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UMI
Plotinus on the Soul as Substance and Act:

A Study on the Possibility of a Scientific Knowledge of Sensible Reality

by Jennifer L. Yhap

This thesis is presented to the School of Graduate Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

University of Ottawa

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ABSTRACT

Jennifer Yhap

Plotinus on the Soul as Substance and Act: A Study on the Possibility of a Scientific Knowledge of the Sensible Reality

The thesis argues for the admission of the scientific knowledge of the sensible reality in the Plotinian philosophy. As such, the thesis is a study in the metaphysics of knowledge.

The thesis is constructed in three parts. The first part is dialectical in nature; that is, it is a reasoning which starts from a given, commonly held position in order to elucidate the relative strengths and weaknesses thereof. The point of departure is the text of Enneads V.1 (10),3 on the acts and passions of Soul.

The second part is demonstrative in nature; that is, it is a reasoning which is meant to be conclusive of the thesis based upon rational and exegetical deductions. This part of the thesis is based on a study of the text of Enneads III.5 (50). Proceeding, the thesis identifies the mythological figure of Divine Aphrodite with Divine Soul and studies the nature of a priori knowledge. Following, the thesis identifies the mythological figure of Worldly Aphrodite with Mixed Soul and studies the nature of a posteriori knowledge. This section of the thesis includes five steps. The first step introduces the notions of knowledge of the particular and knowledge of the universal common to Aristotle and Neoplatonism. The second step situates the nature of reason to be potential within the historical context of Alexander of Aphrodisias, an Aristotelian well known to Plotinus. The third step posits the difference between potential or implicit knowledge and actual or explicit knowledge consequent to the application of the universal to the particular. The fourth step concerns the teaching on genus and species. Finally the fifth step concerns the subsumptive knowledge of Mixed Soul and the role of the abstract universal in Plotinian philosophy.

The third part is apologetic in nature; that is, a defence of the thesis against foreseeable objections. A first objection concerns the status of opinative knowledge in the Plotinian philosophy. The second objection concerns the Soul’s knowledge in contradistinction to Intellect’s knowledge.
Introduction

The present study wishes to argue for the admission of the empirical sciences within the Plotinian philosophy. In large, this task may be situated in two ways. First, there is the philosophical tradition, namely the contrast between two worlds or orders of reality, the intellectual or truly real which tells us what it is for something to be, and the sensible or image of reality which is the copy, trace, and approximation of its intellectual archetype. This view of reality is inherited from Plato and is the basic cosmology elaborated upon by all Platonists since. Second, there is the spiritual tradition which teaches us that the role of the philosopher-sage is to flee the world and to be as godlike as possible. Equally Platonic in origin, this injunction is taken anew by many Neoplatonists to mean the disinterest in all things practical and empirical in nature. Brêhier tells us: "The Plotinian theme par excellence, the one to which the contemplative mystics of every age will return, is that of the solitude of the sage who is alone with the supreme principle which he has attained because he has successively abandoned all finite and definite reality. ...The contemplative can only be a recluse, expecting no sympathetic echo from the marvelous reality whose vision he possesses; and this reality cannot be defined, for the contemplator wants to escape from every particular relation which binds him to an object". It is the typical view of Hellenism, its culture, religion, and philosophies. Now to pursue this task, we determine to remain within the purview of the first ground of inquiry, the philosophical tradition as it bears upon the relation of two worlds. We situate the study within the third hypostasis of Plotinian metaphysics, soul, and the notions of substance and

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act. In order to accomplish this task, we make especial use of two Plotinian treatises, the treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' (V.1,[10]), an early and important treatise on the doctrine of conversion and the ascent of soul, as well as the treatise entitled 'On Love' (III.5 [50]), a late treatise which recounts the nature of soul to be divine and pure and to be daimonic and mixed.

The thesis presents an original interpretation of the Plotinian philosophy insofar as it argues for the dual existence of reason, a superior reason in act which is identified with the mythological figure of Eros the god, and an inferior reason in potentiality which is identified with Eros the daimon. As such, the thesis is original in two ways: first, it discovers a dual existence of reason, to be in act and to be in potentiality, which the literature in the field has ignored up to the present. Put quite simply, no other study has raised the possibility or affirmed the existence of two distinct kinds of reason belonging to soul. Where scholarship on this possibility has been pursued, for instance by Chaignet in the last century and more recently by Schwizer, attention is different, preferring to understand a difference of rational faculties, τὸ λογιστικὸν and τὸ δὴ δαιμονικὸν, rather than a difference in the modifications of reason as an act and a passion of the soul. In Chapter I we take up and situate this older discussion within our own problematic, namely the possibility of a scientific knowledge of sensible reality. Meanwhile our thesis also differs from the recent work by Emilsson on Plotinus and sense perception. While it is true that both reason and sense perception have knowledge of forms, the kind of form thus known and the kind of knowledge thus obtained are significantly different in each case. In Chapter III section 5C we discuss and clarify this difference based on the notions of the particular and the universal.

Second, the thesis identifies the dual existence of reason to be an act and a passion of the soul with the mythological figures of Eros the god and Eros the daimon. Now this procedure is highly original for apart from Wolters, the English translator and editor of the treatise 'On Love' (III.5[50]), no other Plotinian scholar has made the identification of the two kinds of Eros with the two existences of reason. Meanwhile in the French translation and
edition of the treatise 'On Love', Hadot mentions rarely this aspect of Plotinus' thought.
Instead he concentrates on a study of the dual existence of soul as heavenly or divine and
worldly or mixed in contradistinction to a study of the dual existence of reason. The thesis
represents therefore a contribution to the field of Plotinian scholarship insofar as it identifies a
new method of analysis pertaining to the modifications of reason -- to be in act and in
potentiality -- as well as a new topography of the mythical figures represented in the Plotinian
universe.

There arise questions of method. We suggest a study in three parts. The first part is
dialectical in nature; that is to say, it is a reasoning which starts from a given, commonly held
position in order to elucidate the relative strengths and weaknesses thereof. This view of
dialectical science is based upon the psychological experience: one element necessary to human
reasoning is the agreement we share as to the acceptance, full or partial, of a given position. It
is the problem of justification whereby the inquirer seeks to ascertain the grounds -- rational,
textual, historical, and so forth -- upon which to base acceptance. In this wise, dialectical
reasoning is similar in nature to the pedagogical question, 'how, if at all, may we acquire the
proper object and true conclusions of a science'? As well, there is the negative function of
dialectical reasoning which consists in argumentation against a position commonly held.
Taylor observes: "Now reasoning of this kind differs from 'science' precisely in the point that
you take as your major premiss, not what you regard as true, but the opposite thesis of your

4 In this regard, the work of Yvan Pelletier, La dialectique aristotélicienne, Collection Noésis
(Montréal: Bellarmin, 1991) is especially revealing: "La ratification, par le commun des
mortels, par les sages ou par les spécialistes, ne constitue donc pas, comme on le dit
généralement, l'essence même de la matière dialectique; c'en est plutôt comme le signe naturel.
Mais, puisque ce signe donne le moyen objectif de la reconnaître, ce dont précisément a besoin
le dialecticien pour discerner lui-même et pour faire admettre à son répondant les propositions
de son argumentation, il n'est pas étonnant qu'Aristote ait voulu définir la matière dialectique à
partir de ce signe" 50.

5 See Pelletier: "Au début des Parties des Animaux, Aristote distingue deux habitus différents
développer à l'occasion de chaque science particulière: il y a, outre la connaissance
scientifique de chaque conclusion (η ἐπιστήμη τοῦ πράγματος), une manière d'éducation
(παιδεία τῆς) portant sur le mode approprié à la science (τὸ καλὸς ἢ μὴ καλὸς
ἀποδείκνυσι). ...Cette paideia possède une certaine détermination: elle vise le mode propre à la
connaissance scientifique d'une nature déterminée (περὶ τῶν φύσεων ἀφικομένος); mais
en regard des conclusions particulières concernant cette nature, elle reste commune:..." 57.
antagonist, which you regard as false. Your object is not to prove a true conclusion but to show your opponent that his premisses lead to false conclusions. This is 'dialectical' reasoning in Aristotle's sense of the word -- i.e., reasoning not from your own but from some one else's premisses".6 Chapter I assumes both aspects of dialectical reasoning insofar as it takes for its point of departure an analysis of texts on act and passion of the soul consequent to the seeing of its object read in the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' (V.1[10]): on the one hand, the justificatory nature of acceptance or the discernment of the grounds which support the proper reading of text, and on the other hand, the negative nature or the denial that the position commonly held attains to a true and scientific knowledge of text.

The second part is demonstrative in nature: it is a reasoning which is meant to be conclusive of our thesis based upon rational and exegetical deductions. To begin, chapter II section 1 introduces the principal text, the late treatise entitled 'On Love' (III.5[50]), and gives reasons for our choice of text. They are six in number: First, it is the treatise which most especially bears on reason -- the derived act of soul -- as distinct from substance -- the intrinsic act of soul. Second, it is a work which falls within the philosophical tradition of rational exegesis through the employment of myth, the figures of Uranus, Kronos, Zeus, Aphrodite, and Eros each representing an ontological reality in accordance with Plotinus' teaching on substance and act. Third, the election of this text agrees with our purpose, namely the admission of the empirical sciences within the Plotinian philosophy based on the soul's role as intermediary between the two worlds, intellectual and sensible. More especially, it is the elaboration of a theory of vision which defines reason (Eros the god) as the eye of soul. This precision establishes continuity with Chapter I for we understand the difficulty read in the early text on act and passion of the soul to be resolved in the late treatise 'On Love' based on Plotinus' affirmation upon the eye of soul. Fourth, it is the work which most clearly explains the nature of reason to be a passion of soul. Fifth, the treatise 'On Love' provides the moral and spiritual warrant for the knowledge of nature in the Enneads, for we learn therein that to know the world is a good. And sixth the treatise 'On Love' locates the thought of Plotinus

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within the Platonic tradition of the ascent. While there are several dialogues in which Plato expresses this teaching, there is perhaps none so famous and consistent as the speech by the prophetess Diotima in the *Symposium*. The treatise 'On Love' has for its object the exegesis of this dialogue.

There ensues a series of deductions concerning the nature of divine soul or soul as it looks above to the prior, the Intellect. In Chapter II section 2 we identify divine soul with the mythological figure of divine Aphrodite and situate this identification with reference to the doctrine of procession read in the early treatise entitled 'On the Three Initial Hypostases' examined in Chapter I. We then clarify the nature of divine soul to be a separate existence based on the Platonic and the Aristotelian philosophies of separate substance (Chapter II section 2A). Thereafter we examine the ability of divine soul to have knowledge of the transcendent forms, *a priori* knowledge (Chapter II section 2B). This part of the study includes four observations. There is the principle of priority and posteriority, that actuality is prior to potentiality, this teaching made known to Plotinus from the Aristotelian philosophy. Then there is Plotinus' teaching on genus and species. Unlike the Aristotelian position, Plotinus argues that the generic being or Intellect is not the mere potentiality of a species, say 'soul', but is the power of its species, their unity and source. Following there is the Plotinian dialectics, the division or unfolding of the form -- whole -- into parts and, conversely, the collection of the parts into a whole. More generally, Neoplatonists regarded division as a kind of deduction, for instance the deduction of soul's relations to itself, the *per se* property, and soul's relations to others, the relational property. And finally there is the notion of movement whereby soul's separate existence is understood to be pure act and descended image of form. These considerations also apply to reason insofar as it is the act and result of the soul activity. Born 'out of' soul and 'together with' soul, reason explicits the doctrine of two acts, the intrinsic act of being or cause of existence and the derived act of being or effect of existence in the attributive agency of soul.
After we turn to consider divine soul as a substantial existence which is pure of matter (Chapter II section 3A). We study Plotinus' criticisms of the Aristotelian doctrine of substance and act. Plotinus insisting on the priority, both metaphysical and logical, of the generic being upon the species being (Chapter II section 3B). Now this affirmation leads to two important consequences, first, that the soul has its source of being from within, the generic substrate, rather than from outside, a specific difference adjoined to the genus, for otherwise there ensues the disjunction of soul into two heterogeneous parts, 'substantial being' and 'soul'; and second, the relativity of the Aristotelian doctrine of essential and accidental attributes. Following we clarify several exegetical considerations pertaining to the birth of divine soul, in particular the necessity of remaining (Chapter II section 4A) and the Plotinian doctrine of contemplation as production (Chapter II section 4B). There ensues an analysis of Eros the god and the intellective vision. We adduce three considerations, first, a review of the per se properties and the relational properties of soul (Chapter II section 5A), second, the nature of substantial relations (Chapter II section 5B) and, third, the textual affiliation of the late treatise 'On Love' with the early treatise 'The Three Initial Hypostases' based upon a reference to the eye (ὁμαλόν) of soul (Chapter II section 5C). Finally we close the Chapter with a brief recapitulation of these epistemological considerations (Chapter II section 6).

In Chapter III we proceed with our demonstration of substance and act, this time as regards mixed soul or soul as it looks below to the sequent, the sensible reality. This chapter forms the core of our argumentation concerning the admission of the empirical sciences within the Plotinian philosophy. First, we set the religious and Platonic background which states that the daimon is an intermediary (μεταξύ) whose nature is mixed (μεταξύ), and of a character to love both in beauty -- the Intellect -- and in procreation -- the sensible reality (Chapter III section 1). Second, we discuss the ascent in terms of a logic of analysis: it is conversion or the discovery of the a priori determinations of a being, its participation in a property or form (Chapter III section 2). Third, we identify the elements of the daimon nature, its birth from Form (Poros) and Indetermination (Penia) existent within mixed soul (Chapter III section 3). More particularly, we note that this Indetermination is due to an intelligible matter (ὁλην ὅπετι
or potentiality within soul. Clarifying an especially difficult exegesis of text, and arguing against Corrigan who holds that the daimon nature is the lowest phase of sensible matter, we maintain the view that the daimon is in fact discursive reason understood from the point of view of its originative principles. In support, we adduce lexical considerations which lend credence to our view for we learn that the terms 'ἐμφαιτάζεσθαι' and 'φαινανείμαι' mean respectively 'reflection' or the immanent form in matter and 'representation' or the subject's internalization of these forms in sense perception. Plotinus' interdiction of Penia's partaking in them suggests, therefore, that the daimon can have neither sensation nor representation for its source and ground. Fourth, we clarify the nature of Eros the daimon to be inferior reason based on a consideration of its nature to be a mixture of form and indetermination (Chapter III section 4). Fifth, we situate the study of reason within the Neoplatonism of Philoponus and his witness to the two kinds of reason existent within soul, one that is actual and one that is potential (Chapter III section 5A). Following we analyze the nature of inferior reason to be a kind of disposition of the soul (Chapter III section 5B). Sixth, we turn to address the properly philosophical problem of the possibility of scientific knowledge of the sensible reality. Our argumentation includes five steps. The first step introduces the notions of knowledge of the particular and knowledge of the universal common to Aristotle and the Neoplatonists (Chapter III section 6A). The second step situates the nature of reason to be potential within the historical context of the teaching of Alexander of Aphrodisias, an Aristotelian who held the view that reason passes from a state of potentiality to a state of disposition upon knowledge of the thing (Chapter III section 6B). The third step posits the difference between potential or implicit knowledge and actual or explicit knowledge consequent to the application of the universal to the particular (Chapter III section 6C). The fourth step concerns the teaching on genus and species. We note that Plotinus accepts -- in addition to the older and more active sense -- the passive sense of potentiality as regards the genus (δυνατεί). As such, Plotinus is able to make room for a logic of class inclusion -- the ascending progress of being -- within his teaching on conversion (Chapter III section 6D). And lastly there is the affirmation of the inhering, that is, subsumptive knowledge of mixed soul and the role of the abstract universal in Neoplatonism (Chapter III section 6E). These five steps of our argument on the potential
nature of mixed reason serve to establish a Plotinian position concerning the ability to engage in the empirical sciences. To conclude, we recapitulate the important themes concerning the nature of discursive reason to be an inferior, potential kind of thought within soul, emphasizing the salient epistemological considerations which guide our understanding of the treatise 'On Love' (Chapter III section 7).

The third part is apologetic in nature: we seek therein to defend our position against foreseeable objections. In large, we foresee two objections. A first objection concerns the status of opinative knowledge or Δόξα in the Plotinian philosophy. Following Plato and the Republic, we learn that the classic ontology of science distinguishes two kinds of knowledge. Opinative knowledge whose object is the sensible reality and scientific knowledge whose object is the forms. In defense of our position, we argue that while Plotinus is Platonic in his general conception of being, he is yet able to maintain the validity of the empirical sciences upon grounds of actual and potential knowledge (Chapter IV section 1). Meanwhile a second objection concerns the soul's difference from the Intellect: it is the problem of the cognitive exigency of science, what can be said of a thing if it is to be a proper object of thought. In fact, we observe no difficulty befalling our thought. On the one hand, soul is defined by Plotinus to be the image and logos of the Intellect: it is the unfolding of the forms into parts. Now this consequence obtains because each Intellect has an inhering soul, that is to say, contains the species-being in extension. On the other hand, the doctrine of procession teaches us that soul is like matter to the Intellect as form, soul's actualization as essence being founded on its illumination by its prior, the formal cause. As such, soul is neither cut off nor identical with its prior, the Intellect (Chapter IV section 2). Finally we close the chapter with a recapitulation of our defense of the soul's ability to have scientific knowledge of sensible reality (Chapter IV section 3).

Plotinus is a notoriously difficult philosopher to read and comprehend in his thought. Several approaches recommend themselves, the most popular of which are historical -- reference made to his sources -- and textual -- the philological analysis and translation of text.
In order to understand our approach, it is perhaps timely that we acquaint the reader with a procedure which is particular to Neoplatonism, namely the teaching method 'by appearance' and 'by predominance' (ὅς πολυ ἐχθρον). To take as an example, the term ὅ φῶς' means 'mortal' and can be understood by all pupils as regards its apparent meaning; meanwhile more advanced pupils are able to understand the term as regards its predominant meaning, τὸ φῶτος τοῖκον or the luminescent character of human reason. Now this procedure was widespread amongst the Neoplatonists and serves to found our own approach to the Enneads: the text of the treatise 'On Love' is subject to being read 'by appearance' -- Plotinus' account of Plato's Symposium -- and 'by predominance' -- the main elements, characteristics, and notions which constitute the soul in its relations with its prior, the Intellect, and its sequent, the sensible reality. Our approach takes account of this double intention: the 'apparent' teaching on love as the true desire for the Good does not exhaust but rather requires completion by another 'predominant' teaching on love as the derived act of soul. The relation of the birth of love is not, therefore, merely a means to an end. Rather it is witness to a Neoplatonic procedure -- the 'apparent' and the 'predominant' -- which seeks to initiate the pupil into an appreciation of truth. Meanwhile our task remains clear, that is, the clarification of the nature of reason to have true and necessary knowledge of sensible reality.

A further consideration is the marked preference by the author of the Enneads for an intuitive approach. Rather than construct an hierarchical, that is, vertical order of thought, the Plotinian system is circular in nature. It is the apprehension of an original intuition or principle from which other closely related ideas flow; an apt image is that of concentric circles. Meanwhile the role of the philosopher consists in the personal apprehension of the first principle, a nearly mystical experience, and the direction of students toward a similar knowledge. Our study follows the Plotinian order of instruction for we prefer to fasten upon one intuition, the act of sight in its substantial nature to be an act and a passion of the soul, from which flow succeeding ideas on love -- the psychological aspect -- and reason -- the rational aspect -- rather than engage in a method which subordinates one idea to another.
Hence we ask the reader to be patient insofar as the nature of Plotinian exposition requires us to discuss many elements and parts of Plotinus' thought before arriving at conclusions.

Lastly we make a brief comment on style. From the preceeding remarks, it will have become apparent to the reader that we depend heavily on the Plotinian texts for guidance in our thought. There is, however, one element which remains to be mentioned, that is, the style of exposition or diatribe. Today the term 'diatribe' has assumed rather negative connotations to mean a sustained, reasoned but rather harsh and perhaps unjust attack on a work or person. However in Plotinus' day the use of diatribe was both current and positive. After the public reading of a text, the teacher proceeds to its examination by means of critical exchanges with members of the school. The result is a definitive, that is to say, demonstrative knowledge of the text. The present study is tributary to the original, ancient meaning of the term 'diatribe': it is a style of exposition which allows us to try and find the logic of the text as well as to do justice to current scholarship in the field. As such, the passage between what Plotinus understands as sensible reality and the polemical disputes engaged with contemporary Neoplatonists upon the role and cognizance of that reality is unavoidable and, indeed, necessary.

With these anticipations in hand, let us now turn to Plotinus and the Enneads.

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7 On the role of diatribe in the schools of late antiquity, see Bréhier's Introduction p.xxix and pp. xxxiii - xxxiv to Plotin: Ennéades, ed. and trans. Emile Bréhier, 6 vols. in 7 (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1924-38).
Chapter I
Texts and Problems

It is a commonplace of modern scholarship to say that Plotinus can make no room for a
science of the sensible reality. The judgement of Irwin is typical: "Rejection of the material
universe and of time requires rejection of all claims to knowledge of spatio-temporal and
perceptible objects, properties, and events".¹ This judgement is solidly based upon two
considerations. A first consideration is the Plotinian doctrine of the Intellect: "Thus it is true
that 'Intellection and Being are identical'; in the immaterial the knowledge of the thing is the
thing..." (V.9[5],5,29-31).² It is the affirmation that the ideal of knowledge is realised at the
level of Intellect. The identity of Intellect and of Being fulfills the cognitive exigency of what
can be said of a thing if it is to be a proper object of thought; Intellect says Being because
Intellect is Being.³ The Intellect's perfection requires that it be identical with its object, true
being. A second consideration is the Plotinian doctrine of matter:

Some conception of it would be reached by thinking of measurelessness as
opposed to measure, of the unbounded against bound, the unshaped against a
principle of shape, the ever-needy against the self-sufficing: think of the ever-
undefined, the never at rest, the all-accepting but never sated, utter dearth: and
make all this character not mere accident in it but its equivalent for essential-

¹ Terence Irwin, Classical Thought, A History of Western Philosophy 1 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1989) 190. As background, see VI,1 [42],1-3 for Plotinus' criticism of the
Aristotelian sensible substance and VI,3[44],2-10 on the Plotinian sensible substance as a
mixture (μίγμα 8,20) of qualities and matter. That Plotinus does not construe the Neoplatonic
sensible substance to have the same metaphysical unity as the Aristotelian substance is
discussed in Bréhier's Notice to the treatises VI,1-3[42-44] especially pp. 44-48. See also
on the nature of the sensible object as "something qualified" (109) not owning of an essential
nature. Finally see also the middle treatise 'Quality' II,6[17],1 where Plotinus affirms that the
sensible thing does not possess real existence but only qualified existence(πολλά, ού τι).
These texts are typical and lead the reader to suppose that Plotinus can make no room for the
sciences of the sensible reality by virtue of the non-substantial, non-real existence of things.

² ὅρθος ἀρα τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστὶ τε καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἢ τῶν ἄνευ ύλης ἐπιστήμη
ταύτων τῷ πράγματι...

³ See also V,3[49],5, and V,5[32],2.
being, so that, whatsoever fragment of it be taken, that part is all lawless void, while whatever participates in it and resembles it becomes evil, though not of course to the point of being, as itself is, Evil-Absolute.

In what substantial-form (hypostasis) then is all this to be found -- not as accident but as the very substance itself?

For if Evil can enter into other things, it must have in a certain sense a prior existence, even though it may not be an essence (I,8[51],3,12-22).4

The Plotinian matter is introduced as evil (κακόν), limitless (ἄπειρον), and totally deficient (πενία παντελῆς); it is a doctrine which affirms at once that matter is non-being and that it is the real principle of evil. The problem of the veritable role of the scientific knowledge of sensible reality within Plotinian philosophy may, therefore, be stated as follows: how can the soul have true knowledge of sensible reality when the ideal of science is located in its prior, the Intellect, and when the material consistency of things entails their participation in limitlessness and hence the entirely unknown?5

These evidences notwithstanding, we yet maintain the position that Plotinian philosophy admits of a science of sensible reality which is both necessary and universal.6 Our position is grounded upon the assumption that any text of the Enneads must be read within the

4 ἡ ἰδή γὰρ ἂν τις εἰς έννοιαν ἦκοι αὐτοῦ οἶον ἀμετρίαν εἶναι πρὸς τέτρων καὶ ἀπειρών πρὸς πέρας καὶ άνείδεου πρὸς εἰδοποιητικῶν καὶ εἰς εἰδεῖς πρὸς αὐτάρκες. δεί ἄρωσιν, οὐδαμὴ ἔστως, παμποθές, ἀκόρητον, πενία παντελῆς; καὶ οὐ συμβεβηκότα ταύτα αὐτῷ ἀλλ' οἶον οὐσία αὐτοῦ ταύτα, καὶ ὁ τι ἂν αὐτοῦ μέρος ἴδης, καὶ αὐτὸ πάντα ταύτα· τὰ δ' ἀλλ', όσα ἂν αὐτοῦ μεταλάβη καὶ ὀμοιώθη, κατὰ μὲν γίνεσθαι, όμοιά ὂπερ δὲ κακά εἶναι. τινὶ οὖν ὑποστάσθαι ταύτα πάρεστιν όμοιά ἔτερα ὑπάρχειν καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἐτέρῳ συμβαίνει τὸ κακόν, δεὶ τι πρότερον αὐτὸ εἶναι, καὶ μὴ οὐσία τις ἡ.

5 By 'sensible reality', we understand the visible universe, and, in particular, the sub-lunar world. It is the world of becoming. In Platonian philosophy, world soul is the cause of movement in the sensible reality. With the spermatic reasons, soul is able to produce an image of itself, the sensible reality or nature, the reflection of the form in matter.

6 The term 'science' or 'episteme' goes back to Parmenides and the distinction between the world of opinion and the world of pure thought. Later, Plato speaks of a science of being and knowledge of forms (for instance, Republic476a-480a) in contradistinction to opinion and the knowledge of sensible objects. We use the term 'science' to mean knowledge that is true and universal, demonstrative knowledge, or a knowledge of causes. The term 'science' will be situated within the Platonic tradition, most especially in Chapters III and IV of the thesis.
context of the work as a whole. Ours is not a procedure which is paradoxical in nature: rather, we determine to elucidate the thought of Plotinus in a manner which is consonant with both the cognitive exigency of the Intellect and the material nature of things. To do so requires that we clarify a theory of vision of the soul. We understand the word 'vision' to mean an attention of the soul to an object insofar as the object is rationally present to the soul. It is a theory which elucidates both the ontological and the categorical orders necessary for knowledge of the sensible reality. As such, the theory of vision which we suggest is not a theory of sense perception: that is to say, it is not a theory which has for its object the sensible perception or image of a thing. It is not a theory of the Plotinian imagination. Instead the notion of vision which we propose concerns the seeing of the soul which is conceptual in nature and which has for its object the universal concept. That is, we have affair with the Plotinian doctrine which affirms that the soul is the image (εἰκών) of the Intellect (V.1[10].3.7).

Vision belongs in the first place to the soul’s prior, the Intellect: "In the pure Intellectual there is nothing of this: the vision and the envisioned are a unity: the seen is as the seeing and seeing as seen. What, then, is there that can pronounce upon the nature of this all-unity? That which sees: and to see is the function of the Intellectual-Principle” (V.3[49].8.15-18). To see is the especial function of the Intellect for it is the function which effects the unity of the seen and the seeing as one within itself; that is to say, of Being and Intellect. But similarly, the soul too is a real being whose nature is to see: "Thus its substantial existence comes from the Intellectual-Principle; and the reason within it becomes Act in virtue of its seeing of that prior..." (V.1.[10] 3.15-16). The text clearly admits of a seeing of the soul.

7 See Eyjolfur K. Emilsson, Plotinus on Sense-Perception: A Philosophical Study (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) in particular pp. 115-139.

8 ...εἰκών τίς οὖν...

9 ἀλλ' οὐ τούτων ἐκεῖ οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ὅρασις καὶ τῷ ὁρατῷ αὐτῆς ὁμοῦ καὶ τοιοῦτοι τῷ ὁρατῷ οἷον ἢ ὅρασις, καὶ ἢ ὅρασις οἷον τῷ ὁρατῷ. τίς οὖν αὐτῷ ἐρεί οἷον ἐστὶν ὁ ἴδων οὔσις δὲ ὁρᾶ. See also V.1 (10), 5, 18-19.

10 ἢ τε οὖν ὑπόστασις αὐτῆς ἀπὸ οὗ ὁ τε ἑρεθεία λόγος οὗ αὐτῆς ὁρισμένου. See also VI.2 [43], 5; IV.1 [21], 1; and IV.2 [4], 1. We change the translation of MacKenna to read 'seeing of that prior' in preference to 'contemplation of that prior'. The term
an ὀφθαλμός, whose object is the Intellect. What is important to retain from the text are the following three observations: first, that the soul is a substantial existence that sees -- has knowledge of -- the Intellect, its progenitor. Second, this seeing constitutes the perfection of reason to be in act. Third, the seeing of the soul -- the rational act -- follows from the substantial existence of the soul. Hence in the thought of Plotinus, it is possible to distinguish between the substance of the soul which is brought into being by the Intellect and the activity of the soul which is brought into being by the soul itself. This difference is clearly marked in a preceding text wherein Plotinus observes the difference between the act which is intrinsic to a being qua being -- the heat which is fire -- and the act which derives therefrom -- the heat which ensues on fire. Location of this illustration of heat in the text has been read to apply mainly to the question of the birth of the hypostasis soul from its superior, the Intellect: it is the discernment of the soul as image, verb, act, and offspring of the Intellect. This is the traditional reading of the text. And indeed the treatise has for its main objective the teaching of the birth of the hypostases -- soul and Intellect -- from the One; it is the Plotinian doctrine of procession. But an additional reading of the text can be made to understand a constant difference between the intrinsic act of any being understood as a substantial reality and the

'ὁφθαλμός' has for its usual meaning 'to see, look' (Liddell-Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford, 1940), I.1.). This is distinct from θεοφθαλμός whose meaning concerning the mind is 'to contemplate' (Liddell-Scott, III.2). Consistency in the use of these terms is important, especially for the definition of the act of sight (ὁφασία) of the soul located in the second chapter.

11 We translate the term 'logos' as 'reason'. Historically, the term 'logos' means a coherent discourse, discussion, or argumentation. Philosophically, 'logos' means definition, spermatic or formative principle, faculty, the process of reasoning or discursiveness, and the contents of thought. In the present text, we understand 'logos' (V,1[10],3,15-16) as meaning discursiveness. Our position is founded on two considerations. First, the text of V,1[10],3 relates the birth of soul as substance or hypostasis. This is soul at its most divine, an intellectual soul ὁσιος ὃν ἀπὸ οὗ τονος ἐστι. Second, Plotinus clearly attributes to soul the characteristic of discursiveness τὸ διαινούμενον V,1[10],7,42-43. He does so in order to distinguish soul's actuality from Intellect, second hypostasis. We retain this reading of the text and translate 'logos' as 'reason', the process of discursiveness.

12 See V,1 (10), 3, 10 and V,4 (12), 2

13 See Fernand Brunner, "Le premier traité de la cinquième 'Ennéade': 'Des trois hypostases principales'," Études néoplatoniciennes (A là baconnière - Neuchatel, 1973). "En un sens, l'énergie spirituelle ne s'écoule pas en dehors de l'hypostase supérieure, mais demeure en elle, tandis que se constitue l'hypostase inférieure" 72.
derived act which ensues forthwith. Schroeder explains: "As the flame, just by being what it is, issues in heat, so does the One, simply by being what it is, give rise to Intellect and all of its sequents. Indeed this pattern is extended universally as Plotinus argues that in each and every thing that is there is one activity that inheres in its substance and another that proceeds from its substance. Obviously, the source of light and light would provide the paradigm". 14 It is this latter aspect of the relation between substance and act which concerns us at present. Thus, the seeing of the soul’s progenitor explains both the formation of the derived act by the soul understood as substantial existence and the perfection of this reason in act; it is the act of the soul whose proper nature is to see without fail. 15 We can say that reason -- the derived act -- achieves the unity of subject and object within the seeing of the soul’s prior, the Intellect.

Next to the rational act of the soul, Plotinus places a passion: "...for its thought and act are its own intimate possessions whenever it looks in toward the Intellect. And we must say that these only are acts of the soul which are intellectual and are properly its own; the inferiors are from outside and are passions of this soul" (V.1[10],3,16-20). 16 We make the following observations: first, that soul is a substantial existence whose nature is susceptible of two modifications -- an act which is proper to the soul (οἰκοθεν) and a passion due to that which is foreign to the soul (ἀλλοθεν). This observation upon the dual modifications of the soul is


15 See Michael Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.1 On the Three Principal Hypostases, A Commentary with Translation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983). "In the act of sight, the act itself is perfected by its object (III,8,11 6-7) ἡ πληρωμα τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ ἡ ὑπο τελείωσις. Similarly, the act of thought is completed by its object (V,4,2,4 ff.)" 64.

16 οὕτω γὰρ εἴη ὃντιν, ἐνθεοθεν ἔχει καὶ οἰκεία ἀ νοεῖ καὶ ἐνεργεῖ. καὶ ταύτας μόνας δεῖ λέγειν ἐνεργείας ψυχῆς, ὡς νοεῖν καὶ ὡς οἰκοθεῖν τὰ δὲ χειρὰν ἄλλοθεν καὶ πάθη ψυχῆς τῆς τοιαύτης. MacKenna reads: for its thought and acts are its own intimate possession when it looks to the Supreme Intelligence; those only are soul-act which are of this intellective nature and are determined by its own character: all that is less noble is foreign (traceable to Matter) and is accidental to the Soul in the course of its peculiar task". We revise the translation considerably. In particular, we read the word ἐνθεοθεν to mean passion. The translation of MacKenna lends itself to confusion for the term used, 'accidental', is not indicated in the text, that is, συμβεβηκός. As well, we leave out the words "(traceable to Matter)" and "in the course of its peculiar task"; neither phrase appears in the text.
supported by the logic of the text for Plotinus affirms that the proper (οἱκεῖα) are those modifications which the soul has from within (ἐνδοθεῖν). It therefore stands to reason that what is foreign to the soul can have a provenance neither from soul itself nor from the Intellect; it must come from elsewhere. The couple proper - foreign indicates well the provenance of these two kinds of modification within the soul. Hence we have reason to argue against Irwin that Plotinus does indeed make room for a difference in the causes of soul's modification based upon their provenance.

Second the text clarifies the content of each modification: the proper nature of soul is to be act and thought (νοεῖ καὶ ἐνεργεῖ): meanwhile, what is foreign to soul is to be passions (πάθη). Now the entire difficulty which attends the possibility of a science of sensible reality within Plotinian philosophy resolves itself into the analysis of this word, 'πάθη'. We suggest that the passions of the soul indicated herein belong to the soul as modifications of reason. More particularly, we say that reason can be understood as a kind of passion to the extent that reason does not engage in the exercise of thought upon its prior, the Intellect. Our position is uncommon and requires some explanation. Plotinus has affirmed that reason -- the derived act of soul -- is in act (ἐνεργεῖ) only by virtue of seeing the soul's prior, the Intellect. Thus, it is impossible for Plotinus also to affirm that reason is in act whenever it performs functions other than the vision of the soul's prior. But as we shall soon learn, reason does perform a number of functions which are other than the intellective vision. Thus our proposal: it is these other functions of reason which are given the appellation 'passion' by Plotinus. We suggest

17 Needless to say, ἄλλοθεν cannot be referring to the Plotinian One.

18 We translate the term 'pathos' as passion. At large, 'pathos' means passivity in contradistinction to activity. Philosophically, 'pathos' means the capacity of a subject to receive a quality or determination from an agent. The term 'passion' is a standard translation of 'pathos'. Meanwhile, we avoid the term 'affection', for it may be taken to imply that soul suffers alteration and movement, in the manner of the Stoic soul as body. On this subject, see III.6(26) and Plotinus' discussion of the impassivity of substance.

19 We draw attention to the technical nature of Plotinus' language. The use of the dative case is familiar in Aristotle's philosophy. Also see Liddell-Scott ἐνεργεῖα II: "ἐνεργεῖα actually opp. ὁμαίει": and Metaphysics I-IX, trans. Hugh Tredennick, LCL 271 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1933), VIII.6.1045b19.
that the passions of the soul indicated herein are in fact reason -- the derived act of soul -- which lacks perfection whenever it sees that which is foreign to the soul. The several texts on soul's seeing nature open an avenue of interpretation hitherto ignored by the commentators. that is, that reason is both an act and a passion of the soul in consequence of the nature of the object. To clarify this interpretation our procedure assumes two parts: first, an analysis of the limiting factors placed on reason to be in act, and second, a brief study of the philological register of the text. If it can be shown that there has been no change of register within the texts then our position finds additional justification upon these grounds.

To begin, let us turn to the treatise entitled 'The Knowing Hypostases and the Transcendent'. We read therein that to reason can mean a number of things. For instance, it is the exercise of thought which proceeds by way of analysis and synthesis. At its most simple, reason combines (συνάγει) and divides (διαιροῦν).\textsuperscript{20} it is rational judgement. We read:

Again: we perceive by means of the perceptive faculty and are not, ourselves, the percipients: may we then say the same of the understanding (the principle of reasoning and discursive thought)?

No: our reasoning is our own; we ourselves think the thoughts that occupy the understanding -- for this is actually the We -- but the operation of the Intellectual-Principle enters from above us as that of the sensitive faculty from below; the We is the Soul at its highest, the mid-point between two powers, between the sensitive principle, inferior to us, and the intellectual principle superior (V,3[49],3,32-40).\textsuperscript{21}

And: "We can scarcely suppose this understanding faculty to be unaware that it has understanding: that it takes cognizance of things external: that in its judgements it decides by the

\textsuperscript{20} See V,3[49],2,9.

\textsuperscript{21} καὶ γὰρ αἰσθηύμεθα δι᾽ αἰσθήσεως <μή> ἡμεῖς οἱ αἰσθηύμενοι ἀρ᾽ οὐν καὶ διαινούμεθα οὕτως καὶ διὰ <νοθ> νοοῦμεν οὕτως: ἡ αὐτοὶ μὲν οἱ λογικόμενοι καὶ νοοῦμεν τὰ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ισόματα αὐτοὶ τούτο γὰρ ἡμεῖς. Τὰ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνεργηματα αἰνοῦμεν οὕτως. ὡς τὰ ἐκ τῆς αἰσθησεως κάτωθεν, τούτο οὔτε τὸ κύριον τῆς ψυχῆς, μέσον δυνάμεως διττῆς, χείρους καὶ βελτίωνος, χείρους μὲν τῆς αἰσθήσεως, βελτίωνος δὲ τοῦ νοῦ.
rules and standards within itself held directly from the Intellectual-Principle: that there is something higher than itself, something which, moreover, it has no need to seek but fully possesses" (V.3[49],4.15-19). Plotinus herein sets forth a clear distinction between the operations of reason and the operations of perception. In the former text, reason is favorably contrasted with perception which is not even admitted to be us: the true self of the human subject is the rational soul (οἱ λογιζόμενοι) together with the derived act, reason. To see with reason is not therefore synonymous with the seeing of perception. Whilst Plotinus admits a kind of judgement to perception, he does not seek to identify rational judgement with perceptual judgement. Instead, reason follows upon perception in order to establish a science of sensible reality: it distinguishes, classifies, and orders sensible perception within dialectical procedure to form a judgement in light of the Intellect.

Reason consists in judgement (καὶ ὅτι κρίνει). We can say that when reason exercises thought in judgement, it gives an explanation to the images of sense perception. Heiser explains: "The study of nature receives help from dialectic.... But to the extent that the study of nature remains dependent on the senses and is 'posterior to its objects,' it cannot represent the simple unfolding of intellect within the soul. This role is reserved for dialectic itself. Plotinus describes dialectic in his treatise on that subject. In so doing he presents his

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22 τὸ δὴ διανοητικὸν ὅτι διανοητικὸν ἄρα οὐκ οἶδε, καὶ ὅτι σύνεσιν τῶν ἔξω λαμβάνει, καὶ ὅτι κρίνει ἄ κρίνει, καὶ ὅτι τοῖς έν ἑαυτῷ καὶ οἷς πάρα τού τοῦ ἔχει, καὶ ὅσι ἔστι τι βέλτιον αὐτοῦ. <ὁ> οὐ ζητεῖ. ἀλλ' ἐχεῖ πάντως δῆμον: See also V. 3 (49), 3, 1-9 on sense perception and its relation to reason through judgement.

23 See also II.3 [52],9 and Gerard O’Daly. Plotinus’ Philosophy of the Self (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1973) in particular 25-30. We do not, however, fully agree with his view that "...by 'our' or 'we' are meant...the higher aspects of the soul, its sensitive and reasoning parts" 29. To use the language of logic, the proprium of the soul is reason, not sensation.

24 See III.6 (26), 1, 1-4; in particular τὰς αἰσθήσεις οὐ πάθη... ἐνεργείας... καὶ κρίσεις.... The perceptual judgement has for its object the form in matter of the thing, the sensible quality. In perceptual judgement there ensues a new kind of form, the form of representation. Emilsson explains: "...perception results in the generation of extensionless 'entities' in the soul that are variously described as 'intelligible representations' (typoi noëtai), 'forms', or 'images' (phantasmata)" 108. Reason judges these representations according to the rules of Intellect.
most comprehensive account of what it means to 'give a logos'”;25 with Plato, the Plotinian
dialectic explains the ascent of the soul toward the Good. More especially, from the treatise
entitled 'Dialectic' we learn that the role of dialectic is to give a scientific explanation of true
reality. This procedure is distinguished from the practices of the musician and lover who
remain satisfied with impressions (τῶνων); their act is that of perceptual judgement.26 Instead,
dialectical procedure is a science (ἐπιστήμη) of forms whose practice consists in the Platonic
method of division and combination, that is, of diairesis: "It is the method concerning each
thing which is capable of saying by means of a discourse what each is, how it differs from
others, and what is common to them; in what kind each is and how each is within its kind, and
whether its being is substantial and how many beings there are, and how many non-beings
there are which differ." (I.3 [20],4.2-6);27 rational judgement is instructed to know in
accordance with dialectic, the distinguishing of beings, what they are and what they are not.

We can say that judgement locates the forms within the soul thereby setting forth the grounds
for the soul's understanding of the sequent.28 Meanwhile, the practice of dialectic -- division
and combination -- while resembling in kind the exercise of logic -- to affirm and to negate --

25 John H. Heiser, Logos and Language in the Philosophy of Plotinus, Studies in the History

26 See I.3 [20], 1. Plotinus herein details two aspects of dialectic: the ascent from the
sensible reality to the intellectual reality; and the ascent from the intellectual reality to the One.

27 ...ἐπιστήμη περι πάντων, οὐ δοξή (4.5:9). Also, ἕστι μὲν δὴ ἢ λόγῳ περὶ
ἐκαστοῦ δυναμένη ἐξὶς εἰπεῖν τι τε ἐκαστοῦ καὶ τι ἄλλων διαφερεῖ καὶ τίς ἢ
κοινότης· ἐι oίς ἑστι καὶ ποὺ τοῦτων ἐκαστον καὶ εἰ ἑστιν ὁ ἑστι καὶ τὰ ὑτα
ὁπόσα καὶ τὰ μη ὑτα αὐ. ἡτερα δε ὑτων. MacKenna reads: "It is the Method, or
Discipline, that brings with it the power of pronouncing with final truth upon the nature and
relation of things -- what each is, how it differs from others, what common quality all have, to
what Kind each belongs and in what rank each stands in its kind and whether its Being is Real-
Being, and how many Beings there are, and how many non-Beings to be distinguished from
Beings". See also Plato, Phaedrus, trans. H.N. Fowler, LCL 36 (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1914) 265d - 266c; and Plato, Sophist, trans. H.N.Fowler, LCL
123 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1921) 218d.

28 See Joseph Moreau, Plotin ou la gloire de la philosophie antique (Paris: Librairie
Philosophique J. Vrin, 1970). "Ce sont les conditions de la vie empirique, ses incertitudes, la
dépendance à l'égard des choses extérieures, des autres êtres et des circonstances, qui obligent
l'âme à raisonner, à calculer, à délibérer et à discouvrir. C'est pourquoi la délibération est exclue
de l'Âme universelle, qui gouverne tout silencieusement, par une providence naturelle et
infaillible" 165.
is not identical with the latter. Instead, logic is reasoning by way of a grammatical analysis of terms: "Dialectic, then, has no knowledge of propositions -- collections of words -- but it knows the truth and, in that knowledge, knows what they call the propositions:...

(I,3[20],5,17-19). Heiser explains: "Plotinus was aware of an alternate theory, the Stoic, which reserved the name 'proposition' (axioma) for the understood meaning of a statement -- what it 'says' (the lekton) -- rather than for the utterance which is its sign. He will have none of such a theory.... Logic, therefore, emerges at a lower level than we might have expected; not that of reasoning as such, but of uttered reasoning". For a thinker like Plotinus, logic is an exercise of reason whose object is the word or symbolic item taken separately from the referent. It is, therefore, a formal practice distinct from both dialectic and judgement.

Again, judgement engages reason in the administration of sensible perceptions according to the rules and measures of the Intellect. These two parts of judgement are in fact not separate at all for it is because reason explains sensible perceptions in accordance with the Intellect that it is able to administer them. Heiser explains: "In fact, Plotinus comes habitually to use the term logos to designate the mirroring forth on a lower level of what is found more truly at a higher level of things..."; in judgement, the soul predicates the idea upon sensible reality. We can say that the idea renders the sensible reality an intelligible object to the extent that predication clarifies the logical form of participation. As such, his Platonism provides a

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29 See I,3 [20], 4, 19-20. ...περὶ προτάσεων καὶ συλλογισμῶν ...ἀλλ’ τέχνη δοῦσα' And 5,19-20. ...ό τε τίθησι καὶ αἴρει...

30 περὶ προτάσεως οὐν οὐκ οἶδε - καὶ γὰρ γράμματα - εἰδύτα δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς οἴδειν ὁ καλοῦσι προτάσις;... We change Mackenna 'that is to say' to 'then' and 'the schools' to 'they'.

31 Heiser 47.

32 Heiser 17.

33 See Jean Trouillard, "Le 'Parménide de Platon et son Interprétation Néoplatonicienne," Etudes Néoplatoniciennes (A là baconnière - Neuchatel, 1973). "Celle-ci, comme la précédente, suppose que l'idée est un objet qui fait nombre avec les objets empiriques.... Tel est le platonisme vulgaire;... Il faut la corriger en comprenant que l'idée n'est pas objet, mais objectivante. Elle est ce par quoi les objets sont tels.... L'idée de justice est la norme d'une mesure irréalisable, mais qui anime et juge toutes les actions dites justes. Nicolas de Cuse dira que l'idée est une règle et une limite idéale" 12. See also Joseph Moreau, "L'être et l'essence
critique of the Aristotelian categories based on the view that the typical category, a predicable, lacks unity and is therefore unable to do what a category or form is supposed to, that is, to express the one of the many. Instead, Plotinus situates rational judgement within his teaching on participation and the passage of the intelligible to the sensible.

Thus we have the first pillar of our argumentation: reason has several employments one of which is the vision of the soul's prior, the Intellect; meanwhile, reason admits of other employments such as logic and judgement. Let us now turn to an examination of the words 'οἱ λογίζομεν' (V,3[49],3) and 'τὸ δὴ διανοητικὸν' (V,3[49],4) in order to ascertain their place within the teaching of Plotinus on substance and act. In so doing, we shall be able to establish the terminological alliance of the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' with the late treatise entitled 'The Knowing Hypostases and the Transcendent'. We read in Atkinson: "It is quite clear, then, that, although like Intellect proper, intellect in the soul is quite distinct: it also seems clear that intellect in the soul is another way of referring to what P[lotinus] elsewhere calls τὸ λογιστικὸν (cf. the passages in which soul's intellect and λογισμὸς (= 'reasoning') are mentioned together)..... And it is the characteristic of λογισμὸν" which distinguishes the soul's intellect from Intellect proper...".34 We understand the term 'τὸ λογιστικὸν' to refer to the derived act of soul; it is the λόγος of soul, the rational act. Thus in the treatise entitled 'The Knowing Hypostases and the Transcendent' when Plotinus terms 'οἱ λογίζομεν' the highest part of the soul (τὸ κύριον), this reference places the human understanding on a par with τὸ λογιστικὸν, that is, reason which is the derived act of soul. We see no change of ontological register between the two treatises.

dans la philosophie d'Aristote," Autour d'Aristote recueil d'études de philosophie ancienne et médiévale offert à Monseigneur A. Mansion (Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1955). "Le dualisme de l'idée et de la chose ne doit point s'entendre, chez Platon, en un sens réaliste, mais critique; il exprime que la vérité, saisie par l'intelligence, est irréductible aux données des sens: mais il ne rompt pas la participation du sensible à l'intelligible" 184.

34 Atkinson 59-60. Amongst other texts, he mentions 10,34. There is however no line 34 in chapter 10 of the treatise V,1.
Similarly, our position would receive further support if it could be shown that the appellations 'τὸ λογιστικῶν' and 'τὸ δὴ διανοητικῶν' concern one and the same thing. Atkinson situates the difficulty: "We must now consider the relationship between τὸ λογιστικῶν and τὸ διανοητικῶν or διάνοια, to see whether both terms are alternative ways of referring to the soul's intellect. It has been held by A.E. Chaignet (Psychologie des Grecs IV (Paris, 1893), p.221) and more recently by Schwyzzer (Entr, pp. 366 and 390) that τὸ διανοητικῶν is a higher faculty of soul than τὸ λογιστικῶν." Atkinson disagrees: "First, in Aristotle's system, λογισμὸς and διάνοια are the same.... P[lotinus] seems to use Aristotle's terms to distinguish between the two 'intelligences' at V 3.6.35 ff., so it is probable that like Aristotle P[lotinus] would also identify λογισμὸς and διάνοια. In fact he does so". We follow Atkinson in this judgement for we observe that in the former text, Plotinus speaks of the thinking subjects and their thoughts within reason (τὰ ἐν τῇ διάνοιᾳ νοηματα) in concert with the nominative οἱ λογιζομενοι, whilst in the latter text the term 'τὸ δὴ διανοητικῶν' clearly appear. Thus we can affirm with confidence that when Plotinus speaks of τὸ λογιστικῶν and τὸ δὴ διανοητικῶν, these two terms agree in their meaning -- reason -- and in their register -- derived act.

Thus, we have the second pillar of our argumentation: when Plotinus speaks of logic and judgement, their employment is situated within the rational act of soul; the terms 'οἱ λογιζομενοι' and 'τὸ δὴ διανοητικῶν' are equal appellations of reason, that is, the derived act of soul. With these terminological observations in hand we can now return to the original text. In the treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' Plotinus affirms that whenever reason looks in toward the Intellect, reason is in act (ὁ τε ἐιρήγεια λόγος). Subsequently, Plotinus also affirms that the seeing of the soul's prior constitutes the only acts of reason.

35 Atkinson 60
36 Atkinson 60.
37 See also V.1[10],7,42-43 wherein the offspring of the Intellect is defined to be discursiveness. νοῦ δὲ γεινημα λόγος τις καὶ ὑπόστασις, τὸ διανοουμενοι. The term 'διανοουμενοι' is the same used in V.3[49],3, on the reasoning principle and who we are.
(ταύτας μόνας) which are proper to the soul. The relation is symmetrical: it is because reason is in act that these acts are the proper nature of the soul; again, it is because they are proper to the soul that reason is in act (ὁσα νοερός καὶ ὁσα οἰκοθεν). But what then become of logic and judgement which Plotinus clearly admits to be employments of reason situated within the thinking subject -- οἱ λογιζόμενοι αὖ τὸ δὴ διανοητικὸν? This is the lesson that we have learned from the treatise entitled 'The Knowing Hypostases and the Transcendent': that logic and judgement are two employments of reason which belong to us (ἡμεῖς). Hence we say: whencesoever reason engages in the exercises of thought called logic and judgement, it is a reason which is neither in act nor the proper of the soul. But logic and judgement do belong to reason, the derived act of soul. The result is an aporia.

Our position would gain additional strength if it could be shown that the treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' admits of an axiology. Such a consideration would allow for an exercise of reason to be in act and another exercise of reason to be not so. We read: "Sprung. in other words, from the Intellectual-Principle, soul is intellection, but with an intellection operating by the method of reasonings: for its perfection comes from the Divine Mind, which may be thought of as a father watching over the development of his child born imperfect in comparison with himself" (V.1[10],3.11-15).

We make the following observations: first, that the text includes the terms 'perfection' (τελεῖοσις) and its contrary 'imperfect' (οὐ

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38 On symmetry see B. Brody, "Logical Terms Glossary of," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1972 ed. "A relation R is symmetric if for all a and b that are members of the field of R, aRb if and only if bRa, asymmetric if for all a and b that are members of the field of R, aRb if and only if not-bRa, and nonsymmetric when 'aRb and 'bRa hold for some but not all a and b that are members of the field of R. For example, 'is a member of the same family as' is a symmetric relation, 'is a child of' is an asymmetric relation, and 'is a brother of' is a nonsymmetric relation" 74.


40 οὐτα οὐν ἀπὸ νοερὰ ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐν λογισμοῖς ὁ οὐς αὐτῆς καὶ ἡ τελεῖναι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πάλιν οἰοὶ πατρὸς εκθεταιντος, ὃν οὐ τέλειοι ὃς πρὸς αὐτοῦ ἔχεισθει. MacKenna reads "for its perfecting it must look to that Divine Mind". We read simply "for its perfection comes from the Divine Mind". The notion of vision is premature in the text.
τέλειον): the Plotinian vocabulary supports therefore the suggestion of an axiological base within the text. Second, it is necessary to inquire into the meaning of the term 'perfection' which appears in the text; in so doing, we may accede to a clarification of the factors which condition the aporia of reason. For instruction, we turn to the Plotinian doctrine of procession.

We understand this doctrine to teach the birth of a substantial existence from another and superior substantial existence. Jonas explains: "What is aimed at throughout is a deductive whole where everything hangs together and one chain of reasoning or imagining leads from first principles to last consequences. Now the very idea of such a system was rooted in an axiomatic conviction of the time, namely, that there is a chain of being, which the chain of reasoning does no more than reproduce". More especially, it is the explanation of a peculiar kind of causality which issues forth into the generation of a new substantial existence. This consequence obtains as a result of the overflowing of the perfection of the progenitor. We read: "Again, all that is fully achieved engenders: therefore the eternally achieved engenders eternally an eternal being. At the same time, the offspring is always minor..."(V.1[10],6.37-39); it is the surfeit of perfection which is the progenitor which creates the offspring. This perfection (τέλειοισι) is the perfection of substantial existence: perfection is a cause of being to the extent that it lays down the terms under which a new substance may be produced.

Atkinson tells us: "Thus, the external activity of the higher hypostasis becomes the internal activity of the lower hypostasis. But since each of the hypostases is a causal principle, a δύναμις with causal power, the external activity which each produces may be called its effect. And on the transmission theory of causation which P[lotinus] inherited from Plato and Aristotle...the effect is less in respect of the property caused than the cause". It is the casting forth of the intrinsic act of a being from another and superior substantial existence in virtue of

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42 καὶ πάντα δὲ ὁσα ἦδη τέλεια γεινά: τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ τέλειον ἀεὶ καὶ ἀίδιον γεινα: καὶ ἐλαττῶν δὲ ἑαυτοῦ γεινα.

43 Atkinson 57.
the activity of being, its attribution to an object. We can call this perfection of substantial existence, a metaphysical perfection: it is the perfection of being.

But the doctrine of procession is also, and most especially, a doctrine of conversion. It is a doctrine which teaches the self-constitution of the sequent following upon its birth from the progenitor.\(^44\) For the soul, this constitution takes place within the rational act (ἐν λογισμῷ); it is reason which likens soul to the Intellect and, again, it is reason which distinguishes soul from the Intellect. We can say that in reason, the soul constitutes itself as the veritable sequent to the Intellect.\(^45\) When soul is fully aware of the presence of its progenitor, the Intellect, this very awareness is reason -- the derived act -- constituting the soul as other than the Intellect. Rist explains: “Otherness then is a tendency towards non-existence. It is shared by all things that are the products of the One in virtue of the very fact that they are not the One.... In so far as it is obedient to the summons to return to its source, it takes light and form from that source. In other words in any particular being the element of otherness is recognizable in the fact that the being is finite. It is not the One; it is only its limited self, limited and hence striving for perfection”\(^46\). The constitution of the soul implies perfection for in the spiritual order to realize oneself means the perfection of the derived act in plenitude; that is, in awareness.\(^47\) Whittaker explains: “As mind looks back to the One, soul looks back to

\(^{44}\) See Jean Trouillard, La procession plotinienne (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1955). "Dans cette perspective, non seulement chaque plan se trouve rattaché dans son être à celui qui le précède et l'engendre. Plus exactement, il s'y rattache lui-même du dedans par une conversion constitutive. Il emploie pour se poser l'efficacité de son générateur et dans cette fusion énergétique, il se le rend présent" 2.

\(^{45}\) See Heinrich Dörrie, "La doctrine de l'âme dans le néoplatonisme de Plotin à Proclus," Études néoplatoniciennes (A la baconnière - Neuchatel, 1973): "Qu'est-ce que le Logos? Ce n'est pas seulement la raison au sens théorique, c'est en même temps le pouvoir actif de répandre le Logos, de rationaliser ce qui n'est pas encore raisonnable.... Le Logos n'est pas quelque chose qu'on possède, c'est quelque chose qu'il faut réaliser" 44.


\(^{47}\) See Trouillard, La procession plotinienne: "Il n'y a pas contradiction, mais implication entre le déploiement du complexe et son recueillement dans sa simplicité génératrice, parce que, dans l'ordre noétique, la concentration est en même temps affirmation de soi" 3.
mind; and this looking back is identical with the process of generation”. 48 Soul’s perfection consists in the refraction of the forms within reason thereby constituting the soul as the image of the Intellect. Following, we discern a second kind of perfection: it is the plenitude of reason which serves to instruct the soul upon the verity of the prior, its likeness to and its difference therefrom. We can call this perfection of reason, a gnoseological perfection: it is the perfection of knowledge. It is this latter perfection which is our especial concern. 49

Thus, we have the third pillar of our argumentation: the terms ‘τελείωσις’ and ‘οὐ τέλειον’ establish the axiology of procession; moreover, it is an axiology which applies equally to the intrinsic act of being and to the derived act of being, that is, to substance and act. With these supporting evidences in hand, we may now return to the original text upon the passions of the soul (πάθη ψυχῆς τοιαύτης) (V.1,[10],3.19-20). We have read that reason is the derived act of soul. We are further given to understand that reason is in act whenever the soul looks in (ἐνίδην) toward the Intellect. To be in act is the perfection of reason: it is the entire awareness of the Intellect, its prior and superior. In the thought of Plotinus, the conceptual connection between the sequent and the progenitor is without fail due to the necessity guaranteed by the inherence of the progenitor. We can call the seeing of the soul’s prior, ‘perfective’. If therefore reason does not look to the progenitor, it is logical to assume that reason continues to exist; in such a case, what is lacking to reason is not existence but rather perfection. 50 Whencever reason turns to look elsewhere (ἄλλοθεν) reason is wanting


49 See ‘The Virtues’ I,2[19],4.21-25. ἡ εἰχεὶ οὖς ἐνεργοῦτα, ἄλλα ἀποκείμενα ἀφώνα: ην δὲ φωτισθῇ καὶ τότε γινό αὐτά ἐνίστα, δει προσβαλεῖν τῷ φωτίσοντι. εἰσε δὲ οὕς αὐτά, ἄλλα τυποῦν: δει οὐν τον τύπον τοις ἀληθινοῖς, ὅν και οἱ τύποι, ἐφαρμόσαι. τάχα δὲ καὶ οὔτω λέγεται εἰςειν, ὅτι ο οὐν οὐκ ἄλλοτροι καὶ μάλιστα δε οὐκ ἄλλοτροι, ὅται προς αὐτοῦ βλέποι: ει δε μη και παροι ἄλλοτροι. The text is revealing for it demonstrates that soul’s knowledge is not always active. Curiously, Plotinus is here willing to allow that even the Intellect can be deemed foreign to the soul whencesoever the soul turns its gaze elsewhere.

50 See Trouillard, La purification plotinienne: “La puissance n’étant pas la négation de l’acte n’anéantit pas l’individualité qui s’involue en son universel générateur”. And “En définitive, la puissance exprime le lien synthétique qui unit les composantes de notre auto-affirmation. La puissance est le sommeil (ἡσυχα) (VI.2.20²⁷) ou la latence (ἄποκρύπτουσα) (VI.4.16²⁹) qui
for perfection. We can call the seeing of another, 'imperfective'. This consequence obtains for the Plotinian text includes an axiology of reason. Now the contrary of being in act is being in passion (potency). Hence we say: the passions of the soul indicated herein are in fact reason which is neglectful of the progenitor, the Intellect. Reason which looks to the sequents of the soul cannot also be an act; it must be a passion. 51

A question forthwith arises: 'does reason admit of these perfective acts alone or does reason admit of other acts, acts however which are not perfective for they do not engage in the vision of the soul's prior, the Intellect'? The answer is yes. We have read that there are indeed two employments of reason which do not engage in the intellective vision; they are logic and judgement. This is the lesson that we have learned from the treatise entitled 'The Knowing Hypostases and the Transcendent', that logic and judgement are employments of reason which are dissimilar to the intellective vision. Reason which does not engage in the seeing of the soul's prior, the Intellect, cannot have the perfective vision. Thus, we arrive at an understanding of the term 'inferiors' (τὰ ἐξ ἐξερεύνης) which introduces the statement upon the passions of the soul: it serves to mention reason -- the derived act -- which turns its gaze away from the Intellect. Our position is the following: in the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' Plotinus affirms that only the vision of the soul's prior, the Intellect, constitutes reason in act. But in the later treatises entitled 'The Knowing Hypostases and the Transcendent' and 'Dialectic' we have found that Plotinus admits two other employments of reason which are not synonymous with the intellective vision; logic and judgement. Hence we say: that these other employments of reason whose practice ignores the seeing of the soul's prior, the Intellect, are the inferiors so named.

With these evidences in hand let us now turn to a brief consideration of the philological register of the text. If it can be shown that there is no change of semantic register within the

51 See Liddell-Scott ἐνρέγεια 1.4 on its opposite πάθος on active and passive forms.
text then we shall have shown the conformity of our argumentation with the written body of the Enneads. Now we are aware of the uncommonness of our position. The common view reads a change of register within the text upon the passions of the soul to mean sensation;\textsuperscript{52} it is a view which argues for a comparison between the spiritual change that is the perfection of reason in act and the sensible change that is the affection of sensation. In order to better comprehend their position let us turn to the translation and commentary of Atkinson. While the translation of MacKenna is accomplished, the work of Atkinson affords us the opportunity to know in full the reasons why the editors attribute to the term ‘\(\pi\sigma\theta\eta\)’ the meaning of sensation. Similarly. we shall not stop to analyze each of the principal translations cited herein; we understand our appreciation of Atkinson to stand them all in good stead.\textsuperscript{53} Atkinson translates thus: "...for when it looks intently at Intellect, the objects of its thought and activity come from within it and are appropriate to it. And these alone should be called psychic activities, namely

\textsuperscript{52} See Brunner: "Passer à l’acte sous l’influence d’un être en acte, comme le fait l’âme, c’est subir; mais il faut distinguer avec Plotin ce subir qui provoque un agir spirituel, du subir de la sensation qui est pur \(\pi\sigma\theta\eta\) (1.19)" 73.


\textit{Plotinus}, trans. A.H. Armstrong, 6 vols. in 7 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984). Armstrong reads: "And we should call these alone activities of the soul, all it does intellectually and which spring from its own home; its inferior activities come from elsewhere and belong to a soul of this inferior kind" 5: 21.

\textit{Plotinus: The Enneads}, trans. Stephen MacKenna, 4th ed. revised by B.S. Page (1969, Burdett: Larson Publications, 1992). MacKenna reads: "...those only are soul-acts which are of this intelective nature and are determined by its own character; all that is less noble is foreign (tracable to Matter) and is accidental to the Soul in the course of its peculiar task" 425.

the intellectual activities from within itself. The lower activities are from elsewhere, and are experiences of a soul conditioned in that way".54

In his commentary, Atkinson contrasts the possibility of the body with the impassibility of the soul: "In de An. 403a 2ff., which P[lotinus] seems to have in mind here. Aristotle includes ὅσαίν (and αἰσθάνεσται) among the πάθη of soul. P[lotinus], however, restricts πάθη to those activities for which the body is essential. The πάθη of soul have no effect on διάνοια (cf. IV.4.18.9ff)".55 the translations of Armstrong and MacKenna especially agree with his judgement to place the passions of the soul at the periphery of experience. The Enneads read: "...the body holding animal or vegetative life must hold also some shadow of soul, and it is body thus modified that is the seat of corporeal pains and pleasures which appear before us, the true human being, in such a way as to produce knowledge without emotion" (IV.4[28].18.6-10).56 These are the evidences which argue in favor of the view that the passions of the soul mean sensation. We cannot agree with this view. First, we query the relevance of the text used to support the translation. The treatise entitled 'The Problems of the Soul II' has for its object the relation of the descent of soul into the body. As well, it serves to explain the psychical operations which attend the soul's association with corporeal nature; in particular, the operations of sensation, memory, and imagination. Blumenthal explains: "It is perhaps what made it possible for Plotinus to arrive at the fairly clear distinction he makes between sensation and perception, equipped as he was with no better linguistic tools than his predecessors.... Plotinus did it simply, though perhaps crudely, by separating sense-perception into an affection (πάθος) of the body, and a judgement or act of cognition on the

54 Atkinson IV.

55 Atkinson 67.

56 ...καὶ ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ ἐγώ καὶ τοῦ φυτοῦ δὲ οἷον σκλαῖν ψυχῆς ἔχοιτα. καὶ τὸ ἀλγεῖ καὶ τὸ ἱδέσθαι δὲ τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἱδειν τό ποιοὶς σώμα ἐστὶ. ἡμῖν δὲ ἦ τοῦτον ἀλγηδὸν καὶ ἦ τοιὸν ἱδειν εἰς γνῶσιν ἀποθεὶ ἔρχεται. See also IV.4 [28], 28.1-4 on the difference between the affections (τὰ πάθη) and perceptions (τὰς αἰσθήσεις).
part of the soul".  

We suggest that the translation of Atkinson is the result of a confusion of these two separate and different meanings of the term 'πάθος'; it is an error of homonymy. In the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' Plotinus employs the terms 'act' and 'passion' to explain the spiritual modification of soul (πάθη ψυχής) as required by the doctrine of procession, the perfection of being and knowledge. Alternately, when Plotinus employs the term 'passion' in the middle treatise entitled 'Problems of the Soul II' the intention has changed: his object is to explain the physical modification of the sense organs needed to complete the association of a soul and a body. This difference of register between the two treatises renders inapplicable the evidence adduced by Atkinson in support of his position. Hence we say: the commentary of Atkinson ignores the placement of the text upon the passions of the soul as regards the establishment of rational soul; moreover, we suggest that in order to justify his translation Atkinson must proceed to a confusion of two separate registers of doctrine -- two meanings of the term 'πάθος' -- the spiritual and the physical. It is this confusion which has led to an error of homonymy.

Second, Atkinson restricts the employment of the term 'πάθη' to the body alone. However, against this view we discover evidence that Plotinus does indeed employ the term 'πάθος' within his analysis of substance; it is a notion which serves to clarify the order of priority which obtains between the soul and its progenitor, the Intellect. In the treatise entitled 'The Intellectual Principle, the Ideas, and the Authentic Existence' Plotinus sets forth the doctrine of procession in terms of the presence or absence of passion within a substantial existence. We read: "And if, further, Soul is possible while something impassible there must be..." (V.9[5],4,12-13):  

58 εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας ψυχῆς δεῖ δὲ τι ἀπαθὲς εἶναι .... Note that this treatise is close in composition and subject matter to the treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases'.

and passion. The text is formal: the possibility of soul proves that the soul cannot be the prior of the Intellect; this is the logical relation. Again, the possibility of soul proves that the soul requires the Intellect for its actualization; this is the metaphysical relation. Support for our position may be found in the Notice to the treatise written by Bréhier. The editor and translator of the Enreads lends intelligence to the text upon reference to the Aristotelian doctrine of the priority of act upon potency which was well known to Plotinus.59 The possibility of soul clarified in the treatise entitled 'The Intellectual Principle, the Ideas, and the Authentic Existence' argues against Atkinson and the sole attribution of the term 'πάθος' and its cognates to body alone.

Further, it may be argued that the text upon the passions of the soul refers not to the body per se but instead to the vegetative soul. As such, the entire passage which begins with the seeing of the soul's prior, the Intellect, and ends with the statement upon the passions of the soul is understood to bear upon a comparison of two kinds of soul -- the rational and the vegetative -- rather than upon a comparison of the soul and the body. In this wise, the error of homonymy is judiciously avoided. We read: "Thus much established, we may return on our path; we have to discuss the seat of the passionate element in the human being. Pleasures and pains -- the passions, that is, not the perception of them -- and the nascent stage of desire, we assigned to the body as a determined thing, the body brought, in some sense, to life:..." (IV.4[28].28.1-5).60 The conjunction of the vegetative soul with the body to form the living compound would lend credence to the view that the soul is susceptible of passion. Wolters explains: "In Plotinus' psychology, each embodied soul has an ἰχνος (also called ἰνδαλμα or

59 See Bréhier: "Il y a donc bien une intelligence séparée; les Stoïciens disent que l'intelligence n'est que l'âme arrivée à l'état adulte, expliquant ainsi cette faculté par la seule croissance de l'âme; mais Plotin leur oppose la grande maxime aristotélicienne: l'être en puissance est postérieur à l'être en acte, l'être imparfait à l'être parfait (iv, 1-14)" 5: 155. See also Aristotle, Metaphysics I-IX, IX, 7. 1049b 5-6. "...φαινεται ὅτι πρῶτον ἐνεργείᾳ δυνάμεις ἐστιν,"

60 Καὶ τοῦτα μὲν ταύτη, ἐπαινεῖτο δὲ πάλιν καὶ περὶ τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς ζητητέου, εἰς οὕτως τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τὴν ἀρχήν καὶ ἀληθινὰς καὶ ἡδωνάς—τὰ πάθη οὔ τὰς αἰσθήσεις—ἐν τῷ οὐσίᾳ ἑχούσι σώματι ἐπέθεμεν τῷ οἷον γιωθεῖτι. Once again, we have amended MacKenna's translation of τὰ πάθη to read 'passions'; this lends consistency to the term.
\(\epsilon \delta \omega \lambda o\nu\), which combines with body to form the 'compound' (\(\sigma ναμφότερον\); also called \(\zeta \omega \nu\) and \(\kappa ο λνο\nu\)) which is the 'instrument' (\(\delta ργα\nu\nu\)) of the particular soul. This \(i\chi \nu\nu\nu\) of soul, which is to be distinguished from soul itself, is the seat of passions and subject to the causal necessity within the cosmos (\(\epsilon ναρμέ\nu\nu\))\(^{61}\) to the extent that the living body suffers passion, so too must the soul which gives life to the body, that is, the vegetative soul. This consideration supports the translations of Atkinson and Armstrong who make reference to an inferior kind of soul. But there follows a difficulty of translation: the text upon the passions of the soul clearly states that the passions are of such a soul (\(\psi νχ\nu\nu\ ν\nu\ ι\nu\nu\ ι\nu\nu\nu\n\nu\nu\)); it is the rational soul introduced by Plotinus in the preceding lines. The reference to another, lower soul whose function is to animate the body in order to produce the living compound finds no witness in the text. Hence we say: the text upon the passions of the soul means to speak of one soul, the rational soul; in particular, the reference to a second, inferior soul, the vegetative soul -- most especially in the translations of Atkinson and Armstrong -- lacks the authority of the text.\(^{62}\)

Meanwhile, we observe that there are two meanings which attend the word '\(\pi\delta\thetao\nu\)'. The \textit{Lexicon Plotinianum} states: it is the "emotion, feeling, experience, of soul or body": as well, it is "any condition, modification, attribute, characteristic" whatsoever.\(^{63}\) The editors have judged the placement of the text to fall within the list of passages belonging to the first kind of meaning. We cannot however agree with this choice. First, we have found that the attribution of the text to the affections of sensation -- the body -- leads inevitably to the error of homonymy. As such, the experience of body cannot be the object of the text. Second, we

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\(^{62}\) Admittedly, the textual tradition lends to ambiguity. The Greek of Creuzer supports the interpretations of Atkinson and Armstrong; the punctuation suggesting the placement of the passions of the soul within the vegetative soul. But this punctuation has been retained by neither Henry-Schwyzer nor Bréhier. Interestingly, the Greek of Armstrong is identical with that of Henry-Schwyzer yet Armstrong insists upon reading the text to mean an inferior soul, the vegetative soul. In view of his own text, such a reading cannot be sustained.

have been given to understand the text upon the passions of the soul to refer to the rational as distinct from vegetative soul. The text upon the passions of the soul would seem, therefore, to signify not at all the feelings of soul or body but rather the spiritual modification of soul -- the act of being -- and reason -- the derived act -- upon seeing what is foreign (άλλοθεν). Hence we are drawn to place the text on the passions of the soul in the list of passages belonging to the latter kind of meaning.

Finally, one may object as follows: 'it is agreed that the text on the passions of the soul means neither sensation nor the vegetative soul, but what of sense perception and memory? Might it not be the case that the term 'inferiors' has for its referent sense perception or memory in contradistinction from reason? Such at least is permissible to suppose'. We reply as follows: the supposition that the term has for its reference sensible perception or memory is nowhere supported by the text. In virtue of the phrase 'whenever it looks in toward the Intellect', to be able to say that the inferiors mean sense perception would require that there be some indication of a first seeing -- rational in nature -- and a second seeing -- perceptual in nature. The evidences however are lacking. The text says only that whenever reason looks in toward the Intellect (ἐνίδη) reason is in act; there is no indication of several kinds of seeing. Moreover, the soul has knowledge of sensible reality upon cognition of the affections received by the body. It is knowledge by intermediary. In the late treatise entitled 'The Animate and the Man' Plotinus clarifies the difference between the perceptible and the affection. We read:

"The power of perception in the soul is not of the sensible objects; it is rather the apprehension of impressions made in the living compound. These now are intelligibles; for sensation is the outer image of them, they being more truly the simple, impassive contemplation of forms" (I.1[53],7.9-14).64 the soul's knowledge of sensible perception is impassive (άπαθος) for in

64 τὴν δὲ τὴς ψυχῆς τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι δύναμιν οὐ τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἶναι δεῖ. τῶν δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς αἰσθησίας ἐγγυγμαίαν τῷ ζῷῳ τῶν αὐτολαπτικῶν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἵνητα γὰρ ἢ ἢ τὰ ταῦτα ὃς τὴν αἰσθήσεις τὴν ἔξω εἰδώλιον εἶναι ταύτης, еκείνης δὲ ἀληθεστέραν τῇ ὀψίᾳ οὕσαν εἰδὼν μόνην ἀπαθοῦς εἶναι θεωρίαν. MacKenna reads: "The faculty of perception in the Soul cannot act by the immediate grasping of sensible objects, but only by the discerning of impressions printed upon the Animate by sensation: these impressions are already Intelligibles, while the outer sensation is a mere phantom of the other (of that in the Soul) which is nearer to Authentic-Existence as being an impassive reading of Ideal-Forms". We revise MacKenna considerably. In particular, we read ἦν ἢ to mean 'now'
Plotinus' thought the substantial existence is not likened to a wax upon which impressions are formed. Blumenthal explains: "But any such idea would of course be incompatible with Plotinus' views on the nature of the soul. To be able to receive such an imprint the soul would have to be in some way material, and of this there can be no question. ...[cf.] his attack on materialistic theories of the soul's nature in IV.7. One of the points made there was that memory would be impossible if in perception forms were somehow stamped on the soul in the way that seals are stamped in wax".65 Hence, either the text expresses an indeterminate structure leading to equivocation, that is an amphiboly, or the text is clear and speaks of another kind of passion, that is, the doctrine of the priority of act upon potency with regard to the soul -- the intrinsic act of being -- and reason -- the derived act of being.66

Thus we have the fourth pillar of our argumentation: we find no change of philological register within the text. The passions of the soul in the treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' refer neither to sensation nor to the living compound; in particular, the change of semantic register advised by the common view entails the error of homonymy. Meanwhile, the syntactical structure of the text indicates only one kind of seeing and one kind of soul: mention of a second kind of soul, the vegetative soul, or a second kind of seeing, the perceptual, finds no support within the text. Instead, there opens up the possibility that reason may in some sense be a passion of the soul. It is to the explanation of this possibility that we must now turn.

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rather than 'already', as is typically done. The text is contrasting the sensation which belongs to the body with the perceptible which belongs to the soul in the manner of a form. Our suggestion emphasizes this difference.

65 H.J. Blumenthal, Plotinus' Psychology His Doctrines of the Embodied Soul (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971) 70. See also Bréhier's Notice: "Si, enfin, on voulait attribuer le désir à l'âme, en disant qu'il provient de la faculté de désirer qui est en l'âme, il faut en revenir à Aristote lui-même, qui nous indique très bien que le désir suppose un certain état du corps, et que les facultés de l'âme, en produisant leurs actes dans le corps vivant, restent elles-mêmes impassibles" 1: 36.

66 See Brody, "Logical Terms, Glossary of": "Amphiboly. An equivocation that arises not out of an equivocation in a word or phrase but because the grammatical structure of the sentence or clause leaves the place of the phrase in the whole not entirely determinate. An example is 'The shooting of the hunters was finished quickly'" 57.
To summarize, Chapter I sets forth the basic problematic of the thesis -- the possibility of a scientific knowledge of sensible reality -- in terms of the Plotinian doctrine of two acts, the intrinsic act of being and the derived act of being. As background, we clarify the Plotinian claims to true and scientific knowledge in reference to the Intellect, second hypostasis in the procession of being. Also we make reference to the standard Plotinian doctrine on matter to be the privation of form, its nature being deficiency in every respect. Together these two considerations constitute the limits of our thesis: on the one hand, the upper limit of intellectual science, or intuitive knowledge (the unity of being and intellect); on the other hand, the lower limit of privation, the lack of formal cause. Following we introduce the central theme of the thesis, namely that discursive knowledge for Plotinus consists in a vision of the soul which is rational in nature. Together these two themes -- vision and actuality -- serve to found our study of the Enneads insofar as they direct our choice of texts, the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' (V.1[10]) and the late treatise 'On Love' (III.3[50]). We then proceed to a dialectical analysis of text in which the view commonly held on the acts and passions of the soul read in the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' (V.1[10],3) is shown to entail false conclusions. Chapter I is, therefore, aporetic in nature insofar as it seeks not so much to establish a rational knowledge of sensible reality but rather to point out the many difficulties attached to having such knowledge at all. Our intention in Chapter I is modest, our aim consisting in the purification of text and of our understanding of the Plotinian philosophy. To achieve this end, reference is made to the key Plotinian doctrines of procession and conversion as well as the properly Aristotelian concepts of actuality and potentiality, priority and posteriority, which were well known to Plotinus. Finally, what is important to retain from Chapter I is the realization that only when reason looks in toward the soul's prior, the Intellect, is reason in act. There ensues the possibility that whenever reason looks elsewhere, sensible reality and the logical item, reason is a passion of the soul.

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67 On the theme of purification as a necessary first step for perfection, see Trouillard, *La purification plotinienne* pp. 8-11.
Chapter II
Divine Soul

1: Background to the treatise 'On Love'

Reason may be both an act and a passion of the soul. In appearance paradoxical, this statement gives to us the means necessary for the understanding of the natural sciences within Plotinus' philosophy. The possibility of these sciences is itself grounded upon an analysis of the terms 'ἐνδοθεῖν' and 'ἀλλοθεῖν' read in the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases': the perfection which attends the seeing of the soul's prior, the Intellect, qualifies reason to be an act; similarly, the imperfection which attends the seeing of the soul's sequent, sensible reality, qualifies reason to be a passion. The terms 'ἐνδοθεῖν' and 'ἀλλοθεῖν' set forth the metaphysical nature of reason based upon a consideration of differing objects. It is thus incumbent upon us to inquire into the nature of reason to be both an act and a passion of the soul.

To accomplish this task we now turn to the late treatise entitled 'On Love' (III.5 [50]).

Several reasons recommend to us this choice of text. First, it is the work of Plotinus which most systematically explains the metaphysical nature of reason to be both an act and a passion of the soul. This emphasis upon reason -- the derived act of the soul -- as distinct from substance -- the intrinsic act of the soul -- justifies the selection of this work in preference to the treatise entitled 'On Potentiality and Actuality' (II.5[25]). Now the middle treatise on act and potency has for its object the statement of the metaphysical nature of substance. We read: "We come now to the purpose of all this discussion; to make clear in what sense or to what degree Actualization is predicable in the Intellectual Realm and whether all is in Actualization there, each and every member of that realm being an Act, or whether Potentiality also has place there. Now: if there is no Matter there to harbour potentiality: ...then, potentiality has no place there:

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1 For the English translation of this treatise we use the excellent text and commentary by Albert M. Wolters, Plotinus 'On Eros' A Detailed Exegetical Study of Enneads III.5.
the Beings there possess actuality, as belonging to eternity, not to time" (II.5[25],3,1-8).²
We can say that substance (τῶν ὄντων) is at once an act and in act (ἐνέργεια μόνον ἢ ἐνέργεια ἐκαστοῦ): it is the intrinsic act of being. Plotinus then clarifies the terms 'act' and being 'in act' in the following way: "But after what mode does Actualization exist in the Intellectual Realm? Is it the Actualization of a statue, where the combination is realized because the Form-Idea has mastered each separate constituent of the total? No: it is that every constituent there is a Form-Idea and, thus, is perfect in its being" (II.5[25],3,22-25):³ that is to say, to be an act and being in act means to be a form. His thought may be placed within the Aristotelian teaching on the ungenerated nature of form.⁴ For both Aristotle and Plotinus, it is obvious that the form is not generated; instead what is generated is the compound (συναμφότερον), the particular conjunction of a form with matter. We read in Aristotle:

"...nor does everything contain matter, but only such things as admit of generation and transformation into each other. And such things which, without undergoing a process of change, are or are not, have no matter".⁵ He means to say: matter is ever in potency.⁶ Now since matter is the constituent of reality that is ever in potency and form alone can experience no generation, that is, no passage from being in potency to being in act, it therefore stands to reason that form is ever in act. Moreover, Aristotle teaches us that form itself is an act, a

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² Οὐ δὲ ἐνεκα ταῦτα προείρηται, ἵνα λεκτέοι ἐν τοῖς ιοντοῖς πῶς ποτε τὸ ἐνεργεία λέγεται καὶ εἰ ἐνεργεία μόνον ἢ καὶ ἐνεργεία ἐκαστοῦ καὶ εἰ ἐνεργεία πάιντα καὶ εἰ τὸ δυνάμει κάκειν, εἰ δὴ μήτε ὕλη ἐκεῖ ἢ τὸ δυνάμει, μήτε τι μέλλει τῷ ἐκεί... ὅπερ ἄν εἴη ἐκεῖ τὸ δυνάμει ἐν ὑπό ἐστι, τῶν ὄντων καὶ αἰώνα, οὐ χρόνον ἐχόμεν.⁷

³ τὸ δὲ ἐνεργεία πῶς ἐκεῖ ἀρά ὑπὸ ὁ αἰνήρια τὸ συναμφότερον ἐνεργεία, ὅτι τὸ εἶδος ἐκαστοῦ ἀπειληφθεῖν ὡς τοι εἶδος ἐκαστοῦ καὶ τέλειον ὡ ἐστι.

⁴ See Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII.8,1033a 24-1033b 20 and VIII.1,1042a 26-32.

⁵ Metaphysics VIII.5,1044b 27-29. οὐδὲ παντός ὕλη ἐστιν ἀλλ' ὅσων γένεσις ἐστι καὶ μεταβολὴ εἰς ἄλληλα, ὅσα δ' ἀντὶ τοῦ μεταβάλλειν ἐστιν ή μή, οὐκ ἐστι τούτων ὕλη. We change the translation slightly, leaving out 'as after 'things', 'both' before 'are and are not' and changing 'and' to 'or' in view of ἢ.

⁶ See Aristotle, Metaphysics, VIII.1,1042a 27-28. ὅτι δὲ λέγω ἢ μὴ τὸδε τι οὕσα ἐνεργεία δυνάμει ἐστὶ τὸδε τι...
"...form and actuality...". Hence the conclusion of Plotinus: substance is a form which is at once an act and in act. In his Notice to the treatise, Bréhier explains well the judgement of Plotinus on their identity upon reference to the simple nature of substance.8

Admittedly, the Aristotelian doctrine of the ungenerated nature of form has for its special object sensible reality.9 This consequence ensues for substance is the compound of form and matter in Aristotle's philosophy. For Plotinus, on the other hand, substance is a form separate from matter; its nature is intellectual (ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς).10 Lloyd explains: "If in Plato the rôle of universal is played by the Idea alone, by the time of the Middle Academy, that is, for the Platonists of the first two centuries A.D., the performers of this rôle have been multiplied.... They distinguished first between the 'separate', transcendent form, the χωριστῶν οἴδως, and the inseparable, immanent form, the ἐνυλοῦν οἴδως";11 it is "the 'separate', transcendent form" which is substance in Plotinus' philosophy. This difference notwithstanding, it is fairly evident that Plotinus understood the Aristotelian teaching on the ungenerated nature of form to apply equally and, indeed, more so to the separate forms. What is important to retain from the treatise entitled 'On Potentiality and Actuality' is not so much the appropriation and subsequent reinterpretation by Plotinus of the Aristotelian teaching on the

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7 Metaphysics VIII,2,1043a 27-28. ἡ δ' ὡς μορφὴ καὶ ἐνέργεια. See also VIII,3,1043b 1-2.

8 See Bréhier: "Il en résulte deux conséquences: d'abord tous les êtres intelligibles sont des êtres en acte; en second lieu l'être en acte s'y confond avec l'acte lui-même, puisque leur distinction impliquait une composition qui n'existe plus. La forme ici n'est plus seulement acte; elle est en acte" 2: 74.

9 See Metaphysics VIII,2,1043a 26-27. ...τίς ἡ αἰσθητὴ οὐσία ἐστὶ .... It is true that in the Aristotelian cosmology, the organising principle is also a separate form whose role is to impart movement to the heavens. See Joseph Moreau, Aristote et son école (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962): "Si la sphère suprême est mue d'un mouvement continu et éternel, le principe qui le meut doit être lui-même éternel et éternellement en acte, sans quoi le mouvement produit ne serait pas continu; mais seul peut être continuellement en acte ce qui est immatériel" 137-38. But this consideration only lends credence to Plotinus' own views on substance as separate form.

10 See also V,9[5],8,1-3, wherein Plotinus defines τὸ οἴδως to be ἡ νοερὰ οὐσία.

ungenerated nature of form to agree with his Platonism but rather Plotinus' insistence that
substance -- the intrinsic act of being -- is at once an act and in act. We suggest that the key to
an understanding of the nature of the natural sciences within the Plotinian philosophy is the
realisation that this insistence is lacking in respect to reason. We propose that reason -- the
derived act of soul -- is an act which is not always in act; indeed, it is this dilation of being an
act and being in act which serves to contradistinguish reason from substance in their relations
with sensible reality. To do so, we shall pay close attention to reason as a relational property
whose existence is founded on originative principles -- form and matter, actuality and
potentiality -- inherent in soul.

These evidences on the nature of substance as a form must not however be
misconstrued. When it is said that Plotinus agrees with the Aristotelian teaching on the
ungenerated nature of form, this statement does not contradict the early argumentation on the
possible nature of substantial existence (ἐμαθής).12 The susceptibility of a substance to
experience passion may be located within the doctrine of procession; it is a teaching which
serves to explain the production of a substance from an other, its progenitor. There forthwith
ensues the hierarchical order of reality, a continuity of suites in which each reality is
independent of, while yet contiguous with, the precedent.13 To sustain this view, Plotinus
makes appeal to the general principle of the priority of act upon passion proffered by Aristotle.
Meanwhile, the treatise entitled 'On Potentiality and Actuality' has for its object the distinction
of substance from matter. For Plotinus matter is not merely the being in potency of Aristotelian
philosophy:14 rather, it is non-being itself. We read: "If, then, it is not among beings, it must

12 Reference may be made to the treatise III.6[26] where Plotinus discourses at length on the
possibility and impassibility of soul, most especially as regards physical alteration and
movement. For Plotinus, soul is a form and hence impassible. In particular, see Bréhier's
Notice to the treatise.

13 See Trouillard, La procession plotinienne: "Tout procède de L'Un, immédiatement,
radicalement, éternellement. Et cependant, chaque ordre se constitue lui-même, par une sorte
da-auto-position et engendre le plan qui le suit" 62.

14 See Metaphysics, VIII.1,1042b 9-11. "Επει δ' ἡ μὲν ὡς ὑποκειμένη καὶ ὡς ὑλή
οὐσία ὁμολογεῖται, αὕτη δ' ἔστιν ἡ δυνάμει, λοιπὸν τὴν ὡς ἐνέργειαν οὐσιαν
τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐπείν τις ἔστιν."
necessarily be non-being itself" (II.5.[25],4,6-7).\textsuperscript{15} Matter is not a form; it is neither an act nor in act; it produces nothing of itself. Thus we witness no contradiction by the author of the Enneads: the separation of substance from matter serves to distinguish the order of substantial existence from the order of sensible existence. We must remember that in the philosophy of Aristotle, the compound of form and matter accounts for physical generation alone: it is this kind of generation which Plotinus denies to the separate form, that is, substantial existence. As Bréhier has judiciously observed, the negation of matter in conjunction with substance applies only to sensible matter, not to intellectual matter; that is to say, it is an interdiction of physical change to substance.\textsuperscript{16} For a full explanation of spiritual change most especially to reason -- the derived act of soul -- we must turn to the treatise entitled 'On Love'.

Second, the treatise falls within the philosophical tradition of rational exegesis through the employment of myth. Wolters explains:

Plotinus also hints at a reason for this temporalizing and pluralizing nature of myths, when he writes, in an explanatory aside, that 'even philosophical discourses (λόγοι) not only speak of the 'births' of what is unbegotten, but also split up what exists as a unity' (9.26-28). This seems to indicate that the nature of myth is rooted in the nature of language in general, language being intrinsically inadequate for the representation of metaphysical truth. Such a

\textsuperscript{15} \(\varepsilon\iota\ \omega\iota\nu\ \mu\eta\delta\epsilon\nu\ \tau\omega\nu\ \omega\iota\tau\omega\iota\nu\) \(\mu\alpha\gamma\kappa\ \mu\nu\dot{o}\ \iota\nu\ \omega\iota\tau\eta\nu\ \epsilon\iota\nu\). MacKenna reads: "If, then, it is not among existences, it must necessarily be without existence". We change 'existence' to 'being' and read the apodosis to affirm a quasi-nature of matter, that is, to be non-being. See Jean-Marc Narbonne, La métaphysique de Plotin (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1994): "Dans la première perspective, la négativité de la matière consiste dans le fait de ne pas être autre chose que ce que l’on veut, ...de ne comporter à part soi aucun trait distinctif. Dans la seconde perspective, la négativité de la matière réside plus particulièrement dans le fait d’être toujours quelque chose d’autre que ce qui relève d’une réalité formelle, d’être au-delà de ce qui comporte une détermination positive. A partir de là, la matière est bien toujours privée de positivité, mais elle obtient, au sein même de la négativité, une sorte de pseudo-positivité, ou encore de para-positivité" 42-43. We read the text in the latter sense.

\textsuperscript{16} See Bréhier: "Cette négation de la matière dans les êtres intelligibles n’est nullement contradictoire avec la théorie de la matière intelligible, exposée au début du traité précédent. Ce que Plotin nie ici, c’est l’existence de la matière sujet du changement; mais il ne nie pas du tout \(\tau\omicron\ \upsilon\varsigma\ \upsilon\lambda\eta\)\,..." 2: 73, note 1.
view of the inadequacy of language for philosophical expression is a recurrent theme in Plotinus; in the present context it means that the specific mark of myths is to be sought elsewhere. Plotinus indicates that myths are distinguished from the language of reasoned discourse by their didactic nature: their manner of presentation is clearer and easier to understand.  

It is a philosophical tradition which is ancient in origin and stems from the attempt to understand the world as a living being. Now for Plotinus the world is a god and attains forthwith to all the dignities of a metaphysical reality. Comford explains: "But, when reason seemed to herself to have dispensed with the supernatural, and to be left with nothing but Nature, what was the Nature, physis, she was left with?... The 'Nature' of which the first philosophers tell us with confident dogmatism is from the first a metaphysical entity: not merely a natural element, but an element endowed with supernatural life and powers, a substance which is also Soul and God". We suggest that the treatise 'On Love' serves to explain the rational relations which the soul has with its prior, the Intellect, and its sequent, the sensible reality or nature. In the story of the birth of love, we discover the didactic vehicle used by Plotinus to teach how reason may be both an act and a passion of the soul in virtue of its object. It is therefore a proper choice of text for the determination of the possibility of a scientific knowledge of nature within Plotinian philosophy.

Further, the employment of the myth of love as the didactic vehicle of reason has the authority of two of Plotinus' predecessors, namely, Empedocles and Plato. Now the poems by Empedocles have been understood to contain an inconsistency in his thought upon nature and religion. Cornford disagrees: "The driving power, the cause of Empedocles' system, is

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17 Wolters xxvii - xxviii.

18 See III,5[50],5, 7-9. ...τὸν μὲν κόσμον λεγομένου εὐθαμονος θεοῦ καὶ αὐτάρκους εἶναι...


20 Porphyry's choice of the third Ennead for the treatise 'On Love' supports our position. See Vita 24, 41 - 25, 9 on the arrangement of treatises which concern the world.
not only, or chiefly, intellectual dissatisfaction with Parmenides' theories, but a profound belief that a somewhat different interpretation of the mystic view of the soul and God provides a scheme which, when we use it to interpret nature, leads to conclusions not so paradoxically at variance with sense-data and with Ionian science as those of Parmenides". Since our thesis affirms a similar judgement about the philosophy of Plotinus, it is not without purpose that we pause briefly to consider this early attempt at formulating a philosophy which admits both the mystic view of the soul and the possibility of a science of nature. More particularly, the important role assigned to love by Empedocles will aid in the clarification of the present treatise.

The philosophy of Empedocles sets forth the traditional religious belief in the fall and redemption of the soul in accordance with necessity; as well, it is the elaboration of a philosophy of nature which seeks to explain the process of becoming upon rational grounds. For a thinker like Empedocles, the one teaching is an implicate of the other; far from involving a contradiction, these two aspects of his thought would make no sense taken separately. From the religious belief we learn of the soul's journey during "thrice ten thousand seasons" its passing through all shapes of life in expiation for the commission of sin. The vision is cyclical: the soul falls from blessedness -- the Sphere of Love -- as a consequence of the trust placed in Strife -- the external principle. Its destiny is to return to blessedness after much peregrination and it is these perigrinations which constitute the process of becoming. Nature holds, therefore, a place midway between the unity of Love and the multiplicity of Strife. Alternately, from the natural sciences we learn that Love is the soul-substance which animates the four traditional elements of Greek physics contained within the Sphere, that is, fire, air, water, and earth. Cornford explains: "If we suppose for a moment the molecular structure, then Love would not be a fifth atom, but the soul pervading and unifying the four bodily portions. Love is also called Harmonia; it is of the same order of things as Heracleitus' Fire-Logos; that is to
say, it is both a fluid and a unifying principle which pervades the elements, as the soul pervades the body and holds it together"; the earthly existence is, therefore, an unsteady amalgam of Love -- the soul-substance -- and the four bodily elements -- the corporeal nature -- subsequent to the entrance of Strife into the Sphere. What is important to retain from Empedocles' system is the provision of an analysis of sensible reality based on the union of Love -- the soul-substance -- and the four material elements. Existence arises from the physical compound of Love and the elements, for coming-to-be is understood as a birth and birth itself is the result of marriage. The vision of Plotinus is similar: love describes the spiritual change that is the passage from potency to actuality within the soul. Rather than a mixing and blending of the natural elements with soul, we find in Plotinus' philosophy the mixing of form (λόγος) with intelligible matter (φύσις) located within mixed soul in order to produce the offspring. As well, we shall come to understand why Plotinus was so firm in his judgement against the identification of love with the world, preferring instead that love be born of the world (III,5[50],5,5-7): that love be born of the world means to say that the treatise 'On Love' has for its object the relation of spiritual change. We are again reminded of the difference between the register of physical modification that is sensation and the register of spiritual modification that is reason -- the derived act of soul -- read in the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases'.

This emphasis on myth as proper to rational discourse also has the authority of Plato. Wolters observes: "The importance of myths and their interpretation in Plotinus may be measured by the fact that the passages in Plato which Plotinus most often quotes, and which seem to have been among his primary sources of philosophical inspiration, are those which centre around the great Platonic myths". The explanatory power of myth is located in the

23 Cornford 234.

24 τὸ μὲν οὖν τὸν κόσμον ὑποσκεῖν λέγεσθαι τόνδε τῷ Πλάτωνι τῷ Ἐρωτα, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦ κόσμου τὸν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκφύεται Ἐρωτα, πολλὰ τὰ ἐναντιούμενα τῇ δόξῃ ἔχει,...

25 Wolters xxiii.
imagery it employs in order to render concrete the abstract idea; like the art of storytelling, the myth presents a complex set of ideas, relations, and values within the embodied form of personnage.26 It is a teaching which has its origins in the Platonic dialogues and whose object is the reconciliation of the apparently discordant affirmations on love, he who is the son of Aphrodite and he who is born during the celebration of Aphrodite's birthday.27 We understand the treatise entitled 'On Love' to effect the analysis of the metaphysical nature of reason as both an act and a passion of the soul; most especially, this difference is drawn based on the personnages of Eros the God (θεός) and Eros the daemon (δαιμόν). In the treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases', we learned that only the vision of the soul's prior, the Intellect, constitutes reason to be in act; following we suggested that reason is a passion whensoever reason turns to gaze upon the soul's sequent, sensible reality. We suggest that the treatise 'On Love' furnishes the raison d'être and principles of reason; it is the explanation of the origin, nature, and employments of reason -- the derived act of soul.28

Third, the selection of this text agrees with our purpose, that is, the elaboration of a theory of vision. We understand the theory of vision to mean the seeing of the soul as the soul rationally attends to sensible reality. Now, the treatise 'On Love' includes an internal as well as an external reference to the theory of vision. Regarding the internal reference, we read that love is the eye of the desirer (ὁ φθαλμός τοῦ ποθώντος 2. 40);29 love is born in

26 See Léon Robin, Théorie platonicienne de l'amour, new ed. (Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. 1933). "Mais un mythe n'est pas un simple jeu; c'est ou bien une façon symbolique de représenter sous une forme concrète des idées abstraites antérieurement exposées, ou bien c'est une explication relativement à des choses que les sciences ou la dialectique ne permettent pas d'expliquer sous une forme rigoureuse." 52.

27 See Plato, Symposium, trans. W.R.M. Lamb, LCL 166 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1925) in particular 203 C ... γενθηεις εν τοις εκεινης γενεθλιοις... and Plato, Phaedrus 242 D ... τοι τ' Ερωτα οὐκ 'Αφροδίτης καὶ θεοῦ τινα ἵγει;...

28 This identification of reason with the figures of Eros the god and Eros the daemon may be construed in terms of the pedagogical considerations stated in the Introduction.

29 See also III.5[50].3,13 wherein we read that love is the eye (ὁ μῦς) of desirous soul.
consequence of soul's activity and passion for the progenitor, the Intellect. Further, to both
the mother and her offspring is given the common function of looking upward to the parent of
soul in order to see the beauty and splendor above. This attention to vision is made yet more
manifest upon reference to love as the instrument of sight of the soul. That Plotinus is
referring to a rational as distinct from a perceptual vision is evident from the context of the
discussion for preceding the account of the birth of love by the soul is the relation of the birth
of soul and its adhesion to the progenitor, the Intellect (III.5[50].2,19-21). It is the realm
of pre-sensible realities whose being is ever separate and eternal. As such, we may liken the
treatise entitled 'On Love' to the treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases': in the early
treatise, we learned of the doctrine of the generation of substance following upon the perfection
of the progenitor. To clarify this thought, reference was made to the image of fire: Plotinus
therein observes the difference between the heat which is fire and the heat which derives
therefrom. Now, we find a similar image in the treatise entitled 'On Love' for we read that the
Intellect is like the sun whose effluence, the soul, remains ever close to its source. Again, the
treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' explains the birth of soul -- the intrinsic act of
being -- from its superior, the Intellect. It is the doctrine of procession. Likewise, we read that
reason -- the derived act of soul -- is in act in virtue of the seeing of the soul's progenitor. We
suggest that the treatise 'On Love' teaches the same doctrine: soul, Divine Aphrodite, gives
birth to her beautiful son, Eros the god, whose nature consists in the seeing of the soul's prior
Intellect. Eros the god is the intellectual vision.

30 See III.5[50].2,34 "ἐνήργησε τε πρός αὐτοῦ καὶ ὑκείωθη καὶ ἐρασθείσα... Note
the employment of the verb 'οἰκέω'. As Wolters observes "The expression οἰκείονθαι
πρός is technical..."80. The placement of this word serves to assure the terminological and
philosophical alliance of the treatise 'On Love' with the treatise entitled 'The Three Initial
Hypostases' wherein Plotinus introduces the 'οἰκεία' of the soul (3, 17).

31 See III.5[50].2,35 "Ἐρωτα ἐγένησε καὶ μετὰ τούτου πρός αὐτοῦ βλέπει,...

32 See III.5[50].2,42-43 "...τὴν τοῦ ὅραν δὲ ὄργανον δύναμιν...

33 τὴν δὲ σύμμαχον λεγομένην ἐκ Κρόνου νοῦ ὑπότος ἐκείνου ἀνάγκη ψυχῆν,
θειοτάτην εἶναι εὐθὺς ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀκμητάτων ἀκμητίας μείνασαι ἀνω,...
The internal reference to mixed soul whose object is the sequent, sensible reality, is located in chapter 3 of the treatise ‘On Love’. Here Plotinus attributes to the World Soul (τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῆς 3.27-28) an Eros which also is an eye (ἐρως ὁμοια 3.28-29), the nature of which is to be interior to this world (καὶ τὸν ἐν τῷ συν τῷ κόσμῳ Ἐρωτα 3, 31-32). The Plotinian philosophy contains therefore a theory of vision as concerns both the seeing of the prior, the Intellect, and the seeing of the sequent, sensible reality.

Meanwhile, the external reference points to the Platonic theory of vision and its antecedent, the teachings of Empedocles on Love. Wolters explains:

It is not without significance that the term and the theory derive ultimately, as Mugler points out, from Empedocles and his doctrine of the reign of Love. Plato, who adopted his theory of vision from Empedocles (see Cornford on Tim. 45B - 46A), probably had this in mind when he connects ἔρως with ἔσπειρεν, "because it 'streams in' from outside, and this stream does not belong to the possessor, but comes in adventitiously through the eyes." (Cratylius 420A - B). Similarly, in the Phaedrus myth, he describes the ardor of love as it receives τοῦ καλλους τὴν ἀπαρροήν διὰ τῶν ὁμιμάτων (251B).

It is probably no coincidence that 'love,' 'streaming' and 'eyesight' are here associated by Plotinus also -- a suspicion confirmed by μᾶλλον in line 14, which seems to presuppose the Cratylius etymology. 34

We can say that the Plotinian theory of vision sets forth the conditions under which the soul sees both its sequent, sensible reality, and its prior, the Intellect. More particularly, we propose to show that love -- Eros the god and Eros the daimon -- represents the metaphysical nature of reason to be an act and a passion of the soul as a consequence of its vision. This attention to the story of the birth of love may also be related to the gnoseological perfection introduced in the first chapter: it serves to explain the nature and employments of reason based on a consideration of its origin.

34 Wolters pp. 98-99.
Fourth, it is the work which most systematically explains the nature of reason to be a passion of the soul. We read: "This [Eros] is not the Reason which is pure, since it contains within itself a desire which is indeterminate, irrational and indefinite. For it will never be fulfilled as long as it contains Indetermination within itself" (III.5[50].7.12-15); the reason (λόγος) which is impure (οὐ καθαρός) is defined in consequence of its desirous nature (ἐν αὐτῷ ἐφεσιν). Contrary to the usually excellent judgement of Wolters who understands a difference between the reason which is impure and love, we read the text to affirm their identity. Our position is largely grounded upon contextual considerations. The chapter has for its object the relation of the birth of love, Eros the daimon, in accordance with the Symposium myth. More particularly, we read that love is born in consequence of the amorousness of his parents, that is, form (Poros) and spiritual matter (Penia). There ensues a long sentence wherein Plotinus states twiceover the nature of this birth: it is the affirmation of the birth (γενομένος) of reason in that which is not reason as well as the affirmation of a birth (τὸ γενομένον) which is neither perfect nor self-sufficient (7. 9-11). Rather than try to understand the sentence (II.9-11) to mean two separate and distinct births, we read the text to affirm their identity: the birth of reason in that which is not reason and the birth of that which is neither perfect nor self-sufficient are indeed the same. Thus we may relate the account of the

35 καὶ ἐστι λόγος οὗτος οὐ χαθαρός, ἀτε ἔχου έν αὐτῷ ἐφεσιν ἀορίστου καὶ ἀλογον καὶ ἀπειρον οὗ γὰρ μὴ ποτε πληροσεται, ἐν ἐν ἐν αὐτῷ τῇ τοῦ ἀορίστου φυσι. We change the translation of Wolters in two ways. First, we exclude the brackets placed around the text. Unlike Wolters, we do not understand the text to carry parenthetically upon self-sufficient reason. Second, we add the word 'Eros' to the text.

36 See Wolters 179 note on 7.12-13. We also disagree with his interpretation of the two sentences quoted above which immediately follow the words 'λόγου ἰκανοῦ'. He observes: "However, since it is undeniable that the subject is changed to Eros in 15 ἐξηρτήσευ (see my note), we must interpret the intervening two sentences as a parenthetical explanation of the words λόγου ἰκανοῦ." On the contrary, it seems fairly clear that the text in question refers to the reason which is impure and not the self-sufficient reason as suggested by Wolters. Else the text would read 'This [self-sufficient reason] is not the reason which is pure,' a clear contradiction.

37 λόγος οὗ γενομένος είν οὗ λόγω, ἀορίστω δὲ ἐφεσε καὶ ύποστάσει ἀμυνμα. ἐποίησε τὸ γενομένον οὗ τέλειον οὐδὲ ἰκανοῦ, ἐλλιπεῖς δὲ, ἀτε ἐξ ἐφεσεως ἀορίστου καὶ λόγου ἰκανοῦ γεγενομένου.
begetting of love to the gnoseological perfection, that is to say, the delineation of the nature of reason consequent to an explanation of its origin.

Similarly, textual considerations lend support to our position. The text on reason which is impure is immediately preceded by the account of love as a compound of indeterminate desire (ἔφεσες ὁ ὁρίστον) and self-sufficient reason (λόγου ἰκανοῦ) (7, 12). Now the reason which is impure has a like determination, to be at once a reason and an indeterminate desire (ἔφεσιν ὁ ὁρίστον). (7, 13); the vocabulary is almost identical in both sentences. The terminological alliance witnessed by the texts argues in favour of the identity of love, the offspring of Penia and Poros, and reason which is impure. Support for our position may also be located in the note by Hadot on the text wherein he observes that the term ὁμοῖος (7, 13) has for its referent the offspring of the union of Penia and Poros. Hence, we understand the text on reason which is impure to be an epexegetical phrase added in clarification of the preceding statement on the parentage of love; reason which is impure is a reason which derives at once from form and spiritual matter. Indeed, the text is a fine illustration of the employment of myth at the service of didacticism: based on his acceptance of the Platonic myth, Plotinus must clarify the personnages of parent (Poros and Penia) and child (Eros, divine and daemonic) in terms of the doctrine of procession. This step is necessary since the identification of the Platonic mythology with the Plotinian doctrine of procession is required neither upon exegetical nor upon philosophical grounds, but rather in view of the Neoplatonic teaching method ‘by appearance’ and ‘by predominance’. What is important to retain from the text is the clear admission by Plotinus that reason contains the indeterminate: it has desire. We emphasize this identity of love, Eros the daemon, and the reason which is filled with desire for it sets forth the metaphysical nature of reason to be a passion of the soul. When

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Plotinus says ".we attribute affections to the daimons..." (III.5[50],6,10-11) he means to say that we attribute affections to the intermediaries, one of which is the relational property of reason. Indeed it is these affections which make reason impure; that is, filled with desire. Thus we are able to maintain our position against Atkinson, who argues for the singular attribution of passion to the body. Instead our position is quite opposite: we propose a similarity of views between Plotinus and Aristotle on the reason which is a passion of the soul. In particular, we locate their similarity within the teaching of Plotinus on the reason which is impure based upon its birth from intelligible matter (Penia).40 This similarity will be clarified in Chapter III section 5 of the thesis.

Fifth, the treatise entitled 'On Love' provides the moral and spiritual warrant for the knowledge of nature in the Plotinian philosophy. Wolters addresses the difficulty: "A number of recent scholars have argued that Plotinus differs from Plato on this last point -- that he does not in fact integrate ordinary erotic love into the ascent of man toward the Good".41 He disagrees: "However, an attentive reader of the first chapter of III.5, will, I believe, come to the conclusion that this statement of Plotinus' position misses the mark";42 this view misses the mark for it fails to distinguish between the different sets of criteria which order our consort with nature. Wolters explains: "There is nothing immoral in such an affirmation of the sensual: only sexual perversion is a moral fault (l. 36-38). It is true, to be sure, that those who refrain from sex are more self-sufficient (l. 46-50) and thus superior (l. 58) to those who do not, but both groups act in accordance with temperate virtue (l. 59) and do nothing shameful (l. 62-63). It is, once more, only sexual deviants which are morally reprehensible -- and even...

39 ...δαίμονι δὲ προστιθημεν πάθη... Note the identical employment of the term 'πάθη' in both this text and the text on the passions of the soul (V,1[10],3,20).


41 Wolters xvii.

42 Wolters xvii.
they are motivated ultimately by a love of beauty". The task of the present study is similar to the teachings of the treatise 'On Love': it is the delineation of the various criteria which differentiate the rational seeing. In particular, this study assumes the form of an examination of reason as both an act and a passion of the soul. Now, because for a thinker like Plotinus the criterion of reason is informed consequent to a consideration of the source and object of reason, it is logical that we turn to his work which most properly states how reason is the derived act of soul. We have already met one such criterion within the axiology of procession: whenever reason looks to the prior of the soul, the Intellect, reason is an act, it is perfect; contrariwise, whenever reason looks to the sequent of the soul, the sensible reality, reason is a passion, it is imperfect. The treatise entitled 'On Love' agrees with the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' and the doctrine of procession: it is the account of both the origin and the object of reason insofar as these criteria are determining of its metaphysical nature. We can say that in the treatise 'On Love' Plotinus sets forth the gnoseology of reason as the derived act of the soul. Wolters concludes: "We find much the same view expressed in the treatise On Eros. One class of men (the small élite of ἀγάθοι) have Eros 'simply' and are not concerned with the particular beauties of the sensible world (7.34). All others, however, do have this concern, and Plotinus again stresses that there is nothing per se immoral about this, because not all Souls can have the same worth and value (7.40-42). To take one's point of departure in the sensible world is therefore perfectly normal and legitimate". So too as concerns our knowledge of things. While inferior to the seeing of the prior in the intellective vision, we suggest that mixed or daimonic reason may yet lay claim to truth based on the good of its object and the good of rational judgement. Meanwhile, the treatise 'On Love' provides the moral and spiritual warrant for our knowledge of the world: to love this world is not an evil; on the contrary, it forms the necessary start to all future perfection of the soul.

43 Wolters xviii.

44 Wolters xxi. In this wise, we understand the treatise 'On Love' to share the preoccupation of the two treatises 'On Providence I & II' (III.2 [47] & III.2 [48]): their object lies in the defence of the eternity and necessary goodness of the world against the contemporary gnosticism. See also Wypkje Helleman-Elgersma, Soul-Sisters A Commentary on 'Enneads' IV 3 (27), 1-8 of Plotinus, (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1980) in particular pp. 104-131 on Plotinus' relation with the gnostics.
Finally, the treatise 'On Love' belongs to the Platonic tradition of the ascent. Whilst there are several dialogues in which Plato expresses this teaching,45 there is perhaps none so famous and consistent as the relation by the prophetess Diotima in the Symposium; the treatise 'On Love' has for its object the exegesis of this dialogue46. The commentators are unanimous in their judgement upon the importance of the ascent to Plotinus. Rist observes: "The truth of the matter seems to be that in passages describing the ascent of the soul to the One Plotinus is tremendously indebted to the terminology of Plato's Symposium and that here the Beautiful is the aim of the philosopher's quest".47 And Bréhier: "Thus the soul may be animated by a double movement: an ascending movement which is at the same time a peaceful inner contemplation, a renewal of itself, an escape from the body; and a movement of descent which plunges it into the body, into life and into forgetfulness of its real nature".48 We stress the importance of the ascent insofar as it places the knowledge of the soul's sequent within the Neoplatonic teaching of procession and conversion. More especially, we shall seek to clarify the relation of the seeing of the soul's sequent, the sensible reality, with the seeing of the soul's prior, Intellect. That the former is necessarily inferior to the latter the axiology of procession assures; what remains in doubt is the determination of the exact nature of both the activity and the object of inferior reason together with their alliance, if any, with the activity and object of perfect reason. Again the classic teaching of Plato tells us that there is a necessary rupture between our knowledge of the sensible reality and of the Ideas.49 We shall, therefore, inquire into the existence of a similar rupture in the thought of Plotinus. From the treatise 'On Love'.

45 See Phaedrus 248d 1-4 on the three ways of the philosopher, musician, and lover; also Republic Bk. VII wherein Plato treats of the application of dialectic to education in virtue of his theory of Ideas.

46 See also the early treatise 'On Dialectics' (I,3 [20], 1-3) in which Plotinus deals with the ascent and the Platonic three ways.

47 Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality 56.

48 Bréhier, The Philosophy of Plotinus 34. See also Brunner, "Il est intéressant de noter que le regard peut être dirigé de bas en haut -- il est alors comme ici le signe de la dépendance -- ou de haut en bas -- et c'est au contraire le regard créateur" 73.

49 See Republic VII, 518c 8 - 519a 9; Symposium 212a 4-5. Also Yvon Lafrance, La théorie platonicienne de la doxa (Montréal: Bellarmin, 1981) especially pp. 136-142.
we learn that to know the world is a good. Let us now proceed to an analytical examination of this good in the treatise entitled 'On Love'.

In this section we have explained our choice of text. In particular, we have tried to show that the primary text required for the examination of the possibility of a scientific knowledge of sensible reality is indeed the late treatise 'On Love'. To do so, we have adduced six reasons: the notion of derived act as a birth, the employment of myth as a standard pedagogical method of Neoplatonic instruction, the elaboration of a theory of vision based on its historical and philosophical antecedents found in Empedocles and Plato, the introduction of an important text which suggests that reason may be construed as a passion of the soul, the moral and spiritual warrant for our knowledge of the world, and finally the fundamental role of the ascent in both the treatise 'On Love' as well as the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases'. All these considerations lend credence to the view that our choice of text is both valid from a methodological point of view as well as instructive from a philosophical point of view.
2: Divine Soul and Divine Aphrodite

In keeping with his general practice Plotinus begins the treatise with a question:

"Concerning Eros, the question deserves study: is it a divinity (god or daimon) or is it a passion of the soul"(III.5[50],1.1-2). Plotinus admits that love is both a divinity (θεός and δαίμων) and an earthling (πάθος). His query may, therefore, be understood to pertain equally to the register of physical modification and the register of spiritual modification; indeed, the treatise is unique regarding their juxtaposition. Following the practice of Plotinus himself, let us begin with the third suggestion as pertains to Eros the earthling. We observe the important usage of the term 'πάθος' in the text. Now it may be argued that a passion of the soul mentioned herein is one with the passions of the soul found in the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases', that is to say, their referent is identical. In such a case, our entire argumentation will be destroyed for it is clear that in the present text Plotinus means to say passion in the manner of an emotion. We read: "Now as for the passion which we ascribe to Eros, it is common knowledge, surely, that it arises in souls desiring to be joined with beauty of some kind, and that this desiring occurs..." (III.5[50],1.10-12). To desire (ἐφιμερίας) explains the presence of passion within the soul. We suggest however no confusion on our part. It has been observed that there are two meanings of the term 'πάθος' according to the Lexicon Plotinianum, that is, to be a feeling of soul or body and to be a modification; as well, we have discerned two semantic registers which explain the employment of the term, the register of physical modification and the register of spiritual modification. We submit that the text on a passion of the soul (πάθος τι τῆς ψυχῆς) does indeed pertain to the register of spiritual modification but only as regards the vegetative soul; the changes which we experience when in love may be assigned to the vegetative soul as to their principle even though their

50 ἔρωτος, πότερα θεός τις ἢ δαίμων ἢ πάθος τι τῆς ψυχῆς... We change Wolter's translation from 'affection' to 'passion' of the soul. While the term 'πάθος' admits of both readings, the election of 'passion' in preference to 'affection' maintains a consistent terminology.

51 περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ πάθους οὐ τὸν ἔρωτα αἰτιώμεθα, ὅτι ἐγγίνεται ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐφιμερίαις καλῶ τινι συμπλακήναι, καὶ ὡς ἢ ἐφεσις αὐτῆ...
application refers to the living compound. Wolters agrees: "Here and at 1.11 Plotinus uses
the phrase ἐγγίγνεσθαι ἐν ψυχαίς of Eros as πάθος. This appears to conflict with his
insistence elsewhere (e.g. III.6 [26] 1-5 and I.1 [53] passim) that the soul is free of affections
(ἀπαθής). The explanation is probably that he is here referring to the embodied 'soul', which
is strictly speaking not soul itself, but its (irrational) image:..."; the "(irrational) image"
which is itself a kind of soul is the vegetative soul. Now the task of the vegetative soul is
peculiar for whilst it is a substance whose nature is both an act and in act54 its act is yet limited
to the administration of physical change. Hence our argumentation remains intact: a passion of
the soul mentioned herein has for its referent the vegetative soul. This is distinct from the
passions of the soul found in the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' whose
referent we have shown to be neither the vegetative soul nor the body.

Our position receives further support upon contextual grounds. The first chapter has
for its object the determination of the nature of sexual love as it is variously practised. Plotinus
introduces this intention through the employment of the term 'συμπλακτήριον' in the text, a term
whose meaning is much similar to the English 'liaison', that is, to mean both 'the conjunction
with' and 'the pursuit of amorous relations';55 the rest of the chapter is devoted to an analysis
of the kinds of sexual love existent and Plotinus' judgement upon their worth. As such, it
seems fairly evident that the term 'πάθος' ascribed to this love means a feeling whose bodily
effect is to suffer pleasure and pain. Blumenthal explains: "He assumes that φύσις pre-exists
the body which it forms, and so that φύσις and the body so qualified produced by it are two

52 See III.6[26],3,22-24 wherein Plotinus refuses alteration (ἀλλαγος) to the soul. This
does not, however, contradict the doctrine of procession which affirms that the soul is subject
to passion (καὶ ἐμπαθῆς ψυχῆ) (V.9 [5], 4, 12). For background see Bréhier's Notice 3:

53 Wolters 7.

54 See II.5[25],3,33-34. καὶ ἐὰν ὑλὴ δὲ ἄλλη ἐνεργειά: οἶον ἡ φυτική: The editions
of Kirchhoff and Bréhier accept ἐνεργεια.

55 See Wolters: "Besides, the word συμπλέκω itself has definite sexual overtones.... This is
precisely what Eros at this level is about" 9.
different things. It cannot then be ϕύσις that starts the desire. This must be done by the body so qualified, which actually suffers pain or deprivation and wants their opposites. The ϕύσις on the other hand tries, as it were, to guess the requirements of the sufferer, and attempts to remedy the condition; 56 the earthly love is the desire we feel within us that is located in the body and accepted by the vegetative soul. We can say that the text on a passion of the soul mentioned herein has for its referent the vegetative soul whose task is to animate the body in order to form the living compound: meanwhile, the determination of the passion signifies the feeling which attends the effect of the body. This is other than the spiritual modification of reason in its gaze upon the sequent of the soul, sensible reality.

This notwithstanding, the chapter on earthly love does contain a positive content as regards the metaphysical nature of reason. For instance, we learn that the principle of love is based on a kinship with and knowledge of Beauty: "If someone were to lay down as ruling principle the deeper-lying reaching-out of the soul towards Beauty itself -- the experience of recognition and kinship, the instinctive awareness of affinity -- I believe he would put his finger on the true cause" (III.5 [50],1.16-19). 57 Now in Plotinian philosophy. Beauty is identical with the Intellect. We read: "And it is just to say that in the Soul's becoming a good and beautiful thing is its becoming like to God, for from the Divine comes all the Beauty and all the Good in beings. We may even say that Beauty is the Authentic-Existents and Ugliness is the Principle contrary to Existence:..." (I.6[I].6,18-21). 58 the principle of love is the Intellect. true being (τὰ ὀντά) together with its prior, the One. This appeal to the Intellect sets forth the metaphysical principle of priority and posteriority necessary to the understanding of reason: we are reminded of the dependency of reason on the ideal of knowledge which is realized at the

56 Blumenthal, Plotinus' Psychology... 62.

57 ἀρχήν δὲ εἶ τίς θεῖο τὴν αὐτῷ κάλλους πρότερον ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὅρεξιν καὶ επιγίνεσιν καὶ συγγένειαν καὶ οἰκειότητος ἀλογοι σύνεσιν. τυγχάνοι ἂν. αἷμαι. τοῦ ἁληθοῦς τῆς αἰτίας.

58 διὸ καὶ λέγεται ὀρθὸς τὸ ἄγαθον καὶ καλὸν τὴν ψυχὴν γίνεσθαι ὁμοιόθεται εἶναι θεῷ, ὅτι ἐκεῖθεν τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἡ ποίρα ἡ ἐτέρα τῶν ὀντῶν. μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ ὀντα ἡ καλλιούτη ἕστιν. ἡ δ᾽ ἐτέρα φύσις τὸ αἰσχροῦ,...
level of being, that is, the Intellect. Schroeder explains: "This Plotinian transformation of eros may be understood from the use that he makes of the vocabulary of sunousia. We have seen that sunousia describes the relations of presence and dependence between (to observe Platonic language) Form and particular in such a way that this relationship becomes one of dynamic continuity. It embraces an elastic inventory of presence and dependence that includes, not only the presence of the source to the product, or the product to the source, but the presence of the source to itself. The entire circuit of presence and dependence is completed". The chapter on earthly love makes appeal to the principle of priority and posteriority introduced in the early treatise entitled 'The Intellectual Principle, the Ideas, and the Authentic Existence' (V.9[5]) to clarify the doctrine of procession.

Again we learn that love creates in accordance with the Determinate: "For ugliness is contrary both to Nature and to the divine, since Nature creates by looking towards the Beautiful, and by so doing looks toward the Determinate, which is in the Column of the Good, whereas the Indeterminate is ugly and belongs to the alternative Column" (III.5[50],1.20-23).

60 the couple Determinate - Indeterminate completes the criteriology of reason: it is a principle of classification which, in conjunction with the metaphysical principle of the priority of act upon potency, will serve to explain the nature of reason to be an act and a passion of the soul. More especially, it is a principle of classification which bears on the object of reason. This attention paid by Plotinus to a classification of the kinds of rational object has largely been ignored by the commentators, preference being given to the study of the principle of priority and posteriority and the employment of reason as faculty. We suggest that the treatise 'On

59 Schroeder, Form and Transformation 105.

60 καὶ γὰρ ἡ φύσις πρὸς τὸ καλὸν βλέπουσα ποιεῖ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὦρισμένον βλέπει, ὅ εστιν ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ συστοιχίᾳ· τὸ δὲ ἀφρότου αἰσχρὸν καὶ τῆς ἐτέρας συστοιχίας.

61 For example Hadot Traité 50: "...des ' raisons ' (logoi) dans tous les sens philosophiques du mot (définition, raison, force productrice)" 72. See also Gary Gurtler, Plotinus The Experience of Unity, American University Studies Series V.43 (New York: Peter Lang, 1988): "Reason is looked at from every angle, the faculty or power of the soul that reasons, the process itself, and the content of the process, described both as reasonings in movement and separation and as fully expressed disciplines with their cause in the intellect" 193.
Love' is unique insofar as it teaches the metaphysical nature of reason based on a difference of the rational object. This position accords with the text of the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' wherein are defined the necessary grounds for the perfection of reason: to see the prior, the Intellect, constitutes the only acts which are proper to the soul. Plotinus is consistent in giving explanation of reason on the basis of a classification of the kinds of object.62 The chapter on earthly love provides, therefore, both the principle of classification in respect of the rational object (Determinate - Indeterminate) as well as the principle of priority and posteriority (act - potency) necessary to an understanding of reason -- the derived act of the soul.

His criteriology established, Plotinus now enters upon a study of substantial existence and derived act; we locate this study in the second, third, and fourth chapters of the treatise. That Plotinus means to leave the register of physical modification and the vegetative soul (τὸ φυτικόν) in order to attain the register of spiritual modification and the rational soul (τὸ λογιστικόν) is made manifest by a reference to the works of the ancient theologians and Plato. We read: "Now as for Eros as god: it is particularly with it that philosophy must deal. It is designated a god by other men as well, but especially by the ancient mythologizing poets and by Plato, who in many places speaks of 'Eros, son of Aphrodite,' and says that it was his work to be 'patron of the beautiful boys': to spur souls on to the Beauty on high, or else to intensify the existing upward impulse" (III,5[50],2,1-6).63 Now it is in the first discourse by Socrates in the Phaedrus that is recounted the genealogy of the birth of Eros to be the son of

62 This agrees with the Platonic teaching on the importance of the object for the determination of knowledge. See Y. Lafrance pp.127-135 on the difference between doxaston and gnōston in the Republic; and pp.159-184 on the construction of the Line and its referent objects. Admittedly, the Plotinian explanation of knowledge consists in a doctrine of vision. For instance see V,5[32],7. But this doctrine does not preclude the admission of a principle of classification of the kinds of object. We must remember that Plotinus teaches the primacy of being: it is not the case that the object is because it is known; rather, the object is known because it is. For a clear statement of the primacy of being, see V,9[5],7,12-18.

63 Περὶ δὲ τοῦ ὧν θεόν τιθεύται οὐ μόνον οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνθρώποι, ἀλλὰ καὶ θεολογοί καὶ Πλάτων πολλάκις Ἀφροδίτης Ἐρωτα λέγων καὶ ἔργου αὐτῷ εἶναι καλὸν τῷ ἐφόροις παῖδις καὶ κυνηγοῦν τῶν ψυχῶν πρὸς τὸ ἔκει καλλος. ἢ καὶ ἐπαύξειν τὴν ἰδὴ γενομένην πρὸς τὸ ἔκει ὅμιον, περὶ τούτου μάλιστα φιλοσοφήτων.
Aphrodite. More especially, in expiation of his sin to have suggested that love -- a divinity -- may be a cause of evil, Socrates undertakes an instruction upon the nature of Eros the god. We learn therein that the veritable role of love is to remind the soul of the eternal truths located beyond the celestial sphere in the Plain of truth.\(^{64}\) As well, Plotinus introduces the text of the Symposium wherein love is differently affirmed to be the offspring of Penia and Poros, born on Aphrodite's birthday: "Besides this, we must also accept the teaching of the Symposium, where [we read that Eros was born, not 'of Aphrodite,' but 'during'] the celebration of Aphrodite's birth, of Penia [Poverty] and Poros [Possession]" (III,5[50],2.6-9).\(^{65}\) Wolters explains: "This section at the same time serves as a transition from 'affection' to 'divinity' (Plotinus here deliberately neglects the distinction \(\thetaε\ο\sigma\varsigma/\deltaα\i\mu\omicron\omicron\omicron\) and thus introduces the theme of the rest of the treatise: the philosophical discussion of mythological Eros".\(^{66}\) Eros, both god and daimon, situates the philosophical discourse of the Enneads with the teaching of Socrates on the philosopher's love of truth. Now because the treatise 'On Love' falls within the tradition of rational exegesis through the employment of myth, it is important that we ascertain the characters in their proper relation with the doctrine of procession. In this way, we shall arrive at the determination of the metaphysical nature of reason to be an act and a passion of the soul.

To begin, we identify the mythological figures concerned. We read: "First of all then: who is Aphrodite? Next: how does Aphrodite have Eros in either case, whether it be 'out of' her or 'together with' her? Or rather: in what way does she have the same Eros under both

\(^{64}\) 249a - e upon the philosopher's love and the fourth kind of madness. Also Robin: "C'est donc là qu'aboutit tout ce discours sur la quatrième espèce de délire. Il prouve que, grâce à cette sorte de délire, celui qui voit ici-bas la beauté, ayant alors la réminiscence de la Beauté véritable, prend des ailes et, les sentant battre, brûle de s'envoler; que cependant il ne la peut et, pareil à l'oiseau, lève vers le ciel ses regards, négligeant les choses de la terre; que, pour cette raison, on le prend pour un insensé...et enfin que, participant à ce délire (dont le Beau est le principe), celui qui aime reçoit le nom d'amant des belles choses" 35.

\(^{65}\) καὶ δὴ καὶ ὀσα ἐν Συμποσίῳ εἴρηται παραληπτέοι ἐν οἷς οὕκ ἀ Aphroditos φήσαι αὐτῶν γεινέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐν τὴς Πενίας καὶ τοῦ Ποροῦ. And the Symposium 203b - e.

\(^{66}\) Wolters 46.
aspects at once, both 'out of' her and 'together with' her?" (III,5[50]2,12-14). Plotinus answers: "To begin with, we say that Aphrodite is twofold, and that the one is 'heavenly,' belonging to heaven, and that the other, 'born of Zeus and Dione,' is involved, as patroness, with sexual union here below (whereas the former is 'motherless' and beyond sexual union, because there is no sex in heaven)" (III,5[50]2,14-19). Aphrodite, whether divine (οὐρανίας) or mixed (τῇ δὲ ἐφαπτομενή) represents the soul. Several evidences support this position. A first evidence consists in the clear affirmation made shortly thereafter that Divine Aphrodite is soul: "Now the 'heavenly' one, since she is said to be born of Kronos -- that is, of Intellect -- must of necessity be Soul at its most divine:..." (III,5[50]2,19-20). The divine Aphrodite is divine soul, a substantial existence. A second evidence may be found in the statement on the hierarchy of souls: "But we must also hold that there are many Aphrodites in the world (daimons which have entered the world together with an Eros, having flowed forth from a kind of 'All-Aphrodite': a plurality of partial Aphrodites in dependence, together with their personal Erotes, on that All-Aphrodite) if it is true that Soul is mother of Eros, Aphrodite is Soul, and Eros is Soul's activity (ἐνέργεια) as it strains toward good" (III,5[50]4,18-23). We understand the term 'if' (εἰ περὶ) which introduces the text on soul, the mother of

67 πρῶτον οὖν τίς ἴη Ἀφροδίτη εἶτα πῶς ἢ ἔξ αὐτῆς ἢ σὺν αὐτῇ ἢ τίνα τρόπον ἐκεῖ τῶν αὐτῶν τὸ ἐξ αὐτῆς τε ἀμα καὶ σὺν αὐτῇ.

68 λεγομεν ὅτι τὴν Ἀφροδίτην εἶναι διύτιτι, τὴν μὲν οὐρανίαν οὐρανοῦ λέγοντες εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἐκ Διὸς καὶ Διώνης, τὴν τῷ τῆς ἐφαπτομενῆς ἐφοροι γάμων ἀμητορά δὲ ἐκείνη καὶ ἐπέκεινα γάμων, ὅτι μὴ δ’ εἰν οὐρανία γάμω.

69 Our appellation of the other Aphrodite, born of Zeus and Dione, is based on the employment of the term 'ἐφαπτομενής'. In Liddell-Scott, A Greek English Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940) its meaning is "to touch" or "to lay hold of" 741; there is an indication of composition. See Wolters p.60. As well, this appellation conforms to the distinction made in the first chapter between pure love (καθαρός) and mixed love (μικτός). Finally, it is striking that Plotinus omits the usage of the Platonic 'παιδήμος': see Wolters p.60 and Hadot Traité 50 p.46. Hence our preference for the appellation 'mixed' rather than 'common'.

70 τήν δὲ οὐρανίαν λεγομενήν ἐκ Κρόνου ἰοῦ ὄντος ἐκείνου ἀνάγκη φυχὴν, θειοτάτην εἰναι...

71 οἶεσθαι δὲ χρῆ καὶ Ἀφροδίτας ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ πολλάς, δαίμονας ἐν αὐτῷ γενομένας μετ' Ἕρωτος, μυείας ἐκ Ἀφροδίτης τινὸς ὅλης, ἐν μὲνει πολλάς ἐκείνης ἐξηρτημένας μετὰ ἰδίων ἐρωτῶν, εἰπέρ ψυχὴ μητηρ ἤρωτος. Ἀφροδίτη δὲ φυχή. ἐρως δὲ ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς ἀγαθοῦ ὀργιομενής.
Eros, to be implicative; it explains the necessary condition under which soul may be given the
appellation 'Aphrodite' and the act of soul the appellation 'Eros'. Wolters agrees: "Here and in
line 18 below, εἰπερ is used to introduce a reason",72 it is the εἰπερ of agreement with fact.

Meanwhile, a third evidence is located in the early treatise entitled "On the Good, or the
One" wherein Plotinus discourses on the beatitude of soul with the One: "So long as it is
There, it holds the heavenly love; here its love is the baser; There the soul is Aphrodite of the
heavens; here, turned harlot, Aphrodite of the public ways: and every soul is an Aphrodite"
(VI.9[9].9.28-31).73 Plotinus here agrees with the Symposium and the judgement upon two
kinds of love, the morally superior or divine and the morally inferior or mixed. Now it is in the
second speech, given by Pausanias, that is distinguished a qualitative difference between the
dual Aphrodites based upon a consideration of their origin; to be the daughter of Heaven or the
child of Zeus and Dione.74 We suggest that Plotinus' choice of text not only allows him to
integrate the several Platonic teachings on the birth of Eros -- to be a god and to be a daimon --
but further provides him with a textual authorization for the doctrine of procession.75 In the
early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' we learned that the generation of a new
substantial existence takes place in consequence of the surfeit of perfection which is the
progenitor: it is the metaphysical perfection. The speech by Pausanias clarifies the conditions
necessary for the generation of soul. More especially, we understand the determination of the
origin of soul to lend intelligence to the nature of reason, the derived act. What is important to

72 Wolters 104.

73 καὶ οὐσία ἐκεῖ τοὺς οὐράνιους Ἐρωτα ἔχει, ἐνθαύθα δὲ παῖδημος γίγνεται· καὶ
γὰρ ἐστιν ἐκεῖ Ἀφροδίτη οὐρανία, ἐνθαύθα δὲ γίγνεται παῖδημος οὗ ἐστι
ἐνθεόθεια. καὶ ἐστὶ πᾶσα ψυχὴ Ἀφροδίτη. We change McKenna's translation "yet
the soul is always an Aphrodite" for it implies an interminence in the identification of soul and
Aphrodite. Instead, we understand Plotinus to mean that each and every soul is an Aphrodite.
See Helleman-Elgersma on the Plotinian vocabulary (πάς) pp. 132-147.

74 See Symposium 180c - 185c, in particular 180d 8-10: ... καὶ οὐρανίαν ἐποιομάζομεν
ἡ δὲ ὑπερέα Δίος καὶ Διώς. ἢ δὲ Παῖδημος καλοῦμεν. See Wolters lxiii note 5
on the employment of the Pausanias speech by Plotinus; and Hadot Traité 50 pp. 40-45 on the
moral difference introduced by Plato.

75 On the synthesizing effort by Plotinus of the Platonic sources, see Wolters xxiv.
retain from the texts is the constancy of Plotinus' judgement on the identification of the mythical figure of Aphrodite with the metaphysical reality of soul.

This employment of myth and character includes, however, not one but two Aphrodites. Wolters explains:

We find, therefore, that Plotinus follows a general hermeneutical rule in his interpretation of myth: the multitude of mythological dramatis personae is referred to a small number of ontological equivalents, and the factor time is systematically eliminated. This is the process of συναίσθενος which Plotinus says must be applied to the myth (9. 29). We should observe that it is also applied in the earlier chapters of the treatise, when two apparently contradictory mythological givens are interpreted as referring to a single paradoxical relationship: Eros from-and-with Aphrodite (2. 13-14). 76

The two Aphrodites serve to represent the many kinds of soul. 77 Moreover, this precision agrees with the early treatise entitled 'The Soul's Descent into Body' and the teaching upon the amphibious (άμφιβοι) life of the soul. We read: "Souls then are in both spheres, living of necessity the life there in part and the life here in part: the life there in those more able to consort with the Intellect, the other life here in those who belong more by nature or circumstances" (IV.8[6],4.31-35); 78 Aphrodite represents the dual life of the soul based on a consideration of

76 Wolters xxviii; see also Hadot Traité 50 pp. 22-25.

77 See Hadot Traité 50: "L' 'Âme' représente également tout un ensemble, lui aussi hiérarchisé et unifié, dans lequel une essence unique se multiplie et se dégrade en une pluralité d'essences particulières, jusqu'aux plus bas niveaux de la vie végétative" 24. See also Dominic O'Meara, Structures hiérarchiques dans la pensée de Plotin, Philosophia Antiqua series 27 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975). "La hiérarchie nous est apparue un peu plus haut comme une ordonnance à la fois 'horizontale' (rangs, niveaux) et ' verticale' (série déterminée de rangs, ou de niveaux), exprimant les divers degrés d'une certaine antériorité ou postériorité d'un ensemble d'étres" 6.

78 γίγνοιται οὖν οίον ἀμφὶ βοιού ἐξ αὐδῆς τοῦτο τὸ ἐκεῖ βίον τὸν τὸ ἐν τῷ ἔμερος βιοῦσα, πλεῖον μέν τοῦ ἐκεί, αἱ δύνασαι πλεῖον τὸν ἦν συνεῖναι, τοῦ δὲ εἰσάγει πλεῖον, αἱ τὸ ἐναυίον ἤ φύσιν ἢ τύχαις ὑπηρέτει. We change McKenna's translation considerably. It reads: "...living of necessity the life there and the life here by turns, the upper life reigning in those able to consort more continuously with the divine Intellect, the lower dominant where character or circumstances are less favourable". The emphasis is not upon alternance, "by turns", but rather upon the parts of the soul and their ontological register.
her birth. We can say that the two genealogies of Aphrodite recount the ontological declension which constitutes the soul; insofar as the soul looks to the prior, the Intellect, it is heavenly and divine; meanwhile, insofar as the soul looks to the sequent, the sensible reality, it is worldly and mixed.

In his introduction to the treatise Hadot emphasizes the aspect of continuity which obtains between the dual Aphrodites: the oppositional relation stated in the early treatise entitled 'On the Good, or the One' is now replaced by a subordinative relation of ontological registers in the late treatise entitled 'On Love'. 79 Now this choice of continuity agrees with the Plotinian teaching on the doctrine of two acts, the act which is intrinsic to a being qua being and the act which derives therefrom. Lloyd observes:

The Enneads often make a crucial distinction between the activity of the substance and the activity from the substance.... But a rigorous criterion for discriminating the two activities is difficult; and, if he has one, Plotinus for one does not apply it consistently. He certainly tends to assume that the external activity or its product is 'in something else'; and this implies the further distinction that the product will be only an imperfect likeness of the substance in question. But species are sometimes thought of as in matter and only likenesses of the genus, even if they are more often thought of as the standard case of its internal activity. One may suspect that the distinction is relative to the point of view. 80

The dual Aphrodites illustrate well the doctrine of two acts in the Enneads: the intrinsic act of being is the act which inhere in the subject; it is 'with' the subject. Meanwhile, the derived act

79 Hadot Traité 50: "Mais cette première exégèse plotinienne des figures de l'Aphrodite ouranienne et de l'Aphrodite pandémienne diffère notablement de celle qui est proposée dans le traité 50.... Plotin évite d'utiliser le mot 'pandémienne' et il laisse entendre dans le premier chapitre (1.59) que l'union conjugale, donc la procréation dans le monde, est tout à fait morale. Il n'y aura donc plus opposition morale, mais subordination ontologique entre les deux Aphrodites" 48.

of being is the act which proceeds from the subject; it is 'out of' the subject. This dual nature is itself reproduced in the offspring, Eros, of whom Plotinus speaks equally of a birth 'out of' and 'with' Aphrodite.

Soul then is Aphrodite. Thus while there are three Platonic authorities on the birth of love read in the Symposium-- Eros the offspring of divine Aphrodite, Eros the offspring of mixed Aphrodite, and Eros the offspring of Penia and Poros81 -- we understand only two qualities of soul; to be heavenly and divine and to be worldly and mixed. This judgement finds support in the comments of Hadot who understands the figures of Penia and Poros to restate the mythologies of Aphrodite:82 Divine Aphrodite is identified with Poros -- form -- and Worldly Aphrodite with Penia -- spiritual matter. Thus what is important to retain from the texts is not the number of Platonic accounts of the birth of love but rather the clear analysis of soul to have two qualities. The Plotinian exegesis of texts does not, however, meet with the approval of all the commentators of Plato. One such view is that of Robin who objects to the personal nature of the exegesis: Plotinus is accused of an entire ignorance of context together with the tendency to render fanciful the manifest doctrine of Plato.83 Be that as it may, our purpose remains unchanged; that is, to explain the nature of reason to know the world. Thus we learn: the mythological figure of Aphrodite has for its referent the soul; more especially, the

81 Symposium 180d - e; and 203c.

82 Hadot Traité 50: "D'une part il est le fils de l'âme;.... D'autre part il est son compagnon.... Mais les deux affirmations se contredisent pas, parce que Poros and Pénia, à tous les niveaux de la réalité, ne sont rien d'autre finalement que des constituants de la structure de l'âme, et même de la structure de toute réalité, comme nous aurons à le redire" 62.

83 See Robin: "Les idées qu'on prête à Platon dans toutes ces constructions, plus ou moins métaphysiques, dépassent de beaucoup, si même elles lui ont jamais appartenu, le développement de sa pensée philosophique tel que nous le révèle le Banquet. Pour interpréter correctement le mythe de la naissance de l'Amour, il faut donc le prendre en lui-même avec le texte et sans l'isoler arbitrairement du dialogue auquel il appartient" 127-128. For a more positive appreciation of Plotinus' Platonism, see Heiser: "After working out to my own satisfaction what Plotinus thinks on the same subject, I am left with the same old reaction: if Plato did not mean that, what did he mean? On this, as on many subjects, Plotinus is much closer to the Plato of the dialogues than he gets credit for being" 75.
acceptance of the dual Aphrodites advised by Pausanias in the Symposium serves to found the doctrine of two acts necessary to an understanding of substantial existence and derived act.\textsuperscript{84}

A difficulty arises: within the doctrine of procession, to which reality of soul do the deities conform? In his commentary on the treatise Wolters affirms the identification of divine Aphrodite with the undescended soul: "Having distinguished the two kinds of Aphrodite, Plotinus now begins the discussion of 'heavenly' Aphrodite, which he identifies with the higher, undescended soul. In this section almost every word serves to emphasize that this 'pure' soul stays close to Intellect and far from matter".\textsuperscript{85} We read: "Now the 'heavenly' one, since she is said to be born of Kronos -- that is, of Intellect -- must of necessity be Soul at its most divine: she derives directly from him, pure from pure. She remains above, so that she does not descend to this world below -- being neither willing nor able, because such is her nature: it is not in her nature to walk in the nether regions". (III.5 [50].2,19-23).\textsuperscript{86} Several evidences favour this assignment of character. First, there is the choice of vocabulary. In the cosmology of Plotinus, the term 'heaven' (οὐρανός) has for its referent the celestial sphere and the Intellect. This effect is clearly stated in the early treatise entitled 'On the Intellectual Beauty' wherein we learn that the home of the gods is heaven: "The gods in heaven.... But the gods in heaven above, they whose station is upon it and in it, inhabiting the heaven everywhere..." (V.8[13].3,30-31);\textsuperscript{87} the heaven above (ἐκείνω) is the intelligible realm. This evidence may

\textsuperscript{84} See also Wolters 65 on the identification of soul with Aphrodite.

\textsuperscript{85} Wolters 65.

\textsuperscript{86} τὴν δὲ οὖρανίαν λεγομένην ἐκ Κρόνου νοῦ ὄντος ἐκείνου ἀνάγκη φυσῆν θειοτάτην εἶναι εὐθὺς ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀκράτους ἀκράτους μείνασαι ἄνω, ὡς μὴ δὲ εἰς τὴν ἐλθεῖν μὴ δὲ ἐθελησάσαι μὴ δὲ δυναμένην [ὅτι ἢν φύσεως], μὴ κατὰ τὰ κάτω φύσαν βαίνειν...

\textsuperscript{87} τῶν δὲ θεῶν οἱ μὲν ἐν οὐρανῷ. ὄντες...οἱ δὲ ἐν ἐκείνῳ ὄντες. ὅσοις ἡ οἰκῆσαι ἐπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, ἐν παντὶ οἰκούσες τῷ ἐκεὶ οὐρανῷ... We change MacKenna's translation, "The gods belonging to that higher Heaven itself, they whose station is upon it and in it, see and know in virtue of their omnipresence to it". Nowhere in the text does Plotinus mention 'to see' and 'to know'. As well, the reading 'omnipresence' is not manifest in the text. Instead, we read ἐν παντὶ in the extensive sense, that the Intellect includes all forms. The enumeration of forms which follows thereafter supports our reading of the text.
be situated with respect to the *Phaedrus* wherein Plato contrasts the celestial sphere which is the visible heaven with the Plain of truth beyond.\(^{88}\) As well, in the *Lexicon Plotinianum* we learn that the term 'ὑπαιός' and its cognates mean "the heavens" and all that which is of a celestial nature;\(^{89}\) soul which remains close to the father, Kronos, is soul which partakes in the nature of the Intellect to be heavenly and free of earthly care. And Helleman-Elgersma relates: "A more important attempt to resolve this tension is a teaching of P[lotinus] which was apparently new with him, that the soul is never completely fallen, but a 'part' of it always remains in the higher world without contamination. The soul thus goes forth but also returns, and is always able to make the return because it has never entirely gone forth".\(^{90}\) The treatise 'On Love' agrees with the Plotinian teaching of the abiding soul; soul at its most divine (Θειοτάτην) is the celestial soul (ὑπαιός).

Second, there is the appeal to tradition. In his Introduction to the treatise, Hadot observes that the notion of a simple soul (ἄπλως) stated in chapter three is the usual appellation of celestial soul, that is, the soul which abides with the Intellect.\(^{91}\) To support his position Hadot makes reference to the judgement of Ficino who also held the view that divine Aphrodite represents the undescended soul.\(^{92}\) This view contrasts with that of Igal, who suggests

\(^{88}\) See *Phaedrus* 247a - c, in particular ...ἐξο...πορευθεῖσας...ἐστι...τῷ...ὑπαιός...

\(^{89}\) *Lexicon Plotinianum* 771-774.

\(^{90}\) Helleman-Elgersma 35. See also IV.8[6].8.1-3 in particular, "...οὐ...πάσα...οὐδὲ...ἡ...ἡμετέρα...ψυχή...ἐδυ...άλλα...ἔστι...τι...αὐτής...ἐν...τῷ...νοητῷ...ἀεὶ..."

\(^{91}\) Hadot *Traité 50*: "Tout d’abord la manière dont Plotin décrit la première Aphrodite, lorsqu’il précise qu’elle est 'seulement âme', 'absolument (haplōs) âme' (3, 31), en l’opposant ainsi à l’âme du monde qui est âme de quelque chose, peut nous faire hésiter à identifier cette première Aphrodite à la partie supérieure de l’âme du monde.... Plotin, dans notre présent traité (3, 31 et 4, 2) reprend ce vocabulaire et oppose donc clairement l’âme universelle, qui est l’âme divine (l’Aphrodite ouranienne), à l’âme du monde (l’"Aphrodite inférieure") 53-54.

\(^{92}\) Hadot *Traité 50*: "La solution que nous proposons était déjà celle de Marsile Ficin. Dans son traité *Sur l’Amour*, qui est aussi son *Commentaire sur le "Banquet" de Platon*, il place la première Aphrodite écrite par Plotin, dans le monde intelligible,... Pour lui, la seconde Aphrodite est l’âme du monde" 59.
instead that divine Aphrodite be identified with the higher, contemplative part of the world soul. 93

Now the identification of divine Aphrodite with the undescended soul is important to the extent that it bears upon our argumentation concerning the nature of reason. We have held that the treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' defines the conditions under which reason is in act; it is the intellective vision. Similarly, soul is defined to be intellective and active (ισχύς καὶ ἐνεργεῖ) in consequence of this vision and such only are the acts of soul (ἐνεργεῖας ὑψηλοῦ). 94 If, therefore, the commentators are correct to identify divine Aphrodite with the undescended soul, then it may be argued that the reason which looks to the Intellect introduced in the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' is attributable to the undescended soul rather than to the descended soul as has been done to this point. We do not, however, understand this identification to prejudice our position. In the treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' the account of reason which looks in toward the Intellect clearly follows the distinction drawn between soul which abides and soul which descends. We read: "There one must understand no outflow, but it [soul] remains within, the other [soul] being the establishment of a substantial existence" (V.1[10],3,11-12). 95 The text which identifies reason to be ratiocination (καὶ ἐν λογισμῷ ὁ ὀφθαλμός αὐτῆς 1.13) follows this distinction between the undescended soul (μένονος) and the descended soul (ὑποσταμένη) and is clearly attributable to the latter kind of soul. 96 As such, the text on reason which looks in toward the

93 See Hadot Traité 50 pp. 51-53.

94 V.1[10],3,16-18.

95 δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν ἕκκεν ὁὐκ ἐκφέουσαν, ἀλλὰ μέντοι μὲν τῆν ἐν αὐτῷ, τῆν δὲ ἀλλήν ὑποσταμένην. MacKenna reads: "...but in the double aspect of integral inherence with the establishment of a new being". We change his translation to underscore the difference between the aspect of remaining and the aspect of other establishment.

96 For background to this problem, see Atkinson's discussion to 3,13. In particular, "It seems, then, that the transcendent soul is neither Intellect proper, nor yet the reasoning with which we have been dealing, which judges and aligns the impressions which come both from the world of Forms and from the world of sensation. It remains, then, for the undescending soul to be something above reasoning and below Intellect proper" 62. The ratiocinative nature clearly belongs to the soul in its descent to nature.
Intellect may be said to belong to the descended soul; the newly established soul. Meanwhile, in his Introduction to the treatise Hadot observes with much acuity the application of both a divine as well as a daemon nature to the descended soul.97 We learn that the soul is divine to the extent that it sees its prior, the Intellect, and it is is a daemon to the extent that it sees the world: "Since therefore, it is this Eros which 'leads' each microcosmic Soul towards the good, the Eros of the upper Soul may be considered a god, which keeps Soul eternally attached to that higher reality, but the daemon is the Eros of mixed Soul" (III.5[50],4.23-25).98 Clearly within each particular soul (ἐκάστην or 'microcosmic') exists an upper or divine aspect. Hence it is not necessary to situate the reason which looks to the Intellect with the undescended soul; instead, each and every soul which is descended also has a divine nature belonging to it. This attention to the divine nature of soul to include both the multiplicity of souls and the highest soul may be situated in the context of the logical difference between intension and extension. Lloyd explains:

Plotinus' version of this thesis is coloured by the context of Enneads VI.2 which makes the genus he is describing that of Being or Intellect. This, however, makes it easier for us to understand the properties appropriate to the quasi-genus as belonging to the reified intension or class-concept and those appropriate to the standard genus as belonging to the extension. The distinction must not be ruled out as only modern. Damascius distinguishes two ways in which animal can be analysed, first into 'elements', i.e. of its definition, secondly into 'parts', i.e. its species.99

The genus soul contains many 'parts', that is, many kinds of souls, as well as many 'elements', that is, the list of predicates which serve to constitute the definition. To render this

97 Hadot Traité 50: "La seconde Aphrodite est donc double et on peut supposer, bien que Plotin ne le dise pas explicitement, qu'elle est divine par sa partie supérieure toujours tournée vers le divin, et démonique par sa partie inférieure, mélangée au corps. C'est à l'Amour de l'âme du Tout, et d'ailleurs aussi à celui de toute âme raisonnable particulière, que l'on peut appliquer le principe formulé en 4, 24-25:..." 55-56.

98 ἄγιος τοῖν τεῦχον ἐκάστην οὗτος ὁ ἔρως πρὸς τὴν ἁγαθοῦ φύσιν ὁ μὲν τῆς ἁγιος θεὸς ἄιν εἰς, ὅς δὲi ψυχήν ἐκείνην συμπατεῖ, δαίμων δὲ ὁ τῆς μεμνημένης.

99 Lloyd. The Anatomy of Neoplatonism 82-83.
difference clearly, we shall employ the term 'undescended' to signify that soul (a part) which remains ever above and the term 'divine' to signify that aspect of soul (an element) which determines soul to be most perfect. Needless to say, intension and extension can coincide, undescended soul always being divine.

2 A: Divine Soul and Separation

Divine Aphrodite is soul, that is, the reality of soul at its most perfect. Let us, therefore, turn to study divine soul in the intensive sense; that is to say, in its elements. In this wise, we may accede to an understanding of reason which looks to the Intellect, reason which is both an act and in act:

She is a kind of separate Existence, that is, a Substance not participating in matter (which is the reason they referred to her allegorically as being 'motherless') -- a Substance, accordingly, which one may properly call a god, not a daimon, since she is unmixed and pure as she abides in herself. For that which is the immediate natural offspring of Intellect is itself also pure, strong in its own right by virtue of its proximity, since both Soul's desire and her settled position are towards her Begetter. (III.5[50],2.23-30). 100

The nature of divine soul is to be separate (χωριστήν) from matter (ὕλης); indeed, it is this quality of separateness which distinguishes divine soul from mixed soul. Wolters explains: "Now for the first time, the distinction between θεῶν and δαίμων becomes significant... A god is characterized by being pure of matter; a daimon by being mixed with matter": 101 the appellations 'divine' and 'mixed' adduced earlier in view of genealogical considerations -- to be the daughter of Heaven or the child of Zeus and Dione -- also serve to qualify the essential nature of soul. Let us then begin our study of the epistemological perfection of divine soul with an examination of the term 'separate'. We situate the term 'χωριστήν' within the

100 χωριστήν οὐσαί των ὑπόστασιν καὶ ἄμετοχον ὕλης οὐσίαν - ὅθεν αὐτὴν τοῦτον ἡμιτοῦντο, τῷ ἀμήτῳ εἶναι - ἤν δὲ καὶ θεῶν ἄν τις δικαιός, οὐ δαίμονι εἰπομένων οὐσίαν καὶ καθαρὰν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς μέιονεσσαν. τὸ γὰρ ἐνθῦθες ἐκ τοῦ πεφυκός καραροῦ καὶ αὐτῷ ἀτε ἵσχυον καθ' ἑαυτῷ τῷ ἐγγύθεν, ἂν καὶ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας οὕς ἀυτή καὶ τῆς ἱδρύσεως πρὸς τὸ γεννήσαι ἰκανῶν ὀν κατεχεῖν ἄνω.

101 Wolters 69.
Plotinian criteriology. As regards the criterion of priority and posteriority, we understand the nature of soul to be separate by virtue of the Platonic teaching of the immortality of soul. In the Phaedo we learn that soul cannot suffer death for it is akin to the forms; simple, everlasting, immortal, and changeless.\textsuperscript{102} Again, in the Phaedrus we learn that soul is immortal consequent to its self-movement: its movement assures its perpetuity for it serves as beginning and the beginning can have no precedent.\textsuperscript{103} Soul therefore is separate from body and matter insofar as it is simple and self-moving; as such, it is their prior in nature.\textsuperscript{104}

Concerning the criterion of determinate - indeterminate we understand the nature of soul to be separate based on a consideration of its proper object, the Platonic forms. From the classic doctrine of forms, we learn that the forms are realities which are eternal, self-identical, stable, and unchanging: they are intellectual in nature standing separate or apart from the sensible reality which follows upon them as copy to original.\textsuperscript{105} Wald tells us: "Bound up with this view that the Forms must in some way be prior in the thinking of them is their aspect as causes. They are the reason why things are as they are. As contents of intellect they are formal causes. As 'Forms in matter' they are efficient causes".\textsuperscript{106} The forms are realities

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Phaedrus 245c6 - d6. See also IV.7 [2], 'On the Immortality of the Soul'. For Plotinus the priority of soul upon matter explains the priority of the spiritual upon the material. See Bréhier's Notice: "La question de l'immortalité de l'âme reste en somme, chez Plotin comme chez Platon et les stoïciens, une question physique et cosmologique autant qu'une question intéressant la destinée humaine; les âmes sont les forces qui animent le monde, et la conservation éternelle du monde implique la perpétuité des âmes" 4: 187.
\item Our argumentation for the priority of soul upon body and matter does not take into account the order of procession, matter's generation being a subject of some dispute. For a fuller discussion of this difficulty, whether matter is co-eternal with the One or the last production from the One. see Narbonne's Appendix in La métaphysique, pp.113-147.
\item See Republic V 478 on the knowledge of the form, that is, the real; also Phaedrus 247c8 - d1 on the heaven above visible only to the mind's eye; also Phaedo 67c - d on the purification of soul through its separation from the body; also Timaeus 28 - 32 on the fashioning of the world by the Demiurge; and Lafrance pp.127-128.
\item George Wald, Self-Intellection and Identity in the Philosophy of Plotinus Philosophy XX European University Series 274 (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1990) 53. On Aristotle's critique, see Moreau, Aristote et son école 31.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
which serve the paradigmatic function of determination consequent to their unity. Rist explains: "My view of the first hypothesis is this: that Plato demonstrates both that a bare Unity, such as the Parmenidean One, can admit of no predication of any kind, and that there can be no Form of Unity comparable to the other Forms. Unity, however, is not a non-significant abstraction, as Peck has suggested, but an element that must be present in all that is real".\textsuperscript{107} The forms express the necessary unity inherent in the determination of the ideal object of definition.\textsuperscript{108} Further, the forms are realities whose existence is independent of their being thought by the soul. In the \textit{Parmenides} we learn that the forms are not the thoughts of soul: that is to say, they are not the product of soul's activity.\textsuperscript{109} This distinction between soul activity and the form is maintained by Plotinus for whom form should be identified with the Intellect, the living spirit. Armstrong explains:

\begin{quote}
We are not investigating the origins and background of the Middle Platonist (and Christian Platonist) doctrine that the Ideas are the thoughts of God.... But I think that Plotinian scholars would generally agree that it would be an inadequate and unsatisfactory description of this relation to say that for Plotinus the Ideas are the thoughts of Intellect. If we are to summarise his doctrine more or less in his own language and according to his own mind we must say rather 'The Ideas are Intellect and Intellect is the Ideas' or 'Real Being is Ideas and Intellect; they are one reality described from different points of view.'\textsuperscript{110}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{107} John Rist, \textit{Eros and Psyche Studies in Plato, Plotinus, and Origen}, Phoenix supplementary volume VI (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964) 52. And Moreau, \textit{Aristote et son école}: "Dire que les Idées sont réelles et que les choses sensibles, dénomnées d'après elles, n'existent que par elles, c'est dire...que le objets ne se constituent parmi la confusion des phénomènes que par l'intervention des concepts, des déterminations intellectuelles" 30.

\textsuperscript{108} See also \textit{V, I[10], 7.25-26: στάσις δὲ τοῖς νοητοῖς ὀρισμοῖς καὶ μορφῆ...}

\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Parmenides} 132b - c.

\textsuperscript{110} A.H. Armstrong, "The Background of the Doctrine That the Intelligibles are not outside the Intellect," \textit{Les sources de Plotin, Entretiens sur l'Antiquité Classique V} (Genève: Fondation Hardt, 1960) 395. And Trouillard, \textit{La procession plotinienne}: "L'intelligible n'appartient pas à l'Un, mais aux esprits dérivés de l'Un. ...Les idées procèdent comme les esprits, car elles impliquent une pluralité et une diffusion qui les écartent de la simplicité absolue, et leur formation au sein des termes produits est identique à la genèse de la spiritualité" 40.
The Intelect is prior to the soul and, as such, does not depend on the soul’s activity for its existence; meanwhile, its epistemological role as definition (ὁρισμός) constitutes the Intellect as the separate and determinate object of soul.  

The Platonic doctrine of soul’s immortality and separate transcendent form does not, however, lend a complete intelligence to the term ‘χωρίστημα’ for in Plotinus’ philosophy all souls are immortal and have the forms as their determinate object. To seek further guidance we now turn to the Aristotelian doctrine of separate intellect. This doctrine teaches that there is an intellect whose nature does not depend upon the living body for its existence. We read:

Since in every class of objects, just as in the whole of nature, there is something which is their matter, i.e., which is potentially all the individuals, and something else which is their cause or agent in that it makes them all -- the two being related as an art to its material -- these distinct elements must be present in the soul also. Mind in the passive sense is such because it becomes all things, but mind has another aspect in that it makes all things; this is a kind of positive state like light; for in a sense light makes potential into actual colours. Mind in this sense is separable, impassive and unmixed, since it is essentially an actuality; for the agent is always superior to the patient, and the originating cause to the matter (De Anima III,5,430a10 - 20).  

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111 That is to say, the Neoplatonic whole prior to the parts. For background, see Lloyd. The Anatomy of Neoplatonism p.67 note 3 on the triad of wholes, “before the parts (or many), of the parts (or many), in the part”.


113 Aristotle, On the Soul (De Anima). Ἐπεὶ δ' ὅπερ ἐν ἀπάσῃ τῇ φύσει ἐστὶ τι τὸ μὲν ὑλή ἐκάστῳ γένεσι (τούτῳ δὲ ὁ πάντα δυνάμει ἕκειν), ἔτερον δὲ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικόν, τῷ ποιεῖν πάντα, οἷον ἡ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ὑλήν πέποιθειν ἀνάγικη καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχειν ταύτας τὰς διαφορὰς. Καὶ ἐστὶ ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος οὐς τῷ πάντα γινεῖται ὃ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὡς ἔχει τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς. τρόπον γὰρ τινα καὶ τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει ὀντα χρωμάτα ἐνεργεία. καὶ οὕτως ὁ οὐς χωριστός καὶ ἀπαθής καὶ ἁμίμης τῇ υστίᾳ ὑών ἐνεργεία. αἱ γὰρ τιμιώτεροι τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ πάχους καὶ ἡ ἀρχή τῆς υλῆς. We change the translation of ἐνεργεία from ‘activity’ to ‘actuality’. Both are correct but the latter conforms to our usage, most especially, the text on the acts and passions of the soul read in V,1[10],3.
The pair matter - form used to explain the physical compound is also applied to the nature of soul. Taylor explains: "Since the mind grows and develops, it comes under the class of things which have a 'source of motion internal to themselves,' and psychology is therefore, for Aristotle, a branch of Physics". Now the pair matter - form is akin to the pair potentiality - actuality introduced in the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' wherein was learned the difference between soul which looks to the prior, the Intellect, and soul which looks to the sequent, sensible reality: soul's vision is in act consequent to the priority of its object, Intellect. The present text upon divine soul introduces a further element: soul -- the intrinsic act of being -- is divine consequent to its nature as a separate existence. Wolters explains: "Next to 'pure', the most frequent epithet of the higher Soul in this treatise is 'separate.' It expresses the same idea of detachment from matter, so that Bréhier is not wrong to translate freely 'séparée de la matière'". We suggest that the text on the nature of divine soul as a separate existence sets forth a new series of considerations necessary for intellection vision: it is the statement of the a priori nature of knowledge based on the soul's essence as separate from matter (και ἀμέτοχον ὑλῆς ὀφθαλμ). In so doing, we shall obtain the grounds for knowledge by cause, that is, by what is prior.

2B: Divine Soul and a priori knowledge

This attention paid by Plotinus to the nature of soul as separate form is not new and may be found already fully developed in the middle treatise entitled 'On Potentiality and Actuality'. We read: "...all then is actualization there, everything is an Actuality, for

114 Taylor 75.

115 Wolters 68. On the soul's being a separate existence, see Hadot Traité 50: "A l'intérieur de ces ordres ontologiques, la moindre distinction réelle est elle-même essence et substance" 24.

116 See Moreau, Aristote et son école: "Or, s'il est vain et absurde, comme le prétend Aristote, de réaliser l'universel en dehors des choses singulières, il ne l'est pas d'admettre le caractère a priori de la relation,... l'antériorité de la détermination intellectuelle aux objets sensibles constitués par elle" 30. Also D.W. Hamlyn, "A Priori and A Posteriori," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1967. "According to Aristotle, A is prior to B in nature if and only if B could not exist without A; A is prior to B in knowledge if and only if we cannot know B without knowing A. It is possible for these two senses of 'prior' to have an application in common:... It follows that to know something from what is prior is to know what is, in some sense, its cause" 140. Knowledge of the soul's prior, Intellect fulfills both of these senses: Intellect is prior in nature and in science.
everything is a Life, and all Place there is the Place of Life, the true principle and source of soul and of the Intellect" (II,5[25],3,38-40).\textsuperscript{117} Soul like the Intellect has its source in life (ζωαί) and actuality (ἐνέργεια); and indeed is a form (ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ εἶδος ὁν 3,13-14). Now this determination of soul is important to the extent that it explains the causality necessary to have knowledge of the forms, that is, a priori knowledge. To begin, it must be remembered that Plotinian philosophy teaches an hierarchical order of being, that is, an order based on the principle of priority and posteriority; every member of a series exists in accordance with its pre-eminence, the result being that any given member of a series is causally independent of the sequent and this result obtains based on the Neoplatonic rule which states that the form received is altered by the recipient. As such, the prior member of a series remains unchanged and independent of its sequent. Meanwhile, every member of a series depends upon the first for its entire explanation and being.\textsuperscript{118} Subsequently, mention is made of the principle and source of soul (ἀρχὴ καὶ πηγὴ). For Plotinus, soul is both the place of forms and a form; that is to say, it is both the first term of a series and common to all members of a series. Lloyd explains:

The paradigm case of what I call a P-series is the number series, and what was apparently common to all its members was the unit or monad. But this is also the first term of the series. If therefore it were a genuine or generic universal like animal there would be a contradiction like the contradiction of having animal both what is common to all kinds of animal and one of the kinds of animals themselves. Aristotle believed that some apparent cases of genus and species

\textsuperscript{117} καὶ ἐνέργεια ἄρα καὶ ἐνέργεια τὰ πάντα καὶ ζωαί τὰ πάντα καὶ ὁ τόπος ὁ ἐκεῖ τόπος ἐστὶ ζωής καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ πηγὴ ἀληθοὺς ψυχῆς τε καὶ νοῡ. McKenna reads, "...in the true sense the ground and Spring of Soul and of the Intellectual Principle". See also V.1[10],7-8, on the divine nature of soul and Intellect.

\textsuperscript{118} See O'Meara: "Soulignons tout d'abord le genre d'ordre hiérarchique qu'exprime cette relation d'antériorité-postériorité: chaque terme possède, par rapport à ceux qui le suivent et le supposent, un statut (l'indépendance causale) qui ne se trouve totalement que dans le premier terme, fondement causal de tous" 13. Also Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism 79. On the alteration of the form by the recipient, i.e., its species, we might say rather that the form per se remains unchanged but that its descended image is altered. Lloyd seems to imply such in the following precision: "According to Plotinus, the first, or quasi-genus, (1), is a whole which is prior to its parts, (2) 'remains' unaffected by any 'procession' of the genus and (3) is the 'power', the δύναμις of its species. But it is also, i.e. as a standard genus, (1) a whole which is in the parts and (2) potentially, δυνάμει, the species" 81.
were just such quasi-genera because they formed P-series: for instance good, soul, constitution.

Platonists had plausible and familiar reasons for believing that all genera were quasi-genera in this sense, although the extent to which they did so is not clear. The genus was for them a whole which was prior to its parts; and it was also in some way a member of whatever class it is the class concept of ('Is there anything more beautiful than beauty itself?').

Now soul is a 'P-series', that is, a reality whose nature is to be prior to the parts and common to each of its parts. We can say that the causality of soul effects the unity of the many parts, the species, in order to know the generic being. This result obtains because of Plotinus' understanding of the nature of genus and species. In the treatise entitled 'On the Kinds of Being II' we read that the generation of species entails the addition of specific differences to the generic being: these differences come from the other genera, for example, rest and movement. This is the standard explanation of the logician. But Plotinus then proceeds to qualify the genus in metaphysical terms: against the Aristotelian position, he argues that the genus is not a mere predicate (κατηγορούμενον) of the species, that is to say, it is not the mere potentiality of a species; rather, it exists independently, for its nature is to be pure of admixture (καθαρόν καὶ ὑπάρχην). His Platonism remains intact but what is especially interesting to note is the explanation given for the manner in which the genus is both (αμα) in the species and pure of the species; this explanation relies on the distinction of act and potentiality introduced to situate soul as separate form. Plotinus affirms that the genus is in act: as such, it is the power of its sequents, the species. Meanwhile, the species are each of themselves in act and are the genus in potentiality.

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120 See VI.2 [43], 19, 3-12.

121 See VI.2[43],19,13-17. Also Aristotle, Metaphysics I-IX, VII.12,1038a5 - 9.εἰ οὖν τὸ γένος ἀπλῶς μὴ ἔστι παρά τὰ ὠς γένους εἴδη, ἥ εἰ ἐστὶ μὲν ὑδὲν ὡς ἡ ἐκείν... 

122 VI.2[43],20,4-7. πᾶσα μὲν οὐδὲν τῶν ἐν μέρει δύναμις πάντων, ἐκαστοῦ δὲ ἐνεργεία ἐκείνο, καὶ δυνάμεις δὲ πάντα, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς καθόλου ὡσαύτως.
and species is hereby reversed: it is the genus which is always in act while the species is in act per se but in potentiality with regard to its prior. This result holds, for together with its nature to be the ideal object of definition, form has the causal power to realize the definition in the particular.\textsuperscript{123} We can say that divine soul has a priori knowledge insofar as it is the image of Intellect, that is, it contains the subordinate species in act.\textsuperscript{124}

We now go on to situate the application of soul’s nature as a separate form in the context of Plotinian dialectics. This position is clearly stated in the treatise entitled ‘On the Kinds of Being II’ wherein Plotinus explains the ascending and descending movement of soul. We read: “Perhaps, however, we must not even suppose this unity (of Being) to be in any sense the cause of other things, these being rather its parts or elements.... and we, displaying what we call its parts, consider them each as a unity and make them into ‘genera’, unaware of our failure to see the whole at once. We set them forth in parts, and conversely we combine these parts together, being unable to restrain for long their natural tendency to themselves” (VI.2[43],3.20-30).\textsuperscript{125} This is the act of λογισμὸς whose role is to divide the unity of the Intellect into many parts.\textsuperscript{126} Further, it is a reference to the Platonic method of division and

\textsuperscript{123} See Moreau, Aristote et son école: “L’Idée platonicienne n’est donc pas un genre abstrait; elle est la relation qui, posée par l’esprit, permet d’échapper à l’ambiguïté du sensible, de le déterminer objectivement” 29. On form as actuality, see V.3[49],5 and V.9[5],8.

\textsuperscript{124} Lloyd provides an interesting example. “The order can be accounted for by the order of value possessed independently by the differentiae. For example, several quasi-genera or diacosms, such as soul or intellect, divide conventionally into divine, angelic, and daemonic. These can be represented as the first division of a standard genus, that is, as the first line of coordinate species. But in fact they form a P-series in which a divine soul is more of a soul and a divine intellect more of an intellect than a daemonic soul or intellect, the angelic being intermediate instances” in The Anatomy of Neoplatonism 79-80.

\textsuperscript{125} ὅλος δὲ ἰδὼς οὐδὲ τὸ ἐν φατέον αἴτιον τοῖς ἄλλοις εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽ οίον μὲν αὐτοῦ καὶ οίου στοιχεία αὐτοῦ...ποιεῖν τὸ ἐν μὴ ἐν εἶναι, ἡμᾶς τε οίου μοίρας αὐτοῦ προφέροντας τάς ἐν ἐκάστοτε ὀρθῶς καὶ γένος λέγειν ἀγίουσιν ὅτι μὴ ὅλου ἀμα εἰδομεν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μέρος προφέροντες τάς σωματίζοις οὐ δυνάμειν ἐπί πολūν χρόνου αὐτά κατέχειν σπεύδοντα πρὸς αὐτά. We change MacKenna in the following: “We display it, then, in parts, though, unable to restrain for long their natural tendency to coalesce, we bring these parts together again...”. Our changes follow more closely the text.

\textsuperscript{126} See Heiser: “What is distinctive of reasoning is that it considers ‘one thing after another’ (V.1[10],4,20-21), that is, it considers the intelligible world part by part rather than in synoptic vision” 38. As such, the setting forth in parts explained in VI.2[42],3.20-30 entails the act of λογισμὸς, the derived act of soul.
composition taught in The Sophist. We learn therein that dialectics has for its special object the
genera or greatest kinds of being, the attainment of their knowledge being the effect of
division. More especially, the Neoplatonists regarded division as a kind of deduction an
example of which is the deduction of the relations of soul to itself, the per se properties, and the
relations of soul to others, the relation properly spoken of. As such, the a priori proof rests
upon a set of premisses -- conditions -- whose validity relies upon the exhaustiveness of
division. In this respect, Platonic dialectics represents a method of set theory reasoning. From
The Sophist, we learn that there is a two-fold division of production, one divine and one
human: subsequently, we learn of a second division of production, one original, one images:
and so forth. Several groups of objects receive definition in virtue of their quantification,
that is, in virtue of their application to some or all forms of production. The relationship of the
divisions is a priori: to take a simple example, the original production of a human cannot also
be the original production of divine nature; the one necessarily excludes the other. This
procedure may be distinguished from the Aristotelian syllogistic whose premisses derive from
sense perception, and, as such, are a posteriori.

As such, we are not in entire agreement with Heiser's view of predicative knowledge.

Arguing against the suggestion by Lloyd about thinking the generic being simply, Heiser states:

127 See Lafrance: "Ainsi, la dialectique, selon le Sophiste, n'opère pas seulement sur des
Formes, mais sur des Formes-Genres, et cela fait toute la différence avec la dialectique selon la
République et le Phèdre" 312-313.

128 Plato, The Sophist 264 - 268. And Rabel Abelson, "Definition", Encyclopedia of
Philosophy 1972 ed. "As the painter looks to his model and the tailor to his pattern, the
philosopher can look to the forms for the specifications that identify things as instances of one
class rather than another, as well as for exact information about the properties of that class" 315.
It is the logic of class algebra. Also Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism pp.12-17.

129 See Charles Parsons, "Mathematics, Foundations of", The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
1972 ed. "This is taken to mean that certain totalities of mathematical objects are well defined,
in the sense that propositions defined by quantification over them have definite truth-values.
Thus, there is a direct connection between platonism and the law of excluded middle, which
gives rise to some of platonism's differences with constructivism. ...Various degrees of
platonism can be described according to what totalities they admit and whether they treat these
totalities as themselves mathematical objects. These degrees can be expressed by the
acceptance of set-theoretic existence axioms of differing degrees of strength" 201.
Neoplatonism, it may be said, followed this advice to the fullest degree.
"Rejoining the parts seems to be Plotinus' way of describing predication -- or 'weaving the
Forms together,' to use Plato's phrase (Sophist 260A). We cannot rest with an isolated
subject; we must reunite it with its predicate. Or rather, since we ourselves are responsible for
its original isolation, we must 'let it go back'".130 This is a reference to the text of
VI.2[43].7.16-20 read above. Rather than a description of predication, rejoining the parts
would seem to be Plotinus' way of describing analysis, that is, the discovery of simple
elements. We must remember that both the undescended soul as well as the divine soul have
for their proper object the Intellect, each form being a unity or whole which is prior to the parts.
Now the form is undescended, that is to say, it remains unaltered and hence it should be
possible to think it alone, that is, unaltered by a difference. This would seem to be Lloyd's
point when he claims that we can think "...beauty, without thinking something about beauty,
say that beauty is truth".131 Lexical considerations lend support to this view. We have been
given to understand that the term 'simply' (ἀπλωσ) qualifies divine soul, that is, soul which
always looks to the Intellect and which is pure. Thus it is logical to conclude that divine soul
accedes to a knowledge of generic being insofar as its thought is simple and its object is simple;
for instance, to think beauty simply. Lloyd explains:

These commentators display their Platonism by recognizing and approving a
species of 'analysis' outside deductive logic. It was the 'ascent' from the
sensible to the intelligible forms: its pre-eminent example was to be found in the
Symposium.... It was simply put alongside the application in syllogistic and
other sciences as 'in philosophy': there was the generic concept of analysis as
finding the simple components of a compound, and there were its species in the
sciences (ib..p.5). For of course the ascent from sensible universals was
nothing in Neoplatonic metaphysics if it was not an ascent from the compound
to the simple.132

130 Heiser 39.

131 Anthony Lloyd, "Non-discursive Thought -- An Enigma of Greek Philosophy",

The form is undescended and hence simple. The judgement of Heiser appears to ignore the hierarchical order of Neoplatonism and the especial object of divine soul, the Intellect.

Fourth, the soul's nature as a separate form may be placed in the historical context of Platonism. Now the early Platonists Speusippus and Xenocrates appear to have accepted the identification of divine soul -- soul which is purest and intellective -- with mathematical objects, the former with the objects of geometry and the latter with the objects of arithmetic. Their teaching bears on the doctrine of the mathematical soul, an intermediary reality between the Intellect and the world. More generally, early Platonism witnessed a convergence of two elements of Plato's teaching which the master may or may not have so intended, the thinking-moving principle and the form principle of reality. Armstrong explains:

The difference between an identification of intermediate intelligent soul with intermediate mathematical and an identification of Intellect, sharply distinguished from soul, with the ultimate intelligibles, the Platonic Forms, is much too great to make it possible to regard one as derived from the other. But it does seem important to notice, when we are considering the background of Plotinus's doctrine, that a view of reality which simply identifies the thinking-and-moving principle with what we should normally consider the objects of its thought and the patterns of its activity, appears to be established in the Platonic tradition well before, as I think, we find any evidence for the view of reality which makes the objects of thinking and the norms of intelligent activity eternal thoughts in a divine mind.

133 Armstrong, "The Background..." 396-97.

134 Armstrong, "The Background..." 398. And Aristotle, On the Soul III,4,430a3 - 7. ἐτι μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀτεῦς τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ τὸ νοοῦ καὶ τὸ νοομειον ἢ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη ἡ θεωρητικὴ καὶ τὸ ὀτώς ἐπιστετῶν τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν. Also O'Meara: "...les Idées sont les modèles qui inspirent la formation du monde, certes, mais elles se trouvent dans la pensée de celui qui se charge de cette formation, c'est-à-dire le Démiurge. On a affaire ici, du moins en ce qui concerne la façon d'exprimer cette notion chez certains platoniciens, à une analyse de la fabrication artisanale formulée en premier lieu par Aristote: l'artisan réalise dans la matière la forme qu'il retient dans sa pensée" 26.
We mention their thought for it situates the nature of soul and a priori knowledge with respect to the notion of movement (κίνησις). Now the status of movement within the order of true being is a subject of some dispute: in several treatises, Plotinus is wont to affirm the immutability and eternity of the Intellect and soul; contrariwise, in several other treatises Plotinus speaks of a movement and development within real being. Reasons of space forbid us from examining the subject in detail; instead, we draw attention to the role of movement within generic being. In the treatise entitled 'On the Kinds of Being II' we learn that movement is generic being understood under the aspect of actuality. We read: "Being, then containing many species, is but one genus. Motion, however, is to be classed as neither a subordinate nor a superordinate of Being but as its concomitant; for we have not found Being serving as substrate to Motion. Motion is Being's Act; neither is separated from the other except in thought; the two natures are one; for Being is inevitably actual, not potential" (VI.2[43].7.16-20). Soul is a substantial existence, a member of true being; in particular, divine soul is pure soul and represents the aspect of every soul substance to be eternally act. Now the perfection of soul has the authority of Plato and ontological reflection: it is in the famous passage of The Sophist wherein is stated the nature of the perfectly real to include movement, life, soul, and thought; else it would be lacking in perfection. We suggest that the identification of the thinking-moving principle with the form-principle advanced by early Platonism clarifies a priori knowledge upon grounds of actuality. The soul knows generic

135 A.H. Armstrong, "Eternity, Life and Movement in Plotinus' Accounts of Noûs," Le Néoplatonisme Colloque de Royaumont 1969 (Paris: CNRS, 1977). "But there are other passages in which the vital importance of the idea of static and unchanging life for Plotinus is illustrated, not by a contrast between Intellect and Soul, but by raising Soul to the unchanging level, III.6[26]3.22ff., cp.4.34ff. (here the object is to exclude anything like physical movement or change from soul or form); VI.4[22]5.5-8 (cosmic soul does not flow because it has nowhere to flow to -- again a sort of physical movement and change is excluded). In general, this treatise (VI.4-5[22-23]) greatly emphasizes the static, unchanging character of real being" 68-69.

136 οὕτως μὲν δὴ εἰδὴ πολλὰ καὶ γένος· κίνησις δὲ οὔτε ὑπὸ τὸ οὐν τακτεά οὔτε εἰπὶ τῷ ὑπὲρ, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦ οὕτως, ευρεθεία ἐν αὐτῷ οὐχ ὡς ἐν ὑποκειόμενῳ; ἐνεργείᾳ γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐδέτερῳ ἀνευ τοῦ ἐτέρου ἢ ἐπινοίᾳ, καὶ οἷ τοῦ φύσεις μία· καὶ γαρ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ οὐν, οὐ δυνάμει.

137 Plato The Sophist 248e - 249a. ὡς ἀληθῶς κίνησιν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ψυχήν καὶ φρόνησιν...τῷ παντελῶς οὕτως οὐν μη παρείναι...
being in the actuality of soul's existence; it is the intrinsic act of being, the thinking-moving principle, the self-constitution of the soul as sequent. Again, the soul knows generic being in the actuality of the form; form is true being whose act is the determination of a pattern of sequents, that is, παράδειγμα. In the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' we learned that the seeing of the soul's prior, Intellect, constitutes the only proper acts of the soul by virtue of their perfection. The late treatise entitled 'On the Kinds of Being II' confirms this thought based on a consideration of movement and actuality.

Interestingly this identification of the thinking-moving principle with the form principle meets with objection from Rist. In reference to the doctrine that the intelligibles are not outside the Intellect, Rist complains that Plotinus misunderstood the text of The Sophist to mean that the Platonic forms are active powers like soul. He states:

This theory, however, can only be maintained as Platonic by what Professor Grube describes as 'a misunderstanding of 248D - 249B and of a passage from the Philebus' (23C - 27C). Grube's analysis makes it clear that Plato teaches that the real cannot be limited to what is immobile. Therefore either the Ideas are active powers, or souls are active realities distinct from Ideas. Plato prefers the second alternative. This passage in the Sophist has caused interpreters a good deal of concern, and Grube has had to cut away many extraordinary interpretations to clarify its meaning. Plotinus certainly understood it wrongly as teaching that the Forms possess intellection and that absolute immobility must therefore be attributed to something other than the Forms, in fact to the One which is beyond intellection.138

We put aside the question of self-intellection with regard to the forms, turning instead our attention to the relation of soul and the forms together with Rist's claim that Plotinus misunderstood the meaning of Plato. Now as a defense of Plotinus entails the explanation of soul and form, we understand that such explanation will resolve both difficulties at once. First,  

138 Rist, Eros and Psyche 42.
it has been observed that Plotinus accepts a common source (πνεύμα) of soul and the Intellect or forms; this source is the place of life which is no doubt identical with the perfectly real of The Sophist wherein life and movement are named qualities of perfection. We submit that unlike the modern commentators who understand the text of The Sophist to mean the attribution of life and movement to either soul or the forms, that is, disjunctively, Plotinus on the other hand understands the text to apply to each of both, that is, distributively. In addition to The Sophist, Plotinus can make appeal to the Phaedo wherein Plato defines form to be true existence (τὸ ὄν) and places soul in the company of form (συγγενῆς οὐσα αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ μετ᾽ ἐκείνου). 139

Such being the case, to understand the nature of divine soul as akin to the forms, that is to say, to share in all the perfections of true being, is fully supported by the Platonic dialogues. Hence we are left unconvinced by Grube's interpretation of the texts to mean a disjunction of soul or form having the active power.

Rist mentions these passages but objects that the principle of movement cannot be attributed to the forms since it is the special quality of soul. 140 This objection is, however, not entirely to the point for the forms, if they do not possess life and movement in the biological sense of the term, are nevertheless the causes of being. Schroeder explains: "The contemporary student of Plato will tell us that (if we entertain the Platonic theory of Forms at all) the Platonic Form is posited as cause or explanation. Ontologically it is the cause of being, epistemologically it is the cause of knowledge, and ethically it is the guarantee of right action". 141 Now it is common knowledge that Plato posits movement as one of the genera, that is, the greatest kinds of being. 142 If such is the case then Plotinus is not wrong to follow

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139 Plato, Phaedo 78d: αὐτὸ τὸ ἰσοῦν, αὐτὴ τὸ καλὸν, αὐτὸ ἐκαστὸν ὁ ἐστὶν, τὸ ὄν τίοι ὁ ποτε μεταβολῆν καὶ ἑρμηνεῖσθαι ἥ ἀεὶ αὐτῶν ἐκαστοῖν ὁ ἐστι. μοιοεἰδὲς ὦν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὐτὸ, ὁσαύτως κατὰ ταύτα ἔχει καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδαιμή ὀδαμίδες ἀλλοιωθον εἰνδεχεσθαι καὶ 79d: ὅταν δὲ γε αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὐτὴν σκοπην ἐκεῖσθαι εἰς τὸ καθαρὸν τε καὶ ἀεὶ ὧν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὁσαύτως ἔχον, καὶ ὡς συγγενῆς οὐσα αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ μετ᾽ ἐκείνου τε γίγνεται...

140 Rist, Eros and Psyche 41.

141 Schroeder, Form and Transformation 4.

142 The convergence of the thinking-moving principle with the form principle in Early Platonism may be read in concert with the problem of the communication of forms. See
the Platonic tradition and the identification of the thinking-moving principle with the form principle for reasons of science: the actuality of the form principle is necessarily presupposed by the actuality of soul in a priori knowledge.

Second, it is ill-advised to assume that in attributing active power to the form and to soul Plotinus did so identically, that is, synonymously: to say that form is an active power and that soul is an active power is not necessarily to say the same of each. Lloyd explains:

In Aristotelian logic the standard genus is predicated 'synonymously' of all its species, that is, with the same name and the same definition or meaning. According to some modern idealists this is unreasonable: for the species, say of birds, is animal modified by the form of being able to fly while the species of fishes is animal modified by being able to live in water, with the result that 'animal' no longer has the same meaning when it is attributed even to co-ordinate species. In the cases of super-ordinate and subordinate species this picture is clearly going to fit the Neoplatonic frame of procession and causation: for in this frame forms are not transmitted identically from agent to effect, as they are for Aristotle, but are altered qualitatively when received by the effect.

Now it is reasonably clear that form and soul are two species of the genus substantial being.

We can say that the species of forms is substantial being modified by the activity of the paradigmatic function while the species of souls is substantial being modified by the activity of

Lafrance: "La notion de communication des Forms-Genres répond au problème de la conciliation de l'un et du multiple dans le monde intelligible et fonde ainsi la possibilité de la prédication" 410. Movement or the actuality of generic being makes possible the communication of forms, and as such, is a necessary condition of science.

143 Leonard Linsky, "Synonymity", The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1972 ed. "The suggestion is that the synonymity of two linguistic forms consists simply in their interchangeability in all contexts without change of truth-value -- interchangeability, in Leibniz' phrase, *salva veritate*" 54. See also Avrum Stroll, "Identity", The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1972 ed. in which this suggestion is appraised in terms of Frege's theory of meaning and the extensional context of interchangeability.

144 Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism 77.
seminal reasons; the genus 'substantial being' changes meaning consequent to its application to one or more species. Evidence of this thought may be found in the treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' wherein Plotinus teaches that soul is both continuous with and different from the Intellect: "The Intellect, then, enhances the divine quality of soul as father and as immanent presence; nothing separates them but the fact that they are not one and the same; however there is succession, as to the recipient there stands the form. And this recipient, matter to the Intellect, is beautiful, and intelligent, and simple like the Intellect" (V.1[10],3,20-23). To be other than Intellect and yet not separate states the lack of synonymity in the Plotinian procession. Moreover, the text suggests that Plotinus admits the coincidence of properties between soul and the Intellect while denying the identity of substance. This position may be likened to the modern logic of Leibniz and the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. We read: "In the Discourse on Metaphysics (IX) he stated it as follows: 'It is not true that two substances may be exactly alike and differ only numerically, solo numero,' while in the Monadology (9) he wrote, 'It is necessary, indeed, that each monad be different from every other. For there are none in nature two beings exactly alike and in which it is not possible to find an internal difference, or one founded upon an intrinsic quality (dénomination)." Hence it may arrive to both the form and soul to have a property in common while yet doing so differently. For a thinker like Plotinus, the relation of meaning to referent, of properties to substance, changes according to the principle of priority and posteriority. Lloyd explains: "But the denial of a κοινόν, of whatever ontological status, is equivalent to the denial of a 'synonymous' generic predicate.... On the other hand,... it was not to be inferred that a quasi-genus was said equivocally of the species (or of other series which derived from them): it was

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145 οὐδὲν γάρ μεταξύ ἡ τὸ ἑτέρος εἶναι, ὡς ἐφεξῆς μέντοι καὶ ὡς τὸ δεχόμενον. το ἀπλῆ καὶ ἡ ὑποκείμενη ὑπότις καὶ ἀπλῆ. We change McKenna who reads: "In two ways, then, the Intellectual-Principle enhances the divine quality of the Soul, as father and as immanent presence; nothing separates them but the fact that they are not one and the same, that there is succession, that over against a recipient there stands the Ideal-Form received; but this recipient, Matter to the Supreme Intelligence, is also noble as being at once informed by divine intellect and uncompounded." We retain the term 'simple' for ἀπλη and read καὶ successively as the text suggests.

an instance of Aristotle's tertium quid between the synonymous and the homonymous, namely the ab uno (ἐφ' ἐν ὅς) or ad unum (πρὸς ἔν). Unlike Rist's complaint, we understand neither a confusion of form and soul nor the synonymous attribution of properties to substance in Plotinian philosophy.

In this section of the thesis we have examined the epistemological perfection of soul as possessing a priori knowledge. This examination is required by virtue of the text on the reason that is in act read in the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' (V.1.[10].3). As explanation, we make mention of the Platonic doctrine of division -- the a priori method of set theoretic reasoning -- and its application to generic being. In concert with the Plotinian teaching on the priority of genus upon species, this method explains the soul's necessary knowledge of the subordinate species in act. It will be useful to bear in mind these considerations on divine soul’s knowledge by means of formal cause when we turn to study mixed soul. Meanwhile we finish the section with a defense of the Plotinian position on the non-synonymous attribution of predicates to real being. This doctrine, standard amongst the Neoplatonists, admits the difference between form-substance and soul-substance while yet allowing for degrees of participation between them.

Divine soul is a priori knowledge for its nature is to be separate ($\chi\omega\rho\iota\sigma\tau\eta\nu\ o\upsilon\sigma\alpha\upsilon\nu$) like Intellect and the transcendent forms. Now this similarity between the divine soul of Plotinus and the separate intellect of Aristotle has also been explained in terms of the unmixed (δΕικτων) nature of divine soul. In his commentary to the treatise, Hadot clarifies this thought by reference to the metaphysical rule which states that only separate realities are self-subsistent (ἐφ’ ἐαυτής μερισμὸν). Let us, therefore, now turn to study the soul in terms of its nature as a substantial existence. In this way, we shall accede to an understanding of the metaphysical factors which ground the soul's scientific knowledge, that is, the science which decides by the rules and measures within itself. First, some terminological considerations will help our understanding of divine soul as a separate substance. In the Lexicon Plotinianum we read that the verb 'χωρίζειν' means to separate, to divide. Similarly, the Index Aristotelicus explains that 'χωρίζειν' means to distinguish by reason; as well, it states the truth

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148 Hadot, Traité 50: "Etant 'sans mélange', elle est donc vraiment divine et non démonique, selon le principe admet tout au long de ce traité, selon lequel n'est divin que ce qui est sans mélange (6.39-45), et elle est, à cause de cette pureté, une réalité subsistante, séparée, une substance (2.23-24). Nous rencontrons ici encore un des thèmes fondamentaux du traité: l'opposition entre ce qui subsiste en soi, en sa propre substance, et ce qui ne subsiste que dans un sujet différent de lui (7.47-50). Pour désigner ce caractère de l'âme divine, Plotin emploie aussi le mot chôristos. Ce mot, chez Plotin, signifie le fait d'être séparé du corps ou de la matière, à propos de l'âme... cet emploi est peut-être alors un souvenir d'Aristote, De anima 430 a 17. Chôristos signifie dans ce cas à la fois 'séparé' de la matière et 'subsistant en soi'... et transcendant" (173-4). And again, "Comme le remarque A.H. Armstrong (note à 49 (V.3), 3.46), le term 'séparé' vient d'Aristote (De anima, 430 a 17) et il est à l'origine de la doctrine de l'"Intellect Agent", identifiée par Alexandre d'Aphrodise avec l'Intellect divin d'Aristote, cause première et premier moteur (Alexandre, De anima, p.89, 22-23 Burns), et identifiée par Plotin à l'Esprit divin" (191).

149 On the per se nature of substantial existence, see Jacques Maritain, Éléments de Philosophie, introduction générale à la philosophie, 23rd ed. (Paris: Librairie Pierre Tequi, 1951). "Comment définir le sujet d'action par rapport à l'existence? Il existe à lui tout seul ou par ses propres moyens, non pas en ce sens qu'il n'aurait pas besoin de cause..., mais en ce sens qu'il se suffit à lui-même pour être posé hors du néant par les causes de l'être; considéré à part il a en lui ou dans sa propre nature tout ce qu'il faut pour recevoir l'existence: disons en ce sens-là que c'est un être existant par lui-même (per se) ou à raison de lui-même, à raison de sa propre nature, ens per se existens 156. Divine soul exists unto itself (ἐφ’ ἐαυτής), that is to say, 'dans sa propre nature'.

150 Lexicon Plotinianum 1122-1123.
of a reality by what is intrinsic to its nature. \textsuperscript{151} Meanwhile from Wolters, we learn that the term 'χωριστή' is similar in meaning to the term 'pure' (ἀκήρατος) which itself means to be free from matter: "Plotinus uses three words for 'pure' to describe the higher Soul in the present treatise: ἀκήρατος (here and 3.27), καθαρός (26,27) and ἀμικτος (26). All three bring to expression that the higher Soul is ἀμέτοχος ὑλής (24), i.e. stays clear of association with all things material, unlike the lower Soul. This point is most vividly brought out by the adjective ἀκήρατος: 'undefined,' ...". \textsuperscript{152} Finally, in Aristotle's \textit{On the Soul} we read that the separate intellect is by nature "separable, impassive and unmixed" (χωρίστως καὶ ἀπαθῆς καὶ ἀμίγης), being in substance active (τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὑπὲρ τὸν εὑρημενὸν); furthermore, it is immortal (ἄθανατον) and eternal (ἀἰῶν). These are the evidences which show what it means for divine soul, in virtue of its nature, to be a separate and substantial existence.

3A: Divine Soul and Actuality

Now the doctrine of the separate intellect provides Plotinus with two elements necessary for the exegesis of soul as substance: it affirms the immortality of soul and it specifies the kind of act which belongs to the soul. Concerning the former element, we learn that Aristotle admits the possibility of soul's immortality based on a consideration of the conditions of soul's activity. We read: "In most cases it seems that none of the affections, whether active or passive, can exist apart from the body. This applies to anger, courage, desire and sensation generally, though possibly thinking is an exception. But if this too is a kind of imagination, or at least is dependent upon imagination, even this cannot exist apart from the body. If then any function or affection of the soul is peculiar to it, it can be separated from the body: but if there is nothing peculiar to the soul it cannot be separated". \textsuperscript{153} For Plotinus soul

\textsuperscript{151} Index Aristotelicus, ed. Hermannus Bonitz (Berolini: Georgii Reimeri, 1870) 859-860. "ratione et notione distinguere", and "χωριστῶς ἀπλῶς id dicitur quod suapte natura et per se in re ac veritate est".

\textsuperscript{152} Wolters 66.

\textsuperscript{153} Aristotle, \textit{On the Soul (De Anima)} I.1,403a6 - 13. In particular, εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τῷ τῇ ψυχῆς ἐργῷ, ἔργῳ ἐργαθῶν ἑαυτῷ, ἕναντι ἐν τῷ αὐτῇ χωρίζεσθαι, εἰ δὲ μὴν ἐστὶ τῷ ἑαυτῷ αὐτῆς ὕπω ἐν εἰς χωριστῇ... We draw attention to the term 'ἑαυτῷ' for it serves to situate the text with respect to the 'propers of the soul' in Plotinus (V.1[10],3,16-20).
is immortal by virtue of its nature as a separate form. We must remember that in both the Aristotelian and the Plotinian philosophies, separation from matter implies pure actuality. To think the soul in separateness is therefore to think its essence: it is the element within the soul’s constitution which is both primary and necessary to soul. We can say that actuality identifies the attribute which is intrinsic to soul, thus setting the soul forth as separate from matter.154

Concerning actuality, we learn that Aristotle admits two kinds of act, first act and second act. We read: “Each of these two has capacity, but in a different sense: the former, because the class to which he belongs, i.e., his matter, is of a certain kind, the latter, because he is capable of exercising his knowledge whenever he likes, provided that external causes do not prevent him. But there is a third kind of instructed person -- the man who is already exercising his knowledge; he is in actuality instructed and in the strict sense knows (e.g.) this particular A”.155 The potentiality (δυνατός) which is a kind of matter is mere virtuality. Now Aristotle is here consistent with himself for we have learned that the genus (γένος) as matter is only potential, requiring the determination of form -- a difference -- to become actual; for instance, the form of knowledge.156 There ensues another act, act in the full sense of the term consisting in the present (ηδόν) and entire exercise of thought.157 Taylor explains: “When

154 See Trouillard, La procession plotinienne: "Les raisons sont toutes en chaque âme (V.7.19). Le monde intelligible est ramassé tout entier dans le moindre esprit singulier (III.4.323). L’individualité n’est donc pas la possession exclusive d’une nature, mais le caractère actuel ou actif (ἔνεργεία) (VI.2.2028) d’une structure parmi les autres, la prédominance (ἐπικρατησία) (V.7.28) de telle ou telle raison" 42. It is actuality, rather than this or that reason, which is peculiar to soul as a separate form.

155 Aristotle, On the Soul (De Anima) II.5,417a27 - 30, ἐκατερος δὲ τούτων οὐ τού τινός τρόπον δυνατός ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν ὅτι τὸ γένος τοιοῦτον καὶ ἡ ὕλη, ὁ δ’ ὅτι βουληθεῖς δυνατός θεωρεῖν, ἀλλ’ μὴ τι καλύπτω τῶν ἑξοδεύειν· ὁ δ’ ἡδὴ θεωρῶν ἐνελεχεία ὑπ’ καὶ κυρίως ἐπιστάμειος τόδε τὸ Α

156 See Moreau, Aristote et son école: "Ce qui empêche que le genre ne soit ousia, ce n’est pas proprement son universalité, son extension, par laquelle il déborde la singularité de l’être concret et se trouve dans l’impossibilité de coïncider avec lui; c’est son indétermination. Le genre n’est que la possibilité ambiguë de ses déterminations ultérieures, des différences qui constituèrent les espèces; il n’est pas une ousia, une essence réelle, mais seulement une notion abstraite, un universel, parce qu’il ne suffit pas à constituer une définition; il ne répond qu’incomplètement à la question τι ἐστι, par où l’on demande ce qu’est une chose” 149.

157 See Moreau, Aristote et son école: “Nous savons, en effet, qu’il est des degrés de la puissance et de l’acte. La science est en puissance chez celui qui apprend; elle est en acte chez
Aristotle is speaking most strictly he distinguishes the process by which a Form is realised, which he calls Energeia, from the manifestation of the realised Form, calling the latter Entelechy (literally 'finished' or 'completed' condition). Often, however, he uses the word Energeia more loosely for the actual manifestation of the Form itself, and in this he is followed by the scholastic writers, who render Energeia by actus or actus purus”. 158 We submit that divine soul has the appellation 'pure' insofar as its nature is act in the second sense; it is the act of form which entails both the perfection and self-subsistence of soul in Plotinian philosophy. In the treatise entitled 'On Potentiability and Actuality' (II.5[25],3) we learned that each member of true being is both an act and in act (εἰ ἐνεργεία μόνον ἤ καὶ ἐνέργεια ἐκαστον). We are now able to understand his meaning better: divine soul is an act in consequence of its nature to be a completed form which lacks nothing for its existence. Clarifying the metaphysics of Plotinus, Narbonne explains well this conclusion upon grounds of a difference between being in act -- traditional to Aristotelianism -- and being an act -- new to Neoplatonism and which has for its special object the substance which is self-producing. 159

Further exegetical considerations help to explain Plotinus' views on the separateness of soul. We read that divine soul is "...strong (ἰσχυρόν) in its own right by virtue of its proximity

158 Taylor 49. And Moreau, "L'être et l'essence dans la philosophie d'Aristote": "Mais, après l'analyse qui précède, et si c'est faute de détermination ou de forme que la matière ne peut prétendre au titre de substance,... C'est donc à la forme (ἐἴδος) que convient principalement le nom de substance (ὑστὰρ)" 186.

159 See Narbonne: "...exprimer une distinction en réalité inexistante chez Aristote, celle de l'acte et de l'être en acte. Chez Plotin, les entités intelligibles ne sont pas seulement en acte, dans le sens où elles existeraient toujours déjà éternellement et s'opposeraient aux êtres soumis au devenir qui n'existent qu'en puissance; elles sont également acte, en tant qu'effet ou que cristallisation d'une puissance productrice active qui réside en elles-mêmes et qui s'identifie en fait à elles-mêmes" 30. And again, "Le passage de l'état de repos de cet acte à son état actif n'est plus à proprement parler un passage, un changement opéré grâce à l'intervention d'un élément adventice: c'est une production à partir de soi-même. ...Telle est aussi la doctrine de Plotin pour qui la puissance au second sens est celle qui produit son acte par elle-même (παρ' αὑτής), celle pour qui l'être intelligible tient de lui-même (παρ' αὑτού) d'être éternellement ce qu'il est, puisqu'il possède toujours de lui-même ce qu'il doit posséder" 68-69.
(ἐγγύθεν)..." to the Intellect. Plotinus continues: "He, the Begetter, is capable of holding her on high -- which is why Soul, being kept suspended from Intellect, cannot fall away from it -- much more than the sun can hold forth from itself the light which forms a halo around it and stays closely bound up with it" (III.5[50],2,30-32). 160 Again: "For that pure Soul, too, was Substance, sprung from the activity of the one preceding it, and so alive -- from the activity, that is, of the Substance of true beings,..." (III.5[50],3,3-4). 161 These texts together form his explanation of the soul's substantial existence. From the doctrine of procession, we learned that the generation of a being results from the surfeit of perfection which is the progenitor. Now the treatise 'On Love' fulfills our purpose insofar as it identifies the necessary factors which attend the birth of divine soul. Dodds explains: "Read the second part of the Parmenides as Plotinus read it, with the single eye of faith; do not look for satire on the Megarians or on anybody else; and you will find in the first hypothesis a lucid exposition of the famous 'negative theology,' and in the second (especially if you take it in connexion with the fourth) an interesting sketch of the derivation of a universe from the marriage of unity and existence". 162 Soul is the mediating existence between the second and fourth hypotheses of Parmenides. Plotinus' teaching on soul and its offspring, eros the god or the daimon, continues the metaphor of marriage and begetting observed in Plato and Empedocles.

3B: Plotinus' Criticism of Aristotle's Doctrine of Substance and Act

Plotinus does not, however, only repeat Aristotle. Instead, his understanding of divine soul as a separate and self-subsistent existence is also based on a profound criticism of Aristotle's metaphysics of substance and act. Lloyd explains:

It is often said that he rejected the Aristotelian categories on the grounds that they cannot have the same meaning when they are applied to the intelligible world as they have in the sensible world: but to the extent that this suggests that

160 θει οὐδ᾽ ἢ ἐκπέσοι φυχῇ νοῦ ἐξηρτημένη πολὺ μᾶλλον ἤ ἡλιος ἢν ἔχων ἐς ἑαυτοῦ ὅσοι αὐτοῦ περιλάμπει φῶς τὸ ἐς αὐτοῦ εἰς αὐτοῦ συνηρτημένοι.

161 καὶ γὰρ ἤ πυχὴ ἐκειν ὦσία ἤν γενομένη ἐς ἐνεργείας τῆς πρὸ αὐτῆς (καὶ ζώσι) καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὄντων ὦσίας...

162 E.R.Dodds, "The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic 'One'," The Classical Quarterly 22 (1928) 133-134.
they have at least an analogical application it is misleading. They have no place in the intelligible world. In any case, as he regularly objects in VI.2, they cannot be among 'the first' or 'the first genera', since they are compound, not simple. This flexible notion seems here to mean that they are capable of analysis into subject and attribute. The five greatest kinds of the Sophist are the only simple genera. They do not form a P-series -- otherwise they would not be summa genera -- although each is a P-series. But they form a whole, the name of which is 'substance' or 'being'. They are not attributes of substance/being -- otherwise it would not be simple -- but activities of it. For reasons which we shall see, it follows that each can be described as identical with it and therefore with each other; but the identity is in subject not concept -- Plotinus uses the Aristotelian formula. Extensionally, therefore, there is one summum genus; and as a genus it is not simple in another sense, inasmuch as it contains sub-genera and species, which are the classes of all that is. By assuming this, Plotinus is enabled to make what I have alluded to as the radical criticism of the semantics of substance and attribute.\textsuperscript{163}

Plotinus' disagreement with the Aristotelian model centers upon the notion of attribute. For everyday purposes Plotinus appears willing to admit the Aristotelian distinction of substance and attribute. We read: "The existence of Soul will, we may presume, be at once conceded. But is this existence to be taken as identical with that of the stone? Surely not. Being in the case of the stone is not Being pure and simple, but stone-being"(VI,2[43],5,17-21).\textsuperscript{164} The ordinary objects of discourse employ the method of attribution in order to explain their occurrence. The predicate relation places the objects into kinds thereby setting forth one object as specifically different from an other. Taylor explains: "Science is called on to supply not merely a definition but the definition of the classes it considers, the definition which faithfully

\textsuperscript{163} Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism 86-87.

\textsuperscript{164} εἶναι μὲν γὰρ αὐτῆς τὰς ἀν τὸς συγχωρησειν' ἀρα δὲ ταύτων ὡς εἰ καὶ λίθων ἑλεγεν εἶναι ἢ οὐ ταύτων. ἀλλ' ὅμως κάκει ἐπὶ τοῦ λίθου τὸ εἶναι τῷ λίθῳ ἢν οὐ τὸ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ τὸ λίθῳ εἶναι.
reflects the 'lines of cleavage' in Nature. This is why the Aristotelian view is that a true
definition should always be per genus et differentias. It should 'place' a given class by
mentioning the wider class next above it in the objective hierarchy..."165. Plotinus accepts
the ordinary logic of his day; the grammatical division of a sentence into subject and predicate
makes possible the logical functions of affirmation and denial.166 Rather his disagreement is
metaphysical in nature and carries upon the distinction between essential and accidental
attribution maintained by Aristotle.

Simply stated, for Plotinus the specific difference cannot play the role of form making
determinate generic being. We have read that generic being is the power of the species; it
serves as cause ascribing being to them. Thus it cannot be the case that the difference
determines and perfects the generic being; instead the opposite is true. We read: "Furthermore,
what being will soul have without other components? The being of a stone? No, it is
necessary that the being of soul is from within, a source and principle, or rather this is all that is
the soul" (VI.2[43],6,5-8).167 Now the source of soul is Intellect, its prior. This teaching is
clarified by reference to the relation which exists between a science which is prior (πρό) to the
species (εἰδώλιον).168 We understand this priority to be both logical and metaphysical in nature:
metaphysically. Intellect is prior to the soul for in the order of procession Intellect is closer to

165 Taylor 26.
166 See Newton Garver, "Subject and Predicate," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1972 ed. "In
the realm of grammar, subject and predicate are sentence parts; they are, therefore, words or
groups of words, and their definition and identification is a matter of syntax. In the simplest
case, where the sentence consists of just two words, such as (1) Bats fly, (2) Fraser swims,
the subject is the noun and the predicate is the verb" 33. And "In epistemology the contrast
between subject and predicate is a contrast between that part of a sentence which serves to
identify or designate what is being discussed and that part which serves to describe or
characterize the thing so identified" 33.

167 ἑπεῖτα τὸ εἶναι αὐτὴν τι ἐσται ἀνευ τῶν ἄλλων ἢ λίθος ἢ δεῖ τούτο τὸ εἶναι
αὐτῆς εἰντὸς εἶναι οἰον πηγὴν καὶ ἀρχήν, μᾶλλον δὲ πάντα. ὡσα αὐτῆς MacKenna
reads: "Furthermore, what being will it have when we separate it from its other components?
The being appropriate to 'a source and first-principle', or rather to all that the soul comprises in
its own nature:....".
168 VI.2[43],20,3. ...ὡσπερ ἐπιστήμη πρὸ τῶν ἐν μέρει εἰδώλιον...
the One: logically, Intellect is prior to the soul for it contains all the truths which the species later demonstrate in predication. Lloyd explains:

When he says that the substance of soul must be the source of all that it is, Plotinus means the substance of soul which it already possesses. He cannot mean that the differentia which supplements and qualifies the genus comes from the substance of soul, for the substance of soul ex hypothesi does not exist until the differentia has supplemented and qualified the genus. He means that the substance of soul is not brought into existence by anything supplementing or qualifying the genus. The reader might go on to infer that, unless all notion of genus has been thrown overboard with the notion of differentia as quality, Plotinus must mean the 'source' of particular substance (soul or stone) to be the genus.

Generic being, Intellect, is the source of particular substance for it includes every substance as a part of its constitution. Moreover, Intellect is identical with being itself. Hence we understand Plotinus to mean that Intellect is the source of soul's substantial existence insofar as it is the veritable ground of soul's actuality. For there to be particular substance, the Intellect does not seek perfection from the specific difference, that is, from outside: instead its perfection lies within its own determinations which constitute the source of soul's substantial

169 Such at least seems to be the case. In his Notice to the treatise, Bréhier suggests the replacement of the logical relation genus-species by the causal relation producer-offspring. He states: "...c'est celle du lien des espèces au genre. Sur ce point, la doctrine de Plotin est très différente de la doctrine classique d'Aristote; pour lui les intelligibles sont, en même temps, des intelligences: c'est pourquoi....il substitue à la hiérarchie logique genre-espèce, qui se fait par addition. la production des intelligences partielles par l'intelligence totale" 6: 43. This leaves however a false impression for Plotinus clearly states that intellectual science is prior to its species. Now intellectual science is the Intellect itself. Hence the logical relation of genus-species is not so foreign to the causal relation producer-offspring as may first seem to be the case. Further we have read that the doctrine of procession is identical with looking back to the prior. As such, the rational order coincides with the metaphysical order. See chapter I pp. 23-26.

170 Lloyd. The Anatomy of Neoplatonism 89.

171 See Trouillard, La procession plotinienne: "L'esprit (vwïç) est dans l'âme, non parce que l'âme est posée par l'esprit sans participer à cette position, mais parce que le psychisme tire de sa contemplation sourde le mouvement et les raisons par la médiation desquels il se pose. L'Un est dans le vwïç, en tant que l'esprit vit, par la constitution de l'intelligible, la radicale liberté dont il procède. Relation et présence sont essentiellement intérieures et actives" 2.
existence. In the late treatise entitled 'On the Kinds of Being II' Plotinus clearly elicits this consequence, demonstrating the generation of species in terms of the mutual relations amongst the kinds -- the Platonic method of division and combination -- rather than by reference to a completive term or quality. Again, from the doctrine of procession we learned that the soul proceeds from the Intellect following upon the Intellect's seeing the One, soul being the image of the Intellect. This doctrine agrees with the teaching on genus and species: the Intellect is the source of the species insofar as it is the unity of their being. Contrariwise, to admit the Aristotelian specific difference to be a form would be tantamount to admitting that the soul's substantial existence is separable into two heterogenous parts, 'substantial being' and 'soul'. Plotinus denies this consequence in his refusal to place being a soul on a par with being white.

Meanwhile Plotinus' disagreement with Aristotle's teaching on substance and attribute extends equally to considerations of science proper. Lloyd explains: "Secondly, he finds the notion of categories which divide qualities from substances unintelligible if they allow a quality to be an integral part of substance. This is the point of his eventually concluding that the only genuine qualities must be the non-essential 'affections', posterior to substances, such as a

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172 See Trouillard, *La procession plotinienne*: "L'universel plotinien apparaît alors très différent de l'universel aristotélicien. Non seulement le genre néoplatonicien contient ses espèces, mais il les engendre selon une dialectique réelle et par un développement interne. Les espèces jouissent du même privilège vis-à-vis des sous-espèces, et ainsi, de proche en proche, de division en division, elles sont grosses des moindres caractères individuels....Mais l'universel plotinien ne s'épuise pas en cette fonction génératrice, et ne se perd pas dans la multiplicité de ses produits comme une simple nature commune. Il possède l'antériorité d'une cause immanente, plus large et plus dense que ses effets (VI.2.20)" 43-44.

173 See VI.2[43].21,55-6. ...ἡ πάντων ἐν ἐνὶ οὐτών οἷον συμπληκτὴ καὶ σύνθεσις οὐσίς ἐστι. And Lafrance: "Pour bien comprendre ici la nature de l'altérité on prendra appui sur la science. La science constitue une unité que l'on peut fragmenter en diverses parties selon les objets auxquels elle s'applique" 341. And again: "Seligman fait observer, avec raison croyons-nous, que les Formes du *Sophiste* sont des 'primitive ontological notions', et il comprend le terme 'notions' comme le nom d'entités réelles qui sont à la fois principes de la réalité et principes de la connaissance. ...comment une Forme peut-elle être à la fois une et multiple. Pour traiter ce problème, le *Sophiste* introduit le notion de *koïnònia* qui permet de concevoir les relations entre les Formes sans que la nature de celles-ci en soit modifiée pour autant" 349.

174 See VI.2[43].5,24-26. In particular, ...ἡ τι ὁμέν ὦ ψυχή. οὐ μεντοι οὕτως. ὃς ἀνθρώπος λευκός, ἀλλ' ὥς τις οὐσία μόνον.
man's colour". 175 The difficulty centers upon the distinction between what is necessary and what is accidental to a substance. For Plotinus as for both Plato and Aristotle, scientific knowledge is knowledge of that which is true and certain: it is knowledge of the necessary. In all three philosophies, the necessary is identified with the essential: the necessary states that element which is intrinsic and primary in the substance. Again, both Plotinus and Aristotle agree that true science consists in the knowledge of causes: to know scientifically is to know why such is the case for an existence. Heiser observes: "In VI.7[38],1-3, Plotinus undertakes to rewrite the *Posterior Analytics* and eliminate the causal syllogism, thus adapting it to intuitive intellect. The intelligible -- intelligible man, or horse, or what have you -- must contain within itself and be identical with its 'cause' (*aitia*, 1,57), its 'why' (*dia ti*, 2,6-8). In contrast with the sensible, in the intelligible 'the essence (ousia) and the what-is-being (to ti en einai) and the why (to dioti) are one thing' (3,21-22: *cf.* VI.8[39],14&17)." 176 The cause states the necessary insofar as it produces truth. Now Plotinus' criticism of Aristotle is simple: upon the grounds of empirical observation, how is it possible to select one attribute as essential over against the others? What is the distinguishing mark which allows a quality to be an integral part of substance in the one case, but a mere accident to substance in an other? Their disagreement remains current in our day. Losee situates the complaint: "The requirement that the premisses be true is one of four extra-logical requirements which Aristotle placed on the premisses of scientific explanation. The other three requirements are that the premisses must be indemonstrable, better known than the conclusion, and causes of the attribution made in the conclusion". 177 Concerning the fourth requirement, Losee explains:

> What is needed at this point is a criterion to distinguish causal from accidental correlations. Aristotle recognized this need. He suggested that in a causal relation the attribute (1) is true of every instance of the subject, (2) is true


of the subject precisely and not as part of a larger whole. (3) and is 'essential to' the subject....

Aristotle's third criterion identifies causal relation and the 'essential' attribution of a predicate to a subject. This pushes back the problem one stage. Unfortunately, Aristotle failed to provide a criterion to determine which attributions are 'essential'. To be sure, he did suggest that 'animal' is an essential predicate of 'man', and 'musical' is not, and that slitting an animal's throat is essentially related to its death, whereas taking a stroll is not essentially related to the occurrence of lightening. But it is one thing to give examples of essential predication and accidental predication, and another thing to stipulate a general criterion for making the distinction.178

Plotinus' response to the difficulty consists in the affirmation that essential attributes are such because they derive from a higher source, that is, Intellect. It is because Intellect is the power of the species that we are able to state their essential nature. To seek them from outside -- a specific difference -- maintains the accidental nature of attribution.179

The result of this attention to substance and attribute is Plotinus' realization that when we speak of divine soul's essential attribute as actuality, we speak improperly. Instead we mean to say that soul's substance is identical with its act. Lloyd concludes: "Are not activities attributes? The short answer is yes, but not in the sense of the terms, namely ἐνέργεια and συμβεβηκότα, used by Neoplatonists and their opponents. Grammatically, of course, activities (ἐνέργεια) can be predicated of subjects: but this does not make them attributes (συμβεβηκότα), for the semantic analysis of such a predication, or what would make it true.

178 Losee 11.

179 See Trouillard, La procession plotinienne: "Les idées ne sont donc pas données, ni construites, ni abstraites; elles sont engendrées par exigence absolue. Elles procèdent d'une conversion contrariée, ou d'une conspiration contrainte à se poursuivre par le circuit noétique". And again: "Quiconque vit sous le régime de l'hétéronomie parviendra au dieu de l'imagination et des mythes" 51. See also VI.7[38],17,32-34 on the power (δύναμις) which both generates and is the Intellect.
would be represented by a statement of identity". For Plotinus, the distinction of substance and attribute is a mere syntactic device which enables us to speak not so much of substance and attribute but of substance and its activity. We can say that in Plotinian philosophy, the couple genus-species clarifies the dependency which exists between the prior and its sequent. Rather than stating an effort of classification -- the logical subject serving to underlie the attributes as matter to form -- Plotinus emphasizes the functions, logical and metaphysical, which constitute a subject. Helleman-Elgersma observes:

> In referring to soul as one genus, this genus is not to be identified as the soul of the world; the one soul which is everywhere the same, and which is also true soul-substance, οὐσία and the truly one soul, is the ἄρχη of the other souls. It is ἄλλο, distinct from them; and they are made to depend on it, ἄναρτωσι for they are not pure, as it, but also belong to bodies τῶν ἄνω (8). With this true soul-substance P[lotinus] refers to soul as hypostasis, the ground of existence of all other soul, as well as the most all-embracing class of soul, and thus most truly universal soul.\(^1\)

The relation of dependency within the couple genus-species rejoins the principle of priority and posteriority introduced to explain the text on the passions of the soul read in the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases'.

In this section we have proceeded to clarify the nature of soul as a substantial existence. This concept supports the Plotinian epistemology of knowledge by formal cause read in the preceding section. Our analysis makes reference to the concept of actuality -- being in act and

\(^{180}\) Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism 91.

\(^{181}\) On functions as a many-one relation, see B. Brody, "Logical Terms, Glossary of," 65. See also Raziel Abelson, "Definition." The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1972 ed. wherein are explained the rules governing definition which may or may not seek to classify by genus and difference. "Moreover, there are types of definition, such as contextual and recursive definition, that cannot be expressed in genus-differentia form. Contextual and recursive definitions provide rules for substituting a simpler expression for each of an infinite number of complex expressions of a given type" 322. It may be that Plotinus was more interested in this latter type of definition and relation.

\(^{182}\) Helleman-Elgersma 66.
being an act -- which founds the existence of soul as a complete form. Also there is the
Plotinian criticism of the Aristotelian doctrine of substance and attribute. Here Plotinus takes
issue with the standard model of genus and difference -- matter and form -- upon grounds of
unity; rather than the external adjunction of a specific difference to an underlying generic
matter. Plotinus advises the doctrine of the priority of generic being which serves to ground
species being in their actuality. These two considerations, actuality and potentiality and priority
and posteriority, support our analysis of soul as a separate existence. As well, they help us
understand the text on the acts and passions of the soul read in the early treatise entitled 'The
Three Initial Hypostases' insofar as they elaborate the soul's substantial existence to be self-
producing, that is, to be at once an act and in act based on its proximity to the prior, the
Intellect.
4: The Birth of Divine Soul

Let us, therefore, now complete our understanding of the birth of divine soul as a separate and substantial existence confident in the teachings of the treatise 'On Love'. We read therein that divine soul remains (μένουσαν 2,27) with the progenitor. Second only to the appellation 'pure', Plotinus is wont to insist that divine soul remains or is bound up with (συναρτημένον) the prior. Wolters explains:

The compounds of ἀρτάω which Plotinus likes to use in contexts like the present have the peculiarity that they can be construed with a number of apparently contradictory prepositions without change of meaning. The compound used here, for example, can take, besides the dative, not only πρὸς or εἰς but also ἀπὸ ὑπὲρ ἐκ (LSJ s.v. συναρτάω 1, with examples of all five possibilities from Aristotle). Plotinus is here making a play on this oddity of usage to bring out in his illustration the dialectical simultaneity of procession and return.183

In respect of our analysis of substance and act, we have learned that soul's substance is identical with its act: it is the intrinsic act of being. In this way, it is possible to understand soul's remaining above to mean the identity of soul's substance and act. With Dodds, we can call this soul's unity of being whereby soul is both an act and in act.184

We ask ourselves how it is that soul's separate existence is established by virtue of the doctrine of two acts. Now there are two principal interpretations of the text on the birth of divine soul from Intellect. In his commentary on the treatise 'On Love' Hadot maintains that the soul is not born of Intellect's seeing the One.185 Instead, Hadot recommends the birth of

183 Wolters 75.

184 See Trouillard, "Le 'Parménide' de Platon": "Tout changement implique donc une sorte de point neutre, qui est un milieu parce qu'il est le centre originel des extrêmes que l'âme peut se donner tour à tour. Damascios y voit l'éternité profonde de l'âme, le principe d'où part la procession et où aboutit la conversion de l'âme à l'intérieur d'elle-même" 25.

185 Hadot, Traité 50: "Tout d'abord, on ne comprend pas bien la raison pour laquelle Plotin évoquerait le regard de l'Esprit vers le Bien. Nous avons vu en effet que l'âme n'est pas produite par ce regard" 184.
soul as following entirely from the soul's seeing its prior, Intellect.186 Meanwhile, in his own commentary to the treatise Wolters argues the opposite conclusion based on the unanimity of manuscript editions: "ὁρᾶται...ὁρᾶσθαι. These two participles can only agree with οὐσίας, so that the meaning is: the Substance of τὰ ὀντα looks with intensity towards That which is the First Substance.... However, apparently because the designation πρῶτη οὐσία refers, in Plotinus' normal usage, to Intellect itself, (see below), Bréhier writes in his apparatus: 'ὁρᾶσα exspectaveris,' so that it is Soul which is said to be towards the πρῶτη οὐσία, which can then be equated with Intellect".187 In agreement with the manuscripts, Wolters reads the text thus: "For that pure Soul, too, was Substance, sprung from the activity of the one preceding it, and so alive -- from the activity, that is, of the Substance of true beings, the Substance that also looks, and looks intensely, towards That Other, which is primary Substance" (III,5[50],3,3-5).188 The text raises the following difficulty: what conditions are necessary for the soul to remain with Intellect; that is, to have the identity of substance and act?

4A: The Doctrine of Remaining

We are inclined to accept the solution suggested by Wolters based on our readings of the early treatise entitled 'On the Three Initial Hypostases'. First, we note the similarity of images used to illustrate the relation of the soul to Intellect: in the early treatise, Plotinus speaks of fire and the two kinds of heat whilst in the late treatise Plotinus speaks of the sun and the

186 Hadot, Traité 50: "Au contraire, dans le cas de la génération de l'âme par l'Esprit, l'âme ne peut être considérée comme la substantialisation, la personnification de l'énergie de l'Esprit. Le résultat de l'énergie...c'est la production, par une sorte de différenciation interne, de toutes les Formes et notamment de celles de la vie et de l'âme. Cette activité est identique à l'ousia, à la substance de l'Esprit (38 (VI,7),13,37-42; 49 (V,3),5,37-39)....
L'âme ne résulte donc pas spécialement de l'activité amoureuse ou de l'activité pensante (38 (VI,7),35,19-33) que l'Esprit dirige vers le Bien. L'âme ne résulte pas non plus d'une activité de l'Esprit qui serait spécialement consacrée à la prospérité. Mais l'âme résulte de l'acte-substance de l'Esprit, dans la mesure où l'âme s'active et se réalise elle-même, grâce à la perfection, à l'acte de l'Esprit, vers laquelle elle se tourne et qui lui donne forme" 182-183.

187 Wolters 93. In accepting Bréhier's emendation, Hadot reads thus: "Car, elle aussi, cette âme divine dont nous parlons était une substance engendrée par l'acte qui est antérieur à elle et vivant, et qui est précisément la substance des êtres. Et, regardant, regardant avec ardeur dans la direction de ce qui était la première substance...l'âme divine a regardé..." 113.

188 καὶ γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκείνη οὐσία ἢν γενομενὴ ἐξ ἐνέργειας τῆς πρὸ αὐτῆς [καὶ ζωῆς] καὶ τῆς τῶν ὄντων οὐσίας καὶ πρὸς ἑκείνον ὀρῶσα, ὁ πρῶτη ἢν οὐσία, καὶ αφόρα ὀρῶσα. In view of the unanimity of the manuscripts Wolters recommends ὀρῶσης in preference to ὀρῶσα.
light which forms a halo around it. Concerning the latter case, we learn that the comparison of the sun with Intellect dates back to Alexander of Aphrodisias. Schroeder explains:

Alexander of Aphrodisias in De Anima 88,26-89,6 invokes the Aristotelian analogy of the Active Intellect to light in order to explain how the Active Intellect functions as cause of intelligibility and intellection. If we were to look only to the notion that the Active Intellect is cause of intelligibility by being the supreme intelligible, then we might wish to see in this a Platonic participation, especially if we think that Alexander has here in mind the analogy of the sun to the Good in Republic 508C ff. MERLAN ventures to remark that this participation is 'as close to what is causality in Neoplatonism as possible'.

The image of the sun identifies Intellect to be the cause of actuality for the soul by virtue of the activity of being, its attribution to an object. Subsequently, we learn that the prior must remain during the generation of the sequent. In the early treatise entitled 'How the Secondaries rise from the First; And on the One' we read that procession implies remaining: "But how from amid that's rest can an act arise? There is in everything the act of the essence and the act from the essence: the first is the act of the being itself, the second is the act which follows necessarily from the first and is different therefrom" (V,4[7],2,26-30).

Plotinus is conjointing the Aristotelian model of two acts as explanation of change in a substance with the Platonic teaching on creation and the abiding nature of the maker. Meanwhile, this understanding of reality is once again based on the physical model of light and the sun. Lloyd explains: "Incidentally, it was part of accepted physical theory that supralunar causation did not

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190 ἀλλὰ πῶς μενοῦτος ἐκείνου γίνεται ἐνέργεια ἢ μεν ἐστι τῆς οὐσίας. ἢ δὲ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας ἐκάστου καὶ ἢ μεν τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ἐκάστου. ἢ δὲ ἀπείκειν καὶ δὲι παντὶ ἐπεσθαὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐτέρων οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ. We change MacKenna as follows: 'the One's rest' for 'perfect rest'; 'follows necessarily' for 'is an inevitably following outgo'; 'and is different therefrom' for 'an emanation distinct from the thing itself': we leave out 'going out' and 'in its realized identity'. Much of MacKenna is superfluous to the text. See also III,2[47],1,40-45.

191 See Plato, Timaeus, trans. R.G.Bury, LCL 234 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1929) in particular 42e ...μενοῦτος δὲ νοῆσαντες...
involve constancy of motion or energy. In the sublunar world if a pot of water was heated by a stove so much less heat was left in the stove, but the sun and the stars, which were eternal bodies, transmitted their heat and light without losing any. For a thinker like Plotinus generation does not exclude but rather presupposes immanence: the act of being founds its own perfection.

The prior remains and the soul remains with the prior. In appearance paradoxical, this consequence is required by the metaphysical perfection of being. The soul is the image of Intellect and must have, therefore, the perfection of its prior as an element of its constitution. This perfection is guaranteed through remaining: to speak of remaining is the acknowledgment of the Platonic participation from the point of view of the participant rather than of the participated. Howsoever the participant remains, therein lies its likeness to -- its participation in -- the prior. The logical structure of remaining is required in virtue of Plotinus' affirmation on the unfolding nature of the forms within reason: this unfolding by reason is the act of λογισμός. Now the unfolding of forms would not be logically consequent -- outside of an appeal to the priority of the Intellect -- if the soul did not remain with Intellect. As such, the soul's remaining teaches a theory of meaning akin to the modern study of internal relations wherein are distinguished the necessary relations and properties for a being to be such.


193 See Trouillard, La procession plotinienne: "La transfiguration, pour chaque âme, c'est d'accéder à son activité la plus pure, non de se l'ajouter. Le processus reste donc en un sens immanent. Mais il suppose une première diffusion et une communication germinale qui constitue cette immanence à plusieurs plans. Transcendance et immanence s'impliquent donc mutuellement dans la procession, selon des points de vue divers, à condition qu'on pose à l'origine une initiative transcendante" 65.

194 See V.8[13],6,10.

195 See Richard Rorty, "Relations, Internal and External," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1972 ed. "For among the properties which are essential to a thing (for example, the state of Maine) are relational properties, properties whose characterization essentially involves reference to some other thing (for example, the property of being north of Boston), then we say that the relations in question (for example, the relation between Maine and Boston) are internal to that thing (Maine). If we think that the thing would be the same were it (for example) not north of Boston -- as in the case of a railroad car traveling through Maine -- then we say that the relation in question is merely external to that thing" 125.
Curiously Lloyd finds difficulty in this teaching:

We are in any case left with problems. Neoplatonists explicitly connect reversion to what is above it with establishing the identity of what reverts: but then will it not precisely have lost this identity -- its newly won, if indeterminate identity which is due to its having proceeded from, and therefore not being, what is above it? They tend to blur this difficulty. They seem to rely on the normative concept of definition.... Damascius is conscious of the problems but his position is fundamentally the same:.... ...when anything remains or proceeds, it can correctly be seen also as the remaining of, and procession from, its cause.196

Rather than seek refuge in a 'normative concept of definition', we suggest that the soul has perfection upon maintaining necessary relations with the prior, Intellect. These relations are at once elements of the soul's constitution and logical entailments derived from the prior.

Meanwhile the doctrine of remaining may be further clarified by reference to the modern notion of identity. Upon the relation of sameness and otherness Chappell explains:

The word 'same' itself has different functions in these examples: it itself is used to accomplish different things. By using the word 'same' in the statement 'I own the same car now that I owned in 1951' I identify the referents of two different referring expressions, namely, 'the car (I own) now' and '(the car) that I owned in 1951.' By using the word 'same' in the statement 'My present car is the same as the one I owned before 1951,' however, I compare the referents of different referring expressions, namely, 'my present car' and 'the one I owned before 1951.' In the one case I use 'same' to indicate that one single thing is being referred to, that the different referring expressions I employ have a common referent. In the other case I use 'same' to convey a certain feature of the two different things I refer to: that they resemble one another, are very

much or just alike, have some property in common, exemplify a single form or
type, or fit a common mold or pattern. 197  

Lloyd's difficulty with the doctrine of remaining as an element of divine soul seems to stem
from a confusion of these two different kinds of sameness: divine soul remains with Intellect
insofar as it is the image of Intellect, that is, has sameness of -- likeness to -- the prior. But this
kind of sameness does not mean to imply that divine soul is one with Intellect, that is, an
identificational sameness. 198

Second, we note that the doctrine of two acts explains a rule of transformation. In its
Aristotelian form, it provides the reasons why change is effected in a subject and, again, why
the subject may effect change in another. Lloyd tells us: "Physics, III.3 had claimed that the
actualized movement or process in an agent was the same 'in subject/substrate' as the one it
caused in the patient but that they differed in 'being/essence': in other words, they are
numerically the same event but conceptually different. If A exercises his ability to teach, and B
his ability to learn, there is one fact expressed by 'A teaches B' and 'B learns from A', but
there are two descriptions of it, since 'teaching' does not have the same meaning as
'learning". 199 Meanwhile, Plotinus distinguishes a real difference between the act of the
agent and the act of the patient. 200 Now the choice of two distinct acts results in the perfection


      CNRS, 1971). "Selon Proclos toute dérivation est régée et toute réalité se constitue sous trois
      lois fonctionnelles: μονη, πρόοδος, ἐπιστροφή. 'Platon) a divisé la substance de l'âme en
      une part qui demeure, une autre qui procède, une autre enfin qui se convertit, selon la division
des genres divins. Car il y a chez les dieux trois genres, ce qui demeure, ce qui procède, ce qui
se convertit. Le premier est cause d'identité, de puissance immuable et d'essence, le second est
le point de départ générateur des processions et des multiplications, le troisième est réalisateur
de perfection et réduit les dérivés aux êtes primordiaux" 229. Remaining is the cause of
identity -- sameness -- of each and every substantial existence with its progenitor.


200  See Frederic Schroeder, "Conversion and Consciousness in Plotinus, 'Enneads'
      agrees that the mover need not itself be moved by the act which it communicates to the moved,
      but differs from Aristotle in stipulating that the distinction between the second act in that which
      is moved and as act of the mover is real. Thus the primary act of the mover has no relation ad
      externa (cf. 5.4[7],2,28-30 and 6.7[38],40,5-24)" 191-192.
of the prior being presupposed for the existence of the sequent; it is the surfeit of perfection of the progenitor which produces the offspring. Thus we follow Wolters in his judgement to retain the manuscript readings of the text (δρώσης...δρώσης) in preference to the emendation suggested by Bréhier (δρώσα exspectaveris). While it is uncommon for Plotinus to speak of the One as a first substance (πρώτην ἡ ποιήσια), it is not uncommon for Plotinus to affirm the perfection of the progenitor as cause of the effect. Now the perfection of Intellect lies in its seeing the prior, the One. Schroeder explains: "This is possible only to νοῦς. It is precisely in the quasi-awareness of this possibility latent in the power of the One that there lies the potentiality that νοῦς may produce essence. When νοῦς is fully aware of the One's power that it can produce essence, that very awareness constitutes νοῦς. Νοῦς is the self-constituting awareness of the power of the One that it may produce essence". The perfection of Intellect clarifies the conditions necessary for its own self-constitution as well as the generation of its sequent. Thus we must disagree with Hadot who objects to the Intellect's seeing the One for the generation of divine soul. Instead our position is opposite: so far as Intellect looks to its prior, the One, so far it is capable of generating its sequent, the soul.

4B: Contemplation as Production

We can now turn to Plotinus' teaching on contemplation in order to complete our understanding of soul's separate existence. This choice accomplishes two ends: it serves to situate the theory of vision -- the conceptual seeing -- with respect to the a priori knowledge of divine soul, and it helps clarify the birth of divine soul in consequence of Plotinus' views on production. These considerations are, therefore, more functional than metaphysical in nature, thereby completing the metaphysical model of two acts and the doctrine of remaining. Now for Plotinus contemplation is synonymous with production. We read:

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201 See Trouillard, "La MONH selon Proclo"; "En somme, la cause ne pose pas hors d'elle-même un effet passif. Mais elle le retient pour une part en elle-même, lui donne de se constituer lui-même, et elle unit cette réalisation de l'effet à son autoréalisation de cause. Il y a manence dans l'acte commun de substantiallyisation" 234. We understand this teaching to apply equally to the philosophies of Plotinus and Proclus. See also V.4,[7]2; V.6[24],2; and VI.8[39].

202 Schroeder, "Conversion and Consciousness..." 193.
All beings which truly are come from contemplation and are a contemplation. From their contemplation are the begotten which are themselves objects of contemplation -- by sensation or knowledge or opinion. All action aims at knowledge; all desire is for knowledge; all producing comes from contemplation and ends with the form which is an other object of contemplation. And generally, each being is the image of its maker which produces forms and objects of contemplation. The begotten are imitations of being which shows that the end realized is not productions nor actions but the finished product which is contemplated" (III,8[30],7,1-11).

We can say that contemplation clarifies efficient causality in the Plotinian philosophy to the extent that it introduces the agent of production. More especially, we learn that the role of the agent consists in the begetting of forms, the causality of the agent being evidenced in the actuality of the begotten form.

To understand this thought we turn to the difference between production and action in the Enneads. For Plotinus production belongs to procession to the extent that it is necessary. In the early treatise entitled 'The Intellectual Principle, the Ideas, and the Authentic Existence'

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203 ὅτι μὲν οὖν πάντα τὰ τε ὡς ἀληθῶς ὤντα ἐκ θεωρίας καὶ θεωρία, καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἐκείνων γειώμενα θεωροῦντων ἐκείνων καὶ αὐτὰ θεωρήματα, τὰ μὲν αἰσθήσεις τὰ δὲ γινώσκει ἢ δόξης, καὶ αἱ πράξεις τὸ τέλος ἔχουσι εἰς γινώσκων καὶ ἡ ἐφεσὶς γινώσκων καὶ αἱ γειώμενες ἀπὸ θεωρίας εἰς ἀποτελέσματι εἴδους καὶ θεωρήματι ἄλλου καὶ ἀλλος μιμήματα ὄντα ἐκαστά τῶν ποιοῦντων θεωρήματα ποιεῖ καὶ εἶδη, καὶ αἱ γινώσκεις ὑποστάσεις μιμήσεως ὄντων οὕτως ποιοῦντα δείκνυα τέλος ποιούμενα ὡς ποιήσεις οὔθε τὰς πράξεις, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα ἕνα θεωρήθη,.... MacKenna reads: "All the forms of Authentic Existence spring from vision and are a vision. Everything that springs from these Authentic Existences in their vision is an object of vision -- manifest to sensation or to true knowledge or to surface-awareness. All act aims at this knowing; all impulse is towards knowledge, all that springs from vision exists to produce Ideal-Form, that is a fresh object of vision, so that universally, as images of their engendering principles, they all produce objects of vision, Ideal-Forms. In the engendering of these existences, imitations of the Authentic, it is made manifest that the creating powers operate not for the sake of creation and action but in order to produce an object of vision". We change MacKenna considerably, in particular the substitution of the term 'contemplation' for 'vision' and 'production' for 'creation'. On the difference between praxis and poiesis in Aristotle, see Nicomachean Ethics VI, 1140a1-16.

204 See O'Meara: "...chaque être intelligible contient en lui-même la raison de son être, et forme ainsi une unité d'être et de fondement causal" 76. The 'fondement causal' is active in respect of the generation of forms.
we learned that procession is necessary as a consequence of the doctrine of the priority of act upon potency: soul is the necessary sequent of Intellect insofar as soul requires Intellect for its actualization. Similarly, production as contemplation also clarifies the necessity of procession by virtue of its immediacy. In the treatise entitled 'On the Intellectual Beauty' we learn that procession excludes deliberation: "There it is not the case that because it was necessarily such that it was decided as such, but because it is such as it is that it is good; as if the conclusion came before the causal syllogism, and is not from the premisses. There nothing is by consequence or by design but is before both. All of these are later: reason, demonstration, and persuasion" (V.8[31],7,38-43). Production consists in the simple presence of the prior to the sequent. Deck explains:

For Plotinus there is, however, another and better way in which knowledge -- in this case knowledge in the proper sense of the word -- can bring about results in the sensible world. It is the 'automatic' producing of sensible things by the contemplations which are Nous and nature. He vigorously combats the notion that praxis, with the limitations that it implies, is the pattern of all 'intelligent' making. He envisages a type of knowledge which flows immediately into action, or better, is immediately productive.

We can say that production (poiesis) is superior to action (praxis) insofar as it maintains the unity of act and object. Like the intellective vision whereby the act of sight is perfected by its

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205 ἐκεῖ δὲ ὦ, διότι οὕτως ἔχρην, διὰ τὸ τοῦτο οὕτως βεβούλευται, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι οὕτως ἐχει ὡς ἐστι, διὰ τὸ τοῦτο καὶ ταῦτα ἐχει καλῶς οἷον εἰ πρὸ τοῦ συμπέρασμα, οὐ παρὰ τῶν προτάσεων: οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἀκολούθιας οὕτως ἐξ ἐπινοιας, ἀλλὰ πρὸ ἀκολούθιας καὶ πρὸ ἐπινοιας: ὑστέρα γὰρ παύεται τὰ ταῦτα, καὶ λόγος καὶ ἀπὸδεκαζη καὶ πίστις. Mackenna reads: "...we can say only that because the Exemplar is what it is, therefore the things of this world are good; the causing principle, we might put it, reached the conclusion before all formal reasoning and not from any premisses, not by sequence or plan but before either, since all of that order is later, all reason, demonstration, persuasion".

object, Plotinus understands production to mean the act of sight which perfects its object.\textsuperscript{207} Taylor explains well this thought in terms of the Aristotelian classification of efficient causes. "The difference between Nature and Man or Intelligence as efficient causes has already been illustrated. It is that in causation by Nature, such as sexual reproduction, or the assimilation of nutriment, or the conversion of one element into another in which Aristotle believed, the form which is superinduced on the matter by the agent already exists in the agent itself as its form. ...In the case of human intelligence or art, the 'form' to be superinduced exists in the agent not as his characteristic form, but by way of representation, as a contemplated design."\textsuperscript{208} In agreement with his Platonism, Plotinus understands causality not as consequence or design -- the adjunction of an external form -- but rather as the mimetic actuality of form -- the copy/original relation.\textsuperscript{209} Plotinus is suggesting that all production takes after nature, that is, the immediate presence of the form which is the progenitor to another.

But again Plotinus suggests that all production is contemplation. Deck tells us:

Now, for Aristotle, movement is in the thing moved. The actuality of making is in the thing made; the actuality of house-building is in the house which is built. Whenever something else comes to be from something, the ultimate actuality is in the product. Aristotle contrasts this situation with those activities in which there is no product beyond the 'work' itself, activities such as seeing and contemplating. Here the act is in the one who sees, in the contemplator, not in anything else (\textit{Metaph}, Q.8,1050a23-b2)....

The actuality of efficient causality is, then, for Aristotle, in the product. Co-ordinately, a contemplator \textit{qua} contemplator cannot be an efficient cause.

\textsuperscript{207} See Deck: "The Nous and nature 'contemplate' the sensible world not as an object, but in an act of producing" 98-99.

\textsuperscript{208} Taylor 53.

\textsuperscript{209} See also John Fielder, "Plotinus' Copy Theory," \textit{Apeiron} 11.2 (1977) 1-11.
For Plotinus, on the contrary, a contemplator is a maker. The Nous, soul, and nature make and generate things.\(^\text{210}\)

Now Plotinus understands contemplative causality to unify two aspects of form, the paradigmatic and the efficient: form realizes the particular to the extent that it determines the nature of the particular. And indeed both the Aristotelian and the Plotinian philosophies fully accept the ontological role of form as essence.\(^\text{211}\) Instead, where the two philosophies disagree concerns the efficient nature of contemplation, that is, of separate form. Plotinus' answer would appear to consist in the following: it is not possible to admit the paradigmatic or ontological aspect of form without also accepting the efficient aspect for insofar as the form is the principle of reality it must be actual, that is to say, it must produce. This result obtains by virtue of imitation: it is the reflection of the form in matter. In the treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' we read that the soul is a matter for the Intellect which is form. The efficacy of procession may now be clarified in terms of reflection.

In the thought of Plotinus reflection is an activity of the subject upon a receptacle: his classic example is the mirror. The Intellect is present to the soul in reflection, that is to say, in diffusion. Ferwerda suggests that the productive efficacy of reflection is assured by virtue of its instrumentality.\(^\text{212}\) And no doubt the mirror is an instrument of sorts. In the case of the

\(^{210}\) Deck 107. Admittedly, the Aristotelian active intellect \(\pi\omicron\omicron\omicron\nu\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\omicron\omicron\iota\) is an active agent whose product is knowledge but Plotinus clearly understands contemplation to belong to all forms, even those in the vegetative soul or plant life. See Bréhier's Notice to the treatise III,8[30].

\(^{211}\) See Moreau, "L'être et l'essence chez Aristote": "Aristote ne conteste pas que l'eidos soit ousia; mais précisément, s'il est ousia, si c'est en lui que consiste la réalité du sujet ou de la chose, il est impossible qu'il soit séparé de la chose, du sujet dont il constitue la réalité, dont il est l'ousia. Ce qu'Aristote combat dans le platonisme, ce n'est donc pas la signification épistémologique, ni même la fonction ontologique de l'Idée, c'est la séparation de l'idée et de la chose, du sensible et de l'intelligible" 183-84.

\(^{212}\) R. Ferwerda, La Signification des images et des métaphores dans la pensée de Plotin, (Groningen: J.B. Wolters, 1965). "Dans trois cas (I,4,10,9 et IV,3,18,12 et IV,3,30,10) le 'miroir' symbolise la valeur d'un instrument qui fournit la connaissance indirecte des objets intelligibles" 16. And "Traitant les forms diverses de génération, Platon relève le fait que, même si les images qu'on voit dans un miroir n'ont aucune réalité, toutefois, avec ce même miroir, on peut créer en un tour à la main autant d'objets qu'on le désire. ...Certes, Platon insiste plutôt sur l'autre aspect, mais il ne nierà jamais que, en tout cas, le miroir fasse, produise, crée" 17.
soul, we can say that the instrumentality of reflection is located in λογισμός: it is the derived act of soul which knows by parts. But Ferwerda's suggestion is not fully explanatory for Plotinus' main interest is to show that creation is first in the subject, the prior, rather than the receptacle, the sequent. For instruction, we turn to the teaching on light. In the Plotinian philosophy light and the source of light contain both a physical and a philosophical meaning. Schroeder explains:

Let us examine similarities and differences in the two texts. For Alexander light is the act of the diaphanous and this act is realized when the luminous body (the source of light) and the object to be illuminated are juxtaposed. He offers the example of reflection in a mirror: When the mirror and the object before it are appropriately placed in a relation to each other, then illumination and reflection take place.

For Plotinus light is the act, not of the diaphanous, but of the source. He also takes the example of a mirror. The image in the mirror does not appear merely because of the juxtaposition of the source of the reflection and the mirror. Nor is it the removal of these objects from each other which causes its disappearance. He thus confines the use of παρειναι and ἀπερχεσθαι to the source. Alexander, by contrast, interprets παρουσία and παρειναι in terms of relation (σχέσις) and uses ἀπερχεσθαι both of the source of illumination and of the illuminated object.213

Light is the unique cause of illumination to the extent that the receptacle does not cause illumination but rather is caused by illumination; that is to say, comes to have form. We must remember that the receptacle -- soul -- exists only in virtue of the perfection of the progenitor; meanwhile, the soul's awareness of the progenitor is illumination understood from the point of view of the sequent.214 Hence we say: so far as predication clarifies the logical form of

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213 Schroeder, "Light and the Active Intellect..." 243.

214 Plotinus is here consistent in respect of both the spiritual and the material receptacle. The Plotinian matter is non-being and therefore cannot be a true cause of reflection. See Deck: "Paradoxically: since it has no being, no strength, no truth, it can in no sense be 'outside' of being, power, and truth: because whatever it has (and ontically it has nothing) must be in complete dependence upon being, it can have no separate existence -- it is in no sense 'on its
participation -- the passage from the intelligible to the sensible -- so far too production clarifies the efficient cause of participation -- the begetting of forms.215

Finally, it is not without purpose that we pause to consider the importance of the images of fire and heat in Plotinian philosophy, given their prominent use in both the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' and the late treatise 'On Love'.216 Now Plotinus' use of imagery is the subject of some dispute most notably as regards its exegetical value. On the one hand, Bréhier cites the use of images to imply the conceptual weakness of Plotinian philosophy:

In assuming that the sensible world exists, he discovered, indeed, its explanation in the intelligible world. The intelligible world, in its turn, granting its existence, is explained by the One. But why should the lower stages of reality exist?....

For the solution of this question, Plotinus found very little help in Plato. The progressive synthesis of reality in Plato, as he is known to us and as he was known to Plotinus, is described only in mythical terms....

Consequently, the solution which he himself gives is expressed only through the use of images, whose very beauty and variety cause us to feel that the reality which he wished to lay hold upon escapes every conceptual formula.217

On the other hand, Ferwerda ascribes a more positive and pedagogical role to the use of images. We learn that within the ancient tradition, the metaphor, the paradigm, and the image

own" 78. For a somewhat different view of matter, see Narbonne's Appendix (1994), pp. 113-47.

215 For an excellent exegetical examination of divine Aphrodite, especially in reference to the employment of the term 'heavenly', see Hadot, Traité 50 169-175.


are all used to instruct the student in scientific truths. For instance, this is the method employed by Plato in the *Meno*, an early dialogue which introduces the notion of true opinion and the doctrine of reminiscence in the Platonic corpus. Ferwerda understands Plotinus to accept this use of image with respect to the dialectical ascent; the images of fire, light, and so on awaken the student to the higher realities, namely, Intellect and the One. As such, the use of images is methodologically consonant with the doctrine of conversion and the seeing of the soul's prior, Intellect.

Ferwerda’s approval of Plotinus’ use of metaphor and image is not, however, unqualified. While Plotinus’ attempt to put in words the surpassing reality of the One is lauded, a similar employment of image, paradigm, and analogy to express the relation of sensible reality to Intellect is judged severely.

We must disagree with this view. First, Plotinus recommends reasoning by analogy to be a true kind of knowledge of the One. In the treatise entitled ‘How the Multiplicity of Ideal-Forms came into Being; and on the Good’ we learn that knowledge of the One is obtained by virtue of analogy, negation, and the reflexion upon beings in their ascending progress (VI.7[38],36.6-8).

Now analogical reasoning was

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218 See Lafrance 83-94. In particular, "Les figures tracées sur le sable par le maître constituent un apport important dans la recherche de la solution du problème, surtout si l'on considère que ces figures prennent une complexité croissante au cours de l'interrogatoire" 92.

219 Ferwerda: "Il nous faut donc conclure que, dans les conceptions antiques, le paradigme, l'image et la métaphore sont trois branches d'un même arbre, et qu'elles ont en premier lieu une fonction pédagogique: reconnaître un élément connu dans un objet étranger, de sorte qu'on découvre au moins une partie de la vérité de cet objet; nulle part on ne trouve l'idée d'un 'new concept integrated from those constituent ideas'" 3.

220 See Trouillard, *La Purification plotinienne*: "La grande loi platonicienne qu'il n'y a pas de vérité des apparences ni d'attachement innocent au particulier ni de maîtrise de ce monde sans la médiation des idées est donc une loi de dépaysement et d'intériorisation à la fois" 61. This interiority is synonymous with the doctrine of conversion.

221 In view of texts on εἰκῶν, παράδειγμα, and ἀνάλογα, Ferwerda concludes: "Les textes ne laissent subsister aucun doute: pour pénétrer dans l'intelligible, il faut que nous nous servions d'images sensibles, mais il est impossible d'arriver ainsi à une science exacte et définitive. Le monde supérieur se soustrait complètement à nos expressions. Les images ne peuvent combler le gouffre qui se creuse entre le monde sensible et le monde inteligible" 6.

222 διδασκομεν μὲν οὖν ἀνάλογα τε καὶ ἀφαιρέσεις καὶ γνώσεις τῶν ἔξ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀναβασμοῖ τινες,...
accepted as true by Plotinus, as by all Neoplatonists, both in respect of style and in respect of doctrine. Lloyd explains:

...it was an instance of Aristotle's tertium quid between the synonymous and the homonymous, namely the ab uno (ἀφ’ ἕνος) or ad unum (πρὸς ἕν). This is the notion which he left notoriously unclear but illustrated by terms such as 'medical' and 'friendship', which, he says, depend on the 'first' or 'primary' terms (or objects) doctor, i.e. medical man, and friendship for the good respectively. In Metaphysics Γ and E Aristotle suggests that the notion is applicable to being, so that there will be what we may call a quasi-science of metaphysics. The quasi-generic term he describes as 'universal inasmuch as first' (E 1026a30) -- an epigram which could serve as the motto of Neoplatonism. It is recognized by all Neoplatonists, if not always by their expositors, re-appearing, for instance, in Marsilio Ficino as the 'primum in genere'.223

The πρὸς ἕν is not only a rhetorical device; instead, it is also a method of reasoning whose object is being. From Aristotle, we learn that there are two ways in which we may speak veritably of the Good and the One. A first way is to speak of several beings insofar as they derive from one source: "Of anything from which things derive their being as the prime mover of them into being. Thus some are called Hellenes by race, and others Ionians, because some have Hellen and others Ion as their first ancestor".224 A second way is to speak of several beings which entertain a similar relation to an other being: "...since the truth is that we use the terms neither equivocally nor in the same sense, but just as we use the term 'medical' in relation to one and the same thing; but not of one and the same thing, nor yet equivocally. The term 'medical' is applied to a body and a function and an instrument, neither equivocally or in one

223 Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism 77-78.

sense, but in relation to one thing". Now these two ways of relation coincide to form what is communally known as focal meaning: it is the method of signification through which we may speak of being, and of the One, neither in a relation of synonymity nor in a relation of homonymity but rather in a relation of derivation and convergence. Thus, when Ferwerda understands analogical reasoning to constitute a purely illustrative and pedagogical device, he ignores the metaphysical content which renders the analogy significant; that is, focal meaning. Meanwhile, his position is plainly contrary to the judgement of Plotinus on the scientific nature of this type of reasoning. We must bear in mind that not only does Plotinus admit analogy as one way toward a science of the One; he deems this science to be the greatest (μεγίστον) of sciences. Hence we find the description of analogy by Ferwerda peculiar insofar as it removes the employment of analogy from its metaphysical base, that is, to be an element of the science of the One and of its subsequent, Intellect, in order to place analogy on the semiotic ground of illustration.


226 See Pierre Aubenque. "Plotin et Dexipe, exégètes des Catégories d'Aristote," *Aristotelica Mélanges offerts à Marcel de Corte* (Liège: Presses Universitaires; Bruxelles: Éditions Ousia, 1985). "Certes, Aristote n'en reste pas, à propos de l'être, à la constatation purement factuelle de l'homonymie. Il sait que cette homonymie n'est pas fortuite, ἀπὸ τῦχης, et il l'interprète comme reflétant la pluralité des relations que les significations multiples de l'être entretiennent avec une signification primordiale, qui est celle de l'ousia, l'existence de ce foyer de convergence expliquant dans une certaine mesure une homonymie qui ne s'en trouve pas pour autant supprimée. C'est la structure qu'Aristote appelle πρὸς ἐν λέγεσθαι, ce qu'on pourrait traduire par 'unité de signification par convergence' ou, en s'inspirant de la suggestion aujourd'hui largement acceptée de G.E.L. Owen, 'unité focale de signification' ('focal meaning')" 11-12.

227 See Ferwerda: "Nous pouvons donc conclure que l'image chez Plotin tout comme chez Platon ne vaut jamais en soi.... Sa fonction est donc purement illustrative et pédagogique, parce qu'elle constitue un procédé dialectique et non pas la description adéquate de l'unité rétablie entre les Formes et le monde sensible" 7.

228 VI.7[38],36,4-5. ...καὶ μέγιστον φησι τοῦτ ἐναι μάθημα,...
Second, Ferwerda's description of the Platonism of Plotinus is equally odd for he judges there to be a chasm (*gouffre*) between sensible reality and the forms. But this is neither good Plato nor good Plotinus. Concerning Plato, we read in the *Parmenides* that the forms have being unto themselves (*πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐκαστέρα*) whilst yet capable of communication with the realities of the world; otherwise, absurdities ensue. Concerning Plotinus, we read in the treatise entitled 'Nature, Contemplation, and the One' that all parts of the world enjoy contemplation: "Supposing we played a little before entering upon our serious concern and said that all things are desirous of contemplation, looking to vision as their end -- not only beings endowed with reason but even the unreasoning animals, the nature that is in plants, and the Earth that produces these -- and that all achieve their purpose in the measure belonging to their nature..." (III.8[30],1,1-6).

Plotinus's originality lies in his ascription of contemplation to many levels of reality, including the world as nature Earth. Unlike Aristotle who reserves contemplation for rational beings alone, Plotinus extends contemplation to every part of the world, every part of being in the doctrine of procession. Thus, instead of a chasm between sensible reality and the Intellect, we understand a continuity of contemplation which comprises the ascending progress of being. Deck explains: "Nature, the lower 'part' of the World Soul, has itself been produced by the contemplative activity of the World Soul proper. The World Soul has been produced, it would seem, by the contemplative activity of the Nous (The Intelligence, the Knower). Only the One, which is beyond the duality of knowledge, seemingly does not contemplate, and produces the Nous in a different way. In all

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230 Παίζοιτες δὴ τὴν πρωτὴν πρὶν ἐπιχειρεῖν σπουδάζειν εἰ λέγοιμεν πάντα θεωρίας ἐφισθαι καὶ εἰς τέλος τοῦτο βλέπειν, οὐ μόνον ἐλλογὰ ἄλλα καὶ ἀλογὰ ζώα καὶ τὴν ἐν φυσικὸς φύσι καὶ τὴν ταύτα γεινιώσαν γῆν, καὶ πάντα τυγχάνειν καθός τινι τοιοῦτοι κατὰ φύσιν ἐχοιτα... We change MacKenna in the following: we read 'said' (λέγοιμεν) for 'maintained', 'desirous of' for 'striving after' (ἐφισθαι), 'nature' for 'Principle' (φύσιν), and 'belonging for' possible' (ἐχοιται). We understand these changes to more closely state the text.

231 See Bréhier's Notice to the treatise, in particular p.149 on their contrast.
other instances, producing comes about through contemplating. We can say that nature is a veritable contemplation of forms whose causality lies in the eternal generation of living species. As such, it is neither unintelligent nor unintelligible.

What is more, sensible reality is also a reflection of Intellect. In the early treatise entitled 'On Matter' we learn that sensible reality is a compound of form and matter:

A proof that bodies must have some substratum different from themselves is found in the changing of the elements into one another.... The elements of things must be either form or prime matter or a compound of the form and matter. Form, they cannot be; for without matter how could things stand in their mass and magnitude? Neither can they be that prime matter, for they are destructible. They must, therefore, consist of matter and form -- form for quality and shape, matter for the base, indeterminate as being other than form (II,4[12],6,2-4:14-19). Sensible reality is not lacking form; rather it has the form in matter, the quality whose being is an image of an image of the forms which are Intellect. By this we mean that the soul is the image of Intellect, receiving the forms in mediation within itself, that is, in reflection upon the universal genus and species. Meanwhile nature, the lower part of the world soul, also knows

232 John Deck 4.

233 ὅτι μὲν οὐν δεὶ τι τοῖς σώμασιν ὑποκείμενοι εἶναι ἄλλο ὑπὸ παρ᾽ αὐτά. ἢ τε εἰς ἅλλα μεταβολὴ τῶν στοιχείων ὅντι.... ἀνάγκη δὲ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἢ εἶδος εἶναι ἢ ὑλὴ πρῶτη ἢ ἐξ ὑλῆς καὶ εἴδους. ἄλλ᾽ εἶδος μὲν οὐχ οἶον τε πῶς γὰρ ἄνευ ὑλῆς εἰν ὁγκῷ καὶ μεγαθεῖ ἃλλ᾽ οὐδὲ ὑλὴ ἢ πρῶτη. φησὶ τοὺς γὰρ ἐξ ὑλῆς ἀρα καὶ εἴδους. καὶ τὸ μὲν εἴδος κατὰ τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὴν μορφήν, ἢ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀφίστοιν ὅτι μὴ εἴδος. We change MacKenna as follows: 'elements' for 'basic-constituents' (στοιχείων), 'destructible' for 'not indestructible' (φθειρέται), and leave out the words 'pure and simple' after 'Form...they cannot be'.

234 See Maria Isabel Santa Cruz de Prunes, La génèse du monde sensible dans la philosophie de Plotin, Bibliothèque de l'école des hautes études, section des sciences religieuses 81 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1979). "Ainsi nous avons tout d'abord la nature, qui est un logos, qui est une forme. Ce logos produit un autre logos qui, à son tour, agit sur la matière en lui donnant la forme; ce deuxième logos est de dernier rang car il est incapable de produire un autre logos au-dessous de lui-même" 109.
the Intellect in mediation, that is, in an external reflection which is the qualified form. It is this qualified form in matter which is the image of the image of the Intellect in things. Corrigan explains: "Thus, the notion, and reality, of the sensible object, when viewed purely in terms of the outer nature, is firstly that of the whole subject compound and secondly, on analysis the quality in matter or qualified thing (VI.3,8,22-23) which leads inevitably to the notion of the substratum as bare matter, sterile in itself (ibid 34-35), yet the base of all appearance (ibid. 35-37). This outer nature, therefore, although an image in the Platonic sense, is also very simply Aristotle's basic compound of form and matter". Plotinus, like all Neoplatonists, accepts the Aristotelian form in matter. This form they interpret to mean the whole in, that is, composed of, the parts. It is distinct from the Platonic forms or the Intellect whose being is the whole which is prior to the parts.

The upshot of these considerations is our dissatisfaction with the judgements of both Bréhier and Ferwerda. In view of Plotinus' teaching on analogical reasoning as well as on nature and the form in matter, we understand the employment of images in the Enneads to be positive and veridical. This understanding is consonant with the employment of myth by Plotinus: the illustrative and pedagogical use of images does not exclude but rather presupposes the metaphysical truth.

235 See Trouillard, La procession plotinienne: "L'idée est concrète parce qu'elle est a priori et parce que, dans ce dernier caractère, se rejoignent l'universel et le singulier" 23. And "De ce point de vue, le sensible paraît avoir pour signification de médialisier la pensée, de l'opposer à elle-même, afin d'exprimer sous une forme nouvelle son recueillement substantiel. L'hétérogénéité est ici plus fonctionnelle qu'ontologique. Le sensible ne se présente pas seulement comme un reflet anémé, mais en quelque sorte comme une négation active ou une abstraction agressive" 10-11.


237 For a generally favorable treatment of images in Plotinus, see Schroeder, "Light and the Active Intellect..." 239-248 wherein is given an analysis of light as physical, metaphysical, and mythological reality. See also Brunner: "Dira-t-on que ce symbolisme dénote un recul de la rationalité par rapport à l'époque classique? Ce n'est pas notre avis. ...il s'agit d'un procédé dont le philosophe ne peut se passer pour exprimer le rapport du supérieur à l'inferieur.... Et surtout, elles offrent tout cela à la fois à une intuition intellectuelle qui est fondamentale.... Loin d'être inférieure au concept, l'image est ici d'une efficacité supérieure, de sorte que l'image des rapports de l'Intelligence et de l'âme élève l'âme au-dessus d'elle-même jusqu'à Intelligence" 73.
In this section we have extended our understanding of divine soul and the epistemological conditions necessary for its existence. To do this, reference has been made to the doctrine of remaining -- the affirmation of both the self-identity of soul as well as its qualitative or comparative sameness with the prior, Intellect -- and the doctrine of contemplation as production -- that all begetting consists in the contemplation of form and every begotten is a form. These two considerations complete, therefore, our study of the gnoseological perfection of divine soul insofar as they place the theory of vision within the context of an efficient causality. The text on the acts and passions of soul read in the early treatise entitled ‘The Three Initial Hypostases’ now receives fuller explanation in virtue of the notions of contemplation and production. In the Plotinian philosophy, being is an act of contemplation, that is, of seeing. The soul substance is, then, an act of contemplation, the perfection of which is to be a proper act of soul.
Enough on the birth of divine soul, heavenly Aphrodite. Let us now turn to examine the birth of her beautiful son, ἔρως the god. In so doing we shall attain a fuller understanding of reason -- the derived act of soul -- and the seeing of the soul's prior -- a priori knowledge.

We read:

Being intent, therefore, upon Kronos (or, if you like, upon Kronos' father, Uranus), Soul has conceived toward him both an activity and an affinity, and in her passion for him has given birth to Eros, together with whom she now looks toward him. Her activity has produced an Existence or Substance, and now the two of them look upward: both the mother and the beautiful Eros, he who is born as an Existence that is eternally set towards Another that is beautiful, and whose Being consists in this" (III.5[50],2,32-39).

To begin, we observe the terminological alliance between the two treatises, the text on the birth of the hypostasis soul and reason -- the derived act -- in the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' and the text on the birth of divine love in the late treatise entitled 'On Love'.

First, in both treatises we read that the offspring is born (ἐγέννησεν ἐγέννησε) of the parent; the term used to describe the generation of a new existence is the same in each case.

Second, upon the "affinity" of soul with its prior, Kronos or Uranus, in the early treatise we read that whenever the soul looks toward Intellect, soul has within itself "its own intimate possession" (οἰκεία), such having the nature to be acts which are "intellectual and are properly its own" (ὅσα νοερῶς καὶ ὅσα οἰκοθεν). Similarly in the late treatise we read that the soul, divine Aphrodite, has an "affinity" or kinship (οἰκείωθη) with the prior. Now the verb 'οἰκείωθη shares the same root with the noun 'οἰκεία' whose meaning denotes the proper

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238 ἔφεσμενιν δὲ τῷ Κρόνῳ ἢ, εἰ δεῦλε, τῷ πατρί τοῦ Κρόνου Οὐρανῷ ἐνῆργησε τε πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ οἰκείωθη καὶ ἑρασθείσα Ἐρωτα ἐγέννησε καὶ μετὰ τούτου πρὸς αὐτῶν βλέπει, καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς ὑπόστασιν καὶ οὐσίαν εἰγραστι, καὶ ἀμφὶ ἐκεῖ βλέπει, καὶ ἡ γενεμαζέε καὶ ὁ καλὸς Ἐρως ὁ γεγενεμαζεὺς ὑπόστασις πρὸς ἄλλο καλὸν ἀεὶ τεταγμένη καὶ τὸ εἶναι εἰ τούτῳ ἡχοῦσα... Both Wolters and Hadot read a new phrase after ἡχοῦσα, thereby separating the introduction of Eros to be a substantial existence from a new series of affirmations concerning its nature as the intermediary and eye of the soul. See Wolters 81 and Hadot 112 note 104.
characteristics belonging to each.\textsuperscript{239} In view of these considerations, we suggest that the text on divine soul conceiving an activity and an affinity toward Kronos, the Intellect, supports both the metaphysical as well as the gnoseological perfection of soul in the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases'. Concerning the former perfection, we learn that the soul is divine in virtue of its birth and proximity to the prior: it is the selfsubsistence of soul based on its being a separate form, pure of matter. Concerning the latter perfection, we learn that reason is in act whenever the soul looks in toward the Intellect, these acts being the proper of the soul.

Now Plotinus is consistent in his thought: soul produces an activity upon seeing its prior, Intellect, an activity whose nature is also to "look upward". Upon the affinity of soul for the Intellect, Atkinson states: "In this conception of the nature of soul he followed Plato; in Sym. 210a4 ff. soul is involved in the journey from external beauty to the Form of Beauty and in Phd.65a ff. it is soul which achieves knowledge of the Forms. Both writers believed that soul could 'experience' higher realities because there was a 'kinship' (\textit{συγγένεια}) between soul and the objects of its attention. There had to be this kinship because both philosophers believed in the theory that like was known by like".\textsuperscript{240} The treatise entitled 'On Love' agrees therefore with the treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases': it serves to identify the elements proper to the soul's constitution.\textsuperscript{241}

5A: The \textit{per se} property and the relational property

Moreover we observe that Eros is born of the activity of the soul. When the soul is intent (\textit{ἐφεσωμήνη}) upon the prior, there ensues an act in respect of the object of soul's attention (\textit{ἐνέργησε} τε πρὸς αὐτῶν). And Plotinus repeats this affirmation several lines later wherein is explained the soul's act (\textit{ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς}) to produce "an Existence or Substance" (1.36). Upon this derived act of soul Wolters tells us: "ἡ ἐνέργεια ... ἐνέγασατο. This is the key phrase in Plotinus' discussion of Eros in relation to Aphrodite.

\textsuperscript{239} See also its cognate \textit{οἰκία} in Liddell - Scott p.1203 section IV which states "the house or family from which one is descended". This meaning further emphasizes the derivation of reason from soul.

\textsuperscript{240} Atkinson 19.

\textsuperscript{241} See Wolters: "Note how the meaning of \textit{οἴκειοῦσθαι} πρὸς is here defined by \textit{ἀγαμαῖ} and \textit{συγγενῆς}: attraction based on kinship" 17.
For a similar conception of ἐνέργεια ‘producing’ see III,8[30] 5.12-22. Note that Eros is here the result of Soul's ἐνέργεια. Cf. on 4.22".242 The latter text reads: "But we must also hold that there are many Aphrodites in the world (daimons which have entered the world together with an Eros, having flowed forth from a kind of 'All-Aphrodite;... and Eros is Soul's activity (ἐνέργεια) as it strains toward good" (III,5[50],4,18-23).243 We suggest that the result of soul's act -- the intrinsic act of being -- is reason -- the derived act of being -- understood in the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases'. We have been given to understand that whensoever the soul looks in toward the Intellect, reason is in act and these only are the proper acts of the soul. Meanwhile from the method of division, we learn a twofold explication of the nature of soul, namely, soul's relation to itself, its per se properties, and its relations to others, the relation as such. Now that which is produced by the soul, its result, cannot be the per se properties for its nature is consequent to the soul's intention upon the prior. Indeed the text is formal: Plotinus states that divine love is an existence "eternally set towards Another", that is, insofar as the soul remains with the prior, Intellect, so far the soul sets forth the necessary and proper relations pertaining forthwith. Divine love has therefore the gnoseological perfection of a relational property, the first born of which is reason, the derived act of soul.

We may now situate the birth of divine love with respect to the doctrine of two acts. This doctrine is already familiar to us as regards the teaching of the birth of substantial existence. More particularly, the birth of divine love clarifies the apparent relativity of the derived act in respect of the intrinsic act read above.244 Lloyd tells us:

Turn now to Plotinus. The 'external activity' that follows from something's 'repletion' or perfection is his version of the transmitted change or motion.

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242 Wolters 80.

243 οἰςθαὶ δὲ χρῆ καὶ Ἀφροδίτας ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ πολλάς, δαιμόνας ἐν αὐτῷ γενομένας μετ Ἐρωτός, δυνάμες ἐξ Ἀφροδίτης τινὸς ὅλης...ἐρως δὲ ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς ἀγοθοῦ ὀργινωμενης.

244 See p. 62 note 80.
which is the actus secundus of any actualized potencia prima. In VI.3.23 he broadly reproduces the doctrine of Physics III.3 and mentions that it applies as much to 'generation' (of substances) as to qualitative change. The necessity of emanation can be seen as the absence of need (according to Aristotle) for an additional cause of this second actualization. Where his version departs from Aristotle is over the inferiority, the lower degree of reality: of the effect or product to that of the cause or agent. But he does not admit this as a departure: he simply writes as though the partial identity constituted by 'same in substrate but different in essence' is the partial identity of his own pair, original and image (V.3.49.44-5;VI.4.9.37-42). Plotinus regularly borrows the metaphor from the formula of the Physics: the product is not cut off from its origin -- in V.3.12.44, 'neither cut off nor identical' -- and commonly in connection with remaining.245

Now there are two genealogies of love, one each from the Phaedrus and the Symposium. Plotinus summarizes their difference in his observation to the effect that Eros is born "under both aspects at once, both 'out of' her and 'together with' her".246 We understand the account of the birth of love 'out of' the parent to teach the generation of the sequent from the prior in virtue of the activity of being; it is procession. Meanwhile, the account of the birth of love 'together with' the parent teaches the likeness of the sequent for the prior, this likeness guaranteed by the inheritance of the progenitor; it is the doctrine of remaining. Plotinus is therefore consistent in his thought: the treatise 'On Love' teaches the doctrine of two acts in accordance with Plato and the ancient poets; in particular, his choice agrees with the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' wherein Kronos, the parent of soul, is named 'satiety and Intellect'.247 Hence the complaint by Lloyd concerning the apparent relativity of the two acts -- the derived act is sometimes thought of as internal and sometimes as external --

245 Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism 100.

246 See 2.13. ...ξε αὐτῆς ἡ σὺν αὐτῇ....

247 κόρου καὶ νοοῦ ὄντος. See also Brunner pp. 75-76 and 91-93 for a discussion of the mythological referents within Plotinian philosophy.
is peculiar to the extent that Plotinus admits their mutual implication. Concerning the intrinsic act of being, we learn that the cause of existence is the identity of being, the per se property. Similarly, concerning the derived act of being we learn that the effect of existence is the attribution of being to an object -- the relational property. Support for our interpretation may be found in the contrast between the static aspect of being and the dynamic aspect of being noted by O’Meara who understands the generation of the hypostasis -- the Intellect -- from the One as a consequence of this dual aspect.  

5B: Substantial Relation

Besides, Plotinus imputes to Eros, the god, the nature of substantial existence and does so twice (ὑπώστασιν καὶ ὁ γεγεννημένος ὑπώστασις). This choice is not surprising for we have read that Plotinus understands the doctrine of two acts to teach their real distinction: it therefore follows that the second, derived act must partake of substantial existence in order to be. In his Introduction to the treatise ‘On Love’, Hadot clarifies the text by referring to the doctrine of substantial relations in the philosophy of Plotinus. We suggest that divine love has substantial existence in virtue of the principle of multiplicity in unity, that is Intellect -- second hypostasis -- and its image remaining therewith, divine soul. Two considerations situate our affirmation. A first consideration bears on the doctrine of

248 See O’Meara: "...Plotin se croit en mesure d’établir la production des choses à partir de l’Un, celui-ci conçu comme l’être le plus parfait et la plus grande puissance, étant donné que les autres êtres ont, tous, une puissance génératrice et dynamique. Un dynamisme accompagne donc l’aspect statique (la simplicité indépendante absolue) de l’Un sans le modifier: c’est une ‘intellection’ (νόησις), une activité secondaire qui accompagne mais se distingue de l’activité essentielle de l’Un, et qui établit ainsi la possibilité de la constitution d’un être nouveau à l’extérieur de l’Un” 43-44.

249 See chapter 2 note 200.

250 See Hadot, Traité 50: "Du point de vue de la logique, cette théorie de l’amour-substance peut présenter quelques difficultés. En effet, il est essentiel à l’amour d’être une relation à quelque chose d’autre que lui (Banquet, 199e-201c). Comment dans ces conditions peut-il être substantiel? Pour répondre à cette question, Plotin fait allusion à une notion qui devait être appelée à jouer un grand rôle dans la théologie trinitaire chrétienne, l’idée de relation subsistante. L’amour est une substance dont tout l’être consiste à être ordonné à quelque chose d’autre qu’elle (2,38-39). Une telle conception est fondée sur l’idée néoplatonicienne que sera, elle aussi, un des principes de la théologie trinitaire: tout contenu intelligible différent, que l’on peut distinguer à l’intérieur de la substance intelligible est lui-même substance. ...Ainsi la substance intelligible (donc aussi celle de l’âme) se multiplie et se divise intérieurement sans sortir de l’unité” 31-32.
remaining: insofar as the soul remains with the its prior, the Intellect, so far the soul participates in the perfections of its prior and is relation. Again from the doctrine of conversion, we learn that the soul is other than the Intellect by virtue of the rational act, it is reason which likens soul to the Intellect and, again, it is reason which distinguishes soul from Intellect. Reason is therefore a substantial relation to the extent that it realizes the self-constitution of soul. In this way, we understand the cause of divine love -- subsistent relation -- to be the soul as distinct from the Intellect. While the presence of the Intellect is necessary to fulfill the rational act of sight, it nonetheless remains the case that it is the rational act belonging to soul.

A second consideration bears on ontological reflection. In the treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' we read that Intellect and Being are equipollent: "Each of them is Intellect and Being; and the sum is all of Intellect and all of Being, the Intellect by its intellective act establishing Being, which in turn, as the object of intellection, gives intellection and existence to the Intellect" (V,1[10],4,26-28). Their equipollence lays down the terms of existence based on a consideration of the sum (σύμπαυ) of Being and Intellect. The employment of the term 'sum' situates the thought of Plotinus with respect to the Parmenides

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251 See Trouillard, La Procession Plotinienne: "Intelligence et intelligible s'impliquent sans coïncider pleinement. Car la pensée n'est pas simplicité pure, mais différence surmontée. ...C'est dire que l'esprit est relation (V.1.4)" 41. And Dörrie: "...sur le plan des mathématiques,... Leur existence est telle que chaque âme individuelle peut en participer, et plus elle en participe, plus elle augmente sa puissance logique. Le Logos est actif et chaque âme qui en participe devient semblable à lui: ομοιοτάτη. On parle beaucoup aujourd'hui de la participation. Voilà la solution proposée par Platon" 45.

252 See Schroeder, Form and Transformation: "We have seen that presence (sunousia) to oneself does not exclude, but rather extends to presence (sunousia) to others. If we take sunaisthēsis and suneisis as cognitive aspects of sunousia, then the cognitive aspect of presence to self would likewise entail an extension of this cognitive aspect of presence to others" 110.

253 έκαστον δε αὐτῶν νοῦς καὶ ὃν ἔστι καὶ τὸ σύμπαυ πᾶς νοῦς καὶ πᾶν ὅν. ὁ μὲν νοῦς κατὰ τὸ νοεῖν ὕποστάς τὸ ὁν. τὸ δὲ ὃν τῷ νοείσθαι τῷ μαθιζόντος νοεῖν καὶ τὸ εἶσαι. MacKenna reads: "...and everything, in that entire content, is Intellectual-Principle and Authentic-Existence; and the total of all is Intellectual-Principle entire and Being entire. Intellectual-Principle by its intellective act establishes Being, which in turn, as the object of intellection, becomes the cause of intellection and of existence to the Intellectual-Principle...". And Brody, "Logical Terms, Glossary of": equipollent. Used of sets between which there exists a one-to-one correspondence" 64.
of Plato: it is in the second hypothesis wherein is said that the one partakes of being. Now in classic metaphysics, all that which may be a subject of thought is, by that very fact, a kind of reality. As such, all pure relations must partake of being to the extent that they are objects of intellection.

Similarly, we locate this thought with respect to the Aristotelian doctrine of categories. It is a doctrine which Aristotle elaborates in response to the Platonic genera and the communication of forms. We must remember that in the Aristotelian metaphysics "the term 'being' has several senses..."; being, the proper object of the metaphysical science, does not have the unity of a universal, a common generic term. Instead its nature is to be a focal meaning of signification, that from which all other manners of being -- reference -- take their meaning. There ensues the science of logic whereby Aristotle clarifies the several senses of

254 See Plato, Parmenides 143a5: οὐσίας φαίνει μετέχειν τὸ ἐν. διὸ ἔστι: See also Trouillard. "Le 'Parménide' de Platon": "L'un se trouve donc réalisé ou hypostasié. Autant de négations dans la première hypothèse, répète Proclus, autant d'affirmations dans la deuxième. et autant d'ordres procédants, si bien que les négations sont génératrices des affirmations. La théologie négative est la constitution d'une ontologie. Reconnaître l'ineffable dans la première hypothèse, c'est déterminer ce qu'il ne peut pas être, mais ce que doivent être ses dérivés. Le monde intelligible est la totalité des perfections que l'Un refuse, mais pose par le refus même" 22.

255 See Pierre Aubenque, "Plotin et le dépassement de l'ontologie grecque classique," Le Néoplatonisme (Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1971). "Chez Aristote, la science de l'être en tant qu'être était englobante, universelle, metaphysica generalis, car l'être ou plutôt l'étant est ce qu'il y a de commun à toutes choses, πᾶσα κοινών, puisque, impliqué dans la copule de la proposition attributive (S est P), il est virtuellement attribué à tout sujet d'une attribution possible. Tout ce qui est pensable, y compris la fiction et le néant, est un étant dans l'exacte mesure où il peut être le sujet d'une attribution: l'étant est le prédicat en général du sujet (ὑποκειμενον) en général" 101.

256 See Hadot, Traité 50: "Plotin ne dit rien du problème que pose cette définition de l'Amour comme relation subsistante, probablement parce que, d'une manière plus générale, l'idée que des notions relative, comme la science ou l'amour, puissent préexister comme Formes substantielles dans le monde de l'Esprit ne présente pas pour lui de difficulté" 179. We submit that Plotinus accepts the substantial existence of relations by virtue of the gnoseological perfection.

257 Aristotle, Metaphysics VII.1, 1028a10. Το ὄν λέγεται πολλαχῶς... And IV.2,1003a33. See also J. Moreau, Aristote et son école 75-76. And S. Mansion, "Les apories de la Métaphysique aristotéllicienne," Autour D'Aristote Recueil d'études de philosophie ancienne et médiévale offerte à Mgr. A. Mansion (Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1955). "Le mot être, y souligne-t-il, se prend en plusieurs acceptions. Cependant ce n'est pas un terme équivoque, car ses différentes significations se rapportent toutes à une seule et même nature, l'ousia, la substance" 154.
the verb 'to be' based upon an analysis of terms in contradistinction from an analysis of perfection. Taylor explains: "The list of 'Categories' reveals itself as an attempt to answer the question in how many different senses the words 'is a' or 'are' are employed when we assert that 'x is y' or x is a y' or 'xs are ys'". As such, the existence of a relational term is guaranteed in consequence of its generality; it is because the relation serves to define a class of subjects that we can speak of being a such. Now for Plotinus the relational property has substantial existence to the extent that it sets forth the being of the subject, soul, in terms of the being of its prior, the Intellect. We must remember that conversion teaches the perfection of being based on the relation of priority and posteriority; that divine love is "eternally set towards Another" means to say that it has the being of a relational property, a form. With Atkinson, we can say that the act of thought is completed by its object, that is to say, is perfect.

5C: Ἐρως the Eye of Soul

Meanwhile, the text introduces several conditions necessary for the birth of divine love. We read that divine soul has "an activity" (ἐνέργησε) and "an affinity" (ὁμοιωθη) equal to her "passion" (ἐρασθείσα) for Kronos, the Intellect. Now the juxtaposition of the verbs ἐνεργεῖοι and ἔραμαί is noteworthy for it contrasts two modifications within the soul; that is, to be active and to desire with passion. In his commentary to the treatise Wolters suggests a philological explanation for their use: "Plotinus uses the expression ἐνεργεῖν πρὸς interchangeably with ἐνεργεῖν εἰς. ...It is just possible, in the light of the context, that there are overtones of the erotic meaning which ἐνεργεῖν can have (LSJ III), like the colloquial

258 Taylor 22. And S. Mansions: "L'unité de l'universel être est beaucoup plus souple que celle d'un genre proprement dit. Et c'est encore trop peu dire. Le véritable gain de la théorie de l'analogie de l'être est d'avoir trouvé le fondement de la relation logique entre le prédicat commun (être) et ses différents sujets dans une relation réelle entre les êtes eux-mêmes: si tout ce qui existe à un rapport ontologique que mérite le nom d'être, c'est en vertu du rapport ontologique que tout cela entretient avec un être d'un certain type, la substance" 154-55.

259 See Georges Rodier: "Les catégories sont les plus généraux ou, si l'on préfère, les plus simples des synonymes, c'est-à-dire des mots qui expriment une essence commune aux différentes choses comprises dans leur extension" 165-166. And "Sur ce point, les déclarations d'Aristote sont formelles: l'application du terme d'être à toutes les catégories est légitime, non pas parce que l'être est comme leur genre, mais, au contraire, parce qu'elles sont toutes quelque chose de ἄνθρωπος" 167. It is the focal meaning.
English 'be turned on'\textsuperscript{260} The soul's activity toward the progenitor implies the desire for
perfection; it is purification and the ascending progress of being.\textsuperscript{261} This consequence
obtains for the One is both the object and the cause of love, the One's substance (\(\sigma\upsilon\sigma\iota\alpha\)) being
identical with its desire (\(\epsilon\phi\epsilon\sigma\iota\zeta\)).\textsuperscript{262} As well, we suggest that their use may be clarified by
reference to the priority of act upon potency, a theory developed in the early treatise entitled
'The Intellectual Principle, the Ideas, and the Authentic Existence'. It was therein understood
that the soul admits a passion for the progenitor; to suffer passion is both the logical as well as
the metaphysical sign of the dependency of the sequent upon the prior. That Plotinus is using
the verb '\(\epsilon\rho\alpha\mu\alpha\)' in a metaphysical and spiritual sense is clear from the text for we are yet
dealing with divine soul which is said to remain with the progenitor, the Intellect. The treatise
'On Love' agrees therefore with the early treatise entitled 'The Intellectual Principle, the Ideas,
and the Authentic Existence'(V,9[5]): the soul's passion for Kronos, the parent, combines the
Platonic teaching of the ascending progress of being -- purification -- with the Aristotelian
doctrine of the priority of act upon potency used to explain change.\textsuperscript{263}

\textsuperscript{260} Wolters 80. See also Hadot, \textit{Traité 50}: "Aphrodite (l'âme) s'attache à suivre (2,32)
Kronos (l'Esprit) au sens concret: comme la lumière s'attache au soleil, ainsi qu'on vient de le
voir (2,28-32), mais aussi, au sens affectif: on a déjà parlé du désir (2,28) que l'âme éprouve
de rester auprès de l'Esprit" 176.

\textsuperscript{261} See Trouillard, \textit{La purification plotinienne}: "Comme chez Platon, l'\(\epsilon\rho\omega\zeta\) est le moteur de
la connaissance: 'la tendance engendre la pensée' (\(\upsilon \gamma\alpha\rho\eps\eta\epsilon\sigma\iota\nu \iota\omicron\nu \omicron\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\iota\omicron\nu\ Appendix) (V,6,59)" And again: "Ce qui ne signifie pas que l'amour cesse d'agir dans l'âme à l'intérieur
de la dialectique. Le 'désir de Dieu' anime bien toute l'ascension. Comme chez Platon, il n'est
pas indétermination, mais présence obscure qui aspire à se parfaire et à se récupérer en
s'épanchant" 157.

\textsuperscript{262} See VI,8[39],15,1. καὶ ἐρασμίου καὶ ἐρω̂ς ο ἀυτός καὶ ἀυτοῦ ἐρω̂ς.... And
VI,8[39],15,7-8. ...πάλιν αὐ ἡμῖν ἀνεφάγη ταύτων ἐ ἐφεσι καὶ ἡ ὦσια.

\textsuperscript{263} See Hadot, \textit{Traité 50}: "L'activité d'Aphrodite, c'est-à-dire de l'âme, s'exerce donc dans la
direction de l'Esprit et du Bien, et cette activité ne peut être pour Plotin qu'une activité d'amour.
Le désir de l'âme, nous l'avons vu (2,28-32), répond à l'attraction que l'Esprit et finalement le
Bien exercent sur l'âme. En effet, pour Plotin, toute réalité inférieure, lorsqu'elle se retourne
vers ce qui lui est supérieur, se trouve dans la situation d'une 'matière' par rapport à cette réalité
supérieure" 177. Hadot's observation about the unique activity of soul as the act of love is
interesting for it ignores the rational act read in the treatise entitled 'The Three Initial
Hypostases'.
Plotinus then goes on to give an account of the elements which constitute divine love. We read:

Being in the middle, as it were, between desirer and desired, it is an eye to the desirer. To the lover it provides a medium through which to see his beloved, while the eye itself precedes vision, that is: prior to making possible this instrument-mediated vision, the instrument itself is filled with the image seen. It sees earlier, to be sure, but not in the same way, since the eye does impress the visual image on the seer, but itself only enjoys the vision of the beautiful one as it runs past (III.5 [50],2,39-46).264

Concerning the theory of vision which we propose, the image of the eye (ὀφθαλμὸς) retains our attention. Wolters explains: "Plotinus here uses the striking simile of Eros as the eye of a lover gazing fascinated at his beloved. It is in fact an image within an image: Soul is compared to a lover (ὁ ποθόν 39,40 = ὁ ἐρών 41), and Eros is compared to the lover's eye".265 In view of the importance of the doctrine of procession and the text on the seeing of the soul's prior read in the early treatise 'The Three Initial Hypostases' (V,1[10]), it is not without purpose that we pause to consider this image in some detail. As is usual, Ferwerda understands the use of the images of love and generation in the Enneads to be didactic alone; it were as if the images employed constituted the succedaneum of Plotinus' thought, expressing with commodity philosophical concepts which would otherwise be difficult to convey.266

264...μεταξὺ ὁσπερ ποθοῦστος καὶ ποθουμένου, ὀφθαλμὸς ὧ τοῦ ποθοῦστος παρέχων μὲν τῷ ἐρωτότε ἀυτοῦ τῷ ὀραίῳ τῷ ποθουμένῳ, προτέρων δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ πρὶν ἕκειν παρασχεῖν τὴν τοῦ ὀραίῳ διὰ ὁραίου δύναμιν αὐτῶν πιμπλακέως τῷ θεάματος, πρότερος μὲν, οὐ μὲν ὁμοίως ὁρῶν τῷ ἐντεχνήσει μὲν ἐκείνη τῷ ὑμάτῳ, αὐτῶν δὲ κατασκοποῦσα τῷ θεαί τοῦ καλοῦ αὐτῶν παραθέουσαι.

265 Wolters 83.

266 See Ferwerda: "Dans l'emploi des images de ce domaine, nous constatons d'une part l'influence de l'imagerie statique de Platon, mais, d'autre part, aussi celle du système stoïcien. des mythes et des écrits populaires, qui, ensemble, leur ont donné une caractère plus dynamique qu'elles n'avaient chez Platon. Mais l'usage fréquent de mots d'introduction devant les expressions de ce domaine nous interdit de les concevoir au sens littéral, ce qui nous convainc encore une fois de la valeur purement comparative et didactique de l'imagerie plotinienne" 91. In fact, we read few qualificatory 'mots d'introduction' in the text of III.5[50].
Meanwhile, in his commentary to the treatise, Hadot expresses surprise at the identification of divine love with the organ of sight.²⁶⁷ We submit that Plotinus' decision is cogent in respect of the doctrine of two acts and the terms of spiritual modification of soul. Concerning the spiritual modification of soul, Atkinson provides the background to the affiliation between the Platonic theory of vision and the teachings of Empedocles on the reign of love: "By Plato's time the theory of vision was more sophisticated. Vision took place when an emanation of light from the eye coalesced with the light around the eye and formed as it were an exterior (physical) extension to the eye".²⁶⁸ More especially, in regard to spiritual modification an analogous process ensues: "Plato seems to have been the first to apply the theory to immaterial principles. In Ti. 37a2 ff. Plato explains how knowledge takes place by means of the contact between the immaterial ingredients of the soul and the cognitive objects".²⁶⁹ Now the soul's contact with its object -- the Intellect -- is both a vision and a passion; this is the lesson taught in the preceeding chapter wherein we learned that the seeing of the soul's prior -- Intellect -- entails gnoseological perfection. This perfection is the passage from potency to actuality. As such, the identification of divine love with the organ of sight is fully explanatory in virtue of the teaching on spiritual change.²⁷⁰

Concerning the doctrine of two acts, Atkinson informs us that the "phrase ψυχὴς ὀμμα (1,32) is Platonic" in origin.²⁷¹ We understand the term τὸ ὀμμα used to address the soul's

²⁶⁷ See Hadot, Traité 50: "Méthaphore hardie qui, à ma connaissance, est unique dans l'histoire de la littérature et de l'art antiques, bien que le thème de la parenté étroite entre l'oeil et l'amour soit très fréquent. Mais l'idée d'une identification entre oeil et amour semble bien ne se retrouver nulle part ailleurs" 62. See also p. 179.

²⁶⁸ Atkinson 19.

²⁶⁹ Atkinson 20.

²⁷⁰ See Brunner: "Ce perfectionnement de l'âme par l'Intelligence est une actualisation (1.15-16). L'âme intellective passe de la puissance à l'acte, contrairement à l'Intelligence qui est toujours en acte" 72.

²⁷¹ Atkinson 20. See also Republic 533d2 and Sophist 254a10. On ψυχής ὀμμα Brunner states: "Le philosophe choisit le deuxième discours qui, traitant de la grandeur de l'âme, montrera en même temps si l'âme est capable de s'élever aux choses divines.... Ainsi la psychologie est en même temps doctrine des fins dernières et théorie de la connaissance:..." 67. This consideration supports our approach, that is, the Neoplatonic teaching method 'by
search for its origin in the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' to be similar to the term ὄ φθαλμος used to designate an element of divine love in the treatise 'On Love'. In the first case, Plotinus seeks to clarify the divinity of soul upon discovery of the means through which soul may attain perfection: it is the doctrine of conversion wherein the act of sight is perfected by its object. In the second case, Plotinus again seeks to clarify divine soul this time on the basis of an analysis of the act of sight as intermediary (2, 39): it is the explicitation of the doctrine which states that soul is the image of the Intellect. Wolters explains: "μεταξύ. Plotinus is already thinking of the ὄ φθαλμος mentioned in the next line: the sense-organs were to him the intermediary between the sensible (object perceived) and the intelligible (perceiving soul). This is analogous here to the intermediate position of the god Eros between the hypostases Soul and Intellect, and should be distinguished from that of the daimon Eros between the ἀφροτία and λόγος of the same hypostasis, Soul (see 7.9-19).

From the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' we have been given to understand that whensoever reason looks in toward the Intellect, reason is in act; moreover, the seeing of the soul's prior constitutes the only acts of reason which are proper to the soul. Now the treatise 'On Love' teaches the same doctrine: to be an 'instrument-mediated vision' illustrates the relational property: it is the affirmation of the necessary relations which pertain properly to soul as it looks to the prior. In contradistinction from Intellect, which both thinks of itself and by itself and is thus itself that which it thinks, soul has need of an intermediary for the completion of its act of sight.

appearance' -- the psychology of love -- and 'by predominance' -- the rational knowledge based on a doctrine of act and passion.

Wolters 82.

See V.9(5),5-7. εἰ δὲ ἔρχεται αὐτὸς καὶ αὐτοῦ νοεῖ, αὐτὸς ἐστὶν ἄ νοοεῖ. Our position agrees with Wolters who states: "It should be noted that the passage in its entirety is an extended simile, i.e. the description refers throughout to the lover's eye, and only by analogy to the Soul's Eros" 83. In contrast, Hadot argues the opposite conclusion: "Cette description suppose évidemment la métaphore de l'oeil et elle décrit le rôle de l'Amour et de l'âme conformément au modèle de la vision sensible:.... Il ne s'agit pas toutefois d'une simple description du mécanisme de la vision sensible, mais, comme le montre bien la mention explicite de la vision du beau (2.42),....autrement dit, c'est l'Amour qui est le sujet de la phrase" 180. Their difference is not unimportant for it bears on the meaning of the text. With Wolters, we understand the text to apply primarily to the act of sight and the seeing of the soul's prior as stated in V.1(10),3.
Plotinus insists: "It is therefore out of that which is strenuously active towards the visual object, and out of that which 'streams off,' so to speak, from the object, that Eros is born, an eye (ὁμμα) that is filled: like image-mediated vision. It is perhaps rather from this that Eros gets its name, because it comes to Existence out of vision, ἱρασίς" (III.5(50).3.11-15).274 The terminological alliance of this text with the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' (V.1[10].1.32) is clear. In each case, Plotinus uses the term 'ὁμμα' to denote the eye of the soul. Again in each case, the participle ὀρωμένον has for its referent the Intellect, the object of soul’s gaze. Further evidences may be found regarding the etymology of the text. Now the author of the Enneads has recourse to an etymological determination of a term only one other time: it is in the middle treatise entitled 'That the Intellectual Beings are not outside the Intellectual-Principle' that Plotinus affirms the derivation of being -- τὸ εἶναι -- from the One -- τὸ ἐν in consequence of their common root.275 Here too Plotinus practises a similar deduction: Eros the god comes to be out of the vision of the prior, Intellect. Wolters observes: "By saying that the etymological derivation of ἐρως is perhaps rather from ὀρασίς, he indicates that he has an alternative etymology in mind. Since he assumes that his readers are acquainted with this other etymology, it seems probable that he is alluding to the one in the Cratylus referred to above. We may wonder why Plotinus rejects the derivation from ἐσπειν in favour of that from ὀρασίς. This is perhaps because, on his own theory, it is not Eros which 'streams in,' but his father Poros".276 The images which stream into the soul are images of Intellect. We can say that the seeing of the soul's prior constitutes the 'image-mediated vision' in λογισμός, the unfolding of the forms within reason. A clear statement of this thought may be found in the middle treatise entitled 'The Virtues' wherein Plotinus affirms that soul has the

274 ἐξ οὖν τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος σωμάτως περὶ τὸ ὀρωμένον καὶ ἑκ τοῦ οἰον ἀπορρέοντος ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀρωμένου ὀμμα πληρωθέν, οἰον μετ' εἰδολον ὀρασίς. Ἐρως ἐγείρετο τάχα που καὶ τῆς προσηγορίας ἐντεθεῖ μᾶλλον αὐτῷ γεγεινημένης. ὅτι ἐξ ὀράσεως τῆς υπόστασιν ἔχει.

275 See V.5(32).5.14-15 καὶ τὸ εἶναι δὲ τοῦτο ἢ τῆς οὐσίας δηλωτικῆ ὀνομασία ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν εἰ τῆς λέγει γεγογέναι,....

276 Wolters 100. In fact, there are several Platonic etymologies attributed to the term 'ἐρως'. See Robin p.25 and Phaedrus 238c on the relation of the terms 'ῥώμαμμι, ἐρωμένος, to be strong' with ἐρως.
forms within itself in the manner of impressions (τύπους), that is to say, an 'image-mediated vision'.

In this section we emphasize the relational aspect of the soul and the rational act of sight. This end is accomplished in two ways: First, we make reference to the distinction between the per se property and the relational property in order to identify soul's derived act (ἐνεργεία) with Eros the god. As explanation, we make reference to the Neoplatonic teaching of substantial relations, in particular as concerns Plato's Parmenides -- the ontological reflection -- as well as Aristotle's Categories -- the many ways to say being. Second, we turn to a lexical analysis of text. We show that the terms 'ὁφθαλμός' and 'ὁμμα' read in the late treatise 'On Love' and the term 'ὁμμα' read in the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' have the same referent, that is, the eye of soul. This consideration further justifies our choice of texts and the emphasis placed on a theory of vision as explanatory of Plotinian epistemology.

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277 See I.2(19)4,21-23. ή εἶχεν οὐκ ἐνεργοῦντα, ἀλλὰ ἀποκείμενα ἀφωτιστα· έινα δέ φωτισθῇ καὶ τότε γι' αὐτά ἐνόντα, δεί προσβαλείν τῷ φωτιζούτι. εἰσε δέ οὐκ αὐτά, ἀλλὰ τύπους· δεί οὖν τῶν τύπων τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς, οὕτως καὶ οἱ τύποι, ἐφαρμόσαι. The parallel is striking. Neither soul -- the intrinsic act of being -- nor reason -- the derived act of being -- are in act until intellective vision has taken place.
6: Recapitulation

To summarize, our reading of the treatise 'On Love' has led to a demonstration of soul's perfection based upon a study of substance and act. Our procedure has consisted of four parts. A first part examines the a priori knowledge of soul based on a study of the principle of priority and posteriority; the logical relation of genus and species; the use of dialectics and the Platonic method of division and combination; and soul's nature to be movement and actuality. A second part serves to ground the a priori knowledge based on a study of the soul's self-subsistent nature. To do this, we introduce the Aristotelian analysis of act as realized form. More especially, we examine the Plotinian semantics to learn Plotinus' criticism of the standard Aristotelian model of subject and attribute. Indeed his criticism is twofold: on the one hand, Plotinus complains that the Aristotelian specific difference cannot be the form which makes the genus determinate for the difference is inferior to, that is, a sequent of, generic being; on the other hand, Plotinus discovers that the Aristotelian teaching on attribution is faulty to the extent that the use of specific difference to qualify the genus provides only for accidental as distinct from essential attribution. A third part focuses on exegetical considerations of the self-subsistence of soul. We learn therein that soul remains with the prior insofar as it has the likeness of -- is the image of -- Intellect. This effect is further clarified by reference to Plotinus' teaching on contemplation as production, that is, the begetting of forms. Finally, a fourth part explains the gnoseological perfection of reason -- the derived act of soul -- on the basis of its nature as a relational property, a form. This effect is realized in its role as intermediary.

Chapter II studies the gnoseological and ontological perfection of divine soul with a view to elucidating the possibility and role of scientific knowledge of sensible reality within Plotinus' philosophy. To do so, it was necessary to clarify soul's perfection as a separate substance, thereby establishing the necessary ground of explanation for the forms' descent into soul --the unfolding of the forms within the act of λογισμός. This end is achieved through the doctrine of divine soul, the identity of soul's substance and act: the affirmation that soul's substantial existence remains ever above guarantees our knowledge of the forms based upon necessary and internal relations with the prior, the Intellect. To this extent our thesis has
advanced, the aporia noted in Chapter I concerning the acts and passions of soul being replaced by positive conclusions on soul -- the intrinsic act of being -- and reason -- the derived act of being.

With these considerations in hand, let us now turn to study mixed soul -- worldly Aphrodite -- and the birth of her offspring -- ἔρως the daimon. In this way, we shall come to an understanding of how it is that Plotinus envisions the possibility of a science of sensible reality in the Enneads.
Chapter III

Mixed Soul

Having spoken of ἐρως the god and of being in actuality, Plotinus devotes the largest part of the treatise 'On Love' to a discourse on the nature of ἐρως the daimon as taught in the Symposium myth. Now as the admission of the possibility of a scientific knowledge of nature within Plotinian philosophy constitutes our present purpose, it is timely that we turn to this part of the treatise in order to seek clear indications about reason which is a passion of the soul. We read: "Does then the microcosmic Soul also have such a substantial and existent Eros? Why should the All-Soul and the macrocosmic Soul (the World-soul) have an existent Eros, but not the Soul of each one of us, and indeed the Soul in all other living creatures as well? This Eros is then the daimon, which people say accompanies everyone, one's personal Eros" (III.5[50],4,1-6).¹

The text introduces three different kinds of soul; the 'All-Soul' (ἡ ὅλη), the 'macrocosmic' or 'World-soul' (ἡ τὸῦ παντός), and the 'microcosmic Soul' (ἐκάστη ψυχή). Upon the terminological difference Wolters explains: "ἡ μὲν ὅλη. All soul, whether belonging to plants, animals, men, the world or the stars, or not embodied at all, is included by Plotinus in the one concept of 'All-Soul' (ἡ ὅλη ψυχή or ἡ πᾶση ψυχή). ...In this sense, as Soul qua soul, it is here contrasted with the World-soul and the microcosmic souls, and is equivalent to the pure Soul or ἀπαθή ψυχή (3.31) of chapters 2 and 3".²

Plotinus is hereby contrasting divine soul -- separate and pure -- with the varieties of mixed soul -- the World-soul and the particular or microcosmic souls.³

¹ Ἀρ' οὖν καὶ ἐκάστη ψυχῆ ἔχει ἐρωτα τοιοῦτον ἐν οὐσίᾳ καὶ ὑποστάσσει ἡ διὰ τι ἡ μὲν ὅλη ἔχει καὶ ἡ τὸυ παντός ὑποστάτων ἐρωτα, ἡ δὲ ἐκάστου ἡμῶν ὅ, τι πρὸς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῷοις ἀπασί καὶ ἀρα ὁ ἐρως οὐτός ἐστιν ὁ δαίμων. ὃν φασιν ἐκάστω συνεπισθαν. ὁ αὐτοῦ ἐκάστου ἐρως;

² Wolters 125. See also Hellemans-Elgersma: "Each soul is one, and all souls together are also one (IV 3.5.14). It is not always clear just what the distinction may be, in use of πᾶση or ὅλη with reference to the soul; in general however one can say that the 'whole' [ὅλη] soul is more closely related to the 'one', or the unified soul, than is the soul as an 'entire' [πᾶση], or as a totality of parts..." 141-42.

³ For a fuller explanation of their difference, see Hadot Traité 50 p.117 note 146 on 'particular soul' as distinct from 'mixed soul', and Wolters p.124 on 'individual' or 'particular' applying equally to the World-soul and to the soul of each living being.
made to depend upon this difference "...the Eros of the upper Soul may be considered a god, which keeps Soul eternally attached to that higher reality, but the daimon is the Eros of mixed soul" (III.5[50],4,24-25). We have shown that ἑρως, the god, has the being of a relational property whose role is to assure the necessary and proper relations between the soul and its prior, the Intellect. It is knowledge by intermediary, the unfolding of the forms within reason. Similarly we must now show the nature of ἑρως, the daimon, insofar as it too is an intermediary and a reason of soul.

1: ἑρως as Intermediary

To begin, we turn to the historical background of the doctrine which states that every soul which looks to its sequent, sensible reality, engenders a daimon suitable to its worth. Now we find that the daimon is the expression of both the human soul as well as of nature. Ccrnford explains:

A nature-daemon is thus defined as the soul, or force, or mana, resident in some species of natural phenomena. It is, like its human counterpart, the soul of a group, not of an individual thing, except in cases where a species happens to have only one member, as, for instance, the sun. The fire-daemon is manifested in all fire; for all fire has the same specific behaviour. It is for this reason that daemons, in Greek theology as elsewhere, remain impersonal; they consist of will and force without individuality, because they are each the soul, not of an individual object, but of a species or kind (γείνος), to which they are related exactly as the daemon of a human kindred (γείνος) is related to his group.5

This background clarifies Plotinus' ascription of many daimons to the world, their role consisting in the administration of particular natures.6 Meanwhile the Platonic teaching finds

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4 ...ό μην τῆς ἄνω θεὸς ἄν εἴη, ὅσ τι τῷ ζέον ἐκεῖνῳ συνάπτει δαίμον καὶ τῇ τῆς μελημένης

5 Cornford 97.

6 See III.5(50),6,31-34 (συμπληροῦσι καὶ συνδικήσουσι τῷ παντὶ ἐκαστα) and 7,26-30 (ἐφιέμοιου δε τινος τῶν μέρει ὡς ἁγαθῶν). See also 3,27-38; 4,23-25; 6,24-27.
equal footing upon another ground, namely, the mystical or Dionysian religion. Cornford tells us: "The typical Mystery God of Greek religion is, of course, Dionysus. In his case, the cult organisation reflects the essential fact that he is the daemon of a human group". And "Because the province of a Mystery God is always, primarily, the human society from which he immediately springs, it is possible for him to remain human as well as divine. In this lies the secret of the vitality of mystical religions. The characteristic rite is sacramental -- an act of communion and reunion with the daemon". For both Plato and Plotinus, the daimon is an intermediary (μεταξύ) between the divine and mortal natures. What is more, the medial nature of the daimon parallels the medial nature of its superior sibling, eros the god, treated in the preceding chapter. As such, we suggest that daimon-nature provides one of the means for understanding soul’s relations with its sequent, sensible reality.

Turning now to mixed soul we learn that eros the daimon has the nature of a relational being, it is an intermediary (μεταξύ). What is more, the proprium of its medial nature is to have the property of mixture. We read: "But Eros is dependent on Soul, since on the one hand it is 'born' as it were, from Soul, as from an Origin or Principle, and since, on the other hand, it is a mixture (μιξήμα) resulting from a Reason which has not remained in itself, but has become mixed (μιχθείτοις) with Indetermination. (It is not Reason itself which merges with Indetermination, but Reason derived from it which does so)" (III.5[50],7.15-19). In view of the importance that this property will have for the elucidation of Plotinus’ views on the reason

7 Cornford 111 & 112.

8 Symposium 202e καὶ γὰρ πάν τὸ δαιμόνιον μεταξὺ ἑστι θεοῦ τε καὶ θυήτου. And III.5(50),6.12. μεταξὺ θεῶν τε καὶ τοῦ ἡμετέρου γείου. See O’Meara: 'Il semble, tout d’abord, que la relation hiérarchique que composit le 'monde intelligible' et le 'monde sensible chez Plotin est solidaire d’une doctrine courante dans le platonisme et s’inspirant en dernière analyse des dialogues de Platon. Quelles que soient les perspectives philosophiques où se situent certains passages dans les dialogues, la tradition platonicienne a su y trouver une division entre ce qui 'est' (les 'I dées' intelligibles, douées d’une nature immuable et incorruptible) et ce qui 'devient' (les objets sensibles, qui n’ont qu’une nature 'fluide', changeante, corruptible)" 9-10.

9 ἐξηρτηται δὲ φυσῆς ὡς ἐξ ἐκείνης μὲν γενόμενος ὡς ἀρχῆς. μίγμα δὲ ὃν ἐκ λόγου οὖ ὑμίναντος ἐν αὐτῷ. ἀλλὰ μιχθείτος ἁπαστία, οὐκ αὐτοῦ ἀνακραθεῖτος ἐκείνη. ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνη.
that is a passion of the soul, let us begin by citing the meaning and employments of the term. Wolters tells us: "μίγμα. Plotinus interprets Eros as being not so much the independent offspring of Poros and Penia as their fusion. He can do this by exploiting two peculiarities of the Greek word μείγνυμι (and its compounds): the connotation of sexual intercourse which it has (LSJ B4) alluding thus to the union of Poros and Penia (see on 6), and the possibility of construing it with ἕκ (LSJ I), as here".10 Besides this philological precision, we learn that its mixture is also based on the compounding of the objects of desire. In the first chapter of the treatise we read: "Every man whose love of beauty is pure takes delight only in the beauty, whether he remembers or not, whereas the man who also has another desire mixed in, that of being 'as immortal as a mortal may' seeks beauty in the 'ever-born' and everlasting. Following nature's way he sows and begets in beauty. He sows to achieve perpetuity, and this is 'in beauty' because of the kinship of perpetuity and beauty" (III.5[50],1.38–44).11 Natural love is defined as partaking of both intellectual nature -- beauty (τὸ καλὸν) -- and sensible nature -- a desire (ἐπιθυμία) for procreation (σπείρων); its proprium is mixture.

In this section we situate the Plotinian teaching on eros the daimon within the mystical or Dionysan and Platonic traditions. Both traditions agree that the daimon is an intermediary nature between the human and the divine. Plotinus accepts this teaching and adds a further precision: the daimon exists by virtue of the descent of soul to sensible reality. These two precisions -- that it is an intermediary and that it is the offspring of mixed soul -- will serve to direct our study of daimon nature in the context of an epistemological analysis of text.

10 Wolters 181.

11 καὶ ὡς μὲν καθαρός ὁ τοῦ καλοῦ ἑρως. ἀγαπητὸν τὸ κάλλος μόνον εἰτε ἀναμιμηθεὶτε εἰτε καὶ μη. ὡς δὲ μέμικται καὶ ἀλλη τοῦ ἄθανατον εἶναι ὡς εἰς θυητῷ ἐπιθυμία. οὗτος εῦ τῷ ἀείγειεῖ καὶ ἀδίῳ τὸ καλὸν ἔτει καὶ κατὰ φύσιν μεῖν ἑν τῇ σπείρῃ καὶ γεινά ἐν καλῷ. σπείρων μὲν εἰς τὸ ἀεί. ἐν καλῷ δὲ διὰ συγγένειαι τοῦ καλοῦ.
2: ' Erots and Analysis

We must now draw attention to the substantial nature of eros the daimon (ἐν οὐσίᾳ καὶ ὑποστάσει). Although this precision has received little notice from the commentators, its statement is important for it serves to introduce the notions of substance and attribute necessary for the elucidation of the possibility of a scientific knowledge of nature. In order to explain this possibility, we suggest an analysis in two halves of the remaining texts of the treatise 'On Love'. A first half will concentrate on an exegetical analysis of text whereby the soul's relations with its sequent are clarified upon grounds of priority and posteriority and determination -- indetermination. In particular, we shall elaborate the epistemological role of the daimon in view of knowledge by analysis, that is, the search for a necessary ground. This task is incumbent upon us insofar as the daimon existence falls within the Plotinian teaching of the ascent and the passage from the sensible universal to the separate form. Meanwhile, a second half will seek to situate this analysis with respect to a philosophy of science proper, and to the elaboration of the broader implications of the scientific knowledge of nature within the Plotinian philosophy.

Still in his discussion of divine love Plotinus lays down the rule that non-substance presupposes substance: "(The affection, you see, takes its desire from this existence, since Non-substance presupposes Substance, although it is of course the affection which is ordinarily said to 'love,' and since one ordinarily says 'he has love for such-and-such,' but not simply 'love' without further qualification)" (III.5[50],3,15-19).\textsuperscript{12} The metaphysical terms of 'substance' (οὐσία) and 'affection' (πάθος) serve to instantiate the logical relation of priority and posteriority taught in the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases'. Wolters explains: "πρότερον. It is generally true, in Plotinus and other philosophers, that terms denoting priority and precedence tend to be used in a specifically logical sense: 'before' then means 'presupposed.' ...Plotinus' point is that before you can have Non-substance you must

\footnotesize{12 ἔπαι τὸ γε πάθος τούτου ἔχει ἀν τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν, εἴπερ πρότερον οὐσία μὴ οὐσίας - καὶ τὸ γε πάθος ἔρως λέγεται - καὶ εἴπερ ἔρως αὐτοῦ ἔχει τούδε', ἀπλῶς δὲ οὐκ ἀν λέγοιτο ἔρως. With the manuscripts, Wolters reads ἐπιθυμίαν in place of ἐπιθυμίαι. See Wolters 103.}
have Substance,...". 13 Substance is the essence or formal cause of being; as such, it serves to designate that which is proper, true, and necessary of a being per se. Moreover, it is the principle by virtue of which a real definition is made of a thing. We know that Aristotle accepted two kinds of attribution, essential and accidental. Essential attribution, on the one hand, tells us the nature of a being, what it is (τι ἐστι); for instance when we say 'man is animal', we apply the genus 'animal' to the particular kind or species 'man' in order to express its nature. Lloyd explains: "Necessity entails a ground or explanation. To say that man is necessarily animal is the same thing as to say that animal is the genus of man". 14 That is, 'animal' is necessarily presupposed (πρὸς τοῦ ζωῆς) of 'man'. Accidental attribution, on the other hand, is admitted of a being without telling us the nature of a being. It is only affection (τὸ συμβαθεῖσθαι). 15

Following we must remember that Plotinus intended the doctrine of procession, conversion, and remaining to demonstrate truth. Lloyd explains: "The series of hypotheses in the Parmenides (he asserts) represent a chain of demonstrations.... The logical order of the properties, which are forms or Ideas, is of paramount significance to Neoplatonists. For participation is the converse relation of procession or generation. That is why they say division corresponds to procession and analysis to reversion (e.g. Damascius on the Philebus, 54 Westerink, followed by Olympiodorus, 246 Stallbaum)". 16 The relational properties of soul -- substantialized in the being of a god and a daimon -- now receive further clarification in terms

13 Wolters 104. Also: "μὴ ὁμοίωσις. Plotinus is referring to πᾶς ὁς in its logical aspect: as an 'accident' which does not belong to the substance" 105. Wolters stresses that 'πᾶς ὁς' is a "technical philosophical term" 102.

14 Lloyd, "Neoplatonic logic and Aristotelian logic - I" 70.

15 See Moreau, Aristote et son école: "Quand je dit, par exemple: Socrate est homme, et quand je dis: Socrate est sage, le copule est n'a pas dans les deux cas le même sens.... Quand je dis de Socrate qu'il est homme, je fais connaître, au moins partiellement, ce qu'il est (τι ἐστι); le prédicat est, en pareil cas, un genre dans lequel rentre le sujet Socrate; le prédicat est un élément de l'essence ou de la définition. Quand je dis au contraire de Socrate qu'il est sage, je ne fais pas connaître ce qu'il est, mais seulement quel il est;...quelque chose qu'il a, mais qu'il n'est point; bref, au sens le plus large du mot, un accident" 79.

of synthesis or division -- and analysis or reversion. Concerning the latter, we have learned that the ascending movement of soul from the sensible to the intelligible entails analysis: it is the passage from the compound to the simple. Also, we have been given to understand the doctrine of remaining as teaching the participant's necessary likeness to the prior: this likeness is qualitative as distinct from numerical sameness. Again, we have read the derived act of being -- the relational property -- as setting forth the effect of an existence in terms of the activity of attribution. Lloyd's clarification about Neoplatonism is important to the extent that it allows us to articulate further the attributive activity in terms of analysis and synthesis.

To situate this difference we turn first to Plotinus' source, the Platonic method:

In addition to referring to branches of mathematics, the Philodemus passage mentions 'analysis and the lemma concerning diorismoi.'... Analysis can be thought of as the process of looking for the proof of an assertion \( P \) by searching for propositions that imply \( P \), propositions that imply those, and so on until one reaches propositions already established; in synthesis one simply writes down the proof discovered by analysis, that is, one goes through the steps of analysis in reverse order. In the most common case one focusses on a single established proposition \( Q \) which (conjoined with propositions \( Q_1\ldots Q_n \) taken as given) implies \( P \), that is, is a sufficient condition for the truth of \( P \); it might happen that \( P \) also implies \( Q \) in which case \( Q \) will also be a necessary condition for the truth of \( P \).  

Analysis is a proof form which seeks the ground or explanation of a being, say 'man', in what precedes, say 'animal'. In this sense, analysis is a method which discovers the a priori determinations of a being, and its participation in a property or form. Its logical operation is one of inclusion, setting forth the conditions under which a being is such.  

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18 See Lafrance: "Elles ne sont pas davantage des genres et des espèces obtenus par la méthode de division puisque la diairesis décrite en 253d-e est un processus d'inclusion de Formes spécifiques dans une Forme générique, et non un processus d'extension qui regroupe des classes d'objets" 349.
Furthermore, we learn from Aristotle that analysis discovers the unity which is present in the many particulars. Lloyd tells us:

Aristotle's own description of the mind's formation of universals by induction is one of the few texts which can be taken to commit him to universals in nature (Posterior Analytics II, 100a3-b5). For it suggests a process of recognition, and what is recognized must already by there. It is also one of the few texts from the Posterior Analytics II that was widely familiar. ...But it is possible to read both Aristotle and Philoponus in a conceptualist way. It is consistent with either text to suppose that a form exists as a set of particular forms in a set of particulars, and that when perception, thought, or the two combined, attend a sufficient number of times to a sufficient number of forms which in fact fall under one class-concept they become aware of the set (rather than recognize it) as being or containing one common attribute -- in short they are aware of it as universal, not particular. 19

Analysis entails the search for the causes of things, these causes forming the true premisses of a deductive proof, that is, the causal syllogism. With the universal, we can identify the middle term of a syllogism which properly states the relationship between premisses and conclusion of a proof form. 20 Analysis therefore is the search for premisses, and for causes, in a word, the search for a necessary ground.

Meanwhile, the logical employment of analysis dates to Aristotle and the analysis of contrary statements. In traditional logic, the law of excluded middle teaches that any statement must be either affirmed or denied, is true or false. 21 For Aristotle this law is employed in his


20 See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, 88a5-6. τὸ δὲ καθόλου τίμιον, ὅτι δηλοὶ τὸ αἰτίον.

21 See Brody, "Logical Terms, Glossery of": "laws of thought. Three laws of logic that were traditionally treated as basic and fundamental to all thought. They were (1) the law of
arguments against the ancient philosophers; on the one hand, Heraclitus, who affirms that everything both is and is not, on the other hand, Anaxagoras, who argues for an intermediate between contraries thereby implying that each is falsifiable, whilst their mixture (μῖγμα) is neither true nor false. Instead, Aristotle maintains that for any pair of contradictories, the affirmation of one leads invariably to the denial of the other and to this extent not everything can be made false. The incontrovertibility of the law is itself understood to depend upon the definition of the terms employed, their meaning (σημαίνειν) effectively precluding the provision of an intermediate between them; for example, it is a logical truth to state 'It is raining or it is not raining' the disproof of one of the terms thereby constituting the proof of its denial, that is, the truth of an existential statement. The excluded middle may therefore be distinguished from the middle term of the causal syllogism which serves the purpose of establishing the necessary relations between the major and minor terms of a true proof.

In this section we clarify the role and importance of analysis in Plotinus' philosophy.

Based on the Neoplatonic doctrine of conversion, we show that Plotinus accepts the method of analysis as veridical insofar as it discovers the a priori determinations of a being, the presuppositions which imply a being and which are implied by that being. These considerations further extend our understanding of the daemon nature as a relational property: the daemon is an intermediary between sensible reality -- the particular thing -- and the unfolded forms -- the species, being in act and subsistent within divine soul. As such, the elucidation of

contradiction, that nothing can be both P and not-P, (2) the law of excluded middle, that anything must be either P or not-P (3) the law of identity, that if anything is P, then it is P. See also Aristotle, Metaphysics IV 1011b24-25: ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ μεταξὺ ἀντιφάσεως εἰνδεχεται εἶναι οὐθέν, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη ἢ φαίνει ἢ ἀποφάσαι ἐν καθ' ἐνός ὁτιοῦν.


23 See Aristotle, Metaphysics IV.8,1012b9 - 11: εἰ δὲ μηθεὶν ἀλλο τὸ ἄληθὲς φάμαι ἢ ἀποφαίαι ψευδός ἐστιν, ἀδύνατον πάντα ψευδὴ εἶναι.

24 See Aristotle, Metaphysics IV.8,1012b7 - 9. In particular, ...οὐκ εἶναι τι ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἀλλὰ σημαίνειν τι,...
the daemon nature is methodologically consonant with analysis, or the search for a necessary
ground of being. It will be useful to bear these considerations in mind when we turn to study
the properly epistemological aspects of mixed reason, and the elaboration of the broader
implications of our knowledge of sensible reality as understood within Plotinian philosophy.
3: The Originative Principles Penia and Poros

With these clarifications in hand, let us now turn to identify the elements of daimon-
nature:

For this reason Plato says in the Birth of Eros that it was with nectar that Poros
was drunk, 'since wine did not yet exist,' to indicate that Eros' birth was prior
to the sensible, and that Penia shared in the nature of the intelligible -- not
merely in an image of the intelligible or a reflection from above, but entering
into that realm and coming to union with it. The meaning is that it is out of
Form and Indetermination -- an Indetermination characterizing Soul when it has
not yet achieved the good, but 'presages that there is Something' in an
indeterminate and indefinite mental image -- that Penia gives birth to the
Existence Eros (III,5[50],7,1-9). 25

We suggest that the relation of the Birth of Eros as an existence born of form (εἰδους) and
indetermination (ἀδοριστιας) clarifies the Plotinian approach to a scientific knowledge of
sensible reality based on a study of the factors which condition the realization of our
knowledge. Several considerations will serve to clarify this view. First, we read that the
daimon is constituted of a kind of matter: "But in what sense do they also partake of a kind of
matter? For they do not partake of corporeal matter, else they would be living creatures
perceptible to the senses. ...But why does the one mix with body, and not the other, if there is
not some cause for the one that mixes? What then is the cause? We must postulate an
intelligible matter, so that something which partakes of it may also, through it, come as far as
this corporeal matter" (III,5[50],6,35-37,42-45). 26 As Wolters observes, the intelligible

25 Διὸ καὶ εἴ τῇ γενέσει τοῦ Ἐρωτος ὁ Πλάτων φησὶ τὸν Πόρον τῇ μέθην
ἐχειν τοῦ ἴεκταρος οὐνο οὕτω διότως. ὡς πρὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ Ἐρωτος γενομέμιου καὶ
tῆς Πενίας μετέχουσις φύσεως ιοητοῦ. ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰδώλου ϊοητοῦ οὐδ'
ἐκείθεν εἴμαισθαιτείς. ἀλλ' ἐκεί γενομενής καὶ συμμετέχεις ὡς εἰς εἴδους καὶ
ἀδοριστιας. ἢν <ἡν> ἢκουσα ἢ ψυχῇ πρὶν τυχεῖν τοῦ ἁγάθου, ματιομενήν δὲ τῇ
eίναι κατὰ ἀδριστον καὶ ἄπειρον φαιναμα, τῆν ὑπόστασιν τοῦ Ἐρωτος
τεκουσα.

26 ἀλλὰ πῶς καὶ τίνος ὑλῆς μετέχουσιν οὐ γὰρ δὲ τῆς σωματικῆς. ἢ ζῶα αἰσθητα
ἐσται. ...ἀλλὰ διὰ τὶ ἢ μὲν σωματι μιγνυται, ἢ δὲ οὐ. εἰ μή τὶς εἰς τῇ
μεγαληθιαν αἰτια τὶς οὐν ἢ αἰτια ὑλην δει νοητην ὑποθεσαι, ἦνα τὸ κοινωναν
ἐκείνης ἢκη καὶ εἰς ταύτην τῆν τῶν σωμάτων δὲ αὐτῆς.
matter (ὐλημ...τημημ) in which the daimon partakes belongs to its parent as indetermination.27 The text is fundamental. In both the Aristotelian and the Plotinian philosophies, matter is the ontological element whose nature is to be potential: it is needy, incomplete, indeterminate, and uninformed.28 Meanwhile, from Aristotle’s psychology we learn that matter plays an important epistemological role: in each rational soul, there is something which is like matter, which is potential, and which becomes all things.29 The reference to an intelligible matter within soul advances our understanding of the possibility of a scientific knowledge of sensible reality insofar as it introduces an important new element necessary for the rational conception of things, namely, that reason of mixed soul has no positive nature of its own, being nothing determinate before it actually conceives the object.

Because of the manifest importance of this text whereby Plotinus states the constitutional nature of the daimon's being, let us learn what his readers have said thereupon. Corrigan explains further this matter:

It is also thought that in the subsequent argument (chapters 7-9) Plotinus interprets the Diotima myth of the birth of Love as meaning that Love is a spirit (daimon) born from intelligible parents, Poros and Penia, which latter is understood to be intelligible matter, stricto sensu. But this is mistaken. Intermediate 'intelligible' matter in III,5,6 must be lower/pre-cosmic matter (i.e. as Plotinus himself states, 'before the sense world') at the edge of the Intelligible universe". This is also the position of I,8,14,36-39 (cf. VI,5,10,3-

27 See Wolters: "ὐλημ...τημημ. Armstrong notes on this: 'This idea that 'intelligible matter' is an intermediate stage between complete incorporeality and material embodiment is unparalleled in Plotinus.' However, see I,2[19]2.19-22 where Soul as matter is compared to (corporeal) matter as differing only in degree. - It is not strictly correct that intelligible matter here is equivalent to Soul (as Brêhier says in a note). As the sequel shows, it is the Indetermination (ἀφωτιστια) of Soul" 168-169. See also A.H.Armstrong, The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940) in particular p.87 on Plotinus’ acceptance of matter as the Aristotelian potentiality. As well, II,4[12],1,1-2; II,5[25]2,1-2;3,1-5; and 4,1-5 on matter as potential.

28 See Chapter I pp.11-12.

29 See On the Soul (De Anima) III,5.
6). Matter cannot take from its source, but it is illuminated. And where there is only the intelligible and lower matter, if there is to be anything else produced, matter must be illuminated by (or 'participate' in) the intelligible, although in itself it always remains what it is: non-being. In the participation of III.5.7 Poverty forms a new kind of compound, not with the source and not with the father of the child, but with a logos proceeding from the source and from the father, Plenty. This logos in the mother, Poverty, comes to birth as a spiritual being composed of logos and shaped indefiniteness, i.e. a spiritual, invisible, but nonetheless lower, matter.\(^\text{30}\)

The matter of which the daimon partakes is an intelligible matter which precedes, both logically and metaphysically, sensible reality. This effect is clearly stated in the text for it is through the existence of this intelligible matter that we may come to the sensible matter of body (ηκή καὶ εἰς ταύτην τὴν τῶν σωμάτων δι’ αὐτῆς). We therefore agree with Corrigan's judgement that the matter mentioned herein cannot be intelligible matter "stricto sensu" for such is the Intellect -- second hypostasis -- understood in terms of the Platonic Dyad. In the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' Plotinus discourses upon the birth of Intellect from the One on the basis of a consideration of unity: out of unity proceeds the Dyad whose nature is indefinite (αὐτῇ δὲ ἀπόριστον παρ᾽ αὐτῆς 1.8) until it sees the One; number, being, and form arising thereafter.\(^\text{31}\) Again intelligible matter "stricto sensu" may be explained in reference to the method of division, whereby is achieved form and limit, that is, the subordinate genera and species being.\(^\text{32}\) To this extent, its nature as matter is to be a subject and receptacle of forms, based in part on the multiplicity of forms and in part on their mutual otherness. As such, intelligible matter is related to the problem of the communication of forms.\(^\text{33}\) Instead the


\(^{31}\) See V.1[10],5 and Brunner pp. 79-80.

\(^{32}\) See II.4[12],4 and Bréhier's Notice 2: 48.

\(^{33}\) See II.4[12],1,1-2: Τὴν λεγομενὴν ὑλὴν ὑποκειμενων τι καὶ ὑποδοχὴν εἰδῶν λέγουσε εἶναι.... And 5.28-29: Καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐτερότης ἐκεῖ ἀεὶ, ἢ τὴν ὑλὴν ποιεῖ. Also V.1[10],3,20-25. And Lafrance: "Contre Parménide, l'ontologie platonicienne
'ύλης...υοητήν' of the treatise 'On Love' is clearly stated to belong to soul, the third hypostasis of the Plotinian philosophy.

This notwithstanding, we cannot fully accept Corrigan's identification of soul's intelligible matter with matter at its 'pre-cosmic stage', that is to say, "prior to the generation of the physical universe". Two reasons situate our difference. First the text of the treatise 'On Love' establishes the intelligible as distinct from the sensible nature of this matter. Although concise -- amounting to no more than 10 lines -- Plotinus' intention is clear: the matter in which the daimon partakes is a matter that is at once non-sensible and prior to the sensible elements. But yet Corrigan attributes lower, sensible matter to be one source of the daimon-nature thereby achieving its offspring, 'pre-cosmic' matter. He says: "Hence indefiniteness is not just intelligible indefiniteness, i.e. intelligible matter, but necessarily the whole soul and the indefiniteness of lower matter (which includes in V,3,17 the frustrating indefiniteness and lack of illumination of our own historical experiences). Finally, our general interpretation is confirmed by the fact that in the final chapter of the treatise III,5,9,45ff. Plotinus explicitly states that Poverty is matter, because matter too is altogether in need (...) υλη ευδεης τα παινται. Such a statement can only have its full meaning if Poverty is lower matter". Now it is the error of homonymy to confuse two kinds of matter, the sensible and the intelligible.

affirme qu'il n'y a pas de contraire de l'être, mais que le soi-disant contraire de l'être, c'est-à-dire le non-être, s'identifie à la Forme-Genre de l'autre. Le non-être est alterité 341.

34 Corrigan, "Is there more than one Generation..." 170. See also p.170 note 10 wherein three sources are cited in reference to 'pre-cosmic' matter: IV,3,9,23-25; III,9,3,9-14; and I,8,14,35-40. However, the reference I,8,14,35-40 says nothing about a 'pre-cosmic' matter but only that soul and matter share one place, 'τοπος', soul's separation being understood in ontological rather than spatial terms. Meanwhile, the reference to III,9,3,9-14 is similarly inconclusive for while Plotinus is clearly speaking of the individual soul's descent to matter, there is no reason to suppose that this matter is 'pre-cosmic' nor that it is the intelligible matter so named in III,5,6. The same may be said of IV,3,9,23-25 where the faintness (ευμυδρον) spoken of is not termed 'matter', much less an 'intelligible matter' in any precise sense of the term.

35 Corrigan, "Is there more than one Generation...", 179-80. That Corrigan intends lower matter to have for its referent sensible matter is clear from note 14 wherein he states: "Since, as I have shown above, the matter of the physical world is also the matter which will be of the physical world (i.e. matter is both cosmic and pre-cosmic), I shall use the phrase 'lower matter', wherever appropriate, to retain both significations" 171. Now whether sensible matter be taken in relation to soul or separately qua matter, it nonetheless remains sensible matter.
Assuredly Corrigan tries to avoid the error by reference to a limited 'participation' of his 'pre-cosmic' matter in form. But even if such were true, its participation in form would not entail the strong consequence argued on Corrigan's behalf, namely, that 'pre-cosmic' sensible matter is the intelligible matter so called in the treatise 'On Love'. Instead there entails only the more modest consequence that sensible matter is thereby made intelligible to, that is, is made known to, the soul.  

Second we query the judgement of Corrigan upon the relation of intelligible matter to the descent of the soul. He suggests that this matter appears "...at the end of intelligible reality prior to the generation of the physical universe". And indeed the Enneads say that "...Eros' birth was prior to the sensible, and that Penia shared in the nature of the intelligible". But we must remember the context of this statement, Plotinus here providing an explanation of the ontological declension of soul insofar as it is a substantial existence whose nature is to be particular, a soul of such. We read: "For all Soul longs for the good, even that which is mixed and has come to 'be attached to' something" (III.5[50],3,36-37). Helleman-Elgersma explains: "As οὐσία (9) soul-genus does not primarily belong to anything else: it is as such independent and logically prior to the others. Nor is it as such predicated of a body in the way both our souls and the world-soul may be predicated of their respective bodies; note the use of the genitive τοὺς (6), κόσμου (6), or τινός ἄλλου (7), etc (cf.2.56)". The text employs the genitive indefinite article (τινός) enclitic to identify the particular soul. As such, the ascription by Corrigan of intelligible matter -- 'pre-cosmic' matter -- to an instance prior to the generation

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36 See also Lexicon Plotinianum, οὗ b1 wherein the editors have judged the placement of the text of III.5[50],6,35-45 to belong to the list of texts bearing on intelligible matter.

37 Corrigan, "Is there more than one Generation..." 170.

38 πάσα γὰρ ἐφίεται τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ καὶ ἡ μεμιμένη καὶ τινός γειμιμένη.

39 Helleman-Elgersma 66. On the genitive use, see also Hadot, Traité 50: "...car l'âme du monde, même en sa partie supérieure, reste âme du monde, de même que l'âme individuelle, même en son sommet qui vit toujours dans l'intelligible, est toujours l'âme de tel individu" 55. And note 146. See also Wolters pp.123-124.
of sensible reality is peculiar for it ignores the manifest attachment of mixed soul to body.\textsuperscript{40} Exegetical reasons for this attachment may be located in Pausanias' speech upon the dual genealogies of Aphrodite wherein we learn that mixed soul, the daughter of Zeus and Dione, is soul in its embodied state. Wolters explains: "By identifying these two Aphrodites with Soul in its pure and its embodied state, respectively, and maintaining that Eros is simultaneously 'out of' and 'together with' Aphrodite-Soul, on both levels and in all its manifestations, Plotinus manages to bring together these disparate fragments of myth...".\textsuperscript{41} Corrigan's judgement upon the ulterior generation of sensible reality is therefore untenable to the extent that this generation is \textit{simultaneous} with the soul's attachment to body. Else there ensues the consequence that embodied soul is somehow prior to itself, that is, its attachment to body.\textsuperscript{42} Meanwhile to say that soul is a substantial existence -- the last in the declension of true being\textsuperscript{43} -- is neither fully explanatory nor fully justificatory of our text, for the doctrine of procession does not contravene the teaching on mixed soul and its relations with the sequent.

To understand properly these texts, we suggest instead that the phrase "Eros' birth was prior to the sensible" (ώς πρὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ Ἐρωτὸς γενομένου) be construed differently

\textsuperscript{40} See Corrigan. 'Is there more than one Generation...': "The language of compounding then, is better understood in the context of lower matter at its pre-cosmic stage, which is the field of definiteness pertaining to soul. However, what of the definiteness which soul has before 'hitting upon the Good'? What does this mean? This phrase (and others like it) has to be interpreted. I believe, in a similar manner to the peculiar eternally unlit substratum of Π.4.5, with the proviso that it reflects a slightly changed viewpoint, namely definiteness as it relates to soul instead of lack of light as it implicitly characterizes lower, ultimate matter" 179. But "lower, ultimate matter" is not the same as body.

\textsuperscript{41} Wolters xxiv.

\textsuperscript{42} See Moreau. \textit{Plotin ou la gloire de la philosophie antique}: "Dans la production naturelle, la contemplation de l'idéal n'est pas séparée de sa réalisation par une réflexion médiate, par les calculs de l'intelligence discursive: la contemplation et la réalisation coïncident" 118. And again, "Il n'y a plus lieu, par conséquent, de distinguer entre le reflet transparent de l'intelligible dans l'âme et le reflet opaque projeté dans la matière, s'il est vrai que c'est en elle-même que l'âme produit les objets sensibles" 119. Further complicating Corrigan's exegesis of the text is his affirmation that Penia stands for "lower/pre-cosmic matter" (178) whilst also affirming that soul must descend into "the indefiniteness of pre-cosmic matter" (note 31). But this is plainly confusing for how can Penia -- one element of soul -- be "pre-cosmic" matter and need to descend \textit{to} "pre-cosmic" matter; in such a case, to itself.

\textsuperscript{43} See V.1[10],7,45-49.
to mean the priority of rational upon sensible change in mixed soul. Our procedure will be to purify the text, stripping away misconception and misinterpretation in order to attain a truer reading of the text. As such, our arguments will be largely negative, that is, the refutation of alternative interpretations of the daimon-nature and Penia, the indetermination of mixed soul. Let us begin by examining the lexical evidence. We read that soul shares in the intelligible nature, 'not merely in an image of the intelligible or a reflection from above' (7.4-5). Upon the term 'reflection' Wolters explains: "The verb εµφαντάζεσθαι is used only in the passive and seems to occur rarely outside the Enneads (cf. LSJ). Plotinus generally uses it, as here, to describe the sensible 'appearance' of intelligible reality 'in' (corporeal) matter. ...By the addition of the prefix to φαντάζεσται 'appear' (see on 1.36), Plotinus stresses his view of the relation of sensible reality to matter, which he compares to that of a reflection to the mirror in which it appears".44 It is the Aristotelian form in matter, the whole in, that is, composed of the parts. Lloyd tells us: "The Neoplatonist philosopher John Italos (eleventh century) perfectly understood this, having read his Aristotle through Ammonius' as well as John Damascene's spectacles. For he made it clear that the three properties of genera and species in the many, namely being inseparable, being particular, and not being predicable of many, are mutually implicative".45 To fully situate this interdiction on soul's nature partaking (μεταχειρίσθης) of reflection, let us recall the role of the form in matter for the Neoplatonists. Emilsson observes:

Now, it is in virtue of its form that we say of a composite (of form and matter) that it is a man, and hence one might think that this form which enters into union with matter would satisfy the requirement of being a man by virtue of itself. This, however, is not so. For in Plotinus' view the forms in matter are partners in a union with matter and do not have an independent existence (IV.2.1,47-53; VI.4.1,17-24). The form of the sensible man, even when considered in itself in isolation from its underlying matter, is nonetheless spatially dispersed and hence is contaminated in the sense that it has features that the union with

44 Wolters 173.
matter is responsible for. Therefore, in order to account for the diversity of being as well as for true being itself, Plotinus posits another realm of forms, the model of which is of course the Platonic Forms, whereas historically the forms in matter derive from Aristotle's notion of immanent forms...46

The term 'reflection'(7,5) signifies the whole in the parts, form as it is particularized in the individual subject. Hence, when Plotinus states that mixed soul (Penia) does not partake of reflection, he means to say that the daimon nature does not partake of the form in matter, that is, the sensible quality which is inseparable from body and cannot be predicated of many.47 Penia, one element of the soul's nature, ought not be construed to mean the particular quality. It therefore stands to reason that the daimon whose nature is to be the fusion of a logos (Poros) and an indetermination or intelligible matter (Penia), and whose role as derived act of mixed soul is to be a relational property to sensible reality, cannot be sensation. We draw this conclusion based on the gnoseological perfection, the nature and employments of soul's knowing being clarified in accordance with its origin. Meanwhile our argumentation on the text on the passions of the soul read in the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' where it is maintained that the referent of the soul's passion cannot be sensation upon grounds of homonymy now finds further support upon lexical grounds: to look elsewhere (ἀλλοθεν) implies neither partaking in sensible quality, the image of the image of the form in matter, nor the faculty of sensation.

Again, the relation of the Birth of Eros includes reference to a 'mental image' (φάντασμα) in the soul. Corrigan places this mention in concert with the material 'unlit

46 Emilsson 17.

47 On form in matter as quality, see Emilsson: "In the treatise 'On How Distant Objects Appear Small' (II.8[35]) Plotinus talks about forms from the objects reaching the eyes, and also about colours reaching the eyes (chap.1, passim). ...This is also in accordance with what Plotinus says elsewhere: we know that colours are an example of the so-called forms in matter or qualities (IV.2.1,34-9) and he also says that in sense perception the percipient receives the quality of the object perceived and that sense-perception is of qualified bodies rather than of essences (IV.4.2.3,1-4; II.6.2,17)" 52. Also Emilsson pp.20 & 34.
substratum' read in the early treatise entitled 'On Matter'.

We cannot agree with this view. A first difference concerns the intelligible nature of soul’s matter. Wolters affirms: "Having shown the necessity of postulating intelligible matter, he goes on to say that this is why Plato makes Poros drunk with nectar, not wine, since this indicates that the myth deals with pre-sensible realities and that Penia (traditionally equated with matter) is an intelligible Penia". It follows that soul’s spiritual indetermination (ἀόριστος) cannot be the effect of sensible matter, the Enneads always teaching the impassive nature of soul regarding sensible change. This teaching finds clear statement in the treatise entitled 'The Impassivity of the Unembodied' (III.6[26]) wherein Plotinus teaches the impassivity of soul by virtue of its being a form. As such, Corrigan’s placement of the indeterminate 'mental image' belonging to soul together with the 'unlit substratum' belonging to sensible matter is misleading for sensible matter is never taught to lead to any change within the soul, definite or indefinite.

Meanwhile a second difference concerns the reference of the mental image. Perhaps aware of the above, Corrigan explains his position upon appeal to a 'slightly changed viewpoint'. namely, darkness as it relates to the soul in contradistinction from darkness as it qualifies matter. His suggestion reads, therefore, two instances of indetermination within the text. on the one hand a lower, 'pre-cosmic' matter, on the other hand soul’s darkness in its relations with the substratum. But this appeal to a twofold indetermination is doubtful to the extent that the relation of the Birth of Eros states only one object of indetermination, the 'mental image' within the soul. Wolters clarifies this consequence: "Ἠν...φάντασμα. These words are best understood (and printed) as a parenthesis, since they interrupt both the thought and the

48 See note 40. Also II.4[12].5.10. ...τὸ κατω ὅς ὑπὸ τὸ φως ὑκοτεινοῦν ἡγηται,... Darkness. ὑκοτεινοῦ, being Corrigan's 'unlit substratum'.

49 Wolters 170.

50 See Bréhier’s Notice: "Il s'agit de savoir si l’âme est capable de pârir, et plus généralement de subir des altérations et des mouvements. Plotin se range ici du côté d’Aristote, qui affirme que l’âme est une forme, et que, comme telle, elle est immobile:...". And further, "Chez Plotin comme chez Aristote, l’incorporité entraîne nécessairement l’impassibilité; un état passif ne peut être que quelque chose comme un refroidissement ou un échauffement, et par conséquent, il ne peut appartenir qu’à un corps" 3: 89.
syntax. Plotinus for a moment steps out of the mythological framework to explain that he is talking about the ἀναστήσια of Soul. This is necessary, since the symbols of these ontological realities, Πεντάς and Ἀφροδίτη, have nothing to do with each other in the myth itself. The text on soul's mental image is exegetical rather than sequential in nature. As such, mention of soul's ἀναστήσια cannot serve to introduce a new, second indetermination originating this time within the soul. Corrigan's suggestion that Plotinus means to speak of a first indetermination identifiable with sensible matter, followed by a second indetermination identifiable with soul would appear to have little grounding within the text.

What then is φάντασμα? To answer this question we turn to Emilsson's account of representation and the unity of perception:

Because for Plotinus perception as such is an undifferentiated power, present as a whole in various parts of the body, there is no need to posit a central sense above the special senses to perform this function. But this raises the question what becomes of the other functions assigned to the general sense by Aristotle and Alexander: the perception that we see, hear and so forth and the quasi-sensory apprehension of image (phantasmata) that in the Parva Naturalia are assigned to the general sense. I take it that perception of the so-called common sensibles is included in what Plotinus calls, simply, 'perception' (cf.II.8.1). And again: "We have mentioned earlier that Plotinus maintains that perception results in the generation of extensionless 'entities' in the soul that are variously described as 'intelligible representations' (typoi noétoj), 'forms', or 'images' (phantasmata). Meanwhile the power in the soul which corresponds to the objects of phantasma is called 'phantasia' or representation. Emilsson continues:

51 Wolters 175.
52 Emilsson 107.
53 Emilsson 108.
Plotinus' notion of phantasia is much closer to that of Aristotle than to that of the Hellenistic philosophers, although there are passages where phantasia seems to cover all kinds of apprehension below the level of intellection.

...According to Plotinus phantasia (to phantastikon) is the faculty by which we have images or representations (phantasmata, phantasai, typoi). Both memory and reasoning involve such images, and hence the faculty of phantasia is at work in the operation of these other faculties.

...As one would expect given Aristotle's statement that phantasia is concerned with residua of sensory affections, he maintains that phantasia as a psychic function that depends on the body (De An. 430a8-10). Plotinus, on the other hand, holds that phantasia does not depend on the body for its operation although it is linked with the functions of sense perception and bodily desires which do depend on the body.54

In agreement with Emilsson, we suggest that the mental image so named in the relation of the Birth of Eros has for its referent the object of representation. This assignment is further strengthened on the basis of the placement of the text. We have been given to understand the term 'reflection' as signifying the particular quality, the object of sensation: following upon sensation. Plotinus now distinguishes representation and its object, the mental image, from the daimon-nature or offspring of soul. We turn once again to Emilsson for clarification: "The present passage permits us therefore to fill out the account we have already given as follows: the judgement that constitutes the original sense-perception leaves an intelligible representation of what is perceived in the soul. These intelligible representations are the objects of the faculty of representation". And "...representation is, so to speak, the perception of things that have been internalized by the soul, whereas sense-perception is the judgement of external objects that are internalized in or by this judgement, because the judgement leaves an intelligible

54 Emilsson 107-108. And Hadot, Traité 50: "Avec les traducteurs de 34 (VI,6),3,38 et 17,10...je pense que l'on peut faire correspondre dans certains cas chez Plotin phantasma à 'représentation'" 129. For background, see W.D.Ross, Aristotle (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1923) pp.142-143.
representation of the external object judged". We can say that representation is the internal mediation by mixed soul of the external objects pertaining to perception and sensation. The 'indeterminate mental image' may, therefore, be identified with the object of representation; it is a spiritual as distinct from a physical reality pertaining to soul. Meanwhile, these precisions are valuable for they serve to situate the daimon with respect to sensible reality: when Plotinus says that eros is born 'prior to the sensible', he intends both a logical as well as a metaphysical priority upon sensation and representation. In a word, he means to say that ἐρῶς, the daimon, is discursive reason.

In this section we have proceeded to study the elements which constitute the daimon nature. In particular, we have shown that the affirmation of its birth from an intelligible matter refers neither to the intelligible matter of generic being -- alterity -- nor to the sensible matter construed in a 'pre-cosmic' sense. Instead we situate the reference to an intelligible matter within the gnoseological tradition: it is the affirmation of a rational matter existent within soul by virtue of originative principles. As well, we have carefully identified and explained the multiple referents in the text on the Birth of Eros. We have shown, upon lexical and philosophical grounds, that the referent of the 'reflection from above' is the sensible quality in matter, the descended image of the image of form. Meanwhile the referent of the 'indefinite mental image' is the object of representation, the internal mediation of the sensible images of things. ἐρῶς the daimon is, therefore, a spiritual reality whose referent is neither sensation nor representation; indeed we proceed to suggest that its referent is discursive reason. Meanwhile our procedure is founded upon the Neoplatonic method of purification, of negation, our purpose being to clarify our understanding of the text by eliminating faulty conceptions of the daimon-nature.

55 Emilsson 110.
4: Ἐρως the daimon or discursiveness

Our clarifications upon the nature of soul -- the intrinsic act of being -- and reason -- the derived act of being -- have brought us to conclude: the daimon whose nature is constituted out of (ἐξ) form and intelligible matter is the discursive reason. In light of the gnoseological perfection let us now state the nature and employments of reason based upon a consideration of its origin. Wolters supports our identification of the daimon nature and discursive reason. He states:

The final three chapters of the treatise are concerned with the exegesis of the Symposium myth. Reduced to its essentials, this interpretation is that Eros, as the unstable compound of Indetermination and Determination in Soul, represents Soul's constitutional need to be fulfilled as pure Determination in Intellect, i.e. it is the inherent 'activity of Soul in its straining towards the Good' (4.22). In other words, Plotinus interprets the Penia of the myth to be the lack of rational form of Soul (= ᾤδρῳστία or intelligible ὠλη) and Poros to be the possession of rational form of Soul (λόγος or εἰδος). By their intercourse (=μίξις) they produce Eros as their offspring or resultant (μίγμα), which is therefore the type of deficient rationality in Soul. Since Aphrodite is further identified with Soul, the fact that this birth of Eros takes place, according to the myth, 'when Aphrodite was born' indicates that this kind of deficient rationality (Plotinus means discursive reasoning) does not arise before the coming into existence of the third Hypostasis -- that is to say: Eros and its parents presuppose the existence of Soul (9.6-8,22-23; 39-41).56

Our argumentation upon the inferiors (τὰ δὲ χειρῶ) read in the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' now receives further support in the treatise 'On Love': Ἐρως the daimon -- deficient rationality -- is the inferior reason of mixed soul. Unlike its superior sibling, Ἐρως the god, whose nature is to be an act issuing from the identity of soul's substance

56 Wolters xxv-xxvi.
and act, ἔρωτις the daimon partakes of an inferior nature, the intelligible matter whose nature is described as soul's indetermination.

This teaching on inferior reason may also be read in connection with the employments of logic and judgement stated in Chapter I of the thesis. From Heiser we learn that logic is a lower employment of reason whose matter is the utterance or symbolic item taken separately from its referent. Upon this assignment of logic within the Neoplatonic tradition, Strange observes: "The fundamental disagreement among the commentators was over whether the 'Categories' was a logical work, concerning either simple terms or the simple concepts they represent, or whether it was a work of metaphysics, concerned with the classification of simple entities or concepts by genera. There is more at stake here than merely what the text of the 'Categories' says, but there are certainly textual grounds for the dispute". Logic is, then, only indirectly concerned with being; instead its primary object is the simple expression and act of utterance. We can say that logic is an inferior kind of reason insofar as its practice leads to exactitude -- the well defined term -- rather than to truth -- the knowledge of essence.

Turning now to the rational judgement, we learned that reason engages in the administration of the sensible perceptions in accordance with the rules and measures of the Intellect. The reason so named in the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' -- ἔν λογισμοῖς νοῦς αὐτῆς -- judges and aligns the images received from sense perception with the images -- refracted forms -- received from Intellect. Based on the account of the Birth of Eros, we can say that judgement is an inferior kind of reason to the extent that its exercise depends upon the presence of an indetermination existent within soul, that is to say, the


58 Strange adds: "The Forms are supposed to be the causes of sensibles, but that is a matter that need not fall within the purview of a semantic theory of ordinary language, which according to Porphyry is all that is at issue in the 'Categories'" 963. In this more nuanced view, logic is an inferior kind of reason to the extent that its referent is the sensible reality of ordinary language. Needless to say, for neither Plotinus nor Porphyry does logic have the Platonic separate forms as object. See also Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism p. 150.
'indefinite mental image' of representation. Now the metaphysical expression of this constitutional need is to be a passion, an incompleteness of the soul, whereby reason must pass from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality. Our interpretation of the text on the passions of the soul, read in the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' to mean the inferior employments of reason, now receives further clarification and support from the text on the Birth of Eros read in the late treatise 'On Love'.

Following we situate this deficiency with respect to the rational object:

Eros is like a craving which is by its nature aporos: needy and without means or resources. Therefore, even in the act of achieving its goal, it is again needy. For it cannot be fulfilled, because its mixed nature forbids it. For only that truly achieves fulfilment, which also constitutionally possesses fulfilment. But that which craves on account of its inherent deficiency is like a leaky vessel: even if it does achieve fulfilment momentarily, it does not retain it. Its cleverness, in the same way, is on account of its deficiency, whereas its 'efficiency'

[poristikon] is due to the Reason-side of its nature (III.5[50].7.19-25). 59

Soul's fulfilment (πληροῦται) consists in the necessary and essential relations which obtain between the act of sight and its inherent object, the Intellect: this necessity is explained in the doctrine of conversion, the perfection of reason in the seeing of the soul's prior. 60 Inferior reason, on the other hand, does not contain its own object (οὐ στέγει) but must seek fulfillment from elsewhere. Wolters explains: "It is this quest for a lacking wisdom which Plato describes as Eros's essential φιλοσοφία, its position midway between ἁμαθία and σοφία

59 καὶ ἔστιν ὁ ἐρως οὗν οἰστρος ἀπορος τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει. διό καὶ τυγχαίνων ἀπορος πάλιν. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει πληροῦσθαι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχει τὸ μίγμα. μόνον γὰρ πληροῦται ἀληθῶς. ὅπερ καὶ πεπληρώται τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει. ο ὅ δε διὰ τὴν συνούσαι ἐνδειαν ἔφειται. καὶ παραχρήμα πληρωθῇ. οὐ στέγει. ἔπει καὶ τὸ εὐμήχανον αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν ἐνδειαν. τὸ δὲ ποριστικὸν διὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου φύσιν.

60 See also Trouillard, La procession plotinienne: "C'est dire que la suprême valeur est universelle réalisatrice et que l'idée existe dans la mesure où elle exprime en termes de vérité un 'inconditionné' (ἀνυπόθετον), qui apparaît ici comme une exigence absolue. ...La consistance est la vérité, c'est-à-dire la valeur intrinsèque de l'intelligible. Tel est le principe de la science qui diffère de l'opinion droite, non par une conformité matérielle, mais par un 'enchaînement' (δεσμός), par sa rigueur" 37.
(Symp. 203E ff.), and which Plotinus here calls its 'cleverness', i.e. its discursive reasoning as a deficient mode of true wisdom' \(^{61}\) Instead it sees the soul's sequent, the thing and the logical item, their perfection consisting in the mediated form in matter and the abstract universal or Neoplatonic whole of the parts.\(^{62}\) Such, then, is the nature of reason to be a passion of the soul in consideration of its originative principles Form (Poros) and Indetermination (Penia).

In this section we have elaborated our interpretation of ἐρως the daimon as discursive reason. Agreeing with Wolters, we maintain the view that the daimon-nature is indeed the mythological figure of inferior reason, the offspring of mixed soul. This identification enables us to further clarify and situate the difficult text on the acts and passions of the soul read in the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' cited in Chapter I. We read there that whenever reason looks in toward the prior, Intellect, reason is in act; and these only are the acts of soul (ταύτας μόνας δει λέγειν ἐνεργειάς ψυχῆς). There ensue the inferiors which come from looking elsewhere (ἀλλοθεῖν) and these are the passions of such a soul. Now the teaching of the treatise 'On Love' is similar: discursive reason, the offspring of mixed soul, is an inferior kind of reason to the extent that its object is inferior -- is a sequent of soul -- and its birth is inferior -- it is born of an unstable fusion of form and indetermination existent within soul. Plotinus is, therefore, consistent in his thought: the early teaching on the acts and passions of the soul finds explanation in the late teaching on the two kinds of ἐρως, the god or intellective vision and the daimon or discursive reason.

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61 Wolters 190.

62 Strange informs us: "Abstract universals for Porphyry, unlike the real universal, the Platonic Forms, have a merely conceptual existence, and are indeed posterior to sensible things" 962. As such, they are also posterior to soul.
Now it is common opinion to say that Plotinus can make no room for a science of sensible reality. We began with Irwin's judgement whereby the author of the Enneads is understood to preclude all true knowledge of nature, or what Irwin calls 'spatio-temporal and perceptible objects'. And Irwin is not alone in this judgement, the Neplatonist Trouillard agreeing with him upon somewhat different grounds.\textsuperscript{63} Our evidence, however, suggests otherwise, namely, that inferior reason -- the derived act of mixed soul -- has a potential nature capable of knowing sensible reality. To explain this thought and to complete the second half of this chapter, namely the study of the broader epistemological implications of inferior reason within the Plotinian philosophy, let us turn once more to its Aristotelian antecedents. From \textit{De Anima} we learn that thought has two natures: on the one hand, a passive nature insofar as it becomes all things; on the other hand, an active nature insofar as it makes all things.\textsuperscript{64} Moreover, thought in its passive nature is described as a kind of matter (τὸ μὲν ὑλὴ ἐκάστῳ γείτοι) being like all things. Taylor explains:

> From the point of view of the 'physicist' who is concerned with thinking simply as a type of natural process, the relation of 'understanding' to the mental imagery just described is analogous to that of sensation to sensible qualities. The objects which thinking apprehends are the universal types of relation by which the world of things is pervaded. The process of thinking is one in which this system of universal relations is reproduced 'by way of idea' in the mind of the thinker. The 'understanding' thus stands to its objects as matter to form.

\textsuperscript{63} See Trouillard, \textit{La procession plotinienne}: "Le sensible se présente comme une perspective, c'est-à-dire comme un type de connaissance et un régime d'objectivité. Et cependant, on peut se demander s'il est autre chose qu'une inversion de la pensée, s'il y a en lui un contenu qui ne soit de l'intelligible dégradé, s'il n'est pas, comme appréhension distincte de celle de l'esprit, une simple négation" 7. And again: "Mais les succédanés ne révèlent pas d'eux-mêmes leur origine et leur caractère. ...On ne passe pas par processus continu, mais par illumination et par rupture, de la mentalité empirique à la pensée vraie. C'est que la mentalité empirique ne peut se juger elle-même. Incapable de justifier et d'éclairer le peu de raison qu'elle recèle, elle n'engendre que l'opinion, et son objet ne mérite pas le nom d'être" 24.

\textsuperscript{64} Aristotle, \textit{On the Soul (De Anima)} III,5,430a 10-20.
The process of getting actually to understand the world is one in which our 'thought' or 'understanding' steadily receives completer determination and 'form' from its contemplation of reality. In this sense, the process is one in which the understanding may be said to be passive in knowledge.\footnote{Taylor 84.}

For the Neoplatonic interpretation of thought as a kind of matter, let us now turn to the sixth century commentary of De Anima by Philoponus. This choice allows us to achieve two ends: it sets the background to a discussion of inferior reason from a stance close in time to Plotinus, and it provides clarifications upon the nature of actual and potential knowledge suggested by the epistemology of the treatise 'On Love'.

\textbf{5A: Plotinus and Philoponus on Potentiality}

Introducing his commentary on De Anima 430a10, thought which becomes all things and thought which makes all things, Philoponus states: "We must supply a similar exposition of the things Aristotle says here about the intellect which is in actuality: it must be consonant with what he says everywhere else about the intellect in actuality; it must resolve the problems which arise: and it must make clear to us the reason why certain of his expositors have been led astray to alien expositions".\footnote{Philoponus, On Aristotle on the Intellect (de Anima 3.4-8), trans. William Charlton with Fernand Bossier (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991) 62.} Now Philoponus includes four possible expositions of Aristotle:

But there is dispute about the intellect in actuality. Some say that by this he means the intellect which is universal, that is, divine and creative. ....

Others say that Aristotle is not here referring to the universal and creative intellect. For the creative and divine intellect is not psychical at all. There is another intellect, lower than that but placed next above ours, which irradiates our human souls and perfects them....

According to others he says neither of these things. They do not make the intellect transcend the soul, since he himself says that both the intellect in potentiality and the intellect in actuality are in the soul; but they say our soul has
two intellects, one which is in actuality and one in potentiality. The intellect which is in potentiality is always in the soul, and at a certain time is perfected by the intellect in actuality, but the latter enters from outside. This opinion has been defended by some ostensible Platonists....

In addition to these opinions there is a fourth which is true: that he is speaking of a human intellect which is identical with that which is in potentiality.67

That the third opinion belongs to Plotinus is quite clear, Philoponus citing its adherence by 'some ostensible Platonists' while his editors list four sources for these opinions, one each for Alexander, Marinus, Plotinus and Plutarch.68 More particularly, we draw attention to the two kinds of thought -- in actuality and in potentiality -- found in the soul. This precision is important for it lends credence to our views on the two kinds of reason belonging to soul, one whose nature is to be an act and divine by virtue of its birth, divine soul, and of its object, the Intellect, and one whose nature is to be a passion and mixed by virtue of its birth, mixed soul, and of its object, the sensible reality. The witness of Philoponus advances our understanding of the Plotinian epistemology to the extent that it identifies inferior reason to be potential. This affirmation follows upon our discussion of intelligible matter (ὤλην δεῖ νοητήν) read above: when Plotinus says that eros the daimon is born of form -- logos -- and indetermination -- intelligible matter -- he means to say that eros the daimon, discursive reason, is potential.69

67 Philoponus 63-64.

68 Philoponus p. 63 note 3.

69 To this extent, we cannot fully agree with the judgement of Narbonne on the nature of intelligible matter cited in III.5[50],6.45. Narbonne argues against the view that the intelligible matter so named has a potential nature (être en puissance) and suggests that the text is misleading (trompeuse). But the text is quite clear, intelligible matter is a kind of indetermination ἀφιετίας existent within soul. Now indetermination is the epistemological expression of potentiality. As such, it signifies an incomplete and unformed kind of being. On this subject, see Plotin Les deux matières [Ennéade II.4(12)], trans. Jean-Marc Narbonne, Histoire des Doctrines de L’Antiquité Classique 17 (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1993) in particular pp. 98-99.
Meanwhile the use of the term 'intellects' should not perturb us for Philoponus introduces his remarks with the claim that the intellects in question do not transcend soul but rather, as Aristotle himself teaches, exist 'in the soul'. Hence it cannot be the case that Philoponus is here referring to the Intellect as second hypostasis for the position now advanced on Plotinus' behalf indicates that the 'intellects' so named are found within soul. Philological support for our position may be located in the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' where we read that soul's nature is to be intelligible like its parent, the Intellect (οὐσα οὐν ἀπὸ νοῦ νοερὰ ἐστι, καὶ ἐν λογισμοῖς ὁ νοῦς αὐτῆς 3,12-13). In his commentary to the same treatise, Atkinson recognizes the appropriate application of this terminology to λογισμός, the derived act of soul. He explains: "...in I 8,2,7 ff. νοῦς παρ’ ἡμῖν is compared with Intellect proper; and the same distinction is made in slightly different terms in 10,12 ff. and V 3.3,21 ff. In the first of these latter passages he speaks of two 'intellects' -- one a νοῦς λογιζόμενος (the soul's intellect), and the other a νοῦς ... λογιζεσθαι παρέχων (Intellect the second hypostasis). Soul's intellect is its νοῦς οἰκεῖος (V 2.2.9), although unlike Intellect proper its intellect is 'imported' (ἐπακτός) (V 6.4,16: V 8.3,10)".70 If this is correct, we can affirm a terminological agreement between Plotinus' constant teaching upon reason as a kind of νοῦς λογιζόμενος or ἐν λογισμοῖς and Philoponus' report upon the two kinds of intellect in soul.

But how are we to understand the nature and role of inferior reason, a reason whose nature is the fusion of an intelligible matter and descended form, and is potential? We know from Aristotle that thought in its potential state is likened to a tablet, an immaterial surface upon which may be inscribed the sensible form. Philoponus relates:

The intellect, then, is unaffected according to one meaning of 'affection' which is, indeed, affection in the strict sense; and it is not unaffected according to the other meaning, inasmuch as it is none of the intelligible things in actuality, but all of them in potentiality.

70 Atkinson 59.
He likens it to a tablet which has nothing written on it. Just as on an uninscribed sheet all those things which can be written on it are present in potentiality, on account of its suitability, but none of the things to be written is present in actuality before it is written, so too, the intellect, he says, is no intelligible thing in actuality, but all in potentiality. And just as something you write on when it is inscribed becomes a thing you write on in actuality, yet the form the sheet had before is not destroyed, so too the intellect when it becomes the things understood in actuality is in no way changed from its proper nature.71

Reason that is potential indicates the soul's capacity to receive the sensible forms without alteration to its substantial existence. Now this precision is not without interest for we must remember that there was another view known to Plotinus, that of the Stoa, which claimed that the soul is a body, knowledge of things consisting in a kind of physical assimilation or alteration of the soul in virtue of new pieces of knowledge. Watson explains: "The Stoics attempted to give a completely materialist explanation of reality and the knowledge of reality. They maintained that anything that was real was body. ...The human soul acts, therefore the human soul is a body (SVF II 790 ff.). It is a part of the physical world". And "The universe cannot be explained except by the interaction of bodies. To bring in anything apart from body is to bring in nothing. And the theory of knowledge was the chief testing point. Aristotle introduced something suspiciously like nothing in the De Anima III 5..... Plato was even more obviously a 'spiritualising' philosopher".72 We mention this other view because of the difficulty attached to determining the daimon's matter. As noted above, Corrigan's attribution of a "lower/pre-cosmic matter" to soul leads to confusion for it seems to identify the second

71 Philoponus 57.

72 Gerard Watson, The Stoic Theory of Knowledge (Belfast: The Queen's University, 1966) 9&10. See also Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism on the Stoic λκτου. "But since Stoics held that to be is to be a body or physical object, it follows that, at the least, one meaning they attached to 'incorporeal' was 'non-existent'. In fact I am not sure what else it could have meant. In a logico-metaphysical context the most likely implication of something being 'non-existent', but permanently there to be spoken of, is that it is a 'construction'. ...The proviso is that Stoic references to incorporeals including lekta were reducible to expressions and hence to sounds:...." 55.
"moment" in the generation of sensible matter with the intelligible matter so named in the treatise 'On Love'. Plotinus' acceptance of the notions of form and matter pertaining to the daimon is therefore significant insofar as it posits another basis for a scientific knowledge of nature, that is, the notions of actual and potential knowledge in the soul.

It is not enough, though, to say that the reason which is born of form and indetermination (intelligible matter) is in potentiality for we may ask the further question: 'what kind of potentiality does Plotinus affirm of the daimon, a first or a second potentiality'? Now there are two sources for the discernment of potentiality, one each of Plato and of Aristotle. Philoponus relates:

He here agrees with Plato and anyone else who says that the soul is the place of forms....

And Plato too, just like Aristotle, says that forms are present in the rational soul potentially, not actually. But Plato says they are present in the second sense of 'potentially', present in the way in which theorems are present in a sleeping geometer, when for the ready use of these theorems all he needs is something to remove this impediment. Aristotle, in contrast, says they are present in the first sense of 'potentially', inasmuch as the intellect is by nature able to receive them, but does not yet possess dispositional knowledge, and takes in the forms, as it appears, from things which are perceived".74

This difference between the Platonic potentiality or previous possession of science and the Aristotelian potentiality as realized capacity is important to the extent that it clarifies the daimon-nature as potential, thus laying down the grounds for an epistemology of sensible reality. Now the principal Platonic text is the Phaedo which affirms the doctrine of recollection (ἀναμνήσκεσθαι) of sciences (τὰ ἐπίστηματα) following on our use of the senses

73 That Corrigan intends "pre-cosmic" matter to apply to sensible matter is clearly stated in pp.169-170. "Is there more than one Generation..." on the three moments in the "unfolding" of sensible matter.

74 Philoponus 39. And repeated on p.57.
(ὕστερον δέ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι χρώνενοι 75ε 1-2). That Plotinus cannot mean inferior reason to be potential in the same way as Plato understood our knowledge of the forms to be present in soul may be adduced from a variety of considerations. First, there is the Plotinian teaching on genus and species; so far as soul is the image of the Intellect so far too soul is the necessary refraction of the forms, that is, the subordinate species in act. Unlike Plato, Plotinian philosophy does not understand the refracted form to be present only potentially within soul, but rather in actuality. Second, the doctrine of recollection which plays so important a role in the Platonic philosophy, both epistemologically and morally, is less present in the Enneads. In his Introduction to the treatise ‘On Love’ Hadot places this omission within the changed role of love, the seeing of sensible beauty awakening not so much a recollection of the archetypal forms — Intellect — but rather a knowledge of the nature of soul itself as desirous of beauty. And indeed the text of the treatise ‘On Love’ is clear, Plotinus affirming that pure love is content with (ἀγαπητῶν) beauty alone (τὸ κάλλος μόνον) whether or not there is recollection (ἀναμνησθεῖτα) of the form of beauty. As such, we ought not to assume that the potentiality attributable to inferior reason implies the Platonic doctrine of recollection and the potential knowledge of the forms within soul. Third, that inferior reason does not refer to the Platonic potentiality is further made apparent from Plotinus’ teaching on the amphibious life of soul found in the early treatise entitled ‘The Soul’s Descent into Body’ (IV.8[6]): Plotinus here teaches the ontological declension whereby soul is distinguished into divine and mixed consequent to its birth — as the daughter of Heaven or the child of Zeus and Dione — and the seeing of its object — the Intellect or the thing. Hence it ensues that inferior reason, offspring


76 On the Platonic forms in soul, see Moreau. Aristote et son école 186.

77 Hadot. Traité 50: “D’une manière générale, le théorie platonicienne de la réminiscence est peu développée chez Plotin. Si l’âme remonte de la beauté visible à la beauté idéale, ce n’est pas tellement parce qu’elle se souvient de la beauté contemplée dans une existence antérieure, mais plutôt parce qu’elle prend conscience du désir inné de la beauté qui est inscrit dans sa nature” 36.

78 See 1.38-40 and Wolters pp. 25-6 on the three kinds of lovers, pure, mixed, and evil.
of mixed soul, can have neither the Platonic form for its object nor partake in the nature of that form, that is, as potentially known by virtue of a previous possession of science.

5B: On Disposition

Later Philoponus recounts another view, this time from Aristotle, which suggests that reason has the possession of knowledge of things, this knowledge in some sense being latent. We read:

If Aristotle were speaking here of the creative intellect it would be more reasonable to compare it to the sun than to light; for as the sun produces light and creates its being, so the creative intellect produces that intellect in actuality by which things intelligible in potentiality are made intelligible in actuality, as things visible in potentiality are made visible in actuality by light.

These words are an object of attention to those who laud what Plato says and try to make Aristotle agree with him. For in the earlier passage it looked as if he was placing forms in the intellect potentially according to the first mode of potentiality, comparing the intellect to an uninscribed thing you write on. But if he says here that as light stands to colours, so that which is intellect in actuality stands to that which is in potentiality, and if light does not make colours which did not exist but brings into evidence colours which did not appear, then intellect in actuality does not produce forms which did not exist in the intellect which is in potentiality, but makes manifest forms that were hidden.79

As a first potentiality, reason is likened to an uninscribed surface -- a sort of plastic material -- the existence of which permits the soul to know the abstract universal form elicited from the thing. These universals are the intelligible material of soul. Meanwhile, as a second potentiality, reason is compared to light and knowledge to the existence of hidden forms within soul. Now this precision is revealing to those who wish to comprehend Plotinus within the conciliative tradition of late Antiquity, most especially the several influences of Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Stoicism. From Trouillard we learned that potentiality is the synthetic link

79 Philoponus 73-4.
(le lien synthétique) in our conversion toward the prior. In potentiality exists the latency of an actuality. Let us, then, study the nature of discursive reason as a latency of an actual knowledge of things.

To begin, we examine the judgement of the modern commentators who explain the Aristotelian epistemology based on the notions of actual and potential knowledge of the thing. From Moreau we learn that the reason which is potential -- reason which is capable of determination -- is a second potentiality, a disposition or state capable of receiving forms. Nuyens too rallies to this view, arguing that reason that is potential is a reason that is predisposed to receiving forms just as a general is predisposed to commanding an army even when not actively doing so. Philoponus, on the other hand, restricts disposition to the reason in actuality, offering as explanation the view that it is the same reason in potentiality which is in actuality.

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80 See p. 26 note 50. He says 'notre auto-affirmation' but affirmation is implied in conversion.

81 See Moreau, Aristote et son école: "Pareillement, l'intellect lui-même, nous dit Aristote, ne doit avoir absolument aucune nature, si ce n'est celle-ci: qu'il est capable (ὁτι δυνατόν). Capacité ou puissance seconde, aptitude à recevoir les intelligibles dans leur actualité formelle...." 184. And "L'intellect ne devient pas matériellement n'importe quoi; mais il devient idéalement toute chose;.... C'est pourquoi il n'est pas comparé, comme le réceptacle de Platon, à une cire qui reçoit les empreintes (ἐκμαγεῖον), mais à une page blanche, à une tablette vierge;.... La comparaison d'Aristote tend à marquer la distinction entre l'intellect et le réceptacle, à caractériser l'intellect comme puissance seconde, aptitude universelle, par opposition à la virtualité indéfinie, à l'indétermination et à la passivité de la matière, puissance première" 185.

82 François Nuyens, L'évolution de la Psychologie d'Aristote (Louvain: Éditions de l'institut supérieur de philosophie, 1948). "Un savoir permanent (ἐξίς, habitus) de ce genre, tenant le milieu entre la pure puissance et la pleine actualisation et qu'on peut, à ce titre, appeler une puissance d'un degré supérieur, met celui qui la possède en état de passer de par lui-même à l'exercice de son savoir, c-à-d à l'actualisation dernière de sa puissance" 290.

83 See Philoponus on the text 430a17, "that intellect is separate and not mixed and unaffected": "By the word 'that' he does not mean to refer to intellect in actuality in contradistinction to intellect in potentiality; he refers as a whole to that in the soul which from being intellect in potentiality becomes intellect in actuality. Hence it is both at once that he calls separate, as has been said above" 74.
Following, we know that Plotinus was fully conversant with the Aristotelian teaching on actuality and potentiality. For instance, in the middle treatise entitled 'Potentiality and Actuality' (II.5[25],3) the notion of potentiality is applied to the operations of soul. Moreover from Narbonne we learn that Plotinian metaphysics accepts the notions of actuality and potentiality in terms of a distinction between two kinds of potentiality. To begin there is an active kind which precedes the Aristotelian act in the sense of bringing forth the act of being, that is, substantial existence.\textsuperscript{84} This active potentiality founds the doctrine of procession to the extent that it explains the surfeit of perfection as cause of substance; so far as the One is self-producing, so far its effect is existence.\textsuperscript{85} Meanwhile, Plotinus applies this model of production universally to account for all generation of substantial existence.\textsuperscript{86} In the judgement of Narbonne, this active kind of potentiality is specific to the Plotinian metaphysics, surpassing thereby the philosophies of substance hitherto taught by Plato and Aristotle.\textsuperscript{87} There then ensues a passive kind of potentiality which corresponds to the Aristotelian pair of actual and potential. This potentiality is, properly spoken of, a disposition. It is a nature whose being partakes of actuality inasmuch as it realizes a certain measure of determination.\textsuperscript{88}

\textsuperscript{84} See Narbonne, La métaphysique…: "Cette puissance-productrice-active-première, quasi désincarnée, 'dé-substantialisée' -- ou encore pré-substantielle --, est donc telle qu'elle se veut en-deçà de toute position d'existence, l'existence se présentant plutôt elle-même selon Plotin comme l'effet immédiat et obligé de cette puissance productrice première" 33. This distinction may be compared to the real distinction of two acts explained in Chapter II p.103 note 200.

\textsuperscript{85} See also Aubenque, "Plotin et le dépassement de l'ontologie grecque classique": "En réalité, Plotin est mue ici par une exigence logique qui le pousse à chercher en dehors de l'étant le fondement de l'étant. Car, si l'être de l'étant était lui-même un étant, il faudrait demander derechef quel est l'être de cet étant, et ainsi de suite à l'infini:..." 102. And "Il reste que la relativisation de l'ontologie et la nécessité correlative de son dépassement sont logiquement inscrites dans la question, pensée dans sa radicalité, de l'être de l'étant" 103.

\textsuperscript{86} See Atkinson p. 57 and Narbonne, La métaphysique…: "Elle ne se limite plus, en effet, aux seuls aspects noétiques de la réalité; elle sous-tend en réalité toute la structure métaphysique de l'univers, depuis le principe originel, l'Un, jusqu'à l'Ame" 71.

\textsuperscript{87} See Narbonne, La métaphysique p. 27. And Trouillard, La procession plotinienne: "Chez les platoniciens, 'être a le sens d'ouïa, c'est-à-dire d'essence pleine et concrète" 23.

\textsuperscript{88} See Narbonne, La métaphysique: "L'Ame est ainsi un acte d'un acte, le passage de l'état de repos à l'état de veille, de la possession actualisée de la science à l'exercice proprement 'actif' de cette science se produisant selon Aristote sans intervention extérieure, de manière pourrait-on dire 'spontanée'. ...La disposition (éξίς) est bien une puissance, mais c'est une puissance ayant déjà épuisé ce qui restait en elle de potentialité indéterminée. C'est une puissance,
And is this not the characterization of the daimon given to us in the relation of the Birth of Eros, that Eros the daimon is a nature born of "Form and Indetermination"? Now a nature -- a reason -- born of such parents cannot be reason fully actualized, or reason that is in act. Such a nature belongs to its superior sibling, Eros the god. This is the lesson learned from the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' (V.1[10],3) which teaches that reason which looks in toward the prior, the Intellect, is always an act. Instead we understand the daimon as inferior reason, a reason whose constitutive elements are logos and matter. In a word, inferior reason or daimon-nature is a kind of disposition of soul.\textsuperscript{89}

Textual support for our position may be found in Plotinus' affirmation on the soul's bringing forth in likeness to itself. We read: "Now the Erotes which are natural and in accordance with Nature are fair and good: those which belong to an inferior Soul are inferior as far as their worth and power goes; others are superior; all consist in Substance. But the unnatural loves of those who have gone wrong -- these are affections, and are in no way Substance or substantial Existences. They are no longer brought forth by Soul, but come into existence as concomitants of vice, whereas Soul, for its part, brings forth -- in dispositions and states -- things similar to itself" (III.5[50],7,39-46).\textsuperscript{90} The method of production natural to mixed soul is based on disposition. It is therefore logical to conclude that soul's beloved

\textsuperscript{89} That the daimon cannot mean potentiality in the first sense, pure indetermination, is evident for such is the nature of matter alone, not matter mixed with form. Curiously Hadot does not elaborate this aspect of the text even though he is clearly aware of the issue of disposition as regards reason. "Mais on peut dire aussi de nos pensées, cette fois de nos pensées habituelles, que, lorsqu'elles ne coïncident pas avec ce qui est absolu et universel, elles n'en sont pas moins substantielles, même lorsqu'elles se rapportent à un objet particulier, parce que, dans cet objet particulier, elles voient l'essence universelle et absolue et se rapportent à elle: c'est ainsi que, dans tout triangle, on voit le triangle en soi (7,55-58)" 235. Of course, the object of his commentary was not to draw attention to inferior reason's knowledge of the thing.

\textsuperscript{90} οἱ μὲν οὖν φύσει ἐρωτεῖ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν καλοὶ καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐλαήτων ψυχῆς ἐλαήτως εἰς ἄξιον καὶ δύναμιν. οἱ μὲν κρειττοὶς, πάντες ἐν ὑσια. οἱ δὲ παρὰ ψυχηψ ψαλείτων παθὴ ταῦτα καὶ ὑπάρχει ὑσία ὑπάρχει ὑποτασίας ὑσιώδεις οὐ παρὰ ψυχῆς ἐτὶ γεννώμεναι, ἀλλὰ συνυφιστάμεναι κατὰ ψυχῆς ὑμοῦ γεννήτως ἐν διαθέσει καὶ ἔξεσιν ἡδη. We change Wolters slightly to read 'states' instead of 'attitudes', and leave out 'only' before 'brings forth' which the text does not state.
offspring, eros the daemon, partakes of this nature. Interestingly, Hadot's translation implies that the dispositions (διαθέσεως) and states (εἴσοδος) mentioned herein are born of soul fallen into evil.91 Now this difference is not without importance inasmuch as it clarifies both the gnoseological origin and nature of soul's offspring. We are not inclined to agree with Hadot's reading of the text for several reasons. First, it obscures the distinction made between the offspring of soul whose being consists in substance (ἐν οὐσίᾳ) and the evil passions which are adventitious to soul and which find their source in vice (κακίᾳ). The text is formal: the passions which belong to the fallen nature (οἱ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν ἀφαλέυντων) do not partake of metaphysical perfection; they are neither substance nor substantial, being born no longer of soul. Plotinus' intention is clearly to absolve soul from the causality of vice and its effects. Yet Hadot's reading suggests just the opposite, namely, that soul is responsible for the production of evil effects in accordance with vice. Second, it renders difficult the interpretation of the final phrase whereby soul is said to bring forth in disposition and state. Wolters explains: "ψυχῆς...γενετομένη". This should be taken as a genitive absolute: affections take their rise together with vice, while soul brings forth things like itself. It is paralleled by 47 ψυχῆς ἐνεργοῦσα. All the translators take ψυχῆς as an adnominal genitive dependent on κακίᾳ but this fails to bring out the contrast between the evil πάθη which soul does not produce, and the good ὁμοία which it does produce. To make the point clear, a comma should be put after κακίᾳ.92 We follow Wolters in his judgement for the term 'ὁμοία' is hence in the attributive position and can best be read as the complement of the genitive absolute. Third, Hadot's reading would appear to confuse the categorical register of disposition and state with the accidental register of passions. Wolters tells us:

91 Hadot, Traité 50: "Donc les Amours qui sont naturels et conformes à la nature sont bons moralement. Sans doute les Amours de l'âme inférieure sont inférieurs, en proportion de leur mérite et de leur puissance, les autres sont supérieurs: tous ont un statut de substance. Quant aux amours de ceux qui se sont détourné pour suivre le chemin contraire à la nature, ces amours ne sont que des états de l'âme et ils ne sont en aucune manière substance ni réalités substantielles, car ils ne sont plus engendrés par l'âme elle-même, mais produits en même temps que le vice de l'âme, de l'âme qui, à partir du moment où elle est devenue vicieuse, engendre des produits qui sont semblables à son vice, mais qui n'ont que le statut de dispositions et d'habitudes acquises" 133.

92 Wolters 205.
éν διαθέσει kai ἐξεσι. These complementary terms derive from Aristotelian logic; like πάθος (which Plotinus is here reserving for the affections of those 'who have gone wrong;' see 42) they refer to non-essential attributes, and are as such distinct from ωσία (see on 3.16-17). According to Aristotle, they belong to the category 'Quality' (Cat.8b 27ff.) and are distinguished in that διαθεσις (dispositio) denotes a temporary state and ἐξεσι (habitus) an ingrained 'stance' of the soul (ibid.). Plotinus, in his critique of Aristotle's categories, rejects the distinction as irrelevant (VI,1[42]11.1-7/VI,3[44]19.31-33), but takes over the designation of them as πολύτητες (VI,3[44]16.26/18.24-26/19.31-32; cf.II,6[17]3.22). The two terms are therefore synonymous in Plotinus...

To construe the generation of evil passions as the effect of soul's categorical activity plainly misunderstands the role of the category in the thought of Plotinus. For whether we accept the role of the category as distinguishing terms which signify things -- as Porphyry teaches -- or as distinguishing the things themselves -- as Plotinus teaches -- it is clear that the category cannot have the role of generating passions in the body.

In this section we have elucidated two principal inferences concerning the daimon nature or discursive reason. The first inference draws attention to the potential nature of discursive reason based on its birth from form and intelligible matter. In support, we make reference once again to the fundamental Aristotelian teaching on the passive intellect to be like matter capable of receiving form. Also we list the important Plotinian texts which state the nature of matter to be potential, in particular, the treatises entitled 'On Matter' (II,4[12]) and 'On Actuality and Potentiality' (II,5[25]). To situate this philosophical stance, we make appeal to the witness of Philoponus who affirms the existence of a dual reason within soul, 'one which is in actuality and one in potentiality'. In view of these evidences, we can say with confidence that Plotinus did indeed understand discursive reason -- the offspring of mixed soul

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93 Wolters 206. See also Hadot 133.
whose object is ever the sequent, sensible reality and the logical item -- to be potential in nature.

Also, we try to clarify the kind of potentiality ascribed to discursive reason, whether it is potential by virtue of a previous possession of science, a Platonic potentiality, or whether it is potential in the manner of a disposition to know the thing, an Aristotelian potentiality. Based on our reading of the texts, as well as specific reasons concerning the subordinate species in act adduced in Chapter II, we maintain that discursive reason is potential in the manner of an Aristotelian realized potentiality to know the thing.
6: Plotinus and the Scientific Knowledge of the Thing

Until now we have concentrated on an analysis of the nature of reason to be an act and a passion of the soul. We have shown that Plotinus clearly admits the passive, that is, potential nature of discursive reason. Let us, then, now turn to study the epistemology of Plotinus insofar as it is capable of elaborating a rational basis for the knowledge of things. In order to have an epistemology of sensible nature, Plotinus must account for the true and necessary knowledge of things.

6A: The Particular and the Universal

To begin, we must remember that for Plotinus there exist two kinds of seeing, the rational and the perceptual. In perceptual seeing soul is made aware of the form in matter, the descended image of the image of the Platonic form. Emilsson explains:

We noted earlier that 'form' may mean either 'quality' or 'Form'. In the context of perception, 'form' sometimes means 'quality', sometimes something closer to 'Form', and perception in fact involves the process, or is the process, of transforming the form from the former state to the latter (cf. IV.4.23, 31-2). I say 'something closer to 'Form'', rather than simply 'Form', because there are two stages of the intelligible form, one which is involved in pure intellection at the level of Intellect and another which is involved in discursive thought. The former is what really has the right to be called 'Form' in the strict sense. In any case, it is correct to say that in perception the form is transformed into an intelligible entity.94

Perceptual seeing consists in the knowledge of a 'this', the sensible thing known by means of the particular and inseparable form in matter.95 Hence, the potentiality in question -- the mixture of logos and intelligible matter -- cannot have for its object the 'this'. We have seen that the daimon nature is prior both logically and metaphysically to the reflection of the form in matter, that is, the sensible quality, as well as the extensionless intelligible entities of

94 Emilsson 71-2.

95 See for instance IV,6[41] and V,3[49],9.
representation. Instead, we suggest that inferior reason has for its object the 'such', the abstractable univerals or referents of general terms predicated of the subject.96 Lloyd tells us:

Predicating was 'calling something in accordance with something (τὸ) signified (58.16-17). In this definition what is signified cannot be the thing, the physical object. ...Certainly, when he returns to the definition, the physical object is called the thing (πρᾶγμα) signified. But Porphyrian semantics always referred to two objects of signifying, the direct and the indirect. ...Here the predicate expression is spoken of, or applied to (ἀγορεύεται), the thing which is indicated, but 'signifies such a thing' or 'a thing of that kind'. I say 'but' because it does not make sense, and Porphyry would not have thought it did, to identify 'such a thing as A' with 'A'. Nor can it denote, or refer to, A, since it is not a referring expression in the way that a definite description is".97

Again "Following the famous opening of De interpretacione, Neoplatonists of the third century onwards accepted a formula according to which subject and predicate expressions signified things by the mediation of thoughts (concepts). It is, in fact, Porphyry's own view; and his description of it confirms what we could have supposed -- that the 'such' signified by the predicate word 'stone' coincided with Aristotle's distinction between the universal and the individual which is a 'this".98 Porphyry's formula is the standard Aristotelian, and later Noplatonic, distinction between the universal that is known through reason and the particular that is known through sense perception. But this distinction may equally be traced back to the author of the Enneads, Plotinus affirming a similar distinction between the particular and the universal in the treatise 'On Love': "It follows that our Eros is for universals, since our acts of

96 For background see Strange: "Simpl. In Cat. 79.30-80.7 is probably an amplification, not a criticism, of the position of Porphyry stated just before (79.22-30), pace J. Pinborg, Logik und Semantik im Mittelalter (Stuttgart, 1972), p.39, so that the abstractable universal immanent in the subject is what is predicated of a subject in essential predication, and not the Form" 963 note 29. See also Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism in particular, "Whether or not the application of the word 'κατατεταγμένος' was initiated by him, it was understood in the same way by Porphyry and all his Neoplatonic successors. It indicates the universal, that is the genus or the species as it is 'in' the species or individual respectively" 65.


thought, too, are directed to them. Even if they are directed to something particular, this is true only per accidens. Just as, if someone perceives that this particular triangle equals two right angles, he does this only in so far as it is a universal triangle" (III,5[50],7,55-58);99 Aristotlean in origin, the terms 'τόδε τὸ τρίγωνον' and 'ἀπλῶς τρίγωνον' serve to distinguish the 'this' -- a particular -- from the 'such' -- a universal.100

To clarify this thought we cite the reports of Plotinus' editors. For his part, Hadot cites Metaphysics 1035b1-3 wherein Aristotle speaks of the absolute circle (ἀπλῶς) and the particular circle (ὁ καθ' ἐκαστον) both of which have the same name.101 This reference is, however, not immediately pertinent to our text for it stems from an examination of the subject of generation, for instance that of a sphere out of a matter and a shape or form, the further question then arising as to the relation of the definition of the parts to the definition of the whole. We read: "Must the formula of the parts be contained in the formula of the whole, or not? It seems clear that it is so in some cases, but not in others. The formula of the circle does not include that of the segments, but the formula of the syllable includes that of the letters".102 Aristotle explains this difference in terms of matter and form, on the one hand the segments of the circle being matter for the circular shape or form and thus do not enter into the definition of the whole, on the other hand the letters of the syllable being elements (στοιχεῖα τοῦ λόγου)

99 See Moreau, "L'ètre et l'essence chez Aristote": "L'individu seul est, en étant ceci ou cela, un être défini (τόδε τι), un homme ou un cheval;..." 201. And "La distinction de l'être et de l'essence paraît marquée avec une parfaite netteté dans cette formule tirée de l'Organon: 'Ce n'est pas la même chose que d'être ceci ou cela (εἰναι τέ τι) et d'être absolument (εἰναι ἀπλῶς, esse simpliciter)" 181. And the Lexicon Plotinianum ti", 'd) instances with the article' 1022-23.

100 See Hadot Traité 50 note 263 to the text.

102 Aristotle, Metaphysics VII,10,1034b23 - 26. ...ἀπορεῖται ἢδη πότερον δει τοῦ τῶν μερῶν λόγον ἐπισπαρχεῖν ἐν τῷ τοῦ ὅλου λόγῳ ἢ οὔ. ἐπ' ἐνίων μὲν γὰρ φαίνεται ἐνίσχυσε, ἐνίων δ ὅσι. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ κύκλου ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τῶν τῶν τμημάτων, ὁ δὲ τῆς συλλαβῆς ἔχει τῶν τῶν στοιχείων.
of the form and thereby do enter into the definition of the whole.\textsuperscript{103} We read further on: "This is why the formula of the circle does not contain that of the segments, whereas the formula of the syllable does contain that of the letters; for the letters are parts of the formula of the form; they are not matter; but the segments are parts in the sense of matter in which the form is induced".\textsuperscript{104} These texts, philosophically interesting in themselves, do not serve to clarify our text which bears instead on the relation of the universal and the particular.

Wolters meanwhile cites \textbf{Metaphysics} 1025a32 as regards the example of the triangle, "...being equivalent to two right angles functions as an illustration of an 'accident' which belongs to a particular as such, but not to its essence".\textsuperscript{105} An accident, then, is what the thing has without belonging necessarily to its substantial existence. We read: "'Accident' means that which applies to something and is truly stated, but neither necessarily nor usually...".\textsuperscript{106} And: "'Accident' has also another sense, namely, whatever belongs to each thing in virtue of itself, but is not in its essence; e.g. as having the sum of its angles equal to two right angles belongs to the triangle".\textsuperscript{107} These texts serve to instruct the reader upon two kinds of attribute which may be said truly of a thing without entering into its definition; on the one hand, the

\textsuperscript{103} Upon the difference between matter and form as elements of a thing and its definition, see S. Mansion: "C'est un progrès d'avoir distingué les principes internes d'un être (matière et forme) des causes proprement dites (moteur et fin), qui peuvent du dehors exercer leurs influences sur les êtres. C'en est un d'avoir perçu la différence, dans les principes constitutifs d'une chose, entre les éléments, la matière dont elle est faite, et ce qu'est cette chose, c'est-à-dire sa détermination essentielle" 177-78.

\textsuperscript{104} Aristotle, \textbf{Metaphysics} VII, 10.1035a9-13. διὸ ὁ μὲν τοῦ κύκλου λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τοῦ τῶν τιμημάτων. ὁ δὲ τῆς συλλαβῆς τῶν τῶν στοιχείων τὰ μὲν γὰρ στοιχεῖα τοῦ λόγου μέρη τοῦ λόγου μέρη τοῦ εἴδους καὶ οὕτως ἢῃ, τὰ δὲ τιμημάτα οὕτως μέρη ὡς ἢῃ ἐφ᾽ ἴῃ ἐπιτιγνωσται.

\textsuperscript{105} Wolters 223.

\textsuperscript{106} Aristotle, \textbf{Metaphysics} V, 1025a14-16. Συμβεβηκός λέγεται ὁ ὑπάρχει μὲν τινι καὶ ἄλλης εἰπεῖν, οὐ μὲντιν οὕτο ἔξ ἀνάγκης οὔτε <ώς> ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ..., We leave out "<or 'attribute'>" which only serves to confuse the reader on the kinds of predicate, accidental or proper. See note 107 below on their difference.

\textsuperscript{107} Aristotle, \textbf{Metaphysics} V, 1025a30-33. Λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἄλλως συμβεβηκός. οἷον ὁσα ὑπάρχει ἐκάστῳ καθ᾽ αὐτὸ μὴ ἐν τῇ οὕσῃ ὁντα, οἷον τῷ τριγωνῷ τὸ δύο ὁρθάς ἔχειν.
accident as such, non-essential and external to the thing; on the other hand, the proprium, also non-essential and external to the thing but which is usually (ἐπί τὸ πολύ) said of the thing.\footnote{See Taylor: "...(1) the predicate may state precisely what the subject defined is; then y is the Definition of x, etc. (2)The predicate may not express the inmost nature of the subject, and yet may belong only to the class denoted by the subject and to every member of that class. The predicate is then called a Proprium or property, an exclusive attribute of the class in question." 23. "Or finally (5) y may be no part of the definition of x, but a characteristic which belongs both to the xs and some other things than xs. The predicate is then called an Accident." 24. On the difficulty which attends this distinction, see Lloyd, "Neoplatonic logic and Aristotelian logic - I": "The point is, again, that two-footedness is not a kind of animality, so that it is, rather, an extrinsic and therefore accidental determination of it. (This tends to be overlooked when as often, a classification is represented with the names of the differentiae instead of the names of the species.) True, the doctrine of 'proper' differentiae, ὁκείας διαφοράς χρήσθαι, is a denial that they are accidents. But is it tenable within the genus-species logic? It leaves them extrinsic and yet intrinsic." 70.}

Of textual interest as concerns Plotinus’ example of the triangle, the point being made about actual and potential knowledge is, however, left ignored. For his intention is not to clarify the difference between accidental and proper attributes of a thing, that is, the list of predicables, but rather to show the relation which obtains between universal and particular.

The references of his editors thus clarified, let us now turn to read a series of short texts which state the Aristotelian position on knowledge of the universal. In Posterior Analytics I, a work dating from his middle period, we read: "Scientific knowledge cannot be acquired by sense-perception. Even granting that perception is of the object as qualified, and not of a mere particular, still what we perceive must be a particular thing at a particular place and time. On the other hand a universal term of general application cannot be perceived by the senses, because it is not a particular thing or at a given time; if it were, it would not be universal; for we describe as universal only that which obtains always and everywhere". And "Again it is obvious that even if it were possible to perceive by the senses that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles, we should still require a proof of this; we should not (as some maintain) know that it is so".\footnote{Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, 87b28-34. Οὐδὲ δὲ αἰσθήσεως ἔστω ἐπίστασθαι. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἑστιν ἡ αἰσθήσις τοῦ τοιούτου καὶ μὴ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ’ αἰσθάνεσται γε ἀναγκαῖον τὸ δὲ τι καὶ ποὺ καὶ ἵνων, τὸ δὲ καθόλου καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἀδύνατον αἰσθάνεσθαι, οὐ γὰρ τὸ δὲ οὐδὲ ἵνως, οὐ γὰρ ἄν ἦν καθόλου, τὸ γὰρ ἄει καὶ πανταχοῦ καθόλου φαμέν εἶναι. And 87b35-37. ...ἀλλὰ δὴν ὅτι καὶ εἰ ἦν αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ τρίγωνον ὁτι δυσίν ὀρθάις ἴσας ἔχει τᾶς γωνίας. Εζητοῦμεν ἄν ἀπόδειξιν καὶ οὐκ ὑσπερ φασὶ τινὲς ἡπιστάμεθα.}
will the elements be knowable; for they will not be universal, and knowledge is of the universal. This can be seen by reference to proofs and definitions; for there is no logical conclusion that a given triangle has its angles equal to two right angles unless every triangle has its angles equal to two right angles, or that a given man is an animal unless every man is an animal".110 In De Anima, a work dating from the final period, we also read: "Again, actual sensation corresponds to the exercise of knowledge; with this difference, that the objects of sight and hearing (and similarly those of the other senses), which produce the actuality of sensation, are external. This is because actual sensation is of particulars, whereas knowledge is of universals; these in a sense exist in the soul itself".111 Aristotle is therefore constant in his teaching upon the role of universals for the elaboration of science, from the earlier works on logic and metaphysics through the later psychological works.112 Logically the universal is the middle term of the causal syllogism which sets forth the reason why such is the case in all occurrences of the case. It is the whole said of the parts, primary in the order of demonstration but posterior with respect to us. Taylor observes: "Looking at scientific reasoning, then, from the point of view of its formal character, we may say that all science consists in the search for 'middle terms' of syllogisms, by which to connect the truth which appears as a conclusion with the less complex truths which appear as the premises from which it is drawn. ...Since it is a rule of the syllogism that the middle term must be taken universally, at least once in the premises, the search for middle terms may also be described as the search for universals, and we may speak of science as knowledge of the universal interconnections between facts and

110 Aristotle, Metaphysics XIII, 10, 1086b33 - 37. Ἐτι δὲ οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμη τὰ στοιχεῖα· οὐ γὰρ καθόλου, ἢ δ᾽ ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου. δῆλον δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν ἀποδείξεων καὶ τῶν ῥοσμῶν· οὐ γὰρ γίγνεται συλλογισμὸς ὅτι τὸ ἔδε τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθαί. εἰ μὴ παίν τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθαί. οὖν ὅτι διὸ ἐκ ἀνθρώπου ζώον εἰ μὴ πᾶς ἀνθρώπος ζῷοι.

111 Aristotle, De Anima II, 5, 417b19 - 24. καὶ τὸ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν δὲ ὁμοίως λέγεται τῷ θεωρεῖν· διαφέρει δὲ, ὅτι τοῦ μὲν τὰ πολλὰ τῆς ἐνέργειας ἐξουθεν. τὸ ὀρατόν καὶ τὸ ἀκοῦσθαι. ὅπως δὲ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν αἰσθητῶν. αὐτοῦ δὲ ὅτι τῶν καθ᾽ ἐκαστὸν κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν αἰσθησίας. ἢ δ᾽ ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου· ταύτα δ᾽ ἐν αὐτῇ πώς ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ.

112 On the chronology of the Aristotelian corpus, see Nuyens pp. 10 & 184 on the authorship of Metaphysics Book XIII 1086a21 ff., p. 113 on the authorship of Posterior Analytics, and p. 216 on the authorship of De Anima.
ontologically, the universal tells us what something is, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, its essence or formal cause.\footnote{Taylor 35.}

With these evidences in hand, let us now return to the text on the universal and the particular from the treatise ‘On Love’. Clearly Plotinus intends the realization that ‘this’ particular triangle equals two right angles to pertain to scientific knowledge only if (εἰ) there exists a universal triangle (ἀπλῶς τρίγωνον) as necessary ground of explanation. But so too Aristotle who maintains the view that all true science is science of the universal, that which is invariable and demonstrable.\footnote{See Moreau, Aristote et son école: “D’autre part, la critique des Idées platoniciennes, telle qu’elle s’exprime dans le premier livre de la Métaphysique, suppose une épistémologie héritée de Platon, et qu’on peut faire remonter, suivant Aristote, à Socrate lui-même: la science ne saurait avoir d’autre objet que l’Universel. ...C’est la réalisation et la séparation de l’Universel, le réalisme de l’Intelligible, la dualité de l’intellogible et du sensible que rejette Aristote, mais non le rôle épistémologique de l’Universel, la fonction de l’Idée dans la connaissance” 37.}

Besides we have learned that soul -- the descended image of the Intellect -- does indeed have the subordinate species in act; it is the refraction of the forms within divine soul.\footnote{See pp. 73-75 & pp.89-93 on genus and species. Also p. 23 note 49 on the treatise ‘The Virtues’ I.2[19],4,21-25 wherein soul is said to have impressions of τύποι of the forms.}

And Aristotle agrees with the Platonists who affirm that soul is ‘in some sense’ the place of forms. We read in De Anima: "It has been well said that the soul is the place of forms, except that this does not apply to the soul as a whole, but only in its thinking capacity, and the forms occupy it not actually but potentially".\footnote{Aristotle, De Anima III,4,429a27 - 30. καὶ εὖ δὴ οἱ λέγοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τόποις εἶδων. πλὴν ὅτι οὔτε ὅλη ἂλλ' ἡ νοητικὴ, οὔτε ἐντελεχείᾳ ἄλλα δυιάμει τὰ εἶδη.} But now a difficulty arises: how is it possible for Plotinus to affirm on the one hand that soul has the subordinate species in act while yet on the other hand admitting the potential, that is, receptive nature of inferior reason? This is unlike Aristotle whose metaphysics of immanent form amply supports his logic, all subsequent statements of genus and species resting upon the
disjunction of their lowest species with individuals as the immediate subjects for species. Lloyd relates: "To this the Neoplatonist retorts that a genus which is a potentiality is incapable of accounting for this necessity [of genus and difference]. In order to have such an effect it would have to be real, whereas on Aristotle's principles it is only the disjunction of its lowest species. ...This is simply the Boolean principle that a class which is included in two other classes is the logical product or conjunction of the pair; and from that it follows unavoidably that the superordinate species and genera telescope into the lowest species".118 The Aristotelian analysis of genus and species, form and substance is coherent to the extent that it understands the form in matter to give consistency to the thing, the logical notions of genus and species existing only as second substances (δεύτεραι δὲ οὐσίαι) -- classes -- in which first substances -- things -- are present.119

6B: The Aristotelian Background of Alexander of Aphrodisias

In fact, we see no difficulty befalling Plotinus. Our reasons are fourfold. First, we must remember that the Plotinian inferior reason partakes of an actuality: this actuality is disposition or the realized ability to know the nature of a thing. Amongst the Aristotelian commentators, this was apparently the view held by Alexander of Aphrodisias. Philoponus relates the background to Alexander's view:

118 Lloyd, "Neoplatonic logic and Aristotelian logic - I" 71-2. See also Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism pp. 56-8 on 'When is a proposition one proposition?' and the individuation of compound sentences in terms of 'signifying a single thing'.

119 See Aristotle, Categories, trans. H.P. Cooke and H. Tredennick (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938) in particular V, 2a13-16. δεύτεραι δὲ οὐσίαι λέγονται. ἐν οἷς εἴδεισιν αἱ πρῶτοι οὐσίαι λέγομενι ὑπάρχουσι. ταῦτα τε καὶ τὰ τῶν εἴδων τούτων γενή... See also W. D. Ross, "The main point is this: -- the world which is given to us in experience is a world of concrete individual things acting and reacting on each other. In contemplating these we become aware of characters common to many individuals. These are for Aristotle as real, as objective, as the individuals. They are not in any sense the work of the mind, any more than are the Forms to Plato. But he warns us to assign to them only that mode of existence which is proper to universals, viz. existence as characteristic of individuals. We must not posit a separate world of universals" 157-8. And Moreau, "L'être et l'essence dans la philosophie d'Aristote": "Comment l'eidos, qui avec le genre est expressément relégué, dans le Traité des Catégories, au rang d'ousia seconde, peut-il, dans la Métaphysique, être caractérisé comme l'ousia première, d'après laquelle le sujet concret, l'individu, est ce qu'il est? ...Il faut comprendre que l'eidos est d'autre nature que le genre: bien qu'il ait une extension, il n'est pas un universel à la rigueur..." 188.
That is, just as a sense is none of the sensibles [actually] but is potentially like them, and is perfected by them and becomes actually similar, so too the intellect has no form of anything intelligible but is a thing which is potentially they, and when perfected by them it becomes actually what the intelligible things truly are. ...so, plainly, Aristotle means that it is the same intellect which is first in potentiality and then in actuality. It is not as Alexander imagined: that the intellect in actuality by which intellect in potentiality is perfected is different, the latter becoming not intellect in actuality but only dispositional intellect.\textsuperscript{120}

Clearly Aristotle understands the existence of a dual intellect, one of which is in actuality, higher and different to the intellect which is potential and a disposition. Also from Porphyry, we know that Plotinus had the works of Alexander and other Aristotelians read aloud in his school.\textsuperscript{121} Hence Plotinus' position may be placed in the context of the authority of the commentators who affirm that there are two distinct kinds of reason, actual and potential. Further clarifications may be obtained if we bear in mind that Alexander understood the active intellect in the manner of the Platonic Good, that is, the supremely intelligible. As such, the subsistence of the intelligibles -- or more correctly their descended images -- within divine soul does not preclude inferior reason being potential. For inasmuch as Alexander may affirm the active intellect as the supreme intelligible whilst yet affirming the potentiality of reason to know the thing, so too Plotinus may affirm at once the subsistence of the subordinate species in act within divine soul and the potentiality of inferior reason within mixed soul.

In view of the importance of this thought as background for the understanding of Plotinus, let us pause to consider briefly Alexander's psychology. The modern commentators tell us that Alexander's noetic maintains the reception and rational comprehension of the sensible reality based on the abstractive power of the soul. Moreover, this teaching is constant in the Alexandrian tradition, whether it be attributed to the intellect in potentiality or material

\textsuperscript{120} Philoponus 35. We leave out '[from it]' after 'is different,' the emendation adding nothing to the text.

\textsuperscript{121} See Porphyry, \textit{Vita} chapter 14.
intellect (ιοὺς ὑλικός) found in his work entitled De anima, or to the intellect in disposition (ιοὺς ἐν ἕξει) found in a contested work entitled De intellectu. Now it is beyond our purpose to decide on the authenticity of the latter text, our interest lying instead in the opposite direction, that is, the elucidation of the abstractive process as it relates to the potential nature of inferior reason. On the one hand, we learn that in both works the material intellect is understood to be receptive, its perfection consisting in the acquisition of knowledge -- forms -- of things. This is the intellect in disposition. In both works, there exists an active intellect, separate in nature, whose role is to preside over abstraction as the supreme intelligible, all other objects of knowledge locating their formal cause therein. This is the divine intellect. On the other hand, we learn that there exists at least two major differences regarding the operation and nature of abstraction described in these works: firstly, unlike De anima wherein Alexander attributes the abstractive power to the material intellect, the De intellectu attributes this same power to the intellect in disposition; secondly, whereas the De anima construes the intellect in disposition to depend upon the prior operation of the material intellect, its abstractive and receptive powers, the De intellectu understands the opposite, namely that the intellect in disposition is actualized by the active intellect. These differences aside, what is important to retain for our purpose is the clear recognition of an intellect in disposition whose role is the

122 On this subject, see Bernardo C. Bazán, "L'authenticité du 'De intellectu' attribué à Alexandre d'Aphrodise," Revue Philosophique de Louvain 71 (1973) 468-87. And Frederic Schroeder and Robert Todd, Two Greek Aristotelian Commentators on the Intellect, the 'De Intellectu' Attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias and Theristius' Paraphrase of Aristotle 'De Anima' 3.4-8 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1990).

123 See Bazán: "L'intellect agent est donc cause de l'intelligibilité des choses sensibles en tant qu'il leur donne leur principe d'intelligibilité, à savoir la forme" 472. And "Dans les deux ouvrages l'intellect agent est assimilé à la divinité, et son concept est appelé ιοὺς δύναμεν" 473.

124 See Bazán: "Cependant M. Moraux a mis en évidence des divergences qui opposent les deux traités: 'Le ιοὺς ὑλικός était dans le De anima une faculté complètement développée en tant que puissance opérative; dans le De intellectu, seul le noûs ἐν ἕξει peut abstraire; dès lors, le ιοὺς ὑλικός ne sera plus qu'un état imparfait de la faculté, une pure puissance à la réception des concepts. Second changement capital: dans le De anima, la ἕξει se constituait grâce aux traces laissées dans la mémoire intellectuelle par l'activité abstractive, réceptive et cognitive du noûs δύναμεν. Dans le De intellectu, le passage à la ἕξει n'est plus la conséquence de l'opération intellectuelle, mais bien le développement de la faculté intellectuelle elle-même" 474.
abstraction of forms from matter in consequence of its illumination by the divine intellect, its
formal cause. We suggest further that the subordinative relation between the two Aphrodites
given as explanation of the ontological declension of soul observed in Chapter II now finds its
noetic application: by virtue of the descended image of the forms held within divine soul,
mixed soul is capable of abstracting the forms in matter, that is to say, it is able to lend
intelligence to the immanent form based on the latter's participation in and subordination to the
intelligible form.\footnote{See Paul Moraux, Alexandre d'Aphrodise, exégète de la noétique d'Aristote (Paris, 1942)
131 qtd in Bazán: "Entre la forme de qualité inférieure, si l'on peut dire, qui est contenue dans
le sensible, et la forme immatérielle (ou νοῦς ὑποθετεῖν) possédée par l'esprit, il existe un
rapport de subordination (ἀναφορά); donc, si l'intellect peut dégager la forme du tout matériel
où elle est virtuellement intelligible, c'est parce que d'une part, il possède en lui une forme
pure, et que d'autre part il rapporte la forme sensible à cette forme intelligible en acte" 475.}
For a thinker like Plotinus, the elaboration of a scientific knowledge of
sensible reality must depend on the Platonic forms; however, rather than an effort of
recollection whereby mixed soul is reminded of its prior and progenitor, Intellect, Plotinus is
led to affirm a relation of priority and posteriority, of ontological and formal dependency, in a
word, of subsumption.\footnote{See Bazán: "L'abstraction consistera précisément à ramener les formes immergées dans la
matière à l'intelligibilité en acte semblable à celle que possède l'intellect grâce à la présence en
lui du nous venu du dehors" 477. And "Ce qui, d'après l'exposé de M. Moraux, était
pleinement contradictoire dans le De anima, devient plus cohérent dans le De intellectu:
l'intellect matériel reçoit une première actualité (le nous venu du dehors) sans qu'il doive
exercer aucune activité (ce qui lui serait d'ailleurs impossible), car cette actualité provient de
l'intelligible par excellence, source de toute intelligibilité; et c'est ainsi actualisé que notre
intellect est apte à connaître" 477-78.} We can say that inferior reason passes from a state of potentiality
to a state of actuality whenever it takes up the particular and places it within the universal
soul, that is to say, in the species being.

6C: Implicit and Explicit knowledge of the Thing

Second, the term 'potential' has both a metaphysical as well as an epistemological
meaning. Lloyd explains:

There is, however, Aristotle's metaphysical reply to the problem of necessity.
The unity of the specific essence is the self-explanatory unity of form and
matter. In a way the necessity of genus and differentia together is what Aristotle
meant by matter (not, of course, prime matter); for since man includes two-
fooledness and animal is potentially man, his whole matter lies in a potentiality of animal... But 'potentiality' can only be another way of saying, 'Animals may be two-footed', that is, 'Some animals are men'. No, it has to be more than that, for all men are animals, that is, what is two-footed must be animal....127

Inferior reason presupposes the latency of the genus and its possible application to any particular case. As well, we may situate this thought with respect to the notion of causal dependency examined in Chapter II.128 We learned there that Plotinian philosophy teaches an hierarchical order of being which construed that every member of a series depends upon the first for its existence. Now this rule argues for the potential existence of the prior in its sequents, thus explaining the latter's existence as well as its constituent properties.129 This is other than its superior sibling, eros the god, whose nature to be eternally act is the metaphysical substantialization of soul's necessary relations with the prior, Intellect.

Concerning the epistemological meaning, let us read what modern Aristotelian have to say about actual and potential knowledge of sensible reality. To begin, we learn that Aristotle's philosophy is widely understood to contain "a discrepancy between the real and the intelligible". that is to say, between the most real or concrete individual substance and the most intelligible or demonstrative knowledge by means of universals. Leszl situates the difficulty: "This conflict in his system is usually attributed to the existence of two incompatible strands of thought, one of which is close to a form of empiricism and is typically Aristotelian, while the other is 'idealistic' (meaning by this that it takes what is conceptual or formal as the ultimate

127 Lloyd, "Neoplatonic logic and Aristotelian logic - I" 71

128 See p.73.

129 See Strange: "The sort of priority involved in both versions of the P - principle is the Academic priority in nature or ontological dependence. ...We can see why from the 'De Anima': each term of the series exists in its successor \( \epsilon \nu \tau \omega \epsilon \phi \epsilon \eta \zeta \upsilon \pi \alpha \alpha \chi \epsilon \), at least potentially (414b29-30), so that removing the former also removes the latter" 967. And "Plotinus also conceives of the ordering of P - series as involving natural priority. But he understands natural priority in a more restricted sense than does Aristotle: not merely as ontological dependence, but also as causal priority" 967.
reality) and derives from Plato.  Aristotle himself introduces the text of Metaphysics XIII upon mention of this difficulty.  It is this sort of apparent inconsistency in Aristotle’s thought that the Neoplatonists typically exploit when they turn their attention to ascertaining the universal and scientific knowledge of the sensible reality.

Aware of the difficulty, Leszl suggests a solution which is both elucidating and possibly Neoplatonic in character. He explains further:

Another step for the comprehension of the main text under consideration lies in recognizing that Aristotle cannot be saying that potential knowledge has one object and actual knowledge another object, for a potentiality is the potentiality of what is actual. If actual knowledge is about the individual (though not qua individual), also potential knowledge is about the individual: it is the potentiality to have (actual) knowledge of the individual. Aristotle, then, is distinguishing two types of knowing, both referred to the particular; neither of which, however, is of the particular qua particular.

Mixed soul, worldly Aphrodite, has for its object sensible reality; it is knowledge of the thing, a particular. Moreover, we have been given to understand that soul’s offspring -- eros the daimon or discursive reason -- is potential by virtue of its birth from logos and intelligible matter. We have further clarified its potentiality to mean disposition, a realized potentiality to know ‘such’. Now Leszl’s suggestion elucidates Plotinian philosophy and the epistemological employment of inferior reason: when mixed soul has knowledge of the thing, this knowledge consists in the ability to know that this triangle (τὸδε τὸ τρίγωνον) enters into the species-

130 Walter Leszl, "Knowledge of the Universal and Knowledge of the Particular in Aristotle," Review of Metaphysics 26.2 (Dec. 1972): 278. See also Moreau, Aristote et son école: "...mais l’espèce seule est actuelle, est une ousia, une forme substantielle. Le genre ne s’actualise que dans telle ou telle espèce;.... Mais cette solution, qui identifie l’ousia ou la substance avec la forme de l’espèce, est-elle compatible avec la conception pour qui la substance était le sujet concret, individuel? ...C’est à surmonter cette difficulté capitale que tendra tout l’effort de la métaphysique aristotélicienne" 33.

131 See Aristotle, Metaphysics XIII, 10, 1087a11 - 15.

132 Leszl 294.
being of triangle (ἀπλωσ τρίγωνον) as necessary ground of explanation. It is analysis or the search for premisses. This is distinct from the perceptual judgement whose only statement is to show that something, a 'this', conforms to the shape of triangle. Perception is therefore a kind of judgement to the extent that statements like 'I see an ox' or 'I hear a bird chirping' may correctly be replaced by truth bearing propositions. Emilsson explains:

It may be asked whether such common reports of perception as 'I see a man' do not constitute counter examples to the thesis that perceptions are judgements: 'a man' does not express a judgement. I do not know what Plotinus' answer to this would be, but let us firstly note that it surely can be argued that perceiving that [proposition] is more basic than perceiving [object or event], that expressions of the latter type are in fact shorthand for, or analysable as, expressions of the former type. Thus, for instance, one might suggest that 'Jones sees a house' can be analysed as 'Jones sees that there is a house over there' or 'Jones sees that x is a house'.

But perceptual knowledge differs from rational knowledge insofar as it identifies a being as 'this' without simultaneously providing a ground or causal explanation for the being of 'such'. Leszl observes:

One must not confound the latter assertion [something is a triangle] with the minor premise of a scientific syllogism like 'All triangles have their angles equal to two right angles; this figure is a triangle; hence this figure has its angles equal to two right angles.' For if the syllogism is in fact scientific, the minor premise is itself universal in principle and already presupposes the identification of something as a certain geometrical figure,... the fact (stated by the minor) that a geometrical figure with certain properties is a triangle being non-contingent and capable of being expressed by a statement which belongs to science (and not to opinion or to intuition)".


134 Leszl 299 note 51.
The perceptual judgement is limited to identification; it is the realization that something may properly be called a 'this' whilst implying neither an explanatory knowledge of 'such' nor the generality that every 'this' is a 'such' and will ever be so.\textsuperscript{135}

Following we notice that potentiality can also mean the implicit knowledge of things. Once again Leszl tells us:

In possessing that general knowledge about every triangle one does possess it, in a way, about this triangle as well; for it is a triangle, and thus it satisfies those descriptions which apply to every triangle. ...In other words, with reference to the particular case, possessing a certain truth about all triangles is implicitly (hence potentially) knowing what is true about this triangle. But only when the actual content of knowledge, which is always a certain rule or necessary connection that is in principle universal, is applied to the particular case... does the knowledge become explicit (hence actual) knowledge about the particular case.\textsuperscript{136}

Now for both Aristotle and Plotinus all learning depends upon previous knowledge. In the case of Plotinus, this view is clearly stated in the text of the treatise 'On Love', knowledge of the particular triangle -- a perceptual knowing -- having for its ground (καθόσον) knowledge of the universal triangle -- a rational knowing. We may also recall the nature of potential reason as disposition, a realized ability or kind of implicit knowing whose actualization depends upon the subordinate species in act for the full exercise of thought. In the case of Aristotle, this view is taught in \textit{Posterior Analytics} I: "All teaching and learning that involves the use of reason proceeds from pre-existent knowledge".\textsuperscript{137} And

\textsuperscript{135} See Brody, "Logical Terms, Glossary of": "generalization, rule of. The rule of inference that allows one to infer from every proposition another proposition that is the same as the original one except that it is preceded by a universal quantifier binding any variable" 65.

\textsuperscript{136} Leszl 295-6.

\textsuperscript{137} Aristotle, \textit{Posterior Analytics} I,1,71a1 - 2. Πάσα διδασκαλία καὶ πάσα μάθησις διαιρητικῆ ἐκ προπαρχοῦσης γίγνεται γιώσεως.
Sometimes it is necessary to assume the fact beforehand (προσταλαμβάνειν), and sometimes one must understand the meaning of the term; sometimes both are necessary. ...Recognition of a fact may sometimes entail both previous knowledge and knowledge acquired in the act of recognition; viz., knowledge of the particulars which actually fall under the universal, which is known to us. We knew already that every triangle has the sum of its interior angles equal to two right angles; but that this figure inscribed in the semi-circle is a triangle we recognize only as we are led to relate the particular to the universal...

Whenever soul takes up the particular within itself, knowledge of the universal is actualized.

We can say that in analysis, potential knowledge is rendered actual by making manifest of universals which are existent in soul. Now this position does two things: on the one hand, it explains the view held by both Alexander and Plotinus that the reason in actuality is not the same as the reason in potentiality, but that reason in potentiality is led only to disposition.

Disposition is implicit knowledge or the power to know particulars as instances of the universal. Again Leszl explains: "The difference between them lies in the fact that potential knowledge is the unactualized capacity to apply the general rule to any particular case which falls under it, and actual knowledge is the actualization of this capacity by application of that rule to a given particular case". Following Trouillard, we suggest that the soul's universal knowledge means the latency (latence) to know that such is the case, its actuality relying upon the ascent whereby soul takes up the sensible reality within the intelligible.

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138 I.1.71a12 - 14. тα μεν γάρ ὅτι ἐστι προσταλαμβάνειν ἀναγκαῖον, τά δὲ τί τὸ λεγόμενόν ἐστι ξυνίσκαι δεῖ, τά δ’ ἀμφότερον ἐστι δεῖ. And I.1.71a17 - 22. ἐστι δε γινόμενον τα μεν πρότερον γινώσκειν. τῷ δὲ καὶ ἀμα λαβάνοντα τὴν γνώσιν, ὅποι ὅσα τυγχάνει ὡς ὧν ὁ καθόλου ὅτι ἔχει τὴν γνώσιν ὅτι μεν γὰρ πάντων ἡμικυκλίων ἐχει δυσώς ὅμοιος ὅποι προῆδει, ὅτι δὲ τὸν ἠμικυκλίων ἡμικυκλίων ἐστιν ἀμά επαγορίου ἠγιώρισει.

139 Leszl 303. We leave out the following sentence which immediately proceeds the quotation. "On this account, then, potential and actual knowledge have the same contents, namely the rule or connection expressed by the mentioned hypothetical proposition". Rather than 'the same contents', we suggest that actual and potential knowledge have the same object, the thing. Besides, this coincides better with Leszl's own affirmation on the two kinds of knowing, 'both referred to the particular'.

140 See Trouillard on potentiality in p. 26 note 46.
On the other hand, the actualization of reason as a kind of implicit knowledge of the soul clarifies one element of the inferiors (τὰ δὲ κειρῷο 3,19) read in the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases': reason that is a passion of the soul must look elsewhere (ἄλλοθεν) and leads to the incomplete grasp of its object. To situate the difficulty attached to knowledge of the soul's sequent, Taylor explains:

This exactly illustrates Aristotle's conception of the function of induction, or comparison of instances, in fixing attention on a universal principle of which one had not been conscious before the comparison was made.

Now comes in the point where Aristotle differs wholly from all empiricists, later and earlier. Mill regards the instances produced in the induction as having a double function: they not only merely fix the attention on the principle, they also are the evidence of its truth. ...Aristotle avoids a similar inconsistency by holding that the sole function of the induction is to fix our attention on a principle which it does not prove. 141

As one kind of empirical reasoning, induction is inferior to demonstration because the method of comparison does not constitute proof regarding the nature and causal relations of its instances. We have seen that causal proof requires that the attribute or universal be true of every instance of the subject. But this is precisely where inductive reasoning suffers most, the universal statements ordinarily made in the natural sciences far outmeasuring the efforts at enumeration acceptable to induction. 142 As well, this consideration suggests an interesting exegesis of the text of the treatise 'On Love' wherein Plotinus denies constitutional fulfilment (πληρούται) to inferior reason based on its inability to contain (οὐ στεγεί) that which it craves: this consequence ensues because the object of inferior reason -- the particular instance -- is indefinitely enumerable.

6D: The Logic of Class Inclusion

141 Taylor 37-8.

142 See Losee p. 11 on the 'open scope of predication' of scientific statements and his p. 7 on the role of enumeration in induction.
Third, we situate potential reason within Plotinus' teaching on genus and species, their actual and potential nature. Lloyd provides the background: "In Metaphysics D Aristotle distinguished two senses of δυνάμις, that of potentiality or possibility, and that of power in the active sense. He admitted that the first depended on the second; but in the questions we are concerned with he made no further use of the active sense;... The active sense is historically the older one:...". In the preceding chapter, we were given to understand Plotinus' characterization of the generic actuality in terms of its power: Intellect, or the summa genera, is the source and cause of the species being. Meanwhile from Narbonne we learned that Plotinus accepts the active sense of potentiality as power in order to explain the per se or self-subsistent nature of substantial existence. It is the doctrine of procession whereby the formal nature of δυνάμις as power to exist serves to found and justify the causal nature of δυνάμις as power to produce: this power is generosity as cause of being. Now Lloyd continues: "VI 2.20: There is a Nous whose activity is not concerned with any particular (ἐν μέρει) thing [i.e., it is not specific], just as there is a genus, science, which is δυνάμις of its species. Each species is ἐνεργεία what it is in itself, δυνάμει the genus [i.e., in its extension]". And "The genus contains the species in the universals..., and the species contain the genus, qua universal; the two embrace each other [for the genus and the conjunction of its species are convertible], while also existing per se". When used in the dative case, potentiality (δυνάμει) is Aristotelian in formula and may be taken to mean possibility or capacity. What is important to retain for our purpose is that Plotinus accepts the passive sense of potentiality in order to make room for a logic of class inclusion. Lloyd tells us: "For the genus is ἐνεργεία all its species and δυνάμει each single one of them [i.e., what was said, at the beginning, of the intension can also be said of the extension, so that we have the Aristotelian formula]; and each of these is ἐνεργεία what it is, but δυνάμει the whole". The term 'δυνάμει' signifies the extensional aspect while

143 Lloyd, "Neo-platonic logic and Aristotelian logic - II," Phronesis 1.2 (1955-56): 146. See also Plotinus' discussion in VI.2[43].20 on knowledge, potentiality, and the relation between generic being and species being.

144 Lloyd, "Neo-platonic logic and Aristotelian logic - II" 148.

the term 'ἐνεργεία' signifies the intensional aspect of the genus-species relation. As such, the
Aristotelian pair ἐνεργεία - δύναμις correlate, at least formally, with the pair elements - parts
which are Platonic in origin. Lloyd explains further:

Plotinus' fusion of the pair is of course a return to the Platonic Idea, which was
-- why jib at Aristotle's characterisation? - οὐσία and κοινή, what is nothing
but so and so, when it should properly be designated by a noun, and what it is
to be so and so, which should properly be designated by an adjectival
expression. The description, δύναμις ἐκαστον, is sufficient to leave room for
Aristotelian logic as a calculus -- indeed what it signified in logic is necessary
for any logic which is to be a formal instrument. It provides an elementary
algebra of classes.146

This is not merely a verbal device. In order to clarify how perfection is a cause of being.
Plotinus can have recourse to the notion of convertibility whereby from the superior may be
inferred a partial, that is, potential nature; for instance 'all oxen are animals' yielding 'some
animals are oxen'.147 As Lloyd has judiciously observed, the latter statement is simply
another way of saying that 'animals may be oxen', a potentiality of the generic being to be each
particular kind. Hence we come to see why the passive sense of δύναμις depends on the
older active sense for its operation: that oxen exist depends on the prior existence of animal.
the generic being in whose unity subsists all the potential species.

6E: The Universal in the Soul

Fourth, we turn to an analytical exegesis of the text. Recalling the three kinds of love
introduced in chapter one of the treatise 'On Love' -- pure, mixed, and evil -- Plotinus begins
his explanation of actual and potential knowledge by reference to his demonology. We read:

146 Lloyd. "Neo-platonic logic and Aristotelian logic - II" 149.

147 See Brody. "Logical terms, Glossary of": conversion. In traditional logic, a type of
immediate inference in which from a given proposition another proposition is inferred which
has as it subject the predicate of the original proposition and as its predicate the subject of the
original proposition (the quality of the proposition being retained). ...the A-proposition 'All
men are mortal' can be converted only by limitation, yielding 'Some mortals are men'"61. See
also Lloyd. The Anatomy of Neoplatonism pp.21-25 on the conversion of proof figures.
Accordingly, the good men of this world direct the Eros which they have to the
non-particular and truly worthwhile good, and do not have a particular Eros.
But those who identify with other daimons, identify with one daimon after
another, leaving the Eros which they simply 'have' inactive, and instead
developing their activity along the lines of another daimon, the one they have
'chosen,' in accordance with the harmonizing part of the activity-principle in
them, namely Soul. Those, however, whose longing goes out to evil things,
have repressed, by the evil desires which develop within, all the Erotes within
them, just as they repress, by the bad opinions which they acquire, their innate
right reason (III.5[50],7,30-38).148

That Plotinus intends this reference to the three kinds of love to apply to his teaching on soul --
the intrinsic act of being -- and reason -- the derived act of being -- is clear from the context, for
he then enters into an explanation of his demonology upon grounds of substance and accident.
true and false ideas. Wolters observes:

οἱ μὲν οὖν...τρίγυρου. The remainder of chapter 7 may be called an
ontological excursus. Having dealt with the three classes of lovers in terms of
their relationship to daimons (30-39), Plotinus now proceeds to discuss these
same classes in terms of their relationship to οὐσία -- that is, to give the
ontological foundation of his doctrine without reference to the mythological
'Birth of Eros' in the Symposium (to which he returns at 8.1). He first
discusses threefold Eros as a specific instance of a general ontological principle
(39-46), then states generally what that principle is (46-49), and finally shows

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148 ὅθεν καὶ τοὺς ἐνωμένα ἀγαθούς. ὃν ἔχουσιν ἔρωτα, τοῦ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ
tou ὀντως ἔχουσιν οὐχ ἔρωτα τυια ἔχοντας. τοὺς δὲ κατ’ ἄλλον δαίμονας
tetagmeinous κατ’ ἄλλον καὶ ἄλλον δαίμον τετάχθαι, ὃν ἀπλῶς εἶχον ἄργον
ἀφέντας. ἐνεργούτας δὲ κατ’ ἄλλον δαίμονα. ὃν είλοιτο κατὰ τὸ σύμφωνον
μέρος τοῦ ἐνεργούτας ἐν αὐτοῖς ψυχῆς. οἱ δὲ κακῶν ἐφεμεΐστοι ταῖς κακαῖς
eγγειομέναις ἐπίθυμαις ἐπέδησαν πάντας τοὺς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔρωτας. ὡσπερ καὶ
λόγου τοῦ ὀρθοῦ, ὡστὶς σύμφωνοι, κακαῖς ταῖς ἐπιγειομέναις δοξαῖς.
how this principle applies to the analogous specific case of knowledge (49-58).

Let us then complete our understanding of discursive reason and the knowledge of the soul’s sequent confident in the teaching of Plotinus and the treatise ‘On Love’.

In virtue of the general ontological principle that non-substance presupposes substance, Plotinus states:

"They [evil loves] are like false concepts which do not 'possess' the Substances underlying them, the way the concepts which are really true and eternal and limited, do possess in a unity thinking, object of thought and being -- not only in the non-particular, but also in the individual: in that which is ontically object of thought and subject of thought in each individual. If we must posit that in each one of us there is a pure thinking and object of thought, but not in unity, then this is both our personal thought and universally true (III.5[50],7.49-55)."  

The chapter concludes with the example of the particular and universal triangle. Now the text is striking for Plotinus is here affirming a kind of thought within us (ἡμῶν) which is at once universal (ἀπλοῖς) and true (ὅτι τοῖς). Meanwhile this kind of thought must be carefully distinguished from his teaching on Intellect -- the second hypostasis -- whose identity of being and intellect is maintained throughout the Enneads. Instead Plotinus is positing a unity of subject and object of thought in the particular soul, this intention being made clear from his use of the term ἐν ἐκάστῳ (in each), the same term used to designate the microcosmic or particular soul read earlier in the treatise. Wolters agrees:

149 Wolters 202. See also Robin on the Platonic demonology: "Si l'homme sage est démon, ou tout au moins démoniaque, cela tient sans doute à la prédominance en lui de l'âme raisonnable..." 134; and more generally pp.129-138.

150 ὁσσρ εὐθὴ νοήματα οὐκ ἔχοιτας ὑπ᾽ αὐτὰ νοσίας. καθάπερ τὰ ἀληθὴ ὀἵτως καὶ ἄδια καὶ ὀρισμένα ἐμοῦ τὸ ιοεῖν καὶ τὸ ἱοητὸν καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἐχοιτα οὐ μόνον ἐν τῷ ἀπλῶς. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἐκάστῳ. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐν ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν τίθεσθαι καθαρῶς νοσίως καὶ νοητῷ - καὶ μὴ ὁμοῦ καὶ ἡμῶν τούτῳ καὶ ἀπλῷς - ὅθεν καὶ τῶν ἀπλῶν ἡμῖν ὁ ἔρως.

151 See p. 67.
ou μόνοι...τρίγωνοι. The two previous lines have dealt with the two opposite poles of knowledge: outright error and absolute truth. Plotinus now proceeds to a longer discussion of an intermediate kind of knowledge: one which conforms to its object without becoming completely identified with it. It is important to keep in mind that the whole discussion of knowledge is meant as an analogy to Eros, and that just as error and absolute truth correspond to Eros in the two extremes of σφώλευτές (42) and ἀγαθοί (30), so this intermediate kind of knowledge corresponds to the intermediate kind of Eros. This is the key to understanding this extremely difficult and seemingly misplaced epistemological discussion. Just as he had insisted repeatedly that the intermediate kind of Eros, though inferior to the pure Eros of the ἀγαθοί, is nevertheless blameless (and therefore to be distinguished from the deviation of unnatural Eros), so he here insists throughout that the intermediate kind of knowledge (that found in particular souls: 53 ἐν ἐκθαστῷ ἡμῶν), though inferior to the complete identification of Subject and Object in Intellect (54 μὴ ὁμοιούμενος), is nevertheless 'pure' (54 καθαρός), and correlated with the universal Forms (55 τῷ ἀπλωτῷ) -- and is therefore to be distinguished from error (49),152

We suggest that this intermediate kind of thought is the act of subsumption whereby soul takes up the particular within itself, that is, within the universal. Our suggestion also makes sense of and room for the whole of the parts or abstract universal taught by Neoplatonists. Lloyd reminds us: "There were three kinds of universals (kolivón): (1) the transcendent or separate from the particulars, e.g. 'the first animal' which makes animality for animals; (2) the product of this, the animal which exists only in each specific and individual animal; (3) the universal which is 'posterior' because it exists only in our conceptions and which we form by subtracting all differentiae that modify animality in the external world. (3) alone is a genuine universal. for (1) is 'a common cause rather than a common nature' and (2) is not really the same in different

152 Wolters 211-12.
species". Now, the knowledge of abstract universals is veridical to the extent that it allows for universal predication, the affirmation that all members of a species participate in a common nature and do so necessarily. We further suggest that this act leads to a scientific as distinct from opinable statement insofar as its task is not the identification of an object as 'this', say 'an ox' -- it is the perceptual judgement -- but rather the affirmation of a necessity about all oxen -- the class or subordinate species in act -- the actualization of this knowledge consisting in its application to 'this ox'. Taylor would seem to agree with us: "Aristotle is quite aware that his 'induction' does not establish its conclusion unless all the cases have been included in the examination. In fact, as his own example shows, an induction which gives certainty does not start with 'particular facts' at all. It is a method of arguing that what has been proved true of each sub-class of a wider class will be true of the wider class as a whole. The premises are strictly universal throughout". The Aristotelian method is consonant with the universality inherent in the rational act -- discursiveness -- of soul.

We began the study by reading the text of the early treatise entitled 'The Intellectual Principle, the Ideas, and the Authentic Existence' (V,9[5],5) wherein Plotinus affirms the identity of Being and Intellect. But now in the late treatise entitled 'On Love' we learn that soul too has a kind of unity of subject and object insofar as it may conceive the whole of the parts, the universal concept. Wolters reiterates: "ἐν ἐκάστῳ ἐπείρι τὸ ἑντὸς ὑπωτὸς καὶ νοοῦν. Note the punctuation. ...The thought is: true knowledge means the ontic identification of Subject and Object, not only in the non-particular, but also in the particular, (that is) in what is ontically object and subject in the particular". And "περὶ. Plotinus very often uses περὶ with the accusative in a technical sense that has gone unnoticed in the lexicons and is hard to render in English. ...in the sense of inhering in it, being a constituent moment in it. ...The emphasis


154 Taylor 29. See also Leszl: "The recognition that a certain something (not otherwise identified) is a triangle certainly does not constitute knowledge, but rather opinion (which is based on sensation). Once, however, that something is recognized as being such, the general truth that a triangle has a certain property can be applied to it, without becoming itself the object of mere opinion, for the truth of that statement does not depend on the truth of an assertion expressing the simple identification of something as a triangle" 299.
here (cf. on 9.2-3) is similar: true knowledge, also in the particular, requires being absorbed, as it were, into the Being-Thought identity which constitutes the ontic structure of a given particular. 155 We may clarify this thought upon metaphysical as well as epistemological grounds. Concerning Plotinian metaphysics, we know that from the original is produced an effect which is the image or begotten form: this form is the Neoplatonic efficient causality made famous in the doctrine of procession. But image or effect also calls to mind the ascent, the return to the One. Elucidating this relation, Leroux tells us that the image expresses both a difference as well as an identity with the original. 156 In contradistinction from the Aristotelian theory of signs and categorization, Plotinus affirms a doctrine of mimetic actuality whereby the image is the active expression of the original. What is more, the image presupposes the inherence of the original as necessary ground of its existence, this holding true of nature and soul as well as of soul and its prior, Intellect. 157 We can say that the form in matter accedes to a participation in the intelligible insofar as it is the trace of transcendent form which finds its veritable expression in the rational act of soul -- the abstract universal or whole said of the many. 158

Concerning Plotinian epistemology, we know the Neoplatonic rule which states that the form, or more properly its descended image, is altered by the recipient. Meanwhile the newly

155 Wolters 213 & 214.

156 Georges Leroux, "La trace et les signes, aspects de la sémiotique de Plotin," *Sophus. 

156 Georges Leroux, "La trace et les signes, aspects de la sémiotique de Plotin," *Sophus. 

156 Georges Leroux, "La trace et les signes, aspects de la sémiotique de Plotin," *Sophus. 

156 Georges Leroux, "La trace et les signes, aspects de la sémiotique de Plotin," *Sophus. 

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156 Georges Leroux, "La trace et les signes, aspects de la sémiotique de Plotin," *Sophus. 

156 Georges Leroux, "La trace et les signes, aspects de la sémiotique de Plotin," *Sophus. 

157 See Leroux: "Signifier, ce n'est donc pas représenter, mais rapporter à une origine ontologique toute représentation de la différence". And "Par l'expression de la trace, la causalité ontologique, dont cherche à rendre compte Plotin au sujet de l'Intellect, se trouve déplacée d'un pur rapport sémiotique d'image vers une expression active: l'origine a marqué et marque éternellement son produit" 249. Also see (V,1[10],3; 6-7) on soul and Intellect as the image and expression of their prior and that nothing stands between them and their prior.

158 See Leroux: "La nature elle-même est donc englobée par Plotin, comme cela résulte de tout son traité sur la contemplation (III,8[30]), dans cette connaissance de soi comme produit marqué par l'origine: la diminuation et l'effacement ne parviennent pas à occulter ce qui s'exprime dans la trace, la présence vivante de l'origine" 253.
formed recipient is not cut off from the original but remains with its prior and progenitor in likeness. Lloyd tells us: "Later Neoplatonists made this dogma familiar by claiming that the products or their properties were contained 'occultly'. ...It does not mean that the properties at the higher level which contain those below them are not overt: it means that the fact that they are manifestations of those below them is not overt. Indeed, the philosopher, aided by the experience of his interior life, does see the essential resemblance". 159 And "Would it not then be just as correct to describe the product as, say, copying its cause occultly? Certainly, and this would be in the spirit of Neoplatonism. The term 'occultly' is relational and generally signifies 'not overtly resembling', which is a symmetric relation. But it so happens that as a technical term it was restricted to the containment of the effect by the cause". 160 We understand this 'containment' in terms of analysis and the search for causes; the cause contains the effect insofar as it provides the a priori grounds for the actualization of the effect. Like the Aristotelian causal syllogism wherein a single event or fact is placed in a universal which correctly accounts for its existence, the Neoplatonic doctrine of conversion founds the perfection of the image upon its likeness to the original, thus establishing their unity in the class concept. 161

In this section we have considered the main epistemological ramifications of soul's knowledge of the sequent, sensible reality and, incidently, the logical item. To do so, we have had recourse to a key Aristotelian distinction, the particular and the universal, for the elaboration of a scientific knowledge of things. In agreement with later Neoplatonism, we observe that Plotinus accepts these two concepts as witnessed in the text of the treatise 'On

159 Lloyd. The Anatomy of Neoplatonism 101.

160 Lloyd. The Anatomy of Neoplatonism 102.

161 This rapprochement between the Neoplatonic doctrine of conversion, perfection, and the Aristotelian search for causes was already taught by Alexander. See Bazán: "Pour les rendre intelligibles, l'homme doit établir entre les formes immergées dans la matière et cet 'intellect par nature' une relation d'imitation (μιμησθαι) qui s'accomplit précisément par la séparation (χωρίζειν) (les formes sont rendues immatérielles comme l'intelligible en acte). Une même idée est exprimée tant dans le De anima que dans le De intellectu et cette idée est très profonde: l'intellect humain, tout en étant la faculté abstractive (la cause efficiente), n'est pas le fondement dernier de la pensée et de la vérité" 482.
Love'. As well, we study the potential, that is, implicit knowledge of things: it is the power to know particulars as instances of a general rule. The epistemological efficacy of implicit knowledge is itself founded upon the Neoplatonic notion of natural priority, the potentiality of generic being to be 'in' the species-being.
7: Recapitulation

To fully comprehend and appreciate the thought of Plotinus in this most subtle and complex of treatises, it is timely to recall the teaching method 'by appearance' and 'by predominance' (ὅπερ πάντολο ἐξ ὁμοίου) preferred by the Neoplatonic school. It is a method which seeks to instruct the pupil of philosophy by means of familiar terms and images -- Homeric, mythical, historical, and so forth -- in view of an understanding of the elements and reasons which constitute and explain true being. The late treatise 'On Love' is a prime example of this method at work: in the personnages of worldly Aphrodite -- mixed soul -- and ἰπωτος the daimon -- inferior reason -- we have Plotinus' explanation of the role and nature of reason as regards sensible reality.

This method firmly guiding our exegetis of text, we proceed to a series of precisions upon the daimon nature and the Neoplatonic interpretation of the ascent as analysis. We observe with Lloyd that Plotinus intended the doctrine of procession, conversion, and remaining to demonstrate truth: to the act of procession corresponds the epistemology of synthesis while to the act of conversion corresponds the epistemology of analysis. As background, we make reference to the principle of priority and posteriority and the general metaphysical rule which states that non-substance presupposes substance, noting with Lloyd its Neoplatonic application to analysis -- the search for causes -- and the doctrine of conversion -- the return to the origin and ground of being. Now this observation is important to the extent that it places the daimon-nature -- the derived act of mixed soul, the relational property of which is to be an intermediary between the divine and mortal natures, that is, between the descended image of the form or species-being and the immanent form in matter -- in the context of analysis and the search for the a priori determinations of the sensible thing. To know sensible reality, the especial object of mixed soul, consists therefore in the discovery of the necessary ground, cause, and reason for a thing to be such.

We then went on to investigate carefully the elements which constitute the daimon nature, that is, to be born of form (Poros) and intelligible matter (Penia). To begin, we cite the
current interpretations of the relation of the ‘Birth of Eros’ and argue strenuously against the views of Corrigan on the ascription of intelligible matter to a 'lower / pre-cosmic' matter grounded in sensible reality. Our arguments are several, the most important of which is homonymy, the confusion of sensible with intellectual being, for while Corrigan clearly intends the 'lower / pre-cosmic' matter to have for its ultimate referent the sensible reality, the text of the Enneads is clear and conclusive: the matter in which the daimon nature partakes is a matter that is at once intelligible (ὤλην δεῖ τον ηπὶ) and prior to the sensible (πρὸ του αἰσθητοῦ).

We then proceeded to purify our understanding of the text further, this time based largely on textual grounds. From Wolters, the treatise’s excellent English translator, we learn that the term 'ἐμφαντάζεσθαι' has for its referent the descended image of the image of the form in matter. the Neoplatonic whole in the parts, while, together with the equally excellent French translator Hadot, we learn that the term 'φαντασμα' has for its referent the extensionless intelligible entities or forms of representation. These clarifications provide, then, the necessary basis for a true appreciation of the thought of Plotinus as related to us in the ‘Birth of Eros’. In agreement with Wolters, we maintain the view that eros the daimon, offspring of mixed soul, is indeed discursive reason, an inferior kind of reason whose object is ever the soul’s sequent, the sensible reality, and also the logical item, most often found in the general terms of predication as the abstract universal.

Further we study the nature of inferior reason in view of its constitutional need for fulfilment and discern two consequences: first, that inferior reason is potential, a suggestion supported by the ancient witness of Philoponus on the two intellects in soul, one of which is in actuality and one in potentiality and, second, that inferior reason is a disposition of the soul to have knowledge of the thing. Now these two consequences are important to the extent that they set forth the psychological basis for an epistemology of the sensible object. This epistemology we divide into five steps. The first step introduces the key Aristotelian distinction of knowledge of the particular relative to sense perception and knowledge of the universal relative to reason. We show that not only was this distinction accepted by the later
Neoplatonists but also, and most importantly, by Plotinus himself. The text of the treatise 'On Love' is witness to the employment of these concepts as regards the kinds of knowledge pertaining to soul. The second step is historical in nature, reference being made to Plotinus' antecedents in the psychology of Alexander of Aphrodisias. We learn therefrom that the Aristotelian commentator holds both the subsistence of the active Intellect and the potentiality of reason to take up the form in matter and realize the universal. We argue a similar position, that inferior reason is illuminated by its formal cause, the Intellect, in order to recognize the immanent form and thereby actualize the universal knowledge of soul. The third step is the epistemological analysis of inferior reason to be a kind of implicit knowledge by virtue of its latency: to know what is true about a species, say 'oxen', is simplicity to know what is true, universally and necessarily, about 'this ox' as instance of the species-act. The fourth step consists in an appeal to the Plotinian teaching on genus and species wherein we learn that the author of the Enneads accepts both an active as well as a passive sense of διναμίς. Now this acceptance allows Plotinus to explain how it is that universal knowledge of the soul may become actual: it is the act of inclusion whereby we subsume the particular in the universal as a part of the universal's extension (διναμίς). The fifth step cites exegetical considerations which lend support to the view that inferior reason -- discursiveness -- accedes to a true and universal knowledge of the particular. On the one hand, the form in matter is the veritable trace of the transcendent form and as such has likeness to its prior, that is to say, it may be included in a class concept. On the other hand, we learn that the Neoplatonists teach a doctrine of abstract universals in the soul which serve as object of rational explanation and predication.

Chapter III has advanced the thesis on the possibility of a scientific knowledge of sensible reality insofar as it has provided clear and necessary grounds for our knowledge of things. These grounds enumerated above satisfy the exigencies of both Plotinian philosophy -- that reason is a passion of the soul whenever it turns to gaze upon the sequent, the sensible reality, by virtue of its originative principles Penia and Poros -- as well as the broader epistemology of a subsumptive knowledge whose task consists in placing the particular within the class concept -- the refracted forms held within divine soul. Chapter III completes therefore
our epistemological study of soul -- the intrinsic act of being -- and of reason -- the derived act of being -- insofar as it elucidates the role of analysis in Plotinian philosophy and identifies the doctrine of conversion with the Platonic ascent. As well, our choice of a pedagogical as distinct from an historical or philological approach has proven fruitful, the treatise 'On Love' being an excellent example of how the student of Neoplatonism accedes to an understanding of difficult metaphysical concepts by means of familiar images, names, and stories.

Such then is mixed soul -- worldly Aphrodite -- and its offspring inferior reason -- eros the daimon. We understand our task to be nearly accomplished, namely the demonstration of the rational and especially metaphysical grounds for the empirical sciences within Plotinus' philosophy. This done, let us now turn to answer the objections arising forthwith.
Chapter IV
Objections and Replies

Our argumentation that reason may be both an act and a passion of soul rests upon solid grounds; it is the lesson taught to us by the treatise 'On Love' wherein Plotinus affirms a dual nature to reason, as an act born of the act of soul -- eros the god -- and a passion born of the matter of soul -- eros the daimon. More particularly, it is the determination of the daimon's nature to be a second kind of potentiality or disposition which founds the rational discourse of nature. But what now can we make of Plotinus' several affirmations in the opposite sense, namely, that the empirical sciences are none indeed. To resolve this dilemma and conclude our study, let us read the texts in question seeking clarification upon their meaning and importance in the Enneads.

1: Δόξα

A first text is located in the early treatise entitled 'The Intellectual Principle, the Ideas, and the Authentic Existence'. We read:

On the one hand, the sciences in the rational soul are of sensible objects -- if indeed one must call them science, the name of opinion (δόξης) suit them better -- they are posterior to the objects and reflections of them. On the other hand, the truly scientific are those sciences whose objects are intellectual, coming to the rational soul from the Intellect and which do not conceive the sensible object. Insofar as they are sciences they are each themselves that which thinks and has within (ἐν δοξῇ) the intellectual act and object, for the Intellect is interior and is the priors themselves; being unto itself always and active, it subsists and never comes to the object as not having or by acquiring or traversing by reason what is not ready at hand -- for these are passions (πάθη) of soul -- but is present to itself altogether, for it is not by thought that each [prior] exists (V,9[5],7,1-12).¹

¹ Αἱ δὲ ἐπιστήμαι ἐν ψυχῇ λογικῇ οὐσαί αἱ μὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν — εἰ δὲι ἐπιστήμασ τοῦτον λέγειν, πρέπει δὲ αὐταῖς τῷ τῆς δόξης όνομα — ύστεραι τῶν πραγμάτων οὐσαί εἰκόνες εἰσὶ τοῦτων τῶν δὲ νοητῶν, αἱ δὲ καὶ όντως
The text is remarkable for two reasons. First it confirms our argumentation on the text on the passions of the soul (πάθη ψυχής τῆς τοιαύτης) read in the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' (V.I[10],3) for it was there suggested that reason, in contradistinction to sensation, is the proper reference of the text. Plotinus is therefore constant in his thought: starting in the earliest treatises, V.9[5], and V.1[10], and reiterated in the late treatise III.5[50]. the author of the Enneads maintains always that reason of mixed soul -- discursiveness -- is a passion.

Second, the text brings to mind the role of judgement in the Plotinian philosophy. In the first chapter, we learned that reason (τὸ δῆ διανοητικόν) decides by the rules and measures held within; more especially, it is the exercise of thought whereby soul predicates the idea upon sensible reality. Now in order to situate this thought and explain our text, let us turn to the Platonic teaching on δόξα. From Lafrance we learn that there exists no one stance regarding δόξα or opinion within the Platonic corpus. For instance, in the early dialogue 'Meno' we are told that both true opinion and science belong to knowledge as having the same object, their being distinguished from representation or the mere reception of a particular by the senses. Meanwhile, in the later dialogue 'Republic' we are told something else, namely that

έπιστήμηια, παρὰ νῦν εἰς λογικὴν ψυχὴν ἐλθοῦσαι αἰσθητῶν μὲν οὐδὲν νοοῦσιν, καθόσον δὲ εἰσὶν ἐπιστήμηια, εἰσὶν αὐτὰ ἐκαστὰ ἄ νοοῦσι, καὶ ένδοθεν τὸ τε νοητὸν τὴν τε νόημαν ἔχουσιν, ὅτι ὁ νοῦς ἐνδοθ — ὁ ἐστὶν αὐτὰ τὰ πρῶτα — συνεχεῖς αὐτῶν ἀπὶ καὶ ἐνεργεία υπάρχουν καὶ οὐκ ἐπιβάλλων ὡς οὐκ ἕχων ἢ ἐπιστημονίας ἢ διεξοδευόμενον ὡς προκεχειρισμένα — ψυχῆς γὰρ ταύτα πάθη — αὖτ' ἐστηκεν ἀν αὐτὸ ὑπὸ πάλαιτε ὄνομα ἄλλ. ἐστηκεν ἀν αὐτῷ ὑπὸ πάλαιτε ὄνομα ἄλλ. ἐστηκεν ἀν αὐτῷ ὑπὸ πάλαιτε ὄνομα ἄλλ. ἐστηκεν ἀν αὐτῷ ὑπὸ πάλαιτε ὄνομα ἄλλ. ἐστηκεν ἀν αὐτῷ ὑπὸ πάλαιτε ὄνομα ἄλλ.

MacKenna reads: "Knowledge in the reasoning soul is on the one side concerned with objects of sense, though indeed this can scarcely be called knowledge and is better indicated as opinion or surface-knowing: it is of later origin than the objects since it is a reflection from them: but on the other hand there is the knowledge handling the intellectual objects and this is the authentic knowledge; it enters the reasoning soul from the Intellectual-Principle which actually is the primals and is always self-present and is in its nature an Act, never by any want forced to seek, never acquiring or traversing the remote -- for all such experience belongs to soul -- but always self-gathered, the very Being of the collective total, not an extern creating things by the act of knowing them". We change considerably MacKenna, notably 'posterior' for 'later origin', 'passion' for 'experience', and the final phrase where no mention of 'extern' is made in the text.

2 See pp.16-21
3 For a brief but informative discussion of δόξα in its relation to discursive reasoning and science amongst the Neoplatonists, see Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism pp. 142-43.
opinion must be distinguished from science insofar as they have differing objects: on the one hand, sensible reality in the case of opinion; on the other hand, the forms in the case of science. 4 More particularly, from the *Meno* we learn that ὅξα is a form of judgement which belongs to the Platonic doctrine of reminiscence or method of discovery whereby the subject arrives at knowledge of a science, say geometry, by means of questions. 5 As such, the difference between opinion and science is one of degree, Plato not yet having elaborated the theory of forms and the ascription of different objects to different kinds of thought. Rather than an ontology of science, the *Meno* teaches an epistemology based on the question, 'how do we come to reflect on the simplest truths, axioms, and principles of science'? 6 To accomplish this end Plato introduces the famous criterion of causal reasoning (*aitias logismos* 98a3–4), an explanation or ground capable of justifying true opinion. Doxa means therefore opinative knowledge, the statement that such is the case admitting of truth or falsity. 7

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4 See Lafrance: "L’opinion vraie et la science ont les mêmes objets, et, dans la mesure où l’épistémologie platonicienne spécifie la nature d’une connaissance par son objet, il en découle que l’opinion vraie et la science appartiennent dans le *Ménon* au même mode de connaissance. Pourtant, dans l’analogie de la Ligne de la *République*, l’opinion et la science reçoivent des objets différents, le monde sensible pour l’opinion et le monde intelligible pour la science" 14. And "La doxa doit-elle être conçue en fonction de la connaissance sensible ou en fonction de la connaissance intellectuelle? Dans le premier cas, qu’est-ce qui la distingue de la sensation? Dans le second cas, qu’est-ce qui la distingue de la science?" 15.

5 On the Platonic as distinct from Orphic-Pythagorean teaching on reminiscence (anamnèsis), see Lafrance 88. On the method of discovery, we read: "En suivant la démarche de l’esclave, on observe facilement que le processus cognitif consiste à passer du connu à l’inconnu en suivant l’interrogation d’un maître. À ce processus cognitif Socrate donne le nom de réminiscence parce que l’esclave, guidé par le maître, s’avère capable de trouver en lui-même et par lui-même un savoir qu’il ne possédait pas avant l’interrogatoire socratique" 100.

6 See Lafrance: "Remarquons, d’abord, que le couple doxa-épistémè ne présente dans le *Ménon* aucun statut ontologique, puisque l’absence de la théorie des Idées ne permet pas encore de distinguer entre le monde sensible, objet de l’opinion, et le monde intelligible, objet de la science. ... Par conséquent, à l’étape du *Ménon*, la doxa ne signifie pas un mode d’appréhension des réalités sensibles donnant lieu à un mode de connaissance non scientifique, mais un jugement, et, dans le cas d’une doxa vraie, un jugement vrai. L’épistémè ne se réfère pas ici à la connaissance des Idées, mais à celle des objets mathématiques, quoiqu’elle n’exclut aucun objet du savoir" 100.

7 For instance see Richard Gale, 'Propositions, Judgments, Sentences, and Statements,' *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 1972 ed. "It is important to distinguish between propositional verbs, such as ‘judge,’ ‘think,’ ‘believe,’ and so on, on the one hand, and what we shall call cognitive verbs, such as ‘know,’ ‘see,’ ‘hear,’ ‘feel,’ ‘taste,’ and ‘smell,’ on the other. ... One very significant difference between propositional and cognitive verbs is the fact that it is tautological to say, ‘If he knows (or sees and so on) that the cat is on the mat, then it is true that the cat is on the mat,’ whereas it is not tautological to say, ‘if he judges (or believes and so on)
However, in the Republic (509d4-511e6) Plato undertakes a somewhat different analysis of knowledge, based this time on a four-fold distinction of powers: they are eikasia and pistics appropriate to opinion and dianoia and noesis appropriate to science. We learn that the powers of eikasia and pistics are distinguishable by virtue of the clarity of their respective objects and their exercise: as the name implies, eikasia concerns the images found in nature, shadows, reflections, mirages and things of that sort while pistics concerns the thing or particular whether of natural or fabricated origin. In agreement with the Meno, δόξα is understood to be a judgement or kind of intellectual comprehension which now also extends to include the power of representation. To this extent we cannot entirely agree with Lafrance who affirms a distortion (distorsion) between the powers relevant to opinative knowledge and the powers relevant to scientific knowledge, noting on the one hand a difference of object as regards the former and a difference of exercise as regards the latter, for with Lafrance himself that the cat is on the mat, then it is true that the cat is on the mat." 499. That is to say, the judgement 'that the cat is on the mat' does not carry within itself a ground of explanation.

8 See Lafrance: "Le passage sur la Ligne divisée que nous allons maintenant analyser introduit une notion nouvelle dans notre théorie de la doxa, c'est la notion de degrés. En effet, la Ligne divisée nous parle de deux degrés de connaissance relatifs à la doxa: le premier est l'eikasia et le second est la pistics. Ces degrés sont obtenus à partir d'une distinction à l'intérieur de la réalité sensible entre les images et la réalité physique" 151. And "Qu'est-ce donc que la doxa? Le passage 477b7-c5 définit la doxa comme une dynamis distincte de la science parce que l'une et l'autre se rapportent à un objet différent. ...Or, lorsqu'on examine cette définition du terme dynamis, on s'aperçoit qu'il est pris beaucoup plus dans le sens d'un pouvoir, d'une capacité ou d'une habilité à faire quelque chose que dans le sens technique d'une faculté" 124.

9 See Lafrance: "Le monde visible est assimilé au doxaston, c'est-à-dire est présenté comme l'objet de l'opinion, tandis que le monde intelligible est présenté comme l'objet de la science. Socrate affirme que le monde visible, objet de l'opinion, est une copie ou une image du monde intelligible, objet de la science, et que ce rapport se trouve à l'intérieur du monde visible entre les images et les réalités sensibles. À la fin du passage sur la Ligne, Socrate assigne pour chaque segment représentatif des objets de connaissance les états d'esprit (pathêmata) correspondants: pour le premier segment, l'eikasia, et pour le second segment, la pistics" 155.

10 See Lafrance: "Or, ce pouvoir de connaissance qu'est la doxa est décrit simultanément comme un pouvoir de représentation ou d'appréhension d'objets de connaissance aussi bien qu'un pouvoir de juger" 126. And more generally pp.125-27 on the background to this question.
we observe within ὑόχα both differences -- that of object, image or thing -- and that of
eExercise, representation or judgement. 11

Interestingly the powers of dianoia and noësis are also distinguishable in like manner.
We learn that the role of dianoia consists in the deduction of true conclusions using sensible
reality or particular as example, while noësis takes up the hypotheses and conclusions of
dialogical thought, using a method of combination and division in order to establish knowledge
of the forms and their originating principle, the Good or One. 12 More generally, there is a
difference between mathematical and dialectical science. Hamlyn tells us: "Plato's ultimate
purpose in introducing mathematical Forms is, of course, to show that mathematics is
propedectic to dialectic, but the way in which the distinction is made in the account of the line is
such as to make it an analogue of the distinction between the objects of eikasia and pistis, and
not vice versa". 13 In the intellectual sciences, Plato admits a difference between two kinds of
truth-bearing statements, one which bears upon originals (noësis) and one which bears upon
images (dianoia).

The difference between opinative knowledge and scientific knowledge may also be
placed in the larger context of classic ontology whereby existence is affirmed the substrate of
knowledge, it being impossible to know that which is not. 14 More especially, scientific

11 See Lafrance: "Tandis que la division du monde visible est fondée sur la distinction des
objets de connaissance, celle du monde intelligible s'articule avant tout sur les processus de
connaissance plutôt que sur les objets eux-mêmes" 155.

12 See Lafrance: "Socrate procède ensuite à la division du monde intelligible en deux
segments. ...Dans le premier segment, l'âme est forçée dans ses recherches a) d'utiliser à titre
d'images les objets qui, dans la section précédente, étaient des modèles par rapport aux objets
du premier segment inférieur, b) de partir d'hypothèses qui la conduisent non pas à un premier
principe, mais à un terme, c'est-à-dire à une conclusion qui en dépend. Dans le second
segment, l'âme va de l'hypothèse au principe premier, sans se servir d'images, mais poursuit
sa recherche au moyen des seules idées" 156.

13 D.W. Hamlyn, "Eikasia in Plato's Republic," Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1958), 16, qtd. in
Lafrance 184 note 297. And Lafrance: "Comme l'a bien vu Hamlyn, la division du monde
sensible en images et en réalités aurait pu être à l'origine de la distinction du monde intelligible
en images (objets des mathématiques) et réalités (objets de la dialectique)" 184.

14 See Lafrance: "En effet, celui qui connaît doit connaître quelque chose, et ce quelque chose
est, puisqu'il est impossible de connaître quelque chose qui n'est pas" 122. In this wise, the
knowledge depends upon four principal characteristics of the intelligible world: the self-identity of the forms or their per se nature as against the relative or contingent nature of sensible reality: the permanence of the forms as against the changeableness of the objects of sense; the perfection of the forms as originals as against the imperfection of the thing as image; and the unicity of the forms -- the whole above or prior to the parts -- as against the sensible many -- the whole in the parts. In Platonic philosophy, the forms are principles of being and thought required in respect of the observed mutability, indeed contradictoriness, of sensible reality. Such is the classic theory of forms or ontology of science read in the Republic.\textsuperscript{15}

Further, this teaching was widely accepted and developed during the period of Middle Platonism immediately preceding the authorship of the Enneads. We are told that the philosophers of the second century A.D. understood two worlds -- one intellectual and one sensible -- the business of philosophy being the clarification of both their difference as well as their mutual implication. On the one hand, the task of differentiation is made possible based on the ontological reflection, the necessity and eternity of true being as distinct from its passing

modern British philosopher Bertrand Russell takes up a position similar to the ancients for he too affirms that every predicative statement of the kind 'The so-and-so is such-and-such' necessarily implies the existence of the subject so construed as a 'denoting phrase'. See Leonard Linsky. "Referring," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1972 ed. "The contrast between 'denoting phrases' and 'proper names' is the contrast between expressions which have no meaning in themselves and expressions which have meaning in their own right" 97. And "One important consequence of Russell's theory is that every statement of the form 'The so-and-so is such-and-such' implies that the so-and-so exists" 98. Russell's distinction between 'no meaning in themselves' and 'have meaning in their own right' would seem to coincide with the ancient distinction between a being existent 'in itself' per se and 'in another' in alio.

\textsuperscript{15} For a general explanation of these four characteristics, see Lafrance pp.142-45. And Moreau, Aristote et son école: "Pour apprécier les critiques d'Aristote à l'égard des Idées platoniciennes, il convient de voir d'abord comment il entend cette théorie. Elle résulte à ses yeux de la conjonction de deux influences: celle du mobilisme héraclitien, transmise à Platon par l'enseignement de Cratyle, et celle de Socrate. Platon avait retenu de l'enseignement de Cratyle que les choses sensibles sont perpétuellement changeantes (ὡς ἀπάντησιν τὸν αἰσθητὸν αἰεί ἰδέαν); d'autre part, il avait hérité de Socrate une méthode que celui-ci appliquait seulement aux questions morales, et qui consistait dans la recherche de définitions universelles (τὸ ὁρίζοντα καθέλου). Seul, à ses yeux, l'Universel, l'essence stable, saisie par la définition, pouvait fournir un objet à la science. Il s'ensuivait de là que la science ne pouvait avoir pour objet immédiat le sensible, perpétuellement changeant; une science ne pouvait se rapporter au sensible que si l'on admettait, en dehors du sensible, des essences immuables ou Idées, et si les choses sensibles, multiples et changeantes, empruntaient leur être aux Idées n'existaient qu'en participant aux Idées" 28.
imitations. On the other hand, the Middle Platonists sought to unite the two worlds in a number of ways: on the ethical plane they teach two kinds of virtue, the theoretical and the practical, the latter being preparatory for the former; on the ontological plane there is the entire acceptance of the Aristotelian immanent form in matter, the descended image of the image of the transcendent form; on the devotional plane they make appeal to Platonic demonology or doctrine of intermediaries, its role consisting in the relation of the divine with the mortal; and on the physical plane they maintain the efficient causality of form, the original producing an image or sequent by virtue of its nature to be paradigm.

With these evidences in hand, let us now return to the text in Plotinus' early treatise entitled 'The Intellectual Principle, the Ideas, and the Authentic Existence'. A first response situates the text on opinative and scientific knowledge within the general problematic of the treatise. Now it is fairly clear that the treatise falls within the tradition of the ascent, Plotinus beginning the treatise with an appeal to virtue as a means of attaining to the place of truth (τὸ τῶν ἀληθινῶν καιείω... 1. 20). There then ensues a series of affirmations, that Intellect is separate from the sensible world, that Intellect is the totality of being or form, and that being and Intellect are identical insofar as they both partake of one nature (μία μέν ὁ ὕμνος το τε διὸ τε νοῦς... 8.16-17). As Bréhier observes, Plotinus is here refuting those who claim that the forms owe their existence to our thought. Instead, Plotinus maintains the opposite view, namely that being -- the object of thought -- is the necessary presupposition

16 See O'Meara: "On souligne le sens ontologique de la division: chez Albinus, Maxime de Tyr, Apulée et Numénios l'être sensible s'avère 'fluide' et changeant; l'intelligible en revanche est incorruptible. Les intelligibles sont alors, d'après eux, l'être véritable, ou l'être tout court, par rapport à la corruptibilité des sensibles" 20.

17 More generally, see O'Meara pp.19-24.

18 See also Trouillard, La Purification Plotinienne: "Toute la doctrine des Ennéades peut être regardée comme une tentative de faire la genèse de la connaissance humaine, ou bien comme l'élaboration d'un processus d'affranchissement pour l'esprit qui est en chacun de nous" 5. And "Dire que le procédé cathartique est intellectuel n'est donc pas l'identifier à une démarche discursive, ni même à la dialectique. Ce n'est pas davantage en exclure la pratique morale, l'amour ou l'admiration de la beauté. Un disciple de Platon ne peut omettre ces modes de purification" 10.
of Intellect -- the act of thought; indeed they are identical in their nature as actuality. This said, the text on opinion and science cannot be repudiating predicative knowledge, the unfolding of the forms within reason, for to do so is tantamount to a repudiation of the doctrine of procession itself. The descent of form in its synonymous attribution, say 'animal' of 'oxen' is the work of soul, the combination of the genus and its difference. Similarly, the non-synonymous descent of form within an ordered series, where the generic whole remains above or prior to the parts, is also the work of soul; it is the allocation of the whole to the parts by way of degrees of participation. For instance, the nature of 'equine' is in one part 'donkey', in one part 'mule', consequent to the reproductive value of the donkey to produce the mule and in contradistinction from the sterility of the mule so formed.

But neither can the text be disputing the role of the causal syllogism, the universal or necessary ground of explanation concerning fact. This point has been made abundantly clear in our references to analysis and the logic of inclusion made acceptable to Neoplatonism through the teaching of the Symposium, that is, the ascent. Indeed Plotinus' consent to the efficacy of the causal syllogism is stated in the middle treatise entitled 'How the Multiplicity of the Ideal-Forms came into Being; and on The Good' (VI.7[38]) wherein he cites approvingly one of Aristotle's most famous examples, the lunar eclipse. Heiser remarks: "When he speaks of 'cause' here [the sensible reality], Plotinus is thinking primarily of the end, since he is excluding deliberation from Intellect, but he means cause in general. He points out one example -- the eclipse -- where cause and thing are the same 'even here' (2.11-12), and an eclipse is not defined by its end". And we read: "There all is one, for the thing and the why of the thing are the same. And oftentimes even here the thing and its reason are the same, for

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19 See Bréhier 5: 156-57. In particular: "En réalité, il n'y a point séparation, ni ordre de préséance entre l'être et la pensée; un être qui est en acte ne peut être qu'une pensée, et une pensée en acte est un être en acte:... 157. See also V.3[49],5 where Plotinus clearly states the identity of act, intellect, and intelligible: εἶν δὲ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ ὃν καὶ τὸ νοητὸν 5.42-43.

20 Heiser 43-4.
instance the nature of the eclipse" (VI,7[38],2,10-12).  

That is to say, the recognition that the earth's passage between the moon and the sun leads to a diminution of moonlight establishes both the fact of an eclipse as well as the cause of an eclipse. To this extent we must disagree with Heiser who argues that the text serves to "eliminate the causal syllogism", Plotinus' point being rather just the opposite: the cognitive exigency fulfilled by the identity of being and Intellect (ταύτων) may also be properly applied to our knowledge of sensible reality under certain circumstances.

Instead, we suggest that the text may properly be read as a statement bearing upon the nature of judgement and the soul's scientific knowledge. Firstly, we recall the text of the late treatise entitled 'The Knowing Hypostases and the Transcendent' (V,3[49],3) wherein Plotinus again distinguishes between two elements of judgement within soul, the intelligibles which come from above (τὰ δὲ τῶν ἐνεργημάτα ἀνωθεν οὕτως) and the sensibles which come from below (ὡς τὰ ἐκ τῆς αἰθήσεως κάτωθεν). Secondly, we must remember that even on Aristotelian grounds, mere reception of the sensible form alone does not constitute science: rather it constitutes only opinion. Leszl explains:

It should be noted that possession of a statement to the effect that a given triangle has its angles equal to two right angles is not necessarily an instance of scientific knowledge. This is so only if the proposition in question is connected with the proposition that all triangles have that property, that is to say, if it is

21 ἐκεῖ δ’ ἐὰν ἐὰν πάντα, ὡστε ταύτων τὸ πράγμα καὶ τί διὰ τί τὸν πραγματός. πολλαχοί δὲ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ πράγμα καὶ τὸ διὰ τί ταύτων, οἷον τί ἐστιν ἐκλεῖψις. MacKenna reads: "In the Intellectual all is at one so that the thing is identical with the cause. Even here the thing and its cause are often identical -- an eclipse furnishes an example...". See also Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I.31.87b39-88a6 and II.2.90a24-30.

22 See Moreau, Aristote et son école: "Le moyen terme, en révélant la cause du fait, achève d'en faire connaître l'essence: l'éclipse, c'est, à l'égard de la Lune, une privation de lumière du fait de l'interposition de la Terre..." 61.

23 See Heiser 43. As well, Plotinus was no doubt aware of the difference between a causal syllogism which establishes a reason why such is the case and a syllogism of fact which, while true, only serves to indicate that such is the case.

24 See p.17.
regarded as explicating the general proposition: 'All triangles have their angles equal to two right angles.' For one might possess the particular proposition on the basis of empirical considerations, without realizing that the truth which it states is valid for all triangles qua triangles, so that the proposition turns out to express an opinion and not a necessary truth.25

To this extent, Plotinus is justified in calling the empirical sciences mere opinion (δόξα) for they yet lack the rules and measures of the Intellect, that is to say, they lack the illumination of the subordinate species in act held within divine soul. We must remember that the Plotinian philosophy is a system of procession and conversion whereby the prior is both the generator and formal cause of the sequent. So too with the sciences: the transcendent forms clarify, ground, and explain our knowledge of things insofar as they provide the unity of subject and object upon whose eternal self-evidence discursive reason, including induction and syllogism, must depend.26 As Moreau observes, the purely descriptive sciences whose rigor is limited to the compilation of features relevant to an object or class of objects accedes only to a logical as distinct from a real claim to science.27 And Taylor agrees with this view, for he says that neither sense perception nor induction offer proof, their role being limited to the observation and discernment of fact.28 We can say that in judgement, soul predicates the intelligible upon the sensible through the act of subsumption, the taking up of the particular within the universal as necessary ground of knowledge.29

25 Leszl 299. And Posterior Analytics I,1,71a18 - 22.

26 See also VI,6[34]6, wherein Plotinus speaks of the role of the Intellect to render scientific, that is, stable, our knowledge of the thing.

27 See Moreau, Aristote et son école: "Faute de cette union, dans le moyen terme, de la cause et de la raison, il n'y a pas de science véritable: la connaissance, procédant à partir de prémisses mieux connues seulement pour nous, est purement extérieure et logique; elle ne saisit pas l'ordre de la nature, l'ordre réel des choses, mais un ordre d'intelligibilité relatif à nous; elle n'a pas une valeur explicative, une portée physique. Il s'ensuit de là que les sciences du fait, de l'Œt, les sciences purement empiriques, fondées seulement sur l'observation, ne peuvent s'élever à de véritables explications:..." 54.

28 See Taylor 34.

29 We are reminded of the role of inferior reason, the daimon: it is potential knowledge or the application of the universal to the particular. See Bazan: " M. Moraux, rencontrant cette même doctrine dans le De anima, avait montré très heureusement que l'intellect ager n'est pas source de l'intelligibilité actuelle des formes; tout simplement il fournit aux êtres hylémorphiques
This being the case, what then are we to make of Plotinus' stance toward the Platonic doctrine of δόξα? How Platonic is Plotinus' Neoplatonism with regard to the classic ontology of science taught in the mature period, the Republic? These questions surpassing by far the limits of our study, we resolve to state only the following small observation: so far as Plotinus accepts the teaching of two worlds, the intellectual and the sensible, so far too he admits the distinction between two kinds of objects of knowledge, doxaston and gnōston. The sensible world is properly speaking the object of sensation, its formal cause being limited to the form in matter, the whole in the parts. However, there exists in both Platonism, the Symposium and the Parmenides, as well as in Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism, Albinus and Plotinus, the realization that sensible reality is not cut off from but is rather tributary to the transcendent forms. Plotinus' solution would appear to consist in the notion of subordination or a hierarchy of science. Wolters observes, "Plotinus frequently uses the perfect passive of compounds of ἀπτάω, especially ἐξηρτηθαί and ἀνηρτηθαί, to describe the dependence of the lower upon the higher in his metaphysics." That is to say, while accepting the view that knowledge of the particular qua particular constitutes only opinion -- this is the classic ontology of science -- Plotinus can nonetheless affirm the validity of the scientific knowledge of nature on the basis of the Aristotelian teaching of actual and potential knowledge. This end is achieved following upon an analysis of inferior reason as a realized capacity to know the sequent: reason passes from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality whenever it places

l'élément formel, mais l'intelligibilité reste potentielle aussi longtemps que n'est pas intervenu l'esprit humain qui saisit la forme en elle-même, indépendamment de la matière à laquelle elle est jointe" 483. Our knowledge of the sensible reality remains opinative until placed in the light of the species-act or universal.

30 See for instance O'Meara: "Albinus ajoute aussi à l'analyse ontologique des êtres en intelligibles et sensibles, l'analyse des sensibles en 'forme' et 'matière': c'est une combinaison, un rapprochement traditionnel des Idées transcendantes de Platon et des formes immanentes d'Aristote, et le monde sensible d'Albinus se voit attribué ainsi une présence intelligible" 21-22. And Lafrance: "Même si le Banquet, en accord ici avec la République, affirme que le Beau en soi est de nature essentiellement différente des beautés sensibles, il n'en reste pas moins que c'est la connaissance des beautés sensibles qui permet à l'initié d'avoir la révélation soudaine du Beau en soi. À quoi serviraient toutes ces étapes intermédiaires si l'objet final du processus n'est plus le même que les objets initiaux" 132? And "On connaît l'objectie du Parménide: à quoi serviraient cette science du Beau en soi si par elle on ne peut arriver à la connaissance des beautés sensibles" 133?

31 Wolters 71.
the particular within the universal, the veracity of this procedure being guaranteed upon
grounds of likeness, the class concept or logos as formal cause.32

This stance may be situated in the actual practice and teaching of the natural
philosophers of Plotinus’ day. By 200 A.D. the various schools of thought, Stoic,
Aristotelian, Neoplatonic, and Neopythagorean accepted a blending of a priori and a posteriori
methods of research regarding the knowledge of nature. A case in point is Ptolemy’s On the
Criterion. Lloyd tells us: “At the stage in the cognitive process which is equivalent to
belief/judgement he simply avoided the choice between rationalism and empiricism: he said that
thought tested and corrected the data from the senses either by further use of its agents or
instruments. the senses, or, more often, by appealing to its own rational knowledge of the
classification of objects (c. 10; cf. p.16.19-20)”.33 Ptolemy’s approach to a scientific
knowledge of nature agrees with the position suggested on behalf of Plotinus: the task of
natural science consists in saving the hypotheses (rational elements) rather than the appearances
(sensible qualities).34

As such, the traditional teaching of a rupture between the sensible and the intellectual as
observed by Lafrance in the Republic and the Symposium is not fully adhered to by Plotinus.
Rather than rupture or opposition, we read a continuity of suites, of orders, which serves to
conciliate the sensible -- image and reflection -- with the intellectual -- original and source. In
support we make reference to the epistemological aspect of the distinction image-original taught
by Plato in the Republic. This distinction is later recaptured in the Neoplatonic notion of

32 See Leszl: "This view is supposed to explain not only why the universality of the A is
regarded as grasped only 'incidentally' in Metaph. M10, but also why universal knowledge is
potential: it is the correlative of the potentiality or possibility of multiple instantiations on the
form's part. Owens says: 'The knowledge (and the act of knowing) is definite. But since this
definite knowledge of the form is able to be applied indefinitely to singulars of the same
species, it is potentially indefinite and universal. As such it can be regarded as matter for each
new actual cognition of a singular" 306. And Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism p. 140
on the varying degrees of knowledge.


34 As background, see Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism pp. 145-152.
intelligible shape which, together with the notion of intelligible matter, Plotinus and the Neoplatonists use as explanation of the difference between the One and the forms as well as between the forms themselves. Rist observes: "Plotinus inherits the general, if inadequately formulated, problem of differentiating between the Forms. He also inherits the specific problem of the nature of the difference, left at the least obscure by Plato in the Republic, between the other Forms and the Form of the Good or One. ...He regularly insists that the One is distinguished from νοῦς by otherness (έτερότης)". And "It is well known that Plotinus speaks of intelligible matter and that Plato's dialogues do not. We now add the concept of intelligible shape, and, we should recall, although incorporeals are to be differentiated from one another not by spatial measure but by difference and otherness, these differences are all features of the intelligible world (κόσμος νοητός)". 35 From the early treatise entitled 'On Matter' (II.4[12] we learn that in order to be able to distinguish between the forms, Plotinus has recourse to the notion of intelligible matter, the product of otherness and movement, first born of the One. 36 Together otherness and movement produce intelligible matter whose definition (δριξεται δε 1.33) is achieved upon conversion toward the One: the result is form, being, and number. 37 Hence the Platonic teaching on dianoia and noēsis -- mathematical science and the ensuing relation image-original as regards dialectical science -- suggests that the ascription of image-being to an object, say a square, does not necessarily preclude its admission into scientific knowledge; else geometry itself would not be a science. And regarding soul, the third hypostasis in the order of true being, Atkinson reminds us: "The concept of 'image' is elaborated by means of the concept of 'logos'; as the logos in expression is the image of the logos in the soul, so the soul is the logos of Intellect. One is led to expect some sort of image relationship between the logos in soul and the logos in Intellect. But instead P[lotinus] asserts

35 Rist, "The Problem of 'Otherness' in the Enneads" 79 and II.4[12],1-5 on the birth of intelligible matter, otherness, and movement in the second hypostasis, Intellect.

36 See II.4[12],5,28-30, καὶ γὰρ ἦ ἐτερότης ἦ ἐκεῖ ἄει, ἦ τὴν ύλην ποιεῖ· ἀρχὴ γὰρ ύλης αὐτῆ, καὶ ἦ κίνησις ἦ πρῶτη.

37 More generally on the background to this teaching see Dodds, pp. 135-36, the Neopythagorean influences on Platonism and vice versa. And V,1[10]5, on number, the dyad, form and the One.
a closer relationship, probably because speech does not merely image, but actually expresses thought: soul is the logos (=expressed content) of Intellect".\textsuperscript{38} We suggest a similar relation with sensible reality: the rational soul may have a true knowledge of things insofar as the form in matter is the descended image or veritable trace of the transcendent form. In the Platonic tradition, to be an image of a higher reality is not an impediment to science.

Even less can we accept the judgement of Rutten on the role and relation of sensible reality as regards Intellect, the accusation of their contrariety (contraires) whose only result is falsehood (fallacieuse).\textsuperscript{39} Instead we affirm the opposite: for Plotinus, nature is a soul whose act is a reason and contemplation. We read: "As what is called 'nature' is a soul, the offspring of a prior soul of a more powerful life...which does not seek [the sequents] but achieves their contemplation in splendor and grace" (III.8[30],4,15-16; 21-22).\textsuperscript{40} And Deck says: "Nature, then, is the last of the contemplative producers: the last producer that produces simply by being in possession of itself, simply by being an immobile contemplation. With nature we have reached the penultimate stage in the watering-down of the Nous's being and intellectuality".\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{38} Atkinson 50. And Trouillard, \textit{La Purification Plotinienne}: "La raison discursive est le plan proprement humain" 7.

\textsuperscript{39} Christian Rutten, \textit{Les catégories du monde sensible dans les 'Ennéades' de Plotin}, fascicule 160 (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1961). "Il n'est donc point question de découvrir dans les phénomènes une signification métaphysique. L'inspection des apparences ne révèle pas le réel. On devine déjà qu'entre deux univers contraires l'un à l'autre, l'âme raisonnable ne peut opérer une véritable médiation. Et l'on ne s'étonnera point du caractère paradoxal de l'hypostase discursive. fallacieuse médiatrice qu'il faut à présent définir" 34.

\textsuperscript{40} ὃς ἢ μὲν λεγομένη φύσις ψυχὴ οὕσα, γέννημα ψυχῆς προτέρας δυνατώτερον ζωῆς....οὐκέτι ἐξητηρεῖ ἀλλὰ θεώρημα ἀποτελέσσας ἁγιαν καὶ χάριν.
MacKenna reads: "...that what we know as Nature is a Soul, offspring of a yet earlier Soul of a pure powerful life...a knowledge of the realm of subsequent things perceived in virtue of that understanding and consciousness; and, achieving thus a resplendent and delicious spectacle, has no further aim". See also 3,2-3 where Plotinus says that nature is a reason (λόγος) and a contemplation (θεωρία).

\textsuperscript{41} Deck 72. See also I,4[20],6,1-5 wherein Plotinus clearly states the study of nature (περί φύσεως) as a part (μέρος) of philosophy; indeed is closer (μάλλον μείνει αὐτή ἐγγύθειν κοιμήσει ταῖς διάλεκτικῆς) to dialectic than is the arithmetical science.
Rather than a false mediation, the Plotinian philosophy of nature teaches the proper relations of soul -- including world-soul -- with its prior, the Intellect -- and its sequent, the sensible reality.

In this section we have argued for the consistency of the Plotinian position as regards our knowledge of sensible reality. We have maintained the view that Plotinus' views on opinative nature of our knowledge of sensible objects does not contradict the possibility of a scientific knowledge of sensible reality but instead must be integrated within the rest of his epistemology. To do so, we have recapitulated the major elements of the Platonic teaching on άσκησις, its development from the early dialogue 'Meno' to the mature dialogue 'Republic'.

Following Lafrance, we observe that the Meno teaches an epistemology of science based on the question 'how do we come to reflect on the simplest truths, axioms, and principles of science'? In response, Plato suggests the famous criterion of causal reasoning as explanation of true opinion. As such, the early teaching of Plato does not recognize a difference of object between opinative and scientific statements. Meanwhile in the mature dialogue 'Republic' Plato does recognize an ontological difference between opinion and science, granting to the former the object of άσκησις -- eikasia and pistis -- and to the latter the object of science -- dianoia and noēsis. We argue that Plotinus does admit a scientific knowledge of sensible reality based on the principles of actuality and potentiality introduced in Chapter I: while accepting the view that knowledge of the particular qua particular constitutes only opinion, Plotinus can still affirm the validity of the empirical sciences on the basis of the notion of actual or explicit knowledge of the thing and potential or implicit knowledge of the thing.
2: Soul and the Ideal of Truth

Having addressed one half of the dilemma, that is, the role of opinative knowledge or δόξα in Plotinian philosophy, let us now turn to address the other half, that is, the cognitive exigency of truth as taught by the author of the Enneads. In the late treatise entitled 'The Knowing Hypostases' Plotinus reiterates the gnoseological perfection of Intellect. We read: "If such is the case, the act of knowing must be identical with the object known and the Intellect with the intelligible. For in fact, if they are not identical there will be no truth; one will have an impression (τυποῦ) -- a nature different from substance -- which is not truth. Truth cannot be of another but what it says this also it must be. Hence Intellect, intelligible, and being are one; this is the primal. And primal Intellect has the substances or rather is the same as substance" (V.3[49]5.21-28). Armstrong tells us: "The writers who put forward the doctrine that the Ideas are the thoughts seemed very often to be concerned with the questions 'On what pattern did God make the world?' and 'What is the relationship between the Maker and the pattern he used in making?' Plotinus in formulating his doctrine that the Intelligibles are in Intellect seems to me to be concerned with a question of a different sort 'What is the relationship of eternal intuitive thought to its object (or objects) and how is that object to be conceived?" Now it is well known that this questioning of the intuitive thought, both as act and as object, stems from a reflection on the Aristotelian noesis. Once again Armstrong explains:

42 εἰ τούτο, δει τὴν θεωρίαν ταύτων εἶναι τῷ θεωρητῷ, καὶ τὸν νοὸν ταύτων εἶναι τῷ νοητῷ καὶ γὰρ, εἰ μὴ ταύτων, οὐκ ἀλήθεια ἔσται τύπου γὰρ ἐξεῖ ὁ ἐχων τὰ ὀντα ἐπεροῦ τῶν ὄντων, ὡς ἐπερ οὐκ ἐστιν ἀλήθεια. τὴν ἀρα ἀλήθειαν οὐχ ἐπεροῦ εἶναι δει, ἀλλ' ὁ λέγει, τουτο και εἶναι. ἐν ἀρα νοῦν νοῦς καὶ τὸ νοητὸν καὶ τὸ ὄν καὶ πρώτον ὃν τούτο καὶ δὴ καὶ πρῶτος νοῦς τὰ ὀντα ἐχων, μᾶλλον δὲ ὃν αὐτῶν τοῖς οὕσιν. MacKenna reads: "At that, the object known must be identical with the knowing act (or agent), the Intellectual-Principle, therefore, identical with the Intellectual Realm. And in fact, if this identity does not exist, neither does truth; the Principle that should contain realities is found to contain a transcript, something different from the realities; that constitutes non-truth; Truth cannot apply to something conflicting with itself; what it affirms it must also be. Thus we find that the Intellectual-Principle, the Intellectual Realm, and Real Being constitute one thing, which is the Primal Being; the primal Intellectual-Principle is that which contains the realities or, rather, which is identical with them". We change MacKenna considerably, simplifying the text and leaving out the terms 'transcript' and 'conflicting with itself' which Plotinus does not say.

43 Armstrong, "The Background of the Doctrine..." 401.
What Albinus seems to me to be doing here is something more interesting and intelligent than simply tacking the doctrine of the Ideas as thoughts of God on to his conception of God as an Aristotelian νοῦς. He is, as I suggested at the beginning of this section, critically rethinking Aristotle on Platonic lines. He accepts from Aristotle that God’s thought must be self-thought: but it seems to him (I conjecture) as it has seemed to many critics of Aristotle since, that a bare νόμος νοησις is a limited, sterile and unsatisfactory conception. So by boldly combining the Aristotelian doctrine of the identity of thought and its object in the case of immaterial beings (Met. 1074b38-1075a5) with the doctrine of the ideas as the thoughts of God, which he assumes, as I have said, without discussion, he arrives at the doctrine that for God to think himself is to think the Ideas, that is the whole of intelligible reality.\textsuperscript{44}

For the thinkers of Late Antiquity to whom Plotinus is in debt, truth requires the identity, indeed the immanence, of the Intellect and the intelligibles. From the Parmenides we learned that being and Intellect are equipollent: being gives existence to the Intellect and, equally, Intellect lays down the essence of being. Meanwhile, from Aristotle is introduced a new element necessary to the scientific knowledge: his is the doctrine of actuality and potentiality according to which the Intellect can never be potential but must remain always actual; else there ensues imperfection, incompleteness, or in a word, fallibility.\textsuperscript{45} Besides, intellectual knowledge is favorably contrasted with sensible knowledge whose object -- the thing -- remains exterior to sensation, the actualization of the sense faculty leading only to an incorporeal impression and internalization of the object in sense perception. In Plotinian philosophy, perceptual judgement is a cognitive power susceptible of error insofar as it may mistake -- falsely identify -- say an ox for a sheep. Ontologically, this consequence ensues because the sensible quality is a form in matter whose being is ‘in another’ and as such does not exist by virtue of itself.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{44} Armstrong, “The Background of the Doctrine...” 404. See also pp. 408-409.

\textsuperscript{45} See Moreau, Plotin ou la gloire... pp. 55-59 on the identity of subject and object. This affirmation is however made relative to the One, whose identity is absolute. See pp. 65-71.

\textsuperscript{46} See Lloyd, ‘Neoplatonic logic and Aristotelian logic - I: "The conception of ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὑπ’ was readily assimilated because it was identified (and probably correctly) with
The place of truth is the Intellect, the transcendent forms or Platonic essence. How then is it possible for soul to fulfill the ideal of knowledge when it is most obviously not the Intellect -- second hypostasis -- the realization of the One in essences? Now there is no need to recapitulate the doctrine which teaches that soul -- third hypostasis in the procession of being -- is the logos of Intellect; it is the veritable expression or utterance (ἐν προφορᾷ) of Intellect itself (V.1[10],3.7-8). Heiser explains: "Plotinus does not represent Soul, via Nature, as 'uttering' the Universe like some cosmic logos prohorikos. He uses the Stoic term 'utter' exclusively for human verbal utterance. ...It is always an expression and explication of a higher and more unified contemplation".47 Interestingly the Stoic teaching of uttered and interior reason (προφορικός, ἐνδιάθετος) may be traced back to Platonic philosophy which had recognized the difference between the unspoken dialogue of the soul and its utterance.48 Meanwhile, the ontological explanation of this thought may be found in the late treatise entitled 'On Love' wherein we read that each Intellect has an inhering soul: "Well, in this case too, we must identify Zeus from the writings of Plato: from the Phaedrus, where he calls this god 'great leader,' although I believe it is this god which he calls 'third [Cause]' in another place. But he speaks more clearly in the Philebus, when he says that 'in Zeus there is royal Soul and royal Intellect' (III,5[50],8.6-11).49 Wolters explains: "In the present chapter Plotinus is concerned to emphasize that Aphrodite is not simply Soul-in-general but Zeus's Soul.... This is because of his exegesis of the quote from the Philebus (10-11): Aphrodite is the 'royal soul' in Zeus, with which he is often identified, just as a man may be identified with either the Soul

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47 Heiser 19. See also Brunner: "L'amè est donc comme l'expression de la pensée, et l'Intelligence comme son intimité silencieuse" 72.

48 See Lloyd, 'Neoplatonic logic and Aristotelian logic - I' p.60, and Atkinson pp.50-51 on the background to this teaching.

49 δει δὴ λαβεῖν καὶ ἐναθαύσα παρά Πλάτωνος τῶν Δία ἐκ μὲν Φαίδρου ἡγεμόνα μεγαί λέγοιτος αὐτοῦ τοῦ τῶν θεῶν, ἐν ἀλλοις δὲ τρίτου, οὐμα, τοῦτοι σαφέστεροι δὲ ἐν τῷ Φιλήβῳ ἡμίκ ἂν φη ἐν τῷ Διὶ εἶναι βασιλικῆι μὲν ψυχῆι, βασιλικοί δὴ νοοῦ.
or the Intellect 'in' him (see on 3.25/7.54-55).

We make two observations. A first observation deals with the problem of the generation of essence. In his commentary to the treatise 'On Love', Hadot notes the general ontological rule which states the multiplication of essence by means of its expression — unfolding — into parts. This consequence ensues due to the activity of being and its attribution to an object: whencesoever the generic intelligence adjoins differences to its substance, it thereby creates the specific essence. In the middle treatise entitled 'Problems of the Soul I' we read: "This also holds for the souls. They are severally linked. one by one, each to its own individual intellect on which it is dependent, and are the rational principles expressing the intellects; they are also more unfolded (ἐξειλιγμέναι) than these, a greater multiplicity, as it were, coming from less" (IV.3[27],5.8-11).

We must remember that the Intellect is the source of soul and provides the power of its sequent, the species being. Meanwhile through soul's contemplation of its progenitor, Intellect, originates the species-being or common nature whose extension consists in the multiple forms in matter and whose intension is generic being understood as substrate. Helleman-Elgersma tells us: "Later in the same treatise [V.9(5)] P[lotinus] amplifies by saying that we must not think of souls here as images, or copies, εἰδωλαί, εἰκόνας of soul-absolute αὐτοψυχὴ although one soul may rank higher in honour than another, souls here are in fact truly soul inasmuch as they have true knowledge. ...P[lotinus] refers to soul on three levels, thus, that of soul in body, γεινέσθαι, the soul as a true universal, καθόλου, and prior to that the life which characterizes

50 Wolters 231.

51 See Hadot, Traité 50: "La raison de cette liason nous est donnée: chaque âme est l'expression, le logos d'un Esprit particulier; elle permet donc l'explicitation de telle Forme particulière sur le plan rationnel et prépare sa manifestation dans l'espace et le temps. ...En un certain sens, on peut dire que le mouvement de particularisation des Formes à l'intérieur de l'Esprit (décrit dans le traité 38 (VI.7),7.1-38, cf. mon commentaire p. 237-241) mène logiquement et dynamiquement à cette manifestation de telle Forme intelligible dans telle âme qui correspond à cette Forme particularisée" 238.

52 οὔτω τοῖς καὶ ψυχαί ἐφεξῆς καθ' ἑκαστοῦ νοῦν ἐξηρητιμέναι, λόγοι νοῦν οὕσαι καὶ ἐξειλιγμέναι μᾶλλον ἢ ἑκεῖνη, οἷον πολύ ἐξ ὀλίγου γεινέσθαι..... We follow the Helleman-Elgersma translation. More generally, see the commentary to the translation, pp.354-59.
soul in ὑπὸ and properly called the αὐτὸψυχή. Soul, therefore, accedes to a knowledge of truth insofar as it is the universal and veritable expression of the Intellect.

A second observation deals with the act of participation. From Lloyd we learn that the Neoplatonists allied Platonic participation -- the whole prior to the parts whose being is determinate of the many, say 'beauty' of beautiful things -- with the doctrine of procession -- the casting forth of a new substantial existence by virtue of the perfection of the progenitor. He says:

Participation is implied by procession. When an entity proceeds it generates another entity and therefore partly transmits an attribute; this second entity is then said to participate in the first, its cause. Since the partial transmission implies an alteration of the attribute, what is possessed by the participant is distinct from what is possessed by the cause. (This is the chief point of In Parm. 1045.22-3, αἱ μεθέξεις ἀλλαὶ τῶν μετεχομένων). And it is what is in, or possessed by, the participant that is referred to as what is participated in, τὸ μετεχόμενον. The cause, or the original entity, continues to have, or par excellence to be, the original attribute whole and unaltered; and this is what is referred to as what is imparticipable. The participated attribute is also said to be generated by the imparticipable. In fact not every participant is so generated, but only if it belongs to the same series or genus as the imparticipable; if it belongs to another series, however, the attribute will be an accident of it. But every participated attribute is the product of the imparticipable.54

The participants (αἱ μεθέξεις ἀλλαὶ) may be souls whose attribute is the participated entity (τὸ μετεχόμενον) or descended image of the form. Now the actuality of participation is analysable into an act or form and a potency or matter. From the early treatise entitled 'The

53 Helleman-Elgersma 46.

54 A.C. Lloyd. "Procession and Division in Proclus." Soul and the Structure of Being in Late Neoplatonism Syrianus, Proclus, and Simplicius, ed. H.J. Blumenthal & A.C. Lloyd (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1982) 25. We understand this explanation to apply also to Plotinus.
Three Initial Hypostases' we learned that soul is like matter to the Intellect as form (V,1[10],3.22-23): whenever soul -- the intrinsic act of being -- turns and looks toward the prior, Intellect, reason -- the derived act of soul -- is in act (ειν' εν εργεια) and soul is thereby fully constituted in essence. This result obtains due to the nature of essential predication for the Neoplatonists affirm the unity of subject and predicate, say 'oxen' and 'animal', by virtue of the priority of 'animal' upon 'oxen'. As such, the participant soul attains to perfection through unification with its source, the formal cause and generic being.

In this section we maintain the view that soul -- third hypostasis in the procession of true being -- does indeed accede to the cognitive exigency of truth. We suggest an argument in two parts. The first part deals with the notion of the Intellect and the inhering soul, the epistemological activity of which is expressed in the unfolding of the forms within reason. The second part concerns the metaphysical doctrine of participation which states that the participant, say 'soul', is realized upon its participation in the participated entity or attribute. This result obtains because of the nature of essential predication and the actualization of the sequent by the prior as necessary and formal cause.

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55 See Brunner: "L'être spirituel se fait lui-même ce qu'il est, sous l'influence pourtant d'un être supérieur -- ainsi l'auto-constitution proclusienne ne laissera pas de requérir une transcendance" 73.
3: Recapitulation

To summarize, the chapter has resolved a dilemma concerning the possibility of a science of nature in the Enneads. In order to succeed in this task, we have analysed the dilemma into two parts, a first part which concerns the role and relation of δόξα to science, and a second part which addresses the ideal of truth attainable by soul. Concerning δόξα, we suggest that Plotinus was able to accept the classic ontology of science taught by Plato in the Republic, namely, the division into two worlds and their respective kinds of knowledge -- the sensible and opinative, the intellectual and scientific -- but yet affirm the validity of the natural sciences upon grounds of actual and potential knowledge well known to him from Aristotle. Sensible reality qua sensible, qua particular is always and only the object of opinative knowledge in both Platonic and Aristotelian philosophies. Plotinus herewith agrees, ascribing to the sensible sciences the name of 'δόξα', that is, opinion: these are the descriptive sciences. In order to accede to scientific knowledge, we must pass from knowledge of the particular to knowledge of the universal, from potential knowledge of the universal to actual knowledge of the universal. Again, as concerns the second part of the dilemma, namely the ideal of truth, we learn that each Intellect has an inhering soul. To clarify, mention is made of the nature of soul as the logos and expression of the Intellect's power, the unfolding of the form into parts. This actuality of soul is further clarified in terms of the doctrine of procession: the participant or receptacle is made perfect by virtue of the illumination of the participated entity or form.

Chapter IV completes our study of the possibility of a scientific knowledge of sensible reality. In nature apologetic, Chapter IV situates Plotinian philosophy and the role of discursive reason within the Platonic tradition of two worlds. We observe that the employments of reason as regards the thing, and in particular the act of induction, are deemed inferior to Platonic division and the unfolding of the forms within divine soul. This teaching rejoins the text on the inferiors of the soul examined in the early treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' (V,1[10],3). Meanwhile, we observe the positive nature of soul to be the image (ἐἰκών) of Intellect, a doctrine stated in Chapter I of the thesis. We situate this thought within the Platonic tradition which regards geometric science as the image of a properly
dialectical science. That sensible reality is constituted of images of the descended form does not, therefore, preclude a true and necessary science of things in Plotinian philosophy. Instead it points to the imitative relation taught by all Platonism and the causality of form. Also, we note that the text of the early treatise entitled 'The Intellectual Principle, the Ideas, and the Authentic Existence' (V.9[5]) supports our reading of the text on the acts and the passions of the soul read in the treatise entitled 'The Three Initial Hypostases' (V.1[10]). Our thesis thus stands on solid grounds: the dialectical argumentation of Chapter I regarding the difficult text on the passions of the soul is shown to be exact and true.
Concluding Remarks

Plotinus the Aristotelian? Has history produced a misnomer of sorts, we preferring to call him the founder of Neoplatonism rather than Plotinus the Neoaristotelian? Katz observes: "It is with Plotinus and his teacher Ammonius Sakkas that we date the beginning of Neoplatonism. The term 'Neoplatonism' is a product of modern scholarship. It marks the recognition of doctrinal differences within the Platonic movement, in particular differences between Plato himself and the 'Platonists' (a recognition which has not even yet been followed through in all its implications)." And from Blumenthal we know that Plotinus shared much of Aristotle's views on sense perception, the sense faculty, say sight, being the actualization of a potentiality to know the object. Where they differ seems to lie mainly in the role assigned to the sense organs: on the one hand, Aristotle asserting their independent activity, say sight as regards the eye, else it would not be an eye; on the other hand, Plotinus understanding their role as intermediary between the prior sensible power of soul and the particular object, they being mainly possible in nature. And our study of soul, third hypostasis, leads us to think that his conception of two reasons -- one actual, one potential -- reveals a Plotinus a great deal closer to Aristotle as regards discursiveness than is generally supposed. But to call him a Neoaristotelian, a Neostoic, a Neopythagorean, or what not else misses the point. For we must remember that Plotinus claims always to teach Platonic philosophy, this end read at length in the treatise 'On Love', the Plotinian exegesis of one of Plato's most celebrated dialogues. If he is not a Platonist in the technical sense of the term, he is certainly Platonic in his thought; the

1 Katz 1-2.

2 See Blumenthal, "Plotinus' Adaptation of Aristotle's Psychology..." 46.

3 See Blumenthal, "Plotinus' Adaptation of Aristotle's Psychology...": "In Aristotle's psychology it was possible, not to say desirable, for the organs to be independently active. Vision is, after all, inherent in the eye. It is its form and essence: an eye that cannot see is simply not an eye (412b18-22). For Plotinus, on the other hand, an eye qua part of a body can only see when activated by the relevant faculty of its detached soul, and its function, like that of all the sense organs, is to act as an intermediary, a kind of transformation point, between the sensible objects outside and the immaterial soul 'inside' which is only able to perceive what is presented to it in an intelligible form (IV.4.23.5f.)." 48. See also Emilsson p.107. And Enneads III,6[26],1 on the unity of the perceptual judgement and IV,3[27],21-23 on the role of the sensible organs.
doctrine of three hypostases is largely taken from the Parmenides -- the three Ones -- while the classic ontology of science -- two worlds, one intellectual one sensible -- is taken from the Republic.4

To grasp better the importance and role of Plotinus' teaching on reason as both an act and a passion of the soul, let us remember what success Plotinus enjoyed in teaching the doctrine 'that the intelligibles are not outside the intellect'; that is to say, the doctrine of the immanence of the ideas. Dodds relates:

That Pythagoreans should thus take their material from Plato, and that their interpretation of it should influence later Platonists, need not surprise us. ...Later, Plutarch shows clearly the influence of Neopythagoreanism: while in the eclectic Platonist Alcinous (or Albinus) the Neopythagorean transcendence theory appears in hopelessly inconsistent combination with the immanence theory (God=\(\psi\)\(\nu\)\(\sigma\)\(\varsigma\) = the sum of the Ideas) which had developed under peripatetic and Stoic influence. In his attempt to connect these divergent views he foreshadows Plotinus: his complete failure to make anything coherent of them is one measure of Plotinus' greatness".5

To achieve the cognitive exigency of science, truth, two steps needed to be taken: first, the determination of the proper object of thought and second, the clarification of the logical relations pertaining therewith. From Plato onwards philosophers have deemed the form, the necessary and essential determination of being -- what is so and so -- as the proper object of science. Afterwards this step was enlarged upon by the Middle Platonists Albinus and Gaius from whom Plotinus learns the doctrine that thought thinking itself -- the Aristotelian \(\nu\)\(\omicron\)\(\nu\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\eta\)\(\omicron\)\(\iota\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\) -- necessarily thinks the Platonic forms. The second step is properly Aristotelian in

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4 On the background to the Neoplatonic One, see Dodds: "The first, second, and third 'Ones' are the three Ones which are posited in the first three hypotheses of the Parmenides, and the interpretation here given to them is the same which was current in the school of Plotinus" 137. On the Republic VI 509a-511b.

5 Dodds 139. For a more positive appreciation of Alcinous, see Armstrong, "The Background of the Doctrine..." 404.
nature and may be found fully stated in Metaphysics 1075a4-5 as well as in De Anima 430a3-5: concerning objects without matter, that which thinks and that which is thought is the same.  

As Armstrong recounts, this teaching was also most certainly familiar to Plotinus from Alexander's psychology:

Alexander, in the passages in both the De Anima and the Mantissa in which he deals with the divine intellect, insists particularly strongly on the identity of ἵνατος and νοητὸν at this highest level (De anima 87,43-88.5. Mantissa 108,7-9,16-19,109,23-110,3. Burns). I think it would be difficult for anyone to compare the Mantissa in particular with Plotinus's discussions of the same subject, and especially the long argument, very Aristotelian in its phraseology, of V3.5, without coming to the conclusion that Alexander provides at least a very likely starting-point for Plotinus's thinking about the identity of intellect with its object.  

Whensoever the Intellect conceives the form, there ensues the identical relation whereby our grasp of the object coincides with the object. The result is truth and scientific knowledge.  

Now, many laud Plotinus for this success, history noting the rigour of his thought together with the amplitude of his influence. As Moreau observes, the Christian doctors largely accepted this teaching as true of Plato and of reality in general. From that moment onward and with the continuous activity of the oriental schools -- Jamblicus in Syria, Simplicius from Alexandria -- Plotinus' place in the history of philosophy was assured. And so too his teaching on reason as both an act and a passion of the soul. Less well known to us today than the doctrine of the unity and immanence of the ideas and the Intellect, we can say with confidence

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6 ὅσα μὴ ὑλὴ ἔχει, τὸ ἀυτὸ ἔσται, καὶ ἡ νοησις τῷ νοουμένῳ μια And εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὼν ἡλεν ἡλεν τὸ αὐτὸ ἔστι τὸ νουμεν καὶ τὸ νουμένου

7 Armstrong, "The Background of the Doctrine..." 408.

8 See Moreau, Plotin ou la gloire... : "L'objet de l'Intellect absolu lui est donc intérieur; l'Inelligible n'est pas hors de l'Intellect; mais, en outre, il coïncide avec lui" 57.

9 Moreau, Plotin ou la gloire... p.55 & note 4. And more at large, the Introduction pp.7-8.
that Plotinus enjoyed another and equally important success, the integration of Aristotelian empiricism which says that to have knowledge we must employ the senses, with Platonic rationalism which says that true knowledge has its source in the ideas, transcendent and self-subsistent ground of explanation. As has often been remarked by commentators, this primary division of Plato and Aristotle is itself crude, Moreau on the one hand citing the critical (critique) as distinct from realist (réaliste) employment of the form as regards the object -- that is to say, that knowledge is not reducible to sense experience does not forbid the object’s sharing in the form’s nature -- Taylor on the other hand repeatedly reminding us that Aristotle’s final views on the cognitive exigency of science -- proved knowledge -- are little removed from those of his master. 10 Plotinus’ response would seem to consist in the following: the empirical sciences consist of two elements, one formal and the other one material. Now it is true that to know the thing we must employ the senses. That is, the perceptual judgement which tells us that something is a ‘this’, for instance, that what is in front of our eyes is a three-sided plane figure or triangle. It is the task of item identification. There then follows the rational judgement whereby soul takes up the particular triangle -- a ‘this’ -- and places it within the species-being -- a ‘such’, thus ascribing the necessary ground of explanation for scientific knowledge. In so doing two consequences ensue; first, discursive reason passes from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality, for we must remember that in both the Plotinian and the Aristotelian philosophies the act of thought is perfected by its object. Now the application of the species-being to the particular object perfects reason insofar as reason passes from a state of need, potentiality, to a state of completion; it is first actuality or disposition, the state of acquired knowledge. Meanwhile, reason which is actual -- Eros the god -- remains ever turned toward the prior, Intellect; its task is that of division, the unfolding of the form being into the species-being. The science of nature requires this division in order to have a necessary ground of explanation. Second, this position differs from that of moderate

10 Moreau, "L'être et l'essence..." 184. And Taylor: "The result is that Aristotle does little more than repeat the Platonic view of the nature of science. Science consists of deductions from universal principles which sensible experience 'suggests,' but into which, as they are apprehended by a purely intellectual inspection, no sense-data enter as constituents. The apparent rejection of 'transcendental moonshine' has, after all, led to nothing" 39.
empiricism which admits a distinction between the acquisition of concepts -- as having their source in experience -- and the logical validity of the conceptual relations pertaining thereto -- their proved knowledge. Instead, Plotinian philosophy teaches that true being is the ideas whose necessary refraction within soul constitutes the parts or species-being. Hence it follows that while the empirical sciences gather their matter from sensible reality, their formal cause nonetheless remains separate, that is to say, is neither dependent upon nor reducible to sense perception.

We began the study with a dialectical reasoning concerning the position commonly held on the passions of the soul as sensation (V,1[10],5,19-20). Instead, we suggested the view that the passions (πάθη) so named have for their referent the employments of reason whose object is not the soul's prior, the Intellect, but rather sensible reality, elsewhere (ἀλλοτριόν). Our analysis of the treatise 'On Love' (III,5[50]) confirms us in this view upon grounds of gnoseological perfection: the birth of mixed love -- discursive reason -- from its parents Fortuna and Indetermination implies a potential nature. In order to become actual, it must take up the particular within the universal, thus rendering explicit or actual both its object -- universal knowledge as it applies to any particular instance -- and its activity -- subsumption or the inclusion of the particular under a class concept or species. History therefore is well grounded in calling Plotinus the founder of Neoplatonism. In Plotinus' philosophy, the conciliation of the two philosophers he most read -- Plato and Aristotle -- as well as the two worlds -- sensible and intellectual -- reaches its clearest statement. We can say with Dodds that Plotinus is both the founder and culmination of Neoplatonism.12

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11 See D.W. Hamlyn, "Empiricism," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1972 ed. "A second reason for maintaining that all knowledge is dependent on experience would be that we can have no ideas or concepts which are not derived from experience, that is, that all concepts are a posteriori, whether or not the truths which can be asserted by means of these concepts are themselves a posteriori. It may be that we know some propositions without having to resort immediately to experience for their validation; for their truth may depend solely on the logical relations between the ideas involved. Yet these ideas may themselves be derived from experience. If all our ideas are so derived, then knowledge of any sort must be dependent on sense experience in some way" 499.

12 See Dodds: "To say that the Enneads were not the starting-point of Neoplatonism but its intellectual culmination is no disparagement of Plotinus' originality" 140.
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