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THE QUESTION OF REPRESENTATION  
IN ELIZABETHAN LITERATURE  

By  

Timothy H. Wilson  

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of the University of Ottawa  
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
in English Literature  

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For Kerry
ABSTRACT

The sixteenth century has become a focal point for the analysis of the genealogy of political imperialism. It marks the shift from the medieval to the modern age as manifested in the discovery of the New World, the rise of imperial control and expansion, and the historical construction of the individual subject. My dissertation argues that Sidney, Spenser, and Shakespeare, to some extent, all participate in the “imperial” disposition of modern representational thinking. However, all three authors also offer alternatives to imperial and representational thinking.

The first chapter uses Heidegger’s conception of the work of art in order to assert that art is not always and only a representational copy of an original. For Heidegger, the work of art is not an imitation of a pre-existing thing, nor is it an epiphenomenon of a system of relations. On the contrary, it first founds these relations.

The second chapter analyzes the conception of poiēsis which Sidney presents in his Defence of Poesie. In some respects, Sidney’s definition is merely a reformulation of the representational one. That is, for Sidney poetry imitates the ideal rather than “brasen” nature. However, in other respects, insofar as he draws on certain formulations of the Italian humanists, Sidney conceives of poiēsis as a figuring forth of something for the first time.

In the third chapter, I turn to Book I of Spenser’s The Faerie Queene. This chapter takes issue with contemporary readings of Spenser which assert that he is our “preeminent poet of empire.” I point out that the entire conception of the just and true order of things that is presented in Book I speaks against the assertion of an imperial disposition in Spenser.

Finally, in the fourth chapter, I deal with Shakespeare’s Hamlet in relation to the Cartesian
metaphysics of the subject. In modern metaphysics, the sovereign subject becomes master over existence. I demonstrate the ways in which “The Mouse-trap” figures forth this imperial control over nature that the subject wields. However, I also explore the ways in which it presents a non-representational experience of truth along the lines of the pre-metaphysical experience of *a-λειψεια*. 
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ABBREVIATIONS

The majority of titles to which I refer can be discerned by finding the corresponding author and, if necessary, the corresponding year in the “Works Cited.” The following clarifications, however, need to be made: 1) With the exceptions of The Republic and Poetics—for which I have used the Desmond Lee (Plato 1955) and the Richard Janko (Aristotle 1987) translations—references to the works of Plato and Aristotle are from the Collected Dialogues (Plato 1961) and The Basic Works (Aristotle 1941) respectively. 2) References to the original Greek text of the works of Plato and Aristotle are based on the corresponding Loeb Classical Library edition of the work. 3) References to the works of Shakespeare are based on the individual, scholarly editions listed under Shakespeare in the “Works Cited”; references to Hamlet are to the Norton Critical Edition (1992a). 4) For the sake of convenience and consistency, I have transliterated Greek words. 5) Again for the sake of convenience and consistency, I have silently modernized the letter usage of the Elizabethan texts I cite (mostly Florio’s translation of Montaigne and Spenser’s The Faerie Queene): for example, v = u. 6) I have referred to dramatic and poetic texts by line, scene, and/or act numbers where possible. 7) With certain prose works with internal divisions—such as Heidegger’s Being and Time, Ficino’s commentaries, Bacon’s works, and those of Nietzsche—I have referred to the appropriate book and section numbers. 8) For the sake of convenience, with certain works which I cite quite often, I have used the following abbreviations within parenthetical references.

Elizabethan Texts:


Modern Essays in Collections:

“NGH”      Foucault, Michel. “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” 1977, 139-64.
“SR”       Heidegger, Martin. “Science and Reflection” 1977a, 155-82.
INTRODUCTION:

THE QUESTION OF REPRESENTATION

I  Representation in Question

Obviously you must be quite familiar with what you mean [with the word "being"], whereas we, who formerly imagined we knew, are now at a loss. (Plato, Sophist 244a)

In recent years the concept of representation has suffered an acute critique. Martin Heidegger, as well as seminal poststructuralists, such as Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, and Julia Kristeva, deconstruct representational thinking as the forgetting of an ontological difference constitutive of all apparent presence or identity. For Heidegger, the ontological difference which representational metaphysics has forgotten is the difference between beings (as what arises or appears within the open lighted region) and Being (as the lighting process which allows beings to arise as what has been illuminated). In forgetting this ontological difference, metaphysics is the coming to pass of the oblivion of Being in favour of the thinking of beings as beings (ri to on e on).¹ Metaphysics passes over the phenomenal showing of the being as itself through the lighting process in order to find the "truth" of the being in: 1) a common denominator or "ground" of all beings, or 2) in another present-being as "highest being." The first sense of the truth of the being makes metaphysics an "ontology"; the second sense makes it a "theology." Heidegger refers to the history of Western metaphysics, encompassing both of these determinations of the truth of beings, as an "onto-theo-logy."

Western metaphysics, as the history of representational thinking, designates the phenomenon, or that which appears, as the copy (representation or epiphenomenon) of a pre-
existing conceptual frame. Heidegger points out, through reference to the etymology of "phenomenon" in connection with *phainesthai* (to show itself) and *phainō* (to bring to light) (1962a, 51), that the phenomenal appearing of a being is the shining forth of Being through a particular thing; however, the Being of the phenomenon, within representational thinking, is not in the latter's appearing and shining forth; the appearing of the phenomenon in its manifestation is less in being than the ground of the phenomenon (substance or form). Representational metaphysics, in short, denotes a mistrust of phenomena--of the appearances of things in their outward manifestness. Representational metaphysics is, in this way, a forgetting of phenomena, a forgetting of Being.

In this representational determination of that which is, art is relegated to the status of a mere copy of the phenomenon as copy of the pre-existing ground of beings. This representational conceptualization of the relation of truth and art (as *mimēsis*) finds its first, and most famous, formulation in Plato's metaphysics (especially as stated in *The Republic*): where the form (*eidos*) constitutes that which is true, or in being; the particular thing, as copy of the form, is somewhat less true; and finally, the artwork, as copy of a copy, possesses a mere simulacrum of being, and is therefore false (*pseudos*). "So the tragic poet, if his art is representation, is by nature at third remove from the throne of truth; and the same is true of all other representative artists" (597e). So, too, in Aristotle is art conceived as representation (*mimēsis*): "Epic and tragic composition, and indeed comedy, dithyrambic composition, and most sorts of music for wind and stringed instruments are all, as a whole, representations" (*Poetics* 1447a14-16).³

This mistrust of phenomena and the related designation of art as representative occur in both the Platonic and Aristotelian versions of representational metaphysics. As Deleuze points out, Aristotle's "Categories" completes the initiation of the philosophy of representation begun by
Plato: that is, by seeing an identity underlying differences in the form of the species or genus (1994, 59-61): "We should not think, however, that Platonism develops this power of representation only for itself: it is satisfied with staking out this domain, that is, founding it, selecting it, and excluding from it everything that might come to blur its limits. The deployment of representation as well-founded, limited, and finite representation is rather Aristotle’s object: representation runs through and covers over the entire domain, extending from the highest genera to the smallest species" (1990, 259).

The critique of representational metaphysics in the name of an ontological difference finds a different but related source in the work of poststructural thinkers. Poststructuralists deconstruct representational thinking inasmuch as it is a recognition only of the homology of origin and copy and not of the difference that constitutes the copy as copy and the origin as origin. Metaphysics, according to the poststructural critique, designates being as (re)presentation. Representation is the preservation of identity--where preservation means the reappearance of what appeared before. Poststructuralism, it could be said, designates being as the (re)production of difference; in the transforming of material or forces into product, production is the institution of a difference which did not previously exist. The goal of representational thought and art is the reduction of difference between origin and copy; the goal of anti-representational (anti-Platonic) thought and art, on the other hand, is the production of difference through the perceptual similarity of the simulacrum. Copies are copies, according to Deleuze, inasmuch as they are determined through an inner resemblance with the original; simulacra, on the other hand, arise out of an inner dissimilarity (1990, 256). The poststructural, anti-representational conception of being is that of a proliferation of simulacra in the pure repetition of the image or model--where the repeated image, although superficially similar, internally differs. Being is repetition with difference.
Following a particular interpretation of Friedrich Nietzsche's eternal return (as the return of being as difference, as will to power), Derrida, Deleuze, and Foucault assert that repetition, and the repetition of the image in the simulacrum, is the production of a radical difference: "the most exact, the most strict repetition has as its correlate the maximum of difference" (Deleuze 1994, xxii); "on the basis of this unfolding of the same as différance, we see announced the sameness of différance and repetition in the eternal return" ("Dif" 17); "being would no longer be a unity that guides and distributes [differences], but their repetition. . . . Being is the recurrence of difference. . . . [T]he present . . . endlessly recurs. But it recurs as singular difference; and the analogous, the similar, and the identical never return."7

Generally, then, the poststructural critique of representation involves the assertion that an original principle of differentiation allows or constitutes the apparent identity of origin and copy—that difference ontologically precedes identity. "Resemblance then can be thought only as the product of this internal difference" (Deleuze 1990, 262). For Derrida, it is an "arché-différance"—a disappearance of the origin or an original supplementarity—which constitutes the self-presence of the model and the identity of the copy.8 For Kristeva, in the Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, the ontological principle of difference which calls into question the representational metaphysics of identity is "abjection"—the violent delimitation and differentiation between being and non-being, between I and Other, that is the meaning of being as "want": "all abjection is in fact recognition of the want on which any being, meaning, language, or desire is founded. . . . if one imagines . . . the experience of want itself as logically preliminary to being and object . . . then one understands that abjection, and even more so abjection of self, is its only signified" (5). Abjection allows, in particular, the mimetic constitution of identity in the subject: "In this struggle, which fashions the human being, the mimesis by means of which he becomes
homologous to another in order to become himself, is in short logically and chronologically secondary. Even before being like, 'I' am not but do separate, reject, ab-ject. Abjection, with a meaning broadened to take in subjective diachrony, is a precondition of narcissism" (13).

These representational determinations of the Being of beings, which Heidegger and the poststructuralists cited above seek to critique, have guided the Western tradition throughout its history. Is this, however, the only way beings can arise for us? Out of the concealment of Being as ontological difference, out of the oblivion of the concealment essential to truth and Being, "a question still haunts us like a specter" (Heidegger 1959, 38): Must beings necessarily and only arise as a mere derivation of the pre-existing, metaphysical substratum of truth? Is art always and only the re-presentation of that which truly is, merely a repetition of the already manifest? We see, in the thought of Heidegger another possibility: where art is that which shows forth, or "founds," truth. I wish, in the present work, to ask these questions pertaining to representation, truth, and art. I intend to use Heidegger's thinking of the work of art, and to some extent that of poststructuralism, as a guide, as an alternative conception of art and Being to the representational one described above. I will ask these questions of representation as they pertain to Elizabethan literature.

In recent years, then, in our postmodern age, the question of representation has arisen in unique ways; the representational determination of beings, it could be said, has been called into "question." However, in this work I want to inquire into the nature of representation with respect to Elizabethan literature, specifically with respect to Sir Philip Sidney's Defence of Poesie, Book I of Edmund Spenser's The Faerie Queene, and William Shakespeare's Hamlet. Was representation an issue for the Elizabethan writer? Was representation a "question"? And, if representation was a question, in what way?
II  The Age of the World Picture: Representation as Mastery

[U]nder the dominance of the modern metaphysics of subjectivity. . . . [L]anguage . . . denies us its essence: that it is the house of the truth of Being. Instead, language surrenders itself to our mere willing and trafficking as an instrument of domination over beings. ("LH" 199)

In order to approach these questions, let us use as a point of departure a few simple premises: that at the turn of the sixteenth century the European world was fundamentally changed by the "discovery" of the "New World" and by the development of the scientific method and its "discoveries"; and that these changes in the "world" were articulated through corresponding changes in the literature of the period. The changes mentioned here can be summed up in terms of the general shift from the medieval renunciation of the world to the early modern fascination with the imperial and scientific conquest of the earth and of nature. Stephen Greenblatt, for instance, points to this shift in terms of the corresponding modes in which the foreign, the "marvelous," is encountered. In the Middle Ages, this encounter, according to Greenblatt, occurs in the form of a "dispossessing" wonder. The marvelous causes one to lose one's stable hold on the earth; it reminds the medieval Christian that this is not our proper home. In the Renaissance, on the other hand, the marvel of the other sets in motion procedures for the conquest and the "appropriation" of that other (cf. Greenblatt 1991, 24-25).

In this respect, Thomas More's *Utopia* can be seen as a foundational text of the early modern era. In More's book, Hythloday relates the tale of how he "discovered" a land whose way of life (communal ownership) offered certain possibilities for European nations. *Utopia* is "discovered," much as the New World is discovered. It is a foreign land whose differences offer possibilities for the European observer. However, because *Utopia* is associated with the New World, the relation of Hythloday and More to *Utopia* is akin to that of the European conquerors.
Hythloday’s treatment of the existing religions of the Utopians, for instance, echoes the relations of the explorers to their New World discoveries. In the section in which he describes Utopian religion, Hythloday outlines the garb of the Utopian priests: “The priest wears a robe of many colours, wonderful for its workmanship and decoration, though not of materials as costly as one would suppose. It contains no gold embroidery nor any precious stones, but is decorated with the feathers of different birds so skilfully woven together that the value of the handiwork far exceeds the cost of the richest materials” (105). This description of Utopian priests parallels Vespucci’s description of the inhabitants of the New World he supposedly encountered on his first voyage: “Their riches consist of variegated birds’ feathers, and of strings of beads (like our *pater noster*), made of fish bones, or of green or white stones” (Vespucci 98). And just as the Europeans felt that the existing spirituality of the New World inhabitants was something that they could “recode,” so, too, does Hythloday interpret Utopian spirituality in terms of its accordance, or the possibility of its accordance, with the fundamentals of Christianity.

The entire section on religion in More’s *Utopia* is concerned with the question of differences in religious interpretation, differences in faith, and the relation of these differences to the truth-value of one religious belief: Christianity. Hythloday describes the various forms of worship of the Utopians in the following manner:

Some worship as a god the sun, others the moon, still others one of the planets. There are some who worship a man of past ages, conspicuous either for virtue or glory; they consider him not only a god, but the supreme god. The vast majority of Utopians, however, and among these all the wisest, believe nothing of the sort: they believe in a single power, unknown, eternal, infinite, inexplicable, far beyond the grasp of the human mind, and diffused throughout the universe, not physically, but in influence. Him they call father, and to him alone they attribute the origin, increase, progress, change and end of all visible things; they do not offer divine honours to any other. (95-96)

On the one hand, a certain aspect of Hythloday’s narrative seems to lead us to the conclusion that
the latter group, which contains the majority and all of the wisest of the Utopians, is more “correct” in its form of worship. Not only do the wise worship in this way, but they also hold a form of belief strikingly similar to European Christianity. Thus, in some senses, Hythloday and the (European) reader are led quickly to judge one form of worship as better than another. That form of worship which is “better” is that which most easily succumbs to a Christian “recoding,” that form which can most readily be interpreted within Old World schemata. For instance, the majority of Utopians were easily converted to Christianity. “Either through the secret inspiration of God, or because Christianity seemed very like the belief that most prevails among them, they were well disposed towards it from the start” (96). Thus, the dominant mode of Utopian worship enabled a quick conversion (translation) of Utopia to Christianity. This preoccupation with the conversion of the Utopians is ironically referred to by More in his prefatory letter to Giles. In the letter, More points out that it is unfortunate that they did not discover the location of Utopia from Hythloday:

for I’m quite ashamed not to know even the name of the ocean where this island lies about which I’ve written so much. Besides, there are various people here, and one in particular, a devout man and a professor of theology, who very much wants to go to Utopia. His motive is not by any means idle curiosity, but rather a desire to foster and further the growth of our religion, which has made such a happy start there. To this end, he has decided to arrange to be sent there by the Pope, and even to be named Bishop to the Utopians. He feels no particular scruples about intriguing for this post, for he considers it a holy project, arising not from motives of glory or gain, but simply from religious zeal. (5-6)

On the other hand, another aspect of Hythloday’s narrative leads one to the conclusion that it is the plurality of religious beliefs that is valuable in Utopian society—not its conduciveness to a pan-Christian interpretation. For instance, the violent conflicts over religion on the island allowed Utopus to take over the island in the first place; that is, violent differences were the condition of possibility of the setting up of the Utopian commonwealth: “Even before he took over
the island, King Utopus had heard that the natives were continually squabbling over religious matters. Actually, he found it easy to conquer the country because the different sects were too busy fighting one another to oppose him" (97). Utopus, upon conquering the island, institutes the lawfulness of religious diversity. Religious differences are to be tolerated: perhaps "there is something in this variety of religions which delights [God's] inscrutable will" (106).

However, Utopus wishes to eliminate violent differences: "he decreed that every man might cultivate the religion of his choice, and proselytise for it too, provided he did so quietly, modestly, rationally and without bitterness towards others. If persuasions failed, no man might resort to abuse or violence, under penalty of exile or slavery" (97). Utopus violently legislates against religious violence. He enforces conformity to the law that none are to "enforce conformity." That is, in matters of religion, "he was not at all quick to dogmatise, because he suspected that God perhaps likes various forms of worship and has therefore deliberately inspired different men with different views. On the other hand, he was quite sure that it was arrogant folly for anyone to enforce conformity with his own beliefs by threats or violence" (97-98). Here, the differing opinion loses its radical violence and strangeness. The differing opinion is absorbed into the "norm." What is left is a shadow of difference. Let us say, by way of an example, that my religion calls on me to kill for the sake of the deity. Within the system of King Utopus, I would be able to believe in my deity and preach on behalf of my deity, but I would not be able to bring my strange god forth in a sacrificial rite. My religious belief is thereby absorbed into the Utopian system and any of its strange or violent powers are effaced. My opinion becomes a difference which serves conformity. Differences in Utopia are deprived of their radicality; they are sedated and normalized. The field of religious worship is left open in the same way that a consumer's choices in the modern shopping mall are left open; the religious consumer is forced to choose
from a set of interchangeable items of belief and to live a life which accords with a Prozac-like rationality: "For they are confident that in the end his madness will yield to reason" (99).

One need not even introduce the distasteful concept of a kill-mongering deity in order to point to the covert mastery of radical difference within Utopian religion. For instance, more mundane practices than ritual murder are also prohibited: "The only exception [to religious freedom] was a positive and strict law against anyone who should sink so far below the dignity of human nature as to think that the soul perishes with the body, or that the universe is ruled by blind chance, not divine providence" (98). Also, the religious difference, so to speak, brought about by a child’s relation to the divine must be secured and put under controlling limits. Hythloday describes the seating arrangements in Utopian churches as follows:

Then they take their seats so that the males of each household are placed in front of the head of that household, while the womenfolk are directly in front of the mother of the family. In this way they ensure that everyone’s public behaviour is supervised by the same person whose authority and discipline direct him at home. They take great care that the young are everywhere placed in the company of their elders. For if children were trusted to the care of other children, they might spend in infantile foolery the time they should devote to developing a religious fear of the gods, which is the greatest and almost the only incitement to virtue. (105)

Any potential danger presented by non-conforming religious practices is surveyed and controlled by this church-panopticon structure.9 Differences which survey one another, which negate one another, lead to the same. In this way, the Utopians, with their differing faiths, "are like travellers going to a single destination by different roads" (104).

To recognize Utopia as a possibility for the Old World is to recognize its difference and the claim that this difference makes on the observer. Thus, it also means to recognize the Utopians’ differences from Europe when it comes to the question of religion. In this way, More’s Utopia, early in the sixteenth century, formulates the crisis in which accepted forms of truth are
placed by the confrontation with differing perspectives or interpretations—a problem which was to receive an expanded formulation, toward the end of the sixteenth century, in Michel de Montaigne's Essays. There are two basic reactions to this "crisis," as we saw in the example of the religions of Utopia: 1) the first reaction involves the overt "translation" or conversion of the "other," a translation which forces the other to arise within the parameters of the same; 2) the other reaction involves the disciplinary self-surveillance of differences, the covert absorption of differences within the ruling structure. In both of these general, imperial reactions to the "crisis," that which differs, Utopia, is a formless matter waiting to be moulded by language—for example, in the form of the classical texts brought by Hythloday—and religion (Christianity).10 Utopia, like the New World for the sixteenth century explorer, is a land to be mastered, ordered, and moulded.

The primary means by which this ordering takes place are linguistic and interpretive. The Europeans assume that the inhabitants of the New World are without language; they assume that their speaking is a meaningless babble: a "barbarism" (cf. Greenblatt 1990, 16-17). The Utopians, similarly, need to be given classical texts and languages. The cultural "other," in the early modern discourses of discovery, is forced to arise within the linguistic structures of the "same." These linguistic structures always already determine the nature of the "other." The moulding of the matter of that which is discovered is also accomplished through interpretive schemata. The New World is interpreted by means of the structures of the golden age myth of the Old World. This is also the case with Hythloday's interpretation of Utopia. That which is "discovered" does not arise as different; it does not arise in its unique splendour; rather, it arises within the pre-existing schemata of the Old World. The European interpreter understands (re-presents) the New World or Utopian "other" according to the pre-determined structures of what is already-known. In this way, Utopia is "between England and America, between the Old and the New World" (Marin
285); it is a mediating link (a representation), of sorts, necessary for the interpretive mastery of the New World, and of Utopia itself. The interpretive mastery of Utopia as text is highlighted if we recall that Hythloday’s “sailing has not been like that of Palinurus, but more that of Ulysses, or rather of Plato. This man, who is named Raphael—his family name is Hythloday—knows a good deal of Latin and is particularly learned in Greek. He studied Greek more than Latin because his main interest is philosophy, and in that field he found that the Romans have left us nothing very valuable except certain works of Seneca and Cicero” (10). Hythloday’s travels, that is, have been textual. He has travelled the strange seas of knowledge and philosophy; he has journeyed into the realm of the extraordinary; he has encountered the strange texts of the classical (Greek and Latin) past. Hythloday’s interpretation of the strange texts of the past is associated with the explorers’ discovery and interpretation of the strange “text” of the New World. Hythloday’s desire to encounter and interpret strange texts, for instance, led him to accompany “Vespucci on the last three of his four voyages, accounts of which are now common reading everywhere” (10).

The early explorers encountered the strange text that is the New World, as a blank page to be over-written, as something of which to take possession, as that which is to be mastered and moulded. If this is paralleled by Hythloday’s relation to classical texts, then the Renaissance “discovery” of the works of the classical world are implicated in a general “imperial” project. That is, the Renaissance relation to the other as past (or texts of the past) and its relation to the other as New World are brought together in More’s Utopia—and this is what makes it a “founding” text of the early modern era—they are brought together, in one sense, as two manifestations of a general “imperial” project of the mastery of the “other,” of the “strange.” It is a general, imperial operation; it is an operation which brings the strange, the other, to a stand within the linguistic and interpretive structures of the same.11
If it is More’s *Utopia* that first articulates the unity of the politico-imperial project and the hermeneutico-imperial project, it is Francis Bacon, in *The Great Instauration* and the *New Atlantis*, who first articulates the unity of the early modern politico-imperial project and the scientifico-imperial project. Bacon parallels the scientific “discoveries” to be had by means of the empirical method with the “discoveries” of uncharted lands. In Bacon’s work, more overtly than in the *Utopia*, that which is discovered arises within the controlling gaze and manipulation of the scientist or explorer. For instance, toward the end of *New Atlantis*, the Father of Salomon’s House describes their “ordinances and rites.” He describes a “long and fair” gallery in which is placed “the statues of all principal inventors”: “There we have the statua of your Columbus, that discovered the West Indies; also the inventor of ships; your monk that was the inventor of ordnance and gunpowder; the inventor of music; the inventor of letters; the inventor of printing . . .” (456). In both the geographico-political and the scientifico-technological discovery a certain power over what is dis-covered, or “drag[ged] into light,” corresponds with the act of knowing that which is dis-covered; it is for this reason that the two operations are conceived of as intimately related within the thought of Bacon:

But as in former ages when men sailed only by observation of the stars, they could indeed coast along the shores of the old continent or cross a few small and mediterranean seas, but before the ocean could be traversed and the new world discovered, the use of the mariner’s needle, as a more faithful and certain guide, had to be found out; in like manner the discoveries which have been hitherto made in the arts and sciences are such as might be made by practice, meditation, observation, argumentation, for they lay near to the senses and immediately beneath common notions; but before we can reach the remoter and more hidden parts of nature, it is necessary that a more perfect use and application of the human mind and intellect be introduced. (*Great Instauration* 308)

If More first formulates the early modern impulse toward an interpretive mastery of strange texts and Bacon first formulates the impulse toward a scientific mastery of nature—both forms of
mastery being intimately bound with the political mastery of newly discovered lands—then it is René Descartes who gives this modern imperial disposition its philosophical formulation. It is Descartes who first defines existence as a whole as objects which stand before, and exist on the basis of, the human subject as ground (subiectum). An entity, according to this foundational articulation of modern metaphysics, exists in its Being as that which is posited by the subject. The truth of beings, in the modern age, is this "presenting before" (Vor-stellen). As Heidegger points out in "The Age of the World Picture," in the modern age humanity knows by means of the scientific (Baconian) procedures of research. And this knowing as research "calls whatever is to account with regard to the way in which and the extent to which it lets itself be put at the disposal of representation" ("AWP" 126). The scientific mastery of the world means that the world becomes, in the early modern age, a "world picture." To "picture" the world, according to Heidegger, "means to set whatever is, itself, in place before oneself just in the way that it stands with it, and to have it fixedly before oneself as set up in this way" ("AWP" 129). In this way, "world picture . . . does not mean a picture of the world but the world conceived and grasped as picture. What is, in its entirety, is now taken in such a way that it first is in being and only is in being to the extent that it is set up by man, who represents and sets forth" (129-30). In the modern age, that which arises as true and known arises in the representing. Heidegger distinguishes this modern metaphysics of representation from the early Greek noein: apprehending, a receptive knowing. Whereas to apprehend something is to let it show itself as itself, "to represent [vor-stellen] means to bring what is present at hand . . . before oneself as something standing over against, to relate it to oneself, to the one representing it, and to force it back into this relationship to oneself as the normative realm" ("AWP" 131). In this sense, Utopia is a representation of religious differences; by Utopia, Europe represents the New World and differing interpretations.
Similarly, Baconian science "represents" nature; Baconian science posits the natural within the schemata of the methodology. Finally, in Descartes, representation achieves a metaphysical universality; all entities arise as objects represented by a subject.

In the early modern era (the "age of the world picture"), as essentially articulated in the Cartesian metaphysics of representation, humanity relates to that which is "as a domain given over to measuring and executing, for the purpose of gaining mastery over that which is as a whole" ("AWP" 132). In this early modern picturing or representing, "the world stands at man's disposal as conquered" ("AWP" 133). In short, the question of representation with respect to Elizabethan literature, or early modern culture more generally, arises as a question concerning a historical humanity's political mastery of other cultures, a question of an interpretive mastery of texts, a question of a scientific mastery of nature, and a question of an ontological mastery of entities as a whole. For this reason, I have referred to a general, "imperial" project of modern representation. The relations of representation to particular projects and dynamics of power within early modern discourse have been outlined by a variety of critics working within a variety of recent critical trends. In the present work, however, I will try to delineate the relation of the question of representation to a general, "metaphysical" imperialism.

By considering More, Bacon, and Descartes, we saw some of the ways in which representation was a "question" for the early modern era. At this point, I would like briefly to point to why the "question" arises for us today. Within our own hermeneutic situation, our "postmodern" age marks the culmination of the projects of representational mastery founded in the early modern era. We live in the shadow of the decisions made with respect to representation four hundred years ago (cf. Weimann 1996, 6-11). Political representation and mastery have culminated in the problems of a post-colonial world: a world seeking to overcome "ethnocentrism"
and reach the promised land of a cosmopolitan humanity and a universal liberal humanism; but it is also a world that is threatened by the specter of the effacement of unique cultural identities. Interpretive representation and mastery, as a response to the crisis of differing opinions and values, have culminated in the problems of the contemporary critical scene: a scene marked by the proliferation of interpretive technologies and interpretive conflicts which have called into question the grounds of not only literary and cultural studies but also of higher education itself. Scientific representation and mastery have culminated in the problems of a scientifico-technological world: a world in which humanity's manipulation of nature as a resource pool, or "standing reserve," threatens to replace the integrity of the natural with a technological simulacrum or, at best, to cause irreparable ecological contamination. Finally, the Cartesian metaphysics of the subject (in its mastery) and of representation have culminated in the Nietzschean and poststructural metaphysics of the dissolved subject and of the "will to power."

Our era, the era of cosmopolitanism, of the dance of the signifier, of technological manipulation, and of the will to power, is our hermeneutic situation; it guides the way in which we encounter the past horizon; it guides the questions we will ask when turning to Elizabethan literature. That is, out of our own hermeneutic context, we encounter the literature of the Elizabethan age in terms of the possibilities it offers for our retrieval—the alternatives to the modern, representational determination of the Being of beings, to the disposition of representational and imperial mastery. Inasmuch as the past offers possibilities for us today, Nietzsche can say, in On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, that "[w]hen the past speaks it always speaks as an oracle" (1983, 94). We must heed this oracle and not quickly categorize the words of the Elizabethans according to pre-existing interpretive schemata. Our interpretation discloses the past in a certain way; this disclosure, in turn, shapes our present
bearing. In this way, our existence is essentially historical. This essential "historicality" of human existence is prior to what we think of as "history": a series of known events and relations of beings. History, according to the traditional understanding of this term, is a series of "now-points" which are distinct and causally related. Essential historicality, on the other hand, is an existential temporality. This understanding of temporality is one in which humanity "is" its past (cf. Heidegger 1962a, § 6; 1992, 1; and 1997, 7). The past arises as possibilities and "futural" directives while the future arises as that which guides the present and shapes our interpretations of the past. In the language of phenomenology, we could say that the present exists as the "retention" of certain aspects of the past and as the "protention" of the future. We exist within this interpretive synthesis of past and future. We understand ourselves in terms of this synthesis. By means of our understanding of the past, "possibilities of [Dasein's] Being are disclosed and regulated. Its own past . . . is not something which follows along after Dasein, but something which already goes ahead of it" (Heidegger 1962a, § 6, 41).

Humanity constantly falls into the forgetting of this essential historicality. Within this forgetting, the past becomes a defined and already known thing. It is delivered over to self-evidence. It is no longer taken up as a question, as certain interpretive possibilities. The traditional answers to essential questions are taken as self-evident and the questions as questions are no longer taken up. For instance, within the metaphysical tradition, the question of art's relation to the truth is no longer asked. It is self-evident that art is the representation of something. "When tradition thus becomes master, it does so in such a way that what it 'transmits' [other possibilities for Being] is made so inaccessible . . . that it rather becomes concealed" (1962a, § 6, 43). What the past "transmits" or "sends" is the "unsaid" of the tradition. The prevalence of the forgetting of essential historicality calls for a "Destruktion" of the traditional concepts which conceal that which
is sent. This *Destruktion* is a positive task: the discovery, preservation, and explicit study of the tradition. "The discovery of tradition and the disclosure of what it 'transmits' and how this is transmitted, can be taken hold of as a task in its own right" (1962a, § 6, 41). Our interpretation of the early modern era, and of Elizabethan literature in particular, in order to attend properly that which it "transmits," must be undertaken in the wake of the "Destruktion," undertaken by Heidegger and others, of general, "metaphysico-imperial" concepts.

One way in which the Elizabethans articulated their "world" was in terms of the metaphysics of representation and mastery; living in the shadow of this articulation, we readily understand what they mean when they speak in this way. However, concealed within this Elizabethan articulation lie other, competing possibilities; we can call this concealed realm of possibilities for Being (this concealed side of the divine sign *[sema]* of the past), following Heidegger, the "unsaid" of the Elizabethan text. The "unsaid" is unfamiliar to us; it speaks of foreign paths not taken, of strange ways forgotten; it is shadowy and difficult to discern. Yet, if we heed what shows itself behind the manifest texts of Sidney, Spenser, and Shakespeare, if we encounter their works as lived possibilities and not as objects of analysis, we will see that Elizabethan art has the potential to communicate a "saving power" to our era (cf. "QCT" 28-35).

Here, the past is heeded as an oracle, as a lived possibility for the present, as a founding, saving power. In this encounter, the soil is prepared for the art work to arise as a founding of truth—as opposed to the work of art as an object or as a function of a signifying system.

As mentioned above, various recent critical trends have called into question, have "critiqued," in their own ways, the relations of power, mastery, and representation in the Renaissance. Thus, a methodological question arises: why have I set out to approach the Renaissance in a Heideggerian fashion by heeding the "unsaid" of their works? Why am I not
analyzing these Renaissance texts according to the interpretive technologies of "culture studies"? Why am I not analyzing the material conditions of production of the texts in question, or their relation to political pamphlets, or, more generally, the configuration of discursive and non-discursive forces in which the text is situated? A quick answer to these methodological questions is that these approaches do not critique representation completely enough. Rather, they replace, as their ontological point of departure, the Cartesian metaphysics of objective representation with the Nietzschean metaphysics of functionalized "hyper-representation," with the metaphysics of the will to power. Let me try to address this question in more detail by turning, at this point, to the work of Foucault. I will take Foucault's critical "genealogy," because of its great influence on a broad range of contemporary critical practices (for example, New Historicism, Post-Colonialism, Feminism, Gender Studies, and Queer Studies), as an exemplary methodology with respect to today's critical practices. As a focus for this procedure, I will examine Foucault's genealogy with a specific question in mind: what is the nature of genealogy's relation to the past?¹⁹

III The Representational Metaphysics of the “New Historian”²⁰

The givenness of the past announces itself in its availability. The use of processing technologies in the humanities—concordances, "word-processors," etc.—assure the availability of the work as "text" manifested as a system of signifiers. Availability, however, is just one form of givenness; it is the form of givenness proper to the technological epoch, and is clearly distinct from the givenness of poetry in ritual, in myth, in religious and existential enactment. The availability of the signifier institutes givenness for the sake of availability; availability is the mode of givenness commensurate with the institutionalization of poetry as textuality. (Radloff 1992, 159)

Hubert L. Dreyfus has tried to show that Foucault's work is akin to Heidegger's.²¹ He does this by insisting that Foucault has to be seen as someone who attempts to relativize the present by revealing other possibilities for existence. That is to say, Foucault has to be seen (for Dreyfus's position to have merit) as someone who turns to other historical periods (epistemes) in order to
demonstrate the fact that the present way of punishing or thinking about sexuality is not the only possible way. If our examination of genealogy is to keep Dreyfus's thesis in mind, a more specific formulation of the focal question of our analysis would be: does Foucault's genealogy relativize the present and reveal other possibilities for Being? Can Foucault's genealogy relate to the past on that past's own ground—that is, as a radical Otherness that shatters the self-certainty of the present? On the one hand, if we come to the conclusion that Foucault's genealogy allows the past to exist as a radical Other (if we answer this question in the affirmative), then we will have to agree with Dreyfus's comparison of Foucault to Heidegger. In other words, our conclusion will be that genealogy's relation to the past is one in which the past arises within the Event (das Ereignis) of Being: in which Being sends itself (as moment of the past) as possibilities (as "futural") which arrive and "open" a present. The past, as it arises within the "Event" of Being, is present; however, it also withdraws from the present; it exceeds all re-presentational schemata. On the other hand, if we find that Foucault's genealogy forces the past to exist within the representational framework of the present (if we answer this question in the negative), then we will have to disagree with Dreyfus's comparison of Foucault to Heidegger. That is to say, our conclusion will be that within Foucault's genealogy, and thus the general methodologies of today's "culture studies," the being of the past is only allowed to reveal itself within the essence of our technological present: Enframing (das Gestell). The past is allowed to arise only within the "hyper-representational" schemata of the present.

During interviews and lectures, Foucault certainly gives the impression that his work indeed reveals other possibilities for Being; that is, Foucault gives the impression that the answer to this question is affirmative. For instance, Foucault gave the following provisional definition of "genealogy" during a lecture in 1976: genealogy is "the union of erudite knowledge and local
memories which allows us to establish a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of this knowledge tactically today" (1980, 83). This belief in the radical nature of genealogy is connected to the rhetoric of "difference" that is prevalent in Foucault's discourse. However, in order to understand more fully the genealogical relation to the past, we must not accept this talk of difference at face value. We must determine the originating force of this difference: does it arise from the mere recombination of terms within the existing system; or, does it refer to a radical break that withdraws from the modern metaphysics of representation?

I will explore these questions by comparing the genealogical mode of analysis to that of traditional historiography—keeping in the forefront of this analysis the conceptual poles of relating to the past described above: as event and as representation or repetition. Foucault describes his theoretical conception of the Nietzschean genealogical relation to the past most concisely in "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History." Thus I will rely heavily on this essay in the first part of the discussion that follows, in order to determine the nature of Foucault's philosophy concerning these issues. I will also use, in the second part of the following discussion, an example from Foucault's genealogical "practice": his genealogy of the subject of sexuality undertaken in the three volumes of The History of Sexuality. Finally, it has been suggested that the thought of Gilles Deleuze belongs, like that of Foucault himself, within this Nietzschean genealogical tradition we are describing (Lash; Mahan 3). If this is the case, Deleuze represents Nietzsche's philosophy taken to its logical extreme: where existence manifests itself as a mere simulacrum or phantasm. Foucault delineates his philosophical relation to this Deleuzean brand of Nietzscheanism most consisely in "Theatrum Philosophicum." Thus, I will turn to this essay in the third part of the following discussion, in order to provide us with yet another perspective on the way in which the past exists for Foucault. In the end, I will have shown that Foucault's fundamental philosophical
assumptions cannot support his claims that genealogy offers us new possibilities for Being.

A) On the Metaphysics of Power

Nevertheless, as a mere countermovement it necessarily remains, as does everything "anti," held fast in the essence of that over against which it moves. Nietzsche's countermovement against metaphysics is, as the mere turning upside down of metaphysics, an inextricable entanglement in metaphysics ("NW" 61).

The most important element that distinguishes genealogy from traditional historiography is that the latter, for Foucault and Nietzsche, is a Platonism. Plato, disguised as a historian, seeks the truth of an origin; he does not content himself with the lies of mere copies. This masked historian assumes that the essence of that which is can be found in the enduring conceptual elements of history--those enduring Ideas that are expressed in various ways throughout time. If this actor were to write the history of sexuality, he would discover sexuality's truth or essence. The various particular instances of sexuality would not be important; rather, the historian would discover the Idea of sex that is constant in all these Particulars--these imperfect repetitions.

Nietzsche and Foucault are, of course, self-professed anti-Platonists. Thus, rather than discover an origin, they delineate the forces that participated in a particular occurrence. There can be no origin for Nietzsche and Foucault because neither believes in the existence of "things-in-themselves." What we think of as "things" or "entities" are merely the functions of relations of forces. "There are nothing but quantities of force in mutual 'relations of tension'. . . . Every force is related to others and it either obeys or commands. What defines a body is this relation between dominant and dominated forces" (Deleuze 1983, 40). Similarly, rather than trace the progressive manifestations of concepts in terms of their continuities, Foucault and Nietzsche map the discontinuities that arise within a field of material forces inasmuch as these forces have various interpretations imposed upon them throughout history.
Foucault and Nietzsche, therefore, rewrite Plato based on an inversion of his metaphysics—an inversion that remains metaphysical. Foucault replaces origin and continuity with emergence and descent. Foucault says that genealogy cannot tolerate the concept of origin: 1) because it is an essence; 2) because it is lofty—"[w]e tend to think that [the origin] is the moment of [the] greatest perfection [of things], when they emerged dazzling from the hands of a creator or in the shadowless light of a first morning" ("NGH" 143)—and 3) because it is revered as a site of truth ("NGH" 142-3). Thus, what the genealogist finds "at the historical beginning of things is not the inviolable identity of their origin; it is the dissension of other things. It is disparity" (142). (This disparity at the site of historical beginnings is referred to as an "event," as we will see, in Foucault's "Theatrum Philosophicum.").

Foucault, in a parodic repetition of Nietzsche, calls this historical beginning Entstehung: meaning, for Foucault, "emergence" or "the moment of arising" ("NGH" 148). That which arises out of emergence cannot exist in-itself—or else the genealogist would be witnessing the birth or origin of a "thing"—rather, that which emerges is a function of a "particular stage of forces" (148-9). "The analysis of the Entstehung must delineate this interaction, the struggle these forces wage against each other or against adverse circumstances" (149).

Foucault overturns Plato again by replacing the continuity of the Idea with the discontinuity of Herkunft (descent). Descent is the endless history of forces overcoming one another: "whatever exists, having somehow come into being, is again and again reinterpreted to new ends, taken over, transformed, and redirected by some power superior to it; all events in the organic world are a subduing, a becoming master . . ." (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals II.12). Descent is the discontinuity that results from this repetition of varying wills securing victory and imposing their interpretation. "Genealogy does not pretend to go back in time to restore an unbroken
continuity that operates beyond the dispersion of forgotten things; its duty is not to demonstrate
that the past actively exists in the present, that it continues secretly to animate the present" ("NGH"
146). The study of descent traces these repeated emergences of a different will or interpretation;
it traces the "numberless beginnings whose faint traces and hints of color are readily seen by an
historical eye" (145). In this way, genealogy records the history of wills in struggle, the history
of different interpretations in confrontation.

If interpretation were the slow exposure of the meaning hidden in an origin, then
only metaphysics could interpret the development of humanity. But if interpretation
is the violent or surreptitious appropriation of a system of rules, which in itself has
no essential meaning, in order to impose a direction, to bend it to a new will, to
force its participation in a different game, and to subject it to secondary rules, then
the development of humanity is a series of interpretations. The role of genealogy
is to record its history: the history of morals, ideals, and metaphysical concepts .
. . the emergence of different interpretations ("NGH" 151-2)

The genealogist finds this history marked on the surface of bodies: "descent attaches itself to the
body. It inscribes itself in the nervous system, in temperament, in the digestive apparatus. . . .
The body is the inscribed surface of events (traced by language and dissolved by ideas), the locus
of a dissociated Self (adopting the illusion of a substantial unity), and a volume in perpetual
disintegration" (147, 148).

Thus, Entstehung, like will to power, is a play of forces; it is the scene in which forces
struggle to dominate. Herkunft, then, is the eternal return of dominating forces; it is the repetition
of one force overcoming another and, in the process, forming a reality through the imposition of
its interpretive grid—a process that forms bodies that are corporeally marked through interpretive
schemata. Descent, for Foucault, denotes the repetition of the marking of bodies by history, the
marking of bodies by the repetition of events or emergences.26 In this way, we can say that the
metaphysics of the concept or the Platonic Idea (as origin and continuity) is replaced by
begins and discontinuity, by emergences and descent. This replacement remains metaphysical, however, in that it still denotes the essence of that which exists (as a field of forces: the power relations of forces and the space or scene of the interactions of these forces) and the modality of that which exists (as the repetition of the imposition of a new interpretation on this field of forces).

What remains metaphysical about this move away from the concept? What, in other words, replaces the Idea or concept as the stable element of our analysis of history? That is to say, if we cannot revert to the continuity provided by the concept of sexuality that exists throughout history, what allows us to analyze various particularities in different times and say that they all fall under the banner of “sexuality”? It is the will to power which replaces the Idea as the hypokeimenon of existence; the will to power is that which stands in support of the various “entities” that arise in its field. The will to power, then, is "the fundamental trait of everything real" ("NW" 79). The expression "will to power," “[a]s the name for the basic character of all beings, . . . provides an answer to the question ‘What is being?’" (Heidegger 1979, 3-4). As already mentioned, entities do not exist in-themselves for the genealogist; they exist only as functions of other relations. The space of these relations of forces, this functionality, is what Nietzsche calls will to power.

Foucault gives the name “power/knowledge” to this hypokeimenon as function. That is, power/knowledge is not an in-itself; it is not an autonomous entity that can be exchanged; it is "functional" inasmuch as it consists of the relations of forces. For instance, Foucault says that his analysis of power is an “analysis of a multiple and mobile field of force relations, wherein far-reaching, but never completely stable, effects of domination are produced” (1990a, 102). Foucault also makes this point by stressing the fact that power is not a commodity that is possessed. "Power is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared, something that one holds on to or allows to slip away; power is exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of nonegalitarian and
mobile relations" (1990a, 94). Similarly, Foucault feels, “that power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization" (1990a, 92). In this way, notions like “subject” or “sexuality” lose their status as autonomous substrata to existence; they are no longer “things-in-themselves” for Foucault. Thus, the subject or the agent is, like all else, a function. It is constituted by the relations of power/knowledge; for this reason, it does not have an autonomous existence; a plurality of forces determine its outline. It is Foucault’s hypothesis, “that the individual is not a pre-given entity which is seized on by the exercise of power. The individual, with his identity and characteristics, is the product of a relation of power exercised over bodies, multiplicities, movements, desires, forces” (1980, 73-4). Similarly, Foucault says, in "What is an Author," that “the subject (and its substitutes) must be stripped of its creative role and analysed as a complex and variable function of discourse” (1977, 138). The translation of Foucauldian genealogy into the study of literature does not mean only the dissolution of the author into a “function”; the work of art itself is dissolved into its “textual traces," into the discursive and non-discursive forces which constitute it, for the New Historicism (Greenblatt 1985, 5). The impression of the autonomy of the work of art is a particular illusion, like the illusion of the autonomous self or of the essential identities of things in themselves; it is an illusion that is necessary; however, the New Historicism wishes to expose the genealogical origins of this illusion: “The idea is not to strip away and discard the enchanted impression of aesthetic autonomy but to inquire into the objective conditions of this enchantment, to discover how the traces of social circulation are effaced” (Greenblatt 1985, 5).

Foucault’s power/knowledge, again like the will to power, is perspectival. It evaluates from a certain perspective, draws the lines, determines relations. As Heidegger has shown, the
will to power is an evaluative principle: “[w]hen metaphysics thinks whatever is, in its Being, as the will to power, then it necessarily thinks it as value-posing” (“NW” 82). Similarly, Foucault’s power/knowledge is that which indicates values. For instance, “spaces,” in the disciplinary configuration of power/knowledge, provide the framework for what is valued, what is to be known. “It is spaces that provide fixed positions and permit circulation; they carve out individual segments and establish operational links; they mark places and indicate values” (1979, 148).

This carving out of “individual segments” is similar to the way in which the will to power slices up becoming: both make that which exists knowable. In other words, both stabilize becoming, make it predictable.

In order for a particular species to maintain itself and increase its power, its conception of reality must comprehend enough of the calculable and constant for it to base a scheme of behavior on it. The utility of preservation—not some abstract-theoretical need not to be deceived—stands as the motive behind the development of the organs of knowledge—they develop in such a way that their observations suffice for our preservation. In other words: the measure of the desire for knowledge depends upon the measure to which the will to power grows in a species: a species grasps a certain amount of reality in order to become master of it, in order to press it into service [my emphasis]. (Nietzsche 1968, § 480)

In this manner, power/knowledge and the will to power produce reality. They create a horizon, a world, a perspective.

But it should not be forgotten that there existed at the same period a technique for constituting individuals as correlative elements of power and knowledge. The individual is no doubt the fictitious atom of an “ideological” representation of society; but he is also a reality fabricated by this specific technology of power that I have called “discipline”. We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it “excludes”, it “represses”, it “censors”, it “abstracts”, it “masks”, it “conceals”. In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production [my emphasis]. (Foucault 1979, 194)

As suggested above, this functionality of the will to power or power/knowledge replaces the Idea as the metaphysical principle that supports historical thinking. The concept is replaced,
then, by a play of forces, a drama. "To return to our subject, namely punishment, one must distinguish two aspects: on the one hand, that in it which is relatively enduring, the custom, the act, the 'drama,' a certain strict sequence of procedures; on the other, that in it which is fluid, the meaning, the purpose, the expectation associated with the performance of such procedures" (GM II.13). The actors in this drama are not important. As we have seen, the actors cannot be agents or subjects with intentions that cause historical occurrences; they are not substances but functions. The important aspects of this drama for the genealogist are the roles or positions that can be filled by other bodies at other times. Will to power and power/knowledge, as schematizing principles, position bodies in this theatre of power.

This play of forces (will to power or power/knowledge) is what provides the stability needed for historical thinking. Thus, one particular dominant force or concept is not the enduring element of history; the field of power is one of "multiple and mobile force relations" where domination is "never completely stable" (1990a, 102). However, the principle of domination itself is stable; the fact that one force will control or struggle for control over others is eternal. In this way, will to power and power/knowledge, as principles denoting the essence of existence as forces struggling to dominate, are metaphysical principles.

B) On the Kybernētēs of the Self

In the domain of pleasures, virtue was not conceived as a state of integrity, but as a relationship of domination, a relation of mastery. This is shown by the terms that are used--whether in Plato, Xenophon, Diogenes, Antiphon, or Aristotle--to define moderation: "rule the desires and the pleasures," "exercise power over them," "govern them" (kratein archein). (Foucault 1990b, 70)

The eternal return of the principle of domination is clearly discernible in Foucault's genealogy of sexuality. In the three volumes of The History of Sexuality, Foucault undertakes a genealogy of the modern desiring subject. Usually, sex and the sexual subject are thought of as
givens; they are constant, without a history. It is generally assumed that the subject endures repressions of its sexuality throughout history but does not itself have a history. Foucault, however, reverses this assumption: "Sexual behavior is not, as is too often assumed, a superimposition of, on the one hand, desires which derive from natural instincts, and, on the other hand, of permissive or restrictive laws which tell us what we should or shouldn't do" (1988a, 287). Thus, Foucault situates sexuality and the subject in history. He steps back to the Greeks, to a time that apparently did not experience "sexuality" as we know it: "instead of studying sexuality on the borders of knowledge and power, I have tried to go further back, to find out how, for the subject himself, the experience of his sexuality as desire had been constituted" (1988a, 48).

In this respect, Foucault assumes he will not find sexuality as we know it when he turns to the Greeks. He looks, rather, to the broader realm of the experience of moral existence. From Nietzsche he inherits the assumption that moral experience involves a relation to the self. Nietzsche gives this moral existence the name "asceticism." Nietzsche feels that asceticism, that of the artist for example, can be a healthy self-discipline--that is, if it remains anti-Platonic: a "will to deception." However, if it is excessively ascetic, if the artist places "himself in the service of the ascetic ideal," then the artist and the art are corrupted; they become unhealthy or reactive (GM III.25). The particular nature of this asceticism changes, of course, over time; however, the fact that human history is one of self-regulation or self-domination is an eternal truth.

Foucault distinguishes various historical configurations with varying systems and means of relating to the self--that of the ancient Greek, of the medieval Christian, and that of the modern. He feels the relation to oneself consists of four dimensions that structure moral experience: "the ethical substance, the types of subjection, the forms of elaboration of the self, and the moral teleology" (1990b, 32; cf., also, 1983, 237-43). For us today, the ethical substance, that
aspect of oneself that is at issue for ethical judgement, is "feelings." For the medieval Christian, we might say, it was desire. For the ancient Greek, Aphrodisia--a dynamic relation among action, desire, and pleasure--was the ethical substance (1983, 238; 1990b, 39). As a dynamic unity, the concern with aphrodisia that the Greeks had was one of quantity. That is to say, the Greeks did not worry about natural and unnatural acts; rather, they concerned themselves with questions of moderation and excess. The ethical relation to the self was one of moderating or restraining the self--a healthy self-discipline. Another concern for the Greek practice of aphrodisia was "role": that is, "[i]n the ancient morality . . . self-control is a problem only for the individual who must be master of himself and master of others and not for those who must obey others" (1988a, 261-2). Sexual pleasure is divided into two distinct roles: active/passive or penetrator/penetrated. The first role is filled by free adult males; the latter role is filled by slaves, children, and women. Thus, "[f]or a man, excess and passivity were the two main forms of immorality in the practice of the aphrodisia" (1990b, 47).

The second aspect that structures moral experience, "mode of subjection"--"the way in which people are invited or incited to recognize their moral obligations" (1983, 239)--can take many forms: "Is it, for instance, divine law, which has been revealed in a text? Is it natural law, a cosmological order, in each case the same for every living being? Is it a rational rule? Is it the attempt to give your existence the most beautiful form possible?" (239). For the Greeks, it was for the latter reason--the attempt to give existence the most beautiful form--that they recognized moral obligations. Their moral reflection on aphrodisia was prompted by a wish to "work out the conditions and modalities of a ‘use’; that is, to define a style for what the Greeks called chrēsis aphrodisiōn, the use of pleasures" (1990b, 53). Thus, the Greek ethic is a practice of self-government; it is an art, technē, or technique of the self (1990b, 62).
The third dimension which structures moral experience is the form of relation with the self. By this, Foucault is referring to "the means by which we can change ourselves in order to become ethical subjects," or how "we work on [the] ethical substance." For instance, "[i]n order to be faithful to your wife you can do different things to the self" (1983, 239). The Greek means of forming the self was referred to as Enkrateia: "the dynamics of a domination of oneself by oneself and . . . the effort that this demands" (1990b, 65). This self-mastery is what permits the Greek to reach the "Telos" of his ethical practices--that is, "the kind of being to which we aspire when we behave in a moral way. For instance, shall we become pure, or immortal, or free, or masters of ourselves, and so on" (1983, 239). The Greeks conceived their telos to be Ἁρμονία: moderation (with connotations of freedom) (1990b, 72, 78). "Ἀρμονία was a state that could be approached through the exercise of self-mastery and through restraint in the practice of pleasures; it was characterized as a freedom" (1990b, 78).

By studying these four aspects of moral experience, Foucault feels he is making it "possible to determine what structured the moral experience of sexual pleasures" (1990b, 37). Thus, sexual pleasure throughout history has arisen in various forms; however, these forms have always arisen within that which allows it to arise, that which structures experience: the essence of existence as the relations of forces in their struggle to dominate. We have seen that the Greeks, for Foucault, had an ethics based on an "aesthetics of existence" (1990b, 89). The medieval Christians, in their turn, had an ethics based on the "confession of the flesh": the securing of a soul's salvation through a confessional monitoring of it. Here the morality of self-restraint practised by Greek masters is turned into a universal code; that is to say, it is the same restriction for everyone. Modernity’s ethical existence is based on the self-examination of the desiring-subject. Deviations are sought out and eradicated. Scientific discourses have arisen in the last hundred years that are
able to analyze this sexual subject; these discourses have the task of making the subject knowable and predictable. The subject is positioned within schema by these discourses; movements and desires are charted; timetables are drawn up.31

Many forms of the self have arisen in history to be sure. However, for Foucault they can only arise within the space of what allows them to exist: power/knowledge as the essence of existence. The nature of the force that governs within a particular period will not be constant; however, the fact that forces will be struggling to govern—and that this struggle will produce dynamic historical arrangements—is unchanging. We can see, in this sense, that Foucault cannot offer us alternatives to the "technologies of individualization" through his genealogical analyses. The foundation of his thought, as will to power or power/knowledge, is itself technological. It is for this reason that the Greek experience he uncovers is essentially little different from our own. The event of Greek existence is forced to reveal itself within the space of the representational technologies of power/knowledge. Thus, the Greeks appear, within Foucault's work, to be simulations of the modern individual. Foucault does not reveal, in the example of the Greeks, a possibility for being which manifests itself as an "Other" with respect to the self-certainty of the present. When he looks to the Greeks, Foucault does not find an alternative to the modern tendency of thinking of the self as a cybernetic organism; rather, Foucault's philosophy makes it impossible to think of any other kind of organism.

The word "cybernetics," the study of the controlling and communicating mechanisms of a machine or organism, comes from the Greek word kybernētēs meaning "controller," "pilot," "steersman," or "governor" (Angeles 52).32 Foucault does not refer to this word; however, if we keep it in mind, it may shed light on his analysis of the subject of sexuality. That is to say, human existence can only arise within the framework of a certain self-governing for Foucault. The Greek
relation to the self, for instance, manifests itself for Foucault as one based on governing and restraint. Similarly, Foucault describes the medieval and modern relation to the self as one based on the schematization of the self through confessional practices. The modes of practising this self-governing are different throughout history; Foucault is correct to illustrate this. However, for all these examples, Foucault finds that their existence has been cybernetically based; that is, the individual only exists inasmuch as he or she is a kybernētēs.

This limitation of the manifestation of the individual to that which arises as a kybernētēs is no doubt related to the way in which Foucault, as demonstrated above, defines the essence of existence in terms of a technological principle—will to power or power/knowledge—and that the modality of this existence is the eternal return. As Heidegger points out, the “willing” that constitutes the will to power, as opposed to mere “striving,” is a positing of the self, a commanding of the self, or a putting of the self before the self:

Willing wills the one who wills, as such a one; and willing posits the willed as such. Willing is resoluteness toward oneself, but as the one who wills what is posited in the willing as willed. In each case will itself furnishes thoroughgoing determinateness to its willing... In contrast, striving can be indeterminate, both with respect to what is actually striven for and in relation to the very one who strives. In striving and in compulsion we are caught up in movement toward something without knowing what is at stake. In mere striving after something we are not properly brought before ourselves. (1979, 40-1)

In other words, since Foucault thinks of the self as a function of forces determined by a will to power or a certain configuration of power/knowledge, he always thinks of the self (regardless of the particular historical occurrence he encounters) as an entity that is posited by the will; every self he encounters is only a self inasmuch as it manifests itself within modern metaphysics, which bases the truth of a being on “self-certitude” or, with the culmination of modern metaphysics in the will to power, “self-positing” and self-commanding (Heidegger 1992, 91). Thus, the actors
within Foucault's cybernetic theater change, but the mask of mastery that they put on is an enduring one.

C) On Events and Repetitions

It is not easy to think in terms of the event. All the harder since thought itself then becomes an event. (Deleuze and Parnet 66)

Like Nietzsche and Foucault, Deleuze defines the essence of existence as the play of forces that constitutes the will to power: "There are nothing but quantities of force in mutual 'relations of tension'" (Deleuze 1983, 40). For Deleuze, then, what defines any being, "whether it is chemical, biological, social or political," is the "relation between dominant and dominated forces" (1983, 40). Since that which exists manifests itself as a functional structure of forces, existence is offered up to the interpretation of the genealogist: "A phenomenon is not an appearance or even an apparition but a sign, a symptom which finds its meaning in an existing force. The whole of philosophy is a symptomatology, and a semeiology" (1983, 3). In this way we can say of Deleuze what Bernhard Radloff says of other post-structuralists for whom the totality of being manifests itself as functional structures of inter-related signs or forces: "the mode of manifestation of the things themselves [is limited] to the purely functional structures which can be captured in the abstract calculus of a formal system. . . . [A]nd what can manifest itself has no ontological 'presence,' only a 'simulacrum' of being" (1993b, 639). Thus, Deleuze follows the Nietzschean inversion of Platonic metaphysics inasmuch as he claims that existence only manifests itself (in its "truth," shall we say) as a simulacrum or a "phantasm."

Foucault attempts to relate his own anti-Platonic philosophy to that of Deleuze in "Theatrum Philosophicum." This Deleuzo-Foucauldian species of the genus anti-Platonic claims to inscribe an excessive sign on the surface of this metaphysical father. This sign is a "phantasm."
The phantasm is an incorporeality which is outside the logic of origin and copy. That is to say, the phantasm is not original; nor, however, is it a mere representation since it does not refer to an original model ("TP" 166-7). Phantasms and events, which are the result of the colliding of physical forces, incorporeally transform or mark bodies. Like Foucault’s notion of power, the event and its phantasm (power relations and their eternal return) mark, carve up, schematize, and regionalize bodies: "Phantasms must be allowed to function at the limit of bodies; against bodies, because they stick to bodies and protrude from them, but also because they touch them, cut them, break them into sections, regionalize them, and multiply their surfaces . . ." ("TP" 169). Similarly, Foucault asks us to "imagine a stitched causality: as bodies collide, mingle, and suffer, they create events on their surfaces, events that are without thickness, mixture, or passion; for this reason, they cannot longer be causes. They form, among themselves, another kind of succession [that of the phantasm] whose links derive from a quasi-physics of incorporeals—in short, from metaphysics" ("TP" 173). The overturning of Plato, then, is an incorporeal transformation of a body of texts—the history of Western metaphysics. The overturning of Plato is, for Foucault, the emergence of a new interpretation, a new domination: "How could it change roles on the same stage? Only by being seized, dominated, and turned against its birth. . . . [It is necessary to master history so as to turn it to genealogical uses, that is, strictly anti-Platonic purposes" ("NGH" 159-60).

If we are to think in these terms, of the event and the phantasm, we must think of the past genealogically: the past as a struggle of forces that have inscribed the surface of bodies throughout history. Genealogy, as we have seen, discerns the nature of the "emergence" of an event—what forces are involved and what qualities they possess—and the "descent" of this event in the form of the phantasm as it is inscribed on the surface of bodies.
As with the parodic repetition of monumental history that Foucault’s genealogy calls for ("NGH" 160-1), the perversion of Platonism that Foucault sees Deleuze undertaking involves “humour.” “To convert Platonism (a serious task) is to increase its compassion for reality, for the world, and for time. To subvert Platonism is to begin at the top (the vertical distance of irony) and to grasp its origin. To pervert Platonism is to search out the smallest details, to descend (with the natural gravitation of humor) as far as its crop of hair or the dirt under its fingernails” (“TP” 168). Perhaps, then, to think of the past genealogically means to think of it as a humorous phantasm. The past exists as an event for Foucault and Deleuze; however, it is an event that is repeated infinitely. This repetition makes its existence banal, a parody of itself. It is for this reason that Foucault refers to Andy Warhol as an artist of difference and repetition—in other words, of the event and the phantasm (189).

In this respect, for Foucault, the event does not manifest itself as a radical Otherness; rather, it is merely a repetition of the existing elements of the system. That which exists can only arise within the space of representation for Foucault—with in the theater of the will to power as positing, as *vorstellen*. The fact that this theater of power relations eternally returns means that there can be no escape from the system; there are no monumental events that are too colossal (or sublime) to be encompassed within the relations of forces. There can only be parodic repetitions of the monumental for the genealogist ("NGH" 160). In this sense, the will to power as a purely relational “non-place,” as we have seen, replaces the Platonic Idea as that upon which all existence is grounded. “In a sense, only a single drama is ever staged in this ‘non-place,’ the endlessly repeated play of dominations" ("NGH" 150). Genealogy, then, cannot think of the “event” as an originary or founding moment—as *das Ereignis*; rather, in a path of thinking which points ahead to Derrida’s notion of *arché-différance*, the genealogist believes that the radically new or the
originarily is always dissolved into the pre-existing elements which constitute the origin as merely their re-configuration: "In the beginning, at the origin, there is the difference between active and reactive forces. Action and reaction are not in a relation of succession but in one of coexistence in the origin itself" (Deleuze 1983, 55). Thus, the event, for the genealogist, is merely an emergence: a particular configuration of forces.

Thus, Nietzschean genealogy, whether Foucault engages in it through Nietzsche himself or through Deleuze, is an overturning of Platonism that nevertheless remains metaphysical: genealogy defines the essence of existence as the functional relations of forces and gives it the name "will to power," "power/knowledge," "emergence" (Entstehung), "the event," or "difference"; the modality of this existence, of course, is that of the eternally stable and is given the name "eternal return," "descent" (Herkunft), "phantasm," or "repetition." Foucault is willing to accept that his and Deleuze's position (and, implicitly, Nietzsche's) is metaphysical: "Logique du sens should be read as the boldest and most insolent of metaphysical treatises" ("TP" 170). In fact, Foucault asserts that his and Deleuze's philosophies, like that of Nietzsche according to Heidegger, are the supreme statements of metaphysics, the culmination of metaphysics, the complete formulations of what could only be partially said by previous philosophers in the history of Western metaphysics. This is the case, for Foucault, because he and Deleuze are the first to realize that metaphysics is "discourse dealing with the materiality of incorporeal things—phantasms, idols, and simulacra" (170).

Thus, in thinking the genealogical phantasm of history, we are not discovering new possibilities for Being. There can be no such thing as a new possibility for existence since the phantasm and the event, for Foucault, deny the categories of existence and non-existence. In other words, to define existence as the colliding of bodies (the event) and to define the mode of its
manifestation as the banal repetition (phantasm) amount to a claim that existence manifests itself as a meaningless "simulacrum of being"; that is, it amounts to an announcement of the utter oblivion of being, an announcement of the culmination of nihilism where the truth of being can no longer be meaningfully distinguished from non-truth: "[phantasms] should consequently be freed from the restrictions we impose upon them, freed from the dilemmas of truth and falsehood and of being and non-being (the essential difference between simulacrum and copy carried to its logical conclusion); they must be allowed to conduct their dance, to act out their mime, as 'extra-beings'" ("TP" 170).

In this way, rather than seeking the truth of a historical existence that still speaks to us today, the genealogist seeks its simulation. Rather than forgetting the unimportant or that which may harm, rather than being monumental, the Foucauldian genealogist constructs a counter-memory. This genealogist, this "new historian" ("NGH" 160), makes the past account for itself: why did the past not stress this detail more, he asks; why did the past not make a monument of this mole-hill? The past is photographed from a theoretically infinite number of angles—all perspectives combine to give us a panoptic view of the past. All the way down to the smallest details, the past is set before the present as a humorous transparency.

As we accumulate data on the smallest details of the past, the past becomes available to us in our data bases in all its virtual presence; the past is available as a phantasm. The past is not permitted to retreat from the view of our examination; rather, it is re-presented endlessly. Mark Poster calls this phenomenon that strikes at the heart of the present epoch, this proliferation of information from every perspective, a "Superpanopticon" (126). It is a superpanopticon that Foucault helps us to recognize. However, it is a way of relating to the past and a way of relating to existence as a system of forces offered up to total calculation that Foucault’s own philosophical
assumptions help facilitate.

Because the phantasm and the event are seemingly outside the categories of origin and copy, Foucault insists that they are outside the philosophy of representation ("TP" 172). However, in actuality, they express the culmination of Western metaphysics--specifically the modern metaphysics of representation as expressed in the hypokeimenon of existence as power relations and their eternal return. That is to say, the genealogist does not allow that which exists (that is, in the past) to present itself in itself as itself; rather, the past is ceaselessly re-presented within the schemata posited by a general will to power. In this way, Foucault’s thought presents us with a philosophy of hyper-representation rather than a philosophy beyond representation. Therefore, when we inquire into the nature of genealogy’s relation to the past (and indirectly the “New Historicist” relation to the past)—when we ask whether or not genealogy allows the past to exist on its own ground—our results are negative. That is, genealogy does not allow the past to present itself as it is in itself; rather, the past is endlessly re-presented on the basis of the schemata of the present. The past is not allowed to arise in any other manner than as a set of power relations.

In order to undertake a more thorough-going critique of representation, a critique to which the Nietzschean tradition of genealogy, New Historicism, or post-structural “cultural studies” in general can only point, I will follow Heidegger in attending to the “unsaid,” the concealed essence, of the tradition. Attending to the self-emerging strangeness of the “unsaid” is to be distinguished from any of the representational schemata of the metaphysical tradition: the former unfolds as a receptive apprehending of the self-showing; the latter constitute a positing and manipulating which force that which is to arise within a pre-existing conceptual grid. (For instance, in the latter mode, the dialogue of an Elizabethan play may only be permitted to arise within the representational
schemata of twentieth century political struggles.) The distinction is one between a heedful, reverent knowing and a masterful manipulating; it is the distinction between the “fusion” or dialogue of interpretive horizons and the rigid application of a pet critical theory.

This methodological distinction maps onto a distinction I will make throughout this work between the early Greek experience of humanity’s relation to Being as noēin (apprehending [Vernehmen]) and the metaphysical experience of this relation as an imperial and technical mastery of beings. *Technē* was the Greek name for humanity’s receptive bringing forth (*Hervorbringen*) of Being in the proper limits of a being. As a bringing forth, *technē* is essentially tied to *poiēsis* and *phusis* (cf. "QCT"). We will call this receptive bringing forth "*technē I.*" Throughout the metaphysical tradition, *technē* has become, however, a way of revealing characterized by "challenging revealing" ("QCT" 15): it is a mastering, manipulating, and positing of beings. I have outlined the ways in which this aspect of *technē* finds its modern founding in the work of More, Bacon, and Descartes—and I shall have occasion to return to these three authors as this work unfolds. The modern founding of *technē* as a mastering revealing finds its culmination in the age of technology and the metaphysics of the will to power. Nietzsche’s anti-Platonic thought—transmitted to Foucault and, by means of Foucault, to New Historicism and most of today’s critical trends—is the completion, not the overcoming, of this tradition of the revealing that is *technē*. We will call this latter tradition that of "*technē II.*" 34

There is a metaphysical, manifest text of the great works of the tradition, and the three Elizabethan works I will deal with are included in that tradition: Sidney’s *Defence of Poesie*, Book I of Spenser’s *The Faerie Queene*, and Shakespeare’s *Hamlet*. I will point to the nature of the manifest text of each of these three Elizabethan works. However, more profoundly, an "unsaid" tradition, the unfolding of Being in its oblivion, also runs through these works. In the first
chapter, "Art and Truth," I will discuss the "unsaid" of Aristotle and Plato: the echo of the pre-metaphysical experience of Being as alētheia. In the second chapter, "Poïēsis and Mimēsis in Sidney's Defence of Poesie," I will briefly outline the continuity of this "trace" within the tradition, this experience of Being in terms of alētheia, through the Middle Ages and through the thinking of the Renaissance humanists. This continuity, from the Greeks to the Middle Ages to the Renaissance humanists, provides the essential ground of Sidney's thinking about poetry in relation to truth. I will discuss the way in which Spenser relates to this essential (unsaid) ground in the third chapter, "Spenser's Pharmacy: Nature and Art in The Faerie Queene (Book I)." Finally, in the fourth chapter, "Representation and Lethe in Hamlet," I will discuss the Shakespearean echoing of this non-metaphysical possibility. Because I will outline both the metaphysical and non-metaphysical aspects of each of the three works, I will be able to utilize both a general post-structural and a Heideggerian mode of analysis. They are made compatible inasmuch as the former will be used to isolate the metaphysical structures (the "said") of the Elizabethan text and the latter will be used to point to a non-metaphysical ("unsaid") possibility in the work. That is, I can use post-structural methods in order to "deconstruct" that aspect of each work which is metaphysical. However, because the post-structural point of departure denies the possibility of an overcoming of or a stepping "outside" of the representational-metaphysical tradition, I will follow Heidegger in attending to that possibility in each work.

In order to prepare the ground for the question of representation as it pertains to Elizabethan literature, in order to hold ourselves open to the possibility of a non-metaphysical (non-representational) determination of truth and art, we might consider the following: Is art in the Renaissance always and only the re-presentation of nature? Is art only the repetition of the already manifest? Understanding these questions, and how we might formulate answers to them,
will have repercussions for the way in which specific Renaissance or Elizabethan artistic "statements" are viewed. More profoundly, however, the understanding of the Renaissance notion of representation also points to a significant shift in our notion of the Renaissance conception of truth and Being: rather than the hierarchy of origin and copy, or pure nature and fallen art, perhaps another determination of the truth of beings is at work here. Certainly for Sidney the poet does not merely imitate pre-existing nature; rather, the poet is the one who founds or creates that which did not, or could not, previously exist in the world of nature, in the world of beings as they are:

There is no Art delivered unto mankind that hath not the workes of nature for his principall object, without which they could not consist, and on which they so depend. . . . Onely the poet disdeining to be tied to any such subjectiō, lifted up with the vigor of his own invention, doth grow in effect into an other nature: in making things either better then nature bringeth foorth, or quite a new, formes such as never were in nature. . . . Nature never set foorth the earth in so rich Tapistry as diverse Poets have done. . . . her world is brasen, the Poets only deliver a golden. (7-8)

Here, it would seem, Sidney is not articulating a representational determination of the truth of beings. But what do we mean when we say that Sidney articulates a particular non-representational determination of the truth of beings? Let us back up a little, before proceeding with the questions of truth and art in Elizabethan literature, in order to delineate the meaning of these terms. What is "truth," then, if we are not to accept blindly the metaphysical determination of it? And what is art, if we are to keep its essence open to question, if we are to attend it as it shows itself rather than subsume it under the metaphysical model of identity?
Notes to the Introduction

1. On this point, see Richardson 9-15; see, also, Heidegger’s “Letter on Humanism” 1977b, 193-242; hereafter cited as “LH”: “Metaphysics does indeed represent beings in their Being, and so it thinks the Being of beings. But it does not think the difference of both. Metaphysics does not ask about the truth of Being itself” (“LH” 202-3). See, too, Heidegger 1984a, 50: “The oblivion of Being is oblivion of the distinction between Being and beings” [emphasis in original].

2. For the early Greeks, Being is called phusis. Being as phusis is essentially connected to phainesthai: “We know that being disclosed itself to the Greeks as physis. The realm of emerging and abiding is intrinsically at the same time a shining appearing. The radicals phy and pha name the same thing. Phyein, self-sufficient emergence, is phainesthai, to flare up, to show itself, to appear” (Heidegger 1959, 100-01).

3. Of course, the translation of mimēsis as used by Aristotle is rather complicated. In one sense it refers to a “re-presentation”; however, in another sense, it can refer to a “presenting” of something for the first time. On the possibility of a non-representational understanding of mimēsis, in connection with Sidney’s Defence of Poesie, see Chapter 2. An insightful treatment of the problematics of mimēsis in classical thinking is provided in McKeon 1957. See, also, Nagy 47-52 and Woodruff.

4. In Cratylus, Plato has Socrates consider whether or not two identical objects would be one and the image of the one.

   Let us suppose the existence of two objects. One of them shall be Cratylus, and the other the image of Cratylus, and we will suppose, further, that some god makes not only a representation such as a painter would make of your outward form and color, but also creates an inward organization like yours, having the same warmth and softness, and into this infuses motion, and soul, and mind, such as you have, and in a word copies all your qualities, and places them by you in another form. Would you say that this was Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, or that there were two Cratylikes? Cratylus: I should say that there were two Cratylikes. (432b-c)

   Derrida refers to this passage, in his essay “Plato’s Pharmacy” (1981, 61-171; hereafter cited as “PPh”), when asserting that it is difference that allows the mimetic constitution of identity. “If one eliminates the tiny difference that, in separating the imitator from the imitated, by that very fact refers to it, one would render the imitator absolutely different: the imitator would become another being no longer referring to the imitated” (“PPh” 139). For an overview of the Deleuzean and Derridean deconstruction of representation, see Paul Patton, “Anti-Platonism and Art.”

5. For instance, Derrida, following Saussure, says that language as a differential system, outside of which there is no self-standing present being, is produced: “[s]ince language, which Saussure says is a classification, has not fallen from the sky, its differences have been produced, are produced effects” (“Différence” 1982. 3-27; hereafter cited as “Dif”; this excerpt is from page 11). However, the differential system of language is not produced by a present-being as cause; it arises out of its own pure production of difference: “What is written as différence, then, will be the playing movement that ‘produces’ . . . these differences, these effects of difference” (“Dif” 11). On being as production, and production as the manifestation of differential relations, in
poststructural thought, see also Derrida's *The Truth in Painting* (1987b, 80-1) and Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus*: "Everything is production" (1983, 4).

6. We will try to point to the possibility of a "non-representational" experience of Being in this work. Post-structuralism posits an "anti-representational" determination of being. It is this "anti" position which we will have the occasion to call into question. Heidegger, for instance, shows how Nietzsche's "anti-Platonic" position is entangled in Platonic metaphysics; see "The Word of Nietzsche: 'God is Dead'" 1977a, 53-112; hereafter cited as "NW": "as a mere countermovement it necessarily remains, as does everything 'anti,' held fast in the essence of that over against which it moves. Nietzsche's countermovement against metaphysics is, as the mere turning upside down of metaphysics, an inextricable entanglement in metaphysics" ("NW" 61). Elsewhere, Heidegger makes a similar point with respect to Sartre's existential reversal of the "essentialism" of metaphysics: "But the reversal of a metaphysical statement remains a metaphysical statement" ("LH" 208). Later in this "Introduction" I will try to show that Foucault's-and, thus, that of the New Historicism and of Cultural Studies--"anti-Platonic" approach to history is itself merely the completion of representational-metaphysical thinking, not its overcoming. For a similar argument with respect to Derrida, see Radloff 1989.

7. Foucault, "Theatrum Philosophicum" in 1977, 165-96; hereafter cited as "TP." These exerpts are from pages 187 and 194.

8. The following excerpt from Derrida's "Plato's Pharmacy" is informative on this point:

To repeat: the disappearance of the good-father-capital-sun is thus the precondition of discourse, taken this time as a moment and not as a principle of *generalized* writing. That writing (is) *epekeina tēs ouσias*. The disappearance of truth as presence, the withdrawal of the present origin of presence, is the condition of all (manifestation of) truth. Nontruth is the truth. Nonpresence is presence. Difference, the disappearance of any originary presence, is *at once* the condition of possibility *and* the condition of impossibility of truth. At once. "At once" means that the being-present (*on*) in its truth, in the presence of its identity and in the identity of its presence, is *doubled* as soon as it appears, as soon as it presents itself. *It appears, in its essence, as* the possibility of its own most proper non-truth, of its pseudo-truth reflected in the icon, the phantasm, or the simulacrum. What is is not what it is, identical and identical to itself, unique, unless it *adds to itself* the possibility of being *repeated* as such. And its identity is hollowed out by that addition, withdraws itself in the supplement that presents it. (168)

9. The Utopia Hythloday describes is a foreshadowing of the "panopticism" of later-modern life: "So you see there is no chance to loaf or kill time, no pretext for evading work; there are no wine-bars, or ale-houses, or brothels; no chances for corruption; no hiding places; no spots for secret meetings. Because they live in the full view of all ..." (60).

10. On the European interpretation of the New World inhabitants as people without language, as a blank page upon which a European cultural inscription was called for, see Greenblatt, "Learning to Curse: Aspects of Linguistic Colonialism in the Sixteenth Century" in 1990, 16-39.
11. I have emphasized, here, that aspect of More’s work which articulates the early modern, “imperial” mastery of difference. However, Utopia, in another sense, also calls into question these structures of mastery. I will expand each of these aspects of Utopia. On the relation of Utopia to the “imperial” discourses of Columbus, Vespucci, and Montaigne, see Chapter 2; on Hythloday’s relation to the past as a non-imperial, receptive knowing, see Chapter 3; and on the relation of Utopia to Bacon’s articulation of the scientifco-imperial mastery of nature in The Great Instauration and the New Atlantis, see Chapter 4.

12. Timothy Reiss points out the confluence of the “gaze” of the scientist and of the explorer. The scientist’s, or “new philosopher’s,” telescope (“eye--instrument--world”) and the explorer’s voyage of discovery (“self-possessed port of departure--sea journey--country claimed as legitimate possession of the discoverer”) share the same metaphorical structure according to Reiss (31).

13. For a more detailed treatment of Bacon on this point, see Chapter 4.

14. On Descartes’ formulation of the modern metaphysics of the subject, see Chapter 4.


16. Heidegger finds the experience of receptive apprehending (noein) in the fragments of Parmenides and in Aristotle, especially Metaphysics IX, 10. This apprehending, for Heidegger, is essential thinking; it “lets itself be claimed by Being so that it can say the truth of Being” (“LH” 194). The understanding of knowing in terms of the mastery of beings, on the other hand, is a “technical interpretation of thinking” (“LH” 194). In apprehending, humanity “is the shepherd of Being.” In metaphysical thinking, on the other hand, especially that thinking which culminates in the modern metaphysics of the subject, humanity becomes the “tyrant of Being” (“LH” 210).

17. The analysis of the Renaissance, today, is almost entirely undertaken in terms of various notions of power dynamics. While I am unable to provide an exhaustive list of the works which have preceded me in thinking about the early modern era within the rubric of notions of mastery and representation, I can point to the major “schools” and critics which manifest this trend. The New Historicism approach is, of course, one of the most prevalent today. Within this movement Stephen Greenblatt, Louis Montrose, Stephen Orgel, Catherine Belsey and Francis Barker are critics whose work relates most closely to this problematic of representation and power. The related work of such Cultural Materialists and Postcolonialists as John Drakakis, Jonathan Dollimore, and Robert Weimann is also worth checking. Approaches which have had less influence on this study, but which also concentrate on the issues of power and representational mastery, include recent feminist critiques of Renaissance literature as well as the burgeoning field of Queer Studies.

18. On the technological relation to existence as a “standing reserve,” see Heidegger’s “The Question Concerning Technology” in 1977a, 3-35; hereafter cited as “QCT.”

19. For some varying interpretations of the connections between Foucault’s and Nietzsche’s genealogical methodologies, see Scott Lash, Michael Mahan, John Pizer, Benjamin C. Sax, and Gary Shapiro.
20. The following section consists of a modified version of my "Foucault, Genealogy, History."

21. For another formulation of this point, see Jürgen Habermas: "Foucault must have been irritated by the affinity that obviously existed between his archaeology of the human sciences and Heidegger's critique of the metaphysics of the modern age" (1987, 266).

22. Perhaps it is because of passages like this from Foucault's speeches that Michael Mahan can assert that genealogy is a "critique." He feels that Foucault's genealogy continues the enlightenment tradition by problematizing the present, by relativizing our historical way of being (181).

23. "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" in 1977, 139-64; hereafter cited as "NGH."

24. On the New Historicism as a critique of this kind of idealist historiography and of essentialist humanism, see Howard 1986. On the critique of the "essential" definition of a work of art, in favour of a definition which attends to "the network of practices that governs the circulation of social energy" (18), see Stephen Greenblatt's essay, "The Circulation of Social Energy," 1985, 1-20.


26. Foucault makes this point in the following way:
   What Nietzsche calls the Entstehungsherd of the concept of goodness is not specifically the energy of the strong or the reaction of the weak, but precisely this scene where they are displayed [where they are set before us to view, where they are (re-) presented: vor-stellen] superimposed or face-to-face. It is nothing but the space that divides them, the void through which they exchange their threatening gestures and speeches. As descent qualifies the strength or weakness of an instinct and its inscription on a body, emergence designates a place of confrontation. . . . [my emphasis] (150)

27. On this point, see also Foucault 1980, 89.

28. Foucault, for instance, points out the functional character of the notion of sexuality:
   One must not suppose that there exists a certain sphere of sexuality that would be the legitimate concern of a free and disinterested scientific inquiry were it not the object of mechanisms of prohibition brought to bear by the economic or ideological requirements of power. If sexuality was constituted as an area of investigation, this was only because relations of power had established it as a possible object; and conversely, if power was able to take it as a target, this was because techniques of knowledge and procedures of discourse were capable of investing it. (1990a, 98)

29. Of course, for Nietzsche, too, the subject was a function of language. We think in terms of subject/predicate, doer/deed, substance/attribute etc. because Indo-European languages are configured in this manner (cf. GM 1.13, 1968, 481-492, and Twilight of the Idols IV.5).
30. The body has a somewhat confusing existence within genealogy: history is inscribed on it, for Foucault; it (as instinct) is somewhat ahistorical for Nietzsche. It is beyond the scope of this work to deal with this issue; however, Scott Lash and Michael Mahan provide good, somewhat opposed, interpretations of the notion of the body in Foucault and Nietzsche’s genealogies.

31. The confession, thus, is what secures a soul within the metaphysics of medieval Christianity. This confession becomes transformed into a scientific examination of the self in the modern age. Confession becomes all-pervasive within the epoch of technology; it becomes the only way to discover the truth of the self. Through psychoanalysis, for example, the self-certain subject of Cartesianism is solidified. “Whence too this new way of philosophizing: seeking the fundamental relation to the true, not simply in oneself—in some forgotten knowledge, or in a certain primal trace—but in the self-examination that yields, through a multitude of fleeting impressions, the basic certainties of consciousness” (1990a, 59-60). Because “the obligation to confess is now relayed through so many different points,” Western man “has become a confessing animal” (1990a, 60, 59). Within this technologizing of the individual, this “normalization,” the self becomes a transparency to view. No detail is too small to be confessed. The self must be present, his truth available for manipulation. The self can only exist within this panopticism of the present; it cannot withdraw from the representations of modern metaphysics.

With this in mind, it would be interesting to do an etymological study of the German words for “confession” (the mode or technology of re-presenting the self) and “enframing” (the essence of technology): gestehen is equivalent to the English verb “to confess”; das Gesell, as noted above, could be translated as “enframing.” The stems of these words have the same meaning (to position, to stand, to place, to put, or to set); the only difference is that stehen is strong and stellen is weak. Perhaps we see in these parallel meanings a long forgotten connection between a technology of the self and the essence of technology.

32. On “cybernetics” as a fulfilment of the tradition of calculative-mastering thinking, see Heidegger's essay “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” 1977b, 373-92, especially 377: “‘Theory’ means now supposition of the categories, which are allowed only a cybernetical function, but denied any ontological meaning. The operational and model character of representational-calculative thinking becomes dominant.”

33. On the proliferation of data and information concerning the past (or, more specifically, the literary tradition) and its relation to “the value of availability,” see Bernhard Radloff (1992, especially 155).

34. Here, I follow Bernhard Radloff who, in an unpublished lecture, made this distinction between modes of technē.
CHAPTER 1:
ART AND TRUTH

At this point I would like to explore the possibility of a non-representational relation of art and truth, as articulated by Heidegger, and to demonstrate the way in which this possibility is uttered, in a concealed fashion, by the initiators of the metaphysical tradition themselves: Aristotle and Plato.

Truth and Representation (Accordance)

_The primordial phenomenon of truth has been covered up by Dasein’s very understanding of Being—that understanding which is proximally the one that prevails, and which even today has not been surmounted explicitly and in principle._ [emphasis in original] (Heidegger 1962a, § 44, 268)

In "On the Essence of Truth," Heidegger delineates the distinctions between the common, metaphysico-representational determination of truth (as accordance) and the primordial essence of truth (as _alētheia_).¹ According to our average, everyday understanding of things, Heidegger points out, truth seems self-evident in its nature; we pass over it and think nothing more about it. If pressed, we may define truth as what makes a true thing true. But then we are faced with the question: what is a true thing? According to this usual, self-evident definition of truth, the true is the _actual_. For instance, Heidegger says, we distinguish between “true” and “false” gold through the distinction of what “actually” is gold and what merely presents the “semblance” of gold. However, are not both the “true” and the “false” gold actual? Then the truth of the gold does not reside merely in its actuality. What then gives to “true” gold its distinct nature as true? “Genuine gold is that actual gold the actuality of which is in accordance with what, always and in advance,
we ‘properly’ mean by ‘gold’" ("ET" 119). We say, "[i]t is in accord."

This, then, is the standard definition of the truth of things as accordance: truth is matter in accord with a pre-determined meaning of the thing in question. However, we also say that statements about beings are true or false. But in what sense can we say that a statement "accords" and, thus, is true? "A statement is true if what it means and says is in accordance with the matter about which the statement is made. Here too we say, ‘It is in accord.’ Now, though, it is not the matter that is in accord but rather the proposition" ("ET" 119).

This dual sense of truth as accordance--the accordance of matter and of proposition--is uttered in the traditional definition of truth: veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectūs. This can mean that truth is the correspondence of matter to knowledge (the matter is in accord) or of knowledge to the matter (the proposition accords). Both material and propositional truth think veritas as conformity, as "correctness" ("ET" 120). This usual definition of truth finds its clearest, and most recent, definition in medieval metaphysics. Within this medieval definition, a thing (ens creatum), "is only insofar as it corresponds to the idea preconceived in the intellectus divinus, i.e., in the mind of God, and thus measures up to the idea (is correct) and in this sense is ‘true’" ("ET" 120). Truth as adaequatio of created thing and divine intellect guarantees truth as adaequatio of human intellect and created thing ("ET" 121).

Because truth is self-evident, the definition presented here is obvious. It is also self-evident that truth has an opposite: un-truth. If gold, or a statement about gold, can be true inasmuch as it accords with what is set out in advance as "gold," then things and propositions can equally be false inasmuch as they do not accord ("ET" 121). Since it does not pertain to truth itself, we do not bring un-truth into our account of the usual notion of truth. We shall see, however, that un-truth is integral to the primordial essence of truth, as alētheia.
Separated from theological explanation, the usual definition of truth is connected to an old tradition of thinking: where "truth is the accordance (homoioesis) of a statement (logos) with a matter (pragma)" ("ET" 122). It is in this sense that our usual, obvious notion of truth springs from a certain representational determination of Being. It is in this sense, also, which we will, obviously, determine the "truth" of the artistic "statement": does it faithfully represent? Does it accord? But do we know what it means for a statement to accord with matter?

Thing and thing come into accord "in the oneness of their outward appearance." But the same is not true of the statement and the thing--which are manifestly different in their outward appearance. So, how can the statement correspond to the thing? The statement "relates itself" to this thing in that it presents [vor-stellt] it and says of the presented how, according to the particular perspective that guides it, it is disposed" ("ET" 123). To present, says Heidegger, is "to let the thing stand opposed as object" (123). In being presented and placed [vor-stellt] by the presentative statement, the object, that which stands opposed, crosses an "open field of opposedness" [Entgegen]. Yet, as object, it still maintains its stand as an autonomous thing. It is within a previously opened "open region" that this traversing of a "field of opposedness" by the object takes place.

Essential humanity, Dasein, exists within this open region and comports itself to the beings presented in this openness. "Comportment" is the way in which we relate to a being as this or that being. It consists of the unwritten rules guiding the relations of people to one another and to things in an open region. This comportment, this way of relating to beings presented in the open region, determines which "statements" about these beings will be deemed true and which false. "A statement is invested with its correctness by the openness of comportment; for only through the latter can what is opened up [a being] really become the standard for the presentative
correspondence" ("ET" 124). In this way, Heidegger points out, the “inner possibility" of truth as accordance is “comportment." To turn to the example of a frog, we could say that a certain comportment to “what is opened up," in this case, a frog, holds sway within the experimental method. Within this comportment, we relate to the frog as a biological specimen, as an object of experimentation, or as an instance of a categorical type. This comportment thereby provides the standard by which statements about the frog can be evaluated. According to the standard of this comportment, the statement "the frog is a member of the kingdom Animalia, the phylum Chordata, the subphylum Vertebrata, the class Amphibia, and the order Salientia" is "true"; the statement accords with the thing within the parameters of the scientific way of relating to the thing. However, within a mythico-poetic comportment this statement would seem absurd. Within the parameters of the latter way of relating to the frog, other statements would be more appropriate: "the frog was once a prince," or "the frog is a sacred animal with magical properties," or “the frog is a portent of calamitous change.” Because comportment plays the role of the standard by which we determine the truth of statements, we can say that the locus of truth as correctness is not in the proposition itself. Rather, the locus of truth as correctness is the ground of its inner possibility, that is, the site of the comportment, the previously opened open region.

Heidegger asserts that this ground of the inner possibility of accordance is freedom. Relating to and according with an object are possible only if this relating has always already entered freely into an open region. Directedness to a thing (comportment) only arises through a being-free for what is opened up in an open region. "The openness of comportment as the inner condition of the possibility of correctness is grounded in freedom. The essence of truth is freedom" ("ET" 125).

What is meant by freedom if it is taken as the essence of truth? Certainly this essential
freedom cannot mean mere human caprice. In fact, freedom, in this sense, is not a property belonging to humanity at all. If anything, freedom possesses humanity in its essence. Consideration of the essential connection between truth and freedom leads us to pursue the question of the essence of humanity in a regard leading to the concealed essential ground of humanity, to Dasein.

Freedom reveals itself, then, with regard to its relation to the essential ground of humanity, as freedom for what is opened up in an open region. Freedom as "letting beings be" is not to be understood as a resignation or indifference; rather, to let beings be is to engage oneself with beings. Letting be is engagement with the open region and its openness into which every being comes to stand, bringing that openness along with it ("ET" 127).

Western thinking from its inception thinks of this open region as ta alētheia (the unconcealed). Freedom, in this sense, is an engagement with the disclosedness of beings ("ET" 128). Letting be, freedom, is exposing, "ek-sistent." It is ek-sistent, and here we more properly address the human essence, in that it is a "standing out" beyond beings as beings; it is a surpassing, for instance, of the received wisdom concerning beings in themselves and a correspondent exposure to beings in their presencing, in their Being. Dasein is the essential ground in which humanity is able to ek-sist. "[T]he ek-sistence of historical man begins at that moment when the first thinker takes a questioning stand with regard to the unconcealment of beings by asking: what are beings? In this question unconcealment is experienced for the first time" ("ET" 128-9). Freedom, then, arises as exposure to the disclosedness of beings. With the ek-sistent questioning that constitutes essential humanity, disclosedness (unconcealment) occurs for the first time. It is this transcendence, this standing out beyond beings as they are, this ek-sistent questioning that defines humanity as essentially "uncanny" or "un-homely" (unheimlich).
That is, it is because humanity is "ek-sistent" that the chorus in Sophocles’ Antigone can proclaim: "Many the wonders but nothing walks stranger than man" (332). Humanity is essentially strange or "un-homely" because it exposes itself to the overpowering order of Being (dikē) and because, with a knowing violence (technē) humanity brings the overpowering order forth into a particular form. "The unhomely [Unheimische] prevents us from making ourselves at home and therein it is overpowering. But man is the strangest of all, not only because he passes his life amid the strange understood in this sense but because he departs from his customary, familiar limits, because he is the violent one, who, tending toward the strange in the sense of the overpowering, surpasses the limit of the familiar" (Heidegger 1959, 151).

This strangeness of humanity, this letting beings be, is the ground of history. It marks the site of history, the polis. The polis is the articulation of the essential relation and the strange belonging of the forfeiture of the site (apolis)—the unquestioning fallenness into beings as they are—and the surpassing of the site (hupsipolis)—the creative, ek-sistent standing over and questioning of beings as they are. History begins only when beings themselves are expressly drawn up into their unconcealment and conserved in it—within the articulated site (polis)—only when being as a whole (phasis) discloses itself in the openness of the open region, only when the overpowering order (dikē), through a receptive violence (technē), is brought forth into manifestness. The primordial disclosure of being as a whole, the question concerning beings as such, and the beginning of Western history are the same; they occur together in a “time” which, itself unmeasurable, first opens up the open region for every measure. History begins, then, with ek-sistent exposure; it is ek-sistent Dasein, in its relatedness to being as a whole, which first founds all history. Only ek-sistent humanity is historical. “Nature” has no history.

Humanity can also not let beings be as they are: then beings are covered up and distorted;
semblance comes to power. This untruth, this distortion, derives from essential truth; it is not just the caprice of humanity, because humanity's ek-sistence is a property of freedom, not the other way around (130). Truth and untruth are essentially connected. It is only through this essential connection that true and untrue propositions can become opposed. Just as the essence of truth, however, is not the correctness of statements, so, too, the non-essence of truth is not the incorrectness of judgements. Since, in contradistinction to the usual and obvious determination of truth, that un-truth is connected to truth in its essence, we must ask: what is the essence of un-truth?

We have defined the essence of truth as freedom; freedom is ek-sistent, disclosive letting beings be. Freedom has already attuned all comportment to beings as a whole; freedom, ek-sistent exposure, is in the way of an attunement (Stimmung). Every mode of historical humanity's comportment, whether understood or not, is attuned. Letting beings be, which is an attuning, prevails throughout all open comportment ("ET" 131). Attuned disclosure prevailing through open comportment is also a concealing: "Precisely because letting be always lets beings be in a particular comportment which relates to them and thus discloses them, it conceals beings as a whole. Letting-be is intrinsically at the same time a concealing. In the ek-sistent freedom of Da-sein a concealing of being as a whole comes to pass. Here there is concealment" ("ET" 132).

Concealment resides at the heart of alētheia. This is not a privation; "rather, concealment preserves what is most proper to alētheia as its own" ("ET" 132). Concealment is un-disclosedness, the untruth that is most proper to truth (dis-closedness). In this way, concealment is the sheltering archē of truth itself.

As letting beings be, freedom is the resolutely open bearing (Ent-schlossenheit) that does not close up in itself (133). But this bearing toward concealing conceals itself. "Certainly man
takes his bearings constantly in his comportment toward beings; but for the most part he acquiesces in this or that being and its particular openedness. Man clings to what is readily available and controllable even where ultimate matters are concerned" (134). This forgetting of concealment is the forgetting of Being, the forgetting of the mystery.

But the forgetting of the mystery bestows on its apparent disappearance a peculiar presence (134). Humanity takes its standards from the "world" as plannable--these standards are not essential standards, not proper to the essence of humanity (134-5). As ek-sistent, Dasein is also insistent. Dasein, as well as standing above beings, questioning them, also entails an insistence on beings as they are, in their pre-determined, unquestionable character. Even in insistent ek-sistence the mystery holds sway, but as the forgotten and hence non-essential essence of truth (135). As insistent, humanity is turned toward the most readily available beings--turned away from the mystery. This passing by of the mystery is erring.

Humanity is always astray in errancy. Erring is essential to Dasein, not an occasional mistake (135). Erring is the forgetting of itself constantly of Dasein. Errancy is the open site for and ground of error. Every mode of comportment has its mode of erring--error as the incorrect judgement is only the most superficial mode of erring. "But, as leading astray, errancy at the same time contributes to a possibility that man is capable of drawing up from his ek-sistence--the possibility that, by experiencing errancy itself and by not mistaking the mystery of Da-sein, he not let himself be led astray" (136).

Freedom is the essence of truth (as correctness of statements) only because freedom itself originates from the primordial essence of truth, the rule of the mystery in errancy. The glimpse into the mystery out of errancy is a question, the question of Being. It is this question of the meaning of Being, this glimpse into the mystery, that is the primordial essence of truth, which
originates the thinking of Being (philosophy) since Plato ("ET" 137). Philosophy is a glimpse into the mystery in that it is a transcendence: an ek-sistent questioning, a stepping out and beyond things as they are presently understood or defined and an encounter with the mystery, with the strange possibilities of Being outside the cave. Philosophy is a thinking which opens itself to the question of the meaning of Being. It is not limited by the everyday understanding of beings; it steps beyond these understandings and founds new paths for a historical people; philosophy "breaks the paths and opens the perspectives of the knowledge that sets the norms and hierarchies, of the knowledge in which and by which a people fulfills itself historically and culturally" (Heidegger 1959, 10). Philosophy, in this way, is "untimely"; it "always remains a knowledge which not only cannot be adjusted to a given epoch but on the contrary imposes its measure upon its epoch" (Heidegger 1959, 8). Philosophy, then, is an ek-sistent stepping beyond the familiar, beyond the cave, and an inquiry into the strange and extra-ordinary: "When in our thinking we open our minds to this question, we first of all cease to dwell in any of the familiar realms. We set aside everything that is on the order of the day. Our question goes beyond the familiar and the things that have their place in everyday life. Nietzsche once said . . .: 'A philosopher is a man who never ceases to experience, see, hear, suspect, hope, and dream extraordinary things'" (1959, 12). This inquiry itself is extraordinary and marks humanity as the strangest (ta deina ton) of all the strange, the most uncanny or unhomely (unheimlich): "It is entirely voluntary, based wholly and uniquely on the mystery of freedom, on what we have called the leap. The same Nietzsche said: 'Philosophy . . . is a voluntary living amid ice and mountain heights' . . . To philosophize, we must now say, is an extra-ordinary inquiry into the extra-ordinary" (1959, 12-13).

In this way, the philosophic thinking of Being is the putting into words of humanity's freedom or ek-sistence; it is the "conserved articulation of the truth of being as a whole" ("ET"
138). With the beginning of philosophy, with the essential articulation of Western ek-sistence, so too begins the marked domination of common sense (Sophistry). With ek-sistent questioning, with the essential transcendence of humanity, there belongs fallenness and errancy, the enshramment in beings as they are. Along with the freed prisoner as philosopher-ruler, there are the prisoners who remain tied unquestioningly to the mere appearance of beings. Sophistry is a manifestation of this falling; it insists on the unquestionable character, the pre-determined nature, of the beings that are opened up and interprets all thoughtful questioning as an attack on common sense. For Heidegger, then, Sophistry is the articulation of insistence which is integral to the articulation of ek-sistence that is philosophy.

We have thought, with Heidegger, of the essence of truth, and seen it as first of all a question of the truth of essence. Of course, in the name “essence,’ philosophy thinks Being” (“ET” 139). So the essence of truth (as correctness) is ek-sistent freedom (as the ground of the inner possibility of truth as correctness). The essential commencement of this ground (that is, the primordial essence of truth, its founding) is concealment and errancy. Thus, the essence (Being) of truth is not an abstract universality; rather, it is the self-concealing, unique site (“meaning”) of the history of the disclosure of Being (“ET” 139). We shall now explore the ways in which art, as a poetic dis-closure, is a self-concealing site of essential truth.

Art as a Site of Truth

Unconcealment occurs only when it is achieved by work: the work of the word in poetry, the work of stone in temple and statue, the work of the word in thought, the work of the polis as the historical place in which all this is grounded and preserved. . . . “work” is to be taken here in the Greek sense of ergon. . . . (Heidegger 1959, 191)

Truth as accordance or the "correctness" of statements is derivative of the essence of truth. Thus, measuring the truth-value of art in terms of its poor accordance (homoioσis) with a pre-
given model, measuring art within the representative determination of truth, is also derivative. Truth is not an "abstract universality." The essence of truth reveals itself as the sited disclosedness that allows beings to come into the region of un-concealment; the essence of truth accompanies the founding of essential history and the ek-sistent questioning, essential to humanity, that is philosophy.

It is here that the discordance of truth (as model) and art (as poor copy) breaks down, when we think of art and truth in their essence. That is, rather than the "false" copy that presents a pale shadow of little resemblance to the original, art in its essence is a site for the founding project that is essential truth. But for this to be the case we must rethink that which constitutes the essence of the work of art: if the work of art is not to be referred to an external, pre-given model for its measure of truth, what is its standard, its end, its archē and telos? What is the origin of the work of art? Again Heidegger will provide the guiding thread through these questions. We will follow this guiding thread by looking closely at his essay "The Origin of the Work of Art."5

Origin means that from and by which something is what it is as it is. What something is, as it is, we call its essence, nature, or Being. The origin of something is the source of its nature. Perhaps we will jump to the assertion, if our bent is a broadly romantic one, that the source of the work of art in its essence is the artist. Or, perhaps, we see the work of art as a result of contextual relations beyond its usually determined frame of reference, or even that of the artist; the work of art is a reflection of socio-economic conditions; or, the work is a function of discursive and non-discursive forces. Before we jump to these obvious conclusions we should keep in mind that the work of art’s essence is to be held open; the work is not to be reduced to a function of representational schemata. We have said that the source of the work of art is not necessarily an external, pre-given standard. But certainly the work of art needs an artist, and certainly the artist
is somehow integral to the work. So the work needs an artist, but is the chain of "causality" finished here? What makes the artist an artist? Artists are artists inasmuch as they relate in some way to a third term: art. But where does "art" exist? What is art? Certainly art cannot exist apart from particular works of art. We only find art where we have found a work of art. The circle is now complete: work needs artist, artist needs art, and art needs work. We must inquire, then, into the work of art in terms of the totality of this circle.

What is the work of art, and what makes it a work of art, if none of the three elements in themselves is a singular cause? What is common to all works of art? All works of art are things. "The picture hangs on the wall like a rifle or a hat. . . . Works of art are shipped like coal from the Ruhr and logs from the Black Forest. During the First World War Hölderlin's hymns were packed in the soldier's knapsack together with cleaning gear. Beethoven's quartets lie in the storerooms of the publishing house like potatoes in a cellar" ("OWA" 19). All works of art have a particular "thingly" character. At first glance this does not seem to get at anything important or essential in the work. Certainly the work is a thing, we say, but it is also more; the work of art "says something other than the mere thing itself is, allo agoreuei" ("OWA" 19). But this allegorical or symbolic interpretation of the work itself presumes the work as thing or substance to which the "something more" is attached. But even the much-vaunted aesthetic experience cannot get around the thingly aspect of the art work. There is something stony in a work of architecture, wooden in a carving, colored in a painting, spoken in a linguistic work, sonorous in a musical composition" ("OWA" 19). What, then, is this thingly character?

1.1 Thing and Work

What is a thing as thing? One prevalent notion of the thing is that it is the union of an irreducible stuff and the manner in which that stuff is distributed; it is a union of matter (hule) and
form (*morphē*) (cf. "OWA" 26-7). Does this definition of the thing arrive at what, first of all, strikes us as "thingly": "its independent and self-contained character" ("OWA" 25)? (Let us call this its "phusis-quality"). Throughout the metaphysical tradition the form-matter (or form-content) distinction has proven a formidable concept; with it, "representation has at its command a conceptual machinery that nothing is capable of withstanding" ("OWA" 27). The form-matter distinction speaks most directly to the character of that type of thing that is also equipment. Equipment is what is made through the distribution or forming of matter in a particular way. The usefulness of the equipment determines the manner of the distribution of matter and the type of matter selected—that is, hard matter, perhaps a type of metal, distributed such that there is a sharp edge if we are to make an axe for the purpose of chopping fire-wood. Equipment is self-contained, rests in itself, as does the "mere" thing (the rock, the tree) and the work of art. All are things, are thingly. However, the equipment is not self-sufficient; it exists "in-order-to" perform a task. The art work seems closer to the mere thing in being self-sufficient. Yet, in being human-made, the work of art and the piece of equipment seem akin. The piece of equipment, in standing in some way between the mere thing and the work of art, may be able to tell us something about what is thingly in the thing and what is workly in the work.

We have said that the matter-form distinction has come, throughout the metaphysical tradition, to be treated as the truth of all entities. This inclination "receives a yet additional impulse from the fact that on the basis of a religious faith, namely, the biblical faith, the totality of all beings is represented in advance as something created, which here means made" ("OWA" 29). Within the Thomistic tradition, for instance, "the *ens creatum* is conceived as a unity of *materia and forma*" ("OWA" 29-30). This Christian distinction relies upon the uprooting of the original Greek distinction of *morphē*/*eidos-hule*. The medieval distinction survives into modern
thinking and becomes progressively removed from the essential thinking that first articulated it in Plato and Aristotle. No longer is the distinction a matter for the most thoughtful reflection; rather, in its self-evidence it is passed over. Because it is not the focus of essential thinking, because it is all too obvious, the matter-form distinction “turns out to be an assault upon the thing” (“OWA” 30).

Inasmuch as thing-concepts are handed down to us unquestioned within the unfolding of the tradition, and inasmuch as they guide our thinking about beings in general, they persist through human insistence, rather than ek-sistence. Thing-concepts preconceive “all immediate experience of beings. The preconception shackles reflection on the being of any given entity. Thus it comes about that prevailing thing-concepts obstruct the way toward the thingly character of the thing as well as toward the equipmental character of equipment, and all the more toward the workly character of the work” (“OWA” 31). Through the “destruction” of the concepts of the tradition, we achieve a stripping away of the layers of accepted ideas that have been handed down and encrusted upon the thing, obstructing its self-showing (as phainomenon, as phusis, as Being); this results in a “step-back” to the primordial thinking that discloses, and allows unconcealment, for the first time. In the destructive stripping away of the concepts that assault and obstruct the self-showing of the thing, the letting-be of beings which marks essential humanity is allowed to happen. “We ought to turn toward the being, think about it in regard to its being, but by means of this thinking at the same time let it rest upon itself in its very own being” (“OWA” 31).

We are having a difficult time describing the thing; we see that even the venerable form-matter distinction falls short. The thing does not offer itself readily to thought—much less conceptual reduction. Perhaps this stubborn resistance, Heidegger points out, this self-contained independence of the thing, is what belongs to it most properly (“OWA” 31-2). We have called this
its *phusis*-quality, and will see how this is what is "earthly" in a work.

We wish to find the "equipmental" character of equipment, in order to delineate the thingly character of the thing and the workly character of the work. But how do we get to this equipmental character? We must avoid the usual concepts in finding this character. So, we will turn to the phenomenon of equipment and describe it apart from any philosophical theory.

If we turn to a pair of peasant shoes, as visually realized by Van Gogh, do we get at the equipmental character of equipment? The equipment is in its usefulness. The peasant shoes are in their essence in their use: when being worn in the field, when the peasant woman forgets about them. "It is in this process of the use of equipment that we must actually encounter the character of equipment" ("OWA" 33).

It would seem, then, that the painting can tell us nothing about the equipmental being of equipment. In the painting the shoes stand there alone and empty. The work-context is not represented.

And yet--

From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the toilsome tread of the worker stares forth. In the stiffly rugged heaviness of the shoes there is the accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge through the far-spreading and ever-uniform furrows of the field swept by a raw wind. On the leather lie the dampness and richness of the soil. Under the soles slides the loneliness of the field-path as evening falls. In the shoes vibrates the silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripening grain and its unexplained self-refusal in the fallow desolation of the wintry field. This equipment is pervaded by uncomplaining anxiety as to the certainty of bread, the wordless joy of having once more withstood want, the trembling before the impending childhood and shivering at the surrounding menace of death. This equipment belongs to the *earth*, and it is protected in the *world* of the peasant woman. From out of this protected belonging the equipment itself rises to its resting-within-itself. ("OWA" 33-4)

For the peasant woman, equipment withdraws into usualness. In the work we see the equipmental character of equipment: "The repose of equipment resting within itself consists in its reliability"
("OWA" 35). In its reliability, equipment "is essentially 'something in-order-to . . .'") (Heidegger 1962a, § 15, 97). Equipment, in this "in-order-to . . ." structure, is "assigned" and "referred" to other things within the equipmental context. "Equipment--in accordance with its equipmentality--always is in terms of its belonging to other equipment: ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room" (1962a, 97). Heidegger, in Being and Time, illustrates this point by means of the famous example of the hammer. In using the hammer, the hammer arises in its equipmental character. The hammer arises as equipment needed "in-order-to . . ." hammer nails; it arises in this way only if it is serviceable, manipulable, or suited for operation. If the hammer is proper to the work at hand, then we encounter the hammer as it is "ready-to-hand." "The hammering itself uncovers the specific 'manipulability' of the hammer. The kind of Being which equipment possesses--in which it manifests itself in its own right--we call 'readiness-to-hand'" (98). The hammer, as ready-to-hand, withdraws into the work context. If it does not withdraw, if it becomes an object of our conscious, theoretical gaze rather than our practical "circumspection"--because it is broken, or it is not suited for the job--then it is no longer encountered as a serviceable piece of equipment. "The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically. That with which our everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves. On the contrary, that with which we concern ourselves primarily is the work--that which is to be produced at the time; and this is accordingly ready-to-hand too" (99). In discussing equipment here, have we not discovered something about the workly character of the work? The truth of the equipment, or more particularly shoes, withdraws into its context of references. The shoes, or a hammer, only are, in their truth as equipment, inasmuch as they withdraw. The carpenter's hammer withdraws; its being as reliability does not arise; rather, it is obstructed by
the "in-order-to . . ." structure of the carpenter’s world: what arises is the need for the shelves he is making, "in-order-to . . ." store books in a more orderly fashion, "in-order-to . . .". However, in the work of art, outside of an equipmental context, the being arises for the first time. It is in Van Gogh’s painting that we see the truth of the shoes as equipment: reliability. The nature of the shoes in the painting is not a matter of mere "subjective" interpretation, nor is the shoes’ relation to the peasant’s earth and world a "pathetic fallacy."

Rather, it is what shows itself in the shoes through the work. It is only in the work that the equipment "appears" as it is ("OWA" 36). Because, in the case of Van Gogh’s peasant shoes, the work of art sets forth the truth of equipment, Heidegger concludes that "[t]he nature of art . . . [is] the truth of beings setting itself to work" ("OWA" 36). Beings are brought to a stand in the work. This bringing to a stand, this setting into work, is technē.

The work of art does not constitute the setting itself to work of truth in some representational manner. "The work . . . is not the reproduction of some particular entity that happens to be present at any given time; it is, on the contrary, the reproduction of the thing’s general essence" ("OWA" 37). This general essence or presencing is not a pre-given Platonic idea to be copied; rather, the being "essences" or presences (Wesen) for the first time in the work.7 "The art work opens up in its own way the Being of beings. This opening up . . . happens in the work. In the art work, the truth of what is has set itself to work. Art is truth setting itself to work. What is truth itself, that it sometimes comes to pass as art? What is this setting-itself-to-work?" ("OWA" 39).

1.2 World and Earth

In what way is truth set into work in the work? In asking this question, we should keep in mind our discussion of the essence of truth; that is, truth as accordance is not what is set into the
work; rather, the primordial essence of truth, un-concealing, happens in the work. We said that truth is set to work in the work in the example of the Van Gogh painting inasmuch as the shoes show themselves as they are for the first time in the work. In order to answer this question of the nature of the truth set to work, let us turn to another example, one which "cannot be ranked as representational art" ("OWA" 41).

A building, a Greek temple, portrays nothing. It simply stands there in the middle of the rock-cleft valley. . . . The temple and its precinct, however, do not fade away into the indefinite. It is the temple-work that first fits together and at the same time gathers around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire the shape of destiny for human being. The all-governing expanse of this open relational context is the world of this historical people. ("OWA" 41-2)

What is the "world" of a historical people? And how does the work hold "open the Open of the world"? ("OWA" 45). First of all, a "world" is not an abstract space or environment; rather, it is a meaningful context of relations and significances, a historically sited context. For this reason, only a historical humanity has a world. The marsh and its environs are not, properly speaking, the "world" of the duck. "A stone is worldless. Plant and animal likewise have no world; but they belong to the covert throng of a surrounding into which they are linked. The peasant woman, on the other hand, has a world because she dwells in the overtness of beings, of the things that are. Her equipment, in its reliability, gives to this world a necessity and nearness of its own. By the opening up of a world, all things gain their lingering and hastening, their remoteness and nearness, their scope and limits" ("OWA" 45). 8

We see in the example of the temple, in its opening of a world of a historical people, that the work's self-subsistence is not the New Critical autonomy of the work as object. The work's standing in itself is not a standing apart from "history." Rather, only inasmuch as it arises within the open of a context of significances, the world of a historical people, is there the self-subsistence
of the work. When works of art are taken from their own proper sphere, the realm in which the work properly belongs, "the realm that is opened up by itself" ("OWA" 41), when works are amassed in a "collection," museum, or literary critical edition, then the work of art is withdrawn from its world--and uprooted from the earth. Works in the museum become objects standing before us, or, worse yet, dissolved into the relational systems of the art-market and art-semiotics. "Their standing before us is still indeed a consequence of, but no longer the same as, their former self-subsistence. This self-subsistence has fled from them. The whole art industry, even if carried to the extreme and exercised in every way for the sake of works themselves, extends only to the object-being of the works. But this does not constitute their work-being" ("OWA" 41).

The work emerges out of itself and rests in itself (is self-contained and subsisting) in its opening of a space, the space of its own arising, in its opening of an open region of relations and meanings; the work self-emerges in its world. The work creates its place and first defines and delineates what arises in this place. The work is the arising of the self-emerging within a world. Self-emerging and resting in itself is phusis. This self-emerging of all things is the ground of humanity's dwelling: "earth." "What this word says is not to be associated with the idea of a mass of matter deposited somewhere, or with the merely astronomical idea of a planet. Earth is that whence the arising brings back and shelters everything that arises without violation. In the things that arise, earth is present as the sheltering agent" ("OWA" 42).

The essence of being human, according to Heidegger in a later essay, is to dwell on the earth as a mortal ("BDT" 325). In dwelling, humanity sets the earth "free into its own essence" ("BDT" 328). That is, in humanity's building and dwelling on the earth, the earth is set forth for the first time. The building of a bridge, for instance--a building which, for the Greeks, is technē, a producing "in terms of letting appear" ("BDT" 337)--does not primarily occur as the traversing
of two pre-existing banks. Rather, the bridge first brings these banks into relation. "The bridge gathers the earth as landscape around the stream" ("BDT" 330).\textsuperscript{11} The bridge, in its gathering-setting forth, constitutes the "site" of humanity’s dwelling; it opens the region of this dwelling; or, in the language of the artwork essay, it sets up the world of a historical people. In opening a world and dwelling on the earth, a historical humanity brings forth the divine (the extra-ordinary or marvelous [damonion]) into the presence and limit of the ordinary. Heidegger’s analysis of a saying of Heraclitus is informative on this point (cf. "LH" 232-36):

The saying of Heraclitus (Frag. 119) goes: ἀθος ἀνθρώποι daimōn. This is usually translated, "A man’s character is his daemon." This translation thinks in a modern way, not a Greek one. Ἄθος means abode, dwelling place. The word names the open region in which man dwells. The open region of his abode allows what pertains to man’s essence, and what in thus arriving resides in nearness to him, to appear. The abode of man contains and preserves the advent of what belongs to man in his essence. According to Heraclitus’ phrase this is daimōn, the god. The fragment says: Man dwells, insofar as he is man, in the nearness of god. ("LH" 233).

The world of a historical people, as rooted in an earth, is the site of the strange belonging of the ordinary and the extra-ordinary, of mortals and divinities.

Earth is the sheltering archē of human existence: it arises out of itself, but it also rests back in itself. This is phusis. Phusis is poiēsis, as a bringing forth out of itself, in an exemplary sense.\textsuperscript{12} Thus, the work’s opening of a world and setting forth of earth is a bringing forth of that which arises and rests in itself; it is a making in the sense of “pro-duc-ing”: a leading out, a bringing and setting forth. "The work as work, in its presencing, is a setting forth, a making" ("OWA" 45). The "making" of equipment, on the one hand, uses up the matter of which it is fabricated such that the matter disappears into the usefulness of the equipment; on the other hand, the work sets forth its material for the first time by bringing it into the Open of the work’s world; in this way, "[t]he work lets the earth be an earth" ("OWA" 46). In the work, phusis, the thingly, is most radiant.
This self-emerging and self-concealing (*phasis*-quality) of earth arises only inasmuch as it is articulated, “sung-forth” by the poetic word, or otherwise brought into the naming power of the word. If we encounter a rock never touched by hands it is “mere matter,” an “igneous entity.” The rock only arises as rock when taken up and set forth by a certain naming. At that time it gains a certain meaning and “cultural weight” (Halliburton 37). In the work of art in particular, or in the building-dwelling site of a historical humanity more generally, the “rock comes to bear and rest and so first becomes rock; metals come to glitter and shimmer, colors to glow, tones to sing, the word to speak. All this comes forth as the work sets itself back into the massiveness and heaviness of stone, into the firmness and pliancy of wood, into the hardness and luster of metal, into the lighting and darkening of color, into the clang of tone, and into the naming power of the word” (“OWA” 46).

Earth, or *phasis* as what is set forth in the Open, is essentially self-secluding. Earth resists penetration or conceptual representation. Earth, like the thing, is what phenomenally arises and shows itself, as it is set forth, out of itself; that is, it arises out of itself inasmuch as it is not determined or measured by external standards or concepts. For this reason, it is the ever-self-contained and subsisting. If we, in a representational manner, posit the truth of the phenomena, of light for instance, in an essence—in this case the scientific equations and theories of wavelength—beyond the phenomena, then the phenomena withdraw; our perception of the brightness and shining of light can only arise, within this scientific determination, as the “artificial” effect of what is “actual”: the wavelength.

We have approached the workly character of the work in our discussion of world and earth: the work-being of the work is the unity of the setting up of a world and the setting forth of earth. This unity in the work is a unity of that which essentially differs. This difference does not
constitute a purely negative destructive conflict, nor does it constitute a pure opposition of totally unrelated, thus indifferent, parts. "In essential striving, rather, the opponents raise each other into the self-assertion of their natures" ("OWA" 49). The work sets up a world and sets forth the earth; in so doing, the work gathers and institutes this strife. This is the unity of the work itself: the gathering-striving of earth and world. That is, we do not say that the work's self-standing and repose in itself are a result of its clear external delimitation and differentiation; it is not a self-contained, bounded image of an idea, image of God, or autonomous object. We do not say that the book, for instance, is "in itself" in its external delimitation: from cover to cover, or first to last word. If that were the case, the source of the book's order would not be its resting in itself; rather, its order and limits would be derived from external relations. The book would be derived from the pre-existing. Certainly the work of art, the book for example, has limits, has a boundary; however, this boundary is not that of an external delimitation. In Greek, boundary is peras. The boundary, in the sense of peras, is not that wherein something stops and goes no further; rather, the boundary is that from which something defines itself and unfolds as what it essentially is. We might say, for instance, that it is within the proper limits of the hammer to drive in a nail. Here limit refers not to the external form of the hammer but to its essential nature. In this way, "the boundary is that from which something begins its essential unfolding" ("BDT" 332).\textsuperscript{15} Limit (peras), then, does not come from the outside; it is not a deficiency; rather, it is a differentiation, a separating of a being from a non-being.\textsuperscript{16} A being comes to stand and is by achieving a limit for itself, by "having-itself-in-the-end": "Coming to stand accordingly means: to achieve a limit for itself, to limit itself. Consequently a fundamental characteristic of the essent is to telos, which means not aim or purpose but end. Here 'end' is not meant in a negative sense, as though there were something about it that did not continue, that failed or ceased. End is ending in the sense of
fulfillment" (Heidegger 1959, 60). This is the way in which the Greeks understood *telos* and *entelecheia*: as a bounding and circumscribing limit which gave the essential definition to the thing (cf. "QCT" 8). And this placing itself in the limit, this coming to a stand and fulfilment, is how the Greeks understood form (*morphē*) (cf. Heidegger 1959, 60). It is for this reason that Aristotle, in his *Poetics*, claimed that the organic unity of tragedy, the order and limits of tragedy, are not to be found in its material or external limitations: its temporal duration or spatial extent. For Aristotle, the order and limits of the tragic work include its plot and its end (*telos*) in catharsis, in its engagement with the audience. So, too, according to Heidegger's argumentation, the unity and order of the work is in its own self-emerging and resting in itself, in its internal limits (*peras*); we have seen that this unity is the gathering-striving of world and earth.

1.3 Truth and Art

We said that the work is the happening of truth. We have also said that truth, in its essence as un-concealedness, is a primal conflict (*polemos*): "The nature of truth is, in itself, the primal conflict in which that open center is won within which what is, stands, and from which it sets itself back into itself. . . . World and earth are always intrinsically and essentially in conflict, belligerent by nature. Only as such do they enter into the conflict of clearing and concealing" ("OWA" 55). Thus, truth itself, the institution of the primal conflict, is at work in the work and not merely a true thing.

Truth happens in the work. Thus, the work is the bearer of this happening. We are again confronted with the self-sufficiency or thingly nature of the work—which we have as yet not defined. The work is what, to our thinking, is "worked," effected, or created. But what is the nature of the createdness that defines the work? "We think of creation as a bringing forth. But the making of equipment, too, is a bringing forth" ("OWA" 58). Thus, we will distinguish between
the bringing forth that is "creation" ("pro-duc-ing") and that which is a "making." What unites artistic creation and equipmental making would seem to reside in the Greek word used for both spheres of activity: technē. Both activities, as technē, require craftsmanship ("OWA" 59). However, technē, in its essence, does not denote craftsmanship or art for the Greeks. Rather, it is a "mode of knowing" ("OWA" 59). Both the artist and craftsman (as technirēs), in setting forth the work or the equipment, bring forth and place into appearance beings for the first time—in the midst of Being that arises out of its own accord, phusis ("OWA" 59).

Rather than craft, we must turn to the work, the fulfilment of the creative act (energeia), in order to see the nature of creation. In the work is the accomplishing of truth. Creation is this establishing of truth in the work; it is the "bringing forth of a being such as never was before and will never come to be again. The bringing forth places this being in the Open in such a way that what is to be brought forth first clears the openness of the Open into which it comes forth" ("OWA" 62). The rift (Riss) of the conflict of lighting-concealing and of world-earth is the gathering of "the opponents into the source of their unity by virtue of their common ground" ("OWA" 63). Truth is incorporated as a strife within a being brought forth in the Open. The strife or rift brought forth is figure, shape, Gestalt, or morphē. Createdness is "truth's being fixed in place in the figure" ("OWA" 64). Gestalt is the gathering and placing into appearance (morphē) that accomplishes itself as work (ergon). Equipmental making, in "using up" its material and dismissing itself in favour of the "in-order-to . . ." context beyond itself, is never an establishing or happening of truth. The createdness of the work, the "that it is" of creation, shows forth luminously in contrast to the withdrawal of the equipment into serviceability ("OWA" 65).

The work only is in the manner of a preserving-knowing relation to it. This knowing is the willing essential to human ek-sistence. The work is not a work when it is an object of aesthetic
enjoyment, only when it is a site of human exposing ek-sistence: when Dasein responds in a questioning way to that which shows itself and offers itself to thought in the work.

For this reason, it seems, we cannot properly ask the question of the thingly nature of the work--at least not without forcing the work to arise "as an object that is simply there" ("OWA" 69). But from the perspective of the work, the thingly nature of the work is earth. Thus, we see the thingly in the thing in its belonging to earth, its self-closure and emergence in a world. Just as we only see the equipmental character of equipment in the work, so too we only see the thingly character of the thing in the work.

Art is the origin of the work and artist (as creator and as preserver). Art is "the creative preserving of truth in the work. *Art then is the becoming and happening of truth*" ("OWA" 71). Truth is not the pre-existing that becomes manifest; it "happens only as the openness is projected, sketched out, that makes its advent in thrownness" ("OWA" 71). In this way, we can say that truth happens in the manner of being composed--as the poet composes poetry. All art is essentially poetry ("OWA" 72). Poetry is the lighting projection of truth (*poieisis*). Poetry, as linguistic art, is only one mode of this lighting projection. Thus, in saying all art is essentially poetry, we mean poetry in the broad sense. Yet, the linguistic work, the poem, occupies a place of priority within the arts. This is because language, in its essence, is not communication. Language is the essential articulation and bringing to appearance of things. "Where there is no language, as in the being of stone, plant, and animal, there is also no openness of what is, and consequently no openness either of that which is not and of the empty. Language, by naming beings for the first time, first brings beings to word and to appearance" ("OWA" 73). It is for this reason that Heidegger maintains that "language is the house of Being" ("LH" 213).

Language in its naming power is a projective saying, the release of a throw. 21 Thus,
language is essentially poetry. "The nature of art is poetry. The nature of poetry, in turn, is the founding of truth" ("OWA" 75). The founding of truth that happens in art, essential poetry, and the naming power of language exist as a going beyond things as they are in order to bestow new meanings and relations, in order that the founding is truly a founding. "What art founds can therefore never be compensated and made up for by what is already present and available. Founding is an overflow, an endowing, a bestowal" ("OWA" 75). This founding of truth is also a grounding in the earth of a historical people as disclosed in world. Finally, founding has the character of beginning, a beginning which, as archē and telos, has the beginning and end within itself. "A genuine beginning, as a leap, is always a head start, in which everything to come is already leaped over, even if as something disguised. The beginning already contains the end latent within itself" ("OWA" 76). The end is latent within the beginning much as, for Aristotle, beings out of phusis have their beginning and end within themselves; that is, the full grown oak is latent within the acorn.

When the mystery that is Being is responded to authentically, when the thinking of Being is achieved, in ek-sistent exposure, when the articulation of attuned understanding achieves itself in the thrown project, then the founding of truth occurs, the arising of the openness of beings in the Open occurs. This essential founding occurred primordially, for the West, with the thinking of the ancient Greeks. "Always when that which is as a whole demands, as what is, itself, a grounding in openness, art attains to its historical nature as foundation. This foundation happened in the West for the first time in Greece" ("OWA" 76). Western history since then has been the unfolding of this primordial founding--with twists in the fabric along the way.22 Art lets truth originate in the manner of a founding leap. "To originate something by a leap, to bring something into being from out of the source of its nature in a founding leap--this is what the word origin
(German *Ursprung*, literally, primal leap) means" ("OWA" 77-8). Art is by nature an origin: "a distinctive way in which truth comes into being, that is, becomes historical" ("OWA" 78).

In stating that art is the letting originate (founding) of truth, a question hauntingly enters the scene: can art be, for us today, an origin? Is Hegel correct in asserting that art in its highest vocation, as "the highest manner in which truth obtains existence for itself," is "something past" ("OWA" 80)?

We have discussed the essential relation of art and truth in order to define the parameters of our overriding question: must art arise for us merely as a representation? We ask this question with reference to Renaissance art, and specifically Elizabethan literature: can Elizabethan literature arise in any way other than that of the representational copy? We looked to the work of art and saw that, in its essence, it is the letting happen of truth. However, we are still confronted with the question of whether or not the conditions exist for art to be an origin today, or if they existed in the Renaissance. We may ask: can a Shakespearean play "work," in the sense of founding truth, the unconcealedness of beings, for a historical epoch? We are immediately aware that these questions of the nature of art will not hinge on a notion of aesthetic (sensuous) experience or objective artistic analysis. What is at stake, and what determines the answers to these questions, is the history of Being. In order to think through these questions, in order to think Being properly, and thus art, we must "step back" to the primordial Greek founding. From this discussion of the Greeks, we will be able to see the nature of art, as it arises today as well as in the Renaissance, as the unfolding of the possibilities opened up in this founding.

**The Word of Aristotle: Being as Phusis**

*Phusis* is *alētheia*, unconcealment, and therefore *kruptesthai philei* [loves to hide itself]. (Heidegger 1976, 269).
We have said that art is originally and essentially named *technē*. Rather than understand *technē* as craftsmanship or skill, we understand it to mean the knowing bringing forth of a being into appearance as it is. We said that this essential bringing forth of art is *poieis* (poetry) in the sense of the composing, the founding, and the letting originate of truth. We distinguished this conception of *poieis* from that which sees it as a derivational "making." The being that arises out of its own origin and order (*archē*), such as the work of art as so defined, has its Being in *phusis*. In order to "step back" to the essence of *phusis* and art as they were originally thought, in order, by means of a certain destruction, to peel away the conceptual layers that have become attached to and have covered over this original thinking, we will turn to Aristotle's *Physics*: "this first thoughtful and unified conceptualization of *phusis* is already the last echo of the original (and thus supreme) thoughtful *projection* of the Being of *phusis* as this is still preserved for us in the fragments of Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides" (Heidegger 1976, 224).

1.4 *Phusis* as *Archē* *Kinōseōs*

Aristotle begins Book II of the *Physics* in this way: "Of things that exist, some exist by nature [*phusis*], some from other causes. 'By nature' the animals and their parts exist, and the plants and the simple bodies (earth, fire, air, water)--for we say that these and the like exist 'by nature'" (192b 8-11). *Phusis* is the first element marked off in this distinction. It is understood as a "cause" [*aition*] of a certain region of beings.\(^{23}\) This determination will then be made, later in the text, in terms of *archē*: source, origin, and order. *Phusis* is the origin and order of "being-moved" (*kinōseōs*) and "being at rest," of those beings which have the origin of their being-moved within themselves and integral to themselves (in their self-emerging).

*Phusis* is the *archē* of moving beings that have the *archē* of being-moved in themselves. This is not to be understood in the modern sense of moving in abstract space; plants, too, can
move: "But something that continues to occupy the same place and so is not moved in the sense of change of place, can nonetheless be in the process of being-moved. For example, a plant that is rooted ‘in place’ grows (increases) or withers (decreases)—auxesis and phthisis. And conversely, something which moves insofar as it changes its place can still ‘rest’ by remaining as it was constituted. The running fox is at rest in that it keeps the same color" (Heidegger 1976, 229). What is at rest, too, is a moving being. Only what is essentially in motion can rest, we do not say that the stone rests: "Plants and animals are in the state of being-moved even when they stand still and rest. Rest is a kind of movement; only what can move can rest. It is absurd to speak of the number 3 as ‘resting.’ Because plants and animals are in movement regardless of whether they rest or move, for that reason they not only are in movement but have their Being as being-moved" (Heidegger 1976, 228). It is immediately evident that this description of the movement and repose belonging to the being arising out of physis also defines the nature of the work's standing in itself. For instance, pertaining to the resting in itself of the work, Heidegger says that, "[o]nly what is in motion can rest. The mode of rest varies with the kind of motion. In motion as the mere displacement of a body, rest is, to be sure, only the limiting case of motion. Where rest includes motion, there can exist a repose which is an inner concentration of motion, hence a highest state of agitation, assuming that the mode of motion requires such a rest. Now the repose of the work that rests in itself is of this sort" ("OWA" 48).

Physis is archē kineśeōs: the origin and ordering of movement and change (metabolē), emerging into presence, "such that each thing that changes has this ordering within itself" (Heidegger 1976, 230). Aristotle then finds an opposing category:

All the things mentioned present a feature in which they differ from things which are not constituted by nature. Each of them has within itself a principle of motion and of stationariness (in respect of place, or of growth and decrease, or by way of
alteration). On the other hand, a bed and a coat and anything else of that sort, *qua* receiving these designations—i.e. in so far as they are products of art—have no innate impulse to change. But in so far as they happen to be composed of stone or of earth or of a mixture of the two, they *do* have such an impulse, and just to that extent—which seems to indicate that *nature is a source or cause of being moved and of being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily*, in virtue of itself and not in virtue of a concomitant attribute. (*Physics* II.192b 12-23)

Aristotle opposes plants, animals, earth, and air to beds, robes, and houses. The former are growing things; the latter are "artifacts" (*poioûmena*). The latter are still subject to movement and change, and thus repose: the being-moved of production and the rest of "having-been-produced" (Heidegger 1976, 231). What distinguishes the two types of things is the *archê* which belongs to the being-moved in each case. The *archê* of artifacts is *technê*. *Technê* here, as with its relation to the work of art, does not mean craft, skill, or technique. "Rather, *technê* is a form of knowledge; it means know-how in, i.e., familiarity with, that which grounds every act of making and producing. It means knowing what the production of, e.g., a bedstead must come to, where it must achieve its end and be completed. In Greek, this ‘end’ is called *telos*" (Heidegger 1976, 231).

However, the bed, as made out of wood, is, to that degree, a "growing thing": "in so far as they happen to be composed of stone or of earth or of a mixture of the two, they *do* have such an impulse, and just to that extent" (*Physics* II.192b 19-21). The bed, in its nature as a usable thing, has no necessary relation to wood. "It could just as well be made out of stone or steel. Its woodenness is *sumbebêkos*, that is to say: in reference to what the bed ‘really’ and properly is, woodenness *appears only incidentally*. Insofar—*but only* insofar—as it is just wood, a bedstead certainly does have the *archê kinôseôs* in itself, for wood is what-has-grown of a growing thing" (Heidegger 1976, 233). The bed as equipment, we have said, uses up its material or thingly nature. The wood is used up and withdraws, just as the bed itself does as thing, into its
serviceability. In the work of art that is created out of wood, however, the wood is set forth. The wood arises as the self-contained and subsisting (earth-\textit{physis}) which rests in itself.

1.5 \textit{Physis} as \textit{Morphē}

\textit{Physis} is the \textit{archē} of self-emerging into unhiddenness and resting in itself, the \textit{archē} of moving-beings that have the \textit{archē} of their being-moved in themselves. This gives us a clear view of the \textit{Being} of moving beings. How should we think the \textit{Being} of \textit{physis} itself? \textit{Physis} is \textit{kinēsis}, and more. \textit{Physis} is also \textit{morphē}. \textit{Morphē} (form) will, once again, not be understood properly if we only think of it in terms of the matter-form distinction. We must understand \textit{morphē} in relation to \textit{eidos}: “the appearance of a thing and of a being in general, but appearance in the sense of the aspect, the ‘looks,’ the view, \textit{idea}, which it offers and only can offer because the being has been put forth into this appearance and, standing in it, becomes present of itself—in a word, \textit{is}” (Heidegger 1976, 249). The \textit{idea} is “the seen,” but not in the modern sense of that which is available for human seeing. Rather, the \textit{idea} denotes that which, as appearing, offers itself, offers a view. For Plato, individual beings were subordinated to their common (\textit{koinon}) aspect or view (\textit{idea}). As thus subordinated, individual beings took, for Plato, the status of non-beings (249). For Aristotle, on the other hand, beings are not non-beings; inasmuch as they are self-forming, they put themselves forth into appearance. “In other words, \textit{eidos} is genuinely understood as \textit{eidos} only when it appears within the horizon of the immediate statement about the being, \textit{eidos to kata ton logon}. The statement in each case immediately addresses a this and a that as \textit{this and that}, \textit{i.e.}, \textit{as} having such and such an appearance. The clue by which we can understand \textit{eidos} and so also \textit{morphē} is \textit{logos}” (Heidegger 1976, 250). \textit{Morphē}, as placing into appearance, is not “an ontic property of matter” but a mode of Being as \textit{ousia}, becoming-present. Also, as placing into appearance, \textit{morphē} is being-moved, \textit{kinēsis}.
We understand *morphē*, and since *morphē* is the Being of *phasis*, we also understand *phasis*, in terms of *logos*. Aristotle's thinking on this point is usually interpreted as meaning that form is posited on things based on mere "linguistic usage." For instance, we say that for Plato essences are "real," they have a "true" and separate existence; we then say that for Aristotle the forms or essences of things are only "nominal," or "merely" exist in terms of linguistic usage. Heidegger asserts, however, that this common interpretation misses the essential meaning of the Greek *logos* and *legein*.

But we need only recall the Greek definition of man's Being as *zoon logon echon* in order to find the direction our thinking must take if it is to grasp the Being of *logos*. We can—in fact, we must--translate *anthropos: zoon logon echon* as: "man is the living being to whom the word belongs." Instead of "word" we can even say "language," provided that we think the nature of language adequately and originally, viz., from the Being of *logos* correctly understood. The determination of the Being of man that became common through the "definition" *homo: animal rationale,* "man, the rational animal," does not mean that man "has" the "faculty of speech" as one property among others, but that the distinguishing characteristic of the Being of man is that he has, and holds himself in, *logos*. (Heidegger 1976, 251)

We should remind ourselves, at this point, that the existential structure of articulation (*Rede*) is, in a sense, *logos* (cf. Heidegger 1962a, § 34 and Richardson 66-70). *Dasein* exists as the articulation of attuned understanding. In other words, humanity dwells--and this always means essentially exists—through a certain setting forth of earth and setting up of world; this setting forth and setting up occur in the "articulation," the projective saying, that is language (*logos*). Thus, the poetic, naming power of language entails the essential gathering-instituting of the strife of earth and world--this strife is fixed in the *Gestalt-morphē* of the work. *Logos*, from *legein*, means "to gather," "to collect": *legein* means to bring together into a unity and to bring forth this unity as gathered, i.e., above all as becoming present; thus it means the same as to reveal what was formerly hidden, to let it be manifest in its becoming-present" (Heidegger 1976, 252).24 For this
reason, the assertion (apophansis) is essentially an un-concealing. Thus, Aristotle thinks here, in conceiving morphē in terms of logos, the essential relation of humanity to beings in their unconcealedness.

Morphē, understood in its essential connection to logos, has priority over hule. Morphē, according to Aristotle, is phusis to a greater degree: “The form [morphē as the placing into the appearance] is ‘nature’ [phusis] rather than the matter [the ‘order-able’ (hule)]; for a thing is more properly said to be what it is when it has attained to fulfilment [having-itself-in-the-end, entelecheia] than when it exists potentially” (Physics II.193b7-9). Why does Aristotle say that morphē is more fully phusis than hule? Aristotle’s reasoning turns on his conception of morphē as a mode of entelecheia (“having-itself-in-the-end”) and as a mode of ousia (becoming present). Something is to a greater degree “when it is in the mode of entelecheia” (having-itself-in-the-end) (Heidegger 1976, 255). Morphē fulfils the “end” of a thing more fully than that which is “order-able” [hule] to an end. Thus, morphē is, in some manner, a “having-itself-in-the-end,” entelecheia. Phusis is a mode of ousia, becoming-present. Morphē fulfils this becoming present more so than hule inasmuch as the former is entelecheia--entelecheia itself being a higher mode of ousia than matter as “appropriateness for.” Phusis is also archē kinēseōs, the origin and order of being-moved. Being-moved is the Being from which rest and movement are determined: “The movement of seeing and inspecting what is around one is truly the highest state of being-moved only in the stillness of (simple) seeing, gathered into itself. Such seeing is the telos, the end where the movement of seeing first gathers itself up and essentially is being-moved. (‘End’ is not the result of stopping the movement, but is the beginning of being-moved as the ingathering and storing up of movement.) Thus the being-moved of a movement consists above all in the fact that the movement of a moving being gathers itself into its end, telos, and as so gathered in the end, ‘has’
itself: *en telei echê, entelecheia*, having-itself-in-the-end" (Heidegger 1976, 256). From this we can say that the rest-repose of a thing standing in itself, for instance the work, is its returning to its own sheltering *archê* and its gathering itself in the end (*telos*).

The relation of the Being of *phasis* as *morphê-entelecheia* to the gathering itself in the figure (*Gestalt*, form) of the work is made even more explicit when, instead of *entelecheia* and *telos*, Aristotle refers to *energeia* and *ergon*: “Here, in place of *telos*, there stands *ergon*, the work in the sense of what is to be produced and what has been produced. In Greek thought *energeia*, means ‘standing in the work,’ where ‘work’ means that which stands fully in the ‘end.’ But in turn the ‘fully-ended or fulfilled’ [*das ‘Vollendete’*] does not mean [sic] ‘the concluded,’ any more than *telos* means ‘conclusion.’ Rather, in Greek thought *telos* and *ergon* are defined by *eidos*; they name the manner and mode in which something stands ‘finally and finitely’ [*‘endlich’*] in the appearance” (Heidegger 1976, 256). *Entelecheia* most fully manifests what *ousia* is. This is what is essentially thought when Aristotle says that *energeia* is prior to *dunamis*. By way of an Aristotelian example, we might say that the mature oak tree presents more clearly what it essentially means to be an oak tree than does the acorn. The former is the setting into work (*energeia*) of “oak-treeness”; the latter presents the possibility (*dunamis*) of this work. However, this distinction between *energeia* and *dunamis*, when translated into Latin as *actualitas* (actuality) over *potentia* (potentiality), loses its original force and meaning. When interpreted-translated by the Romans, the contrary, that potentiality is prior to actuality, seems more plausible: “Surely in order that something be ‘actual’ and be able to be ‘actual,’ it must first be possible” (Heidegger 1976, 258).

1.6 Distinguishing Kinds of Production: Making and Producing

To avoid understanding growing things as a type of artifact, as a “self-making” artifact,
Aristotle distinguishes between the modes of production (placing forth into appearance) involved with each. Making is one mode of production, "whereas 'growing' (the going back into itself and emerging out of itself), phusis, is another" (Heidegger 1976, 260). In the latter mode, producing (generating or deriving) is not making or fabrication; it is the allowing of something to become present, placing "something into the unhiddenness of the appearance." But there are other kinds of production which exist in the manner of a paradigmatico-representational "making." In this paradigmatic making, the appearance (eidos) of the made thing stands outside the production process. It guides, in the manner of a paradeigma, the know-how undertaking the making but does not constitute the archê of the coming forth into appearance of the made thing. Let us turn to the example of this making, the example of a table, provided by Heidegger:

Something that is generated (say, a table) can be derived from one appearance (that of "table") and placed forth into the same kind of appearance without the first appearance, from which the table is derived, itself performing the placing into the appearance. The first appearance or eidos "table" remains only a paradeigma, something which certainly shows up in the production but does nothing more than that and therefore requires something else which can place the order-able wood, appropriated for appearing as a table, into that appearance. In those cases where the appearance merely shows up, and in showing up only guides a know-how in its producing and plays an accompanying role rather than actually performing the production--there production is a making. (1976, 260-1)

Heidegger opposes this "making" to the "pro-duction," the self-placing into appearance, that manifests itself in morphê.

It is also possible that the appearance--without showing up as a paradeigma in the proper sense, namely in and for a technê--can directly present itself as that which takes over the placing [Stellen] into itself. The appearance places itself forth. Here we have the placing [Gestellung] of an appearance. And in thus placing itself forth it places itself into itself, that is, it itself produces something with the same appearance. This is morphê as phusis. And we can easily see that a zoon (an animal) does not "make" itself and its kind, because its appearance is not and never can be merely a criterion or paradigm according to which something is produced from a hyle. . . . In genesis as placing, production is entirely the becoming-present of the appearance itself without the importation of outside help--which is the case
with all "making." (Heidegger 1976, 261)

Does this negate all that we have said about the work of art? We had said that the work arises as a self-emerging and resting in itself: a self-concealing revealing. We said it is not solely and essentially the representation of a pre-existing model (paradigma) which is the origin and goal of artistic "making." Yet we cannot say that the work is a phusis-being, that it grows and produces itself as a tree or a flower does. If it is not a being in phusis, in the sense of growing things, is it an artifact? No, we have distinguished between thing, equipment (artifact), and work. According to Aristotle, what is not brought forth as self-produced (out of phusis) is a product of "making" as derived from an external paradigm. This determination of things would appear to relegate art to the realm of representation, which, in fact, it has for the ensuing history of metaphysics. Yet, what Aristotle also says, and what remains an unsaid possibility within the metaphysical tradition, is that phusis—rather than being merely a mode of ousia, a branch of beings—names ousia itself: the Being of beings as such and as a whole. As well as designating a particular sphere of beings (growing things), phusis also names Being as such as the arising into unconcealment of a being from itself as itself. In this way, phusis is alêtheia (Heidegger 1976, 268-9). Whatever is, in its arising in un-concealment (truth), must, in this sense, inasmuch as it is the showing of Being in and through itself, be a self-producing, self-concealing revealing. Things as they are, in their unconcealedness, are self-contained and subsisting; things as the self-shining of Being are the self-placing into appearance (morphê). All beings, then, in their own self-emerging appearance, have an internal, appropriate differentiation and delimitation (peras). Thus, the origin of the work is neither technê, as the archê of artifacts, nor phusis, as the archê of growing-moving things; rather, the origin and order of the work lies in phusis as Being and technê as the knowing-bringing forth (and violent bringing to a stand) of Being as phusis—and, we shall
see, as dikē.

In this distinction of phusis and technē as archē, Aristotle, following Plato, designates the work of art as an “imitation.” Yet, the other possibility of this Greek saying, not properly understood by the Greeks themselves, the unsaid possibility that resides concealed and forgotten in all metaphysical thinking, claims that Being itself is phusis, Being is kinēsis (the movement, happening, and setting to work of truth), that Being is morphē, the self-placing into appearance-form, that Being is Gestalt, that Being is the appropriate articulation of each thing within its own limits, order, form, or measure, and that beings in their Being are not externally limited, ordered, formed or measured.

The Word of Plato: Being as Dikē

[Dikē-dikaiosunē] is translated as "justice," but that misses the proper sense, inasmuch as justice is transposed straightaway into the moral or even the merely "legal" realm. But dikē is a metaphysical concept, not originally one of morality. It names Being with reference to the essentially appropriate articulation of all beings. (Heidegger 1979, 165-66)

Certainly in the writings of Plato the production of each thing accords with that kind of production we called “making.” The eidos, the primary appearance of the being, for instance a bed, shows forth in the production of the bed, but this production (as making) requires an outside agent to effect the bed’s appearance. It is for this reason that the true appearance of the being (eidos) stands in a seeming relation of discord with the artistic appearing of the being (phantasma). Yet, in Plato’s essential thinking, as with that of Aristotle, there is an unsaid possibility: where Being arises as the appropriate articulation of each thing within its own limits, order, form, or measure. Similarly, the work of art, in the unsaid and concealed essence of Plato’s thought, is the self-showing forth of Being in the figure-form (Gestalt). Plato gives this appropriate articulation (Being) the name dikē.
In *The Republic*, Plato attempts to think the essence of *dikē-dikaiosunē*. We translate these terms with the word "justice" and think no more about it. However, we must do away with all moral-legalistic concepts of justice—such as equality, everyone getting "a fair shake," and as the balancing of accounts—if we are to think the essence of *dikē* as originally spoken by Plato. After a preliminary discussion of *dikaiosunē* in the individual, Socrates tells Glaucon and Adeimantus that in order to see *dikaiosunē* more clearly they should look at it as it is in "larger letters"; that is, they should look to *dikaiosunē* as it exists in the *polis* (368e). Socrates' argumentative strategy here is not one of randomly choosing the *polis* over the individual as a primary topic of discussion, nor is Socrates displaying a "totalitarian" privileging of the concerns of the state over the "rights" of the individual—this is a strictly modern notion of the relation of individual and *polis*. Rather, Socrates is merely following what is the essential bent of Greek thinking: to see Being (*ousia* as becoming present) as most fully accomplished in the whole, to see Being as being-in-the-whole, as the fulfilment of what unfolds itself. We saw this nature of the Greek thinking of Being given the names *entelecheia* and *energeia* in Aristotle's work.

Socrates defines the nature of *dikaiosunē* as it exists in the *polis* as follows: "I believe justice is the requirement we laid down at the beginning as of universal application when we founded our state, or else some particular form of it. We laid down, if you remember, and have often repeated, that in our state one man was to do one job, the job he was naturally most suited for" (*The Republic* IV.433a). In this way, *dikē* means each person arising within the just limits of that which is proper to him or her. Those who are strong and brave have a natural tendency, out of themselves, to be, for instance, warriors. We say that their being warriors is proper (*dikē*): "Quantity and quality are therefore more easily produced when a man specializes appropriately on a single job for which he is naturally fitted, and neglects all others" (*The Republic* II.370c);
“justice is keeping what is properly one’s own and doing one’s own job” (IV.434a). It should not surprise us, then, that dikaiosunē arises in the individual inasmuch as the elements of the latter exist within their proper limits: “each of us will be just and perform his proper function only if each part of him is performing its proper function” (The Republic IV.441e). When the aspects of the individual each arise within their own just limits, their own internal limits (peras) inasmuch as this is an inclination from out of their own nature, then we see that what is dikē in individuals, as with the polis, is the natural order and harmony belonging to them: “The just man will not allow the three elements which make up his inward self to trespass on each other’s functions or interfere with each other, but, by keeping all three in tune, like the notes of a scale (high, middle, and low, and any others there be), will in the truest sense set his house to rights, attain self-mastery and order, and live on good terms with himself” (The Republic IV.443d). The dikaiosunē of each being is its arising within the order and harmony that is natural to, or arises from, itself. It is the being’s arising within its own just or proper limits. Dikē-dikaiosunē "names Being with reference to the essentially appropriate articulation of all beings" (Heidegger 1979, 166).

1.7 Art as Technē

We see here that dikē names Being, for Plato, much as phusis does for Aristotle. We said that for Plato beings (more properly non-beings) arise out of the process of "making." The primordial appearance, the true being, the eidos, shows itself in the making of the (non-) being. However, the eidos does not accomplish the placing into appearance of the (non-) being. The bringing forth into appearance requires an outside agent (architekton). We also said, in connection with Aristotle, that the archē of that which has the source of its being-moving, the source of its change or emerging into unhiddenness, outside itself is technē.27 This is the classic Platonic position pertaining to art (technē): technē is the occulting of the primary (true) appearing of the
being (*eidos*). In its “making,” the products of *technē* are to some degree, depending on the degree of the occulting, non-beings. This is the classic Platonic position because it guides all later thinking about art within the representational tradition: art is consigned to the realm of the flickering image (*horāos topos*), to the realm of non-being, of un-truth—where truth is correspondence and un-truth is falsity (*pseudos*) (cf. *The Republic* II.377d-e, 379a). We will see that even within Plato’s “classical,” representational denigration of art, in *The Republic*, there is an unsaid defense of art—this defense could be seen only more readily in Plato’s dialogues which are more explicitly sympathetic with regard to the status of art: *Ion*, *Phaedrus*, and *The Symposium*.

Plato addresses the notion of *technē* as an *archē* through his discussion of the relation of health to medical science or know-how (*technē*) as an analogy of the unfolding of *dikē* in *technē*.

> ‘Then has any form of professional skill [*technē*] any interest at which it aims over and above its own perfection?’
> ‘What do you mean by that?’
> ‘Suppose, for example,’ I replied, ‘that you were to ask me whether the body were self-sufficient, with no needs beyond itself, I should answer “It certainly has needs. That is the reason why medicine has been discovered, because the body has its defects and is not self-sufficient; medical skill was, in fact, developed to look after the interests of the body.” Would that be a correct answer, do you think?’
> ‘It would.’
> . . . . . . . . .
> ‘Medicine therefore looks to the interest not of medicine but of the body.’
> ‘Yes.’
> ‘And training to the interest of the horse and not its own. Nor does any form of skill seek its own interest (it needs nothing) but that of its subject matter.’
> ‘It looks like it.’
> ‘Yet surely,’ I said, ‘all forms of skill rule and control [*archousi . . . kai kratousin*] their subject-matter.’ (*The Republic* I.341d-342c).

Plato seems to be saying that medical know-how (*technē*) is the *archē*, in the sense of ruling and ordering, of the body; this is due to the fact that all forms of *technē* “rule and control their subject-
matter." In navigating, the sea-captain uses his know-how in the field of navigation in order to rule and look towards the good end of the subject-matter of his know-how: the ship. If the captain is also, or more pressingly, concerned with making money, then he uses financial know-how in order to rule and see to its good end the subject-matter of this know-how: his finances. In this way, technē would appear to be the archē of its subject-matter. Yet, we cannot say that technē is an archē for its subject-matter in the same way in which phusis or technē arise as an archē of a thing according to our discussion of Aristotle. That is to say, we cannot say that medical know-how (technē) constitutes the "making" of the body. We cannot say, similarly, that the know-how of cookery constitutes the "making" of the cooked vegetables that one eats--certainly, "mother-nature" had a hand in the production of the vegetables.

Thus, Plato must be saying something else about technē here. Technē, that which constitutes the activity of everyone from a craftsman to a doctor, from a political leader to an artist, is a knowing bringing forth into appearance. Technē, when it is an external archē--for example, as the archē of artifacts--brings about the "making" of the being in its coming into appearance. However, technē can also be merely the guiding of the self-placing into appearance of the being whose archē is in phusis as morphē. Perhaps an analogy with the question of health, as a phusis-like state, would be informative at this point. If health, like phusis, is the natural order, harmony, and proper limits of the body, then if the body suffers a minor cut, it heals itself out of itself: its health as its natural order (phusis) is the source (archē) of the cure, the source of its own health. Medical know-how (technē), in cleaning the wound, merely guides or facilitates the workings of the natural order (phusis/health) of the body. It is with this in mind that Aristotle raises the following example:

[A] man, entirely by himself, might become the [originating and ordering] source
[archē] of health for himself, and at the same time he could be a doctor. He has the medical know-how [technē] in himself, but not insofar as he regains his health. Rather in this case, being a doctor and regaining health happen to have come together in one and the same man. But for that very reason the two also remain separated from each other, each on its own. And the same holds for everything else that belongs among things made. That is to say, none of them has in itself the origin and ordering of its being made. Rather, some have their archē in another being and thus have it from the outside, as for example a house and anything else made by hand. (qtd. in Heidegger 1976, 234)

Thus, the body's health arises out of its own natural order. It is a loose linguistic usage that says that the doctor "cures" the patient. Heidegger expands Aristotle's example of the "self-curing" doctor into a discussion of the relation of medical technē to health-phusis in terms of modern medical practice which may seem to keep the body alive "unnaturally":

Say that two doctors suffer from the same disease under the same conditions and that each one treats himself. However, between the two cases of illness there lies a period of 500 years, during which the "progress" of modern medicine has taken place. The doctor of today has at his disposal a "better" technique and he regains his health, whereas the one who lived earlier dies of the disease. So the archē of the cure of today's doctor is precisely the technē. There is, however, something further to consider here. For one thing, the fact of not dying, in the sense of prolonging one's life, is not yet necessarily the recovery of health. The fact that men live longer today is no proof that they are healthier; one might even conclude to the contrary. . . . Technē can only co-operate with phusis, can more or less expedite the cure; but as technē it can never replace phusis and in its stead become itself the archē of health as such. That could only happen if life as such were to become a "technically" producible artifact. At that very moment, however, there would also no longer be such a thing as health [the natural order, harmony, and proper limits of the body], any more than there would be birth and death. Sometimes it seems as if modern man rushes headlong towards this goal of producing himself technologically. When he achieves this, man will have blown himself up, i.e., his Being as subjectivity, into the sky where the simply meaningless is valued as the one and only "meaning" and where preserving this value appears as the human "domination" of the globe. (1976, 235-36)

We have seen that, for Aristotle, technē cannot be the archē of a being, such as the body, in the same way that phusis can—out of the thing's own nature. We have seen that technē is the guiding of the health, or self-healing (self-emerging into appearance, phusis-Being), of the body
(being). At first glance, it appeared that Plato, in contradistinction to Aristotle, posited that medical-technē is the archē of the body, rather than health-phusis. This would correspond to, and would be supported by, the infamous Platonic denigration of the work of art as a product of paradigmatic making with its origin and order (archē) outside itself. However, if we attend more closely to Plato’s text, we will see that for him, as with Aristotle, technē is the “mid-wife" to phusis-dikē-Being; technē guides the self-emerging and placing into appearance that is Being. In this way, we will see that Plato holds out another possibility for art as technē: that it is a relation to Being, rather than the non-being of the representational image; the possibility also arises that the work of art has its archē in its own nature, in its self-placing into appearance (Being as phusis-morphē) in the figure (Gestalt). Rather than a non-being, then, the work, having Being as its archē, is the self-shining of Being in the work as form.

1.8 Health and the Body, Dikē and the Polis

In the preliminary discussion that constitutes Book I of The Republic, dikaiosunē, the unfolding of what is proper, is assumed to arise (in the manner of its unfolding) only inasmuch as it is brought forth by a certain know-how (technē).

‘Yes, but look here,’ I said, ‘suppose someone asked him "How then does medical skill [technē] get its name, Simonides? What does it supply that is due and appropriate and to whom?" How do you suppose he would reply?’

‘Obviously that it is the skill that supplies the body with remedies and with food and drink.’

‘And if he were asked the same question about cookery?’

‘That it is the skill that supplies the flavour to our food.’

‘Then what does the skill we call justice supply and to whom?’ (I.332c-d).

Dikē, that is, unfolds itself in technē; technē is the guiding of the self-appearing of dikē. That, for Plato, dikē shows itself in technē is most famously expressed in the analogy of the “ship of fools" as “ship of state” (cf. VI.488a-489a).
Because *technē* is thought of as the knowing-guiding of the self-presencing of *dikē* as Being, the philosopher, the one who knows the Good, is conceived of, by Plato, as an artist, and his knowing as a knowing-bringing forth (*technē*). For instance, the ideas brought forth in the philosophic dialogue are thought of as artistic sketches: "'I say, Glaucon,' I put in, 'you're putting the finishing touches to your two pictures as vigorously as if you were getting them ready for an exhibition'" (II.361d). Similarly, the discussion of the "ideal" *polis*, where *dikē* is to be found, begins with "an imaginary sketch of the origin of the state" (II.369c).29 The artist's sketching, of course, is a sketching of the whole, where each part arises within its limits and each is sketched in its proper hue:

We are therefore at the moment trying to construct what we think is a happy community by securing the happiness not of a select minority, but of the whole. . . . Now if we were painting a statue, and were met with the criticism that we were not using the most beautiful colours for the most beautiful parts of the body—for we had not coloured the eyes, the body's most precious feature, purple, but black—we could, I think, reasonably reply as follows: "It is absurd to expect us to represent the beauty of the eye in a way which does not make it look like an eye at all, and the same is true of the other parts of the body; you should look rather to see whether we have made the whole beautiful by giving each part its proper colour. (IV.420c-d)

Socrates' painting of the ideal *polis*, in its sketching-bringing forth of the whole in its own appearing, as with all works of art, does not refer to external existence; it need only refer to the appearance (*eidos*) that it itself brings forth: "If a painter, then, paints a picture of an ideally beautiful man, complete to the last detail, is he any the worse painter because he cannot show that such a man could really exist?" (V.472d).30

Along with the know-how (*technē*) of the philosopher-ruler in bringing forth the *dikē* of the *polis*, and along with the artist's *technē* in bringing forth the appearing of the *eidos*, Plato uses the example of medical know-how, as does Aristotle, in order to demonstrate that *technē* cannot
produce a cure for the body; rather, the body's natural order and harmony (physis-dike-health) is its own archê; it heals itself out of itself. Plato wishes to make this point in order to form a comparison, an analogical illustration, with the way in which the healthy (dike) polis has its origin and order (archê) arise out of its own natural order and proper limits. Conversely, the polis that is adikia is one in which, like the unhealthy body, indiscipline and disorder hold sway: "And the prevalence of indiscipline and disease in a community leads, does it not, to the opening of law courts and surgeries in large numbers" (III.405a). Indiscipline in individual, body, and polis means that their order and measure are sought externally; the body, unable to heal itself out of its own natural order, needs the surgeon to attempt a 'cure'; the criminal, unable to be just out of his or her own natural order (dikaiosune), needs the judge to attempt a "reform": "And when not only the lower classes and manual workers, but also those who have some pretensions to a liberal education, need skilled doctors and lawyers, that is a pretty conclusive proof that the education in a state is disgracefully bad. For is it not a strikingly disgraceful sign of a bad education if one has to seek justice at the hands of others as one's masters and judges because one lacks it in oneself?" (III.405a-b).

Socrates refers to the time of Asclepius as a time in which healing (technê) is the appropriate bringing forth of the natural order of the body, not the attempt to impose an external order. However, with modern methods of treating disease, the struggle against death is extended.

'It was not till the days of Herodicus, so they say, that doctors made use in their treatment of modern methods of cosseting disease. Herodicus was an athletic trainer, whose health failed, and he proceeded to make first and foremost himself, and then many others after him, miserable by a combination of medicine and physical training.'

'How did he do that?'

'By dying a lingering death. His whole attention was devoted to his disease which was mortal; he could not cure himself of it, but spent the rest of his life too busy to do anything but doctor himself and being made wretched by any departure
from his routine treatment. And his skill prolonged the struggle against death till he was an old man.’ (III.406a-b)

The treatment of Herodicus is monstrous in that it takes one out of his or her proper nature; rather than bringing forth and guiding the health (phusis-dikē-Being) of the body, Herodicus' technē is an external imposition. For instance, we may say that a relative who has had his or her "struggle against death" prolonged by a life-support machine, although still technically "alive," is no longer the same person—be it due to the non-responsiveness of the coma-condition or, if out of the coma, the seeming change in personality that accompanies the brain damage. The relative, it could be said, has been taken out of his or her proper limits and natural order. And it is in this respect that Heidegger says that "the fact of not dying, in the sense of prolonging one's life, is not yet necessarily the recovery of health. The fact that men live longer today is no proof that they are healthier; one might even conclude to the contrary" (1976, 235). Living longer is not necessarily the recovery of health which, as the self-emerging out of itself that is the phusis-dikē-Being of the body, cannot be provided for externally by the life-support machine. For Socrates and Plato, the proper order of the individual, the phusis-dikē-Being of the individual, is his or her proper role or job within the polis. One's job, here, is one's function (ergon) or end (telos). One realizes one's ultimate potential or essence in one's function within the whole.

'If a carpenter is ill,' I replied, 'and goes to a doctor, he expects to be given an emetic and be cured, or to get rid of the trouble by purge or cautery or operation. If he is ordered to undergo a long cure, wrapping his head up and all that sort of thing, he will probably say that he's no time to be ill and that a life in which one must give all one's attention to one's ailments and none to one's proper job simply is not worth living. Then he will dismiss the doctor who has given the advice, go back to his normal routine, and either regain health and get on with his job, or, if his constitution won't stand it, die and be rid of his troubles.'

'That's the right way for that sort of man to treat medical advice,' he agreed.

'The reason being,' I said, 'that he has a job to do, and if he does not do it, life is not worth while.'
'Yes, clearly.' (III.406d-e)

In contradistinction to Herodicus’ treatment, Socrates presents Asclepius as an example of a case in which technē is a responding to and a guiding-bringing forth of the natural order and proper limits of the body. In this way, in bringing forth the proper order and just limits (phusis-dikē-Being) of the thing, Asclepius is a great statesman.

'Let us say, then, that Asclepius too knew all this, and therefore introduced medical treatment for those who have a good constitution and lead a healthy life. If they get some specific disease, he gets rid of it by drugs or surgery, but tells them to go on leading their normal life so as not to make them less useful to the community. But he makes no attempt to cure those whose constitution is basically diseased by treating them with a series of evacuations and doses which can only lead to an unhappy prolongation of life, and the production of children as unhealthy as themselves. No, he thought that no treatment should be given to the man who cannot survive the routine of his ordinary job, and who is therefore of no use either to himself or society.'

'You talk as if Asclepius was a real statesman!'

'Of course he was . . . .' (III.407c-e)

Just as the body that is within its proper order and limits has the source of its health arise out of itself, so too the polis has its dikaiosunē out of its own natural order and just limits (phusis-dikē-Being).

In the body-polis that heals itself out of itself, that which is diseased or incurably corrupt is excised for the good of the whole: "This then is the kind of medical and judicial provision for which you will legislate in your state. It will provide treatment for those of your citizens whose physical and psychological constitution is good; as for the others, it will leave the unhealthy to die, and those whose psychological constitution is incurably corrupt it will put to death" (III.409e-410a).

In all of these cases, that of the unfolding of dikē in technē, of the philosopher’s artistic sketching of the eidos, and of the medical know-how that is the guiding of the health of the body, technē is understood as the knowing-bringing forth of phusis-dikē-Being in a being. In this way,
the true artist, with *technē* as this bringing forth, *occasions* the appearance of the truth of the thing, rather than the distorted representation of the truth of the thing:

‘The graphic arts are full of the same qualities and so are the related crafts, weaving and embroidery, architecture and the manufacture of furniture of all kinds; and the same is true of living things, animals and plants. For in all of them we find beauty and ugliness. And ugliness of form and bad rhythm and disharmony are akin to poor quality expression and character, and their opposites are akin to and represent good character and discipline. . . . We must look for artists and craftsmen capable of perceiving the real nature of what is beautiful, and then our young men, living as it were in a healthy climate, will benefit because all the works of art they see and hear influence them for good, like the breezes from some healthy country, insensibly leading them from earliest childhood into close sympathy and conformity with beauty and reason.’ (III.401a-d)

We have seen that art, in its essence as determined in the primordial Greek founding, is not necessarily the externally determined derivation of a pre-existing appearance, that it is not necessarily a copy of poor accordance (*homoioïsēs*) to the original. This involved a rethinking of the essence of truth, of art, and of Being as it is thought and named in the work of Aristotle and Plato. We are now prepared to explore the ways in which the unsaid possibilities for art and truth delineated here arise in three great works of Elizabethan literature.
Notes to Chapter 1

1. Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth" 1977b, 117-41; hereafter cited as "ET." For a similar treatment of the distinction between truth as accordance and the essence of truth as alētheia, see Heidegger 1962a, § 44.

2. Heidegger’s neologism, "ek-sistence," is used to distinguish the standing apart from beings and exposure to Being that marks human "ek-sistence" from the notion of "existence" (existentialia) as a mere being actual, present, or real. In "What is Metaphysics," Heidegger refers to this "ek-sistent" character of Dasein as "transcendence." Da-sein is "being held out into the nothing," the nothing integral to the presencing of Being. "Holding itself out into the nothing, Dasein is in each case already beyond beings as a whole. This being beyond beings we call ‘transcendence.’" (See Heidegger, "What is Metaphysics," in 1977b, 95-112; hereafter cited as "WM." Above quotations from "WM" 105). In Being and Time, the "ek-sistence" of Dasein is related to the "ecstatic" (Greek, ekstasis) nature of existential temporality: the way Dasein "stands out" in its temporal unfolding; Dasein is not a present thing but an interpretive construction of the three dimensions of time; Dasein is constantly "thrown" in terms of its past and constantly "projecting" future possibilities. Dasein, in this way, is "ek-sistent"; it "stands out" beyond beings as they are and into the truth of Being. "Ek-sistence," as this transcendence of beings, is thereby distinguished from "existence" as simple actuality or "presence-to-hand": "Ek-sistence, thought in terms of ecstasy, does not coincide with existentia in either form or content. In terms of content ek-sistence means standing out into the truth of Being. Existentia (existence) means in contrast actualitas, actuality as opposed to mere possibility as Idea. Ek-sistence identifies the determination of what man is in the destiny of truth. Existentia is the name for the realization of something that is as it appears in its Idea. The sentence 'Man ek-sists' is not an answer to the question concerning man's 'essence' ("LH" 206-7). Humanity is always prey to the danger of not "ek-sisting"; humanity is always also ensnared in beings as they are. "Forgetting the truth of Being in favor of the pressing throng of beings unthought in their essence is what ensnarement [Verfallen] [or, "fall"] means in Being and Time" ("LH" 212). On Dasein's "fall" into beings, see Heidegger 1962a, §§ 25-27, 38, and 68C. This fallen character of Dasein, we shall see, is connected with the essential "errancy," "insistence," "inauthenticity," and forfeiting of the site (apolis) of humanity; see Chapter 1, note 4 and the "Conclusion."

3. Heidegger develops an interpretation of the essence of humanity as "un-homely" (Unheimlichkeit) in relation to an interpretation of the second choral ode of Sophocles’ Antigone (lines 332-75), wherein humanity is defined as to deinotaton (the most uncanny). For this interpretation of the choral ode, see Heidegger 1959, 146-65 and 1996, 51-122. We shall have the opportunity to return to the question of to deinon, the strange, the uncanny, in more depth in the "Conclusion."

4. This erring of Dasein, this forgetting of the mystery of Being and insistence on beings as they are, can be related to the description of the "falling" (Verfallen) of Dasein in Being and Time. In its average everydayness, Dasein passes over Being in its presencing in each being; Dasein encounters beings in their non-surprising, non-unique mode as units in a "system of one's life." "Idle talk [Gerade, or the already-said], curiosity and ambiguity characterize the way in which, in an everyday manner, Dasein is its ‘there’—the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world. . . . In these, . . . there is revealed a basic kind of Being which belongs to everydayness; we call this the
"falling" of Dasein" (Heidegger 1962a, § 38, p 219). In falling, as in errancy, a forgetting of one’s essential and authentic possibilities occurs. Thus, falling and errancy manifest themselves as "the nonawareness of what it means to be" (Gelven 1989, 106).


6. On art as not essentially a symbol or allegory, see Heidegger 1996, 18-20.

7. Wesen, as a noun, means "essence"; as a verb, it means "to presence."

8. On "world" as a context of significances and relations (as an ontic category) and as an ontological structure of Dasein (as an "existential"), see Heidegger 1962a, § 14-18. On "world" as not an abstract space—that is, not as something chartable through Cartesian spatial coordinates; thus, things are "near" and "far" in a world not inasmuch as they are objectively positioned in relation to our bodies but inasmuch as they relate to our concernful dealings—see 1962a § 22-24. On the dwelling place, a world as rooted in the earth, as distinct from space as mere extension, see "Building Dwelling Thinking" 332-35—in 1977b, 323-39; hereafter cited as "BDT." On world in Being and Time, see Richardson 52-58 and Kockelmans 111-29. On world in relation to earth, see Halliburton 36-38 and 28: "world in the case of the peasant woman would include all the work she performs but also her rest, since rest is rest from work. It would also include any other involvement in her surroundings or ‘environment,’ such as the gathering of the family at the morning meal before going into the fields or in the evening after coming back, or in church on the Sabbath, when all pray together for a bountiful harvest" (28). On "world" as peculiar to humanity, see "Letter on Humanism": "Because plants and animals are lodged in their respective environments but are never placed freely in the lighting of Being which alone is ‘world,’ they lack language" ("LH" 206). See, too, Heidegger 1995, §§ 49-76. Humanity is essentially world- forming (1995, § 68, 285), and "[w]orld’ is the lighting of Being into which man stands out on the basis of his thrown essence" ("LH" 229).

9. Heidegger’s description of the place of the temple provides a lucid illustration of this point: Standing there, the building rests on the rocky ground. This resting of the work draws up out of the rock the mystery of that rock’s clumsy yet spontaneous support. Standing there, the building holds its ground against the storm raging above it and so first makes the storm itself manifest in its violence. The luster and gleam of the stone, though itself apparently glowing only by the grace of the sun, yet first brings to light the light of the day, the breadth of the sky, the darkness of the night. The temple’s firm towering makes visible the invisible space of air. The steadfastness of the work contrasts with the surge of the surf, and its own repose brings out the raging of the sea. Tree and grass, eagle and bull, snake and cricket first enter into their distinctive shapes and thus come to appear as what they are. ("OWA" 42)

10. Richardson points to a correlation between world-earth and the projection-thrownness of Dasein: "this project is always thrown among beings which captivate it and which constitute the matter-of-fact situation in which There-being [Dasein] finds itself. The project implies positivity, the constriction negativity. Now we find a clear analogy to this correlation of positivity and
negativity in There-being when in terms of a work of art the author speaks of the correlation between World and earth" (406). Humanity is essentially its possibilities, the meanings it can create for itself, its projects. However, humanity is also essentially a "thrown-project." It "finds itself" in the world already. This finding of oneself entails the restrictions on the possibilities of the project. Possibilities or projects are revealed in the existential structure of Dasein’s understanding [Verstehen]. The restrictions or thrownness are revealed in the existential structure of Dasein’s disposition or attunement [Befindlichkeit]. These two existential structures exist along with, and only with, the third existential structure: articulation or logos [Rede]. In this way, as Bernhard Radloff has pointed out in an unpublished lecture, Dasein is the "articulation of attuned understanding." On Dasein as an articulation of attunement and understanding, see, also, Pöggeler 41. As we shall see, this corresponds to the manner in which earth and world only arise insofar as they are articulated or "sung forth"—we could also say, depending on the circumstance, that they are set forth and set up, "pro-duced," brought forth, or allowed to appear.

11. As a "gathering," and according to the etymology of the word "gathering," the bridge is called a "thing" ("BDT" 331). On the "thing" as "gathering," see also Heidegger’s essay “The Thing” in 1971a, 165-86; hereafter cited as "Th."

12. On phusis as poiēsis, see Heidegger’s essay “The Question Concerning Technology": Not only handcraft manufacture, not only artistic and poetical bringing into appearance and concrete imagery, is a bringing-forth, poiēsis. Physis also, the arising of something from out of itself, is a bringing-forth, poiēsis. Physis is indeed poiēsis in the highest sense. For what presences by means of physis has the bursting open belonging to bringing-forth, e.g., the bursting of a blossom into bloom, in itself (en heautōn). In contrast, what is brought forth by the artisan or the artist, e.g., the silver chalice, has the bursting open belonging to bringing-forth not in itself, but in another (en allōn), in the craftsman or artist. ("QCT" 10-11)

13. Halliburton’s description of this point is worth noting: "The point is that, before being named, rock is not rock; it is merely something about which there is nothing to say. But in setting up a rock, and in doing this, furthermore, through the setting-up of a work or art, we are no longer dealing with a nameless entity but with a named thing: ‘rock’" (37).

14. As Heidegger points out, Color shines and wants only to shine. When we analyze it in rational terms by measuring its wavelengths, it is gone. It shows itself only when it remains undisclosed and unexplained. Earth thus shatters every attempt to penetrate into it. It causes every merely calculating importunity upon it to turn into a destruction. . . . The earth appears openly cleared as itself only when it is perceived and preserved as that which is by nature undisclosable, that which shrinks from every disclosure and constantly keeps itself closed up. . . . The earth is essentially self-secluding. To set forth the earth means to bring it into the Open as the self-secluding. ("OWA" 47)

15. On peras, see also Heidegger 1976, 245 and "OWA" 83.
16. On this point, see Heidegger 1959, 60: "This limit is not something that comes to the essent from outside. Still less is it a deficiency in the sense of a harmful restriction. No, the hold that governs itself from out of the limit, the having-itself, wherein the enduring holds itself, is the being of the essent; it is what first makes the essent into an essent as differentiated from a nonessent."

17. The function or end of poetry is to arouse emotions and thereby produce the catharsis of them; see Poetics 1449b27, 1460b25, 1462a11-13, 1462a18-b3, and 1462b12-15. Poetry does not disclose emotions that necessarily accord with the pre-existing emotions of the writer or of a character. The emotions (pathē, attunements) disclosed are, rather, possible emotions (cf. Corngold 103). Sidney, we shall see, similarly praises poetry for its ability to disclose and articulate emotions which need not literally have manifested themselves to the writer or reader. Finally, this is also what marks poetic discourse as distinctive for Heidegger. Poetry has a certain priority, for Heidegger, as a site of the disclosure of Being. What poetry discloses is an attunement: "In ‘poetical’ discourse, the communication of the existential possibilities of one’s state-of-mind [Befindlichkeit, attunement] can become an aim in itself, and this amounts to a disclosing of existence" (1962a, § 34, 205) (cf. Corngold 101 and Halliburton 11). Because poetry discloses an attunement, as a way of Being, it is a founding of truth in a particular way. Before quoting and describing a section of Rilke’s novel The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge, Heidegger makes this statement: "Poetry, creative literature, is nothing but the elementary emergence into words, the becoming-uncovered, of existence as being-in-the-world. For the others who before it were blind, the world first becomes visible by what is thus spoken" (1988, 171-72).

18. Heidegger describes this "mode of knowing" in the following way:

To know means to have seen, in the widest sense of seeing, which means to apprehend what is present, as such. For Greek thought the nature of knowing consists in alētheia, that is, in the uncovering of beings. It supports and guides all comportment toward beings. Technē, as knowledge experienced in the Greek manner, is a bringing forth of beings in that it brings forth present beings as such beings out of concealedness and specifically into the unconcealedness of their appearance; technē never signifies the action of making. ("OWA" 59)

19. Again we must remind ourselves of the non-representational nature of the truth so established. Truth is un-truth, not as falsity, but as the double refusal or concealment proper to truth as unconcealment. Truth is the self-establishing of openness in the Open as the sphere of the primal conflict of clearing and concealing. "[I]f the nature of the unconcealedness of beings belongs in any way to Being itself (cf. Being and Time, §44), then Being, by way of its own nature, lets the place of openness (the lighting-clearing of the There) happen, and introduces it as a place of the sort in which each being emerges or arises in its own way" ("OWA" 61). This happening of the openness of beings (essential truth) is historically sited.

One essential way in which truth establishes itself in the beings it has opened up is truth setting itself into work. Another way in which truth occurs is the act that founds a political state. Still another way in which truth comes to shine forth is the nearness of that which is not simply a being, but the being that is most of all. Still another way in which truth grounds itself is the essential sacrifice. Still another way in which truth becomes is the thinker’s questioning, which, as the thinking of
Being, names Being in its question-worthiness. By contrast, science is not an original happening of truth, but always the cultivation of a domain of truth already opened. ("OWA" 61-2)

20. Heidegger elucidates the relation of the preserving-knowing of the work of art to human existence in the following manner:
   The willing here referred to, which neither merely applies knowledge nor decides beforehand, is thought of in terms of the basic experience of thinking in Being and Time. . . . The resoluteness [Entschlossenheit = (literally) unclosedness] intended in Being and Time is not the deliberate action of a subject, but the opening up of human being, out of its captivity in that which is, to the openness of Being. . . . Willing is the sober resolution of that existential self-transcendence which exposes itself to the openness of beings as it is set into work. ("OWA" 67).

21. This quality of language, as projective saying, makes it poetry:
   Projective saying is poetry: the saying of world and earth, the saying of the arena of their conflict and thus of the place of all nearness and remoteness of the gods. Poetry is the saying of the unconcealedness of what is. Actual language at any given moment is the happening of this saying, in which a people's world historically arises for it and the earth is preserved as that which remains closed. Projective saying is saying which, in preparing the sayable, simultaneously brings the unsayable as such into a world. ("OWA" 74)

22. At this point in the essay, Heidegger gives a brief sketch of this unfolding of the history of Being in the West since the Greek founding—this is an unfolding which we shall have the opportunity to discuss in more detail later: "What was in the future to be called Being was set into work, setting the standard. The realm of beings thus opened up was then transformed into a being in the sense of God's creation. This happened in the Middle Ages. This kind of being was again transformed at the beginning and in the course of the modern age. Beings became objects that could be controlled and seen through by calculation. At each time a new and essential world arose" ("OWA" 77).

23. On this notion of "cause," as responsibility "for the fact that a being is that which it is," as distinguished from our notion of "causality," see Heidegger 1976, 227 and "QCT" 6-12.

24. Heidegger further describes this point: "And only because man is insofar as he relates to beings as beings, unconcealing and concealing them, can he and must he have the "word," i.e., speak of the Being of beings. But the words that language uses are only fragments which have precipitated out of the word, and from them man can never find his way to beings or find the path back to them, unless it be on the basis of legein. Of itself legein has nothing to do with speech and language" (Heidegger 1976, 252-3). On legein as "to gather," or "to collect," and as tied to phusis, see Heidegger 1959, 123-35 and 164-96.

25. Heidegger also refers to Aristotle's Metaphysics as a formulation of this thinking of Being as phusis, as a certain self-forming essence: "Now since we are seeking the first principles and the highest causes, clearly there must be some thing to which these belong in virtue of its own nature. If then those who sought the elements of existing things were seeking these same principles, it is
necessary that the elements must be elements of being not by accident but just because it is being. Therefore it is of being as being that we also must grasp the first causes" (Metaphysics IV.1, 1003a26-32). Heidegger also refers to the distinction between physis as a realm of beings and phusis as Being, as the "self-forming prevailing of beings as a whole," in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude (1995, § 8, 25-33). On Being as phusis, see, also, Heidegger 1959, 13-16, 61-63, and 14: "Physis as emergence can be observed everywhere, e.g. in celestial phenomena (the rising of the sun), in the rolling of the sea, in the growth of plants, in the coming forth of man and animal from the womb. But physis, the realm of that which arises, is not synonymous with these phenomena, which today we regard as part of 'nature.' This opening up and inward-jutting-beyond-itself... must not be taken as a process among other processes that we observe in the realm of the essent [being]. Physis is being itself, by virtue of which essents become and remain observable." On Being as phusis, as connected with appearing (phainesthai), see 1959, 100-102: "We know that being disclosed itself to the Greeks as physis. The realm of emerging and abiding is intrinsically at the same time a shining appearing.... The radicals phy and pha name the same thing. Phyein, self-sufficient emergence, is phainesthai, to flare up, to show itself, to appear" (100-101). On the relation of Being as phusis to becoming, as a coming-into-presence and a going-out of it, see 1959, 114-15. On phusis as tied to logos, see 1959, 123-35, and 164-96. On phusis as archē kinēseōs, see Heidegger's essay "Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics" 1977b, 247-82--hereafter cited as "MSMM"—especially 259-60.

26. This notion of being-in-the-whole is prevalent throughout Plato's assertions that the good of the polis is the good of the whole (the common-wealth). More particularly, it can be seen in his assertion of the need for a common interest, especially among the Guardian class, that makes the members akin to a body:

What is more, such a state most nearly resembles an individual. For example, when one of us hurts his finger, the whole partnership of body and soul, constituting a single organism under a ruling principle, perceives it and is aware as a whole of the pain suffered by the part, and so we say that the man in question has a pain in his finger. And the same holds good of any other part in which a man suffers pain or enjoys pleasure. (The Republic V.462c-d)

Similarly, we should note that in defining the philosopher, the one who loves knowledge or wisdom and whose ultimate object of knowledge is the Good, Socrates asserts that loving entails loving the whole of the thing: "Well, I hardly need to remind you," said I, 'that if a man can be properly said to love something, it must be clear that he feels affection for it as a whole, and does not love part of it to the exclusion of the rest'" (The Republic V.474c).

27. We should point out that Plato also distinguishes between internal and external sources of being-moved: "Well, if anything does change its proper form, must not the change be due either to itself or to something else?" (The Republic II.380d).

28. Heidegger points out some of the intricacies of this analogy:

What could be more obvious than the opinion that phusis is therefore a kind of self-making, hence a technē, the only difference being that the end of this making has the character of phusis? And we do know of such a technē. Iatrike, the art of medicine, has its telos as hugieia, a phusis-like condition. Iatrike is hodos eis phusin. But just when the road seems open to an analogy between phusis and iatrike, the basic
difference between the two ways of generating a *phusei on* comes to light. *Iatrike*, as *hodos eis phusin* is a being-on-the-way toward something that precisely is no *iatrike*, not the art of medicine itself, i.e., not a *technē*. *Iatrike* would have to be *hodos eis iatriken* in order to be at all analogous to *phusis*. But if it were, it would no longer be *iatrike*, because practiseing medicine has as its end the state of health and that alone, Even if a doctor practises medicine in order to attain a higher degree of the *technē*, he does so only that he might all the more reach the *telos* of restoring health—provided, of course that he is a real doctor and not some shrewd "businessman." (1976, 262)

29. For another example of the depiction of the ideal state as a work of art, see *Timaeus*:

*Socrates:* I should like, before proceeding further, to tell you how I feel about the state which we have described. I might compare myself to a person who, on beholding beautiful animals either created by the painter's art, or, better still, alive but at rest, is seized with a desire of seeing them in motion or engaged in some struggle or conflict to which their forms appear suited. . . . (19b)

30. We see, too, that Plato's conception of the artistic sketch, as what brings forth the appearance of the thing, is not one of simple one to one representation of that which pre-exists inasmuch as Socrates' analogical illustrations are fantastic constructions: "But you listen to my illustration, and see just how greedy I am for comparisons. For there's really no single thing one can use to illustrate the plight of the better type of philosopher in contemporary society; one must draw on several sources for one's illustrations in defence of him, like a painter combining two or more animals into a goat-stag or similar monster" (VI.488a).

31. For another parallel between justice and medicine, see *Gorgias* 464b-c.

32. Interestingly, at the beginning of the *Phaedrus*, Socrates refers again, this time with a certain irony, to the medical suggestions of Herodicus: "I'm so eager to hear about it [Lysias' speech] that I vow I won't leave you even if you extend your walk as far as Megara, up to the walls and back again as recommended by Herodicus" (227d).

33. The healthy body and just *polis* are so in their natural order and proper functioning. The unhealthy body, out of its proper order, is not able to function as it should; the attempt to prolong the life of this body means an unhealthy concentration on "remedies" which still do not allow the individual to lead his or her proper life. Similarly, the unhealthy (*adikia*) *polis*, tyranny is the clearest example, is one in which an unhealthy concentration on the prolongation of the life of the state occurs; the state is not allowed to function within its proper limits. The tyrant,

'... must keep a sharp eye out for men of courage or vision or intelligence or wealth; for, whether he likes it or not, it is his happy fate to be their constant enemy and to intrigue until he has purged them from the state.'

'...a fine kind of purge,' he remarked.

'Yes,' I returned, 'and the reverse of a purge in the medical sense. For the doctor removes the poison and leaves the healthy elements in the body, while the tyrant does the opposite.' (VIII.567b-c)

34. On the topic of the *polis* as a being out of *phusis*, Socrates remarks, "And once we have given our system [*politeia*] a good start . . . the process of improvement [growth, *phusis*] will be
cumulative" (IV.424a).

35. For other relevant comparisons of medical and judicial health, see the following passages:
   ‘Otherwise,’ he said, ‘they will spend their whole time making and correcting detailed regulation of the sort you’ve described, always expecting to achieve perfection.’
   ‘You mean,’ said I, ‘that they will lead lives like invalids who lack the restraint to give up a vicious way of life.’
   ‘Exactly.’
   ‘And a very attractive life they lead! For all their cures and medicines have no effect—except to make their ailments worse and more complicated—yet they live in hope that every new medicine they are recommended will restore them to health.’ (IV.425e-426a)

   ‘Men don’t reckon that life is worth living when their physical health breaks down, even though they have all the food and drink and wealth and power in the world. So we can hardly reckon it worth living when the natural principle by which we live breaks down in confusion, and a man of his own choice avoids one thing that will rid him of wickedness and injustice, the acquisition of justice and excellence, now that they have been clearly shown to be as we have described them.’ (IV.445a-b)
CHAPTER 2:

POIĒSIS AND MIMĒSIS IN SIDNEY’S DEFENCE OF POESIE

We have delineated the parameters of the “question of representation” in relation to art and truth. We saw that the manifest texts of Plato and Aristotle determine the nature of art and truth along metaphysico-representational lines. In this determination, art is a mimēsis (as imitation) of pre-given, present beings and truth is located in the homoiōsis (likeness or accordance) of statements or artistic presentations with the originals to which they refer. However, we also saw that beneath these manifest claims about art and truth there is an “unsaid” echo of the pre-metaphysical, early Greek thinking of Being. In this latter thinking, art is a bringing forth, a founding of a site of truth, where truth is thought of as the sited unfolding of un-concealedness. Both of these determinations of art and truth, both the metaphysical and the non-metaphysical, were passed down through the Middle Ages and through Renaissance humanism; both offered themselves as possibilities for the Elizabethan writer. We want to see the ways in which these possibilities are taken up by three central Elizabethan writers: Sidney, Spenser, and Shakespeare. We will begin by following this theme as it unfolds in Sidney’s foundational treatise on the nature of poetry: The Defence of Poesie.

Poιēs is and ῥechnē

‘Tis an old story, legislator, which we poets are always telling with the universal approval of the rest of the world, that when a poet takes his seat on the Muse’s tripod, his judgement takes leave of him. He is like a fountain which gives free course to the rush of its waters . . . (Laws 719c)

According to Plato’s representational thinking, poetry is not a technē (a knowing). The poem arises out of a divine inspiration, not from any art or knowledge on the part of the poet.
As I just now said, this gift you have of speaking well on Homer is not an art [technē]; it is a power divine, impelling you like the power in the stone Euripides called the magnet, which most call “stone of Heraclea.” This stone does not simply attract the iron rings, just by themselves; it also imparts to the rings a force enabling them to do the same thing as the stone itself, that is, to attract another ring, so that sometimes a chain is formed. . . . Just so the Muse. She first makes men inspired, and then through these inspired ones others share in the enthusiasm, and a chain is formed, for the epic poets, all the good ones, have their excellence, not from art, but are inspired, possessed, and thus they utter all these admirable poems. . . . [W]hen once they launch into harmony and rhythm, they are seized with the Bacchic transport and are possessed. . . . (Ion 533d-534a)

In the Ion, Plato insists that the poets lack technē. At best, in other dialogues, one can say that Plato claims that poets are “poor” in technē. That is, the craftsperson, in making the bed, has a certain “know-how”; the poet or painter, on the other hand, in copying that bed, does not have the “know-how” of bed-production that the craftsperson does (cf. The Republic 595a-602b). Similarly, if you want to know about medicine, you go to one with medical “know-how,” a doctor, not an actor playing a doctor, or a poet writing the story of a doctor.1 (In this light, the advertisements that begin “I’m not a doctor, but I play one on T.V. . . .” qualify the sales-pitches/medical advice that follow. They become self-parodies in this light.) We also saw, however—in contradistinction to Plato’s manifest statements—that poetry is akin to the philosopher’s (dialectical) “art”; both are, in this sense, a technē, a knowing bringing forth of the self-emerging, appropriate articulation of things (dikē). For Aristotle, following in this (unsaid) tradition, poïēsis is a species of technē. In the Augustinian metaphysics of the Middle ages, poetry is an art (in the sense of skill), but one of reference; that is, poetry is a representational or derivative art. The other side of this Augustinian metaphysics, we shall see, allows for an experience of truth along non-representational (“alethic”) lines. Finally, the Renaissance humanists responded in a variety of ways to the possibilities offered by these ancient Greek and medieval predecessors. These responses laid the groundwork for the Elizabethan poetic foundations Sidney erects in his Defence
of Poesie. Our task, first, will be to see the ways in which Sidney defines poetry in relation to this question of technē—and the ways in which he returns to these founding texts in order to make this definition. This definition involves a stepping back to the Greeks, to Plato and Aristotle; it involves a re-thinking of the essence of poiēsis and of mimēsis. This step back ultimately leads to a non-representational thinking of truth and art.2

2.1 Rhetoric and Dialectic

In Sidney's Defence of Poesie, poetry is compared to another “skill” (technē) at the very beginning of the treatise. Technē, as skill-knowledge-discipline, must be taught. Thus, Sidney writes, “[w]hen the right vertuous E.W. [Edward Wotton] and I, were at the Emperours court togethier, wee gave our selves to leanne horsemanship of Jon Pietro Pugliano” (DoP 3). Horsemanship, like all forms of “know-how,” must be learned. Pugliano praises this knowledge-skill of horsemanship above all others: “Skill of government was but a Pederantia, in comparison” (3). Of course, we are meant to view Pugliano’s misplaced praise with some humour; we are not meant to agree completely with one who, Gulliver-like, would have us prefer horses over humans: “then would he adde certaine praises by telling what a peerlesse beast a horse was, the onely serviceable Courtier without flattery, the beast of most bewtie, faithfulnesse, courage, and such more, that if I had not bene a peece of a Logician before I came to him, I thinke he would have persuawed me to have wished my selfe a horse” (3). Pugliano’s arguments are, if only ironically, persuasive. Thus, his discourse is tied to the traditional definitions of rhetoric. His speech is also a “praise”—one of the two primary forms of poetry, along with blame (cf. Aristotle, Poetics 1448b20-1449a10). So Pugliano’s discourse is an example of rhetorico-poetic art.3 His arguments are opposed to Sidney’s logic (dialectic); if Sidney had not been a “peece of a Logician,” he would have been persuaded to wish himself a horse.
Although Pugliano’s arguments are “weake,” Sidney parallels his “strong affection” in the defence of his skill-\textit{technē} of horsemanship to the “defence of poor Poetry” which Sidney’s treatise will provide: “Wherin if \textit{Puglianos} strong affection and weake arguments will not satisfie you, I wil give you a nearer example of my selfe, who I know not by what mischance in these my not old yeares and idllest times, having slipt into the title of a Poet, am provoked to say somthing unto you in the defence of that my unelected vocation, which if I handle with more good will, then good reasons, beare with me, since the scholler is to be pardoned that followeth the steps of his maister” (3). Like that of his parodic “maister,” Sidney’s defence of his \textit{technē} will contain “more good will, then good reasons.” A number of possible interpretive qualifications to Sidney’s \textit{Defence} suggest themselves through this relation of poetry and horsemanship and of Sidney’s apology and that of Pugliano: perhaps (a) the comparison is purely ironic and we are meant to take Sidney’s defence as one with more “good reasons” than strong affections (that is, poetry and its defence are dialectical-logical, not “merely” rhetorical); or, (b) it is an essentially un-ironic comparison: poetry and its defence share certain essential features with horsemanship and its defence (if this is the case, the defence of poetry is merely rhetorical and anyone who is \textit{a pееce of a Logician} will resist its conclusions); or, finally, (c) it is both an un-ironic comparison in that, like Pugliano’s, Sidney’s defence is essentially rhetorical, yet an ironic comparison in that, unlike Pugliano’s defence, Sidney’s rhetoric, like poetry itself, is the bringing forth of the true. This option, if correct, points to a distinction within Sidney’s conception of \textit{technē}: there is (1) a rhetorico-poetic “art” (\textit{technē}), such as poetry and Sidney’s defence of it, which is tied to the bringing forth of truth (dialectic) and is not a derivative representing; there is also (2) a rhetorico-poetic “skill” (\textit{technē}), such as that of Pugliano’s defence of horsemanship, which is misleading (opposed to logic and the dialectical bringing forth of the true). The latter \textit{technē} is a derivative
skill, knack, or routine presenting distorted images of that which it represents. For clarity, we will refer to the first type as "technē I" and to the second type as "technē II." The statements Sidney is making about poetry as technē here will guide and determine the ultimate end and unity of the treatise. Yet, we must look to the whole and the end before we can decide what these initial statements mean.

We must jump into the circle of the interpretation of this comparison in some preliminary way in order to return to it in the fullness of the circle. It would appear that the door open for initial entry is called technē. Either (a) poetry is only ironically a technē like horsemanship and actually closer to technē (techne I) as the discipline of true knowledge (dialectic), or (b) poetry is actually a mere skill (techne II) like horsemanship and the Defence’s later assertions that tend to characterize poetry as true knowledge are ironic, or (c) poetry and its defence are a technē like horsemanship, but unlike horsemanship, poetry (as well as Sidney’s defence of it) is the knowing bringing forth of the true.4 We can say, then, that poetry for Sidney is a technē in some way: all three interpretive options deem poetry some type of technē, some form of knowing. The three interpretive options basically designate the form of knowledge assigned to poetry in the following way: a) dialectic, b) “mere” rhetoric, c) rhetoric as dialectic.5 What is at stake in these distinctions of forms of knowing (technē)?

Dialectic (Gk., dialectikē, “the art of conversation, discussion,” or dialectikos, “one skilled in logical argument or debate.” “Dialectic” originally referred to debating tournaments in which the primary aim was to refute an opponent’s arguments or lead him to contradictions, dilemmas, or paradoxes. In general, a dialectician was one who left nothing unquestioned). 1. The art (TECHNI) of asking and answering the proper questions in a discussion at the proper time and in the proper way so as to bring knowledge out into the open. 2. The art of gaining better knowledge on a topic by exchanging reasoned views and arguments. 3. The art of procuring true knowledge on a topic by the use of a formal reasoning process. (Dialectics is the term sometimes used to designate that branch of logic which presents the rules and modes of reasoning correctly; also to designate the systematic, logical analysis of concepts to show what they entail.) 4. The method
of arriving at a definition for a concept by means of examining the common characteristics found in a number of particular examples of that concept. 5. The method of classification whereby there is a repeated division of a concept into its respective subclasses. (Angeles 61)

**Rhetoric** (Gk., *hretorikē*, "rhetoric," "the art of oratory," from *hrētōr*, "orator," "rhetorician," "public speaker," "pleader"). **1.** The art [*technē*] of expressive, persuasive speech and argumentation. **2.** The art of using eloquent (elegant) language to impress as well as to persuade. See *SOPHISTES*. (Angeles 247)

Poetry, according to the first interpretive option, would be a dialectical *technē* inasmuch as it is the art of bringing "knowledge out into the open." This is supported by Sidney's claims for poetry as the nation's language of knowledge. Poetry, for Sidney, "in the noblest nations and languages that are knowne, hath bene the first light giver to ignorance, and first nurse whose milke litle & litle enabled them to feed afterwards of tougher knowledges" (4). Yet, can we say that poetry is a simple equivalent of the philosopher's knowledge? Can we say, simply and finally, that both possess knowledge in the form of dialectic? Certainly, for Sidney, there is a distinction to be made. The philosopher's knowing relation to the truth, his or her dialectic-art, is an *epistēmē-sophia*: a pure knowing for knowing's sake. For this reason, Sidney says that the philosopher knows the truth or the "precept," but he cannot give us the "example." The poet's knowing relation to the truth, on the other hand, is a *technē* in another sense: a knowing directed to making or bringing forth (cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* VI.4.1140a10). The definition of poetry as *technē*, as a knowing bringing forth, is behind Sidney's determination of *mimēsis* as "figuring forth." Thus, we can see a limitation to this interpretive option: the poet's knowing, as *technē* or knowing bringing forth, is not the philosophico-dialectical opposite of Pugliano's rhetorical or persuasive speech. In fact, Sidney defines poetry as *mimēsis* with the end to teach, to delight, and to move. He defines poetry according to rhetorical parameters.

Within the second interpretive option, any claims to truth-value in poetry made by the
Defence are strictly ironic. The type of “skill” that is poetry, like horsemanship, is that of the passions, the fleeting, the phantasia. For this reason it is “merely rhetorical.” Sidney’s defence, like Pugliano’s of horsemanship, is merely an “art of expressive, persuasive speech and argumentation” (Angeles 247). However, this interpretive option assumes as its point of departure the grounds of the Platonic critique of rhetoric. Just as poetry is not a true technē for Plato, so, too, the discourses of the rhetorician are not based on any knowledge whatsoever. The rhetorician can argue both sides of an argument; thus, the rhetorician knows neither side, or they would argue only for the correct one (cf. Gorgias 462b-465e). As we have seen, though, poetry and horsemanship are referred to as forms of “know-how” and they must be learned. The claim that rhetorical knowledge is “merely rhetorical” is based, technically, on the assumption that rhetoric is, in fact, not a knowledge—at least in the sense of a technē I, a knowing bringing forth; rather, rhetoric, like poetry, is a knack or routine, not at all related to truth. Since Sidney asserts that poetry is the highest knowledge, since “of all Sciences . . . is our Poet the Monarch” (19), poetry cannot be a “mere” ornament or rhetoric: it is not outside the realm of knowledge.

We have seen that the first two interpretive options chiasmically intersect and lead to (collapse into) the third. Our preliminary leap into the hermeneutic circle of Sidney’s Defence has led us to the conclusion that poetry, for Sidney, is a rhetoric-technē, but, since it is a technē, it is not a rhetoric relegated to the non-knowledge of phantasia; rather, it is a rhetoric-technē that is the knowing bringing forth of the true. Finally, since it is a knowing bringing forth, it is not the pure dialectical knowing of the philosopher (sophia-epistēme).

Our initial determination of poetry as technē keeps us wary of Sidney’s next assertion: that the poet is a divinely inspired seer. Inspiration, of course, was one of the arguments used by Plato, in the Ion, along with the arguments mentioned earlier in Gorgias and The Republic, to
deny that poets actually know anything, or that poetry is a \textit{technē} (cf. \textit{Ion} 533c-536d). Again we are suspicious that this comparison of poets to the Roman \textit{vates} is a strictly rhetorical manoeuvre. “Among the \textit{Romanes} a Poet was called \textit{Vates}, which is as much as a diviner, foreseer, or Prophet, as by his conjoyed words \textit{Vaticinium} and \textit{Vaticinari}, is manifest, so heavenly a title did that excellent people bestowe uppon this hart-ravishing knowledge” (\textit{DoP} 6). Levao has pointed out the ambiguity of the Roman designation applied here. Sidney says that the belief of the Romans that chancing upon verses is a foretoken “of their following fortunes” is “a verie vaine and godlesse superstition,” yet he also says that it is “not without ground” (6). It would appear from this, Levao points out, that “inspiration is not the cause of the poet’s conceit but the effect that the conceit has on the reader” (137). The ambiguity as to whether or not Sidney is claiming divine inspiration for the poet is heightened inasmuch as later in the \textit{Defence} Sidney seems to assert the opposite: Plato, he says, in the \textit{Ion} “attributeth unto \textit{Poesie}, more then my selfe do; namely, to be a verie inspiring of a divine force, farre above mans wit” (34). Similarly, the poets that could be considered within a Christian context to be truly inspired by God—David, Solomon, Moses—are set apart from the category of “right poets” (Levao 137). We will have to let this ambiguity remain for now and return to this question as it arises with respect to the nature of the poetic word. At this point, however, we have seen that poetic bringing forth (\textit{poiēsis}) is a mode of the knowing bringing forth (\textit{technē}) of the true.

2.2 \textit{Poiēsis as Eikastic}

Sidney, in accordance with his determination of poetry as a species of \textit{technē} or knowing bringing forth, next refers to the poet as “a maker”: “But now, let us see how the Greekes have named it, and how they deemed of it. The Greekes named him \textit{poiēton}, which name, hath as the most excellent, gone through other languages, it commeth of this word \textit{poiein} which is to make:
wherin I know not whether by luck or wisdome, we Englishmen have met with the Greeks in calling him a Maker" (7). Sidney contrasts this bringing forth as poiēsis to “the scope of other sciences.” Poetry is the only true knowing bringing forth (as a mode of technē) in that it is the only “art” that does not merely represent Nature as it is: “There is no Art delivered unto mankind that hath not the workes of nature for his principall object, without which they could not consist, and on which they so depend, as they become Actors & Plaiers, as it were of what nature will have set forth” (7). The astronomer, geometrician, arithmetician, musician, natural and moral philosopher, lawyer, historian, grammarian, rhetorician, logician, physician, and metaphysician are all tied to the rules of nature or the abstract rules of “the depth of nature.” “Onely the Poet, disdeining to be tied to any such subjectīō, lifted up with the vigor of his own invention, doth grow in effect into an other nature: in making things either better then nature bringeth foorth, or quite a new, formes such as never were in nature: as the Heroes, Demigods, Cyclops, Chymeras, Furies, and such like; so as he goeth hand in hand with nature, not enclosed within the narrow warrant of her gifts, but freely raunging within the Zodiack of his owne wit” (8). Later in the Defence, by way of reiterating this point, Sidney points out that all other arts find their order (archē) in their subject-matter; poetry, however, is the self-emerging of an order or form (archē) in the composing (poiēsis): “where all other Arts retain themselves within their subject, and receive as it were their being from it. The Poet onely, onely bringeth his own stuffe, and doth not learn a Conceit out of a matter, but maketh matter for a Conceit” (26). The fact that this poetic bringing forth is not a representation of Nature as it is but a free ranging within the zodiac of the poet’s wit—where he “bringeth his own stuffe”—raises an important question: what is the nature of the poet’s bringing forth? What is the nature of the poet’s making? Is it a representational making based on a pre-existing paradeigma other than nature, or is it the bringing forth of the
self-emerging and forming (*poiēsis* as *phusis*)? Again, three interpretive options will be considered. "Making," here, means either (a) a representational notion of making as the copying of an "Idea" or "Form," as "eikastic"; or, (b) a representational (what we will call for now a "subjective-imperial") notion of making (and truth) as a process and product of the positing of an object or an other by the subject; or, (c) a non-representational notion of poetic making as a "founding saying" for the first time, a naming of things so they can arise into unconcealment. We must look carefully at each of these options in order to determine how Sidney defines the poet’s making.

For Plato, as we have said, art is the copy of a copy (Nature-particulars) of the truth (the Idea-Form, *eidos*) of things. In saying that the poet borrows not from nature (*horānos topos*) (*The Republic* VI.509d), Sidney is claiming, in some senses, that the poet copies directly from the intelligible realm of the Forms (*noētos topos*) (*The Republic* VI.509d). In this way, for Sidney, the poet has knowledge of the true (as form) and brings forth with an eye to that true form as do other skilled trades. This would be the defence of Sidney’s claim that poetry is a *technē* and would have a precedent in the Augustinian and humanist-Neoplatonic traditions. Plato had said that the skilled tradesman, such as a craftsman who makes a bed, presents the image of the bed based on a knowledge of the Idea (*eidos*) of “bedness.” The artist appears to know what a bed is when he or she brings forth the image of a bed, as in a painting. However, the artist’s presenting of the image is akin to one who holds a mirror to the world. One does not have to “know anything” in order to be able to “create everything” in this sense of mirroring (*The Republic* X.596d-e). So we can see here a distinction between a legitimate and an illegitimate presentation of an image. The truer, "eikastic," mode of image making draws close to the original model; it is the making of a likeness of the origin (*eikon*). The illegitimate, “phantastic,” mode of image making draws on
other images (copies) and thus produces a mere "semblance" (phantasma). Thus, in claiming that the poet does not copy nature, Sidney can be seen as asserting that poetry is an "eikastic" mode of image making, that it is a knowing representation of the the Idea (eidos): "For I will not deny, but that mans wit may make Poesie, which should be eikastike, which some learned have defined figuring foorth good things to be phantastike: which doth contrariwise infect the fancie with unworthy objects" (DoP 30). The eikastic notion of poetry, while a defence of its usefulness, still posits it within a representational framework as an effect of an external origin. However, Sidney's understanding of the eikastic image as a "figuring foorth good things," in connection with Sidney's conception of mimēsis, we shall see, points to another, non-representational possibility for poetry. For now, though, we must deal with the second interpretive option pertaining to the poet as maker: that this making is a "subjective-imperial" positing.

Poiēsis as "Subjective-Imperial" Positing

[In modern metaphysics,] consciousness of things and of beings as a whole is referred back to the self-consciousness of the human subject as the unshakable ground of all certainty. (Heidegger 1982, 86)

As well as being free from the constraints of nature as referent, Sidney also says the poet as maker ranges within the "Zodiack of his owne wit." We have seen that a freedom from the physical cosmos (zodiac) of nature can mean the poet’s referent is the Idea. However, in mentioning that the zodiac of nature is replaced by the "Zodiack of his owne wit," Sidney seems to be suggesting that the poet is not even limited, in terms of his creative productions, by the eidos. Rather, the poet-subject creates his or her own cosmos within the limits of the imagination. The poet's making, in this sense, is an imaginative invention. Of course, it is a critical commonplace to say that in the Renaissance the individual increasingly was experienced as the ground of reality. The critical story begins, most clearly, with Jacob Burckhardt and the assertion
that the Renaissance, especially that of Italy, consisted of a general reaction against the “oppressive” structure of the church and a corresponding rise in the creativity and freedom of the individual.\textsuperscript{10} Nietzsche was then to expand on Burckhardt’s thesis. For Nietzsche, the Renaissance always remained the “high point of the millennium, and what happened since then is the great reaction of every kind of mob impulse against the ‘individualism’ of that period” [my translation] (1981, 276).\textsuperscript{11} This has also been the reigning interpretation of the Renaissance well into the twentieth century. Ernst Cassirer, for instance, refers to Petrarch as “the artist and virtuoso who rediscovered the inexhaustible wealth and value of ‘individuality’” (128).\textsuperscript{12} Similarly, Jacques Maritain argues that during the Renaissance philosophy and the human mind abandoned theology and God:

In the sixteenth century, and more particularly in the age of Descartes, the interior hierarchies of the virtue of reason were shattered. Philosophy abandoned theology to assert its own claim to be considered the supreme science, and, the mathematical science of the sensible world and its phenomena taking precedence at the same time over metaphysics, the human mind began to profess independence of God and Being. Independence of God: that is to say, of the supreme Object of all intelligence, Whom it accepted only half-heartedly until it finally rejected the intimate knowledge of Him supernaturally procured by grace and revelation. Independence of being: that is to say, of the connatural object of the mind as such, against which it ceased to measure itself humbly, until it finally undertook to deduce it entirely from the seeds of geometrical clarity which it conceived to be innate in itself. (qtd. in Willey 8-9)

Heidegger, too, sees Renaissance humanism as the anthropological centering of truth. For Heidegger, Renaissance humanism is a return to the metaphysics of the Romans, a return to the “imperial” determination of beings. “Every humanism,” including that of the Renaissance, according to Heidegger, “is either grounded in a metaphysics or is itself made to be the ground of one” (“LH” 201-202).\textsuperscript{13} Here we must break ranks with Heidegger; we will find that although the anthropological centering of truth, the “subjective-imperial” experience of truth, was to gain total sway within the “early modern” period—that is, in the metaphysics of Bacon and Descartes
in the seventeenth century—and although the roots of this “subjective-imperial” positing are present in the Elizabethan period, Sidney’s *Defence of Poesie* is an example of a heeding of the call of a more primordial experience of truth. Although, in many ways, Sidney conceives of poetry in a representational fashion, and hence a metaphysical fashion, alternatives to the metaphysical tradition, unsaid possibilities, are also uttered in the treatise.

Before we are able to uncover the alternatives to the metaphysics of the subject that Sidney presents, we must first understand that against which this unsaid possibility contends. What does this Renaissance “individualism” mean? We must think through this matter more essentially than has been done so far in the critical tradition. The commentators mentioned above interpret the Renaissance in terms of the modern essence of truth as the certainty of the subject.\(^\text{14}\) The truth of the subject as ground is left unquestioned. We must think “individualism” in terms of what was offered to the Renaissance as matter for thinking, what unfolds itself in the Renaissance out of the history of Being—out of the history of the transformations of the essence of truth. We must think this subjectivism, this Renaissance individualism, in relation to the “metaphysico-imperial” experience of truth—and mastering-knowing—that holds sway throughout the Western tradition.

2.3 On the “Metaphysico-Imperial” Tradition

* A) The Early Greek Essence of Truth: Aletheia and Pseude

Whence does this imperial essence of truth arise? The essence of truth as experienced in the primordial Greek founding is *alētheia*. Anaximander, Parmenides, and Heraclitus are the first thinkers to articulate the nature of *alētheia*; they are the primordial thinkers; they are the thinkers of the beginning of Western history. The beginning is what is always returned to in (or, rather, arises again to meet) the future; it is futural in that it “lies in advance of what is to come.” In this way it is a “gift to an epoch” (Heidegger 1992, l). This beginning is Being: it sends, gives,
destines itself in the unfolding of essential history (1992, 7). The primordial thinkers think the
beginning, think Being. Essential thinking, or essential knowing, is a heeding of the essential. It
is a responsiveness to the call or claim (Anspruch) of Being as the beginning. This responsiveness
is a receptive and resolute openness.¹⁵ Resolute openness (Ent-schlossenheit) is distinct from the
mastery model of knowing that marks metaphysics as an “imperial” determination of truth.
Mastering knowing is not a strictly scientific or modern phenomenon but belongs to the essential
experience of truth throughout Western metaphysics.¹⁶ Yet, what is the distinction between the
primordial thinking of Being and the imperial-mastering thinking that marks the history of
metaphysics? Allow me to quote Heidegger at length at this point in order to arrive at some
preliminary answers to this question.

What we usually call “knowing” is being acquainted with something and its qualities. In
virtue of these cognitions we “master” things. This mastering “knowledge” is
given over to a being at hand, to its structure and its usefulness. Such “knowledge”
seizes the being, “dominates” it, and thereby goes beyond it and constantly surpasses
it. The character of essential knowing is entirely different. It concerns the being in its
ground—it intends Being. Essential “knowing” does not lord it over what it knows but
is solicitous toward it. For instance, to take just one example, every “science” is a
cognitive mastering, an outdoing, and a surpassing, if indeed not a complete
bypassing, of a being. All of which occurs in the manner of objectivization. Versus
this, essential knowing, heedfulness, is a retreat in face of Being. In such retreating
we see and we perceive essentially more, namely something quite different from the
product of the remarkable procedure of modern science. For the latter is always a
technical attack on a being and an intervention for purposes of an “orientation” toward
acting, “producing,” wheeling and dealing. Thoughtful heedfulness, in contrast, is
attention to a claim that does not arise from the separate facts and events of reality and
does not concern man in the superficiality of his everyday occupations. (1992, 3-4)

Although the primordial thinking of Being is a pre-metaphysical experience of truth and thinking,
as a beginning it arises again throughout the metaphysical tradition as a faint echo or unsaid
possibility. Thus, we must pay heed, if only briefly, to this original thinking of truth and observe
the nature of its transformations throughout the unfolding of the history of Being.

How can we properly understand alētheia as primordially experienced? In his effort to
translate *alētheia*, Heidegger does not stop at merely substituting a modern word-form ("unconcealedness") for the ancient; he wishes to transport "us into the domain of experience and the mode of experience out of which the Greeks or, in the case at hand, the primordial thinker Parmenides say the word *alētheia*" (1992, 11). That is, "every endeavour to think *a-lētheia* [un-concealedness] in a somewhat suitable manner, even if only from afar, is an idle affair as long as we do not venture to think the *lethe* [concealedness, forgetting] to which, presumably, *alētheia* refers back" (1992, 11). In order to be able to transport ourselves to the region of the Greek word *alētheia*, Heidegger describes four directives for its translation that arise from the word itself. First of all, "‘un-concealedness’ directs us to something like ‘concealedness.’ . . . We know it as veiling, as masking, and as covering, but also in the forms of conserving, preserving, holding back, entrusting, and appropriating. We also know concealedness in the multiple forms of closing off and closedness. From these modes of concealedness and concealing, ‘unconcealedness’ immediately gains clearer features” (1992, 13). The Greek word first directs us to an awareness that concealment is an essential component of truth within the primordial Greek experience. In the second case, the word directs us to the fact that truth is the "suspension or cancellation" of concealment: "The prefix ‘un-‘ corresponds to the Greek *a-*, which grammar calls ‘a privativum.’ What kind of *privatio*, deprivation, and taking away is at stake in a privative word-formation depends in each case on what it is that is exposed to the deprivation and impairment. ‘Un-concealedness’ can mean concealedness is taken away, cancelled, evicted, or banned, where taking away, cancelling, evicting, and banning are essentially distinct” (1992, 14). As the name for the truth of that which is, *a-lētheia* determines being as the privation, taking away, or annihilation of *lethe* (16). For this reason, the third directive provided by the word is that truth, as experienced by the Greeks, is an essential conflict or strife: "‘Truth’ is never ‘in itself,’
available by itself, but instead must be gained by struggle. Unconcealedness is wrested from concealment, in a conflict [polemos] with it” (1992, 17). That is, truth is opposed to untruth; the ordinary sense of untruth is “falsity.” Just as unconcealedness “itself can be grasped adequately only from its counter-essence, the untruth, and therefore from falsity” (20), so, too, is it “clear that we can never think ‘the true’ and ‘the false,’ ‘truth’ and ‘falsity,’ as separate from each other in essence” (20); rather, we must understand that the essence of truth, for the early Greeks, was tied to falsity. And since “unconcealedness gives the essence of truth its character, then we must attempt to understand falsity as a concealment” (20). Finally, the fourth directive given by the word alētheia is that Being is an “open,” and this open was experienced by the Greeks as a temporal emergence. Heidegger refers to Sophocles’ tragedy Aias (V, 646):

“The broad, incalculable sweep of time lets emerge everything that is not open as well as concealing (again) in itself what has appeared.” (1992, 140)

Here, time is the open of unconcealedness in that it “hides (kruptesthai) and lets come forth (phuei)” (1992, 142). The fourth directive also designates this open—that is Being, that is Time—as “freedom” and as a clearing or a lighting: “The light is the determining radiance, the shining and appearing. ‘The’ light in the eminent sense shines as the light of the sun. On the basis of Plato’s ‘cave allegory’ we can immediately gather the connection between sun, light, unconcealedness, and unveiling on the one hand, and between darkness, shadow, concealedness, veiling, and cave on the other” (1992, 144).

When discussing the third directive, Heidegger outlines the nature of the opposition of alētheia and lethe in the history of Being. We recall that the third directive emphasizes that truth is a conflict or essential strife. This primordial experience of truth as strife (polemos) has been transformed throughout the history of Being; “[i]t is important, however, to think for once this conflictual essence of truth, an essence which has been shining for 2,500 years in the faintest of
all lights. The task is to experience properly the conflict occurring within the essence of truth” (1992, 17). Because truth is essentially conflictual, in order to think truth properly we must think of it in terms of a wrestling from concealment. To think the essence of truth we must think the counter-essence of truth. Thinking the opposite of truth as un-concealedness would seem to be very simple: “The opposite of the ‘unconcealed,’ the concealed, can easily be found, in name at least, if we simply revoke the a-privativum, annul the cancellation of the concealed, and let it, ‘the concealed,’ remain” (1992, 20). The annulling of the cancelling privative ‘a’ leaves us with lethes. However, nowhere is this used by the early Greeks as the name for the false; instead, the Greeks use pseudos to name the false. Just as the ‘false’ has many meanings for us—as non-genuine (a “false Rembrandt”), as incorrect, and as erroneous (29)—so too does pseudos have many senses. For instance, “[t]he meaning of pseudos in ‘pseudonym’ eludes us if we translate it as ‘false.’ We have here a covering that at the same time unveils something recondite and does so in a specifically recondite way, whereas a ‘false name,’ e.g., that of the impostor, is also not simply incorrect, but it covers up while making visible something pertaining only to the facade and to the most unrecondite” (1992, 30). In this way, and like lethe as concealing, pseudos names untruth as the covering which is essentially related to un-covering or truth.19 Pseudos belongs to the counter-essence of truth—that is, it exists in the manner of concealedness—inasmuch as it is a “dissembling” (1992, 32).

B) The Roman-Imperial Translation: Falsum and Verum

The counter-word to truth as alētheia, which we usually translate as “false,” is a dissembling concealing that is at the same time a showing and bringing into appearance. But what does “false” mean for subsequent metaphysics? How is pseudos translated in the unfolding of the history of Being?
The word “false” [falsch] entered the German language in the early Christian Middle Ages through the Latin falsum. The stem of the Latin word falsum (fallo) is “fall” and is related to the Greek sphallo, i.e., to overthrow, bring to a downfall, fell, make totter. But this Greek word sphallo never became the genuine counter-word opposed to aletes. I deliberately say “genuine,” because the Greek sphallo can sometimes be translated “correctly” by “deceiving”; what is meant, however, thought in the Greek way, is “making totter,” “making stagger,” “letting stumble into erring.” But man can be led into such tottering and falling in the midst of the beings appearing to him only if something is put in his way obstructing beings, so that he does not know what he is dealing with. First something must be held forth and set forth, and then something else entirely must be delivered, so that man can “fall for” what is presented that way and thereby fall down. Bringing to a fall in the sense of misleading first becomes possible on the basis of a putting forth, dissembling, and concealing. (1992, 39)

Bringing to a fall is derivative of dissembling and concealing—the latter being the essence of pseudos. For this reason, “falling” is not that which opposes and resides in essential strife with unconcealedness (alêtheia).

However, for some reason, “bringing to a fall” (falsum) is the essential counter-word to truth for the Romans. In the Latin translation of Greek philosophical terms, the “genuine event” of essential Western history, the “imperial” disposition gains a certain sway in humanity’s relation to beings as a whole. This “imperial” disposition has constituted the ground of all subsequent thinking and relating to beings. “The realm of essence decisive for the development of the Latin falsum is the one of the imperium and of the ‘imperial.’ ... Imperium means ‘command!’” (1992, 40). Understanding Being and truth in terms of the command (imperium) is the “essence of domination,” of all mastering-knowing. All mastering-knowing and domination of a region of beings rests on a “commanding-on-high” or a commanding-overseeing.

We say that to “oversee” something means to “dominate” it. This overseeing, which includes the surmounting, involves a constant “being-on-the-watch.” That is the form of acting which oversees everything but still keeps to itself: in Latin, the actio of the actus. The surmounting overseeing denotes the dominating “sight” expressed in the often quoted phrase of Caesar: veni, vidi, vici—I came, I saw, and I conquered. Victory is only the effect of Caesar’s seeing and overseeing, whose proper character is actio. The essence of the imperium resides in the actus of constant “action.” The
imperial *actio* of the constant surmounting of others includes the sense that the others, should they rise to the same or even to a neighboring level of command, will be brought down—in Latin *fallere* (participle: *falsum*). This bringing to a fall pertains necessarily to the imperial realm. The bringing to a fall can occur in a “direct” attack and overthrowing. The other can, however, also be brought down by being “tripped up” from behind in a furtive way. The bringing to a fall is then subterfuge, “trick” [*Trick*], which word, not accidentally, comes from the “English.” (1992, 41)23

The “imperial” stand of truth rests on the subterfuge, or “trick,” that brings the other to a fall. In this way, the other’s falling is orchestrated by the imperial position as a “pressing-into-service” for its own domination.24 We sometimes say, in terms of the modern analysis of power relations, that a subjugated group, by means of certain mechanisms of domination, seems to “desire its own oppression.” This can be more essentially understood as a product of the “imperial” disposition that marks the nature of truth throughout Western history. “The great and most inner core of the essence of essential domination consists in this,” according to Heidegger, “that the dominated are not kept down, nor simply despised, but, rather, that they themselves are permitted, within the territory of the command, to offer their services for the continuation of the domination. The bringing to a fall aims at keeping the overthrown standing in a certain sense, though not standing high. Imperial bringing to a fall, *fallere*, is therefore a going after and a going around that lets stand” (1992, 45). The original counter-essence of truth for the Greeks, a concealing *pseudes*, is transformed, through this Latin translation, into a deception, a subterfuge, or a “trick”: “*Pseudes*, dissembling and concealing, now becomes what fells, the false” (1992, 41).

The essence of truth, through the Roman transformation, becomes *veritas* as *rectitudo*. The essence of truth “attunes” historical humanity through and through (cf. “ET”). On the basis of this historical attunement, that of the Romans, a comportment, a relatedness to beings as beings, arises that can be characterized in terms of the *imperium*: “The imperial as the mode of Being of a historical humanity is nevertheless not the basis of the essential transformation of *alētheia* into
veritas, as rectitudo, but is its consequence, and as this consequence it is in turn a possible cause and occasion for the development of the true in the sense of the correct" (1992, 42). Within this “comportment” particular “assertions” become possible, such as veni, vidi, vici.

Thus, we can see that historical statements arise as essentially true/un-true within a particular comportment as attuned in and by the essence of truth as it arises within a historical epoch. The essence of truth for every epoch displays, if only faintly, the nature of the conflictual nature of truth. With the Roman transformation, falsum is essentially related to the true as verum. However, what does verum mean? “The stem ver is Indo-Germanic. . . . Ver means to be steady, to keep steady, i.e., not to fall (no falsum), to remain above, to maintain oneself, to keep one’s head up, to be the head, to command. Maintaining oneself, standing upright—the upright” (1992, 47). Thus, Heidegger points out that there are two things to keep in mind with respect to the Latin name for the true, verum:

1. Verum, ver-, meant originally enclosing, covering. The Latin verum belongs to the same realm of meaning as the Greek alethes, the uncovered—precisely by signifying the exact opposite of alethes: the closed off.
2. But now because verum is counter to falsum, and because the essential domain of the imperium is decisive for verum and falsum and their opposites, the sense of ver-, namely enclosure and cover, becomes basically that of covering for security against. Ver is now the maintaining-oneself, the being-above; ver becomes the opposite of falling. Verum is the remaining constant, the upright, that which is directed to what is superior because it is directing from above. Verum is rectum (regere, “the regime”), the right, justum. For the Romans, the realm of concealment and disconcealment does not at all come to be, although it strives in that direction in ver, the essential realm determining the essence of truth. Under the influence of the imperial, verum becomes forthwith “being-above,” directive for what is right; veritas is then rectitudo, “correctness” we would say. (1992, 48)

We have said that the metaphysical tradition thinks within the comportment to beings of the imperium, and that this comportment is based on the experience of the essence of truth as veritas-rectitudo.

Metaphysics, however, does not begin with the Romans; rather, the determination of truth
as “correctness” has its roots in the very Greek soil it was to overturn and occult. As we discovered in Chapter 1, Plato and Aristotle set forth the metaphysical determination of Being and truth while at the same time uttering the early Greek experience of Being as alētheia—or, as phusis and dikē grounded in alētheia. “Since Plato, and above all by means of Aristotle’s thinking, a transformation was accomplished within the Greek essence of alētheia, one which in a certain respect alētheia itself encouraged. Alethes is first of all the unconcealed and the disclosing. The unconcealed as such can be disclosed for humans and by humans only if their disclosing comportment adheres to the unconcealed and is in agreement with it Aristotle uses the word aletheuein for this comportment” (1992, 49). Truth here is an agreement and “correspondence” of human relatedness to the unconcealed and the unconcealed itself; “[t]his adherence to and agreement with the unconcealed is in Greek homoiōsis” (1992, 49). Here we can see the roots of representational metaphysics in relation to the problematic of the primordial essence of truth. The Roman “imperial” determination of truth and un-truth and the Greek experience of homoiōsis are united as the co-inaugurators of the representational-metaphysical tradition. Throughout the metaphysical tradition different names and features have been experienced in terms of the essence of truth, but these variations have all been grounded in the Graeco-Roman inception that essentially determines their unfolding. That is, truth transforms itself throughout the tradition, yet it is always, for the West, experienced in terms of the representational categories of “correctness”: “In the early Middle Ages, following the path set by the Romans, alētheia, presented as homoiōsis, became adaequatio. Veritas est adaequatio intellectus ad rem. The entire thinking of the Occident from Plato to Nietzsche thinks in terms of this delimitation of the essence of truth as correctness” (1992, 50).

Although the metaphysical determination of truth has its roots in Plato and Aristotle, their
thinking still, of necessity, pays heed to the sheltering concealment essential to truth. With the Latin translation of truth, essential concealment is perverted, occulted and forgotten: "In rectitudo, in the 'self-adjustment to . . .,' there also resides what the Greeks call oiesthai, to take something as something and to accept it thus. But whereas for the Greeks to 'take something as something' was still experienced within the essential realm of disclosedness and unconcealedness, thought in the Roman way it lies outside this essential domain" (1992, 50). This withdrawal of concealment, this forgetting of concealment, implicates a transformation in the way in which humanity experiences technē and poiēsis: "To 'take something as something' is in Latin reor—the corresponding noun is ratio. In a variation of the Roman saying: res ad triarios venit [The matter has come to the final stage], we can say: res aletheias ad rationem venit [aletheia has come to reason]. The essence of truth as veritas and rectitudo passes over into the ratio of man. The Greek aletheuein, to disclose the unconcealed, which in Aristotle still permeates the essence of technē, is transformed into the calculating self-adjustment of ratio" (1992, 50). Technē and poiēsis are experienced within the same frame of reference as the mastering-knowing or commanding on high of the imperium. This still persists and holds sway ultimately in the technological character of modern existence. Today we secure all beings in their relation to humanity's projects. Time itself, as noted above, becomes one resource among others. Things do not arise within their own proper limits and time, that is, within the ordering of Being and Time in their unfolding-appearing; rather, beings arise within the schemata, charts, and ordering principles of technē as experienced within the domain of the imperium. Things arise as ordered (mastered, or commanded on high) by technē as an external archē, as technē II.

C) The Modern Experience of the Secure and Certain: Certitudo

This technological culmination of the "imperial" comportment arises out of medieval and
modern decisions as to the nature of truth. The sheltering-concealment of *pseudos-lethe* that is transformed by the Romans into the securing-enclosing vantage point of the *imperium* (that brings to a fall--*falsum*) becomes, in the Middle Ages, a “securing” of salvation—thus preparing the ground for the modern determination of truth as *certitudo*: “The Roman world in the form of the ecclesiastical dogmatics of the Christian faith has contributed essentially to the consolidation of the essence of truth in the sense of *rectitudo*. The same realm of Christian faith introduces and prepares the new transformation of the essence of truth, the one of *verum* into *certum*. Luther raises the question of whether and how man can be certain and assured of eternal salvation, i.e., certain of ‘the truth’” (1992, 51).28 The next step is from the securing-enclosing of the soul to the securing of the “certain-subject” in terms of its rational judgements. This is the “step” taken by modern metaphysics:

The inception of the metaphysics of the modern age rests on the transformation of the essence of *veritas* into *certitudo*. The question of truth becomes the question of the secure, assured, and self-assurring use of *ratio*. Descartes, the first thinker of modern metaphysics, inquires into the *usus rectus rationis*, i.e., *facultatis judicandi*, the correct use of reason, i.e., of the faculty of judgement. The essence of saying and asserting had already for a long time not been the Greek *logos*, i.e., *apophaineusthai*, the letting appear of the unconcealed. The essence of saying is now the Roman *judicium*—correct saying, i.e., attaining, with certainty, what is right. . . . Now, where all that matters is the *usus rectus rationis humanae*, falsity is conceived as *usus non rectus facultatis judicandi*. The *usus non rectus* is error, fault; or better: erring and error are conceived on the basis of the *usus non rectus facultatis judicandi*. The untrue is the false in the sense of the erroneous, i.e., in the sense of the wrong use of reason. (1992, 51-2)30

With Nietzsche the metaphysical interpretation of the essence of truth as “correctness,” as well as the modern metaphysics of securing-certainty, reaches its apex. “Even for Nietzsche the true is the right, that which is directed by what is real in order to adjust itself to it and make itself secure in it. The basic feature of reality is will to power. What is right must conform itself to the real, hence must express what the real says, namely the ‘will to power’” (1992, 52). There are
many names throughout the metaphysical tradition for what is true, but what prevails in this tradition is the representational ground of the essence of truth (as correctness) and the prevailing "imperial" disposition. "Truth is, in the West, veritas. The true is that which, on various grounds, is self-asserting, remains above, and comes from above; i.e., it is the command. But the 'above,' the 'highest,' and the 'lord' of lordship may appear in different forms. For Christianity, 'the Lord' is God. 'The lord' is also 'reason.' 'The lord' is the 'world-spirit.' 'The lord' is 'the will to power'" (1992, 53).

2.4 Sidney and the Imperial Subject

What has this history of the transformations of the essence of truth to do with Sidney's Defence? We had set out in our interpretation of Sidney with an end to determining whether or not poetry is conceived in representational terms. We arrived, more specifically, at the question of the nature of poiēsis as understood by Sidney. We determined that since the poet ranges within the "Zodiack of his owne wit," poiēsis for Sidney, in some sense, is a bringing forth grounded in the operations of the individual subject. Rather than accept the traditional definitions of Renaissance "individualism," we then proceeded to delineate the issues at stake in the unfolding of subjectivist metaphysics. We then came to the conclusion that the modern metaphysics of the subject is a particular fulfilment of the broadly "imperial" comportment to beings that marks the metaphysical tradition. We are now in a position to modify our questioning into the nature of poiēsis: is poiēsis, for Sidney, a bringing forth in the sense of a simultaneous bringing to a stand and bringing to a fall—that is, does it participate in the "imperial" comportment to beings? Is this bringing to a stand and bringing to a fall part of a general operation of securing a field of beings as objects and securing the certainty of the self as the vantage-ground of a high command? Is Sidney's poiēsis, in other words, a "subjective-imperial" positing? Let us turn, for a moment, to
the notion of the imperial subject within the thought of Renaissance humanism in order to answer this question.

Within the discourse of Renaissance humanists, the imperial subject rises, in some senses, to a height of "creativity" only equalled by God. According to Ficino, for instance, the mind "draws a line above the heavens beyond any limit in all directions" (Kristeller 1964, 57). Similarly, he says that men "are the inventors of innumerable arts," producing through them "by themselves whatever nature itself produces, as if we were not slaves, but the rivals of nature" (Platonic Theology 13.3; quoted in Levao). Cristoforo Landino also reflects these claims: "And the Greeks say 'poet' from the verb 'piin,' which is mid-way between creating, which is peculiar to God when out of nothing He bringeth anything forth into being, and making, which pertaineth to men when they compose with matter and form. For which cause albeit the feigning of the poet is not wholly of nought, yet it departeth from making and draweth near unto creating" (qtd. in Levao 107). For the humanists, then, the human subject is in some ways self-founding and self-securing.\(^3\) Human reason, and the right use of human reason, sets the measure and limits of things. The imperial subject, as what sets the measure and posits from its secure position, becomes the arché of beings within the domain of its procedures. We can see this notion of the self-founding productions of the imperial subject clearly in Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s Oration on the Dignity of Man. Here God reveals the power of the imperial subject at the Creation: “We have made thee neither of heaven nor of earth, neither mortal nor immortal, so that with freedom of choice and with honor, as though the maker and molder of thyself, thou mayest fashion thyself in whatever shape thou shalt prefer” (225).

The imperial subject secures itself by bringing the other to a stand, and thus bringing it to a fall (falsum). The positing of the other (hetero-), as what is “fallen,” enables the delimitation or
securing of the imperial position (the same) as that which is not-other, not-fallen, and thus standing and true (Verum). We can see this positing of the other within Renaissance thinking about poetry in terms of the linguistic construction of, what LeVao calls, a "heterocosm" (106; cf. also Berger 1988b). This linguistico-imperial operation is, perhaps, what is at stake in Sidney's claim that poetry constructs a "golden world" that surpasses and is apart from the world that nature produces. "Nature never set foorth the earth in so rich Tapistry as diverse Poets have done, neither with pleasaunt rivers, fruitfull trees, sweete smelling flowers, nor whatsoever els may make the too much loved earth more lovely: Her world is brasen, the Poets only deliver a golden" (8).

Greenblatt has shown that the early modern Europeans—including such Elizabethans as Puttenham and Daniel—conceived of the New World as a blank page on which the Europeans could inscribe their own culture, language, religion, and values. This conception, and its consequences, result in a peculiar "linguistic colonialism" according to Greenblatt (cf. 1990, 16-39). The New World is naked culturally according to this view; the inhabitants are also naked linguistically: their language is a non-language; it is merely a meaningless, barbaric chatter. According to this point of departure, the inhabitants of the New World must be taught English, the civilized language of the imperial state. For the Renaissance European, Greenblatt reports, "language is the perfect instrument of empire" (1990, 17). In this inscription of European culture and language on the seemingly blank page of the Americas, the Old World undertakes a certain positing and positioning of the New World. The New World is to arise within the parameters of the Old. Is the "golden world" that poetry creates a similar positing or inscription on the part of the European, poetic subject?

The linguistic construction of the other by means of the "other-" or "New-World"—as
“hetero-cosm” and as an inscription on a blank page—is, of course, one of the key ways in which we understand the imperial or colonial projects of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. To cite just one example, Stephen Greenblatt has shown that it was through pseudo-performative linguistic acts that Columbus “took possession” of the West Indies (1991, 52-85): “And there I found very many islands filled with people innumerable, and of them all I have taken possession for their highnesses, by proclamation made and with the royal standard unfurled, and no opposition was offered to me” (Columbus 2). Although the inhabitants of the island could not possibly have known the significance of the ritual of unfurling the “royal standard,” Columbus’s imperial operation involves the bringing of the Caribbean residents to a stand within the linguistic measure or community of the imperium—and thus the bringing of them to a fall. This linguistic operation is also effected through the act of (re-) naming the islands: “To the first island which I found, I gave the name San Salvador, in remembrance of the Divine Majesty, Who has marvelously bestowed all this; the Indians call it ‘Guanahani’” (Columbus 2). Naming, in this instance, has lost its essential sense as a “founding saying” or bringing into unconcealment. Naming within this imperial disposition is a procedure for the fixing of a region of beings in relation to the vantage of the commanding, sovereign-subject. Greenblatt also points out the curiosity of Columbus’s act of taking possession. “It did not, after all, occur to Marco Polo in the late thirteenth century to claim for the Venetians any territorial rights in the East or to rename any of the countries; nor in the fourteenth century did Sir John Mandeville unfurl a banner on behalf of a European monarch” (1991, 53). Greenblatt then demonstrates that the distinction lies in the fact that “Columbus was neither a merchant nor a pilgrim: he was on a state-sponsored mission from a nation caught up in the enterprise of the Reconquista” (1991, 53). Columbus’s relation to the New World, then, is based on a certain “command” (imperium): “the grant that Columbus received from Ferdinand
and Isabella speaks of Columbus as ‘going by our command, with certain vessels of ours and with our subjects, to discover and to gain certain islands and mainland in the Ocean Sea’” [my emphasis] (Greenblatt 1991, 53). Thus, when Columbus unfurls the “royal standard,” he speaks out of the position of “command,” out of the imperium of the nation-subject. This imperial bringing of the other to a stand within the linguistic domain of the same is secured in the written documents reporting the conquest:

The papers are carefully sealed, preserved, carried back across thousands of leagues of ocean to officials who in turn countersign and process them according to the procedural rules; the notarized documents are a token of the truth of the encounter and hence of the legality of the claim. Or rather they help to produce “truth” and “legality,” ensuring that the words Columbus speaks do not disappear as soon as their sounds fade, ensuring that the memory of the encounter is fixed, ensuring that there are not competing versions of what happened on the beach on October 12th. A priest may be said to facilitate a transaction with eternity, but an escrivano facilitates a transaction with a more immediately useful form of temporality, the institutional form secured by writing. (Greenblatt 1991, 57)

Through the positing of the New World (other) within the linguistic domain of the Old (same), the imperial position (vantage or high-command) defines itself.

Excursus: On the “Heterocosm” and Cannibalism

Through the imperial bringing of the other to a stand within the domain of the same, the European world sees in the “noble savage” a pristine state or instance of themselves. We saw this in relation to Columbus’s presumption that the natives of Guanahani would understand the European procedures for the acquisition of a territory. The natives, within the imperial outlook, are the Europeans themselves as they once existed, in a “pre-civilized” setting. In this way, the imperial outlook involves, as Brook Thomas asserts, a positing of the “synchronicity of the non-synchronous” (249)–in the contemporary cultural other, in the inhabitants of the New World during the sixteenth century, Renaissance Europe sees the synchronicity (“with-timeness”) of two epochs that are out of synch (“non-synchronous”): the European present and the “primitive” European
past. The explorers brought certain Old World conceptions of a purely “natural” existence to their experience of America. This “natural” existence was either understood according to the parameters of the “soft primitivism” of the golden age myth or it was understood in terms of the “hard primitivism” of a barbaric existence from which the civilizing arts provided a Promethean salvation. Often these two understandings are intertwined in the discourse of a single explorer. Vespucci’s account of his first voyage, for instance, whether or not the voyage “actually” occurred, oscillates between these two poles of imperial positing. On the one hand, because the natives of the mainland he supposedly encountered live with “no legal obligations” (96) and live according to nature (phasis) not custom or law (nomos), Vespucci thinks that they live a prelapsarian existence. The women, for instance, do not suffer the consequences of the Christian fall; the women, according to Vespucci, “delivered with very little pain” (96). Their existence is also akin to a classical golden age existence in that they live without greed and are “content with what nature freely offers them”: “Among them there is neither buying nor selling, nor is there an exchange of commodities, for they are quite content with what nature freely offers them. They do not value gold, nor pearls, nor gems, nor such other things as we consider precious here in Europe. In fact they almost despise them, and take no pains to acquire them” (98). On the other hand, the fact that they “observe no laws” also means, for Vespucci, that they are “barbarous” (95, 99), that they are “like the Tartars” (92).32 “They very rarely eat flesh, with the exception of human flesh; and in this they are so inhuman and so savage as to outdo even the wild animals. Indeed, all the enemies whom they either kill or capture, without discriminating between the men and the women, are relished by them with such savageness that nothing more barbarous and cruel can either be seen or heard of. Time and again it fell to my lot to see them engaged in this savage and brutal practice, while they expressed their wonder that we did not likewise eat our enemies”
Indeed, cannibalism seems to provoke the most horror within Vespucci’s account of the “barbarous” nature of the natives. However, even an “enlightened” account of the practices of cannibalism, that of Montaigne in “Of the Caniballes” (Essays I.30), involves a certain “imperial” bringing of the other to a stand within the domain of the same.

Montaigne begins the essay by pointing to a couple of examples in which what one person or group deems to be “barbarian” another group can see as “nothing barbarous”: “At what time King Pirrhus came into Italie, after he had survaide the marshalling of the Armie, which the Romaines sent against him: I wot not, said he, what barbarous men these are (for so were the Gréciens wont to call all strange nations) but the disposition of this Armie, which I see, is nothing barbarous. So said the Gréciens of that which Flaminius sent into their countrie: And Phillip viewing from a Tower the order and distribution of the Romaine campe, in his kingdome, under Publius Sulpitius Galba” (100). The Greeks, in their everyday thinking and dealing, thought of all foreign nations as “barbarous”: as inarticulate and unordered. The Greeks, in seeing the order and “distribution” of the Roman army, are forced to reconsider this general impression according to the examples Montaigne provides. The point of these stories, for Montaigne, and apparently the point of his own discourse on cannibalism, is that “a man ought to take heede, lest he overweeningly follow vulgar opinions, which should be measured by the rule of reason, and not by the common report” (100). Consequently, Montaigne’s “enlightened” position consists of not positing the practices of cannibalism performed by some in the New World as a barbarism: “I finde (as farre as I have beeene informed) there is nothing in that nation, that is either barbarous or savage, unlesse men call that barbarisme, which is not common to them” (101). Montaigne insists that this practice of labelling that which differs as barbaric arises out of a certain unthinking self-centeredness: “As indeede, we have no other ayme of truth and reason, then the example and
Idea of the opinions and customes of the countrie we live-in. There is ever perfect religion, perfect policie, perfect and compleate use of all things. They are even savage, as we call those fruities wilde, which nature of hir selfe, and of hir ordinarie progresse hath produced: whereas indeede, they are those which our selves have altered by our artificial devises, and diverted from their common order, we should rather terme savage” (101-02). From the perspective of civility, the self-emerging of fruit or the unfolding of a foreign people according to their own nature (phusis) is “wild” and “barbarous”; it must be brought within the bounds and controlling order of an external archē, technē; it must be “survaide” and viewed from a “Tower,” as do the “Gréciains.” Montaigne, however, reverses the meaning of these terms; since it involves the overcoming of what is natural, Montaigne calls the arts and institutions of civilization “wilde” and “barbarous.” “[T]here is no reason, arte should gaine the point of honour of our great and puissant mother Nature. We have so much by our inventions, surcharged the beauties and riches of hir workes, that we have altogether over-choaked hir: yet where-ever hir puritie shineth, she makes our vaine, and frivolous enterprises wonderfully ashamed” (102). At this point, in order to further buttress his argument as to the priority of phusis over technē, Montaigne quotes Propertius:

   Ivies spring better of their owne accord,  
   Un-hanted plots much fairer trees afford,  
   Birdes by no arte much sweeter notes record.

In short, phusis is the archē of the cannibal society and their ways of life; the “lawes of nature do yet commaund them, which are but little bastardized by ours” (102).

Because the “Caniballes” live in perfect accordance with the laws of nature, their society, according to Montaigne, rivals those imagined by the poets in their compositions about the golden age; it also rivals the musings of the philosophers as to the nature of the ideal society:
And that with such puritie, as I am sometimes grieved the knowledge of it came no sooner to light. . . . I am sorie, Licurgus and Plato had it not: for me seemeth that what in those nations wee see by experience, doth not onelie exceede all the pictures wherewith licentious Poesie hath prowedly imbellished the golden age, & al hir quaint inventions to faine a happy condition of man, but also the conception & desire of Philosophie. They could not imagine a genuitie so pure and simple, as we see it by experience; nor ever beleeeve our societie might be maintained with so little arte and humane combination. It is a nation, would I answere Plato, that hath no kinde of trafike, no knowledge of Letters, no intelligence of numbers, no name of magistrate, nor of politike superioritie; no use of service, of riches, or of poverty. . . . How dissonant would hee finde his imaginary common-wealth from this perfection? (102)

This raises certain questions about European conceptions of utopia and the golden age. What, for instance, is the general (Renaissance) European conception of “utopia” or of the “golden age” if, for Montaigne, they can be realized most fully in a non-European setting?

The term “utopia” was coined by Sir Thomas More in his book of the same title. We, today, categorize it as an “ideal” society and contrast it with its opposite: the most “hellish” society, a “dystopia.” Of course, there is a much broader and more essential sense to the term, of which we should be aware. More coined the term with an ambiguous Greek etymology in mind. In “utopia” there is the possibility of “[e]u-topia”: good place. There is also the possibility of “[o]u-topia”: no place. A utopia can be both a good place and a non-place; the latter aspect of utopia designates, perhaps, the sense that the good place is not a possibility, that all societies are varying degrees of “dystopias.” Perhaps a definition that synthesizes these aspects of the term, and its etymology—and the varying genres of “utopian” writing—would be that a utopia is an “imagined place”: it does not, materially speaking, exist; it is a mythico-fictive construction. It is an imaginative place (heterocosm) which lies outside of the parameters of present social norms and values. It is also an imaginative “outside” from which one can critique the standards of the society of the here and now; it presents other possibilities; it is the presentation of an “Other.” The presentation of other possibilities in utopian literature has traditionally taken two routes. (1) The imagined place
presents a "primitive" order, what, in the modern age, is called a "state of nature." Homer's Elysian Fields, the Garden of Eden, the golden age of Hesiod and Ovid, and the Arcadian settings of pastoral literature all provide examples of this mode of the imagined place. (2) The other mode is one in which the ordering principle of the imagined place is provided by foreign (to our own social way of thinking) laws and knowledge: the heterocosm, in this mode, has radically different customs, laws, or (in modern utopian literature) technology. We could turn to Plato's *Republic*, More's *Utopia*, Bacon's *New Atlantis*, or the whole gamut of contemporary science fiction for examples of this latter mode. This distinction of modes of utopian literature, obviously, relates to a theme with which, in relation to the question of representation more generally, we have already concerned ourselves: the distinction between *phusis* and *technē*. I am not saying, however, that the first (primitivist) mode of utopian fiction is one in which *phusis* is the origin and order of the society whereas in the second (technico-legal) mode *technē* is the origin and order. Rather, in both modes there is a certain self-emerging order within social relations and within the things themselves. The question is whether a certain linguistically constructed heterocosm founds itself on the bringing forth or on the overcoming of that self-emerging order. The distinction is between *technē I* and *technē II*.

For Montaigne, the cannibals fulfil and surpass the principles of the golden age, the first mode of utopian literature. Our primary sources for this story are Hesiod's *Works and Days* and Ovid’s *Metamorphoses*. Let us begin at the beginning. Hesiod describes the age of gold in the following way:

And now with art and skill I'll summarize
Another tale, which you should take to heart,
Of how both gods and men began the same.
The gods, who live on Mount Olympus, first
Fashioned a golden race of mortal men;
These lived in the reign of Kronos, king of heaven,
And like the gods they lived with happy hearts
Untouched by work or sorrow. Vile old age
Never appeared, but always lively-limbed,
Far from all ills, they feasted happily.
Death came to them as sleep, and all good things
Were theirs; ungrudgingly, the fertile land
Gave up her fruits unasked. Happy to be
At peace, they lived with every want supplied,
[Rich in their flocks, dear to the blessed gods.] (li 105-19, p 62)

The race of gold, according to Hesiod, lived in harmony with the gods; they were as one with the gods. They also lived in accord with "the fertile land." The land, nature or the earth, gave itself freely; it "Gave up her fruits unasked." In Hesiod's version of the golden age, as in the Garden of Eden in the Biblical Genesis, the self-emergence of nature shines forth in its utmost brilliance. Subsequently, this self-emerging and appearing withdraws, like the golden race itself which ends up "hidden in the ground" (li 120, p 62). This golden race and self-emergence of nature is contrasted, by Hesiod, with the way in which things arise in the present; Hesiod contrasts the golden age, that is, to the iron age.

I wish I were not of this race, that I
Had died before, or had not yet been born.
This is the race of iron. Now, by day,
Men work and grieve unceasingly; by night
They waste away and die. (li 179-83, p 64)

Hesiod's account of the age of gold and of the self-emergence of nature accords generally with Ovid's account.

For Ovid, too, the earth gave of itself freely during the age of gold; the earth produced without the technē of husbandry.

. . . The innocent earth
Learned neither spade nor plough; she gave her
Riches as fruit hangs from the tree: grapes
Dropping from the vine, cherry, strawberry
Ripened in silver shadows of the mountain,
And in the shade of Jove's miraculous tree,
The falling acorn. (33)

Ovid, however, also adds a few of his own images to this age of gold. He feels that the age of gold was one in which there was “Nothing forbidden in a book of laws” (33). Also, he feels that the race of gold was happy because it did not have “to sail uncharted seas” (33). It is only with the fall from the golden age, then, that we need, work and skill (technē), law (nomos), and the wandering and travel of conquest. As opposed to this, in the age of iron people are forced to sail the seas, to be ever adrift without a home or proper place on the earth: “The mountain oak, the pine were felled and stripped,/ Their long beams swaying above uncharted Ocean” (34). Most horribly, according to Ovid’s account, in the age of iron there is the dawning of greed and private interest:

Then land, once like the gift of sunlit air,
Was cut in properties, estates, and holdings:
Not only crops were hoarded; men invaded
Entrails of earth down deeper than the river
Where Death’s shades weave in darkness underground;
Where hidden from the sight of men Jove’s treasures
Were locked in night. There, in his sacred mines,
All that drives men to avarice and murder
Shone in the dark. . . . (34)

In invoking the stories of the golden age, then, Vespucci and Montaigne, in some ways, posit the Old World as akin to the greed of the iron age—both are spurred on by a lust for power and material possessions, both travel endlessly to fulfill this desire, and both rape the earth out of this lust.

Because it is, in fact, the native inhabitants of the New World that live more in tune with nature in its giving of itself freely—more in tune, that is, with what Europeans conceive to be a golden age or utopian existence—whereas the so-called “civility” of the Europeans involves a breaking away from what is natural, it is the latter group which truly deserves, for Montaigne,
to be called “barbarous” or unnatural. Thus, the practice of cannibalism is, for Montaigne, separated from the rules of reason; it is a form of barbarity. However, in encountering the cannibals, Europeans, according to Montaigne, should be made aware of the even greater degree to which they are barbarous themselves. Even with respect to war the cannibals are closer to the self-emerging abundance of nature.

We may then well call them barbarous in regarde of reasons rules, but not in respect of us that exceede them in all kinde of barbarisme. Their warres are noble and generous, and have as much excuse and beautie, as this humane infinitie may admit: they ayme at nought so much, and have no other foundation amongst them, but the meere jealouse of vertue. They contend not for the gaining of new landes for to this day they yet enjoy that naturall ubertie and fruitfullnesse, which without labouring-toyle, doth in such plenteous aboundance furnish them with all necessary things, that they neede not enlarge their limites. They are yet in that happy estate, as they desire no more, then what their naturall necessities direct them: whatsoever is beyond it, is to them superfluous. (104)

So, while the cannibals strike the average Europeans with wonder due to their “barbarity,” the cannibals, likewise, find certain European practices strange or “amazing”:

they answered three things, the last of which I have for gotten, and am very sorie for-it, the other two I yet remember. They saide, First, they found-it very strange, that so many tall men with long beardes, strong and well armed, as were about the Kings person (it is very likely they meant the Swizers of his guard) would submit themselves to obey a beardless child, and that we did not rather chuse one amongst them to command the rest. Secondly (they have a maner of phrase whereby they call men but a moytie of men from others.) They had perceived, there were men amongst us full gorged with all sorts of commodities, and others which, hunger-starven, and bare with neede and povertie, begged at their gates: and found it strange, these moyties so needle could endure such an injustice, and that they tooke not the others by the throte, or set fire on their houses. (106)

What is at stake in these discourses of the heterocosm? What is at issue in Columbus’s, Vespucci’s, and Montaigne’s accounts of the cultural practices of the New World? What is at stake in the stories of the golden age as presented by Hesiod and Ovid or in the descriptions of various utopias from Plato’s Republic to More’s Utopia, Bacon’s New Atlantis and beyond? For our purposes, the key question at issue is whether or not the linguistic construction and mediation of
the imagined place manifests itself as a securing of that which is foreign, as a bringing of the foreign-other to a fall within the linguistic parameters of the same? That is, is it akin to what we saw in the case of Columbus: an imperial re-naming and linguistic possession taking? The other alternative would be that the language which describes this imagined place is an essential language; it names and first founds alternate possibilities; it is a linguistic "bringing forth"; it is language as "founding saying." Let us continue to reflect on the first way in which we can see the linguistic construction of the New World—that is, as the "linguistic colonialism" of the New World—in terms of de Certeau's interpretation of Montaigne's essay. According to de Certeau, even a discourse as ostensibly anti-imperialistic as Montaigne's involves a certain imperial mastery over and securing of the foreign. How so?

De Certeau isolates what he calls a "heterological" tradition in Western literature: a discourse of the other that is seemingly authorized by the other, that is seemingly unmediated. It begins as early as Herodotus: "Book IV of Herodotus' Histories, devoted to the Scythians, proceeds in the same manner; it is twice mentioned in the essay 'Of Cannibals,' and forms its fundamental precondition (in an 'archaeological' history of the 'Savage'). It combines a representation of the other (which places in opposition the Scythian nomad and the Athenian city-dweller, or the barbarian no-place and the Greek oikoumene) and the fabrication and accreditation of the text as witness of the other" (1986, 68). According to de Certeau, Montaigne's essay is "inscribed within this heterological tradition, in which the discourse about the other is a means of constructing a discourse authorized by the other. It exhibits the same structural features as the fourth book of Herodotus, although it makes different use of them" (68). Thus, despite Montaigne's manifest intentions, "Of the Caniballes" falls within the typical travel tale structure—and thus the structure
of Columbus's letters, Vespucci's letters, and More's *Utopia*.

The essay develops in three stages which give it the structure of a travel account. First comes the outbound journey: the search for the strange, which is presumed to be different from the place assigned it in the beginning by the discourse of culture. This *a priori* of difference, the postulate of the voyage, results in a rhetoric of distance in travel accounts. It is illustrated by a series of surprises and intervals (monsters, storms, lapses of time, etc.) which at the same time substantiate the alterity of the savage, and empower the text to speak from elsewhere and command belief. Montaigne begins with the same initial postulate. . . . It consists in establishing a distance from nearby representations: first, from common opinion (which talks about "barbarians" and "savages"), then from the ancient sources (Plato's Atlantis and the pseudo-Aristotle's island), and finally from contemporary information (the cosmography of the period, Thévet, etc.). Faced with these increasingly authoritative discourses, the essay only repeats: that's not it, that's not it. . . . The critique of proximities places both the savage and the narrator at a distance from our own lands. (1986, 69)

The second part of the travel tale, according to de Certeau, entails a description of the "savage body"—that is, of the cultural other in terms of its social, anatomic, and spiritual differences. Montaigne's essay also contains this type of description of the strange, other world: by means of his description of the practices of cannibalism and polygamy. Finally, the travel tale generally describes the return voyage: the return of the traveller and the reception of his or her authoritative discourse. Montaigne's essay embodies this aspect of the travel tale in the form of the picture of the cannibals in France and their disgust with certain aspects of French society.

De Certeau asserts, in short, that in attempting to allow the other to speak, Montaigne undertakes all of the classical procedures for the isolation and securing of the other as what is known by the traveller-self. What Brook Thomas says in regard to Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*, then, could also be applied to Montaigne's "Of the Caniballes":

Ironically, then, a project that seems intent on decentering a Eurocentric point of view turns out to be the most Eurocentric of all. For just as Conrad's story [and Montaigne's essay] can be read, not as a story about Africa [or the New World], but
actually as a story about Europe, so the decentering set in motion by Europe’s
encounter with “the Other” can be read as a statement about European thought, not
about that which is foreign to it. Thinking we are encountering something outside of
ourselves or Western culture, we end up merely discovering “the Other” within
ourselves, a discovery that could be described as the most imperialistic of all, since
what was once thought to be truly different is now absorbed into a system that
accounts for its own decentering. In the meantime, “the Other” seems to be of interest
only in so far as it can help the West in its own task of self-definition. (246)

This is what is at issue in the fact that the imperial encounter with “the Other” as heterocosm—in
Columbus’s, Vespucci’s, and Montaigne’s encounters with the New World through the medium
of the golden age myths of the Old World or Hythloday’s encounter with Utopia by means of the
classical texts of Greece and Rome—manifests itself as an encounter with a repressed or forgotten
aspect of the imperial self (a “counter-memory”). This implicates metaphysico-imperial thought
as well. Perhaps the lofty pursuit of the metaphysicians, the pursuit of the ultimate meanings and
possibilities of things, has been, all along, merely a repetition, in some concealed manner, of the
same, of the already defined nature of things. Perhaps, too, the poetic construction of a “golden
world” is also merely a repetition, in some concealed manner, of the “brasen” world of the pre-
existing. In order to inquire into this notion further, let us return to Sidney’s conception of the
“golden world” as heterocosm at this point.

With these notions of the heterocosm in mind, we can see the ways in which Sidney’s
conceptualization of the poetic construction of a world is based on the imperial operation of
bringing the other to a stand within the domain of the same, of defining the self by means of the
encounter with “the Other”; it is based, to some extent, on a certain “linguistic colonialism.” That
is, in some ways the poetic construction of a world, for Sidney, is an imperial operation akin to
that of Columbus: an imperial (re-) naming that masters beings as present at hand, a mastering-knowing (*technē II*). Sidney’s poetico-golden world, on the other hand, can also be a naming as founding saying: one that brings forth the true in its self-emerging, a shepherding of being, a receptive knowing (*technē I*). Sidney’s conception of *poieīsis* participates in both determinations. Let us, at this point, ascertain, briefly, in what ways Sidney is “embedded” in a certain colonial or imperial determination of the nation and of the poetic.

The poet, for Sidney, “in the *noblest* nations and languages that are knowne” [my emphasis], is the one that allows the nation to be a nation; poetry starts them on the path of (mastering-) knowing. Poets, “draw with their charming sweetnesse the *wild untamed* wits to an admiration of knowledge” [my emphasis]. The linguistic construction of a golden world is, in this way, a construction of the civilized or “noblest nations” out of the “wild untamed” barbarian. “So as *Amphion*, was said to moove stones with his Poetry, to build *Thebes*, and *Orpheus* to be listened to by beasts, indeed stony and beastly people. So among the *Romans*, were *Livius, Andronicus*, and *Ennius*, so in the Italian language, the first that made it aspire to be a treasure-house of Science, were the Poets *Dante, Bocace*, and *Petrarch*. So in our English, wer *Gower* and *Chawcer*, after whom, encouraged & delighted with their excellent foregoing, others have followed to bewtify our mother toong, aswel in the same kind as other arts” (*DoP* 4). Sidney creates a genealogy of the “noblest nations and languages” of poetic knowing: the Greeks, the Romans, the Italians, and the English. For each of these nations, poetry provides the decisive civilizing factor: knowledge. This is another example of how thinking about poetry was tied to the thinking about rhetoric. In the preface to his *The Arte of Rhetorique*, Thomas Wilson makes a similar point: “whereas men lived brutishly in open feelds, having neither house to shroude them in, nor attire
to clothe their backes, nor yet any regard to seeke their best aviale, these [orators] appointed by GOD called them together by utterance of speech, and perswaded with them what was good, what was bad, & what was gainful for mankind. And . . . being somewhat drawne and delited with the pleasantnesse of reason, and the sweetnesse of utterance: after a certaine space they became . . .

. of wilde, sober: of cruell, gentle: of fooles, wise: and of beastes, men: such force hath the tongue, and such is the power of Eloquence and reason, that most men are forced, even to yeeld in that which most standeth against their will” (27). The nations with the civilizing poet-orator stand on a high ground of knowledge as distinct from those without this civilizing knowledge.

There were many precedents for this assertion that the poet-orator is the nurse of human civilization. Horace provides the classical source for this notion:

When primitive men roamed the forests,
Orpheus, the sacred interpreter of heavenly will,
Turned them away from killing and living like beasts
And hence is said to have tamed wild lions and tigers.
Amphion is said, as founder of the city of Thebes,
To have moved the stones and led them wherever he wished
By the sound of his lyre and the winning appeal of his voice.
This was the wisdom of former times: to distinguish
Public from private concerns and sacred from common,
To forbid impromptu liasons and makes rules for marriage,
To build towns and carve out the laws on pillars of wood.
The poets who taught by expressing these things were acclaimed:
They and their works were considered divine. (“The Art of Poetry” 390-401)

In the Renaissance, Giovanni Boccaccio, in *Genealogy of the Gods*, Angelo Poliziano, in *Nutricia*, and George Puttenham, in *The Arte of English Poesie*, had made similar claims concerning the civilizing power of the poet-orator (cf. Hardison 40, 67). One way in which to interpret this conception of poetry as the first knowledge—as the “Monarch” of sciences (*DoP* 19)—is to see in it a Renaissance emphasis on the fact that poetry, “like oratory, is a source of power” (Hardison
Another way, which I will outline in the next section, is to see these statements as unrelated to the consolidation (or, even the subversion) of pre-existing power dynamics, but as the assertion of the essential founding power of the poetic word.

Within the first interpretation of the civilizing function of poetry, the imperial position, in its upright standing as true (*verum*), rests on the bringing to a stand (and to a fall) of the other (*falsum*). For this reason, Sidney provides a “counter-genealogy of the barbarian” which, Interestingly, also has civilizing poetic-knowledge.\(^\text{34}\)

In *Turkey*, besides their lawgiving Divines, they have no other writers but Poets. In our neighbour Countrey *Ireland*, where truly learning goes verie bare, yet are their Poets held in a devout reverence. Even among the most barbarous and simple *Indians*, where no writing is, yet have they their Poets who make & sing songs which they call *Arentos*. . . . In *Wales*, the true remnant of the auncient *Britons*, as there are good authorities to shew, the long time they had Poets which they called *Bardes*: so thorow all the cõquests of *Romans, Saxons, Danes*, and *Normans*, some of whom, did seeke to ruine all memory of learning from among them, yet do their Poets even to this day last. . . . (*DoP* 5-6)

Here, although these people lack the knowledge and civility of the “noblest nations,” they still have poetry. In fact, Wales still has it despite the imperial attempt by the noble Romans and others to wipe it out. The barbarian peoples are brought to a stand within the imperial-linguistic domain of poetry. It is assumed that they all have and experience poetry—despite the fact that they refer to it by different names: poems as *Arentos*, or the poet as *Bard*. The imperial operation, as with Columbus, involves a bringing to a stand within the domain of the *imperium* through the possessive or controlling naming that makes the other equivalent to the same. This is accompanied by the trick of bringing the other to a fall, and thus securing the stability of the imperial position, by then distinguishing between the non-knowledge (un-truth) of the other and the knowledge (truth) of the same. It is for this reason that the last section of Sidney’s *Defence* takes on the task
of revitalizing the national poetry of England. The barbarous possession of poetry is used as a contrast for what “proper” English poetry should be.\textsuperscript{35}

\textit{Poie\=sis as Founding Saying}

Occasioning [or, \textit{poie\=sis}] has to do with the presencing [\textit{Anwesen}] of that which at any given time comes to appearance in bringing-forth. Bringing-forth brings hither out of concealment into unconcealment. (“QCT” 11)

Within the “subjective-imperial” disposition discussed above, within its positing-bringing-to-a-fall of the other and securing of the self as subject or nation, there is an alternative expressed: rather than always and only a positing (based on \textit{homoio\=sis}, \textit{adaequatio}, \textit{rectitudo}, or \textit{certitudo}), \textit{poie\=sis} is also experienced as a “founding saying.” When experienced as an essentially poetic-founding word, \textit{poie\=sis}, as understood by Sidney, is a \textit{mythos}, a “primal word.” \textit{Mythos} is the Greek for the word that expresses what is to be said before all else. The essence of \textit{mythos} is thus determined on the basis of \textit{al\=etheia}. It is \textit{mythos} that reveals, discloses, and lets be seen [\textit{logos}]; specifically, it lets be seen what shows itself in advance and in everything as that which presences in all ‘presence’” (Heidegger 1992, 60).

The importance of the primal word (\textit{mythos}) as experienced by the Greeks can be seen in the fact that the Muses “open the \textit{kosmos}” according to the Greek way of thinking. The second section of the \textit{Phaedrus} begins with a reference to the Muses through a description of the myth of the cicadas. Socrates and Phaedrus, enjoying the beauty of the bank of the Illyses, hear the song of the cicadas. Socrates points out that the cicadas originally descended from human beings who lived before the time of the Muses. As the Muses sprang forth into existence, their songs so enchanted some humans that they forgot about food, wanting only to sing, and were changed into cicadas. As Ernesto Grassi points out, “[t]he myth of the cicadas is at first a strange one. What, for
instance, is the meaning of the condition of man 'before' the birth of the Muses? Why should men have been so fascinated by the Muses and their work that they went so far as to forget about food?” (1983, 13). The key to understanding this mystery is the order which the Muses represent. “Order of movements appears in the dance, order of tones in song, and order of words in verse” (Grassi 1983, 14). In the Laws, Plato writes: “order in movement is called rhythm, order in articulation—the blending of acute with grave—pitch” (665a).

This reference to the “order of movement” seems particularly significant because movement [kinēsis] represents a fundamental phenomenon in the realm of existence; whatever is perceived through it shows a certain becoming, that is, a movement in itself (change) or in space (locomotion). To order the process of becoming, however, means to harness it into measure, thereby preventing it from flowing out into the unlimited. Through the application of a measure, movement proceeds within certain barriers and under certain laws; it is, so to speak, “arranged.” Thus, the Muses appear as divinities bringing order so as to let a kosmos appear in the double sense of world and ornament. (Grassi 1983, 14)

Being is the self-arising into appearance within the proper limits (peras) of a being; Being, as phusis, is the self-placing into the appearance-form of morphē and the movement (kinēsis) in measure that is the “rhythm” (hruthmos) of the being. Technē is the violent bringing to a stand that arranges, composes (poiēsis), and sets forth these limits; however, technē can only bring to a stand in the sense of bring within a measure inasmuch as it is a receptive heeding of the measure that Being gives of itself. The primordial and essential way in which technē manifests itself as this receptive bringing to a stand is in poiēsis—the bringing forth into appearance out of itself. Mythos is the primal word, the primordial technē-poiēsis. The Greeks experience this primal word that sings forth the kosmos in terms of the Muses: “The Muses ‘open’ a cosmos: they design an ordered world where everything appears within its respective boundaries according to its own nature” (Grassi 1983, 15).
We often think the Greeks determined "myth" to be merely the opposite of rational or true discourse as logos. However, as essentially thought, mythos, the primal word, is akin to logos in its essential meaning—that is, not in terms of the logos as "assertion" (logos apophantikos) which, in order to be a true assertion (logos alethes), must correspond (homoiōsis) with what is true, the unconcealed (alethes), as the pre-given. Rather than correspond to the pre-given, rather than present again (re-present) what gives itself in its presencing, logos is primordially the "letting be seen" or making manifest of what arises. Logos, as a letting be seen out of hiddenness, is a concealing revealing based on the essence of truth as aletheia. The disclosing that is truth (aletheuein) manifests itself most clearly in legein, or the logos: "Thus aletheuein shows itself most immediately in legein. Legein ("to speak") is what most basically constitutes human Dasein. In speaking Dasein expresses itself—by speaking about something, about the world. This legein was for the Greeks so preponderant and such an everyday affair that they acquired their definition of man in relation to, and on the basis of, this phenomenon and thereby determined man as zoon logon echon" (Heidegger 1997, 12). This determination of logos is also the primordial sense in which the Greeks experienced the sign (sema): as a reserved showing forth. In demonstrating this, Heidegger refers to the second book of the Iliad (B 348):

prin kai Dios aigiochoio
gomenai ei te pseudos huposchesis ei te kai ouki

Voss translates:
(as) "previously, from the lightning-thrower we knew whether he was out to deceive us or not."
The reference is to Zeus, and the event called to mind took place the day the Greeks in Argos boarded their ships to go to Troy.
astrapon epidexi', enaisima semata phainon

Voss translates:
"On the right his lightning flashed, a sign portending good fortune."
Literally translated, the verse says, "Zeus, slingling his lightning bolts to the right and
letting appear propitious signs." In the first passage quoted these signs are called *huposchesis*. The best translation would be our word "reservation," but this is fixed too much in a certain direction of meaning because of the Latin word *reservatio*. *Huposchesis* means a holding out and holding forth, a showing which holds forth and at the same time holds something back, and hence does not show. It belongs to the essence of *sema*, the sign, that it itself shines (shows itself) and in this appearing also indicates something else: the sign, in appearing itself, lets something else appear. The lightning bolts going to the right are a portent. Since they are on the right, they let something propitious appear, though to be sure in such a way that they, as signs, still hold back and veil the outlook of the upcoming course of the campaign against Troy. (Heidegger 1992, 31-2)

Here, it is not a question of the sign (*sema*) being understood as a representational icon, symbol, or index of another pre-existing thing; rather, as is the case with the essential *logos*, the sign (*sema*) shows forth a being in the unhiddenness of the open, while at the same time sheltering and reserving it in concealment.

The essential sense of the poetic word--the essential sense of *poiēsis* as "primal word" (*mythos*), as *logos*, as *sema*--is occulted and forgotten within the metaphysical tradition; this oblivion accompanies the oblivion of Being in the primordial sense of *alētheia*. The representational understanding of the poetic word is based on a representational transformation of the primordial meaning of *sema*. Let us consider the following, a standard metaphysical text about the nature of the sign (*sema*):

One crucial consideration that enters into any analysis of representation is the *relationship* between the representational material and that which it represents. A stone may stand for a man, but how? By virtue of *what* "agreement" or understanding does representation occur? Semioticians generally differentiate three types of representational relationships under the names of icon, symbol, and index. An iconic account of the relation "stone-represents-man" would stress *resemblance*: a certain stone might stand for a man because it is upright, or because it is hard, or because its shape resembles that of a man. ("Mimesis" and "imitation" are thus iconic forms of representation that transcend the differences between media: I can imitate--i.e., mimic or produce a resemblance of--a sound, speech act, gesture, or facial expression and, thus, iconically reproduce it; icons are not just pictures.) Symbolic representations,
by contrast, are not based on the resemblance of the sign to what it signifies but on arbitrary stipulation: the stone stands for a man because "we say so," because we have agreed to regard it this way. Representation in language is "symbolic," in that letters, words, and whole texts represent sounds and states of affairs without in the least resembling what they represent. Indexical representation, finally, explains "standing for" in terms of cause and effect or some "existential" relation like physical proximity or connectedness: the stone represents a man because a man set it up as a marker, to indicate (like a trace or footprint) the fact that he was here; a glove, a strand of hair, or a fingerprint are, to the skillful detective, all representations by "indication" of the person who left them behind. (Mitchell 14)

This is the way in which the poetic word, as logos-sema, is understood within the metaphysical tradition. The sign (sema), since it is no longer understood out of the essence of alētheia, ceases to be a reserved showing forth of a being in its Being. Rather, the sign is determined and ordered by its referent-origin as external archē. The sign is "true" inasmuch as it "accords"—within the different modes of accordance mentioned here—with the referent-origin. This representational transformation of the sign also forms the basis of the "crisis of representation," where will or intention cannot properly be represented or accorded with action or expression, where verba does not reveal res.

Representation is that by which we make our will known and, simultaneously, that which alienates our will from ourselves in both the aesthetic and political spheres. The problem with representation might be summarized by reversing the traditional slogan of the American Revolution: instead of "No taxation without representation," no representation without taxation. Every representation exacts some cost, in the form of lost immediacy, presence, or truth, in the form of a gap between intention and realization, original and copy. (Mitchell 21)

The representational conception of the poetic word or sign comes to the Renaissance through the metaphysical tradition: through the transformations of the essence of truth—from alētheia to homoiōsis to rectitudo to adaequatio.

2.5 The Medieval Representational Word
In the Christian Middle Ages, existence itself is experienced as "signs," in effect, representing a Divine intention. As David Lyle Jeffrey points out, "whereas we speak with words, God speaks with things, persons, and events, preeminently so in the event of the Incarnation" (1990, 37); similarly, he asserts that for the Christian tradition "creation is a language, speaking forth the divine chabod" (43; cf. also, Robertson 76). This notion of the referential nature of existence is clearly traced to a Pauline source: "For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen; being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead" (Romans 1:20). In fact, Augustine refers to this passage when asserting, in reference to the phase in his life in which he was a Skeptic, that he should have known that Truth existed because it makes itself known through creation: "And, far off, I heard your voice saying I am the God who IS [Exodus 3:14]. I heard your voice, as we hear voices that speak to our hearts, and at once I had no cause to doubt. I might more easily have doubted that I was alive than that Truth had being. For we catch sight of the Truth, as he is known through his creation" (1961, VII.10). 

Because existence itself is a referential sign of God's Will, the distinction between physical things and actual signs is a rather subtle one. This is one of the first delineations Augustine tries to make in his *On Christian Doctrine*:

All doctrine concerns either things or signs, but things are learned by signs. Strictly speaking, I have called a "thing" that which is not used to signify something else, like wood, stone, cattle, and so on; but not that wood concerning which we read that Moses cast it into bitter waters that their bitterness might be dispelled, nor that stone which Jacob placed at his head, nor that beast which Abraham sacrificed in place of his son. For these are things in such a way that they are also signs of other things. There are other signs whose whole use is in signifying, like words. For no one uses words except for the purpose of signifying something. From this may be understood what we call "signs"; they are things used to signify something. Thus every sign is
also a thing, for that which is not a thing is nothing at all; but not every thing is also a sign (1958, 1.2.2)

According to Augustine’s description, a thing is that which exists unto itself; a sign, although a thing unto itself, is that which also signifies, refers to, a thing beyond itself. Beyond the mere human conventions of signification, however, all things, like all signs, refer to something beyond themselves. The sign, as a human institution, is intended to be used to refer to the thing it signifies. The sign is the expression of the mind of a human speaker: “Conventional signs are those which living creatures show to one another for the purpose of conveying, in so far as they are able, the motion of their spirits or something which they have sensed or understood” (1958, 2.2.3). For this reason, the sign is not as important as the thing to which it refers. Thus, one should not dwell on a sign used within an utterance; rather, according to the intention of the one who utters, the receiver should use the sign as a reference to a created thing. To dwell on the sign for its own sake, according to Augustine, would be to “enjoy” the sign: “To enjoy something is to cling to it with love for its own sake. To use something, however, is to employ it in obtaining that which you love, provided it is worthy of love” (1958, 1.4.4). The sign, obviously, is to be “used” rather than “enjoyed”—used as a reference to the thing it was intended to signify.

Here we can see the relation between the representational conception of truth and Being and a relegation of the poetic word or sign as a false representation (as an incorrect presentation, a presenting that does not correspond to the original)—following, of course, Plato’s denigration of art in Book X of The Republic: “Again, if I should ask which of these would be forgotten with greater inconvenience to our life, to read and write or those poetic fables, who does not discern the answer of every man who has not completely lost his mind? Therefore, as a boy I sinned when
I preferred those inane tales to more useful studies, or rather when I hated the one and loved the other” (Augustine 1961, I.xiii). Even if the poetic word is not a “fable” and the sign is “true” inasmuch as it “accords” with what is deemed before hand as true (Divine Intention), then the poetic word and sign are relegated, as are all phenomena, as the mere epiphenomena of the true (the original sending) which they merely represent (re-send). We see this in the fact that things, within the essential experience of the Middle Ages, are not to be “enjoyed” (that is, related to and known) as what they are in themselves:

Just as I began, when I was writing about things, by warning that no one should consider them except as they are, without reference to what they signify beyond themselves, now when I am discussing signs I wish it understood that no one should consider them for what they are but rather for their value as signs which signify something else. A sign is a thing which causes us to think of something beyond the impression the thing itself makes upon the senses. Thus if we see a track, we think of the animal that made the track; if we see smoke, we know that there is a fire which causes it; if we hear the voice of a living being, we attend to the emotion it expresses; and when a trumpet sounds, a soldier should know whether it is necessary to advance or to retreat, or whether the battle demands some other response. (1958, 2.1.1)

We are to “use” earthly things “so that by means of corporal and temporal things we may comprehend the eternal and spiritual” (1958, 1.4.4). Here “use,” in the unfolding of the “imperial” disposition of the tradition, means that the earth becomes the territory of action (use) directed to the end of securing salvation: mere physical existence must be brought to a fall (in its being constituted as the falsum) in its being brought to a stand. The “use” of the corporal—as what is brought to a fall in its falsity—for the securing of salvation becomes, in modern metaphysics, the positing of an “objective” domain of beings in relation to the secured (certain) subject. Today, with the apex of the certain subject’s climb to a height of vantage from which it can absolutely judge existence, beings arise as that which are used and consumed in the securing of technological
procedures (*technē II*).

That things are determined in their "use," according to the nature of willing at work in the "use," is also, interestingly, a prevalent medieval argument in defence of poetic fiction. Since that which exists is good in itself, it is not reasonable to despise anything which exists. Even when the flesh seems to be that which prevents us from achieving communion with God, the flesh is not to be blamed. Rather, it is the "evil habit" of the flesh which makes it sometimes unruly and unwilling to submit itself to the spirit (mind). This evil habit can only be the result of an evil will which corrupts the perfect order. "In view of all this, do you think it is right to blame silver and gold because of greedy men, or food and wine because of gluttons and drunkards, or the feminine form because of fornicators and adulterers . . . ?" (1968, 1.15.33); in a like manner, Augustine points out that, "the physician puts fire to a good use while the poisoner uses bread for his wicked purposes" (1968, 1.15.33). Thus, it is not the things themselves which deserve appraisal; rather, it is the way in which they are used, the wills or intentions which they serve, which should be judged: "in all things of this kind we are to be commended or reprimanded, not because of the nature of the things which we use, but because of the motive in using them and the way in which they are desired" (1958, 3.12.19). 43 We can see this belief that things are intrinsically good and only corrupted if serving bad intentions well into the Renaissance. For instance, Boccaccio uses this argument to defend the content of his stories:

[T]hese tales, like all other things, may be harmful or useful, according to whoever listens to them. Who does not recognize wine as a very good thing for the healthy, according to Cinciglione and Scolaio and many others, and yet it is harmful to anyone with a fever? Shall we say because wine harms those with a fever that it is evil? Who does not realize that fire is most useful, and even more, necessary to mankind? Because it destroys homes, villages, and cities, shall we say that it is wicked? In like manner, weapons defend the lives of those who wish to live peacefully, and they also
(on many occasions) kill men, not because of any wickedness inherent in them but because those who wield them do so in an evil way. . . . Everything is, in itself good for some determined goal, but badly used it can also be harmful to many; and I can say the same of my stories. [my emphasis] (1977, 144-5)

Similarly, George Gascoigne, also in the context of defending the value of his literature, uses this argument: “it is your using (my lustie Gallants) or misusing of these Posies that may make me praysed or dispraysed for publishing the same” (243). Finally, Sidney uses examples very similar to Boccaccio’s in order to defend the premise that poetry is good in itself and only corrupted by misuse:

Do we not see the skill of Physicke the best ramper to our often assaulted bodies, being abused, teach poyson the most violent destroyer? Doth not knowledge of Law, whose end is, to even & right all things, being abused, grow the crooked fosterer of horrible injuries? Doth not (to go to the highest) Gods word abused, breed heresie, and his name abused, become blasphemie? Truly a Needle cannot do much hurt, and as truly (with leave of Ladies be it spoken) it cannot do much good. With a swoord thou maist kill thy Father, and with a swoord thou maist defend thy Prince and Countrey. (31)

In these seeming defences of the poetic word, an “imperial” disposition speaks: the poetic word is “used” in its being brought to a fall, the “fall into the exteriority of meaning” (Derrida 1974, 12-3), for the securing of salvation. This is what is at stake in the didactic arguments for poetry. Here, the poetic word is a veil that makes the Divine Word, the instruction, all the more enjoyable; in another variation of this, the poetic word, the metaphor or allegory, is a sugar-coating allowing us to swallow the pill of doctrine. The necessity of obscurity, the poetic veil, in scripture is a commonplace in medieval thinking following Augustine. “The more these things seem to be obscured by figurative words, the sweeter they become when they are explained” (1958, 4.5.15). Literary obscurity, the poetic word as veil, then, is praised as the medium to a doctrinal end. It is praised inasmuch as it is set up and brought to a “fall” (as
exterior, not fully present, meaning) and thus secures the imperial standpoint through doctrine. The poetic veil or obscurity is considered to be, like rhetoric or eloquence—since obscurity is a type of eloquence (1958, 4.6.9)—necessary for the teaching of truth (1958, 4.2.3).  

2.6 The Medieval and Humanist Poetic Word — As Rooted in Alētheia

The nature of this poetic veiling as it is experienced in medieval thinking points to a non-representational possibility. The conflictual essence of truth as alētheia can be heard as a faint echo in these medieval statements pertaining to the nature of the poetic word. The medieval experience of truth is one of a dynamic un-concealing. God, as the supreme truth of existence, is un-concealed through His creation. The created order, like a dark glass, conceals divine being, yet it also shows it forth. As Augustine illustrates, “to the extent that we in this life enjoy Him ‘through a glass’ or ‘in a dark manner’ [I Cor. 13.12] we shall sustain our pilgrimage with more tolerance and more ardently desire to end it” (1958, I.30). That is, the divine is shown forth in an “analogical” manner. In this way, as Jeffrey points out, and despite immediate appearances, the referential nature of existence as conceived in medieval thought differs from the representational—“imperial” determination of truth that is the tradition of Platonism: rather than being a matter of mastering pure forms through the education of the self, which would be akin to the pride of Babel, referentiality means that this world’s things “are seen as an insight, as informed by the glory of God which descends into the world, and of which glory the created order is . . . a lively ‘imagination’” (1979, 6).

Accordingly, the poetic veil, as a participation in the essence of truth as alētheia, is a concealing-sheltering that simultaneously brings forth into the unhidden. While making Divine instruction sweeter or more enjoyable, the poetic veil also holds back the Divine. That is, the
Divine is ineffable: “Have we spoken or announced anything worthy of God? Rather I feel that I have done nothing but wish to speak: if I have spoken I have not said what I wished to say. Whence do I know this except because God is ineffable” (1958, 119).47 The sign, then, is not a transparent representation. Also, the poetic veil holds back the meaning from the uninitiated, thus preserving the truth in its reserved and precious nature. Of course, this is the dominant aesthetic stance of the Middle Ages: from Richard de Bury’s attack on the lovers of “naked truth,” to Pierre Bersuire’s defence of Ovid’s fables (citing the fact that fables can also be found in Holy Scripture), to Dante’s, Petrarch’s, and Boccaccio’s belief that obscurity exists in order to keep truth out of the reach of the “common herd.” Augustine, similarly, felt that one of the functions of obscurity is to keep the ignorant in the dark (1958, 2.16.24). All of the attention paid by medieval exegetes to the allegorical meaning behind the obscure figure or poetic veil, then, does not mean that they “neglected the literal sense”; that is, they did not exalt the spirit and despise the letter; rather, “condemnations are directed against the letter only insofar as it is taken without the spirit, and not against the letter itself. To use an analogy, medieval authors condemn the flesh, not because they have forgotten that ‘no man hates his own flesh,’ but because they wish to condemn the flesh as it operates without the guidance of the spirit” (Robertson 303).

According to Derrida, logocentrism, as well as defining the entity in terms of full presence, also scorns any mediation of that fully present entity: “The epoch of the logos thus debases writing considered as mediation of mediation and as a fall into the exteriority of meaning” (1974, 12-13). Is the medieval relation to the poetic word solely “logocentric”? A brief consideration of what we have already said should lead us to answer this question in the negative.48 We have seen that the nature of the existence of the sign, for Augustine, like that of the thing, is conceived to be
referential. We have seen that this referentiality means a bringing to a fall of that which is "used" with an end to securing salvation. We have also seen, though, that there is an "alethic" structure to medieval referentiality. Although referentiality means that the sign is not to be valued as much as that to which it refers, it also means that the sign is good in itself; the sign is not corrupt or contemptible. Although signs, like all human institutions, are only imperfect copies of the perfect ordering of things—Divine Law [nomos = "institution" or "law"] (1958, 2.26.40)—these institutions are useful, even necessary, if used charitably (1958, 2.25.38-9): "they should not neglect those human institutions helpful to social intercourse in the necessary pursuits of life" (1958, 2.39.58). Similarly, Augustine implicitly refers to the ancient Greek conception of the "word uttered" and the "word remaining within"—logos prophorikos and logos endiathetos (Jeffrey and Morris 459)—while explicating the Johannine description of Christ as the Word (1988, 1.8.1-3; cf. also, Aquinas Q.4 Art.1). In Derrida’s terms, the uttered word would constitute a fall into mediation for the medieval thinker—a fall into that which separates us from the full presence of interior meaning which is the “word remaining within.” For Augustine, however, the uttered word, in this context, is not a “fall into the exteriority of meaning” (1974, 12); rather, this uttered word is the way in which the Divine has made Himself known to us.

Finally, within the “alethic” structure of the referential poetic sign, truth is not a human production or matter of human judgement: the “being-true” (aletheuein) of the sign is based on Divine Intention, not on the “accordance” (homoiosis-adaequatio) of human knowing and an original state of affairs. Signs, in their rhetorical employment and poetic obscurity, are a human convention or institution (nomos or technē). This limited human word, however, because of the referential and analogical nature of being, speaks forth the divine truth. Even here, where technē
names the human institution of signs, the medieval experience of the bringing forth of the truth of beings is alien to that of the modern notion of human production. That is, signs are a human convention, but their truth is discovered or revealed through them, not produced by the self-grounded actions of the human subject:

There are, moreover, certain precepts for a more copious discourse which make up what are called the rules of eloquence, and these are very true, even though they may be used to make falsehoods persuasive. Since they can be used in connection with true principles as well as with false, they are not themselves culpable, but the perversity of ill using them is culpable. Men did not themselves institute the fact that an expression of charity conciliates an audience, or the fact that it is easy to understand a brief and open account of events, or that the variety of a discourse keeps the auditors attentive and without fatigue. There are other similar principles which may be employed either in false or in true causes, but which are themselves true in so far as they cause things to be known or to be believed, or move men’s minds either to seek or to avoid something. And these are rather discovered than instituted (Augustine 1958, II.36).

The technē-nomos, then, of the poetic sign is a principle which allows beings “to be known or to be believed”; this principle is discovered within the divine revealing of the truth of beings; it is not, in its truth, a human institution or production.

The Renaissance experience of poïësis and technē, as the knowing and bringing forth of the truth of beings, is essentially grounded in this medieval experience of the poetic bringing forth of the divine. For instance, in the case of Italian humanism from Dante, Mussato, Petrarch, and Boccaccio to Pontano and Poliziano, the poetic word speaks forth the divine truth. This is largely a development within the medieval disposition described above, where creation and signs show forth the truth of God’s intention. That is, for these humanists, the poetic word (verba) covers or veils beings (res); however, this poetic veiling also shows beings forth in their truth. Grassi points out that the poetic veil, for Boccaccio and others, is what allows the thing to arise for the first
time; he points to "the insight that only in and through the word (verbum) does the 'thing' (res) reveal its meaning" (1983, 17): "Boccaccio's thesis is that poetry reveals the reality that lies behind a veil (velamen) which, when brought to light, permits the 'thing,' the res, to appear in unhiddenness" (1983, 21). Grassi at this point quotes Boccaccio's first definition of poetry:

The fable is an exemplary and demonstrable speech which unfolds behind a veil [fabula est exemplaris seu demonstrativa sub figmento locutio]. If its covering is removed, then the intention of the fable becomes obvious [cuius amoto cortice, patet intentio fabulantis]. Hence, if something appetizing appears under the fabulous veil, then the fable proves not to be something useless [non erit super vacaneum fabulas edidisse]. (1983, 22).

While in the medieval tradition the poetic veil shows forth out of the Grace of God, poetry, for Dante, Boccaccio and others, reveals out of its own inventiveness. The poetic word, then, takes on a force within humanist thought that it did not previously have in the Middle Ages. For Boccaccio, "[poetry gives voice to an original force, a power (ex sinu dei procedens’) which is expressed in the word. It possesses an ‘inventive’ character (‘fervor exquisite inveniendi’) which enables it to make something obvious and open to view" (Grassi 1983, 22-23).

For the humanist way of thinking, then, the poet’s activity, and the poetic word, is not based on a representational accordance. Rather, poieisis, or the poetic word, is a "founding saying"; that is, in and through the word, things are brought into the shelter of un-concealment for the first time; they are founded as beings. According to Grassi’s reading, similarly, "[t]he task of the poet is not to report information or to explain, but rather to let beings appear in the light of 'wonder' by means of the poetic word" (1983, 55). Grassi quotes from Giovanni Pontano’s (1426-1503) "Antonius" in order to make this point:

Vergil himself makes clear that the nature of the mountain Aetna did not serve as a model to him ["montis naturam id consilii non fuisse sibi"]. . . . So he does not take
it and describe it as some particular kind of matter [ut vellet pro assumpta et quodammodo destinata materia describere] . . . , not [sic] does he try to discover the causes of things [nec rei causas exquirit]. . . . When he began to describe Aeneas’ landing . . . , he added the most wonderful and remarkable things, things that Aeneas himself was reminded of, so that he turned from the description of this harbor to the wonder of this thing itself [rei ipsius miraculo adverteretur]. (1983, 55)

Here the awe and wonder of the mountain presences out of itself. The mountain, in its splendour, disposes Aeneas and the listener/reader; it attunes them. “Hence, the poetic word is in no way something subjective or arbitrary, but rather, as Pontano himself says, ‘inherent in the things themselves’ (‘rebus ipsis inhaerens’). He is not referring here to any kind of physical similarity with things, ‘for the poet does not make any use of this kind of similarity’ . . . Inhaerentia refers here to the experience of the miraculum that arises from the commotio” (Grassi 1983, 56). Thus, we can see in the example of Pontano, as with Boccaccio, that, within this essential humanist determination of truth and the poetic word, “[t]he thing itself is revealed in and through the word; the res is given form in song (‘velletque rem ipsam ut admirabilem, ut horribis plenam verbis suis ante oculos ponere animisque infigere ac tubae suae canorem tenere’)” (Grassi 1983, 56).

2.7 Sidney’s Poësis and the Polis

Sidney’s conception of poetry and poësis is possible only because the Greek experience of essential truth as alētheia still presented itself, however faintly, as a claim. This claim of Being is heard and responded to by Sidney, if only in an “unsaid” manner, through the tradition of the poetic word as veil just described. For Sidney, as we have seen and as was the case for the humanists, poetry is a revealing-concealing of the divine. Let us remind ourselves, at this point, that Sidney refers to the poet as seer. He turns to the ancients, “so farre as to see what names they have givē unto this now scorned skill” (6).
Among the Romanes a Poet was called Vates, which is as much as a diviner, forseer, or Prophet, as by his conjoyned words Vaticinium and Vaticinari, is manifest, so heavenly a title did that excellent people bestowe uppon this hart-ravishing knowledge. . . . and altogethuer not without ground, since both by the Oracles of Delphos and Sybillas prophecies, were wholly delivered in verses, for that same exquisite observing of number and measure in the words, and that high flying libertie of conceit propper to the Poet, did seeme to have some divine force in it. (6)

Thus, because it is the word of the Muses as the ones who open the cosmos, poetry opens the space in which the truth of beings presences itself. In this way, as Sidney points out, any knowing is based on the poet’s primordial bringing to word or name. And because poetry is the setting up or founding of truth (cf. “OWA”), Sidney claims that the poet never lies. The poet does not affirm anything that “is” in the sense of that which pre-exists; rather, he or she names, founds, and brings forth beings for the first time. Without this first naming and founding poetic word, there can be no knowing relation to beings, no human existence or history. The poet opens the space in which things can arise and be known. This “space,” or rather “place,” of the opening of truth is also called the polis, the community.

And first truly to all them that professing learning envey against Poetrie, may justly be objected, that they go very neare to ungratefulnesse, to seeke to deface that which in the noblest nations [polis] and languages that are knowne, hath bene the first light giever to ignorance, and first nurse, whose milk lithe & lighte enabled them to feed afterwards of tougher knowledges. . . . Nay, let any Historie bee brought, that can say any writers were there before them, if they were not men of the same skill, as Orpheus, Linus, and some other are named, who having bene the first of that country that made pennes deliverers of their knowledge to the posteritie, nay justly challenge to bee called their Fathers in learning. . . . So as Amphion, was said to moove stones with his Poetry, to build Thebes, and Orpheus to be listened to by beasts, indeed stonie and beastly people. So among the Romans, were Livius, Andronicus, and Ennius, so in the Italian language, the first that made it aspire to be a treasure-house of Science were the Poets Dante, Bocace, and Petrarch. So in our English, wer Gower, and Chawcer, after whom, encouraged & delighted with their excellent foregoing, others have followed, to bewtify our mother toong, aswel in the same kind as other arts. (4)
The space (polis), as nation, in which beings are made knowable, is founded upon the poetic word. The polis is experienced in terms of a solicitous knowing and an uncompelled arising into the open of unceasealment (alētheia). The modern experience of the “political,” on the other hand, is determined out of the “imperial” comportment to beings. The political, thus, is experienced in terms of power and the securing of position. This is the essential difference between the notion of the poet’s “golden world” as a product of “subjective-imperial posit ing” (or linguistic construction) and the “golden world” as a “founding saying.”

For Dante, like Sidney, “The polis or place of the community is not there . . . from the beginning. It ‘develops’ or arises through the poetic, imagistic, metaphoric word” (Grassi 1983, 18). In De Vulgari Eloquentia (I.xviii), Dante asserts that poetic language creates the “court” [aula], which is the homogeneous space of the community (cf. Grassi 1988, 9). The community, and its openness to beings, is rooted in its language. It is through language that beings are brought into the open space of the polis, and thus made knowable. Language itself is rooted in the poetic word. The poet makes a language suitable for the bringing forth of beings into the space of knowing. The poet, as Sidney claims, “hath bene the first light giver to ignorance, and first nurse whose milk little & little enabled them to feed afterwards of tougher knowledges.” And finally, Grassi points to Mussato as another Renaissance figure who asserts the primordial relation of poetry to the bringing forth of beings into a space of knowing, who comes to the daring conclusion that he, “the poet, is ‘there’ before the ones engaged in struggles whom he sings; only through the poet’s work ‘are’ they the heroes with their deeds, with their fame: ‘Through me Pergama, the fortress of the Dardanian Teucer, was won back; before Dardanus was in Troy, I was there. The civil wars on the Emathian fields [of Macedonia] and the distinctions of the
Caesars were reported to the peoples by me’” (Grassi 1983, 62). Being, or the divine (daimôn), presences in the open through the poetic word. Yet, the archê of poetic revealing is Being. Poetic revealing is not a matter of the poet-subject’s construction; rather, poiēsis-technē is a mid-wife to (not the archê of) the “golden world” of Being in its appearing.

At this point we can formulate some preliminary answers to the question of the relation of poetic inspiration to poetic technē raised at the beginning of the chapter. In dealing with the second of the four Platonic charges against poetry, “that it is the mother of lyes” (DoP 28), Sidney answers “Paradoxically, but truly, I think truly: that of all writers under the Sunne, the Poet is the least lyer” (28). All other knowledges are tied to the pre-existing order of things. The statement and proposition must accord with that which has already been set out in advance. Practitioners of the other sciences must “take upon them to affirme. Now for the Poet, he nothing affirmeth, and therefore never lieth: for as I take it, to lie, is to affirme that to bee true, which is false” (DoP 29). Since the poet founds the site of the essential disclosing of truth (as alētheia), he or she does not lie; the poet’s words are not to be judged in terms of whether or not they accord with or “affirme” a matter; rather, the poet’s words are a founding of truth. The poet’s source is truth itself in its divine presencing: “the Poet as I said before, never affirmeth, the Poet never maketh any Circles about your imaginatid, to conjure you to belewee for true, what he writeth: he citeth not authorities of other histories, but evē for his entrée, calleth the sweete Muses to inspire unto him a good invention” (29). Because the archê of the poem is the divine presencing of the Muses, the claim that the poets “nothing affirmeth” does not divorce poetry from the realm of truth and relegate it to the world of “phantastike” images. It “does not deny truth-value to poetry—the appeal to inspiration implies a surer source of truth than that available through reason.
It does, however, deny that poetry is subject to rational verification; and by corollary, that verisimilitude is a significant factor in the success of a poem" (Hardison 70). The archē of the poem is the divine presencing of the Muses as guided forth by the poet’s technē. The presencing of truth needs this art; the bringing to a stand in the figure that is art (technē) is necessary for the founding of truth and the presencing of the divine. In this way, Sidney’s position that the poet is inspired is reconciled with his position that “Poesie” is a skill. Poetry arises out of the divine gift (Grace) of the Muses, of poetic inspiration, as cultivated and given measure by artistic skill and practice which brings this divine presencing to a stand within the rhetorical figure: “A Poet no industrie can make, if his owne Genius be not carried into it. And therefore is an old Proverbe, Orator fit, Poeta nascitur [an orator is made, a poet born]. Yet confesse I alwaies, that as the fertilest ground must be manured, so must the highest flying wit have a Dedalus to guide him. That Dedalus, they say both in this and in other, hath three wrings [sic] to beare it selfe up into the ayre of due commendation: that is Art, Imitation, and Exercise” (DoP 37).

The notion that the polis, as poetically founded, is the open space wherein the divine presences in the here and now is a significant one for Renaissance-humanism. This is what drives Sidney’s definition of poetry as the uniting of the philosophical ideal or truth with the historical emphasis on the actual. While the knowledge of the philosopher is abstract and general, “[o]n the other side, the Historian wanting the precept, is so tied, not to what should be, but to what is, to the particular truth of things, and not to the general reason of things, that his example draweth no necessarie consequence, and therefore a lesse fruitfull doctrine. Now doth the peerlesse Poet performe both, for whatsoever the Philosopher saith should be done, he gives a perfect picture of it by some one, by whō he presupposeth it was done, so as he coupleth the general notion with
the particular example" (14). In a like manner to Sidney, Pontano feels that poetry "has the function of making manifest the miracle, the admirable, the unfoundable, and, therefore, un-fathomable in the 'here' and 'now,' not in the contemplation of the abstract" (Grassi, 1988, 39). Siddey’s definition of poetry, as *mimēsis*, makes this bringing forth of the true or divine into the particular example essential; he calls it "figuring forth." What is this *mimēsis* as "figuring forth" and why is it so essential to Sidney’s definition? We must again, in the fullness of the circle, return to the question of the rhetorical figure in order to understand "figuring forth."

2.8 *Poiēsis* and *Mimēsis*

We saw that *poiēsis* as founding saying, as understood by Sidney, means the poetic word (*logos*) or sign (*sema*) is experienced on the basis of the primordial Greek notion of truth as *alētheia*. Accordingly, the poetic word is a reserved showing forth. This essential sense of the poetic word arises out of the primordial meaning of *mythos* as primal word—the primal word that brings forth the open of truth. *Mythos* is the divine (*daimōn*) speaking through the poet and the poet’s word. For this reason, as Sidney notes, poetry is deemed to have a divine force. We then saw that this bringing forth of the truth, this bringing forth of the divine, into the "here and now" is essential to *poiēsis* and is called "figuring forth." The nature of this "figuring forth" leads us to Sidney’s central definition of poetic bringing forth (*poiēsis*) as *mimēsis*. Sidney writes,

_Poesie_ therefore, is an Art of *Imitation*: for so *Aristotle* termeth it in the word *mimēsis*, that is to say, a representing, counterfeiting, or figuring forth to speake Metaphorically. (9)

This essential definition of *poiēsis* as *mimēsis* consists of six elements: (1) "*Imitation* (*mimēsis*), (2) "representing,” (3) "counterfeiting,” (4) “figuring forth,” (5) “to speake,” and (6) “Metaphorically.” We will need to look at each of these elements in order to understand Sidney’s
definition of poetic bringing forth. Although "mimēsis," as the essential definition of poiēsis, is that after which we are questioning, we will leave it to the last. The word "mimēsis" would have been strange to English ears at the time of Sidney's Defence (Heninger 1982, 120)---in fact, it is still quite unfamiliar today---it is for this reason, no doubt, that Sidney added the glosses on the term which constitute the six elements listed above. Thus, without a proper context for the word, we will only be able to understand it after properly coming to terms with the glosses Sidney provides.

What we can say at this point is that Sidney's understanding of mimēsis is expressed in the English words he uses as near equivalents. "Imitation" is set off from the other words in terms of the syntax of the sentence: "Poesie therefore, is an art of Imitation." Thus, "imitation" must have a special, or particularly close, relation to mimēsis within Sidney's understanding of these terms. What, then, does "imitation" mean here?54 We might immediately conclude that Sidney is defining mimēsis according to representational-metaphysical categories in calling it imitation. However, this is not necessarily the case. Mimēsis as imitation is also a setting forth into appearance. This is not necessarily representational or referential in the sense that it must constitute an "accordance" of some sort with a pre-given original. In his essay "Poetry and Mimēsis," Hans Georg Gadamer makes this point. Because the poem is perspicuous in its being "made," says Gadamer, but not in its being "made" in reference "to" or "for" anything else, it stands out as a "self-standing" and as a "pro-duc-ing" in an essential sense---what we called in Chapter 1 "poiēsis as phusis": "When it is language alone that lets something be there [logos], the ideal of production [poiēsis-phusis] is most clearly fulfilled. For the word enjoys unlimited power and ideal perfection. Poetry is something that is made in such a way that it has no other
meaning beyond letting something be there. There is no respect in which a linguistic work of art has to be there for anything. It is thus properly speaking something ‘made’” (1986b, 119). This self-standing and setting forth into appearance makes poièsis a mimēsis in an essential sense. “No special historical investigations are required to recognize that the meaning of the word ‘mimesis’ consists simply in letting something be there without trying to do anything more with it” (119).

The distinction at stake here is one between the metaphysical and non-metaphysical senses of the eidos in Plato’s “allegory of the cave.” In this allegory, according to Heidegger, Plato presents his ambiguous determination of the nature of truth—that is, one aspect of Plato’s thinking speaks of truth in terms of the pre-metaphysical alētheia and another aspect posits truth as the correctness (orthotes) of statements and looking. It is easy to see, says Heidegger, the early Greek essence of truth, as alētheia, in an allegory that foregrounds the nature of concealedness, of the darkness of the cave, and the lethe (forgetting) that constitutes the soul’s existence in the physical (in the cave). “For what is the subterranean cave other than something also quite overt in itself, but which remains at the same time sealed over and enclosed by the surrounding walls of the earth in spite of its entrance. The enclosure of the cave, open in itself, and what it surrounds and thus hides, indicate together an outer part, the unknown, which by day extends in the light. What in Greek was at first thought to be the essence of truth in the sense of alētheia, unhiddenness in relation to the hidden (the pretended and the disguised), only this has an essential relation to the image of the cave underground” (1962b, 261). However, the metaphysical essence of truth, as the correctness of perception and statements with respect to the stable and secured appearance of things, is also evident in the allegory.

In the ‘allegory of the cave’ the force of the clarification does not spring from the
image of being enclosed in a subterranean vault and imprisoned in this enclosing, it
does not even spring from the aspect of the openness outside the cave. The image-
making interpretative force of the ‘allegory’ is gathered together for Plato rather in
the role of the fire, the firelight and the shadows, the brightness of the day, the
sunlight, and the sun. Everything depends upon the shining of the phenomenal and the
possibility of its visibleness. To be sure unhiddenness is named in its various stages,
but one can only consider it in the way it makes the phenomenal accessible in its
outward appearance (eidos) and the way it makes this emerging (idea) visible. (1962b,
261)

The eidos, in the pre-metaphysical determination, is the appearance of things as grounded in the
essence of truth as unhiddenness (alētheia). Within the metaphysical determination of truth,
alētheia comes under the yoke of the eidos as the stable appearance of things in their enduring
presence (ousia). In the shift inaugurated by Plato here, the locus of truth shifts from the things
themselves in their emerging into appearance to the correctness (orthotes) of statements made
about already-present beings–beings secured in their presence by the eidos: “Truth becomes
orthotes, correctness of the ability to perceive and to declare something. In this change of the
essence of truth a shift of the place of truth takes place at the same time. As unhiddenness truth
is still a basic feature of beings themselves. But as correctness of ‘looking’ truth becomes the label
of the human attitude towards beings” (Heidegger 1962b, 265).

Sidney understands “represents” and “counterfeits” in the primordial sense of presenting an
appearance, not in the sense of the correctness of the presentation with respect to the present
being. That is, the representing and counterfeiting are not understood in terms of their accordance
with what is pre-given; as we have pointed out, the poet is not reigned by the zodiac of nature.
Rather, the representing and counterfeiting are a setting forth within just limits (dikē) through the
poetic word. This setting forth within just limits is the poetic setting forth of what Sidney calls
what “ought to be.” Through the setting forth into appearance for the first time of a Cyrus or
Lucretia, the just limits and measure of things (the ought to be as dikē) are determined for the first time.

What we have said about imitation as a setting forth into appearance is the key to understanding properly the next element of the essential definition of poetry as mimēsis: “figuring forth.” From what we have said, figuring forth can be understood as the self-placing into appearance or form (morphē). This primordial shining forth into appearance, into the figure, denotes the essential meaning of Being as what gives itself or appears in the figure-form (Gestalt-morphē). Both history and philosophy, for Sidney, lack this element of the bringing forth of Being into the sheltering-limit of the figure-form. History lacks necessity and philosophy lacks the example. In this way, they fade into the unlimited. However, poiēsis, as imitation, as setting forth into appearance, and as “figuring forth,” as the setting forth into the sheltering appearing (un-concealing) of the figure-form, means the bringing forth of Being within the proper limit and measure of a being—and that means the bringing forth of Being through the letting appear of a being out of itself. Being shines within the sheltering concealment and revealing of a being. According to Heidegger’s reading of Plato’s Phaedrus, beauty is Being shining in form (1979, 191-99). Similarly, according to Gadamer, beauty, as Being shining in form, is the ideal shining-appearing in the actual.

This is how we should understand Sidney’s proclamation of poetry’s ability to bring forth the ideal in the actual. The beauty of the figure of Lucretia shines forth in its radiance. The poet does not copy or refer to a pre-given existence in the setting forth of the appearance of Lucretia; rather, she is set forth for the first time as what she is. The distinction, here,

is such a kinde of difference, as betwixt the meaner sort of Painters, who counterfeyt
only such faces as are set before them, and the more excelent, who having no law but wit, bestow that in colours upon you, which is fittest for the eye to see, as the constant, though lamenting looke of Lucretia, when see punished in her selfe another's faulte: wherein hee painteth not Lucretia whom he never saw, but painteth the outward bewty of such a vertue. For these third be they which most properly do imitate to teach & delight: and to imitate, borrow nothing of what is, hath bin, or shall be, but range onely reined with learned discretion, into the divine consideration of what may be and should be. (DoP 10)

Within the figure of Lucretia, virtue shines within a necessary limit. Virtue, as the proper limits and disposition of certain human action, is set forth in the figuring forth of Lucretia; the ideal is brought forth in the actual. We must understand the “ideal” and the “actual” in Sidney’s sense of these terms. He is not valuing them in accordance with their usual metaphysical significations. The ideal is not the highest and truest value, as within metaphysical Platonism, of which physical existence is a poor copy; nor is the actual the ultimate fulfilment of existence and the ideal a mere shadow and imposition of thinking, as it is within metaphysical Aristotelianism. If this were the case, Sidney would have to concede the poet’s inferiority to the philosopher or the historian respectively. Rather, the “ideal” signifies the proper limits of things (the “ought,” dike) in its showing forth of itself, and the “actual” signifies the setting forth of this proper measure of all things within the figure-form of the work. In this way, actuality is Sidney’s name for Being (as the appropriate articulation of each thing out of itself, physis-dike) as it is, and only is, in the work: energeia. Sidney refers to energeia (energia) as a “forciblenesse” of the original or “founding” poetic work as opposed to that which is a mere repetition of the already-said, a repetition undertaken by “Poet-apes, not Poets” (41, 45). In this way, the Being of the work in terms of energeia, the arché of the work, is in the work’s own arising and appearing as “founding saying,” as opposed to the representational work, which, as a repetition of another, has its
Being-archē in the “original” it copies. Accordingly, energeia unifies what we have said so far about Sidney’s essential definition of poetic bringing forth (poiēsis). Energeia is Being-in-the-work, or the “ideal” appearing in and through the “actual.” Being-in-the-work is a Being-in-the-figure or “figuring forth”—which we can also understand, in terms of Aristotle’s thinking and Heidegger’s artwork essay, as phusis-morphē or Being as Gestalt). And finally, this “figuring forth” is the essential sense of “imitation,” “representing,” and “counterfeiting” as a setting forth into appearance in the figure-form.

Of course, following Aristotle’s use of it in his Rhetoric, energeia signifies, within the rhetorical tradition, a type of metaphor. Energeia, then, will provide a connection for us between “figuring forth” and the last elements of Sidney’s essential definition: “to speake” and “Metaphorically.” According to the syntax of the sentence, and the meaning of Sidney’s essential definition, we must consider these two elements together. “To speake” refers to the nature of the bringing forth peculiar to poetry; the bringing forth here occurs in and through the “word.” We have seen that the essential meaning of the poetic word comes from logos. Logos means the “letting be seen” of what shows itself. This letting appear, when fully concrete, “has the character of speaking” (phōnē) (Heidegger 1962, Int.II.§7B). Thus, “to speake Metaphorically” refers to the poetic word’s letting be seen of what shows itself, where the letting be seen is undertaken in the manner of the metaphor. Metaphor is the privileged mode of speaking (letting be seen) in terms of the effecting of mimēsis (Heninger 1982, 124). What, we should ask at this point, is “metaphor”?

Metaphor: [Gk, f. metaphorein, f. as META- + pherein to bear.] 1. A figure of speech in which a name or descriptive word or phrase is transferred to an object or action different from, but analogous to, that to which it is literally applicable; an
instance of this, a metaphorical expression. 2. A thing considered as representative of some other (usu. abstract) thing; a symbol. (OED)

Aristotle defines “metaphor” in the section on diction (lexis), that is, on kinds of names, in *Poetics*. Metaphor is the kind of name which “is the application [to something] of a name belonging to something else, either (a) from the genus to the species, or (b) from the species to the genus, or (c) from a species to [another] species, or (d) according to analogy” (1457b7-9). Analogy, for Aristotle, is the highest fulfilment of what it means to be a metaphor (*Rhetoric* III 10.1410b36). (This is perhaps mirrored in our modern notion of metaphor which would only include the last of Aristotle’s four types.) In the metaphor that operates “according to analogy,” the transferring-naming (*metaphora*) occurs between a known and an unknown term without a predetermined relation between them (Heninger 1982, 131). With the other three types of metaphor, there is a pre-existing relation between the terms of the transference: that of part-whole or species-genus. However, with analogy, the relation is one that is invented, imagined, or founded. Thus, the metaphor (*metaphora*) is a naming in the manner of a transferring (or, “trans-ferrying”) and carrying-over of the standard name of one term to another related or unrelated term. The word “*metaphora*” comes from *metapherein* (to carry over) which itself consists of “*meta*” (beyond, over) and “*pherein*” (to carry, to bring, to bear).

The meaning of “metaphor” is central to the understanding of Sidney’s definition of poetic bringing forth. We can see, immediately, that metaphor can be understood or experienced within two different registers. Within the “imperial” comportment that marks Western metaphysics, metaphoric “transference” from a known to an unknown term is experienced by means of the “subjective-imperial” positing of the same on the other. The metaphor undertakes, according to
this metaphysical understanding, a linguistic mediation and construction of the unknown; it is a "linguistic colonialism" of the unknown which brings it to a stand, and thus to a fall, within the parameters of the known. The transference reduces alterity to a function of the familiar through the assumption of a similitude (homoιοσίς) between the two terms. This can be seen in the examples of "imperial," possessive naming described above; it can also be seen in the "analogy inference theory" of modern metaphysics: that is, I know that I am happy when I smile, so I know that the other is happy when he or she smiles.\textsuperscript{56} The "subjective-imperial" process of representation in terms of a "posing before" (Vor-stellen) is experienced in the realm of metaphor as energeia. The "imperial" experience of energeia, that is, is one of a "setting things before our eyes" (Rhetoric 1410b33) as they are, not as they are "to be" (dunamis). The energeia of the imperial metaphor is a "quasi-visual" image (cf. Heninger 1982, 134-45). The notion of the "mind's eye" arises in criticism as what allows the listener or reader to see the image presented by the poet in its "lifelike vividness" (energeia) (Heninger 1982, 138).

Another experience of the analogic-metaphor and energeia, one grounded in the primordial experience of truth as alētheia, is also perceivable here. The analogy, rather than the positing of the other by the subject, and a reduction of alterity to the framework of the same, can be seen in terms of the medieval understanding of the "analogy of Being"--whereby the (un-known) Divine is un-concealed, yet reserved in concealment, to humanity. Similarly, energeia, as we have seen, and according to Aristotle's essential use of the word, is the setting forth into appearance in the form out of itself. This setting into appearance in the form, in the open of disclosure, is the essential feature of the naming power of the poetic word. The analogy, then, is the bringing forth of the unknown for the first time into the open of truth and knowing. For Cicero and Aristotle,
as Heninger points out, “the impulse for metaphor derived from deficiencies of vocabulary, from the need to say what denotative language did not already provide for” (138). However, when *verba* and *res* begin to be thought of as distinct, this naming power of the metaphor or analogy is gradually lost; the metaphor becomes, basically, an ornament.7 As disclosive naming, metaphor is a “trans-porting” to the essential ground of the beginning, of Being. Heeding the call of the beginning, or of Being, occurs through the poetic word as essential metaphor.

Sidney, in some ways, speaks out of the “metaphysico-imperial” experience of metaphor and *poiēsis* as *mimēsis*, yet he also heeds the claim of the beginning, of the essential experience of truth as *alētheia*. If we listen carefully to Sidney’s essential thinking, we can hear him heeding this claim within his definition of *poiēsis* as *mimēsis*. Let us remind ourselves of the features of this definition: “*Poesie* therefore, is an Art of *Imitation*: for so Aristotle termeth it in the word *mimēsis*, that is to say, a representing, counterfeiting, or figuring forth to speake Metaphorically” (9). Based on our exploration of Sidney’s *Defence* in terms of the essential thought it expresses, we can hazard the following interpretation of this definition—an interpretation that attempts to expose that which the “unsaid” of the tradition offered to Sidney, and that which he heeded:

Poetic bringing forth (*poiēsis*) [“*Poesie*”] is a knowing bringing to a stand in the open (*technē*) [“Art”] through a setting forth into appearance [“*Imitation*”], for so Aristotle termeth it in his word *mimēsis*, that is to say, a showing-shining forth [“representing, counterfeiting”] of Being, as the appropriate articulation of things [*dikē*, the ought, the ideal], in the figure-form of the work (*energeia*) [“figuring forth”], in order to let appear (*logos*) [“to speake”] in the manner of a disclosive naming [“Metaphorically”].

In this interpretation we see the unity of the elements of the definition within the oneness of the essential meaning of *mimēsis*.

We saw that *mimēsis* is linked to the rhetorical “figure” in terms of the essential metaphor;
we also saw that *poiēsis* as “founding saying” makes the poet an orator (cf., also, Grassi 1980). Thus, it should not surprise us, as we return to the question of rhetoric-*technē* within the fullness of the circle, that *poiēsis-mimēsis* is given a rhetorical end: “A speaking *Picture*, with this end to teach and delight” (*DoP* 9). The rhetorical end of *poiēsis-mimēsis* resolves the Renaissance dilemmas over the distinction between *res* and *verba*—the gap between the truth and any action-expression based on it. Because Sidney’s essential thinking is a returning to the Greek understanding of truth, to which the concept of a gap between *res* and *verba* is foreign, the rhetorical ends of teaching, delighting, and moving (to action-expression) are realized in the essential sense of *poiēsis-mimēsis* as a setting forth and setting up of truth in action (*praxis*) or the actual (*energeia*). “For as Aristotle saith, it is not *gnosis*, but *praxis* must be the frute” (*DoP* 19). In short, the poet-orator, in bringing forth the proper order (*dikē*) into the figure-form of the work (*energeia*)—the ideal into the actual—and as founder of the *polis*, is a “philosopher-ruler,” in Plato’s sense of the term, or, at least, in More’s sense of the phrase, a “counsellor of Kings” (cf. Hardison 41).
Notes to Chapter 2

1. For similar arguments pertaining to Plato's position that the rhetoricians lack technē, see Gorgias 462b-465e.

2. As Levao asserts, the Defence seems derivative and contradictory to many scholars; they, for this reason, turn to Sidney's predecessors to try to make the treatise more coherent (101). I agree with Levao in proclaiming the originality of Sidney's Defence. While I am turning to his predecessors, I do so in order to demonstrate the original (foundational) way in which Sidney takes up the claims of the tradition—not, that is, to say that Sidney is merely rewording Plato, Aristotle, or the humanists. Weiner, similarly, believes that Sidney's work was "built of commonplaces which concealed the novelty of his basic conception of the function of poetry" (34).

3. For Aristotle, poetics and rhetoric are tightly connected. This interconnection of rhetoric and poetics was expanded in some ways during the Renaissance to the point that they are indistinguishable. In 1508, the first Greek text of Aristotle's Poetics was made available to Renaissance Europeans in the edition of John Lascaris, as issued by Aldus. As O.B. Hardison Jr. points out, "[t]he volume in which it appeared was entitled Rhetores Graeci, a title which indicates that neither Lascaris nor Aldus sensed the fundamental difference between Aristotle's theory of rhetoric and his theory of poetry" (21). I mention this in order to highlight what seem to be, at the outset at least, the similarities between Pugliano's "rhetoric-poetic" defence of the art of horsemanship and Sidney's "rhetoric-poetic" defence of the art of poetry. On the connection of poetry to rhetoric, see, also, Vickers 1970 and 1989 and Waller 48-59.

4. As Levao demonstrates, at the beginning of the Defence, in saying that he needs "to bring some more available proofs" to defend poetry—and thus alluding to Aristotle's definition of rhetoric as the "faculty of observing, in any given case, the available means of persuasion"—Sidney is self-consciously assuming the role of rhetorician (150). Thus, since the ends of poetry and rhetoric are somewhat entwined, Sidney's Defence is a case of what he is defending (Hadfield 138). Levao assumes from this that the Defence is also in the "realm of feigned images and self-conscious conjectures," that it is a "feigned apology," or, in the terms of our interpretive options, "merely rhetorical" (151). It has long been noted that the Defence "follows the organizational pattern of a legal oration recommended by classical and Renaissance manuals of rhetoric" (Hardison 64).

5. The first two interpretive options imply a Ramist division of logic and rhetoric. Such a Ramist division would implicate Sidney's conception of poetry in representational-referential constructs: "by rigidly separating logic from rhetoric, Ramism implied that the 'truth' was a matter of the given objects-in-nature which were to be 'discovered' not 'invented', while the arts of language were merely the necessary clothing of those truths" (Waller 50). On Ramism and this distinction between logic and rhetoric, see Waller, Tuve, and Jardine 1988.

6. These two forms of knowing are modes of what Aristotle calls "epistemonikon":

   We said before that there are two parts of the soul—that which grasps a rule or
rational principle, and the irrational; let us now draw a similar distinction within the part which grasps a rational principle. And let it be assumed that there are two parts which grasp a rational principle—[epistemonikon] one by which we contemplate the kind of things whose originative causes are invariable, and [logistikos] one by which we contemplate variable things. . . . (Nicomachean Ethics VI.2.1139a3-9)

Epìstêmê (science) and sophia (wisdom) are the ways of knowing which constitute the first mode of reasoning (of logon echôn); techne (art) and phronesis (prudence, or circumspection) are the ways of knowing which constitute the second mode of reasoning. On this Aristotelian distinction, see Heidegger 1997, 15-44.

7. Antonio Minturno transfers Cicero’s “teach, delight, and move” from the office of the orator to that of the poet; in doing so, he's followed by Julius Caesar Scaliger and Sidney, as we have seen (Levao 116-17).

8. On this “eikastic-phantastic” distinction, see Plato, Sophist 235a-236c, 264b-268d; see also Levao 104-105). The Renaissance Neoplatonists would have picked up the notion of art as a legitimate image making from Plotinus. “For Plotinus,” Levao points out, “matter assumes the role of false artist” (105). Plotinus, in fact, refers to it as “no more than the image and phantasm of Mass . . . but a passing trick making trickery of all that seems to be present in it, phantasms within a phantasm; it is like a mirror showing things as in itself when they are really elsewhere” (Enneads 3.6.7). Art, however, presents an image based on things as they are in themselves; arts give “no bare reproduction of the thing seen but go back to the Ideas from which nature derives” (5.8.1).

9. The fact that poetry could be seen as a cosmos of fantastic images (phantasia) grounded only in the productive operations of an individual subject constitutes the grounds of the major attack on poetry in the Renaissance. See Levao and Weiner on the danger of poetry as an individual fantasy; also see Weiner on the imagination as free from the fall's damaging of the senses, will, and reason.

10. As Douglas Bush points out, the Michelet-Burckhardt conception of the Renaissance, which has been so congenial to the modern mind, while it was, to be sure, based on historical research, was also largely predetermined by the philosophic outlook of its authors. It was, in short, a conception engendered by modern secular liberalism, by the nineteenth-century faith in rationalistic enlightenment and progress. From that point of view the Middle Ages appeared as not much more than a long cultural lag, a period in which man was enslaved by a system based on religious superstition and unnatural restraint. Hence anything in the way of revolt was a step toward the Renaissance and, ultimately, toward the triumphant freedom of the nineteenth century. (31-2)

11. The original reads as follows: “Die Renaissance bleibt mir immer noch die Höhe dieses Jahrtausends; und was seither geschah, ist die große Reaktion aller Art von Heerden-Trieben gegen den »Individualismus» jener Epoche.”
12. On this point, see, also, Burke, Sawday, Smith, and Thomas Greene 104-26.

13. "That is why," Heidegger writes, "the historical state of the world we call the modern age, following historiographical chronology, is also founded on the event of the Romanizing of Greece. The 'Renaissance' of the ancient world accompanying the outset of the modern period is unequivocal proof of this" (1992, 43).

14. Even Jacques Maritain, presumably calling into question the modern metaphysics of the subject, assumes that the Middle Ages conceived of God as "the supreme Object of all intelligence." Of course, God cannot become an Object until the subject as metaphysical ground is experienced as that which posits him as Object.

15. Resolute openness is related to the Parmenidean assertion of the belonging together in the same (to auto) of noēin (apprehension) and ērē (Being) and to the assertions in Sophocles' choral ode on the happening of the "strange," or the "uncanny," in the reciprocal relation of techne (as a violent and receptive bringing to a stand) and dikē (as the emerging, overpowering order belonging to things); see Heidegger 1959, 137-65.

16. Heidegger writes, "Ordinary thinking, whether scientific or prescientific or unscientific, thinks beings, and does so in every case according to their individual regions, separate strata, and circumscribed aspects. This thinking is an acquaintance with beings, a knowledge that masters and dominates beings in various ways" (1992, 7).

17. This is not to say that truth only arises, for the Greeks, through a human struggle: "Unconcealedness is not simply gained through conflict in the general sense that among humans truth is something to be sought out and struggled for" (1992, 17). Rather, the essence of truth itself is determined as conflictual inasmuch as "[u]nconcealedness suggests an 'opposition' to concealedness" (20).

18. Being and Time in many ways is a laying of the ground work for the possibility, in the modern epoch, of a compartment to Being and Time in terms of ἀλήθεια. In the projected but never completed "Part Two" of Being and Time, Heidegger intended to undertake "a phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology, with the problematic of Temporality as our clue" (1962a, Int.II.8). This was to be undertaken in three divisions:

1. Kant's doctrine of schematism and time, as a preliminary stage in a problematic of Temporality;
2. the ontological foundation of Descartes' cogito sum, and how the medieval ontology has been taken over into the problematic of the 'res cogitans';
3. Aristotle's essay on time, as providing a way of discriminating the phenomenal basis and the limits of ancient ontology. (Int.II.8)

In his "Parmenides" lectures Heidegger also points to the roots of the metaphysical (ontological) comportment to Time in Aristotle:

Admittedly, already among the Greeks, in Aristotle's Physics, the essence of time was
understood precisely on the basis of "number." That is certainly food for thought, above all because the Aristotelian determination of the essence of chronos has dominated the Western understanding of time ever since. Not only in the mathematical formulae of modern physics but in general in all human comportment towards time, time becomes a "factor," i.e., a "worker," that "works" either "against" or "for" man, namely "against" or in "favor" of the calculation by means of which man makes plans to master beings and secure himself in them. (1992, 141)

Humanity, within the metaphysico-imperial comportment to Being and Time—which reaches its culmination in the modern technological epoch—takes time into "account"; we "use" and "consume" time as a resource among others to be calculated and administered to maximum advantage.

As a consequence of this disposition, which consumes and uses up, man constantly has less and less time in spite of all his time-saving, and that is why the saving and economy of time are necessary in even the tiniest procedures of technology. Modern man, the subject to whom the "world" has become a uniquely uniform "object," consumes even time. Modern man therefore always "has" less and less time, because he has taken possession of time in advance only as calculable and has made time something of which he is obsessed, though he is presumably the ruler whose rule masters time. For primordial Greek thinking, on the contrary, time, always as dispensing and dispensed time, takes man and all beings essentially into its ordering and in every case orders the appearance and disappearance of beings. Time discloses and conceals. (1992, 142)

19. As Heidegger points out,

Under the force of the essential relations named by the Greek word pseudos, we have already spoken, almost 'automatically,' of 'covering,' and 'veiling,' but at the same time also of 'letting-appear.' Pseudos pertains to the essential realm of covering, hence it is a kind of concealing. The covering involved in pseudos, however, is always at the same moment an unveiling, a showing, and a bringing into appearance. (30)

20. "What realm of experience is normative here," asks Heidegger, "if the bringing to a fall attains such a priority that on the basis of its essence there is determined the counter-essence to what the Greeks experience as alethes, the 'unconcealing' and the 'unconcealed'?” (1992, 40).

21. Heidegger writes, "[w]hat is decisive is that the Latinization occurs as a transformation of the essence of truth and Being within the essence of the Greco-Roman domain of history. This transformation is distinctive in that it remains concealed but nevertheless determines everything in advance. This transformation of the essence of truth and Being is the genuine event of history" (1992, 42). 

22. Heidegger traces the way in which the concept of "command" came into modern thinking in the following way:

To be sure, we now understand the word "command" in a later, Latin-romanic, sense. Originally "command" [Befehl] . . . meant the same as "to cover": to "commit" (command) the dead to the earth or to the fire, to entrust them to a cover. The original meaning of "command" survives in our expression, "I commend (command) thy ways to the Lord"
(i.e., entrust to protection and sheltering cover). This commending is preserved in our word “recommend.” Instead of “recommend,” Luther always used the word “commend” -- *commendare*. On its way through the French language, “commend” became *commandieren*, i.e., more precisely, the Latin *imperare, in-parare* = to arrange, to take measures, i.e., *praecipere*, to occupy in advance, and so to take possession of the occupied territory and to rule it. *Imperium* is the territory [Gebiet] founded on commandments [Gebot], in which the others are obedient [botmäsig]. *Imperium* is the command in the sense of commandment. Command, thus understood, is the basis of the essence of domination, not the consequence of it and certainly not just a way of exercising domination. (1992, 40)

23. Heidegger expands this discussion of the institution of an “imperial” disposition by pointing out that the *imperium* is consolidated within the ecclesiastical branch of Roman civilization:

But the Romans did not only lay the foundation for the priority of the false as the standard meaning of the essence of untruth in the Occident. In addition, the consolidation of this priority of the false over *pseodus* and the stabilizing of this consolidation is a Roman accomplishment. The operating force in this accomplishment is no longer the *imperium* of the state but the *imperium* of the Church, the *sacerdotium*. The “imperial” here emerges in the form of the curial of the curia of the Roman pope. His domination is likewise grounded in command. The character of command here resides in the essence of ecclesiastical dogma. Therefore this dogma takes into account equally the “true” of the “orthodox believers” as well as the “false” of the “heretics” and the “unfaithful.” The Spanish Inquisition is a form of the Roman curial *imperium*. By way of Roman civilization, both the imperial/civil and the imperial/ecclesiastical, the Greek *pseodus* became for us in the Occident the “false.” Correspondingly, the true assumed the character of the not-false. The essential realm of the imperial *fallere* determines the not-false as well as the *falsum*. The not-false, said in Roman fashion, is the *verum*. (1992, 46)

24. Heidegger provides a historical example of this “subterfuge”: “The battles against the Italian cities and tribes, by means of which Rome secured its territory and expansion, make manifest the unmistakable procedure of roundabout action and encirclement through treaties with tribes lying further out. In the Latin *fallere*, to bring down, as subterfuge, there resides ‘deceiving’; the *falsum* is treachery and deception, ‘the false” (1992, 41).

25. As Heidegger points out, “This originally Roman stamp given to the essence of truth, which solidly establishes the all-pervading basic character of the essence of truth in the Occident, rejoins an unfolding of the essence of truth that began already with the Greeks and that at the same time marks the inception of Western metaphysics” (1992, 48-9).

26. Heidegger demonstrates this relevance to the question of representation:

At the same time, however, the *homoiois*, i.e., the agreeing correspondence, as the mode of the execution of *aletheia*, assumes, as it were, the definitive “representation” of *aletheia*. This is, as the non-dissembling of beings, the assimilation of the disclosive saying to the disclosed self-showing beings, i.e., it is *homoiois*. From then on, *aletheia* presents itself only in this essential
form and is taken only in that way. (1992, 49)

27. As Heidegger writes, "[t]he Greek homoiōsis as disclosive correspondence and the Latin rectitudo as adjustment to... both have the character of an assimilation of assertions and thinking to the state of affairs present at hand and firmly established. Assimilation is called adaequatio" (1992, 49-50).


29. For a more detailed explication of the modern metaphysics of certainty, see Chapter 4.

30. As Ficino says, "[t]hrough the reason we are entirely our own law" (qtd. in Levao 106).

31. On the imperial securing of colonial conquest through linguistic and graphic measures, see, also, Mignolo.

32. Vespucci, then, oscillates between a vision of natural existence without civilization as "ideal," as a golden age, and as a "barbarous" horror to be avoided. This oscillation has a rich history reaching back to the early Greeks. See Hesiod's portrayal of the Prometheus myth (Theogony 507-612) and his portrayal of the golden age myth (Works and Days 42-105). Homer seems to have had more affinities with the Promethean version of this nature/art opposition. He stresses the limitations posed by an uncivilized existence on a couple of notable occasions; see Odyssey IX.105-15 and XVIII.130-142.

33. For a good treatment of this Renaissance notion of the civilizing aspect of poetry in its connection to the consolidation of Tudor power in sixteenth century England, see Waller 1-71. Poetry was fostered, according to Waller, through the patronage system as "part of a concentrated effort by the regime to mould opinions and to direct writers to socially or politically approved goals" (20). On Sidney's conception of poetry as connected to the protestant aspirations of power consolidation, as "the most fully developed attempt to establish a puritan-humanist aesthetic," see Sinfield 1983, 23. I feel there are limitations to Sinfield's thesis, however. As Waller points out, "it would be a peculiarly partial reading... to see didacticism as totally dominant. It may be true... that Sidney handles the central issues of his treatise in distinctively Protestant ways... But the Defence, and indeed the period's other treatises on poetry, are less absolute than Sinfield's argument suggests. Like poetry, even a prose treatise brings into play contradictions and tensions it would consciously like to exclude. The Defence combines many contradictory strands which tend to unravel the hard-line Protestantism of parts of its argument" (44). Waller points to the competing discourses—and the dynamics of power attached to them—in Sidney's treatise. Waller points, in this way, to certain, let us say, "counter-imperial" forces within the work: forces which do not serve the consolidation of the existing power configuration. However, these "counter-" or "anti-" discursive forces are still understood within the existing political power dynamics. I want to show that while these power dynamics are present in Sidney's Defence, his treatise also formulates a non-representational—and, thus, "non-imperial"—determination of poetry's essence. In this essential aspect of the work, poetry is a "founding saying"; the poet first founds a nation's understanding of things; he or she does not
reinforce or subvert pre-existing power relations.

34. On Sidney's "counter-genealogy of the barbarian," see Hadfield 136-54 and Worden.

35. On the significance of the last section of Sidney's Defence, on the need for a renewed "national" poetry, see Hadfield 132-69; also, on Sidney's conception of the "masculine" imperial subject, see Doherty.

36. Heidegger explicates the essential meaning of logos in Being and Time. Rather than "reason", 'judgement', 'concept', 'definition', 'ground', or 'relationship'," logos primordially means "to make manifest what one is 'talking about' in one's discourse. Aristotle has explicated this function of discourse more precisely as apophainesthai. The logos lets something be seen (phainesthai), namely, what the discourse is about; and it does so either for the one who is doing the talking (the medium) or for persons who are talking with one another, as the case may be. Discourse 'lets something be seen' apo . . . that is, it lets us see something from the very thing which the discourse is about" (1962a, Int.II.§7B). Heidegger expands this explication in order to point out that the relation of the logos to truth is not primordially a representational one: "Furthermore, because the logos is a letting-something-be-seen, it can therefore be true or false. But here everything depends on our steering clear of any conception of truth which is construed in the sense of 'agreement'. This idea is by no means the primary one in the concept of alētheia. The 'Being-true' of the logos as aletheuein means that in legein as apophainesthai the entities of which one is talking must be taken out of their hiddenness; one must let them be seen as something unhidden (alethes); that is, they must be discovered" (1962a, Int.II.§7B).

37. Hugh of St. Victor expresses this widely held medieval conception rather clearly:

... this whole visible world is a book written by the finger of God, that is, created by divine power; and individual creatures are as figures therein, not devised by human will but instituted by divine authority to show forth the wisdom of the invisible things of God. But just as some illiterate man looks at the figures but does not recognize the letters: just so the foolish natural man, who does not perceive the things of God, sees outwardly in these visible creatures the appearances but does not inwardly understand the reason. But he who is spiritual and can judge of all things, while he considers outwardly the beauty of the work inwardly conceives how marvelous is the wisdom of the Creator. (Didascalicon 116-7)

38. Within a similar context, Augustine also declares that, "[b]y reading these books of the Platonists I had been prompted to look for truth as something incorporeal, and I caught sight of your invisible nature, as it is known through your creatures" (1961, VII.20).

The referential (qua representational) nature of existence as experienced in the Middle Ages is also evident in the "convertibility" of truth, being, and the good (or, "correct" will, that is, will accorded with Divine Intention [Will]) in medieval thinking. Truth and being are convertible inasmuch as that which exists in the Divine order, that which takes its place in the hierarchy of being, accords with the Divine intention or will. As Aquinas points out, the truth of a thing is its
accordance with the Divine mind (the Divine purpose or intention): "[A natural thing] is said to be true with respect to its conformity with the divine intellect in so far as it fulfils the end to which it was ordained by the divine intellect" (Aquinas 11; Q.1, Art.2). This sense of truth, as accordance of thing and Divine intellect, as accordance of thing with the "end [purpose or intention] . . . ordained by the divine intellect," is the primary sense of truth, for Aquinas: "In a natural thing, truth is found especially in the first, rather than in the second, sense; for its reference to the divine intellect comes before its reference to a human intellect" [my emphasis] (11; Q.1, Art.2). This primary sense of truth is also the sense in which truth is defined as the being (or existence) of the thing: "First of all, [truth] is defined according to that which precedes truth and is the basis of truth. This is why Augustine writes: 'The true is that which is'; and Avicenna: 'The truth of each thing is a property of the act of being which has been established for it.' Still others say: 'The true is the undividedness of the act of existence from that which is'" (Aquinas 6-7; Q.1, Art.1). Because truth and being are convertible within the philosophy of the Middle Ages, Augustine, can claim that "all things are true in so far as they have being" (1961, VII.15).

The good and being (and thus, truth) are convertible within medieval thought: as Augustine states, "in so far as we are, we are good" [my emphasis] (1958, 1.32.35). The good of a thing can be defined, in Platonic terms, as the thing's existence in an intelligent order (Angeles 112). For our purposes, then, the good of a thing could be thought of as the thing's existence in the Divine order. This is what is meant when Augustine says that sin "is contrary to nature" (1948, 47). That is, the good of a thing, like the truth of a thing, can be defined as the thing's accordance with God's will. This is precisely how Anselm defines the truth, or goodness, of the will:

[The truth of the will] is only that correctness of the will which we call uprightness [rectitude]. For as long as Satan willed what he ought to have willed—namely, the end for which he had received a will—he remained in the truth and in uprightness; and when he willed what he ought not to have willed, he deserted this truth and uprightness. So truth in the will can only be thought to be this uprightness, or correctness, of willing—because the truth, or uprightness, in Satan's will consisted only in his willing what he ought. (Anselm 97)

The true will, then, is the will which wills what it ought to will; in this way, it is the will which wills the good. Willing what one ought means willing "the end for which he had received a will;" it means that the will accords with God's intention for that will (cf. also, Augustine 1968, 1.12.24). Thus, inasmuch as everything exists within the hierarchy of being or the order which constitutes the Divine intention, everything which exists is true to the extent that it exists; also, everything which exists ought to exist; everything which exists is good: "there is truth in the essence of all that exists, because all things are what they are in the Supreme Truth. . . . [I]f all things are what they are in the Supreme Truth, then without doubt they are what they ought to be" (Anselm 102).

39. According to Augustine, "[h]e is a slave to a sign who uses or worships a significant thing without knowing what it signifies. But he who uses or venerates a useful sign divinely instituted whose signifying force he understands does not venerate what he sees and what passes away but rather that to which all such things are to be referred" (1958, 3.9.13).
40. When we enjoy that which is to be enjoyed in itself, we love charitably. When, however, we enjoy that which should be used, our love is called “cupidity”: "I call 'charity' the motion of the soul toward the enjoyment of God for His own sake, and the enjoyment of one's self and one's neighbor for the sake of God; but 'cupidity' is a motion of the soul toward the enjoyment of one's self, one's neighbor, or any corporal thing for the sake of something other than God" (1958, 3.10.16).

41. On the falsity of theatre and "obscene rituals," see Augustine 1972, I.31-2; II.4-5, 9-14, 27; IV.26.

42. For another example of this relegation of phenomena as played out in the distinction of enjoyment and use: "Some things are to be enjoyed, others to be used, and there are others which are to be enjoyed and used. Those things which are to be enjoyed make us blessed. . . . The things which are to be enjoyed are the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, a single Trinity" (1958, 1.3.3, 1.5.5).

43. This notion that it is the will which is corrupt not the thing itself is largely a medieval commonplace. For instance, in the work of John Scotus, like that of Augustine, as Robertson points out, "[w]e should observe that the evil involved in [the] process of perversion does not lie in the object. . . . It lies in the libido, the cupiditas" (71).

44. Sidney participates in this medieval-referential conception of the didactic purpose of the poetic veil:

Now therein of all Sciences I speake still of humane (and according to the humane conceit) is our Poet the Monarch. For hee doth not onely shew the way, but giveth so sweete a prospect into the way, as will entice anie man to enter into it. Nay he doth as if your journey should lye through a faire vineyard, at the verie first, give you a cluster of grapes, that full of that taste, you may long to passe further. (19)

45. On this point, see also Augustine 1958, 2.6.7; 1972, 11.19; and Robertson 16, 53, 62-3.

46. Petrarch largely sums up this attitude that eloquence is necessary for the teacher: "Aristotle teaches, I do not deny, what a virtue is. But the reading of Aristotle either lacks entirely, or almost entirely, the verbal goad and fire by means of which the mind is inflamed to the love of virtue and urged to the hatred of vice. He who seeks these things may find them among the Latins, especially in Cicero and Seneca, and . . . in Horace. . . . What does it profit to know what a virtue is, if being known it is not loved? Or of what use is it to know what a sin is, if once known it is not detested" (qtd. in Robertson 79-80).

47. It is outside the scope of this work to analyze this point fully, but this "alethic" nature of Being can also be seen in the mysticism and "negative way" of figures such as Meister Eckhardt and Nicholas of Cusa. On this point with respect to Nicholas of Cusa, see Levao 3-96. For an astute treatment of four medieval mystics (St. Bonaventure, Meister Eckhart, Johannes Taurer, and Jan van Ruusbroec) and the similarities of their thought with that of Heidegger, see Sikka. Sikka shows that each of the four medieval thinkers in question has a certain metaphysical position, that each, as I am attempting to show with respect to Elizabethan literature, has a "manifest" text. However, Sikka also
shows that there is a corresponding mystical, non-metaphysical experience of truth in their writing, that there are "unsaid" possibilities within their thinking. For instance, she points out that Bonaventure thinks of the immanent presencing of Being (God) in things—that is, we do not see the divine through things but in things (14-15).

48. For a more thorough treatment of this topic, see Jeffrey 1990.

49. Idolatry, for example, is considered a sin not because the image itself is "bad"; rather, idolatry is an example of the privileging of the image (as sign or thing) over the Divine (1961, VII.9)—which is contrary to the perfect ordering of things.

50. For instance, "Mussato replies [to Giovannino of Mantua] that the fact that he wrote priapic poems cannot be considered an objection to the divine character of poetry. Poetry's claim to be a theologiamundi does not derive from its having sacral objects in each case, but from its power to reveal beings—which it is also itself—and among beings is also included the obscene" (Grassi 1983, 60). Similarly, more famously, Boccaccio asserts that poetry "proceeds from the bosom of God" (Boccaccio 1989, 166). For an extensive discussion of the humanist definition of poetry as that which brings forth divine truth, in contradistinction to the Dominicans who defined it as pure fiction, see Aguzzi-Barbagli.

51. Hardison, like many, sees these two aspects of Sidney's definition of poetry as irreconcilably opposed; see 72-73.

52. Grassi also points out how the humanist educational reformers, through their emphasis on the concrete example in contradistinction to the abstractions of Scholasticism, also united the ideal and that which is: "Through the use of example as witneymphony...the difficulty in applying abstract norms to single cases is overcome. The distinction between abstract thinking and concrete acting, between true and good becomes, therefore, untenable. The 'doctrina exemplorum' demands not a rational but an imaginative language which, as such, affects the passions and induces imitation" (54).

53. Heninger points out the issues involved in the punctuation variations of this key passage between the two major texts of the Defence:

Essentially, what is at issue depends upon two variant readings of the text occasioned by a difference in punctuation: (1) "...figuring forth to speake Metaphorically. A speaking Picture, with this end to teach and delight," which is the reading of William Ponsonby's edition of 1595; and (2) "...figuring forth: to speake metaphorically, a speaking picture: with this end, to teach and delight," which is the reading of Henry Olney's edition, printed the same year as Ponsonby's. There are three key phrases involved: "figuring forth," "to speake Metaphorically," and "a speaking Picture"; and clearly there is a difference in meaning whether we group the second phrase with the first in a relationship of cause-and-effect, so that the reading becomes "figuring forth in order to speak in a way which results in metaphor," an interpretation in accord with the punctuation of the Ponsonby text, or whether we group the second phrase with the third as an adverbial modifier, so
that the reading becomes "to use a figure of speech, a speaking picture," a reading suggested by the punctuation of the Olney text. My concern is to preserve intact the phrasing of the Ponsonby edition, so that we read "figuring forth to speake Metaphorically," (1982, 121).

Heninger goes on to give extensive evidence for the preference of the Ponsonby text based on its "authority" (cf. Heninger 1982, 122-9). For this reason, I have followed him and base my interpretation of the Defence on the Ponsonby text.

54. For an excellent account of the ancient and medieval traditions of *imitatio*, and their uses in the Renaissance, see Thomas Greene; see, also, Pigman III.

55. For Aristotle's examples of analogical metaphor, see *Poetics* 1457b16-33 and *Rhetoric* III 4.1406b31, III 4.1407a17, III10.1411a1, and III 11.1413a1.

56. We might also think of this analogical subjective positing in terms of the psychoanalytic theory of "transference"—a process occurring during treatment whereby there is the "actualisation of unconscious wishes" and, from the diagnosis of this process, a cure effected (Laplanche and Pontalis, 455).

57. On metaphor and *trope*, see Quintillian *Institutio oratoria* VIII.vi; here metaphor is part of the category "ornaments of oratory" [VIII.v.35]. The metaphor's relation to the naming power of the word is reflected by Ricoeur's thinking on the subject:

Therefore, speaking of metaphor in philosophy, we must draw a line boldly between the relatively banal case of an 'extended' use of the words of ordinary language in response to a deficiency in naming and the case—to my mind singularly more interesting—where philosophical discourse deliberately has recourse to living metaphor in order to draw out new meanings from some semantic impertinence and to bring to light new aspects of reality by means of semantic innovation. (291)
CHAPTER 3:

SPENGER’S PHARMACY: NATURE AND ART IN THE FAERIE QUEENE (BOOK I)

The “question of representation” is the question as to whether humanity will respond to Being in its sending of itself in beings, in their self-emerging, or will humanity occult Being and determine beings ahead of time as re-presentations of a pre-existing onto-theo-logical ground. Representational metaphysics is governed by a broadly imperial disposition. That is, the imperial disposition marks the essential relation of humanity to beings within the history of metaphysics; thus, one must not content oneself with simply assessing the nature of this or that politico-imperial project; one must, as I am attempting to do in the present work, ground that assessment of political imperialism in the essentially imperial bearing of Western metaphysics itself. Rather than beings in their self-emerging, the essentially imperial disposition of Western metaphysics encounters beings only in terms of a commanding vantage. Rather than being a receptivity to the self-emergence and differentiation of beings based on their own internal principle (archê), the imperial disposition marks the determination of beings as externally ordered and controlled. We can see this in the two extremes within the experience of technê which mark the primordial Greek founding and the metaphysico-representational founding respectively: technê is (a) a guiding-bringing forth of a thing out of its own nature (phasis), or (b) it is an imposition of an external standard, paradigm and imperial vantage as archê. On the one hand, within the non-representational experience of technê (technê I), humanity’s confrontation with Being is understood as an open questioning, as a resolute openness. On the other hand, within the representational experience of technê (technê II), humanity’s relation to beings is understood in
terms of a closed vantage that commands and oversees beings.

The nature of technē at work, and thus the question of representation, is manifested most perspicuously in Spenser's *The Faerie Queene* in a number of guises: (1) the question of the physician's technē and the "source" of the cure, the "source-archē" of health; 2) the question of the poet-artist's making—whether this making has its source in a paradigm or in the self-emergence of the form figured forth; and 3) the question of rulership—whether it is a "political" commanding and over-powering of a populace, or a "shepherding" of the polis. Thus, this chapter will return to the oft debated question of art and nature in *The Faerie Queene* and, indirectly, the question of nature and grace, through the essential determination of Being as physis, as the self-emerging that is guided by technē. This essential determination of physis will be manifested in (1) the self-emergence of the health of the body as guided by the physician's technē, (2) the self-emergence of the form (morphē-eidos) of the thing as guided forth by the poet-artist's poiēsis; and, although not receiving a separate section of treatment, implicit in the previous two, (3) the self-emergence of the proper order (dike) of the polis as guided (shepherded) by the technē of the "ruler."

Within each of the spaces of these three questions, a metaphysico-imperial structure is manifest in Spenser's text. However, we shall also see that in this text an unsaid (non-representational and non-imperial) response to the call of Being through the tradition underlies these metaphysical structures at every stage. The metaphysical determination of each space of questioning relies on what we will call a "logic of mediation." The imperial projection of the "Other," the bringing of the other to a fall as a means of securing the self-same—through its secure (re-) presentations—relies on and is permeated by a process of mediation. This "logic of mediation" (of the "trace," of the discourse of the other ["heterology"], of the "go-between") that enables the securing of the self-same is pointed to by a number of theorists: for instance, Bakhtin, Foucault,
Derrida, Kristeva, De Certeau, and Greenblatt. We will use Derrida’s thoughts as a point of departure with respect to the metaphysico-imperial procedures of self-securing. In the first section, “Physis as Health,” we will see that the original sense of the self-emergence of the health of the body as guided by the physician’s technē is occulted within the metaphysico-imperial determination of health as an “allergic” reaction. Here, the proper limits of the body are delimited in terms of a “reaction to” or an “exclusion of” the exterior. The exterior must be brought to a fall in order to secure the health of the body—the external parasite that threatens the interior of the body must be eliminated. Derrida refers to the logic of mediation that rules here as that of the “pharmakon” (the drug as remedy/poison). We shall see that, rather than relying solely upon this metaphysical determination of health as an external delimitation and upon this logic of the pharmakon, The Faerie Queene also responds to the original sense of health as a self-emergence. We shall see this in the form of the presentation in Book I of Æsculapius as an improper physician (through his externally imposed “cures”) and in the presentation of Christ and Arthur as the proper physicians inasmuch as their “caring” brings forth the “health of the body” out of the body itself.

In the second section, “Physis as Form,” we shall see that the original sense of the self-emergence of the physis-morphē-eidos of the thing as guided forth by poiēsis (as pro-ducting) is also occulted by the metaphysico-imperial determination of the thing as a “product” of poiēsis—where poiēsis is a process of making or manufacturing by means of an external cause. Manufacturing, in this sense, is not a responsive guiding of what is proper to the thing in its self-showing; rather, it is an external effecting of an “artifact” out of its “dew.” The maker-magus is the locus of technē as the archē of the artifact. The imperial poet-magician, who commands and rules the things in his purview—who is the locus of the archē of things—is manifested by
Archimago in *The Faerie Queene*—whose name, here, signifies that the magus is the archē of the "products" of his creative art. The magus's mediated presentation of the image—the double image, Duessa—this doubleness that allows the imperial commanding-making, is a manifestation of the "logic of mediation." Here, where mediating processes effect the securing of the thing as a product of a maker or magus, the logic of mediation could be referred to as a logic of the "pharmakeus" (magician or sorcerer). We shall see, however, that the true poet-maker for Spenser is one who brings forth by receiving the divine gift (grace) of Being in its self-emerging and self-sending. Rather than the hubris or pride of the maker who asserts that his or her own "skill" or "wit" is the source (archē) of the work, rather than the pride which feels that a work of art speaks "the praises of the workmans wit" (*FQ* I.iv.5), Spenser's conception of making (poiēsis) is one which sees the source of the work in Being as *phusis*, as the divine appearing in the ordinary, as the gift of Grace, or as the gift of poetic inspiration (*enthousiasmos*). For Spenser, the maker is under a certain *furor poeticus* (Plato's *Phaedrus*) or *enthousiasmos* (*The Shepheardes Calender*, "October"); we shall see that the madness or folly of the maker, for Spenser, is akin to the "ecstatic folly" delineated in Plato's *Phaedrus* and in Erasmus's *Praise of Folly*.

Stephen Greenblatt, in what has become one of the most influential readings of Spenser's *The Faerie Queene* to date, "To Fashion a Gentleman: Spenser and the Destruction of the Bower of Bliss" (1980, 157-92), asserts that the Bower of Bliss is destroyed because its gratifications "threaten 'civility'" (173). Following the Freudian principle that civilization rests upon repression, he isolates the "technology of control" in which Spenser participates. Because of this participation in the political technologies of control and repression, Greenblatt labels Spenser as "our originating and preeminent poet of empire" (174). It is this "original" reading of Spenser as an "imperial" poet, and the many derivative readings it has spawned over the last fifteen years, that provides a covert
foil for this chapter. Because it is beyond the limits of this chapter to deal adequately with the question of nature and art in Book II, much less the charge of political imperialism current readings bring upon Spenser, within readings of Book II especially, I will limit myself to a discussion of nature and art in Book I—using the "essence of imperialism" (the "imperial" disposition of representational metaphysics), as diagnosed by Heidegger and Derrida, as my cue. By attending to this notion of the essentially imperial disposition of Western humanity, we will see that the question of "imperialism" in Spenser is more complicated than is usually realized.

The metaphysico-imperial interpretation of the polis is that of the closed off interior structure with a viewing-vantage-point on the fallen exterior. This imperial determination of the politically enclosed interior relies on the logic of mediation in that it sets itself up by bringing before itself—that is, by representing [Vor-stellen]—and bringing to a fall the other. "The city's body proper," as Derrida points out, "reconstitutes its unity, closes around the security of its inner courts, gives back to itself the word that links it with itself within the confines of the agora, by violently excluding from its territory the representative of an external threat or aggression" ("PPh" 133). The enclosed position is thus secured by means of this exclusion. However, the space of the other, of that against which the enclosed position defines itself, is also co-constituted in this process of exclusion. For instance, the representative of the outside is "regularly granted its place by the community, chosen, kept, fed, etc., in the very heart of the inside. These parasites were as a matter of course domesticated by the living organism that housed them at its expense" ("PPh" 133). The space of the other, this other world (heterocosm) that both is and relies upon the processes of mediation, is a world of internalized disease that infects the healthy body and a world of madness that distorts the form of the thing and the identity of the subject, but it is also a world of the "barbarian," the "savage," or of the "scapegoat" (pharmakos) that simultaneously threatens
and constitutes the secure enclosure of the civilized position.⁴ We can see the delineation of the space of the cultural other within the colonial discourses which constitute the most famous texts of the politico-imperial project: from Herodotus to Tacitus, to the modern imperial project manifested in such discourses as Columbus's "Letters," those of Vespucci, and the "Essays" of Montaigne.⁵ We shall see, however, that Spenser's text is not an "embedded" "product" of the "circulation" of these modern colonial discourses; we shall see that the nature of true "ruling," for Spenser, is not that of the imposition of an external or commanding order. Rather, as with prominent Northern Renaissance humanists such as Erasmus and Sir Thomas More, Spenser conceives of this commanding and discordant rule as a tyrannical, dysfunctional or unhealthy relation. Proper ruling is experienced here as a guiding-shepherding of the body-thing-<em>polis</em> out of its own nature and to its proper end (<em>telos</em>).

**Preliminary Reflection: On Allegory as a Figuring Forth**

To some I know this Methode will seem displeaunt, which had rather have good discipline delivered plainly in way of precepts, or sermoned at large, as they use, then thus clowdily enwrapped in Allegorical devises. ("LR" 737)

Before exploring these metaphysico-imperial questions, I would like to bring to the fore a question intimately bound up with those listed above: that of the nature of Spenser's allegory. The term "allegory" "derives from Greek <em>allegoria</em> 'speaking otherwise'" (Cuddon 22). The metaphysical manner of interpreting this speaking otherwise has traditionally been that the allegorical figure or sign speaks, that is, refers to, a pre-existing alternate level of meaning. "As a rule, an allegory is a story in verse or prose with a double meaning: a primary or surface meaning; and a secondary or under-the-surface meaning" (Cuddon 22). There is a pre-existing truth or meaning within the metaphysico-representational allegory. The allegorical figure arises, then, as an authorial construct whose function is to reflect this pre-existing truth. With this view
of allegory as a point of departure, one can say of John Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress, taken as a
typical allegory, that it "is a simplified representation or similitude of the average man's journey
through the trials and tribulations of life on his way to Heaven" (Cuddon 23). There is, however,
another way in which allegory can be thought. This alternate possibility is tied to the experience
of the poetic word as "veil" within medieval and Renaissance thought. That is, the allegorical
figure, rather than referring to a pre-existing meaning or thing, is a veil, an instance of the
unveiling of Being itself. The allegorical figure is obscure and concealing; it is a veil. However,
this concealment is akin to a veil placed on an invisible person; the veil hides but also shows forth
for the first time. If the veil is removed, nothing presences. Truth is not truth if the veil is lifted.
Truth (disclosure) happens in the shelter of the veil. This early Greek notion of truth as unveiling
(alētheia) was alive for Spenser as a possibility for thought and for poetic experience.

We have already seen, in Chapter 2, that within medieval referentiality a possibility for
a non-representational relation to the divine is opened. This possibility is opened through the
experience of the poetic word as veil. Within the medieval representational experience of beings
and signs, the sign or thing is "used" referentially in order to determine intention, human or
divine. Here beings and signs representationally refer to a pre-existing onto-theo-logical ground
which always already pre-sends them and determines their meaning. However, this referentiality
of signs and things is also experienced in medieval, as well as in certain Renaissance humanist,
discourses as a poetic veiling. Within this experience, one hears the early Greek conflictual
essence of truth as alētheia as a faint (un-said) echo. Here, truth arises as a dynamic un-concealing
of the Divine. God is un-concealed through his creation. The created order and the poetic word,
like dark glasses, conceal divine being, yet they also show it forth. "[T]o the extent that we in this
life enjoy Him 'through a glass' or 'in a dark manner' [I Cor. 13.12]," according to Augustine,
"we shall sustain our pilgrimage with more tolerance and more ardently desire to end it" (1958, I.30). This "alethic" structure of medieval referentiality is the concealed essence of the Augustinian metaphysics of the Middle Ages. This concealed and essential experience of truth lies beneath the "logocentrism" or "metaphysics of presence" that Derrida finds within the manifest text of medieval-Christian thought. What is more, it is this un-said, "alethic" structure that guides the Renaissance humanist determination of the poetic word. Here, the poetic word (verba) veils beings (res); however, this poetic veiling also shows beings forth in their truth. Through this tradition of the poetic word as veil, the early Greek experience of essential truth as alētheia presented itself as a claim, to Sidney, as we have seen, and to Spenser. With all of this in mind, we approach the question of Spenser's allegory.

Whether operating under the distinction of historical and spiritual allegory or the more contemporary distinction of political and semiotico-psychological allegory, the general tendency is for the critic to posit the allegory as a referential structure, however complex, representing an external reality. With respect to the poetic word as veil, we can see that Spenser's allegory, as a response to what offers itself within the tradition, is also an "alethic" structure. For years critics have recognized that the representational relationship between figures within Spenser's fictions and an external meaning are, at the very least, problematic. Within The Faerie Queene for instance, according to Thomas P. Roche Jr., "[w]e cannot restrict ourselves to a sterile hunt for one-to-one relationships. There is no single meaning, at least no single meaning to be stated apart from the experience of the poem" (1964, 31). We must keep this in mind and resist the impulse to turn the poem into a referential or allegorical abstraction. Rather than a "fill-in the blank" allegory, or an allegory of "one-to-one" relationships, Spenser's poem operates as a dynamic process of un-concealing within language. With this notion of "veil" operative within the "alethic"
structure of the poetic word in mind, we could say that Spenser's allegories are a veiling-showing forth of things for the first time. One does not perform a substitutive operation or calculation upon the figures within the poem; one does not exchange or cash-in the figure for the appropriate allegorical significance. A more appropriate description of the poem's unfolding would be to say that beings are brought forth ("figured forth") within the language of the poem. When encountering the "wandering wood" and "Errours den" (I.13), one need not refer to a subtly derived, external, spiritual meaning with which the language serves as a mere mediating link. Here, and throughout the poem, language unfolds and brings forth for the first time the "wood" and the "den"; the language makes "clear" what these figures "mean." Of course, as poetic veil, this "founding saying," this "making clear" in its "letting be seen" (logos), is a concealing-revealing. This concealedness is the sheltering withdrawal proper to Being; it is the sheltering of Being as understood within the thinking of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance; it is the "dark" manner in which the divine shows itself in all things. However, this concealedness can also be experienced, within the representational determination of beings, as the surplus value of signification ("supplementarity") that provides the motor of sign substitutions within the poem and the discourses in which it is "embedded"; or, this concealment can be deemed the shadow side of a "one-to-one" referential allegory that reveals itself through the redemption (buying back) of the materiality of the figure. In order to demonstrate the ways in which Spenser's allegory is essentially rooted in the "alethic" structure of the poetic word, rather than these representational determinations of the allegorical figure, let us briefly compare Spenser's own description of his allegory, in his "Letter to Raleigh," with Sidney's definition of poiēsis.6

For Sidney, "Poesie" is mimēsis: a "figuring forth to speake Metaphorically." We outlined the essential meaning of this definition in Chapter 2: poiēsis is a figuring forth out of the word
(logos), out of a disclosive naming (metaphor); it is a showing forth of the appropriate articulation of things (dikê, the ought, the ideal) in the figure, form, work-deed (energeia) or "ensample." Spenser begins his description of his own allegory, or "darke conceit" ("LR" 737), by pointing to its "generall end": "to fashion a gentleman or noble person in vertuous and gentle discipline" (737).

Spenser points out the major examples in the epic tradition in which heroes have been used in order to figure forth virtuous action. He then asserts that the figure of Arthur is that in which he displays "the twelve private morall vertues" and the twelve "pollitick vertues" (737). (This parallels Sidney's claim that all arts aspire toward "the Ethike and Politique consideration, with the end of well doing, and not of well knowing onely" [DoP 11].) There has been some discussion, since Spenser's epic does not contain these projected twenty-four books, as to what these virtues actually would have been. A key to determining the nature of these virtues lies in determining the nature of the way in which they are presented: allegory. Spenser points out that to some people "this Methode will seeme displeasaunt, which had rather have good discipline delivered plainly in way of precepts, or sermoned at larger, as they use, then thus clowdily enwrapped in Allegoricall devises" (737). Most people would prefer to be presented with the already known. They want "precepts" which guide them on a predetermined path; they want precepts which accord with predetermined, already known virtues. This is the manner of moral instruction to which people are accustomed. It is also the manner of education, of fashioning a gentleman, which Spenser eschews. Education and allegory for Spenser involve a setting of one on a path to self-discovery. They entail the removal of the one on the educative quest from the domain of the familiar and from that to which he or she is accustomed. Education occurs in the "clowdily enwrapped" allegorical figure. Virtue is figured forth in the allegorical veil. The virtues Spenser presents in his allegories are not "types" that the educated reader is to emulate; rather,
each virtue presents itself in the manner of a temporal unfolding, through the dealings of the heroes of each book. Virtue is not a timeless precept to which we must accord our actions; virtue unfolds only in time. Spenser, like Robert Greene, feels that "Temporis filia veritas" [truth is the daughter of time] (Pandosto 153). Similarly, truth shows itself, in the allegory, in the manner of a concealing revealing. For these reasons, Spenser does not describe his allegorical devices, which "clowdily" figure forth the various virtues, in terms of a "representation" of a pre-existing virtue. Rather, the virtue is "expressed," "set forth," or "pictured" for the first time in the allegorical figure, in the works and action (energeia) of the hero: "The first of the knight of the Redcrosse, in whome I expresse Holynes: The seconde of Sir Guyon, in whome I sette forth Temperance: The third of Britomartis a Lady knight, in whome I picture Chastity" (737). In short, Spenser's conception of allegory, akin to Sidney's definition of poiēsis, is that it is a figuring forth of the appropriate articulation of things (the ideal, virtue) in the word (logos) as work (energeia).

Allegoria (speaking otherwise), when grounded in the essential experience of alētheia, as is Spenser's allegory, is a speaking of the "other" in which the otherness or difference introduced by poetic language is not one that is a product of external delimitation and reference. Here, allegory is a founding saying of the Other, an unfolding and showing forth of a being in language, a "siting" of the mystery of Being. The sheltering mystery, integral to Being in its unconcealedness, arises in language, in humanity's questioning confrontation. In confronting the mystery, historical humanity arises in its power as that which is "strange" (to deinon). The concealedness of Being, this occult power, has been given various names historically: the foreign, the barbaric, the savage, the mad, the mystic. Language, or the tradition in language, is the concealing-revealing that is Being; language, then, in this essential sense of reserved showing forth ("Sagen" or "Saying"; Heidegger 1971b, 122-3), is the locus of the occult power of Being.
The particular "speaking" undertaken by a historical humanity more or less heeds this occult power—and does so within more or less unique modalities. Spenser's allegory is a particular heeding of the concealing-revealing that is language.

Excursus:

_The Philosopher and Poet as Traveller: More's Hythloday and Spenser's Immerito_

Let us explore this concealing-revealing nature of language and allegory and its relation to truth in the work of Spenser by means of a brief excursus on, an attention to the correspondences between, two texts: Book I of More's _Utopia_, and E.K.'s Dedicatory "Epistle" to _The Shepheardes Calender_. In the background of this discussion a third text will also be significant: Plato's "allegory of the cave" (_The Republic_ VII.514a-521b).

Let us begin this exploration at the logical, as well as temporal, beginning. For Plato, philosophy is an open questioning, a refusal to take things as they are, a refusal to decide ahead of time what truth is, a refusal to accept the "already known" as the ultimate limit of things. Philosophy calls into question the familiar definitions of things and holds out the possibility of the foreign and the strange. Occupying a central location in Plato's _The Republic_ is a description of the unfolding of this philosophic thinking and questioning in terms of a movement along a divided line (509e-511e): from opinion (_doxa_) to knowledge (_epistēme_), from illusion (_eikasia_) and belief (_pistis_) to reasoning (_dianoia_) and dialectic, from images and physical things to forms (_eide_). After introducing this conception of philosophic thinking as the movement along a divided line, Socrates describes the "allegory of the cave." Rather than a transition in the discussion to the level of pure "dialectic," rather than a transition to the practice of an imageless knowing, Socrates provides yet another allegorical figure, another image, "the image of the cave" (Sallis 444). What this peculiar lack of a transition connotes is that, for Plato, philosophic activity (questioning), occurs in the
dialogue, in the speech or word (*logos*). The speech (*logos*) is philosophic questioning in action or at work (*energeia*). In the *logos*, in language, in the linguistic figure, the happening that is truth and Being is set to work.

Philosophic or dialogic questioning, as a transcending of the familiar and shadowy definitions of things, as a movement or voyage into the bright light of truth and Being, is dramatically figured forth in the cave allegory. The allegory is a familiar one. We generally pass by it and think little about it; for us, it is something familiar and "already known." For this reason, I will not discuss it in depth; however, we should remind ourselves of a few of the features of this cave "image," features which are pertinent with respect to our discussion of More and Spenser. After this comparison, the "familiarity" of these features will fade and the cave image will be able to strike us with some of its intended strangeness.

The cave image presents, first of all, prisoners in a cave. The prisoners see only the shadows of stick figures cast on the cave wall by firelight (514a-c). The prisoners think that these shadows are the whole truth (515c); this unquestioning nature of the prisoners, says Socrates, makes them "like us" (515a). Socrates then raises the question as to what would happen if the prisoners were "cured" (*iasin*) of their fixed and unquestioning relation to the shadows (515c). To be cured, the prisoners must be dragged out of the cave and into the bright light of the sun. This is a painful process, likely to be resisted. The prisoners would be completely unaccustomed to this other space, this heterocosm outside the cave; it would be a foreign territory to them (516a). Upon returning, the released prisoner, this philosopher-traveller, would think that the ways of the cave-dwellers are foolish; he would not desire the power and honour that can be won through the games and dealings of the cave-dwellers. "Will our released prisoner," Socrates asks, "hanker after these prizes or envy this power or honour? Won't he be more likely to feel, as Homer says, that he
would far rather be 'a serf in the house of some landless man', or indeed anything else in the world, than hold the opinions and live the life that they do?' (516d). In fact, the philosopher-traveller would be so repulsed by the ways of the cave-dwellers that he or she would not even want to return (517c-d). So, too, the prisoners who have not been cured will regard the philosopher-traveller with apprehension; the philosopher will seem foolish to them (517a); they may even be forced to put the philosopher on trial (517d-c). Let us keep these features of the cave image in mind as we turn to Spenser.

Sidney refers to Spenser only once in his *Defence of Poesie*, and not by name. In one of the most famous of Elizabethan back-handed compliments, Sidney declares that *The Shepheardes Calender* is a notable example of poetry, yet he tempers this by saying that the poem's rustic language should not be followed: “The Sheepeheardes Kalender, hath much *Poetrie* in his Egloges, indeed woorthie the reading, if I be not deceived.” That same framing of his style to an olde rusticke language, I dare not allow: since neither *Theocritus* in Greeke, *Virgill* in Latine, nor *Sanazara* in Italian, did affect it” (37). It should not surprise us that Sidney deems the work essentially poetic, and lauds its poetic nature, while at the same time disparaging that aspect of Spenser’s writing that modern thinking about "literature" deems most central to poetry: style. What is at stake for Sidney here is his definition of *poiēsis* as a *mimēsis*—as a "figuring forth to speake Metaphorically" (9)—and not as a mere "ryming and versing" (10). Sidney calls poetry the bringing forth of the proper order of things (the ought, the ideal) within the figure or the feigned image. "What Sidney has in mind as ‘poetry’ in Spenser’s poem," S.K. Heninger Jr. points out, "are the monologues and dialogues reported as direct speech, which in accord with his rhetorical training he would have dubbed prosopopoeias" (1989, 308). For Sidney, those things which are poetic in Spenser's work are the fables that act as speaking pictures, as lively and vivid showings
(enargeia), such as Thenot's tale of the Oak and the Brier in "February." In the Argument of the "February" eclogue, E.K. asserts that "the olde man telleth so lively and so feelingly, as if the thing were set forth in some Picture before our eyes, more plainly could not appeare." Conversely, what would not count as poetry is what merely repeats a historical world. In "June," for example, Hobbinol advises Colin Clout to "Forsake the soyle, that so doth thee bewitch" (line 18). E.K. in his gloss points out that "This is no poetical fiction, but unfeynedly spoken of the Poete selfe" (cf. Heninger 1989, 565n4). Thus, the rustic language does not advance the poetic figuring forth (the fiction), according to Sidney, nor does it accord with the pastoral tradition: Theocritus, Virgil, and Sannazzaro. The language of The Shepheardes Calender, in this way, is strange and foreign to the tradition. The strange language of the poem takes it away from the familiar and present and removes it to another domain: that of a "mistie" past that withdraws into secrecy. It is for this reason, perhaps, that Sidney's reference to The Shepheardes Calender occurs along with a reference to Chaucer's Troilus and Criseyde—within the context of his discussion of the arts and skills that need to attend the potentially fertile ground of an English poet: "Chawcer undoubtedly did excellently in his Troilus and Criseid: of whom trulie I knowe not whether to mervaille more, either that hee in that mistie time could see so clearly, or that wee in this cleare age, goe so stumblingly after him" (37). In withdrawing into a "mistie" past, the poem also becomes associated with a "golden" realm as opposed to the "brasen" or familiar world. The heterocosm that is the past, in Sidney's Defence, is the world in which poetry is respected by diverse societies, in which poetry, in fact, founds social relations. In this poetically constituted past, poetry was in "almost the highest estimation of learning"; since then it has "falne to be the laughing stocke of children" (4).

The Shepheardes Calender, in this way, becomes doubly poetic within Sidney's
formulations: (1) it is a figuring forth of fictions (dialogues and fables) which accord with a manifest tradition; and (2) its language operates within a concealed or "mistie" tradition that links it to the past as golden-poetic-world (heterocosm). It is for this reason that E.K., in his Dedicatory "Epistle" to "Mayster Gabriell Harvey," like Sidney, thinks of the work of "Immeritô" (Spenser, "this our new poet") and that of Chaucer in the same breath: "Uncouthe unkiste, Sayde the olde famous Poete Chaucer. . . . as in that good old Poete it served well Pandares purpose, for the bolstering of his baudy brocage, so very well taketh place in this our new Poete, who for that he is uncouthe (as said Chaucer) is unkist, and unknown to most men, is regarded but of few" (lines 1-13).9 That is, it is the strangeness of the poem’s language that allows E.K. to bring together the great Chaucer and one who would appear to be "undeserving" (Immeritô). E.K. points out that Immeritô’s language, the "framing" of his words, will be that which seems the "straunget" to readers: "framing his words: the which of many thinges which in him be straunge, I know will seeme the straunget, the words them selves being so auncient, the knitting of them so short and intricate, and the whole Periode and compasse of speache so delightsome for the roundnesse, and so grave for the straungenenesse" (23-29). Immeritô’s language is "straunge," E.K. says, and by most people "unused"; however, it is a foreigness within the essential identity of the readers themselves: it is the English language and language used by many poets: "And firste of the wordes to speake, I graunt they be something hard, and of most men unused, yet both English, and also used of most excellent Authors and most famous Poetes" (29-32). If this language is "straunge" and foreign, although (as English) essential to our identity, the encounter with this language, to which most people are unaccustomed, occurs in the form of a travel beyond the realm of the familiar and already known. This is a travel out of the shadowy realm of the familiar and into the bright light of the sun, of truth and Being: "In whom whenas this our Poet hath bene much
traveiled and throughly redd, how could it be, (as that worthy Oratour sayde) but that walking in
the sonne although for other cause he walked, yet needes he mought be sunburnt" [my emphasis]
(32-36). The poet travels into the realm of the strange, into the bright light of truth. The poet
returns in order to educate the reader. To the reader, to "most people," the poet-traveller will seem
foolish and strange. The poet-traveller, accustomed to the bright light of truth, will stumble in the
more mundane setting of the everyday world. More properly, we should say that the poet is
acustomed to the sounds of language, the strange sounds of the past, to the "mistie" tradition; the
poet, for this reason, does not have an ear (or pen) for the mundane and familiar words of the
everyday world; the poet does not have an ear for unthoughtful words, for the "already said" and
"already known": "and having the sound of those auncient Poetes still ringing in his eares, he
mought needes in singing hit out some of theyr tunes" (36-38). Although they seem foolish to
many, E.K. asserts that the strange words of Immerito the poet-traveller have an authority, a truth
value: "sure I think, and think I think not amissee, that they bring great grace and, as one would
say, auctoritie to the verse" (44-46).10

For E.K., in short, Immerito's archaic language is a matter of listening to the call of
language, to that which shows itself in the tradition (Being). Immerito (Spenser) responds to the
tradition in this way, through the language used by the "most famous Poetes." The poet, E.K.
says, "hath bene much traveiled" in the texts of the past. Here, where the historic text arises as a
foreign territory, the poet arises as a voyager or traveller. Immerito, the undeserving one, writing
and travelling in the "base" terrain of rustic language and pastoral form, has his poem "glossed"
by E.K.--suggesting that the poem is akin to a classical text of some importance. This ambiguity
of a seemingly wise poet-traveller who should be attended, and glossed, "if [we] be not deceived,"
and who is yet associated with a certain folly through his name (Immerito), recalls the figure of
Raphael Hythlodaeus in More's *Utopia*.

Immeritó is described as being "sunburnt" (36) from travelling in the "sonne" of the poets of the past. Similarly, in first describing Hythloyd, More mentions his "sunburned face": "One day after I had heard Mass at Nòtre Dame, the most beautiful and most popular church in Antwerp, I was about to return to my quarters when I happened to see [Peter Giles] talking with a stranger, a man of quite advanced years. The stranger had a sunburned face, a long beard and a cloak hanging loosely from his shoulders; from his face and dress, I took him to be a ship's captain" (9). And just as Immeritó's travels have been in the sun of knowledge, so too the travels of this stranger, Hythloyd, have been primarily textual. Upon the meeting of the characters of More and Hythloyd, Peter Giles insists that "there is no man alive today can tell you so much about strange peoples and unexplored lands" [my emphasis] (9); and when More asserts that he had correctly guessed the nature of this stranger--"my guess wasn't a bad one, for at first glance I supposed he was a skipper" (10)—Peter retorts that More is "off the mark . . . for his sailing has not been like that of Palinurus, but more that of Ulysses, or rather of Plato. This man, who is named Raphael—his family name is Hythloyd—knows a good deal of Latin and is particularly learned in Greek. He studied Greek more than Latin because his main interest is philosophy, and in that field he found that the Romans have left us nothing very valuable except certain works of Seneca and Cicero" (10). That is, Hythloyd's travel has been in and through language, through the classical texts of the tradition.

One of the central problems surrounding the ambiguity of Hythloyd's character—is he a wise healer (Raphael) or merely a foolish "nonsense peddler" (Hythlodaeus)?—has to do with his decision not to counsel kings. The dialogue on the counsel of kings takes up the majority of Book I of the *Utopia* (13-41), thus providing one of the central concerns of the work as a whole. Peter
Giles first suggests that Raphael should advise some leader: "I’m surprised that you don’t enter some king’s service; for I don’t know of a single prince who wouldn’t be glad to have you. Your learning and your knowledge of various countries and men would entertain him while your advice and supply of examples would be helpful at the counsel board" (13). Hythloday has travelled beyond the sphere of the familiar, beyond the shadows of the cave, into the bright realm of knowledge and the strange; he has a sunburned face from this exposure to things as they are. More and Giles thus insist that Hythloday undertake what is proper for the philosopher-poet-traveller: return and dispense his cargo of wisdom, return and draw others out (e-duco) into this light. As More points out to Raphael: "Your friend Plato thinks that commonwealths will be happy only when philosophers become kings or kings become philosophers" (28) (cf. The Republic V.473c-d; Epistles VII.326a-b). Hythloday, of course, refuses to do so. He insists that society cannot be improved unless people are willing to give up private property and interest—and in this, Hythloday insists, he is following Plato (38-9). Since no one in contemporary European society is willing to give up private interest, Hythloday’s advice will be scoffed at as the advice of a fool or madman. Of course, this is the same reason that Plato gives for the existence of a prejudice against philosophers in all societies. The philosopher, whose eyes are accustomed to the lighting of truth and Being, operates in current societies as one in a dark cave: "And if he had to discriminate between the shadows, in competition with the other prisoners, while he was still blinded and before his eyes got used to the darkness . . . wouldn’t he be likely to make a fool of himself?" (The Republic 516e-17a).14

More suggests that Hythloday be willing to temper his advice, that he suit his advice to the occasion, that Hythloday compromise some principles in an effort to persuade the ruler and his councillors in other areas: "To tell you the truth, I don’t think you should offer advice or thrust
forward ideas of this sort that you know will not be listened to. What good will it do? When your listeners are already prepossessed against you and firmly convinced of opposite opinions, what can you accomplish with your out-of-the-way notions? This academic philosophy is pleasant enough in the private conversation of close friends, but in the councils of kings, where grave matters are being authoritatively decided, there is no room for it” (35). More is suggesting a Ciceronian approach to counsel relying on persuasion or rhetoric (cf. Orator II.xvi.67-68 and On Moral Obligation I.xxvii-xlili). This position is presented in healthy tension with that of Hythloday: a Platonic approach to counsel relying on the truths of dialectic. The only result of a Ciceronian rhetorical compromise, says Hythloday, “will be that while I try to cure others of madness, I’ll be raving along with them myself. If I’m to speak the truth, I will have to talk in the way I’ve described” [my emphasis] (36). But what is the nature of Hythloday’s preferred mode of philosophical speaking? How does he suggest that philosophers, in the past, have counselled kings? It should not surprise us that Raphael sees the philosophical counsel, the healing or curing of others’ madness, in terms of a presenting of a strange text, a text that, in its misty-foreignness, is seldom heeded. Raphael says that philosophers are glad to assist rulers; “in fact, many have already done it in published books, if the rulers were only willing to take their good advice” (28).

We see here, then, the tension of rhetoric and dialectic brought together within the form of More’s work, Utopia. Dialectical truth is brought forth within the rhetorical figure of the text. The humanist letters that frame the text proper remind us that this is nominally More’s transcription of Hythloday’s advice, that this is one of the “published books” in which, Hythloday insists, philosophers counsel and educate those still in the dark.

Let us return to The Shepheardes Calender at this point and remind ourselves that Immerito echoes Hythloday as a philosopher-poet-traveller. The philosopher-rulers’ beholding of the sun,
or the Good as the grant of Being, dazzles their eyes. With the overpowering brightness of truth flashing in their eyes, their perceptions within the cave are altered. The “sunburnt” Immeritò, interestingly, basks in the glow of the language of the famous poets. The sound of this language, that which shines forth and manifests itself within this language, rings in his ears as he composes his particular poetic composition. In returning to the cave in order to cure the reader, Immeritò, “having the sound of those auncient Poetes still ringing in his eares” (36-7), speaks in a “straunge” manner. On the one hand, this strangeness can be perceived as a babbling, as a rustic foolishness. It is for this reason that Immeritò’s rustic language is “put on trial,” so to speak, by Sidney. On the other hand, this strange language can also be perceived as a receptivity to an occult power, a receptivity to a more primordial truth, to the bright light of truth outside the familiar schemata of the cave. This heeding of what is essential in language brings “great grace and . . . auctoritie to the verse” (45-6). In this way, the “author” is not Immeritò as a sort of human “manufacturer” of the poem; rather, the “author” (“auctoritie”) of the verse is the grace of Being as sent in language, the original and essential in language.

Insofar as he or she “heals” (iasin) those in the cave, by releasing them from their bound and unquestioning relation to the shadows, the philosopher-poet-traveller is also a physician. The art of the physician lies in bringing forth the natural, self-emerging order and health of the body. That is, the doctor does not “make,” in the sense of manufacture, the health of the body. So, too, the philosopher-poet-physician brings forth the self-emerging order and truth of language. This is the type of physician’s art which E.K. praises in Immeritò: “for in my opinion it is one special prayse, of many whych are dew to this Poete, that he hath laboured to restore, as to theyr rightfull heritage such good and naturall English words, as have ben long time out of use and almost cleare disherited. Which is the onely cause, that our Mother tonge, which truely of it self is both ful
enough for prose and stately enough for verse, hath long time ben counted most bare and barrein of both" (83-90). Others, according to E.K., have tried to manufacture or effect a cure unnaturally: "which default when as some endeavoured to salve and recure, they patched up the holes with peces and rags of other languages, borrowing here of the french, there of the Italian, every where of the Latine, not weighing how il, those tongues accorde with themselves, but much worse with ours: So now they have made our English tongue a gallimaufry or hodgepodge of all other species" [my emphasis] (90-97).

Immeritô the poet-traveller-physician heeds and brings forth the natural order of things in language, the self-emergence of truth and Being in language. Immeritô responds to the original meanings of things veiled in words; thus, he heeds the original essence of truth as it is sent in language and brings this forth in the rhetorical figures of the work. For this reason, E.K. refers to "that worthy Oratour" (34), Cicero, when it comes to this issue of responding to what is primal in language: "Tullie in that booke, wherein he endeavoureth to set forth the paterne of a perfect Oratour, sayth that oftentimes an auncient worde maketh the style seeme grave, and as it were reverend" (56-9). Responding to the essential and setting it forth in the figure is what Cicero deems to be "the paterne of a perfect Oratour." The reader is urged to regard this process as similar to what makes, for E.K., the "perfecte paterne of a Poete" ("October," Argument), as set forth in Cuddie, Colin, and ultimately Immeritô/Spenser.

In conclusion, we might say that this aesthetic of Raphael and Immeritô as philosopher-poet-traveller-physicians, which, perhaps, marks the Renaissance experience of the poetic more generally, operates conversely to the "aesthetic of the good physician" as delineated by Stanley Fish. For Fish, in Self-Consuming Artifacts, one attains dialectical truth, and brings the reader to this truth, by kicking away the rhetorical ladder of the text that got them there, by leaving behind
language and its figures and images in the transition to the other side of the divided line. I am suggesting, on the other hand, that in Plato, in Sidney (as we have seen in Chapter 2), in More's description of philosophical counsel, and in the poetics of Spenser, philosophical truth arises only within the site of the rhetorical figure; truth happens only in language (logos), in the linguistic work (ergon-energeia), in the veil, and only in time. This aesthetic, wherein dialectical truth is brought forth in the rhetorical figure, connects Spenser's essential understanding of art with that of Sidney (cf. Chapter 2).

Spenser's allegorical fictions offer rich possibilities for interpretation. I will emphasize, in this chapter, the differences between two main paths of interpreting Spenser's allegory (his "speaking otherwise"), two paths which correspond to two ways in which we might view Immerito's poetic saying: (1) as a "representational allegory," a speaking of the strange or other in which what is effected is a colonization, an external delimitation, of a foreign territory (the unknown) by the imperial-metaphysical poet-traveller; or, (2) as an allegorical "veil," a speaking of the strange or other arising out of a heeding of the text of the past, out of the philosophic word. These two modes of allegory, as we have noted, arise out of the possibilities offered in the Christian Middle Ages. Medieval metaphysics thinks of existence (and the work of art) as a "representational allegory"; existence consists of signs which represent and refer to a divine intention. The other possibility within medieval thinking is one which understands existence (and the work of art) as an "allegorical veil," as a concealing revealing of the divine. The latter mode of allegory is that in which the strange world arises as the golden world brought forth in poetic language—as Sidney describes it. According to my interpretation, Spenser's allegory operates primarily in this latter mode, this "saying of the strange" that sounds foolish, that sounds rustic
and rude, but, if heeded, is an education, a leading out and toward the truth. The nature of the education achieved is distinct in each mode of allegory: (1) the education can be a venture into the unknown in order to redeem that territory, in order to reclaim it as a sure object realm of knowledge based on the stability of the Idea (eidos); or, (2) the education can be a leading out by way of a concealing-revealing, the shining forth of Being in its appearing (eidos). The "representational allegory" is a speaking of the other and an education that operates by way of the imperial "analogy"; it encounters what arises in its foreignness by way of the structures of the known. Spenserian allegory, as a figuring forth in the word (logos), is a speaking of the other and an education that operates by way of the essential metaphor: a disclosive naming that is a heeding of and a "trans-porting" (meta-pherein) to the essential ground of the origin. In the latter we have, then, a "figuring forth to speake Metaphorically": a setting forth in the rhetorical figure in order to speak in the manner of the metaphor, in order to transport one to the realm of the essential meaning of things veiled in language, to the foreign realm outside of the cave, to the realm of the lighting of Being.

Excursus: On The Question of "Nature" and "Art" in the Renaissance

We are attempting to discern the ways in which both representational and non-representational ways of thinking about truth and art offered themselves as possibilities for the Elizabethan writer—possibilities opened up by the Greek founding of Western thinking and transmitted through the Middle Ages. In the Renaissance, one of the ways in which the question of representation in relation to truth and art manifested itself was in the prevalent concern with the distinctions between "nature" and "art." Today, these words lack the force and meaning which they had for the Renaissance thinker. "Art for us usually means fine art," as Edward Taylor points out, "and Nature has been stripped of the veils that made her a a figure of mystery and power for
Spenser" (1961, 1). The Renaissance, with its extensive thinking on the question of nature and art, heeds the original, Greek formulation of a distinction between phusis and technē/nomos. The distinction is one between that which arises as the "innate characteristics" of things, the self-emerging nature of things (phusis), and that which arises out of the knowing intervention of humanity (technē), out of law or custom (nomos) (cf. Taylor 1961, 39-71). As Taylor points out, two main alternatives with regard to the question of nature and art offered themselves to Renaissance thinking: (1) nature and art are opposed, in essential discord, or (2) nature and art are complementary (29). The essential ground of these alternatives, however, rests on an early Greek distinction between phusis and technē/nomos—on the early Greek reflection on whether phusis or technē/nomos provides the origin, order, and end (archē-telos) of human endeavour. Human art and custom are in essential discord with nature and truth if we think of technē/nomos as replacing phusis as the archē of the matter at hand, if we think of art in terms of technē II. On the other hand, human art and custom are in felicitous concord with nature and truth if we think of technē/nomos as bringing forth phusis, a bringing forth which heeds and responds to phusis as the archē of the matter at hand, if we think of art in terms of technē I. Let us turn, at this point, to some Renaissance examples of this distinction.

In King Lear, Edmond has a certain understanding of nature and art; Edmond understands human arts and customs as in essential discord with the natural truths of existence.

Thou, Nature, art my goddess; to thy law
My services are bound. Wherefore should I
Stand in the plague of custom and permit
The curiosity of nations to deprive me?
For that I am some twelve or fourteen moonshines
Lag of a brother? Why ‘bastard’? Wherefore ‘base’?
When my dimensions are as well compact,
My mind as generous, and my shape as true
As honest madam’s issue? Why brand they us
With 'base'? With 'baseness'? 'bastardy'? 'base, base'?

Well, my legitimate, [Takes out a letter] if this letter speed
And my invention thrive, Edmond the base
Shall to th'legitimate. I grow; I prosper;
Now gods, stand up for bastards! (I.ii.1-22)

The customs surrounding the determination of legitimate and illegitimate children impede and corrupt, according to Edmond, his natural unfolding. By overcoming these artificial customs, Edmond will reveal his true nature, a nature which has, within the customs of British society, been occulted. He will "grow" and "thrive." Edmond thinks of art and custom, here, in terms of technē II; art and custom, in its poor accordance with nature (the representational original), mask the true order of things. This is essentially the position provided by Montaigne in his essay "Of the Caniballes," as translated by John Florio (1603). The Native-Americans, says Montaigne, are even savage, as we call those fruites wilde, which nature of hir selfe, and of hir orindarie progresse hath produced: whereas indeede, they are those which our selves have altered by our artificiall devises, and diverted from their common order, we should rather terme savage. In those are the true and most profitable vertues, and naturall proprieties most livestie and vigorous, which in these we have bastardized, applying them to the pleasure of our corrupted taste. And if notwithstanding, in divers fruites of those countryes that were never tilled, we shall finde, that in respect of ours they are most excellent, and as delicate unto our taste; there is no reason, arte should gaine the point of honour of our great and puissant mother Nature. We have so much by our inventions, surcharged the beauties and riches of hir workes, that we have altogether over-choaked hir: yet where-ever hir puritie shineth, she makes our vaine, and frivolous enterprises wonderfully ashamed. [my emphasis] (101-2)

In Montaigne, as in Edmond's speech, nature, in its pure shining forth and self-emerging, is occulted and perverted ("over-choaked") by the machinations of art. The product of art’s interaction with nature is, in another interesting parallel with Edmond’s speech, the "bastard." Art bastardizes nature; in nature's self-emerging all things are brought forth in their proper time and are "legitimate." Edmond, in his natural unfolding, is true and legitimate; similarly, the practices
of the "caniballes" are true and legitimate; it is only through the lens of art and custom that Edmond arises as "bastard" and the "caniballes" as "savage." In The Winter's Tale, Perdita holds a parallel view on the nature of art to that of Edmond and Montaigne.

Sir, the year growing ancient,
Not yet on summer’s death nor on the birth
Of trembling winter, the fairest flowers o’th’season
Are our carnations and streak’d gillyvors,
Which some call nature’s bastards: of that kind
Our rustic garden’s barren; and I care not
To get slips of them. [my emphasis] (IV.iv.79-85)

This type of thinking with respect to art manifested itself in many guises during the Renaissance: in thinking on "cosmetics," on gardening, and on courtly rhetoric (flattery), to name but a few. All three "arts" were often seen as a masking or concealing of the truth: the truth of the face, the true unfolding of nature, or the truths of moral and political practice. When Hamlet says "let her paint an inch thick," he is referring to the ways in which the deception and corruption he perceives in women have obscured the true order of things and their own true nature. For these reasons, Baudrillard is correct to assert that one manifestation of representational thinking posits the "image" as that which "masks and perverts a basic reality" (11). For Baudrillard, the Renaissance is the founding of a thinking about the appearance concerned with the "counterfeit," the false image: the "Counterfeit [order of appearance] is the dominant scheme of the ‘classical’ period, from the Renaissance to the industrial revolution" (83). However, Baudrillard fails to recognize another possibility for the thinking about art in the Renaissance; that is to say, rather than merely mask a basic reality (nature/truth), art, for the Renaissance thinker, also brings forth that "reality"; it also brings forth the self-emerging order of things. There is an art of cosmetics (as technē II), for instance, that conceals the proper lines and hue of the face. However, there is also an art of cosmetics (as technē I) which brings forth the nature of the face for the first time.
In other words, one approach to the application of “rouge” is that it should be painted on “an inch thick”; it should cover deficiencies in the natural cheek and create an “artificial” shape to the cheek. Another way of thinking about rouge is that it, if skillfully applied, brings forth into appearance (makes visible) the natural shape and beauty of the cheek; the rouge draws out the curve of the cheek and brings that curve into appearance. In the first mode of cosmetic art, the cosmetic itself (or technē as the knowledge that applies it) provides the origin and order of the appearance of the cheek. The natural cheek is “over-choaked.” In the latter mode, cosmetic art brings forth the nature of the cheek, but the nature of the cheek itself, the self-emerging form, is the origin and order of the appearance of the cheek.

The proper art of speech, according to Castiglione, is akin to this second mode of cosmetic art; it involves a certain sprezzatura (natural grace). This notion of sprezzatura, which became a sixteenth-century commonplace, asserts, in contradistinction to Montaigne, that art is necessary. However, according to Castiglione, proper art is an “what does not seem to be art.”1 Certain works of art, from poems to speeches to painted faces, appear “artificial” in that the self-showing of physis has been effaced. What appears is art; art is the ordering principle (archē) of the appearance. In the work which arises out of sprezzatura (natural grace), what appears is the spontaneity of physis, not the artfulness of technē II. The art of sprezzatura is one which does not over-power the matter with which it is dealing; it is an art (as technē I) which brings forth nature and truth but does not replace them as the archē of the work.

I remember once having read of certain outstanding orators of the ancient world who, among the other things they did, tried hard to make everyone believe that they were ignorant of letters; and, dissembling their knowledge, they made their speeches appear to have been composed very simply and according to the promptings of Nature and truth rather than effort and artifice. For if the people had known of their skills, they would have been frightened of being deceived. So you see that to reveal intense application and skill robs everything of grace. [my
emphasis] (67)\textsuperscript{17}

It is this thinking of art (as technē \textit{I}) that lies behind Polixenes' reply to Perdita. As opposed to the conception of art as essentially opposed to nature, Polixenes asserts that art and nature are in felicitous concord.\textsuperscript{18} Human arts are nothing other than the unfolding of nature itself. For Polixenes,

\begin{quote}
Nature is made better by no mean  
But nature makes that mean: so, over that art,  
Which you say adds to nature, is an art  
That nature makes. You see, sweet maid, we marry  
A gentler scion to the wildest stock,  
And make conceive a bark of baser kind  
By bud of nobler race. This is an art  
Which does mend nature—change it rather— but  
The art itself is nature. (The Winter's Tale IV.iv.89-97)\textsuperscript{19}
\end{quote}

Because art is continuous with nature, because it is the unfolding and bringing forth of nature, Polixenes tells Perdita to make her "garden rich in gillyvors, / And do not call them bastards" (IV.iv.98-99). Polixenes' position, as has often been noted, is an echo of statements made by Puttenham in his \textit{The Arte of English Poesie} (1598):

\begin{quote}
In some cases we say arte is an ayde and coadiutor to nature. . . . In another respect arte is not only an aide and coadiutor to nature in all her actions, but an alterer of them, and in some sort a surmounter of her skill, so as by meanes of it her owne effects shall appeare more beautifull or straunge and miraculous . . . the Gardiner by his arte will . . . embellish [a flower or fruit] in vertue, shape, odour and taste, that nature of her selfe woulde never have done: as to make the single gillifloure, or marigold, or daisie, double: and the white rose, redde, yellow, or carnation. . . . [So the poet] doth as the cunning gardiner that using nature as a coadiutor, furders her conclusions & many times makes her effectes more absolute and straunge. (303-7)
\end{quote}

The Renaissance, in short, thought of art as a threatening effacement and "counterfeiting" of nature and truth. However, the Renaissance also thought of art as the bringing forth into the actual of the self-emergence of nature and truth, as a showing forth of the "straunge," as a showing
of the wondrous and divine (*daimonion*) in all things. The question of nature and art manifests itself in many ways within Renaissance literature. The works of Spenser are particularly rich fields in which this question is cultivated. In the next section we will explore the ways in which Spenser figures forth the notion of *phusis* as health in its relation to the *techne* of the physician in Book I of *The Faerie Queene*. In the final section of this chapter, we will explore the ways in which Spenser figures forth the notion of *phusis* as form (*morphê-eidos*) in its relation to the *technai* of the poet and of the magician in Book I of *The Faerie Queene*.

**Phusis as Health: Æsculapius’s Pharmakon and the Physician’s Technê**

Thou feeble flocke, whose fleece is rough and rent,
Whose knees are weake through fast and evill fare:
Mayst winnesse well by thy ill governement,
Thy maysters mind is overcome with care. (*SC, "Januarye"* 43-46)

3.1 On Phusis and Technê

Aristotle’s *Physics* is a formulation of the distinction between *phusis* and *techne*. It is a formulation which guides much of subsequent Western thinking and which has guided most critical interpretations of Spenser’s *The Faerie Queene*, whether consciously acknowledged or not. We know this distinction as that between “Nature” and “Art,” and we interpret the distinction according to various assumptions. In order to keep in mind what is essential in this distinction, let us not immediately substitute these more “familiar” translations and interpretations. Let us pay heed to what is originally expressed in this distinction and that to which, perhaps unknowingly, Spenser’s poetic concerns with “Nature” and “Art” are a response.

Aristotle begins Book II of the *Physics* in this way: “Of things that exist, some exist by nature [*phusis*], some from other causes. ‘By nature’ the animals and their parts exist, and the plants and the simple bodies (earth, fire, air, water)—for we say that these and the like exist ‘by
nature" (192b 8-11). Phusis is the first element marked off in this distinction. It is understood as a "cause" [aition] of a certain region of beings. This determination will then be made in terms of archē: source, origin, and order. Phusis is the origin and order of "being-moved" (kinēseōs) and "being at rest," of those beings which have the origin of their being moved within themselves and integral to themselves (in their self- emerging). Aristotle then refers to another realm of beings.20 Things that exist from phusis, such as "the animals and their parts . . . and the plants and the simple bodies (earth, fire, air, water)," are distinguished from a bed, coats, "and anything else of that sort," which are "products of art [technē]." As opposed to things out of phusis, a bed and a coat are "artifacts" (poioumena). As Heidegger points out, "for Aristotle, the issue here is to show that artifacts are what they are and how they are precisely in the being-moved of production and thus in the rest of having-been-produced" (1976, 230-31). Technē is the archē of artifacts. Artifacts do not have an "innate impulse [horme] to change." The archē of their production and having-been-produced is not in themselves; it is not internal. Rather, the archē of artifacts is in another, "the architektōn, the one who controls the technē as archē" (Heidegger 1976, 231). Technē is not a mere skill; it is a bringing forth through knowing, through a familiarity with "that which grounds every act of making and producing" (1976, 231).

Thus, Aristotle distinguishes between phusis and technē, each the archē of a certain realm of beings. One is an internal impulse, the other external. We would appear to have a simple enough distinction and seem prepared to translate this distinction to our familiar "nature-art" opposition. However, the distinction is more complex than it would first appear: phusis also names Being itself for Aristotle, not just a realm of beings (cf. Heidegger 1976, 268-9): phusis is the arising into unconcealment of a being from itself as itself; it is alētheia. We must keep this in mind when questioning the various contradictions that seem to arise between the "order of
grace" and the "order of nature" (understood as the realm of physical things) or between the "order of nature" and the "order of art." That is, in the essential sense of the word phusis, we can speak of the work of art as a being from phusis—in terms of the work of art as a being in its self-emerging order and harmony. Our word "nature," when understood in terms of "essence"—and when "essence" is understood in terms of the presencing of Being [Wesen]—suggests some of what is at stake here. For instance, we can speak of the "nature" of a work of art. So too, then, can we speak of the "nature," the self-emerging coming to appearance, of the Divine (the "order of grace").

For Aristotle, phusis names Being as the self-emerging natural order and harmony of beings. Phusis, as this self-emergence, can be either (1) guided by technē in a process of "producing," or (2) technē can replace phusis, through its "effecting" by means of an external archē, through its "making" or "manufacturing" of the artificial, the artifact. Here it is not a matter of this artificial "product" being outside of the realm of phusis as Being; rather, here the way in which phusis arises (emerges or sends itself), and is brought forth in technē, is that of an occulting-withdrawal. Phusis withdraws inasmuch as it emerges as the "effect" of an external "making," a technē.

Health is one of the ways in which we experience the self-emergence of phusis. If health, like phusis, is the natural order, harmony, and proper limits of the body, then if the body suffers a minor cut, it heals itself out of itself: its health as its natural order (phasis) is the source (archē) of the cure, the source of its own health. Medical know-how (technē), in cleaning the wound, merely guides or facilitates the workings of the natural order (phasis/health) of the body. In order to make this point, Aristotle uses the example of the doctor who heals himself of an illness: "a man, entirely by himself, might become the [originating and ordering] source [archē] of health
for himself, and at the same time he could be a doctor. He has the medical know-how \textit{[technē]} in himself, but not insofar as he regains his health." In this example, health \textit{(phusis)} and the healing \textit{(technē)} seem to be conflated, they belong to the same person. However, the two, for Aristotle are still distinct. "Rather in this case, being a doctor and regaining health happen to have come together in one and the same man. But for that very reason the two also remain separated from each other, each on its own." The example provides a case where \textit{phusis} and \textit{technē} arise in the same body, but \textit{technē}, even in this example, has not replaced \textit{phusis} as the \textit{archē} of the cure. Aristotle expands his conclusion with respect to healing to include all modes of \textit{technē}: "And the same holds for everything else that belongs among things made. That is to say, none of them has in itself the origin and ordering of its being made. Rather, some have their \textit{archē} in another being and thus have it from the outside, as for example a house and anything else made by hand" (Aristotle, qtd. in Heidegger 1976, 236). Thus, the body's health arises out of its own natural order. It is a loose linguistic usage that says that the doctor "cures" the patient. For Aristotle, \textit{technē} cannot be the \textit{archē} of a being, such as the body, in the same way that \textit{phusis} can--out of the thing's own nature. We have seen that \textit{technē} is the guiding of the health, or self-healing (self-emerging into appearance, \textit{phusis-Being}), of the body (a being).

We had an occasion earlier, in Chapter 1, to point out that for Plato \textit{dikē} (justice) names Being as the self-emerging appropriate articulation of beings. We also noted that Plato experiences this innate order and harmony in terms of health, just as Aristotle does with the notion of Being as \textit{phusis}. Along with the know-how \textit{(technē)} of the philosopher-ruler in bringing forth the \textit{dikē} of the \textit{polis}, and along with the artist's \textit{technē} in bringing forth the appearing of the \textit{eidos}, Plato uses the example of medical know-how, as does Aristotle, in order to demonstrate that \textit{technē} cannot produce a cure for the body; rather, the body's natural order and harmony \textit{(phusis-dikē-}
health) is its own archē; it heals itself out of itself. Plato wishes to make this point in order to form a comparison, an analogical illustration, with the way in which the healthy (dikē) polis has its origin and order (archē) arise out of its own natural order and proper limits. Conversely, the polis that is adikia is one in which, like the unhealthy body, indiscipline and disorder hold sway: “And the prevalence of indiscipline and disease in a community leads, does it not, to the opening of law courts and surgeries in large numbers” (Republic III.405a). Indiscipline in individual, body, and polis means that their order and measure are sought externally; the body, unable to heal itself out of its own natural order, needs the surgeon to attempt a “cure”; the criminal, unable to be just out of his or her own natural order (dikaiosunē), needs the judge to attempt a “reform”: “And when not only the lower classes and manual workers, but also those who have some pretensions to a liberal education, need skilled doctors and lawyers, that is a pretty conclusive proof that the education in a state is disgracefully bad. For is it not a strikingly disgraceful sign of a bad education if one has to seek justice at the hands of others as one’s masters and judges because one lacks it in oneself?” (III.405a-b).

Socrates refers to the time of Asclepius as a time in which healing (as technē) is the appropriate bringing forth of the natural order of the body, not the attempt to impose an external order. However, according to Socrates, with modern methods of treating disease, the struggle against death is extended. The treatment of Herodicus, for instance, is monstrous in that it takes one out of his or her proper nature; rather than bringing forth and guiding the health (phusis-dikē-Being) of the body, Herodicus’ technē is an external imposition. For Socrates and Plato, the proper order of the individual, the phusis-dikē-Being of the individual, arises from his or her proper role or job (technē) within the polis (cf. III.406d-e). Extended cures, says Socrates, keep people away from their daily jobs and functions within the polis. In this way, the people being
given these extended (unnatural) cures have their proper order, their essential selves, effaced.

In contradistinction to Herodicus' treatment, Socrates presents Asclepius as an example of a case in which technē is a responding to and a guiding-bringing forth of the natural order and proper limits of the body. In this way, in bringing forth the proper order and just limits (phusis-dike-Being) of the thing, Asclepius is a great statesman (cf. III.407c-e). Just as the body that is within its proper order and limits has the source of its health arise out of itself, so too the polis has its dikaiosune out of its own natural order and just limits (phusis-dike-Being). In the body-polis that heals itself out of itself, that which is diseased or incurably corrupt is excised for the good of the whole: "This then is the kind of medical and judicial provision for which you will legislate in your state. It will provide treatment for those of your citizens whose physical and psychological constitution is good; as for the others, it will leave the unhealthy to die, and those whose psychological constitution is incurably corrupt it will put to death" (III.409e-410a).

The questions of the just polis, of the being out of phusis, and of the healthy body all seem to come together in the figure of Asclepius. For Plato, obviously, he is an example of the proper ends of technē—what we have called "technē I." For Plato, Asclepius does not impose an external order; he guides and aids what emerges out of itself. However, Plato notes that there are other versions of the Asclepius story: "But Pindar and the tragedians don't believe us, and say that Asclepius was a son of Apollo, that he was bribed by a large fee to cure a rich man who was at death's door, and blasted by a thunderbolt in consequence.24 But we cannot, if we are to be consistent, agree with them on both counts: if he was son of a god he was not out for profit, and if he was out for profit he was not son of a god" (III.408b-c). According to our parameters, the story of Asclepius (Latin: Æsculapius)—as the son of Apollo and as "curing" for profit—would be an example of technē which is the imposing of an external order, which occults the self-emerging
proper order of things; this would be what we have called "technē II." Spenser takes the poets as his guides (Virgil, Ovid, and Boccaccio) and sees Æsculapius as the son of Apollo and as one who "effected" the improper cure (FQ I.v.36-44). Although this figure of Æsculapius differs from Plato's Asclepius, what is at issue for both writers is the same. Both see the story as a question of the proper and improper ends of technē or of "art." It is the question of the distinction between 1) "technē I" as the guiding bringing forth of the truth out of itself; or, 2) "technē II" as an occluding of the self-emergence of truth through the representational-external order. With "technē I," the bringing forth is that of a poiēsis in the sense of a "pro-duc-ing," or a leading forth of the thing out of itself. With "technē II," the bringing forth is that of a poiēsis in the sense of a derivational "making" or "manufacturing," undertaken by the maker as architekton and based on a pre-existing model or form (eidos). The gardener, with his or her know-how pertaining to the growth of the plant (technē I), in planting the seed and tilling the soil, guides the plant in its self-emergence. This is a "pro-duc-ing" of the plant in the sense of leading it forth (poiēsis I). We do not say that the gardener "makes" or "manufactures" the plant (poiēsis II). Thus, this question of the proper and improper ends of technē dove-tails, for both Plato and Spenser, with the question of the proper and improper modes of "making" (poiēsis). We shall see, in the last section of the present chapter, that in the figures of the Poet and Archimago we are given—or, Spenser "figures forth"—this distinction between two types of making, two types of magi, or two types of images.

3.2 On the Pharmakon

Before turning to Spenser's treatment of the physician's technē, I think it is important to put our comments—on phusis/technē, on the internal and external order—within the context of certain questions raised by Derrida. As the title of this chapter attests, my analysis of Spenser is, in part, a response to certain challenges made by Derrida in his essay "Plato's Pharmacy" to the
notion of an internal and integral order of things. The challenges are pertinent to our treatment of "nature and art" in that they call into question the notion of the "organic" unity of a work of "nature" (as narrowly understood) as well as of a work of "art." Derrida's challenge, as a deconstruction of Plato, is also pertinent with respect to Spenser's oft touted "Platonism."

Derrida's essay is, nominally, a thorough reading of Plato's Phaedrus, specifically as it pertains to the problematic of writing. The question that has plagued interpreters for centuries is why Plato, a writer, would so acutely denigrate writing in this work. Near the end of the dialogue, an attack on writing, seemingly unrelated to the rest of the dialogue, is given in the form of a myth. After a discussion of love and beauty, Socrates and Phaedrus (re)turn to a discussion of writing: "But there remains the question of propriety and impropriety in writing, that is to say the conditions which make it proper or improper" (274b). The myth is an exotic one, from Egypt. The myth tells of the god Theuth, or Thoth, who had offered his "arts" as gifts for the benefit of humanity: "there dwelt one of the old gods of the country, the god to whom the bird called Ibis is sacred, his own name being Theuth. He it was that invented number and calculation, geometry and astronomy, not to speak of draughts and dice, and above all writing [grammata]. Now the king of the whole country at that time was Thamus. . . . To him came Theuth, and revealed his arts, saying that they ought to be passed on to the Egyptians in general" (274c-d). Thamus, or Ammon-Ra, the king of the gods, considers and judges each art, and finds that each art has its good and bad points: "Thamus asked what was the use of them all, and when Theuth explained, he condemned what he thought the bad points and praised what he thought the good. On each art, we are told, Thamus had plenty of views both for and against; it would take too long to give them in detail" (274d-e). In the final analysis, writing is deemed to be a bane or detriment to society rather than a benefit. Theuth presents this art of writing as that which will be the most beneficial:
“Here, O king is a branch of learning that will make the people of Egypt wiser and improve their memories; my discovery provides a recipe [pharmakon] for memory and wisdom.” However, Thamus denies these claims: “O man full of arts, to one it is given to create the things of art, and to another to judge what measure of harm and of profit they have for those that shall employ them. And so it is that you, by reason of your tender regard for the writing that is your offspring, have declared the very opposite of its true effect” [my emphasis] (274e-275a). The problem with writing is that it substitutes mere inscriptions for the authentic living presence of spoken language. It also provides a pseudo-memory in that it is the substitution of mnemonic devices for genuine, living wisdom, or genuine memory as an-amnesis (un-forgetting): “If men learn this [writing, grammata], it will implant forgetfulness in their souls; they will cease to exercise memory because they rely on that which is written, calling things to remembrance no longer from within themselves, but by means of external marks. What you have discovered is a recipe not for memory but for reminder” [my emphasis] (275a).

One interpretation of Plato’s dialogue has been that this myth is external to the central concerns of the whole—those being love and beauty. Derrida is correct to point out the fallacy of this view. “That entire hearing of the trial of writing should some day cease to appear as an extraneous mythological fantasy, an appendix the organism could easily, with no loss, have done without. In truth, it is rigorously called for from one end of the Phaedrus to the other” (“PPh” 67). As he points out, the dialogue has as its “central” concern the question of the proper modes of speechwriting (logography) and thus of self-presence.

At the precisely calculated center of the dialogue—the reader can count the lines—the question of logography is raised (257c). Phaedrus reminds Socrates that the citizens of greatest influence and dignity, the men who are the most free, feel ashamed (aiskhunontai) at “speechwriting” and at leaving sungrammata behind them. They fear the judgement of posterity, which might consider them “sophists”
The logographer, in the strict sense, is a *ghost writer* who composes speeches for use by litigants, speeches which he himself does not pronounce, which he does not attend, so to speak, in person, and which produce their effects in his absence. In writing what he does not speak, what he would never say and, in truth, would probably never even think, the author of the written speech is already entrenched in the posture of the sophist: the man of non-presence and of non-truth. Writing is thus already on the scene. ("PPh" 68)

The question is raised as to the proper and improper modes of writing. Phaedrus wants to know what it means to write dishonourably and to write beautifully (*kalos*). The question of proper and improper writing, of the good and bad arts of Theuth, obviously bears on the question of proper and improper *technē* within our analysis of Spenser.

This question bearing on "Spenser's pharmacy" is also related to the two myths that Plato introduces in the first half of the *Phaedrus*. Early in the dialogue, while walking by the stream in the cool breeze and looking for a place to sit down, Phaedrus asks, "Tell me, Socrates, isn't it somewhere about here that they say Boreas seized Orithyia from the river?" (229b). Phaedrus then asks whether or not Socrates believes that story. Socrates replies that he would be one who is in "fashion" if he disbelieved it, as do the men of science. "I might proceed to give a scientific account of how the maiden, while at play with Pharmacia, was blown by a gust of Boreas down from the rocks hard by, and having thus met her death was said to have been seized by Boreas, though it may have happened on the Areopagus, according to another version of the occurrence" (229c-d). Socrates will only quest for that true knowledge that comes from within through a process of un-forgetting (*an-amnesis*); he will not conjecture concerning external matters: "I can't as yet 'know myself,' as the inscription at Delphi enjoins, and so long as that ignorance remains it seems to me ridiculous to inquire into extraneous matters" (230a). Derrida then suggests that this seemingly marginal reference to the myth of Pharmacia, Orithyia, and Boreas—"marginal" in that Plato does not manifestly refer to it again in the dialogue—is in fact part of the central concern
with writing and truth. "This brief evocation of Pharmacia at the beginning of the Phaedrus—is it an accident? An hors d’oeuvre? A fountain, ‘perhaps with curative powers’... was dedicated to Pharmacia near the Ilissus" ("PPh" 70). How is this myth, and the curative fountain, connected to the central questions we have mentioned? First of all, Derrida shows that “Pharmacia (Pharmakeia) is also a common noun signifying the administration of the pharmakon, the drug: the medicine and/or poison" (70). This connection to the drug is crucial inasmuch as shortly after this myth is discussed Socrates compares a written speech of Lysias that Phaedrus conceals under his cloak to a drug. When Phaedrus comments that this is perhaps the only time he has seen Socrates leave the walls of the city, Socrates responds: "You must forgive me, dear friend; I’m a lover of learning, and trees and open country won’t teach me anything, whereas men in the town do. Yet you seem to have discovered a recipe [pharmakon] for getting me out" (230d).

The second “original” myth that Plato presents in the dialogue is that of the cicadas. Socrates and Phaedrus, enjoying the beauty of the bank of the Illisus, hear the song of the cicadas. Socrates points out that the cicadas originally descended from human beings who lived before the time of the Muses. As the Muses sprang forth into existence, their songs so enchanted some humans that they forgot about food, wanting only to sing, and were changed into cicadas (258e-259d). We had occasion to refer to this myth earlier in connection with mythos as “primal word” and as an example of the fact that the Muses “open the kosmos” according to the Greek way of thinking. Derrida refers to it for a slightly different reason. For him, this is a forgetting and losing of oneself, in one’s self-presence, that is related to the thematic of writing as a process of the disappearing of the author. “The incompatibility between the written and the true is clearly announced at the moment Socrates starts to recount the way in which men are carried out of themselves by pleasure, become absent from themselves, forget themselves and die in the thrill
of song (259c)" ("PPh" 68).

In the connection of writing to the drug (pharmakon) and to the forgetting of oneself, there is a distinction made between true knowing (teknē) and that knowing that relies on the external prompt: the book as writing. "As opposed to the true practice of medicine, founded on science, we find indeed, listed in a single stroke, empirical practice, treatments based on recipes learned by heart, mere bookish knowledge, and the blind usage of drugs. All that, we are told, springs out of mania" ("PPh" 72). Derrida is referring here to that section of the Phaedrus in which, in the process of critiquing the "art of rhetoric"—that is, in saying that it is no "art" (teknē)—Socrates compares the sophist to a mad doctor: "I expect they would say, 'The man is mad; he thinks he has made himself a doctor by picking up something out of a book [ek bibliou], or coming across some common drug or other [pharmakiois], without any real knowledge of medicine'" (268c).25

Derrida's analysis uncovers, then, within the question of proper and improper writing (teknē), a number of structural oppositions: dialectic as a living knowledge versus writing as the dead letter (cf. 73), medical teknē versus the pharmakon, truth (a-lētheia) as what is known and spoken (logos) out of ourselves versus what is known only externally through hearsay (mythos),26 true art (teknē) versus an artless routine (or, "knack"),27 logos as a living being (zōon) in its responsiveness to the situation versus "the cadaverous rigidity of writing" ("PPh" 79), the living logos as out of phusis (in its having been born and growing ["PPh" 79]) versus writing as outside the order of phusis ("PPh" 105), the living logos (discourse) as one following a necessary organic order versus an "unnatural" or contingent written discourse,28 living memory (mneme) versus a mere re-collection (hupomnēsis) (91), the living word (logos) as inspired versus the breathless written sign (92), and a living presence versus a ghostly disappearing (103-4).29 In the end, Derrida wants to show that these structural oppositions, operating through the exclusion of the
latter term in order to secure the former, are an effect of general differential relations (différence). The *pharmakon* is Plato's word for this *arche-différence*, this *l'écriture*. The *pharmakon* is "undecidable" in that, as remedy and poison, it seems to inhabit both sides of the structural opposition. It occupies in his analysis of Plato, as Derrida himself points out ("PPh" 96n43), the position that the notion of "supplement" did in his analysis of Rousseau (cf. Derrida 1974); that is, both concepts appear to be "dangerous," and, thus, are excluded and delimited from the secure and present, but both are also "necessary."³⁰ *Pharmakon* is generally translated as "remedy," or "recipe"; this conceals its undecidable meaning as a "drug" that is both remedy and poison. Certainly one sense of the *pharmakon* is that of the beneficial remedy. "This medicine is beneficial; it repairs and produces, accumulates and remedies, increases knowledge and reduces forgetfulness" ("PPh" 97). Yet this translation denies (excludes) the other meanings "reserved" in the word—reserved through the sign substitutions (differential relations) that the *pharmakon* embodies, that is, in its relation to writing, rhetoric, death, magic, and sorcery (*pharmakeus*): "Its translation by ‘remedy’ nonetheless erases, in going outside the Greek language, the other pole reserved in the word *pharmakon*. It cancels out the resources of ambiguity and makes more difficult, if not impossible, an understanding of the context. As opposed to ‘drug’ or even ‘medicine,’ *remedy* says the transparent rationality of science, technique, and therapeutic causality, thus excluding from the text any leaning toward the magic virtues of a force whose effects are hard to master, a dynamics that constantly surprises the one who tries to manipulate it as master and as subject" (97). In the *Laws*, those associated with the *pharmakon/pharmakeus*—"the mantic and magic, sorcerers and casters of spells"—are expelled, excluded, ostracized: "At death he shall be cast out beyond the borders without burial, and if any free citizen has a hand in his burial, he shall be liable to a prosecution for impiety at the suit of any who cares to take
proceedings” (X.909b-c). This operation of excluding the fallen element, according to Derrida, of reducing the play of the word, is an effect of “Platonism” as the history of the metaphysics of presence. “It could no doubt be shown . . . that this blockage of the passage among opposing values is itself already an effect of ‘Platonism,’ the consequence of something already at work in the translated text, in the relation between ‘Plato’ and his ‘language’” (98). That is, for Derrida, it is not a matter of Plato deciding to “exclude” writing or the pharmakon by placing it within the structural opposition. Rather, the play of language, in its “playing” with and setting up of humanity’s projects, determines the nature of this problematic. Thus, while the “manifest” text of Plato denigrates writing and reduces it to the fallen term of a hierarchical opposition, the “latent” text of Plato (the play of language, of difféance, of l’écriture, of the pharmakon), according to Derrida—which has this hierarchical opposition enfolded within itself, which configures this metaphysical opposition—is, in fact, a “saving” of writing: “Only a blind or grossly insensitive reading could indeed have spread the rumor that Plato was simply condemning the writer’s activity. Nothing here is of a single piece and the Phaedrus also, in its own writing, plays at saving writing—which also means causing it to be lost—as the best, the noblest game” (“PPh” 67).

We should remind ourselves that, for Derrida, the history of metaphysics is the history of the thinking of Being as presence: “the history of metaphysics is the history of a determination of being as presence . . . its adventure merges with that of logocentrism, and . . . it is produced wholly as the reduction of the trace” (1974, 97). There are no fundamental shifts or “founding moments” within this history, although it does have inner articulations. The movement of these inner articulations is one from a thinking of presence in the “objective” form of the ideality of the eidos and the substantiality of ousia, in Plato and Aristotle, to a thinking of presence as the self-presence of consciousness and feelings through the subject’s “representation” of the object, in
Descartes, Rousseau, and Hegel (1974, 97-8). The securing of beings in their presence requires a "mastery" of the threats to this presence, a mastery of difference. It is for this reason, the mastery of difference in the form of writing, that the "manifest" text of Plato places writing and the *pharmakon* within the oppositional structure. "Plato thinks of writing, and tries to comprehend it, to dominate it, on the basis of *opposition* as such" ("PPh" 103)." 31 Derrida then points out that the opposition of internal/external takes priority within the binary structure and that writing or the *pharmakon* allows the whole structure to occur—they are not, that is to say, governed by the rules of the structure.

In order for these contrary values (good/evil, true/false, essence/appearance, inside/outside, etc.) to be in opposition, each of the terms must be simply *external* to the other, which means that one of these oppositions (the opposition between inside and outside) must already be accredited as the matrix of all possible opposition. And one of the elements of the system (or of the series) must also stand as the very possibility of systematicity or seriality in general. And if one got to thinking that something like the *pharmakon*—or writing—far from being governed by these oppositions, opens up their very possibility without letting itself be comprehended by them; if one got to thinking that it can only be out of something like writing—or the *pharmakon*—that the strange difference between inside and outside can spring; if, consequently, one got to thinking that writing as a *pharmakon* cannot simply be assigned a site within what it situates, cannot be subsumed under concepts whose contours it draws, leaves only its ghost to a logic that can only seek to govern it insofar as logic arises from it—one would then have to *bend* [plier] into strange contortions what could no longer even simply be called logic or discourse. ("PPh" 103)

The metaphysical "reduction of the trace," according to Derrida, is a "forgetting," let us say, of Being as *différence*. Because the metaphysics of presence is marked by a "mastery" of difference in the securing of the enduring present, Derrida asserts that a general, "imperial" disposition holds sway within Western thinking. Thus, the metaphysical structures isolated by Derrida—the structures in which writing, rhetoric, the *pharmakon*, and death are mastered—will be useful in our attempt to determine the extent to which Spenser’s text participates in the general project of
“imperialism.” However, we will be referring to the insights of Derrida with certain reservations to be noted later.

3.3 The House of Pride and Æsculapius’s Pharmakon (The Faerie Queene I.iv-v)

In the houses and gardens within The Faerie Queene, Spenser presents structures which figure forth the proper and improper orders of a community or an individual. The proper order of the body, the temperate body, is most explicitly figured forth in the House of Alma (FQ II.ix-xi) and set in strife with the disorder figured forth in Mammon’s Cave (II.vii) and the Bower of Bliss (FQ II.xii). Here, however, I want to delineate the nature of the proper order (or, health) of the body as presented by means of the negative example provided by the House of Pride.

As the fourth canto of Book I opens, the reader is reminded of the circumstances of the Redcrosse knight’s separation from Una. The narrator emphasizes the shameful or unchivalrous nature of his “inconstancie.”

Young knight, what ever that dost armes professe,
    And through long labours huntest after fame,
Beware of fraud, beware of ficklenesse,
    In choice, and change of thy deare loved Dame,
Least though of her beleeeve too lightly blame,
    And rash misweening doe thy hart remove:
For unto knight there is no greater shame,
    Then lightnesse and inconstancie in love;
That doth this Redcrosse knights ensample plainly prove. (I.iv.1)

Redcrosse has been fickle, light, and inconstant in matters of love. His “rash misweening” of Una was a “misdeeming of her loyaltie” (I.iv.2) and a violation of his loyalty to her. His lack of faith seems to be foregrounded here. Yet, the argument of the fourth canto refers to Redcrosse as “the faithfull knight.” As Hamilton points out in the gloss on this argument, “He earns his title by defeating Sansfoy. Yet his relation to Duessa raises the question, ‘faithful to whom?’” (63). The identities of Duessa and Una would seem to be hopelessly entangled; Redcrosse is simultaneously
faithful and inconstant to both. Redcrosse figures forth human existence in his interpretation of
signs in their "seeming" showing forth throughout Book One, but his interpretations are never
completely freed from the trains of Error; although called "the faithful knight," he is never
decisively distinguishable from Sansfoy.

The distinctions of seeming and being, of inconstant and constant, of multiplicity (Duessa)
and oneness (Una), and of improper and proper orders, are first delineated and given a certain
stability in Book I, with the latent intention of mastering the undecidable play of terms alluded to
above, beginning with the House of Pride episode (I.iv-v). The house is encountered in a stanza
which highlights the play of appearances and substitutions:

Who after that he had faire Una lorne,
Through light misdeeming of her loyaltie,
And false Duessa in her sted had borne,
Called Fidess', and so supposd to bee;
Long with her traveild, till at last they see
A goodly building, bravely garnished,
The house of mightie Prince it seemd to bee:
And towards it a broad high way that led,
All bare through peoples feet, which thither traveiled. (I.iv.2)

Una is that which always withdraws and is lost or "lorne." Una can only be approached through
veils. The withdrawal and disappearance of Una as truth occurs through, is made possible by, the
substitution of a seemingly "false" Una. Redcrosse travels with Duessa "in her sted." Una would
not be the truth if Redcrosse possessed her; thus, there arises the structural necessity of the ersatz
Una: Duessa. As mentioned above, Duessa and Una collapse into one another. Una, as modest
or veiled truth, can only be what she is through Duessa as the false. Una is always veiled; It is
the nature of truth (Una) to withdraw. In the unfolding of Redcrosse's journey, Una literally is
lost; this loss occurs because Redcrosse replaces her, as an object of "faith," with Duessa.
Metaphysical thinking on the withdrawal of truth understands it as the "fallen," the false. The
fallen (Duessa) is thereby "mastered," which allows the securing of the "truth" (Una) as that which is un-fallen, which is un-concealed, non-withdrawn—the un-concealment of Una, the lifting of her veil, occurs in the twelfth canto. Like the pharmakon, Duessa, or "the false," is both denigrated as the fallen term of a hierarchy and, in fact, allows that hierarchy to occur. Substitutions of Duessa for Una, of Fidessa for Duessa, allow the structural opposition of Una/Duess, Being/seeming, and faithful/fickle.

According to the oppositions set up in order to stabilize this indeterminacy, the House of Pride is that which merely "seems" rather than truly "is" what it presents: "The house of mightie Prince it seemd to bee." The house is described as "bravely garnished." This is, as Hamilton’s gloss points out, akin to the description of Duessa: "‘A goodly Lady’ who wears a crown ‘garnished’ with jewels, and rides a horse with ‘bosses brave’" (ii.13). The House of Pride, then, will occupy the fallen term of the dichotomy as opposed to the grace manifested in the House of Holiness. We are also aware of its diabolical nature and its affinity to Duessa in that Redcrosse is following her there: "Thither Duessa bad him bend his pace" (I.iv.3). As when Guyon is without his Palmer and is led into error, so Redcrosse, without Una, is led astray, by Una’s false substitute, to this House of Pride.

Let us follow this opposition and some of its other significances. The distinction between the "seeming" of Pride and the "Being" of Holiness is echoed in the description of the architecture of the House of Pride. The House of Pride is a work of art, but certainly not a type of art Spenser is praising. One interpretation of the art of the House of Pride, of Archimago, or of the Bower of Bliss, is that they call into question the Spenserian artistic project through their calling into question of the image or the appearance. In order to secure his own art, just as Plato must secure his own speaking of the truth from that of the Sophist, Spenser highlights the weakness of Pride’s
work of art. Pride’s Palace is made of “squared bricke,/Which cunningly was without morter laid”
(I.iv.4). The skill of the artist-mason is called “cunning,” and the “hinder parts” of the palace (like
the “hinder parts” of Duessa) are “painted cunningly” (I.iv.5). The art work is a product of the
“workmans wit” (I.iv.5); which is to say that this work presents the art of the architekton as its
archē. This is essential to Spenser’s figuring forth of Pride throughout Book I. Pride sees in
human endeavour the greatness of humanity’s “erected wit.” However, proper art, for Spenser,
as for Castiglione, Polixenes, Puttenham, and Sidney, is a showing forth of nature or the divine;
properly speaking, the divine is the “source” of the work; properly speaking, the work “speaks the
praises” of the self-showing of the divine.

The work is also inconstant. This is more than just saying that it is within time as denoted
by the “Diall” that tells “the timely howres” (I.iv.4). All of human existence is within time; yet,
a certain constancy is possible through a “vertical” relation to the divine. Life anchored in God and
Grace is secure and stands on a firm vantage. The House of Pride, the House of Error, of the
false, is, on the contrary, that which is brought to a fall [falsum]. The “wals were high, but
nothing strong, nor thick” (I.iv.4); the house is set on a “weake foundation . . . /For on a sandie
hill, that still did flit,/and fall away, it mounted was full hie” [my emphasis] (I.iv.5). This false
foundation means that, rather than securing it in truth and holiness, the “breath of heaven” shakes,
solicits, and causes it to come to a fall (I.iv.5).

As Duessa and Redcrosse enter the palace and pass the “infinite sorts of people” (iv.6)
thronging there, they enter the “Presence” (iv.7) of “the Lady of that Pallace bright” (iv.6). From
her high throne, she presents a “glorious vew” or “sumptuous shew,” such that not even “Persia
selfe, the nourse of pompous pride/Like ever saw” (iv.7). The Lady, Lucifera, and the throne
upon which she sits—“a rich throne, as bright as sunny day” (iv.8)—battle to “outdo” each other
when it comes to the brilliance of their bright shining.

Yet her bright blazing beautie did assay
To dim the brightnesse of her glorious throne,
As envying her selfe, that too exceeding shone. (iv.8)

This excessive brilliance hints that the House of Pride and Lucifera, and by analogy Duessa, are outside the natural order in some way. Lucifera attempts to shine beyond what is proper for mortals; she attempts to be a replacement for the sun, to take the sun's place, just as does the son of that sun, Phaethon.

Exceeding shone, like Phoebus fairest childe,
That did presume his fathers firie wayne,
And flaming mouthes of steedes unwonted wilde
Through highest heaven with weaker hand to rayne;
Proud of such glory and advancement vaine,
While flashing bearnes do daze his feeble eyen,
He leaves the welkin way most beaten plaine,
And rapt with whirling wheeles, inflames the skyen,
With fire not made to burne, but fairely for to shyne. (iv.9)

What we have here, then, is an image of improper rule and an intemperate order. Lucifera's is a weak hand at the reins/reign—a "weaker hand to rayne." We could relate this to the nature of the architecture of the house. The palace does not present itself as self-standing and emerging; rather, it "spake the praises of the workmans wit" (iv.5). The workman, the architecture, in asserting himself as the locus of the archē of the house, is presented as a weak hand, an unskilled hand, in the production of the house inasmuch as the house is "nothing strong" (iv.4). The house is not properly founded. Rather than work with the natural unfolding of their landscape and materials—for example, rather than use mortar and pitch in conjunction with a solid footing that brings forth the strength of their materials—these workmen have used their "wit" in order to try to overcome and subdue the materials of their craft. They attempt to overcome the nature of bricks; they defiantly say that the bricks will not topple despite the height of the "goodly heape" in which they
are placed. Here their "skill" is "cunning." This "cunning" skill is also the nature of Lucifera's rule. The proper or rightful order of the kingdom is overcome by Lucifera. She tyrannically usurps the throne.

Yet rightfull kingdome she had none at all,  
Ne heritage of native soveraintie, 
But did usurpe with wrong and tyrannie 
Upon the scepter, which she now did hold: 
Ne ruld her Realmes with lawes, but pollicie, 
And strong advizement of six wisards old, 
That with their counsels bad her kingdome did uphold. (iv.12)

Her rule, her reign ("rayne"), is weak, not arising out of "native soveraintie." The proper order of the kingdom is not brought forth and brought to a stand by her technē of rulership; she does not rule with laws. Rather, "pollicie" or political cunning upholds the kingdom. She receives politic "advizement" from "six wisards," and the "counsels bad" of these "wise men" become the standards of the kingdom.

This improper political rule, this tyranny, is figured forth in the pageant of the "Counsellors" which borrows heavily from medieval allegories of the seven deadly sins. Lucifera calls for her coach. It, like all else in the House of Pride, strives to match the gods in the brilliance of its ornament (iv.17). It "was drawne of six unequall beasts," and on each beast one of Lucifera's "six sage Counsellours did ryde" (iv.18). The counsellors, rather than guide their beasts, are "Taught to obay their bestiall beheasts" (iv.18). The procession of the coach is led by Idleness "Upon a slouthfull Asse" (iv.18). Idleness leads a life of "lawlesse riotise," and "in his lustlesse limbs" "A shaking fever raigned continually" [my emphasis] (iv.20). With Idleness, as with the other counsellors in the House of Pride, fever or unhealth is that which "reigns"; disorder is the order (archē).

"And by his side rode loathsome Gluttony/ . . . on a filthie swyne" (iv.21). Gluttony, akin
to the prideful bag of hot air that is Orgoglio, is "up-blowne," but in the case of Gluttony this swelling is "with luxury" (iv.21). All of the counsellors are presented as outside of the limits of proper humanity; however, this is especially the case in the presentation of Gluttony:

And like a Crane his necke was long and fyne,  
With which he swallowed up excessive feast,  
For want whereof poore people oft did pyne;  
And all the way, most like a brutish beast,  
He spued up his gorge, that all did him dextcast. (iv.21)

Similarly, Gluttony is described as being "In shape and life more like a monster, then a man" (iv.22). Gluttony, as a monstrous example of life outside its proper limits, is the figuring forth of justice perverted in terms of the social body, and of health perverted, in terms of the individual body:

Full of diseases was his carcas blew,  
And a dry dropsie through his flesh did flow: (iv.23)

Next in the procession rides "lustfull Lechery, Upon a bearded Goat" (iv.24). Much like Gluttony, Lechery is presented as more beast than human. The goat's "rugged haire, And whally eyes (the signe of gelosy,) Was like the person selfe, whom he did beare" (iv.24). Redcrosse, inasmuch as he, like everyone, necessarily stumbles and errs within the broad path of pride, is under the "advizement" of these counsellors. For this reason, we are reminded of his fickleness with respect to Una at the beginning of the Canto. This fickleness, we now find out, is most perfectly figured forth in Lechery:

For he was false, and fraught with ficklenesse,  
And learned had to love with secret lookes,  
And well could daunce, and sing with ruefulnesse,  
And fortunes tell, and read in loving bookees,  
And thousand other wayes, to bit his fleshely hookes. (iv.25)

This affinity of Redcrosse and Lechery, the "Inconstant man" (iv.26), means that Redcrosse is also
implicated in the pseudo-technē of the pharmakon: "secret lookes," the skill of "daunce," of song, of telling fortunes, and of reading "loving bookes." Lechery, not surprisingly, is also consumed by disease, syphillis: "that fowle evill, which all men reproove,/That rots the marrow, and consumes the braine" (iv.26).

Next to Lecherie rode "greedy Avarice" "Upon a Camell loaden all with gold" (iv.27). 32 Avarice figures forth, of course, the pride that manifests itself as the gluttonous lust for gold—it is also an idle affair because what is truly useful is not undertaken by the greedy and self-interested. In this way, each counsellor is led by the wayward forces of the other counsellors that precede him. Avarice makes the appearance, the ornament, out to be the highest order of being: "For of his wicked pelfe his God he made,/And unto hell him selfe for money sold" (iv.27). The coin, the filthy lucre, that which is held as a substitute and an exchange for what is truly to be valued, is held as the only locus of value by Avarice. In Augustinian terms, Avarice values only the sign rather than using it in order to attain the end and ultimate use of the sign, that which is truly valuable: intention, authority, the Divine. The worth of a thing, the citizens of More's Utopia might point out, is in the thing itself, in its use and end. Avarice sees the value of a thing not in itself but according to the exchange of the marketplace: "And right and wrong ylike in equall balaunce waide" (iv.27). A thing should be deemed "good" out of its own nature; it should not be externally determined "good" or "bad" depending on the sway of the market. And just as natural propagation is the growing, expanding and multiplying of a thing out of its own nature and according to its worth, natural or proper wealth should arise out of a just deserving of that wealth. That is, the labourers work in common and share the "common wealth" as the fruit of their labour. With Avarice's "Accursed usurie," however, there is an unnatural coupling and multiplying of wealth with wealth—based, again, on the external system of exchange not on internal value.
Avarice has great wealth and it reproduces itself, substitutes for itself—and only itself, it does not "refer to," or get "cashed in" for, a thing in itself—but he has no natural offspring: "Yet chylde ne
kinsman living had he none/To leave them to" (iv.28). We should not be surprised that this externality, this exchange system of currency or signs with no reference, is presented as a poison, as that which brings about ill health:

A vile disease, and eke in foote and hand
A grievous gout tormented him full sore,
That well he could not touch, nor go, nor stand:
Such one was Avarice, the fourth of this faire band. (iv.29)

But when is poison not a poison? When is the pharmakon a poison but also a remedy? In the case of Romeo and Juliet, in Act V, having been given the message (a message that did not properly arrive) that Juliet was dead, Romeo no longer wishes to live; thus, he acquires

A dram of poison, such soon-speeding gear
As will disperse itself through all the veins
That the life-weary taker may fall dead,
And that the trunk may be discharged of breath
As violently as hasty powder fired
Doth hurry from the fatal cannon’s womb. (V.i.60-5)

Upon paying the forty ducats for this drug, Romeo claims:

There is thy gold, worse poison to men’s souls,
Doing more murder in this loathsome world,
Than these poor compounds that thou mayst not sell.
I sell thee poison, thou hast sold me none. (V.i.80-3)

The drug he buys is, certainly, from our everyday perspective, a "poison"; yet for Romeo it is not really a "poison" at all. It is a “remedy,” so to speak, to cure the disease that is fallen existence in a world that no longer makes sense. In that case, worldly wealth is, in many ways, a “remedy” for the ills of poverty. Perhaps it heals and aids the Apothecary. Romeo tells him “Famine is in thy cheeks,/Need and oppression starveth in thy eyes,/Contempt and beggary hangs upon thy
back" (V.i.69-71). However, from another perspective, the forty ducats, this "wicked pelfe," is a "poison." In Book I of *The Faerie Queene*, as we have noted, the interchangeability of true and false, of faithful and fickle, of poison and remedy, means that Redcrosse's fall into pride, his continuing entanglement in error, is necessary on two counts: first, substitutionality is foregrounded as that which configures existence as a whole, so the multiplicity of the sign series, duplicity or Duessa, is the "truth"; second, according to the structural necessity of the imperial logic of the metaphysics of presence, as we have seen in our discussion of Derrida's reading of Plato, this substitutionality and undecidability must be mastered—and, in its being mastered, be "forgotten" as *differene*, or the truth of Being—through the construction and extension of a field of opposing terms. The relations of replacement that substitute for Redcrosse and Una's proximity are the unfolding of the first necessity; the fact that Redcrosse becomes pridelful, is led by the six bad "wisards," and is then purged in the House of Holiness, is the figuring forth of the "bringing to a stand" (of the bringing forth in form or figure) and bringing to a fall (or expulsion) of the fallen term of the hierarchical opposition; it is the unfolding of the second necessity.

Let us return to the pageant of counsellors. Behind Avarice rides Envie, "Upon a ravenous Wolfe" (iv.30). Envie, as are the other counsellors, is attributed "poisonous" associations. He chewed

_Betteene his cankered teeth a venemous tode,_
That all the poison ran about his chaw; (iv.30)

Envie dines on, as it were, poison; he chews and and ingests it. We are, perhaps, reminded here of the perverted nursing that is figured forth in the first canto when Errough's brood suckle at the "poisonous dugs" of their mother (I.i.15) and at her "bleeding wound" (i.25); herein they make "her death their life, and eke her hurt their good" (i.25), just as Envie makes others' well being
his death and others' harm his gladness (iv.30).

Here, there is an obvious inversion of the proper nursing and unfolding of life. The "proper" unfolding of life entails a nurturing of life to its good and end. Envie and Errour confront us with the prospect that the proper is grounded in the improper, that life relies on the death of previous generations—and on the expropriation of that death—that a curative nursing is also a poisoning, and that the "good" end of existence may be entangled with the evils of error and envy. The proliferation of Errour's brood—her "thousand yong ones" (i.15), her "fruitfull seed" (i.21), her "fruitfull cursed spawne" (i.22)—also brings into play the questions of legitimation with respect to signification and lineage: what distinguishes the cursed "brood" of Errour from a legitimate and proper offspring, an Edmond from an Edgar? What distinguishes the multiplicity of interpretations, paths, and images which couple and produce even more interpretations (and which ultimately lead Redcrosse astray)—just as signs proliferate in The Faerie Queene and intersect with other signs—from the proper interpretation?\textsuperscript{33} What distinguishes the evil paths that lead to Errour from the path of the good? The Faerie Queene is, in some senses, a didactic poem which sets out to answer these questions, to delineate legitimate from bastard, good from evil, proper from improper.

Interpretive multiplicity proliferates in The Faerie Queene. It is the evil, the poison, of which Redcrosse and the reader are to be cured. Errour herself, like Envie, spews forth "poyson" in a bewildering multiplicity of forms:

Therewith she spewd out of her filthy maw
   A floud of poyson horrible and blacke,
   Full of great lumpes of flesh and gobbets raw,
   Which stunk so vildly, that it forst him slacke
His grasping hold, and from her turne him backe:
   Her vomit full of bookes and papers was,
   With loathly frogs and toades, which eyes did lacke,
And creeping sought way in the weedy gras:
Her filthy parbreake all the place defiled has. (I.i.20)

Most curious is the fact that the poisonous vomit contains "bookes and papers." We can assume that this refers to the lies and deceptions of sophistic written speech (*logography*) or to the deceiving images of the false poet. The poison of envy in relation to the poet’s book is brought up in the envoy, “To His Booke,” of *The Shepheardes Calendar*—and interestingly the "booke" is referred to here as a child:

Goe little booke: thy selfe present,
As child whose parent is unkent:
To him that is the president
Of noblesse and of chevalree
And if that Envie barke at thee,
As sure it will, for succoure flee
Under the shadow of his wing, (1-7)

This defense against the (poisonous) bark of envy is undertaken on behalf of the child, in order to secure the text as off-spring in its sending, in order to secure its proper arrival. Here the child is singular and proper. The child is the text as *Logos* that will stand in place of the absent author or father. The text-child is the necessary mediation of an abstract audience and an abstract author-father (Immeritó); any questions asked of the author will be asked through this mediating link, and the author will respond by sending more mediations.

And asked, who thee forth did bring,
A shepheards swaine saye did thee sing,
All as his straying flocke he fedde:
And when his honor has thee redde,
Crave pardon for my hardhedde.

But if that any aske thy name,
Say thou wert base begot with blame:
For thy thereof thou takest shame.
And when thou art past jeopardee,
Come tell me, what was sayd of mee:
And I well send more after thee. (8-18)
For Derrida, the message, what is sent, or even Being as “a” sending (Geschicht-Geschick), "does not arrive" [emphasis in original] (1987a, 192); for that matter, it is never properly sent—Derrida refers to this as "adestination": "no destination before the arrival" (1987a, 245).\textsuperscript{34} The message is always prey to the multiplicity and indeterminacy of meaning that is language; it is ultimately dissolved into the play of interpretations which constitutes it, into a certain "postal difference" (1987a, 93; cf., also, 1990). Thus, the Socratic "legacy" was "re-written," so to speak, by Plato. Plato, the son Socrates never had, did not transmit the word of the father faithfully. He could only write in the absence of, or through the death of, Socrates. He then re-writes Socrates, makes Socrates a character, a puppet of his own views, in his dialogues. So, too, the Platonic "legacy" does not consist of legitimate heirs but only "bastard" off-spring. Thus, the tradition, or Being as what sends itself, is not a singular unfolding but a multiplicity of re-writings. It is an "imperial" or metaphysical operation, according to Derrida, which attempts to secure or control the multiple Bloomian "misreadings" of a paternal legacy, which exerts control through the word of the father-king-author. The "imperial" operation, then, distinguishes between the proper and improper—the legitimate and the bastard—text and interpretation. In his envoy (sending), Immeritō attempts to establish his legitimate textual legacy by defending it from the assured onslaught of envious or poisonous misreadings. The many misreadings of the text would be the products of "error" to be avoided.

The legitimate text of the poet, then, is preserved and opposed to the bastard "bookes and papers" of Errour, to her poisonous brood. This denigration of the poisonous and inverting misreading is echoed further in the description of Envie:

And eke the verse of famous Poets witt
He does backebite, and spightfull poison spues
From leprous mouth on all, that ever writt: (iv.32)
Finally, Envie is associated with the folds of Errou's train through one of the emblematic figures he carries:

And in his bosome secretly there lay
An hatefull Snake, the which his taile uptyes
In many folds, and mortall sting implyes. (iv.31)

The snake is hidden it would seem; it lies "secretly" or covertly in Envie's bosom as Errou does in her dark cave. The snake, again like Errou, is coiled, folded, knotted.

The final counsellor, riding beside Envie, is "fierce revenging Wrath,/Upon a Lion" (iv.33). Obviously, the counsellor named Wrath must be figured forth in terms of a disorderly intemperance. He lacks temperance: "of his hands he had no governement" (iv.34); similarly, he has spilled much blood "Through unadvizd rashnesse woxen wood" (iv.34). Wrath, and the other counsellors we have observed, figure forth the improper rule of the body or of the polis. Yet this figure (Wrath) folds in on itself within the Spenserian narrative, much like the trains of Errou. Wrath is figured forth in the Lion, "loth for to be led" (iv.33). The lion here, in its irascible nature, signifies intemperance, error, the improper, the external exchange system, which is to be opposed and to be brought to a fall within the narrative. Yet, the wrathful lion is also a figure for Redcrosse--the one who is to be 'raised up' through his redemption, not brought to a fall. For instance, in the battle with Errou, Redcrosse left "As Lyon fierce upon the flying pray" (I.i.17). In the second canto, after misinterpreting the false images of Una and a Squire in "wanton lust and lewd embracement," "he burnt with gealous fire,/The eye of reason was with rage yblent" (I.ii.5). In a curious inversion, Archimago must restrain Redcrosse from following his rash impulse to slay both of them. This rage continues as he rides on quickly, "Pricked with wrath" (I.ii.8), such that the "true" Una cannot catch him. This wrathful haste allows him to encounter Sansfoy.

The knight of the Redcrosse when him he spide,
Spurring so hote with rage dispiteous,
Gan fairely couch his speare, and towards ride: (I.ii.15)

In the case of Redcrosse here, rather than take him out of his proper limits, as is the case with
Pride's counsellor, this anger, this "wondrous wroth," spurs on his "native vertue" (I.ii.19), his
courage, which allows him to overcome Sansfoy.

Because "The true Saint George was wandred far away" (ii.12), in his wrath, the various
substitutions that construct our image of Redcrosse come to light. The "true" St. George is carried
outside himself in the madness of wrath and disappears. In terms of the narrative, the first archê-
substitution we encounter is that of Archimago, when he undertakes the guise of Redcrosse
(I.ii.11). But for Una, in search of the lost "original" knight, the first substitute she encounters is,
interestingly, a Lion.

                                                    It fourtuned out of the thickest wood
                                                    A ramping Lyon rushed suddainly,
                                                    Hunting full greedie after salvage blood;
                                                    Soon as the royall virgin he did spy,
                                                    With gaping mouth at her ran greedily,
                                                    To have attone devour'd her tender corse:
                                                    But to the pray when as he drew more ny,
                                                    His bloudie rage asswaged with remorse,
                                                    And with the sight amazd, forgat his furious forse. (I.iii.5)

We get a first glimpse here of what might be the distinguishing factor between the beneficial Lion-
wrath (the tame Lion, the wrath that spurs on Redcrosse's "native vertue") and that Lion of Wrath
as "unadvized rashnesse." The Lion approaches "greedie after salvage blood," but as he drew
closer to "the royall virgin" he is tamed. This obviously has implications for a discussion of
"political" imperialism within the poem inasmuch as this could be a figuring forth of the historical
"royall virgin," Queen Elizabeth, in her role as monarch—or, "Empresse" ("LR" 737)—of a vast
empire which includes the colonies of the "salvage" new world. 35 The anthropomorphism of the
Lion within this reading merely fits in with the colonial operation of forcing the "other" to arise within the universe of European discourse. Although it is outside the scope of this chapter to follow the nuances of this historico-political imperial reference, let us take note of this distinction in terms of a certain conception of health as the expulsion of the external poison and a certain self-mastering—that is, in terms of the general, "imperial" disposition of the metaphysical tradition. The imperial distinction between self-mastery and losing oneself through the external infection—the locus of the distinction between health and un-health, or order and disorder—is that which distinguishes between a proper anger and an improper anger or wrath.

The chain of substitutions linking Redcrosse, Archimago, the Lyon, and Wrath—the chain which this imperial distinction attempts to control—is made more explicit after the taming of the Lion referred to above.

The Lyon Lord of everie beast in field,
Quoth she, his princely puissance doth abate,
And mightie proud to humble weake does yield,
Forgetfull of the hungry rage, which late
Him prickt, in pittie of my sad estate:
But he my Lyon, and my noble Lord,
How does he find in cruell hart to hate
Her that him lov'd and ever most adord,
As the God of my life? why hath he me abhord? (I.iii.7)

This substitution chain is extended when the Lyon withdraws from the narrative. Una encounters Sansloy, who wounds and reveals Archimago in his disguise as Redcrosse and then slays the Lyon. The Lyon had been "Lord of everie beast in field" (I.iii.7), now Sansloy is "Lord of the field" (I.iii.43). Sansloy, in his role as replacement possessor of Una, is also marked by his rage: "Her prayers nought prevaile, his rage is more of might" (I.iii.43).

These interchangeable terms, which the narrative secures by positioning them in the opposition of self-mastered interior and threatening exterior, find an echo in the presentation of
the ambiguous nature of the travel path taken by Lucifera’s coach—the one led by the counsellors just discussed. In one sense the course of the coach is described in hellish terms; “after all, upon the wagon beame/Rode Sathan” (iv.36). Within this side of the description, the coach, and all that it figures forth—pride, error, bad counsel, improper rule, disorder—resides within a realm of concealment, of the withdrawal of light, of life gone astray:

A foggy mist had covered all the land;
And underneath their feet, all scattered lay
Dead sculls and bones of men, whose life had gone astray. (iv.36)

This misty and covered field certainly parallels the presentations we have seen of Envie’s covert Snake, the hidden cave of Errour, and the deceptive (covert) identities of Duessa and Archimago.

Yet this trip is also figured forth in terms of a bright openness:

So forth they marchen in this goodly sort,
To take the solace of the open aire,
And in fresh flowring fields themselves to sport; (iv.37)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

So having solaced themselves a space
With pleasance of the breathing fields yfed, (iv.38)

This image of a pastoral stroll in the sunny “open aire” is in definite contrast to the one presented only a stanza earlier of a nightmarish trek through a murky wasteland littered with bones. One way in which this ambiguity is “explained” is that Pride entails both ends of the semiotic register: both the dark concealment that “had covered all the land” and the brightness of “the open aire.”

As we mentioned above, one way in which the undecidability of this semiotic interchangeability is secured is through the construction of the opposition of the healthy (proper) order to the unhealthy (improper) order—and we have seen that this is based on a distinction between the self-mastered interior and the threatening exterior. The question of the pharmakon, of proper healing, of the administration of the healing drug (pharmakeia), although in the
background of everything we have seen so far, is brought to the fore as this opposition of the healthy and unhealthy is most clearly delineated beginning in the fifth canto.

The fifth canto opens with an appeal to the notion that "vertuous thought" is akin to being "with child." This virtuous intent, then, must be followed through and converted into virtuous action, "Th’eternall brood of glorie excellent" (v.1). We must oppose this brood of glory (Gloriana) to the poisonous bastard brood of Errour, her "bookes and papers," and align it with the legitimate brood of the poet Immeritô—both are examples of intention expressed, of word become flesh. After this conceptual invocation on the part of the narrator, Redcrosse is presented preparing for battle with Sansjoy. He rises with the sun and puts on his "sun-bright armes" (v.2). In the battle that ensues, the "faithfull knight" is still indistinguishable from "his faithlesse foe" (v."argument"). Both knights, using "The instruments of wrath and heavinesse," strike each other "With greedy force" (v.6); "Both stricken strike, and beaten both do beat" (v.7), "And each to deadly shame would drive his foe" (v.9). Even when Redcrosse defeats Sansjoy he does not disentangle himself from the prideful train, just as he did not free himself from the trains of Errour when he slayed her. After the combat, he kneels before the Queene of the House of Pride and "To her makes present of his service seene" (v.16). Having won the combat, he can claim his rewards: Duessa and the shield of faithlessness (Sansfoy). These are the "lawrell girloonds" due to the victor (v.5)—to Redcrosse as victor, or the "laurel" due to the poet of truth. Inasmuch as the "lawrell girloonds" consist of falsity and faithlessness, the true knight of "faith" is not yet distinguished from the "faithlesse foe" and the true poet (and his legitimate image as off-springs ["brood"]) is not yet distinguished from the false poet or image maker.

The distinction, the disentangling, is made in terms of the healing "care" or "cure" each of the knights is given. Redcrosse, after the combat,
Home is he brought, and laid in sumptuous bed:
Where many skilfull leaches him abide,
To salve his hurts, that yet still freshly bled. (v.17)

Although this is not yet the true healing of Redcrosse, to be undertaken in the House of Holiness, this is a foreshadowing of that true healing. The true healing, that which only Christ can bring forth, to be achieved in the House of Holiness means an attainment of self-mastery, a self-mastery to be fully figured forth in Redcrosse’s replacement in Book II, Guyon. This self-mastery is opposed to the losing of oneself in the false (Duessa), in “furious ire” or wrath, and in the prostration of oneself at the throne of Pride. We might say that holiness names the healthy spiritual existence which is achieved through the mastery of one’s soul and the elimination of error, and that temperance (sophrosune) names the healthy existence of the body-politic which is achieved through the mastery of the self (as body-state) and exclusion of the external threat—that is, of the parasite, of the poison, of the savage enemy.

We have seen that a certain “falsity” and disorder (intemperance, wrath or pride)—in their undecidable nature as “hinge” concepts—allow the metaphysical structures of “truth” and order to occur. Thus, as was the case with the pharmakon in Derrida’s reading of Plato, they must be relegated to the fallen side of a structural opposition. The disorder of the House of Pride will be opposed to the “order of grace,” the human-centred will be opposed to the divine-centred. Thus, the perverted order that the House of Pride represents is extended and related, parodically, to the order of grace in terms of “divine healing.” Sansjoy is taken to Hell, an inversion of the heavenly inspiring (choosing) of the fallen in Grace. He is healed by a semi-divine Æsculapius, another figure of pride. In fact, his cave of “wondrous art” (v.36), in paralleling the art of Lucifera’s house, means that, in some respects, we have not left the House of Pride.

The achievement of health as self-mastery by Redcrosse/Guyon is opposed to the literal
loss or disappearance of the self that occurs in the case of Sansjoy. Having mortally wounded Sansjoy in the combat—and apparently in the process of following his epic forefathers, Achilles and Aeneas, in finishing off the downed enemy—Redcrosse searches for him; however, "he no where doth appeare,/But vanisht is" (v.13). Duessa, as sorcerer (pharmakeus), had concealed Sansjoy; he "Lay cover'd with inchaunted cloud all day" (v.19). Duessa makes haste "to the easterne coast of heaven" (v.19). She is seen by "griesly Night," who is the supplement or substitute of Phoebus—whose face she "durst never vew" (v.20). Night is clad "in a foule blacke pitchie mantle" and rides a "charet" with "coleblacke steedes yborne of hellish brood,/[That on their rustie bits did champ, as they were wood" (v.20). Upon seeing Duessa, Night is "amazed at the sight,/And th'unacquainted light" (v.21). Duessa appeals to Night as a foremother, as a source of all things:

O thou most auncient Grandmother of all,  
More old then Jove, whom thou at first didst breede,  
Or that great house of Gods caelestiall,  
Which wast begot in Daemogorgons hall, (v.22)\textsuperscript{37}

Duessa asks Night to save one of her "Nephews," Sansjoy:

Or who shall not great Nightes children scorne,  
When two of three her Nephews are so fowle forlorne? (v.23)

For Duessa, "dreaded Night in brightest day hath place" (v.24). Duessa still seems to resist the distinction the narrative is working to construct between the truth and light of day and the falsity and darkness of night. However, Night must inform Duessa, her child,\textsuperscript{38} that the father-god, Jove, who has the "chayne of strong necessitee" tied to his "eternall seat," favours "The sonnes of Day" (v.25). Night points out the construction of the opposition and the bringing to a fall undertaken by the imperial position, here figured in Jove. Night, as archē-supplement of day, as archē of the father, is opposed and brought to a fall by the imperial-securing operations of Jove: "And by my
[Night’s] ruines [Jove] thinkes to make them [the sons of day] great:/To make one great by others losse, is bad excheat" (v.25).

Night and Duessa travel to where Sansjoy lies devoid of his "native strength" (v.29). They dress his wounds "wisely" (skillfully), but, being devoid of his own power or life per se (his "native strength"), this dressing will not suffice as a "cure." His cure will have to be externally effected. They take the lifeless Sansjoy in Night’s chariot to "deepe Avernus hole," which is the "entrance darke and bace" that "Descends to hell" (v.31). Out of hell no creature ever "backe returned without heavenly grace" (v.31). Since Sansjoy does not actually return, we should see the healing pursued in this hellish descent as that which is opposed to the true healing of Christ or "heavenly grace."

In their journey, they pass by many figures of classical mythology who suffer endless torment in hell: Ixion, Sisyphus, Tantalus, Tityus, Typhoeus, and Theseus. Finally they reach the abode of Æsculapius: "a Cave ywrought by wondrous art," which, like the cave of Errour, is "Deepe, darke, uneasie, dolefull, comfortlesse" (v.36). He "Emprisond was in chaines remedilesse" [my emphasis] (v.36). Since he cannot "remedy" himself, we are given a hint that the remedy he will provide for Sansjoy lacks substance. Æsculapius suffers so because he went outside the proper order by effecting a cure of Hippolytus. Hippolytus, son of Theseus, was a worshipper of Diana, the goddess of hunting; he was a "jolly huntsman" (v.37). His stepmother, Phaedra, loved him, but he, again following Diana, this time in her form of chastity, rebuked her. Phaedra, in anger, "Her love . . . turnd to hate," accused Hippolytus before "His father fierce of treason false" (v.37). Theseus, in rage against his seemingly false (bastard) son, sought revenge through "his Sea-god syre," Neptune (v.38). The sea-god caused two sea-monsters to arise which frightened the steeds of Hippolytus’ chariot. As a result, Hippolytus'
... goodly corps on ragged cliffs yrent,
Was quite dismembred, and his members chast
Scattered on every mountaine, as he went,
That of Hippolytus was left no moniment. (v.38)

Upon discovering that Phaedra was duplicitous and deceiving, Theseus, with the help of Diana ("By Dianes means" [v.39]), who is also goddess of the moon, brought Hippolytus’ corpse to Æsculapius—just as Duessa, by Night’s means, brings Sansjoy’s body to Æsculapius. Hippolytus was torn in diverse members and thus “left no moniment.” But, by re-collecting the members, by “re-membering,” the physician “by his art/Did heale them all againe, and joyned every part” (v.39).39

What is central here is that it is “by his art” (that of Æsculapius) that Hippolytus is “healed.” It does not arise out of Hippolytus’ own nature and his self-mastery of that nature. Because this “healing” transgresses the proper nature of Hippolytus, or of humanity in general, Jove must—in favouring the sons of day or of the proper order—punish Æsculapius.

Such wondrous science in mans wit to raine
When Jove avizd, that could the dead revive,
And fates expired could renew againe,
Of endlesse life he might him not deprive,
But unto hell did thrust him downe alive, (v.40)40

Jove responds negatively to this “wondrous science” because it “raines,” because it becomes the reigning origin and order (archê) of the cure, rather than responding to (bringing forth) the proper order which ought to “raine.” Night and Duessa find Æsculapius in hell with Jove’s “flashing thunderbolt ywounded sore” (v.40). Thus, in his eternal stay,

... he did alwaiies strive
Himselfe with salves to health for to restore,
And slake the heavenly fire, that raged evermore. (v.40)

Here, in terms of Plato’s discussion of Asclepius as opposed to Herodicus, Æsculapius is more
akin to Herodíicus in his endless attempt to heal himself—an attempt which prolongs his days, yet
does not restore him to his proper order or health. Thus, we should not expect Æsculapius to
restore Sansjoy to the health of "holiness" or of "temperance." Regardless, Night and Duessa
appeal to

... him with prayer, and with praise,
If either salves, or oyles, or herbes, or charmes
A fordonne wight from dore of death mote raise,
He would at her request prolong her nephews daies. (v.41)

After some convincing, Æsculapius agrees to aid with his healing hands.

... And then the learned leach
His cunning hand gan to his wounds to lay,
And all things else, the which his art did teach: (v.44)

Æsculapius's healing hand, like the "wit" of the workman who constructed the House of Pride,
is referred to as "cunning." It is a knowing [kunne, cunne: to know], a skill (technē), but one
which is deceitful, duplicitous and concealing. The effecting of the external "cure" is a "cunning"
operation, a concealing bringing forth (technē), because the internal archē, the proper order,
health, or phusis, of the thing is obscured or forgotten in the external "re-membering." As
Æsculapius effects the "cure," Night and Duessa return to the House of Pride, leaving Sansjoy in
the physician's charge (cure/care).

Which having seene, from thence arose away
The mother of dread darknesse, and let stay
Aveugles sonne there in the leaches cure (v.44).

The two women of concealment leave Sansjoy in the "care" of Æsculapius, but that is not how the
poem phrases it. Rather, it is said that the knight is left "in the leaches cure". Now "cure" means
"care," but also "charge" in the sense of one's control or power. Thus, the knight is left in the
physician's "cure," in the sense of the physician's controlling archē. If the poem had said the
“leaches care,” something else entirely would have been spoken. It is not through a linguistic accident that the word “cure” was chosen here. The concealing nature of the “cure,” of the external archē or control, that is figured forth in this episode, as opposed to the true bringing forth and receptivity of “care”—figured forth in Arthur, in the House of Holiness, and in Christ’s grant of Grace—calls for and determines this phrasing. Sansjoy is left under the controlling power of Æsculapius’s technē in a cave in hell, just as the “captive wretched thralls” (v.45) that Redcrosse and his Dwarf discover in the dungeon of the House of Pride are under the controlling power “of that proud Tyrannesse” (v.46), Lucifera.

This distinction between internal and external controlling powers (archē) brings us to the “end,” for our purposes, of the structural oppositions set up in Book I, cantos iv-v. It also allows us to chart these structural oppositions in a somewhat rudimentary form: Being/appearing, true/false, Una/Duessa, faithful/fickle, Immerito/Archimago, legitimate son/bastard seed, light/dark, sun-son/Night-daughter, temperance/intemperance (wrath), good counsel/bad counsel,41 order/disorder, health/unhealth, self-mastery/loss of the true self, secure foundation (Castle of Medina)/fallen or weak foundation (House of Pride), original/supplement-substitute, internal/external.

3.4 Physis-Health and Peras

We have seen that in a certain respect, inasmuch as Spenser’s text participates in the representational-metaphysical tradition like the text of Plato as diagnosed by Derrida, The Faerie Queene (Book I) secures the indeterminacy of sign substitutions by setting up the opposition between the healthy (proper) order and the unhealthy (improper) order and that this distinction is itself based on the opposition of an interior (to be mastered) and an exterior (to be mastered through its exclusion). The erection of the limit or border separating interior and exterior—the
limits of a body separating it from what is outside it, or the limits of a state separating it from what is beyond its geographic boundary and the boundaries of its politico-economic control—is that which secures the identity of the subject body and of the sovereign state. This metaphysical logic, according to Derrida, relies on a "mediating" principle. The seemingly "external" term of the interior/exterior binary opposition is, in fact, that which, neither inside nor outside, allows the opposition to arise—for example, the parasite or the scapegoat (pharmakos), through its exclusion, allows the integrity of body and state to arise; the exchange system (of a capital economy or of signs) and exchange value allow the construction of the distinction between a thing's value in itself (or its use) and an externally imposed value.

It is this designation of the proper order or temperance (sóphrosunē) as the mastery of an externally delimited interior that we should call into question here. Derrida interprets sóphrosunē in terms of a certain mastery (enkratēia) of the self. I had occasion, in the "Introduction," to point to Foucault's similar interpretation of the Greek notion of sóphrosunē as a self-mastery (enkratēia). Foucault, like Derrida, feels that, for the Greeks, "enkratēia can be regarded as the prerequisite of sóphrosynē, as the form of effort and control that the individual must apply to himself in order to become moderate. . . . the term enkratēia in the classical vocabulary seems to refer in general to the dynamics of a domination of oneself by oneself and to the effort that this demands" (1990b, 65). In mastering oneself, one overcomes that which opposes enkratēia: "akrasia" (1990b, 65). Greenblatt follows in this Foucauldian-Derridean tradition when he interprets the overcoming of Acrasia and the "destruction of the Bower of Bliss," in Book II of The Faerie Queene, in terms of an imperial mastery and "technology of control." The metaphysical determination of the proper order (sóphrosunē), as a self-mastery, as a mastery of an externally delimited interior, is based on the notion of limit as an external border. Certainly, in the ways
demonstrated in the above section, Spenser participates in this metaphysical definition of identity. However, the primordial experience of "limit," as peras, is also an unsaid possibility within this tradition, a possibility to which Spenser also responds.

Peras, as experienced by the early Greeks, is distinct from the metaphysical experience of limit—just as the primordial experience of truth as alátheia is distinct from the metaphysical experience of truth as correspondence. The metaphysical determination of "limit," arising from the form-matter distinction, is that of the outer boundary. However, as Heidegger points out, "peras in Greek philosophy is not limit in the sense of the outer boundary, the point where something ends. Limit is always that which limits, determines, gives footing and stability, that by which and in which something begins and is" (1976, 245). Heidegger makes a similar point about the nature of peras in the "Addendum" (1956) written for his essay "The Origin of the Work of Art." The context of the "Addendum" is that there is an apparent contradiction in the original essay between the notions of art as the "fixing in place of truth" and art as the "letting happen of the advent of truth." This is not truly a contradiction, Heidegger states, if we think the "fixing in place" (thesis) in a Greek manner, and in terms of peras:

'Fixed' means outlined, admitted into the boundary (peras), brought into the outline. . . . The boundary in the Greek sense does not block off; rather, being itself brought forth, it first brings to its radiance what is present. Boundary sets free into the unconcealed; by its contour in the Greek light the mountain stands in its towering and repose—repose in the fullness of motion—all this holds of the work in the Greek sense of ergon; this work's 'being' is energeia, which gathers infinitely more movement within itself than do the modern 'energies.' (83)

The limit, as peras, rather than an abstract, spatio-temporal outer boundary, is "that by which and in which something begins and is" (1976, 245). But what does this mean? Heidegger's definition of peras arises in a discussion of Aristotle's distinction between "real beings" and "non-beings" (Physics II.193a 21-28). Heidegger points out that we mistakenly interpret this distinction as one
between the "eternal" and the "temporal." It is not a matter, Heidegger insists, of distinguishing between limitless and limited duration (or, "enduring presence") for the Greeks. Rather, "real beings," for Aristotle, are those which "become present of themselves" (1976, 245). "Non-beings on the other hand are sometimes present, sometimes absent, because they become present only on the basis of something that is already present; that is, along with it they make their appearance or remain absent" (1976, 245). Peras, then, as "that by which and in which something begins and is," is the internal order and limit of a thing (archē). As internal order, and as that in which a thing has its "motion" (kinēsis) and "repose" ("OWA" 83), peras belongs to phusis. Peras lets that which arises in its self-emerging appear in its "radiance." It is the inner articulation and rhythm (hruhmthesis) of the thing. As self-emerging radiance (phusis) and as the proper (appropriate) articulation, order and limits of a being, peras also belongs to dikē. We might say that it is within the self-emerging "nature" (phusis) and proper order and limits (dikē) of the hammer to drive in the nail; it is not within the proper limits of the hammer to paint.45 In saying that the nailing of the nail is within the proper limits of the hammer, obviously we do not mean "limits" in the metaphysical sense of an outer boundary—or a form on a matter. In the latter sense of limit, of course, as spatio-temporal boundary, the nailing and the nail are not "in" the hammer. The "identity" of the hammer, here "identity" is thought in a non-metaphysical sense, and the proper limits of the hammer do not arise through an opposition of an interiority and an exteriority; the hammer is not constituted through its delimitation from an exterior.

Derrida's deconstruction of limit applies to the metaphysical determination of "form," but it misses the mark when applied to a "limit" (peras) which is not thought of in terms of an external delimitation. Derrida points out that the outer boundary, in relying on the exterior from which it is delimited, dissolves itself into that exteriority. In this way, for Derrida, the thing, or text, fades
into the unlimited, into the exchange and differential system that is Being as *différance*. The "presence" of the thing, according to Derrida, relies on this *différance*, on what withdraws and is never present. But this "withdrawal" is understood by Derrida in a metaphysical manner. The fund or "reserve" of concepts under the name "*pharmakon*" allows the "presence" of a term in the series of oppositional structures that Derrida outlined in Plato's text, but this reserve itself, as we said, withdraws and does not present itself. But how does Derrida understand this "withdrawal"?

The excess—but can we still call it that?—is only a certain displacement of the series. And a certain *folding back* [repli]—which will later be called a *re-mark*—or opposition within the series, or even within its dialectic. We cannot qualify it, name it, comprehend it under a simple concept without immediately being off the mark. Such a functional displacement, which concerns differences (and, as we shall see, "simulacra") more than any conceptual identities signified, is a real and necessary challenge. ("PPh" 104)

Here withdrawal, concealment and the *lethe* of *alētheia* are understood as an "excess," a "surplus value," or a "fold" in the system of differential relations which, rather than constituting that which is radically apart or "Other" with respect to the differential system, is in fact recuperated in the system and becomes the motor of the production of differences (cf., too, 1987, 258). In this way, Derrida does not "think withdrawal as withdrawal"; he does not "let withdrawal be withdrawal" (Radloff 1989, 24). *Différance*, or the "trace," for Derrida, is that which withdraws, "[r]eserving itself," from the "order of truth" ("Dif" 6). In "Plato's Pharmacy," the *pharmakon* names that reserve of concepts which withdraws from the metaphysical structures of presence. This also implicates, says Derrida, the concept of the Good—the father of all which we can only know through its off-spring, the sun. The Good marks "[t]he absolute invisibility of the origin of the visible"; "the good-sun-father-capital," as names for withdrawal, designate "the unattainment of presence or beingness in any form"; thus, "the whole surplus Plato calls *epekeina tēs ousias* (beyond beingness or presence), gives rise to a structure of replacements such that all presences
will be supplements substituted for the absent origin, and all differences, within the system of presence, will be the irreducible effect of what remains *epekeina tēs ousias*” (“PPh” 167).

_Différance_ names the thought of “what is most irreducible about our ‘era’” (“Dif” 7). Here, Derrida means to say that within the era of technology and telecommunications—the era of the computer pro-gram, of the cybernetic pro-gram, of the genetic pro-gram (1974, 84)—the _gramme_, difference, or the trace structure of existence, makes its “presence” felt. It emerges out of oblivion and is thought for the first time—as opposed to the history of logocentric metaphysics which constitutes the “reduction of the trace” (1974, 97). We should distinguish, briefly, this Derridean understanding of the technological era, our hermeneutic situation, from that of Heidegger.

Heidegger names the essence of technology, which challenges and “exposes” historical humanity within the modern “era,” _das Gestell_. _Das Gestell_ names the technological manipulation, expropriation, and reduction of that which is to a “standing reserve.” Within the essential claim that technology holds upon humanity, _technē_ is understood only in terms of this challenging, positing, manipulating (as _technē_ II). Technology (_das Gestell_) is a “sending” of Being (a “destining”). It is the way in which Being sends itself in the technological era—as its withdrawal. The holy, the divine as Being showing itself in the ordinary (cf. Heidegger 1992)−“through a glass darkly”−shows itself only in terms of its “want.” Yet, within the essence of technology, “the self-denial of the Clearing of coming-into-presence as such prevents the want of ‘holy names’ from being itself experienced as a want” (Heidegger 1985, 266). For this reason, technological (or even “metatechnical”) thinking does not “think withdrawal as withdrawal.” Rather, Being (the withdrawal of unconcealment) is thought of only in terms of its “effects”: for Derrida this means the signifying relations, the repetitions and replacements, which Being as _arche_-supplementarity
enables.

As a technological thinker, a thinker of technē in terms of technē II and of Being-phusis in terms of its "effects," Derrida thinks of illness as an “allergic” reaction to an exterior threat and of the dream of health as one in which there would be no exterior (“PPh” 101). This interpretation of health, as an opposition of an interior and an exterior, as a self-mastery of a perfect interiority, relies on a metaphysical positioning of both text and reader. Certainly this positioning, as was shown in the previous section, is available in the case of Spenser’s text. However, within the experience of phusis in the domain of alētheia, and the experience of peras proper to it, another notion of health is uttered. \(^4^8\) Let us turn, then, to the nature of health (phusis) and healing (technē) as expressed in The Faerie Queene (Book I) inasmuch as it is a non-metaphysical work—one which responds to the unsaid possibilities of the tradition.

3.5 The Technē of the True Physician (The Faerie Queene I.vii-xi)

The context of Spenser’s thinking concerning the nature of health and healing begins with Plato. Health in Plato is not a mastering of oneself or of one’s passions. The hierarchical order of a “body’s” parts—the parts of a body, a mind, or a polis—is based on the inner articulation of the things themselves. It is based on that which is proper to each thing out of its own nature (phusis). For this reason, we can say, in a Platonic manner, that it is proper for the ruler to rule and for the labourer to labour—just as it is proper for the hammer to hammer and the paint brush to paint. The proper limits and order of the things themselves determine this arrangement. An externally imposed order, what Plato refers to as a “tyrannical” order—for example, forcing the hammer to paint, or the labourer to rule—effaces and transgresses these proper limits. Thus, the fact that the “producing” class, for Plato, does not have a “say” in the rule of the polis—or, for that matter, the feet a “say” in the decision making process of reason (its ruling) as to where the body
will go and what it will do—does not mean that there is a "repression" or a "technology of control" at work. Rather, it means that each thing is brought forth to arise within its own nature and proper limits. The technē of ruling, for Plato, consists in guiding and bringing this self-emerging proper order forth; it does not consist in substituting its own (or, external) order and limit (archē) upon the things in its purview. Thus, rather than mastering and controlling, the proper (internal) ruling order (archē) is an attuned harmony of elements, with each in its proper pitch and rhythm. And, rather than a ruling which consists of a violent repression of that which it rules, proper rule and order is a guiding in the way of the shepherd in relation to his or her flock. It should not surprise us, then, that Plato characterizes a certain healing "by nature" in terms of a leading out, a guiding, and a setting free into the radiance of the coming-into-appearance, into the self-emergence, of one's own proper limits and one's dwelling in truth. In that most famous of Platonic allegories, that of the cave, Socrates, after describing the situation of the fettered prisoners, asks us to "[c]onsider, then, what would be the manner of the release and healing [iаsіn] from these bonds and this folly [aфrоsunеs] if in the course of nature [phusei] something of this sort should happen to them" (VII.515c). Socrates then goes on to describe a "healing" which consists in the setting free of a prisoner and the progressive steps of that prisoner's coming to dwell in the inspiring self-emerging (lighting-clearing-Being) of truth. The philosopher ruler is one set free, and in his turn sets others free, to his own nature and truth.

The Platonic notion of proper order and rule, or of health and healing, as a loving, shepherding, guiding, and caring is echoed in Spenser's treatment of the "cares" of Redcrosse and Una. As Book I opens, "carefulness" signifies a proper directedness, a quest and longing for the true home of Una. We are introduced to Redcrosse as one who is "solemme sad" (i.2). Similarly, Una is figured forth as one "that inly mournd" because "in heart some hidden care she had" (i.4).
As opposed to the "care" displayed on the part of Redcrosse and Una, the House of Morpheus is guarded by dogs "Watching to banish Care their enimy" (i.40), and Morpheus himself lies sleeping in "carelesse Quiet" (i.41), his head "devoide of carefull carke" (i.44). After the Sprite returns from the House of Morpheus with a "fit false dreame" (i.43), it is because Redcrosse lies in "carelesse sleepe" (i.53) that the seeming and the deceptions of Archimago's images are able to lead him astray, away from Una. For this reason, Redcrosse's carelessness at the Fountain of Canto VII, even before the threat of Orgoglio manifests itself, suggests that he is stumbling from his rightful path and way. Here the Fountain, as the inversion of the Well of Life (xi.29-30), figures forth the withdrawal of care, of health, of the proper order.

Redcrosse's carelessness means that he becomes a slave to Orgoglio—we might say that he is still kneeling at the throne of Pride. Redcrosse has lost his own proper limits and is made an "eternal bondslave" (vii.14) to this improper order of himself—a bondslave to Orgoglio as georgos (a corrupted version or name of Redcrosse himself as St. George). Orgoglio holds Redcrosse captive in a "Dungeon deepe" (vii.15). This dungeon is akin to the dungeon in the House of Pride and the recesses of the 'cave of unhealth' and its careless images described by Plato. Redcrosse's disease, his condition of captivity in the dungeon-cave, is "remediless" (vii.51). That is to say, a drug, a simple remedy, administered through the know-how (technē II-pharmakeia) of the physician will not "effect" a cure. The cure will have to arise within the self-emerging and inspiring care of Grace.

The controlling power in which Orgoglio and Duessa hold Redcrosse, like that of Æsculapius's "cure" and that of the "proud Tyrannesse" (Lucifera), is a tyrannical one. It makes Redcrosse a "Thrall to that Gyants hatefull tyrannie" (viii.2). The tyrant operates through fear; the lamb dreads the wolf's predatory ruling power. For this reason, "to make her dreaded more of
men,/And peoples harts with awfull terrour tye," Orgoglio seats Duessa on a “monstrous beast” (vii.16).

Upon hearing of Redcrosse’s being made a “caytive thral” to this fearful tyranny—upon hearing of this situation which denotes the withdrawal of Redcrosse’s proper limits, of his health—Una is wounded with sorrowful care (vii.28). It is Una’s wound of sorrow which Arthur, in figuring forth the true physician and Christ’s healing Grace, must first treat and “salve.” Arthur figures forth healing here in the manner of the healing “word.” His healing art is an art of eloquence—and because it is an art (technē), an eloquence or rhetoric grounded in the dialectic of truth. This rhetorical art is a bringing forth and unfolding of the proper order of a thing within its own nature. Thus, Arthur’s healing of Una is a “caring,” with his “Faire feeling words” (vii.38), and the unfolding of her sorrowful state—and thus an “attuning” of this sorrow with the peace which comes from the faithfulreasonable recognition of Grace (cf. vii.38-42). Arthur’s healing art of eloquence, his “well guided speach” (vii.42), constitutes a proper “counsell”—as distinguished from the “counsels bad” of the “six wisards” of the House of Pride (iv.12)—which “mitigates” or soothes Una’s wound (vii.40).

Arthur’s art of eloquence, in being “well guided,” and thus a proper technē (technē I), is distinct from the Sophist’s eloquence as portrayed by Plato; the Sophist’s “faire seeming” eloquence is no art, in the sense of a proper guiding, but a mastering and a manipulating of the matter at hand (technē II). This deceptive and dissimulating eloquence, in its distinction from the speaking which figures forth the lighting process of truth and Being, and as a distortion of the lighting of beings through its attention to the beings of the simulacra, is clearly that which is employed by Archimago and Duessa. Archimago, for instance, “well could file his tongue as smooth as glas” (i.35). More immediate to the context of Arthur’s healing, however, this truthful
eloquence is distinguished from the persuasive, yet dissembling, words of Despair (cf. ix.21-54).

Sir Trevisan, upon being convinced by Redcrosse to unfold his "tydings strange" (ix.28), paints Despair as a "cunning thiefe" who steals one's hope (ix.29). What could cause one to overcome the "Castle of his health?" asks Redcrosse (ix.31). Trevisan remarks that Despair's "subtil tonge, like dropping honny," or like a poison, "mealt'fh/Into the hart, and searcheth every vaine" (ix.31). Redcrosse, despite Trevisan's warnings, wishes "that treachours art" to "have heard and tride" (ix.32). Trevisan leads them to a cave. This cave is "Darke, dolefull, drearie, like a greedie grave" (ix.33); this evokes the description of Æsculapius's cave earlier in the poem: "Deepe, darke, uneasie, dolefull, comfortlesse" (v.36). Within the domains of these caves, and their parallel dungeons, phusis, as self-emergence and growth, is effaced. The domain of Despair has only the "stubs of trees,/Whereon nor fruit, nor leafe was ever seene" (ix.34). In an inversion of the image of growth, the only things that hang on these trees are "carcases" (ix.34). Just as Æsculapius's "cunning" art is a prideful or hubristic exceeding of the proper limits of one's life, and, thus, an effacing of the natural unfolding of life, so, too, is the "cunning" verbal art of Despair a transgressing of the proper limits of one's life in its self-emerging and natural unfolding: as Redcrosse asserts in reply to the appeal of Despair to death as a "port after stormie seas" (ix.40), "The terme of life is limited,/Ne may a man prolong, nor shorten it" (ix.41). Redcrosse's assertion is that phusis, as the self-emerging, as the proper and divinely ordained order, is the ruling measure of life. "The soouldier may not move from watchfull sted,/Nor leave his stand, untill his Captaine bed" (ix.41). Arts, medical and rhetorical, if they replace this ruling measure, occult this proper order; they cause it to withdraw into oblivion. For Despair, that is, 'the wages of sin is death' (cf. ix.43); however, he forgets the freeing power of Grace that is the corollary to this dictum. Redcrosse "was much enmoved with his speach" (ix.48). The cunning
rhetoric of Despair made it seem "As he [Redcrosse] were charmed with inchaunted rimes" (ix.48). Despaire's words "bewitch" Redcrosse (ix.53). But Una reminds him, firmly, of the Grace that Despaire's rhetoric had occulted: "Where justice growes, there grows eke greater grace" [my emphasis] (ix.53). Here then, whereas the dissimulating arts of Æsculapius and Despaire had forgotten and concealed the self-emerging and growing (phasis) as well as the inspiring power of Grace, Una not only pays heed to "greater grace," she also understands this Grace in terms of the self-emerging and growing.

In the parallel between Æsculapius and Despaire, as two poles of the effacing of the proper unfolding of life in its self-emerging (phasis) (ix.41), and in its being distinguished from its counter-examples in Arthur, Redcrosse, and Una, Book I finds a central definition of the "virtue" it figures forth: the virtue of holiness, like that of temperance, is a proper heeding of and receptivity to the self-emerging (phasis) and divinely "provided" order of things (Grace).

Arthur figures forth the healing Grace manifested in the life of Christ, where the Word of Being (Logos-Wisdom) becomes, or rather "shines through," flesh (folly). The seventh Canto begins by asking "What man so wise, what earthly wit so ware,/As to descry the crafty cunning traine" (vii.1) of deception (of Duessa). No mortal can do this, no "earthly wit." But inasmuch as Arthur figures forth divine Grace; he is able to "descr the crafty cunning traine." Arthur's shield is the emblematic weapon which embodies this power most fully: "But all that was not such, as seemd in sight,/Before that shield did fade, and suddeine fall" (vii.35). Arthur brings forth a healing Grace in the eighth Canto: one which results in the rescue of a fallen Redcrosse and the stripping of the simulacra of Duessa.

In order to rescue or more properly "heal" Redcrosse, Arthur must overcome the giant Orgoglio and Duessa. Orgoglio's blows upon hitting the earth cut a furrow "three yardes deepe"
Thus, when Arthur actually survives a direct assault by this type of blow, we might justifiably ask: "What mortall wight could ever beare so monstrous blow?" (viii.18). Of course, the point is, again, that no "mortal wight," or "earthly wit," could do so; only Arthur in his figuring forth of the shining forth of Grace, in his embodying of the appearing of the divine in the ordinary, can achieve such a feat. Upon defeating Orgoglio and Duessa, Arthur enters the Castle in order to free Redcrosse. There he encounters Ignaro who appears wise but is, in fact, foolish and "ignorant" (viii.33). Arthur’s is a true wisdom in his leading out of the dungeon-cave. Redcrosse is led out of the dark pit, whereupon, like the freed prisoners Plato describes, "His sad dull eyes deepe sunck in hollow pits,/Could not endure th’unwonted sunne to view" (viii.41).

In the proper course of time, "With dew repast"—that is, without the "cunning" hands of an Æsculapius—Redcrosse and the others "had recured well" from their encounter with Orgoglio (ix.2). The three then "knit friendly bands" (ix.Argument) and exchange gifts. Arthur’s gift is the gift of healing Grace, in the form of a healing liquid and Redcrosse’s that in the form of the healing Word:

Prince Arthur gave a boxe of Diamond sure,
Embowed with gold and gorgeous ornament,
Wherein were clood few drops of liquor pure,
Of wondrouses worth, and vertue excellent,
That any wound could heale incontinent:
Which to requite, the Redcrosse knight him gave
A booke, wherein his Saveours testament
Was wirt with golden letters rich and brave;
A worke of wondrouses grace, and able soules to save. (ix.19)

These gifts of healing Grace parallel two healing liquids which enable Redcrosse to overcome the Dragon in the eleventh Canto. At the end of the first day’s battle, Redcrosse falls into "The well of life":

Of auncient time there was a springing well,
From which fast trickled forth a silver flood,
Full of great vertues, and for med’cine good. (xi.29)

The well heals "Those that with sickenesse were infected sore" (xi.30), but it is also referred to as a well "of auncient time." That which springs forth in the well is a divine healing power but also the voice of an "auncient time." The second healing liquid that arises within the battle with the Dragon arises at the end of the second day of the combat, when Redcrosse is "wondrous sore diseasd" (xi.38). God guides the wounded Redcrosse as he retreats from the battle (xi.45). Redcrosse stumbles into the grove of "The tree of life" that "Great God" had "planted" (xi.46). In that grove, "all good things did grow,/And freely sprong out of the fruitfull ground,/As incorrupted Nature did them sow" (xi.47). Here, the balm of the tree of life, as did the water of the well of life, "Did heale his wounds" (xi.50).

Proper healing is also figured forth in the form of the House of Holiness (I.x). The House of Holiness is a well-ruled body-polis: "It governd was, and guided evermore, / Through wisedome of a matrone grave and hore" (x.3). True propagation, as distinguished from the proliferation of Errour’s brood, is also set forth in this house. Upon arriving to the house, Una is led to Charissa’s "fruitfull nest" (x.29). Charissa’s "necke and breasts were ever open bare, / That ay thereof her babes might sucke their fill" (x.30). Her self-giving, her proper rule, and her beauty mark Charissa as one with "goodly grace" (x.30). While Una encounters the figure of true propagation and self-giving, Redcrosse is being healed, in the manner of the philosopher ruler, by a hermit. Hermits normally live in caves; however, this hermit-philosopher had "Eagles eye, that can behold the Sunne" (x.47). The hermit leads Redcrosse to a mountain top (x.53). The mount, in its height, is contrasted with the falleness into beings as they are, the falleness into the caves of Æsculapius, of Despaire, and of flickering shadows—that is, the cave described by Plato.
The mount is connected to Mount Sinai where Moses received the divine Law "writ in stone / With bloody letters by the hand of God" (x.53). The mount is also associated with the Mount of Olives (x.54), the site of Christ's Olivet discourse (Matt 24 and Mark 13) and the site, after his resurrection, of Christ's ascension. Finally, this mount is connected to Mount Parnassus "On which the thrise three learned Ladies play / Their heavenly notes, and make full many a lovely lay" (x.54). As Hamilton's gloss points out, Spenser, in this way, "links Christ with the Muses." Christ's healing Grace is associated, for Spenser, with the poetic inspiration of the Muses. From the height of this mount—and because he is in the bright shining forth of Grace and inspiration that is the realm outside of the cave—Redcrosse is able to see the proper order of the polis as figured forth in "The new Hierusalem" (x.57). Like the philosopher rulers who leave the cave, he does not want to return. When he does, the lighting-appearing of the vision blinds him to other things: "dazed were his eyne, / Through passing brightnessse, which did quite confound / His feeble sence" (x.67).

The healing liquids, the elixir given by Arthur, the well of life and the balm of the tree of life, heal deadly wounds:

Life and long health that gratious ointment gave,
And deadly woundes could heale, and reare againe
The senselesse corse appointed for the grave. (xi.48)

Why, then, do these liquids, and the healing Grace they signify, not meet with the same objection that was given to Æsculapius and Despaire on the matter of transgressing the proper limits of the unfolding of life? This is because the Christian sense of healing expressed here is one in which the healing of holiness arises out of the proper unfolding of life itself. The individual's choosing or not choosing to heed the gift of Grace, the nature of their virtue of "holiness," becomes the source of the healing. Health is the unfolding of this virtuous or "holy" relation between the divine
in its presencing (Grace) and humanity in its decisions. For this reason, the healing of holiness or Grace is not ascribed to any physician's *technē*, in the sense of an external *archē* (as *technē II*): "Ne let the man ascribe it to his skill./That thorough grace hath gained victory" (x.1).

**Physis as Form: Archimago as Pharmakeus and the Poet's Poiēsis**

PER. All as the Sunyne beame so bright,
WIL. hey ho the Sunne beame,
PER. Glaunceth from *Phæbus* face forthright,
WIL. so love into thy hart did streme: (*SC*, "August" 81-84)

We must keep in mind, in moving from the question of healing to the question of the bringing forth of forms, the distinction we made earlier between *poiēsis* as (1) a "pro-ucing," a bringing forth of a thing in its form (*morphē*) out of itself (*phasis*), and as (2) a "making," a derivational manufacturing in which the maker bases the product on a pre-existing form or idea (*eidos*). We must keep this distinction in mind as we approach the nature of the "makers" of images as figured forth in *The Faerie Queene*.

The "reserve" of signification that is the *pharmakon*—with the dissembling image of the sorcerer-magician (*pharmakeus*), with the dissembling word of the Sophist, with the dissembling of the form (of health) in the effecting of the external cure (*pharmakeia*), and with the dissembling of identity in the painter's copies or simulacra (*zographema* as *phantasma*) threatens metaphysical constructs of identity and dissolves its externally delimited forms. Thoth, the god who offers the gift of the *pharmakon* as writing, is also the god of the moon. He substitutes for Ammon-Ra, the father-sun god. Thoth arises only within the absence of the father or origin ("PPh" 89), only when the father is "cut off." This substitutional or ersatz-being which Thoth and the *pharmakon* signify "could be judged 'mad' since it can go on infinitely" ("PPh" 89). In being the god of substitutions, Thoth is the god of non-identity ("PPh" 93). Finally, Thoth, "like his Greek
counterpart, Hermes... occupies the role of messenger-god, of clever intermediary, ingenious and subtle enough to steal, and always to steal away" ("PPh" 88). With all of this in mind, we might ask the following questions: do the infinite substitutions (guises) which Duessa and Archimago undertake threaten to plunge the heterocosm of "Faery Lond" into disorder and madness? Do the dissembling images of Archimago, as 'arch image maker,' call into question the forms figured forth by the poet? Or, rather than a loss of form and identity, is this "madness" connected to phusis, the self-emergence of form?

3.6 Archimago as Pharmakeus (The Faerie Queene I.i-ii)

The encounter with Errour, in the wandering wood that leads one astray—a dark wood whose trees "did spred so broad, that heavens light did hide" (i.7)—as we saw, is largely an encounter with a textual or semiotic danger: with poisonous "bookes and papers" (i.20) and with Errour's "spawne of serpents small, / Deformed monsters, fowle, and blacke as inke" [my emphasis] (i.22). This encounter with the devious "trains" of signification does not end with the slaying of Errour. Archimago constitutes a continuation of this threat in his first appearance as a "sagely sad" "aged Sire" who "by his belt his booke he hanging had" (i.29). Here, we come across a distinction between the book of the healing Word—the book which Arthur gives to Redcrosse and which this book seems to be—and Archimago's books of sorcery, his books of the dissembling word and image.61

Una informs Redcrosse that he needs to rest just as "The Sunne that measures heaven all day long, / At night doth baite his steedes the Ocean waves emong" (i.32).62 This healing rest and repose is taken in Archimago's "little lowly Hermitage":

Thereby a Christall streame did gently play,
Which from a sacred fountaine welled forth alway. (i.34)
The "sacred fountaine" by the hermitage parallels the other Fountain of false healing—at which Redcrosse is "carelesse" with Duessa—and the well and tree of life, of true healing, in the eleventh Canto. With the drawing into concealment of the Sunne, with Redcrosse in "carelesse sleepe" (i.53), the seeming "godly father" (i.33), Archimago as arch-magician, arises. Archimago, "when all droyned in deadly sleepe he findes, / He to his study goes" (i.36). In his study, with "His Magick bookes and artes of sundry kindes," Archimago "seekes out mighty charmes, to trouble sleepy mindes" (i.36). Archimago’s "mighty charmes" are unspeakable "spelles" that summon daemons:

> Then choosing out few wordes most horrible,
> (Let none them read) thereof did verses frame,
> With which and other spelles like terrible,
> He bad awake blacke Plutoes griesly Dame,
> And cursed heaven, and spake reprochfull shame
> Of highest God, the Lord of life and light;
> A bold bad man, that dar’d to call by name
> Great Gorgon, Prince of darknesse and dead night,
> At which Cocytus quakes, and Styx is put to flight. (i.37)

What makes these words, these "verses" and "charmes" uttered by Archimago, unspeakable and terrible? Why are these words, like the type of healing offered by Æsculapius, concealing in the sense of distorting and dissimulating—and concealing in the sense that they can only be spoken in the concealment of Night? We might say, speaking metaphysically, that these are concealing words inasmuch as they are false, and that they are "false" inasmuch as they fail to "correspond" to a pre-existing matter—53—in a Christian context, they are false in their failure to accord with the Divine as origin and with a Divine intention. We would then say that the "true" word, as the non-concealing word, is that which corresponds to the original, is that which is a perfect imitation. This metaphysical determination of the non-concealing word could then be called into question (deconstructed) by the mediating element of repetition or mimesis—the logic of mediation here
being the necessary difference allowing the copy to be a copy and thus jeopardizing the ability for any word to be a “true” word. And certainly this is how the true and false word, in some ways, are designated in The Faerie Queene.

Spenser’s manifest text and thinking adheres to Christian doctrine and, thus, to representational metaphysics. However, by means of what shows itself in his language, in the concealing-revealing that is language, Spenser’s essential thinking is one which heeds the non-representational possibilities first founded by the Greeks and then transmitted in the medieval understanding of existence and the poetic word as veil. In this other possibility for the poetic word, in this possibility which is expressed in the “reserve” (or, unsaid) of Spenser’s language—as we have seen in his “unsaid” treatment of the true physician’s technē and, as we shall see, in his treatment of the true poet’s poiēsis—the distorting and dissembling word is so called in terms of its relation to the lighting process of Being, not its relation to a pre-existing being. This poetic word is distorting in that it is a distortion and oblivion, as is the distorting cure of Ἐσκουλαπius and Despaire, of the self-emerging (phasis) and clearing of Being. The distorting word is a relation to an effect of this self-emerging and clearing. It relates to a particular being: an original form or eidos as the (external) archē. Thus, this distorting word is one of poiēsis II, of a derivational “making.” The poetic word, or “verses,” of Archimago, within the domain of poiēsis II, effect the “making” of images. These images are made with an end to being as close seeming as possible to (or, in “accordance” with) a pre-existing original. The poetic word that is non-distorting, that speaks out of the un-concealment of Being, is a leading out and forth (a “pro-duce”) a figuring forth in form (morphē), of this self-emerging unconcealment. This poetic word, within the domain of poiēsis I, is akin to the “straunge” speaking that occurs in Immeritō’s verse. The technē of the poet, in each case, is not lauded. Immeritō is “unworthy” of praise; that is, another “auctoritee"
speaks in his verse: the call of Being as manifested in the tradition of language.

Thus, Archimago's "spelles," with which "he cald out of deepe darknesse dred / Legions of Sprights" (i.38), are poetic words which call forth, in the sense of "make," sprites based on the recipes (pharmakon) of his "Magick booke and artes." The sprites called forth have their archē in the maker's "booke and artes" (technē), not in their proper or "dew" unfolding. For this reason, Archimago is described as ruling the sprites. He is the one "that the stubborne Sprites can wisely tame" (i.43); so, when finished his business in the House of Morpheus, the Sprite returns "In hast unto his Lord" (i.44). Archimago is an "imperial" Lord, so to speak, of the products of his linguistic arts. This imperial mastery has its locus in his "mighty" arts (technē). Archimago's first "fit false dreame" fails to seduce Redcrosse (cf. i.47-54). So, just before Phoebus was about to repeat his daily round, "Full envious that night so long his roome did fill" (ii.1), Archimago, "all in rage to see his skillfull might / Deluded so" [my emphasis], began to searche "his balefull booke and againe" (ii.2). Archimago forms another "seeming body," this time of a Squire. He puts the Squire and the false Una into "a secret bed, /Covered with darknesse and misdeeming night" (ii.3). Archimago's mighty-imperial arts--his "mightie science" (ii.10) which "had such might over true meaning harts" [my emphases] (ii.9)--and their covering-distorting words, separate Redcrosse from Una this time.

Archimago deals in images; he can make many forms and become many forms.

As ever Proteus to himselfe could make:
Sometime a fowle, sometime a fish in lake,
Now like a foxe, now like a dragon fell,
That of himselfe he oft for feare would quake,
And oft would flye away. O who can tell
The hidden power of herbes, and might of Magicke spell? (ii.10)

The many forms and images made in this way cause the reader to encounter each figure rather
warily in Book I. Each time a character arises who "seems" wise or beneficent, one questions the nature of that appearing or seeming. It is in this way that the logic of mediation, of mimēsis and of the pharmakeus, deconstructs the metaphysical determination of identity. It is in this way, in Archimago's becoming the image of Redcrosse ("Full jolly knight he seemde"),\(^64\) that the nature of Redcrosse, and thus of Holiness, can be seen as threatened to dissolve into related images. Redcrosse is in a signifying chain that includes: the Lyon, Archimago, Fradubio, Sansloy, the satyrs, Satyrane, Arthur, and finally even the Dragon. The pharmakeus—as a principle of the imitation, copy, or image—threatens the very integrity of Redcrosse and Holiness, making him, in the end, one of the many "Chaungelings" (x.65), or signifying substitutions, of the system of Book I.

In his making of Duessa out of one of the Sprites, the pharmakeus-maker explicitly orders her according to the parameters of representational imitation:

\[
\text{And that new creature borne without her dew,} \\
\text{Full of the makers guile, with usage sly} \\
\text{He taught to imitate that Lady trew,} \\
\text{Whoses semblance she did carrie under feigned hew. (i.46)}
\]

Duessa has her archē in the technē of Archimago as maker—who models her according to Una as form and prototype. But Duessa, as witch-sorceress-pharmakeus, is also the "author" of Fradubio's woes (ii.34). Her "hellish science" raised a distorting "foggy mist" which occulted the beauty of Frælissa, which "Dimmed her former beauties shining ray, / And with foule ugly forme did her disgrace" (ii.38). Duessa's distorting "science" (technē) occults the shining forth out of itself of Frælissa's beauty. Beauty shining forth in form is one way in which we might define Grace. Thus, to distort the shining and self-emerging of beauty is to "dis-grace" the form. Duessa's poetic art, her skill with "charmes" and "herbes and ointments" (pharmakeia), like that of Archimago, is a
"magicke might" [my emphasis] (ii.42).

What distinguishes the "devilish" magic and charms, the "hellish science," of Archimago and Duessa from the benevolent charms of other characters? The red cross on his shield, for instance, protects Redcrosse from death. Similarly, Arthur’s shield has the magical power of destroying illusion (vii.35). It was Merlin who made this shield, "which whylome did excell / All living wightes in might of magicke spell" (vii.36). Now Merlin has the "might" of magical art just as does Archimago. However, he "excells," in the sense of exceeding, the might of other magicians. This excelling-exceeding can be seen as a matter of having more might than the others, or as a going beyond the experience of the magus (wise man) as merely mighty. In the only other description we have of Merlin in Book I we are aided in our interpretation of this passage. In the ninth Canto, in the course of discussing his "signage," Arthur describes Merlin:

Thither the great Magicien Merlin came,  
As was his use, ofttimes to visit me:  
For he had charge my discipline to frame,  
And Tutours nouriture to oversee. (ix.5)

The Merlin figured forth here is the magus as wise man that guides and nurtures through his education—Gk. e-duco = leading out. This nurturing and guiding of the pupil, guiding him to his proper end, is distinct from the tyrannical magus, as maker-magician, whose "might" is an exercise in lordship over his or her charge. We might say that Archimago "makes" Duessa while Merlin "pro-duces" (leads forth and out) the shield—where the shield figures forth the healing and bringing forth of truth (out of the power of the "occult") of Arthur, Merlin’s pupil. This nurturing figured forth in Merlin, and this healing-bringing forth of truth embodied in Arthur, finds a parallel in the figure of the poet in Book I. The full title of the work should be kept in mind here: 

*The Faerie Queene: Disposed into twelve bookees, Fashioning XII Morall vertues.* Each book
"fashions" a moral virtue. To "fashion" means to represent and to educate. "Fashioning" can be thought of in a metaphysical manner: where the representing is a "making" or imitating based on an original model and the educating is a mastering-forming-moulding of a pupil as matter. I would suggest that the "generall end" of The Faerie Queene, "to fashion a gentleman or noble person in virtuous and gentle discipline" ("LR" 737), is not experienced primarily in this metaphysical manner. Rather, the representing is a figuring forth of a thing in form and the educating is understood in terms of this nurturing (gardener-like, nurse-like, parent-like) and guiding (shepherd-like) of a thing to its proper end.

3.7 The Pharmakeus and Divine Madness: Plato's Phaedrus

The metaphysical construction of identity, according to Derrida, involves a securing of and a delimitation from that which differs. Book I, according to a "Derridean" reading, attempts to secure the identity of Redcrosse and of the virtue of Holiness. The substitution of images and figures in Book I threatens to efface the limits necessary for this identity. Through his associations with the many other figures in the Book, Redcrosse's delimitation from that which differs is called into question. Redcrosse loses himself in the madness associated with becoming-wrathful or in becoming-desperate. In order to think about these matters in a non-metaphysical manner, let us return to Plato's Phaedrus--more particularly, to Socrates' two speeches on love in the Phaedrus. In this work we will find a thinking which understands form (beauty) as a self-emergence of Being and truth. We will find an understanding of the "losing of oneself" in madness that, in essence, does not, contra Derrida's interpretation, threaten "identity"; rather, madness (mania) in the Phaedrus is a showing forth of the divine, a divine inspiration, a divine gift (grace), which first makes things what they are.

After finding an appropriate place for their discussion, Phaedrus reads a speech by Lysias
on the superiority of the artful non-lover to the mad lover. Phaedrus admires Lysias’s speech; however, Socrates responds to it differently. He calls into question the comprehensiveness of Lysias’s speech with one of his own. Socrates’ speech, his response to Lysias, arises out of a certain divine enthousismos: “Good sir [o daimonie], there is something welling up within my breast, which makes me feel that I could find something different and something better, to say.” That which wells up in Socrates’ breast points to the fact that his speech does not have its origin in his own art (techne) of speaking or knowledge: “I am of course well aware it can’t be anything originating in my own mind, for I know my own ignorance; so I suppose it can only be that it has been poured into me” (235c). Socrates hesitates to give this speech. However, Phaedrus insists that he do so. In order to coerce Socrates, Phaedrus threatens never again to report speeches to him. Socrates, at this point, agrees to deliver his speech and remarks that Phaedrus has found the proper means of forcing one who, like himself, is a lover of logoi (236e). Before he begins his speech, Socrates covers his head so that he “can rush through [his] speech at top speed without looking at [Phaedrus] and breaking down for shame” (237a). Socrates then begins his speech by invoking the Muses, thus referring again to the divine source of his words: “Come then, ye clear-voiced Muses, whether it be from the nature of your song, or from the musical people of Liguria that ye came to be so styled, ‘assist the tale I tell’ under compulsion” (237a). Socrates then delineates the distinctions between a lover’s relation to a boy and a non-lover’s relation to a boy in rough accordance with those of Lysias. Socrates asserts that, in the end, the lover will be more detrimental to the boy. The lover will tyrannically harm the boy for the lover’s own satisfaction: “Be sure that the attentions of a lover carry no good will; they are no more than a glutting of his appetite, for ‘As wolf to lamb, so lover to his lad’” (241c-d). Socrates extends Lysias’s speech and makes it more orderly; he seems to outdo Lysias at his own game (cf. Sallis 126).
Socrates, however, breaks off this speech. He breaks off because the speech seemed to be an offense against the divine: "At the moment when I was about to cross the river, dear friend, there came to me my familiar divine sign—which always checks me when on the point of doing something or other—and all at once I seemed to hear a voice, forbidding me to leave the spot until I had made atonement for some offense to heaven" (242 b-c). Socrates' daimón restrains him. The first speech had been a sin inasmuch as it disparaged Love, "a god, the child of Aphrodite" (242d). The second speech arises in this context as a means of purification (243a). The second speech will do honour to love. The first issue which this praise of love addresses is that of madness.

Lysias's speech, and Socrates' first speech, asserted that the non-lover is more of a beneficial mate in that he is sane (sophronēt); the lover, on the other hand, is mad (mainetai). In the second speech, Socrates contradicts this thesis by asserting that "the greatest blessings [ta megista ton agathon] come by way of madness [manias]," if it is a divine madness, a madness that is "heaven-sent" (244a). Thus, there is a distinction, for Socrates, between human and divine madness. Socrates asserts--following "the men of old who gave things their names," following those who hold "madness to be a valuable gift, when due to divine dispensation" (244b-c)="the superiority of heaven-sent madness over man-made sanity" (244d). Socrates, at this point, distinguishes between four types of divine madness: 1) prophetic (244b-d), 2) that which leads to sacred rites (244d-e), 3) that of the Muses, exemplified in the poets (245a), and 4) that of love (245b-c). Socrates wishes to defend the madness of love. He wishes to praise the folly of love. For him, the madness of love is a divine madness; it is, let us say, an "ecstatic folly."

In order to show that love is a kind of divine madness, Socrates says we must first inquire into the nature of the soul (245c). First of all, Socrates points out that the soul is self-moving (autokinesis) and ever-moving (immortal). The soul is the principle of movement of those things
which have their principle of movement within themselves; that which does not have its principle of motion arise from an internal impulse is "soulless": "Any body that has an external source of motion is soulless, but a body deriving its motion from a source within itself is animate or besouled, which implies that the nature of soul is what has been said" (245e). Socrates next describes the movement of the soul by means of the "image" of a charioteer controlling two winged steeds (246a). The image brings forth the essence of the soul's movement: in the image, the steeds present the principle of movement that is the soul. The steeds of the souls of the gods are of noble stock. With humans, on the other hand, one steed is noble and the other poor. The soul that loses its wings is embodied in mortal flesh. It falls into forgetfulness of its previous life, of its high ascents with the other gods up to the "summit of the arch that supports the heavens" (247b) and the "divine banquet" held there. At the divine banquet, the soul feeds on truth; other souls, without the wings to achieve this ascent, feed on semblance (247d-248a).

The life of the philosopher, of the lover of wisdom, is that which allows one to arise again from the depths of forgetting and semblance. The philosopher is one who un-forgets (anamnesis), who recollects the truth and the prior domain of the soul. "Therefore is it meet and right that the soul of the philosopher alone should recover her wings, for she, so far as may be, is ever near in memory to those things a god's nearness whereunto makes him truly god." As was the case with the philosopher in the "image" of the cave, the philosopher who recollects the truth and whose soul recovers its wings is deemed by the average person as mad or strange: "Standing aside from the busy doings of mankind, and drawing nigh to the divine, he is rebuked by the multitude as being out of his wits, for they know not that he is possessed by a deity" (249c-d).

The philosopher undertakes the paths and flights that transcend those of the multitude; the philosopher stands apart (ek-sists) from the familiar and already-known. According to the classic
Renaissance reading, that of Ficino, this is an "ecstasy," a stepping out beyond oneself; it is a "Dionysian frenzy" (dionysiaco furore) (Ficino 1981, 174-5). In this standing apart, in this Dionysian frenzy, the image of the philosophic soul, the soul of the lover in its ascent beyond the fallen multitude, parallels the visionary chariot ride portrayed in the poem of Parmenides: beyond the gates of Night and Day to the goddess Truth (αληθεία).⁶⁶

And the goddess graciously received me, taking my right hand in hers; and she spoke thus and addressed me: 'Young man, companion to the immortal charioteers with the mares who carry you as you come to my house, I greet you. For no evil fate was sending you to travel this road (for indeed it is far from the tread of men) but Right and Justice. You must learn all things, both the unwavering heart of persuasive truth and the opinions of mortals in which there is no true trust.' (131)

Philosophic questioning of the semblances of the familiar, of the shadows in the cave, and of that on which the fallen souls feed, is a journey, as in a chariot, for Parmenides and Plato; it is a voyage into the realm of the strange and an encounter with the awe-inspiring power of Being and truth.

This encounter with the awe and mystery of Being, this ascent of the soul-chariot, occurs in one’s relation with the beautiful. "But when one who is fresh from the mystery, and saw much of the vision, beholds a godlike face or bodily form that truly expresses beauty, first there come upon him a shuddering and a measure of that awe which the vision inspired, and then reverence as at the sight of a god, and but for fear of being deemed a very madman he would offer sacrifice to his beloved as to a holy image of deity" (Phaedrus 251a). Being withdraws and is forgotten inasmuch as it is understood by means of the "fleeting," by means of familiar, already-known beings, by means of the semblances upon which the fallen souls feast. However, in awe-inspiring beauty, Being shines forth. In beauty, Being shines forth in appearance: "for beauty alone this has
been ordained, to be most manifest to sense and most lovely of them all” (250d). A beautiful thing captivates us; we fall and are ensnared by it; we encounter it as a lovely being. However, as Heidegger points out, “it at the same time liberates us to the view upon Being. The beautiful is an element which is disparate within itself; it grants entry into immediate sensuous appearances and yet at the same time soars toward Being; it is both captivating and liberating. Hence it is the beautiful that snatches us from oblivion of Being and grants the view upon Being” (1979, 196). It is in this freeing claim that the beautiful holds upon humanity that the transcendence (existence) of the philosophic soul happens. The beautiful “draws man through and beyond itself to Being as such” (Heidegger 1979, 197). Beauty shines in the form or figure. Here, beauty is the site of the open that is Being; it is the abode of the goddess Truth: “Because Being opens itself only to the view upon Being, and because the latter must always be snatched from oblivion of Being, and because for that reason it needs the most direct radiance of fleeting appearances, the opening up of Being must occur at that site where, estimated in terms of truth, the me on (eidolon), i.e., nonbeing, occurs. But that is the site of beauty” (1979, 198).

At this point, having said that the lover’s madness is “heaven-sent,” that the beautiful form (being) which the lover follows is a site of truth—inasmuch as it inspires the recollection of the soul’s prior visions of truth, Being, and beauty—and that the philosophic soul fosters the same divine ascent in the beloved (253b–e), Socrates concludes that, in contradistinction to Lysias, the lover, the philosophic soul, is superior to the non-lover (256e–257a). So, for Socrates, love is a divine madness, a daemonic possession (enthousiasmos), which is the drawing of one out and toward beauty as Being and truth. It is an “ecstatic folly.”

According to "Tommaso Benci, a devoted imitator of Socrates" [my emphasis] (VI.1), in Ficino’s *Commentary on Plato’s Symposium*, love is, following in the footsteps of Diotima as
reported in Plato’s *Symposium* (203d), “a *sophist* and a *magician*” (VI.10). Later in the *Commentary*, Cristoforo Marsuppini refers to Socrates himself as a sophist and magician: “*Sorcerer, enchanter, magician, and sophist.* Certainly Alcibiades said that he was soothed more by the words of Socrates than by the melody of the excellent musicians Marsyas and Olympus [*Symposium* 215b-c]. That a daemon was familiar to him both his accusers and his friends testify [*Apology* 31d-40b and *Phaedrus* 242b-c]. Aristophanes, the comic poet, called Socrates a Sophist also, and his accusers did also” (VII.2). We have seen that madness, for Plato, is, primarily, in contradistinction to Derrida’s interpretation, not a dissolution of one’s identity; rather, it is the inspired bringing forth of one to the bright light of beauty, truth, and Being. However, the questions that Derrida raises concerning the philosopher as sorcerer or magician (*pharmakeus*) and as Sophist are still present. Does the fact that the philosopher is associated with the Sophist and the magician, for Plato and for the major Renaissance interpreter of Plato (Ficino), call into question the identity of the philosopher and the nature of the truth he or she speaks? By turning to Ficino in order to see how these terms are defined, we will be able to answer this question in the negative.

After referring to love as “a *sophist* and a *magician,*” Tommaso Benci explains what Plato means by the term “Sophist*: “A *sophist* Plato defines, in the dialogue *Sophist*, as an ambitious and crafty debater who, by the subtelties of sophistries, shows us the false for the true, and forces those who dispute with him to contradict themselves in their speeches. This lovers as well as beloveds endure at some time or other. For lovers, blinded by the clouds of love, often accept false things for true, while they think that their beloveds are more beautiful, more intelligent, or better than they are. They contradict themselves on account of the vehemence of love, for reason considers one thing, and concupiscence pursues another” (VI.10). It is clear from this definition
of sophism that it a certain aspect of love which is sophistic. It is not the ecstatic form of love that Socrates describes that is sophistic; rather, it is that aspect of love which ensnares us in familiar beings. That is, essential humanity is "ek-sistent" and, correspondingly, loves in an ecstatic manner—by way of a divine enthousiasm. However, humanity is also essentially "in-sistent" and, correspondingly, loves in a fallen way. The movement or unfolding of essential human existence, the movement of the soul, in its falling is one of an ensnarement in and feeding on the fleeting and familiar forms of beings; it is a forgetting of Being as the divine banquet. The other aspect of the unfolding of human existence is that of the ecstatic "un-forgetting" (an-amnēsis or a-lētheia) of Being. Both the ek-sistent and in-sistent movements belong to the human soul.67 Thus, we can say that a certain aspect of love (and of Socrates' existence) is sophistic falleness and forgetting.

Next, Benci attempts to describe why Diotima would refer to love as a magician (pharmakeus). "Because the whole power of magic consists in love. The work of magic is the attraction of one thing by another because of a certain affinity of nature. . . . Therefore just as in us the brain, lungs, heart, liver, and the rest of the parts draw something from each other, and help each other, and sympathize with any one of them when it suffers, so the parts of this great animal, that is all the bodies of the world, similarly joined together, borrow and lend natures to and from each other. From this common relationship is born a common love; from love a common attraction." (VI.10). Love, here, is the well-wrought jointure of all things in their proper nature (phasis). Love is the intricate joining (or, sympathy) of all things according to the proper order (dike). Thus, fire, according to its proper nature, "is drawn upward by the concavity of the sphere of the moon, because of a congruity of nature" (VI.10). Love, as magician, is the bringing together and the bringing forth of this well-wrought jointure of all things. The work of magic, the magical, is the bringing forth of this "magesic" order of things. The art of magic consists in the
guiding of this magetic self-showing (of phusis/dike), not in the over-coming or over-powering of it: “Therefore the works of magic are works of nature, but art is its handmaiden. For where anything is lacking in a natural relationship, art supplies it through vapors, numbers, figures, and qualities at the proper times. Just as in agriculture, nature produces the crops, but art makes the preparations” (VI.10). Benci refers to this manner of artistic bringing forth, this art (technē I) which guides but does not replace the self-showing nature (phusis) of the thing as the archē of the work, as “true magic.” At this point, then, we are reminded of that which distinguishes Archimago from the proper maker-magician (magus). That is to say, Archimago (or, at least, his art), as we have seen, is the archē of the images he brings forth; he is the archē-imago. His art, in this way, is what we have called “technē II”; it is distinguished from the “true magic” or art (“technē I”) which Benci describes.

Love and madness are divine gifts; they arise “through the kindness of providence” (V.13) and through the presencing of “daemons” (cf. VI.3-5). They are connected to the lighting that is truth, grace, beauty, and the good. For this reason, Pausanias compares God as Being to the sun, in accordance with a certain interpretation of Plato’s Republic, Books VI-VII: “Obviously the sun creates both visible bodies and seeing eyes; into the eyes, in order that they may see, it infuses a shining spirit; and the bodies, in order that they may be seen, it paints with colors” (Ficino II.2). This notion of Being as sun-like in its shining-in and infusing of all things brings together many of the Platonic themes we have dealt with in this chapter. The sun, according to Pausanias,

warms, brings to life, stimulates, perfects, and strengthens. . . . Insofar as He stimulates and calms, soothes and arouses, He is called beautiful. Insofar as, in objects which are to be known, He attracts to them those three powers of the knowing soul: intellect, sight, and hearing, He is called beauty. Insofar as, in the cognitive power He connects it to the known object, He is called truth. Finally, insofar as He is good, He creates, rules, and perfects; insofar as He is beautiful, He illuminates and infuses with grace. (II.2)
Being (God), in short, according to the essential retrieval of Plato's thinking that occurred in the Renaissance, is the "good" as the proper articulation of all things (dikē); it is the self-emerging "nature" of all things (phusis) in their intricate sympathies or "love"; it is "truth" as the site of the bringing together of beings and a knowing-humanity in an open region; it is "beauty" as that which stimulates an un-forgetting of Being itself; it emerges in the ecstatic "madness" which beauty inspires; and finally, as the self-emerging, unmerited, and divine gift (or, sending: Geschenk-Geschick), it is "Grace."

Excursus: On Erasmus's Ecstatic Praise of Folly

The logic of the pharmakon-pharmakeus entails the question of folly (moria) or madness (mania). The limitless play of substitutions and the proliferation of the image-copy brings about a dissolving of identity and secure form. This is how Derrida interprets the four types of madness (furor) described in the Phaedrus, as examples of "losing oneself." Folly, sophistry, the magus, and the distorting image have all become central points of questioning in our reading of The Faerie Queene. The most famous and influential Renaissance treatment of these issues and their complex relations is that of Erasmus. So let us turn, briefly, to The Praise of Folly in order to see if any more clues to our problems are provided.

After the preface to More, the text begins with a tag, "Folly Speaks" (Stultitia Loquens). The work, then, consists of what is spoken or "called forth" in the words of Folly. She is "the one, the one and only . . . who have the power to bring joy both to gods and to men" (6). Despite this power, even the biggest fools, she insists, do not recognize the benefit she brings to humanity. Thus, she will sing her own praises. She will "act the sophist" (7) and display how she is "that true and proper 'giver of divine gifts'" (9). After describing her parents, riches and youth, as well as her attendants—which include Self-love, Flattery, Forgetfulness (Lethe), Lieabout, Pleasure,
Imbecility, Fascination, Festivity, and Sound Sleep--Folly begins to lay out the benefits she brings to humanity. Life, Folly says, is the sweetest thing; thus, prolonging or enabling life must be a virtue. This is exactly the virtue Folly first demonstrates as one of her possessions (11-13). The losing of oneself to the lust of sex is a prime example of folly--not to mention childbirth and marriage. Youth is the age most blessed with "the charm of foolishness" (13). But old age also has its pleasure, and thus folly, through forgetfulness (lethe): "As for how the transformation is worked, I won't conceal it. I lead them to the fountain of my handmaid Lethe" (14). The seeming "wisdom" of the male--and by extension the Stoic in relation to the Epicurean or the Dialectician in relation to the Sophist--would not be able to exist without the folly of the female (19-20). What masculine wisdom attempts to exclude and repress (feminine folly) is necessary. The male must necessarily succumb to it. Folly next shows that she is the source of social existence. Love (as self-love) gives pleasure and results in the binding relationships of friendship and society. Thus, society, and its reasonable constructs, is based on an arche-blindness: "But, after all, isn't Cupid, creator of all intimacy, so myopic that for him 'even ugliness looks beautiful'? Thus he plays on you humans so that each finds beauty in his own. . . . These things happen all the time, and people laugh at them, but absurdities like these are what binds society together in mutual pleasure" (21). Folly, as a principle of civil society, is that which, on the one extreme, prevents the spread of the "infection of wisdom" (25), and, on the other, brings the savage into civilized concord: "what force do you suppose brought into civil concord those primitive men, savage as their native rocks and forests--what force if not mutual flattery?" (26).

Now this description of Folly's powers in every realm of human affairs can be interpreted in a number of different ways. One prevalent way is that Erasmus' text is a making manifest of an arche-folly which allows metaphysical, social, and individual structures to arise. This would
accord with a reading of *The Faerie Queene* that sees the logic of the *pharmakon* at work—where the “wise” words of Arthur would be inseparable from and would rely upon the dissembling words of Archimago.

Another influential interpretation is that which sees it as an “ecstatic folly,” as a work following in the tradition of the *Phaedrus*—which I will attempt to delineate here.69 *The Praise of Folly* is a translation of the Greek title—although the work is written in Latin—*Moriae Encomium*. *Moria* (from *moros*) means “dull,” “stupid,” “with mental or physical deficiency,” or, “one who lacks understanding and wisdom” (*sophos*). As used by St. Paul in the New Testament, however, the terms *moria* and *stultitia* undergo a fundamental transformation (cf. *I Cor* 1.25). For Paul, worldly wisdom is a foolishness in the face of God. Here the term has its original negative meaning. However, Christian faith is derided as foolishness by the philosophers of Athens, men who have “worldly wisdom.” Thus, since in the eyes of the world—the eyes of those in the murky light of the deep recesses of the cave—Christians are foolish, Paul identifies folly with true knowledge: “Where is the wise? where is the scribe? where is the disputer of this world? hath not God made foolish the wisdom of the world? For after that wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe” (*I Cor* 1.20-21). Another biblical source is the distinction made in the Book of Proverbs between Dame Wisdom (in the NT connected with the *Logos*-Word)—personified as a woman that is more desirable than any earthly wealth or pleasure—and Dame Folly who is personified as a harlot luring young men away from the correct path to idolatry and wastefulness. We should immediately see a relation to the distinction made in *The Faerie Queene* between Una and Duessa. Using these sources as a guide, the interpretation of Erasmus’s work in terms of “ecstatic folly” attempts to situate it in this tradition of “Wisdom” literature. This reading stresses the last section of the book
(73-87): where Folly points out, using St. Paul for the first time as an authority, that Christ redeems (heals) the world through folly (81-2); that is, the Word heals in its becoming flesh. The wisdom of the world, in this reading, is the wisdom of those in Plato’s cave. Those that appear mad or foolish in this world are those, sunburnt like Hythlodaeus and Immerito, whose madness is actually an inspired madness—a wise knowing relation to the lighting outside the cave, a “lighting” as un-concealment, not the metaphysical conception of the “stable” eidos—whose folly is an “ecstatic folly,” whose mania is a furor poeticus.

Thus the majority find themselves in the position of those described in Plato’s myth of the cave, who are chained up in darkness, knowing only the shadows of things. But then one man escaped and came back to tell them that he had seen things as they really are, and that they were much mistaken in thinking nothing existed but those paltry shadows. The man who has achieved understanding pities his comrades who are in the grip of such a fundamental error; he deplores their insanity. But they in turn ridicule him as a raving lunatic. (83-4)

In a rather different, but also “ecstatic,” reading of the work, Ernesto Grassi points out that The Praise of Folly is not just a praise of “folly” in the sense of “human’ behaviour”; it is not merely an “‘ironical’ anthropology.” Rather, it is “something far more fundamental, a treatise about Being and its self-disclosure” (1988, 89). He defends this claim by pointing out that Folly claims she has power over not only humans but the gods as well. Also, according to Erasmus, “‘Moria’ was born on the Isle of the Blessed, ‘where no one sows and no one plows, where everything sprouts of itself’. . . . ‘Moria’ is here equated with physis as the essence of the eternal phuein, growing, sprouting. In the realm of ‘physis’ every death is always also a birth” (90).

Moria gives humanity masks and illusions which enable them, ironically, to be themselves (92). Human existence is a spectacle observed by the gods. Some interpret wisdom as an insight (theoria); in terms of a spectacle it would mean that a spectator of this “world theatre,” the representational thinker-poet-magus, would use “insight” in order to undertake the “unmasking of
the various actors." This insight, "however, would prove to be pure 'madness,' for the moment the mask of the actor is torn off, the possibility of the play is destroyed" (Grassi 1988, 94). Folly is unfathomable and cannot be delineated within the structures of rational or representational thinking. "[T]he revelation of the essence of being through 'Moria' implies an act of faith (fides). Such an unveiling of the meaning of being has as its prerequisite hope (spes), for in the original appeal, in which man himself appears, he must remain 'open' for every new form of self-manifesting" (96).

3.8 Physis, Grace, and the Enthousiasmos of the Poet

Folly, according to this "ecstatic" reading, according to this reading which heeds an unsaid possibility within Erasmus's manifest text, is an openness and receptivity to Being in its self-manifesting. It is distinguished from a mastering knowing, as was technē I from technē II and poiēsis I from poiēsis II. The true healer-ruler-magus-poet in Book I of The Faerie Queene is figured forth as one who receptively responds to the self-emerging: as physis, dikē, Grace. Immerito, as poet-figure, responds to that which sends itself (self-manifests) in the language of the tradition. Parallel embodiments of this poet-figure, in The Shepheardes Calender, are Colin, Cuddie, and Hobbinol. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss fully the figure of the poet in The Shepheardes Calender. (Although, when it comes to the issue of the poet figure, there may not be a "richer" text for such a discussion.) However, let us look briefly at two points in the work—the "Argument" of the "October" eclogue and the song in the "Aprill" eclogue—in order to draw some conclusions with respect to our problematic of the poet.

E.K., in the "Argument" of "October," refers to Cuddie as "the perfecte paterne of a Poete." As E.K. points out, Cuddie claims—a claim made in Sidney's Defence as well—that poetry is now held in "comtempt" but had "bene in all ages, and even amongst the most barbarous
always of singular acount and honor. . . .” E.K. asserts that it had always been held as a “commendable” art, but stops himself: “or rather no arte, but a divine gift and heavenly instinct not to bee gotten by laboure and learning, but adorned with both. . . .” Rather than art (technē), as the arche of what is brought forth in the poetic word, E.K. asserts that it is a divine grant (“gift”), a “heavenly instinct”--as that which grows and springs forth on its own (phusis)--that is the origin and order of what the poet “pro-duces.” E.K. seems to foreshadow a similar statement in Spenser’s epic: “Ne let the man ascribe it to his skill, / That thorough grace hath gained victory” (FQ I.x.1). The poet receives the divine gift as it is “poured into the witte by a certaine enthousiasmos. and celestiall inspiration” (SC "October" Argument).

This self-manifesting of beauty and Grace in poetic bringing forth is also demonstrated in the song of Colin which Hobbinoll sings in the "Aprill" eclogue. The "laye" is "Of fayre Elisa, Queene of shepheardes all" (34), just as The Faerie Queene pertains to fair Gloriana, Queene of Faeries--and just as both the epic and pastoral "layes" figure forth the historical Elizabeth, Queene of the Britons. Colin had “tuned it unto the Waters fall” (36). That is to say, the rhythms of nature in their self-emerging order the “laye.” The song begins with an invocation of the Muses: “you Virgins, that on Parnasse dwell, / Whence floweth Helicon the learned well” (41-2). The Muses inspire the poet from their sacred fountain or “well,” which parallels the healing fonts we have encountered in Book I. The song proclaims that Elisa is the daughter of Syrinx and Pan. In order to follow the unfolding of the myth referred to here--in which, to escape the pursuing Pan, Syrinx becomes a reed--Elisa must embody the pastoral song which Pan plays on his lover as reed. Elisa is a divinely begotten virgin-song, not blotted by mortal skill:

So sprong her grace
Of heavenly race,
No mortall blemishe may her blotte. (52-5)
Colin’s song “of faire Elisa,” then, is about the composition of itself as song—a song in which the Graces dance to the music of the song of the Muses. The graces need a fourth to make their “daunce even” (113). This place is filled by Elisa:

She shalbe a grace,  
To full the fourth place,  
And reigne with the rest in heaven. (115-17)

Early in the “Aprill” eclogue, Hobbinoll laments that Colin, with “hys madding mynd” (25), has turned from him. Colin’s love for Rosalind has taken him onto strange paths. As E.K. points out in the “Argument” of the “Januarye” eclogue, Colin is “very sore traveled” with his love for Rosalind. His love is, on the one hand, a travail or burden. On the other hand, his love is a travel or journey. The (chariot-) journey of love is instigated, in this case, by the beauty which shines forth in Rosalind and, by extension, Elisa, Gloriana, Una, and Queen Elizabeth. This journey undertaken by Colin as philosopher-poet-traveller means that the familiar, for him, has become strange; “his frened [Hobbinoll] is chaunged for a frenne” (SC, “Aprill” 28). E.K.’s gloss points out that “frenne” means “a straunger. The word I think was first poetically put, and afterwarde used in commen custome of speach for forenne.” Upon hearing Colin’s song—a song about the inspiring Grace(s) which are the source of all poetic song—as sung by Hobbinoll, Thenot refers to the poet Colin as a “foolish boy, that is with love yblent” (155). Again we see the poet-fool as seeming blind, foreign, or mad, and once again this is an inspired madness.

Grace, as inspiration, is the divine; it is Being; it is the “strange,” as a radical “Other,” that is spoken in the poetic word as metaphor or allegory. It is the strange appearing within the ordinary, within the veil of language, that makes the Hythloday-like traveller (and thus the poet, Spenser-Immeritô-Cuddie-Colin-Hobbinoll) seem mad. The madness of the philosopher-poet-traveller is an inspired madness, an ecstatic folly. And this is why Book I closes by signalling the
end of one "strange" adventure (xii.15), that of Redcrosse and Una, and the start of another:

Now strike your sailes ye jolly Mariners,
    For we be come unto a quiet rode,
Where we must land some of our passengers,
And light this wearie vessell of her lode.
Here she a while may make her safe abode,
Till she repaired have her tackles spent,
And wants supplide. And then againe abroad
On the long voyage whereto she is bent:
Well may she speeded and fairely finish her intent. (I.xii.42)

Certainly Spenser, in Book I of *The Faerie Queene*, refers to "nature" as a restricted realm of beings: that is, as the "order of nature" as opposed to the "order of grace" and the "order of art." Certainly, too, Spenser refers to "nature" as the essence of a thing where *phusis*-essence is understood in terms of *ousia* as enduring presence. However, as we have seen, Spenser also responds to the concealed essence of *phusis*; that is, his essential thinking is a response to the "unsaid" *phusis* concealed and withdrawn within the metaphysical tradition--where Being-*phusis* means the self-emerging of each thing out of itself. Similarly, Spenser thinks of art in terms of an external effecting (*techne II*). The metaphysical logic of this external delimitation, in its securing-exclusion (yet, reliance upon) the "mediating" principle, can be, and has been, deconstructed as an "imperial" operation. However, Spenser's essential thinking understands art as a receptive bringing forth (as a guiding-shepherd) of a thing out of itself.
Notes to Chapter 3

1. This metaphysical determination of "allergic" health is diagnosed by Derrida in his essay "Plato’s Pharmacy" 1981, 61-171. On the "allergic" relation to otherness, see, also, "Dif" 8.

2. When I say that Greenblatt’s is one of the most influential readings of The Faerie Queene, I do not mean in terms of its own interpretive conclusions; rather, I am referring to the direction that Spenser studies, like Renaissance studies generally, have taken since Greenblatt’s influential book. It has become common, since Greenblatt’s pioneering work, to read Spenser in connection with "the Irish Question" or in connection with the colonizion of the New World.

3. However, this chapter will act as a prelude to an extensive reading of Book II I will undertake elsewhere.

4. On the scapegoat (pharmakos), see "PPh" 128-34 and Kristeva 56-89.


6. Spenser’s “A Letter of the Authors. . . . To the Right noble, and Valorous, Sir Walter Raleigh. . . ."; in 1977, 737-8; hereafter cited as “LR.”

7. This Homeric reference is to Achilles’ assertion that he would rather be a serf in the world than the ruler of the underworld (Odyssey XI.489). For another comparison of the cave to Hades, to the realm of concealment (Leithe), see Republic VII.521c: “Then would you like us to consider how men of this kind are to be produced, and how they are to be led up to the light, like the men in stories who are said to have risen from the underworld to heaven?”

8. We should note here that Sidney is concerned with deception at this point. In ascertaining the nature of this poem as the bringing forth of images, Sidney is wary of the dissembling image. Of course, as we shall see, in The Faerie Queene the question of the proper bringing forth of the image is paramount as well.

9. It is interesting to note that, in order to follow the logic of this comparison, the reader must think of E.K. as a Pandarus figure, as a “panderer.”

   Pandér n. Also, pandér'er. 1. a go-between in amorous intrigues. 2. a person who furnishes clients for a prostitute or supplies women for illicit sexual intercourse; procurer; pimp. 3. a person who caters to or profits from the weaknesses or vices of others . . . (Webster’s).

First of all, this comparison means that the poet and the poet’s talents are akin to a prostitute that is peddled and sold—with E.K. performing the function of pimp. Secondly, the notion of the "go-between" as one who courts patronage arises.

   I would also like to note that the context of Pandarus’s lines to which E.K. refers have a bearing on Book I of The Faerie Queene: Pandarus says “Unknowe, unkist . . .” (I.809) in the midst of trying to relieve Troilus from his overwhelming despair. This despair is something from which Troilus, at first, refuses the "cure":

Nor other cure kanstow non for me;
Ek I nyl nat ben cured; I wol deye. (I.757-8)

Troilus rebukes Pandarus’s old proverbs and “ensamples” (I.760). Pandarus then insists that Troilus’ cure is not impossible:

Why, put nat impossible thus thi cure,
Syn thyng to come is oft in aventure.

“I graunte wel that thow endurest wo
As sharp as doth he Ticius in helle,
Whos stomak foughles tiren evere moo
That hightyn volturis, as bokes telle;
But I may nat endure that thow dwele
In so unskilful an oppynyoun
That of thi wo is no curacioun. (I.783-91)

10. E.K. refers to his own glossing as seeming “staunge and rare in our tongue” [my emphasis] (181).

11. Interestingly, Astrophil, in attempting to discover an “invention” for his poem to Stella, turns to other poets. This exposure to the poetry of the tradition is an attempt to soothe his “sunne-burn’d braine”: “Oft turning others leaves, to see if thence would flow / Some fresh and fruitfull showers upon my sunne-burn’d braine” (Astrophil and Stella 1.7-8).

12. For this reason, the lessons and examples Hythloday gives are presented as classical texts. For instance, the Utopia Hythloday has discovered and presents to More and Giles—which is in turn presented by More in the text Utopia—is glossed, presumably by the historical Giles, as something past: where Hythloday reports that the cities do not want to needlessly expand their borders, Giles has as a gloss, “But today this is the curse of all countries” [my emphasis] (44). This is only one of many such examples.

We should also note that just as Immeritó’s work was peddled by E.K., so too Hythloday’s descriptions are given various “sales pitches” by Giles and others of the humanist circle in the glosses and the framing letters. The mediating and marketing of both texts is in this way foregrounded. Both texts present the work as the product of an “undeserving one,” of a “nonsense peddlar,” or of an intellectual prostitute willing to offer his services to the market. Yet this presentation is moderated, in both cases, by the “glosses,” by E.K. and Giles/Erasmus, which situate the texts, in terms of their form and content, within a tradition of classical texts.

13. In fact, Book II, Hythloday’s description of Utopia, can be seen as Hythloday’s final argument against counselling kings: societies are not willing to make the radical changes necessary, most fundamentally, the switch to communal ownership, without which no society will improve (cf. 37-41): “When I consider all these things, I become more sympathetic to Plato, and wonder the less that he refused to make laws for any people who would not share their goods equally. Wisest of men, he saw easily that the one and only path to the welfare of all lies through equality of possessions” (38-9).
14. On the "foolish" appearance of the philosopher in the realm of the court, see *Theaetetus* 172c: "And it strikes me now, as often before, how natural it is that men who have spent much time in philosophical studies should look ridiculous when they appear as speakers in a court of law"; see 173c (on court and theatre as scoffing philosophy), and see *Gorgias* 484d-e:

For if a man is exceptionally gifted and yet pursues philosophy far on in life, he must prove entirely unacquainted with all the accomplishments requisite for a gentleman and a man of distinction. Such men know nothing of the laws in their cities, or of the language they should use in their business associations both public and private with other men, or of human pleasures and appetites, and in a word they are completely without experience of men's characters. And so when they enter upon any activity public or private they appear ridiculous, just as public men, I suppose, appear ridiculous when they take part in your discussions and arguments.

15. Of course, nothing in Shakespeare's works is entirely straightforward. Edmond, that is, also espouses art, in the form of the art of rhetoric.

16. Longinus and Quintilian are the classical sources for this notion: "Art is only perfect just when it seems to be nature, . . . and nature successful when the art underlies it unnoticed" (*On the Sublime*, xxii). For a similar position in Quintilian, see *Institutio oratoria* II.iii.

17. At this point, I will just note, in passing, that *physis* (nature, the self-emerging) is coupled with "grace" in this discussion. Even Thomas Hoby, in his translation of *The Courtier* (1561), calls *sprezzatura* "grace." We will return to this confluence of *physis* and grace at the end of the chapter—in relation to the "grace of the gods" in the form of inspiration. Also of interest here is the fact that Castiglione thinks of proper cosmetics as a mode of *sprezzatura*:

Surely you realize how much more graceful a woman is who, if indeed she wishes to do so, paints herself so sparingly and so little that whoever looks at her is unsure whether she is made-up or not, in comparison with one whose face is so encrusted that she seems to be wearing a mask and who dare not laugh for fear of causing it to crack, and who changes colour only when she dresses in the morning, after which she stays stock-still all the rest of the day, like a wooden statue, letting herself be seen only by torch-light, in the way a wily merchant shows his cloth in a dark corner. (86)

18. The notion of the necessity of a concord of nature and art is present, among others, in the work of Horace:

The Question is raised
Whether nature or art makes a poem deserving of praise.
I fail to see what good either learning can be
Which is not veined with natural wealth or primitive genius.
Each needs the other's help and friendly alliance. (*The Art of Poetry,* *Epistles* II.3.408-12)

An Elizabethan manifestation of this Horatian concord arises in John Lyly's *Euphues: The Anatomy of Wit*:

Now whereas you seem to love my nature and loathe my nurture, you bewray your
own weakness in thinking that nature may any ways be altered by education, and as you have ensamples to confirm your pretence, so I have most evident and infallible arguments to serve for my purpose. It is natural for the vine to spread: the more you seek by art to alter it, the more in the end you shall augment it. . . . education can have no show where the excellency of nature doth bear sway. The silly mouse will by no manner of means be tamed . . . plant and translate the crab tree where and whenever it please you and it will never bear sweet apple, unless you graft by art which nothing toucheth nature. (95-6)

So, too, Thomas Browne expresses the fundamental concord of nature and art—both are the shining forth of Being as God:

Now nature is not at variance with art, nor art with nature; they being both the servants of his providence: Art is the perfection of Nature: Were the world now as it was the sixt day, there were yet a Chaos: Nature hath made one world, and Art antoher. In briefe, all things are artificiall, for nature is the Art of God. (81)

The notion that nature and art belong together as the source of moral virtue also has a rich tradition. Aristotle, for instance, asserts that nature and art, with respect to moral character, are brought together in habituation; see Nichomachean Ethics X.1179b20-26 and Politics VII.1334b.24. One could have a natural character whose make-up disposed him or her to the virtues of thoughtfulness. However, a certain training of that nature, through the art of instruction, brings that character forth into habit. What was a potential (dunamis) for virtue is brought forth into actuality (energeia) by the instruction. This Aristotelian notion of the importance of bringing forth a latent virtue into actuality, into a work or a deed (energeia), through moral instruction, was, of course, an important notion for Renaissance thinkers. Castiglione, for instance, asserts that,

as with other arts and skills so also with the virtues, it is necessary to have a master who by his teaching and precepts stirs and awakens the moral virtues whose seed is enclosed and buried in our souls and who, like a good farmer, cultivates and clears the way for them by removing the thorns and tares of our appetites which often so darken and choke our minds as not to let them flower or produce those splendid fruits which alone we should wish to see born in the human heart. Thus in this way justice and self-respect, which you say Jove sent on earth to all men, are natural in each one of us. But just as however robust it is a man’s body may fail when seeking to accomplish some task, so, although the potentiality for these virtues is rooted within our souls, it often fails to develop unless helped by education. For if it is to pass to actuality and to its full realization, it cannot, as I said, rely on Nature alone but needs the assistance of skilful practice [my emphasis] (291).

19. Again, we must keep in mind the polysemy and irony of Shakespeare’s work, especially when referring to this exchange between Polixenes and Perdita. For a concise treatment of the nuances involved in this passage, see Williams.

20. Aristotle marks off this other realm of beings in the following way:

All the things mentioned present a feature in which they differ from things which are not constituted by nature. Each of them has within itself a principle of motion and of stationariness (in respect of place or of growth and decrease, or by way of alteration). On the other hand, a bed and a coat and anything else of that sort, qua receiving these
designations—i.e. in so far as they are products of art—have no innate impulse to change. But in so far as they happen to be composed of stone or of earth or of a mixture of the two, they do have such an impulse, and just to that extent—which seems to indicate that nature is a source or cause of being moved and of being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily, in virtue of itself and not in virtue of a concomitant attribute. (Physics II.192b 12-23)

21. A more standard, and thus less thoughtful, translation of this passage, that of R.P Hardie and R.K. Gaye in McKeon’s edition of The Basic Works of Aristotle, runs as follows:

I say ’not in virtue of a concomitant attribute’, because (for instance) a man who is a doctor might cure himself. Nevertheless it is not in so far as he is a patient that he possesses the art of medicine: it merely has happened that the same man is doctor and patient—and that is why these attributes are not always found together. So it is with all other artificial products. None of them has in itself the source of its own production. But while in some cases (for instance houses and the other products of manual labour) that principle is in something else external to the thing (Physics II.192b 23-30)

22. Socrates uses the example of Herodicus to discuss this “unnatural” extension of life:

‘[I]t was not till the days of Herodicus, so they say, that doctors made use in their treatment of modern methods of cosseting disease. Herodicus was an athletic trainer, whose health failed, and he proceeded to make first and foremost himself, and then many others after him, miserable by a combination of medicine and physical training.’

‘How did he do that?’

‘By dying a lingering death. His whole attention was devoted to his disease which was mortal; he could not cure himself of it but spent the rest of his life too busy to do anything but doctor himself and being made wretched by any departure from his routine treatment. And his skill prolonged the struggle against death till he was an old man.’ (III.406a-b)

23. We should remind ourselves of the following pertinent instance: we may say that a relative who has had his or her “struggle against death” prolonged by a life-support machine, although still technically “alive,” is no longer the same person—be it due to the non-responsiveness of the coma-condition or, if out of the coma, the seeming change in personality that accompanies the brain damage. The relative’s “nature” emerges as that which has withdrawn in its being replaced by the techno-relative. The relative, it could be said, has been taken out of his or her proper limits and natural order. And it is in this respect that Heidegger says that “the fact of not dying, in the sense of prolonging one’s life, is not yet necessarily the recovery of health. The fact that men live longer today is no proof that they are healthier; one might even conclude to the contrary” (1976, 235). Living longer is not necessarily the recovery of health which, as the self-emerging out of itself that is the phusis-dike-Being of the body, cannot be provided for externally by the life-support machine.

24. For this story, see Pindar, Aeschylus’s Agamemnon 1022, and Euripides’ Alcestis 3. For those accounts pertinent for Spenser’s treatment of Aesculapius, see also Virgil’s Aeneid 7.765-69, 12.428-9, Ovid’s Metamorphoses 15.497-550, and Boccaccio’s De Genealogia Deorum 10.50.
25. And if these connections of writing and the pharmakon seem indirect, Derrida points out (73), the two are directly related in the myth of writing discussed above. Theuth presents writing to Thamus saying "Here, O king, is a branch of learning that will make the people of Egypt wiser and improve their memories; my discovery provides a recipe [pharmakon] for memory and wisdom" (274e).

26. This distinction arises, in connection with writing, inasmuch as Socrates presents the "trial of writing" in the form of a myth and as something he is only repeating from a traditional story: "I can tell you the tradition that has come down from our forefathers, but they alone know the truth of it. However, if we could discover that for ourselves, should we still be concerned with the fancies of mankind?" (274c).

27. This distinction arises in the trial of the sophist's art of rhetoric: "Socrates: Yes, if the arguments [logoi] advanced against oratory sustain its claim to be an art [technê]. In point of fact, I fancy I can hear certain arguments advancing, and protesting that the claim is false, that it is no art, but a knack that has nothing to do with art, inasmuch as there is, as the Spartans put it, no 'soothfast' art of speech, nor assuredly will there ever be one, without a grasp of truth" (260e).

28. On this organic unity and order of a discourse, see "PPh" 79-80:

Logos, a living, animate creature, is thus also an organism that has been engendered. An organism: a differentiated body proper, with a center and extremities, joints, a head, and feet. In order to be "proper," a written discourse ought to submit to the laws of life just as a living discourse does. Logographical necessity (anangke logographike) ought to be analogous to biological, or rather zoological, necessity. Otherwise, obviously, it would have neither head nor tail. Both structure and constitution are in question in the risk run by logos of losing through writing both its tail and its head. (79)

Derrida refers at this point to Socrates' description of the "logographical necessity" of a discourse: "any discourse [logon] ought to be constructed like a living creature, with its own body, as it were; it must not lack either head or feet; it must have a middle and extremities so composed as to suit each other and the whole work" (264c).

This distinction, according to Derrida, is one of the proper internal structure of the body, of truth, and of memory as opposed to the external drug, written sign (reminder), and prosthesis: "What Plato is attacking in sophistics, therefore, is not simply recourse to memory but, within such recourse, the substitution of the mnemonic device for live memory, of the prosthesis for the organ; the perversion that consists of replacing a limb by a thing, here, substituting the passive, mechanical 'by-heart' for the active reanimation of knowledge, for its reproduction in the present" (108).

29. This set of "oppositions" would seem to connect with the "distinction" we made earlier: between technê I as the bringing forth of the innate impulse (phasis) and technê II as the effecting via an external cause. However, we will have to suspend judgement on this for now.

30. On the parallel nature of these terms (pharmakon, différence, and supplement), see "Dif" 12: "Now if we consider the chain in which différence lends itself to a certain number of nonsynonymous substitutions, according to the necessity of the context, why have recourse to the
‘reserve,’ to ‘archi-writing,’ to the ‘archi-trace,’ to ‘spacing,’ that is, to the ‘supplement,’ or to the pharmakon. . . ."

31. On this metaphysical operation of "mastering" difference, see, also, "PPh" 117: "the relation (the analogy) between the logos/soul relation and the pharmakon/body relation is itself designated by the term logos. The name of the relation is the same as that of one of its terms. The pharmakon is comprehended in the structure of logos. This comprehension is an act of both domination and decision."

32. Hamilton’s gloss points out "Avarice and Lechery are paired as are Mammon and Acrasia, the two extremes of the state of impenitence in Book II" (69).

33. On the problem of the proliferation of opinions as figured forth in the metaphor of the grafting of shoots, see Montaigne’s "Of Experience":

   It was never seene, that two men judged alike of one same thing. And it is impossible to see two opinions exactly semblable: not onely in devers men, but in any one same man, at several hours. I commonly find somthing to doubt-of, where the commentary happily never deigned to touch, as deeming it so plaine. I stumble sometimes as much in an even smooth path; as some horses that I know, who oftner trip in a faire plaine way, than in a rough and stonie. Who would not say, that glosses increase doubts and ignorance, since no booke is to be seene, whether divine or profane, commonly read of al men, whose interpretation dimmes or tarnisheth not the difficulties. . . . Our opinions are grafted one upon another. The first serveth as a stocke to the second; the second to the third. (635, 636)

34. For Heidegger, Being is the concealed sending of itself in Western history. This sending comes to language in essential thinking and art. Being as the mystery comes to language as the "unsaid" of the tradition. This unsaid of the tradition is that which it is most proper for thinking to think. Proper thinking becomes a retrieval of this concealed sending; it becomes "recollection." See Richardson 437-38; for a few of Heidegger’s many references to Being as a sending or destining (Geschick), see "LH" 215, 240-41, "QCT" 24, and "NW" 58. Being is a sending (Geschick); this sending is Western history (Geschichte). Being, as what sends itself, and as what gives itself—the "it is" construction in German can literally be translated as "it gives" (es gibt)—is a "gift" (Geschenk). On Being as a "gift," see "LH" 196, 214-16. We shall see that, for Spenser, Being is a divine giving of itself as manifested in poetic inspiration or Grace.

35. We should remind ourselves of the undecidability of the "salvage" within the "salvage nation" in the sixth canto. The "salvage" nation is presented, on the one hand, as that which provides the salving (healing) and saving of Una—that is, from Sansloy (vi.8). On the other hand, the salvage nation is also presented as a collection of violent beasts in need of conversion: "During which time her gentle wit she plyes, / To teach them truth, which worshipht her in vaine, / And made her th’Image of Idolatryses" (vi.19).

36. Pride occupies both ends of the semiotic register in a manner akin to that of Duessa and Wrath. Duessa is both "false" and a substitute for Una (truth), inasmuch as she was the object of Redcrosse’s faithfullness/fickleness. Similarly, Wrath/the Lyon is presented as both an intemperate
loss of the self and as a royal (tamed) self-mastery of the interior.

37. Night's being older than the "father-god," Jove, can be interpreted as an example of a primordial concealment allowing un-concealment (this might be a "Heideggerian" reading), or as an archē-supplement (that is, night for day) allowing the apparent "origin" (which might be a "Derridean" reading).

38. We are informed that Night is the mother of "Duessaes race," Night says,
    ... In that faire face
    The false resemblance of Deceipt, I wist
    Did closely lurke; yet so true-seeming grace
    It carried, that I scarce in darksome place
    Could it discerne, though I the mother bee
    Of falsehood, and root of Duessaes race. (v.27)

39. Hippolytus, in fact a true son of Theseus, in being dissolved into the multiplicity of members, threatened not to pass on a legacy or "moniment." Healing, in this way, is a preserving of the poetic word or legacy that has been sent within the tradition, by "re-membering" it. (See The Shepheardes Calender "Epilogue" on the continuity within time, or the unfolding of the tradition, that is effected in the poem; see, also, Epithalamion #24 on the poem as an "endlesse moniment").

40. Perhaps Zeus's judgement of Æsculapius's art, here, reminds us of Ammon-Ra's judgement of the arts of Thoth. Perhaps, too, the opposition of Night/Diana (as those who create the situation for the excessive healing by bringing the lifeless bodies of Hippolytus and Sansjoy respectively to Æsculapius) and Zeus (in favouring "The sonnes of Day" [v.25]) parallels the opposition of Ammon-Ra (Sun) and Thoth (Moon). On Thoth (Moon) as an archē-substitute for Ammon-Ra (Sun), see "PPl" 92, 94.

41. In terms of our discussion of Hythloday in relation to the allegory of the cave, we could say that this distinction between good and bad counsel is one between a counsel, or a poetic-philosophic saying, that reveals and shows forth within the cave and one that conceals and obstructs this revelation within the cave—the former is a leading out toward the light, a bringing forth and letting shine forth of this light (but never to the point where that light, the sun—Good (Being), can be viewed directly; it can only be "viewed" through the beings that are unconcealed in its lighting process); the latter, on the other hand, is an obstructing and oblivion of Being in favour of beings and their shadows on the cave wall.

42. For Foucault's treatment of enkrateia as the essential ground of sōphrosunē, see 1990b, 63-77.

43. Of particular interest, here, is Derrida's deconstruction of Kant's third critique. Derrida attempts to show that Kant seeks to define the artwork in terms of its external delimitation. This delimitation of the interior of the work from the exterior of the work relies on a conceptual "framing." The frame is neither inside nor outside the work. The work in its seeming to stand in-itself actually relies on this framing. The work (ergon) is constituted by the conceptual and
discursive forces of its framing, by the parergon; art, in this way, "becomes inscribed in a program" (1987, 19): "the parergon inscribes something which comes as an extra, exterior to the proper field . . . but whose transcendent exteriority comes to play, abut onto, brush against, rub, press against the limit itself and intervene in the inside only to the extent that the inside is lacking. . . . the self-protection-of-the-work, of energeia which becomes ergon only as (from) parergon . . ." (1987, 56, 80). What I want to point out is that this deconstruction can only take place, this primacy of the parergon can only arise, within a metaphysical understanding of limit as an external outline. It is this understanding of limit which Derrida himself leaves unquestioned: "[the shoe in a Van Gogh painting] retains a form, the form of the foot. Informed by the foot, it is a form, it describes the external surface or the envelope of what is called a 'form'" [my emphasis] (1987, 265).

Also of interest, here, is the fact that the New Critics, following Kant, think of the literary work of art as an autonomous aesthetic phenomenon. This is most clearly manifested in Wellek and Warren's assertion of this principle of literature, and of the "intrinsic," not "extrinsic," approach to literature which it demands: "Most philosophers since Kant and most men seriously concerned with the arts agree that the fine arts, including literature, have a unique character and value" (240).

44. On peras, see, also, Heidegger 1959, 60 and "BDT" 332.

45. On Being, according to early Greek thinking, as appropriate usage (chreion), and as tied to dikē-adikia, see Heidegger's "The Anaximander Fragment" 1984a, 13-58.

46. For two good treatments of the distinctions between Heidegger's thinking of alētheia and ontological difference and Derrida's conception of diﬀerance, see Radloff 1989 and Spinosa.


48. Similarly, we can see Duessa, Pride, and Wrath as "undecidable" signifying elements only inasmuch as we see the "reserve" (or veil) of language in terms of a fund of sign relations available for recuperation and repetition—that is, only if we do not think the withdrawal of language as withdrawal.

49. On health and justice (dikē) as the harmony of elements, each "in tune" (The Republic IV.443d), see The Republic IV.443d-444e.

50. On the opposition of these two notions of the technē of ruling—as (a) a wolf-like predatory relation to the masses as sheep and (b) a shepherd-like guiding of the masses—see The Republic I.336b-I.350e; also, with respect to the guardians as being "philosophic"—that is, loving what they know—in their loving care for the citizens, see II.375c-376c. On the tyrannical or wolf-like rule as a slaughter of innocents, see The Faerie Queene I.viii.35:
   But all the floore (too filthy to be told)
   With bloud of guiltlesse babes, and innocents trew,
   Which there were slaine, as sheepe out of the fold. . . .
51. Recrosse displays "carelesnesse" (vii.3) inasmuch as his lying there in dalliance with Duessa, without wearing the armor of a Christian soldier, means that he is "carelesse of his health" (vii.7).

52. In other words, Redcrosse's carelessness, in terms of being outside his proper limits and direction, denotes his unhealthy (wounded) state; Una's carefulness, in terms of her despairing sorrow, denotes her unhealthy (wounded) state. Both are in need of of the healing-inspiring "care," as Grace.

53. Redcrosse also states that there is a healing "med'cine" within the unfolding of "griefe" in his encounter with Fradubio (I.ii.34).

54. Of course, Chaucer's Pardoner can similarly "affile his tonge" (Canterbury Tales, "General Prologue" 712).

55. The demonic image of nature or propagation is a "fruitful" one in The Faerie Queene: for two pertinent examples, see Errour's "fruitfull seed" (i.21) and Duessa's "fruitfull-headed beast" (viii.20).

56. The House of Holiness, another seat of Redcrosse's healing, is, similarly, described as "an auntient house" (x.3).

57. Similarly, Calidore, in the tenth Canto of Book VI, comes across the three classical Graces on the top of Mount Acidale. They are dancing to the piping of Colin Clout. The Graces are associated here, as in Book I, with poetic inspiration and with the gifts of Christian Grace ("gracious gifts" [VI.x.23]).

58. The pharmakon also means "paint," Derrida points out ("PPh" 142); it is, thus, associated with the copy of a copy (simulacra), which is in the third remove from the original-truth (according to Plato in Book X of The Republic), and with writing, which, as a fourth remove from truth, escapes the imitative system.

59. In the myth of the combat of Seth and Horus, Derrida points out, Thoth also, interestingly, takes on the role of healer: "In the course of the fight, Thoth separates the combatants and, in his role of god-doctor-pharmacist-magician, sews up their wounds and heals them of their mutilation ("PPh" 90).

60. We should note that Archimago, most perspicuously at the end of Book I, occupies this role of messenger. As the King, and father of Una, is about to proclaim "with great wisedome, and grave eloquence," a messenger--a messenger we soon discover to be Archimago (xii.34)--comes in and cuts the king off:

   Thus gan to say. But eare he thus had said,
   With flying speede, and seeming great pretence,
   Came running in, much like a man dismayd,
   A Messenger with letters, which his message said. (xii.24)

61. On Archimago as "healer," of Pyrocles, see FQ II.vi.48-51.
62. Archimago, as Hermit, also tells Redcrosse he should “with the Sunne take . . . [his] timely rest” (i.33).

63. Thought of in this sense, un-health, like the concealing word, would be the failure to accord with a “type” or form for the body, and this type (typos) would then be the external arche of the body.

64. We should note that this is the same description that is given concerning the “real” Redcrosse as Book I opens: “Full jolly knight he seemd” (i.1). Also, we should note that it is only with the arising of Redcrosse’s “double” in the form of Archimago that the “original” is named: as “Saint George” (ii.11).

65. Sansfoy complains: “Dead long ygoe I wote thou haddest bin,/Had not that charme from thee forwarned it” (ii.18). Similarly, Duessa is worried about Sansjoy’s chances in his upcoming battle with Redcrosse because the latter “beares a charmed shield” (iv.50).

66. The chariot of the soul described in the Phaedrus is associated with this Parmenidean chariot by Renaissance figures such as Ficino (cf. Allen 1981, 3).

67. On the simultaneous “ek-sistence” and “in-sistence” of Dasein, see Chapter 1.

68. On all arts as a certain loving and caring for the proper disposition of things, see Ficino 1985, III.3: “For what else does Medicine consider but how the four humors of the body may become and remain mutual friends. . . . In Agriculture one must find out what soil requires what seeds or what care; or what method of cultivation is desired by all plants. . . . In the rest of the arts, it is possible to infer the same thing. . . .”

69. On this interpretation of folly in terms of Divine Wisdom, as “ecstatic folly,” see Screech 1980.

70. It is for this reason that Una wears a veil of mourning throughout Book I: from our introduction to her (i.4) to the last mention of her—Redcrosse “Unto his Farie Queene backe to returne:/The which he shortly did, and Una left to mourne” (xii.41).

71. In many ways Immeritô brings together the figure of the poet in the pastoral (SC) and in the epic (FQ). E.K.’s Dedicatory Epistle points out that this is a new poet beginning with pastoral in order to test his wings, as did the “greats” of the tradition: “So flew Theocritus, as you may perceive he was all ready full fledged. So flew Virgile, as not yet well feeling his winges. So flew Mantuane, as being not full somd. So Petrarque. So Boccace; So Marot, Sanazarus” (li 158-61). Of course, in turn, the Proem of Book I of The Faerie Queene then claims that this testing of wings is complete:

Lo I the man, whose Muse whilome did maske,
As time her taught, in lowly Shepheardes weeds,
Am now enforst a far unfitter taske,
For trumpets sterne to chaunge mine Oaten reeds, (I.Proem.1)

The poet admits to not being able to make this change in the traditional manner; he is unfit for the “taske.” Thus, we are set up for a hybrid, as it were, of epic/pastoral, of epic poet/Immeritô.
72. See, too, Calidore's vision of the Graces joined by a fourth, "Another Grace" (FQ VI.x.23-28).
CHAPTER 4:

REPRESENTATION AND LETHE IN HAMLET

The Modern Theatre of Representation

[Is] consciousness ... a more or less fantastic commentary on an unknown, perhaps unknowable, but felt text? (Nietzsche 1982, § 119).

It is often asserted that Shakespeare’s Hamlet is the English Renaissance play which most fully formulates the metaphors of the shift from the medieval to the modern age. This turn to the modern age manifests itself in various modalities: in the shift, beginning with the turn of the sixteenth century and the discovery of the New World, from the politics of earthly renunciation to the grand politics of imperial control and expansion, the corresponding movement from local, feudal structures toward the centralization of state apparatuses, and the shift from the development of the self as an organ of the community to the historical construction of the individual or sovereign subject with its autonomous imagination and conscience.¹ This historical confluence of the creation of the imperial sovereign and of the sovereign subject finds its foundational statement in the modern metaphysics of subjectivity as developed by Descartes.² Descartes’ formulation of modern metaphysics asserts that human thinking—doubting, feeling, perceiving, and imagining, human being and activity in general—constitutes the foundation of existence as a whole. The human subject is “that-which-lies-before” (Gk: hypokeimenon), “which, as ground, gathers everything onto itself” (“AWP” 128). The human subject as hypokeimenon is interpreted within modern metaphysics by means of the Latin translation of hypokeimenon as subiectum. According to this interpretation, the subiectum as ground is that which provides the conditions necessary for
that which is, the conditions of possibility of existence as a whole. Existence is a play or show as structured and (re) presented on the stage of the subjectum as ground (cf. Heidegger 1973, 26-32, 1982, 114-18, "AWP" 128-33). It is this shift to the construction of the modern subject as that which, in its thinking, positing, and representing, conditions existence that Hamlet most fully formulates. Frank Kermode insists that the play is "a model for the new mind of Europe" (1974, 1136). Similarly, Duncan Salkeld asserts that "the play anticipates the Cartesian moment when the soul or mind would be decisively separated from the body" (89). The Cartesian subject as ground, in its representational constitution of existence, posits a "ground plan" which regulates the ways in which beings will be allowed to arise within the theatre of the subject's representations. The sovereign subject, in this way, becomes master over existence inasmuch as that which is arises only as structured ahead of time by the process of representation, just as the imperial sovereign, whose royal box has the only sight lines which provide the "true" perspective, is master of the "private," royal masque or show. In what follows, I will discuss the ways in which the thinking of Descartes and that of Bacon provide a context for Hamlet's "The Mouse-trap" and will show the ways in which the latter is a figuring forth of the modern metaphysical "theatre of representation."

4.1 Modern Metaphysics: Cartesian Representation

What, we must ask ourselves at this point, is the nature of this modern metaphysics of the subject, of representation? What distinguishes this metaphysics from that of the Middle Ages or that of the Greeks? Before attempting to answer these questions, we must keep in mind that the word "metaphysics" here refers not to the doctrine of a particular thinker, nor to a philosophical discipline that is considered alongside ethics, epistemology, and aesthetics (cf. "NW" 54-55). Rather than being a philosophical doctrine or discipline, according to Heidegger, "metaphysics"
grounds an age. Metaphysics is the essential way in which the humanity of a historical epoch disposes itself toward Being and opens a realm for the arising of beings "through a specific interpretation of what is and through a specific comprehension of truth." This interpretation is the essential decision of a historical humanity: "[i]n metaphysics reflection is accomplished concerning the essence of what is and a decision takes place regarding the essence of truth" ("AWP" 115). In "What is Metaphysics," Heidegger claims that metaphysics is the essential ground of Dasein, as that which is held out over the nothing, as that which is a "transcendence." The nothing is the concealed (lethe) and reserved mystery of Being in its presencing or un-concealing (a-êtheia) in beings. Human existence (Dasein) is a "transcendence," is metaphysical, in its "being held out into the nothing" ("WM" 105), in its encounter with the concealed essence and mystery of Being. Just as the essence of un-truth, concealment (lethe), is not the "negation" or opposite of the essence of truth as un-concealment (alêtheia)³—but is, rather, the sheltering archê of the presencing of truth—so too the "nothing" is not a negation of existence; it is our "proper and deepest limitation" ("WM" 108). The encounter with the nothing, the encounter with the lethe essential to Being and truth, is an encounter with the "heretofore concealed strangeness" of beings "as what is radically other—with respect to the nothing" ("WM" 105).⁴ For the most part, in its average everyday existence, humanity does not encounter the nothing. Self-deception and the idle talk of the marketplace replace genuine thinking and the encounter with the nothing ("NW" 112). In this way, the nothing, for the most part, is distorted or concealed ("WM" 106). Metaphysics, then, arises as the interpretation of beings, the forgetting of the essence of the nothing (and, thus, of Being), and the denial of this forgetting (cf. "NW" 56, 104-5, 110). Each metaphysical epoch has developed its propositions concerning Being and the nothing, but these do not become a "problem" or a "question" ("WM" 109-110). For the ancients, nothing is "non-being" in the sense of a matter
without form. For the metaphysics of the Christian Middle Ages, the nothing is that out of which created beings (sumnum ens) arise; the nothing is the counter concept to being proper ("WM" 109). Before undertaking an analysis of Hamlet with respect to the modern experience of metaphysics, of Being and the nothing, we will have to distinguish the metaphysics of modernity more precisely from that of the Greeks and that of the Middle Ages. Let us remind ourselves, then, of the distinctive features of the historical unfolding of the essence of truth.  

The essence of truth as experienced in the primordial Greek founding is alētheia. Alētheia is first thought by Anaximander, Parmenides, and Heraclitus; they are the primordial thinkers; they are the thinkers of the beginning of essential Western history. The beginning is what is always returned to in (or, rather, arises again to meet) the future; it is futural in that it "lies in advance of what is to come." This is what Nietzsche means when he asserts, in On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, that "[w]hen the past speaks it always speaks as an oracle" (1983, 94). It is a "gift to an epoch" (Heidegger 1992, 1). In this way, the beginning as what is past "is nothing detached from us, lying far away. On the contrary, we are this past itself" (Heidegger 1997, 7). In the same way, our engagement with the modern metaphysics of representation in relation to Hamlet is no idle affair or intellectual flight of fancy. Rather, it touches on what is most essential about our existence today; the modern metaphysics of the subject and of methodology, as founded by Descartes and Bacon, culminates in the Nietzschean metaphysics of the absolute subject (of the Will to Power, of the essence of technology [das Gestell]) and of absolute procedure (of the positing of what is as available for manipulation within the "standing reserve" of technology).  

The primordial thinking of Being in the Greek word "alētheia" first directs us to an awareness that concealment is an essential component of truth within the primordial Greek
experience. The word also directs us to the fact that truth is the "suspension or cancellation" of concealment: "The prefix 'un-' corresponds to the Greek α-, which grammar calls 'α privativum.' What kind of privatio, deprivation, and taking away is at stake in a privative word-formation depends in each case on what it is that is exposed to the deprivation and impairment. 'Un-concealedness' can mean concealedness is taken away, cancelled, evicted, or banned, where taking away, cancelling, evicting, and banning are essentially distinct" (Heidegger 1992, 14). From this it is "clear that we can never think 'the true' and 'the false,' 'truth' and 'falsity,' as separate from each other in essence" (20); rather, we must understand that the essence of truth, for the early Greeks, was tied to falsity. And since "unconcealedness gives the essence of truth its character, then we must attempt to understand falsity as a concealment" (20).

This primordial experience of truth as the strife (polemos) of concealment and unconcealment has been transformed throughout the history of Being. To think the essence of truth, as historically sited in each epoch, we must think the counter-essence of truth. The Greeks use pseudos to name the the counter-essence of truth. Just as the 'false' has many meanings for us—as non-genuine (a "false Rembrandt"), as incorrect, and as erroneous (29)—so too does pseudos have many senses. For instance, as we have already noted above, "[t]he meaning of pseudos in 'pseudonym' eludes us if we translate it as 'false.' We have here a covering that at the same time unveils something recondite and does so in a specifically recondite way, whereas a 'false name,' e.g., that of the impostor, is also not simply incorrect, but it covers up while making visible something pertaining only to the facade and to the most unrecondite" (1992, 30). In this way, and like lethe as concealing, pseudos names untruth as the covering which is essentially related to uncovering or truth. Pseudos belongs to the counter-essence of truth—that is, it exists in the manner of concealedness—inasmuch as it is a "dissembling" (1992, 32).
The counter-word to truth as *alētheia*, which we usually translate as "false," is a dissembling concealing that is at the same time a showing and bringing into appearance. But what does "false" mean for subsequent metaphysics? How is *pseudos* translated in the unfolding of the history of Being? Our word "false" comes from the Latin *falsum* which originally means the "bringing to a fall." Although not related to the Greek counter-word to truth (*pseudos*), for some reason "bringing to a fall" (*falsum*) is the essential counter-word to truth for the Romans. In the Latin translation of Greek philosophical terms the "imperial" disposition gains a certain sway in humanity’s relation to beings as a whole. This "imperial" disposition has constituted the ground of all subsequent thinking and relating to beings. "The realm of essence decisive for the development of the Latin *falsum* is the one of the *imperium* and of the ‘imperial.’ . . . *Imperium* means ‘command’" (Heidegger 1992, 40). Understanding Being and truth in terms of the command (*imperium*) is the "essence of domination," of all mastering-knowing. All mastering-knowing and domination of a region of beings rests on a "commanding-on-high" or a commanding-overseeing (cf. Heidegger 1992, 41).

With the Roman transformation, *falsum* is essentially related to the true as *verum*. However, what does *verum* mean? "The stem *ver* is Indo-Germanic. . . . *Ver* means to be steady, to keep steady, i.e., not to fall (no *falsum*), to remain above, to maintain oneself, to keep one’s head up, to be the head, to command. Maintaining oneself, standing upright—the upright" (1992, 47). Thus, Heidegger points out that there are two things to keep in mind with respect to the Latin name for the true, *verum*. Heidegger says, first of all, that "[v]erum, ver-, meant originally enclosing, covering. The Latin *verum* belongs to the same realm of meaning as the Greek *alethes*, the uncovered—precisely by signifying the exact opposite of *alethes*: the closed off." Secondly, Heidegger asserts that "because *verum* is counter to *falsum*, and because the essential domain of
the *imperium* is decisive for *verum* and *falsum* and their opposites, the sense of *ver-* , namely enclosure and cover, becomes basically that of covering for security against. *Ver* is now the maintaining-oneself, the being-above; *ver* becomes the opposite of falling. *Verum* is the remaining constant, the upright, that which is directed to what is superior because it is directing from above. *Verum* is *rectum* (*regere*, "the regime"), the right, *iustum* (1992, 48).

The sheltering-concealment of *pseudos-lethe* that is transformed by the Romans into the securing-enclosing vantage-point of the *imperium* (that brings to a fall--*falsum*) becomes, in the Middle Ages, a "securing" of salvation--thus preparing the ground for the modern determination of truth as *certitudo*. The next step is from the securing-enclosing of the soul to the securing of the "certain-subject" in terms of its rational judgements. This is the "step" taken by modern metaphysics (cf. Heidegger 1992, 51-2).

Descartes, the founder of modern metaphysics, begins his meditation by applying himself "to the general destruction of all [his] former opinions" (95). The "First Meditation," then, concerns itself with the destruction of the foundation of all knowledge. Because he is destroying the foundation of knowledge, truth, and Being, he does not have to concern himself with individual propositions that would be derived from that foundation: "the destruction of the foundation necessarily brings down with it the rest of the edifice" (Descartes 95). This foundation will have to, in turn, be reconstructed on a new ground. Descartes finds a new Archimedean point for the truth of beings in the "Second Meditation": "Archimedes, in order to take the terrestrial globe from its place and move it to another, asked only for a point which was fixed and assured. So also, I shall have the right to entertain high hopes, if I am fortunate enough to find only one thing which is certain and indubitable" (102). This Archimedean point of security and certainty, and with it the founding of modern metaphysics, stands in Descartes’ statement: *Ego cogito, ergo*
sum, “I think, therefore I am.” Here, the Latin interpretation of truth as verum, the secured and overseeing standpoint, has its locus of securedness shifted to the subject in its certain representing. “All consciousness of things and of beings as a whole is referred back to the self-consciousness of the human subject as the unshakable ground of all certainty” (Heidegger 1982, 86; cf. also “AWP” 127-28). The essence of truth becomes this self-asserted certainty. We have seen that, for the Greeks, human existence consists of a certain receptivity to that which presences in unconcealment (alētheia). The medieval metaphysics founded by the Latin translation of a-letheia into verum-falsum, and prepared for by the Platonic-Aristotelian assertion of truth as homoiōsis, still echoes this receptivity inasmuch as the true and the fallen are taken to be that which are given by God; they are not products of human representing. The salvation to be secured in medieval metaphysics is grounded in revelation as interpreted and consolidated in Christian doctrine.7 In becoming the ground of Being and truth, the modern subject becomes the self-secured locus of certainty as well as the measure and setting of beings. That is, beings arise in their Being and are true inasmuch as they are grounded in the certain representing of the subject (“AWP” 131-32).8

Descartes’ formulation of the position that humanity is the measure of beings is to be distinguished from Protagoras’ statement pertaining to man and measure: “man is the measure of all things—alike of the being of things that are and of the not-being of things that are not” (Plato, Theaetetus 152a). For Protagoras, thinking within the Greek experience of truth and Being as alētheia, “the man of the basic relationship with beings is metron, ‘measure,’ in that he lets his confinement to the restricted radius (restricted for each respective self) of the unconcealed become the basic trait of his essence. That also implies the recognition of a concealment of beings” (Heidegger 1982, 94). In other words, for Protagoras within the Greek experience of truth, Being in its presencing in beings, arising as the restricted radius of a “world” or of beings as a whole,
"measures" humanity. For Descartes, on the other hand, and the modern age in general, humanity "measures" beings in their Being (cf. Heidegger 1982, 91-5 and "AWP" 143-7).

4.2 Modern Representation and the Projection of a Ground Plan: Bacon

We have seen that within the Cartesian metaphysics of the modern age humanity is the measure and ground of beings in their truth. Beings can only arise as "true," and in the modern age this always means as "certain," inasmuch as they are thought of, felt, or perceived by the subject. The nature of perception here is understood in terms of a possessive presenting to and for the self: "In important passages, Descartes substitutes for cogitare the word percipere (per-capio)—to take possession of a thing, to seize something, in the sense of presenting-to-oneself by way of presenting-before-oneself, representing" (Heidegger 1982, 104-5; cf. "NW" 87-88, "AWP" 128-33). This perceiving-representing sets up over against us, and thus sets forth into Being, the entity as "ob-ject" [Gegen-stand] (1982, 107; cf. also "MSMM" 280). Entities, in their being perceived or represented, arise as what is "pregiven" or as "available." The modern articulation of cogitatio and perceptio in terms of representation means that the beings so posited or represented for humanity are "established and secured as that over which [the human undertaking the representation] can always be master unequivocally, without any hesitation or doubt, in the radius of his own power to enjoin" (Heidegger 1982, 105). In short, humanity measures beings within the modern experience of Being. Humanity is the secured and certain ground of beings (subiectum) in its cogitatio and perceptio. As a result, beings are true (certain), are in Being, in their arising within the representational theatre of the modern subject’s positing by and for itself of these beings. And this positing-presenting of beings within the modern metaphysical theatre of representation corresponds to the modern experience of beings as a whole—that is, of nature and of history—as that over which humanity wields "imperial" power.
Generally, as Timothy H. Paterson points out, "attempts to understand the historical origins of the modern concept of mastery of nature have devoted at least some attention to the thought of Francis Bacon" (427). The modern experience of beings as a whole as that which is mastered implicates a corresponding conception of the essential knowing of these beings. The experience of knowing as an "imperial-mastery" over beings reaches a certain culminating phase in the thought of Bacon. Knowing, as the encounter with the truth of beings, in the modern age, is science. Insofar as entities are true, within the modern age, in their being certain and secured representations, the mode of access to these beings is a knowing (modern mathematical science) which grasps these entities within the framework in which they are already posited, and hence already known. It is for this reason that modern science gains its "precision" in the degree to which it becomes "mathematical": "The mathēmata, the mathematical, is that ‘about’ things which we really already know" ("MSMM" 252). But how can we refer to Bacon in the context of modern "mathematical" science? It is well-known that Bacon did not hold much faith in mathematics. The answer to this question lies in the fact that the "mathematical" nature of modern science lies not in the particular application of geometrical or algebraic rules but in the general "application of a determination of the thing which is not experientially derived from the thing and yet lies at the base of every determination of the things, making them possible and making room for them" ("MSMM" 265). This pre-understanding of things is the essence of the "mathematical project." Modern science, which today primarily means "research," founds itself in the mathematical projection, the projection of a "ground plan" [Grundriss] (cf. "AWP" 118-122 and "MSMM" 267-9). The projection of a ground plan opens up a sphere in which and by which entities can arise and be known. Knowing exists, then, as a securing-procedure which grasps and explicates the entities that arise as pre-given and pre-understood within the sphere of the ground plan: "The
projection sketches out in advance the manner in which the knowing procedure must bind itself and adhere to the sphere opened up. This binding adherence is the rigor of research. Through the projecting of the ground plan and the prescribing of rigor, procedure makes secure for itself its sphere of objects within the realm of Being" ("AWP" 118).

In Bacon’s inductive reconstruction of the sciences, as particularly manifested in his *The Great Instauration*, we see a foundational event in the modern scientific projection of a ground plan onto every realm of that which is. The irony here is that Bacon feels that he is the first to attempt to let beings arise as they are, rather than projecting a human fabrication, a method or an art, upon existence. In fact, for Bacon, human knowledge has failed to lay a claim to “the subtlety of nature, the hiding-places of truth,” up until the modern age because modes of interpretation (“arts”) have halted at that which is concealed (*lethe*) with respect to the way in which things present themselves within the parameters of that art: “And then whatever any art fails to attain, they ever set it down upon the authority of that art itself as impossible of attainment; and how can art be found guilty when it is judge in its own cause? So it is but a device for exempting ignorance from ignominy" (*Bacon, Great Instauration* 305). Because the human mind is fraught with “idols, or phantoms” (317), the making “faithful and secure” of knowledge rests, for Bacon, in “no other means than the true and legitimate humiliation of the human spirit” (308). In this way, Bacon can “humbly pray, that things human may not interfere with things divine” and “that knowledge being now discharged of that venom which the serpent infused into it, and which makes the mind of man to swell, we may not be wise above measure and sobriety, but cultivate truth in charity” (309). Perhaps our guiding question, as we attempt to come to terms with Bacon’s “total reconstruction of sciences, arts, and all human knowledge, raised upon the proper foundations” (299), should be the following: does Baconian science, as it manifestly attests, allow beings to arise as they are in
their own coming to presence and self-emerging (phasis)?

Bacon asserts that the only way in which we can encounter beings as they are is through the method of eliminative induction. In this way, he feels he is going to the thing itself as it shows itself—that is, as phainomenon (cf. Heidegger 1962a, 51 and 1997, 5-6): "Those however who aspire not to guess and divine, but to discover and know, who propose not to devise mimic and fabulous worlds of their own, but to examine and dissect the nature of this very world itself, must go to facts themselves for everything" (Bacon, Great Instauration 318). According to Bacon, science undertaken on a reconstructed foundation is an "interpretation" of the self-showing of nature. Similarly, according to Bacon, this "interpretation" attends to the self-showing of nature rather than positing its own ruling measure; that is, humanity, "being the servant and interpreter of Nature" (New Organon Book I, § I, 331), must "be content to wait upon nature instead of vainly affecting to overrule her" (Great Instauration 298-99). The interpretation which obeys and serves nature is distinguished from what Bacon calls "Anticipations of Nature": "The conclusions of human reason as ordinarily applied in matters of nature, I call for the sake of distinction Anticipations of Nature (as a thing rash or premature). That reason which is elicited from facts by a just and methodical process, I call Interpretation of Nature" (New Organon Book I, § XXVI, 334).

However, if we are properly to think through the relation of Bacon to the essence of the modern age, we must keep in mind that although the ostensible modality of this interpretation is one of servitude to nature, the ultimate telos of this scientific interpretation of nature is a certain, secured power over and commanding of nature: "For the end which this science of mine proposes is the invention not of arguments but of arts, not of things in accordance with principles but of principles themselves, not of probable reasons but of designations and directions for works. And
as the intention is different, so accordingly is the effect, the effect of the one being to overcome an opponent in argument, of the other to command nature in action" [my emphasis] (Great Instauration 314). The ambiguity of this position—that is, the trick of seeming to serve nature but, in fact, having as an end goal the of commanding of nature—is observed by Bacon himself: "Nature to be commanded must by obeyed" (New Organon Book I, § III, 331; cf. also Great Instauration 323). Bacon expresses a similar duplicitous front on this point elsewhere. On the one hand, he asserts that the end of knowledge is not profit, fame or power: "Lastly, I would address one general admonition to all, that they consider what are the true ends of knowledge, and that they seek it not either for pleasure of the mind, or for contention, or for superiority to others, or for profit, or fame, or power, or any of these inferior things, but for the benefit and use of life; and that they perfect and govern it in charity." On the other hand, in the next paragraph, he asserts that the goal of his reconstruction is "to lay the foundation, not of any sect or doctrine, but of human utility and power" [my emphasis] (Great Instauration 310). Knowledge of entities, then, is implicated in a particular wielding of power in relation to these entities; or, according to that most infamous of Baconian adages, knowledge is power: "the roads to human power and to human knowledge lie close together and are nearly the same" (New Organon Book II, § IV, 378). This integration of knowledge into the procedures of power is related to Bacon's blurring of the distinctions between the two poles of his own philosophy. That is, Bacon distinguishes between the "speculative" and "operative" aspects of his science: "the former involved an 'inquisition into causes,' the latter, the 'production of effects'" (Urbach 59). However, speculative knowledge, for Bacon, always serves the goals of an operative power: "Nor indeed [does Bacon] ever allow [himself] to be drawn away from things themselves and the operative part" (New Organon Book II, § XVII, 388). Thus, the knowing of beings, for Bacon, is always experienced as the
"production of effects" "for the benefit and use of life," for "human utility and power."

The power over nature that is acquired and grounded in the reconstruction of the sciences establishes the certainty and security of beings for humanity. In this way, for Bacon, an ostensible humility with respect to beings and our knowing of them is always at the service of the ultimate goal of all knowing: the certainty of beings as secured resources to be commanded and disposed of according to the needs and projects of humanity. "Nor need any one be alarmed at such suspension of judgement in one who maintains not simply that nothing can be known, but only that nothing can be known except in a certain course and way; and yet establishes provisionally certain degrees of assurance for use and relief until the mind shall arrive at a knowledge of causes in which it can rest" (Great Instauration 323). Bacon’s reconstruction of knowledge on a sure ground, on an Archimedean point, constitutes a “remedy” for the failings of the human mind and its endeavors (316-17). In this way, through progressive stages of certainty, we are able to overcome the inductive skepticism toward the axiomatic proposition as what is pre-given.14 Bacon’s “plan is to proceed regularly and gradually from one axiom to another, so that the most general are not reached till the last, but then when you do come to them, you find them to be not empty notions but well defined, and such as nature would really recognize as her first principles, and such as lie at the heart and marrow of things” (315). Simply turning to the phenomena in their self-showing will not lead us to the gradual construction of axioms and of ultimate certainty and power over nature. We must turn, rather, to things as they are allowed to arise within the structure of the inductive methodology. For instance, there are many “who have committed themselves to the waves of experience, and almost turned mechanics; yet these again have in their very experiments pursued a kind of wandering inquiry without any regular system of operations” (306). The necessity, for Bacon, of a ground plan of nature, and of the adherence to this plan in
procedure and methodology, means that "[o]ur steps must be guided by a clue, and the whole way from the very first perception of the senses must be laid out upon a sure plan" (307). Thus, although Bacon constantly reminds us of the limits of human reason and knowledge, this does not mean that the experience of truth has not become grounded in the certainty of the human subject in its securing of beings within its sphere of knowing. Limited knowledge is always provisional, and is part of the ground plan. Gradually, through the rigor of research, we will build our knowledge from the particular to the more general and all-embracing truth; eventually, for Bacon, we will be able to know the forms, general essences, or necessary conditions of things (cf. New Organon, Book II, § IV - V, 378-81). In short, Bacon proposes “to establish progressive stages of certainty” (New Organon, "Preface" 327).

Bacon’s ground plan of nature, then, is posited in the progressive stages of certainty constitutive of and constituted by the human subject. Rather than being a heeding of things as they presence out of themselves, the ground plan means that nature is moulded, structured, and secured according to the uses it is put to by human activity. The projected “third part” of Bacon’s Great Instauration was to embrace “the Phenomena of the Universe; that is to say, experience of every kind, and such a natural history as may serve for a foundation to build philosophy upon” (318). This embracing of phenomena, this natural history as the foundation of a new philosophy, is “to be a history not only of nature free and at large (when she is left to her own course and does her work her own way) . . . but much more of nature under constraint and vexed; that is to say, when by art and the hand of man she is forced out of her natural state, and squeezed and moulded. . . . Nay (to say the plain truth) I do in fact (low and vulgar as men may think it) count more upon this part both for helps and safeguards than upon the other, seeing that the nature of things betrays itself more readily under the vexations of art than in its natural freedom” (320). Nature, or
phenomena in general, is experienced here as that which can be forced, through a certain human moulding and measuring, to 'betray itself,' or show itself in a way that is not "natural," that is outside of its own limit and measure. Within Baconian science, beings are "drag[ged] into light" (320) and are not granted the withdrawal and limits which make them what they are. If the primordial experience of Being is that of physis as a self-emerging—within the domain of a-lētheia, and thus, as a self-emerging out of a sheltering self-concealment—then the modern age, marked by the positing of humanity (subiectum) as the ground and measure of beings, means a transition from the experience of a being as what arises out of itself within the limits and self-concealment proper to it to an experience of a being as what is posited, commanded, and measured by the human subject and as what is available for human manipulation and moulding.

Insofar as the goal of Baconian science is a certain imperial power and command over nature, it is not surprising that his vision of a society that has advanced toward this goal—the Bensalem society in New Atlantis—is described partly in the form of a utopian travel narrative and partly in the form of a discourse of colonial conquest. The new age of humanity that Bensalem figures forth—where Bensalem is a New Atlantis or New Jerusalem—is not one in which we have a Platonic or humanist concern with human virtue in accordance with nature; in fact, in Bacon's scientifco-technological utopia the perfection of the society—that which marks this as a new age for humanity, a New Jerusalem or heavenly city on earth—is based on the scientific manipulation of the physical world and not on moral or legal reform as it is in Plato's The Republic and More's Utopia (Frye 207). Bensalem figures forth a new age for humanity which is akin to the discovery of a New World (over which European humanity yields a politico-imperial control) and akin to the corresponding scientific discovery of the laws of the natural world (over which humanity yields an epistemologico-imperial power). For instance, the relation of the discovery of Bensalem
to the politico-imperial intercourse of old and new worlds is made explicit insofar as the narrator of the *New Atlantis* recalls informing his crew that they "are men cast on land, as Jonas was out of the whale’s belly, . . . [they] are but between death and life, for [they] are beyond both the old world and the new" (424). The question of the relation of life to death, as the “undiscovered country,” and of the relation of the old to new (undiscovered) worlds raised in this passage dovetails, throughout Bacon’s works, with the question of drawing out the subtlety of nature in the discovery of her laws—which, because science is always operative, corresponds to practical inventions. Toward the end of *New Atlantis*, the Father of Salomon’s House describes their "ordinances and rites." He describes a "long and fair" gallery in which is placed "the statues of all principal inventors": "There we have the statua of your Columbus, that discovered the West Indies; also the inventor of ships; your monk that was the inventor of ordnance and of gunpowder; the inventor of music; the inventor of letters; the inventor of printing . . ." (456). In both the geographico-political and the scientifico-technological discovery a certain power over what is discovered, or "drag[ged] into light," corresponds with the act of knowing that which is dis-covered; it is for this reason that the two operations are conceived of as intimately related within the thought of Bacon:

But as in former ages when men sailed only by observation of the stars, they could indeed coast along the shores of the old continent or cross a few small and mediterranean seas, but before the ocean could be traversed and the new world discovered, the use of the mariner’s needle, as a more faithful and certain guide, had to be found out; in like manner the discoveries which have been hitherto made in the arts and sciences are such as might be made by practice, meditation, observation, argumentation, for they lay near to the senses and immediately beneath common notions; but before we can reach the remoter and more hidden parts of nature, it is necessary that a more perfect use and application of the human mind and intellect be introduced. (*Great Instauration* 308)

The discovery of a New World—for example, that of Bensalem or of the Americas—which, as we
have seen corresponds to scientifcotechnological discovery and invention, is compared with the power of God to create out of the nothingness and chaos of the deep. *New Atlantis* opens with an account of the voyage that eventually was to discover Bensalem: "So that finding ourselves in the midst of the greatest wilderness of waters in the world without victual, we gave ourselves for lost men, and prepared for death. Yet we did lift up our hearts and voices to God above, who showeth his wonders in the deep, beseeching him of his mercy that as in the beginning he discovered the face of the deep, and brought forth dry land, so he would now discover land to us, that we might not perish" (419).15

To the extent that they participate in the imperial disposition of metaphysics, both Plato's *Republic* and More's *Utopia* define the *polis* as an autarchic structure which secures itself through the exclusion or suppression of an exterior. This "politics of exclusion" manifests itself in these texts, in a rather obvious way, in the form of a military barrier set up in order to secure the border of self and other, of inside and outside, of familiar and strange. One of the first stages in the construction of a hypothetical society in *The Republic*—after it is deemed that this society will have a certain amount of luxury and, thus, will be threatened by external forces—is the determination of the nature of the military class: the guardians. The guardian, like a watchdog, is to be philosophic in that he or she is to love the known and familiar and to be violent toward the unknown and strange: "It is annoyed when it sees a stranger, even though he has done it no harm: but it welcomes anyone it knows, even though it has never had a kindness from him" (376a). This, then, is an active differentiation of the "one" and the "other" insofar as it does not arise as a reaction to a previously harmful or beneficial action. A similar active differentiation is expressed in Hythloday's description of the geography of Utopia. Because of the physically self-enclosed nature of the island, "hardly any strangers enter the bay" without Utopian permission and
guidance. As the gloss to the text—provided (perhaps) by Peter Giles and Erasmus—points out, this means that the island is "naturally safe" (More 42). However, we can hardly say that this self-enclosed disposition of the island is "natural" in the sense that it has arisen out of its own accord, out of its own nature. Rather, the enclosure is the result of a brutal Baconian moulding of nature on the part of Utopus. The founder of Utopia,

who conquered the country and gave it his name . . . and who brought its rude, uncouth inhabitants to such a high level of culture and humanity that they now excel in that regard almost every other people, also changed its geography. After subduing the natives, at his first landing, he promptly cut a channel fifteen miles wide where their land joined the continent, and thus caused the sea to flow around the country . . . . [T]he project was finished quickly, and the neighboring peoples, who at first had laughed at his folly, were struck with wonder and terror at his success. [my emphasis] (43)

Insofar as Amaurot, the capital, "lies at the navel of the land" (44), and insofar as the land thus arises as a "body-politic," we are reminded that the politico-geographic self-enclosure of Utopia and the politico-militaristic self-enclosure of Socrates' imagined Republic are directly related to the medical discourses which each of the writers employ in order to define health as an exclusion of external-parasitical threats and as a corresponding self-enclosure of the body-proper. In order to delimit the healthy body and the just polis, that which is unhealthy and unjust must be excluded or brought to a fall: "This then is the kind of medical and judicial provision for which you will legislate in your state. It will provide treatment for those of your citizens whose physical and psychological constitution is good; as for the others, it will leave the unhealthy to die, and those whose psychological constitution is incurable corrupt it will put to death" (The Republic 409e-410a). Hythloday's description of Utopian practices displays a similar impulse toward the securing of health and justice through the exclusion of potential medical and moral infections: "Bondsmen do the slaughtering and cleaning in these places [that is, outside the city]: citizens are not allowed
to do such work. The Utopians feel that slaughtering our fellow creatures gradually destroys the
sense of compassion, the finest sentiment of which our human nature is capable. Besides, they
don't allow anything dirty or filthy to be brought into the city lest the air become tainted by
putrefaction and thus infectious" (57).

Bacon's *New Atlantis*, insofar as it also expresses the imperial determination of the essence
of truth (as *verum/falsum*), participates in this diagnosis of health and justice as a closing off of
the secure position of identity and as an exclusion of the fallen (the not-closed off). When the
narrator first encounters it, for instance, Bensalem is shrouded by a thick cloud: "And it came to
pass that the next day about evening, we saw within a kenning before us, towards the north, as
it were thick clouds, which did put us in some hope of land, knowing how that part of the South
Sea was utterly unknown, and might have islands or continents that hitherto were not come to
light" (419). The clouds that shroud the island do not mark a sheltering concealment (*lethe*) out
of which the island can arise in its openness (*a-letheia*); rather, the reserve and withdrawal of the
island from what is known, which the clouds signify, marks the island as the secured and closed
off position. The imperial determination of truth as the closed off (*verum*), the secured, and
ultimately with the modern age, the certain (*certitudo*) means that the truth of the state (the just
state) and the truth of the body (the healthy body) are rendered as autarchic vantage points which
overlook fallen exteriors. It should not surprise us, then, that the advanced Bensalemites should
be so reserved in their reception of foreigners--so reserved, in fact, that travelers, the external
threat, must be contained within the "House of Strangers." The initial reaction of the officials
meeting the visitors to Bensalem is also indicative of this point: "My lord would have you know
that it is not of pride or greatness that he cometh not aboard your ship; but for that in your answer
you declare that you have many sick amongst you, he was warned by the Conservator of Health
of the city that he should keep a distance" (422). As the governor of the House of Strangers points out, this closed off and secretive disposition also explains why the Bensalemites know the outside world so thoroughly—which they overlook from their scientific vantage point—yet are seemingly unknown by the rest of the world: "by means of our solitary situation and of the laws of secrecy which we have for our travelers, and our rare admission of strangers, we know well most part of the habitable world, and are ourselves unknown" (427).

4.3 On Secretive Discovery

Bensalem’s security rests upon a certain secretive surveillance of the outside world, a seeing from an unseen vantage. Of course, this operation of seeing while unseen is a prevalent and important catalyst of the action in *Hamlet*. This operation also marks the site of conjunction of “a series of contemporary contexts in which the language of spying, discovery, or bringing before the eye . . . appears across a broad range of discourses” (Parker 231). The discourses of “spying, discovery, or bringing before the eye” manifest themselves in two contexts which are particularly pertinent to our treatment of *Hamlet* in relation to modern metaphysics: first of all in “the function of the delator or informer as secret accuser, part of the sixteenth-century development of a nascent secret service and the apparatus of judicial discovery,” and in the “early modern European fascination both with monster literature and with narratives of the ‘discovery’ of previously hidden worlds” (Parker 231). The “imperial” disposition of modern metaphysics—with its basis in the representation (the “bringing before” [Vor-stellen] the eye) of the subject—corresponds with, as we saw in the work of Bacon, the “imperial” operations of geographic “discovery” and with, as we will see in *Hamlet*, the operations of spying, surveillance, and judicial discovery.

The imperial position is en-closed. "Close," in early modern English usage, means secret or private, as opposed to that which is on display or shown, as in Claudius’s “we have closely sent
for Hamlet” [my emphasis] (III.i.29). “Close” also suggests that which is constricted or closed (cf. Parker 232). The imperial position secures itself, as does Bensalem, by closing itself off, by remaining private. The importance of the construction and preservation of an enclosed, private realm arises in the early modern age as a manifestation of the turn to the subject and its self-grounding as the hypokeimenon of existence.18 The securing of the private, as related to the modern metaphysics of the subject, also corresponds to the “paranoid atmosphere of spying and being spied upon” that plagued the court in the last decades of Elizabeth’s reign. Parker cites, as one instance of the emerging importance of this aspect of spying and discovery in late sixteenth century England, the fact that “Francis Walsingham—the secretary of state who so enlarged the Elizabethan network of intelligence—was described in his obituary notice as ‘a most diligent searcher of hidden secrets’” (Parker 233-34). Parker makes the case that “[t]hings done in secret that depended on intelligence or report—crimes, like adultery and witchcraft, beyond the access of ocular proof—are very much part of the atmosphere of espial and informing in the period before Hamlet, itself filled with attempts to uncover an ‘occulted guilt’ (III.ii.80)” (234).

This “espial,” or judicial discovery, is connected to the discourses of geographic discovery in that “[t]ravelers and discoverers were informers to a European audience, bringing reports of matters otherwise hidden and unseen—an ocular emphasis that frequently makes the activity of reporting of the foreign or exotic one of informing in the sense of espial or spying out” [my emphasis] (Parker 241). This informing or reporting, in turn, connects the operations of judicial discovery and geographic discovery with the various modalities of poetico-rhetorical bringing forth—that is, as an “imperial” naming or as a dis-closive naming as “founding saying” (see Chapter 2). The discourses of discovery are also connected to poetic and rhetorical operations insofar as both, to ensure reliability, utilize enargeia, the creation of convincing, life-like pictures that are
brought before the mind's eye of the audience. The discourse of discovery can also ensure its own authenticity by appeal to the "authority of the eyewitness" (Parker 243), if visible proof is unavailable. Africanus's narrative, as translated by Pory (A Geographical Historie of Africa Written in Arabicke and Italian by John Leo A More [1600]), is illustrative: "These are the things memorable and woorthy of knowledge seene and observed by me John Leo, throughout all Africa, which countrey I have in all places travelled quite over: wherein whatsoever I sawe woorthy the observation, I presently committed to writing: and those things which I sawe not, I procured to be at large declared unto me by most credible and substantiall persons, which were themselves eie-witnesses of the same" (cf. Parker 243).

The relation of Hamlet to the various discourses of secretive discovery that we have mentioned lies, according to Parker, in "the play's persistent harping on opening something closed, the attempts everywhere within it to ferret out secrets and disclose what is hid" (256). The thematic of indirection and spying, while usually associated with Polonius, is prevalent in the play. "Spying is everywhere in Hamlet" (Parker 257). The discourses of spying, of surveillance, and of secret service, mark both the plot and the "obsessive language" (Parker 256) of the play. The "vigilant eye," which secures the state and sets up the world as objects for the subject, manifests itself in Hamlet via this prevalent spying. The "vigilant eye" of the state and subject replaces, in the early modern era, the Greek experience of the look of the things themselves in their self-appearing and the medieval experience of God's judgemental gaze. "Hamlet comes at this crucial historical juncture, the point where an older language of divine or angelic intelligence, or the eye of God, was being converted into the new lexicon of espial, and the 'privy intelligences' provided by a progressively more organized network of informers and spies" (Parker 257). Thus, the prevalence of the thematic of spying and secretive discovery in Hamlet marks it,
in many ways, as a foundational work of the modern metaphysics of representation.

First Polonius, then Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, spy on Hamlet at Claudius's request. The spying has as its objective the plucking out of Hamlet's "mystery"--that is, the hidden causes of Hamlet's strange behavior, of his "antic disposition." Polonius, similarly, sends Reynaldo to inquire into the private details of Laertes' life. Polonius, as he does with respect to his own son, also wishes to discover the private matters of the heart that transpire between Ophelia and Hamlet. Finally, the close of the play leaves us with the impression that Horatio will "report" (or, "inform") a particular audience, outside the theatrical spectacle, of the play's events; "the narrative of Horatio/oratio . . . [promises] to report Hamlet's story faithfully to those who could not see or ocularly witness it" (Parker 257). In fact, intelligence gathering and reporting are so prevalent in the play that it seems to Hamlet as if existence as a whole, that is, "all occasions," "inform" or accuse him (IV.iv.32-66).

Maynard Mack, in a famous phrase, said that Hamlet dwells in an "interrogative" mode. Parker, picking up this commonplace of Hamlet criticism, shifts the emphasis somewhat. For her, "[t]he impulse that stands behind such questioning as Hamlet's address to the Ghost"--a Ghost that appears in a "questionable shape"--("Say why is this? wherefore? what should we do?") frequently verges on what elsewhere in Shakespeare are called 'interrogatories,' forms of interrogation in a more aggressive sense" (257). The impulse to question in Hamlet, to the interrogative, if understood as interrogation, implicates the play in the structures of knowing which mark the modern metaphysical determination of beings: the Cartesian structures of the representational bringing of that which is before the self as measure and the Baconian structures of the ground plan in which nature is put "under constraint and . . . moulded. . . . under the vexations of art" (Great Instauration 320).
The operation of forcing the truths of nature into the light and of forcing the truths of another's conscience into the light, and out of a private and hidden sphere, belong to the same metaphysico-imperial experience of truth. This is what links "The Mouse-trap" with the discourses of spying, of surveillance, and of the discovery of that which had formerly been covered or hidden. For Hamlet, the play will achieve the discovery of Claudius's deepest secrets and of what is most private. It will bring forth, before the eye of Hamlet as audience, the "occulted guilt" of Claudius. The play, as "trap," will "catch the conscience of the King":

I have heard  
That guilty creatures sitting at a play,  
Have by the very cunning of the scene  
Been struck so to the soul that presently  
They have proclaimed their malefactions,  
For murder, though it have no tongue, will speak  
With most miraculous organ. (II.ii.545-51)

Within the discourses that we have explored cursorily so far in this chapter—that of the modern metaphysics of representation, that of the scientific ground plan, and those of geographical, judicial, and poetico-rhetorical discovery—a certain determination of theatre and the "theatrical," as that which "depends on the sense of something viewed or seen" (Parker 252), has prevailed. That is to say, what we have called the "modern metaphysical theatre of representation" is an understanding of Being as a theatre in which things arise as presented before the view of the human subject. We shall see that this modern determination of the theatrical is not the only one possible, and certainly not the primordial determination. The modern determination involves a certain distance from the theatre that arises out of and as the look of the goddess (thea-horein). At this point, however, we must delineate the ways in which the modern metaphysical theatre of representation manifests itself in Hamlet's "Mouse-trap."
4.4  Theatre, Representation, and "The Mouse-trap"

As Clark Hulse points out, the publication of Stephen Orgel's *The Illusion of Power: Political Theater in the English Renaissance* (1975) "initiated a new wave of study of the political dimensions of Renaissance literature" (316). This new analysis has as its focus the material and symbolic configurations of power in which the Renaissance artist is situated or "embedded." It looks to the poetic work, for instance, as a particular confluence of the economy of discursive and non-discursive forces operative within a local situation. As such a confluence of local forces, the work can then be calculated in terms of the quality and quantity of "social energy" it manifests (cf. Greenblatt 1985, 1-20). This mode of analysis has, indeed, been quite productive. However, within the context of our analysis of the metaphysics of representation, I want to take Orgel's work as a point of departure for thinking about the way in which the theatre of power arises out of the essential metaphysical bearing of the modern age, and for thinking about the ways in which "The Mouse-trap" in Shakespeare's *Hamlet* figures forth this theatre of power. Orgel's work, "an essay about theatre at court" (1), can help us to understand "The Mouse-trap" in *Hamlet* as an instanciation of the Renaissance conception of court theatre and of the modern conception of the theatre of representation.

As Robert Weimann points out, the question of representation (*mimēsis*) is central in *Hamlet*. "The play contains the most sustained theoretical statement on the subject that we have in Shakespeare's whole oeuvre" (1985, 279). "The Mouse-trap" figures forth the imperial metaphysics of representation and its ground in the experience of truth as *verum/falsum*. The essentially imperial structure of "The Mouse-trap" entails the bringing of Claudius before the subjective theatre of Hamlet. Hamlet possesses a secure vantage point from which to view Claudius and the truth of the latter's conscience as it is revealed to the observer. From his
secretive-self-enclosed position of feigned madness, Hamlet is able to observe Claudius as Claudius observes the play. Hamlet, like the Bensalemites, sees but is himself unseen. Claudius, in being open to a structured seeing, is thereby brought to a fall.  

In order for Hamlet to secure his own position, and thus that of truth as certainty, Claudius's "occulted guilt" (III.i.71) must be brought to a stand within the viewing vantage of the subject; Claudius's hidden intentions must be brought into the open and, thus, brought to a fall. In bringing out Claudius's conscience into the open, and thereby bringing it to a fall, Hamlet is secured in his certainty of Claudius's guilt.

Although we are concentrating on "The Mouse-trap," we should also take notice that this imperial motif of the relation of the enclosed (as true) to the open and fallen (as false) position is prevalent throughout Hamlet. The play opens with a scene emphasizing the monitoring of a secure perimeter. The sentinel calls out to the darkness asking it to reveal itself to his overlooking vantage: "Stand and unfold yourself," says Francisco in the process of watching the perimeter of the secure state (I.i.2). The basic correspondence of the open (insecure or unfortified) with the fallen, false, or "incorrect," also manifests itself in Claudius's protestations over Hamlet's extended grief: "'Tis unmanly grief./ It shows a will most incorrect to heaven,/ A heart unfortified . . ." (I.ii.94-96). Finally, the imperial disposition as figured forth in the motif of the secure fort is also applied to the truthfulness of "reason." Hamlet, for instance, asserts that Danish drunkenness, like a natural defect, "oft break[s] down the pales and forts of reason" (I.iv.28). Reason is sovereign; it is in the truthful and upright position. When one is brought to a fall, when the fort of reason is brought down through a drawing into madness, one loses one's "sovereignty of reason" (I.iv.73). Ophelia, in dismay over the fall of Hamlet's fort of reason, summarizes this imperial motif of the confluence of truth and reason:

O, what a noble mind is here o'erthrown!
The courtier's, soldier's, scholar's, eye, tongue, sword,
Th'expectancy and rose of the fair state,
The glass of fashion and the mould of form,
Th'observed of all observers, quite quite down!
And I of ladies most deject and wretched,
That sucked the honey of his musiced vows,
Now see that noble and most sovereign reason
Like sweet bells jangled, out of time and harsh; (III.i.146-154)

The gravity of Claudius's crime, the rottenness and the foul falseness at the heart of the
state, lies in the fact that the secure position, the upright position of vantage, has been penetrated
and itself brought to a fall. The proper order has been inverted. Claudius poisoned the Old Hamlet
upon his "secure hour" (I.v.61) in his enclosed garden. Hamlet's uncle, "[w]ith witchcraft of his
wits" (I.v.43), had infiltrated the enclosed garden; his poison is then able to penetrate the house
and city of the King's body through the "porches" of his ears, gates, and alleys (I.v.63). In
securing his position as true, Claudius also tries to enclose his own position and draw out that of
Hamlet. Hamlet's feigned madness is his way of shrouding his inner intentions and, thus, a way
of not falling under the sway of his uncle. As Robert Weimann points out, Hamlet's "antic
disposition" allows him to elude the representational strategies of the court:

What, especially in the court scenes, the "antic disposition" involves is another
mode of release from representivity. Such release is at the center of a
nonrepresentational dramaturgy as manifested in the achieved strategy of
dissociating Hamlet from the courtly world of dramatic illusion and aristocratic
decorum, the strategy of distancing this privileged world through proverb, pun,
aside, "impertinancy," and, most important, the use of the play metaphor. (1985,
284)

For this reason, the play does not present madness as an individual psychodrama but as a political
threat; Claudius, for instance, insists that "Madness in great ones must not unwatched go"
(III.i.185). Because he cannot find Hamlet out and bring him within his viewing-vantage-point,
Claudius compares Hamlet, in his madness, to a disease that corrupts the (ideally enclosed) body-
politick:

But so much was our love,
   We would not understand what was most fit,
But like the owner of a foul disease,
   To keep it from divulging, let it feed
Even on the pith of life. Where is he gone? (IV.i.19-23)

The upsetting of the proper order of the state and of the bodies and the minds (the sovereign reason) of several of the characters is figured forth as a general poisoning and infection of the properly enclosed and sealed corpus; it is an ulcer that, unseen, corrupts from within. This just order is “rejustified”; that is, the play achieves its resolution in the last scene where the major remaining characters are poisoned and Fortinbras enters “to claim [his] vantage” in the kingdom (V.ii.369).

Nowhere, however, is the essential operation of the imperial disposition of the verum more apparent than in Polonius’ advice to Reynaldo. Polonius suggests, much like Bacon in “Of Simulation and Dissimulation,” that Reynaldo, in his spying mission on Laertes, veil his own intention to the one with whom he is speaking. Reynaldo will thereby be able to draw the other’s intention out into the open:

   Your bait of falsehood takes this carp of truth,
   And thus do we of wisdom and of reach,
   With windlasses and with assays of bias,
   By indirections find directions out; (II.i.62-5)

Because the true is that which is enclosed, hidden, occulted, secured, and reserved, Polonius believes that in order to find the “truth” of Hamlet he must follow the advice he gave to Reynaldo. In this way, Polonius can rightly be called “Claudius’s master of surveillance” (Jardine 1996, 149). He will have to, while being himself in a reserved and secure position, draw the truth of Hamlet out into the open: “I will find/ Where truth is hid, though it were hid indeed/ Within the centre”
(II.i.156-8). In order to overview objectively Hamlet's disposition, "[s]ince nature makes [Gertrude] partial," Polonius must "o'erhear/ The speech of vantage" [my emphasis] (III.iii.32-33).

        Let his queen-mother all alone entreat him
        To show his grief. Let her be round with him,
        And I'll be placed, so please you, in the ear
        Of all their conference. If she find him not,
        To England send him: (III.i.178-84)

All of these secretive acts of bringing the other before the unseen eye of the subject manifest "court theatre" as it is most broadly defined. Orgel differentiates between the public and the court theatre in the following manner: in public theatre, the theatrical company and its apparatus construct the audience and assign their positions; with court theatre, on the other hand, the audience (the monarch) composes the theatre and assigns its role. That is, "private theatres are the creation of their audiences, and are often designed not only for a particular group but for a particular occasion" (6). This aspect of court theatre raises certain practical or political questions. Within the context of the argument of this paper, however, we should consider the act of an audience positing the position and modality of its theatre as a manifestation of the essential experience of truth in the modern age; we should consider it as a manifestation, that is, of the metaphysics of the sovereign subject as hypokeimenon and its self-grounded certainty. For Hamlet, the crime is not a crime, it is not true, unless he can be certain of it. Certainty is to be self-grounded. That is, he will be certain only if the evidence is brought before him in a pre-conditioned manner. The words of the Ghost, the "portentous figure" (I.i.109), are not "relative" enough grounds. For this reason, Marjorie Garber rightly calls Hamlet "the poet of doubt" (301), as manifested in his love poem to Ophelia:

        Doubt thou the stars are fire,
Doubt that the sun doth move;
Doubt truth to be a liar;
But never doubt I love. (II.ii.116-19)

Certainty arises out of the regulation of seeing; the subject secures certainty through the projection of a grid through which phenomena must arise in order to be considered true. This projection of a procedural grid is what Hamlet proposes with his idea of the play that will "catch the conscience of the king" (II.ii.562). With the rigorous procedure of the conscience-catching play, Hamlet will be able to "observe" and probe ("tent") Claudius as if he were an object within the field of a scientific gaze (cf. II.ii.551-562).²⁴

In court theatre, the monarch is the centre of the action. The royal seat was often on stage itself and the monarch directly involved in the action (Orgel 9-10). After 1605, with the dawn of perspective settings--used only in court theatre--the monarch becomes the centre of the action in another way. The monarch and his or her royal seat become the structural centre of the scene by occupying the position which embodies the central point of view. "In a theatre employing perspective, there is only one focal point, one perfect place in the hall from which the illusion achieves its fullest effect. At court performances this is where the king sat" (Orgel 10). In a similar manner, Hamlet describes "The Mouse-trap" as a play presented to and for the King: "There is a play to-night before the king" (III.ii.66). In this way, Claudius, as imperial sovereign and sovereign subject, is directly on the stage or puts himself on the stage inasmuch as his positing, his point of view, means a putting of the self on the scene—that is, by structuring the scene itself. Orgel makes this point clear with respect to that form of court theatre known as the masque: "The climactic moment of the masque was nearly always the same: the fiction opened outward to include the whole court, as masquers took partners from the audience. What the noble spectator watched he ultimately became" (39).
A certain modality of this perspectival theatre involves the institution of a proscenium (or framed) stage. "To begin with, perspective settings require a proscenium, a frame at the front of the stage—Montagu’s audience was separated from his actors in a way that the popular dramatist’s was not. But a frame does more than separate the viewer from the scene. It also directs his attention and provides a context for the action it contains" (Orgel 20). That which is presented before the sovereign subject, as framed, becomes an object to be possessed and controlled. "The frame . . . comes into being when paintings become commodities, objects to be bought and collected. . . . So it is with a framed stage, the theatre created and possessed by its audience" (Orgel 21). That which arises as an object gives itself over, opens itself, and thus brings itself to a fall within the purview of the subject. "The Mouse-trap" as object, for instance, shows all, according to Hamlet; it does not reserve itself and hold back in order to exist as something apart from the viewer: "The players cannot keep counsel; they’ll tell all" (III.i.125-6). Because Hamlet shelters his intentions in the words of madness—that is, his Cartesian "method" is madness: "Though this be madness, yet there is method in’t" (II.i.201)—he cannot be framed and brought into the certain view of the court of Denmark. It is for this reason that Guildenstern asserts, "Good my lord, put your discourse into some frame, and start not so wildly from my affair" [my emphasis] (III.i.281-2). Similarly, although Guildenstern cannot "command" the pipe "to any utt’rance of harmony" (III.i.329), he is a party to the attempts by Polonius and Claudius to draw Hamlet out into the open and to thereby "pluck out the heart of [Hamlet’s] mystery" (III.i.333). As framed object, brought before the open view of the subject, a thing stands over against (Gegenstand) the subject, and its relation to the subject becomes its normative measure. That is, a thing arises as what is posited and valued as good or bad within the structure of the cogitatio; "for there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so" (II.i.241-2). The earth itself is a "goodly
frame" (II.ii.284), and the fact that its measure and value has come to be posited by humanity means that, for Hamlet, it is meaningless and valueless, "a sterile promontory." For the world to have value, for Hamlet, it must be "rejustified" and he must gain a certain control over it by means of his presenting—his theatre of representation. This theatre in which the subject controls and posits what is present before it is a private theatre. Orgel points out that the masque as private theatre manifests the power of the imagination (of the sovereign and of the sovereign subject) over nature: "Imagination here is real power: to rule, to control and order the world, to change or subdue other men, to create; and the source of the power is imagination, the ability to make images, to project the workings of the mind outward in a physical, active form, to actualize ideas, to conceive actions" (47).25

The Renaissance saw private theatre in general, and thus "The Mouse-trap" in particular, "as models of the universe, as science, as assertions of power as demonstrations of the essential divinity of the human mind" (Orgel 58). We have seen that "The Mouse-trap," as a private theatre of representation, celebrates the metaphysico-imperial power of "the human mind" and that it is grounded in the following essential components of modern metaphysics: 1) the imperial experience of truth (verum/falsum) as the relation of that which is self-enclosed and that which is exposed to view, 2) the Cartesian metaphysics of the subject and its self-grounded certainty, and 3) the Baconian goal of knowing entities in order to gain a certain power over them.

4.5 Hamlet and the Limits of Representation

We have seen that in many ways Shakespeare’s play presents truth as the securing of an autarchic structure, the securing of the enclosed vantage-point. Insofar as this is the case, we were able to see that the characters within the play concern themselves with the enclosing of a perimeter and the overlooking of a fallen exterior. This "imperial" understanding of truth—as the interplay
of the enclosed (verum) and the fallen (falsum)—corresponds to Claudius’s construction of Denmark as an imperially enclosed political structure and to the construction of of Hamlet as an imperially enclosed psychic subject. What I want to show now is that this desire for the seamlessly enclosed structure is that which, while pointed to, ends up being denied in the play. Shakespeare’s play simultaneously points to or posits the modern metaphysico-imperial determination of truth described above and deconstructs these imperial structures. On the one hand, in Hamlet the imperial sovereign and sovereign subject must bring before themselves—that is, represent (Vorstellen)—and thus bring to a fall, the other. This representational bringing before and bringing to a fall secures the position of the identical. Thus, we were able to say that Hamlet, of all Elizabethan-Jacobean works, most perspicuously figures forth the modern metaphysical theatre of representation. On the other hand, Hamlet also points to the limits of representation, and thus the limits of the imperial, self-securing project.

Perhaps a passage in The Faerie Queene most succinctly exemplifies this operation of evoking the metaphysico-imperial determination of truth while simultaneously pointing to its limits. In Canto ix of Book I, Arthur describes his “lignage.” He informs Una and Redcrosse of his upbringing or education at the hands of Timon and Merlin. Timon had warned Arthur “Those creeping flames [of passion] by reason to subdew,/ Before their rage grew to so great unrest” (I.ix.9). Arthur’s psycho-imperial fort of reason was able to withstand many an onslaught:

Their God himselfe [Cupid], griev’d at my libertie,
Shot many a dart at me with fiers intent,
But I them warded all with wary government. (I.ix.10)

Arthur’s self-secured position is a psychologico-political enclosure; he withstands the assault of the passions by means of his “wary government” of the body-politic. He thereby arises as a manifestation of the metaphysico-imperial determination of truth as verum/falsum. However,
Arthur simultaneously points to the limited strength of this imperial "fort" of truth; he points to the possibility of a receptive opening to an other—to the divine-like presencing of Gloriana. Arthur points out that his attempt to secure the imperial position was futile:

But all in vaine: no fort can be so strong,
Ne fleshly brest can armed be so sound,
But will at last be wonne with battrie long,
Or unawares at disadvantage found;
Nothing is sure, that growes on earthly ground:
And who most trustes in arme of fleshly might,
And boasts, in beauties chaine not to be bound,
Doth soonest fall in disaventrous fight,
And yeeldes his caytive neck to victours most despight. (I.ix.11)

One day, while "slombring soft" within the forest, Arthur seemed to see "a royall Mayd" (I.ix.13). When Arthur awoke, the Queene of Faeries had withdrawn. The way in which Gloriana presences within Book I of The Faerie Queene, a presencing which shatters the enclosed fort of reason of Arthur as subject, is by means of the trace of her presence left in the "pressed gras" (I.ix.15).

Let us now turn to the ways in which this operation of the deconstruction of the seemingly secure position occurs in Hamlet. Psychoanalytic criticism has most powerfully demonstrated the ways in which Hamlet enacts the attempt to create and to secure an enclosed sovereign subject. In fact, the play has been so thoroughly entangled in and associated with the founding texts of psychoanalysis itself that one can barely think of Hamlet outside of the parameters of the Oedipal drama. I want to refer, briefly, to the Lacanian reading of this drama. The Lacanian reading is that which most thoroughly points to the illusion that is the symbolic construction of the subject; Lacanian analysis, then, "deconstructs" the subject and its relation to the "Symbolic Other" by showing them to be fictions or simplifications of the fluid semiosis of the symbolic register (Holland 243). Thus, by turning from the traps of indirection to the "anamorphic" trap of the gaze, as diagnosed by Lacan, and the "bait" used in this trap, we will see the ways in which the play's
operations of representational and imperial securing deconstruct themselves.

Lacan reads *Hamlet* as a "tragedy of desire" (1977a, 11). The hero of this tragedy of desire is Prince Hamlet: "The principal subject of the play is beyond all doubt Prince Hamlet. The play is the drama of an individual subjectivity, and the hero is always present on stage, more than in any other play" (1977a, 12). The play is the drama of the desire of the individual subject in its self-creation or ego-formation. In order to accomplish this ego-formation, Hamlet as principal subject must encounter and internalize an external image or "other" in which he sees an imaginary image of selfhood. Selfhood arises out of this phantasm of identification that is taken as a swallowed bait (*leurre*), out of this misrecognition. The self constitutes itself by means of this image of the other that is mistaken as its own. The self so constructed distinguishes itself from others and from objects. The imaginary security and autonomy of the subject gives the illusion of an objective vantage over things in the world within its view. "The privilege of the subject seems to be established here from that bipolar reflexive relation by which, as soon as I perceive, my representations belong to me" (Lacan 1977c, 81). The imaginary wholeness of the subject, and its specular mastery of things, is shattered as it enters the symbolic register of the Other through the acceptance of the authority of the Name of the Father and of the prohibitions that accompany the Father's No (*nom/n* du père). Hamlet, however, avoids the trap of subjectivity in both its specular and post-specular moments. Hamlet does not take the bait of the phantasmic Other, nor does Hamlet choose to live up to the Name of the Father. These two moments of the drama of desire are treated in ways relevant to Shakespeare's play in Lacan's analysis of "anamorphosis" (1977c, 79-90). Let us turn to this analysis, at this point, and determine its relation to a certain Lacanian or poststructural reading of *Hamlet*.

We have already analyzed some of the ways in which *Hamlet* is centred on the specular
and on the specular mastery constitutive of modern metaphysics. Specular self-grounding is, in fact, the way in which we understood the modern metaphysics of the Cartesian Cogito; this notion of specular self-construction is also the way in which Lacan relates philosophical representation to the problematic of consciousness: "I saw myself seeing myself; young Parque says somewhere. . . . We are dealing with the philosopher, who apprehends something that is one of the essential correlates of consciousness in its relation to representation, and which is designated as I see myself seeing myself. What evidence can we really attach to this formula? How is it that it remains, in fact, correlative with that fundamental mode to which we referred in the Cartesian cogito, by which the subject apprehends himself as thought?" (1977c, 80). Lacan also points out that "[i]t is not for nothing that it was at the very period when the Cartesian meditation inaugurated in all its purity the function of the subject that the dimension of optics that I shall distinguish here by calling 'geometrical' or 'flat' (as opposed to perspective) optics was developed" (1977c, 85). Perspectival laws correspond to the institution of the Cartesian subject in their mapping of space as that which is set over against the subject in its imaginary wholeness (cf. Lacan 1977c, 86). Lacan refers, at this point, to Hans Holbein's The Ambassadors. The painting presents two "stiffened" figures. "Between them is a series of objects that represent in the painting of the period the symbols of vanitas" (88). The painting presents these images in such a way that they can be plainly (mis-) recognized. One figure, in particular, catches Lacan's attention: "that figure, which the author [Baltrusaitis, author of Anamorphoses] compares to a cuttlebone and which for me suggests rather that loaf composed of two books which Dali was once pleased to place on the head of an old woman, . . . or, again, Dali's soft watches, whose signification is obviously less phallic than that of the object depicted in a flying position in the foreground of this picture. . . . Holbein has the cheek to show me my own soft watch" (88, 90).
The perspectival image can easily be identified and identified with; it is "my own soft watch." Yet this imaginary identification with the phallic presence of the phantasmic image is shattered by the "anamorphic" structure of the same image. Anamorphosis entails "the distortion, on another surface, of the image that I would have obtained on the first" (87). It designates the reversal of the perspectival procedure and of the perspectival mechanism, the lucinda, invented by Dürer. The image and its distortion, for Lacan, embody the phallic signifier in its two modes of presence: "How is it that nobody has ever thought of connecting this with . . . the effect of an erection? Imagine a tattoo traced on the sexual organ ad hoc in the state of repose and assuming its, if I may say so, developed form in another state" (87-88). The distortion of the phallic image, the anamorphic-phallic ghost, arises through a change in one's focus or perspective on the image. With the side glance or the repetition of the look the presumed phallic presence gives way to the horror of annihilation that shocks the viewer. Phallic presence and identity give way to the phallic ghost and the absence of ground for the phallic signifier: "Begin by walking out of the room in which no doubt it has long held your attention. It is then that, turning round as you leave--as the author of the Anamorphoses describes it--you apprehend in this form . . . What? A skull" (88).26

Ophelia is "a piece of bait" (Lacan 1977a, 11). Perhaps she could be called an anamorphic lure. Lacan asserts that the etymology of Ophelia is "O phallos" (1977a, 20). Ophelia is the bait as phallus (in repose) in presenting herself as a phantasm for Hamlet's lost wholeness—that is, with his mother. The bait of the phallic signifier, when taken, catches the subject in the endless substitutes for presence within the signifying chain (cf. 1977b, 303). Ophelia, then, embodies the role, according to Lacan, of the objet petit a. She is the small "other" as fetishized object of desire which eventually triggers the entrance of the subject into the realm of the large "Other," of the symbolic, or of the Law of the Father. In categorizing Hamlet as a drama of the psycho-subject,
and in seeing that drama as solely the drama of Prince Hamlet as subject, the possibilities for interpretation that the play offers are narrowed considerably—namely to the realm of the modern metaphysics of the subject and to the psycho-politics of the masculine subject. With Hamlet considered to be the principal subject of the play, character analysis in the history of Hamlet criticism has invariably revolved around him. The little that has been said about Ophelia, and Lacan is no different in this regard, defines her as the object of desire of Hamlet: "She is linked forever, for centuries, to the figure of Hamlet" (Lacan 1977a, 20). Ophelia loses her autonomy as subject within this categorization; she is only an object which helps, through her baiting, to form the mature masculine subject. However, this traditional conception of the Oedipal drama obviously breaks down in the play. Hamlet does not take the bait of subjectivity, signification, and desire; we could say that the play does not take the bait either.

In the scene in which Ophelia is offered as a literal bait by which the spying members of the court (Polonius, Gertrude, and Claudius) will be able to catch the intentions of Hamlet (III.i), Hamlet out-baits, or out-feigns, the other dissimulators. His feigned madness in the scene leads the other characters to mis-recognize the cause of his distress. Polonius, having over-heard the dialogue between Hamlet and Ophelia, concludes in the following manner:

> But yet do I believe
> The origin and commencement of his grief
> Sprung from neglected love. (III.i.172-74)

Hamlet rejects Ophelia, in rejecting the bait of an imaginary identification. Rather than the image of an ideal earth and ideal paternal imago, the earth is a sterile promontory for Hamlet. This marks the importance of the denigration of human marriage and reproduction in Act III Scene 1. Hamlet rejects Ophelia, as a potential wife, along with marriage in general. Hamlet says that "we will have no moe marriage" (III.i.143). Ophelia is also rejected insofar as she is a potential
"breeder of sinners":

Get thee to a nunnery. Why wouldst thou be a breeder of sinners? I am myself indifferent honest, but yet I could accuse me of such things that it were better my mother had not borne me: I am very proud, revengeful, ambitious, with more offences at my beck than I have thoughts to put them in, imagination to give them shape, or time to act them in. What should such fellows as I do crawling between earth and heaven? We are arrant knaves all; believe none of us.... Get thee to a nunnery, farewell. Or if thou wilt needs marry, marry a fool, for wise men know well enough what monsters you make of them. (III.i.119-127, 134-36)

If we are to accompany Polonius in the role of court spy and master of covert intelligence, with the mission of discovering Hamlet’s mystery, we may be asking ourselves, as the scene unfolds, what brings on this tirade against marriage and breeding? One perspective on this problem sees the tirade as part of a general despising of female sexuality. Ophelia, like Gertrude, is rejected as a contaminated maternal body, as a sexualized female body that the pre-Oedipal subject had wished to possess solely for himself: "Ophelia becomes dangerous to Hamlet insofar as she becomes identified in his mind with the contaminating maternal body, the mother who has borne him" (Adelman 258). Hamlet’s madness, then, could be interpreted, in the manner of Polonius, as a matter of love—more particularly, as part of the masculine subject’s oscillation between the idealization and the denigration of female sexuality, an oscillation succinctly described in Shakespeare’s Sonnets:

    Past reason hunted, and no sooner had,
    Past reason hated as a swallowed bait
    On purpose laid to make the taker mad: (Sonnet 129)

Hamlet’s disillusionment with the prospect of a pre-Oedipal possession of the pure maternal body facilitates his acceptance of the paternal law and entrance into his social role. According to this reading, in rejecting Ophelia as literal bait in the trap set to catch his intentions, Hamlet actually takes the bait of subjectivity and desire as the movement (glissement) (Lacan 1977b, 303) of
signifying replacements. I would assert, however, if we are to take this Lacanian-psychoanalytic point of departure, that Hamlet’s problem is not so much the threat of feminine sexuality here as that of the anamorphic trap. Hamlet’s anxiety is inspired by the distorted image, and the abyssmal ground of subjectivity that this distorted image reveals.

I have heard of your paintings well enough. God hath given you one face, and you make yourselves another. You jig and amble, and you lisp; you nickname God’s creatures, and make your wantonness your ignorance. (III.i.139-42)

Hamlet is not struck with horror at the female equation in the nature of reproduction (breeding). He is not struck with the lack that is embodied, according to Lacan, in the female sexual organs. Rather, he is struck with the nihilation upon which the subjects so engendered, the products of this reproduction, are based. He is struck with the fact that these subjects, “arrant knaves all,” cannot be believed. That is, the position, the stability, and the identity the subject seems to possess are fictions. Hamlet, according to his own parameters a “wise” man and no “fool” (III.i.135), has seen into the anamorphic trick of subjectivity; he has seen the anamorphic skull that can be mistaken for the phallic presence of secure subjectivity. He has seen the phallic ghost that marks the trace or absence of any ground or identity behind the desiring subject. In this way, the bait of an *O phallos* in repose can make “monsters” (III.i.136) of the seeming subject.

The first moment of the anamorphic trap for the gaze is that of the misrecognized phallus in repose. Hamlet, as we have said, does not take the bait of this trap; he does not see Ophelia as the ontological unity symbolized by the *O phallos*; Hamlet does not misrecognize Ophelia as his own “soft watch.” The next moment of the anamorphic trap is that of the entrance into the field of the Other and the acceptance of the relay of substitutes for real presence, the acceptance of the mask of subjectivity and the nihilating “skull” behind it. Hamlet also eludes this part of the trap set by the technologies of subjectivity. Because Hamlet did not take the bait of the *O phallos*, he
is not grounded, as social subject, upon the phallic-zero signifier. Hamlet does not accept the Father’s Law and the the signifier of lack (the phallus as lack, the zero-phallus, the O phallos) that accompanies it. “Where does Hamlet’s ghost emerge from, if not from the place from which he denounces his brother for surprising him and cutting him off in the full flower of his sins? And far from providing Hamlet with the prohibitions of the Law that would allow his desire to survive, this too ideal father is constantly being doubted” (Lacan 1977c, 34-35). Hamlet doubts the ghost—according to Lacan, a veiled phallus—which embodies the Law of the Father, the Law of the Dead Father of memory and culture à la Freud’s Totem and Taboo. What is Hamlet doubting in doubting the ghost? The ghost, which “com’st in such a questionable shape” (I.iv.43), has a questionable form; it is ana-morphic. In questioning the ghost, then, he questions the phallic, anamorphic ghost.

Entry into the symbolico-social realm means the adherence to the paternal imago. But Hamlet must choose between two father figures: King Claudius and King Hamlet. Perhaps the most famous psychoanalytic interpretation of the play, Laurence Olivier’s film Hamlet (1949), in fact, frames the play for the viewer along these parameters of the problematic of the choice between two fathers: the voice-over prologue announces at the beginning of the film that this is a play about “a man who could not make up his mind.” This choice between two fathers is also the psychoanalytic significance of the comparison of the pictorial images of the two fathers in the infamous “closet scene”:

Look here upon this picture and on this,  
The counterfeit presentment of two brothers.  
See what a grace was seated on this brow:  
Hyperion’s curls, the front of Jove himself,  
An eye like Mars, to threaten and command,  
A station like the herald Mercury  
New lighted on a heaven-kissing hill—
A combination and a form indeed
Where every god did seem to set his seal
To give the world assurance of a man.
This was your husband. Look you now what follows.
Here is your husband, like a mildewed ear
Blasting his wholesome brother. Have you eyes?
Could you on this fair mountain leave to feed,
And batten on this moor? (III.iv.54-68)

Here the representation, the “counterfeit presentment,” of each figure enacts the attempt, by means of the metaphors that position each presentation, to secure the identity of each, and thus of the Oedipal subject. However, this attempt to clearly delineate between the proper father and the fallen breaks down and does not afford an avenue for the construction of the representational subject. The differentiation between the two fathers is problematic even at the start of the play. Hamlet cannot tolerate Gertrude’s lack of memory of the first father. This lack of memory threatens the delineation and identification of this father and of the subject with this father.

Gertrude’s failure to differentiate has put an intolerable strain on Hamlet by making him the only repository of his father’s image, the only agent of differentiation in a court that seems all too willing to accept the new king in place of the old. Her failure of memory . . . in effect defines Hamlet’s task in relation to his father as a task of memory: as she forgets, he inherits the burden of differentiating, of idealizing and making static the past; hence the ghost’s insistence on remembering (1.5.33, 91) and the degree to which Hamlet registers his failure to avenge his father as a failure of memory (4.4.40). (Adelman 257)

The identification of Hamlet as emerging psychic subject, then, requires a clearly delineated paternal image with which he can identify. The attempts to secure this paternal identity, like all attempts to secure identity in the play, are doomed to failure. Adelman sums up this problematic quite succinctly:

The triangulated choice between two fathers that is characteristic of these plays [1 and 2 Henry IV, and Julius Caesar] is at the center of Hamlet; here, as in the earlier plays, assuming masculine identity means taking on the qualities of the father’s name—becoming a Henry, a Brutus, or a Hamlet—by killing off a false father. Moreover, the whole weight of the play now manifestly creates one father
true and the other false. Nonetheless, the choice is immeasurably more difficult for Hamlet than for his predecessors; for despite their manifest differences, the fathers in *Hamlet* keep threatening to collapse into one another, annihilating in their collapse the son's easy assumption of his father's identity. (256)

Garber, like Adelman, points to the centrality of memory in the play: "*Hamlet* is indeed a play obsessively concerned with remembering and forgetting" (310). The task of memory imparted by the dead father is that of the father's taboo: *Thou shalt not kill thy father*. This puts Hamlet, the bearer of paternal memory, in the ambiguous position of having to kill the father (Claudius)—and therein break the taboo of the dead father of culture—in order to obey the commandment of the dead father (King Hamlet). For this reason, as Garber points out, only by forgetting the father can Hamlet undertake the revenge: "the Name-of-the-Father is the dead father. *This* father—the Ghost—isn't dead enough. The injunction to 'Remember me' suggests that he is not quite dead. Hamlet must renounce him, must internalize the Law by forgetting, not by remembering" (301, cf. 310-22).

"The Mouse-trap," as we have seen, is Hamlet's attempt to secure the truth of Claudius. In this way, it is part of the subject-Hamlet's on-going attempt to secure the identity of the paternal image. This on-going attempt to secure the truth of the father, and thus of the self, is undercut at every stage by Hamlet's awareness, on another level, of the nothingness on which it is based. Hamlet's forgetting of the father's law is one manifestation of this primacy of nihilation. "The Mouse-trap" is a perspicuous example of this failure of the operation of self-securing. *The Murther of Gonzago* is a "trap" insofar as it is an anamorphic trap for the gaze. But again this "trap" does not "catch" the identity of Hamlet's father. It does not prove the fallen nature of one paternal figure and ensure the truth of the other. In the soliloquy which first reveals Hamlet's professed intention behind the presentation of the play of *The Murther of Gonzago*, we encounter
the parameters of anamorphic representation in encapsulated form:

I have heard
That guilty creatures sitting at a play
Have by the very cunning of the scene
Been struck so to the soul that presently
They have proclaimed their malefactions;
For murder, though it have no tongue, will speak
With most miraculous organ. I'll have these players
Play something like the murder of my father
Before mine uncle. (II.ii.545-553)

This proclamation of the aims of representation, and its modalities, must be read in conjunction
with the instructions Hamlet gives the Players two scenes later:

Be not too tame neither, but let your own discretion be your tutor. Suit the action
to the word, the word to the action, with this special observance, that you o’erstep
not the modesty of nature; for anything so o’erdone is from the purpose of playing,
whose end both at the first, and now, was and is, to hold as ‘twere the mirror up
to nature, to show virtue her own feature, scorn her own image, and the very age
and body of the time his form and pressure. (III.ii.14-20)

In both passages, the “purpose” (telos) of representation is the moulding and educating of the
viewing subject: the representation strikes the viewer to the soul; the representation gives the
viewer an image of virtue and or vice with which he or she can identify and live up to. This is the
“mirror” held up to nature that is representation. The play represents by showing us our mirror and
thus drawing out our inner truths. Yet these images of virtue and vice in the mirror of
representation are not photographic copies of the real. They are distorted images which are (mis)
recognized by the viewing subject. The play, for instance, which will “catch the conscience of the
king,” need only be “something like the murder” of King Hamlet. The court performance of the
murder does not correspond to the “real” murder insofar as the murderer, Lucianus, is nephew to
the king rather than brother. Having Lucianus, as nephew and thus structurally equivalent to
Hamlet, kill the Player King implicates the son in the murder of the father. This need not become
a barrier to the formation of Hamlet as representational subject insofar as it could be an instance of the subject projecting itself onto the scene—a projection that aids the identification of self and paternal imago.

However, this projection and identification does not occur in "The Mouse-trap" scene. In fact, it seems that, rather than catch the conscience of the king, Hamlet had set out to catch the conscience of the queen. Hamlet sets out to show the King his own mirror, his own image—and thereby secure a paternal imago for Hamlet as subject—but, in fact, the mirror seems to be placed more squarely in front of Gertrude. As Adelman points out, in "'The Murder of Gonzago,' Hamlet's version of his father's tale, the murderer's role is clearly given less emphasis than the Queen's: Lucianus gets a scant six lines, while her protestations of undying love motivate all the preceding dialogue of the playlet. Moreover, while the actual murderer remains a pasteboard villain, the Queen's protestations locate psychic blame for the murder squarely in her. 'None wed the second but who kill the first,' she tells us (3.2.175)" (268). The bringing out into the open, the attempt to "unkennel," that is to occur in "The Mouse-trap" scene seems to be the bringing out into the open, and into the subject's view, of the mother, of the female body, and of her guilt. This is why "The Mouse-trap" scene is not followed by the swift execution of justice against Claudius in the next—although it is contemplated in III.iii—rather, Hamlet's next moment of action entails the accusations levelled against Gertrude that accompany his prying his way into her private sphere, her closet, in Act III scene IV.30

The bringing before the self of the truths of the mother and of female sexuality that occurs in "The Mouse-trap" scene is connected to our discussion earlier of the discovery of new worlds. There is a link "between the anatomist's opening and exposing to the eye the secrets or 'privities' of women and the 'discovery' or bringing to light of what were from a Eurocentric perspective
previously hidden worlds" (Parker 240). For instance, John Pory's English translation of *A Geographical Historie of Africa Written in Arabicke and Italian by Ioan Leo a More* (1600) participates in the operation of unfolding and exposing to the eye. Its preliminary material included "a map of Africa folded and closed upon itself, which when opened up, brings before the reader's gaze the land of monsters, of Amazons, of prodigious sexuality and of peoples who expose those parts that should be hid" (Parker 240-41). The *Geographical Historie*, then, according to its author Leo Africanus, opens "the secrets and particularities of this African part of the world . . . now plainly discovered and laide open to the view of all beholders." Richard Hakluyt participates in this confluence of the discourses of biological and geographical discovery "when he urges English voyagers to Virginia (simultaneously named after Elizabeth the Virgin Queen and suggestive of yet unopened virgin territory) to strive 'with Argus eies to see' what this virgin territory might be made to 'yield,' a visual language of espial" (Parker 241).

Thus, while it is the truth of Claudius that is the putative aim of Hamlet's representations, it is actually Gertrude, as a geographico-biological "undiscovered country," whose truth is put under the speculum. Yet even this truth, as it is disclosed—by way of confirming the uncertainty principle which is the only ruling principle of the play as a whole—slips away from the observer. Gertrude's identity, truth, or guilt are left undecided in the play—at least in the Second Quarto and First Folio. This inconclusive examination of Gertrude undertaken by the viewing subject is compared by Parker to the discovery of the "monstrous":

Ambivalence, then, about opening up to 'shew' this secret part produces what might be called the anatomical text's pornographic doubleness, its simultaneous opening up and denying to the eye. In this sense, exposures of a female lap or 'privatie' are part of the more general hunger in the period for pornographic or quasi-pornographic display, not just in gynecological description or anatomical illustration but in the extraordinary popularity of a 'monster' literature—the word itself . . . forging a link between showing or demonstrating and the monstrous
previously unknown or hidden from vision. (238)

Thus, we might say that the failure to catch the paternal image within the representations of "The Mouse-trap," and the failure to de-monstrate the truth of the maternal body, seals the foreclosure of subjective structures undertaken by Hamlet. Hamlet encounters the images of social identity held before him like a mirror—for instance, the images of fidelity in love (in the quick to forget her vows Gertrude), of proper ruling (in the Machiavellian Claudius), of political duty (in the indirections of Polonius and the sycophancy of Osric), and of friendship (in the double agency of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern)—in each phantasmatic image, in each distortion, Hamlet perceives the horrible truth. Hamlet perceives the fundamental lack of reality that is the ground of these distorted images; this perception is only possible through the liminal position of madness. One can only see through the fantasy by way of a sideways glance as it were. Insofar as this is the case, Lacan's description of The Ambassadors holds for Hamlet as well: "In Holbein's picture I showed you at once . . . the singular object floating in the foreground, which is there to be looked at, in order to catch, I would almost say, to catch in its trap, the observer, that is to say us. . . . [T]he secret of this picture is given at the moment when, moving slightly away, little by little, to the left, then turning around, we see what the magical floating object signifies. It reflects our own nothingness, in the figure of the death's head" (1977c, 92). We can also say of Hamlet that "at the very heart of the period in which the subject emerged and geometrical optics was an object of research, Holbein makes visible for us here something that is simply the subject as annihilated" (1977c, 88). Garber succinctly addresses this confluence of Hamlet, The Ambassadors, and the critique of the modern metaphysical subject:

Holbein's portrait shows 'the subject as annihilated'—which is the subject of Hamlet, a play situated on the cusp of the emergence of what has come to be known as the modern subject. For there is a way in which Hamlet performs the
same operation as Holbein’s painting upon the gaze and the trope of *vanitas*. Its final tableau of the death’s head in the graveyard scene is another critique of the subject. What then is being caught in the trap Hamlet sets for the King, the King who is a thing of nothing? Is it Claudius who is caught in the “Mouse-trap,” or Hamlet as the signifier of the modern subject, already marked by negation, already dressed in black? (303-304)\(^2\)

*Hamlet* presents the attempts of the representational, Cartesian subject to secure and delineate its identity, to see itself and the truth of the situation in the image before it. This image, and thus the subject’s image of itself, is always distorted in the play. The subject’s delineated image distorts itself and identities end up blurring together within the play: Hamlet is King Hamlet, is Lucianus, is Claudius, is Fortinbras, is Laertes, just as, especially from a post-Stoppard perspective, Rosencrantz is Guildenstern.\(^3\) Michael Bristol has demonstrated that the mingling of funeral and mirth, referred to at the beginning of the play, signals a destruction of the barriers between social identities: “The funeral for Hamlet’s father is combined with a wedding feast, and this odd mingling of grief and of festive laughter is typical of the play as a whole” (350). This social mingling marks *Hamlet*, for Bristol, as “a play that typifies Shakespeare’s use of Carnival as the basis of his dramatic art” (350). As Calderwood suggests, this mingling of identities is part of a wider break down of the borders between entities as a whole:

The running together of funeral and marriage signals a breakdown of the borders between other entities. Hamlet the grieving son of the dead king discovers that he is not merely ‘cousin Hamlet’ to the new king but ‘my son’ as well, which is rather more kinship that he cares for: ‘A little more than kin, and less than kind’ (1.2.65). Claudius is now his ‘uncle-father’ and Gertrude his ‘aunt-mother’ (2.2.376), a hyphenization of relations that leads to the total undifferentiation of Hamlet’s reference to Claudius as ‘My mother’ (4.3.55). This destruction and merger of identities leaves Hamlet longing in his first soliloquy for a corresponding dissolution of self, for a deliquescence of this corporeal being in a union with nothingness: ‘O, that this too too sullied flesh would melt,/Thaw, and resolve itself into a dew’ (1.2.129-130). (63)

This dissolution of identities, of selves, of bodies, and hierarchical relations is also signalled in
the grave-diggers scene:

Against the perspective of death and burial all claims to hierarchical superiority are nullified, all the 'serious' claims of economic, political, or moral systems become the objects of laughter. The doomsday image of the grave is from this perspective not something grim and gloomy but, on the contrary, the occasion for 'drink' and merriment. The grave-diggers' jokes reflect an alternate hierarchy of ontological categories in which death and change are sovereign and permanent, while such symbolic edifices as church, state, and society are killed, buried, dissolved back into the earth by the patient and persistent labor of the grave-digger. (Bristol 360).

In light of our analysis of the play thus far, these instances of dissolved identities and violated boundaries could be seen as supporting the claim that the experience of truth in the play is one in which the secure enclosure of a perimeter is sought in order to define the identities of self, object, or other. This enclosed perimeter, however, is never secure in the play. This failure to secure the perimeter induces, as Adelman points out in relation to Hamlet's fear of the contaminating maternal body, a "boundary panic" in the play (273).34

By making the enclosed position always self-destructive, perhaps Hamlet calls into question the modern experience of truth. Perhaps the play marks a crisis of identity for the modern subject, or, as Salkeld phrases it, a "crisis of sovereignty" (89). The play points to the Cartesian subject and its self-grounded identity but eventually turns away from and loses sight of it (cf. Salkeld 96). Parker points out, similarly, that the showing, and thus the securing of what is shown, in the play is problematized by the infamous Being/appearance dichotomy highlighted throughout it: "The sense that the secret or occulted will come finally to light is countered, however, within the play by a powerful contrary sense of opacity, of inability to penetrate to the show beyond the show, of mysteries that cannot be uncovered or made visible to the eye" (258; cf. 367n70). The play, then, is part of a general "crisis of representation" in the period (Parker 259). Hamlet "never offers any perspicacious or unambiguous sense of a revelation beyond forgery, not even in the player's
oblique show of a hidden scene its commissioner seeks to bring unambiguously to light" (259).

We have seen the ways in which the metaphysics of the subject deconstructs itself in the play—this is the case within a Lacanian reading and within a more general poststructural reading of the play. However, just as we saw in the limitations presented by a Derridean reading of Spenser, if we set out to see the play as telling the truths of subjectivity, any other possibilities will be occulted. Thus, insofar as *Hamlet* arises out of a metaphysical experience of truth, we can deconstruct this understanding, and show how this understanding deconstructs itself. But the deconstruction must remain, and this aspect of the play must remain, within the limits of a metaphysical determination of truth. In order to attend to the non-metaphysical possibilities uttered in the play, we must change our focus.

*Thea-ōra and Lethe*

Too much of nothing
can make a man ill at ease. (Bob Dylan)

We have seen that *Hamlet* figures forth the modern metaphysical theatre of representation, while, at the same time, pointing to the limits of the representational—that is, the metaphysico-imperial—determination of truth. In this way, *Hamlet* entails the negative portion of a “critique” of representation. I want to explore, in this section, the positive aspect of this critique; I want to explore the “undiscovered country” that is the unsaid, non-metaphysical possibilities uttered in the play. That is to say, rather than the representational determination of truth, and its limits, the play also presents, as a positive alternative, the primordial experience of truth as *alētheia*. To do this I will show the ways in which the play and some of its major thematics arise out of an encounter with concealment (*lethe*).

The change of focus required in order to attend to the unsaid possibilities uttered in *Hamlet*
entails a shift in the way seeing itself, or focussing and the changing of focus, is determined. Up until this point in our analysis of Hamlet we have encountered the “specular” within the play according to its determination as “theatrical.” Correspondingly we have determined the “theatrical” along the lines of the “modern metaphysical theatre of representation” wherein the grounding subject (subiectum) “stages” the theatre of existence as a series of shows or presentations of entities held up for its view and control. This modern metaphysical determination of Being as theatrical shows posited by and for the subject is to be distinguished from the early Greek determination of seeing and of theatre. We have said that the modern metaphysical determination of truth sees entities arise in their truth insofar as they are posited as objects over and against (Gegen-stand) the thinking subject. In contrast to this modern determination, “neither medieval nor Greek thinking represents that which presences as object.” What is “real” in the modern age has, as the manner of presence belonging to it, the character of “objectness” (Gegenständigkeit) (“SR” 163).

What is the manner of presencing proper to things as experienced within the early Greek determination?

We have said that Being, in its pre-metaphysical determination, is a presencing that corresponds to the Greek experience of alētheia as an unconcealing, an appearing out of concealment. We have also said that this experience of alētheia is essentially related to that of phusis, so that the happening of alētheia is a self-appearing or self-emerging along the lines of the essence of phusis. For this reason we can say that “[t]he unconcealed is what has entered into the tranquility of pure self-appearance and of the ‘look’” (Heidegger 1992, 132). What does it mean to say that beings arise as “the unconcealed” in their entering “the tranquility of . . . the ‘look’”? What is this “look”? The nature of this looking points us to the distinction between the modes of seeing and presencing which belong to the modern and the Greek experience of Being. The
Greeks, like the moderns, conceived of knowledge as a looking. However, for the Greeks, the “look” that takes place in the arising of something within the sphere of the unconcealed is the look of the outward appearance, or outward look, of Being shining in beings (as phainomenon, eidos); it is not the look of the self-grounded subject onto the world it represents. The concept of the “look” as it arises in the modern concepts of “theatre” and of “theory” has its roots in this early Greek sense of the “look” as thea: “Thea . . . is the outward look, the aspect in which something shows itself, the outward appearance in which it offers itself” (“SR” 163). The outward look in which things show themselves (thea) is centrally related to the early Greek experience of the essence of truth as alētheia and to the determination of knowing as a “seeing”: “Because the essence of truth holds sway as alētheia, the open and lighted determines what appears therein and makes it comply with the essential form of the look that looks into the light. In correspondence to this appearing look, the disclosing perception and grasp of beings, i.e., knowledge, is conceived as a looking and a seeing” (Heidegger 1992, 147). Thea is the “look of Being, which looks into beings.” Our word “theory” comes from the coupling of this thea with a seeing that is understood as the grasping of the appearing, horao: “The grasping look in the sense of seeing is in Greek horao. To see the encountering look, in Greek thean-horan, is theorao—theōrein, theōria. The word ‘theory’ means, conceived simply, the perceptual relation of man to Being, a relation man does not produce, but rather a relation into which Being itself first posits man” (1992, 147). Thus, as we have already seen, Being—or, in this case, Being as the look or appearing of beings—not man, is the measure (metron). For Plato, the self-appearing of the outward look is eidos. We grasp the eidos through the comportment of theōria (cf. Heidegger 1997, 84-90).

“Thus,” Heidegger points out, “it follows that theōrein is thean horan, to look attentively on the outward appearance wherein what presences becomes visible and, through such sight—seeing—to
linger with it" ("SR" 163). Put another way, theōros "means the one who looks upon something as it shows itself, who sees what is given to see. The theōros is the one who goes to the festival, the one who is present as a spectator at the great dramas and festivals—whence our word 'theater'" (Heidegger 1997, 44).

This conception of thea and of theōria is the foundation of the modern experience of the subjective theatre and of scientific theory, where the seeing of beings has become a controlling and over-seeing surveillance. Certainly these metaphysical interpretations of seeing are harboured, although not realized, within the early Greek experience. What, however, was more fundamental for the Greek experience was the relation between the look of thea and the presencing of Being as alētheia. Thea, for the Greeks, also means goddess; and it is as a goddess that alētheia, "the unconcealment from out of which and in which that which presences, presences, appears to the early thinker Parmenides" ("SR" 164). Heidegger, along these lines, points out that "alētheia is the looking of Being into the open that is lighted by it itself as it itself, the open for the unconcealedness of all appearance" (1992, 162). Thus, along with the aspects of the "look" which lead to the "theoretical" interpretation of thea, there also resides another possibility of meaning: where thea is the look of Being or of the divine. It is not by accident that "in theo- resides the stem theion, theos; theorein thus means: to look upon the divine" (Heidegger 1997, 44). Heidegger also points out that the roots of the word theorein can be understood in other than "theoretical" ways: "When differently stressed, the two root words thea and orao can read thea and ōra" ("SR" 164). Thea, as we have said is the goddess—most pertinently, as we have said, in this context, the goddess Truth. In conjunction with this divine presencing, the "Greek word ōra signifies the respect we have, the honor and esteem we bestow. If now we think the word theōria in the context of the words just cited, then theōria is the reverent paying heed to the
unconcealment of what presences" ("SR" 164). We can sum up, at this point, by saying that theorein, as thea-ora, is a beholding with reverence of divine presencing; this beholding is the hold and claim that the divine (or Being) has on humanity, not the other way around. Theorein, in this old, "and that means the early but by no means the obsolete, sense is the beholding that watches over truth" ("SR" 164-65). Thus we will attend to the ways in which, in Hamlet, the specular is experienced along the lines of this thea-ora, or the reverence of the beholding of the wonder of Being. Along with this attention to the fundamental comportment of thea-ora, we will also attend to the encounter of human existence with lethe in the play.

In the self-appearing of the divine (thea) in alētheia, as "alē-theia" (Heidegger 1992, 163), there is an essential relation to lethe. We discussed earlier the nature of pseudos as the counter-essence of alētheia. Pseudos designates the "false" in the sense of that which arises within the realm of the unconcealed in a "distorted" manner. The false, the distorted or dissembled, are "unconcealed" and belong to the unconcealed just as the "true" in the sense of the non-distorted. Thus, "[w]e can now see . . . that mere unconcealedness, in which even something 'false' may stand, does not exhaust the essence of alētheia" (Heidegger 1992, 132). A more primordial moment of alētheia manifests itself in its relation to lethe. Lethe marks the primordial counter-essence of truth.

In light of this, Heidegger suggests that, in order to attend properly to a certain range of meaning within the word, we should translate alētheia as "dis-closure" (Entbergung) rather than "un-veiling" (Unverborgenheit?). "Dis-closure" is not the mere opposing or lifting of closure. Rather, "[w]e must think dis-closure exactly the way we think of dis-charging (igniting) or displaying (unfolding). Discharging means to release the charge; displaying means to let play out the folds of the manifold in their multiplicity" (1992, 133). In other words, while we automatically
think of truth and Being within oppositional structures—that is, Being is the negation of nothing and truth the negation of falsity—within the primordial essence of truth as alē-theia there is an interplay of revealing and concealing; there is a sheltering-concealment, of necessity, within the open of dis-closure:

Our first tendency is to understand disclosure or disconcealing in opposition to concealing, just as disentangling is opposed to entangling. Disclosure, however, does not simply result in something disclosed as unclosed. Instead, the dis-closure [Ent-bergen] is at the same time an en-closure [Ent-bergen], just like dissemination which is not opposed to the seed, or like in-flaming [Entflammen], which does not eliminate the flame [Flamme] but brings it into its essence. Disclosure [Entbergung] is equally for the sake of an en-closure as a sheltering [Bergung] of the unconcealed in the unconcealedness of presence, i.e., in Being (1992, 133).

This oppositional structure—the determination of the counter-essence of truth and Being as a lack or negation of Being—arises within the metaphysical determination of the Being of beings corresponding to the forgetting of Being. "Being, the never autochthonous, is the groundless. This seems to be a lack, though only if calculated in terms of beings, and it appears as an abyss in which we founder without support in our relentless pursuit of beings. In fact we surely fall into the abyss, we find no ground, as long as we know and seek a ground only in the form of a being and hence never carry out the leap into Being or leave the familiar landscape of the oblivion of Being" (Heidegger 1992, 150).40 We have seen this metaphysical approach to the Being of beings as it is manifested in the projection of the scientific ground plan, in the modern metaphysics of the subject, and in the demonstration that, within its own metaphysical logic, this subject is based on a lack—that is, as manifested in psychoanalytic-deconstruction. Rather than disclosure being the "lack" of closure, or vice versa, dis-closure is the bringing of closure (lethe) to its essence. Only in the open of dis-closing Being is there sheltering concealment. We shall see this as manifested in Hamlet in a couple of guises. We will begin by attending to the interplay of the
essence of speech and silence in the play, and end with the interplay of forgetting and memory.

The Greek experience of *alētheia*, of dis-closure, delineated here—as the look of Being into the open lighted by it—as we have noted, has been transformed throughout the metaphysical tradition. Within modern metaphysics the look of Being becomes the metaphysical *theatre* of representation (for the subject) and the modern scientific *theoretical* gaze. We have already seen the ways in which *Hamlet* participates in the foundations of these modern experiences of the specular. We will now turn to the ways in which the play speaks this alternate possibility of determining the “look” of Being; this is another possibility that has been relayed, in a covert manner, throughout the tradition and expressed in “great” works.41

4.6 On Silence and Madness

We will explore, in this sub-section, some modalities of the presencing of things out of sheltering concealment: silence, madness, and revenge. All point to an experience of the theatre of existence that is primordial. Rather than the modern metaphysical theatre of representation, these figure forth the theatre of the look of the goddess (*thea-ōra*).

Silence, it can be argued, is so prevalent in the play that it becomes the ground out of which the play itself emerges.42 As Calderwood points out, “[s]ilence is the matrix from which the play issues, the inexpressible country from which the Ghost comes like a whispered word to make us realize that beneath the chatter and clamor of the court there was, all along, a more meaningful zone of silence and secrecy” (1983, 74). In some senses, silence, in *Hamlet*, manifests the metaphysical enterprise of securing the upright position. In some ways silence is a mode of the “shutting up” of oneself, or securing of oneself, in order to bring the other out into the open. *Hamlet’s* madness, as Wolfgang Clemen asserts, is a form of silence that cloaks his “real” intentions: “Hamlet needs images of his ‘antic disposition.’ He would betray himself if he used
open, direct language. Hence he must speak ambiguously and cloak his real meaning under quibbles and puns, images and parables" (110). This is also the function of the "silence" of the "spy" in the several scenes which employ one or more characters in the role of the over-hearer or over-seer. One is silent in order to over-see and over-hear while being oneself un-seen and un-heard. Let us take as exemplary the way in which Polonius silences himself before withdrawing behind the arras in the "closet scene":

'A will come straight. Look you lay home to him.
Tell him his pranks have been too broad to bear with,
And that your grace hath screen'd and stood between
Much heat and him. I'll silence me even here. [my emphasis] (III.iv.1-4)

In another sense, however, one that speaks out of the primodial essence of ἀληθεία, silence is the sheltering-archē of speech. Silence is the beginning and end of speech. Only humanity, as the ones bestowed with language or speech, as zōn logos echon, can be silent. We do not say that the tree can "silence" itself. Speech gives to silence its proper essence. Similarly, silence is the beginning and end of speech, its sheltering-archē-telos. Silence separates speech from the chatter of monotonous noise. Disclosure, then, occurs in the word (logos) inasmuch as beings arise in the realm of unconcealment in the shelter of silence.

In the last words of Hamlet, as he lays dying, we encounter silence as a thematic in relation to the proper ends of the unfolding of one's life and to the proper ends of the dramatic plot.

O, I die, Horatio!
The potent poison quite o'er-crows my spirit.
I cannot live to hear the news from England,
But I do prophesy th' election lights
On Fortinbras. He has my dying voice.
So tell him, with th' occurrents, more and less,
Which have solicited—the rest is silence. (V.ii.331-337)
Hamlet’s life ends; “the rest is silence.” This “rest” points to the concealedness of death. His life is a certain apportionment of dis-closure, a dis-closure in the word; thus, Hamlet’s life reaches its end—in the sense of its telos or essential definition—with silence. Also, this “rest” is that which remains unsaid within this most loquacious play. The events not presented, but perhaps inferred, those conjectured, the words not said but implied, all of this is the “rest” and all of this remains a silence sheltering and structuring that which is said. Finally, the “rest” referred to here could be a rest in the sense of “repose.” For instance, Hamlet ends the first encounter with the Ghost with an appeal: “Rest, rest, perturbéé spirit!” (I.v.181). Death, then, is the telos of life in the sense that it is the defining remainder (“rest”) of life, but it is also, as this appeal to the Ghost points out, a silent “repose” (“rest”). The Ghost is rest-less, without repose, because of the injustice of the state at present. Only with a certain restitution can the Ghost rest in peace as the telos of a justified life. Thus, the “rest” as “silence” points to the three-fold unity of lethe (concealment-withdrawal): 1) as the “unsaid” of language or of the play, as the withdrawal integral to language; 2) as death, the concealing-withdrawal essential to the unfolding of life itself; and 3) as the “rest” or repose integral to the movement (kinēsis) of existence.

All words and action in the play, we have said, arise out of a certain silence. Words have a certain power in the Danish court. Words are “daggers” that enter the ears, akin to the strange poison that operates on the “porches” of King Hamlet’s ears. Words and actions, when suited each to the other (cf. III.iii.15-22), persuade and move the soul in a remarkable way. Horatio, as orator, in many ways stands for this power of the word and action, and of the word to move to action. For this reason, the question arises as to why Horatio falls increasingly silent as the play progresses (cf. Calderwood 1983, 117-22)? Using our point of departure in silence as the ground of the play, we could answer this question by pointing to this as yet another example of the
constitutive power of silence. That is, the silence that allows the oration (Horatio) is foregrounded throughout the play to such an extent that (H)oratio is himself silenced. We should keep this power of silence with respect to words and actions in mind, too, when we ponder the fact that Hamlet’s inability to act is thought of in terms of an inability to speak. Hamlet contrasts his inaction to the “actions” of the player:

What would he do
Had he the motive and the cue for passion
That I have? He would drown the stage with tears,
And cleave the general ear with horrid speech, (II.ii.516-19)

The player differs from Hamlet, then, not in “doing”—in our general sense of that term—anything different but in his ability to “cleave the general ear with horrid speech.” Hamlet, on the other hand, like “John-a-dreams, unpregnant of [his] cause, / . . . can say nothing” (II.ii.525-6).

We should note, too, that even speech is a silence of sorts—that is, when it is a speaking out of the realm of madness. Gertrude, for instance, says that Ophelia’s “speech is nothing.” Again this speech as nothing, this silence, moves the hearer; it has a certain power:

Her speech is nothing,
Yet the unshaped use of it doth move
The hearers to collection; they aim at it,
And botch the words up fit to their own thoughts,
Which, as her winks and nods and gestures yield them,
Indeed would make one think there might be thought,
Though nothing sure, yet much unhappily. (IV.v.7-13)

The words of madness, akin to a silence, move the listener. One aims at a meaning based on the familiar, the sane, the world of beings as they are. But this falls short; it is “nothing sure.” In this way, we are drawn out, in wonder, to the leap into Being as the abyss of possibilities. In this way, madness is a “sacred space” out of which the meaningful relations of the familiar world are founded. This is the sense of the “ecstatic folly” that we saw in relation to the folly described by
Erasmus and the modes of madness (*furor*) described in Plato’s *Phaedrus* (cf. Chapter 3).

The mode of madness that presents itself in *Hamlet* is that of melancholy. According to Elizabethan thinking, Hamlet, being a man, is melancholic in such a way that his imaginative genius is emphasized. Ophelia’s is a madness that “the Elizabethans would have diagnosed as female love-melancholy, or erotomania” (Showalter 225). Within Pythagorean and even older mythological thought, the health of the human body depended on the harmonious balance of four humours (*chymoi*: juice or flavour). “Bodily states, mental imagery and characteristic forms of behaviour which had been regarded as symptomatic of illness, and thus of humoral imbalance, were progressively associated together as general dispositions or character types. Humours, thus, came to denote either pathological states or constitutional aptitudes” (Ferguson 6). The melancholic humour was “cold and dry.” Vegetative growth, the self-emergence (*phusis*) of plants, and procreation were essentially tied to warmth and moisture. Thus, the melancholic individual, “excessively taciturn, withdrawn and lethargic” (Ferguson 7), was tied to a certain concealment or withdrawal of that which self-emerges and appears. The melancholic, from an early point in Western thinking, is tied to *lethe*. With Plato, this connection with *lethe* is expanded and tied to the inspiration (*enthousiasmoi*) of the divine—an inspiration that arises out of the domain of *lethe*. Plato thought of melancholy as the mood related to *ekstasis*. “We receive the greatest benefit through frenzy,” and the melancholic is the most attuned to receive this “divine gift” (*Phaedrus* 244d). Pseudo-Aristotle combined the earlier medical theories with Plato’s notion of melancholic frenzy (*ekstasis*). *Problemata XXX*.1 founds a historically repeated sentiment as to the nature of melancholy: “Why is it that all men who have become outstanding in philosophy, statesmanship, poetry or the arts are melancholic?” This is the context in which the Renaissance experienced melancholy. It is a context that is still at work when Heidegger says, with conscious reference to
Aristotle, that all creative action resides in the fundamental mood (Grundstimmung) of melancholy. Creative achievement, he says, is a free-forming activity whose freedom is found only where there is a burden to be shouldered. The burden weighs heavily on humanity’s overall mood, so that a historical humanity comes to be in the mood of melancholy (Schwermut)—whether or not humanity is aware of it (1995, 182-183).

Pseudo-Aristotle includes “Empedocles, Plato, Socrates, and many other well-known men” among melancholics. Melancholy is the attunement, the madness, proper to philosophizing. Philosophy is the essentially ec-static questioning undertaken by a historical humanity. We have seen the ways in which this manifests itself in Plato, Erasmus, More’s Hythloday, and Spenser’s Immeritó. Ec-static questioning is a confrontation with the nothing as integral to Being; it is undertaken as a divine madness (mania), possession (enthousiasmos) or frenzy (ekstasis). Following in the tradition of Pseudo-Aristotle, Renaissance thinking associated melancholy with all of these “ec-static” aspects of humanity: mania, enthousiasmos, ekstasis (cf. Screech 1983, 32).

This encounter with Being and the nothing in essential ek-sistence occurs in the historically sited attunement of humanity. For instance, in the modern age, the confrontation with the nothing (leithe-concealment)—rather than its oblivion in our day to day affairs, our in-sistence—arises in the fundamental attunement of “anxiety.” In the modern age, “[a]nxiety reveals the nothing” ("WM" 103). In anxiety, beings slip away, yet they also show themselves in their utter strangeness; they show themselves as what escapes representational schemata and calculative planning. This revealing of the nothing takes away beings and gives them back in the strangeness of Being which stimulates wonder (cf. Pöggeler 74). In the Renaissance the historically sited fundamental attunement which disclosed the abyss that is the essential ground of human existence was melancholy (cf. Radloff 1993a, 357). In melancholy, things withdraw and this withdrawal
confronts the melancholic with an immobilizing wonder, with a transfixing, pensive apprehension of the groundlessness of all action. Hamlet's oft discussed delay, then, arises, on the one hand, as a metaphysical procedure of ascertaining the certainty of the murder and of the other characters' guilt or innocence. On the other hand, this "delay" arises as a wonder in the face of the strange ground of existence: the beings with which he deals (the Danish court, the other characters) are no longer calculable and securable for him. He has encountered, in the fundamental attunement of "melancholy," the nothing out of which beings arise and upon which his own existence is based.

It is for this reason, that even speech is a silence of sorts for Hamlet. Speech which does not confront this groundlessness of all human endeavour arises, for Hamlet, as mere "words, words, words." Hamlet upbraids himself, for instance, for not transcending the pre-existing order completely enough, for not undertaking a revenge—which is a strange surpassing of the law in order to institute a lawfulness. Without the strength, as yet, to transcend the existing order in the form of revenge, Hamlet is fallen in the world of beings as pre-determined. He also has a fallen relation to language. He is relegated to the iteration of the already said; he does not undertake an essential, revengeful saying which founds the order of the Danish polis anew. This is the way in which language, in its inauthentic mode, for Hamlet, consists of mere "words." This is also what lies behind his denigration of the fact that he "Must like a whore unpack [his] heart with words" (II.ii.542).

As a poetic furor, as the mood of creative achievement, and as an encounter with the nothing (lethe), melancholy marks the disposition of Renaissance European humanity as receptive to the self-emerging and concealing of Being. It is a receptivity to the divine (daimonios) in its presencing. This is what Socrates is pointing to when he makes the distinction between the prophetic art as "heaven sent" and this art as a product of human activity (Phaedrus 244a). The
archê of madness, of all prophetic insight into Being undertaken by humanity, is the self-emerging (phusis), lighting-look of inspiring grace, of the divine (daimonios); it does not reside in human “skill” or know-how (techne). But what is this daimonios?

A literal translation, found in the modern dictionary, is “divine” or “marvelous.” The divine, in Greek thinking, is the the “marvelous” or the “uncanny” as it presences itself in the ordinary. But what is the “uncanny”? The uncanny is the moment of Being coming into focus for the ones who are attuned and attentive; it arises where “the extraordinary announces itself, the excessive that strays ‘beyond’ the ordinary, that which is not to be explained by explanations on the basis of beings” (Heidegger 1992, 101). The divine moment, the moment of the look of the goddess (Thea) Truth, is a moment in which familiar schemata fail and the unknown is encountered. The strange, the marvelous, the uncanny strikes us with an immobilizing wonder. Melancholic-madness is the gift of the attunement to the presencing of the strange. The god (daimôn), then, is an appearing of the extraordinary in the realm of the ordinary; it is an appearing that is a founding moment; it is the event (Ereignis) of truth—the shattering of familiar meaningful relations and the founding of meaning anew, out of the realm of the abyss of meaninglessness. This is the importance of the Ghost as daimôn (demon) who “defamiliarizes” the world of Hamlet and the Danish court.

4.7 Lethe and Memory

The Ghost speaks out of the realm of lethe as concealing-oblivion. It is “forbid / To tell the secrets of [its] prison house” (I.v.13-14). The Ghost, in this way, is a concealed revealing out of the realm of lethe. The Ghost’s prison house does not expose itself to the everyday analysis of beings here and there. Rather, it withdraws and presents itself as this withdrawing concealment. The Ghost points to this Lethe field by name a little later in the same scene:
And duller shouldst thou be than the fat weed
That roots itself in ease on Lethe wharf,
Wouldst thou not stir in this. . . . (I.v.32-34)

According to the Ghost, the tale told out of this realm of oblivion would stir all but the most dull. But as we know, and as centuries of criticism have wrestled with, Hamlet, in a sense, is not stirred to action. Is this due to the fact that the Ghost's words lack the rhetorical force to stir one to action (energeta)? If we are to take the Ghost's words just cited as true, the answer to this question is no. A traditional response to this problem, and perhaps one not far afield, is that Hamlet is not stirred because he is, in fact, dullest "than the fat weed / That roots itself in ease on Lethe wharf."

Of course, Hamlet's dullness is a sign of his melancholic disposition. According to Timothy Bright in A Treatise of Melancholy (1586), "melancholy causeth dullness of conceit" (111). This dullness, as manifested in Hamlet as "A dull and muddy-mettled rascal" (II.ii.524), this cold, dry, and thick nature of the melancholic humour, means that psychic impressions (inscriptions) are retained and not easily passed over. The melancholic broods over what the average person passes over in blissful oblivion.

Hamlet, as melancholic, is marked by an excessive memory and an excessive forgetting of the Ghost and its call. After the Ghost ends its tale, it commands Hamlet to remember: "Remember me" (I.v.91). Hamlet replies to this commandment with the assertion that he will, in an excessive manner, remember only the Ghost:

Remember thee?
Yea, from the table of my memory
I'll wipe away all trivial fond records,
All saws of books, all forms, all pressures past
That youth and observation copied there,
And thy commandment all alone shall live
Within the book and volume of my brain,
Unmixed with baser matter. . . . (I.v.97-104)
Yet, as we have noted, Hamlet, the dull weed of Lethe wharf, forgets the Ghost’s commandment, in a way, to revenge and to remember. In the “closet scene” the Ghost must return to give him a reminder of his purpose:

Do not forget. This visitation
Is but to whet thy almost blunted purpose. (III.iv.111-112)

This oscillating interplay of memory and forgetting, of revealing and concealing, marks the “between” nature of Hamlet: he is one strung between a dullness which ties him to the field of Lethe (forgetting) and a dullness of humour that determines his disposition as one of excessive memory. Hamlet straddles the abyss between the call of the demon (daimôn) and the everyday engagement with the world and its politics. Hamlet both steps outside of the laws and just order of the polis and refounds its order in setting the world and time aright; he is, like Antigone, one who stands above beings as they are and into the nothing (hupsipolis). This is also the dual nature of revenge. Francis Bacon, in his essay entitled “Of Revenge,” refers to revenge as “a kind of wild justice.” He says the first wrong “doth but offend the law, but the revenge of that wrong puttesth the law out of office” (55). Hamlet, in order to revenge, must not simply bend the existing rules of the social order; rather, he must step outside of the existing and familiar order of things; he must put “the law out of office” in order to found order anew.  

We have had occasion elsewhere to comment on the prevalence of memory and forgetting in the play, and I am not the first to notice this prevalence (cf. Garber 310). Adelman, for instance, asserts that the task of memory that Hamlet undertakes, in the face of Gertrude’s forgetting of the ghost-father, is a matter of the differentiation (and, thus, securing) of collapsed father figures (cf. 257, 261). I have said that while this reading applies to the play as a text concerned with the modern psychic-subject, it does not speak for the play in its entirety. I agree
that forgetting is crucial to Hamlet’s task, and to the play. However, this centrality of *lethe* is the condition of memory in the broader sense than just that of the individual. It is a politico-historical and ultimately existential memory. It is a forgetting (*lethe*) and an un-forgetting that form a horizon for a historical people and allow them to define themselves out of a past. *Lethe* is the forgetting proper to this historical horizon, to this relation to tradition and one’s “fore-fathers.” A historical humanity, and Hamlet or the Danish court as perspicuous cases of this, stands on the ground of the past as unfamiliar (uncanny). A historical humanity arises, as do Hamlet and the re-founded Denmark, only out of this strange concealing ground. *Lethe* is an “existential” ground in the sense that it is the concealment-oblivion proper to the presencing of all things, and not the absent-minded “forgetting” of an individual psyche: “But it would be erroneous to claim . . . that unconcealedness corresponds to not-forgetting and that the *alethes*, the unconcealed, is precisely what is not-forgotten. It *is* so, by all means, but only under the presupposition that we think of forgetting in terms of *alētheia* and not substitute for the essence of *lethe* the ‘forgetting’ which is later understood as inadvertence, a kind of psychic-subjective comportment” (Heidegger 1992, 131-32). The question of memory, then, of the memory of that which speaks out of the of the realm of the dead, of *lethe*, as does the Ghost as *daimōn*, should be understood within the tradition of memory-truth as *anamnesis/aletheia*: unforgetting/disclosure. The question of memory in the play, in an essential sense, arises out of the presencing of *lethe*, of the Ghost as out of *Lethe*, and of the presencing of the uncanny in the ordinary.

Just as *lethe* defines one in relation to a past that shapes, so too does *lethe* guide one in a futural sense: that is, as one’s ownmost possibility, death. Death, and the specter of the nothing (*nihil*) or of the meaninglessness it entails, haunts the play. It is the skull that lies behind the “painted” facade of beauty, truth, duration, and meaningful words. Words, for Hamlet, marital
vows for example, are dead letters that lack the breath of intention, spirit, or truth. Hamlet also confronts the possibility that the body is a dead letter, a quintessence of dust. Death, in a way, according to Calderwood, is the root of all of the other negations—what we have thought of in terms of 

\textit{lethe}—in the play (1983, 97). The grave can arise for the modern critic as a figuring of absence, a veiled phallus, or as a carnivalesque undecidability that dissolves social distinctions (cf. Bristol 350, 359-62). However, more primordially, the grave, as the sign of death, marks a certain defining and focussing of things within their proper limits. For instance, a certain grave-digging marks the whole of Hamlet’s life. When asked how long he has been a “grave-maker,” the “clown” replies by measuring the duration of his profession according to that of Hamlet’s life:

\begin{tabular}{ll}
\textit{Clown}: & Of all the days i’ th’ year, I came to’t that day that our last King Hamlet overcame Fortinbras. \\
\textit{Ham}: & How long is that since? \\
\textit{Clown}: & Cannot you tell that? Every fool can tell that. It was that very day that young Hamlet was born—he that is mad, and sent into England. (V.i.122-26) \\
\end{tabular}

Why is this portion of the dialogue here, in the climactic fifth act? Merely to give us some more information about the relative dates of the life of Hamlet? Perhaps. But more importantly, this passage connects the life of Hamlet, in its essential unfolding, to the presencing of death, to the presence of graves. As Harold Jenkins points out in the Arden edition of \textit{Hamlet}, “[w]hat matters is that when Hamlet came into the world a man began to dig graves and has now been at it for a lifetime. . . . As Hamlet’s talk with the grave-digger thus links the grave-digger’s occupation with the terms of Hamlet’s life, will it not seem to us that the hero has come face to face with his own destiny?” (554). Hamlet, in this respect, brings to the fore the essential relation of humanity to death. Only mortals can die; only what is living can be said to die. The death of the living thing is not its negation; death does not exist as an opposition to life. Rather, the living thing comes into
its own, into its essence, insofar as it can die. Death is the limit proper to mortal existence. Life unfolds as a being-towards this defining end, as a being-towards-telos (entelecheia). *Hamlet* presents, most profoundly, this sheltering and defining aspect of death, of *lethe*, of the nothing.

This *lethe* or nothing, we have seen, holds sway in the play in various modalities: as silence, as madness, as that which presences in the Ghost, as what is encountered in the mood of melancholy and in being-towards-death. It is out of this *lethe* that all meaning, existence or presence arise in the play. The *lethe* as encountered marks the way in which the play departs from the structures of metaphysico-imperial representation. The essential relation of *lethe* to Being and truth also means we must encounter the questions raised in the play in a new light. We must keep in mind, for instance, that meaningful existence is not opposed to the meaninglessness that Hamlet encounters in existence—nihilism, in fact, as the withdrawal, concealment, or *lethe* of Being, is the way in which Being itself presences. Authentic meaning, of being-in-the-world or being-with-others, of community, relies on a questioning and holding of oneself out over the abyss of non-meaning as Hamlet does. We must also keep this in mind with respect to the biggest question in the play: "To be, or not to be." Again, this is not an either/or dualism that accords with the metaphysical logic of non-contradiction. Rather, the speech marks how the nothing (the "not to be") hovers over existence (the "to be"). It marks how

the dread of something after death,
The undiscovered country, from whose bourn
No traveller returns, puzzles the will,
And makes us rather bear those ills we have
Than fly to others that we know not of? (III.i.78-82)

There is an unknown, a certain dream-like "to be," in the nothingness of the "sleep of death." And in hovering over and defining existence, the nothing resides in the "to be."

The encounter with the nothing (*lethe*), in all of these guises (silence, madness, forgetting,
and death) is the encounter with the essential strangeness and mystery of existence. "Only because the nothing is manifest in the ground of Dasein can the total strangeness of beings overwhelm us. Only when the strangeness of beings oppresses us does it arouse and evoke wonder. Only on the ground of wonder—the revelation of the nothing—does the 'why?' loom before us" ("WM" 111).
Notes to Chapter 4

1. On the construction of subjectivity in the Renaissance in relation to the theatre, and from a psychoanalytic perspective, see Freedman 7-46; on this topic in specific relation to *Hamlet*, see Barker 29-40, Lacan 1977a, 11-52, and Garber 303, 319.

2. Although I will concentrate on Heidegger’s analysis of Descartes’ thought as the founding statement of modern metaphysics, the position that the Cartesian *Cogito* marks the inception of the philosophical discourse of modernity is a widely held one. The rise of human thinking with respect to the philosophical determination of truth marks, for many, modernity as the “epistemologically centred philosophy” that follows Descartes (Rorty 357). As Bernstein summarizes, “[b]riefly stated, the history of modern philosophy is the history of the rise and fall of the ‘mind’ and the prized philosophical discipline—‘epistemology’” (27). Similarly, Timothy Reiss asserts that the “discourse of modernism” finds its “exemplary formal statement” in the “cogito-ergo-sum” (31). On this point, see, also, Mark C. Taylor xxix-xxxi, Porter 3-4, and Smith 49-57.

3. On this point, see *Being and Time* (1962a, §44) and “ET.”

4. As Bernhard Radloff has pointed out in an unpublished lecture, the encounter with the mystery of Being or the *lethe* of *alētheia* corresponds to the essential experience of human existence in Being-towards-Death. Death is not the negation or opposing of human, mortal existence; rather, death is that which makes us what we are. Death is, not in a theoretical sense of causes in linear time, the *archē* out of which mortals arise; it is also the *telos* of mortals, the fulfilment and coming to be of what they are.

5. A more detailed discussion of the Greek and medieval moments of this unfolding is undertaken in Chapter 2.


8. On this self-grounding of knowledge and truth, see, also, “MSMM.” 272.

9. The German word for “representation,” *Vor-stellen*, is foregrounded in Heidegger’s reading at this point in that it literally means ‘to posit or position’ (*stellen*) ‘before’ (*vor*).

10. On the notion of the “Theatre of Representation” as that which privileges identity and forgets difference, and on this theatre of representation as opposed to the “Theatre of Repetition” as a theatre of movement or *physis*, see Deleuze 1994, 5-11; on this topic in relation to *Hamlet*, see Deleuze 1994, 91-2. For a good commentary on Deleuze’s notion of philosophy as theatre, see “TP.”

11. The list of commentators who interpret, as Paterson and I do, the goal of Bacon’s science as being a total mastery or power over nature, or the beings which arise within the object-sphere laid
out by the scientific ground-plan, would be too voluminous fully to list here. However, for some of the more recent and cogent examples of this position, see the following: Hulse 318, 322, Faulkner 4, 7, Whitney 1, Weinberger 9, and Van Leeuwen 2).

12. On *ta mathemata* as what is already known, see also “AWP” 118.

13. On the limits of human knowledge due to the mind’s innate failings and due to the restraints imposed by the adherence to a tradition, see *The Advancement of Learning* 198-271 and *The New Organon* 326-92.

14. On the axiomatic proposition as part of the mathematical projection inasmuch as it is taken as what is pre-given, see “MSMM” 268.

15. In this Baconian passage, one encounters that which is dis-covered in a mood of wonder and awe. On the topic of the disposition of “wonder” that beholds the discoverer in relation to the New World, where the New World arises as a “marvelous possession,” see Greenblatt 1991.

16. For further examples in Bacon’s work of a determination of truth as the secure vantage point, see “Of Truth.” One of the formulations of truth in that essay is a citing, interestingly, of the Roman Lucretius: “It is a pleasure to stand upon the shore, and to see ships tossed upon the sea; a pleasure to stand in the window of a castle, and to see a battle and the adventures thereof below; but no pleasure is comparable to the standing upon the vantage ground of Truth (a hill not to be commanded, and where the air is always clear and serene), and to see the errors, and wanderings, and mists, and tempests, in the vale below” (48). Similarly, on the importance and value of secrecy and reserve in relation to that which is open and thus inferior or fallen, see “Of Simulation and Dissimulation” (58-60). For an astute analysis of these two essays in relation to the imperial essence of truth, see Radloff 1996, 145-63.

17. Parker also points out that “[t]he business of detection and informing, of espiant and bringing ‘privie secretes’ before the eye, was part of the obsession in early modern England with things done ‘privilie’ or in secret, in the confessional, the ‘secret chamber’ of the heart, or the ‘closet’ of a monarch” (234). On the closet as a “private” realm, and on the implications of this for the “closet scene” in *Hamlet*, see Jardine 1996, 150-57. With respect to Act III, Scene iv of *Hamlet*, Jardine asserts that “[t]he erosion of privacy which has already been effected by the constant surveillance which has characterised Claudius and Polonius’s management of the state of Denmark here reaches its logical conclusion: the state invades the Queen’s inner sanctum, and in the ensuing confusion it is defied by a botched and mistaken act of violence” (151). For discussions of the “private” in similar contexts, see Reiss 1982, 189-90, Barker, Montrose 1991, Greenblatt 1980, and Kermode 1979. For general discussions of spying and the secret service in the English Renaissance, see Plowden and Archer.

18. Parker lists the usages of “private” and “privy” in *Hamlet* in the process of arguing for the centrality of this concept-trope to the play: from Horatio’s asking if the Ghost is ‘privy to thy country’s fate’ (I.i.133) to Polonius’s observation that Hamlet has given Ophelia ‘private time’ (I.ii.92) and his command that she ‘lock herself from his resort’ (II.ii.143). Hamlet swears his
friends to secrecy, after the revelations of the Ghost: "Never make known what you have seen tonight" (I.v.143). The sense of secrecy is also suggested by the play's repeated references to sealed documents, in "Upon his will I seal'd my hard consent" (I.ii.60), in the 'letters seal'd' (III.iv.202) borne by the spies Rosencrantz and Guildenstern to England; in Claudius's "every thing is seal'd and done" (IV.iii.56); and in Hamlet's decision to 'unseal' (V.ii.17) this sealed 'commission' (V.ii.18). (366n66)

19. On the importance of "enargeia" in discourses of geographic discovery, see Parker 242; on "enargia" (energeia) in Sidney's Defence of Poesie, see Chapter 2.

20. Two other examples of travel narratives which appeal to the eyewitness, examples which directly bear on the readings of Elizabethan literature that I have undertaken here, are More's Utopia and Montaigne's "Of Cannibals." For a good reading of this aspect of Montaigne's essay, see De Certeau's "Montaigne's 'Of Cannibals': The Savage 'I'" (1986, 67-79).

21. For the image of the Christian story of the Fall in Hamlet, see I.v.36, and for the image of Cain's murder of a brother, see III.iii.36-8.

22. Hamlet also uses indirect language--language that reserves itself, holds itself back, puns and metaphors, for instance--in order to conceal his intentions and secure his position. On this point see Calderwood 1983, 73.

23. On the metaphor of the disease of the body-politic, see Salkeld 91.

24. The Mouse-trap is Hamlet's privileged mode of representing the crime, by bringing Claudius's guilty conscience into the open, but the murder of the old King arises (is represented) throughout the play: "The act of rupture or contradiction, the killing of the old King, is dispersed throughout the text, in the ghost's testimony, in the dumb show and Claudius's prayer, to form the truth which on which [sic] the revenge narrative depends" (Salkeld 90). We should note that a similar representational securing of certainty occurs in Thomas Kyd's The Spanish Tragedy. The whole play is a scene presented for the ghost of Don Andrea and the spirit of Revenge. Within the broader theatre presented before Don Andrea and the spirit of revenge, two letters (III.ii and III.vii), two dumb shows and a play within a play represent the murder of Horatio and its consequent resolution in revenge. Finally, as do the characters in Hamlet, Balthazar and Lorenzo observe their enemies from an enclosed position: in secret (II.ii) and in disguise (II.iv). We should also take note that a representational method--the "scientific-method" of the chastity test invented by Antonius Mizaldus (IV.i.46)--is utilized as a mode of securing the certainty of a crime in Thomas Middleton and William Rowley's The Changeling. Beatrice puts the chastity of Diaphanta "Upon an easy trial" (IV.i.97). Beatrice, in turn, is put on trial because Alsemero "cannot be too sure" (IV.ii.125). As with Hamlet's "antic disposition" in relation to the strategies of Claudius, the attempts to secure certainty in The Changeling can also be avoided through cunning and feigning. Beatrice, when faced with the test involving the "glass inscribed there with the letter M" (IV.ii.114), makes the following evaluation:

I'm put now to my cunning; th'effects I know,
If I can now but feign'em handsomely. (IV.ii.136-37)
25. On the relation of Bacon, masque, and imperial power, see Orgel 55.

26. On "anamorphic" art in the Renaissance, see, also, Ong and Plottel.

27. On the history of Ophelia interpretation, see Showalter. For an interesting reading of Ophelia as a victim of the masculine power structures presented in the play, see Leverentz.

28. For a listing of the many references to these concepts in the play, see Garber 310-12.

29. On Hamlet's forgetting of the actual murder of his father and corresponding emphasis on Gertrude's guilt, see also West 228.

30. On Gertrude as brought into the open of the "gaze" of the subject, see Parker 234-38; on the encounter with the "mother" (mater) as the encounter with the matter of existence as nothing, see Parker 253-5. On the closet and its relation to sexual privacy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see Jardine 1996, 150-51. On the distinctions between the quartos in connection with the question of Gertrude's guilt, see O'Brien.

31. The First Quarto, as Wofford points out, "precludes the hovering doubt and even disgust at his mother that is so characteristic of the Hamlet we know" (17). Wofford goes on to suggest that there is political room to question "the principles that have caused editors to reject the Gertrude of the First Quarto and to select always the more ambiguous figure of the later printed versions" (17). For a listing of the ways in which Gertrude is an enigmatic (or, undecidable) character—in the Second Quarto and First Folio—see Adelman 258-59.

32. Adelman also asserts that Hamlet enacts the unravelling of the (Oedipal) subject (281n4).

33. On the blurring of fixed identities as marked by the prevalence in the play of images of mediation, "conveyance," translation, messengers, and go-betweens, see Parker 149-84 and Calderwood 113-87; on the private secretary as go-between, see Parker 260; on women as go-betweens, see Parker 262-65.

34. Adelman's analysis of this "boundary panic" with respect to Hamlet is informative: withdrawing himself from the sullying maternal body of the world, Hamlet retreats into what he imagines as an inviolable core of selfhood that cannot be known or played upon (1.2.85; 3.2.355-63), constructing an absolute barrier between inner and outer as though there were no possibility of uncontaminating communication between them; unable to risk crossing this boundary in any creative way, through any significant action in the world, he fantasizes crossing it through magical thinking—imagining the revenge that could come "with wings as swift / As meditation" (1.5.29-30) or through the power of his horrid speech (2.2.557). (273)

35. Heidegger, "Science and Reflection" in 1977a, 155-82; hereafter cited as "SR." The quote is from page 163.

36. Phusis, insofar as it "signifies a coming forth, an emergence, . . . is an equiprimordial word for what is named by alētheia" (Heidegger 1992, 139). On the relation of phusis and alētheia, see
also Heidegger 1992, 163 and 1976, 269: "Being is the self-concealing revealing, *phasis* in the original sense. Self-revealing is the coming-forth into unhiddenness, and that means: preserving unhiddenness as such in its becoming-present. Unhiddenness is called *a-lētheia*. Truth, as we translate this word, is of the origin, that is, in its Being it is not a characteristic of human knowing and asserting. . . . Rather, truth as self-revealing belongs to Being itself. *Phusis* is *a-lētheia*, unconcealment, and therefore *kruptesthai philei* [loves to hide itself]."

37. On the connection of *eidos* and *thea*, and for a good summary of what we have said so far about *thea*, see Heidegger 1997, 44: "The word *theorein* was already known prior to Aristotle. But Aristotle himself coined the term *theoretikos*. The word *theorein*, *theōria*, comes from *theoros*, which is composed of *thea*, ‘look,’ ‘sight,’ and *horao*, ‘to see.’ *Thea*, ‘sight,’ which allows the look of something to be seen, is similar in meaning to *eidos*.”

38. Heidegger emphasizes that "*a-lētheia is thea*, goddess” (162) in order to emphasize that it is not a “concept.”

39. At this point, I would like to gesture toward, with the hopes of being able to follow up this gesture more thoroughly elsewhere, the connection between two historico-conceptual analogues: 1) the modern *theoretical*-controlling gaze as an aspect of the mood of "wonder" with which the New World, or the newly discovered, is encountered (cf. Greenblatt 1991); and 2) early Greek *theōria* as the comportment of *Dasein* in its confrontation with a matter of "wonder" (*thaumazesthai*) (Heidegger 1997, 86-87): “The astonishing, the wondrous, is constituted in relation to an onlooking insofar as the understanding at one’s disposal does not suffice for this encountered state of affairs. The understanding is shocked by what shows itself” (87).

40. Heidegger points out the non-oppositional interplay of concealment and unconcealing with respect to *phasis* as a name for Being:

"Being loves to hide itself." What does that mean? It has been suggested, and still is suggested, that this fragment means that Being is difficult to get at and requires great efforts to be brought out of its hiding place and, as it were, purged of its self-hiding. But it is the opposite that is needed. Self-hiding belongs to the pre-dilection of Being, that is, it belongs to that wherein Being has secured its way of becoming present. And the way Being becomes present is to unconceal itself, to emerge, to come out into the unhidden—*phasis*. Only that which in its very Being unconceals and must unconceal itself, can love to conceal itself. Only what is unconcealing can be concealing. (1976, 269)

41. For a cursory tracing of this tradition, see Chapter 2.

42. For a good list of the many references to or evocations of silence, see Calderwood 1983, 73-77.

43. Madness in Shakespeare’s plays in general has also been categorized as having a “scapegoat” function within the parameters of “magical thinking” (cf. Liebler and Woodbridge). Foucault also defines, to some extent, madness as a scapegoat of sorts in the early modern era; however, he also isolates this “sacred” function of madness as a founding of the open of Being, along the lines of the primordial essence of *a-lētheia* we have described—a founding of the open whose power has
fallen into oblivion. Thus, Foucault’s classic work on the topic is an “archaeology of that silence” (1988b, xi).

44. On this tradition of the thinking of melancholy, the classic study is Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl; see, also, Screech 1983. Pertinent Renaissance texts on melancholy include Timothy Bright’s *A Treatise of Melancholy*, Robert Burton’s *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, and Milton’s *Il Penseroso*.

45. This is related to what we might call the “tragic” essence of existence: that we exist in being held out over the nothing. For this reason, the audience admires the tragic hero because of his noble existence, not because of his or her adherence or transgression of any pre-existing moral codes (cf. Gelven 1979).

46. On Hamlet as one who confronts death, beyond the clothing of immortality, see Calderwood 1987, 77-87.
CONCLUSION:

ON THE ENCOUNTER WITH THE STRANGE

I would like, at this point, to touch briefly on a set of themes which have weaved their way implicitly throughout the preceding chapters: the encounter with the strange, the uncanny, the foreign, the wonderful, the marvelous, or the amazing. I would like to make a simple distinction in regards to this set of themes, a distinction between two modes of encountering the “strange.” On the one hand, I have tried to show that there is a representational mode of undertaking this encounter. In this mode, the strange, the mystery of Being, is forgotten; it is occulted and replaced by beings in their existence as that which is “already known.” This metaphysical oblivion of the mystery of Being does not arise as an oblivion, as a withdrawal, within the representational encounter; rather, the strange is encountered as a being, a foreign body or text, which arises within the translation or representation. The “other” arises within the mediating “go-between” which presents it. The “other” arises in this presentation inasmuch as it accords with what is already known about the “other” as a being. On the other hand, I have tried to point to the possibility of encountering the withdrawal of the mystery as a withdrawal, to the possibility of an encounter with the uncanny which makes the encounter itself essentially uncanny, extra-ordinary (cf. Heidegger 1959, 12-13). Rather than the “trans-lation” of a foreign being within the framework of that which is already known, rather than an imperial, possessive naming, in the second mode of the encounter with the strange there occurs a naming which operates within the primordial domain of the metaphor (metapherein: to carry over): it is a figuring or bringing forth, into the form of the “unfamiliar” (xenikos) name (Poetics 1458a20-25), of the strange, in the
sense of the mystery of Being itself, for the first time; it is a figuring forth which “carries over” a historical humanity into the essential, abyssmal realm of the uncanny, the unhomely (das Unheimliche).¹ Allow me briefly to outline some examples of these two modes of encounter.

The first, metaphysical mode of encounter has a rich history. De Certeau refers to it as a “heterological” tradition, a tradition of “discourse on the other” apparently authorized by that other—by the discourse’s accordance with the other as already-known. Book IV of Herodotus’ Histories is a foundational text, for de Certeau, in this tradition. It relies on the “report,” the mediation, and the positioning of this mediation, in order to take into account the “marvels” (thōma) of foreign practices. In one sense, Herodotus’ own text adopts “the function of mediator, or knowledge (histōr, he who knows), between the Greek logos and its barbarian other” (De Certeau 1986, 68). In another sense, within the “history” that the book recounts, there is a “play on mediators”: “the mediators are the witnesses, interpreters, legends, and documents—the sayings of others about the other—that Herodotus manipulates and modalizes, by means of a subtle, permanent practice of distancing, so as to distinguish from these sources his own ‘testimony,’ that interspace where the fiction is erected of a discourse, addressed to the Greeks, which treats both the Greek and the Barbarian, both one and the other” (68). For instance, Herodotus must distinguish between the myriad accounts and legends of the origins of the Scythians. He distinguishes certain accounts, which he feels forced to “re-count,” by prefacing them with the following typical tag: “I merely repeat the tradition, and do not myself believe it” (Herodotus 272). In contrast to these qualified accounts, there is the “most likely” version (Herodotus 274). The proliferation of accounts and perspectives, according to de Certeau, is that which is strange and must be secured through Herodotus’ narrative. The free floating stories and legends that Herodotus encounters are like the nomadic Scythians themselves: difficult to track, find, defeat,
and master.

The Scythians, however, though in most respects I do not admire them, have managed one thing, and that the most important in human affairs . . . I mean their own preservation. For such is their manner of life that no one who invades their country can escape destruction, and if they wish to avoid engaging with an enemy, that enemy cannot by any possibility come to grips with them. A people without fortified towns, living, as the Scythians do, in waggons which they take with them wherever they go, accustomed, one and all, to fight on horseback with bows and arrows, and dependent for their food not upon agriculture but upon their cattle: how can such a people fail to defeat the attempt of an invader not only to subdue them, but even to make contact with them? (Herodotus 286)

This concern over the plurality and nomadism of the Scythians, and, by extension, truth itself, is echoed, in Herodotus' narrative, by Coes. Coes obtains an interview with Darius who is preparing to invade Scythian territory. Coes suggests a conservative strategy which plans ahead for a route of retreat, by leaving their makeshift bridge intact: "I have never been afraid of direct defeat by the Scythians in battle; the danger, to my mind, is rather that we should fail to find them, and that endless and indeterminate marching in the attempt to do so would get us into difficulty" (Herodotus 303).

The differing accounts of the nature of the Scythians threaten the security of the historian's narrative; certain accounts must be isolated, pinned down, given a home. So, too, the violent and strange practices of the Scythians, for instance, their strange rituals of sacrifice (cf. Herodotus 289-92), call into question the validity of Greek notions of what is proper and natural. In terms of the representational (mediating) encounter with the strange, the Greek polis, understood metaphysically as an autarchic structure, must define and secure itself through and against this foreign, nomadic threat. This, precisely, according to de Certeau, is the type of metaphysical mediation which Book IV of Herodotus' Histories performs: "It combines a representation of the other (which places in opposition the Scythian nomad and the Athenian city-dweller, or the barbarian no-place and the Greek oikoumenē) and the fabrication and accreditenation of the text as
witness of the other” (De Certeau 1986, 68).²

We have seen various manifestations of this heterological tradition initiated by Herodotus, of this translation and mediation of the other. According to Greenblatt, for instance, the European conquest of the “New World” manifested itself as a certain “linguistic colonialism.” Rather than understand this conquest as enabled by the representational technology of writing, rather than follow the technological determinism of Todorov, Greenblatt asserts that a certain translation and mediation (representation itself) was a crucial element of this conquest: “There is a demonstrable linguistic element to the Spanish triumph. . . . Montezuma had no one who was even remotely the equivalent of Cortés’s loyal bilingual informants and go-betweens, Geronimo de Aguilar and the indispensable Doña Marina” [my emphasis] (1991, 12).³ In the second chapter, I had the opportunity to point to this issue of “linguistic colonialism,” this mediation of the New World, in a brief discussion of Columbus, Vespucci, and Montaigne in connection with Sidney’s conception of poetry. We could say, too, as we saw in the “Introduction,” that More’s Utopia performs this representational function with respect to the New World as other, that Utopia is “between America and England” (Marin 285), that Hythloday, in turn, mediates Utopia for More and Giles, and, finally, that More is the go-between which situates and presents Hythloday to the reader.

In this heterological tradition, the strange is brought within pre-determined, already known limits; it is normalized. It loses its violence and strangeness. The “wonder” of the New World, as it arises within representational schemata, becomes a banal “oddity” of which the European is able to take possession; the New World, or the possibility of the strange in general, becomes a “marvelous possession.”⁴

The second mode of encounter with the strange has an equally rich, yet less obvious,
tradition; it is the unfamiliar, “unsaid” tradition that I have tried to highlight throughout this work. Parmenides, for instance, discusses the travel into the realm of the strange, “far from the tread of men” (Barnes 131), to the abode of the goddess (and the look: thea) Truth (alētheia). This is the strange path taken by the philosopher ruler as described by Plato in the allegory of the cave—a philosophic path taken, in some ways, by More’s Hythloday and Spenser’s Immeritō. For Aristotle, as for Plato, wonder was the disposition (pathos) of philosophy, or, at least its prelude (cf. Bishop 3-4, 17-41). Wonder or amazement (to thaumastōn) is also crucial within Aristotle’s thinking on poetry. It arises in the encounter with that which, although in accord with the ruling measure of probability (eikos), is contrary to expectation (doxa). Plots involving reversal (peripeteia) and recognition (anagnōrisis) are the ones which most fully bring forth this disposition. In this way, “amazement” and “astonishment” (ekplēxis) are tied to the events which inspire the dispositions of pity and terror (cf. Poetics 1452a1-11, 1453b37-54a9, 1455a17, and 1456a21). In this connection to pity and terror, amazement and astonishment play a crucial role in the essential unfolding of the tragic experience to its proper end: the accomplishment “by means of pity and terror [of] the catharsis of such emotions” (1449b27). The work of tragic poetry fulfils itself in its end (telos); it achieves and fulfils its function (ergon), its end, in arousing pity and terror—by means of the amazing encounter with the uncanny, the probable but unexpected and unknown—and achieving the catharsis of these emotions. Catharsis is not a purgation of emotions; rather, it is the bringing of the audience into a proper measure with respect to their disposition. It is the habituation of one to the emotion in question, a habituation which brings one’s character to its proper fulfilment. Here, the encounter with the strange, that which escapes doxa, occurs in the manner of a poetic bringing forth of the strange into the form of the work and of a bringing forth into fulfilment of the essential strangeness of humanity itself.
According to the essential thinking of the Middle Ages, the strange, uncanny, or marvelous (*daimonion*), as the divine, shows itself, "through a glass darkly," in the familiar works of nature. So, too, according to certain Renaissance humanists, the uncanny as divine shows itself in the poetic word as veil. Sidney, in his *Defence of Poesie*, taps into this tradition and thinks of poetry as a figuring forth of a strange, golden world—not, primarily, as a representation of the pre-existing works of nature or of an idea. Similarly, Spenser, in Book I of *The Faerie Queene*, thinks of the work of art as arising out of the "amazing" self-emergence (*phasis-Grace-enthousiasmos*) of the divine—not as a product of the representational human's or "workman's wit." Finally, Shakespeare's *Hamlet* figures forth the strange (*daimonion*), the holding sway of concealment (*lethē*), in the forms of silence, forgetting, the ghost, and the "undiscovered country" of death.

In encountering the foreign—as Scythian nomad (Herodotus), as "New World" (Columbus, Vespucci, More, Montaigne), as past (More), as the still concealed or unknown secrets of nature (Bacon), or as the essential uncanny itself (*to deinon, daimonion*)—we encounter ourselves. On the one hand, we can "find" ourselves in a metaphysical manner; we can encounter ourselves in the manner of the modern subject which finds itself everywhere inasmuch as all things arise as objects within the theatre of its psychic impressions; we can encounter ourselves in the sense that one defines oneself by means of the opposition with the exterior—and, thus, always finds oneself in the other. On the other hand, in attending to the self-emerging-concealing site that is the mystery of Being, we can encounter the essential "foreigness" of our nature; our "uncanny" essence. This is the essential meaning of the choral ode in Sophocles' *Antigone*: "Many the wonders but nothing walks stranger than man" (332).9 Why is humanity the strangest (*ta deinotaton*)? We have translated *to deinon* as "the strange"; however, we may more properly understand this essentially strange nature of humanity if we keep in mind its translation into German, by Heidegger (1959,
150-53), as “das Unheimlich”: the uncanny or the unhomely. What, then, makes humanity strange in the sense of uncanny or unhomely?

In the uncanny site that is a historical humanity, the overpowering order of things (dikē) and the earth itself, “the greatest of gods,” is brought into a certain measure: “he wears her away as the ploughs go up and down from year to year/ and his mules turn up the soil” (Antigone 338-41). The overpowering order of things (dikē) is, with a certain violence and receptivity, brought to a stand in technē. This uncanny encounter of dikē and technē is the founding of the essential site of a historical humanity, the polis; it is the founding of a site for Being itself. In the polis, beings first arise as what they are; a certain determination occurs and they are given their weight and bearing. The temple rock, for instance, first becomes known as rock within the founding site. Things, in this way, are brought to word, to language, and founded in the work of the polis. Humanity can know beings in a certain way within the historically specific founding that is the polis. That is, the temple rock is “known,” it arises in its truth, in a different manner within different foundings: for the Greeks, the rock may have arisen as true in terms of its connection to the sacred earth of the temple and in terms of the skill of the mason who carved it; on the other hand, for the modern scientist, the rock may arise as true in terms of the calculations of its mass or atomic composition. A historical humanity, in this way, has a particular foothold with respect to beings; Being sends itself in this historically specific site: the site of the work of the polis. The polis is a work (ergon) that founds unconcealment; it sets truth to work as does the work of art: “Unconcealment occurs only when it is achieved by work: the work of the word in poetry, the work of stone in temple and statue, the work of the word in thought, the work of the polis as the historical place in which all this is grounded and preserved . . . ‘work’ is to be taken here in the Greek sense of ergon” (Heidegger 1959, 191).
Essential humanity, according to Heidegger in *Being and Time*, in having a foothold amongst beings within a historically specific presencing of Being, exists as the simultaneous articulation of two existential poles: (1) an authentic understanding of possibilities (ek-sistence, transcendence) and (2) a fallenness into beings as pre-determined, as already-known. In a lecture course on Hölderlin, *Hölderlin's Hymn “The Ister, ”* Heidegger discusses the strange belonging-together of these two existential structures that occurs in essential human existence in terms of the choral ode in *Antigone*, especially in terms of the *polis*. Humanity is the belonging-together of two aspects of the *polis*: 1) *hupsipolis* (towering above the site) and 2) *apolis* (forfeiting the site). To tower above the site is to transcend (ek-sist) the pre-existing definitions, determinations, and understandings of beings. Art, philosophy, and leadership—all essential creations—are rooted in this existential structure. Creators tower above the site because they are “without city and place, lonely, strange, and alien, without issue amid the [being] as a whole, at the same time without statute and limit, without structure and order, because they themselves as creators must first create all this” (Heidegger 1959, 152-53). To forfeit the site is to “fall” into the already accepted paths of thinking; it is to “speak” only in the manner of the iteration of the already-said. Being arises within the site of a historical humanity as the strange belonging of a transcendence of the site and of a falling into it unquestioningly.

The encounter with the foreign has the possibility of opening one to the unsettled nature of our own existence. It opens us to the awareness that we are, as humans, as yet undefined, that we are held over an abyss of possibilities, that our essential ground is the *Ab-grund*. Philosophy and art have within them the power to institute (found) this encounter with the strange, with our unhomely essence; they have the power to found a new determination of things as known and a new ek-sistent questioning of that determination.
In this work, I have tried to prepare at least the ground for the possibility of encountering the strange, concealed essence (the "unsaid") of Elizabethan literature—to prepare the ground for an authentic and questioning relation to the Elizabethans, rather than the fallen acceptance of their works as objects which we already know. I have tried to prepare the ground for a "step back" in the tradition and beyond the pre-existing determinations of the past. Of course, this work does not hope to achieve an overcoming of metaphysics itself. It is not as though upon re-reading Heidegger, or upon reading this interpretation of Elizabethan literature, we will suddenly achieve a "turning" in the unfolding of Being. Rather, I have tried to point to a concealed possibility in the language of the tradition. In doing so, I have also pointed to the limits of the Derridean perspective on the "step back."\(^{10}\)

Inasmuch as each Elizabethan text is within the metaphysical tradition, we can "deconstruct" its representational determinations of truth and art. However, if that is all for which we are listening, and that is all that is permitted to arise within our interpretive schemata, then that is all that the Elizabethan work will be able to say to us. Inasmuch as Sidney’s *Defence of Poesie* posits an imperial-naming function for the poetic word, we could say that his text presents a metaphysico-representational conception of poetry. However, by attending to the unsaid of the tradition, we were also able to delineate an echo of the pre-metaphysical determinations of *poie\(\overline{\text{s}}\)is* and *mim\(\overline{\text{s}}\)is* in his work. And insofar as Spenser’s *The Faerie Queene* participates in a Platonic-metaphysical opposition of the good and the evil, or the true and the fallen, we were able to deconstruct the metaphysical premises of his "pharmacy." However, we were also able to detect another, "ecstatic," Plato in the *Phaedrus* and in the "platonism" of *The Faerie Queene*. Finally, we were able to delineate aspects of Shakespeare’s *Hamlet* which dove-tail with the modern metaphysics of the representational subject. Insofar as this was the case, we were able
psychoanalytically to deconstruct this subject, and show how it deconstructs itself in the play. We then moved beyond modern subject-thinking itself in order to reveal an aspect of the play previously occulted: where Being arises as a self-presencing, as a look, and in relation to a sheltering concealment. In all three works, these metaphysical structures were, in fact, present; yet, something else is uttered in each work, if only faintly. To apprehend truly the problematic of representation for Elizabethan literature, then, to apprehend it as a “question,” is to attend to this faint echo of the non-metaphysical experience of Being as well as the predominant, metaphysical one.

In the end, a work such as this can only prepare the soil for such a heedful apprehending of the Elizabethan work. As Walt Whitman said, for there to be great poets, there needs to be a great audience. The creative founding of the work of art occurs only within a site, only where it is preserved and its naming word heeded. Do we, today, have the potential to be an audience for what is named in Elizabethan literature? Can we heed what is spoken? In the modern era, is there a homestead for one who would preserve and cultivate this word? Where does the preserver find a hold, a tenure, on this soil?
Notes to the Conclusion

1. On this distinction between the "imperial" analogic-metaphor and the primordial metaphor, see Chapter 2.

2. On nomads as necessary, as a Derridean "supplement" (417), with respect to the "State apparatus," see Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 315-423; for another analysis of Herodotus' treatment of the Scythians, another analysis which takes the "wonder" of the foreign as its cue, see Greenblatt 1991, 119-51.


4. On the ambiguities of the "wonder" of the New World, see Greenblatt 1991, 14-25. I have followed, in a certain respect, Greenblatt's isolation of the representational encounter with (and appropriation of) the strange; however, I believe that his analysis is limited in that he does not hold out the possibility for a non-representational encounter—he merely isolates a less violent representational encounter, where "wonder remains available for decency as well as domination" (cf. 1991, 24-25).

5. For a thorough reading of Parmenides' poem on the goddess Truth, see Heidegger 1992. On Parmenides' poem in relation to Plato's Phaedrus, see Chapter 3 of this work. On the journey into the strange undertaken by Plato's philosopher-ruler in relation to More and Spenser, see Chapter 3.

6. On reversals as that which inspire "amazement," see also Rhetoric I 11.1371b10.

7. Amazement is also central to epic; see 1460a11-18.

8. On habituation with respect to catharsis, in terms of forming the proper response (emotion) at the proper time, see Nichomachean Ethics III 7.1115b11-20. On catharsis in relation to education, see Politics VIII 5.1340a14-25, 7.1342a4-16.

9. For Heidegger's extensive reading of this ode, which I can only refer to briefly here, see 1959, 146-65 and 1996, 51-122.

10. For Derrida, there is no "outside" of metaphysics and representation. Every revolutionary rethinking ("rupture") is a reconfiguration of the existing metaphysical concepts and signs; it is a "redoubling" (1978, 278): "There is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to shake metaphysics. We have no language—no syntax and no lexicon—which is foreign to this history; we can pronounce not a single destructive proposition which has not already had to slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest. . . . Since these concepts are not elements or atoms, and since they are taken from a syntax and a system, every particular borrowing brings along with it the whole of metaphysics" (1978, 280-81). On this point, see, too, Derrida 1990: "And yet, whatever the strength and the obscurity of this dominant current, the authority of representation constrains us, imposing itself on our thought through a whole dense, enigmatic, and heavily stratified history. It programs us and precedes us and warns us too severely for us to make a mere object of it" (1.14).
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