledgement that this category of offenses may not be
reflective of most categories of crime. Brown (1995) suggests that the "presence of cameras might be expected to have most effect within confined areas, or within those areas where camera coverage is extensive and on those offences that are planned and relatively conspicuous" (p. 10). Thus, camera surveillance might be effective in dealing with this particular category of crime, with little or no displacement effect, whereas in other situations the results may be less satisfying.

A second potential iatrogenic effect stems from what has been labeled 'function creep'. This term refers to the well-intentioned expansion in the applications of existing surveillance practices, beyond their original 'mandate' (Flaherty, 1998). For example, surveillance cameras that are installed in public spaces in an attempt to reduce car theft or burglary may subsequently be used to monitor other forms of 'deviant' (and not necessarily criminal) behaviour, like public drunkenness or littering. This is a particularly potent observation in relation to preventive intervention strategies, given that legislators, policy-makers, and the police are under intense pressure to maximize returns from public investments by "reduc[ing] costs,...promot[ing] efficiency, and...spend[ing] public money wisely" (Ibid.). Further, the expanding use of surveillance tactics may increase rather than decrease the fears of crime they are supposed alleviate. Widespread use of camera surveillance may suggest to some people that governments, through their sponsorship of preventive programs involving surveillance, are implying that crime is out of control and it "is so dangerous that we have to spy on you to protect you" (Crew, 1997).

Third, despite the appearance of impartiality, there is a potential for the focus of surveillance to be discriminatory in nature. Surveillance practices may reify or enhance
the negative categorization of individuals or communities since “marginalized and socially disadvantaged groups, who already receive disproportionate attention from the state, are more likely to come to notice because of their unusual or stereotyped appearance or behaviour” (Flaherty, 1998). Further, although anyone could be the object of camera surveillance, very few have control over and access to the data gathered. This is a significant concern because the images captured by surveillance cameras may be gathered by or sold to employers, insurance companies, sales people, and various news agencies and production companies (to name a few ‘interested’ parties) for purposes that may be bothersome and/or discriminatory in nature, thereby negatively affecting the people who are ‘observed’.

A fourth iatrogenic effect of camera surveillance, which requires extended contemplation, stems from the potential of these technologies to produce diffuse and subtle social control effects among the general population irrespective of their ability to prevent crime. Such a consideration is the principal impetus for writing this thesis, and thus will be considered in greater detail in chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis. First, however, the discussion turns to an exploration of the effectiveness of camera surveillance in deterring crime.

Camera Surveillance: An Analysis of its Effects

Generally, camera surveillance technologies are implemented as a specific strategy to reduce crime through detection and deterrence, curtail fear of crime among the general populace, and promote consumer confidence and therefore business viability in specific areas. It is the panoptic functions of these technologies, specifically ubiquitous
and unverifiable surveillance, which is believed contributive to bringing about these changes. Essentially, the core objective being promoted by advocates of CCTV technology is that of crime reduction, while fear of crime and economic viability are addressed indirectly by dealing with this primary concern. Moreover, advocates argue that the visibility (both physical and advertised) of camera surveillance technologies may alleviate unwarranted fears\(^3\) of crime through the suggestion that concrete preventive strategies are in place, despite the lack of ‘convincing’ evidence that crime is being reduced substantially and directly by camera surveillance practices.

The widespread use of camera surveillance technologies has been subject to few studies seeking to test the effectiveness of these practices in reaching their intended goals. Perhaps this stems from the general support these strategies have among targeted populaces, the police and public officials. In an evaluation of the support for camera surveillance initiatives in Great Britain, Honess and Charman (1992) found that public support ranged from 85% to 92%; however, support was notwithstanding concerns of its overuse. Thirty six percent of respondents did not hold a ‘more is necessarily better’ attitude in relation to the use of camera surveillance. This latter finding suggests that there are limits to the general public’s acceptance of these technologies; however, evidence that camera surveillance is effective in reducing crime could subdue mild anxieties. The knowledge about camera surveillance that is available to the general public is largely made up of anecdotal accounts of the success of surveillance and small

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\(^3\) This position appears to contradict the aforementioned suggestion that visible examples of camera surveillance may perpetuate, not quell, public fear of crime; however, this situation reflects the contrast between worldviews expressed by either proponents or opponents of the use of camera surveillance. It is likely that either position is correct depending on the particular situation and/or specific individual involved.
police-based studies reported by the local media. It appears that although the use of camera surveillance is generally well received and perceived as effective in reducing crime, public opinion is largely based on incomplete and inaccurate knowledge of the performance and capabilities of publicly situated camera surveillance technologies (Ibid.). Since it is probable that the general public's knowledge (and lack thereof) of the various practices and effects of camera surveillance emanates from media coverage of this area⁴, some typical newspaper examples involving these technologies follow.

Recently, a male Russian cosmonaut forcibly kissed a Canadian female crewmember during a space-station simulation program. This incident is significant to this discussion because – as was emphasized in various media reports – the assault took place away from the view of surveillance cameras (Teahen, 2000). This suggests one of two things. First, if the cosmonaut in question did not take into consideration that he might have been observed (despite being aware of the surveillance cameras), then one could surmise that camera surveillance was ineffective in producing a deterrent effect in this specific case. Second, if the cosmonaut was aware of the surveillance cameras, yet decided to behave purposefully and inappropriately away from them (as was suggested by the victim), then there was a deliberate attempt to subvert the capabilities of this technology. Further, if this latter scenario is correct, the surveillance cameras present produced a displacement effect on the crime being committed – away from an observable space, to an unobservable one. Therefore, it may be inferred that more comprehensive

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⁴ Ray Surette (1992), in an extensive evaluation of the literature on media's role in shaping public perceptions, discusses how the media (both 'entertainment' and 'news') influence the viewpoints of individuals in relation to criminal justice issues. This influence is particularly strong when the issues debated are new (p. 85, 102). Given the relative newness of the camera surveillance issue, it is likely that public perceptions of the extensive use of camera surveillance may be considerably influenced by both entertainment and news media.
surveillance may have prevented the assault. Clearly, it would be a foolhardy task to extrapolate definitively a model of the effects of camera surveillance based on a single and limited example – something I am not attempting to do; yet, in a similar fashion, public opinions about the use of camera surveillance are to a large extent formed via the limited and often sensational case examples that the media offer for public consumption.

In another case, Mrs. Boles noticed that vegetables were being pilfered from her country-road stand. Not wanting to challenge the honesty of her neighbours, she purchased video surveillance equipment to observe who was stealing her produce. Three individuals were caught on tape and later plead guilty to petty-larceny (CNEWS, 1998a). There is no indication whether the surveillance was covert or overt; however, this incident demonstrates to the reader that even when the offenders are not deterred by the installation of video surveillance (which is particularly understandable in cases of covert surveillance), this technology nonetheless proves effective as a crime detecting and evidence gathering tool. In another story, involving the ‘misuse’ of food, four individuals plead guilty to misdemeanor charges after throwing eggs at the residences of town officials. Indirect evidence of their involvement was discovered on surveillance tapes at the local grocery store (the only one in this town) where they had purchased the eggs (CNEWS, 1998b). This story underscores a potentially important feature of camera surveillance as an effective crime reduction/detection tool. A collage of our daily movements, both mundane and deviant, can be formed from the numerous recorded images gathered from various public and private surveillance cameras. Further, increases of the use of various surveillance technologies both broaden and tighten the ‘web’ of surveillance that we are subjected to daily. As such, all the activities before, during and
after a criminal offense, which are recorded by surveillance systems, can be pieced together and thereby assist police in tracking down potential suspects. To this end, police in Seattle requisitioned surveillance tapes from a shoe store for the purpose of identifying suspects and reconstructing the events of a riot (Batsell and Ortiz, 1997).

In another ‘success’ story, a man was apprehended after stealing money from local ATM machines. Although he hid his face from the camera’s view, he inadvertently wore a hat bearing the name of a construction company he had worked for (Camilli, 2000). Despite the eventual triumph of the camera derived evidence, a significant aspect of this story is that it presents an individual who was undeterred by the surveillance technology before him. The man merely attempted to outmaneuver the technology by hiding his face. Likely, he would have avoided detection altogether were it not for the ‘fatal’ mistake of wearing an identifiable article of clothing. Indeed, there are many incidents reported by the media, where individuals remain motivated to commit criminal acts, despite the use of surveillance technologies. For example, another bank robber (who was later apprehended) stole $46,000 and the bank’s VHS surveillance tape in an attempt to avoid detection (Whitely, 1996). Both these examples demonstrate attempts by individuals to subvert the capabilities of surveillance technologies through various means. In this way, stories of this nature show that the effectiveness of camera surveillance as a crime deterrent mechanism can be compromised by determined individuals. For, if the capabilities of these technologies can be outmaneuvered, then their reliability as a crime-reducing tool are diminished and any claims to their alleged effectiveness are, to some degree, eroded.
The reasons for including such examples are twofold. First, while these stories are characteristic of the type of knowledge about camera surveillance that the general public is most often privy to, which may confuse their understanding of the actual capabilities and impact of these technologies, cumulatively, they invite individuals to form opinions about the effectiveness and necessity of camera surveillance based on sparse evidence. Second, the vast majority of news stories involving camera surveillance highlight incidents where individuals are observed offending (as is discussed in the examples above), which, ironically, undermines claims that these technologies are an effective deterrent to crime. Nevertheless, these types of stories provide some evidence that camera surveillance is effective in detecting crime, and therefore send a message of high risk of apprehension. This may promote a general perception that justice is being served through their continuing use. This may be one reason why public support of camera surveillance is so high. What remains unclear, on a broader scale, is on what basis official claims about the effectiveness of these technologies are made. This is where the discussion now turns.

In Great Britain, one public official stated that the use of CCTV technology (in conjunction with increased lighting) in secure car parks resulted in a 70% reduction in car theft (and related crimes) (BBC News, 1999a). In Glasgow, CCTV technology is purported to have reduced crime by 68% (Montalbano, 1996). In Berwick, England, surveillance cameras are considered the major reason why burglaries fell by 69% after their introduction (Ibid.). In Tacoma, Washington, police officials credited surveillance cameras with prompting a decrease in homicides by 40% and drive-by shootings by 33%. In Tukwila, Washington, surveillance cameras are heralded for reducing crime in the area
by 80% (Madden, 2000). Reductions in various categories of crime attributed to the use of camera surveillance in these examples appear impressive; however, these reports do not disclose how these figures have been arrived at. While this does not imply that these official claims should be discounted outright, it does suggest that the figures should be interpreted with caution.

In contrast, a study conducted for the Scottish Centre for Criminology, suggests that the 32 cameras that watch over public space in Glasgow have not produced a reduction in targeted crimes (BBC News, 1999b). Flaherty (1998) cites a report that indicates that CCTV initiatives in Times Square, New York, failed to reduce crime. Further, it claimed that “[w]hen officials in New Jersey installed cameras in subway stations, crimes actually increased” (Ibid.). Clearly, in this instance, it would be inappropriate to claim that surveillance cameras were causally related to an increase in crime; yet, when surveillance cameras appear to reduce criminal behaviours, a causal relationship is often assumed. As these findings suggest, camera surveillance appears to produce mixed results in deterring crime, and therefore may not be the technology-based panacea for crime control/deterrence that it has been claimed to be.

The discrepancy in reported ‘facts’ is unsurprising considering the relative paucity of research in this area. Further, hopeful proponents have made enormous personal and financial investments in these technology-based initiatives, and recognize that in order to be effective, these technologies must appear to be effective. This has propagated an intense desire, among many individuals and organizations, for these initiatives to produce (or appear to produce) remarkable reductions in crime. Therefore, successful stories and statistics are ‘necessarily’ revealed, despite their uncertain reliability and validity. At the
core of this point is the role of experts as technocrats. According to Berger and Kellner (1981), technicism is reflective of one extreme on a continuum that ranges from explicitly technocratic to expressly ideological. The key characteristics of a technicist mindset are: the belief that one can readily confront complex social problems through the introduction of ‘simple’ solutions; approaches are generally quantifiable; expertise is meted out ‘at a distance’, so there is low emotional involvement; cost benefit considerations weigh heavily in decision-making (Ibid.).

It would be reductive to suggest that all expertise in relation to camera surveillance is necessarily technicist; however, the technocratic worldview (or interpretative framework) has a great impact on the delivery of these technologies. The complexity of perceived social ‘problems’ (in this case, particular categories of crime) is addressed vis-à-vis specific techniques (for example, surveillance practices) enabled by particular rationalities premised on control, prediction, effectiveness and efficiency (Henshel, 1990). The various players involved in the design, implementation and evaluation of camera surveillance initiatives have a vested interest in the success of these practices; therefore, there is “pressure to produce immediately applicable results” (Berger and Kellner, 1981: 124). Governments and local police agencies assume that there is a greater likelihood of surveillance cameras deterring crime if the general public is well informed of any successes related to these technologies. This scenario perpetuates a ‘hired gun’ mentality where ‘experts’ work to produce measurable results for the agencies that hired them. The fact that surveillance practices continue to expand, despite evidence suggesting limitations to their effectiveness, speaks to the technicist worldview that may underlie these strategies. This being said, however, in Great Britain
particularly, where the use of CCTV as a government sponsored campaign to reduce crime is extensive, more rigorous studies have emerged to investigate camera surveillance’s effectiveness in deterring crime. An exploration of this evidence follows.

The Central Research Unit of the Scottish Home Office (1999) studied the impact of Glasgow’s camera surveillance prevention project which commenced in late 1994. The purpose of this study was to ascertain the effectiveness of this strategy in reducing crime and fear of crime. The evidence was compiled using police crime statistics in conjunction with interviews of people living in Glasgow. The study found that “[i]n the 12 months after installation of the cameras there were 3,156 fewer crimes and offences than the average for the 24 months preceding installation” (Ibid.); however, although crime rates fell in certain categories of crime, when the figures were adjusted to reflect the general trend of decreasing crime rates, the evidence no longer supported a causal link between reduced incidences of crime and the introduction of CCTV. This study is significant because the data analyzed came from a city that has utilized camera surveillance for an extended period of time. Consequently, the long-term impact of these technologies on crime was more easily discernible in this study. The authors concluded that although the overall volume of registered offences appears to have been reduced following the introduction of strategic camera surveillance, it is likely that national trends of decreasing crime rates provide a more accurate explanation for the reduction of crime in Glasgow during this time.

Ben Brown (1995) conducted a case study of the effectiveness of camera surveillance in three towns in England: Newcastle, Birmingham, and King’s Lynn. The research involved an examination of CCTV and police incident data, coupled with
interviews of individuals involved in the CCTV projects, police and public officials. Generally, the findings of these case studies indicate that camera surveillance is effective in reducing incidences of property crime (particularly burglary and theft from vehicles and vehicle theft); however, it appears that initial decreases in property crime rates fade over time. In Newcastle, in areas utilizing camera surveillance, reports of burglaries dropped by 56%, and ‘criminal damage’ incidents were reduced by 34%. However, in areas that were not using camera surveillance, ‘other thefts’ (principally thefts of property) also dropped but only by 18%. Both these sets of percentages are based on the average monthly totals for specific offences reported to police between January 1991 and June 1993; cameras became fully operational in March 1993. A shortcoming of this study, given its time period, is that it could only (attempt to) grasp the short-term effects of the use of camera surveillance in these areas. Brown notes that, generally, crime rates were declining prior to the installation of CCTV initiatives; therefore, the large percentage decreases in crime attributed to the use of camera surveillance may be exaggerated. Yet, there is evidence to suggest that the rate of decline was sharper in areas utilizing camera surveillance.

CCTV was found to be less effective in deterring personal crime (public order and assault offences). The use of camera surveillance had little effect on incidents of robbery and theft from persons; however, recorded images facilitated crime detection/identification, investigation and conviction of offenders. A critical factor in

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5 Although not a personal crime, in one example, police used CCTV technology to gather evidence of a gang who was stealing merchandise from parked trucks. The evidence captured by this surveillance tactic was crucial in convicting these offenders. In another incident, a CCTV operator watched as two assailants attacked an individual (who later died from the injuries) at a bus stop. The individual watching this situation unfold on camera alerted the police, who arrested the perpetrators before they could flee the scene (Brown, 1995).
determining the effectiveness of preventive strategies in reducing crime, is whether or not crime has been displaced after the implementation of these strategies. For, if crime is merely reduced in one area because patterns of criminal behaviour have moved elsewhere, then the alleged deterrent effect of camera surveillance is undermined. Brown found that the use of camera surveillance displaced some categories of personal crime, although there appeared to be no displacement of property crimes. The author concluded that “[t]he...likelihood of crimes being displaced by the cameras depends on the nature of the offence, the type of area the cameras are located in and the extent of the camera coverage within this area” (Ibid., p. 64).

Nick Tilley (1993) conducted a study of the effectiveness of camera surveillance in reducing incidences of car crime (in car parks) in six cities in England. He found that, generally, car crime fell after the installation of camera surveillance, yet effects were short-lived. Further, the effectiveness of CCTV increased when it was used in tandem with other preventive measures. He warns that one should interpret reductions in car crime (specifically) and crime (generally) that result from camera surveillance initiatives modestly, for the impact might be merely short-term. Also, since the effectiveness of camera surveillance in reducing car theft was greatest when utilized in conjunction with other measures, any claim that CCTV is directly effective in deterring these types of crime is seriously undermined. Other measures that were implemented, variously, in the cities being investigated included: physical alterations like increased lighting and installation of fences; increased visibility of security guards; broadcasting success stories and advertising the potential risks of offending. It is plausible that the ‘other’ measures
may have been the critical factors in deterring car theft, and not merely effective working partners.

Lorraine Glanz and Fatima Nacerodien (n.d.) conducted a study of the use of camera surveillance in Benoni, South Africa. Crime statistics were examined from January to June 1995 and January to September 1996. Prior to this study, various officials had claimed the outright success of camera surveillance initiatives, based on reductions in crime that ranged from 9.3% to 17%; one optimistic newspaper reported a decline in crime rates of 35% following the installation of surveillance cameras. Conflicting figures, presumably, stem from that fact that different time frames were considered when drawing information from the crime statistics; nonetheless, disparity between figures is rampant in reports of surveillance cameras' effectiveness, generally. Glanz and Nacerodien found that rates of specific categories of crime (for example, car theft and breaking and entering) dropped significantly after the implementation of camera surveillance; however, while general crime rates for the same periods actually increased, Glanz and Nacerodien suggest that crime displacement (to different areas, and from one category of crime to another) may be a contributing factor in the declining crime rates in areas using camera surveillance. For example, whereas, motor vehicle theft decreased by approximately 25% per month, other forms of theft increased by approximately 7% per month. Further, although crime rates in Benoni dropped by an average of 8.8%, crime increased in the surrounding areas of Benoni by 46%.

Although surveillance cameras are intended to deter specific categories of crime, we have seen that the more rigorous studies of their effectiveness have found mixed results in this regard. Therefore, initial optimism and claims to the overwhelming
success of camera surveillance initiatives should be interpreted with caution, for more comprehensive research is needed in this area to determine the long-term effects (including effects that are not part of the central reasoning for the use of camera surveillance) of these technologies. The possibility of crime displacement, the inequity of surveillance practices, and camera surveillance’s encroachment on private space, are important considerations of the use of these technologies. This being said, however, the points discussed in this chapter, although informative, ignore two relevant considerations specific to the use of camera surveillance: the issue of panopticism, and the issue of governance. The following chapters provide an exploration and analysis of these two key issues in the effort to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the potential effects of these camera surveillance technologies and indicate where further research in this area might turn.
Chapter 2: Panopticism and Camera Surveillance

As indicated in the concluding paragraph of the preceding chapter, a notable concern, which has received little theoretical and substantive attention, stems from the more widespread (and subtle) forms of social control that may be enabled or effected by the use of camera surveillance. This chapter will address this key concern through an exploration and analysis of camera surveillance as a panoptic technology.

Power/Knowledge and Interiorization of the Panoptic ‘Gaze’

At the core of this analysis is Bentham’s design for a reformatory prison. Although his project never reached fruition in its intended form, both the architectural design and the theory behind it have been implemented, to varying degrees, in a multitude of settings. Foucault’s analysis provides for exactly this contingency, for, although his discussion of panopticism is premised on Bentham’s architectural design, he states that “the Panopticon...must be understood as a generalizable model of functioning; a way of defining power relations in terms of the everyday life of men” (Ibid., 1977: 205). Specifically, Foucault claims that panopticism is pervasive in society/social relations and is a mechanism of power that can exist in a multitude of forms (see Lyon, 1994). Although Foucault’s analysis is historically specific, this expanded conceptualization of panopticism serves as the foundation for my theoretical exploration of camera surveillance as a panoptic technology. From this starting point, then, I will attempt to draw contemporary linkages, in relation to camera surveillance, to Foucault’s concept of panopticism. In design, surveillance cameras appear to be vastly different mechanisms than the panoptic prison; however, given Foucault’s claim that panopticism
takes on many forms throughout society and social relations, one can explore ways that these two disciplinary mechanisms are, at least in intention, functionally similar.

Foucault’s explanation and analysis of panopticism presumes an understanding of his conceptualization of the power/knowledge construct, whereby each of these notions is postulated to be one part of an intimate and mutually informing relationship. “[T]here is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations” (Foucault, 1977: 27). Power produces knowledge, and knowledge produces power; the interdependent nature of this relationship facilitates cumulative advances in both power and knowledge.

Central to the claimed effectiveness of panopticism, is the ‘eye’ or ‘gaze’ through which the Panopticon both reveals and realizes its intended effects and therefore the power being exercised through them. In the Panopticon, each prisoner who is under the ‘gaze’ of the central tower becomes a source of knowledge (or object of information) to those individuals watching him/her. The hypothesized effect of Panopticon’s power is that those subjected to and cognizant of the omnipresent ‘gaze’, assume “responsibility for the constraints of power...[thus] becom[ing] the principle of [their] own subjection” (Ibid., 1977: 203). Prisoners, therefore, take it upon themselves to project the behaviours suggested and/or believed necessary to end their imprisonment, but in doing so have internalized, and thus enable, the power that they are subjected to. In this way, each individual being watched is expected to (and may in fact) become “his own overseer,...thus exercising this surveillance over, and against himself” (Ibid., 1980: 155).
As such, the Panopticon's power is not merely a coercive obligatory and/or prohibitive power exercised on and against those being watched. It is also a power that is enabled, expressed, and made manifest through the various reactive behaviours (executed in accordance to the expectations of the 'gaze') of its 'objects'. At each stage in this process of self-discipline the prisoner becomes a cumulative source of knowledge that makes possible enriched advancements in power. Therefore, Foucault (1977) states that the panoptic institution functions as a kind of laboratory of power. Thanks to its mechanisms of observation, it gains in efficiency and in the ability to penetrate into men's behavior; knowledge follows the advances of power, discovering new objects of knowledge over all the surfaces on which power is exercised (p. 204).

Although camera surveillance does not always function in the centralized fashion present in the Panopticon, the exercise of power/knowledge operates similarly between these technologies. Camera surveillance, like the Panopticon, can be conceptualized as a knowledge producing technology (a source of examinable information) that reflects and reproduces power relations between those being observed and those exercising the panoptic power. Camera surveillance, like the Panopticon, is thought to be effective in rendering its deterrent effect through its power of observation. Individuals subject to the 'gaze' of a surveillance camera are encouraged to pass through its field of vision in a self-reflective manner. If specific deviant behaviours are not displayed, observations of them will cease. Or will they? Surveillance camera systems are designed to both observe and record images. Recorded images provide a semi-permanent record of behaviours that can be viewed and interpreted over and over again. From these records, supplementary knowledge can be gleaned, that may result in power being exercised in increasingly
focused ways. For example, recorded images become a source from which to discern categories of ‘normal’ behaviour that then become the baseline for acceptable behaviour in subsequent observations. Also, the ‘knowledge’ recorded by surveillance cameras may be used as evidence to either exonerate or convict suspects.

Therefore, unlike the panoptical prison scenario where cumulative self-monitoring and self-control is rewarded by a suspension of the ‘gaze’ (when one is released), individuals subject to the ‘gaze’ of camera surveillance cannot be assured that practicing ‘acceptable’ behaviours will result in less surveillance of themselves generally. In this way, individuals are always potentially a source of examinable knowledge. One can see, then, how the use of camera surveillance has the potential effect of concurrently encouraging individual self-monitoring while making observable the various changes in individual expression and/or behaviour. Subsequent forms of individual self-constraint serve as continual and cumulative sources of knowledge that, in turn, facilitate advances in, and are indicative of, Panopticon’s power.

Yet, a key feature of the Panopticon’s power is that cumulative advances in power do not originate from the various individuals observing the prisoners – it is the central tower itself that is the exercise of power. In fact, it is not even important that there are individuals watching prisoners from the tower. The Panopticon is a mechanism that “automatizes and disindividualizes power” (Ibid., 1977: 202). The exercise of power within a panoptic institution is not contingent upon particular individuals with specific motivations; it is not a form of power that one can ‘possess’. Consequently, each observer becomes the extension and bearer of Panopticon’s power while never claiming ownership of its ‘influence’. In other words, “power is exercised rather than possessed; it
is not the ‘privilege’, acquired or preserved, of the dominant class, but the overall effect of its strategic positions” (Ibid., 1977: 26). The architectural design of the Panopticon permits this disindividualization of power. A natural lighting arrangement emanating from outside each cell ensures that each prisoner can only see the outline of the central tower. Moreover, a shutter and partition system ensures that this structure is impenetrable to the gaze of prisoners (Bentham, 1962). Therefore, prisoners cannot know definitively whether or not they are being observed at a given moment. In this way, anyone watching from the central tower is exercising the power of the Panopticon and thus enabling its potential effects.

Similarly, the design of overt surveillance cameras makes it nearly impossible for the potential targets to establish whether they are, in fact, being watched. One cannot peer through the lens of a surveillance camera to discern whether it has been activated, whether the images are recorded on a tape, and whether someone is actually watching the scene on a monitor. Of course, some cameras are mounted on moveable bases so that they can follow the activities of potential offenders. Clearly, if someone is being ‘followed’ by a surveillance camera there is evidence that they are being observed. Yet, the person being observed still cannot know who is watching them. In addition, many cameras designed to scan over a particular area are ‘shielded’ with opaque coverings so that the camera’s movements cannot be detected. These coverings also obscure the ability for one to identify readily if a surveillance camera is present.

Another example of the disindividualizing effects of camera surveillance stems from the practices of making visible the images captured by these technologies. Numerous retail stores and banks present real-time images, via television screens, of what
their cameras are observing. In this way, customers are made aware of the fact that they are being observed; however, again, there is no indication of a particular ‘official’ viewer. Moreover, this contingency necessitates that the idea of the ‘watcher’ be expanded, for anyone watching the screen becomes an observer and thus is exercising and enabling a form of panoptic power. The aforementioned scenario also provides a postmodern twist: the person observing may concurrently be the person who is being observed – we are invited to watch ourselves (Manning, 1999). By viewing ourselves on screens and adjusting our image in reaction to this obtained knowledge, we reflect the outmost expression of the disindividualizing aspect of panoptic power in relation to camera surveillance. Many establishments are also displaying very realistic fake surveillance cameras in an attempt to produce the same effects possible through more expensive, operational models. Here, the ‘visible’ and ‘unverifiable’ unite and reflect the disindividualized exercise of panoptic power. In this case, no one is watching; therefore, the exercise of power is only enabled by the individual customer who recognizes the possibility of being observed.

**Panopticon’s Gaze – The Eye of Power**

Bentham’s design for the Panopticon consisted of a circular building divided into laterally partitioned cells, all of which are visible to those within a central tower – the eye of power. A primary component of this prison’s design is that outside light passes through each cell thus illuminating all prisoners to those authorities watching; however, although the shape of the central tower is constantly visible, a system of window shutters on the tower ensures that prisoners are unable to determine when they are, in fact, being
observed. In this way, Bentham surmised that the effectiveness of Panopticon's power rested in its visible and yet unverifiable nature: visible in that the prisoner can continually behold the central tower that 'watches' him/her; unverifiable in that the prisoner cannot know whether or not he/she is being watched from moment to moment and therefore must assume the 'gaze' to be constant, and act accordingly (Foucault, 1977). Further, through practices of segregation, the design of the Panopticon ensured that all prisoners could be viewed at any time, yet each would experience being the subject of observation individually. Therefore, this visible and unverifiable disciplinary technology produces a field of surveillance that is "both global and individualising" (Ibid., 1980: 146).

Bentham claimed that a method of observation maintaining visibility and unverifiability would encourage individuals to monitor their thinking and behaviours, and exert self-control when deemed necessary, expected and/or appropriate; however, what is not readily apparent is how these two elements work outside of the closed environment of the panoptic prison, hospital and mental institution. Specifically, what needs to be explored are the 'visible' and 'unverifiable' characteristics of camera surveillance in public settings, and in what ways these elements are integral to the functioning and effectiveness of these technologies.

Decentralized forms of overt camera surveillance, like the central tower, operate by making particular spaces (and all things within them) observable; however, the diminutive nature of surveillance cameras permits one to utilize them as technological add-ons to construct existing spaces as panoptic spaces. In other words, one need not necessarily design, from the ground up, a panoptic environment as Bentham did. An important feature of camera surveillance as a panoptic technology, then, is its ability to
render most existing spaces observable. Further, the potential to place surveillance cameras in a vast array of locations facilitates the increased public visibility of these technologies. Currently, for example, surveillance cameras are visible on street corners, parks, banks, retail stores, parking garages and schools. As such, numerous decentralized forms of visible surveillance may, collectively, produce more widespread effects than envisioned by Bentham in relation to his closed and highly specific panoptic environment— the prison.

However, the advent of inexpensive and minute covert surveillance cameras necessitates that one reconsider the role of ‘visibility’ in the panoptic self-control equation. Hidden cameras that have a lens the size of a pinhead and a body the size of a small coin allow one to gather surveillance images potentially anywhere. These cameras are not visible, and yet are lauded for their capability not only to detect offenders but also potentially deter them. Such claims seem to undermine the critical importance given to the role of ‘visibility’ in producing the intended deterrent effect of the panoptic ‘gaze’. This being said, however, the invisible nature of covert cameras ensures that surveillance is ‘unverifiable’, thus maintaining another key feature of panopticism. Here, the ‘unverifiable’ nature of panoptic power must be considered more broadly. When hidden, the surveillance camera itself does not give us a clue as to whether or not we may be observed. Therefore, unverifiable forms of surveillance may not, in themselves, produce the intended deterrent and self-control effects. In order to enable the effects of covert surveillance (and perhaps surveillance generally), individuals must know about the potentially clandestine and far-reaching capabilities of these cameras. In other words, covert camera surveillance may be effective in deterring crime because, increasingly, we
come to believe that the use of covert technology could, at any point, render us observable.

Omnipresent surveillance, a related characteristic of panopticism, sheds some light on this discussion. For Foucault, the potential effects of panopticism are believed to be contingent upon a perception of an ‘omnipresent’ and ‘continuous’ gaze. However, Bentham’s idea of the central tower around which a building would be constructed to facilitate the central focal point of omnipresent and continuous panoptic power, may be rendered superfluous in light of decentralized, localized and affordable panoptic technologies like camera surveillance. When one considers the breadth of covert and overt camera surveillance technologies in use, coupled with continual technological innovations and the increased affordability of surveillance systems, the market and marketing of the ‘gaze’ becomes increasingly conspicuous. In such a scenario, it is plausible that the perception or belief, on a social scale, that one could at any time be observed may be strengthened. The perception of omnipresent and continuous observation may allow the panoptic power of surveillance to realize its intended effects within and outside a prison setting.

In this way, the ‘visible’ characteristic of panopticism takes on a more abstract form, one that is based on a perception of the probability of being observed. Explored on its own, the suggestion that the panoptic gaze must be ever-present and ceaseless implies that any effects would likely be more immediately deterrent, and thus transitory (rather than reforming), in nature. This assertion may be correct, yet when one considers the revised conceptualization of ‘visibility’ previously noted, in view of the seemingly ubiquitous nature of camera surveillance, then it is possible that on a social level the
omnipresent and continuous features of these technologies are preserved. Consequently, any effects that result from the use of camera surveillance may be enduring.

The latter point is at the core of my analysis of camera surveillance as a panoptic practice. For, although the use of camera surveillance specifically targets (and attempts to deter) potential offenders, there is a more general potential for social-management which stems from the use of this technology. However, the more wide-spread control features of camera surveillance are potentially effective only in so far as the central features of panopticism (visibility and ubiquitousness) are maintained. Therefore, the factors that shape individual and/or collective awareness or belief in omnipresent surveillance must be explored in relation to camera surveillance.

**Omnipresent Surveillance**

In analyzing Foucault's notion of panopticism, Mathiesen (1997) stresses that there are limitations to adhering to a strictly panoptic conceptualization of contemporary technologies. Whereas Foucault (in relation to panopticism) highlights the “fundamental...transformation from the situation where the many see the few to a situation where the few see the many”, the former situation nonetheless remains an integral part/process of many media-based technologies (Mathiesen, 1997: 217). From this viewpoint, the transformation that Foucault describes is not a replacement of the former situation but one part of the ‘viewer society’ whole that must be addressed in discerning possible subtle control effects of camera surveillance.

Mathiesen constructs the notion of synopticism to describe the situation where the many see the few. Television provides a good example of synopticism in practice, as the
images projected (characterizing the few) are ‘absorbed’ by many on a community, societal and often global scale. In this way, representations formulated and projected by a select group of individuals might be internalized among the general population, thus characterizing a link between the dissemination of ideas and conceptualizations of omnipresent surveillance. For example, media provide daily, sensational accounts of victimization that may provide the impetus for practicing preventive strategies. As discussed in the first chapter of this thesis, media also inform the public of many instances of the use of surveillance generally, and camera surveillance specifically. Concurrently, those selling preventive technologies, like camera surveillance, provide and advertise ‘simple’ avenues/techniques for risk-management/reduction. Meanwhile, police agencies and victims’ associations support the use of cameras for the surveillance of areas for walking, parking, etc., and produce special televised features on various ways for individuals to reduce their risk of victimization through surveillance practices. In tandem, these ideas/images encourage individuals to adopt and/or adhere to suggested modifications of behaviours that may decrease instances of victimization. In such a scenario, the dissemination of information that becomes duly acted upon can be conceptualized and examined within an implicit model of subtle social control. This is not meant to suggest a simple causal link between images projected and the subsequent behaviour of viewers; however, dissemination, consumption, internalization and projection of particular ideas, behaviours and practices is a potential effect of information disseminated and drawn from synoptic mediums.

For Mathiesen, synopticism and panopticism work together to provide particular "decisive control functions in modern society" (Ibid., p. 219). Specifically, these
seemingly autonomous technologies are united within some settings thereby, feasibly, producing distinctive combined effects. The prison provides a good example of these entwined technologies at work. On the one hand, prisoners are under the constant ‘gaze’ of various panoptic surveillance techniques (for example, camera surveillance, and supervision by correctional officers). On the other hand, prisoners take part in numerous synoptic activities/practices (for example, the intermingling of a select group of social intermediaries and/or experts – guards, educators and psychologists – with a large group of prisoners). The supposed combined effects of these technologies flow from prisoners being provided with examples of what is normative and acceptable, while simultaneously being expected to exhibit behavioural restraint. It could be argued that the prison does not readily produce the expected panoptic/synoptic effects among all prisoners; however, the individually specific effects are a somewhat secondary consideration to the general effects of these interrelated technologies. In other words, it is the collective effects of a significantly predictable population that may reflect the efficiency and effectiveness of synoptic/panoptic practices as subtle social control mechanisms.

The relationship between synoptic and panoptic mechanisms of power is further explored by Manning (1999). He suggests that the ability to observe oneself on various screens has significant consequences for social and self-control. Individuals are subject and object to various visible and invisible screens throughout their daily lives. For Manning, screens serve as filters for the various reflections we are exposed to. The principal example, here, is the synoptic medium of television, whereby individuals are invited to ponder the largely decontextualized reflections being broadcast. These reflections then become a source of ‘knowledge’ that is reflected on; we reflect on
reflections. Reflections have implications for social and self control because the
‘knowledge’ (for example, concerning preventive practices like camera surveillance)
gathered through visual means may subtly shape our interpretative framework, our view
of ourselves, and our subsequent behaviour.

Further, the ability to view oneself onscreen (or imagining oneself being visible
on screen), through various surveillance technologies, has the potential of discouraging
‘unreasonable’, ‘unwanted’, or ‘unpredictable’ behaviours. We are invited to monitor our
own behaviour, as the screened versions of ourselves suggest that someone (or in some
cases ourselves) might be watching us. Generally, the reflections we see of surveillance
images are expected to encourage us to reflect upon, self-monitor, and exhibit self-control
and restraint in our behaviour and demeanor. The example of viewing oneself onscreen
provides a perfect physical manifestation of the intended outcome of panopticism – self-
monitoring. We are encouraged to internalize the ‘gaze’ and thereby monitor, reflect on,
and manipulate our comportment (in other words, govern our behaviour) so that it
corresponds with various socially acceptable ways of behaving. Reg Whitaker’s (1999)
concept of ‘the participatory Panopticon’ captures the essence of this scenario, whereby
surveillance practices become increasingly consensual in nature; we become active
participants in panoptic spaces, thereby allowing these technologies to realize their
intended effects.

One can see how surveillance in general and covert surveillance specifically can
be rendered increasingly visible through the reflections that are exhibited through various
synoptic mediums, principally news media. “Every step you take, they’ll be watching
you”, is the headline of one Canadian newspaper article that describes the negative
impact of the increasing use of hidden video cameras (Moll, 2000: A17). Another article highlights numerous places where affordable surveillance cameras can be placed in order to observe others in a voyeuristic fashion: smoke detectors, stuffed animals, VCR’s, etc. (Fidler, 1999). The Seattle Times (2000) reports that “[d] ozens of college athletes were videotaped surreptitiously while they undressed, using locker rooms, showers and urinals. Worse, their naked images were being sold as ‘hidden-camera’ tapes, promoted with displays on Web sites”.

Horror stories about the use of hidden cameras are replete with details about where, when and how we might be observed. A Village Voice article provides some striking examples:

At a Neiman-Marcus store in California, a female worker discovered a hidden camera in the ceiling of her changing room that was being monitored by male colleagues. At the Sheraton Boston Hotel, a union president invited a comrade to view a videotape of himself in his underwear. The hotel was monitoring its workers’ changing rooms. In Maryland, a 17-year-old lifeguard was videotaped changing into her bathing suit by her supervisor at the county swimming pool. Elsewhere in that state, a couple discovered that a neighbour had installed two cameras behind bathroom heating ducts and had monitored them for six months. On Long Island, a couple discovered a pinhole camera watching the bedroom of their rented apartment. It had been planted by the owner. In Manhattan, a landlord taped a tenant having sex with his girlfriend in the hallway, and presented it along with a suggestion that the tenant vacate the premises. He did (Boal, 1998: 3-4).

Although these are American examples, one must nonetheless observe the possibility that such incidents could happen elsewhere. Further, extensive international media coverage of positive and negative occurrences related to surveillance, generally, may encourage individuals from other areas to contemplate the possibilities of ubiquitous surveillance.
News and entertainment are meshed in what Manning (1999) labels ‘infotainment’, which may further perpetuate the idea that we might at any time be observed. Examples of this genre include television shows like Spy TV and Caught on Tape which showcase exceptional examples of incidences that might otherwise not have been recorded if not for the advent of inexpensive surveillance equipment. This is not necessarily even a recent phenomenon, as the television show Candid Camera, for decades, has exploited as entertainment the covert images gathered of unsuspecting ‘victims’. The audience is even ‘warned’ to look out because next time it might be them caught on camera. Entertainment media like books and movies may also create an atmosphere of ubiquitous surveillance. Enemy of the State is a recent Hollywood movie inspired by the technologically based, far-reaching and ominous capabilities of surveillance. Its strength at the box-office suggests that thousands of viewers saw a sampling of the numerous technological means of surveillance that may exist, and were encouraged to ponder their own transparency.

The Internet is another avenue whereby surveillance becomes increasingly visible. On the Internet, a host of companies proposition us to buy surveillance equipment and related services in order to reduce our risks of victimization. There are also numerous websites that cater to the voyeurs among us. These sites are laden with images, simulated and real, captured by various camera surveillance technologies. Whether they are real-time images of cars merely driving down a highway, or scattered images of naked ex-girlfriends/boyfriends whose former partners are intent on public revenge, more than ever, we are invited to ‘watch over our shoulders’. Frequently, employers monitor their
employees’ use of the Internet to deter online ‘indiscretions’ and ensure that company time is not being wasted. Media coverage of this phenomenon is extensive.

In 1999 the American Management Association disclosed that 45% of employers monitored the phone messages, Internet use, and e-mails of their employees (an increase of 10% from the previous two years) (Gurnsey, 1999). A nation-wide U.S. survey found that more than 59% of employers monitor their employees (through a variety of mechanisms that include peering over their shoulders), and 60% have disciplined employees for Internet abuse (DeBais, 2000). Another survey suggests that 35% of medium to large size businesses monitor Internet use by applying a ‘non-productive’ and ‘productive’ classification scheme to the websites visited by their employees (Evans, 1998). One can see that, by extension, employees may be similarly labelled. Many employees have been fired for ‘unacceptable’ use of the Internet. Xerox Corporation recently fired 50 employees for online ‘indiscretions’; the New York Times Company fired 23 employees for similar reasons (Gurnsey, 1999). What is deemed to be unacceptable online behaviour is open to the various interpretations of employers. More evidently, it may include accessing pornographic sites or sending offensive jokes to fellow employees; however, seemingly ‘benign’ activities like playing cards and sending family pictures online are sometimes censured (Shiver, 1999).

Despite the doubtful value of the percentages, the aforementioned examples (and others like them) speak to two important points. First, individuals are increasingly becoming the object of surveillance and the observers of surveillance images. Second, there is extensive media coverage of surveillance practices and their effects (for example, the disciplining of employees). Both of these developments have the potential to render
camera surveillance (in all its forms) increasingly visible and provide individuals with the opportunity to reflect on their own visibility and form perceptions about the extent of surveillance practices. Further, media coverage of surveillance practices (and surveillance technologies themselves) communicates a particular message to potential ‘deviants’: do not behave in inappropriate ways. Christa Carone, a Xerox spokesperson, reflected this sentiment when she stated that disciplining employees for ‘unacceptable’ use of the Internet is “enough to send a message to employees that we’re very serious about protecting the company from any Internet abuse” (DeBaise, 2000: F2). In other words, high profile censorship is intended to make visible various surveillance practices, communicate the risks associated with ‘abusive’ Internet use, and thereby deter potential abusers.

We have seen how the ‘visible’ nature of surveillance is not eroded by the use of hidden surveillance technologies; in fact, it may be enhanced. Panoptic and synoptic technologies help render all camera surveillance (both covert and overt) visible. Just as the ‘unverifiable’ takes on a broader and more abstract meaning in relation to the use of camera surveillance, so too does the ‘visible’ – we do not need to see the technology to know that it might be there. What becomes increasingly visible are the end products or images that surveillance cameras capture. Images may be broadcast through various avenues in numerous forms to a population that is encouraged to interpret them. Individually these interpretations may be many and varied; however, it is plausible that the idea that we are increasingly living in conditions of ubiquitous surveillance is promoted via the end products of panoptic and synoptic camera surveillance technologies. Such an atmosphere may have varied effects; it may put us on guard, but it
also may desensitize us to possible negative implications of the use of these technologies, while diminishing any bashfulness we may feel about being watched. Further, the popularity of surveillance cameras, and the images gathered from them, may "resonate with our desire to gaze and be gazed upon" (Boal, 1998: 5). A recent headline in the New York Times reflected this sentiment when it asked: "Do You Know Who's Watching You? Do You Care?" (Hafner, 1999: G1). While such a contingency appears to weaken the panoptic hypothesis being discussed, we do not know whether or not this is indeed the case. This would be an interesting avenue for further research in this area to explore.

One study conducted by the Central Research Unit of the Scottish Office (1999) found that 41% of respondents were aware of the surveillance cameras in use in public locations. This figure suggests a significant degree of general knowledge about camera surveillance practices. We may or may not be practically moving towards a total surveillance society; however, an acknowledgement of the extent of surveillance technologies in use, and therefore our increasing visibility, has the potential to encourage a more compliant and thus increasingly predictable population.
Chapter 3: Governance and Camera Surveillance

What has not yet been made clear in the discussion thus far are the particular preventive rationalities that underlie the use of camera surveillance, and what type of governance would benefit from and encourage a widespread belief in omnipresent surveillance. This chapter will provide a short overview and exploration of these points in relation to camera surveillance. My work on this subject has been influenced by Foucault’s conceptualizations of government and governmentality, and the subsequent literature in this area. Governmentality “refers to the range of governmental rationalities and practices, associated with liberal rule, by which populations are rendered thinkable and measurable for the purposes of government” (Stenson, 1999: 45; see also Foucault, 1980). Government, for Foucault, is conceptualized as the conduct (to guide or direct) of conduct (behaviour or comportment). Specifically, government is the ‘art’ of “acting on the actions of individuals, taken either singly or collectively, so as to shape, guide, correct and modify the ways in which they conduct themselves” (Burchell, 1993: 267). Although an exhaustive deconstruction and analysis of Foucault’s concept of governmentality and government is outside the scope of this thesis, I will enter into this discussion by providing the definition of government that I am working from:

Government is described as “any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seek to shape conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes” (Dean, 1999: 11).
Mitchell Dean’s definition speaks to three features of governance pertinent to my analysis: the multiplicity of modes and constitutive elements of governance; the conduct of conduct; and the legitimacy to govern. This discussion now turns to an exploration of these three interrelated themes of governance in relation to preventive practices generally and camera surveillance specifically.

Preventive Rationalities in Practice

For Garland (1996), preventive intervention strategies are premised, to some degree, on the belief that crime is no longer “an aberration or an unexpected, abnormal event. Instead, the threat of crime has become a routine part of modern consciousness, an everyday risk to be assessed and managed in much the same way that we deal with road traffic” (p. 446). Governments that adhere to this perception/stance insinuate a weakened ability to solve specific and recurrent crime problems. Such a sentiment is antagonistic to one of the quintessential roles of governance – providing protection for governed populations. Garland suggests that many governments are thus caught in a precarious position. On the one hand, they are suggesting and/or expecting that their populaces accept more responsibility for managing and reducing their own risks of victimization. On the other hand, in adopting such a stance, governments inevitably compromise a degree of their legitimacy as governing bodies.

In an attempt to solve this conundrum, authorities have constructed new modes of governance premised on the delegation of particular responsibilities that, if accepted and practiced by the general population, enable existing degrees of governing legitimacy and/or promote new ones. Garland (1996) has labelled the rationalities behind this new
mode of governance as the ‘responsibilization strategy’. Here, governments endeavour “to devolve responsibility for crime prevention on to agencies, organizations and individuals which are quite outside the state and to persuade them to act appropriately” (Garland, 1996: 451-453). However, governments do not want individuals making ad hoc decisions in relation to risk management (for example, becoming vigilantes). Instead, responsibility is devolved in a manner that is suitable to governing authorities. Governments promote and provide sponsorship (both financially and ideologically) to various intervention strategies that are dispensed through numerous government and non-government agencies. Currently, the Home Office in Great Britain actively supports crime prevention initiatives that involve camera surveillance as a key component of the preventive strategy. In this way, alternative rationalities and measures are neutralized as increasing numbers of individuals and communities come to adhere to and participate in the particular programming promoted by a governing body.

Government in this way “is not, then, [about] the suppression of individual subjectivity, but rather the cultivation of the subjectivity in specific forms, aligned to specific governmental aims” (Garland, 1997: 175; see also Allen, 1991). The key feature of this strategy is the expression of governmental power that is not simply ‘objectifying’ (coercive domination and manipulation of the populace), but rather it is ‘subjectifying’ (cultivating particular choices, that appear self-determined, among the general population). By placing the onus on individuals to accept the terms of their own subjectification, responsibility is redistributed without the effect of governmental delegitimization. Since the terms of responsibility are encouraged (not overtly imposed), a general population’s acceptance of them enables the authority structure that perpetuates
them. In this way, governments maintain the illusion that “one governs one’s own conduct, while government guides the conduct of others” (Simons, 1995: 36; see also Cruikshank, 1993). Yet, one’s own conduct, which on the surface seems self-determined, may be affected by the specific direction of governmental bodies.

Preventive strategies are contingent upon the particular governmental rationalities that enable them. As such, preventive practices, within the scope of liberal governance, must cultivate or regulate the various expressions of individual freedom in ways that serve the collective social interest, while preserving (or appearing to maintain) individual freedom and autonomy. In view of current preventive strategies, then, we see the importance given to the maintenance of a critical balance between individual freedom/liberty and collective/social interest, where appropriate thinking and behaviour are encouraged within a regime of discernible freedom of choice\(^6\).

At times, for example, individuals are ‘required’ to submit to specific preventive practices like random roadside breathalyzer tests; nonetheless, choice and freedom remain an expectation even within this scenario. For, we are ‘asked’ to participate as free individuals, although there is a narrowing or shaping of choice, since a refusal to submit to the test would entail more intrusive measures, coupled with an assumption of guilt. Further, even the idea of refusing may be negated. Two critical assumption are promoted in anti-drunk driving campaigns – that driving while impaired is wrong, and that

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\(^6\) Rose (1999) makes clear how an exploration and analysis of the concept of freedom is crucial to our understanding of the current nature and practice of government in liberal democracies. According to Rose, freedom “has come to define the problem space within which contemporary rationalities of government compete...[while concurrently being] the name we give today to a kind of power one brings to bear upon oneself, and a mode of bringing power to bear upon others” (Rose, 1999: 94-96). This is particularly consequential point in relation to the use of camera surveillance as a form of governance in that it encourages one to explore the ways in which various technologies, spaces and gazes may be used to govern the comportment of ‘autonomous’ and ‘free’ individuals (Ibid.).
*responsible* people do not drink and drive. Individuals may internalize these assumptions, and thereby express the behavioural expectations that underlie them (choosing not to drink and drive and supporting anti-drunk driving campaigns). Therefore, responsible behaviour is promoted in such a way that individuals may submit willingly to breathalyzer tests – for it is what a responsible citizen with nothing to hide would or should do. Similarly, we are told that the use of camera surveillance is in our best interest, because it will deter crime and reduce our risk of victimization. Further, concerns about privacy are dismissed by the adage ‘if you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear’. Individuals who remain defiant or express discomfort with the use of surveillance cameras may be labeled ‘aberrant’ and their subsequent behaviour interpreted with suspicion.

Crime prevention strategies are social supplements designed to promote and/or preserve the well-being and normalcy of a society (Pavlich, 1999). By encouraging and/or shaping the choices of the individual rational decision-maker, crime prevention strategies invite each of us to take part in the maintenance of a robust society. Pavlich suggests that these preventive rationalities and strategies are effectively disseminated among populations because they address, concurrently, both our individual self-interest and altruistic tendencies or aspirations. Crime prevention initiatives often involve partnerships between communities, governments and non-governmental agencies, which encourage socially reflective individual self-interest.

To govern effectively, then, governments must allow “appropriate versions of individual liberty to flourish” (Pavlich, 1999: 106; see also Rose, 1994). Therefore, increasingly authority is exercised indirectly or ‘at a distance’. To this end, governments
direct various aspects of life through a “a loose assemblage of agents and agencies [where]...one actor comes to convince another that their problems or goals are intrinsically linked, that their interests are consonant, that each can solve their difficulties or achieve their ends by joining forces or working along the same lines” (Miller and Rose, 1990: 9-10). The ‘partnerships’ that emerge in relation to the use of camera surveillance technologies reflect the capacity for governments to exercise authority at a distance.

Various forms of media inform the public about surveillance practices generally, bringing to light this technology’s various success stories; they also provide space for advertisers promoting related services and products. Insurance companies encourage their clients to take adequate preventive steps to reduce various risks associated with being in business7. The police and security agencies provide expertise on surveillance practices, while promoting preventive strategies that assist them in detecting and deterring crime. Numerous businesses (for example, retail stores and banks) use surveillance technologies to deter internal and external theft and increase customer confidence. Surveillance industries peddle camera surveillance hardware and/or related services to individuals, communities, businesses, and local governments; these companies also provide expertise on the installation and use of their surveillance products. Governments utilize this technology to protect their properties and monitor employees’ work-time activities. Further, various levels of government promote and sponsor preventive strategies involving the use of camera surveillance. In so doing, governments appear to be taking steps to assure the public that crime is being dealt with, incidents of

7 Some insurance companies in Great Britain provide a 30% discount on premiums for businesses taking part in crime reducing strategies like the use of camera surveillance (Graham, Brooks and Heery, 1996).
victimization are being reduced in their neighbourhoods, and that their social well being is being protected (Graham, Brooks and Heery, 1996). At each level of participation, then, a form of government is being exercised that is one part of a loosely coordinated effort to deliver preventive practices (and their incumbent rationalities) to the general populace. Further, some of these actors are actively (and increasingly) involved in aggregating and processing the information produced by surveillance and turning it into a market (political) commodity.

As the preceding examples emphasize, the dissemination of preventive rationalities occurs in a multitude of forms within a given society. Advertising can be conceptualized as a direct form of governance whereby advertisers disseminate disjointed fragments of cultural references within a short piece so that consumers are motivated and/or persuaded to purchase various products (Manning, 1999). Principally, then, this industry attempts to shape consumer choice within a finite, yet ever expanding, range of possibilities. To do so effectively, advertisers frequently associate products and services with particular ‘images’ or ‘lifestyles’. In this way, consumers’ habits are manipulated while, concurrently, individual style is shaped in a collective manner. This form of governance has general social implications, as the ‘images’ being sold may gain cultural currency such that adherents can be stereotyped, for example, by the particular style of clothing they are wearing. In this way, advertising promotes particular products while encouraging consumers to be ‘thrifty’, ‘hip’, ‘fashionable’, ‘socially conscious’, etc. Those that react against such images, nonetheless do so in reflection of them. Similarly, individuals are encouraged (directly and indirectly) to adopt and identify with the preventive rationalities that underlie the use of camera surveillance. Subsequently,
individuals may project the socially-valued 'responsible' or 'safety/security conscious' image in their behavioural attempts to reduce the chances of being victimized. Those that do not adopt such patterns of thinking/behaviour do so at the risk of increasing their chances of victimization and being the recipient of negative social stereotyping (for example, 'he/she was asking for it' or 'he/she is irresponsible'). These individuals may also be blamed for undermining the security of others. Therefore, the 'advertising' of specific preventive rationalities/practices has the potential of reifying patterns of 'othering' characteristic of specific modes of government.

Clifford Shearing and Philip Stenning's (1992) analysis of the subtle control features present in the environment at Disney World, highlights the way space can be constructed (vis-à-vis the influence of specific preventive rationalities) to shape individual behaviour. Foremost, as participants in this environment we are encouraged to spend money and have fun. Yet, we are also expected to conduct ourselves in reasonable ways that are conducive to everyone's enjoyment of the attraction and willingness to spend money. To this end, employees are engaged in the helpful maintenance of order by directing the movements of visitors throughout the park, thus ensuring a smooth flow of operations. Another subtle control feature is set in the physical design of the Disney World environment where "virtually every pool, fountain, and flower garden serves both as an aesthetic object and to direct visitors away from, or towards, particular locations" (p.251). We acquiesce to these subtle control features and cooperate with the various behavioural expectations within this environment because they allow us to maximize our enjoyment at Disney World. Further, the embeddedness of these control features ensures that, for the most part, they are largely unknown to individual participants, as are their
intended effects. While frequently more overt, camera surveillance is a technology similarly embedded within particular environments or situations to deter potential offenders but, by extension, may be capable of directing individual behaviour generally. Like the Disney World environment, we may participate 'willingly' in panoptic spaces because we come to believe our individual and collective well-being is better protected, and thus the potential to enjoy a range of social situations is improved.

Hidden cameras used to covertly observe nannies are a specific example of the way camera surveillance encourages individuals to adopt a preventive mindset. Parents 'want' to monitor their baby's sitter to gain forewarning or evidence of any instances of abuse; however, they also hope that these cameras deter potential mistreatment of their children. Yet, deterrent effects are only enabled by increasing the visibility of these covert technologies. Parents must therefore tell nannies that they are being observed (which they may be reluctant to do), or the use of 'nannie cams' must be publicized widely, and the public (including nannies) informed of any 'success' stories. There is an expectation that 'good' parents, who have their children's best interests at heart, will take steps to protect their well-being at all times. Success stories about the use of these technologies encourage parents to seize similar strategies to secure the safety of their children when they cannot be with them. Thereby, technological innovations, like camera surveillance, are 'sold' as simple and 'accepted' ways parents can reduce the chances of their children being victimized. In other words, the field of 'acceptable' choices is restructured, so that surveillance strategies become a primary consideration for 'responsible' parents wanting to protect their loved-ones.
As the previous example suggests, the practice of surveillance (generally) and camera surveillance (specifically) is reflective of a particular mode of governance, premised on preventive rationalities, which encourages a populace to monitor their own thinking and behaviours. According to Dean (1996) we are witnessing the emergence of a host of techniques of government that have ramifications for how we are governed and govern. Specifically, there has been an increase in the use of “techniques for the minimization of risk and ensuring the safety and security of risky actions, places, individuals and populations” (Dean, 1996: 223). The use of camera surveillance is such a technique of government. Foucault’s (1977) concept of panopticism, discussed in the previous chapter, informs this discussion on surveillance as an extension of a mode of governance. Panopticism embodies the idea that constantly visible, yet unverifiable, surveillance facilitates (among those being observed) the internalization of a self-disciplinary model of control whereby individuals scrutinize and manipulate their behaviour in accordance with expectations thought/known conducive to placating the omnipresent ‘gaze’.

The use of camera surveillance as a crime prevention strategy is, on the one hand, an attempt to create conditions that reduce the likelihood of offending, or dissuade offenders and potential offenders from committing criminal acts. On the other hand, camera surveillance is a technology that ‘speaks’ to potential victims as well (i.e. society at large). It can be seen as an extension of preventive strategies that seek to reduce/prevent occurrences of victimization. Unlike the originally conceived Panopticon, camera surveillance works on the whole population. By way of this technological example, potential victims are encouraged to reflect on behavioural choices that increase
or lessen their chances of being victimized, and to take behavioural measures thought conducive to avoiding criminal victimization (for example, locking doors, walking in well-lit areas, avoiding ‘troublesome’ areas). Camera surveillance is a ‘medium’ capable of projecting specific risk-management rationalities that, if interpreted and internalized as intended, may alter the behaviour of individuals so that they are in line with current preventive practices. Therefore, this technology facilitates, generally, a populace’s acceptance (and/or internalization) of risk-management mentalities and preventive practices that may serve to alter the behaviour of individuals (by their own volition).

As noted, camera surveillance is believed to be effective in deterring crime because of its ‘visible’ yet ‘unverifiable’ nature. Although, in many instances, the cameras are in view, one cannot know that he/she is being watched at a given moment. In this way, when a surveillance camera is in sight, we are urged to assume that we might be under observation. Further, even when there are no visible cameras, our growing awareness of the prevalence of surveillance technologies may prevent us from ruling out the possibility of their hidden presence. Individuals who adhere to such an assumption are thereby expected to act in ‘reasonable’ and non-deviant/criminal ways. Individuals are further invited to internalize notions of what is ‘appropriate’ observable behaviour, and thus supposed to act accordingly. Surveillance cameras facilitate a general mode of surveillance, since one cannot know definitively who is a potential offender. The effects of these cameras, although intended to deter potential offenders, have the ‘unintended’ effect of manipulating social conditions in ways that encourage, generally, a populace to critically assess and manipulate their own thinking and behaviour. Any subsequent changes in behaviour that result from such an environment, then, may be viewed as
extensions of a particular mode of governance premised on preventive rationalities, while simultaneously enabling and/or legitimizing it.
Chapter 4: Conclusion

As we have seen, camera surveillance technologies have both panoptic and synoptic capabilities. The panoptic effects of camera surveillance may be largely deterrent in nature in that individuals subjected to the ‘gaze’ are expected to exhibit self-control in their behaviours; however, these technologies also encourage us to internalize preventive rationalities generally, and are thus reflective of a much broader (and less transitory) method of control than mere deterrent-based self-discipline. Specifically, for those subjected to ceaseless surveillance, or those who are aware of the mere possibility of being under surveillance (an environment shaped through the use of various synoptic mediums), there is the possibility that they “lose the power and even almost the idea of wrong-doing” (Foucault, 1980: 154). Therefore, panoptic technologies (like camera surveillance) may quell any desire and/or motivation a person may have to behave in criminal or other ‘inappropriate’ ways.

It is the interiorization of preventive rationalities, manifest in various acts of self-monitoring and self-discipline (where we seek to avoid being the ‘other’ and end up viewing ourselves as the ‘other’), that is at the heart of my problematization of the potential widespread effects of decentralized panoptic technologies like camera surveillance. An acknowledgement of ubiquitous surveillance, coupled with an internalization of suggested or expected norms of behaviour, may placate any motivation to engage in criminal activity; however, there is also the potential that these technologies invite us to regulate seemingly banal behaviours that might be deemed conspicuous in specific settings. Mark Boal (1998) suggests that “[d]eprived of public privacy, most people behave in ways that make them indistinguishable: you’re less likely to kiss on a
park bench if you know it will be on film. Over the long run, mass monitoring works like peer pressure, breeding conformity without seeming to” (p. 5).

Contemporary crime prevention strategies (for example, camera surveillance, neighbourhood watch programs, personal safety devices, and target hardening measures), which necessitate explicit and/or implicit involvement among their adherents, fall within the purview of the responsibilization strategy described by Garland and thus are examples and/or extensions of a particular mode of governance based on individual or community responsibility. Further, populations that adopt, generally, the preventive rationalities that underlie specific crime prevention strategies (such as the use of camera surveillance), enable and legitimize the governing bodies that promote them. In fact, once individuals have assumed responsibility for managing risks associated with crime, they may then make specific demands (for example, to agencies of the state) to secure the deliverance of particular methods of risk management (for example, increased street lighting or camera surveillance initiatives) (O’Malley, 1996). Demands of this sort are a direct avenue through which the authority to govern is further legitimiz ed.

Reflecting on the current capabilities and scope of surveillance practices, Gerard La Forest (former Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada) stated that “[w]e can only be sure of being free from surveillance today if we retire to our basements, cloak our windows, turn out the lights and remain absolutely quiet” (Flaherty, 1998). This statement, presumably, exaggerates the level of surveillance we are currently subjected to; however, it certainly underestimates the qualities of some surveillance techniques that, for example, now allow objects to be seen in total darkness or through walls. David Brin (1998) suggests that the various practices of surveillance are here to stay, and will
continue to expand into private and public spheres of life. Considering the intense desire to eradicate crime (on which the use of most of these technologies is premised), and the production of smaller and cheaper surveillance technologies, Brin’s assertion seems realistic. Once in place, these technologies are extremely difficult to remove because individuals and groups have a vested interest (financially, ideologically and practically) in their continued success.

Crime prevention/reduction may be a primary intention behind this technology’s use; however, its potential to influence social behaviour via the pressure to conform, generally, is particularly disconcerting. Whether this is an intended or unintended effect of the use of camera surveillance, it is nonetheless an extension of a particular mode of governance, which it, in turn, enables. This situation provides the impetus for us to form a greater understanding of surveillance as a preventive strategy (particularly in relation to its potential to deter forbidden activities by directing individual ‘motivation’), the governing rationalities that perpetuate its use, and the various long-term effects of the use of these technologies. In this way, we can anticipate the more widespread effects of surveillance and contemplate whether or not these ‘unintended’ effects are desirable in light of current and prospective social realities.

Let us now return to our beginning - is Big Brother here? Do camera surveillance technologies represent decentered forms of Big Brother (or Little Brothers)? We have seen how the ‘gaze’ of camera surveillance operates and may be rendered increasingly visible and omnipresent. One can see that the panoptic ‘gaze’ present in Nineteen Eighty-Four exists, to some degree, in our society today in the form of camera surveillance. Nonetheless, our discussion explored a particular mode of governance
being exercised in liberal-based societies that is dependent upon the consensual participation of 'free' individuals. This is a vastly different mechanism of power than is being brought to bear upon the populace in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. It appears, therefore, that Big Brother may be a literary reference that has only limited explanatory power. Franz Kafka’s *The Trial* and *The Castle* may provide a more representative forecast of our present. Both of these novels focus on the character K. who is immersed in a particular set of irrational circumstances that *appears* to be outside his control. However, in his attempt to understand and gain personal control in these environments, K. goes through a continual process of self-reflection, and self-governance. Further, although his behaviour is affected by the circumstances in which he finds himself, K. nonetheless takes part as a 'free' and 'autonomous' individual. K. is an active participant whose choices come to reflect and reproduce the social conditions that hasten his downfall. Therefore, ultimately, the responsibility for K.'s failures is his to bear (even if the deck is stacked against him). One can see that our discussion of governance through self-governance (see chapter 3) has some application here. Kafka has provided two literary references that deserve increased attention by theorists in this area, since they mirror some of the qualities exhibited in current modes of governance that make use of contemporary surveillance practices.

This being said, however, Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four* may yet provide grounds for reflection and further research in this area. Stanley Cohen (1985) suggests that a key distinction between dictatorial and liberal governance hinges on the value given to preserving a division between private and public spheres of life. He suggests that one of the principal features of totalitarian governments is that they seek to merge
public and private spheres, as is indeed the case in "the world of Nineteen Eighty-Four" (Ibid., p. 134). We have seen how the coordinated use of camera surveillance in Great Britain (and elsewhere) may be blurring or eroding this private/public distinction. If this is the case, then we need to reflect further on our use of contemporary surveillance technologies, and explore how they may reflect the qualities of government and effects of governance that we so vehemently condemn. Currently, however, we do not even have a comprehensive understanding of the effects of the use of surveillance technologies, nor their relationship to particular modes of liberal-based government.

Clearly, further exploration and analysis is needed to grasp a more comprehensive understanding of the potential social control effects of camera surveillance technologies. The analysis provided in this thesis has indicated or implied many areas where further exploration might turn. One particularly significant focus that needs to be explicated, is the intersection of Foucault's analysis of 'technologies of power', 'governmentality', and 'technologies of the self'. While the first two concepts have been explored here in some detail, an inclusion of the concept of 'technologies of the self' into this analysis may provide a more complete theoretical model from which to understand and explore the potential effects of surveillance technologies.

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8 Technologies of the self are defined as practices "which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and ways of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality" (Foucault, 1988: 18).
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