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Kant's Leibniz-Critique in the Amphiboly Chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason

A dissertation submitted to the School of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the Department of Philosophy at the University of Ottawa

by
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July 2, 1999

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Abstract

In this dissertation it is argued that Kant's critique of Leibniz as found in the amphiboly chapter of the *Critique of Pure Reason* derives from his theory of reflection. It is argued further that this unfocused and fragmentary amphiboly chapter, which contains the Leibniz-critique, can be seen to have a previously unsuspected unity to it. The keys to perceiving this unity are the appendix's purpose, structure and mosaic composition.

The primary purpose of the appendix is not to present Kant's criticisms of Leibniz as is commonly thought, but rather it is to sketch his theory of reflection. Not only is this attested to by Kant himself (A 270 / B 326), it is also made evident by the structure of the appendix. Structurally, the appendix is built around an introduction to the operation of transcendental reflection and a discussion of the concepts of reflection, this being the structure of each of the first three sections. By means of each pair of concepts of reflection Kant claims to summarize
the basic tenets and origin of Leibniz's philosophy. Kant also
claims that Leibniz's whole philosophy rests on one seminal
error, which will be shown to be the omission of the operation of
transcendental reflection. To be sure, Kant claims Leibniz made a
number of other errors, but these various errors all derive from
the omission of transcendental reflection.

While this omission can be used to explain the other more
well-known epistemological mistakes with which Kant charges
Leibniz, it is undeniable that there are certain textual
difficulties with the appendix. These can be dealt with by the
hypothesis that the different sections were composed at different
times and then pieced together without detailed revisions. If
such a mosaic composition is granted, then some allowance can be
made for the noticeable incongruities between these sections and
for occasional problematic passages. This does not, however,
warrant the claim that the appendix is not properly placed or
unimportant. On the contrary, supplemented by clearer statements
of Kant's theory of reflection and of his Leibniz-critique, the
following interpretation shows that the appendix is properly
placed and integral to the primary aims of the Critique of Pure
Reason.
to my family
L'esprit humain envisage beaucoup tout d'un coup et c'est le génie que de le vouloir obliger à s'arrêter à chaque pas qu'il fait et à exprimer tout ce qu'il pense.

- Leibniz

Da ich während dieser Arbeiten schon ziemlich tief ins Alter fortgerückt bin (in diesem Monat ins vierundsechzigste Jahr,) so müß ich ... mit der Zeit sparsam verfahren, und die Aufhebung sowohl der in diesem Werke anfangs kaum vermeidlichen Dunkelheiten, als die Verteidigung des Ganzen von den verdienten Männern, die es sich zu eigen gemacht haben, erwarten.

- Kant
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I acknowledge with gratitude the help of my committee and readers at various stages of writing this dissertation. Thanks are due to my initial supervisor, the late Professor Pierre Laberge, who challenged me to look deeper into the history of Kant’s Leibniz-critique. Special thanks are due to Professor Graeme Hunter, who graciously took on the duties of interim supervisor and gave generously of his time and knowledge. Special thanks as well to Professor Murray Miles for suggesting that the amphiboly chapter might be a good thesis topic and for his helpful criticism. In addition, thanks are owed to Professor Peter McCormick and Mme. Danièle Letocha for their helpful comments on methodology.
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Introduction

The chief aim of this dissertation is to arrive at a coherent interpretation of Kant's critique of Leibniz within the Critique of Pure Reason, concentrating mainly on the appendix to the Transcendental Analytic entitled (in full): "The Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection Arising from the Confusion of the Empirical with the Transcendental Employment of Understanding."

I do so because this appendix is Kant's most sustained effort in his magnum opus to discuss Leibniz's philosophy. Over half of the explicit references to Leibniz occur in this appendix.

The thesis to be established is that Kant's Leibniz-critique derives from his theory of reflection. Understanding this theory is therefore a prerequisite for interpreting his critique of Leibniz correctly. Kant himself states that his Leibniz-critique arose in a way he had not anticipated. He states that:

A 260, B 316 - A 290, B 349.
Our table of concepts of reflection gives us the unexpected advantage of putting before our eyes the distinctive features of his system in all its parts, and at the same time the chief ground of this peculiar way of thinking, which rested on nothing but a misunderstanding (A 270 / B 326).

His primary goal was to outline his theory of reflection. That theory enabled him subsequently to articulate what he took to be the distinctive features of Leibniz's monadology and also to attempt to show that it rests upon a misunderstanding.

This task, however, must resolve an important problem that arises from the content and structure of the appendix itself. The appendix is both fragmentary and unfocused. Kant does not expound his theory of reflection as comprehensively, nor does he formulate it as simply as one might hope. Both failings affect Kant's statement of the basic misunderstanding which he maintains underlies Leibniz's metaphysics. Moreover, Kant presents several different accounts of what the basic misunderstanding is. This has led to numerous misconceptions of the Leibniz-critique as well as to significantly different opinions about the relevance of the appendix as a whole. More will be said of these in a moment.

Faced with these and other difficulties to be mentioned presently the task must be to provide a clearer statement of Kant's Leibniz-critique and theory of reflection than he himself
furnishes. This task finds warrant in Kant’s own view about understanding past thinkers:

[It] is by no means unusual, upon comparing the thoughts which an author has expressed in regard to his subject, whether in ordinary conversation or in writing, to find that we understand him better than he has understood himself. As he has not sufficiently determined his concept, he has sometimes spoken, or even thought, in opposition to his own intention (A 314, B 370).

In order to do so, it will be necessary to develop three key features of the appendix’s underlying organization: the table of concepts of reflection, the presentation of the basic misunderstanding and Kant’s theory of reflection. Discussion of these topics and of the secondary literature dealing with them culminates in the presentation of the ‘mosaic thesis’. I shall argue that some of the deficiencies of the appendix arise because Kant developed his theory of reflection on at least two different occasions, joining these texts together without detailed editing. The result is a ‘mosaic’ of juxtaposed pieces rather than a finely dovetailed exposition which might have forestalled the difficulties to which the appendix has given rise.

The mosaic thesis accounts for the fragmentary and unfocused character of Kant’s theory of reflection and Leibniz-critique. It must be differentiated from the more familiar claim that the
Critique is a patchwork, originally propounded by Vaihinger and taken over in English Kantian scholarship by Kemp Smith. The thesis is familiar enough. Focussing on the A-edition of the Transcendental Deduction, Vaihinger claims that Kant’s discussion is not unified and that the arrangement of his arguments is without internal unity. Kemp Smith expands this thesis and he argues that the whole Critique is merely pieced together, artificially arranged and offers no single standpoint. The term ‘mosaic’ is introduced instead of ‘patchwork’ in order to suggest that a stronger unity is present in the appendix than suspected by Kemp Smith. Following Adickes, I argue that, at least when clearer statements of Kant’s theory of reflection and his Leibniz-critique are supplemented by the mosaic thesis, the text exhibits a unity that remedies its original fragmentary and unfocussed character.

The mosaic thesis therefore challenges Beck’s claim that there are only two ways to read the Critique. He states that one

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Ibid, p. 23.
Kemp Smith 1962, p. xx.
Ibid, p. xxiii.
Adickes 1887, p. 16.
can either claim that there are real inconsistencies in the text, which reflect the slow composition of the text, or one claims that these inconsistencies are only apparent and disappear on a more penetrating understanding of Kant’s argument. The mosaic thesis states that there are real inconsistencies in the text, which reflect different composition dates, but that a penetrating interpretation of the text can find an implicit unity in the text which can account for those inconsistencies. The question is not whether or not there are inconsistencies, it is a question of how they are handled in one’s interpretation. Therefore, contrary to Beck, I maintain that the diversity of Kantian scholarship and adoption of his views over last two hundred years proves that the Critique does demand more philological and philosophical attention “than most other philosophical classics.”

Beck 1969, p. 469.

Compare, for example, the diversity of and within just the mainstream Kantian philosophy: German Idealism; Neo-Kantianism; Existentialism; Phenomenology; and Pragmatism (for a brief summary the reception, development and criticism of Kant’s ideas see Höffe 1994, ch. 13, pp. 231 – 247).

Beck 1969, p. 469. Or in Beck’s words, it does cause “more eyestrain” when studied under a philological and philosophical microscope.
The interpretation so arrived at suggests that the appendix should be regarded as an integral, systematic and significant part of the Critique. This interpretation is a preliminary step towards a larger project of presenting a detailed evaluation of Kant's Leibniz-critique. It is due to the length required to provide an exegesis of the appendix, that can both compensate for the weaknesses of the text and address the secondary literature, that other aspects of this evaluation cannot be pursued here. Some of the important aspects not discussed below are: the extent of Kant's first-hand knowledge of Leibniz; the accuracy of his portrayal of Leibniz; the effectiveness of his criticisms; and the range of possible responses open to Leibniz.

A preliminary sense of the main issues surrounding Kant's critique of Leibniz to be discussed in this dissertation can be gained from a brief overview of the secondary literature. It is unsatisfactory in a number of respects. Inattention to Kant's theory of reflection, to which his accounts of the basic misunderstanding underlying Leibniz's metaphysics must be accommodated, leads most interpreters to confine themselves to just one or another of these accounts. Consequently, the appendix is often viewed as unimportant. After all, they suggest that it is only an appendix and Kant charges Leibniz with nothing new, not argued for better elsewhere. On the other hand, some of those who view the appendix as important for its Leibniz-critique
nevertheless suggest that the appendix is misplaced in the
architectonic structure of the Critique. This further
misconception springs from the same source: the tendency to
interpret the Leibniz-critique as the primary purpose of the
appendix, while neglecting Kant’s account of the method of
transcendental reflection.

Few commentators in the secondary literature appear even to
notice the diversity of Kant’s accounts of the basic
misunderstanding at the heart of the Leibniz-critique. This is a
problem, because it compounds the error of ignoring Kant’s
implicit theory of reflection with an inadequate interpretation
of the appendix. Moreover, it also falsely assumes that the
presentation of the Leibniz-critique is Kant’s primary task in
the appendix.

The method of interpretation employed combines both
synchronic and diachronic analyses. A synchronic analysis
interprets a text as it stands, using the statements and
interpretive cues found within the text itself. A diachronic
analysis explores salient historical considerations behind the
composition of a text and the development of an author’s ideas.
By combining both methods a judicious and measured interpretation
of Kant’s Leibniz-critique in its historical context can be
developed.
The claim that at least the first two parts of the appendix have different composition dates is not based on philological evidence. It will be defended by philosophical evidence and corroborated by the work of eminent historians and Kantian scholars who have come to the same conclusion. In bringing out the implicit unity of Kant's Leibniz-critique extensive use will be made of the best scholarship on the amphiboly chapter offered in the secondary literature. Though these analyses are primarily German and English, some French literature is also referred to.

A survey of the literature reveals that the main schools of thought in the appendix are divided on the question of the appropriate method of interpreting the appendix. Those who claim the appendix is a work which expresses Kant's mature thought often reject the importance of considering problematic passages in light of the editorial history of the appendix. Typically, they do not even take seriously the claim that there are problematic passages in the appendix, even though this claim makes up the core of the argument for the competing school of thought. And those who claim the appendix is in some way not properly placed simply reject that there is a unified and unique critical standpoint expressed in the appendix as it stands. Despite the fact that both these schools essentially agree about the nature of Kant's mature thought, their interpretations appear antithetical.
By integrating these approaches the two main schools of thought can be reconciled, utilizing the strengths of each school to offset their weaknesses. Combining the best aspects of each interpretive method, it is possible to take the middle path between the two extremes, avoiding both the patchwork thesis on the one hand and the outright dismissal of the weaknesses of the appendix on the other. Nevertheless, two key issues are brought into sharp focus by these competing approaches. The first is whether the theory of reflection and its concepts belong to Kant’s mature philosophical thought; the other, whether Kant’s transcendental reflection engages the question of the subjective origin of our knowledge. By adopting a new approach, affirmative answers can be given to both these questions.

Apart from this combined method, there is a third traditional way of interpreting the appendix, that needs to be mentioned briefly. Some commentators on the appendix use a retrogressive method, interpreting a text from the standpoint of the author’s later works and philosophical position. Comments on such interpretations will be postponed until Chapter Five. Still, it may not be amiss to note in passing that they tend to discourage close study of the appendix itself, borrowing their interpretive framework from elsewhere. Should there be any change in the author’s opinions over time, then the earlier work is usually considered the one in need of revision. Yet, Kant’s
Leibniz-critique is not obviously the same either in the Critique or between his different works. Thus, although a retrogressive method may be appropriate for attempts to formulate global accounts of either Kant’s Leibniz-critique or his theory of reflection, such interpretations are less fruitful for understanding the appendix as it stands.

Before identifying the source of the chief problems to which the structure of the appendix gives rise and outlining the corresponding tasks of the individual chapters of this study, we shall discuss that structure. The appendix has four sections. It begins with the appendix proper, which is followed by a note and two further supplemental sections. The first three sections have the same topic. The second supplement, or last section, deals with Kant’s very enigmatic four-fold table of the concept of nothing. This last section is the most incongruous part of the appendix. It is likely that a similar opinion led Adickes to call this section a curiosity.

Moreover, it should be noted that Kant himself introduces the second supplement as if it were an afterthought to the Transcendental Analytic. He begins the section by stating, “before we leave the Transcendental Analytic we must add some remarks which, although in themselves not of special importance, might nevertheless be regarded as requisite for the completeness

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of the system" (A 290, B 346). This surely suggests that the second supplement concerns only the completeness of his revised system of metaphysics' and is not intended to be an integral component of either his theory of reflection or his Leibniz-critique. It is for this reason that this last section is not of special importance and this study shall deal almost exclusively with sections one, two and three. This approach is fairly standard. The fourth section is usually discussed independently of the rest of the appendix, if it is discussed at all.‘

Although scholars have divided the text in different ways, nevertheless for present purposes none is more useful than that proposed by Adickes.‘ His division of the text will be adopted

In order to make my discussion of the appendix uniform, the sections of the appendix will be indicated by the following names: the appendix proper (section one), the note (section two), the first supplement (section three) and the second supplement (section four). The names in the parentheses have been added in order to allow for some variety of expression when discussing the different sections.

‘ Cf., A 341 / B 369.
‘ See for example, Vallenilla 1965 and Vollrath 1970.
‘ Adickes 1889, p. 272, fn 1, cf., Adickes 1924, pp. 134, 147f. In the later work Adickes modifies his opinion on division VIII and IX. There he claims that together these divisions act as
here, with the exception of division IX, or the fourth section. The reader may find it easier to follow the subsequent discussion of the appendix if these divisions are pencilled into his own copy of Kant's text:

Appendix proper (A 260, B 316 - A 268, B 324)

division I: A 260, B 316 - A 263, B 319
division II: A 263, B 319 - A 268, B 324

Note (A 268, B 324 - A 280, B 336)

division III: A 268, B 324 - A 270 / B 326
division IV: A 270 / B 326 - A 277 / B 333
division V: A 277 / B 333 - A 280, B 336

First Supplement A 280, B 336 - A 289, B 346

division VI: A 280, B 336 - A 280, B 337
division VII: A 280, B 337 - A 286, B 342
division VIII: A 286, B 342 - A 289, B 346

The present study has five chapters. In the first chapter I give an introductory interpretation of the underlying structure of the appendix and summarize the four tenets of Leibnizianism from divisions II, IV and VII that Kant argues are mistaken. Chapter Two begins with a review of the secondary literature on Kant's Leibniz-critique as it is presented in the appendix and ends with a comprehensive interpretation and synthesis of the various statements of the basic misunderstanding that Kant transitional sections between the Analytic and the Dialectic.
maintains at the heart of the Leibnizian monadology. Chapter Three explores the ways in which Kant's use of transcendental reflection is manifested in the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements, offering a synchronic interpretation of Kant's theory of reflection, while Chapter Four is devoted to a review of the three different schools of thought concerning the appendix. The aim of Chapter Five is not only to clarify the position taken here by juxtaposing it with others in the secondary literature, but also to show that the appendix is not a pre-critical work and that Kant retains an interest in the subjective origin of knowledge.

As already noted, the appendix is frequently described as obscure. Many commentators over the last two centuries share the opinion that it is one of the most difficult parts of the Critique to understand. The source of this charge can be easily identified in the light of the purpose and structure of the appendix.

The chief purpose of the appendix is to outline Kant's theory of reflection, and primarily the operation of transcendental reflection. This is the reason why at the beginning of each section Kant devotes some paragraphs to a description of transcendental reflection itself. Having explained the operation in general terms, he then elaborates it through a discussion of a unique class of concepts called 'the concepts of
reflection'. A cursory glance at the appendix reveals that divisions II and IV are divided according to the different pairs of concepts of reflection: identity and difference; agreement and opposition; inner and outer; matter and form. They form the organizational matrix of the body of the first three sections of the appendix, namely divisions II, IV and VII, in which Kant argues that the use of the concepts of reflection in a procedure called 'logical reflection' can be misleading. He claims that one can be misled by these concepts in reflecting logically, if one confuses the empirical and the transcendental use of the understanding. For the most part, within the appendix Kant examines logical reflection in light of the transcendental employment of the understanding. The Leibniz-critique develops out of these concerns.

In contrasting, through transcendental reflection, the two different uses made of the concepts of reflection by the understanding, Kant brings to light the alleged four principal philosophical tenets of Leibniz's metaphysics. These tenets, he contends, arise from the ambiguity indigenous to the use of the concepts of reflection in logical reflection. Of course, Kant maintains that he can show more than how these four and presumably principal tenets of Leibniz's monadology arose. Kant claims that with transcendental reflection he can show that the
whole "intellectual system" (A 270 / B 326) arises from a single basic misunderstanding.

In light of this brief summary of the purpose and organizational structure of the appendix, we can identify three main sources of perplexity. First, there is some disparity in Kant's summaries of the false Leibnizian tenets, which differ between the appendix proper, the note and the first supplement. Second, Kant presents several different accounts of the basic misunderstanding allegedly at the heart of Leibniz's philosophy. Finally, Kant discusses his theory of reflection twice, yet in terms that require a good deal of interpretation if we are to synthesize his comments.

The focus of the first chapter is on the problems associated with the first area mentioned. Kant's various accounts of the basic misunderstanding are discussed and integrated in the following chapter, while the disparities in Kant's manner of introducing his theory of reflection are considered in Chapter Three.
Chapter 1

The Four Tenets of Leibnizianism

1.1 Introduction

The body of the appendix proper is divided by numbered sections, beginning with the first pair and ending with the last pair of concepts of reflection. The note has the same structure, but is instead divided by ordinal numbers ("Firstly," etc.). The first supplement follows a similar order, but without any explicit partition and explicit discussion of the fourth pair of concepts of reflection. Unique to the note and first supplement is the addition of extra comments following the discussion of the last pair of concepts of reflection.

A brief overview of the Leibnizian tenets at issue and of Kant's objections to them, may be helpful before examining the individual arguments more closely. His comments on the concepts identity and difference and the principle of identity of indiscernibles remain relatively uniform throughout the first three sections of the appendix. Kant summarizes this principle in the following way. An object is one and not many if on several
occasions one’s concept of it always has the same predicates. The challenge Kant brings to this principle is to say that concepts alone are insufficient to individuate physical objects.

The second tenet of Leibnizianism Kant discusses is the principle of non-contradiction. He interprets this principle in two ways: first, Kant summarizes it as the principle that opposition in reality cannot be thought; and second, he states that it is the principle that realities never oppose one another. This second summary is found in the note. There Kart is apologetic about attributing the paraphrase to Leibniz and states that he did not profess it, though his successors adopted it. Kant counters this reading of the principle by claiming that there is opposition in the physical world and thus opposition can be thought if one considers empirical reality.

The third and fourth tenets are less clearly formulated. In the appendix proper the third tenet Kant discusses is the concept of a monad and how Leibniz came to use this concept. In the note, however, he refers to the broader theory of the monadology and gives a reason why the notion of pre-established harmony was a necessary addition to that theory. We shall look more closely at his reasons below, but in the first supplement, Kant gives a more detailed account of how one could arrive at the notion of a monad.
In the appendix proper Kant's remarks on the concepts of matter and form are directed against the general principle that matter precedes form. He counters this supposed Leibnizian tenet by stating that, in the case of human knowledge, form precedes matter. Complicating matters here is the fact that Kant mentions four distinct notions of matter and form in the appendix proper, ranging from the logical to the metaphysical. It is not clear to which sense or senses the more general principle that matter precedes form is to be applied. What is clear is that Kant takes issue with the general principle, arguing that at least for the use of the empirical understanding form precedes matter.

In the note Kant changes his examples and states that it is Leibniz's doctrine of space and time that is mistaken. He argues that the form of sensibility precedes the matter of experience. His remarks in the first supplement vary yet again. In contrast to the appendix proper and note, Kant does not isolate the concepts of matter and form in the first supplement and no particular Leibnizian tenet is mentioned or argued against.

This brief overview reveals that Kant's discussion of the tenets of Leibnizianism shows two specific types of variation. First, the particular tenets of Leibniz's monadology are sometimes altered between sections. Kant's discussion of the first two tenets vary least between the sections, that of the final tenet most. Second, the analysis of the different uses of
the understanding varies in intent and details, since two quite different aims are in play: refutation and explanation. Kant’s goal is rebuttal when he discusses the first two tenets, while in discussing the third and fourth his aim is diagnostic. It is perhaps for this reason that the description of the particular tenets fluctuates more than it does in the first two tenets. However, with respect to details the situation is somewhat different and it is worth while examining the detail of all four cases.

1.1 Kant’s Counter-Arguments

(a) Identity and Difference
All three versions of Kant’s argument against the principle of the identity of indiscernibles focus on the conditions which enable us to differentiate objects numerically. In the appendix proper Kant contrasts the cognitive abilities needed to individuate two types of object: appearances and things in themselves. Kant claims that each type of object is related to different faculties of the mind. Things in themselves are objects of the pure understanding and appearances are objects of sensibility.

Kant states that, if a thing in itself is presented to the pure understanding several times and each time we can discern
conceptually that it had the same properties, we could say it is one thing and not many. This would be the way in which we would differentiate objects if our use of the understanding were transcendental. Kant maintains, however, that in the case of differentiating physical objects our use the understanding is empirical. According to him, therefore, if two drops of water are presented to the senses, then our ability to conceive their properties wholly or in part is not relevant to differentiating them numerically. In this case it is only a matter of seeing the different places each thing occupies. No comparison of concepts is required. Kant claims that multiplicity and numerical difference are given by space, which he claims is a condition of there being any outer appearances. He does not discuss how the empirical use of the understanding operates in connection with these objects of sensibility. Instead, Kant discusses how space purportedly makes outer appearances possible (A 264, B 320).

Space makes the numerical differentiation of objects possible, because, despite the fact that any part of space is completely similar to any other, if they are added together they make a bigger space (ibid). A house with four rooms is bigger than a house with two rooms; room sizes being equal. Kant argues that this also holds for any two things which simultaneously exist in space (ibid). Thus, if two very similar things are in different positions, then we can say that they are different.
things despite the similarity of our concepts of them. Our concepts of any two particular drops of water may be completely similar, for example, but simply conceiving them simultaneously does not entail that two drops of water exist. If, however, these same things are not merely conceived in the abstract, but are observed, then we can say there are two drops of water (regardless of how similar their concepts may seem to be to us).

So much for the appendix proper. In the note Kant’s discussion of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles introduces a new and important concept called the transcendental place. When considering whether things in general are one and not many, Kant says that Leibniz did not consider the transcendental place of his concepts (A 272 / B 328). If he did Kant says that Leibniz would have had a means to differentiate appearances from things in themselves. Kant asks us to consider a drop of water again. Let us say that we have a complete conceptual representation of its properties: “if I know a drop of water in all its internal determinations as a thing in itself” (A 272 / B 328). In this case Kant says that we cannot differentiate any two drops of water, unless we first distinguish the conceptual from the spatial. If we are considering the concept of a drop of water in the abstract, then Kant says the concept is in the understanding. If, on the other hand, we are using the understanding empirically, then not only do we have a concept of
a drop of water, but we can also see it. Kant claims that it is on the basis of the latter and not the former that we determine whether there are one or many drops of water before us.

One question that arises here is what Kant means by a transcendental location. If we work from what Kant paraphrases his point to be (A 271 / B 327), then his claim is that Leibniz did not entertain whether the object under consideration is to be reckoned among appearances (transcendental location a) or among things in themselves (transcendental location b). This is more consistent with his discussion of this principle in the appendix proper, but not consistent with what he has to say about transcendental locations at the beginning of the note. At the beginning of the note it refers to the two primary faculties of mind, namely sensibility and understanding. There is no obvious symmetry, however, between a concept being in the understanding (transcendental location a) and a concept being in sensibility (transcendental location b) in Kant’s discussion of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, because when expanding on his point he appears to refer to real physical places. In division IV Kant claims that space is indifferent to the inner determinations of things (ibid): “A location b can contain a thing which is

E.g. “Let me call the place which we assign to a concept, either in sensibility or in pure understanding, its transcendental location” (A 268, B 324).
completely similar and equal to another in a location a, just as easily as if the things were inwardly ever so different.” Though we shall discuss this notion further in Chapter Three, I take it up again briefly below in connection with Kant’s comments in the first supplement.

Coming now to the first supplement Kant provides another summary of the problem he finds with the principle of identity of indiscernibles. Kant says that Leibniz assumed that if a property is not to be found in a concept, then it is also not to be found in the real object corresponding to the concept either. He says that one need only look to the particularity of sensibility to see this, elaborating on his point by means of the following example.

He states that “the concept of a cubic foot of space, wherever and however often I think it, is in itself throughout one and the same” (A 282, B 338). No matter when or where I think the concept of a cubic foot of space the concept remains the same. Yet, as mentioned already any two real cubic feet of space are distinguished merely by their different physical locations. Kant claims that there is, therefore, a property that does not belong to the concept of a cubic foot of space, which belongs to space itself: “two cubit feet are nevertheless distinguished in space by the mere difference of their locations” (ibid). The concept of a cubic foot of space does not contain the property of
having different locations, because Kant says that it stays the same no matter where one thinks it to be. Things are different with the empirical use of the understanding, because it makes use of sensibility. The property of having different locations is accessible only to this empirical use. Kant states that these locations are the conditions, "of the intuition wherein the object of this concept is given" (ibid).

Kant's point might be paraphrased this way. On any two occasions on which I think the concept of a cubic foot of space, that concept has exactly the same properties. Yet, any two cubic feet of space differ in location. The property of having different locations seems to be what makes them two, for tacit in this argument is the process of intuiting the two separate physical places. In Kantian terms, the real contrast ought to be described as the differences between the transcendental places, that is to say between 'intuiting' or rather experiencing a cubic foot of space (transcendental location a) and merely 'thinking' it (transcendental location b). We could re-phrase Kant's point this way. The concept of a cubic foot of space is the same no matter how often conceived, but it does not follow that the amount of space intuited is the same regardless how often a single foot of space is multiplied.
(b) Agreement and Opposition

At first glance, Kant's account of the principle of non-contradiction in the appendix proper simply states that if reality is represented by the pure understanding, then no opposition can be conceived between realities. To illustrate his point, Kant suggests an analogy with arithmetic. Just as three subtracts from three without remainder, Kant claims Leibniz cannot think opposition, because he conceives two realities in a single subject and concludes that their consequences cancel each other out (A 164f, B 120f).

The problem with the Leibnizian principle thus interpreted, says Kant, is that there are conceivable counter-examples. We can think of empirical cases of something opposing another. Kant mentions the examples of colliding objects and two psychic states in which pleasure offsets pain. In both cases Kant claims that the opposition between forces or feelings provides counter-examples to the principle. If we express Kant's first counter-instance by an example of billiard balls, his claim is that when two of them collide, we see an example of real opposition. Conceptually, the feeling of pleasure is the opposite of pain, but Kant also suggests that the feeling of pleasure opposes the feeling of pain, such that the pain of a pricked finger would be impeded by the pleasurable scent of the offending rose.
In the note Kant modifies his interpretation of the principle. He says that, according to the Leibnizian principle of non-contradiction, realities [die Realitäten] can never conflict with one another. Advocates of this principle, he says, ignore the rough and ready examples of reciprocal action and reaction. Kant states that there are cases of real conflict where two things are combined and cancel each other out like \( A - B = 0 \) (A 273 / B 329). Instead of comparing this analogy with a sum whose amount is zero, as in the summary of the Leibnizian position which he aims to refute, Kant concedes that this holds true of concepts at least. He argues that it is not, however, true of empirical reality. For example, if one presses a stone with one's finger, the finger is also pressed by the stone. It would be a mistake to think that, since the resultant movement is nil, there is no real opposition between the finger and the stone. Since, according to Kant, Leibnizian-Wolffians can only conceive of opposition in absolute terms, the only negation in reality of which they can conceive is annihilation. Kant claims that this notion of reality is not only oblivious to opposing forces in nature, but it also falls short in the moral context. He says that Leibniz's successors argued that all evil in the world is a consequence of the limits of creation. A consequence of this view is that evil is wholly parasitic upon the good and has no independent existence. Kant states that Leibniz seldom appealed
to this interpretation of the principle, but his successors explicitly incorporated it into their systems.

Against this transcendent view of the moral order Kant urges that its proponents are unable to acknowledge real evil in the world. It is as if the Leibnizian could only acknowledge metaphysical evil (the limits or imperfections of created beings) and when he states that evil has no substantial existence, he means that there is in fact no real evil in the world. Committed as the Leibnizian is to the non-substantial nature of evil, Kant suggests that he cannot admit the real evils under his nose, e.g. in nature (disease and disasters) and in human action (theft, adultery and murder).

In the supplement Kant states that opposition in a concept only occurs when affirmative and negative concepts are combined in one subject (A 292, B 338). Affirmative concepts alone do not generate contradictions. Kant says that the Leibnizian concept of motion in general is an affirmative concept, whereas empirical reality has opposing motions for which this concept of reality cannot account. The Leibnizian only maintains that all reality is in agreement with itself because his purely conceptual representation of the world cannot admit of patently obvious examples of opposition in nature.
1.3 Kant's Genetic Interpretation

Kant's discussion of the concepts inner and outer introduces the second aim of his summary of the Leibnizian tenets, his genetic interpretation of the Leibnizian monadology. In discussing the third and fourth pair of concepts of reflection, he continues to differentiate the transcendental from the empirical use of the understanding, but he no longer argues for the falsity the former and the truth of the latter. Instead, Kant presumes the truth of his position and offers an estimation of how Leibniz came to formulate his notions of the monad, the monadology, pre-established harmony and space and time.

(a) Inner and Outer

In the appendix proper Kant tells us that, contrary to the opinion of Leibnizians, an object of the pure understanding has no relation to anything other than itself. The inner

This has also been recognized by Fischer and Ameriks.

Instead of introducing the third and fourth tenets by the name of the disputed principle, Fischer entitles them as follows: "Origin of the Monadology"; and "Origin of the Leibnizian Doctrine of Space and Time" (Fischer 1976, p. 147, 148, respectively).

Concerning the third pair of concepts of reflection Ameriks also notes that, "Kant presents not so mush a counter argument as rather a hypothesis..." (Ameriks 1992, p. 255).
determinations of an appearance, on the other hand, are wholly made up of relations (A 265, B 321). Misunderstanding the proper use of the understanding can arise when the ambiguities of the concepts of inner and outer. Kant avers that the concept of a monad originated from such an error. In seeking to understand the world, Leibniz uses the pure understanding transcendentally. According to Kant, the only properties available to pure understanding to consider in this situation are properties which are internal to the mind (such as having representations or thinking).

He counters with the claim that we know of things which exist in space only through the senses and not by pure thought. In order to make sense of our talk about substances in space, Kant conjectures that Leibniz had to attribute some property he knew to every individual substance. The only property Kant claims Leibniz is entitled to is ‘thinking’ and thus the concept of the monad was introduced. Existent things or substances came to be discussed as subjects endowed with the power of having representations, because Leibniz had no other properties available to him. He therefore interpreted them as a thinking [ein Denken] or analogous to thinking (A 266, B 321).

Kant expands his genetic interpretation in the note, from accounting for the concept of a monad, to explaining the origin of the whole monadology. He even addresses the pre-established
harmony between individual monads. Leibniz is again described as believing that the mind is directly acquainted with the thing in itself. This, Kant says, is because he is misled by an ambiguity of the concepts of inner and outer, falsely taking himself to be considering monads or simple things through projecting the feature of possessing only inner qualities (an essence or internal nature) onto the objects of experience. Kant claims that since the properties of place, shape, contact and motion are determinations based on outer sensible relations and unavailable to Leibniz, he takes the property of being simple from his own inner representations, or experience of himself.

It is here that Kant also alludes to the doctrine of pre-established harmony. He includes not only the physical influence of objects upon other objects, but also the physical influence of the world on the experiencing subject, suggesting that the introduction of this harmony indicates his acknowledgment that the pure understanding has no relation to the existence of anything outside its own representations and reflective activity (A 275 / B 331). Without effective and real outer relations, monads cannot interact physically and thus a third cause' is

What Kant states in the 'General Note on the System of the Principles’ (B 288 - B 294) is a significant departure from this interpretation of the problem with the Leibnizian notion of the community of substances in the appendix. In the General Note he
required to make sense of the apparent interaction between sensible things. Pre-established harmony thus had to be introduced by Leibniz, because he needed to account for physical influence between the simple monads.

(b) Matter and Form

Kant's discussion of matter and form varies more than any of the other three pairs of concepts of reflection. This can be disconcerting for the reader, because Kant claims that these concepts are very important. They ground all reflection and are inseparably tied to all employment of the understanding (A 266, B 311). In the appendix proper Kant mentions no fewer than four different and presumably Leibnizian conceptions of matter and form. He summarizes them by the principle that 'matter precedes form':

Logicians formerly gave the name 'matter' to the universal, and the name 'form' to the specific difference. In any judgment we can call the given concepts logical matter (i.e., matter for the judgment), and their relation (by means of the copula) the form of the judgment. In every being the constituent elements of it (essentialia) are the

states that, because he thought the world through the understanding alone, Leibniz "had therefore to resort to the mediating intervention of a Deity" (B 293) to account for the community of substances.
matter, the mode in which they are combined in one thing the essential form (A 266, B 323).

Kant rejects the principle that matter precedes form and claims that for the empirical use of the understanding the converse of this principle is true; form precedes matter. He repeats the genetic interpretation of the monadology described in the appendix proper and expands it to include the concepts of space and time. After projecting a universe of simple monads Kant says that Leibniz assumed a direct and immediate connection between things in themselves through the understanding. On this assumption, Kant remarks, it would be right to think of space and time as properties of things in themselves. But Kant challenges this assumption, stating that space and time are unique representations, which actually precede and make possible that which is given to the understanding (A 267, B 323). For Kant, space and time are not the intelligible forms of things in themselves, but rather are the sensible forms of appearances. As a priori sensible intuitions, space and time precede the given data of experience (ibid). As unique subjective conditions Kant states that space and time are the original forms of all perception. Therefore, in any empirical use of the

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"Da aber die sinnliche Anschauung eine ganze besondere subjektive Bedingung ist, welche aller Wahrnehmung a priori zum
understanding, form (or the sensible intuitions of space and time) precedes matter (or the things themselves which appear (A 268, B 324)). This is the so because representations of the latter are possible only given the intuitive capacity of the former.

In the note Kant is clearer about the Leibnizian tenet at issue and his problem with it. Referring to the Leibnizian doctrine of space and time, he claims that Leibniz’s mistake lay in not recognizing the unique subjective a priori mode of intuition, i.e. human sensibility. There are three steps to Kant’s interpretation of how Leibniz came to overlook this faculty and misunderstand space and time. First, if the relations among things are represented solely by the understanding, then Kant says that those relations must be conceived in terms of grounds and consequences. In Kant’s Morgenvius Metaphysics lectures he states that a ground “is that which, having been posited, another thing is posited determinately, the consequence is that which is not posited unless something else is posited”. For example, if one sees a footprint, one thinks there was once a human being present. As for the second stage, Kant notes that Leibniz claimed that space was a certain order in the community

Gründe liegt, und deren Form ursprünglich ist” (Ak. III, p. 219).

Kant 1997, p. 162.

Ibid, p. 163.
of substances and time the dynamic sequence of their states. He viewed space and time as the intelligible form of the relations among things in themselves. Finally, Kant says that Leibniz claimed that this intelligible order was the same order for representations of the empirical world.

It is this third step that Kant rejects, claiming that Leibniz overlooked that the faculty of sensibility could have a form of intuition unique to itself. He suggests that those who think we can intuit things in themselves should examine their concepts of such things by the operation of transcendental reflection \( A 276 / B 332 \). Kant suggests that one would then realize that space and time are only properties of the way things appear, and are not properties of things in themselves.

Before exploring in more detail how Kant describes this operation of transcendental reflection, we need to look at the basic misunderstanding Kant believes Leibniz made. A better understanding of the different types and accounts of the basic misunderstanding with which Kant charges Leibniz will help us understand the reason why Kant envisions that we need transcendental reflection. Leibniz’s basic misunderstanding is the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter 2

Leibniz's Basic Misunderstanding

2.1 Introduction

The previous chapter introduced three areas of difficulty in the appendix, pointing out the troubling variability of expression with which Kant summarizes what he takes to be the four main tenets of Leibniz's monadology. According to Kant, the Leibnizian tenets are all mistaken, resulting from the ambiguity and consequent misinterpretation of the concepts of reflection. He states that his summary of these tenets was an unforeseen consequence of developing his list of the concepts of reflection. Kant did not anticipate that the ambiguity of these concepts would also summarize the key tenets of Leibniz's philosophy.

As already noted, Kant contends that he can show that Leibniz's whole philosophy derives ultimately from a single error. When we survey the manner in which Kant expresses this purported error we find a further anomaly in the fact that there are several different accounts of one and the same error. The aim of this chapter is to summarize these different accounts and to
review the problems with the relevant secondary literature. There are no fewer than seven distinct statements of Leibniz’s fundamental error, which can be subsumed under one or the other of two types, either the logical or the epistemological.

The fundamental misunderstanding with which Kant charges Leibniz is that he was without a critical philosophy. In terms of the above classification system the different accounts of the basic misunderstanding can be synthesized in the following manner. Kant explains why Leibniz made the logical mistakes by introducing what he takes to be Leibniz’s mistaken dogmatic epistemology. These epistemic problems arose because Leibniz did not give a critical evaluation of the mind’s own powers. Kant’s critical solution to the epistemic problems is to offer a critical evaluation of these powers using transcendental reflection. The most fundamental charge on the basis of which certain more popular charges are developed is that Leibniz lacked the method of transcendental reflection.

This charge coincides with the main purpose of the appendix. As stated in Chapter One, the presentation of the rudiments of a theory of reflection is the primary purpose of the appendix. Before turning to an exposition of this theory, however, I shall review the shortcomings of the secondary literature concerning Kant’s critique of Leibniz.
2.2 The Secondary Literature

Nearly every study of the Leibniz-critique is unsatisfactory in one or more of three ways: either (1) insufficient attention is paid to the different accounts of the basic error, or (2) the structure of the appendix is left out of account, or (3) the Leibniz-critique is assumed to be the sole or primary purpose of the appendix.

The first failure, while a fairly minor fault in itself, leads to the selection of one or another of the accounts as a convenient summary, so that no comprehensive interpretation of the appendix or Leibniz-critique is given at all. Sometimes the failure to mention the different accounts arises because the commentators are unaware of the underlying structure of the appendix. Some commentators who make this second mistake even claim that there is no structure to the appendix at all, that the whole appendix is simply the result of Kant's obscure style and philosophy. To one commentator the appendix appears so obscure that he suggests that the appendix may have only been included in the Critique by accident. Others focus on only one tenet or one account of the basic misunderstanding in the

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Kemp Smith 1962, pp. xx, xxii, xxiii.
Döring 1904, p. 7.
Erdmann 1878, p. 37, fn. 1.
appendix, because they do not recognize the overall structure of the appendix. Still others maintain that the primary concern of the appendix is to discuss Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Or again, that Kant is introducing a relational concept of nature or that he is arguing primarily against the system of pre-established harmony. The former interpretation, which concentrates on the concepts of identity and difference, at least has the merit of focusing on a tenet that Kant consistently addresses in each of the first three sections. The last mentioned misinterpretations restrict themselves to the concepts of inner and outer.'

What remains unrecognized in such interpretations is that there are four pairs of concepts of reflection discussed in the appendix and that it is due to one basic misunderstanding that

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- Laywine 1993, pp. 39, 141.

Pereboom claims that this pair of concepts is independent of the other pairs (Pereboom 1991, p. 57) and suspects that there is no deep difference between the third and fourth pair of concepts of reflection (ibid, p. 57, fn. 14).
- A.C. Ewing recognizes that Kant discusses four false tenets (Ewing 1938, p. 169).
ambiguity arises in each of the four. The principle of the identity of indiscernibles is therefore not the most fundamental misunderstanding with which Kant charges Leibniz, nor is it Kant's primary concern in the appendix. However crucial to Kant's critical response to dogmatic epistemology, the concepts of inner and outer are not the most important pair of concepts of reflection either. That role is given to the fourth pair, namely matter and form (A 266, B 322).

Other commentators focus on the dogmatic epistemological mistakes. Here too the structure of the appendix is often not penetrated. To these authors the listing of the table of concepts of reflection appears completely arbitrary or irrelevant, while Kant's discussion of the epistemological errors seems redundant since the same mistakes were discussed in greater detail in the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic.

There are also those who stress the importance of the formal fallacy mentioned in the appendix. In these interpretations the placement of the appendix is often questioned. Since the logic of illusion is scheduled to be discussed in the Transcendental


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Dialectic, some of these commentators hypothesize that Kant misplaced the appendix. They suggest that aim of the appendix relates better to the task of the Transcendental Dialectic than to the subject of the Transcendental Analytic.

Omission of the various accounts of the basic misunderstanding becomes more significant in a second way as well. The third fault is that some commentators claim that the primary purpose of the appendix is the presentation of Kant's Leibniz-critique. Omitting the other accounts, they claim to summarize Kant's Leibniz-critique with only a partial listing of

the mistakes." Such interpretations are open to the charge of being arbitrary, because they neither address the other tenets or accounts, nor incorporate them into their interpretations of the Leibniz-critique. Moreover, focusing on only one of the accounts of the basic error leads to the suspicion that the appendix is either trivial or misplaced or redundant. If exposing an informal fallacy of ambiguity is Kant's primary concern, then the appendix appears to have a trivial task. If the formal fallacy were central, the appendix would be misplaced. If the exposition of any of the three particular dogmatic epistemological errors is the primary goal, it would indeed be redundant since they are discussed in greater depth in the Transcendental Aesthetic and Analytic.

Only if the presentation of the theory of reflection is understood as the primary goal of the appendix can it be interpreted as systematic, properly placed, non-trivial, and not entirely redundant. This approach has the benefit of being able to account for both the structure of the appendix and the various versions of the Leibniz-critique. Furthermore, this thesis is

Hess, for example, summarizes four mistaken theses, but they are not the same as those discussed in Chapter One (cf., Hess 1981, p. 217f). Moreover, only three of these theses are taken from the appendix. The other thesis is taken from the Transcendental Aesthetic.

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supported indirectly by some secondary literature concerning the value of the Leibniz-critique.

Despite the frequent claim that Kant’s Leibniz-critique is the primary purpose of the appendix, commentators often avoid or reject outright the need for an explicit analysis of the accuracy of Kant’s interpretation of Leibniz. Thus, although Cassirer says that there is abundant and unambiguous evidence that Kant studied Leibniz’s New Essays intensely, he avoids the question of whether Kant properly understood the text: “this is of little importance for the history of Kant’s intellectual evolution, since it is not a matter of what Leibniz was, but of how Kant understood and saw him.” Even in contemporary analyses which focus on Kant’s Leibniz-critique and theory of reflection, the accuracy of Kant’s interpretation of Leibniz is regarded as unimportant.

When Kant’s interpretation of Leibniz is carefully examined, it is the considered opinion of a number of scholars that it is unsuccessful.” The inaccuracy of Kant’s interpretation of

Hildebrandt 1955, pp. 25, 43, McRae 1976, pp. 82, 145,
Pereboom 1991, p. 66. Martin claims that Kant’s theoretical philosophy is in intention and in achievement a fundamental discussion with Leibniz (cf., Belaval 1966, p. 1). Yet, even

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Leibniz has also led commentators to find philosophers to whom one could apply Kant's criticisms. Three other Leibnizians are suggested in the literature, namely Wolff, Baumgarten, and the pre-critical Kant. Which of the three is selected varies according to the commentator's choice of the particular basic misunderstanding at the heart of the Leibniz-critique.

Those who focus on epistemology suggest that Wolff is the subject of Kant's strictures. Those who focus on the principle of the identity of indiscernibles see strong connections with Baumgarten. Two commentators even maintain that the appendix represents some of Kant's own self-criticisms. Schnadelbach claims that the appendix contains a critical reconstruction of the methodological foundation of rationalistic metaphysics and his own pre-critical philosophy. Allison maintains that the appendix is Kant's attempt to provide a critical corrective to some of the metaphysical excesses of his Inaugural．

Martin claims that Leibniz is often criticized with little success (Martin 1961, p. 76).


Schnadelbach 1977, p. 39
Dissertation." Both commentators suggest that a closer understanding of the appendix would be fruitful — as indeed the present study will show it to be.

Though unique, the approach to be taken here is not wholly novel. There are a few commentators who mention that the omission of such an operation is the fundamental charge Kant makes against Leibniz in the appendix. The best account of Kant as a critic of Leibniz is Parkinson. He lists a few of Kant's accounts of the basic misunderstanding and states that, according to Kant, Leibniz uses four pairs of concepts of reflection to generate fallaciously a distinctive feature of his philosophical system.1 Leibniz does not recognize sensibility and understanding as two different sources of knowledge, assuming that sensation is just a form of confused thinking. Parkinson claims that Kant's reason for why Leibniz was misled by the concepts of reflection is that he was without transcendental reflection.2 Though Parkinson

In R 1964 Kant states of the Critique, that, "Through this treatise the value of my previous metaphysical publications has been completely destroyed. I shall now merely try to save the correctness of the idea" (Ak. XVIII, p. 42, translation: Werkmeister 1979, p. 144).


3 Ibid, p. 303. Kaehler also mentions this charge (Kaehler
recognizes this basic charge, and though his paper represents an
excellent introduction to the appendix, he does not develop the
charge in relation to the four false tenets or in connection with
the other accounts of the basic misunderstanding Kant offers. We
now begin to look at the different accounts.

1.3 Logical Mistakes

(a) Transcendental Amphiboly

The informal fallacy with which Kant charges Leibniz is an
amphibology, i.e., in contemporary parlance, an ambiguity or
equivocation. A statement is amphibolous when the meaning of its
terms is left ambiguous by the sentence construction. Far from
being difficult errors of reasoning to spot or to avoid,
statements containing amphibologies are straight-forward enough to
be deliberately employed, in advertising and promotions, for example.

1981, p. 418) in attempts to develop Kant’s Copernican
Revolution, which he claims illustrates the shift from a position
of absolute reason to a position of finite or natural reason.

Cf., also Paton’s essay (Paton 1969). Though less attentive
to Leibniz’s philosophy, it also provides an good summary of Kant
on the errors of Leibniz.
Take, for instance the following example: "Safe driving is no accident." The meaning of this advertising slogan is indeterminate. It could mean (1) that one must consciously endeavor to drive safely if one is to accomplish it. It could also mean (2) that one drives safely only if one does not have a collision with any other vehicle or object. The ambiguity arises because of a combination of an awkward form of negation and the ambiguity in the meaning of 'accident'. On one reading 'accident' is taken to mean 'unintentional action' and the negation is double negation. In this case, one parses the sentence by reading the 'no' as canceling the 'un-' of unintentional. The sentence is interpreted as 'safe driving is intentional'. On the other reading 'accident' means 'a vehicular collision'. The negation is singular, but awkward; the sentence means: 'safe driving is not having a vehicular collision'.

Now transcendental as opposed to ordinary ambiguity or amphiboly concerns ambivalent relations between subjective representations. By a transcendental amphiboly Kant understands the error of maintaining that a concept or idea has a sensible referent when it has none. One confuses the relationship a concept has to the world by assuming it has a direct relation when according to Kant it has only an indirect relation, through sensibility. Kant uses the term in this manner in two places. In the note he speaks of, "...a transcendental amphiboly, i.e., a
confusion of the pure object of the understanding with the 
appearance” (A 270 / B 326). The confusion in this case appears 
to be between two objects, an object of pure understanding and an 
object of sensibility. Although this distinction deserves a more 
detailed exposition, it will suffice for the present to recognize 
that the ambiguity at issue is twofold: (1) it occurs when one 
asserts that a certain subjective representation corresponds to 
an object (e.g. noumenon, or thing in itself), which cannot in 
principle be given empirically; and (2) it occurs when one claims 
that a subjective representation corresponds to an abstract or 
intelligible object when it in fact corresponds to a sensible 
appearance.

A transcendental amphiboly is also mentioned in a passage 
outside the appendix. In § 4 of the Antinomies Kant emphasizes 
the disparity between an imagined objective representation and 
the laws of experience. Using potentially misleading and polemic 
language Kant describes his imagined interlocutor as follows:

For your object is only in your brain, and cannot possibly 
be given outside it, you have only to take care to be at one 
with yourselves and to avoid the amphiboly, which makes your 
idea into a supposed representation of an object that is 
empirically given and therefore to be known according to the 
laws of experience (A 484, B 512). 17

17 " Guyer and Wood translation.
17 The translation is corrected by this author, because Kemp
We see here that the first sense of an amphiboly is mentioned. Kant’s interlocutor claims that a certain subjective representation corresponds to reality when in fact it cannot in principle be given empirically. According to Kant, the whole of nature in space and time is not a possible object of perception for us (A 422f / B 510f). That concept is only an abstract representation and cannot be given concretely under the conditions of sensible intuition (ibid).

There are two accounts of the basic misunderstanding that suggest that the second notion of a transcendental amphiboly might be at the heart of his Leibnic-critique. The first is found in Kant’s discussion of identity and difference in the appendix proper.” After discussing the different conditions for ascribing identity to objects of the understanding and objects of sensibility, Kant states that “Leibniz took the appearances for things-in-themselves, and so for ... objects of the pure understanding” (A 264, B 320). Leibniz mistook objects of sense for things known as they would be known solely by the pure understanding. Leibniz thought that empirical objects were objects directly accessed by the pure understanding. He mistook

Smith mistakenly translates the pronouns “eurem” and “euer” (Ak. III, p. 334) as “our” (Kant 1989, p. 435).

“ The seven different accounts are not numbered in their order of appearance in the appendix.
what is given to the senses (appearances) as something given
directly to the pure understanding (things-in-themselves).

The second account is found in Kant’s genetic interpretation
of Leibniz’s concept of the monad. Here Kant says that we are not
acquainted with any properties belonging to a substance other
than those which can be found in space. Leibniz, according to
Kant, considers objects of the pure understanding and not objects
of sense. He thus regards phenomenal substances as if they were
noumena (A 166, B 322).

We must explore the epistemological arguments in order to
understand better the confusion between the empirical and the
transcendental use of the understanding, which Kant claims is
behind the error of transcendental amphiboly. But first we shall
look briefly at the formal fallacy Kant claims Leibniz made.

(b) I illicit conversion
The formal logical fallacy arises from Kant’s association of the
transcendental use of the understanding with logical reflection.
The connection appears to be somewhat overstated since, for Kant,
not all logical reflection the transcendental use of the
understanding. In order to properly understand what Kant thinks
formal logic consists in, it is necessary to review the
distinction between general and special logic, after which we
shall take a look at the third account of the basic misunderstanding of Leibnizianism.

Kant divides logic into general and special. In its special employment logic is a tool or organon for a specific field of inquiry. It then contains the practical rules for the investigation of particular kinds of objects (A 52, B 76). General logic, on the other hand, concerns the rules of thought and is either pure, applied or transcendental. Pure logic deals with the a priori principles of all thought, abstracting from all empirical conditions like the influence of sense, imagination, memory, habits and inclinations. It deals only with the form of thought itself, irrespective of its particular content and psychological context. Applied logic, by contrast, is concerned with issues involved in the concrete application of pure logic. It assesses accidental psychological factors in order to determine whether they may help or hinder the application of pure logic. Applied logic thus treats of the psychological principles, subjects like attention, doubt and conviction, which are implicated in the empirical use of pure logic. Finally, transcendental logic differs from both pure and applied logic. Kant states that transcendental logic is a science of the origin, scope and objective validity of claims to knowledge (A 57, B 81). It explores the origin of the modes in which we know objects in so far as that origin is not empirical. Like pure logic,
transcendental logic abstracts from the empirical content of knowledge; but unlike pure logic it does not completely abstract from all content of knowledge, namely not from the a priori content. Transcendental logic examines the faculty of understanding as a possible a priori source of knowledge, just as in the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant treated of sensibility as a source of pure a priori intuitions.

Transcendental logic, then, is similar to applied logic in that it deals with subjective conditions governing the employment of the understanding and reason. It is unique, however, in that those conditions are not accidental, but universal and necessary. Surmising that there is a pure a priori source of concepts which are neither empirical nor sensible in origin (A 57, B 81), Kant dissects the faculty of understanding in order to find therein the possible birthplace of concepts necessary for experience and knowledge (A 64ff, B 89ff). The part of Transcendental Logic in which the faculty of the understanding is dissected is called the Transcendental Analytic. Here Kant aims above all to differentiate this legitimate employment of the understanding from the misuse of general logic as an organon for extending knowledge (A 61, B 85). It is the Transcendental Dialectic that discusses the misuse of general logic, called the 'logic of illusion' (A 61, B 86) and the 'hyper-physical employment' (A 63, B 88) of the understanding. This use of logic is illusory
because, according to Kant, general logic abstracts from all content of knowledge and cannot therefore be validly used to extend the scope of such knowledge. The hyper-physical employment of general logic attempts to do just that. Kant’s point is that before one can presume to extend one’s knowledge of the world, an exposition of the origin, scope and objective validity of knowledge is required.

With these preliminaries out of the way, we turn now to the error with which Kant charges Leibniz. According to the third account, Leibniz committed a purely logical error. This account is found immediately before the third discussion of identity and difference in the appendix. There Kant states that Leibniz made the mistake of maintaining that if a property cannot be found in the concept of a thing in general, then it cannot be found in a thing in the world. Kant proposes that Leibniz committed this mistake because he made another different but related mistake of misinterpreting the dictum de omni et nullo. On this account Leibniz committed a formal logical fallacy by confusing the quite legitimate dictum with its converse. The dictum asserts that, ‘all that is strictly contained in the genus is also found in all the species subsumed under it’. Kant claims that Leibniz interpreted the dictum in the following way: ‘what is not contained in the genus is also not found in the species subsumed under it’. Kant writes,
it is indeed true that whatever universally agrees with or
contradicts a concept also agrees with or contradicts every
particular which is contained under it (dictum de omni et
nullo); but it would be absurd to alter this logical
principle so as to read: -- what is not contained in a
universal concept is also not included in the particular
concepts which stand under it... (A 280f, B 337)."

Despite the improbability of Leibniz's whole philosophy
resting on this basic formal fallacy, Kant claims that:
"Nevertheless it is upon this latter principle that the whole
intellectual system of Leibniz is based" (A 281, B 337).

"If we express the dictum as a conditional we can see the
logical error Kant charges Leibniz with more clearly. The dictum
could be expressed as: 'if it is strictly contained in the genus,
then it is found in all the species subsumed under the genus'.
This can be symbolically rendered as 'A -> B'. Kant states that
Leibniz interprets the dictum negatively: '-A -> -B'. This is
equivalent to 'B -> A', by contraposition and would read as
follows, 'Only what is contained in the genus is found in the
species subsumed under it'. Kant's charge, therefore, amounts to
the claim that Leibniz based his whole philosophical system on a
confusion regarding conversion of universal statements, or
equivalently, Leibniz confused 'B, if A' with 'B only if A'.

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2.4 Epistemological Mistakes

To explain why Leibniz committed these logical mistakes Kant reverts to what he takes to be Leibniz’s mistaken dogmatic epistemology. Three particular mistakes are discussed: Leibniz holds that (1) there was only one source of ideas and that (2) we have an intellectual grasp of the way things are, while remaining (3) unaware of the a priori and spontaneous operation of apperception. It is the third mistakes that led Leibniz to posit the monadology described in the last chapter.

4) Intellectualising Appearances

The fourth account of the basic misunderstanding of Leibnizianism is found in Kant’s second version of his argument against the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Like the appendix proper, the note offers a summary of Leibniz’s basic misunderstanding in connection with the discussion of the concepts of identity and difference. This time, however, Kant says, “in a word, Leibniz intellectualised appearances” (A 271 / B 327). Instead of recognizing two sources of cognitions Leibniz maintained there is only one source of ideas, the understanding. When he reflected on appearances Leibniz could only interpret them as a confused form of conceptual representation. It is because this is to misunderstand the nature and content of sensibility that Kant claims that Leibniz ‘intellectualized
appearances'. He allows sensibility no mode of representation peculiar to itself, but gives it instead the task of confusing and distorting the representations of the understanding (A 271 / B 327).

This charge repeats what Kant stated in § 8 of the Transcendental Aesthetic. There Kant claims that Leibniz and Wolff gave a "completely wrong direction to all investigations into the nature and origin of human knowledge" (A 44, B 61), because they do not correctly differentiate the sensible and intellectual elements of knowledge. Kant says that they distinguish sensibility and understanding logically, that is solely in terms of conceptual clarity and not transcendentally.

As a result Kant claims that they interpret the difference between things in themselves and appearances as a difference only of the degree of the clarity of our conceptual knowledge. Kant claims to the contrary that, "what objects may be in themselves, and apart from all this receptivity of our sensibility, remains completely unknown to us. We know nothing but our mode of perceiving them – a mode which is peculiar to us, and not necessarily shared in by every being, though, certainly, by every human being" (A 42, B 59).

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* Cf., A 276 / B 332.

* See Appendix A below.
Leibniz and Wolff not only misunderstand the nature and content of human sensibility, they also give a completely wrong direction to epistemology by failing to grasp that the difference between sensibility and understanding is "quite evidently transcendental" (A 44, B 61). The difference between the transcendental and the empirical concerns the critique of knowledge, not the relation of that knowledge to its object (A 57, B 81). As dogmatists, Leibniz and Wolff did not engage in a preparatory criticism of reason's capacities. They assumed the understanding has a direct grasp of the world, when according to Kant, it is only related to the world via the intuitions received from the faculty of sensibility. Kant suggests that Leibniz and Wolff thought they could learn about objects in the world solely by an analysis of their concepts of them. Yet, without a critique of their own intellectual powers Kant says that they had no reason to think that they could attain such knowledge. This is the common fate of reason, according to Kant: it completes, "its speculative structures as speedily as may be, and only afterwards [enquires] whether the foundations are reliable" (A 5, B 9). Had Leibniz and Wolff reflected on their dogmatic epistemology, they would have seen that sensibility and understanding are different sources of cognitions and that these two faculties differ both in origin and in content. They would have realized that the concept
of an object must be taken in a twofold sense, as an appearance and as a thing in itself (B xxvii, B 69).

(b) The Concept of a Thing in General

In the fifth account Kant introduces the basic epistemological error in a different way. If we reflect only in a logical fashion, he points out, then we contemplate the concept of a thing in general or a thing in itself. This concept, however, has no direct empirical reference, being insufficient to pick out an item in the world. Moreover, the understanding cannot be used transcendentally. The concept of things in themselves or noumena is of no use since it can do no empirical work. At best, it signifies an object as a thing in general, which is an abstract concept having no particular empirical referent. If one insists on using this concept independently of any empirical determination, then according to Kant it is even self-contradictory: "...taken without sensible determination, and independently of any empirical condition [the representation of an object as a thing in general is], self-contradictory" (A 279 / B 335). The contradiction arises because a transcendental use of the concept of a thing in general presupposes possession of an intellectual intuition; yet we humans do not have any such capacity to intuit thing as they are according to Kant (A 267, B
In the absence of such a faculty, our abstract concepts refer, as far as we know, to nothing at all (A 279f, B 335f).

When he maintains that it is contradictory to claim that something exists which, given our cognitive abilities, cannot in principle be intuited, Kant is not claiming that the concept of a noumenon, as an object of pure understanding, is self-contradictory (B 311). This would be to imply that there is only one possible mode of intuition, namely sensible intuition. Since there could possibly be other kinds of intuition, Kant does not say that noumena are logically impossible. He does claim, however, that they are not objects of knowledge 'for us', for our kind of intuition. The conclusion is that we must either abstract from semantic considerations, i.e. the reference of our thought to objects altogether, as in formal logic, or concede that our concepts can only refer to objects of the senses, given that our intuition does not extend to all things (A 286, B 342), which, he claims, is entirely sensory and non-intellectual.

Cf., Adickes 1924, p. 131f.

I shall not discuss the implications of the different ways in which Kant expands on the notion of direct intelligible grasp of the world in his lectures on metaphysics and Reflexionen written in and around the time of the silent decade. He refers to original, intellectual, logical, mystical, spiritual and revelatory intuition, which can be distinguished from the
Thus, we must renounce any claim to knowledge of things, or any ability to meaningfully refer to things that cannot in principle appear to our sensory apparatus. Kant does not, however, dogmatically claim that his epistemology resolves the question of whether or not there are actually existing objects apart from those we can experience. To argue that claim based solely on his analysis of the transcendental limits of knowledge would force him into the unacceptable position of an idealist. The critical philosopher is not persuaded by this kind of idealism. Warranted knowledge claims are limited to those objects alone of which we can in principle have experience. This does not address or resolve the metaphysical question of whether or not the realm of entities that can in principle be experienced is co-extensive with the sum total of existing entities.

There are two types of ignorance according to Kant, accidental and necessary. The former, ignorance of things, is a contingent form of ignorance, which is remedied by a dogmatic, different types of 'intellectual cognition' that Kant discusses, namely divine cognition and the pre-established harmony of innate principles or concepts. Kant also associates these different cognitive capacities with diverse thinkers (e.g. Plato, Aristotle, Crusius, Malebranche, Swedenborg, Wolff, Baumgarten, Leibniz).

\[\text{Cf., B xxxiv.}\]
i.e. systematic, enquiry concerning the possible object. The existence of this object can be confirmed or rejected based on further observation. The second type of ignorance, ignorance of the function and limits of knowledge, cannot be remedied by observation. Only through an examination of the sources of our knowledge does Kant say we can absolve ourselves from the duty to enquiry into objects which transcend our epistemic capacities. Only after we have provided this analysis of reason itself (A 758 / B 786) and have gained insight into its origin and genuineness (A 763 / B 791), can we say we are necessarily ignorant of a particular thing.

It was remarked earlier that Kant's association of logical reflection with the transcendental use of the understanding is overstated. This is seen in the fifth account. Logical reflection can be called abstract in either of two ways. It can be either a mode of reflection which assumes a transcendental use of the understanding in its comparison of concepts. In this case logical reflection is used to gain knowledge about some abstract, nonsensual objects. Or, it can also refer to a mode of reflection which is derivative from, and dependent upon, an empirical use of

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Die Ergründung, cf., the different names found in same section for the requisite procedure to determine our epistemic duties like, for example: die Kritik (A 761 / B 789, A 763 / B 792 (x2)); and die gründliche Vernunftprüfung (A 764 / B 792).
the understanding. Both are pure modes of reflection, according to Kant, but the latter does not presume to reckon with objects other than those which can be empirically given. This sense of logical reflection is not excluded in his discussion of transcendental reflection, but since this is not stated clearly enough, his association of the transcendental use of the understanding and logical reflection is potentially misleading.

In the fifth account Kant refers to the first of these two kinds of logical reflection. We must not be misled into thinking that Kant eschews all logical reflection. His position is rather that, without transcendental reflection, one cannot be sure about whether the purported referent of a concept considered in logical reflection is an object which is transcendent or one which is a possible object of experience. Therefore, transcendental reflection is necessary in order to ward off the logical errors discussed above.

(c) Overlooking the Act of Apperception

The sixth account contains the first and only reference to apperception in the appendix. In the last paragraph of the first supplement Kant again summarizes the error behind the transcendental use of the understanding, stating that Leibniz mistakenly employed the understanding transcendently, because "apperception, and with it thought, precedes all possible
determinate ordering of representations" (A 299, B 345). Kant's point is that while all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not all arise out of experience (B 1). Apperception spontaneously synthesizes what is given to our senses before abstract thinking takes place. According to Kant, Leibniz overlooks how the act of apperception precedes any conscious ordering of or reflection upon empirical representations. In his logical and metaphysical reflections Leibniz reasoned rashly, employing the understanding transcendentally, outside its proper empirical scope. The sixth account is unique in that it suggests that Leibniz did this, not because he thought the difference between the sensible and the intelligible was one of degrees, but because he overlooked the role of apperception and its tacit function in the empirical use of the understanding, its initial and proper use.

This account of Leibniz's logical errors relates to Kant's explanation of the genesis of Leibniz's monadology. We saw in the last chapter how, according to Kant, Leibniz constructed his monadology, projecting the quality of unity or singularity onto the objects of the empirical world. In light of the sixth account of the basic misunderstanding, we can interpret Kant to be saying that this quality was illicitly taken from the a priori act of apperception. This is a key element in Kant's genetic interpretation of the Leibnizian monadology. Leibniz thinks that
reality is simple or monadic, because he attributes to objects properties derived from his own a priori and unifying operation of apperception.

(c) Omission of Transcendental Reflection

We turn, finally to Kant's last account of the basic misunderstanding. Thus far we have seen that the basic misunderstanding with which Kant charges Leibniz is that he bypassed and misunderstood the human cognitive capacities before he set out to describe, study and reflect on the world. This mistake is best explained as the charge that Leibniz did not engage in transcendental reflection. This final charge is thus not only the fundamental mistake with which Kant taxes Leibniz; it also shows how Kant explains the logical and dogmatic errors underlying his system.

In the introduction to his theory of reflection at the beginning of the note, Kant attributes Leibniz's misunderstandings to the absence of a transcendental topic: "having no such transcendental topic, and being therefore deceived by the ambiguity of the concepts of reflection, the celebrated Leibniz erected an intellectual system of the world" (A 270 / B 326). Lacking a theory of reflection, Leibniz was bound to be deceived, since he reasoned about the nature of things solely through his concepts of them. For want of a
transcendental topic he used general logic as an organon and was misled in his claims to objective knowledge. A transcendental topic, or namely “in distinguishing the cognitive faculty to which in each case the concepts properly belong, [would] provide a sure safeguard against the surreptitious employment of pure understanding and the delusions which arise therefrom” (A 269 / B 325).

According to Kant, Leibniz is mistaken about the nature and origin of our knowledge both with regard to sensibility and understanding. We have seen how Leibniz overlooked the unique quality of sensibility and how he was misled by not appreciating the a priori act of apperception. Through a transcendental topic, a concept that lies at the heart of Kant’s theory of reflection, it is possible to arrive at a more suitable account about the origin, scope and objective validity of human knowledge.

With the foregoing analysis of the four tenets of Leibnizianism and Kant’s Leibniz-critique the importance of Kant’s theory of reflection has been demonstrated. We now turn to an explicit exposition of that theory in order to develop more thoroughly what Kant takes to by Leibniz’s basic omission.

Cf., A 269 / B 325.
Chapter 3

Kant's Theory of Reflection

3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter it was argued that the failure to develop a theory of reflection should be seen as Kant's most basic criticism of Leibniz. Thus, contrary to received opinion, the foregoing has shown that Kant's Leibniz-critique turns not so much on what Leibniz did or said as on what he failed to do or say. What Kant claims Leibniz failed to do was engage in the operation that he calls 'transcendental reflection'. The other more familiar charges arise because of this omission. In order to get a better understanding of this operation, Kant's theory needs to be elaborated upon.

Though there have been attempts in the secondary literature to present Kant's theory of reflection, there is no agreed upon interpretation. The aim of this chapter is therefore to sketch the theory briefly, particularly as it pertains to the Leibniz-critique, indicating why it is central to the project of the Critique. In the two subsequent chapters I shall discuss the
interpretations of the appendix, including some different interpretations of Kant's theory of reflection.

3.2 The Importance of Reflection

Prior to discussing Kant's theory of reflection, its place within the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements must be clarified. The importance and purpose of transcendental reflection can only be fully clarified in relation to Kant's reasons for thinking that a critique of pure reason is required. Engaging in transcendental reflection is, for Kant, a duty, and the whole Transcendental Doctrine of Elements is structured around his attempt to meet this requirement.

(a) The Aims of the Critique

To get the reader's attention in the second Preface Kant draws an analogy (B xxii, fn. a) between the Copernican cosmological hypothesis and his proposed critical path for philosophy. Copernicus proposed a heliocentric in opposition to a geocentric model of the solar system. Instead of the earth at the centre of the cosmos, he proposed that the apparent motions of the planets could be better explained on the assumption that the sun is at the centre. Analogously, Kant opposes to the natural assumption that our knowledge conforms to the objects in the world the hypothesis that the world can be explained better by assuming
they must conform to the a priori forms of human knowledge (B xvi).

Kant's proposed change in our mode of thinking (B xix, B xxii, fn. a) has a negative and a positive goal. The former is to curb our natural inclination to seek knowledge concerning the way things are. This should be done according to Kant, because he avers that it is the inevitable fate of human reason that by its very nature it is burdened by questions it cannot answer (A vii). This negative aim of the Critique thus not only challenges those with the natural habit and the trained skills in seeking answers to questions about the nature of things as they are, the immortality of the soul and the existence of God, but it also is to deprive metaphysics of its influence once and for all (B xxxii). Kant attempts to refute these specific metaphysical claims by assailing dogmatic epistemology lying behind them, 'dogmatism' being defined as the use of pure reason without a previous criticism of its own powers (B xxxv).

Though I shall not do so here, this attitude towards metaphysics needs to be weighed against both Kant's tempered claims regarding 'necessary ignorance', mentioned in the previous chapter, and other passages like A 849 / B 877, where Kant states that although metaphysics cannot be the foundation of religion, it must always continue to be a bulwark of it.
The positive goal of Kant’s philosophy, by contrast, is to extricate human reason from what he sees as the darkness and contradictions of metaphysical knowledge claims. This task is limited to providing a propaedeutic analysis of the sources and limits of objectively valid knowledge. Kant envisions this propaedeutic as the first step in a larger project of finding a secure path for the natural sciences. He does not claim to provide the complete system of knowledge in the Critique, but only its necessary elements."

The Critique thus represents Kant’s attempt to furnish a critique (as self-criticism) of human reason itself." He engages in this speculation, because he claims that pure reason has the peculiarity of being capable of measuring its own powers (B xivii). Kant warns that this analysis should not to be confused with a critique of books and systems (A xii, A 13, B 26), or with an analysis of the nature of world as such (A 12f, B 26). His

_Cf., A 12, B 25; A 14, B 28; A 841 / B 869; A 850 / B 878.

It seems possible that Kant came up with his first sketch of his method of reflection early in the silent decade. Thus, for example, in a 1773 letter to Marcus Herz, Kant states that, "I now find myself in possession of a system that completely solves the hitherto unsolved riddle and brings the procedure of self-isolating reason under sure and easily applicable rules" (Kant 1968, p. 119).
subject matter is rather the modes of human cognition (A 11f, B 25), his goal self-knowledge (A xi). It is in this vein that Kant suggests to his reader that,

we shall be rendering a service to reason should we succeed in discovering the path upon which it can securely travel, even if, as a result of so doing, much that is comprised in our original aims, adopted without reflection, may have to be abandoned as fruitless (B vii).

(b) The Epistemic Duty and Purpose of Reflection

The Critique is a treatise on the method of an investigation of the limits and internal structure of pure reason. The undoubted importance of Kant’s theory of reflection in this investigation is demonstrated in two ways. Not only does Kant tell us that engaging in transcendental reflection is the duty of the critical thinker, but he structures the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements around its application.

Both within the appendix and outside it Kant informs us that the critical thinker has the duty to engage in transcendental reflection. At the end of division I of the appendix, Kant states that transcendental reflection is a duty from which no one who wishes to make a priori judgments about things can claim exemption (A 263, B 319). He also concludes the Doctrine of Elements by reiterating this same claim: "the resolution of all

Cf., B xxii.
our transcendent knowledge, into its elements (as a study of our
inner nature) is in itself of no slight value, and to the
philosopher is indeed a matter of duty" (A 703, B 731).

Transcendental reflection has two purposes. First, it is
required for a transcendental analysis of the a priori sources of
knowledge. Transcendental reflection explicates the origin of the
two types of representations which Kant claims are necessary for
objective knowledge and synthetic a priori knowledge. Without the
analysis of the faculties of sensibility and understanding, Kant
maintains that one could not be in a position to justify how
synthetic judgments are possible a priori, because the pure a
priori sources of knowledge would remain concealed. Second,
transcendental reflection makes an objective comparison [eine
objektive Komparation] of concepts possible. This is the
procedure whereby a particular concept is examined and compared
with the sensible conditions of knowledge in order to see if an
empirical object can in principle be found to correspond to it.
Both purposes are summarized in the appendix, where Kant states
that transcendental reflection not only determines the limits of
the understanding (A 263, B 319), but also confirms his
hypothesis that we cannot have knowledge of things in themselves
(A 278f / B 334f). Since transcendental reflection differentiates
between the empirical and the transcendental uses of concepts and

\[\text{\textsuperscript{7}}\] Cf., A 280, B 336.
confirms the hypothesis that we can only have knowledge of appearances it is obviously central to the project of the Critique.

Both purposes are reflected in the architectonic structure of the Critique. The Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Logic present the results of Kant’s examination of the faculties of sensibility and understanding, respectively. These two faculties have different cognitive mediums and epistemic functions. Moreover, each functions independently of the other and knowledge arises only when they work in unison. If one accepts these presuppositions about the capacities of the human mind, then one has the utmost reason to attempt to carefully distinguish the influence on knowledge of the one from the influence of the other (A 842 / B 870). “It is a strong reason for carefully separating and distinguishing the one from the other” (A 51f, B 75f). It is precisely this that Kant claims has never occurred.

In light of these presuppositions, the problems with previous metaphysics can be outlined. First, Kant suggests that most of his major predecessors conflated their classification of one type of cognition with the other. In effect, they maintain that there is essentially only one type of cognition. Second, Kant also claims that since they did not recognize the different types of cognition involved in knowledge, the collaboration of
the two faculties was also overlooked. The first problem is discussed at length in the appendix, where both Locke and Leibniz are said to have committed it, though in opposed ways. It is the error of dogmatic epistemology, its 'intellectualizing of appearances', which Kant concentrates, although he also mentions the error of his counterpart, the empiricist. Locke 'sensualized all concepts of the understanding' (A 271 / B 327). Though they committed the first error in opposed ways, Locke and Leibniz are charged with making the second mistake in common: both overlooked that objectively valid knowledge occurs only when sensibility and understanding work together.

At bottom, the error of both dogmatists and empiricists alike is the omission of transcendental reflection. Otherwise they would have separated the two types of cognition and drawn the appropriate consequences for the evaluation of judgments about subjects like the world, the soul and the existence of God. Having satisfied the requirements of transcendental reflection in the Transcendental Aesthetic and Analytic, Kant goes on to apply the resulting critical epistemology to traditional metaphysics in the Transcendental Dialectic. The first job of the critical thinker, then, is to isolate the epistemic contributions of the thinker from what is thought, separating the contributions of the different faculties. Kant writes: "If our faculty of knowledge makes any such addition, it may be that we are not in a position
to distinguish it from the raw material, until with long practice of attention we have become skilled in separating it” (B 1f).

Kant claims to be the first to separate our capacity for knowledge into its elements, isolating the pure content of knowledge from that which originates in experience and the contribution of sensibility from that of the intellect:

What the chemist does in the analysis of substances ... is in still greater degree incumbent upon the philosopher.... Human reason, since it first began to think, or rather, reflect, has never been able to dispense with a metaphysics; but also has never been able to obtain it in a form sufficiently free from all foreign elements (A 943 / B 870).

There are similar passages throughout the Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Logic in which Kant speaks in a similar vein of the fruits of transcendental reflection. For example, Kant writes: “In the Transcendental Aesthetic we shall, therefore, first isolate sensibility, by taking away from it everything which the understanding thinks through concepts, so that nothing may be left save empirical intuition” (A 22, B 36). At the appropriate place Kant states something similar with regard to the understanding: “In a Transcendental Logic we isolate the understanding — as above, in the Transcendental Aesthetic, the sensibility — separating out from our knowledge that part of thought which has its origin solely in the understanding” (A 62, B 87). The Transcendental Analytic is
introduced in a similar way: "Transcendental analytic consists in the dissection of all our a priori knowledge into the elements that pure understanding by itself yields" (A 64, B 89).²

The results of these examinations are then utilized in the Transcendental Dialectic. This chapter deals with transcendental illusions, which arise from the tacit application of principles not intended for empirical use. Even after attention is brought to these errors, however, Kant states that the illusion of knowledge can remain, because the human mind continually projects organizing principles in its natural drive for knowledge. The critical philosopher cannot stop the natural illusions which arise from false projection, but he can attempt to expose the deceptions and call for their correction. The primary error Kant aims to expose and correct is that reason is an independent source of concepts and judgments by means of which it represents objects as they are in themselves.

3.3 Kant’s Statement of His Theory

We turn next to Kant’s critical corrective to dogmatic epistemology as set out in divisions I and III of the appendix. Both the appendix proper and the note begin with a summary of the theory of reflection. It is for this reason that Adickes separates the first from the second division in each of the first

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² Cf., A 65, B 90.
three section of the appendix, dividing the appendix proper into division I and II, the note into divisions III, IV and V and the first supplement into divisions VI, VII and VIII. He claims that the first division in each section introduces Kant's theory of reflection, on which a discussion of the four pairs of concepts of reflection follows.

There are, however, a number of problems with Kant's presentation of his theory of reflection. The first is the equivocal way in which he labels and describes it, referring to it by four different names: reflection; transcendental reflection; transcendental topic; and objective comparison. The first three terms are not as clearly differentiated from one another as they all are from the fourth. The second problem concerns the incompleteness of his presentation. Many questions arise from his theory that cannot be answered based on what he

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Adickes 1889, p. 272, fn. 1.

In the first division of the appendix it is not clear how succinctly Kant intended to differentiate reflection from transcendental reflection. What Kant says about the two operations is very similar. In the following section I shall discuss some problems with Kemp Smith's translation of significant passages in Kant's presentation of this theory and review some nuances of theory.

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says. These will be discussed in light of the secondary literature in the following chapter.

(a) Division I

Reflection is first introduced as a procedure which is unconcerned with deriving concepts from objects directly. Instead, Kant states that, "reflection (reflexio) ... is that state of mind in which we first set ourselves to discover the subjective conditions under which we are able to arrive at concepts" (A 260, B 316). Reflection, in other words, examines the cognitive faculties through which we can acquire representations of objects. In another passage, where Kant contrasts logical with transcendental reflection, this examination is also referred to as transcendental reflection. The relation of any given representations to sensibility or understanding cannot be decided by logical reflection, according to Kant, because the latter deals only in conceptual analysis. He claims that the relations of representations to sensibility or to understanding can be determined "only through the distinction of the kind of mode of cognition to which they belong, by means of a transcendental reflection (reflexio)" (A 262, B 318).

It would be a mistake to think that in this passage Kant is claiming that the dogmatist does not differentiate between sensibility and understanding at all. The dogmatist neither lacks
the distinction between sensibility and understanding, nor does Kant say he does. What Kant claims the dogmatist does not recognize is that the distinction refers to two types of cognition and not different degrees of a single type. According to Kant, the distinction between the sensible and the intellectual does not concern the clarity of conceptual representations (A 44, B 61f), but two different and irreducible types of representations, which are necessary for objective knowledge. Kant introduces reflection to examine these faculties and to show that they are not differentiated solely in terms of degrees of conceptual clarity.

This first summary of reflection is, however, imprecise. It remains unclear whether the analysis of the two cognitive faculties alone also decides the relation between the given representations to those faculties. One might expect this to involve a further procedure. In the second sentence of division I Kant suggests there is a logical priority between two procedures, but he does not develop the point. He states that reflection, "is the consciousness of the relation of given representations to our different sources of knowledge, through which alone their relations to one another can be properly determined" (A 260, B 316). This makes it sound as though there is one procedure to

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Cf., also A 256, B 313, fn. a.

Author’s translation. German: "Sie ist das Bewußtsein des
do both jobs, to determine both a representation’s relation to either sensibility or understanding and to other representations.

It is likely due partially to the equivocal reference of the pronoun ‘their’ in ‘their relations to one another’ that Kemp Smith translates this sentence differently, namely: “It is the consciousness of the relation of given representations to our different sources of knowledge; and only by way of such consciousness can the relation of the sources of knowledge to one another be rightly determined.” This translation suggests that the relations that are properly determined in reflection are between the different sources of knowledge as opposed to the relations among the representations. It is much more likely, however, that Kant is referring to the relations between the representations. In fact, the line immediately after this passage emphasizes that the relations under consideration are those between representations: “Prior to all further treatment of our representations...” (A 260, B 316).

When Kant summarizes this aspect of reflection at the beginning of the Transcendental Dialectic, he again mentions two tasks of transcendental reflection: assigning different

Verhältnisses gegebener Vorstellungen zu unseren verschiedenen Erkenntnisquellen, durch welches allein ihr Verhältnis untereinander richtig bestimmt werden kann” (Ak. III, p. 215).

Kant 1989, p. 276.
representations to their proper faculty; and determining the influence of those faculties on the representations. Kant claims that the composite effect of the faculties of sensibility and understanding on pure a priori judgments needs to be resolved into simple acts:

this must happen through transcendental reflection, through which (as already shown) every representation is assigned its place in the faculty of cognition proper to it, and hence also the influence of the latter is distinguished from it (A 295, B 351)."

When we turn to the concepts of reflection, we find that Kant describes them as employed in two ways. While the second has

Guyer and Wood translation (Kant 1998, p. 385). German:
"...durch transzendente Überlegung geschehen muß, wodurch (wie schon angezeigt worden) jeder Vorstellung ihre Stelle in der ihr angemessenen Erkenntniskraft angewiesen, mithin auch der Einfluß der letzteren auf jene unterschieden wird" (Ak. III, p. 235).

Kemp Smith: "In the case of pure a priori judgments this is a task which falls to be discharged by transcendental reflection, through which, as we have already shown, every representation is assigned its place in the corresponding faculty of knowledge, and by which the influence of the one upon the other is therefore likewise distinguished" (Kant 1989, p. 298).
to do with the formation of categorical judgments,” the first supports the view that transcendental reflection deals with the relations between representations. The concepts of reflection are introduced, first of all, as depicting the relations that representations can have in a single state of mind: “the relations in which concepts in a state of mind [in einem Gemütszustande] can stand to one another are those of identity and difference, of agreement and opposition, of the inner and the outer, and finally of the determinable and the determination (matter and form)” (A 261, B 317). These unique concepts describe the range of possible relations all representations can have to one another in either faculty. Kant’s discussion of the four tenets shows how the concepts of reflection can be misused if one acknowledges only the single faculty of pure understanding. This discussion focuses on Leibniz, who, Kant claims, did not acknowledge sensibility as a distinct source of representations. Though Kant makes a parallel charge against Locke, he does not develop it in terms of specific tenets and the concepts of reflection.

Kant claims that though two concepts of objects may be identical to one another, it does not entail that there are two such objects in the world. Only the spatial differences

--- I shall not discuss this use in depth, cf., Longuenesse 1998, especially Chapter Six.
discoverable by intuition enable one to differentiate between objects numerically. Moreover, Kant claims that, for Leibniz, all objects are in agreement with each other. He counters by stating that real opposition arises when one considers what is given to sensibility. Kant also states that Leibniz's representations of the objects of pure understanding are wholly inward, having no outer relations. Things are different with sensibility, according to Kant, because all inner determinations of objects are entirely made up of relations based on outer sense. Finally, as regards the last pair of concepts of reflection, we find four different senses of matter and form. According to logicians, Kant claims that (1) matter is the universal and form its specific difference. Moreover, (2) concepts are the matter of a judgment and their relation is its form. Intellectualists, Kant says, claim that (3) the composite elements of an individual being are called its matter and the mode in which those elements are connected its form. They also maintain that (4) unlimited reality is the matter of all possibility and form its particular limitation. All these views agree on one thing, according to Kant: they presume that matter precedes form. Kant, however, argues that the converse is true: when considering the relation of objects to sensibility, the form of sensibility precedes the matter of sensations. "Space and time come before all appearances and before all data of experience,
and are indeed what make the latter at all possible" (A 267, B 323).

In the note Kant does not discuss either the logical or the metaphysical notions of matter and form mentioned in the appendix proper. Instead Kant repeats his genetic interpretation of Leibniz's monadology given in his discussion of inner and outer. He does, however, address a complaint, which one would have thought should have properly been raised in connection with the previous pair of concepts of reflection. Recounting the charge that, according to his philosophy, we have no insight into the inner nature of things, Kant replies to his hypothetical objector that, if what is meant is that we cannot conceive things in themselves, then the complaint is illegitimate and unreasonable, since the understanding has no direct relation to the world. In other words, if what is meant is that we are completely ignorant of the transcendental ground of appearances, then we should acknowledge that we have come up against the mystery of the source of our sensibility. On this question Kant says that matters are "undoubtedly so deeply concealed" (A 278, B 334) that we are unable to make any progress.

Outside of their role of defining the relations in which representations can stand, Kant states that the concepts of reflection also function in logical reflection. He says that they
help determine the different categorical judgments. This is the second of the two uses mentioned earlier. Kant writes:

Before constructing any objective judgment we compare the concepts to find in them identity (of many representations under one concept) with a view to universal judgments, difference with a view to particular judgments, agreement with a view to affirmative judgments, opposition with a view to negative judgments, etc. (A 262, B 318).

When the concepts of reflection operate in logical reflection Kant says they should be called concepts of comparison (conceptus comparationis) since they deal only with the construction of the form of judgments and not with their content. When it comes to the content of concepts transcendental reflection is required, “since it bears on the objects themselves” (A 262, B 319) as they are given in sensibility. Logical reflection ignores any consideration of the origin, scope and objective validity of its concepts; it deals only in a formal comparison of concepts. It is therefore incapable of providing anything similar to transcendental reflection’s analysis of the transcendental relations of our representations:

We may therefore say that logical reflection is a mere act of comparison; for since we take no account whatsoever of the faculty of knowledge to which the given representations belong, the representations must be treated as being, so far as their place in the mind is concerned, all of the same order (A 262, B 318f).
Kant contrasts his attention to the different origins of knowledge with the dogmatist’s position, which he characterizes here as maintaining that all representations originate in the understanding. Their use of logical reflection does not consider whether the given concepts fall under the conditions of sensible intuition. This is a fault, according to Kant, since the dogmatist does not recognize sensibility as a unique origin of representations and thus cannot distinguish between the transcendental and the empirical use of the understanding; and those who engage in logical reflection may be misled by natural inclination or dogmatic prejudice into judging that a particular thing exists based solely on a general description of it. This mistake is mentioned at the beginning of division I. “Many a judgment is accepted owing to custom or is grounded in inclination; but since no reflection precedes it, or at least none follows critically upon it, it is taken as having originated in the understanding” (A 260f, B 316).

Without transcendental reflection, Kant states that one could fall victim to ambiguity, mistakenly assuming the existence of an object on the basis of a mere comparison of concepts, as in the case of the two drops of water discussed above. The heart of Kant’s misgivings about logical reflection is that those who engage in it do not explicitly analyze the content of their concepts and so cannot justify their claims to objectively valid
knowledge. They assume that sensible content differs from conceptual content only in degrees of clarity. Without transcendental reflection the dogmatist is misled by his natural habits and dogmatic inclinations into thinking that they are considering representations of things as they are, as opposed to representations of things merely as they appear to sensibility. Transcendental reflection is needed to facilitate an objective comparison of concepts and avoid this problem. Kant thus defines 'transcendental reflection' in the following way:

the act by which I make the comparison of representations in general with the cognitive faculty, wherein they belong, and by means of which I distinguish whether they are to be compared with one another as belonging to the pure understanding or to sensible intuition, I call transcendental reflection (A 261, B 317).

After assigning representations to a cognitive faculty the critical thinker gives an objective comparison of the content of the concepts. Transcendental reflection is therefore necessary preparatory work. Kant writes, "...transcendental reflection (which concerns the things themselves) contains the ground of the possibility of objective comparison of representations..." (A 260, B 319). The transcendental and empirical uses of the understanding differ significantly in the way one should consider the relations of representations to one another. Providing an objective comparison determines whether the given concepts or
representations can correspond to something given in sensibility. And according to Kant, only the empirical use of concepts is valid, because only that use is verifiable by the general conditions of sensibility outlined in the Transcendental Aesthetic.

In sum, Kant maintains that Leibniz did not adequately analyze the epistemic faculties because he did not engage in transcendental reflection. Leibniz did not curb his inclinations which lead him to believe that his concepts originated in the understanding and represent the world as it is. Kant claims that the right determination of the relations of our representations is important if we are to assess whether a judgment which employs those representations is objectively valid." This determination requires the operation of transcendental reflection since the question of the objective validity of a concept or a judgment, "depends on the answer to the question, in which faculty of knowledge they belong together subjectively" (A 261, B 317).

(b) Division III
So much for Division I. We turn now to Division III in the note, which begins with Kant's introduction of different names for the sources of knowledge and the operations of transcendental reflection. He calls the former transcendental locations and the

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Cf., A 262, B 317.
latter a transcendental topic. There are two other places in the Critique where Kant mentions ‘topics’. One of these references is negative and the other positive. Once we have examined these two other references, the transcendental topic can be contrasted with the table of categories.

At the beginning of the note Kant indicates unequivocally that he is introducing new terminology. He writes: “Let me call the place which we assign to a concept, either in sensibility or in pure understanding, its transcendental location” (A 268, B 324). He goes on to introduce the transcendental topic in these terms: “the critical assessment of the place assigned each concept, taking account of their different uses, together with the instruction to determine this location for all concepts according to rules, would be the transcendental topic” (A 268, B 324).\footnote{Author’s translation. German: “Auf solche Weise wäre die Beurteilung dieser Stelle, die jedem Begriffe nach Verschiedenheit seines Gebrauchs zukommt, und die Anweisung nach Regeln, diesen Ort allen Begriffen zu bestimmen, die transzendente Topik” (Ak. III, p. 219). Kemp Smith: “Thus the decision as to the place which belongs to every concept according to difference in the use to which it is put, and the directions for determining this place for all concepts according to rules is a transcendental topic” (Kant 1989, p. 281)
the note supports the view that the 'transcendental topic' is a general name for the specific operations of transcendental reflection. For immediately after claiming that one may, for want of transcendental reflection, commit a transcendental amphiboly (A 269f / B 325f), Kant continues: "...having no such transcendental topic ... the celebrated Leibniz erected an intellectual system of the world" (A 270, B 326).

Describing the logic of illusion at the beginning of the Transcendental Logic, Kant mentions attempts to provide a rhetorical topic to enhance dialectic, i.e. disputation. He warns against such an addition to logic on the grounds that it merely imitates the methodological thoroughness that logic prescribes. Such a topic conceals the emptiness of its pretensions and it is only the sophistical art of intentionally giving ignorance the appearance of truth (A 61, B 86). Kant's point is that no account of the rhetorical criteria of effective debate and persuasion can overcome the abstractness of general logic as he defines it. In the end, any attempt to use general

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Kant, of course, does not use the word 'dialectic' in the same way as Aristotle. 'Dialectic', no longer belongs to rhetoric, but rather belongs to 'transcendental logic'. "The title 'dialectic' has therefore come to be otherwise employed, and has been assigned to logic, as a critique of dialectical illusion" (A 62, B 86).
logic as an instrument for gaining knowledge, without providing a preparatory exposition of the origin and scope of one’s capacities for knowledge, amounts to nothing more than ‘mere talk’ (A 61, B 86).

Other than the references to a transcendental topic, there is one other reference to Kant’s own work as presenting a topic. In § 10 of the Transcendental Analytic, namely, after introducing the table of categories, he excuses himself for not defining them, even though he says he has a definition. He says that providing this definition would only distract the reader from the subject matter at hand. Along with the definition of the categories, a more complete summary of a priori concepts is reserved as supplementary work. Kant suggests the latter would, in any case, be an easy task with the aid of some ‘ontological manuals’.” These could be used to supplement the divisions already provided by his own ‘systematic topic’ (A 83, B 109). Although Kant refers to his table of categories as a systematic topic here, this passage must be supplemented by what he says about the transcendental topic since the categories are clearly differentiated from the concepts of reflection.

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In a footnote found in § 39 the Prolegomena Kant writes about this task. He states that one could use, “any good ontology (for example, Baumgarten’s)...” (Kant 1977, fn. 29, p. 67).
When Kant discusses the transcendental topic in the note, he mentions what he calls Aristotle’s logical topic, describing it as that which, “teachers and orators could make use in order ... to find what would best suit the matter in hand, and then, with some appearance of thoroughness, to argue or be eloquent about it” (A 269f / B 325f). This corresponds to the first negative remark about topics mentioned above. Kant's positive remark, however, cannot be taken to refer to the transcendental topic, for he states that the latter contains no more than the four pairs of concepts of reflection (A 269 / B 325). The concepts of reflection are different from the categories in that the former serve to present the comparison of representations in their manifold relationships to one another, while the concepts of reflection do not figure in representing the object according to its unity and reality, for example, but only enable the reflective thinker to examine the subjective conditions of knowledge and the subjective relations of representations.

3.4 Conclusion
This concludes the outline of Kant’s theory of reflection. We have seen that Kant describes transcendental reflection in a manner consistent with the structure of the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements. Only with transcendental reflection can one adequately differentiate the pure transcendental use of the
understanding from its empirical use; only through it can one recognize that there are two types of representations and faculties involved in knowledge; only then can one see that knowledge arises only when the two sources of representations, namely sensibility and understanding, work together.

We now turn to the secondary literature on the appendix and shall find that the discontinuities of Kant’s arguments discussed in the last three chapters have led not only to misunderstandings concerning the Leibniz-critique, but also concerning the appendix as a whole. I shall comment on the different schools of thought on the appendix in Chapter Five.
Chapter 4

The Secondary Literature

4.1 Introduction

This chapter contains a survey the most viable interpretations of the appendix in the secondary literature. The examination of the literature is structured around two important issues, the placement of the appendix and the commentator's method of interpretation. As regards the former, there are three schools of thought concerning the placement of the appendix. For ease of reference I shall refer to them as the misplacement school, the relict school and the proper placement school and discuss them in connection with the interpretive method they have adopted. There are two dominant methods of interpretation. A diachronic method is used by both the misplacement and relict schools. Employing this method both schools interpret the appendix in light of various historical considerations. The two primary factors considered are its general editorial history and Kant's intellectual development over the silent decade. A synchronic method of interpretation is used by the proper placement school.
The aim of these commentators is to interpret the appendix as it stands and defend the position that the appendix can be interpreted as properly placed and significant without appealing to any potentially extraneous or misleading historical considerations.

4.2 Diachronic Methods

(a) The Misplacement Charge
The first school of thought maintains that the appendix is misplaced within the architectonic design of the Critique. Proponents of this school claim that the subject matter of the appendix properly belongs to the Transcendental Dialectic, but since Kant’s austere architectonic design did not sanction its inclusion there, it was placed in the Transcendental Analytic instead. Although some proponents of this school focus on the content of the appendix and others on its method, their analyses of the appendix revolve around one particular question, namely what is Kant’s position on ontology?

Seeking to answer this question, the commentators of this school often look to Kant’s intellectual indebtedness to and tacit confrontation with Baumgarten’s Metaphysics. In order to help determine the extent of this indebtedness they also look to Kant’s Reflexionen and Lose Blätter. Their claim is that Kant was
initially concerned with dealing with issues involving ontology when he wrote the appendix. They look to these historical sources for evidence that in the preparatory work for the appendix, Kant was concerned with similar issues to those discussed in the Dialectic.

(1) Erich Adickes

In his 1889 edition of the Critique, Adickes introduced the guiding question of the misplacement school, arguing that the appendix actually belongs in the Dialectic. In the Critique ontology is mentioned as one of the four main parts of metaphysics along with rational physiology, cosmology and theology (A 946 / B 874). In the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant discusses the mistakes made within the latter three fields, but not the first. Adickes picks up on what seems to be a missing discussion of ontology and associates it with the appendix. Adickes claims that Kant could not find any room for a discussion of ontology in the Transcendental Dialectic so he placed it in the Transcendental Analytic as an appendix.

On the face of it, this view has a certain plausibility. According to Kant, there are only three kinds of syllogisms,
either categorical, hypothetical or disjunctive (A 304, B 361). The possible errors corresponding to these kinds of syllogisms coincide with Kant's Paralogisms, Antinomies and Ideal of Pure Reason. Since these three chapters discuss rational physiology, cosmology and theology respectively, ontology does not find a place in the Transcendental Dialectic. Adickes claims that this was the reason why Kant included his rejection of traditional ontology in the appendix.

Adickes finds further support for his thesis in two historical considerations. First, he claims that each of the four pairs of concepts of reflection can be traced back to Baumgarten's views on ontology. With this claim Adickes aims to pick up on the contrast between Baumgarten's position, expressly denied by Kant, that ontology can know the inner determinations of things in their qualitas and quantitas, although perhaps not always distinctly. Second, Adickes also appeals to Kant's Lose Blätter from Kant's Nachlass. In an essay discussing Kant's Nachlass, Adickes comments on the composition dates and the content of various Lose Blätter. The central sheet Adickes uses

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"Adickes 1887, p. 112.
"Baumgarten 1783 § 53, p. 21f, cf., Ak. XVII, § 69, p. 41.
"Cf., Reicke 1889.
"Adickes, 1897.

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to support his claim is I 9, which includes the same list of
the concept of nothing as is found in the fourth section of the
appendix. To support his claim that the appendix concerns Kant’s
criticisms of ontology, Adickes refers to the last line of the
table on Reflexion 5552, which reads: “the end of ontology.”

(ii) Hans Graubner

Hans Graubner’s comprehensive analysis of the concept of form in
the Critique also argues that the appendix discusses Kant’s
position on ontology. Like Adickes, Graubner suggests that the
pre-critical ontology Kant is discussing is most likely
Baumgarten’s Metaphysics.” Graubner also mentions that Kant did
not find room enough in the Transcendental Dialectic to discuss
ontology in the same way as Adickes.” Though Graubner maintains
that the appendix discusses ontology, he does not consistently
argue that the appendix therefore belongs in the Dialectic. In
fact, when he discusses the placement of the appendix he is of
two minds.

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Reicke 1889, p. 26f. Many of these sheets are included in
the Akademie Ausgabe (e.g. I 9 is listed as Reflexion 5552, cf.,
Ak. XVIII, p. 218f).

Cf., Werkmeister 1979, p. 135.


Ibid.
Arguing for a tacit confrontation between critical and pre-critical ontologies, Graubner cites a passage from the phenomena-noumena chapter to show Kant's confrontational attitude. In that passage Kant claims that ontology presumptuously claims to supply synthetic a priori knowledge about things in general and it must be replaced by the more modest Analytic of pure understanding (A 247, B 303). It is Graubner’s suggestion that the Transcendental Logic (including both Transcendental Analytic and Dialectic) constitutes Kant’s critical response to ontology.

Based on this account of Kant’s confrontation with pre-critical ontology, Graubner makes a more attenuated claim concerning the placement than Adickes. He claims that, in light of the content the appendix, it belongs to the Transcendental Analytic; but systematically it belongs in the Transcendental Deduction, namely between the first and second chapter of the Analytic of Concepts (between §§ 12 and 13). Nevertheless, Graubner claims that the appendix, situated as it is between the Transcendental Analytic and the Dialectic, acts as a transitional section dealing with the misuses of ontology, just as the Dialectic discusses the misuse of psychology, cosmology and theology."

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Ibid.

Ibid, p. 244.

Ibid, p. 246.
Further nuances separating Adickes’s and Graubner’s positions are worth mentioning. Graubner suggests that the central criticism Kant gives in the appendix concerns a misuse of the understanding and is similar to the misuse of reason in the Dialectic. He claims that the misuse of the understanding discussed in the appendix amounts to using formal logic to generate conclusions about things that are beyond the scope of the proper application of the understanding. Kant calls the misapplication of general logic dialectic (A 61, B 87). Since this is a misuse of logic that Kant claims to reveal in the Transcendental Dialectic, Graubner argues that the method of the appendix, according to Kant’s own criteria, belongs there.

A potential problem for Graubner’s interpretation concerns whether Kant really intended to refer to this misuse of formal logic as a ‘transcendent’ rather than a ‘transcendental’ use of the understanding. The misuse of the understanding discussed by Graubner is more properly called transcendent and this is among the reasons why both Adickes and Graubner argue the appendix is misplaced. However, Kant is clear that ‘transcendental’ and ‘transcendent’ are not interchangeable terms (A 296, B 352). It is the transcendent and not the transcendental use that goes beyond the limits of empirical conditions. All conclusions regarding objects which are beyond the scope of possible

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Ibid.
experience are indefensible in Kant's critical philosophy, because according to him the real application of the understanding (and, therefore, the valid application of formal logic) is limited to only those concepts whose referent can be empirically given.

Graubner responds to this problem by claiming that Kant's use of the term transcendental is complex. He mentions certain subtleties of Kant's usage, "arguing that there are three uses of the term. First, it is used to designate the non-sensible or hyper-physical use of the understanding. This is the sense referred to in the title of the appendix where Graubner claims it refers to the sense in which it would be used to refer to traditional ontology, e.g. "the transcendental philosophy of the ancients" (B 113). In a passage from the fourth section of the appendix, which Graubner also cites as an example of how others use the term, Kant states that, "the supreme concept with which it is customary to begin a transcendental philosophy is the division into the possible and the impossible..." (A 290, B 346). This is how Baumgarten begins his Metaphysics. After introductory comments concerning metaphysics and ontology, §§ 7, 8 of the Metaphysics introduce the concept of nothing (nihil negativum), the impossible and the concept of something (nonnihil), the

"Cf., ibid pp. 247ff."
possible." Second, there is Kant's more technical sense, which contrasts the empirical with the pure and a priori origin of our knowledge. "I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our cognition of objects in so far as it is to be possible a priori" (B 25). This sense is not the same as the traditional and hyper-physical sense mentioned above, since the distinction belongs to an immanent analysis of the subjective conditions required for objective knowledge and not to the question of whether that knowledge corresponds with reality. The final sense is an extension of the second. Graubner argues that, despite Kant's criticisms of traditional ontology, he is offering a critical version of ontology which he also entitles 'transcendental'. This version is the idea of a science for which Kant's Critique of Pure Reason lays down the architectonic design and the attempts to enumerate the essential concepts (A 13ff, B 27ff). These concepts do not describe a non-relational reality, a reality existing in itself, nor are they merely concerned with the modes of our cognition as such; rather Kant is dealing with a unique class of concepts, which are necessary for any objective knowledge whatsoever. Kant claims that these concepts can be

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Cf., A 56, B 80ff; A 11f, B 25.

Cf., A 56, B 81.
deduced only by an immanent analysis of the conditions of human knowledge.

(b) The Relict Charge

The second school of thought claims that the appendix is a relict of Kant's earlier pre-critical period. The members of this school have two concerns. First, they are preoccupied with the difference between transcendental and logical reflection. In their opinion this distinction is a replica of the pre-critical distinction between the logical and the real use of reason. Second, they are suspicious of the mention of the transcendental object, noumena and things themselves. They argue that reference to these things is incompatible with Kant's mature critical position.

There is also a general consensus amongst commentators of this school concerning the composition dates of the different sections of the appendix. Gideon claims that the first section of the appendix was written in the early 1770's. As support Gideon refers both to the strong emphasis on the difference between sensibility and understanding and to the previously mentioned conflicting uses of 'noumena' throughout the appendix. He is

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Gideon 1977, p. 26: "Very probably the chapter belongs to the preparatory work to the Critique, with which he was occupied in the 70's."

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disturbed by the looseness with which Kant wields phrases like "objects themselves" (A 260, B 316), "things themselves which appear" (A 268, B 324) and "objects of pure understanding" (A 265, B 321). It is in light of Kant’s use of such terms and the apparent pre-critical tenor of his thought in the appendix that Erdmann accounted for its inclusion in the Critique by saying that it was included simply as a lapsus memoriae. 

Those who make the relict charge support their position with a diachronic method of interpretation, which typically only surveys the historically relevant Reflexionen or Lose Blätter. They employ a variant of a diachronic method called a reductive method, which focuses on the general editorial history of the appendix.

(i) Norman Kemp Smith

Kemp Smith is the most celebrated proponent of the relict charge. Like proponents of the misplacement charge, he thinks that the appendix discusses problems more properly raised in the Transcendental Dialectic. The driving force behind the appendix, according to Kemp Smith, is not so much an interest in presenting his position on ontology as Kant’s inclination towards systems:

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Erdmann 1878, p. 37, fn. 1.
"Architectonic, that ever present source of so many of Kant's idiosyncrasies, has again interposed its despotic mandate."

Kemp Smith also sees some significance in the fact that Kant did not remove certain passages within the appendix in the B-edition of the Critique, as he did with the Transcendental Deduction, the phenomena-noumena chapter and the Paralogisms. He claims that the positive sense of noumena is not unequivocally rejected in the appendix. For example, Kant still occasionally refers to them in the appendix: "If we are pleased to name this object noumenon for the reason that its representation is not sensible, we are free to do so" (A 288, B 345). According to Kemp Smith, Kant is referring to concepts which are censured in the B-edition of the Critique, e.g. 'things in general' and 'transcendental object'. Kant writes: "Consequently what we do is to think something in general ... a merely logical form without content, but which yet seems to us to be a mode in which the object exists in itself (noumenon) without regard to intuition..." (A 289, B 345f); and "Understanding ... does indeed think for itself an object in itself, but only as transcendental object, which is the cause of appearance...."

Kemp Smith summarizes his position in the following way: "Kant would seem, indeed, to have lapsed into the dogmatic

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"Kemp Smith 1962, p. 419.
standpoint of the Dissertation, distinguishing between a sensible and an intelligible world and maintaining that pure thought is capable of determining the matter of the latter." From this he summarizes the Leibniz-critique as the charge that Leibniz did not recognize that understanding and sensibility are two distinct sources of representations. The reason why this error was committed is that sensibility is regarded as confused thought. "Leibniz, through failure to realise the dual character of thought and sense, overlooked this all-important fact; and, in asserting that what is true for pure thought is valid of the sensuously real, fell victim to the fallacy which Kant entitles transcendental amphiboly."

Despite the fact that this criticism appears to arise from a 'critical' position, Kemp Smith claims that Kant did not have his critical system clearly in mind. He claims that the appendix's first three sections were, "successive expositions of one and the same argument" and they, "were doubtless independently written, and then later pieced together in this external fashion." This external nature of their composition is the heart of the patchwork thesis, for which Kemp Smith is well known. The core of this thesis is not merely that the different sections of the

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" Ibid, p. 419.
" Ibid, p. 420.
" Ibid, p. 423.

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appendix were written at different times and then pieced
together, but that in the final analysis these section have no
internal unity and, most importantly, they are incompatible with
Kant's critical philosophy.

(ii) Edgar Zilsel

Zilsel offers a unique interpretation of the appendix. His
focuses primarily on the unique nature of the concepts of
reflection. For example, at no place within the Critique is there
an account of where these concepts come from. The concepts of
reflection are strangely absent from the serial list of
representations given on page A 320, B 377. There is also no
discussion of how they can be arranged according to the table of
categories, as Kant suggests in § 39 of the Prolegomena. Zilsel
offers the unique thesis that not only was the appendix proper
written before 1772, but that the concepts of reflection were
developed primarily in order to advance his Leibniz-critique and
this use precipitated to the development of the table of
categories. I shall confine myself here to two stylistic and
three philosophical reasons for his dating and interpretation of
the appendix.

First, Zilsel interprets Kant's use of the term "things
themselves" (die Dinge Selbst) as referring to noumena. Since
Kant's mature position does not sanction such objects, Zilsel
argues that this must mean the appendix proper was written in a pre-critical period, when they were still accepted. Second, in the introduction to the appendix Kant mentions custom and inclination as possible reasons for accepting a judgment. Yet, in the introduction to the idea of transcendental logic in general, Kant claims that transcendental logic, as a branch of general logic, is not concerned with the influence of the senses. It is abstracted from the force of habit and from all sources of prejudice (A 53, B 77). Zilsel claims that the very mention of custom and inclination at the beginning of the appendix proper indicates that it was written before the composition of the Transcendental Logic.

Third, Zilsel mentions that Kant refers to sensibility and understanding as two types of knowledge (die Erkenntnisarten). Kant’s critical opinion concerning the functions of the understanding and of sensibility, however, is that they can never do each other’s work, nor can they achieve anything alone. Knowledge arises through the combination of sensibility and understanding. In Kant’s critical philosophy these faculties do not yield two different types of knowledge, differing in how things appear and how they actually are. Fourth, since Kant contrasts logical reflection and transcendental reflection in terms of whether the content of knowledge is considered, Zilsel

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Cf., A 260, B 316.
argues that this distinction is identical to the difference between the logical use of reason and the real use of reason found in the Dissertation. Finally, Kant claims that the concepts of reflection facilitate the construction of universal, particular, affirmative and negative judgments. Zilsel interprets the lack of any mention of the categories in the appendix proper as showing that the concepts of reflection were in fact philosophical precursors to the categories in Kant’s intellectual development. After working on his Leibniz-critique with the concepts of reflection, Zilsel claims that Kant then had a sudden inspiration which led to the development categories. He writes:

A system of ‘concepts of comparison’ are in the most intimate relationship to rudiments of the table of judgments. A sudden inspiration and these elements could have linked themselves together. The concepts of reflection would then be uncritical precursors to the categories."

(iii) Max Wundt

Wundt also claims that the appendix is a relict of Kant’s pre-critical period. He claims that the appendix stems from a

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Zilsel 1913, p. 436.

It is interesting to note, however, that Wundt only refers to the second section of the appendix or note when he cites the textual source of his discussion of the appendix (Wundt 1924, p. 228).
period when Kant was working solely from the position of the
Inaugural Dissertation. Wundt’s interest is in the development
of Kant’s thought in the ‘silent decade’, particularly in so far
as it represents an incomplete attempt at providing a new
foundation for metaphysics. In pursuing this thesis Wundt claims
he is pursuing Kant’s own description of the Critique as the
‘metaphysics of metaphysics’, which is found in a 1781 letter to
Marcus Herz:

For my part I have nowhere sought to create mirages or to
advance specious arguments in order to patch up my system; I
have rather let years pass by, in order that I might get to
a finished insight that would satisfy me completely and at
which I have in fact arrived; so that I now find nothing I
want to change in the main theory (something I could never
say of any of my previous writings), though here and there
little additions and clarifications would be desirable. This
sort of investigation will always remain difficult, for it
includes the metaphysics of metaphysics.

Wundt does not look to any other historical sources other
than Kant’s letters in his attempt to decipher Kant’s
intellectual development in this decade. He contends that the use
of Kant’s Lose Blätter to help fill in holes of our knowledge is

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Ibid, p. 228.


Kant 1967, p. 95.
fanciful and pointless, because of their uncertain dating. What is instructive about Wundt's conclusion concerns the central development Kant made in the silent decade. This development was the separation of understanding and reason, specifying their roles and their native types of representations.

Wundt summarizes two significant stages in Kant's intellectual development in the silent decade. In the first stage he contends that Kant's critical position is represented by the shift from the real use of reason in the Dissertation to a more restricted empirical use of the categories or real use of the understanding. Wundt writes:

In any case there are two steps above all, above which the progress of Kantian thought during this decade carried itself out; the deduction of the categories and the separation of the categories from the ideas. Perhaps we may assume from the suggestions in the letters, that he climbed the first step in 1772, the second in 1776.

Cf., H.-J. de Vleeschauwer, who says that appeals to the Reflexionen for dating Kant's intellectual development are a 'makeshift solution' (Vleeschauwer 1962, p. 44). Wundt 1924, p. 181.

Wundt 1924, p. 183. Erdmann also emphasizes the period between 1771/2 - 1776 (Erdmann 1911, pp. 579 - 583). H.-J. de Vleeschauwer stresses the influence on Kant's thoughts by N. Tetens's Philosophische Versuche über die Menschliche Natur und
In the Dissertation Kant stresses the importance of not confusing the sensible with the intelligible. "[I]t is of the greatest importance here to have noticed that cognitions must always be treated as sensitive cognitions, no matter how extensive the logical use of the understanding may have been in relation to them." No matter how abstract an empirical concept becomes in the process of the logical use of reason, it does not thereby become an intellectual concept. Intellectual concepts and relations are given by the inner activity of the intellect itself and they are not abstracted from the empirical. No amount of logical comparison removes the sensible origin of general empirical concepts. The real use of reason in experience is abstract, but this is not to be understood as abstracted from experience. What is abstract about the real use of reason is that the concepts are given by the very nature of the intellect. We come to know these concepts, not through any particular sensible representation, but rather through attending to how these concepts function in concrete experience.

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ihre Entwicklung (1776-7) (Vleeschauwer 1962, pp. 68f, 82-88)

Kant 1992, p. 385 ($5$).

Ibid, p. 386 ($6$).

Ibid.

Ibid, p. 387f ($8$).

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In the Critique Kant distinguishes between reason and the understanding, restricting the real or concrete formative action of the mind to the understanding. "Sensibility, when subordinated to understanding, as the object which the latter exercises its function, is the source of real modes of knowledge" (A 295, B 351, fn. a). This move away from the real use of reason is also reflected in the well-known critical thesis that all knowledge presupposes a combination of sensibility and understanding. Pure concepts of the understanding are the unity of the act or the rule for bringing various representations under one common representation (A 68, B 93). Differentiating these concepts from those empirically derived is the job of the Transcendental Deduction (A 85, B 118).

In so far as Kant himself claims that this Deduction cost him the greatest labour (A xvi), Wundt finds support for his account of the central question of the silent decade. What is not articulated clearly at the early stages of the silent decade, according to Wundt, is the exact separation of the roles of both understanding and reason.** He also claims that this leaves open

*** Wundt does not mention it but the famous passage from the introduction where Kant states the there are two stems of human knowledge, namely sensibility and understanding [\textit{der Verstand}] (A 15, B 29), is not the only time Kant talks about the 'stems of knowledge' in the Critique. In the Architectonic Kant states that
the question of the precise restriction of the limits of the understanding. The second phase is represented by the introduction of a clear separation of the categories of the understanding from the ideas of reason. Wundt claims that the second stage was not completed until around the summer of 1776 or even 1777. Only then did Kant find his final formulation.\footnote{This formulation included the thorough-going restriction both of reason's sole role in ordering the understanding (A 643f / B 671f) and of the understanding's being limited by sensibility (A 289, B 344).} Both the relict and the misplacement schools of thought are challenged by another novel school, which claims that the appendix is not only properly placed, but that it also has an

\footnote{The unknown root of our faculty of knowledge, "throws out two stems, one of which is reason [die Vernunft]" (A 835 / B 363). It seems clear that either Kant did not fully resolve the differences between reason and understanding, or at least the passage from the Architectonic was written at such a time.}

\footnote{Wundt 1924, p. 182.}

\footnote{Wundt suggests that Tetens's sensationalism may have been helpful in completing this stage, because of Tetens's distinct separation of understanding and reason (Wundt 1924, p. 181, fn. 1, p. 185, cf., also Vleeschauwer 1962, pp. 85 - 88).}
integral role in the structure and content of the whole Critique. It supports its claims by using a synchronic method.

4.3 Synchronic Methods

(a) The Proper Placement Defense

The third school of thought regarding the placement of the appendix maintains that it is properly placed. In support of this claim, this last school offers interpretations of Kant's theory of reflection. After developing this line of questioning, these commentators claim that this theory also turns out to be a fundamental procedure of the Critique. The main representatives of this school agree on this point. Though the procedures of Kant's theory of reflection are considered central to these interpretations, there is some difference of opinion on how transcendental reflection is to be interpreted.

Typically, the reductive considerations mentioned by the other interpretations are dismissed. In Rudolf Malter's estimation, for example, they are simply irrelevant. He dismisses the considerations of editorial history of the appendix and argues that the appendix as it stands is a seamless part of Kant's critical position.\textsuperscript{112} Peter Reuter also rejects that historical considerations help to determine the status of the

\textsuperscript{112} Malter 1982, p. 125f.
concepts of reflection." Despite the boldness with which they discard the help such considerations may possibly provide, both authors conclude that the appendix is insufficient to resolve all the questions that arise.

As opposed to the other two schools, many commentators do not find a problem with the placement of the appendix, nor are they troubled by the likelihood of different composition dates of its sections. Among those is Hans Vaihinger, who has commented on the composition date of the appendix claiming that it is an early piece. In fact he estimates that, "the section 'The Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection' ... turns out to be one of the earliest of the whole Critique." Malter, a stalwart supporter of the appendix's existing placement, agrees that the different sections may have been composed at independent times. He claims that this does not, however, entail that the appendix is a relict. It only reflects how serious and difficult the subject matter of the appendix is. The repetition also reflects Kant's earnestness in attempting to think the matter through more precisely.

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" Reuter 1989, pp. 222, 229.

When Malter comments on the views of Wundt, Gideon, and Kemp Smith, he flatly denies that there is any obscurity in the arguments Kant makes in the appendix. He rejects the need to appeal to different and conflicting developmental periods in Kant's thought to explain the appendix. Malter is confident that the appendix can be easily integrated into the critical programme of the Critique of Pure Reason. In fact, he asserts that it can be 'effortlessly proven' that Kant's theory in the appendix is of a piece with his mature critical position, whilst maintaining that the three section were written at different times.

According to Malter the appendix is a very important section of the Critique and should not be looked at as a 'mere appendix'. He focuses on the appendix proper and rejects that the appendix belongs to the Dialectic or involves fallacious syllogistic inferences. According to Malter, the appendix deals with limits and use of the understanding established in the Transcendental Aesthetic and the deduction of the categories. The concepts of reflection, in combination with transcendental reflection, are a precondition for establishing the objective comparison of given

Malter 1982, p. 125f.
Ibid, p. 126.
Ibid, p. 131f.
representations and concepts. Transcendental reflection, "...concerns the subjective side of the formation of judgment and constitutes a self-relation of the knowing subjectivity."\textsuperscript{12} Given representations and concepts can only be objectively compared after it has been decided 'to which faculty they belong'. This decision is made through transcendental reflection.

The objective comparison, the comparison of given representations in cognition according to the measure of the concepts of reflection, presumes an act of determination, which locates in which cognitive faculty the representations belong and thereby also guarantees the proper formation of synthetic a priori judgments. This act of determination [der Entscheidungsakt] is transcendental reflection.\textsuperscript{13}

Malter makes three points about the transcendental reflection: first, transcendental reflection is a subjective operation; second, the concepts of reflection concern the form and not the content of representations; and finally, transcendental reflection is the main operation behind the whole Critique. In presenting these three points below I shall also introduce his position on other relevant questions concerning the appendix.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid, p. 134.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid, p. 141.
Transcendental reflection is a subjective operation of the understanding. Though a subjective operation, in making this first point Malter is loath to admit that Kant's talk about transcendental reflection determining to which 'faculty representations and concepts belong' should be interpreted at face value. He rejects the implication that Kant is concerned with the psychology (the study of mental processes) or the phenomenology (the discipline endeavoring to lay foundations for natural sciences by describing the formal structures of sensual experience). "The talk about a given concept's possible belonging to pure understanding in fact only has a critical expository meaning." Like Graubner, Malter argues that Kant is only indulging the idiom of his opponent. Malter claims that the talk of 'belonging to a faculty' can be misleading and we should interpret Kant as simply embracing his opponent's terms of discussion for the sake of argument.

Malter argues for the proper placement of the appendix on the basis of the consistency between the appendix proper and the note. He emphasizes the overlap between the procedure of transcendental reflection and the transcendental topic and says, that, "what Kant has to say about this discipline [viz., the transcendental topic] merely repeats in other words what he had

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Ibid, p. 132.

already stated in another place regarding transcendental reflection.” Malter claims that the rules for the correct application of the concepts of reflection are assumed to have already been established by the general discussions presented in the Transcendental Aesthetic and Analytic. In fact, Malter’s principal objection to the relict charge is that the placement of the appendix indicates that the procedure of transcendental reflection tacitly uses the conclusions developed in those chapters:

Transcendental reflection should do nothing other than make the results of the Aesthetic and the Analytic — the restriction of our knowledge to sensuously conditioned knowledge — fruitful for the concrete formation of synthetic a priori judgments. In every individual case, transcendental reflection advises whether a given representation in fact stands under the conditions of sensibility and is thus qualified for the formation of a synthetic a priori judgment.

Though Malter claims that the transcendental topic merely repeats what Kant said about transcendental reflection, he acknowledges that it remains open how Kant enumerated and derived exactly four pairs of concepts of reflection. He emphasizes that in the appendix transcendental reflection is used externally,

128 Malter 1982, p. 147
that is to say it is used to confront other philosophical positions. This application of transcendental reflection makes its foregoing internal use fruitful. We shall discuss Malter’s internal use under the third point below.

Malter’s second point addresses the fact that the concepts of reflection are not mentioned in the list (see A 320, B 377) of the types of representations. The table, he claims, refers to the content of the representations. Malter suggests that the concepts of reflection were not added to the list of representations since they alter the actual content of the representations compared.  

The concepts of reflection function in the formal use of the understanding itself.

As for the charge that Kant makes some questionable references to noumena in the appendix, Malter rejects the view that these references represent Kant’s own ideas and that the appendix has a pre-critical redolence.  If there are such references then, according to Malter, they arise because they help Kant describe the position against which he is arguing. Malter confidently appeals to the placement of the appendix for confirmation that Kant not longer holds this pre-critical

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"Ibid, p. 140."
"Malter 1982, p. 130f."
"Ibid, p. 126."
attitude towards noumena, only mentioning them in connection with Leibnizianism. "That Kant no longer holds this position in the amphiboly chapter, shows itself purely externally in that the 'appendix' comes after the Aesthetic and Analytic and thus presumes their work and their results (presented in the phenomena-noumena chapter)."

Malter's third point expands on the internal applications of transcendental reflection. The internal is the application of transcendental reflection to and by the knowing subject. The Transcendental Aesthetic and Analytic delimit the scope of human knowledge and specifically the concrete use of the understanding. Transcendental reflection is used internally to describe and legitimate Kant's position that the use of the understanding is restricted to empirical experience. It is thus an important operation for the Critique. Malter cites H.J. Paton approvingly, who claims that, "the whole Critique of Pure Reason may be regarded as a work of transcendental reflection."

Malter does not mention the fact that in the B-edition Kant saw fit to alter some of the phenomena-noumena chapter, making clearer the difference between the positive and negative senses of noumena. This would go to support Kemp Smith's query as to why the appendix was not also modified in the 1787 edition.


Although Malter does not mention him in his comprehensive discussion of the concepts of reflection, one of the key difficulties for Malter’s interpretation of the appendix concerns a topic discussed in Zilsel’s interpretation of the appendix. “To be sure, the main difficulty set against the amphiboly chapter which the interpreters should pursue is the fact that Kant operates with a type of concept that is not sufficiently explained either in the appendix itself, or in any other context of the Critique.” 8 The origin of the concepts of reflection remains a problem, because if they are required (in combination with transcendental reflection) in order to provide a critique of pure reason, then the whole project rests on the assumption of these “mysterious concepts” 9 of reflection. Despite their centrality in Malter’s estimation, he nevertheless admits that the problem of the origin of the concepts of reflection remains unanswered in his analysis: 10 So do the questions to which faculty the concepts of reflection belong: 11 and whether they have a systematic status in connection with the table of categories. These questions remain unanswered in Malter’s account precisely.

8), cf., also Schnädelbach 1977, p. 93.
11 Ibid.
12 Malter 1982, p. 150.
because they are omitted in Kant's, who does not say a word about them in the Critique.

Although his interpretation leaves us with an incomplete account of transcendental reflection, Malter concludes that the appendix promises to be a fruitful subject matter for further enquiry were its themes to be taken up in a contemporary reworking of the Critique. He suggests that transcendental reflection is a promising topic of contemporary relevance since, as Kant claimed, when it is taken in hand we, "shall obtain no little light for the determining of the real business of the understanding" (A 263, B 319).  

(ii) Peter Reuter

Aside from offering the most comprehensive discussion of the problems surrounding the content of the appendix, Reuter's interpretation is unique in that he does not argue that Kant's main goal in the appendix is to provide his Leibniz-critique. Instead, Reuter claims that Kant's aim in the appendix is to present a new philosophical method. According to Reuter the, argumentative goal of the amphiboly chapter would lie then, not in a repetition of a fundamental insight of the Critique of Pure Reason over against positions of pre-critical philosophy — to which this chapter is much too often reduced.

“Ibid.”

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- but rather in the conception of a philosophical method...\(^{13}\)

Like Malter's discussion of the appendix, the new philosophical method that Kant introduces centres around the operation of transcendental reflection. While Reuter offers an extensive rehearsal of the literature and of the problems with the appendix, we shall only look at his views on transcendental reflection and the concepts of reflection.

Like Malter, Reuter rejects the psychologistic or phenomenological interpretations of Kant's talk about transcendental reflection determining to which faculty a concept actually belongs. Rigorously adhered to, he says that such an interpretation would entail that transcendental reflection is a quasi-empirical or psychological operation, which considered only pure intuitions and pure concepts, as Döring has suggested.\(^{11}\) On Reuter's interpretation, transcendental reflection is a method of separating concepts only according to their use, not their origin.\(^{12}\) The question at issue for transcendental reflection is whether individual concepts have an empirical referent or not.\(^{13}\) This corresponds roughly to what in Malter's interpretation is

\(^{13}\) Reuter 1989, p. 108.


\(^{12}\) Cf., Marx 1974.

\(^{13}\) Reuter 1989, p. 101.
called the external use of transcendental reflection. Only on the basis of such an interpretation of transcendental reflection that the Leibniz-critique makes any sense at all.\footnote{Ibid.}

Reuter discusses three questions that he sees facing his interpretation of transcendental reflection: How does transcendental reflection examine given representations?; What is the relationship between transcendental reflection and the objective comparison of concepts?; and Where does Kant get the rules according to which the second level application of transcendental reflection assigns given representations to either of the two transcendental locations?

If, with Reuter and Malter, one rejects the psychological or phenomenological reading of reflection, then what is the medium given in the appendix 'examine' or 'compare' representations? Reuter does not attempt to solve this problem, because he sees his goal as only to reconstruct Kant's method of transcendental reflection in greater detail.\footnote{Ibid, p. 12.} He refers to Schnädelbach's *Reflexion und Diskurs*\footnote{Cf., ibid, p. 6, fn. 1.} as a model of the type of work that could be done once his exposition of Kant's theory of concepts of reflection is completed. Schnädelbach is concerned with the translation of the idiom of conceptualism and reflection in
Modern Philosophy into the language of contemporary linguistic methods and discursive levels of language." This programme is again similar to what Malter suggests could be pursued in a contemporary reworking of the Critique. Schnädelbach claims that Kant's operation of transcendental reflection is the most important source of this concept of reflection in the Modern period." And like Malter and Reuter, Schnädelbach also finds that Kant's theory of reflection is underdeveloped."\footnote{Schnädelbach 1977, p. 60.}

The second question Reuter asks is this: How do we use the concepts of reflection to sort out the problem of the existence of an objective referent for any given concept? Malter claimed that the directions for sorting representations were assumed and not explicitly given. We must look to the third question in order to discuss Reuter's response to the second. The third question is the following: What is the relationship between transcendental reflection and the objective comparison of concepts? This is the question that most occupies Reuter. While it suggests a response to the second, it also introduces further questions.

The relationship between transcendental reflection and the objective comparison of concepts is explicitly discussed in the secondary literature. Reuter summarizes what he sees as the two

\footnote{Ibid, p. 63.}

\footnote{Ibid, pp. 64, 93.}
main views. On the first, transcendental reflection is the precondition of any objective comparison of concepts. According to this view (Reuter has Malter and some others in mind), the concepts of reflection do not affect the actual content of the representations and concepts they compare. One of the problems Reuter has with this view is that it is not clear how transcendental reflection provides an objective comparison of concepts, since, according to Malter for example, the concepts of reflection only function in the formal use of the understanding itself. To provide an objective comparison of concepts one must compare a given concept stands with the conditions of sensibility; yet in order to determine this, one must have already differentiated and examined sensibility and understanding. Malter deals with this problem by arguing that the appendix presupposed the conclusions of the Transcendental Aesthetic and Analytic. But Reuter questions whether Malter acknowledges how dissimilar the internal and the external uses of transcendental reflection are. As Reuter sees it, the internal use of the concepts of reflection presumes the separation of sensibility and understanding as distinct faculties. The problem with Malter’s account is that it presumes a tacit appeal to the

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fourth pair of concepts of reflection to account for the difference of sensibility and understanding.\footnote{50}

The second view also runs into a similar problem. The second view focuses on transcendental and logical reflection as formal operations of the understanding. For example, Lange asks: How can both logical and transcendental reflection be procedures of the understanding, when Kant states that transcendental reflection deals with two different types of representations (A 262, B 319)? Lange responds by claiming that transcendental reflection must operate on two levels: the first level of transcendental reflection separates sensibility and understanding. Then, in a self-reflexive operation, transcendental reflection assigns representations to either faculty and provides an objective comparison. This second level of transcendental reflection is an operation of the understanding which compares the formal aspects of representations and concepts.

Reuter is sympathetic to the second view\footnote{51} as presenting what he sees as a more plausible account of the relationship between logical and transcendental reflection. The main problem with this two-level interpretation of transcendental reflection, however, is that the text of the appendix is inadequate to

\footnote{50}{Reuter 1989, p. 103.}
\footnote{51}{Cf., Lange 1958, p. 45.}
\footnote{52}{Reuter 1989, p. 233.}
support such a complex operation. Reuter states that on the assumption of the two-level theory, "...transcendental reflection becomes a highly complex operation, to which Kant's arguments in the amphiboly chapter hardly bear witness." Moreover, with this two-level interpretation of transcendental reflection, the second problem is compounded. That was the problem of the relationship between transcendental reflection and the concepts of reflection. With the two-level model this problem multiplies into the following two questions: How do the concepts of reflection facilitate the separation of the faculties of cognition? And: How are they involved in the comparison of individual representations and concepts?

Reuter's suggested response is discussed in light of three further problems with the two-level procedure: (1) How can only four concepts of reflection determine the transcendental locations for all concepts? (2) How does the first-level application of transcendental reflection distinguish between sensibility and understanding? (3) Where does Kant get the rules according to which the second level application of transcendental reflection assigns given representations to either of the two transcendental locations? Reuter's response to the first problem

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Cf., A 269 / B 325.
is to argue that Kant's claim that there are only four pairs of concepts of reflection cannot be seriously maintained.\textsuperscript{116} Since the principle of the deduction of the concepts of reflection suggested by Kant in the Prolegomena is missing,\textsuperscript{117} Reuter claims that the question regarding the completeness of the table of concepts of reflection remains open.\textsuperscript{117} He sees this as opening up the further possibility that a contemporary reconstruction of the table of the concepts of reflection could satisfy the demands of differentiating the transcendental locations.

Reuter does not think that the second and third problems can be solved based on what is presented in the text of the Critique. Speaking of the second problem he notes that the function of the concepts of reflection in the first level of transcendental reflection is unclear. With the rejection of anything like a phenomenological reading of reflection, the problem of how the first level application of transcendental reflection establishes the difference between sensibility and understanding remains unsolved. Reuter concludes that the relationship between the two levels of transcendental reflection also remains underdetermined.\textsuperscript{118} The exact rules for assigning representations

\textsuperscript{116} Reiuter 1989, pp. 213, 216.

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid, p. 220.

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid, p. 232.

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid, p. 233.
to a transcendental location is simply not given. The third problem is, therefore, also undecidable based on the appendix as it stands.

Reuter mentions that these problems with Kant's theory of reflection are compounded by the problem of Kant's silence on the relationship of it to the fundamental cognitive act of apperception. "...Kant's definitions in the amphiboly chapter are decidedly underdetermined exactly in relation to the central doctrine of the Critique of Pure Reason." In the end, Reuter contends that a precise determination of the nature and function of the concepts of reflection must be sought outside the scope of the text of the appendix.

This concludes the review of the secondary literature on the appendix. Three different schools of thought employ different interpretive methods and arrive at different conclusions regarding the appendix. The disparity in the conclusions reached is most apparent with regard to their views concerning the proper placement of the appendix. As for their interpretive methods, both the misplacement and the relict schools begin with the difficult passages of the appendix and defend that the theory operative in the appendix is not consonant with Kant's placement

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of the appendix. As regards conclusions, the misplacement school claims that methodologically the appendix more properly belongs to the Transcendental Dialectic than the Transcendental Analytic, while the relict school claims that the appendix does not properly belong to the Critique at all. Commentators employing a synchronic method of interpretation counter these views by claiming that the appendix is properly placed. They expand on how the theory behind the appendix justifies its proper placement and explains its importance and argue that the operation of transcendental reflection is central to the Critique. Although I have already argued my position on the structure, purpose and content of the appendix, it would help to clarify my position further if I commented on the secondary literature. This is the task of the next chapter.
Chapter 5

Assessment of Literature

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter two themes in the secondary literature will be examined, since they present something of a challenge to the interpretation of the amphiboly chapter adopted in the first three chapters. The first theme arises out of textual difficulties facing any interpretation of the appendix. In Chapter Four we saw how the incongruities of the appendix have led commentators to significantly different accounts of its proper placement and content. A number of commentators challenge the contention that the appendix is systematic, unique or even important. In this chapter I argue that the passages that make the appendix appear pre-critical or misplaced can be accounted for by its mosaic composition.

The second theme on which I compare the preceding interpretation with those in the literature is Kant’s theory of reflection. In Chapter Two I claimed that most commentators do not recognize the importance of Kant’s description of the
operation of reflection or its relevance to the Leibniz-critique.
In the preceding chapter we saw that those who recognize its
importance, namely Malter and Reuter, reject that transcendental
reflection is involved in a transcendental analysis of the
subjective origins of knowledge. Though their claim that Kant is
not giving a critical evaluation of the subjective origins of
knowledge will be rejected, many of the questions they raise
regarding this theory remain unanswered by Kant’s presentation of
his theory of reflection.

5.2 Textual Difficulties
Though the text of the amphiboly chapter is not a polished work,
I have argued that it is not a patchwork. The first three
chapters discussed the discontinuities of the appendix. Chapter
Four examined the different schools of thought regarding it. In
the first three chapters I attempted to present Kant’s position
more clearly by means of a synchronic interpretation of the
appendix. Before considering the first theme and some of the
specific problematic passages, which have led commentators to
call for revisions of the appendix, it may be useful to compare
the different interpretive methods used in the different
interpretations of the appendix with my own.
(a) Interpretive Methods

The dominant methods of interpreting the appendix are three: diachronic; synchronic; and retrogressive. The diachronic method approaches the appendix in light of some particular historical considerations surrounding it, typically either the appendix’s editorial history or Kant’s intellectual development. The synchronic method analyzes the appendix as it stands and interprets the appendix in light of the evidence internal to the Critique itself. The retrogressive method appraises a text in light of the later works and thoughts of an author. I have not included an in-depth discussion of the interpretations that employ a retrogressive method, because, in my opinion, they disregard the main problems specific to the appendix. As a result, their interpretations often do not examine the text adequately. These interpretations discuss the appendix primarily in terms of three later works: On a Discovery According to which Any New Critique of Pure Reason Has Been Made Superfluous by an Earlier One (1790, hereafter: On a Discovery); The Critique of Judgment (1790); and What Real Progress Has Metaphysics Made in Germany since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff? (1804, hereafter: Progress).

Martin refers to a remark at the end of On a Discovery, where Kant claims that, “The Critique of Pure Reason can ... be
seen as the genuine apology for Leibniz...” He claims that Kant’s philosophy should be seen in intention and in achievement as a real discussion of Leibniz’s philosophy, meaning that Martin not only thinks Kant intended to discuss Leibniz’s philosophy, but that he believes Kant has genuinely understood it. However, when Martin mentions the appendix in his own analysis, he only focusses on the third pair of concepts of reflection (inner and outer). He claims that Kant’s overall purpose in the appendix is to argue for the relational character of the Newtonian nature. Although not wholly incorrect, his interpretation does not address the fact that the concepts inner and outer are only one of four pairs of concepts of reflection. And, by Kant’s own account, they are not even the most important pair.

To take another example, Longuenesesse argues for a greater continuity between the Critique of Judgment and the Critique of Pure Reason than is generally recognized. She argues that the Transcendental Deduction and System of Principles of Pure Understanding must be understood by the guiding thread of the logical forms of judgments. When she discusses the appendix, her aim is to show that the concepts of comparison illuminate and

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formalize the tacit mental functions performed by the mind in generating empirical concepts. She argues that the formalized operations of comparison, reflection and abstraction help us understand the a priori combinations of sensible representations suggested by Kant. For the most part, Longuenesse's interest in the appendix is directed to the role of the concepts of comparison in the reflective genesis of all concepts. She only has a tertiary interest in transcendental reflection or the Leibniz-critique. Much of what she does say about the appendix is explicitly intended to expand and complete Kant's very cursory presentation of the role of the concepts of comparison in the formation of judgments (A 262, B 317f). She maintains that this role of the concepts of reflection is not emphasized enough in the secondary literature.

Longuenesse 1998, pp. 131 - 166.
Ibid, p. 129f.
Although she mentions Graubner 1972, Miles 1978, and Parkinson 1981 (Longuenesse 1998, p. 130, fn. 66), Longuenesse appears to be unaware that there are a number of other attempts at developing this relationship between judgments and the concepts of reflection (cf., Knauer 1881, Döring 1904, Behn 1908, Lange 1958, Liedtke 1964, Broeckcen 1970, Reuter 1989).
To take yet another example, Andrews combines Kant’s comments in the appendix with what he states in Progress. She considers the four false tenets of Leibnizianism to be similar enough in both cases to combine them into a single Leibniz-critique. The variations in Kant’s summary of these tenets in the appendix are not discussed and the difference between the summaries of the four tenets in the two works is not viewed as significant. In the appendix proper Kant lists the four false tenets as the principle of identity of indiscernibles, the principle of non-contradiction, the concept of a monad and the


I disagree with Karl Ameriks, who states that “there is just a slight change in the tone and focus” between the arguments in Progress and the appendix (Ameriks 1992, p. 256).

In discussing Eberhard’s attack on Kant’s philosophical originality in the Critique, Andrews distinguishes between those who interpret the principle of sufficient reason logically, namely as an analytic principle of non-contradiction “as the Wolffians do” (Andrews 1990, p. 161f), and those who interpret as a synthetic principle about truths of fact. Andrews does not mention that though in On a Discovery, Kant attributes the latter interpretation to Leibniz (Allison 1973, p. 157f), in the appendix he attributes the former to Leibniz, emphasizing the Wolffian interpretation: “Although Herr von Leibniz did not
principle that matter precedes form. In Progress Kant lists these
tenets as follows: principle of identity of indiscernibles;
principle of sufficient reason; system of pre-established
harmony; and monadology.\footnote{This is somewhat closer to, but is
still not identical with, the list Kant gives in the note,
namely: the principle of identity of indiscernibles; the
principle of non-contradiction; pre-established harmony; and the
ideality of space and time.} Although this interpretive method and these examples of its
application are not without merit, they do not serve my ends of
explaining Kant's Leibniz-critique and some of the intricacies of
the appendix. The two dominant interpretive methods employed in
the secondary literature make a closer inspection of the
appendix. Consequently, they are more instructive and more
important for gaining a judicious and measured interpretation of
the appendix and Kant's Leibniz-critique. I shall, therefore,
continue to focus my attention on these interpretations of the
appendix.

\footnote{indeed announce the above proposition [namely, that realities
never logically conflict with each other] with all the pomp of a
new principle, he yet made use of it for new assertions, and his
successors expressly incorporated it into their Leibniz-Wolffian
system" (A 273 / B 329).

\footnote{Kant 1983, pp. 97 - 105.}
In the remainder of this section, I propose to supplement my synchronic interpretation of the appendix presented in Chapter Three with two theses, to be called the competence and the mosaic thesis. They make it possible to find a middle path between the diverse views offered in the commentaries which use the synchronic and diachronic methods. These two interpretive methods have complementary strengths and opposing weaknesses. When the diachronic method is used the appendix is analyzed in detail and difficult passages are found. The strength of the synchronic method is that it assumes the proper placement and expands on the theory of reflection espoused therein. The weakness of the diachronic interpretations is that it leads commentators to see the appendix as improperly placed or in need of substantial revisions. The weakness of the synchronic interpretations is that commentators often ignore the most difficult passages in the appendix, which the other schools use to challenge the natural assumption that the appendix is properly placed as it stands.

I shall assume a competence thesis, which entails that of two equally complete interpretations the one that demands the least revisions of the text is the better, because it attributes more competence to the author. The synchronic interpretations tend to be incomplete in their analysis of the appendix. My interpretation of the appendix is not only more complete than the synchronic interpretations, but it also requires no changes. And
since the diachronic interpretations tend to require substantial changes, I claim that my interpretation is superior to both.

A combination of the insights derived from the two main interpretive methods can fortify my own interpretation. I aim to utilize the strength of one method to offset the weakness of the other. Attention to the difficult passages by the misplacement and the relict schools can be used to offset the truncated exposition of Kant’s theory of reflection given by Malter and Reuter. Though this approach is warranted by my assumption of the competence thesis, I think it is also strengthened when supplemented by the mosaic thesis.

(b) Mosaic Thesis

The mosaic thesis is the hypothesis about the composition of the appendix that, although there is a single tacit position argued in the text of the appendix, at least its first two sections were written at different times. The hypothesis also contends that when the appendix was collated it was not edited rigorously. Though there are minor slips and unrefined passages throughout the appendix, the mosaic thesis makes it possible to defend the position that the appendix is properly placed. At least when clearer statements of Kant’s Leibniz-critique and theory of reflection are supplemented by a mosaic thesis are given, the appendix exhibits a systematic unity that compensates and often
accounts for its problems. It was because Kant considered these matters important that he formulated his thoughts on the subject more than once. And the issues raised were difficult enough not to have been resolved perfectly in the process.

I introduce the term 'mosaic' to contrast the more popular 'patchwork' thesis and to suggest that a stronger unity is present in the appendix than suspected by Kemp Smith. Adickes first introduced the mosaic thesis as a way to appraise the affect of Kant's systematic approach to philosophy on his architectonic system and even offers some thoughts on some possible outlines which Kant used to compile the Critique. When Adickes discusses the appendix, he argues that an appeal to Kant's Reflexionen is sufficient to show that it has a unified subject matter. My application of the mosaic thesis has a significantly more narrow application. I restrict it to the analysis of the appendix and following competent historians of Kant's work, namely Wundt and de Vleeschauwer. I shall not

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I adopt this suggestion from Malter 1982, p. 125.

Adickes 1887.

Adickes 1889, pp. XVIII - XXVII, cf., Erdmann 1911. There is also the suggestion from Ameriks that much of the Critique was "the product of a series of hasty rearrangements" (Ameriks 1992, p. 253).

Wundt 1924, p. 181, Vleeschauwer 1962, pp. 44, 63, 77, cf.,
appeal to Kant's *Reflexionen* or *Lose Blätter* for the purpose of interpreting or providing hypotheses on the different composition dates of the first two sections.

Compared to the other diachronic evidence, Kant's letters are still the best indicators of his intellectual development, despite the fact that they still leave profound gaps in our knowledge of his intellectual development during the silent decade. It is very likely that the appendix was composed within the silent decade, but without better philological evidence on the appendix, we are left with only less than adequate hypotheses about how early its sections were composed. This position on the composition dates agrees with the bulk of the secondary literature. Apart from cursory remarks by Heidegger, Erdmann and Laywine, which suggest that the appendix was composed quite

Beiser 1992, p. 52.

"Vermutlich ist dieser 'Anhang' sehr spät, erst nach Abschluß der 'Kritik der reinen Vernunft' eingeschoben" (Heidegger 1976, p. 472).

"...Kant habe den Abschnitt über die Amphibolie der Reflexionsbegriffe erst später eingeschoben" (Erdmann 1878, p. 37, fn. 1).

Introducing the appendix she states: "After-thoughts added to after-thoughts are not the most promising way to present or to clarify ideas – especially complicated ones" (Laywine 1995, p. 149)
late in the silent decade, those commentators who analyze the appendix closely accept that it is the one of the earliest composed sections of the Critique. And except for the relict school, actual composition dates are not usually proposed.

Support for a mosaic thesis can be found, not only in the way Kant introduces the fourth section, but also by some of Kant's own descriptions of the composition of the Critique. In a June 8, 1781 letter Kant writes to Biester (the secretary to von Zedlitz, to whom the Critique is dedicated) stating that the Critique represents reflections made over many years, which were written out in short order. It is for this reason that Kant suggests there are a few irregularities and some errata yet to be found in the text.11 Kant writes something similar to Mendelssohn in August 16, 1783. He writes that, "...the book is the product of nearly twelve years of reflection ... completed hastily, in perhaps four or five months...."12 Kant goes on to say that he is too old to give the uninterrupted effort required to rounding, smoothing and lubricating each of the work's parts. It was his hope that Mendelssohn would take up this task.

It is uncertain if Kant had his operation of transcendental reflection in mind, but as early as 1772 Kant blamed his

\[\text{329) .} \]

\[\quad \text{Ak. X, p. 272.}\]

\[\quad \text{Kant 1968, p. 105.}\]
‘changing constitution for reflection’ for his failure to respond
to Herz’s letters.” And in a 1783 letter to Christian Garve,
Kant responded to his altered and anonymously published, review
of the Critique, naming him, along with Mendelssohn and Tetens as
the only men he knows through whose co-operation the problems
raised by the question of how synthetic knowledge is possible
could be resolved.” Kant again states that the expression of his
ideas in the Critique — “ideas that I had been working out
painstakingly for twelve years in succession — was not worked out
sufficiently to be generally understandable.” Kant clearly
acknowledges the unpolished nature of the Critique and contrary
to Cassirer, he claims that it is the test of a theory’s
stability that in the course of time its obscurities and
inequalities can be smoothed away (B xlv).

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Ibid, p. 117.

Kant 1967, pp. 103, 107, cf., p. 96.

Ibid, p. 100.

Cassirer writes that, “The Critique of Pure Reason is a
classic book, for the works of the great thinkers, unlike great
works of literary art, appear in their truest form when the seal
of perfection is not set on them, but when they still reflect the
incessant movement and the inner restlessness of thought itself”
I now turn to a different set of problems and the 'rough edges' of the appendix. In examining whether they support the claim that it is a pre-critical work, I shall have occasion to contrast my interpretation with the misplacement and relict schools of thought.

5.3 The Misplacement and Relict Schools
The relict school delivers what appears to be a candid summary of the weaknesses and pre-critical nature of the appendix. Though I agree that the appendix is at many points unfocused and fragmentary, the conclusion that the appendix is a pre-critical work and does not belong in the Critique is unwarranted. It is worth while, therefore, to examine the premises on which they base their conclusion. Challenging their interpretations of these passages is not easy, because the passages are problematic. Nevertheless, I shall argue that an interpretation that presumes a competency and mosaic theses can account for virtually all the questionable and problematic passages, mentioned by the misplacement and relict schools and even those that they do not mention. I shall begin with those questionable passages often overlooked in the literature.

A questionable passage can be found when Kant turns to the fourth pair of concepts of reflection in the note. He begins by summarizing the fallacy in Leibniz’s philosophy as the 'fallacy

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of transcendental reflection'. Kant appears to have changed the emphasis on the fallacy he is exposing. Initially it was said that it was caused by the complete exception of transcendental reflection, but this passage suggests that the fallacy originated in either the use or misuse of transcendental reflection. Although Kant does not appear to allow for the possibility of the misuse of this operation, Kant might have been thinking of a misuse of transcendental reflection at the time of composing this passage. Still, this need not entail that the appendix is a pre-critical work, only an incomplete and an unpolished one. It seems even more likely, however, that Kant simply intended to write 'the fallacy of logical reflection', but in haste mistakenly wrote 'transcendental reflection'.

In another questionable passage in the note Kant appears to forget the limits he places on the transcendental topic. Having already said that the transcendental topic contains no more than the above mentioned four pairs of concepts of reflection (A 269 / B 325), after the fourth pair Kant goes on to claim that, "the remaining concepts of reflection have to be dealt with in the same manner" (A 277 / B 333). This passage implies that there are

"Leibniz's famous doctrine of time and space, in which he intellectualised these forms of sensibility, owed its origin entirely to this same fallacy of transcendental reflection" (A 275 / B 331).
more concepts of reflection than the four discussed. Again, it is not unlikely that Kant simply composed the note hastily and in editing overlooked the passage.\(^{121}\)

Arguing that the appendix proper was written before Kant thought up the table of categories, Zilsel appeals to (among other passages) the first paragraph of division I, where Kant states that many judgments are accepted owing to custom or grounded in inclination. This, Zilsel suggests, shows that Kant wrote the appendix before he was clear about his critical system. Kant introduces transcendental logic as excluding what he calls applied logic, which considers the affect of things like custom and inclination on logical judgments (A 52f, B 77). Zilsel argues that Kant must therefore have written the appendix before he had developed transcendental logic.

Kemp Smith claims that this passage, which begins division V and makes the note longer than the appendix proper, might be of an earlier composition date than division IV (Kemp Smith 1962, p. 423, cf., also Adickes 1889, p. 272, fn. 1, cited by Kemp Smith). This seems unlikely, because in the latter part of division V, Kant appears to have a better grasp of the problem he finds with logical reflection, than in any of the preceding divisions (cf., § 2.4 (b) The Concept of a Thing in General, above). Given the mosaic thesis, however, it is nevertheless feasible that division V might have been composed separately from division IV.
This passage need not be interpreted in this way. It is more likely that Kant is simply stating that many a judgment is passed on inadequate grounds. He claims that a reflective examination of the transcendental grounds of judgments is required to be in a position to test whether any particular judgment is objectively valid. Since reflection is required to provide this examination, it is to be expected that Kant would mention custom and inclination to accentuate his point. His interest in providing adequate grounds for judgments is also shown in numerous Reflexionen, which deal with the differences between prejudice and judgment. Kant claims that reflection is the indispensable step between the two. For example, he writes: "reflection means: to compare something to the laws of the understanding and reason. As a general rule, to judge something without reflection is called prejudice." If one conceives the importance of reflection, then the passage at the beginning of the appendix proper could have been composed before the Transcendental Logic without being pre-critical.

The misplacement school overemphasizes Kant’s use of terms like noumena, the transcendental object and things themselves. Adickes’s appeal to Reflexion 5552 may support a connection


R 2519, Ak. XVI, p. 403.

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between the fourth section of the appendix and the Paralogisms; but, on the assumption of the mosaic thesis, that need not imply anything in regard to the first three sections. On this point I think Malter is right to point out that the appendix is not concerned with inferences of reason, but with the misuse of the understanding. Were the appendix dealing with the former, then Kant could have easily placed it in the already lengthy appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic. As regards the guiding question of the Misplacement School, Kant clearly states in his Mrongovius Metaphysics lectures (1782-3) that it would be wrong to consider his transcendental philosophy as ontology:

[Transcendental philosophy] occupies itself with the sources, the extent, and the boundaries of pure reason, without busying itself with objects. For that reason it is wrong to call it ontology. There we consider things already according to their general properties. Transcendental logic abstracts from all that; it is a kind of self-cognition.

The bulk of the relict school's evidence in favour of their interpretation also focuses on passages which mention transcendental objects, noumena, and things themselves. In response, I think that Malter is again right to suggest that Kant

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For an analysis of that appendix (A 643 / B 671 - A 704 / B 723) see Hanel 1981.

is often referring to the dogmatist's position when he mentions noumena and things in themselves [die Dinge an sich]. When Kant says that Leibniz took appearances for things in themselves (A 264, B 320), or regarded substances as noumena (A 266, B 331f), or that appearances were to him representations of things in themselves (A 270 / B 327), Kant does not himself commit an amphiboly by claiming the existence of things in themselves or noumena. He is contrasting his critical position with what he thinks Leibniz's is.

Malter's approach does not, however, adequately deal with all the problematic passages that the relict school uses to support their position. I shall discuss in turn those passages which mention the transcendental object and things themselves. The transcendental object is mentioned twice in the appendix. The first time it is mentioned does not pose a problem. Kant only suggests that it may be the cause of the matter of an appearance and states that we are not able to decide this question (A 277 / B 333). He appears to equate the transcendental object with the thing in itself in this passage, but since he does not elaborate on his point, little can be concluded in favour of the pre-critical nature of his comment.

The second time the transcendental object is mentioned Kemp Smith contends that Kant overstates his case. The understanding, Kant writes, "...does indeed think for itself an object [einen
Gegenstand] in itself, but only as transcendental object, which is the cause of appearance..." (A 288, B 344). There are two problems with this passage. The first problem is that Kant says that the understanding thinks an object in itself. The second problem is that this object is said to be the cause of an appearance. As regards the first problem, Adickes suggests that Kant likely did not intend to say that understanding thinks an object in itself, but rather that it knows it. He claims that were Kant to have said this, then we could interpret the second mention of the transcendental object as signifying an undetermined object or the negative sense of noumena. Though this involves changing the sense of the term from the first mention, it would allow the categories to have some relation to it. In support of his suggested modification Adickes refers to the fact that Kant distinguishes the negative from the positive sense of noumena on the pages preceding the second mention of the transcendental object.

Adickes’s approach to this passage is useful, especially if one sought to provide an extensive explication of this difficult passage. Nevertheless, something Kemp Smith mentions challenges the feasibility of such a response. He contends that Kant is referring to the positive sense of noumenon and thus the appendix was written at such a time when Kant has not yet developed from

\[Adickes 1924, p. 138.\]
the more rationalist *Dissertation*. Immediately after the second mention of the transcendental object, Kant states that we are free to name this object a noumenon (A 288, B 345). Since the first passage in the appendix which mentions the transcendental object equates it with the thing in itself, Kemp Smith’s claim appears warranted.

The line following this passage supports Adickes’s claim, however, in that it suggests that the negative sense of noumenon is what Kant has in mind. We are free to name this object a noumenon, because this concept does not refer to an object. It is related to the problem of the limits of our sensible knowledge (A 288, B 345). We can see that this is also how Kant explains the negative sense of the concept of a noumenon in the B-edition (B 309ff). Therefore, Kemp Smith’s suspicions as to why these passages were not stricken in the B-edition can be allayed by the fact that they already reflect Kant’s critical position on noumena.

This explanation of the first problem with Kant’s remarks on the transcendental object intensifies a further problem. If a noumenal object has no assignable positive meaning, then how can it be said to be the cause of an appearance? This leads us into the problem of affection, which was first raised by Jacobi.\footnote{In my opinion, the best work on this problem is Herbert Herring’s *Das Problem der Affektion bei Kant* (1953, Köln). He}
shall not speak to this problem, because it is sufficient for my purposes to shift the emphasis away from thinking the second problem indicates a pre-critical position to its proper quandary. Moreover, this confirms my position that the appendix deals with important, difficult and unresolved questions of Kant’s critical philosophy.

We can now turn to Kant’s references to “things themselves” (die Dinge selbst, die Gegenstände selbst), which are also cited by the relict school as clear indicators of the pre-critical tenor of the appendix. The expression “things themselves” is mentioned in connection with transcendental reflection and the concepts of reflection. Zilsel suggests that in the former instances Kant reproduces the distinction between the real and logical use of reason in the distinction between transcendental and logical reflection. He refers to a passage on A 260, B 319, where Kant writes, “transcendental reflection ... bears on the objects themselves [die Gegenstände selbst]....” Zilsel maintains summaries the different interpretations from Jacobi to N. Hartmann and W.H. Walsh. His analysis of the literature reveals two further and more feasible approaches to this problem in addition to Hans Vaihinger’s initial three (Vaihinger 1892, II, p. 53).

I shall discuss the latter below, but I shall not discuss A 268, B 324.

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that Kant is referring to the positive sense of noumena or things in themselves. This would make the use of transcendental reflection mentioned in the passage similar to the real use of reason since it purports to represent the objects themselves.

Zilsel's interpretation of this passage is not the only feasible one and it does not recognize the central contrast Kant is making in this passage. In his critical philosophy Kant rejects the real use of reason, whereas in this passage he is actually accentuating the relevant differences between transcendental reflection and the purported misuse of the understanding by the dogmatist. The dogmatist misuses logical reflection by moving directly from conclusions derived from a comparison of concepts to conclusions about objects. Kant claims that without transcendental reflection the dogmatist only considers abstract concepts of things and is mistaken if he thinks he is thereby also conceiving things as they are. According to Kant the only access we have to objects is sensible. Without transcendental reflection, the dogmatist does not recognize that he has a mistaken view of our epistemological capacities. He overlooks the nature of sensibility completely, bypassing any consideration of the sensible relation of concepts to things.

With transcendental reflection, on the other hand, one can analyze the subjective conditions under which alone Kant
maintains we are able to arrive at objectively valid concepts of objects. Thereby one can also realize the independent status of sensibility as a source of representations, necessary for empirical knowledge of the world. Transcendental reflection, therefore, bears on the objects themselves in that it uncovers the dual nature of our epistemic faculties through which objects are known by us. This view is opposed to what Kant sees as bogus attempts to know the world by pure concepts alone, or empirical intuitions alone.  

As explained in Chapter Two, Kant nevertheless overstates the association of the transcendental use of the understanding with logical reflection. This overemphasis can be misleading, because not all logical reflection presumes the transcendental use of the understanding. His point is that only with transcendental reflection does one properly separate the empirical from the transcendental use of the understanding. Though Kant’s critical views did not get formulated quickly or univocally, if we concede the mosaic composition of the appendix, then these passages must be weighed against Kant’s clear statements of disagreement with the intellectualist’s position. The occasional mentioning of the conditions under which the

This also suggests a way one could defend Kant’s conflating of sensibility as the transcendental location with real spatial locations mentioned in Chapter Two.
intellectualist’s position would be right does not show that Kant did not develop his mature critical ideas at the time of writing these passages. On the contrary, it shows that he was aware that there are distinct differences between the two positions. When Kant states that space and time can be used as grounds and consequents, if the pure understanding was directed immediately to objects (A 267, B 323) or if we intuit things as they are (A 267, B 323), he is not repeating his pre-critical position. He is pointing out the errors of that type of position in light of his critical philosophy.

With the critical character of the appendix defended, I now turn to a defense of my interpretation of transcendental reflection. In particular, I shall address Malter and Reuter’s claim that Kant is not interested in examining the origins of human knowledge.

5.4 The Proper Placement School

I argued in Chapter Three that transcendental reflection (1) analyzes the subjective origins of knowledge and (2) helps to determine the scope of that knowledge. The two commentators who interpret the appendix synchronically and expand on Kant’s theory of reflection, reject (1), claiming that such an interpretation of Kant’s work undermines his true intent and reduces

\[ \text{Cf., A 283f, B 340.} \]
transcendental reflection to a phenomenological analysis of pure representations. In this section, I shall argue that Kant does not repudiate the analysis of the subjective origins of knowledge simpliciter. Rather he claims that pure knowledge stems from transcendental sources and that transcendental reflection plays a role in determining not only the scope of objective validity knowledge, but also its subjective origin.

Malter limits the operation of transcendental reflection to applying externally to past epistemological theories the insights won in its internal use, which is given in the Transcendental Aesthetic and Analytic. Both Malter and Reuter suggests that transcendental reflection must be seen as systematically prior to a proper understanding of logical reflection and the use of the understanding since it is a radically new philosophical method of analyzing the functions (including logical functions) of the mind, separating the conditions of sensibility from those of the understanding. This thematic reflection or analysis is, therefore, not to be identified with the reflective function of the understanding. While Reuter suggests that Malter's interpretation of transcendental reflection does not place enough emphasis on this point, they nevertheless agree on two important points. First, they agree that transcendental reflection is methodologically prior to proper logical reflection. And second,
they also agree that Kant’s talk of representations ‘belonging to a faculty’ should not be taken at face value.

Leaving aside Reuter’s proposed emendations to Kant’s theory of reflection and criticisms of Malter’s interpretation, it needs to be emphasized that transcendental reflection should not be interpreted as a tacit function of the understanding. This is not to say that Kant does not describe the understanding as reflective. He does. This reflective function is described in a number of places in Kant’s works. It is emphasized in the Prolegomena, for example, where Kant states that the understanding intuits nothing, but only reflects. This particular function is suggested in Kant’s claim that the concepts of comparison function in the construction of the logical forms of judgments (A 262, B 317f). Thus, in a few of Kant’s Reflexionen he describes concepts as reflective:” and as ideas of reflection.” In the Mrongovius Metaphysics he states that concepts do not arise from sense, but arise from reflection.” He also mentions a particular mistake one can make,  


which is relevant to our analysis of his Leibniz-critique. The mistake is to think concepts are formed by only a single faculty. Thus, Locke thought their origin could all be traced to sensible experience, and Leibniz to pure understanding. In regard to the latter, Kant states that without something given in sensibility the understanding would have nothing on which to reflect.\textsuperscript{133}

Regarding the question of whether Kant treats of the subjective origin of knowledge, Reuter argues that such an interpretation of transcendental reflection is wrong, because it would reduce the notion of transcendental reflection to a simple psychological or phenomenological operation. He suggests that Kant's theory should be reformulated in a purely linguistic manner in order to avoid any psychologistic overtones. Malter suggests that these passages should be taken metaphorically or polemically. He claims that when Kant says this, that he should be interpreted as simply imitating the idiom of his opponent. Let us consider these suggested interpretations in turn, beginning with Malter's.

Kant has no reason to be conciliatory when discussing the question of the faculty to which representations belong. When he talks of determining which faculty a concept belongs to, he is not contrasting his view with the dogmatist's, but explaining his own distinction between logical and transcendental reflection.

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid, p. 136.
The latter operation is unique, because it accounts for representations that do not even belong to the same faculty of knowledge. Moreover, this is the reason why transcendental reflection can be said to bear on the things themselves as discussed above.

Though Reuter's suggestion fares somewhat better, it does not justify ruling out any analysis of the origin of knowledge. While it is a valid aim for Kantian research to interpret his theory of reflection in wholly linguistic terms, the aim of the present study is only to explicate how it relates to his Leibniz-critique in the amphiboly chapter. Reuter's linguistic reinterpretation of transcendental reflection does not show that Kant did not in fact present this operation in order to examine the subjective origins of knowledge. In this connection, it is worth noting that Reuter indirectly acknowledges a problem with his suggestion. After rejecting the question of the origins of representations and their phenomenological examination, he states

Cf., A 262f, B 319. Malter proposes that the 'letzteren' (Ak. III, p. 216) mentioned in this passage Kant refers is logical reflection (Malter 1982, p. 142f) and not to the given representations (cf., Lange 1970, p. 42). Although Malter aims to make a sound point (that transcendental reflection and logical reflection are not congruent operations), I maintain that his interpolation is incorrect.
that there is no medium in which Kant’s objective comparison of concepts can be carried out. This is the case, because the medium of Kant’s operation of transcendental reflection is human consciousness and its purported transcendental makeup.

It is true, however, that Kant is not primarily interested in engaging in a phenomenological analysis of the origins of representations. This is only a preliminary step in his larger project of giving a critical examination of pure reason, which determines not only the origin, but also more importantly the scope and the objective validity of knowledge. A review of this question in terms of Kant’s *Mélanges Metaphysics* lectures can help develop my point. In the introduction to these lectures we find themes of self-knowledge and critical examination familiar to the Critique. Kant states that transcendental philosophy considers reason itself and is occupied with three issues, namely determining the sources, extent and boundaries of pure reason. He also states that philosophy should not be divided in terms of objects, but in terms of cognition. This difference constitutes a central point of dissimilarity between Kant’s critical and pre-critical work. Cassirer summarizes Kant’s shift away from the concerns of his Dissertation in this way: “The division between objects, the dualism of the sensible and the intelligible world,

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Kant 1997, p. 121.

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is displaced by a division between cognitive functions which are the basis of any sort of objectivity.”

In discussing the history of metaphysics, Kant distances himself from the question of the origins of concepts. He differentiates between physiology, the critique of pure reason and systems of science, noting that the first is an inquiry into the origin of concepts and is really a part of psychology. This, he says, was the business of Locke and Leibniz. In so far as Kant criticizes both philosophers, it would be fair to assume that Kant is not interested in adopting either’s philosophical approach. As regards systems of science, he states that one such has been propounded by Wolff. No one, however, says Kant, has thought of offering a critique of pure reason. The introduction

Kant 1997, p. 125.
Cf., the following from the Vorarbeit zu den Prolegomena (1783): “No one considered the possibility of such a priori knowledge, although Herr Tetens could have suggested it” (Beck 1969, p. 415, fn. 76). And in the anonymous L. Lectures on Metaphysics (c. 1790) Kant states that instead of dogmatic philosophy one could adopt “critique, or the procedure of investigating and judging reason. Locke had dissected the human understanding, and showed which powers belong to this or that cognition; but he did not complete his work” (Kant 1997, p. 306,
of these distinctions between physiology, critique and systems suggests that Kant's critique of pure reason eschews both physiology and systems. Yet, it must not be overlooked that Kant states that it is impossible to "disabuse the understanding of these questions. They are so woven into the nature of reason that we cannot be rid of them". This could be interpreted to mean that it is natural for us to ask questions about origins and expound systems, but that a critical philosopher tries to avoid them. On the other hand, it is probably more accurate to say that Kant is claiming that even the critical thinker must examine the origins of knowledge and expound systems, but only in so far as that examination is limited to the transcendental origins of knowledge. Moreover, this task must be carried out systematically. This follows from what Kant states in the Critique about the systematic development of his ideas. Trying to avoid both shallow dogmatism and anti-metaphysical scepticism, Kant claims that one cannot give in to these injurious positions. Not only is the criticism of the powers of pure reason necessary to prepare for a thoroughly grounded metaphysics (B xxxvi), but the execution of the plan prescribed by the critique, the future system of metaphysics must, "follow the strict method of the celebrated Wolff, the greatest of all the dogmatic philosophers"

Ak XXVIII, p. 540).

Kant 1997, p. 126.

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(ibid). To do otherwise Kant states is to change work into play, certainty into opinion and philosophy into philodoxy (B xxxvii). What Kant rejects is indifference to these metaphysical questions (A x) or uncritical trust in our received opinions without knowing its origin, extent and objective validity (A 3, B 7).

We can develop Kant's thoughts on his critique of pure reason further by discussing physiology. In the Transcendental Doctrine of Method in the Critique Kant divides physiology into three types: the transcendent, the immanent, and the rational (A 845f / B 873f). The first has as its object either the knowledge of the world or God, which transcends experience. The second type of physiology examines either corporeal nature (physics) or thinking nature (psychology). Kant introduces rational physiology as the narrow definition of metaphysics (A 842 / B 870). He states that it treats of understanding and reason, but takes no account of material nature.

Turning again to the lectures on metaphysics, we see Kant describe metaphysics as including the summation of all pure cognitions of reason clarified through analysis.²⁵ It is because Kant claims these pure cognitions arise from different human sources of cognition that we must develop a science of metaphysics.²⁶ He does not reject systematic approaches to

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²⁶ Kant 1997, p. 115.
philosophic problems. "Accordingly, the method of metaphysics is both critical and dogmatic in order to systematically explore and develop a criterion for distinguishing between the cognitions which legitimately arise from understanding and from reason...." Kant states that his critique has the goal of producing a system of the self-cognition of our reason. "We must therefore investigate the powers of the mind out of which the cognitions arise, in order to see whether we can trust them, regardless of whether they seem to be obviously true...."

From these considerations we can see that Kant does not abandon the analysis of the subjective origins of knowledge. On the contrary, he retains an analysis of the transcendental modes of human cognition as a necessary step towards systematically developing metaphysics as a science. Transcendental reflection is the method by which Kant carries out the determination of the origins, extent and objective validity of human knowledge. Despite its importance, however, Kant does not describe transcendental reflection extensively or clearly enough to answer all the questions that arise.

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Ibid.
5.5 Some Unresolved Questions

As the discussion of the secondary literature indicated there are a number of interesting but unresolved questions about Kant’s theory of reflection. Despite the expository aim of this dissertation at least four unresolved questions remain unsolved. They deserve to be mentioned briefly since they concern the tenability of the appendix as a systematic and unique part of the Critique, in which transcendental reflection plays an important role not only in Kant’s Leibniz-critique, but also in the aims of the Critique of Pure Reason.

The first question has already been mentioned by the other synchronic interpretations of the appendix. Kant’s theory of reflection is underdetermined. The majority of commentators fail to acknowledge that Kant says anything at all concerning reflection. And even of those who do acknowledge this aspect of Kant’s philosophy, the commentators are divided over the complexity of the operation. Reuter discusses the question of whether transcendental reflection works at one or two levels. This debate arises because Kant does not describe in enough detail how transcendental reflection accomplishes what he says it does and Reuter is right to point out the weaknesses of both accounts of transcendental reflection. The single level interpretation presumes the isolation and analysis of the faculties of knowledge, whilst the two level interpretation
demands an operation that is too complex to be adequately supported by what Kant states in the appendix. If transcendental reflection analyzes the subjective conditions under which alone we can arrive at objectively valid concepts, then in the appendix Kant has sketched only the most basic features of such an operation.

There is also a related question concerning the relationship between transcendental reflection and objective comparison. Kant states that the former is required for the latter, yet which type of representations does he thinks are to be given an objective comparison with the conditions of sensibility? There seem to be three possible answers to this second question, each with some measure of plausibility. Based on Kant’s descriptions of the operation of transcendental reflection, one could expect that there is a select list of representations that shall be given an objective comparison. The objective comparison could be limited to an internal comparison of those pure representations which belong to the faculties of understanding and sensibility. In this case the objective comparison could be interpreted in light of Kant’s aim of replacing the proud name of ontology with a mere analytic of the understanding. Another type of representation could be those indigenous to the faculty of reason, namely the ideas of the soul, the world and of God. In this case the objective comparison could be seen as a part of Kant’s attempt to
undermine claims to knowledge concerning such hyper-physical objects. Although related to the criticisms of ontology these representations are unique in that they are avowedly non-empirical and relate to Kant’s arguments presented in the Dialectic. In so far as the Critique aims to outline the first principle of human knowledge, the objective comparison could also be used externally on any purportedly objective representations. In this case, it could be the way in which we could understand the external nature of Kant’s general confrontation with empirical and rationalist epistemologies like those of Locke and Leibniz. Kant states that these epistemologies entail that we can know through either empirical intuitions alone or pure concepts alone. Kant’s objective comparison of representations, however, enables him to adjudicate between objectively valid and invalid knowledge claims.

The third unanswered question deals with the difference and relationship between the reflective apperceptive function of the understanding and the method of transcendental reflection. Both Malter and Reuter recognize that despite the significance of both for his philosophy, Kant does not explicitly discuss how they differ or how they work together. This is a serious limitation of Kant’s theory of reflection. It is also interesting to note that discussions of transcendental reflection appear to be limited to the Critique. We do not find Kant discussing transcendental
reflection anywhere else in his main works, though he does talk about the faculty of understanding and the act of apperception as reflective. For example, in his Anthropology he discusses empirical and pure apperception. He calls pure apperception "the purely [bloß] reflective I." Though the proper analysis of the different notions of reflection in Kant's works requires independent study, Reuter mentions in passing that reflection is the most vacillating concept in Kant's philosophical corpus. We have seen that even in Kant's most focused discussion of transcendental reflection, he does not dedicate sufficient attention to explaining it, especially considering its argued centrality to the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements.

The final unresolved question that needs to be mentioned concerns the concepts of reflection: Where do they come from? Both Malter and Reuter ask about the origin of these mysterious

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Ak. VII, p. 134, fn *. Reuter 1989, p. 82, fn. 2, cf., Zilssl 1913, p. 448. Reuter gives the example that even in the Anthropology (1798) Kant does not describe reflection in a uniform manner (Reuter 1989, p. 83, fn. 4). In § 3 Kant describes our attempts to become conscious of our representations as facilitated either by attention (attentio) or abstraction (abstractio) (Ak. VII, p. 131). Yet, when he comes to discuss the understanding in § 6 he describes it as containing attention, abstraction and reflection (reflexio) (Ibid, p. 133).
concepts and do not find a satisfactory answer. The deduction of
the concepts of reflection that Kant mentions in the Prolegomena
is not found in the appendix. Reuter suggests that the missing
deduction opens the door to increasing the list of possible
concepts of reflection. Malter's caution and refraining from
speculating beyond what Kant has given us in the appendix is
prudent, whereas Reuter's suggestion that we could add to the
list of concepts of reflection implies a certain ad hoc character
to their origin not present in Kant's explicit comment about
their origin in § 39 of the Prolegomena.

What Kant does tells us about the concepts of reflection is
their use. He describes the concepts of reflection in two roles.
The first delimits the possible relations representations can
have in a single state of mind. The second describes their role
as concepts of comparison in which they play a role in the
construction of categorical judgments. The former I have
developed in light of the four false tenets argued in Kant's
Leibniz-critique, the latter is developed in different ways in
the literature, but neither are sufficiently explained in the
Critique.

\[\text{Cf., fn 165 above.}\]
Conclusion

In the foregoing it has been shown that Kant’s Leibniz-critique as found in the amphiboly chapter derives from his theory of reflection. It has been argued that the unfocused and fragmentary amphiboly chapter of the Critique, which contains the Leibniz-critique, can be seen to have a previously unsuspected unity to it. The keys to perceiving this unity are the appendix’s purpose, structure and mosaic composition.

The primary purpose of the appendix is not to present Kant’s criticisms of Leibniz as is commonly thought, but rather it is to sketch his theory of reflection. Not only is this attested to by Kant himself (A 270 / B 326), it is also made evident by the structure of the appendix. Structurally, the appendix is built around an introduction to the operation of transcendental reflection and a discussion of the concepts of reflection, this being the structure of each of the first three sections. By means of each pair of concepts of reflection Kant claims to summarize the basic tenets and origin of Leibniz’s philosophy. Kant also
claims that Leibniz’s whole philosophy rests on one seminal error, which has been shown to be the omission of the operation of transcendental reflection. To be sure, Kant claims Leibniz made a number of other errors, but these various errors all derive from the omission of transcendental reflection.

While this omission can be used to explain the other more well-known epistemological mistakes with which Kant charges Leibniz, it is undeniable that there are certain textual difficulties with the appendix. These can be dealt with by the hypothesis that the different sections were composed at different times and then pieced together without detailed revisions. If such a mosaic composition is granted, then some allowance can be made for the noticeable incongruities between these sections and for occasional problematic passages. This does not, however, warrant the claim that the appendix is not properly placed or unimportant. On the contrary, supplemented by clearer statements of Kant’s theory of reflection and of his Leibniz-critique the foregoing interpretation shows that the appendix is properly placed and integral to the primary aims of the Critique of Pure Reason.
Appendix A

The Single-Faculty Charge

The single faculty charge has at least two interesting historical features that deserve to be mentioned, even though they do not fit into the discussion of Chapter Two. The first interesting thing about this charge is that it was not originally made against Leibniz. The second thing is about this charge is that even though it came to be attributed to Leibniz exclusively, at the time Leibniz was added to those Kant claims made the single faculty charge, maintained that he was defending Leibniz.

In § 7 of the 1770 Inaugural Dissertation Kant charges Wolff alone with viewing the difference between sensibility and understanding as one of degrees of clarity.\footnote{Kant 1992, p. 387, cf., also anonymous L1 lectures on metaphysics from the mid-1770s (Kant 1997, p. 48).} We find this charge again in § 8 of the Transcendental Aesthetic, but at this time both Leibniz and Wolff are charged.\footnote{"The philosophy of Leibniz and Wolff, in thus treating the difference between the sensible and the intelligible as merely...} In the Critique (1781) Kant
also makes a stronger claim, stating that they falsified sensibility and appearances by teaching that the difference between sensibility and understanding is only one of degrees of clarity.  The appendix is unique in that sometimes Leibniz alone is charged (A 271 / B 327) and sometimes the Leibnizian-Wolffian system is charged (A 273 / B 273).

By the time of the Anthropology (1798) Kant claims that Leibniz was ‘actually to blame’ for the ‘real psychological difference’ between sensibility and understanding being interpreted as a ‘merely formal’ distinction of conceptual clarity. * Yet, between the time when Leibniz was first included logical, has given a completely wrong direction to all investigations into the nature and origin of our knowledge” (A 44, B 61).

"The concept of sensibility and of appearance would be falsified, and out whole teaching in regard to them would be rendered empty and useless, if we were to accept the view that our entire sensibility is nothing but a confused representation of things, containing only what belongs to them in themselves, but doing so under an aggregation of characters and partial representations that we do not consciously distinguish. For the difference between a confused and a clear representation is merely logical, and does not concern the content” (A 61f, B 43f).

--- Ak. VII, p. 140f, *.

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into the single faculty charge (1781) and the time when he became the primary cause of the mistaken view (1798), Kant claimed that the Critique was actually intended to be an apology for Leibniz. In the last paragraph of On a Discovery Kant writes: “The Critique of Pure Reason can thus be seen as the genuine apology for Leibniz, even against his partisans whose eulogies scarcely do him any honour....” Allison suggests that this is simply polemical posturing in order to goad Eberhard. This seems plausible, but when the passage is seen in the context of the falsification and the single faculty charges it seems to indicates an inconsistency on Kant’s part.

Kant’s professed defense of Leibniz’s honour arose as a result of an attack made on Kant which amongst other things was directed to the charge that Leibniz falsified sensibility and appearances. After the publication of the second edition of the Critique in 1787, the journal Philosophisches Magazin was founded. Its aim was profoundly anti-Kantian. Allison summarizes the magazine’s purpose in the following way: “The avowed purpose of the Philosophisches Magazin is...to enable more people to recover from the stupor induced by the Critique of Pure Reason.” The publication of the second edition of the Critique


Ibid, p. 16.
was attacked in 1788-89 in four issues of the Philosophisches Magazin. The attack infuriated Kant. It was the same kind of reception Kant's Critique of Pure Reason found in its first review in 1781. The result of that review was Kant's Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that will be able to come forward as science (1783) and the result of Eberhard's attack was his On a Discovery According to Which Any New Critique of Pure Reason Has Been Made Superfluous by an Earlier One (1790).

To my knowledge the falsification charge has not been considered as significant since Eberhard's challenge of it was his claim to fame in the late 1780's. Although Eberhard rejected the claim that Leibniz falsified sensibility, I shall not go into the details of his argument. Rather, I would like to look at a letter inspired by Eberhard's challenge, which Kant wrote to Reinhold on May 19, 1789. In recounting Eberhard's attack for Reinhold, Kant boldly denies that he charged Leibniz with falsifying sensibility. He admits to claiming that Leibniz and Wolff treated the difference between the sensible and the intellectual as merely formal, but he denies charging Leibniz with falsifying sensibility - that, he says, is a fiction of Eberhard's brain.** Kant writes:

"This echoes the passage about amphibolies in the Antinomies where Kant states that, "your object is merely in your brain and cannot be given at all outside it; hence all you have to worry
[Eberhard] cites p. 44 of the old edition of the Critique of Pure Reason... and presents it thusly: "Here Kant has accused the philosophy of Leibniz and Wolff of falsifying the concept of sensibility and appearance...." Now just as certain people finally come to believe themselves the lies that they have often repeated, so Eberhard becomes so carried away in regard to the alleged use of this presumptuous expression against Leibniz, that he attributes the word 'falsify,' which exists only in his brain, three times on one page (289) to the author of the Critique. What does one call someone who deliberately falsifies a document in a legal trial?"

History has passed judgment on both Eberhard and Kant in this case: Eberhard did indeed 'falsify the document', but the 'author of the Critique' committed perjury. It is true that Eberhard falsely quoted the page reference on which Kant makes the falsification charge. The charge was in fact made on page 43 of the A-edition and not page 44. However, Kant perjured himself when he denied that the 'author of the Critique' did not attribute the presumptuous expression 'falsify' to Leibniz. Kant did not delete the falsification charge in the B-edition as his appeal to the 'old edition' would suggest. He might have been thinking of the Inaugural Dissertation, because there he said

about is agreeing with yourself, and avoiding the amphiboly that would make your idea into a putative representation of something given empirically" (A 484, B 512, Guyer and Wood translation).


Eberhard 1789, p. 290.
that sensibility is "poorly defined" as confused cognition. Or he could have been thinking of the Prolegomena, where he said that his insight into the nature of sensuous cognition is "spoiled" if it is seen as a confused mode of representation. In the Critique, however, Kant writes: "Daß daher unsere ganze Sinnlichkeit nichts als die verworrene Vorstellung der Dinge sie ... ist eine Verfälschung des Begriffs von Sinnlichkeit und von Erscheinung...".

The commentary on this letter that I am aware of is inconsequential. For example, Allison notes that Kant was wrong, but does not pursue the charge. Vaihinger acknowledges Kant’s blunder, regrets the fact and moves on. He goes on to quote a passage from the appendix in which Leibniz alone is charged: "...sensibility [is] for him only a confused mode of representation, and not a separate source of representations" (A 270 / B 326). The question remains why Kant came to think that Leibniz was primarily to blame for the mistake he originally attributes to Wolff and why, when the charge against Leibniz is the strongest (the falsification charge), Kant claims to have

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I.e. "verdorben" (Ak. IV, p. 290, cf., Kant 1977, p. 34).

Ak. III, p. 66 (A 43, B 60).


Vaihinger 1892, II, p. 450.
been actually defending him. To answer these questions we would have to explore the extent of Kant's actual acquaintance with Leibniz's philosophy and the time at which he gained it. Both remain subjects worthy of further study."

One specific question that needs to be addressed is whether Kant had actually read Leibniz's *New Essays* before writing either the 1770 *Dissertation* or the 1781 *Critique*. The falsification charge suggests that Kant's *Dissertation* was not influenced by the reading of the Raspe (1765) or Dutens (1768) editions of Leibniz's work as is commonly thought by Cassirer, for example. He claims that the Raspe edition of the *New Essays* elevated Leibniz to the status of a contemporary.

Leibniz once again stood among them as a contemporary, as though raised from the dead. Only now did the whole breadth and originality of his thought, hitherto clouded by academic tradition, emerge. In this book, it was of an event which was a decisive irruption into universal intellectual history and all its problems and interests (Cassirer 1981, p. 98).

After an extensive review of Kant's contemporaries around 1765, Tonelli comes to a completely different conclusion. He argues that there was in fact no collective response in Germany to the Raspe edition of Leibniz's work. And if we could say there was a collective response, then it was anything but positive (Tonelli 1974, p. 453). He concludes that if the *New Essays* had an impact on Kant's 1770 *Dissertation*, then the impact was unique
to him.

There are two dissertations devoted to the question of whether the New Essays effectively altered Kant’s thoughts and lead to the 1770 Dissertation. In 1908 Robert Merton cited eight 19th Century scholars (Paulsen, Erdmann, Janitsch, Fischer, Reihl, Windleband, Vaihinger, Adickes) in support of the claim that Kant’s reading of the New Essays facilitated some key distinctions in his Dissertation. In 1928 Georg Feichtinger claimed that he can not find any evidence that Kant even read the New Essays. He claimed that Kant certainly knew of them in 1783 when it is mentioned in connection with Locke’s Essay in the Prolegomena, but Feichtinger argued Kant was already on the way towards his critical philosophy before the German publication of the New Essays. According to him, therefore, an interpretation of Kant’s first steps towards his transcendental philosophy that does not appeal to Leibniz is viable. And he argued that such an interpretation is more consistent with the evidence available in Kant’s letters of the time. And one might say that it is also consistent with the historical nuances of the single faculty charge discussed above.
References

A number of translations of the Critique have been considered in the writing of this dissertation (e.g. Norman Kemp Smith, Paul Guyer and Allen Wood, Max Müller, J.M.D. Meiklejohn, and Werner Pfluhar). In my opinion, the first two translations are the best. I have chosen to take all quotations of the Critique from the standard Kemp Smith translation. When the Kemp Smith translation reflects an appreciable error, however, I defend my corrections of the translation in the body of the dissertation and cite the original German text in a footnote. In some of these cases, I use the Guyer and Wood translation.

Passages from the Critique follow the standard method of citation and are cited by the A- and B-edition pages. When the line of the page breaks correspond between the two editions the page numbers are joined with a slash (e.g. A 269 / B 325). When the line of the page breaks differ between editions a comma separates the page numbers of the two editions (e.g. A 260, B 316). Direct references to the Critique shall be cited in the
body of the text. Other references to the Critique and to other works shall be cited in footnotes. When the Akademie Edition is cited the convention of citing the volume and page number will be followed.

Quotations from other sources are cited by author, date and page number. The reference list is divided into four sections: Kant's works; dissertations; books; and articles. Translations of sources are by this author unless an English translation is cited. All italics and emphasis belong to the original text, unless otherwise cited.

(a) Kant's Works


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