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NL-339 (Rev. 8/80)
ROMAN INGARDEN'S CRITICAL PHENOMENOLOGY

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Thesis presented to the School of Graduate Studies
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Ph.D. in Philosophy

UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA
OTTAWA, CANADA, 1978

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ABSTRACT

Ingarden investigates whether species have essences in the same way as particular real objects have essences. He thinks that Husserl could not distinguish the concept of essence from that of species. He goes along with Husserl's phenomenological investigations and accepts the principle of epoché as necessary for non-question begging cognition of the object. He also accepts the results of those of Husserl's analysis which lead to the discovery of the domain of pure consciousness.

Ingarden finds, however, no justification in Husserl's attempt to define the domain of pure consciousness as absolute and the domain of objects as relative. By virtue of Husserl's phenomenological reduction, existing entities become constituted objects in the experience of pure consciousness as intentional correlates of such experience. Ingarden therefore starts defining the existential status of the domain of pure consciousness and that of objects and examines the nature of the relation that holds between them.

He concludes that we grasp the nature of objects only through their mode of being, and these modes only
through certain existential moments characteristic of a mode. Such moments when grasped reveal the constitutive nature of objects.

Together with this analysis, Ingarden examines the domain of pure consciousness with regard to its existential moments as well as objects and finds they both are autonomous in their existence while the intentional correlate of the object is not autonomous but heteronomous.

Unlike Husserl, for Ingarden the principle of epoché leaves objects unaffected and it only facilitates a transition from the life-world to the phenomenal-world, from objects to purely intentional objectivities. The content of purely intentional objectivities carries the heteronomous ontic character of the phenomenon, not the autonomous ontic character of the real object. This is rendered possible because of the reduction.

He then examines the constitutive nature of this heteronomous object in terms of other existential moments which are in fact characteristics of dependency relations. He concludes that their structure is like structure of meaning of a word. Those entities that result directly from executing an intentional act are known only to one subject while as meaning correlates they are known
inter-subjectively for meaning itself is inter-subjective. Likewise Ingarden uses the theory of intentional correlate of sentence-meaning unit to establish a relation between intentional states-of-affairs and objectively existing intentional state-of-affair states-of-affairs on the one hand. On the other, being an intentional correlate of the subjective sentence formation act, it is dependent for its source on the autonomous existence of pure consciousness.

His analysis of word-meaning shows that the entire range of potential stocks of word-meaning as contained in its ideal concept does not allow the subjective sentence forming operation to fully exhaust its content, thereby providing the meaning unit (both at word-level and sentence) à transcendence from subjective conscious act. For ideal concept is in itself as an autonomous being, transcendent to pure consciousness. Thus in order to establish inter-subjective identity of meaning Ingarden recognises, besides pure consciousness and word-sign, ideal concept, as autonomous entities and as ontic foundations of meaning. Thus Ingarden explains the essential relation objects hold to consciousness as intentionally meaningful quasi-real entities.

In this attempt, in as much as Ingarden recognises in addition to pure consciousness, word-sign and ideal concept, his phenomenology is a critical phenomenology.
In as much as he accepted pure consciousness at all, he is a phenomenologist.
This thesis grew out of a graduate paper where I tried to decipher the ontic foundations of meaning from § 66 in *The Literary Work of Art*. I soon realized that if one could understand Ingarden's ontic foundations of meaning one could understand his philosophy. Since then it has been my effort to trace the philosophical development of Ingarden that led him to postulate these ontic foundations i.e., his theory of ideal concept.

To begin with, I found, as Tymieniecka points out, that "Ingarden's inquiries are scattered in voluminous, only partly correlated, fragments of analysis within a common framework, ... and the crucial parts and links in his programmed edifice are still missing." While in Poland for seventeen months, collecting materials for my research I collaborated with Professor Andrzej Połtawski of Kraków and Professor Peter J. McCormick of Ottawa in the preparation of Ingarden Bibliography (Appendix III). Neither Professor Połtawski nor Professor D. Gierulanka nor Professor W. Strózewski could explain as to why Ingarden doubted the existence of ideal concepts. Professor A. Stepień of Catholic University of Lublin pointed out to me Ingarden's
Preface to the Polish edition of The Literary Work of Art, saying that since Ingarden himself said that he no more believed in the existence of ideal concept, it should be treated as not so important in his philosophy. Professor Bohdan Dziemidok of Marie Curie Sklodowska University in Lublin then most helpfully called my attention to some recent works of P. Graff which confirmed my initial views on the importance of the doctrine of ideal concept in Ingarden's Phenomenology. And towards the end of my stay in Poland Professor Poltawski wrote to me saying that he "has some difficulties in understanding why Ingarden had felt he could not dispense with the ideal concepts as absolutely existing entities."

Even in Poland, Ingarden is known more for his phenomenological aesthetics than for his existenology. Outside Poland in Tymieniecka's "Beyond Ingarden's idealism-realism controversy with Husserl - the New Contextual Phase of Phenomenology" I could hardly find any reference to Ingarden's theory of ideal concept. It could be said that Ingarden's cryptic remarks in the Preface to the Polish edition of The Literary Work of Art has eluded Tymieniecka for nearly two decades of her scholarly work on Ingarden. Dr. Arnor Hannibolsson's thesis seems to be the only thesis on Ingarden where too, only two chapters are closely concerned with Ingarden's ontology,
and these do not take into account and of the ontic foundations of meaning nor the problem of intersubjective identity independent of the ontic foundations.

Viewed in this context, my efforts have been to read in the controversy over the existence of the world, the controversy over the existence of ideal concept and thus to present Ingarden’s phenomenology through his existential ontology.

NOTES


3. Private Communication from Kraków, letter dated March 25, 78.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to Professor T. Krukowski of University of Ottawa for introducing me to Polish language and for recommending me for the award of a scholarship at the Catholic University of Lublin (KUL) in Poland. I take this opportunity to thank the Most Rev. Professor dr. M. Krąpiec, Rector of KUL, and Professor dr. Stefan Sawicki, the Vice-Rector, for providing me with financial support throughout my stay in Poland.

During my stay in Poland I received encouragement and guidance in my research from Professor Danuta Gierulanka of Kraków; Professor A. Połtawski of the Academy of Catholic Theology in Warsaw; Professor A. Stępień of KUL; Professor Bohdan Dziemidok of University Marie Curie Skłodowska in Lublin and Professor W. Stróżewski of Jagiellonian University of Kraków. I thank them. I am also thankful to the Franciscan Fathers of Kraków for their repeated hospitality.

I wish to thank Professor Benoît Garceau, University of Ottawa who granted me leave of absence to continue the research in Poland and Professor Maurice Carignan,
for whom I was a graduate Assistant during my stay in Ottawa, for helping me with the translation of French texts.

I would like to thank Professor Peter J. McCormick not only for supervising my thesis but also for visiting me in Lublin (from Konstanz) to help me to revise a good part of my thesis. He and Mrs. Hélène McCormick have been a constant source of support in Ottawa. I would also like to thank my wife Alicja for her help in translating Polish texts.
INTRODUCTION

Till now scholars on Ingarden have not argued Roman Ingarden's basic philosophical position. Tymieniecka, for instance, believes that Ingarden's works do not lend themselves to a coherent, systematic interpretation and that Ingarden goes beyond the idealism - realism controversy inherent in Husserlian phenomenology towards a pure ontology. 1 Gadamer on the other hand believes that Ingarden merely applies phenomenological method to aesthetics, in particular to the literary work of art. 2 In general, scholars share one or the other of these two dominant views. In my opinion both these views are incorrect.

In this context I believe, my thesis represents a different point of view. Firstly, it distinguishes Ingarden's philosophical position from those of other phenomenologists. I am referring to this distinction when I speak of Ingarden as a critical phenomenologist. Secondly, the thesis traces and develops Ingarden's philosophical position through his published works. Thirdly, it rehabilitates his fundamental theory of ideal concept which has been ignored by scholars on Ingarden. Fourthly, provided my point of view is considered,
it necessitates further researches in re-establishing the ontic foundations of a work of art, aesthetic object, and aesthetic value in addition to re-examining the ontic foundations of human action and moral values, both of which are beyond the scope of my thesis.

Ingarden is a critical phenomenologist in the sense that he propounds the existence of the domain of ideal concept transcendent to the existence of the domain of pure consciousness. Pure phenomenologists in the sense of Husserl's programmatic statements in the first volume of *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung* do not accept the existence of anything transcendent to pure consciousness. It is this result of Roman Ingarden's researches which my thesis tries to trace through much but not all of Ingarden's philosophical development.

For Roman Ingarden, pure phenomenological inquiries cannot account in particular for the intersubjective identity of objectively existing states of affairs. A certain form of solipsism is ineluctably present in such philosophical position. It is to overcome such a danger that Ingarden propounds the theory of ideal concept which is therefore of central importance in his critical phenomenology. Though it is not relevant to the establishment of my thesis, the radical position of
Ingarden is that no pure epistemology is possible in any philosophical tradition. For any epistemological investigation has certain ontic consequences, which lead either to a solipsistic conclusion or to ontological commitments. A pure ontological investigation thus is also not possible. Ingarden's philosophical position is therefore an existential ontology, which investigates the various dependency relations between objects of cognition and our awareness of them, and as to how they are intersubjectively identified. These dependency relations are known by the modes of existence and the moments of existence of the objects of cognition. One of the modes of existence is intentional existence which assumes a vital role in Ingarden's critical phenomenology.

Ingarden's criticisms of Husserl have been uniformly presented by previous works as a polemic against Husserlian position without however establishing the relevance of such a criticism to Ingarden's own systematic exposition and to the results he arrives at. Ingarden's criticisms of Husserl is meant to explicate Ingarden's doctrine of intentional object, which is one of the three basic concepts of his existential ontology.

In the first chapter I have expressed how each phase of Ingarden's philosophical development is different from
the other. His early phase is an investigation into pure
ontology which he eventually abandons. His creative phase
is marked by his inquiries into existential ontology while
his postwar development is restricted to the application
of the concepts of existential ontology to studies in
aesthetics and philosophical anthropology, and to certain
revisions of these concepts. My thesis is concerned with
his creative phase. In chapter two I have tried to show
the sources of his creative phase chiefly drawing evidence
from the writings of his early phase where he discusses
in what sense a pure epistemology is possible. Only a few
scholars (Hempelenski, Motroshilova and Lubnicki) have
commented on these writings of the early phase of Ingarden,
though they incorrectly believe that Ingarden wrote at that
time under the influence of Husserl.

In my third chapter I have elaborated the three
concepts of existential ontology i.e., modes of being,
moment of being and the doctrine of intentional object.
In order to render the existence of intentional object
intersubjectively cognisable, Ingarden elaborates the
theory of the intentional correlate of sentence meaning
unit, which I have expounded in chapter four. Since for
Ingarden the intersubjective identity of the intentional
object is known only through the intentional correlates
of sentence meaning units, and the intersubjective
identity of meaning is maintained by the ideal concept in the penultimate chapter I have expounded the theory of ideal concept as one of the ontic foundations of meaning. Since I have expounded for the first time the ontic foundations of meaning, and since his philosophical position is shown here finally to depend upon the ontic foundations of meaning, I believe I have substantially contributed towards a better understanding of Ingarden's philosophy. In order to reiterate my claim, I have brought in view, in the final chapter, the opinions of some scholars on the status of ideal concept. As a conclusion to his researches, Ingarden says, "we believe that in this way we have overcome the danger of subjectivizing the literary work... But we have done so only by accepting the existence of ideal concepts. In order to fully justify the correctness of our position, we would need a theory of ideal concepts and their actualisations in word meanings. This, however, would require a new and extensive study". My thesis is an attempt to fulfil this wish of Roman Ingarden.

The philosophical style of Ingarden is hard to follow and at times obscure largely due to the fact that the concepts he employs are not current in any philosophical literature. The translation of such a text tends to be more obscure because of the pronouns which he uses. One
find it hard to decide on the reference of the pronouns in uninvolved sentences that are common features in his writings. Ingarden changed the nomenclature of the concepts of his early phase substantially and incorporated a good part of his researches of his early phase into the writings of his creative phase. I have therefore referred mostly to two of his works of creative phase namely The Literary Work of Art and the Controversy Over the Existence of the World. Further, I have avoided reference to any work by scholars on Ingarden except in my penultimate and final chapters.

NOTES


CHAPTER I

THE PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION OF

ROMAN INGARDEN

1. Introduction

Phenomenological philosophy as a school of contemporary thought is suspected to be nothing but an idealism. The method of the phenomenological reduction which holds that all our beliefs about the empirical factors with regard to the existence of the world should be suspended if we are to have a knowledge of the world at all, the theory of immanent perception that assigns a role of priority to pure consciousness in its epistemological methodology, and the doctrine of intentionality that brings with it both scholastic and Brentanist ideas of mental phenomena all have obscured the claims of Edmund Husserl that phenomenology is "a rigorous science."

Roman Ingarden in his long association with Husserl, both as a student and as a critic, developed a philosophy of his own. Ingarden's major work, The Controversy Over the Existence of the World,¹ as well as The Literary Work
of Art were written as a critique of Husserl's phenomenology, though he had occasion to wonder whether his Controversy Over the Existence of the World would be considered a phenomenological study.

Ingarden's philosophy is not merely a critique of Husserlian thought. He accepts both the method of the reduction and its eventual phenomenological residue as constituted though in a different sense from that of Husserl. He is grateful to Husserl for leading him to the hitherto unexplored domain of pure consciousness. Yet, after having discovered that domain of pure consciousness, he struggles to devise ways to get away from Husserl's impending idealism, out of the depth of subjective isolation. Both in his advance through involved associations with Husserl's phenomenology and in his retreat from the doctrine of the epoché, Ingarden exhibits rare philosophical insight in his phenomenological work. It is in his return from the "fairy world of 'only the phenomena themselves'," that his critical phenomenology is to be discerned.

Whether phenomenological epistemology is possible without considering the wider metaphysical problems of mind is the question we discern in Ingarden's critical phenomenology. Though Ingarden says a pure theory of cognition is possible through eidetic analysis, he admits
a certain ontological or metaphysical consequence in every epistemological investigation which cannot be explained away. In this sense his critical phenomenology is to be described as metaphysical phenomenology. In the sense that his investigations are metaphysical, it can be said that his is a critique of philosophy.

2. Ingarden's Philosophical Development---
The Early Phase

It was under Husserl's direction that Ingarden wrote his thesis on Intuition und Intellekt bei Henri Bergson. In it he rejects Bergson's assertion about the inability of intellectual cognition to apprehend concretely flowing reality so as to find a basis for an absolute theory of cognition. Early in his philosophical career Ingarden was intrigued by Twardowski's attempt to do philosophy as an exact science. Under Husserl's guidance such a passionate ideal remained an influencing factor on Ingarden's philosophical inquiries. Though he starts with Bergson's premise to base true cognition on immediate data apprehended by intuition, Ingarden finds unacceptable Bergson's assertions that such phenomena as "reality is flux" or "things-in-themselves" are not cognisable. If true cognition is based on intuitive apprehension, then how can things-in-themselves not be cognisable? Unlike
Bergson, in order to explore possibilities to cognize individuals, Ingarden sought to define the essence of individual objects, as that which provides absolute and invariable structure for objects. If true cognition is at all possible, Ingarden reasons, then both objects and consciousness must have certain distinct and essential immanent features. Thus Ingarden believed that the essence of pure consciousness is distinct from that of things as an entity, a belief which he shared with Husserl. But unlike Husserl, Ingarden did not believe in the absolute being of pure consciousness which later led him to believe in the existence of ideal concepts which are transcendent to pure consciousness. All these beliefs of Ingarden were part of his attempt to find the basis for a pure cognitive theory and of his search for the foundation of knowledge as a critique of philosophy.

Ingarden's growing concern, therefore, is to investigate the position of a pure cognitive theory in a philosophical system and what problems such a cognitive theory should address itself to; what method it should adopt; which means of cognition it should use; and, above all, which area is to be considered as philosophical. That is to say, his concern was how to demarcate the limits of epistemological questions that extend into metaphysical
problems for their justification. He believed that for
a philosophical investigation pure cognitive theory is
not only possible but also necessary. His belief in the
existence of the essence of pure consciousness and in the
existence of ideal concepts transcendent to pure
consciousness, is held for the sake of defending the
possibility and the necessity of pure cognitive theory.
Thus he says, without the assumption of the existence of
the essence of pure consciousness, absolute cognition is
impossible. And he adds that, if we justify the
possibility of absolute cognition, then we have to accept
the absolute necessity of certain forms of logical-formal
categories as intuitive, for if such forms are relative
then knowledge of an absolute kind is not possible.
It is for this reason that he defends the possibility of
pure cognitive theory against the alleged threat of
petitio principii in "Über die Gefahr einerpetitio
principii in der Erkenntnistheorie" where he investigates
the nature of the "given" and argues for the distinction
between "objective givenness" and "experiencing" as also
"undergoing" or "living-through the experience." It is
to inquire into the essence of knowledge which he finds
as the basic problem of the theory of knowledge that he
investigates the nature of the given. For him, the
existence of knowledge should not be presupposed in any
way. Ingarden says, that although Kant distinguishes things as they are from their appearances, he says nothing about things as they are, for he thought that the basic categorical structures of objects are subjective forms of intellect.

What seems to have been the guiding force in Ingarden's investigations is the belief that "what is essential in an object [is what] keeps it fully within the bounds that are accessible to our cognition." He defines the essence of an individual object by contrast with the general and particular idea of it: The variables and constant factors as well as the actual and potential moments of an idea of the individual object help determine the essential nature of an individual in its formal structure and material contents. According to him an investigation that assimilates the formal content of an individual object as the materially determining factors and that which does not distinguish formal ontological inquiry from that of pure formal inquiry cannot explain the essential constitutive nature of an individual object. Ingarden therefore rejects the pure formalistic approach which ignores the discovery of the essence of an object and its essential qualitative and formal features. The structure of such formal essential features
is not the same as the formal categorical structure of an object according to Ingarden. A pure cognitive theory, therefore, cannot reject as unknowable what accounts for the essential content of an object, that is, the constitutive nature of an object. Such an inquiry that analyses the basic structure of existing individual objects in order to grasp their individual distinctness and to define their essences has been Ingarden's preoccupation since the time of his *Essentiale Fragen*. This notion plays a very important role in the formal ontology of Ingarden as distinct from that of Husserl. For Husserl included many existential ontological questions as well as material ontological questions in his study of formal ontology.

For Ingarden, the intuition of the essence of experience as cognition requires no other act of cognition directed towards the object of cognition. In the intuitive lived through act, what is grasped is identical with the act of knowing and hence is a grasping of itself. Since there is a loose identity between the act of knowing and the knowledge without however their distinctness being lost, any possibility of doubt about the intuitively lived through experience is excluded in principle. It is on the basis of this view that
Ingarden propounds a pure cognitive theory which as a system of tenets would eventually serve as a set of criteria for an applied theory of cognition. Such a view of pure cognitive theory is not rooted so much in a desire to find a firm basis for philosophy as a rigorous science as Husserl or Twardowski wanted it to be, as in Ingarden's dissatisfaction with the unending metaphysical idealism-realism controversy for he says that the "assumption of the necessity of a theory of being cannot be forced upon us either by idealists or by realists." His own position is that philosophy has a special area of research which is not that of a science. He eschews attempts to do philosophy as a rigorous science, and considers philosophy rather as a criteriological critique of knowledge. He accepts a theory of eidetic cognition and he thinks that epistemology and the necessarily connected ontological inquiries can be conceptually construed as the idea of objects and eidetically analysed in such a way as to identify the individuals with schematically provided cognates as the content of such an idea. According to Ingarden a pure epistemology is neither possible nor could pure formal apriori principles independent of experience be the basis for an apodictic cognition, nor is an indubitable empirical foundation possible. In
all epistemological investigation there are certain ontic consequences for the explanation of which we need not only a formal ontology, as Husserl propounded, but also existential and material ontological considerations. Such considerations, Ingarden thinks, can be construed as investigations about the idea of such ontic consequence which results in every epistemological inquiry. If we turn away from such a possibility, we run the risk of dividing our knowledge of experience into cognisable or unknowable, or we face eventual dichotomy of some other sort. In other words, epistemological questions necessarily refer to wider metaphysical issues connected, for example, with mind-body problems. In such a situation the cardinal question is how we are to take such metaphysical issues into epistemological consideration. Ingarden suggests we can consider such questions as those concerning the idea of such objects.

Ingarden's conception of modes of being which we cognise only through their various existential moments is nothing but the idea of such an existence that we cognise. In such deliberations all Ingarden does is to contrast the knowledge of the idea of the structure of the object which we come to know through its mode of existence. When we contrast the formal structure of the individual object with that of the
intentional object (as understood by Husserl) as a phenomenon given to our cognition, the former is found to have a certain mode of existence characterised by certain moments, a certain material qualitative determination, and in addition a certain formal structure distinguishable from the qualitative determinations. The given phenomenon as understood by Husserl as an intentional correlate of sense, though accepted by Ingarden, is construed differently in that such phenomena exhibit the characteristics mentioned above. For Ingarden, in fact, the intentional object, to speak in a figurative sense, is an incarnation of the idea of the object that we cognise, so to say, an extension of his pure theory of cognition into metaphysics where the theory is presented as a doctrine of intentional objects and later, as we will observe, as a theory of the intentional correlates of sentence meanings, even later as the ontic foundations of meaning. Ingarden was attempting in all these investigations to avoid all philosophical dichotomies—idealism–realism, appearance and reality, apriori–aposteriori (in the Kantian sense)—in short every mind–body dualism. Yet he believed that all these investigations are to be carried out within the compass of pure cognitive theory.
3. Ingarden's Philosophical Development——
The Creative Phase

Ingarden says that he developed the idea of
the mode of existence and that of the ideality of
literary work in 1918. "In denying the idealist concept
that
of word meaning," he ruefully recalled, "went too
far in the opposite direction so that at the time
I was disposed to deny the very existence of meaning
or concepts."¹³ He further says that in Essentiale
Fragen he "went too far in the direction of pure
ontology without sufficiently appreciating various
existential relativities (relationships) with respect
to conscious operation."¹⁴ It can be surmised from
these texts that Ingarden's early phase is marked by his
pure theory of cognition which remained independent of
the phenomenological methodology of Husserl although
he was not far from Husserl's theory of immanent per-
ception. Husserl unlike Ingarden was not concerned with
ontology whose study he continually postponed. In
contrast to his early phase, Ingarden in his creative
phase on the one hand looks upon word-meaning not merely
as a unit of language but sees in it an ontic founda-
tion of meaning having a mode of existence as autono-
ous and real as an object, and on the other as a
result of his investigation into the nature of the
relationship between word-meaning and pure consciousness, he finds in it the intentional objectivity of the literary work of art. The mode of such an entity is characterised by many moments. One of the moments, heteronomy, gives us the idea that such an entity is an inevitable consequence of our cognitive activity. Though they have no place in the world which in contrast has an autonomous existence, these entities as it were live in our life dependent for their existence on pure consciousness.

Ingarden says that his Literary Work of Art has to be viewed "as an inquiry (that) has fundamental significance for the theory of knowledge and especially for logic" and that, it is a relatively unimportant matter to construct a theory of literature. What has incomparably greater significance is the inter-subjective identity of the literary work of art. Overcoming the danger that threatens the inter-subjective identity of propositions is of greatest fundamental importance. One cannot but notice in these lines that his creative phase is marked by his considerations of the mode of being of intentional objectivities which he construes not merely as a solution to the realism-idealism controversy but as an extension of his pure cognitive theory.
In constructing a doctrine of intentional objectivities, Ingaard is not indulging in pure ontological exercises; in fact as he says he did in his earlier phase. His analyses of modes and moments of existence and his inquiries into formal and material questions about the structure of objects are all to be understood in the light of his theory of the intentional correlates of sentence meaning-units.

In his subsequent note to the publication of his letter to Husserl in 1961, he observes that, "the letter (dated July 1918) contains the germ of my various later conceptions beginning with the investigation 'On the danger of petitio principii in the theory of knowledge,' . . . up to the work Controversy Over the Existence of the World. Also in relation to Husserl's views this letter contains a series of critical considerations and alternate theoretical proposals." It seems that Ingaard had programmed his research, independently of his reaction to Husserl, since 1919, on the content of ideas, i.e., the formal structure of individual entities as distinct from the idea of the individual. In his creative phase Husserl's influence is discernible. Ingaard says that he came to know of the phenomenological
reduction only in 1929.\textsuperscript{17} What he acquired from Husserl in the concept of pure consciousness, although Ingarden was familiar with Bergson's notion of the stream of consciousness, is the sense of pure consciousness as some kind of entity. In accepting this concept from Husserl, Ingarden also accepted the principle of \textit{epoché} to which, Ingarden says, he remained faithful.\textsuperscript{18} In spite of Ingarden's own statement, it seems doubtful that he remained indeed faithful to the methodology of Husserl, at least in what concerns Ingarden's doctrine of intentional objects. Ingarden had carried out his analysis of the constitutive nature of objects in his \textit{Essentiale Fragen} to which Husserl gave attention only in his \textit{Erfahrung und Urteil}, a year later. With his own idea on the essence of an individual and with Husserl's concept of constitution, it is no wonder that this phase proved to be creative for Ingarden.

Husserl had assimilated the structure of the object as constituted in the experience of consciousness, and so the transcendence of objects is something he could not assert. Ingarden is concerned about the constitution of objects as an idea of the essence of the object, and not the temporal structure of
subjectivity in which the constitutive nature of the object is lost. Ingarden therefore inquires into the various existential relationships which objects have to that pure consciousness in which they are cognised. His existential ontology provides an analysis of concrete time as belonging to a particular mode of being, i.e., real autonomous mode of existence. In contrast, purely intentional objectivity is heteronomous, that is, it depends for its existence on the act of pure consciousness which belongs to the real mode of existence. In this mode time is merely represented. Ingarden's analysis of the constitutive nature of intentional objects convinced him that it is only through such explanations that he could avoid the problems connected with the thesis of the existence of the external world.

Husserl made no attempt to distinguish the structure of intentional objects from real ones. For Ingarden, the difference between the two is not only with respect to their structure, but also with respect to their material contents and their ontic characterisation. It is for the purpose of elucidating the nature of relations between consciousness and the world and to determine their modes of being through
their existential moments that Ingarden investigates the nature of intentional objects as opposed to real ones.

4. Ingarden's Philosophical Development—
   After the Second World War

Ingarden's contributions to phenomenological aesthetics are substantial. His investigations concern aesthetic phenomena and aesthetic objects, creative processes, the value of a work of art, aesthetic experience, the theory of the cognition of a work of art, and the function of art in human life. His theory of the structure of the work of art that grows out of his theory of intentional objects has been widely acknowledged by aestheticians like Hartman, Wellek, Kayser, and Dufrenne. His analysis of the physical foundation of a work of art as distinct from the work itself, a similar distinction between artistic and aesthetic values, and the distinction of the valuation of a work of art from the judgement of the value of work of art—all are ideas that are in some ways parallel to and dependent on his previous philosophical development. Just as he discerns in epistemological inquiries certain ontic consequences that cannot be analysed cognitively, so too he finds a difficult problem in
aesthetic studies on the objectivity of emotional factors that play a role in the evaluation and cognition of aesthetic values. As a solution he puts forward different concepts of the objectivity of artistic and aesthetic values commensurate with different types of valuation.\textsuperscript{19}

For Ingarden, a phenomenological investigation of meaning as an intentional objectivity is based on the fundamental structure of objects. For Husserl such a structure of meaning is genetically constituted. Husserl could not relate the intentionality of pure consciousness as meaning conferring act to the basic linguistic expression—sign, or the referent. For Ingarden however, the intentional directional factor of nominal word-meaning is self-contained in the word-meaning, though it ultimately depends for its source on the act of consciousness. Thus, for Ingarden the word-sound or word-sign as concrete phonetic material is an autonomous ontic foundation of meaning, just as the pure consciousness. Therefore, Husserl's eidetic analysis may not be considered as a clarification of meaning. For Husserl there can be no ontic foundations of meaning other than pure consciousness. Ingarden expounds the theory of intentional correlates
of meaning units with respect to how an objectively existing state-of-affairs maintains an existential relation with a sentence-meaning as its intentional correlate. He further establishes by his theory of the ideal concept how inter-subjective identity of meaning is possible at all. In fact, Ingarden says that he wrote *The Literary Work of Art* in order to answer the painful questions which Husserl faced---"How subjectivity can itself bring forth purely from sources appertaining to its own spontaneity, formations that can rightly be accounted as ideal objects in an ideal world---and how (on a higher level) the question of how these idealities can take on spatio-temporally restricted existence in the cultural world (which must surely be considered real as included in the spatio-temporal universe), real existence, in the form of historical temporality, as theories and sciences."20

This is an indicator that Husserl could not explain a theory of meaning in terms of intentionality and why Ingarden propounded his theory of intentional correlates of sentence-meaning units.

Ingarden thought an absolute cognition should be able to explain the thing-in-itself which, he believed, had always been treated by philosophers like
Kant, Bergson, and Husserl as unknowable although they all wanted philosophy to be a critique of knowledge. Ingarden believed in the phenomenological method allowing knowledge to be obtained without petitio principii and that such a knowledge could be based on the experience of pure consciousness where immanent cognition is achieved. However in order to know the idea of things-in-themselves or individuals, he inquired into the structure of individual objects. As a result of this attempt he found he could know the structure only through the modes of existence and the modes only through their moments. Thus he arrived at the idea of intentional objectivity known through its existential moment of heteronomy from where he could cognise other modes of being. Now he finds that since all objects are cognised eidetically only through their intentional correlates and in order to meaningfully express these intentional correlates, he needed to have another ontic foundation of meaning, namely word-sign in addition to pure consciousness. In order to establish an intersubjective identity of such intentional correlates of meaning unity, to expound what is immanently cognised as transcendent to subjective consciousness, Ingarden brings in yet another ontically autonomous entity, namely ideal
concept as transcendent to pure consciousness. Husserl's phenomenology had only one absolute being, that is, pure consciousness. We thus now find that Ingarden's phenomenology required three distinct ontic foundations of meaning, where ideal concept is transcendent to pure consciousness.

Ingarden however in his mature post-war reflections writing the preface to the Polish translation of The Literary Work of Art, says, "I am not inclined to accept the existence of ideal concept. I don't see, however, another concept for the basis of objective identity of meaning of the sentences of the literary work of art, which would be able to replace the ideal concept without creating substantial doubts." 21 There is no indication in the materials published so far as to the reason for these second thoughts about the ideal concept. The reason can only be hypothetically discussed. Grabowicz 22 in his translator's introduction speculates that it is because of Ingarden's later commitment to realism that he was not satisfied with the acceptance of the existence of ideal concepts. This view does not carry conviction. To be sure, Ingarden avoided all controversy about idealism-realism. In fact if Ingarden did not accept
ideal concepts, his position would have become more
idealistic, as the purpose of the hypothesis of the
ideal concept is to maintain inter-subjective identity
without which Ingarden will be subjected to the criticism
of Julian Kleiner\textsuperscript{23} that there will be as many
Hamlets as many times Hamlet is read. However, apart
from the fact that what Ingarden himself has concluded
is not yet published, Ingarden hints in his subsequent
note to his letter to Husserl that till then, i.e.,
1961, his researches on the role of eidetic analysis
in theory of knowledge and on perception were uncon-
cluded.

This question of inter-subjective identity is
in fact the question of the tenability of the nature
of intentional correlates of whatever we know. Such
an intentional correlate is not by itself the thing-
in-itself, which he thought he would find by finding
the essence of individual objects and the structure of
intentional objects. The cognition of the essence of
the individual is not the same as the cognition of
intentional ones. So the question remains perpetually
to be asked, as Ryle\textsuperscript{24} noted, how we know individuals
even if it is only in the concrete instant now in its
moment of actuality.
5. Conclusion

An evaluation of Ingarden's contribution must not fail to take into account his doctrine of intentional objects—the theory of intentional correlates of sentence meaning units, and his theory of the ideal concepts which go together to expound his phenomenological theory of meaning, based on eidetic cognition of objects given in consciousness. Ingarden shows by his theory how such experience can be meaningfully expressed through sentences.

After accepting the phenomenological doctrine of *epoché* he could accomplish a return only at the level of ideal concept, through which he sought to maintain intersubjective communication. He had to accept the phenomenological reduction in order to find the domain of pure consciousness in whose ground he could trace the source for the sentence forming operation which is an act of consciousness. It is to make communicable what is grasped in immanent perception that Ingarden introduces the doctrine of ideal concept in such a way that it is beyond the reach of conscious acts. The perceived and the perception are identically cognised if only for apodicticity and to communicate that apodictic cognition their
distinctiveness has to be preserved. The doctrine of the ideal concept, by letting the actualization from its potential contents through subjective act of sentence forming operation, holds out the promise of maintaining the apodicticity achieved in immanent perception; and by holding back in its potential stock of words meaning ideas, essences, ideal qualities remain transcendent beyond the reach of subjective conscious acts so that conscious acts do not exhaust their potential nature. In this way the distinctiveness of the perceived and the perception is maintained and at the same time their peculiar unity is maintained.

Ingarden for this reason says\textsuperscript{25} that his attempt is not a pure phenomenology understood in the Husserlian sense where nothing can be recognised in any way autonomous or transcendent besides pure consciousness. His is a metaphysical phenomenology as he himself indicates in that he recognises as autonomous entities both word-sign and ideal concept where ideal concept is transcendent to pure consciousness as three distinct ontic foundations of meaning. His attempt can be described as critical phenomenology because he has shown how phenomenology can have an epistemology of its own kind.
NOTES

1LH, p. 437.
2LWA, p. lxxv.
3Private communication from Pani Danuta Gierulanka, a conversation in April, 1972 at Kraków. Pani Gierulanka has been editing Ingarden's manuscripts.
4MHTI, p. 28.
5BFW, pp. 137-38.
6Ibid, p. 186.
7Ibid, p. 561.
8SESP, p. 3.
9BFW, pp. 130-31.
10Ibid., pp. 142-43.
11SE, p. 283 footnote.
12BIR, p. 190.
13LWA, p. 97 footnote.
14Ibid., p. 221 footnote.
15Ibid., p. 359.
16LH, p. 436.
17BIR, p. 184 footnote.
18TMB, p. 18 footnote.
19BFO, p. 42.


22 LWA, p. lix.

23 Ibid, p. 15


25 LWA, p. 360.
CHAPTER II

PHENOMENOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY

1. Introduction

Between 'appearance' and 'reality,' "whatever may be in question is either real or not; there is no room for anything in between" says A. J. Ayer. Phenomenologists however have been steadily encroaching on this forbidden area between 'appearance' and 'reality' with their theory of eidetic cognition. Ingarden in particular peopled this domain with quasi-real intentional objects to the effect that both 'appearance' and 'reality' disappeared. Husserl is alleged to have perpetuated the distinction by dissolving reality into intentional objects. Thus phenomenological study which began ostensibly as an epistemological inquiry also turned out to have a metaphysical side.

For Husserl logical principles, when freed from psychologistic impurities, appeared to be apriori non-empirical cognition, not pertaining to individual facts.
After Husserl arrived at this conclusion, he wrote, "Our great task is now to bring the ideas of logic, the logical concepts and laws to epistemological clarity and definiteness." In this task he finds a problem as to whether such an apriori cognition can refer to beings that are general (species). Husserl finds species are different from particular determinations, after having examined and dismissed empiricists' accounts of cognition of the existence of abstract entities. So he arrives at the conclusion that only through an art of 'ideation' could he give an account of an apodictic cognition of the existence of species. Husserl's apodictic cognition is characterised by immanent perception where the essential characteristic of a perceived object is realised through insight. Thus Husserl aimed at providing an indubitable base for knowledge of the essential structures of objects, once consideration of its existential aspect is suspended.

Ingarden expostulates as to why Husserl used 'apriori' and 'immanent perception' synonymously and he discerns Husserl's phenomenological sense of apriori as follows. Ingarden says that Husserl surely never meant by apriori an innate and necessary form of
intuitive knowledge as Kant understood.\(^3\) The phenomenological sense of apriori is non-empirical only in the sense that it is independent and autonomous in its cognitive value from that of experience. But apriori understood as that knowledge which is "vor aller Erfahrung" in a causal or temporal sense in which the apriori plays a role in building up experience, is excluded in phenomenological understanding. In the phenomenological sense apriori does not by itself build up experience and hence is not independent of experience. In Ingarden's sense, immanent perception, is knowledge of the essence of an object, ideal qualities, and ideas, \(\text{i.e.},\) "taking into account," grasping directly the relation between qualities.\(^4\) For example, when I notice a colour I also notice some similarities between this given one and other ones. I see a certain "tone" common to them, a tonal similarity among them. According to Ingarden, Husserl has not given an account as to how species exist in time. \textbf{Besides:} Husserl postponed a discussion on it even in his late work \textit{Cartesian Meditation}.\(^5\) Only in \textit{Erfahrung und Urteil} does Husserl give his views on the ideal essentialities in empirical generalisation, whereby eidetic variation we can discern a generalisation. According to Ingarden, Husserl has not distinguished the concept of essence from that
of species merely by referring essence to species, the concept of species does not become generalised so as to include essence. Essence has to be discerned in individuals, particularly real objects, according to Ingarden. Ingarden therefore asks, "Whether species have essence in the same way individual objects have?" Until this question is resolved, apodictic apriori knowledge is not realisable.

Investigation into the pure ideal qualities as distinct from the form in which its individuality occurs has therefore become Ingarden's preoccupation. How is pure essence to be determined by the nature of an object? Ingarden examines the structure of an idea. For him, every idea has a two-sided structure—on that is to be understood idea qua idea, and the other through its contents. It is by virtue of this two-sided structure that two ideas differ from each other even when the general structure is the same. According to Ingarden, we can differentiate various types of ideas depending on the structure of the contents and the determining components of the contents. Ingarden therefore poses the question as to how we cognise the contents of ideas and how we cognise the real essence that is the nature of the conscious experience in which the cognising of the essence takes
place and in which we cognise a certain object. For what is necessary in a theory of cognition is the contents of general ideas of the cognitive experience and the knowledge of certain concepts which the general ideas and their correlates could furnish. It is only through such knowledge that we can arrive at statements of higher cognitive value than incomplete empirical concepts. Therefore, according to Ingarden, the cognition of ideas, i.e., their contents and ideal qualities, is apriori *sensus-strictum*, while cognition of essence of individual objects is not a apriori *sensus-strictum*. For even with the knowledge of the contents of cognitive experiences and certain concepts, we can obtain only certain directions to cogitate the essence of objects only within the already fulfilled acts of consciousness. Whether the already fulfilled acts of cognition would allow or provide us with apodictically true cognition of the essence of objects or not cannot be ascertained. This would mean that we need a pure cognitive theory independent of the fact whether we can use them for obtaining cognitively valuable results, and that the application of such a pure cognitive theory would give us apodictically true cognition.
2. Pure Cognitive Theory

According to Ingarden a pure cognitive theory is concerned about the general idea of the acts of consciousness and its possible variants as well as the less general ideas that come under it. It is concerned with the ideas of experiences of consciousness built up through the act of consciousness and is based on eidetic cognition or intuition of durch-leben. The acts of consciousness are not treated as entities but are only elements for the achievement of a cognition that is in respect of the act's function, a mode of being determined by the relevant moments of the act. Thus Ingarden says, pure cognitive theory through its own means of cognition, i.e., cognition of ideas through eidetic perception, can critically examine the acts of consciousness and those ideas in which the acts of cognition are recognised.

What is relevant is the general idea of the relation which holds between the content of the act of consciousness and the object of cognition that is the idea of agreement. It is not therefore necessary that such a cognition has to refer exclusively to the outside world. In this view the existence of the world is not in any way presupposed, for it is not the only
object of cognition in pure cognitive theory. What is referred to as the object of cognition is a variable, and what is referred to as the value of such an object is also a variable—both of which point to an object of the type of the existing particular object. It is to discover certain criteria of cognition that he considers the structure of general ideas and the relation that subsists between them. The existence of such ideas does not determine the existence of objects that fall under the ideas, nor do the existence of objects that fall under a variable of the general idea of cognition determine the existence of such ideas. Pure cognitive theory does not investigate the causal relation between the act of cognition and the object of cognition. For such an inquiry constitutes an applied cognitive theory which concerns itself with the individual process of cognition as determined by the existence of psycho-physical individuals who in turn are determined by the existence of the world. Such an existence of a psycho-physical individual and the existence of the world are not a necessary precondition to the existence of the act of pure consciousness. Ingarden holds this view because there is no substantiation connection between the existence of the world and the act of pure
consciousness.

The relation is that between the content of the act of consciousness and the structure of the object of consciousness where cognitive theory examines the act of consciousness and not the experience of consciousness. The acts of consciousness are investigated in relation to the moments of cognition, that is, its functions in the achievement of cognition and the mode of being of these functions determined in the relevant moment of the act. In other words, it concerns itself with the ideas of objects which the acts of cognition according to their content refer to. The existence of the object as such is not determined. Every act of cognition has to refer to some thing whether it exists or not. What is referred to is construed as an appearance or idea of existence, of a real or ideal object independent of the function of the act of cognition but which the act refers to. So it is the idea of different types of objects as referred to by the corresponding acts of cognition as to how the act could construct the idea of the type so that the object becomes the object of cognition. In such a scrutiny the structure of the object is revealed, for this analysis examines those conditions of the act and its contents which fulfil in order to refer to an object that falls under the idea
through which the object is cognised. Thus all ontological assertions are to be neutralised when considering the cognition of an object while only the structure and character for it to be an object of cognition through the modification of the act of consciousness are to be considered.

Within the field of eidetic cognition, it is possible to detect necessary relations between the ideal qualities within the material characteristics of objects. Ingarden cites how the interdependence among hues and sound properties in a musical piece could be apprehended in eidetic cognitions which are non-empirical and yet are not understood by apriori knowledge. In the same way the internal experience, i.e., essence of conscious experience, the essence of sensory experience like that of aesthetics and moral values is apprehended by eidetic cognition. The necessary connections among the qualitative determinations of objects which have been sought by philosophers as the basis for knowledge, can be found within sense experience or in any experience, through eidetic cognition as such cognition refers to the idea and the essence of objects. Alfred Schütz rightly observes that eidetic cognition "leads to an entirely new theory of induction and association and also opens
the way to scientific ontology. Only by this method we find the real reason for so-called spheres of incompatibility.\textsuperscript{10}

For Ingarden, what is perceived is subjected to eidetic 'ideation' where only the essential and general determinations that are the "constants of the contents of general ideas of material thing"\textsuperscript{11} are searched for. In a theory of knowledge we can only assert how objects are meant in corresponding cognitive acts. But when we assert something about the objects on the basis of the critical knowledge obtained about their cognition, then such an assertion is no longer an epistemological assertion. In phenomenological reduction we are not to assert anything about the objects of cognition themselves, but we eventually assert that they are the intentional entities constituted in the act of consciousness. Ingarden thinks that in epistemological investigation there is always some consideration of ontic consequences. If we decide that all philosophical questions need not necessarily be solved by epistemological investigation, then phenomenological reduction would become redundant. For, we will then have to give up even the cognition of the idea of objects. A theory of knowledge cannot be founded exclusively on certain formal apriori principles from
which experience could be deduced if we are to avoid dichotomies such as apriori-aposteriori, analytic-synthetic, or appearance-reality.

3. Perception and Objectivity

The concept of perception as a concept of 'sense-datum' or 'appearance' has played a major role in the controversy over the existence of the world among contemporary philosophers. Do objects exist unperceived? Though posed originally by Berkeley, this problem still continues to remain significant both in epistemological and in metaphysical investigations. Berkeley, for sure, never denied the existence of the world when he said esse est percipi. Since that time Berkeley's basic proposition that when we perceive an object what is experienced is appearance, has been tacitly accepted by all those who believe in the empirical foundation of knowledge, a belief which is based on what is cognitively given in the perception of things.

Whether such an appearance depends for its existence upon ourselves is a question that has preoccupied many contemporary British philosophers in particular. For Descartes, the external world can never be perceived; what we perceive is only its appearance. Locke's
philosophy is also a philosophy of appearance which is caused by the external world. Thus a dualistic view—appearance and the object of appearance are both construed to be real.

Russell's attempt to do away with this difference led him to devise ways to convert statements about appearances to statements about things. His phenomenalist belief was that physical objects are logical constructions upon appearances in the same way as he showed in *Principia Mathematica* that statements about numbers are translatable into statements referring to particular objects. However, in his subsequent views, Russell found statements of things not to be the same as statements about appearances because appearances are not the ultimate constituents of external physical objects but are parts of our body structure, i.e., our brains. He believed that it is events, some of which are appearances, that constitute physical objects. In the theories of sense perception, the central question therefore is whether appearance can be construed as identical to physical objects or not.

This question raises the issue of how knowledge based on appearance could be the knowledge of objects. In other words, how objective could such knowledge be?
And whether such knowledge based on appearance could be inter-subjectively cognised? In all these attempts one could discern certain assumptions with regard to the existence of objects perceived, their identity with their perceptual phenomenon, and our past perceptual experience of the object. Thus we arrive at the situation where the world can only be seen and not known. What is known is only the phenomenon of the world which cannot be seen.

In view of the unresolved problems in the objectivity of external perception, Capaldi has recently proposed a theory called linguistic realism. His theory is not based on the distinction between appearance and reality. He says it is "based on the rejection of any sharp dichotomy between subject and object of perception, between ideas and objects, between mental and physical." In fact, Capaldi is phenomenologically inclined as he says he follows the 'givenists' like Dewey and Marleau-Ponty. He, like Ingarden, thinks that since the time of Berkeley all theories of perception involve some mental phenomena which they are unable to explicate. For him sense-data are actual facts. It is an event. Since it is an event and as events are not private and are not unobservable substances, he contends that there
is no threat of solipsism in his theory. As the perceptual process is an interaction between the subject and the object of perception, the questions of unperceived objects and the ontological status of such objects do not come up at all. According to him, we take into account the structure of objects and the physiological process of the subject to explain the sense-data. As a process, perception is in time and so there is no immediate perception. Capaldi says that, the essential difference between linguistic realism and all other theories of perception is the perspective of the person offering the theory. 13

In the above view we not only find that theories of perception, in general, are partial to phenomenon, but also that a phenomenological account is due. However in Capaldi’s account, as he admits, absolute objectivity for knowledge based on perception is ruled out. Since the objectivity of perception rests on public reports (on perception), correspondence to facts by the perceiving subject is ruled out. Some social-public dimensions of language are appealed to for their objectivity. However, public reports cannot but refer to certain non-linguistic objects. The social-public dimension of language, he mentions, may have to refer to
such non-linguistic objects. He accepts objects of perception as events, as observable substances and as external to body. If public reports are only a "symbolic representation," as he says, then it is also an 'appearance' which he rejects.

For Ingarden the act of external perception could be objective when the whole content of the act coincides with the properties of the object of cognition to which the content of the act refers. 14 What brings out the objectivity is the relation between the appearance of the object as experienced by the perceiver and the object. All other factors such as the existence of the object and its properties independent of our experience are irrelevant, according to Ingarden. Ingarden's concern is to explicate the perceptual phenomenon, or the appearance of the object, as distinct from the object of perception and also from the act of perception. Ingarden thinks that the relation between the existing entity and its perceptual correlate cannot be decided upon within a pure epistemological investigation. If the existing object is taken to be autonomously real in relation to cognitive acts of perception, then the perceptual correlate of it would become subjective in the sense that it is not autonomously a real being. If,
on the other hand, the perceptual correlate is taken to be real in the sense it is not something illusory, then it will have to be conceived as phenomenon or as appearance through which the existing object manifests itself to us in our cognition. If we consider that the perceptual correlate does not exist in any sense or is not cognisable in any sense, then we could not also cognise in any sense the existence of physical objects. The question, therefore, is merely that of explicating the relationship between the two--perceptual correlate and the object of perception. They are not identically one and the same. If they are not identical, it becomes incomprehensible as to why we cannot decide that these two are different objects.

For Ingarden, in the case where we have perceived the same thing or similar things for a number of times, what is given in our specific perception is something which transcends the bounds of that which is explicitly given. Every perception in this way is transcendental according to Ingarden. When I look at the 'table' from different perspectives or for a repeated number of times, I gather more details with regard to the properties of the perceptual correlate. The perceived object therefore seems to transcend every specific perception.
By an act of perception we grasp only a part of what occurs in the object itself. Likewise our knowledge of previous perception influences our present perception. In such cases we seem to select from among the properties through which the properties of the perceived object manifest themselves as in a motivated scientific experiment. When such motivated scientific experiments provide us with the confirmation, our present perception becomes motivated. The knowledge we acquire in a specific perception, in relation to the properties of the object of perception, is inadequate and is conditioned by subsequent perceptions.

The relation between the perceptual correlate and the object perceived is not entirely transparent. By deciding in what essential way one determines the other, we may be able to decide the nature of the relation they hold among themselves. Since we cognise the object of perception through the perceptual correlate, we can say that the perceptual correlate determines the object of perception. In scientific investigations, where from the perceived phenomena the nature of objects of perception is derived, the reconstruction in perceived phenomena accounts for the change in the properties of objects of perception, as and when such changes
occur. However, when we consider the relationship between the two from the point of view of their dependency, then it is the object of perception that determines the perceptual correlate. Since the human body is also an object of perception, it can also be considered as one that plays a role in determining the nature of the perceptual object.

Perceptual acts or sensory perceptions are not self-sufficient for Ingarden. Sensory perception always supplies partial knowledge about objects. Sensory perception depends on the result of other acts involving the same object of perception. It is through the multiplicity of appearances experienced by us during perception that we learn about the properties of the objects of perception. But when we perceive a geometrical figure, we are not aware of its appearance in the way a perceptual object appears and still we are able to perceive the properties of such figures. In such cases what we visualise is only a form. Some such epistemic content is what the phenomenological analysis seeks to clarify.

The perceptual act is taken as a cognitive (mental) act of consciousness by phenomenologists. Perception construed as an act in such a sense has an
intentional relation to the object. The act does not impose on the object any quality or moment. The act takes the object to be of such characteristics which do not constitute any part of the content of the act. For Ingarden there is an essential relation between the content of the act, the content of the appearance of the object, and some properties of the object of perception. For any perceptual act to be objective for Ingarden, the content of the appearance of the object should be identical to some of the characteristics of the object of perception. However, those moments or qualitative determinations which characterise the appearance of the object as an intentional correlate of the act need not be identical with the features of the object. This identity indicates that the content of the act agrees with at least some features of the object of perception and that the contents of the object are autonomous in relation to the act of perception while those moments of this appearance as an intentional correlate of the act are not autonomous. Since the act of consciousness by itself does not produce any moment in the object, in successive appearance, the fulfillment of the act becomes the condition for the description of the existence of appearance and for the act fulfilled at the moment of perception. If the content of the
act is not a result of sense data, then the contents of experienced appearance, i.e., the intentional correlate, would be such that it would be a subjective creation and hence there would be no objectivity. In this account of external perception, Ingarden says what is assumed here is only pure consciousness and immanent perception. For Ingarden the objectivity depends on the assumption that pure conscious act is possible and that it is the appearance which brings about the objectivity.

4. Meaning and Sense-data

A. J. Ayer believes that both phenomenological and analytical philosophers try to discover what is essential in a given concept by seeing what is common to the situations in which it typically applies. Ayer characteristically argues that phenomenology, as well as linguistic analysis, have their respective presuppositions. The phenomenologists assume that cognitive verbs must always stand for special mental acts. As a critique of this position he points out Ryle's analysis that there is no such element as an essential inner state or process in the case where someone knows something. But he is equally critical of
the analysts in saying that the analysts' method of catching concepts at work by looking at examples of the situations which they cover is very much the same. Because, he says, in analysing one concept a philosopher must make use of others which the philosopher does not subject to criticism in that instance; there is of course no reason why he should not analyse them in their turn, but then he will be making use of some other concepts which he takes for granted so that he presupposes at any stage whatever the concepts which he is employing in his analysis commit him to. For example, a person who comes from another planet who does not know anything about the banking system as practiced on this planet, will have to be told what banking is. We may explain to him what a cheque is in terms of a series of actions like filling in the withdrawal slip, giving to the teller, etc. But there will always be one concept in the system of banking which cannot be fully explained in terms of his behavior. That irreducible concept, in this case currency or legal tender, is necessary to explain his own behavior in the context of banking. Thus there always remains one concept which he has to take for granted. Therefore the analysts' claim that their attempt is presuppositionless is far from being true, according to
A. J. Ayer.

Ayer further says that a more serious presupposition on the part of analysts is their assertion that analysis of an empirical statement is yielded by the description of the observable situation in which it holds. Thus, the analysts assume some form of verification principle. In the example given above, one cannot observe the intention of the man who withdraws money from the bank, although his actions, as a series of internally connected behavior, could be verified thus reducing, in terms of his behavior, all the concepts in the banking system except one means that this one concept would always remain irreducible and so unverifiable. Likewise, Ayer says, the serious presupposition on the part of phenomenologists is that the being of things is identical with their being for consciousness. This would imply, as he points out, either "that the things are unaffected by our consciousness of them or that they are the product of our consciousness." In fact, this criticism of Ayer's about the serious presuppositions of the phenomenological and analytical tradition is what Ingarden himself brings out. Ingarden could not bring himself to agree with Husserl that "things are the product of our consciousness."
Like Ayer, Ingarden is critical of the assumption of some form of the verification principle of the analysts. Ingarden is said to be the first to point out that "the verification principle of meaning being a meta-language proposition is either meaningless or nonsensical since like all meta-language propositions, it is, in principle, unverifiable."²³ That there should be some form of verifiability criterion for meaningfulness cannot be of the physical order or capable of being perceived or conceivable by the senses, according to Ingarden. If verifiability means the existence of an agreement between proposition and the datum, how is the agreement to be found between the proposition and the datum to which it refers? For such an agreement itself would not be physical or perceptible to the senses. In any well-defined relation, the relation is determined between the terms in the relation univocally in an order of sequence and by the totality of properties of these terms. However, Ingarden says there can be several types of relations between two individuals, and that the properties that constitute one type of relation may differ from properties that constitute another type of relation without the properties of one type of relation loosing their significance in another type of relation between the same individuals. For example, Ingarden
says, in the relation between father and son, taken in that order of succession, one can discern several types of relations, i.e., that of resemblance, that of age, that of size, etc. A relation that is determined only on the basis of terms that occur in the relation, their order of succession, and by the totality of properties of these terms, may hold good with respect to well-defined relations. But "if we do not know the relation $R$ to be determined in its essential traits and that only the two objects $x$ and $y$ and their order of succession are given, how can we determine from among the totalities of properties of $x$ and $y$, the properties to be chosen ($E_1(x)$ and $E_2(x)$) as being those the knowledge of which would allow us to recognise the $F(R)$ and thereby the relation itself?" asks Ingarden. For him, therefore, the knowledge of the properties of the terms of the relation alone does not help discover the properties that constitute the relation. In other words, material properties are required in addition to the formal ones in order to know the essential traits of the relation. According to Ingarden, the properties of an object as an object in itself are to be distinguished from the properties of the same object when that object becomes an element in a relation. The ontic status of such a property is not the same as the ontic status of the
property of an object as an object in itself. Ingarden thinks that between a proposition and a certain datum several types of relations are possible but without there being the particular relation that could be verified. For, the properties of relations may not be of such a nature as to be capable of being attributed to an object of physical order.

The agreement between the proposition and the datum could be understood in a causal, spatial, or temporal sense, or in the sense of a relation as contradictory propositions have. But the existential status of such agreement would be like ink-marks or sound waves which are themselves not in agreement with a datum. In other words, if the relationship is understood to be the foundation of verification or verification itself, then it is untenable according to Ingarden. For Ingarden the agreement or relation between proposition and datum corresponding to it cannot be satisfactorily explained by positivists. If there is such a relation, the meaning of such a relation cannot be identified with the physical properties of such data as ink-marks or sound waves or with the verifiability of the proposition. For verifiability presupposes immanence of meaning as well as contents of datum, while the datum itself cannot be the meaning of
the proposition. In fact, the tenability of Ingarden's own theory of intentional correlate of sentence meaning unit rests on the untenability of the positivist theory of meaning.

According to Ingarden, the methodological principle of the positivists rests on certain ontological assumptions. That there is such an assumption is brought out by Popper's ambitious attempt to derive an ontological commitment from a purely physicalistic or formal language of Carnap. 25 This he does in opposition to Carnap who maintained that physicalistic or formal language provides the criterion of meaningfulness. Thus for Carnap metaphysical statements become meaningless. Popper's attempt is to find a way out so that in a scientific language metaphysical expressions get their meaning from something other than physicalistic criteria. This he accomplishes by constructing well-formed sentences out of metaphysical expressions. However the rules he provides to construct well-formed statements so as to be meaningful in a scientific language are not the same as the rules of confirmation and truth in a formal system. He claims that the rules of confirmation are not applicable to the well-formed sentences because in a formal system there are existential statements
which cannot be falsified and so they are not covered by the rules of confirmation and truth. In the same way Popper wants to keep the well-formed statements about metaphysical expressions and seeks an ontological exemption from the rules of confirmation just as existential propositions are exempted from the rules of confirmation. According to Popper, we can assert that the statement, "There is a man who is 1/2 black, 1/4 green, 1/4 blue, 1/4 orange" is meaningful for it is a well-formed sentence in accordance to the rules of logic and semantics. That this statement is false is overruled by Popper because existential sentences can only be shown to be true and not false by rules of logic, i.e., falsification of all the infinitely possible disjuncts can never be satisfied. Thus, according to Popper, every sentence that contains an existential quantifier becomes an ontological or metaphysical statement. In fact, as Jack Kaminsky observes, Popper has trivialised ontology so as to include all statements with an existential quantifier such as 'These are trees.' It follows from these considerations that the principle of positivist theory of meaning goes beyond a purely methodological inquiry which prompted Ingarden to say that "one must either abandon the thesis of the identity between verification and the meaning of proposition or
admit the existence of meaning other than that of meaning - verification." For, as we have noted above, either all statements would become ontological statements and none meaningful in Popper's sense, or only such statements are meaningful that are in a metalogical frame, i.e., verifiability sense. In contrast to the positivist position, for Ingarden every sentence has a derived purely intentional sentence correlate which is the meaning of the sentence, while only a-type sentences, called judicative sentences by Ingarden, have claims to truth, whose meaningfulness nevertheless refer to objectively existing states-of-affairs. But the agreement here is between intentional states-of-affairs and objectively existing states-of-affairs.

5. Conclusion

Perceptual knowledge is essentially a personal perspective, as Capaldi suggests. In such a process, an element of belief and its justification is, therefore, unavoidable. Phenomenologists' attempts to clarify the epistemic content of the belief involved in external perception leads them to the doctrine of the phenomenological reduction where all the beliefs about the existence of object are not counted. Such an attempt to
separate consciousness from the world assumes a *tertium
guid*, as intentionality of the act of consciousness.
Such a concept is as disputable as the 'sense datum' of
the realists in avoiding some sort of solipsism.

Ingarden's attempt is to give an account of an
inter-subjective identity of the perceptual phenomenon.
But to say that the 'appearance' is not a subjective
creation and yet it is the intentionality of the act of
consciousness that we identify as the 'appearance' of
the object, is not an account of objectivity of such
knowledge.

It is in this context that phenomenologists'
accounts of meaning gain some significance. Phenomeno-
logical epistemology is to construe meaning as an inten-
tional correlate of the act of consciousness. It is
only through the theory of intentional correlates of
meaning that language is shown to belong to both the
realms, conscious and the world, by Ingarden in order to
make the intentionality of the act of consciousness
intersubjective and the objectivity of intentional corre-
lates possible.

For 'appearance' is an intentional objectivity
and its existence is of a different mode of being. Such
an entity can be understood only in terms of the relation it holds, on the one hand, with the subjective act of consciousness and, on the other, with the objectively existing entity. Meaning, as an intentional correlate, is construed as rendering this essential relation objective. In Ingarden's account, the meaning of a word is derived purely from the intentional object which brings about inter-subjective identity as it is ontically founded not only in the word-sign which is the external carrier of meaning and in the pure consciousness in whose acts it has its source for its existence, but also in the ideal concept which is transcendent to the pure consciousness. It is by virtue of this transcendency of an ideal concept that meaning is not just subjective and immanent in pure consciousness.
NOTES


3. UPTP, p. 256.

4. BFW, p. 329.

5. KB, pp. 211-12.

6. UPTP, p. 269.

7. SESP, p. 30.


11. MHTI, p. 36.


14. OEP, p. 303.


19 Ibid, p. 123.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 LWA, p. lxxiv.
23 H. Skolimowski, *Polish Analytical Philosophy*, p. 27.
24 LRP, p. 143.
27 LRP, p. 153
28 Capaldi, p. 66.
CHAPTER III

DOCTRINE OF INTENTIONAL OBJECTS

1. Introduction

The source for this doctrine of intentionality can be traced to Brentano's analysis of phenomena. He says that, "this intentional inexistence is exclusively characteristic of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon manifests anything similar. Consequently, we can define mental phenomena by saying that they are such phenomena as include an object intentionally within themselves."¹ Brentano's analysis of inner perception led him to believe that objects appear as they are in inner perception. The presentation of sensation is a mental phenomenon; while colour, shape, etc. make up the physical phenomena. In his later philosophy, Brentano tended to do away with this distinction and instead he distinguished presentation from judgement, saying that both presentation and judgement are mental phenomena.

"What we mean by this" Brentano says, "according to what has been remarked before, is that they are two entirely
different ways of being conscious of an object." 2 One sees a radical change of point of view when Brentano further asserts that only concrete individuals are genuine objects. Brentano's philosophy of intentionality is but an instance to indicate that whoever talks about intentional objects will have to account for 'genuine objects' as well as 'fictional' ones, not in one's imagination, but in (names) words or in sentence-meaning.

For Husserl intentionality is the units of sense of material things. That is, intentional units of sense constituted in the experience wherein it undergoes many modifications and by necessity belongs to corresponding acts of consciousness. Objects are, for Husserl, intentional correlates of conscious experience, and as such they are not a part of experience. With this view, unlike Brentano, Husserl remained committed to his thesis of intentionality, even while he embraced idealism.

Ingarden admits that his own interest in the doctrine of intentional objects was created by Twardowski, Husserl, and Pfänder. 3 Twardowski's influence on Ingarden was more subtle. Twardowski's major concern on the relation of "part and whole" gave insight for Ingarden which in fact enabled him to distinguish the
"formal structure" of the object and to build up his own concept of the constitutive nature of objects through which intentional objects are distinguished from real ones and on which all his differentiation of the modes and moments of existence depends. In fact Ingarden criticises Twardowski for not having discovered the notion of "formal structure" as distinct from "material qualitative moments" while analysing the dependability relation between parts and whole.  

In developing this doctrine of intentionality, Ingarden coined new terms, many of which are foreign to philosophical literature. In the formulation and clarification of these concepts, Pfänder's influence could be discerned. Pfänder's distinction of the assertive function of the "copula" in a sentence enables Ingarden to clarify his notion of "quasi-real" which is a characteristic feature of intentional objectivity. Indicating Twardowski's and Pfänder's influence on Ingarden in his formulation of intentional objects is not to minimise Husserl's influence. After all, it is for Husserl's sake Ingarden develops the doctrine of intentional objects. In propounding this doctrine, Ingarden in effect expounds a philosophy.
This doctrine plays a crucial role in the philosophical development of Ingarden. In the first place, it is a phenomenological critique of the transcendental idealism of Husserl. Besides, it simultaneously builds up a phenomenological theory of meaning and a theory of literature and thus enlarges the scope of phenomenological investigations. Ingarden observes, "Only subsequently do I attempt to give some pertinent phenomenological outline" to his investigations with regard to meaning units. His inquiries into the nominal word-meaning in particular seem to have been first carried out without any phenomenological consideration. For he locates the intentional directional factor as a part of the content of word-meaning itself. It is therefore apologetically that he introduced subsequently the intentional act of subjective consciousness as external to the word-meaning. In this introduction we see "the pertinent phenomenological outline" he mentions. The point is that since intentional objects could be pure or derived from word-meaning, it is necessary that we know that Ingarden considers word-meaning in terms of intentional analysis.

In what follows we discuss what occasioned Ingarden's considerations towards intentional objects;
and in order to explicate the mode and moments of intentional objects, what other modes and moments we have to obtain; and what types of intentional objects could be discerned along with their sources, that is, word-meaning. In all these efforts of Ingarden one cannot fail to discern his anxiety to explain meaning in terms of intentionality. Therein lies his "pertinent phenomenological outline" to the investigation of meaning. Ingarden's "pertinent phenomenological outline" becomes more pertinent because of the possibility of a phenomenological theory of meaning. Whether phenomenological epistemology is possible or not, Ingarden shows a phenomenological theory of meaning is possible which, in his opinion, Husserl could not realise. As Tugendhat rightly says, Husserl could not explain meaning in terms of intentionality. It is natural that after the reduction where the world is no more considered transcendent, language and meaning, which are as part of the world also transcendent, become casualties too of this (phenomenological) reduction. Can we meaningfully express our experiences when language meaning is immanent to consciousness? It is in fact this question that Ingarden addresses himself to when he expounds his doctrine of intentional objects.
2. The Context of the Husserlian Doctrine

Ingarden sees in Husserl a basic conflict as to whether the world is a mere noematic sense content existing only in pure consciousness constituted by intentional acts, or whether it is given in perceptual experience having its own essence and existence independent of pure consciousness. For what is given in sense experience except imaginative ones is real in the sense that in such experience something appears to exist in itself as something similar to the previous experience of it as a correlate of infinite manifoldness of perception. In contrast, what is given in imaginative experience has nothing essentially similar to the previous experience. Imaginarily experienced therefore is dependent on acts of pure consciousness, whereas what is given in sense experience does not seem to depend for their existence on acts of pure consciousness.

For Ingarden it is the essential identity between being and pure consciousness that is realism. It is because of idealism that he is opposed to Husserl. Although in his early investigations Husserl kept being and consciousness as heterogeneous entities, he subsequently transforms such an essential difference into the noesis-noema distinction. The noema is of the
essence of consciousness and so reality as noema becomes an intended being which remains then perpetually in epoché. In this view of Husserl, Ingarden sees a continuation of Cartesian dualism between "cogitaliones" and "res extensae." He says therefore "either one has to give up any essential unity between pure consciousness and the real world or deny the difference which has its source in their essence or at least understand the relation between the real world and consciousness somehow quite otherwise and give up the two factors (existing in the same mode of being and equal in their existence) which could remain between themselves in a real relation of the same type as the members of this unity among themselves. It may be that the change in the type of relation between them enables us to restore the unity between these two heterogeneous essences as pure consciousness and the real material things (the material world). It may be that the change of the type of relation and at the same time a changed mode of existence of one of these members will permit us to understand how pure consciousness can relate itself to things." One could see in these alternatives set out various possibilities of relations which Ingarden has in mind. It is out of these phenomenological exercises that Ingarden chooses the last alternative. And by
determining the structure and the mode of being of intentional objects, Ingarden planned to clarify the type of relation among different entities and how pure consciousness relates itself to these entities without having to accept necessarily the exclusive idealist-realist view of the mode of existence of the world.

Every act of consciousness is an act directed towards an object whether the object is perceived or not. Husserl starts with the polarity between consciousness as a spaceless entity and object as an extended being. But in explicating the nature of the object, Husserl introduces a subtle variation that it is consciousness of the noema. Husserl never gave up the difference in their essence between objects and consciousness. But no such difference, he maintained, was to be found between noesis and noema.

There are different views among Husserl scholars as to what exactly the concept noema signifies. Some are of the opinion that noema means the identification of particulars. Follesdal thinks that Husserl's concept of noema is the Sinn of the intentional act distinct from its reference or intended object and distinct from the act itself. Some others think that it is the unperceivable abstract intentional entity. Since this,
concept cannot be explicated in isolation from other concepts like "constitution." It lends itself to different interpretations. Whatever be the interpretations, the noema is the tertium quid, since Gurwitsch thinks that the noema is a percept or a perceptual phenomena. Such partial interpretations are due, in Ingarden's opinion, to the internal contradiction in accepting Husserl's original thesis that consciousness and reality are heterogeneous and also in having to accept that the noema is the creation and not a mere correlate of certain sets of perceptual acts.

It is through noema that consciousness relates to objects, but the noema is not in itself the object of consciousness. The noema as an intentional entity does not have the essence of the real object nor does the noema constitute the essence of the real object. In other words, intentional entities could exist without being perceived or intended. In such a reasoning it would be redundant to posit noema and would be absurd to think of consciousness which would not present for itself in its intuitive act. For Ingarden, therefore, Husserl's noematic-constitutive consideration, i.e., the noesis-noema relation, is in effect an attempt to do away with the essential difference.
For Husserl the noematic sense depends, for its constitution, on the operation of the perceiving subject. The constitution is a kind of creation from the experience of lower noematic layers until the object is presented. For Ingarden such a dependence cannot be construed as a creation. Ingarden thinks it is a type of transition from one layer to another noematic layer till the presentation of the object is determined. Ingarden observes that, "it says nothing else than that there are differently built noemata in the domain of consciousness as well as various contexts of meaning between noemata respectively between different layers of noemata as well as various connections between the noesis and noema."¹² For Ingarden thinks it says nothing else as to what is the nature of the transition between one layer to another.

The problem of constitution ensues as a result of the phenomenological reduction. Husserl's reduction is meant to clarify the essence of objects and its existential relation to consciousness. Ingarden says, "it is clear that all these analyses (constitution) are carried out with use of phenomenological reduction first on level of Ideen, because this was for Husserl a conditio sine qua non for the whole study."¹³ The phenomenological residue, after reduction, is explained by
Husserl as constituted. The noema is created by noesis while noesis cannot be distinguished from its existence. To explain what existence itself is, from the noematic sense of existence, Husserl resorted to transcendentalism and thought he would speak about the object itself. Ingarden says that "nothing essential will be changed if we recognise that every higher element of noematic sense is founded by the pure Ego in its experience of a plurality of lower noematic senses and in performance of corresponding intentional act or in passive experience."  

Ingarden's own account of intentional objects has to be viewed in this context. For him the intentional object is only a correlate of the act of pure consciousness. In his own account, the different layers of noemata are interpreted as derived from the purely intentional objects corresponding to word-meaning and higher meaning unit formations. He finds this construed intentional objectivity could be a solution to Husserl's constitutive problem. In seeking this solution, Ingarden is motivated to keep noema as that which is cognisable and through which we cognise the object as meaningful. The object is transcendent and not a mere construct of meaning intended and certain intuitable
components of \textit{noema}. Therefore for Ingarden's phenomenological perspective, every act of consciousness as an act directed towards an object as a performance of consciousness, "\textit{cannot give rise to anything else or to anything more than an assumed reality}."^{15a}

It is to account for the existence of spatial objects as we cognise their dependence on the acts of perception and their existential relation to acts of consciousness that Ingarden inquires into the existential nature of intentional objects. It is to account for what sort of essence a certain kind of object has if it is to exist as a thing given in perception that Ingarden propounds this doctrine of his. He points out that even by considering the object as an intentional projection of the act of pure consciousness, one could still doubt the existence of the object in principle. For the object as experienced becomes transcendent in the sense that no element of the object is part of the act of consciousness. Thus the assumption that pure consciousness and the object are heterogeneous is unavoidable. However, only pure consciousness is considered to be indubitable by Husserl. So a reduction of the one to the other leads to a one-sided metaphysical solution that either one is dependent for
on the other for its existence or is independent. Such a one-sided view of the dependency equation postpones a solution to the idealist-realist controversy, according to Ingarden.

Ingarden says that the problem of the mode of being of the real world comes as a result of the method of phenomenological reduction. The mode of being of the real world is determined as relative in essence to the mode of being of pure consciousness which alone is considered to be absolute by Husserl. Husserl also asserted that the world is relative to pure consciousness with respect to the experience of its factual content. The world and all its components are but an intentional unity for Husserl and, as such, belong to the experience of the pure I. They are noema. How things or objects belong to the experience of the I, is explained in saying that they are constituted as noematic layers. Pure consciousness by virtue of its acts, noesis, form hyletic data as their correlates. For Ingarden, what Husserl has characterised of the world as being relative to the mode of being of pure consciousness, is the important question in the phenomenological exercise. It is so because Ingarden is concerned about the nature of the relation between the world and pure
consciousness. It is by examining this relation that Ingarden extends the frontiers of phenomenological perspective.

According to Ingarden, Husserl's concept of constitution does not exhaustively treat the mode of being of the real world. It is not only the mode of existence of the real world, but also the mode of existence of pure consciousness as absolute that have not been clarified by Husserl. Husserl assumed that the mode of being of pure consciousness is absolute. The reason is that, according to Ingarden, Husserl did not indicate the various existential moments through which we could cognise the modes of being. For Ingarden, the moment of existence of the mode of being of pure consciousness is distinct from the absolute nature of pure experience as given in immanent perception. However, Husserl's notion of absolute seems to have been based on the view that the immanently perceived and the immanently perceiving together form "an immediate whole." Husserl, according to Ingarden, does not refer to what is given directly in its own identity, nor does he define the nature of its being as to whether it can have an independent being in spite of the real world as a correlate (as hyletic data) in its content. Husserl is not quite
certain about the contents of pure consciousness as to whether it includes all intentional acts, all original hyletic data and noema, or only the acts and the noema. On the other hand, Husserl never inquired into the form of individual objects. According to Ingarden, if Husserl had inquired into the formal structure of individual objects, he would have found out that the form of the intentional object cannot be that of an absolute being and that the real object, in its formal structure, could not be equated formally with that of intentional objects. ¹⁷ Husserl denied spatiality to lived experience though he attributed it to physical objects. For him experiences though intentional are not characteristic of physical objects. Ingarden therefore says, "if this treatment of the sense of object (noema) was only transitory and made possible--after critical investigation of the whole cognitive process--a return to objects given and the retention of the proper character of their existence, then we are not compelled to an idealistic solution." ¹⁸ One could discern here the motives of Ingarden, his anxiety to effect a return to objects given. In other words, Ingarden's motive is to neutralise the doctrine of the reduction, which he could accomplish only through the transformation of the Husserlian notion of intentional correlate of sense (noema) into the intentional correlate,
of the object. It is in this transformation that one sees Ingarden's own contribution. It is the intentional correlate of the object that becomes the core of his doctrine of intentional objects. Ingarden says he does not violate the principle of epoché, yet he does not keep the world perpetually in epoché and seeks a way to relate it to the thing-in-itself without erasing its dependence on the pure consciousness in whose experience it is given. Husserl was more concerned with noetic deliberations than with the contents of noema. He forbids the return to the object appearing through the analysed phenomenon, once the reduction is performed. Husserl, though not justifiably, thought that any inquiries into object here would perhaps confirm an absolute status for objects, as he had already decided to keep only pure consciousness absolute and so wanted to keep the object relative to pure consciousness. For Ingarden, the nature of inner perception is such that it cannot exist without what is perceived in it. For Husserl, the cogitatum is transcendent without any unity with cogitare, and yet they are inseparable in the sense that the cogitatum cannot exist without cogitatio. Such a position on Husserl's part motivated Ingarden to say that the "phenomenological reduction led us exclusively to this absolute being of
consciousness." Understood in this sense, we can describe Ingarden's phenomenological exercise as, de paradiso consciensio exire, into which he entered as abruptly as he came out. One wonders whether the same fate would be in store for all those who take Husserl seriously on this point. And also one wonders whether Ingarden would have developed his philosophy without taking Husserl seriously.

Ingarden believes that all philosophers from Descartes to Kant have been considering that the thesis of the existence of the world is an epistemological problem and that the judgments on the nature of the world are also epistemological. For all idealist philosophers, the existence of the world is in principle dubitable and only that consciousness is indubitable in which experience of the world and its objects are located. Husserl's eidetic analysis is restricted to the domain of consciousness, and when he eventually extends it to perceptual objects, he treats them as intentional correlates of sense. In all these attempts what has not been discerned according to Ingarden is that the world has an ontological state-of-affairs which is its essence. That element of the world is transcendent to conscious experience in which it is
known. This is therefore a metaphysical issue but has mistakenly been treated as an epistemological question. Ingarden says, "precisely this problem moved me to undertake a formal analyses of the literary work of art and the objects portrayed in it, which served me as an example of the merely intentional object." 21

In considering intentional objects—their dependency relation vis-à-vis real objects on the one hand and the subjective act of pure consciousness on the other—Ingarden not only addresses himself to the Husserlian problem of the relation of the world to consciousness and its modes of being, but also extends the scope of phenomenological examination of objects qua intentional objects to works of art and aesthetic values. In as much as his investigations delineating the different modes of existence and their moments of existence and in defining concepts like pure consciousness as an absolute being which Husserl used without clarity, Ingarden's attempt has to be described as a critical phenomenology.

3. The Structure of Intentional Objects

According to Ingarden, we cognise an object only through its mode of being. To be an object is to have a mode of being. Ingarden distinguishes four such
modes—absolute mode, temporal or real, extra-temporal or ideal, and intentional mode. Ingarden is undecided with regard to the composition of moments of absolute modes of being; likewise he is undecided with regard to the temporal mode of being. Ideal objects, like mathematical numbers, he agrees are decidedly extra-temporal. Similar categorisations have been attempted by philosophers, but in Ingarden's classification, the order of being of the intentional mode occupied a very special place. The modes of being by themselves do not help us determine the ontic status or the existential nature of objects. In order to comprehend the existence of an object, we are provided with a certain phenomenological contrast called moments of existence. They are existential autonomy versus heteronomy; existential originality versus existential derivation; existential separateness versus existential inseparateness, and existential self-dependence versus existential contingency. It is only through these moments that we cognise the mode of being of an object. These existential moments are nothing but certain existential dependency relations that exist between objects of different modes of being.

For our purpose the first of these moments is more important if we are to grasp the existential
nature of the intentional object, especially the relation it holds vis-à-vis other modes, in particular the mode of being to which pure consciousness belongs and the mode of being to which the real object belongs. Ingarden defines existential autonomy as "the complete immanence of the moments determining a certain object is the essential condition for its self-existence."\(^{22}\)

For instance, an object which has the moment "redness"--contains in itself this concretion. This is to say that "redness" is the "existentially conditioned form in which pure quality makes its appearance in one particular individual mode of existence."\(^{23}\) The object is said to be autonomous in its mode only with respect to the existential moment, i.e., redness which forms the structure of the object. It is this immanence of the qualitative material moment which provides the structure of the object that determines whether the object is autonomous or heteronomous. However, since this characteristic feature that determines the existence of being in general is not present in the intentional object, the intentional object is determined in its structure and contents by the intentional act of experiencing consciousness. These intentional objects in this sense depend upon the act of consciousness for their existence or for their "coming into being." Hence, they are known through
the moment, characteristic of their mode of existence, called heteronomy.

Such a heteronomous objectivity does not possess its own essence, as there is no immanent qualitative determination in it. This is not to say that their contents are empty. Surely there are material determinations, formal moments, and certain existential characterisations which, of course, are not immanent in them. But whatever they have in their contents are borrowed or assumed determinations. In this sense we say that intentional objects are not self-existent. Since it cannot have any moments other than those that are assigned to it, by the act of consciousness, it has a dependent existence. "The pure intentional object is the correlate and content of pure conscious act or the manifoldness of act," according to Ingarden.

Another characteristic feature of the intentional object is that it is not existentially original in the sense that it has its source for its being in the pure conscious act, and so it is existentially derivative. Intentional objects do have a form or a formal structure and certain existential qualitative moments. But these characteristics alone by themselves cannot provide the originality to the intentional
object. For Ingarden says that "the creation of the intentional object therefore depends on an intentional attribution of its being thought of—in particular the existence of this kind of object is contingent upon its being perceived." It was such an existence which Berkeley mistook as original existence says Ingarden. It is in this derived and original existence sense that the intentional object is posited by Ingarden between "appearance" and "reality." On the other hand, it is in this sense Ingarden extricates the phenomena, i.e., the derived intentional correlate of the act, from the noema sense of Husserl for whom the phenomenon gets submerged in the originality of the existence of pure consciousness.

Further existential moments that characterise intentional objects are "separateness" and "contingency." An object is separate in its existence when in its essence it does not require any other object with which it has to co-exist, says Ingarden. For example, the "red colour" has to co-exist in its essence with the individual object which is red. In this case, we say that the "red colour" and the "object that is red" are existentially inseparate. In such cases the object's material essence is so determined that it is impossible
for the objects, in this case, the "red thing" and "redness" to exist separately. How can the whole object whose redness inheres in a red thing be in any mode. However, those objects which are existentially separate can be either self-dependent or contingent, in the sense that such an object, although separate, requires for its continued existence or enduring in existence another existentially separate object. Those that are not existentially inseparable need not necessarily be separate. Only when in none of the moments described above they are inseparable can it be ascertained that they are existentially separate. When one separate object is existentially contingent upon another separate object, then the object that is depended upon may have a determined essence, or it may not. In such cases when an object in its essence does not require another for its existence, then it is said to have an existentially self-dependent relation. If the object, on the other hand, in its constitutive nature, is relative to the determinate essence of the separate object on which it depends for its existence, it is said to be contingent.

Ingarden's analysis attempts to indicate that there are variously construed dependency relations that hold between the object as substance or carrier of
property and the qualities or moments that inhere in the substance or carrier. It is through discriminating these relations that we understand the constitutive nature of objects; through the constitutive nature of objects we understand the existential moments of these objects; and through the existential moments we understand the mode of existence of these objects. We have observed how the moments, heteronomy and derivativeness, characterise the mode of existence of intentional objects with regard to the "coming into being" of intentional objects. However, the other existential moments, separateness and contingency, that characterise the intentional objects are more important. These moments—separateness and contingency—which are different shades of dependency relations, explain how the intentional object, after its "coming into being", could continue to exist.

In the example "Red Colour," we see "red colour" as a property that requires a subject as a bearer or carrier of the property. We see, in it, a dependency relation that one requires the other and that they are inseparate. In a variant case, say "redness," we understand that it not only requires a subject of the property, but also a qualitative individual moment.
"coloration." This qualitative individual moment "coloration" makes it even more difficult for "redness" to be thought of separately. Here it is only a matter of degree of inseparateness. In the latter, the degree of inseparateness is greater, while in the former case, the existential moment is of a lesser degree because the "red colour" needs only a subject, a carrier, for its existence and does not require any other qualitative moment which is different from it. However, the moments "redness" and "coloration" inhere in the properties of ideal qualities. And when it is concretised as in the form of the individual object, then the existential moment is characterised as inseparate.

Within this context, we need to indicate that Ingarden finds it a problem to ascertain the mode of existence of ideal qualities before its concretisation. Concretisation takes place as an existential moment of actualisation. In order to discern the existential moment of actualisation, Ingarden takes into account time and existence in time when he delineates the modes of being. In a wide sense, for him the modes of being are temporal or atemporal. For Ingarden, not all objects that have the temporal mode of being are real. Those that are temporally real are those that come into
being, continue in time, change, and get destroyed. For Ingarden, being in time is the innermost core of being of temporal objects. The object is cognised as connected with concrete time which is the experienced time and is not the time in which the object endures. They appear as events or processes or as objects enduring in time. All of them have the moment of actuality.

An event is that which comes into being and is a "single concrete now" where the time factor is understood as individual units which stand out in time sequence. As the event appears in one instant it has the essence of time and its mode of being is characterised by the existential moment of actuality. A process, on the other hand, is continually transient while only the present phase of the process has the existential moment of actuality while the other phases of the process either sink into the past or remain, as yet, in the future. The past and future are non-actual but they are not void, particularly the past. An object that endures in time, however, remains identically the same through new instants in which it exists. For Ingarden, process exists in objects that endure in time, and it modifies the properties of enduring objects. Process does not constitute the conditions for the existence of
objects. They are characterised by certain existential moments like contingency and inseparateness. In this respect, enduring objects are existentially prior to processes. The enduring objects are, so to say, the base for the process which remains identical and in which the transition of the phases of the process take place. The enduring objects themselves do not require a base different from themselves. They persist in time through their material essence. Thus, the material essence, in addition to the actuality moment, could constitute the existential moments for enduring objects.

The purpose of this analysis is to show that intentional objects have, in addition to the heteronomous and derivative existential moments, separate and contingent moments. In contrast to real objects, intentional objects do not have the actuality moment and are not marked by the existential moment. In other words, intentional objects are contingently dependent upon the act of consciousness for their continued existence. That is to say that as long as the act of consciousness sustains it, the intentional object remains in existence. We have already noted that, by virtue of their heteronomy and derivative moments, intentional objects have their source in the act of consciousness. The act of
consciousness is existentially autonomous and original. The act of consciousness is separate as it is not existentially inseparable from all of its objects, particularly intentional objects for which it is the source. Intentional objects are also separate in their existential moments. Further, the act of consciousness is self-dependent in the sense that it does not, in its essence, require any existentially separate object for its existence. But, it is not the case with intentional objects which are contingent upon the essence of the act of consciousness. The relativity of the intentional object to the existential status of pure consciousness is brought out through these existential moments by virtue of its constitutive nature which is different from that of the real object.

The results of the analysis of the modes of being, the existential moments, and the constitutive structure of objects are the basic tools needed for understanding Ingarden's phenomenology. As has been indicated, they are interdependent in the sense that to know the object, we need to know the mode; to know the mode, we need the moments; to know the moments, we need to know the constitutive structure of the object. Ingarden now extends his inquiry into the analysis of the meaning of words
and sentences. In explicating and formulating his basic tools mentioned above, Ingarden in effect has formulated the notion of intentional object.

We have noted that the intentional object, when once it comes into being, continues in existence only as long as the act of consciousness, so to say, holds it in being. It is, therefore, cognisable only by the subject who performs the act. And we have seen it assume the formal and material determination assigned to it. We have also observed that its ontic characterisation is described as heteronomous. The question now is how such an intentional object continues in existence so that it could be cognised by other conscious subjects. In other words, how to maintain the intentional object in its characteristic ontic mode with its characteristic formal structure and material determination as its contents, so that other conscious subjects could cognise it even though the act of consciousness that effected its coming into being is withdrawn?

As has been observed, it is the act of pure consciousness of an ego that projects an intentional object. However, once the intentional object comes into being, Ingarden asserts, the intentional object has some sort of independence i.e., the intentional
object is transcendent to the act of consciousness in
the sense that no element of the intentional object is
an element of the act and vice versa. Those inten-
tional objects that directly originate from concrete acts
of pure consciousness are called primary purely inten-
tional objects. Such an intentional object is a result
of various intuitive contents such as attitudes,
emotions, and acts of will. The limited independence
and transcendence of intentional objects, which Ingarden
asserts is to be construed in the sense that the inten-
tional object has its own content, but having the content,
namely a formal structure and material qualitative deter-
mination, does not entail the continued existence of the
intentional objects. The intentional object, with all
the ontic and structural characterisations, is condemned
to be a private possession. In fact, it would remain
only in someone's mind or consciousness but for the fact
that it could be the meaning of a word or a name. A
word-meaning, particularly a nominal word-meaning like
Delhi or Gandhi, could evoke an intentional object, and
in that sense the intentional object can continue in
its existence as the meaning of a word transcending the
privacy of one subject's world. Ingarden asserts that
this is indeed the case and that such intentional objects
are called purely derived intentional objects. That
is to say that they depend for their existence on word-
meaning but ultimately, he says, they refer back to the
act of unconsciousness though indirectly, that is through
the meaning of a word. By providing certain contents
to intentional objects, Ingarden shows that they are,
even as intentional beings, transcendent. This is
Ingarden's first step to avoid Husserlian transcenden-
talism, effecting the repeal of the epoche. But Ingarden
in fact could get over subjectivism only by showing that
word-meaning is intentional.

In what follows an account is given as to how
word-meaning is construed as the intentional correlate
of the object (as purely derived intentional objects)
and how the (primary purely) intentional object itself
is construed as the intentional correlate of an object,
is considered. In this consideration, what we in effect
are dealing with is the constitutional nature of inten-
tional objects and how meaning has to be an intentional
entity.

According to Ingarden, a word as a unit of lan-
guage contains word-sound or word-sign as its phonic
material and meaning. The meaning of a word is inten-
tionally designated. Ingarden says, "the intentional
designation contained in the meaning is, as it were, a
reflection of the intentional thinking contained in the meaning bestowing act. And, as to word-sound, word-sound is the unchangeable identical phonic form made strictly identical by the repeated utterance of the word. The word-sound has no form as mathematical objects have, although its concretisations are manifold, which are identically the same. Word-sounds are like ideal pure essences or mathematical objects, unchangeable timeless entities. However, they are not extratemporal as they come into being in time, and are not real. They function as the carriers of meaning where meaning is intended. Explaining the phenomenological function of a word-meaning, Ingarden says, "when a determinate word-sound is apprehended by a psychic subject, the apprehension leads directly to the execution of an intentional act in which the content of a determinate meaning is intended." The meaning of the word is therefore not presented.

Word-meaning seldom occurs as isolated meaning units. As an element of a sentence, it undergoes modifications in its meaning, when it performs different functions in a sentence, that is, intentional functions. This function is the sense or meaning for Ingarden. According to Ingarden, this function is bestowed upon
the words by the act of pure consciousness. Thus, when we intentionally designate an object, the word-sound is made into a 'name' for the intended object. Thus the meaning of a word becomes transcendent to the intentional act. Nevertheless, as the word-meaning depends for its source on the act of intentional designation, it is heteronomous. A word-meaning thus becomes a self enclosed unit of meaning. This account of word-meaning depends on three factors—i.e., word-sound, meaning, and intentional designation. In fact, Ingarden's theory of meaning follows the same pattern as has been described with respect to word-meaning, in the case of higher meaning unit formation.

The word, in particular name words, has several factors in its content such as intentional directional factors, material content, formal content, and existential characterisation. When a word that is a nominal word like "Table" refers to an object, it not only designates the object, but also directs itself towards it. This directional factor can be potential when it refers to a class of tables and when the word is not applied to a determinate object. Its meaning becomes actualised when it is applied to a particular table. Likewise, the intentional directional factor of the
nominal word-meaning in the example "Table" can refer to any individual "table." Thus it can be variable or constant when it refers to a determinate "Table." This directional factor though is contained as a factor in the meaning of the word. It is the intentional supposition that is the intentional act of pure consciousness according to Ingarden. This directional function depends upon the material qualitative determinations in the content of the word-meaning. The material content of word-meaning or an object refers to the qualitative constitution of an object. The qualitative constitution is determined intentionally by an act of consciousness. That is to say, the act attributes certain material features to the intentionally projected object, as in the example "coloured cloth" where the intentional object is determined such that it has just those attributes for it to be cloth and for it to be coloured. Thus the intentional directional factor is determined by the material content. In other words, the intentional object presents only those moments that are attributed to it in its material content. The intentional directional factor of the nominal word-meaning can also determine the constants and variables within the qualitative moments that are present in the material content of its meaning. When, for example,
the "coloured cloth" presents the moment 'coloured,' it can be further specified by another qualitative moment when it is indicated as red. Thus the meaning in its content carries a more specific quality moment.

In this way we are able to determine the constitutive nature of the projected intentional object more specifically with individual variations. In order to grasp the constitutive nature of the intentional object as projected by the word-meaning, we also need its formal structure. The formal structure of an object depends upon the type of object; as to whether the object is a thing or a state or a quality, etc. Though the intentional directional factor of the nominal word-meaning refers directly to the qualitative material determination, it also indirectly refers to the form in which such qualitative moments are structured, that is, as a property of something or as a feature belonging to something. This indirect consideration of the intentional directional factor is what Ingarden calls the formal content of the nominal word-meaning or the intentional object. In order to make explicit the nature of the purely derived intentional object, Ingarden says that the function of formal content should be made
explicit in the same manner that the material content is made explicit. In addition to these important characteristics of the intentional object which are brought out, through analysing the factors that inhere in the nominal word-meaning, yet another characteristic feature of the purely derived intentional object is the moment of ontic characterisation. A nominal word like "Triangle" refers to an ideal mode of existence; while "Delhi" refers to the really existing capital city of India. All these factors are mutually dependent on each other in determining the constitutive and existential nature of purely derived intentional objects. Ingarden indicates, by this analysis of word-meaning, the higher order of the meaning unit which is composed of sentence-meaning. Meaning is thus construed as an intentional entity by Ingarden.

Ingarden says that although intentional objects are presented in our imagined experience, the intentional objects continue to give the same experience through concrete time without any change in their contents and without acquiring psychic characters of ourimaginational experience, whereas imaginational objects are invariably presented with all the psychic conditions of imaginational experience. Besides, all cases
of imagining do not present imaginational objects, while it is not so with intentional experience. The intentional object, though imagined, basically rests on the intention of the act. But the imagined object is ontically grounded in imaginational data which are not obtained as the result of the determinate acts of consciousness. Once it becomes the determinate act of consciousness, then it becomes an intended act and hence has the content of such an act.

In the intentional act, for instance, that is directed towards an object "table," we obtain certain characteristic features which constitute the result of such an act, i.e., the intentional object. In the content of this object there are a formal structure and a range of material determinations which together qualify this object as a table or as something resembling a table. Since this obtained objectivity is a resemblance of the existing object, table, it has an ontic character of its own irrespective whether it is real or fictitious or a datum of some sort. We call the really existing object an intended object and that which is presented to the intentional act as the intentional object.
Among the contents of an intended object, we find that the formal structure is the carrier of qualities or properties and is determined by the essential qualitative moments which constitute the immediate *morphe* of the intended object. The purely intentional object has its own carrier with its own distinct properties, while the carrier of the intended object, as determined say by the qualitative moment of the object 'table,' only appears as an element in the content of the purely intentional object. It is the minimum differentiation between intended objects and intentional objects with which Ingarden starts to account for the nature and existence of the intentional object. If there is no such *differentia*, then there is no need to talk of the immanent character of the real object or its transcendent character. In other words, they would be totally identified or remain distinct. The intentional object has at least that property in its content, that is, that it is "something intended" and as such it basically belongs to the act of consciousness. Therefore, the intentional object has this peculiar nature of possessing double-carryer quality in its structure. It has a two-sided structure. "On the one hand it possesses the character of being a property carrier determined by the *morphe* of the object intended as
part of its content and as the property carrier of
the intentional object intended by the act of conscious-
ness. It is this formal character, which is not part
of its content, that distinguishes an intentional
object from objects which are independent of conscious
acts. It is in this sense that Ingarden defines
objects that are dependent upon acts of consciousness
as intentional objects and those that are not, as
objects intended in the sense that they are independent
of the act of consciousness with regard to their being.
However, such objects which are independent of the
act of consciousness, i.e., intended objects, are also
called "intentional" in the sense that they acciden-
tally become targets of conscious acts when they are
cognised.

As we have seen, this problem of existential
status of 'phenomena' is a point of controversy
even among philosophers of the same school of thought.
Besides, it leads to wider metaphysically divergent
views like idealism and realism, and the problem
remains unsettled. In this context, Ingarden's asser-
tion that the intended object is 'also intentional'
in the sense that it accidentally becomes a target
of conscious acts when it is cognised is significant.
It only points to the fact that Ingarden is urging a thesis that the intended object and intentional object are in some sense identical, if only in our cognition. In this context, it is worthwhile to compare Russell's attempt to convert all statements of phenomena into *thing* statements with that of Ingarden's. Russell's conclusion that all appearances are not physical and that they are partly in our brain and partly in 'events' which are physical is an admission of the unsolvable difficulty which this problem entails. On the one hand we are not able to account for the thing, and on the other, we cannot account for the given phenomena of the thing either. Ingarden's aim is to establish that intentional objects are the authentic phenomena of things we cognise through eidetic analysis.

The carrier of properties determined by the "tableness" of the intended object is an element in the content of the purely intentional object and is subordinate to the carrier of properties of the intentional object itself. However, the content of the intentional object by itself does not constitute a property of the intentional object, and as an element of the content of the intentional object even if it is considered to be a property, then this element itself
does not perform the role of a carrier in the intentional object. This element can only perform the role of a carrier with respect to other properties of intended tables and not with respect to the properties of the purely intentional object. However, this element has a special carrier role to play as a carrier of the property of "represented objectivity," that is, purely derived intentional objects. The "represented objectivity" is not produced as a purely intentional object on the one hand, and on the other, it is not intended to be taken altogether seriously. For example, those characters that are described by a novelist are only derived intentional objectivities and are not purely intentional ones. Ingarden asserts that the represented objectivities are not mere "neutralising modifications" as Husserl believed, in the sense that they are neither dependent nor independent of conscious acts or that they have an ideal mode of existence which is beyond the reach of conscious act.\textsuperscript{32} The ontic character of represented objectivities like that of purely intentional objects and the intended or "also intentional" objects, is important in the sense that the ontic characters of these objects can be subjected to the ontic characteristics of represented objectivities and the represented world as in a
novel, where real objects are contrasted with dreamed ones by a represented person. Therefore, for Ingarden every object is not a mere creation by the act of consciousness, and every object is not independent of the act of consciousness. It is in this peculiar dependency relation with respect to conscious acts that Ingarden seeks to clarify the distinct ontic position of different types of objects through their formal structure, i.e., their carrier of properties.

The carrier property of the purely intentional object remains concealed when the full capacity of the act of pure consciousness is not effected. For what is presented as the content of the intentional object not only appears as the carrier element of the content of the intentional object, but effectively as the entire intentional object. Hence, it is the moment that is qualified by an immediate morphe which functions as the carrier and not the carrier of the intentional object itself. The carrier of the property and the structure of the purely intentional object therefore lie concealed and become visible only when the full act of consciousness is executed. This is the reason why we normally fail to observe the distinction between the structure of purely intentional
objects effected as the intentional correlate of the act and the "also intentional" object on the one hand, and the "represented objectivities" or the purely derived intentional objectivity that is the 'word-meaning,' on the other.

What is needed is to bring to light the double carrier structure of intentional objects, to effect a simple act of intending in such a way that it brings the full performance of the act into view. This indicates that the purely intentional object is dependent for its existence and for its essence on the act of consciousness because a change in the act produces a corresponding change in the formation of the structure of intentional objects. The intentional object, although dependent so much on the conscious act for its existence, is not a created object of the consciousness. Apart from the fact that there is no genuine creative power for consciousness to create, the intentional object does not immanently contain within its content the determinations assigned to it by the act of consciousness. The formal structure is not immanent in the intentional object, it is only assigned to it by the act of consciousness. However, the represented objectivities are manifested in the sense that once
the act of consciousness assigns to them certain determinations, such determinations come to stay as quasi-immanent in their meaning units. They come to stay in a quasi-real sense, although they are not ontically autonomous like the real object or the ideal or pure consciousness. For such determinations have their existence in the intentionality of meaning of sentences which ultimately refer to conscious acts. The purely intentional object is a subjective formation, as it is accessible only to the subject whose conscious act created the intentional object. But the represented objectivity, as a purely derived intentional object and as a correlate of intentional meaning units, becomes inter-subjective since it can be apprehended by different conscious subjects as identically the same.

Every intentional act has its own purely intentional object as its correlate. But when the carrier of the content is intended as identically the same, a different intentional act can mean one and the same intentional object as its intentional correlate. Thus there is the possibility that the content of the intentional object can be altered. This possibility is different from that of "also intentional" objects. The intentional object that is produced can also be
destroyed or rendered null and void by another act of consciousness. In such cases, the content of the intentional object produced by a manifold of acts transcends the content of the intentional object produced by one single act. In the case of "also intentional" objects, this character is excluded by its very nature and also, to some extent, is not present in the purely intentional object which is produced by a single act of consciousness. All this points to the fact that intentional objects have special intentionality contents distinct from those of "also intentional" objects.

The objectively existing objects do not belong to an act of consciousness as their correlates while intentional objects do. The objectively existing objects have their ontic locus in existing objects, while purely intentional objects have their ontic locus in the acts. The objectively existing object can enter into the given ontic domain and so is not isolated, while purely intentional objects remain self-enclosed and isolated entities. The objectively existing object exhibits no relation with the word-meaning by itself. There is no intrinsic, essential, or ontic connection between the word and the object, whereas
intentional objects are intentional correlates of meaning units. The purely intentional object is what a nominal word-meaning signifies and it can contain mutually exclusive material elements. The objectively existing object cannot have mutually exclusive material elements. It is possible because the ontic character of the content of purely intentional objects is different from the formal structure of their content. Since it has its own carrier, i.e., intentional correlate, it is capable of holding mutually exclusive material determinations in one and the same ontic level.

4. Conclusion

Ingarden finds no justification in Husserl's attempt to define the domain of pure consciousness as absolute and the domain of objects as relative. By virtue of Husserl's phenomenological reduction, existing entities become constituted objects in the experience of pure consciousness as the intentional correlate of such an experience. Ingarden therefore starts defining the existential status of the domain of pure consciousness and that of objects and examines the nature of the relation that holds between them.
Ingarden concludes that we grasp the existential nature of objects only through their mode of being as *esse est in modus* and these modes only through certain existential moments characteristic of a mode. Such moments, when grasped, reveal the constitutive nature of objects. The constitutive nature of objects indicates the mode of being of pure consciousness, the mode of being of the real objects as autonomous, while the mode of being of intentional objects as heteronomous. Ingarden then examines the constitutive nature of this heteronomous entity in terms of other existential moments which are characteristic of the dependency relation. By virtue of these dependency relations, he concludes that the intentional object has a peculiar two-sided structure. He concludes that such a structure and the structure of the meaning of a word are alike and that the word-meaning is an intentional object. While those intentional objects that result directly from executing an intentional act are known only to one subject who effects an intentional act, as meaning correlates of words, the intentional object is known intersubjectively for meaning itself is intersubjective.

Ingarden thus renders meaning in terms of intentionality by defining the constitutive nature and
the existential relations of the intentional object, and characterises meaning as a heteronomous, self-enclosed entity which does not belong to either the ideal mode of being or to the real mode of being.
NOTES

1. F. Brentano, Realism and the Background of Phenomenology, ed. by Roderick M. Chisholm; pp. 50-51.


3. LWA, p. 118 footnote.

4. BFW, p. 260.

5. LWA, p. lxxiv.


8. MHTI, pp. 31-32.


11. LH, p. 422.


13. TIH, p. 198.


15. MHTI, p. 27.

16. TIH, p. 191.

17. BFW, pp. 483-84.

18. MHTI, p. 37.

20. TMB, p. 6.
22. TMB, p. 46.
25. TMB, p. 81.
26. Ibid, p. 82.
27. LWA, p. 118.
30. Ibid, p. 60.

31. R. M. Chisholm, Realism and Background to Phenomenology, p. 28 footnote.
32. LWA, p. 221.
CHAPTER IV

THE THEORY OF THE INTENTIONAL CORRELATES
OF SENTENCE MEANING UNITS

1. Introduction

Ingarden began examining the possibilities for a pure cognitive theory by which one can eidetically achieve the point of intuitive support for the cognition of the essence of individual objects. By accepting the principle of epoché through phenomenological investigations, a principle which he finds necessary for non-question begging cognition, Ingarden discovers the domain of pure consciousness. The discovery of the domain of pure consciousness though promising with regard to the inquiry about the essence of individual objects and the nature of species, for Ingarden meant a new set of problems concerning the existential relations objects have vis-à-vis pure consciousness. He therefore, through the ontic characterisations of objects by virtue of their constitutional nature, propounded the idea of intentional objects which have
a self-enclosed, dependent existence. His analysis of word-meaning reveals that meaning is also an intentional objectivity in the sense that meaning, like an intentional object, is heteronomous and is a self-enclosed entity. In this way he establishes that meaning is an intentional projection.

The analytical tradition's discussion on the theory of meaning, beginning from Frege, by and large concerns itself with the notion of linguistic reference to external questions such as "What does the expression 'P' refer to?" Apart from conceptual clarification, the theories of meaning have left the traditional questions on the problem of the existence of the world, universals, sense data, and, in fact, the mind-body problem, still external to such theoretical formulations. Viewed in this context, Ingarden's phenomenological theory of meaning provides a new formulation in the sense it does not keep metaphysical questions external to it.

Ingarden's theory of the intentional correlate of sentence-meaning units shows how sentence-meaning, as an intentional correlate or as an intentional state-of-affairs, relates itself to objectively existing states-of-affairs. In other words, how sentence-meaning
can contain in itself different levels of ontic characterisations. For in Ingarden's phenomenology, what we grasp through the existential moments of a dependency relation is only the intentional objectivity and the real object is grasped only as an "also intentional" object. By sentences, Ingarden means all statements, including propositions. In this attempt Ingarden is largely concerned with avoiding idealistic conclusions that meaning is an ideal species of ideal kinds.

For Ingarden the word-meaning is a self-contained unit of meaning and is, unlike sentence-meaning, ontically autonomous in the sense that its phonetic material, i.e., word-sound, functions as its external real carrier.

The nominal word-meaning in its meaning content has several distinct features. It has, in its meaning content, a formal structure and material qualitative determinations which are inter-dependent. In other words, within the word-meaning the specific qualitative moments are structured as properties and as belonging to some object. The intentional directional factor in the content of word-meaning determines the qualitative moments while the qualitative moments are intentionally
supposed. Thus Ingarden's analysis of word-meaning discerns all the factors within the content of word-meaning that go to project meaning even before the word refers to any object and as embedded in its concrete outer shell, i.e., word-sign.\textsuperscript{1} It has been noted that Ingarden applies this scheme of the word-meaning as an intentional objectivity. A purely intentional object is projected by the intentional act and is thus directly dependent on the act; but it is not something that the act discovers in the sense of a creation. However, word-meaning as the intentional objectivity becomes inter-subjectively communicable unlike the purely intentional object which is cognised by the ego of the intentional act.

The sentence formation act is an intentional act by which word-meanings are functionally determined as elements of a sentence. The meaning of a sentence depends upon the mutually performed functions of the words that occur in it and on the sentence forming operation of the act of consciousness. For example, in the sentence, "Delhi is the capital of India," the nominal word-meanings that occur in the sentence direct towards each other and establish a state-of-affairs that is objectively existing. The state-of-
affairs that is pointed out by the sentence is developed by the predicate "is the capital of India." The predicate, as an attribute to Delhi, points to the characteristic of 'belonging' towards 'Delhi.' Thus, the predicate, together with the subject, develops a state-of-affairs. Such a state-of-affairs is, in fact, the intentional correlate of the sentence according to Ingarden.

A word-meaning has its corresponding intentional objectivity when they occur together in some order in a sentence; their intentional correlates are functionally determined, not merely by the subject-predicate relation but essentially by the sentence forming operation of the act of consciousness. The sentence-meaning correlate is not that of the word-meaning correlates; it points to something transcendent to the word-meaning correlates that are contained in the sentence.

The sentence forming operation is, according to Ingarden, a temporally extended subjective operation. In this operation word-meaning intentional correlates are, with many possible variations, ordered into a temporally extended sequence to form a higher order meaning unit. Since this sentence forming operation is temporally extended, it cannot order ideal objects in
an order of sequence, for ideal objects are atemporal. This operation projects the intentional correlate of the sentence and sustains it in existence. The sentence-meaning intentional correlate relates itself to the mode of being of the state-of-affairs whether the state-of-affairs is an objectively existing one or an ideal one. The purely intentional state-of-affairs has its ontic foundations in the ontic sphere of the sentence as its meaning correlate. But the objectively existing state-of-affairs does not belong to the ontic sphere of the sentence-meaning correlate, as the objectively existing state-of-affairs belongs to another ontic mode that is an autonomous mode of existence. However, assertive propositions or statements of facts, which Ingarden calls judgements, are considered to be identical in their meaning content to the objectively existing states-of-affairs. According to Ingarden, this is not actually the case, for even the objectively existing states-of-affairs we cognise only as intentional correlates of such judgements. Since every sentence, whether the sentence is a statement of values, command, wish, desire or interrogative, has an intentional meaning correlate, a statement of fact also has its correlate. While the intentional meaning correlate belongs always to one mode of being that is
a heteronomous mode of being, objectively existing states-of-affairs or ideal objects belong to different ontic spheres. In the following theory Ingarden explains how a sentence-meaning correlate relates itself to objects of different ontic modes.

2. The Theory

Ingarden believed that Husserl's programme would eventually clarify the various existential dependency relationships with respect to conscious operations. In the meantime, he himself sought such an explanation. His concept of the moments of autonomy and heteronomy is meant to grasp the essential relation which objects of different ontic modes have. Ingarden's searches to establish a relation between objects of different ontic modes and sentences, while Husserl, Reinerch, Pfänder, and Meinong made no such attempts. Ingarden says that "in none of these authors do I find a fully conscious and detailed distinction made between the objectively existing and purely intentional state of affairs." For Ingarden, the objectively existing state-of-affairs cannot be separated from its ontic sphere and it is characterised by the existential moment of inseparability, while the purely intentional state-of-affairs
could remain relative to its ontic region. The former is discovered by us in judgements that assert the existing state-of-affairs as objectively true while the latter has its ontic foundation in the meaning of the judgement that is the assertive proposition. The objectively existing state-of-affairs has no intrinsic connection with the sentence as it is ontically autonomous, whereas the purely intentional state-of-affairs belongs to the sentence-meaning content as its correlate and thus has an intrinsic and essential connection. For Ingarden, a sentence cannot represent the ontic sphere of the objectively existing state-of-affairs. 3a

For Husserl, on the other hand, the meaning intentionality is not the expression of any entity. Husserl is concerned with the experience which the meaningful expression gives. Husserl did not construe meaning as the intentional correlate of the act as did Ingarden. Any meaning intentionality, for Husserl, is a meaning conferring act, on an expression that intends an object. But only subsequently through another act, i.e., a meaning fulfilling act, can an expression be meaningful. Husserl explains how a subsequent meaning fulfilment takes place once the
meaning intentionality conferred meaning to an expression. But he is not concerned about how the act of meaning fulfillment relates itself to the intended object. But Husserl thinks that the meaning intentionality realises the intended object. As Mohanty observes, "since the reference is conditioned by the meaning-intention, the object referred to is to be given by way of fulfilment of that intention and therefore the mode of givenness of the object of reference is conditioned by the meaning intention itself. This does not however, entitle us to go a step ahead and say that the object of reference is the same as the meaning fulfilment."

Ingarden's problem is how it is possible for the assertive proposition to correspond directly with the objective state-of-affairs. The subjective sentence forming operation which is an act of pure consciousness, adopts the contents of the perceptual object or existing state-of-affairs on the basis of intuitive apprehension. The thus formed intentional correlate of the sentence in the perceptual cognition is identified with the objectively existing state-of-affairs and is also recognised as really existing along with it while the sentence itself is claimed to
be true. These moments occur, according to Ingarden, only when the sentence forming operation is at the service of perceptual cognition. These moments are however not essential elements of a subjective sentence forming operation. The essence of the subjective sentence forming operation is that it is an intentional unit of meaning, in the sense that it transcends itself and points to something different from itself. In other words, it is capable of representing states-of-affairs or a coordination of sentences to states-of-affairs where objects and states-of-affairs are intended as elements of reality. Every sentence must therefore have the function of representation according to Ingarden. The sentences by themselves are not capable of bringing about this function. It is the intentionality of sentence-meaning that brings about this coordination. It is however doubtful that the sentence forming operation could free itself from any cognitive operation as it is inextricably interwoven with moments of other cognitive operations, even though such moments are not essential to its functions, according to Ingarden. 6

As in the case of purely intentional objects and the derived purely intentional object that is the
intentional correlate of nominal word-meaning, Ingarden distinguishes in the intentional correlate of the sentence, between content, intentional structure, and mode of existence. The sentence-meaning is always in one particular ontic mode by virtue of the fact that it is the result of intentional acts. Although the word-meanings that occur in it are intentional, the sentence-meaning has to coordinate various ontic modes within its meaning to which the word-meanings are correlates. What characterises the purely intentional object is its structure. In the case where a "table" is imagined, the content comprises of the formal structure of the thing, the material determinations, and the ontic character of the imagined thing. The formal structure of the thing is the carrier of (qualitatively determined property of) the qualitative moment "tableness," i.e., the immediate morphe which is the nature of the object. However, this property carrier in the structural content is different from the property carrier of the purely intentional object itself, which is only something intended, and belongs to the given act of consciousness. Thus the structure of the purely intentional object itself constitutes a characteristic formal distinctiveness of the double-carrier quality. The property carrier of the purely
intentional object is ontologically prior to the second carrier which is only an element within the frame of its content. Ingarden thinks that the property of the content of the second carrier itself is not the purely intentional object and it cannot be considered as part of this object in the sense in which say a leg is part of a table. However, the second carrier functions in relation to other moments or properties of the contents of the intended table, as in the case of the represented objectivities which have "only an external habitus of reality." In the intentional act, what is intended is not only the content of the corresponding intentional object alone, but the entire intentional object. Usually in such acts what is intended is the moment that is qualified by an immediate morphé which is exemplified by the second carrier. However, the carrier of the purely intentional object as such remains latent. It is only in the full act of consciousness that the true carrier of intentional objects as such becomes visible. And so the constitution of the structure of the purely intentional object which is the essence of the purely intentional object comes to light. From the double-carrier constitution, according to Ingarden, it becomes clear that purely intentional objects depend for their existence and essence on
intentional acts of consciousness although the purely intentional object is transcendent to the corresponding acts of consciousness in the sense that no moment of the act is an element of the object and vice versa.

By contrast, the objectively existing state-of-affairs is merely "also intentional" and not purely intentional as has been described. Individual objects that are ontically independent with respect to acts of consciousness do not possess the double-carrier character in their constitution. The qualitative and formal elements are immanent in such things of perceptual cognition. In intentional objects, qualitative and formal elements are not immanent. The double-carrier structure of intentional objects only seems to play the role which it is not truly capable of. For they lack the immanence of the material and formal determinants assigned to them. Whatever determinations are assigned to it are only assigned in accordance with the proper essence of the intentional act of thought. In this sense, the purely intentional object, unlike the individual object, is not a substance. It is an "illusion" that draws its essence and existence from the projecting intention or meaning bestowal act (Sinnegebung) according to Ingarden. 8
Cognitive operations pronounce judgements about things which are expressed in indicative sentences. In this case, the meaning-content points to or refers to an object that is existing objectively as an object which possesses those determinations that are intended by the expression. Thus the purely intentional state-of-affairs of the meaning-content of the sentence is applied to the real object as having the same intended determinations. By that the intentional state-of-affairs is transposed from the intended ontic region to the ontic region of the existing object. It is intentionally transposed to the real ontic domain in which the given object finds itself rooted. This function is carried out by the intentional directional factor of the nominal expression conveyed by the meaning-content of the proposition. This function is supported further by the function of the verbal development of the predicate of the proposition as the state-of-affairs (determined by the meaning-content of the proposition) actually existing in the real world. It is based in these two functions that the proposition makes claim to truth, according to Ingarden. Such a claim, in effect, is that the state-of-affairs is not a purely intentional one, but one that is ontically rooted in the sphere that is independent with respect to the
judgement. According to Ingarden's analysis, the function of "transposing" performed by the intentional directional factor of the nominal expression in the intentional correlate of the sentence brings about an identification between the material and the formal determinations of the content of the purely intentional sentence correlate and the existing state-of-affairs. This identity is constituted by virtue of a (perceptual) cognitive operation together with the subjective sentence forming operation. This degree of identical adjustment between the intentional state-of-affairs and existing states-of-affairs is attained. That is to say, these moments constitute two different kinds of concretisations of the same ideal essences or ideas--the purely intentional concretisation and the objectively existing concretisation. These two modes of concretisations are identified and as a consequence the purely intentional concretisation is not counted while the intention of the proposition is treated as directly pointing at that which is ontically independent of the proposition. This means that, by transposing the purely intentional state-of-affairs into the corresponding ontic sphere, it becomes transparent and so it remains no longer distinct from the objectively existing concretisation. Ingarden says that the
evidence for this is the very deferment of the claim to truth by indicative propositions\textsuperscript{10} and that, therefore, such a character is immanent in the indicative proposition. In fact, Ingarden's theory of the purely intentional correlate of sentence-meaning units rests on this explanation as to how objects hold a relationship to sentences which are different modes of being and are characterised as such by different moments particular to these respective modes of being.

For him, every sentence is the product of a subjective sentence forming operation. Without such an operation, there is no sentence at all. And, as such, every sentence has the intentional correlate in its meaning-content. In the case of indicative propositions, there are two different modes of states-of-affairs where the matter and form of purely intentional states-of-affairs are identified with the objectively existing one. This identification is brought about by the judgement functions of the indicative proposition which has claims for truth. What is identified is not the intentional correlate of the proposition itself with the objective state-of-affairs, but the content of the intentional correlate of the proposition with the existing state-of-affairs. And this is made
possible in the sense that the essence of the given object in the content has the identical mode of existence of the existing state-of-affairs. Since the purely intentional mode of existence does not belong to the content of the purely intentional correlate, it is transparent, i.e., it is not distinct.

In this analysis of the purely intentional state-of-affairs and the objective state-of-affairs, one cannot fail to notice Ingarden's commitment to the explanation of objects and their relationship to sentences. Through his analysis of the purely derived intentional object which is distinct from the purely intentional object, he establishes the intersubjective identity of sentences, just as he establishes a relationship of objects to sentences through his distinction between purely intentional states-of-affairs and objectively existing states-of-affairs. The purely defined intentional objects have their existence and essence in the formation of units of meaning. Since the formation of units of meaning refers back to the original intentionality of the acts of consciousness, the purely derived intentional objects have their ultimate source of existence in the intentional act of subjective consciousness. The formation of meaning
units contains only a borrowed intentionality. Hence it becomes possible for the meaning units to gain a relative independence from acts of consciousness. Thus it remains ontically heteronomous and dependent as it refers directly to the intentionality immanent in the meaning unit and only indirectly to the acts of consciousness. The purely intentional object, however, is the subjective formation as it is accessible to only one conscious subject that effected the act and created it. It is unable to remain independent of subjective acts. By contrast, the purely derived intentional objectivity as a correlate of the meaning units becomes intersubjective. These can be intended by different conscious subjects as identically the same. Thus they have their ontic foundations in the meaning unit or content of the sentence, whereas the purely intentional objects constitute a necessary intentional correlate of acts of consciousness which flows from the essence of the act of consciousness.

Ingarden's search for various existential relationships or dependencies with respect to conscious operations led him to formulate what essential relationships objects have to sentences and how the intersubjective identity of sentences is secured. His
eidetic analysis led him to propound that among various subjective operations, a sentence forming operation is peculiar in that it cannot free itself from other subjective operations, in particular cognitive judgements of a thing. As a result, it modifies itself and the cognitive operations as well, and so it is bound up with various elements that are not essential to it. For him, therefore, nothing can be asserted about material things themselves whether they are constituted as intentional entities in a certain set of cognitive acts or whether they are dependent for their being on pure consciousness. They can only be spoken about in a pure theory of cognition as to how they are meant in a corresponding cognitive act.

Even with this theory, Ingarden concludes that ontic consequences could not be contained. Ingarden is still far from recovering from phenomenological reduction, for the objectively existing state-of-affairs as autonomous entities cannot be explained away as intentional correlates of meaning units. In the case of the indicative proposition, the intentional meaning correlate only shares the ontic sphere in which the real objects are, as states-of-affairs or as events, confirmed as having their existential moment of actuality.
It is, so to say, as if the intentional correlate coincides with regard to its ontic mode with that particular moment which makes the objectively existing state-of-affairs as irreducibly actual and real. Thus a dichotomy which Ingarden sought to overcome continues only because he relates the intentional state-of-affairs and the objectively existing state-of-affairs as the intentional correlate and the intended. In fact, his theory only justifies how a category mistake is to be allowed and acknowledged, in the sense that the predicate of the intentional state-of-affairs is projected onto the objectively existing state-of-affairs as if it belongs to the objectively existing state-of-affairs.

In his subsequent analysis of quasi-judgements, Ingarden seeks to explain the intentional transposition.

3. **The Quasi-Judgements**

According to Ingarden, sentences can be judgements which, besides their intentional correlates as their meaning, refer to a corresponding objectively existing state-of-affairs. They have claim to truth and are either true or false. We find sentences of this kind in scientific works. There are other types of sentences, like affirmative propositions and quasi-judgements. The purpose here is to determine the
intentional correlate of quasi-judgements in contrast to the judgements on the one hand and by contrast to the pure affirmative or categorical propositions which have no claim to truth on the other. Ingarden's conclusion is that the quasi-judgements are a class by themselves, they neither can make claim to truth nor abandon such claims. Thus their position is somewhat in between these two types of sentences—judgements or assertive propositions and pure affirmative sentences. By showing the nature of quasi-judgements, Ingarden seeks a proof in their explanation for his theory of intentional correlates of sentence-meaning units. He also establishes that it is this type of quasi-judgement that produces literary works of art. Hence the importance of the consideration of literary works of art in the phenomenology of Ingarden. Ingarden points out that Husserl mentioned the mode of being of fiction but did not consider it seriously, and, as a result, Husserl posed the "painful question" as to "how subjectivity can itself bring forth . . . real existence in the form of historical temporality as theories and sciences?" 11

For Ingarden, an affirmative proposition is a judgement about something. This becomes an assertive
proposition which is a genuine judgement, that is, a proposition in the logical sense. The difference between these two types of sentences is that in the case of the former, the intentional directional factor of the nominal word merely points to its corresponding intentional correlate, whereas in the case of the latter, the nominal word-meaning refers to an object beyond itself. In such cases, because of the reference to an object beyond the nominal word-meaning, the entire sentence intentional correlate is transposed to the real object as if the entire content of intentional correlates of the sentence belongs to the ontic range of the object and thus makes the claim that the state-of-affairs of its meaning-content exists. What is actually existing is the object referred to by the nominal word-meaning. But the contents of the meaning, the material and formal determinations as contained in the intentional correlate of the sentence, are not the objectively existing state-of-affairs. Nevertheless, in the case of judgement all the contents of the intentional correlate of meaning of a sentence are transposed to the object referred to by the intentional directional factor of the nominal word-meaning. If the claim to truth is deferred or modified, then such sentences are no longer pure judgements for in such a case, the
no-longer-pure judgements carry merely the intentional correlate and no claim to an existing state-of-affairs. Ingarden cites an example to convey this difference between the judgement and no-longer-pure judgement, "This fountain pen is of German make." In this example, since there is no objectively existing state-of-affairs corresponding to "This" (fountain pen), we should conclude that sentences have their own intentional correlates irrespective of objectively existing states-of-affairs. Such sentences are called affirmative sentences according to Ingarden. They are not false judgements where the claim to truth is immanent.

In pure affirmative sentences there are no claims for truth, that is, claims about objectively existing states-of-affairs. In contrast to judgement, the nominal word-meaning of the affirmative sentence does not refer to an objectively existing state-of-affairs. Since the nominal word-meaning in this case does not point to an object beyond itself, the entire content of the intentional correlate of the meaning of affirmative sentences remains ontically neutral and hence it is possible for it to remain in the characterisation of any ontic mode. In the affirmative proposition, the judgement, there is no claim for truth.
It carries only a purely intentional state-of-affairs.

The quasi-judgements, according to Ingarden, occupy a peculiar position between judgements which have claims to truth and affirmative propositions which have no claims to truth. Such statements are sentences that occur in historical novels, or in period novels, or in imaginative literary works of art. In the case of an historical literary work, the characters and incidents that are portrayed are actually what happened once. Here the intentionality of the meaning correlates points to something beyond the particular individuals. Yet the contents of the intentional correlates of the meaning of the proposition in the historical play do not reach out to the objectively existing state-of-affairs as is the case in judgements. Since they are quasi-present in ontic characterisations, they are close to judgements. They are quasi-judgements, not actual ones, and yet not purely intentional as the affirmative propositions are. Sentences that appear in period novels intentionally project certain general types of states-of-affairs which have occurred. They are quasi-judgements but the intentional directional factor of the nominal word-meaning does not reach out to any individual state-of-affairs as in the case of historical novels.
They are, therefore, quasi-judgements where, unlike the quasi-judgements of historical plays, the transposition of intentional states-of-affairs does not lead to the near-transparency of the intentional correlate. In the case of the imaginative novels, there is no effort to effect a transposition of the intentional correlate to the objectively existing state of affairs. In other words, these sentences do not make claims to truth like affirmative propositions.\textsuperscript{13}

With this analysis of quasi-judgements, Ingarden points to the modification in the content of the intentional correlate of sentence-meaning units according to the type of sentence, i.e., judgement, affirmative propositions, and three distinct quasi-judgements. The purpose is to indicate that it is the subjective sentence forming operation that projects the meaning units of different kinds and that word-meanings and units of meaning of higher orders are not ideal unchangeable formations. This is also to indicate that it is not the subject who effects the transition from one unit of meaning into another.

Answering Käte Hamburger's criticism, Ingarden says that we can distinguish the judgement from quasi-judgements by attaching a label to the
quasi-judgement, just as Russell distinguished those of the system from statements through the assertive sign. However, Ingarden himself admits that it is difficult to distinguish an affirmative proposition from the quasi-judgement yet he says we all know that the sentences that appear in a novel are not mere affirmative propositions because we do not take quasi-judgements seriously. The sentences that appear in literary works of art, according to Ingarden, vary from close affirmative propositions to judgements though they are not in themselves genuine judgements. Though there is a looseness of fit on either end of his classification of quasi-judgement, in so far as it clarifies the nature of the intentional correlate of sentence-meaning units and through it in explaining the stratum of meaning units in the structure of literary works of art, Ingarden's theory is a contribution.

4. Conclusion

Language, according to Ingarden, has both cognitive and non-cognitive functions such as conveying emotions, desires, etc. It derives from and depends on other cognitive operations. It is an apparatus to convey what is given in experience. In its cognitive
aspect, it has a role in predicting and in intelligent perception. Ingarden says, "alongside what is the mental counterpart of sensuous perception there are in language units, some elements (functors) that exceed in their sense the data provided by experience and nevertheless correspond to some of our cognitive mental operations." Ingarden discusses the logical constants such as is, if, then, etc. in a sentence as those elements which go beyond in conveying meaning than the data given in direct sense perception. Therefore, according to him a pre-linguistic predication is possible for one can grasp a state-of-affairs even though there is no name for the subject of the state-of-affairs or for the process. Such an initial predication is a mental action, which is a cognitive operation based on the perception of differentiated objects. He speaks about the language of children which they cognise only by name without connectives. These considerations indicate that language is not autonomous and that it is derived from some other cognitive operation. For Ingarden, therefore, the sentence is a functional intentional unit of meaning and it is the result of subjective sentence-forming operations. Such a subjective sentence-forming operation can meaningfully convey other cognitive operations like perception.
For these reasons, Ingarden says "I am only trying to reveal more thoroughly the essence of the purely intentional object and to free its concept from various impurities." By impurity Ingarden means the mistaken identity of the intentional object with psychic content, or as real or as ideal species. From that point on, Ingarden was led finally to the theory of the intentional correlate of sentence-meaning units which not only indicates that meaning is not an ideal species, but projects an account for a theory of literature.

Brentano's intentional relation between the object and its presentation to our mind or his judgment in which the intentional relation that either affirms or rejects the existence of objects kept the objects merely as fictitious and not genuine. Ingarden, on the contrary, has not dissolved the object. He promised to reveal the essence of the object by virtue of its relation to the conscious subject.

For Twardowski, objects are only presented objects which are species and, since meaning is not a species, he could not show how a word-meaning is intentional. Husserl, on the other hand, thought meaning is an ideal species though for him it is an intentional formation. Husserl's problem is that the
status of language as a whole and, with it, the meaning lose their transcendence totally once eidetic reduction is performed. It has to be in such a reduction immanent to the conscious experience and hence meaning is an ideal species for him. Ingarden's account enables him not to lose sight of the individual object.
NOTES

1 Word-sound and word-sign are both phonetic materials of word-meaning. Relatively word-sound is unchangeable, but it is not real (LWA, p. 37). But, it is also considered as real in the sense that it is an ontic foundation of meaning (LWA, p. 361). When Ingarden says that word-sound is not real, he seems to mean that it is not to be construed as unchangeable as an ideal object.

2 For Ingarden, the ideal objects are beyond the reach of conscious act. If it were not so, in his scheme, ideal objects would also become intentional objectivities.

3 LWA, p. 129 footnote. 3a LWA, p. 110 & p. 116.


6 LWA, p. 111 footnote.

7 Ibid, p. 120 footnote.

8 Ibid, p. 123.


10 Ibid, p. 163.

11 Ibid, p. lxxv.

12 Ibid, p. 165.


15 TJFP, p. 112.

16 Ibid, p. 110.

17 LWA, p. 118 footnote.
CHAPTER V

THE THEORY OF THE IDEAL CONCEPT

1. Introduction

Ingarden's search for a pure theory of cognition, free from non-question begging assumptions, led him to accept the validity of immanent perception. For him a purely epistemological investigation is not possible because in such investigations there is always an ontological or metaphysical assumption which cannot be explained epistemologically. Ingarden indicates that a phenomenological pure theory of cognition is possible, but he has not undertaken to detail such a theory in explaining the inter-subjective identity of meaning. For, according to him, even with the solution of such a cognitive theory, only a metaphysical conclusion is possible. He therefore seeks a metaphysical solution to the problem faced by Husserl in maintaining the inter-subjective identity of meaning.

Ingarden's doctrine of the purely intentional object is by necessity solipsistic, although he
propounds this doctrine as a solution to the transcendental idealism of Husserl. What Husserl meant by the intentional correlate of the sense of the object, Ingarden construes with his own doctrine of intentional objects as the intentional correlates of the object. However, such an intentional projection is known only for the ego that effects it. The intentional objectivity—"comes into being" by the act of pure consciousness and continues in "existence" as long as the act keeps it in "existence." Hence, such an intentional objectivity lacks a support for its "existence" independent of the act of consciousness. However, the purely derived intentional objectivity depends for its existence and essence on the word-meaning or sentence-meaning directly. Thus the purely derived intentional object for its "coming into being" only indirectly depends upon the act as the meaning itself depends upon the act of consciousness for its own "coming into being." The meaning can continue in "existence" independent of the act once it "comes into being." Therefore, the purely derived intentional object can also continue in "existence," as it is dependent on the meaning, and so is understood inter-subjectively since the meaning is understood inter-subjectively. When discussing the theory of the intentional correlates of
sentence-meaning units, Ingarden gave the tentative explanation that such correlates depend on the sentence-meanings, as in the case of word-meaning, for their continued "existence" and for their inter-subjective identity. He then postponed the question as to how the meaning of a word or a sentence itself is inter-subjectively identical.

Ingarden says, "in the stage of the analysis where we now find ourselves, there are two courses along which we can proceed: either the purely phenomenological, which refrains from accepting the existence of anything besides pure consciousness or the metaphysical, which does not shy away from accepting the existence of other objectivities if there are justified motives for it and if the purely phenomenological approach does not suffice." By introducing the doctrine of the intentional object, Ingarden has shown that the purely phenomenological approach does not suffice to explain the ontic foundations of meaning. For he found only that the purely phenomenological approach considers meaning as an ideal species of a special kind. If only the pure consciousness is considered to be the ontic foundation of meaning, then meaning cannot be inter-subjective. A purely
phenomenological approach that considers pure consciousness as the only source for meaning is therefore untenable according to Ingarden. In order that meaning itself be inter-subjectively understood, it must have other sources in addition to that of pure consciousness. Since for Husserl pure consciousness is absolute, his phenomenology is considered by Ingarden as purely phenomenological. On such a view, it is difficult to discern any relation which objects have vis-à-vis pure consciousness because the existential character of the objects is not considered as transcendent. Hence meaning is also considered as immanent to absolute pure consciousness. It is particularly so in Husserl's pure phenomenology where with the principle of epoché, when objects and the world are no more transcendent, language also loses its transcendence. This creates the problem of inter-subjective identity of meaning.

With Husserl's purely phenomenological suspension of all existential commitments, in order to obtain a basis on which apodictic knowledge of the essence of the object could be built, the possibility of meaning of the apodicticity of being understood inter-subjectively becomes questionable. For such a meaning bears no relation to the existential commitments from
which the object is suspended by the principle of epoche. Therefore the meaning that is grounded in the apodicticity of the essence of the object as cognised in absolute pure consciousness cannot but be solipsistic. In such an attempt we have a realm of ideal meaning as distinct from the realm of the real. Such subjective operations, according to Ingarden, do not produce something new out of nothing and whatever is created by such operations does not belong to the same mode of existence as pure consciousness. Therefore, Ingarden argues for the recognition of other sources of meaning in addition to pure consciousness, in order to maintain the intersubjective identity of meaning. Since, for this reason, he argues for two other sources for meaning, namely word-sign and ideal concepts that are heterogeneous to pure consciousness, he says he is seeking a metaphysical solution rather than a purely phenomenological solution.

Ingarden calls these three sources of meaning—namely pure consciousness, ideal concepts, and word-signs—the ontic foundations of meaning. In explaining word-meaning and sentence-meaning, we have observed the role played by the intentional act as the sentence-forming operation, and the phonetic material of the
word that is the word-sign as something which functions as the external carrier of word-meaning. An ideal concept is the concept that makes it possible for a word-meaning to have an actualised meaning at a given time out of its potential stock of meanings. For Ingarden, the meaning of a word or a sentence therefore depends on these three factors, i.e., on the ontic foundations for its continued existence and hence for its inter-subjective identity. Construed in this sense, meaning, after its "coming into being," is not an ideal species but has characteristics derived from both real material properties of objects and ideal concepts. Since its "coming into being" is effected by the subjective sentence forming operation, it is an intentional being having a heteronomous mode of existence. Thus meaning is structured in the intentional heteronomous mode of existence which is-ontically founded for its existence simultaneously upon three distinct autonomous sources--pure consciousness, the ideal concept, and the word-sign. On Ingarden's view, explication of the functional intentional operation between the ontic foundations and the structure of meaning provides us with an account as to how the heteronomous mode of existence of meaning, and therefore its inter-subjective identity, is obtained. In other words, the continued
existence of meaning independent of the act of consciousness is accounted for by its heteronomous mode of existence.

2. Ideal Concepts

In Ingarden's philosophy, the ideal concept occupies a prominent central place as an indispensable ontic foundation of meaning without which, in his scheme, inter-subjective identity of meaning is impossible. Furthermore, Ingarden says that without ideal concepts, "purely intentional objectivities are impossible in the same degree as real objects taken in a true sense." In other words, the ideal concept enables the "objectification" of the intentional object and through such "objectification" we are able to cognise the transcendence of real objects. When the intentional object could "continue in existence" in a heteronomous mode of being because of its dependence on ideal concepts, the intentional objectivity gains certain transcendence from the act of consciousness through which it "comes into being." Through the heteronomous existence of intentional objects, Ingarden aimed at ascertaining the transcendence of the essence of real objects even from within a phenomenological perspective.
For Ingarden, an ideal concept is therefore necessarily transcendent to pure consciousness. In this sense he could not assign an absolute existential moment for the mode of existence of pure consciousness, while for Husserl, pure consciousness is an absolute being.

For Ingarden, "a word meaning, we said, is nothing other than an actualisation of the meaning contained in corresponding ideal ontically autonomous existing concepts. Moreover it is at any one moment an actualisation of only a part of this meaning." In fact Ingarden postulates the ideal concept even before he gave a phenomenological explanation. When he analysed the word-meaning he distinguished several factors that are characteristic of a word-meaning. One of them is the intentional directional factor that is contained in the word-meaning itself. This intentional directional factor indicates precisely the material content of the word-meaning and depending upon this content, it is either constant and actual or variable and potential. Ingarden explains the actual and potential stock of word-meaning through the following example. The word-meaning of "square" can be understood, according to Ingarden, by virtue of its material moments in different
ways such as (i) an equilateral rectangular parallelogram, (ii) an equilateral parallelogram with sides of any length, (iii) an equilateral rectangular quadrangle with two pairs of parallel sides of any length. He says while the word "square" and all the compound words that are employed to explicate the meaning of "square" have their individual meanings, the meanings they convey are the same in a sense that has yet to be determined. But the meaning of the word "square" is not the same as the meaning of the compound words where each has its own meaning. Ingarden says that it is not the case that they all refer to one and the same object whether it is a real object or a formally conceived one, but that they are different meanings belonging to one ideal concept of the same object. There are different expressions in which part of one and the same meaning can appear. Thus, according to Ingarden, "the meaning of the word 'square' contains in its material content actually only part of what is contained in the concept of square or in the idea of 'the square'; in contrast the meaning of the expression 'equilateral rectangular parallelogram' contains actually a different part of the content of the same concept, one which, moreover, allows the object of the concept to be constituted by a manifold of essences that is equivalent to
squareness. Further both of these meanings contain, though how in a totally different potential way, something which is also contained in the ideal concept of a square, namely that the sides of a square can be of any 'absolute length'. Thus, for Ingarden, the potential stock of meaning in a concept is only partially actualised by a word-meaning belonging to the concept, which actualisation provides the word-meaning its material and formal contents. The intentional directional factor of the word-meaning is developed by the material content of the word-meaning that is actualised from the corresponding potential stock of ideal concept. Thus within the nominal word-meaning, the intentional directional factor, the actualisation of material, and formal content from the potential stock of its corresponding concepts all function together to project the "objectification" of what is intended. By contrast, the word-meanings of verbs do not lead to such "objectification." For in verbs there is no intentional directional factor which directs itself to its material contents, rather it always points to the nominal meaning's "objectification." When it is the sentence-forming operation of the act of consciousness, then such actualisation takes place in a temporally extended series. Thus, the
ideal concept is the source for the actualisation of
not only word-meaning, but also sentence-meaning.

Ingarden construes an ideal concept as that
which has a mode of being. According to him such a
mode is, by necessity, atemporal. For ideal entities,
like mathematical objects, ideal qualities, and ideas,
are not like objects existing in time. Objects that
exist in time have the existential moment of actuality.
However, ideal concepts are not of the nature of pure
possibilities only because their potentiality can be
actualised at some point, though not totally realisable.
Because of this peculiar nature of the mode of being
of an ideal concept, Ingarden develops certain varia-
tions within this atemporal mode, so that the existen-
tial moment of individual ideal objects, for instance
"a square," is kept distinct from those that have
derivative formal relations with self-dependent ideal
objects. Ideal concepts are autonomous and original
in their being.

3. The Ontic Foundations of Meaning

Ingarden believes that a purely phenomenological
approach cannot explain how meaning is identically
apprehended by two different conscious subjects without
recourse to a theory of ideal concepts. He thinks a solution could be found if the objective ontically autonomous basis of existence of a literary work, or the sentences that appear in it, or the imaginational object represented in it, could be established. He, for this reason, distinguishes between the basis of the "coming into being" of the literary work of art and the basis of its "existence after it has come into being." Since Ingarden considers the sentences or the imaginational objects represented in literary works as a test for adequacy—for a theory of meaning or of essence, this approach of Ingarden not only applies to the kind of existence of literary works of art but also to the nature of phenomena of our cognition of the external world.

The literary work has a unity and an identity of its own which is preserved by its four strata. They are (i) the stratum of word sounds and phonetic formation, (ii) the stratum of meaning units, (iii) the stratum of schematised aspects, and (iv) the stratum of represented objectivities. This schematic formation of the literary work helps us to conduct an eidetic analysis of the general idea of a literary work. Ingarden does not believe in investigating
aesthetic objects like literary works of art in an empirical manner. He does not believe in an isolated analysis of aesthetic experience distinct from the aesthetic object. His schematic formation, as a purely intentional objectivity, is meant to resolve the idealist-realist dichotomy. In a letter to Husserl, therefore, Ingarden says that "the ontological investigation of the object must precede the constitutive phenomenological perspective." He, therefore, inquires into the structure of meaning—the four-fold strata, and its ontic foundations of meaning.

The phonetic stratum and manifold of word sounds form the fixed shell of the literary work or of the sentences on which the other strata find external support. However, all the strata of the literary work depend on the stratum of meaning units: Given this structure, any composition would be a literary work, meaningful and existing in some sense. In the words of Ingarden, this many layered structure has certain elements which "cause every work to have a 'beginning' and an 'end' and allow it to unfold in the course of a reading in its specific length from beginning to end." These elements are the ontic foundations which are the sources for the structure's dependent existence. For
him, in the constitutive phenomenological perspective, subjective consciousness is one of the ontic foundations of meaning which has to counterpose itself between two other ontic foundations, the ideal concept which is transcendental to the subjective consciousness and the word-sign which is the real, fixed, and concrete carrier of word-meaning.

A literary work comes into being when it is created by an author. It is composed of sentences, words, and letters, which come to signify certain meanings in a society. Ingarden does not take for granted the relation between speech and thought as Smith\textsuperscript{10} seems to think. In fact, his whole attempt is to clarify the above relation. It is through ideas that the typical formation of word-sounds into phonetic formation takes place. Again, it is through ideas that the formation of the higher order of meaning above words takes place. In both cases, the formation is brought about by the intentional act of pure consciousness. Ingarden writes, "when a determinate word sound is apprehended by a psychic subject the apprehension leads directly to the execution of an intentional act in which the content of a determinate meaning is intended. Here this meaning is not given as an object of
thought) but, is rather set into a function; and for its part this setting into function brings about the fact that the corresponding objectivity which belongs to the word meaning or to the meaning of the sentence is intended and thereby the subsequent strata of literary works of art are revealed." 11 The intentional formation of the phonetic formation expresses the intentional concretisations of word-sounds where the word-sounds are themselves genuine concretisations. The intentional concretisation is possible "as there are ideas for everything that exists objectively," 12 which is ontically heteronomous and keeps the identity of this phonetic stratum. The phonetic stratum is ontically dependent upon the word-sounds which constitute the ontic basis of meaning and is considered so only indirectly. For Ingarden says, "this basis is not sufficient for the ontically heteronomous existence of the work. The other two ontic bases must not only be present as well; they are, in fact, more essential for its existence simply because the relationship between the objectivities founded by them [sentences] and the literary work is entirely different from the relationship between the typical letters or the concrete graphic material and the work." 13 The graphic materials are the regulative signals for the reader to apprehend the
identical phonetic formation.

The situation that arises out of this assertion that "there are ideas for everything that exists objectively,"\textsuperscript{14} and his commitment for realism in accepting the word-sound as the material ontic basis for meaning although indirectly, brings out a debatable point in Ingarden's polyphonic stratification of meaning. Ingarden's English translator here comments that "he finds no other basis for the objective identity of meaning of sentence which could replace ideal concepts without itself evoking serious doubts."\textsuperscript{15} Ingarden accepts concepts or ideas as a hypothesis as one that is indispensable for overcoming the danger of subjectivising the literary work or reducing the work to a manifold of concretisations. The identity of this stratum is not assured to the same extent by its ontic basis as is the stratum of meaning units in the recourse to ideal concepts.

In the case of meaning units, the second stratum, when the actualisation of meaning elements from the ideal meaning content of the corresponding concept takes place, the subjective conscious act selects appropriate moments to bring out a part of the concept. This determines the meaning content at one moment to be
formulated by the sentence-forming operation of the subjective conscious act. This operation is directed by the concept's regulative principle of formation, i.e., the actualisation of meaning elements at one moment from among the (potential) contents of the concept and the ordering of the moments' sequential formation of these actualisations into a unified whole. This unified whole of the parts of actualisation is ontically heteronomous while it has its ontic basis simultaneously in the subjective conscious act and in the ideal concepts. Together with the intentional concretisation in the phonetic formation of the word-sound, i.e., the indirect ontic basis which functions as the external carrier of the unified whole, and the sentence, the representation, and schematisation stratifications take place in which the literary work of art is incarnated as an intentional objectivity.

This intentional objectivity always refers to the ontic autonomy of its foundations since, by itself, it does not realise the genuinely ideal essence of its ontic foundations. The intentional objectivity can only actualise a certain part of the ideal concept and cannot exhaustively realise the ideal concept. Consequently, the ideal concept will always elude the
capturing attempt of the sentence-forming operation of the subjective conscious act. The actualisation of the concept is regulated by the sequence of parts in the formation function which guarantees, in Ingarden's scheme, the inexhaustive yet potential nature of the ideal concept, which in fact does not allow total realisation of the ideal essence into the sentence. The sentence, therefore, will always have to refer to the indirect ontic basis, i.e., the word-sign, and not to the other two ontic bases since the nature of the sentences is heteronomous. Thus the sentence-meaning is neither real nor ideal but is in the intentional mode of being having separate, contingent, non-actual, derivative (sequentially), and heteronomous existential moments. While all the three ontic foundations are autonomous in existence, each one has its own variation and is not identically autonomous. This variation is important for Ingarden's scheme.

The word-sound ontic basis has in its autonomous existence certain characteristic variations in its mode of existence. According to Ingarden, this applies not only to words, but also to things that exist. Things have autonomy, derivation, activity, separateness, contingency, and they have characteristics with respect to
their future (for their as-yet unknown occurrence) such as empirical possibility and hence heteronomous existence. For Ingarden, the future existence of a real object is heteronomous, while the present mode of existence of the same identical object is autonomous. "What exist in time must pass through three different modes of being and it appears that only that existence which is passage from future into present and the past is that specific 'modus existentiae' that we call reality."\textsuperscript{16}

The ontic basis of the ideal concept is in the extra-temporal mode and hence its potential cannot fully be realised and can only be actualised in a sequence. It has existential moments such as autonomy, originality, non-actuality, and self-dependency. Ingarden is not sure if indeed these ideal concepts themselves could be existentially derived. He thinks that mathematical objects, logical relations, ideas and ideal qualities cannot be regarded as existentially derived. He says, "for it seems doubtful that we could succeed in proving that everything we encounter in ideal being exists in its essence in the way of necessity so that it could not, not be."\textsuperscript{17} He thinks of the possibility of two kinds of extra-temporal modes of being, one which is
existentially original and the other that is existentially derivative.

The following diagram represents the ontic foundations and their interconnections, with the four-fold stratification order of meaning. The structural organic whole of the strata resonates in harmony with its existential sources transmitting the vibrations among its different strata in unison to the ontic sources.

This scheme represents the constitutive phenomenological perspective and the ontological stratus of meaning as expounded by Ingarden in The Literary Work of Art. The meaning is the actualisation of a part of the contents of the (potential) ideal concept at a given time (moment) and the simultaneous or concurrent formation of the actualised parts of the ideal concept in the sequence of the order of this actualisation, woven as a unique whole upon the external carrier of phonetic formation which is also intentionally concretised by the subjective conscious act. Basically, Ingarden's approach to secure the ontic foundations of meaning rests on this sequence of orders which in turn rests on his notion of time where, on a point-instant, he locates his unique, inimitable individuatum.
SUBJECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS ONTIC BASIS
(Transcendental to Word-Sound)

WORD-SIGN ONTIC BASIS

IDEAL CONCEPT ONTIC BASIS
(Transcendental to Subjective Consciousness)

ACTUALISATION & INTENTIONAL FORMATION FUNCTIONS CONCRETISATION

Stratum of Phonetic Formation
Stratum of Meaning Unit
Stratum of Schematic Aspects
Stratum of Represented Objectivities
It is from the sequence of order that he develops the structure of meaning of the literary work of art and the sentences that appear in it.

With its ontic foundations, the stratification theory of meaning creates a heteronomous world of its own. This world is quasi-real in all respects and filled with quasi-temporal sequences and quasi-judgements except for the word-sounds in the phonetic stratum and in other strata. The quasi-real objectivity is the literary work. The objects represented in the literary work are derived as purely intentional objectivities projected by meaning units. The actual reality is a "determinate relationship between judicative proposition and objectively existing states-of-affairs selected by its meaning contents." 18 However, no statement in the literary work is a judgement or assertion; it is something between the assertive and the judicative proposition which is the quasi-judgement. Truth and untruth are not applicable to sentences of the literary work of art. How do we know the quasi-judgement or, for that matter, the quasi-temporal sequence, or the quasi-real world of Ingarden? His answer is that the "quasi-real" brings out "ideas" and not "truth." "The 'idea' of a work is based on the essential connection brought
to intuitive self-givenness that exists between a determinate represented life situation taken as a culminating phase of a development preceding it and a metaphysical quality that manifests itself in that life situation and draws its unique coloration from its content." 19

Ingarden points out a series of other differences between works of art and scientific works such as style, composition, manifold of aspects, the representation function of represented objects, presence of aesthetically valent qualities, and appearance of metaphysical qualities. He agrees with Käte Hamburger that one must look for a "linguistic function" 20 which distinguishes the literary work from the non-literary work and for that purpose he prefers quasi-judgements. All that he could say is that we identify the "quasi-judgements" by the title, whether what we read is a literary work or scientific literature. These titles function like guide-posts for us to distinguish. One is allowed to use a particular sign with sentences to indicate the "quasi-real." For Ingarden, it is only a question of what linguistic or grammatical means are used to point to their constitution.
Ingarden does not avoid the problem at issue. One can agree with him that his stratification with its ontic foundations explain the quasi-real nature of meaning. But to accept it as a distinct theory of the literary work of art seems to involve us, as Hamburger thinks, in a circular argument. To show what quasi-judgements are, we look to the stratification theory and the stratification theory is to identify the literary work of art which is, of course, one among the characteristics of the literary work of art. And, to say that the literary work of art is filled by nothing but quasi-judgements seems to involve us in a circular argument. He accepts the ontological implications of the quasi-real nature of the literary work of art as a totally rigid and closed formation. Yet in that isolation, he considers the literary work of art to be secure with its proud heteronomy. For if the literary work of art is liberated from the quasi-real enclosure to remain merely as a theoretical and abstractly ordained function as that which has nothing to do with heteronomous existence, then it would be merely imaginary. In such an event, it would be reduced to a manifold of concretisations losing its identity and dissipating itself finally into subjective experiences. If, on the other hand, the literary work of art remains in the
domain of the quasi-real as a subjective formation having no ontic autonomy of its own, then how does the work exist when it is not read by anyone? Therefore, in either case, whether it remains within the quasi-real or outside the enclosure, the literary work of art is condemned to be solipsistic.

Ingarden says, "the distinction between the scientific and the 'literary works' lies in the fact that in scientific works sentences do not undergo quasi-judgemental modification but are instead true judicative propositions. But regardless of whether they are true judicative propositions or not, they are at any rate propositions. If propositions are not ideal objectivities in the strict sense, if they arise from the special subjective operations, and if it is precisely this circumstance which leads us to doubt whether propositions so constructed pose inter-subjective identity and a mode of existence that is heterogeneous with respect to subjective operations, then the above question clearly refers just as much to scientific work as to purely 'literary' ones." Ingarden extends his innocuous solipsism to all forms of literature including scientific literature. His solution to this dilemma consists in demonstrating that the inter-subjective
identity of the literary work of art could be maintained, notwithstanding its ontic relativity to subjective operations, by providing a heteronomous stratified mode of existence with respect to conscious acts. Consequently, when the literary work of art comes into being, it could exist and continue to exist heteronomously even though it is not read or thought of. The intersubjective identity of the literary work of art as a schematic formation could also be salvaged. The fourfold stratification order of meaning as a heteronomous objectivity based on the three autonomous foundations in the constitutive phenomenological perspective is what Ingarden asserts to be his own contribution.

It is for the purpose of maintaining intersubjective identity that Ingarden posits ideal concepts as a distinct ontic basis transcendental to the ontic basis of subjective consciousness and heterogeneous to the dependent ontic basis of words. The intersubjectivity of meaning can be maintained only by positing the ideal concept as an autonomous ontic foundation transcendental to subjective consciousness. For Ingarden, subjective consciousness is only a source in intentional objectivity whereas the ideal concept renders heteronomous existence to meaning which
makes inter-subjective identity of meaning possible by virtue of its being transcendental to subjective consciousness. It is with respect to this point that he opposed Husserl's transcendental idealism. He says, "he cannot limit himself to accepting pure conscious acts. For just as a sentence cannot come into being without sentence forming operation, it likewise cannot exist ontically heteronomously without ideal concepts. This is, in fact required on the one hand by its characteristic ontic heteronomy and on the other hand by the circumstance that it is a meaning-formation. The acceptance of ideal concepts, essences, and ideas may contradict so called transcendental idealism, but transcendental idealism itself is untenable as long as it is contradicted by the very thing whose acceptance makes possible the principle discoveries and mainstays of transcendental idealism—the purely intentional object. For without ideal essence and ideas, purely intentional objectivities are impossible in the same degree as real objects taken in a true sense."  

Husserl's efforts to establish transcendental idealism are based on his concept of essence. For him "thought" and "thinking" are inseparable aspects of one experience. "Thought" is the constituted meaning
itself, while "thinking" is the meaning conferring or
constituting experience. Being derives it's very
meaning from consciousness. Meaning, according to his
earlier view, is not a hypostatised entity. The
whatness of a real thing is signified as pure essence
and the essence is indicative of a particular concreti-
sation. In his later work, Husserl assumes that the
autonomy of the world is fictitious. The question which
was bracketed before is now answered in the negative
according to Guido Künig. Ingarden sought clarity between
the "noetic" and the "noematic" in Husserl's constitu-
tive phenomenological perspective. He says, "it is
made clear that although Husserl is not an immanent
philosopher he is nevertheless an idealist as he not
merely acknowledges the transcendence of things as in-
tentional correlation of the manifolds of experiences,
but at the same time explains them as those which are
inseparable from consciousness." The problem Ingarden
finds in Husserl is that whatever sense Husserl attrib-
utes to transcendence, he is unable to overcome sub-
jectivity. It is for this reason Ingarden says, "the
abandonment of ideal concept makes word meanings, sen-
tences, and sentence complexes impossible; and just as
the idealisation of the units of meaning of various
degrees is as absurd and contradictory to the essential
facts as is their psychologisation, so, conversely, the acceptance of ideal concept not only makes possible the recognition of the ontically heteronomous existence of sentences (and the derived intentional objectivities projected by them) but at the same time makes possible the acceptances of the intersubjective identity of sentences for different conscious subjects."27

It is not the case that the aims of Ingarden differed from those of Husserl. Both of them faced the same "painful question" which Husserl states, "how subjectivity can itself bring forth from sources appertaining to its own spontaneity, formations that can be an ideal 'world' and then (on a higher level) the question of how these idealities can take on spatio-temporally restricted existence, in the cultural world (which must surely be considered as real; as included in spatio-temporal universe) real existence in the form of historical temporality as theories and sciences."28 It is to these questions that Ingarden addresses himself in his The Literary Work of Art and says that "these painful questions (particularly the second) . . . were the point of my departure for my consideration of literary work."29
Ingarden's search for the ontic foundations of meaning within the constitutive phenomenological perspective is in response to this painful question: The possibility of meaning depends on its inter-subjective identity. Meaning is not a real entity as it is not wholly dependent upon the words, and it is not an ideal entity as it is not purely a subjective operation of consciousness. Hence for Ingarden, meaning is neither real nor ideal but heteronomous in existence. Such heteronomous existence is possible by virtue of positing the ideal concept as an ontic foundation of meaning transcendental to the other ontic foundations, namely the words and the subjective consciousness.

Ingarden's claim that his stratification theory of meaning is meant for a critical appraisal of the literary work of art rests on his assertion that any theory of meaning or of philosophy should be able to appraise the aesthetic value of the literary work of art or, for that matter, other forms of art. In this respect he extends his phenomenological inquiries towards a theory of genre. In so far as any critical appraisal of Ingarden's claim depends upon the understanding of the significance of the ontic foundations of meaning, it is worthwhile to consider some of the
critical views. Piotr Graff says, "the basic theoretical conflict originates in the description of a purely intentional object as such that its whole content is merely ascribed to it. But aesthetic value belongs to such objects and still they are not ascribed to them, but are their 'real' characteristics, independent, as we are told, of the acts of conceiving the objects. Still, they cannot be recognised as autonomous, if only because they are obviously not 'real,' i.e., physical things. They must be heterogeneous but they seem to constitute a peculiar variety of heterogeneous entities different from purely intentional objects." Therefore Graff concludes that Ingarden's "basic ontological opposition of the existential autonomy and heteronomy cannot be applied to the values." According to Ingarden, the value of a literary work of art is to be construed as an 'idea,' "based on the essential connection brought to intuitive self-givenness" which cannot be determined conceptually. The objective consistency of a literary work of art is a value and is also a condition for other values, but it is not an indispensable condition for its existence or for the total value of a literary work of art. For Ingarden, the very nature of heteronomy brings out such an 'idea' and so it cannot be conceptually determined as
opposed to autonomy. For him any attempt to answer what constitutes value assumes an understanding of the structure of the literary work of art. His theory of meaning is an attempt towards formulating such a structure for the literary work of art. 33

Graff's inquiry, "what is the necessary and what is the sufficient condition for (a) an autonomous object and (b) a heteronomous object, to be an ontical foundation for another heteronomous object?" 34 although valuable, is obscured by his misunderstanding of Ingarden's ontic foundations of meaning. Ingarden considers the ontic foundations of meaning to be the first step towards an understanding of the nature of value. Graff rejects the ideal concept for the following reason, "the thought (ideal concept) expressed appeared only once and it has never been reiterated by Ingarden. Let us then consider it as a rejected idea." 35 He gives no other valid reason for rejecting the ideal concept on which Ingarden builds his whole philosophy and because of which he was opposed to Husserl. Ingarden says, "in order to fully justify the correctness of our position we would need a theory of ideal concepts and their actualisation in word meanings'. This, however, would require a new and extensive study. To those for
whom the acceptance of the ideal concept seems dangerous, who are inclined to assume a waiting attitude with regard to them we can only suggest that they see in this acceptance a hypothesis without which neither literary work as an identical objectivity opposed to all of its concretisations, nor the scientific work and inter-subjective knowledge, nor finally the manifold concretisations of literary works could be accepted.  

In his *The Literary Work of Art* where he expounds the theory of meaning, Ingarden carefully avoids the familiar phenomenological expressions such as "noesis" and "noema." Guido Küng, however, relates these terms to logistic philosophy on the one hand, and to the theory of Ingarden on the other, but without justification says that "the 'noema' of a noetic act (of a 'noesis') is not the referent but only the intended qua intended; the 'noema' is not the object referred to, but only the intentional object qua intentional."  

It is clear therefore that if "noema" is to be applied to Ingarden's analysis, it could only be applied to the strata which is heteronomous. Küng is right in so far as he says that the "noema" is an entity with non-autonomous existence, but not so when he implies that Ingarden has shown that they have certain heteronomous
existence. The "noema" is not identifiable with the strata. For, according to Ingarden, the strata have the word-sound as the real concrete shell which is the autonomous ontic basis. Küng also concedes that "noema" is not the same as referent as he has learned it from Ingarden himself. For Ingarden's aim is to keep the strata in an enclosed heteronomy distinct from all implications of real existence on the one hand, and from the implication of an ideal existence on the other. Küng further says that, "in the case of a true belief or of genuine knowledge on the other hand, there is both an intended referent qua intended and an actual referent, the intention is in agreement with what exists in actual fact."^39 He obviously means that the "noema" and referent could, under such circumstances, be identical. Such a situation will render the ideal concept in Ingarden's scheme redundant, for the ideal concept never allows itself (its potential) to be fully realised by the intentional act of subjective consciousness. That is why Ingarden posits ideal concepts as transcendental to subjective consciousness. If the "noema" means the intentional act of the subjective consciousness, then it cannot be in Ingarden's scheme the ideal concept either, because the ideal concept is both autonomous and transcendental to subjective
consciousness.

Ingarden's main concern is to found an ontic basis which would enable an intentional objectivity to exist in some sense once such an intentional objectivity is created by the intentional act of the subjective consciousness. If there is no such provision for such an ontic basis in the constitutive phenomenological perspective of Ingarden, then the intentional objectivity that is created by the intentional act of subjective consciousness will have no existence at all, except in the subjective consciousness. Such a situation will make the inter-subjective understanding of meaning untenable. In order to avoid such a solipsistic situation, Ingarden insists on the ideal concept as the ontic foundation transcendental to subjective consciousness so that once the intentional objectivity is created, it depends on the ideal concept for its continued existence in some heteronomous realm. Unlike Husserl, for Ingarden meaning is not a timeless, changeless ideal entity. Thus the tenability of Ingarden's ideal concept rests on the untenability of Husserl's "noema." In view of this position of Ingarden vis-à-vis Husserl, Küng's assertion that "there is a systematic relationship between ideas and 'noemata' which have a consistent
content," seems pointless. 40

4. Conclusion

This position of Ingarden is in contrast to what Husserl holds when he writes that "a formal ontology of any possible world as world constituted in transcendental subjectivity is a non-self-sufficient part of another formal ontology which relates to everything that exists in any sense: to what exists as transcendental subjectivity and to everything that becomes constituted in transcendental subjectivity." 41 Husserl believed in one philosophy as genuine science and that particular genuine sciences are only non-self-sufficient members within it. Such an ultimate science can be grounded only in transcendental subjective logic according to Husserl. In this view, what he brings out is the relative character of the truth of the objective sciences vis-à-vis transcendental logic. The notion of the truth of transcendental logic is not the same as the notion of the truth of objective logic. He, therefore, says that the truth of transcendental logic "is no longer truth-in-itself in any normal sense not even in a sense that has relation to a transcendental 'every one'." 42 The reason why he thinks that it is so, is
that the question of evidence of the truth of objective logic inevitably leads one to transcendental constitutive subjectivity. For only then can one apprehend the sense of existents of different levels, as he says, "naively natural logic that logic that could be concerned only with positive sciences pre-supposes the world." For Husserl the concept of the truth-in-itself of objective logic is relative and hence insufficient. For, such a concept of truth remains independent of the problem of cognising subjectivity. Hence the need to relate the concept of truth-in-itself to a description of the processes of consciousness in which logical ideas originate.

The implication of this view of transcendental logic is problematic. If a transcendental logic becomes inevitable, then the notion of truth becomes relative to a transcendental subjectivity, as the transcendental subjectivity becomes the source for such truth. In that case, there can be no truth claim such as the concept of truth-in-itself as the sciences and objective logic assert. All objective truth would become subjective. Further, such relativity of truth cannot be conceived without an affirmation of different levels of existence. Such an affirmation of different levels
of existence could lead to an endless series of affirmations. Moreover, as transcendental subjectivity cannot be said to depend upon lower constitutive levels of formal ontology, it cannot be said to have its own norms. How could a transcendental subjectivity that is not dependent upon the relative lower constitutive level of objective logic seek a valid criticism of itself?

Ingarden's theory of the ideal concept is meant to overcome Husserl's problems of transcendental subjectivity that fall short of the realisation of his desired aims and to relate the concept of the truth-in-itself of objective logic to a description of the processes of subjective consciousness in which logical ideas originate. Ingarden postulates the ideal concept as a world of value-conferring possibilities or that which relates the truth-in-itself of objective logic to a description of the processes of subjective consciousness which are freed from both psychologism and transcendentalism. For Ingarden there is only one sense in which the truth-in-itself of objective logic holds value-laden ideal concepts, and that is not in a relative sense, but in an inclusive sense, unlike Husserl. The truth-in-itself of objective logic cannot free itself.
from ideal concepts or essences. In other words, the truth-conditional frame of objective logic, for its meaningfulness, has its ontic foundation in ideal concepts.

In fact this is what Ingarden seeks to accomplish by his inclusion of the stratum of schematised aspects in his stratification of meaning. He says, "by schematised aspect, therefore, one should understand only the totality of those moments of the content of a concrete aspect whose presence in it is a sufficient and indispensable condition for the primary self-givenness of an object or more precisely for the objective properties of a thing."44 These properties and their schemata do not depend on the object itself or on the selection of the properties but on factors which are of subjective nature. Husserl inquires into the temporal structure of subjectivity and finds it alike in all objects, i.e.; perceptual objects, logical objects, and objects of reference. For Ingarden, the temporal structures of subjectivity of the imaginational object, of the logical object, and in fine of all intentional objectivities are all distinct. This distinction is maintained by virtue of their actualisation of essence or of the ideal concept, because it is the
actualisation of essence or the ideal concept that constitutes the sufficient and indispensable condition for the description of the properties of a thing or the primary self-givenness of an object. Since Husserl's notion of inner time awareness of objects could not maintain the distinction of these objectivities, it dispenses with the sufficient and indispensable condition for description of the primary self-givenness of objects. Hence his transcendental subjectivity treats all conditions for description only as relative while itself unable to set forth any such conditions. For Ingarden, the ideal concept makes all descriptions possible.

Ingarden does not accept that the truth-in-itself of objective logic is relative to transcendental logic, even though he agrees with Husserl that there is the need to relate the concept of the truth-in-itself of objective logic to a description of the processes of subjective consciousness in which logical ideas originate. However, Ingarden does not find it necessary to postulate a transcendental logic to which the truth-in-itself of objective logic would remain perpetually relative and thereby creating two different senses of truth and evidence and two different ontologies. Such a dichotomy
does not solve the idealist–realist controversy and does not take into account the truth-value or, for that matter, any value-conferring act of the consciousness. It is to resolve this problematic situation that Ingarden postulates the ideal concept as a unified world of possibilities without any existential affirmations.
NOTES

1 LWA, p. 360.
3 Ibid, p. 363.
5 Ibid, p. 85.
6 Ibid, p. 87.
7 Ibid, p. 84. 7a Ibid, p. 292 - 3.
8 E. Husserl, Briefe an Roman Ingarden p. 166.
9 LWA, p. 31.
11 LWA, p. 60.
16 TMB, p. 162.
17 Ibid, pp. 159-60.
18 LWA, p. 300.
19 Ibid, p. 304.
21 Ibid, p. 358.
22 Ibid, p. 358.
23 Ibid, p. 363.
26 BTPI, p. 58.
27 LWA, pp. 363-64.
28 Ibid, p. lxxv.
29 Ibid, p. lxxv.
31 Ibid, p. 92.
32 LWA, p. 304.
33 Ibid, p. lxxxii.
34 Graff, p. 71.
38 Ibid; p. 22.
40 Ibid, p. 21 footnote.
42 Ibid, p. 269.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid, p. 263.
CHAPTER VI

THE CRITICAL PHENOMENOLOGY OF ROMAN INGARDEN--AN APPRAISAL

1. Introduction

In his Preface to the first German edition of The Literary Work of Art, Ingarden writes, "all objectivities which he [Husserl] previously held to be ideal--in the old sense--Husserl now considers to be intentional formations of a particular kind, and in this way he arrives at a universal extension of transcendental idealism; whereas I today still maintain the strict ideality of various ideal objectivities (ideal concepts, ideal individual objects, ideas and essences) and indeed see in ideal concepts an ontic foundation of word meanings that enable them to have intersubjective identity and an ontically autonomous mode of existence."¹ But after thirty years, after he has published the Controversy Over the Existence of the World and after having fully analysed the different modes of being and distinguished the existential

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ontology from formal and material ontological questions, he writes in the Preface to the Polish edition that, "now I am not inclined to accept the existence of ideal concept. However, I don't see another concept for the basis of objective identity of sentences that appears in the literary work of art, which will be able to replace this ideal concept without creating substantial doubts." What would be the reason for his second thoughts on the existence of ideal of concept?

There are only few scholars who have addressed themselves to the existence of ideal concept. Piotr Graff has made a pertinent examination of the implication of ontic foundations vis-à-vis intentional objects. His work seems to be the only study on this aspect of Ingarden's phenomenology. But Graff has not included this concept in his examination. It seems that the significance of this concept in Ingarden's thought has as yet not been realised.

Commenting on ideal concept in Ingarden's theory of meaning, Augustin Riska says that "at the cross section of his ontology and theory of language one finds the preference given to ontological assumption which seem to mold the basic linguistic material before the language can rush to help them shape up.
Language which is being sought as a tool serving the ontology has already been dressed by its master in a self-evident way.4 But he has merely treated it as the potential reservoir for word-meaning.

In what follows, an attempt is made to evaluate these views on Ingarden's hypothesis of ideal concept and to articulate the underlying metaphysical assumptions. Since Ingarden himself has not mentioned why he has certain doubts on the existence of ideal concept, it is only surmised what could have been his reason for doubting the existence of ideal concept.5

2. The Metaphysical Assumption

Ingarden addressed himself to the problem of the existence of the external world. He finds in Husserl's transcendental idealism a profound and significant attempt to solve the controversy between idealism and realism.

Husserl's concept of immanent perception is such that pure-consciousness is presented as that which in its essence precludes anything alien to its essence. What is neutralised as alien to pure consciousness, though not of its essence, is constituted in the
essence of pure consciousness as an entity. Such a constitution, according to Ingarden, is not the same as real being. Thus the concept of pure consciousness emerges as distinct from the concept of real world.

When experience as given in immanent perception is freed from all psychic apprehension by strictly observing the principle of epoché, according to Ingarden no decision with regard to the validity of the apprehension should be made if one were to be consistent with the principle of epoché. If the apprehension is regarded as objectively valid, then one is led to realism. If, on the other hand, one regards it as the intentional product of inner perception, then one is led to idealism. Hence the controversy over the existence of the world. For Ingarden, it is in elucidating the connection between the two regions of being that a solution to the controversy could be found. Such a relation cannot be of the nature of relations that exist in either of the domains of being. Pure consciousness is given indubitably, for Ingarden, in immanent perception. Ingarden says that "it is necessary to try to base the controversy over the existence of the real world on this foundation of indubitability alone and to resolve it in a way equally indubitable."
His conclusion to the controversy is that the world is existentially dependent upon pure consciousness, which dependence is characterised by the existential moment of separateness. With this moment and other moments like originality and autonomy, we cognise the mode of existence of the world as distinct from pure consciousness which is outside the world. 7

The being of pure consciousness as independent of all entities could be admitted by virtue of the characterisation of the existential moments. We cannot, however, say from this conclusion that pure consciousness is indubitable. Ingarden himself says that the indubitability of pure consciousness is given in immanent perception. 8 In immanent perception, according to Ingarden, we are not to assert anything about the validity of the apprehension constituted in the essence of pure consciousness. For if we do so, we either become idealist or realist and we are not consistent to the principle of epoché. Ingarden is not clear whether one could assert the indubitability of the essence of pure consciousness because of the principle of epoché. It is because the existential relation that the world has with pure consciousness only enables us to know that pure consciousness is outside the world. But it
cannot be construed to mean that pure consciousness is indubitable. That pure consciousness is dubitable is given only in immanent perception. In other words, the mode and moments themselves do not reveal the indubitability of pure consciousness, they only show its existence and the existential relation.

It is in immanent perception that Ingarden discovers the indubitability of pure consciousness and where he discovers what is constituted as an idea of the object of cognition without deciding on the cognitive validity of such an idea given in the experience of consciousness. It is in this sense that Ingarden's philosophy is phenomenological. According to Ingarden, Husserl however "treated this apprehension from the outset as something which can be set aside and as dependent upon inner perception, and, therefore, as an apprehension which should not be taken into consideration in definitive research having as its aim the discovery of what possess absolute validity. In principle, of course, it may be that this is how it is, but this could only be determined as the final result of a critical study." Ingarden concludes that the relation such an idea of the object has indicates the mode of being of pure consciousness. The cognition of the
mode of being by itself does not help us decide on the cognitive validity of pure consciousness, that is, on whether it is indubitable.

Ingarden's basic assumption is that "an existing object can never be given to us in experience without its mode of being nor a mode of being without a corresponding existing object."\(^{10}\) Where by experience he understands "every conscious experience in which an individual object is self-given 'in the original' to the subject performing an act."\(^{11}\) In other words, if we cognise the mode of being, then we cognise the existence of the object in the mode of being. He says, "it is as if what exists 'absorbs' its existence into itself or conversely its existence is wholly infused in it and is not something alongside it that has only a connection with it."\(^{12}\) For Ingarden, therefore, the cognition of the mode of existence provides us with cognitive validity of the object of the mode. For him, a presupposition of knowledge is the presupposition of the object of knowledge. Presupposition of knowledge and the object of knowledge are only two different points of view. Intuition as the essence of consciousness is "live-through-itself" in experiencing whereas what is perceived as phenomena is that of being experienced.
The intuitive act and the object are identified separately in intuitively lived-through-experience, which is a specific perception, where what is grasped is identical with knowing. The mode of being of consciousness is grasped intuitively in immanent perception and so other modes that have existential relation to pure consciousness are also cognised as ideas of objects. How the validity of such ideas of object can also be indubitable or cognisable through their existential relation vis-à-vis pure consciousness is what Ingarden sought to explain only through intentional modes of existence, through the existence of ideal concept. How the other modes, i.e., temporal mode (real) and the atemporal ideal mode of existence, in spite of their existential relation to indubitable pure consciousness being could be cognised is what Ingarden could not explain through his metaphysical assumption. Ingarden admits that the atemporal mode is beyond the reach of conscious acts, but not so the temporal mode. The cognition of the temporal mode of object in Ingarden's scheme is possible only through intentional acts. Ingarden, however, does not make it clear whether the mode of the real object is cognised only through the intentional mode of being. For, according to him, the real is 'also intentional.'
In order to render the intentional mode of existence inter-subjectively cognisable, Ingarden had to resort to its existential relation to another ontically autonomous being, namely ideal concept, of whose mode of being Ingarden is not certain. In other words, the indubitability thesis of pure conscious being by virtue of its existential relation to the intentional mode, could not lend its indubitability in such a way that the intentional mode is cognisable inter-subjectively. Ingarden's critical phenomenology rests on the fact, on the one hand, that Ingarden asserts the indubitability of pure conscious being and thereby the indubitability of the existential relations to objects, and, on the other hand, his not being able to ascertain the inter-subjective identity of such objects without assuming the existence of another mode in addition to and transcendental to the indubitable mode of pure consciousness. Thus the controversy over the world has become the controversy over the ideal concept in Ingarden's philosophy.

3. The Controversy Over the Existence of the Ideal Concept

Ingarden believed in the existence of ideal concept even before he analysed the modes of being.
However, in his late years he began to doubt the existence of ideal concept but affirmed its existence and its role as an ontic foundation of meaning. This concept has been either misunderstood or ignored by scholars on Ingarden although it is the important concept in Ingarden's critical phenomenology. Commenting on the ideal concept, Grabowicz says, "in the light of his later commitment to realism, the notion of ideal concept becomes a major problem for Ingarden, and, in the Preface to the Polish edition, he warns that he now questions their existence. Yet he finds no other basis for the objective identity of the meaning of a sentence which could replace ideal concepts without itself evoking serious doubts. It is for this reason that at the end of 1966 Ingarden suggests that they be accepted as a hypothesis, but one that is indispensable for overcoming the danger of subjectivising the literary work or reducing that work to a manifold of concretisations." 13

If ideal concept is not accepted, then meaning would remain as a pure intentional projection immanent to the pure conscious act. With it the language itself would become immanent particularly when the principle of epoché is followed. Meaning would then be ideal species. Ingarden never thought of a special mode of being for language and meaning commensurate to his
basic metaphysical assumption that assigned mode and moments to every conceivable object. Ingarden therefore thought of language neither as real nor as ideal, but as intentional. Since language has a purely intentional mode, in order to avoid subjectivism, ideal concept becomes necessary. On the other hand, if it is assumed that Ingarden tended to be a realist and therefore he had reason to doubt the existence of ideal concept, it would only mean that Ingarden entertained the thought of dissolving the intentional mode of being and so, in turn, his whole existential-ontological scheme. In either case, the realist thesis of Grabowicz does not give a clue as to why Ingarden was not satisfied with the existence of ideal concept.

There is yet another account which is also a realist thesis, but considers that the ideal concept is not an important concept in Ingarden's philosophy. Graff makes an attempt to do away with ideal concept and retain only pure conscious act and word-sign, the two other ontic foundations. He builds a case for the existence of intentional objectivity and for its communicability. According to Graff, the concept of ontic foundation is bound up with the notion of existential heteronomy. For him, the derived purely
intentional object is transcendent to the primary intentional object as it has not got the intentionality of conscious act. Graff bases his argument on the grounds that the derived intentional object is redundant and that only primary intentional objects are sufficient conditions for communication. Graff says, "a purely intentional object if it has been once called into being, constitutes a basis for a series of consecutive and reciprocal determining 'correlates'--entities of higher and higher levels like meanings, presented objects, and ultimately values. All these entities are revealed to a beholder with irrevocable necessity; if any of them evades him it is his fault only."\(^{14}\) In this way Graff argues for the expendability of derived purely intentional objects and with it, ideal concept.

Graff examines the structure of the purely intentional object to say that such an object once created by the act of consciousness is created for all time. He says, "we have rather to take it as a fact introduced into existence once and for all; the world just is such that somebody has fulfilled a definite act of conceiving."\(^{15}\) The purely intentional object derives its existence "as intentional structures from
the act of conceiving" and so the act is the ontic foundation only with regard to the form of the intentional object. They need the acts that warrant their continuation in their form. But the act does not constitute the content of intentional objects. For example, the act of conceiving, according to Graff, does not include that which is embodied in a material, make, or execute, etc. Graff says, "in general whatever can be sensibly said about an act or at that about any function or state of consciousness, cannot be meaningfully said about the process or state of informational networks, neutral, electronic or whatever."\(^1^6\) For Graff, all acts of consciousness described by Ingarden such as intentional directional factors, etc., are not autonomous or real. Therefore, Graff says, "an ultimate material cause determining the phenomena of intentionality is not an act but process which are its causal determinants."\(^1^7\)

For Graff, the act of consciousness is to be considered as an aspect of consciousness and limited in time and not something real and autonomous. Construed in this way, the act of consciousness once appears in the world and cannot disappear as something that has taken place. The modality of "something that
has taken place" is intentional according to Graff. For Graff, therefore, "an intentional object cannot be arbitrarily shaped; certain limits are imposed by what can and what cannot be achieved in the given material."18

Thus, Graff points to only one ontic foundation that is the material base when he says, "to destroy a purely intentional object, something more than a decision is required and thus something more than a simple act or a set of acts must be the ontic foundation of such an object, also in the case when it is only thought up, i.e., when it has no second foundation in something material."19

In the first place, Graff's critique of Ingarden particularly with respect to intentional objects has no pertinent phenomenological outline. Ingarden's doctrine of intentional objects is meant to seek a solution to the idealist-realist controversy. In as much as Graff recognises only one ontic foundation, Graff has already decided metaphysically to favor realism. For Ingarden, the purely intentional object depends on the word-meaning and it is to explain this meaning that Ingarden expounds the doctrine of ontic foundations. The purely intentional objects are directly dependent upon the act of consciousness and
as such they do not need any other ontic foundation. The material qualitative determination of the content of purely intentional objects is not a mere property attributable to a material base; it is an operation of determining qualitative moments which is an intentional supposition according to Ingarden. Such and other intentional operations like sentence-forming operations or intentional directional factors are not by themselves supposed to be autonomous as Graff thinks. Autonomy as an existential moment according to Ingarden can be only a moment of a mode of being. Such a moment indicates certain dependency relations. The dependency relation cannot be understood in the causal frame according to Ingarden. But Graff says, "such an ultimate material cause determining the phenomena of intentionality is not an act but processes which are its causal determinants."\(^{20}\) Ingarden, however, doubts that there can be a causal connection between an original and a derivative being, i.e., between the act of consciousness and the intentional object.

According to Ingarden, cause and effect in an ontological sense are an event or process and so they are temporal objects. This means that the cause or effect is understood as an activity. For Ingarden,
the relation between a process and a thing, where the thing is conceived as the bearer of the process, does not constitute a causal relation. In Ingarden's analysis, it is "the individual acts in the conceiving of a project as the cause of the occurrence of the individual events of which the origination of the project, as only conceived and imagined, is composed." The individual acts in relation to corresponding 'matching' phases of conceived projects 'coming into being' is what Ingarden describes as 'existential conjunction' of a cause and an effect. For Ingarden, a causal relation is an existential relation and such an existential relation exists between an original and a derivative being and not between existential autonomy and heteronomy relations for the latter excludes existential originality. For a causal connection is something that exists within the world which cannot be said to exist among two different modes of being. The relation among the modes of being for Ingarden should be such that it is not a relation that is within one mode. The existential relation that holds among acts of consciousness and intentional objects is not determined by material ontological relations.
The intentional object, according to Ingarden, "exceeds in various directions that which corresponds to the explicit content of the intention of each individual act" and "the intentional act is usually constructed on the basis of various intuitive contents and is frequently interwoven with various theoretical and practical attitudes. It is also frequently accompanied by diverse emotions, acts of will. As a result of this, the corresponding purely intentional object achieves vividness and richness in its contents and in time is provided with diverse feeling and value characters which surpass what is projected by the mere meaning content of simple intentional act." For Graff, the intentional object can constitute "entities of higher and higher levels" and ultimately values. But Graff also says that intentional objects may have their foundation in "culturally determined aesthetic rules or regularities, among them also various linguistic usages." It seems obvious that Graff's expendability thesis of derived purely intentional objects is based on the idea that it is a derived being in relation to the originality of pure consciousness. What Ingarden means by derived purely intentional object is that it is derived from purely the meaning of words. Maybe Graff means that the derived purely intentional object
loses "both the imaginational intuitiveness and its manifold feeling and value characters" which the purely intentional object has. Graff, therefore, advocates the expendability of derived purely intentional objects and with it ideal concept. However, Graff's reason for the expendability by itself does not constitute the reason for the dispensability of ideal concept. In any case, Graff's reasons cannot be what Ingarden meant when he wrote that he no longer believes in the existence of ideal concept. However, as Ingarden himself observes, there is no other concept to maintain intersubjective identity of meaning of sentences, words, and of intentional objectivity, which he could think of without creating substantial doubt about his existential ontology. We have to accept that this concept is fundamental to his existential ontology.

Ingarden is not sure if word-sign or sound could be accepted as an autonomously real entity. He says, "One would have to agree, then, that we know word-sounds by discovering them to be timeless, unchangeable entities and to find them to be simply existing, as we find mathematical objects or pure essences. Nevertheless, a word-sound is built only in the course of time, under the influence of various real and
cultural conditions and it undergoes, with changing time, numerous and varied alterations and modifications. It is not real, yet it is anchored in reality and it is changeable according to changes in the latter.\(^2\)\(^5\)

Word-sound as the phonetic material of word-meaning is accepted by Ingarden, on the other hand, as an ontic foundation of meaning. He says, "this signal shows the reader the way, as it were, to apprehend the work in its phonetic stratum. Thus, although it is transcendent to the work itself, as well as to its concretisations, and has only a relatively fixed relationship to the word-sounds, we can also see in it an indirect ontic basis for the work makes possible the apprehension of an ideal phonetic formation."\(^2\)\(^6\) For this reason Ingarden could only say that the word-sound is indirectly an ontic basis. Although he says the word-sound is not real and that it is only anchored in reality, nevertheless he also says that, "the word-sounds that are actually expressed are an objectively existing entity in which the typical formations attain genuine concretisation."\(^2\)\(^7\) For, as he thinks "there are ideas for everything that exists objectively."\(^2\)\(^8\) It is yet another reason why Ingarden accepted ideal concept.

As Augustin Riska rightly says, "without such a bridge, the human activity of assigning particular meaning to
a certain word-sound, explicating the assigned meaning by virtue of definition or other means, etc., might undermine its theoretical basis and justification."\(^{29}\)

It is to maintain a relation between the language and acts of consciousness that Ingarden hypothetically accepted ideal concept. But, however, since meaning is supposed to be the intentional objectivity and so, as the intentional mode of being, meaning has the intentional relation to acts of pure consciousness. With acceptance of ideal concept as some being transcendent to the act of pure consciousness, it undermines his doctrine of intentional objects and also his own original thesis of existential ontology. For ideal concept cannot be thought of without a mode and its mode would have to be an atemporal ideal mode of existence. By construing ideal concept to be transcendent to pure conscious being, the possibility of any existential relation with pure consciousness is ruled out. In other words, derived intentional objects are not genuinely intentional for they are not only dependent upon ideal concept, but also lose much of the intentional content which the purely intentional object has. Ingarden says, "as soon as the purely intentional object loses its direct contact with experience, however (i.e., when it is a derived intentional object)
and finds its immediate ontic support in the borrowed intentionality of word-meaning (or a meaning content of a sentence), it also loses both its imaginational intuitiveness, and its manifold feeling and value characters, since the full word-meaning, too, can contain only what corresponds exactly to the content of a simple intentional act." \(^{30}\) Therefore, Ingarden, in order to compensate for the inadequacy of derived purely intentional objects, introduced ideal concept.

4. Conclusion

In Ingarden's vision, concrete time provides a continuum stretched between appearances that are directly given in sense perception at one end and structurally analogous immanent perception at the other. While he locates his intentional mode of being, as well as the temporal mode, somewhere on this continuum, he places pure consciousness beyond the reach of time as the ground for immanent perception. But he enigmatically locates the extratemporal mode outside this continuum, yet as one that could intervene. It is a phenomenological classification of the order of being which Husserl never thought of, and is unlike that of Aristotle's commensurable order of being or the
incommensurable order of Plato. As a reason for this vision, Ingarden observes, "phenomenologists took into account only the circumstances constituting sense perception, which are discoverable when the inquiry is restricted to immanent analysis of external perception and did not ask at all about the conditions of the origin of these perceptions—especially those conditions which occur in states-of-affairs that are transcendental in relation to the stream of consciousness. With the performance of phenomenological epoché such a procedure seemed only correct, since it would seem to violate the principle of epoché if any transcendent conditions were taken into consideration." 31 Ingarden inquired into 'those conditions which occur in the state-of-affairs that are transcendental in relation to the stream of consciousness' and discovered the intentional mode of being and, to provide transcendence to the intentional objectivity from the stream of consciousness, he discovered ideal concept.

The phenomenological principle of epoché showed Ingarden the way to the indubitable pure conscious being yet whose acts could not lead him to the cognitive validity of meaning and language, the transcendence of which he therefore leaves in the ideal concept. Since
he thinks he has not isolated the principle of *epoché* in hypothesising ideal concept to give him the benefit of doubt, he can be considered, if not a pure phenomenologist, a critical phenomenologist for having provided us with phenomenological ontology.
NOTES

1. LWA, p. lxxiv.


3. Other than Peter Graff's article on the 'ontic foundation' in Ingarden, no work is found among the 350 entries we have collected under Part II of Ingarden's Bibliography.


5. In the second part of the forthcoming Foundations of Theory of Knowledge, the last two paragraphs are on the intersubjective identity of knowledge. It is likely that Ingarden discusses the hypothesis of ideal concept under the problem. Since the manuscripts are still to be sorted out and the contents were written by Ingarden, Pani da D. Gierulanka, who is editing the manuscripts, could let me read only the contents.

6. TMB, p. 15.


9. TMB, p. 11 footnote.

10. Ibid, p. 33.


12. Ibid, p. 34 footnote.

13. LWA, p. lix.


15. Ibid, p. 75.
Ingarden however maintains that the world if it exists at all, is not to be deduced from the essence of the operations of pure consciousness.
CONCLUSION

Ingarden's phenomenological problem is that of the objectivity of cognition, a particularly difficult problem when the distinction is added that nothing about the nature of object of cognition is to be asserted. According to such a postulate, we should not make a "judgement concerning the reality of transcendentally directed cognitive results." We are not to assert the qualities of the object of cognition. Ingarden thinks that Husserl, in order to avoid asserting anything about the qualities of the object, was forced to take up the problem of constitution.

Ingarden thinks that any cognitive act beginning with perception is a process of development through experienced time. Thus there is a corresponding change in the awareness of such experiences of time. The grasping of such experiences becomes possible only in subjectivity. In order to obtain inter-subjective cognition, we need a language. According to Ingarden, Husserl's opposition to the "objectivity" of scientific theories because of his claim that these theories can
never grasp being-in-itself, is untenable. For Husserl, according to Ingarden, never clarified the concept of objectivity. Husserl identified transcendental phenomenology with pure psychology. For Ingarden, therefore, phenomenology should strive for objective knowledge. Such objective knowledge does not merely concern itself with being-in-itself as correlated with consciousness, but also with not-being correlated-with-consciousness. It is in this sense that Ingarden assumes the notion of ideal concept in order to effect inter-subjective and, therefore, objective identity for the establishment of a common language between being-in-itself as correlated with consciousness and not-being as correlated with consciousness. Such a language maintains the transcendence of real objects as opposed to intentional ones. Hence Ingarden's critical phenomenology.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Roman Witold Ingarden (1893-1970) attended the classical gymnasium in Lwów (Lemberg) from 1903 to 1911 where he studied philosophy under Kazimierz Twardowski. He left for Göttingen in 1915 and studied philosophy under Husserl and later in 1916 in Freiburg where, with Husserl's guidance, he obtained his Ph.D. with a doctoral dissertation, Intuition und Intellekt bei Henri Bergson, in 1918.

Ingarden then taught in Polish schools for six years while keeping up a correspondence with Husserl. It was during these years that he wrote some of his important papers—"Über die Gefahr einer Petitio Principii in der Erkenntnistheorie" (1918-1919), "Can External Perception be Objective; If So How?" (1923), Essentiale Fragen (1924), Über die Stellung der Erkenntnistheorie im System der Philosophie (1925).

After writing his habilitation thesis, Essentiale Fragen, in 1924 Ingarden taught philosophy at Jana Kazimierza University in Lwów, and then during the war years he taught theory of literature until the Germans
closed the university in 1944. Ingarden's visits to Husserl and discussions with him during this period resulted in his decision to formulate on existential ontology as evidenced by his "Bemerkungen zum Problem Idealismus Realismus" (1929) and The Literary Work of Art (1931). Parallel to this development he carried on his research into the theory of knowledge. Following the publication of his paper on external perception in 1927, he wrote "Psycho-physiological Theories of Knowledge and their Critics" (1930), "Some Assumptions of Berkeley's Idealism" (1931).

Towards the end of the war Ingarden returned to Kraków where he was born and taught at Jagiellonian University where he completed writing his major philosophical treatise—The Controversy Over the Existence of the World. This work, as Ingarden says, is "a live thought on some basic problems of philosophy." The third volume of The Controversy Over the Existence of the World was written during the period 1950-1957 when he was not teaching. At the same time he translated Kant's Critique of Pure Reason into Polish. His writings after the War were by and large restricted to certain revisions of his bold creative ideas or applications of such ideas to larger studies in aesthetics and on philosophical
anthropology. His research on the foundations of the theory of knowledge was carried out before and during the war years. However, their publication was postponed in order to complete *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art* (1939). A good part of his unpublished materials are on the role of eidetic cognition in the theory of knowledge.

The early influence of Twardowski on Ingarden and the then prevailing concern of psychologism prepared the ground for Ingarden's own ideas on immanent perception even before he met Husserl in 1915. Meeting Husserl, however, was a decisive turning point in his life.

Ingarden retired from teaching philosophy in 1963. His scholarly life resulted in more than 200 publications beginning with a review he wrote on Husserl's *Logical Investigation* up to his last work--*Über die Verantwortung: Ihre Ontische Fundamente* in 1970. Ingarden left a large number of unpublished manuscripts at his death.

As Tatarkiewicz rightly observes in his obituary for Roman Ingarden, few philosophers--Plato, Hobbs, Kant--lived such a long and philosophically active life as Roman Ingarden did.
CZY I JAK MOŻNA WYKAZAĆ
OBJEKTYWNOŚĆ SPOSTRZEŻENIA
ZEWNĘTRZNEGO?

Roman Ingarden

I. Chcąc zbadać objektywność spostrzeżenia zewnętrznego, trzeba znać idee objektywności w ogóle. Da się wykazać, że idee te można poznać bez popełnienia petitio principii.

II. W akcie poznawczym (a przez taki rozumie tylko akt czystej świadomości) uzyskujemy poznanie objektywne, jeżeli całkowita treść aktu zgodna jest z temi własnościami przedmiotu poznania, których treść aktu się tyczy. Przez przedmiot poznania rozumiem przytem cokolwiek, co ma swój byt i swoje własności niezależnie od tego, czy jest celem domniemania aktu poznawczego, czy nie, a na co intencja tego ostatniego się zwraca.

III. Nie mogąc definiować spostrzeżenia zewnętrznego, podaje jego przykłady: widzę ten stół, słyszę wygłoszone przeze mnie słowa, wyczuwam, dotykając, szorstkość
materjału, wącham zapach róży, smakuję gorycz chininy.

IV. Momenty konstytutywne spostrzeżenia zewnętrznego:

1. Przedmiot spostrzeżenia (to, co jest dane przy spełnieniu aktu) dany jest w charakterze samoobecności i w nieprzesłonienej naoczności;

2. Pomiędzy aktem spostrzegania a jego przedmiotem zachodzi stosunek transcendencji, to znaczy:

(a) akt domniemywa coś, co nie jest częścią ani momentem aktu,

(b) akt jest wobec przedmiotu, „bezsilny” czyli nie jest zdolny wtargnąć tak w tok spraw świata zewnętrznego, jak to czyni jakikolwiek psycho-fizyczny czyn indywidualum psychicznego;

3. Przedmiot dany jest jako coś różnorodnego w stosunku do świadomości;

4. W akcje spostrzeżenia zawarte jest przeświadczenie o rzeczywistości jego przedmiotu, ten zaś dany jest jako rzeczywisty.—Rozróżnim przytęmem

(a) przedmiot, który spostrzegam, to znaczy ten, który ma swą naturę i własności (formalne i
materiałalne) niezawiśle od tego, czy go spostrzegam czy nie,
(b) przedmiot spostrzeżony jako taki,
(c)gląd przedmiotu, doznany przez podmiot w czasie spełniania aktu spostrzegania i
(d) akt spostrzegania.

W wyglądzie zaś należy odróżnić „daty wrażeniowe" od „ujęć".

V. Dla uniknięcia petitio principii należy przy badaniu objektywności spostrzeżenia zewnętrznego zneutralizować zawarte w akcie przeświadczenie o rzeczywistości przedmiotu i wyrugować z rozważań wszelkie założenia, stwierdzające lub Implikujące rzeczywiste istnienie przedmiotu spostrzeżenia zewnętrznego. Z tego powodu niemożliwem jest wykazać objektywność spostrzeżenia zewnętrznego za pomocą kryterium, które powiada, że spostrzeganie zewnętrznne jest objektywne, jeżeli w porównaniu treści aktu z cechami przedmiotu, który spostrzęgam, zostanie wykazane zachodzenie zgodności pomiędzy niemi. Przy zachowaniu podanej pod II. idei objektywności poznania pragnę podać odmienne kryterium, które pozwoli bez popełnienia petitio principii zbadać, czy spostrzeżenie
zewnętrzne jest objektywne.

VI. Ponieważ:

1. pomiędzy treścią aktu zawartością wyglądu a doborem cech przedmiotu spostrzeżonego zachodzą ściśle określone związki aprioryczne, mianowicie: pewne cechy przedmiotu spostrzeżonego są wówczas i tylko wówczas dane, jeżeli z jednej strony wygląd ma odpowiednią zawartość a z drugiej odpowiednio zbudowana jest treść aktu (por. t. zw., „zagadnienie konstytucji” u E. Husserla);

2. jeżeli spostrzegienie zewnętrzne ma być objektywne, to przedmiot spostrzeżony co do wszystkich swych cech (z wyjątkiem momentów, charakteryzujących go jako intencjonalny odpowiednik aktu) musi być identyczny z przedmiotem, który spostrzegam, co do jego natury i przynajmniej niektórych jego cech (wówczas bowiem istotnie takim spostrzegam przedmiot, jakim on jest sam dla siebie, czyli całkowita treść aktu zgodna jest przynajmniej z niektórymi cechami przedmiotu, który spostrzegam);

3. w razie zachodzenia tej identyczności elementy (natura, własności, formalna budowa) przedmiotu spostrzeżonego
musiałyby być w stosunku do aktu spostrzeżenia wzgl. podmiotu poznania (którego nie należy identyfikować z realnym indywidualnym psychicznym, wzgl. psychofizycznym!) samoistne, wszystko zaś, co jest wytworem aktu wzgl. podmiotu poznania, tej samoistności nie posiada;

więc:

warunkiem objektywności spostrzeżenia jest, by żaden element ni moment przedmiotu spostrzeżonego (z wyjątkiem momentów, przysługujących mu wskutek zachodzenia stosunku intencjonalnego pomiędzy aktem a przedmiotem) nie był wytworem aktu spostrzeżenia wzgl. podmiotu poznania.

Ponieważ zaś tak każdy wygląd jak i przynależna mu treść aktu jest rezultatem syntezy, dokonywającej się w przebiegu mnogości wyglaďów i aktów kolejno się modyfikujących (przy tem prymitywnym początkiem tej mnogości jest całkowicie bierne doznanie dat wrażenionych), od każdorazowego zaś rezultatu tej syntezy zależy—dzięki zaznaczonym wyżej związkom—, jakie elementy przedmiotu spostrzeżonego są dane, więc warunkiem na to, by te ostatnie nie były wytworem aktu, jest ażeby w mnogości aktów, których uprzednie i kolejne spełnienie jest warunkiem zaistnienia wyglądu i aktu spełnianego w momencie spostrzegania, a których syntezą jest ten ostatni, nie istniał ani jeden akt, którego treść nie byłaby wyłącznie rezultatem uświadomienia sobie
w czysto odbiorczej postawie doznanych dat wrażeniowych i związków pomiędzy niemi zachodzących. Jeżeli istniałby choć jeden taki akt, to w aktualnie doznanym wyglądie musiałby istnieć takie elementy (momenty), których istnienie nie jest w wystarczający sposób uwarunkowane przez daty wrażenia, ich współczesny i następczy porządek i ich czysto passywne przez podmiot poznania dokonane doznanie, lecz do których powstania musi się przyczynić jakąś akcją podmiotu poznania, mającą choćby część przyczyny poza doznaniem dat wrażeniowych i uświadomieniem sobie ich zawartości i porządku. Jeśli każdy taki element czy moment wyglądu nazwiemy domieszką subiektywną, to kryterium objektyności spostrzeżenia brzmi: Spostrzeżenie przedmiotu x jest objektynne, jeżeli w żadnym wyglądzie doznawanym przez podmiot poznania przy dokonywaniu spostrzeżenia przedmiotu x niema ani jednego elementu (momentu) będącego domieszką subiektywną.

VII. Należy zauważyć, że ani przy ustalaniu powyższego kryterium ani przy jego stosowaniu niema założenia faktycznego istnienia przedmiotu, który spostrzegam. Założone natomiast są idee poznania w ogóle, jego objektyności i idea przedmiotu poznania. Prócz tego założone jest istnienie czystej świadomości (w znaczeniu E. Husserla) i jej struktur
jakóż podmiotu poznania, a nadto możliwość imanentnego poznania czystej świadomości.

W dyskusji zabierali głos PP. Ajdukiewicz, Leśniewski, Kardasz, Witwicki, Garbowski i Referent.
APPENDIX II (B)
THE OBJECTIVITY OF EXTERNAL PERCEPTION—

CAN IT BE PROVED, IF SO, HOW?

Roman Ingarden

I. If the objectivity of external perception is to be examined, then the whole idea of objectivity must be known. Learning this idea, it can be shown, need not involve the error of petitio principii.

II. In the cognitive act (and here I mean only the act of pure consciousness) we obtain objective cognition when the whole content of the act coincides with those properties of the cognitive object to which the content of the cognitive act refers. The subject of cognition I understand as anything which has its own existence and its own properties regardless of whether it is the goal of the cognitive act or regardless of whether the intention of the cognitive act is directed to it.

III. Since I am not able to define external perception, I offer some examples: I can see this table; I can hear the words; I speak, when I touch, I feel the cloth;
I can smell a rose; I can taste the bitterness of quinine.

IV. Constitutive moments of external perception.

1. The object of perception (what results when the act of perception is fulfilled) is given under the aspect of self presence and in an unconcealed appearance.

2. A transcendence relation holds between the act of perception and the perceptual object. This means:
   
   (a) The perceptual act presupposes something which is not part of a moment of the act; and

   (b) the perceptual act is impotent with regard to the perceptual object. It cannot penetrate the matter of the external world in the way that any psycho-physical action of a psychic individual does.

3. The object is given as something which varies in relation to consciousness.

4. The perceptual act includes a conviction about the reality of the perceptual object which is given as real. I distinguish here:
(a) The object that I perceive which has its own nature and formal and material properties whether I perceive it or not;

(b) the object perceived as such;

(c) the appearance of the object as experienced by the subject while the perceptual act is being fulfilled; and

(d) the act of perception itself.

In the appearance we must distinguish between the "data of the impression" and the "grasping" of the impression.

V. If petētio principii is to be avoided in examining the objectivity of external perception, the connection about the reality of the object contained in the perceptive act must be neutralised and all assumptions asserting or implying the real existence of the object of external perception must be excluded. This is the reason why it is impossible to prove the objectivity of the external perception with the help of the criterion which says that external perception is objective if, when the content of the act is compared with the features of the object which I perceive, the agreement between them
can be shown while retaining the idea of the objectivity
of knowledge presented in section II of the cognitive idea
of objectivity, I want to propose another criterion which
will allow us to analyse without petitio principii
whether external perception is objective.

VI. Since:

1. Between the content of the act, the content of the
appearance, and the choice of features of the perceived
objects, there are closely defined apriori connections,
that is to say, some features of the perceived object
are given if and only if, on the one hand the appear-
ance has the proper content and on the other the
content of the act is properly constructed [compare
the so-called problem of constitution in E. Husserl];

2. If external perception is to be objective, then the
perceived object in all its features (with the excep-
tion of moments characterising it as intentional
counterparts of the act) must be identical with the
perceived object in its nature and with at least some
of its features. This is because I really perceive
the object as such, as it is for itself, and the total
content of the act agrees with at least some of the
features of the object that I perceive;
3. If this identity is found, then the elements of the perceived object, its nature, properties, and formal structure, would have to be autonomous in relation to the act of perception or to the subject of perception which must not be identified with a real psychic or psycho-physical individual, whereas everything which is created by the act of the subject of perception is not autonomous;

then:

the condition of the objectivity of perception is that no element or no moment of the perceived object (with the exception of moments belonging to it as a result of the intentional relation between the act and the object) would be a creation of the perceptual act or of the cognitive subject.

Every appearance and act content belonging to it is the result of a synthesis being performed in the course of the presentation of a multitude of appearances and the acts subsequently being modified. The given elements of the perceived object depend on every result of the synthesis because of the relations mentioned above. The elements of the perceived objects are not created by the act if in the multitude of acts—whose antecedent and subsequent fulfillments are the condition of the existence
of the appearance and fulfillment of the act at the moment of perceiving and whose synthesis is the latter—there would not be a single act whose content would be exclusively the result of realizing the data of impressions and connections between them in a purely receptive (passive) approach. If there was at least one such act, then in the appearance actually experienced there would have to be such elements or moments whose existence is not well enough conditioned by the data of impression and the contemporary and future order and the purely passive experience alone by the cognitive subject. An action of the subject of perception must contribute to the creation of that data of impression. The action must have at least a part of its cause outside the experience of the data of impression and outside realizing its content and order. If we call every such element or moment of appearance a subjective addition, then the criterion of objective perception is the following: the perception of object n is objective if in no appearance experienced by the subject of perception during the act of perception of the object there is a single element or moment being a subjective addition.

VII. It should be noted that in establishing the above criterion and in applying it, there is no assumption
that the perceived object actually exists. However, there are assumptions of the ideas of perception in general, of its objectiveness, and of the idea of the object of perception. In addition there are assumptions of the existence of pure consciousness (in Husserl's meaning) and of its structures as well as of the subject of perception. The possibility of immanent perception of pure consciousness is also assumed.
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and work on Ingarden, see Andrzej Poltawski, R.
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referred to in the thesis are arranged alphabetically
except for Ingarden's works which are arranged chrono-
logically in the order of composition, rather than in the
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ABBREVIATIONS FOR INGARDEN'S WORK

1. LH  "The Letter to Husserl About the VI
       [Logical] Investigation and 'Idealism'."

2. OEP "Can the Objectivity of External Perception
       be Proved? If So How?"

3. SESP "Über die Stellung der Erkenntnistheorie
       im System der Philosophie."

4. BIR "Bemerkungen zum Problem Idealismus-Rea-
       lismus."

5. LWA The Literary Work of Art.

6. LRP "L'essai logistique d'une refonte de la
       philosophie."

7. TIH "Über den Transcendentalen Idealismus bei
       E. Husserl."

8. OD O Dziele Literackim.

9. Spór Spór O istnienie Świata.

10. BFW Z Badań nad Filozofia Współczesna.

11. SEW "Der Streit Um Die Existenz Der Welt II/1."

12. TMB Time and Mode of Being.

13. SE Studia Estetyki.

14. BPO "Bemerkungen Zum Problem der Objectivität."

15. BTPI "Die Vier Begriffe der Transcendenz und
       das Problem des Idealismus in Husserl."

16. UPTP U Podstaw Teorii Poznania Cześć Pierwsza.
17. TJFP Z Teorii Języka I Filozofcz Nych Podstaw Logiki.

18. KB "Kritische Bemerkungen von Professor Dr. Roman Ingarden."


1a. GPP "Über die Gefahr einer Petitio Principii in der Erkenntnistheorie."
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In preparing this version of the Bibliography with English
translation we are motivated by two aims: to make available
references to original sources in Polish along with German and
translations in French and English; and to make available
references to works about Ingarden in these languages.

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rights reserved.
In Part I of the Bibliography - Works by Ingarden - we have included philosophical treatises, articles, critical essays, translations of philosophical works, reviews of books, and forwards to other works. These entries are arranged in chronological order under: 1) Polish original, 2) German original, 3) French translations, and 4) English translations. Appropriate English translations are inserted for entries in Polish.

In Part II - Works about Ingarden - books, articles, reviews written on Ingarden are arranged in alphabetical order with English translations for entries in Polish.

It is to be noted that The Philosophers Index, Bulletin Signaletique, and The Repertoire Bibliographique de Louvain do not provide full information on works by or on Ingarden. This Bibliography is therefore meant to provide adequate information for research purposes.

We would be grateful to receive additions and corrections for subsequent updating of the present bibliography.
PART I

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