INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

Bell & Howell Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600

UMI®
Pluralism and the Structure of Ethical Discourse:

Insights from Lonergan, MacIntyre, and Conflict Resolution

Dissertation presented in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
at the University of Ottawa

by

(C) Peter L. Monette

Faculty of Theology
Saint Paul University
University of Ottawa

March, 1999
The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author’s permission.

L’auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

L’auteur conserve la propriété du droit d’auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

0-612-45187-9
Acknowledgments

What you have in your hands is a single manuscript written by a single author. But, what you may not be aware of is the fact that the manuscript emerged because of the existence of a specific set of conditions. In my case, some of these conditions are actual persons and I would like to simply acknowledge them and thank them for their gifts. First and foremost I want to thank my director Kenneth Melchin. Ken was always encouraging and often pushed me in a gentle way to write more clearly and think out my insights more thoroughly. In the process of writing a thesis, the director is a significant condition. Ken's way of working made this project enjoyable and, I think, ultimately successful (though, of course, I take full responsibility for the content of this manuscript). Second, I would like to thank Christine Jamieson for the time and effort she spent editing the manuscript. Her editing suggestions allowed me to clarify some important insights. Finally, I would like to thank William Penney who offered his home to me during the final writing stage of the manuscript. His hospitality allowed for a level of human comfort sufficient for a creative writing space.

Peter L. Monette
March, 1999
Ottawa
Table of Contents

Acknowledgments

Introduction / vi

Chapter One: Alasdair MacIntyre on the Dialectical Encounter Among Traditions

1.0. Introduction / 1

1.1. MacIntyre’s Account of Emotivism / 2

  1.1.1. Three Characteristics of Emotivism / 3
  1.1.2. The Emotivist Self / 5
  1.1.3. The Emotivist Culture / 7
  1.1.4. Liberalism / 8

1.2. MacIntyre’s Ethical Framework / 10

  1.2.1. MacIntyre’s Method: Tradition-Dependent Rationality / 11
  1.2.2. Tradition / 13
  1.2.3. The Development of a Tradition / 16
  1.2.4. Rational Moral Discourse Among Traditions: A Dialectical Encounter/ 17
  1.2.5. The Goals of the Dialectical Encounter / 23

1.3. Clarifying the Dialectical Encounter: 7 Issues / 26

  1.3.1. Critiques of MacIntyre’s Account of the Liberal Tradition / 26
  1.3.2. Is MacIntyre’s Position Basically Relativist? / 31
  1.3.3. The Possibility of Translation / 33
  1.3.4. The Notion of a Boundary Person / 37
  1.3.5. Are the Canons of Logic Enough to Settle Moral Disagreement? / 39
  1.3.6. The Concept of Truth in the Dialectical Encounter / 40
  1.3.7. MacIntyre’s Example of a Forum for the Dialectical Encounter: The University / 42

1.4. On MacIntyre’s Internal Contradiction:
    Contributions from Michael Maxwell / 44

1.5. Summary of Chapter One / 54
Chapter Two: Bernard Lonergan’s Cognitional Theory and World-View of Emergent Probability

2.0. Introduction / 56

2.1. Bernard Lonergan’s Cognitional Theory / 57

2.1.1. The Levels of Conscious Intentionality / 58
2.1.2. The First Three Levels of Consciousness Intentionality / 59
2.1.3. The Fourth Level of Conscious Intentionality / 64
2.1.4. Insight on the Practical Insight / 65
2.1.5. Method in Theology and the Fourth Level of Responsibility / 75
   2.1.5.1. The Level of Responsibility / 76
   2.1.5.2. Sublation / 77
2.1.6. The Question of Reduplication / 79
   2.1.6.1. Philip McShane / 81
   2.1.6.2. Patrick Byrne / 82
2.1.7. Towards a More Complex Image of Conscious Intentionality / 86

2.2. Emergent Probability and the Complementarity in the Knowing Process / 89

2.2.1. Heuristic Anticipations / 90
2.2.2. Procedures / 91
2.2.3. Formulations / 91
2.2.4. Modes of Abstraction / 92
2.2.5. Verification / 93
2.2.6. Domains of Data / 94

2.3. Emergent Probability and the Complementarity in the Known / 96

2.3.1. Schemes of Recurrence / 99
2.3.2. The Probability of Schemes / 104

2.4. Emergent Probability and Schemes of Recurrence / 106

2.5. Emergent Probability and the Human Sciences / 111

2.6. Lonergan on Meaning / 116

2.6.1. Carriers of Meaning / 116
2.6.2. Elements of Meaning / 123
2.6.3. Functions of Meaning / 125
2.6.4. Realms of Meaning / 133
2.6.5. Stages of Meaning / 138

2.7. Lonergan and Intersubjectivity / 139

2.7.1. The Structure of the Human Good / 140
2.7.2. The Dialectic of Community / 142
2.7.3. Bias and the Cycles of Decline / 146
2.7.4. Cosmopolis / 152

2.8. Secondary Sources on Lonergan and Intersubjectivity-Discourse / 154

2.8.1. Kenneth Melchin / 155
2.8.2. William Rehg / 159
2.8.3. Tad Dunne / 162
2.8.4. Steven Wentworth Arndt / 164
2.8.5. Summary of Section 2.8. / 166

2.9. Summary of Chapter Two / 166

Chapter Three: The Structure of Ethical Discourse I

3.0. Introduction / 169

3.1. The Foundational Recurrence Scheme of Discourse / 170

3.1.1. Gibson Winter's Three-Fold Structure of Sociality / 171
3.1.2. Melchin on the Dialectic of Unification / 173
3.1.3. Summary of the Foundational Scheme of Discourse / 177

3.2. The Four Levels of the Structure of Ethical Discourse / 178

3.2.1. The First Level of Recognition / 184
    3.2.1.1. Clarification Through Lonergan's Cognitional Theory / 191
    3.2.1.2. Summary of the First Level / 192

3.2.2. The Second Level of Mutual Understanding / 193
    3.2.2.1. What is an Expression? / 194
    3.2.2.2. Interpretation / 200
    3.2.2.3. Summary of the Second Level / 208

3.2.3. The Third Level of Common Judgment and Conviction / 210
    3.2.3.1. Critical Mind / 211
    3.2.3.2. Dialectics and Conversion in Radical Differences / 218
3.2.3.3. Judgment in Discourse: The Tripartite Set of Judgments of Fact and Value / 224
3.2.3.4. Summary of the Third Level / 229

3.2.4. The Fourth Level of Cooperative Action and Commitment / 230
3.2.4.1. Intending Cooperative Action Strategies / 231
3.2.4.2. Considering, Committing, Deciding, and Acting / 232
   3.2.4.2.1. Considering / 233
   3.2.4.2.2. Committing / 237
   3.2.4.2.3. Deciding / 238
   3.2.4.2.4. Acting / 240
3.2.4.3. Summary of the Fourth Level / 241

3.3. Summary of Chapter Three / 242

Chapter Four: The Structure of Ethical Discourse II

4.0. Introduction / 244

4.1. MacIntyre Revisited / 244

4.2. Recurrence Scheme Analysis and Internal Norms / 248
   4.2.1. The Internal Norms of Discourse / 251

4.3. A Compound Notion of Solidarity / 259
   4.3.1. First Order Solidarity / 260
   4.3.2. Second Order Solidarity / 261
   4.3.3. Third Order Solidarity / 263
   4.3.4. Fourth Order Solidarity / 264

4.4. Summary of Chapter Four / 266

Chapter Five: Insights From the Field of Conflict Resolution

5.0. Introduction / 268

5.1. The Field of Mediation / 270
   5.1.1. R. Fisher and L. Keashly / 271
5.1.2. R. Dukes / 272
5.1.3. Kressel et al. / 274
5.1.4. R. Bush and J. Folger / 276
5.1.5. Summary of the Field of Mediation / 278

5.2. Illustration of the Structure of Ethical Discourse in Mediation / 279
5.2.1. First General Pattern: Microfocus / 281
5.2.2. Second General Pattern: Deliberation and Choice-Making / 283
5.2.3. Third General Pattern: Perspective Taking / 285

5.3. Summary of Chapter Five / 287

Chapter Six: Towards a Theological Ethics of Discourse

6.0. Introduction / 289

6.1. MacIntyre’s Virtue Ethics / 291
6.1.1. A Practice / 292
6.1.2. Internal and External Goods / 296
6.1.3. Relationships in a Practice / 299
6.1.4. Institutions / 302
6.1.5. Evil Practices / 304

6.2. Lonergan’s Dialectic of History: Progress, Decline, and Redemption / 310
6.2.1. Redemptive Praxis and the Theological Virtues / 311
6.2.2. Lonergan’s Theology of Redemption / 315

6.3. Towards a Theological Ethics of Discourse / 318
6.3.1. Mediation as a Practice / 319
6.3.2. Conflict and Sin / 320
6.3.3. Charity in Mediation / 322

6.4. Summary of Chapter Six / 325

Conclusion / 327

Bibliography / 338
Introduction

It is commonplace today to speak of our society as pluralistic. Our society is composed of people from diverse traditions with conflicting values and concepts of the good life. We no longer expect that our social arrangements will promote a single tradition, group, or notion of the good life. In fact, we value the value of a multitude of values. We expect our social institutions to promote this overarching value of a respect of values. However, we also know that our pluralistic society is not without its problems. Political life seems more often than not a fight for privilege rather than a sincere search for common understanding and peaceful coexistence. Though we value the overarching value of respect for other people's way of living, we often seem inept at being able to put this respect into practice. Various philosophical and ethical projects have emerged in response to this problem.¹ On one side of the debate are proceduralists who argue that in order for pluralistic society to truly respect and foster the value of respecting other people's values we must be attentive to the structural arrangement that exists among us. The practice of discourse itself, so the proceduralists argue, can provide for a neutral procedure that mitigates conflicts while promoting respect among citizens. On the other side of the debate are

¹ Representatives of the two sides of this debate are well known. Procedural arguments tend to be promoted by scholars like Jürgen Habermas and Bruce Ackerman. Communitarian arguments tend to be promoted by Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Sandel among others. This brief description of the debate is meant only to contextualize this thesis.
communitarians who argue that pluralistic discourse must recognize the
tradition of each group or each member of society. Ethical discourse must
allow for the deeply held convictions of citizens because it is through these
convictions that ethical living has any meaning at all. In fact, the
communitarians argue, only a pluralistic discourse that respects these values
can, at the same time, protect minority groups from being dominated by a
politically powerful group or tradition. Though this debate between the
proceduralists and the communitarians is much more complex than laid out
here, at issue remains the challenge to articulate the necessary resources for
pluralistic discourse that can both respect divergent and conflicting values
and, at the same time, promote peaceful social living.

A thesis that enters into this vast and at times convoluted debate can
easily be misunderstood. So, it would be best to begin this introduction by
briefly describing areas of the debate with which this thesis is not directly
concerned. First, though the thesis will present insights toward a theological
ethics of discourse, I am not directly concerned with the issues of public
theology. The debates on public theology generally question the adequacy

---

2 A good summary of the public theology debate can be found in the
article by Kathryn Tanner, “Public Theology and the Character of Public
Debate,” in The Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics, ed. Harlem Bakley
(Chicago: Society of Christian Ethics, 1996), 79-101. See also Albert R.
Jonsen, “Theological Ethics, Moral Philosophy, and Public Moral Discourse,”
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 4 (1994): 1-11; Don S. Browning and
Francis Schüssler Fiorenza, ed., Habermas, Modernity, and Public Theology,
and relevance of Christian symbols, stories, and doctrines in a pluralistic society that cannot a priori anticipate even a slight agreement on religious beliefs. Second, I am not directly concerned with issues related to the globalization of the public sphere which has occurred through mass communication, immigration, and the decline of classicist culture. These debates generally focus on the issues of identity, recognition, and difference in multicultural societies that promote democratic ideals of participatory citizenry. Though certain arguments in this thesis may provide contributions to this debate, it will not be my focus here. Third, I am not directly concerned with ethical questions on the commensurability of divergent notions of the good. These debates generally focus on how different notions of the good can be evaluated in pluralistic discourse. While I have no doubt that some insights developed in this thesis can shed light on these issues,


they too will be put aside. If this thesis is not directly concerned with these debates, then what is its contribution?

This thesis does not directly concern these debates because it attempts to shift the field of reference. Instead of making a contribution directly to the substantive debates, this thesis works on a heuristic level. It does this by articulating the structure of ethical, pluralistic discourse in relation to the heuristic insights of Bernard Lonergan’s intentionality analysis. Working with these seminal insights has the distinct advantage of shifting attention away from substantive issues on either the content of discourse, or its procedural rules, by attending to the structure of intentionality that guides collective inquiry in the pursuit of truth, value, and cooperative action. On this heuristic level, the thesis seeks to articulate the structure of ethical discourse as having its source in the structure of conscious intentionality. As subjective inquiry is guided by the four levels of experience, intelligence, rationality, and responsibility, I will suggest that so too is ethical, pluralistic discourse guided by intersubjective acts of recognition, mutual understanding, common judgment, and cooperative action. My effort, throughout, will be to show how an heuristic investigation allows us to identify these four levels of the structure of ethical, pluralistic discourse.

---

The thesis is organized into six chapters. In chapter one, I begin with the philosophical framework of Alasdair MacIntyre as a point of entry into the debate on pluralistic discourse. MacIntyre argues that contemporary society is emotivist in its ethical framework. Emotivism is the philosophy that claims that all ethical statements are merely expressions of personal preference. On a social level, it does not expect a rational debate on ethical issues. Instead, according to MacIntyre, emotivism gives rise to an ethical debate controlled by political will. He argues, however, that there is a method for rational ethical debate in pluralistic society. This method involves a dialectical process whereby members of diverse moral traditions can encounter each other and advance collective understanding on moral issues. In fact, for MacIntyre, the dialectical method is not a new method founded upon modern pluralism, but is the basic approach that Thomas Aquinas used in synthesizing the two great Western traditions of Aristotle and Augustine. For MacIntyre, Aquinas' synthesis represents the ideal of his dialectical method. I elaborate this method by discussing seven related issues: critiques of MacIntyre's account of liberalism; the relativity of MacIntyre's framework; the possibility of translation; the notion of a

---

6 I could also have used the discourse ethics of Jürgen Habermas as the starting point of this thesis. However, MacIntyre's ethical framework provides an historical dimension that I have found to be rich in substantive content.
boundary person; the canons of logic; the concept of truth; and the university as a forum for the dialectical encounter. Part of MacIntyre’s argument for his dialectical method is that, although it is founded upon Aquinas’ account of practical rationality, it can be radically revised. I argue that there is no place in MacIntyre’s overall ethical framework for a permanent ethical or philosophical achievement. All ethical knowledge is simply the best answer so far developed through the dialectical encounter among traditions. But, this introduces a problem in MacIntyre’s account of the dialectical method.

According to Michael Maxwell’s critique, the method of MacIntyre’s dialectical process itself cannot be open to radical revision, since one cannot base a revision of rationality by using that same rationality. For Maxwell, MacIntyre’s dialectical method reveals this *aporia* because he does not make an adequate interpretation of Aquinas’ notion of rationality. Maxwell suggests that Bernard Lonergan’s account of human inquiry, based as it is on a more adequate account of Aquinas’ rationality, can provide the trans-traditional element to the dialectical method that MacIntyre seems to avoid. But, far from being a universal perspective that appeals to substantive norms, Lonergan’s trans-traditional notion of human inquiry is heuristic. Maxwell’s suggestion regarding overcoming MacIntyre’s internal problem by working with Lonergan’s cognitional theory is a clue. Lonergan’s work may provide a nonuniversalist, trans-traditional basis for articulating pluralistic
discourse because it attends to the basic structure of the human pursuit of truth, value, and action.

Chapter two introduces Bernard Lonergan's cognitional theory and world-view of emergent probability. The chapter aims to provide the basic framework within which the structure of ethical discourse can be examined. Emergent probability is the term for Lonergan's dynamic world-view. As a world-view, it accounts for the methods of classical and statistical inquiry as fundamentally complementary. Each method is interdependent and can be used to analyze data. The prime example of these two methods at work is Lonergan's notion of a scheme of recurrence. A scheme of recurrence allows for classical and statistical investigations in both natural and human processes. Within emergent probability, Lonergan is able to account for the structure of human inquiry. Thus, Lonergan's cognitional theory is briefly presented through the use of a thought experiment. But, two problems immediately are raised. The first is the question of interpreting Lonergan's account of practical insight in chapter eighteen of *Insight*. Specifically, the question is what kind of knowing does practical insight intend? In order to answer this question an interpretation of Lonergan's *Insight* will be done. I argue that Lonergan uses three different understandings of the term "knowing" in chapter eighteen of *Insight*: knowing concerned with facts; knowing concerned with value; and knowing concerned with action. The
second question concerns the issue of how the operations of intentionality function on the different levels of intentionality. There is a question in Lonergan studies concerning the reduplication of the operations of intentionality on different levels. For example, is the act of judging value only a fourth level activity, or can it be done on any of the other levels of intentionality? This question will be addressed because it has some repercussions for the image that one has of the four levels of intentionality and their interrelations. I argue for a more complex, flexible, and dynamic image of conscious intentionality, not a simple step model whereby one ascends mechanically through inquiry first by experience, then understanding, judging, and decision. From these two questions, chapter two considers Lonergan’s notion of meaning as an expansion of the basic structure of conscious intentionality. Meaning is the substance of acts of inquiry expressed and communicated to others. The issue of meaning allows for an articulation of Lonergan’s notions of intersubjectivity, the human good, the dialectic of history, bias, and cosmopolis. This is followed by a brief review of the literature of Lonergan scholars who have worked with Lonergan’s seminal insights on subjectivity and expanded the analysis into the context of discourse and intersubjectivity. Throughout chapter two, the aim is to provide the basic framework to work out the structure of ethical discourse.
Chapter three is the first part of an articulation of the structure of ethical discourse. I argue that the structure of ethical discourse has its source in the structure of subjective conscious intentionality. Two people engage in face-to-face discourse to discuss some ethical issue. This engagement is structured by the four levels of conscious intentionality contextualized by the encounter of discourse. This generates the four levels of the structure of ethical discourse as recognition, mutual understanding, common judgment, and cooperative action. Fundamental to this encounter is the process of gesture, response, and unification. This fundamental discourse scheme of recurrence will be articulated by drawing on the work of Gibson Winter's account of sociality and Kenneth Melchin's reworking of the dialectic of unification. This fundamental discourse scheme is operative throughout the discourse. Each level of the structure of ethical discourse orientates the fundamental scheme towards the goal of each specific level.

On the level of recognition, I will work with Winter's notion of the "We-relation" that is established in face-to-face encounters. In the We-relation, discourse partners engage in the gesture, response and role-taking of self and other images. I will also offer a correction to Winter's account of consciousness via Lonergan's intentionality analysis. On the level of mutual understanding, I will work with Lonergan's notion of expression and interpretation. An expression is an attempt to communicate an insight to
another person. The structure of an expression intricately links the
discourse partners. But, the expression must be interpreted. Discourse is
the place wherein interpretations of each other’s expressions can be clarified
directly through questions and answers. On the level of common judgment, I
will work with Lonergan’s notion of judgment. Judgments grasp the
existence of the fulfilling conditions for propositional statements.
Establishing the conditions involves asking all the relevant questions. In
discourse, this means that one must seek the questions of other people in
affirming judgments of fact and value.7 This gives rise to a threefold set of
judgments that consist of the subsets of judgments of agreement, judgments
of disagreements, and judgments of agreements to disagree. This tripartite
set of judgments allows for a greater awareness of the types of judgments
that concern all discourse partners. Upon these judgments, discourse
partners establish their collective, higher viewpoint as an integration of their
pre-discourse horizons. On the fourth level of cooperative action, discourse
partners work out practical insights. Practical insights can be considered,

7 Note that here I deal with judgments of fact and value together on
the third level of discourse. To some Lonergan scholars this may seem like a
misrepresentation of Lonergan’s ethics since in Method in Theology he seems
to place judgments of value on the fourth level of intentionality. However,
the question about operations and levels of consciousness is taken up in
sections 2.1.6. “On the Question of Reduplication” and 2.1.7. “Towards a More
Complex Image of Conscious Intentionality” which introduce a dynamic
image of the structure of intentionality. It is this image that is guiding the
analysis of this thesis.
committed to, collectively decided upon and implemented in cooperative
action strategies that constructively effect the social arrangement of the
discourse partners. Chapter three, then, is an elaboration of the structure of
ethical discourse.

Chapter four works out two characteristics of the structure of ethical
discourse in relation to two issues in MacIntyre's dialectical encounter among
traditions. A recurrence scheme analysis provides for a first characteristic of
the internal norms of discourse. Each level of the structure of ethical
discourse has its own internal norm which must be attended to in the
discourse in order for the discourse to constructively achieve the goals of each
level. On the level of recognition there is the norm of attention. Each
discourse partner must be attentive in providing authentic self-images to the
other. On the level of mutual understanding, there is the norm of the
universal viewpoint. The universal viewpoint is not some place from
nowhere, but the perspective of an openness to potentially all possible
interpretations of each other's expressions. An universal viewpoint can lay
the grounds for correcting possible interference due to bias. On the level of
common judgment, there is the norm of asking all the relevant questions. In
coming to common judgments that involve the tripartite set, discourse
partners must allow for all the relevant questions from all partners in order
that those judgments can carry the conviction that is associated with making
judgments. On the level of cooperative action, there are the internal norms associated with considering, committing, deciding, and acting. Of particular importance is the internal norm to carry out in action what one has decided upon in discourse. This requires a degree of trust among discourse partners that what has been agreed to in discourse will become part of the new routines in their collective action. A second characteristic of the structure of ethical discourse concerns a compound notion of solidarity. The structure of ethical discourse provides for an understanding of a compound notion of solidarity. Solidarity here does not simply mean having the same rational affirmations, or beliefs. Rather, there is a distinct quality of solidarity on each level of the discourse. On the level of recognition, there is the solidarity of the exchange of images. On the level of mutual understanding, there is the solidarity involved in the linkages of adequate expressions and interpretation. On the level of common judgment, there is the solidarity of the higher viewpoint that consists in the collective convictions associated with each subset of judgments of agreement, disagreement, and agreement to disagree. On the level of cooperative action, there is the solidarity of establishing new action strategies that aim to constructively alter existing routines toward new social arrangements. These two characteristics of the internal norms of discourse and the compound notion of solidarity show some of the advantages of a heuristic approach to the question of pluralistic
discourse.

In chapter five the thesis seeks to concretely illustrate the structure of ethical discourse. I do this by working with material from the field of conflict resolution, particularly, the practice of mediation. Mediation works with potentially destructive discourse patterns among discourse partners and tries to constructively resolve disputes. This chapter will first present a brief review of literature in the field of mediation in order identify divergent understandings of the mediation process. The work of Robert Baruch Bush and Joseph Folger will be used to illustrate the structure of ethical discourse. Their work has raised a lot of interest in the field because it represents a significant attempt to coherently account for the process of transformative mediation. I will illustrate the structure of ethical discourse by making linkages with their own work. They present the structure of mediation by articulating the three general patterns of transformative mediation. I argue from these general patterns to show the structure of ethical discourse. Chapter five, then, aims to concretely illustrate the structure of ethical discourse through the field of mediation.

Chapter six follows up on the concrete illustration of the structure of ethical discourse by outlining an initial sketch of a theological ethics of discourse which works with insights of the three major sources of this thesis. This chapter starts by working with MacIntyre's notion of practice. A
practice is a cooperative system which aims to provide internal goods that benefit the larger society. It does this by establishing standards of excellence that members of the practice must follow in order that their virtuous acts will provide for the internal goods of their practice. The notion of a practice is expanded by considering both issues of relationships in practice and institutions. Of particular importance is the question of evil practices. I will argue that MacIntyre's account of how evil practices are overcome involves an *aporia*. From within his own account of practice, MacIntyre cannot adequately account for how evil practices can be restored to good practices. This *aporia* can be resolved, I further suggest, by working with Lonergan's dialectic of progress, decline, and redemption. Members of a practice in decline do not have adequate resources to overcome their own decline. Thus, it requires an external source; the redemptive moment. This is presented through Lonergan's heuristic account of God's solution to the human problem of evil. From this heuristic account, I will briefly present Lonergan's theology of redemption as the theological correlative. The redemption of Christ allows for our redemptive participation in our world in overcoming evil practices. This will be briefly illustrated in the case of mediation. I will argue that mediation is a practice. Conflict can be the place of sin and it can be the place of redemptive practice. The mediator, I argue, can facilitate the redemptive praxis of charity via the skills of active listening. These
interventions can act to shift the probabilities that the disputants will take up the gift of charity which overcomes the priority of destructive conflict by allowing the concerns of the other to become one's own. This amounts to a redemptive praxis whereby charity is allowed to alter conflicting patterns among discourse partners toward constructive engagements. In such constructive engagements, discourse partners operate within their common, higher viewpoint to work out action strategies that affect their social living. Chapter six, then, brings together the three major sources of this thesis to sketch some insights into a theological ethics of discourse.
Chapter One: Alasdair MacIntyre on the Dialectical Encounter Among Traditions

1.0. Introduction

Alasdair MacIntyre's three books *After Virtue, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* and *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry* address contemporary moral debates from within a tradition-dependent rationality. MacIntyre's position represents a detailed and extensive analysis that is both contemporary in its subject matter and historical in its scope. Of particular importance is MacIntyre's articulation of the dialectical encounter among traditions. This is a tradition-informed process that can guide members of diverse traditions through their dialogical encounter. This process, however, is set up against emotivism. MacIntyre perceives emotivism to be the dominant moral philosophy of contemporary Western culture. This chapter, therefore, consists of four parts. Part one will present MacIntyre's understanding of emotivism. This section will include the four basic elements of emotivism: three characteristics of emotivism; the emotivist concept of self; the notion of an emotivist culture; and MacIntyre's conceptualization of liberalism as the political correlative of emotivism. Part two will present

---


2 As MacIntyre writes in *After Virtue* "... it is indeed in terms of a confrontation with emotivism that my own thesis must be defined." 22.
MacIntyre's proposed solution to the problems of emotivism. It will include a presentation of MacIntyre's tradition-dependent rationality, the process of tradition and development, and his notion of a dialectical encounter of traditions. Part three will clarify seven issues related to MacIntyre's position: critiques of MacIntyre's account of liberalism; the relativity of MacIntyre's framework; the possibility of translation; the notion of a boundary person; the canons of logic; the concept of truth; and the university as a forum for the dialectical encounter. Part four will present Michael Maxwell's critique of MacIntyre's position by articulating an aporia within MacIntyre's understanding of the trans-traditional nature of rationality. This part of the chapter will suggest that Lonergan's account of rationality provides the explanatory, heuristic framework to work out the structure of ethical discourse. MacIntyre's ethical framework, therefore, functions as an entry point for contributing to the debates on pluralistic discourse in contemporary society.

1.1. MacIntyre's Account of Emotivism

In After Virtue, MacIntyre argues that our contemporary moral discourse can be characterized as emotivist. For MacIntyre, emotivism is

---

"... the doctrine that all evaluative judgments and more specifically all moral judgments are *nothing but* expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character."\(^4\) MacIntyre critiques emotivism, as a moral philosophy or position, by highlighting three characteristics: its interminable moral debates; its paradox of meaning and use; and its fragmented moral language.

1.1.1. Three Characteristics of Emotivism

First, as a moral philosophy emotivism results in interminable moral debates. Emotivism is a moral theory that argues that although moral statements may appear to rest upon objective standards, in fact, no such standards exist. As MacIntyre argues, "for what emotivism asserts is in central part that there are and can be no valid rational justification for any claims that objective and impersonal moral standards exist and hence that there are no such standards."\(^5\) This means that since moral judgments are merely expressions of personal feelings or emotions, there can be no rational method of deciding among contesting moral arguments. As MacIntyre argues, "it is precisely because there is in our society no established way of deciding between these claims that moral argument appears to be necessarily

---

\(^4\) *After Virtue*, 11-12 (italics in original)

\(^5\) Ibid., 19.
interminable.”\textsuperscript{6} Furthermore, emotivism as a moral theory does not even anticipate a resolution to moral questions. Rather, emotivism equates all moral concepts and judgments with personal preferences. For MacIntyre, emotivism promotes a moral discourse that is merely the personal assertions of those individuals involved in moral debate.

The second characteristic of emotivism concerns a contradiction within its theory. Although emotivism conceives moral discourse as mere assertion, in fact, emotivist moral arguments make appeals to impersonal moral standards.\textsuperscript{7} On the one hand, emotivism argues for a relativity among moral judgments and concepts and, on the other hand, emotivist moral arguments appeal to impersonal, rational standards. This contradiction signals a disparity, for MacIntyre, between the meaning of moral statements and the way moral judgments and concepts are used within emotivist moral theory. For MacIntyre, the meaning of a moral statement refers to its appeal to impersonal, rational standards and the use of a moral statement refers to its emotional, assertive, and rhetorical force. Thus, emotivism is a moral theory of the use of moral statements and not a theory of the meaning of moral statements. Since emotivist theory holds that rational, objective criteria are not available in moral debates, what becomes significant for emotivist theory

\textsuperscript{6} Ibid., 8.

\textsuperscript{7} See ibid., 9 and 68.
is the use of moral statements not the meaning of moral statements in
relation to impersonal, rational argumentation.

The third characteristic of emotivism is its failure to understand the
historical context of moral judgments and concepts. Emotivism, for
MacIntyre, is a moral mélange of fragmented moral systems. What were once
coherent moral systems, with identifiable moral histories, have now been
broken up and merged into a common emotivist framework which
decontextualizes moral concepts from their original framework. For
MacIntyre, this occurs in emotivism because it is concerned with how moral
judgments and concepts are used in moral debates not whether those
statements have a historical or cultural context. However, stripped of their
historical significance, moral concepts take on meanings quite different than
their original context. What emerges is an assortment of moral fragments.
According to MacIntyre, this makes emotivism a collection of moral concepts
with no means of establishing a coherent response to contemporary moral
problems. These three characteristics of emotivism set the context for
MacIntyre's critique of contemporary moral discourse and for the articulation
of his own position.

1.1.2. The Emotivist Self

According to MacIntyre, the emotivist self is an autonomous decision
maker independent of social roles or traditions. The emotivist self operates
within a democratized context of moral agency. The basis of its moral action is not rational criteria, but individual will. As MacIntyre argues:

the specifically modern self, the self that I have called emotivist, finds no limits set to that on which it may pass judgment for such limits could only derive from rational criteria for evaluation and . . . the emotivist self lacks such criteria.⁸

This means, moreover, that the emotivist self is not connected with a social role, institution, or moral tradition. The emotivist self is free to wander among different, and even diverging, moral viewpoints in order to establish arguments for personal action that meet with one's own preferences.

However, though emotivist moral judgments might be posed in rational terms, in fact as we have seen, for emotivism no such rationality exists. This means, for MacIntyre, that the emotivist self has no conceptualization of a personal moral history. The movement from one moral viewpoint to another is simply the shift in personal preference not the result of rational debate (whereby one becomes convinced of the correctness of another's viewpoint). Rather, for an emotivist, all moral judgments are "... construed as expressions of attitudes, preferences and choices which are themselves not governed by criterion, principle or value . . . ."⁹ According to MacIntyre, therefore, the emotivist self resides in a democratic culture, free

⁸ Ibid., 31.

⁹ Ibid., 33.
to hold whatever moral judgments in whatever particular arrangement he or she wishes.

1.1.3. The Emotivist Culture

For MacIntyre, the key problem of the emotivist culture is "... the fact that [it] entails the obliteration of any genuine distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations."\(^{10}\) If, as an emotivist, my moral judgments are merely the expression of my personal preferences, then I have no way of being able to determine whether my actions simply make another person the means for my personal ends. The lack of impersonal standards for distinguishing social relations as either manipulative or non-manipulative means that all social relations are under the arbitrary force of individual wills. According to MacIntyre, the social world of emotivism resembles:

... a meeting place for individual wills, each with its own set of attitudes and preferences and who understand that world solely as an arena for the achievement of their own satisfaction...\(^{11}\)

What is at stake in the emotivist culture's discourse is not common judgment

\(^{10}\) Ibid., 23.

\(^{11}\) Ibid., 25. As such, emotivist society implies acknowledging Nietzsche's position that in the final analysis moral discourse is simply the will to power. Thus, the title of MacIntyre's ninth chapter in After Virtue is "Nietzsche or Aristotle?". For MacIntyre, either Aristotle is essentially correct that social living can involve rational discourse on moral issues or Nietzsche is correct that morality is a conflict of individual wills vying for political power.
on moral issues, but a combat of autonomous, individual wills which are connected not by social relations, but by whatever arrangements happen to advance one's particular interests.\textsuperscript{12} There is no collective interest other than, perhaps, a thin notion of mutual self-interest. Thus, for MacIntyre, the emotivist culture is an aggregate of individual wills with no means of distinguishing between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations.\textsuperscript{13}

1.1.4. Liberalism

For MacIntyre, the political correlative of emotivism is liberalism.\textsuperscript{14} Liberalism is informed by a tradition-\textit{independent} rationality that, it argues, all rational human beings can accept. It is politically the establishment of a

\textsuperscript{12} As MacIntyre argues in \textit{After Virtue} "what this brings out is that modern politics cannot be a matter of genuine moral consensus. And it is not. Modern politics is civil war carried on by other means . . ." 253.

\textsuperscript{13} In \textit{After Virtue} MacIntyre summarizes his thoughts this way, "contemporary moral experience as a consequence has a paradoxical character. For each of us is taught to see himself or herself as an autonomous moral agent; but each of us also becomes engaged by modes of practice, aesthetic or bureaucratic, which involve us in manipulative relationships with others. Seeking to protect the autonomy that we have learned to prize, we aspire ourselves \textit{not} to be manipulated by others; seeking to incarnate our own principles and stand-point in the world of practice, we find no way open to us to do so except by directing towards others those very manipulative modes of relationship which each of us aspires to resist in our own case. The incoherence of our attitudes and our experience arises from the incoherent conceptual scheme which we have inherited." 68. (italics in original)

\textsuperscript{14} In \textit{Whose Justice? Which Rationality?}, 335-48 MacIntyre develops his critique of Liberalism.
sphere of noninterference within which each individual can follow his or her personal preferences without fear of government control. As MacIntyre writes:

"every individual is to be equally free to propose and to live by whatever conception of the good he or she pleases, derived from whatever theory or tradition he or she may adhere to unless that conception of the good involves reshaping the life of the rest of the community in accordance with it."\textsuperscript{15}

Liberalism, for MacIntyre, does not propose a hierarchy of goods, or an overall good, by which specific goods can be evaluated. Instead, social life consists of compartmentalized spheres wherein specific goods can be pursued. Conflicts between goods in a liberal society are either resolved by a type of calculation of goods, or bargained against each other. The rules of this bargaining aim toward the greatest effectiveness in achieving the preferences of the individuals involved. In other words, the desires, wants, and preferences of an individual become the best reason for action. In such a bargaining forum, nonrational persuasion based upon personal preference overcomes rational debate.

However, as MacIntyre points out, the liberal system does promote at least one overriding good, namely, "... no more and no less than the

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 336.
continued sustenance of the liberal social and political order."\textsuperscript{16} This good, in fact, excludes any attempt to displace the liberal system.\textsuperscript{17} To some degree, therefore, the liberal system is coercive (and, thus, self-contradictory) by limiting the debate to predetermined parameters. Thus, MacIntyre articulates his ethical framework in opposition to the emotivist self, its culture, and its political manifestation in liberalism.

1.2. MacIntyre's Ethical Framework

In response to emotivism and the liberal project, MacIntyre presents an ethical framework based upon a tradition-dependent rationality. The following will present MacIntyre's ethical framework by working with his material in the three books After Virtue, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? and Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry. The aim here is not to present an exhaustive account of MacIntyre's position, but rather, to articulate its main

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 345. Part of MacIntyre's argument against liberalism is that its supposedly tradition-independent rationality is, in fact, just another tradition with its set of first principles developed over time through argumentation. Thus, to oppose liberalism requires further argumentation through the dialectical process whereby the internal contradiction of liberalism is exposed.

\textsuperscript{17} This is not an insignificant point for MacIntyre's critique of liberalism since as we will see MacIntyre responds to the interminable debates of emotivism by articulating a rational, tradition-dependent, dialectical process whereby rival traditions can work out moral truth. But, if the liberal project, under the influence of emotivism, cannot anticipate such rational debate and, in fact, excludes any other means of encounter among rival positions other than the bargaining forum, then, MacIntyre's dialectical process will not become a dominant form of exchange in contemporary society.
features with particular emphasis on the dialectical process. This section will be followed by section 1.3 which aims to clarify the dialectical encounter by addressing seven related issues. Section 1.4 will work out the problem of whether MacIntyre’s dialectical method is un revisable. The proposed resolution of this problem, I argue, provides a clue that Lonergan’s cognitional theory and world-view of emergent probability can provide the necessary explanatory tools to suggest a response to the problem of discourse in pluralist society.

1.2.1 MacIntyre’s Method: Tradition-Dependent Rationality

For MacIntyre, the task of the moral philosopher requires a correlative understanding of moral history. Moral philosophy and the history of morality are part of the same endeavour. To arrive at moral comprehension requires a corresponding understanding of the historical context within which moral concepts have meaning. MacIntyre illustrates this by making a distinction between understanding and intelligibility. Consider the dynamics of a simple conversation. If one overhears part of a conversation, one might be able to make intelligible sense of the content of the speech acts that are spoken. However, for MacIntyre, intelligibility is not understanding. To understand the content of the speech acts one must have knowledge of the wider context within which they are spoken. Let us

\footnote{See \textit{After Virtue}, 210-11.}
suppose, for example, that one were to overhear a woman say to a man "What about sex?" From the sentence alone one cannot understand the meaning of the question. But, if one knew that the woman was a doctor and the man her patient, then one could understand that the question concerned the man's health. The wider context provides the connections among roles and expectations that allow an outside person to understand the conversation.

For MacIntyre, a conversation is like a narrative; it has a beginning, middle and end. As in a narrative, we are actors in our conversations. As MacIntyre writes, "... a conversation is a dramatic work, even if a very short one, in which the participants are not only the actors, but also the joint authors, working out in agreement or disagreement the mode of their production."19 Our conversations can be understood as being of different genres. They can be, for example, comic, tragic, or business-like. The genre of our conversations is part of the context of our meaning-making. Within this narrative context, we can understand the speech acts made by others. For MacIntyre, conversations, understood broadly, are the form of human transactions in general. Thus, like conversations, moral understanding requires knowledge of the wider context as it provides the foundation for human action and moral meaning-making.

The point, then, is that moral understanding requires situating moral

19 Ibid., 211.
statements within the wider context of their tradition. The consequence of this tradition-dependent position, for MacIntyre, means that the search for universal moral concepts or norms decontextualized from their tradition is impossible. Philosophical projects that attempt to establish a universalistic procedural ethics (for example, those of John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas) fail to understand that their attempt to make universal moral norms is tantamount to trying to understand a moral concept without recognizing its historical or traditional context. As MacIntyre writes, "... all morality is always to some degree tied to the socially local and particular and that the aspirations of the morality of modernity to a universality freed from all particularity is an illusion..."\(^{20}\) This attempt fails because the search for moral universals often appeals to moral concepts that are not independent of context. At best they provide necessary conditions for dialogue, but are not sufficient in themselves.\(^{21}\)

1.2.2. Tradition

For MacIntyre, moral knowing is always already bound by the historical context of a tradition. He defines a tradition as:

\[\ldots\text{ an argument extended through time in which certain fundamental agreements are defined and redefined in terms of two kinds of conflict: those with critics and enemies external to the tradition who reject all}\]

\(^{20}\) Ibid., 126-27.

\(^{21}\) See section 1.3.5. below on the canons of logic in moral disagreement.
or at least key parts of those fundamental agreements, and those internal, interpretative debates through which the meaning and rationale of the fundamental agreements come to be expressed and by whose progress a tradition is constituted.\textsuperscript{22} The concepts and terms that a tradition develops in response to these two types of conflict can be understood only in relation to each other. In other words, moral concepts are context-dependent. For MacIntyre, in order to understand the meaning of a moral concept, one must also understand how that concept is related to other moral concepts and how that concept came to have the meaning it does through the history of that tradition.\textsuperscript{23} The tradition-constituted nature of moral understanding means that moral norms express a tradition’s understanding of the moral significance of its moral problems and their resolutions from within the context of its own history. They represent a tradition’s best answer so far developed in the history of that tradition as an argument extended over time.

For example, according to MacIntyre, Aristotle’s understanding of practical rationality involves a syllogism with three components:

(a) a major premise of the good at issue;

(b) a minor premise of the context or situation; and

(c) the action that follows.

\textsuperscript{22} Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 12.

\textsuperscript{23} See ibid., 23.
Understanding this practical syllogism and its components can be achieved only if one understands Aristotle’s tradition as a whole. To understand what Aristotle meant by the good at issue is not, according to MacIntyre, to understand what anyone from any particular tradition might understand by the good.\textsuperscript{24} Understanding a moral concept involves understanding the unique tradition and history of that particular concept. Thus, Aristotle’s notion of the good at issue is understandable only when one comprehends the hierarchy of goods, the teleology of the good life for human beings, and the social roles of individuals that contextualize Aristotle’s work.\textsuperscript{25}

Furthermore, the self-identity of a tradition is, in part, constituted by other rival traditions. As MacIntyre writes:

\ldots a tradition is partially constituted not only by those texts which exemplify, advance, correct, and defend its central doctrines but also by those texts which through their hostile criticism enable the adherents of that tradition to understand their own positions better, to identify those problems and issues against which the theses of their tradition now have to be tested and more generally from which they have to learn.\textsuperscript{26}

As we will see, an important aspect of MacIntyre’s understanding of the dialectical encounter of traditions is the fact that a tradition is not isolated from other traditions. In effect, traditions emerge, develop, or decline in

\textsuperscript{24} Aristotle’s syllogism is dealt with again on page 21.

\textsuperscript{25} See ibid., 390.

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 233.
relation to other traditions.

1.2.3. The Development of a Tradition

MacIntyre writes that traditions can develop through three stages:

... a first in which the relevant beliefs, texts, and authorities have not yet been put in question; a second in which inadequacies of various types have been identified, but not yet remedied; and a third in which response to those inadequacies has resulted in a set of reformulations, reevaluations, and new formulations and evaluations, designed to remedy inadequacies and overcome limitations.²⁷

The first stage represents a stable situation. The tradition has yet to face questions that might challenge its principal concepts. The second stage involves the emergence of such questions, but the tradition has not yet been able to provide adequate answers. The third stage proceeds in one of two ways: either the tradition can internally resolve its questions through imaginative innovation and discovery, or it can seek an external solution through an encounter with a superior tradition. This other tradition will provide the necessary resources to remedy the inadequacies and overcome the limitations. However, when external resolution takes place, MacIntyre argues that the inferior tradition will be involved in a radical break with its past set of shared beliefs. Thus, the notion that a tradition will develop and that this development might involve an encounter with an alien tradition is critical for MacIntyre's project, since it provides him with the framework for

²⁷ Ibid., 355.
working out how different traditions can have rational discourse on moral questions.\textsuperscript{28}

1.2.4. Rational Moral Discourse Among Traditions: A Dialectical Encounter

When members of different traditions do encounter each other, how is understanding possible?\textsuperscript{29} MacIntyre's position is that although there are definite possibilities for substantive understanding and common ground between traditions, this cannot be known \textit{a priori}, before their actual encounter. It is possible that two traditions can be so different in terms of fundamental beliefs, language, and stage of development as to make shared moral understanding impossible to achieve. MacIntyre argues that although his process of dialectical encounter anticipates some degree of common understanding, one cannot know what the substance of this understanding will be except through the process itself.\textsuperscript{30}

MacIntyre presents a process for members of different traditions to


\textsuperscript{29} As MacIntyre writes in \textit{Whose Justice? Which Rationality?} the practical concern is expressed through Western history as "what kind of principles can require and secure allegiance in and to a form of social order in which individuals who are pursuing diverse and often incompatible conceptions of the good can live together without the disruptions of rebellion and internal war?" 210.

\textsuperscript{30} MacIntyre's position is juxtaposed to a universalism which would anticipate that common understanding is always possible and that differences between traditions are merely a matter of degree.
come to some type of understanding and possibly reach common clarification on central ideas and first principles. This process involves two stages.

MacIntyre writes:

the first [stage] is that in which each characterizes the contentions of its rival in its own terms, making explicit the grounds for rejecting what is incompatible with its own central theses, although sometimes allowing that from its own point of view and in light of its own standards of judgment its rival has something to teach it on marginal and subordinate questions.\textsuperscript{31}

Stage one involves minimum contact between traditions such that some understanding can be achieved. This involves mutual recognition between the rival traditions. There may be resources within one tradition that can clarify problems of minor importance in the other tradition and vice versa. However, nothing more is necessary. Such an encounter would not substantially alter either tradition in terms of self-identity, first principles, or fundamental beliefs.

The second stage, however, is more complex. As MacIntyre argues:

a second stage is reached if and when the protagonists of each tradition, having considered in what ways their own tradition has by its own standards of achievement in enquiry found it difficult to develop its enquiries beyond a certain point, or has produced in some area insoluble antinomies, ask whether the alternative and rival tradition may not be able to provide resources to characterize and to explain the failings and defects of their own tradition more adequately than they, using the resources of that tradition, have been able to do.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 166.

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 166-67.
Chapter One, MacIntyre

The second stage involves recognizing how the beliefs, principles, or moral judgments of the other tradition might resolve certain problems that are unresolvable within the terms and references of one's own tradition. As we have seen, with MacIntyre's notion of development, each tradition, qua tradition, will be faced with certain problems which it cannot adequately resolve with its own resources. Stage two represents a situation within which one tradition provides another tradition with those resources that resolve its internal problems. In effect, this means that the tradition providing the resources for another tradition would be a superior tradition. Through these two stages, MacIntyre proposes that both understanding and critique is possible in the encounter between traditions.

MacIntyre recognizes, however, that there is indeed, more to the process than that identified by these two stages. The process requires some specific skills. MacIntyre argues that the movement from stage one to stage two requires:

. . . a rare gift of empathy as well as of intellectual insight for the protagonists of such a tradition to be able to understand the theses, argument, and concepts of their rival in such a way that they are able to view themselves from such an alien standpoint and to recharacterize their own beliefs in an appropriate manner from the alien perspective of the rival tradition.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 167.
These rare gifts further clarify what MacIntyre has in mind concerning the dialectical method. Stage two requires not only that one is able to determine whether concepts of the other tradition are incompatible with concepts of one's own tradition, but through empathy and intellectual insight, one must be able to understand one's own tradition as the other tradition understands it. This activity includes the work of imagination in order to construct the arguments of the other tradition. These are rare gifts because they require members of rival traditions to engage in acts of moral imagination that, in fact, suspend arguments of one's own tradition for the sake of understanding not only how the rival tradition constructs their argument, but how the other tradition understands one's own tradition.

Furthermore, according to MacIntyre, in this process each tradition must become vulnerable to the other tradition. By being vulnerable to the other tradition, one can move from stage one to stage two. Such maximum vulnerability, as MacIntyre names it, involves openness toward the other's critique or correction. MacIntyre writes that:

to be accountable in and for enquiry is to be open to having to give an

\[34\] See ibid., 394.

\[35\] As MacIntyre writes, "for one view to have emerged from its encounter with another with its claim to superiority vindicated it must first have rendered itself maximally vulnerable to the strongest arguments which that other and rival view can bring to bear against it." Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, 181. See also, 125 and 200.
account of what one has either said or done, and then to having to amplify, explain, defend, and if necessary, either modify or abandon that account, and in this latter case to begin the work of supplying a new one.\footnote{Ibid., 201.}

Maximum vulnerability is required in order for a tradition to come to the awareness that it can find the resources to resolve its own interminable problems only by incorporating the insights of another tradition and, in so doing, become other than what it was at the start of the dialectical encounter.

For MacIntyre, the advantage of the tradition-dependency of moral inquiry is that it allows for interpreting different traditions in such a way that each tradition is understood in its own terms, rather than in terms imposed from other traditions. For example, as we saw with the Aristotelian practical syllogism, in order to understand the concepts and the process of deliberation, from the major premise to the minor premise to action, we need to understand these terms from within their wider context. MacIntyre summarizes the Aristotelian practical syllogism as follows:

in the initial premise or premises the agent affirms of a given type of action a predicate which has gerundive force: such and such is to be done \textit{qua} good. In the secondary premise or premises the agent affirms that circumstances are such as to provide the opportunity and the occasion for doing what is to be done. In the conclusion the agent in acting affirms that this action \textit{qua} such and such is to be done.\footnote{Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 139 (italics in original)}
According to MacIntyre, a person of the Aristotelian tradition who goes about the task of constructing a practical syllogism begins by articulating the major premise concerning the good at stake. This good is derived from the hierarchy of goods that already informs the person through the structure of the *polis*. The good of the major premise gives action its *telos*. The minor premise of the means to achieve the good is deduced through an understanding of the situation at hand. The conclusion of the practical syllogism *is the action* conducted by the person who constructed the syllogism. Understanding the place of action as the conclusion of the practical syllogism requires a comprehensive understanding of the function of the other concepts of the syllogism. The logical structure of the practical syllogism must be taken in its entirety with action understood as the completion of the syllogism.

With this understanding of Aristotle's practical syllogism, one can make contrasts with one's own understanding of practical decision-making. Stage one of the dialectical encounter demands that each tradition be understood from within its own viewpoint. At this stage the aim is not to judge the other tradition. Thus, in regards to understanding Aristotle's syllogism, MacIntyre argues that "what this shows of course is not that Aristotle was mistaken, but that he was describing a form of practical rational life both different from and in conflict with that at home in the social
orders characteristic of modernity." MacIntyre points out that Aristotle's understanding of the place of action is quite unlike modern notions of practical rationality that involve a decision that may prohibit the proposed action from following immediately upon establishing its necessity via the syllogism. The decision functions to allow for alternative reasons, either for a specific action, another possible action, or a refusal to act. From within emotivism, for example, one may understand the goods at stake, but simply not feel like acting at a particular moment. But, for Aristotle, no such decision is needed; action follows necessarily in the syllogism. Simply because Aristotle does not take into account the role of decision within his syllogism does not make his account of practical reasoning inadequate from within his tradition. Arriving at an understanding of the difference between a modern distinction between decision and action and Aristotle's concept of action as the conclusion of the syllogism is possible only when one understands each tradition in its own terms.

1.2.5. The Goals of the Dialectical Encounter

The dialectical encounter among rival traditions can aim toward two different goals. The first goal, corresponding to stage one, is simply to come

---

38 Ibid., 140.

39 As MacIntyre writes, "indeed this is why we are apt to suppose that between the evaluation of our reasons for action and action itself some further act of decision is necessary." ibid.
to a constructive understanding of the disagreements that exist between rival
traditions. This seems to be an implicit goal of *Three Rival Versions of Moral
Enquiry* wherein MacIntyre clarifies how the three traditions that he
discusses are both similar and different from each other. 40 He shows, for
example, how both the encyclopaedia tradition and the genealogical tradition
share a notion of history such that moral knowledge consists of a single
chronology of continual progress. This is different than the Aristotelian-
Thomistic tradition which views moral history as a sequence of radical
breaks, stoppages, progresses, and declines. Although this goal is less
comprehensive than the second goal, it can provide the dialectical encounter
with the necessary foundation for more elaborate exchanges.

The second goal, corresponding to stage two, is the synthesis of the
rival traditions. The synthesis is an integration of the two rival viewpoints
into a new single comprehensive whole. For MacIntyre, Thomas Aquinas's

---

40 MacIntyre comments about the context of discourse that surrounds the
Gifford Lectures and the resultant book *Three Rival Versions of Moral
Enquiry* this way, “the experience therefore of participating twice over in the
discussion of these lectures strongly reinforced the conclusion that such
lectures can no longer be presented either on the basis of presupposed
agreements or with the purpose of securing general agreement. The most
that one can hope for is to render our disagreements more constructive. It
was with this aim that I delivered these Gifford Lectures; it is with the same
aim that I publish them.” 8.
work is an example of this kind of synthesis. Aquinas was able to
synthesize the competing Augustinian and Aristotelian frameworks into a
new overall scheme. As MacIntyre writes, Aquinas invited people to
understand his point of view as:

\[ \ldots \text{one into which both the achievements of Augustinianism and} \]
\[ \text{Aristotelianism had been integrated in such a way that what were, or} \]
\[ \text{should have been recognized as the defects and limitations of} \]
\[ \text{Augustinianism as judged from an Augustinian standpoint and the} \]
\[ \text{defects and limitations of Aristotelianism as judged from an} \]
\[ \text{Aristotelian standpoint had both been first more adequately} \]
\[ \text{characterized and then corrected or transcended. In doing so, Aquinas} \]
\[ \text{achieved what neither Augustinians nor Aristotelians could have} \]
\[ \text{achieved in respect of the other} \ldots \]. \]

Aquinas achieved his synthesis because he was better able to account for the
limitations of both systems. In doing so, Aquinas was able to provide what
both rival systems were unable to deliver.\(^{43}\)

\(^{41}\) For critiques against this position and how MacIntyre interprets
Aquinas see especially, Janet Coleman, “MacIntyre and Aquinas,” in \textit{After MacIntyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work of Alasdair MacIntyre}, ed. John
Horton and Susan Mendus, (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame
Next?,” in \textit{After MacIntyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work of Alasdair
MacIntyre}, 91-107; Ian Markham, “Faith and Reason: Reflections on
259-67; Robert P. George, “Moral Particularism, Thomism, and Traditions,”

\(^{42}\) \textit{Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry}, 120.

\(^{43}\) As MacIntyre explains, “what justifies his [Aquinas'] representation of
the order of things over against its Averroist, Neoplatonist, and Augustinian
1.3. Clarifying the Dialectical Encounter: 7 Issues

1.3.1. Critiques of MacIntyre’s Account of the Liberal Tradition

MacIntyre's understanding of liberalism is perhaps one of the most contested issues in his work. Some writers such as Jeffery Stout, Stephen Fowl, and Terry Pinkard argue that MacIntyre fails to understand correctly what liberalism actually attempts to do.\(^4^4\) One of Stout's criticisms, for example, is that MacIntyre applies the term "liberal" only "... to those features of our society that [he] finds contemptible."\(^4^5\) Aspects of modern society that MacIntyre agrees with are, according to Stout, attributed as pre-liberal, or even, nonliberal. For Stout, MacIntyre has failed to give an account of liberalism that is robust enough to account for his rejection and

rivals is its ability to identify, to explain, and to transcend their limitations and defects, while preserving from them everything that survives dialectical questioning in a way which those rivals are unable from their philosophical resources to provide any counterpart.” Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 172.


\(^4^5\) “Homeward Bound”, 231.
total opposition to it. Writers like Andrew Mason and Philip Pettit suggest that MacIntyre ought to explain fully his understanding of liberalism. Mason, for example, argues that liberalism is not as simple a project as MacIntyre conceives it. As Mason argues, "... liberalism includes a broad and diverse body of thought, and some important forms of liberalism properly so-called do not have the content or aspirations that MacIntyre attributes to liberalism-in-general." Other authors such as Cornel West and Robert George suggest that, in fact, MacIntyre is involved in a type of self-contradiction, since his project requires the very values liberalism espouses.

46 As Stout writes, "MacIntyre's pessimism about 'liberal society' analogously depends on rhetorical devices in which, first, that society is identified with an essentially antitraditionalist project and, secondly, any counterforces within it are disassociated from the vacuous and rootless condition toward which it aspires." ibid., 231.


48 "MacIntyre on Liberalism", 227. For Mason, MacIntyre's assumption that liberalism is a single tradition is difficult to sustain in light of the radically different ways that liberalism has been grounded philosophically and in the contradictory articulations of such core concepts as rights.

West, for example, writes that MacIntyre's insistence on distinct traditions requires the liberal value of liberty to ensure the continual existence of each tradition and that thus, "... the praxis of his [MacIntyre's] position affirms liberalism."\(^{50}\) While it is quite likely that MacIntyre's understanding of liberalism could use some clarification and realignment, it is possible, as Jean Porter suggests, that MacIntyre does not fully develop his understanding of liberalism because he is, in fact, a liberal.\(^{51}\) Porter suggests that MacIntyre's work is best understood as an argument from within the broadly-based form of inquiry which is the liberal tradition.\(^{52}\) Porter argues that "... it becomes apparent that he [MacIntyre] both presupposes and fosters the virtues of tolerance, respect for pluralism, and openness to revision and change that are constitutive of that way of life."\(^{53}\) For Porter, MacIntyre's project ought to be regarded as part of the tradition of liberalism which has as its basic tenants values such as equality, openness, tolerance,

\(^{50}\) "Neo-Aristotelianism", 82 (italics in original)


\(^{52}\) Ian Markham argues along similar lines by suggesting that MacIntyre offers an open account of traditions "... without realizing that he [MacIntyre] now stands in a liberalized Thomist tradition." in "Faith and Reason: Reflections on MacIntyre's "Tradition-Constituted Enquiry"", 266.

\(^{53}\) "Openness and Constraint", 523.
and dialogue. In this way, according to Porter, some of the criticisms against MacIntyre fall away: he may not have an adequate conception of the liberal project because he assumes as much from his readers; he is not involved in a self-contradiction regarding the values of liberalism since, as a liberal, he espouses these values; and, his project is best conceived as an attempt at further articulating and challenging the goals, values, and process of the liberal project.  

How might MacIntyre respond to these challenges to his work? Since I am not aware of any published article where MacIntyre himself responds, the following represents how I think he might construct a response from within his own ethical framework. First, to suppose that he is a liberal because he shares concepts, such as tolerance and openness, with the liberal project does not mean that MacIntyre is a liberal. In fact, this argument misunderstands MacIntyre’s notion of commensurability. As we will see, for MacIntyre, two people from opposed moral traditions can hold very similar moral concepts. Simply because two traditions share similar understandings of say, openness and dialogue, does not make them the same tradition. Second, these critiques fail to understand how MacIntyre conceives his project in opposition 

---

54 Nevertheless, I would argue, that these criticisms against MacIntyre’s account of liberalism at the very least require MacIntyre to be clearer about this aspect of his project especially since he has positioned himself in opposition to emotivism and liberalism.
to emotivism. As we have seen, according to MacIntyre, liberalism is the
political correlative of emotivism; to call him a liberal is to call him an
emotivist. But, no one is arguing that MacIntyre is really an emotivist. These
critiques do not go to the heart of MacIntyre's position, since they separate
the issue of liberalism from emotivism.55 Third, as we have seen, MacIntyre's
dialectical encounter anticipates a substantive, rational debate, but
according to MacIntyre liberalism does not. Though both make use of
concepts like dialogue and openness, MacIntyre's position includes concepts
like critique and correction, but liberalism proposes merely a sphere of
noninterference. Thus, MacIntyre's position includes important concepts not
found in liberalism. Fourth, according to MacIntyre, liberalism excludes
from the discourse attempts to overturn its primary good, namely, the good of
liberalism. However, MacIntyre's method allows for the possibility that an
superior tradition might overcome and correct his account of rationality.
Thus, MacIntyre's account is more inclusive than liberalism. Understanding
MacIntyre with his own terms and relations, I would argue that he is not a
liberal and furthermore that his project is an alternative to the liberal

55 This is not to suggest that MacIntyre is correct in linking emotivism and
liberalism, but rather that if one wants to understand MacIntyre on his own
terms and from within his own ethical framework, then one must understand
how his critique of liberalism is linked to his critique of emotivism.
tradition. \footnote{It should also be noted that in After Virtue, 66-67, MacIntyre contrasts his tradition-dependent approach with contemporary analytical philosophers such as Alan Gewirth. MacIntyre's basic argument is that these philosophical projects fail because they need to rely upon tradition-dependent moral concepts to fully account for their own work.}

1.3.2. Is MacIntyre's Position Basically Relativist?

As we have seen, MacIntyre's tradition-dependent understanding of moral reasoning allows each tradition to be understood in its own terms, but does this mean that all traditions are relative to each other? At first sight, it might appear that MacIntyre's dialectical method implies a relativism. Each tradition must be understood as providing their own standards of moral evaluation. MacIntyre does not anticipate a neutral universalist viewpoint which can independently adjudicate conflicting moral concepts of different traditions. Instead, each tradition must be evaluated on its own terms and with the standards so far developed from that tradition. This, however, does not mean that, for MacIntyre, each tradition cannot be critiqued by other

\footnote{See Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Chapter 18 "The Rationality of Traditions" where MacIntyre argues against both the relativist and perspectivist critiques. As Robert George writes, "the burden for MacIntyre is to hold on to his particularism while demonstrating that, appearances aside ultimate choices among traditions need not be arbitrary." in "Moral Particularism, Thomism, and Traditions," 599. George argues that MacIntyre's argument ultimately fails since a Thomistic position implies universal norms of rationality independent of traditional context. A focus on the relativist charge is sufficient for our purposes here.}
traditions. The fact that each tradition must be understood on its own terms does not remove the possibility for mutual critique and challenge. For as we have seen, it is MacIntyre's contention that the development of a tradition is dependent upon the way that it can resolve its most significant internal questions in relation to other traditions. If, through discovery and imaginative conceptual innovation, a tradition is able to resolve its own problems, then it can, by its own standards, achieve progress and continue to develop. If, however, by its own resources, it fails to resolve the set of problems that it currently faces, then the tradition can be said to be involved in an epistemological crisis. Such a crisis means, for MacIntyre, that the tradition becomes unable to resolve its problems by its own trusted methods. In fact, the foundational beliefs of the tradition would become suspect as they would no longer provide what is necessary for the progress of the tradition.

58 It becomes clearer in Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry that MacIntyre is also concerned that the encounter among rival traditions must not be orientated by a will to power of one tradition over another. The issue here, for MacIntyre, is to articulate a form of practical reasoning that can mitigate the extremes of relativism and domination. It is, for MacIntyre, "... the possibility that reason can only move towards being genuinely universal and impersonal insofar as it is neither neutral nor disinterested, that membership in a particular type of moral community, one from which fundamental dissent has to be excluded, is a condition for genuinely rational enquiry and more especially for moral and theological enquiry." 59-60.

Chapter One, MacIntyre

No amount of imaginative innovation can relieve the tradition of its crisis. At this point, a tradition may encounter, or seek to encounter, another tradition that can provide the necessary resources to resolve its crisis. However, if this is so, then the other tradition must be acknowledged as rationally superior to the tradition in crisis. MacIntyre's dialectical encounter, therefore, allows for a relative moment in stage one where each tradition can stand on its own terms. I would argue, however, that stage two is not relativist, since in this stage traditions seek to resolve moral problems through a dialectical process.

1.3.3. The Possibility of Translation

In the process of the dialectical encounter there remains, however, the question of whether concepts of one tradition are either directly translatable into the other tradition, or are commensurate with similar terms of the other tradition. In chapter nineteen in *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*

---

60 As MacIntyre writes, "every tradition, whether it recognizes the fact or not, confronts the possibility that at some future time it will fall into a state of epistemological crisis, recognizable as such by its own standards of rational justification, which have themselves been vindicated up to that time as the best to emerge from the history of that particular tradition." in *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*, 364. And in *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry* MacIntyre writes, "knowledge is possessed only in and through participation in a history of dialectical encounters." 202.

61 The issue of translation and commensurability between traditions is one of the most disputed issues of MacIntyre's position. This is to be expected since how one answers these questions will stem from one's basic orientation; either a proceduralist or contextualist framework. For proceduralists,
MacIntyre clarifies his position on this issue. For MacIntyre, each tradition is embodied within a specific language and culture. It is this embodiment that provides part of the context of each tradition as a moral inquiry over time. MacIntyre calls the language of a particular embedded tradition at a specific time and place a "language-in-use." This gives MacIntyre's position its concreteness and focus on particularity. In the encounter between traditions one has, in effect, an encounter between specific languages-in-use.

To translate concepts between traditions is, for MacIntyre, a laborious process that requires the learning of the language-in-use of the other tradition. One must learn the language of the other as a type of second first translation and commensurability must necessarily be possible if all rational people are able to determine universal norms. However, for contextualists in order to avoid ideological domination, one must allow each tradition to be understood in its own terms. This must assume that each tradition is to some degree different and, thus, there is, at least, the possibility that some concepts will be either untranslatable and/or incommensurate. For MacIntyre, this is determined by the concrete encounter among traditions. Interestingly, Jürgen Habermas argues that MacIntyre's examples of incommensurateness turn out to be commensurate, since MacIntyre can, in fact, describe the supposedly incommensurate concepts through the use of English as a third language. This is so, for Habermas, because the examples that MacIntyre uses are not from as radically different and distinct traditions as MacIntyre thinks since they all "... compete within the same universe of discourse of Western philosophy. They interpenetrate to a sufficient degree that they can learn something from each other without compromising their identity." in Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics, trans. Ciaran P. Cronin, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1993), 100 (italics in original). For further reflection on this issue see Stephen Fowl, "Could Horace Talk with the Hebrews? Translatability and Moral Disagreement in MacIntyre and Stout," Journal of Religious Ethics 19 (1991): 1-20.
language through cultural immersion.

With the acquisition of a second first language one can take on the task of translation. According to MacIntyre, this task can take two forms: same-saying and explanation. Same-saying is the translation of concepts that have identical meaning for each tradition. Explanation is the translation of concepts that are foreign to another tradition and, thus, require elaborations in order to be understood within the framework of that tradition. Nevertheless, for MacIntyre, either same-saying or explanation may result in there being no possibility for translation between traditions. It may be the case that one tradition is not as developed as another, thereby, prohibiting even the possibility of explanation. At the very least, according to MacIntyre, translation between traditions is not an easy activity. Since, as we have seen, moral understanding is always context-dependent, translation requires knowledge of the wider context for correct meaning. Knowledge of context requires the acquisition of a second first language in order that the two stages of the dialectical encounter between the traditions can take place.

Thus, the dialectical process requires a skill set that includes not only empathy, imagination and insight, but also the historical and linguistic skills of a second first language. According to MacIntyre, what is significant about this skill set is that it implies that the encounter between two rival

---

traditions cannot be resolved through a neutral third way that claims standards derived from some universal viewpoint that would be applicable to both traditions. As MacIntyre argues:

when two rival large-scale intellectual traditions confront one another, a central feature of the problem of deciding between their claims is characteristically that there is no neutral way of characterizing either the subject matter about which they give rival accounts or the standards by which their claims are to be evaluated. Each standpoint has its own account of truth and knowledge, its own mode of characterizing the relevant subject matter.63

This argument against a neutral context-independent viewpoint is consistent with MacIntyre's tradition-dependent understanding of moral inquiry. If moral inquiry is tradition-dependent, then so too is the way that rival traditions resolve their disputes. For MacIntyre, a genuine encounter among traditions involves the immersion of each tradition within the tradition of the rival. Such immersion requires a specific type of dialogue and a requisite skill set. For, as MacIntyre argues, "there is no way to engage with or to evaluate rationally the theses advanced in contemporary form by some particular tradition except in terms which are framed with an eye to the specific character and history of that tradition . . ."64 This is so since the meaning of a moral concept is constituted both by its historical development and by the set of other concepts that are related to it. Attempts to abstract

63 Ibid., 166.

64 Ibid., 398.
arguments from their historical context, or language-in-use, of a tradition presupposes that such decontextualization will generate the kinds of substantive meaning required for the translation of concepts or terms. But, according to MacIntyre, such attempts will fail since they lack the necessary resources of inquiry derived only from within a developed tradition. Such attempts are illusory for "the person outside all traditions lacks sufficient rational resources for enquiry and a fortiori for enquiry into what tradition is to be rationally preferred."\footnote{Ibid., 367.} For MacIntyre, then, the process of resolving disputes between rival traditions does not involve the search for a neutral place, somewhere beyond the traditions, but rather it demands a process and a skill set that engages each tradition in the history and context of the other.\footnote{Ibid., 350.}

1.3.4. The Notion of a Boundary Person

For MacIntyre, the member of a tradition who would have this skill set is the boundary person. A boundary person is one who is able to be at home in two rival traditions at the same time. This is the person who has taken on the rival tradition as a second first language. The boundary person does not simply transliterate the meaning of moral concepts from one tradition into the other, but rather, understands the meaning of a moral concept from

\footnote{Ibid., 367.}

\footnote{Ibid., 350.}
within the whole set of moral concepts of that tradition. According to
MacIntyre, Aquinas is an example of a boundary person since he was at
home in both the Augustinian and Aristotelian frameworks. Likewise,
MacIntyre presents *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry* as a work of a
boundary person who, although he takes refuge in one tradition, is also, at
the same time, at home in all three. As MacIntyre writes, "one can indeed, as
I have tried to do, learn the idiom of each [tradition] from within as a first
language, much in the way that an anthropologist constitutes him or herself
a linguistic and cultural beginner in some alien culture."67 But this does not
mean that the boundary person is lost forever in-between traditions, since
there is a sense that one's own tradition always remains one's place even in
one's appropriation of the other tradition. As MacIntyre argues:

> it is not that the adherent of one particular standpoint cannot on
occasion understand some rival point of view both intellectually and
imaginatively, in such a way and to such a degree that he or she is
able to provide a presentation of it of just the kind that one of its own
adherents would give. It is that even in so doing the mode of
presentation will inescapably be framed within and directed by the
beliefs and purposes of one's own point of view.68

It is, therefore, only a boundary person who can recognize the
incommensurable nature of rival traditions, since it is only the boundary

---

67 See *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry*, 43.

68 Ibid., 117.
person who knows where the boundary of commensurateness lies between the rival traditions.\textsuperscript{69}

1.3.5. Are the Canons of Logic Enough to Settle Moral Disagreements?

One might question MacIntyre's position to suggest that the minimum requirements of logic can be used to derive universal norms applicable to all traditions. Could not these principles form the foundation for a neutral position between rival traditions? Early in \textit{Whose Justice? Which Rationality}? MacIntyre addressed this question. He recognizes that Aristotle's principle of non-contradiction is, indeed, applicable to all traditions. Nevertheless, for MacIntyre, the principles of logic, though necessary, do not sufficiently provide for substantive moral knowledge. MacIntyre argues:

\begin{quote}
but even if Aristotle was successful, and I believe that he was, in showing that no one who understands the laws of logic can remain rational while rejecting them, observance of the laws of logic is only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for rationality, whether theoretical or practical.\textsuperscript{70}
\end{quote}

In other words, these principles are far too thin to form the foundation of moral inquiry. Some philosophers have attempted to develop moral theories

\textsuperscript{69} See ibid., 114.

\textsuperscript{70} \textit{Whose Justice? Which Rationality}? 4. See also 173 and 334.
from such basic principles of logic. However, MacIntyre argues that these theorists get involved in intractable conflicts when they begin to specify the requirements of their theories beyond the basics of logic. These theorists do not advance the debates at all, since they do not take into consideration contextual issues. Thus, for MacIntyre, "the only rational way in which these disagreements could be resolved would be by means of a philosophical enquiry aimed at deciding which out of the conflicting premises, if any, is true." This philosophical inquiry is an encounter of traditions that provides for the immersion of members of each tradition in the other tradition in order to arrive at substantive understanding and critique.

1.3.6. The Concept of Truth in the Dialectical Encounter

The goals and process of the dialectical encounter imply a certain concept of truth. For MacIntyre, all moral knowledge is affirmed through the history of the inquiry of a tradition which involves its conflicts with rival traditions. Abstracting a moral concept from its traditional context removes it from its foundation of meaning. The search for moral truth, therefore,

---

71 See, for example, the discourse ethics of Karl Otto-Apel and Habermas and the human rights theory of Alan Gewirth. For an argument that uses discourse ethics as a starting point, but that attempts a substantive moral discourse as well see William Rehg's work in the bibliography.


73 Ibid., 343 (italics in original)
must take place from within a tradition. This is why MacIntyre discusses the function of the boundary person. The boundary person does not search out moral concepts from some neutral viewpoint, but rather from within the set of concepts that have so far been developed within a specific tradition. This means that MacIntyre's project conceives the dialectical encounter between traditions as a process that allows each tradition to remain unique and not dominated by the rival, while at the same time, allowing for a search for understanding through the role of the boundary person.

However, the notion of moral truth that is operative here advances the insight that no tradition can have the confidence that their framework is the best so far achieved until they have engaged in the dialectical encounter with a rival. Without the dialectical encounter, a tradition can have only a "limited warranted assertability" about the moral truths it holds.74 It is only in the dialectical encounter that one can become confident in its moral truths as these truths stand up to the dialectical test posed by rival traditions.

---

74 For MacIntyre, the term "warranted assertability" refers to the way a tradition develops its concepts, truths, and beliefs. A truth statement, for example, is merely warrantedly assertable from within a tradition if it fulfils the conditions of truth from within that tradition. However, MacIntyre's concept of truth is not warranted assertability. Rather, MacIntyre argues that truth concepts from one tradition can be critically tested by other traditions. In fact, his notion of an epistemological crisis assumes as much. This gives a certain contingency to MacIntyre's understanding of truth, since "no one [tradition] can ever rule out the future possibility of their present beliefs and judgments being shown to be inadequate in a variety of ways." ibid., 361. See also Three Rival Versions, 121-22.
Some times such a dialectical encounter, as we have seen, will mean that the tradition will have to acknowledge that the rival tradition is rationally superior, or that a new synthetic framework needs to emerge to displace both traditions. This means that the concept of moral truth that the dialectical encounter anticipates is one that does not seek out moral truth solely from within one tradition, but seeks out moral truth through the dialectical encounter among traditions. Through such encounter a tradition can articulate true moral knowledge as the best answer so far available.

1.3.7. MacIntyre's Example of a Forum for the Dialectic Encounter: The University

The dialectical encounter as a process of interaction among rival traditions can take place, according to MacIntyre, within the university setting. Although he admits that his proposal is somewhat idealistic and far from the contemporary university setting, MacIntyre is serious about his suggestion that the modern university can be a place where rival traditions of moral inquiry can come to a rational agreement on real moral problems. His proposal for a university-in-dialogue involves understanding the roles of the participants in the encounter in a specific way. First, each participant will have a dual role. One role will be that of participant. This role has two tasks. The first is that each participant must be one who speaks from within

---

75 *In Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry* MacIntyre claims that the University of Paris in the thirteenth century is an historical precedent, 232.
one tradition. Each participant must present the best arguments so far available from within one’s tradition in openness with others. The second task is to engage the other tradition in order to critique the mistakes of the other tradition from one’s own viewpoint and to test one’s own position in light of the position of the other tradition. The second role for each participant involves the critical assessment of the encounter. This role concerns keeping the conflict among traditions open and constructive. It means:

... to provide and sustain institutionalized means for their expression, to negotiate the modes of encounter between opponents, to ensure that rival voices were not illegitimately suppressed, to sustain the university... as an arena of conflict in which the most fundamental type of moral and theological disagreement was accorded recognition.  

This also means recognizing the major agreements that exist even as the conflict unfolds between opponents of rival traditions. Furthermore, this means that there might emerge a synthesis that accounts for the limitations of all existing frameworks, or it may mean that one existing framework can come to be acknowledged as rationally superior, or it may simply provide the ground for recognizing and clarifying the disagreements and agreements that

---

76 Ibid., 231. It is not insignificant that this role resembles a procedural orientation. As MacIntyre might argue, the proceduralist position has a partial insight into what is required in such a forum; attention must be paid to the question of the structure of the forum itself. However, for MacIntyre, these questions alone cannot facilitate a genuine rational debate on moral questions.
exist between rival traditions.

1.4. On MacIntyre's Internal Contradiction: Contributions from Michael Maxwell

MacIntyre's process of the dialectical encounter raises one important question: Is the rationality that informs the dialectical process trans-traditional? In other words, is it operative for all such encounters no matter which traditions are involved, and if so, in what way is it invariant? This is the question that Michael Maxwell raises in his article "A Dialectical Encounter Between MacIntyre and Lonergan on the Thomistic Understanding of Rationality." But, rather than making his case on the grounds of the canons of logic, Maxwell questions MacIntyre's interpretation of Aquinas' rationality. Maxwell suggests that MacIntyre's position involves an internal contradiction, because he has incorrectly interpreted Aquinas. Maxwell sees a better interpretation of Aquinas in Bernard Lonergan's account. For Maxwell, Lonergan's trans-traditional, heuristic account of rationality overcomes MacIntyre's contradiction.

For Maxwell, MacIntyre's internal contradiction involves, on the one hand, that he seems to acknowledge that his account of rationality is trans-traditional, but on the other hand, MacIntyre argues that his account of

---

rationality might be overcome by a superior tradition. Maxwell suggests that MacIntyre appears to argue that his account of rationality is trans-traditional in three ways. First, MacIntyre recognizes that the principles that move a tradition toward a dialectical encounter or justification express a basic human capacity. As Maxwell argues:

MacIntyre appears to argue that these principles express the basic capacity of human beings to move within a tradition of enquiry toward the dialectical justification of 'substantive' first principles, which principles in turn ground conclusions about what is reasonable in concrete situations.  

If this is so, then these principles are trans-traditionally normative, since rational human beings from all traditions would need to possess this capacity for this to be true of all traditions. Second, Maxwell argues that MacIntyre claims that his position is superior to both the encyclopaedia and genealogical traditions, because it can account for what these traditions actually do as inquiring traditions. As Maxwell argues, MacIntyre's position is that the "... Thomistic understanding of rationality makes sense of what they do as participants in traditions of enquiry." In this sense, it seems that for MacIntyre, Aquinas' account of rationality is trans-traditional.

Third, Maxwell argues that MacIntyre's suggestion of a university forum of dialectical encounter is modelled by his Thomistic understanding of

---

78 Ibid., 389.
79 Ibid.
rationality. As Maxwell argues:

MacIntyre explicitly states that this forum would be constituted by the understanding of rationality informing the Thomistic tradition of enquiry. It appears, then, that this understanding of rationality provides the principles adequate for the proper unfolding of, and dialectical engagement among, these traditions. 80

Thus, Maxwell argues, it would seem that, for MacIntyre, Thomistic rationality is trans-traditional. In these three ways, then, Maxwell points out how MacIntyre’s position implies a trans-traditional rationality.

However, according to Maxwell a problem emerges with MacIntyre’s overall argument because he also denies that the principles informing the rationality of the Thomistic tradition are trans-traditional. According to MacIntyre, the Thomistic tradition is open to possible revision through the dialectical encounter with other traditions. It is possible, for MacIntyre, that the Thomistic tradition could be revised by a superior tradition. This means that, for MacIntyre, the Thomistic tradition is just the best answer so far possible. However, for Maxwell this position is incoherent. He argues:

... one cannot base a revision of one’s understanding of rationality upon the very understanding being revised. Such an attempt would place one in the untenable position of justifying the revision through an appeal to the very norms being revised ... In short, it is incoherent to base the revision of norms on the very norms being revised. A principle of revision cannot require its own revision. 81

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid., 390.
In other words, if MacIntyre’s argument about traditions is to have any force, the rationality that informs the dialectical process must possess a certain unrevvisability. The Thomistic rationality that grounds the dialectical encounter must involve a trans-traditional element that all traditions at least implicitly engage to work out their own internal problems. Thus, it seems that either MacIntyre must acknowledge that the Thomistic rationality is trans-traditional, or give up on his project of accounting for the development of traditions through a dialectical process.

Before continuing on to find out how Maxwell proposes to resolve MacIntyre’s contradiction, it would be helpful if we attempt to articulate how MacIntyre might respond to Maxwell’s critique. As we have noted, for MacIntyre, the tradition-constituted nature of rationality means that the encounter between traditions will also be tradition-constituted. This is to say that the dialectical encounter must allow each tradition to be understood from within the framework of each tradition. In *Three Rivals of Moral Enquiry*, MacIntyre plays the role of the boundary person. It is this person

---

82 Lonergan acknowledges that his cognitional theory is relatively unrevvisable. It may be that a more accurate explanation of the inquiring process may be developed. But, were this to happen such an account would still be attentive to the data, intelligent in its questions, rational in its judgments, and responsible in its decisions. See *Method in Theology*, (Minneapolis: Seabury / Winston Press Inc., 1979): 19-20.

83 I do not know of any response that MacIntyre has published to Maxwell’s challenge.
who bridges understanding between members of rival traditions. Now, 
MacIntyre would concede that the process of dialectical encounter does 
involve at least the canons of logic as trans-traditional. In fact, for 
MacIntyre, the principle of non-contradiction, for example, can provide for 
both the basis of an internal critique of a tradition and the over-coming of 
that tradition by a superior tradition. However, MacIntyre would argue that 
these canons of logic cannot provide all the elements of what is needed in 
concrete ethical decision-making.\textsuperscript{84} Concrete ethical decision-making 
requires the range of sources of the ethical life that are provided only by the 
tradition within which one lives. In this sense, then, the canons of logic are 
necessary for the dialectical encounter, but are not sufficient in the concrete 
encounter among traditions. For MacIntyre, the Thomistic understanding of 
rationality may indeed be superior to both the encyclopaedia and 
genealogical traditions, but this is so only because of the concrete encounter 
that MacIntyre’s position as a boundary person affords and not because of 
some trans-traditional rationality. Thus, MacIntyre would allow for the 

\textsuperscript{84} In \textit{Whose Justice? Which Rationality?} MacIntyre writes, “we do indeed, 
according to Aquinas, apprehend \textit{being} as the most fundamental concept of 
thoretical enquiry and make explicit what we apprehend in the recognition 
which our judgments accord to the principle on noncontradiction. Similarly, 
we apprehend \textit{good} as the most fundamental concept in forming practical 
activity and make explicit what we apprehend in the recognition which our 
actions accord to the principle that good is to be done and evil to be avoided. 
But when each person assesses what it is good and best for him or her to do, 
more is needed.” 173 (italics in original).
limited role of a trans-traditional conception of rationality as based upon the canons of logic which may provide some direction in the dialectical encounter, but by themselves, they would be insufficient to resolve practical and moral conflicts among traditions.\textsuperscript{85}

\textsuperscript{85} MacIntyre might also respond to Maxwell by denying the significance of the data of consciousness since a conceptualization of this data presupposes a conceptual scheme. In at least two places MacIntyre seems to suggest this point. In Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, MacIntyre writes, "but any conception of that state [an adequate conception of the object by the mind] as one in which the mind could by its own powers know itself as thus adequately informed is ruled out. . . ." 360-61 and in Three Rival Versions, he writes "suppose, then, that someone aspired to adjudicate between Augustinian and Aristotelian claims by appealing away from their theoretical conceptualizations to how things in fact are in the human psyche. Any such appeal would have to present empirical data. Yet at the level at which such data are characterizable in a way that make them independent of and neutral between schemes as conceptually rich and organized as the Aristotelian and the Augustinian- the levels at which it is in term of reflexes and responses to sensory, linguistic, or other stimuli that human patterns of behaviour are described-the data are too meager and underdetermine any characterization at the required level. They are no more than matter still to be given form by characterization at the higher, more theoretical level. And if the data are themselves presented as more fully and richly characterized, in a way that make them relevant to the disputes between Augustinians and Aristotelians, then some conclusion as to where the truth lies in those disputes will already have been presupposed by the way in which the data have been conceptualized." 111-12. In other words, for MacIntyre, conceptualizing the data of consciousness presupposes a theoretical framework. This much is true. But, Lonergan's cogntional theory does not deny this. Rather, he shows that there is a relatively invariant structure to consciousness. If new concepts from other traditions can expand on this structure, then so much the better. But, such an expansion will be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible. More to MacIntyre's point, however, the structure alone cannot resolve differences between traditions. A tradition-dependent process is still required. Rather, the structure articulates norms that must be satisfied for ethical discourse. Thus, the structure, based upon the data of consciousness, provides for both substantive discourse and
This possible response of MacIntyre allows us to clarify what is going forward in this dialogue. There are, on the one hand, a set of trans-traditional norms of rationality. These norms such as the principles of non-contradiction, the whole is greater than the parts, coherence and the excluded middle are necessary in the concrete encounter among traditions. All traditions, then, to the extent that they claim to be rational must follow these norms. However, on the other hand, according to MacIntyre, they are not specific enough to guide concrete ethical decision-making. It is here that the substance of the conflict among traditions rests. Substantive ethical conflicts cannot be resolved simply by an appeal to the canons of logic. The reason for this is that two conflicting substantive ethical arguments can each meet all the demands of the canons of logic, but still give contradictory answers to concrete ethical issues.\(^{86}\) Thus, for MacIntyre, in order that one might be able to resolve such a conflict one must engage the two traditions of moral enquiry in a process that is tradition-constituted. Maxwell would argue in return, however, that MacIntyre has missed an important element

\[^{86}\text{As MacIntyre writes, "that is to say, in the case of both Nozick's account of justice and Rawls's account of justice the problems that I want to raise do not concern the coherence of the internal structure of their arguments. Indeed my own argument requires that their accounts do not lack such coherence." After Virtue, 248.}\]
in Aquinas' account of rationality. Specifically, the issue becomes: how substantive are the trans-traditional norms of rationality? In order to understand what MacIntyre has missed, Maxwell argues that we must turn to Bernard Lonergan's understanding of Aquinas' account of rationality.

Maxwell accounts for the trans-traditional element in a dialectical encounter among traditions by appealing to Lonergan's distinction between the logical and the dialectical modes of reasoning. The logic mode of reasoning works with a set of first principles or basic insights from which a tradition can develop into an integral whole. As Maxwell argues:

\[
\ldots \text{they express a set of basic insights grounding a logical expanse.} \\
\text{Their relevance does not extend beyond this logical expanse because of the limited scope of the questions about experience whence they originally derived. It is always possible that further questions will emerge which cannot be answered within the limits of the basic insights grounding the deductive expanse.}
\]

The deductive expanse is limited by the questions and answers that are possible by the basic insights. A tradition can be said to be open to revision when it is not able to answer questions based upon its basic insights. At these times, the tradition would find itself in what MacIntyre names an epistemological crisis.


\[88\text{"A Dialectical Encounter", 396.}\]
However, rationality also functions in a dialectical mode. The basis of this mode of reasoning can be found in the basic operations of the human mind as it moves forward in the process of inquiry. As Maxwell argues, these norms are:

...an expression of the immanent norms of the mind that are constitutive of the emergence, appropriation, development, and dialectical revision of every logical context or succession of logical contexts that makes for the cumulative advance of a tradition of enquiry.\(^{89}\)

This process provides the inquirer with a set of norms that are applicable in every logical mode of reasoning. These norms are not open to radical revision, since such a revision would presuppose these very norms.\(^{90}\) For Maxwell, they function as a strategic heuristic which orientates the inquirer throughout the inquiry process. As Maxwell argues, "...they are a strategic heuristic that can be employed to orient and direct the further progress of a tradition of enquiry in its pursuit of truth, but do not warrant the illusion that one has transcended tradition."\(^ {91}\) They are trans-traditional in the sense that, whether or not one is aware of them, they are operative whenever an

---

\(^{89}\) Ibid., 397.

\(^{90}\) In other words, the logical mode works within a given frame of reference but cannot account for the development of this framework. The dialectical mode, however, can both account for a framework and the shift from one to another, because it is based on the operations of rationality that work in the logical mode.

\(^{91}\) Ibid.
inquiring subject inquires. Thus, for Maxwell, Lonergan’s distinction between these two types of functions of rationality provide a better understanding of Aquinas’ account of rationality.

For Maxwell, Lonergan’s understanding of Aquinas’ rationality means that the internal contradiction that he understands to be operative in MacIntyre’s position can be worked out in the following way. The dialectical mode of reasoning, according to Maxwell, provides the trans-traditional norms of reasoning, because they are founded upon the very activity of reasoning itself. The dialectical mode of reasoning is applicable within the logical mode of reasoning. The norms of the dialectical mode of reasoning can provide the ground for the dialectical encounter within a university, for example, because they provide a strategic heuristic to guide the dialectical inquiry. The key difference that Maxwell clarifies is that this strategic heuristic is founded upon the basic human capacity for rational inquiry.

Maxwell’s suggestion that the dialectical mode of reasoning provides the strategic heuristic to guide the dialectical encounter among traditions because it is founded upon the basic human capacity of rational inquiry is our clue to developing a response to pluralistic discourse. The basic human

\[92\] Maxwell argues, however, that these norms are tradition-constituted in two ways. First, in order for one to be aware of them and understand how they function one’s tradition must be developed enough to know about these norms. Second, these norms do not purport to be ahistorical. Rather they set an anticipation for the subject in his or her inquiry. See ibid.
capacity of rational inquiry assumes an adequate cognitional theory. This will be developed from Bernard Lonergan's philosophy. This cognitional theory will give us the general terms and relations of the basic human capacity for knowing, valuing, and acting which will be articulated, within the context of intersubjectivity, as the structure of ethical discourse. This structure is heuristic in the sense that it articulates the structural requirements of pluralistic discourse without determining substantive issues. It allows for a tradition-dependent articulation of moral knowing, as MacIntyre suggests, while providing trans-traditional norms for conducting ethical discourse in a pluralistic society.

1.5. Summary of Chapter One

We began this chapter by articulating MacIntyre's ethical framework and his account of our contemporary moral situation of emotivism. For MacIntyre, our emotivist culture, with its political manifestation of liberalism, fails to secure moral agreement because it does not have an adequate account of the rational grounding of moral knowledge. Through a series of three books, MacIntyre struggles to articulate his ethical framework as one that allows for a dialectical encounter among divergent moral traditions. From within such an encounter, MacIntyre anticipates a discovery of moral truth and understanding that is tradition-constituted. I have argued, however, that within his approach there exists at least one aporia.
Though MacIntyre argues that it is the Thomistic tradition that provides us with the rationality of the dialectical process, in his view this tradition is itself open to possible revision through an encounter with a superior tradition. The question raised by Maxwell, however, concerns how one's rationality (which provides the resources for revising one's understanding) be itself open to revision? For Maxwell, the rationality that informs the dialectical process must be trans-traditional if it is to be a resource for revising a tradition. The principles of revision cannot themselves be open to revision. Maxwell's engagement with MacIntyre, through Lonergan's account of Aquinas' notion of rationality, gives us a clue that Lonergan's work might provide the necessary resources for understanding the structure of ethical discourse among traditions. The following chapter, then, will provide an introduction to Lonergan's philosophy. Chapter three will work with Lonergan's seminal insights into conscious intentionality to articulate the structure of ethical discourse. Chapter four will show how an attention to the structure of ethical discourse addresses two issues raised in MacIntyre's dialectical process. Chapter five will provide a concrete illustration of the structure of ethical discourse in the field of conflict resolution. Chapter six will work again with MacIntyre, Lonergan, and conflict resolution to draw out some insights towards a theological ethics of discourse.
Chapter Two: Bernard Lonergan's Cognitional Theory and World-View of Emergent Probability

2.0. Introduction

The previous chapter ended with a clue that Lonergan’s basic position on rational inquiry can provide us with a framework for working out the structure of ethical discourse. This chapter will follow up on this clue by presenting Lonergan’s cognitional theory and world-view of emergent probability. I will first present the basic framework of Lonergan’s cognitional theory. The first three levels of conscious intentionality will be presented. This presentation will be facilitated by a brief thought experiment. Following this, the fourth level of conscious intentionality will be presented. An interpretation of Lonergan’s work in chapter eighteen of Insight will show that Lonergan uses the term “knowing” in three distinct ways. This distinction will help articulate a more complex image of the relationship between the operations and the levels of conscious intentionality. It will be shown that a simple four-step image of Lonergan’s cognitional theory can be augmented by a more complex image in order to further clarify the operations of conscious intentionality. The work of Philip McShane and Patrick Byrne will provide the context for presenting this image of conscious intentionality that will guide the presentation of the structure of ethical discourse in chapter three. This will be followed by a presentation on Lonergan’s world-view of emergent probability and his notion of a scheme of recurrence, since this provides an explanatory heuristic for the structure of
ethical discourse. This chapter will conclude by considering Lonergan’s notion of meaning and the intersubjective dimensions of Lonergan’s cognitional theory as it has been developed in Lonergan studies. This will help situate this thesis with Lonergan scholars who have sought to work out insights relating Lonergan’s work within discourse and intersubjectivity.

2.1. Bernard Lonergan’s Cognitional Theory

Lonergan’s cognitional theory is a meta-level explanation of human inquiry. For Lonergan, the move to a cognitional theory is an heightening of consciousness such that one is able to develop not only a metaphysics and an epistemology, but an understanding of the operations of one’s own conscious intentionality that ground them. As Lonergan writes, his position leads to three basic questions, “What am I doing when I am knowing? Why is doing that knowing? What do I know when I do it? The first answer is a cognitional theory. The second is an epistemology. The third is a metaphysics . . .”¹ It is important, therefore, to present Lonergan’s cognitional theory. A major difficulty, however, in doing this is that there are diverse interpretations in Lonergan scholarship regarding certain aspects of Lonergan’s theory. As we will see, some of these difficulties will affect an understanding of the structure of ethical discourse. The following, then, will initially focus on the first three levels of conscious intentionality. Facilitating this presentation is

¹ Method, 25.
a brief thought experiment. Second, the presentation will then focus on the fourth level, since it is on this level that Lonergan conceives decision-making. This presentation will work with material in Insight and Method on the practical insight and on a problem in Lonergan scholarship concerning the question of reduplication. This section will provide some clarity on key aspects of Lonergan's cognition theory which will prove valuable in chapter three on the structure of ethical discourse.

2.1.1. The Levels of Conscious Intentionality

The basic schema of Lonergan’s theory divides cognition into four levels: experience, understanding, judgment, and decision. As a general framework these four levels do not pose much of a problem in Lonergan studies. Sections 2.1.1. and 2.1.2. will present the relationship among the first three levels. Sections 2.1.3. to 2.1.5. will present the fourth level of intentionality as it relates to practical insights, decision-making, and action. As we will see in section 2.1.6., current debates in Lonergan scholarship, however, point to disagreements about a fully explanatory account of the terms and relations of the operations of intentionality.² Section 2.1.7. will present a more complex image of conscious intentionality which will guide the analysis in chapter three on the structure of ethical discourse.

2.1.2. The First Three Levels of Intentional Consciousness

For Lonergan, human knowing is an intentional process involving successive operations arranged in a hierarchy of sublated levels. Humans inquire about their world through an ordered method. The method of human inquiry is not mechanical where the same results are obtained through the function of repeated operations. Rather, for Lonergan, the method of human inquiry generates cumulative and progressive results through the proper functioning of the intentional operations of consciousness. Lonergan's notion of method focuses upon the heuristic structure of inquiry. It suggests those operations and their relations that function to give human understanding its progressive and cumulative content. Rather than focusing upon the content of human inquiry, however, Lonergan's method identifies the foundational cognitive operations of human inquiry. In this way, Lonergan describes his method as transcendental. The transcendentality of the process of human inquiry refers to the normative functioning of the operations of conscious intentionality regardless of the diversity of fields of experience in which we find them at work.

---

3 The term "method" can cause some confusion. Some Lonergan scholars prefer to use the term "meta-method" in an attempt to distance Lonergan's cognitional theory from purely procedural theories of truth. See, for example, Giovanni B. Sala, Lonergan and Kant: Five Essays on Human Knowledge, trans. J. Spoerl, ed. R.M. Doran, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994).
A brief thought experiment can facilitate this presentation.  

*Imagine that you are relaxing on an almost deserted beach. The sun is shining brightly and there is a warm breeze. After a while you find yourself moving in and out of consciousness as your body eases into the embrace of the warm sun. Suddenly you hear a noise. You are startled and immediately awake from your near sleepy consciousness. No longer relaxed, your muscles are tense and responsive. You feel your heart beat race and your eyes focus on the distant horizon.*

How can we explain what has just happened? For Lonergan, the sound of the noise initiates a process of inquiry involving distinct cognitive operations related by successively higher levels of consciousness. From an almost dream state one moves to a level of consciousness that allows one to hear a distinctive noise. The experience of the noise does not occur in the dream state, since the noise is not produced within one's mind. It has, rather, an external source. However, on the *level of experience*, the sound is just a noise. It is experienced as merely background noise. The data of sense is the contents of acts of hearing, seeing, touching, smelling and tasting. The experience of these acts of sensing is what happens on the first level of

---

intentional consciousness. Were human inquiry to stop at this level, we would not be able to say that we knew anything at all. Being attentive to sense data is not knowing the cause or the meaning of the data. To explain this difference, Lonergan argues that human inquiry moves to another level of consciousness when it begins to ask questions about the data of the senses. When we ask what caused the sound, or what the sound means, we are inquiring about the intelligibilities in what we have sensed. 

Upon hearing the sound you immediately get up from your chair to take a look around. You search the horizon seeking out the source of the noise. Is it a child crying out for her mother? Is it someone drowning and in need of help? Is it a seagull? Or, is it simply the sound of a truck’s brakes?

These questions, posed about meaning of the data of sense, involve acts on the second level of intelligence. The operations of conscious intentionality on the second level ask about the inherent intelligibility of the data of sense. The second level does not remain with the data of sense alone, but rather grasps within the data specific intelligibilities (unities or correlations among the data) that answer such questions as what, where, how often, and why. The difficulty of the second level of conscious

---

5 Were this the only data we could inquire about, we would never know that we are inquirers. Thus, Lonergan distinguished between data of sense and data of consciousness. The data of consciousness occurs by the operations of conscious intentionality. There is a duality in these operations. On the level of experience, there is the data of the object and there is the data of the operation itself. See *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, (London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd, 1967), 274.
intentionality is human creativity. The possibilities of understanding a
specific situation seem endless. The search for intelligence tends to produce a
variety of equally viable and intelligent possibilities.

But almost immediately you remember that the road does not allow for
trucks, so the noise was unlikely caused by truck brakes. You look
quickly around the beach and notice that there are neither children nor
swimmers. But, you look upward and see a flock of young seagulls
playing against the warm breeze.

Each possibility is an answer to a question of intelligence. However, on the
level of intelligence one cannot know which insight into the data is correct.
For Lonergan, the act of judging the truth content of a question for
intelligence is an act on the higher, third level of rationality. This level asks
the further question of critical rationality regarding the questions of the
second level. The third level reflects upon second level insights to ask
whether or not they are true. The third level asks the question “Is it so?” to
the insights grasped on the second level. In the example above, the questions
asked are mutually exclusive. Either the cause of the sound is someone
drowning, a truck's brakes, a child crying, or a seagull. Although all four are
insights about the possible source of the sound, only one is correct. However,
one does not know whether it was, say, the seagull, until one moves to the
third level of conscious intentionality and asks the question “Is it really the

---

6 Note Lonergan’s various applications of the term “insight”, e.g. direct
insight, inverse insight, oversight, reflective insight, and practical insight.
bird?" The reflective question of the level of judgment sublates both levels of understanding and experience. It does so in order to arrive at a judgment of fact. In our example, the third level of consciousness seeks to determine what in fact caused the sound.

Now, the affirmation of the critical reflective question "Is it so?" occurs by way of what Lonergan names the grasp of a virtually unconditioned. Put simply, the intelligible insight that it was a bird that caused the sound is a conditioned. When a seagull makes a sound it does so by certain fulfilling conditions. These conditions can be known to exist through the critical reflection of the third level. They are fulfilled according to Lonergan not absolutely, or necessarily, but virtually, since all empirical knowledge for Lonergan is contingent. The knowledge that it was the bird that caused the sound can be affirmed only at the third level of conscious intentionality when the subject grasps that the virtually unconditioned exists. Thus, the first level of experience provides the raw data of sense which the second level operations organize through intelligence to provide possibilities of explanation that the third level determines is in fact the case through a grasp of the virtually unconditioned. While no doubt this presentation is limited, it does provide enough of a background for our presentation of the fourth level of consciousness.
2.1.3. The Fourth Level of Conscious Intentionality

It is commonly understood in Lonergan scholarship that while the first three levels are orientated to questions of fact, the fourth level is concerned with questions of value and the good. In his article "Insight Revisited," Lonergan comments that in Insight the good is intelligent and reasonable, while in Method the good is a distinct notion. While much has been made in Lonergan studies about this shift in Lonergan's understanding of the good, it is probably best to understand the shift as one involving Lonergan's own conceptualization of the good in relation to his cognitional theory.

Nevertheless, there remains some difficulty in interpreting Lonergan's position with regard to the relationship between a practical insight and a judgment of value. Section 2.1.4. will present an interpretation of Lonergan's account of this relationship in Insight. Section 2.1.5. will present an

---

7 It is beyond the limits of this thesis to fully work out an explanation of the distinction of the fourth level. For recent developments along this line of research see, Joseph P. Cassidy, Extending Bernard Lonergan's Ethics: Parallels between the Structures of Cognition and Evaluation, Doctoral Dissertation, Ottawa: Saint Paul University, 1995.

8 We will see below that this distinction between the first three levels and the fourth level is not quite accurate. I will argue that the first three levels also can be orientated by value and the good, but at this point in the presentation the distinction can be used to clarify the difference between intentionality to facts and to value.

9 See, for example, Kenneth Melchin, "Ethics in Insight," in Lonergan Workshop 8 (Missoula: Scholars Press, 1990), 135-47.
Chapter Two, Lonergan

interpretation of how Lonergan addresses this relationship in *Method*.

Section 2.1.6. works through the problem of reduplication in an effort in
section 2.1.7. to articulate a more complex image of the structure of conscious
intentionality that can be used for the analysis of the structure of ethical
discourse in chapter three.

2.1.4. *Insight* on the Practical Insight

In chapter eighteen of *Insight*, Lonergan introduces ethics as a
prolongation of metaphysics into the area of human action. In this chapter,
he covers issues on the human good, value, and freedom. Central to this
chapter concerns the question of the process of human deliberation and
decision. The difficulty, however, in understanding Lonergan in this part of
chapter eighteen rests in his strong economy of words. Moreover, it is known
that Lonergan did not have a lot of time to write this part of *Insight*. So, the
fact that there are problems in interpretation is not surprising. What,
therefore, is the problem of chapter eighteen and how can an adequate
interpretation be made?

The first step will be to organize the required paragraphs. The section

---

10 As Morelli and Morelli explain "by the fall of 1952, Lonergan had
completed chapters 1 to 13; the task of 'rounding off' consisted of writing
seven more chapters by next summer". This includes chapter 18 "On the
Possibility of Ethics", *The Lonergan Reader*, ed. Mark D. Morelli and
Elizabeth A. Morelli (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 7-8. See
also, Lonergan's comments in "Insight Revisited," in *A Second Collection*,
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 268.
at issue in chapter eighteen, is part two, "The Notion of Freedom."\(^{11}\)

Lonergan's focus here is to show that human action is not simply the result of biological conditioning. Intelligence, rationality, and the will are higher order levels of human functioning. The emergence of the practical insight is the subject's questioning of her existential existence. It is an inquiry into the unity of sense images and is similar to any direct insight. However, as Lonergan writes:

\[\ldots\] while the speculative or factual insight is followed by the question whether the unity exists or whether the correlation governs events, the practical insight is followed by the question whether the unity is going to be made to exist or whether the correlation is going to be made to govern events.\(^{12}\)

This sets up a comparison between two different kinds of insight. On the one hand, there is the factual, or speculative insight, that can lead to the knowledge about an existing event or an event that was existing at one time.

---

\(^{11}\) Within this section Lonergan discusses the significance of the statistical residue, the underlying sensitive flow, the practical insight, practical reflection, decision, and freedom. The significance of the statistical residue rests in the fact that higher ordered events are not fully determined by the sequence of lower order events. This significance accounts for the fact of human freedom. The next four issues concern Lonergan's notion of freedom. The underlying sensitive flow poses fewer problems of interpretation. This refers to experiential activities of the body and imagination. Some of these activities are freely chosen acts. These acts are discernable as such because they emerge from human intelligence and reason as higher ordered integrations of what would otherwise be merely coincidental manifolds on the level of sensitivity.

\(^{12}\) Insight, 609.
On the other hand, there is the practical insight that can lead to a type of knowledge about future events that at present do not exist. Succinctly, Lonergan writes that “. . . speculative and factual insights are concerned to lead to knowledge of being, practical insights are concerned to lead to the making of being.”\textsuperscript{13} The distinction between these two types of insight must be kept in mind when one interprets this section of \textit{Insight}. Lonergan continues that the objective of the practical insight concerns what is to be done. It reveals unities and correlations not of events that have occurred, or are occurring, but of possible courses of action.

Practical insights, like factual insights, lead to reflection and judgment. However, unlike direct reflection, correct practical reflection cannot grasp the virtual unconditionality of a possible event in quite the same way. This is so, because the possible event has not occurred. As Lonergan writes:

\begin{quote}
but, when practical insight is correct, then reflective understanding cannot grasp a relevant virtually unconditioned; for if it could, the content of the insight already would be a fact; and if it were already a fact, then it would not be a possible course of action which, as yet, is not a fact but just a possibility.\textsuperscript{14}
\end{quote}

At this point in his presentation, Lonergan does not clarify this distinction between practical knowing and factual, or speculative, knowing. At first

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 610.
reading, it would appear that the knowing of practicality is not of the same order as factual knowing. In the previous chapters of *Insight*, Lonergan makes great effort to explain the process through which a subject can affirm that he or she knows the existence of some object. For Lonergan, knowing is a compound activity that cumulates on the third level of consciousness. On this level, the subject judges that the insight is indeed true. There is no *knowing* at the prior two levels of experience and understanding. The known is the object of the reflective question, "Is it so?" that takes up the intelligibility of the prior level of understanding. It would appear, then, that the reflection that follows practical insight is not a knowing of this same kind, since it concerns an event that has not yet occurred. But, what type of knowing can it be?

---

15 In his article, "The Transcendental Reduction According to Edmund Husserl and Intellectual Conversion According to Bernard Lonergan," *Creativity and Method: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lonergan, S.J.*, ed. Matthew L. Lamb (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1981): 409, William Ryan writes that "no single level, insists Lonergan, is knowing, much less the paradigm for understanding what knowing might be." Whenever Lonergan discusses the level of judgment, he implies that the prior two levels are operative via the process of sublation.

16 At times Lonergan's words do not fully express such strictness regarding knowing as third level activity. See, for example, *Understanding and Being: The Halifax Lectures on Insight*, ed. Elizabeth A. Morelli and Mark D. Morelli, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan Volume 5* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 207, where Lonergan writes about knowing at each level. In *Method* Lonergan writes about knowing as a compound of three levels; experience, understanding and judgment. This is the more exact terminology.
The next section of *Insight* concerns practical reflection. Not all practical insights lead immediately to action. We can have many insights into different possible courses of action given a certain situation, but we don’t execute every practical insight. Before the practical insight can result in action, there is some type of reflection. Practical reflection searches for motive, sufficient reason, and the obligatoriness of a specific action. Often we reflect upon whether an action is worthwhile, whether it contributes to the existing good of order, or whether it requires a change in the good of order itself. Even though some, if not most action is the result of habit, we can even reflect on our habits and ask whether they result in actions that are worthwhile. These periods of reflection can be long or short depending on one’s familiarity with the situation at hand. But in all cases, the issue is a further questioning of the practical insight through the higher integration of rational self-consciousness. As Lonergan writes, “. . . I become rationally self-conscious inasmuch as I am concerned with reasons for my own acts, and this occurs when I scrutinize the object and investigate the motives of a possible course of action”.¹⁷ It appears at this point that Lonergan has introduced a further level of consciousness. There is the empirical consciousness of experiencing, the intellectual consciousness of understanding, the rational consciousness of judgment and the rational self-consciousness of the practical

¹⁷ *Insight*, 611.
insight and practical reflection.\textsuperscript{18}

However, it is at this point in his presentation that \textit{Insight} becomes difficult to interpret. After introducing the term “rational self-consciousness” Lonergan writes:

\ldots though the reflection heads beyond knowing to doing, still it consists simply in knowing. Thus, it may reveal that the proposed action is concretely possible, clearly effective, highly agreeable, quite useful, morally obligatory, etc. But it is one thing to know exactly what could be done and all the reasons for doing it. It is quite another for such knowledge to issue in doing.\textsuperscript{19}

When one compares this quote with the previous quote on page 610 of \textit{Insight} that states that practical reflection does not grasp a virtually unconditioned possible course of action it would seem that Lonergan is contradicting himself. If practical reflection occurs on the level of rational self-consciousness and does not grasp a possible course of action as virtually unconditioned and, therefore, cannot be a knowing of the same order as factual knowing, how can it be called a knowing at all?

The issue becomes even more confusing with the very next paragraph

\textsuperscript{18} Whether rational self-consciousness in \textit{Insight} is a distinct level of consciousness is a point of disagreement among Lonergan scholars. See, Patrick Byrne, "Consciousness," where he argues that in relation to the good "while there is little evidence that when he wrote \textit{Insight} Lonergan was thinking of additional levels of consciousness (and indeed good reasons to doubt that he was)” 133. Compare with Elizabeth Morelli, \textit{Anxiety: A Study of the Affectivity of Moral Consciousness}, (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985), 74.

\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Insight}, 611.
where Lonergan writes:

thirdly, the reflection has no internal term, no capacity of its own to come to an end. For it is a knowing that leads to doing. In so far as it is a knowing, it can reach an internal term, for one can grasp the virtually unconditioned and thereby attain certitude on the possibility of a proposed course of action, on its agreeableness, on its utility, on its obligatoriness. But in so far as this knowing is practical, in so far as its concern is with something to be done and with the reasons for doing it, the reflection has not an internal but an external term; for the reflection is just knowing, but the term is an ulterior deciding and doing.²⁰

Here we are told that the knowing of practical reflection can grasp a virtually unconditioned! Does this not contradict what Lonergan wrote only a few paragraphs before? How can we make sense of this paragraph?

I would argue that Lonergan has in mind three types of knowing. The first type of knowing is factual. It is concerned with events that have occurred. The second type of knowing concerns knowledge of possible future action which can lead to judgments about a possible course of action that is useful, obligatory, and agreeable. A third type of knowing is concerned with the doing itself. Since the object of the third type of knowing is doing, it cannot bring itself to an end without decision. It has an external term. This type of knowing will continue until a decision is made concerning whether or not the proposed course of action will be carried out. It is the use of the same word “knowing” for all three of these activities that is the source of the

²⁰ Ibid.
confusion. The first type of knowing is speculative or factual. The second type of knowing refers to possible action. The third concerns bringing action into being; the making of the good. With this understanding we can clarify what at first sight appears to be a contradiction. The paragraph from page 610 of *Insight* refers to the third type of knowing without discussing the second type of knowing. But it is the difference between the three types of knowing that concerns Lonergan in these pages.

The second type of knowing, then, consists of a practical reflection on the reasons for a proposed action; one's motives and obligation. Through this reflection one can know what action one must do either because of one's obligations or one's motives. But, with the third type of knowing reflection lacks an internal term; it can go on indefinitely. The reflection is not oriented to knowing as in the second type, but is oriented to making a decision to act; about whether the action will be carried out. Thus, the decision is the external term which ends reflection in favour of either action or no action. As Lonergan writes, "... what ends the reflection is the decision. As long as I am reflecting, I have not decided yet. Until I have decided, the reflection can be prolonged by further questions."\(^{21}\) The reflection may be long or short, but it ends only by a decision.

In *Insight*, then, Lonergan presents an expanding movement of

\(^{21}\) Ibid., 612.
consciousness. Images and sensations are acts of the empirical
consciousness. The insight of the practical action is an act of intellectual
consciousness. The judgment on the action is an act of rational consciousness.
The decision is an act of rational self-consciousness. As Lonergan writes:

... there is a succession of enlargements of consciousness, a succession
of transformations of what consciousness means. Waking replaces
dreaming. Intelligent inquiry emerges in waking to compound
intelligent with empirical consciousness. Critical reflection follows
understanding and formulations to add rational consciousness to
intelligent and empirical consciousness. But the final enlargement and
transformation of consciousness in the empirically, intelligently, and
rationally conscious subject (1) demanding conformity of his doing to
his knowing, and (2) acceding to that demand by deciding
reasonably. 22

The final transformation of rational self-consciousness is the place of human
freedom to choose to act or not. The freedom, though, does not come without a
demand. That demand is to do what one knows is the good, the right, the
worthwhile.

But what type of knowing is this knowing of the good? Of the three
types that have been distinguished, the first two have an internal term which
is provided by the grasp of some sort of virtually unconditioned. Both of these
types of knowing, Lonergan explains, take place on the level of rational
consciousness. He writes:

it is possible for practical reflection to reach with certitude the
conclusion that a proposed course of action is obligatory, that either I

22 Ibid., 613.
decide in favour of the proposal or else I surrender consistency between my knowing and my doing. Now in such instances it is apparent that the emergence of an obligation is the emergence of a rational necessity in rational consciousness.\textsuperscript{23}

Here Lonergan means the second type of knowing. This knowing involves the moral demand to make one's action consistent with one's knowing. As such, it has an internal term. However, the third type of knowing involves a practical reflection and decision to act. According to Lonergan:

\begin{quote}
but practical reflection is concerned with knowing only in order to guide doing. It is an activity that involves an enlarging transformation of consciousness. In that enlarged consciousness the term is not judgment but decision. Consequently, practical reflection does not come to an end once the object and motives of a proposed action are known; it comes to an end when one decides either in favour of the proposal or against.\textsuperscript{24}
\end{quote}

Here Lonergan means the third type of knowing. It involves an act of rational self-consciousness that lacks an internal term since it only comes to an end through a decision to act.

This clarifies some aspects of Lonergan's understanding of knowing as he presents it in chapter eighteen of \textit{Insight}. Lonergan uses the

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 614. Lonergan continues “to repeat the point in other words, the rational subject as imposing an obligation upon himself is just a knower, and his rationality consists radically in not allowing other desire to interfere with the unfolding of the detached and disinterested desire to know. But the rational subject as carrying out an obligation is not just a knower but also a doer, and his rationality consists not merely in excluding interference with cognitional process but also in extending the rationality of his knowing into the field of doing.” ibid..

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
single term “knowing” to specify three different types of knowing. The first type of knowing refers to factual knowing. It is concerned with knowing events that have occurred in the past. The second and third type of knowing concern practical insights, reflections, and actions. The second kind of knowing can grasp a type of virtually unconditioned to judge that a proposed action is say morally obligatory. The third type of knowing concerns carrying out the proposed action. It is completed by a decision to either act on the practical insight or not.

2.1.5. Method in Theology and the Fourth Level of Responsibility

In Method Lonergan articulates the notion of the good as a distinct level of intentional consciousness. The shift between Insight and Method involves developing cognitional theory from within an intentionality analysis. As Lonergan commented, “the basic inquiry [of Insight] was cognitional theory and, while I still spoke in terms of a faculty psychology, in reality I had moved out of its influence and was conducting an intentionality analysis.”

25 What is distinguished in Insight as rational self-consciousness emerges in Method as a separate level with its own principle, goals, and operations. Section 2.1.5.1., presents Lonergan’s understanding of responsibility as the distinct fourth level of intentionality. Section 2.1.5.2. will present how the fourth level sublates the prior three levels. Section 2.1.6.  

25 “Insight Revisited”, 277.
will address the question of reduplication concerning the operations of consciousness. Section 2.1.7. will articulate a more complex image of the structure of conscious intentionality that will guide the analysis of the structure of ethical discourse in chapter three.

2.1.5.1. The Level of Responsibility

In *Insight* the basic levels of intentionality are referred to as experience, intelligence, rationality and its extension to rational self-consciousness. In *Method*, the basic levels of operation are experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. Decision emerges as a distinct level with its own operations of "deliberating, evaluating, deciding, speaking, writing."\(^{26}\) This set of operations makes up the fourth level of conscious intentionality. The concern, or transcendental notion, of the fourth level is responsibility. As Lonergan writes, the fourth level is "... the responsible level on which we are concerned with ourselves, our own operations, our goals, and so deliberate about possible courses of action, evaluate them, decide and carry out our decisions."\(^{27}\) The fourth level is concerned with the existential dimensions of human existence where human action consists in the making of oneself. As Lonergan writes, it is on the fourth level that:

we emerge as persons, meet one another in a common concern for

\(^{26}\) *Method*, 6.

\(^{27}\) Ibid., 9.
values, seek to abolish the organization of human living on the basis of competing egoisms and to replace it by an organization on the basis of man's perceptiveness and intelligence, his reasonableness, and his responsible exercise of freedom.\textsuperscript{28}

The making of the self involves, for Lonergan, social organization within which one can identify oneself as intelligent, reasonable, and responsible. The fourth level is the level of conscious intentionality that explicitly intends the making of the self and, as we will see, the community as well. It is with this type of consciousness that social living can be transformed away from ego-centric concerns toward collective values. This involves a social living which is guided by the immanent norms of consciousness itself—being attentive, being intelligent, being reasonable, being responsible—orientated toward creating persons aware of their actions as responsible and free human beings.

2.1.5.2. Sublation

The fourth level functions in relation to the prior three levels by sublation. Lonergan writes that the fourth level:

\ldots goes beyond them [the levels of experience, understanding, judging], sets up a new principle, and types of operations, directs them to a new goal, but so far from dwarfing them, preserves them and brings them to a far fuller fruition.\textsuperscript{29}

The fourth level of decision goes beyond experience, understanding, and

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 10.

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 316.
judging because it has a different orientation. Where experience, understanding, and judging are concerned with the facts of the matter, the fourth level is concerned with action in light of these facts. Thus, the facts of the situation are brought to the fourth level of consciousness in order to arrive at some type of action. The new principle for action is responsibility. It is not just action for the sake of action, but action that emerges from the immanent norms of consciousness itself. It is action that is attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible. The new goal, then, is the existential concern of the self and its own meaning-making. The fourth level is the existential level where who one is and who one wants to be come into play. It consists of the new operations of deliberating, evaluating, deciding, and acting. On this level of consciousness we deliberate on which course of action is available to us, we evaluate the worthwhileness of each course of action in light of our values, we decide which course of action we will take in the concrete, and we carry this action out.

As we have seen in *Insight*, Lonergan uses the term “knowing” in three distinct ways. In *Method*, Lonergan further distinguishes the fourth level of intentionality by indicating its relationship with the previous three levels through sublation, by conceiving its goal as the good, and by distinguishing its operations as the four-fold process of deliberation, evaluation, decision, and action. Since the publication of *Method*, however, Lonergan scholars
have attempted to further clarify Lonergan's cognitional theory. As we have seen, although the basic four-fold structure provides a relatively unreviseable position, it is still necessary to work out a more precise understanding of conscious intentionality. Lonergan's own work provides a start, but by no means an end, to reflecting on the operations of one's own process of inquiry. While the full range of the development of this understanding is beyond the focus of this thesis, some consideration for a more accurate understanding of conscious intentionality is needed. Of particular importance for this thesis is the relationship between the third and fourth levels. The following section, therefore, will present two Lonergan scholars who have contributed to the development of a more explanatory understanding of conscious intentionality. This section will be followed by articulating a more complex understanding of conscious intentionality that will be used in working out the structure of ethical discourse in chapter three.

2.1.6. The Question of Reduplication

In the presentation of Lonergan's cognitional theory we are left with an image of conscious intentionality that consists of four levels that are hierarchically related to each other through a process of sublation. But, is this simple image an adequate representation of human knowing? This is a question that has been raised by some Lonergan scholars. A reading of Lonergan can yield two different images of conscious intentionality. The first
Chapter Two, Lonergan

is a simple four-step image. With this image the operations of each level of intentionality are fixed on their particular level. Sensing, perceiving, imaging, are first level operations. Inquiring, conceiving, and defining are second level operations. Reflecting, grasping, and judging are third level operations. Deliberating, evaluating, and deciding are fourth level operations. Thus, whenever one is, say, defining, one is operating on the second level of consciousness. This simple four-step image seems to function in a pedagogical way in that it allows for an initial understanding that the knowing process is a compound activity involving conscious operations on at least four distinct levels. However, recent efforts to fully interpret Lonergan's work and explain the relationship among the operations of each level have begun to yield a second, more complex image. While there are divergent views of how to conceive this image, what is consistent among these scholars is the agreement that the four-step image is a too simplistic model of conscious intentionality.  

---

30 For another interpretation, see Cassidy's *Extending Bernard Lonergan's Ethics*. Cassidy distinguishes two parallel structures; cognition and evaluation. Within each of these structures the basic operations of intentionality are at play. This generates a cognitive structure of experience, understanding, and judging in terms of fact and an evaluative structure of intentional desire, projecting further possibilities, and judging real value. The fourth level for Cassidy refers to the subject taking responsibility for being responsible for both the cognitive and evaluative structures.
2.1.6.1. Philip McShane

In chapter six of *Wealth of Self and Wealth of Nations*, McShane articulates the activity of decision and action. He argues that on the fourth level of intentionality there exists a change of context. The context of the first three levels of experience, understanding, and judgment concerns determining the facts of the situation. The fourth level involves an expanded context that takes one beyond a determination of facts toward a concern for the future. McShane makes use of the distinction between complacency and concern to indicate the new context. Complacency involves a certain acceptance of the current situation, while concern involves an attitude of action. McShane argues that in the context of decision and doing there is "... a recurrence of the three levels [experience, understanding, judgment], but now in a new context and with the addition of a new dimension."\(^{31}\) The new context is the concern for the future and the new dimension is the will (that is, for a faculty psychology). McShane cautions, however, that his presentation is meant as a primer on self-appropriation. The actual process of knowing, deciding and doing is much more complex. He writes that "human knowing and willing is not just a solid step-by-step process from experience to understanding to judgment to complacency to concern. There

\(^{31}\) *Wealth of Self, Wealth of Nations*, 47.
are, rather, rapid oscillations within the structure."32 McShane leaves it to
the reader to discover the more complex pattern of conscious intentionality.
Nevertheless, McShane's position is that the fourth level of decision involves
a recurrence of the three levels of intentionality orientated to a concern for
doing some action in the future.

2.1.6.2. Patrick Byrne

In his article "Consciousness: Levels, Sublations, and the Subject as
Subject," Byrne puts forward the following thesis: "the phrase 'level of
consciousness' refers primarily and directly to the subject as subject, and only
derivatively and indirectly to acts of consciousness."33 Byrne is careful to
explain the terms "levels" and "consciousness" and the related term
"sublation". Consciousness refers to the subject's self-presence. The
awareness of the self can be of different types. There is the self-presence of
experiencing, of understanding, of judging, and of deciding. For Byrne, acts
of consciousness which occur when a subject operates from one of the types of
self-presence are truly acts of that type of consciousness.

However, an important distinction is made since Lonergan related the
different types of self-presence by the hierarchical levels. For Byrne, an
introductory or descriptive presentation of these levels of consciousness, or

32 Ibid., 48.

33 "Consciousness: Levels, Sublations, and the Subject as Subject", 132.
ways of self-presence, structures them in a simple pattern as follows:\footnote{34

\textit{decision}

\textit{judgment}---->

\textit{understanding}---->

\textit{experience}---->

As we have seen, this image gives the impression that knowing and deciding are a simple step-by-step process and that the operations of consciousness are localized on the four specific levels. Byrne argues that with this image acts of consciousness are fixed to specific levels. For example, acts of imagination are fixed on the level of experience. However, Byrne tells us that his own experience of self-appropriation does not fit with this structure. Byrne does not experience the process of knowing as some type of oscillation between levels; a type of back and forth approach between levels. Rather, Byrne argues that whenever a subject is on a specific level of self-presence though she or he performs different acts or operations, all of these acts of consciousness are properly acts of that specific level. Therefore, if a subject is intellectually self-present, then any act of imagination is properly speaking a second level act. Furthermore, the subject does not move through the levels of

\footnote{34 See ibid., 138.}
consciousness in a step-by-step fashion as this image suggests. Rather one can move, for example, immediately from a dream state to the level of decision. Byrne gives the example of someone lying on a quiet beach. The sound of a sudden cry for help can set someone directly onto the fourth level of deliberation and action.

The notion of sublation, as we have seen, pertains to Lonergan’s way of explaining the relations among the different operations and levels. For Byrne, sublation refers not simply to the relation among the levels, but to a change or transformation of the subject’s self-presence. For example, the subject as intellectually aware sublates the experiential subject. Thus, it is for Byrne that the transformed subject conducts the acts of consciousness.\textsuperscript{35}

To quote Byrne at length:

\begin{quote}
now it is true that the operators operate on the contents of acts which occur on a lower level of consciousness; but more primordially, the operators operate on the subject present to herself or himself. The operators, therefore, operate on contents indirectly, by means of operating on the subject who is conscious of those contents. To be specific, the intellectual operator does indeed transform mere sense data into intellectual problems; but it does so by transforming the empirical subject into an intellectual subject, and it is because of this transformation of the subject that the mere givenness of empirical data is transformed into intellectually problematic data.\textsuperscript{36}
\end{quote}

Nevertheless, the reference to levels does provide an important

\textsuperscript{35} See ibid., 140.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 143 (italics in original).
understanding for the role of the operator in the process of knowing and doing. Byrne argues that, for Lonergan, the levels are determined by their operator. The determination of a level comes about by indicating the lowest level that an operator can operate (and thus the name of the level is referred to by that operator). Therefore, the operator of judgment does not function on the level of experience or intelligence, but both experience and intelligence can operate on the level of judgment.

Byrne brings the argument one step further by including the distinction of a fifth level of consciousness. The fifth level refers to the self-presence of an unrestricted love. When a subject is aware of being in this level of consciousness, all acts of consciousness are properly understood as fifth level acts. Byrne writes:

... all judgments of value, judgments of fact, insights, and indeed even acts of sensitive attentiveness which are brought to consciousness precisely because one is unrestrictedly in love would also be fifth-level acts.

Therefore, Byrne’s position is that whenever a subject is aware of him or

---

37 See ibid., 137.

38 Lonergan scholarship debates whether Lonergan understood that there was a fifth level of intentionalness that relates to God’s love. See, for example, Michael Vertin, “Lonergan on Consciousness: Is There a Fifth Level?,” METHOD:Journal of Lonergan Studies, 12 (1994): 1-36. To enter into this debate would be beyond the focus of this thesis.

39 “Consciousness: Levels, Sublations, and the Subject as Subject”, 141.
herself as engaged in a specific level of consciousness all possible intentional operations conducted are truly acts of that level.

2.1.7. Towards a More Complex Image of Conscious Intentionality in Discourse

There are two images at issue: (1) a simple four-step image of conscious intentionality which fixes specific operations on distinct levels and; (2) a more explanatory image which involves a differentiation of all four operations functioning on the fourth level of consciousness. I would suggest that there is some evidence in the work of the scholars treated here that the second is a more adequate basic framework of the second image. The more differentiated explanatory image of conscious intentionality conceives the basic operations as reduplicated on the fourth level. On this fourth level, intentionality is orientated toward value and action. To understand what is going forward on the fourth level, recall that I argued that in Insight Lonergan was operating with three types of knowing: 1) knowing facts, 2) knowing values, and 3) knowing action. In terms of the more complex image of conscious intentionality, the first three levels of experiencing, understanding, and judging are related to the first type of knowing facts. The other two types of knowing, values and action, are the concern of the

---

40 There are, however, some disagreements about the substance of this framework.
fourth level. The fourth level can be concerned with the objective knowing of values through experiencing\(^{41}\), understanding, and judging value. In *Method*, Lonergan describes this as the initial thrust of the moral self-transcending subject coming to know true and objective value.\(^{42}\) Ultimately, the fourth level of intentionality is orientated towards the third type of knowing action. Here the operations of deliberation, decision, and action. As we saw, this is a distinct type of knowing because it lacks an internal term and comes to an end only through a decision. To name this a “knowing” in the strict sense is not quite accurate since the goal is not knowledge per se but action. Rather, the operation of decision goes beyond understanding and judging value to implement them in action.\(^{43}\) In *Method*, Lonergan describes this process as the subject becoming morally self-transcendent through deciding and acting.\(^{44}\) Thus, the fourth level is concerned with both knowing objective


\(^{42}\) *Method*, 38.

\(^{43}\) On Lonergan’s comparison between judging and deciding see *Insight*, pp. 612-613.

\(^{44}\) Lonergan writes, “True judgments of value go beyond merely intentional self-transcendence without reaching the fulness of moral self-transcendence. That fullness is not merely knowing but also doing and man can know what
moral values and implementing probable value-creating action in the concrete situation.\textsuperscript{45} The fourth level of the more complex image of conscious intentionality can be schematized as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fourth Level of Decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&gt; Experiencing: Intentionally Responding to Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; Understanding: Deliberating on Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; Judging: Objectively Knowing Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; Deciding: Implementing Value</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The advantage of this complex image of conscious intentionality is that it incorporates the distinctions that Lonergan makes in both \textit{Insight} and \textit{Method} by conceiving the concern for value on the fourth level through a reduplication of the basic operations of conscious intentionality. Since ethical discourse concerns value, the thesis will be founded upon this more complex image of the fourth level of conscious intentionality. While I have no doubt that this image will require further precision through future research, it can be used as a guide to working out the structure of ethical discourse. However, before moving directly to consider the structure of ethical discourse, two further elements must be presented. The first concerns Lonergan's notion of a

\textit{is right without doing it" Method, 37.}

\textsuperscript{45} It should be remembered that the fourth level sublates the three prior levels. Thus, the concern for value involves objective factual knowledge.
scheme of recurrence and the second concerns Lonergan's understanding of meaning and intersubjectivity.

2.2. Emergent Probability and the Complementarity in the Knowing Process

For this thesis considering emergent probability is necessary because of Lonergan’s notion of schemes of recurrence which will be used as an explanatory heuristic to articulate the structure of ethical discourse. Emergent probability is a world-view that consists of understanding the complementarity of both classical and statistical methods. It anticipates that theoretical inquiry into either natural or human process will take into consideration both these methods. As such, emergent probability is an inclusive world-view that acknowledges the relationship and interdependency of both methods for comprehensive and explanatory knowing. The complementarity of the knowing process of classical and statistical inquiry concerns their heuristic anticipations, procedures, formulations, differences of abstraction, verification and their domains of data. We can take each in turn.

---

46 This presentation is based upon chapter four of Insight and is limited in the sense that it does not take into consideration the nature of a thing, or the finality of world process. It does, however, cover enough characteristics to generate a basic account of emergent probability.

47 Some helpful secondary sources on Lonergan's world-view of emergent probability include: Patrick H. Byrne, "God and the Statistical Universe" Zygon 16 (1981): 345-63; Cynthia S.W. Crysdale, "Revisioning Natural Law:
2.2.1. Heuristic Anticipations

Classical and statistical methods are complementary in their heuristic anticipations. An heuristic anticipation is the intelligent expectation of the act of understanding. Classical and statistical heuristics are alternatives: either the relation among the data will be systematic or non-systematic. Classical inquiry anticipates systematic relations through direct insights, while statistical inquiry anticipates the non-systematic through inverse insights and statistical knowledge. It follows that either method will be useful in anticipating any range of data. This means, therefore, that empirical method is, in general, open. There is no a priori determination concerning which method will best account for the range of data under investigation. Both methods can be operative and have their respective range of relevance which is determined by the basic trial and error of the empirical method. Some range of the data will be explainable through classical anticipation of system, while other aspects will be explained through an inverse insight into how the data clusters about statistical norms but does not diverge systematically from these norms.


48 See *Insight*, 105.
2.2.2. Procedures

Classical and statistical inquiry are complementary in their procedures. In the process of accounting for the data, both statistical and classical methods separate out aspects of the data, whether concretely through experimentation, or mentally, through acts of imagination. Nevertheless, while classical separation is the elimination of extraneous factors in an effort to localize systematic properties, statistical separation is from systematic abstraction to concrete occurrences. Thus, while classical procedures separate out extraneous factors to determine classical laws, they do this by mentally making allowances for the statistical importance of the presence of those factors which interfere with the systematic relations of the data. Thus, classical procedures use statistical procedures in the determination of their laws.

2.2.3. Formulations

Classical and statistical inquiry are complementary in their formulations since classical inquiry regards conjugates which are verified in events and statistical inquiry regards events which are defined by their conjugates. Classical formulations state the relations of systematic components in data which are verified in events when all other things are

\[49\] For Lonergan, the notion of abstraction involves an enrichment of knowledge. As he writes, “so far from being a mere impoverishment of the data of sense, abstraction in all its essential moments is enriching.” ibid., 88.
equal. The reference to "all other things being equal" points to aspects of events which are not systematic. It is a link to the statistical residues. As Lonergan summarizes:

for if statistical formulations are to be significant contributions to the advance of science, they will appeal to the experiential and pure conjugates of classical classifications and definitions. Inversely, the conjugates of classical formulations are verifiable only in statistically occurring events and their immanence in statistical residues is revealed by the proviso, 'other things being equal'.

Statistical laws are complementary to classical laws since the relevance of the non-systematic aspects of the data are determined by the pure conjugates defined through classical inquiry.

2.2.4. Modes of Abstraction

Classical and statistical inquiry are complementary in their modes of abstraction. Classical inquiry assumes aspects of the data that are systematic and abstracts from contingent data to determine systematic relations in an effort to define pure conjugates. Statistical inquiry assumes the non-systematic relations among aspects of the data to determine an ideal frequency from which actual frequencies will not systematically diverge. For Lonergan, the complementarity of classical and statistical inquiry provides for two movements in the empirical process wherein the: 

\[50\] Ibid., 109. Or more succinctly, "... classical laws tell what would happen if conditions were fulfilled; statistical laws tell how often conditions are fulfilled." ibid., 108.
Chapter Two, Lonergan

... first movement, inquiry aims at determining the systematic component in data; in its second movement, inquiry turns to the more concrete task of determining the manner in which the systematic component in data moderates the non-systematic.\textsuperscript{51}

The two movements together represent the larger, complete empirical framework.

2.2.5. Verification

Classical and statistical inquiry are complementary in their verification. As we have seen, classical laws determine what will happened when conditions are fulfilled and statistical laws determine how often one can expect those conditions to be fulfilled. As Lonergan writes, classical knowledge embraces:

\ldots all the systematic relations between determinate data; none the less, such knowledge would be abstract and so in need of further determinations to be applied to concrete instances; it follows that the further determinations cannot be systematically related to one another; and so there must be a field for statistical laws.\textsuperscript{52}

In order to verify classical laws one must set up experimentation with the assumptions of the proviso "all other things being equal." From the viewpoint of classical inquiry, those other things, such as place, time, and frequency of occurrence, are irrelevant. However, statistical inquiry can determine the probability of when, in fact, those other things are concretely equal. Though

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 110.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 111-12.
classical inquiry requires the further determination of statistical inquiry, statistical inquiry relies upon classical determinations in order for its frequencies to be intelligent. As Lonergan writes:

for statistical laws are of no greater scientific significance than the definitions of the events whose frequencies they determine; unless these definitions are determined scientifically, statistical thought lapses into pre-scientific insignificance.\textsuperscript{53}

In order to be scientific, neither type of inquiry can do without the other.

2.2.6. Domains of Data

Finally, according to Lonergan, classical and statistical inquiry are complementary in the domains of data that they explain. However, as Lonergan writes:

by this is meant, not that some data are explained by classical laws and other data by statistical laws, but rather that certain aspects of all data receive the classical type of explanation while other aspects of the same data are explained along statistical lines.\textsuperscript{54}

This means that given the same range of data, classical inquiry, with its heuristic anticipations, will seek those systematic aspects and statistical inquiry, with its heuristic anticipations, will seek out those aspects of the data that are non-systematic divergences from the systematic aspects. Classical inquiry begins by descriptions of sense relations of things to

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 112.

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
ourselves, but moves through enriching abstraction and measurement to
determine the relations of systematic aspects of data in relation to other data.
In the limit, there emerges a determination of the pure conjugates which are
"... terms implicitly defined by the empirically established correlations in
which they occur."\textsuperscript{55} However, classical inquiry determines its conjugate
forms by abstracting systematic aspects of the data and by ignoring non-
systematic aspects. Statistical inquiry takes up these non-systematic aspects
to determine the probabilities for the concrete occurrence of events. Those
non-systematic aspects refer to the place, time and frequency or rarity of the
event's occurrence. As Lonergan writes:

\begin{quote}
for the general form of the statistical law is that on \(p\) occurrences of
the occasion, \(P\), there tend to be \(q\) occurrences of the event, \(Q\). Now the
occasion, \(P\), is itself an event or a combination of events. In either case
it will possess its probability. In like manner, the occasions on which \(P\)
is probable, will have their probability, and so there arise an indefinite
regress of probabilities from events of the type, \(Q\). More generally, for
events of any type, \(X\), there are corresponding indefinite regress of
probabilities.\textsuperscript{56}
\end{quote}

The explanatory significance of statistical laws is the fact that in our world
there are both long intervals of time and vast numbers. In other words, if the

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 113. Lonergan makes a distinction between implicit and
explanatory definitions. Implicit definitions include explanatory definitions
but exclude nominal definitions since they concern complete generality, see
ibid., 12-13.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 113.
probabilities of the occurrence of an event are low, they can be offset by long periods of time, or if the event is rare, it can be offset by the occurrence of a large number of times. As Lonergan writes:

\[ \ldots \text{what is probable only once in a million occasions, is to be expected a million times on a million million occasions } \ldots [\text{and}] \text{ if occasions arise only once in a million years, still they arise a thousand times in a thousand million years.}^{57} \]

This is the explanatory significance of statistical laws. They can allow for some ideal probability for the occurrence of a given event. Probability is “\ldots \text{an ideal norm that, for all its ideality, is concretely successful in the long run.}^{58} \] This is different than chance which is merely the non-systematic divergence from the ideal frequency in a concrete situation. Chance is not explanatory. But, the ideal probability determined by statistical inquiry can intelligently predict the occurrence of events whose conjugates are determined by classical inquiry. The complementarity of classical and statistical inquiry, therefore, exists in respect of their heuristic structures, their procedures, their formulations, their modes of abstraction, their verification and the aspects of the data they work with.

2.3. Emergent Probability and the Complementarity in the Known

The complementarity of the two types of explanatory knowing lead to a

---

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid., 114.
corresponding complementarity in the known. As Lonergan writes, "... as the known is reached only through knowing, structural features of the one are bound to be reflected in the other." 59 A complementary understanding of the known gives Lonergan a world-view, which he names emergent probability. Emergent probability has four basic characteristics. First, it is related to the intelligibility immanent in the totality of human experience, since it is founded upon the dynamic structure of the inquiring mind. Its concern is with our universe of being and how we can come to know this world. It will be, therefore, characterized by the canons of empirical method. 60 Second, emergent probability will be a generic account. It is concerned not with the substantive laws of classical or statistical inquiry, but with its general characteristics. Certainly, there will be a need to use actual classical and statistical laws to illustrate the world-view. But, Lonergan's intent is to develop a world-view that is foundational in its characteristics. Third, emergent probability is relatively invariant. The content of scientific investigation moves through development; it progresses and declines. New laws build upon older laws, and at times, new systems replace old systems.

59 Ibid., 115.

60 There are six canons: selection, operations, relevance, parsimony, complete explanation, and statistical residues, see ibid., chapter three, "The Canons of Empirical Method", 70ff.
But, there is an invariant structure to the inquiry itself which underlies both progress and decline.\textsuperscript{61} As Lonergan writes:

but knitting together these diverse manifestations of scientific thought, generating each in turn only to bring forth the revision and transformation of each, there is the underlying invariant that loosely may be named scientific method and more precisely, I think, would be designated as the dynamic structure of inquiring intelligence.\textsuperscript{62}

Since the inquiry has an invariant structure, so too will the general structure of the universe of our existence. Nevertheless, Lonergan's account of emergent probability is only relatively invariant since, his "... appeal will be, not to the structure of the human mind itself, but only to our account of that structure."\textsuperscript{63} This account may, indeed, undergo shifts in development as further inquiry clarifies its characteristics and procedures. Thus, Lonergan argues:

... the world-view to be presented will be invariant, inasmuch as it will be independent of changes in the content of the natural sciences; but it will be only relatively invariant, for it cannot be independent of revisions of our analysis of empirical method.\textsuperscript{64}

In other words, the very method of scientific inquiry will be used to bring

\textsuperscript{61} Decline, of course, is the failure of authentic knowing process, see section 2.7.3. below on bias and cycles of decline.

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 116.

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 116-117.

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., 117.
about more nuanced understandings of the structure itself. Since one cannot deny the means by which one arrived at one's denial without risking self-contradiction, it can be affirmed that there is an invariant structure to inquiry which has a relative component that corresponds to the level of development of our understanding of science itself. Fourth, Lonergan's account of emergent probability consists of a correspondence between classical and statistical inquiry and the structure of the known. The articulation of this correspondence is not deductive, but shows "... how both classical and statistical laws can coalesce into a single, unified intelligibility commensurate with the universe of our experience."\textsuperscript{65} Emergent probability, therefore, is a genetic and relatively invariant world-view that involves the complementarity and interdependence of classical and statistical methods which we use to inquire about the universe of human experience. This includes, of course, the intersubjective experience of discourse.

2.3.1. Schemes of Recurrence

Lonergan uses the notion of a scheme of recurrence to illustrate emergent probability, since a scheme of recurrence is understood as a combination of classical laws which occur according to a schedule of

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid.
probability.\textsuperscript{66} Since, as we will see, our account of discourse rests, in part, upon the notion of a scheme of recurrence we need to consider it in more detail.

The notion of a scheme of recurrence consists in a structural relation among different events (each of which results from a series of positive conditions) that coil around in a flexible circle. Lonergan writes:

\ldots a series of events, A, B, C, \ldots would be so related that the fulfilment of the conditions for each would be the occurrence of the others. Schematically, then, the scheme might be represented by the series of conditionals, If A occurs, B will occur; if B occurs, C will occur; if C occurs, \ldots A will recur.\textsuperscript{67}

The conditional structure of a recurrence scheme means that events are dependent upon the functioning of other events. In order that B can function, A must already be functioning; for the event C to function B must be functioning. The circular nature of the recurrence scheme links the functioning of C as the condition for the functioning of A so that the scheme can begin again. Illustrations of concretely functioning schemes of recurrence exist in both natural and human processes. There are, for example, the schemes of recurrence of the planetary system, the distribution of water, and economic transactions.

\textsuperscript{66} As Lonergan writes in \textit{Insight}, "abstractly, the scheme itself is a combination of classical laws. Concretely, schemes begin, continue, and cease to function in accord with statistical probabilities." 117.

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., 118.
There are two factors or conditions which can make this account of the recurrence scheme more complex. First, the variation can be a set of almost complete circular arrangements so that the emergence of any of the events will mean the automatic or simultaneous functioning of the entire scheme. In this case, none of the events in the scheme could function alone. This would mean that if A occurs then B and C occur as well. However, if any of the events in the scheme ceased to function, then the entire scheme would break down. The second variation involves defensive circles. If, for example, another event outside the scheme were to interfere in the functioning of the scheme, then, a defensive circle may emerge to counteract the negative effect of the interfering scheme for the sake of its own functioning. The immune system is an example of a defensive scheme. Defensive schemes act to offset effects by an interfering scheme in order to restore the scheme to its proper functioning. Both these complexities add to Lonergan's understanding of the scheme of recurrence.

However, not only are there individual schemes of recurrence, there are also conditioned series of schemes. As Lonergan writes:

let us say that the schemes, $P$, $Q$, $R$, $\ldots$ form a conditioned series, if all prior members of the series must be functioning actually for any later member to become a concrete possibility. Then, the scheme, $P$, can function though neither $Q$ nor $R$ exists; the scheme, $Q$, can function, though $R$ does not yet exist; but $Q$ cannot function unless $P$ is already
functioning; and \( R \) cannot function unless \( Q \) is already functioning.\(^{68}\)

This understanding of the conditioned series of schemes is straightforward. One scheme can emerge or begin to function if and only if its prior conditioning scheme is already functioning. Conditioned recurrence schemes are dependent upon prior schemes for their occurrence. This dependence will become important later on in our analysis. For the moment, notice the dependency involved in the conditioned series of schemes in the example that Lonergan provides: the carnivore dietary scheme. Carnivores are dependent upon herbivores which are dependent upon plants which are dependent upon chemical processes which are dependent upon physical laws.\(^{68}\) Physical laws function even though none of the other schemes function, but carnivore dietary schemes cannot function without the functioning of the prior four schemes. The entire series represents a conditioned relationship among schemes of recurrence.

Now, according to Lonergan, a conditioned series of schemes can be either a possible seriation, a probable seriation, or an actual seriation. An actual seriation consists of those schemes that were, are, or will function.

\(^{68}\) Ibid., 118-119.

\(^{69}\) In other words, higher order events require lower order event for their emergence and survival, but not vice versa.
They are specified by their place, time, durations and relations to one another. Their occurrence involves a non-systematic divergence from the ideal frequency of probability. They are the factual occurrence of conditioned series. Possible seriations are ideal. They refer not to the actual schemes that do occur, but to the set of schemes that might occur given the situation at hand. As Lonergan argues:

> at each stage of world process there is a set of probable next stages, of which some are more probable than others . . . The probable seriation includes all that would occur without systematic divergence from the probabilities.\(^70\)

They refer not to the single conditioned series of schemes, but to the manifold of more probable schemes that are more likely to occur given a specific understanding of the probabilities of the next stage of world process. Possible seriations include all the schemes of recurrences that can be designed from our current understanding of classical laws. They are not probable, but the merely possible or negligible. They are the set of schemes that are “. . . equally relevant to our universe and to any other universe subject to the same classical laws, no matter what its initial numbers, diversities, and distribution of elements.”\(^71\) The possible refers to the widest range of possibilities given the classical laws that we know. Probable seriations bring

\(^{70}\) *Insight*, 119.

\(^{71}\) Ibid., 120.
together both classical laws in the understanding of the conjugates of the
schemes and the statistical laws to determine the probability of which
seriation is most likely to emerge given the situation at hand. Nevertheless,
it is ideal "for each moment of world history, it assigns a most probable
future course. But it also assigns a series of less probable courses, and it has
to acknowledge that any of these may prove to be the fact."\[72\] The actual
seriation is the factual one that concretely occurs. It is unique, "... but it
purchases its uniqueness by going beyond the field of all laws, classical and
statistical, and entering the field of observation, in which alone non-
systematic divergences from probability are determinate."\[73\] This distinction
among possible, probable, and actual schemes will become significant in the
third chapter when we discuss the structure of ethical discourse.

2.3.2. The Probability of Schemes

The conditional structure of schemes of recurrence provides for an
understanding of the probability of schemes that is different than the
probability of an event of a scheme. The probability of any set of events is
equal to the product of their frequencies. As Lonergan notes:

consider a set of events of the type, A, B, C, ... and a world situation
in which they possess respectively the probabilities, p, q, r, ... Then by

---

\[72\] Ibid.

\[73\] Ibid.
a general rule of probability theory, the probability of the occurrence of all the events in the set will be the product, \( pqr, \ldots \), of their respective probabilities.\(^{74}\)

This is simply a question of a set of events that has no structural relationship. Now, consider that there is a structural relationship among the events such that the occurrence of one conditions the occurrence of them all. If the probabilities of each individual event remain the same as before, then the probability of the scheme itself shifts:

\[ \ldots \text{from the product } pqr, \ldots, \text{ to the sum, } p+q+r+\ldots. \]

For, in virtue of the scheme, it now is true that \( A \) and \( B \) and \( C \) and \( \ldots \) will occur, if either \( A \) or \( B \) or \( C \) or \( \ldots \) occurs; and by a general rule of probability theory, the probability of a set of schemes is equal to the sum of the probabilities of the alternatives.\(^{75}\)

The sum of a set of proper fractions is always greater than their product. This difference afforded by the conditional structure among the events is what Lonergan refers to as the jump in the probability of the scheme itself.

The jump in probability of a scheme of recurrence consists "\ldots in the sum of the respective probabilities of all the events included in the scheme, and it arises as soon as the prior conditions for the functioning of the scheme are satisfied."\(^{76}\) If the internal conditions of a scheme are fulfilled, then the

\(^{74}\) Ibid.

\(^{75}\) Ibid. 121.

\(^{76}\) Ibid.
probability of the emergence of the events shifts from a product of the
fractions of their frequencies to a sum of their fractions.

Furthermore, as well as the probability of the emergence of a scheme,
there is also a probability of its survival. Although the emergence of a scheme
has a certain probability once its prior conditions are concretely functioning,
its emergence and continual functioning are not necessary. For example, the
prior conditions may cease to function due to interfering schemes. Thus, the
probability of the survival of a scheme is the probability of the non-
ocurrence of other interfering schemes. The probability of the emergence of a
scheme and the probability of its survival, once it is functioning, are
components of Lonergan’s dynamic world-view of emergent probability.

2.4. Emergent Probability and Schemes of Recurrence

We can further clarify Lonergan’s dynamic world-view. The notion of
emergent probability involves how:

... the actual functioning of earlier schemes in the series fulfils the
conditions for the possibility of the functioning of later schemes. As
such schemes are fulfilled, the probability of the combination of the
component events in a scheme jumps from a product of a set of proper
fractions to the sum of those proper fractions. But, what is probable,
sooner or later occurs. When it occurs, a probability of emergence is
replaced by a probability of survival; and as long as the scheme
survives, it is in its turn fulfilling conditions for the possibility of still
later schemes in the series. 77

77 Ibid. 121-22.
This means that for a given conditioned series of schemes, earlier schemes, say Y, are the condition for the possibility of the emergence of later schemes, say X. For the X scheme to emerge, Y must already be functioning; without such functioning X cannot emerge. When Y is functioning, the probability that X will function shifts from a product of the probability of the events of the scheme to a sum of those probabilities. This jump in probabilities occurs because of the internal conditional structure of the events of the scheme.

When X begins to function there is a shift from the probability of emergence to the probability of survival. The scheme will continue to survive as long as its conditions continue to be met and as long as there are no interrupting schemes. The functioning, then, of the scheme Y can itself be a condition for the emergence of a further scheme in the conditioned series of schemes making it both a conditioned and a conditioning scheme.

Lonergan admits that though the preceding notion of emergent probability seems rather meager for a world-view, it does have some characteristics for explanation. The first concerns spatial concentrations. The later schemes in a series can emerge only when earlier schemes are functioning. Thus, the initial or elementary scheme can occur anywhere in the initial distribution of materials, but later schemes can only occur where the earlier ones are already functioning. It follows, then, that "... however widespread the realization of elementary schemes, there will be a succession
of constrictions of the volumes of space in which later schemes can be found." In other words, the lower the constriction of space, the higher the probability for the emergence of a scheme and vice versa. It is significant to point out that "... since the latest scheme in the series have the greatest number of conditions to be fulfilled, their occurrence will be limited to a relatively small number of places." This fact gives emergent probability an explanatory characteristic in expecting the emergence of an entire series of schemes. One could base one's expectations on the fact that later schemes would be more rare than earlier schemes.

The second characteristic concerns absolute numbers. As we have seen, large numbers offset low probabilities. As Lonergan argues, "it follows that the lower the probability of the last schemes of the conditioned series, the greater must be the initial absolute numbers in which elementary schemes can be realized." Since later schemes depend upon earlier schemes, the later scheme will have the lowest probability.

The third characteristic pertains to long intervals of time. Even though spatial concentrations limit the place for later schemes, given enough time

---

78 Ibid., 122.

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid., 123.
these schemes will function. If an event can be shown to occur because of a huge number of initial occasions that occur at once, the same can be shown to occur over a long period of time given the same probability.

The fourth characteristic is the significance of the distinction between the probability of emergence and the probability of survival. This allows Lonergan to make a series of predictions. If both are low, then the occurrence of the scheme will be both rare and fleeting. If emergence is high, but survival is low, the event will be common but fleeting. If the survival is high, but the emergence is low, the event will be rare but enduring. If both are high, then the event will be both common and enduring.

These predictions have significance for two other characteristics: stability and development. Since the emergence of later schemes depend upon the functioning of earlier schemes, the more stable the earlier scheme, the more stable will be the later schemes. However, for development to occur, the stability of lower schemes can pose a difficulty since stability can tend to prohibit the emergence of later schemes. As Lonergan argues, "schemes with high probabilities of survival tend to imprison materials in their own routines. They provide a highly stable basis for later schemes, but they also tend to prevent later schemes from emerging."\(^{81}\) From the perspective of

\(^{81}\) Ibid. The relationship between higher and lower levels can be illustrated in the case of moral development. Suppose you were talking with some one who admitted she stole merchandise from a department store, but who had
development, a resolution of this conflict would call for lower schemes that have a high probability of emergence, but a low probability of survival in order to allow higher developmental schemes to operate with the material generated from the earlier scheme. Since these characteristics are generic, Lonergan has not attempted to apply them to concretely functioning series of schemes. They allow for a heuristic set of characteristics that could be used in explaining data.\textsuperscript{82} Though the preceding was cast generally within the natural sciences, Lonergan's notion of emergent probability includes a consideration of the human sciences.

\textsuperscript{82} As Lonergan writes, "needless to say, the foregoing considerations are extremely rudimentary. They are limited to the emergent probability of any conditioned series of schemes of recurrence. They make no effort towards developing that notion in the direction of its application to the conditions of the emergence and survivals of modes of living. However, while absolutely such a fuller exposition would be desirable, still it has no place in a merely generic account of world order." \textit{Insight}, 124.
2.5. Emergent Probability and the Human Sciences

In what way are human processes explainable within the framework of emergent probability? Lonergan replies:

as in the fields of physics, chemistry, and biology, so in the field of human events and relationships there are classical and statistical laws that combine concretely in cumulating sets of schemes of recurrence. For the advent of man does not abrogate the rule of emergent probability. Human actions are recurrent; their recurrence is regular; and the regularity is the functioning of a scheme, of a patterned set of relations that yields conclusions of the type, If an X occurs, then an X will recur.\textsuperscript{83}

For the most part, the realm of human actions consists in the domain of practical common sense's concern for meeting human needs and desires. These desires are not unique. They have a recurrent aspect which requires a repeated effort to meet them. This effort can be seen in human history. Primitive societies set aside time to develop new tools which aim to satisfy desires in a more efficient manner. The tools are not desired for themselves, but rather facilitate the fulfilment of other more immediate desires (and mitigate fears) in a regular fashion. The development of tools reveals human intelligence meeting human problems in ever unique and efficient ways. But the problems themselves are recurrent and human intelligence responds to those problems in a recurrent fashion. The development of the sophistication

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., 209. As we will see in chapter three, discourse provides a complex example of schemes of recurrence in human affairs.
of tools in modern technology brings a parallel development in capital
formation and the division and specialization of human labour. As Lonergan
argues:

\[\ldots\text{in correspondence with each stage in the development of practical}
\text{intelligence, there is a measure and structure of capital formation, that}
is, of things produced and arranged not because they themselves are
desired but because they expedite and accelerate the process of
supplying the goods and services that are wanted by consumers.}\]^{84}

Correlative to both the development of capital formation and technological
advancement are an increase in population and improved standards of living.
Practical intelligence meets the ever increasing demands of development
through greater technological sophistication, that is, capital formation (e.g.,
tools, technology, buildings, transportation) to regularly meet human needs.
Our civilization is, in fact, at a certain stage of human history where the
standards of living and the level of population cannot be turned back without
severe consequences to our people.

Combined with the technological and economical developments,
practical intelligence must meet the demands of human cooperation, since
development itself requires an ever greater degree of collaboration. But the
demands of collaboration are a recurrent problem correlative to each new
development of technology or economy. Though human intelligence may

\[84\text{Insight, 208.}\]
devise new solutions to recurring problems, these ideas must be
communicated to and implemented by citizens. As Lonergan writes:

of itself, communication only reveals the disparity. What is wanted is
persuasion, and the most effective persuader becomes a leader, a chief,
a politician, a statesman. For the problem of effective agreement is
recurrent. Each stage in the process of technological and economic
development is an occasion on which minds differ, new insights have
to be communicated, enthusiasm has to be roused, and a common
decision must be reached.86

Thus, there exists, along with technological and economical development, the
specialization of politics which, at its best, aims for the collaboration of
members of society in the regular pursuit of the general interests of society
and its members. Communication, agreement, and decision are recurrent
problems that demand (if they are to be met in a regular fashion) not only the
specialization of politics and its workers, but must be structured as an
ordered scheme of recurrence.

Nevertheless, though there is technological, economical, and political
progress, human processes are also susceptible to decline. Technological,
economical, and political realms are orders of human collaboration that
change in response to human desires and fears, because they are schemes
whose events are human acts of meaning. Though these fears and desires are
ever present, the orders that are arranged to meet them are fragile. As

86 Ibid., 209.
Lonergan writes, "... economic break-down and political decay are not the absence of this or that object of desire or the presence of this or that object of fear; they are the break-down and decay of the good of order." Technology without knowledge of its functioning is worthless. Economies without their prior conditions satisfied remain idle. Political disorder promotes revolution.

According to Lonergan:

schemes that once flourished lose their efficiency and cease to function; in an ever more rapid succession, as crises multiply and remedies have less effect, new schemes are introduced; feverish effort is followed by listlessness; the situation becomes regarded as hopeless; in a twilight of straitened but gracious living men await the catalytic trifle that will reveal to a surprised world the end of a once brilliant day.\(^{87}\)

The schemes of recurrence of technology, economics and polity are the creation of human intelligence attempting to meet the demands of human desires and fears in an ever increasing sophistication. Success or failure depends not upon any one individual, but on the cooperative endeavours of a sufficiently large number of members of society.

Though human processes fall under the domain of emergent probability, they do so in a significantly different manner than natural processes. Human processes are not only intelligible they are also the products of intelligence. The increasing domination of practical intelligence

\(^{86}\) Ibid., 213.

\(^{87}\) Ibid., 210.
in the development of human society means that human processes are less the result of the mere coincidence in the functioning prior conditions and more the result of human insight, communication, agreement, and decision.

As Lonergan writes:

man does not have to wait for his environment to make him. His dramatic living needs only the clues and the opportunities to originate and maintain its own setting. The advance of technology, the formation of capital, the development of economy, the evolution of the state are not only intelligible but also intelligent.\textsuperscript{88}

This intelligent response is reflected in the cooperative orders that we create. These intelligible cooperative orders, however, are themselves schemes that are conditioned by a further series of schemes that consists of insight, communication, agreement, and decision. The practical insights that first emerge within individual minds must be shared if they are to become implemented within existing schemes, or in the development of new schemes. This sharing or communication is the condition of possibility that the practical insight will become the basis for collective action. Communication, if successful, will lead to mutual agreement that the insight is the most probable response to the situation. Decision leads to the cooperative action of the specialized labours of the technological, economical, and political realms in pursuit of the common needs of everyone. Therefore, insight,

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid.
communication, agreement, and decision are part of the exchange of meaning among members of society.

2.6. Lonergan on Meaning

The notion of schemes of recurrence can be used as an explanatory heuristic in human affairs. Since the presentation in chapter three on the structure of ethical discourse will depend to some extent on how Lonergan's position involves an intersubjective dimension, the following sections will deal with this issue. The transition toward the intersubjective can be made through articulating Lonergan's position on meaning. The discussion on meaning allows Lonergan to widen the implications of his cognitional theory to include human processes of community, civilization, economy, and politics.

When we talk about meaning we often speak about how someone or something has meaning for oneself. So we speak with passion about how the flag of one's country has meaning for oneself, or we speak with conviction about how a particular hero has been meaningful for one's life. While such expressions of meaning are certainly valid, there is more that can be said about the role of meaning in our lives. In *Method* Lonergan distinguishes among carriers, elements, functions, realms, and stages of meaning. It will be important to say a little on each of these.

2.6.1. Carriers of Meaning

For Lonergan, meaning is carried or embodied in intersubjectivity, in
art, in symbols, in language and in the lives of persons. Intersubjectivity embodies meaning in two ways. First, there is an underlying foundational basis among human beings qua human beings. Lonergan explains, “prior to the ‘we’ that results from the mutual love of an ‘I’ and a ‘thou’, there is the earlier ‘we’ that precedes the distinction of subjects and survives its oblivion.” This prior basis can be shown through acts of spontaneous mutual aid. Lonergan’s own example comes from an experience he had while walking in the streets of Rome. Lonergan writes:

in my daily walk in Rome there is a ramp up which I go to enter the Borghese Gardens. One day there was a child running in front of its mother, and it stumbled on the concrete. I was at least thirty feet away but spontaneously I leaned forward to prevent the child from falling, although it was quite a useless gesture.

Lonergan argues that intersubjectivity is vital and functional in that it provides a basis for a sense of community before there is a distinction of persons. In some sense, then, human beings are community-constituted before there is reflection or deliberation about what this community might mean.

89 Method, 57.
Another example of how intersubjectivity carries meaning comes from the work of Max Scheler. Lonergan uses Scheler’s work on the communication of feelings to show how intersubjectivity can carry meaning. As Lonergan argues, Scheler distinguishes four ways feelings can be communicated: community of feeling, fellow-feeling, psychic contagion and emotional identification. Both community of feeling and fellow-feeling involve intentional responses to value in objects that evoke feelings. In community of feeling two or more people respond to the same object, while in fellow-feeling one responds to the manifestation of the feelings of another. However, psychic contagion and emotional identification are vital not intentional. Psychic contagion is responding to another though one does not know the object that the other is responding to. And emotional identification is the co-mingling of two individuals who either are not differentiated as a new born infant in relation to its mother, or are differentiated but retreat to emotional identification as in sexual intercourse or mystic prayer.

Intersubjectivity as a carrier of meaning relates to spontaneous actions and feelings. However, intersubjectivity can be also the basis for the communication of meaning. The physical encounter of two or more persons is the context for intersubjective meaning. The body manifests a form of communication among the interactants. Lonergan’s example is the smile. One cannot explain what a smile is simply by a consideration of facial
movements. A smile carries meaning because the smiler performs the facial movements with the intention of evoking meaning to another. The receiver grasps the meaning of a smile through the organization of the pattern of facial movements and the context of their relationship. The smile reveals oneself to another. It is not about objects but the meaning of subjects. It is understandable through the intersubjective context of prior meaning. So one does not smile the smile of affection to someone one has just met or else one risks being misunderstood. Equally valid examples are one's clothing, mannerism, and gestures. Each of these carries with it meaning for communication to other people that one has encountered.

Art is another carrier of meaning. Here Lonergan follows the work of Susanne Langer. For Langer, art is "the objectification of a purely experiential pattern." A work of art is an insight into the elemental meaning of pure experience. As such it invites one to review one's ordinary living through the variations of possibilities that experience offers. As Lonergan writes, art is a liberation from the routines of ordinary living. It "... invites one to withdraw from practical living and to explore possibilities of fuller living in a richer world." This is so because the pure pattern is free

---

91 *Method*, 61.

92 Ibid., 64.
from the instrumentalization of practical living. Practical living can distort our senses to the extent that we live within our world without reflection; we sense and respond like Pavlov's dog. But the elemental world of pure experience frees the instrumentality of sense and response. It relates to one's capacity "... for wonder, for awe and fascination, [with one's] openness to adventure, daring, greatness, goodness, majesty."\textsuperscript{93} The meaning of the work of art exists within the mind of the artist. But through objectification the artist can express the elemental meaning in the work of art for all to see, hear, and feel.

The symbol is another carrier of elemental meaning. But now the relationship is the internal communication of the subject. A symbol for Lonergan is "... an image of a real or imaginary object that evokes a feeling or is evoked by a feeling."\textsuperscript{94} As such the symbol links with the subject's affective development to connect elemental meaning to the subject's feelings. The symbol does not follow the laws of logic. It can be contradictory; it can have opposite meanings at the same time. It functions to link the unconscious world of the subject with consciousness. The meaning of a symbol as interpreted is not elemental, but cognitive. As Lonergan writes "to

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., 62.

\textsuperscript{94} Ibid., 64.
explain the symbol, of course, is to go beyond the symbol." Interpretative systems respond to the desire not of the elemental level where the symbol relates oneself to one's affective development, but to the conscious world mediated by meaning.

Another carrier of meaning which Lonergan presents is linguistic meaning. Linguistic meaning is a set of conventional signs. With this type of meaning, Lonergan argues, meaning finds its greatest liberation since it is larger than the intersubjective context. Lonergan's example is the naming process that Helen Keller went through in coming to know her surroundings. The process of naming involves the dual process of ordering one's world and being orientated within that world. One's conscious intentionality develops within and is molded by one's language. Language makes available to others aspects of our world which might otherwise remain hidden. Linguistic meaning, however, also orientates and structures oneself in one's world. There are spacial adverbs relating to place; tenses of verbs relating time; grammatical moods corresponding to commands, wishes, declarations; voices can be passive or active; and grammar gives it all structure. As language develops there emerges a distinction among ordinary, technical, and literary language. Ordinary language is the language of common sense. It is the

\[95\] Ibid., 67.
language of practical intelligence and the everyday world of commerce and recreation. Technical language emerges with the division of labour and the specialization of theory with its empirical method. Literary language emerges with development of feelings. It aims to be a permanent achievement not of logic but of affect. With literary language are written the classics which carry meaning throughout cultures and generations.

Finally, there is incarnate meaning. Incarnate meaning is the meaning of a human person through her words and actions. It is the summation of what that individual means to others. For example, when a Canadian thinks about Terry Fox one means his whole person—his achievements, his actions, his words, his struggles, his victories, and his tragedy—one is moved not only in thought, not only in feeling, but in action to respond in one's life in similar ways.\textsuperscript{96} Incarnate meaning inspires others to be likewise. But, while incarnate meaning can be valuable, it may also mean a lack of value. Paul Bernardo incarnates meaning as much as Terry Fox, although their meanings are contradictory. Incarnate meaning, like symbolic and artistic meaning, is multi-vocal.

\textsuperscript{96} If you do not know who Terry Fox was his life does not carry meaning for you. With incarnate meaning you must be introduced to another person however this may take place (e.g. television, newspapers, books, or in person).
2.6.2. Elements of Meaning

Lonergan distinguishes among three elements of meaning: sources, acts, and terms. He argues, "sources of meaning are all conscious acts and all intended contents, whether in the dream state or on any of the four levels of waking consciousness." Thus, there is the principal division between transcendental sources and categorial sources. Transcendental sources are the very dynamism of consciousness itself as the capacity for truth and value. The categorial sources are the substance of the acts of consciousness on the four levels of consciousness. As Lonergan summarizes, "the transcendental notions ground questioning. Answers develop categorial determinations." Thus, Lonergan arranges the acts of meaning ontologically as potential, formal, full, constitutive, and effective. With potential acts of meaning there is not yet the distinction between meaning and meant. As Lonergan writes:

such is the meaning of the smile that acts simply as an intersubjective determinant, the meaning of the work of art prior to its interpretation by a critic, the meaning of the symbol performing its office of internal communication without help from the therapist.

With the potential act of meaning there is simultaneously the meaning and the meant. Elemental expressions are potential acts of meaning. So too are

---

97 Method, 73.

98 Ibid., 74.

99 Ibid.
acts of sensing and understanding. The occurrence of an insight is spontaneously the meaning and the meant. One has not yet begun to conceptualize or define the content of the insight. With formal acts of meaning one is thinking, conceiving, defining, supposing, and formulating. There is the initial distinction between meaning and meant. However, one does not know whether what one means is what is meant. Lonergan writes:

\[ \ldots \text{the precise nature of this distinction has not as yet been clarified. One is meaning precisely what one is thinking about, but one has yet to determine whether the object of one's thought is merely an object of thought or something more than that.}^{100} \]

With a full act of meaning one arrives at the exact status of what one means. It is the act of judging the reality of the meaning of one's object. Constitutive and effective acts of meaning are active meanings. They are judgments of value, decisions, and actions. Lonergan treats them more fully under the functions of meaning. Instrumental acts of meaning are the expressions of meaning. They externalize the other acts of meaning for others. But since the expression of meaning may be either adequate or inadequate there emerges the need in some spheres of being to interpret the expressions.\(^{101}\) Terms of meaning, therefore, are what are meant. In potential acts of meaning the terms meaning and meant have not been worked out. In formal acts of

\(^{100}\) Ibid.

\(^{101}\) We will have occasion to take this up in more detail in section 3.2.2.
meaning there is the distinction, but the exact status has not been determined. In full terms of meaning one determines the exact status of what one means.\textsuperscript{102} In constitutive acts of meaning one settles one’s attitude toward the term of meaning. In effective acts of meaning one decides whether one will bring about the term or what one will do for the term.

2.6.3. Functions of Meaning

Lonergan distinguishes among four functions of meaning: cognitive, efficient, constitutive, and communicative. The \textit{cognitive} function of meaning refers to the fact that for the most part we live our lives not in the world of immediacy, but in the far richer world mediated by meaning. For Lonergan, the world of immediacy is represented by the infant’s world which is “... the world of what is felt, touched, grasped, sucked, seen, heard.”\textsuperscript{103} But far from only the infant’s world, the world of immediacy can also be the adult’s world as the:

... world of immediate experience, of the given as given, of image and affect without any perceptible intrusion from insight or concept, reflection or judgment, deliberation or choice. It is the world of pleasure and pain, hunger and thirst, food and drink, rage and satisfaction and sleep.\textsuperscript{104}

\textsuperscript{102} See chapter three section 3.2.3.1. on spheres of being in relation to full terms of meaning.

\textsuperscript{103} \textit{Method}, 76.

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.
While the world of immediacy is part of one’s world there is also the far larger world mediated by meaning. The development of language, as we have seen, enlarges one’s world from the immediate in terms of time and space to the imaged future and past; out of the world of immediate presence to the world of the possible and probable. Words express not only what we have found out for ourselves, but far more they expand one’s own knowledge to include what others have learnt.\(^{105}\) This expansion is characteristic of the cognitive function of meaning as it enlarges one’s framework of meaning beyond the possibilities of one’s own immediate experiences, understandings, and judgments. For the cognitive function of meaning does not merely repeat experience. Rather, it includes the acts of understanding and judgment as well. In fact, the:

\[\ldots\text{addition of understanding and judgment is what makes possible the world mediated by meaning, what gives it structure and unity, what arranges it in an orderly whole of almost endless differences partly known and familiar, partly in a surrounding penumbra of things we know about but have never examined or explored, partly an unmeasured region of what we do not know at all.}\(^{106}\)

Thus, the world mediated by meaning is the unfolding of conscious intentionality from what we know to the known unknown in our desire for understanding and truth. In addition, it is open to a realm that we do not

\(^{105}\) For more detail on belief and rational trust see section 3.2.4.2.1..

\(^{106}\) *Method*, 77.
even know--the unknown unknown. Such is the vastness of the world mediated by meaning that it offers the greatest possibility for the satisfaction of our most basic desires for understanding and truth. However, while meaning is cognitive in its function this doesn’t guarantee that meaning will not be wrong. For with truth there is falsity, with honesty there is conceit, with understanding there is mistake, with fact there is fiction. Thus, our world consists not only of meaning, it can be also rather insecure.\textsuperscript{107}

Besides knowing through experience, understanding, and judgment we also make things through our work. But working is not aimless. Before we work we first intend. Thus, meaning also has an \textit{efficient} function. What we mean through acts of meaning can be made into things through work. And our working is most often not an isolated experience. Most of our working is a cooperation. Besides the work itself there is the order that organizes cooperative work to recur in successive cycles. This good of order consists of acts of meaning.\textsuperscript{108} We imagine, plan, think of possibilities, deliberate, work

\textsuperscript{107} Lonergan makes three further points. First, besides the world of meaning which are the categorial determinations of the transcendental notions there is also the mediation of the immediacy of the conscious acts in the objectification of intentionality resulting in transcendental method. Second, there is the identification of feelings related with the unconscious that occurs in counselling and psychotherapy. Third, there is the return from mediated meaning to immediacy in the identification in mutual love and mystical prayer. See, ibid.

\textsuperscript{108} On the good of order see section 2.7.1 below.
out policies, establish institutions, and regulations. And each of these are acts of meaning through which we intend to create not only particular goods and their good of order, but worthwhile systems of cooperation. Far from simply living in a ready made world, we create our world through the efficient function of meaning.

The constitutive function of meaning refers to the fact that not only can we know our world and make our world, but by doing so we are involved in making ourselves. On the subjective level, the constitutive function of meaning refers to the existential subject's self-constituting oneself through acts of responsibility. Through our acts of meaning we are involved in the very making of ourselves. Our lives do not come to us prepackaged. Though there exist certain limitations and determinations on the levels of physics, biology, and culture, there is, nevertheless, a basic freedom (both essentially and effectively) by which our intentional acts are self-constituting.\textsuperscript{109} Not only on the subjective dimension, but our cultural and our social institutions are not perpetual structures. Their changing and adaptations are the result of changes in meaning. As Lonergan writes, "... but all such change involves

\textsuperscript{109} Essential freedom refers to the structure of the operations of conscious intentionality that are basic to human beings. What Lonergan also names the natural right of all human beings. Effective freedom refers to the ability to operate the structure within one's world, that is, to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible. On the distinction between these types of freedom see \textit{Insight}, 619.
change of meaning—a change of idea or concept, a change of judgment or evaluation, a change of the order or request." The constitutive function of meaning is the self-making of persons, societies, and cultures through acts of meaning.

Meaning is also communicative. Through acts of meaning we not only experience, understand, judge, and decide about ourselves individually and collectively we also communicate our acts of meaning to each other. We communicate our acts of meaning through the various carriers of meaning discussed above. Through these expressions of meaning we can have common meaning. Though acts of meaning originate in subjective intentionality they can be communicated to form common meanings shared by many through education and training. Common meaning can develop to produce progressive and cumulative results or it can decline toward impoverishment and suppression of meaning.

Together the constitutive and communicative functions of meaning help us understand the three notions of community, existence, and history. Community is not simply the geographical collection of individuals. Rather community is the achievement of common meaning. That achievement varies in degree according to the type of acts of meaning. It is worth quoting

\[110\] *Method*, 78.
Lonergan at length:

common meaning is potential when there is a common field of experience, and to withdraw from that common field is to get out of touch. Common meaning is formal when there is common understanding, and one withdraws from that common understanding by misunderstanding, by incomprehension, by mutual incomprehension. Common meaning is actual inasmuch as there are common judgments, areas in which all affirm and deny in the same manner; and one withdraws from that common judgment when one disagrees, when one considers true what others hold false and false what they think true. Common meaning is realized by decisions and choices, especially by permanent dedication, in the love that makes families, in the loyalty that makes states, in the faith that makes religions. 111

Community is the achievement of common meaning. Common meaning involves the communication of meaning. The source of acts of meaning are the questions for intelligence, rationality, and responsibility. These questions have their source in the transcendental notions. Thus, there will be a four-fold structural division within community corresponding to the structure of conscious intentionality. Potential acts of meaning are the source for common formal acts of meaning. Formal acts of meaning are the source for common full acts of meaning. Full acts of meaning are the source for the realization of common meaning in the making of the community.

Human beings are born and raised within communities. The source of common meanings are available for the education of members of the

111 Ibid., 79.
community. The development of the person in community is contextualized within the set of common experiences, common understandings, common judgments and common decisions of his or her community. Within this set of common meanings a person will come to find out what one is to make of oneself. Within the community one finds the source of one’s existence as the person that one is to be; the person that one is to make of oneself. In this development the subject is contextualized by the community but the exigencies of the transcendental notions which ground both subjective acts of meaning and common meaning of community are still operative. The common source provides for authentic development and authentic critique. But authenticity is of two types. There is the minor authenticity of the subject being attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible in taking up what his or her community provides. And there is the major authenticity of the development of one’s community over time. To the extent that one’s community has been orientated by the exigencies of the transcendental notions, the community is authentic. Inauthentic community is the refusal of the transcendental notions.\(^{112}\) To the extent that one’s community is inauthentic one’s commitment to one’s community will be inauthentic. As Lonergan writes:

\(^{112}\) See section 2.7.3. below on bias and dialectic of community.
so the unauthenticity of individuals becomes the unauthenticity of a tradition. Then, in the measure a subject takes the tradition, as it exists, for his standard, in that measure he can do no more that authentically realize unauthenticity.\textsuperscript{113}

Thus, the transcendental notions provide for the possibility of authenticity for both persons and traditions.

Tradition, authenticity, and the acts of meaning of individuals and communities form the substance of history. Human being are more than natural processes. The biological functions of the human animal make up a lower order manifold which, though constitutive of human beings are not sufficient in themselves to explain how human beings think, feel, and live in this world. For besides the biological level of human existence there is the experiential, intellectual, reasonable, and responsible activities of human creativity and ingenuity. The common meaning which is established among human beings of common experience, common understanding, common judgment, and common decisions is the development of human history. Thus, as Lonergan summarizes:

\ldots it is that man stands outside the rest of nature, that he is a historical being, that each man shapes his own life but does so only in interaction with the traditions of the communities in which he happens to have been born and, in turn, these traditions themselves are but the deposit left him by the lives of his predecessors.\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{113} \textit{Method}, 80.

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., 81.
The invariant structure of human meaning is the basis for human tradition, but the development or decline of this rests upon human acts of meaning through time.

2.6.4. Realms of Meaning

Lonergan distinguishes among four different realms of meaning. A realm of meaning refers to a basic orientation of consciousness in meeting distinct exigencies. The systematic exigence distinguishes common sense meaning from theoretical meaning. While both these realms regard the same object they do so from different standpoints. Common sense is concerned with the practical, concrete exercise of action. It relates objects to oneself. Its method is the self-correcting process of learning where insights are corrected through the practice of trial and error. As Lonergan argues, through the common sense mode:

\[\ldots\text{insights gradually accumulate, coalesce, qualify and correct one another, until a point is reached where we are able to meet situations as they arise, size them up by adding a few more insights to the acquired store, and so deal with them in an appropriate fashion.}\]

Common sense language is the expressions of ordinary language; of the working world where words function not to express essences, but to focus "\ldots our conscious intentionality on the things, of crystallizing our attitudes,\]

\[\text{115 Ibid.}\]
expectations, intentions, of guiding all our actions.” In this realm, what
works is what is correct.

However, the systematic exigence shifts consciousness to a higher
realm. The concern is not with objects related to oneself, but objects as
related to one another. One can move from the common sense viewpoint to
the theoretical, but one does so by achieving the systematic viewpoint that
measures objects. The language of theory is systematic, linking explanatorily
the characteristics of objects via measurements. For example, a metal object
compared with a wooden object will feel colder though they have the same
temperature. Temperature is the measurement used to understand both
objects. The feeling that one object is colder than another is a common sense
understanding relating the two objects to oneself.

For Lonergan, the critical exigence must be further distinguished from
the systematic exigence. Is common sense just so much nonsense to be
liberated by science? Or is theory mere abstraction with no relevance to
human living? To meet these questions one must satisfy the critical exigence

116 Ibid., 81-82.

117 See Lonergan’s article “Dimensions of Meaning,” in Collection, ed.
Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, Collected Works of Bernard
the distinction between classical and modern controls of meaning on the
systematic level.
which shifts intentionality away from the object of investigation to the investigating subject. As we have seen, this gives rise to the three basic questions as Lonergan writes:

what am I doing when I am knowing? Why is doing that knowing? What do I know when I do it? With these questions one turns from the outer realms of common sense and theory to the appropriation of one’s own interiority, one’s subjectivity, one’s operations, their structure, the norms, their potentialities.¹¹⁸

This heightening of one’s consciousness to achieve knowledge of one’s activities of knowing allows one to critically control both the different levels of consciousness that are involved in our knowing process and the realm of meaning within which they operate. However, the move to interiority is a means to a further heightening of consciousness through the objectification of the operations of knowing themselves. This is the meeting of the methodical exigence. The grasp of self-appropriation is the knowledge of the different methods of common sense and the specialization in the sciences. According to Lonergan:

... for self-appropriation of itself is a grasp of transcendental method, and that grasp provides one with the tools not only for an analysis of common sense procedures but also for the differentiation of the sciences and the construction of their methods.¹¹⁹

The appropriation of method allows one to know which method is being used

¹¹⁸ Method, 83.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.
in knowing the objects under study. It places consciousness on a different realm. Instead of a focus only on objects, self-appropriated knowing allows for the distinction between the known and the method of knowing the known.

Beyond the methodological exigence, Lonergan argues, there is the transcendent exigence. The detached unrestricted desires to know and to value have their fulfilment not in their own levels of activity but in the realm of God. The fulfilment of the knowing is the fully known, but the fully known is the formally unconditioned which is God. Our knowing, then, intends knowing all there is to know, that is, God. It is in the divine realm that our knowing will become complete. As Lonergan argues, "... man can reach basic fulfilment, peace, joy, only by moving beyond the realms of common sense, theory, and interiority and into the realm in which God is known and loved."120 Ultimately, human knowing, valuing, and doing is orientated to and fulfilled by God.

The distinctions among the four different realms of meaning allows Lonergan to make the distinction among what he names a "differentiated consciousness." Common sense knowing is undifferentiated consciousness. As we have seen, its concern is the practical and immediate. It searches the repertoire of available insights for just that insight that will get the job done.

120 Ibid., 84.
These insights are expressed, for example, by proverbs. But by its historical location and cultural determinations, common sense varies with time, place, and culture. One’s own common sense is not that of another culture or another time even within one’s own tradition. What is common about common sense among diverse cultures is not its proverbs, but its method—the self-correcting process of learning. The differentiated consciousness of theory concerns relating things to one another in search for abstract explanatory terms and relations. Lonergan distinguished two phases to the development of theoretically differentiated consciousness. Classical theory was concerned with the causes of events. It sought necessary knowledge by causes. However, modern science distinguishes between causes and statistical probabilities. Theory seeks not necessary knowledge, but the best theory so far available. It is an open theory of progressive and cumulative results through control of one’s method. But this signals the differentiation of critical consciousness. The move to interiority is the appropriation of the knowing process involved in one’s knowing activities themselves. It allows for the differentiation of the transcendental method and the knowledge of method in the other realms of consciousness. And the transcendent differentiated consciousness is a move to the divine realm where knowing,

\[121\] See ibid., 303.
valuing, and loving are fulfilled. The unity of the differentiation of consciousness consists in its ability to know within which realm one is active and to shift one's method appropriately to each specific realm. As Lonergan writes, "the unity, then, of differentiated consciousness is, not the homogeneity of undifferentiated consciousness, but the self-knowledge that understands the different realms and knows how to shift from one to any other."\textsuperscript{122} When one is in a common sense mode one seeks to learn by trial and error. However, when one is explaining objects one requires the scientific method.

2.6.5. Stages of Meaning

The delineation of differentiated consciousness allows Lonergan to construct three ideal types of the stages of cultural development.\textsuperscript{123} Basically, a first stage of meaning is controlled by common sense. Although the meaning satisfies its four functions there is no distinction among them. The result is myth and magic alongside practical development. The second stage of meaning emerges with the development of science. Human beings want to know not only how to do things but why processes work the way they

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., 84.

\textsuperscript{123} In his article "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness" in \textit{A Third Collection: Papers by Bernard J.F. Lonergan, S.J.}, ed. Frederick E. Crowe (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), 169-83, Lonergan discusses these three ideal types as plateaus of meaning.
do. This development involves the scientific method which provides two forms of abstraction that enrich human knowing about the world. Unexplainable phenomena and processes are no longer thought to be controlled by magic, but are simply unexplainable from within the limits of current knowledge.

Nothing else needs to be added to explanation than is not provided for by the operations of the scientific method. The third stage of meaning is the discovery of the operations of intentionality. The move to interiority establishes a control over method and distinguishes among the three basic questions as we have seen. It is the move toward the subject as active agent in one's world. It is the awareness of the realms of differentiated consciousness and the ability to move among them through the application of the appropriate method.

2.7. Lonergan and Intersubjectivity

Lonergan's notion of meaning expands his intentionality analysis to include the intersubjective dimension. As we have seen, emergent probability can also be used to account for human processes which are both intelligible and intelligent. The following section will, therefore, present Lonergan's account of the structure of the human good, the dialectic of community, bias, cycles of decline, and Lonergan's notion of cosmopolis. Section 2.8. will present a brief review of four Lonergan scholars who have expanded Lonergan's basic notions into the context of intersubjectivity and
discourse. Section 2.9. will summarize chapter two as the framework for articulating the structure of ethical discourse that will be worked out in chapters three and four.

2.7.1. The Structure of the Human Good.\textsuperscript{124}

For Lonergan, the structure of the human good is isomorphic to the structure of conscious intentionality.\textsuperscript{125} The first level of the human good refers to personal needs, desires, and fears. These goods are of various kinds, but they are all concretely felt as strongly personal. Nevertheless, the continual satisfaction of these personal desires demand that one engage in relationships with other people. These are, in fact, socially conditioned goods. They move us toward collaboration with others in pursuit of the satisfaction of everyone's desires. This collaboration represents Lonergan's second level to the structure of the human good. This level Lonergan refers to as the good of order. Collaboration is an intelligently ordered set-up of


\textsuperscript{125} I will present here the basic structure of the human good that involves personal needs, the good of order, and the judgment of value. However, in *Method*, Lonergan presents the structure of the human good in a more complex fashion by means of the chart on page 48.
human engagement in pursuit of a wide range of personal desires and needs. The good of order provides individuals with social roles and tasks within institutional arrangements. It is in the concrete good of order that Lonergan’s analysis relies upon the notion of a recurrence scheme of human interaction. The good of order structures human cooperation in such a way that collaboration involves a series of conditioning events. Sets of conditioning events are recurrent schemes of interaction. While the initial aim of the good of order is the regular delivery of specific goods, the proliferation of complex social orders gives rise to social goods which are not reducible to individual needs and desires. In other words, the manifold goods of order themselves become desired for their own sake. The third level of the structure of the human good Lonergan refers to as the judgment of value. What establishes a good of order as truly good and not merely apparently good is the human judgment of value that the good of order indeed creates the types of social institutions, roles and tasks that actually meet the myriad human needs and desires. This involves the further desire for the good of order itself and its participants. One becomes involved with others in social relations not simply for personal gain, but for the good of others through attention to the sustaining social orders.¹²⁶ A truly valuable good of order,

¹²⁶ As we will see in chapter three this is constituted by a moral conversion that shifts the criterion of judgments of value from personal satisfaction to value, that is, the value of others and the relationships that
then, involves the value judgment that social arrangements are meeting the
vectors of progress as worthwhile structures of human collaboration.
Lonergan's three-fold structure of the human good, therefore, represents the
basic component of a social ethics that is isomorphic to the structure of
human knowing and doing.

2.7.2. The Dialectic of Community

Now, initially the object of desire is felt within the intersubjective
context. In the primitive community the intersubjective context is the
immediacy of the family, clan, or tribe. For it is within this context that "a
sense of belonging together provides the dynamic premise for common
enterprise, for mutual aid and succour, for the sympathy that augments joys
and divides sorrows." The desires of the intersubjective context are
recurring desires that require the cooperative interaction of members of the
family, clan, or tribe. However, such cooperation is spontaneous. It occurs
through the feelings and sentiments of close proximity and the affects of the
naturally occurring recurrence schemes of family, clan, and tribe. Even after

sustain us.

127 For a good account of the dialectic of community see Michael Shute,
The Origins of Lonergan's Notion of the Dialectic of History, (Lanham:
University Press of America, 1994).

128 Insight, 212.
civil society emerges, the basis of the intersubjective context remains. In terms of emergent probability, the intersubjective context is the lower order manifold which is ordered by the higher integration of civil society. As such, the disintegration of civil society does not mean the disintegration of the intersubjective context since the lower order remains though the higher fails.

As we have seen, the emergence of civil society occurs through the development and implementations of practical intelligence. The recurring desires of individuals produce a corresponding demand for sustained cooperative schemes of recurrence. The ever changing situation of these recurrence schemes must be continually matched by practical intelligence. As new situations of cooperation emerge, new problems demand new insights from practical intelligence. These new insights occur within the technological, economical, and political realms. The result is a transformation of the situation from the primitive community to civil society. But, where primitive community emerged through the spontaneous intersubjective feelings of family, tribe or clan, civil society emerges through the continual implementation of practical intelligence. Such a transformation requires a distinction in the notion of the good. The good can no longer be associated simply as the object of desire. Rather, the good now can be further distinguished as the result of practical intelligence, that is, the intelligent cooperative schemes of recurrence of technology, economics, and politics that
move beyond the spontaneous schemes of family, clan, and tribe. The intelligible good of order of civil society is the result of practical intelligence's search for cooperative order. It is the set-up of technological, economical, and political schemes which aim to provide the capital and social arrangements of an aggregate of individuals and families. This involves human ingenuity in the making of human society. Unlike the spontaneous associations of intersubjectivity, civil society emerges from the practice of human intelligence.

The relationship between intersubjective spontaneity and intelligently designed social order produces, according to Lonergan, a tension within community which has as its source a duality within the human person. The person, as intelligent, seeks out intelligently ordered social arrangements which aim to meet the ever changing situations of technological, economical, and political schemes. But, as intersubjective, each individual is also orientated toward family, clan, and tribe. As such the two orientations are in radical tension. Lonergan employs the notion of dialectic to explain this tension. For Lonergan, a dialectic is "... a concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles of change."\(^{129}\) As such a dialectic has four conditions:

1. there is an aggregate of events of a determinate character,
2. the events may be traced to either one or both of two principles,
(3) the principles are opposed yet bond together, and
(4) they are modified by the changes that successively result from
them.\textsuperscript{130}

The dialectic of community consists of the two principles of spontaneous
intersubjectivity and practical common sense. Social events can be
understood as the result of working out the interaction between these two
principles. The two principles are linked in that one is the higher integration
of the other. The principles are opposed in that the contents of
intersubjectivity can lead to a rejection of practical intelligence or vice versa,
while practical intelligence requires the ordering of intersubjective feelings.

Furthermore, the changes in common sense intelligence into concrete
events change the constitution of intersubjective bonds. According to
Lonergan, during times of tranquillity practical common sense meets the
demands of intersubjectivity, but with crisis there exists the opposition
between the demands of spontaneous intersubjectivity and intelligent
common sense. What emerges within the intersubjective context is taken up
by practical intelligence in the search for general solutions and rules of
action. But, such arrangements can be at odds with intersubjectivity. During
times of peace, social living and intersubjective living coincide. What is
considered good for the family, clan, or tribe is good for the general social

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.
order. However, in times of crisis the demands of the family, clan, or tribe conflict with the demands of intelligently ordered social living. At these times, the dialectic of community forces upon individuals a challenge between these two tendencies. The individual is pitted between the demands of the intersubjective context and intelligently ordered social arrangements such that the choice of one tendency is the denial of the other. For Lonergan, the normative progressive resolution of this dialectic is the implementation of practical intelligence over intersubjective feeling since the former is the higher integration of the latter.

2.7.3. Bias and Cycles of Decline

Social living, then, is the concrete unfolding of the dialectic of community. Within this unfolding lie the roots of both individual bias and group bias. Both types of bias result from the incomplete unfolding of the pure disinterested unrestricted desire to know. Individual bias is intelligent up to a point. The egoist uses her intellect to understand the situation at hand. But far from allowing such understanding to be dominant, the egoist refuses complete understanding and remains satisfied in fulfilling her own desires and diverting her own fears. Lonergan writes, “egoism is neither

---

131 Lonergan discusses four types of bias; psychological, individual, group and general. Psychological is not treated here. Psychological bias refers to the relationship between neural demand functions and the censorship. See *Insight*, 217.
mere spontaneity nor pure intelligence but an interference of spontaneity with the development of intelligence."\(^{132}\) The egoist refuses the self-denial that is necessary for the complete unfolding of understanding. She stops short of asking questions that involve the general perspective of other people and the social order.

Likewise, group bias is an incomplete unfolding of practical intelligence. But where the egoist prohibits common sense its free play, group bias rests upon the insights of the common sense of the group. It is a bias against the intelligently guided development of a society. The group bias is the rejection of the quest of intelligence that questions whether specific change is to the advantage of another group. As such, new insights which could initiate the change necessary to meet specific social problems are overlooked, rationalized away, or ignored, because one dominant group selectively disregards specific insights that it perceives will not advance its own interests. In this light, Lonergan distinguishes between operative and inoperative practical insights. Operative practical insights are those that are not ignored by the group, while inoperative insights, though intelligible, are considered against the group's self-interest. Thus, group bias, like individual bias, lacks the higher viewpoint of the good of wider society, because it

\(^{132}\) Ibid., 219.
favours the constitution and identity of the narrower group over and against other groups in society.

Both individual and groups bias are distortions in the dialectic of community which demand a equilibrium of the dialectic in favour of intelligence. But besides individual and group bias there is general bias which refers to the bias of common sense to admit that human intelligence requires a move to explanatory knowing in order to work through problems that the common sense perspective is not capable of resolving. Common sense is concerned with the concrete and particular. It is a set of insights into practical possibilities. The application of common sense is dependent upon the situation, upon the individual’s development, upon wisdom, and virtue. Common sense bias is the short-sightedness of disregarding long term consequences, or viewing problems it can’t resolve as merely theoretical. It is the totalizing perspective of the practical.\textsuperscript{133} However, common sense is unable to know that it is a specialized knowledge. It, therefore, runs the risk of enforcing its bias to view as meaningless whatever is not useful. Common sense bias disregards all knowledge that does not fit into its practical perspective. Its particular danger is an extension of its concern for the

\textsuperscript{133} This presentation of Lonergan’s understanding of intersubjectivity in \textit{Insight} is not meant to be comprehensive. Lonergan goes into somewhat more detail than is presented here. My aim is simply to provide a basic context from which further insights into the situation of dialogue can be articulated.
immediate and practical into other areas of specialized knowledge thereby making all knowing the concern of common sense. While the solution to the problem of individual bias and group bias is the equilibrium of the dialectic by intelligence, the solution of general bias is the overcoming of the dialectic by a move to the explanatory perspective and, eventually, the involvement of the corrective function of cosmopolis. However, before such a solution there is the fact of both the shorter and longer cycles of decline.

Group bias and general bias promote the shorter and longer cycles of decline respectively. Let us name the five-fold scheme of insight, proposal, action, new situation, and fresh insight as the basic cycle of community development.\textsuperscript{134} The basic cycle is under the influence of emergent probability. But unlike natural processes, the basic cycle of community development is intelligent. Human societies do not wait around for change; they initiate change through the operations of intelligence, rationality, and responsibility. As such, community development “... is the cumulative realization of concretely possible schemes of recurrence in accord with successive schedules of probabilities.”\textsuperscript{135} These schemes of recurrence are

\textsuperscript{134} See Insight 226. The term “basic cycle” is my own. It is not to be confused with “basic scheme”, a term that Lonergan uses to identify the longer cycle of decline, see Insight, 228-29.

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., 227.
grasped by operative insights that foresee the conditions of possibility for these schemes. However, these insights are still just probable realizations of concrete possibilities, since earlier insights and decisions determine later possibilities and probability of insight and decision. Nevertheless, the greater human development becomes, the more human community has control over the emergence of correct operative insights, and their concrete actualization. Thus, social development is the result of human intelligibility that can know the effects of bias on the development of the necessary operative insights that are required to meet the problems of the day.

However, both group and general bias interfere with this basic cycle and affect either a short or long-term decline. The shorter cycle of decline initiated by group bias is the interference of the basic cycle by making operative those insights that will provide their group with social advantage over and against other groups in society. The distortion of operative insights through biased selection disrupts the basic cycle by prohibiting the operation of practical insights that meet not merely the needs of the group but the society at large. The effect of the distortion of the basic cycle is that the further new insights that begin a new movement of the cycle are limited by the dominant group's self-interest. Each new movement of the cycle continues to narrow down the range of possible operative insights which results in a cumulative distortion of the group's perspective.
The longer cycle of decline is the distortion of the basic cycle not by the exclusion of operative insights of the groups, but by the exclusion of knowledge about knowing itself. The historical importance of the basic cycle is that human society has a historical responsibility to develop by becoming more and more aware of the function of meaning constituting human history in accordance with emergent probability. As Lonergan writes, "the challenge of history is for man progressively to restrict the realm of chance or fate or destiny and progressively to enlarge the realm of conscious grasp and deliberate choice."

But, common sense is unable to think on the level of history. Historical responsibility is not within the practical concerns of common sense. Thus, the bias of common sense is the denial of historical responsibility. For common sense will reject the long term view, the higher integration, and the theoretical question for the sake of practicality. The distortion of the basic cycle by common sense bias means the rejection of fruitful ideas. The continual rejection of ideas means that successive viewpoints are less comprehensive than their predecessors. Common sense bias distorts the basic cycle and prevents later cycles from benefiting from

---

136 Ibid., 228.

137 It also, as Lonergan writes, "... twists to the view that, as insistent desires and contracting fears necessitate and justify the realization of ideas, so ideas without that warrant are a matter of indifference." ibid., 228.
earlier ideas, including the corrective possibilities that later insights often provide to earlier insights. The result is a continually less comprehensive viewpoint that rejects the long view, higher integrations and theoretical disputes in favour of an overbearing and uncritical practicality.

2.7.4. Cosmopolis

The longer cycle of decline initiated and sustained by the general bias of common sense can be reversed only through a higher viewpoint that recognizes the relevance of common sense knowledge. Common sense, by itself, cannot end the longer cycle because it lacks critical method. Its sole concern is the concrete and practical. It is not concerned about the course of history. However, since history is within the influence of emergent probability nothing is for certain. Human beings can discover historical responsibility and understand how less comprehensive viewpoints cumulatively lead to cultural decline. They can identify the need for a higher viewpoint that is critical through disinterested and detached intelligence. And by this intelligence they can understand its immanent norms that can maintain the equilibrium of the dialectic of social living.\textsuperscript{138}

The higher viewpoint Lonergan named cosmopolis. Cosmopolis is a cultural attitude that is critical of the general bias of common sense. It keeps

\textsuperscript{138} In chapter six, we will augment this account by including Lonergan’s understanding of redemption.
Chapter Two, Lonergan

a constant vigil against the intrusion of common sense practicality in areas that common sense has no place. Though common sense functions in the technological, economic, and political spheres, cosmopolis is a critical, cultural response to the dominance of these spheres throughout society. It is not a police force since correct understanding requires no force outside its own coherence. It is not a government body or lobby group, since it is not a social institution but a general cultural phenomenon or attitude that recognizes that common sense is not the only type of knowledge, that common sense's practical criteria is only part of the full functioning of society and culture. Finally, cosmopolis is not easy. For the struggle with the general bias of common sense is ongoing.

Emergent probability, therefore, is a dynamic world-view that can account for human process. Beyond the spontaneous intersubjectivity of the family or clan, civil society organizes itself not merely for the satisfaction of specific group interests, but in an attempt to meet a wide range of human needs. The organization of society gets worked out through a dialectic that operates with the difficulties of individual, group, and general bias. To the degree that civil society can resolve its bias it will continue to develop and meet the needs of a wider range of its citizens. To the degree that group bias is effective, society will narrowly implement only those practical insights that meet the dominant group's needs. In fact, the dominant group will rationalize
its own interest as if they were in the interest of the whole society. But, group bias can be overcome through the self-correcting process of learning when eventually the cumulatively narrow view of the dominant group can be overcome since its practical insights cease to provide for the needs of society. However, the general bias of common sense is more difficult to overcome. It requires the cultural attitude of cosmopolis that envisions civil society within a historical perspective wherein it can evaluate whether society has continued to develop or not. Thus, there are two types of intersubjectivity at play here: the spontaneous intersubjectivity of human beings that underlies the family, tribe, and clan; and the intelligent, rational, and responsible intersubjectivity that underlies civil society.

2.8. Secondary Sources on Lonergan and Intersubjectivity—Discourse

There is no doubt that Lonergan's larger project involved contextualizing the subject within the social context. Central to this context is intersubjectivity and its relationship with the basic operations of conscious intentionality. Various authors in Lonergan scholarship have taken up

---

139 On the movement to dialogue Lonergan writes, "but it can be more helpful, especially when oppositions are less radical, for the investigators to move beyond dialectic to dialogue, to transpose issues from a conflict of statements to an encounter of persons. For every person is an embodiment of natural right. Every person can reveal to any other his natural propensity to seek understanding, to judge reasonably, to evaluate fairly, to be open to friendship. While the dialectic of history coldly relates our conflicts, dialogue adds the principle that prompts us to cure them, the natural right that is the inmost core of our being." in "Natural Right and Historical Consciousness,"
Lonergan's understanding of intersubjectivity to work out problems either within Lonergan's own work or problems found in other fields. The following will survey four such scholars.\textsuperscript{140} Kenneth Melchin's reworking of Winter's account of sociality will offer key insights into the scheme of discourse. William Rehg's work offers some points of contact between Lonergan's work and Habermas' understanding of intersubjective discourse. Tad Dunne's work on the heuristic notion of community relates emergent probability to community formation and development. Finally, Steven Wentworth Arndt's work on the basic intersubjective discourse situation provides links between Lonergan's intentionality analysis and the basic functions of intersubjective discourse.

2.8.1. Kenneth Melchin

In his book \textit{History, Ethics and Emergent Probability}, Melchin offers an expansion of Lonergan's notion of the dialectic of community through Gibson Winter's account of the structure of social identity formation.\textsuperscript{141} For

\textsuperscript{140} This review does not aim to be exhaustive. For two other sources see Michael McCarthy, "Towards a New Critical Center" and Matthew Lamb, \textit{Solidarity with Victims: Toward a Theology of Social Transformation}, (New York: Crossroads, 1982).

\textsuperscript{141} The general context of this section of Melchin's book consists in explaining how history can be conceived in terms of acts of meaning, while at the same time, acknowledging that history can not be explained as the result of any one individual's act of meaning. Melchin conceives the structure of human interaction as acts of meaning in terms of emergent probability. Thus,
Melchlin, the structure of discourse is a recurrence scheme of intersubjective acts of meaning. The basic structure involves three events: (1) gesture, (2) response, (3) and the drive to unification. As Melchlin writes:

the gesture always invites a response and we can all recollect personal experiences wherein responding to a gesture was almost impossible to avoid. The response is to the gesture, and it interprets the meaning of the gesture as well as invites its own confirmation or rejection as an adequate interpretation. And the drive to unification brings both the gesture and the response forward to reconcile them on two distinct levels: on the level of the coherence, the truth or the value in what the subjects intended, and on the level of the relative need for mutual confirmation and approval among the persons in dialogue.\(^{142}\)

Person A gestures to person B and receives a response from B. A then interprets B's response from B's viewpoint to determine how B views A's initial gesture. If the response from B presents to A an image that is different than A's intention, then A will modify his or her's subsequent gestures in order to reconcile A's intention with what A interprets to be B's understanding of A's intention. The form of the reconciliation towards unification occurs on two levels; on the level of coherence in truth and value, and on the level of mutual confirmation and approval. Melchlin argues that this sequence is, in fact, a recurrence scheme of meaning making. Each event

\(^{142}\) History, Ethics, and Emergent Probability, 183.
functions as the condition for the subsequent event. Each gesture invites a response. Each response is an interpretation of the gesture that requires its own confirmation or rejection. The drive to unification is the higher order event that emerges from the gesture-response sequences. To a greater or lesser extent this level of the recurrence scheme establishes intersubjective meaning on the two interdependent levels of truth and mutual relationship.

The significance of this insight, according Melchin, is that it links two human drives as dialectically related. The drive for truth and value, as the response to the unrestricted desire of knowing and valuing, is always already linked with the drive for meaning in human relations. These drives emerge on an unified level from the interplay between human gestures and responses that, according to emergent probability, provide the conditions of human understanding and cooperation.\(^{143}\)

To further understand Lonergan’s dialectic of community, Melchin uses Winter’s intersubjective scheme. As we have seen, for Lonergan, the dialectic of community consists of the principles of spontaneous intersubjectivity of the group, tribe, or clan in opposition to the principle of

---

\(^{143}\) As Melchin writes, “... the recurrent operation of the scheme sets the context and fulfills the conditions for the development of virtually all the social skills from the child’s most primitive engagement with its mother’s gestures of affection to the most sophisticated political maneuverings among heads of state.” ibid., 183.
truth and value. Civil society, for Lonergan, is the emergence of intelligently
devised goods of order that cooperatively set up schemes of recurrences that
go beyond the interests of one's own group, tribe, or clan. According to
Melchin, the third event of Winter's scheme, the drive to unification,
corresponds to the structure of Lonergan's dialectic of community. The
principle of intelligibility refers to the truth or value content of the exchange.
This principle seeks to discover the truth and value of the issue at hand
through the disinterested desire of human knowing and valuing. The second
principle refers to the level of mutuality. The intersubjective principle is the
desire to be loved, trusted, and valued as a whole person. The two principles
are linked inasmuch as what is unified consists of both the feelings of
mutuality and the contents of intelligible inquiry. However, they are opposed
inasmuch as what is intelligent may be found to be in opposition to group
interests or group interest may suppress the disinterested desire for
intelligibility. When intellect dominates mutuality, there can arise correct
practical insights that have no possible means of implementation because the
principle of human relationship is ignored thereby thwarting conditions of
cooperation such as mutual trust. When mutuality dominates intellect, there
is sacrificed possible correct insights in favour of group interests.\textsuperscript{144}

\footnote{Melchin writes, “the drive towards unification with another needs to be
a unification in accordance with the criteria of intelligence as well as a
unification in a true, non-abusive care. And while compromise on the}
However, Melchin further argues that the dialectic between these two principles most often has the effect of reformulating questions for intelligence and reconstituting mutual relationship toward collaboration in the resolution of common problems none of which could have been resolved individually. As Melchin argues:

and even more profoundly, this drive to unification leads to collaboration in the conception and execution of projects and to patterns of social interaction and organization that pursue a desired result which none could have achieved on their own.\textsuperscript{145}

Thus, Melchin's analysis of Winter's structure of social identity formation suggests that the basic scheme of gesture, response, and unification is the foundational recurrence scheme of discourse which grounds collective inquiries of truth and value toward cooperation based on trust and mutual relatedness.\textsuperscript{146}

2.8.2. William Rehg

In his book \textit{Insight and Solidarity}, Rehg seeks to discover the moral

\begin{flushleft}
principle of cooperation and agreement might seem to yield the tumultuous consequence of anarchy and revolution, a compromise of intelligence yields the equally destructive failure of poorly conceived plans and the distortion that ensue from 'group bias'." ibid., 184-85.
\end{flushleft}

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., 184.

\textsuperscript{146} We will have occasion in chapter three to work with this foundational discourse scheme in more detail.
foundations of social cooperation. He finds the rational basis for his answer in the research project of Jürgen Habermas' discourse ethics. While I will not cover all of Rehg's analysis, he does indicate a potential intersubjective dimension of Lonergan's cognitional theory. In a short section titled "Insight as Intersubjective," Rehg argues that knowing is an intersubjective process. He shows this by analysing the intersubjective context of Lonergan's cognitional theory. By intersubjective, Rehg simply means the involvement of other people. The essence of his argument is that, within the moral realm, the condition of knowing that Lonergan details in *Insight* cannot be fulfilled by an isolated individual. Although it is true that factual and practical insights occur within the consciousness of individuals, the verification that these insights as true is an intersubjective process. As we can recall, strictly speaking, knowing that a direct insight is true occurs on the third level of conscious intentionality; that of reflection and judgment. The criteria of correctness involve whether the conditions happened to be fulfilled. They are fulfilled when all the relevant questions have been asked.

---


In the moral realm, all relevant questions require the input of other people.

As Rehg writes:

the intersubjective currents in Lonergan’s analysis can be detected in the notion of ‘further relevant questions’ for these are not restricted simply to ‘further questions for me’—typically they arise for others. In the realm of normative questions, however, the need for other people’s questions becomes not just typical, but essential. 149

In the normative realm the further relevant questions must come from other people because no one person could possibly possess all the relevant questions of all the people who are involved in the moral issue under discussion. Rehg argues that it is, in fact, only within the situation of discourse that some people may (even for the first time) be able to articulate their questions—questions that are essential if everyone is to know whether the moral norm at issue is correct. 150 Moral knowledge, then, is the result of an intersubjective series of discursive acts. Rehg’s arguments on the cognitional level reinforce the necessary interpersonal dimension of

---

149 Insight and Solidarity, 85 (italics in original). Lonergan writes in Insight, that “[...it is not enough to say that the conditions are fulfilled when no further questions occur to me. The mere absences of further questions in my mind can have other causes. My intellectual curiosity may be stifled by other interests. My eagerness to satisfy other drives may refuse the further questions a chance to emerge. To pass judgment in that case is to be rash, to leap before one looks.” 284.

150 As Rehg writes, “the other, precisely as other, represents a partially hidden set of potential questions and further relevant data—questions that often come to light only in response to a concrete proposal calling the other to thematize further his or her own views.” Insight and Solidarity, 86.
Lonergan’s work. Far from being a cognitional theory of isolated subjects, Lonergan’s analysis of human knowing is essentially intersubjective. Rehg’s analysis, then, works with Habermas’s discourse ethics to articulate a rational basis for moral cooperation that is, in part, founded upon a knowing process that is intersubjective.

2.8.3. Tad Dunne

In his article “Consciousness in Christian Community,” Tad Dunne asks the question, “what, in terms of human consciousness, is the ontological structure of Christian community?” His answer provides some arguments toward articulating the social structure of human togetherness and social identity. Dunne argues that just as there is a dual mode of subjective consciousness (that is, the data of consciousness and the data of sense), group consciousness involves two levels. There is the consciousness-as-perception which is the ordinary sense of belonging. And there is consciousness-as-experience which is the technical group self-consciousness as deliberate, intentional, and common act. To work out his argument, Dunne borrows from the work of Martin Buber. Buber identifies three types of intersubjective dialogue; technical, monological, and genuine. Neither technical nor

---

monological dialogue intend the formation of a community among discourse partners. Genuine dialogue, however, has the specific intention of group formation. It has two dimensions: (1) personal address which is the mutual address of the unique value of the other establishing the "I-Thou" relationship; and (2) togetherness which is the welcome of the dialogue partners to a mutual and unique union. For dialogue to be genuine both dimensions must be present.

Dunne integrates Buber's understanding of genuine dialogue with Lonergan's work to explain both the formation and the development of communities. According to Dunne, within Lonergan's notion of development two principles are at play. Integrators consolidate change on a given level of development and operators initiate the change to the next higher level of possible integration. With these two explanatory terms, Dunne argues that within the context of genuine dialogue the dimension of personal address acts as the operator moving the dialogue partners toward the next level of development in their awareness of being-in-common. The dimension of togetherness acts as the integrator forming the sense of community and commonality among the dialogue partners. This form of togetherness provides the basis of common experience, common understanding, common judgments, and common decisions at a specific level in the development of the dialogue partners' group consciousness. This, Dunne argues, is
Lonergan's heuristic of community. For Dunne, the "we-consciousness" of community is an achievement of the partners' conscious intentionality engaged in genuine dialogue. It is a conscious awareness of the members of the community that they are involved in a common effort based upon a set of common experiences, understandings, judgments, and decisions. Furthermore, the we-consciousness is itself the result of the concrete unfolding of the conscious intentionality of the members of community created in genuine dialogue. This is to say, the awareness that one is a member of a group does not have to be simply spontaneous intersubjectivity, but can be a consciously intelligent, rational, and responsible decision. Thus, the development of community can be explained, according to Dunne, as the result of the function of the operator-personal address and the integrator-togetherness within the basic structure of conscious intentionality.

2.8.4. Steven Wentworth Arndt

In a compact article, Steven Wentworth Arndt attempts to explain the basic structure of interpersonal relationship.\textsuperscript{152} He notes that, although the phenomena of interpersonal relations have been studied from a variety of perspectives, there continues to be lacking a systematic framework. He argues that Lonergan's intentionality analysis can provide the necessary

tools for such a framework. Wentworth Arndt focuses upon those types of interpersonal relations that provide the most depth of intersubjectivity. As his starting point, Wentworth Arndt makes use of the three basic moments, or functions, of interpersonal discourse; a speaker says something (expressive function) about something (referential function) to a listener (communicative function). To this basic understanding of interpersonal discourse, Wentworth Arndt integrates Lonergan’s intentionality analysis. The referential function regards objects and operations according to any of the four levels of conscious intentionality. But, while the referential function refers to objects, both the expressive and the communicative function refer to the subjects of discourse. As such, according to Wentworth Arndt, all expression is a self-expression to another. Whether the expression is verbal or nonverbal, it involves self-revelation to another person. These three dimensions of discourse allow for a heuristic of discourse to emerge. For Wentworth Arndt, discourse is not just speaking, or listening. It is not simply the exchange of words and sentences that refer two people to something external to them both. Rather, discourse is the interaction of two (or more) subjects each of whom is guided in their unique inquiries by the operations of conscious intentionality. And as we have seen from the other authors involved in expanding on Lonergan’s work in the area of intersubjectivity, the interpersonal provides not only for personal development on the level of feelings and emotions, but it is also the
condition of possibility of knowing, valuing and action. Wentworth Arndt's article points to the advantage of integrating Lonergan's intentionality analysis and the situation of discourse.

2.8.5. Summary of Section 2.8.

The major thrust of this section on the secondary sources on Lonergan and intersubjectivity-discourse, therefore, is that there is a common view among scholars in the field that Lonergan's cognitional theory is not merely individualist. These Lonergan scholars represent research initiatives that attempt to work out some of the intersubjective dimensions to Lonergan's cognitional theory. This thesis will seek to contribute to this general orientation. As we will see in chapter three, expanding Lonergan's cognitional theory to include the intersubjective context of discourse provides for the further insight that the structure of conscious intentionality can be the source for articulating a structure of ethical discourse. The exchange in discourse, then, is an exchange of meaning among discourse partners who, through the structure of their own discourse, might not only reach cooperative action strategies, but common judgment, mutual understanding, and recognition as well.

2.9. Summary of Chapter Two

This chapter presented an overview of Lonergan's cognitional theory and world-view of emergent probability. It presented the basic terms and
relations of emergent probability as a world-view that can accommodate natural and human processes. Emergent probability itself is founded upon a cognitional theory that explains the complex functioning of human knowing, valuing, and doing. I investigated the issue of practical insight in relation to judgments of value and saw some difficulties with the image of Lonergan's intentionality analysis. I presented a sketch of a more complex image of conscious intentionality. Following this I looked at Lonergan's intentionality analysis extended into the intersubjective dimension through an account of meaning. This involved Lonergan's account of the structure of the human good, the dialectic of community, bias, cycles of decline, and cosmopolis. Finally, I presented a brief review of Lonergan scholars who have extended Lonergan's work into the context of intersubjectivity and discourse. This chapter, then, has been the first step in following up in the clue that was offered at the end of chapter one, that Lonergan's work could provide the basic framework for working out the structure of ethical discourse. The following chapters will present the next step in the argument that Lonergan's cognitional theory can establish a framework for understanding the structure of ethical discourse that can respond to the problem of pluralistic discourse in contemporary society. Chapter three will present the structure of ethical discourse as having its source in the structure of conscious intentionality. Chapter four will present two characteristics of the structure of ethical
discourse as they relate to two issues developed in MacIntyre’s dialectical method. Chapter five will concretely illustrate the structure of ethical discourse through the field of mediation. Chapter six will bring together the three major sources of this thesis in an effort to sketch some insights towards a theological ethics of discourse.
Chapter Three: The Structure of Ethical Discourse I

3.0. Introduction

In chapter one we saw that MacIntyre's dialectical method offers a process whereby two or more members of diverse traditions can engage in moral inquiry. I have argued, however, that MacIntyre's method involves an internal problem that cannot be resolved by his own terms. Through the work of Michael Maxwell, we saw that Lonergan's interpretation of Aquinas' practical rationality promised to resolve MacIntyre's problem by incorporating a more adequate cognitional theory. This provided us with a clue which we followed up on by investigating Lonergan's cognitional theory and world-view of emergent probability. We saw that Lonergan scholars have developed insights extending this framework to begin to understand discourse and intersubjectivity. Our focus now is to advance this analysis by examining more closely the components of the structure of ethical discourse.

In this chapter, my basic argument will be that the structure of ethical discourse has its source in the structure of conscious intentionality. Two or more people enter into face-to-face discourse to discuss some issue. Their discourse has a structure that is parallel to their own conscious intentionality. Since conscious intentionality is authentic when one is attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible, then so too is the collective effort at discourse. Discourse is authentic when discourse partners are attentive to each other, intelligent in regards to the issues discussed or not discussed, reasonable in their collective judgments and responsible in their
cooperative endeavours. The following will work out this basic argument by a two-step approach. The first step will articulate a foundational discourse scheme of recurrence by working with Gibson Winter's three-fold structure of sociality. This scheme is operative throughout the four levels of the structure of ethical discourse. The second step will focus on each level of the structure of ethical discourse. Keeping in mind what was discussed in terms of the more complex image of conscious intentionality, I will work with a notion of ethical discourse as basically taking place on the fourth level where the concern is knowing and implementing value. On the level of attention, I will work with Winter's insights into the "We-relation" that occurs in intersubjectivity. On the level of intelligence, I will investigate Lonergan's understanding of expression and interpretation which links speaker and hearer in an intricate relationship. On the level of rationality, I will argue that the internal norm of asking all the relevant questions links discourse partners to seek out all the questions of the discourse partners toward the affirmation of judgments, particularly judgments of value. On the level of responsibility, I will look at how this level's own operations take place on a higher level integration of the discourse partners' collective horizon that is formed as their discourse moves through the prior levels. Throughout, it is my suggestion that the structure of ethical discourse has its source in the structure of conscious intentionality and that attention to this structure will
provide some insights into the question of ethical discourse in pluralistic society.

3.1. The Foundational Recurrence Scheme of Discourse

In chapter two, we saw that a scheme of recurrence consists of a conditioned set of events such that the occurrence of event A conditions the occurrence of event B which further conditions event C and so on and where the final event of the scheme is the condition for event A such that the entire scheme recoils around itself like a circle. The foundational scheme of discourse consists of a conditioned scheme of events. It is a foundational scheme, because it is operative in face-to-face discourse in each of the four different levels of the structure of ethical discourse. The structure of ethical discourse orientates the foundational scheme of discourse to different goals according to the basic intention of each level which, I argue, has its source in the structure of intentionality itself. The following will first present the foundational scheme of discourse, by investigating Gibson Winter's scheme of sociality as dynamic, form, and unification. Second, this scheme will be augmented by Kenneth Melchin's explanation of the dialectic of unification.

3.1.1. Gibson Winter's Three-Fold Structure of Sociality

The three basic elements of Winter's three-fold structure of sociality are dynamic, form, and unification. Dynamic refers to the gesturing of self to the other. In gesturing, I call for attention from the other. This call reflects a
relatedness between self and other and a call for a response. For Winter, the act of gesturing reveals the anxiety of being-in-the-world and the concern for a response from another. *Form* refers to the interpretative response by the other to one's gesture. This is a meaning-giving openness by the other to one's gesture. It calls forth an acknowledgment of the relatedness of self and other. *Unification* refers to the reciprocity of perspectives in the mutual role-taking. According to Winter, the meaning of one's own gesture is interpreted by the self from the response given by the other. In understanding one's gesture one interprets, through the mental act of role-taking, the perspective of the other. But, the response of the other is also a gesture. It too elicits a response from the self. The other also interprets his or her gesture/response through the act of role-taking to interpret how his or her gesture/response is understood by oneself. The combination of dynamic and form seeks some type of unification of the self and other. This allows each person to participate in a shared world of mutual interpretation. As Winter argues:

> the unity of self and other is actualized as a social world through the sharing of gestures, signs, and language; the unity of the self is actualized simultaneously, as personal identity in the consistency of the intentionality of the self with the responses of the social world and particularly the world of significant others.¹

For Winter, then, one's gestures have meaning which anticipate a response

from the other. If one's gesture to another does not receive a response that is aligned with one's intention, as interpreted by the self from the perspective of the other, then one will alter one's gesturing. Furthermore, the response by the other is, at the same time, a gesture which carries meaning to the self. The interplay among gesture, response, and role-taking interpretation gives rise to the unification of the self and other in mutual interpretation of each other's gestures and responses. This unification represents a reaching beyond the limits of the self towards a comprehensive meaning of both self and other. It involves moving beyond one's own set of meanings toward a more enriching intersubjective meaning. As Winter writes, "the reach of embracing unity thus includes the self-surpassing dynamic of freedom toward richer experience for the self within a world of more comprehensive meaning."\(^2\) The fundamental thrust of unification, then, is the expansion of the self toward more integrated meaning of self and other.\(^3\)

3.1.2. Melchin on the Dialectic of Unification

We have already had occasion to sketch how Kenneth Melchin reworks Winter's structure of sociality by understanding it as a scheme of recurrence

\(^2\) Ibid., 107.

\(^3\) Again Winter writes, "we can speak here, then, of a passion for unity which presses the self beyond any level of integration of self or world which is already achieved; any coherence of the world already grasped is subject to reconsideration and new levels of formulation." ibid.
orientated by the dialectic of unification. As we saw in chapter two, Melchin argues that Winter's three-fold process of sociality is structured like a scheme of recurrence. As Melchin writes, "each stage functions as the fulfilling condition for the next stage and each stage is an event that can be classified irrespective of the particular meaning that it intends."\(^4\) The gesture that is given and the response that is received constitutes a particular event in the scheme. Each gesture-response-interpretation event can be understood on its own terms. The combination of the sequence of events can lead to the unification of the subjects. As Melchin writes, the drive toward unification:

\[
\ldots \text{brings both the gesture and the response forward to reconcile them on two distinct levels: on the level of the coherence, the truth or the value in what the subjects intended, and on the level of the relative need for mutual confirmation and approval among the persons in dialogue.}^5
\]

In order for the scheme to function properly it requires its own conditions, such as ability in language and the willingness to participate in the scheme toward its completion.

However, for Melchin, the process of unification on these two levels occurs dialectically. He uses Lonergan's notion of a dialectic to explain the dialectic of unification. Melchin argues, "in the drive to unification there are operative two distinct principles of change that correspond to the two levels

\(^4\) History, Ethics and Emergent Probability, 182.

\(^5\) Ibid., 183.
on which the gesture and response demand reconciliation."\(^6\) The first
principle is the drive toward understanding, truth, and value. It involves the
conscious operations of intentionality as they are ordered by their immanent
norms. The second principle is "... the drive towards expression and
confirmation of what is understood, judged, decided, with another person."\(^7\)
This is the drive for the confirmation of mutuality between persons.
Mutuality refers basically to what Lonergan calls spontaneous
intersubjectivity. It functions as both communicative and constitutive. It is
communicative because it expresses meaning about the other person in
discourse such as whether the other is trustworthy, likeable, funny, serious,
sensual, and so on. And it is constitutive because self-identity is, in part,
conditioned by others. I understand myself in relation to other people.
Mutuality and intelligence, then, relate interactants dialectically on two
levels.

The principle of mutuality is linked to the principle of intelligence
inasmuch as both involve intentional acts. However, the first principle is
opposed to the second principle inasmuch as it requires a confirmation of the
whole person, not only cognitive acts of meaning. According to Melchin, when
the principle of mutuality is ignored, there results an over emphasis on

\(^6\) Ibid.

\(^7\) Ibid. (emphasis added).
intelligibility, truth, and value of the issue at hand without regard for the
other's feelings and concerns. When the principle of intelligence is ignored,
intelligibility, truth, and value are sacrificed for intersubjectivity and mutual
fellow feeling. For example, insulting someone while expressing an insight
may satisfy the drive for intelligence but at the sacrifice of the drive for
mutuality.

More significantly for Melchin, the dialectical drive for unification
among individuals "... leads to collaboration in the conception and execution
of projects and to patterns of social interaction and organization that pursue
a desired result which none could have achieved on their own."8

Collaboration rests upon the dialectic by a careful attention to both principles
throughout the course of their encounter. Concretely, the difficulty of the
dialectic consists in expressing insights without losing the drive for
mutuality and attending to mutuality without losing the drive for
intelligence. Melchin's explanation, then, of the dialectic of unification
further clarifies the foundational scheme of discourse.9

---

8 Ibid., 184.

9 The basic insights of the dialectic of unification resonate with
research in conflict resolution. Researchers in conflict studies who focus on a
micro-analysis of exchanges of speech acts argue that each speech act carries
meaning on two levels; the substantive content of the intended message and
meaning concerning the relationship between the discourse partners. [Joseph
P. Folger, Marshall S. Poole, Randall K. Stutman, Working Through Conflict:
Strategies for Relationships, Groups, and Organizations, (Harper Collins
3.1.3. Summary of the Foundational Scheme of Discourse

The foundational scheme of discourse consists of events of gestures, responses, and interpretative role-taking that move discourse partners through the dialectic of unification. Each event consists of a set of gestures and responses that each discourse partner interprets from his or her idea of the perspective of the other through role-taking. This interpretation and the exchange in gestures/responses takes place within the dialectic of intelligence and mutuality. Each event contributes to working through the dialectic according to whether the meaning of the event moves the discourse partners toward intelligence, or mutuality, or an adequate balance of the two. Skewing the dialectic in the direction of either intelligence or mutuality to the exclusion of the other can adversely effect the way discourse partners interpret each other's gestures/responses. This has the further effect of discouraging collaboration among discourse partners. The scheme of discourse, however, can contribute to enlarging the horizon of each disputant,

---

Publishers: New York, 1993), 92-3.] For example, suppose someone said to you, “You have no right saying those things to me!” On the level of substantive content, there is the message about an ethics of relationship; people ought to treat other people in a certain way. On the level of relationship, there is the message of hurt and anger. Both these levels are communicated to the other person in the same speech act. These researchers, however, do not structure the two levels as a dialectic. They focus, rather, on how the relationship level can either constructively or destructively alter the flow of discourse. Melchin’s work is more explanatory since it identifies the structural relationship between both levels as dialectical. This will be discussed further in chapter five.
if the dialectic is balanced in such a way that both intelligence and mutuality are affirmed overall in the discourse scheme.

3.2. The Four Levels of the Structure of Ethical Discourse

The foundational scheme of discourse operates throughout the four levels of the structure of ethical discourse. The movement of dynamic, form, and the dialectic of unification is operative as the foundational scheme of discourse. In a sense, the foundational scheme represents a microfocus of individual exchanges among discourse partners. Since the foundational scheme of discourse is operative throughout their encounter, these individual exchanges can themselves be orientated by the goal of each of the four levels of the structure of ethical discourse. In this way, then, the foundational scheme of discourse can be orientated by the goals of recognition, mutual understanding, common judgment, and cooperative action depending upon the intention of the discourse partners. In other words, the structure of ethical discourse orientates the foundational scheme of discourse according to the goal of one of the four levels.

Though more will be said throughout this chapter on the relationship among the four levels of the structure of ethical discourse a brief introduction to their relationship can aid in clarifying what is going forward here. The four levels of the structure of ethical discourse combine with the basic scheme to form a complex scheme of recurrence. The four levels of the structure of
ethical discourse yield goals that the discourse must meet if it is to proceed. The four-fold structure has its source in the structure of conscious intentionality. This structure acts to effect the jump in probabilities that the discrete events of discourse will concretely function together. If recognition occurs in discourse it increases the probability that the discourse partners will move on to reach mutual understanding. Reaching mutual understanding of each other's perspective in terms of facts and values increases the probability that the discourse partners will be able to proceed to articulate their common judgments. Articulating common judgments involves differentiating those judgments of fact and value that the discourse partners share from those that are in conflict and those that the discourse partners can agree to disagree about. Articulating common judgments increases the probability that the discourse partners will be able to cooperatively implement action strategies that constructively affect their social living. This involves considering practical insights, personally committing to them through constitutive acts of meaning, collectively deciding to implement them through efficient acts of meaning, and acting on them through communicative acts of meaning. The structure of ethical discourse, therefore, consists of a scheme of schemes of recurrence (that is, a

\[\text{\textsuperscript{10}}\text{ As will be argued, this is not to suggest that concrete discourse moves through the levels in a step-by-step fashion.}\]
conditioned series of schemes) whereby there exists a jump in the probability that the discourse partners will achieve each individual stage or level in the discourse. Each stage itself is a scheme of acts of gestures, responses, and role-taking. As each stage moves on to condition the next, there emerges a scheme of schemes of intersubjective acts of meaning that constitutes the structure of ethical discourse.

The four levels of the structure of ethical discourse are related by the process of sublation. As we saw in chapter two, sublation refers to the structural arrangement among the levels of conscious intentionality. A higher level takes up material of the lower level and orientates intentionality to a new goal. The higher level does not eliminate the functioning of the lower level, but orientates conscious intentionality to a fuller knowing, valuing, and doing. Now, we have also considered the question of the reduplication of the operations of conscious intentionality throughout the four levels. The complex image of intentionality that guides this analysis involves conceiving value as a fourth level concern that sublates the prior three levels of experience, understanding and judging. We have seen in chapter two that value involves a concern for understanding as much as judging according to the basic intention of each of these levels. The fourth level, then, is ultimately concerned with the implementation of practical insights that alter existing arrangements toward creating the right, good,
and value.

Working with this more complex image of conscious intentionality as the guide for exploring the structure of ethical discourse as a scheme of recurrence means that lower levels condition higher levels. Acts of recognition that occur on the first level provide material for understanding on the second level. Understanding concerns the mutual understanding among discourse partners in terms of both facts and values. Mutual understanding provides material for common judgment as the discourse partners articulate a common, higher viewpoint that incorporates the perspective of each into a common viewpoint. From this common, higher viewpoint discourse partners can consider, commit, decide, and act upon practical insights that they believe will bring about the desired changes to their collective living.

However, this is not to suggest that the structure of ethical discourse is a simple linear four-step process. As will be seen below, the structure of ethical discourse is conceived dynamically. Discourse partners can move back and forth among the four levels in a variety of ways. For example, sometimes discourse begins with practical insights only to move toward greater understanding of the values that are motivating the discourse partners. At other times, discourse partners may be attempting to work out common judgments of value when it becomes clear to some of the discourse partners
Chapter Three, The Structure of Ethical Discourse I

that they have not completely understood each other.\textsuperscript{11} In this way, the discourse partners would have to "move down" to the level of mutual understanding in order to clarify to each other what the issues are in terms of either facts or value before they can reach common judgments on the third level. Therefore, although the lower level conditions the higher level, this does not mean that discourse simply moves through the levels in a linear four-step fashion. In fact, concrete discourse often moves flexibly and dynamically back and forth throughout the four levels.

But, far from being haphazard, these movements can be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible. The jump in probabilities that is afforded by the structural arrangement among the events of discourse is not only intelligible, it also can be intelligent. Discourse partners can participate in their discourse in ways that are attentive to the other, intelligent in terms of their substantive and relational issues, reasonable in determining their common viewpoint, and responsible in implementing action strategies that create a better living for all. Thus, an analysis of the structure of ethical discourse can provide insights into the unfolding of authentic discourse and, by drawing attention to authentic discourse, the analysis can promote authentic discourse in our pluralistic society.

\textsuperscript{11} Furthermore, the conditioned series of schemes of discourse can be interfered by other factors such as fatigue and hunger.
In this way, then, there are two sets of schemes operative in ethical discourse. The first scheme is the foundational scheme of discourse that functions on a micro-level. An understanding of this three-fold scheme of gesture, response, and role-taking can be used to analyze each speech act in discourse. Together, these acts unfold in the dialectic of unification. The second scheme is the larger scheme of schemes of ethical discourse itself. This scheme consists of the four levels, or stages, of recognition, mutual understanding, common judgment, and cooperative action. It functions to orientate the three-fold foundational scheme towards one of the four goals of the structure of ethical discourse according to the various levels on which the discourse partners participate. Thus, the foundational scheme can be orientated towards recognition in the exchange of self and other images, towards mutual understanding in the exchange of insights into facts and value, towards common judgment in the collective conviction of facts and values, and towards cooperative action in considering, committing, deciding, and acting on practical insights for the common good. The following will present a more detailed analysis of each level of the structure of ethical discourse. After each level is presented a summary paragraph will link the level of the structure of ethical discourse with the foundational scheme of discourse.
3.2.1. The First Level of Recognition

The first level of the structure of ethical discourse has its source in the level of attention. To be attentive in discourse means to be open to one’s experience of the other as another subject. To investigate this level, I will work with the insights of Gibson Winter into the “We-relation” where self and other become intimately related through sharing their experience of each other.\textsuperscript{12} In Winter’s discussion of the We-relation he argues that another person’s consciousness is not directly accessible to one’s own consciousness. According to Winter, in common experience the other, as a conscious person, is taken for granted. We assume that the other is similar enough to us so as to be treated in a like manner. However, a closer investigation reveals that the consciousness of the other is never an immediate object within my consciousness. Winter writes, “the other consciousness cannot be an object to me but is a reality in which I can participate by becoming engaged with the other.”\textsuperscript{13} The operations of the other’s consciousness are not available for direct observation. Though we may say, in a common sense way, that we can “see” when another person is thinking, in fact, we cannot directly observe the

\textsuperscript{12} Winter’s account of sociality reworks George Herbert Mead’s account of social identity. Winter argues that he tries to balance Mead’s overly behaviouralist approach through a phenomenological method. See his \textit{Elements for a Social Ethic}, 90.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 93 (italics in original).
operations of another's consciousness. For Winter, rather than having the other's consciousness as an object of one's consciousness, we participate in an engagement with the other through the mediation of gesture, signs, and symbols. As Winter writes, the other's consciousness "... is never given as object to my consciousness but is only mediated through his disclosures in symbols and gestures." Gestures, signs, and symbols act as the link among people as they participate in meaningful engagements so that the other "... is never given to us as immanent in our consciousness, he always stands over against us as transcendent to our consciousness."15

The other's consciousness is indirectly accessible to me because both of us participate in mutual gesturing, signing, and symbol-making. For Winter, this is possible because there is a more basic lived encounter of the "I" and "Thou" in a face-to-face encounter on the primary level of social experience. From this level, other more complex acts of meaning and social relationships are developed. The encounter, as participation, is the pregiven of social life. It is the elemental level of social engagement. It is, for Winter, "... the root concept of the intentional self."16 Thus, the significance of gesture, sign, and

---

14 For example, brain wave analysis does not observe acts of consciousness. In terms of emergent probability, they represent observations on the biological level to which consciousness is the higher order.

15 Ibid., 92.

16 Ibid., 91.
symbol become important for Winter's account of sociality and communication in general.

Now, Winter understands this mutual interdependence as the foundation of sociality. In the We-relation, what is non-accessible to myself is accessible to you and what is not accessible to you is accessible to me. In other words, I am experientially given to you, you are experientially given to me and this experience can be a shared reality to which we can appeal in our discourse. This provides for a foundational social interdependence of the self with the other whereby the present becomes a vivid performance in the participation of the face-to-face encounter. The We-relation is the social interdependence of self and other. It is in this experience that "... my vivid present is confirmed by the other's response, even as his vivid present finds


\[\text{18} \text{ Winter makes use of Albert Schutz's general thesis of the alter ego, see Elements of Social Ethic, 96ff.}\]
recognition in my response."\(^{19}\) In the We-relation, the confirmation of self and recognition of the other form the basis of intersubjectivity. For Winter, the We-relation "... is the matrix of self-actualization of the I as being-in-the-world, but it is a matrix of mutual dependence."\(^{20}\) Since in the We-relation the meaning of my gestures are available to me through the expressions of the other, I rely upon the other to recognize my gestures and confirm myself in the exchange, while at the same time, the other seeks my recognition of her for her self-confirmation.

Moreover, for Winter, the We-relation is essential for self-actualization. He argues, "the possibility of actualization as self-in-the-world depends upon the intersubjective experience of self and other in the We-relation."\(^{21}\) The self is further linked in the intersubjective context. Not only do we depend upon the We-relation for confirmation of our being-in-the-world and our recognition of beingness, but our development through self-actualization is dependent upon the dynamics of the We-relation.\(^{22}\) Thus, for Winter, sociality is fundamentally internal. It is not imposed by an outside

\(^{19}\) Ibid., 96.

\(^{20}\) Ibid.

\(^{21}\) Ibid., 97.

\(^{22}\) Winter further argues, "we depend upon each other in the We-relation for the confirmation of our being-in-the-world." ibid.
force upon individuals, but rather develops from within the matrix of mutual participation in the We-relation of a face-to-face encounter.

For Winter, the We-relation represents the pregiven relation between the self and others. It is the foundational intersubjective phenomena upon which more complex social relationships are built. According to Winter, it is from the We-relation that there is a human "... 'reach' beyond the face-to-face relationship to the most complex possibilities of temporal, spatial, and higher-order relationships." The development of language and ordered social living through civilization does not remove the importance of the We-relation. For Winter, the foundational significance of the We-relation supports civilization, language, and ritual not vice-versa. While analysis of texts and social relationships remain important tasks for sociology, it cannot overlook, according to Winter, the pregiven within all social activity. Thus, the primary sociality of human relations is formed in the We-relation.

While, for Winter, positive meaning is the basic thrust of the We-relation, he is aware that it can also be a place for deceit and dishonesty. As he writes:

"even as the T subject has the power to negate every social and cultural form, up to and including his own existence, so the T subject may engage the other in a mutual confidence which he intends to betray or"

---

23 Ibid., 99.
may later betray for other reasons.\textsuperscript{24}

The possibility of betrayal within the We-relation is, for Winter, a betrayal of the self as much as it is a betrayal of the other. The structure of the We-relation offers a basis for a normative ethics, according to Winter, because the formation of mutual meaning and identity requires an engagement with an openness and relatedness to the other that does justice to the mutual experience of the We-relation. Mutual experience as given in the We-relation is the basis of the interpretation of the other's response to one's gesture and the basis for subsequent mutual re-interpreting as one moves back and forth with the other towards unification. This involves a distancing of the self through interpreting the response of the other. In this distanciation, the self forms an identity in relation to the other. As Winter argues:

\ldots the social character of a human being is fundamental to the self in its anxiety for being - the impulse to find response in the other and the intentional thrust of the self toward a consciousness of its own meaning as the meaning of being-in-the-world.\textsuperscript{25}

Betrayal or deceive disrupts this self-other relatedness by generating distorted meanings from others and thus a distorted self-consciousness. In deceit, the self will not be provided with the types of responses from the other that are necessary to confirm the self's own gestures and intended meaning. As

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 107.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 105.
Winter argues:

bad faith, for example, which arises in the anxiety of being, ultimately reflects the choice of the \textit{T} in its reach toward fulfillment; in bad faith, the harmony of self and other to which the \textit{T} belongs is sacrificed for a lesser reality of the \textit{T’s} choice, and the basic relatedness of self and other is denied . . . bad faith arises in a violation of the essential unity of self and other, in the 'false' commitment of the self to its own fulfillment.\textsuperscript{26}

Thus, the normative aspect of the relationship between self and other allows Winter to argue that betrayal in the We-relation is as much betrayal of self as it is a betrayal of the other.

For Winter, then, the structure of the We-relation represents the basis for a normative process of self-and-other-meaning-making towards unification. However, it does not describe the substantive meaning of the self, or the other, or their social meanings. Nevertheless, for Winter, the self and other are "... mediated by a particular structure of social and cultural possibilities."\textsuperscript{27} The cultural and social structures that exist present the context within which the We-relation is enacted. They are not determinations, but "... the limited, finite possibility available to the infinite passion for unity."\textsuperscript{28} They are interrelated such that "the \textit{T} constitutes itself

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 108-9.

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 108.

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
in its intentionality toward the social and cultural world, but it is in turn constituted by the meaning of the world toward which it moves."\textsuperscript{29} For Winter, the process of eliciting a response from another through gestures and the relatedness of taking the other's perspective toward unification are both the source of existing social and cultural structures and the possibility of future structures. The We-relation, then, provides shared experience to which the participants of this process can appeal.

3.2.1.1. Clarification Through Lonergan’s Cognitional Theory

Before we move to consider the second level of the structure of ethical discourse, we need to clarify one point. In terms of Lonergan’s cognitional theory, the other is not only a subject to me, but in a very specific way, the other is also an object. As Lonergan writes:

\ldots just as we pass from consciousness of the self as subject to an objectification of the self in conception and judging, so too we pass from intersubjectivity to the objectification of intersubjectivity. Not only do we (two subjects in a subject-to-subject relation) speak and act. We speak about ourselves; we act on one another; and inasmuch as we are spoken of or acted on, we are not just subjects, not subjects as subjects, but subjects as objects.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.

The other is an object of my higher levels of conscious intentionality.\textsuperscript{31} In terms of the structure of ethical discourse, discourse partners do not remain at a first level, but strive for higher order integrations through the three further levels. Though the exchange of self-images continues throughout discourse, the discourse partners do not remain at the level of subject to subject. The higher levels allow one to discourse with the other as an object through the other's acts of meaning that occur on the higher levels. This is what Lonergan means by the objectification of intersubjectivity. For example, when one is understanding how the other values a certain aspect one is understanding the object of the other's valuing not solely the other as subject. This distinction between the other as subject and as object helps to clarify the higher levels of the structure of ethical discourse since these higher levels work with the material of the objectification of intersubjectivity.

3.2.1.2. Summary of the First Level of Recognition

The normative status of the first level of recognition is explained through the We-relation within which participants of a face-to-face encounter exchange images of each other which either confirm or deny each other's intended meaning. The foundational scheme of discourse functions at this level primarily in a non-verbal fashion. For each participant, the gesture, 

\textsuperscript{31} This is not the same as saying the other is an object when one treats another as a means to one's end. The term object is used in a cognitional sense; it is that which one questions.
response, and role-taking provide a wide range of possible meanings. But, at
the level of recognition, these meanings are not verbally expressed to each
other. In fact, the non-verbal basis of these exchanges provide the discourse
partners with more meaning than they can verbally articulate to each other.
Nevertheless, the exchange of meaning at the level of recognition provides a
basis for further verbal expression on the next level of mutual
understanding. We are not content to consider for ourselves whether or not
one has correctly understood the other's gesture. Through verbal exchanges,
we seek out whether or not we are right in our interpretation. Furthermore,
we are do not live simply on the level of recognition of each other as subjects.
We can seek to understand and to agree with others in order that through
our discourse we can create a space of cooperative living that benefits all.

3.2.2. The Second Level of Mutual Understanding

The second level of discourse heads towards mutual understanding.
Its goal is for each discourse partner to grasp the meaning of each other's
expressions. To articulate the level of mutual understanding, the following
section will be divided into two parts. First, I will present Lonergan's account
of an expression. The second level of discourse works with language and is
constituted by the flow of spoken discourse. Second, I will present Lonergan's
notion of interpretation. Within the second level of the structure of ethical
discourse, partners seek affirmation from each other regarding their
interpretations of each other's expressions of both facts and values.

3.2.2.1. What is an Expression?

For our purposes, let us limit an expression to a verbal communication from one person to another.³² Lonergan breaks down an expression into its components. He writes:

... an expression is a verbal flow governed by a practical insight (F) that depends upon a principal insight (A) to be communicated, upon a grasp (B) of the anticipated audience's habitual intellectual development (C), and upon a grasp (D) of the deficiencies in insight (E) that have to be overcome if the insight (A) is to be communicated.³³

As we can see, an expression, for Lonergan, is not simply the exchange of principal insights.³⁴ Before one can communicate an insight to another person there are prior conditions that must be met. One must know what other insights (E) the other person needs to have before he or she can grasp the principal insight (A) one wants to communicate. This further requires a prior understanding (B) of how far along the other person is in his or her intellectual development (C). If the other person lacks the necessary intellectual development in the particular field of experience, he or she lacks

---

³² Here I want to make it clear that our context is verbal discourse and not written discourse. Interpretation and expression consists in verbal exchanges among discourse partners.

³³ Insight, 562 (emphasis added). See also 556.

³⁴ Thus, (A), (B), (D), (F) are on the part of the speaker; (C), (E) are on the part of the hearer.
the intellectual conditions for understanding (A).\footnote{While it may be that the other person lacks only specific prior insights, it may also be possible that he or she lacks even further sets of insight so that besides (E) there are (G) and (H) sets of insight that are required before the principal insight (A) can be communicated, see ibid., 557.} In other words, for Lonergan, since knowledge advances from lower to higher viewpoints, the expression must take into consideration whether the other person has achieved the higher viewpoint that is consistent with the principal insight (A). If the other person has an intellectual development that is represented by a lower viewpoint, he or she would not be able to grasp an insight of the higher viewpoint until the appropriate development takes place. Thus, the principal insight (A) that one wants to communicate would not make sense to that person.\footnote{Notice, however, that the opposite is not true. In terms of intellectual development a person of a higher level would not have trouble grasping insights that emerge on the lower level. Any one who has ever taught a class or has been with children knows the truth of this dimension of expression. Lonergan's anatomy of an expression makes this more precise. It is a condition of all the expressions we make in all the exchanges of our conversations and discourses. One of the goals of mutual understanding is to work out the prior sets of insight that condition the principal insight of the expression.}

The expression consists of a practical insight (F) into how one will communicate the principal insight (A) to the other person. Insights, however, are of various kinds. The practical insight into the means of expressing the principal insight will, in part, be determined by the sphere of being from
which the insight makes sense.\textsuperscript{37} Scientific insights, for example, depend upon the development of specialized language and are best expressed through technical words and phrases. Scientists depend upon an economy of words to accelerate advancement in their field of knowledge. An expression, then, for Lonergan, is a combination of insights within a context of the specific intellectual development of both speaker and hearer.

This detailing of an expression reveals a further interdependency between the speaker and hearer on the second level of discourse.\textsuperscript{38} In order for the hearer to grasp the principal insight (A), the speaker must have three conditioning insights (B), (D), and (F). Each of these insights regard the hearer. The speaker must have grasped an insight (B) into the intellectual development of the hearer (C). If the hearer's intellectual development is not on the same level as that of the principal insight (A), the hearer does not have the necessary prior insights that form part of the development of knowledge within which the principal insight (A) makes sense.\textsuperscript{39} Correlative

\textsuperscript{37} See section 3.2.3.1. below on the notion of spheres of being.

\textsuperscript{38} Recall that the first level of recognition in the structure of ethical discourse revealed an interdependency of the We-relation.

\textsuperscript{39} Notice that the term "level" is used in two different ways. There is a level of intellectual development represented by the difference between higher and lower viewpoints in the development of knowledge. And there is a level to the structure of ethical discourse, in this case, the level of mutual understanding.
to (B) is the insight (D) into the precise set of insights that the hearer lacks. The principal insight (A) requires specific prior insights upon which it makes sense. The speaker must know whether the hearer possess these prior insights. Furthermore, the speaker must know the hearer in order to grasp the precise means with which he or she will communicate (F) not only the principal insight (A) but also those prior insights (E).\footnote{This explains why one cannot say everything at once in one expression. Not only must one make sure that the other has the prior insights (E) but these prior insights may have their own conditioning insights which also have to be communicated to the other if the other lacks those insights as well. This extends the discourse far from the principal insight (A), but is a necessary condition for possibility in the exchange of meaning of the original expression.}

This interdependency combines to account for the variable standard of adequate expression. For Lonergan, an expression itself is neither true nor false. It can be only more or less adequate.\footnote{Lonergan writes, "it follows, then, that properly speaking expression (sic) is not true or false . . . in themselves expressions are merely adequate or inadequate." ibid., 556.} Its adequacy depends upon whether the speaker and hearer have worked out their interdependency sufficiently enough to grasp (B), (D), and (F).\footnote{Notice also that the expression links back to the fundamental scheme of discourse as well. That is, not only is it conditioned by (B), (C), and (D), but it carries meaning on two levels; the level of intelligent content represented by (A) and on the level of mutuality between speaker and hearer.} This standard of adequacy is variable because it is dependent upon the unique combination of speaker and
hearer. Although the interdependency of speaker and hearer is established by the compounded structure of an expression, insights (B), (D), and (F) are usually not grasped prior to the concrete encounter of face-to-face discourse.\textsuperscript{43} The expression, therefore, is a concrete event in the discourse which links speaker and hearer in an interdependency of mutual insights based upon each other's intellectual development.

For Lonergan, the source of meaning for an expression can be found on any one of the levels of intentionality.\textsuperscript{44} Lonergan writes:

\begin{quote}
\ldots the expression may have its source (1) simply in the experience of the speaker, as in an exclamation, or (2) in artistically ordered experiential elements, as in a song, or (3) in a reflectively tested intelligent ordering of experiential elements, as in a statement of fact, or (4) in the addition of acts of will, such as wishes and commands, to intellectual and rational knowledge.\textsuperscript{45}
\end{quote}

This means that, for Lonergan, there are levels of expression. There are a variety of type of expressions depending upon the operator of intentionality.

\textsuperscript{43} The insight (F) can have certain determinations to it depending upon the sphere of being within which the principal insight (A) exists. For example, if the principal insight is within the theoretical realm, then the technical language which is developed correlative with this realm will determine, to some degree, the range of possible means of expressing the principal insight. However, insights (B) and (D) can act to off set this condition when, for example, a scientific principal insight is to be communicated to some one with no scientific training.

\textsuperscript{44} Recall section 2.6.2 on elements of meaning.

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 569.
from which the expression originates. The focus on levels of expression is not meant to provide a static categorization of different modes of expression, but rather provides a means for distinguishing the difference in types of expression by their source of meaning.

Now, if this is true on the part of the speaker's expression, it is also true on the part of the hearer's response to the expression. Lonergan writes:

in turn, the hearer or reader may be intended to respond
(1) simply on the experiential level in an intersubjective reproduction of the speaker's feelings, mood, sentiments, images, associations, or
(2) both on the level of experience and on the level of insight and consideration, or
(3) on the three levels of experience, insight, and judgment, or
(4) not only on the three cognitional levels but also in the practical manner that includes an act of will. 47

Thus, the response of the hearer is also from one or another of the four levels of intentionality. The significant insight here is that an expression is simply an instrumental act. It is a sensible manifestation of meaning through speaking or writing. 48 The materiality of speaking is the sound produced by

46 Lonergan writes, "it follows that the problem of working out types of expression (genera litteraria) is to be met, not by assigning some static classification that claims validity for all time, but by determining the operators that relate the classifications relevant to one level of development to the classifications relevant to the next." ibid., 572.

47 Ibid., 569.

48 Lonergan writes, "... instrumental acts are sensible manifestations of meaning through gestures, speech, and writing." ibid., 569. The sensibility of a gesture through sight, sound, and touch provide the materiality for the expression and the interpretation, but do not provide the meaning of the
the vocal cords. But the meaning of an expression has its source in acts of meaning. And the response to an expression by a hearer also has as its source acts of meaning by the hearer. Lonergan summarizes his point:

such, in outline, is the distinction between the different levels of expression. It envisages the expression as a flow of sensible events that (1) originates in the cognitional and volitional sources of meaning of a speaker or writer, and (2) terminates in a reproduction of sources of meaning in the hearer or reader.49

Thus, the speaker and hearer are linked by the operators of the four levels of intentional consciousness.50 Nevertheless, the difficulty is that the reproduction of the meaning of an expression is not automatic.

3.2.2.2. Interpretation

Now, the reproduction of the sources of meaning in the hearer involves a process of interpretation on behalf of the hearer in regards to the expression of the speaker. For Lonergan, it is possible that a correct interpretation can be made by the hearer, however, it has a number of conditions. First, the hearer must make an interpretation from an universal interpretation itself. Interpretation, for Lonergan, is an intelligible, reasonable, and responsible act of the interpreting subject.

49 Ibid., 571.

50 For Lonergan, the specific response by a hearer to an expression may be obscure. However, the advantage of the distinction of levels of expression allows for an analysis of clearly distinguishable modes of expression. Lonergan distinguishes among the modes of advertisers, literary writers, scientists, and philosophers. See ibid., 569-70 and 572.
viewpoint. For Lonergan, the universal viewpoint is not an ideal viewpoint, or a viewpoint from nowhere from which one can understand expressions. Rather, for Lonergan, the universal viewpoint is simply the full set of possible correct and incorrect interpretations for any particular expression. As Lonergan writes, a universal viewpoint is "... a potential totality of genetically and dialectically ordered viewpoints."\textsuperscript{51} As a potential viewpoint, it is an open heuristic structure that anticipates all possible viewpoints. It is from this heuristic, potential, and universal viewpoint that concrete viewpoints can be determined.\textsuperscript{52} The universal viewpoint is the anticipation of the totality of interpretations of the principal acts of meaning of the interpreter. This refers to the interpreter's ability to grasp the meaning of others. This is achieved, for Lonergan, through the interpreter's own conscious intentionality. Thus, the totality of viewpoints opens the interpreter to:

... ideas that do not lie on the surface and to views that diverge enormously from his own; it would enable him to find clues where otherwise he might look but would fail to see; it would equip him with a capacity to transport his thinking to the level and texture of another

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 564.

\textsuperscript{52} It should be noted that the universal viewpoint does not mean that one has to construct all possible interpretations, but that one has a fundamental openness to all potential interpretations. The universal viewpoint is not a construction, but an anticipation of the interpreter.
culture in another epoch.\textsuperscript{53}

The ability of the interpreter to understand the meaning of an expression that is not his or her own is found within the interpreter's conscious intentionality. The ordered universal viewpoint refers to the further capacity of the interpreter for self-appropriation, since it is only through one's conscious intentionality that one can reach a correct interpretation in the first place.\textsuperscript{54} Self-appropriation, then, is the awareness of one's operation within each level of conscious intentionality.

The focus on the interpreter may lead to the suggestion that Lonergan's notion of interpretation is relativistic. But, for Lonergan, if an interpretation claims to be intelligent, reasonable, and responsible, then it must have its source in the interpreter's act of meaning. As Lonergan writes:

nor has the work of interpreting anything more than a material determinant in the spatially ordered set of marks in documents and monuments. If the interpreter assigns any meaning to the marks, then the experiential component in that meaning will be derived from his experience, the intellectual component will be derived from his intelligence, the rational component will be derived from his critical reflection on the critical reflection of another \textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 565.

\textsuperscript{54} The process of self-appropriation relates to the realm of interiority that we saw in chapter two.

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 556-567. The better one is skilled in experiential, rational, and critical reflection, the more one is able to interpret the meaning of another. See also, ibid., 582.
Thus, the universality of the viewpoint does not refer to an ideal, but rather to its potential to include a vast range of possible viewpoints. It involves the concreteness of interpreters interpreting through their acts of conscious intentionality.

For Lonergan, a correct interpretation is possible when an interpreter makes use of his or her own conscious intentionality under the guidance of the universal viewpoint. Without the universal viewpoint the interpreter would "... exclude a priori some meanings that are possible; and such exclusion runs counter to the possibility of correct interpretation."\textsuperscript{56} The heuristic structure of the universal viewpoint enlarges the interpreter's horizon of understanding by providing for a wider range of possible interpretations than their own horizon provides without the universal viewpoint.

In this way, the interpretation of another involves a process of expanding one's horizon. From within the universal viewpoint, what the interpreter knows after an interpretation is more than he or she knew before the interpretation. As Lonergan writes:

\begin{quote}
if they [interpreters] do not make the universal viewpoint possible, then objective interpretation of another's meaning is impossible; for if there is no possible universal viewpoint, there is no general possibility of rising above one's personal views and reaching without bias what
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 578-79.
the personal views of another are.\textsuperscript{57}

The expansion may include a reorientation of the interpreter through the acknowledgment of meanings that were not possible before the interpretation. The meanings of another person, then, link one not only to that other person, but to the potential, ordered totality of all viewpoints.

I would further suggest that the process of interpretation in discourse itself can involve what might be called a "subroutine or scheme of clarification." As we have seen, an expression is the verbal manifestation of a speaker's attempt to communicate a principal insight (A). The means of communication is constituted by the practical insight (F) which aims to effectively allow the hearer to grasp the meaning of (A). However, in discourse the hearer may ask the speaker for a clarification of the terms used in the expression. This request for clarification may have as its source the fact that the hearer lacks intellectual development (C), or requires specific prior insights (E). In this case, the speaker would have to put off the original intent to communicate (A) until the hearer had grasped (E) or has developed intellectually. The clarification may also simply seek a confirmation between speaker and hearer regarding the meaning of a specific term used in the expression. In this case, the speaker and hearer may have the same level of

\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Insight}, 583.
intellectual development and the hearer may possess the sufficient prior insights (E) to grasp (A). The efficiency of (F) consists in avoiding assumptions by either speaker or hearer and, thereby, clarifying certain terms which may have a variety of meaning. In either case, the insight into the subroutine of clarification points to the necessity of determining within discourse not only the set of insights (E) or the development of (C), but that both speaker and hearer have removed assumptions regarding the meaning of specific terms in their expressions (F).

The specialization of the subroutine of clarification further points to an important distinction between the sources of meaning of expressions and the operator of the second level of discourse. As we have seen, on the part of the subject, a principal insight may have its source in any one of the four levels of conscious intentionality. For example, I may wish to express a principal insight (A) to you that is for me a judgment of fact. For me, the principal insight has as its source my grasp of a virtually unconditioned and my rational conviction of the correctness of the judgment. However, when I express this judgment to you it may not be received at the same level of judgment. In fact, your response may be on any one of the four levels of conscious intentionality. However, the operator of the second level of discourse is mutual understanding not judgment. The second level operator of discourse aims to work out mutual understanding among discourse
partners, because the source of an expression and their reception may or may not be the same.

If through working out of the subroutine of clarification, the hearer grasps the principal insight (A), he or she does so through an interpretation. The interpretation itself is an expression. It attempts to communicate to the speaker that the hearer has grasped the principal insight (A). However, the interpretation in discourse has the special characteristic of a question for judgment. The hearer does not know whether his or her interpretation is correct. He or she does know that a correct interpretation is possible when it is both achieved in the openness of the universal viewpoint and worked out through the subroutine of clarification. However, within the situation of face-to-face discourse, the hearer has the opportunity to ask the speaker whether the interpretation is, in fact, correct. The interpretation is posed as a question for judgment. If the speaker agrees that the interpretation is a sufficient grasp of the principal insight, then the discourse has achieved mutual understanding of (A). If, however, the speaker does not agree that the hearer has a sufficient grasp of the principal insight (A), then the discourse must move back through the subroutine of clarification until a correct interpretation can be made by the hearer.  

Now, if the interpretation by the hearer expresses a judgment to be

---

58 Note that this may involve working out (E).
confirmed or denied by the speaker, does this move the discourse to the next level of the structure of ethical discourse of common judgment? The short answer is yes. The four-level structure of ethical discourse is not meant to imply that concrete discourse is static or linear. Quite the contrary, concrete discourse exhibits a dynamic flexibility and openness whereby discourse partners pursue issues by moving through the different levels of discourse. The affirmation or denial of an interpretation is an example of discourse partners seeking a common judgment of fact about their mutual understanding of a particular expression. It concerns a judgment of fact that the discourse partners have correctly interpreted each other. It does not seek an agreement concerning the truth or falsity, value or dis-value, of the meaning of the expression itself either on the substantive or relational level. The distinction to note here is that discourse partners can make common judgments of mutual understanding, but disagree on the substantive level of the truth or value of each other's expressions. The structure of ethical discourse consists of a flexibility whereby discourse partners can judge that they correctly understand each other while not judging the truth or value of their expressions.

Furthermore, the complex image of conscious intentionality that guides this analysis conceives the discussion of value among discourse partners on the second level. Discourse partners can come to a mutual
understanding through expression and interpretation of each other's values as well as the facts of the issues at hand. Mutual understanding of each other's values has the advantage of removing misperceptions of each other that tend to develop when recognition and discourse are omitted from the discourse partners lived exchange. The principle advantage of coming to understand the values of the other person consists in understanding the existential dimensions that motivate the other. Understanding the other's motivations and convictions allows for the possibility that one can alter how one has previously come to perceive the other. Where before the discourse one may have perceived the other negatively, one can, through mutual understanding, alter one's perceptions of the other because one has understood what motivates the other. The mutual understanding of each other's motivations, convictions, and values is necessary in order that on the higher level of common judgment discourse partners can begin to articulate precisely which values they hold in common, which are in conflict, and which are not as relevant for the questions that they are discussing.

3.2.2.3. Summary of the Second Level of Mutual Understanding

The normative status of the second level of mutual understanding is explained by the structural arrangement of the process of expression and interpretation. The very process of expressing an idea to another person means that one must have some prior understanding of that other person in
order for the other to be able to understand one’s expression. The process of interpreting the expression of the other further links the discourse partners by the subroutine of clarification whereby discourse partners can explicitly state to each other the content of each other’s expressions. Furthermore, the four level structure of ethical discourse is dynamic and open to the shift between judgments of facts of mutual understanding and judgments of fact and value of substantive issues that takes place on the third level. In other words, in order that discourse partners can achieve some degree of clarity on which judgments of fact and value they hold in common, which are in conflict and which are not relevant they must also have a mutual understanding about what these judgments mean, how they came to be formed, and how they are related to other judgments. Mutual understanding and common judgment are dynamically related such that the former conditions the later in a nonlinear fashion.

The foundational scheme of discourse functions at the second level as the verbal expression of each discourse partners’ understanding in terms of facts and values. A verbal expression is embodied in discourse and carries with it meaning that is more than the content of the principle insight. As we have seen, the expression consists of the two levels of intelligence and mutuality. In the expression and interpretation of mutual understanding of facts and values these two levels are operative in their dialectical structure.
One can express a principle insight without regard for the level of mutuality as much as one can ignore insights in order to promote mutuality. The fundamental scheme of discourse on the second level, then, works with expression and interpretation to facilitate mutual understanding of both facts and values.

3.2.3. The Third Level of Common Judgment and Conviction

We have seen how the structure of ethical discourse involves of the We-relation on the first level and the interpretative movement of mutual understanding on the second. The We-relation links the discourse partners in an elemental interdependency, while mutual understanding moves the discourse towards adequate expression and interpretation of each other's perspective. Discourse, however, need not stop with mutual understanding. In discourse, we can seek common judgments of both facts and values. We have seen that there is a difference between understanding another's facts and values and possessing the conviction that is correlative with those facts and values. One can understand what motivates the other without sharing the other's conviction at the same time. In the following section I will present the level of judgment in discourse by first articulating the source of the desire for judgment in the critical mind. Second, I will present Lonergan's dialectical method as a process of achieving common judgment through the three-fold process of conversion. Finally, I will present how common
judgments made in discourse consist of a tripartite set of judgments; agreements, disagreements, and agreements to disagree.

3.2.3.1. Critical Mind

As we have seen, Lonergan argued from his interpretation of Aquinas that the inquiring mind of understanding is distinct but not separate from the critical mind of judgment.\textsuperscript{59} The inquiring mind raises the question “What is it?” but cannot definitely answer its own question. By itself the inquiring mind reaches only opinion. It points beyond itself toward the critical attitude expressed by the question “Is it so?” As Lonergan writes of his cognitional theory, it involves “... the attitude of the inquiring mind that effects the transition from the first level to the second level and, again, the attitude of the critical mind that effects the transition from the second level to the third.”\textsuperscript{60} According to the complex image of conscious intentionality guiding this analysis, the critical mind can be orientated to fact or to value. We can first consider facts, then values.

The critical attitude of judging facts is uneasy with a multitude of opinions. It involves the judgment of determining the facts; the truth of the situation. This third level of conscious intentionality involves the operation of judgment which, through sublation, works on the material of understanding

\textsuperscript{59} See \textit{Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas}, 25.

\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Insight}, 274.
to determine, by its own internal structure, a judgment of fact. This internal structure cumulates in what Lonergan named a virtually unconditioned. The structure of a judgment of fact consists of three components: a conditioned; a link between the conditioned and its conditions; and the fulfilment of the conditions.\textsuperscript{61} The virtually unconditioned judgment of fact consists in the grasp of the empirical evidence that fulfils the conditions for a prospective judgment. The judgment is dependent upon the grasp and fulfilment of the specific conditions of the conditioned.

Different types of conditions can be categorized into different spheres of being. Lonergan distinguishes between the realm of real being and restricted realms. As Lonergan writes, "a distinction, accordingly, has to be drawn between a sphere of real being and other restricted spheres such as the mathematical, the hypothetical, the logical, and so on."\textsuperscript{62} These spheres of being are rational because judgments can be made through a grasp of the existing fulfilling conditions. But the spheres differ because the conditions to be fulfilled differ. The distinction among spheres of being is important because it allows one to identify the type of judgment that is being pursued and its requisite conditions. Thus, on the third level of judgment we can

\textsuperscript{61} See ibid., 280.

\textsuperscript{62} Method, 75. Further in Method, on page 76, Lonergan distinguishes transcendent being as a third sphere.
determine what is demanded by the critical mind in order to make the necessary judgment.\textsuperscript{63}

Nevertheless, the question arises concerning how, if ever, one can grasp the virtually unconditioned. For Lonergan, a prospective judgment is virtually unconditioned and correct when all relevant questions have been answered and there are no further questions surrounding the judgment. As we have seen, for Lonergan, particular judgments are part of a set of judgments. So, specific judgments can lead to further questions that are either indirectly or directly concerned with the substance of the judgment. These further questions "... lead to further insights that certainly complement the initial insight, that to a greater or lesser extent modify its expression and implications, that perhaps lead to an entirely new slant on the issue."\textsuperscript{64} For Lonergan, when there exist other such questions, the prospective judgment is vulnerable. Its vulnerability rests in the fact that there are other pertinent questions that must be raised and pursued. When all the relevant questions have been addressed, then the prospective

\textsuperscript{63} It is beyond the scope of this thesis to develop the structure and significance of judgment beyond this introduction. What is significant for this thesis, however, is that the critical mind marks a transition from understanding to judgment and that since there are different spheres of being, it is important to know the conditions of the conditioned (i.e., the prospective judgment) that one is questioning on the third level of conscious intentionality.

\textsuperscript{64} Insight, 284.
judgment can be said to be invulnerable. The distinction between vulnerable and invulnerable insights allows Lonergan to articulate an immanent norm of the cognitional process in this way: The prospective judgment is correct if and only if there are no further, pertinent questions.\footnote{See, ibid.} It is not enough to argue that there are no relevant questions for oneself, since bias prohibits questions from emerging. Rather, the full set of relevant questions must be allowed to be asked, to be probed, and explored by others as well.

A question emerges, however, concerning how those relevant questions can be known in the concrete situation. Lonergan responds to this question by suggesting that though the pure desire to know can be corrupted by group bias, the self-correcting process of knowing itself can provide some certitude in the results of one's judgments. Judgments are contextualized by presuppositions, assumptions, and other judgments. Correct judgments, then, take place within an already established horizon of judgments. As Lonergan writes, "good judgment about concrete insights presupposes the prior acquisition of an organized set of complementary insights."\footnote{Ibid., 286.} The exigency that demands that all the relevant questions must be raised includes bringing to light the presuppositions and assumptions involved in a specific insight as that insight exists within a predetermined horizon. The
correctness of an insight and the affirmative judgment resulting from the
lack of relevant questions takes place within the horizon of judgments. Even
if a judgment is novel, it still occurs within and can be taken up by the self-
correcting process of knowing through which assumptions and
presuppositions are brought to light and the correctness of the judgment
determined. As Lonergan writes:

we become familiar with concrete situations; we know what to expect;
when the unexpected occurs, we can spot just what happened and why
and what can be done to favour or to prevent such a recurrence; or if
the unexpected is quite novel, we know enough to recommence the
process of learning and we can recognize when, once more, that self-
correcting process reaches its limit in familiarity with the concrete
situation and in easy mastery of it.\textsuperscript{67}

Although, as Lonergan recognizes, temperament plays a role in either a
rashness for quick judgment, or an indecision toward delaying judgments,
the basic process involves the operational norm that demands the affirmation
of the judgment on the correctness of an insight when there are no relevant
questions that remain unanswered. Openness to this norm is the foundation
for the process of resolving disputes on the level of judgment.

The level of judgment considers not only facts but values as well.\textsuperscript{68}
The analysis of Lonergan's chapter eighteen of \textit{Insight} distinguished that

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., 286-87.

\textsuperscript{68} Recall that here we are involved in discourse on the fourth level of
decision where both facts and values are discussed.
Lonergan's was working with three uses of the term knowing; facts, values, and action. The knowing of value involves the judgment of what is worthwhile, obligatory, right, or good. In *Method*, Lonergan is more clear about this type of knowing. He writes that judgments of fact and value are not different in terms of structure, but are different in terms of content. To quote him at length:

judgments of value differ in content but not in structure from judgments of fact. They differ in content, for one can approve of what does not exist, and one can disapprove of what does. They do not differ in structure, inasmuch as in both there is the distinction between criterion and meaning. In both, the criterion is the self-transcendence of the subject, which however, is only cognitive in judgments of fact but is heading towards moral self-transcendence in judgments of value. In both, the meaning is or claims to be independent of the subject: judgments of fact state or purport to state what is or is not so; judgments of value state or purport to state what is or is not truly good or really better.\(^{69}\)

I suggest that here Lonergan is referring to the second type of knowing that was identified in chapter eighteen of *Insight*. The first and the second type are referred here as judgments of fact and judgments of value.

Now, beyond this similarity of judgments of fact and value, Lonergan is more precise about what makes up a judgment of value. He writes:

in the judgment of value, then, three components unite. First, there is knowledge of reality and especially of human reality. Secondly, there are intentional responses to values. Thirdly, there is the initial thrust towards moral self-transcendence constituted by the judgment of value itself. The judgment of value presupposes knowledge of human life, of

\(^{69}\) *Method*, 37.
possibilities proximate and remote, of the probable consequences of projected courses of action.⁷⁰

For Lonergan, the judgment of value concerns judging the worthwhileness of a proposed course of action. In this sense, practical insights are taken up by judgments of value to be considered as truly good, right, or morally obligatory. However, the knowledge of this type of knowing grasps a virtually unconditioned in the practical insight towards the affirmation of the judgment of value.

Here I would argue is another indication of the reduplication of the operations of intentionality. Practical insights are judged as truly good, right, or obligatory on the third level when the discourse is orientated by the type of knowing that can judge the value of a proposed course of action. It consists in a type of grasp of the virtually unconditioned knowledge of the conditions of progress and human flourishing. To be more specific, the knowledge of value consists in affirming certain arrangements of human cooperation as contributing to human progress and others as promoting decline.⁷¹ In other words, it is the judgment that the shift from one set of social arrangements to another constitutes a movement of human progress

---

⁷⁰ Ibid., 38.

⁷¹ This point anticipates the discussion in chapter four on the internal norms of discourse.
not decline. At the third level of ethical discourse, discourse partners can discuss their individual judgments of value and convictions. At this level, these values are open to the same norm of judgments of fact. They can consist of a virtually unconditioned through asking all the relevant questions in light of the value under consideration. This includes raising and answering the questions that other people have concerning one's own values. Addressing all these relevant questions means being open to the challenge of other discourse members.\textsuperscript{72} Thus, values are not set aside in ethical discourse but are part of the substance of the discourse.\textsuperscript{73}

3.2.3.2. Dialectics and Conversion in Radical Differences

For Lonergan, judgments are not isolated affirmations. They are always contextualized within a set of other judgments. The set of judgments can be conceived as a horizon or perspective. A horizon represents the limits

\textsuperscript{72} In a similar context David Tracy writes that "conversation is a game with some hard rules: say only what you mean; say it as accurately as you can; listen to and respect what the other says, however different or other; be willing to correct or defend your opinions if challenged by the conversational partner; be willing to argue if necessary, to confront if demanded, to endure necessary conflict, to change your mind if the evidence suggests it." \textit{Plurality and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion, Hope}, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 19. My suggestion here is that the openness to changing one's mind if the evidence suggests it involves the exigence of the third level and the intellectual, moral, and religious dimensions of one's self-constititution.

\textsuperscript{73} In fact, it is in a discussion of values discourse partners can discover that they hold similar values on a number of significant issues.
of one's questions and what one can imagine. The context for one's horizon involves such dimensions as one's education, social background, cultural milieu, personal development, and the historical period within which one was born. Horizons can be developed either logically or dialectically. Logical developments of horizon consist in the additions of judgments in line with the laws of logic such as coherency among judgments, lack of contradictions, and consistency. Dialectical developments of horizon consist in radical shifts. What is considered true from one horizon is false for another horizon. The laws of logic are not sufficient to resolve the conflict between two radically opposed horizons, since each can be logically correct and still arrive at dialectically opposed judgments. For Lonergan, when horizons are radically opposed one must make recourse to a dialectical method to determine which horizon is correct.\(^4\)

Dialectical method, for Lonergan, refers to the way that horizons differ in respect of the presence or absence of intellectual, moral, and/or religious

\(^4\) Now, for Lonergan, horizons can be related in three ways. There are genetic horizons based upon development. Complementary horizons which in some way depend on each other. Dialectical horizons which are fundamentally opposed to each other. Differences in genetically different horizons call for development. Differences in complementary horizons call for understanding and even acceptance of the difference. But, dialectically opposed horizons call for the dialectical method to resolve the differences. See, *Method*, 236-37. On Lonergan's notion of the three different types of horizon; complementary, genetic, and dialectical see Cynthia Crysdale, "Horizons that Differ: Women and Men and the Flight from Understanding," 347-48.
conversion. *Intellectual conversion* is the elimination of the myth that knowing is like seeing; that all one needs to do in order to know reality is to sense it. Intellectual conversion is the awareness of the distinction between the world mediated by meaning and the world of immediacy. The world of immediacy “…is the sum of what is seen, heard, touched, tasted, smelt, felt.” It is part of our known world, but not all of the knowable world. To conceive knowing as related to only the sensible is, for Lonergan, a counterposition that ignores the richer world mediated by meaning. The world of human meaning is the knowledge gained through the authentic operations of conscious intentionality. Thus, in the world mediated by meaning “the reality known is not just looked at; it is given in experience, organized and extrapolated by understanding, posited by judgment and belief.” Human knowing that emerges within an intellectual conversion is the self-transcendent subject engaged in the compound process of conscious intentionality.

*Moral conversion* refers to the shift in the criteria of one’s decisions from personal satisfaction to value. One can know what one ought to do in a given situation, but one can fail to decide to carry this out because the criteria of one’s decision is self-interest. However, through moral conversion

---

75 *Method*, 238.

76 Ibid.
the knowledge gained concerning the good act to be done is decided upon through the criteria, not of personal self-interest, but the judgment of the value of the act itself. The criterion of value is developed in the subject through moral development and by community standards.\textsuperscript{77} Value, then, adds to decision the necessary criteria for one to follow through upon what one knows to be the good in a given situation. The criterion of value in decision is the awareness that through our action we are in a process of self-constitution and by extension community-constitution. With moral conversion, the constitutive function of meaning is the value of deciding to follow through on the knowledge of the good. Through this action we make ourselves what we are. Moral conversion shifts the criterion of self-constitution from self-interest to the truly good.

Religious conversion refers to a further shift in one's being through a falling-in-love with the source of all being. For Lonergan, religious conversion is an "other-worldly-falling-in-love". It is the ultimate shift of one's foundations by God's active love upon us. It is, Lonergan argues, "... revealed in retrospect as an under-tow of existential consciousness, as a fated acceptance of a vocation to holiness; as perhaps an increasing simplicity and

\textsuperscript{77} In Method Lonergan delineates the scale of values as vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious, see ibid., 31.
Chapter Three, The Structure of Ethical Discourse I

passivity in prayer.\footnote{Ibid., 240-41.} Religious conversion does not contradict either moral or intellectual conversion, but rather, fulfils them by orientating the subject toward one's ultimate concern; toward the finality of one's entire existence. It places one's life within the context of God's love within which one can make final sense about the meaningfulness of one's life.

The dialectical method is concerned with fundamental conflicts that have as their source differences in the presence or absence of the three conversions. The problem, for Lonergan, is that the content of understanding, of objectivity, of decision and of love are quite different with the presence or absence of any one of the three conversions within any particular subject. The problem can be met head on, for Lonergan, through the awareness of the conversions themselves. Intellectual awareness refers one to the dynamics of objectivity. Moral awareness refers one to the criteria of one's own self-constitution. Religious awareness places one within the ultimate horizon of God's love. But, without the dialectical method to bring awareness to these fundamental differences of horizon, people will not have the adequate resources to resolve their differences that have their source in the three types of conversion. Dialectical method is the application of Lonergan's advice of knowing what one is doing when one is doing it. When differences in horizon are neither genetic or complementary, then, the only
way that one can attempt to resolve them is through a dialectical method that identifies the differences along the lines of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion.\(^{79}\)

Now, for Lonergan, the process of the dialectical method, which identifies the presence or absence of conversion, is not merely an academic exercise. Rather, the dialectical process is an encounter among persons.\(^{80}\) This encounter is a "... meeting of persons, appreciating the values they represent, criticizing their defects, and allowing one's living to be challenged at its very roots by their words and by their deeds."\(^{81}\) The encounter of the dialectical method is at once a challenging of the other and a challenge to oneself since, for Lonergan, the process of authenticity is dynamic; always open to the possibilities of the encounter of persons. The encounter is a reciprocal process whereby:

\(^{79}\) As Lonergan writes the dialectical method is involved in differences which are not merely differences in perspective but are radical differences of horizon “... and the proportionate remedy is nothing less than a conversion” ibid., 246.

\(^{80}\) Lonergan is well aware that the process of authenticity is difficult. He writes, “cognitive self-transcendence is neither an easy notion to grasp nor a readily accessible datum of consciousness to be verified” ibid., 243 and “indeed, the basic idea of the method we are trying to develop takes its stand on discovering what human authenticity is and showing how to appeal to it. It is not an infallible method, for men easily are unauthentic, but it is a powerful method, for man’s deepest need and most prized achievement is authenticity.” ibid., 254.

\(^{81}\) Ibid., 247.
just as it is one's own self-transcendence that enables one to know others accurately and to judge them fairly, so inversely it is through knowledge and appreciation of others that we come to know ourselves and to fill out and refine our apprehension of values.\textsuperscript{82}

The reciprocal process of the dialectical method is an encounter of individuals through which one can understand oneself as one can understand the other. Through this process, for Lonergan, the three-fold conversion process is promoted in encountering individuals. This is achieved by "...pointing out ultimate differences, by offering the example of others that differ radically from oneself, by providing the occasion for a reflection, a self-scrutiny, that can lead to a new understanding of oneself and one's destiny."\textsuperscript{83} The basis, then, of the dialectical method is to bring to the encounter among persons a basic openness along the lines of the three-fold conversion in order that the individuals might develop intellectually, morally, and religiously.

3.2.3.3. Judgment in Discourse: The Tripartite Set of Judgments of Fact and Value

Now, as Lonergan argues, the affirmation of a judgment of fact or value consists in a personal conviction. In the act of judging one is convinced of what is, in fact, the case or what one determines to be worthwhile. This involves, as we have seen, the constitutive function of meaning. In an act of

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., 253.

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.
judging one is involved in the process of making oneself. In discourse a similar development takes place among discourse partners. It involves distinguishing among the facts and values those which are relevant to the questions that have motivated their discourse. This involves the movement to the higher viewpoint. The higher viewpoint represents the discourse partner's achievement in determining through the self-correcting process of learning which judgments can be affirmed through the mutual openness to the immanent norm of judgment. The higher viewpoint is higher because the discourse partner's pre-discourse horizons consist of judgments that have not been tested through the discourse on the third level. In other words, the pre-discourse horizons consist of vulnerable insights that can become progressively more invulnerable through discourse on the third level. The set of invulnerable insights that make up the higher viewpoint are what each discourse partner can be convinced of when their discourse has been guided

---

84 On the role of the higher viewpoint in the context of community identity and difference see Martin Matuštík, "Democratic Multicultures and Cosmopolis: Beyond the Aprorias of the Politics of Identity and Difference," METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies 12 (1994):63-89. Matustik's question concerns how community identity can remain intact within a multicultural society. He argues, with Habermas, along procedural lines but bases his arguments on the "... presuppositions of unbiased intersubjectivity" as the conditions for open identity and community, 65.

85 Recall MacIntyre's notion of warranted assertability. A similar notion is operative here. One's judgments are open to the critique of the other precisely because the involvement of the other can raise questions concerning the validity of one's judgments.
by the immanent norm of asking all the relevant questions.

Furthermore, this conviction of the higher, common horizon on the level of judgment can involve three subsets of judgments of fact and value. Discourse partners can: (1) arrive at agreements on common judgments of fact and value, (2) arrive at disagreements on judgments of fact and value, (3) agree to disagree on judgments of fact and value. The first subset of agreements of common judgments on fact and value consists of those facts and values that all parties have agreed on and have conviction about their truthfulness or worthwhileness. This can involve agreements about the content of their common situation and the specific values that all parties share in common. The second subset of disagreements involves those judgments of fact or value about which parties cannot come to a common conviction. They represent significant differences between parties that remain unresolved in the higher viewpoint. These differences can rest upon the range of intellectual, moral, and religious conversions and pose dialectical difficulties among discourse partners. As such, it is this subset of judgments that is most often the focus of discourse. As we have seen with Lonergan's notion of dialectical method, the resolution of radical differences requires a transformation on the part of some or all of the discourse partners. The third subset involves those judgments of fact and value that are less significant such that the parties can agree to disagree about their
substantive content. These facts or values are not relevant to the motivating questions of the discourse partners. These three subsets, then, consist of the common judgments of the higher order horizon that discourse partners share when their discourse achieves success at the third level.

Now, as Lonergan’s work on the dialectical method points out, discourse on the third level of judgment involves an encounter among persons. The set of pre-discourse judgments are made from within a horizon that consists of the presence or absence of one or more of the three conversions. A discourse partner’s openness on the third level is itself conditioned by a certain development of moral conversion, for example, in making a decision to enter into the discourse with an openness toward the other's questions concerning one's own commitments, convictions, and understandings. Nevertheless, the possibility of radical change in the third level involves persons in their intellectual, moral, and religious dimensions of meaning. It involves significant aspects of self-identity that are not so easily discarded. As Lonergan often notes, the unrestricted desire to know (and in this case we can say the unrestricted openness on the level of judgment) can perhaps more often than not be thwarted by bias, temperament, and practical considerations.

A question remains, however, concerning what might happen to the pre-discourse horizon of each discourse partner. Four types of changes can
be distinguished in terms of value and conviction. First, there is the type of change whereby a discourse member comes to not only understand what the other values, but comes to share this value with the other. In this sense, one's pre-discourse horizon is expanded to include a sharing of the conviction that is associated with a particular value. This change amounts to not merely considering the other's value but judging it worthwhile as well. Second, there is the type of change that recognizes that discourse partners already share similar values. Often, pre-discourse horizons are expressed as polar-opposites. But the exploration in terms of values on the third level may reveal that discourse partners actually share similar values. Third, it may be that discourse partners come to understand not only that they share similar values, but that values they thought were in conflict are, from the higher viewpoint, complementary values. For example, health care workers may discover that certain values typically held by physicians or by nurses complement each other rather than conflict. In this sense, the higher viewpoint resolves conflicts of the discourse partner's pre-discourse horizons. Finally, a fourth type of change in terms of values involves articulating in a precise enough fashion those values that discourse partners hold in conflict. This change amounts to specifying in exact terms what each discourse partner does not value and what they do value as well as how certain values are in conflict. It involves clarifying through the dialectical method the
horizon within which discourse partners have made their judgments of value. Any possible change of this kind involves a constitutive change since it would consist of changes in intellectual, moral, or religious conversion. These four changes in pre-discourse horizon can allow discourse partners to articulate a common, higher viewpoint within which they be able to work out practical insights.

3.2.3.4. Summary of the Third Level of Common Judgments

The normative status of the third level of the structure of ethical discourse is explained by the exigency of asking all the relevant questions regarding the facts and values that are at issue for the discourse partners. These questions set the context for the discourse partners to work out the tripartite set of judgments that form their common, higher viewpoint. Within the third level of common judgment, the foundational scheme of discourse is orientated toward the grasp of the virtually unconditioned in terms of both facts and values on the two levels of mutuality and intelligence. The significance of the dialectic of unification on the third level involves establishing the higher viewpoint which includes possible changes in the way that discourse partners have come to understand and hold values in relation to each other. Some of these values will be considered complementary, others considered new, some that were in conflict will be resolved, and still others will be precisely articulated as in conflict. Through establishing the higher
viewpoint of facts and values, discourse partners would be in a position to work out practical insights that effect changes of their social living towards a better situation for all.

3.2.4. The Fourth Level of Cooperative Action and Commitment

On the fourth level of the structure of ethical discourse, discourse partners work out practical insights that they can be committed to implementing when the discourse is completed. The difficulty that is faced in articulating the fourth level involves understanding its operations. In *Method in Theology*, Lonergan clearly distinguishes the four operations as deliberation, evaluation, decision, and action. But, Lonergan does not fully develop how these operations function in relation to each other. He does argue, however, that:

... the process of deliberation and evaluation is not decisive, and so we experience our liberty as the active thrust of the subject terminating the process of deliberation by settling on one of the possible courses of action and proceeding to execute it.\(^{86}\)

This quote seems similar to Lonergan's understanding of the relationship between deliberation and decision that he worked out in *Insight*. We saw that when conscious intentionality is concerned about action it works through deliberation on practical insights but only ceases deliberation through a decision to act or not act on the practical insight. I argued in

\(^{86}\) *Method*, 50.
Chapter Two that this process involves the third type of knowing that is concerned with action. Now, in Method Lonergan introduces evaluation as a further operation to this type of knowing. This gives him the four operations of deliberation, evaluation, decision, and action. But, the basic structural arrangement among the operations is the same as Lonergan presented it in Insight. As the above quote shows, for Lonergan, deliberation and evaluation are brought to an end through an exercise of liberty, that is, a decision to act on the practical insight. I will argue that evaluation adds a personal commitment to the practical insight. In order to indicate that the fourth level is not solely concerned with value judgments, I suggest that the four operations of the fourth level be referred to as considering, committing, deciding, and acting. Therefore, on the fourth level discourse partners consider implementing practical action strategies, commit themselves individually, decide as a group which will be implemented, and act cooperatively to bring them about.

3.2.4.1. Intending Cooperative Action Strategies

For Lonergan, the fourth level of decision is existential and moral. On this level, discourse partners work out what action strategies they will implement. It involves not only the moral realization that by one's action one is involved in a process of self-making, but that through discourse, individuals can meet a host of demands that cannot be fulfilled without
cooperation. The higher viewpoint upon which the level of cooperative discourse works provides for a common commitment to implement a set of cooperative action strategies which were impossible before the discourse. What was otherwise impossible because of a lack of common experience, mutual understanding and collective judgment is now possible through a common commitment that their cooperation is better for all involved. These new, now possible action strategies, set up a new interdependence among the discourse partners. The new action strategies that are developed at the cooperative level of discourse refer to the new arrangements of the discourse partners' collective good of order. This includes a sense of cooperation such that one is engaged in goods of order not merely to meet one's own needs and interests, but to meet the needs of others as well. The cooperative interdependence is the realization that discourse partners are connected through the structure of their social living.

3.2.4.2. Considering, Committing, Deciding, and Acting

The four operations of the fourth level are orientated by the discourse partners' concern for cooperative action. The discourse partners will consider possible or probable practical insights, personally commit to implementing those practical insights, collectively decide to implement particular practical insights and carry their common commitment towards realizing those action strategies in their concrete routines and policies. The effect of collective
action is a change in the collective goods of order. Discourse members cooperate toward a better situation which meets their collective needs as determined through their higher viewpoint. Each of the four operations will be taken in turn.

3.2.4.2.1. Considering

Consideration concerns working out practical insights into the concrete situation. As we have seen, practical insights can be possible, probable, or improbable. Consideration is the process of working through each practical insight in terms of its consequences upon the specific good of order that it affects. The aim of consideration is not to decide which practical insight will be acted upon. Rather, consideration aims at working through the implications of each practical insight. The difficulty here rests in the fact that in most cases particular individuals will not have the necessary expertise related to each practical insight. To work out with other discourse partners the significance of the consequences, for example, of a proposed practical insight requires a correlative expertise to correct or approve of the analysis of the expected consequences of the practical insight. To counter this problem, the process of consideration requires a certain degree of rational trust among discourse partners. 87 Such trust is rational when an expert is a member of a

87 On the notion of rational trust see Rehg, *Insight and Solidarity*, 236.
specific practice where critical appraisals are normative. The critical nature of a field of expertise can provide for the rationality that is necessary for one to believe in the analysis of experts in relation to practical insights.

This is true for Lonergan as well in his notion of belief. For Lonergan, most of what we claim to know is, in fact, belief. We trust in the attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible exercise of other people's conscious intentionality as applied to specific fields of knowledge. We don't work out for ourselves every single judgment of fact or value. Rather the cumulative and developmental aspects of knowledge require that we trust in the immanent knowledge gained by other people.

Human knowing, then, is a collaborative activity. It is facilitated in large part by a process of believing which has five steps. First, there is the communicated knowledge which is the achievement of specific individuals. As Lonergan writes:

I cannot give another my eyes for him to see with, but I can truly report what I see, and he can believe. I cannot give another my understanding, but I can truly report what I have come to understand to be so, and he can believe. I cannot transfer to another my powers of judgment, but I can report what I affirm and what I deny, and he can believe me.

---

88 We will have occasion in chapter six to discuss the meaning of the term practice in more detail.

89 For Lonergan's detailed treatment of belief see *Insight*, 703-18.

90 *Method*, 45.
The process of believing requires that one report or communicate one's experience, understanding, and judgment responsibly through accurate communication. Second, the process of believing rests upon a general judgment of value regarding both the historical and social characteristics of knowledge. Both judgments of fact and value are communicable because by their structure they are objective and available to others. The collaborative effort of human knowing is social in the division of labour that exists to achieve knowledge by developing upon experiences, understandings, and judgments achieved by others and it is historical in the sense that development rests upon knowledge gained by past generations. Both the social and historical characteristics of human knowing provide a general judgment of the value of believing itself. Third, there is a particular judgment of value regarding a specific person or source of potential knowledge. With regard to each source of knowledge one must judge the value of the source as being authentic in their knowing and valuing endeavours. As Lonergan writes:

the point at issue in each case is whether one's source was critical of his sources, whether he reached cognitional self-transcendence in his judgments of fact and moral self-transcendence in his judgments of value, whether he was truthful and accurate in his statements.\(^9^1\)

Often the determination of this judgment of value is achieved indirectly

\(^{91}\) Ibid.
through a variety of means such as the fact that other people use the source, or that the source has a reputation as an authentic inquirer, or that the knowledge of one's source is confirmed through other independent sources. In whichever case, the particular judgment of value of one's source regards the source's authenticity in his or her process of knowing and valuing. Fourth, there is the decision to believe. The general judgment of value is the anticipation that one's knowing involves believing and the particular judgment of value is the concrete judgment of a specific source or person and his or her substantive knowledge. But one must still decide to believe a specific source or person. No doubt, as Lonergan acknowledges, human knowing is at times controlled by bias and oversights. But the alternative to believing is to refuse all knowledge gained by other people. This is, in fact, an uncritical approach to knowing and valuing because it does not take into account one's actual process of knowing, valuing, and doing. The problem is not that one is involved in a process of believing; one believes if one knows at all. The problem is correcting false beliefs through an authentic appropriation of one's own conscious intentionality and critically analyzing both the source of one's beliefs and how one comes to believe. Fifth, there is the act of believing. The process of believing cumulates when I actually believe in the knowledge of fact or value of my source. It is an act not in my own immanently generated knowing, but in the authentic unfolding of
another's knowing. The process of believing, therefore, is a rational process that contributes to the common fund of human knowing and is a critical moment in the consideration process itself.

3.2.4.2.2. Committing

The process of committing involves a personal commitment to particular action strategies. Discourse partners not only consider the consequences of specific practical insights through utilizing the expertise of other people, they must be each personally committed to implementing those action strategies. This involves the self-constitutional elements of the moral realm since those action strategies will affect one's self-identity. Committing to action strategies means that one believes that the common conviction that the discourse partners have achieved must be carried forward in their ordinary routines. It involves a constitutive act of meaning whereby one settles one's attitude toward a practical insight. Nevertheless, the process of

\footnote{Lornergan makes use of the example of the slide rule, ibid., 46-7. The markings on a slide rule represent both logarithmic and trigonometric tables. But the user of the slide rule does not usually workout these tables for him or herself. Rather, one believes in the accuracy of the slide rule. This belief allows one to work on other areas of knowledge. The result is an acceleration of knowing. One does not have to spend time working out knowledge gained by others when one can rationally trust that knowledge. Upon this belief, one can develop one's own immanently generated knowledge which one can communicate accurately for others to believe and further develop. Thus, the social and historical characteristics of knowing reveal the common fund of knowledge to be the product of a recurrence scheme of knowing that involves both belief and immanently generated knowing.}
committing only intends a moral change since by itself it is a promise that cooperating with the other discourse partners is a better way of achieving the kinds of goods that the discourse partners have agreed upon. Furthermore, committing involves a promise that their constructive discourse can provide for even more encounters through cooperative activities that affect all involved.

3.2.4.2.3. Deciding

The process of making a decision concerns the collective consenting or refusing to carry out a proposed practical insight. As we have already seen, the reflection on a practical insight has no internal term.\(^ {93}\) Considering and committing end when the discourse partners are able together to consent to carry out the practical insight or to refuse to do so. This involves the collective liberty of the discourse partners to decide their own future course of action.\(^ {94}\) It involves an efficient act of common meaning that the discourse partners will implement the proposed action strategy. The restraints of concrete discourse can be particularly effective on the process of decision. Time restraints can force the discourse partners to commit too early to a proposed practical insight. Power imbalances can inhibit a party's ability to consent to a proposed practical insight that might, in fact, contribute to a

\(^{93}\) See section 2.1.4. above.

\(^{94}\) On decision see Insight, 612-13.
better situation for that person. In some types of public discourse one's constituents can also hinder one's willingness to consent to a proposed action when, for example, one believes that one's constituents would not agree with the decision. Moreover, personal characteristics (such as charisma) and physical conditions (such as fatigue) can affect how one is able to partake in the decision process itself.

A further characteristic of concrete discourse concerns the flexibility of the discourse process itself. As I have already noted, although I have been focusing on articulating how discourse has as its source the structure of intentionality, this is not to suggest that concrete discourse follows a strictly linear course. In concrete discourse, discourse partners tend to move much more flexibly through the four levels. If, for example, in the process of decision discourse members discover that they lack mutual understanding around a particular term or point of interest, then their discourse must move to the level of understanding in order to clear up their disagreement. The movement "down" the structure to understanding is necessary in order to provide the discourse partners with the necessary material, that is mutual understanding, about a specific point of interest, before the discourse partners can each make a decision. When mutual understanding concerning the disputed point is achieved, then the discourse partners can resume their decision-making on the fourth level. The flexibility of concrete discourse gives
it the appearance of a back and forth motion as discourse partners move from
one level of discourse to another; up and down through the structure.
Nevertheless, as we will see, this movement is conditioned by the exigencies
that are in place for each level of the discourse. The flexibility is, in fact, the
discourse partners’ attempt at meeting the internal norms at each level of
discourse.\footnote{See section 4.2 on the issue of the internal norms of discourse.} More times than not in concrete discourse this is achieved not all
at once, but one issue at a time.

3.2.4.2.4. Acting

Action concerns the concrete implementation of the proposed practical
insight that has been collectively decided upon and consented to be brought
about by the discourse partners. It concerns concrete action strategies which
may alter existing roles, responsibilities, and routines in order to create the
necessary conditions for the specific recurrence schemes to occur with the
desired frequency. It is concretely altering existing goods of order in the hope
of creating the desired goals and values that the discourse partners have
come to understand as dependent upon their collaboration. It involves
communicative acts of meaning whereby their common decisions are
implemented in the cooperative living. Action may consist of new policies
and procedures which alter existing ways and means of interacting. In
general, action refers to the new common projects that form the basis of
common experience in contexts broader than discourse alone. Upon these common projects, new forums of discourse can be constructed to further the advances made in earlier discussions. And so discourse turns back upon itself as common action strategies are the condition for further common experiences, mutual understanding, collective judgments and cooperative action.

3.2.4.3. Summary of the Fourth Level of Cooperative Action

The normative status of the fourth level is explained by the collective concern that their situation is made better through their cooperative action. It concerns the responsibility of all discourse partners to implement what they hope will create new arrangement that are based upon their common conviction. It concerns the operations of considering proposed practical insights, personally committing to their cooperative future, collectively deciding to implement those practical insights that the discourse partners hope will create the types of social arrangements that reflect their common higher viewpoint. It involves a hope more than a knowing since the practical insights they decide to implement are not currently existing. Discourse partners must rationally trust each other that after the discourse is completed each will implement those practical insight that they have as group decided upon. The foundational scheme of discourse is operative here in a similar way as it is in the prior three levels only now the content of the
discourse scheme concerns further action strategies. Perhaps more strongly here is the level of mutuality since the fourth level requires a degree of trust among discourse partners such that what each has agree to implement will be implemented. The fourth level, then, concerns the discourse partners cooperative responsibility to carry out what has been collectively decided is the best course of action.

3.3. Summary of Chapter Three

Understanding that the structure of ethical discourse has its source in the structure of intentionality allows for a more complex articulation of the dynamics that are involved in pluralistic discourse. Debates or discourse in pluralistic society are never simply about facts or values. They are always, rather, about an encounter among people. In this encounter, the foundational scheme of discourse relates the dynamics of the gestures, response, and interpretative role-taking on the two levels of substantive content and the relationship among those in discourse. Upon this discourse scheme, discourse partners can move through a structured process that involves the four levels of recognition, mutual understanding, common judgment (and conviction), and cooperative action (and commitment). This means that the opportunity of pluralistic discourse is never merely an exchange of information, or a conflict of values, simply problem-solving, or decision-making. Discourse is a complex of levels that can significantly alter
pre-discourse horizons toward a common horizon consisting of the tripartite set of judgments that form the basis of a collective conviction that their new cooperative action strategies can meet the problems discourse partners face together. In the following chapter I will present two further characteristics of the structure of ethical discourse; the internal norms of discourse and a compound notion of solidarity. In chapter five, I will illustrate the structure of ethical discourse by making use of insights from the field of mediation. In chapter six, I will bring the three major sources of this thesis together (that is, MacIntyre's virtue framework, Lonergan's notion of redemption and the practice of mediation) by working out insights towards an initial sketch of a theological ethics of discourse.
Chapter Four: The Structure of Ethical Discourse II

4.0. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I articulated the structure of ethical discourse as consisting of the four levels of recognition, mutual understanding, common judgment, and cooperative action. This chapter will work with two of its characteristics that respond to questions in MacIntyre's presentation of his dialectical method; the internal norms of discourse and a compound notion of solidarity. The chapter will first briefly revisit MacIntyre's dialectical method as the context for developing the two characteristics. Second, the internal norms of discourse will be presented through working with a recurrence scheme analysis of discourse as suggested by the work of Kenneth Melchin. Third, a compound notion of solidarity will be presented that conceives solidarity as consisting of substantively different types associated with each level of the structure of ethical discourse.

4.1. MacIntyre Revisited

In chapter one we investigated MacIntyre's notion of the dialectical method that can occur among members of different traditions when they encounter each other and inquire on moral issues. MacIntyre points out that this encounter is a complex process that involves both boundary persons and procedural norms. Boundary persons take on the role of crossing between the substantive differences and similarities between the encountering traditions. Through the acquisition of language and culture, boundary persons become, in a sense, members of both traditions. They effect the coming together of two
traditions through their own lives. The procedural aspects of the dialectical process must also be attended to. For MacIntyre, rules can be made regarding how the discourse can more forward; how long one has to say something; and who gets a chance to talk. However, MacIntyre argues that, since morality is historically constituted, merely attending to procedural rules will not guarantee that discourse will achieve a common understanding on moral truths. MacIntyre’s notion of the tradition-dependency of moral knowing involves the affirmation of moral truths as the best answer so far developed from the history of a tradition. This best answer can be developed from the dialectical encounter of different traditions. However, any agreement on moral truths would still be tradition-dependent. Furthermore, for MacIntyre, it may also be that in cases of moral conflict expressed through the dialectical process one tradition may come to an understanding that it lacks internal resources to deal with its own moral conflicts. Lacking such resources, it may seek out answers to its moral conflicts in another tradition’s line of moral reasoning. As it does so, this tradition may come to the awareness that the other tradition is indeed rationally superior to it. What emerges, then, in the dialectical encounter may be a synthesis of traditions (as MacIntyre argued occurred with Aquinas). It seems possible for MacIntyre, that two traditions can merge into one through the work of a boundary person who, in effect, works out the problems internal to both
traditions by working with resources found in each. The resulting synthesis is, itself, a historically constituted inquiry. The synthesis does not mean that there has been achieved some total viewpoint that is free from the historical conditions of moral inquiry. For MacIntyre, the synthesis is the process of the historically constituted dialectical encounter.

The problem that we saw with MacIntyre's dialectical method is that he argues that though the method itself comes from a Thomist understanding of rationality, that understanding may need to be revised if it encountered a superior tradition. In other words, MacIntyre bases his account of the dialectical method on Aquinas' account of rationality, but this account is not free from radical revision. However, as we saw, Michael Maxwell argues that this is precisely where MacIntyre contradicts himself. If the source of revision is itself open to revision, then one is contradicting oneself. For Maxwell, one cannot base one's revision on the very grounds one is revising. The difficulty here, according to Maxwell, is that MacIntyre has not completely understood Aquinas' account of rationality. It would seem that MacIntyre's desire to avoid any universal position whatsoever biases him from considering a cognitional theory based upon the operations of human inquiry. Maxwell suggested that Lonergan's account of Aquinas' rationality not only accounts for an adequate cognitional theory, but that it is a more authentic interpretation as well.
Lonergan's cognitional theory and dynamic world-view of emergent probability was presented as the framework for this thesis. In chapter two, I articulated the structure of ethical discourse from seminal insights of Lonergan's account of both the structure of intentionality and the context of intersubjectivity. In chapter three, I articulated the structure of ethical discourse as consisting of the four levels of recognition, mutual understanding, common judgment, and cooperative action. Now, we need to investigate how this structure meets two issues of concern in MacIntyre's dialectical method. First, MacIntyre's account of the dialectical method, while acknowledging the procedural norms of discourse, does not give an adequate consideration to the way such norms function in discourse. The presentation of the structure of ethical discourse will be expanded by developing the internal norms of discourse through a recurrence scheme analysis as suggested by the work of Kenneth Melchin on the fundamental norms of social living. Melchin's recurrence scheme analysis offers a more explanatory account of how norms function in discourse. Second, MacIntyre's dialectical method proposed that the encounter among traditions involves either a minor change in stage one or a major synthesis of each tradition in stage two. However, from the structure of ethical discourse a compound notion of solidarity can be developed. Each level of discourse consists of a unique order of solidarity. The structure of ethical discourse, then, will allow for an
articulation of both its internal norms and a compound notion of solidarity.

4.2. Recurrence Scheme Analysis and Internal Norms

In chapter two we saw how Lonergan's three-fold notion of the good involves understanding cooperative endeavours as goods of order that condition individual desires. Ethical reflection on the good of order shifts analysis away from individual desires and fears towards the structural arrangement among members of a group or society. Moreover, we saw that the good of order can be desired itself as an object of the good sustaining a wide range of individual goods. Kenneth Melchin is one Lonergan scholar who has taken up this line of ethical analysis. He argues that a good of order is a scheme of recurrence that is, in fact, the proper object of moral knowing. The content of moral knowing, for Melchin, regards not individual desire, but "...pertains to the development, maintenance, and ongoing transformation of the cooperative systems of social relations which condition the emergence and satisfaction of wide ranges of individual desires and feelings."¹ Melchin further argues that an analysis of specific schemes of recurrence will reveal that since personal desires are, in fact socially conditioned goods, the goods of order that condition them must be healthy in order for personal desires to be

fulfilled. The health of a good of order, then, is dependent upon the participants of the good of order functioning constructively together in the scheme. Ethical analysis of such healthy, or constructive, action within a scheme will generate a set of ethical norms applicable to all members of the scheme. According to Melchin, field-specific schemes, such as food production and distribution, can be analyzed to determine concrete ethical norms that must be satisfied (under certain probabilities) in order that individual desires (which the scheme conditions) might be fulfilled.

---

2 Melchin further argues that the schemes can be desired in themselves. He writes “the distinctively moral component of this knowledge is the dynamic movement towards progress expressed in the relationship between the social structures and the flows of concrete goods whose delivery they condition. Moral subjects experience this dynamism as a demand for a reciprocal concern for the social structures which condition the desired object.” ibid., 502.

3 Melchin discusses the ethical norm against the theft of food. If the scheme of recurrence of food production and distribution recurs in a sufficiently large number of occurrences it can still function with a certain low proportion of acts of theft. In this sense, the acts of participants obeying the norm against theft support a healthy functioning good of order despite acts of theft. In other words, the virtuous acts of the majority sustain goods of order in spite of the vice of the minority. A good of order will be rendered unhealthy if the number of acts of theft are out of proportion with acts which regard the norms of the scheme. In such a case, the good of order cannot be sustained and the personal desire which it conditions will not be met in a recurring fashion. However, it is not simply a matter of calculating the number of virtuous acts versus the number of vicious acts. Schemes of recurrence are acts of meaning and, as we have seen in chapter two, acts of meaning have communicative and constitutive functions. Because a single vicious act is an act of meaning it can have a much larger affect (through constitutive and communicative functions) on the entire society as well. The life of Terry Fox in Canadian culture is a positive example of the meaning of
Furthermore, it is Melchin's argument that moral analysis will not end with field-specific schemes, but will work out the relations among field-specific schemes to identify fundamental schemes that condition all field-specific schemes. As Melchin argues:

moral analysis in specific fields will reveal mutually conditioning relationships between and among fields of social structures. In the limit, ethics will reach a most general layer of fundamental norms which will be applicable to the full sweep of social, political, economic, cultural, and religious structures operative in human civilization.  

This fundamental level of moral analysis will seek to understand those norms that condition all schemes of social living. For Melchin, these schemes will "... include the structure of moral understanding itself and the social meaning schemes of interpersonal discourse which set the dialogical framework for the exercise of such personal cognitional skills." Thus, for Melchin, discourse is a fundamental scheme of recurrence that conditions all field-specific schemes, because the acts involved in discourse are acts of meaning.

---

a single life affecting an entire culture. Fox's life represents to Canadians a self-image of courage, strength, youth, and determination against overbearing obstacles. In his death, Fox represented tragedy and finitude.

---

4 Ibid., 503. Again Melchin summarizes, "thus moral analysis will move beyond a study of field-specific social structures to grasp fundamental norms which are at stake in the emergence, development, and transformation of the full range of interconnected social structures that have constituted human civilization." ibid., 504.

5 Ibid., 505.
As we have seen in chapter three, Melchin's reworking of Winter's notion of sociality identifies the dialectic of the process of unification as grounding the fundamental scheme of discourse. Discursive acts of meaning are dialectically related toward either intelligence or mutuality. For Melchin, discourse involves acts of meaning on both levels of intelligent consciousness and relationship through intersubjectivity. These acts of meaning in discourse fundamentally condition all field-specific schemes. Now, while MacIntyre is essentially correct that appealing merely to these fundamental norms is no guarantee that the discourse will function constructively, nevertheless, the little attention that MacIntyre gives to these norms ignores important insights into the structure of ethical discourse. The next section, then, will briefly work out the internal norms of each level of discourse.

4.2.1. The Internal Norms of Discourse

Taking up the fundamental line of ethical analysis as suggested by Melchin, the understanding of the structure of ethical discourse presented in this thesis can be expanded to include articulating the internal norms of discourse that are associated with each level: attention to the other; universal viewpoint; all the relevant questions; and a consistency between decision and action.

The first level is characterized by the experience of the We-relation. The face-to-face encounter of discourse provides for the space of the We-
relation by linking discourse partners in a mutual self-discovery through knowledge gained through mutual experience with the other. Through the We-relation the other's confirmation of one's gestures provides self-images that make up part of our self-understanding. The other's response to one's gestures provides the image of these self-images through reflecting back to the self an image of one's gestures as seen through the interpretation of the other. Such gesture-reflection and interpretation requires that each discourse partner be attentive to the other. The internal discourse norm at the level of experience is that each discourse partner must be attentive to the gestures of the other. Such attentiveness allows for the possibility that the other will provide one with the self-images which are accessible to the self through the presence of the other. Failure to be attentive at this level will result in a failure to provide such self-images for the other. Through attentiveness to each other's gestures, discourse partners can provide for each other what neither can achieve on their own.

Furthermore, not only must one be attentive to the gestures of the other, but one's response must be authentic. As we saw with Winter's analysis of deceit, one can respond to the other through acts of betrayal which provide the other with self-images that are not honest reflections of the other's gestures. This deceit works to reinforce self-images that the other wishes to impose upon the self. A good example of how deceit works can be
seen through the acts of some sales people. Some sales techniques attempt to provide the customer with self-images that reflect not the customer but the image that the sales person relates with the merchandise. For example, sports cars express images of youth and vitality which some car sales people, through the We-relation, attempt to associate with the customer in order to entice the customer to purchase the car. It does not matter, at least to the sales person, that the customer does not, in fact, have either youth or vitality. Rather, the sales person reflects to the customer's gestures images that imply that the customer is young and full of energy and that these images are consistent with someone who owns and drives the particular sports car under consideration. Though attention to the other's gesture is, indeed, met in this example (in fact, necessary in order for the customer to purchase the car) it is not an authentic attention to the other as subject, but is a form of deceit since the other is not attended to as another subject but as a customer and, in the limit, a mere object.

The second level of ethical discourse is characterized by the process of expression and interpretation. On this level, discourse partners seek common understanding of each other's perspective through the process of verbal expression and reflective interpretation. This process, as we have seen in chapter three, is conditioned by the universal viewpoint (a heuristic anticipation of the widest range of alternative interpretations). The universal
viewpoint is the internal discourse norm of the second level of discourse.

From the universal viewpoint, discourse partners interpret the expression of
the other by means of the widest possible range of interpretation. This is not
a viewpoint from nowhere, but an open interpretative heuristic. It is a
fundamental attitude of interpretation which does not limit interpretation a
priori. The universal viewpoint is an internal norm, without which one's
interpretation of another's expression might be biased against certain
understanding. Only a viewpoint which is open to all possible
interpretations can be adequate to the task of discursive interpretation. As
an internal norm, the universal viewpoint sets up an openness among
discourse partners that orientates them toward possible correct
interpretations of each other's expressions.

A good example of the operation of the universal viewpoint is provided
by attribution theory. This theory argues that people interpret their world
by understanding the cause of events. Causes are either dispositional factors
such as mood, ability, and knowledge or situational factors such as
environment, luck, and external force. According to attribution theory,

6 In other words, the possibility of critique assumes that other
interpretations might be possible and, in the limit, this is the universal
viewpoint.

7 For a brief presentation of the attribution theory see Joseph Folger,
Marshall Scott Poole, and Randall K. Stutman, Working Through Conflict,
52-54.
people: (1) generally attribute other people’s positive behaviour to situational factors, but attribute one’s own positive behaviour to dispositional factors; and (2) attribute dispositional factors to other people’s negative behaviour, but attribute situational factors to one’s own negative behaviour. For example, if my students score low on their exams (negative behaviour), I would tend to attribute this to dispositional factors like their lack of effort, however, if they generally scored well (positive behaviour), I would attribute this to my skills as a teacher. The attribution theory is an example of how the universal viewpoint can be useful to overcoming these tendencies in interpretation. In effect, the universal viewpoint allows for the biases of attributing to be overcome. Instead of attributing the students’ bad performance I can, through the universal viewpoint, anticipate an expanded range of possible interpretations of the situation.

The third level of discourse is characterized by the critical attitude of the inquiring mind which seeks to make judgments about understandings achieved on the second level. As we have seen in chapter three, the third level of discourse seeks to raise all the relevant questions with respect to common judgment. Asking all the relevant questions is the internal norm of the third level of discourse since the discourse aims to articulate common judgments about the content of discourse. As we have seen, this set of common judgments includes three subsets: judgments of agreement;
judgments of disagreements; and judgments of agreements to disagree. Failure to reach this set of judgment will mean a failure of conviction. As we have seen, the correlative to affirmation in judgment is a conviction that is an act of self-constituting meaning. The internal norm of asking all the relevant questions allows for the eventual mutual conviction of the discourse partners and allows for each to make a self-constituting act of meaning. But, the common judgment makes this conviction precise. Some convictions will be in regards to common judgments of agreements in facts and values. Other convictions will be in regards to judgments that are dialectically opposed and require conversion. Still other convictions will regard certain judgments that discourse partners can agree to disagree about. But even with these judgments there exists a certain common conviction since the discourse partners achieve a degree of awareness regarding the range of judgments they share in common. Failure to achieve this conviction by, for example, either ignoring issues of disagreement, or confusing radical disagreements with facts or values that the parties can agree to disagree on, can distort the discourse. In this case, discourse partners can be locked in conflicting discourse because they have not adequately attended to the internal norm at the level of judgment. Not all the relevant questions are being raised and, consequently, the different types of judgments are not being distinguished. Each subset of judgment, then, is conditioned by the
internal norm of the third level that seeks all the relevant questions of the
issues at hand.

Take for example a meeting in a small town between state sponsored
social workers and representatives of the community's local churches
discussing the problem of teen vandalism. While the behaviour of their
teenagers is the presenting problem, on the third level of judgment the group
can articulate the contents of the three sets of judgments. Common
judgments of facts may refer to the statistics suggesting the rise in vandalism
and concerns about how the community shows how it values its teenagers.
Common disagreements of facts may refer to differences in understanding
the statistics in relating all acts of vandalism to teenagers as a type of scapegoating. Common disagreements of value may relate to the religious
significance of teenagers for a particular religious community versus secular
values of teenagers. Common agreements to disagree might refer to certain
aspects of parenting or religious and secular values that can be put aside
since they are not relevant to their common questioning in light of the
situation at hand. The discourse, then, among the social workers and church
representatives can articulate their common conviction with their tripartite
set of judgments.

The fourth level of discourse is characterized by the four operations of
cooperative action. As we saw in chapter three, the fourth level of cooperative
action consists of the operations of consideration, commitment, decision, and action. Each operation involves its own internal norm. Consideration requires that all possible, probable, and impossible practical insights be taken into consideration. Only through such an inclusive set of practical insights will the discourse partners be assured that their discourse is not biased by personal interest, group interest, or the general interest of common sense. Committing refers to whether one has given oneself over to a proposed practical insight. The difficulty here, as we noted in chapter three, is that consideration and commitment do not end by their own accord. Only through collective decision does the process of consideration and commitment cease.  

The internal norm of decision is linked with action, namely, that one's action should follow from one's decision. What one has decided is the right action to do in a given situation, one ought to actually do in that situation. In discourse, the norm relating decision and action means that what one has decided to do in discourse one ought to do after the discourse has ended. This involves a rational trust among discourse partners. Such changes are not automatic. Discourse partners must trust each other that the norm of consistency between decision and action will be met in their cooperative living.

---

8 Nevertheless, concretely decision can involve external constraints such as time, fatigue, resources, and authority to list a few
Now, MacIntyre does not place much stock in the procedural norms of discourse because, for him, they do not provide enough substantive guidance for moral knowledge. I have argued that appealing to the internal norms of discourse through a recurrence scheme analysis along the lines suggested by Lonergan's work reveals a critically mediated substantive moral knowledge that is more than what MacIntyre anticipates. Each of the four levels of the structure of ethical discourse operates with its own internal norm that must be concretely fulfilled in the discourse in order that the discourse achieves an authentic level of participation among the discourse partners. Failure to meet any one of the four internal norms will distort the constructive unfolding of the discourse process. I have argued, therefore, that a recurrence scheme analysis of the internal norms of discourse allows for a wider range of substantive moral knowledge regarding the functioning of ethical discourse.

4.3. A Compound Notion of Solidarity

The notion of solidarity can have diverse meanings. For some solidarity occurs only among people with substantive ideological and cultural backgrounds. Solidarity is reserved for ethnic or religious groups which develop common meaning through the group’s history of oppression and survival. Or, solidarity might simply mean those who share similar truths, beliefs, feelings, or experiences. For MacIntyre, as we have seen, the
dialectical encounter can have one of three results: no radical change in the traditions; or the emergence of a superior tradition; or the synthesis of the encountering traditions giving rise to a new tradition. I will use the term solidarity to mean an achievement of common meaning among members of discourse. Solidarity refers to both the intelligent and relational aspects achieved in discourse. The materiality of solidarity involves how the discourse partners relate to each other and upon their substantive issues. The analysis of the structure of ethical discourse reveals, I would argue, that solidarity is not simply a single achievement. Rather solidarity is a compound. It is achieved differently on each level of the discourse. Each level allows for a different, more substantial notion of solidarity to emerge. Through the process of sublation, each higher level in the structure of ethical discourse takes up the material of the lower level in order to move the discourse toward a more comprehensive goal. Thus, the achievement of the goals of discourse reveals a compound understanding of solidarity.

4.3.1. First Order Solidarity

The first level of discourse can achieve a first order of solidarity through the We-relation. In the We-relation, each discourse partner provides an image of the other which the other takes in consideration of one's self-image. These images of the self from the other are not accessible to the self. It is only through an encounter with another person that one can receive these
images. Since it is only the other who is the source of these self-images, one is dependent upon the other. It is a solidarity of attentiveness and awareness of the other. It is a solidarity that recognizes that the other provides one with self-images that are not accessible to oneself and that one provides others with similar self-images.

Furthermore, first-order solidarity is potential. The potentiality of this first order solidarity provides for the types of substantive solidarities on the other higher levels of the discourse. This potentiality is of two types. First, there is the awareness of a similarity, a common experience of previous encounters among the discourse partners. In the case of conflict, there is the experience of the escalation of the conflict itself. The second type of solidarity experienced at this level involves the common experience of the discourse itself. Working through the discourse in its four levels provides a common experience among discourse partners that can be a potential source for further encounters and exchanged self-images and other-images.

4.3.2. Second Order Solidarity

The second level of the discourse involves working toward common understanding through verbal expression and reflective interpretation. This level can achieve a second order of solidarity as a commitment to working towards mutual understanding of each other's viewpoint or horizon. As we saw in the discussion of the components of an expression, one has to have a
certain understanding of the other person in order that one can adequately communicate some insight. Such an adequate understanding of the other involves coming to understand the other's viewpoint or horizon as the other understands his or her horizon. The prior insights, for example, that are necessary for adequate expression constitute understanding the substance of another's horizon. One needs to know what the other has achieved, how they have developed, what they have experienced and how the other's horizon relates to the insight that one wants to communicate. The complexity of the second order of solidarity involves a determined effort at understanding the other as the other understands him or herself. It is not enough in discourse for one to simply think that one understands the other. This is particularly important in cases of conflict. Common understanding needs to be explicit.

This involves particularly the subroutine of clarification whereby discourse partners attempt to clarify each other's interpretation of expressions in their discourse. The subroutine of clarification allows the speaker to judge whether the listener has correctly interpreted a specific speech act. Through discourse a common understanding of each other's horizon is developed such that each discourse partner can articulate the horizon of the other.\(^9\) The

\(^9\) This is close to the role that MacIntyre identified as the boundary person. For MacIntyre, the boundary person has a dual role; not only must they understand the other tradition, they must translate and interpret concepts of that other tradition into concepts of their own tradition.
content of the second order of solidarity allows for a mutual understanding of each other’s viewpoint or horizon.

4.3.3. Third Order Solidarity

The third level of the structure of ethical discourse concerns the critical attitude of reflection where one makes judgments of fact and value. The third order of solidarity consists in the mutual self-constitution of the members of the discourse since judgments involve conviction. It is the achievement of the higher integration of the previous orders of solidarity into a common critical horizon. This horizon consists in the tripartite set of judgments. The common horizon consists of the judgments of both fact and value that the discourse partners have agreed upon. This is their common ground. It consist in their collective conviction about matters that all discourse partners agree upon. The common horizon also consists of the set of disagreements. Judging the substantive issues that are in conflict is an important awareness in understanding their shared horizon. Conflicts of value and of fact require discourse partners to focus their collective efforts to discover as much about these conflicts as they can. It may be that some of these conflicts remain unresolved. Others, perhaps, can be worked out through more research and understanding. Nevertheless, this set of disagreements represent relevant substantive issues for the discourse partners. Finally, the common horizon includes a set of agreements to
disagree. This set of agreements represents substantive issues that are not relevant to the motivating questions of the discourse partners. It is with this set of disagreements that further discourse is not deemed necessary by the discourse partners. Nevertheless, the third order of solidarity is the collective, higher integration of the disputants' common conviction of agreements, disagreements, and agreements to disagree.

4.3.4. Fourth Order of Solidarity

The fourth level of the structure of ethical discourse concerns cooperative action. This level of the discourse allows for a fourth order of solidarity upon which discourse partners can implement collective practical insights for cooperative action. This order of solidarity consists in the discourse partners working with practical insights that follow from the substance of their common horizon. This involves developing action strategies that follow upon the common conviction that is developed in the third order of solidarity. With the fourth order of solidarity the concern is with changing their collective living toward the values that they have agree upon. With fourth order solidarity the various goods of order that consist of their social living are considered in order to determine which might contribute toward their collective understanding of value. It is a matter of collectively deciding on practical insights in order to decide which ones are the most probable action strategies in regards to creating value in their social
living. Moreover, the fourth order of solidarity is the awareness that collectively discourse partners can act in ways that could not have been possible before the discourse. With this compound notion of solidarity, discourse partners are able to work collaboratively to change their social living. This change provides for the experience of living together in collaborative projects.

MacIntyre's dialectical method anticipates three possible results in the encounter among members of diverse moral traditions. If the encounter is orientated by the first step, then there would be little change in members of the moral tradition. If the encounter is orientated by the second step, then it appears that the subordinate tradition would be overcome in some way by the superior tradition. And a third possibility whereby the two encountering traditions can be synthesized into a new tradition. I have argued, however, that an attention to the structure of ethical discourse reveals a wider understanding of the type of solidarity that can be anticipated when members of diverse moral traditions engage in ethical discourse. The four levels of ethical discourse reveal a compound notion of solidarity. Each order of solidarity links the discourse partners according to its basic goal. The first order links the discourse partners to an exchange of images. The second order links discourse partners to correct interpretations of each other's viewpoint. The third order links discourse partners to a
common conviction regarding the tripartite set of judgments. The fourth order links discourse partners in a cooperative decision to implement action strategies that promote common value. Thus, the compound notion of solidarity anticipates a wide degree of substantive and relational linkages among the discourse partners.

4.4. Summary of Chapter Four

While MacIntyre's notion of the dialectical encounter among members of diverse traditions allows for some substantive understanding of what is going forward in such discourse, it lacks a critical cognitional theory upon which a more substantive understanding of the structure of ethical discourse can be made. In chapter three, I attempted to make such an articulation. This structure was presented in chapter three as consisting of the four levels of recognition, mutual understanding, common judgment, and cooperative action. In this chapter, I further clarified the structure of ethical discourse by focusing on two related aspects; the internal norms of discourse and the compound notion of solidarity. A recurrence scheme analysis of the structure of ethical discourse reveals internal norms on each level of discourse. These norms must be fulfilled in order that the discourse scheme continues to function as a healthy scheme. Failure to fulfil the norms will distort the discourse scheme. Correlative to the internal norms of discourse is a compound notion of solidarity. This means that solidarity is not simply
having similar experiences or that people are from the same nation or identity group. Rather, the process of discourse itself establishes a compound solidarity among its discourse partners through each stage of discourse. However, while this structural analysis will prove useful in identifying both the norms of discourse and a notion of solidarity, it lacks specific concreteness. What happens, for example, when discourse goes wrong and starts to become destructive? Is there anything one can do at that time? The field of mediation can provide some insights into the concrete task of resolving disputes. The next chapter will present an illustration of the structure of ethical discourse within the practice of mediation in order to further expand on understanding the possibilities of ethical discourse in a pluralistic society. In chapter six, I will work with MacIntyre's notion of practice, Lonergan's theology of redemption, and the virtue of charity in mediation in an effort to develop some insights towards a theological ethics of discourse.
Chapter Five: Insights from the Field of Conflict Resolution

5.0. Introduction

The main argument of this thesis is that an attention to the structure of ethical discourse can shed light on what we can ethically anticipate in pluralistic discourse. From the philosophical ethics of MacIntyre, we saw a dialectical process that allows for the possibility of the emergence of either a new synthesis or corrections of a tradition's viewpoint on specific issues. However, we noted along the lines of the argument provided by Maxwell, that MacIntyre’s position involves a critical *aporia* in that MacIntyre cannot account for the trans-traditional elements implicit in his own position. From Maxwell's argument, the thesis moved to the work of Bernard Lonergan whose cognitional theory not only provided the basis of the trans-traditional element missing from MacIntyre's argument, but allowed for a further elaboration of the structure of ethical discourse itself. I have argued that the structure of ethical discourse has as its source the structure of conscious intentionality. As such, it consists of the four distinct levels of recognition, mutual understanding, common judgment, and cooperative action. I further argued that this analysis revealed four internal norms of discourse and a compound notion of solidarity.

At this point in the thesis, however, it would be helpful if we were able to illustrate the structure of ethical discourse by drawing correlations between the experience of conflict resolvers and the structure of ethical
discourse. Ideally, it would be best to make the correlations by using empirically controlled studies, however, the field of mediation does not have a sufficiently large number of studies that have empirically investigated actual mediation processes. To date most published works are based on either case or anecdotal studies. As a relatively new field of study, it still needs to empirically validate its most central claims. Nevertheless, these case studies can be used as the basis for exploring some preliminary correlations. While the aim of this chapter is not to empirically validate the structure of ethical discourse, insights developed here could be used as the basis for future empirical research in mediation.

I would like to make one further point. Through my own work as a peer mediator I have also made a number of observations regarding how disputants move through discourse. While I have neither documented these observations, nor subjected them to the control of social science research they have, nevertheless, guided my insights into ethical discourse. Thus, my insights into Lonergan’s cognitional theory and MacIntyre’s concern for pluralistic discourse have been guided by a set of correlative insights grasped from observations in the practice of mediation. Consequently, the following does not draw simply from Bush and Folger, but from my own observations as well. Though it is not my aim here to document these observations, I feel it is necessary to note these correlations as an important personal basis for the
direction of chapter five.

This chapter, therefore, will first present a brief review of a selection of literature of conflict resolution writers who articulate different understandings of the mediation process. It will be shown that researchers in the field of mediation do not share a common set of terms and references. However, various authors in the field have recognized the work of Bush and Folger as a significant project. Second, Bush and Folger's transformative model of mediation will be used to illustrate the structure of ethical discourse in conflict resolution. The aim of this chapter, then, is to draw some preliminary correlations between the structure of ethical discourse and the experience of mediators using transformative mediation.

5.1. The Field of Mediation

The field of mediation emerged in Canada through grass-roots movements in social justice and peace groups. Its initial purpose generally was as an alternative means of resolving disputes to the judicial system. Mediation is a process of resolving disputes that facilitates face-to-face discourse between disputants through the intervention of a third-party mediator. While this generic description of mediation would probably be acceptable to those who do mediation, there seems to be little agreement in the field on key issues such as what exactly mediation is, what it aims to accomplish, what is the role of the mediator, and what actually goes on
during a mediation session. Part of the reason for this lack of agreement is due to the fact that the practice of mediation is relatively young. In Canada, for example, it has been practiced since the early 1970s.\footnote{See, for example, Ben Hoffman and Catherine Morris, Going \textit{*} Forward Together: A discussion paper for the participants of Interaction 1990 (Kitchener: The Network, 1990).} Compounding the problem is the lack of empirical research in the field.\footnote{See, for example, Kenneth Kressel, Dean G. Pruitt and Associates (eds.), \textit{Mediation Research} (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1989).} Although the literature in the field is becoming quite large, there is a noticeable lack of empirically controlled studies that attempt research beyond the exploratory level. This has not, however, curtailed mediation writers from offering accounts of what they believe it is that they do when they are doing mediation. The following, then, will briefly present the work of four separate groups of writers in the practice of mediation: R. Fisher and L. Keashly; F. Dukes; K. Kressel, et.al; and R. Bush and J. Folger.

5.1.1. R. Fisher and L. Keashly

In an early article, "Third Party Intervention in Intergroup Conflict: Consultation is NOT Mediation" written in 1988, Fisher and Keashly articulate two different and, for them, contradictory approaches to third party intervention; mediation and conciliation (or problem-solving conflict resolution). Fisher and Keashly argue that the basic difference between
these two approaches rests on their different assumptions about conflict resolution. Mediation, they argue, tends to view conflict in terms of an incompatibility of goals or values. They argue that the mediation perspective views conflict in objective terms whereby mediators "... accept a competitive, win-lose orientation and concentrate on developing a compromise."³ The focus of mediation, according to Fisher and Keashly, concerns the objective dimension of conflict while working around or avoiding relationship issues. Problem-solving conflict resolution (or conciliation), however, works with relationship issues among disputants, since it tends to view conflict as misperception and misunderstanding. Problem-solving conflict resolution is, according to Fisher and Keashly, orientated to the subjective dimensions of conflict. It assumes that "... reevaluation of perceptions, attitudes, behaviours and priorities will facilitate a more collaborative and integrative approach to the resolution of the more objective issues."⁴ In other words, according to Fisher and Keashly, while mediation will avoid relationship issues to focus directly on the conflict of values or incompatibility of goals,  


⁴ Ibid., 381. Fisher and Keashly argue that the role of the third party with a problem-solving orientation will be to "... attempt to facilitate creative problem-solving by improving communications and analyzing the underlying issues and the relationship between the parties." 382.
problem-solving conflict resolution will work with relationship issues as a means for revealing underlying issues that are the source of conflict.

5.1.2. F. Dukes

In 1993, Frank Dukes wrote the article, "Public Conflict Resolution: A Transformative Approach." In this article, Dukes contrasts two methods of resolving public disputes; the traditional management approach (that includes mediation) and transformative public conflict resolution. According to Dukes, the management approach is orientated to saving money, eliminating delays, and reducing court related expenses. It focuses on a microanalysis of the dispute between individual people, while avoiding structural or systematic problems. The intended purpose of resolving a dispute is to find the best accommodation of interests which "... mainly concern protection or allocation of resources, and they remain constant in the negotiations."\(^5\) For Dukes, an important problem with the management approach is that it narrowly separates public issues from private issues. It will focus on public issues, such as government interventions, but ignore private issues, such as identity and quality of life.

In contrast to the management ideology of conflict resolution, Dukes argues for a transformative approach. For Dukes, the transformative

approach can be "... a vehicle of changing governing practices and institutional culture of agencies, public officials, citizenry, and communities." This approach to resolving public disputes will not be simply a microanalysis but will focus on the structural aspects of the conflict. It views conflict between individuals as symptomatic of larger social problems. For Dukes, transformative conflict resolution will focus on three issues; community, government, and resolving public disputes. It aims to engage members of communities through developing relationships, encouraging governments to be facilitative rather than directive, and deals directly with larger social problems. Thus, for Dukes, a managerial approach focuses on the individuals of the dispute, while ignoring social - structural issues that are the source of many public disputes and a transformative approach addresses the source of public disputes by dealing directly with the structural disorder through empowering community members and encouraging government agencies to be less directive.

5.1.3. K. Kressel et al.

Of the four sources presented in this section, only Kressel et al. is a discussion of empirical research. Through an exploratory research project, Kressel et al. argue that they discovered two distinct types of mediator styles;

---

6 Ibid.
settlement orientated and problem-solving orientated. According to Kressel et al., the settlement style of mediation tends to be concerned with finding a settlement to the dispute by working with the original position of each disputant. In order to appear neutral and value-free to the disputants, a settlement style mediator will focus on the problem as it is presented by the disputants without probing for more information. In fact, according to Kressel et al. by remaining focused on resolving the dispute a settlement orientated mediator achieves "... little genuine understanding of the conflict." The problem-solving orientation, however, is less concerned with resolving the dispute and more focused on the underlying reasons for the conflict. According to Kressel et al., a problem-solving mediator will ask more probing questions and will be willing to test his or her own hypothesis concerning the cause of the dispute. Through this approach, problem-solving mediators get more "... important information on the table, thereby increasing the probability that realistic and durable agreements would be

---

7 Kenneth Kressel, Edward A. Frontera, Samuel Forlenza, Frances Butler and Linda Fish, "The Settlement-Orientation vs. the Problem-Solving Style in Custody Mediation," Journal of Social Issues 50 (1994): 67-84. My concern is not to judge the empirical value of this study, but rather to show a discrepancy in the terms used by these researchers in comparison to the other sources presented in this chapter.

8 Ibid., 73.
reached. In their study, problem-solving mediators generated more integrative and longer lasting disputes than settlement orientated mediators. Thus, for Kressel et al., settlement orientated mediators focus on resolving the dispute while ignoring the underlying causes of the dispute and problem-solving mediators focus on the underlying reasons for a dispute through an active search and hypothesis testing.

5.1.4. R. Bush and J. Folger

For Bush and Folger, mediation is not specifically about solving problems. Conflict rather is an opportunity for moral growth. Bush and Folger understand the process of mediation as a place of encounter between two people who, by the context of their conflict, are presented with the possibility of developing together through the resolution of their conflict. Bush and Folger argue that "...the mediation process contains within it a unique potential for transforming people--engendering moral growth--by helping them wrestle with difficult circumstances and bridge human differences, in the very midst of conflict." For Bush and Folger, the key issue for mediation is the moral growth or character development of the disputants.

\[9\] Ibid., 75.

This does not mean that the mediator must seek out major developmental issues with the disputants, but rather the concern with moral development changes what the mediator will anticipate in the mediation process. Instead of focusing on the disputants' problem and trying to problem-solve for the disputants, the mediator looks for moments in the mediation session where a disputer might be changed ever so slightly in their moral being.

Bush and Folger borrow from the field of moral theory to articulate the two dimensions of moral growth that they argue are affected in the mediation process; empowerment and recognition. By attending to these two dimensions together with, what Bush and Folger name "compassionate strength," the mediator can facilitate a mediation process that provides for a wider range of goals than problem-solving alone. As they argue:

... the goal of transformation—that is, engendering moral growth through both strength and compassion—should take precedence over the other goals mediation can be used to attain, even though those other goals are themselves important.11

In other words, the primary goal of compassionate strength orientates the mediation process in order that other goals may be satisfied. But, the primary goal of engendering moral development remains central even if

11 Ibid., 28-9.
those other goals are not achieved in the mediation process.\textsuperscript{12} The reason that compassionate strength is central for Bush and Folger is that the mediation process itself is not simply a tool for problem-solving. The potential of mediation extends to the moral development of the disputants upon which a successful settlement cannot only be reached but implemented as well. For Bush and Folger, moral development, then, is the unique value of mediation. In the very midst of conflict, mediation provides a process whereby disputants can be changed in both empowerment and recognition.

5.1.5. Summary of the Four Approaches in the Field of Mediation

There does not yet appear to be a consensus in the field of mediation regarding what is going forward in a mediation session or what it is that a mediator ought to do in mediation. Dukes and Bush and Folger argue that mediation is not simply problem-solving. For these researchers mediation involves some type of transformation. For Dukes, mediation is the transformation of social relationships, while for Bush and Folger

\textsuperscript{12} Bush and Folger also argue that their model involves a social dimension. They claim that a transformative approach to mediation will positively affect society. They write that the goal of the transformative model “. . . involves changing not just situations but people themselves, and thus society as a whole . . . the occurrence of this transformation brings out the intrinsic good, the highest level, within human beings. And with changed, better human beings, society as a whole becomes a changed, better place.” ibid., 29. See also, ibid., xvi, 21, 24, 81, 94, 224-25 where the same argument is repeated.
transformation refers to the moral growth of the disputants. But for Dukes, mediation is a type of management-oriented process, where for Bush and Folger mediation can be understood under a number of different perspectives. Both Fisher and Keashly and Kressel et al. argue that a problem-solving approach of mediation will generate more lasting settlements. But according to Bush and Folger, problem-solving is not the unique goal of mediation. Rather, problem-solving emerges from a moral transformation on the part of the disputants. For Bush and Folger, settlement process are merely problem-solving processes, while for Fisher and Keashly and Kressel et al. problem-solving represents a better mediation process. The confusion in the field of mediation is, in part, representative of the fact that researchers in the field have only just begun to understand the process of mediation and the mediator's role. Nevertheless, the work of Bush and Folger is a significant attempt at a comprehensive account of the mediation process and the mediator's role. As such, it can be used as an initial example illustrating the structure of ethical discourse in the situation of conflict resolution.

5.2. Illustration of the Structure of Ethical Discourse in Mediation

The following section will illustrate the structure of ethical discourse by using the perspective of the transformative model of mediation. Bush and Folger's work in the field of mediation represents a major attempt to provide
a coherent and systematic framework for explaining the process of mediation. Bush and Folger maintain that the transformative approach to mediation involves three general patterns: microfocus; choice-making and deliberation; and perspective taking. The term “general pattern” refers to basic characteristics of transformative meditation. Bush and Folger do not argue that there is a structural relationship among the patterns. Nevertheless, I will argue that their description of these three patterns illustrates the structure of ethical discourse developed in this thesis such that the first pattern illustrates the first level of recognition; the second pattern illustrates both the third level of common judgment and the fourth level of cooperative action; and the third pattern illustrates the second level of mutual understanding. The aim here is simply to sketch the potential concrete significance of the structure of ethical discourse.

---

5.2.1. First General Pattern: Microfocus

The first general pattern of the transformative process of mediation involves the mediator attending to each disputant's contribution to the mediation session. Bush and Folger write that the mediator:

avoids making any global assessment of what the dispute is about and instead keeps a microfocus on the parties' contribution. The mediator is always focused on what the parties have just said, what they are doing in each move as the dispute unfolds. During the entire session, the mediator remains in a responsive posture. . . Although the mediator probably has a general idea of the kinds of things that may happen as the session unfolds, he knows that the specifics of the parties' interactions differ in every case, and he keeps his attention on responding to those specifics.\(^\text{14}\)

The responsive posture of the mediator is an attitude that allows the mediator to respond to the needs of the disputants. For Bush and Folger, the transformative approach is not about problem-solving alone, but rather it involves allowing the disputants to work through a constructive discourse with the help of the mediator's attention to the opportunities of moral growth for the disputants. Since the mediator is in a responsive posture, he or she focuses not on trying to problem-solve the dispute, but rather on working with whatever the disputants do and say in the mediation session. This approach means that there is no substantive predetermination of how the mediation will proceed, what issues will be discussed, and what types of

\(^{14}\) *The Promise of Mediation*, 192-93 (italics in original).
decisions will be made.

I would argue that the first general pattern illustrates the first level of the structure of ethical discourse. The responsive posture involves the mediator's attention to each of the disputants' words and actions in the dispute. This aims to fulfill the internal discourse norm of being attentive to both the substantive content of their words and to the disputants' gestures. It also involves being attentive to the process itself. It means recognizing where the disputants are in terms of the levels of their discourse, that is, being aware of whether or not the internal norms of each level have been met. If, for example, in the process of considering action strategies, he or she discovers that the disputants have not actually understood each other, the mediator must allow the disputants to work out this mutual understanding before continuing the process of considering action strategies. Failure to allow the disputants to move to mutual understanding would be a form of mediator manipulation since the mediator would not be allowing the disputants themselves to control the process. The receptive posture aims to mitigate against the mediator's bias of either imposing his or her own solution to the conflict or manipulating the process in order to achieve a quick result. The mediator's responsive posture, then, can facilitate the disputants themselves to be attentive to each other in their conflict resolution. A transformative mediator fosters the disputants' control over
both the substance and the process of mediation, thereby encouraging the disputants themselves to engage in the first level of recognition through being attentive to each other throughout the course of mediation.

5.2.2. Second General Pattern: Deliberation and Choice-Making

The second general pattern of the transformative process of mediation involves encouraging disputants' deliberation and choice-making. For Bush and Folger, transformative mediation acts to support each disputant in their decision-making activities. As they write:

> from the earliest moves in the session, the mediator encourages and helps the parties clarify their needs and goals and reflect and deliberate about options with full awareness of their potentials and limits.¹⁵

This refers to the moral dimension of empowerment. The mediator looks for moments in the mediation process where he or she can promote each disputant's ability to be self-empowered. This includes being empowered to decide to go to mediation and to make a commitment to the ground rules of mediation. This allows each disputant to be in control of his or her own situation. The transformative mediator facilitates each disputants' ownership of the dispute resolution process by encouraging empowerment rather than by controlling either the process itself or the substantive issues.

I would argue that the second general pattern of transformative

¹⁵ Ibid.
mediation illustrates both the third and the fourth level of the structure of ethical discourse. The process of clarifying goals and needs illustrates the third level of common judgment. It involves the process of articulating to the other person in a precise fashion both one's needs and goals. In mediation, it is often experienced that one comes to a clearer self-understanding of these needs and goals only through a discursive articulation with another. However, this process also involves articulating the needs and goals from a common, higher viewpoint. The process of discourse involves working out a common horizon that includes the concerns of each disputant in terms of the motivating questions that are driving the discourse. Articulating the substance of their common horizon involves the process of the third level of common judgment by meeting the internal norm of asking all the relevant questions of each disputant towards working out the tripartite set of common judgments. This set of judgments represents the common needs and goals of all disputants.

The second general pattern of transformative mediation also illustrates the fourth level of cooperative action. The process of deliberating about one's options in terms of resolving the dispute involves considering, committing, deciding, and acting on practical insights. The process of working out cooperative action strategies occurs through the common horizon that has been articulated on the third level. It involves considering which
options are more likely to provide for the common needs and goals. In determining those probable practical insights, each disputant must commit to implementing the practical insight after the mediation is over. But, the decision to actually implement a practical insight is the collective achievement of the disputants. Through such a decision the disputants can bring their mediation session to a close, since what they have committed to they have decided to implement. This involves their rational trusting of each other in that what has been decided upon and committed to in their discourse will be acted upon in their social living. The second general pattern of choice-making and deliberation illustrates both the third level of common judgment and the fourth level of cooperative action.

5.2.3. Third General Pattern: Perspective Taking

The third general pattern of the transformative process is encouraging perspective taking. This refers to the recognition dimension of moral growth. For Bush and Folger, perspective taking allows for acts of recognition of the other which significantly reshape how each disputant understands not only their own perspective, but the other's as well. Bush and Folger write:

the mediator looks for openings--places where one party can consider the other's situation or self from the other's perspective and where a more positive or sympathetic view of the other might be entertained. . . . the mediator also listens for and invites each party's expressions of their own motives and sensitivities, statements that call for response
and recognition from the other.\textsuperscript{16}

The mediator's actions can shift the probability that the disputants will make acts of recognition. The perspective taking of the other's viewpoint involves understanding the events of the conflict from the other's vantage point including how the other has understood one's own actions and words.\textsuperscript{17}

I would argue that the third general pattern of transformative mediation illustrates the second level of mutual understanding. The process of recognition for Bush and Folger involves not only actual acts of recognition but the mental act of imagining the conflict as the other person understands it. In effect, the third pattern illustrates how the mediator's actions can facilitate the expansion of each disputant's pre-discourse horizon through understanding the concerns of the other, including how the other has been

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 196.

\textsuperscript{17} For Bush and Folger, the mediation session is a moment in a larger context of dispute resolution. As they write in their article "Transformative Mediation and Third-Party Intervention: Ten Hallmarks of a Transformative Approach to Practice" \textit{Meditation Quarterly} 13 (1996):274, "Intervenors who understand the transformative framework are aware that their work involves stepping into a stream of interaction that began before the intervention and, in most cases, will continue in some form after the intervention is finished. In practical terms, this means that the mediators view the intervention as one point of the entire conflict." It may be that a particular mediation session does not end in a settlement. But, that does not make the session a failure. Rather, for Bush and Folger, changes occurring in the mediation session can increase the likelihood that the disputants will be empowered in their own position and empowered to give more recognition of the other and that renewed efforts at conflict resolution will provide the require settlements.
affected by the conflict. Coming to a greater understanding of the other’s point of view facilitates an exchange of insights (expressed as personal concerns, feelings, and positions) between disputants, including providing for the prior insights of the other that are necessary for effective communication and interpretation. In other words, through what Bush and Folger name acts of recognition, the process of mutual understanding allows for the articulation of the prior insights that condition effective expression and interpretation thereby expanding disputant’s pre-discourse horizons to include a genuine understanding of the other. The third general pattern, then, illustrates the second level of mutual understanding.\textsuperscript{18}

5.3. Summary on Chapter Five

Chapter five aimed to illustrate the structure of ethical discourse by making linkages with a significant research project in the field of conflict

\textsuperscript{18} Furthermore, for Bush and Folger, perspective taking involves working with the historical material of the conflict. Unlike other approaches to dispute resolution, the transformative approach understands that disputants must be allowed to tell their stories of what has happened in their relationship. Working with the material of past events that have occurred between the disputants allows each disputant to reconceive how each one has understood the conditions of their conflict. The aim is not to judge whether either of the disputants has the correct understanding of the flow of events, or whether certain motivations existed or not. Rather, working with past events allows for mutual understanding as an new articulation of each disputant’s perspective on the conflict. By incorporating new insights and new feelings of mutuality within the new perspective, disputants are able to work out a mutual understanding of their common conflict.
Chapter Five, Conflict Resolution

resolution. The chapter began with a brief review of literature in order to situate the work of Bush and Folger within the field of mediation. Their work describes three general patterns of mediation: microfocus; choicemaking and deliberation; and perspective taking. I argued that their description of these three patterns illustrates the structure of ethical discourse developed in this thesis. The first pattern illustrates the first level of recognition; the second pattern illustrates both the third level of common judgment and the fourth level of cooperative action; and the third pattern illustrates the second level of mutual understanding. This chapter was a sketch of the potential concrete significance of the structure of ethical discourse. In the next chapter, I will address a question concerning the theological characteristics of discourse by using the three main sources of this thesis. MacIntyre, Lonergan, and the transformative model of mediation all recognize that correlative to a structural analysis is a virtue analysis. Working with a virtue framework, chapter six will offer some insights towards a theological ethics of discourse.

---

19 In other words, this chapter has sought to illustrate correlations between the structure of ethical discourse and the general patterns of mediation that represent vulnerable insights which require further verification through empirical research. I hope, nevertheless, that I have articulated these correlations accurately enough that they are both intelligible and reasonable.
Chapter Six: Toward a Theological Ethics of Discourse

6.0. Introduction

In the earlier chapters we saw how MacIntyre's dialectical method addresses the possibility of rational discourse, but that it lacked an adequate cognitional theory for resolving an internal problem in his account of the encounter of members of diverse traditions. It was argued in chapter two that Lonergan's cognitional theory and world-view of emergent probability could form the basis for articulating a response to the problem of pluralistic discourse. In chapter three, we saw that the structure of ethical discourse consists of the four levels of recognition, mutual understanding, common judgment, and cooperative action. Chapter four presented two characteristics of ethical discourse that relate to issues in pluralistic discourse; internal norms of discourse and a compound notion of solidarity. In chapter five, the structure of ethical discourse was illustrated in the situation of mediation. But, one important question remains unaddressed. How does our analysis contribute to an understanding of the theological dimension of authentic discourse?

For both MacIntyre and Lonergan, a structural analysis alone misses important ethical insights into social living.¹ Both MacIntyre and Lonergan

¹ On the relation between structural and virtue analysis see James Swindal, “The Role of Cognitive Reflection in Bernard Lonergan's Moral Theory,” METHOD:Journal of Lonergan Studies 16 (1998): 65 where Swindal writes “Lonergan takes the Aristotelian position that a good society is reached not simply through generalized interests, but through the development or perfection of each member. Lonergan remains strongly
understand that simply appealing to a structural analysis, no matter how in-depth, will not enable one to identify the types of virtues that are specific to pluralistic discourse. Furthermore, Bush and Folger argue that the goal of mediation is not simply settlement, but the moral growth of the disputants. This chapter, then, will be a sketch of a virtue analysis as one possible approach toward a theological ethics of discourse. The first section will focus on MacIntyre’s concept of practice as the place for the exercise of virtues. This will present the notions of internal and external goods, relationships in practice, institutions and the possibility of evil practices. It will be argued that MacIntyre’s account of evil in practices involves an aporia. I will argue that Lonergan’s three-fold dialectic of history of progress, decline, and redemption can be used to provide an explanatory account of how decline in practices can be reversed. The second section will work with Lonergan’s dialectic of history and his theology of redemption as God’s gift and our participation in redemptive praxis. The third section will suggest a discourse

committed to the contribution ethics makes to the developmental process of individuals; ethics is not simply a matter of properly applying universalizable norms, but of becoming a more authentic and free person.” (italics in original)

2 As we have seen, for MacIntyre, a structural approach that focuses solely on procedures and rules is inadequate. As MacIntyre writes, rules “. . . find their place in a larger scheme in which the virtues have the central place . . . .” After Virtue, 257. It is a mistaken interpretation to suppose that MacIntyre is against rules out right.
virtue that responds with God's gift of charity to overturn the situation of destructive conflict. It will be argued that the mediator's skill can shift the probabilities that the disputants can respond with God's gift of charity in turning their conflict into a constructive discourse that both renews their relationship and establishes action strategies that offer to create better social living arrangements for all participants. By working with the three major sources of this thesis, these insights, then, offer a sketch towards a theological ethics of discourse.

6.1. MacIntyre's Virtue Ethics

As we saw in chapter one, in his book After Virtue, MacIntyre articulates a virtue framework as a response to what he sees as our contemporary moral situation of emotivism and individual liberalism. His virtue framework consists of a three-fold approach.\(^3\) He articulates a notion

---

\(^3\) MacIntyre writes, "for there are no less than three stages in the logical development of the concept which have to be identified in order, if the core conception of a virtue is to be understood, and each of these stages has its own conceptual background. The first stage requires a background account of what I shall call a practice, the second an account of what I have already characterized as the narrative order of a single human life and the third an account a good deal fuller than I have given up to now of what constitutes a moral tradition. Each later stage presupposes the earlier, but not \textit{vice versa}. Each earlier stage is both modified by and reinterpreted in the light of, but also provides an essential component constituent of each later stage." \textit{After Virtue}, 186-87 (italics in original). Thus, our account of MacIntyre's notion of a practice would have to be modified by the two later stages. However, it is, as we will see, adequate in itself for developing some insights towards a theological ethics of discourse.
of a practice as the prior concept that grounds the articulation of the virtues. He then moves to conceive the exercise of the virtues from within a narrative understanding of a complete human life with a beginning, middle, and end. Then, he rounds these ideas by situating the exercise of the virtues within a tradition or community of moral inquiry. According to MacIntyre, this three-fold structure of the virtue framework gives it an explanatory characteristic in response to both emotivism and its social correlative, the liberal society. For MacIntyre, the virtues are dynamic characteristics of an individual who exercises them within practices that are conditioned by one’s tradition or moral community. While a complete presentation and explication of MacIntyre’s framework of virtue ethics is beyond the scope of this thesis, we can, nevertheless, work with his notion of practice in order to organize a reflection on a theological ethics of discourse. The following section, therefore, will first present MacIntyre’s concept of a practice. This will focus on his distinction between internal and external goods; the place of institutions and practices; and the relationship among participants of a practice. It will conclude with a question raised by critics of MacIntyre on whether his notion of practice includes evil practices.

6.1.1. A Practice

In chapter fourteen of *After Virtue*, MacIntyre begins his presentation of a core concept of virtue. While his full explanation will take him through
four more chapters, in chapter fourteen, MacIntyre starts by noting that an unitary concept of virtue, in fact, underlies all accounts of virtue. This unitary concept is first articulated by noting that all accounts of virtue have a prior concept to which they appeal in explaining their theory and categories of virtue. MacIntyre argues that the concept of a virtue always requires 
"... for its application the acceptance of some prior account of certain features of social and moral life in terms of which it has to be defined and explained."⁴ Along this line of analysis, MacIntyre notes that the Homeric notion of virtue has a prior concept in the social roles that one enacts in society; Aristotle's prior concept to his virtue theory is the natural telos of the human person; and the New Testament's prior concept is a supernatural telos of the believing Christian orientated towards the Divine.⁵ Thus, for MacIntyre, all virtue theories will have a prior concept in relation to which the virtues are explained and defined.

MacIntyre's prior concept to his theory of the virtues is the notion of a practice. He defines practice as:

... any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve

⁴ After Virtue, 186.

⁵ See ibid., 184-85.
excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.\textsuperscript{6} MacIntyre gives examples of practices as games such as chess and football, and labour such as farming and architecture.\textsuperscript{7} Activities involved in these practices are not identical to the practice; throwing a football is not a practice, but the game of football is a practice. It consists of a complex and cooperative arrangement among players, coaches, managers, owners, and fans. Furthermore, the cooperative activity acts to systematically extend the range and availability of the excellences and internal goods. It is because the activity is cooperative that those goods internal to the practice can be available for more of society than without their cooperative activity. A practice, then, because of its cooperative structure facilitates more internal goods through the exercise of the virtues constituted by standards of excellence derived from the history of the practice itself.

We can clarify the notion of a practice by noting that for MacIntyre

\textsuperscript{6} Ibid., 187.

Chapter Six, Toward a Theological Ethics of Discourse

virtues are not always exercised in practices. It is possible, according to MacIntyre, for one to exercise virtue while not participating in a practice. For example, suppose that I came upon the scene of a burning car and I immediately attempted to rescue the trapped driver. My actions would not constitute virtuous actions within a practice as defined by MacIntyre.

However, the emergency response team that comes on the scene of the accident would constitute a practice. These professionals (fire fighters, paramedics, and nurses) exercise virtue through the cooperative activity of emergency response. Their cooperative endeavour, organized by their standards of excellence, provides for specific internal goods such as life saving. Furthermore, since their activity is cooperative, the standards of

---

8 MacIntyre argues, "... my argument will not in any way imply that virtues are only exercised in the course of what I am calling practices." After Virtue, 187.

9 It might be argued that my actions take place within the practice of community-making. Courageous acts by strangers for strangers constitute one of the highest forms of recognized acts of virtue in our society as exemplified by the many different awards garnered to our local heroes. MacIntyre argues that ancient and medieval community-making were practices as he conceives them, but is our modern, liberal society a practice? It would appear that, for MacIntyre, it is not, since for him, liberal society does not promote virtuous living, see ibid., 195. I would argue that MacIntyre's position could account for our society's love of such courageous acts by our heros as a moral remnant of our history as community-makers, but that we, as liberals, no longer conceive society as a practice of community-making. This exemplifies emotivism's internal conflict between, on the one hand, recognizing and celebrating the exercise of civic virtues for the good of society, but, on the other hand, not promoting those virtues for all its members.
excellence and the internal goods of their practice are systematically available for all of society. My virtuous acts are available to these specific victims whom I happened to have come across.\textsuperscript{10} The practice of emergency response, however, is a cooperative activity for the good of all society.

6.1.2. Internal and External Goods

Both internal and external goods are achieved through the exercise of the virtues in a practice.\textsuperscript{11} However, for MacIntyre, the internal goods of a practice are achieved only through that particular practice and by no other means. They are internal for two reasons. First, the internal goods can be defined only through the activities of the practice itself. The specific internal goods are defined intrinsically with the practice that is the means for these goods. Second, it is only by participating within the practice that one can identify and know that practice's internal goods. The active participation within the practice, through the development of one's virtues in accord with

\textsuperscript{10} Note also the difference that the practice makes to the exercise of the virtues. My virtuous act may or may not be complemented by the techniques of life saving. In some situations my skills may be enough, in others insufficient, and in still other situations I may create more harm than good. But, the emergency response teams' virtuous acts are complemented by the most up-to-date life saving skills because they must meet the standards of excellence so far developed by their practice in order to achieve the desired internal goods.

that practice's standards of excellence so far defined allows one to come to an understanding of those internal goods and how they are to be achieved in that practice. In other words, experience in the practice allows one to judge which goods are internal to that practice.\textsuperscript{12}

It is characteristic of internal goods, according to MacIntyre, that when they are achieved, they benefit the entire community. Though internal goods do emerge through the competition to excel, they possess the quality such that the more the internal goods are achieved, the more they are available for the entire community and the more the community benefits from their effects. MacIntyre delineates two kinds of internal goods.\textsuperscript{13} A first type of internal good is the product that is made in a practice both in the objects themselves and in the act of producing the product. In the practice of music-making there is both the music and the action of cooperatively making music. The second type of internal good is the certain kind of life that it takes to make specific internal goods.\textsuperscript{14} Though making the internal good of a specific 

\textsuperscript{12} See \textit{After Virtue}, 188-90.

\textsuperscript{13} See ibid.

\textsuperscript{14} MacIntyre writes, "for what the artist discovers within the pursuit of excellence in portrait painting--and what is true of portrait painting is true of practice of the fine arts in general--is the good of a certain kind of life. That life may not constitute the whole of life for someone who is a painter by a very long way or it may at least for a period, Gauguin-like, absorb him or her at the expense of almost everything else. But it is the painter's living out of a greater or lesser part of his or her life \textit{as a painter} that is the second kind of
practice may not fully constitute how one understands one's entire existence, nevertheless, participating in a specific practice in order to achieve certain internal goods requires the making of a certain type of person which is, itself, an internal good of the practice. In the making of music one identifies oneself, to some degree, as a musician. In the making of music, one contributes not only to one's practice through developing its standards of excellence, but one also gives to the entire community the benefit of the internal goods of one's practice.

MacIntyre identifies a second type of external good of a practice. These goods are not specific to any single practice, but are common to all practices. External goods are money, cars, buildings, prestige, reputation, power, and social status, to list only a few. What distinguishes external goods from internal goods is that external goods can always be achieved by other means. If one desires the external goods of money, one can chose many good internal to painting.” ibid., 190 (italics in original)

15 In Ethics after Babel, Stout notes that a good considered external to one practice may be considered internal for another. He argues, “other goods are external to one social practice while internal to another. Goods internal to football may be external to the practice of preventive medicine, and vice versa.” 272. Furthermore, for Stout, these different goods between practices may conflict as, for example, when a baseball player risks personal injury in order to steal home base and win a game. It is not clear in Stout's example if both these goods are external, or whether this is an example of a conflict between internal and external goods. If Stout is arguing that stealing home base and winning the baseball game is an internal good, then his understanding of internal and external goods is not what MacIntyre has in
different types of practices from football to politics. It is characteristic of external goods that the more one possess this type of good, then necessarily others will have less.\textsuperscript{16} External goods involve limited resources. They are always some one's individual possession or property. Furthermore, MacIntyre explicitly links external goods with institutions.\textsuperscript{17} MacIntyre argues,

\begin{quote}
  institutions are characteristically and necessarily concerned with what I called external goods. They are involved in acquiring money and other material goods; they are structured in terms of power and status, and they distribute money, power and status as rewards.\textsuperscript{18}
\end{quote}

Thus, external goods are the goods of the institution and internal goods are the goods of a practice.

6.1.3. Relationships in a Practice

For MacIntyre, participating in a practice sets one up in relationship mind. For MacIntyre, external goods are goods of competition. The good of winning a game is an external good, since in achieving the victory one team wins and the other loses. The internal good of baseball is not winning the game, but the cooperative interaction of players, managers, and fans as they exercise the virtues of baseball such as fair play, sportsmanship, and respect for tradition.

\textsuperscript{16} MacIntyre writes, "external goods are therefore characteristically objects of competition in which there must be losers as well as winners." ibid., 190.

\textsuperscript{17} More will be said about institutions below, but notice that MacIntyre associates the development of institutions with external goods.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 194.
with others of the practice in two ways. First, there is a present collaborative relationship among members of the practice. The practice is a cooperative complex that requires the exercise of the virtues by most of its members in order that the practice can flourish. In fact, according to MacIntyre, a practice can sustain a certain amount of vice, but it does so because most of its members are practicing virtuous living and are achieving the internal goods of their practice. MacIntyre identifies as fundamental for all practices the exercise of the virtues of justice, courage, and truthfulness. It is by these virtues that we are related to other members of the practice. As MacIntyre argues, "... the virtues are those goods by reference to which, whether we like it or not, we define our relationships to those other people with whom we share the kind of purpose and standards which inform practices."¹⁹ We define our relationships by justice, courage, and truthfulness independent of any particular moral code, since the virtuous practice is not determined by the code. Though we might have different codes of justice, courage, and honesty, for MacIntyre, these are accidental to the essential way that we relate to each other by these virtues. These virtues, then, are a type of universal set of virtues that all practices require for their progress.

The second type of relationship is historical. Each member of the practice must set herself in an historical relationship to the standards of

¹⁹ Ibid., 191.
excellence which have so far been defined. For MacIntyre, when one first enters into a practice, one must subject oneself to the authority of other participants who have acquired technical skills and virtues the exercise of which give them the experience and knowledge of the internal goods of the practice. Without letting one be subjected to those in authority in this way, one will never learn the appropriate skills or virtues that are required for the internal goods themselves. This letting go is, for MacIntyre, a courageous act of self-sacrifice whereby one allows oneself to be subjected to the standards of excellence of that practice. As MacIntyre argues:

It is thus the achievement, and a fortiori, the authority, of a tradition which I then confront and from which I have to learn. And for this learning and the relationship to the past which it embodies the virtues of justice, courage, and truthfulness are prerequisite in precisely the same way and for precisely the same reasons as they are in sustaining present relationships within practices.

Consequently, for MacIntyre, his notion of practice allows for a place for authority and tradition to not only set the standards of excellence so far developed, but to evaluate neophytes both with respect to the skills and

---

20 This is so, for MacIntyre, because the ends of a practice change through its history. A practice is an historical cooperative.

21 Ibid., 194. Elsewhere, MacIntyre writes, “to enter into a practice is to accept the authority of those standards and the inadequacy of my own performance as judged by them. It is to subject my own attitudes, choices, preferences and tastes to the standards which currently and partially define the practice.” Ibid., 190.
virtues necessary for the internal goods of that practice.\textsuperscript{22}

6.1.4. Institutions

MacIntyre argues that practices require institutions for their maintenance. Emergency response teams constitute a practice, as we have seen, but their professional organizations are the institutions that maintain the practice itself. Institutions are concerned with the external goods (such as money, power, and status) that are associated with the practice. For MacIntyre, institutions are necessarily concerned about these external goods because these goods, in effect, allow the practice to function in society. As MacIntyre argues, no practice could function for long without some form of institution. However, while the internal goods of the practice effect all community, external goods are competitive and can, according to MacIntyre, subvert the internal goods. In fact, internal goods are causally related to external goods such that “... the creativity of the practice [is] always vulnerable to the acquisitiveness of the institution, in which the cooperative care for common goods of the practice is always vulnerable to the

\textsuperscript{22} This does not mean that MacIntyre is not aware of the critical moment when certain members of a practice critique the standards of a practice so far developed. Rather, for MacIntyre, such critique is possible only after one has both successfully mastered the requisite skills and acquired the necessary virtues. In this way, it would seem that the critique of a practice is a responsibility primarily of the elders, since neophytes lack the experience of the practice necessary for adequate judgment, see ibid., 190.
competitiveness of the institution." The decline of a practice is, for MacIntyre, the result of the desire for the external goods over the desire for the internal good of the practice.

Now, MacIntyre is not thinking about particular individuals who work within a practice solely for the sake of the external goods. Rather, MacIntyre, means that "the integrity of a practice causally requires the exercise of the virtues by at least some of the individuals who embody it in their activities; and conversely the corruption of institutions is always in part at least an effect of the vices." Consequently, for MacIntyre, the possession and exercise of the virtues will be an hindrance in acquiring certain external goods. The exercise of truth, for example, might prohibit the acquisition of power within an institution. This conflict between the exercise of virtue and the desire for external good is not simply, for MacIntyre, an issue of character. Rather, his point is that there is a causal relationship between the exercise of the virtues within specific practices for the sake of internal goods which are sustained by institutions that have as their goal external goods which are fundamentally opposed to the practice's internal goods. While it is certainly the case, for MacIntyre, that character, or lack thereof, determines whether an individual chooses either to be virtuous or to act exclusively for

---

23 Ibid., 194.

24 Ibid., 195.
the external good, however, the conflict between internal and external goods itself does not arise because one’s character lacks development. It is a permanent feature of the relationship between institutions and practices.

6.1.5. Evil Practices

MacIntyre takes up the issue of whether there are, in fact, some practices that are evil, that is, whose members cooperatively exercise the virtue as a means for evil consequences. If this were true, then it would seem to suggest that MacIntyre’s theory of virtue is lacking in a key aspect for it would allow that in some cases the virtues are exercised for evil. Thus, MacIntyre would not succeed in grounding the priority of the virtues in social

25 It seems that, for MacIntyre, virtues are not always in conflict with the desire for external goods since these are still goods. Rather, it is that through the historical unfolding of an institution, at certain times some virtues will be in conflict with the desire for external goods.

26 On this issue of evil practices see, for example, Elizabeth Frazer and Nicola Lacey, “MacIntyre, Feminism and the Concept of Practice,” in After MacIntyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work of Alasdair MacIntyre, 265-82. These authors seem to expand MacIntyre’s notion of practice to include more cultural phenomena. They argue, for example, that heterosexuality is a practice with informal institutions. However, they also argue that rape is a practice since it involves cooperative, complex socially established activities. They argue “rape and other forms of sexual violence, too, realize goods which are internal to them. Feminist analysis, the testimony of rapists themselves and readings of cultural discourses of sexuality reveal how masculine dominance and the symbolic and material subjugation of femininity can be uniquely realized through the penetration of a woman, with the phallus, against her will.” 274. What these authors overlook is that though rape may have goods realized exclusively by its activity, these goods are not internal goods of a practice since they do not benefit the entire community.
living. MacIntyre's response is two-fold. In the first place, he is not convinced that certain evil forms of human collaboration are, in fact, practices as he has defined this term. MacIntyre admits, however, that this is a weak argument, since it rests upon his lack of conviction and may be merely a question of defining the concept of a practice. In the second place, MacIntyre argues that he conceives the relationship between the virtues and practice independently of morally criticizing whether a practice is a source of evil or not. His virtue theory does not depend upon empirical studies of concrete practices that may be the source of evil, but rather establishes an explanatory framework that can be applied in empirical studies.  

Furthermore, MacIntyre argues, that for his virtue theory, it is not inconsistent to argue that at times courageous acts result in injustices or that at certain times and places practices can be sources of evil. As he argues:

\[
\text{... it is at once obvious that any of these [practices] may under certain conditions be a source of evil: the desire to excel and to win can corrupt, a man may be so engrossed by his painting that he neglects his family, what was initially an honorable resort to war can issue in savage cruelty... I do have to allow that courage sometimes sustains injustice, that loyalty has been known to strengthen a murderous aggressor and that generosity has sometimes weakened the capacity to do good.}^{29}
\]

---

27 See After Virtue., 196.

28 In other words, conceptually the practice is not evil though concretely in a state of decline it is the source of evil.

29 Ibid., 200.
For MacIntyre, individual acts of virtue can have evil consequences. But, MacIntyre’s response does not seem to go to the heart of the question. Is it possible for practices qua practices to be evil?

Since MacIntyre does not seem to answer this question directly it is necessary to construct an answer from his account of the nature of a practice. It would seem that for MacIntyre, it is not possible for practices to be evil qua practice, rather practices have moments of development and decline. Practices, for MacIntyre, have histories such that its goals are dynamic. They change through the development of the practice when standards of excellence are refined or when new technologies are introduced into the practice. As well, practices can go into decline. For MacIntyre, decline occurs when the acquisitiveness associated with the external goods overcome the exercise of the virtues. In this case, the practice has failed to maintain its integrity. As MacIntyre argues:

for the ability of a practice to retain its integrity will depend on the way in which the virtues can be and are exercised in sustaining the institutional forms which are the social bearers of the practice. The integrity of a practice causally requires the exercise of the virtues by at least some of the individuals who embody it in their activities; and conversely the corruption of the institutions is always in part at least

---

30 Frazer and Lacey make a similar complaint, see “MacIntyre, Feminism and the Concept of Practice”, 274.
an effect of the vices.\footnote{After Virtue 195.}

Thus, it would seem that for MacIntyre, a practice which has lost its integrity is driven by the desire for the external goods. This, however, would not necessarily mean that the practice is evil \textit{qua} practice, but only that through the history of the practice it has lost its integrity. The internal goods are so vulnerable to the desires of the external good that sometimes in the history of a practice, members seek the external goods to the detriment of the internal goods. At such a time, a practice can be said to be in a state of decline and can be a source of evil since the exercise of the virtues is not occurring and the internal goods are not being acquired.

But, at these times more is at stake, since, according to MacIntyre, when a practice has lost its integrity the virtues are not only not practiced and the internal goods not achieved but the virtues become \textit{unrecognizable}. Without the experience and knowledge of the virtues, neophytes cannot be taught the virtues necessary to achieve the internal goods of the practice. In this state of decline, medicine for example, would not be able to teach new physicians the virtues and internal goods of their practice. All that is left for a practice in a state of decline are the external goods; one teaches and participates in one's practice because of money, status, and power.
For MacIntyre, then, the history of a practice consists of moments of progress through the exercise of the virtues and development through the qualitative increase in the standards of excellence and moments of decline when it loses its integrity by acquiring exclusively the external goods and, consequently, the members of the practice fail to pass on the virtues and excellences associated with its internal goods. If this is an adequate account of MacIntyre's position, the question remains; how can a practice emerge from a state of decline to recover its integrity, to relearn its virtues and regain its internal goods? Although, MacIntyre does not address this question directly he does write that his virtue theory can offer a critical approach to the empirical study of particular practices at certain times and places. As MacIntyre writes:

the conception of justice as a virtue which is required if the goods internal to practices are to be achieved, let alone the goods of individual lives and of communities, is itself sufficient to provide a standard for identifying and condemning the deformations and distortions to which practices may be subjected.\textsuperscript{32}

It would seem that MacIntyre's argument for the foundational virtues of justice, courage, and honesty are critical tools for analyzing practices as they take place in the concrete. However, I would argue that this response alone does not seem to resolve the problem. If a practice has lost its integrity and

\textsuperscript{32} Alasdair MacIntyre, "A Partial Response to my Critics," in After MacIntyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work of Alasdair MacIntyre, 290.
its members have no experience of either exercising the virtues or knowing its internal goods, an ethical analysis that simply appeals to these foundational virtues cannot accomplish what it seeks to do since the members of the practice would not know what the virtues are or why the virtues are worthwhile exercising. Nor would they have access to the experience of practicing these virtues. Since the members lack experiences of justice, courage, and honesty within the specific practice under investigation, telling them to be just, courageous, and honest is telling them some thing of which they have no knowledge nor experiential basis to form the virtues.

Even more significant than this is the fact that, as MacIntyre points out, in the state of decline, the external goods can so dominate the practice that the virtues and internal goods suffer near total effacement; the goods of money, status, and power are sought for their own right. I would argue that when members of a practice desire and achieve only the external goods, this acts to reinforce the view that the internal goods of the practice are the external goods! In fact, a state of decline is the confusion of the external goods for the internal goods. A response to this decline must overturn this priority. But, here we are faced with an aporia in MacIntyre's virtue theory. MacIntyre appeals to the standards of virtue to critique a practice in a state of decline whose members have no experience of those virtues nor knowledge of why they are worthwhile and, in fact, misconceive the practice's external
goods for its internal goods. While MacIntyre's notion of a practice offers substantive concepts which prove useful in understanding the exercise of a virtue and its goods in relation to the larger community, it is incomplete. I would argue that Lonergan's account of the three differentials of history can be used to build upon MacIntyre's work and provide a more adequate account of the history of a practice that includes moments of progress, decline, and redemption.

6.2. Lonergan's Dialectic of History: Progress, Decline, and Redemption

In chapter two, we saw Lonergan's understanding of the dialectic of history as involving two principles of change; progress and decline. We noted that communities develop, according to Lonergan, through practical intelligence's authentic intentionality which result in positions. Decline involves counter-positions that result from bias that interferes with practical intelligence. This would result in either the shorter cycle of decline through group bias or the longer cycle through the general bias of common sense. As we saw, for Lonergan, the general bias and the longer cycle of decline called for a cosmopolis as a cultural attitude of authentic intentionality that works through the dialectic of progress and decline. However, for Lonergan, the attitude of cosmopolis does not emerge from decline. As we saw, the basic problem with decline, especially the longer cycle, was that the results of decline provide for its own rationalization and further promotes decline. For
Lonergan, what decline calls forth is redemption. Redemption, for Lonergan, is the third principle in the dialectic of history that operates to correct the effects of decline.\textsuperscript{33} It is not a matter of a careful balance in social living between progress or decline, but rather decline must be overcome. The overcoming of the principle of decline is an act of redemption. This is properly, for Lonergan, a religious component in world history.\textsuperscript{34} It is a solution to the problem of decline provided by God’s love of humanity. Theologically, as we will see below, decline is overcome through the incarnation of Christ and His redemptive act of death and resurrection that is enacted in our world with our participation through redemptive praxis.

6.2.1. Redemptive Praxis and the Theological Virtues

For Lonergan, the salient characteristic of the state of decline is that it

\textsuperscript{33} Using the categories presented by Robert Doran, another way of putting this is that the dialectic of progress and decline is one of contradictories not contraries. For Doran, contraries are more complementary. This type of dialectic seeks a balance between the two principles of change. A contradictory dialectic, however, seeks a resolution to the dialectic when the negative principle dominates. This resolution, in the case of the dialectic of history, is affected by the principle of redemption. For the Doran source see Theology and the Dialectics of History, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 10.

\textsuperscript{34} As Lonergan writes in Insight, “there is a theological dimension that must be added to our detached analysis of the compounding of man’s progress with man’s decline. Bad will is not merely the inconsistency of rational self-consciousness; it is also sin against God. The hopeless tangle of the social surd, of the impotence of common sense, of the endlessly multiplied philosophies, is not merely a cul-de-sac for human progress; it is also a reign of sin, a despotism of darkness; and men are its slaves.” 692.
cannot reverse itself by its own resources. This difficulty rests upon the developmental nature of human beings. Humans must live and their living occurs even though there is not a full knowledge of their situation, nor a complete conviction that their judgments are correct, nor a full commitment to their decisions. This situation is a permanent feature of being human. No accumulation of insights, no theory, no tradition of moral inquiry no matter how developed, can overcome the basic developmental nature of human existence. If this represents the situation of decline and the problem of evil, for Lonergan, it is not without its solution. But the solution is not more insights, or greater conviction, or stronger commitment. For Lonergan, the solution is supernatural. Now, by supernatural Lonergan does not mean something beyond our universe, or a mysterious power controlling our lives like puppets. Rather, the term supernatural must be understood within the world view of emergent probability. The supernatural solution is a higher integration of natural processes. The natural process of human development

which involves the inability of overcoming decline is resolved through a supernatural intervention which provides human beings with what they lack in knowledge, conviction, and commitment. But, as a higher integration it is, according to Lonergan, an intervention that is in line with human freedom. It is not a supernatural imposition that ignores the natural order where human beings are both essentially and effectively free. Rather, it takes up this freedom to restore human limitations. Specifically, for Lonergan, this intervention involves the infusion of the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love. The theological virtues are the supernatural integration of the natural human process which corrects the problem of development by providing the necessary knowledge, conviction, and commitment to change human situations of decline toward progress in hope, faith, and love.

For our purposes here let us focus on the theological virtue of charity. For Lonergan, charity is the theological virtue that allows human beings to respond to situations of evil by acts of loving kindness.\textsuperscript{36} Charity responds to evil with good actions. For example, suppose that in a state of progress justice is considered as a broad based equality for all members of society. Under ideal conditions justice as equality would act to promote just human

\textsuperscript{36} In a similar way Lonergan writes, “for the evils of the situation and the enmities they engender would only be perpetuated by an even-handed justice: charity alone can wipe the slate clean.” in “The Transition from a Classicist World-View to Historical-Mindedness,” in \textit{A Second Collection}, 8.
relations for the benefit of all. However, in a state of decline justice as
equality promotes injustice. This is so because a state of decline involves a
narrowing of horizons by the dominant group's successive selection of
insights that meet their own interests in opposition and to the detriment of
minority groups. In a state of decline, the demands of justice as equality
mean basically that what are given to the minority groups must be equally
given to the dominant groups otherwise the inequality would be seen as
unfair. But, this only acts to make the dominant groups more powerful by
giving even more to an already dominant group and, thus, further promoting
the decline of society. For Lonergan, in a state of decline only acts of charity
that respond to evil with good acts can offset the imbalances that are
produced by acts of justice; justice is saved by charity. Charity becomes the
correction of the narrow horizons of decline whereby where one might expect
justice, one finds charity instead. The theological virtue of charity, then, is
God's supernatural gift that allows one to respond to one's situation of evil
and sin by intelligent acts of love and kindness.37

37 Lonergan makes the same argument in the essay "The Ongoing
Genesis of Method" in Third Collection where he argues, "can a people, a
civilization, recover from such decline? To my mind the only solution is
religious. What will sweep away the rationalizations? More reasoning will
hardly do it effectively, for it will be suspected of being just so much more
rationalizing. And when reasoning is ineffective, what is left but faith? What
will smash the determinism--economics, social, cultural, psychological--that
egoism has constructed and exploited? What can be offered but the hoping
beyond hope that religion inspires? When finally the human situation
6.2.2. Lonergan's Theology of Redemption

While one can understand generally the supernatural gift of the theological virtues, Lonergan also makes a specific theological argument that the theological virtues are gifts which allow human participation with God's act of redemption.\textsuperscript{38} Lonergan presents his theology of redemption in the Latin text \textit{De Verbo Incarnato} and a condensed version in his article "The Redemption."\textsuperscript{39} For Lonergan, the redemption is principally understood as a communication between God and humanity. The fact of the incarnation and the act of redemption by God is a giving of God to humanity because God loves us. The act of redemption is a reconciliation of humanity with God. This is not, for Lonergan, a vicarious satisfaction, but a personal expression of

\begin{quote}
seethes with alienation, bitterness, resentment, recrimination, hatred, mounting violence, what can retributive justice bring about but a duplication of the evils that already exist? Then what is needed is not retributive justice but self-sacrificing love." 158.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{38} A key difficulty in a theological ethics is the problem of whose religion and which theology? For Lonergan, theology mediates between a religion and a culture. Theological ethics is developed from this same mediation. For our purpose, then, the religion is Christianity, the theology is developed from Bernard Lonergan and the culture is Western, North American.

God.\textsuperscript{40} It is not that Jesus Christ earned salvation for us because he suffered and died on the cross. Rather, for Lonergan, God always loved humanity. The redemption is an act \textit{within} world order as designed by God. It is not an event that God was forced to do because of unforeseen circumstances. The redemption is God's love for us as a personal communication. As Lonergan writes, "the redemption is above all something that is accessible to everyone, no matter what his natural talents or opportunities, his cultural, intellectual, or spiritual development."\textsuperscript{41} The redemption meets the subject where the subject is in the full sense of his or her humanity. It is not something that is available only for a short time, after long hours of prayer and fasting, or accessible to only a few people of a particular culture. Rather, the redemption is God's personal communication to each person as the supernatural gift that facilitates the higher integration of one's development.

Furthermore, the act of redemption is not, for Lonergan, some event that simply occurred at one point in human history. Rather, it is the on-going communication of God to humanity that has the potential to effect human living through cooperation between God and humanity. As such, we can talk

\textsuperscript{40} It is, of course, beyond the scope of this thesis to present Lonergan's full theology of redemption. For a good treatment of this issue see Jean Higgins, "The Redemption," in \textit{Desires of the Human Heart: An Introduction to the Theology of Bernard Lonergan}, 201-21.

\textsuperscript{41} "The Redemption," 7.
about a redemptive praxis that involves human cooperation with God in achieving the higher integrations that God’s love provides. This redemptive praxis is fundamentally a reversal of roles that overcome the situation of decline and sin. As Lonergan writes:

> there is in the death and resurrection of Christ a fundamental intelligibility that is not something like a deductive process but rather like a dialectical process: that sin leads to death, and death, through Christ, becomes the means of salvation. That means that the conditions in this world continue despite the advent of the Messiah, but their very continuance becomes the means by which we proceed to eternal life.\(^{42}\)

Redemptive praxis is a participation in the transformation of sin and death into the source of life and love. This transformation occurs because of God’s love for us and our participation freely chosen. God’s love is manifest in us in accordance with our development and correlative skills that allow us to participate in situations of decline in ways that transform relationships and social arrangements towards progress and away from decline. Thus, the supernatural integration is possible because redemptive praxis transforms decadent social living into a cooperative love with God. It involves taking occasions of sin and transforming them into events of love. According to Lonergan, the world we live in is transformed through the higher integration of cooperative redemptive praxis.

In this way, then, the *aporia* in MacIntyre’s account of evil practices

\(^{42}\) Ibid., 10.
can be resolved. MacIntyre claims that justice, courage, and honesty are enough to reverse decline. We saw that this argument involved the difficulty of promoting a solution that the members of a practice could not take on because they lacked the knowledge and experiences of the virtues that MacIntyre claims could solve the problem of decline. It is precisely because the members do not have either the experience nor the knowledge of the virtues that the solution to the problem of decline must be supernatural. But, this is a viable solution only from within a world-view that acknowledges God’s action within human freedom. Lonergan’s three-fold process of human history and theology of redemption allows for the possibility of the supernatural action in reversing decline as a higher integration of human potentials. The infusion of the theological virtues, like charity, act to facilitate human cooperation to restore their own situations. Acts of charity, not justice, reverse the expectations that are part of the situation of decline.

6.3. Toward a Theological Ethics of Discourse

Developing from Lonergan’s theology of redemption and the theological virtue of charity as a response to the situation of decline, the following will provide an initial sketch of a theological ethics of discourse. First, discourse will be explained as a practice with its internal and external goods. To be specific here, the focus will be on the practice of mediation. Second, we will
explore a theological interpretation of conflict and sin. Third, the theological virtue of charity will be articulated as correlative to the skills of active listening which, in the situation of conflict, act as a redemptive moment which displaces the listening disputant away from his or her own concerns toward the other in the process of role-taking and interpretation.43

6.3.1. Mediation as a Practice

Using the terms and relations of MacIntyre’s notion of practice we can understand mediation to be a practice. It is a complex collaborative system among mediator and disputants. It aims to provide both the internal goods of mediation and some external goods.44 As we saw from the work of Bush and Folger, mediation as a dispute resolution process is uniquely able to provide for both empowerment of self and recognition of the other. Thus, both of these dimensions of moral growth can be viewed as the two internal goods of mediation. Through the facilitation of a third party, disputants are given the

43 This presentation sketches a theological ethics of discourse that assumes a basic theological stance of operative and cooperative grace that explains both that God’s love is operative in human affairs and that humans are free to act. Of particular importance is the function of one’s community to facilitate an attention to God’s grace concretely in human affairs, since as Stebbins argues “. . . the primary recipient of grace is not an individual but a community . . . ” in The Divine Initiative, 138. However, the full range of theological issues that are at play here is beyond the scope of this chapter.

44 Note that the settlement reached in a mediation session is an external good since other means, such as arbitration, litigation, and pre-court trials, exist that can also reach a settlement though the process each uses is different.
opportunity for empowerment and recognition which can be the foundation for lasting and effective settlement. Mediation is concerned with the excellence of being able to work through conflict and achieve both its specific internal goods. Furthermore, the standards of excellence and the internal goods of mediation are systematically extended to the whole society through the cooperative endeavours of mediators and disputants. Mediation as a practice is sustained by mediation as an institution. More and more states and provinces are requiring mediation as a dispute resolution alternative to court. With these changes, there are also demands to formalize the profession of mediation, in part, so that the practice can be sustained. The practice of mediation, then, consists in the cooperative set-up between mediator and disputants who, through discourse, attempt to achieve the internal goods of empowerment and recognition.

6.3.2. Conflict and Sin

In chapter five we saw that for Bush and Folger conflict is an

\[\text{Interestingly, the debates about the professionalization of the mediator focus around the internal goods of mediation. If the field is professionalized, can it still provide what it was originally designed to do, that is, its internal goods? If it is not professionalized, can the practice of mediation survive without being supported by an institutional framework? Here again is an example of the structural conflict between a practice and its institution. See, for example, Cheryl A. Picard, "Surviving the Critique: The Growth of Informal Justice," in The Proceedings of the Conflict Resolution Symposium 1996, ed. Catherine Borshuk, Peter Monette and Rena Ramkay (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1997), 1-26.}\]
opportunity for moral growth through both empowerment and recognition. Conflict emerges for a number of reasons; miscommunication, perceived incompatible goals or values, or lack of moral development to list a few. Theologically speaking, however, conflict can involve sin when it emerges from the three-fold bias. The conflict that emerges from the individual bias is the refusal of images that may disrupt present psychic order. The conflict that emerges from group bias is the refusal to consider the concerns and needs of people from other groups. The conflict that emerges from general bias is the refusal of intelligence to move to a theoretical framework to work out practical problems in the long term. In social living, these biases can manifest themselves as feelings of anger, mistrust, envy, and fear. The destructive results of such manifestations speak for themselves. Destructive conflict produces alienation, resentment, separation, violence, and war. In conflict, as a state of decline, disputants find evidence that confirm their biased viewpoint. The destructiveness of conflict leads to its escalation and the eventual disintegration of the good of order that once united disputants. Theologically, conflict can be an opportunity for disputants to open themselves to accept the theological virtues which allow them to transform their situation of decline and sin into one of progress and development. Conflict resolution, then, can become a redemptive praxis which aims at an authentic discourse.
6.3.3. Charity in Mediation

A mediator's skillful interventions in conflict situations can act to shift the probability that disputants will be able to constructively resolve their dispute. Mediators do this in two ways. First, their actions model constructive discourse patterns. The mediation session is, in part, a place where disputants can begin, at least initially, to learn the skills of conflict resolution. Second, mediator interventions help to reorientate the substantive positions and underlying issues of the disputants such that they are able to achieve both acts of empowerment and recognition. More specifically, I would argue that correlative to the theological virtue of charity are the skills of active listening. Charity orientates disputants to a love of God and fellow human beings concretely within the practice of mediation in association with the specialization of active listening. Actively listening involves altering the criteria of one's concern from self-satisfaction to valuing the concerns of others. In situations of conflict this shift can be experienced not as the achievement of a stronger will to listen, but the infused virtue of

\[\text{In terms of emergent probability, the conflict pattern represents a destructive scheme. The mediator's intervention is a defensive scheme that interferes with the conflict pattern in order to allow a constructive scheme to emerge. Once this constructive scheme emerges, the probability of its survival is dependent upon the mediator's intervention to prohibit negative interferences from the disputants. But, the acceptance of the gift of charity can continue long after the mediation session is over thereby conditioning the survival of the constructive discourse scheme among the disputants.}\]
charity. The gift of charity facilitates the process of bringing the concerns of the other within one's own horizon. In fact, active listening consists of seven different kinds of skills: reframing, encouraging, clarifying, restating, reflecting, summarizing, and validating.\footnote{These seven are taken from Cheryl Picard, \textit{Campus Mediation Training Manual}, (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992), 22-5. In fact, Picard does not include reframing as an active listening skills, however, it does have the same types of characteristics as the other six as to be included in the group at least for our purposes.} Reframing, for example, is the skill of organizing the content of another person's speech acts within a different frame of reference. It usually consists in reframing a disputant's positional statement into a value statement. Positional statements tend to specify action strategies that the disputant wants as an outcome of the mediation. The active listening of reframing articulates the underlying value that is expressed in the positional statement. Take the following exchange for example:

\textit{D: I want to be able to go home at night without a hassle!}

\textit{M: So, security in your neighbourhood is important for you?}

\textit{D: Yes.}

The reframing has the effect of expanding the disputant's frame of reference by articulating the underlying values that the disputant holds. In effect, the mediator does what the disputant is unable to do; he or she alters the frame of reference to discover the common ground between disputants. The
mediator will reframe for both disputants and thereby attempt to articulate a value frame of reference which both parties can hold. Reframing allows disputants to disengage from their own horizon of concern and understand the concerns of the other. This acts to increase the likelihood that disputants will be able to resolve their dispute based upon identified common concerns and judgments that occurs on the third level of the structure of ethical discourse.

The change that often occurs in mediation involves a real transformation of the disputants' horizon. Lonergan discusses two types of shifts in horizon; horizontal and vertical.\textsuperscript{48} Horizontal shifts simply concern an expansion within an existing value reference. New understandings may be added that reinforce one's convictions. Vertical shifts, however, involve a radical change in value reference. What before the shift one did not care about, after the shift becomes one's value. The transformation of horizon in conflict is generally a vertical shift. The concerns of the other disputants become one's own concerns. Theologically, this shift represents the type of reorientation that is affected by God's gift of charity. Before the mediation session, each disputant expects his or her concerns to be the major focus of their discussion. In fact, the thrust of conflict is often felt as the force of establishing one's concerns over and against those of the other. However,

\textsuperscript{48} On vertical and horizontal shifts in horizon see \textit{Method}, 237.
through charity this priority is reversed. Active listening manifests charity by allowing the other's concerns to enter into one's own value framework. This involves the shifting of horizons such that one is able to recognize the other as other subject, understand the other's point of view as the other understands it, arrive at common judgments of both fact and value, and together commit to decisions that constructively effect arrangements of social living. The shift in horizon, then, represents a transformation of the destructive aspects of the conflict through a redemptive praxis whereby the disputants are able to achieve the internal goods of mediation and effectively reconstitute their relationship and their patterns of social living.

6.4. Summary of Chapter Six

Conflict resolution can be an experience of redemptive praxis. It can transform the destructive feelings and intentions in conflict into a constructive collaborative horizon of mutual concern. Through this new higher integrative horizon, disputants can reorganize their social living toward collaborative projects that promote their common values. This acts, no doubt, to shift social living away from decline and toward progress. But, the shift though enacted through human activity is fundamentally constituted by God's love for humanity. This love as permanently and universally available transforms human beings through a supernatural higher integration. It takes human beings where they are in their place of
development and reorientates them toward God. It is this supernatural solution to the problem of evil that resolves the *aporia* in MacIntyre's account of evil practices. While MacIntyre offers a great deal of ethical analysis of practices that can, no doubt, be useful for empirical study, he cannot account for how practices might overcome their own decline. Lonergan's account of God's solution and specifically, the act of redemption, allows for a more explanatory account of the history of a practice. Upon such redemptive praxis, human beings can live within their current states of social living in such a way that every act of evil is met with a corresponding act of love, where every act of loss is met with an act of hope and where every act of despair is met with an act of kindness.
Conclusion

This thesis has been concerned with a basic problem for pluralistic society; how can members of diverse traditions come together in discourse to cooperatively live in their society? This question, or one much like it, has motivated philosophers, ethicists, and theologians to grapple with the very ideas of society and the basis of human relationships. Proceduralists have worked with the pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation to work out the requirements of a pluralistic discourse adequate to meet the demands of pluralism. Communitarians have worked with the historical and tradition-constituted nature of moral knowledge to argue that procedural concerns also are not enough to meet the concrete ethical problems of pluralistic society. This thesis offers a contribution to this debate by focusing on the structure of ethical discourse that has its source in the structure of conscious intentionality. I argued that the four levels of the structure of ethical discourse allow us to understand the complexity of discourse for our pluralistic society.

Chapter one began with the philosophical framework of Alasdair MacIntyre in order to enter into the debate on pluralistic discourse. MacIntyre argues that contemporary society is emotivist in its ethical framework. Emotivism is the philosophy that claims that all ethical statements are merely expressions of personal preference. On a social level, it does not expect a rational debate on ethical issues. Instead, according to MacIntyre, emotivism gives rise to an ethical debate controlled by political
Conclusion

will. He argues, however, that there is a method for rational ethical debate in pluralistic society. This method involves a dialectical process whereby members of diverse moral traditions can encounter each other and advance collective understanding on moral issues. In fact, for MacIntyre, the dialectical method is not a new method, but is the basic approach that Thomas Aquinas used in synthesizing the two great Western traditions of Aristotle and Augustine. For MacIntyre, Aquinas' synthesis represents the ideal of his dialectical method. I elaborated this method by discussing seven related issues. Part of MacIntyre's argument for his dialectical method is that, although it is founded upon Aquinas' account of practical rationality, it can be radically revised. There is no place in MacIntyre's overall ethical framework for a permanent ethical or philosophical achievement. All ethical knowledge is simply the best answer so far developed through the dialectical encounter among traditions. But, this introduces a problem in MacIntyre's account of the dialectical method. According to Michael Maxwell's critique, the method of MacIntyre's dialectical process itself cannot be open to radical revision, since one cannot base a revision of rationality by using that rationality. For Maxwell, MacIntyre's dialectical method possesses this aporia because he does not make an adequate interpretation of Aquinas' notion of rationality. Maxwell suggests that Bernard Lonergan's account of human inquiry, based as it is on an adequate account of Aquinas' rationality,
can provide for the trans-traditional element to the dialectical method that MacIntyre avoids. But, far from being a universal perspective that appeals to substantive norms, Lonergan’s trans-traditional notion of human inquiry is heuristic. Maxwell’s suggestion regarding overcoming MacIntyre’s internal problem by working with Lonergan’s cognitional theory is a clue. I argued that Lonergan’s work can provide for a nonuniversalist, trans-traditional basis for articulating pluralistic discourse because it attends to the basic structure of the human pursuit of truth, value, and action.

Chapter two introduced Bernard Lonergan’s world-view of emergent probability and his cognitional theory. The chapter aimed to provide the basic framework within which the structure of ethical discourse can be elaborated. Emergent probability is the term of Lonergan’s dynamic world-view. As a world-view, it accounts for the methods of classical and statistical inquiry as fundamentally complementary. Each method is interdependent and can be used to analyze data. The prime example of these two methods at work is Lonergan’s notion of a scheme of recurrence. A scheme of recurrence allows for classical and statistical investigations in both natural and human processes. Within emergent probability, Lonergan is able to account for the structure of human inquiry. Thus, Lonergan’s cognitional theory is briefly presented through the use of a thought experiment. But, two problems immediately were raised. The first is the question of interpreting Lonergan’s
account of practical insight in chapter eighteen of *Insight*. Specifically, the question is what kind of knowing does practical insight intend? I argued that Lonergan uses three different understandings of the term “knowing” in chapter eighteen of *Insight*: knowing concerned with facts; knowing concerned with value; and knowing concerned with action. The second question concerned the issue of how the operations of intentionality function on the different levels of intentionality. There is a question in Lonergan studies concerning the reduplication of the operations of intentionality on different levels. This question was addressed because it has some repercussions on the image that one has of the four levels of intentionality and their interrelations. The structure of ethical discourse presented in chapter three works with a dynamic image of conscious intentionality, not a simple step model whereby one ascends through inquiry first by experience, then understanding, judging, and decision. From these two questions, chapter two considered Lonergan’s notion of meaning as an expansion of the basic structure of conscious intentionality. The issue of meaning allowed for an articulation of Lonergan’s notions of intersubjectivity, the human good, the dialectic of history, bias, and cosmopolis. This was followed by an brief review of the literature of Lonergan scholars who have worked with Lonergan’s seminal insights on subjectivity and expanded the analysis into the situation of discourse and intersubjectivity. Throughout chapter two, the
aim was to provide the basic framework to work out the structure of ethical discourse. 

Chapter three was the first part of an articulation of the structure of ethical discourse. I argued that the structure of ethical discourse has its source in the structure of subjective conscious intentionality. Two people engage in face-to-face discourse to discuss some ethical issue. This engagement is structured by the four levels of conscious intentionality contextualized by the encounter of discourse. This generates the four levels of the structure of ethical discourse as recognition, mutual understanding, common judgment, and cooperative action. Fundamental to this encounter is the process of gesture, response, and unification. This foundational discourse scheme of recurrence was articulated by drawing on the work of Gibson Winter's account of sociality and Kenneth Melchin's reworking of the dialectic of unification. This foundational discourse scheme is operative throughout the discourse. Each level of the structure orientates the foundational scheme towards the goal of each specific level. On the level of recognition, I worked with Winter's notion of the We-relation. In the We-relation, discourse partners engage in the gesture, response and role-taking of self and other images. I also offered a correction to Winter's account of consciousness via Lonergan's intentionality analysis. On the level of mutual understanding, I worked with Lonergan's notion of expression and
interpretation. An expression is an attempt to communicate an insight to another person. The structure of an expression intricately links the discourse partners. But, the expression must be interpreted. Discourse is the place wherein interpretations of each other's expressions can be clarified directly through questions and answers. On the level of common judgment, I worked with Lonergan's notion of judgment. Judgments grasp the existence of the fulfilling conditions of propositional statements. Establishing the conditions involves asking all the relevant questions. In discourse, this means that one must seek the questions of other people in affirming judgments of fact and value. This gives rise to a three-fold set of judgments that consist of the subset of judgments of agreement, judgments of disagreement, and judgments of agreements to disagree. This tripartite set of judgments allows for a greater awareness of the types of judgments that concern all discourse partners. Upon these judgments, discourse partners establish their collective, higher viewpoint as an integration of their pre-discourse horizons. On the fourth level of cooperative action, discourse partners work out practical insights. Practical insights can be considered, committed to, collectively decided upon and implemented in cooperative action strategies that constructively effect the social arrangement of the discourse partners. Chapter three, then, elaborated the structure of ethical discourse.
Chapter four worked out two characteristics of the structure of ethical discourse in response to two issues in MacIntyre's dialectical encounter. A recurrence scheme analysis provides for a first characteristic of the internal norms of discourse. Each level of the structure of ethical discourse has its own internal norm which must be attended to in the discourse in order for the discourse to constructively achieve the goals of each level. On the level of recognition there is the norm of attention. Each discourse partner must be attentive in providing authentic self-images to the other. On the level of mutual understanding, there is the norm of the universal viewpoint. The universal viewpoint is not some place from nowhere, but the perspective that includes potentially all possible interpretations of each other's expressions. On the level of common judgment, there is the norm of asking all the relevant questions. In coming to common judgments that involve the tripartite set, discourse partners must allow for all the relevant questions from all partners in order that those judgments can carry the conviction that is associated with making judgments. On the level of cooperative action, there are the internal norms associated with consideration, commitment, decision, and action. Of particular importance is the internal norm to carry out in action what one has decided upon in discourse. This requires a degree of trust among discourse partners that what has been agreed to in discourse will become part of the new routines in their collective action. A second
characteristic of the structure of ethical discourse concerns a compound notion of solidarity. The structure of ethical discourse provides for an understanding of a compound notion of solidarity. Solidarity here does not simply mean having the same rational affirmations, or beliefs. Rather, there is a distinct quality of solidarity on each level of the discourse. On the level of recognition, there is the solidarity of the exchange of images. On the level of mutual understanding, there is the solidarity involved in the linkages of adequate expressions and interpretation. On the level of common judgment, there is the solidarity of the higher viewpoint that consists in the collective convictions associated with each subset of judgments of agreement, disagreement, and agreement to disagree. On the level of cooperative action, there is the solidarity of establishing new action strategies that aim to constructively alter existing routines toward new social arrangements. These two characteristics of the internal norms of discourse and the compound notion of solidarity show some of the advantages of a heuristic approach to the question of pluralistic discourse.

In chapter five the thesis sought to concretely illustrate the structure of ethical discourse. I did this by working with material from the field of mediation. Mediation works with destructive discourse patterns among discourse partners and tries to constructively resolve disputes. This chapter first presented a brief review of literature in the field of mediation in order
identify divergent understandings of the mediation process. The work of Robert Baruch Bush and Joseph Folger was used to illustrate the structure of ethical discourse. Their work has raised a lot of interest in the field because it represents a significant attempt to coherently account for the process of transformative mediation. They present the structure of mediation by articulating the three general patterns of transformative mediation. I illustrated the structure of ethical discourse by making linkages with their own work. Chapter five, then, aimed to concretely illustrate the structure of ethical discourse through the field of mediation.

Chapter six followed up on the concrete illustration of the structure of ethical discourse by providing an initial sketch of a theological ethics of discourse by working with insights of the three major sources of this thesis. This chapter started with MacIntyre's notion of practice. A practice is a cooperative system which aims to provide internal goods that benefit the larger society. It does this by establishing standards of excellence that members of the practice must follow in order that their virtuous acts will provide for the internal goods of their practice. The notion of a practice was expanded by considering both issues of relationships in practice and institutions. Of particular importance was the question of evil practices. I argued that MacIntyre's account of how evil practices are overcome involves an *aporia*. From within his own account of practice, MacIntyre cannot
adequately account for how evil practices can be restored to good practices. This *aporia* can be resolve, I further suggested, by working with Lonergan's dialectic of progress, decline, and redemption. A practice in decline does not have the resources to reverse its own decline. Thus, it requires an external source; the redemptive moment. This was presented through Lonergan's heuristic account of God's solution to the human problem of evil. From this heuristic account, I briefly presented Lonergan's theology of redemption as the theological correlative. The redemption of Christ allows for our redemptive participation in our world in overcoming evil practices. This was illustrated in the case of mediation. I argued that mediation is a practice. Conflict can be the place of sin and it can be the place of redemptive practice. The mediator, I argued, can facilitate the redemptive praxis of charity via the skills of active listening. These interventions can act to shift the probabilities that the disputants' will take up the gift of charity which overcomes the priority of destructive conflict by allowing the concerns of the other to become one's own. This amounts to a redemptive praxis whereby charity is allowed to alter conflicting patterns among discourse partners toward constructive engagements among all partners. In such constructive engagements, discourse partners operate within their common, higher viewpoint to work out action strategies that effect their social living. Chapter six, then, brought together the three major sources of this thesis to articulate
a redemptive praxis which aims to alter destructive patterns of social living towards constructive patterns constituted by God's gift of charity.
Bibliography


_______. "Analogical Knowledge of God and the Value of Moral Endeavor."
Bibliography


Frankena, William K. Review of After Virtue: A Study of Moral Theory, by
Bibliography


Higgins, Jean. "Redemption." In The Desires of the Human Heart: An


Lawrence, Frederick G. "The Fragility of Consciousness: Lonergan and the Postmodern Concern for the Other." In *Communication and Lonergan: Common Ground for Forging the New Age*, eds. Thomas J. Farrell and


_____. "How Can We Learn What Veritatis Splendor Has To Teach?" The Thomist 58 (1994): 171-95.


Pinzon, Luis Arturo. "The Production of Power and Knowledge in Mediation."


Stout, Jeffery. "Homeward Bound: MacIntyre on Liberal Society and the


