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UMI
WOMEN IN THE COMBAT ARMS:
A QUESTION OF ATTITUDES?

by

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A thesis submitted to the
School of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the
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ABSTRACT

Examining change in any organization can be a difficult task, especially in an organization as complex as the military. With the assistance of civilianization theory, we will examine change within the Canadian Forces imposed by outside civilian legislation (external pressure). In particular, we will examine the integration of women in the combat arms, a result of federal human rights legislation (1989). Issues that are discussed include a brief history of women in combat, arguments used against the participation of women in combat environments, the masculine nature of the military, and the training standards and physical requirements within the Canadian Forces.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Military organizations are considered to be conservative organizations that are resistant to social change. They are also seen as institutions where gender ideology serves to perpetuate "traditional" values concerning gender. Militaries are described as active (not passive) organizations which pride themselves on "masculine" traits such as courage and strength as opposed to traditional "feminine" traits such as nurturing and compassion. It is ironic that as an institution the military, which has based itself on such masculine traits, when faced with integrating women into its ranks has responded with fear, a trait that the military often considers to be "feminine".

In one capacity or another, women have served in militaries since armed conflict began. Some followed their husbands, sons and brothers; some cooked, sewed and washed clothes; and others participated in nursing activities. Many have participated in combat but because most militaries would not allow women to enlist, the exact number of women who served in the early wars is unknown as many of them served anonymously (Prewitt, 1995:3). Today, women are allowed to enlist in most militaries. However, they are often victims of oppression due to the masculine nature of these organizations.

Like many other male-dominated institutions in society, the military has been slow in fully integrating women. Traditionally, most militaries banned women from combat positions since war
was seen as a man's world with no place for women. Women were characterized as having a
different moral voice, that is, one based on caring and compassion. Ideological explanations of the
military as being masculine also permitted "maleness" to be the standard by which women were
often evaluated. This helped perpetuate the stereotype that women do not belong in these
institutions, especially in combat positions. Military women are thus seen as disrupting traditional
stereotypes of women's roles and the traditional ways in which men have demonstrated their
masculinity (Peach, 1994:7-8).

The goal of this thesis is to examine change within the Canadian Forces (CF). Examining
change within a military establishment, however, can be a very daunting task as there are many
areas which can be examined (i.e. manning, operations, etc...). In this case, we will examine
changes which have taken place in the Canadian Forces as a result of human rights legislation.
Due to the magnitude of changes which have resulted from this legislation, we will concentrate
our efforts on one major change that has taken place, that is, the integration of women into the
combat arms. Thus, this leads us to our first area of research: What are the events that led to this
change? Our next step will be to examine policy within the CF to determine whether or not
policies which have been implemented since the integration of women serve as an obstacle to their
integration. Due to the large number of policies found within the CF, we will focus on policy
concerning physical standards. The reason for examining physical standards is that it has been a
contested issue that women cannot "keep up" to male training standards. It will also provide us
with insight into the can/should dichotomy. That is, one of the most common concerns with
gender integration is: Can women meet the standards? What this question does is mask the real
issue of: Should women be allowed in combat? Our second area of research will thus be: Are training standards an obstacle to the integration of women into the combat arms? The sociological pertinence of these questions is that they deal with issues such as gender relations, myths and stereotypes, traditional gender-role assumptions and notions of masculinity. Also relevant is the fact that gender integration is a total experience for the women in the combat arms. We will see that the psychological barriers to integration are just as important as the physical ones and as such cannot be separated from them.

1.1 METHODOLOGY

In order to properly examine any organization, one usually examines the literature that is available on that organization as well as other organizations found in society. However, because the military is different when compared to other organizations (differences which will be examined in the next chapter), it is important to focus on the literature that is specifically related to the military. Janowitz tells us that the “sociology of military institutions becomes a meaningful enterprise only when scholars can project themselves into the institutional life of the military” (1964:8). Thus, documentary research began with the existing academic literature in the field of military sociology. The field of military sociology is a recognized field of research which has scientific journals such as Armed Forces and Society in North America and Small Wars and Insurgencies in Europe. It also has professional associations such as the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society in Canada and the U.S.A. as well as ERGOMAS in Europe. Military sociology has been a recognized field of study since World War 2.
According to Palys, qualitative approaches are characterized by an "inductive perspective, a belief that theory should be grounded in the day-today realities of the people being studied..." (1992:410). In this thesis, informal interviews were used as background information to guide documentary research. There were 15 unstructured, open-ended interviews done with CF personnel who ranged in rank from Major to Major-General. There were males and females interviewed, ranging from infantry personnel to people responsible for gender integration. These interviews which were done during the period of January 1997 to November 1998, provided us with insight and familiarity with the topic of study as well as some insight into the obstacles that women have faced in the CF.

Due to the limitations of the Master's degree/thesis, we felt that examining the literature from the field of military sociology was sufficient to understand the military as an organization. The informal interviews with CF military personnel, complemented our understanding of the events that led to the integration of women into the combat arms and the obstacles that women have encountered concerning training standards.

Before examining the different chapters in this thesis, it is important to define some of the concepts that will be used. For our research purposes, integration will mean the incorporation of females in the combat arms and the CF. This definition will have two parts. The first is a legal standard where women and men are incorporated as equals into the military. That is, according to Canadian law women and men have equal access to all occupations within the CF and there is no discrimination based on gender. The second is of a social nature. Here, integration is defined as
the full acceptance of women as equals. Thus, it is broader than women being legally allowed to enter male dominated areas such as the combat arms. The combat arms is narrowly defined as individuals who are members of either the infantry, artillery, armour and engineer divisions of the CF.

Training standards are the means of determining who meets the physical criteria set out by the CF and particularly the Army. Training standards are the physical criteria that both women and men must meet to become members of the CF and the combat arms. As we will see in Chapter Three, meeting such standards for the CF includes the successful completion of common tasks (e.g. sand bag carry) and in addition, for those in the combat arms, the successful completion of the Land Force Command Physical Fitness Test (weight-load march etc...).

Finally, external pressure is defined as legislative and civilian pressure which led to changes in the CF. It includes the Canadian Human Rights Act (1978), Section 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1985), the Royal Commission on the Status of Women (1970) and the 1989 Human Rights Tribunal decision regarding the employment of women in combat. In particular, it will mean laws, regulations and rulings from civilian sources that eventually resulted in the opening of combat positions for women in the CF (full integration of women).

This thesis is organized into four sections. The first section will examine some of the reasons why the military is different from other organizations found in society. Here, we will focus on the military’s central function of war as well as other factors such as “unlimited liability”.
This is important because some of these differences have been used in arguments opposing women in combat.

The next section will introduce our theoretical framework. The theory of civilianization is used in this thesis since it serves the purpose of explaining change within military establishments. In this part, we will examine the work of American scholars such as Morris Janowitz and Charles Moskos and Canadian scholars such as Charles Cotton and Frank Pinch. Civilianization theory is important because it allows us to understand how external circumstances or pressures (such as human rights legislation) can lead to change within the military and how this change will be accepted by some, more than others. Civilianization theory and in particular, one aspect of it, which is the convergence and divergence debate, helps us understand why the combat arms are most resistant to gender integration. The final part of this section will examine some of the attitudes found within the CF towards women in combat. This will assist us in understanding how women are perceived in this masculine environment. This is particularly important when we discuss the integration of women.

In the next section, we will examine four historical events that arguably have been the most influential in achieving women’s participation in the CF. They are: the 1970 report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women; the 1978 Canadian Human Rights Act; Section 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1985) and the 1989 Canadian Human Rights Tribunal’s decision on the status of women in the CF (combat arms). Although we can identify some of the obstacles that women have faced through these events, they still do not provide a full account of
other hardships women have had to overcome and are still facing today within the CF. Thus, this discussion will be followed by two parts which address (a) the masculine nature of the military and (b) arguments that have been used by some military sociologists and military personnel against women serving in combat positions. This is important because it helps to provide a more realistic account of the obstacles and experiences that women have faced and are facing in gaining acceptance in the CF. This section will also include a historical account of women in combat environments. Here we will see that women have participated in military operations since at least the 1800's and that women's serving in a combat environment is not a new phenomenon.

We will then discuss the training standards that are found within the CF and particularly the Army (combat arms). The first part will examine the training standards and the physical requirements that must be met by all members of the CF. This will be followed by a discussion on the application of these policies to men and women in the CF and the important role that military leaders have in enforcing them.
CHAPTER TWO

CIVILIANIZATION AND THE MILITARY

The primary goal of this thesis is to examine change concerning the integration of women within the Canadian military. There are many on-going debates in military sociology in relation to civil-military relations, military organization, manpower issues, military modernization and so forth. What interests us is how scholars within this field of study have addressed change within military organizations, in particular, change within the military as a result of "external" circumstances. This is pertinent to our research because we are examining how externally-imposed human rights legislation has led to change within the CF, in this case, the full integration of women into the combat arms. Thus, for the purposes of this research, we need to examine the theory of civilianization. This theoretical framework informs us that the different elements (land, sea and air) within the military respond to change differently. For example, as we will soon see, because the combat arms are more divergent from civilian society they are more resistant to changes coming from civilian society. In this case, we will see that the integration of women (influence of civilianization trends) will be more resisted by the combat arms (divergent) than by the more convergent elements (i.e. air).

When examining the literature on civilianization, we discover that two American scholars, Morris Janowitz and Charles Moskos, have done considerable work in this area. Their work provides us with useful insight into general concepts and conditions in military organizations. Their theories have also been applied and expanded by Canadian scholars such as Charles Cotton,
Frank Pinch and Donna Winslow. By examining the work of these Canadian and American military sociologists as well as others, we intend to situate human rights legislation and the integration of women within the “civilianization” framework.

This chapter will consist of three sections. The first section will examine some of the reasons why the military is different from other organizations found in society. The goal of this section is to show the reader that the military is in some ways different from other organizations and therefore it is important to examine literature that takes into account these differences. It is also relevant to our research as some of these differences have been used as arguments against integrating women into the combat arms (see Chapter Four). The second section will introduce our theoretical framework of “civilianization”. In this section we will see how some sectors of the military are divergent (combat arms) from civilian society and are thus less likely to accept change. We will then examine some of the attitudes that are found within the CF in relation to the integration of women and discover that civilianization theory can be useful in explaining how some elements (combat arms) of the CF will be more resistant to civilianization trends such as the integration of women. These three sections will also help us understand why it took externally-imposed change to fully integrate women into the combat arms and why training standards can be an obstacle to the successful integration of women.
2.1 WHAT MAKES THE MILITARY DIFFERENT?

Segal and Segal point out that “military organizations tend to be microcosms of the societies that host them, and thus the rationalization of society and its civilian institutions should be reflected in the military as well”. This means that the CF should reflect the diversity found in Canadian society but we will see below that it does not. Segal and Segal also tell us that in some ways the military is an anachronism in modern society (1983:152). Thus, the Canadian Forces, although similar in some ways to other organizations found in Canadian society, are quite different from any other government department.

What makes the military different from any other government department is the fact that its central functions are related to war. According to Morris Janowitz, “war is differentiated from other forms of social conflict because war-making relies on a highly professionalized and specialized occupation, the professional soldier” (1970:120). This is particularly true in modern times as conscript armies are being changed into volunteer armies. Janowitz argues that, in some ways, the military has the characteristics of any large-scale bureaucracy. He adds however, that the military, regardless of its societal context, “has a unique character because the threat of violence is a permanent reality to its leaders” (1970: 143). Janowitz also states:

The results of previous combat and the pressure to prepare for future combat pervade the entire organization. The unique character of the military derives from the requirement that its key members be specialists in the use of violence (1970:143).
Winslow seems to argue along similar lines when she says that the overall goal of the military is to prepare for war. "In short, soldiers are trained killers" (1997:13). Manning and Marlowe tell us that soldiers are encouraged, allowed, and even obligated to kill because of their duties as citizens, soldiers, and as comrades. These duties "provide the soldier with his reasons for both killing and risking his own life. They provide his conviction that he is right to fight" (1990:69). In relation to the military's core activity, Dunivin states that since the primary role of the military is for the preparation and conduct of war, "the image of the military is synonymous with the image of combat" (1994:533). As we will see in Chapter Four, the battlefield, where combat takes place, is viewed by traditionalists as a masculine domain where women do not belong.

Combat is the ultimate goal toward which all of the varied activities of the Army, no matter how indirect, are oriented. Moreover, organized combat is the activity by which the Army and the military in general is most differentiated from other social organizations. As the British military historian John Keegan ... points out: "For it is not through what armies are but by what they do that the lives of nations and of individuals are changed." Thus, while armies can and often do perform many different tasks, in the final analysis their function is to fight (Cockerham, 1978:1).

Another difference is in the idea of "unlimited liability" which is the obligation to risk one's life as a member of the military. A member of the military may not simply quit when he or she wishes to (Friedland, 1996:2-3).

In consequence of this unlimited liability, even in peacetime a member whose specialty is clerical might be required to fight
forest fires one day and to use weapons to restore order at a penitentiary the next. In war, this unlimited liability can result in members being transferred from sedentary clerical duties to the harsh conditions of combat in which failure can result in death, injury, or capture. This wide span inhibits the accurate definition of the occupational requirement and thus of the physical and mental capabilities required of members. It also blurs the relatively clear distinction between occupations that exists in other enterprises. The term “occupation” therefore has a meaning for the CF different from that in other organizations. For the CF, the unlimited liability of membership is the occupation, and specialties are secondary (Charter Task Force, part 2, 1986:2-3).

As Winslow points out, the unlimited liability of the armed forces means that “members of the CF must be prepared to risk their lives in order to complete a task derived from national goals, and expect to face an opponent also using deadly force” (1997:14).

To be an effective servant of the people the army must concentrate, not on the values of our liberal society, but on the values of the battlefield ... We must recognize that this military community differs from the civilian community from which it springs. The civilian community exists to promote the quality of life; the military community exists to fight and, if need be, to die in defence of that quality of life (former vice-chief of staff of the U.S. Army General Walter Kerwin cited in Winslow, 1997:15).

This is critical in relation to the integration of women because the integration of women is seen to threaten the cohesion of combat units thus affecting combat capability — the core of military activity and identity. In addition, it has been argued that women are not able to meet the physical requirements for combat thus threatening the safety of the units they are in.
Another factor that makes the military different is that everything is subordinated to the needs of the institution. According to Huntington, “success in any activity requires the subordination of the will of the individual to the will of the group” (1957:63). He adds that unity, esprit, community and tradition rate high in the military value system (1957:63). This community has been traditionally defined as “masculine” with a value system that opposes all that is “feminine” (see Chapter Four). LGen Robert Guard tells us that:

Vital to combat operations and therefore a necessary part of traditional military professionalism is a set of values which are to some extent contrary to those held by liberal civilian society. Military organization is hierarchical, not egalitarian and is oriented to the group rather than to the individual; it stresses discipline and obedience, not freedom of expression; it depends on confidence and trust, not caveat emptor. It requires immediate decision and prompt action, not thorough analysis and extensive debate; it relies on training, simplification and predictable behaviour, not education, sophistication and empiricism. It offers austerity, not material comforts (cited in Winslow, 1997:14).

Lack of privacy within the military also makes the military different from civilian society. “The extreme degree to which privacy is absent and freedom of association is curtailed, and the extended periods during which these conditions obtain in military life, have no parallel in society” (Charter Task Force, part2, 1986:6). Lack of privacy has also been an issue surrounding the integration of women.¹ Lack of privacy and the need for unit cohesion have been used as arguments against the integration of women (which we will expand on in Chapter Four).

¹ especially in relation to deployment overseas and on field exercises -- difficulty in supplying separate latrines, sleeping quarters and working facilities.
The goal of the above discussion is to demonstrate that the military does have “unique characteristics” and that this “uniqueness” is often used as a reason for resisting women in the combat arms. The most resistant parts of the military to the integration of women are the combat arms. Civilization theory offers us some insight as to why this might be the case.

2.2 CIVILIZATION

Over the years, many authors (see Janowitz 1964, Moskos 1988) have argued that the nature of the military as an institution has changed drastically since its inception. Segal and Segal believe that in the United States, prior to the second World War, there were significant differences between military and civilian organizations, between civilian work forces and the military, and between civilian employment and military service (1983:160). “There were crucial technological differences between the two spheres, rooted in the fact that military and civilian personnel spent their time doing different things” (Segal and Segal, 1983:160). Janowitz points out that military installations were relatively isolated and self-contained, with stable but limited social connections to the larger civilian society (1971:xxxv). However, Winslow points out that people began noticing changes in the military after the Second World War, because of changes in the technology of war, as “officers went from managing men in combat to managing resources and weapons systems” (1997:24). In relation to the CF, Cotton tells us that over time the majority of military personnel were found in “support roles, utilizing skills and knowledge which have direct parallels in the civilian labor force, while the minority are involved in purely ‘military’ operational duties related to combat” (1979:11). Many of these changes have led to what some academics and
military professionals have labelled the "civilianization" of the military.

2.2.1 AMERICAN CONTEXT

In the American context, the major contributors to the civilianization debate were Morris Janowitz and Charles Moskos, both military sociologists. According to Janowitz, the revolution in relation to military technology created a need for the military profession to adjust itself (1964:16). Janowitz adds that "the complexity of the machinery of warfare and the requirements for research, development, and technical maintenance tend to weaken the organization line between the military and the nonmilitary" (1970:125).

The changes in the military reflect organizational requirements which force the permanent military establishment to parallel other large-scale civilian organizations. As a result, the military takes on more and more the common characteristics of a government or business organization. Thus the differentiation between the military and the civilian...is seriously weakened. In all these trends the model of the professional soldier is being changed by "civilianizing" the military elite to a greater extent than the "militarizing" of the civilian elite (Janowitz, 1970:126).

Changing technology, according to Janowitz, creates new patterns of combat and therefore modifies organizational behaviour in the military. "The more complex the technology of warfare, the narrower are the differences between military and nonmilitary establishments, because more officers have managerial and technical skills applicable to civilian enterprise" (1970:143). Janowitz and Little tell us that for some time, the military establishment has tended to
display more and more of the characteristics that are typical of any large-scale nonmilitary bureaucracy. They add that the decreasing difference is a result of “continuous technological change which vastly expands the size of the military establishment, increases its interdependence with civilian society, and alters its internal social structure. These technological developments in war-making require more and more professionalization” (1974:33).

Thus, due to technology and the uncertainties of war, the military has been moving towards “scientific management” (Janowitz, 1964:17). Moskos tells us that “weapons development gave rise not just to a need for increased technical proficiency, but also for men trained in managerial and modern decision-making skills” (1973:267). Janowitz adds that the military establishment’s operating structure has undergone significant change in direct response to the new types of military technology which have produced a “managerial format emphasizing decision-making and command” (1964:16-17). According to Janowitz, the consequences of the “new tasks” of military management “imply that the professional soldier must more and more acquire skills and orientations common to civilian administrators and even political leaders” (1970:130).

Not only must the professional soldier develop new skills necessary for internal management; he must develop a “public relations” aptitude in order to relate his formation to other military formations and to civilian organizations.... The transferability of skills from the military establishment to civilian organizations is thereby increased. Within the military establishment, conflicts occur and deepen with greater acceleration between the old, traditionally oriented officers and the new, who are more sensitized to the emerging problems of morale and initiative (Janowitz, 1970:130).
Civilianization, arguably, supports the integration of women in the military. Women could be efficient managers in the new military "bureaucracy" just as they are in other government organizations. Also, changes in technology would allow for smaller women to not be disadvantaged in some areas such as support services. This does not, however, seem to be the case in the combat arms. Moskos' institutional/occupational model is a good starting point in understanding why women will be more accepted in some areas (convergent with civilian society) than in others (divergent with civilian society).

2.2.2 INSTITUTIONAL/OCCUPATIONAL THEORY

Charles Moskos expanded on Janowitz's writings and developed what has come to be known as the institutional/occupational (I/O) theory. Moskos believes that there has been an organizational trend within the modern armed forces from a form of authority based on traditional styles of domination towards newer forms of managerial philosophy which place an emphasis on persuasion, personal manipulation and consensus (1975:399). He points out that the military has traditionally attempted to avoid the organizational outcomes of the occupational model (1977:43).

Moskos' theory "assumes a continuum ranging from a military organization highly divergent from civilian society to one highly convergent with civilian structures" (1988:57). Tension and interplay between occupational and institutional tendencies characterize organizational change within the armed forces (1988:67). "Both truths operate in such a way that the future of the army enlisted man is best understood as the interplay between citizen-soldier and
marketplace trends” (Moskos, 1986:54).

According to Moskos, convergence with civilian structures was a consequence of changes which were induced by sophisticated weapons systems (1973:267).

These new technological advances had ramifications on military organization which were particularly manifest in the officer corps. For weapons development gave rise not just to a need for increased technical proficiency, but also for men trained in managerial and modern decision-making skills. This is to say that the broader trend toward technological complexity and increase in organizational scale which was engendering more rationalized and bureaucratic structures throughout American society was also having profound consequences within the military establishment. In the military, as in civilian institutions, such a trend involved changes both in the qualifications and sources of leadership (Moskos, 1973:267-268).

Moskos, however, points out that to argue that the military is an institution or an occupation “is to do an injustice to reality. Both elements have been and always will be present in the military system” (1988:57). This seems to be reflected in what Moskos calls the segmented or plural military. “Simply put, the plural military will be both convergent and divergent with civilian society; it will simultaneously display organizational trends which are civilianized and traditional”.

He adds, however, that the segmented military “will not be an alloy of opposing trends, but a compartmentalization of these trends” (1973:275). He argues that the plural model does not foresee a “homogeneous military” lying somewhere between the civilianized and traditional poles, instead, “the emergent military will be internally segmented into areas which will be either more convergent or more divergent than the present organization of the armed forces” (1973: 275). As
we will see in the next section, attitudes concerning the integration of women are more favourable in the convergent sectors (air force) and less so in the divergent sectors (combat arms).

Moskos claims that all of his military models “have in common a reference to a continuum ranging from a military organization highly differentiated from civilian society to a military system highly convergent with civilian structures” (1973:266). In sum, Moskos argues that divergent and traditional features in the military will become most pronounced in labour-intensive support units, combat forces and possibly at senior command levels. On the other hand, the convergent or civilianized features will accelerate where functions deal with education, clerical administration, logistics, medical care, transportation, construction and other technical tasks (1973:275-276). Moskos tells us that the divergent or traditional sector will “stress customary modes of military organization”, while at the same time, “there will be a convergent sector which operates on principles common to civil administration and corporate structures” (1973:277). In this case, the divergent sector (combat arms) will emphasize the traditionally male oriented organization and in particular, masculine cultural models of the warrior (which we will see in Chapter Four).

The above discussion is of interest to us because the combat arms (divergent) have traditionally resisted the idea of having women in combat (this will be introduced in the next section and developed further in Chapter Four). Even though women makeup 51% of the workforce, in the CF, only 13.4% are women (Department of National Defence, 1998:13). When we look at the non-commissioned member (NCM) strengths of the CF we also discover that there are only 66 (0.6%) women in the Combat Arms (divergent) as opposed to 10,454 men (Tanner,
1997:14). This resistance seems to reflect what Moskos tells us about the traditional and occupational military in the United States:

In a traditional military, women service members are small in number and assigned to limited support roles, often in separate female corps. Career patterns are prescribed and restricted. In an occupational military, both recruitment needs and the greater entry of women in the labor force lead to a higher proportion of female service members. Female corps are abolished, and women are much more integrated into mainstream roles. Combat exclusion strictures, however, still work against completely open career patterns. Accordingly, pressures to do away with female combat exclusion become stronger (1988:62).

2.2.3 CANADIAN CONTEXT

In the Canadian context, Charles Cotton, Frank Pinch and Rodney Crook give us some insight into the Canadian experience of civilianization. In their article Canada’s Professional Military: The Limits of Civilianization (1978), they examine the decade from 1966 to 1976, a period which they identify as being characterized by significant change in the Canadian military. It is their view that the direction of change during this period was towards increased civilianization (1978:366-367). “The modernizing reforms within the Canadian military in the late 1960's represented a radical break with previous traditions” (Cotton, Crook and Pinch, 1978:369).

Although women were not allowed in combat positions at this time, changes surrounding their combat status did start to emerge in the 1970's (this will be expanded on in the next chapter).
One key change during this period was the 1966 government decision to unify and functionally integrate the three services (army, navy, and air force). This was done to increase the efficiency of the CF. "Most of the changes were administrative, designed... to make the military, as a formal organization, more efficient and cost-effective in the managerial sense" (Cotton, Crook and Pinch, 1978:370). The authors suggest that the tendency in the late 1960's was to view military organization as a management problem and that "to this end a centralized career management system was developed which emphasized skills, occupations, and military positions as administrative tools rather than loci of commitment and cohesion" (1978: 370). Kasurak argues along similar lines when discussing leadership in the CF. He claims that a significant portion of the leadership in the CF believe that military values and morale have been eroded by the transference of civilian management techniques and values to the Forces (1982: 108). Thus, a significant number of members in the armed services believe that the CF have adopted civilian standards and norms to an "unacceptable degree" and that civilian public servants exercise "undue influence" over matters that are exclusively military in nature (Kasurak, 1982: 109). The reactions to civilianizing influences (from the outside) by the different elements in the CF, demonstrate that the element (the combat arms) most against civilianization is also the one most resistant to the integration of women.

In a major study of the CF, Cotton found that junior enlisted personnel in both combat and support segments tended to have an "occupational orientation" toward military service, "defining their involvement in a contractually limited way, whereas officers and senior enlisted ranks displayed an institutional, or vocational, orientation characterized by norms of unlimited
commitment" (cited in Cotton and Pinch, 1986:242). As one major in a Service Battalion pointed out in Cotton's 1979 study, support personnel "live in the real world of daily forces management while the Combat Arms live in the make believe world of past and future wars" (1979:50). This seems to reflect what Moskos calls the "plural military", that is, that support personnel as well as others who perform similar functions will be more convergent with civilian society while the combat arms will be more divergent.

Cotton, Crook and Pinch, when examining changes within the military, believe that one of the most obvious points of departure is the actual size of the CF. "The last decade has been a period of marked decline in...size... The drop between 1964 and 1973 was 32.5%, which ....was a much steeper decline than that experienced in other advanced industrial democracies" (1978:371). For example, in 1964 the size of the CF was around 120,000 while in 1973 it was around the 82,000 mark (Cotton, Crook and Pinch, 1978:372). They claim that the central factor for the decline in the CF was the cost of the military in relation to other national priorities and claims upon the fiscal resources available to the federal government (1978:372). "The decisions to reduce the force size, and also to unify the three services, were taken with costs uppermost in mind. The burden of inflation was taken up by manpower reductions, rather than by a reduction of force commitments" (1978:372 - 373). This trend has continued and the actual size of the CF is roughly 62,000 and could drop as low as 55,000 or 50,000.

In addition, only a small minority of personnel in the CF are actually involved in the combat arms. The majority of CF personnel are engaged in technical and administrative functions
of a support nature. If we look at the NCM strengths in the CF we see that there are only 10,520 people in the combat arms (Tanner, 1997:14). The same situation is still true as observed by Cotton in his 1979 study, “within the army, the ground combat soldier is now surrounded by a web of administrative and technical support personnel who perform occupational roles quite similar to those found in the civilian economy” (1979:11). Cotton adds that the “combat soldier is in a distinct minority position in the modern volunteer Canadian Forces” (1979:13). However, he also argues that in terms of the ultimate function of an armed force, “those who are trained for and engage in violent activity have functional primacy” (1979:13). Thus, in terms of absolute numbers, it is interesting that the combat arms are in a minority position even though the primary mission of the military is combat.

In relation to the emergent military, Cotton, Crook and Pinch argue that the military is changing in the direction of a plural format composed of three occupational clusters. The first is the administrative-technical support sector which is characterized as being convergent with civilian society. The two others, sea operations and combat arms, are characterized as being divergent (1978:383). If we examine these “clusters” a little differently and see them as being the land, sea and air elements, we discover two interesting points in relation to numbers and women. First, there is a difference in relation to the number of women in the different “elements”. Second, the actual number of women in the Combat Arms is extremely low. For example, when we look at the NCM strengths of the CF we discover that there are only 66 (0.6%) women in the Combat Arms as opposed to 10,454 men. In the SeaOps/Tech, there are 298 (4.4%) women and 6,500 men. The Air Ops/Tech has 718 women (8.5%) and 7,704 men (Tanner, 1997:14). What this
demonstrates is that there are more women in the Air Force then there are in the Land and Sea trades. More recent statistics in relation to the Combat Arms reaffirm that women constitute a small percentage there:

Effective 30 Nov 97, women comprised 1.9 percent of the total strength of the combat arms officer corps and 0.9 percent of the total strength of soldiers in the combat arms. However, at the same time women comprised only 0.6 percent of the trained effective strength of the combat arms officer corps, and 0.6 percent of the trained effective strength of soldiers in the combat arms. These proportions translate into a total of ten women employed within three different combat arms officer occupations, and 53 women employed within five different combat arms occupations for Non - Commissioned Members (NCMs) (Davis and Thomas, 1998:3).

Thus, what becomes evident on examining the number of women in the combat arms, is that “the force of traditional cultural values continues to oppose trends toward rationalization in decisions about women’s military role” (Segal and Segal, 1983:165). The integration of women seems to be “stronger where there are roles which have counterparts in the civilian world and where material technology is similar to that found in the civilian labor market” (Firestone, 1984:86). Moskos points out that “the organizational characteristics tending toward convergence with civilian structures have been most apparent in the Air Force, somewhat less so in the Navy, and least of all in the Army” (cited in Winslow, 1997:45). In relation to gender integration within the CF, this also holds true. The Air Force seemed to be more at ease in the late 1980's with the presence of women than the Navy and particularly the Army (who both needed to be ordered to fully integrate

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2 For more detail and charts concerning the breakdown of women in the CF, see Tanner, 1997 as well as Davis and Thomas, 1998.
women).

The above discussion demonstrates how the military seems to be divided into those who support what Moskos calls an institutional orientation (divergent with civilian society) and those who support an occupational orientation (convergent with civilian society). It is also important because those who are most often perceived as being divergent (combat arms), have traditionally resisted the integration of women. As Tanner tells us, “female participation continues to be highest in the more traditional types of MOC groups for women (ex.medical/dental and support) and lowest in the operational type MOC groups” (1997:v). Cotton also tells us that in relation to women,

Those with a latent role identity of Soldier are more than twice as likely to reject the employment of women in the Combat Arms than those with an Employee role identity. The former group typically finds this an emotional issue and feels that the employment of women in combat units would have a negative effect on cohesion and motivation in battle. Again, the battlefield as a point of origin in discussion of issues from the Soldier perspective is apparent here. Those with an Employee orientation, on the other hand, are more likely to consider the issue in terms of trends toward increased female participation in the labour force and concerns for equality of opportunity between the sexes. The basic difference lies in their relative frames of reference; for one, it is a secular issue to do with equal opportunities for “qualified” persons in an employment sector; for the other, it is an emotional issue linked to military traditions and survival on the battlefield (1979:85,88).

The Battlefield (as we will see in Chapter Four) is perceived as an exclusively male domain where “indeed, a lot of the grumbling about today’s Army from tough-guy officers is nothing more than
whining about any departure from the days when men were men and dames were dames and civilians knew their place" (Fallows, 1981:98-99)

The I/O model predicts a continuum of change where the military institution as a whole moves progressively towards more civilian standards and ways of operating. For the purposes of our discussion, the convergent/divergent aspect of civilianization is the most interesting. This allows us to view the CF as a plural military model where the divergent sectors (combat arms) will be seen to resist the integration of women. We will now examine some of the attitudes found within the Canadian Army and the CF surrounding the integration of women. According to civilianization theory, we should discover that the combat arms have negative attitudes towards women’s integration into combat roles.

2.3 ATTITUDES

Cotton tells us that the Army “is a complex social institution, and no one researcher or team of researchers could fully depict its character. One is constrained to simplify issues and to describe patterns in its social structure and the attitudes of personnel within it” (1979:6). This becomes evident when we examine the 1979 study that Cotton conducted in relation to military attitudes and values in the Canadian Army. He found that there were three different “latent role types” that divided serving personnel. There were those who were characterized as “soldiers” who “expressed a strong institutional orientation”; “employees” who “expressed a strong occupational orientation”; and “ambivalents” who “fell between the two extremes” (Cotton and
Pinch, 1986:242). According to Cotton, amongst those who shared a "soldier" identity, 73% rejected women in Combat Arms, while 53% of the "ambivalents" and 38% of the "employees" rejected them (1979:86).

According to Americans Segal and Segal, "as with other predominantly male occupations, research shows that military men in newly gender-integrated settings have negative attitudes toward the presence and performance of women" (1983:165). Yet, technology has led to a greater acceptance of women. "Where the material technology of a service is similar to technologies found in the civilian labor force, and particularly where that technology substitutes capital intensive automated conflict for more traditional mass face-to-face battle, acceptance of women is higher" (1983b:255). They argue, therefore, that women have been integrated most fully into the high technology U.S. Air Force while the Navy, with a more traditional structure but a high technology base, projects increases in female utilization. "The acceptability of women in these traditionally male roles, however, is limited to those roles that have counterparts in the civilian labor force, into which women are also moving" (1983b:255). However, public opinion has not gone the next step and defined as acceptable "women serving in the traditionally male ground combat specialties that do not have counterparts in the civilian labor force. Thus, the greatest restrictions to expansion are found in the Army and the Marine Corps" (Segal and Segal, 1983b:255).

In relation to women in combat in the CF, this difference within the services was also found in the late 1980's (i.e. in the air force's being more open to women). In its 1989 ruling, the
The Human Rights Tribunal made references to the SWINTER (Servicewomen Women in Non-traditional Environments and Roles) trials and noted:

The evaluation of the air trial concluded that social integration had occurred in a satisfactory manner in a majority of squadrons. Women had performed their tasks well, had received no preferential treatment, and a majority of servicemen agreed that women should be fully employed in previously all male units. The commanding officers believed that this integration was successful and did not compromise effectiveness because both men and women were held to the same high training standards. In other words, the inclusion of women would not detract from but would sustain the esprit de corps. The air service was, as a result, prepared to develop a workable rule regarding pregnancy, and to re-assess its physical selection standards so as to be gender-neutral in effect as well as intention (1989:26).

The Tribunal also noted a major development which occurred in July of 1987 in relation to the Air Force. On this date, the Minister of National Defence announced that women would now be permitted to be employed in all air force units. Thus, all restrictions on the employment of women were removed and they could now enter training for combat air crew occupations. “The testimony of Major General Morton was that air units were satisfied that women could be employed in combat roles in mixed gender units without compromising the operational effectiveness of the units, and that, therefore, no further tests or trials need be done” (1989:35).

As the air commander testified, the nature of the air force business and environment made the change in employment policy a logical one. Factors such as danger, living space, and environment were less important than physical ability, stamina and acceptance by males. These could be dealt with in a slow and methodical manner. In short the change could be managed without compromising standards and without combat trials (1989:36).
Although these changes were occurring in the "air element", CFPARU's (Canadian Forces Personnel Applied Research Unit) evaluation of the sea and land trials revealed a more problematic result:

Women were judged to perform jobs competently at sea in a supply vessel but neither there nor in the land trials was there satisfactory social integration, from the point of view of all parties. Women complained of the fishbowl effect. Men asserted that women lacked the necessary physical stamina and combat motivation, and received special attention, i.e., favouritism. The Unit's report strongly suggested that many of the problems could be traced to initial poor selection and training, lack of identification of special skills needed, inadequate job definitions, and poor organizational or management preparation (Human Rights Tribunal, 1989:26-27).

2.3.1 DIFFERENCES IN ATTITUDES AMONGST THE ELEMENTS

Differences in attitudes regarding the employment of women amongst the "elements" (land, sea and air) were also noticeable in the late 1970's. In a 1978 questionnaire administered to 4,314 CF members and their spouses, the results indicated that the answers given by those serving at sea were willing to "see women serve at sea in support ships" and that there was no clear "majority either for or against women serving in destroyers, but there was a majority against women serving in submarines". Most of them indicated that they would be willing "to serve with women on board their present ship". The sailors also believed that "women would either make no difference or improve the operational effectiveness in a support ship, but that their presence would have a detrimental effect on operational effectiveness of destroyers and submarines" (these being combat ships). What is also interesting here is that the sailors "were in favour of women as
aircrew, but were against the use of women as fighting soldiers” (Directorate Personnel Development Studies, 1978:4).

Answers given by those in Land Combat units were different from the sailors. “Personnel serving in the land force were strongly opposed (69%) to women being allowed to serve in the Combat Arms”. They did, however, believe that women should have the opportunity to serve in service units and in combat support. “A majority (56%) of soldiers believed that the operational effectiveness of the Combat Arms units would be greatly impaired by the introduction of women. They foresaw less serious impairment to the combat support and service units”. What is also interesting here is that soldiers “were prepared to have women serve as aircrew and in some of the field units, notably service and combat support units. They were concerned about the physical and emotional makeup of women and the effect these might have on Combat Arms units’ operational effectiveness. A slight majority were against women serving as sailors” (Directorate Personnel Development Studies, 1978:5).

The answers of those serving on flying bases were generally in favour of women as aircrew. The majority of the respondents believed that women could serve in all aircraft types except high performance aircraft. “In the latter case, they judged that operational effectiveness would be degraded. Similarly, the majority of respondents considered women capable of serving in all types of air units except Tactical Fighter, Destroyer Helicopter and Tactical Helicopter squadrons”. Again, what is also interesting here is that “a slight majority of the airmen sampled were against women serving as soldiers and sailors” (Directorate Personnel Development
As we saw earlier, attitudes within the Air element changed towards women and, in 1987, the air force removed all restrictions involving women.

In November of 1977, a poll\(^3\) was conducted by Gallup Canada for the Department of National Defence regarding the employment of females “in active military combat roles”. The results indicated that 55% of the respondents were in favour of females serving at sea as sailors, that 53% were in favour of female employment in land combat, and that 62% were in favour of their employment as military aircrew. In May 1978, another poll was done by Gallup Canada. The results of this poll showed similar results although the percentages were lower. In relation to females serving at sea, 50% of the respondents were in favour of the idea, while 44% were against it. In relation to Land Combat units, 49% were in favour, while 45% were against the idea. On the other hand, 58% of the respondents favoured females serving as military aircrew and 36% were against the idea (Directorate Personnel Development Studies, 1978:10-11).

These findings, although not recent, are interesting as they seem to demonstrate the idea of divergence-convergence. The Air Force as well as the public at large both seemed to have similar favourable responses in relation to the integration of women in the air force. However, in regard to the integration of women in the combat arms, the land personnel seemed to be against integration, i.e. divergent, and public opinion was more divided on the issue. That is, the Air Force (high technology) seems to be more convergent with civilian society/attitudes and will be

\(^3\) The two Gallup Polls discussed in this section assessed public attitudes (Canadian public opinion) towards women serving as soldiers, sailors and aircrew.
more “open” to changes. Again, this is particularly evident in the Air Force’s 1987 decision to abolish its restrictions surrounding women.

Differences in attitudes amongst the “elements” are also noticeable when we examine the final reports of the social/behavioural science (SBS) evaluation of the SWINTER (Servicewomen in Non-Traditional Environments and Roles) trials. In relation to the Sea Trial, there were three major findings. First, women appeared to “function effectively aboard HMCS Cormorant. In particular, servicewomen were consistently rated by their fellow male crewmembers and the Ship’s Captains during the trial period as capable of performing their trade tasks...” (Park, 1984:ii-iii). Second, work relationships between women and men were “repeatedly rated as satisfactory by both male and female crewmembers over the four-year employment” (1984:iii). Third, the majority of “servicemembers who completed attitudinal surveys during the four-year period supported the continuing employment of women aboard HMCS Cormorant” (1984:iii). However, the findings did not indicate that a completely satisfactory social integration of female and male crew members had been achieved. Within the mixed-gender crew, “the contributions of men and women were not mutually valued. Servicewomen tended to remain segregated from the larger group of male crewmembers throughout the trial period and were accorded only a partial acceptance” (1984:iii). The evaluation, however, did not “show cause” for excluding women from continuing to serve aboard the HMCS Cormorant (Park, 1984:v).

In relation to the Aircrew trial, Phillippo and Park inform us that almost all servicewomen and the majority of servicemen at the five operational trial squadrons assessed as satisfactory the
performance of female flight engineers, pilots and navigators. “At all squadrons except one, female aircrew were rated as displaying the normal range of flying abilities. Seventy-seven percent of the aircrew completing surveys in 1985 agreed that women should continue serving as aircrew in some capacity” (1985:ii-iii). Also, 93% of female aircrew and 74% of male aircrew believed that women “should be liable for air combat operational duties on the same basis as men” (1985:iii). Based on the overall results of the Aircrew trial SBS evaluation, “a satisfactory social integration was achieved at four of the five squadrons with a partial acceptance of women at the fifth squadron. At four operational air squadrons, the majority of servicemen agreed that women had performed satisfactorily, did not receive preferential treatment, and should continue serving as aircrew in some capacity in the future” (1985:iv-v).

As for the Land Trial, Park tells us that “servicemen and servicewomen in the two trial Units did not achieve a satisfactory social integration over the four-year trial period” (1985:ii). Instead, “the attitudes and behaviours expressed by men and women in the two trial Units showed that servicewomen, at best, were ‘accommodated not assimilated’… during their trial postings” (1985:39).

Unit cohesion (i.e., unit members’ perceptions of interdependence and common purpose), esprit de corps, and ultimately unit morale (i.e., the belief of unit members that their unit can attain its assigned mission) were found to suffer in that almost 50% of the servicemen in the two trials Units continued to view servicewomen throughout the trial period as “women first, tradesperson second, and soldier never” who could not be relied upon. Servicewomen themselves were demoralized and understood that they were only tolerated by many men. With little doubt in their minds, servicewomen were able to identify the primary reason for their unsatisfactory social integration. As one women stated: “It’s not the
job...it’s the men and the constant putting down. It’s hard”. Finding little comfort in turning to other women for support, given that “if we stick together, we’re told we’re not trying to fit in”, they also found “the guys who like us won’t stick up for us”. In the extreme, certain women took their release from the CF to extricate themselves from their Land Trial obligation ..., sought professional help to cope with the stress they were experiencing ..., or vowed never to return to a field posting “even if I was begged to come back” ... In all, the highlighting of differences between men and women, and the voicing of distrust and resentment of each other prevailed throughout the trial period as the two sexes struggled to work and live together (Park, 1985:39).

In her report, Park concluded with some interesting observations such as “just as certain women were found ill-suited for a field posting because of their lesser physical strength... certain men were found to be ill-suited for being in a mixed-gender unit because of their inability to work with women” (1985:47-48). The distorting of perceptions to fit existing beliefs, the generalizing of one woman’s difficulties to conclude that all women are incompetent and making additional objections once early complaints of the integration of women were found groundless, “are all symptomatic of stereotypic and dysfunctional attitudes” (1985:47-48).

In particular, servicemen’s reluctance to accept women could have been expected, if only for the general difficulty many individuals have coping with change and unpredictability... However, the presence of a few individuals within a group who are extremely prejudiced can obstruct group formation, particularly if such individuals are permitted to vocalize and/or act upon their negative attitudes. While a number of actions can be taken by the group or the larger formal organization to counter this expression of prejudice, it appears advisable, at the very least, to counsel servicemen with extreme beliefs about women as to the negative impact of their attitudes within mixed-gender units (Park, 1985:47-48).
Although women and men were not able to achieve a satisfactory social integration in the Land trial, Park concluded this does not mean that women cannot be employed in combat service support units, because some women were found to be well-suited for such a posting. She adds that more than 50% of the servicemen indicated that they were willing to serve with women and accepted their contribution and presence. Lastly, the most important criterion in determining women’s integration into an all-male unit is the overall impact that women will have on a unit’s operational effectiveness. “Although beyond the scope of SBS research mandate, periodic reports by the two Unit Commanding Officers, throughout the trial period, suggest that operational effectiveness was not judged as having been compromised” (1985:52-53).

On a final note, many problems identified by the SBS evaluation to impede the two sexes’ integration can largely be corrected...In view of these lessons learned, and noting the conclusions of other case studies in which a high level of unit identification was achieved despite initial differences amongst members ... it is concluded that mixed-gender Combat Service Support Units are viable if certain steps are taken to facilitate gender integration (Park,1985:53).

According to Lamerson, the negative attitudes of men towards women entering non-traditional roles can be attributed to a lack of information about women’s abilities in the new role. “SWINTER Land Trial findings suggest that men’s negative reactions to women were based on unfamiliarity in working with women in field units, failure to prepare men for the introduction of women into their unit, and hesitancy of men in accepting women as potential combatants” (1987: 4). Once women have been integrated into a traditionally all-male group, the male population will not only be the majority group but will also be more familiar with unit tasks than the women will
be. Thus “the men may feel considerable ownership of the unit, based on their perception of its roles as masculine. This factor can cause a negative reaction to women” (1987:6). Lamerson also points out that, from the SWINTER experience, it was recognized that the more masculine the setting the more resistant servicemen were to the integration of women (1987:6). Park also found that “the more ‘masculine’ the setting, the greater confusion women experienced in identifying appropriate behaviours for themselves” (1986:20). Although it could be argued that attitudes and other factors that led to the unsuccessful integration of women in the Land Trial were due to men not being “familiar” with the idea of working with women, there is still evidence today that successful integration has not taken place within the combat arms. This will be expanded on in Chapter Four.

2.4 SUMMARY

In the first section of this chapter, we examined the idea that the military as an organization is fundamentally different from other organizations found in society. Like other organizations, however, change does occur within the military. As we saw in the second section, changes in technology eventually led to changes in the military organization. Civilianization theory tells us, however, that some sectors of the military will be more resistant to change than others as was demonstrated in the last section on attitudes. This is important because in the next chapter we will examine change within the CF that has been externally imposed. In particular, we will discuss human rights legislation and how this legislation led to the opening of combat positions for women. We will see that the combat arms (divergent) resisted the integration of women and was
ultimately ordered to integrate them.
CHAPTER THREE
CIVILIANIZING INFLUENCES

In the previous chapter, we examined the theory of civilianization and found that change does occur within the military organization as a result of external circumstances. What also came out of this discussion was that some elements (combat arms) will resist change more than others (air force). This discussion serves as an excellent introduction to this chapter which examines some of the sources of "external pressure" which led to changes in the combat status of women in Canada. Here, we will focus on the 1970 report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women; the 1978 Canadian Human Rights Act; Section 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1985) and the 1989 Canadian Human Rights Tribunal’s decision on the status of women in the CF (combat arms). The importance of this discussion is that it will allow us to understand the events that led to the integration of women into the combat arms. It will also allow us to see how external pressure has been met with internal resistance within the CF.

3.1 EXTERNAL PRESSURE

The extent of women’s participation in a nation’s military at any time results from an interplay among many factors, including the national defence situation, military personnel needs and labor availability, federal law, military policy, cultural values, social norms, and individual women's behavior (M. Segal and Hansen, 1992:296).
Among the historical events that have taken place regarding women’s participation in the Canadian Forces (CF), perhaps the four most influential have been: the 1970 report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women; the 1978 Canadian Human Rights Act; Section 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1985) and the 1989 Canadian Human Rights Tribunal’s decision on the status of women in the CF (combat arms)\(^4\).

3.1.1 ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN (1970)

*External Pressure*

The report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women marked a turning point for women in the CF (Davis, 1997:180). Robinson argues that it is this commission which “pressured the Department of National Defence to improve conditions of service for military women” (1985: 100). Of the 167 recommendations made for changes to provide a climate of equal opportunity for women in Canada, six pertained to women in the CF (Davis, 1996:7). These six recommendations were that: all trades in the CF be open to women; the prohibition on the enlistment of married women in the CF be eliminated; the length of the initial engagement be the same for women and men; release from the CF because of pregnancy be prohibited; the CF

\(^4\) The importance of the hearings was that it was the resolution of an issue of general societal concern and of broad public policy. That issue was, should women generally be permitted to train for and enter into occupations and to perform roles which are combat related, occupations and roles that were at the time closed to them; would the operational effectiveness of the CF be adversely affected by the introduction of women into such occupations and roles; and could this assessment appropriately be made by professional military judgment (Human Rights Tribunal, 1989:1-2).
Superannuation act be amended so that its provisions would be the same for men and women; and finally, women be admitted to the military college operated by the Department of National Defence (Final Report, part 3, 1986:3-4).

Hellstrom found that four of these recommendations,

were dealt with expeditiously: married women could be enroled; women who had children would no longer be released, and women and men became subject to the same initial engagement and superannuation terms. Implementation of the other recommendations, that the military colleges and all occupations be opened to women, took much longer. Women became eligible for subsidized education at civilian universities, in other words, the Regular Officer Training Plan (ROTP), but they only entered the military colleges with full cadet status in 1980 (1996:93).

CF Response

Within the Canadian Forces, the Defence Council directed that “other than in the primary combat role, at some remote locations and at sea”, there would be no limitations on the employment of women (Simpson et al, 1979 cited in Davis, 1996:7). Although women would not be employed in combat roles, the ceiling on their number (1,500) was taken away (MacKenzie and Acreman, 1990:3). “A decision was also made to increase the number of women to a total of between 8,000 and 10,000 by 1981. By March 1974 there were 2,373 women in the Canadian Forces, employed in 33 of 95 trades. This represented an increase from 1.8 percent of the total force in 1970 to approximately 3 percent of a total force of 81,000” (Davis, 1996:8). Over the
years, roles for women in the CF continued to expand. By 1978, women made up 5.9 percent of the CF and were employed in 81 of 127 classifications and trades (Davis, 1996: 8). Thus, although external pressure led to some changes, the military still did not allow women to be fully integrated into the CF.

3.1.2 THE CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS ACT (1978)

External Pressure

In 1978, the Canadian Human Rights Act (CHRA) was passed, bringing more external pressure on the Canadian Forces. The act prohibits discrimination on ten grounds. They are: race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex (including pregnancy and childbirth), marital status, family status, a pardoned conviction, and physical or mental disability (including disfigurement and dependence on drugs or alcohol) (Pinch, 1994:7). The CHRA forced the complete reassessment of military policy as it stipulated that there should “be no discrimination against women, except under bona fide occupational requirement” (Suh, 1989:171). Thus, the Act prohibited discrimination in employment practices with the exception that “a job could be refused to a person who could not perform it safely, efficiently and reliably” (Davis, 1996:9). Now, the CF had to demonstrate why it was not possible for women to go into combat (Suh, 1989:171).

5 See Davis, 1996 for more details.
**CF Response**

Hellstrom tells us that the CF attempted to justify discrimination against women through the SWINTER trials. (1996:94). When the SWINTER trials began, the number of women in the regular forces had risen to over 5,000. This was three times greater than in 1970 (Human Rights Tribunal, 1989:19).

The purpose of the SWINTER trials was to determine the impact of employing mixed groups in various environments, and the main criterion against which the trials were to be assessed was the effect of mixed gender groups on operational capabilities. Because of the importance of these trials in the determination of future policies for women's employment, and indeed for the justification of exclusion of women from some occupations (in contrast to the declared principles of the Canadian Human Rights Act), considerable time and attention was paid to the design and assessment of the trials (Human Rights Tribunal, 1989:19-20).

The aim of the trials (which were to last five years), "was to assess the impact on operational effectiveness of women's inclusion in near combat roles such as combat service support, field ambulances, aircrew in transport, and search and rescue squadrons; at remote locations (such as Alert); and at sea, in the navy's only non-combatant ship, HMCS Cormorant" (Hellstrom, 1996: 94-95).

However, from the start the reliability of the SWINTER trials was questioned. Because combat situations cannot be easily simulated and because women were not assigned combat duties in the SWINTER trials, the Human Rights Tribunal argued that the trials "could not, and did not,
provide any data of an acceptable social science kind" (1989:24). The Tribunal found that; "The limitations of the trials, the research methodology, the design of the tests and so on made the 'results' less definitive than many had hoped" (Human Rights Tribunal, 1989:28). Although the CF attempted to understand the full implications of expanding opportunities for servicewomen through the SWINTER trials (which some individuals hoped would provide arguments in favour of their exclusion), "overall SBS results demonstrate that the employment of servicewomen in such novel roles is feasible" (Park, 1986:23). The Human Rights Tribunal also seemed to answer in a similar fashion:

In the mid 1980's as the results of SWINTER trials were made available, it became clear on the evidence that a \textit{bona fide} occupational requirement restricting the employment of women could no longer be sustained. The trial results cast doubts on the proposition, essential to the \textit{bona fide} argument, that cohesion, an essential element in operational effectiveness, could be or was found only among males and in all male groups (1989:62-63).

\subsection*{3.1.3 SECTION 15 OF THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS (1985)}

\textit{External Pressure}

While the SWINTER Trials were near completion, the equality section (Section 15) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms came into effect on April 17, 1985. It ensured that discrimination on the basis of sex (among other things) would no longer be tolerated unless \textit{bona fide} occupational reasons could be established (Robinson, 1985:100). Robinson argues that section 15
required the CF to open up combat roles to women, since it was the "responsibility of every citizen to help defend the nation by bearing arms if the rights and freedoms of that nation are directly or indirectly threatened" (Robinson, 1985:100).

In its 1985 report, the Parliamentary Committee on Equality Rights\(^6\) recommended that "all trades and occupations in the Canadian Armed Forces be open to women" (cited in MacKenzie and Acreman, 1990:3-4). According to the Human Rights Tribunal,

The Parliamentary Committee's recommendation that all restrictions on women's employment be dropped was based on its belief that excluding women from so many job opportunities, most of them related to combat in an indirect way, had adverse consequences: it closed to women many well paid jobs after military service, because military training was not available to them; it hindered their promotion in the Forces because they lacked experience in occupations and units that were combat linked; and it excluded them from experience and training in leadership (1989:29).

The committee concluded that "the Canadian Armed Forces must revise its present policy, a process that has begun but is proceeding all too slowly" (cited in Human Rights Tribunal, 1989:30). The Government's response to the committee report was short:

The Government is fully committed to expanding the role of women in the Armed Forces and will ensure that women will be able to compete for all trades and occupations. The Government shall vigorously pursue this policy in a manner consistent with the requirement of the Armed Forces to be operationally effective in

\(^6\) It was established to examine areas that might be in conflict with s.15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Hellstrom, 1996:95).
the interests of national security (cited in Human Rights Tribunal, 1989:30).

Within the CF, a task force was created to flesh out the Government's response.

A Charter Task Force was set up, one senses with some urgency, to determine the effect on CAF policies of the Government response concerning the employment of women, sexual orientation, mandatory retirement...to examine relevant information...and to develop options so as to meet Government policy objectives (i.e. enhancement of individual rights and freedoms) within requirements of operational effectiveness and efficiency (Human Rights Tribunal, 1989:30).

The Charter Task Force recommended further "expansion of the roles of women and that a programme be developed to provide detailed policy guidance and leadership training concerning mixed-gender employment" (Davis, 1996:10).

**CF Response**

In June 1986, Canadian Forces Administrative Orders 49-14 and 49-15 were issued to the regular force by the Chief of the Defence Staff. Administrative Order 49-14 outlined a general employment policy for the Forces. This opened up all units or occupations to female members of the Forces, and laid down one caveat: "any limitation on eligibility for employment resulting from the requirement that a member's participation be able to contribute to operational effectiveness will be confined to the minimum that must be imposed in order to achieve the required standard of
operational effectiveness of the regular forces in general” (cited in Human Rights Tribunal, 1989: 31). At the same time, Administrative Order 49-15 addressed mixed gender employment and reiterated a justification for the exclusion of women in some occupations and units. The military was resisting gender integration on the basis that it affects cohesion and morale:

Empirical evidence gained throughout the history of warfare has proven that the operational effectiveness of an armed force is decisively affected by a combination of human factors... The stresses encountered in battle drive members of the units involved to their physical and psychological limits. The ability to continue to perform effectively under these extreme conditions requires a high level of physical and mental strength and stamina. Most importantly, effectiveness in battle is vitally dependent on a strong bonding among the members, which is essential to units’ cohesion and morale. Empirical evidence has shown that human stresses are compounded by the added complexities of mixed-gender groups. Concern that such additional stress would seriously jeopardize operational effectiveness has resulted in every major nation in the world maintaining limits on mixed-gender composition in their armed forces, particularly in units which are most likely to face an enemy directly in battle. Consequently, in order not to jeopardize the operational effectiveness dictated by the needs of national security, the composition of some units will remain single-gender male. As a result, a number of military occupations will be restricted to men, and in a number of others, there will be a minimum male component (cited in Human Rights Tribunal, 1989:32).

The Human Rights Tribunal also noted the annexes to Administrative Order 49-15. The annexes listed 21 units designated as single-gender male, some of which included destroyers, submarines, artillery, infantry and armoured units. Months later, five of these units were opened to mixed gender employment. They included supply ships, field ambulances and military police. Approximately 40 military occupations were also designated single-gender male, including infantry, artillery and many naval trades. Again, some months later four of these were opened up
to mixed gender. They included pilot, flight engineer and air navigator (Human Rights Tribunal, 1989:33). "Some 71 military occupations were designated as requiring a minimum male component to provide for career progress. These included cook, administrative clerk, medical and other technician jobs, and engineering positions" (Human Rights Tribunal, 1989:33).

In 1987, a new set of trials were announced called CREW (Combat-Related Employment of Women). According to MacKenzie and Acreman, the aim of the trials was not to "test women" but "to evaluate the impact of mixed gender units on operational effectiveness" (1990:4). At this time, ten army units and four naval units were classed as single-gender male only. They were combat units such as submarines, destroyer, infantry, armoured, artillery and so forth. Thirty-three military occupations were single gender male while fifty-two had a minimum male component (Human Rights Tribunal, 1989:39). In relation to the Crew trials, Hellstrom states this project "was to bring women initially into the hard sea trades, in signals, field artillery and infantry, with follow-on trials in air defence artillery, field engineers and armour. The air force had already opened everything to women, including the fighter pilot classification, so it was not included in the CREW trials" (1996:96). Again, this demonstrates that women seemed to be more accepted in the convergent sectors/occupations (air force) than in the divergent ones (combat arms).

Hellstrom also tells us that the trials had hardly begun "when a complaint of discrimination on the basis of sex, under the Canadian Human Rights Act, was launched against the Canadian Forces by four individuals - three women and one man - which ended in a human rights tribunal" (1996:96-97). We will now examine some of the conclusions that were made by this tribunal.
3.1.4 HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL

External Pressure

In 1989, the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal ruled that “all trials of women in non-traditional roles were to cease and that women were to be fully integrated into all Canadian Forces roles, except service on submarines, during the following ten-year period” (Davis, 1997: 181). The case that was before the tribunal involved three people who complained that they were individually denied entry to combat support or combat employment because they were women. The fourth complainant was a man who alleged that limiting the risk of combat duty to men discriminated against them. The complaints were made under Sections 5, 7 and 10 of the Canadian Human Rights Act “which prohibits discrimination on specified grounds, in this instance, sex, in the provision of services and employment, and which prohibits the establishment or pursuit, by an organization, of a discriminatory policy or practice” (Human Rights Tribunal, 1989:1).

The issues in this case were: should women generally be permitted to train for and enter into occupations and to perform roles which were combat related, occupations and roles which were closed to them at the time; would the operational effectiveness of the CF be adversely affected by the introduction of women into such occupations and roles; and could this assessment appropriately be made by professional military judgement (Human Rights Tribunal, 1989:1-2). According to Hellstrom, the CF’s arguments before the tribunal were similar to those used
following the SWINTER trials, at the Parliamentary Committee hearings, in internal policy
documents and in the Charter Task Force report: the exclusion of women from combat, although
discriminatory, was justified as a bona fide occupational requirement which ensured the
operational effectiveness of the combat arms (1996:97).

They cited specific areas contributing to operational effectiveness where, they believed, women's presence could be detrimental. These included physical capability such as strength, endurance, the impact of pregnancy and child-related issues; environmental conditions such as lack of privacy, primitive toilet and sleeping facilities and the costs of modifying these; social relations and cohesion where the presence of women might be a complicating factor because of fraternization, harassment and favouritism. Eight years later, these arguments sound almost archaic, but it took the tribunal two years of hearings to find that the policy of designating certain occupations and units male-only was discriminatory (Hellstrom, 1996:97).

The Human Rights Tribunal found that the exemption from the Canadian Human Rights Act based on the occupational requirement could not be supported by the evidence. According to Pinch, despite the best professional opinion and scientific evidence that could be mustered, "the CF were unable to convince the tribunal that restrictions should remain" (1994:8) Therefore, the Tribunal ruled that the policy of the CF that designated specific units and occupations as male-only was an unjustified discriminatory practice (1989:64).

The Tribunal directed that all occupations and units in the CF be opened to women (with the exception of submarines because of privacy issues). It also ruled that the minimum-male requirement be eliminated; that gender-free selection standards be developed; that the integration
of women take place with all due speed in order to achieve complete integration in both the reserve and regular forces within ten years; and that this process be subject to external and internal monitoring (Hellstrom, 1996:97). It also made an interesting comment on “unresolved issues”, issues which still seem to be a barrier in the CF today and which can be seen as a type of resistance to the full integration of women (which will be expanded upon later in the next chapter).

There are, the Tribunal recognizes, a number of as yet unresolved issues which affect women perhaps more than men, but these can be dealt with in the same way civilian employers have. If the Forces do not resolve these issues, then it will remain out of step with societal changes and will fail to attract women to a career in the CAF\(^7\), whatever the occupations. The long term societal trend is clear: women will continue to enter the paid workforce, by choice or by necessity, and more will make the commitment to long term careers. The CAF must be in a position to take advantage of that trend. And it is clear that young men will also continue to enrol in the Forces and they are likely to be not only more at ease with women as colleagues, but also more supportive of them in new roles, than are many of the middle-aged members. These inter-generational attitudinal differences may not lend themselves to easy resolution now but they will probably resolve themselves in time in any case (Human Rights Tribunal, 1989:66).

3.2 SUMMARY

In this chapter, we have examined the major “historical events” that generally led to the full integration of women in the CF. What also became evident through this discussion was that the responses of the CF to these “events” or “external pressures” (i.e. Human Rights Act) were in

\(^7\) Canadian Armed Forces
fact a form of resistance. Although the CF tried to resist change through trials such as SWINTER, their resistance was ineffective as the CF was “ordered” to integrate women. Thus, what this demonstrates is that external pressures force change in spite of resistance. In this case, external pressures forced change on the CF which was the full integration of women. However, in examining these changes we have not described additional obstacles that women have had to overcome and are still currently facing. In the next chapter, we will examine other issues and arguments that have been used against women seeking employment in the combat arms.
CHAPTER FOUR
WOMEN IN A MAN’S WORLD

In previous chapters, we have seen that external circumstances and pressure such as increased technology and human rights legislation can lead to change within the military. What we have also seen is that some elements of the armed forces (those that are convergent with civilian society) will accept change more than others (those that are divergent with civilian society). The work of Moskos and Cotton suggests that the combat arms (divergent) are more likely to resist the employment of women in combat, a function which is considered to be the central purpose of the military. In this chapter, we will examine what some academics and military professionals have discovered when they studied the employment of women in the military, especially in combat positions. This is important because “battlefield/combat” has traditionally been seen as an exclusively male domain. In the first section of this chapter, we will briefly examine the history of women in the CF. We will then examine the masculine nature of the military along with some of the myths and stereotypes used against employing women in combat positions.

4.1 HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE CF

Women have long contributed to military support, liberation armies and wartime defence, with their roles expanding during wars and being scaled down when peace arrives. The military history of women describes their involvement as auxiliaries and camp followers and their participation in fighting at times of national emergency (Chandler, Bryant and Bunyard: 1995:123).
In its 1989 decision regarding the employment of women in the Canadian Forces (CF), the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal found that, while the recorded history of women in combat is largely anecdotal, women have nonetheless participated in combat environments. “Women fought beside men in combat and combat support units, were armed, suffered loss of life and injury, inflicted death and injury on others. In short, women were indistinguishable from men in terms of performance” (1989:57).

According to D. Segal, “the historical record shows that when faced with manpower shortages in wartime, nations have changed their policies on the utilization of women in the military, and have increased their dependence upon women as a personnel resource” (1986b:2). Whatever policies are in place in Western nations regarding the use of women during peacetime, in the event of a war, mobilization needs will dictate gender integration within Western forces. “The question is not whether we will increase our utilization of women in the military, but rather when we will make the decision: when we have the luxury of peace to learn what problems are created or after we have gone to war” (D. Segal, 1986b:3).

Canadian women have a long tradition of military service (see Schacter, 1997:28 and Robinson, 1985:100). Robinson tells us that women have been a part of the Canada’s armed forces for over one hundred years (1985:100). “Women have served in the military forces since 1885 when trained nurses were called for active duty during the suppression of the North West Rebellion” (Committee on Women in the NATO Forces, 1982:11). Since that time, women nurses have served continuously in this nation’s forces. They have also been wounded and killed in action
during the World Wars. Hoiberg notes that during the first World War, nurses were assigned on hospital ships, in field ambulance units and to overseas hospitals. A total of 53 nurses died while on duty. Near the end of the Second World War, about 50,000 women had served in the women’s divisions and 5000 nurses had served in the medical corps of the Navy, Army and Air Force (1991:729).

Over the years, however, women other than nurses have served intermittently. “When the need arose they were enrolled to release men to fight, but were quickly demobilized when the crisis was over (Robinson,1985:100). In 1986, the CF’s Charter Task Force reported that women in traditional and support roles served with distinction during Canada’s wars. However, at the end of each war they were quickly demobilized (except for a few nurses and food services officers)⁸. “During the Korean conflict, women were again recruited in other support occupations; however, until 1971 their numbers were limited” (part 3,1986:3). According to the Minister’s Advisory Board on Women in the Canadian Forces, the number of women in uniform varied during this period of time, with the largest number of women serving during the Second World War. When the enrollment of women was again permitted in the 1950’s, they were restricted to traditional roles in the administrative, communications, logistics and medical fields (cited in Weinstein and White,1997:57).

⁸ The Task Force was set up to examine the extent to which CF policies could be changed to enhance individual rights and freedoms without having a major impact on operational effectiveness.
In 1965, the government decided to continue to employ women in Canada’s armed forces but with a fixed ceiling of 1,500 for women in all three services (Davis, 1996:5)\(^9\).

This fixed ceiling remained in effect until unification of the three forces took place 1 July 1968, and continued within the Canadian Armed Forces into the early 1970's. From the time of unification until 1971, women were employed as Radio Operators, Administrative Clerks, Nursing assistants, X-Ray Technicians, Accounts and Finance Clerks, Personnel and Defence Co-ordinators, Teletype Operators, Radar Plotters, Operating Room Assistants, Dental Assistants and Supply Technicians (Davis, 1996:5-6).

Canadian servicewomen have been located in combat zones, been taken prisoners of war or killed, and Canadian civilian women have participated in irregular warfare (e.g., espionage, intelligence operations etc.). However, at no time in their military history have Canadian women “officially” participated as combat personnel in military assault units - ground, sea or air (Park, 1986:3).

Human history, according to Weinstein and White, is marked by warfare. They argue that images of war are “overwhelmingly masculine”, but that throughout history many women have served in armies and have “abetted war efforts”. They add that many women have died as a result of war. “Yet, the myth of the male warrior has made female warriors nearly invisible” (Weinstein and White, 1997:55) — until external pressure forced the CF to fully integrate women into its ranks (as discussed in the previous chapter). We will now examine some of the reasons why women have had to struggle to enter the military organization.

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\(^9\) For a more detailed account of women in the CF prior to 1970, see Davis, 1996 and the 1989 Human Rights Tribunal decision.
4.2 WOMEN AND CHANGE: THE MASCULINE BATTLEFIELD

When discussing change within the U.S. military, Dunivin asserts that most social change has been "externally imposed" (1994:539). In Canada, the full integration of women in combat roles (with the exception of submarines) was the result of human rights legislation. Yet, militaries around the world and particularly the army are resistant to this change. Harries-Jenkins and Moskos argue: "Armed forces are traditionally held to be resistant to and suspicious of change" (1981:29). Cotton and Pinch claim that, as is the case for most militaries, the CF "neither welcome nor easily accommodate change, regardless of its origin" (1986:251). According to Mackenzie and Acreman, armed forces in most countries are "generally perceived as conservative if not reactionary components of their societies" (1990: 1). Huntington tells us that the military ethic is conservative (1957:79). As one of Winslow’s interviewees said: "the military culture is very conservative. If there’s a conservative institution, it’s the army. It’s the army that changes the most slowly in a society. They tend to be hermetically closed to new ideas" (1997:28).

In relation to women in the military, Holm maintains that the influx of women into the previously all-male military challenged both the outlook of the armed forces and their deeply entrenched customs (1991:68). Weinstein and White argue along similar lines as they tell us that "whether women are knocking on the doors of the academies or fighting to win placement on the front lines, their stories are similar. All threaten the existing status quo" (1997:55). Howes and Stevenson, however, tell us that "official attitudes" change more rapidly than the "gut-level reactions" of males who feel that their jobs and cultures are threatened (1993:212). According to
Cotton, "traditionalists, usually from warrior classifications, warm to any defence of the treasured culture of the past, but grow cold and antagonistic when the need for adaptive change is raised" (1997:3).

In terms of the integration of women into combat, Mackenzie and Acreman argue that the CF are at the forefront of social change. However, they also tell us that a "concerted effort is required if we are to be successful in overcoming widespread resistance and reactionary attitudes regarding the employment of women in the CF and, in particular, their employment in the combat arms" (1991:18).

It is quite clear that acceptance of women in the military service and questions about their ability as leaders have been overshadowed by controversy over whether they should participate in combat and whether they could lead in battle. Much of the debate is rooted in attitudes, and changes in laws and regulations will not automatically alter social tradition (Staff Support Branch, 1978:147).

The next section will focus on the "traditional" or "masculine" nature of the military and particularly the combat arms, since it is this traditional image which is challenged by the presence of women in the battlefield.
4.2.1 MASCULINE MILITARIES

Traditionally, the military has been seen as a masculine organization where gender ideology serves to perpetuate traditional understandings in relation to sex and gender. These understandings are often the result of sexist values and attitudes that are maintained within a culture that is still patriarchal (Peach, 1994:6). Patriarchy is "a system of social structures and practices in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women (Walby, 1990:2). According to Peach, traditional theories of gender identity almost always link women with peace and men with war (1994:7). Throughout history, war has been a theatre in which "men could prove their masculinity, and in which masculinity is deemed a necessary prerequisite to success" (1994:7). Peach also points out that associated with this idea of the manliness of war is the myth that the reason men fight is to protect women. In other words, being the weaker sex makes women more dependent on men; women are not capable of defending themselves. "Much of the opposition to women in combat has been based directly on such ideological notions of gender" (Peach, 1994: 8). Military women are thus seen as disrupting both traditional stereotypes of women's roles and the traditional ways in which men have demonstrated their masculinity (Peach, 1994:9).

The employment of women in combat units was not considered in Canada until recently. Previously, there was a widely-held perception that women had a role in society quite different from that of men. Women were seen as the bearers, not the takers, of life, and as the embodiment of peaceful rather than aggressive qualities. These attitudes made the idea of female front-line troops unthinkable. Also, there was never a shortage of recruits so critical that there was any need to employ women in combat (Charter Task Force, part 3, 1986:3).
As Firestone notes, however, "most jobs are sexless; tradition and status, not aptitude, define them as appropriate for one sex rather than the other" (1984:88). Shilts seems to argue along similar lines when he says that "the issue of women in the military was never about women; it was about men and their need to define their masculinity" (cited in Thomas and Thomas, 1996:70). Herbert argues that the military holds "the male soldier, and particularly the combat soldier, as an ideal type, and that by seeking to emulate that which they are not and can never be, women are marginalized within the military" (1992:Abstract). Hertz adds that combat career fields are prestigious partially because of the monopoly men have over these positions. "The most elite jobs are reserved for the most 'macho' males" (1996:262-263). Thomas and Thomas claim that when women can do "a man's job", that job can no longer be used as a sign of manhood (1996:70).

Any signs of femininity, according to Peach, have also been traditionally discouraged in military institutions. Great effort has been made to exclude traits found in male soldiers that are deemed to be feminine (1994:7). "In the military, gender polarity facilitates a structure of negation which becomes a keynote basis of in-group solidarity: to be male is to be not female, which is to be valued positively" (Harrison and Laliberté, 1997:36). Thomas and Thomas claim that a major function of the military is to create men, that is, men defined by a traditional masculine ideology. "This ideology requires that 'real' men repress the feminine inside them" (1996:70). According to Enloe, "to be masculine is to be not feminine" (1983:13). She argues that to prove one's manhood "is imagined to be to prove (to oneself and to other men and women) that one is not 'a woman' ". Consequently, experiencing military combat and identifying with an institution that is totally committed to the conduct of combat is, for those men trying to fulfil society's expectations, part
and parcel of displaying and proving male identity and thus qualifying for the privileges it bestows (Enloe, 1983:13-14). Thus, gender ideology supports the idea that women and any characteristic associated with femininity must be effectively and finally eliminated from the masculine realm in order to maintain the value of bonds between males (Peach, 1994:12). Similarly, Robinson tells us about hostility towards integration of women in the military:

It has nothing to do with women’s capabilities, but it has a great deal to do with the fear that women in combat would disorient men and deprive them of their unique role. The last bastion would be conquered at last (1985:102-103).

In the past, young males have either been lured or drafted into the military with the promise of becoming a man (Arkin and Dobrofsky, 1978:154). The military has often been seen as an opportunity for young men to grow up, fostering a belief that they will return home as men. The status for those who have served in the forms of honor, medals, success, and recognition have reinforced the military’s role as creator of men (1978:154). Segal and Segal point out that the military has traditionally been an “exclusive male province characterized by prototypic masculine norms, with military service functioning as a rite of passage to manhood” (1983:165).

These beliefs affect female recruits because they are perceived as different from men. According to Davis, women in the military must cope “simultaneously with symbols and behaviors which perpetuate and maintain male ideology and develop identities as women which satisfy the organizational culture”. She adds that the male identity of the organization is “strongly evident
through sexualized behaviors and norms, such as male attitudes of paternalism, sexist male talk, joking and innuendo, pinups and calendars, and sexual harassment, in the day-to-day environment of work” (1997:185-186). Hunt tells us:

Even patriotism is gender-linked in a patriarchal society. While for men the ultimate expression of loyalty to one’s country is to serve honorably in the military, in combat if necessary, women are given a very different message. To serve in the military, other than as a nurse or in some other support position, is at best anomalous, at worst invading men’s territory, in short unpatriotic (1991:98).

As a socializing institution, the military reinforces masculine values and norms. Dunivin argues that the combat arms provide men with the opportunity to demonstrate their masculinity and the warrior role is one way to prove one’s manhood. She adds that this “masculine mystique” is evident during basic training when traditional images of independent, aggressive, competitive, and virile males are rewarded and promoted (1994: 536). During initial training, recruits are also often associated with femininity as they are often referred to as “girls” and “ladies” until they demonstrate signs of masculinity such as aggression and other “macho” qualities (Peach, 1994:7).

Harrison and Laliberté argue that during basic training male recruits are challenged to become “real men” by proving that they are not women. “Instructors encourage stereotypically masculine behaviors from recruits by using female-associated words to derogate them” (1997:36). As such, they are often forced and pressured into proving their masculinity. According to Cropsey, combat is also a “final haven of male exclusivity” and thus represents a challenge to be mastered (1980:69). Carroll and Welling Hall tell us that “war and training for war are specifically designed
to make men tough, to challenge that which is soft and feminine in them” (1993:20).

Basic training not only links sexuality with domination, aggression, and violence, it also teaches that the man’s very survival depends on maintaining these attitudes and behaviors. By associating qualities that are stereotypically considered common to women and homosexual men with all that is undesirable and unacceptable in the male recruit, misogyny and homophobia are perpetuated in the military and in society at large (former Marine Corps recruit cited in Peach, 1994:7).

Weinstein and White argue that:

Women can undue the pro-masculinist training which has been so carefully crafted, and for this reason women are sexualized, despised, and condemned - the cadets must be able to separate themselves entirely from women if their bond to the “machine” is to be complete (1997:56).

Harrison and Laliberté also tell us that the military uses its “socially constructed polarity” between masculine and feminine in order to use masculinity as the “cementing principle” which unites “real military men in order to distinguish them from non-masculine men and women” (1997:36). In general, according to Arkin and Dobrofsky, the final product of basic training is to produce a silent, strong, self-reliant man who participates as a loyal member. They add, however, that this “product” is primarily created through the “indoctrination of values and a mentality which have nothing to do with the military mission” and that all of the assignments and exercises of basic training are “designed to build the man whose sex-role identity is molded under
conditions similar to the controlled environment of a laboratory” (1978:159). “You have to
conform to a hard core, tough image or you’re a punk...The pressures of assuming manhood are

According to M. Segal, there is a cultural ideal in most societies that men are the warriors.
“This ideal persists despite the fact that women in many nations have participated in military
operations and even in warfare as combatants” (1993:81). Similarly, Stoddard argues that the
myth persists that women have never served in combat “even as the direct combat experience of
WW II servicewomen continues to be documented” (1994:4). M. Segal tells us, however, that
public discourse and other forms of social life are “socially constructed to support a perception
that women are not combatants” (1993:81). She adds that the “steadfastness of this belief
demonstrates the social construction of reality” (1993:81).

Howes and Stevenson also tell us that society has traditionally viewed women as “out of
place” both in organizations responsible for the implementation of military force and in applying
“lethal force” as individuals. “The use of lethal force is so strongly associated with our ideas of
masculinity that the ability to use it is one of the defining traits of manhood” (1993:209). They
argue that war has traditionally been seen as a masculine enterprise and that the preparation for
combat has contributed to the “construction of hegemonic masculinity... at least in part because of
the absence of women” (1993:209). Carroll and Welling Hall argue that when we talk about
women and the use of force, “we are digging at the roots of what simultaneously makes women
feminine and men masculine. Not a biological determinism that makes males aggressive and
females passive, but how we as human beings have constructed and continue to interpret the world" (1993:20).

Arkin and Dobrofsky tell us that, through relative physical isolation, community insulation and behaviour modification, "the traditional prototype of masculinity is molded by the military in the belief that war and military are masculine domains and, as inherently masculine domains, success is dependent upon the degree to which the military person conforms to the defined archetypes" (1978:166). Davis describes how "as women enter the "man's world" they are struggling not only with questions surrounding their capability to do "men's work," but with issues surrounding their identity as women" (1997:184). Women may thus sacrifice their gender identity for a masculine one that is reinforced and rewarded in this predominantly masculine institution (Dunivin, 1991:17). Firestone argues that women have no choice but to "conform to male images if they wish to succeed in the Army - competent soldiers are defined as men" (1984:89).

These women do not want to draw attention to themselves as women (either individually or collectively). Thus, they defeminize their gender roles, emphasize their work status, and distance themselves from other women. They recognize that the power and influence which promote or destroy military careers lies with senior male officers. Thus they choose to identify up, not down or laterally (Dunivin, 1988:60).

Cotton and Pinch argue that many of the decisions regarding women's employment and careers in the military are made by men who are not "entirely positive in their attitudes toward
women's participation" (1986:244). They add that "in general, the trials have shown that the most serious problem has proved to be traditional male attitudes" (1986:245). Thus, ideological identifications of the military as being masculine allows men to be the standard by which women are often evaluated (Peach, 1994:7). This helps to perpetuate the stereotype that women do not belong in this institution, especially in combat positions. Hunt tells us:

The Catch-22 for women in the military, and especially for women in combat, is that they must conform to a norm in which what is feminine is inferior. Recruits are taunted with the epithet "girls" if they do not perform properly. It is one thing for a young man to have stereotypically masculine traits ingrained into him, quite another for women. Women must choose between participating in the implicit degradation of all women by tolerating the abusive macho practices, or distinguish themselves as feminists or be accused of being lesbians because they maintain their integrity as women in a system in which being a woman under any circumstance is wrong (1991:98).

Firestone argues along similar lines as she tells us that pressure "is directed at women to meet male standards and modes of behaviour, but women who meet these standards are then held suspect as women" (1984:91). According to Weinstein,

The issues of women in combat and sexual harassment make it clear that women are still not readily admitted into that hallowed inner male sanctum of the military. Military women are expected to be strong and independent (masculine norms), yet if they are too strong and/or too independent they are viewed as dykes. If, on the other hand, military women are too weak and too dependent on the men (feminine norms) they are viewed as incompetent drags on the system (they limit unit readiness) (1997:xvii).
Today, the male preserve of the military is being challenged on all fronts. “Sexual harassment, the opening of combat posts and military academies to women, and opening the closets to let gays and lesbians into the military, are all issues which are slowly eroding that bastion of masculinity” (Weinstein, 1997: Introduction). Dunivin tells us that traditionally, the military has recruited, trained and rewarded soldiers who “embody its CMW [combat, masculine - warrior paradigm] ideology - a homogeneous force comprised primarily of white, single, young men who view themselves as masculine warriors”. She adds, however, that “times are changing” (1994:537). Perhaps Davis sums this process of change up best:

Many women feel that things are slowly changing, and many women and men continue to exert considerable effort to provide equitable opportunity for an improved quality of life and career for women in the Canadian Forces. Women, however, continue to represent a “difference” which the organization as a whole has not fully embraced and integrated (1997:195).

This idea of the military as being masculine is important when examining the integration of women because the introduction of women into this traditionally male-dominated environment represents “difference”. This “difference” is rejected by the combat arms because it challenges traditional gender role assumptions of what is masculine and feminine.
4.3 ARGUMENTS USED AGAINST WOMEN

4.3.1 Care vs Justice

Based on previous analyses of the factors that influence women's military roles, two categories of value rationales stand out: "military effectiveness" and "citizenship rights and responsibilities" (M. Segal and Hansen, 1992:298).

According to M. Segal, those who argue in favour of expanded roles for women in the military emphasize citizenship equality and its relationship to the military service. However, individuals who are opposed to the expansion of women's roles emphasize the negative impact of women on military effectiveness or possibly on the women themselves (1993:91). Those who are not in favour of the expansion of women's roles in the military "focus on problems that women would allegedly pose in combat or near-combat tasks, including both problems with women's military performance in combat and problems with morale and the combat performance of men who might attempt to protect their female colleagues" (Wilcox, 1992:311).

D'Amico points out the difference between antifeminists and radical feminists on the idea of women as "warriors":

The image of the women as warrior has been viewed as distressing, intriguing, and compelling. Antifeminists decry the image as unnatural and warn us that women's increased military participation destroys both the family and the fabric of civil society while also impairing military
efficiency. Their argument assumes inherent and natural gender differences...

Radical feminists see the image of the women warrior as representing women’s potential for power, as lingering evidence of an ancient matriarchy or women-centered and women-governed society. They embrace the image as a symbol of solidarity and sisterhood, and argue for a separatist philosophy of empowerment. Some see military means as necessary for liberating and defending women from patriarchy. In this view, as with the antifeminists, gender differences are seen as natural and immutable, and as barriers to gender equality within any community. But while antifeminists would maintain the current gender hierarchy, radical feminists would either reverse it or disengage from it via separation (1996:379-380).

According to Peach, the main division among feminists who have examined the issue of women in combat is between those who support an “ethic of care” and those who support an “ethic of justice”. These two ethical positions present “prevalent and opposing frames of reference for considering the issue of women in combat, and have consequently been one of the fault-lines that divide feminists into opposing camps” (1997: 100). The “ethic of care” approach assumes that women are more oriented “toward peace than war, and that because the military is an inherently male institution, it is incapable of being transformed in accordance with feminist principles. Care feminists consequently conclude that combat -- like the military more generally -- is an inappropriate place for women” (1997:109). In contrast, those who support an “ethic of justice” approach base their arguments on principles of justice such as equality, basic fairness and individual legal rights (Peach,1997:100). “Advocates of this ‘ethic of justice’ argue that only by sharing in such duties of citizenship as that entailed in national defence through combat duty can women ever be considered full citizens and attain full legal and social equality with men” (Peach,1997:100). Justice feminists also “endeavor to debunk the myths that women lack the
capacity for military combat" (Peach, 1997: 102). As we will soon see, these ethics seem to represent the different viewpoints that are found within the CF surrounding the integration of women.

4.3.2 THE ARGUMENTS

M. Segal points out that the issue of whether or not women should be permitted to volunteer for combat positions has been in American public discourse since the 1970s. Since then, the arguments for and against women in combat have not really changed much. These arguments include the "consideration of differences between men and women (on the average) in physical and psychological traits (especially aggression), the potential impact of women on the cohesion of military units, and cultural values regarding gender roles" (1993: 91). This also appears to be the case in the Canadian context. When she returned to DWP (Directorate of Women Personnel) in 1980 at the start of the SWINTER (Service Women In Non-Traditional Environments and Roles) trials, Hellstrom was shocked to see the same attitudes and hear the same arguments that had prevailed fours years earlier:

The land trial, and to a lesser extent the sea trial, were problematic, particularly from a social integration point of view. The final social and behavioural science report indicated that the presence of women had no impact on the operational effectiveness of the units. However, the report later prepared by NDHQ staff told a somewhat different story, one which did not reflect the content of reports filed by unit commanders, and by the social and behavioural scientists. The NDHQ report seemed intent on proving that women could not succeed in non-traditional environments and roles. This was not just the opinion of DWP, but also of a number of other officers involved with equality issues and with the occupations
that had significant numbers of women trial participants.

I remember this time as being extremely frustrating, although support from some senior officers was becoming evident - even if they were reluctant to express that support in the presence of their peers (Hellstrom, 1996:95).

In relation to studies done on the utilization of women in the military, D. Segal wonders about the objectivity of the research which has been conducted by the armed services of the Western nations: "That is to say that at times such research, rather than being a fair trial, was expected to produce a directed verdict, and was discounted by the services if it came up with the wrong results" (1986b:3).

Dunivin informs us that

traditionalists cite combat readiness and unit cohesion as essential to success and thus resist social change (e.g., integration of women or homosexuals) that may destroy combat effectiveness, degrade cohesion and morale, or create an ill-trained, unprepared "hollow" force. These traditionalists conclude that both the military and nation will lose if sweeping social change subsequently destroys the military's cohesion and readiness to fight and win.

Conversely, liberals advocate an ideology of equality... They believe that social change is both mandatory and manageable... Liberals note that the military, as a servant of society, must reflect societal core values and culture or be labeled an anachronism. Without paradigm evolution, the military runs that risk - divorcing itself from society. In turn, the military may lose public confidence, respect, and support... (Dunivin, 1994:541-542).
According to Chandler, Bryant and Bunyard, “as warriors, physical and emotional characteristics of personnel are emphasised and the greater inclusion of women, especially into combat situations, is seen as carrying the potential to degrade military effectiveness”. They add, however, that women’s participation in real combat situations has rarely been fully tested and, “where analyses of women’s wartime performance have been undertaken, they largely confirm their positive contribution ... but this confirmation does not prevent the generic question being re-asked of women and never asked of men” (1995:127). Even when “studies have demonstrated that women do not degrade and may actually enhance the performance of their units in combat-support tasks ..., the impact of women on military effectiveness has been the subject of debate (Wilcox, 1992:311).

Recently, Ottawa Citizen readers have demonstrated that women’s impact on military effectiveness is still a hotly debated issue even though women have been a part of Canada’s combat arms for almost ten years. For example, Burt Harper (a former wartime infantry platoon commander) claims that there is no place for women in an army unit that has a role of engaging in deadly competition with an enemy. “It would be unfair and unreasonable to add gender considerations to the responsibilities of the junior commander and soldier in battle...And inter-gender emotion and its consequences would be there in that intensely, personal environment - unless, of course, soldiers are physically neutered beforehand” (Thursday, November 27, 1997). In an interview with the Ottawa Citizen, Retired Maj.- Gen. Dan Loomis states that “the problem with women isn’t that they’re not strong enough, isn’t that they’re not brave, isn’t that they won’t die well like the rest of us...The problem is group dynamics in a small group. You cannot get
away from the basic nature of our species. There’s a natural protectiveness of men” (cited in Pugliese, 1997). Women in combat are still also seen as problematic for some within the defence community. The Conference of Defence Associations, in a paper called *Recovery Measures For The Canadian Armed Forces: Advice For The Minister Of National Defence*, argues that the insistence of government on the matter of women in the combat arms:

... is an example of how Canadians often move from naivety into the realm of stupidity. It is yet another example of the inability to grasp that armed forces are in fact unique within society. Recent policy directing the army to establish 25% of combat arms as females by 1999 — by lowering standards if all else fails — simply means that the combat effectiveness of the forces will fall and they will no longer be capable of guarding and advancing the national interest. It also illustrates “civilianization” since it puts the armed forces on the same footing as other uniformed parts of government... (1997:7).

Yet the argument that women in the combat arms will degrade a unit’s operational effectiveness is not borne out by studies. Despite the presence of women during the SWINTER trials, no degradation in operational effectiveness was reported. Robinson commented:

Nevertheless, much speculation and many assumptions concerning women have been offered in attempting to justify the continuance of an outdated, discriminatory policy. These opinions are based primarily on myths and prejudicial stereotypes about women. No hard evidence has ever been produced in support of such attitudes. In fact, all evidence confirms that women have been combatants in times of war and continue to be; and, skepticism aside, they have conducted themselves just as well and, in some cases, better than their male counterparts” (1985:101).
Other arguments which have attempted to discredit the participation of women in combat have focused on protectionist justifications, that is, women should not be killed in combat and so forth. Others relate to physical characteristics such as strength, stamina and muscle; disruption of discipline, unit bonding, pregnancy and so forth. What is evident in reading some of the literature available on women in combat and arguments which surround their inclusion or exclusion is that for practically every argument used against women, there is a counter-argument that can be made. For example, Cropsey argues that the problem with women in combat has nothing to do with their ability to become pregnant, their strength and so forth. Instead, he argues that “sexual attraction between men and women is as likely to destroy camaraderie as it is to produce constant dissension among men in a group. The difficulty is not...that men instinctually protect women, but that both men and women in couples will protect one another to the exclusion of what is good for the unit” (1980: 72). On the other hand, Robinson argues that it is “ludicrous to think that, in the heat and dirt of battle, there would be time for romantic liaisons. Close attachments would perhaps be formed, because there have always been close friendships among combat soldiers. Such ‘bonding’ transcends romantic attachments and stimulates combatants to fight more fiercely when one of their number is killed” (1985:101). In short, the arguments used against integrating women in the combat arms seem to be more emotional than grounded in fact.

In a position paper prepared for the Canadian Department Of National Defence entitled *The Impact Of Gender Integration On The Cohesion, Morale, And Combat Effectiveness*

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Of Military Units, D. Segal addressed many of the issues discussed above. He concluded that “despite the fact that in the short run, as a new phenomenon, gender integration is frequently met with resistance which in turn may constrain cohesion, there is no indication that gender integration negatively affects the performance of military units” (1986b:19). He also found that “while there are undeniably problems when previously all-male military formations are gender integrated, there is no firm scientific evidence that would justify the categorial exclusion of women from combat units on organizational grounds” (1986b:24). In relation to physical differences, he argued that there was no question that women and men were different (on the average) in a wide range of physical traits related to military performance. However, he did note that “physical conditioning increases the capabilities of women, and that while average differences between the genders persist after conditioning, the gender distributions tend to overlap. Thus, where these abilities are relevant to particular military trades, it is rational to screen for the ability rather than for gender, thereby selecting the most qualified individuals” (1986b:24).11 Again, this demonstrates that many of the arguments used against women are extremely controversial and that often people’s personal perceptions and attitudes can have a large impact on what they believe.

It should be noted here that the Tribunal Human Rights Tribunal made some interesting comments in relation to Dr. David Segal’s findings. For example, it cited his observation that: “the major basis for the categorial exclusion of women from combat units are cultural values regarding appropriate roles for women and resistance from male military personnel” (1989:59).

11 For more detail concerning psychological differences, medical differences and so forth, see D. Segal, 1986b
The Tribunal concluded that women are, with training, capable of combat roles. The experience of women in combat in the Second World War bears this out. The decision of the air force bears this out. Performance was not an issue as a result of SWINTER trials. Cohesion and the physical and environmental elements are susceptible to management. Integration policies and practices can be designed and applied. We agree with the report of Dr. Segal that attitude is a major factor in making integration work...Behaviour can to some extent be mandated, with sanctions and rewards as inducements but attitudinal change may not keep pace, and it is this element that must accompany the implementation of an integration policy. Leadership and commitment to integration are essential at the mid and upper levels of command because it is in the operational units that integration must take place (1989:60).

In brief, allowing women to enter combat positions is a controversial and emotional issue as it challenges the traditional ideology that war is a man’s world where women do not belong.

4.4 THE MILITARY: A PLACE OF NON-ACCEPTANCE?

Earlier, we examined the idea that “official attitudes change more rapidly than the gut-level reactions of males who feel their jobs and cultures are threatened...” (Howes and Stevenson, 1993:212). This still seems to be the case regarding the integration of women in the combat arms. In Chapter Three, we also saw how externally-imposed change led to policy changes in the CF (full integration of women). However, these “official” changes do not mean that successful integration has taken place nor that attitudes which inhibit the success of women no longer exist. For example, in her 1985 report on the Social/Behavioural Science (SBS)
Evaluation of the SWINTER Land Trial, Park commented on how the SBS results suggested that "participating in the Land Trial did not significantly change Unit members' attitudes. Specifically, attitudes expressed by respondents when they first arrived at the trial Units tended to remain the same when surveyed later at the end of the Trial" (1985:iii). Interestingly, she adds that "the proportion of acceptance/non-acceptance of women expressed by servicemen during the Land Trial was virtually identical to the response patterns of servicemen in all-male field units, including Canadian CSS\textsuperscript{12} units, surveyed since 1978" (1985:iii). Although Park's comments were made in the mid-1980's (prior to the 1989 Human Rights Tribunal Decision), they do indicate that attitudes do not change quickly over time. These concerns are still voiced by some in the 1990's:

The Human Rights Tribunal drew clear attention to the distinction between attitude and behaviour, and the need to alter the former while insisting upon the latter. Yet despite advances in education and experience, the CF is still caught in a situation where behaviour is not fully consistent with policy, and where negative attitudes may still be displayed with impunity in inappropriate and potentially directive circumstances (Minister's Advisory Board On Women In The Canadian Forces, 1992-1993:10).

In its 1993-1994 annual report, the Minister's Advisory Board on Gender Integration in the Canadian Forces (MABGICF) expressed the following concerns:

During the Board's visits to units or major sub-units which have not, as yet, experienced integration, personnel voiced attitudes that were strongly biased or stereotyped and bordered on being hostile. While the disciplinary structure of these units might mitigate the translation of these attitudes into direct behaviours, the wholehearted endorsement of such attitudes is nevertheless

\textsuperscript{12} Combat Service Support (CSS)
inappropriate in a professional mixed-gender workplace and serves to underscore the necessity for effective mixed-gender leadership and awareness training. Lack of experience will not be considered an excuse for hostility; rather, it will appear to be a cause of inaccessibility to or inequity in the workplace. The prevalence of such expressed attitudes is one of the defining factors in what is now termed a "poisoned work atmosphere" (1994:14).

The Canadian Human Rights Commission has also been concerned with the pace of change regarding women in the CF. In its 1994 annual report, the Commission reported:

Sometimes it takes nothing short of a binding order to remove a systemic barrier, and even then it may meet with considerable reluctance. This has been the case in the military profession. A tribunal order was required before women were fully accepted into combat and combat-related positions in the Canadian Forces, even in principle... Five years after the tribunal decision, however, and half way into the period envisaged for "complete integration", we are more than a little concerned about the pace of change... The Advisory Board's third report... detailed a number of continuing attitudinal and procedural problems that make combat-related duties unduly difficult for women. They range from subtle signals from superiors that they are not welcome, to patronising assignments and sexist remarks. Such behaviour indicates a lack of sustained support for the integration of women into the CAF... Given the Board's findings, and the current lack of statistical data, we can only be left wondering just how much progress has in fact been made since 1989 (1994:58).

Similarly, in its 1996 annual report, the Human Rights Commission reported:

The Commission has made it very clear to the Canadian Forces, at the most senior levels, that the integration of women is not receiving the attention it needs. The end of the ten-year deadline is almost upon us, and their representation in combat occupations appears to be stalled at a very low level. Incidents involving the treatment of a woman officer that came to light around
the end of the year seemed to suggest that the Armed Forces culture was still far from welcoming to women members. The Canadian Forces can hardly claim to be taking the tribunal order seriously if integration of women is not given a much higher priority, along with corresponding resources and a more active involvement of senior management (1996:53).

In April 1995, the Minister’s Advisory Board on Gender Integration in the CF issued its fifth annual report called *Half-Way Through The Transition: A Mid-Term Review Of The Progress Of Gender Integration In The Canadian Forces 1989-1994*. Once again, the Board made some interesting observations. While systemic barriers to the employment of women were gradually being eliminated in the CF, attitudinal barriers were still present among some of the supervisors and leaders (1995:13). The Board, however, concluded its report on an optimistic note:

This review has touched only lightly upon some of the issues that will be added to the matrix of change during the next five years... The MABGICF is confident that, given the evidence of ability and willingness to change, and to investigate further institutional options evidenced to date by the CF, the commitment that has been observed in the mid-term review will, if sustained, monitored and adapted in a timely and responsible manner, allow the institution to meet the requirements of the HRT decision, the expectations of the Canadian public, and the principles of equitable employment during the five years that remain in the transitional period. There is much that remains to be done; but a solid base for continued development has been established (1995:35).

However, a recent study by Davis and Thomas indicates that the concerns of the Human Rights Commission over the years have not been exaggerated. Women in the combat arms are still finding themselves in an environment that often does not foster an atmosphere of acceptance.
Their study, *Gender Integration Study: The Experience Of Women Who Have Served In The Combat Arms* (1998), found that women regularly experienced an environment that was characterized by discrimination and harassment and that often conveyed messages of non-acceptance. It was also an environment that women perceived as having subjective and inconsistent performance standards (1998:iv).

As gender issues in the combat arms are acted out, it appears that issues related to physical strength and stamina provide the curtain that masks other issues. As long as women are not as strong as men, it does not matter whether they have met the standards or not. The research suggests that when women meet the standards, the standards are questioned, the social and sexual activities of women are scrutinized, women’s leadership ability is questioned, and women’s perceptions of harassment and inequitable treatment are questioned (Davis and Thomas, 1998:7).

Davis and Thomas also tell us that women expressed considerable frustration that they were not “even given a chance”. Women understood that they were not accepted nor welcomed within the combat arms (1998:11).

The environment has been defined by men and maintained to train and employ men. The world that women enter is a world that defines and reinforces gender roles in a way that is in conflict with the role of a woman in the combat arms. Consequently, a woman’s motivation to take on a ‘male role’ is suspect. Within the combat arms, the motivations and behaviours of each woman are interpreted in a way that leaves no room for women to be there because they ‘want to do the job’. On the other hand, women understand that they will have to become ‘one of the guys’ if they are going to succeed. In the end, there is no where for them to go because they cannot achieve either of these conflicting roles (Davis and Thomas, 1998:13).
For these women, the mental and physical demands of the work were not the real challenge of entering a traditionally male occupation. The real challenge was enduring the systematic rejection and bias against them that was evident in both “covert and overt” attempts to get them out of the combat arms (Davis and Thomas, 1998:19). Asked to give advice to young women considering a career in the combat arms, many answered with

a quick and decisive “DON’T DO IT!”. However, most emphasized that a female combat arms candidate should make sure that she knew what she was getting into, and make sure that she was physically and psychologically prepared to enter a male-dominated environment that, for the most part, did not want women (Davis and Thomas, 1998:28-29).

Thus, as we can see, although women have been allowed to enter the combat arms since 1989, they still face many barriers which are rooted in the negative attitudes of their male peers who still believe that combat is a male domain.

4.5 SUMMARY

In this chapter we briefly discussed the history of women in combat. We also examined how women have often not been accepted in this male-dominated environment, where traditional gender-role assumptions, myths and stereotypes along with negative male attitudes have been barriers to women’s integration and acceptance. Although the 1989 Canadian Human Rights Tribunal decision has “quashed” many of the arguments used against employing women in the combat arms, the successful integration of women has not yet occurred. This is important for the
purposes of the next chapter where we will examine policy concerning training standards and the application of these policies by military leaders. This will perhaps help us in understanding why women are treated differently than men within the CF and the combat arms.
CHAPTER FIVE

TRAINING STANDARDS: A PERCEPTION OF DIFFERENCE

In previous chapters, we have briefly examined the history of women in combat as well as some of the arguments that have been used against them performing these functions. What resulted from these discussions is that women were only allowed to be fully integrated into the combat arms by means of external civilian pressure (the Human Rights Tribunal ruling). Although it has been almost ten years since the Canadian Army was ordered to integrate women into combat positions, their full acceptance and representation (as we saw in Chapter Three) has still not occurred. Myths and stereotypes about proper gender roles along with negative attitudes found within the ranks have in many cases been obstacles to the successful integration of women. The goal of this chapter, however, is to attempt to distance ourselves from these myths, stereotypes and attitudes and to examine the CF’s, in particular the Army’s, training standards. The reason for taking this approach is to determine if these standards foster an atmosphere where men and women are treated differently, thus allowing traditional stereotypes, myths and negative attitudes towards female soldiers to be maintained. Our goal here is to determine if training standards can be seen as another “obstacle” which women must overcome in order to be accepted.

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13 Representation rates being so low in the combat arms that they may have quotas imposed on them by the Canadian Human Rights Commission in 1999.
5.1 TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

Efforts to hold women to the same physical standards as men are deluded. Rather than trying to raise female standards to abnormal levels, or lower standards for men, much better to admit the differences and be done with it (Moskos, 1998: C01).

According to D. Segal, there is no question that women and men “differ on the average in a wide range of physical traits relevant to military performance, e.g. upper body strength, aerobic capacity, adaptability to high temperatures, and that much of the difference is innate” (1986: 24). Due to these differences in physical traits, many people are under the impression that women in the CF and in combat positions are less fit, less able to perform their functions and are subject to different training standards than their male counterparts. In terms of the CF, these beliefs are false as they are based on perceptions of difference in standards, not actual difference (which will be discussed in the next section). The CF acknowledges that there are physiological differences between men and women; however, these differences do not mean that women are subject to different physical standards. “Difference between males and females in physical performance characteristics exist but the significance given to these differences will largely depend on attitudinal factors. Often the importance given to the difference far outweighs the actual differences” (Quinn, 1986: 5). We will now examine the physical standards and requirements that women and men must meet to become a member of the CF as well as the standards that must be met to join the combat arms.
5.2 TRAINING STANDARDS AND REQUIREMENTS

The physical fitness situation today is confusing. The impression that many officers share is that there are a myriad of testing devices which seem to be only in place to qualify the test and not address the fitness problem. It should also be pointed out that, with mixed gender training no longer a trial, there are two standards of physical training at Cornwallis, one for men and one for women" (cited in The Army Lessons Learned Centre, 1998:21).

Although people have the impression that double standards exist in the CF, this is simply not true. These perceptions arise as a result of the different "ways" women and men meet the required physical standards. In a sense, there are different physical requirements for men and women; however, the standards they must meet are the same. In order to clarify this, we will examine the CF EXPRES\(^\text{14}\) (term used to describe the method for conducting physical fitness training evaluation and exercise prescriptions in the CF) Programme.

The EXPRES Programme has different components which include a pre-test screening designed to ensure the absence of health risk factors before testing as well as a physical fitness evaluation which consists of aerobic muscular strength, upper and lower body muscular endurance, and body composition measurement (Lee, Chahal, Wheeler and Singh, 1995). Since April 1991, any Canadian citizen who walks into a CF recruiting centre is required to meet the Minimum Physical Fitness Standard (MPFS) of the CF EXPRES Programme. The Minimum Physical Fitness Standard resulted from a major study conducted between 1985-1988 on a large

\(^{14}\) Exercise Prescription Programme
CF population. From this study, five common military tasks were approved as being representative of the physical requirements needed by all CF members. The five approved tasks consist of a stretcher carry, sea evacuation, low/high crawl, entrenchment dig and sand bag carry (Lee, 1998:4).

Due to the length of time (two days) and the amount of resources necessary to evaluate CF personnel in these five common tasks, a predictor test was established which is still used by the CF today. This test is called the CF EXPRES test. “Predictor Standards were correlated to common tasks for the evaluation of aerobic efficiency (step test), muscular strength (hand grip test), lower body muscular endurance (sit-ups), and upper body muscular endurance (push-ups)” (Lee, 1998:4). Thus, if an individual passes the predictor test (CF EXPRES test), it is probable that this individual will also be able to perform the five common tasks of the CF EXPRES programme. If we examine the diagram below, we see that the five common tasks of the CF EXPRES programme are gender neutral. That is, that both males and females must meet the same standards.
5.2.1 TABLE 1:

Pass/Fail Criteria for Common Task Performances of the CF EXPRES Programme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMON TASK</th>
<th>MALES AND FEMALES UNDER 35 YRS OF AGE</th>
<th>MALES AND FEMALES 35 YEARS OF AGE AND OLDER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Entrenchment Dig (secs)</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Evacuation (secs)</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>1188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low/High Crawl (secs)</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea Evacuation (secs)</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sand Bag Carry (#)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As we discussed earlier, due to the time involved in assessing all CF members and the resources that would be needed, predictor tests (CF EXPRES test) were developed which would determine if CF members can meet the gender neutral common task standards above. However, what causes the impression of double training standards for women and men is the diagram below. The diagram below illustrates the *physical requirements* that must be met in the CF EXPRES test.
5.2.2 TABLE 2:

Pass/Fail Criteria for Each of the CF EXPRES Test Predictor Tasks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CF EXPRES Predictor Tasks</th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th></th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34 YEARS AND UNDER</td>
<td>35 YEARS AND OVER</td>
<td>34 YEARS AND UNDER</td>
<td>35 YEARS AND OLDER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step test (Vo2 max)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handgrip (Kg)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Push-ups (Reps)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9*</td>
<td>7*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sit-ups* (Reps)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(toe fulcrum push-ups for females)


At first glance, one would think that these requirements are not gender neutral as it seems that men have higher standards to meet than women do. However, what is important here is that the above diagram demonstrates the physical requirements (CF EXPRES predictor test) that men and women must meet in order to attain the common task standards (Table 1) which are gender neutral. This is often where confusion sets in as people begin to mix-up standards and
requirements. Table 1 illustrates the gender-free common task standards that all CF members must meet. There is no difference here between men and women as long as they meet the time requirements. Table 2 describes the EXPRES test which leads people to perceive that the standards are different. In fact, however, all it is doing is demonstrating the physical requirements that men and women need to meet in order to accomplish the common task standards (which are gender neutral).

The reason for this perceived difference is due to physiological differences. For example, women tend to use lower body strength while men use more upper body strength when meeting the common task standards (gender neutral). Thus, men are expected to have more upper body strength (which is reflected in the push-up requirements and so forth of the CF EXPRES predictor tests). Again, what is important here is that due to the amount of time that it would take to evaluate personnel on the five gender neutral common tasks (found in Table 1), predictor tasks (Table 2) were developed (push-ups etc.). Although these predictor tasks are used to determine if people are capable of meeting the common task standards, they also reflect gender appropriate physical strength issues. This is why we see differences in physical requirements for the predictor tasks as they take into account physiological differences. In the end, men and women all have to attain the gender neutral standards (common tasks), yet, their way of doing so may differ thus causing the perception that double standards for men and women exist.

Females who meet the minimum standard for the five common tasks displayed different performance profiles than males who meet the minimum standard for the five common tasks when the predictor test
was used. Hence, the predictive model reflects these differences between the genders, yet is based on the premise that both genders would be able to complete the five common military tasks in the required minimum time (Lee, 1998:4).

Thus, it is these different profiles

which have lead to differences in the EXPRES requirements for men and women. It has been scientifically determined that a woman who achieves the standard for women on the EXPRES test is as capable of successfully performing the five common tasks as a man who meets the EXPRES test standard (The Army Lessons Learned Centre, 1998:21).

Although all members of the CF must meet the physical requirements of the EXPRES test, individuals who are interested in joining the combat arms are also required to meet another set of physical standards due to the extreme physical nature of this type of work. Members of the Land Force are expected to meet the Land Force Command Physical Fitness Test (LFCPFS). The aim of this physical fitness policy is to ensure that all personnel are fit to fight. All land force personnel are also required to pass the LFCPFS in order to be deployable for operations (Land Forces Command Order 24-2). The LFCPFS consists of two parts. The first is the weight-load march where personnel must complete a 13 km march in 2 hours and 26 minutes. The march is to be completed in fighting order with rucksack while carrying 24.5 kg of equipment. The second part of the test is the casualty evacuation task. This task is done upon completion of the weight load march. Each individual soldier is thus required to evacuate another soldier of roughly the same weight and size 100 metres in 60 seconds or less. Both of these standards are to be met by all
personnel in the Land Force and they are both gender neutral standards (Land Forces Command Order 24-2). The rationale for these standards is:

Units must move as a group carrying a basic load. The requirement is to arrive at the destination fit to fight and not exhausted. There is no running allowed during the test. Everyone should arrive at the same time, carrying their own equipment, ready to complete the mission in the time allotted. In a battle situation, a soldier may be required to evacuate a wounded soldier safely in the shortest possible time (Land Forces Command Order 24-2).

In summary, it does not appear that training standards are an obstacle to the integration of women in the CF and, in particular, the combat arms. Women and men must meet the same common task standards. The differences found in the CF EXPRES test, are based on physiological factors, that is, women and men meet the same common tasks by different means. The Land Force test is also gender neutral since all members must complete the same standards regardless of their gender. In this case, there are no differences in the physical requirements needed to meet the standards (unlike the CF EXPRES test). Thus, since there are no differences in standards, we will now examine whether or not the application of these standards is an obstacle to the integration of women.

5.3 APPLICATION OF POLICY

Women don't want to skip the hard stuff - it just makes the men ostracize you (Dorge, 1997:5).
They (men) clearly do not want you, as a woman, to be there. It’s not so much the young guys, your peers, but the old guys, the instructors...with the young guys, their mentality is different. If you can prove to them you are capable, they’ll accept you. But the instructors are more limited (cited in Davis and Thomas, 1998:17).

Women report facing numerous social and psychological barriers which have an impact on their ability to meet physical standards, and have an over-riding effect on whether or not they will be deemed ‘suitable’ for the combat arms, regardless of whether they have met the physical standards. The very fact that they are women in a male defined and male-dominated environment has resulted in ambiguous perceptions and beliefs, on the part of peers, supervisors and instructors (Davis and Thomas, 1998:abstract).

The goal of this chapter was to attempt to determine if training standards act as a barrier to the integration of women. In the previous section, we examined the CF’s and the Army’s physical standards. We observed that the standards are in fact gender neutral. However, the above citations raise the following issue: Is the application of these policies gender neutral?

According to Aaltio-Marjosola, gender stereotypes are “cultural artifacts, existing within the cultural boundaries of individual organizations, inherited from the past and remaining in the organizational memory” (1994:148). In the case of gender integration in the combat arms, this also seems to hold true.

It is clear that the culture of the Army has not been one completely conducive to accepting that service by women in the combat arms is either feasible or desirable. In some cases this culture has resulted
in a leadership environment which if it did not actively resist integration, certainly might have been more successful in facilitating it (cited in The Army Lessons Learned Centre, 1998:1).

Tetreault tells us that belief systems surrounding gender roles, "like all belief systems, are characteristics of individuals rather than societies" (1988:45). However, she also tells us that each culture (or society) has a dominant "gender ideology that defines each gender and how it relates to the other" and that "all individual gender belief systems must come to terms somehow with these cultural norms" (1988:45). As we saw in the previous chapter, the essence of military culture is the image of the combat masculine - warrior. That is, men make -up the stereotypical image of the combatant. It is thus no surprise to find that since their integration into the combat arms, women have been treated differently than men as they do not fall into the traditional definition of what a combat soldier is (i.e. male). In its 1991 - 1992 annual report, the Minister's Advisory Board on Women in the Canadian Forces reported that new behavioural norms needed to be developed if integration was to proceed smoothly. It also claimed that "stereotypical attitudes arising from a belief in restrictive roles and functions for each sex must give way to professionalism where competence and performance as a team member are priorities rather than gender" (1992:3). These concerns were also raised in its 1993 - 1994 annual report:

Employment of women in land units is often a reflection of the attitude of some supervisors, who send men to the line and leave women in the rear areas. Where there were women on the line, it was reported that they were sometimes given less demanding tasks or were removed entirely if they expressed feelings of discomfort with their situation. The feeling that there was a "need" to protect women was heard frequently from men (supervisors and junior ranks) in units
with little or no experience with women (1994:20).

However, most women (like most of their male counterparts) do not want nor look for special treatment in the military. (The Army Lessons Learned Centre, 1998:7). These discriminatory practices thus stem from what male supervisors and male soldiers believe. That is, women and men are different and women need to be treated differently based on traditional gender-role assumptions (i.e. men protect, women nurture).

In the end, the research data suggest that the lens through which women are observed and evaluated is tinted in a way that discredits and devalues women in relation to male norms and standards. If women cannot perform physical tasks to the same standards, and using the same methods, as their counterparts, other 'soldier' qualities are not recognized (Davis and Thomas, 1998:7-8).

Abrams tells us that part of the strength of androcentrism is found in its power to "characterize nondominant groups in ways that facilitate their continued subordination" (1993:229). Thus, military leaders must be aware of the important messages they send out to their men and women when they give special treatment to women or allow special treatment to occur. Doing so only helps perpetuate traditional notions of proper gender roles and complicates the integration process.

Many women described an experience of being systematically worn down psychologically, resulting in a gradual loss of interest, and less and less inclination and/or ability to keep up with physical and/or academic demands of training (Davis and Thomas, 1998:12).
Some of the women who were interviewed in Davis and Thomas' study noted that "they had the most difficulty with their peer group, several identified older instructors and supervisors as the problem and others believed that the younger males had the most difficulty with women in the combat arms" (1998:9). Davis and Thomas add that the "peer group process is guided and influenced by instructors and leadership" (1998:9). This is important as it demonstrates the impact that both senior and junior leaders can have on the members of their group. When discussing the acceptance of women and other integration concerns, people tend to focus on senior leadership. However, we must also realize that those in junior leadership positions also play a vital role. Junior leaders are often the individuals who are in contact with the women and men within the ranks. Thus, their attitudes and behaviour must also be addressed and taken as seriously as those in senior leadership positions. When discussing leadership here, we are thus making reference to both junior and senior leaders.

According to Lamerson, supervisors, by virtue of their position, "have the power to influence the reactions of subordinates" (1987:10). Effective leadership is critical in order for gender integration to succeed. "The focus of successful gender integration has been centred on leadership for good reason; without the support of informed and committed leaders, and visible demonstration of that support, any attempts to introduce major changes within an institution will fail" (The Minister's Advisory Board on Women in the Canadian Forces, 1992:14). This is the message that The Army Lessons Learned Centre has also sent out in its recent publication on leadership in a mixed gender environment.
The bottom line is that although we, by our nature, are slow to change, our culture of arms must change to reflect the society which it protects. The employment of women in combat roles is part of that cultural change. *Your role in this cultural change it to be an effective leader in a cohesive unit that is ready for war.* If you cannot adapt or refuse to adapt, then you are part of the problem and not part of the solution (1998:4).

More simply put, “there are no such things as women’s issues - just leadership issues” (The Army Lessons Learned Centre, 1998:24).

According to Davis and Thomas, cultural (male) assumptions that are related to the expected, accepted and/or “appropriate social and sexual behaviours of women create a systematic barrier to the objective evaluation of the performance of women in the combat arms” (1998:31). Military leaders must thus realize that in order for these barriers to erode, they must be an example to their subordinates. This example begins by treating both men and women equitably. There are no double standards for training. Therefore, leaders must take the responsibility that none arise or are permitted. Applying double standards only helps perpetuate traditional stereotypes and norms which are outdated. Women are a part of the combat arms and have been so for years. Although the alteration of a belief system is difficult, it must begin somewhere, and the truly effective leader must lead by example. The combat arms and the military in general must alter their traditional belief system and replace it with an egalitarian one.

The military must alter its prevailing view of warrior as a male - only vocation. In the emerging pluralistic, egalitarian military, combat includes soldiers (e.g., gays and women) who do not fit the traditional mold of “masculine warrior”. Their very existence and success
challenge the military’s traditional notion of warrior. Therefore, the military must begin to view the warrior as a soldier whose job extends beyond combat and whose ability transcends gender or sexual orientation (Dunivin, 1994:542).

Canada’s top soldier, General Maurice Baril, has acknowledged that there is a “problem of attitude” towards women in the CF. He has also admitted that he cannot command a change in attitude (Maple Leaf, 1998:3). So where do we begin? Again, leadership is the key. If soldiers see their superiors treating women equitably, that is, by not giving them special treatment or enforcing double standards, they may internalize this and eventually do the same themselves. The Army Lessons Learned Centre makes it clear that you “never pass a fault” and that “There are no separate standards or training quotas based on gender. There is only one standard ENFORCE IT!” (1998:20).

5.4 SUMMARY

If we ask the question of whether or not there are different standards for men and women in the CF and the combat arms, the answer is no. The policies are clear - they are gender neutral. It is the application of these policies that help perpetuate traditional gender role assumptions, myths and stereotypes. Consequently, double standards emerge and women are thus seen as different from their male counterparts. Most women do not ask to be treated differently. Otherwise, they lose the respect of fellow soldiers and are further victimized by traditional attitudes. In order for women to prove that they are as capable as men in performing combat
functions, they must be given a fair chance to do so on the same level as their male colleagues:

The culture of the Army must evolve, and it is important for all of us to promote the required change. This change does not imply adoption of a double standard, or for that matter a relaxation of standards. It simply demands that all members of the Army achieve the one standard that meets operational requirements. In the most basic sense, all soldiers must be treated equitably (cited in The Army Lessons Learned Centre, 1998:1).
CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

The primary goal of this thesis was to examine how human rights legislation (externally-imposed change) has led to change within the Canadian Forces (CF), in this case, the full integration of women. A second goal was to examine this change in the context of training standards to determine if such standards are an obstacle to the integration of women in the CF. In Chapter Two, we examined what military sociologists such as Morris Janowitz and Charles Moskos have argued in relation to changes which have taken place in military establishments over the years. This discussion showed that change within the military can occur as a result of external circumstances and that this change will be accepted by some (those whose attitudes are convergent with civilian society, i.e. the air force) more than others (those whose attitudes are divergent, i.e. the combat arms). This discussion allowed us to situate human rights legislation within the civilianization framework. That is, we examined how externally-imposed change (human rights legislation) led to changes within the CF (full integration of women) and how these changes were resisted by some (the combat arms) more than others (the air force).

We then focused our attention (Chapter Three) on changes which have taken place over the years as a result of external pressure concerning women in the CF. We did so by examining key historical events such as the 1970 report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women, the 1978 Canadian Human Rights Act, the implementation of Section 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1985) and the 1989 Canadian Human Rights Tribunal’s decision on the status of
women in the CF (the combat arms). Although these events led to the full integration of women
(except submarines because of privacy issues), they did not provide a full account of some of the
other obstacles that women have had to overcome and are still currently facing. We thus
examined (Chapter Four) some of the arguments used against women seeking employment in the
combat arms (which are mostly based on myths and stereotypes) as well as the masculine nature
of the military. This discussion showed that women's serving in combat environments is not a new
phenomenon and that the integration of women is a very controversial and emotional issue.

In Chapter Five, we examined the training standards within the CF. Here we discovered
that, although training standards are gender free, supervisors and those in leadership positions
have not been consistent in the application of training standards policy. Double standards have
been reported that allow women to receive special treatment which in turn does not help them in
getting the respect from their peers that they deserve. These double standards are often the result
of decisions taken by people in leadership positions who allow women to be treated differently.
This eventually leads to the further subordination of women by reinforcing traditional gender
stereotypes.

If we ask ourselves whether or not human rights legislation has led to change within the
CF, the answer is clearly yes. The most obvious change has been that women are now allowed to
be members of the combat arms. This change alone has resulted in many other changes. For
example, training standards and physical requirements have had to be examined for gender
neutrality. Perhaps one of the major changes it has caused, however, is that it has made the Army
(the combat arms) reassess itself. The presence of women has put into question the traditional combat culture and have forced military leaders to realize that women are now a necessary part of the military. That is, military officials are now beginning to realize that military culture must change to reflect the civilian society from which the CF draws its personnel resources.

Has gender integration within the combat arms been a success? It could be argued that since the late 1980's, when women were officially allowed to enter the combat arms, there have been changes made (e.g. maternity leave) to meet women’s needs. However, it is the author’s opinion that successful integration has not yet taken place. Although women have been in the combat arms for almost ten years, people are still debating the question of whether women belong in the combat arms. This continuing debate itself demonstrates to a certain extent how unsuccessful integration has been. Instead, we should be asking ourselves what advantages women can bring to the CF, including the combat arms. By law women have the right to be in combat and those who are successful in meeting the standards should not be discriminated against based on gender. Recent scandals involving sexual harassment which have been reported by Maclean’s magazine and the recently-released Davis report (discussed in Chapter Three) are also good examples of problems that still surround the integration of women. As long as women are seen as different within the combat arms, their successful integration will be limited. Soldiers and leaders must realize the role they have to play if integration is to be a success. They must put aside their traditional attitudes and gender-role assumptions and realize that women and men working side by side can be an effective fighting force.
When we examine the CF's policy concerning training standards, it becomes apparent that these standards are clear and gender neutral. Thus, from a training standards perspective, one could argue that integration of women has been a success, that is, the CF has been able to develop standards that apply to all. However, the obstacle lies in the application of these standards. Military leaders cannot allow their personal attitudes to impede the proper evaluation of women. They have a responsibility to make sure that all individuals, regardless of their gender, meet the training standards of the CF, including the combat arms. If senior military officials do not ensure that training standards are being met by all, the military will not only be faced with poorly trained soldiers, they will also be faced with the same integration problems that they are currently facing. If changes do not take place, the combat arms will be faced with an environment which will continue to help perpetuate existing stereotypes and myths about women, thus preventing successful integration. Although the combat arms are divergent from civilian society, this should not be used as an argument for the non-acceptance of their fellow female colleagues. Women have the right to protect this nation's national interests. Attitudes within the combat arms surrounding women must thus become more convergent with those in civilian society.

The employment of women in combat environments has been a controversial and emotional issue. However, this thesis has shown that the aim of full integration of women in combat roles is fully justifiable and a necessary aim. In fact, full integration of women within the military will have the effect of bringing the military's values more in line with those of Canadian society, given that civilian society has increasingly recognized the equality of women and men in the workplace. Thus, the integration of women into our military may be seen as one particular
aspect of the civilianization of our armed forces. However, the means to achieve this end of full integration must be carefully selected. For example, the implementation of a quota system to achieve full integration may well be an inappropriate means to this end since it could perpetuate within the traditional warrior class the belief that women are inferior to men. Although the reasons for imposing a quota can be seen as helping women enter areas where they are a minority, doing so will only make men think that women are in combat positions only because the CF has numbers to meet. This can help reinforce the idea that women do not belong in combat and are only there out of efforts by the CF to become politically correct. Imposing a quota could cause more problems than solutions because it could lead to resentment, thereby inhibiting progress in the integration process.

Further research is needed in order to address other areas of gender integration. Research in relation to women in the combat arms must examine every component of the combat arms separately. That is, one should examine the infantry, the artillery, and so forth, as separate entities. A further area of research would be the development of occupation-specific standards for each occupation within the combat arms. Such research would set out specific and objective standards that must be met by all, thus making it easier for instructors to evaluate potential candidates.

Finally, even though there have been many problems with the integration of women in combat, it is unfair to suggest that all men in the combat arms have been opposed to their integration. Unfortunately, sometimes we have no choice but to generalize. Those who have supported the acceptance of women in the CF (and the combat arms) should continue to lead by
example:

The integration of women into the military shines a bright light on conflicts between military and social values whose resolution is important for their own sake as well as for the sake of those whose lives and careers are the battleground on which the fight takes place (Tetreault, 1988:66).
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