INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.
PRISONERS OF THE HOME FRONT:
A Social Study of the German Internment Camps of Southern Quebec,
1940-1946

By

Martin F. Auger

A Thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate and Post-Doctoral Studies
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Master of Arts degree in History

University of Ottawa
© 2000 Martin F. Auger
The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

L’auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

L’auteur conserve la propriété du droit d’auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

0-612-48127-1
ABSTRACT

During the Second World War (1939-1945), five internment camps were created on the south shore of the St. Lawrence river for the incarceration of male individuals of German descent. They were known as Farnham, Grande Ligne, Île-aux-Noix, Sherbrooke (Newington) and Sorel. Their goal was to neutralize any potential threat to the defence of the Canadian nation. With the entire country being mobilized for war, the security of the homefront was necessary. Any person suspected of sympathizing with the enemy was perceived as a potential “spy and Saboteur” and was incarcerated in internment camps. Individuals of German origin were no exception. During the first phase of southern Quebec’s internment operation, 1940-1943, civilians formed the bulk of the inmates while during the second phase, 1942-1946, it was prisoners of war. This thesis analyzes how the region’s internment operation developed. It deals primarily with the issue of life behind the barbed wires and how psychological strains came to affect inmates. It also looks at how Canadian authorities attempted to counter such problems by introducing labour projects and re-educational programs. This case study of southern Quebec demonstrates that the internment camp operation in Canada was an integral part of the effort to produce total war.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to take this opportunity to thank my M.A. supervisor, Professor Jeffrey Keshen, for his guidance and valuable comments. Without his precious help, this thesis would not have been. Thanks are also due to my thesis board - Professors Peter Bischoff, Jan Grabowski and Mark Stolarik. I would also like to thank the staff of the Eastern Townships Research Centre, the National Archives of Canada as well as the National Library of Canada. I am also indebted to my parents, Robert and Yvette Auger, as well as my brother Yannick, for their years of support and encouragement. Finally, I wish to thank my friends and colleagues, Ludovic Béliveau, Mélanie Brunet, Gaétan Guilbert, Dominic Jasmin, Yves Pelletier, Jean-Sébastien Plante, Alain Roy, Matt Snider and Sara Wallace, for making university life and the writing of this manuscript most pleasurable.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1: Organizing and Developing Southern Quebec’s Internment Operation</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2: Life Behind Barbed Wires</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3: Labour Projects</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4: Educational Programs</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviations</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

During the Second World War, some 40,000 Germans were detained in internment camps located throughout Canada. Among these internees were prisoners of war (POW), refugees and Canadian civilians of German descent. Initiated by the federal government in 1939, the internment operation was an integral part of Canada's War Measures Act. Its goal was to neutralize any potential threat to the defence of the Canadian nation. With the entire country being mobilized for war, the security of the homefront was necessary. As part of these precautionary measures, Canadian authorities authorized the construction of five internment camps on the south shore of the St. Lawrence river. The camps in this small rural region were known as Farnham, Grande Ligne, Île-aux-Noix, Sherbrooke (Newington) and Sorel.

The internment operation in southern Quebec (1940-1946) was divided in two phases. The first, from 1940-1943, witnessed the incarceration of numerous civilians. Any person suspected of sympathizing with the enemy was perceived as a potential "spy and saboteur" and was incarcerated in internment camps. Individuals of German origin were no exception. During this phase, the camps in southern Quebec were used for the detention of male individuals of German descent, most of whom were civilians who had been interned in the United Kingdom and transferred to Canada for security reasons. As the war progressed, it became evident that these civilian internees were no threat to the nation. Consequently, most of them were either transferred to other camps or liberated between 1941 and 1943. However, as more and more German prisoners of war were being captured by British and Commonwealth soldiers overseas, the Canadian government agreed to ship many of them to Canada for confinement. It was decided to use the camps of southern Quebec to incarcerate this new class of captives. The new inmates began to
arrive in most of southern Quebec’s internment camps in early 1942. The incarceration of German prisoners of war constituted the second phase of the Canadian internment operation in southern Quebec, lasting from 1942 to 1946. The Canadian soil became the home of thousands of such prisoners.

The purpose of this study is to examine the development of the internment camps in southern Quebec. This research intends to evaluate the importance of the war camp operation and how it developed on the south shore of the St. Lawrence River. The choice of this area is of great significance because half of the internment camps in Quebec were located in this region. This thesis will analyze how these camps functioned and how the region’s internment operation developed. Also addressed will be life within the barbed wires and how psychological strains came to affect inmates. Since most of these camps operated work projects, the study will also observe how the internment enterprise contributed to the war effort. The introduction of educational programs will be analyzed as well. This case study of southern Quebec should demonstrate that the internment camp operation in Canada was an integral part of the effort to produce total war.

Before undertaking an analysis of internment camps, a proper definition of what is meant by such facilities must be given as well as a historical background. Internment operations consisted of a complex network of prisoner of war camps and concentration establishments. Prisoners of war camps are detention facilities for enemy military personnel captured on the field of battle. According to The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, a prisoner of war is a “person captured or interned by a belligerent power during war. In the strictest sense it is applied only to members of regularly organized armed forces, but by broader definition it has also included guerillas, civilians who take up arms against an enemy openly, or noncombatants associated with a military force.”

Although prisoners of war have been a reality of warfare for thousands of years, the creation of prisoner of war camps is a modern phenomenon. The rise of such installations coincided with the development of a sense of awareness by most western powers that prisoners of war needed to be adequately treated. This new mentality emerged after numerous eighteenth century philosophers, notably Montesquieu, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Emerich de Vattel, developed the “quarantine theory for the disposition of
prisoners.” It stipulated that a “captive was no longer to be treated as a piece of property to be disposed of at the whim of the victor but was merely to be removed from the fight.” Now that a definite body of principles for the treatment of prisoners of war was recognized in the western world, captives were not to be enslaved, exchanged for ransoms, tortured or executed but were to be protected and cared for by their captors until the end of hostilities.²

Prisoners of war camps began to emerge by the middle of nineteen century. However, they were inadequate and faced great problems in terms of handling and sustaining large number of prisoners. For instance, during the 1861-1865 American Civil War, the men captured by each side were forced to endure terrible hardships in such facilities. Overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, lack of heat, diseases, starvation, thirst and death were all realities of life in American Civil War camps. Perhaps the most famous of these facilities was the Confederacy’s Andersonville prison camp in Georgia, where some 13,000 Union inmates died between 1864 and 1865.³

What was needed was a set of regulations which would address the issue of treatment of prisoners of war. A first attempt occurred in 1863 when Columbia University jurist Francis Lieber formulated a document now known as the Lieber Code, whose provisions dealt exclusively with the protection of war prisoners. Although innovative, this document, which only guaranteed very basic human rights, was never ratified.⁴ As for the Geneva Convention, which had been signed by most world powers in 1864 to improve the effects of war on soldiers and civilians, none of its clauses addressed prisoners of war. However, what this convention did was prove that it was possible to create an international set of rules regarding warfare.⁵

The appalling treatment of prisoners of war in late nineteen century armed conflicts, notably during the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), caused great concern in the western world and led to numerous attempts to improve conditions for captives. Despite the endeavors of the 1874 Brussels Declarations, which reiterated most of the articles of the Lieber Code, it was not until the 1899 and 1907 The Hague (Netherlands) international conferences that most world powers agreed to create rules of conduct regarding the treatment of war prisoners.⁶ The Hague Rules stipulated that a captive was
the responsibility of the detaining power and “must be protected by his captors from violence, insults, and public curiosity.” It also mentioned that a prisoner’s “permanent place of captivity must not be in a district which is unhealthy, nor in an area where he will be exposed to the fire of the fighting zone.” Furthermore, the rules indicated that an inmate was to be fed, clothed and accommodated on the same footing as the troops of the government which captured him and “forbade the killing of enemy soldiers who had surrendered and who were defenceless, having laid down their arms.”

When the First World War began in 1914, all belligerents had signed The Hague treaties and complied as best they could with their clauses. Although The Hague Rules were “restricted to the armed forces of the belligerents, and stipulated that ordinary citizens of the contending States must be treated leniently and must not be deprived of their lives or liberty,” it excluded those who took up arms against enemy forces. This exclusion gave carte blanche to all belligerents to act with great ferocity against certain civilian populations during the First World War. For example, when the invading Germans came into conflict with insurgents in Belgium in 1914, they responded by shooting several hundred Belgian townspeople. This situation was not rectified until The Hague Rules were integrated to the Geneva Convention in 1929.

As for concentration camps, they were created for the incarceration of civilian prisoners in time of war. According to The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, a concentration camp is an “internment centre for political prisoners and members of national or minority groups who are confined for reasons of state security, exploitation, or punishment, usually by executive decree or military order.” Further, the definition indicates that “Persons are placed in such camps often on the basis of identification with a particular ethnic or political group rather than as individuals and without benefit of either indictment of fair trial... Civilians have been concentrated in camps to prevent them from engaging in guerrilla warfare, from providing aid to enemy forces, or simply as a means of terrorizing the populace into submission.”

Concentration camps were first used during the Boer War (1899-1902) in South Africa. When the Boer Kommandos turned to guerilla warfare in 1900, using the support of the rural populace and utilizing local villages as bases of operations, British authorities
decided to carry their attacks to the South African countryside. Adopting scorched-earth policies, the British began to burn farms, destroy crops and steel livestock. The inhabitants, mostly women and children, who were captured by the British during such operations were sent to concentration camps. Some 120,000 Boers were sent to such facilities since the aim was to clear the countryside and undermine civilian support upon which Boer guerrillas depended.11 The problem with these early camps was that they were set up in haste and were ill-regulated and poorly managed. Indifferent care eventually led to some 20,000 deaths from disease and hunger. As a result, international opinion began to believe that "the British were seeking not merely to conquer an enemy but to exterminate a race."12

Nevertheless, the concentration system became reality and by the First World War most military powers resorted to such policies to intern civilians of "enemy blood." The development of concentration camps added a new dimension to internment policies. By the early twentieth century, internment operations came to include both prisoner of war camps and concentration establishments. As a result, though their status as captives were different, prisoners of war and civilians saw their fate administered by the same authorities. This was a new historical phenomenon which illustrated how modern warfare now affected both civilians and combatants.

The first tests for internment operations involving both civilians of "enemy blood" and prisoners of war came during the First World War. It was during this conflict that belligerents incarcerated for the first time both types of internees in similar internment facilities. Canada was among the first to adopt such measures and its policies, therefore, arguably represents the best example of how internment operations were organized during the war by all belligerents. It began when Great Britain declared war on Germany on behalf of the British Empire on August 4, 1914. With the entire empire at war against Germany and its allies, internment facilities were created in all British colonies for the detention of civilians of "enemy descent" and the incarceration of prisoners of war. The belief was that "enemy subjects" could become threats to the security of the entire British Empire. The assumption was that "a man who owes his first allegiance to the land of his birth could endanger the British war effort." As a result, Great Britain and the dominions
of Australia, India, New Zealand, South Africa, and Canada, detained thousands of civilians and prisoners of war of Austrian, Bulgarian, German and Turkish descent.\textsuperscript{13}

In Canada, the process began with the introduction of the \textit{War Measures Act} on August 22, 1914. This emergency legislation "enabled the Governor-in-Council to do whatever was deemed necessary or advisable for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada...during war, invasion or insurrection."\textsuperscript{14} It gave the Canadian government "extraordinary powers with which to meet the emergency" created by the war. Among those extraordinary powers was the right to "arrest, detain, exclude and deport" all individuals believed to be "enemy aliens." It is important to note at this point that \textit{The New Encyclopaedia Britannica} defines an "alien" as being "a foreign-born resident who is not a citizen by virtue of parentage or naturalization and who is still a citizen or subject of another country." Nevertheless, though the government initially maintained a policy of tolerance towards civilians of "enemy blood," this situation soon changed.\textsuperscript{15} Keeping in step with British policy and anti-German sentiments in Canada, Ottawa issued Order-in-Council PC 2721 on October 28, 1914, authorizing the appointment of civilian registrars in major urban centres. All "enemy aliens" who had not yet been naturalized as Canadian citizens were obliged to report to the nearest registrar and were forbidden to leave the country. If a registrar so decided, a suspected "enemy alien" could be interned. In those early days, individuals ordered for internment were kept in temporary detention centres such as in Montreal's Immigration Building. All were transferred to internment camps as of November 6, 1914, when the Canadian government finally authorized the creation of internment facilities for both "enemy aliens" and prisoners of war.\textsuperscript{16}

Coordinating and administrating internment operations was the Department of Militia and Defence (1914-1915) and the Department of Justice (1915-1920), with Major General Sir William Dillon Otter placed in charge.\textsuperscript{17} Of the 85,000 "enemy aliens" who had been registered by April 1915, 8,579 were interned, including 1,192 Germans. In fact, the bulk of the civilian internees consisted of Ukrainians who had been born in the Austro-Hungarian controlled province of Galicia. All were incarcerated because they were considered to be either dangerous or potential burdens to the local welfare system as they
were unemployed. However, since most of these internees proved to be no threat to the security of Canada, most were released in 1917 if signing a parole agreement which demanded "loyalty and obedience to the laws of Canada and a periodical report to the nearest police authority."  

As for the internment of prisoners of war, this began when the Canadian authorities, after consulting with the British government, decided to detain all potential German army and naval reservists caught on Canadian territory. Under the terms of the *German Imperial and State Nationality Law* of July 1913, a German was able to retain his German nationality and rights even if he had been naturalized in another country. Since all Germans were subjected to universal conscription and were to serve in reserve units, many "enemy aliens" considered to be German reservists were arrested and detained as prisoners of war as of November 1914. Further, at Britain's request, some 800 prisoners of war, mostly merchant seamen caught in various ports under British jurisdiction, were transferred to Canada from Newfoundland and the West Indies in 1915. These were the only prisoners of war interned in Canada to have actually seen action. Overall, some 3,180 prisoners of war were detained in the country during the war. As for enemy soldiers captured by Canadian troops on the European battlefields, most were interned in Great Britain. This was done for logistical reasons, namely the United Kingdom's proximity to the European front lines. In fact, Great Britain absorbed most of the prisoners of war caught by British Imperial forces. By 1918, some 250,000 prisoners of war were detained in close to 500 camps across the British Isles. Overall, Canada operated 24 internment camps during the war. 

Canadian internment camps treated both civilian internees and prisoners of war in accordance with the 1907 *The Hague Convention*. Internees were given the same standard of clothing, food and quarters as Canadian soldiers and were free to give concerts, create gardens, conduct athletic events, view weekly movies, have hobbies and attend educational classes. Furthermore, prisoners had access to camp libraries where they could read books, magazines and newspapers once having been scanned by a censor. Further, medical facilities and religious services were also provided for the inmates. Prisoners were also allowed to send and receive two letters each week. The prisoners also
benefited from the services of relief societies such as the International Red Cross and the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA). The International Red Cross was the most important of these associations. It had been founded at Geneva (Switzerland) in 1864 by Henri Dunant to prevent and alleviate human suffering. During the war, it kept track of all prisoners of war and “enemy aliens” detained by all belligerents, provided medical assistance and coordinated a huge traffic of parcels usually filled with cloth, food and medicine intended for war prisoners. As for the YMCA, a benevolent organization founded in 1844 by Sir George Williams, it contributed greatly to the welfare of prisoners during the war as it provided recreational and sports equipment, games and books to internees. Furthermore, camps were inspected by delegations from neutral powers, notably from Switzerland, to assure the humane treatment of prisoners.

Work projects were also integrated into camp life. According to the 1907 The Hague Convention, prisoners could work on various tasks “as long as the projects had no connection to the war effort, the labour was not excessive, and the men were paid a rate equivalent to that of soldiers.” As labour shortages became critical in Canada during 1915, the federal government believed that it could compensate by employing both civilian internees and prisoners of war on labor projects. Numerous duties awaited inmates. They would be used to clear land; work on farms; build roads and railways; cut wood; work in mines; and labour in mills. Many private companies such as the Canadian Pacific Railway and the Asbestos Corporation came to employ internees. At all times, armed guards followed the prisoners in their tasks. In April 1916, the situation changed when “selected prisoners were released in the custody of farmers willing to guarantee them the prevailing rate for farm labour and to report on their behavior.” As a result, some internment camps were closed. The liberation of the internees, namely German prisoners of war, only began once the Treaty of Versailles, which officially ended the war, was signed on June 28, 1919. Although most remaining “enemy aliens” were liberated upon that date, the repatriation of the prisoners of war lasted until May 1920 due to logistical problem.

The Canadian example demonstrated well how the intensification of internment operations had become a reality of modern war. It also showed how fighting nations
possessed the ability to detain large populations in times of war. During the First World War, similar internment experiences also took place in Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Russia, Turkey, the United States and most other fighting nations.33

In 1929, the Geneva Convention was modified and provisions were made for the protection of prisoners of war, a subject which had been dealt earlier in The Hague Convention of 1907. From now on, the treatment of prisoners of war was placed under the jurisdiction of the Geneva Convention. This was done to correct and expand clauses which had proved troublesome during the Great War. This was the case for measures dealing with prisoner of war work and punishment. The 1929 Geneva Convention proved to be of great importance since it now integrated under one document all aspects of warfare.34

Nevertheless, the First World War internment experience had already proved its worth and in the interwar years numerous nations resorted, once again, to such measures. It was during this period that internment facilities were transformed into “institutions of terror.” In most cases, internment centres were used by totalitarian regimes as instruments to neutralize political opposition. For instance, following the Russian Revolution (1917) and Civil War (1918-1921), the new Soviet government resorted to internment camps to incarcerate political prisoners. Many corrective labour camps, commonly known as Gulags, were established in northern Russia and Siberia. Although deportation to these regions had been a legacy of old Russia, it had now been integrated into the concentration system. In such camps, political prisoners were used as forced labour to build railways and waterways and to work in factories and mines. In a sense, internment camps had been converted into “tools of slavery.”35

With the advent of the Second World War (1939-1945), internment camps were once again used by all belligerents, including Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the United States and Canada. Even neutral states such as Afghanistan, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Eire and the Vatican resorted to such facilities in order to detain “exchanged POW and airmen who forced-landed in neutral territories...” In fact, internment camps were created on all continents. This had to do with the intensity of the
conflict at hand. Furthermore, internment operations were used on a much larger scale. Between 1933 and 1945, some 26 million prisoners of war, political prisoners and civilians were incarcerated in German internment camps and used as forced labour. During the war, it was in Germany that the harsh nature of internment camps was exploited to its maximum. After all, it was this country which, in 1940, added a new dimension to internment operations by introducing death camps. These facilities were created with one single aim in mind: the complete and systematic extermination of all people considered to be “undesirable” by the Germans, notably the Gypsies and the Jews. This process, which became known as the “Final Solution,” comprised series of camps located in eastern Europe. Overall, millions of internees were put to death in German internment camps through “hunger, cold, pestilence, torture, medical experimentations and other means of extermination such as gas chambers.” Despite the German case, conditions in the internment facilities of most of the other nations at war, notably in Canada, largely accorded to conditions set out in the Geneva Convention.

The social examination of the German internment camp operation in Canada during the Second World War is quite new. Few historians have approached this subject. Although research in this field began in the late 1970s, the lack of accessible primary sources rendered the study of war camps problematic. This can be explained by the fact that most of the official documents relating to Canadian internment camps were kept from public scrutiny by the Department of National Defence (DND). Hence, most of the researchers who wrote on the topic prior to the early 1990s had to rely on personal accounts rather than official documents. Eric Koch’s 1980 autobiography Deemed Suspect - A Wartime Blunder is probably the best example of this genre. By the early 1990s, the DND’s sources were opened for consultation at the National Archives of Canada. As a result, numerous researchers began venturing in the uncharted waters of the Canadian internment operation. One can think of Yves Bernard and Caroline Bergeron’s 1995 study Trop loin de Berlin - Des prisonniers allemands au Canada, and Bill Waiser’s 1995 account, Park Prisoners: The Untold Story of Western Canada’s National Parks. However, still no thorough study of the camps of southern Quebec exists.
This thesis is based on research in both primary and secondary sources. Extensive government documents relating to Canadian internment operations are contained in the collections of the National Archives of Canada. Sources relating to internment operations were collected from Record Group 24 (Records of the Department of National Defence). All official papers relating to the Canadian internment operation during the Second World War are contained in this collection. This includes correspondence, reports, standing orders, strength returns and war diaries. Most of these sources were issued at the time by representatives from National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) in Ottawa and by the authorities of each camp. Southern Quebec’s five internment camps are included in this collection. Also used were interviews with ex-internees gathered from the “Collection Eric Koch” in Manuscript Group 30 (Manuscripts of the First Half of the Twentieth Century). These interviews enabled a thorough study of how inmates perceived their fate and how they lived behind the barbed wires. In addition, records from the Eastern Townships Research Centre (E.T.R.C.) were utilized. Interviews from the E.T.R.C.’s Eastern Townships Collection “Oral History of Eastern Townships Anglophone Women During the Second World War” offered an opportunity to study how the local civilian population perceived the camps. Printed primary sources were also consulted. First-hand documents such as Mario Duliani’s La Ville Sans Femmes [1945], and François Lafitte’s The Internment of Aliens [1940], have proven a fine supplement to the primary sources listed. Further, printed government documents such as Red Cross and Prisoners of War Conventions [1942] and Orders and Instructions, Internment Camps [1945] contributed greatly in understanding the regulations governing the administration of internment camps in Canada.

By looking at the internment operations in southern Quebec, this case study will enable one to appreciate the relationship which existed between small rural communities and the war camp apparatus. The mere support of relief societies such as the YMCA and the International Red Cross, the use of prisoners in Work Programs, the re-education of prisoners by local teachers were, among many others, symbols of this relationship. Further, by analyzing the everyday life of prisoners, this will demonstrate how Germans interacted with each other and with their guards in such camps. Overall, this thesis will
enable one to appreciate the drastic measures that can be taken by a government in the advent of total war, but also, despite that fact, how well German prisoners were treated by Canadian authorities during these tumultuous years.
NOTES

2. Ibid., p. 711.
7. Canada, Red Cross and Prisoners of War Conventions (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier Printer to the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, 1942), pp. 48-61; Jackson, pp. 5-6; Vance, Objects..., pp. 16-17.


19 Morton, p. 34.

20 Carter, p. 20.; Laflamme, p. 20.; Thompson, p. 6.


22 Jackson, p. 134-141.


24 Jackson, p. 137.; Morton, p. 41.


26 Jackson, p. 137.; Morton, p. 41.


28 Carter, p. 29.


30 Waiser, p. 10.


33 Canada, Red Cross and Prisoners..., pp. 87-137.


36 Vance, Objects..., p. 5.

CHAPTER 1

ORGANIZING AND DEVELOPING SOUTHERN QUEBEC'S INTERNMENT OPERATION

When Canada declared war on Nazi Germany on September 10, 1939, measures were immediately taken by the federal government for the incarceration of "enemy subjects." The protection of one's homefront against enemy infiltration and sabotage had become a harsh reality of twentieth century wars and internment was believed to be an effective method for neutralizing this threat. For many Canadians, this was a revival of Canada's First World War internment operation. The story of southern Quebec's internment operation began in the early Summer of 1940 when Canada agreed to accommodate internees detained by Great Britain, most of whom were German refugees.

The region's internment operation can be divided in two phases. During the first phase (1940-1943), civilians of German descent formed the bulk of the inmate population, while during the second phase (1942-1946), it was German prisoners of war. Despite its short lapse of time, the first phase was of great importance. It was during this period that the region's camps flourished from small ghettos to highly sophisticated internment centres. The knowledge gained with the civilian internees enabled camp authorities to solve early deficiencies, correct mistakes and improve installations. As a result, when it was decided in 1942 to use the region's internment camps for the incarceration of German prisoners of war, the authorities were prepared to meet the new challenge. The experience gathered during the first phase had provided the perfect training ground for handling prisoners of war. With this in mind, the internment operation which developed on the
south shore of the St. Lawrence River became a complex and well orchestrated network of internment facilities.

Canada’s Second World War internment operation was the result of several years of planning. The process began on August 20, 1936, when Order-in-Council PC 2097 was passed, forming a Canadian Defence Committee whose purpose, among others, was to handle the issue of “enemy aliens” in the advent of war. The architect of this was Minister of National Defence Ian Mackenzie.¹ In March 1938, this Committee was divided into a number of sub-committees, including a Committee on the Treatment of Enemy Aliens on the Outbreak of Hostilities, later re-named the Interdepartmental Committee on the Treatment of Enemy Aliens and Enemy Property. Chaired by the Under Secretary of State and taking in members from the Departments of the Secretary of State, External Affairs, Justice, Mines and Resources, National Defence and Finance, this sub-committee was to “inquire into and report upon the treatment of aliens and alien property in time of war or emergency, real or apprehended…” Working in conjunction with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), it compiled a list of all “enemy aliens” believed to be involved in subversive activities.²

When Great Britain declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939, Canada, though not yet officially a belligerent, responded by issuing the Defence of Canada Regulations, which, among other measures, provided in Section 21 for the internment of all individuals “acting in any matter prejudicial to the public safety or the safety of the state.” The establishment of this regulation had been possible because a state of “apprehended war” had been proclaimed since August 23, 1939, and because civil rights had been suspended with the introduction of the War Measures Act on September 1, 1939. Immediately after the regulation became law, suspected German sympathizers, whose names were taken from the list compiled by the Committee on the Treatment of Enemy Aliens on the Outbreak of Hostilities, were rounded up by the RCMP. This was a precaution against sabotage and the rise of a Canadian “fifth column.” Canada’s Second World War internment operation had begun.³

When Canada declared war on Germany on September 10, the anti-German manhunt intensified. All German immigrants who had arrived in Canada after 1922 were
forced to register with the authorities. However, of the 16,000 German-Canadians who did so, only a few hundreds were arrested. As the *Defence of Canada Regulations* stipulated: “All enemy aliens legally admitted to Canada and ordinarily resident in Canada, so long as they peacefully pursue their ordinary avocations, shall be allowed to continue to enjoy the protection of the law and shall be accorded the respect and consideration due to peaceful and law-abiding citizens, and they shall not be arrested, detained or interfered with, provided they comply with the requirements in respect of registration...” The main reason for this situation was the deep sense of indifference that most German-Canadians displayed regarding German politics. The overwhelming majority of persons of German origin in Canada had either been born in Canada or had emigrated to the country in order to escape Germany and its problems. The Canadian government understood this, which explains why only 850 German-Canadians were interned during the war out of a population of some 470,000. Because the Canadian authorities expected to handle “only the Canadian civilian internees imprisoned under the *Defence of Canada Regulations.*” no measures were taken in 1939 to accentuate the country’s internment operation. In fact, Canada operated only three internment camps at the time, located at Kananaskis (Alberta), Petawawa (Ontario) and Valcartier (Quebec).

The situation changed in the spring of 1940 when the British government began negotiating with Ottawa for the transfer of thousands of German internees to Canada. At the time. Great Britain detained both “enemy aliens” of German descent and prisoners of war. Britain’s internment operation was initiated when it declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939. Because civilians of German descent were perceived as potential threats, special tribunals were set up in late September to examine all “enemy aliens” over the age of 16 with the object of “sifting out anyone who might not be friendly to the country.” Overall, some 120 tribunals were established, each dealing with more than 500 cases. As a result, “enemy aliens” were graded into three categories: Class “A” being “aliens about whose loyalty and reliability the tribunals had doubts and who might constitute a potential security risk”; Class “B” being “aliens about whose loyalty the tribunals were not absolutely certain and who for one reason or the other should be kept under a form of supervision”; and Class “C” being “all those about whom the tribunals
were satisfied." The aim of this classification system was to keep track of all German "enemy aliens." After all, by 1939, some 75,000 German "enemy aliens" were in the country, 55,000 of whom were refugees. In fact, since 1933, Nazi policy had been to expel all "undesirables" from Germany. With this in mind, numerous Jewish refugees found their way to Great Britain. According to one Jewish internee: "The purpose was to rob us and to force emigration, to force us to leave and to blackmail other countries into taking us. And it worked..." However, as xenophobia and war hysteria increased in the British Isles, London decided to "intern the lot" in early 1940. This meant the incarceration of most individuals classed under the "ABC" system. For the German refugees who had fled Nazi Germany, Britain's general internment policy came as a shock. As one internee recalled: "...I was surprised in England that they had interned us in the first place because we came as their friends. There is an Arab proverb...'The enemy of my enemy is my friend'...we were the enemies of Hitler. The British were the enemies of Hitler so we assumed that they must be our friends..." As for the German war prisoners detained in Britain, most were enemy merchant seamen whose ships had been caught in British ports; German Navy sailors captured at sea by the Royal Navy; and German Air Force pilots whose planes had been shot down over British territory. Therefore, Britain was forced to detain large populations of civilians of German descent and prisoners of war by 1940.

The reason guiding Great Britain's desire to transfer all of its prisoners overseas in the spring of 1940 was to alleviate the pressures that internment operations imposed on the British homefront. At the time, Britain was coping with German aerial bombardments and was facing the prospect of a German invasion. Because the British government felt that "internment on the British Isles was no longer sufficiently secure," the Chiefs of Staff recommended that most German internees be transferred overseas. As Eric Koch indicated in his book Deemed Suspect, three reasons guided this decision. First, in the advent of a German invasion, the danger of fifth columnists would be lessened; second, there would be less mouths to feed in Britain; and third, less military personnel would be required to guard British internment camps.
In late May 1940, the British government began sending requests to its dominions asking them if they would be prepared to accept British internees. As British Secretary of State, Viscount Caldecote, told Vincent Massey, High Commissioner for the Canadian government in London, on June 7, 1940: "...The United Kingdom government sincerely hopes that the Canadian government may be pressed to come to the assistance of the United Kingdom by agreeing to receive at the earliest possible moment, at least the internees whose removal from this country it is desired to secure on the ground that their continued presence in this country is bound to be a source of the most serious risk."\textsuperscript{15} Despite much British pressure, the Canadian government debated the issue and on June 19, 1940, Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King announced in the House of Commons that Canada "agreed to accept German prisoners of war and [civilian] internees from the United Kingdom."\textsuperscript{16}

The first batch of prisoners sent to Canada left Liverpool on June 20, 1940, aboard the \textit{Duchess of York}, a 20,000 ton vessel belonging to the Canadian Pacific Steamship Company. The ship's cargo of 2,112 Class "A" internees and 535 German prisoners of war reached Quebec City on June 29. Although the \textit{Duchess of York}'s trip across the Atlantic Ocean went according to schedule, nothing of such can be said of the ill-fated \textit{Arandora Star}. Having left Liverpool on July 1, 1940, with a contingent of 473 Class "A" internees and 717 Italian inmates, the \textit{Arandora Star}, once a Blue Star luxury liner, was torpedoed by a German U-Boat off the Irish coast on July 2. Approximately 146 German and 453 Italian internees died. Those who survived the \textit{Arandora Star} disaster were later packed aboard other ships, also bound for Canada. Then, on July 3, 1940, the \textit{Etrick} left Liverpool with 1,308 Class "B" and "C" internees as well as 785 German prisoners of war and 405 Italians. The last vessel to leave Britain for Canada with a cargo of internees was the \textit{Sobieski}, a Polish luxury liner. Having left Greenock, Scotland, on July 4, 1940, with 982 Class "B" and "C" internees and 548 German prisoners of war, the \textit{Sobieski} reached Quebec City on July 15, two days after the \textit{Etrick}.\textsuperscript{17}

What this transfer demonstrated was that there were less prisoners of war than civilian internees being sent to Canada. Furthermore, the bulk of the prisoners were Class "B" and "C" captives, "most of whom should never have been sent from England."
according to historian John Joseph Kelly. As British author François Lafitte indicated in 1940: "This showed clearly - out of the mouths of the Ministers themselves - that the War Office, the Home Office and Mr. Chamberlain [British Prime Minister Arthur Neville Chamberlain] between them made a complete mess of the job of selecting people for deportation in a sensible and democratic way and of organizing the overseas transport of less than 8,000 men." Lafitte further stated: "The plain fact is that thousands of innocent refugees have been treated like cattle in the name of national security." Nevertheless, because the internees were being kept for the British government, the Canadian authorities had no choice but to detain them. Only the British Home Secretary had the "overriding power here of ordering release in any case where he is convinced that release will be in the national interest, or in the interest of our [British] war effort."  

However, Canada was unprepared to accommodate an influx of prisoners from Great Britain, as the country lacked proper detention facilities. This led Ottawa to create new internment camps to accommodate the British internees. The immediate result of this decision was the creation of temporary internment centres in Quebec. Operations began in June 1940, with the construction of two such facilities: the first was built at Cove Fields on Quebec City’s Plains of Abraham and the second was located on the Trois-Rivières exhibition ground property. It was in these facilities that the arriving prisoners were first held. While this was being done, permanent detention facilities were being built in New Brunswick, Ontario and Quebec. These provinces were chosen because Canadian authorities believed it was unwise to send the internees to the Canadian west due to the significant German populations living there. As such, eastern Canada was chosen for security reasons.  

It was within this context that southern Quebec’s internment operation was initiated in 1940. At the time, four permanent camps were being built in the province to accommodate the bulk of the British civilian internees. These were Camp “A” Farnham, Camp “I” Île-aux-Noix, Camp “N” Sherbrooke, and Camp “S” Île Ste. Hélène. Except for Camp “S,” which was located in Montreal and whose purpose was to incarcerate Italian inmates, all of the other camps were situated in southern Quebec and detained civilians of German descent.
The first phase of internment in southern Quebec had begun. Although responsibility pertaining to the "administration, treatment and security of prisoners of war and internees" was that of the Department of National Defence's Directorate of Internment Operation - later re-named the Directorate, Prisoners of War - Military District 4 headquarters in Montreal was in charge of all internment camps located in Quebec. In each camp, the Directorate Veterans' Guard of Canada (VGC) had complete jurisdiction over camp personnel. The VGC had been established on May 24, 1940, as a special corps of First World War veterans to be used for guard duties wherever needed. The aim was to exploit the veterans' military experience for the benefit of the homefront. Indeed, the unit's tasks were to guard internment camps, cable stations, oil refineries, bridges, canals, ammunition depots, factories, and many other such sites. Although the age-limit for enlistment was fixed at 49 years, a number of older men were accepted including some veterans of the Boer War. This freed up the younger military personnel for overseas service. The VGC replaced the Canadian Provost Corps as the most preeminent guards at internment camps. By 1945, the corps numbered 15,000 men who served in Canada, the Caribbean, Great Britain and Newfoundland. In southern Quebec, most of the VGC personnel were unemployed French-Canadian veterans.

Because of the urgency to find proper quarters for the British internees, the three camps which were created in southern Quebec in 1940 were set up in haste. The first camp built in the region was Camp "1" Île-aux-Noix. It was constructed within the walls of old Fort Lennox, an eighteenth century fortress situated on the Île-aux-Noix - an island on the Richelieu River near St. Jean. The history of Camp Île-aux-Noix began on July 1, 1940, when Major Eric D.B. Kippen was asked by the officer commanding Military District 4 to find a suitable location for an internment camp. Following a thorough investigation of the île-aux-Noix's existing facilities, Kippen reported favorably to his superiors about the site and work on the camp began on July 4.

However, converting old Fort Lennox into an internment camp was no easy task. As Kippen wrote in the camp's war diary on July 5: "There is a lot to do. The old barracks and other buildings have not been inhabited since 1880. Water and light must be installed; wire fences put up and a great many other things attended to." Because of the urgent
necessity to find new internment centres, Camp Île-aux-Noix was constructed in haste. As Kippen stated: "...I'd taken about three weeks [to build the camp]. I had some engineers working on it night and day. They had to install a...proper lighting and had to do a lot about the water and the drainage and all that sort of thing, because it [Fort Lennox] hasn't been lived in about 60 or 70 years. It was full of bats...and all sorts of animals...it was a rotten place, really, but it was the only thing I could find in a hurry."²⁵ When Major Kippen received the order to prepare for the arrival of the first internees on July 15, 1940, the camp was still in the midst of construction. As he wrote: "This news causes considerable excitement in view of the fact that the camp was far from complete, at the time..." In fact, civilian workers were still being employed by the camp three weeks after the arrival of the prisoners.²⁶

The inexperience of the camp staff was another problem. This could be seen through the lack of coordination characterizing the arrival of the first prisoners on July 15. Upon reaching St. Paul, a small town facing the Île-aux-Noix, at 7 p.m., the 273 prisoners were divided into groups of 35 and shipped to the island on a large barge escorted by a fleet of motor boats. Because only one barge could be used, the transfer to the Île-aux-Noix was a slow process. By midnight, some 76 prisoners were still waiting on the St. Paul shore to be transferred to the island. Complicating matters was the fact that the entire operation was done at night and in the midst of pouring rain. As they arrived in the camp, prisoners were thoroughly searched, were given a hot shower, and were examined by medical officers before being sent to their quarters. So slow was this process that the prisoners were not completely settled until 4 o'clock in the morning. As a result, the internees' transfer from St. Paul to the camp took nearly ten hours. Major Kippen well summarized why the transfer was so slow: "The whole thing was quite a job, considering the camp was partly finished and the staff were quite inexperienced of this kind of work."²⁷

Inexperience also led to further logistical problems. The camp staff's manipulation of the inmates' luggage well demonstrated this issue. Although prisoners were allowed a maximum of 40 lbs. of baggage, most disobeyed orders and brought with them between 75 lbs. and 250 lbs. Moreover, nothing was done to protect the prisoners' belongings as
they were transferred from St. Paul to the camp. Transported amidst pouring rain, most of the luggage sustained serious damage. Since most of the bags were of poor quality, wet cases often ripped due to the sheer weight of their contents. As a result, many possessions were lost. Although the internees were blamed for this problem, the camp staff also held some responsibility. Despite the poor weather, no soldier made any attempts to preserve the prisoners' luggage. Instead, the already broken possessions were piled up and covered with small canvas sheets outside of the camp and left to the inclement weather for a couple of days. Moreover, many soldiers resorted to pillage.28 Stolen were gold and silver wristwatches, lighters, kitchen utensils, silverware, wallets, knives and even boots, shirts and pants.29 Although Major Kippen was unaware of the looting, he indicated to the internees that their baggage had been handled some ten times since it left Britain, "thereby running all the hazards of loss, damage and theft." He added that "under war time the fact that the prisoners are regarded with some considerable hostility by civilians and in some cases soldiers are inclined to look upon prisoners of war property as fair game."30 A Court of Inquiry was assembled in September 1940 to investigate the matter.31 Although it admitted that the internees "have suffered the loss of personal effects and property," the court came to the conclusion in February 1941 that it was "unable to arrive at a definite conclusion and to hold anyone in particular accountable for the unfortunate mishap." There was not enough evidence, it claimed, "to show exactly how and where the alleged loss or polfering had taken place." Too many opportunities to tamper with the luggage took place during the long journey from Britain to Canada. Further, since most of the luggage was made of poor quality fabrics which "could hardly stand the wear and tear incidental to traveling by land and sea," the court began to wonder how anyone could know if some of the baggage had not already been broken before the arrival of the internees at Camp Île-aux-Noix. Because no system of control by means of receipts had been issued, no one could be found directly responsible for the safety of the luggage. Despite its conclusion, the Court of Inquiry mentioned that it might be "worthwhile to have the Provincial Police pursue inquiries, not only in Montreal but also St. Jean and the vicinity of St. Paul."32
The Quebec Provincial Police’s investigation of the matter was much more conclusive. After interrogating several witnesses, the police concluded in July 1941 that “it is therefore proven that the articles lost by the prisoners had been stolen at île-aux-Noix by the soldiers, the members of the Veterans Home Guard and the employees of National Defence and the officers in charge are to be blamed for what occurred.”

According to the civilian workers employed by NDHQ at Camp Île-aux-Noix, the luggage was looted on the island. As one worker said: “The suit cases were opened and several broken and torn. Lots of stuff was stolen. The guards who were there were kicking the suit cases open with their heels, saying that all these things were to be burned and that the prisoners were never to see their belongings any more.” With this in mind, the civilian workers began searching the luggage for valuables. Also, one civilian worker recalled, “there was about 50 soldiers and these men went through and pilfered the luggage of the internees.”

Meanwhile, hoping to alleviate crowding in the camps already established in Quebec, new sites were considered in August 1940. In southern Quebec, the result was the creation of Camp “A” on the Dominion Experimental Farm at Farnham and Camp “N” on the property of the Quebec Central Railroad (Newington) at Sherbrooke. Unlike Camp Île-aux-Noix, both these camps were situated in Quebec’s Eastern Townships. An alternate site was offered by the Quebec government on the Brompton Farm near Sherbrooke. This site, which would have been known as Camp “O,” never materialized as federal authorities did not deem necessary the construction of a fourth camp in the region.

The story of Camp “A” began on August 1, 1940, when the Dominion Experimental Farm in Farnham became the property of the Department of National Defence. Immediately, a thorough investigation of the site was made by members of the Directorate of Internment Operations for the construction of a new camp. As they stated in their report on August 8: “It is important that this camp be completed...so as to move the internees now in temporary camp “L” Cove fields, Quebec City, a very unsatisfactory place.” Despite the urgent need, the construction of the camp did not begin until mid-
September. As a result, work was still in progress when order was given to open the facility in early October, 1940.  

Camp Farnham became operational on October 9, 1940, when Major Eric D. B. Kippen, who was then in command of Camp Île-aux-Noix, was transferred to Farnham. When he arrived, the camp was in a primitive state. At the time, some 120 civilians were still working on the camp’s facilities. There was still a lot to be done, for only one line of barbed wire had been erected. Although nearing completion, most of the buildings still remained inhabitable. Further, no towers were yet installed at the four corners of the compound. In fact, the compound was literally strewn with debris. Still, orders had been given to Kippen and his men to settle the camp. This was no easy task since no huts existed to house the camp’s staff. Kippen tried to correct this deficiency by immediately ordering the conversion of two old tobacco-drying buildings - remnants of the Dominion Experimental Farm - into huts for his men. In the meantime, large tents had to serve as living quarters for the troops while Kippen and his officers stayed at the Montcalm Hotel in Farnham.  

The main purpose of Major Kippen’s presence in the camp was to accelerate the construction process and supervise “the last stages of the building…”  

To increase production, Kippen began using night shifts. This enabled work to go on 24-hours a day. In the span of five days, the entire barbed wire fence system was built, most of the buildings and huts were completed and the four towers were erected. The camp was able to welcome its first internees on October 15, 1940. Still, there was still a lot of work left to be done. As Kippen wrote in the camp’s war diary: “…it will probably take another week to complete the work going on in the camp.” Clearly, camp authorities were not ready to welcome a huge influx of inmates. Nevertheless, in the course of a few days, Camp Farnham was forced to accommodate 520 internees. The initial batch, which consisted of 140 men, arrived by train on October 15, and was followed by a second shipment of 180 men on October 16, and a third group of 200 inmates on October 18.  

This created a serious security problem since the camp was not ready to accommodate such a large number of internees. Work was still in progress in the compound and on the barbed wire fences and buildings. Further, the camp lacked beds for internees thus forcing
many to sleep on the floor. This problem was solved three days later when the long awaited double decker iron beds were sent to Camp Farnham.\textsuperscript{42}

To accelerate the construction of the camp, the civilian workmen were replaced by the internees themselves. According to the camp’s war diary, “a lot of work inside the compound can now be done by the internees and there seems to be many skilled men among them.” Despite the prisoners’ belief that the camp should have been completed prior to their arrival, most complied with the authorities’ request and began working on the facility.\textsuperscript{43} However, should internees hurt themselves in the process, no facilities existed within the camp to treat them. In fact, the internees’ hospital was still in the midst of construction. Further, no trucks or cars were in the possession of the camp authorities at the time. This was a serious handicap, for it meant that any wounded prisoners could not rapidly be evacuated to a nearby hospital.\textsuperscript{44} Although no injury was sustained by any of the inmates, the use of internee labour constituted a serious risk taken by the authorities.

The story of Camp “N” Newington in Sherbrooke was somewhat similar, for it too was still being constructed when prisoners arrived. The site originally belonged to the Quebec Central Railroad (Q.C.R.) and was transferred to the Department of National Defence in September 1940. It consisted of two main buildings (hangars): an old machine shop and boiler house; an oil house; and the administration building of the Q.C.R. Further, railway tracks and oiling pits extended throughout the yard. According to the camp’s war diary: “The facilities are so inadequate that when the Sherbrooke Fusiliers [a local regiment] made an inspection in September 1940, exploring the possibilities of using the site as their headquarters, the officer commanding flatly rejected the project.” Nevertheless, Brigadier-General Edouard de Bellefeuille Panet, Director of Internment Operations, requested Major D. J. O’Donahoe, Engineer Officer at Military District 4, to inspect the site in late September with a view of using it as a camp. According to O’Donahoe’s report, dated September 24, 1940, “the camp could be made ready for occupation by October 4, 1940.”\textsuperscript{45}

Although this completely contradicted the Sherbrooke Fusiliers’ report, the Directorate of Internment Operation authorized the construction of an internment camp on
the Q.C.R. site. However, transforming this property into an internment facility proved a slow process. Because of the enormous amount of work to be done, none of Major O’Donahoe’s deadlines could be respected. When the camp opened on October 5, 1940, the site was far from being completed. As Major S. H. Griffin, camp commandant, reported: “There are virtually no sanitary arrangements other than 6 out of date toilets in the boiler house. The lighting system is extremely limited, and the uncleanliness of the main buildings is beyond description.” Despite the harsh conditions, Griffin’s men tried to “give the place a semblance of habitability” while preparing for the arrival of the internees. Despite this effort to rapidly complete the camp, the site remained unready to welcome internees. When 618 prisoners arrived on October 15, the “appalling conditions at the camp” generated a considerable amount of discontent. According to Eric Koch:

...the property consisted of two repair sheds. one for locomotives and the other for railroad cars...The railway tracks and oiling pits that ran through the sheds were filled with black water. The place had six-old fashioned lavatories without ventilation, two urinals and seven low-pressure water taps which also had to serve the kitchen. The windows were broken and the rofts were leaky: so were the noisily hissing heating pipes. The floor space allotted to each of the...internees amounted to 29 square feet. That was contrary to British Ministry of Health regulations which required a minimum of 35 square feet for each person incarcerated in a British prison.

Internees soon came to the conclusion that this camp was “not fit for human habitation.” The camp lacked bedding equipment. As one internee recalled: “When we arrived at these sheds we started to laugh and say. ‘This is a camp? Where are the beds, where are the mattresses, where are the blankets?’...it was completely ridiculous...” This had resulted from the faulty routing of the camp’s bedding equipment; mattresses destined for Camp Farnham were sent to Camp Sherbrooke while bed frames were sent to Montreal. Furthermore, prisoners had to wash “by means of a small bowl, after having queued up for about half an hours’ time to get a spot of hot water, if any. in a coal pit under the boilers. And if one wanted to make use of one of six lavatories, another hour had to be spent.”

Obviously, camp conditions were inadequate. This shocked most of the prisoners who had been told by the authorities of Camp Cove Fields that living conditions in southern Quebec camps would be much better. Feeling betrayed, the internees immediately
resorted to passive resistance by refusing to prepare meals, eat, or do work of any nature. The camp staff immediately negotiated with the internees in order to quell this small mutiny. This was reflected when assistant adjutant, second lieutenant J. A. Edmison, addressed the internees on the morning of October 16. Because most of the internees were Jews, Edmison pointed “that their present conduct was highly damaging to their own cause, that it would arouse resentment rather than sympathy, would aid spread anti-Semitism in Canada and severely handicap the efforts of Canadian Jewry to work out plans for post-war Jewish immigration.” According to Eric Koch, Edmison made a great impression on the internees. As a result, the prisoners agreed to cooperate, but on the basis of a three day trial. Although this ended the hunger strike, it did not erase the inmates’ discontent. However, helping to cool down the already heated climate was the camp commandant’s speech of October 18, whereby he pleaded for cooperation. To further entice the inmates into cooperating, camp authorities, in association with Major D. J. O’Donahoe, agreed to pay each internee 25¢ per day for any work done to improve the camp. As a result, a Work Committee of internee technicians was formed to “draw up plans for immediate requirements.” Immediately, internee labour was used to construct outside latrines, patch leaks in the roofs and holes in the floors, prepare the kitchen and mess hall, install ice boxes and cook-stoves and to improve lighting. From this moment on, the situation began improving, though there still remained a lot of work to be done.

The treatment of the internees was to be in accordance with the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Although the convention was to apply solely to enemy combatants, the Canadian government had decided in 1939 that it should also pertain to civilian internees. This was done by integrating both prisoners of war and civilians into the same category. For instance, prisoners of war were referred to as “prisoners of war Class 1” whereas civilian internees were termed “prisoners of war Class 2.” This system of classification enabled civilian internees to benefit from rights as prisoners of war. As it was stated by the Canadian authorities: “Enemy Aliens interned as Prisoners of War under the Defense of Canada Regulations are not entitled to the special rights and privileges accorded to those Prisoners of War defined in... the International Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. It is intended that the
provisions of that convention shall be made applicable to them as regards their general
treatment, but saving and excepting certain articles of said Convention which are
considered applicable to Prisoners of War... \(^{60}\) This was reinforced on May 31, 1940,
with the introduction of Order-in-Council PC 2322 which mentioned that all interned
individuals in Canada were to be termed as prisoners of war. \(^{61}\) According to historian
John Stanton, there was now “no legal distinction between the British internees and
prisoners of war sent to Canada; the prisoners of war captured in combat by Canadian
soldiers; the Canadian citizens who were political dissenters; and the enemy aliens.” As
he concluded: “It was a neat way of disguising the fact that these people [civilian
internees] were in fact political prisoners.” \(^ {62}\) Because southern Quebec guards had been
told that they were to guard dangerous “enemies of the state” and prisoners of war, the
arrival of the civilian inmates created much confusion. \(^ {63}\) Major Eric D. B. Kippen,
commandant of Camp Île-aux-Noix, recalled how he was shocked at the sight of the
internees, especially the Orthodox Jews.

First of all, an old fellow comes out [of the train] ... I guess he must have
been at least 80... he could hardly walk... then there was a young boy, he
was 16 or 17... these were all... refugees... that had been brought over in this
ship [Sobieski]. Well, the information I had got was entirely wrong, and I
had quite a shock when I saw them. because I said, “Hell, these aren’t
prisoners of war”... a lot of them were Orthodox Jews... \(^ {64}\)

This amalgamation of civilian internees and prisoners of war into the same
category demonstrated that the Canadian government did not understand who their
inmates were. Although it created a climate of uniformity and enabled civilian inmates to
be protected by the Geneva Convention, the situation made it difficult for camp
guardsmen to distinguish the specific needs of one type of prisoner from another. For
instance, military personnel understood the concept of internment and the treatment they
were to receive if ever caught in battle. Most had received classes pertaining to the subject
in their specific regiments and all understood the provisions of the Geneva Convention.
They knew what to expect and understood that they were to remain incarcerated until the
end of the war. On the other hand, civilian internees had not been prepared psychologically for internment. In most cases, they did not understand the reasons for
their internment and very few knew about the provisions of the *Geneva Convention*. Further, they did not comprehend why the Canadian government treated them as prisoners of war, for most of them wished no harm to the British Commonwealth. This whole situation meant that camp authorities had to deal with very different psychological profiles among the internees. Hence, the uniformity of the prisoners’ status was bound to create discomfort and discontent among the civilian prisoners. For the civilian internees of southern Quebec, this issue was solved in 1941 when the Canadian government agreed to change the British inmates’ status from prisoners of war to refugees.

In the summer of 1941, the British government, which remained responsible for southern Quebec’s internees, acknowledged the fact that most of the civilian inmates were German refugees and that they constituted no threat to the security of the realm. When the Canadian government was made aware of this change, measures were immediately taken to rectify the prisoners’ status. On June 25, 1941, Ottawa issued Order-in-Council PC 4568 which granted the inmates refugee status. This meant that the civilians of German descent were no longer to be treated as prisoners of war class 2. It also meant that they were no longer registered under the provisions of the *Geneva Convention*. The camps of southern Quebec became known as refugee camps. Because the administration of such camps was to be distinct from prisoner of war camps, a Central Committee for Interned Refugees was created by the Secretary of State. This meant that though the Department of National Defence remained responsible for the camp staffs, it was the Department of the Secretary of State which coordinated all refugee camps.

As refugees, the civilian inmates of southern Quebec benefited from new privileges. These were introduced on July 15, 1941, through Order-in-Council PC 5246. Internees were given complete freedom in the performance of their religious duties; were allowed to obtain liquor; were permitted to receive visitors; were given special privileges regarding mail quotas; saw their prison uniforms discarded; and faced less surveillance by guards. At Île-aux-Noix, inmates could “almost undisturbedly walk out of camp and take a stroll on the island or take a swim in the Richelieu River...” However, because many internees had been misguided to believe that their new status would ensure drastic changes in terms of camp organization, some dissatisfaction was expressed.
When Great Britain began releasing some 17,000 Germans civilians in April 1941, Canada responded by doing the same. "Friendly aliens" were to "return to Britain where their manpower could be put to use in the war effort, or to remain in the internment camps in Canada until each refugee could qualify for admission to Canada under the prevailing immigrant regulation." The first people to be released were the very old and sick. Then, there were those whose work was considered vital for the war effort such as engineers, scientists and factory owners. Then, there was the very young people. They were followed by what might be termed "anomalies," characters "who through ignorance or neglect were regarded as Germans or Austrians, but could speak no German and who had been in Britain uninterruptedly since early childhood." Further, prisoners could accelerate their release by enlisting in the unarmed "alien" companies of the Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps. a para-military unit used "to build roads. camps and airfields, to shovel coal, to load and unload railway trucks with coils of barbed wire, pit props and all manner of warlike stores. [and] to act as unskilled handymen to the armed forces of the Crown." For men aged between 18 and 50 years old, enlistment in the Pioneer Corps proved to be an opportunity to demonstrate their friendliness to the Allied cause. For southern Quebec's inmates, the Pioneer Corps was the only way to return to Great Britain. Altogether, some 5,000 internees joined the Corps during the war. Internees could also be released if they had relatives in Canada. Finally, authority was granted to release refugees on parole so that they could study or work in Canada.

The release of refugees was a very meticulous operation. Before being released, inmates were interviewed by immigration officers working for the Canadian Central Committee for Interned Refugees. In most cases, they cooperated with the United Jewish Refugee and War Relief Agencies. Furthermore, internees had to be sponsored by Canadian civilians or recognized institutions. The sponsoring of refugees led many visitors into the camps. Although numerous businessmen, farmers, private companies and universities sponsored inmates, the Canadian Jewish Congress was the most active institution in this field. The sponsorship operation not only helped the prisoners but also went some way to enlightened Canadian civilians that the vast majority of refugees were no threat to the security of Canada.
By 1942, the strength reductions in southern Quebec camps had become so drastic that the Canadian government began to consider new applications for the region's internment operation. The result was Ottawa's decision in early 1942 to use the camps of southern Quebec for the incarceration of prisoners of war class 1. It was during that same year that all of Camps Farnham and Sherbrooke refugees were transferred to Camp Île-aux-Noix. As a result, Île-aux Noix remained the only facility in southern Quebec to detain refugees. However, because more and more refugees were being released by October 1943, it was finally decided to close that camp altogether. In fact, only 42 inmates resided in the camp by November 1943. With this in mind, all of the camps' captives were transferred to Camp Hull on November 4, 1943. Unlike the other camps situated in southern Quebec, Île-aux-Noix was not converted for the accommodation of war prisoners. Instead, the site was handed over to the Department of Mines and Resources in June 1944. This marked the end of a chapter in the history of southern Quebec's internment operation, for civilian internees would no longer be incarcerated in this region. Southern Quebec's first phase of internment had thus come to an end with the closure of Camp Île-aux-Noix in 1943.

Southern Quebec's second phase of internment, which was marked by the incarceration of German prisoners of war, was initiated in early 1942. This was the result of intense negotiations between the British and Canadian governments. The process began in February 1941 when representatives of the British War Office suggested that "all prisoners taken by United Kingdom and dominions' forces, whether acting separately or in combination, should be placed in an Empire pool in respect of which the United Kingdom would be the detaining power and the dominions would have the status of agents." In other words, German prisoners of war were to be shipped overseas for incarceration in the dominions. The main reason was that prisoners of war had to be removed from the battlefields and kept away from danger. This was in keeping with the Geneva Convention. Article 7 stipulated: "As soon as possible after their capture, prisoners of war shall be evacuated to depots sufficiently removed from the fighting zone for them to be out of danger." Because Great Britain constantly faced the prospect of German aerial bombardments, it was deemed logical to send the prisoners around the
British Commonwealth. However, wishing to fight a “limited liability war,” the William Lyon Mackenzie King government initially refused such an offer. But when the British authorities persisted, the Canadian government finally agreed to “serve as one of the official gaolers for the Allied war effort.” Arrangements were immediately formalized whereby the Canadian government agreed to incarcerate German prisoners of war in North America as long as the British authorities accepted to cover the costs of transporting and maintaining them. Prisoners of war were to come from all branches of the German *Wehrmacht*, which included the *Luftwaffe* (air force), the *Kriegsmarine* (German Navy), the *Reichsheer* (German army) as well as the *Schutzstaffel* (SS) and the *Geheime Staatspolizei* (secret state police - Gestapo). Furthermore, also included were enemy merchant seamen (E.M.S.).

This decision to incarcerate prisoners of war in Canada led Ottawa to reorganize its internment operation. New internment camps had to be created for the detention of the incoming prisoners. By October 1941, Canadian internment camps were classed in accordance with the military district in which they were located. This led to the rise of the numeral system of camp classification. This was done to facilitate the bureaucratic efficiency of Canadian camps. For instance, the camps registered by Military District 4 headquarters in Montreal were assigned numbers in the 40s. The first digit indicated the camp’s district while the second gave the camp’s code. The camps of southern Quebec were registered as followed: Camp No. 40 Farnham; Camp No. 41 ile-aux-Noix; and Camp No. 42 Sherbrooke. As a result, the old classification system whereby camps were designated by letters of the alphabet and which had been operational since 1939, was abandoned.

Camp Farnham was southern Quebec’s first internment centre to be chosen for the accommodation of prisoners of war class 1. The process began in September 1941 when Military District 4 Headquarters advised camp authorities that Farnham was to be converted for the detention of prisoners of war. All of the camp’s 445 refugees were transferred to Camp Sherbrooke on January 23, 1942. Camp Farnham was then closed for a period of three months in order to prepare for the arrival of the enemy combatants. As it was stated in a report dated January 27, 1942: “It is anticipated that this camp will be re-
opened about the middle of April and will contain POW [s]...from the U.K." The camp became operational on April 18, 1942, when 597 enemy merchant seamen arrived at Farnham. In the autumn of 1942, Canadian authorities decided to convert Camp Sherbrooke into a facility for the detention enemy merchant seamen. This was done because refugee populations were declining and since many German prisoners of war were arriving in Canada. As a result, all of Sherbrooke’s 299 refugees were transferred to Camp Île-aux-Noix on November 25, 1942.

Camp Sherbrooke was used for the incarceration of enemy merchant seamen until its closure in June 1946. Its refugee population was replaced on December 2, 1942, by the arrival of 594 enemy merchant seamen from Camp Farnham. At the time, Farnham was chosen for the temporary incarceration of prisoner of war officers. In accordance with the Geneva Convention, enemy officers were segregated from the rest of the prisoners of war. Also, they were to be treated differently. As article 21 stipulated: "...belligerents shall be required reciprocally to inform each other of the titles and ranks in use in their respective armed forces, with the view of ensuring equality of treatment between the corresponding ranks of officers and persons of equivalent status. Officers and persons of equivalent status who are prisoners of war shall be treated with due regard to their rank and age." This meant that the incoming officers could not be detained in the same facilities as enemy merchant seamen. In the end, some 177 German officers and 50 other ranks were sent to Farnham on December 6, 1942. The reason why a limited number of other ranks were sent to Farnham was because officers were, according to article 22 of the Geneva Convention, not allowed to perform manual labour.

Because Camp Farnham had not been created for the accommodation of prisoner of war officers, the newcomers were much appalled by camp conditions. As they indicated to the Consul General of Switzerland in Canada - which was in charge of German interest - on December 6, 1942:

As you perhaps know already, it concerns a camp of wooden barracks made for soldiers only, which is in every respect completely unsatisfactory for officers even for only temporary lodging for the following reasons: (1) mass lodging in wooden huts without considering the various grades. Thus for older senior officers the same quarters only is available as for lieutenants and as for the youngest soldiers; (2) One washroom, shower and toilet for
89 men; (3) Huts are dilapidated. They represent the most primitive lodging that can be imagined. It is in contradiction to numerous rulings of the Geneva Convention and forms an immense contrast to the lodging which is given to the British officers in German camps - even in temporary camps.”

The prisoners’ conclusion was that “this camp here was absolutely unfit in every respect for officers even for temporary accommodation.” As camp authorities mentioned in the Farnham war diary: “They were pretty arrogant and considered the camp absolutely unfit for German officers, lighting inadequate and no cubicles or small rooms for senior officers and staff officers and many other complaints... It would appear that they complained about being overcrowded at Bowmanville and Gravenhurst [Ontario] early in the summer but cannot understand why they were moved to this temporary camp just before Christmas. They say it must be considered as a punishment.”

Camp authorities tried to comply with some of the inmates’ complaints. For instance, the prisoners were given permission to “divide their huts into cubicles with spare sheets belonging to them” and to improve lighting. In the meantime, measures were being taken to find a suitable camp for the prisoner of war officers. Since the autumn of 1942, NDHQ had advised Military District 4 of its intention to create a prisoner of war officer camp in Southern Quebec. At the time, the aim was to find a better location for the German officers who were temporarily incarcerated at Camp Farnham. Several properties were considered. One such site was located 75 miles north of Montreal at St. Donat in the Laurentians. The complex consisted of a hotel and several large cottages. The advantage of this site was its isolation, being located in a very hilly country covered with heavy bush. Furthermore, the area was sparsely populated. The main problem with this isolation was in terms of logistics since only one single gravel road led to the site. This meant that in winter, the camp would have to be supplied by means of snowmobiles. Another potential site known as the Domaine de l’Esterel was located at Ste. Marguerite in the Laurentians some 65 miles north of Montreal. The property, like the one at St. Donat, had the advantage of being located in a hilly area with heavy bush. However, unlike the previous site, it was located in an area which was very popular for summer vacations and winter sports. Situated on a small plateau, the property was surrounded by
three precipitous descents. Furthermore, the ground was very rocky and irregular, rendering tunneling difficult if not impossible.\textsuperscript{98} However, the site’s hotel was then occupied by the Canadian School of Army Administration. Because this property could not be occupied until alternative accommodations could be provided for the school, the project was rejected.\textsuperscript{99}

With this in mind, Military District 4 officials decided to find a suitable location in southern Quebec. On September 12, 1942, they began investigating the possibility of using the Grande Ligne Mission’s Feller Institute premises situated near Napierville in the village known as Grande Ligne (presently Saint-Blaise).\textsuperscript{100} Located on a 240 acre farm, the property originally served as a residential school for young men and consisted of a four storey stone building, a brick gymnasium, eight frame houses, a large barn and numerous smaller buildings.\textsuperscript{101} Suitable in every way to serve as an internment camp for prisoner of war officers, the Privy Council began negotiating with the Grande Ligne Mission. An agreement ensued on November 24, 1942 whereby the Mission agreed to lease its property to the Crown for the sum of $15,000 per annum.\textsuperscript{102} On January 15, 1943, Military District 4 headquarters authorized the creation of internment camp No. 44 Grande Ligne.\textsuperscript{103} Work began immediately to convert the Feller Institute into an internment facility.\textsuperscript{104}

While this was done, the situation in Farnham remained problematic. When prisoners learned that a new camp was being built at Grande Ligne for their convenience, pressure was made to accelerate their transfer to this new facility.\textsuperscript{105} Conditions at Camp Farnham had not improved. Large groups of prisoners were still being housed in the same wooden barracks. As the prisoners indicated to Swiss representatives in April 1943: “The quarters are not different at all from those provided for corporals and men. The oldest staff officers have the same quarters as Lieutenants and the youngest privates. During the winter months, it was not possible to heat the barracks adequately. And with the spring thaw, water is running from the ceiling in various places. Taking everything into consideration, the quarters here can only be called unworthy of an officer.”\textsuperscript{106} This issue led to much debate when the Consulate General of Switzerland in Canada was requested by the German legation in Berne (Switzerland) to inquire into the case at Camp Farnham. As the
Swiss Consul indicated to the Canadian Department of External Affairs: "The German authorities have gained the impression from reports that camp Farnham is not suitable for officers and request an early removal to the new quarters. In case the transfer should not take place in the immediate future, I am asked to request the Canadian authorities to alleviate the principal deficiencies such as insufficient electric light, housing of officers in large dormitories, and lack of cupboards through which personal effects are damaged from exposure to dust."  

On the other hand, Swiss representatives were much impressed by the facilities at Camp Grande Ligne. As one diplomat indicated following his inspection of the camp on June 18, 1943: "...I was deeply impressed by the work undertaken in order to adapt perfectly the existing buildings and annexes to the new purpose. I think that, in spite of the natural difficulties due to the very hard winter and conditions prevailing in wartime, the Canadian authorities have done splendid work on this place and I have no doubt but that the new camp will be on the same level, in the way of comfort and facilities, as the Bowmanville officer's camp, which is universally regarded as being an outstanding place of internment." Nevertheless, it was not until June 28, 1943, that all of Camp Farnham's inmates were transferred to officer Camp Grande Ligne. With Farnham now empty, Military District 4 authorities decided to use this camp as a regional headquarters for the Veterans Guard of Canada.

In October 1943, a "Scout School" was established within the camp to train VGC personnel. Its purpose was to familiarize guardsmen with the administration of internment camps and the detention of prisoners of war. Training sessions normally lasted for four weeks. Within this short time span, guardsmen were given classes on the Geneva Convention; on chemical warfare; on internal security; on camp discipline; on how to guard prisoners of war; on first aid treatment; on how to conduct camp searches; on map usage; on escape and recapture plans; on how to detect tunnels; and on the operation of rifles, pistols and machine guns. The Camp Farnham Scout School was a complete success. As camp authorities indicated in the Farnham war diary in February 1944: "This course has improved their [VGC guardsmen] outlook on scout duties and they all agree that the knowledge they have gained in this course will be of great benefit to them in their
future work." The camp school was so important that guardsmen from all over Canada came to Farnham to be educated. By April 1944, some 498 guardsmen were staying in the camp. The operation came to an end when order was received from the Department of National Defence on May 13, 1944, to close the camp altogether. Because no reason was given, this order came as a shock for camp authorities. As indicated in the camp's war diary: "This [closure of the camp] is an impossibility unless we just walk out and leave it on that short notice. No provisions were made of where staff and 160 attached men could go for rations and quarters." Nevertheless, the camp was officially closed on May 15, 1944.

Camp Farnham re-opened on 18 September 1944 with the arrival of some 547 officers and 49 other ranks of internees from the United States. This was done to relieve American internment camps as the U.S. government had agreed since the summer of 1942 to incarcerate in the United States many of the German prisoners of war captured by British and Commonwealth forces. This process was known as the 50/50 Sharing Agreement. Although this had been done to solve the British Commonwealth's housing problems, it was only normal that Canada help the United States when this latter faced internment-related difficulties of its own. Because Camp Farnham had been modified between June 1943 and May 1944 for the accommodation of Canadian troops, the facilities were deemed acceptable for the internment of prisoners of war officers. Camp Farnham, like Camp Grande Ligne, became a facility for the detention of German officers. It remained so until the camp's closure in 1946.

Following the successful Allied landing in Normandy (France) on June 6, 1944, both British and Canadian forces began capturing German soldiers by the tens of thousands. The First Canadian Army, for instance, had captured more than 25,000 German prisoners in Northwestern Europe by September 1944. This soon created serious problems in terms of accommodation. Although the bulk of these prisoners were being interned in camps located in France, Belgium, Holland, and eventually Germany, the British government pressured the Canadian government in December 1944 to accept 50,000 additional inmates for incarceration in North America. At the time, some 34,000 German prisoners of war were already being held in Canada. With this said, Ottawa's response
was hesitant. As Canada’s Minister of National Defence indicated on December 11, 1944:

"Reception of more than 7,000 could not be recommended because of the additional strain on the already tight manpower situation and because of the potential risk involved."¹¹⁸

Britain’s High Commissioner bristled claiming in January 1945, that:

Whereas in the whole of Canada they are at present accommodating only 34,000 German prisoners (as compared with 66,000 captured by Canadian troops in North Western Europe alone apart from those captured in Italy), we in this small overcrowded island, where much accommodation for our own people has been destroyed by enemy action, are now holding 306,000 prisoners of war of whom 139,000 are Germans and no less than 22,000 British troops are required for their administration and security...It is estimated that before the surrender of Germany or the break-up of organized resistance at least another 300,000 prisoners of war will be captured in North West Europe for half of which the United Kingdom government will be responsible. Negotiations are in progress with the French, Belgian and Dutch governments to accommodate and guard some of these captures...We have appealed to the United States government to give further assistance in this matter but they have refused and have given as their main ground that insufficient use is being made of British Commonwealth resources in general and Canadian resources in particular...It will be seen from the figures...that the request which we made of Canada is actuated only by the urgent needs of a situation for which appears no other solution. We are stretched to the utmost and we greatly hope that they will therefore see their way to come to our assistance.¹¹⁹

However, Ottawa maintained its refusal. As Canada’s Secretary of State for External Affairs stipulated on January 22, 1945:

...no further commitments in this matter should be assumed by the Canadian government...Canadian government’s paramount purpose is to maintain and support Canada’s fighting forces in Northwestern Europe and in Italy. They proposed to do this without seeking any reduction in the combatant strength of those forces...At the same time the government is anxious to fulfill completely the demands which are being made, or are likely to be made, on Canada for munitions under the Mutual Aid arrangements. This program of munitions production will require employment of many additional workers in munitions factories...The manpower position with regard to prisoners of war is as follows. 5,374 troops are engaged on guard duties in connection with the 34,000 German prisoners in Canada...There are certain factors which make the ratio necessarily higher in Canada than would be the case, say, in Great Britain. For example, the camps are widely spread in different parts of the country.
and the guard forces are therefore not within a distance of each other which would enable them to give mutual support in case of trouble in one or other of the camps. On the present basis, therefore, some 8,000 extra men would be required to guard 50,000 additional prisoners whom you propose. Such a figure is completely out of the question under present circumstances in Canada...The Canadian authorities cannot risk running short of reinforcements for overseas service...There is a good deal of evidence of plans amongst the prisoners to make demonstrations and to attempt mass escapes. Many of the prisoners are desperate and fanatical Nazis ready to cause trouble even though this in effect means their committing mass suicide...The Canadian winter is long and extremely severe. Camps therefore need a more elaborate accommodation than is the case in gentler climates. Their construction takes much more labour...At present the labour for extra construction work could not be provided without prejudicing more urgent war tasks...120

Canada’s refusal to accept Britain’s 50,000 German prisoners of war demonstrated how internment had caused severe strains on the Canadian home front. There are no doubts that should Ottawa have accepted this huge influx of internees, the internment camps of southern Quebec would have been affected. It would have meant a huge increase in the number of prisoners in the region and would have necessitated much more complex internment camps. Nevertheless, very few German prisoners of war were sent to Canada after this dispute. Instead, the Canadian authorities decided to concentrate their efforts on the political re-education and de-nazification of those prisoners of war already being held on Canadian soil, a topic which will be analyzed in Chapter 4.

The Canadian government decided in February 1945 to create a re-assessment camp for the purpose of re-educating German prisoners of war along democratic lines. At the time, Great Britain was developing its own re-educational camps and was hoping that Canada could do the same. As it was stated in a special British report: “sociologists and psychologists are of the opinion that the future peace depends first and foremost on a change in the German national character and the patterns of inter-personal relations.” The document further stipulated the main purposes for operating such experimental facilities. First, such camps were to offer inmates training in social responsibility. This included valuable training and experience in spontaneous democratic leadership and social responsibility. The aim was to use the graduates for “practical employment under military
government, control commission or elsewhere to form focus points of healthy influence within the German community.” Second, these experimental camps were to study the effects of Allied propaganda, including re-educational literature, films, and broadcasts. Also, re-educational lectures, debates and study groups were to be given in such facilities in order to study the degree of social change among inmates. The main purpose of such facilities was to “help medical authorities to know how to coordinate and control German POWs.”

In March 1945, the Canadian government proposed two sites for the purpose of re-education. These were situated at Sorel and Montmagny in southern Quebec. Despite much discussion, only the Sorel option was retained. It was this site, which was situated on the property of the military’s Sorel Basic Training Centre, which became Internment Camp No. 45 Sorel. The camp became operational on May 9, 1945, with the arrival of the camp’s staff. It was at that time that work began on the site’s facilities. Barbed wire fences were laid and the huts were repaired and improved. The first prisoners arrived at the camp on the 22nd and 29th of June 1945. Unlike other internment camps, prisoners were selected on a voluntary basis and came from all Canadian prisoner of war camps. The aim was to gather internees who were willing to cooperate with the Allies. Furthermore, because military ranks and hierarchy had been abolished at Camp Sorel, the camp housed nearly as many German officers as other ranks. With this in mind, Camp Sorel was an anomaly in southern Quebec.

Although hostilities in Europe came to an end on V-E (Victory-in-Europe) Day on May 8, 1945, German prisoners of war held in Canada were not immediately released despite the fact that the Geneva Convention stipulated that “the repatriation of prisoners shall be effected as soon as possible after the conclusion of peace.” Due mostly to the logistical problems involved in repatriating thousands of German prisoners back to Germany and the impressive re-educational program initiated in Canada, the Canadian government decided to wait until early 1946 before starting to transfer the internees back overseas. Because Great Britain was responsible for most of Canada’s 35,000 German prisoners of war, the Canadian government agreed to send all of its inmates to the British Isles. From there the prisoners would return to their “Fatherland.”
Camp Sorel was the first internment centre in Southern Quebec to repatriate its prisoners. Such was due to this camp’s devotion to re-education. In fact, the Sorel inmates were to be repatriated to Germany as fast as possible in order to work for the Allied Control Commissions in both the American and British zones of occupation. Although all of its prisoners were initially transferred to the United Kingdom on March 4, 1946, Camp Sorel was not closed until April 16, 1946. The main reason for this phenomenon was that the camp’s staff was being used to clean up the facilities. The next camp to be closed in the region was Camp Grande Ligne. The process began on April 16, 1946, when the bulk of the camp’s inmates was transferred to Camps Farnham and Gravenhurst in order to await repatriation. The camp was finally closed on April 30, 1946, following the disbandment of the camp staff. For the Grande Ligne Mission, the legal owner of the site, the closure of Camp Grande Ligne was more than welcome. Ever since the Second World War had come to an end on August 14, 1945, with Japan’s capitulation, the Grande Ligne Mission Board had applied pressure upon the Department of National Defence for the return of its property “since our board plans to re-open the school at the earliest possible date.” However, because the lease stipulated that “the lessees shall have the right to so renew the present lease for only one period of one year subsequent to the termination of the present world war,” the camp remained operational well until 1946. As for Camp Farnham, the bulk of its prisoners was transferred to the United Kingdom on May 22, 1946. Although the Department of Labour took over most of the camp’s huts on June 6, 1946 in preparation for occupancy by Japanese families, the camp was not officially closed until June 17, 1946. Finally, all of Camp Sherbrooke’s prisoners were repatriated on June 11, 1946, and the camp closed its doors on June 14, 1946. The closure of Camp Sherbrooke marked the end of internment in Southern Quebec.

By July 1946, only 4,000 German prisoners of war out of a total population of 35,000 remained in Canada. All of them were evacuated by November 1946 except for 60 inmates who had been hospitalized. The Canadian internment operation came to an end in January 1947 when these last internees were transferred to the United Kingdom. It is interesting to note that more than 6,000 German prisoners of war had made applications to stay in Canada. However, because the Geneva Convention stipulated that all prisoners had
to be repatriated and due to the fact that Canadian immigration policies were very strict about allowing in Germans, none of these internees were allowed to stay. Nevertheless, great many emigrated to Canada in later years. \textsuperscript{135}

The internment operation which emerged in southern Quebec was set up in haste. Although Canada began interning civilians of German descent as early as September 1939, the country’s internment operation was still limited in scale by the spring of 1940. Ottawa’s decision to accept Britain's request to intern some 7,000 British “enemy aliens” and prisoners of war on Canadian soil in June 1940, complicated matters. With the British prisoners arriving in Canada as early as July 1940, the creation of new internment camps became an urgent necessity. With this in mind, three sites were chosen in southern Quebec: Camp Farnham, Camp Île-aux-Noix and Camp Sherbrooke. The establishment of these internment centres demonstrated well how the Canadian authorities were unprepared to accept the huge influx of British internees. The main problem was that not enough time had been allotted for the construction of these sites. As a result, none of these camps were ready to welcome internees. This created much discontent among the internees, especially at Camp Sherbrooke where a hunger strike ensured. Therefore, the early days of internment in southern Quebec were not a success, for they demonstrated the early deficiencies of the Canadian internment operations. However, over time, the region’s internment operation improved and flourished. When the bulk of the civilian refugees were released between 1942 and 1943, authority was granted to use the region’s facilities for the incarceration of German prisoners of war. The region’s prominence as an internment centre was further reflected by the construction of two new internment camps: Camp Grande Ligne in 1943 and Camp Sorel in 1945. What the prisoner of war phase did was to prove how flexible southern Quebec’s internment operation had become. Each camp specialized in a certain type of operation: Sherbrooke focused on enemy merchant seamen; Farnham and Grande Ligne concentrated on German officers; while Sorel served as a re-educational facility. Although the bulk of the region’s inmates were not repatriated until 1946, southern Quebec’s internment operation demonstrated how the Canadian homefront was constantly forced to adapt to the pressures imposed by years of total war.
NOTES


8 Kochan, pp. 1-2.; Lafitte, pp. 36-37.; Stent, pp. 21, 30.


10 Kochan, p. 59.; Stent, pp. 69-72.


12 Stent, p. 97.


14 Koch, p. 27.
Ibid., p. 28.


18 Kelly, The Prisoner of War Camps..., p. 54.
19 Lafitte, p. 13, 135, 143.
24 NAC, FHTC. EK, MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, “Interview of Colonel Eric Kippen by Harry Rasky (CBC) in Como (Quebec).” [1980’s]., pp. 7-11 - 7-12.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15.399, Volume 1 (July 1940), War Diary of Internment Camp “I” (No. 41), Fort Lennox. Île-aux-Noix, July 1, 1940 and July 5, 1940, p. 1.
26 NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15.399, Volume 1 (July 1940), War Diary of Internment Camp “I” (No. 41), Fort Lennox. Île-aux-Noix, July 15, 1940. p. 3.; NAC, DND. IO, RG-24, Vol. 15.399, Volume 2 (August 1940), War Diary of Internment Camp “I” (No. 41), Fort Lennox, Île-aux-Noix. August 1, 1940. p. 1.
28 NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15.399, Volume 1 (July 1940), War Diary of Internment Camp “I” (No. 41), Fort Lennox, Île-aux-Noix, July 16, 1940 and July 17 1940, pp. 3-4.
30 NAC, DND. IO, RG-24, Vol. 15.399, Volume 2 (August 1940), War Diary of Internment Camp “I” (No. 41), Fort Lennox, Île-aux-Noix, August 31, 1940. p. 8.
31 NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15.399, Volume 3 (September 1940), War Diary of Internment Camp “I” (No. 41), Fort Lennox, Île-aux-Noix, September 25, 1940, p. 8.


NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5378, File: HQS 7236-20, Organization and Administration, Camp Farnham, 1940-1946, “Brigadier-General Edouard de Bellefeuille Panet (Director of Internment Operations) to the Adjutant-General (Department of National Defence), September 5, 1940.

NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5378, File: HQS 7236-20, Organization and Administration, Camp Farnham, 1940-1946, “Brigadier-General Edouard de Bellefeuille Panet (Director of Internment Operations) to the Secretary of State,” August 8, 1940.

NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15.397, Volume 1 (October 1940), War Diary of Internment Camp “A” (No. 40), Farnham, October 9, 1940, p. 1

NAC, FHTC, EK, MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, “Interview of Colonel Eric Kippen by Harry Rasky (CBC) in Como (Quebec),” [1980’s], pp. 7-16 - 7-17.

NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15.397, Volume 1 (October 1940), War Diary of Internment Camp “A” (No. 40), Farnham, October 10, 1940; October 11, 1940; October 15, 1940; October 16, 1940; and October 18, 1940, pp. 1-6.


NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15.397, Volume 1 (October 1940), War Diary of Internment Camp “A” (No. 40), Farnham, October 18, 1940 and October 20, 1940, pp. 6-8.


NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15.399, Volume 1 (October 1940), War Diary of Internment Camp “N” (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), October 5, 1940, p. 1.

NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15.399, Volume 1 (October 1940), War Diary of Internment Camp “N” (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), October 5, 1940 and October 7, 1940, pp. 1-2.

NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15.399, Volume 1 (October 1940), War Diary of Internment Camp “N” (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), October 15, 1940, p. 3.


One internee even recalled a guard telling him "that there will be no barbed wires [in Camp Sherbrooke]...you're on the honor system. We know you're not Nazis..." This led to the "deep-rooted belief that they [internees] had been ousted from their comfortable quarters at Camp Cove Fields to make way for Nazi prisoners." See NAC, FHTC, EK, MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, "Interview of Emil Fackenheim by Harry Rasky (CBC) in Toronto," [1980's], pp. 40-41.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 1 (October 1940), War Diary of Internment Camp "N" (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), October 15, 1940, p. 3.

As Koch indicated in his book: "I shall never forget the impression Edmison made on me. Here was a man in Canadian uniform who knew who we were, who realized that there were men among us who had been in German concentration camps...he appealed to us, trying to persuade us to cooperate with the authorities...His main point was that, if we were more flexible, we could make the camp more livable. He said, even the officers had to put up with sub-standard accommodation." See Koch, p. 128.

As the camp commandant indicated: "Sherbrooke is not going to be a temporary camp. Both you [internees] and I [commandant] are going to be here for a long time!...There are among you many clever and qualified men; to them, I throw out the challenge to assist in the planning and erection of this new camp. You will tell me what materials you want and I will supply them without delay...The winter is fast approaching and every day's delay is serious...I speak to you now not only as commandant but as man to man, and I hope a lot of things will be different from now on." See Koch, pp. 129-130.

Koch, pp. 129-130.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 1 (October 1940), War Diary of Internment Camp "N" (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), October 18, 1940, p. 4.

For instance, when a brief snow storm struck the camp on the night of October 18-19, satisfaction was expressed by the internees at the warmth of the buildings. Further, the prisoners indicated that the meals were "highly satisfactory." See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 1 (October 1940), War Diary of Internment Camp "N" (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), October 19, 1940, p. 4.

Canada. Regulations Governing the Maintenance of Discipline Among and Treatment of Prisoners of War (Ottawa: J.O. Patenaude Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty, 1939), p. 3.

As it was stated: "The term 'prisoner of war' used in this Regulation [Defense of Canada Regulations] shall include any person detained or interned under these Regulations." See NAC, OC, RG-2, Vol. 1675, File: 2089G, "Order-in-Council P.C. 2322," May 31, 1940.

Stanton, pp. 223-224.

Kochan, p. 65.

NAC, FHTC, EK, MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, "Interview of Colonel Eric Kippen by Harry Rasky (CBC) in Como (Quebec)." [1980's], pp. 7-12 - 7-13.


Volume 10 (July 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp "N" (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), July 23, 1941, p. 5.; Priebe, p. 178.


Dissatisfaction was expressed at Camp Sherbrooke on July 24, 1941 where some of the inmates expected more liberties and the complete removal of the barbed wire system. See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 10 (July 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp "N" (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), July 24, 1941, p. 6.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 10 (July 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp "N" (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), July 25, 1941, p. 6.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 10 (July 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp "N" (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), July 28, 1941, p. 6.


One such case occurred on December 7, 1941 when some 40 visitors came to Île-aux-Noix to meet the inmates they were to sponsor. See Draper, "The Accidental Immigrants...Part 2," pp. 94.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 18 (December 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp "I" (No. 41), Fort Lennox, Île-aux-Noix, December 7, 1941, p. 1.

The release of refugees into civilian life created humorous ironies. Such was the case of Kurt Swinton, a Camp Farnham refugee who became an officer in the Royal Canadian Signal Corps upon his release. Swinton recalled the visit he made to Camp Farnham in his new military uniform: "It was a traumatic experience both for me and for the others. And the guards, they thought they were dreaming...The guards saluted! It killed them but they did it..." See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 13 (October 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp "A" (No. 40, Farnham, October 13, 1941, p. 3.; NAC, FHTC, EK, MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, "Interview of Kurt Swinton by Harry Rasky (CBC) in Toronto." [1980's], pp. 15-16.; NAC, FHTC, EK, MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, "Interview of Constance Hayward by Harry Rasky (CBC) in Wolfeville (Nova Scotia)," [1980's], pp. 10-15.


NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5413, File: HQS 7236-91-4-40, Complaints by P/W, Camp Farnham, 1943-1945, “Schlichting (Camp Spokesman) to the Consul General of Switzerland (Protecting Power),” April 8, 1943.


1940-1946, "Memorandum of J.A. Lacombe (Military District 4 Treasury Officer)," January 24, 1944.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,398, Volume 41 (February 1944), War Diary of Internment Camp "A" (No. 40), Farnham, February 6, 1944, p. 2.

110 NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,398, Volume 37 (October 1943), War Diary of Internment Camp "A" (No. 40), Farnham, October 17, 1943 and October 18, 1943, p. 3.


112 NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,398, Volume 41 (February 1944), War Diary of Internment Camp "A" (No. 40), Farnham, February 25, 1944, p. 5.


114 NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,398, Volume 44 (May 1944), War Diary of Internment Camp "A" (No. 40), Farnham, May 13, 1944 and May 15, 1944, pp. 3-4.

115 In fact, the American government interned some 380,000 German prisoners of war in the United States during the war. See Daniel Costelle, Les Prisonniers. (Paris: Flammarion, 1975), p. 236.


119 Ibid., p. 1104-1105.

120 Ibid., pp. 1106-1109.

121 NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5366, File: HQS 9139-9, Administration, Camp Sorel, 1945-1946, "Lt.-Col. H.V. Dicks (Royal Army Medical Centre) to Director of Army Psychiatry," February 24, 1945.

128 Canada, Red Cross and Prisoners..., pp. 116-117.
129 Hilliker, Documents..., Volume 10..., pp. 1116-1117.
Ligne, 1943-1946, "Major-General H.A. Young (Quartermaster General) to Deputy Minister (Department of National Defence)," February 28, 1946.


CHAPTER 2
LIFE BEHIND BARBED WIRES

Living conditions in the camps of southern Quebec was marked by a duality of emotions. Both feelings of contentment and stress prevailed behind the barbed wires. Although internees were protected by the provisions of the 1929 Geneva Convention and benefited from numerous privileges, the sheer reality of being held captive was enough to generate psychological strains. Well aware of this situation, camp authorities did their best to improve the prisoners' standards of living. They permitted them to benefit from the generosity and humanitarianism of international organizations and to entertain themselves. However, such attempts could never completely eradicate the pressures imposed by years of internment. Restricted mobility, sexual deprivation, social alienation and the privation of material comfort were all factors which influenced the morale of captives. As a consequence, prisoners became restless and uncooperative. Often this led to the rise of dissension and increased attempts at escape. Such behavior forced camp authorities to consolidate their powers and increase the degree of camp discipline, a situation that intensified life behind barbed wires. Political motives was another important factor which guided the behavior of prisoners. The presence of Nazis, anti-Nazis and Communists inside the camps of southern Quebec often created a stressful and divisive environment which had to be dealt with by camp authorities.

To serve their own needs, captives were given the opportunity to appoint representatives. As article 43 of the Geneva Convention stipulated: "In any locality where there may be prisoners of war, they shall be authorized to appoint representatives to represent them before the military authorities and the protecting powers." This was done
to permit prisoners to administer their own affairs and to enable them to have weight and influence despite being held behind barbed wires. As such, internees elected a camp spokesman. This individual represented the communal interests of the entire inmate population and served as the official intermediary between the prisoners and camp authorities. Because such administrative positions were very important, only the most competent individuals could be chosen. As it was pointed out in the Camp Île-aux-Noix war diary: "For internal government, a lot depends on the camp leader and assistant camp leader and they are positions that have to be filled with considerable care." Being a camp spokesman was no easy task. The appointed individuals had to bear huge pressures and often had to endure all sorts of demands and pressures at the hand of their brethren. In fact, they were often blamed by their peers for collaborating with camp authorities. Because of such pressures, one Camp Sherbrooke spokesman was forced to resign in June 1941.

Supporting camp spokesmen were hut leaders. Inside each internment camp, internees were divided into small hut groups. As such, each barrack would appoint group representatives commonly known as hut leaders. These individuals were responsible for the administration and discipline of huts. Canadian regulations described well the duties of these individuals:

The members of each group will select a representative who will assist the camp staff in maintaining order in his group and will bring to the notice of the staff any matter bearing upon the comfort or well being of the prisoners which require attention. The appointment of such representatives shall be subject to the approval of the commandant. Prisoners of war are not permitted to set up any other form of administrative organization among themselves unless and until such form of organization had been submitted to the Director of Internment Operations and been duly approved.

Camp spokesmen and hut leaders worked together. In *La Ville Sans Femmes*, Mario Duliéni described well how the camp system of internal administration functioned. As he stated:

Le camp ressemble aussi à une petite ville par son administration qu’on pourrait qualifier de politique mais qui, bien entendu, n’exige des "administrateurs" aucune connaissance profonde non plus qu’aucune expérience des affaires publiques. Je veux dire que chaque baraque se choisit un chef, un Hut Leader, et ces douze mandataires ont chacun la responsabilité de ce qui se passe chez eux. Ils exercent leurs fonctions de
concert avec le porte-parole ou représentant de tous les internés qui, lui, est élu par eux en assemblée générale. Ce "chef" du camp est l'intermédiaire reconnu entre chaque interné et le commandant militaire. C'est à lui que le commandant indique ce qui doit se faire et ce qui ne doit pas se faire dans le camp. Deux ou trois fois par semaine, le représentant général réunit les douze chefs de baraque, auxquels se joignent le directeur de l'hôpital, le directeur de la cantine et quelques autres, pour transmettre des ordres et examiner les problèmes du camp. Cette assemblée forme en quelque sorte le conseil municipal du camp. Les passions, les heurts, les discussions et les prises de bec y sont quelquefois aussi vives et aussi violentes que dans de véritables conseils municipaux.  

Aside from this system, prisoners were not permitted to set up any other form of administrative organization among themselves unless it had been approved by the Department of National Defence.  

The proper treatment of internees was supervised by delegates from neutral nations. According to the Geneva Convention, each belligerent could choose a neutral country to act as protecting power. Neutral nations acted as arbiters whose duties were to protect the interests of belligerent nations. According to article 86 of the convention:  

The representatives of the protecting power of their recognized delegates shall be authorized to proceed to any place, without exception, where prisoners of war are interned. They shall have access to all premises occupied by prisoners and may hold conversation with prisoners, as a general rule without witness, either personally or through the intermediary of interpreters. Belligerents shall facilitate as much as possible the task of the representative or recognized delegates of the protecting power.  

Protecting powers were important assets for belligerents. They enabled fighting nations to know exactly how their captured military personnel were treated by the enemy. They also forced belligerents to comply with the clauses of the Geneva Convention. The protecting power reported back to the nation it represented. If this country was not happy with the treatment experienced by its prisoners held in enemy hands, it could always retaliate on the enemy subjects it detained. Although the laws of war forbade such procedures, retaliatory measures prevailed and remained one of the most important elements guiding the treatment of prisoners of war.  

In the case of Germany, the protecting power was Switzerland. As such, the Consulate General of Switzerland in Canada's main duty was to visit internment camps,
where its personnel was given complete freedom to inspect all buildings and to interview internees without a third party being present. At no time were Swiss delegates to “deliver to, or receive from prisoners of war or internees any papers, documents, letters or parcels…” Swiss representatives acted as mere inspectors. During the civilian phase of internment in southern Quebec, internees refused contact with the Swiss Consul. Because most were refugees from German aggression, internees insisted not to be represented by Nazi Germany’s protecting power. Furthermore, civilian internees resented being treated as prisoners of war. As a result, the prisoners became stateless men, for no protecting power other than Switzerland could represent their German interests. It was not until the arrival of the first prisoners of war in early 1942 that the Swiss Consul began taking care of inmates in the camps of southern Quebec.\footnote{9}

Internees also depended upon the generosity of relief societies. According to article 78 of the Geneva Convention, “societies for the relief of prisoners of war…shall be permitted to distribute relief in the camps and at the halting places of repatriated prisoners under a personal permit issued by the military authority, and on giving an undertaking in writing to comply with all routine and police orders which the said authority shall prescribe.”\footnote{10} Thousands of neutral relief organizations were created around the world during the Second World War to help with the educational, spiritual and recreational needs of prisoners of war. Certainly, German internees benefited from the work of international organizations such as the Red Cross and the YMCA as well as relief societies from Germany and neutral nations. Very few Canadian relief agencies helped German prisoners, for their mission was to support Canadian soldiers in captivity overseas.\footnote{11}

The International Committee of the Red Cross and the War Prisoner’s Aid of the World’s Committee of the YMCA were the two main international relief organizations addressing the needs of German internees. Both organizations were neutral, based in Switzerland and offered their services to all belligerents. While the International Red Cross concentrated on the material, physical and sanitary conditions in internment camps, the YMCA concerned itself with the intellectual, recreational and religious needs of prisoners. This ensured that both organizations complemented rather than duplicated each
other’s efforts. On August 28, 1940, the International Red Cross received the honor of being the first relief organization to be permitted into Canadian internment camps, followed by the YMCA on September 9, 1940. This privilege enabled representatives from these associations to visit the camps of Southern Quebec on numerous occasions. During such visits, delegates talked with camp commandants and camp spokesmen. This permitted relief organizations to help supervise how prisoners were treated by the detaining power. On such occasions, internees often requested special services from relief organizations. This often related to the purchase of goods required to alleviate the pressures of internment. In most cases, recreational equipment was requested.

In principle, internment camps provided the inmates with basic necessities in terms of shelter, food, clothing and personal hygiene. This was done in accordance with the *Geneva Convention*. In regards to shelter, article 10 of the convention stipulated that “Prisoners of war shall be lodged in buildings or huts which afford all possible safeguards as regards hygiene and salubrity. The premises must be entirely free from damp, and adequately heated and lighted. All precautions shall be taken against the danger of fire. As regards dormitories, their total area, minimum cubic air space, fittings and bedding material, the conditions shall be the same as for the depot troops of the detaining power.” Article 11 addressed the issue of nutrition, stating that the “…food ration of prisoners of war shall be equivalent in quantity and quality to that of the depot troops” while article 12, which dealt with the inmates’ clothing, stated that “clothing, underwear and footwear shall be supplied to prisoners of war by the detaining power. The regular replacement and repair of such articles shall be assured.” Finally, hygiene matters were described in article 13, which said that “belligerents shall be required to take all necessary hygienic measures to ensure the cleanliness and salubrity of camps and to prevent epidemics.” Therefore, in essence, the *Geneva Convention* limited the Canadian authorities material obligations to the strict minimum.

Despite such obligations, some Canadian citizens became jealous of the internees’ standard of living. At the time, Canadians were being rationed for the war effort. As a correspondent to the Toronto *Globe and Mail* noted in 1943: “Some Canadians obviously felt that rations for German POWs were better than they should be; we are giving our
German prisoners of war better food than the average Canadian taxpayer can afford to buy.  

As Major Eric D.B. Kippen recalled when commanding Camp Famham: "...In some cases, people were jealous of the prisoners. Civil society had to face rationing and some items of food were rationed. However, prisoner were fed Canadian Army rations in accordance to the Geneva Convention." Kippen further recalled what some local ladies told him: "...We're having an awful time getting certain...articles of food and we understand that these refugees are getting, at no trouble at all, army rations." Despite such complaints, Canadian authorities continued to provide inmates with basic necessities. Anything acquired beyond this had to be done by the prisoners themselves through relief organizations.

Sending parcels to inmates was one of the prime activity conducted by aid societies. However, there were certain restrictions. For instance, relief organizations were prohibited from including such items as field glasses, photographic apparatuses, sextants, compasses, electric torches, maps, money, fountain pens, telegraphic and telephonic materials, radios, inflammable materials, spirits, liquors and wines, drugs, weapons, foreign literature and civilian clothing. In other words, they were banned from sending any items which might help or entice prisoners to escape or adopt riotous conduct. This meant that all parcels had to be examined by the Canadian authorities. As a result, the German government requested in the summer of 1941 that the Canadian government issue proper reports of all parcels received in internment camps. Canada's Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs responded to this request on August 23, 1941 by ordering the Directorate of Internment Operations to begin compiling summaries of parcels received in all Canadian camps and to send these reports to Germany. To make certain that German prisoners had received their parcels, each form had to be completed and signed by the camp spokesman. It was then examined by the camp's commandant before being sent to Internment Operations headquarters in Ottawa for transmission to the Swiss Consul. This whole procedure enabled the proper supervision of all parcels received by Canadian internment camps.

Parcels delivered to internment camps were divided into five categories: (I) FOOD: canned goods, cheese, chocolates, etc.; (II) CLOTHING: uniforms, shoes, gloves,
underwears, socks, etc.; (III) CIGARETTES AND TOBACCO; (IV) WELFARE: billiard tables, books, games, gramophones, musical instruments, sport articles, moving picture projectors, etc.; and (V) MIXED PARCELS.24 These packages were usually sent by relief organizations from such countries as Argentina, Chile, Germany, Paraguay, Switzerland and the United States.25 Table 1 offers a good example of the number of parcels received by southern Quebec camps. Although this chart concentrates on the 1944-1946 period due to lack of sources, it clearly demonstrates that the bulk of packages were sent from Germany. It also gives an impression of the huge amount of parcels received in the region. Hence, relief organizations contributed greatly to the welfare of the prisoners.

Such parcels enabled southern Quebec internees to enjoy numerous leisure activities in the fields of the arts, education and sports. Recreational equipment sent by relief organizations contributed notably to camp life. While some internees turned to physical activities, others played music, made handicrafts, read books and played games like poker, bridge and bingo. Such activities helped raise morale. This certainly seemed true during concerts, plays and athletic competitions.26 Whatever the activity was, it helped internees to retain a certain sense of sanity by allowing them to psychologically escape their fate as prisoners, at least for a few moments.

Although recreational activities enabled inmates to ease their condition behind barbed wire, they could not prevent the rise of psychological strains. After all, the pressures imposed by years of internment could not be eased over night. In his book entitled Essai sur la psychologie du prisonnier de guerre, Jean Cazeneuve described well the pressures imposed by years of internment. Captured by the Germans in 1940 while defending his native France from invasion, Cazeneuve had lived the remainder of the war in a prisoner of war camp.27

The privation of material comfort was the most important strain that internees had to endure. As Cazeneuve indicated: "...la nourriture, le coucher, le logement, l'aménagement, l'habillement et les moyens de défense contre les variations de température constituent une régression sensible par rapport au niveau de vie que la plupart des gens connaissent dans le civil. C'est là, dans la captivité, une des causes les plus élémentaire de la souffrance." Hence, lack of comfort created both physical and
### Table 1
Number of Parcels Received in the Camps
1944-1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relief Organization</th>
<th>Type of Parcels</th>
<th>CAMPS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No. 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Red Cross</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>V</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Individuals in Germany</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>V</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>V</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Aid Societies and Private Sources</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside Germany</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>V</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:**
psychological pains. For the German prisoners incarcerated in southern Quebec, exposure to the cold Canadian weather was a source of discomfort which generated physical pain. Adaptation to instinctive tendencies was the only remedy for such problems. After all, the human body could adapt to such changes as colder temperatures. On the other hand, psychological pains were based on habits and developed when prisoners recalled past luxuries. For example, a sufficient and healthy portion of camp food could be seen as inadequate when compared with an exquisite meal. In that sense, the privation of civilian life comforts created a nostalgia of old habits which ensured mental discontent. Adaptation and acceptance of one’s fate was the only solution to combat psychological pains. However, adaptation could not totally annihilate both physical and psychological pains. Although prisoners became more accustomed to life behind barbed wires, their conscience could never forget lost pleasures. According to one Sherbrooke internee, prisoners became so obsessed with the camp’s environment that some attempted suicide while others suffered nervous breakdowns.

Restricted mobility was another problem which created psychological strains. Limited to camp enclosures, prisoners were often struck by “Barbed Wires Psychosis.” As Cazenueve indicated: “La psychose des barbelés porte sur la simple conscience d’une impossibilité. Même si rien ne venait exciter le désir de franchir l’enceinte, il suffirait pour en souffrir, de savoir qu’il serait impossible d’en sortir le cas échéant. Le barbelé représente pour l’esprit une interdiction.” This restriction of personal freedom created both monotony and boredom. Understanding that one’s mobility was restricted was enough to create suffering. In that sense, “Barbed Wire Psychosis,” known to most southern Quebec prisoners as “internitis,” contributed greatly to the inmates’ mental suffering. In Deemed Suspect, Eric Koch explained the symptoms of this “disease” as being “a combination of despondency, touchiness, and worst of all, self-absorption and self-pity.” As one southern Quebec internee explained: “It is hell on earth mentally to wake up in the middle of the night… and to say to yourself, ‘I’ll never get out of here,’ ‘This war is not going to end in my lifetime’, and ‘They’ll keep me here for life.’ That feeling was the worst of internment.” This feeling of seclusion also led some prisoners to consider suicide. Overall, camp authorities acknowledged the fact that prisoners
suffered from some sort of psychosis. As stated in the Camp Île-aux-Noix war diary in September 1940:

The trouble is of course that men behind barb wire develop various complexes and one very definite one it to magnify mole hills into mountains and there are “many tempests in the compound tea cup.” A vague disease known as “barb wireitis” seems to develop in some prisoners. It is a combination of languidness, fatalism and despair and in some cases expresses itself violently and in a devil-be-care way, and in other by passive resistance. During the last two days, there have been symptoms of this malady and it has been necessary for the commandant to address the camp and section leaders using a mixture of sternness, philosophy, tact and salesmanship.37

The absence of a feminine presence was another factor influencing the prisoners’ psyche. This created a suitable climate for sexual obsession. Unable to fulfill their sexual instincts, prisoners would often talk or dream about women.38 Mario Duliani well described this phenomenon in his book properly entitled *La ville sans Femmes*. Interned at Camp Farnham, Duliani recalled that women dominated the collective thoughts of prisoners.39 As he indicated:

Dans chaque baraque, des dessins en couleurs qui font des tâches criardes sur les murs, les vitres des fenêtres, les cloisons de carton des couchette, même sur le dossier des chaises, étalent des corps féminins nus ou presque nus en des poses provocantes et lascives. Ces dessins ont été découpés dans les magazines *Esquire* ou d’autres périodiques semblables par des camarades victimes de “refoulement.” A travers cette iconographie naïve, la femme absente reste toujours omniprésente.40

This nostalgia of past pleasures was often reflected in art work. In their paintings, poems and sculptures, prisoners would often treat the female body as an object of idealization. This conception was demonstrated when Mrs. Ann Cowan of the Canadian Jewish Congress visited Camp Île-aux-Noix in 1941. Upon her arrival at the camp, where she was to interview civilian inmates regarding their future liberation, the camp commandant informed her that the prisoners “had never seen a women in two years.” For her personal security, she was escorted into the camp’s compound by armed guards with fixed bayonets. As she recalled, the prisoners were eager and placing “a table on top of another table so that I would be interviewing them.” Further, the internees gave her
numerous presents which included poems, watercolors and a wooden ashtray. However, idealization also created distorted views about women. As Cazeneuve explained:

Le portrait que garde le captif dans son souvenir n’est pas un cliché photographique; c’est bien une copie mouvante et qui s’écarte de plus en plus de son modèle réel. Ainsi s’explique l’extrême susceptibilité, la sévérité même des exilés quand ils reprennent contact avec cette réalité et mesurent la différence... Combien de plaintes recueillies-t-on quand arrive le courrier. C’est que l’être réel ne s’exprime pas dans ces lignes comme l’eût fait l’être idéal qui est né de lui dans la méditation du prisonnier.  

This reality often generated feelings of abandonment. As a result, the absence of women led prisoners to become more aggressive. Unable to suffice their sexual needs, men would become restless and violent.

When circumstances permitted and internees were able to meet women, they often did not know how to react. Years of seclusion and inexperience with ladies took its toll. When a small group of young Farnham refugees was taken to Montreal for examinations in the fall of 1941, the Canadian Jewish Congress organized a party which was attended by Jewish girls. According to one internee:

...It’s the strangest experience...you think you sort of immediately go and grab them...but most of us really didn’t know how to handle the situation at all...The girls were very nice looking and we had sort of bragged among ourselves what we would do with those girls...Some of them were going to go right to bed with them...I doubt that I as much as said ten words to a girl and I found that experience really traumatic...suddenly to be with the opposite sex after all this time. And actually, I had a sleepless night after that. I was so mad at myself for not taking more advantage of the opportunity.

Seclusion from women also led to the development of homosexuality. Although not much is known about this sexual behavior in the camps of southern Quebec, a few inmates claimed that homosexual activities were an everyday occurrence. According to Eric Koch, who was interned at Camp Sherbrooke: “The absence of women had a very predictable influence on the lives of many inmates. The only way in which prisoners could have heterosexual love affairs was in their fantasies. Yet, no fantasy at all was required to have affairs with men. By far the greatest number of love affairs were between men who before and after internment were perfectly straight.”
Social alienation was another cause for psychological strains. Isolated from their families, friends, professions and the customs of their country, prisoners often became "home sick." This feeling of alienation was also accentuated by the prisoner’s realization that life went on at home without him. Hence, though life inside internment camps were known to be "micro-societies," inmates remained nostalgic for their native country and their past life. Social alienation was also intensified by the prisoners’ recognition that Canadian society flourished outside the camps. In fact, prisoners were often reminded that life continued on the "outside world" through Canadian newspapers and magazines. The rare contacts with Canadian civilians also re-affirmed such feelings. Knowing that communities prospered beyond the barbed wire was both a source of frustration and envy. Such realizations were often enough to entice a prisoner to escape. Furthermore, there was always the threat of illicit correspondence and exchange of valuable information. As a result, contact between prisoners and civilians was kept to a strict minimum. After all, article 2 of the Geneva Convention stipulated that prisoners "shall at all times be humanely treated and protected…from public curiosity."

Public curiosity was a major problem. Although Canadian propaganda pictured the Germans as "bloodthirsty Huns and savages," Canadian civilians still wanted to see for themselves who was behind the barbed wires. According to a Sherbrooke resident:

...my mother would worry...about us going out at night when there was an escape that was sounded. She’d say, ‘You can't go beyond the property because there are prisoners around’...The thing that my mother did not know was that these prisoners of war used to go skiing. They would walk with guards to the Bowen Hill, and they would go down and ski down there. Us girls would ski down the hill...and we'd kind of talk to these prisoners. Our parents didn't know that for a long time, that we were actually talking to them. They weren't allowed to say much to us because of the guards. We never got near the fence...

Some civilians even approached the camps' enclosures. The problem became so dramatic at Camp Farnham in 1942 that warning signs had to be posted around the camp because curious motorists and pedestrians often approached the camp’s periphery. Nevertheless, such incidents enabled the prisoners to see, if only for a slight moment, faces from the "outside world." The sight of Canadian civilians was a constant reminder
that while they were incarcerated, others were free. Therefore, lack of material comfort, restricted mobility, the absence of a feminine presence and social alienation were basic factors which created a climate of dissatisfaction in the camps of southern Quebec.

One result of psychological strains was marked by the rise of dissension. Dissension was expressed through numerous forms of protest. In most cases, internees exploited the Canadian government's fear of German reprisals. At the time, retaliatory measures were a common form of political pressure. According to historian Jonathan F. Vance, "the [Canadian] government remained committed to the principle of reciprocity. The treatment of prisoners in Canada was seen to be inextricably linked to the treatment of Canadians in enemy hands, and the government generally lodged a protest when conditions affecting Canadians in Axis hands were markedly worse than those experienced by POWs in Canada." It is important to note at this point that the German government adhered to similar policies. Understanding this situation, most of the German internees in Canada used this tactic to pressure camp authorities to cave in to their demands.54

The power of retaliatory means had been well demonstrated during the shackling controversy of 1942-1943. The process began in the immediate aftermath of the ill-fated Dieppe raid of August 19, 1942 whereby 1,000 British and 5,000 Canadian troops attempted a military landing in northern France. Since the Germans found many of their own dead with their hands tied on the Île-de-Sark following an earlier British commando raid, Germany responded by shackling some 1,376 Canadian and British prisoners of war interned in both Oflags (officer camps) and Stalags (other-ranks camps) on October 8, 1942. Immediately, Britain threatened to shackle an equivalent number of German prisoners in both Great Britain and Canada. When Germany raised the stakes on October 10 by chaining some 4,128 prisoners. Britain requested the Canadian government to approve the handcuffing of 3,888 German prisoners of war. Four Canadian internment camps were chosen for this purpose. These were camps Gravenhurst, Espanola, Monteith, and Bowmanville. Although the British and Canadian governments decided to unshackle the German prisoners on December 10, 1942, the incident did not end until November 1943 when Germany finally agreed to unchain the Canadian and British inmates.55
The exploitation of the Canadian government’s fear over German reprisals encouraged the internees to adopt rebellious behavior. Numerous methods were adopted by the prisoners to express their dissatisfaction. One form of pressure was by complaining to the Swiss Consul. Acting as the prisoners’ protective power, Swiss delegations had to report all incidents to the German government. As such, this created much pressure and often led camp authorities to improve treatment of the prisoners.\textsuperscript{56} Passive resistance was another method used by the inmates to express their discontent and was often expressed through strikes, namely hunger strikes. By refusing to prepare meals or to eat, prisoners placed enormous pressure upon the Canadian authorities. Should any prisoners’ health be affected by this form of strike, there was always the threat of German reprisals. On such matters, belligerent nations often did not care to know if it was the prisoners or the camp authorities who were responsible for the diminishing health. For them, what was important was the treatment that their prisoners received while in the hands of the enemy. Therefore, any health problem was usually blamed on the enemy authorities.\textsuperscript{57} In order to limit the chances of retaliation on Canadian prisoners of war, camp authorities usually nodded to the prisoners’ demands.\textsuperscript{58} Another popular form of protest was postal strikes. The belief was that if no inmate made use of his privilege to send letters home, his family and friends would worry and initiate pressure upon the German government to make formal inquiries.\textsuperscript{59} Prisoners also resorted to labour strikes, as each southern Quebec camp employed inmates on special work projects.\textsuperscript{60}

Sometimes, internees adopted riotous behavior, including camp mutinies. Although rare, such forms of dissension created enormous pressures for camp authorities. Such a case occurred at Camp Farnham between September 26\textsuperscript{th} and September 28\textsuperscript{th} 1941. At the time, a strong Communist movement had grown inside the camp. As camp authorities indicated in early September 1941: “A communistic element among the refugees is becoming most assertive and vocal...An effort is being made to discover who the ring-leaders of the Communists are.” They further stated: “...there are about ten to twelve professional politicians and Communist leaders who work with indirect and undercover methods. Someday their efforts will probably blossom forth in some kind of riot or trouble.”\textsuperscript{61} It is important to note that the internees of this camp were divided over
the issue of Communism. This generated much tension. As camp authorities indicated: “It is quite apparent that the refugees in this camp are a mixed group as previously reported and differences consists not only of race and religion but there are differences of a violent political and social nature. Communists as previously reported are very strong…”

Rioting emerged when camp authorities decided to transfer seven of the most politically active Communists to Camp Île Ste. Hélène on September 26. The process began in the early morning when the camp spokesman requested “that the movement be immediately canceled, if it was not a hunger strike would immediately commence.” In order to place more pressure, he further added that “heads would fall over this move.” As camp authorities indicated, “there was great commotion, excitement and high feeling in the compound over the whole matter.”

The riot which ensued was well described by Major E.D.B. Kippen who was then camp commandant:

At approximately 1200 hours on Friday, September 26th the hunger strike started and the refugees removed the rations from the kitchen and brought them down to the main gate of the camp although much was strewn over the compound…The refugee canteen was closed by the compound hut leaders at 1400 hours when the [seven] refugees were embussed and left for Camp “S”. This was the cause of tremendous excitement in the compound and semi-rioting and general confusion. Just before the bus was about to start three rifle shots were discharged into the air outside the guard room and this had the effect of calming down the compound for awhile…After the bus had left, the various factions in the compound were involved in disturbances and some of the refugees were injured although none very seriously, which was more by good luck than by anything else. During the rest of the afternoon the sentries were doubled and the police force inside the compound was increased so as to give full protection and furthermore to protect groups of refugees from each other. Attacks were made on individuals and on groups. During the balance of the day the agitation continued…The hunger strike continued all day during the 27th and there was outbreaks of rioting and attempted attacks on groups and individuals. Approximately 100 to 125 refugees broke away from the strike and managed to get some breakfast and lunch although their fires were put out on several occasions by raids made on the kitchen. The compound police were able to control the situation very well but at times groups were able to break through their cordon. It was necessary to move about 51 refugees out of the various huts and they were segregated in the quiet room. This was done for their protection…The next day, September 28th camp representatives were interviewed and given instructions to stop the hunger strike. They were given until 1430 hours…and at that time they reported
that the hunger strike was over. During the balance of the day there were a
number of disturbances but they were small incidents. On September 29th
the situation improved considerably and by noon of September 30th it was
considered normal... 64

This riot, which was caused by the political atmosphere that reigned among Camp
Farnham prisoners demonstrated the power and efficiency of communal actions. Although
such violent incidents were rare, they clearly showed the importance of cohesion.

Dissension was also expressed through illicit activities. Drunkenness was one such
form. Hoping to escape the hardships of life behind barbed wires, prisoners often
consumed alcohol. Drunkenness, although vigorously prohibited by Canadian officials,
was a serious problem inside the camps. To control this phenomenon, beer was made
available to the internees on a limited scale. As Canadian regulations stipulated:
“Internees will be permitted to purchase beer daily, during a period not exceeding one
hour...No limit will be placed upon the amount purchased during the hours of sale, but
strict control will be maintained to prevent drunkenness.” It was further indicated that
“permission to purchase beer will be considered as a privilege. If the privilege be abused
in any way the Commandant will withdraw same, and immediately and suitably discipline
the internees concerned.” 65 Although camp authorities did their best to prevent
drunkenness and restrict prisoners from having access to other forms of alcoholic
beverages, they could not prevent the clandestine making of such drinks. In fact, prisoners
did their best to concoct their own hard liquor, known as Moonshine. Eckehart Priebe,
who was a Camp Grande Ligne prisoner of war, described the process:

First, one needs an electrical hot-plate. The base was fashioned from some
clay we found in the compound, the bedsprings provided the wire to make
the coil. The big pot to go on the plate originally contained two pounds of
tobacco, the copper piping for the cooling and drip-off process was
‘requisitioned’ from the overflow tubes of the toilets. The fruit used as
basic ingredients came from the canteen with which we had a ‘contact’ for
all the rotten apples or peaches they could not sell. The biggest difficulty
was to hide the equipment, but we somehow managed. 66

Drinks could be made from all sorts of ingredients, including peaches, apples and cacao.
However, the manufacture of alcohol necessitated certain precautions. As Priebe
explained:
Came the ‘historic’ moment when the first drop was about to appear at the lower end of the piping. We crowded around the originator of the project, spoon at the ready. He was eager to exercise his privilege of first tasting. Full of anticipation he lifted the first teaspoonful of self-made booze, brand name ‘Grande Ligne special,’ to his tongue, immediately dropped it and blew the precious booze all over the place. We learned the hard way, that the first drops of such a distillation were 100% pure alcohol which, like acid, can burn a hole in your tongue. 67

For the Canadian authorities, the clandestine making of alcohol was perceived as an act of dissension on the part of the prisoners. Searches would often be made to find stills and the ingredients which made camp micro-breweries. 68

Illicit activities also included the usage of hidden radio receivers. As Eckehart Priebe indicated: “The POW is always hungry for news; news from home, news from the war theatres, news of things to come, news, news, news. He is a notorious optimist, always expecting good news as bad news from the war fronts would prolong his confinement.” Radio sets would often be improvised by the prisoners themselves. 69 As Camp Farnham authorities noted in March 1941:

It has been brought to our attention that parts of sound projectors for films can be used in the manufacture of improvised wireless sets by experts in wireless. No doubt there are many such experts among the prisoners of war and internees. Therefore, those camps, to which sound projectors have been donated or loaned, must take the necessary precautions to prevent any prisoner from having the opportunity of taking any parts from or in any way tampering with the apparatus. 70

Finally, secret correspondence was another form of illicit activity. Although article 36 of the Geneva Convention stipulated that “each of the belligerents shall fix periodically the number of letters and postcards which prisoners of war of different categories shall be permitted to send per month,” prisoners often tried to transmit valuable information to individuals in Germany and other Canadian internment camps using secret writing material. 71 Daniel Costelle well described such constraints in Les Prisonniers:

...les lettres passaient...à la censure qui rayait soigneusement tout ce qui pouvait de près ou de loin ressembler à une indication d’ordre militaire. Les sacs de lettres étaient ensuite rassemblés et embarqués à bord de bateaux neutres, suédois, sud-américains ou suisses - et amenés à Marseille, où ils étaient mis dans des wagons plombés à destination de Genève. Ils étaient
ensuite transportés à la frontière et remis aux Allemands. Les lettres étaient alors de nouveau ouvertes et lues par la censure allemande, qui rayait soigneusement tout ce qui de près ou de loin pouvait ressembler à un éloge de l'Amérique. Entre les paragraphes entiers passés à l'encre noire, les parents, les femmes ou les enfants des prisonniers pouvaient toujours essayer de deviner la vie de leur être cher...Dans le sens inverse, le trajet était le même, et les prisonniers recevaient des pages entières rayées par la censure...\textsuperscript{72}

Letters could not contain controversial subjects such as reference "to either armed forces, political situation, numbers interned, passages from documents or books, cypher code, secret writing, shorthand, marking signs, underlinings, criticisms of, or reference to the business of the camp or conduct of any other prisoner of war...Letters must not contain political propaganda or abusive, insolent, derogatory, or threatening language with respect to the government or military authorities of the Allied nations." This led prisoners to adopt diverse methods to convey important information in their letters. The most ingenious means were "invisible ink" and secret codes.\textsuperscript{73} Secret writing material was usually received inside the camps in parcels sent by German relief organizations and by Pro-German associations in Latin America, Germany and the United States.\textsuperscript{74} The most common used materials "for developing by heat are writings in milk; orange juice; orange juice, sugar and water; starch and water; cabbage juice; potato juice, urine; equal parts of sulphate of copper and salamoniac dissolved in water; sulphuric acid and water. also the common styptic pencil...Another form of secret writing is by the use of linseed oil, ammonia and water."\textsuperscript{75} Although "new sensitized paper which prevented the use of any liquid secret writing ink, or other commonly known secret writing techniques in prisoner of war correspondence" was introduced by Allied chemists, the use of "invisible ink" prevailed inside the camps of southern Quebec.\textsuperscript{76} As for secret codes, numerous techniques could be adopted. Canadian authorities warned censors to examine letters for the following coding methods: "Underlining of phrases, words or letters or use of question marks; veiled and obscure language in music, spelling of words backwards, and by chess problems or mathematical formulae; the use of drawings to conceal messages in shorthand, morse, or other codes."\textsuperscript{77} Prisoners also tried to send secret letters by concealing them in outgoing packages.\textsuperscript{78} In most cases, secret letters would be used to
transmit valuable military information, to communicate cases of ill-treatment on the part of the Canadian authorities and “to report to Germany the names of prisoners of war who appeared unfaithful to Nazism.” 79

Escapes were another consequence of psychological strain. Although Canadian regulations warned that “any prisoner of war attempting to pass the boundary fence, wall, or to go out through any gate, exit or other opening without a permit signed by the commandant after being only duly warned and disregarding that warning, will be fired on,” internees continued to attempt escapes. 80 During southern Quebec’s civilian phase, there were very few escape attempts. A major reason which can explain this phenomenon was the fact that most internees were refugees. As such, inmates understood that good behavior might accelerate their chances to be released on parole. There was also no need for escapes since such attempts could mean a prolongation of internment. Also, unlike prisoners of war who escaped in order to return to Germany, refugees had nowhere to go. This made the prospect of escape less attractive. However, despite these circumstances, the idea of escaping was always on the mind of many internees. As one Sherbrooke inmate recalled:

We had no idea how long we would be there, how long the war would last, or if we would be released before the war was over...so I made plans for building a tunnel...I managed to steal maps of the area out of one of the military automobiles and ...I thought seriously that I would start digging if it [the war] went on for too long... what I had done was to arrange the floor of one of the huts...so to have some boards easily removable so I could get into the sub-floor. And I reckoned that the sub-floor would have sufficed to accept all the earth I would have to dig out. And the fence was not very far from that hut. 81

Although this prisoner did not try to escape, some did. In most cases, these attempts took place in the latter part of the civilian phase at a time when the pressures imposed by years of internment were at their highest. 82 Escape attempts intensified in southern Quebec with the arrival of prisoners of war. This can well be demonstrated by table 2. Enemy combatants saw it as their duty to try and escape if ever captured. The belief was that escapes greatly helped Germany’s war effort by keeping the Canadians occupied and forcing them to concentrate more troops for the protection of internment camps.
## Table 2

**Number of Attempted Escapes in Southern Quebec 1940-1946**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Escape</th>
<th>Camp</th>
<th># of Inmates</th>
<th>Date of Recapture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 16, 1942</td>
<td>Farnham</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>July 17, 1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 8, 1942</td>
<td>Sherbrooke</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>November 28, 1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 6, 1942</td>
<td>Sherbrooke</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>December 11, 1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 8, 1943</td>
<td>Sherbrooke</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>April 9, 1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 14, 1943</td>
<td>Sherbrooke</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>April 17, 1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 22, 1943</td>
<td>Farnham</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>April 22, 1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 24, 1943</td>
<td>Ile-aux-Noix</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>May 24, 1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 28, 1943</td>
<td>Farnham</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>June 29, 1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 5, 1943</td>
<td>Sherbrooke</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>August 6, 1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 13, 1943</td>
<td>Grande Ligne</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>August 13, 1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 19, 1943</td>
<td>Farnham</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>August 22, 1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 27, 1943</td>
<td>Grande Ligne</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>August 27, 1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 16, 1944</td>
<td>Grande Ligne</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>March 16, 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 17, 1944</td>
<td>Sherbrooke</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>April 17, 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 3, 1944</td>
<td>Sherbrooke</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>May 3, 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 6, 1944</td>
<td>Sherbrooke</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>May 6, 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 7, 1944</td>
<td>Sherbrooke</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>May 7, 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 9, 1944</td>
<td>Sherbrooke</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>July 30, 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 13, 1944</td>
<td>Grande Ligne</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>September 14, 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 26, 1944</td>
<td>Grande Ligne</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>September 26, 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 18, 1944</td>
<td>Farnham</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>December 18, 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 29, 1945</td>
<td>Farnham</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>April 1, 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 14, 1945</td>
<td>Sherbrooke</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>May 15, 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 17, 1945</td>
<td>Sorel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>November 17, 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 24, 1946</td>
<td>Sherbrooke</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>March 27, 1946</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:**
Cutting through a camp’s barbed wire system was one of the most common means of escape. This was usually done at night, the prisoners using stolen tools or improvised equipment to cut holes. Improvised tools included stolen kitchen knives converted into saws as well as saws made from old gramophone springs. Also, prisoners would often remove their iron beds’ cross pieces and springs to make wire cutters. This was a very delicate operation since the internee had to work in the open without any means of concealment.\textsuperscript{83} Also, such endeavors took time for usually three lines of barbed wire fences had to be cut. Despite such difficulties, inmates used this method on numerous occasions and succeeded.\textsuperscript{84} Furthermore, prisoners also escaped by climbing over the wire fences. As Camp Farnham authorities warned: “If a man cannot go through the wire, that is to say by using wire cutters, he might go over it with the aid of ladders. Cases have been known where a ladder in three or four sections has been carried towards the wire in a creeping position and then the movement of the sentry timed so as to bring it into action at a favourable time.”\textsuperscript{85}

Prisoners also dug tunnels underneath the camps hoping to reach the other side of the wire fences. The only problem with such an enterprise was the amount of work involved. Building tunnels was a complex procedure which needed special tools. These usually were fashioned by the prisoners’ themselves from scrap wood, iron and even kitchen utensils.\textsuperscript{86} Mining operations also needed to be properly coordinated. Plans had to be established to know where to dig, how to hide the tunnel’s entrance, how to organize the work and where excavated earth was to be thrown to avoid detection. Furthermore, mining projects took a lot of time and energy. The construction of a tunnel could take several months. As Camp Farnham authorities indicated: “It is practically impossible to tunnel faster than say a yard a day and even that is difficult; therefore, to build a tunnel 30 or 40 yards long it would take at least 30 or 40 days for the tunneling alone.” Because of such conditions, numerous internees had to be involved in such projects, rendering the issue of secrecy somewhat problematic. Because of such conditions, mining operations were rare. Still, there were incidents in southern Quebec camps.\textsuperscript{87}

Yet, other approaches were used by the prisoners in order to escape. Inmates sometimes escaped through the main gate, “the prisoner hiding himself in the garbage and
ash boxes or by concealing himself in a truck, car, or under it... Other internees attempted escapes by impersonating camp guards. As Camp Farnham authorities warned:

It would be possible for a prisoner to get hold of a uniform, although it might be difficult. At the same time, many prisoners are ingenious, intelligent, imaginative and courageous and difficulties are not insuperable to such people. This stunt is also worked on the lone wolf basis, that is to say, prisoners dressing up as officers, NCOs or soldiers and coming boldly up to the gate and asking for exit. This is generally done late in the afternoon, just before dusk, when the light would not show up any imperfections in his uniform... There have been actual cases of impersonation. It generally takes a good actor to do this and it is a very daring operation.

To conceal their escapes, some prisoners even went as far as placing dummies in their beds "to look as if they were sleeping in them."

The goal for German escapees was to reach the United States. With most Canadian internment camps located in proximity of the American border, internees saw the U.S. as a natural asylum. Stimulating the prisoners intentions was the legend of prisoner of war Franz Von Werra, a German Luftwaffe officer who managed to escape Canada and return to Germany by fleeing through the United States in January 1941. It is important to note at this point that when this incident occurred, the U.S. was a neutral country. As the story goes, Von Werra jumped out of a train in the midst of snow storm as it neared the American border near Prescott, Ontario. Reaching the German embassy in Washington D.C. a few days later, Von Werra was told that the best way to return to Germany was through South America. Issued with falsified identification papers, Von Werra was sent to Brazil where he boarded an Italian aircraft bound for Rome. Arriving in the Italian capital in April 1941, he was then taken to Germany aboard a Luftwaffe aircraft. The success of Von Werra's adventure gave hope to all German prisoners of war held in Canada. Although the United States joined the Allied cause in December 1941, the German prisoners' zest for escape continued. Their new aim was to traverse the United States with the help of sympathetic German-Americans and reach Mexico. As the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) indicated to the RCMP in November 1942 while searching for two Camp Sherbrooke escapees: "...ces deux hommes essaieront par tous les moyens possibles d'entrer aux États-Unis et qu'ensuite ils tenteront probablement
de retourner en Allemagne via l’Amérique du Sud.” 93 When another escape ensured at Camp Sherbrooke in December 1942, the FBI and the American Immigration Department “began an investigation into the possible existence of an underground system to aid prisoners in escaping from Canada to the United States.” 94

In all of southern Quebec internment camps, measures were taken to prevent escapes. Alertness was very important for camp guards. According to a document entitled *Notes on Prevention of Escapes* issued by the Department of National Defence on December 24, 1940:

The whole question of safe custody of prisoners must depend on the constant alertness of each and every member of the staff and guard. No amount of mechanical equipment, no matter how efficient, will prevent escapes, if the individual guard is not constantly and at all times on alert. If one [meaning the guard] gets in the habit of assuming that the fence is unclimable, that the rocky nature of the ground of the frost will prevent tunneling or that perfection illumination by flood and pistol-grip searchlights makes escape practically impossible, then escapes will occur. . . . The troops employed in connection with prisoners. . . should be made to realize that the prisoners are always studying their habits and trying to discover their weaknesses, and any person connected with an internment camp who becomes apathetic in his duties is a menace to the security of the camp. 95

Because “plots and preparations for escape are constantly going on among the prisoners, especially among combatant prisoners of war.” camp guards were constantly being trained in prevention. The main problem with the Veterans’ Guard of Canada was that most of its members had not seen active service since the Great War. The necessity for training was well demonstrated in the early days of southern Quebec’s internment operations. 96 As it was stated in the Camp Farnham war diary on October 24, 1940:

The guards have to be instructed in internment camp work as guarding an internment camp is very different from guarding say a bridge or a munition plant or something of that nature. The guards have received several lectures from the commandant and other officers on their work, and it is pointed to them that everlasting vigilence is their first duty and that they must not rely too much on the mechanical equipment of the camp, such as the wire, flood lights, etc. Sentries, provost police and escorts for working parties must be made to realize that prisoners are continually studying their habits and customs and endeavour to pick the weak points of each one personally or the organization as a whole. 97
Every week, the guards in southern Quebec’s internment camps trained in order to perfect their skills. The guards had to understand the rules pertaining to the treatment of the prisoners and the methods they could use to enforce regulations. They also needed to know what to look for in the advent of escapes:

When an escape is being planned, there is an atmosphere about the camp that is unmistakable. When you sense tension in the air do not ignore it as a figment of your imagination, but see that everybody is on their toes. Prisoners who intend to escape usually accumulate chocolate, cake or food. Special attention should be paid to prisoners who are noticed taking exceptionally vigorous walking exercise; also to any group who appear to be somewhat pale and who sleep continuously in the daytime, which may indicate night tunneling operations. Periodical searches should be made for contraband, that is, civilian clothes, money, maps, compasses, etc...Watch for signs of fresh earth, etc., sprinkled over the exercise ground or filling up holes, etc. If prisoners are noticed leaving the huts or going out on working parties with bulging pockets, examine same in case they are carrying out earth from excavations. Wood is essential in building tunnels. Keep a close watch for planks removed from walls, floors, etc. Avoid leaving boxes and boards in places that are accessible to the prisoners.

They were also told that “a prisoner planning an escape generally arranges with accomplices for a diversion so as to attract attention to something else rather than his own particular activities. There are many possible diversions ranging all the way from a commotion to a fire. When anything out of the ordinary happens...it is a good rule...not to concentrate too much attention on the particular incident...” The inmates’ practice of substitution. “that is to say, one prisoner attempting to give the name and number of another [during roll calls] so as to cover up a comrade who may have escaped or is attempting to do so,” was also noted.

To prevent escapes, prisoners were issued with special uniforms. Aside from the prisoner of war officers who were authorized to wear their military uniforms and the refugees who were granted permission to wear civilian clothing, all internees were issued with special marked clothing. This consisted of dark blue upper garments marked on the back by a 14” red circular patch and gray trousers with a 3” red stripe down one leg. The aim of the uniform was for the rapid identification of escapees. The circle on the shirt was to serve as a target if a guard was aiming his rifle at an escapee. The size of the circle was
chosen deliberately to ensure it could not be removed without wrecking the garment. Furthermore, to facilitate the recapture of escapees, each southern Quebec internee was photographed and finger printed by the RCMP. These pictures were distributed to local police forces and the media whenever escapes occurred. With this in mind, prisoners were not allowed to have long hair or beards.\textsuperscript{101}

Daily camp inspections, also known as roll calls, were crucial in preventing escapes. On such occasions, prisoners would fall in two ranks in their numerical order and be counted for and inspected by the camp's commandant. Such inspections helped ensure that the "discipline of the prisoners is maintained." Moreover, they permitted camp authorities to know if prisoners had escaped.\textsuperscript{102} As a rule, each camp was to have two roll calls per day: one in the morning and one in the evening. However, often, a third inspection was made as an extra precaution.

Preventing escapes was a tiresome enterprise for camp authorities. In many ways, it was a game of cat and mouse which constantly forced camp guards to remain on alert. Although camp authorities knew that prisoners were preparing escapes, they had no way of knowing when such events might occur. This was certainly the case at Grande Ligne where the inmates began attempting escapes as soon as they arrived. In fact, camp guards discovered the entrance of a tunnel as early as July 6, 1943. When six prisoners attempted to escape by cutting their way through the wire fences on August 13, 1943, it was clear that camp authorities had become restless. What worried them even more was the fact that the prisoners had in their possession numerous documents including detailed maps of eastern North America. This was of major concern for the camp authorities since it meant that prisoners had access to restricted information.\textsuperscript{103} When a second escape attempt occurred on August 27, 1943, Military District 4 headquarters immediately responded by ordering a surprise search of the prisoners' compound. More than 100 VGC personnel and 50 RCMP constables took part. The operation was a complete success. Confiscated were numerous forged documents which included Argentine, British, Dutch and Latvian certificates of identity and U.S. Army draft certificates. Also found were detailed maps of Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Brunswick, New Hampshire, New York, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Quebec and Vermont as well as compasses, wire cutters, home made
daggers, tools, codes and diaries. Furthermore, it was discovered that the prisoners of war kept detailed records of the movements of camp sentries and of trains arriving at the local railway station. When home-made VGC shoulder badges were found on September 2, 1943, as well as a metal tunnel framework the next day, camp authorities began to panic. The fear was that prisoners might be able to escape by means of impersonating camp personnel. To meet this threat, camp personnel were issued on September 6, 1943, with a special identity disc which was to be worn around the neck like “dog-tags.” The issue also led to an intensification of the camp’s security system. For instance, large searchlights were put on each of the camp’s towers and extra lines of barbed wires were built in October 1943.

However, these measures did not prevent prisoners from attempting escapes. In fact, between January and February 1944, Camp Grande Ligne authorities became convinced that the prisoners were building another tunnel when large stones belonging to the foundation wall of one of the buildings were discovered. One of them, which weighed 225 pounds, was even found concealed under the piano in the prisoners of war officers’ mess. Night after night, camp authorities began searching for the tunnel’s entrance. It was finally found on February 27, 1944, under a window in the prisoner of war library room. When the tunnel was inspected, an electrician’s rock drill and two pieces of galvanized pipes were found in the hole. It was estimated that the prisoners had removed some $\frac{3}{4}$ tons of rocks from the foundations.

To keep a closer watch on the prisoners in March 1944, camp authorities formed a special intelligence group known as the “Ferrets.” Manned by camp scouts, the Ferrets’ duties were to make nightly searches in the prisoners of war compound to find out if the inmates were preparing escapes. In the summer of 1944, digging operations resumed at Camp Grande Ligne. As a result, experiments were carried out at night by camp authorities using listening apparatuses borrowed from the RCMP. However, such attempt proved unsuccessful since water pipes and other underground noises neutralized the efficiency of these instruments. In the meantime, some prisoners imposed more pressure by attempting to cut through the wire on July 30, 1944, while some 350 inmates were in the camp’s yard watching a soccer match. As a result, the camp guards intensified their supervision of the
enclosure. As camp authorities indicated: "It will be extraordinary if some well planned scheme of escape is not tried this month - between now and the middle of September. The gardens are now full of vegetables, fruits, etc. and it is possible for a man to exit for days without much in the way of provisions...next attempt might be a slick wire job. It's a great game and the zest of it is the unknown." Eventually, the "Ferrets" discovered the internees' tunnel on August 26, 1944. In early September, the prisoners were told of the tunnel's a couple of surprise searches of the camp were initiated, and a considerable number of contraband items were found. These included complete battle-dress suits fitted with homemade Veteran's Guard of Canada badges made of tin, homemade wedge caps, shoulder badges, escape rigs, civilian clothing made out of blankets, tunnel ventilators, hand-made tools, wires, falsified documents, maps, diaries and a tremendous amount of scrap iron. In late September 1944, the strain of escapes was widely felt by VGC guardsmen. As camp authorities indicated:"...VGC personnel feel they should get $10 to $11 gratuity, in view of duties guarding POW, being similar to battlefield duty."

Whenever prisoners escaped, camp authorities requested local support. Because "it is to be expected that a prisoner will endeavor to reach the United States border and will make use of any available means of transportation, such as motor vehicles, trains, bicycles, etc."

"camp personnel had to react rapidly. After having notified Military District 4 headquarters, local security forces would immediately be contacted. These included the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Quebec Provincial Police, the New York State Police, the Vermont State Police, the Canadian Provost Corps, the Canadian National Railroad (CNR) and Canadian Pacific Railroad (CPR) security forces, the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) Service Police, the United States Immigration Border Patrol, the American Immigration Department authorities, municipal police corps as well as local military units and Canadian Army Training Centres (CATC). Search parties would then be formed and sent around the region. RCMP special agents and dog handlers would usually coordinate such teams which, more than often, consisted solely of policemen. Roadblocks and observation posts would also be established in the local countryside in order to warn civilians about the escape and to interrogate and search both pedestrians and motorists."
Furthermore, local newspapers and radio stations would be advised of the escapes and asked to communicate this information to the general public. In newspapers, this was usually done by printing a photo of the escapee along with a short text describing the individual's physical characteristics. As for radio stations, they were usually requested to broadcast the prisoner's description in both English and French every 15 minutes. Warning Canadian civilians about escapes was the only time the media was authorized to openly discuss camp-related matters. The fact was that Canadian censorship forbade both newspapers and radio stations to communicate to the public any information concerning Canadian internment camps. Instead, the press kept all its effort on detailing the progression of the Allied forces. Local journalists and reporters were almost never allowed to visit southern Quebec internment camps. Because of this strict control of information, some Canadian civilians were often unaware of the existence of internment camps in their regions. This situation was well reflected by the number of articles written about Camp Sherbrooke by *La Tribune de Sherbrooke*. In fact, of the twenty-four articles published by this newspaper during the war about the camp, sixteen of them dealt exclusively with the issue of escapes. As for the other articles, they dealt with such vague topics as change of camp commandants and fires. The civilian population responded well to the media warnings about escapes. On some occasions, the public contributed to the recapture of escapees. Although most escapees were usually recaptured within a day, some were actually able to dodge searching parties for several days. In some cases, southern Quebec escapees were even able to reach such metropolitan areas as Montreal. In all, some 600 attempted escapes were registered in Canada during the war. Most were recaptured within a couple of days.

When not conforming to camp rules, prisoners could be punished by the detaining power. According to article 45 of the *Geneva Convention*, "Prisoners of war shall be subject to the laws, regulations, and orders in force in the armed forces of the detaining power." In accordance with articles 46 to 53 of the convention, punishments were to be humane. The most severe disciplinary punishment which could be inflicted on a prisoner was solitary confinement. As article 54 stipulated: "The duration of any single punishment shall not exceed thirty days...Where, during the course or after the
termination of a period of imprisonment, a prisoner is sentenced to a fresh disciplinary penalty, a period of at least three days shall intervene between each of the periods of imprisonment, if one of such periods is of ten days or over.” The condition of prisoners inside detention cells was governed by articles 55 to 59 of the Geneva Convention. As it was stated, facilities were to be kept in a constant state of cleanliness. Furthermore, prisoners were to be given at least two hours per day for outdoor activities and provided with the opportunity to read and write. Never were prisoners to be sent outside of the camps to serve their disciplinary sentences. As article 56 of the document indicated: “In no case shall prisoners of war be transferred to penitentiary establishments (prisons, penitentiaries, convict establishments, etc.) in order to undergo disciplinary sentences there.”

To conform with the provisions of the Geneva Convention, each Canadian internment camp was provided with a specific number of detention cells. Any prisoner committing an offense was liable to be imprisoned in such facilities. As regulations stipulated: “Any prisoner of war guilty of disobedience to orders or of any act prejudicial to the safety, good order or discipline of the camp will be liable to punishment.” The maximum sentence a prisoner could receive was 28 days detention. This was usually given for attempted escapes, theft, illicit activities and smuggling messages. When prisoners disobeyed orders; when absent during inspections; when insolent; or when committing acts of aggression, they were usually sentenced to 21 days detention. Any inmate involved in the destruction of property was given 14 days detention. As for prisoners convicted for minor infractions, punishments included confinement to quarters for periods not exceeding 14 days and the issue of extra fatigue duties. This applied for fighting, disobedience of orders, insubordination and refusal to work. It is important to note that disciplinary sentences could only be awarded by Canadian officers vested with disciplinary powers such as camp commandants and the responsible officers acting as their substitutes. Furthermore, when cases proved too complicated for camp authorities, they were usually submitted to the district’s commanding officer.

In the early days of southern Quebec’s internment operations, camp authorities were somewhat uncomfortable when awarding sentences to specific prisoners because
they had no idea how the inmates would react as a whole. As a result, they only gave internees short sentences. Despite this leniency, the authorities understood the necessity of showing the prisoners that they were in charge. As Camp Île-aux-Noix, authorities claimed when arresting their first inmate on July 21, 1940: “This will have a very salutary effect on many of the others and it is obvious that the prisoners need some considerable training and discipline.” They further stated on August 2, 1940: “It is necessary to maintain a high degree of discipline among the prisoners and even the smallest infraction of regulations must be immediately checked.” This explains why so many internees were arrested for minor infractions in the first months of internment in southern Quebec. For instance, 37 of the 40 internees disciplined by southern Quebec camp authorities between July 1940 and Mach 1941 were awarded sentences of less than 10 days’ detention.

The main problem with the civilian internees was their lack of discipline. Because most had never served in the military, such internees had a hard time adapting to the regimentation and control of life behind barbed wires. This can explain why so many cases of insubordination and refusal to obey orders occurred during the civilian phase of internment. On the other hand, prior military training helped prisoners of war have a better integration into camp life. Their respect for authorities and understanding of discipline made them in some respects better inmates. However, as Table 2 suggested, they were more prone than civilians towards trying to escape.

Since some prisoners adopted criminal behavior, judicial proceedings had to be initiated. This was done in conformity with the Geneva Convention. In such cases, the Canadian authorities had the right to court martial offenders. This was usually done in the case of such crimes as murder, mutiny and offenses against Canadian personnel. Canadian regulations specified that “military courts shall have power to try any prisoners of war upon any such charges as may be preferred before them for any offence which, if committed in Canada by a person amenable to Canadian law, would be triable before a civil court of criminal jurisdiction, or for any act, conduct, disorder, or neglect prejudicial to the safety or well-being of His Majesty’s Dominions, armed forces or subjects, or to the safe custody, control or well-being of any prisoner of war, or to good order and discipline
among prisoners of war." On conviction by a military court, punishment could usually be awarded according to the following scale: (1) death; (2) penal servitude for life or for any term not less than three years; (3) imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for any term not exceeding two years; (4) detention for any term not exceeding two years; and (5) field punishment for any period not exceeding three months. In all cases, prisoners could be sent to local prisons to serve their terms. However, none of these sentences could be carried into effect until they had been confirmed by the Governor-General-in-Council or the Minister of National Defence in accordance with the prisoners' protecting power.\textsuperscript{122}

In southern Quebec, judicial hearings were very rare. It seems that the only one took place at Camp Sherbrooke on April 3, 1945, when a prisoner of war was tried by a District Court Martial for "stealing property belonging to a person subject to military law." The fact was that this prisoner had stolen the watch of one of the Canadian guards. The prisoner was eventually sentenced to 90 days imprisonment without hard labour at the Bordeaux prison in Montreal.\textsuperscript{123}

However, the threat of disciplinary action did not always control troublesome ideological motives among the prisoners. This created problems for southern Quebec authorities. The major factor, it seems, derived from strong political opinions among the inmates. In fact, most of the German internee populations held by Allied powers were divided along ideological lines. Some prisoners were Nazis while other were anti-Nazis and in some cases, Communists. This situation created friction which often led to violence. As a result, the detaining powers were forced to segregate the prisoners along political and ideological lines. This was no easy task for there was almost no way of knowing exactly what was going in a person's mind.

During southern Quebec's civilian phase of internment, the main concern for the Canadian authorities was the presence of Communist elements. The fear was that Communist ideologies might entice internees to consolidate themselves against camp authorities and initiate internal disturbances. As Eric Koch explained in Deemed Suspect: "...Communists were in the forefront of those making demands, for recognition of the refugee status, against the use of prisoner of war stationery, against sites unfit for human habitation, against mail delays...and so on. Communists were activists and trouble-
makers." Furthermore, most western powers, including Canada, were staunchly opposed to Communism, despite the fact that the Soviet Union was fighting on their side against Nazi Germany. The doctrine was perceived by many as a "social disease" that had to be annihilated. When Camp Farnham authorities learned in May 1941 that close to 45% of their inmates were Communist sympathizers, they responded by stating: "Communists...declare that they are "social thinking people" but their social thinking is similar to the attitude the Nazis take regarding their new "Social Order in Europe."" This can explain why the Camp Farnham authorities wrote in September 1941:

...the Communists in this camp have become most active and vocal. Their activities from an administrative standpoint are of course most troublesome and tiresome...The leaders of this group are doing their best to spread the gospel of communism...In a recent election held in this camp some two weeks ago, communists or communist sympathizers were selected for most of the posts. This means that they are now in a position to exert a considerable amount of influence over the life of the compound...This Communist element in the camp will have to be dealt with and more important still it will have to be watched...It is therefore in its larger aspect a problem of considerable importance as it has a bearing on the present and certainly the future.\textsuperscript{125}

Although Communism was perceived as an ideological threat, its supporters rarely resorted to violence. However, this situation changed with the advent of the prisoner of war phase. At that time, the main problem for the Canadian authorities was to counter Nazi dominance. Nazi prisoners often terrorized other inmates in order to neutralize anti-Nazis and ensure that no one cooperated with the Canadian authorities. On numerous occasions, Nazis spied on new internees, threatened fellow prisoners, and beat-up anti-Nazis. Nazis often gathered impressive arsenals of clubs, knives and other weapons. Sometimes they held Kangaroo Courts, where fellow inmates were judged on charges of "treason" for having cooperated with the camp authorities and for openly admitting that they were anti-Nazis. Prisoners began talking of "Camp Gestapos."\textsuperscript{126} Nazis also "waged symbolic war" by defying and taunting the Canadian authorities. They would do so by singing Nazi marching songs, waving Nazi regalia such as home made swastika banners and using the Nazi salute both among themselves and when confronting Canadian
officers. The celebration of Nazi holidays, including Hitler’s birthday, were also held to provoke camp staffs.  

The entire situation demonstrated that Nazis and anti-Nazis had to be segregated. A system of classification had to be introduced by the Canadian authorities. With this in mind, a Psychological Warfare Committee was created in 1943 to handle the issue of prisoners of war segregation and re-education (as will be detailed in chapter 4). In 1944, a system of classification known as PHERUDA, was introduced by the Psychological Warfare Committee to segregate Nazis from anti-Nazis. To conform with this new scheme, prisoners were interrogated by Camp Intelligence Officers and classed in three categories: Black (Nazis), Grey (no strong political interests or convictions) and White (anti-Nazis). Each letter of the term PHERUDA referred to the first capital letter of the areas in which prisoners were to be interrogated. These categories considered the inmates’ (1) POLITICAL leanings (from democrat to rabid Nazi); (2) attitudes toward HITLER (from anti-Hitler to fanatically pro-Hitler); (3) level of EDUCATION (from university to minimum); (4) RELIGION (from devout Protestant or Catholic to neo-pagan); (5) USEFULNESS in terms of labour (from willing to cooperate and skilled to refuse to work); (6) DEPENDABILITY (from known dependable to undependable); and (7) attitudes towards the ALLIES (from pro-Allied to anti-Allied). Further, each PHERUDA file came with an Interrogation Report which included five sets of questions covering personal details of the internee’s life, such as his general background (education, work, and home life); prisoner of war history (attitudes, work record and camps where he had been detained); political history (how politically oriented he was in Germany); military history (attitudes, units in which he served, and on which fronts he fought); camp information; and the examiner’s remarks (personality, truthfulness, reliability). By combining PHERUDA files with Interrogation Reports, Intelligence Officers were able to segregate inmates in one of the three color categories.  

The Canadian government’s new color system of classification enabled camp authorities to completely reorganize the Canadian internment operation along the political ideals of the internees. In that sense, the introduction of PHERUDA meant a radical transformation. In southern Quebec, it meant that camps were to specialize in the
incarceration of certain types of prisoners. For instance, Sherbrooke and Farnham were Gray camps, Grande Ligne was an institution for Blacks and Sorel was a White camp. However, PHERUDA classification was no easy task, for each war prisoner had to be interrogated. According to historian Bill Waiser: "The process was so incredibly slow that by war's end, almost two-thirds of the German prisoners held in Canada had yet to be classified." By late September 1945, only 9,172 inmates had been classified by PHERUDA teams out of a total population of some 34,000 prisoners of war.  

As such, despite the introduction of the PHERUDA classification system, Nazi elements continued to infiltrate the camps. Such was the problem at Sherbrooke in December 1944 where the arrival of 62 prisoners from Camp Monteith created a reign of terror. The problem was that many Nazis were among the newcomers. This led to much unrest on the part of the inmates. Rumors were that the Nazis were planning hangings, beatings and other forms of brutality. Two Nazi prisoners were even overheard saying: "We have hung some at Monteith. let's erect a gallows here." It seemed that the aim of these troublemakers was to deliberately create fear among the other prisoners. As a result, numerous internees began approaching the camp authorities for protective custody or for transfer to the anti-Nazi camp they believed to be in existence. Some of them even made applications for the Pioneer Corps. By February 1945, the problem had become so tense that camp authorities began talking about a "war of nerves inside the enclosure." Prisoners threatened by Nazis were often psychologically tense as they feared for their lives; finding a rope noose in one's own bed as a death warrant was extremely traumatizing. So intense were these pressures that according to the camp's Intelligence Officer, one prisoner even "broke down and wept while telling his story to the camp commandant." The Sherbrooke "Reign of Terror" only came to an end on March 26, 1945 when 49 Nazi trouble makers were transferred to Camp Monteith.  

Nazi military training was another problem in southern Quebec camps. The focus behind such a project was to secretly prepare German prisoner of war officers for participation in future Nazi wars. Although such training offered no direct threat to the security of internment camps, it kept the spirit of Nazism and militarism alive among inmates. One such military training initiative was introduced at Camp Farnham. There,
Black prisoners working in the POW orderly room began a census of all Nazi officers incarcerated in the camp. Initiated on October 15, 1944, this census took the form of a "Card-Index System." Each card represented an individual and indicated his rank; date of entry into the German army; date of last promotion; military position last held; number of years in the field; number of service years at home; date of capture; formation or military unit; military district; and whether he was a regular soldier or a reservist. The purpose for collecting this kind of data "is to build up an underground movement and to re-educate the officers for the next war." Officers from all branches of the military were given secret classes connected with their future in the German general staff. Lectures comprised such topics as military science, intelligence, map reading and commanding troops in the field. The purpose for these lectures was to counter the fact that a number of officers were loosing their enthusiasm for Nazism. A secret lecture room was established in one of the camp's huts and all officers were grouped in the same quarters. The reason for keeping candidates together was to create cohesion and ensure that senior officers had total control. Nevertheless, despite the secrecy, camp authorities learned of this military training program in December 1944 from a White prisoner.\textsuperscript{133}

Nazis were very organized, especially at "Black" camps like Grande Ligne. The camp had been constructed to house German prisoner of war officers. Canadian authorities believed that Camp Grande Ligne was bound to experience more Nazi activities than any other southern Quebec camps. They were right. In the summer and early autumn of 1944, camp authorities learned how organized and aggressive the camp's Nazi officers really were, for they had created their own intelligence section, propaganda section, escape committee and Gestapo section.\textsuperscript{134} This organization on the part of the prisoners was a major threat for the security of the camp and the local area. With such a system, there was always the possibility that escapees might be used to collect data or even to commit acts of sabotage. Indeed, it became known that one of the camps' escapees had carried out a reconnaissance of the Dorval airport in Montreal and reported back to the prisoners' intelligence section upon his return. As the authorities indicated in October 1944: "The fact that they have an intelligence section which has obtained a mass of information on railroads, bridges and airports in the Montreal area and upper New
York State has been known for some time." Although camp authorities knew of such organization and actions, they did not understand the prisoners' real purpose for such a system.

The answer came in October 1944, when the camp authorities learned that the prisoners had created an organization called the Hari-kiri Club. Based on the old German Goetierdämmerung (Twilight of the Gods) myth whereby the gods killed each other off in a final orgy of violence, the Hari-kiri Club proposed that the camp's Nazi prisoners revolt in a desperate act of bravado as soon as they regarded the war as absolutely lost. The Hari-kiri Club was to initiate the action by killing all the "cowards" among the inmates as well as the entire camp staff, including the camp commandant and the intelligence officer. Camp authorities learned of this club's existence on October 3, 1944, through a secret message given by internee George Felber, the camp's Roman Catholic priest. The fact was that Felber feared for his life, for he and his followers had been persecuted for many months by anti-Christian Nazi elements. According to Felber, the Hari-Kiri Club had to be dissolved and this "must be done with extreme care and skill, because otherwise the Hari-Kiri Club would begin the attack." He then gave the authorities a list of the ringleaders and other dangerous prisoners. It included some 100 names.

To confirm the authenticity of Felber's story, a White officer named Alois Frank was interrogated on October 12, 1944, while in Montreal for an eye treatment. A staunch anti-Nazi, Frank gave the authorities a detailed account of the Hari-Kiri Club's aims. As he indicated: "The purpose of the club is to do as much damage and sabotage as possible. The organization is aware that they will be fired upon by soldiers and that there will be a number of innocent people killed, but some will get out of the wire and proceed to the nearest plants and industrial areas in order to commit sabotage although they do expect to be killed in the act." He even indicated some of the prisoners's targets, notably the munition dumps at l'Acadie situated some six miles from Grande Ligne and the St. Jean airport located some five miles from the camp and where a great number of military planes were concentrated. He further stated that the prisoners were operating a secret radio through which they could receive signals from Germany. This meant that the
inmates would be able to know the exact date of Germany’s capitulation and at this point initiate their own *Gotterdammerung*.\textsuperscript{137}

The Hari-Kiri Club scheme was taken very seriously by the Canadian authorities. Knowing for several months that the prisoners’ Intelligence Section had collected information on specific objectives within the area from recaptured prisoners of war, the authorities feared that the Hari-Kiri Club might use these sites as targets for their eventual attack.\textsuperscript{138} On October 17, 1944, the Department of National Defence’s Directorate of Military Intelligence came to the conclusion that such a mass suicide effort was quite possible. They also admitted that should it occur, “a considerable number of German prisoners of war officers will be shot with perhaps unfortunate repercussions on our own POW in Germany; some of the camp staff will be killed; and some of the Nazis will succeed in breaking out and in reaching vulnerable objectives such as the Dorval and St. Hubert air fields.” As a result, it was “suggested that because of this threat and the proximity of Grande Ligne to Montreal, it might be better if Grande Linge not be made a black officer camp.”\textsuperscript{139} This decision was supported by the camp authorities, who requested the transfer of the Hari-Kiri Club leaders to a new Black camp. By doing so, the belief was that this would neutralize the Hari-Kiri Club.\textsuperscript{140}

The imminent threat imposed by the Hari-Kiri Club also led to an immediate strengthening of Camp Grande Ligne security system. So fearful were Canadian authorities that Colonel C.P. Lavigne (A/Adjutant-General, Directorate Veteran’s Guard of Canada), in cooperation with Major Fairweather, (Internment Operation officer at Military District 4) suggested a most impressive “order of battle” to defend the camp from the Hari-Kiri Club. Among the items requested were one armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) and one Universal Carrier - which was a small tracked armoured vehicle used for general purposes. As is was stated, “the AFV could be used inside the camp’s enclosure while the Universal carrier would be useful to follow escapees over fields.” It was also suggested that Camp Grande Ligne be provided with six additional heavy machine guns, seven portable radios, a supply of tear gas, grenades and a good quantity of “parachute flares and pistols grip lights” to be used in the advent of an electrical breakdown. Further, the camp’s guard
companies were to be equipped with U.S. style steel helmets "to afford greater protection against clubs, stones, etc."\textsuperscript{141}

In the end, Colonel J.M. Taylor (Director Veteran's Guard of Canada) refused most of the items recommended in Colonel C.P. Lavigne's memorandum. As he stated: "It is respectfully suggested that the POW personnel of this camp remain as at present, and in addition to, or in place of Vickers guns...which the V.G.C. are not trained in the use of, that sufficient Reising guns be made available to place two in each tower instead of one as at present. That tear gas be not supplied, but instead fire hose might be used to rout the POW out of buildings. That an adequate supply of flash and pistol grip lights be kept on hand; and that a supply of wood clubs, say from 2 to 2\frac{1}{2} feet in length, be on hand for close combat skirmishing, inside buildings, where it is not possible to use bayonets."\textsuperscript{142} It seems that Colonel Taylor did not perceive the Hari-Kiri Club with the same fear. He even opposed the transfer of Hari-Kiri Club leaders to a new Black camp. As he stated: "The question of establishing a black camp for officer prisoners of war is one that should not be [done] hastily...Up to the present, attempts towards segregation have accomplished little of a constructive nature and have added substantially to the confusion and unrest amongst POW."\textsuperscript{143}

Although urgent requests to segregate the compound were issued by numerous regional officers, higher authorities remained hesitant. The main reason was that no one understood if prisoners of war in other camps knew of the Hari-Kiri Club or if similar Nazi organizations had been established in other internment centres. There was the dual possibility that transferring Hari-Kiri Club leaders might initiate the suicide process at Grande Ligne and trigger the rise of similar groups in other camps.\textsuperscript{144} Nevertheless, this situation changed on December 1, 1944, when Major-General E.J. Renaud (District Officer Commanding Military District 4) urgently recommended that the Department of National Defence move all Black prisoners out of the district. He further indicated that a camp other than Grande Ligne should be chosen to house Black inmates. His main reasons were that Camp Grande Ligne was located in an area where the density of the civilian population was quite high and that it was too close to Montreal where there were a considerable number of factories working for the war effort. The proximity of the camp
to vital power plants such as Beauharnois, Cédres, Black River and even Shawinigan; to important airports such as those located at St. Jean, St. Hubert, and Dorval; and to the ammunition dumps located at L’Acadie and Delson was also problematic. As a result, it was decided on December 2, 1944, that Grande Ligne no longer be used as a Black camp. All prisoners were to be transferred to a new Black Camp located at Wainwright (Alberta). However, because work was still in progress at Wainwright, the transfer of Grande Ligne’s Black prisoners had to wait. In the meantime, it was proposed to add an additional barbed wire entanglement to Camp Grande Ligne and reinforce other aspects of the camp’s defence.¹⁴⁵

More troops were posted at Grande Ligne with additional firearms. Machine gun posts were established at strategic points around the camp with weapons facing in and guard towers were reinforced. Arrangements were also made with No.9 Air Observation School at St. Jean for military aircrafts and with the Veterans’ Guard of Canada Training Centre located at Camp Farnham for three platoons to act as a reserve force. These men were to be mobilized in the advent of any escapes to form a “recapture screen” around the camp. These units were also to protect all bridges and railway stations in the vicinity and intercept all civilian traffic on nearby roads. To ensure that the Canadian authorities benefited from a proper communication system in case prisoners cut telephone lines, radio transmitting and receiving equipment was installed at the camp. To assure the proper protection of the region’s civilian population, a temporary headquarters with barracks, commonly referred to as “Bleak House,” was established by Military District 4 one mile away from Grande Ligne. Based at this headquarters were two well trained platoons. In order to facilitate communication with locals, all troops detailed for the protection of civilians were to be French-speaking. Arrangements were also made with Quebec Hydro for the armed protection of the Beauharnois and Cédres electric power plants. Further, in case of escape, all freight trains passing within the area and heading towards Montreal were to be examined by soldiers and the Chiefs of the Canadian National Railway (CNR) and Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) investigation bureaus.¹⁴⁶

Black prisoners were eventually transferred to Camp Seebe in Alberta instead of Camp Wainwright on February 6, 1945. In order not to agitate the prisoners and face a
possible Hari-Kiri Club attack, the move was kept a secret. As a result of this surprise move, the Hari-Kiri Club threat faded away. Overall, some 236 inmates were transferred from Grande Ligne. 147

Despite the lessons learned from the Hari-Kiri Club experience, Nazi elements continued to flourish in the camps of southern Quebec. Although support for Nazism was weakened when Germany unconditionally surrendered to the Allies on May 8, 1945, “Black” power remained an important force. This was a problematic issue, especially since the Canadian government was in the midst of re-educating its war prisoners. This was the case of Camp Grande Ligne where camp authorities pleaded in June 1945 for the transfer of Black prisoners because they were a “stubborn hindrance to the efforts of cooperation which were made by the camp spokesman.” The problem with the presence of Nazi elements was that it had a retarding effect on the development of White attitudes. The situation worsened in July when many Whites were transferred to Camp Sorel in order to work for the Allied Control Commission. As one report stated: “There is now not enough counter-pressure to keep the Blacks in check. This situation tends to endanger the success of the policies of re-education that have been laid down by high authority.” The culminating point of this issue occurred on August 7, 1945, when Blacks prisoners organized a strike to oppose the re-education program which was supported by the camp spokesman. In fact, the latter was “perceived as a traitor and collaborator whose removal by murder was desirable.” The problem with that strike was that 90% of the camp’s strength participated in it. Although the strike ended when camp authorities intervened, the situation demonstrated the considerable power that hard-core Nazis prisoners still held. 148

Therefore, psychological strains were a source of constant worry in the camps of southern Quebec. Although internees were given numerous opportunities to pursue recreational activities, the pressures imposed by years of internment could not be eradicated. In fact, restricted mobility, sexual deprivation, social alienation and the privation of material comforts were all factors which influenced the morale of prisoners and which created severe psychological strains. In order to express their discontent, dissension began to emerge inside the camps of southern Quebec. This resulted into
strikes, riots, illicit activities and escape attempts. As a consequence, camp authorities were forced to apply discipline by punishing the perpetrators. The main problem had to do with the prisoners' political thoughts. In fact, both Communism and Nazism prospered inside the camps and had to be controlled by the Canadian authorities. Despite the introduction of the PHERUDA system of prisoner of war classification and intense censorship, such contrasting ideologies persisted. Because violence was sometimes used by Communists and Nazis in order to convert fellow inmates, camp authorities found themselves in a constant state of alert. Such was certainly the case with the rise of the Hari-Kiri Club at Camp Grande Ligne. Hoping to minimize the consequences of psychological strains, the Canadian government introduced two schemes whereby internees could be used for specific tasks. First, prisoners were given the opportunity to participate in camp labour projects. The belief was that working prisoners had less time to on their hands to plot against camp authorities. Second, the introduction of educational programs was done to modify the minds of the prisoners. Captives were bombarded with information about democracy in Canada and the rest of the British Commonwealth. As will be discussed in the next two chapters, labour projects and educational programs kept the internees occupied and in many cases opened their minds to new ideologies.
NOTES

3. NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 3 (September 1940), War Diary of Internment Camp “I” (No. 41), Fort Lennox, Île-aux-Noix, September 14, 1940, pp. 5-6.
4. NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 9 (June 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp “N” (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), June 9, 1941, p. 2.
5. Canada, Regulations..., p. 5.
7. Canada, Regulations..., p. 5.
8. Canada, Red Cross and Prisoners..., pp. 120-123.
9. Switzerland also supervised exchanges of prisoners of war between Canada and Germany. On one such case, Swiss delegates contributed to the release of an old German soldier from Camp Sherbrooke in March 1945. This internee, who had served in the German military in both world wars, had already spent ten years of his life in interment. When notified about this case, the Consulate General of Switzerland in Canada decided to pressure the Canadian Department of National Defence into including this inmate in the next exchange of internees between Canada and Germany. See Canada, Orders and Instructions, Internment Camp (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1945), p. 62.; Draper. “The Accidental Immigrants...Part 1...” pp. 25-26.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5413. File: HQS 7236-91-1-4-42. Complaints by P/W, Camp Sherbrooke, 1943-1945, “The Consul General of Switzerland to Prisoner of War Hans Hans Knaps,” March 6, 1945.
15. NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 6 (March 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp “N” (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), March 5, 1941, p. 1.
17. Vance, Objects..., p. 131.
20. Canada, Orders and Instructions..., p. 60.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 5 (February 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp “N” (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), “Camp Standing Orders for Internees,” March 5, 1941, Appendix “A”

As the Germans indicated: “Following an enquiry carried out in war prisoners’ camps in Germany, it is stated that the British prisoners of war held in Germany receive within reasonable time a regular and considerable flow of parcels, partly through the British Red Cross and partly through other channels. The same certitude does not seem to exist so far for
the numerous parcels addressed to German prisoners in Great Britain and Canada....The German authorities would attach great importance to having the senior officers and the spokesmen of camps housing Germans in Canada...to fill in the enclosed form every month...The Embassy of the United States of America, in its capacity of representative of the protecting power for British prisoners in Germany, is carrying out a similar enquiry in the English camps in Germany and the German High Command has given its agreement.” See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5376, File: HQS 7236-1-11, *Parcels, Letters to External Affairs, IRC, and Swiss Consul, 1942-1946.* “Consulate General of Switzerland in Canada to Department of External Affairs.” August 8, 1941.


28 Ibid., pp. 15-16, 18.

29 As Jean Cazeneuve indicated: “Un être qui ne jugerait pas ou qui n’aurait pas d’éléments de comparaisons n’en souffrirait pas et ne parlerait même pas de privation. Un prisonnier sur la paille regarde son lit de plumes, mais il est probable que les indigènes de l’Afrique noire sont très heureux dans de tel conditions. De même, on est malheureux quand une panne d’électricité vient gâcher une soirée. Mais nos ancêtres qui s’éclairaient au suif pouvaient-ils se sentir privés d’un luxe qu’ils ne prévoyaient même pas?” See Cazeneuve, p. 20.

30 As Jean Cazeneuve stated: “C’est pourquoi chez ceux qui s’obstinent à maintenir l’importance des biens matériels perdus, la douleur peut s’apaiser par un phénomène d’exaspération ou d’obsession intellectuelle.” See Cazeneuve, pp. 22-23.
As Cazeneuve explained: "Pour tout prisonnier, la chose est bien certaine: on pourrait mettre dans l'enclaire du camp tous les biens, toutes les délices qu'il aimerait, le fait même de rester emprisonné lui pèserait." See Cazeneuve, pp. 33-35.

Koch, p. 143.

As one Sherbrooke prisoner indicated: "...the worse thing about any prison situation is you don't know when you come out. At least if you're a convict you know you've got a fixed term. If you're a prisoner of war...you don't know when you're coming out." See NAC, FHTC, EK, MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, "Interview of Klaus Scheye by Harry Rasky (CBC) in New York," [1980's], p. 30-6.

As one Sherbrooke prisoner of war stated: "One slowly declines here morally. One has days that one would like to take one's own life. Nobody can imagine what it means to be five years behind barbed wires." On February 26, 1943, one Farnham prisoner attempted suicide. As camp authorities indicated: "One POW officer missing off the evening count was found in an unconscious condition in a bath with a cut on wrist in the officers' recreation room with the door locked. He apparently tried to commit suicide." See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,398, Volume 29 (February 1943), War Diary of Internment Camp "A" (No. 40), Farnham, February 26, 1943 and February 27, 1943, pp. 8-9.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5416. File: 7236-94-6-42, Intelligence Reports. Camp Sherbrooke. 1943-1946. "October 1944 Intelligence Report." November 1, 1944.

As Jean Cazeneuve indicated: "Les plaisirs devenus impossible envahissent la méditation, les rêveries, accaparent les conversations. N'est-ce pas là le pur instinct sexuel qui, ne trouvant plus ses moyens d'expressions physique, se déguise et revêt la forme de la réflexion intellectuelle pour reconquérir ses droits." See Cazeneuve, pp. 39-41.

Duliani, pp. 205-206.

Ibid., p. 219.

As one Grande Ligne prisoner of war recalled: "Nous avions la permission de cultiver un petit jardin à l'extérieur de notre camp...Un jour, l'un de nous trouve une enveloppe au beau milieu de notre jardin. À l'intérieur, une feuille blanche sur laquelle est inscrit: 'Je m'appelle Mimi, je ne suis pas une ennemie.' Imaginez le succès qu'eut cette lettre...Pendant plusieurs semaines, tout le monde voulut aller au jardin espérant y trouver d'autres messages de Mimi. Malheureusement, nous n'avons jamais eu d'autres lettres. Malgré tout, cela nous permet de nous accrocher à un fil espoir..." See Bernard and Bergeron, p. 292.; NAC, FHTC, EK, MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, "Interview of Mrs. Ann Cowan by Harry Rasky (CBC) in Toronto (Ontario)." [1980's], pp. 11-14.

Cazeneuve, pp. 45-50

As Mario Duliani explained: "Celui qui a une maîtresse ou une femme et vit ici pendant longtemps a l'impression que le Mur de l'Éloignement devient peu à peu le Mur de l'oubli. Et il lui faut une grande force pour se défendre contre le découragement." See Duliani, p. 209.

According to internee John Newmark, "...when you're in prison as we were, with no sex, food takes place instead of sex. To the extent that I've seen grown men with knives going at each other for a bigger steak." See NAC, FHTC, EK, MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, "Interview of John Newmark by Harry Rasky (CBC) in Montreal," [1980's], p. 11-1.
Prisoners were sometimes given the opportunity to meet women. As Eric Koch indicated: “If you were a favorite of the Sergeant Major, you were sometimes allowed to go along on the garbage truck to the city dump...it was a treat to see downtown Sherbrooke. The truck driver was a nice man, and on at least one occasion he took the favorite to the entrance of the local whorehouse, put three dollars in his hand and said, ‘Go in, have a good time. I’ll pick you up in half an hour.’” See Koch, p. 137.


As Jean Cazeneuve indicated: “La rupture de tous ces liens est évidemment cause de bouleversement intérieurs très importants. Elle se traduit par un sentiment de regret, de tristesse et une impression de dépaysement. Cet arrachement signifie la cessation complète d’habitude ancrées depuis longtemps chez tous homme.” See Cazeneuve, p. 55.

According to Cazeneuve: “Le déracinement, c’est la souffrance accrue du prisonnier quand il s’aperçoit que la vie là-bas, dans son pays, a repris sans lui, quand il constate en lisant les journaux ou certaines lettres, que la société se passe aisément de lui, que ce vide créé par son absence a été comblé dans l’entrecroisement des fibres sociales, comme une plaine se referme par la croissance des tissus. Sa place dans sa profession a été occupée par un autre...Il semble pour l’exilé que cet oubli de son absence est une sorte de mort pour lui.” See Cazeneuve, pp. 57-58.


As one Sherbrooke woman admitted: “We used to walk up there...where the prisoner of war camp was and look at those fellows through the fence. We had no business there at all, but I remeber tracking up there on a nice fall day and seeing those German prisoners through the fence...I never got any closer to them than that, but that was off limits, and we didn’t go often...” See Carol Gaskell. Women’s Words - Eastern Township Anglophone Women Remember the Second World War (Lennoxville: 1995), p. 105.

These signs bore such messages as “WARNING AND NOTICE It is strictly forbidden for anyone to enter this military area unless properly authorized” and “KEEP MOVING Anyone trespassing on this property does so at his own risk. Trespassers are subject to drastic military action and prosecution. See NAC, DND. IO. RG-24, Vol. 7 (April 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp “A” (No. 40), Farnham, April 25, 1941, pp. 6-7.


Ottawa’s decision to Shackel German prisoners of war in Canada eventually led to violence. At both Espanola and Monteith, the prisoners resorted to passive resistance while those at Gravenhurst “threw their shackles into the stoves, rendering them useless and making it necessary to locate additional supplies.” Resistance was even stiffer at Bowmanville. In this
camp, the internees rebelled on October 11, 1942 and began barricading themselves inside their huts and used hockey sticks, clubs, baseball bats and broom handles as personal weapons and bottles as grenades. When Canadian troops charged the buildings on October 13 with fixed bayonets and high-pressure fire hoses, they were met by “a hail of glass, clubs and tableware.” Although the prisoners were dislodged, dozens of minor casualties were sustained by both sides. One internee lost his left eye in this upheaval. In the end, the prisoners were handcuffed as Ottawa ordered. What became known as the three day Battle of Bowmanville demonstrated how far prisoner dissatisfaction could go. Eventually, many of the Bowmanville prisoners were transferred to Camp Grande Ligne. See Bernard and Bergeron, pp. 174-178.; Carter, pp. 144-148.; John F. Hilliker, ed., Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 9 (1942-1943) (Hull: Canadian Government Publishing, 1980), pp. 473-525.; Melady, pp. 62-69.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5413, File: HQS 7236-91-1-44, Visits by Representatives of Protecting Power. Camp Grande Ligne, 1943-1945, “Memorandum of the Consulate General of Switzerland in Canada in charge of German Interests,” November 30, 1943.; Priebre, pp. 107-117.; Jonathan F. Vance, “Men in Manacles: The Shackling of Prisoners of War, 1942-1943,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 59, No. 3 (July 1995), pp. 485-497.; Vance, Objects..., pp. 134-137.

Such an example occurred at Camp Farnham in October 1942 when the crew of the German merchant ship M/S Gonzenheim complained to the Swiss delegation that they were not being treated properly as prisoners of war. According to these enemy merchant seamen, they were in possession of identification papers which integrated them into the German Navy when their vessel was captured by the Allies. The fact was that article 81 of the Geneva Convention stipulated that, “persons who follow the armed forces without directly belonging thereto...who fall into the hands of the enemy, and whom the latter think fit to detain, shall be entitled to be treated as prisoners of war, provided they are in possession of an authorization from the military authorities of the armed forces which they were following.” Although the Swiss Consul remained skeptical of the prisoners’ statement, they conducted a proper investigation. As they indicated, “Captain Krieger, of the M/S Gonzenheim, complaints that he and his crew are entitled, under article 81 of the Geneva Convention, to be treated as prisoners of war since they were at the time of capture furnished with the papers necessary to establish such a right. While it is not thought likely that such papers could have been issued to the crew of a merchant ship or, if issued, would substantiate such a claim...inquiry is being made in the United Kingdom to determine what papers, if any of this sort were taken from the prisoners at the time of capture...The problem is that article 81 was not applicable to merchant seamen or members of the reserve forces when employed in auxiliary capacity to army forces.” See Canada, Red Cross and Prisoners..., pp. 118-119.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 11,247, File: 9-1-3 (40), Complaints, Camp Farnham, 1942, “Consul General of Switzerland in Canada to Captain K. Krieger (Camp Spokesman),” October 1, 1942.

Priebe, p. 89.

Such was the case at Camp Farnham during the civilian phase when a hunger strike was initiated as a means to oppose the camp authorities’ punishment of one internee who had not made his bed right. As a result, the arrested individual was immediately released. The main reason was summed up in a statement made by camp authorities to the inmates: “...we cannot deny you food because if we do that, in one camp in Germany, our soldiers will also be denied food.” See NAC, FHTC, EK, MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, “Interview of Helmut Pokorny by Harry Rasky (CBC) in Perth (Ontario),” [1980’s], pp. 3-8 - 3-9.

Priebe, p. 89.
Such a strike occurred at Camp Sherbrooke on September 3, 1943 when the prisoners noticed that the camp censor had thrown away all of their incoming mail without having opened it or censored it. As the camp spokesman told the camp authorities: “I am sorry to have to inform you that we have evidence and witnesses that the camp censor has destroyed and thrown away incoming mail from Germany as well as England dated June and July, 1943 destined for prisoners of war...This matter has aroused considerable excitement and protest from the community of this camp and I would herewith inform you that I am not responsible for the consequences resulting out of this and I shall have to report this matter to the Protecting Power and the Director Prisoners of War.” To express their dissatisfaction, the internees initiated a small labour strike which forced camp authorities to initiate an investigation which resulted in the arrest of the censor. Realizing that suitable action was being taken, the internee returned to work. See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5409, File: HQS 7236-87-5-42, Correspondence re. Mail, Camp Sherbrooke, 1943-1946, “Carl Witt (Camp Spokesman) to Capt. M.J. O’Brien (A/Camp Commandant).” September 3, 1943.: NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5409, File: HQS 7236-87-5-42, Correspondence re. Mail, Camp Sherbrooke, 1943-1946, “Major D.J. O’Donohoe (Works Program) to the Director Prisoners of War,” September 6, 1943.

NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 12 (September 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp “A” (No. 40), Farnham, September 2, 1941; September 11, 1941; September 19, 1941; September 21, 1941; and September 25, 1941, pp. 1-6.


Canada, Orders and Instructions... pp. 20-21.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5398, File: HQS 7236-81-40, Canteens, Camp Farnham, 1942-1948, “Camp Spokesman to Ernest L. Maag (Delegate in Canada for the International Red Cross)”, April 19, 1943.

Priebe, p. 149.

On September 13, 1941, the Camp Farnham authorities indicated: “Four large demi-jars of wine confiscated in the compound today. The wine is really fermented potato juice, raisins, etc. It is a very strong wine and from time to time jars of it are spotted by the compound police and confiscated.” The same applied at Camp Sherbrooke between January and March 1944 when camp authorities confiscated at least four home made stills. See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 12 (September 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp “A” (No. 40), Farnham, September 13, 1941, p. 4.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,400, Volume 40 (January 1944), War Diary of Internment Camp “N” (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), January 22, 1944; January 23, 1944; and January 24, 1944, pp. 5-6.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,400, Volume 41 (February 1944), War Diary of Internment Camp “N” (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), February 29, 1944, p. 5.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,400, Volume 42 (March 1944), War Diary of Internment Camp “N” (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), March 4, 1944 and March 6, 1944, p. 1.
Eckehart Priebe explained well how a radio was created by Grande Ligne inmates: “For reasons beyond our understanding we were denied radio, even local stations were not for us. What we really needed and wanted was a shortwave receiver to pick up original German communiqués and reports at the source...Fortunately we had a particularly gifted Air Force Reserve officer, crafty in all fields of electricity and radio communication, one of those ingenious types who can make anything from nothing. Together with some Navy engineers he started building a shortwave receiver from tin cans, pieces of wire, aluminum foil, even toothbrushes. The result was a most amazing contraption lacking only the most important ingredients, the tubes...The Canadians were the only possible source...A request was submitted and returned with the condition that we could have an amplifier, but only on our word of honour that it would only be used for concerts with the record player. The inference was that we could convert the amplifier into a shortwave receiver...a few weeks later we had our record player and amplifier...Our experts went to work and a few days later the ‘voice of Germany’ came through loud and clear behind Canadian barbed wire. Only a handful of POWs knew of the existence and whereabouts of this new source of information. It was used under the most elaborate of precautions twice a day. While snipers worked feverishly, watchful eyes protected the listening post from the inquisitive guard patrols. With the original information and reports at our disposal we were now the best informed POWs on world events...” Searches were often initiated by the Camp Grande Ligne authorities to find primitive shortwave receivers commonly known as the Staubsaug. As Priebe explained, “it was concealed in window sills, double-bottom self made easy chairs, even double bottoms of record containers or in gymnastic equipment, such as medicine-halls when the receiver had to be moved. In the end, this homemade radio was found in February 1945. See Priebe, pp. 141-145.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365. File: HQS 9139-4-44, Camp Intelligence. Camp Grande Ligne, 1944-1946. “February 1945 Intelligence Summary.” February 1945. NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,397. Volume 6 (March 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp “A” (No. 40), Farnham, “Colonel H. Stethem (Director of Internment Operations) to the Commandants of all Internment Camps,” March 19, 1941. Appendix 11.

Canada, Red Cross and Prisoners,..., pp. 102-103.

Costelle, p. 178.

Canada, Orders and Instructions..., p. 52.; Priebe, pp. 180-181.


Such was the case on April 29, 1943, when one Camp Farnham prisoner attempted to slip out a letter amongst parcels destined to a prisoner of war camp in Alberta. As camp authorities indicated, the message was found when "the truck driver pilfered some cigarette papers from one of their parcels, gave the cigarette papers to a friend who discovered a letter written in German." See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,398, Volume 31 (April 1943), War Diary of Internment Camp "A" (No. 40), Farnham, April 29, 1943, p. 11.

As the Camp Sherbrooke censor indicated in March 1945: "...attempts have been made, or are being made, by officer camps to contact this camp. This was overheard in a conversation in the Works Program office of this camp by two POW. Several weeks ago, a POW of this camp was asked by a German officer of another camp to furnish the names of the anti-Nazis of this camp. The answer was to be given to the next POW who was going to St. Anne de Bellevue Military Hospital." See Kelly, "Intelligence...", pp. 289-290; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5409, File: HQS 7236-87-5-42, Correspondence re. Mail, 1943-1946, "H.D. Hedley (Camp Commandant) to Headquarters, Military District 4," March 6, 1945.

The most ambitious attempt occurred at Camp Île-aux-Noix on the early morning of May 24, 1943 when one inmate attempted to leave the island by stealing the camp's motor boat. Unable to start the engine, the escapee paddled the vessel down the river until the current took hold of it. He then jumped into the river and swam for the mainland. It was at this point that the escapee was spotted by a local innkeeper, who immediately contacted the Camp Île-aux-Noix authorities. The internee was recaptured that same day. See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 35 (May 1943), War Diary of Internment Camp "I" (No. 41), Fort Lennox, Île-aux-Noix, May 24, 1943, pp. 4-5.

Snow storms sometimes facilitated the escape of prisoners. In fact, when deep snow drifts formed in proximity to the wire fences, there was always the possibility that inmates might dig through them and used these tunnels as means of concealment in cutting the wire. This forced camp authorities to constantly keep the fences clear. See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,398, Volume 29 (February 1943), War Diary of Internment Camp "A" (No. 40), Farnham, February 13, 1943; February 16, 1943; and February 18, 1943, pp. 4-5.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,398, Volume 31 (April 1943), War Diary of Internment Camp "A" (No. 40), Farnham, April 22, 1943, p. 8.

Such a case occurred at Camp Sherbrooke on March 24, 1946 when one of the internees was able to cut a hole in the camp's barbed wire system and escape using a pair of pliers which he had stolen from the camp's workshops. See Carter, p. 122.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,401, Volume 66 (March 1946), War Diary of Internment Camp "N" (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), "Major A.R. Turner (Camp Commandant) to Headquarters, Military District 4," March 24, 1946. Appendix 3.


NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 2 (November 1940), War Diary of Internment Camp "A" (No. 40), Farnham, "Escapes - What to Look For," November 1940, Appendix 7,
For instance, a tunnel was found at Camp Farnham on January 25, 1943. While working under one of the camp’s huts, an electrician discovered an air vent sticking out of the ground. He even mentioned to camp authorities that he could hear two prisoners working underground. However, because camp authorities had no idea where the tunnel’s entrance was, VGC personnel found their way into the tunnel by digging around the air vent using spades. What they found was an 18 feet long tunnel. As a result, the trap door of the tunnel was found behind one of the huts’ stoves. It was concealed behind a cord of wood. Another tunnel was found at Camp Grande Ligne in 1948 when “a truck driver backed up a loaded gravel truck and the wheels of the vehicle sank into the earth. Evidently, the truck had crossed over the incomplete escape tunnel built by the Germans.” See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 2 (November 1940), *War Diary of Internment Camp “A”* (No. 40), Farnham. “Escapes - What to Look For,” November 1940, Appendix 7, p. 1.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5416, File: HQS 7236-94-6-40, *Intelligence Reports, Camp Farnham, 1943-1946*, “January 1943 Intelligence Summary,” February 4, 1943.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,398. Volume 28 (January 1943), *War Diary of Internment Camp “A”* (No. 40), Farnham. January 26, 1943; January 27, 1943; January 28, 1943; and January 29, 1943, pp. 8-9.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5389. File: HQS 7236-44-44, *Escape Plans and Correspondence, Camp Grande Ligne, 1943-1948*, “Royal Canadian Mounted Police Commissioner to the Director of Administration - Army (Department of National Defence),” December 21, 1948.

On April 14, 1943, for instance, two Sherbrooke prisoners attempted to escape by concealing themselves in large freight bags which were to be loaded aboard a train. Both were caught on April 17, 1943. Another case occurred at Camp Grande Ligne on September 13, 1944, when a captive escaped by hiding himself inside a truck and avoiding detection when the vehicle was searched at the gate. Camp authorities were greatly annoyed by this incident, indicating that “this is old routine stuff and should not have happened.” In fact, all motor vehicles and horse drawn carriages were to be thoroughly searched with a sharp-pointed iron prodding stick. This was to make certain that no one was concealed therein. Walking along the Richelieu River, he reached the United States where he was caught on September 14 near Rouses Point, New York. His recapture caused great problems since this latter had been handcuffed by members of the Canadian Provost Corps. This action was in complete violation of the *Geneva Convention*. As the camp spokesman wrote: “I herewith most pointedly protest against this action. We as German officers consider such an action an attack on our honor. Simultaneously I refer to the German note of protest of Fall 1943 concerning the shackling of German POWs.” Although the situation did not deteriorate, it reminded Canadian officials of the 1942-1943 shackling controversy. See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 1 (October 1940), *War Diary of Internment Camp “A”* (No. 40), Farnham, October 25, 1940, p. 11.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 1 (October 1940), *War Diary of Internment Camp “A”* (No. 40), Farnham, “Camp Standing Orders,” October 25, 1940, Appendix 2.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 2 (November 1940), *War Diary of Internment Camp “A”* (No. 40), Farnham, “Escapes - What to Look For,” November 1940, Appendix 7, p. 2.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 5 (February 1941), *War Diary of Internment Camp “A”* (No. 40), Farnham, “Notes on Prevention of Escapes,” December 24, 1940, Appendix A, pp. 1-4.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5389, File: HQS 7236-44-42, *Escape Plans and Correspondence, Camp Sherbrooke, 1944-1945*, “Lt.-Col. B.B.W. Minard (Camp Commandant) to Headquarters, Military District 4,” April 22, 1943.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,403,
Volume 21 (September 1944), War Diary of Internment Camp No. 44, Grande Ligne, September 13, 1944; September 14, 1944; September 15, 1944; and September 28, 1944, pp. 4-5.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5413. File: HQS 7236-91-4-44, Complain by P/W, Camp Grande Ligne, 1943-1945, “Camp Spokesman to the Consul General of Switzerland in Canada,” October 17, 1944.; “Police Dragnet Spread Through District for Two Escaped Nazis,” The Sherbrooke Daily Record, April 16, 1943, p. 3.; “Two Escaped German Prisoners of War are Found Hiding Inside Camp,” The Sherbrooke Daily Record, April 17, 1943, p. 3.


Priebe, p. 122.; Bernard and Bergeron, p. 75.

“Recherches des 2 évadés,” La Tribune de Sherbrooke, November 26, 1942, p. 3.

“Les deux évadés de Sherbrooke sont repris à Newport, Vermont,” La Tribune de Sherbrooke, December 11, 1942, p. 3.; “Two Escaped German Prisoners are Recaptured at Newport, Vt.,” The Sherbrooke Daily Record, December 11, 1942, p. 3.


For instance, a false alarm was initiated in Camp Île-aux-Noix on July 19, 1940 when a sentry accidentally fell against the siren button. Although the alarm was a good practice for the camp staff, it demonstrated how VGC personnel were unfamiliar with the facilities. The result was extensive training for the guards not on duty. As it was stated in the camp’s war diary on August 15: “…all troops not on duty received considerable training and drill in squad and rifle drill. From now on this will be a daily occurrence and it is planned to give lectures on various military subjects.” See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 1 (July 1940), War Diary of Internment Camp “I” (No. 41), Fort Lennox, Île-aux-Noix, July 19, 1940, p. 5.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 2 (August 1940), War Diary of Internment Camp “I” (No. 41), Fort Lennox, Île-aux-Noix, August 15, 1940, p. 4.

NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 1 (October 1940), War Diary of Internment Camp “A” (No. 40). Farnham, October 24, 1940, p. 10.


NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 2 (August 1940), War Diary of Internment Camp "I" (No. 41), Fort Lennox, Île-aux-Noix, August 3, 1940, p. 1.


In 1940, for instance, Camp Farnham authorities formed an “Emergency Car Brigade” manned by fifteen civilian volunteer motorists. This unit was used to provide transportation for search parties in the advent of escapes. Each car carried up to five VGC personnel. The “Emergency Car Brigade” was also used for other tasks. When severe thunderstorms created power failures at Camp Farnham in November 1940, and June 1941, the unit’s cars were “placed around the outside wire with the lights shining in; in this way the approaches to the wire were fairly well lighted up.” See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15.397, Volume 2 (November 1940), War Diary of Internment Camp “A” (No. 40), Farnham, 1941-1945, “Escape Standing Orders,” January 10, 1941; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15.397, Volume 2 (November 1940), War Diary of Internment Camp “A” (No. 40), Farnham, November 11, 1940, p. 5. NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15.397, Volume 9 (June 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp “A” (No. 40), Farnham, June 25, 1941, p. 5.


Such a case occurred on November 28, 1942, when two Camp Sherbrooke escapees, who had been hiding in the region’s forests for nearly three weeks and who had recently begun working on a local farm, were found when a neighboring farmer saw their pictures in a newspaper and contacted the RCMP. Ever since they had left the camp on November 8, 1942, the two escapees stayed in a small bivouac which they had built out of bed covers. During this period, they both lived on charity and theft. The two prisoners well explained the reasons which guided their decision to find work. As they stipulated: “Nous étions fatigués de la vie du camps [bivouac]. Il commençait à faire froid et notre argent diminuait, alors nous avons décidé de se trouver du travail vendredi. Nous avons dû déménagé notre camp au début de la
Such was the case for a Sherbrooke prisoner who escaped on March 24, 1946 and was recaptured in Montreal on March 27, 1946. It was also the case for one Farnham prisoner who was recaptured by the Quebec Provincial Police near the Dorval airport in Montreal on June 29, 1943. See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,398, Volume 33 (June 1943), War Diary of Internment Camp “A” (No. 40), Farnham, June 28, 1943 and June 29, 1943, pp. 8-9.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,401, Volume 66 (March 1946), War Diary of Internment Camp “N” (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), “Major A.R. Turner (Camp Commandant) to Headquarters, Military District 4,” March 29, 1946. Appendix 4, p. 1. 

Canada, Red Cross and Prisoners..., pp. 106-111.

Canada, Regulations..., pp. 4.


Fraternization between camp personnel and internees was strictly forbidden. Guards were to refrain from communicating to any prisoners unless it was in the execution of their duties. Severe disciplinary action were to be taken against any of those who infringed. Despite such warnings, some prisoners did develop bonds with guards. One such incident occurred at Camp Sherbrooke in January 1941, when one of the guards proved to be involved in illicit activities with three internees. The situation began when one of the camp guards gave an internee artist a photograph of his daughter so that this latter could draw a sketch of her. In exchange, the guard agreed to give the artist a bottle of rum, food from the camp staff's kitchen as well as a few bottles of beer. Furthermore, the prisoner was given the opportunity to write to the guard's daughter. The situation deteriorated when other internees began writing to the young girl, begging her to send letters to friends and relatives in the United States and other Canadian internment camps. When higher authorities learned of the situation, the offending internees were sentenced to 28 days detention while the guard was tried by court martial. See Draper, "The Accidental Immigrants...Part 1...", pp. 33-34.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 4 (January 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp "N" (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), January 25, 1941, p. 1.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,401, Volume 48 (September 1944), War Diary of Internment Camp "N" (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), "Camp Orders", September 6, 1944, Appendix 1, p. 5.

This was the case at Camp Sherbrooke where in January 1943, the camp spokesman ordered fellow inmates to place pictures of Adolf Hitler over the prisoners’ hut doors along with large “Victory is with Hitler” signs. This was done so that the Canadian authorities would have to pass under them each time they visited the huts. Needless to say that the pictures and signs were immediately removed and the camp spokesman was relieved of his functions. As the camp commandant indicated “During the short period of time that Captain Krieger was camp leader, he proved to be a trouble maker of the meanest type.” See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 11,247, File: 9-1-3 (42), Complaints, Camp Sherbrooke, 1943, “Lt.-Col. B.B.W. Minard (Camp Commandant) to the Commissioner of Internment Operations,” January 21, 1943.; Ron Robin, The Barbed-Wire College - Reeducating German POWs in the United States During World War II (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 34-35.


A similar situation also took place at Camp Farnham in late 1944 where SS personnel came to dominate the enclosure. Having established their own intelligence section, these Nazis would watch fellow prisoners and search the rooms of anti-Nazis during their absence. They even set up a secret Nazi tribunal “which claims for itself the power of life and death over defeatists and anti-Nazis.” See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40, Camp Intelligence, Camp Farnham, 1944-1946, “December 1944 Intelligence Report,” December 1944.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40, Camp Intelligence, Camp Farnham, 1944-1946, “January 1945 Intelligence Report,” January 29, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-42, Camp Intelligence, Camp Sherbrooke, 1944-1946, “March 1945 Intelligence Report,” April 2, 1945.

Another secret military training program was known as NAPOLA [Nazi Political Learning] and was established by the prisoner of war officers of Camp Grande Ligne. NAPOLA members were gathered by invitation. Activities mainly consisted of lectures on Nazi topics. For instance, one such class studied Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf. However, despite NAPOLA’s early popularity, the program diminished in scale when Nazi Germany was defeated in May 1945. As camp authorities indicated by June 1945, “NAPOLA activities have either ceased or


CHAPTER 3

LABOUR PROJECTS

The internment operation which emerged in southern Quebec contributed to Canada’s war effort through its labour projects. Although this scheme included unpaid compulsory services, the bulk of the program was paid. This included employment on farming operations and in camp workshops. Introduced in 1940, the labour projects’ purpose was to employ internees on a voluntary basis for the production of goods which had no direct connection with the operation of the war. The aim was to ease the pressures imposed by billeting huge numbers of prisoners on the Canadian homefront and to contribute to the country’s agricultural and industrial production. The most important of southern Quebec’s internee labour contribution was through the Works Program. This was an industrial project whose purpose was to use internee labour in “camp factories.” Established in most of the region’s camps, these workshops produced huge quantities of goods, such as camouflage nets, boots and ammunition boxes. Labour projects became an important aspect of life behind Canadian barbed wires. It gave the internees a constructive past-time while giving them an opportunity to earn money which they could use to buy goods from camp canteens. Moreover, the work projects gave the prisoners the ability to practice new trades which they could use after the war. For the camp authorities, labour projects were effective methods for neutralizing unrest among the inmates. A working internee had less time to plot against the authorities. The fact that inmates were paid for their labour gave the authorities the hope that prisoners would not dare bite the hand that fed them. Lasting well until 1946, internee labour programs also became a noteworthy part of the Canadian homefront’s effort to aid the war.
The use of internee labour in times of war was a complex phenomenon. Regulations governing the employment of civilian internees and bonafide prisoners of war were very different. For instance, the treatment of prisoners of war was controlled by international conventions, unlike with civilian prisoners. According to article 27 of the 1929 Geneva Convention, "belligerents may employ as workmen prisoners of war who are physically fit, other than officers and persons of equivalent status, according to their rank and their ability." This was reinforced by articles 29 and 30 which indicated that "no prisoner of war may be employed on work for which he is physically unsuited" and that "the duration of the daily work of prisoners of war...shall not be excessive and shall in no case exceed that permitted for civil workers of the locality employed on the same work."¹ Further, it was stipulated in article 31 that "work done by prisoners of war shall have no direct connection with the operations of the war. In particular, it is forbidden to employ prisoners in the manufacture or transport of arms and munitions of any kind, or on the transport of material destined for combatant units." It was also prohibited in article 32 to "employ prisoners of war on unhealthy or dangerous work."² None of these conditions applied to civilian internees, for whom the prospect of cheap exploitation became a possibility. However, eventually helping to alleviate this segregation was the fact that both civilian internees and enemy combatants were originally integrated in the same category: prisoners of war were referred to as "prisoners of war Class 1" while "enemy aliens" were categorized as "prisoners of war Class 2". This system of classification enabled civilian internees to benefit from the same rights as prisoners of war and contribute on an equal scale in labour projects.³

Camp labour projects began in southern Quebec with unpaid compulsory work. According to article 34 of the Geneva Convention, "prisoners of war shall not receive pay for work in connection with the administration, internal arrangement and maintenance of camps."⁴ This was reinforced by the Department of National Defence's Orders and Instructions Internment Camps, which stipulated that "prisoners of war, below the rank of corporal or the equivalent ratings, and Internees may be compulsorily employed without pay on maintenance work." This included maintenance work on the buildings within the
enclosure; the maintenance of the camps' roadways; the clearing of snow; unloading and hauling rations, fuel, and other camp supplies; sawing and splitting wood for fuel consumption; cutting hay; tidying up; repairs to made buildings; and any other work approved by the Department of National Defence. In other words, internees were not paid for duties which contributed to their personal well being. Unpaid compulsory work was crucial for the good functioning of the camps and was used for the duration of the region's internment operation.

On the other hand, paid labour formed the bulk of southern Quebec's work projects, namely service sector jobs and construction work. According to the Orders and Instructions, Internment Camps, service sector jobs were vital for the proper functioning of Canadian internment camps. Because internment centres had to be self-sufficient, each camp was equipped with a tailor shop, a cobbler shop, a barber shop, a carpenter shop, a hospital and a kitchen. For these services, internees with specific skills were employed. Aside from doctors and dentists, who were paid 50¢ per day, internees involved in other trades earned between 20¢ and 30¢ per day. However, because of the limited number of positions, few inmates benefited from such employment. For instance, by February 1942, it was said that only the Camp Leader, the Deputy Camp Leader, and the Camp Adjutant were paid for their services at Camp Sherbrooke along with ten accountants and clerks, two doctors, three hospital orderlies, two dentists, two tailors, four barbers, twenty-seven cooks, six stokers, nine cleaners, one electrician, one plumber, one carpenter, and one runner. out of a camp population of approximately 900 inmates. Despite their limited numbers, these jobs ensured that the prisoners benefited from certain services. Service sector work became common in all of southern Quebec's internment camps and these positions remained active for the duration of the war. They helped keep morale up by providing food, clothing, grooming, leadership and medical attention.

Camp related work also involved construction duties inside or outside the camp area “involving capital outlay, whereby the state benefited financially.” Prisoners were paid for the construction of new buildings, drains, roads, and any other type of modification to the existing facilities. For the duration of the war, internees benefited
from such duties in all of southern Quebec’s internment camps. Because Camps Farnham, Île-aux-Noix and Sherbrooke were incomplete in the early days of internment, camp authorities immediately resorted to use internee labour to accelerate the considerable amount of work that needed to be done and prepare the facilities for winter. For such tasks, prisoners were paid between 20¢ and 30¢ per day. Such working opportunities were usually welcomed by all internees for it offered them a means to earn money.

The problem with camp related work was that internees were either employed in limited numbers or temporarily. What they needed were stable labour projects which could employ most internees. However, this process began in early 1940 when the Canadian authorities began to consider using internee labour for the benefit of Canada’s homefront. This was reflected through a June 1940 Military District 4 report entitled Scheme for the Employment of Interned Aliens which indicated well the main reasons why the government intended to introduce major work projects within the barbed wires.

When any group of men, large or small, are forcibly detained in a restricted area removed from their ordinary activities, their morale rapidly deteriorates if they are not given some occupation. This leads to discontent which gives rise to insubordination, a tendency to destroy property wantonly, and renders the group difficult to handle. The result is that an increased number of men are required to guard them. Material of all kinds is destroyed, food is wasted and an internment camp becomes much more expensive than is necessary to operate...It is therefore of primary necessity to provide some form of labour for those forcibly detained.

Further, the document indicated that “conditions have forced us to concentrate into camps a number of men who must be fed, clothed, and housed at our expense...If we have to detain these people, we should plan to make the best possible use of them.” The aim of this document was for the introduction of agricultural work within the camps. The object, as it was told, was to prepare land for future settlement while making the camps self-supporting in the shortest possible time. This meant clearing sufficient land to start farming operations. As it was stipulated: “...while internees are not criminals, they are persons confined for the safety of the state, and, as they cost a certain amount to keep, every effort should be made to make them self-supporting, and, if possible, profitable.”
Hence, farming was to give the internees an opportunity to raise their sense of self-esteem and escape the boredom of life behind barbed wires while contributing to the welfare of the camps.

The first internment centre which adopted an agriculture scheme in southern Quebec was Camp Farnham. Located on the property of the Dominion Experimental Farm, it possessed all the necessary assets for the introduction of such an operation. After all, the site had the infrastructure, the tools, the livestock and the rich arable land essential for farming. The Directorate of Internment Operation decided to exploit this advantage for the benefit of the internees as early as September 1940. As Brigadier-General Edouard de Bellefeuille Panet, Director of Internment Operation, said: "It is recommended that the present farm foreman and herdsman be employed to take care of the herd, and also harvest the crop... We understand the cows are being milked and the milk sold to a dairy in Farnham. The foreman and herdsman will have to be employed permanently to supervise the work of the internees while the camp is occupied by them."14 When the prisoners arrived at Camp Farnham in October 1940, some 40 acres of land was made available to them along with 23 cows, 4 horses, a tractor and numerous tools. Because of the lateness in the season, work on the farm had to begin immediately. As the camp authorities indicated: "It is planned to have the farm ploughed and this should be done in the next few weeks."15 Land had to be prepared for seeding in the spring. As a result, two prisoners skilled in the art of agriculture went to the fields on October 27, 1940, and began preparing 12 acres of the land, thus initiating the camp’s farming operation. In the spring of 1941, the farm’s first seeds were planted. Further, a deal was made with a neighboring farmer to rent 21 acres of land for $150. This increased the size of the Camp’s farm to some 30 acres.16

Soon after, Camp Île-aux-Noix initiated its own farming operations. The process began on May 12, 1941, when representatives from the Dominion Experimental Farm at Ste. Clothilde visited the camp in connection with the creation of a farm. Immediately, enthusiastic prisoners began preparing the fields with a disc-harrow that the representatives of the Ste. Clothilde Experimental Farm had brought with them.17 The
farming operation at camp Île-aux-Noix was somewhat smaller than the one in Farnham; only 49 internees were employed on the farm at Île-aux-Noix as opposed to 80-100 inmates working on the one at Farnham. In the end, Camp Farnham was the most productive. During the 1941 season, the farm produced 38,700 lbs. of carrots, 48,900 lbs. of turnips, 3,800 lbs. of beets, 62,000 lbs. of potatoes, and 21 tons of hay. As in the case of Île-aux-Noix, most of the products were either sold to local grocers or consumed within the barbed wires. According to the camp’s war diary: “The farm was a success. Aside from providing some 150,000 lbs. of vegetables, the farm has paid for the labour of the internees who were utilized.” This well demonstrated the efficiency of using internees on farm work and the profits that could be made by using them.

When Camp Grande Ligne became active in June 1943, a farming operation had already been initiated. The process began in January 1943 when the German officers interned at Camp Farnham asked Ernest L. Maag, delegate in Canada for the International Red Cross, if an experimental farm school could be created at Camp Grande Ligne where they were to be soon transferred. On January 21, 1943, Maag approached Colonel H.N. Streight, Director Prisoners of War, and introduced the request, to which this latter agreed. A confirmation from the Farnham internees was then asked by the Canadian authorities, whereby the camp spokesman indicated: “I and the officers in Camp 40 are very interested in such an enterprise. There is a great demand for it, and many would take that profession [farmer] after the war.” Further, the prisoners mentioned that they were ready to begin the preliminaries, emphasizing their wish to operate a garden farm with cows, poultry, and hogs. To pay the expenses, the internees approached the German Red Cross for a $5,000 loan, which they were to reimburse with the farm’s profits. To ensure that this project was serious and that money was well invested, the Red Cross asked for a written assurance, signed by the officer in charge of internment operations in Military District 4 and by the Camp Farnham spokesman. As the document stipulated, the prisoners “pledge themselves to look after the livestock, regardless of what may happen at the camp... The officers also are prepared to pledge their word that these schools will not be used to facilitate escapes, all garden and farm workers being strictly on parole.” As a
result, the Grande Ligne farm was inaugurated and the prisoners began to buy livestock and farm implements with their loan from the Red Cross. While the prisoners were still at Camp Farnham in June 1943, arrangements, were made with a local farmer at Grande Ligne to begin work on the farm for $100. As a result, the 40 acre farm was readied for the season, its land having been disked, harrowed and seeded. When the prisoners arrived at Camp Grande Ligne on June 28, 1943, they were very much pleased with the farm and immediately began working the fields.

In the end, the Grande Ligne farming operation was a complete success. Production during the first season was profitable. For instance, 82,000 lbs. of potatoes were harvested during the 1943 season as well as 28,000 lbs. of turnips, 6,500 lbs. of red beets, 3,500 lbs. of beans, 750 lbs. of peas, 2,500 lbs. of oats, 800 lbs. of barley, 4,000 lbs. of hay, 32 square mile of corn for provender, 4,500 cobs of sweet corn, 2,085 lbs. of radishes, 20,000 cucumbers, 43 bags of lettuce, and 38 bags of silver beets. Some 350 German prisoner of war officers worked on the farm. Camp Grande Ligne, like Camp Farnham also relied on livestock. When the first animals arrived in the camp in September 1943, a Department of Husbandry was immediately created to coordinate the stables. This meant that farming operations were divided, as some prisoners were assigned to the fields while others to the stable. At the time, the camp's livestock was comprised of 3 milk cows, 8 pigs and 101 chickens. By February 1944, the number of animals in the camp had reached a peak of 9 milk cows, 21 pigs, 201 chickens and 15 geese. The livestock enabled the prisoners to benefit from fresh eggs, meat and milk. On numerous special occasions, permission was granted by the Canadian authorities for the slaughter of certain animals for camp consumption. For instance, in December 1945, five pigs and one cow were killed for the Christmas dinner.

Camp Grande Ligne also experimented with other products. In March 1943, when the prisoners expressed their desire to use maple products, an arrangement was concluded with the Grande Ligne Mission, who owned a sugar bush on the camp's site. The Mission was to set up the necessary equipment and provided the expert labor while the internees furnished a few men. Further, maple sugar production was to be divided 50/50 between the
camp and the Mission. The sugaring operation resulted in 1,300 maples tapped and the production of more than 200 gallons of syrup. So successful was the maple syrup production that it was renewed in 1944.\textsuperscript{30} The internees at Grande Ligne also exploited a nearby orchard for camp consumption in September 1944. By the end of the month, the total amount of apples picked amounted to two tons. These were stored and issued twice a week to the prisoners as long as stocks lasted.\textsuperscript{31} The prisoners at Camp Grande Ligne also produced honey in early 1945. Ten colonies of bees in thriving condition were acquired and rumor circulated that these bees had been purchased from a farm owned by a brother of American General George S. Patton. As a result, the internees nicknamed the insects “Patton’s Panzerbees.”\textsuperscript{32} Although the production of honey went accordingly, problems emerged in June 1945 when it was reported that the bees were starving. The main reason was that the insects’ natural feed had been depleted due to early frost. Further, the bees were unable to get sugar as a substitute. Nevertheless, the colonies survived and in early August the prisoners decided to increase honey production by buying more bees.\textsuperscript{33} All these efforts enable the internees to enjoy certain luxuries, which, as a result, helped to sustain morale.

In the Autumn of 1944, farming operations resumed at Camp Farnham after two seasons of inactivity. However, the function of the 30 acre farm was to be somewhat different as it came to be operated under a Share Crop arrangement. According to this scheme, 2/3 of the production’s profits were kept by the internees while 1/3 was retained by the Canadian authorities. To ensure that this operation was profitable, prisoners were given classes on Canadian farming techniques and even the opportunity to visit neighboring farms on parole.\textsuperscript{34} During the winter, three greenhouses located outside the camp enclosure were rented by the prisoners from the Canadian authorities. They were used to seed vegetables which would be transplanted on to the farm in the spring. This enabled prisoners to work on farm-related work all year long.\textsuperscript{35} By April 1945, use of greenhouses proved its worth as some 54,000 cabbage, 54,000 cauliflower, 28,000 red cabbage and 15,000 tomato plants had been grown during the winter while radishes, lettuce, carrots, celery, horse radishes and spinach were seeded.\textsuperscript{36} In the Autumn of 1945.
as the first season came to an end, the vegetables grown on the camp farm where sent to a local cannery where they were canned at 6¢ per can. For this task, some 16 prisoners were employed at the cannery on parole. The products were then marketed in Montreal. Total profits for the 1945 season came to $15,000; $10,000 for the prisoners and $5,000 for the Canadian authorities. The prisoners also harvested luxury crops such as tobacco. This enabled the inmates to be self-sufficient as to their needs for smoking.

A small farming operation was also initiated at Camp Sherbrooke in the summer of 1945. Prisoners created small gardens from which they cultivated flowers, vegetables, strawberries and raspberries. These gardens were very popular and helped to embellish the camp. So important had become gardening at Camp Sherbrooke that greenhouses were established for the sole purpose of growing plants in the winter. Expert gardeners even went as far as cultivating tropical plants in these glass buildings.

Until the repatriation of the prisoners in 1946, the farming operations at Camps Farnham, Grande Ligne and Sherbrooke continued to be active and formed a major component of the work projects. The prisoners appreciated this opportunity to work the fields and consume their own products. As a Farnham prisoner said: "Planning a better living...is important - A plentiful supply for our consumption of "greens" during the summer is assured, as well as extra vegetables for our use next Fall and Winter. Vegetables are one of the essentials of better and healthier living."

As of September 1945, internees could also be employed on parole for work on local private farms. At the time, labour was desperately needed on Canadian farms due to military recruitment and the movement of numerous Canadian lads to cities where better paying industrial jobs were available. In order to benefit from internee labour, a farmer had to produce a certificate from the National Defence Headquarters' Selective Commission before signing any contracts with the prisoners and the camp authorities. In order to obtain internees' labour, farmers had to prove to the Commission that they could not obtain civilian labour. The prospect of working on farms located outside the camps was very popular among the internees. Every time positions opened on local farms, prisoners voluntarily applied in great numbers. For instance, when a call was made in
Camp Sherbrooke in May 1946 for 14 volunteers to work on individual farms, some 104 internees applied.\textsuperscript{45} Needless to say that so many applications obliged the camp authorities to choose candidates. Usually, the authorities' decision rested upon the internees with the best records. As it was indicated, "The men were chosen on their good behavior and their good work attendance."\textsuperscript{46} Once chosen, prisoners had to give in writing their promise "not to escape or act contrary to regulations."\textsuperscript{47} In most cases, prisoners were lodged and fed on their respective farms. However, in some cases, internees would work on local farms during the day and come back to the internment camp each night. For instance, at Camp Farnham in October 1945, some 43 inmates were billeted on farms while 75 others left the camp on parole each day for jobs on local farms. Usually, one prisoner was assigned per farm. However, in some cases, it reached levels of three individuals, depending on the size of the farm and the farmer's needs.\textsuperscript{48}

At all times, prisoners were to be under the supervision of the hiring farmers. However, the relationships between farmers and internees often moved rapidly from mere tolerance to warm friendship.\textsuperscript{49} In Behind Canadian Barbed Wire, David Carter even mentioned that "in some instances, relationships between the farmer and the POW became so positive that the POW would be left for days on end with the farm, livestock and children in his care. Some POWs were sponsored back into Canada after the war by their farmer friends. Some married the farmer's daughter."\textsuperscript{50} In most cases, farmers were satisfied with the prisoners' labour. As a result, more and more requests for internee labour were issued by farmers and received daily in each camps.\textsuperscript{51} The camp with the largest number of internees working on local farms was Farnham, growing from 4 individuals in September 1945 to 126 in March 1946.\textsuperscript{52} For the internees, work on independent farms offered an opportunity to escape the monotony and constraints of life behind barbed wires while earning money. It also gave the internees a chance to see for themselves how Canadians lived. In a sense, this contributed to the indoctrination and re-education of the inmates. By getting acquainted with Canadian civilians, the prisoners could see how Canadian society effectively functioned and how it differentiated from the totalitarianism of the Nazis in Germany. Thus, as much as working on farms offered a
certain degree of freedom and autonomy to the inmates, it also demonstrated some of the strengths of Canada in terms of personal freedom, liberty and democratic thought.

Aside from farm work, the Works Program had internees contribute voluntarily to Canada’s war effort by working in camp workshops. The program was initiated in southern Quebec in October 1940 when it was noticed that Camps Sherbrooke and Île-aux-Noix, unlike Camp Farnham, did not possess the necessary acreage for farming operations. The aim of the Works Program was to offer the internees of these two camps an alternative. With this in mind, Brigadier-General Edouard de Bellefeuille Panet, Director of Internment Operations, in cooperation Major D.J. O'Donahoe, the Military District 4 Works Program Coordinator, decided to establish a scheme whereby internees could be employed on light manufacturing projects within the camps.\(^{53}\) As it was stated in the Camp Île-aux-Noix war diary on October 5, 1940:

> The idea is to erect a building...In one end would be housed light manufacturing machinery while the other would be devoted to a wood making plant. It is first of all necessary to have the prisoners erect the building, then to equip it with the necessary machinery. As soon as this is done, prisoners will be employed on manufacturing such articles as Army folding tables, benches, chairs, kit bags, bandoliers, prisoner’s uniforms, shirts, hold-alls and many other articles.\(^{54}\)

In charge of this Works Program was the Ordinance Branch of the Department of National Defence.\(^{55}\) It was this organism, along with the Munitions and Supply and Contract Branches, that controlled the contracts for the Works Program.\(^{56}\) The reason why the Works Program was introduced in southern Quebec instead of other Canadian regions had to do with the fact that most of the prisoners incarcerated in this region at the time were civilians. The belief was that civilian internees, unlike enemy combatants, could be employed on work more closely connected with the war effort. Further, the goal of the program was to exploit the skills possessed by the internees. In fact, many prisoners had backgrounds in science, engineering and management. Aside from the Works Program managers, controllers, accountants, and department supervisors who were paid 50¢ per day, other employees earned 20¢ per day, which was raised to 30¢ on October 1, 1941.\(^{57}\) When the Canadian authorities finally realized the full potential of this project,
the Works Program was expanded to include all Military District 4 internment camps. As a result, workshops were built by the internees at Camps Farnham, Île-aux-Noix and Sherbrooke as well as the Italian internment centre located on Île Ste. Hélène in Montreal.\textsuperscript{58}

However, numerous delays affected the program. For instance, problems emerged in the shipments of machinery and tools to the camps. In most cases, the necessary equipment was not received before January 1941. As a result, this impeded the manufacture of products in camp workshops. Further, the civilian internees' motivation to participate in the Works Program was very weak. In fact, very few of them desired to work while being incarcerated. Hence, negotiations took place between the inmates and the camp authorities. These complications, among many others, delayed the Works Program's operation until early 1941.\textsuperscript{59}

The first operational workshops were established in Camp Sherbrooke. According to Major D.J. O'Donahoe, Sherbrooke was to be the "starting point of the workshop program." In that sense, Sherbrooke was to act as a "prototype camp." Inaugurated on December 21, 1940, the Sherbrooke workshops, which consisted of a Wood Working Department, a Sewing Department, a Knitting Department, a Net Making Department and Shoe Repairing Department became operational in January 1941.\textsuperscript{60} By July 1941, more than $27,000 worth of goods (which included camouflage nets, kit bags, tables, benches and ammunition boxes) had been produced.\textsuperscript{61} However, camp authorities were hoping for a much larger output. As they indicated in the camp's war diary: "...greater results could and should be achieved..."\textsuperscript{62} Still, some 200 internees were employed in the Works Program at Camp Sherbrooke by July 1941.\textsuperscript{63} The workshops remained operational until the civilian internees were transferred in December 1942. The arrival of prisoners of war led to the resumption of the program, which lasted until June 1946.

When it was decided on January 7, 1941, to expand the Works Program to include Camps Farnham and Île-aux-Noix, workshops were immediately built by the internees. Camp Île-aux-Noix, contribution to the Works Program was somewhat limited. In fact, the camp workshop specialized on only one item: camouflage nets.\textsuperscript{64} On the other hand,
Camp Farnham's Works Program operation was bigger. Workshops became operational on February 17, 1941, and were divided in a Wood Working department, a Sewing Department and a Knitting Department. Further, a Net Making Department was opened on April 15, 1941, as well as a Painting Department. By July 1941, approximately 300 men were involved in the Farnham Works Program. When the camp workshops closed on November 30, 1941, prior to the civilian internees transfer to Camp Sherbrooke, production had been most impressive. The Wood Working Department had produced 1,200 soldiers' chests, 500 carpenters' tool boxes, 200 razor blade boxes, 300 bayonet racks, 1,457 fly screens and doors, 50 sign posts for camp Farnham (with lettering and painting done in the camp's paintshop), 1,201 MK-IV folding tables and 1,500 all wooden tables. As for the Sewing Department, it made 30,720 hold-alls, 2,500 kit bags, 700,000 hospital swabs and 8,337 alteration to the clothing of prisoners from Camps Farnham, Île-aux-Noix, and Sherbrooke when their status changed to refugees in June 1941. As for the Knitting Department, it produced 8,880 pairs of army woolen socks while the Net Department made 3,707 camouflage nets and 2,000 projectile grummets for holding 4.9" diameter artillery shells. There was also a lot of recycling done in the Works Program. Each day, saw dust was bagged, waste wood was brought to the cookhouse for camp consumption and waste cloth and wool was bundled and removed to the Quartermaster stores.

When the civilian internees' status changed to refugees in June 1941, camp workshops began to close since many prisoners were being released. The only exception was Camp Sherbrooke, where the Works Program continued until 1946. Although the change in status gave the inmates new privileges, it also created work-related problems at Camp Sherbrooke in October 1941. Two major issues guided the refugees' discontent. First, the inmates made it clear that "the change in designation has not brought about the changes in conditions which the new status suggests and that as refugees, they should be given conditions of living far more closely associated with freedom...". Second, the increase in salary from 20¢ per day to 30¢, which occurred on October 1, 1941, did not please the internees who resented the fact that a "fixed and maximum value should be set
on all workers and that no opportunity exists for refugees to earn in relation to their production." Most refugees wanted to be paid for what they produced (piece work) instead of a fixed salary. Furthermore, refugees wanted to control the internal administration of the Works Program. By doing so, they felt that they "could better determine the value of each individual, both as regards his ability to produce and suitability for work" and that they could thus increase production. Believing that the solution to the present problem was to establish "a system whereby refugees could work happily and create an industry in this camp which could be developed into ever-growing importance to our war effort, rather than await developments of an ugly nature," camp authorities proved willing to grant the refugees what they wanted. However, more senior representatives from Military District 4 headquarters saw the situation as a "natural result of internment" and refused to budge to the inmates' requests. What this situation proved was that the Works Program had become a "battleground" for inmate discontent and that prisoners were not always pleased with its functioning.69

Refugees were given the opportunity to work on parole for Canadian industries. This process was initiated in May 1941, when the Canadian government decided to consider the release of civilian internees if sponsors could be found in civil society.70 With the internees no longer being classed as prisoners of war, the restrictions imposed by the Geneva Convention no longer applied. As refugees, inmates could now enjoy more freedom such as working in war-related functions. This could only be done if Canadian industrialists were willing to sponsor their release. This was not a problem since many industries were desperate for labour. With this in mind, a scheme was developed within the Works Program whereby refugees with certain skills could work voluntarily in Canadian factories for the war effort. As it was stated: "In response to the reiterated claims on the part of refugees that they are willing and anxious to assist in the war effort, an opportunity has been developed through the Works Program to find employment for certain skilled tradesmen under conditions of freedom within a restricted area." By October 1941, tool makers, machinists, machine operators, welders, pattern makers, blacksmiths, draughtsman and architects could benefit from this project. If this
experiment was a success, new job opportunities were to emerge for more internees. So important was felt to be the use of skilled internee labour in Canadian industries that the Canadian government tried to promote this as best it could. For instance, in late 1941, a scheme for rebuilding machine tools was established in cooperation with Camp Farnham. For this purpose, the Canadian government bought the Emmerman machine tool factory in Chicago and brought the tools to Canada in order to create a new crown company named Citadel Merchandising. This new company was located at Ville LaSalle near Montreal in an old marble mill which refugees had renovated to suit Citadel’s purpose of rebuilding machine tools and modifying them for munitions production. In charge of this “Machine Tool Rebuilding Area” was a civilian administrator by the name of Arnold and three Military District 4 personnel including Major D.J. O’Donahoe. The bulk of Citadel Merchandising’s labour force consisted of refugees. As a result, a group of engineers from Camp Farnham were released for work in the new factory. As one internee said: “We were free people working for the Canadian Government for standard normal wages... We succeeded fairly well. It’s not easy within a short time to put up a full fledged machine tool rebuilding operation, but we did... so we had a successful operation until 1944-1945.” Internees from Camp Sherbrooke and Camp Île-aux-Noix also found work at Citadel Manufacturing. Another similar operation was initiated near Lachine in late 1941. Known as the Lachine Machinery Service, this company also employed skilled refugees and engineers on war related work. Indeed, according to Eric Koch, some 250 refugees were released by April 1942, mostly for work in Canadian industries. Besides the refugees who worked in Ville LaSalle and Lachine, many others were employed at a rate of $2.50 per day by factories in Montreal, Toronto and Brantford.

Aside from work in Canadian factories, some refugees cooperated with the Canadian authorities on other war-related work. At Camp Sherbrooke in September 1941, one refugee gave the camp authorities a proposal for the design of a new type of bullet or shell for anti-tank or anti-aircraft guns. Major W.J.H. Ellwood, Camp Sherbrooke’s commandant, was so impressed by this design that he submitted the drawings to the District Officer Commanding Military District 4 “with the
recommendation that they be passed on for study and experiment." Moreover, refugee-engineers established a design office at Camp Farnham where they made numerous studies relating to artillery pieces used by the Canadian Army.\textsuperscript{79}

Apart from scientists and engineers, unskilled refugees could barely contribute to Canada's war effort and were less likely to be liberated than skilled refugees. Solutions had to be found. In order to help unskilled refugees develop trades and find jobs, the Canadian authorities agreed to let the Montreal-based Canadian ORT Organization erect a Mechanical Training Workshop at Camp Île-aux-Noix. The process began in December 1941 when representatives from this organization visited Camp Île-aux-Noix.\textsuperscript{80} In order not to disturb the military authorities and lose time, the ORT decided to construct the building at its own expense.\textsuperscript{81} In January 1942, sixty internees began building the workshop,\textsuperscript{82} which opened on May 29, 1942.\textsuperscript{83} At the time, Camp Île-aux-Noix was the last camp in southern Quebec where refugees were housed. Nevertheless, this organization's aim was to "train Jewish young men and women in the industrial and agricultural fields in order to equip them with a trade or calling which will enable them to take their place in life and earn a living in manual occupation."\textsuperscript{84} As Major-General Howard Kennedy, Quartermaster General, indicated: "...The Canadian ORT Organization...is devoted to the creation of a new occupational existence for refugees and the masses of European Jews through industrial workshops, trade schools, farm colonies..."\textsuperscript{85} In other words, the task was to prepare highly skilled apprentices for war-related work. In that sense, the ORT training workshop at Camp Île-aux-Noix concentrated on training refugees as mechanics and to prepare them for work in machine shops engaged in war production.\textsuperscript{86} As the workshop prepared men for future employment in Canadian war industries, employers often visited the facilities to seek new recruits. In one such case, three representatives from Machinery Services Ltd. and a representative from the Citadel Merchandising Company, visited the camp's shop and assessed the students in late September 1942. As a result of this visit, six refugees were selected for work at Machinery Services Ltd. The representatives also indicated that in the next few weeks, fifteen other men would be chosen. Further, arrangement were made with the camp's Tools
Controller's Office to send old machines from the Citadel Merchandising Company to Île-aux-Noix for training purposes. This proved that there was a great degree of co-operation and success between the ORT training centre at Camp Île-aux-Noix and Canadian industries.

Nevertheless, the ORT workshop began experiencing problems in early 1943 due to reductions in the internee population at Camp Île-aux-Noix. As Colonel H.N. Streight, Director, Prisoners of War, indicated in a report dated March 23, 1943: "Since the 1st December, camp strength was reduced from 354 to 180. Latter figure will be down to about 138 by reason of releases recently authorized. This will affect the ORT school." As it became evident that Camp Île-aux-Noix was about to close due to the reduction in the number of refugees, the camp's ORT training school was liquidated, and all the machinery was taken to the ORT Technical Training School in Montreal on April 27, 1943. As a consequence, the Department of National Defence inherited the workshop on the Île-aux-Noix. In the end, the ORT workshop at Île-aux-Noix was operational for six months. Still, the Canadian ORT Organization's workshop at Île-aux-Noix was a success. A considerable number of refugees benefited from this training and were able to find work in various Canadian war industries, notably Canadian Vickers, Canadian Car and Foundry and Defence Industries Ltd. Although the Île-aux-Noix workshop was closed, the Montreal-based office of the ORT Organization continued to serve the needs of refugees and had re-trained 269 of its 418 trainees by May 1943. According to historian John Joseph Kelly, the operation of the Works Program during the civilian phase of internment was a complete success. As he stated: "...the Works Program was a success in that it kept refugees gainfully occupied; it permitted them to earn money with which to finance any purchases they deemed necessary from the camp canteen; it did not leave them idle time with which to contemplate their fate; it gave the government materials and crops that it would not have received otherwise; and it provided a profit for the program as a whole." So successful was the Works Program that when prisoners of war replaced civilian internees at Camp Sherbrooke, the operation resumed. Furthermore, the Works Program paved the way for the larger-scale labour projects that emerged in 1943 to compensate for
the lack of labour in Canada. This included the employment of prisoners of war by lumber companies and western wheat fields owners.\textsuperscript{91}

The Works Program had been such a success that when prisoners of war arrived at Camp Sherbrooke in December 1942, the project remained operational. At the time, there was “a growing demand for the better allocation of human resources on the homefront.” Ottawa was beginning to view the immense pool of prisoners of war as a passive labour force which could be exploited for the benefit of Canada. Only a few month later, on May 10, 1943, the Canadian Government authorized the Departments of Labour and National Defence to employ prisoners of war on a voluntary basis for essential work projects across the country at a rate of 50\(^\text{c}\) per day. As a result, when the war ended, some 16,000 prisoners of war had been employed since early August 1943, in more than 169 different projects in factories, on docks, in mines, in fields and in forests.\textsuperscript{92} Hence, the resumption of the Works Program at Camp Sherbrooke was but a mere integration into this wider scheme. As camp authorities indicated: “The continued operation of the Works Program depends upon production. So long as sufficient production is maintained to warrant economical operation, workshops will be maintained, otherwise the Works Program will be closed down.”\textsuperscript{93} Lt.-Col. W.D. Graham, Camp Sherbrooke’s commandant, even stated in July 1943, that “the Works Program has been considered to be the main reason for having the camp, and discipline has been a secondary consideration.”\textsuperscript{94}

To maximize production and create the best work environment possible, most of the camp’s “bad elements” were transferred to other camps as of May 1944. These included professional gamblers; manufacturers and dealers of alcoholic drinks; escapees; and fanatical Nazis. This ensured that only those prisoners willing to cooperate with the Works Program remained in the camp. To further alleviate the tensions arising from internment and to raise morale, the prisoners at Camp Sherbrooke were given a great many privileges and liberties. For instance, prisoners could walk out of the camp on parole and go fishing on the nearby St. François River.\textsuperscript{95} Prisoners appreciated these special privileges and understood that any breach would mean a return to past conditions. As one inmate told his wife: “We have walking privileges in this camp - we can’t see a
guard armed, and it is up to us, how long we will enjoy these liberties. Anyone should try to escape these liberties will be over...”96 Inmates greatly appreciated what the Canadian authorities were doing by easing camp discipline. As another internee told his wife: “This camp is the best camp in this country - which fact has been also established by the protecting power. All POWs going to work every day in factory, myself working 8 hours a day over a year already - and enjoying more privileges over the other POW camps. Therefore I would beg you all neither food stuffs, nor cigarettes to send - as we have everything we need.”97 So successful had been the Works Program that when operations were terminated in June 1946 with the camp’s closure, the Department of Justice took over most of the workshops’ machinery with the intention of integrating a similar program into Canadian prisons.98

In the end, labour projects enabled inmates to earn money while being interned. However, such programs were not the only way through which internees could gain income. According to the Geneva Convention, prisoner of war officers were to continue receiving their military salaries. As article 23 stipulated:

Officers and persons of equivalent status who are prisoners of war shall receive from the Detaining Power the same pay as officers of corresponding rank in the armed forces of that Power, provided, however, that such pay does not exceed that to which they are entitled in the armed forces of the country in whose service they have been. This pay shall be paid to them in full, once a month if possible, and no deduction therefrom shall be made for expenditure devolving upon the Detaining Power, even if such expenditure is incurred on their behalf. An agreement between the belligerents shall prescribe the rate of exchange applicable to this payment; in default of such agreement, the rate of exchange adopted shall be that in force at the moment of the commencement of hostilities.99

This meant that the Canadian government was responsible for the service pay of German prisoner of war officers. For instance, a German Brigadier-General received $53.16 per month while a Lieutenant earned $21.26. As for the other prisoners of war it was the German government which took care of their salaries. These were paid in the form of monthly allowances, which were distributed to the internees through the Swiss delegation. Non-commissioned officers were paid $11 per month while privates received $6.60. On
the other hand, enemy merchant seamen received quarterly payments from their shipping companies. In most cases, their monthly salary was $13.26. Civilian internees could also receive an allocation from the German authorities if they declared to the Swiss Consul their loyalty to the Third Reich. Furthermore, internees often received money in letters from friends and relatives and sometimes benefited from donations by relief societies.

Because inmates were not allowed to carry money on their persons, earned incomes were usually credited to the prisoners’ trust accounts. The main reason for doing so was to forbid prisoners from resorting to illicit activities such as gambling and bribery. Prisoners were prohibited from using any form of official currency, whether it be cash, money orders or cheques. In the labour projects, this financial procedure was followed. Pay lists were prepared monthly from daily time sheets by the internees’ Works Office and submitted to the camp’s orderly room for double-checking. The lists were then forwarded to the Department of National Defence, which was responsible for the printing of pay cheques. As soon as these cheques were received in each camp, “the individual prisoners whose name appear on the pay list are credited with the amount of wages earned by them for the month in question.” At no point was an internee to be credited in his account with pay for work until payment had been received from Ottawa. Similar procedures also applied whenever prisoners received allowances from Germany or money from relatives. In that sense, trust accounts formed the cornerstone of camp monetary system.

Although prisoners were not allowed to carry money, they could use their credit to purchase goods from their canteen. According to article 12 of the Geneva Convention, “in all camps, canteens shall be installed at which prisoners shall be able to procure, at the local market price, food commodities and ordinary articles. The profits accruing to the administrations of the camps from the canteens shall be utilized for the benefit of the prisoners.” This enabled internees to reinvest money in their camp’s economy. Because internees were not allowed to carry money, an alternative means of purchase had to be adopted. It was with this intention in mind that canteen tickets were issued by camp banks. Whenever an internee desired to withdraw credit from his account in order to
buy goods from the canteen, he would be provided with this form of currency. As it was indicated in a Camp Farnham memorandum of 1941:

These tickets are issued to the internees as required by them against their signature on an Acquittance Roll prepared for this purpose. A cheque for the total amount of these Acquittance Rolls is then made on the Farnham Internment Camp Trust Account in favour of the Camp “A” Internees Canteen and deposited to the credit of that account in the bank, and each prisoner is then debited with the amount shown opposite his name in the Trust Account ledger.106

Such a procedure ensured that credit was adequately transferred from an internee’s account to the canteen. However, this could only be done if the internee concerned had sufficient balance in his trust account and if the Acquittance Roll had been authenticated by both the camp spokesman and the treasurer. The issue and control of canteen tickets was the responsibility of the internees themselves.107 Denominations recommended for canteen tickets were of the values of $1.00, 50¢, 25¢, 10¢, 05¢ and 01¢.108 To prevent illegal activities, numerous measures were introduced for the proper administration of canteen tickets. As it was indicated in the Orders and Instructions, Internment Camps:

Coloured printed tickets only will be used. Tickets will bear the number of the camp, the value, and the period of validity. Colours will be changed semi-annually...Tickets of different denominations are to be in different colours. At the end of each half year (June 30, December 31) all tickets will be called in an a fresh issue of tickets made of a different colour...All tickets called in at the end of half-year periods...are to be cremated in the presence of a responsible officer representing the Commandant.109

By introducing new canteen tickets every six months, prisoners were prevented from accumulating large sums which could be used for gambling and participation in other illegal activities.110 When a prisoner was transferred elsewhere, tickets to be redeemed were returned to the camp treasurer and a certificate to this effect was handed over to the camp staff. If funds were available, the appropriate amount was credited to the internee’s trust account.111 In the end, canteen tickets were the only form of currency that internees could use to purchase commodities. As such, prisoners could only buy outside goods through camp canteens.112
The operation of canteens was coordinated by a committee selected by the prisoners. Canteens offered internees an opportunity to improve their standard of living. Canteen were usually established within a month of a camp's opening. Items were classed in eight categories: (1) TOBACCO: ash trays, cigars, cigarettes, lighter, matches, pipes, tobacco, etc.; (2) CONFECTIONERY: beer, candies, candles, chewing gum, chocolate bars, soft drinks, etc.; (3) GROCERIES: cakes, coffee, ice cream, fresh fruits and vegetables, sauces, sugar, tea, etc.; (4) TOILET ARTICLES: brushes, hair tonic, mirrors, razors and blades, scissors, shoe polish, soap, toothpaste and toothbrushes, etc.; (5) STATIONERY: books, glue, gramophone needles, ink, music records, paint and brushes, paper, pens and pencils, playing cards, rulers, etc.; (6) CLOTHING: jackets, gloves, pyjamas, shirts, shoes and laces, shower sandals, socks, ties, towels, underwear, etc.; (7) LITERATURE: daily, weekly or monthly magazines published in Canada or the United Kingdom and newspapers; and (8) MISCELLANEOUS: can openers, fly repulsers, pillows, remedies, seeds, tumblers, watches, etc. All of these products had to be purchased directly from the suppliers. Numerous Canadian enterprises were involved in such transactions, including the Colgate-Palmolive Company, Imperial Tobacco and the Eaton Company. Canteen merchandise could also be acquired from local businesses. Products were purchased from local dairies, greenhouses, news companies and pharmacies. Because commodities were usually purchased in large quantities, canteens contributed notably to the region's economy. However, none of these suppliers could furnish camp canteen with goods which had been rationed for the war effort or were in short supply for the civilian market. For instance, when the Camp Farnham canteen tried to acquire 20 lbs. of nuts, 50 lbs. of raisins or currents, 300 lemons, 100 lbs. of butter and 60 lbs. of coffee for their Christmas festivities in November 1944, the Department of National Defence replied: "Any rationed article such as butter will not be approved at any time...the other supplies such as raisins, currents, etc. are in short supply for the civilian market and are not approved for that reason." Although internees were forbidden to buy rationed goods through normal Canadian suppliers, they could do so via relief organizations. Such organizations were regarded by
the Canadian authorities as viable suppliers for camp canteens. Because most relief societies were neutral organizations which operated world wide, internees could sometimes purchase products which were not available in Canada and had been rationed on the Canadian market. Such was the case in April 1943 when the Camp Farnham spokesman requested the International Red Cross to gather such rationed grocery products as cinnamon, essence of almonds, vanilla, cloves, pot-herbs, paprika and nuts for the canteen. Furthermore, the camp spokesman indicated: "It should be specially appreciated, if you could find some way in securing oranges and grapefruits in those months when Canadian fresh fruits are not available." Needless to say that such acquisitions were not always appreciated by camp authorities since they had to conform with Canada's rationing policies. Canteen inventories usually varied on a monthly basis. Such was the case at Camp Sherbrooke where the canteen held $5,954 worth of merchandise in July 1945 and $1,392 the next month.

Canteen committees would send their requests to suppliers and pay upon receipt of the merchandise. To ensure the viability of this procedure, canteen stewards had to make sure "that at all times the cash in bank is sufficient to pay all outstanding commitments: this meant that prisoners had to purchase canteen tickets in advance of the orders placed with suppliers." To help administer canteens, internees also loaned money from relief organizations. Such was the case at Camp Farnham in February 1945 when the canteen committee handed the International Committee of the Red Cross a Canadian Bank of Commerce Draft in the amount of $1,600. This was to be the final payment due on an original loan of $5,000 which had been arranged between the Red Cross and the Camp Farnham canteen.

To assure profits, canteens were allowed to buy products from local suppliers at usual civilian or retail prices and sell them at a higher rate. Prices were controlled and supervised by camp authorities, but a profit margins still existed. Coffee was purchased from suppliers at a cost price of 36¢ and sold to the internees for 50¢; playing cards were bought for 29¢ and sold for 33¢; chocolate bars were acquired for 6¢ and sold for 7¢; beer was bought at 19¢ and sold at 20¢; and chewing gum was purchased at 6¢ and sold
for 7¢. Canteens also enabled internees to earn money by selling handicrafts. Talented prisoners and artists created incredible masterpieces out of wood, stone and other products which could usually be found within the camps. Woodcarving was one of the most popular form of art. Using nothing but small pocket knives and old razor blades, inmates fashioned ashtrays, bottleships, chess boards, cigarette holders and, of course, figures. Artists also created incredible drawings, sketches, paintings and poems. Numerous topics were addressed in works of art, including women, camp life and landscapes.

Canteens gave such artists the possibility to earn money by selling their products. In most cases, canteen kept 10% of all sales. Prisoners could also sell their artistic products through the numerous art exhibitions held inside the camps. During such exhibitions, inmates were often given the opportunity to sell their art work outside of the enclosure. All sales were to be done through the “proper channels” and were to be guided by two conditions: "(1) The price of each article is to be marked plainly and the censor’s stamp must be placed on each article before sale; (2) payment for articles sold outside the enclosure will be made to the accounts officer who all credit the individuals trust account with such payments. The securing of handicrafts through the medium of gifts or barter is strictly prohibited." Works could also be sent to Geneva (Switzerland) to be displayed for the International Red Cross prisoners of war art expositions. Such was the case for two Camp Farnham prisoners in January 1945.

In general, canteen profits were used for the amelioration of living conditions in the camps of southern Quebec. Kept in a special account, this money gave the inmates enough financial power to serve many of their collective needs. Sometimes, profits were used as payment for internee damage to camp property. As for the rest of canteen profits, prisoners could use it as they pleased. As it was indicated in a Camp Farnham memorandum in March 1941: "...profits for the month...are paid out to various prisoners as decided by the Prisoners’ Committee in the form of wages to those who do not receive wages from the Director of Internment Operations...and also for general camp benefits." Canteen profits were often used for the purchase of recreational and educational material. However, when most of the camps closed in 1946, it became very
difficult to distribute left-over canteen profits among the prisoners. Because all of the prisoners had been transferred to the United Kingdom, contacting every one of them over the issue of canteen profits proved impossible. For this reason, the profits made by all Canadian internment camp canteens were placed in a special trust fund registered by the Receiver General of Canada. This money was then handed over to any international organization willing to use the fund for the benefit and aid of those prisoners of war who had formerly been held in Canada.\textsuperscript{137}

The establishment of labour projects enabled southern Quebec inmates to earn money which could be reinvested in camp economies by purchasing commodities through canteens. Such opportunities gave prisoners a sense of autonomy while contributing to Canada's war effort. Whether they worked on farms or in workshops, internees learned new trades which they could use after the war. It also permitted camp authorities to better manage internee behavior. After all, a working internee had less time to plot against camp authorities or plan escapes. Furthermore, the bare fact that they were earning money from the Canadian authorities led fewer internees to adopt rebellious behavior. In fact, prisoners understood that any act of dissension on their part might mean the end of paid privileges and the labour projects altogether. With this in mind, camp life became very much influenced by such programs. With their earnings, southern Quebec inmates could purchase goods through their camp's canteen. By doing so, prisoners were able to increase their standard of living and, as far as possible, their enjoyment of camp life.
NOTES

1 Canada, Red Cross and Prisoners..., p. 98-99.
2 Ibid., pp. 100-101.
3 Because Britain was responsible for the internees and paid for their care, work projects meant pure profits for Canada. See Canada, Regulations..., p. 3.; Draper, “The Accidental Immigrants...Part 2,” p. 89.
4 Canada, Red Cross and Prisoners..., p. 100-101.
5 Canada, Orders and Instructions..., pp. 43-44.
6 For instance, when the prisoners in camp Sherbrooke were used in the Autumn of 1940 for chopping 150 Elm trees - which had been cut in the construction of the camp - into cords of firewood, they were not paid for the task. The reason was that this firewood was to serve as fuel for heating the buildings. See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,400, Volume 14 (November 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp “N” (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), “Major W.J.H. Ellwood (Camp Commandant) to District Officer Commanding (D.O.C.) Military District 4,” November 20, 1941. Appendix 1, p. 8.
7 On rare occasions, prisoners were paid for certain tasks. For instance, because rats assembled underneath huts. Camp Sherbrooke authorities told inmates during the civilian phase that they would pay them 40¢ for any rodent that they could catch. As one internee recalled: “This was an enormous activity. Everybody invented some special system to kill the rats...Sometimes four to five rats a day were caught.” See NAC, FHTC, EK, MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, “Interview of Edgar Steinberg by Harry Rasky (CBC) in Willowdale (Ontario),” [1980’s], pp. 1-2.
10 Canada, Orders and Instructions..., p. 44.
11 For instance, some fifteen prisoners were employed at a rate of 20¢ per day at Camp Farnham in November 1940 for building a hospital extension, an isolation hospital and a workshop. A similar situation occurred in October-November 1941 when it was decided to enlarge camp Sherbrooke for the accommodation of some 1,500 inmates. Although the Stewart & Stewart Construction Company was in charge of the project, arrangements were made to employ internees for digging drains at a rate of 30¢ per day. See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 11,249, File: 9-5-3-40, IRC Report, Camp Farnham, 1940-1941, “Report of the November 26, 1940 Red Cross visit to Camp Farnham by Ernest L. Maag (Delegate in Canada for the International


14 NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5378, File: HQS 7236-20, Organization and Administration, Camp Farnham, 1940-1946, “Brig.-Gen. Edouard de Bellefeuille Panet (Director of Internment Operation), to the Adjutant-General (Department of National Defence),” September 5, 1940.

15 NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 1 (October 1940), War Diary of Internment Camp “A” (No. 40), Farnham, October 18, 1940, p. 6.


17 NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 11 (March 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp “I” (No. 41), Fort Lennox, Île-aux-Noix, May 12, 1941, p. 3.


19 NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 13 (October 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp “A” (No. 40), Farnham, October 7, 1941 and October 14, 1941, pp. 2, 4.

20 NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 12 (September 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp “A” (No. 40), Farnham, September 8, 1941 and September 30, 1941, pp. 3, 7.

21 However, the transfer of prisoners within the camps had repercussions on the farms, as was the case in Farnham. During the 1941 season, when civilian internees were held in the camp, production on the farm was somewhat diversified. The main reason was that numerous captives had previously been farmers. On the other hand, when Enemy Merchant Seamen (EMS) formed the bulk of the internees during the 1942 season, emphasis was placed on potatoes since they were easier to harvest. The fact was that most sailors had never farmed. In fact, the camp harvested 1,500 lbs. of beets, 5,760 lbs. of cabbage, 4,350 lbs. of carrots, 60 lbs. of cucumbers, 3,000 lbs. of turnips and 9,955 lbs. of tomatoes during the 1942 season as oppose to 101,625 lbs. of potatoes. Therefore, lack of farming experience led seamen to place emphasis on a crop which was easy to produce. This well demonstrated how different kinds of

22 NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5403, File: HQS 7236-83-7-40, IRC Correspondence, Camp Farnham, 1943-1944, "Ernest L. Maag (Delegate in Canada for the International Committee of the Red Cross) to S. Marley Scott (Department of External Affairs)," March 23, 1943.

23 NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5396, File: HQS 7236-79, Officers, Grande Ligne, 1942-1946, "Schlichting (Camp Farnham Spokesman) to Ernest L. Maag (Delegate of the Red Cross)," January 21, 1943.

24 NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5403, File: HQS 7236-83-7-40, IRC Correspondence, Camp Farnham, 1943-1944, "Ernest L. Maag (Delegate in Canada for the International Committee of the Red Cross) to S. Marley Scott (Department of External Affairs)," March 23, 1943.

25 NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,403, Volume 6 (June 1943), War Diary of Internment Camp No. 44, Grande Ligne, June 1, 1943; June 5, 1943; and June 6, 1943, p. 1.

26 NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,403, Volume 6 (June 1943), War Diary of Internment Camp No. 44, Grande Ligne, June 28, 1943; June 29, 1943; and June 30, 1943, p. 5.


41 As the camp intelligence officer reported in May 1945: “Nearly all of the prisoners had their sharing lots and were looking after them.” See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-42, Camp Intelligence, Camp Sherbrooke, 1944-1946, “April 1945 Intelligence Report”, May 3, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40, Camp intelligence, Camp Farnham, 1944-1946, “July 1945 Interpreter’s Report”, August 1, 1945.
44 ETRC, ETC, 98-003, Box No. 121, File: 2.25, Oral History of Eastern Townships Anglophone Women During the Second World War, “Interview of Eleanor Taylor by Susan Lefebvre and


47 The promise stated: “I hereby promise and undertake that during the period I am permitted to leave this place of internment for the purpose of taking exercise, I will make no attempt to escape; or make preparations for future escape; I will not make any purchases or enter any house or shop or post any correspondence, and I undertake to commit no act prejudicial to the British Empire or the United Nations.” See Canada, *Orders and Instructions…., p. 18.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40, *Camp intelligence, Camp Farnham, 1944-1946, “March 1946 Interpreter’s Report,” April 5, 1946.


49 However, the presence of prisoners of war on Canadian farms scared many civilians. According to one farmer: “Je me souviens cependant qu’un jour mon frère revêtit l’uniforme d’officier d’un de ces prisonniers et descendit dans le salon avec cet accoutrement. Lorsque l’Allemand vit ses vêtements sur le dos d’un étranger, il piqua une violente colère. On n’a rien eu à leur reprocher. Certains gens du village en avaient toutefois peur. Ils nous disaient: ‘Un jour, on va vous trouver morts dans vos lits.’” See Bernard and Bergeron, p. 322.

50 Melady, p. 59.


52 On the other hand, Camp Sherbrooke had the smallest number of prisoners working on local farms. For instance, the largest number of internees working on parole on farms between September 1945 and June 1946 was 10 men. As for Camp Grande Ligne, the operation was somewhat moderate. For instance, in February 1946, some 70 prisoners were employed on farm duties around the region. See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5376, File: HQS 7236-1-13-42, *Monthly Return of P/W Quartered and Rationed Outside Camp, Camp Sherbrooke, 1944-1946, “Return of POW and Internees on Strength of Camp No. 42 Quartered and Rationed Outside Camp,” 1944-1946”, September 30, 1945; October 30, 1945; and December 1, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40, *Camp

53 Kelly, The Prisoner of War Camps..., p. 75.
54 NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 4 (October 1940), War Diary of Internment Camp “I” (No. 41), Fort Lennox, Île-aux-Noix, October 5, 1940, p. 2.
55 Koch, p. 219.
56 Kelly, The Prisoner of War Camps..., p. 78.
60 Koch, p. 219.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 3 (December 1940), War Diary of Internment Camp “N” (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), December 21, 1940, p. 2.
61 NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 10 (July 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp “N” (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), July 20, 1941, p. 5.
62 NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 10 (July 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp “N” (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), July 21, 1941, p. 5.
63 Kelly, The Prisoner of War Camps..., p. 79.
64 Opened on April 15, 1941, the Net Making Department employed some 110 internees by July 1941. By that time, some 300 camouflage nets had been produced and had been shipped to the dyers. The project ended in the Autumn of 1941 and was replaced with the Canadian ORT Organization’s workshop in early 1942. See Kelly, The Prisoner of War Camps..., p. 78.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 10 (April 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp “I” (No. 41), Fort Lennox, Île-aux-Noix, April 15, 1941, p. 2.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 11 (March 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp “I” (No. 41), Fort Lennox, Île-aux-Noix, March 31, 1941, p. 4.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 11,253, File: 112-41, Inspection Reports, Camp Île-aux-Noix, 1940-1941, “Inspection Report,” June 25, 1941. NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 13 (July 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp “I” (No. 41), Fort Lennox, Île-aux-Noix, July 6, 1941, p. 1.
65 NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 4 (January 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp “A” (No. 40), Farnham, January 7, 1941; January 7, 1941; January 8, 1941; January 22, 1941; and January 27, 1941, pp. 2-10.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 5 (February 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp “A” (No. 40), Farnham, February 24, 1941, p. 7.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 14 (November 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp “A” (No. 40), Farnham, November 1941, Appendix 4.


NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,400, Volume 13 (October 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp “N” (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), “Camp Spokesman Statement,” October 15, 1941, Appendix 2, pp. 1-3.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,400, Volume 13 (October 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp “N” (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), “Major W.J.H. Ellwood (Camp Commandant) to the District Officer Commanding (D.O.C.) Military District 4.” October 24, 1941, Appendix 1, pp. 36-37. NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,400, Volume 13 (October 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp “N” (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), October 1, 1941; October 22, 1941; and October 28, 1941, pp. 1-5.

Koch, p. 230.


NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 12 (September 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp “A” (No. 40), Farnham, September 14, 1941, p. 4.

Koch, p. 230.

NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,400, Volume 16 (January 1942), War Diary of Internment Camp “N” (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), January 27, 1942 and January 30, 1942, pp. 7-8.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,400, Volume 17 (February 1942), War Diary of Internment Camp “N” (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), February 2, 1942, p. 1.


According to the inmate's rough drafts: “...attached to the base of the bullet or shell there should be a second part filled with magnesium or highly inflammable wire which on percussion would be broken at its connecting neck from the bullet proper and be set on fire. By some device the base of this portion should be made to split outwards so that it would be prevented from passing through the hole made by the bullet on contact with its target and so
have the effect of expending the burning time. It is frequently reported that aeroplanes return riddled with bullet holes and the feeling is that if each bullet left behind it a piece of burning magnesium wire, the effect would be disastrous. Similarly in anti-tank operations an armour piercing bullet passing through the gasoline tank and leaving its trail of burning magnesium would be most effective." See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15.400, Volume 13 (September 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp "N" (No. 42). Newington (Sherbrooke), "Major W.J.H. Ellwood (Camp Commandant) to District Officer Commanding (D.O.C.) Military District 4," September 8, 1941, Appendix 1, p. 18.

79 As one refugee-engineer recalled: "...I personally was involved in setting up a design office for gun reamers and tools for the guns in conjunction with industries...they made the 4" naval guns, and out of the camp compound we set up a design office for about 14 or 15 engineers...under the supervision of a Frenchman from...Paris, who had come over to help us design these special tools for the guns." As another internee noted: "There were a group of engineers who were experts in cheeks and fixtures and so on and they designed all the cheeks and fixtures of one of the famous Canadian guns in the Second World War, the 25 pounder, and that was all done in the camp." See NAC, FHTC, EK, MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, "Interview of Helmut Pokorny by Harry Rasky (CBC) in Perth (Ontario)," [1980's], pp. 3-10 - 3-11.; NAC, FHTC, EK, MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, "Interview of Toni Obert by Harry Rasky (CBC) in Hudson Heights (Quebec)," [1980's], p. 38-3.

80 NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15.399, Volume 18 (December 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp "I" (No. 41), Fort Lennox, Île-aux-Noix, December 18, 1941, p. 3.

81 NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5420, File: HQS 7236-96-41, Construction and Maintenance, Camp Île-aux-Noix, 1940-1944, "Louis Fitch (President of the Canadian ORT Organization) to Lt.-Col. R.S.W Fordham (Commissioner of Refugee Camps, Department of the Secretary of State)," May 18, 1942.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5420, File: HQS 7236-96-41, Construction and Maintenance, Camp Île-aux-Noix, 1940-1944, "Report by V.I. Grossman (Executive Secretary of the Canadian ORT Organization)," May 20, 1943.

82 NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15.399, Volume 19 (January 1942), War Diary of Internment Camp "I" (No. 41), Fort Lennox, Île-aux-Noix, January 17, 1941, p. 2.

83 NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15.399, Volume 23 (May 1942), War Diary of Internment Camp "I" (No. 41), Fort Lennox, Île-aux-Noix, May 29, 1942, p. 4.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5420, File: HQS 7236-96-41, Construction and Maintenance, Camp Île-aux-Noix, 1940-1944, "Colonel H.N. Streight (Director Prisoners of War) to the Adjutant-General," November 1, 1943.

84 NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5420, File: HQS 7236-96-41, Construction and Maintenance, Camp Île-aux-Noix, 1940-1944, "Louis Fitch (President of the Canadian ORT Organization) to Lt.-Col. R.S.W Fordham (Commissioner of Refugee Camps, Department of the Secretary of State)." May 18, 1942.

85 NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5420, File: HQS 7236-96-41, Construction and Maintenance, Camp Île-aux-Noix, 1940-1944, "Major-General Howard Kennedy (Quartermaster-General) to Deputy Minister (Department of National Defence)," November 9, 1943.

86 NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5420, File: HQS 7236-96-41, Construction and Maintenance, Camp Île-aux-Noix, 1940-1944, "Louis Fitch (President of the Canadian ORT Organization) to Lt.-Col. R.S.W Fordham (Commissioner of Refugee Camps, Department of the Secretary of State)," May 18, 1942.
NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5420, File: HQS 7236-96-41, Construction and Maintenance, Camp Île-aux-Noix, 1940-1944, "V.I. Grossman (Executive Secretary of the Canadian ORT Organization) to Lt.-Col. R.S.W. Fordham (Commissioner of Refugee Camps, Department of the Secretary of State)," September 22, 1942.

NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5420, File: HQS 7236-96-41, Construction and Maintenance, Camp Île-aux-Noix, 1940-1944, "Colonel H.N. Streight (Director Prisoners of War) to Director of Works and Construction (National Defence Headquarters)," March 23, 1943.


The new Camp Sherbrooke Works Program was divided into three departments: a Wood Working Department, a Sewing Department and a Boot and Shoe Repairing Department. As La Tribune de Sherbrooke indicated: "Le camp de Sherbrooke est le seul camp de prisonniers de guerre au Canada qui relève du Programme des Travaux...A Sherbrooke, il y a quatre grands ateliers où les internés s'occupent à ouvrir le bois, à réparer les chaussures et à coudre divers genre de vêtements...Le Programme des travaux fonctionne sur la même base qu'une entreprise industrielle ordinaire...L'ouvrage du bois est la partie la plus importante du programme. Les ateliers sont divisés en deux sections, l'une où l'on pratique la production en série et l'autre où sont ouvrés les articles uniques ou de petite quantité. Dans la première, on produit surtout des caisses de toutes dimensions, en planchette à claire-voie ou en bois contreplaqé, des piliers d'entrepôt et tels autres travaux d'ouvriers-layetteurs. On peut aussi se faire une idée de l'importance qu'a cet atelier en songeant qu'en une seule période de deux semaines, l'été dernier, il en sortit dix-huit wagons de marchandises...Parmi les commandes qu'a remplis le Programme des travaux, depuis sa fondation, il se trouve plusieurs milliers de tables pliantes et de chaises pliantes, toutes en bois, pour les camps de l'armée canadienne, une de 20,000 piliers d'entrepôt, une de 115 porte-civières, dont le dessin fut tracé à Sherbrooke, et qui est une grande amélioration sur les appareils similaires déjà existants, une autre d'une soixantaine de paires de béquille ajustables, et d'innombrables pièces particulières allant du petit fichier à cartes jusqu'au monumental pupitres des salles administratives. Dans de nombreux cas, le personnel devait inventer à la fois le dessin et le procédé de construction de l'article demandé...Le grand atelier comprend tout l'outillage nécessaires au travail de production en quantité: scies multiples, scies à chantournier, planeuses, embouvetées, façonneuses, moulureuses, etc. L'atelier spécialisé comprend un outillage aussi complet, mais de moindre capacité et de plus grande précision, ainsi que des tours à bois et d'innombrables outils à mains...Dans une série de salles voisines, une centaine d'internés s'occupent à refaire les chaussures usagées de l'armée canadienne, pour distribution aux population d'Europe. On reconstruit ainsi actuellement quelque 2,000 paires de souliers et bottines par semaine, et l'on
s'attend prochainement à atteindre le chiffre de 5,000 paires par semaines. Les chaussures sont d'abord examinées pour voir si elles sont bien appareillées, puis elles sont plongées dans une solution huileuse d'où elles sortent souples et pliables. Les semelles et les talons sont alors aplatis et l'arche biscuitée. Une équipe pose ensuite les taonsneufs et pique à faux-frais les semelles de caoutchouc qui seront ensuite cousues par des machines ultra-modernes... À la salle des couture, il y a trente-six machines à coudre, dont une complète une boutonnière en 10 secondes, entaille et ourlet, et une autre coud le bouton dans un temps aussi bref. L'atelier de couture est lui aussi agencé de même façon que les ateliers industriels. Il y a des ciseaux électriques qui peuvent tailler des centaines de plis de tissus à la fois. Cette division du Programme des travaux a rempli, il n'y a pas longtemps, une commande de 200,000 tabliers, une autre de 100,000 pochettes à rations. Actuellement, on y façonne des chemises khaki. En plus des ces quatre grands ateliers qui servent à la production, il y a une boutique pour l'ouvrage du métal, qui sert surtout à la réparation des machines et à la fabrication de pièces particulières dont on se sert au camp. Cet atelier comprend une forge, un appareil à soudier, des tours à métaux, des foreuses, une planeuse à métal et tous les outils à main du machiniste et du forgeron.” Between 1943 and 1946, these workshops produced a wide array of goods. So great was production that between January and June 1945 the Wood Working Department produced 23,842 boxes, 15,808 packing cases, 5,000 paint crates, 160 tables, 21,432 flat pallets, 200 razor blade boxes, 300 lane markers, 209,240 shoe trees and 500 naval lockers. On the other hand, the Sewing Department, produced 19,653 shirts, 17,826 jackets (Summer and Winter), 22,886 trousers (Summer and Winter), 961 pyjama trousers, 3,301,650 swabs, 4,200 water bottle covers, 11 ambulance stretchers, 4,500 chemical warfare respirator cases and 1,853 bags. Finally, the Boot and Shoe Repairing Department made and repaired 93,481 pairs of boots and shoes. By early 1946, some 250 prisoners were employed in the program. See Alfred Desrochers, “Une journée avec les prisonniers allemands du camp Newington.” La Tribune de Sherbrooke, October 29, 1945, p. 10.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15.400, Volume 18 (March 1942), War Diary of Internment Camp “N” (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke). “Works Program,” March 1942, Appendix 1, p. 36.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-42, Camp Intelligence, Camp Sherbrooke, 1944-1946. “January 1945 Intelligence Report,” February 4, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-42, Camp Intelligence, Camp Sherbrooke, 1944-1946. “February 1945 Intelligence Report,” February 4, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-42, Camp Intelligence, Camp Sherbrooke, 1944-1946. “March 1945 Intelligence Report.” April 2, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-42, Camp Intelligence, Camp Sherbrooke, 1944-1946. “April 1945 Intelligence Report,” May 3, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-42, Camp Intelligence, Camp Sherbrooke, 1944-1946. “May 1945 Intelligence Report,” June 15, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-42, Camp Intelligence, Camp Sherbrooke, 1944-1946. “February 1946 Intelligence Report,” February 1946.


One inmate even described his Sunday schedule to his wife in order to allay anxiety and so that she could understand how well he was being treated: “With beautiful sunshine we started the day at 6 A.M. with concert and coffee outside, then we walked for a long stroll into the bush, by twelve we were back to the camp. After the meal we had moving pictures, 3 O'Clock coffee with cakes, then after this - there is a little river around the camp where we are allowed to fish until five. Our dogs are crazy to go in for a swim. Then supper and after supper football game with coffee and cakes again outdoors - As you see, we are doing well - I wish you could be here.” See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5416, File: HQS 7236-94-6-42, Intelligence Reports, Camp Sherbrooke, 1943-1946, “May 1944 Intelligence Report,” May 1944.

NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,401, Volume 68 (May 1946), War Diary of Internment Camp “N” (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), May 9, 1946, p. 1.

Canada, Red Cross and Prisoners..., pp. 96-97.


Canada, Red Cross and Prisoners..., pp. 92-93.

Priebe, pp. 185-186.


Canada, Orders and Instructions..., p. 26.


Canada, Orders and Instructions..., p. 30.

Bernard and Bergeron, p. 22.; Priebe, pp. 185-186.

Canada, Orders and Instructions..., p. 31.; Priebe, pp. 185-186.

Canada, Orders and Instructions..., p. 20.

Ibid., p. 19.

NAC. DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 2 (August 1940), War Diary of Internment Camp “I” (No. 41), Fort Lennox, Île-aux-Noix, August 4, 1940, p. 2.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 2 (November 1940), War Diary of Internment Camp “N” (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), November 2, 1940, p. 1.
One Farnham prisoner even carved a nine inch model yacht fitted with movable pulleys. Another prisoner made a beautiful "hand-carved set of chess figures, complete with board. The figures were most artistically carved out of wood, so carefully done that the very faces of the pawns showed individual expressions." See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9139-2-40, Material for Broadcasting to Germany, Camp Farnham, 1944-1946, "Major G.H. Cuning (A/Camp Commandant) to District Officer Commanding (D.O.C.) Military District 4," December 22, 1944. NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5419, File: HQS 7236-94-14-40, Reports for Psychological Warfare Committee, Camp Farnham, 1944-1946, "Report on Camp Farnham by Lt-Col. A.W. De Wolf (Camp Commandant)," January 1945.


There were many great artists in the camps of southern Quebec. The most well known was probably Oscar Cahen, who had been interned at Camp Sherbrooke during the civilian phase and who became Canada’s leading abstract expressionist painter. As Eric Koch indicated in Deemed Suspect: "Had anyone told him then that his works would one day be part of the National Gallery’s collection in Ottawa, he would have uttered his unforgettable, high-pitched laugh." See Koch, p. 156.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9139-2-44, Material for Broadcasting to Germany, Camp Grande Ligne, 1944-1946, "Lt-Col. E.D.B. Kippen (Camp Commandant) to District Officer Commanding (D.O.C.) Military District 4," August 17, 1944.


As it was stipulated: "Fifty percent of canteen profits will be set aside each month to create a reserve for barrack damages, until such time as the said reserve has reached the amount fixed for the camp, on the basis of $2.00 per prisoner of war" or $1,000 for a camp not exceeding 500 inmates and $2,000 for a camp detaining between 500 and 1,000 internees. See Bernard and Bergeron, p. 22.; Canada, Orders and Instructions, p. 20, 32.

Canada. Orders and Instructions..., p. 20.

136 Bernard and Bergeron, p. 22.; Canada, *Orders and Instructions*, p. 32.

CHAPTER 4

EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS

Educational programs constituted an important part of life behind barbed wires in southern Quebec. Fostered by the internees' thirst for knowledge, education eventually became a characteristic of camp life. It broadened the mind of inmates, helped them maintain sanity, showed them alternatives to Nazism and prepared them for post-war professions. Initiated in 1940 for civilian internees, early camp education was organized and coordinated by the inmates themselves. Prisoners specialized in certain fields of study would organize discussions and classes. The aim was for the prisoners to share with one another and gain knowledge. This intellectual climate eventually led the Canadian authorities to authorize younger prisoners to pursue their personal education through correspondence courses with Canadian universities. The arrival of prisoners of war in 1942 dramatically changed the nature of educational programs. As German soldiers, most of these internees had been manipulated by Nazi propaganda. As the war progressed, the Canadian authorities became aware that the presence of Nazi ideology in internment camps "contaminated" the prisoners. It was determined that the prisoners needed to be shown an alternative, and this was done through a program of re-education. The aim was to influence prisoners along democratic lines so that when they returned to Germany, the roots of Nazi thoughts would be "exterminated." To ensure that the German authorities would not see this as "brainwashing," only volunteers were chosen among the inmates to participate in this program. Re-education eventually became an important tool in the war against Nazi ideology. Through discussion groups, classes, special guest speakers, films and literature, many inmates came to conclude that democracy was a much better system
than National Socialism. So important became re-education that in 1945, a camp was set up in Sorel for that specific purpose.

The issue of internee education was neglected by the *Geneva Convention*. In fact, there were no clauses which dealt exclusively with the education of prisoners. Only article 17, which stipulated that "belligerents shall encourage as much as possible the organization of intellectual and sporting pursuits by the prisoners of war," touched upon the issue. The problem with this clause was that detaining powers could interpret it differently. This complicated matters and made the international control of education very difficult. The only reason which restricted certain nations from using propaganda methods to indoctrinate prisoners of war was the fear of enemy reprisals. This explains why the re-education of German prisoners of war was not introduced in Canada before the end of the war. However, the Canadian authorities did agree to introduce general educational programs in the civilian phase. According to Canadian regulations: "Educational study courses will be permitted under the direction of the International Red Cross, the International YMCA, and any other organization approved by the Director, Prisoners of War."2

During the civilian phase, general education flourished in the camps of southern Quebec. Since many academics and ex-professors were among the prisoners, the camps provided an excellent learning environment. In fact, many of these individuals were highly distinguished European scholars who had made important contributions in a variety of disciplines. This led many prisoners to seek knowledge from one another. This intellectual environment was commonly referred to as the *Université populaire*. The mere presence of so many people of different trades and professions offered tremendous opportunities to expand one's mind. For instance, mechanics developed close ties with famous musicians while scientists mingled with lawyers. In other words, internment brought together people who would have never met under normal circumstances. This informal process began at Camp Île-aux-Noix in July 1940,4 and was soon followed by the other camps.5 It proved very popular and generated quite a lot of satisfaction among southern Quebec inmates.6
To exploit this highly charged intellectual environment, formal camp schools were eventually established at Camps Farnham, Île-aux-Noix and Sherbrooke. These were created and coordinated by the prisoners themselves, upon approval from camp authorities. The first camp school was established at Farnham in November 1940 by William Heckscher, an internee who had taught at Hamburg University. He did so after realizing that there were at least one hundred young boys in the camp, age 16 to 20, who needed proper guidance and education. These pupils were viewed as being easy targets for the camp Communists who were seeking new recruits. Some thirteen internee teachers were involved in the program. Cooperating with the camp school were the camp’s authorities who gave the internees the possibility of using a hut for educational purposes and exempted students from fatigue duties. The camp’s war diary summarized well the reasons guiding the camp authorities’ involvement in the program:

The idea behind this is to give internees as much mental activity as possible, as it takes their minds off their many worries and makes them that much easier to control. After all in the running of an internment camp, the expedient thing to do is to run it with as little trouble as possible from the prisoners. If they are given considerable amount of freedom concerning internal affairs in the compound and as much self-government as possible, it has the effect of making them that much easier to control and govern.

Camp schools were also created at Île-aux-Noix and Sherbrooke in the Spring of 1941. Inmates who participated in camp schools studied topics such as chemistry, economics, geography, history, language, mathematics and music. Furthermore, they were given the opportunity to participate in junior and senior matriculation examinations held by Montreal’s McGill University. The junior matric could be written anywhere in Quebec as long as McGill approved of the exams’ supervision. This meant that prisoners could write such exams inside their respective camps while being supervised by Canadian officers. On the other hand, the senior matric had to be written in Montreal. The main reason was that fewer people were writing them. Eventually, other Canadian universities became involved in their program. Camp schools were highly successful. So important were they that in September 1941, more than 347 internees were registered in educational programs at Camp Sherbrooke out of a population of approximately 587 inmates. Aside
from matriculation classes, internees could also prepare for post-war professions through vocational training classes. Furthermore, guest speakers sometimes lectured inmates on Canadian topics.

When prisoners of war began arriving in the camps of southern Quebec in 1942, the Canadian authorities were hesitant to continue camp schools. In fact, educational programs were not re-established until late 1943 when correspondence courses were initiated with the University of Saskatchewan. Again, like during the civilian phase, the prisoners were credited for their work through matriculation examinations. Arrangements could also be made with other academic institutions as long as internees pursued educational classes without being credited for them.

Education was also helped by the establishment of camp libraries. As Canadian regulations stipulated, "text books not prohibited...will be admitted, if supplied by the International Red Cross, the International YMCA., the German Red Cross, Canadians universities and libraries, or from such other institutions or persons as may be authorized by the Director, Prisoners of War." The first camp libraries were created during the civilian phase. In most cases, prisoners requested relief organizations to purchase specific books, magazines and newspapers for which they paid upon delivery. Novels remained among the most popular form of literature inside the camps. In Sherbrooke, where the camp library comprised some 3,600 volumes in September 1944, 26% of the books were classed as non-fiction, 10% dealt with economics, 10% addressed history, 15% were textbooks and 39% were classified as fiction. Although a form of entertainment, novels helped prisoners to develop their intellect and imagination. In many ways, novels helped prisoners to psychologically evade the pressures of internment. Also, so that prisoners not be obliged to purchase books at their own expense, a "Traveling Library" was organized by McGill University.

Not all books were accepted by camp authorities. In fact, camp censorship was very strict and forbade inmates to read literature which was deemed to be damaging to the Allied cause or which was thought to entice prisoners towards violence or Nazism. Indeed, Canadian authorities decided in September 1944 that "only educational books will
be permitted to be purchased by the POW and then only such books as are necessary for the course they are taking within the enclosure. Books dealing with Navy, Army, Air Force (British or Allied), espionage, map making, weapons and armaments, spying, or formulae for the manufacturing of alcohol or poisons, publications which are predominantly enemy propaganda will be forwarded to National Defence Headquarters; if however the propaganda element is of an incidental nature and the scope of the publications chiefly education or recreational they may be admitted. ²⁵ Numerous books and magazines were censored and removed from camp library inventories. ²⁶ In the end, camp libraries offered southern Quebec inmates an opportunity to educate themselves and learn more about the world. It also helped them to acclimatize themselves to the North American way of life. ²⁷

Education was also promoted through motion pictures. Although they entertained prisoners, movies also served as an important means of indoctrination. In many ways, they permitted prisoners to learn more about life in North America. In fact, such films initiated German internees to the norms and values of both American and Canadian societies and often engendered a certain sense of respect towards these cultures. In many ways, films served as a form of Allied propaganda. As authorities at Camp Grande Ligne indicated: "One hears that these pictures induce in many prisoners a great inclination towards our way of life. Moving pictures play a tremendous part in the somewhat restricted life of a prisoners. and each detail is thought over and placed under the magnifying glass. Hence, films are an excellent tool of psychology and propaganda." ²⁸ Moving picture projectors and equipment were furnished by relief organizations. ²⁹ The YMCA was in charge of the general distribution of movies. Working in conjunction with such film distributors as Twentieth Century Fox, United Artists and Warner Brothers, the YMCA was able to supply the inmates with one movie per week for which the organization bore the expense. ³⁰ In most cases, prisoners were given movie lists from which they could choose the titles which were of interest to them. ³¹

Movies were first presented in southern Quebec during the civilian phase The process began in early 1941 when both Camps Sherbrooke and Île-aux-Noix received
their first motion picture projectors through relief organizations.\textsuperscript{32} They were followed by Camp Farnham in the summer of 1942, Camp Grande Ligne in the summer of 1944, and Camp Sorel in the fall of 1945.\textsuperscript{33} In order to help with the costs of the movie shows, internees had to pay 5\(c\). This money was usually obtained from the prisoners’ canteen funds. American and Canadian movies shown inside the camps were among the most popular of the era.\textsuperscript{34} Furthermore, the Canadian government had the obligation to issue the prisoners with German-made films. Historian Ron Robin described well the circumstances of this situation: “As part of a reciprocal agreement mediated by the Red Cross, the Allies sent a small selection of pre-approved movies to their prisoners in Germany. In exchange, German prisoners in Allied POW camps viewed a limited number of German film productions. All these German movies had been meticulously censored for any overt or covert Nazi propaganda.”\textsuperscript{35}

The presence of Nazi prisoners of war in Allied internment camps eventually led the American, British, Soviet and Canadian governments to inaugurate more formal re-educational programs. The major goal was to “reorient the political thinking of enemy prisoners through a process of re-education with the hope of using these “graduates” as a vanguard in directing the defeated state [Germany] toward a specific form of government.” The problem with re-education was that western Allies had different political ideals than the Soviets. For instance, Canada, Great Britain and the United States wanted to re-educate German prisoners along democratic lines while the Soviet Union hoped to do so using Communist ideology. As a result, each re-educational program became a reflection of the political motives of the nation which introduced it. Aside from indoctrinating German prisoners along new political beliefs, re-education offered each Allied nation an opportunity to prepare a vanguard to plant the seeds for a new German government and collaborate with them in their respective zones of military occupation.\textsuperscript{36}

In Canada, the issue of prisoners of war re-education was introduced in 1944. The process began when the British Foreign Office approached the Canadian Government on the matter. Canada was detaining German prisoners of war which had been caught by both British and Commonwealth forces. Because Canada had the necessary manpower and
space, Great Britain felt it normal that a proper re-education program be initiated in that country. Ottawa’s initial answer was negative. As the Canadian Director of Internment Operations indicated: “The government did not countenance any campaign to re-educate and convert the Nazis.” As a result, the British became very pessimistic vis-à-vis Canadian cooperation. As the British Foreign Office stated: “The Canadians have done virtually nothing to re-educate prisoners...Indeed, the Canadian camps are a hot-bed of Nazi ideology. The Party regime appears to be fully established amongst prisoners in some camps, and even those on whom we might make a promising beginning in the U.K. would certainly revert to Nazism on arriving in Canada.”

However, British pressure was finally rewarded in June 1944 when Canada finally agreed to cooperate on a re-education program. The entire project was to be coordinated by the Canadian Psychological Warfare Committee, which had been created in 1943. To ensure the success of such an operation, Nazis had to be properly segregated from anti-Nazis. This resulted in the introduction of the PHERUDA system of classification, (see Chapter 2). The goal of re-education, which had a naturalistic component, was to make “listeners aware of Canada’s separate and distinct identity within the United Nations and underscoring its contributions to the Allied effort. The benefits of democracy could be lauded by referring to Canadian achievements and standard of living.”

Although Canada agreed in mid-1944 to initiate its own re-educational program, the project was not officially introduced until early 1945. At the time, the program was very limited in scale and consisted solely of lectures. This situation changed as of May 8, 1945 when Germany surrendered. As a consequence, Canada’s re-education program intensified. With the fall of Germany, internees were more inclined to abandon National Socialist doctrines. As a Camp Sherbrooke intelligence officer indicated: “…the wind has been completely knocked out their sails. The rabid Nazis finally realized that their game was up. Strong-arm Gestapo methods are a thing of the past, and to the best of my knowledge complete peace and quietness reigns within the enclosure. The anti-Nazis are now more or less able to hold up their heads and even to a certain extent dictate their own policies.” As time passed, German prisoners of war became less arrogant and more
cooperative.\textsuperscript{42} No prisoner was forced to participate in the program.\textsuperscript{43} Also, because the original idea was to create a system which united all the "democrats" among the prisoners of war, Allied countries began creating special re-assessment camps.\textsuperscript{44}

The special re-educational centre in southern Quebec was Camp Sorel. It was created in June 1945 as requested by the Psychological Warfare Committee and served as a transit camp for White prisoners of war destined to be repatriated to Germany to serve the Allied cause. The camp's functions were as follows: "(A) to assess the prisoners of war for reliability, leadership qualities and suitability for employment in their particular fields either here or in Germany; (B) to strengthen the Anti-Nazi attitudes of the prisoners of war and familiarize them with certain basic principles and attitudes of the Western Allies; (C) to provide facilities for propaganda work (press, radio) either in Germany or to the other camps; (D) to provide special or refresher training in specific occupation; and (E) to collect data of value for guidance in planning propaganda to Germany and in re-educational work (lectures, films, broadcasts) in other camps."\textsuperscript{45} As a re-assessment centre, Camp Sorel selected "students" meticulously. As camp regulations stipulated:

Recommendation for the transfer to this camp of suitable POWs will be made...by POW camp commandants all over Canada, in consultation with the camp intelligence officers. Such recommendations will only be made after a detailed interrogation according to the PHERUDA system and a statement that the POWs desires to work for the reconstruction of Germany and to be transferred to the special camp in Sorel. Such recommendations will be forwarded to the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) for consideration. Final decision as to suitability and time of transfer shall rest with DMI who will make the necessary requests to the Directorate Prisoners of War. In selecting POW, consideration will be given to professions and occupations, partly with a view to the establishment of discussion groups, partly in terms of requests from the U.K., and partly in order to create a well-balanced camp... An attempt was made to draw men from all camps in Canada in order to show that White attitudes were by no means confined to one or two camps. \textsuperscript{46}

All White prisoners selected for Camp Sorel were volunteers and came from all over Canada.\textsuperscript{47} Before being sent to Sorel, inmates had to sign a written undertaking whereby they agreed to cooperate with the Allies and conform to Canada's re-educational project.\textsuperscript{48}
German officers, other ranks, and enemy merchant sailors were all declared as suitable for this scheme. Camp regulations stipulated that “distinction of rank, it is hoped will disappear amongst the POW when in classes, discussion groups or engaged on psychological warfare work.” With this in mind, “all ranks were abolished and all insignia of ranks taken down.” This was done “to express the idea that all were finding themselves under identical conditions.”

The good of the screening process was to select prisoners who “would adapt to the [re-educational] program by opening their minds to new ideas and by working hard to understand what was being presented to them. Success or failure rested with the men chosen.” Because “special emphasis is laid upon the fact that willingness to cooperate must be with all the Allies,” each selected internee had to be formerly asked “whether he is willing to cooperate actively with the Allied nations, both here and in Europe, in the reconstruction of Germany, in accordance with Allied plans and agree to his proposed transfer to Camp Sorel. It should be made clear to the prisoner that this camp will provide both training and refresher courses for the occupations most needed and that if found suitable the prisoner will be employed to the best advantage.” Inmates were also chosen based on their previous civilian occupations and professions. The aim was to exploit the inmates’ special talents for the benefit of the Canadian re-educational program. Initially, intellectuals were chosen. They were to form a “brain-trust” for the democratization of Germany and of fellow prisoners of war. However, the program eventually came to cover a wide variety of job categories.

The main problem with the Camp Sorel segregation system was that Gray and Black “prisoners sometimes played the game and gave the interviewers what they [authorities] wanted.” This meant that “even the more careful screening could not prevent the inclusion of students who were just looking for an easier or more interesting way to spend their internment, and had no intention of taking re-education seriously.” In fact, opportunists believed that participation in the re-educational program might accelerate their repatriation. As Camp Farnham authorities said: “there are those who have drastically changed overnight from Black to White. These are naturally recognized
as opportunists who are most unreliable and insincere." With this in mind, National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) refused numerous internees access to Camp Sorel.

Originally, each selected group of prisoners was to stay no longer than three months at Camp Sorel. The idea was to repatriate these internees as soon as possible in order that they might serve the Allied occupation forces in Germany. However, this proved to be an impossibility due to the chaotic situation that persisted in Germany after the war. Because Sorel prisoners became more and more dissatisfied with the postponement of their transfer home, camp authorities readjusted their operational policies in September 1945. A plan was introduced by M.I. on October 26, 1945, to transform Camp Sorel into a re-educational “production centre.” The task of re-educating prisoners of war in Canada had grown considerably since V-E day and the demand for re-educational material and agents kept increasing. To comply with this situation, Sorel inmates became involved with the production of re-educational material. Because most of the Sorel prisoners could not benefit from labour projects, as was the case in the other southern Quebec internment camps, the Canadian authorities decided in November 1945 to pay them 50 ¢ per day for their re-educational work. The main argument was that these internees were replacing Canadian personnel in this duty. With this in mind, the camp was guarded by a limited number of VGC personnel.

The production of re-educational material was coordinated by the camp’s Counter Propaganda Committee. It was formed “with the object of producing [German written] literature, mainly in the form of pamphlets, which will on the one hand refute Nazi ideology and attitudes in various fields and on the other hand produce material designed to help in mental and moral reeducation. These pamphlets are to be sent to all internment camps in Canada.” This committee was divided into a number of sub-committees which were “headed by experts in the fields they attempted to cover.” The following sub-committees were established: law, history, theology, racial theories, forestry, agriculture, economics, education and “a special section to combat Nazi slogans.” The re-educational material produced in Camp Sorel was quite diversified and also led to the establishment of radio broadcast sections, press sections, film sections, and
even a committee for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Germany. The radio broadcast section had the important task of cooperating with the international service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) in the preparation and recording of re-educational radio scripts. These were to be broadcast in Canadian internment camps and in Germany.\textsuperscript{62}

The press section was in charge of producing the weekly \textit{Lager Post} newspaper known as \textit{Der Weg}. Articles for this publication were not only provided by Sorel inmates but also by prisoners from other internment camps. The press section also published re-educational bulletins, lecture outlines, newspapers, leaflets and pamphlets, which were distributed to other Canadian internment camps on a weekly basis. This was done in cooperation with the camp’s translation bureau.\textsuperscript{63} From Camp Sorel there came three major sources of re-educational literature. First, there was the \textit{Bruecke Zur Heimat}, which was a weekly newspaper similar to \textit{Reader’s Digest}. Second, there was the \textit{Nachrichten}, which was a weekly bulletin containing the latest news. Third, there was the \textit{Historische Rundbriefe}, which was a fortnightly pamphlet covering aspects of German history.\textsuperscript{64} The production of re-educational material at Camp Sorel ceased on March 2, 1946. Overall, 22 different pamphlets had been produced as well as 8 editions of the \textit{Historische Rundbriefe}, 25 editions of the \textit{Nachrichten}, and 34 editions of the \textit{Bruecke Zur Heimat}.\textsuperscript{65} This literature was also “designed for...prisoners employed in lumber camps and other works projects which could not be reached for re-educational purposes in any other fashion.”\textsuperscript{66} Moreover, copies of these documents were distributed to Canadian internment camps on a weekly basis. Each week, 130 copies of \textit{Historische Rundbriefe}, 600 copies of \textit{Nachrichten}, 1,850 copies of \textit{Bruecke Zur Heimat} and 3,300 pamphlets were produced at Camp Sorel and distributed throughout Canada.\textsuperscript{67}

To facilitate the preparation of re-educational material, Canadian authorities provided Sorel inmates with special literature. In most cases, volumes illustrating democratic attitudes, experiences or governmental methods were chosen.\textsuperscript{68} Furthermore, unlike other Canadian internment camps, prisoners were given the opportunity to access National Socialist propaganda and books addressing Nazi issues.\textsuperscript{69} This was done because
the bulk of the Sorel prisoners were known to be staunch anti-Nazis. The belief was that such literature might be used by the internees to demonstrate the flaws of Nazism.\textsuperscript{70}

Re-educational work was also inaugurated on a voluntary basis at Camp Farnham. When decision was taken in the spring of 1945 to create a re-assessment camp in Sorel, camp Farnham authorities replied by proposing to use their facilities "as a preliminary sifting camp."\textsuperscript{71} At the time, the Canadian authorities felt that there was a considerable number of Gray prisoners in no country with "definite anti-Nazi attitudes" who did not feel ready to be transferred to Camp Sorel due to "residues of militaristic sentiment, unwillingness to break with comrades, and oath to Hitler." Camp Farnham authorities explained well the problem:

That is to say that these people do not denounce democracy but rather that they find it extremely hard to snake off National Socialist doctrines, pumped into them incessantly during the Hitler Regime. Although the earnest endeavor to understand democracy and the sincere attempt to practice it in their own small community, is a fact, the younger element at Camp 40, officers and OR's who did belong to the Jung Volk and Hitler Jugend, consequently received their one-sided education only in Nazi ideology, find it extremely hard to comprehend many factors about the democratic way of life.\textsuperscript{72}

As such, the idea of a preparatory camp seemed logical. Consequently, the Canadian government agreed to use Camp Farnham as the "final pre-Sorel screening point" in May 1945. As it was stated: "It [Camp Farnham] is in the same military district as [Camp] Sorel, so that transfers between camps could be made with a minimum of difficulty." Internees from all over Canada were liable to be transferred to Camp Farnham "without the consent of the prisoners concerned, but simply on suitable recommendations from the camp commandants."\textsuperscript{73} With this project in mind, the bulk of the Black prisoners incarcerated at Camp Farnham were transferred in the fall of 1945 in order to make room for the newcomers. This enabled the camp to flourish and become an important re-educational centre.

At Farnham, prisoners were given the opportunity to establish among themselves a democratic form of government to administer their own affairs. This was allowed in order
to initiate German prisoners of war to the principles of democracy and let them experience the system for themselves. This was seen as the perfect way to prepare Camp Farnham inmates for their potential transfer to Camp Sorel. The direct consequence of this was the formation of a camp Democratic Committee on July 1, 1945. This eight-man representative council, elected by secret ballot, had the task of coordinating “all POW affairs, administrative as well as political.” The Democratic Committee also became very active in the re-educational program. As it was stated: “After years of Nazi indoctrination, these POW are highly propaganda-minded and look for political significance to every newspaper article, lecture or addresses by their own fellow POW. To overcome this attitude it has been the policy of the Democratic committee to slowly guide these people into a new channel of thought.” The Democratic Committee began operating a weekly re-educational program consisting of newspaper reviews, lectures and political discussions. By August 1945, the camp’s inmates proposed to administer their own affairs through a new form of democratic government. For this purpose, four prisoner of war “lawyers” created a camp constitution which they submitted to the camp authorities on August 7, 1945. An election by secret ballot was then held to know if the prisoners were in favor of the constitution and the establishment of an elective assembly or if they preferred to retain the camp spokesman as their official representative. The election was carried out on August 11, 1945 without any evidence of coercion. The result was clear-cut: 95% of the internees were in favor of the constitution.

As table 3 demonstrates, the Camp Farnham prisoner of war government, as established through the camp constitution, was divided into two major entities: the representative assembly and the executive committee. The executive committee was the higher echelon of this camp government. It took decisions in consultation with the representative assembly, but it was also this body that negotiated with camp authorities. It was made up of three elected members. The chairman, otherwise known as the camp speaker, acted as camp spokesman. Under him was the spiritual and political advisor and the administrative advisor, both being in charge of their respective sections within the representative assembly. At the time, all of the executive committee’s representatives
Table 3
Camp Farnham Internee Government
1945-1946

CAMP EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

CHAIRMAN (CAMP SPEAKER)
(1 man)

SPIRITUAL AND POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS
(1 man)

ADMINISTRATION REQUIREMENTS
(1 man)

REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLY

RADIO MESSAGES LIBRARY
(1 man) (1 man)

SPORT NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENCE
(1 man) (1 man)

GENERAL LECTURES FILM-RADIO
(1 man) (1 man)

MUSIC POLITICS AND ECONOMICS
(1 man) (1 man)

EDUCATION CHURCH
(1 man) (2 men)

PAYMASTER TOOLS
POSTAL KITCHEN CANTEEN
(1 man) (2 men) (2 men)

MEDICAL DENTAL
(1 man) (1 man)

Sources: NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40, Camp Intelligence, Camp Farnham, 1944-1946, "Administrative Chart of the POW Representative Assembly at Camp Farnham", September 20, 1945.
were former officers. This changed in February 1946 when one "other rank" was granted permission to sit on the committee.77 The representative assembly was the lower echelon of this camp system. Each hut would elect two representatives, each being assigned a specific function in the assembly. The representative assembly was divided into three sections: spiritual and political, administration and medical. All were coordinated by the executive committee. The assembly's role was to discuss specific camp-related issues and propose new measures to the executive committee. Overall, 20 members were elected by the internees for the representative assembly.78 Camp authorities were very much pleased with the establishment of the democratic camp government. As they indicated: "this is an encouraging sign as to their [prisoners'] sincerity to adjust their political bearing."79

Re-education was also introduced on a limited scale in camps Grande Ligne and Sherbrooke. However, the continuous presence of Black elements inside both camps constituted an immense problem as they seriously retarded the efforts made by Canadian personnel to re-educate the prisoners.80 As a result, series of transfers were initiated in the fall of 1945. The aim was to segregate the enclosure so that Gray prisoners might be more prone to participate in the re-educational program without being influenced by Black elements. Results were obtained as the remaining prisoners increased their participation in the Canadian re-educational program. Still, attempts to initiate re-education at Camp Sherbrooke were quite weak and unfruitful. Because this camp was the only facility in southern Quebec to still be involved in the Works Program, re-educational activities were less advanced than in other internment camps. The problem was that not enough time could be allotted during the day for re-educational lectures and courses since most internees were working. Furthermore, since the bulk of the camp's inmates were poorly educated merchant seamen, interest in reading and studying re-educational material did not attract many prisoners.81 Because participation in the Canadian re-educational program was voluntary, the bulk of the inmates became more inclined to use their spare time for recreational activities.82 This situation only began changing in April 1946 when a new intelligence officer arrived in the camp and formed the Camp Sherbrooke
Educational Committee. With such emphasis, some prisoners began to participate in the program.\textsuperscript{83} Lectures were an important aspect of the Canadian re-education program.\textsuperscript{84} Special re-educational classes in English formed the bulk of this system. The administrators and teachers employed for this task were people with professional teaching backgrounds. In most cases, they were university professors who specialized in the fields of humanities and social sciences.\textsuperscript{85} Re-education classes were coordinated by the University of Toronto’s Canadian Association for Adult Education (CAAE). In charge of this organization was George W. Brown, one of the university’s history professors. Each year, the CAAE sent each camp a list of potential lectures from which the internees made selections.\textsuperscript{86} Professors from Bishop’s University, McGill University, the University of Toronto and the United Theological College participated in the CAAE program and lectured southern Quebec inmates. Furthermore, Canadian military personnel, priests, members of Canada’s National Film Board and representatives from relief organizations gave classes. All were paid $7.50 per lecture.\textsuperscript{87} Between 1944 and 1946, prisoners were lectured on democracy, on constitutional issues, on politics, on economics, on international affairs, on British and Canadian history, on western literature and on the Canadian way of life. Overall, more than 100 CAAE lectures were given in southern Quebec camps during that period.\textsuperscript{88} Because the CAAE largely depended upon the availability of university professor, lectures were usually discontinued in the summer.\textsuperscript{89} Southern Quebec inmates appreciated well these weekly lectures.\textsuperscript{90} However, because the language of instruction in the camps was predominantly English, this created a major disadvantage. The main problem was that most Canadian professors had no knowledge of German.\textsuperscript{91} As a result, interpreters had to be used, which meant that inmates “had far more contact with someone other than the designated instructor. This ‘someone’ was very often a German Jewish refugee.” Therefore, the language barrier and religious prejudice proved to be handicaps for Canada’s re-educational program.\textsuperscript{92}

Some re-educational classes in German were inaugurated in the camps of southern Quebec. These were “intended not merely for academic information, but to illuminate the
present situation and suggest, overtly or by implication the causes of present ills and a solution to present problems." Such lectures were organized, directed, and taught by White prisoners of war officers. This process was initiated at Camp Farnham in July 1945 when the camp's Democratic Committee established the basis of a program "for the education and enlightenment and general betterment of the young POW, on democratic principles." Although the process was followed by Camp Grande Ligne, such was not the case with Camp Sherbrooke. Because no German prisoner of war officers were residing in the camps and since there was strong resentment "against combatant officers of the former Nazi army," the Camp Sherbrooke enemy merchant seamen requested that Canadian civilian speakers give them such lectures. With this in mind, local city teachers were approached to lecture the internees in December 1945.

Re-educational classes aimed at preparing the German internees for future re-integration into German society. Prisoners of war had to be thought how to react to the transition from military to civil life. The Canadian government did not want a repetition of the events which had followed the end of the First World War in Germany, namely the 1919 German Revolution and the rise of para-military movements including National Socialism. In southern Quebec, the main problem was the German officers interned in both Camps Farnham and Grande Ligne. Many of them had never held a civilian profession nor had they received any preparation for future employment in civil society. Classes were initiated in both camps to teach the prisoners of war various civil professions and trades. This program was on balance successful. By May 30, 1945, some 438 Grande Ligne officers were registered in civil employment classes.

Because the goal of re-education was to prepare Germans to cooperate with the future Allied occupation of Germany, great importance was attached to the teaching of the English language. As a result, English language classes were inaugurated in all of southern Quebec's internment camps. So important became the study of English that some eleven such classes were in progress at Camp Sorel by July 1945. The success of English language classes was so great that camp authorities estimated that 60% of the Sorel prisoners were fluent in English by November 1945. Advanced students could
participate in daily English conversation sessions, commonly known as “round table conferences.” These were usually attended by some 30 internees as well as camp intelligence officers and censors. Prisoners usually chose the topics of conversation for such sessions. In most cases, inmates freely discuss the arts, democracy and politics. Although these discussions helped the prisoners’ English, they also permitted camp intelligence officers to have a better understanding of the inmates’ concerns. Eventually, French language classes were also inaugurated.

Finally, study groups were organized in most of the camps. Similar in concept to the Camp Farnham English language seminars, the aim of such groups was to prepare the inmates for future cooperation with the Allied occupational forces on German soil. These discussion groups were deemed to be useful in providing “assessment material regarding POW in their group relations; studies and reports on practical problems of reconstruction, administrative and technical; and providing opportunities to certain POW to carry on re-educational work amongst their comrades.” Study periods were usually held once per week.

Literature was another major form of re-education. In all camps, American, British, Canadian and even Soviet-produced information was distributed to the inmates. Such bulletins were not always welcomed by the inmates who saw them as Allied propaganda. However, during the war, most of southern Quebec’s internment camps produced camp newspapers and magazines. The prisoners of war who participated in the publishing of such documents usually attended special “Press Classes.” During such classes, the prisoners were taught how to print and bind. In most cases, the men involved in such projects had formerly been journalists or had demonstrated an interest in becoming journalists once the war ended. At Camp Farnham, one such publication was known as DKD (Deutscher Kriegsgefangenen Dienst). This newspaper’s purpose was to stimulate new thoughts in the minds of prisoners. DKD was published on the 15th and 30th of each month. DKD’s first edition was launched on October 15, 1945. Overall, seventeen issues of this short magazine were published at Farnham before production ended on May 20, 1946. Another camp paper, known as Der Regenpfeifer was created
at Camp Grande Ligne and began to be published in December 1945 in order “to foster a literary forum for discussions on matters political, educational, religious and philosophical and to propagate a humanitarian and Christian moral code.” The Camp Grande Ligne press group was in charge of this camp newspaper.

To re-educate the German inmates, special propaganda films were also shown to them. In most cases, these short films were provided by the Military District 4 film library and included numerous newsreels. Most of these short films lasted no longer than 20 minutes and were usually shown on movie nights before the feature presentation. These films were provided by most of the western Allies. Although all of them dealt with different subjects, they all shared the common goal to initiate the German prisoners of war to democracy. Special films were also shown to test the prisoners’ reaction to specific issues. When the Allies learned of the atrocities committed in German concentration camps during the war, the Canadian government decided to show German prisoners of war short films and photographs which depicted the scenes of barbarism that the Allied forces encountered when liberating such facilities. The aim was to create a sense “collective culpability,” make the internees feel responsible for the actions of their government and convince them how wrong the Nazis really were. Official atrocity films, as they were called, were shown to the internees on compulsory parade. They depicted gas chambers, crematoriums, mass graves, the liberated prisoners and other aspects of what came to be known as the Holocaust. It was reported that the prisoners’ reaction to such films varied considerably. Although most were shocked by what they saw, many refused to believe that such events had actually taken place. Some of the Farnham prisoners felt so shocked and humiliated with the atrocities committed that many requested that they be allowed to donate their blood, regardless of whose lives they saved.

Radio was another important propaganda tool used for political re-education. In February 1945, the government authorized the International Service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) to record prisoner of war broadcasts to be diffused throughout Germany. The internees’ initially responded to this scheme by asking: “Why
should we tell our relatives in Germany that we are well treated here in Canada. Over there our people are thoroughly convinced that we receive the best of everything. In fact, our people are jealous of us being here.” The Canadian authorities clarified the situation by telling the inmates that the aim was to tell the German people about the “futility of further resistance, and about the fact that the Canadians do not intend ‘harm and destruction’ but ‘peace and rehabilitation.’” As a result, radio groups of 15 men each were created in most southern Quebec internment camps between May and July 1945. As a result, radio groups of 15 men each were created in most southern Quebec internment camps between May and July 1945.121 For their work for the CBC, radio group personnel were paid 50¢ per day.122 Scripts depicting life in the camps of southern Quebec and the treatment of prisoners by Canadian authorities were forwarded to the CBC in Montreal for transmission to Germany.123 CBC personnel were authorized to visit the camps with the necessary equipment to record radio transmissions. In some cases, prisoners of war were brought to the CBC studios in Montreal to record their messages whenever portable equipment was unavailable.124 Positive messages came from individual prisoners and sometimes camp orchestras were even recorded to reinforce the upbeat mood.125 Discussions between inmates were also recorded where, once more, in rather positive terms, camp life was depicted and the men also spoke about democracy, their return to civil life, cooperation with the Allies and the reconstruction of Germany.126 In the end, the CBC deemed it necessary to fix weekly quotas for all camps participating in radio production: Camp Sorel (20 scripts), Camp Farnham (8 scripts) and Camp Grande Ligne (3 scripts).127

For the internees’ relatives in Germany, CBC broadcasts brought an immense sense of happiness. This was often reflected in the letters sent to prisoners of war in Canada. As a Camp Sorel prisoner’s sister wrote in November 1945: “Your radio report from the camp was a great event for us in these days as it was the first time we ourselves were able to hear you speak from abroad. You cannot imagine our joy...Now we feel fully relieved about you...” In another instance, a mother indicated to her son: “Since I heard you on the radio, I am not worried about your fate...”128

Radio receivers were only allowed for re-educational purposes in Gray and White camps.129 There, southern Quebec inmates grew fond of the CBC’s *Vercheres*
transmissions. This was a fifteen minute German language news broadcast aired daily by the CBC at 17:45 hours.\textsuperscript{130} So popular was this show that 75\% of Camp Farnham's internees listened to it each day.\textsuperscript{131} Because most prisoners took for granted that the Verchères broadcasts were "intended primarily for the prisoners of war in Canada and only secondly for all German-speaking circles," camp radio groups often sent suggestions to the CBC regarding the show. Such was the case when the Camps Farnham, Grande Ligne and Sorel radio groups requested CBC officials to abolish all topics regarding "the collective responsibility of the German people for the misfortune that has befallen them" from the Verchères format.\textsuperscript{132}

Initially, the Canadian re-educational program was affected by the prisoners' occasional lack of enthusiasm. The reason for this related to delays in the repatriation of inmates.\textsuperscript{133} According to the Camp Grande Ligne authorities: "Re-education is now 'over the hump.' The whole educational and re-educational work has become overshadowed in the minds of the prisoners of war by the question of their return to the UK. One factor which has contributed to the decrease in enthusiasm is the unconfirmed rumor that the prisoners will have to do reconstruction work in England, before returning home."\textsuperscript{134} Furthermore, the fate of relatives living in the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany affected most inmates. In fact, the prisoners were very concerned with the Soviet occupation of eastern Germany. As a result, this came to affect morale in the camps of southern Quebec. This was even more so when new prisoners arrived in the camps with first hand news about the harsh Soviet treatment of civilians in Germany.\textsuperscript{135} Needless to say that such comments aroused much discontent inside the camps. As a result, prisoners were less inclined to participate in re-education work. The only remedy to this situation was the arrival of letters from the Soviet zone of occupation, "thus relieving the exaggerated fears which many POW had maintained with regard to Russian treatment of civilians."\textsuperscript{136} Nevertheless, it was estimated by 1946 that 95\% of southern Quebec inmates were anti-Communists.\textsuperscript{137}

However, overtime, the Canadian re-educational program had positive results. In 1945, for instance, "confidence in the strength and sincerity of purpose of the western
world" was said to have increased by 70% at Camp Grande Ligne.\textsuperscript{138} Re-education also contributed to creating a climate of cooperation between German inmates and the Canadian authorities.\textsuperscript{139} Indeed, the names of approximately 300 persons in Germany "considered to be willing and trustworthy to cooperate with the Allied Control Commission" were obtained from southern Quebec inmates and submitted to the Directorate of Military Intelligence.\textsuperscript{140} In the end, many southern Quebec internees were pleased with the education they received in the region's camps. Said one former Sorel inmate after having been transferred to the United Kingdom in early 1946: "I have written this letter to you [Major L.L. Brunton, former Camp Sorel Commandant], Sir, because you should know that I, as well as many other POW returned from Canada, have brought back from there a conception of life whereby we can still hold our heads high, in spite of the propaganda directed against all Germans; because this conception will help along those who still have a home and will provide a healthy foundation for the future."\textsuperscript{141}

Although the aim of re-education was to prepare a vanguard for the establishment of democracy in Germany, numerous internees began to express deep resentments in going back to their "Fatherland." In fact, "many POW's expressed their reluctance to leave Canada and hoped they would be allowed to immigrate to Canada in the near future."\textsuperscript{142} As the Camp Grande Ligne intelligence officer indicated:

A somewhat unexpected byproduct of re-education crops up in the attitude of the many POW who have fallen under its influence and who now know so much about the affairs and life on this continent, that the idea of returning to Germany has become utterly distasteful to them. Of course, the main objective of re-orientation is to make a contribution towards the creation of a strong democratic element in Germany. However, many of the POW who for 5 years read Canadian newspapers, accepted Canadian views and are gradually shedding their inner allegiance to the "Fatherland". In one respect it is discouraging to find that after many months of work on a prospective proponent of democratic ideas in Germany, the POW in question appears one day at the office with a long dissertation in which he sets forth that he is through with Germany. Instead, he wants to immigrate to Canada.\textsuperscript{143}

Intending to immigrate to Canada, numerous prisoners attempted to accelerate the process by demonstrating how essential could be their contribution to the Canadian economy.\textsuperscript{144}
Some prisoners attempted to immigrate by promoting their scientific knowledge. Since V-E Day, most Allied powers began racing against one another for the acquisition of German scientists. At the time, southern Quebec prisoners were reading about this situation in both American and Canadian newspapers. Perceiving this as an immigration opportunity, some internees began promoting this skill. Such was the case, for example, for a Sorel inmate who was specialized in aircraft turbines.\(^{145}\) However, no prisoner was allowed to immigrate in the immediate aftermath of the war. This was due to Canada’s strict immigration policies and the *Geneva Convention*’s emphasis that all prisoners were to be repatriated. What these immigration attempts proved was that instead of wishing to return home to implant the basic principles of democracy, internees had “fallen in love” with their detaining power. Furthermore, as historian Ron Robin indicated: “Neither British [Canadian] nor American re-education officials were able to secure pivotal government positions for their graduates. There is no evidence of large numbers of POWs from either program serving as apostles of democracy in their home country.”\(^{146}\) Clearly, the re-education program fell short, and, in a sense, backfired.

The creation of educational programs enabled prisoners to satisfy their thirst for knowledge. The belief was that while inmates were busy learning, they would be less prone to concentrate on their captivity. This led to the establishment of camp schools. However, during the prisoner of war phase, the situation became more complex. This had to due with the political ideology of the captives. At the time, Nazism prevailed in the camps of southern Quebec and was leading to much violence. This led the Canadian government to initiate a re-educational program which aimed at indoctrinating prisoners along democratic lines. The goal was to modify the internees’ beliefs so that when they be repatriated to Germany, the root of Nazi thoughts would be “exterminated.” And by using lectures, films, radio broadcasts and special literature as re-educational tools, Canadian officials were indeed able to open the minds of prisoners towards new ideologies, particularly the democratic ideal.
NOTES

1 Canada, Red Cross and Prisoners..., pp. 94-95.
2 Canada, Orders and Instructions..., p. 66.
3 As Sherbrooke internee John Newmark indicated: "If you come to think of it, we had everything you can imagine there. Professors of astronomy, architects...fur traders...and Cambridge and Oxford students...musicians, painters and sculptors; all the arts were represented, all the sciences, history.... It was a microcosma in itself, everything was there. That's why I learned such a lot..." As Eric Koch wrote in Deemed Suspect: "The academic talent assembled in the Camps [of southern Quebec] exceeded that of many Canadian universities." As another internee recalled: "Sherbrooke was a highly charged intellectual group...it was very exciting from that point of view we had every conceivable profession amongst the inmates and if you wanted to know about anything all you had to do is ask either somebody in the bed above you or near you and you get a very learned lecture on the subject." See Koch, p. 146; NAC, FHTC, EK, MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, “Interview of Walter Loevinsohn by Harry Rasky (CBC) in Côte St. Luc (Quebec),” [1980’s], p. 9-13; NAC, FHTC, EK, MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, “Interview of John Newmark by Harry Rasky (CBC) in Montreal,” [1980’s], p. 11-11.
5 So important were these informal lecture sessions that each Saturday was devoted to series of conferences held by the inmates at Camp Farnham. On one such occasion, internee Hans Karler, who commanded the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), gave general lectures on the military lessons of that conflict. See Duliari, pp. 200-201.; NAC, FHTC, EK, MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, “Interview of Emil Fackenheim by Harry Rasky (CBC) in Toronto,” [1980’s], pp. 6-7.; NAC, FHTC, EK, MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, “Interview of Walter Loevinsohn by Harry Rasky (CBC) in Côte St. Luc (Quebec),” [1980’s], p. 9-13.
6 According to one Sherbrooke internee: "I think...I learned more in the camp universities than I did at Cambridge before and after [the war].” One internee even went as far as saying that "Sherbrooke was one of the tightest groups of intellectuals ever assembled perhaps in this country." See NAC, FHTC, EK, MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, “Interview of Emil Fackenheim by Harry Rasky (CBC) in Toronto,” [1980’s], pp. 6-7.; NAC, FHTC, EK, MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, “Interview of Thomas Gold by Harry Rasky (CBC in Ithaca (New York),” [1980’s], p. 29-7.
8 NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 2 (November 1940), War Diary of Internment Camp "A" (No. 40), Farnham, November 7, 1940, p. 3.
10 When the Farnham camp school was created in November 1940, Montreal’s McGill University agreed to have the prisoners write their matriculation examinations. When the first
exams were held in the Spring of 1941, some 100 young men from Camps Farnham and Île-aux-Noix had registered. See Draper, "The Accidental Immigrants...Part 2," pp. 86-87. NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 11,253, File: 11-2-41, Inspection Reports, Camp Île-aux-Noix, 1940-1941, "Inspection Report", June 25, 1941.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 11,249, File: 9-5-3-40, IRC Report, Camp Farnham, 1940-1941, "Report of the November 26, 1940 Red Cross visit to Camp Farnham by Ernest L. Maag (Delegate in Canada for the International Red Cross)", November 26, 1940.

11 Those who intended to write such exams were transferred temporarily to the Italian internment camp situated on the Île Ste. Hélène in Montreal. Cordial relationship immediately ensured between German and Italian prisoners during such visits. For example, when the first German prisoners arrived at Île Ste. Hélène in the autumn of 1941 to attend McGill’s senior matric, "the Italians kept a crew up to feed the students coffee so that they could stay awake while studying." As one internee said: "we played soccer with them [Italians]. Germany-Austria versus Italy and at the very end, the night before we left they put on a special...variety show."


12 For instance, between April 12 and April 20 1943, examinations set forth by Queen’s University of Kingston were held at Camp Île-aux-Noix. See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5401. File: HQS 7236-83-6-41, YMCA Reports on Welfare Matters, Camp Île-aux-Noix, 1943, "Lt.-Col. R.S.W. Fordham to Major Bruce Thompson (Camp Commandant)." April 1, 1943.

13 As Major E.D.B. Kippen, Camp Farnham’s commandant, told William Heckscher, the camp’s school coordinator: "The results [of the matriculation exams] are fantastic...and I wish I could send my two sons to your school..." See NAC, FHTC, EK, MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, "Interview of William Heckscher by Harry Rasky (CBC) in Princeton (New Jersey)," [1980's], p. 27-8.

14 At Camp Sherbrooke a musical circle was inaugurated as well as a vocational training school specializing in wood and metal work, an Engineering school, and an agricultural studies school operated in cooperation with McGill’s Macdonald College. To suit the educational needs of internees involved in the camp’s Works Program, the Camp Sherbrooke School Board also offered evening lectures and eventually established a general education plan which included English language classes. See Koch, pp. 151-152.

15 Such was the case at Camp Île-aux-Noix in April 1942 when one of McGill University’s deans lectured the inmates on Canada. See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 22 (April 1942), War Diary of Internment Camp "I" (No. 41), Fort Lennox, Île-aux-Noix, April 13, 1942: April 21, 1942, and April 28, 1942, pp. 2-4.

16 Prisoners preparing for matriculation examinations studied such subjects as history, geography, mathematics, chemistry, physics, biology, music and arts. Those studying foreign languages learned English, French, Italian, Latin, Latvian, Spanish, Russian and even Japanese. So successful were language classes that 571 Grande Ligne prisoners were involved in this program in the fall of 1943. Furthermore vocational classes were also held and included sessions on agriculture, forestry, physiology, public speaking, draughting, music, history, the arts, arithmetic, physics, chemistry, navigation, bookkeeping, law, business management, metallurgy, mathematics, electricity, geology, automobile engineering, geometry, and railroading. These classes were usually taught by specialized prisoner of war officers. Study circles were also established inside the camps. See Buffinga, p. 66.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24,

Such was the case when the European Students’ Relief Fund registered a Sherbrooke internee for a Spanish class at the University of Toronto in April 1944. As university officials indicated: “I hope Mr. Herbert Boehme [prisoner of war] realizes that if such a Spanish course is arranged there will be no university credit given him as in the case of the Saskatchewan courses. However, such an arrangement with the University of Toronto professor will enable him to study the language and to learn it, if that is his main objective…” The same applied when another Sherbrooke inmate was given the opportunity to pursue a class on Ignition Engine Practice and Operation from the Technological Institute of Great Britain. See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5400, File: HQS 7236-83-3-42, *Educational Facilities, Camp Sherbrooke, 1943-1946, “Dale Brown (European Students’ Relief Fund) to Mr. Carl Witt (Camp Spokesman),” April 27, 1944.

Canada, *Orders and Instructions…*, p. 66.

Books, magazines and newspapers were usually purchased through the European Students’ Relief Fund and the YMCA. This included such newspapers as the Montreal Gazette, the Montreal Daily Star, La presse and the New York Times. Magazines such as Times, Newsweek, the Illustrated London News, Reader’s Digest, Life, and MacLean’s were also purchased. Orders also comprised volumes in such fields as democracy, foreign language, geography, history, law, mathematics, psychology, politics, philosophy and sports as well as novels. It is also interesting to note that prisoners ordered books written in English, French, German, Swedish, Spanish and Norwegian. See Buffinga, p. 59.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5400, File: HQS 7236-83-3-42, *Educational Facilities, Camp Sherbrooke, 1943-1946, “Alfred Pauli (Camp Spokesman) to Mr. Dale Brown (European Students’ Relief Fund),” October 5, 1944.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5400, File: HQS 7236-83-3-42, *Educational Facilities, Camp Sherbrooke, 1943-1946, “Alfred Pauli (Camp Spokesman) to McGill University (Redpath Library),” October 10, 1944.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5410, File: HQS 7236-88-5-45, *Correspondence, Instructions re. Censorship, Camp Sorel, 1945, “Lt.-Col. B.B.W. Minard (Camp Commandant) to the Director Prisoners of War,“ July 20, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9139-1-45, *Re-Education, Camp Sorel, 1945-1946, “List of Papers Subscribed to by POW Canteen,“ August 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5401, File: HQS 7236-83-6-40, *YMCA Reports on Welfare Matters, Camp Farnham, 1943-1946, “Colonel Jay (Camp Spokesman) to H. Boeschenstein (Director in Canada for the War Prisoner’s Aid of the YMCA),” November 28, 1945.

In May 1944, for instance, 850 of the 2,470 books held by the Camp Grande Ligne library were termed as “light reading.” See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5400, File: HQS 7236-


26 Nazi propaganda books such as Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf* and the German Army's *Soldaten Briefe* were removed from most camps. Furthermore, books dealing with current military subjects such as *The Political and Strategic Interests of the United Kingdom and His Majesty's Ships* were restricted. The same applied to volumes promoting revolution and social change such as Karl Marx's *Das Kapital* and *The Communist Manifesto*. Although some Atlases were tolerated, many were returned by camp censors. The reason was that maps of the United States and Canada were too big. According to regulations, "maps of the northern hemisphere or parts of the British Empire are not admissible if the scale exceeded 60 miles to one inch. Maps showing 61 miles or more miles to one inch are good and 59 or less are excluded." The main reason was that larger maps might be used by the prisoners to plan escapes. Canadian and American magazines were also censored. In some instances, articles were removed from publications. Such a case occurred in February 1946 with a *Reader's Digest* article entitled *We are bungling the Job in Germany*. As the Directorate, Prisoners of War indicated: "It is considered that said article is apt to arouse misgivings...and may also serve to encourage the more fanatical pro-Nazi POW in the belief that their cause is not entirely lost. Consequently, it will be necessary to remove pages 87-92, as well as to obliterate line 26 on the cover of this publication, prior to its admission to POW as reading material." See Canada, *Orders and Instructions...,* p. 58.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5400, File: HQS 7236-83-3-44, *Educational Facilities, Camp Grande Ligne, 1943-1946*, "Colonel H.N. Streight (Director Prisoners of War) to Dale Brown (European Student Relief Fund)," June 2, 1944.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5400, File: HQS 7236-83-3-42, *Educational Facilities, Camp Sherbrooke, 1943-1946*, "Colonel H.N. Streight (Director Prisoners of War) to Dale Brown (Secretary of the European Students' Relief Fund)," February 19, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5410, File: HQS 7236-88-5-45, *Correspondence, Instructions re. Censorship, Camp Sorel, 1945*, "Lt.-Col. B.B.W. Minard (Camp Commandant) to the Director Prisoners of War," July 20, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5410, File: HQS 7236-88-5-42, *Correspondence, Instructions re. Censorship, Camp Sherbrooke, 1943-1946*, "Lt.-Col. H.D. Hedley (Camp Commandant) to Director Prisoners of War," November 19, 1945.; NAC,
As the Camp Sherbrooke spokesman told the "Traveling Library" Department of the MacDonald College in July 1944: "Thank you for the entertainment and educational material provided by your library. This is, apart from newspapers, our only opportunity to keep in touch with the literary and political movements of this continent." Furthermore, according to Eckehart Priebe, who was interned at Camps Farnham and Grande Ligne: "To me as to many others the opportunity to study the Canadian press and literature became of great importance and of far reaching consequences, not realized before... What happened here... was a slow, imperceptible familiarization process, not at all forced down our throats, provided as naturally as food and shelter. You could literally read yourself into the character, history, economy or politics of a nation of which, hitherto, you had known next to nothing. We got acquainted with Canada and the Canadian way of life in a very unobtrusive but equally efficient way. There was no intention to indoctrinate us. Information and reading material was provided as a matter of course. It was of enormous help not only to pass the time away but to understand the inner workings of the democracies allied against our fatherland. The tolerance of the Canadians in providing newspapers, magazines, books and study material amazed me." See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5400, File: HQS 7236-83-3-42, Educational Facilities, Camp Sherbrooke, 1943-1946. "Alfred Pauli (Camp Spokesman) to the Travelling Library Department (MacDonald College)," July 12, 1944.; Priebe, p. 142.

As Camp Sorel authorities indicated: "English and American films receive the best reception, for the POW emphasize that these give them the best opportunity to learn the English language, while at the same time the films have a very strong influence toward understanding of the Anglo-Saxon way of life." See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-44, Camp Intelligence, Camp Grande Ligne, 1944-1946, "September 1945 Intelligence Report," October 4, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-45, Camp Intelligence, Camp Sorel, 1945-1946, "November 1945 Intelligence Report," December 2, 1945.

This included such relief organizations as the Canadian Legion, the Knights of Columbus, the United Jewish Committee for Interned Refugees and the YMCA. See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 10 (April 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp "I" (No. 41), Fort Lennox, Île-aux-Noix, April 30, 1941, p. 4.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 24 (September 1942), War Diary of Internment Camp "A" (No. 40), Farnham, September 12, 1942, p. 4.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 6583, File: 3-3-5 (40), YMCA Gifts and Donations, Camp Farnham, 1942-1943, "Jerome Davis (YMCA) to Major H.W. Pearson (Internment Operations)," January 19, 1943.

Buffinga, p. 59.

NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5401, File: HQS 7236-83-6-40, YMCA Reports on Welfare Matters, Camp Farnham, 1943-1946, "Colonel Jay (Camp Spokesman) to H. Boeschenstein (Director in Canada for the War Prisoner's Aid of the YMCA)," August 29, 1945.

NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 6 (March 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp "N" (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), March 25, 1941, March 28, 1941, and March 29, 1941, pp. 2-3.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 10 (April 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp "I" (No. 41), Fort Lennox, Île-aux-Noix, April 30, 1941, p. 4.

NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 6583, File: 3-3-5 (40), YMCA Gifts and Donations, Camp Farnham, 1942-1943, "K. Krieger (Camp Leader) to Dr. Davis (YMCA)," August 30, 1942.


As the Canadian authorities stated: “It is a waste of time and effort to try and do any re-education until the rabid Nazis have been segregated.” See Smith Jr., p. 24.

Page, p. 116.

The process began when the proclamation issued by the Adjutant-General in Ottawa was read in both English and German to the prisoners in all Canadian internment camps. As it indicated: “The German Forces on land, sea and in the air have been utterly defeated and Germany has surrendered unconditionally. The Allied Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the French Republic, acting in the interest of all the United Nations, have assumed supreme authority, including all the powers formerly possessed by the German Government, the High Command and all State, Municipal and Local Governments and authorities in Germany. The Allies will make provision for the maintenance of order and the administration of Germany. All requirements of the Allies will be carried out unconditionally by the German authorities and the German people.” Although the immediate sentiment was one of sorrow and deception, the situation hopefully meant the end of Nazi thought behind barbed wires. See NAC, DND, IO,

The conclusion of war with Germany enabled the Canadian authorities to adopt measures which were considered forbidden when hostilities prevailed. For instance, Canadian officials began to interview prisoners on war-related matters. Now that war was over with Germany, the belief was that internees would beт more likely to cooperate. This contradicted article 5 of the *Geneva Convention* which stipulated "Every prisoner of war is required, if he is interrogated on the subject, his true names and rank, or his regimental number...No pressure shall be exerted on prisoners to obtain information regarding the situation in their armed forces or their country..." Nevertheless, these interviews were conducted in a most exploitative fashion since they took advantage of the inmates recent vulnerability. In June 1945, for instance, three members of the 12th SS Panzer Division *Hitler Jugend*, who had been captured in Normandy in the fall of 1944, were interrogated at Camp Farnham regarding the vicious and brutal murder by their military unit of 156 Canadian soldiers. Their response was that "they fought against Polish troops, not ever engaging Canadians at any time. On being transported to England, after capture, they heard that Canadians had been in battle with the 12th SS Panzer Division near Caen, and that Canadian prisoners had been shot by SS troops. They themselves had not witnessed any shooting of prisoners or partisans." Whether this statement was true of not, chances were that none of these men would ever acknowledge the fact that they had participated in a war crime. Nevertheless, such interviews well demonstrated how the end of hostilities enabled the victorious powers to adopt measures which would have not been deemed acceptable under wartime circumstances. See Canada, *Red Cross and Prisoners...*, pp. 88-89.; Howard Margolian. *Conduct Unbecoming - The Story of the Murder of Canadian Prisoners of War in Normandy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), pp. 1-187.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40. *Camp Intelligence, Camp Farnham, 1944-1946*, “Lt.-Col. A.W. De Wolf (Camp Commandant) to District Officer Commanding (D.O.C.) Military District 4,” June 26, 1945.


As historian Ron Robin stated: “The sudden milling together of...prisoners from a wide variety of camps and from all services effectively removed the trappings of military life from the prisoners’ routine, thereby destroying their primary and hitherto sole, form of association. To further this goal, the prisoners were required to remove all signs of military association and rank...The program directors hoped that the absence of military regalia and the random grouping of prisoners would eliminate some of the unyielding “state consciousness” of the prisoners...the lack of familiar military frameworks would at least funnel the innate German respect for authority toward the instructors as symbols of [Allied] supremacy.” See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5366, File: HQS 9139-9, *Administration, Camp Sorel, 1945-1946*, “Baron von Schlothein (Prisoner of War) to Lt.-Col. B.B.W. Minard (Camp Commandant),” October 17, 1945.; Robin, pp. 151-152.

Smith Jr., p. 64.


Some prisoners had been interpreters and journalists while others had been high school teachers, technicians, university professors, secretaries, managers, railway engineers, farmers, printers, carpenters, engineers, lawyers, judges and doctors. With this in mind, prisoners were assigned special re-educational responsibilities inside the camp. Printers worked the camp press; professors taught re-educational classes; journalists wrote re-educational literature; cartoonists submitted re-educational cartoons for camp newspapers in Canada, Great Britain and the United States; bank accountants acted as paymasters; landowners and estate managers

54 Smith Jr., p. 72.
55 Ibid., p. 64.
57 Such was the case in June 1945, with a Camp Petawawa internee deemed to be “unreliable and unsuitable for any position of trust with the Allied Government in Germany or elsewhere.” As NDHQ indicated: “(A) He is not a confirmed Anti-Nazi; (B) He is an opportunist and it is believed he would serve or cooperate with anyone as long as it would be in his own interests to do so; (C) He possesses an unpleasant personality and will “grovel” at the slightest sign of friendliness or if he is requesting a favor.” A similar situation occurred in November 1945 when a Sorel prisoner attempted to smuggle a message to Camp Grande Ligne “in which was written statements prejudicial to the good of Camp Sorel.” As a result, the individual was immediately transferred. See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5421, File: HQS 7236-99, *Organization and Administration, Camp Sorel, 1945*, “Brigadier V.C. Thackray (Commandant Camp Petawawa) to National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ).” June 15, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5421, File: HQS 7236-99, *Organization and Administration, Camp Sorel, 1945*, “Major-General E.J. Renaud (District Officer Commanding (D.O.C.) Military District 4) to the Secretary (Department of National Defence),” November 17, 1945.

58 Despite this change, the camp retained certain prisoners who did not possess the education to do such work. For camp authorities, the presence of such individuals “was considered essential in order to create a well-balanced group and to assess reactions of the common men towards certain re-educational measures.” See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5366, File: HQS 9139-45, *Classification of P/W, Camp Sorel, 1945-1946*, “Confidential Report on Camp Sorel by Lt.-Col. R.G. Wygard (M.I.),” February 15, 1946.
59 As Camp Sorel authorities indicated: “This suggestion might solve a good many of the internal difficulties in Sorel and would tend to unify the camp a good deal.” See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9139-1-45, *Re-Education, Camp Sorel, 1945-1946*, “Director Military Intelligence to the Secretary (Prisoners of War Committee),” November 7, 1945.


70 As camp authorities indicated in November 1945: “Several POW have emphasized that they have attained a mental freedom and scope which they could not possibly have attained in other camps. All POW here are outspoken opponents of Fascism and other forms of totalitarianism; all are keen learners of the forms of democracy and at least nearly all of them recognize that the difference between totalitarianism and democracy is in the spirit and in the way of life, rather than in the structures of government.” See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-45, Camp Intelligence, Camp Sorel, 1945-1946, “November 1945 Intelligence Report,” December 2, 1945.

71 As Camp Farnham authorities indicated in April 1945: “In view of the impending establishment of a “White” re-assessment Camp at Sorel within the next few weeks, it would be desirable to be able to use Camp 40 Farnham as a preliminary sifting camp. Essential for this is that no known “Blacks” should remain in the camp.” See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5366, File: HQS 9139-40, Classification of P/W, Camp Farnham, 1944-1946, “Director Military Intelligence (D.M.I.) to Director Prisoners of War (D.P.W.),” April 3, 1945.


The provisions of the constitution are included as follows: "The POW, of Camp 40, Canada, have decided in order to regulate their own personal, spiritual and economic requirements, insofar as these requirements are not limited through the relation between POW, and the Retaining Power or the Geneva Convention, to set down the following regulations for the duration of internment. REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLY: (Article 1) The community of POW, shall determine changes in this constitution and regulation necessary for a productive "living-together" in camp, beneficial to all. (Article 2) For this reason all POW, shall elect a representative council. (Article 3) For the Representative Assembly two representatives from each hut (Four representatives from hut A2 - Other Ranks - ) shall be elected through secret ballot. A preliminary election can be held for nomination, substitutes shall be elected. (Article 4) An ordinary vote-plurality of occupants of a hut shall be sufficient to withdraw representatives for lack of confidence. (Article 5) A camp representative has the privilege to resign his seat in the Representative Assembly if he so wishes, or he can be excluded by decision of the Jury. In this case his rights of being a representative are suspended pending this decision. (Article 6) On written application of one third of the inmates of the camp all POW, shall decide by ballot on resignation of the Representative Assembly of on changes of constitution. (Article 7) Relative to articles 4 to 6, a new election must take place as soon as possible. THE CAMP COMMITTEE: (Article 8) As the organ of the Representative Assembly a camp committee is set up. It is responsible to it for decisions as given by the Representative Assembly. (Article 9) The camp committee shall consist of two members, who must not be members of the Representative Assembly, and the camp spokesman, who will act as chairman. The two members shall be elected by a ¾ majority by the Representative Assembly. They can however be removed by the Representative Assembly for lack of confidence. The appointment of spokesman, adjutant and Quartermaster is subject to approval of the Canadian camp commandant. (Article 10) One camp committee member shall conduct the financial, economic and administrative matters of the camp, whereas the other one shall guide the political and cultural requirements of the POW. If it concerns economic and financial matters of importance to each POW, the Representative Assembly must previously consent to that. (Article 11) The camp committee shall decide policy through majority vote. Each one of the 3 committee members has the right to demand the decision of the Representative Assembly in doubtful cases. (Article 12) In the execution of their tasks the two representatives of the camp committee as mentioned in Article 10 shall carefully choose experts, for their spheres of action as they deem it necessary. The Representative Assembly can at any time demand the resignation of any of these experts and appointment of others. (Article 13) The camp committee takes part in all Representative Assembly meetings. They have no vote in it. (Article 14) Members of the camp committee can resign on their own request or be relieved of their position in case of being transferred to another camp. In these cases, before relieved of their positions, the Representative Assembly will, owing to employment of those people in administration, issue a clearance certificate to them. THE SPOKESMAN: (Article 15) The spokesman is the representative speaker for the camp.
(Article 16) The spokesman has the rights and duties as laid down in this constitution and its regulations. His duties and rights, as empowered to him by the detaining power remain untouched. THE JURY: (Article 17) The meeting up of a jury, to administer major disputes, is reserved to a settlement still to be agreed upon by ballot of the camp. ADMINISTRATIVE AUDIT: (Article 18) An auditor shall be elected by the Representative Assembly in order to examine the economic and financial requirements of the camp. He shall receive his instructions from the representative assembly. RIGHTS OF PRISONERS OF WAR: (Article 19) All POW have the same rights. The Representative Assembly and the camp committee shall take care of their concerns equally. They have the right of freedom to express their opinion. They have the right to make suggestions and complaints. Decisions must be given them.” See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40, Camp Intelligence, Camp Farnham, 1944-1946, “Camp Constitution for POW, Camp 40, Canada.” August 11, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40, Camp Intelligence, Camp Farnham, 1944-1946, “Lt.-Col. A.W. De Wolf (Camp Commandant) to District Officer Commanding (D.O.C.) Military District 4,” August 11, 1945.


NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40, Camp Intelligence, Camp Farnham, 1944-1946, “Camp Executive Committee and Representative Assembly,” August 11, 1945.


As Camp Grande Ligne authorities indicated: “What a few intelligence officers can do in a week can easily be undone by the insidious propaganda of a highly educated crew of Blacks.” See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-44, Camp Intelligence, Camp Grande Ligne, 1944-1946, “September 1945 Intelligence Report.” October 4, 1945.


As camp authorities indicated in December 1945: “...due to the fact that every POW in this camp, unless he is sick, is engaged in one kind of work or other, the educational activities here, with the exception of Wednesday and Saturday afternoons, are practically Nil during day time.” See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-8436, File HQS 9139-1-42, Re-Education, Camp Sherbrooke, 1944-1946, “Lt.-Col. H.D. Hedley (Commandant) to District Officer Commanding (D.O.C.) Military District 4,” December 26, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-42, Camp Intelligence, Camp Sherbrooke, 1944-1946, “January 1946 Intelligence Report,” January 1946.


As the Camp Grande Ligne authorities indicated: “The lectures are a medium for the description and explanation of our way of life.” See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365,
According to historian Arthur L. Smith Jr., teachers were "representatives of the educated genteel middle class who respected education as the foundation of an enlightened democracy..." As Camp Sorel authorities indicated: "...the impact of intensive contact with outstanding Canadian personalities should have definite educational value. Impressions of the POW gained by the lectures might also be useful because outside, check on our evaluations." See Smith, Jr., p. 30.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5419, File: HQS 7236-94-14-45, Reports for Psychological Warfare Committee, Camp Sorel, 1945-1946, "Assessment Camp Sorel," May 3, 1945.


89 NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5400, File: HQS 7236-83-3-40, Educational Facilities, Camp Farnham, 1943-1946, "George W. Brown (Chairman of Special Committee of the Canadian Association for Adult Education) to Colonel H.N. Streight (Director Prisoners of War)," June 21, 1945.

90 Prisoners often commented on the lectures. Such was the case at Camp Sherbrooke following a lecture entitled "Canadian Indians" given by Bishop's University Professor D.C. Masters on March 20, 1945. As the camp spokesman said: "It must not be overlooked that most of us here read all about Indians in our boy's story books - Indians stories included. Cooper's [James Fenimore Cooper - author of The Last of the Mohicans] have always been popular with boy's in Germany - and their ways and customs are fairly familiar to us. After we all have read so much fiction about Indians in our youth, it would have been interesting to round off the picture with facts e.g. more items taken from their history perhaps with special reference to Cooper's works." See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9139-1-42, Re-Education, Camp Sherbrooke, 1944-1946, "R. Hertzel (Prisoner of War) to the Camp Censor," March 23, 1945.

91 One such exception was professor E.H. Yarrill of Bishop's University who gave lectures in German twice weekly at Camp Sherbrooke in March 1946. See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5400, File: HQS 7236-83-3-42, Educational Facilities, Camp Sherbrooke, 1943-1946, "Major A.R. Turner (Camp Commandant) to Headquarters (Military District 4)," February 6, 1946.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5400, File: HQS 7236-83-3-42, Educational
As the camp intelligence officer indicated: "The Committee now has appointed some of its members to take charge of various fields. On Monday afternoons an article on current affairs in Europe is read and translated to the prisoners out of Reader's Digest... Saturday afternoons are taken up with a Wochenschau, where the event of the past week are discussed from newspaper articles of particular interest. The lecturer, a committee member or one appointed by the Committee, expounds the ideas of democratic logic in presenting his review. An open discussion by the audience with the reviewer takes place after the address has been completed... In order to gradually prepare young POW officers for a more balanced and saner political outlook, to make them familiar with other types of government but National Socialism, two Committee members... have been appointed to supervise the scheduled lectures on constitutions of Democratic countries. The first lecture will be on the constitution of Switzerland... There will follow Sweden, British Commonwealth, USA and Canada. On conclusion of this series of lectures one period will be devoted to National Socialism, pointing out its crimes and bad points to the young POW, who do not understand what Nazism meant. Some of the points to be raised will be: The suppression of Religion and infiltration of 'cruelty literature,' thus justifying any crime as long as it was beneficial to National Socialism. Further state autocracy over Individualism. Discussions and lectures are attended by the Camp Intelligence Officer whenever possible." See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9139-1-40, Re-Education, Camp Farnham, 1944-1946, "Lt.-Col. A.W. De Wolf (Camp Commandant) to District Officer Commanding (D.O.C.) Military District 4," July 19, 1945.


As Lt.-Col. A.W. De Wolf, Camp Farnham’s commandant, warned in 1945: “It is evident that these officers, a great many of whom are young, will be a source of trouble in Germany, should the opportunity not be afforded to them to prepare themselves for their change over into civil life.” See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40, Intelligence Report, Camp Farnham, 1944-1946, “Lt.-Col. A.W. De Wolf (Camp Commandant) to District Officer Commanding (D.O.C.) Military District 4,” June 18, 1945.


Such seminars were inaugurated at Camp Farnham following Germany’s capitulation in May 1945. The goal was to prepare “students for future relations with the Allied authorities in Germany, teaching them how to make verbal inquiries, requests, etc.” See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40, *Camp Intelligence, Camp Farnham, 1944-1946*, “November 1945 Intelligence Report,” November 30, 1945.

As the Camp Farnham intelligence officer stated: “It is noteworthy to observe how every conversation wanders away from its original starting point to the fear of the Russians and Communism.” He also wrote: “The ever apparent desire to probe deeper into democratic ideologies and practices can clearly be seen by the enthusiastic reception of these conversations and the animated discussions resulting from subjects introduced by the Canadian officers.” See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40, *Camp Intelligence, Camp Farnham, 1944-1946*, “May 1945 Intelligence Report,” May 29, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5419, File: HQS 7236-94-14-40, *Reports for Psychological Warfare Committee, Camp Farnham, 1944-1946*, “Lt.-Col. G.F. Armstrong (Camp Commandant) to District Officer Commanding (D.O.C.) Military District 4,” November 16, 1945.

This was the case at Camp Sorel where two French classes were initiated in October 1945. As camp authorities indicated: “A class in French conversation was started, which we hope to use to the same effect as the English language classes, namely, as a channel to classification of the POW taking part, and to provide a situation through which the POW can be influenced regularly by our thought.” See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-45, *Camp Intelligence, Camp Sorel, 1945-1946*, “October 1945 Intelligence Report,” October 31, 1945.

At Camp Sorel, special study groups created by the camp’s work committee were organized in such fields as education, law, industry, organization of transportation, introduction to science, medicine, economic organization, religion and the organization of churches, philosophy, publicity, veterinary studies, gardening, health, the reorganization of agriculture, forestry, social welfare, and insurance, See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5419, File: HQS 7236-94-


One such incident occurred at Camp Sorel in November 1945 when four issues of the Information Bulletin of the Soviet Union’s embassy in Washington D.C. were received as “propaganda material from a friendly power.” After careful examination of the products, camp censors came to the conclusion that although these bulletins were very instructive, “German POW do not make a distinction between the Soviet Union as such and the Communist party.” Fearing that such pamphlets might introduce party strife in the enclosure, it was decided to reject such literature. As the Directorate of Military Intelligence headquarters indicated: “...it is just as well not to admit any material, no matter from what source, which might start undesirable political arguments in our POW camps.” As a result, the bulletins were rejected by the Directorate of Military Intelligence. See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5410. File: HQS 7236-88-5-45, Correspondence, Instructions re. Censorship, Camp Sorel, 1945, “Lt.-Col. B.B.W. Minard (Camp Commandant) to the Director Prisoners of War,” November 21, 1945.


So efficient was this group that in February 1946, some 56 articles had been written for future publication. See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-44, Camp
Intelligence, Camp Grande Ligne, 1944-1946, "February 1946 Intelligence Report," March 5, 1946.


115 In January 1946, for instance, some fifteen short films were received in camp Sherbrooke for re-educational purposes. Five were American-made, two were British and eight were Canadian. They bore such titles as Pincers on Japan, Atlantic Patrol (RCN), New Canada, Smoke Steel, Battle of Europe, This is the Enemy, People’s War and Price of Victory. See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5419, File: HQS 7236-94-14-42, Reports for Psychological Warfare Committee, Camp Sherbrooke, 1945-1946, "Major A.R. Turner (Camp Commandant) to Headquarters, Military District 4," January 29, 1946.

116 Such was the case at Camp Farnham in April 1946 when a Frank Capra film entitled The Negro Soldier, which had been designed to get more men into service, was shown to examine the prisoners’ sense of racism. This film produced much criticism and one prisoner of war Colonel actually walked out during the performance. As camp authorities reported afterwards: “This picture was chosen by the intelligence officer to probe the racial prejudices of the POW. These are still strong in the majority of the prisoners.” Authorities also tested the prisoners perspective regarding Communism. This was usually done by presenting pro-Russian films such Our Northern Neighbor. See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-44, Camp Intelligence, Camp Grande Ligne, 1944-1946, "May 1945 Intelligence Report," May 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-45, Camp Intelligence, Camp Sorel, 1945-1946, "January 1946 Intelligence Report," January 31, 1946.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40, Camp Intelligence, Camp Farnham, 1944-1946, "March 1946 Intelligence Report," April 9, 1946.

117 According to one Sherbrooke internee: “At times we see films in German of which the film “German Concentration Camps” made a special impression. One may say the same of the news reels. Ruins of once proud cities, de-lousing of old men, women and children, continuous executions of men. Then the loving care given to the slave workers by the Allies...” See Bernard and Bergeron, p. 315.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40, Camp Intelligence, Camp Farnham, 1944-1946, "May 1945 Intelligence Report," May 29, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-42, Camp Intelligence, Camp Sherbrooke, 1944-1946, "September 1945 Intelligence Report," October 1, 1946.

118 At Camp Grande Ligne, for instance, White prisoners accepted the content of such films as being true while most Blacks believed it to be mere Allied propaganda. At Camp Farnham, on the other hand, it was said that “the prisoners are convinced that the atrocities committed in German concentration camps are true but they state their disbelief that they could have been condoned by the Wehrmacht. They think that arch criminals could only have been responsible for such inhuman deeds.” As it was indicated in the Potsdam Agreement of 1945: “...the fact that they [prisoners of war] blame a distinct section, the SS, for atrocities, and another distinct section, the Prussians for the war indicates that the POW here have a tendency to excuse themselves as a people.” See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40, Camp Intelligence, Camp Farnham, 1944-1946, "May 1945 Intelligence Report," May 29, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-44, Camp Intelligence, Camp Grande Ligne, 1944-1946, "July 1945 Intelligence Report," August 3, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-45, Camp Intelligence, Camp Sorel, 1945-1946, "July 1945 Intelligence Report," August 4, 1945.
Other Farnham prisoners asked the Canadian authorities on May 17, 1945 "for consent to work on the land. The produce from their effort, they propose to forward to the needy countries. Alternatively, the produce is to be sold locally and the cash value handed to the authorities for food and supplies." See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40, Camp Intelligence, Camp Farnham, 1944-1946, "May 1945 Intelligence Report," May 29, 1945.

As the CBC indicated: "...programs ought to indicate that the POW's were conscious of the problems and difficulties of present day Germany and were planning constructively and sympathetically to make what contribution they could to the reconstruction of Germany. A complete break with the past must be indicated. Possible subjects for discussion might be the rebirth of German trade unions or the food problem in Germany, or non-political questions." See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9139-2-40, Material for Broadcasting to Germany, Camp Farnham, 1944-1946, "Lt.-Col. A.W. De Wolf (Camp Commandant) to District Officer Commanding (D.O.C.) Military District 4," February 16, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9139-2-45, Material for Broadcasting to Germany, Camp Sorel, 1945-1946, "Report on a Visit to Camp Sorel by H.G. Skilling (Supervisor for the Central European Section of the CBC)," July 12, 1945.


To facilitate the impact of such messages, prisoners targeted certain German regions. As one Camp Farnham inmate indicated: "We should address different areas in Germany separately... Bavaria must be addressed by a Bavarian, who knows the people there and who does not speak with a Prussian accent" while the Sudetenland must be addressed by prisoners with Czech accents. Furthermore, inmates were supplied with Nazi propaganda speeches so that they may mimic them and confuse the German listeners. As such, speeches made by Nazi officials such as Paul Joseph Goebbels, Alfred Rosenberg, Robert Ley, Baldur von Schirach and many others were ordered by the Camp Farnham radio group in December 1945. As camp authorities indicated: "We understand these speeches have appeared in pamphlet form. Such material could in our opinion prove very useful. The leader of the radio group, Lt. Karl Gass,


This lack of enthusiasm led many Canadian planners to ask themselves if their re-educational methods were achieving their ends. In the early years of re-education, it seemed that brutal Soviet methods were more successful. As historian Arthur L. Smith indicated: “The western Allied planners of re-education may well have asked themselves at some point if the severe deprivation encountered by the German prisoners in Russia was a stronger inducement to study than the more national arguments presented by the U.S. and Britain. If terrible living conditions could be improved by studying communism, many prisoners would conclude that they had nothing to lose; if camp conditions were tolerable of even quite good as in some American and British camps, prisoners did not have the same incentive. However, Western planners could console themselves that the prisoners who chose their offer to study democracy did so because of a genuine interest in learning about it.” As such, the temptation to abandon the program altogether became evident on numerous occasions. However, the fear that Nazi thoughts might prevail forced Canadian authorities to pursue re-education despite the weaknesses encountered. As Camp Farnham authorities indicated: “Re-education must stay active. It is held by this office that, should work in this field be terminated now it is rumored the success and progress already achieved here will slowly disintegrate. The desire to learn is there, the sincerity and eagerness to help those young ones solely educated under the Nazi regime is there. To neglect this fertile ground now would be an indication of lack of imagination and vision.” See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40, Camp intelligence, Camp Farnham, 1944-1946, “September 1945 Intelligence Report,” October 1, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-44, Camp

Such was the case when the commander of the German submarine U-889 arrived at Camp Farnham in May 1945 after having surrendered his boat to the Royal Canadian Navy at HMCS Shelburne, Nova Scotia, following Germany’s capitulation. As he told fellow internees “Russians rape young German girls and make slave labourers out of German workers...” See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 7236-1-6-40, Nominal Rolls Prepared on Arrival. Camp Farnham. 1942-1945, “May 1945 Nominal Roll,” May 23, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40, Camp Intelligence. Camp Farnham, 1944-1945, “June 1945 Intelligence Report,” July 1, 1945.


As the camp intelligence officer indicated in November 1945: “All indications confirm that the process of re-orientation has become substantial, in this camp. It now becomes evident how successful has been this somewhat conservative policy of morally providing the means whereby the POW can exercise their own faculties and develop their own thoughts, and by so doing gain an appreciation of our ideals.” So strong was re-education that Camp Farnham prisoners even went as far as to disavowing their ties to the German military. As camp authorities said: “Significant indication of the anti-militaristic feeling in camp 40 are the remarks passed on arrival here of 200 new uniforms through the Red Cross. Some officers and OR’s stated as follows: ‘We are done with militarism. We don’t want them.’” See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-44, Camp Intelligence, Camp Grande Ligne, 1944-1946, “July 1945 Intelligence Report,” August 3, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40, Camp Intelligence, Camp Farnham. 1944-1946, “September 1945 Intelligence Report,” October 1, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-44, Camp Intelligence, Camp Grande Ligne, 1944-1946, “November 1945 Intelligence Report,” December 3, 1945.

In March 1945, for instance, Camp Sherbrooke inmates indicated that, “Germans like to be missioned...they wonder why not more is done to prevent the rise of Communism, Cynicism, Nihilism and other odious issues. They say that they will return to Germany without having seen anything but the newspapers. It is not obvious that Nazism could only succeed because the average German has not the slightest idea of other people’s way of life.” To correct this situation, they proposed “sightseeing tours in locked buses” and small group visits of the Canadian parliament and universities. Although this solution proved to be an impossibility, their suggestion was most vital in proving some of the weaknesses of re-education. See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5419, File: HQS 7236-94-14-42, Reports for Psychological Warfare Committee. Camp Sherbrooke, 1945-1946, “Report on Weekly Lectures by R. Hertzel (Prisoner of War),” March 23, 1945.

At Camp Grande Ligne, for instance, two prisoners gave camp authorities an agricultural study of their own entitiled *Summary Dealing with Barnyard Manure*. They did so after the Department of agriculture had given the Grande Ligne inmates pamphlets, bulletins and publications depicting the great differences between farming in Canada and Germany. At the time, the Canadian government did so with the sole purpose of helping the internees working on the camp farm. Nevertheless, some internees took this as an indication that the Canadian government was seeking new immigrant farmers. As the two prisoners indicated: "Our one and only intention is, to show you our gratitude for furnishing us with Canadian farmer's literature. We do hope, that our essay may be worth reading for you, though we are fully aware of the fact that Canadian farming-conditions differ greatly from those in Germany...but we would like to give you a specimen of our interest in farming, which we hope to prove practically in case our petitions to immigrate into Canada as farmers...should be granted." See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9139-1-44, *Re-Education, Camp Grande Ligne, 1944-1946*. "Summary Dealing with Barnyard Manure," March 28, 1946, pp. 1-16.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9139-1-44, *Re-Education, Camp Grande Ligne, 1944-1946*. "Rud Bohnisch and Ernst Breiler (Prisoners of War) to Major T.L. Reid (Camp Commandant)," March 29, 1946.

Having read in the newspapers "that the United States is going to transfer German engineers and scientists to that country in order to let them continue their experiment and that England also approached German scientists of chemical and plastic plants for the same purpose and that Russia also engaged many German scientists and engineers to continue their research, he became interested to be employed as such in Canada." Between 1935 and 1939, he had worked as a gas-turbine engineer in Berlin. With this experience in mind, he offered his services to the Canadian government by enclosing a detailed report and the sketch drawing of an aircraft combustion turbine that he had worked on before the war. As he described; "Before the war, the German Reich asked engineers to build a new kind of engine which could use many kind of fuel, especially alcohol, acetylene, hydrogen and the like which can be produced in Germany. For unknown reasons, the production of high economic turbines was delayed for the duration of the war in favor of other kinds of engines to be used in planes and for V-weapons [reactors and rocket engines]. The combustion turbine was designed to create an engine with a low consumption of fuel. It is propelled by two rotors which are geared together. Through this, the effect is almost the same as that of a standard reaction-turbine. On each side of the two rotors are air inlets channels. Shortly before the blades of both the rotors run into one another fuel is added into the air inlet to rotor No. 2. The blades compress the mixture and at the climax ignition elements explode the charge. The expanding gases drive the blades by applying their power to the rotors." See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5366, File: HQS 9139-45, *Classification of P/W, Camp Sorel, 1945-1946*. "Richard Marchfelder (Prisoner of War) to Lt.-Col. B.B.W. Minard (Camp Commandant)," September 19, 1945.

Robin, p. 176.
CONCLUSION

The internment operation which was initiated on the south shore of the St. Lawrence River during the Second World War reflected well the pressures imposed by total war. By using Canada’s home front for the incarceration of civilians of German descent and prisoners of war, both the British and Canadian governments demonstrated how internment operations had become an integral part of any belligerent’s war effort. It also permitted a better understanding of the drastic measures that could be adopted by any government in the advent of war. Overall, Canada detained some 40,000 civilians of German descent, refugees and prisoners of war during the conflict. Aside from Germans, the country also incarcerated other “enemy ethnic groups.” These included civilians of Italian, Japanese, Finnish, Hungarian and Rumanian descent as well as other individuals whose ethnic background lay with countries supporting Axis forces or at war against the Allies.¹ Canada also detained home-grown Fascist sympathizers such as Adrien Arcand and members of his Parti National Social Chrétien, Communists as well as civilians perceived as subversives such as Montreal Mayor Camilien Houde who had preached against conscription.² Aside from these internees, Canada also detained thousands of prisoners of war overseas. In fact, James Bacque demonstrated in Other Losses that both British and Canadian Armed Forces captured some 2,873,900 German prisoners of war in Europe alone following V-E Day (May 8, 1945). Overall, the Allies captured more than 9,000,000 Germans military personnel during the war.³

Caring for so many prisoners in Europe after V-E Day proved to be a hard task for Allied authorities. In fact, the Allied powers were at first short of food and shelter for their astounding numbers of Wehrmacht prisoners. As James Bacque explained: “In a day and a half, Field Marshal Montgomery reported, half a million Germans surrendered to
the 21st Army Group in north Germany...British and Canadian camps soon provided just enough food and shelter for the prisoners to survive in fair health." This situation led to abuses on the part of the Americans, French and Soviets. According to James Bacque, "the western Allies had committed a gigantic war crime from 1944 to 1946. More than 790,000 surrendered [German] soldiers died from deliberate neglect after the war in the camps of the French and American armies. Half a million more were missing/presumed dead in Soviet camps." In fact, these governments refused to supply the inmates with adequate shelter and to provide them with the necessary supplies to survive. As a consequence, German prisoners were scattered in open field camps where they had to dig holes in the ground and live in cardboard boxes to protect themselves from the inclement. As Bacque contended, it was the policy of these nations to "deprive the captives of shelter and of army food as soon as the war was over" although access to supply surpluses existed. This "act of revenge" even went as far as refusing to allow relief organizations and protecting powers inside the camps. This was done in complete defiance of the Geneva Convention. On the other hand, both the British and Canadians proved that it was possible to keep millions of prisoners alive. In fact, both these nations provided humane treatment to their newly captured prisoners in Europe. As Bacque indicated: "The captives in the British-Canadian camps got shelter, space, enough clean water, better hospital care and so on....The Canadian Army permitted at least one German unit to retain all its telephone equipment and even to continue operating a radio transmitter. Within a few months, prisoners were receiving visitors in British and Canadian camps." Overall, probably no more than 10,000 died in British and Canadian hands.

The German prisoners held in Canada during the war were also fairly treated. Because Canada firmly abided by the provisions of the 1929 Geneva Convention, the treatment of German captives proved adequate. This was certainly the case in southern Quebec. Provided with recreational equipment through relief organizations, prisoners could undertake numerous activities in terms of the arts, education and sports. Prisoners read books, played games, wrote letters and poems, painted and made handicrafts. Music and sports were among the most important sources of collective entertainment. Both
helped prisoners bond with one another and enabled the rise of a “community” in the camps. Music boosted morale and helped to break the monotony of camp life. As Sherbrooke internee Helmut Blume recalled, music “was of great importance. Not only to us musicians but to the camp as a whole… I think that in this environment of uncertainty and fear which any type of prisoner behind barbed wire would feel, music helped a great deal to re-establish a kind of a balance and a kind of hope.” With musical instruments loaned by relief organizations, camp musicians formed orchestras and bands in order to entertain fellow prisoners. During the civilian phase, internees benefited from the presence of numerous professional musicians of European renown. Many of them had been educated in the great musical academies of Vienna and Berlin. As such, they brought to the intermittent camps of southern Quebec a taste of European operas and concert halls. At Camp Sherbrooke, so great were the artists that when concerts were given at the camp, civilians would gather on the other side of the St. François River to hear the music. In the end, string quartets, jazz bands, brass bands, and choirs were formed in southern Quebec camps while other orchestras concentrated on classical music, military marches and even operatic music. These bands usually gave concerts on a weekly basis.

Sports were also very important inside the camps of southern Quebec. Physical activity was considered vital for the well being of inmates since it helped keep the prisoners’ body and soul in shape. Sport equipment was usually furnished through relief organizations. Special courts and facilities were even constructed in most camps by the prisoners themselves. In each camp, inmates appointed sport supervisors whose task was to make arrangements for the necessary equipment, organize sporting events, teach various classes and take part in competitions. Prisoners of war officers would often encourage esprit de corps through team sports. As they indicated, sports helped build character and served as a rallying point for group solidarity. As such, numerous athletic competitions were held in the camps of southern Quebec. During such events, prisoners organized teams representing different regions of Germany as well as units of the German armed forces. During such contests, prisoners were often rewarded with special prizes.
In the summer, soccer was the prisoners’ most favored sport. It was played every evening in all of the camps.  In winter, ice skating and hockey were most popular. Ice rinks were created in all of the camps and were maintained by the prisoners. Although skating was a novel for most Germans and necessitated lots of dexterity, the inmates’ interest for this form of outdoor recreation never seemed to fade.  

Clearly, the Canadian government proved itself an adequate detaining power. Indeed, Canadian prisoners of war sometimes found themselves the recipients of privileges as a result of the conditions enjoyed by German Prisoners of war held in Canada. In Objects of Concern, historian Jonathan F. Vance noted an announcement made by German authorities;

Our Führer has been very impressed with the official reports of the treatment received by German prisoners in Canada. He has therefore authorized that preferential treatment be given to Canadian prisoners of war...a new all-Canadian camp is being prepared near Stettin. There Canadians will be allowed the freedom of the town. They will be able to mix among the civilian population, and go to shows and other entertainment. Their food will be increased to double ration.  

Still, camp life created severe psychological strains. Although internees were protected by the provisions of the Geneva Convention and benefited from numerous privileges, the sheer reality of being held captive was enough to generate stress. Restricted mobility, sexual deprivation, social alienation and the privation of material comforts were all factors which affected the morale of prisoners. As a consequence, internees became restless and uncooperative. In order to express their discontent, dissension sometimes emerged in the camps of southern Quebec. This resulted in strikes, riots, illicit activities and escape attempts. This situation forced camp authorities to apply discipline and punish the perpetrators. Another major problem had to due with the prisoners’ political thoughts. This was certainly the case at Camp Grande Ligne with the rise of the Hari-Kiri Club.

Hoping to minimize the consequences of psychological strains, the Canadian government introduced two major schemes in the camps of southern Quebec: labour projects and educational programs. The belief was that both these projects would keep internees occupied and forced them to spend less time plotting against camp authorities.
The aim was to broaden the mind of the prisoners, help them maintain sanity, show them alternatives to Nazism and prepare them for post-war professions. To ensure that the German authorities would not see this as "brainwashing," only volunteers were chosen to participate in these projects.

Because the treatment of prisoners remained adequate in southern Quebec camps, acts of dissension on the part of the inmates were rare. Instead, prisoners actively participated in the activities organized within the camps. All of southern Quebec's internees were repatriated by the end of 1946. The internees' return to civilian life had its toll. Since most had been interned for several years, their reaction towards "freedom" was mixed. As Eric Koch explained in *Deemed Suspect*: "For many, release was a bittersweet experience: they felt lonely and confused at first, having become accustomed to camp life where all decisions were made for them and everything was predictable and safe. Now, suddenly, crossing a street in a busy city was an unnerving experience; sleeping alone in a room without hearing the comfortable sound of 100 men snoring was like being exiled to some distant, unfamiliar and boring island." 24 However, on the other hand, hundreds of prisoners immigrated to Canada in the post-war years. 25 Influenced by the fair treatment they had received in the country during the war and the difficult economic situation which existed in post-war Germany, these individuals chose Canada as their new home because, deep inside, they had come to believe in the superiority of democracy and freedom over Nazism and tyranny.
NOTES


4. Ibid., p. 132.

5. Ibid., p. xxiii.


7. Ibid., pp. 172-175.

8. Ibid., p. lix.


10. The musical instruments that were introduced in the camps included accordions, basses, chelos, clarinets, flutes, guitars: harmonicas; saxophones, sithers, viola, violins and even pianos. See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 11,249, File: 9-5-3-41. *IRC Report, Camp Île-aux-Noix, 1940-1941*, "Report of the August 28, 1940 visit by Ernest L. Maag (Delegate in Canada for the International Red Cross)." September 1940.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 3 (December 1940), *War Diary of Internment Camp "N" (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), December 18, 1940*, p. 2.

11. As Eric Koch recalled in *Deemed Suspect*: “Many of us had a richer musical life behind barbed wire than we had before or after internment. I cannot ever hear the *Wandererfantasie* by Schubert or the F-Minor *Ballade* by Chopin without thinking of Helmut Blume practicing these pieces...in shed A in Sherbrooke.” Musicians were so engrossed with the "sound of music" that they often did not want to be disturbed when playing their instruments or listening to others. Such an incident occurred at Camp Sherbrooke on December 7, 1941 when pianist John Newmark and his friends were listening to the radio broadcast of a concert held at Carnegie Hall by Arthur Rubinstein. When a fellow internee burst into the hut in order to announce Japan’s bombing of the American Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor, Newmark hushed him and whispered: “Quiet please. The war will go on for a long time, but Rubinstein is an old man. Who knows how long we’ll still be able to listen to him!” See Koch, pp. 155-156. See Koch, pp. 155-156.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 3 (September 1940). *War Diary of Internment Camp "I" (No. 41), Fort Lennox, Île-aux-Noix*, September 4, 1940, p. 1.


14 Musicians also coordinated theatrical productions. During the civilian phase of internment, Camp Sherbrooke internee John Newmark directed numerous plays and often chose stories to which the prisoners could relate. For instance, the camp’s first play was known as *Androoulus and the Lion* and was about Roman Emperor Nero and the persecution of Christians. Newmark chose this story because a parallel could be made with the persecution of the Jews in Germany. After all, many of Camp Sherbrooke’s inmates were German Jews at the time. With this in mind, “...the story was switched. They [the cast] were not called victims of Roman persecution but...victims of Nazi persecution...” See NAC, FHTC, EK, MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, “Interview of John Newmark by Harry Rasky (CBC) in Montreal,” [1980’s], pp. 11-3 - 11-4, NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 3 (September 1940), War Diary of Internment Camp “I” (No. 41), Fort Lennox, Ile-aux-Noix, September 4, 1940, p. 1.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-44, Camp Intelligence, Camp Grande Ligne, 1944-1946, “May 1945 Intelligence Report,” May 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-42, Camp Intelligence, Camp Sherbrooke, 1944-1946, “May 1945 Intelligence Report,” June 15, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-42, Camp Intelligence, Camp Sherbrooke, 1944-1946, “January 1946 Intelligence Report,” January 1946.


16 NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 4 (January 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp “N” (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), January 1, 1941, p. 1.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 10 (July 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp “N” (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), July 1, 1941, p. 2.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,403, Volume 7

18 Physical activities became so important during the prisoner of war phase that Camp Grande Ligne inmates even went as far as building their own sports ground between May and June 1944. It consisted of a 500 yards oval running track, a 100 yard track, jumping pits, tennis courts and soccer fields. As camp authorities indicated: “These improvements will be of immense benefit to the generation of young Canadians, who will come to the Feller Institute after the War.” So important were sports that Camp Sorel authorities decided that every Tuesday and Thursday afternoons would be used for physical activities. As it was indicated: “These sport days are not holidays and no soldiers will leave the camp area.” See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5416, File: HQS 7236-94-6-44, Intelligence Reports, Camp Grande Ligne, 1943-1946, “May 1944 Intelligence Summary,” May 1944.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,404, Volume 6 (October 1945), War Diary of Internment Camp No. 45, Sorel, “Camp Daily Orders”, October 22, 1945, Appendix 1, p. 25.


20 During one such tournament held at Camp Sherbrooke in November 1944, the winners were awarded various kinds of German sausages. See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5416, File: HQS 7236-94-6-42, Intelligence Reports, Camp Sherbrooke, 1943-1946, “November 1944 Intelligence Report,” November 1944


22 Such was the case at Camp Farnham in March 1945 when an hockey tournament was organized by the internees following the viewing of a short film on ice hockey. As camp authorities recalled: “…the rink is just crowded, POW trying to master some of the play pictured in the film. One can see these officers rushing up and down the ice with fervor, their lack of hockey-technique being made up by enthusiasm, and even hard spills not curbing their affection for the game.” See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15.403, Volume 13 (January 1944), War Diary of Internment Camp No. 44, Grande Ligne, January 17, 1944, p. 4.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5419, File: HQS 7236-94-14-40, Reports for Psychological Warfare Committee, Camp Farnham, 1944-1946, “Lt.-Col. A.W. De Wolf (Camp Commandant) to District Officer Commanding (D.O.C.) Military District 4,” March 7, 1945.

23 Vance, Objects..., pp. 133-134.

24 Koch, p. 233.

25 As Eric Koch indicated: “Although some prisoners maintained hard grudges about their internment, most confessed to having derived immeasurable benefits from the experience...Most of us feel that the years spent in this compression chamber between Europe and North America, between Hitler and the post-war world, taught us a great deal about
Appendix 1

Number of Internees Incarcerated at Camp Farnham
1940-1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FARNHAM</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1944</th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>1946</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 16-31</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 16-28</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 16-31</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 16-30</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 16-31</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 16-30</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>374-534</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 16-31</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 16-31</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 16-30</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1-Nil</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 16-31</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1-15</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 16-30</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1-15</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 16-31</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numbers represent increases or decreases in the camp’s strength during a given half-month period. Numbers from July 1941 to December 1941 are an approximation based on the movement of prisoners as registered in the camp’s war diaries.

## Appendix 2

### Number of Internees Incarcerated at Camp Île-aux-Noix 1940-1943

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Île-aux-Noix</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1943</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 16-31</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 16-28</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 16-31</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 16-30</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 16-31</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>258-261</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 16-30</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>234-374</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 16-31</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1-15</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 16-31</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1-15</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 16-30</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1-15</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 16-31</td>
<td>376-373</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1-15</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 16-30</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1-15</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 16-31</td>
<td>322-324</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numbers represent increases or decreases in the camp's strength during a given half-month period. Numbers from July 1941 to December 1942 are an approximation based on the movement of prisoners as registered in the camp's war diaries.

### Sources:
Appendix 3

Number of Internees Incarcerated at Camp Sherbrooke
1940-1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHERBROKE</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1944</th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>1946</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 16-31</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>476-921</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>897</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 16-28</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>897</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>889</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 16-31</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 16-30</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 16-31</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 16-30</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>472-636</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 16-31</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 16-31</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 16-30</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1-15</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 16-31</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1-15</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 16-30</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1-15</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 16-31</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numbers represent increases or decreases in the camp's strength for a given half-month period. Numbers from October 1940 to November 1942 are an approximation based on the movement of prisoners as registered in the camp's war diaries.

Sources:
NAC, Records of the Department of National Defence, Sources Relating to Internment Operations, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volumes 1 to 12 (October 1940-September 1941), War Diary of Internment Camp "N" (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), October 1940-September 1941.; NAC, Records of the Department of National Defence, Sources Relating to Internment Operations, RG-24, Vol. 15,400, Volumes 13 to 26 (October 1941-November 1942), War Diary of Internment Camp "N" (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), October 1941-November 1942.
# Appendix 4

Number of Internees Incarcerated at Camp Grande Ligne  
1943-1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GRANDE LIGNE</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1944</th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>1946</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 16-31</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 16-28</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 16-31</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 16-31</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 16-31</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 16-30</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1-15</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 16-31</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1-15</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 16-31</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1-15</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 16-30</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1-15</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>712</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 16-30</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1-15</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 16-30</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1-15</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 16-31</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numbers represent increases or decreases in the camp's strength during a given half-month period.

**Sources:**  
Appendix 5

Number of Internees Incarcerated at Camp Sorel
1945-1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sorel</th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>1946</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 16-31</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 16-28</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 16-31</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 16-30</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 16-31</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1-15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 16-30</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1-15</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 16-31</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1-15</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 16-31</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1-15</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 16-30</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1-15</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 16-31</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1-15</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 16-30</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1-15</td>
<td>234-215</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 16-31</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numbers represent increases or decreases in the camp's strength during a given half-month period.

## Appendix 6

The Canadian Internment Camps for German Internees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ABC 1939-1941</th>
<th># 1941-1946</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>OPEN</th>
<th>CLOSED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;A&quot;</td>
<td>No. 40</td>
<td>FARNHAM</td>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;B&quot;</td>
<td>No. 70</td>
<td>FREDERICTON</td>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;C&quot;</td>
<td>No. 20</td>
<td>GRAVENHURST</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;E&quot;</td>
<td>No. 21</td>
<td>ESPANOLA</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;F&quot;</td>
<td>No. 31</td>
<td>KINGSTON</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;H&quot;</td>
<td>No. 32</td>
<td>HULL</td>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;I&quot;</td>
<td>No. 41</td>
<td>ÎLE-AUX-NOIX</td>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;K&quot;</td>
<td>No. 130</td>
<td>KANANASKIS (SEEBE)</td>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;L&quot;</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>COVE FIELDS (QUEBEC)</td>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;M&quot;</td>
<td>No. 22</td>
<td>MIMICO (NEW TORONTO)</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;N&quot;</td>
<td>No. 42</td>
<td>SHERBROOKE</td>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;P&quot;</td>
<td>No. 33</td>
<td>PETAWAWA</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Q&quot;</td>
<td>No. 23</td>
<td>MONTEITH</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;R&quot;</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>RED ROCK</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;S&quot;</td>
<td>No. 43</td>
<td>ÎLE STE. HÉLÈNE</td>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;T&quot;</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>TROIS-RIVIÈRES</td>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;V&quot;</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>VALCARTIER</td>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;W&quot;</td>
<td>No. 100</td>
<td>NEYS</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;X&quot;</td>
<td>No. 101</td>
<td>ANGLER</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>No. 10</td>
<td>CHATHAM</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>No. 30</td>
<td>BOWMANVILLE</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>No. 44</td>
<td>GRANDE LIGNE</td>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>1943</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>No. 45</td>
<td>SOREL</td>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>No. 132</td>
<td>MEDICINE HAT</td>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>1943</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>No. 133</td>
<td>LETHBRIDGE (OZADA)</td>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>1942</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>No. 135</td>
<td>WAINWRIGHT</td>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Bernard and Bergeron, pp. 17-19.; Carter, p. 309.; Melady, p. 201.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DND</td>
<td>Records of the Department of National Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOC</td>
<td>District Officer Commanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EK</td>
<td>Collection Eric Koch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETC</td>
<td>Eastern Townships Collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETRC</td>
<td>Eastern Townships Research Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation (U.S.A.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHTC</td>
<td>Manuscripts of the First Half of the Twentieth Century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>Sources Relating to Internment Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>National Archives of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDHQ</td>
<td>National Defence Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OC</td>
<td>Orders-in-Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QCR</td>
<td>Quebec Central Railroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCMP</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VGC</td>
<td>Veterans’ Guard of Canada</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

1. Government Documents

National Archives of Canada (N.A.C.)

Orders-in-Council (RG-2)


Records of the Department of National Defence (RG-24)


Vol. 6583, File: 3-3-5 (40), YMCA Gifts and Donations, Camp Farnham, 1942-1943.

Vol. 11,247, File: 9-1-3 (40), Complaints, Camp Farnham, 1942.


Vol. 11.250, File: 10-2-3-40, Intelligence Reports, Camp Farnham, 1941-1942.


Vol. 11.254, File: 13-3-10, Returns, Camp Île-aux-Noix, 1940-1941.


Vol. 15.399. War Diary of Internment Camp "I" (No 41). Fort Lennox. Île-aux-Noix, 1940-1943.


Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40, Camp Intelligence, Camp Farnham, 1944-1946.

Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-42, Camp Intelligence, Camp Sherbrooke, 1944-1946.
Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-44, Camp Intelligence, Camp Grande Ligne, 1944-1946.

Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-45, Camp Intelligence, Camp Sorel, 1945-1946.

Reel: C-5366, File: HQS 9139-9, Administration, Camp Sorel, 1945-1946.


Reel: C-5374, File: HQS 7236-1-10-40, Strength Returns, Camp Farnham, 1941-1946.

Reel: C-5374, File: HQS 7236-1-10-41, Strength Returns, Camp Île-aux-Noix, 1941-1943.

Reel: C-5374, File: HQS 7236-1-10-42, Strength Returns, Camp Sherbrooke, 1941-1946.


Reel: C-5378, File: HQS 7236-20, Organization and Administration, Camp Farnham. 1940-1946.

Reel: C-5389, File: HQS 7236-44-40, Escape Plans and Correspondence, Camp Farnham, 1941-1945.


Reel: C-5403, File: HQS 7236-83-7-40, *IRC Correspondence, Camp Farnham*, 1943-1944.


2. Private Documents

Eastern Townships Research Centre (E.T.R.C.)

Eastern Townships Collection (98-003)


National Archives of Canada (N.A.C.)

Manuscripts of the First Half of the Twentieth Century (MG-30)

PRINTED PRIMARY SOURCES

CANADA. Debates of the House of Commons Vol. 1. Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, Printer to the king’s Most Excellent Majesty, 1940.

CANADA. Defence of Canada Regulations (Consolidation). Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, Printer to the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, 1941, 72 p.


CANADA. Red Cross and Prisoners of War Conventions. Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier Printer to the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, 1942. 137 p.

CANADA. Regulations Governing the Maintenance of Discipline Among and Treatment of Prisoners of war. Ottawa: J.O. Patenaude, Printer to the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, 1939, 17 p.


NEWSPAPERS

The Sherbrooke Daily Record, 1942-1943.


SECONDARY SOURCES

1. Books


2. Articles


