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UMI
IN SEARCH OF INDIGENOUS PARTICIPATION
IN EDUCATION SECTOR STUDIES
IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

© By Werner G. Meier

A Thesis submitted to the
Faculty of Education in fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of
Masters of Arts

Faculty of Education, University of Ottawa
Ottawa, Ontario
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Abstract

In Search of Indigenous Participation

in Education Sector Studies in Sub-Saharan Africa

By Werner G. Meier

In the 1980's, education sector studies emerged as a predominant approach to policy analysis by most donor agencies involved in the identification and design of policy measures for education sector adjustment programs in Sub-Saharan African countries. International donor agencies often used a "technocratic approach" in the conduct of these studies, exercising excessive control and allowing for little indigenous participation in the policy analysis process. Limited indigenous participation in and appropriation of education sector studies became identified as an obstacle to improved education policy implementation. The "participatory approach" to development was soon adopted by some donor agencies as a means to build educational research and policy analysis capacity in Sub-Saharan African countries.

This study examined a set of ten donor supported education sector studies undertaken between 1990 and 1994 in Sub-Saharan African countries, determined the extent of indigenous participation and identified the conditionalities that explain its presence or absence. In general, the research findings indicated that the practice of education sector analysis fell far short of the rhetoric which had embraced the need for increased indigenous participation. Constraints within donor agencies were traced to the administrative procedures and incentives related to project funding and disbursement pressures, while those in Sub-Saharan countries were linked to nascent democratic values and systems of governance, lack of political leadership and a public service rife with inter-ministerial conflict and self-interest.
Dedication

To my late mother,
my source of inspiration,
my intellectual curiosity
and my wonder at all that
there is to know.
Acknowledgements

I wish to thank my thesis supervisor, Dr. Richard Maclure, whose patience and encouragement was an inspiration. I would also like to extend my appreciation to my thesis committee members, Dr. Brad Cousins and Dr. Daniel Moralez-Gomez, for their critical insight and valuable contributions. Finally, to the participants in this study who took the time and made the effort to share with me their personal thoughts, my sincerest and heartfelt gratitude. Finally, to my family and friends who have listened to and endured my never-ending excuses, I thank you.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

In the 1980's, the advent of economic structural adjustment programs in Sub-Saharan Africa was closely followed by the appearance of the more focused sector adjustment programs. Education sector studies emerged as a popular approach to planning by most donor agencies which were in the process of identifying and designing policy measures for education sector adjustment programs in Sub-Saharan Africa. International donor agencies exercised virtually complete control over these education sector studies, from the identification of the research focus, design of the study, choice of analysis techniques, selection of consultants, through to the approval and dissemination of the research findings.

These education sector studies typically employed a technocratic approach to policy analysis that proposed educational investment strategies based on techniques such as manpower planning and cost-benefit analysis. The findings and recommendations of these sector studies provided donor agencies with powerful arguments with which to engage recipient country governments in education policy reforms. Discussions of research findings and their implications for education policy reform generated some dialogue, but served moreover to perpetuate the existing dominant relationships.

In recent years, the World Bank commissioned a series of studies that provided a critical appraisal of education policy implementation in eight Sub-Saharan African countries (Achola 1990, Eshiwani 1990, Galabawa 1990, Kiros 1990, Magalula 1990, Maravanyika 1990, Odaet 1990). The overview of these policy evaluation studies indicated that educational reform policies in Sub-Saharan Africa had been unsuccessful in achieving their goals. It concluded that educational
policies were either 1) never implemented, 2) implemented only partially and had no effect, or 3) were implemented but did not have the intended effect (Psacharopoulos 1990).

Limited indigenous participation in and appropriation of education sector studies was frequently cited as an obstacle to improved policy implementation. The concept of capacity development, which found renewed importance and meaning in the World Bank document *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth* (1989), began a rapid ascendancy to the pinnacle of development philosophy. Capacity development combines human resource development and institutional strengthening with a genuine recognition that the development process must be internally driven to be sustainable (King 1990). Although indigenous participation was considered to be central to the concept of capacity development, it was also seen as a way to induce much stronger political commitments to a new generation of policy reforms that would focus on the adjustment, revitalisation and the selective expansion of educational systems in the region (World Bank 1988).

The international donor community has come to realise that the success of educational reform relies heavily on the existence of a national research and policy analysis capacity and that this capacity can best be developed through greater indigenous participation in the policy analysis process. In October 1989, the Donors to African Education (DAE) Working Group on Capacity-Building in Educational Research and Policy Analysis was established, with Canada's own International Development Research Centre (IDRC) as the lead donor agency. "The main objective of the Working Group is to strengthen educational research and policy analysis capacity
in Sub-Saharan Africa" (Namuddu and Tapsoba 1993). This DAE Working Group recognised that a more participatory approach to policy analysis was needed to meet this objective.

The utilisation of a participatory approach to the conduct of education sector studies has manifested itself in a variety of ways since the turn of the decade. At minimum, this approach implies a greater utilisation of African resources available in government ministries, research institutions or in the private sector. In some cases, donor agencies engage in long-term sustained policy dialogue with government ministries and other key stakeholders. Such a broad participatory approach would involve not only national government staff, but also the education community in general, with representation from teachers, parents, students, and communities (UNESCO 1996). For true capacity development to take place, some advocate that the concept of participation be extended to include national control and ownership of the policy analysis process (King 1991b, Loubser 1994). Nevertheless, it is generally acknowledged that indigenous participation is a key variable in the process of capacity development in policy analysis.

International donor agencies continue to undertake educational research, conduct policy analysis studies, make policy recommendations and fund education sector adjustment programs. Between 1990 and 1994, according to the latest inventory (UNESCO 1996), over 239 studies, reports and papers were produced on education in Sub-Saharan Africa. This thesis will examine the extent of indigenous participation in the conduct of externally sponsored and supported education sector studies.
1.1 Statement of Problem

Against a landscape of evolving development philosophy and practice, it is important to be able to separate fact from fiction and rhetoric from reality. The importance of capacity building in educational research and policy analysis is universally accepted. The important role of indigenous participation in the capacity-building process is equally recognised.

In a recent meeting of another DAE Working Group on Education Sector Analysis (WGESA), for which UNESCO is the lead agency, participants made several recommendations that are pertinent to this research. Firstly, efforts to develop African capacities for sector analysis should be enhanced through the utilisation of existing capacity, rather than the building of additional capacity. Many participants observed that qualified African education specialists are infrequently involved in externally supported policy analysis work, even in their own countries. Secondly, participants agreed on the importance to improve donor agencies' sector analysis practices and stressed the need to promote participatory policy analysis approaches. These recommendations signal the increased importance attributed to indigenous participation in the policy analysis process.

What remains to be determined is whether these concepts are being applied in any systematic fashion in development practice. Some ground-breaking research into the conduct of externally sponsored education sector studies in Sub-Saharan Africa has already begun (UNESCO 1989, Samoff 1990). The work of UNESCO and other educational researchers on this topic indicates the significance of an analysis of the presence of indigenous participation in the conduct of education sector studies. This thesis will assess whether progress is being made in enhancing indigenous participation in the actual practice of conducting education sector studies.
1.2 Research Questions

The purpose of this thesis is: a) to examine a set of education sector studies in order to locate them on a continuum ranging from a conventional "technocratic approach" to a "participatory approach" (as defined in the following literature review), and; b) to examine the conditions that explain the presence or absence of indigenous participation in the conduct of these studies. Two primary research questions have been formulated as follows:

1) Since 1990, what has been the extent of indigenous participation in the conduct of externally supported education sector studies in Sub-Saharan Africa?

2) What are the conditions that explain the presence or absence of indigenous participation in the conduct of externally supported education sector studies?
   a) What are the benefits of increased participation?
   b) What are the constraints to increased participation?

1.3 Thesis Outline

An outline of the thesis is presented here to assist the reader in understanding the structure, organisation and content of the document. The introduction concludes with this section. The literature review, which follows, constitutes an overview of current thinking on the conduct of
education policy analysis and sets the historical context for education sector work by the principal donor agencies involved. It concludes with the presentation of a conceptual framework, based on the literature review, that explains the principal constructs or variables to be studied and the presumed relationships among them.

Chapter three is an expose of the methodology employed to answer the two research questions. While the primary methodology is meta-analytic, issues such as multiple-case sampling, prior instrumentation, use of emergent techniques and study limitations are also addressed. Considerable effort has been invested in making the methodology as explicit as possible for ease of replicability.

Chapters four through six present the research findings as they relate to question one. Relevant constructs from the conceptual framework serve as chapter headings, i.e. control of study, use of policy analysis techniques, and breadth and depth of indigenous participation. The conclusions of each chapter are presented in a case-ordered display and/or narrative summary. A summary of the research findings as they relate to question two are presented in chapter seven and organized along the lines of the benefits and constraints to the participatory approach.

The thesis conclusions are presented in chapter eight that is organized as follows: the research findings are reviewed, limitations of the study are discussed, contributions to current knowledge are presented and implications for further research are suggested.
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Education Policy Studies, Analysis and Planning

2.1.1 Public Policy

The term "policy" can take on a variety of meanings that are context-dependent when used in reference to society at large, to different levels of government, to different sectors of the economy, or when in reference to institutions or even individuals. It is therefore not surprising to find that there have been many attempts to define "policy" in the literature (Downey 1988). In this case, our context is that of a nation-state and our interest is in the education sector. Furthermore, the term "policy" will be used interchangeably with "public policy."

In his book, Public Policy Analysis, Pal provides a useful definition of public policy "as a course of action or inaction chosen by public authorities to address a given problem or interrelated set of problems" (1992, p. 2). He goes on to explain that there are three essential elements in every public policy: problem definition, goals and instruments. Public policies are themselves instruments of governance used by public authorities to address public problems. Identification and selection of a public problem, from amongst all competing demands and needs, will reflect either the dominant or collective values of the society. Choice of policy goals by public authorities, vis-à-vis a selected public problem, will be similarly value-laden (Downey 1988). The instrumental element of a public policy is found in the proposed solutions and accompanying budgetary allocations that serve as a guide to action for those responsible for policy implementation. Public policy instruments are many and varied, depending on the
problem, and can range from the familiar taxes, user fees, regulatory measures through to
government subsidies. From amongst the three essential elements described above, problem
definition is key to understanding the meaning of policy goals and the logic of policy instruments

2.1.2 Policy Studies and Analysis

The field of policy sciences has come to be associated with the study of public policies, their
formulation, implementation and evaluation. It is a field for which several disciplines, e.g.
economics, public administration, sociology, management sciences, education, philosophy and
political science have developed and applied their own methods and techniques. Peter deLeon
defines "policy sciences" as "an umbrella term describing a broad-gauge intellectual approach to
the examination of societally [sic] critical problems" (1988, p. 7). The methods and techniques of
the policy sciences when applied to the examination of public problems and the policymaking
process can take the form of either policy studies or policy analysis. Although this distinction has
not always been made in the past (Nagel 1983), it is more frequently found in the recent literature
(Husen and Postlewaite 1994). These closely related research activities have frequently been
described in contrast to one another using such terms as pure versus applied research, theoretical
versus practical research, or conclusion versus decision-oriented research. Somewhat less
charitably, Pal (1992) prefers to make this distinction using the terms "academic policy analysis"
and "applied policy analysis", thereby emphasising the differences between the preoccupation’s
of the academic and applied research communities. He argues that academic policy analysis, or
in our term's policy studies, focus on the determinants of public policy as causal forces in shaping policy content, whereas the purpose of applied policy analysis is to shape policy content for maximum policy impact. These distinctions are quite relevant to this research and thus warrant closer examination.

Almost every social science discipline, all being concerned with the evolution of human societies, has reason to examine a range of public problems from their own unique perspective. Policy studies, as a genus of the policy sciences, are inter-disciplinary, broad in scope and rich in theory and methods of research. They all focus on how public problems are dealt with by public authorities, such as in the field of foreign policy, e.g. the examination of the Cuban missile crisis (Allison 1971), or in appraisals of international development assistance policies (Pratt 1994). Due to its intellectual autonomy, the academic community is particularly well positioned to undertake such politically sensitive, if not contentious, policy studies. What characterises these studies, and distinguishes them from policy analysis, is their descriptive explanation of the policymaking process itself. Generally conducted within an accepted theoretical framework, policy studies may use different approaches varying from structural determinism, rational actor, and public choice to argumentative and interpretative explanations. They all provide presumably objective, after the fact, examinations of the process of policymaking and an analysis of the determinants of policy content. Policy studies contribute directly to the advancement of knowledge and theory in the policy sciences, as well as, indirectly, to the practice of policy analysis.
Policy analysis, because of its practical applications, is in many respects the opposite of policy studies, although sharing the same theoretical basis, methods and techniques common to the policy sciences. For example, policy analysts cannot exercise the same degree of intellectual and professional autonomy as their counterparts engaged in policy studies. The task of practitioners of policy analysis, whether full-time or on a contractual basis, is significantly different. They must generate information and knowledge for the specific purpose of informing the policymaking process. In policy analysis Downey explains that "policy is viewed as an instrument for social direction; the object of analysis is to inform decisions, to help policy makers to shape that instrument, and to aid in the maximisation of desired outcomes" (1988, p.41). Pal defines policy analysis quite broadly "as the disciplined application of intellect to policy problems" (1992, p. 16), whereas Quade defines it “as any type of analysis that generates and presents information in such a way as to improve the basis for policy-makers to exercise their judgment” (1975, p. 4). Depending on the methods and techniques employed, policy analysis can be as much a craft, as it is a science, one that depends heavily on the intuition and judgement of the practitioner, as well as the policymaker. Employed, in some fashion or another, by an organisation with interests in the policymaking process, policy analysts can have no illusions about the objectivity of the task at hand. Shaping public policy, as discussed above, is heavily value-laden, beginning with problem definition through to the selection of policy instruments. Such are some of the major characteristics that distinguish policy studies from policy analysis.
This dissertation is a policy study into how education policy analysis is undertaken through donor sponsored education sector studies in Sub-Saharan Africa. It provides a unique opportunity to examine the policy analysis methods employed by international banks, multilateral and bilateral donor agencies. A policy study, such as this, which examines the strengths and weakness of the current practice in policy analysis, will contribute directly to the advancement of knowledge and theory in the policy sciences, as well as, indirectly, to the future practice of educational planning.

2.1.3 Educational Planning

Before proceeding to an overview of the different approaches to policy analysis, it seems appropriate to clarify the use of the term “educational planning”. In his contribution to the issue of *Comparative Education Review* entitled *Macro-Planning of Education: A Symposium*, Psacharopolous (1975) presents what best can be described as a position paper on the nature of planning in education. Therein one can find a quite widely cited and contested definition of planning in the literature. “Planning, in general, refers (or should refer) to the examination of many feasible alternatives and choice among them according to an objective” (Psacharopoulos 1975, p. 214). In this definition, rational choice is identified as an essential element of planning. Psacharopoulos goes on to make the distinction between the objective role of the planner, who presents a series of planning alternatives, and the subjective role of the policymaker who chooses the most feasible planning alternative according to some other normative criteria.
This may have seemed reasonable if planning had referred only to the last phase of the policymaking process, limited to the design and preparation of instruments that would best achieve the chosen policy objectives, a presumably technical exercise. However, planning is conceived of as a broad, holistic activity requiring such a high level of aggregation that the prefix macro- is often used (Psacharopolous 1986). Perhaps it was for this very reason that planning in education and education policy analysis began to be used interchangeably. In retrospect, Psacharopolous' definition of planning is not significantly different than that of Downey's definition of policy analysis cited above. In both cases, the generation of information to inform the policymaking process requires the conduct of various types of studies, the preparation of policy alternatives and a determination of their feasibility. Although there are a variety of methods and techniques now available to generate this type of information, the point here is that the concepts of educational planning and policy analysis refer essentially to the same phenomenon of public policymaking.

2.1.4 Approaches to Education Policy Analysis

There is an abundance of literature and a variety of approaches to education policy analysis. Several authors have criticised the traditional concept of policy analysis, still adhered to principally by economists, for its grounding in logical positivism (Adams 1988), unrealistic assumptions (Klees 1986) and overly rational and techno-rational approach (Farrell 1975, McGinn [et al.] 1979, Weiler 1980, Carron 1984, Adams 1988). Farrell was the first to remark that education policy analysis "was early on 'captured' by economists and has been defined
largely in, or in reaction to, their terms" (1975, p. 202). By the mid-eighties, in opposition to this predominant economic model, other authors began to acknowledge the subjective aspects of policy analysis (Lynch and Tason 1984), the preponderant influence of the socio-political context (Carron 1984, Lourie 1985), values (Fischer and Forester 1987), politics (Weiler 1984), leadership (McGinn [et al.] 1979), as well as the role of public participation (Damiba 1980). Policy analysis models began to vary substantially, reflecting a more diverse array of methodologies and approaches. In surveying the various policy analysis models used in education, Adams (1988) concluded that two major approaches had evolved which he named "rational" and "interactionist." In keeping with some of the more common language used in the international development literature, I will refer to them as "technocratic" and "participatory". Now let us turn our attention to these two approaches to policy analysis.

2.2 Technocratic Approach

2.2.1 Theoretical Assumptions

Much of the international development assistance provided to Sub-Saharan Africa from the 1950's through to the 1970's was managed by "development economists" who preached the universality of economic theory. They believed that sound planning, combined with large infusions of capital and new technologies would push developing countries to the "take-off" stage of economic development. Rostow's then popular "stages of growth theory" and the Harrod-Domar growth models assumed that investment of domestic and foreign savings was a sufficient condition to stimulate sustained economic growth. Economists who adhered to these linear theories of
development believed that the resultant increases in GNP would generate wealth that would eventually "trickle-down" to the poor and disadvantaged.

Based on development economics, Theodore Shultz formulated the theory of human capital (Todaro 1975), which assumed that, under conditions of perfect competition, economic growth would occur through increases in either capital or labour. However, these two factors of production explained only 60% of economic growth rates. The other 40% residual grow rates could only be explained through investments in education, health and technological innovation. This led to the redefinition of capital into physical and human factors of production. Human capital was composed of education and training, as well as health, which together explained 80% of the 40% residual growth rates. Human capital theorists like Schultz had long argued for increased international investment in education in order to raise individual and national productivity of developing countries. The assumption was that the resultant economic growth would lead to the modernisation of developing countries and their populations. "Thus the human capital theory postulates that the most efficient path to the national development of any society lies in the improvement of its population, that is, its human capital" (Fagerlind & Saha 1989, p.18). The world's concerns for the equitable distribution of the benefits of economic growth and the alleviation of world poverty coincided with the rising popularity of human capital theory in the international development community.

Concurrently, there was a global increase in available foreign aid and investment financing. From 1970 to 1980 alone, development assistance grew world wide by an astonishing 62% in real terms (Coombs 1985, p. 292). Rural agricultural workers, women, unemployed urban youth
and other disadvantaged groups had suddenly become instrumental in the process of national development and presented new opportunities for international educational financing. More importantly, the results could be tested by using “scientific” techniques for measuring the rates-of-return on individual and national investments in education (Psacharopoulos 1973, 1985, 1993; Lockheed & Verspoor [et al.] 1991). It was human capital theory that provided the international development community with the scientific models, methods and techniques for education policy analysis that would serve to justify educational financing through to the present day.

2.2.2 Models, Methods and Techniques

The technocratic approach to policy analysis and planning is the oldest and most common approach, boasting the most number of models, methods and techniques. Downey describes technocratic models as “(M)odels in which policy making is viewed as a process of maximising or optimising the quality of public choice on some policy issue” (Downey 1988, p.56). These models are typically of the analogue, systems or mathematical type, designed to maximise the effectiveness of either individual or societal investments at the lowest cost possible. In other words, the values achieved must be greater than the values forsaken. However, to accomplish this there must be a rational choice process, whereby alternatives are presented, future costs and benefits are estimated and the optimal alternative is selected.

A technocratic approach to policy analysis includes the scientific gathering of information, its objective analysis preferably presented in a mathematical or algorithmic formula, and a decision process founded on utilitarian values. Although pure rationality is widely recognised as
unrealistic, even the models that accept the concept of "bounded rationality" (Lindblom 1959, Atkinson and Nossal 1981, Borins 1988) still attempt to factor into the same decisionmaking process the extra-rational criteria, whether they be political, bureaucratic, or public. Let's examine some of the economic models that have most influenced education policy analysis.

**Systems Models**

Macro-economics, in the Keynesian tradition, views economic systems as balancing the competing forces of aggregate supply and demand for goods and services. This systems model is based on the assumptions of economic equilibrium, free market competition and limited government intervention in the economy. It provides the economic context for rational consumer behaviour. When applied to education by Windham (1975), he advocates the gradual privatisation of education by introducing a voucher system, elimination of cost and price distortions, and increased cost-sharing measures. Implicit in the systems model is the belief in the efficiency of the free market competitive economy. The technocratic approach to policy analysis would support increased cost-sharing and privatisation of education as a way of increasing the effectiveness of the education system at a lower cost. Presumably, students and their families would choose the school offering the best education for their money, or voucher, in a free market system where they could exercise their individual preferences.

**Rational Actor Models**

The investment decisions of donor agencies and development banks alike have been heavily oriented by micro-economic models such as the "rational actor model" (Allison 1971, Pal 1992). These models embody some of the same set of assumptions, or linked propositions. For example,
all individuals, or consumers of educational services, exhibit the same "rational" behaviour based on these three principles: 1) they are all motivated by self-interest, 2) they all exhibit individual consumer preference orders, and 3) they all want to maximise the utility of their choices. In addition, this model also assumes the existence and accessibility of accurate information for the rational actor to inform an independent choice. Key to the rational actor model is the concept of individual self-determination, that choices are made independent of structural, cultural or other societal influences. It is a universal model. Consequently, it assumes the existence of rational behaviour by policy analysts, policymakers and consumers alike, when accurate decisionmaking information is available.

**Technocratic Methods and Techniques**

The development community, in particular UNESCO and the World Bank, have generally conducted education policy analysis based on the assumptions of economic growth and human capital formation (Jones 1992). Systems and rational actor models provided the assumptions and techniques needed to conduct the research and generate the expected information, knowledge and conclusions. They exercised firm control over each successive phase of the policymaking process: from data collection, to the generation of statistics, their analysis and interpretation, to education policy formulation, selection and implementation through education sector loans or education sector adjustment programs (UNESCO 1989).

All of this research adhered scrupulously to recognised standards of objective scientific inquiry. It required the generation of vast amounts of data and statistics generally unavailable in developing countries. Expert consultants, mostly 'western', but occasionally African, were
employed in the capacity of policy analysts. Data collection, analysis and interpretation of the research findings were fully justified with data tables and calculations measuring the preferred efficiency and equity indicators. This research was recognised as being of the highest technical calibre; whether it was conducted to support the theoretical assumptions underlying current education policy, or to prepare the rationale for education sector adjustment programs and loans, the conclusions were always intended to be indisputable (Samoff 1993).

In 1961, UNESCO’s Conference of African States brought together representatives from approximately forty African countries and four European nations to plan the development of education in Africa. During that conference it was recommended that UNESCO conduct manpower planning surveys in each country (Psacharopolous 1990). Consequently, this planning technique was thereafter used throughout the continent by UNESCO, as well as the World Bank and UNICEF. In Tanzania, for example, the use of this technique produced recommendations for increased financing and expansion of higher education (Psacharopolous 1975). Manpower planning was not an African planning technique, but rather a technique used by international development agencies to inform educational planning with the objective of tightening the link between educational outputs and employment. This objective came to be referred to as external efficiency. It was consistent with human capital theory based on the assumption that the economic system was dependent on education for economic growth.

As the world crisis in education became common knowledge (Coombs 1985), education policy analysts reflected even more intensively on the failure of planning to bring about socio-economic development, especially in the least developed countries. Up to this point, the literature
in *Comparative Education Review* and elsewhere consisted of discussions among mostly economists about the comparative advantages and intricacies of the various techniques they used for educational planning. Trend analysis (Windham 1975) and the international comparisons technique (Psacharopulous 1975) were all criticised as outdated, before the relative merits of manpower planning and cost-benefit analysis were disputed.

One of the strongest critics of manpower planning and staunch proponents of cost-benefit analysis was George Psacharopolous (Jones 1992) who made this admission soon after his appointment at the World Bank. "The realisation of the shortcomings associated with the manpower requirements approach led educational planners to come back to a concept earlier suggested by Schultz, Becker and others: cost-benefit analysis, or more commonly known as 'rate of return to investment in education'" (Psacharopolous 1978, p. 140). Rate of return (ROR) is a measure of external efficiency accomplished by comparing the social cost of education at a particular level e.g. primary, secondary and higher, to the social benefits (returns) of having provided that level of education. Since this is a technique borrowed from micro-economics, the individual is taken as the unit of analysis. On the costs side, one must calculate the unit (pupil) costs by level of education, multiply by the number of years of education, add the estimated opportunity costs of lost wages/labour and total with any direct costs incurred on behalf of the individual. On the benefits side, one must project the lifetime earnings of the individual and the tax revenues that would accrue to the state. A ROR, or cost-benefit ratio, could then be calculated for that level of education and serve as a measure of external efficiency. The implications of this technique for policy analysis and planning are clear; the only rational policymaking decision
would be to allocate resources to those levels of education with the highest ROR in order to maximise the social returns. Another policy implication, in contrast to manpower planning, is that this technique would favour increased investment in primary education as opposed to higher education (Psacharopolous 1975). The use of complex scientific research techniques had made it difficult for Sub-Saharan African countries to participate in the creation of a body of knowledge about their own education systems.

2.2.3 Critique

The technocratic approach to policy analysis in education has been heavily criticised for well over a decade. The principal reasons relate to its over-confidence in some questionable theoretical assumptions, for its reliance on the analytic rationality of the methods and techniques employed.

Economics and Human Capital

Development economics was based on the proposition that all countries progressed through the same stages of development in a linear sequence. Given the right combination of policies and investments to overcome internal economic constraints, socio-economic systems could be engineered for the “take-off” stage of development. This application of structural-functionalist theory to macro-economics neglected to take into consideration the position of developing country economies in the international world order. This weakness was brought into focus with the increased examination of the international structures that perpetuated the dominance and dependency relationships between developed and developing countries. Both dependency and
world systems theory (Benson 1990) presented explanations as to why international interventions had been unsuccessful in generating the expected economic growth.

More relevant to this critique is Todaro’s (1977) ‘false paradigm model’ that attributes the problems of underdevelopment to the inappropriate advice provided by the international donor community to developing countries. He notes that “(T)hese experts offer sophisticated concepts, elegant theoretical structures and complex econometric models of development which often lead to inappropriate or simply incorrect policies” (1977, p. 56). Human capital theory was exactly the kind of “theoretical structure” that guided the educational investment strategies of international development banks and donor agencies in developing countries.

Human capital theory postulated a purely instrumental concept of education; under conditions of perfect competition, investments in education would raise individual and national productivity. Although this argument has tremendous common sense and public appeal, it nevertheless delimits education to its utilitarian function. Education’s social, cultural and civic value in the nation-building process are completely over-shadowed and ignored by its presumed economic importance. Difficulties in establishing a cause-effect relationship through rate-of-return studies were compounded by the inability of the theory to incorporate the more qualitative, non-pecuniary benefits of education into the algorithmic equation. Given the above assumptions and postulates, to invest in education for non-economic reasons would be irrational. The theory did not represent the socio-political realities of post-colonial Sub-Saharan African countries, where the assumptions, upon which development economics and human capital theory, were for the most part erroneous.
Rational Systems and Actor Models

There are a number of assumptions about the rational models favoured by the technocratic approach that have been criticised as inappropriate for most developing countries, especially in Africa. Economic equilibrium, perfect competition and limited government intervention, for example, have restricted applicability. Due to the nascent economic conditions in most Sub-Saharan countries, post-independence African governments generally played an active role in their economies. The creation of parastatal enterprises, agricultural marketing boards, price regulations, production subsidies and import-export tariffs all attest to the fact that most were anything but open, free and competitive markets. Attempts at planned economic development had failed however and many neo-classical economists (Windham 1975) and institutional economists (Klees 1984) rejected planning, whether in economics or education. The “hard systems” models of economic input-output tables, upon which a variety of planning techniques were based, were inaccurate in their projections. Linking the education sector to other economic sectors was too complex, especially in information poor environments. Although it is true that all economic sectors are inter-related, it had not been possible to develop practical, usable and accurate analogue or mathematical systems models. Nevertheless, the attraction of the comprehensive rational systems model remained.

One of the assumptions of the rational actor model is the universal existence of fixed preference orders. Psacharopolous (1990) placed the satisfaction of basic human needs, e.g. food, shelter, etc., as paramount in the hierarchy of social values. Economic well being, at either the individual or national level, becomes a universal social value in this model. Rational choice thus
becomes predictable, a necessary characteristic for rational planning. The implications for
education are that individuals and families would make rational choices regarding the purchase
of education solely for the reason of economic well-being. This precludes, as Benson (1990)
points out, the possibility that people are motivated by other values, such as community and
family solidarity, or national sovereignty. The social values upon which decisions are based are
now perceived to be more transitive (Benson 1990), evolving through social communication,
argument and discourse around situation dependent issues (Fischer and Forester 1987).

Individual self-interest is a key assumption of rational systems and the rational actor model.
Applied to public bureaucracies over twenty-five years ago by Anthony Downs, the study of self-
interest exhibited by politicians, bureaucrats and public interest groups involved in policymaking
led to the development of “public choice theory” (Borins 1988) and the “bureaucratic politics
paradigm” (Allison 1971). They both demonstrate quite effectively how extra-rational
considerations influence, if not determine, public policymaking. The commonly held assumption
(Farrell 1975, Psacharopolous 1990) that developing country ministries of education function in
a rational manner with clear mandates, led by politicians and planners who are preoccupied with
efficiency and effectiveness issues, is clearly unrealistic (Windham 1975).

Availability and accessibility of valid and reliable information are assumed in these rational
models and are central to the technocratic approach. The education consumer and policy
analyst/planner must have full and comprehensive knowledge upon which to base their decisions.
Yet this assumption is blatantly false in most information poor Sub-Saharan African countries
with little educational research and information management capacity. Policy analysts, especially
the foreign consultants, cannot begin to "know" the socio-political and economic realities of the country well enough to rely completely on rational analysis techniques (Lynch and Tason 1984).

The technocratic approach to education policy analysis is severely compromised by the number of assumptions that do not hold true in the Sub-Saharan Africa context. The models rely too heavily on their universal applicability, are far too technical and not sufficiently context sensitive. The broad spectrum of socio-cultural values mitigates against fixed preference orders. Self-interest in a bureaucratic setting works against rational decisionmaking. Information generation and data analysis capacities are limited, thus handicapping the use of quantitative techniques to determine the maximum utility of alternate policy options. Optimal choice under these circumstances could not be "rational".

Technocratic Methods and Techniques

The manpower planning technique itself was dependent on economic growth projections by sector, normally through the use of input-output tables. As we know today, constructing such tables is a tenuous exercise under the best of circumstances because of the need for detailed, reliable and timely economic data. The lack of such data needed to predict and measure the economic outcomes of education is common in many African countries (Kiros 1990). The discovery in economics somewhat later of the elasticity's of supply and demand and labour substitution (Windham 1975) fuelled criticisms of the apparent rigid relationship that was assumed between education and employment (Psacharopolous 1978). Although some representatives of donor agencies still considered it useful (Lourie 1985), manpower planning proved to be ineffectual in projecting employment market trends for school leavers who soon
found themselves among the burgeoning educated unemployed youth. Over the years, economists have been guilty of repudiating one policy analysis technique, that they themselves were responsible for diffusing, only to advance the cause of another.

Cost-benefit analysis has not been without its detractors, even among respected economists. Windham (1975), in the CER Educational Planning Symposium, articulated the many faulty assumptions inherent in ROR calculations. Especially important was "the assumption that earnings are equal to marginal productivity [that] would require perfectly functioning labour markets" (Windham 1975, p. 192), particularly inappropriate for developing countries in Africa. Even more seriously were his direct criticisms, shared by Todaro (1975), of Psacharopolous' calculations of the social rate of return, which ignored the non-pecuniary benefits of education to society and relied on the unrealistic "assumption that income differences reflect the benefits of education" (Windham 1975, p. 193). Similar criticisms made by Klees (1985) addressed the difficulties in first, projecting lifetime wage incomes without using comprehensive production function models that tended to be inaccurate anyway and, secondly, for using inaccurate census data and arbitrarily selecting a correction factor. Given this small sample of the criticisms by other economists, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that there is substantial disagreement over the validity and reliability of scientific policy analysis techniques for education policymaking in Sub-Saharan Africa.

**Politics of Policy Analysis and Planning**

The technocratic approach to policy analysis assumes agreement on problem identification, policy goals and objectives where in fact there may be disagreement and even conflict, whether
within the country or among international agencies. Not enough importance has been placed on problem identification in education policy. Public interest groups: non-government organisations, unions, professional associations, religious orders and other segments of civil society, all have vested interests in determining the role and function of education in society. Problems arise as one or more of these groups feel disadvantaged by current or proposed education policies. When the delicate balance of socio-political power is threatened, other problems can arise. Lobbying and public demonstrations in reaction to new education policies have frequently escalated to violent protests and civil unrest. The overly technocratic methods of foreign policy analysts have ignored these socio-political realities. Problems are too often identified using the external criteria and although their proposals are technically excellent, “most of the products of the rationalist approach end up gathering dust” (McGinn [et al.] 1979, p. 220).

If the problems in education are assumed to be universal, then it is logical to assume that education policy objectives such as adjustment, revitalisation and expansion (World Bank 1988) can also be universally applied. Development banks and donor agencies have prescribed their policy objectives of efficiency and equity for Sub-Saharan African countries for many years (World Bank 1980). Verspoor, a World Bank economist himself, recognises in this passage the inappropriateness of this approach to education policy analysis.

The assumption that educational problems can be clearly defined and that courses of action can be unambiguously identified and easily transferred from one situation to another applies to few tasks in education development, especially when quality improvement and innovation are top priorities. (1992, p. 235)

Assigning responsibility for the final selection of policy objectives to developing country governments maintains the public image of national sovereignty. Whereas in fact, ‘policy
dialogue’ has often meant the temporary suspension of national sovereignty. It is a recognised myth that foreign policy analysts remain objective when they “confine themselves to the means, and political leaders determine the ends of planning” (Lynch and Tason 1984, p. 312). Foreign policy analysts do assume political roles as spokespersons of powerful international financial institutions and donor agencies with established education policy agendas. The art of compromise and negotiation between their mandate and the political constraints of developing country politicians requires them to shed the facade of objective neutrality (Carron 1984).

The appearance of objectivity has been perpetuated by the technocratic approach through its emphasis on quantitative measures, statistical analysis and hypothesis testing. Symptomatic is the prevalent use of indicators to measure internal and external efficiency, as well as equity in education. Adams questions the assumption that these measures are value free and asks if “(E)fficiency and equity concerns only become part of the policy agenda when they have enough political currency” (1990, p. 383). The use of quantitative social science in rational policy analysis attempts to avoid any accusation that international agencies impose their social values on developing countries through official development assistance programs. But what these agencies have not understood is that education policy analysis cannot be achieved exclusively through scientific techniques.

International banks and donor agencies have persisted in demanding African countries for the deposition of education development plans as a prerequisite for sector loans or grant donations. Such plans are expected to be “rational” in that they identify education problems, establish policy goals and propose policy instruments in accordance with the canons of social
science and "free from 'irrational' considerations such as those imposed by politicians" (McGinn et al.] 1979, p.218). The rational models of policy analysis are thereby transferred from the dominant international agencies to African countries seeking "soft loans" or aid for educational development. Benson (1990) suggests that some policy analysts are totally unreflective about the international structures of dominance and dependency within which they work.

**Over-Reliance on Expatriate Personnel**

The technocratic approach to educational development has favoured the use of highly skilled and reputable international consultants to undertake technical assistance contracts for education policy analysis and planning. 'Donor driven' foreign technical assistance has come under increasing criticism and even condemnation from scholars and development specialists for its comparatively high cost and overall ineffectiveness in building individual or institutional capacity (Berg 1993, King 1991a, Morgan & Baser 1993). Some of the more common criticisms refer to: 1) insensitivity to the socio-political and cultural issues in the development context; 2) failure to adequately assess existing institutional capacity; 3) an over-reliance on expatriate personnel recruited, selected and oriented by donor agencies to fill positions when qualified national experts are available, and; 4) less than adequate attention given to the cross-cultural communication skills required by foreign experts for the effective transfer of knowledge, skills and technology. With some limited exceptions, technical assistance is basically 'supply driven' leaving little, if any, opportunity for local participation by government or otherwise in the education policy analysis and policymaking process.
Implementation Failure

Puzzled by the fact that education policies are not implemented (Psacharopolous 1990), international agencies have advocated more education and training. "Irrational politicians or clumsy bureaucrats are assigned the guilt for these failures, and both the Bank and USAID have mounted programs to improve the 'quality' of the technocrats they deal with in the developing countries" (McGinn [et al.] 1979, p. 219). The technocratic approach to policy analysis practised by international agencies is generally divorced from any consideration of implementation, since this would be the prerogative of national ministries of education, planning and finance. Given proper problem definition, goal setting and the appropriate selection of policy instruments, implementation should take care of itself. A "top-down" management process with proper command and control mechanisms should ensure the proper implementation of the plan with little if any deviation. Adherence to the plan becomes a measure of efficiency. However, London (1993) presents an excellent case study illustrating how a rationally conceived education policy was fraught with implementation problems to the extent that a more participatory approach was needed to resolve them. The 'hard systems' view of the education delivery system, as explained above, is unrealistic in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa. Although perhaps appropriate for infrastructure programs, educational development requires a more 'soft systems' approach (Checkland & Scholes 1990). In his survey of scholarly literature on education policy in Sub-Saharan Africa, John Craig summarises his findings and those of two other specific case studies as follows, "(I)n these and other cases, emphasising implementation failures becomes a useful
device for diverting critical attention from particular policies and from the sponsoring individuals, institutions and theories” (1990, p. 5).

2.2.4 Summary

The technocratic approach to education policy analysis is compromised of the number of assumptions that apparently do not hold true in the Sub-Saharan Africa context. Rational planning appears to rely too heavily on the assumption of its universal applicability, is far too technical and not sufficiently context sensitive. A broad spectrum of socio-cultural values can conflict with fixed preference orders. Self-interest in a bureaucratic setting works against rational decision-making. Information generation and data analysis capacities are limited, thus handicapping the use of scientific techniques to determine the maximum utility of alternate policy options. Optimal choice under these circumstances might not be as “rational” as some would believe. Critiques of the technocratic approach have coincided with a growing interest in democratisation, empowerment and local participation. Hence, there has been a growing acknowledgement of an alternative approach involving key stakeholders in the education policy analysis process: the participatory approach.

2.3 Participatory Approach

2.3.1 Theoretical Assumptions

As early as 1978, the World Bank’s own Operations Evaluation Department (OED) identified two major deficiencies in education sector analysis: 1) insufficient borrower participation in project
preparation; and 2) insufficient emphasis on building borrower capacity in educational research, planning and management (Jones 1992). Borrower participation was recognised early on as an essential ingredient in successful project design and implementation, as was the need for capacity building to ensure meaningful participation; the two were, in fact, highly interdependent. The concept of capacity building has evolved over time, taking on new meanings and greater importance to the point where it provides the theoretical rationale for greater indigenous participation.

The 1980 World Bank education policy paper identified capacity building in educational research, planning and management as one of the principles to guide lending for educational development. This concept of capacity building emphasised the need to build both individual, as well as institutional capacities as a way of enhancing meaningful participation.

The development of this capacity could be nurtured by (a) training efforts to enable promising individuals to acquire the knowledge, skills and experience needed for high-level research and experimentation, and (b) institutional development efforts to ensure that trained researchers work on educational problems within the network of decision-making and policy-making (World Bank 1980, p. 57).

Here capacity building clearly incorporates notions about human resource development and institutional development into one broad concept that focuses on augmenting either an individual’s awareness, knowledge and skills or an institution’s organisational, human, and physical resources through external technical assistance. Keeping in mind this focus on individuals and institutions, capacity building can be defined as the creation or expansion of the means, e.g. expertise and resources, by which people or institutions can best achieve their development objectives (King 1991c).
The experience of Sub-Saharan Africa countries in the 1980's with policy-based lending reflected the growing emphasis by donor agencies on creating an enabling policy environment as a pre-condition for sustainable development. However, the results of education policy-based lending programs were generally disappointing. As King points out, "policies cannot be merely imposed from outside; they need to be locally conceptualised, owned, and executed if they are to be sustainable" (1991c, p. 60). Building individual and institutional capacity in itself was insufficient; it was the utilisation of this capacity by national governments and donor agencies that became increasingly important as a capacity development strategy.

King describes the challenge for donor agencies in implementing capacity development: "The new capacity development challenge for donors is to combine capacity building with capacity utilisation. Which means addressing the environment for sustainability from the start of the donor activity" (1991b, p. 23). It is often the public policy environment in which people and institutions find themselves that can enhance or jeopardise sustainability. Thus the frame of reference for capacity development is at a societal level, beyond that of individuals and institutions, but bringing them together in some co-ordinated effort in the development process. Inherent in the definition of capacity development is the notion of a development process moving toward greater indigenous participation, self-reliance and self-management. Based on some generally accepted assumptions, indigenous participation is considered a necessary element in the capacity development process.

First, it is assumed that there are "practical" benefits to using a participatory approach. For example, indigenous participation will improve the technical validity of the data, leading to better decision-making, project implementation and/or developmental results. In a World Bank study of
participation benefits in 121 rural water supply projects, Deepa Narayan concluded that

“(B)eneficiary participation was the single most important factor in determining overall quality of implementation” (1996, p. 12). Other evaluation research and studies of Bank-financed operations have observed similar practical benefits, such as: increased utilisation of project services, decreased operational costs, increased rate of return, as well as improved project implementation (World Bank 1994a, p. 21-24).

Second, it is also assumed that there are “political” benefits to using a participatory approach. For example, involving recipient country public and government servants will secure “buy-in” from the national government for a donor sponsored program of action. And, the participatory approach instils a sense of ownership and empowerment among civil society groups and beneficiaries motivating them to take control of their own development. In 1992, the World Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department “listed borrower ownership and beneficiary participation as two important features of the twenty-four lending operations classified as outstanding” (World Bank 1994a, p. 21-24). More recently, Mary Schmidt cites “capacity building of community-level groups and empowerment of beneficiaries” as two of the benefits of indigenous participation drawn from a study of forty-eight Bank-supported initiatives (Schmidt 1996, p.25). Despite the mounting evidence, some of which is still anecdotal in nature, the theoretical assumptions underpinning the participatory approach depend heavily on the presumed “practical” and “political” benefits described above.
2.3.2 Models, Methods and Techniques

In its 1995 Annual Report, the World Bank defined 'participation' as: "a broad and inclusive term, is defined as a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over the development initiatives, decisions and resources that affect them" (World Bank 1995). Keeping this definition in mind, let's examine the models methods and techniques of participation in development assistance.

The need for a participatory approach is greatest when there is little, if any, agreement on the identification of public problems and definition of goals, especially in a context of social discord, disagreement and maybe even conflict. Policy analysts cannot remain isolated from the influences of politicians and public interest groups who view educational problems from their own unique perspectives. Public interest groups or stakeholders will want to influence the policymaking process through either persuasive or coercive strategies (Downey 1988). Policy analysts are purposively put into contact with the socio-political environment with the expressed intention of mapping its landscape of social values. They must be aware of the social forces which could unduly influence the policymaking process to the advantage or detriment of one or another stakeholder group. Their role in this process is rather one of negotiator, broker and consensus builder. Participatory methods recognise and capitalise on the fact that "(P)lanning is, by definition, an act loaded with ideology, be it implicitly or explicitly" (Carron 1984, p. 33). Communication and interaction between and among stakeholder groups through some form of public consultation process is the method most commonly used to mitigate social differences.
Breadth of Participation through Consultation

The participatory approach has no standardised consultation procedures or sequence of activities to increase the breadth of participation that would be applicable to every policy analysis situation. The common feature is a flexible process of public consultation that sets out to facilitate stakeholder interaction (Adams 1988, Paulston 1990). The scope of consultation will vary in any given situation depending on the style of governance in practice. In countries where the principles of representative democracy apply, consultation may be limited to policy analysts, policymakers, and education managers. Broader consultations including teachers, parents and students are likely to occur where the principles of participatory democracy are respected. To support this proposition, Downey claims that “(I)t is a well-known fact of organisational life, that unless persons affected by policies are involved in shaping the policies, the policies are not likely to be implemented with fidelity” (Downey 1988, p.24). The participatory approach would normally involve a consultation process, as inclusive of all the stakeholders in education as possible, going beyond the tight nexus of funders, policy analysts and policymakers typical of the technocratic approach.

Opening up the policymaking process to broader societal participation, to include the non-government and private sectors, recognises participation as a social value that strengthens civil society and enriches the development process. Good governance and democracy have become important conditionalities for development assistance (King 1991a, King 1991b) that favour increased freedom of speech through the use of the media by civil groups to put public pressure on government authorities regarding education issues. Education reform commissions, public
consultations, opinion surveys and the use of the mass media are all participatory methods. Instituting a process of genuine and active participation, whether in problem definition, policy goal setting, or in selecting policy instruments, builds commitment, fosters empowerment and develops local ownership (King 1992). "Some refer to it as participatory planning, others highlight it as a component of attention to sustainability. Others headline this as capacity building. It is all of these." (North 1994, p. 46).

Important to the participatory approach is the purposes of such consultations, that is: 1) to provide opportunities for the interpretation and clarification of issues; 2) to identify stakeholder value positions, and; 3) to negotiate agreement on policy options. Unlike the linear decisionmaking process of the technocratic approach, this process has built-in feedback loops (Checkland 1981). These feedback loops are used as stakeholders come closer to a shared, intersubjective understanding of the issues and decisions that need attention. "The result of the interactions is a net value change which, when confirmed, is a new policy" (Downey 1988, p.56).

**Depth of Participation through Partnership**

Partnership can be defined “as a long-term reciprocal relationship which results in mutual benefit to co-operating parties who share goals, decision making and risk” (Morgan & Baser 1993, p. 20). Bossuyt and Geert (1994) see a need for a fundamental redefinition of partnership to first include “trust” between partners. After a relationship of trust has been established, only then can the roles and responsibilities of the relationship be determined. All parties involved in a partnership must participate in the development assistance activities for which the partnership was formed. African researchers, policy analysts, policymakers, planners and education managers, teachers and
parents should participate, not just passively, but actively in the creation of knowledge and the subsequent decisions affecting their national system of education. In the case of education sector studies, for example, this would require participation in research design, data collection, analysis, presentation of findings, discussion and selection of policy options. This level of participation implies the sharing of the risks and benefits of development assistance. It also implies a relationship, not necessarily an equal one, but one where the donor agency and developing country have clearly defined authorities and responsibilities for which they are accountable (Kayembe 1992). Despite its apparent complexities, clearly defined partnership relations appear to be the most promising means to increasing the depth of indigenous participation in the development process.

**Indigenous Ownership and Control**

Ownership of the development process in the form of an education project, an education sector loan or an education sector adjustment program is an issue of ‘control’. A participatory approach to capacity development requires donor agencies to gradually relinquish control and thereby empower those stakeholders who are affected by the decisions to be made, so that they can be accountable for their own development. This viewpoint, expressed by Loubser, sees participation as only the initial step in capacity development, allowing for “influence and shared control,” but he advocates going much further.

The success of capacity development rests on the sense of ownership that the beneficiaries feel during the design, development and implementation of any activity. This implies a participatory approach, but goes beyond it to demand that the developing country control the process. (Loubser 1994, p. 36)
The literature that has advocated participation over the past twenty years has indicated that development is more successful when it is initiated and ‘owned’ by indigenous stakeholder groups (Fredriksen 1990, King 1991b, Morgan & Baser 1993, World Bank 1996a/b, ). That “sense of ownership” appears to come from being able to influence and share control over the policy analysis, education reform process and the decisions that will affect them. This implies that developing country stakeholder groups should have the authority to collectively make decisions where their sovereign rights are immutable i.e. education policy formulation. Control over the policy analysis process and the dissemination of education sector study reports is indicative of the issue of ownership. Logically, then, the greater the level of indigenous influence and control over education sector studies, the greater is the prospect of indigenous ownership and commitment to the education policymaking and implementation process.

2.3.3 Constraints

It is important to be aware of the constraints to the participatory approach from both the donor and recipient country perspectives. The following major constraints are noteworthy.

**Organisational and Financial Management Conventions**

Donor agencies disburse billions of dollars annually in development assistance. An annual budgeting cycle sets estimated disbursement targets for which senior administrators are generally held accountable. Performance evaluation criteria usually include the ability to meet disbursement targets. Consequently, under-spending would be anathema for any aspiring administrator. Financial management conventions create pressures to disburse funds quickly, consistently and according to
plan. These conventions, as pointed out in the following statement, represent serious constraints to capacity development.

The deadlines embedded in the funding structures and in the accountability requirements of contracting and financial management that guide donor behaviour do not reward the facilitation of sound plans over time by the recipient’s organisations. (North 1994, p. 46)

Maintaining disbursement targets at all costs can undermine the participatory approach to development which tends to have a slow, variable and often unpredictable disbursement pattern (Saldanha 1994). Capacity development programming with a high level of participation is, in comparison to normal project investments, less efficient administratively, and takes more effort to manage (Corkery 1994). Furthermore, since the participatory process is more ‘demand driven’, disbursement patterns would depend on the absorptive capacity of recipient countries, but donor agencies are generally unwilling to relinquish control of financial management to allow for this (Corkery 1994, Loubser 1994).

**Demands for Short Term Accountability**

Donor agencies are under pressure from their constituencies to demonstrate the achievement of objectively verifiable results, aside from developing country participation and self-reliance. All too often, a donor agency’s domestic constituencies have to be appeased with short-term quantifiable results (Loubser 1994) that are generated with little regard for long-term sustainability (Corkery 1994). The participatory approach implies, however, a slow and steady process in which the concept of results will take into consideration both short, medium and long-term changes in human development.
Although the participatory approach may hold out the possibility of consensus (Adams 1988), there are limitations of this ideal in practice. Consultation and negotiation are time-consuming activities that take longer to implement than the rational analysis techniques characteristic of the technocratic approach. Public participation in decisionmaking and management processes leaves the door open to public criticism of donor agencies and developing country governments alike. Donor agencies are left vulnerable to criticisms of "not making a difference" because of the apparent absence of measurable results.

**Politics and Centralised Government**

Political and bureaucratic structures in recipient countries are also responsible for some important constraints on the adoption of the participatory approach. Politicians and public servants can often work in collusion with donor agencies to perpetuate the donor-recipient aid model. Military and other forms of autocratic governments are generally not receptive to a participatory approach but receive donor assistance nevertheless. Political leaders seeking to maintain or boost their popularity will also welcome announcements of any foreign aid or short-term results oriented projects.

Many centralised government bureaucracies prefer control-oriented, top-down management as opposed to a more open consultative management style (Corkery 1994, Loubser 1994). Broad participation in education decisionmaking represents a challenge for all the parties involved, specifically donor agencies and African policy-makers who do not trust national academics and experts (Kayembe 1992). The lack of access to information, public consultation or employment of local expertise is endemic in many Sub-Saharan African countries. Namuddu (Namuddu &
Tapsoba 1993) finds that policy analysis reports are often kept confidential, even from the local research community, but nevertheless made available to foreign consultants. This lack of national government confidence in utilising local expertise does not inspire donor agencies to adopt a participatory approach. Uncritical acceptance of foreign advice on national policy and program planning belies other problems and motivations. Distorted patronage systems, the attraction of profiteers at the negotiation table (Corkery 1994), the misappropriation of funds are all symptomatic of the ‘kleptocracies’ that have populated the map of Sub-Saharan Africa.

2.3.4 Summary

The important role of indigenous participation in the development process is almost universally espoused by donor agencies. If the participatory approach is to succeed, donor agencies will have to be less concerned with deadlines, disbursement targets and short term results and willing to be more supportive. On the otherhand, developing country governments will have to increasingly exercise responsible leadership and good governance. The success of any participatory approach to education policy analysis and reform will depend on the support and commitment of the political and bureaucratic leadership to a democratic process that builds, uses and develops national capacities. In this simple, yet poignant turn of phrase, Jan Loubser once again captures the essence of what is required. “Capacity development is not what is done for a society but what a society does for itself” (1994, p. 26).

But, against this landscape of evolving development philosophy and practice, it is important to separate fact from fiction and rhetoric from reality. How inclusive have education sector studies
been in encouraging indigenous participation in education policy analysis? What are the conditions that facilitate or constrain participation in the policy analysis process? This dissertation will seek to determine if in fact the rhetoric of the participatory approach is supported in the practice of education sector studies in Sub-Saharan Africa.

2.4 Donor Sponsored Education Sector Studies

2.4.1 Early Donor Cooperation

By the early 1960’s, UNESCO had established its reputation as the UN lead agency for education. It had developed substantial expertise in educational planning through its various technical assistance programs to developing countries. A strong cadre of education specialists and network of consultants were employed in the conduct of education sector studies. Expansion of education systems, especially at the primary level, was part of UNESCO’s program to bring fundamental education to developing countries; but, such an ambitious program needed a higher level of financing than was readily available.

By this time, the World Bank was well positioned to provide substantial foreign investment to developing countries through the lending mechanisms established at the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and, especially, the International Development Agency (IDA). The discovery of human capital theory, consistent with the Bank’s economic development orientation, was contemporaneous with the Bank’s growing interest in financing education projects (Jones 1992). It justified not only the use of the IDA "soft loan" window, but eventually the IBRD "hard loan" channel for investments in such
social sectors as health and education; but, to undertake such lending programs required substantial expertise in educational planning.

The mutual advantages of a UNESCO - World Bank partnership in education quickly became evident to the senior managers of both organisations. UNESCO had the expertise, but was cash poor, while the Bank’s situation was the reverse. In June 1964, the two organisations signed the UNESCO - World Bank Cooperative Agreement. Jones describes the respective roles enshrined in this agreement in the following passage.

The co-operative agreement made general provision for the Bank and Unesco to work together at most points of the project cycle - identification, preparation, appraisal, implementation, end-use supervision and technical assistance are all specified. Allocation of function was more specialized, with UNESCO having ‘primary responsibility’ for project identification and preparation, and the provision of technical assistance to project implementation, while the Bank remained responsible for appraisal and end-use supervision. (Jones 1992, p. 72)

The Cooperative Agreement was to last for over twenty years, but began to lose its relevance as the World Bank expanded its educational financing activities. The consequences of this expansion were to manifest themselves as the increasing number of education specialists on staff in the Bank’s geographic departments assumed greater responsibility for project identification work, or contracted it out to their own consultants rather than using UNESCO’s services. During the 1980’s, the UN agencies, including UNESCO, had increasingly taken opposing positions against the World Bank in matters related to economic structural adjustment and education sector adjustment programs. The agreement was finally “abandoned in 1986 but had lapsed for most practical purposes well before” (Jones 1992, p. 74). The partnership had slowly withered as the
differences in their mandates, priorities and approaches to development became increasingly evident.

2.4.2 USAID

During the early 1980's, USAID's involvement in the education and training sector in Sub-Saharan Africa had been virtually non-existent. According to the UNESCO (1989) review of education sector work from 1980 and 1989, USAID had only conducted 8 educational research studies compared with UNESCO's 29 and the World Bank's 50. This, however began to change in 1988, when the US Congress realised the strategic importance of the sector, from both an economic as well as humanitarian perspective, and mandated the Development Fund for Africa (DFA). Substantial amounts of money were thereafter ear-marked each year for, the education and training sector. The impact of this additional funding can be seen in the dramatic increase in the number of educational research studies conducted by USAID in the region. According to the UNESCO (1996) inventory of education sector work from 1990 and 1994, USAID conducted 30 studies during this period, more than three-fold the number in the previous 10 years. This placed it in the same ranks as UNESCO and the World Bank in terms of the volume of education policy studies and the importance of its role as a donor agency in the education sector.

2.4.3 The World Bank

By 1988, a large number of African countries were increasingly dependent on external financing for their investments in the education and training sector. The most important source of external financing was the World Bank, followed by the African Development Bank and the
bilateral agencies. World Bank financing was increasingly linked to policy adjustments deemed necessary for balanced and healthy economic development. During the 1980's, Education Sector Adjustment Programs (ESAP) became the principal vehicle for Bank lending to borrower countries. ESAP were based on policy research and analyses increasingly undertaken by Bank staff or international consultants.

The Bank's overall level of activity in education sector work remained relatively constant into the early nineties, with a significant shift to multi-country or regional studies. It conducted or commissioned approximately 50 educational research studies between 1980 and 1989 (UNESCO (1989), of which only one was regional in scope. By comparison, it commissioned another 44 between 1990 and 1994 (UNESCO 1996), of which slightly more than 25% (12) were regional in scope. Of the remaining studies during this latter period, only 2 could be considered country focused education sector studies and another 6 as sub-sector studies (Samoff, p.c.1996). Having already established a large number of ESAP in African countries during the 1980's, there appeared to be less demand for the Bank's assistance in conducting country-focused sector analysis.

Sub-Saharan African countries whose development budgets for education were financed, for the most part, by the World Bank were doubly dependent. First, there was an intellectual dependence on the policy analysis drawn from various education sector and sub-sector studies. Second, there was the financial dependence on the Bank for mobilising its considerable resources to support the ESAP it had itself recommended and the subsequent phases. This was an
unhealthy situation for these, most of whom were dependent on the World Bank for external financing of their educational development.

2.4.4 UNESCO

UNESCO had undertaken ESS since the mid-1960's through its Education Financing Division and with financial support of the Bank through the Cooperative Programme Agreement. It had acquired tremendous experience in this field and, through the IIEP, had made many important contributions to the methodology, techniques and instruments for education policy analysis and planning. However, by the end of the third development decade, UNESCO's member states found themselves increasingly in a position of double dependency on the Bank for policy advice and financial support. This situation required a specialised agency with a critical mass of credible technical competence that could act as a counter-weight to the World Bank.

In 1990, soon after the termination of the Cooperative Programme Agreement with the World Bank, the Director General established the Division of Policy and Sector Analysis (PSA). This new unit was located within the Secretariat, staffed with professionals having knowledge and experience with the matrix of policy analysis and dialogue, educational financing and project implementation. It attracted extra-budgetary resources from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) which established the SAT-1 facility to assist countries in developing long-term education policies and investment programs. The PSA was then in a position to offer its member states advisory services in education sector policy and programme development. These
services were to be of high quality and independent of the institutional constraints of the funding sources and the political constraints of the member states.

UNESCO's level of activity in education sector work increased significantly in the early nineties, with only a slight shift to regional studies. It had conducted or commissioned 29 educational research studies between 1980-1989 (UNESCO 1989), none of which had been regional in scope, but undertook and/or commissioned another 28 between 1990-1994 (UNESCO 1996), of which 4 were regional in scope. Of the remaining studies during this latter four year period, 8 could be considered country-focused ESS and another 5 as sub-sector studies (Samoff, p.c.1996). Demand by African countries for support in conducting education sector policy analysis had increased, especially among those experiencing structural adjustment programs.

UNESCO's interest in conducting ESS was to provide a service to its member states through rigorous upstream policy and sector analysis work. With the financial support of the UNDP, it could address the issues of concern of the developing countries, while mobilising the necessary intellectual resources that would be independent of the institutional constraints of the donor agencies and the political constraints of the member states.

2.5 Conceptual Framework

Strauss and Corbin (1990) advance the notion of "theoretical sensitivity" which recognises that data interpretation is often influenced by existing theory, and by professional and personal experience. A number of concepts from the above literature review that are characteristic of the
technocratic and the participatory approaches have thus been knitted together into a theoretically sensitive conceptual framework (Figure 1). Strauss and Corbin define concepts as "conceptual labels placed on discrete happenings, events, and other instances of phenomenon" (1990, p. 61). Conceptualising and labelling how ESS were conducted allowed the researcher to examine and ask questions about this phenomena. A number of key concepts were uncovered during the course of the literature review that were then grouped under different headings. The process of grouping concepts together according to their like qualities is referred to as categorisation (Strauss & Corbin 1990). This allowed the researcher to organise a large number of units of analysis and to examine the data in the light of these units at a higher level of abstraction. For example, initiation of the study, preparation of scope of work, duration of study, selection of consultants, decision-making responsibility, report preparation and dissemination, were identified as critical decision-points in the management of an ESS. These concepts, when grouped under the heading 'Control of Study', provided a valuable framework for data analysis.

Miles and Huberman describe a conceptual framework as either a graphic or narrative explanation of "the main things to be studied - the key factors, constructs or variables - and the presumed relationships among them" (1994, p.18). The conceptual framework presented in Figure 1 served to guide and focus the research process on the concepts and relationships that were most important. A brief description of these concepts and relationships begins at the top of the figure with the identified constraints to indigenous participation and follows the downward arrows.
The political, organisational and managerial constraints, identified in the literature review, circumscribe the actions of both national governments and donor agencies alike when undertaking education sector studies. They can affect decisions with regard to their respective roles and responsibilities, accountabilities, as well as the sharing of risks and benefits. In instances where national governments and donor agencies can work in partnership, despite existing constraints, it is assumed that there is shared control over the critical decision-points in the management of the study. The broken line down from partnership illustrates this balance in the control of the study and consequently shared decisions regarding the policy analysis techniques to be employed. In such cases, donor agencies can positively influence the actions of national governments and encourage the use of participatory policy analysis techniques.

Where donor agency actions are severely constrained, because of their own institutional environments or because of the political context of the recipient countries, the locus of control generally shifts to the right in which case the technocratic policy analysis techniques would be employed more frequently. It is also possible that a donor agency, while exercising considerable control over a sector study, may choose to employ some participatory policy analysis techniques. However, the latter occurs less frequently because donor agencies tend to shy away from techniques that encourage civil society participation in a process that could be construed as subversive or interfering by the national government. The tendency is then to follow the arrows down the right hand side of the conceptual framework.

The choice of policy analysis techniques used in an education sector study has clear implications for the breadth and depth of participation. Breadth of participation is defined in terms
of three distinct stakeholder groups arranged from right to left with increasing presence of participation. On the right hand side, technocratic policy analysis techniques can be undertaken without any indigenous participation, or with participation from the national government, its public officials and civil servants as illustrated by the two downward arrows. Where there is no indigenous participation, there would not be any depth or benefits of indigenous participation, consequently the critical path ends there. While the presence of national government officials would indicate limited breadth of indigenous participation, it does not characterise the study as participatory without a close examination of the depth of that participation. Following the downward arrows on the left hand side, the use of participatory policy analysis techniques will lead to greater breadth of participation inclusive of the other stakeholder groups, i.e. civil society groups, teachers, parents and students. But even when donor agencies and national governments agree to employ a combination of policy analysis techniques that reach out to all stakeholders, depth of participation could still vary considerably.

Examination of the depth of participation is facilitated through the identification of the various phases in the education sector study process. These phases are congruent with a sequence of policy analysis activities commonly found in most education sector studies. The depth of participation of each stakeholder group can be examined in terms of the phases of the study in which they were involved. At this juncture in the conceptual framework, the critical path can turn upwards to the actions of national governments and donor agencies or continue downwards to the benefits of indigenous participation.
The upward arrows flowing from the depth of participation attempts to capture the iterative nature of the policy analysis process. As the breadth and depth of indigenous participation increases, so do the opportunities for stakeholder groups to influence the decision making process of national governments and donor agencies. This, in turn, could instigate actions by national governments or donor agencies to address the prevailing constraints to indigenous participation, or affect a shift in the locus of control over the study to either the left or the right of the continuum. The conceptual framework thus illustrates the iterative nature of the policy analysis process through the use of these feedback loops.

The alternate downward arrow from depth of participation represents the cause and effect relationship that is presumed to exist between increased indigenous participation and improved quality of policy implementation, beneficiary empowerment, etc. While this relationship is not the focus of this research, identifying both the constraints and benefits to participation is an important aspect of this research.

The conceptual framework described above illustrates the basic concepts and their inter-relationships that will guide the research. Primary research question #1 will focus on the following issues: control of study, policy analysis techniques used, breadth and depth of participation, all of which were discussed above and represent the core elements of Figure 1. The constraints and benefits focus of primary research question #2, illustrated at the top and bottom of Figure 1, also represent the pre-conditions and assumed consequences of indigenous participation. In this way, the conditions that explain the presence or absence of indigenous participation allows the researcher to contextualise the findings.
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework

Constraints to Indigenous Participation

Recipient Country
- Politics & Centralised Government

Donor Agency
- Organ. & Fin. Management Conventions
- Demands for Short Term Accountability

National Govn’t Actions

Partnership

Donor Agency Actions

Control of Study

Participatory Policy Analysis
- interviews with stakeholder groups
- site visits to schools
- primary research by local consultants
- qualitative data analysis
- public opinion surveys
- mass media campaign
- seminars/workshops with stakeholders
- national consultations and conferences

Technocratic Policy Analysis
- documentary (statistical) research
- quantitative measures (indicators)
- simulation/projection modelling
- common analytic themes

Breadth of Participation
- teachers, parents and students
- civil groups e.g. NGOs unions & communities
- public & government servants

No Indigenous Participation

Depth of Participation
⇒ in research design and planning
⇒ in data collection and analysis
⇒ in presentation of findings
⇒ in discussion of recommendations
⇒ in selection of policy options

Benefits of Indigenous Participation
Increased utilisation of project services
Improved quality of policy implementation
National Government policy acceptance
Beneficiary ownership and empowerment
3.0 METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Questions

The research methodology was designed to: 1) facilitate the examination of a set of education sector studies and locate them on a continuum ranging from a conventional "technocratic approach" to a "participatory approach", and; 2) to examine the conditions that explain the presence or absence of indigenous participation in the conduct of these studies. The two primary research questions were formulated as follows:

1) Since 1990, what has been the extent of indigenous participation in the conduct of externally supported education sector studies in Sub-Saharan Africa?

2) What are the conditions that explain the presence or absence of indigenous participation in the conduct of externally supported education sector studies?
   a) What are the benefits of increased participation?
   b) What are the constraints to increased participation?

3.2 A Meta-Analytic Approach

As pointed out in the literature review, this policy study will examine the policy analysis methods employed by donor agencies. The primary methodology in this research is meta-analytic, but does not follow the statistical procedures and techniques pioneered by Gene Glass, John Hunter and others (Glass, MacGaw & Smith 1981, Hunter & Schmidt 1982). Rather, a qualitative meta-analytic approach was adopted, using the procedures and techniques developed by Miles and Huberman (1994), because it was considered more appropriate for the research topic. Qualitative meta-analysis techniques, such as case-ordered displays, were used to organise, analyse and display
research findings. The cases selected for this research are displayed according to the relevant variables taken from the conceptual framework, so that the differences among the cases can be more easily identified. A case-ordered descriptive matrix (Annex III) was used to summarise the documentary analysis, while single and two-variable case-ordered matrices (Table 8 - 19) were also used when summarising the research findings at the end of each chapter. These types of displays are refereed to as cross-case or meta-matrices which facilitate the analysis process leading to a better understanding of the differences across cases.

3.3 Multiple-Case Sampling

Multiple-case sampling was used to strengthen the validity and stability of the findings. The selection of cases was based on the research questions and the conceptual framework. Generalizability is therefore not based on the representativity of the cases with the larger population, but moreover on the matching of cases to the underlying theory. Because cases are arranged on a continuum according to their unique properties, they can be more easily contrasted with one another. Miles and Huberman have amply demonstrated in their work that “multiple-case sampling gives us confidence that our emerging theory is generic” (1994, p.29). However, to add confidence to our findings it was necessary to apply explicit sampling criteria in the selection of cases.

The sampling frame designed to enhance the level of confidence in the analytic generalisations consisted of five selection criteria. All of the selected ESS cases were: 1) comprehensive overviews of a country’s education sector, or major sub-sector, i.e. primary, secondary or higher
education, 2) empirical studies involving some primary field research, 3) undertaken to inform national government education policy decisions, 4) externally sponsored and supported by a major donor agency, and 5) accessible in terms of information illustrating the key concepts under examination. The application of these four sampling criteria ensured that the research focused on typical cases of education sector policy analysis within a country planning framework. Furthermore, this sampling frame enhanced the validity of comparisons that were drawn among education sector studies within the sample.

**Sampling of Documents**

Since content analysis was a significant aspect of the research methodology, ESS cases were identified from a population of Sub-Saharan African education sector documents. The *Inventory and Analytic Overview of African Education Sector Studies (IAOS)* produced for the DAE Working Group on Education Sector Analysis (UNESCO 1996) identified a total of 239 studies, reports and papers produced on education in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1990-1994. This inventory of educational research represented the total population of potential ESS cases.

The UNESCO 1990-94 IAOS indicated that there were twenty-two (22) documents that corresponded with the categorisations of <<study>> and <<education sector>> and another twenty-seven (27) that corresponded with the categorisations of <<study>> and <<sub-sector>>. Of primary interest to this research was the first set of 22 documents because of their potential for comprehensive education policy reform. The titles and sponsoring agencies for these documents
were communicated to me by the UNESCO consultant who compiled the inventory. They were then requested from the sponsoring agencies or their publication distributors.

After a considerable delay, 18 of the 22 documents in the first set were received. In addition, another 10 documents corresponding to the second set (study and sub-sector) were also received. After an initial examination of these documents, the criteria used to categorise the IAOS documents as an "education sector study", i.e. "<study>" and "education sector">> proved to be somewhat misleading. Although some of the documents reflected significant research (<study>) that dealt with some aspect of the education system (education sector>) in a given country, they did not constitute comprehensive overviews or analyses of the education sector or sub-sector typical of agency-sponsored "education sector studies". Several documents from the available sample were not included in the research because their stated purpose was described as one of the following: project identification, baseline data collection, aid program evaluation, or special focus such as donor co-ordination and performance measurement. Consequently, seven (7) documents from the first set were not included in this research study, since either their scope, purpose, or content were inconsistent with the sampling frame. The remaining eleven (11) documents from the available sample reflected the required comprehensiveness and study purpose to constitute an externally sponsored education sector or sub-sector study. However, not all of these documents contained sufficient information on the policy analysis methodology and related concepts to facilitate content analysis. Four (4) "education sector studies" were removed from the research sample due to the lack of detailed information presented in the final report pertinent to the methods.

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1 Personal correspondence from Joel Samoff dated May 13th, 1996.
and procedures employed in the conduct of the studies. To compensate for the elimination of these "education sector studies," three additional sub-sector studies were selected from the second set of documents received. Presented in Table 1 below is a list of the final sample of the ten (10) ESS cases, identified by the title of the final report.

Table 1: Sample of Education Sector Study (ESS) Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Title of the Education Sector Study (ESS) Final Report</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Summary Assessment of the Education Sector in Senegal</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Ethiopia: Education Sector Review Part I and Part II</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Basic Education in Namibia: Sector Review Report</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>South Africa: Primary Education Sector Assessment</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>South Africa: Tertiary Education Sector Assessment</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Zimbabwe: A Review of Primary and Secondary Education from Successful Expansion to Equity of Learning Achievements</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>Burkina Faso: L’Enseignement de Base et l’Alphabétisation</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>Congo: Education et Formation: Etat, Perspectives et Propositions</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>Assistance à la Formulation d’une Politique et d’un Programme d’investissement pour le Secteur de l’éducation au Bénin</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Selection of Respondents

Another important primary source of information was a sample of individuals who participated in the conduct of the selected ESS cases. The objective was to secure at least one respondent for each of the cases in order to facilitate triangulation between different data sources and enhance the reliability of the findings. These individuals and their institutional affiliations were identified in the ESS documentation.
A concerted effort was made to collect information from the team leaders and principal consultants, since they were best placed to respond to a broad range of questions regarding the conduct of the ESS in question. In several cases, other team members employed by the sponsoring donor agencies were also contacted when necessary, or simply to supplement the available data. Three of the respondents had in effect worked on more than one ESS in the sample and were able to provide additional comparative information. All of the respondents selected are internationally recognised education sector specialists, many of them holding key positions within their respective institutions. It is also noteworthy that these respondents generally possessed a broad range of experiences in education sector policy analysis allowing them to make comparisons, identify trends and articulate general observations. To ensure the confidentiality of the respondents, each one has been provided with a Respondent Identifier that will be used in data references and quotations in the presentation of the findings. Table 2 below provides a list of the sponsoring donor agencies, the ESS cases and the corresponding respondent identifier(s).

Table 2: Selected Respondents by ESS Case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Education Sector Study (ESS) Cases</th>
<th>Respondent Identifier</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Senegal Sector Assessment</td>
<td>USAID Respondent #1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Ethiopia Sector Review</td>
<td>USAID Respondent #2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Namibia Sub-Sector Review</td>
<td>USAID Respondent #3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>South Africa Primary Sector Assessment</td>
<td>USAID Respondent #4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>South Africa Tertiary Sector Assessment</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Sub-Sector Review</td>
<td>WB Respondents #1,#2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Kenya Human Resources Study</td>
<td>WB Respondents #4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>Burkina Faso Sub-Sector Study</td>
<td>UNESCO Respondent #1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>Congo Sub-Sector Study</td>
<td>UNESCO Respondent #2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>Bénin Sector Study</td>
<td>UNESCO Respondent #3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.4 Question #1: Prior Instrumentation

The conceptual framework (Figure 1) served to guide and focus the research process on the concepts and relationships that were most important to answering the first research question. It provided the basis for the development of the original research instrument (Annex I) upon which the initial coding structure for content analysis was based, but was then refined as the data interpretation process unfolded. For example, some technocratic policy analysis techniques identified in the literature review, i.e., manpower planning were dropped from the analytic framework and replaced with more current ones, such as, simulation and projection modelling. Consequently, the methodology used to answer research question #1 was a predominantly preordinate approach, with some emergent qualities. This is consistent with the recommendations of Miles and Huberman for multiple-case studies. "The latter is looking forward to cross-case comparison, which requires some standardisation of instruments so that findings can be laid side by side in the course of analysis" (1994, p. 35).

The Analytic Framework, presented in Table 3, is composed of categories, concepts, properties and dimensional ranges which facilitated the analysis of the data. Each category of concepts was examined using one ‘property’ and a corresponding ‘dimensional range’. Strauss and Corbin define properties as "attributes or characteristics pertaining to a category" and dimensions as the "location of properties along a continuum" (1990, p. 61). The key properties in this framework are: the ‘locus’ of decision-making control over the study, the ‘extent’ to which different policy analysis techniques were used, and the ‘presence’ of breadth and the ‘level’ of depth of indigenous participation. The corresponding dimensional ranges were based on the underlying assumptions
presented in the conceptual framework, e.g., donor agencies typically have control over the study when the technocratic approach is employed; the technocratic approach favours the use of quantitative rather than qualitative data collection and policy analysis techniques; the participatory approach facilitates greater breadth and depth of indigenous participation from the national government, civil groups, and other principal stakeholders in the country. Each concept was thus examined by locating its property on a dimensional range that corresponded with the technocratic - participatory continuum.

The dimensional range used to examine each category of concepts varies according to the corresponding property. For the category Control of Study, the following dimensional range became evident when identifying the locus of decision-making control in terms of the technocratic - participatory continuum: 1) donor agency, 2) shared control, and 3) national government. For the category Use of Policy Analysis Techniques, this dimensional range was developed to determine the extent of the use of typically technocratic versus participatory techniques: 1) not used, 2) minimally, 3) partially, and 4) extensively. It examines this category of concepts from a simply quantitative perspective.

For Breadth of Indigenous Participation the dimensional range: 1) yes, 2) no, was used to determine the presence of the various stakeholder groups. The category Depth of Indigenous Participation was assessed using the following levels in this dimensional range: 1) none, 2) passive, 3) consultative, and 4) active. Since there cannot be any depth of participation without breadth of participation, ‘none’ in the latter range implies that there was ‘no’ breadth of participation, while ‘passive, consultative and active’ imply that ‘yes’ there was some breadth of participation. Passive
participation indicates the simple solicitation or presentation of information from one party to another, whereas consultative participation indicates that one party seeks the opinion of others with regard to a proposed decision, or set of options, with a view to consensus-building. The highest level of active participation indicates shared responsibilities, decisions and risk-taking among the parties involved. At this far end of the technocratic - participatory continuum, one could say that a level of partnership has been achieved.

In conducting the cross-case comparisons it was important that each concept be examined by locating its property on its corresponding dimensional range in a manner that minimised the possibility of researcher subjectivity and bias. Although the data analysis process is essentially comparative, a set of decision rules were developed to ensure that the process was transparent and as objective as possible. This set of decision rules can be found attached as Annex II.
Table 3: Analytic Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control of Study</th>
<th>Locus</th>
<th>Nat'l Gov'n't</th>
<th>Shared Control</th>
<th>Doncr Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- initiation of study</td>
<td>Locus</td>
<td>Nat'l Gov'n't</td>
<td>Shared Control</td>
<td>Doncr Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- preparation of scope of work</td>
<td>Locus</td>
<td>Nat'l Gov'n't</td>
<td>Shared Control</td>
<td>Doncr Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- timeframe of study</td>
<td>Locus</td>
<td>Nat'l Gov'n't</td>
<td>Shared Control</td>
<td>Doncr Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- selection of consultants</td>
<td>Locus</td>
<td>Nat'l Gov'n't</td>
<td>Shared Control</td>
<td>Doncr Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- study implementation decisions</td>
<td>Locus</td>
<td>Nat'l Gov'n't</td>
<td>Shared Control</td>
<td>Doncr Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- study report preparation</td>
<td>Locus</td>
<td>Nat'l Gov'n't</td>
<td>Shared Control</td>
<td>Doncr Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- study report dissemination</td>
<td>Locus</td>
<td>Nat'l Gov'n't</td>
<td>Shared Control</td>
<td>Doncr Agency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Use of Policy Analysis Techniques

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>- documentary (statistical) research</th>
<th>Extent</th>
<th>Not Used</th>
<th>Minimally</th>
<th>Partially</th>
<th>Extensively</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- interviews with stakeholder groups</td>
<td>Extent</td>
<td>Extensively</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Minimally</td>
<td>Not Used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- site visits to schools</td>
<td>Extent</td>
<td>Extensively</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Minimally</td>
<td>Not Used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- primary research by local consultants</td>
<td>Extent</td>
<td>Extensively</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Minimally</td>
<td>Not Used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- qualitative data analysis</td>
<td>Extent</td>
<td>Extensively</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Minimally</td>
<td>Not Used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- quantitative measures (indicators)</td>
<td>Extent</td>
<td>Not Used</td>
<td>Minimally</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Extensively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- simulation/projection modelling</td>
<td>Extent</td>
<td>Not Used</td>
<td>Minimally</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Extensively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- public opinion surveys</td>
<td>Extent</td>
<td>Extensively</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Minimally</td>
<td>Not Used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- mass media campaign</td>
<td>Extent</td>
<td>Extensively</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Minimally</td>
<td>Not Used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- seminars/workshops with stakeholders</td>
<td>Extent</td>
<td>Extensively</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Minimally</td>
<td>Not Used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- national consultations and conferences</td>
<td>Extent</td>
<td>Extensively</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Minimally</td>
<td>Not Used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- presentation of policy options</td>
<td>Extent</td>
<td>Extensively</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Minimally</td>
<td>Not Used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- common analytic themes</td>
<td>Extent</td>
<td>Not Used</td>
<td>Minimally</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Extensively</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Breadth of Indigenous Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>- from public/government officials</th>
<th>Presence</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- from civil groups e.g. NGOs, unions</td>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- from teachers, parents &amp; students</td>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Depth of Indigenous Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>- in research design &amp; planning</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Active</th>
<th>Consultative</th>
<th>Passive</th>
<th>None</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- in data collection &amp; analysis</td>
<td>Level</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Consultative</td>
<td>Passive</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- in presentation of findings</td>
<td>Level</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Consultative</td>
<td>Passive</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- in discussion of recommendations</td>
<td>Level</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Consultative</td>
<td>Passive</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- in selection of policy options</td>
<td>Level</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Consultative</td>
<td>Passive</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.5 Question #2: Emergent Method

While prior instrumentation was useful in conducting a cross-case comparison in answering the first research question, it was not possible, nor desirable, to use this methodology for the second. Based on the literature review, the conceptual framework illustrated the notion that the constraints to the participatory approach were woven into the fabric of the donor agency and recipient country context, while the practical and political benefits depended on which combination of policy analysis techniques were employed. However, research into the constraints and benefits of the participatory approach is still in its nascent stages and the literature review revealed only a few concepts or constructs that would warrant prior instrumentation. In addition, the broad scope of question #2 appeared to lend itself best to an unstructured open line of enquiry.

Consequently, it was decided that an emergent approach would be the most appropriate method for answering the second research question. This approach was exploratory and largely descriptive, depending largely on data collected from the respondents. An open-ended, non-case specific, question was included in last part of the questionnaire/interview protocol reserved for questions of a more general nature. Open coding was used until a pattern emerged from the data. Admittedly, this approach is heavily dependent on “interpretive validity” (Miles and Huberman 1994, p. 36), but the researcher is confident that the findings presented are an accurate reflection of the lived experiences of the respondents.
3.6 Content Analysis

All ESS reports and related documents, e.g., study terms of reference, scope of work, project descriptions, national commission reports, etc. were subject to content analysis using the analytic framework. First a Document Content Summary form was prepared and completed for each ESS case. These ESS Document Content Summary forms captured all of the available and relevant information on each case for the purpose of conducting content analysis.

The method of content analysis used concepts grouped by category for coding purposes (Strauss & Corbin 1990). Unlike open coding, the initial set of categories and concepts were based on the original analytic framework and used to search the data. Text segments were coded to the specific concept it represented and identified as an example reflecting either the technocratic or participatory approach. As this process of content analysis unfolded according to the natural characteristics of the data, the strengths and weakness of the analytic framework became clearer. Some categories and concepts, e.g. agreement on initial assumptions, proved to be less useful than others. As coding structure evolved, so did the analytic framework.

To facilitate content analysis, a case-ordered matrix was designed and completed for each sponsoring agency, i.e. USAID, World Bank and UNESCO/UNDP based on the Document Content Summaries. Each ESS case was prepared in columnar format with the categories and concepts listed on the vertical axis. When comparing the policy analysis approaches of the different sponsoring agencies, it became increasingly clear that there were significant differences among the donor agency approaches, some reflecting a much greater extent of indigenous participation than others. A case-ordered matrix (Annex III) was then prepared for each sponsoring
agency and the cases were positioned from left to right in order of increasing extent of indigenous participation apparent in the implementation of the ESS.

Based on this limited content analysis a preliminary attempt was made to visualise the technocratic - participatory continuum by placing the USAID, World Bank and UNESCO-UNDP case-ordered matrices end-to-end from left to right. An analysis across the cases of each category in the conceptual framework, i.e., policy problems, control, depth, breadth, recommendations, etc., allows cross-case comparisons suggested for qualitative data analysis by Miles and Huberman (1994). Even a cursory analysis of the continuum reveals a gradual shift in the control of the study and subsequent increase in the extent of indigenous participation. Further observations regarding the findings are discussed in detail in the following chapters.

3.7 Questionnaires and Interviews

In consultation with the Thesis Supervisor, an interview protocol (Annex IV) was developed based on questions arising from the content analysis. The interview questions were subsequently reviewed with education sector specialists working in the field of international development. A written questionnaire (based on the interview protocol) accompanied by an Informed Consent Form was sent by email, fax or letter to 22 individuals who had participated in either the planning, management or implementation of any of the ten case studies. Only three replies, including the Informed Consent Form, were received after a delay of three months and several reminders. Two follow-up telephone interviews were conducted where outstanding questions remained or clarification of the responses were needed. Electronic data files were created for each of the
respondents, but no data analysis was undertaken at this point. Given the difficulty of obtaining written responses, it was decided to move quickly to interviews.

A purposive sample of individuals from the questionnaire cohort were contacted by either telephone, fax or e-mail to determine if they were willing to participate in an in-person interview. Seven in-person interviews and one telephone interview were conducted between February and December 1997 with representatives of the World Bank and USAID in Washington and UNESCO representatives in Paris. Informed Consent Forms, which have been kept on file, were signed by all interviewees before the interviews commenced. Four in-person interviews with representatives from USAID and UNESCO were tape recorded and transcribed with the permission of interviewees, none of the World Bank respondents wished to be tape recorded.

The data analysis process was not started until a sufficient number of questionnaire and interview responses were collected to provide adequate coverage of the education sector work of the major sponsoring agencies. It should be noted however that there is no respondent for one of the USAID South Africa cases. Nevertheless, as illustrated in Table 4, there was a good balance between the number of questionnaire and interview responses for each ESS case.

Table 4: Comparison of Primary Data Sources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Sector Study Sponsoring Agency</th>
<th>Number of ESS Cases Summary Analysis</th>
<th>Questionnaire and Interview Number of Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Questionnaire and interview respondents were asked to comment on the sponsoring agency's approach to the conduct of ESS in general, as well as to provide expert opinion on the conditions that explain the presence or absence of indigenous participation in these studies. Specific information was also collected regarding the implementation of the ESS in which they were involved i.e. decision-making process, policy analysis/research methods used, extent of stakeholder consultation and stakeholder participation in the study implementation. Since individual respondents were coded to the ESS case with which they were associated, the information was easily triangulated with that generated from the content analysis of the ESS reports and related documents.

3.8 Computer Aided Text Interpretation

Computer aided text interpretation software designed expressly for qualitative research was used to assist in the coding, analysis and interpretation of the data. Document Content Summary forms, questionnaire responses and interview protocols were transcribed into electronic data files. These data files were organised in a single data structure called a "hermeneutic unit" for ready access and analysis under a single file name. Triangulation was built into the architecture of the "hermeneutic unit" and the management of the primary data sources. Final coding of primary text segments, associated memos and other interpretive information remains readily available and easily accessible for review by a second party upon request.
3.9 Limitations of Study

There are several limitations to this policy study in terms of the validity and reliability of the findings that should be brought to the reader's attention. First, the accessibility and quality of the ESS documentation presented a number of challenges. The restricted nature of the Bank's ESS reports hampered the application of the sampling frame, thus limiting the selection of cases to those that were simply available. Although, the documentation for each case was composed of the ESS report, supplemented by other related documentation, the quantity and quality of information explicitly describing the policy analysis approach employed varied from one case to another, with the World Bank being the least explicit in its description of research methodology. These limitations have consequences for the generalizability of the findings which are only partially compensated for by the use of questionnaire and interview data.

All of the questionnaire and interview respondents were donor agency staff or international consultants who understandably had views and opinions about the conduct of ESS that could differ from African stakeholders, e.g., ministry of education staff, local education managers, teachers, parents, students, etc. This focus on a predominantly “western expert group” produced a body of information that admittedly reflects the perceptions, judgements and biases of this group. The researcher was attentive to the validity concerns related to working with such a singularly focused stakeholder group. However, based on their different experiences in education policy analysis, there was sufficient variability of opinion within this group of respondents to believe that the research still had sufficient merit to continue.
Another limitation should be noted with regard to the USAID South Africa Tertiary Education Sector Assessment and the World Bank Kenya Human Resources Study. The analysis of these cases is primarily dependent on the available documentation, since either there was no respondent identified or because of the poor quality of the information provided. Even with overlap in case familiarity among the respondents, this weakness could throw into question the reliability of the relevant cross-case comparisons. Fortunately, the documentation in the first case was of very good quality, which compensated to a certain degree.

While the quality of the data collected on the 10 ESS cases may not have been uniform, the researcher was able to employ different strategies to compensate. Although the information provided in the questionnaire responses was thoughtful and sufficiently detailed, the researcher conducted two follow-up telephone interviews to clarify or supplement the data. Where some interview respondents were less than forthcoming with detailed case information, the researcher was able to conduct supplementary interviews with other team members. Since several respondents had participated in more than one of the ESS cases in the sample, occasional reliability checks on previously collected data were made with respondents from the same donor agency. Although the level of confidence in the trustworthiness of the data may vary from one case to another, it is not considered significant enough to affect the cross-case comparisons.

Finally, it should be noted that the reliability of the data interpretation is solely dependent on one researcher, which is a recognised limitation. No attempt was made to test inter-rater agreement on text coding or cross-case comparisons.

\(^2^\) African stakeholders were not contacted due to resource constraints.
4.0 CONTROL OF STUDY

This is the first of three chapters that present the findings of this policy study as they relate to research question #1. The Analytic Framework (Table 3) was used as a data collection and analysis tool, while the categories under examination were considered appropriate as chapter headings. It was also convenient to group the ESS cases by sponsoring donor agency for ease of presentation and subsequently structure these sections according to the concepts listed in the Analytic Framework under the category of “Control of Study”. This presentation format facilitated cross-case comparisons among ESS cases from the same sponsoring donor agency and also between them as presented in the summary analysis.

4.1 USAID

4.1.1 Initiation of Study

USAID is a decentralised organisation with Missions in each country of operation. Each Mission Head is responsible for developing a country program strategy. ESS were undertaken in cases when there was no current involvement in the education sector or when the Mission had an ongoing program requiring review. In all five cases, content analysis of the ESS reports clearly indicated that the initial request to the USAID Head quarters in Washington D.C. for an sector assessment was initiated by the USAID Mission. This was consistent with the comments of USAID Respondent #2 who stated that "The typical situation would have the USAID Mission planning the sector study and following the standard procedure of sector assessments as described in the Sector Assessment Manual (IESS 1988)."
4.1.2 Preparation of Scope of Work

The Education and Human Resources Sector Assessment Manual (IESS 1988) was produced and published by the "Improving the Efficiency of Educational Systems (IEES)" Project, an initiative funded in 1984 to work collaboratively with host governments and USAID Missions for a period of 10 years. The IESS Manual became the de facto guide for the preparation and conduct of education sector assessments during that time and "pretty much dominated the typical cases of how USAID sector assessments have been done" (USAID Respondent #2). The IESS Manual defines the scope of work as "a statement that specifies what is to be accomplished in the sector assessment process and identifies the expected outcomes" (IEES 1988, p. 4-1). It goes on to strongly recommend the participation of representatives from all institutions and organisations which are stakeholders in the assessment with a vested interest in its outcomes. Their endorsement is needed in order to authorise the scope of work, guide the implementation and build commitment for the recommendations. As USAID Respondent #3 points out, "(I)deally, the scope of work is prepared with the host country government, which would convene the stakeholders interested in updating the national education policy."

Despite such recommendations and idealism, actual practice was quite different. In four of the five cases, content analysis of the ESS reports reveals that the ESS scopes of work were prepared by USAID's Africa Bureau in Washington, in collaboration with the USAID Mission. The exception was Part II of the Ethiopia Sector Review which was prepared by the study team while in the field, but nevertheless sent to Washington for approval. This appeared to be standard practice according to a senior USAID official. "The scope of work is always cleared with
technical people in USAID in Washington, D.C." (USAID Respondent #3). Furthermore, there is no evidence that any host country stakeholders, government or otherwise, were involved in the preparation of the scope of work for any of these sector assessments.

4.1.3 Timeframe and Level of Effort

All five sector assessments took place between August 1990 and April 1993. They varied in duration from approximately 3-8 weeks. The shortest was the Namibia Sub-Sector Review. It was undertaken by a team of 6 people (3 USAID staff, 3 US consultants) and completed in 18 days for a total level of effort (LOE) of 108 person days. The timeframe for the study and the LOE were determined in the scope of work by USAID under what was described as unusual circumstances. "In the Fall of 1990 at a meeting in New York, USAID promised to conduct an ESS before the end of the fiscal year. The Namibians understood this to mean March 31, 1991 (their FY end) instead of September 30th, 1991 (USAID FY end). This misunderstanding put pressure on USAID to disburse before March 31st, 1991" (USAID Respondent #3). Another respondent, however, describes similar circumstances in the Ethiopia Sector Review which was completed in 28 days by 4 people (2 USAID staff, 2 US consultants) for a total LOE of 112 person days. "I think it was driven by the fact that USAID wanted by definition a quick and dirty study that would give them enough information to make some program decisions" (USAID Respondent #2). This respondent went on to explain how a request to increase indigenous participation, and consequently the LOE in the scope of work, had been refused by USAID Washington.
The two South Africa assessments of the primary and tertiary sub-sectors represent the longest ESS among the USAID cases. The first was completed in 7 weeks by 7 consultants (6 US, 1 SA) for an estimated LOE of 309 person days. The second took place in parallel and was completed in 8 weeks by 9 consultants (4 US, 4 SA and 1 regional) for an estimated LOE of 468 person days. The study teams in both cases were briefed on their scope of work by the USAID Mission staff. Relative to the other USAID cases, these two studies were allocated more resources and time to complete their work.

4.1.4 Consultant Selection

Content analysis revealed that of the five USAID ESS, four were contracted to private sector firms. The Learning Systems Institute, which also manages the IEES Project, was awarded the Senegal Sector Assessment, while the Academy for Educational Development (AED) was awarded the Ethiopia Sector Review and the two South Africa assessments. The Namibia Sub-Sector Review team was composed of a collection of individual consultants with no corporate association. USAID used established Indefinite Quantity Contracts (IQC) with these private sector firms to facilitate easy access to a roster of quality consultants. The firm, or agency, proposed a short-list of consultants based on the terms of reference and selection criteria for each position specified in the scope of work. The final decision on the selection of consultants remained with USAID Washington as evidenced in these two statements, "(T)he agency with the IQC will recruit the consultants and USAID Washington will review and approve the selection" (USAID Respondent #3). "By law, USAID cannot indicate or express preference for certain
consultants, they can reject consultants, but they cannot tell these organisations who they want to hire" (USAID Respondent #4).

Several criteria were identified in the documentation and in the interviews for selecting consultants. The most frequently cited criterion was the need for technical expertise, such as: educational finance and economics, educational planning, curriculum design and development, education quality assessment, social-community dimensions, and cross-sectoral linkages, e.g. education and health. Depending on the scope of the study, technical expertise was also required in the appropriate sub-sector, such as: primary, secondary, tertiary or non-formal education.

Only USAID Respondent #1 chose to prioritise the criteria, which provides us with some additional insight into the consultant selection process. "So, the first criteria is the substantive expertise, then there is the experience in doing sector assessments." Among other frequently identified criteria are: previous experience, recognised competency and reputation, appropriate language skills, knowledge of the region and ability to write quickly. With these criteria in mind, the following is a breakdown of the study team composition for each sector assessment (Table 5).

The small representation of national and regional consultants involved in these studies is to be noted.

Table 5: Use of Staff and Consultants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Sector Study</th>
<th>USAID Staff</th>
<th>US/Internat'l Consultants</th>
<th>National Consultants</th>
<th>Regional Consultants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA Primary</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1 SA</td>
<td>1 Zimbabwean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA Tertiary</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4 SA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.1.5 Decision-Making Responsibility

The IEES Manual, under the topic of management, emphasises the need for clearly defined lines of managerial responsibility so as to ensure optimum operational effectiveness. This was done by delegating decision-making authority to the study team leader. "The team leader should have overall co-ordinating responsibility and final responsibility for presenting the completed assessment to the appropriate government agency" (IEES 1988, p. 4-11). Indicative of the importance of these guidelines for the conduct of USAID ESS is the following quote from the scope of work, under methodology, for the South Africa Primary Sector Assessment. "The conduct of the study and structure of the final report will be guided by the Education and Human Resources Sector Assessment Manual (August 1988)."

Content analysis of the ESS reports provides a consistent pattern in the delegation and exercise of decision-making authority during the implementation of each study. Each of the five USAID cases had a clearly identified team leader who exercised ultimate responsibility for managing the sector assessment, integrating various inputs into a cohesive and consistent written report, liaising with the USAID Mission and making presentations of the report. Only in the two South Africa assessments was there some evidence that the Deputy Chief of Mission (DMC) in South Africa was responsible for approving the recommendations proposed by the study team in the draft and final study reports.

Interview respondents were equally consistent in identifying the team leader as the person with overall decision-making responsibility for the team dynamic and the preparation of the study report. One sample statement follows, "The Chief of Party is responsible for making sure
that the work plan is coherent, that deadlines are set, that members all know their responsibility and coordinate the team" (USAID Respondent #1). In this instance there appears to be more coherence between the theory and practice of conducting sector assessments.

4.1.6 Report Preparation

Report preparation followed a standard pattern in all five cases. Study team members often did their separate investigations and came back together so that discussions could be held to compare analysis and prepare recommendations. The team leader worked with individual members to write and revise chapters of the draft report. Peer review was also a common practice. The team leader was ultimately responsible for editing or rewriting to bring them together into a cohesive final report. What did differ, in some cases substantially, was the level of participation by other stakeholders, e.g. USAID Mission, Ministry of Education, etc. A case-by-case presentation will best illustrate the generally high level of control exercised by USAID at different points in the report preparation process.

Senegal Sector Assessment: Two consultants spent one week in Washington, D.C. reviewing documents and conducting interviews. Based on the information gathered at that point, a preliminary draft report was forwarded for review to the USAID/Senegal Mission. The entire study team spent two weeks in Dakar reviewing the draft report with the Mission staff. Additional information was collected from other sources and the report was finalised and submitted to the Director, USAID/Senegal Mission. No mention is made of any review or
revision by Ministry of Education staff of the draft report, nor any official presentation to the MOE of the final report.

Ethiopia Sector Review: The study team was wholly responsible for the preparation of the two reports. No mention is made in either document of any official presentation of findings to the Ethiopia Ministry of Education nor review or revision by MOE or USAID Mission staff of the preliminary reports. The final report was submitted to the USAID Mission/Ethiopia.

Namibia Sub-Sector Review: The draft report and briefing statements were prepared for presentation to the Minister of Education and the U.S. Ambassador. Ministry of Education personnel reviewed the draft to identify any errors of fact, possible misunderstandings or misinterpretations, and areas of disagreement. The USAID Mission Director and the Minister of Education finalised the document.

South Africa Primary Sector Assessment: The first working draft of the assessment was presented by the team leader: 1) to the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) in South Africa and 2) to two groups of South African policy makers, NGO representatives, and other individuals connected with education in South Africa. Their responses to the observations and recommendations were incorporated into the report "to the extent that they were relevant to the scope of the assessment" (USAID 1992). The study report was finalised and submitted to the DMC USAID Mission/SA.

South Africa Tertiary Sector Assessment: The first working draft of the assessment in which major findings and conclusions were formulated was presented: 1) at a special meeting with African National Congress (ANC) representatives, and 2) at a separate meeting to the DCM and
several USAID staff members at the U.S. Embassy in Pretoria. Following these meetings, a series of policy recommendations were shaped and developed by the study team as a whole. The second draft report was submitted to the DMC/USAID Mission and was reviewed by various staff members of the USAID Mission and the U.S. Embassy. The purpose was to identify any factual errors, misunderstandings, areas of special sensitivity or possible disagreement. Comments on the report by the Mission staff were received by the team leader and the Academy for Educational Development and taken into account in the editing and preparation of the final report which was submitted to the USAID Mission/SA.

4.1.7 Report Dissemination

Very little information was available with regard to the dissemination of the final study reports. In all cases, dissemination of the report was handled by CDIE/USAID in Washington. The extent to which these reports received further distribution in the host country was not reported.

4.2 THE WORLD BANK³

4.2.1 Study Initiation

In late 1989 the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) invited the World Bank to undertake a collaborative review of the major challenges facing the education system. The Minister of Education and Culture (MEC) communicated her interest to the Bank's Field Representative,

³ N.B.: Little information was available on the "control" aspect of the Kenya Human Resources: Improving Quality and Access study.
who prepared an initiating brief of 2-3 pages in length of why, how and at what cost this could be accomplished. The brief was discussed with the GOZ and forwarded to the Bank officials in Washington. This sequence of events pieced together from documentary content analysis and interview responses coincides with the following description of the Bank's new approach to initiating ESS. "In the old days, an issues paper prepared by the Task Manager formed the basis of the TOR. The new approach, a concept document prepared by the Task Manager outlining the goal, purpose, etc. of the ESS forms the basis of the TOR" (WB Respondent #3). This concept paper is then discussed with the national government.

4.2.2 Preparation of Scope of Work

Upon approval of the afore-mentioned concept document, an initial exploratory mission by the WB study team was first undertaken to further define the focus of the ESS with the GOZ. In preparation for this review, a long list of agenda items was put forward by the MEC and discussed with the study team. To enable the analytical work to be in-depth and achieved within a reasonable timeframe, it was agreed that the scope of work would focus exclusively on those sub-sectors that comprise the portfolio of the MEC, i.e. primary and secondary education, and within these sub-sectors concentrate on the formal system of education, including distance education. It was also agreed that the study would be guided by two principal features. First, it would be collaborative, with the full participation by the GOZ and maximum use of the local research and consultancy resources present within the country. By the end of this first mission
he study team had explored the major issues with the GOZ, prepared a detailed scope of work and signed an Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).

Although this reflects the process in the Zimbabwe Sub-Sector Review, based on the available data, there are apparently a variety of other ways that Bank staff use to prepare the scope of work for an ESS. Here are two examples according to one Task Manager. "It varies: a) replicate the scope of work from another study which generally focuses on internal efficiency, external efficiency, quality, etc. or b) when an individual knows a country and the issues, he\she can prepare a scope of work that is already focused" (WB Respondent #2). How an ESS scope of work is prepared is admittedly variable in practice in comparison to Bank procedures. However, all ESS TOR must pass a peer review quality control process to ensure the effective allocation of Bank financial and human resources. But even then, "experienced Task Managers can easily jump through these hoops" (WB Respondent #3).

4.2.3 Timeframe and Level of Effort

The Zimbabwe Sub-Sector Review appeared to have been completed in a remarkably short period of time. Quoting from the inside cover of the report itself, it states that, "(T)his report is based on the findings of a mission which worked in Zimbabwe from May 20-June 8, 1990" (World Bank 1992). It therefore appears that a study team of 6 people (5 W.B. staff, 1 U.S. consultant) completed the ESS in only 19 days, for an approximate LOE of 114 person days. However, there is no reference made in the report to the involvement of other resources between the first exploratory mission and the second study mission. In fact, interview respondents
referred frequently to the contribution of the 5 person GOZ counterpart team that was formed after the first mission and charged with assembling government statistics in preparation for the second study team mission. In addition, a graduate student was hired to work on the student achievement component with two local consultants, and other studies were commissioned and completed between the 1st and 2nd missions. "Consequently, more time and effort was involved in the conduct of this ESS when indigenous participation is included than was explicitly reported" (WB Respondent #2).

4.2.4 Selection of Consultants

In the case of the Zimbabwe Sub-Sector Review, the Task Manager responsible appeared to exercise considerable freedom in selecting the study team members, offering "the opportunity to the best people possible based on their reputation and skills set as per the requirements in the issues" (WB Respondent #3). This would not be unusual, since WB Respondent #2 describes the consultant recruitment process at the Bank in similar fashion. "You go with people you know, their work, recommended by other people and through the informal network."

The Bank has established a roster or database of consultants from which Task Managers can now choose. The selection criteria most frequently identified by interview respondents were: previous experience, knowledge of the country, language and, particularly, technical skills i.e. educational economist\planner, statistician, curriculum development specialist, vocational\training specialist, systems management specialist, institutional development specialist, PRA - anthropologist, and appropriate sub-sector specialists, etc. In the Zimbabwe
Sub-Sector Review, the recruitment process resulted in a study team composed of 5 Bank staff members and one U.S. consultant. Apparently, the most qualified are the Bank staff themselves. With regard to the GOZ counterpart team, it appears that the members were appointed from among the public service and recommended to and approved by the Bank as evidenced in this statement. "The GOZ recommendation for a counterpart team was taken" (WB Respondent #3).

The following is a breakdown of the study team composition for the Zimbabwe Sub-Sector Review (Table 6). The balanced representation of international and national consultants involved is to be noted.

### Table 6: Use of Staff and Consultants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Sector Study</th>
<th>World Bank Staff</th>
<th>International (U.S.) Consultants</th>
<th>National Experts/Consultants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 4.2.5 Decision-Making Responsibility

The Zimbabwe Sub-Sector Review was an unusual case in that the Task Manager was also the Resident Representative for the WB in Zimbabwe at the time. This meant that while he was in the field, his team was, for the most part, based in Washington. Their respective roles and responsibilities were, however, clarified during the first exploratory mission during which time a pattern emerged. Decision-making among the WB study team members was described by the interview respondents as a consensus-building process.
Documentary content analysis reveals that while the responsibility for the preparation, arguments, conclusions and dissemination of the study report remained with the Bank, it was also agreed that they would be based on extensive input from knowledgeable Zimbabwean experts - and especially on open and frank discussions with the counterpart team established by the GOZ for the exercise. During the first mission, there were opportunities to share and discuss ideas with the GOZ counterpart team. Subsequently, during the second mission, the two study teams held joint seminars and daily meetings to discuss findings and formulate conclusions. Although this consultation process was highly participatory on the surface, respondents’ comments, such as these, clearly indicate the locus of control over the study.

The GOZ directed the counterpart team, but did not control the WB team, but did influence it. The GOZ had indirect influence on the ESS. (WB Respondent #3)

The WB team was responsible for the ESS and should have control. There was no consideration given to increasing the GOZ control over the ESS. (WB Respondent #2)

In the final analysis, the GOZ had control over only one aspect of the study finding and recommendations, that was to either accept or reject them. (WB Respondent #1)

4.2.6 Report Preparation

During the first exploratory mission the WB study team worked with the GOZ representatives on a daily basis. Each member worked individually and wrote a brief outline of their section, discussed it with the study team and with the GOZ representatives. These outlines then served as the basis for the special studies.

In between missions, the Resident Bank representative met with GOZ representatives on a weekly basis to monitor the work in progress. The GOZ counterpart team gathered statistical
information on student enrolments, collected information on educational financing and conducted background studies, labour market analysis, cost analysis, etc. The learning-teaching component was taken on by a graduate student on site, while the GOZ Director of Examinations researched learning achievements which required a complicated sampling of schools.

The Bank study team returned during the second mission to do most of the data analysis, teacher salary simulations, financial tabulations and writing of the draft report in the field. The two study teams met on a daily basis to discuss the findings and conclusions. Although the Bank policy is quite clear that the first draft of an ESS report was to be sent to Washington for peer review before releasing it to the host country government, the study team chose a less restrictive approach. "The Team shared the 1st draft of the ESS report with the GOZ towards the end of the second mission which was against Bank policy" (WB Respondent #3). Subsequently, the draft report was sent to Washington, officially transmitted to the GOZ and officially discussed with the Government in October 1990. The Ministry of Education and Culture thereafter provided written comments which were integrated into the final report.

4.2.7 Report Dissemination

The Bank published and controlled the dissemination of the final report with the following warning on the front cover. "This document has restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization" (World Bank 1992). The extent to which the report received further distribution in the host country was not reported.
4.3 UNESCO

4.3.1 Initiation of Study

Documentary content analysis indicates clearly that the initiative for each of the three ESS cases came from the host country. In the case of the Benin Sector Study, a certain number of government officials and university professors encouraged the Government of Benin (GOB) to officially request the assistance of UNESCO and the UNDP to undertake a study of its education system. In the context of an economic crisis, the Government of the Congo (GOC) requested the assistance of UNESCO to undertake a human resources development study with a particular emphasis on the education and training sub-sector. The Government of Burkina Faso (GBF) had also requested the assistance of UNESCO to undertake the first diagnostic phase of a study focused on basic education.

4.3.2 Preparation of Scope of Work

Unesco does not have a standard scope of work for ESS, since each one is considered unique. The scope of work is generally prepared during a mission to the host country by UNESCO staff, or a consultant hired for the purpose. It is tailored to each situation, according to what makes professional sense in each case. Some respondents were of the opinion that this task is undertaken in close collaboration with the host country government and national experts, while others felt that they usually did not get involved. To support the former opinion this respondent explains. "Ce travail est effectué en étroite association avec les responsables et experts nationaux. Les objectifs et les grands thèmes sont en général standards, mais l'accent mis sur chacun d'eux
peut varier selon le contexte national" (UNESCO Respondent #2). This was in fact the case in the Burkina Faso Sub-Sector Study where after having established a framework within which an education and training sector analysis would be undertaken, the GBF elaborated, in collaboration with UNESCO, the ESS scope of work which included the various research studies and analyses to be undertaken.

Although the extent of national government involvement in the preparation of the scope of work will undoubtedly vary, they must all eventually approve the final content of these documents. Financial support for all three UNESCO ESS was provided through the UNDP facility SAT-1, established to assist countries in developing long-term education policies and investment programs. This grant funding arrangement required the signing of a tripartite agreement between the three parties i.e. UNDP, UNESCO, host country government, which generally included a project description outlining the scope of work to be accomplished within a given timeframe. Documentary content analysis confirms that such tripartite agreements were signed in each case and, upon close examination of one such agreement (Benin Sector Study), the scope of work figures prominently in the project documentation. One respondent describes the options available to host country governments. "The national government has to approve the project documents which contain the ESS TOR and may get involved in their preparation, or may simply comment and then approve" (UNESCO Respondent #3). According to another respondent, in most cases "c'est UNESCO qui prepare les termes de références" (UNESCO Respondent #1). Nevertheless, the signing of a tripartite agreement signifies the national government's approval and agreement with the scope of work to be undertaken.
4.3.3 Timeframe and Level of Effort

The timeframes and levels of effort for the three ESS cases differed substantially due to UNESCO's phased approach. The two diagnostic studies conducted in Burkina Faso and the Congo both began in February 1993 and lasted six (6) and nine (9) months respectively. The Burkina Faso Sub-Sector Study employed 5 UNESCO consultants and 19 government staff and national consultants. The LOE for the UNESCO consultants alone would have been approximately 630 person days. The Congo Sub-Sector Study employed 4 UNESCO consultants and 21 government staff and national consultants. The LOE for the UNESCO consultants in this case would have been approximately 756 person days. These LOE figures are based on the assumption that the consultants worked full-time on an average of 21 working days per calendar month. Nevertheless, these approximate figures provide a relative order of magnitude of the resources required to engage the international consultants, to which can be added the time and effort of the many national consultants which may or may not have been paid by the projects.

The Benin Sector Study began in May 1989 and ended 35 months later in March 1993 with a regional workshop on education policy analysis. The Benin Sector Study, officially titled "Assistance à la formulation d'une politique nationale et d'un programme d'investissements pour le secteur de l'Education au Bénin", was intended to take Benin through all three phases, i.e. diagnosis, strategy and action plan, of the UNESCO programme approach to ESS. It employed two (2) full-time UNESCO consultants, two (2) full-time GOB staff, 20 international consultants and 26 national consultants. Based on the same assumption as above for the four (4) full-time consultants, the LOE would have been approximately 2,940 person days. Again this does not
include the LOE associated with the short-term international (110 person/months) and national consultants (170 person/months) contracted to the project. However, these approximate figures establish an order of magnitude for comparative purposes.

4.3.4 Selection of Consultants

Analysis of the project documentation and ESS reports indicates that UNESCO was officially responsible for the recruitment of the international and national consultants. Consultant selection is generally based on the study's scope of work, i.e. sub-sector focus, research studies and analyses planned, etc. International or national consultants can be grouped into one of the following categories of technical expertise: economist/planner, educator, management specialist, vocational education and technical training specialist, higher education specialist, etc. UNESCO has developed a databank of consultants categorised according to field of specialisation. "C'est à cette banque de données que fait appel l'UNESCO pour le choix de consultants pour une ESS" (UNESCO Respondent #2). According to the same respondent, national consultants are generally recruited during the first mission to the host country from among the university staff, national government staff, or career consultants. "Ici encore, le personnel de l'UNESCO connait très souvent les meilleurs spécialistes nationaux dans de nombreux pays (cf., par exemple, l'annuaire des anciens stagiaires de IIEP)" (UNESCO Respondent #2).

Once a consultant is identified by technical expertise, the selection process can rely on a number of other criteria, including whether or not she/he is known to the UNESCO staff responsible. This quote from another respondent captures many of the main selection criteria, but
also sheds some light on the criteria considered most important. "When selecting individuals the usual criteria apply: reputation (in terms of quality and timeliness of delivery); professional knowledge; technical expertise (this dominates); suitability for the task; being able to work with people; availability; cost..." (UNESCO Respondent #3). Other criteria mentioned by respondents are: professionalism, past experience in educational research or sector studies, knowledge of the country and appropriate language skills.

Contrary to the official documentation reviewed, respondents identified the Benin and Congo ESS as instances where the national government shared control over the selection of national consultants. In the Benin Sector Study, a "Responsible National" was named by ministerial decree as a national counterpart to the principal consultant. According to a key respondent, this person "played a dominant role in selecting the national consultants" (UNESCO Respondent #3). In both the Benin and Congo studies, the relevant government ministries provided UNESCO with a short-list of qualified national consultants from which the final selection was made. In the Burkina Faso Sub-Sector Study, national working groups were formed from principally the staff of the government ministry involved (Ministère de l'Enseignement de base et de l'Alphabétisation de masse) also indicating some influence on the selection process. With this in mind, the following is a breakdown of the study team composition for each sector study (Table 7). The high representation of national consultants involved is to be noted.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Sector Study</th>
<th>UNESCO Consultants</th>
<th>International Consultants</th>
<th>National Experts/ Consultants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26 +2 GOB Directors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.3.5 Decision-Making Responsibilities

Due to the different management structures put in place for each of the ESS cases, it is best to discuss each one separately and then examine the similarities. The Benin Sector Study had the most complex management structure of the three cases, primarily because it was a much larger undertaking than the other two "diagnostic studies". Decision-making authority at the policy and programme levels was invested in the National Co-ordination Committee composed of two representatives each from the Ministère de l'Éducation nationale (MEN), Ministère des Finances, Ministère du Plan et de la Statistique (MPS), et du Ministère de la Culture, de la jeunesse et des sports. The two key management positions in the project were: on the UNESCO side, the Principal Consultant; on the Benin side, the Minister (MEN), who had been appointed "Responsable national". This quote from a respondent describes decision-making responsibilities in terms of the major stakeholders. "Programmatic decisions came out of negotiations and understandings with the Beninois authorities. Nothing about the content of the project was done without active approval and participation of the Ministry. In addition, the local UNDP office was heavily involved" (UNESCO Respondent #3). At this level, decision-making responsibility was shared among the same signatories to the tripartite agreement: GOB, UNDP and UNESCO.
Decision-making responsibilities at a more operational level appeared to be shared between the UNESCO and Beninois project staff. A National (Scientific) Co-ordinator was employed on a full-time basis and mandated to manage the study implementation, under the direction of the Principal Consultant and the "Responsable national". Also reporting to them was another full-time UNESCO consultant employed to manage the audit component, along with a second National (Audit) Co-ordinator. Decisions concerning the mobilisation of national and international consultants; terms of reference; timing; etc. were the responsibility of the Principal Consultant, working closely with the Beninois National Co-ordinators and the MEN. Other day-to-day study implementation decisions were made by the National Co-ordinators in consultation, when necessary, with the Principal Consultant. Major programmatic decisions were presented to the Co-ordination Committee for discussion and approval.

In the other two "diagnostic" cases, documentary content analysis and questionnaire respondents confirm the originality of the programme approach to sector analysis characterised by a high degree of collaboration between the international and national consultants. In the Congo Sub-Sector Study, one respondent provided this comprehensive list of issues requiring joint decisions, e.g. selection of research themes, identification of implementation problems and constraints, elaboration of different scenarios, selecting policy options and strategies, and financing proposed programmes and projects. This quote captures well the decision-making approaches observed when working on UNESCO ESS. "Ces décisions ont toujours été prises collectivement (responsables et spécialistes nationaux et consultants internationaux) dans les ESS auxquelles j'ai participé et, en particulier, dans celle du Congo" (UNESCO Respondent #2).
Similar management structures to those described for the Benin Sector Study were also put into place. For example, in the Burkina Faso Sub-Sector Study a National Co-ordinator was employed on a full-time basis to monitor the study’s progress, and worked with the support of a National Steering Committee composed of representatives from the MEBAM, the Ministère chargé des Finances et du Plan, and other ministries with an interest in basic education.

4.3.6 Report Preparation

The Benin Sector Study generated over forty (40) research, policy studies and working papers on education in Benin. National experts/consultants were directly responsible for over half of these contributions and participated as team members in the other half. The major synthesis documents were prepared by the UNESCO Principal Consultant, International Consultant - Audit, with the assistance of a number of short-term international consultants.

The Burkina Faso Sub-Sector Study generated twenty-one (21) thematic studies undertaken by the national consultants, while the international consultants produced four (4) sub-sector studies in collaboration with MEBAM. The final report in two volumes represents, in the first instance, a synthesis prepared by the international consultants of all the studies. The four (4) sub-sector studies are reproduced in volume two. The report preparation process described in the preface of the final report applauds the high degree of collaboration between the national and international consultants involved.

The Congo Sub-Sector Study was organised around six (6) sub-sector studies undertaken by six (6) teams of national consultants with the support of four (4) international consultants.
Each of the six national study reports was produced according to specific terms of reference discussed in detail among the consultants involved. The study report was finalised by the four international consultants, representing a synthesis of the sub-sector studies. Again, the report preparation process described in the preface of the final report applauds the high degree of collaboration between the national and international consultants involved.

In each case, the preparatory research studies were undertaken by national consultants, either individually or in working groups. Often this work was accomplished with the support and assistance from one or more international consultants. In each case, synthesis documents were prepared by either the full-time UNESCO consultants and/or the short-term international consultants. Although it is not explicitly stated in any of the study reports, we assume that the national governments appraised themselves of the findings, conclusions and approved the policy recommendations before the final reports were published.

4.3.7 Report Dissemination

A consistent pattern of shared control emerges when analysing who published and disseminated the study reports. Although the publication of the major synthesis reports produced by the Benin Sector Study was undertaken by UNESCO, they appear to have received broad dissemination within the country and in the region. The background studies were also made available for consultation with the MEN in Cotonou. The Congo Sub-Sector Study final report was also published by UNESCO, but copies of the sub-sector studies and simulation models can also be obtained from the "Direction des études et de la planification scolaire et universitaire
(DEPSU)" in Brazzaville. The synthesis report (Tome I) and the four sub-sector reports (Tome 2) of the Burkina Faso Sub-Sector Study were published by UNESCO, but copies of the other thematic studies and simulation models can be obtained from the "Direction des études et de la planification du MEBAM", in Ouagadougou. In all three cases, the final reports are clearly presented as joint publications between UNESCO and the national governments involved.

4.4 SUMMARY

Identifying the locus of decision-making control over the initiatives, resources, decisions and products of an education sector study is key to determining the extent of indigenous participation. For each concept in this category, the findings have been summarised (Table 8) using the property, 'locus' of control, and the corresponding dimensional range: donor agency, shared control and national government. A number of patterns have emerged that warrant closer examination and analysis.

In our sample, all five USAID ESS exhibit the same pattern of donor agency control typical of the technocratic approach, from the initiation of the study through to the preparation and dissemination of the report. Each study originated with a request from the USAID Mission. The duration and minimal level of effort allocated to them was determined in a scope of work that was not discussed with the host country, but approved by the Africa Bureau in Washington. The study teams, predominantly composed of USAID staff and international consultants, were selected based on their prior experience and technical expertise, while the designated team leader was delegated overall decision-making responsibility for the conduct of the study. Although
there was an exceptional level of participation by the South African study team members in the tertiary sector study, USAID retained decision-making control over the final policy recommendations, as well as report preparation and dissemination.

Despite the strong recommendations of the IESS Manual, and requests by USAID staff for increased stakeholder participation, it was clearly not in the Agency’s interest to allocate the additional time, resources and effort required for a participatory approach. Administrative pressures to maintain disbursement targets associated with DFA funding, combined with the over-reliance on expatriate personnel, further explains why these ESS were “donor driven,” rather than “demand driven”. The technocratic approach served USAID’s purpose well, in that the study missions were completed quickly and at minimum expense, while informing its education sector programming on a country-by-country basis. Maintaining complete control over every aspect of the ESS was essential to this approach.

Our sample of ESS in Table 8 includes two World Bank ESS, but only the Zimbabwe Sub-Sector Study provides some insight into the locus of decision-making control. From a control of study perspective, this case falls somewhere in the middle of the technocratic - participatory continuum. It distinguishes itself from the previous cases because the national government initiated the study and shared control in the preparation of the scope of work which specified the timeframe and resources for the study. Once these aspects of the study were mutually agreed upon, the locus of control shifted back to the World Bank. It selected a study team, composed mostly of its own staff, and approved the selection of the national government’s counterpart team members. Although the latter had ample opportunity to influence the decision-making process,
the WB study team maintained full control over the implementation of the study, its conclusions and policy recommendations. This tendency to be in control may be more symptomatic of the WB system, than characteristic of the WB study team members themselves, since there is some evidence that Bank policies regarding the sharing of draft reports were contravened in order to enhance indigenous participation. Even the “peer review” procedure places greater importance on the technical opinions of Bank experts than the political considerations of national government representatives. Furthermore, Bank procedures regarding the dissemination of final reports are anything but participatory, restricting access to senior national government officials and only then with “Bank authorization”. Other researchers (Namuddu & Tapsoba 1993) have also observed how these procedures limit access by local research communities to current educational research and policy analysis. Despite the early promise of indigenous participation, this WB ESS exhibits many of the donor agency control characteristics of the technocratic approach.

Further examination of Table 8 focusing on the three UNESCO ESS reveals a strikingly different pattern from the other cases. In each case, the study is “demand driven” by a request from the national government. A scope of work is prepared that reflects the unique circumstances of the country. The timeframe, resources and level of effort required to complete the scope of work is negotiated before an agreement is signed. Similar to the Zimbabwe ESS, at this point, where shared control is exercised through the signing of a formal agreement, what distinguishes these cases from all the rest is the length of time, as well as the relative amount of human and financial resources invested by all parties. This appears to be indicative of shared control over the study design and planning decisions. In two of the three cases there was also
shared control over the selection of consultants, UNESCO selecting the international consultants and the national government selecting the local consultants. Only in the Burkina Faso Sub-Sector Study was it suggested that UNESCO approved all consultants, international or otherwise. Despite this singular exception, the UNESCO ESS exhibited more instances of shared control in all other areas of decision-making responsibility and report preparation, which is more characteristic of the participatory approach.

This summary analysis raises a number of issues related to indigenous ownership and control that were discussed in the literature review. The problems of “donor driven” aid are evident in our findings where disbursement pressures forced USAID, for example, to adopt the more expedient technocratic approach. The need for expediency and technically sound policy analysis, meant that a high level of control over the sector study process was required. Who better placed to exercise this control on behalf of a donor agency than a team of staff and U.S. consultants. Despite the many criticisms of foreign technical assistance (Berg 1993) and its recognised ineffectiveness for local capacity building (Morgan & Baser 1993), some donor agencies continue to favour experienced technical specialists over national consultants. This observation confirms that of other researchers (Kayembe 1992) who decry the fact that national academics and consultants are not utilised more in donor sponsored educational research. It should be noted that all of the donor agencies in our sample, without exception, maintained full control over the selection of their international consultants.

Several examples from the UNESCO, and to a lesser extent the World Bank, studies, illustrated how participation allowed for “influence and shared control” over the decision-making
process. We did not however come across, as Loubser (1994) would have hoped, a ESS where the national government was in full control of the policy analysis process. This can be attributed to the fact that the studies in our sample were ‘donor supported’ and as such the donor agencies would have a legitimate interest in exercising some measure of control. Nevertheless, if Fredriksen (1990) is to be proven correct, we should detect more active indigenous participation in those ESS where there was shared control over the ESS implementation process and its products.
Table 8: Summary Analysis of Control of Study

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5.0 USE OF POLICY ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES

This is the second chapter that presents the findings of this policy study as they relate to research question #1. The Analytic Framework (Table 3) was used as a data collection and analysis tool, while the categories under examination were considered appropriate as chapter headings. It was again convenient to group the ESS cases by sponsoring donor agency for ease of presentation and to subsequently structure these sections according to the concepts listed in the Analytic Framework under the category of "Use of Policy Analysis Techniques". This presentation format facilitated cross-case comparisons among ESS cases from the same sponsoring donor agency and also between them as presented in the summary analysis.

5.1 USAID

5.1.1 Overall Methodology

The USAID methodology for the conduct of ESS was outlined in considerable detail in the *Education and Human Resources Sector Assessment Manual* (IESS 1988). It not only presented the sector assessment approach and the underlying conceptual framework, but also provided a comprehensive description of each stage from preparation, to data collection, data analysis, identification of issues, writing conclusions and recommendations through to the presentation of the final report. The methodology presented in the IESS Manual was a reference point for all interview respondents who voluntarily referred to it and acknowledged that it constituted the formal USAID methodology for the conduct of ESS.
However, it is one thing to have a set of formal guidelines for the conduct of ESS and yet another thing to ensure that they are applied in practice. For example, three of the five ESS - Senegal Sector Assessment, Ethiopia Sector Review and Namibia Sub-Sector Review - were considered by USAID respondents as not representative examples of USAID's ESS methodology.

The reason for that was because USAID wanted to shape a program so this was the first step in the project preparation cycle. So the methodology then became the kind of how do you fly in some place and get as much information you can as quickly as you can .. it was that kind of methodology. (USAID Respondent #2).

Although other reasons were also suggested for these exceptions, the quote above reminds us that the principal purpose of these ESS was to define USAID's investment strategies for the education sector. It also explains the differences observed between the formal ESS methodology and how it was applied in practice.

5.1.2 Data Collection Techniques

Data collection involves the gathering of relevant and available data from different sources using a variety of techniques. A common technique used in the early stages of the USAID ESS was documentary research. Published and unpublished documents were generally obtained from the relevant government ministries of education, finance or planning, and donor agencies actively involved in the country. These documents were gleaned mostly for educational statistics, e.g., student enrolment numbers, attrition rates, national examination scores, etc., as well as financial data, e.g., national macro-economic information, revenue and recurrent cost data. The availability
and reliability of unpublished data from national government ministries often posed certain challenges for the ESS team members.

Interviews represented another data collection technique common to all of the studies, but which did vary in terms of vertical and horizontal coverage of stakeholder groups. First, the vertical dimension generally involved interviews with government ministers, senior policy makers, intellectuals and other actors in education policy formation. These interviews generally took place in the capital cities. Data were also collected from other stakeholders further down the vertical dimension through "field research" or site visits. In only one case was a significant amount of time allocated to this type of research activity: Senegal Sector Assessment - none, Namibia Sub-Sector Review - 2 days, Ethiopia Sector Review - 1 week, South Africa Primary Sector Assessment - 2 weeks, and South Africa Tertiary Sector Assessment - 6 weeks. These site visits were presumably conducted to collect data from decentralised ministry of education staff, institutional administrators, school headmasters and teachers. In only the South Africa Primary Sector Assessment was there a concerted effort during these site visits to collect data from parents and students in order to get full vertical coverage.

The horizontal dimension refers to stakeholder coverage throughout the geographic regions of the country. In the Ethiopia Sector Review, the team split into two groups, with one group travelling to the Oromo and Amhara regions to the north of Addis Ababa, and the other travelling to the south and west of the Southern People's and Oromo regions. In the South Africa Primary Sector Assessment, the team spent one week in each of two regional areas outside of Johannesburg: Cape Town and Durban. Admittedly, the study teams' perceptions were limited by
both the brevity and potential bias of these visits. Only in the case of the South Africa Tertiary Sector Assessment was a significant amount of time and resources allocated to achieve representative horizontal coverage of stakeholder groups, albeit mostly institutional administrators.

For several respondents, the limited time and resources invested in site visits puts into question its usefulness as a data collection technique. Here is one case in point, "I think a lot of ESS teams waste time by going out on these boon-doggle trips where they go to schools and disrupt classes and ask a few questions. Unless you can spend a couple days at the school, watch the dynamics, look at the school budget, its almost not worth it" (USAID Respondent #1). On the other hand, despite having spent only two days doing site visits in the northern regions of Namibia, the study team noted that regional administrative officers, principals, and classroom teachers were "indispensable" resources of information that helped them learn about the Namibian school system.

5.1.3 Data Analysis Techniques

Once the data have been assembled they must be organised, analysed and interpreted. The IESS Manual suggested that it would be helpful to group the data into five thematic areas: external efficiency, internal efficiency, access, equity, administration and supervision, and costs and financing (IESS 1988). These five "analytic themes" are defined in considerable detail with suggestions and examples provided as to how the data would be critically examined, interpreted
and presented. The influence this conceptual framework had on our sample of ESS was quite apparent from the content analysis of the study reports.

The data analysis process included the systematic compilation of quantitative data that were used to populate planning and projection models. Scenario building, based on these projection models, was a data analysis technique used in the Ethiopia Sector Review, and both South Africa assessments. In all cases, macro-economic indicators were used to project national government revenues and estimate education budget allocations. Considerable use was also made of quantitative measures of external efficiency, internal efficiency, access and equity throughout all of the ESS reports depending on the policy issues of importance. The following is a sample of quantitative measures taken from the reports:

- measures of access: numbers of schools, student population numbers, enrolment rates by age cohorts, enrolment rates in private and public systems by region;
- measures of equity: student enrolment by gender, population group enrolment as a percentage of total population, gross and net enrolment ratios by grade and gender, examination results by gender and population group;
- measures of internal efficiency: pass/fail rates, attrition rates, teacher-to-student ratios, student and class ratios, costs per student, costs per graduate, examination results, numbers of graduates;
- measures of external efficiency: calculated marginal rates of return to education, private internal rate of return, admission rates to higher levels of education, unemployment rates by level of education;
• measures of costs and financing: government expenditures by level of education as a share of total government expenditures, recurrent cost per student/year by level of education, government expenditures on the education sector and sub-sectors (primary, secondary, tertiary, teacher training) and ODA commitments and disbursements.

When qualitative information was presented, as it was in the Ethiopia Sector Review and extensively in the two South African assessments, it tended to address specific issues of education quality and equity. This information appeared to be based on data collected through individual interviews and site inspections. As already noted above, there were significant constraints to obtaining adequate vertical and horizontal stakeholder coverage upon which to base conclusions. Thus, there were problems associated with analysing this type of data, as was pointed out by one respondent describing the difficulties the study team had in preparing the final report.

There were problems, in the sense that people have different strategies for making sense of the data and winnowing information. For example, one chapter was lacking in empirical data, being much more emotive and subjective, which posed a different set of problems. Not to say one approach is better than another, but when you have that many people, with that many conceptual approaches to analysis and writing styles, it’s tough. (USAID Respondent #4)

The process of data analysis was generally undertaken by each specialist during the ESS mission while in country. Drafts were shared with and contributed to by the rest of the team members when time permitted, but, principally, the individual who had responsibility for a chapter would do the analysis and interpretation. The team leader generally ensured overall integration, and eliminated glaring inconsistencies and contradictions within the overall report. These data
analysis techniques described above had some obvious drawbacks which were freely admitted to by one respondent "The data we needed was [sic] available from the government and the team did the analysis. The problem with this approach is that you miss the broad participation of the host country" (USAID Respondent #3).

5.1.4 Public Consultations

USAID ESS tried to collect and analyse a vast amount of data, identify key issues and problems and, secondarily, to formulate some recommendations for overcoming those problems. What should normally flow from this work is a public debate or set of discussions about whether the right problems or issues were identified and whether appropriate policy options were proposed to address those problems. Close examination of each of the five studies reveals considerable differences in the frequency with which any kind of public opinion was sought or policy dialogue engaged in with respect to the findings of the ESS.

For example, there is no evidence that public commissions, consultations or structured opinion surveys were used in either the Senegal Sector Assessment, Ethiopia Sector Review or Namibia Sub-Sector Review. In the case of the latter, "(S)ome workshops were held to compensate and inform people of the study" (USAID Respondent #3) and presumably its findings. At this point the USAID Mission Director and the Minister of Education had already finalised the document.

The two South Africa assessments, particularly the case of the primary sector, appeared however to have invested more substantially in the public consultation process. In the case of the
tertiary sector assessment, the study team presented its findings and conclusions to representatives of the ANC who, presumably, had an opportunity to contribute to the formulation of the recommendations. The study team of the primary sector assessment met with several panels of distinguished South Africans who were well-informed about education issues and made several formal presentations to the team. The team leader, who had ultimate responsibility for managing the sector assessment, made two presentations on the draft report, one to the South African reference group and the other to the USAID Mission/SA. However, further consultations on policy options presented in the subsequent drafts and final report phases were limited to USAID and Embassy staff.

The idea was that USAID would take this document, get some more comments, distribute it widely (1500 copies) among a variety of stakeholders and there was to have been another seminar. This document was to be used as a basis for dialogue with government and a variety of other people. It was meant to be a catalyst for provoking discussion and dialogue, but with an empirical basis to it. (USAID Respondent #4).

Although public consultation and presentation of the ESS findings, conclusions and recommendations figures prominently in the IESS Manual, the practice in this regard, based on the above observations, showed considerable variation from one study to another.

5.1.5 Policy Recommendations

An examination of the recommendations made in each of the five sector studies reveals some common characteristics. The Senegal Sector Assessment and Ethiopia Sector Review present a summary of options for USAID investments. For example, "We have recommended that USAID Senegal should concentrate any assistance it gives to education on certain aspects of
basic education in primary schools and nonformal education, primarily in rural areas and in the
service of girls and women" (USAID 1990, p.82). The recommendations go on to suggest
community support for schools and the decentralised delivery of educational services through
grassroots NGOs that are teaching literacy and other basic skills to youth and women. The
Ethiopia Sector Review made similar recommendations to the national government to increase
resources for primary education and that education services be decentralised through community
contributions and the establishment of private primary and secondary schools. Two targets were
proposed, "the first focusing on improving the flow of financial resources and quality boosting
inputs through the decentralised system, and the second on directly enhancing the quality of
educational services, particularly teaching" (USAID 1993, p.33). In both cases, the implications
of these recommendations for education policy formulation were clearly prescriptive.

Although the Namibia Sub-Sector Review report does not explicitly present investment
options for the USAID Mission, it nevertheless clearly identifies for the national government
some priorities for resource allocation, particularly targeted to increase instructional
effectiveness, e.g., instructional materials development and production, teacher training and
support for teachers in the classroom, the construction of classrooms or other instructional
facilities and the construction of facilities other than classroom instructional space. Despite its
stated intention not to be prescriptive, the report nevertheless goes on to provide, as a
prerequisite to the achievement of the educational reforms proposed, a litany of
recommendations for strengthening the capacities of the Ministry of Education in: 1) policy
planning and analysis, 2) management information systems, 3) instructional systems design, and
4) materials development and production (USAID 1990). Policy issues for further consideration by the national government, where the study team did not have specific recommendations, were provided at the end of the report's summary findings.

The Executive Summary of the South Africa Primary Sector Assessment contains an impressive 32 recommendations listed under the following headings: efficiency, finance, educational administration and management, curriculum and teacher training. This list represents a comprehensive package of policy recommendations to improve access to and the quality of services for South Africa primary education. Insightful, concise and undoubtedly justifiable, the prescriptive nature of the recommendations that follow cannot be denied. For example, "(R)esource allocations for materials and facilities must be equalized across the population at the earliest possible moment. ... The growth in population size, especially among Africans, must be stemmed in order to reduce growing demand for education. ... Elimination of the duplication of management functions should be a high priority under a unitary system. ... The quality of instructional content is poor and the curriculum needs to be reassessed and strengthened (USAID 1992, pp. xii-xvi). Contrary to this statement made by an interview respondent, "The intent was not to prescribe, the intent was to state needs and identify some options for the government" (USAID Respondent #4), the recommendations made were in fact detailed statements of an implementation sort, rather than policy options that presented the cost implications of short-term, medium term and longer term approaches.

The Executive Summary of the South Africa Tertiary Sector Assessment lists 56 similarly prescriptive policy recommendations grouped under the following headings: tertiary sector,
universities, technikons, technical colleges, colleges of education and high priority initiatives. Substantive recommendations for educational reform were presented to the effect that the government should: 1) unite the entire tertiary education sector within a single ministry of education; 2) establish a system of community colleges; 3) reorganise administration of tertiary education; 4) improve recruitment, selection and support of black students; 5) reduce subsidies to white institutions, with funds to be reallocated to black institutions; 6) establish differential student fee schedule based on parent income; 7) establish a national student loan program; 8) develop need-based grants and merit-based scholarships; 9) diversify funding sources; 10) set up a financial banking institution for education; and 11) establish an educational planning commission. None of these recommendations could be construed as policy options, but rather as prescriptive solutions to public problems.

5.2 World Bank

5.2.1 Overall Methodology

Confirmed by all of the interview respondents, the Bank does not have a standard methodology for the conduct of ESS. Instead, each study is case specific. The Kenya Human Resources Study made use of readily available research being conducted in-country, supplementing it where necessary without incurring the high costs of using external resources. The Zimbabwe Sub-Sector Review started from an operational perspective and developed a methodology as it went along, eventually meriting the Bank's "Best Sector Study of the Year Award" (WB Respondent #1). A sophisticated method was needed in the latter case to generate
new information which was not then readily available. In fact, there were several different methods used by study team members, depending on the aspect of the study they were working on, but no overall ESS methodology was apparent in either case.

Although the Bank's approach to education policy analysis at that time could be described as "eclectic", there has since been considerable research and staff support provided according to this respondent. "There has been lots of training for Bank staff on how to conduct ESS and consultation with and technical support from the Education Division which constituted a 'state of the art' approach" (WB Respondent #1). The reference here may be to the work of Wadi D. Haddad, then Senior Advisor for Human Development in the World Bank's Africa Department, who developed a framework for education policy analysis which was published by the Economic Development Institute of the World Bank and later by the International Institute for Educational Planning (World Bank 1994b, Haddad 1995). A series of training modules, based on several case studies, were developed from this Bank publication, and seminars were conducted for country education officers in policy analysis.

5.2.2 Data Collection Techniques

Documentary research was again a common data collection technique in these cases. The data collection methods used in the Kenya Human Resources Study report were based primarily on secondary data sources supplemented by the findings of the Study Mission to Kenya. This interview respondent describes the process as follows, "(W)e did do some limited original research, but depended primarily on the Bank Field Representative and the Mission to collect the
materials" (WB Respondent #4). The Bank Field Representative had already been heavily engaged in data collection in order to prepare an Education Sector Project which would be discussed at the upcoming bilateral meeting between the Bank and the Government of Kenya.

The Kenya Human Resources Study report drew on a wide range of both formal and informal Bank reports and on a number of other donor sources, e.g., UNICEF, UNESCO, etc. World Bank sources included published reports as well as country economic, sector, and project documents covering both completed and ongoing work. Major data sources on Kenya were taken from various issues of the Statistical Abstract, and the Economic Survey published by the Kenya Central Bureau of Statistics. Major background sources included an informal Bank desk study reviewing Kenya's education sector (1988) and a number of internal notes on education issues. Data collection relied on ongoing work in the Bank's Resident Mission in Nairobi to establish a comprehensive data base on the education sector. In addition, a number of studies were commissioned, including papers by Kiragu (1989) on education financing and Mungai (1990) on issues in higher education. The report also draws on the Presidential Working Party on Education (1988) and UNICEF's 1989 Situation Analysis of Children and Women in Kenya.

The Zimbabwe Sub-Sector Review collected a broad range of secondary data from a variety of sources. The principal source of data was the GOZ itself. The Ministry of Finance provided budget estimates, expenditure reports, infrastructure expenditure data, labour market data and employment data, while the Central Statistics Office of the MEC provided formal school statistics and examinations data. "The reliability was good and we knew what the weaknesses were in the data. The examinations results were reliable, as was the expenditure data" (WB
Respondent #3). Additional data were gleaned from Bank reports, statistical abstracts and databases, as well as academic research.

Similar to the Kenya Human Resources Study, a number of review papers and studies were commissioned by the Bank Resident Representative specifically for this sector study. For example, background studies were commissioned on three topics: 1) a study of the factors affecting learning achievements in secondary schools, 2) an analysis of the costs of secondary schools, and 3) a review of the prospects for employment, skills development and supply in Zimbabwe. A locally engaged international consultant worked on student achievement measures with two local Zimbabwean consultants, while other review papers were written by MEC staff on a variety of policy issues. The Bank Resident Representative bore most of the burden for managing these activities between the 1st and 2nd missions along with the GOZ counterpart team.

Although few specific references were made to the use of interviews as a major data collection technique, in either the documentation nor by the respondents themselves, it is apparent that the interviews that were conducted were limited in both cases to the highest pinnacle of the vertical dimension of government representatives. Neither of the Bank reports included a list of individuals interviewed, as was typical of the USAID and UNESCO ESS. If some of the ancillary primary research involved interviews with a broader spectrum of stakeholders, it was not documented.
5.2.3 Data Analysis Techniques

Information regarding the techniques used by the Bank ESS teams to organise, analyse and interpret the data once collected was admittedly scarce. Two themes, however, were apparent in the organisation of the data. In the Kenya Human Resources Study, the emphasis was on "revitalizing" the education sector, while the Zimbabwe Sub-Sector Review focused on the "successful expansion" of primary and secondary education. Both of these themes can be traced to a World Bank Policy Study titled, "Education in Sub-Saharan Africa: Policies for Adjustment, Revitalization and Expansion" (World Bank 1988).

The data analysis process in these cases generally included the systematic compilation of quantitative data, some of which were used to populate relatively sophisticated simulation models. Such models were used in the Zimbabwe Sub-Sector Review to project teacher salary costs: with/without double-shifting, with/without increased class size for both the primary and secondary levels. Quantitative data in the form of access, efficiency, and equity indicators were used extensively throughout the two reports, including:

- measures of equity: primary female enrolment ratios, female enrolments in secondary schools;
- measures of access: gross enrolment rate, growth of the education system;
- measures of internal efficiency: pupil progression in standards, student success rates, per capita student pass rates, annual costs per student;
- measures of external efficiency: index of opportunity for secondary schooling; and,
• measures of financing and costs: government expenditure by educational level, costs of
textbooks and uniforms, building and instructional costs, average expenditure per
subject, frequency of resource availability, projected teacher salary costs, estimated costs
of decentralisation, etc.

During the second mission, the study team spent most of its time on data analysis, and site
visits were used not for data collection, but rather to confirm the analyses and conclusions drawn
from the projection models. The use of site visits in this study was described more as a
qualitative data analysis technique. "The team visited some schools in the sample with the
purpose of conducting a visual inspection. This allowed a confirmation or verification of the data
analysis e.g. the classification of schools" (WB Respondent #3). Most of the data analysis was
done in the field during the second mission, e.g., the teacher salary simulations, graduate
examinations score analysis, labour market analysis, multi-level hierarchical analysis, and
modelling teacher employment requirements, etc. As a testament to their resourcefulness and
skills, one respondent describes the analysis and writing process as particularly demanding from
both a physical and intellectual perspective. "The first draft was written in one week in the hotel
with each Bank team member writing their section, while the team leader wrote the 1st draft of
the complete ESS report" (WB Respondent #1). Judging from other respondents' comments,
there were no apparent problems with this methodology from their perspective.
5.2.4 Public Consultations

No public consultations on the sector study findings were reported in either of the sector study reports, nor by any of the interview respondents. The policy issues presented in the draft reports were, however, the subject of discussion and dialogue between the Bank and the respective GOZ representatives on different occasions following the completion of the study missions. Two respondents make these observations regarding the Bank's approach to these consultations. "Discussions of policy options were noncommittal" (WB Respondent #3). "Responsibility for the final recommendations stayed with the Bank team" (WB Respondent #1). In both cases, responsibility for the dissemination of the final reports ultimately remained with the World Bank.

5.2.5 Policy Recommendations

An examination of the recommendations made in each of the two sector studies reveals some common characteristics. The Kenya Human Resources Study report suggested that the government's future human resources strategies and policies needed to focus on increased access for under-served groups through the selective expansion of primary and secondary education systems combined with commensurate improvements in education quality and equity. Key to this process was building institutional capacity in the human resource sectors through intensified public policy research and analysis activities, public consensus building measures, and a more inclusive use of financial inputs through cost-sharing from outside the national government structures.
The Zimbabwe Sub-Sector Review report suggested new education policies to improve learning achievements in disadvantaged secondary schools located principally in the rural areas. Cost-effective strategies for increased utilisation of existing trained teachers and a reduction in the rate of training new teachers was proposed. Staff incentives to work in rural areas and improved English and science instruction were suggested, as well as increased use of distance learning through rural study groups. These changes required a decentralisation of the education system, while the central functions required increased institutional capacity in educational research, policy analysis and planning, as well as monitoring and evaluation through examination development and testing. Financing these quality improvements, it was suggested, could be achieved through reducing the overall education salary burden, improved internal efficiency and increased equity in the allocation of resources to impoverished communities and under-achieving schools. Communities with better resourced schools, especially secondary, would be asked to bear a greater share of the costs of education through increased school fees and voluntary financial contributions.

The two sets of policy recommendations are quite similar in their prescriptive formulation, tone and promotion of many of the same policy packages for the adjustment, revitalisation and expansion of education in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 1988). Recommendations such as the diversification of educational financing, unit cost containment, increased access to learning materials, strengthened examination standards, educational infrastructure development, increased investments in primary education, selective expansion at higher education levels, building the
institutional capacity of government structures and the decentralisation of education system management are all standard World Bank fare.

In response to the Zimbabwe Sub-Sector Review report, the GOZ provided written comments to the World Bank which were recorded at the end of the Executive Summary of the final report. Although in general agreement with most of the report findings, the MEC maintained a different view on those policy issues related to the vocationalization of the secondary school curriculum, the increased utilisation of untrained teachers, and the suggested options for reducing the costs of education. According to one respondent, it was not surprising that many of the recommendations were not adopted nor implemented, since there had not been prior agreement within the GOZ on either the policy issues, nor problems to be addressed in the first place.

5.3 UNESCO

5.3.1 Overall Methodology

UNESCO's methodology for the conduct of ESS is apparently common knowledge to education sector specialists, but does not appear to be documented in the form of a manual. Documentary research uncovered passing references to the methodology in several internal UNESCO documents, briefs and papers. One unpublished paper presented to the Development of African Education Working Group on Education Sector Analysis (UNESCO 1995) provides some written confirmation of this informal methodology described by several UNESCO staff and
education consultants. The methodology is consistent with the approach described in this passage.

Les ESS visent au moins trois objectifs principaux et complémentaires: élaborer un diagnostic du secteur et identifier les principaux problèmes et les contraintes concernant le développement du secteur; identifier les options qui permettraient de répondre au problèmes et au contraintes et apprécier les marges de manœuvre concernant le développement du secteur; contribuer à l'élaboration d'options de politiques, d'une stratégie et d'un programme d'action (ou de projets), qui constituent ce que nous appellerons des recommandations. (UNESCO Respondent #2)

A comprehensive education sector analysis involves a multi-year three stage process leading to the formulation of a national education policy declaration and an investment program. The first stage of ESS implementation consists of a series of diagnostic studies designed to assess the current situation, compile the necessary baseline data, identify education problems/issues and recommend policy options. A capacity building component is included for the development of policy analysis and planning tools needed to assess the proposed policy options. The second stage involves a series of public consultations with a broad range of stakeholders, i.e. government, teachers, parents, students and donors. These consultations are intended to disseminate the findings of the diagnostic stage, open discussion on the policy options followed by the formulation of a national strategy. Stage three requires the preparation of action plans for policy implementation. These action plans, or master plans in some cases, include investment programs and options which are intended to solicit external donor assistance during periodic "round tables" organised for that purpose by the UNDP. The recommendations referred to in the quotation above are in fact proposals to donor agencies for program and project investment opportunities. An examination of the policy analysis techniques used in the three UNESCO ESS
in our sample must take into consideration the three stages described above. As previously mentioned, the Burkina Faso and Congo studies represent the first diagnostic stage, while the Benin Sector Study is the only documented case where all three stages of the sector study were completed.

5.3.2 Data Collection Techniques

The diagnostic phase of a UNESCO ESS will often generate several synthesis and thematic or sub-sector studies, each using data collection techniques appropriate to the specific topic. Yet few details of the techniques used were revealed in the ESS reports themselves, other than the usual list of interviews conducted with government officials. On the surface, the data collection techniques most frequently referred to or mentioned by the international consultants were similar to those used by both USAID and the World Bank i.e. documentary research, interviews and sites visits. The following quote from a respondent attests to this similarity.

Une fois qu'on a les questions qu'on doit poser et le type d'information qu'on doit assembler, on fait deux chose 1) une liste de l'information documentaires, papiers, etc. qu'on peut avoir, et pour la compléter, 2) une liste d'entrevues, réunions et visites qu'on veut organiser. (UNESCO Respondent #1)

International consultants employed by UNESCO, were however, in most cases less involved in first-hand data collection and generally managed the research process. An initial meeting would be held with the government officials and locally engaged consultants responsible for the ESS or sub-sector study in question. The purpose of this meeting would be to review the TOR, discuss the type of baseline data, surveys and special studies required and to request assistance in
obtaining documents, scheduling meetings/interviews, and organising site visits. Special studies would be organised or reviewed with the national consultants or working groups involved.

UNESCO's approach to data collection in its education sector analysis work was both comprehensive and extensive. Using the Burkina Faso Sub-Sector Study as an example, it generated four (4) synthesis reports on the following topics: 1) qualitative aspects of basic education; 2) nonformal education and literacy; 3) human resource management and administration, and; 4) cost simulation modelling. Although these reports were written by the international consultants, following their in-country study missions, they based much of their research on the twenty-one (21) thematic studies prepared in advance or jointly by the national consultants. Similarly, the Congo Sub-Sector Study generated two (2) synthesis reports based on the work of twenty-one (21) national consultants who had formed six working groups each responsible for a thematic study on the following topics: 1) pre-school, primary, secondary, adult education and literacy; 2) higher education; 3) technical and professional education; 4) educational planning and management; 5) population and employment, and; 6) economic and financial projections.

The Benin Sector Study generated, in all, over forty (40) policy studies and working papers. National expert/consultants were directly responsible for over half of these contributions and participated as team members in the other half. A standard data collection technique was employed for each of the following major policy studies: 1) primary education, 2) secondary education, 3) technical and professional education, 4) higher education, 5) nonformal education, 6) employment, 7) capacity of the MEN and 8) educational costs and financing. Teams of
international and national consultants were formed to research each of these sub-sectors. They were all required to verify existing baseline data with original field research, e.g. investigative research, statistical surveys and interviews were conducted.

5.3.3 Data Analysis Techniques

As we can see, the UNESCO ESS emphasised the generation of reliable baseline data, especially during the diagnostic phases. This data served as inputs for analysis and provides the eventual grounding for the formulation of policy options. The latter is facilitated through the use of a simulation modelling technique for education systems development.

UNESCO's Policy and Sectoral Analysis Division developed one such simulation modelling technique in the late 1980s to support its education sector analysis work (UNESCO 1991). The "Simeduc" computer simulation package (Lotus 123) uses a series of electronic spreadsheets grouped into four modules to project 1) student enrolments/teacher staffing, 2) recurrent costs by level and type of education, 3) financial investment requirements, and 4) education indicators. The final module provides an annual summary of projections by grade and level of education. Based on these projections it summarises or calculates the standard indicators of internal and external efficiency, e.g. student enrolment rates, number of students per class, unit costs per student, student/teacher ratios, graduation rates, transition rates, etc. Simeduc's principal attraction is that it allows the users to examine the implications, from educational and financial perspectives, of different policy options through the adjustment of statistical parameters, i.e.
population growth rates, and/or education policy objective/targets i.e. 90% primary school enrolment by the year 2000.

Noted in all the ESS reports was the importance placed by UNESCO on building the capacity of the national government counterparts in the use of this simulation modelling technique. Each ESS did engage an education statistician specialising in the use of education policy simulation models and who fulfilled this capacity building role. Simeduc's value was found in facilitating a joint analysis of the data by the UNESCO and national consultants which was crucial to making the optimum choice among several policy alternatives.

Within the context of a data collection and analysis process described above, the role of UNESCO's international consultants is primarily one of facilitator, coach and trainer, providing the techniques, tools and support needed by their national counterparts. However, it should be noted that the major synthesis documents or reports were almost always prepared by the principal international consultants involved. While most the analysis was undoubtedly done in the field during the study missions, when and where the reports were written was often left to the discretion of the international consultant as explained here by an interview respondent.

Il y a différentes méthodes de travail dépendant de la personne. Y en a qui s'assoient à l'ordinateur le soir et commencent à taper. Y en a d'autres qui n'écrivent pas un mot pendant des jours, qui enregistrent, essayent de comprendre la problématique et après, documentent leurs observations. (UNESCO Respondent #1)

The final product of the diagnostic phase of a UNESCO ESS would still have been very much influenced by the perception and judgement of UNESCO's international consultants.
5.3.4 Public Consultations

Public consultations figure prominently in UNESCO's education sector analysis work as a means of determining whether the right problems or issues were identified and whether appropriate policy options were proposed to address those problems. Close examination of the three studies reveals the high frequency with which public opinion was sought or policy dialogue engaged in with respect to the findings of the ESS.

Frequent reference is made in the Benin Sector Study documents to the use of public opinion surveys, site visits and the use of communications strategies to collect, analyse and disseminate the research findings. Each draft of a sub-sector or thematic study report was the subject of a seminar or workshop organised to disseminate the findings and discuss the policy implications with the stakeholders most concerned. To this end, over thirty seminars, workshops and meetings on different topics, e.g. primary education and higher education, were organised in Cotonou and the provincial capitals bringing together several hundred people, e.g. MOE staff, educational administrators and professionals, teachers and their unions, parents and their associations, students, employers from various sectors of the national and local economy, as well as, on occasion, donor agency representatives. The conclusions and recommendations from these public consultations were thereafter taken into consideration and incorporated into the final versions of the sub-sector or thematic study reports.

Although the Burkina Faso and Congo studies did not provide as much detailed information in this respect, their approaches were similar in leading to a national consultation of major stakeholders to discuss the conclusions and policy options formulated during the course of the
diagnostic phase of the sector study. One of the respondents described the purpose of such a
national consultations as follows.

La consultation nationale, destinée à diffuser les résultats et les implications en
matière de politique et des activités décrites du projet auprès (i) des décideurs
nationaux (Ministères des Finances, du plan, et de la Fonction publique y
compris) et les parties concernées telles que les représentants des syndicats
derseignants, les parents, les étudiants, les employeurs, etc., et (ii) des agences
internationales de financement du développement, notamment celles dont
l'intervention est liée à des changements de politique éducative. (UNESCO
Respondent #3)

The Burkina Faso and Congo studies were viewed as works in progress with some proposed
policy options that were sufficiently researched in order to proceed to action, while others
required additional research and discussion. The study reports were to be the subject of national
conferences during which a more profound discussion of the policy options would occur. This
was only confirmed in the research for the Congo study.

5.3.5 Policy Recommendations

An examination of the UNESCO ESS reports, in terms of structure and content of the
recommendations, was quite instructive. The Congo Sub-Sector Study report is unique in that it
presents its recommendations in two sections: those concerning the external conditions to the
education sector; and, those proper to the education sector. The former recommends measures for
improving public sector management, reducing public expenditures and strengthening the
government's capacity for macro-economic management within a context of structural
adjustment. The principal recommendations in the second section are based on the conclusion
that any educational reform process would be destined to failure without first strengthening the
capacity of the MEN to undertake educational planning, programming and management.
Consequently, the first set of recommendations for the reform process included three initiatives
designed to build the capacity of the MEN: 1) to undertake educational research and policy
analysis, program planning, performance monitoring and simulation modelling; 2) to
operationalize education policy through the formation of a specialised unit; and, 3) to effectively
manage the financial, material and human resources available. The more substantive educational
reform proposals were addressed in the context of the second set of recommendations which
focused on: 1) improving the quality, internal efficiency and teaching conditions of basic
education; 2) improving the quality and internal efficiency of secondary education; 3) improving
internal efficiency, limiting access to and increasing bursaries to post secondary education, as
well as a number of other recommendations for adult education, for privately funded education
and for other supporting institutions. The third set of recommendations suggested that a series of
national public consultations be planned and supported by an information communications
(media) strategy that would seek to build a social consensus around the most acceptable
education policy options being proposed.

Recommendations generated by the Burkina Faso Sub-Sector Study were grouped around
the same topics as the four synthesis reports and thematic studies: increased formal schooling,
improved quality of primary education, continued expansion of literacy and a more efficiently
managed MEBAM. Some of the key recommendations suggested for discussion in each of these
categories were: 1) a model for policy analysis and long-term planning that takes into
consideration demographic and financial information should be adopted by the MEBAM; 2) the
training and monitoring of teachers and the provision of textbooks is needed in order increase internal efficiency of primary education; 3) better co-ordination in the area of literacy between responsible ministries is key to ensuring productive linkages between formal and nonformal education to ensure optimal learning; and, 4) MEBAM must be restructured to allow for more flexibility and efficiency in human resource management. These recommendations and others were to be discussed by MEBAM and other stakeholders during a national workshop in order to set priorities. The simulation model was to facilitate a comparative analysis of policy options given the demographic and financial constraints identified, or at least indicate areas for further research. The study did not identify any optimal policy choices, partially because this was outside of its mandate and partially because there continued to be insufficient data available upon which to base such decisions. However, four tasks for immediate action were recommended: 1) the establishment of a performance information monitoring system; 2) the broad dissemination of educational research: 3) a verification and cross-referencing of salaried personnel between MEBAM and the Ministry of Finance and Planning; and, 4) the continued application of the simulation model as a tool for policy analysis in other areas of education.

Because of the magnitude and duration of the Benin Sector Study, only a summary of the principal recommendations can be presented here. Although specific recommendations were made after the diagnostic phase for each sub-sector, it is the final recommendations that are of interest to us at this juncture. Some principal recommendations were, for example: 1) that primary education become a government priority; 2) that financial resources be transferred from higher education to primary education; 3) that secondary education be designed to reinforce
4) that enrolment to higher education be controlled; 5) that teacher training programmes be redefined; 6) that teachers' salaries be related to their professional competence; 7) that the availability of textbooks and learning materials be increased, fully utilised and maintained; 8) that instead of building more institutions unnecessarily, better equip the existing installations with textbooks and learning materials; 9) that female participation in education be dealt with in terms of socialisation in society; 10) that responsibility, decision-making authority and control be decentralised in order to empower staff at the school/institutional level to increase internal efficiency; and, finally, 11) that global reform is needed in central management of key functions, especially in developing capacity to monitor performance of the education system and progress in policy implementation.

5.4 SUMMARY

Identifying the policy analysis techniques used in each ESS is key to being able to locate the latter on the technocratic - participatory continuum. The various techniques, or concepts, were grouped under the same four headings as the presentation of findings above. The findings were summarised in Table 9 using the property, 'extent' of use, and the corresponding dimensional range: not used, minimally, partially and extensively. To facilitate the summary analysis, the order in which the ESS have been listed was modified. Specifically, the two World Bank ESS were placed before the two USAID South Africa assessments because they have more in common with the first three USAID studies. This shift enhances the overall pattern that emerges from the data and allows for a better summary of the four areas of focus.
First, the data collection techniques that the donor agencies used are quite similar, but what varies is the extent of use. Documentary (statistical) research was used extensively in all cases, while interviews with stakeholder groups and site visits to schools were only used to a minimal extent in the first five cases, but partially or extensively used in the USAID South Africa and UNESCO studies. An exception to this pattern is in the utilisation of local consultants to conduct primary research, which was either not used or only minimally used in four of five USAID studies, while partially used by the World Bank and extensively used in the UNESCO studies. It should be noted that only UNESCO used all four data collection techniques extensively in its studies, while the USAID South Africa Tertiary Sector Assessment used them to a somewhat lesser extent, but more consistently than in the other studies.

Second, the data analysis techniques that the donor agencies used are also quite similar, with less variation in the extent of use across the studies in our sample. The use of qualitative data was generally low across all of the studies. In contrast, with only two exceptions (USAID Namibia and Senegal), there was either partial or extensive use of quantitative measures, indicators and simulation modelling. Only the Namibia Sub-Sector Review departs from this general pattern by reversing the extent to which is used qualitative versus quantitative techniques and information.

Third, the use of public consultation techniques varied quite significantly depending on the donor agency. The pattern is obvious and somewhat predicable. The USAID and World Bank studies did not use three of the four public consultation techniques and only to a minimal extent any seminars and workshops. On the otherhand, the UNESCO studies made either partial or extensive use of the same techniques, while only in the Benin and Congo studies was extensive
use made of national consultations or conferences. It should be noted however that national consultations were held as part of the education reform process after the "diagnostic" studies had been completed.

The last focus for analysis is on the form and content of the policy recommendations generated by our sample of education sector studies. The USAID and World Bank studies listed numerous policy recommendations in a form that could be described as more prescriptive than optional. In fact, with only one minor exception, it is quite surprising to note that none of these studies presented any real policy options, in the manner that a policy-maker could choose between suggested alternatives. In contrast, the UNESCO studies elaborated different policy options based on "scenarios" that were generated from the research data. The extensive use of this technique is not surprising since these "diagnostic" reports were all eventually subject to public scrutiny and debate. The latter approach would be more consistent with our definitions of policy analysis (Downey 1988) and planning (Psacharopolous 1975) as discussed in the literature review where the choice between planning alternatives is left to the national government policy-makers. Equally surprising was the partial or extensive use of common analytic themes found in the content of policy recommendations, regardless of the sponsoring donor agency. Before attempting to interpret this pattern, as well as the others identified above, we should review some of the underlying assumptions built into our conceptual framework.

Based on a review of the literature, certain assumptions were made that underpin the structure of the original conceptual framework. Manpower planning and rate-of-return analysis were included in the framework as examples of technocratic policy analysis techniques. They
have since been removed because an insufficient number of instances were found of their use and replaced with similar but more current techniques, such as, quantitative measures (indicators) and simulation modelling. What all of these techniques have in common is that they are based on quantitative information presented in a mathematical or algorithmic formula. Several authors (Adams 1990, Samoff 1993) have associated the extensive use of quantitative methods and techniques with the technocratic approach, while others (Paulston 1990, King 1991a, North 1994) associate the use of public consultation techniques that enhance stakeholder involvement with the participatory approach. These assumptions can now be examined in light of the patterns that have emerged from the summary analysis.

When examining the correlation’s across the table we can easily identify those ESS that consistently used techniques associated with the participatory approach. The three UNESCO studies are unique in this respect, while the USAID South Africa Tertiary Sector Assessment went at least part way in using data collection techniques that involved a key stakeholder groups, including national consultants and local education experts. To the extent that the UNESCO studies used the full range of public consultation techniques, it can be concluded that only they took full advantage of the participatory approach. However, there is one common assumption often held with regard to the participatory approach that should be corrected.

That faulty assumption is that the participatory approach excludes the use of the quantitative policy analysis techniques associated with the technocratic approach. Our findings show that four policy analysis techniques were used either partially or extensively in all but two studies, i.e. documentary research (statistical), quantitative measures (indicators), simulation modelling and
common analytic themes. These particular techniques each play a unique role in the collection, analysis, and presentation of quantitative data. For example, primary school enrolment numbers, collected from MOE records, are compared with the relevant age group population figures to calculate a net primary school enrolment rate. This quantitative indicator could then be input into a simulation model, along with the population grow rate, to project the need for additional educational inputs, i.e. classrooms, teachers and instructional materials. Depending on the national government’s education objectives, different scenarios could then be developed around one or more of the common analytic themes, e.g. access, to assist policy-makers and stakeholders in choosing the most appropriate policy option. These quantitative policy analysis techniques should not be exclusively associated with the technocratic approach, since they were also used in conjunction with UNESCO’s public consultation techniques.

As mentioned above, there are a number of common analytic themes, e.g., access, cost-sharing, decentralisation, quality, internal and external efficiency, etc. that figure prominently in the policy recommendations of almost all of the ESS reports. The language of education policy analysis and the analytic themes used to organise the data do not appear to be dependent on the type of policy analysis technique, quantitative or qualitative, employed by the sponsoring donor agency. In his earlier research, Samoff had identified common analytic themes in education sector studies, but attributed this to “an orientation, and a process that is largely externally determined, in which African governments and educators are perhaps collaborators but more like junior partners” (UNESCO 1989, p. 7). If this is in fact the case, then a detailed analysis of the breadth and depth of indigenous participation should provide further insight into why these common analytic themes figure so prominently in ESS policy recommendations.
Table 9: Summary Analysis of Use of Policy Analysis Techniques

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor Agency ESS Country</th>
<th>Data Collection Techniques</th>
<th>Data Analysis Techniques</th>
<th>Public Consultation Techniques</th>
<th>Policy Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Document (statistical) Research</td>
<td>Interviews with stakeholder groups</td>
<td>Site Visits to Schools</td>
<td>Primary Research by Local Consultants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID Senegal</td>
<td>Extensively</td>
<td>Minimally</td>
<td>Minimally Not Used</td>
<td>Minimally Partially Not Used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID Ethiopia</td>
<td>Extensively</td>
<td>Minimally</td>
<td>Minimally Not Used</td>
<td>Minimally Partially Partially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID Namibia</td>
<td>Extensively</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Minimally Not Used</td>
<td>Partially Minimally Not Used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB Kenya</td>
<td>Extensively</td>
<td>Minimally</td>
<td>Minimally Partially</td>
<td>Minimally Extensively Partially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Extensively</td>
<td>Minimally</td>
<td>Minimally Partially</td>
<td>Minimally Extensively Extensively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID SA-Primary</td>
<td>Extensively</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Minimally Partially</td>
<td>Partially Extensively Partially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID SA-Tertiary</td>
<td>Extensively</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Partially Partially</td>
<td>Partially Extensively Partially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Extensively</td>
<td>Extensively</td>
<td>Extensively Extensively</td>
<td>Partially Extensively Extensively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO Congo</td>
<td>Extensively</td>
<td>Extensively</td>
<td>Extensively Extensively</td>
<td>Partially Extensively Extensively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO Benin</td>
<td>Extensively</td>
<td>Extensively</td>
<td>Extensively Extensively</td>
<td>Partially Extensively Extensively</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.0 BREADTH AND DEPTH OF INDIGENOUS PARTICIPATION

This is the last chapter which presents the findings of this policy study as they relate to research question #1. Again, the Analytic Framework (Table 3) was used as a data collection and analysis tool, however, two categories, i.e., breadth of indigenous participation and depth of indigenous participation were combined in this chapter. During the course of data analysis it quickly became evident that treating these two constructs in isolation of each other was meaningless. To discuss who participated had to be accompanied by asking at what level was the participation. Consequently, since these two constructs and associated concepts were examined together, it was thought that the summary analysis would be best be presented on a case-by-case basis. Although somewhat of a departure from the previous two chapters, it was felt that the importance of these constructs and their inter-relatedness warranted a format which would best facilitate the reader’s understanding of the case.

6.1 USAID

6.1.1 Senegal Sector Assessment

This ESS was conducted in four weeks by two USAID staff and two US consultants, between August and September 1990, in accordance with the TOR prepared by the USAID/Senegal Mission and approved by USAID/Washington. The study team conducted extensive documentary research and interviews with: Bank staff from the Population & Human Resources Division, Africa Region (2); USAID/ Washington staff from the Africa Division (9);
USAID/Senegal staff (15); as well as donor agency and diplomatic staff (9), before their departure and upon arrival in Senegal.

In contrast, the team's collaboration with the Senegalese was minimal. They had no government co-ordination group, nor any government counterparts to work with. Some interviews were conducted with representatives from the Ministry of Education (6), Ministry of Finance and other government department staff (6), but "(t)hey were clear that the team had very little trust in the Government of Senegal and its ability to undertake an educational reform" (USAID Respondent #1). Although this respondent did not think that donors should turn their backs on a government, it was felt that the Senegalese government was not ready to change and the additional effort of their involvement was therefore unwarranted. Consequently, there was no active participation by the national government in any aspect of the study.

The study team did undertake two (2) days of site visits, and conducted interviews with the personnel of conventional schools, NGOs (6) and private education (3) providers. Again, the extent to which civil groups, NGOs, teacher unions, teachers, parents or students were consulted, even as passive subjects in the data collection process, was virtually non-existent.

Since there was no government counterpart group, the study team was fully responsible for collecting, analysing and reporting on their findings. They apparently worked day and night for two weeks constantly talking to people in interviews, and writing the report at night while they were in the field. The study report was finalised and submitted to the Director, USAID/Senegal Mission without any official presentation to, review or revision by the Ministry of Education.
Reflecting upon this process, one respondent remarked that "(C)learly the down-side was that we didn't get into a dialogue with the government" (USAID Respondent #1).

These findings are summarised in Table 10 where the breadth and depth of participation are cross-referenced using the dimensional range: none, passive, consultative, active.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Senegal Sector Assessment</th>
<th>Breadth of Indigenous Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Depth of Indigenous Participation</strong></td>
<td>Nat'l Gov'n't Officials e.g. politicians, policy-makers, staff, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research design and planning</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data collection and analysis</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentation of findings</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion of recommendations</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection of policy options</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The frequent use of ‘None’ indicates that there was no breadth of indigenous participation in all but one aspect of the study. ‘Passive’ indicates here that information was gathered from some civil groups and other stakeholders. In conclusion, it is safe to say, that there was neither any significant breadth nor depth of indigenous participation in the conduct of this study, typical of the technocratic approach.

6.1.2 Ethiopia Sector Review

This ESS was conducted in two parts of two weeks each by two USAID staff and two US consultants, between September 1992 and April 1993, in accordance with the TOR prepared by the USAID/Ethiopia Mission and approved by USAID/Washington. Ministry of Education officials, including the Minister and Vice Minister, expressed their interest in working with
USAID and were generous in their willingness to share documents with the study team. The initial scope of work made provisions for the involvement of a Government of Ethiopia (GOE) counterpart team to do the sector assessment. This proposal was not accepted, apparently, because of time limitations. "The Agency wanted something to make a relatively immediate decision about programming resources versus doing a participatory involved process of getting all the stakeholders together" (USAID Respondent #2). Since there was no participation of the GOE in the research design, planning, nor any aspect of the study implementation, it was not surprising that there was no evidence of shared responsibility for the findings.

After the study team had finished collecting the "hard data", the other general "impressionistic" information was collected through interviews. Twenty-three (23) MOE officials in total were interviewed, including: the Minister of Education, Vice Minister of Education, thirteen (13) Department Heads, five (5) Directors and Managers, as well as three (3) Senior Consultants and Advisors. The breadth of the consultation process was extended, somewhat, when the team split into two groups to conduct a week of school site visits, with one group travelling to the Oromo and Amhara regions to the north of Addis Ababa, and the other travelling to the south and west of the Southern People's and Oromo regions. Additional interviews were conducted with GOE officials at regional and sub-regional levels, including teachers at the primary, junior secondary and teacher training schools. It was noted that they were all universally open and frank in their discussions with the study team. Despite this foray into the regions, the highest concentration of indigenous participation was with senior government
officials and policy makers, who were themselves treated as passive participants in the study process.

All of the collected data were analysed on site in Ethiopia by the study team, but the initial findings were not discussed with the Ethiopian MOE officials. The draft policy recommendations were, apparently, discussed during one formal session with MOE Policy and Planning Department representatives who, according to one respondent, had an indirect but not direct influence on the selection of policy options. The final report was submitted to the USAID Mission/Ethiopia which used it to pursue their policy dialogue with the GOE. In conclusion, the breadth and depth of indigenous participation in any aspect of this study was, admittedly, minimal as attested to by this respondent. "I think that it was a very poor example of getting local involvement in a sector assessment" (USAID Respondent #2). Although the study did identify some of the policy issues that needed to be addressed by USAID when supporting basic education in Ethiopia, it barely scratched the surface in terms of plausible solutions. "No way did the study examine decentralisation in sufficient depth to make a valid recommendation" (USAID Respondent #2).

These findings are summarised in Table 11 where the breadth and depth of participation are cross-referenced using the dimensional range: none, passive, consultative, active.
Table 11: Ethiopia Sector Review - Summary Analysis of Indigenous Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethiopia Sector Review</th>
<th>Breadth of Indigenous Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Depth of Indigenous Participation</td>
<td>Nat'l Gov'n't Officials e.g.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>politicians, policymakers, staff,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research design and planning</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data collection and analysis</td>
<td>Passive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentation of findings</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion of recommendations</td>
<td>Consultative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection of policy options</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The frequent use of ‘None’ indicates that there was no breadth of indigenous participation in all but two aspects of the study. ‘Passive’ indicates here that information was gathered from all stakeholder groups, while only national government officials were consulted on the policy recommendations. In conclusion, it is safe to say, that there was neither any significant breadth nor depth of indigenous participation in the conduct of this study, typical of the technocratic approach.

6.1.3 Namibia Sub-Sector Review

This ESS was conducted in 18 days between November and December 1990, in accordance with the TOR prepared by the USAID/Namibia Mission and approved by USAID/Washington. A study team of three senior USAID staff and three prominent US consultants had been granted access to the highest levels of government and conducted extensive documentary research and interviews. Fifty-nine Ministry of Education (MOE) officials were interviewed, including the Minister, the Deputy Minister, the Permanent Secretary, the Deputy Permanent Secretary, Special Advisors (2), Under Secretaries (3), Directors (3), departmental staff (7), institutional staff (7), regional staff (31) and National Planning Commission members (2). In addition,
international donor agency (18), NGO (19) and USAID (4) personnel were also contacted. This
government study team did engage in this consultation process independently of the
Government without the benefits of a Namibian reference group or counterpart team to assist
them. It was noted that one MOE official was assigned to the team to co-ordinate the team's
schedule. It was noted in the report that this individual was particularly helpful in the
organisation of a two day "field trip" to the northern regions of Namibia where an undisclosed
number of interviews were conducted with regional staff, teachers and students.

Briefing statements were prepared for the official presentation of the draft report to the
Minister of Education and the U.S. Ambassador. Ministry of Education personnel were given the
opportunity to review the draft, but only "to identify any errors of fact, possible
misunderstandings or misinterpretations, and areas of disagreement" (USAID 1992). It is
probably safe to assume that the policy issues presented in the draft report may very well have
been the subject of discussion between the USAID Mission Director and the Minister of
Education when the document was finalised, although there is no direct reference to this effect.
The USAID Mission Director and the Minister of Education finalised the document in Namibia.
Reflecting upon this process, one respondent remarked that, "I was comfortable with the
recommendations. We allowed for adjustment by the Government of Namibia to the
recommendations with a second list of recommendations, 'wiggle room' for different policy
alternatives" (USAID Respondent #3).

These findings are summarised in Table 12 where the breadth and depth of participation are
cross-referenced using the dimensional range: none, passive, consultative, active.
Table 12: Namibia Sub-Sector Review - Summary Analysis of Indigenous Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Namibia Sub-Sector Review</th>
<th>Breadth of Indigenous Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Depth of Indigenous Participation</td>
<td>Nat'l Gov'n't Officials e.g. politicians, policy-makers, staff, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research design and planning</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data collection and analysis</td>
<td>Passive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentation of findings</td>
<td>Passive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion of recommendations</td>
<td>Consultative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection of policy options</td>
<td>Consultative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Government officials, civil groups and other stakeholders participated in the data collection process, but did so only in a very passive manner and in limited numbers. Given the brief duration of the site visits, the breadth of participation remained highly concentrated among senior government officials and policy makers, who were consulted on the proposed policy recommendations and did appear to influence the selection of some policy options. In conclusion, the study exhibits of the characteristics of a technocratic approach with an appropriate measure of national government consultation to give the final policy recommendations some legitimacy.

6.1.4 South Africa Primary Sector Assessment

This ESS was conducted in 7 weeks by 6 US consultants and 1 South African consultant between October and November 1991, in accordance with the TOR prepared by the USAID/South Africa Mission and approved by USAID/Washington. Due to U.S. laws prohibiting contact with the apartheid government, no USAID staff were involved and the study team members had only limited contact with officials of the South African Government. Under these circumstances, it was not possible to establish a government counterpart team with which
to work. However a reference group, composed of people from the ANC, key South African advisors and education experts, was established by the USAID Mission from the beginning and were consulted in the design and planning of the study.

A designated local Resident Advisor with considerable experience administering and studying South African primary education was also engaged to provide documentary research support to the study team. This advisor not only provided the team with statistical data and historical context for the development of education in South Africa, but also ensured that the factual data were reported consistently and as accurately as possible. To this extent there was some very limited consultation with one local expert in data collection and analysis. Nevertheless, neither government officials, civil groups, or other stakeholders participated in the data collection and analysis process other than in a passive manner.

The study team conducted a total of ninety-two (92) personal and telephone interviews with a broad range of stakeholder groups: government representatives (12), University Education Department faculty (25), College School of Education faculty (18), secondary school teachers (5), primary school teachers (13), university or college students (4), NGOs (13), development banks (7), teacher unions and associations (4) and a journalist (1). The horizontal coverage of these stakeholder groups was limited as reflected in the number of interviews sorted by major city: Johannesburg (39), Cape Town (32) and Durban and other areas (31). Some other stakeholders, i.e. parents and students, were interviewed as well, but the more in-depth kinds of focus group consultations were to follow in a subsequent study.
As previously mentioned, the study team members were each fully responsible for the analysis of all data pertaining to their chapter of the final report. Because of the time constraints, it was not feasible to involve the South African reference group in this stage of the study process. "That was not part of the design. I think that that was a flaw in the design, but that's not for me to say. The South Africa situation, political, etc., dictated the timeframe and I fully appreciated that" (USAID Respondent #4). However, the first working draft of the report was distributed to a variety of people, e.g. South African policy makers, ANC and NGO representatives, reporters on the education scene, influential education experts, ex-government officials and other individuals connected with education in South Africa who were invited to make comments and suggestions on the findings. There was also one closing seminar where the findings were presented orally and these same people were asked to comment on the various policy recommendations. Their responses, observations and recommendations were incorporated into the report "to the extent that they were relevant to the scope of the assessment" (USAID 1992). The study report was finalised and submitted by the study team leader to the DMC USAID Mission/SA.

Further public consultations on the policy recommendations had been planned as a way of facilitating discussion and dialogue between government and civil society groups, however this did not take place during the study. The reason for this, according to one respondent, lies in the purpose of the study described as follows.

It was not to design specific programs and policies. That is the second level of effort which includes holding focus groups, meeting with community groups, parents, stakeholders, etc. which is an integral part of that second stage activity. Our task was just to try to gather the information and identify the key issues that
the ANC was going to face when they engaged in a dialogue with the government. (USAID Respondent #4)

Keeping in mind that the purpose of the study was to identify public problems in education, and not propose policy solutions, the lack of stakeholder participation in the study implementation process was not deemed to be a weakness. However, in the final report, the policy recommendations were nevertheless comprehensive and seemingly prescriptive, although they were not meant to be (USAID Respondent #4).

These findings are summarised in Table 13 where the breadth and depth of participation are cross-referenced using the dimensional range: none, passive, consultative, active.

Table 13: SA Primary Sector Assessment- Summary Analysis of Indigenous Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>South Africa Primary Sector Assessment</th>
<th>Breadth of Indigenous Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Depth of Indigenous Participation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research design and planning</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data collection and analysis</td>
<td>Passive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentation of findings</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion of recommendations</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection of policy options</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil Groups e.g. NGOs, teacher unions, education institutions/experts etc.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultative</td>
<td>Consultative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passive</td>
<td>Passive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultative</td>
<td>Consultative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Stakeholders e.g. teachers, parents and students.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite the breadth of the consultation process in terms of its vertical and horizontal coverage of the major stakeholder groups, it remains nonetheless obvious that the depth of their participation was limited to a relatively passive role as interview subjects. In the absence of a legitimate national government, the study reference group, composed of civil society stakeholders, provided guidance and advice through a relatively limited consultation process. This remains the only noteworthy level of indigenous participation in the study, nonetheless, the overall approach remains technocratic.
6.1.5 South Africa Tertiary Sector Assessment

This ESS was conducted in 8 weeks by 4 US consultants, 4 South African educators and one Zimbabwean consultant between October and December 1991, in accordance with the TOR prepared by the USAID/South Africa Mission and approved by USAID/Washington. Due to U.S. laws prohibiting contact with the apartheid government, no USAID staff were involved and the study team members had only limited contact with officials of the South African Government. Under these circumstances, it was not possible to establish a government counterpart team with which to work.

The study team gathered information and viewpoints from a broad cross-section of stakeholders, inquiring into education problems and issues outlined in advance and articulated in the scope of work. Interviews were conducted with professional educators from chancellors, vice-chancellors and rectors to junior lecturers and school teachers. This included university personnel (128), college of education personnel (5), technikon personnel, and technical college personnel (2). As a continuation of the vertical coverage of formal education sector stakeholders, the consultation process was extended to also include a small number of ANC staff (7), South Africa Department of Education staff (3), representatives of South African banks (5), and representatives from a variety of other education related organisations (8), as well as a handful of parents, students, and a sampling of the public. Horizontal coverage of these stakeholder groups was country-wide encompassing the major cities of Pretoria, Johannesburg, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, Durban, as well as institutions in the Orange Free, Transkei, Transvaal, Bophuthatswana, Natal and Western Cape States. A balanced cross-section of traditional White,
Coloured and Black institutions were visited to ensure sample representivity. One or more members of the study team visited 39 institutions in all: 10 universities, 9 colleges of education, 15 technikons, and 5 technical colleges. Several of the larger institutions like the University of Witwatersrand, University of Cape Town and the University of Western Cape were visited more than once. Except for a few encounters with a handful of public officials, the study team worked independently of the South African government.

Although there is no evidence of indigenous participation in any aspect of the study design and planning, it is important to note that the scope of work specified the participation of South African educators on the study team. A South African resident advisor was engaged for documentary research and statistical data collection and analysis. All study team members, including the four (4) South African educators, were responsible for data collection, analysis and preparation of specific chapters of the report. The first working draft of the study was presented collectively by the team members: 1) at a special meeting with a small group of ANC representatives, and 2) at a separate meeting to the Deputy Chief of Mission and several USAID staff members at the U.S. Embassy in Pretoria. Following these meetings, a series of policy recommendations were shaped and developed by the study team as a whole. To the extent that the ANC attended the initial presentation of the first working draft report, and presumably contributed to the formulation of policy recommendations, we can conclude that there was active indigenous participation in the discussion of policy recommendations contained therein. However, further consultations on subsequent drafts and the final report were limited to USAID and Embassy staff. No mention was made in the documentation, nor by the respondents, of any
further seminars or workshops organised on a broader basis to discuss the identified education
problems and finalise the policy recommendations.

These findings are summarised in Table 14 where the breadth and depth of participation are
cross-referenced using the dimensional range: none, passive, consultative, active.

Table 14: SA Tertiary Sector Assessment - Summary Analysis of Indigenous Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>South Africa Tertiary Sector Assessment</th>
<th>Breadth of Indigenous Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Depth of Indigenous Participation</td>
<td>Nat'l Gov't Officials e.g. politicians, policymakers, staff, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research design and planning</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data collection and analysis</td>
<td>Passive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentation of findings</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion of recommendations</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection of policy options</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The breadth of horizontal and vertical coverage of the stakeholder groups in tertiary education
was exceptional among the USAID ESS in our sample in terms of its vertical and horizontal
coverage of the major stakeholder groups. It remains nonetheless obvious that the depth of their
participation was limited to a relatively passive role as interview subjects. The study team
composition is indicative of active indigenous participation in the data collection and analysis
phases of the study, as well as in the presentation of findings, discussion and formulation of
policy recommendations. Active South African participation was further enhanced because of the
presence of the ANC in the discussion of the preliminary findings and formulation of policy
recommendations. Based on this summary analysis, this study falls somewhere in the middle of
our technocratic - participatory continuum. Its breadth was inclusive of civil society, but not
sufficiently consultative to achieve the requisite level of depth to be considered participatory.
6.2 World Bank

6.2.1 Kenya Human Resources Study

This ESS was conducted in four weeks by four (4) Bank staff between June and July 1990. Prior to the arrival of the study mission, some primary field research studies had been conducted by local education consultants and other statistical data collected by the World Bank Nairobi Office. Although, national government officials were contacted during the course of the study mission, the absence of a list of individuals interviewed and of any description of the research methodology used to conduct the study mission itself, makes it difficult to provide a complete assessment of the breadth of indigenous participation. Based on interview comments (WB Respondent #4), it appears that national government officials, civil society groups, teachers and parents were interviewed in the primary field research and during the study mission, but there was in fact no evidence to suggest that they participated in any other aspect of the study.

The draft report was discussed with the Government of Kenya in October 1-9, and subsequently submitted as a background document for the Kenya Consultative Group Meeting held in Paris in November 1990. Again, based on interview comments, it appears that the policy issues presented in the draft report were the subject of discussion between the Bank representatives and the Government of Kenya during these consultations. Beyond this, there is insufficient information upon which to draw in order to assess the level of government participation in the selection of final policy recommendations.
This situation is somewhat typical of these types of Bank reports which provide little if any information to assist the reader to understand and appreciate the research methods, techniques and practices that the Bank employs when conducting sector analysis. One begins to wonder whether the cloak of secrecy with which these documents are wrapped is for the protection of the borrower country or the World Bank itself.

These findings are summarised in Table 15 where the breadth and depth of participation are cross-referenced using the dimensional range: none, passive, consultative, active. ‘No information’ was used to indicate that insufficient information was gathered upon which to base an assessment.

Table 15: Kenya Human Resources Study - Summary Analysis of Indigenous Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kenya Human Resources Study</th>
<th>Breadth of Indigenous Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Depth of Indigenous Participation</td>
<td>Nat'l Gov't Officials, e.g. politicians, policy-makers, staff, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research design and planning</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data collection and analysis</td>
<td>Passive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentation of findings</td>
<td>Consultative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion of recommendations</td>
<td>Consultative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection of policy options</td>
<td>No Information</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Government officials, civil groups and other stakeholders may have participated in the data collection process, but only in passive role as interview subjects. Given the brief duration of the study mission, the breadth of participation probably remained highly concentrated among the tight nexus of senior government officials and policy-makers, who were consulted on the proposed policy recommendations. Without any apparent breadth nor depth of indigenous
participation, and only a limited level of national government consultation, this study exhibits the typical characteristics of the technocratic approach.

6.2.2 Zimbabwe Sub-Sector Review

The Zimbabwe Sub-Sector Review took place in two parts, the first being a planning and design mission, while the second was the study mission itself. In January 1990 a preliminary World Bank mission visited Zimbabwe to collect information, review an initiating paper written by the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC) and begin discussions concerning the study research design and planning. These discussions culminated in the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the World Bank and the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) detailing the Scope of Work. Some time later, the study mission itself was conducted by five Bank staff and one U.S. consultant during nineteen (19) days in-country between May and June 1990.

The Ministry of Education and Culture (in particular the Minister) had made a commitment to collaborate with the Bank and appointed a counterpart team of five MEC and university staff to work on the ESS. Interviews were conducted by the Bank study team in order to get maximum vertical coverage of the MEC, e.g. central planning and policy analysis staff, distance education staff, regional supervisors, inspectors and teachers. Additional interviews were held with some university faculty and other donor agency personnel. However NGOs, teacher unions, parents and students were not interviewed. As usual, little information was found in the ESS documentation regarding the horizontal coverage of the consultation process, although this comparative observation by one respondent was indicative of the concentrated breadth of
indigenous participation. "Teacher unions, NGOs, students were not consulted. The level of stakeholder participation was low compared to the recent ESS conducted in India" (WB Respondent #1).

Active indigenous participation in data collection and analysis was, however, apparent in a number of ways. During the initial mission, the Bank study team commissioned background research on three topics: a study of the factors affecting learning achievements in secondary schools; an analysis of the costs of secondary schools; and a review of the prospects for employment, skills development and supply in Zimbabwe. Most of these background studies were contracted to university staff and national consultants, as well as an American graduate student living in Zimbabwe. MEC staff also wrote review papers on a variety of policy issues. Presentations by MEC staff of the findings of these research and policy papers were made to the Bank study team upon arrival during the second part of the study.

There was daily consultation between the Bank and GOZ counterpart team members beginning halfway through the first mission and during the second mission. Bank and GOZ team members went out in pairs to do school site visits. Headmasters and teachers were interviewed using standard interview questionnaires, and standard forms were used to get school cost information. Bank team members organised this systematic data collection process while GOZ team members completed the interviews and questionnaires. This respondent describes the sharing of roles and responsibilities: "The GOZ counterpart team was involved in the research and design, and data collection, while the analysis was completed by the Bank team" (WB
Respondent #2). Nevertheless, according to the same respondent, the meetings of the two teams to discuss the findings were "lively and issues were hotly debated."

Data analysis was the purview of the Bank team, most of it taking place during the mission and previously described elsewhere in this document. It is probably safe to assume that discussions between the GOZ counterpart team and the Bank study team ensued in the same manner on the discussion of policy recommendations. A formal presentation of the draft report was made to the Minister accompanied by fifty (50) MEC staff at the end of the study mission. As one respondent describes the atmosphere, "(T)his was a formal stylised meeting thick with protocol. Discussions of policy options were noncommittal" (WB Respondent #3). Another respondent summarises the sharing of decision-making and responsibilities at this stage of the study implementation as follows. "The GOZ participated in the design, data collection (field trips), and in the preparation of the final report by critiquing the iterative drafts. Responsibility for the final recommendations stayed with the Bank team" (WB Respondent #1).

In the end, as this respondent describes it, the GOZ had other considerations in choosing a policy option for educational reform rather than the rigorous research method and technical quality of the information. "There was stiff resistance to the findings because of the political implications of resource reallocations from elite white schools to elite black schools. The Ministry of Finance showed little interest in the findings and didn't want a project loan" (WB Respondent #3).

These findings are summarised in Table 16 where the breadth and depth of participation are cross-referenced using the dimensional range: none, passive, consultative, active.
Table 16: Zimbabwe Sub-Sector Review - Summary Analysis of Indigenous Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zimbabwe Sub-Sector Review</th>
<th>Breadth of Indigenous Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Depth of Indigenous Participation</strong></td>
<td>Nat'l Gov't Officials e.g. politicians, policymakers, MOE staff, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research design and planning</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data collection and analysis</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentation of findings</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion of recommendations</td>
<td>Consultative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection of policy options</td>
<td>Consultative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Breadth of participation was not a strong feature of this study, since only a few university staff were active participants on the counterpart study team, only a few national consultants were engaged in primary research, and a handful of headmasters and teachers were interviewed. What this summary analysis does highlight is the significant depth of national government participation in the early implementation stages of the study. However, the MEC was clearly relegated to a consultative role when it came time to discuss and select the optimum policy recommendations. Based on this summary analysis, this study falls somewhere in the middle of our technocratic - participatory continuum. Its breadth was not sufficiently inclusive of civil society and other stakeholders, and did not achieve the requisite level of active participation by the national government in the final stages of the study to be considered participatory.

6.3 UNESCO

6.3.1 Burkina Faso Sub-Sector Study

The diagnostic phase of this ESS was undertaken over a period of six (6) months from February to July 1993 by a team of five (5) international (UNESCO) consultants and nineteen
(19) national experts. A tripartite agreement was signed, as is the standard practice, by the Government of Burkina Faso, UNESCO and UNDP which contained the agreed upon scope of work for the study. This signifies that the Government was actively involved in the research design and planning phase of the study. The Government's commitment to the study was clearly demonstrated by the "Ministère de l'Enseignement de base et l'Alphabetisation de masse" (MEBAM), which appointed a national Steering Committee with a National Co-ordinator for the study and mobilised a large number of education experts from the various levels, units and educational institutions within the Ministry to participate in the research.

The two major government stakeholders in the study were identified by an interview respondent as MEBAM and the Ministère des Enseignements secondaires et supérieurs et de la Recherche scientifique (MESSRS). Extensive interviews were conducted by the UNESCO study team in order to ensure maximum vertical coverage of these stakeholders. Consequently, thirty-two (32) MEBAM representatives were interviewed including the Minister, the secretary general, directors, department heads, technical advisors, as well as representatives from the MESSRS (3), Ministere des Finances et du plan (2) and other government ministry representatives (2). In addition, representatives of international donor organisations (9) and bilateral agency representatives or diplomatic personnel (11) were also interviewed by the UNESCO team during the course of the study. Although the concentration of the vertical coverage was with the government instances, some teachers were also interviewed in the context of the human resources management component of the study. "On a passé en entrevues quelques enseignants,
mais pas les parents. Il n'y avait pas d'interférence dans l'étude. Les enseignants oui, vis-à-vis la gestion de leurs carrières par le ministère" (UNESCO Respondent #1).

One outstanding feature of this ESS was the apparent close collaboration between international and national education "expert". Nineteen (19) national experts from the various MEBAM departments, educational institutions and special units were commissioned to undertake a series of twenty-one (21) background studies grouped under the following topic areas: policy, planning and finance; management and administration; pedagogy; and nonformal education and literacy. The TOR for these background papers were established by special sub-groups of the National Steering Committee and organised by the National Co-ordinator. Each of the national consultants was responsible for the collection and analysis of data, as well as the presentation of findings. The policy options presented in the sub-sector reports were discussed on a number of occasions between the international study team and the working groups.

C'est leurs moment de s'exprimer s'il y a quelque chose, parce que c'est à partir de cette espèce de consensus que le rapport sera écrit. S'il y a un malentendu, il faudrait pas dire que c'est notre faute. C'est une manière très importante à mon avis de faire participer les gens. (UNESCO Respondent #1)

This process apparently contributed to the strengthening of national competencies in education sector analysis, as well as having contributed to certain program implementation changes during the course of the study. Active indigenous participation by the government was evident in all phases of this study from design and planning, to data collection and analysis, to the presentation of findings and discussion of policy recommendations. However, the partnership between UNESCO and the GBF did have some clearly defined limitations when it came to the selection of policy options, as described in some detail in this passage from an interview respondent.
Dans le cas d'une étude diagnostique, ils n'ont pas le droit de l'approbation du rapport final. Ils peuvent commenter, dire que la perception n'a pas été bonne. L'opinion de l'externe est importante pour une diagnostique. Lorsqu'on fait une étude en vue d'un programme/projet par l'IBAD ou la BM, ce sont des prêts donc c'est de l'argent du gouvernement. En principe, on s'arrange pour que les recommandations formulées soient entérinées par les autorités décisionnelles du pays. Le dialogue avec les autorités nationales est beaucoup plus étroit. Dans tous les cas comme ceux ou ils vont signer les documents finals de prêt, il est sure qu'il faut leurs soutient pour l'entériner. Mais il faut dire, pour être tout à fait honnête, que parfois les pressions politiques sont tellement fortes qu'on est obligé pour des raisons variées, entraîner les choses qui nous plaisent qu'à moitié. Si on ne le fait pas, tout est à rejeter. (UNESCO Respondent #1)

The study report was viewed as a work in progress with some proposed policy options that were sufficiently researched and had sufficient support in order to proceed to action, while others required additional research and discussion. It was recommended that the study report be the subject of a national consultation, but this could not be confirmed.

These findings are summarised in Table 17 where the breadth and depth of participation are cross-referenced using the dimensional range: none, passive, consultative, active.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Burkina Faso Sub-Sector Study</th>
<th>Breadth of Indigenous Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Depth of Indigenous Participation</strong></td>
<td>Nat'l Govn't Officials e.g. politicians, policymakers, staff, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research design and planning</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data collection and analysis</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentation of findings</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion of recommendations</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection of policy options</td>
<td>Consultative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although, the breadth of the consultation process remained relatively concentrated within the nexus of government policy makers, decision-makers, line staff and education experts, the
outstanding feature of this study is the depth of participation. This ESS initiated an educational reform process that was viewed from the beginning as a national enterprise, in which the national government stakeholders identified their goals and set out to achieve some measure of consensus by actively participating in almost all stages of the study. Based on this summary analysis, this study falls slightly on the participatory side of our continuum. It cannot be considered fully participatory since the breadth was not sufficiently inclusive of civil society and other stakeholders, nor did it achieve active participation by the national government in the final selection of recommended policy options.

6.3.2 Congo Sub-Sector Study

The Congo Sub-Sector Study was undertaken over a period of nine (9) months from February to October 1993 by a team of four (4) international (UNESCO) consultants and twenty-one (21) national consultants. A tripartite agreement was signed by the Government of the Republic of Congo (GRC), UNESCO and UNDP which contained the agreed upon scope of work for the study and attests to active indigenous involvement in the research design and planning phase of the study. The Government’s commitment to the study was demonstrated by the "Ministere de l'Education Nationale" (MEN) which mobilised six (6) national teams of consultants from the various levels and units within the Ministry to participate in the research.

The MEN was identified as the major government stakeholder in the study and a significant number of interviews were conducted by the UNESCO study team in order to get some vertical coverage. Consequently, fourteen (14) MEN representatives were interviewed or consulted,
including the minister, the cabinet director, the secretary general, the ministerial advisor on educational reform, three (3) director generals, six (6) departmental directors, and the departmental head for school construction. In addition, representatives from the Université Marien Ngouabi (4), Ministère du plan (3), Ministère des finances (1), Ministère du développement scientifique et technologique (3), international organisations (6), and the Coopération française (4) were also either interviewed or consulted by the UNESCO team during the course of the study. Again, the concentration of the vertical coverage was with the government instances. Civil society groups, e.g. NGOs, teacher's unions, teachers, parents, students were not interviewed, presumably because their opinions were represented by the national consultants.

Les groupes concernés n'ont pas été consulté au moment de la réalisation de l'étude parce que leurs positions étaient très bien connues par les spécialistes nationaux. En revanche, ils ont tous été invité à participer et a s'exprimer au cours d'une conférence nationale chargée d'évaluer les analyses et les propositions de l'ESS. (UNESCO Respondent #2).

The UNDP-UNESCO approach to education sector analysis is somewhat standardised, so one diagnostic study begins to resemble the other. The outstanding feature of this ESS, again, is the apparent close collaboration between international and national consultants. Twenty-one (21) national consultants forming six working groups each responsible for a sub-sector study were employed during the timeframe of the study. Each national team of consultants was responsible for the collection and analysis of data, as well as the presentation of findings on the following topics: pre-school, primary and secondary school, adult education and literacy; higher education; technical and professional education; educational planning and management; population and
employment; and, economic and financial projections. The policy options presented in the sub-sector reports were discussed on a number of occasions between the international study team and the working groups. This process apparently contributed to the strengthening of national competencies in education sector analysis, as well as having contributed to certain program implementation changes during the course of the study.

Considered as a work in progress, the study generated some proposed policy options that required additional research and public discussion. The final report became the subject of a national conference in November 1994 during which a more profound discussion of the policy options occurred. This national conference was eventually attended by a broad spectrum of the country's civil society and other stakeholders, in addition to the MEN personnel, who had debated the policy options presented in the study report.

Il s'agissait: du personnel de l'administration centrale et regionale; des associations d'enseignants; des associations de parents d'élèves; des représentants du parlement; des agences de financement exteme (une conférence specifique suivant la consultation nationale a été organisé à leur intention). Des désaccords ont été exprimé sur certaines analyses et propositions, mais dans l'ensemble, l'étude a été assez largement validé. (UNESCO Respondent #2)

Reflecting on the pertinence of national consultations, one respondent (UNESCO Respondent #2) suggested that the optimum policy recommendations are not often determined by the policy analysis techniques used, but rather by other political, economic and financial considerations valued by the stakeholders.

These findings are summarised in Table 18 where the breadth and depth of participation are cross-referenced using the dimensional range: none, passive, consultative, active.
Table 18: Congo Sub-Sector Study - Summary Analysis of Indigenous Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congo Sub-Sector Study</th>
<th>Breadth of Indigenous Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Depth of Indigenous Participation</td>
<td>Nat'l Gov'n't Officials e.g. politicians, policy-makers, staff, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research design and planning</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data collection and analysis</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentation of findings</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion of recommendations</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection of policy options</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The breadth of the consultation process during the diagnostic phase remained relatively concentrated within the nexus of government policy makers, decision-makers and education experts. Had it not been for the national conference that followed, civil society groups, teachers and other stakeholders would not have participated at all. But this ESS, in its diagnostic phase, nevertheless initiated an educational reform process that was managed as a national enterprise, in which the national government stakeholders identified their goals and eventually achieved some measure of broader social consensus on an optimum set of education policy reforms. Based on this summary analysis, this study exhibited the characteristics of the participatory approach.

6.3.3 Benin Sector Study

This ESS supported a process of educational reform in Benin over a period of approximately four (4) years, from May 1989 to April 1993, with the assistance of a full-time team of two (2) international (UNESCO) consultants and two (2) Government of Benin staff. The Ministere d'education nationale (MEN) also seconded twenty-six (26) of its staff to the project as national "consultants". The existence of a tripartite Agreement, inclusive of the scope of work, indicates
that some level of discussion, consultation and/or negotiation occurred between the Government of Benin (GOB), UNESCO and the UNDP at the research design and planning stage of the study. This is likely to have been the case, since the scope of work was precise in outlining the roles and responsibilities of the three parties, and the job descriptions of the full-time personnel, and in identifying the topics for the various policy analysis studies to be undertaken. Several references are also made with regard to the iterative management approach to be used in the implementation of the study which implies active indigenous participation in the ongoing planning process.

The breadth of indigenous participation which characterises this study was virtually inclusive of all the country's possible stakeholders in education. There was ministerial representation from across the government on the Co-ordination Committee, the employment of nationals in full-time co-ordination positions, the contracting of national expert/consultants, and extensive research, consultations and discussions with stakeholder groups. The vertical and horizontal coverage of the consultation process was inclusive of almost all stakeholder groups, as described here. "For each part of the overall project -- it was composed of a large number of individual studies -- there was an activity that aimed at explanation, feedback, appropriation and critical validation by communities of parents and teachers" (UNESCO Respondent #3). Over thirty seminars, workshops and meetings were organised in Cotonou and the provinces, bringing together several hundreds of people including MEN staff, educational administrators and other education professionals, teachers and their unions, parents and their associations, students, employers from various sectors of the national and local economy, as well as donor agency
representatives. This breadth of participation resulted in a general consensus without which the education sector reforms presented to Council of Ministers would not have been adopted.

In terms of the depth of participation, the study generated an impressive number of documents, reports, working papers and action plans reflecting the magnitude of the data collection and analysis process that was undertaken by international and national teams of consultants. They included: three (3) major synthesis documents of analytic policy studies undertaken, the diagnostic audit of the MEN, and the principal project reference document; twenty-three (23) education policy studies, including several contributions to the "Etats Generaux de l'Education" prepared by teams of international and national consultants; eight (8) synthesis documents on the MEN audit; six (6) working papers, including four produced by the "cooperation francaise"; nineteen (19) research and working papers prepared by individual national consultants; and, three (3) major Action Plans: 1) Research Action Project on girl child education, 2) MEN Audit Implementation, and 3) the plan of action for the reform of the education sector in Benin.

Shared responsibility and partnership were evident in the approach that was taken to the education policy analysis process. A standard methodology was employed for each of the following major policy studies: primary education, secondary education, technical and professional education, higher education, nonformal education, employment, capacity of the MEN and educational costs and financing. Teams of international and national consultants were formed to research each of these sub-sectors. They were all required to verify existing baseline data with original field research, e.g. investigative research, statistical surveys and interviews were conducted. National decisionmakers (central, provincial and regional ministerial representatives) and other partners in education (teacher
unions, parent associations, students and employers) all participated in different ways in these studies. Each draft study report was the subject of a seminar/workshop in order to disseminate the findings and discuss the policy implications with the stakeholders most concerned. The conclusions and recommendations from these activities were thereafter incorporated into the final versions of the policy study documents.

Two events reflect the high level of dissemination, discussion, consultation and appropriation of the study findings and policy recommendations in the country. In October 1990, the GOB mandated a national conference which brought together approximately 400 people from government, the education profession, parent associations, teacher unions, students and various sectors of the national and local economy. The ESS, in its strategic phase, supplied eight (8) background documents on key issues for the work of the "États généraux de l'éducation" and published the acts of the conference which became pivotal in the national debate on education. By the end of the strategic phase and based on the research completed at that time, the sector study team assisted the MEN in preparing the "Document cadre de la politique éducative" adopted by the Council of Ministers in January 1991 as the country's official education policy statement.

These findings are summarised in Table 19 where the breadth and depth of participation are cross-referenced using the dimensional range: none, passive, consultative, active.
Table 19: Benin Sector Study - Summary Analysis of Indigenous Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benin Sector Study</th>
<th>Breadth of Indigenous Participation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Depth of Indigenous</td>
<td>Nat'l Gov't Officials e.g. politicians, policy-makers, staff, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research design and planning</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data collection and analysis</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentation of findings</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion of recommendations</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection of policy options</td>
<td>Active</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

As the above table illustrates, the breadth and depth of indigenous participation in almost all aspects of this study is exceptional and undoubtedly the best example of the participatory approach in our sample. Clearly the time and resources invested in this education reform process, beyond the diagnostic phase, have allowed for more active indigenous participation.

7.0 BENEFITS AND CONSTRAINTS TO INDIGENOUS PARTICIPATION

7.1 Benefits of the Participatory Approach: Opinions of Interviewees

7.1.1 General Perception

The general perception, without exception, among the seasoned development professionals interviewed for this policy study was that the participatory development approach was the new way of doing development. It is now part of the trend towards the democratisation of the development process. Who can argue against giving people the right to get involved in what is going on in their communities and country? It forms an integral part of how development is now done, "along with apple pie and motherhood" (WB Respondent #3). However, one can detect an edge of cynicism in the voices of some seasoned task managers, because there is still doubt as to
whether indigenous participation can make as much a difference at the central government level, as it is recognised for making at the community level.

7.1.2 Problem Identification and Policy Goals

In development circles, it has become increasingly recognised that indigenous knowledge is an essential component of development planning. Experienced international consultants could not, and probably would not, rely solely on their understanding of a country's development problems without the benefit of learning what is taken for granted by those whose daily lives are affected by these problems. "In this new participatory rhetoric, people think that you have to have consensus on the solution. I think that you have to start out with consensus on the problem" (USAID Respondent #1). Although there is admittedly something to be gained from the external perspective that an ESS can bring to the identification of problems affecting the education sector of any country, it should always be kept in mind that, as one respondent phrased it, ultimately the people who are best positioned to identify problems and make recommendations are the indigenous populations.

There is some doubt however among development professionals whether the international donor community realises that the quality of a development investment greatly depends upon the extent of indigenous participation in defining what the investment should be in the first place. "I don't know if that lesson is fully learned yet. Even if it is learned, I don't know if we have the mechanisms to translate that into operations" (USAID Respondent #2). Perhaps the answers to
these questions, at least in part, are suggested in greater role for local capacity building, utilisation and development in the education sector study process.

7.1.3 Local Capacity Development

If one reconceptualises ESS from a participatory perspective, then, at the very beginning of the process, different stakeholder groups must talk to each other, look at certain problems and issues and become engaged in a capacity development process together. Education reform becomes a national enterprise. One respondent, in this passage, briefly summarises how the capacity development process can be operationalized in the context of an ESS.

Au niveau de la planification, le Ministre devrait être le leader dans l'opération. Au niveau de la collecte des données, c'est des nationaux qui doivent le faire. Au niveau d'interprétation des données, ça devrait se faire en collaboration étroite avec eux et au niveau du préparation du projet aussi. (UNESCO Respondent #1)

Although it varies from one donor agency to another, the ESS process can be a very intense experience in which people's professional skills are applied, tested and even developed. A capacity development approach would mean to have a borrower country's education professionals involved in that process so that they could benefit, in the sense that there are skills and approaches that can be learned, then used and applied in their own work for the benefit of their own country. Several testimonials were provided by interview respondents as examples where international consultants worked closely with one or more national experts who together co-authored policy papers. Some international consultants, in this context, would have to reconceptualise their approach to conducting ESS in order to fulfil the dual role being described
implied here. "On a tous un double rôle. Ça veut dire qu'on a un rôle de collecte d'information et un rôle de transfert de méthodologie auprès des nationaux, surtout pour les études sectorielles" (UNESCO Respondent #1).

Using the existing capacity of local education expertise, whether from the national government, university or private sector, is increasingly seen as an essential ingredient of the development process which has a training effect for those involved. Seasoned professionals have seen this time and time again when they go back and someone is using a familiar approach, tool or even table. However, it is equally important that professionalism and quality not be sacrificed. Although some will use this argument against increased indigenous participation in ESS, it apparently does not have to be the case. "Indigenous participation and professional quality are not at odds. All that is needed is a strategy for accomplishing both" (UNESCO Respondent #3). In one example, another interview respondent described an ESS that was undertaken in conjunction with the development of an education sector lending program. "Conducting the ESS was a capacity building project, that provided on-the-job and formal training, resulting in a better product and increased ownership of the policy recommendations" (WB Respondent #1).

7.1.4 Ownership and Control

There appear to be two schools of thought on the benefits of indigenous participation with respect to the issue of ownership and control. It is viewed as absolutely essential by both, but perhaps for different reasons. The first school of thought, adhered to by some of the interview respondents, follows this line of reasoning. Depending on the country, ownership is not
problematic because the government values the information that is generated by an ESS. But, in some other countries, the governments are really not interested in educational reform and do not want to get involved. The consequence of this situation is described by this respondent. "If they are not involved in the process and they are suspicious of the donor’s motives or the consultant’s motives, then the whole study can lack legitimacy" (USAID Respondent #4). Government support for an ESS brings the legitimacy needed to work with the other stakeholders to build support for the findings and policy recommendations. One ESS was cited by an interview respondent as an example of how the "top-down" approach worked very well because it was "taken to the people by someone who is a charismatic leader" (USAID Respondent #3). Without this show of government support and leadership, there would not have been much in the way of community level participation. Again, garnering legitimacy for the final product, i.e. the ESS policy recommendations, appears to be the motive for promoting 'a sense of ownership and control' through indigenous participation. This quotation from an interview respondent captures well the perspective from which the benefits are viewed. "So, having the government and other stakeholders involved in the study is really critical if you want the document to be useful in a policy dialogue" (USAID Respondent #4).

Adherents to the second school of thought view the benefits of indigenous participation from the perspective of the developing country. This line of reasoning begins with the value statement that what is important in an ESS, and the lending program or project that follows, is appropriation by the developing country. This would mean, in the words of one interview respondent, "Ça veut dire qu’à la fin d’une mission, le Ministre ou le Directeur générale dit que
c'est 'mon projet' et non pas le projet de la Banque Mondiale" (UNESCO Respondent #1). This kind of ownership is only possible through indigenous participation in all the phases of an ESS: identification, planning, implementation, and appraisal of the policy recommendations. The benefits of ownership and control that come from this depth of indigenous participation are described in this statement.

La participation nationale dans les ESS est vitale pour développer les capacités nationales d'analyse, reéquilibrer le dialogue avec les agences de financement, récupérer éventuellement un certain contrôle des décisions par les nationaux et faire intervenir les groupes de pression dans la préparation des décisions. (UNESCO Respondent 3)

According to this school of thought, the role of the donor agencies is to gradually withdraw from the stage and leave the podium to those who are most concerned with the education problems and policies in their country. This fits well with the rhetoric around participatory development approaches, and ensures national ownership and control of the educational reform process and any lending program or projects that follow.

7.1.5 Improved Policy Implementation

Opinions on the possible downstream benefits of indigenous participation in the ESS process are mixed. Although there are several variables that can change from one study or country to the next, there appears to be a belief, based on anecdotal experiences, that indigenous participation has a positive effect on policy implementation. One argument is that participation brings indigenous knowledge into the policy analysis process where it can be weighed, considered and incorporated into the formulation of solid policy recommendations. This makes for "a better
product" (WB Respondent #1) which has a better chance of being used. That's a strong technocratic argument for participation, because "it's not just a good democratic thing to do but also makes technical sense" (USAID Respondent #2). Or, from another perspective, since recommendations are perceived as more credible when seen as a result of a public consultation process, they therefore have a better chance of being implemented.

Another reason relates to the medium term benefits of utilising the existing capacity and expertise of national experts and consultants. One respondent provides an account of how most of the government employed experts in an ESS had since been promoted to higher positions in the Ministry, "thus providing them with an opportunity to implement the recommendations made in their policy studies" (UNESCO Respondent #3). Although all of the recommendations made in the ESS report are only now in the process of being implemented, it has taken much longer than expected.

One last explanation of the benefits of indigenous participation for improved policy implementation was made in reference to an ESS not included in this research. In this case, the educational research process was extended to the village level beneficiaries whose opinions, perceptions and concerns were documented. Feedback to the communities on the findings was important in order to build local support for education reform, but also because "the study mobilised villagers to request education services from the government that were 'talked' about during the conduct of the ESS" (WB Respondent #1). This undoubtedly put pressure on the government to implement the required policy recommendations.
Despite the many reasons why some of the respondents believe in the benefits of indigenous participation, there are also those who do not feel that they have a "sufficiently robust" set of experiences to draw on to express an informed opinion and still others who are legitimately sceptical.

La réponse à cette question suppose que l'on puisse suivre l'évolution de l'éducation dans un pays de manière approfondie pendant de nombreuses années et que le contexte politique reste inchangé ou favorable à la mise en œuvre des recommendations. Comme ces conditions sont exceptionnellement remplies, on ne peut que formuler des conjectures sur la question. (UNESCO Respondent #2)

Until there is more research done into the cause and effect relationships between indigenous participation in ESS and improved education policy implementation, we can only rely on anecdotal information and conjecture to guide us.

7.2 Constraints to the Participatory Approach

7.2.1 General Overview

Among the development professionals contacted during the course of this research there is a wealth of knowledge and understanding, based on personal experience, about the many constraints to using a participatory approach in the conduct of ESS. A simple comparative analysis of the total number of constraints versus benefits cited by the respondents reveals an approximate 4:1 ratio. Closer examination of the constraints themselves reveals that they fall into two major categories: those related to the development and management practices of donor agencies represent approximately forty-five percent (45%) and those associated with the
conditions in the developing country represent approximately fifty-three percent (53%), while the remaining two percent (2%) cite donor and developing country relations as a constraint.

7.2.2 Constraints within Donor Agencies

The Predominant Development Paradigm

Donor-driven, supply-side development is still viewed by some respondents, as the predominant development paradigm. From an interventionist perspective, the donor agency establishes a presence in the country and offers assistance to the education sector. To accomplish this task, it will need information upon which to base investment decisions. If the national government cannot provide the needed information, then the donor can allocate the necessary resources to an ESS. By virtue of the fact that the resources belong to the donor, it enjoys a great measure of control over the policy analysis process. If necessary, it may engage in a limited ‘participatory’ process to enhance the credibility of its findings. "But, it is all geared toward you the Bank Task Manager and how you can get better participation in your project appraisal" (USAID Respondent #2). If this is the predominant development paradigm, then it is understandable why it would be considered a constraint to indigenous participation.

As interventionist as donor agencies may at times be, they are also loathe to be perceived as interfering in the affairs of a sovereign country. Several respondents commented on the inherent risks associated with a participatory process. A broad public consultation process on educational reform can easily charge the political atmosphere. Donor agencies do not have the experience, nor the inclination, to take the ‘political sphere’ into account in the conduct of an ESS (USAID
Respondent #2). Controversies regarding foreign monopolies in the publication of textbooks and learning materials, or the existence of "phantom" teachers on the Ministry payroll are best discussed behind the closed doors of the Minister's office, and not out in a public forum (UNESCO Respondent #1). Until donor agencies are ready to accept their role as advocates of educational reform, then indigenous participation will continue to be limited to high-level bilateral negotiations.

The Project Cycle Mentality

The traditional project cycle involves a sequence of activities: project identification, design, contracting, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Several respondents viewed this "project cycle mentality" as a constraint, because donor agencies "seem to think sector assessment, design and implementation of design, and they act as if everything is off in the wings until you actually begin implementing the project" (USAID Respondent #1). ESS are managed as discrete tasks preceding 'the project' with its own resources, timeframe and developmental results. What is at issue here is how the results of an ESS are defined; is it the beginning of a process of local capacity building, or is it a discrete activity that produces a sector study report? Unfortunately, the answer is all too often, the production of a report, as evidenced here by one of our respondents. "The ESS report\document is still the principal product, and not capacity building" (WB Respondent #2). As we have seen in several of our ESS cases, capacity development was not a priority during the education sector analysis phase.
Financial Management

The first constraint in this set is disbursement pressures and the most obvious example of this was experienced by USAID. With the advent of the Development Fund for Africa (DFA), mandated by Congress, USAID had to substantially increase its disbursement rhythm which required an increased number of new project starts in Africa each year. "Congress said that USAID had to get down to business and spend so much money every year. That money was supposed to be a proxy for meaningful activity" (USAID Respondent #1). This commentary explains, at least in part, the remarkable increase in the number of ESS undertaken by USAID in the early 1990's. Longer sector assessments did not lend themselves particularly well to this type of disbursement pressure, so USAID was forced to take short-cuts in order to initiate a new generation of basic education programs. The deterrent effects of this type of disbursement pressure on indigenous participation, not to mention the technical quality of these studies, is evident from our analysis.

A second financial management constraint that is perhaps not the most important, but is nevertheless worth mentioning, has to do with ESS implementation. In some cases, donor agencies, like the World Bank, have paid developing country government employees supplementary salaries to participate as 'expert consultants' in their sector analysis work. "Alors, en terme de modalités, je crois qu'il est maladroit de payer des fonctionnaires nationaux pour ça" (UNESCO Respondent #1). This financial management practice is viewed by several of the respondents as a long-term constraint to indigenous participation. If ESS are to be a national enterprise, then the participation of the government should reflect its level of commitment
without these monetary enticements. To continue this management practice would entrench expectations that would continue the legacy of dependence and be contrary to the participatory approach.

The third financial management constraint has to do with overall funding levels for ESS themselves. In the case of the World Bank, participation is encouraged, but there are serious financial constraints as to what can be done with the budgets made available. This observation by one respondent highlights the difference between rhetoric and reality. "There is limited financing for ESS, generally budgets are low - its rare to get $50,000 on the operational expenses side" (WB Respondent #2). There is a serious gap between what donor agencies expect, in terms of indigenous participation, and what they are willing to financially support according to another respondent. "Personnellement j'ai observé cette dérive il y a 3-4 ans où on avait vraiment un manque de moyens énorme entre ce qu'ils demandaient en terme de participation et les moyens qu'ils mettai à la disposition d'une étude. Je parle aussi bien la BM que la BAD" (UNESCO Respondent #1). Although there may be some recent improvements in this area, often times ESS budgets are insufficient to adequately facilitate indigenous participation. The participatory approach costs more to implement than a straightforward technical study, so adequate financing to facilitate indigenous participation becomes a constraint.

**Time Limitations**

When comparing our ESS cases we can see that increasing indigenous participation requires a longer timeframe, but for some donor agencies there is little flexibility in the ESS process. The kinds of deadlines and timeframes witnessed in the USAID and World Bank ESS are obvious
constraints to indigenous participation. Several respondents remarked that even without a participatory approach, they did not have enough time to do good systematic interviewing and data collection. Furthermore, "writing the report in the field was a bad idea because it left no time to reflect on the findings. This approach didn't give a chance to process data and achieve a deeper level of understanding" (WB Respondent #2). The short timeframes and deadlines described in some of our ESS cases then became the criteria by which the competence of international and national consultants are judged for ESS work. The following quote is a testament to this contorted logic. "The concept of time is different in Africa. Preparation, writing and the submission of reports are often not on time. African researchers don't have the skills to do research in a timely fashion" (USAID Respondent #3). Given the comments from other respondents who worked under severe time constraints, the demands for high quality work under these circumstances might be too much to expect of any self-respecting professional.

**Human Resources**

In this final set, there are several constraints identified that relate to the human resources generally used in ESS work. When reviewing the criteria for selecting international consultants, the most important and common factor was technical knowledge in an appropriate area of specialisation, combined with experience in sector analysis. Academicians are often called upon by USAID and the World Bank because they generally meet the former criteria and over time have developed the necessary experience. USAID has accessed these people through existing contracts with academic institutions or through indefinite quantity contracts (IQC) when recruiting for ESS. The Bank has a less formal recruitment process which also favours those who
already have a reputation and track record. According to our respondents, there are several constraints to indigenous participation that should be considered before signing the next contract with a university professor.

"One of the constraints is that academics are usually not available for 6 week to 3 month periods" (USAID Respondent #4). This does not pose a problem for donor agencies that prefer the quick "sector analysis" approach anyway, but it is a constraint for those who are planning for indigenous participation. Another constraint is "also to find academicians who can write precisely and not in academic language" (USAID Respondent #4) which can also be a constraint when the breadth and depth of participation goes beyond the tight nexus of government policy-makers and national experts. But most importantly, one should ask whether they have the right combination of skills to engender or orchestrate a participatory approach. This last constraint applies equally as well to the task managers of donor agencies as it does to academicians. An effective ESS team member will be one who has the political and consensus building skills, in addition to the traditional technical knowledge and understanding of the education systems. "It's probably unique people who have this combination of skills already. People are not trained in this and we don't have a system that necessarily rewards that" (USAID Respondent #1). As we already know from several extensive studies on technical cooperation (Berg 1993), that the quality of the people used in technical assistance activities is a major factor related to levels of success. Perhaps some consideration should be given to finding these uniquely qualified people among the national experts and consultants of the recipient country.
7.2.3 Constraints in Developing Countries

Development Country Politics

"Opening up the education reform debate to civil society needs a democratic setting and risk taking by the Bank" (WB Respondent #3). This quote can apply equally as well to UNESCO, USAID, as well as any other donor agency. One could say that the level of democracy in a country and the degree of risk associated with encouraging indigenous participation are inversely proportionate to one another.

In developing countries with repressive government regimes there is little, if any, public discourse about public policy or the use, or misuse, of public resources. As one respondent describes it, people are uncomfortable talking and writing about public problems, e.g. nepotism in government, inflated teacher payrolls, monopolies on the publication and distribution of textbooks, etc. It is simple to understand why they fear for their safety and the safety of their families. This is reality in some countries, so how can one justify using a participatory approach when the risks are measured in peoples lives (USAID Respondent #2). Therefore, it is the absence of democratic governance and the respect for human rights which is our first constraint to indigenous participation in this set.

A second constraint is the lack of developing country government appreciation of the importance of national unity to education sector reform and the role of indigenous participation in the process. Although considered democratic by most standards, many national governments practice representative democracy and do not appreciate the value of civil society involvement between elections. Educational reform in these cases is viewed as a senior administrative
management exercise in data collection, analysis and policy formulation. A case in point is the Ethiopia Sector Review where the government "wasn't crazy about having some big national debate on education policy" (USAID Respondent #2). Even when national governments do acquiesce to donor pressures, they are not always fully engaged in a participatory process, although there is a lot of lip service given to it. Take, for example, the much vaunted "États généraux" which have supposedly brought together government, civil society groups and citizens to discuss education reform. Based on personal experience, one respondent describes them in these terms. "While as I think they are very necessary, I don't think they have been participatory at all, it's just the elite meeting the elite with polemic following polemic and not dialogue" (USAID Respondent #1). The breadth of indigenous participation may be at issue here, and there are certainly many differences of opinion on what is appropriate on any given occasion. However, as in the Senegal Sector Assessment, this constraint is evident when there is sufficient reason to doubt the sincerity of the national government to engage in a participatory education reform process.

**Bureaucratic Politics and Self-Interest**

Bureaucratic politics and self-interest can manifest themselves in a large number and variety of ways. This set of constraints will focus on those identified through the personal experiences of our respondents. First, we have to consider how inter-ministerial politics can be a constraint. In the case of the Zimbabwe Sub-Sector Review, the Minister of Education invited the Bank to conduct the study, while the Minister of Finance did not agree. "The relationship between the Bank and the Government of Zimbabwe was strained as a result" (WB Respondent #3). It would
be difficult in such a context of inter-ministerial politics to advocate for increased indigenous participation.

Our second constraint in this set is at the level of the individual and the personal interests of government administrators that could be jeopardised by greater indigenous participation. Let us accept that, by nature, government administrators are conservative, risk averse, and prefer incremental change, if any. An inclusive educational reform process which encourages public participation may result in proposed changes that will be difficult to refuse. A respondent in this passage describes the approach that must be taken with such people.

La première tâche est de se faire accepter par l'interlocuteur, lui montrer que on n'est pas là pour l'emmerder. La deuxième est de voir, quel est son intérêt personnel qu'on est en train de déranger par notre action. (UNESCO Respondent #1)

What is at stake for the government administrator, e.g. more work in the short-term, less authority due to decentralisation, lost control over admissions, scholarships, or simply less social status? Personal interests do play an important role in any bureaucracy. Those who are at the top are reluctant to relinquish any control to other stakeholders over an education reform process if their personal interests may be jeopardised. The personal interest of government administrators thus becomes a constraining factor.

Closely related to personal interests is self-interest, which is our last constraint in this set. Self-interest is more blatant and aggressive that the former and is exercised with a conscious intent of self-enrichment. Some brief examples are provided here without belabouring the point. In one case, the Minister and his cabinet complained about not having enough control over the sector study. The respondent explained that "the reason was because they wanted control over the
budget in order to get their cut (UNESCO Respondent #3). In another case, the attendance of senior government staff at important ESS co-ordinating meetings was dropping off because they were not being paid a daily per diem to attend. Other cases were cited as well where: donor agencies were asked to suppress information uncovered during the course of the ESS, e.g. phantom personnel on the teacher payroll; budget requests based on over-estimated enrolments; and where disbursements for school construction was on schedule, but there were no schools, etc. It is clear that under these circumstances, that donor agencies would be reluctant to engage in a highly participatory process involving the delegation of decision-making authority and control to the national government. The self-interests of those in positions of power must be closely examined if there is resistance to increasing the breadth and depth of indigenous participation.

**Human Resource and Organisational Capacity**

The single most frequently identified constraint to greater indigenous participation in education sector analysis is weak developing country human resource capacity. This weak capacity, upon closer examination, can manifest itself in different ways depending on the stakeholder group. In this set, we will examine those constraints related to the capacity of three stakeholder groups: elected government officials, education experts/consultants, and civil society groups.

The first constraint in this set is the lack of political leadership and support for education sector analysis. ESS tend to lack credibility in the eyes of the government staff, civil society groups and the general populace when elected government officials are mute on the importance of education reform. The absence of the Minister of Education, or a senior delegate, on the
National Steering Committee conveys a message of disinterest. Similarly, a lack of continuity in their participation has the same effect. Without ministerial or cabinet leadership, the national counterpart team may find it difficult to access needed resources and administrative support, which may also result in a high turn-over in the composition of the national team. For donor agency personnel, it is a major setback when "the persons or group that you invested time in and built a relationship with changes" (USAID Respondent #1). The consequence of a lack of political leadership and support becomes quickly evident when the donor agency and its international consultants become the only constant in the educational reform process.

A second constraint is timely access to competent education experts or consultants for the national counterpart team to undertake education research within the context of the sector analysis. The situation described in this quote could apply equally to government staff, university faculty or private consultants. "When there was someone who was qualified and experienced, they were in great demand by other agencies and thus not always available" (UNESCO Respondent #3). Consequently, competing donor agency interests and activities would put a strain on the availability of local expertise.

Several respondents identified a lack of motivation on the part of the government's counterpart team as a major constraint. Motivation can vary considerably from one team to another, or during the course of a sector study. In the Zimbabwe Sub-Sector Review, where the counterpart team was composed exclusively of government staff, participation was apparently inconsistent. Most showed little commitment, while some were enthusiastic, but the general opinion was that they could have done much more of the work. Based on another experience, this
respondent describes perhaps why. "The other thing is that people within a bureaucracy have their ordinary duties X, Y, Z. Sector assessments are outside the ordinary, which represents more work. There is this idea that anything out of the ordinary should be compensated" (USAID Respondent #1). This constraint can, as previously noted, be overcome by paying government employees supplementary salaries. For those donor agencies who choose not to pay extra compensation, they must find other incentives to encourage the full participation of government staff.

Third on the list of constraints, reflecting a lack of human resource capacity, is the incompetence of local education experts and consultants. Admittedly somewhat harsh, this was in essence the general perception of some of our respondents. Two basic complaints rise to the surface: a) "African researchers don't have the skills to do research in a timely fashion" (USAID Respondent #3); and, b) "their knowledge and analytical skills don't go very deep" (USAID Respondent #1). Short deadlines and timeframes were previously identified as a constraint, albeit a self-imposed constraint by the donor agencies. Their own staff and the international consultants that work for them, have found it difficult to conduct systematic data collection and thoughtful analysis under the pressures of these conditions. Perhaps we should not be surprised then by a conclusion to the effect that, "African capacity for doing ESS work by our criteria is not there" (USAID Respondent #3). Although the low competence level of national education experts and consultants may be more perceived than real, in either case it remains an important constraint to indigenous participation.
Finally, civil society groups are important stakeholders in the education reform process, but when they are poorly developed they become a constraint to increased indigenous participation in ESS. Even as the political situation begins to change toward a greater respect for the principles of democracy and good governance, people remain unaccustomed to exercising their democratic rights. There may be a total absence of indigenous civil society organisations, or, the ones that do exist have neither the organisational structure, human resources, communication strategies nor information management tools to influence and advocate education policies on behalf of their constituencies. The government can easily dominate because it is the only institution with access to the information needed for policy-making. "An information monopoly is a really bad thing, just like any other market monopoly is a bad thing" (USAID Respondent #2). The two South Africa assessments are good examples of how ESS can at least support, if not build, the capacity of indigenous civil society organisations in order to facilitate a dialogue with the government. "That's a big challenge and a constraint that these NGOs, civil organisations, don't speak the language of the policy makers" (USAID Respondent #2). In the absence of capable civil society organisations, donor agencies are easily drawn into a two-way conversation on education policy issues between themselves and national government officials.

7.2.4 Donor and Developing Country Relations

A number of examples have already been cited in our ESS cases where poor donor and developing country relations affected national government participation, e.g. the Senegal Sector Assessment, the Zimbabwe Sub-Sector Review and the two South Africa Assessments. In one
case, the donor agency doubted the government's sincerity to undertake educational reform, resulting in a pro forma ESS to satisfy the agency's own political requirements. In another case, the donor agency made policy recommendations for basic education that they did not intend to support because of a preference for higher education. In other cases, there either had not been an established relationship, nor could there be, so full cooperation of the various government ministries became problematic. For any of these reasons and more, poor donor and national government relations can be a constraint to indigenous participation.

This is especially true when the interests of each party are not completely transparent. When developing countries are dependent on the same donor agencies for education policy analysis, as well as financial support, the interests of each party can work at cross purposes. For example, "Pour les responsables nationaux, l'ESS avait essentiellement pour interet de faire revenir les agences de financement dans le domaine de l'education" (UNESCO Respondent #2). At the same time, donor agencies are under pressure to disburse funds or extend lines of credit. When these mutual interests coincide, the participatory aspects of ESS tend to become over-shadowed by the more urgent preoccupations of mobilising the available financial resources.

8.0 CONCLUSIONS

This policy study has examined a set of ten externally supported education sector studies undertaken between 1990 and 1994 in Sub-Saharan African countries in order to determine the extent of indigenous participation. A conceptual framework was developed to guide the research. An Analytic Framework was used to conduct a cross-case comparison. The findings are presented in chapters four through six and are again reviewed below. This is followed by reflections on the
answer to this first research question. An emergent approach was used to research the conditionalities that explain the presence or absence of indigenous participation in education sector studies. The findings are presented in chapter 7 and a concluding discussion of the answer to this second research question are made below. This review of the findings and accompanying conclusions with regard to the research questions is followed by a number of other observations of note, i.e. a comment on the limitations of the study, an appreciation of the contribution of the study to current knowledge and some implications for further research.

8.1 Research Question #1

A review of the summary of findings in Chapter 4.0 places the locus of control over critical decision-points in the implementation of an ESS generally with the donor agencies. The USAID studies exhibited a pronounced pattern of donor control along with the World Bank studies where the pattern was less pronounced. These findings, nevertheless, places both sets of studies squarely on the technocratic end of the continuum, while the UNESCO studies, which reflected an almost consistent pattern of shared control, would occupy the middle to participatory end of the continuum.

A review of the summary of findings in Chapter 5.0 reveals the extent to which policy analysis techniques based on the use of quantitative information and normally considered technocratic, are common to all of the studies in our sample. On the other hand, those techniques characteristic of the participatory approach, i.e. primary research by local consultants, public consultation techniques and presentation of policy options, were used almost exclusively in the UNESCO studies. Again,
based on these findings, only the UNESCO studies can be located on the participatory end of the continuum, while the USAID South Africa Tertiary Sector Assessment falls somewhere in the middle, and the others exhibit the traditional characteristics of the technocratic approach.

A review of the summary of findings in Chapter 6.0 for each case exposes some interesting patterns for breadth and depth of indigenous participation. The overall pattern suggests that when there is a presence of indigenous participation, its breadth is initially concentrated with the national government, and gradually spreads to the wider civil society and perhaps only then to other stakeholders depending on the local constraints, e.g. presence of a legitimate national government. But, if it were not for the passive participation of all the stakeholder groups in data collection activities there would be little breadth of participation at all, since five of the eight studies (not including the South Africa assessments) do not go beyond the tight nexus of national government officials, policy-makers and administrators. Even the depth of indigenous participation with national government officials, or civil society groups in the South African assessments, can vary significantly between passive and active, depending on the implementation stage of the study and the locus of control. These observations simply confirm that indigenous participation is one of relative degree and cannot be described in binary terms. However, the defining characteristics of what constitutes a participatory approach can be identified from the analysis. Clearly only those cases where the national government is active in all stages of the study, and civil society and other stakeholders are consulted on policy recommendations and the selection of policy options, should be characterised as having fully employed the participatory approach.
This examination of the extent of indigenous participation in the conduct of externally supported education sector studies reflects a considerable degree of variability among the cases in our sample. This variability should not be attributed to an inherent variability in our sample, since nine of ten studies, the Benin Sector Study as the exception, can be characterised as diagnostic, where the purpose was to identify education problems, establish baseline information and propose some policy recommendations to address the problems. Given this uniformity of purpose in our sample, it is surprising to note the varying extent of indigenous participation generated by each study when located on a continuum ranging from a conventional technocratic approach to a participatory approach.

Based on the research findings and the summary conclusions above, the ESS cases in our sample would therefore be arranged in the following order on a continuum ranging from a conventional technocratic to participatory: Senegal Sector Assessment, Ethiopia Sector Review, Namibia Sub-Sector Review, Kenya Human Resources Study, South Africa Primary Sector Assessment, South Africa Tertiary Sector Assessment, Zimbabwe Sub-Sector Review, Burkina Faso Sub-Sector Study, Congo Sub-Sector Study and the Benin Sector Study. The South Africa Tertiary Sector Assessment, Zimbabwe Sub-Sector Review and Burkina Faso Sub-Sector Study are spread across the middle of our continuum, exhibiting significant characteristics of both approaches. This leaves only UNESCO’s Congo and Benin studies that can be described as fully employing a participatory approach.

But what can be said, in conclusion, about the extent of indigenous participation in the conduct of externally supported education sector studies in Sub-Saharan Africa? In general, the
findings are disappointing because the conduct of externally supported ESS between 1990 and 1994 fell far short of the rhetoric which had embraced the need for increased indigenous participation. Only the UNESCO studies reflect any semblance of a methodology that systematically incorporates participatory policy analysis methods and techniques. Their diagnostic studies demonstrated active national government participation and follow through with a longer-term commitment to support a consultative process, inclusive of civil society groups, teachers and parents. Neither of the other two donor agencies used the participatory approach in a consistent manner that would reflect a corporate philosophy or development practice. These same donor agencies have published comparative studies, best practices and lessons-learned in education policy formulation (USAID 1994, Haddad 1994, UNESCO 1996, DAE 1996), without, for the most part, explicitly and objectively examining their own practices. In contrast, this policy study has tried to examine the practices of donor agencies in order to better understand how they can be of greater support to the education policy reform process in Sub-Saharan African countries. There are, however, some conditionalities external to the conduct of ESS that could also explain the presence or absence of indigenous participation.

8.2 Research Question #2

The presence of what indigenous participation we did find in our sample of education sector studies can be attributed to a strong philosophical belief on the part of “western” education policy analysts in the benefits of using a participatory approach. The internal logic underlying this philosophical belief is best described by this series of cause and effect relationships:
- Public participation in education problem identification will lead to an improved quality of development investments by donor agencies and national governments.
- Increased utilisation of local human resource capacity will support the sustainable development of education management information systems needed to manage the education system and monitor the reforms.
- Active participation of the national government and educational administrators will strengthen the commitment to the education reform process and selected policy options.
- Public consultations and consensus-building with civil society groups, teachers and parents on the selection of education policy options will result in better policy implementation.

Strung together in this way, this series of cause and effect relationships represent a strong developmental rational for the increased use of the participatory approach. If it weren’t for an equally impressive list of constraints, we should have expected more instances of the participatory approach practised by the same seasoned policy analysts.

The absence of indigenous participation in the majority of the cases in our sample can in fact be explained in part by conditions external to the conduct of the studies. Constraints within donor agencies have been traced to the administrative procedures and incentives related to project funding and disbursement pressure. Preparation activities which are up-stream from the project are considered in isolation and unrelated to the implementation of the project itself. They are mistakenly viewed as data gathering exercises which are time-consuming without making a significant contribution to the longer-term developmental process. Their timeframes are kept short and their budget allocations proportionately small, so that the real work of project implementation could begin as quickly as possible, as in the USAID Ethiopia Sector Review and Namibia Sub-Sector Review. In fact, those responsible for project design are often recognised
by their superiors for their ability to initiate projects and mobilise financial resources quickly, while perhaps never being assigned the role of task manager for the project. Although, incentives for donor agency staff to view this situation otherwise are not present, we have come across a few instances where requests for additional time or funding were made nonetheless, or where the corporate rules were broken to facilitate indigenous participation, such as in the USAID Ethiopia Sector Review and the World Bank Zimbabwe Sub-Sector Review. If donor agency administrative procedures, staffing practices and career incentives were managed in a manner to facilitate the participatory approach then perhaps we would see more indigenous participation in education sector studies.

However, there are also conditions in Sub-Saharan African countries that have been identified by the same group of western education policy analysts that might explain the relative absence of indigenous participation. The first characterisation of the development context which is frequently viewed as a major constraint is the nascent democratic values and systems of governance. Although, the two South Africa studies were a case in point, how is it that they both achieved higher levels of participation than the other USAID studies in the sample? The second characterisation is that national governments suffer from a lack of leadership, are rife with inter-ministerial conflict, while encumbered with a public service that is motivated only by personal and self-interest. Although partially cited as the reason for the lack of participation in the USAID Senegal Sector Assessment, the World Bank’s Kenya Human Resources Study and Zimbabwe Sub-Sector Review, the same problems were mentioned in the context of all of the UNESCO studies as well. How does one then explain the considerably higher levels of indigenous
participation in the latter? The last characterisation of the development context used to explain the low level of indigenous participation in our ESS cases is a weak civil society and the poor quality of trained education policy analysts. Although a frequently cited constraint expressed by several USAID respondents, it seems unfounded in light of the apparent success which UNESCO has had in involving national government staff, institution-based education experts, as well as local consultants in the policy analysis process. After all, one would be hard-pressed to identify more difficult circumstances than working in Burkina Faso, the Congo or Benin. The challenges of working in the Sub-Saharan Africa development context are not to be minimised, but they should also not be used as a convenient excuse to mask the conditions within donor agencies than impede indigenous participation.

8.3 Comment on Limitations of the Study

The specific limitations of this policy study were noted earlier in chapter 3. However a comment on the generalizability of the conclusions is warranted at this juncture. Although there are certainly other ESS cases that could have been selected with the same sampling frame had the circumstances been different, and there are certainly more recent cases that might present a different picture of the spectrum of cases presented here, our sample of education sector studies possessed sufficiently different characteristics to allow a relatively unambiguous cross-case analysis. The high variability within our sample of policy analysis methods and practices of donor agencies strengthen our case for conceptual validity, while recognising that, for several reasons, the generalizability of the findings are limited.
First, the number of cases in the sample represents only a small proportion, approximately 20%, of the total population of eligible cases. Second, the number of contrasting cases from different donor agencies was limited. Third, it was not possible to get a uniformly “thick description” of every case which would have come from more interviews and the inclusion of African stakeholders. Fourth, random sampling within the total population of eligible cases was not possible, and, finally, the findings are based on the data collection, analysis and interpretation of a sole researcher. For these key reasons, the findings and conclusions presented above should not be generalised to other settings where the circumstances are different. Perhaps the most useful generalisations from this study are analytic, that is, the identification of patterns of concepts and their relations that transcend the circumstances of a unique case.

8.4 Contribution to Current Knowledge

This policy study has identified two major sets of conditionalities for the successful undertaking of a donor supported education reform process. The first set could be regarded as pre-conditions to an investment in a participatory approach, since they are outside the manageable control of the donor agencies, while the second set of conditions highlight the need to create an enabling management culture within donor agencies to promote the use of the participatory approach.

The first set of conditionalities is internal to the developing country. Assessing the development country politics is an important first step. Democracy and good governance are values that must exist at the highest levels of the national government if anything other than a
technocratic approach to policy analysis is to be attempted. This observation is consistent with the literature (Corkery 1994, Loubser 1994) that identifies countries with autocratic, centralised, top-down governments as inhospitable to the participatory approach. Similarly, this research supports the argument that bureaucratic politics and self-interest play an important role in public policy analysis and should not be discounted (Allison 1971, McGinn [et al.] 1979, Adams 1990). There must also be receptivity at the bureaucratic level to the utilisation of national expertise, which has been frequently identified as problematic (King 1991c, Kayembe 1992, Namuddu & Tapsoba 1993) for capacity development efforts. Finally, there must be adequate human resource and organisational capacity in the developing country to engage in a consensus-building and sustainable education reform process (Loubser 1994). The conditions which have been identified as internal to the developing country must be thoroughly assessed before adopting or adapting a participatory approach.

The second set of conditionalities identified in this research is internal to the donor agency. First, donor driven development with its emphasis on the “scientific method” remains the predominant development paradigm. Some authors, like Joel Samoff and others (McGinn [et al.] 1979, Adams 1990) have reacted to it quite strongly, as evidenced in this statement. “Positivist proselytizing parades as injunctions for good research, and only good research should guide the allocation of funds and the specification of activities to be supported” (Samoff 1993, p. 205). Furthermore, the combination of donor funding and educational research has generated its own “theology” of education, based on the quantitative measures of access, equity and efficiency (internal and external), surreptitiously imposed on developing countries (Adams 1990, Samoff
1993). Although this research confirmed the wide spread use of quantitative policy analysis techniques and measures, their use was not associated uniquely with the "technocratic" cases, but common to all the ESS cases regardless of their location on the technocratic - participatory continuum. This important finding lays the onus on donor agencies to complement their scientific methods with participatory policy analysis methods and techniques.

The project cycle mentality is another condition that pervades the management systems and practices of donor agencies, but which has not been adequately addressed in the literature. Donor agencies must view up-stream project design and planning activities (i.e. ESS) as development activities which make a vital and necessary contribution to building indigenous educational research capacity (King 1991c). Other related conditions, i.e., financial management pressures for quick disbursements (Saldanha 1994), restrictive time limitations for policy analysis activities were also identified in the research, confirming the observations already made in the literature. Although the over-reliance on expatriate personnel in delivering technical assistance has also been thoroughly documented (Berg 1993, King 1991b, Morgan & Baser 1993), this research has demonstrated that some donor agencies have not significantly altered this technocratic practice. If donor agency staff and the international consultants they hire continue to play an important role in education sector studies, they should at least re-conceptualise their role, from foreign expert to supportive facilitator. This policy study has identified the above conditionalities, external and internal to donor agencies, that should be taken into consideration when deciding to adopt or adapt the participatory approach to any given set of circumstances.
In addition to the above, this research has made a significant contribution to our understanding of the key constructs and their inter-relationships that figure prominently in the conduct of education sector studies. Control of study, use of policy analysis techniques, breadth and depth of indigenous participation were all closely examined through the cross-case comparisons. A brief review of these inter-relationships will serve to illustrate the contribution of this study to current knowledge.

In the technocratic studies, where the locus of control was predominantly with the donor agency, there was less of a tendency to use policy analysis techniques that facilitated or encouraged indigenous participation. The reverse also holds true, in that, where control was shared between the donor agency and national government, the use of participatory policy analysis techniques was more common. Again, in the technocratic studies, the depth of indigenous participation was limited to none, passive or consultative, while in the participatory studies there was active participation by national governments and civil society groups combined with increased breadth of consultation with civil society and other stakeholders.

The relationships identified between these key constructs generally point to a positive correlation between ‘control of study’ among stakeholders and the ‘breadth and depth of indigenous participation’. This conclusion is consistent with two World Bank multiple case studies where the unwillingness of project-level staff, donor agency or national government, to share control over project activities and decisions was identified as a common problem that resulted in lower levels of indigenous participation (Azefor & Bradley 1996, Narayan 1996). In another case study, the World Bank Task Manager also discovered that increasing the level of indigenous participation
resulted in a loss of control over the project. "Through participation, we lost “control” of the project and in so doing gained ownership and sustainability, precious things in our business" (Souhlal 1996, p. 51). While the strength of this relationship will require further testing and verification, it is felt that this research has made a notable contribution through the development of a Conceptual and Analytic Framework that can be used in further research.

8.5 Implications for Further Research

Let us return for a moment to the distinction that was made in the literature review between the practical and political benefits of indigenous participation. Among the perceived practical benefits we can include: local capacity development, and; improved education policy implementation. On the other hand, among the political benefits we can include: creating a sense of ownership among stakeholders in order to promote a given policy agenda, or; empowering the local stakeholders through the planned delegation of control and ownership. These constructs and their inter-relationships require further examination.

The Analytic Framework developed in this policy study could be used to facilitate the identification of education sector studies using a participatory approach. The hypothesis that there are both practical and political benefits to using a participatory approach should be tested with further research. Such a project could involve an limited multi-case sample with in-depth research on the benefits of the participatory approach as perceived by the intended, direct and indirect beneficiaries. Only in this way can we accurately assess the value of the participatory approach to education policy analysis.
**ANNEX I - ORIGINAL ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement on Initial Assumptions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- identification of policy problem</td>
<td>degree</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- choice of policy goals, objectives</td>
<td>degree</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- availability of reliable data</td>
<td>degree</td>
<td>high</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control of the Study</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- initiation of study</td>
<td>locus</td>
<td>donor agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- preparation of scope of work</td>
<td>locus</td>
<td>donor agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- timeframe of study</td>
<td>locus</td>
<td>donor agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- selection of consultants</td>
<td>locus</td>
<td>donor agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- study implementation decisions</td>
<td>locus</td>
<td>donor agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- study report preparation</td>
<td>locus</td>
<td>donor agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- study report dissemination</td>
<td>locus</td>
<td>donor agency</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Use of Policy Analysis Techniques</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- quantitative measures</td>
<td>frequency</td>
<td>often</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- manpower planning</td>
<td>frequency</td>
<td>often</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- cost-benefit analysis (ROR)</td>
<td>frequency</td>
<td>often</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- efficiency indicators</td>
<td>frequency</td>
<td>often</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- qualitative information</td>
<td>frequency</td>
<td>occasional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- national education commissions</td>
<td>frequency</td>
<td>occasional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- public consultations</td>
<td>frequency</td>
<td>occasional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- public opinion surveys</td>
<td>frequency</td>
<td>occasional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- mass media campaign</td>
<td>frequency</td>
<td>occasional</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Breadth of Indigenous Participation</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- from public/government officials</td>
<td>extent</td>
<td>less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- from civil groups e.g. NGOs, unions</td>
<td>extent</td>
<td>less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- from teachers, parents &amp; students</td>
<td>extent</td>
<td>less</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Depth of Indigenous Participation</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- in research design &amp; planning</td>
<td>extent</td>
<td>less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- in data collection &amp; analysis</td>
<td>extent</td>
<td>less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- in presentation of findings</td>
<td>extent</td>
<td>less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- in discussion of policy options</td>
<td>extent</td>
<td>less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- in selection of policy options</td>
<td>extent</td>
<td>less</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## ANNEX II - DECISION RULES FOR CROSS-CASE COMPARISONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories and Concepts</th>
<th>Decision rules</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control of Study</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- initiation of study</td>
<td>- the initiating party was identified in a document and/or by one or more respondents; shared control was not an option.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- preparation of scope of work</td>
<td>- the responsible party was identified in a document and/or by one or more respondents; shared control was selected in cases where there was a signed agreement between the parties outlining the scope of work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- timeframe of study</td>
<td>- same as above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- selection of consultants</td>
<td>- the responsible party was identified by one or more respondents; shared control was selected in cases where national governments prepared a short-list of qualified national consultants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- study implementation decisions</td>
<td>- the responsible party, e.g., Team Leader was identified in a document and/or by one or more respondents; shared control was selected in cases where the ESS management structure included a National Co-ordinator and/or National Steering Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- study report preparation</td>
<td>- the responsible party was identified in a document and/or by one or more respondents; shared control was selected in cases where national consultants produced sub-sector study reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- study report dissemination</td>
<td>- the responsible party was identified in a document and/or by one or more respondents; shared control was selected in cases where the final report was a joint publication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Use of Policy Analysis Techniques</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- documentary (statistical) research</td>
<td>- extensively was selected where frequent references were made to the gathering of &quot;statistics&quot; from national government ministries, donor agencies and other sources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- interviews with stakeholder groups</td>
<td>- minimally &lt; 50; partially 50 to 150; extensively &gt; 150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- site visits to schools</td>
<td>- minimally &lt; 2 wks; partially 2-6 wks; extensively &gt; 6 wks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- primary research by local consultants</td>
<td>- minimally was selected when &lt;50% of the study team was composed of local consultants and no ancillary studies were commissioned; partially was selected when &lt;50% of the study team was composed of local consultants and ancillary studies were contracted to local consultants; extensively was selected when &gt;50% of the study team was composed of local consultants and ancillary studies were contracted to local consultants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology Type</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- qualitative data analysis</td>
<td>- relative comparison of importance placed on personal judgement, opinion and perception of stakeholders as reflected in narrative text or respondent answers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- quantitative measures (indicators)</td>
<td>- relative comparison of importance placed on the use of education indicators as reflected in the documentation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- simulation/projection modelling</td>
<td>- partially was selected when used by the study team only; extensively was selected when used to present and select strategic policy options in collaboration with MOE staff and local consultants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- public opinion surveys</td>
<td>- partially was selected when this technique was used in the context of sub-sector report preparation; extensively was selected when this technique was used as part of a communications strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- mass media campaign</td>
<td>- partially was selected when this technique was used in the context of sub-sector report preparation; extensively was selected when this technique was used as part of a communications strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- seminars/workshops with stakeholders</td>
<td>- minimally &lt; 3; partially 3 to &lt;10; extensively &gt; 10.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- national consultations and conferences</td>
<td>- extensively was selected when &gt; 1 national consultation was held</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- presentation of policy options</td>
<td>- minimally was selected when policy options were presented in the final report; partially was selected when policy options were discussed with national government representatives; extensively was selected when policy options were discussed with other stakeholders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- common analytic themes</td>
<td>- relative comparison of the frequency with which the final reports addressed one of the following analytic themes: access, equity, quality, internal efficiency, external efficiency, administration, costing and financing.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Breadth of Indigenous Participation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- from public/government officials</td>
<td>No/none was selected when the stakeholder group was not involved in the conduct of the study; Yes was selected when the stakeholder group was involved, even if just as a passive participant, e.g., interviewee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- from civil groups e.g. NGOs, unions</td>
<td>No/none was selected when the stakeholder group was not involved in the conduct of the study; Yes was selected when the stakeholder group was involved, even if just as a passive participant, e.g., interviewee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- from teachers, parents &amp; students</td>
<td>No/none was selected when the stakeholder group was not involved in the conduct of the study; Yes was selected when the stakeholder group was involved, even if just as a passive participant, e.g., interviewee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depth of Indigenous Participation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- in research design &amp; planning</td>
<td>- passive was selected when the stakeholder group was informed;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>consultative was selected when an opinion or choice among</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>alternatives was solicited from the stakeholder group; active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>was selected when the stakeholder group fulfilled a useful role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in carrying out the activity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- in data collection &amp; analysis</td>
<td>- passive was selected when data was collected from the stakeholder group; consultative was selected when an opinion or choice among alternatives was solicited from the stakeholder group; active was selected when the stakeholder group fulfilled a useful role in carrying out the activity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- in presentation of findings</td>
<td>- passive was selected when information was presented to the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>stakeholder group; consultative was selected when an opinion or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>choice among alternatives was solicited from the stakeholder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>group; active was selected when the stakeholder group fulfilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a useful role in carrying out the activity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- in discussion of recommendations</td>
<td>- passive was selected when recommendations were presented to the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>stakeholder group; consultative was selected when an opinion or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>choice among alternative recommendations was solicited from the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>stakeholder group; active was selected when the stakeholder group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>was instrumental in organising or coordinating the activity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- in selection of policy options</td>
<td>- passive was selected when policy options were presented to the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>stakeholder group; consultative was selected when an opinion or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>choice among alternative policy options was solicited from the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>stakeholder group; active was selected when the stakeholder group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>exercised some decision-making role in carrying out the activity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX III - CASE-ORDERED MATRICES
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases/Analytic Framework</th>
<th>Senegal</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>General Information</strong></td>
<td>Comprehensive, w/focus on basic Aid program design</td>
<td>Comprehensive, w/focus on basic Improved policy implementation Sept. 1992 - April 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- scope of study</td>
<td>Aug.-Sept. 1990</td>
<td>28 days total in two phases 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- purpose of study</td>
<td>4 weeks</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- dates of study</td>
<td>2 USAID staff, 2 US consult.</td>
<td>2 USAID staff, 2 US consult.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- duration of study</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- composition of study team</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assumptions/Problems</strong></td>
<td>recent economic set-backs require a re-examination of the role of formal &amp; nonformal basic education</td>
<td>deterioration of the quality of education at all levels focus on formal primary education due to decreasing (29%) student enrollment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- policy problem identified</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- policy goals &amp; objectives</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- avail. of reliable data</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control of Study</strong></td>
<td>USAID/Senegal</td>
<td>USAID/Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- initiation of study</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>USAID/Wash./Study team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- prep. of scope of work</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>USAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- timeframe of study</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>USAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- selection of consultants</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>USAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- implementation decisions</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Study Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>- report preparation</td>
<td>Study Team</td>
<td>Study Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- report dissemination</td>
<td>USAID/Washington</td>
<td>USAID/Washington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy Analysis Techniques</strong></td>
<td>predominant reliance on secondary source documents interviews used to supplement or verify documentary research findings 2 days of site visits no reported public consultations, surveys or other original research - considerable use of quantitative measures i.e. ROR</td>
<td>primary source documents, meetings, interviews and site observation used for data gathering and verification 1 week of site visits conducted, but no public consultations, surveys or other original research reported - considerable use in Part I of quantitative measures - qualitative data in Part II used to address education specific constraints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- approach, method, process</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- quantitative measures</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- efficiency indicators</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>- qualitative information</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- national commissions</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>- public consultations</td>
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<tr>
<td>- public opinion surveys</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>- mass media campaign</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Breadth of Participation</strong></td>
<td>56 people met or interviewed 12 MEN &amp; gov't staff 9 NGOs. other consultants yes, but no $s provided 35 USAID, WB, other donors</td>
<td>Meeting and interviews held 23 ME &amp; gov't staff yes, but no $s provided yes, but no $s provided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Gov't officials/staff</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- civil society, NGOs, etc</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- teachers/parents/students</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- donor agency staff</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Depth of Participation</strong></td>
<td>no evidence of indigenous participation in any phase of the study implementation</td>
<td>no evidence of indigenous participation in any phase of the study implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- research design/planning</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- data collection/analysis</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- presentation of findings</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- disc. of policy options</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- policy options selected</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Study Recommendations</strong></td>
<td>Prescriptive recommendations presented for a future USAID education program that focuses on basic education in primary schools and nonformal education in rural areas for girls and women.</td>
<td>Prescriptive recommendations presented for decentralized education services, increased resources for primary education through cost sharing and the establishment of private primary and secondary schools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>South Africa - Primary</td>
<td>South Africa - Tertiary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive, w/focus on basic</td>
<td>Primary education sub-sector</td>
<td>Tertiary education sub-sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education policy reform</td>
<td>Policy formulation/implementation</td>
<td>Education policy reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 days</td>
<td>7 weeks</td>
<td>8 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The quality levels of primary education</td>
<td>- post-independence education system sorely inadequate</td>
<td>- higher education in SA is segregated by race and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>are not adequate</td>
<td>- increase access, improve quality, &amp; enhance internal efficiency in basic educ.</td>
<td>discriminated by gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- primary source documents, meetings, interviews and site observation used for data gathering and verification</td>
<td>- primary source documents, meetings, interviews, panel discussions and site observation used for data gathering and verification</td>
<td>- primary source documents, meetings, interviews, group discussions, conferences and site observation used for data gathering and verification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 2 days of site visits conducted, but no public consultations, surveys or other original research reported</td>
<td>- 2 weeks site visits conducted, but no public consultations, surveys or other original research reported</td>
<td>- 6 weeks of site visits conducted, but no public consultations, surveys or other original research reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- limited use of quantitative measures of equity/efficiency</td>
<td>- qualitative information used to address curriculum and instructional effectiveness</td>
<td>- extensive use of quantitative measures of internal efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- little information available on use of qualitative data</td>
<td></td>
<td>- little information available on use of qualitative data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meetings and interviews held</td>
<td>Meetings and interviews held</td>
<td>Meetings and interviews held</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 59 MOE &amp; govt' staff</td>
<td>- no contact w/gov't staff</td>
<td>- 3 Dept. of Education staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 19 NGO personnel</td>
<td>- 100 institution staff</td>
<td>- 144 higher institution staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 22 USAID, WB, other donors</td>
<td>- yes, but no #s provided</td>
<td>- 15 ANC &amp; civil groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- 5 Development Bank personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- no evidence of indigenous participation in first three phases of study implementation</td>
<td>- with the exception of some limited SA involvement in data collection/analysis, there is no evidence of SA participation in the other phases of study</td>
<td>- significant SA presence in data collection/analysis &amp; report presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- discussion and selection of policy options was likely done with the MOE</td>
<td></td>
<td>- limited participation of ANC in discussion of policy options</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- final selection by USAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prescriptive recommendations for strengthened capacities in policy analysis &amp; planning, development, instructional systems design, materials production, promotion of equity and efficiency, building NGO partnerships and in donor coordination.</td>
<td>Prescriptive recommendations presented to: improve internal efficiency (4), equalized resource allocations (7), a unitary education system (7), improved quality and relevancy of instructional materials (9), and improved quality of teachers (5).</td>
<td>Prescriptive recommendations presented to: unify &amp; rationalize the admin. of tertiary system, establish community colleges, restructure tertiary sub-sectors, revise subsidy formula, establish students grants/loans, and introduce cost-sharing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Study/Analytical Framework</td>
<td>Kenya World Bank</td>
<td>Zimbabwe World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Information</td>
<td>Comprehensive w/ focus on HRD</td>
<td>Primary/secondary sub-sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- scope of study</td>
<td>Health/education policy reform</td>
<td>Policy reform w/ focus on equity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- dates of study</td>
<td>25 days</td>
<td>19 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- duration of study</td>
<td>4 WB staff</td>
<td>5 WB staff, 1 US consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- composition of study team</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 GO2 counterpart study team</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Assumptions/Problems           | rapid expansion of has forced government to allocate a high % of the state budget to educ., but new fiscal measures require a critical look into improving access and efficiency | despite remarkable post-independence expansion, there are important equity issues that remain and require full assessment in order to be in a better position to plan | - despite remarkable post-independence expansion, issues of quantity and quality required in-depth study i.e. expansion, equity, and internal/external efficiency |
| - policy problem identified    |                                    |                      |               |
| - policy goals & objectives    |                                    |                      |               |
| - avail. of reliable data      |                                    |                      |               |

| Control of Study               | World Bank                          | Government of Zimbabwe (GO2) | - SIDA/GO2 |
| - initiation of study          | World Bank/G2                        | World Bank/G2              | - SIDA/GO2 |
| - prep. of scope of work       | World Bank/G2                        | World Bank/G2              | - SIDA/GO2 |
| - timeframe of study           | World Bank/G2                        | World Bank/G2              | - SIDA/GO2 |
| - selection of consultants     | World Bank/G2                        | World Bank/G2              | - SIDA/GO2 |
| - implementation decisions     | World Bank/G2                        | World Bank/G2              | - SIDA/GO2 |
| - report dissemination         | World Bank/G2                        | World Bank/G2              | - SIDA/GO2 |

| Policy Analysis Techniques    | predominant reliance on secondary source documents, but no reported interviews, site visits, public consultations, or surveys conducted | predominant use of primary and secondary source documents from WB, GO2 reports and other research | predominant use of GO2 documents, statistics, staff reports, etc. |
| - approach, method, process    | two papers commissioned and completed by local consultants | - no interviews, site visits, public consultations reported | - extensive site visits, interviews and 40 case studies used to supplement statistical data from GO2 sources |
| - qualitative measures         | considerable use of Resident Mission for statistical database on education | - simulation projection models used to analyze policy options | - 20 SIDA supported projects were examined/evaluated for results |
| - efficiency indicators        | extensive use of quantitative measures and indicators | - extensive use of quantitative measures and indicators | - no public consultations, surveys or other original research reported |
| - national commissions         |                                    |                      | - limited use of quantitative measures and indicators for equity & efficiency |
| - public consultations        |                                    |                      |               |
| - mass media campaign          |                                    |                      |               |

| Breadth of Participation       | no evidence of field research conducted during the study, although consultations and data collection by the Resident Mission are referred to in reports | participation in meetings and interviews appears to be limited to the GO2 officials and local consultants, but a firm conclusion cannot be drawn based on documents | Meetings and interviews held |
| - Gov't officials/staff        |                                    |                      | - 16 education ministry staff |
| - civil society, NGOs, etc     |                                    |                      | - yes, but no # provided |
| - teachers/parents/students    |                                    |                      | - yes, but no # provided |
| - donor agency staff           |                                    |                      | - SIDA field staff |

| Depth of Participation         | no evidence of indigenous participation in any phase of the study implementation | there is evidence to indicate a significant level of official GO2 collaboration and participation in all phases of this "collaborative effort" | there is evidence to indicate a significant level of official GO2 participation in all phases of this "joint education sector study" |
| - research design/planning     | draft report policy options discussed with govn't officials |                                    |               |
| - data collection/analysis     |                                    |                      |               |
| - presentation of findings     |                                    |                      |               |
| - disc. of policy options      |                                    |                      |               |
| - policy options selected      |                                    |                      |               |

<p>| Study Recommendations          | Prescriptive recommendations presented for a shift from expansion to quality and equity requiring institution capacity to manage consensus building for policy reforms, policy research &amp; analysis and broaden input into policy formulation from institutions outside government. | Prescriptive recommendations presented for improved learning achievements, cost-effective strategies, decentralization, cost-sharing and capacity building in policy analysis/planning. GO2 commentary reflects general agreement, but indicate some areas of significant disagreement. | The report outlines 24 prescriptive recommendations for consolidation and improvement of education quality in disadvantaged regions, rather than continued expansion of the education system. |
| - summary observations         |                                    |                      |               |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases/Analytical Framework</th>
<th>Congo</th>
<th>Burkina Faso</th>
<th>Bénin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>General Information</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- scope of study</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- purpose of study</td>
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<td>- dates of study</td>
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<tr>
<td>- duration of study</td>
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<td>- composition of study team</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Assumptions/Problems</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- policy problem identified</td>
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<tr>
<td>- policy goals &amp; objectives</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- avail. of reliable data</td>
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<td><strong>Control of Study</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- initiation of study</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- prep. of scope of work</td>
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<td>- timeframe of study</td>
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<td>- selection of consultants</td>
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<td>- implementation decisions</td>
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<td>- report preparation</td>
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<td>- report dissemination</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Policy Analysis Techniques</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- approach, method, process</td>
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<td>- quantitative measures</td>
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<td>- qualitative indicators</td>
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<td>- qualitative information</td>
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<td>- national commissions</td>
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<tr>
<td>- public consultations</td>
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<td>- public opinion surveys</td>
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<td>- mass media campaign</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Breadth of Participation</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Gov't officials/staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>- civil society, NGOs, etc</td>
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<tr>
<td>- teachers/parents/students</td>
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<tr>
<td>- donor agency staff</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Depth of Participation</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- data collection/analysis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- presentation of findings</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- disc. of policy options</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- policy options selected</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Study Recommendations</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- summary observations</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**UNESCO/UNDP EDUCATION SECTOR STUDIES**

- Bénin: Comprehensive educ. sector analysis Policy reform & investment planning May 1989 - March 1993 35 months 2 UNESCO Consultants, 2 GOB staff 26 nat'l & 20 internat'l consultants

- Economic stabilization requires structural adjustment measures - first examines the socio-economic, population and employment context in the country and the repercussion on education
- Education and training sector has benefited from preferential treatment, but results did not meet expectations - a review required of enrollment, quality, expansion and management
- Economic recession had a negative effect on education - within context of the SAP, improve the quality of education and efficiency of the system

- Government of Burkina Faso (GOBF) - GOB/UNDP/UNESCO - UNESCO - GOB/GOB-MEBA
- Government of Bénin (GOB) - GOB/UNDP/UNESCO - GOB/UNDP/UNESCO - Study Team/Coordin. Committee - Study Team - UNESCO/GOB-MEN

- The diagnostic stage included documentary research and interviews - 4 sub-sector & 21 thematic policy studies generated baseline information for the formulation of policy options - extensive use of quantitative measures & indicators - simulation modeling used to present & select policy options - national consultation and disc. of policy options planned
- The approach used has 3 stages: diagnosis, strategy & action plan - 40 policy studies & working papers generated by study in diagnosis phase - extensive use of quantitative measures & indicators - simulation modeling used to present & select policy options - frequent use of public workshops, surveys and media to stimulate debate & build consensus

- Meetings and interviews held - 21 MEN & other gov't staff - 4 university staff - no #s provided - 20 IPI & bilateral agency staff
- Meetings and interviews held - 40 MEBA & other gov't staff - no #s provided - 20 IPI & bilateral agency staff
- Meetings and interviews held - considerable, but no #s provided - several hundred participated in 30+ seminars, workshops & meetings - yes, but no #s provided

- There is considerable evidence to indicate that gov't officials/experts participated in all phases, except design & planning, while public discussion of policy options was planned for next strategic phase
- There is considerable evidence to indicate that gov't officials/experts participated in all phases, while public discussion of policy options was included of all stakeholders
- Policy options were discussed, selected and legislated in "strategic formulation" phase by GOB/stakeholders
- Investment (action plan) programme recommendations were presented to donor agencies for financial support

- GOB retains control over policy reform and implementation process
ANNEX IV - INTERVIEW GUIDE AND QUESTIONS

INTERVIEW GUIDE

This interview guide provides the researcher with a standard set of questions and protocol that will be followed during each interview. All interviewees will be asked to sign a consent form before beginning the interview. The confidentiality of interviewee responses will be assured and explained. All data collected from interviewees will be pooled. Only the researcher will have access to this information. Although interviewees may be quoted, sources of information will not be identified by either name, position title or specific institutional affiliation. Interviews will have a maximum duration of 1 hour and be tape-recorded. Interviewees offered a copy of the thesis paper when completed.

The use of an interview guide will enhance the internal consistency of the data collected across the spectrum of interviews. Interview questions have been structured and articulated in a manner that will allow for: 1) data collection on each donor agency’s methodology for conducting ESS, 2) triangulation of content analysis findings for specific studies, and 3) the gathering of professional opinion on the advantages and disadvantages of increased indigenous participation in the conduct of ESS. This line of questioning will thereby moves from the broad, to the specific and back to the broad general opinion topics.

Twelve core questions have been formulated that will be asked of each interviewee. These questions reflect the conceptual framework developed for the research and previously applied during the content analysis phase. Additional probes have been prepared for use when interviewees do not address the full range of issues associated with the core questions. However, to ensure full coverage of all core questions no more than 15 minutes will be devoted to questions in Part I of the interview, 30 minutes to Part II and the remaining 15 minutes to Part III questions.
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Part I: The interviewer will begin with some general questions regarding the donor agency’s approach to the conduct of ESS?

1) Why does (USAID, WB, UNESCO, SIDA) do ESS?

2) How are the ESS Terms of Reference/Scope of Work prepared?
   Probe: What are some of the constraints to consider when preparing them?

3) How are the international and/or national consultants selected for ESS?
   Probe: What criteria are used? Describe their respective roles?

Part II: The interviewer should at this point indicate that the line of questioning will focus on the specific ESS in which the interviewee was involved.

4) How were decisions made during the implementation of that ESS? By whom? Why?
   Probe: What are the advantages or disadvantages to that approach?
   Probe: Was consideration given to increasing indigenous control? Why not?

5) Could you describe the policy analysis/research methodology used in that ESS?
   Probe: What were the data sources? How was the data collected? Who analyzed the data? How was it analyzed? Where was it analyzed?
   Probe: Were there any problems? If yes, what were the reasons?

6) Which stakeholder groups were consulted most often? Why?
   Probe: What about ministry staff (central vs regional), teachers or their unions, parents or their associations, students, NGOs, donor agencies, etc.
   Probe: Were there any problems related to such consultation?
7) How were the identified stakeholder groups involved in the study?
   Probe: Did they participate in research design & planning, data collection and
   analysis, presentation of findings, discussion of policy options or in the
   selection of policy options?

8) In your personal opinion do you think the study generated valid recommendations?
   Probe: Were they justifiable given the policy analysis methods employed?

Part III: At this point, the interviewer will let the interviewee know that the questions
will be of a more general nature.

9) What do you think about indigenous participation in ESS?

10) Are there constraints to increased indigenous participation in ESS?
    Probe: If no, why not?
    Probe: If yes, what are they?

11) My study of several ESS so far indicates little difference in education policy
    recommendations regardless of levels of participation. Any comments?

12) In your view, does stakeholder participation in sector studies have a positive effect on
    policy implementation?
ANNEX V - REFERENCE BIBLIOGRAPHY


